BOLSHEVISM/ PAUL MILIUKOV LLD. BOLSHEVISM AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER ITS DOCTRINE AND ITS PRACTICE THROUGH WAR AND REVOLUTION PAUL MILIUKOV, LL.D. Author of " Russia and its Crisis " NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 1920 First published in 1920 (All rights reserved) PREFACE SOME time ago people who tried to prove to European public opinion that Russian Bolshevism was an im- minent danger to the whole of the world's civiliza- tion invariably met with the ready objection, that Bolshevism belonged entirely and exclusively to Russia, and that it was no concern of any other country. Since then reflection and experience have taught people better, and we now often find that the word " Bolshevism " is applied to purely European pheno- mena which have little to do with Russian Bolshevism. The truth is that Bolshevism has two aspects. One is international ; the other is genuinely Russian. The international aspect of Bolshevism is due to its origin in a very advanced European theory. Its purely Russian aspect is chiefly concerned with its practice, which is deeply rooted in Russian reality and, far from breaking with the " ancient regime," reasserts Russia's past in the present. As geological upheavals bring the lower strata of the earth to the surface as evidence of the early ages of our planet, so Russian Bolshevism, by discarding the thin upper social layer, has laid bare the uncultured and un- organized substratum of Russian historical life. That is why Mr. Lenin may be considered both as a sup- porter of the Revolutionary Syndicalism of Georges 6 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER Sorel, so far as his international face is concerned, and as an inheritor of the old tradition of the Russian Pugachevs, Razins, and Bolotnikovs the great social rebels of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. My object in this book is to study the international aspect of Bolshevism. A few months ago I planned a larger book, in which this subject was to enter as a first chapter, to be closely followed by the study of Russian Bolshevism from within, i.e. in its national aspect. Three more chapters were to be devoted to the study of anti-Bolshevist Russia, of the Russian borderlands, and of the relations between dismembered Russia and her former Allies. But now I see that it will take much more time and space than I expected to cover the whole ground. The first chapter has grown into a small book, while I was writing it, and I decided to publish it separately. The international aspect of Bolshevism has been, up to now, far less often treated as a whole than its purely Russian internal aspect. That is why this little work may fill a gap in the literature on Bolshevism until the appearance of a better and more elaborate exposition. It also proved not so difficult and inconvenient as it might seem to detach the international side of Bol- shevism from the Russian. In the first place, so far as its theory is concerned, Bolshevism is not Russian, but European, and international. This may not be uni- versally known, and the first part of the book is written in order to trace Bolshevism to its European source. Secondly, the Russian practice of Bolshevism did not enrich the European theory with any valuable positive data. Mr. Lenin's renowned " Decrees," as applied to Russian reality, were nothing but " scraps PREFACE 7 of paper," and the purely political triumph of Bol- shevism in Russia is no proof that its social teachings can be applied at all. The apparent progress of Bol- shevism can be only explained by the extraordinary favourable conditions created, first by war, and then by the Revolution. But these conditions are common to Russia with all European countries. That is why in the second part of the book Russia is treated only as a particularly favourable background for the inter- national development of Bolshevism. I trace this development through five consecutive stages. After a few unsuccessful attempts to graft the new Bolshevist start on the former (the " Second ") International Social-Democratic organization, the initiators of revo- lutionary communism try to find for it a new form, corresponding to their new doctrine. This is the " Third Internationale." After these first two stages of ideological incubation extremely favoured, how- ever, by war conditions and by German war tactics the Russian Revolution is the third stage of the Bolshevist progress, representing the first embodiment of the theory. I have had to explain just how and why an economically backward country has become a Promised Land of Revolutionary Socialism. I have found the explanation both in historical and national conditions, and in the uncertain and wavering attitude of Moderate Socialism, which is not a Russian, but an international feature. The next the fourth stage is that of the inverted action of Russian Bolshevism on the European Internation- alism. It first takes the form of an international mission of the Russian Revolution to finish the war by a " Democratic peace." This mission is accepted 8 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER by the Allied national Socialism on the condition of a decisive move of the Russian armies for final victory. At that stage the influence of the Russian Extremism is entirely dependent on the success of the Russian offensive of 1917. The offensive fails, and the Russian Soviet's scheme for an International Conference at Stockholm is simply shelved. The fifth stage is that of the Russian military collapse accompanied by the growing success of the Bolshevist propaganda in Ger- many. The Bolshevist Soviet's rule reveals itself on that occasion, not as an efficient experiment in Socialism, but as it really is a huge and powerful machine for the propaganda of the World Revolution. From the height of his Kremlin seat of power Lenin now convokes the Third Internationale, as a prelimin- ary measure to the conquest of the world. National Socialism replies by convoking the Congress at Berne of the " Second " Internationale. But the minutes of this Congress, with its uncertain psychology and wavering logic, clearly witness to the causes of the growing international danger of Bolshevist propaganda. Part III of the book undertakes to show what really has been done by Bolshevist propaganda to prepare the so-much-hoped-for World Revolution. People who are inclined to underrate the Bolshevist danger, or those who obstinately pretend that no reliable informa- tion is available on the subject, will be startled by the little selection of the first-hand evidence which even at present is sufficiently abundant not only to prove the general trend of the Bolshevist Internationalist activity, but also to draw a more or less detailed picture of the methods and results of this activity. Attempts to revolutionize Germany and Austro-Hungary, and PREFACE 9 thus to take possession of " the first link in the chain " of the World Revolution, are here related in the first place. Then follows a review of the Bolshevist pro- paganda in neutral countries their first stepping-stone to the World's Revolution. A short account of the Bolshevist connections and deeds in the Allied countries, in the colonies, and all the world over, completes the picture. Detached features and facts of that general outline are, of course, much better known at the places to which they refer. This or that particular detail may prove incorrect or untrue. New disclosures may throw much better light on the secret springs behind events. But all this can hardly alter the chief features of the picture drawn, or change its general meaning. At any rate, the first attempt to collect and co-ordinate the matter more or less known to every newspaper reader, and thus to corroborate the concordant evidence by showing its place in the whole, seemed to me worth trying, owing to the great importance of the subject and to the political necessity of drawing practical inferences in good time to prevent the worst. My personal views of Bolshevism are sufficiently clear, and need not be emphasized any further. But I trust that the impartial reader will find my exposition of facts unbiassed and unprejudiced by any personal view. The partisans of Bolshevism will hardly find the work done by their heroes minimized by me. But I also hope that their enemies will not find that I have purposely exaggerated the Bolshevist danger by paying too much attention to it. The best way to win the game is not to represent one's adversary as being too stupid, or too dishonest and selfish, or too weak and careless. I prefer to see my enemy at his best in order 10 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER the better to understand and the better to defeat him. One of the features of this book, which may provoke criticism, is my exposure of the part unconsciously or pusillanimously played in the temporary success of Bolshevism by their party opponents, the Moderate Socialists. I bear no grudge against such of them who really preserved their faith which they have in common with the Bolshevists. But such as understand that false inferences drawn by Bolshevism are to a great ex- tent due, not to the lack of logic, but to false premisses, which are to be reconsidered and I think that they are the great majority well, such people show the lack of moral courage and of mental sincerity, when, in their discussions with the Bolsheviks, they admit the obviously inadmissible starting-points, and shift the argument to the ground where they are easily beaten by the Bolshevists' outward consistency and unswerving logic. As long as this confusion of thought remains unchanged, their influence on the popular mind will be lost, and they will be doomed to fight demagogy with another demagogy less convincing and less emo- tional. While weakening themselves, they also weaken their natural allies among the Democratic and Radical parties, and they leave the decision with two political extremes : aimless Revolution and baseless Reaction. CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 5 PART I THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE OF BOLSHEVISM . 19-48 1. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOLSHEVIST DOCTRINE (1905-1914). . 19-33 Utopian and " scientific " elements in Marxism (19-20). Lenin's negative attitude towards immediate Socialist Revolu- tion in 1905 (20-21). The Revolution of 1905 gives a push to Socialistic Utopianism (21-22). A new start in France, by Georges Sorel (22). From " fatalism " of the " scientific " Marxism to the proletarian " freedom " (23). " Class " versus " party " (24). " Proletarian violence " versus Social Peace (25). " International Revolution " versus Nation and State (26-27). " Economic Organization " versus " Politi- cal Society " (27-28). New step forward by Lenin (28). The political role of the " conscious minority " (29-30). Syn- thesis of Syndicalism and Bolshevism : " government by minority" (30) ; Direct action versus Democracy (31). The weakness of Moderate Socialism and patched-up resolutions of 1904-1912 (31-33)- 2. THE PROMOTERS OF THE INTERNATIONALIST DOCTRINE IN THE WORLD WAR 33-48 The chance of National and International currents in Social- ism (33-34). Inconsistency of doctrine with tactics of " National Defence " (34-35). Three fallacies shared by National Socialists. " War unavoidable under Capitalism " (35). " Every Capitalist State Imperialistic " (36). The wrong use of " self-determination " principle (37). Inter- nationalists' scheme for a new offensive (the " Third Inter- national ") (38-39). Germany's use of Internationalist slogans (39-41). Internationalists gain by being employed as " agents " of trouble (41-42). The role of German Social Democracy (42-43). The " secret diplomatists " of Inter- nationalism (43). Parvus a typical " agent " (43-45). M. Parvus' ring (45-48). 11 12 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER PART II PAGE THE PROGRESS OF BOLSHEVISM THROUGH WAR AND REVOLUTION (1914-1919) 49-127 The five stages of progress (49-51). 1. THE ATTEMPTS TO USE THE " SECOND INTERNATIONAL " (1914-1915) 51-53 Attempts to convoke International Socialists to discuss peace conditions (51-52). A new start in Berne for the International " proletarian class war " (52). The passage to the second stage (53). 2. DOCTRINE OF THE " THIRD INTERNATIONAL " (ZIMMER- WALD-KlENTHAL) AND ITS SPREAD IN igi6 . . . 53~63 The composition of the Zimmerwald Congress (53-54). The Extremist doctrine formulated (55-56). Formal call to mutiny waived (56-57). More outspoken language used by the International Socialist Commission in Berne, and by the Kienthal Conference (57). The success of Revolutionary Socialism in Germany (58-59). Zimmerwald- ism in France (59-62). Zimmerwaldism in Great Britain under the cover of " Pacifism " (62-63). 3. THE FIRST VICTORY OF INTERNATIONAL EXTREMISM IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1917) 63-83 The two Revolutions : the National and the Defeatist in March and November, 1917 (63). Why Russia proved particularly receptive to the Extremist propaganda (63-64). Lenin's view on Russia's unpreparedness for Socialism (65). Preparedness for practical Anarchism and " Class War " ; lack of conscious Nationalism (65-66). War weariness and desertion (66). The war popular in its initial stage (66-67). Zimmerwaldism in Russia (67-68). The Tsar's blindness and the Duma's failure to enforce moderate concessions (68). Revolution unavoidable and uncon- trollable (68-69). The Duma's part in maintaining the " sacred national unity " for the first two months of Revolu- tion (69-70). The part of the " Soviet " and the Extremist anti-war propaganda (70-72). M. Goldenberg s crude alternative : Kail the Army (and the War), or Kill the (Ex- tremist) Revolution ? (72-73). The Soviet's new start in foreign politics (73-74). Ambiguous attitude of Allied Socialists (74-75). Allied Socialist Ministers' failure to treat with the Soviet (75-76). Their unconscious help to Extremist tendencies (76-77). Albert Thomas's effort to bring about the " coalition " Government under Kerensky's CONTENTS 18 PAGE guidance, conditional upon the army's new offensive (77-78). My personal attitude (78-79). A. Henderson's share in the Russian Revolution's failure (79). Russia ripe for Bol- shevism (79-80). Moderate Socialists' loss of popularity (80-82). Lenin's demagogy (82-83). Pure Zimmerwaldism wins the game (83). 4. INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON EUROPEAN INTERNATIONALISM, 1917 83-99 The failure of the Russian offensive makes the attitude of the Allied Moderate Socialists untenable (83-84). The chances of the " Democratic Peace " tested by the vicissitudes of the scheme for convoking the International Socialist Con- gress at Stockholm (84-85). German and neutral Socialists' part in the scheme (85-86). The Soviet's attempt under the Extremists' guidance to intercept the initiative (87-89). The " Third International " Conference, or the General Conference in Stockholm ? (89-90). The Allied Socialists' conditional consent (90-91). The Russian delegation to Stockholm in London and Paris (91-92). The Russian retreat of July, its explanation by General Denikin (92-93). The change of attitude toward the Russian delegation (93-94). The Stockholm Conference shelved (94-96). The recrudescence of " militarism " in Berlin and Paris (96-99). 5. THE BOLSHEVIST COLLAPSE IN WAR AND TRIUMPH IN PROPA- GANDA, 1917-1919 99-127 No illusions as to the immediate results (99-100). " Direct action " aim by itself (100-101). Tactics of reckless bluff (101). Negotiations a means of propaganda (101-102). Trotsky's astonishment at German realistic " impudence " (103). Confident appeal to the " peoples " (103-104). Cre- dulity as to the success of the coming Revolution in Germany (105-106). " Neither peace nor war " tactics (106). Bol- shevist pamphlets in German trenches (107-108). The Soviet rule as a means of propaganda of a general conflagration (108-109). Germany's apparent success (109-110). The pro- gress of Bolshevist propaganda in Germany (110-112). The German collapse (112). " The universal Revolution in sight ' ' (112-113). "Soviets" or "The League of Nations": Lenin or Wilson ? (113-114). The " Holy Alliance," or .... the Prinkipo proposal ? (114-115). Prinkipo to be used for propaganda (115-116). Lenin's " sound strategy " to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy (117). Lenin's invitation to the First Congress of the Thinl International (118-119). A review of the Bol- shevist parties in the world (119-120). Their programme (120-121). The Congress of the Second International at 14 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER PAGE Berne on February 3-8, 1919 (121). Hjalmar Branting's resolution (121-123). Concessions to Bolshevism in other drafts of Resolutions (123-124). The pro-Bolshevist opposi- tion at the Congress (124-125). The vote pro and contra Bran ting (125). The International danger of Bolshevism increased by that vacillation (125-127). PART III BOLSHEVISM OUT FOR A WORLD REVOLUTION (1918 ) 128-294 The existence of an organized conspiracy for a World Revolu- tion (128-131). 1. THE " FIRST LINK IN THE CHAIN " GERMANY AND CENTRAL EUROPE 131-147 M. Joffe's propaganda in Berlin (131-134). M. Joffe's legacy (134). Bolshevik's alliance with Liebknecht against Scheidemann, as represented by Radek's mission (134-138). Their part in the January rising (138-139). Pre- paration for the Third Revolution (139-140). The Bol- sheviks on the Rhine (140-141), and in other provinces of Germany (141). The part played by Bolsheviks in the March rising in Berlin (141-143). The Bolsheviks in Munich (143-144). The part played by Russian prisoners (145). The Bolsheviks' failure in Germany (146-147). 2. THE BOLSHEVIST SCHEME FOR FEEDING AND CONQUERING GERMANY 147-159 The grain fund for the World Revolution (147-148). The Red Army (148-149). The scheme for the Revolutionary spring offensive (149-150). Preparations in East Prussia (150-151). Germans help Bolsheviks in occupied provinces of Russia (151-152). The tactics of the German Government (153- 155). Negotiations with the Ukraine (155). Bolshevist propaganda in Poland (155-156). Bolsheviks and German public opinion (156-158). The wavering policy of the Allies and the part played by Kolchak and Denikin's offensive in the failure of the Bolshevist spring military action (158-159). 3. THE BOLSHEVIKS IN HUNGARY AND IN GERMAN AUSTRIA . 160-177 A Revolution backed by national feeling (159-160). The influence of the,Belgrade Armistice and of the Peace Confer- ence Policy (160-162) Count Karolyi in touch with the CONTENTS 15 PAGE Bolsheviks (162-163). The false Red Cross Delegates and the Hungarian prisoners of war (164-165). The Bol- shevist bloodless victory in Budapest (165-166). Wireless communications with Lenin (166-167). The Treaty between Bela Kun and Lenin (168-169). Self-confidence enhanced by General Smuts' mission (169). Hungarian Bolsheviks' counter-proposals (169-170). A start for the World Revolu- tion (170-171). The moment of despondency (171-172). Bolshevism in the Austro-German Republic (172-173). Riot- ing in Vienna (173-174). A temporary success in Slovakia (175). Lenin's reliance on his methods (176). Forged banknotes (177). 4. THE BOLSHEVIST PROPAGANDA IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES . 178-189 The meeting of the Third International on March 2-5, 1919, in Moscow (178-179). A Socialist mission to Russia (179- 180). The Moscow Conference an answer to it (180-181). Bolshevist preparation for world propaganda (181-182). Neutral countries the first stepping-stone (182-183). The Russian Bolshevist mission in Switzerland (183-184). Mr. Vorovsky's activity in Sweden (184-186). Bolsheviks in Norway (186). In Denmark (187). In Holland (187-188). The part played by Russian Red Cross institutions in Bol- shevist propaganda (188-189). 5. BOLSHEVIST CONNECTIONS AND AIMS IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES 189-243 The Russian aim of the Bolshevist propaganda : " Hands- off Russia " (189-191). The German aim : mitigating the Peace Treaty conditions (191-192). A larger circle of propa- ganda (192-193). Two measures of judgment (193-194). The narrower circle of properly Bolshevist organized action (194). The Revolutionary Great Britain (194-195). Bol- shevist pamphlets and manifestoes reach England (195-197). British Socialist organizations endorse " Communism " (197-200). The self-confident stage of the movement (200- 202). " Direct (industrial) Action " versus " Parliamentary (political) Action " (202-204). Mr. A. Henderson's com- promise (204-206). The more consistent attitude of the pro- Bolsheviks (206). Bolshevist influences in the British industrial unrest (206-207). The Glasgow agitators (207-208). Programmes of the Clyde Workers' Committee and the Sparta- cist Union compared (208-212). Appeals to violence (212- 213). The Parliamentary Committee's opposition to Ex- tremism (213-214). Labour leaders' wavering attitude (214- 215). The " Triple Alliance " at work (215-216). The Southport resolutions (216-219). The Trade Unions' Con- gress at Glasgow (219-221). Vorvi&rts on the results of the 16 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER PAGE British Extremist movement (221-222). Bolshevism in France (222). The elements of difference from Eng- land (222-223). The elements of similarity (223-224). Albert Thomas and Bolshevism (224-225). France and Internationalism (226-227). The Lucerne Congress (227- 229). Extremism victorious (229). The International strike of July 21 (229-231). The failure explained by Jouhaux (231-233). The Syndicalist Congress at Lyon (233-235). Extremist elements in the Syndicalist resolu- tion (235-237). Bolshevism in Italy checked by National- ism (237-238). Attempts at strikes defeated (238-240). The November General Elections in France, Belgium, and Italy (240-243). 6. THE BOLSHEVIST PROPAGANDA OUTSIDE EUROPE. . . 243-294 The Bolshevist propaganda in Non-European languages (243-244). The Bolshevist propaganda in Ireland (244-245). Connections with Germany and with the British Extremists (245-247). The " Soviets " for Ireland (247). Govern- ment's action (247-248). The Extremist propaganda in India (248-249). German connections (249). Bolshe- vist agents in India (250). A correspondence between Petrograd and Delhi (250-251). Road to India kept open (252). Who is "professor" Baranatulla ? (253). Nego- tiations with Afghanistan (253-255). Preparations for the last refuge of Bolshevism in China or in Turkestan (255-258). Extremist influences in the Egyptian unrest (259-260). The Bolsheviks in South Africa (260-261). In Australia (261-262). Bolshevist " literature " for America (263). Bolshevist " aliens " in Canada (263- 265). Resolutions of the Calgary Conference (265-266). Attempts at general strikes in Winnipeg, Toronto, etc. (266-268). Opposition of soldiers and citizens (268). Strong action by the Government (268-269). Bol- shevism in the United States (269). Pro-German and Pacifist propaganda before the war (269-270). Revolu- tionary Socialism victorious at the St. Louis Convention (270-271). The part of aliens (271-272). Trotsky's per- sonal influence (272-273). American " commissaries " sail for Russia (273). Their part in Bolshevist adminis- tration (273-275). Raymond Robins' Bolshevist secretary (275-276). Robins favours the " World Revolution " : his excuse (276). Ambassador Francis, Colonel Thompson, Captain Sadoul influenced by Robins (277-278). President Wilson's message to the Bolshevist Congress and the " slap in the face " (278). Bolshevist agitators sail for America: Gumberg, Reinstein, John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams (279- 281). The success of the Bolshevist propaganda (281-282). Co-operation with Anarchists : the bomb plots (282-283). CONTENTS 17 Connections with I.W.W. (283). " I.W.W.'s " pro- gramme of Revolution (283-285). Revolutionary elements in the Labour movement (285). America's peculiarity (286). Failure of the Industrial Conference makes trade-unionism join the National Strike movement (286 287). The miners' strike as differentiated from the steel strike (287-288). The Government's firm stand (288-289). Raid on Extremist organizations and disclosures on the " Union of Russian Workers " (289-290). The Russian manifesto planning a Bolshevist Revolution (290-291). Measures against the aliens (291). Deadlock in negotia- tions with Labour (292). National Socialism, trade- unionism (293). Farmers as anti-Bolshevist agents (293- 294)- CONCLUSION. Lenin's prophesies (295). Will the Russian Revolu- tion fail ? (295-296). Will the " World Revolution " succeed ? (296). International danger of Bolshevism diminishing ; its catchwords still alive (296-297). " Non- intervention " movement consistently Bolshevistic (297-298). EPILOGUE. A new wave of Bolshevism in Europe as a result of changed policy toward Russia (299-300). The Third International meets in Amsterdam (300-301). The Strassburg Con- ference's attempt at a reconstruction on a larger basis (302). Last symptoms (303). PART I i. THE ORIGIN OF THE BOLSHEVIST DOCTRINE (1905-1914). IT is a moot question whether Bolshevism and its European counterpart, " Revolutionary Syndicalism," can be called Socialism at all. Mr. Lenin, in his very first speech after returning to Revolutionary Russia through Germany in the famous " sealed railway carriage " (April 1917), exhorted his followers to throw away Socialism as " dirty linen," and to unfold the banner of " Communism." It comes practically to the same thing when Georges Sorel classifies his " Revolutionary " Syndicalism, not as a breach with Marxian Socialism, but rather as a return to the true, the initial reading of Karl :Marx's doctrine. The distinction between " Revolutionary " and " Reformist " Socialism exists in Marxism itself, and it develops into a patent contradiction in its history. While the Marxism of 1848 is predominantly Revolu- tionary and Utopian, its application to the Parlia- mentary life of German Social Democracy is essentially reformist and scientific. Marx's followers had to choose between the Utopian " Communist Manifesto " of 1847 19 20 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER and the Reformist " Erfurt Programme " of 1891, between Karl Marx and Ferdinand Lassalle. 1 The majority of the party at the Hanover Congress of 1899 chose the reformist reading, and thus the largest Socialist party of the world, under a constitutional regime, although a very imperfect one, took the line of peaceful Parliamentary work for social reform, while relegating " social revolution " to some obscure future, as nothing but its final goal, there- by renouncing the Revolutionary tactics of a direct " class war." Russian Social Democracy, confined under Tsarism to a few conspirative circles of intellectuals and some intelligent workmen, and led by political refugees from abroad, could not possibly go that way. Party leaders had no choice between Parliamentary work there being no Parliament under the Autocracy and social revolution, which they thought Russia was not ripe for. Unwillingly they had to accept the especi- ally Russian watchword of " political revolution," as a preliminary and unavoidable condition to any further social struggle. Lenin himself, at the time of the first Russian Revolution in 1905, had written the following lines in a leaflet entitled Two Tactics : " The low degree of economic development in Russia, as well as the low degree of the conscious class organization of the workman, i.e. both objective and subjective agents, do not permit in any way of an immediate and complete liberation of the working class. One must be quite 1 The practical proposals of the " Erfurt Programme," which are not revolutionary but reformist, were first formulated in the " Chemnitz/' " Eisenach," and " Gotha " programmes in 1866, 1869, and 1875, chiefly under the influence of the followers of Ferdinand Lassalle. THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 21 ignorant in order not to see that the democratic over- throw which is being achieved under our eyes presents a bourgeois character. One must possess a most naive optimism in order to forget just how little the working masses are informed as to the aims and methods of Socialism. Therefore, so long as the working class lacks a conscious organization, so long as it does not possess the necessary education to carry on the class struggle against the bourgeoisie, there can be no question about a socialist revolution." In full contradiction to this remarkable statement, now so completely forgotten, that very Revolution of 1905 gave a strong push to Socialistic Utopianism. The " dictatorship of the proletariat," organized into " Soviets," had already been tried in the autumn of 1905 by the same leaders, Parvus and Trotsky, who repeated the experiment, under better conditions, in 1917. They were responsible for the failure of the first Revolution, which collapsed as soon as " class war " and " social revolution " were substituted for political and bourgeois revolution, the only possibly types according even to the view of Lenin. That the autocracy has not surrendered since 1905, and that a kind of sham constitutionalism existed between 1905 and 1917, thus paving the way for the second Revolu- tion, we owe to the Bolsheviks of 1905. They bore that name even then. It means " those in the majority," because at the Congress of the " Russian Democratic Social Party," held in London in 1903, this group had outvoted the others on a question of tactics and in- ternal organization. Their ultimate aim then was the same as it is now. Economically backward Russia, brought to a state of effervescence by an unsuccessful 22 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER war of 1904, was to be used as fuel for a universal conflagration in countries better prepared to experi- ment in Socialism. It is particularly noticeable after 1905 that Revolu- tionary and Utopian tendencies revived also in Inter- national Socialism. And it is neither half-autocratic Russia, nor the country of Junkerdom Germany but the accomplished democracy of France, which serves as a basis for a new and bolder start. The spirit of the new movement is best characterized by the titles of the two leading productions of its chief spokesman, Georges Sorel : Reflections on Violence ' (first published in Mouvement Socialiste at the beginning of 1906), and The Illusions of Progress. Despair of Democracy, despair of Science : such are the pessi- mistic backgrounds upon which a new generation in France was weaving the tangled web of their political super-optimism. No positivism of the older genera- tion of Taine and Renan. No belief in rationalism and intellectualism. Les Mefaits des Intellectuels is the title of the book of Sorel's colleague, Eduard Berth. Oh, the " little " science la petite science which " feigns to attain the truth by attaining the lucidity of exposi- tion " and shirks the " obscurities." Let us go back to the darkness of the subconscious, the psychological source of every inspiration ; back to the integral phil- osophy of Bergson, the new maitre (who disdainfully disclaims the honour of having served as a teacher of Syndicalism) ; back to the " myth " of the general strike. One is tempted to say : " Back to the famous formula : Credo, quia absurdum." The practical aim and result of this protest against 1 London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 23 " rationalism," in the name of the " integral intuition," is to shift the ground from theory to practice, from scientific law to conscious volition. " Syndicalism," says Eduard Berth (Mouvement Socialiste, 1907), " transfers the idea of catastrophe from the pole of fatalism to the opposite pole of the workmen's freedom. Its principal object is to rouse the proletariat from passiveness to activity." " Direct action " is thus substituted for a slow development of a Socialist over- throw in the future. The " myth " of a general strike is the immediate aim of such direct action, and it is quite unnecessary nay, even dangerous to go beyond that aim and " to argue learnedly about the future." " We are not obliged to indulge in lofty reflections about philosophy, history, or enonomics," Sorel says. " A general strike is indeed the myth in which Socialism is wholly comprised, i.e. a body of images capable of invoking instinctively all the sentiments which corre- spond to the different manifestations of the Socialist war against modern society. Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the noblest, deepest, and most moving sentiments that they possess. We thus obtain the intuition of Socialism such as no language can give us with perfect clearness, and we obtain it as a whole, it is perceived instantaneously." From this point of view an " inspiring struggle " for the struggle's sake is an aim in itself, says Pouget (Le Parti du Travail) : " Revolution is a work of all moments, of to-day as well as of to-morrow : it is a continuous action, an every day fight without truce or delay against the powers of aggression and extortion." Such a direct action, affirms Lagardelle (1906), demonstrating the conscious- ness and the will of workmen, is " self-sufficient " ; it 24 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER demonstrates " the beginning and the end of Syndi- calism." This is where Revolutionary Syndicalism differen- tiates itself from Socialism. " Socialism, like any other party organism," M. Lagardelle goes on to say, " touches the workman only as an elector, as a member of the political society mixed together with citizens belonging to other classes. On the contrary, the class organization considers him exclusively in his quality of working man as a member of the economic society, i.e. at the moment of his dissociation from all other classes and his opposition to them. Party and class thus find themselves at opposite points of view, and their tactics can only be antagonistic." Of the two notions, " class " is a natural combination, while " party " is artificial and intellectual, whether it be " Radical," " Socialist," or " Labour." Here it is also that Revolutionary Syndicalism ab- jures the basic idea of Democracy : the political equality of all members of human society held under common obligation to adapt their individual benefits to the interests of the whole. " The working class," M. Lagardelle writes, " makes use of political Democracy only the better to destroy it." It does not recognize any other law or obligation but the law of " class war." Says M. Merrheim (Mouvement Socialiste, February 1910) : " Syndicalism does not confine itself to any legal boundaries ; it would contradict its very substance if it did. It breaks through every barrier, legal or illegal, which would stem its tide. Moreover, it does this not by fits and starts, not through mediation, but every day." There is only one thing which may indeed retard this rapid course toward the unknown, to the THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 25 " mythic " Social Revolution. This is readiness on the part of the " middle classes " to yield and to make peace, combined with readiness to negotiate on the part of the " working class aristocracy," their acknow- ledged leaders. This is the only issue that Georges Sorel is particularly afraid of, as it is likely to soften the warlike spirit of the working class, and thus to post- pone their victory in the struggle. " To repay with black ingratitude the benevolence of those who would _ protect the worker, to meet with insults the speeches of those who advocate human fraternity, and to reply by blows at the advocates of those who would propagate social peace all this is assuredly not in conformity with the rules of fashionable Socialism . . . but it is a very practical method of showing the bourgeois that they must mind their own business." The " Re- formists " of Socialism and of Syndicalism were coming to the conclusion that Marx's prediction about the widening chasm between the " expropriators " and the " expropriated " did not correspond to reality, which consisted rather in the " blunting " of social contra- dictions, thus verging towards social peace. But just here Revolutionary Syndicalism steps in. " Marx thought," Sorel goes on to say, " that the bourgeoisie need not be excited by the use of force. Now we are in the presence of a new and unforeseen fact : a bourgeoisie which tries to attenuate the force it possesses. Shall we believe that the Marxist conception is dead ? By no means, because proletarian violence appears on the stage at the very time when attempts are being made to mitigate conflicts by social peace. The proletarian violence hedges the employers within their role of pro- ducers, and thus tries to restore the structure of classes 26 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER which were going to mix themselves in the democratic bog. Violence gives back to the proletariat their natural weapon of the class struggle, by means of frightening the bourgeoisie and " profiting by the bourgeois dastardness (la Idchete bourgeoise) in order to impose on them the will of the proletariat." Before we proceed further it is very important to state that this point of view is substantially international. In order to fight out their class war successfully, the working class must rid itself not only from party obli- gations and from solidarity with Democracy, but also from all pledges to Nation and State. " For a Revolu- tionary Syndicalist," says M. Brouilhet (Le Conflict des Doctrines), " the idea of native country is not necessary. It seems rather artificial, and does not correspond to his interests. On the contrary, it associates groups whose interests are conflicting, and it directs that loosely connected aggregate, called patriotism, against classes, whose interests are identical." The Enquete of the Mouvement Socialiste into the idea of " fatherland " in 1905 gave the result foreshadowing the attitude taken by the internationalist currents of Socialism ten years later. " The Workmen's Fatherland," M. T. Bled says, " is their class ; their internationalism knows no boundaries. Capitalism is for them the only enemy to fight with." M. Bousquet says : " All wars are the work of capitalists, and serve their interests." " The only legitimate war," in M. Challaye's opinion, " is the revolt of all proletarians against all capitalists." And M. Lagardelle draws from his Enquete the conclu- sion that " anti-militarist and anti-patriotic proga- ganda has no other meaning but the destruction of State. Its aim is to unsettle the army and to destroy THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 27 the fatherland, because the institution of the army and the idea of fatherland help to maintain the existence of the State." This sentence, preceding by ten years Zimmerwald and Kienthal, is quite seriously meant. " The Syndicalists," affirms M. Lagardelle, " fight the State for the same reason as they fight the employers : both are joint forces which play into the hands of each other. The destruction of State is a preliminary con- dition to the truimph of the proletariat." Revolutionary Syndicalism verges here into Anarchism. And, indeed, genuine Anarchists have tried to represent Syndicalists as " Anarchists who are unconscious of themselves " (les Anarchistes qui s'ignorent). The whole current is sometimes classified as " Anarcho-syndical- ism." This is, however, quite wrong, and the Italian Syndicalist, Labriola, was right in stating that the Syndicalists' anti-Statehood is very different to the Anarchists'. "The first strives to transfer the authority of the State to the Syndicate it is thus for discipline and organization ; while the Anarchist's anti-Statehood abolishes all authority and repudiates every kind of government." One might add that as the destruction of the State was supposed to follow the advent of the " mythical " general strike, it was relegated to the obscure sphere of the future where no predictions were to be attempted, and towards which an attitude of mere class enthusiasm was to be fomented among the masses. Every time that Lagardelle or Berth try to elucidate this question, they fall back upon old Proud- honian formulas and demonstrate that they are not quite clear on the subject themselves. Says Lagardelle, while protesting against Rousseau's political atomism and equality fiction : " The existence of the State is 28 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER possible only as long as it bases itself on the fiction of general ' citizenship ' and throws into the shade the difference between working men, capitalists, landed proprietors, etc. The State will disappear the very day when it will no more represent general interest as opposed to the interests of individuals. Should political parties be composed exclusively of workmen, capitalists, and agriculturists, and should they pursue their material aims alone, without minding such general tasks which political society is expected to solve, the State machinery thus left to work in the vacuum will run down by itself." Economic organization will take the place of political society, and it will take the form of a federation of autonomous syndicates and professional unions. An important change in this attitude toward the State has since taken place. With the advent of Mr. Lenin's millennium in Russia, the obscure transitional stage from the general strike to the Social Revolution was filled up with new " inspiring " images much more in harmony with the " violence " theory. Of course, Mr. Lenin, too, is sure of the final destruction of the State institutions. But meantime he is quite determined to use them for " the dictatorship of the proletariat." A few weeks before his triumph in Petrograd Mr. Lenin wrote his leaflet entitled : Shall the Bolsheviks remain in Power ? Here he bluntly states his attitude toward the State. Of course, he says, we preached the destruction of the State as long as it was in possession of our enemies. But why should we do it after having ourselves taken the helm ? The State is, indeed, an organized rule by a minority . . . of privileged classes. Let us in our turn THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 29 substitute our minority for theirs, and let us run the machinery ! Here we come to the central point of the tactics of Revolutionary Syndicalism. It was called the tactics of " impatience." In order for this tactics to be efficient it was not enough to rid the class from its obligations towards party, nation, and State. It was quite consistent and necessary to rid the " impatient " ones within the class itself of the inertia of its passive members. For direct action to become possible, a minority within the minority was to be organized, namely, the " conscious minority " in the midst of the unconscious throng. Says Lagardelle : " Direct action presupposes an active interference by a daring minority. The mass, unwieldy and clumsy as it is, must not here speak out its mind in order to start the struggle, as happens in Democracy. Figures do not make law, and numbers do not rule. A select group (une elite) is formed, and owing to its qualities it allures the masses and directs them on the path of combat." ' The most conscious and brave lead . . . the mass, seeing their action, instinctively follows." According to M. Pouget (1907), the " conscious minority " is even obliged to act, if it is unwilling to surrender its demands and its strivings to the inertia of the mass, which revels in the state of economic slavery. The minority, con- scious of its aim, acts without heeding the amorphous or the refractory mass ; as opposed to Democracy, which through the machinery of universal suffrage gives the lead to the unconscious and lazy, or rather to their elected representatives, thus stifling the minority which looks to the future. This method is fully justified by the attitude of the masses themselves 30 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER Says Brouilhet (Les Conflicts) : " The masses expect to be treated with violence, and not to be persuaded. They always obediently follow when a single man or a clique shows the way. Such is the law of collec- tive psychology." One might suggest that it is not the best way to educate the masses in political conscious- ness, and that the " law of collective psychology " is here used in the same manner as in Macchiavelli's theory or in the practice of Autocracy. But Revolu- tionary Syndicalism does not shirk the comparison. Its political romanticism, its excursions in the sphere of the subconscious, its repudiation of democratic principles, its hero-worship in short, all its psychology it shares in common with the opposite, the reactionary pole of that generation of French writers and politicians. The observation has been more than once made, that over the head of Democracy Syndicalism stretches forth its hand to Royalism. Sorel and Berth, indeed, fight the same enemy as Charles Maurras, and very often they use the same weapon. Government by minority : This is the last word of Syndicalism which it has in common with Bolshevism, not only in theory, but also in practice. That is why there exists such a strong undercurrent of sympathy with the Bolshevist experiment in Russia amongst all partisans of a direct social revolution the world over. The negative side of the Revolutionary Syndi- calist doctrine, its repudiation of Democracy, is also common to Bolshevism. Both are against Parliamen- tary action, against universal suffrage, against every- thing which provides for equal rights to every " citizen," and thus, quite consistently, against guarantees of political freedom for all. Under the regime of class THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 31 war there can exist no rules of clemency and humanity, not even such minima as are established by the Hague Conventions. No mediation or arbitration is possible between relentless foes the international proletariat, and its " coward " enemy, the " capitalist." No com- pact is admissible even with those " traitors " among the Socialists who wish to join hands with " political Democracy." It must be pointed out that we do not meet with the same state of mind on the side of Moderate Socialism. Far from denouncing the extreme tendencies ol Revolu- tionary Syndicalism, Moderate Syndicalists and Socia- lists, the " Reformists," always tried to keep in contact with the Extremists while preserving their own atti- tude of " political action." As a result of this, at every clash of opinion, the Revolutionary Syndicalists always won in the debates, while their opponents with difficulty carried patched-up conciliatory resolutions in Socialist Congresses. The tactics of " direct action " were approved by a great majority of 825 against 369 at the Syndicalist (C.G.T.). Congress at Bourges (1904). At the next Congress at Amiens (1906), in compliance with the demands of the Revolutionaries, such as Merrheim, the Syndicalist tactics were proclaimed independent from party discipline : Syndicalists were left free to carry on a "a ceaseless fight against every legality, every power, and all enemy forces," while the party was kindly permitted to " strive for social reform." The Socialist Congress at Limoges, two weeks after the Amiens decision, under Jaures' influence, endorsed this decision by admitting a " combined action " of both Syndicalists and politicians, as equally necessary for fully enfranchising the working class. It "invited the' 82 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER militants to do their best to dissipate all misunderstanding between the C.G.T. (Confederation Generate du Travail) and the Socialist party." In vain Guesde tried to prove (next year, 1907, at the Congress of Nancy) how artificial and contradictory this decision was. In vain he at- tempted again and again to subordinate Syndicalist tactics to those of the Socialist party. The " disease of unity," to use Herve's expression, again had the upper hand, and a new conciliatory resolution by Jaures was carried .by an insignificant majority. The debate was reopened at Toulouse in 1908, the question being discussed thoroughly. But the resolution was the same : all differences of opinion, important as they were, were drowned in the benevolent utterances of Jaures' concluding speech. The conciliation achieved was merely that of phrase and style. Every practical issue discussed at the Nismes Congress of 1910, at the St.Quentin Congress of 1911, or at the Lyons Congress of 1912, repeatedly revealed the incompatibility of the two tendencies within the party. The Syndicalist Congress of 1912 reaffirmed the decision of Amiens and severely criticized the " salon Socialism," while pointing out the difference between true proletarians and intellectuals belonging to the Bar and the engineering professions. Moderate Socialism even then persisted in its con- ciliatory attitude. " Why does this tyrannic minority lead the Socialist party in the way it is not willing to go ? " M. Fourniere asks in his book on The Socialist Crisis (1908), and he gave a scathing answer. " All of us, beginning with extreme Anarchists and ending with genuine Parliamentary Socialists, drag along the same chain, the chain of fear, lest we should appear not so advanced as people who lead. Pale and dis- THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 33 concerted, we all press forward in a state of revolu tionary panic which would be ridiculous were not the abyss so close. How shall we keep clear of it when the tail carries the head with it ? " It is very interesting to remark that this was in 1911 the opinion of M. Albert Thomas, the prominent Reformist Syndicalist, who has since played such an important part in organiz- ing the munition work of his country. " The party has not the courage," says he, " explicitly to oppose ideas to ideas, tactics to tactics, doctrine to doctrine : it sticks to ' unanimity formulas,' which, owing to their fatally uncertain character, can have neither the value nor the fecundity of a rule of action." We shall see later on that Albert Thomas himself succumbed to the same deficiency of Moderate Socialism. 2. THE PROMOTERS OF THE INTERNATIONALIST DOCTRINE IN THE WORLD WAR. The World War thus found the World Socialism in a state of confusion and helplessness. It looked, though, as if war in itself might bring about a stoppage on the edge of the " abyss." Had not Sorel himself in his book On Violence foreseen that a great war might stiffen the energy of the bourgeoisie, and bring to power men possessing the will to govern ? On the other hand, was it not more likely that a war of exhaustion would give a new chance for a revival of anti-militarist and anti-patriotic propaganda, having the avowed aim of dissolving the army, ruining the " fatherland," dis- carding the State institutions, and thus helping enor- mously towards some attempts on a larger scale at a proletarian upheaval ? 34 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER Both hopes and fears have been realized. The bracing influence of war, as well as its relaxing influence, have proved equally efficient ; the former chiefly at the beginning of the war, the latter, unhappily, as the end approached, and particularly after the Armistice. The issue between Reformist and Revolutionary Socialism and Syndicalism has, accordingly, remained unsettled. It is being waged to-day. But one con- clusion at least might be drawn from the new experiences of war-time : that of the incompatibility of national and patriotic tendencies of Socialist thought and tactics with international class war strivings. Whether the lesson has been really learnt, I dare not say. I mean, of course, learnt by the national side, because on the international side the incompatibility of class war and social revolution with " political Democracy " and Moderate Socialism always has served as a starting- point for further argument and action. And even now, while the Reformist and National Socialists were very slow to admit the criminality of the tactics of the Internationalist Extremists, the latter have not wavered a moment in proclaiming the Reformists and Nationalists " traitors " to the proletarian cause. The attitude on both sides has remained the same as at pre-war Congresses : conciliatory and evasive on the part of the Moderates, militant and self-reliant on the part of the Extremists. We need not dwell long upon the activity of the Socialists who made " sacred union " with the bourgeois parties. Everybody knows how important their con- tribution was, both in material and moral prepara- tion, for the allied victory. But it is equally im- portant to point out that their doctrine was and THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 35 remained inconsistent with their new tactics of " national defence." Even now and perhaps now less than ever they have not found the " courage " to oppose " ideas to ideas, tactics to tactics, doctrine to doctrine." Practically they stuck to many internationalist doctrines on which, quite consistently, their opponents have based their Extremist tactics. That is why, strong as their national policy was, they have always been powerless to reconcile it with their own international theory. That is also why they were gradually losing their hold over the masses, while their opponents were gaining ground. One cannot lead if he does not know whither he goes. I must particularly mention three leading ideas which have helped the Extremists to gain the lead while they perplexed the Moderates and threw them off the scent. The first is that wars are unavoidable in a world of capitalist production, and they can only be stopped by the international victory of Socialism. 1 The second idea is that all capitalist societies are 1 This point is often mentioned in the resolutions of patriotic Socialists. E.g., that is how the Allied Socialists who met in London in February 1916 expressed this idea in their reso- lution. " The conference does not fail to recognize the exist- ence of general and deep causes of the European conflict, which is a monstrous product of antagonisms that rend asunder the capitalist society, and of a policy of aggressive colonialism and imperialism, which International Socialism has never ceased to combat, and for which all Governments bear their portion of responsibility." ..." Remaining true to the principles of the International," they expressed their hope that soon the proletarians of all countries, recognizing the identity of their fundamental interests, will find themselves united against capitalist militarism and imperialism. The manifesto of the first National Congress of the French Socialist party during the war (December 29, 1915) declares : " The Socialist party knows that as long as the iniquity of capitalism lasts . . . the dangers of war will co-exist with capitalism." 86 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER imperialistic, i.e. they strive for annexations. The third is that the " self-determination " principle must be given free play for all " oppressed " nationalities. There is a good deal of truth in all these ideas, but not one of them can be accepted without strong reserva- tions. Capitalism is an international factor working not for, but against military conflicts. If there is truth in Mr. Norman Angell's assertions, that war in modern times is useless and futile, because " conquest (extension of territory) is not necessary for the welfare of an expanding people in the modern world," it is chiefly based on the growing international influence of the world's industrialism. Not capitalism in itself, but the exclusively " national " system of capitalist production is dangerous, and if carried to extremes is likely to become incompatible with the peace of the world. But this is just the case in Germany, a newly industrialized state which has preserved its mediaeval militarist tradition. This is, of course, " imperialism " in the offensive sense of the word. But it is too far- fetched to draw the inference that every " capitalistic " Government is bound to be " imperialistic." For an Internationalist Socialist this inference is important, because he directly draws from it a further conclusion : that " peoples " which are supposed to be generally Pacifist must " impose their will " upon the " Govern- ments " which are generally accused of being " imperial- istic " and " Never Endians " (jusqu'au-boutistes). To be sure, under Democracy " Governments " represent " peoples," and particularly so in the state of war ; the German " people " as represented by its Social Democracy has backed even its semi-autocratic Govern- ment, which was doubtless " imperialistic." But an THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 87 Internationalist Socialist of the Entente pretends not to make war on the " German people " ; he only fights the German " Government," while he also preserves the right, which is also his duty, of fighting his own Government for being "imperialistic." 1 The " self-determination " principle, if applied in its larger and more general sense, may, of course, apparently justify such a universal use of the term " imperialism." Great Britain may well accept as its slogan Imperium et libertas. And Russia may claim not to be " im- perialistic " at all, but self-sufficient within her immense space of one-sixth of the world's surface. Neither one nor the other may ask for annexations. Never- theless, both Great Britain and Russia possess some " oppressed " nationalities " annexed " many centuries ago. Such is the law of the growth in any large state. Well, this is sufficient for them to be declared " im- perialistic," and for " oppressed " nationalities, such as Ireland, Egypt, India, the Baltic Provinces, Ukraine, Georgia, to be taught to ask for " dis- annexation." This is a state of mind or, rather, the state of doc- trine which was bound to bring patriotic and national Socialists into trouble, while depriving them of any firm basis in their quarrel with the Internationalists. 1 Cf. the declaration of the Parliamentary Socialist Group in France on the occasion of the vote of war credits, on June 15, 1917 : " The Socialist party affirms that it considers it to be its right and even its direct duty to seek, with the Socialists of other countries, for the means of bringing the governed to impose their will on the governors, to use Mr. Wilson's ex- pression." Cf. the Daily News of January 29, 1918 : " The people of Germany, like every other peaceful people, are the victims of a system which places the control of mankind in the hands of military castes." 88 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER The latter only were consistent with their common doctrine, while opposing the idea of the solidarity of classes to that of the solidarity of the nation, in war time. The tactics of August 4, 1914, were certainly inconsistent with this international doctrine of Socialism. That is why Mr. Lenin's argument was irrefutable, when, quite a year and a half before the Bolshevist victory in Russia, he was speaking in his customary style on the subject of the French and other national Socialists : and he said, " Not only capitalists are lying, but also people like Renaudel, Sembat, Longuet (Longuet, too !), Scheidemann, Hynd- man, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co. Powerless diplo- matists, they greatly injure the workmen's movement by their defence of a fiction of unity, because thus they impede the necessary union between the opposition groups in all countries, in order to create the Third Inter- nationale." * The immediate aim of Bolshevism is here quite clearly stated. The " Second International " was to be proclaimed dissolved and non-existent, because of the " treason " of national Socialists, who voted war credits in all belligerent countries, thus forsaking the ground of International Socialism. Instead of that " Second International," the headquarters of which had been transferred during the war from Brussels to the Hague, a new " International " was to be created, which should include only the revolutionary minorities of International Socialism, excluding the Parliamentary and Reformist majorities. " One must start a move- 1 N. Lenin. On the task of the opposition in France. A letter to Comrade Sarafoff, published on February 10, 1916. THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 39 ment," says the Bulletin of the Socialist International Committee, created in Berne for this very purpose, " which will have strength enough to eliminate at once the leading social-patriotic organizations. ... A new International can only be built on the basis of the unfaltering principles of Revolutionary Socialism. The allies of Governments, Ministers, domesticated Deputies, advocates of Imperialism, agents of capitalist diplomacy, grave-diggers of the Second International, cannot take part in its creation." It was here that Germany saw her chance. Among the documents published by the " Committee on Public Information " in Washington there is one which is worth remembering : * CIRCULAR. February 13, 1915. PRESS DIVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BERLIN, TO ALL AMBASSADORS, MINISTERS AND CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. You are hereby advised that in the country to which you are accredited special offices are to be established for the organi- zation of propaganda in the countries of the Powers which are in a state of war with Germany. The propaganda will be con- nected with the stirring up of social unrest and strikes resulting therefrom ; of revolutionary outbreaks ; of separatism among the component parts of the States ; of civil war ; and will also comprise agitation in favour of disarmament and the discon- 1 The German Bolshevik Conspiracy, War Information Series, No. 20, October 1918. Signed by the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, Chairman. The document quoted is published in the Appendix I, under the heading " Documents circulated by the anti-Bolsheviks in Russia." These documents were sent from Petrograd to the Volunteer Army Staff in Novocherkassk in December 1917. 40 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER tinuance of the war butchery. You are requested to co-operate and to favour in every way the managers of the said offices. These persons will present to you proper credentials. (Signed) BARTHELM. The whole set of these documents was declared to be a forgery, for reasons which may be conclusive only for some of them. But even if they were all forgeries, the document quoted is only a good abstract of what is generally known from other sources. Archibald's papers presented to Parliament are known to every- body. I personally heard of such an office as is men- tioned in the document quoted from a Russian revolu- tionary, who, when he had made his appearance in it (in Stockholm), had been asked whether he came from Mr. Lenin, and following upon his embarrassed answer, it had been proposed as a test that he should blow up a railway bridge or smuggle arms into Finland for a remuneration of some thousand roubles. The Russian Intelligence Office had quite a dossier of such informa- tion regarding the Bolshevik leaders, and the Bolsheviks' first concern during all the Bolshevist risings in Petro- grad was to take possession of it and to destroy the docu- ments. But a portion of this information was published with the consent of the Provisional Government during the first Bolshevik rising in July, and I know from an absolutely reliable source that a part of the documents published in the appendix of the American leaflet also comes from the Government offices. So far as the quoted statement of the aims of German propaganda and its destruction policy in war-time is concerned, we find full confirmation of it in another document published in the French Yellow Book and dated Berlin, March 19, 1913. Under Point II, " Aims and THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 41 Duties of our National Policy," in case of a continental war, the German report, received " from a trustworthy source," says : " There need be no anxiety about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle that. On the other hand, disturbances must be stirred up in N. Africa and in Russia. This is a means for absorbing forces of the enemy. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well-chosen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco [in 1917 the Report might rather mention Turkey and the Caucasus] in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of a European War. ... A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact. Unfortunately, the rela- tions established then have not been sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to resort to preparations of this sort in order rapidly to bring the campaign to an end. Risings in time of war created by political agents require careful preparation by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of means of communication. They should be directed by those to be found amongst influential religious, or political chiefs." When the long-looked-for and " carefully-prepared " war finally broke out in the following year, " political chiefs " had been found amongst the Russian refugees of the " Defeatist " type, while " well-chosen agents " among the German Social Democracy had done what they could in order to secure " influential people " in neutral and, if possible, even in the enemy countries. There is no doubt that " material means " have been spent in profusion. It is unnecessary to say that not 42 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER every " head " or " chief " was to be bought by money ; but when aims coincided and lines of action ran parallel, why not use all means to come as soon as possible to the universal outbreak which will destroy even such " capitalists " as were shortsighted enough to help their enemies with money ? The point is that, owing to these tactics of supporting extremists in enemy countries the demarcation line between Parliamentary and Revolutionary Socialism, which, as we have seen already, has not been very distinctly drawn in doctrine, was bound to be finally obliterated in a search for internal enemies in conflicting States. French and British Moderate Socialists used to send congratulations to German Spartacists, while German " Majority " Socialists, through the inter- mediacy of neutrals, encouraged French and British Defeatists, Bourderons and Marrheims, Lansburys and Morels. 1 Of course, it is chiefly German Social Democracy which is especially responsible for fanning into flame the extreme internationalist doctrine, for giving it a new body and setting astir its spirit. German Social Democracy was also rent in twain by two opposite cur- rents. One was ready to support the State in every war, on the principle, " My country, right or wrong." The other ready to oppose the State also in every war, on the principle of the " class war " against all " capitalist " Governments. There were between the two extremes the same intermediate shades of opinion : one ready 1 George Lansbury wrote in the then Daily Herald : " To make our protest effective the working men on whom transport and communication depends ought to oppose its use ; they must strike against war ! " I find this quotation in Larkin's book on National Socialism. THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 43 to support the State in a defensive war, the other ready to fight it in an aggressive war. In order to decide whether the war was aggressive or defensive intermin- able discussions were also carried on regarding the responsibility for the origin of the war and about war aims, " Imperialistic " or otherwise (Schuldfrage and Kriegsziele). But so far as propaganda in enemy countries was concerned, every difference of opinion disappeared. Noske, together with Liebknecht, was carrying on propaganda amongst the workmen in Brussels, while Bernstein, according to his own avowal, was helping Scheidemann, Sudekum, and Richard Fisher " to create sentiments favourable to Germany amongst the Socialists of neutral countries." These exertions, supported by " material means," proved very successful. Quite a number of neutral Socialists have made themselves commis-voyageurs or rather " secret diplomatists " of extreme Internationalism in their dealings with public opinion within the Entente Powers. Such were, e.g., the Swiss Socialists, Greulich, Flatten, Robert Grimm, the Italian Morgari, the Dane Borgbjerg, the Bulgar- Rumanian Rakovsky, and, in a less offensive way, the Dutch Troelstra, etc. A particularly instruc- tive case is that of the Russian, Parvus, if not the initiator, in any case the best and most efficient promoter of Russian Bolshevism. Who is Parvus, or, as his real name is, Alexander Helfant ? Let me answer by quoting a page by a thorough connoisseur of the Bolshevist " secret diplomacy," the Swiss Socialist Grumbach. " A Russian by birth, he had to leave his country as a revolutionary a long time ago. In Prussia he belonged to Social Democracy, and proved so radical that the Prussian Government exiled him as an undesirable 44 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER alien. He fled to Munich, the German Capua, but he did not remain there. Turkey attracts him. After the Young Turk Revolution, he emerges in Constanti- nople. He is at home in the Ministry of Finance, and he also is at home in the harem. He frequently con- tributed to Tanin, the organ of the Young Turks, and he acts as correspondent at the Bosphorus for the German Social Democratic Press, in order to defend the Young Turkish regime. The war breaks out, and Parvus' activity becomes marvellous. He buys grain, he sells grain. He writes articles always for the ' sacred cause ' of Europe, which he finds well served, because it is the German armies which defend it. ' Turkey must fight on the side of Germany, for Euro- pean civilization and for Russian freedom.' That is what he says and writes. ' Bulgaria must fight on the side of Turkey and Germany for European civiliza- tion and for Russian freedom.' That is what he is never tired of repeating. He goes to Sofia, he makes a great speech wherein he asks Bulgarian Socialists to recognize that Germany is a champion of Right. The Socialists of Sofia, although they are Bulgarian patriots, find his argument strange, but they keep silent. Our man goes farther, to other countries, to Germany, to Prussia. The formerly ' undesirable alien,' exiled from the hospitable soil of Prussia, has now got into favour in Berlin. Supreme authorities appreciate very much the new feathers of this bird of passage with whose doings they are well acquainted. They recognize in these small, wily eyes and flat nose of the new Young Turk, formerly Russian (Jew), coming from Stambul in a halo of highest introductions, a glare of the pure patriotism of a Prussian neophyte ; and all THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 45 doors open themselves before Parvus all doors, and perhaps a certain number of hands (pockets) into which this beneficent genius pours his gifts, to the great pleasure of such as receive and also to the great satis- faction of the Treasury. He who had had nothing, now possesses, as a Prussian citizen, a fortune of one million. 1 He buys houses in Berlin for himself and for his satellites, he founds periodicals in order theoretically to justify militarist Socialism and to make propaganda for German Messianism, and he pays well he pays very well. Men of mark who, before the war, enjoyed an undis- puted reputation as untractable Social Democrats, Heinrich Cunow, the late editor of Vorwdrts, Conrad Hanisch, a most sympathetic man and a member of the Prussian Diet, Dr. Paul Lensch, formerly editor of the Leipziger Volkszeitung, and a member of the Reichstag, all receive fixed salaries for regu- larly expressing their views in Parvus' organ, the Bell (Die Glocke}. Heilmann, the prominent braillard, formerly chief editor of the Chemnitzer Volksstimme, is put at the head of the International Correspondence just acquired by Parvus. Along with them some gentlemen of less importance and some distinguished nonentities enter into the same ring of Parvus.' But the patron himself, who commands and supplies funds, only rarely condescends to write articles. How could he find time for it? He travels too often to Switzerland, to Denmark, to Sweden, to Norway, and, in order to do it with more comfort, he has flats in Copenhagen, in Stockholm, in Constantinople, and in Berlin. In some 1 At a later date (July 30, 1919) Mr. Bourtsev's newspaper La Cause Commune communicated that Parvus' savings, con- fiscated at the Copenhagen banks, amount to five million crowns. 46 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER cities he possesses automobiles. All owned by a man who before the war had nothing. Nowadays he writes, he receives, he speaks for the Governments of Turkey, of Germany, of Bulgaria. He creates connections everywhere ; he carries on a coal business with Danish and Norwegian syndicates." Mr. Grumbach might add that Parvus has very cleverly entangled the whole Danish Social Democracy in his profiteering coal busi- ness. He knew from the German Government the exact moment when the blockade was to be enforced and English coal was to disappear from the market. He got permission, equivalent to a monopoly, to import, in advance, a great quantity of German coal, and thus, with a capital of 25,000 crowns, during one year and a half he made net profits for his shareholders (of whom he was the most important) amounting to 1,900,000 crowns. Parvus also carried on business with Russia, through the intermediary of his agent in Stockholm, Ganetsky-Furstenberg, and under cover of business transactions he subsidized his Russian friends with money. At the same time in the Bell he pro- pagated Imperialistic Socialism, while in Russia he helped to promote Revolutionary Extremism. Mr. Grumbach mentions a conversation he had had with Lenin, in order to show that this side of Parvus' activity was no mystery to the Bolshevist leader. When one day Grumbach told Lenin that Parvus intended to visit him at Berne, Lenin grinned maliciously and said : " Let the scoundrel come, and I'll throw him downstairs." Very little time passed, and the " scoundrel " became a " comrade," who was sent by the Central Committee of the German Social Democrats to congratulate the Bolshevist delegation in Stockholm THE INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE 47 with the full success of Parvus' propaganda. On November 17, 1917, the delegation, composed of " scoundrels " of the same type (Karl Radek, popu- larly called " Kradek," i.e. the " thief," Ganetsky and Orlowsky), announced in its official organ that " Com- rade Parvus conveyed to them the greetings of the German Social Democrat Majority, which declares its solidarity with the Russian proletariat in its demands for a direct armistice and immediate peace negotiations on the basis of democratic peace without annexations and indemnities." German Social Democrats, indeed, had good reasons to rejoice. The great success of Revolutionary Ex- tremism in Petrograd has crowned their two years' exertions. It is true that the German Moderate Majority, while greeting the Russian Spartacists, forgot the French proverb, " tel qui rit vendredi, dimanche pleurera." " I recollect," Mr. Grumbach says, " a discussion I had one day with Lenin, on the probability of a revolu- tion in Germany. Lenin had told me that he /irmly believed in a revolution in Germany, if only revolution could be first victorious in Russia." Of the two, Lenin and Scheidemann, it was Lenin who was right. What had been meant initially by Germans to be nothing but a ruse de guerre against the Entente has since become a very effective means for bringing about the international conflagration. Of course, this result has been achieved, not owing to some intrinsic value of the mischievous doctrine, used as an explosive, but chiefly owing to the exceptional state of mind of the European nations, produced by a protracted war. The only people who really knew what they were driving at were Mr. Lenin's partisans. They used 48 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER the war-time psychology of masses, conflicting Govern- ments' and peoples' enmities, the inconsistencies of Moderate Socialists, and last, but not least, the " scoundrels " espionage and secret diplomatists' unrelenting activity for their own unvarying purpose of spreading Bolshevism all over Europe. PART II THE PROGRESS OF BOLSHEVISM THROUGH WAR AND REVOLUTION I CANNOT tell the long story in detail here, but it is important to bear in mind at least the general out- lines of it, in order that the connection of events might not be forgotten too soon. The first step consisted in preparatory attempts to use the whole of International Socialism against such national fractions of it as had contracted a " sacred union " or burgfrieden with the bourgeois parties and Governments. When this attempt failed, the second step was immediately set in motion. It was to detach " revolutionary " fractions of Inter- national Socialism from patriotic " majorities," to connect them together, to work out their common doctrine and tactics, based on the general weariness of the masses, and, finally, to use their growing disaffection for revolutionary experiments in " Communist " Social- ism. The third step was reached as soon as one of these attempts had succeeded at the point of least resistance, which was Russia. Its chief aim and meaning was to transform the national revolution which broke out against the Tsarist Autocracy into a social revolution against the bourgeois and " capitalist " classes. With German help and with a kind of half-conscious con- 4 *9 50 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER nivance of Moderate Socialism, this aim has also been attained. Then a fourth step followed which consisted in an attempt to substitute civil war amongst the classes for international war in the trenches. At least two countries, Russia and Germany, were to be implicated, in order that this attempt might succeed and that inter- national strikes might be stopped. But in Germany social revolution was late in coming, and it was Russia alone that had meantime to suffer from the consequences of her military breakdown in the trenches and the internal social war. The fifth step was taken after the Armistice. It consisted in an attempt to use the Bolshevist dictatorship of the proletariat on a larger scale as a fuel to kindle a similar fire amongst the peoples of both Central Empires and the Entente Powers indiscriminately. Whether this will be the last and the least successful step of the Bolshevist scheme, or the first one in some new series of coming events, it is impossible to foresee and useless to foretell. But for anyone who wishes clearly to trace consecutive events, it is necessary to keep firmly in mind their development by way of the five stages mentioned. They may be classified as follows : (1) The disruption of the Second " Inter- national " ; (2) The Zimmerwald-Kienthal doctrine as a basis for the Third, the " revolutionary " Inter- national ; (3) The Bolshevist advent in Russia ; (4) Brest-Litovsk a temporary eclipse of Bol- shevist schemes for Europe ; and (5) A renewed Bolshevist attack on the hour- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 51 geoisie and democracy in Europe, through the inter- mediary of European " Spartacists." The international aspect of Bolshevism can be clearly seen in this connection. It is necessary to write a book in order to collect the overwhelming evidence which may be adduced as a proof of the statements made. Lacking the space, I may be permitted to give a few hints and illustrations as to the chief points of the whole story. i. THE ATTEMPTS TO USE THE " SECOND INTERNATIONAL " (1914-15). It begins, in 1914, with a series of unsuccessful attempts, backed by the German Social Democrats, to organize a meeting of Socialist representatives of all countries, in order to discuss the question of peace, on the basis of the status quo (all these attempts are posterior to the battle of the Marne). The Italian and Swiss Socialists, Turati and Greulich, were first to formulate a proposal to this effect at their Congress, at Lugano, on September 22, 1914. The Dutch Socialist, Troelstra, succeeded in moving the International Socialist Bureau to Amsterdam, in place of Brussels, and the reorganized Bureau, with the full approval of the German Government, proposed to convoke an International Socialist Congress at the Hague. The French Adminis- trative Committee of the party refused to attend ; the Independent Labour Party nominated Mr. A. Henderson as its representative. The Congress did not meet. At that time a meeting of Revolutionary Syndicalists in France proposed to remove the centre 52 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER of the Syndicalist International from Berlin to Berne (" as Germany might object to the choice of a purely Latin centre " Geneva is meant). The President of this centre, Legien, proposed to summon an Inter- national Congress of Syndicalists in Amsterdam. This time it was the turn of the English Syndicalists to refuse. In January 1915 the Internationalists scored a partial success. A conference of neutral Socialists met on January I2th in Copenhagen ; English and French Socialists were also asked to come, but not the Belgians, who were reputed to be irrevocably national. There was a tinge of international extremism in the resolutions voted by this Congress, so far as general statements were concerned, but no decisions on tactics were taken. A new tournee by the Italian Morgari (May 1915) to Berne, Paris, and London was again a failure, with the exception that the existence of Ex- tremist minorities was proved in France and Belgium. After an equally unsuccessful attempt by the Swiss party administration to convoke, not a Congress, but a meeting of the International Socialist Bureau repre- sentative of all countries, the Swiss tried to summon a Conference in Zurich for May 3oth. The greater maj ority of Socialist parties invited did not reply at all or sent negative answers. Then a new start was made by the Central Committee of the Italian party, which, on May 15, 1915, decided to address itself exclusively to such groups and parties as were likely to adopt the views of extreme internationalism, namely to " oppose the policy of internal peace and to promote a combined and simultaneous movement of the Socialists of different countries against the war, on the basis of the proletarian class war." A preliminary meeting of the initiators, PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 53 held in Berne on July nth, determined more precisely the aims and the methods to be approved by the pro- posed Conference. The Labour Leader endorsed the opinion of this particular group, and thus has marked for England the passage from the first stage of the Extremist propaganda to the second. " We should prefer by far to see the old International reconstituted," the organ of the Independent Labour Party says on August 12, 1915 ; " but if it is impossible, we agree with the Italian comrades that direct efforts must be tried in order to build a new International representing neutral parties and anti-war Socialists of belligerent countries." This, indeed, had been attempted on September 5-8, 1915, at Zimmerwald (a Swiss village near Berne), and which was nearly achieved half a year later, on April 27-30, 1916, at Kienthal (another Swiss village). The initiators had good reason to conceal their conferences from a too close observation by Governments and public opinion, and they purposely avoided meeting in larger centres. They attained their aim. The mysterious names of Zimmerwald and Kienthal have since become slogans of Extremist revolutionary pro- paganda the world over, modest and insignificant as the beginning had been. 2. DOCTRINE OF THE " THIRD INTERNATIONAL " AND ITS SPREAD IN 1916. Only the Italian and Rumanian Socialist parties were officially represented at Zimmerwald. The Independent Labour Party as well as the British Socialist party accepted the invitation, but were prevented from attend- ing by the Government, which refused passports to 54 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER Messrs. Jowett and Bruce Glasier. The Swiss party permitted its members to be present personally, but only later, at the Congress of Aarau, identified itself with the decisions taken at Zimmerwald. The French, German, and Belgian Majority Socialists were not even asked to participate, " owing to their present attitude." Individual French and German Socialists were present : the former without the permission, the latter with the permission of their Governments. They even published, while at the Congress, a joint declaration, in order to state publicly that " this war was not their war." The renowned formula of a " peace without annexations on the basis of self-determination of peoples " first made its appearance in this declaration. But the chief feature of the Zimmerwald Conference was the pre- dominance in it of Eastern-European Socialists : Russians, Poles, Letts, Rumanians, and Bulgarians. These were also the elements representing the " left wing " of Zimmerwald. Such notorious Bolsheviks as Lenin, Rakovsky, Ganetsky, and Radek were among the chief promoters of the Zimmerwald resolutions, along with Martov (Zederbaum), P. Axelrod, Chernov, and Lapinsky. They did not succeed, however, in inducing the Conference straightway to accept in its whole purport their revolutionary doctrine. The amendments of the extreme wing were rejected, on the ground that the new tactics proposed had not been put on the programme and previously discussed ; while their acceptance by the Conference might disrupt internationalist elements which otherwise would cling together. But even the statements made unanimously by the Conference were sufficient to stamp its resolu- tions as extremist and revolutionary, and to differentiate PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 55 its members not only from " Socialist patriots," but even from the so-called " centre " (Kautsky, Haase, and the group of " Arbeitsgemeinschaft " in Germany all of them belonging to the " Minority," as well as Longuet and Pressemane in France). The " right wing " of the Zimmerwald Conference, in fact, did gravitate to this " centre," but it was overawed by the exponents of extreme tendencies. The three salient points in the " Zimmerwald Mani- festo " are as follows : 1. The responsibility for the war is not to be thrown upon Germany, but upon the ruling forces of the capitalist society in whose hands the destinies of peoples have rested monarchical as well as republican Governments, secret diplomacy, powerful combines of employers, bourgeois parties, capitalist Press, Churches all these agents bear the full burden of responsibility for this war, which has originated in the social order preserved by them and nourishing them, and which is being now carried on in their interests. 2. The war aims : not national victory, but the struggle for " Socialism," for peace without annexations and contributions, which is possible only on the condition of the repudiation of all desire for violating the rights and liberties of peoples. (Then follows the formula of the declaration isued by the French and German members of the Conference.) 3. The aim of the Conference is not only to bring about peace, but in view of the intolerable situation (created by the suspension of the class war by the Socialist patriots, who not only vote war credits, but take part in the Governments' propaganda amongst the neutrals, and even become " hostages of national unity," as Ministers in War Cabinets), we who have put our- 56 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER selves not on the ground of national solidarity with the class of employers, but on the ground of the international solidarity of the proletariat and of class war, met in order to re-establish international bonds torn asunder, and to call the working class to recollect their duty towards themselves. . . . Proletarians ! At the beginning of the war we gave our working power, our courage, our endurance to the service of the ruling classes. Now we must begin a struggle for our own cause, for the sacred aim of Socialism, for the liberation of oppressed peoples and enslaved classes by means of an uncompromising proletarian class war. . What remained, then, for the " left wing " to sub- scribe to more than that ? The Russians, the Poles, and " comrade " Radek wished the manifesto to state in a more outspoken way that no real peace was possible unless the very basis of the social structure is changed, and that one must accordingly " attack the very foundations of society " without waiting any longer for the results of the " imperialistic stage " to develop in full. ' The struggle for peace must simultaneously be a revolutionary struggle against capitalism." Owing to the indecision of the more judicious section of the Conference, the formal call to mutiny was omitted from the text of the manifesto ; but it still remained there so far as the spirit of the manifesto is concerned. The members of the Conference did not wish, for the same reason, to make a show of organizing a new International ; but they left behind them a nucleus of the new organization, the " International Socialist Com- mission at Berne," whose President was to be the notori- ous Robert Grimm, a man who knew how to combine " extremely Radical declarations with an entirely opportunist practice." As, for the time being, " ex- tremely Radical declarations " were all that were wanted for the Extremist propaganda, Grimm was the right PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 57 man, particularly if led by one of the Oriental throng, the " Italian " of Russian descent, Angelica Balabanova. The I.S.C. at Berne has complete! everything that was missed by Lenin in Zimmerwald, while speaking always in the name of the " second Zimmerwald Con- ference " at Kienthal which was even more mysterious than the first one. The amendment of the first Con- ference was expanded into the glowing appeal of May i, 1916, to the " conquest of political power and abro- gation of private property by the working class " as the " only means to prevent war in future," and to the struggle by " all means at their disposal " for " immediate peace without annexations." The resolution of the Kienthal Conference declared that all demands of the " bourgeois or Socialist pacifism," such as limitation of armaments, obligatory arbitration, and even the building up of " small nations " into States, are nothing but " new illusions," and that the only " durable " peace can be attained by the Socialist upheaval. Moreover, the Kienthal Conference or the I.S.C. at Berne in its name declared the former Executive Committee of the I.S.B. at the Hague guilty of " National Socialism," and put it under the close supervision of the " organizations which joined the I.S.C. at Berne." For these a special " discipline " was proclaimed necessary, which put them " above all other party duties." " The nationalist sections of the internationalist proletariat who have forgotten their supreme duty, by this very fact, set free their members from every obligation towards them." Here was the " Third International " in a nutshell. Its doctrine and the nucleus of its organization were 58 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER now ready. It was the time to put its propaganda in hand and for its practical application. There is no doubt that during 1916 a great success was scored by that propaganda in all the countries of Europe. Curiously enough, this success was particularly obvious and strong in the very country which tried to use Revolutionary Socialism as a war weapon, i.e. Germany. As a sequel to the Kienthal decisions typewritten letters, composed by different authors, but signed by the same pseudonym of " Spartacus " (especially ascribed to Liebknecht), began to be secretly circulated within a carefully chosen circle of confidential correspondents. They were chiefly directed, not against the " Socialist patriots," but against the more Radical group which formed the " right wing " at Zimmerwald, the so-called " centre." Such attacks quite coincide with Lenin's advice in his memorandum to the Swiss Party (end 1916). Lenin qualifies there the conciliatory attitude of Kautsky and Haase, and even of the seven- teen Extreme members of the Reichstag, as being an " obstacle to the Revolutionary Social Democracy," " which ties their hands, impedes the free display of their action, and thus discourages the masses by a lack of consistency between principles and practice." At that very time the question had been raised in the Reichstag and in the country about the coming split between Parliamentary and Revolutionary Social- ism, and the " central " elements were thwarting the decision. The split was finally achieved in January 1917, owing to the aggressive attitude of the Majority Socialists, who ejected from the party such members and local organizations as agreed with the resolutions of a Minority Conference of January 7th, held in Berlin. PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 59 The new Minority Conference at Gotha, April 6-8, had decided to organize a new " Independent S.D. Party." The " Spartacus " group took part in it, while the other Extremist section, the " International Social- ists," remained outside. The influence of the Russian Revolution on the organization and activity of the new party is quite obvious. Its popularity among the masses may be inferred from the fact that while the membership of the old party decreased in the six months following the creation of the new party from 243,061 to 150,000, the numbers of the paying members of the Independent Party amounted at the same date (Sep- tember 1917) to 120,000. Serious attempts at propagating the Zimmerwald- Kienthal doctrine and tactics were also made in the Entente countries. Here also they have not achieved the complete victory of revolutionary extremism, but they have strengthened extreme tendencies, and thus have made necessary a move to the left in the general attitude of the parties. Bourderon one of the two French representatives at Zimmerwald on his return to France, proceeded to ask the Seine Federation to recall Socialist Ministers from the Cabinet, to dissolve the " sacred union," to refuse war credits, and to blame the Parliamentary fraction and the administrative organ of the party for their tactics. Then M. Longuet, the leader of the Minority, who, too, had visited Switzer- land and had seen Bernstein and Kautsky, declared that " without Internationalism there can be no Social- ism," and demanded the re-establishment of relations with all sections of the International, including German Social Democracy. The number of mandates to the National Congress received by the representatives of 60 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER the three currents of French Socialism represented in figures their comparative strength : Mandates. Votes. Majority (Renaudel) .. .. 26 6,121 Minority (Longuet) . . . . 16 3,826 Extremists (Bourderon) . . . . 2 545 At the Congress, in order to prevent disunion, the Majority had to accept a conciliatory formula (Renaudel- Longuet), which was then carried by an overwhelming majority ; but the Minority was not satisfied with the concessions given. The opposition to the initial attitude of " sacred union " with the bourgeoisie for the aims of " national defence " was increasing throughout 1916, and at the beginning of 1917, under the influence of the propaganda directed by the new " travellers " to Kienthal members of the House Brizon, Raffin- Dugens and Al. Blanc. Attempts had been made to disseminate anti-war views in the army. The National Congress at the end of 1916 was to be held behind closed doors, and this precautionary measure proved opportune, if one may judge by an incident which leaked out and produced the impression of a scandal when it appeared in the Press. When M. Goude, himself a member of the Minority, pronounced from the tribune the words : " I am an eager partisan of national defence, we all agree to it," somebody cried out : " No ! " The great majority of the audience supported the protest with frantic applause. All the resolutions of the party in 1916 reflect this growing spirit of criticism and oppo- sition. French Socialists grew more impatient to learn from the Government its " war aims," in order that the war might not " be protracted " owing to some aggressive aims. They now wanted the war to be PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 61 finished " as soon as possible." They do not wish to crush Germany or to ruin her economically. They asked the Government to be " on the watch, and not to let pass any serious possibility of making peace." They even appeal to " representatives of all belligerent countries to bring pressure to bear upon their Govern- ments " in order to force them to renounce " annexa- tionist tendencies." To be sure, they repudiate the Zimmerwald-Kienthal doctrine, and they persist in asking German Socialists for preliminary explanations of principles before any personal meeting and discussion with them at some international gathering. But they prepare for the possibility of such a meeting on Inter- nationalist lines, while breaking one by one the ties of the " sacred union." Their unwillingness to share in ministerial responsibility steadily grows ; they give notice to the Government of their intention to withdraw their representatives from the Cabinet ; and, indeed, Sembat did not enter the new Cabinet of Briand (November 1916). Albert Thomas remained, but the decision of the National Congress of December 1916 to this effect was adopted only by 1,637 votes against 1,282 given to two other motions. Thomas is asked " vigorously to ensure the national defence," but . . . " in order to obtain the rapid end of the war for a peace which must be a triumph of justice." In short, to state it in the words of their political opponent, Maurras, the French Majority Socialists " have yielded to the menaces of their dissenters in everything that was asked for by these imperious schismatics, and the official organ of the patriotic majority has, in fact, served to propagate the ideas of the Minority. One dreamt of disarming them with concessions, but one was simply 62 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER recruiting for them their adepts, their adherents, their zealous followers." Thus the Majority paved the way to the final vic- tory of the Minority, which actually took place later, under the influence of the Russian Revolution. It is unnecessary for me to expatiate upon the fact that the same conversion has taken place in public opinion of England. The only difference was perhaps that, owing to the comparative weakness of Socialism proper in this country, the anti-war and pro-" Inter- national " propaganda here took to the less offensive watchword of " Pacifism," and that its teaching, primarily confined to a small group of idealists, only lately and slowly has evolved into a demagogic campaign by class war protagonists. Of course, at the very beginning of the war even here there was no lack of direct German influences, together with idealistic and religious motives, working for socialistic solutions and " conscientious objections " to war. As early as April 1915, at the Congress of Norwich, Messrs. Keir Hardie, Jowett, Bruce Glasier, and others had already spoken for the benefit of German " comrades " against . . . British . . . imperialism and militarism ; they already advocated direct international socialistic action for immediate peace. The Congress decided that Socialists must renounce fighting, even in case of enemy invasion, and by 243 votes to 9 they carried a vote of condemnation of the Labour party for its participation in the recruiting campaign. But it is particularly in the second half of 1916 that the so-called (unjustly) " Pacifist " propaganda began to influence larger circles of public opinion. Anyhow, when the Russian Revolution broke out in March 1917 PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 68 there existed a ready current of sympathy for its most extreme achievements. 3. THE FIRST VICTORY OF INTERNATIONAL EXTREMISM IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. There were two Russian Revolutions which were quite dissimilar : that of March and that of November 1917. The first was national and patriotic, and was led by the Duma representatives. The second was due to the Internationalist propaganda, introduced into Russia from the outside. It was led by the group of Russian refugees we know, and it was strongly supported by International Socialists, not only of extreme, but also of more moderate description. The national Revolution of March originated in a strong pro-war sentiment which had brought Russian public opinion to the conclusion that no victory could be won under autocratic rule, suspected of pro-Germanism. The Extremist (Bolshevist) Revolution of November was " Defeatist " in its origin, and it won the victory in Russia for the Zimmerwald and Kienthal International doctrine. Why is it that Russia of all countries has become a field for social experiment ? Many causes peculiar to Russia combine to make this country particularly receptive of the Extremist international propaganda. " Defeatism " was in Russia not the result of recent anti-militarist and anti-patriotic propaganda, but an old tradition amongst intellectuals, contracted during many decades of years of struggle against the Auto- cracy. Lenin only tried to make use of that old habit when at the beginning of the war he began his Defeatist 64 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER propaganda. " As things actually are," he says, in October 1914, in his organ published at Geneva, "it is impossible, from the point of view of the international proletariat, to say which would be the lesser evil for Socialism, an Austro-German defeat or a Franco-Russo- English defeat. But for us, Russian Social Democrats, there can be no doubt that, from the point of view of the working classes and of the toiling masses of all the Russian peoples, the lesser evil would be a defeat of the Tsarist monarchy. . . . We cannot ignore the fact that this or that issue of the military operations will facilitate or render more difficult our work of liberation in Russia. And we say : ' Yes, we hope for the defeat of Russia because it will facilitate the internal victory of Russia the abolition of her slavery, her liberation from the chains of Tsarism.' ' Thus the particularly Russian Extremist point of view seemed to coincide with " the point of view of the international prole- tariat." To be sure, the aims of the international proletariat namely, " Revolutionary Socialism " had been formulated, as we have just pointed out, under the strong influence of Russian abstract dogmatism. The doctrine of pure " class war " developed particularly and took a refined shape in hotbeds of Russian emigres circles, in the atmosphere of the endless disputes of a few intellectuals specially trained in Marx's teachings. In a sense, Bolshevism was the peculiar product of Russian culture, grafted on International Socialism, before it was reimported to Russia. According to Marxists themselves, the Russian soil was not prepared for an early experiment in Socialism. To state it in Lenin's own terms (in his leaflet on Two Tactics, published in Geneva 1905) : " Whoever wants to try any path 65 to Socialism other than political Democracy, he will inevitably come to absurd and reactionary conclusions both in an economical and a political sense. If some workmen ask us, ' Why not achieve the maximum programme ? ' we shall answer them by pointing out just how alien to Socialism the democratic masses are, how undeveloped the class contradictions, how unorganized the proletarians. Just try to organize hundreds of thousands of workmen all over Russia ! Try to teach millions to sympathize with your programme ! Try to do that without limiting yourself to sonorous but empty anarchical phrases, and you will see at once that the largest possible realization of democratic reforms is necessary and requisite for the spreading of socialistic enlightenment, and for introducing appro- priate organization." This is all very wise, but this sound reasoning was invariably thrown overboard at the moment of revo- lutionary outbreaks. Were not, indeed, these outbreaks chiefly due to that very unpreparedness of the masses, which precluded in advance the possibility of any last- ing result ? Was it not that very lack of organization and of the political education of the masses which made them blindly believe in the Bolshevists' promises and follow their demagogical lead ? Revolutionary Social- ism repudiated State institutions ; but the Russian peasants have never learnt to defer to the State. They were, so to say, born anarchists, and Tolstoy reflects very adequately the soul of the Russian peasant. Revolutionary Socialism preached class war and hatred of superior social strata. But in Russia the upper social layers were of comparatively recent origin ; to a large extent they owed their privileged position to 5 66 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER the State, and were bound to yield even to a gentle pressure from below. Revolutionary Socialism exe- crated " imperialism " and " nationalism " ; but the Russian masses simply did not know anything about the international situation. They were unable to consider the interests of the State as a whole, and as opposed to the interests of other State units. They practically had not yet reached the stage of conscious nationalism and patriotism. To speak to these masses about " war aims " was labour lost ; but they understood the weariness of war exertions and the hardships of life in the trenches. They did not understand a word of the so-called " demo- cratic " formula about " annexations " and " contri- butions " and " self-determination," but they only too well understood what " immediate peace " meant ; while " fraternization " with the enemy in the trenches was quite easy for men who had learnt to hate the name of " German," but proved unable to connect that abstract idea with people who, after a laborious day of warfare, treated them to vodka and schnapps and called them " brethren." When, into the bargain, they were promised the long-hoped-for " partition " of the land as soon as as they returned home, it was easy to under- stand that desertion from the ranks, in order to reach home first, was not at all considered to be a disgrace and a crime. After all, in spite of what is said, the war perhaps for the first time in Russian history was, at the be- ginning widely popular, and Russian Socialists were forced to acknowledge the fact. Berlin newspapers were publishing telegrams about " Revolution in Russia " during the first days of the war. Far from PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 67 this being true, a strike which perhaps not without German " material help " was about to start was at once stopped by the workmen themselves as soon as war broke out. " Unlike the Russo-Japanese War, the present war has become popular among the masses," a Social Democratic report stated to the Conference in Copenhagen. " A great majority of Russian citizens," says the Russian correspondent of a German Socialist newspaper (Leipziger Volkszeitung), " and among them many Social Democrats, are convinced that Germany is waging an aggressive war . . . the war is becoming more and more popular in Russia . . . the present situation bears no resemblance to that which existed ten years ago. The war was then a dynastic war, while to-day we are witnessing a people's war." " There is no desire that Russia should be defeated to be observed among the working classes," states another correspondent of the Russian Social Democratic newspaper in Paris. However, the socialistic fractions of the Duma at once differentiated themselves from their European comrades by abstaining from the vote of war credits. Later on, the idea of Zimmerwald was accepted by all Russian Socialists : Kerensky, Tsereteli, and Tshkeidse called themselves Zimmerwaldians. Five working men deputies of the Social Democratic fraction of the Duma were found in possession of a draft of a Defeatist reso- lution drawn up by Lenin. They were put on their trial and condemned to deportation to Siberia. This only made things worse. As early as 1916 a Defeatist propaganda was rife among workmen and in the army, as well as among the prisoners of war in Germany. 68 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER A Russian newspaper, the Russian Messenger, published in Berlin, was regularly smuggled into the Russian trenches. I personally, as a member of the Duma, received many letters from soldiers at the front which proved that the demoralization of the army had already begun before the Revolution of March 1917. Revolution became unavoidable in Russia after the autumn of 1915, when the Tsar ignored the last attempt of the Duma majority to bridge the chasm between him and public opinion by working out a moderately progressive programme and nominating a Ministry " enjoying the confidence of the country." Moreover, he dismissed, one by one, the eight members of the Cabinet (among them Mr. Sazonov) who were inclined to adopt a conciliatory attitude, and he put in their place unswerving reactionaries. On the other hand, public opinion became more radical, and would not be satisfied with anything less than a Parliamentary regime. Revolutionary and republican tendencies began to take root. A revolutionary overthrow during the war was by itself almost equivalent to a catastrophe. It is easy to understand that the more experienced politicians could not at once decide to join hands with the revolu- tionaries ; but the Tsarist regime has proved itself incapable of organizing national defence, and it was strongly suspected of the wish to prevent revolution by a speedy end of the war which would be to the benefit of the Germans. Revolution was now becoming necessary for patriotic reasons. The more advanced groups begun to plan a dynastic overthrow. The scandals of Court life under the influence of the famous Rasputin served to endorse the decision. The assas- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 69 sination of Rasputin by aristocratic conspirators gave two months' respite to the Tsar, but he was blind to the coming danger. The Tsarina dissuaded him from making any concessions, and quoted the example of the French Revolution. The Duma leaders prepared to take the power which was bound to fall from the hands of the mad Autocrat into the hands of popular politicians. The Tsar decided to dissolve the Duma. At that very moment, but without any connection with the dissolution of the Duma, a real Revolution broke out, starting from different sources and basing itself on forces differing from such as had been confidently expected by the Duma. The Duma was prepared to deal with a dynastic overthrow ; it was taken unawares, as everybody was, including the Socialist leaders, by the soldiers' outbreak of March I2th. Yet the Duma took the lead, and by taking sides with the Revolu- tion decided its success. All Russia knew the names of the first revolutionary Ministers and believed in them. The " bloodless " victory of the Revolution, the direct submission of the army commanders, and the hurried resignation of the Tsar who had signed the Act already prepared in 1905 all this was due to the Duma's participation in the movement. Thus the Russian Revolution, as a whole, has nothing to do with any kind of international propaganda. Such German propaganda among the workmen, or Socialist and Radical propaganda amongst soldiers, as may be traced, cannot account either for its deeper causes or for its speedy success. But after success had been achieved, internationalist propaganda immediately set to work in order to steer the course of the patriotic Revolution into the anti-militarist channel. It took 70 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER eight months and four consecutive changes of Govern- ment to make the change complete. During the first two months the First Provisional Government set up by the Duma Executive Committee succeeded in maintaining the " sacred national unity." Its first act was to declare that far from weakening the military forces of Russia the Revolution would inspire them with new enthusiasm, and that the war would be prosecuted in complete harmony with the Allies, on the basis of the existing accords and treaties. But on the very first day of the Revolution a new force appeared on the stage which worked in the opposite direction. " The Council (Soviet) of Workmen and Soldiers " met at once in the Taurida Palace. The Soviet represented Revolutionary Socialism, though it disguised itself under the name of " Revolutionary " Democracy. At first the Soviet did not claim formal power, but it pretended to " push " the Provisional Government, chiefly in regard to its military tactics and its foreign policy. At the same time it profited by the complete political freedom given by the Revolu- tion, in order to make propaganda and to organize the masses. The whole movement was led by men who evidently were familiar with the ideas of Extremist international- ism and who fully shared its aims. Through a Special " Committee for the Contact " of the Soviet with the Government they, from the very beginning, tried to wring from the Government decisions necessary for the weakening of discipline in the army, the grant of funds for propaganda, and, finally, urged the acceptance of the Zimmerwald doctrine in foreign politics. When they met with resistance they started an agitation PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 71 against the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs (Mr. Guchkov and myself). Bolshevism at that first period of the Revolution had not yet differentiated itself from the more moderate socialistic currents, and it was so much the easier for it to keep the whole movement in hand. Without knowing it, the official Socialist leaders of the Soviet, who had won their popularity as Duma delegates, Kerensky, Tchkeidse, Skobelev, etc., submitted themselves to the guidance of more obscure people, who were hurriedly coming back to Petrograd from their Siberian exile, from Paris, Geneva, London, and New York, and who were far better informed regarding the tactics of an Internationalist Revolution. Already before their arrival the first decisive steps had been taken in the name of the Soviet against military discipline and against the further prosecution of war, steps which bear witness to the initial confusion of Extremist and Moderate ideas in the Russian Revo- lution. I mean the famous " Prikaz (Order) No. i," of March I7th, and the " Appeal of the Soviet to the Peoples of the Whole World," of March 27, .1917. " Prikaz No. i " gave a signal by introducing into all army units elected committees of soldiers, abolishing outward marks of respect due to officers, and controlling by the Soviets the possession of arms and all " political manifestations " by the army. The draft of the Order made its appearance, nobody knew where from, on the second day of the Revolution. The Provisional Govern- ment rejected its contents and refused to accept it as one of the conditions of its support by the Soviet. On the following morning the Soviet published it in its name, and although the publication had no legal 72 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER character, in spite of the opposition of the military commanders, its dispositions were enacted first in Petrograd, then in Moscow, and finally at the Front, in the ranks of the fighting army. A special committee, presided over by General Polivanov, the former War Minister, expanded it into what was called " The Soldiers' Charter," and although the War Minister of the Revolution, Mr. Guchkov, would not sign it and resigned, " The Soldiers' Charter " was signed by his successor in office, Mr. Kerensky, in May. It thus became " the last nail in the coffin of the army," according to General Alexiev, the then Commander- in-Chief's telling expression. " Prikaz No. i," a representative of the Soviet, Joseph Goldenberg, explained to M. Claude Anet in July, " was not a mistake, but a necessity. The day we made the Revolution, we understood that the army would crush it if it was not destroyed itself. We had to choose between the army and the Revolution, and we did not hesitate." This is a crude, but true statement. In a sense Mr. Goldenberg was right. The army, if left to itself, would stifle the kind of Extremist Revolution he had in view, while for the first two months it was sure to protect the National Revolution headed by the First Provisional Government. Evidently Mr. Goldenberg's friends knew very well what they were driving at. The Moderate Socialists did not yet realize it, but they followed the lead of the Extremists. Mr. Goldenberg's reasoning was also extended to the problem of war and peace in general. " If the Revolution does not kill the war, the war will kill the Revolution " ; so ran the current formula, not as yet PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 73 adorned with arguments borrowed from the Zimmerwald ideology. To stop the war on the front from the inside a new and more systematic propaganda was started in the trenches, in addition to that from Berlin, as soon as the opposition on the part of commanding officers to the free admission of agitators and periodicals from Petrograd was disposed of. The increasing in- fluence of Extremist newspapers in the trenches will be seen from the following figures of copies, sent from Moscow only : r, March a4 -April. Mayi-Junen. (The Truth) .. 7,972 copies 6,999 copies Soldatskaya Pravda (The Soldiers' Truth) .. 2 ,ooo 61,525 Social Democrat . . .. 30,375 32,711 Then means had to be provided for stopping the war from the outside. Within a fortnight from the beginning of the Revolution the attention of the Soviet was drawn from military questions to those of foreign politics and diplomacy. A special Committee for Foreign Affairs was started within the Soviet, and it was allowed to have free telegraphic communications and its own service of diplomatic couriers with Stock- holm. The whole machinery of extreme internationalist propaganda as herein described was now at the disposal of the Soviets or rather had secured a chance of profiting by the Soviet inexperience, in order to make a tool of it. However, at the beginning, the Soviet leaders had the illusion of leading, and they were very proud to start on a new world mission for a " democratic peace and the fraternity of nations." In their appeal of March 2 ;th they proclaimed a new era of a "decisive struggle with the predatory 74 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER tendencies of the Governments of all countries." " Conscious of her revolutionary strength, Russian Democracy (the Soviet leaders were careful to speak, not in the name of " Socialism," but in the name of " Democracy ") declares that it will in every way counteract the predatory politics of its own ruling classes, and it invites all the peoples of Europe to collective and decisive action for the benefit of peace." " Workmen of all countries, we fraternally tender our hands to you over the mountains of fraternal corpses . . . and we entreat you to restore and to corroborate international unity. ..." This was indeed a new factor and a new test in the struggle of the conflicting tendencies in Socialism. The National Socialists of the Entente countries at once felt their position extremely endangered by the blow which came from an Allied country. Their chief concern now was to know whether the Russian Revolu- tion would increase or diminish the chances of victory over the Central Empires. But they were exceedingly embarrassed in stating this point in the terms of their own socialistic terminology. We have seen how am- biguous it was : this ambiguity now served the cause of the enemy. Anyhow, they now hurried to Russia in order to see for themselves what was to be done to ward oft the danger. The Deputies of Parliaments and political parties, French, British, Italian, were followed by Socialist Ministers of Allied countries : Albert Thomas, Arthur Henderson, Emile Vander- velde. They came with the optimistic idea that a good talk with their Russian " comrades " would be sufficient to edify them and to put them on the right path of wisdom, while the bourgeois leaders, too much PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 75 steeped in their " old regime " tradition, would be easily made to understand the necessity of concessions to the coming " Democracy " in order to take the wind out of the Extremists' sails. Directly they arrrived in Russia they saw at once the intrinsic falsehood of their attitude. It was no use talking a different language to the Extremists, the Soviet, the Duma, or the Government. The Socialist Ministers' arrival was immediately followed by an article in the Stockholm Politiken, which classified them as contaminated by the " sacred union " with bourgeois parties, as sharing their " imperialism," and as coming to Russia in order to force her to protract the war and to stifle her Revolution. In the Soviet they met at once with insidious questions : " What about India, and Ireland, and Morocco ? Why have no representa- tives of your Minorities come with you ? What is your attitude toward your ' Capitalist ' Governments ? " And when the turn of the delegates came to put questions about the exact meaning of " contributions " and " annexations " and " self-determination," and how to conciliate all these slogans of the "sacred democratic" formula with war indemnities, with the disannexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and so on, they were hardly listened to ; they invariably met with subterfuge and reticence, and were politely refused any definite promise. They might have seen at once that their mission had failed. Instead of that they remained week after week carrying on negotiations with the Soviet, " throwing out the ballast " of their convictions, and seemingly making the Soviet's ideology their own. They finally won nothing, and on the eve of their departure the three Socialist Ministers were obliged to state, in very strong 76 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER language, that they were not satisfied with the result of their protracted negotiations. Without even waiting for that, the Soviet Committee for its part published a statement to the effect that their pourparlers with the National Socialist Ministers did not in the least prejudice their general standpoint, which was against any com- promise with the Governments, and was entirely for changing the war with the enemy into a class war with capitalism. Unhappily, while not succeeding in their own mission, the Socialist Ministers very seriously compromised the success of the Russian Revolution. They came to Russia at the moment when the Revolution was at the cross-roads, and no fatal decisions had yet been taken by the Provisional Government. The Soviet at least formally recognized the Government as the sole legal power, and promised it conditional support. There was, as yet, no question of the formal responsibility of the Government to the Soviet or to the political parties. The policy of the First Provisional Government was weak and vacillating, but its moral influence in the country was still strong much stronger than that of any subsequent Government. Representatives of the troops from the Front came daily to the Maryinsky Palace, where the Cabinet held its meetings, and they implored the Government not to yield and not to share its power with the Soviet. The leaders of the Soviet themselves were persuaded that nothing but a bourgeois Republic was possible in Russia. Their only wish was to " push " the Government in their direction, while influencing it and criticizing it from the outside. They understood particularly Mr. Tsereteli that every attempt to share power with the Government would PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 77 only weaken their hold upon the working masses without giving more power either to themselves or to the Cabinet. " Why do you want us to enter the Cabinet ? " Mr. Tsereteli said to the partisans of the idea of a " Coalition " Ministry. " We shall only impede your action while dictating to you uncompromising decisions in the form of ' ultimatums/ and in case you do not consent to them, we shall be obliged to leave the Ministry, thus rousing comment." The only alternative was for themselves to share in a policy of compromise but this seemed impossible to a Russian Socialist. However, French and British Socialists had come from countries where compromise was for the last three years particularly the rule of socialistic activity. They measured Russia by their own political standard, and as they came to Russia at the moment when they were obliged to compromise with their minorities, led by Longuet and Henderson, why not arrange for a compromise with Tsereteli and Tchkeidse, the Georgian Socialists who had become Russian leaders ? Their mistaken idea was that by arranging for a " Coalition " they would strengthen the Government, and that by yielding to the Soviet's Pacifism they would strengthen the enthusiasm of the army. It was M. Albert Thomas, in particular, who dealt the final blow to the First Provisional Government, while energetically working to bring about the first Coalition. The only Socialist in the First Government, Mr. Kerensky, who has just declared the former foreign policy of Russia to be only a " personal opinion " of the Foreign Minister, was about to go to the War Office on the condition that he should try to overcome 78 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER with his personal influence the growing demoralization of the army and to force it, by the power of his oratory, to an offensive movement. The kind of official op- timism which was then predominant, along with growing uneasiness, among the Allied Socialist Ministers, is characterized in M. Vandervelde's book on Three Aspects of the Russian Revolution. 1 Even people like M. Claude Anet were singing the praises of Mr. Kerensky's " juvenile courage." In Russia people knew Mr. Kerensky's deficiencies, but Mr. Kerensky had now become the national hero, and one began to hope against hope that everything would be all right. Only specialists knew that under the state of mind then existent in the army no offensive was possible, that any offensive movement was bound to rouse opposition among the soldiers and would end in a disaster. It is enough to say that women's " shock battalions " were to be formed as one of the measures to inspire self-confidence and courage in the regular troops, in order to understand just how desperate the situation was already. Personally, as Foreign Minister in the First Provisional Government, I was unable to agree to the so-called policy of " peace without annexations and contributions, on the self-determination principle," because I knew there was German intrigue and the spirit of Zimmerwald behind it. I knew it was the first step to a separate peace, because no general peace on that basis was possible, and no war was possible in Russia after the promulgation of a formula which would be understood by the soldiers as a promise of immediate peace. Neither could I accept the idea of a Coalition with Moderate 1 London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 79 Socialists, because I knew how uncertain their tactics were, and how much their popularity depended on their sticking to Extremist solutions. When asked for advice by the Premier, Prince Lvov, I told him that we had to choose between two courses : that of a strong power, necessary to save the Revolution from its excesses, which would necessitate a policy like that of Noske's to-day, and the course of compromise with Zimmerwaldism, which would bring about chaos, anarchy, civil war, and a separate peace. I must state it again that the second alternative was chosen under the strong influence of M. Albert Thomas, whose authority seemed beyond dispute to our inexperienced politicans. Then Mr. Henderson came to tell us that the workmen's control of factories had nothing incon- venient about it, because there was already a precedent for it in the State control introduced in England during war-time. The parallel was incomplete and utterly misleading ; but here, as in the case of the Coalition Ministry and the coming offensive, it helped very much to push the Russian Revolution along the way which could not but prove fatal to it. The result is known to everybody. In two months there came the collapse of the Russian offensive, in half a year the complete victory of the internationalist current in the Revolution, and in nine months Brest- Litovsk. As a consequence of the demoralization of the army and of its retreat, hundreds of thousands of deserters flooded the country, which they found deprived of all its former administrative authorities. They brought trouble and disorders to towns and villages, and they entirely blocked all means of communication. It was under their influence that the peasants, who until then 80 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER had kept comparatively quiet, started the distribution of land the burning of landowners' houses, and the " creating of the new Law," as was the current expression of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the predominating agrarian party. The cities had already, by that time, become isolated from the villages. All commerce was stopped, factories were closed. No manufactured goods were sent to villages. No grain was sold in exchange to the cities, unemployment speedily grew, the first symptoms of famine and disease already made their appearance. Bolshevism was promising peace, food, land, and workmen's control of the factories. Russia was ripe for Bolshevism. The story of its increasing success was only recently told by one of its leaders, Mr. Trotsky. 1 Of course, Mr. Trotsky tells it from his own point of view, and he states the facts in terms of his own ideology, while very often distorting them or in ignorance of their full meaning. But substantially he is right in his explanations of the loss of popularity by the Moderate Socialist leaders of the Soviet, as also in his statements regarding the growing Bolshevist success among the Petrograd workmen and soldiers. Mr. Tsereteli was also right in his forebodings as to the result of his and his friends taking part in the Government. The opinion of the man in the street, a workman or a soldier of Petrograd, was, in April, as M. Anet states it in his diary under the dates April I3~26th, that war must be stopped at once, and the only obstacle was that " Germany would not make peace with Guchkov and Miliukov : accordingly they must go. As soon as a 1 History of the Russian Revolution to Brest Litovsk (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.). PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 81 true Democracy assumes power, the German Socialists will overthrow William and will unite with us." Meantime, the Moderate Socialists were entering the Cabinet with a firm decision, which became nearly a moral obligation, to start an offensive, which could not but be explained as prolonging the war and making common cause with " British and French capitalists." Says Mr. Trotsky : "At that time they spoke of the offensive in exactly the same terms in which Social Patriots of all countries had spoken at the beginning of the war about the necessity of supporting the cause of national defence, of strengthening the sacred unity of the nation, etc. All their Zimmerwaldian Internationalism vanished as if by magic." Moreover, although they never wished to take any coercive measures against Leninite open appeals to mutiny, they had to share the responsibility for such half-hearted measures as were finally taken by the Government after the first Bolshevist rising of July I4~i6th. On taking the helm they soon learnt the appalling in- sufficiency of the vanishing State resources to cope with increased social demands, and they tried to impart to the masses some of their new knowledge, warning them against demagogic exaggerations and explaining to them the unachievable character of Bolshevist promises. They were practically now speaking the same language as the bourgeois politicians, but they were using it in complete contradiction to what was considered to be the true socialistic doctrine and the true tactics of " Revolutionary Democracy." That is why they quickly lost ground and why the Bolshevik leaders gained ground amongst the Petrograd masses. Amongst the uncertain and the wavering the Bolsheviks 6 82 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER were the only people who knew what they wished to do, and who were ready to use force in order to achieve their aims. On the day after his arrival in Russia, on April I7th, Mr. Lenin made public his " personal " points, which started with the assertion that " no con- cessions, not even the smallest ones, to revolutionary defencism (i.e. the point of view of national defence) are possible, because war remains predatory and im- perialistic, owing to the capitalistic character of this Government." Moderate Socialists are " cheated by the bourgeoisie," and they are to be taught that " no truly democratic peace, no peace without violence is possible without the overthrow of capitalism." " This view must be largely propagated in the army," which must be taught to " fraternize." The first stage of the Revolution which is characterized by the bourgeois possession of power owing to the lack of con- sciousness and organization of the proletariat must yield to the second stage, which must give power to the proletarians and poorest peasants. " The first step towards it is to protest against the parliamentary republic, and to insist on the handing over the power to the Soviets. Police, army, and officials are to be abolished, proprietors' estates confiscated, all land and all banks are to be " nationalized." It will not be, as yet, equivalent to " introducing Socialism," but it will make an immediate transition to control by the Soviet, to collective production and the distribution of produce. ' The initiative must be taken for organizing a new International against Social Chauvinists and against the Centre." It is explained that International Socialists give that name PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 83 of the Centre to " the current that vacillates between Chauvinism (" Defencism ") and Internationalism, e.g. Kautsky and Co., in Germany ; Longuet and Co., in France ; Tchkeidse and Co., in Russia ; Turati and Co., in Italy ; Ramsay Macdonald and Co., in England, etc." Pure Zimmerwaldism was to be opposed to " un- principled nebulousness and political servility " of Zimmerwaldian renegades the " lower middle-class Democrats," as Mr. Trotsky misleadingly calls the Moderate Socialists. And pure Zimmerwaldism has won the game. It is impossible to state here in detail just how it happened, but Mr. Trotsky has told his version of the story, and I told mine in another place. 1 The reader may be referred to both. The point is the same in both readings, namely, that International Socialism has gained the upper hand over the National Revolution. Whatever be the result of this change for Russia, in Europe it is a most important episode and a link in the chain in the history of rising Inter- nationalism. 4. INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON EUROPEAN INTERNATIONALISM. We have now seen the kind of influence that European Internationalism has had upon the course of the Russian Revolution. Let us trace the inverse influence which the internationalized Russian Revolution has had upon European Internationalism. Had M, Albert Thomas's exertions been successful, 1 See my History of the Second Russian Revolution, now in process of publication in Russia, 84 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER and had Mr. Kerensky's speeches been able to regenerate the " democratized " Russian Army, the flexible socialis- tic majorities in the Entente countries might have been stiffened. The inevitable failure of the Russian offen- sive was bound, on the contrary, to make their immediate position untenable and to strengthen both extremes at their expense : the " bourgeois militarism " and the Extremist Internationalism. After all, the vicissitudes and the final issue of the war, not parliamentary dis- cussions and the resolutions of congresses, decided the fate of all three currents. Whether it was to be the peace " without victory " of President Wilson of 1916, or a " peace of understanding " (Verstandigungsfriederi) of the German Reichstag of July 1917, or a " peace of violence," in case of the complete defeat of either one side, had to be determined on the battlefield. The Russian Revolution was also considered as a new factor, but not so much owing to the exalted mission assumed by its socialist leaders, as because of the changes likely to result from the state of mind of the Russian fighting forces. The chances of a " democratic peace " as proposed by the Soviet being enforced were rising and falling in exact proportion with the number of enemy troops which the Russian front was able to detain. We can easily trace the seemingly complicated story of these fluctuations to the above mentioned cause, when studying the rise and fall of a new international enterprise started under the auspices of the Russian Revolution. I mean the renewed attempt to convoke a Conference of Socialists of all countries in Stockholm. The two first stages of this story follow the beaten track. Suggested by Germans, the idea was taken up by pro- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 85 German neutrals. It is the third stage that is new : that where the customary participation of neutrals is intercepted by that unforeseen agent the indiscrirni- nating Zimmerwaldians of the Russian Soviet. It is here that fluctuations begin. To start at the beginning. The Soviet's Appeal of March 27th " to the peoples of the whole world " set Internationalist Socialists of all countries to work. It directly invited Germany to take up the Zimmerwald and Kienthal scheme. Lenin himself might be entirely satisfied with the Soviet's proposal to Germany to imitate the Russian example and " to overthrow the yoke of the autocratic regime, to desist from serving an instrument of rapine and violence for kings, land- owners, and bankers, and with united effort to stop the fearful slaughter dishonouring humanity and ob- fuscating the great days of Russia's era of freedom." This invitation elicited only a very reserved and dry response on the part of the German Social Demo- crats. They were against interference in any one's internal affairs ; so far as Germany was concerned, the great majority of Germans were Monarchists, and they would be quite satisfied with democratic reform, without asking for a Republic. Of course, the German Minority, which had just, under the influence of the Russian Revolution, separated itself from the old party, and had at the Congress of Gotha (April 6-8th) assumed a new organization and the new name of the " Independent S.D. Party," did not agree to that view. During the debate following Bethmann-Hollweg's resignation (July I4th) the Independent Socialists pro- posed an amendment including the " pure " Russian formula for " democratic peace," and they wound up 86 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER by a demand for " democratization which will cul- minate in the creation of a Socialist Republic." Far from sharing such views at home, the Majority Socialists were busily aiding in importing them into revolutionized Russia. A lively interchange of views and journeys to and from Berlin had begun. Already at the beginning of April, not only a batch of Russian Bolsheviks with Mr. Lenin at the head, was hurriedly forwarded to Russia via Germany from Switzerland, with the active help of Swiss Internationalists, but signals were given to the Austrians, Adler, Renner, and Seitz, who followed directly on Mr. Lenin's heels via Berlin to Copenhagen, and there discussed matters with Scheidemann and Stauding, after having discussed them previously with Count Czernin. A few days later the same route, Berlin-Copenhagen-Stockholm, was pursued by Dutch members of the old Socialist International Bureau (transferred to the Hague from Brussels), Troelstra, Albarda, Van Kol, followed by the Secretary, M. Camille Huysmans. While in Berlin Troelstra secured the official consent of the German Majority Socialists not to object to the par- ticipation of the Minority at the Conference. The Minority, to be sure, was less conciliatory. Franz Mehring wrote to the Petrograd Soviet " protesting energetically against the admission," of the Majority and " refusing to take part " in a Conference whose only purpose evidently was " to promote the interests of the German Government." The admission of such " faithful slaves of the German Government," as " Scheidemann and Siidecum and all the other so- called Socialists . . . would be a severe blow to Inter- national Socialism." PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 87 Such an appeal, of course, did not go unheeded by the Soviet Zimmerwaldians. They looked askance at National Socialist Deputies and Ministers coming to Russia. How could they allow them to appropriate for themselves the initiative of a Conference towards which their own attitude was, as M. Vandervelde very well stated, that of "a kind of Messianic faith ? " " They believe," M. Vandervelde goes on saying, " that the prestige of their Revolution would put them in a position to impose their peace formula on the other Socialist parties, including the German Majority Socialists." The Entente Socialists might find it rather " para- doxical to suppose that to induce the Russian soldiers to fight, one must put before them the idea of a Con- ference in favour of peace." It was, of course, para- doxical and utterly false, but the idea had become current, as we saw it, already in 1916 among European Socialist minorities. Mr. Tsereteli and Mr. Kerensky were repeating to MM. Albert Thomas and Emile Vandervelde what they might have learnt from M. Longuet and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, had they not been taught in a more direct way by the Zimmerwald and Kienthal resolutions. The chief point is, though, that Tsereteli and Kerensky were led by people who understood the gist of the Zimmerwald doctrine better than they did, and they only repeated words which from their own point of view had no other meaning than that of gaining them the favour of the " revolu- tionary " Democracy. It was the real leaders of International Extremism who prepared the draft of a new appeal issued by the Soviet on June 3, 1917. Here we find the entire doctrine of Zimmerwald 88 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER embodied, without any compromise or misguiding comment. After having told the story of their having " forced " the Government to accept the " democratic " formula of peace, they gave motives for their decisions of May 9-i5th to take the initiative in convoking the International Conference at Stockholm : The Soviet of Working Men and Soldiers thinks that the cessation of war and the establishment of international peace . . . can only be attained by a united international effort of workmen's parties and syndicates of belligerent and neutral countries for an energetic and tenacious struggle against universal slaughter. The first necessary and decisive step in order to organize such an international movement is the convocation of an International Conference. Its principal task must be to bring about an agreement between the representatives of the Socialist proletariat on the subject of liquidating the policy of the sacred union with the Governments and with imperialist classes which precludes all struggle for peace, and also on the subject of the methods of such a struggle. . . . Are invited parties and organizations of working classes which share in these opinions and are ready to unite their efforts for the sake of their realization. The Soviet is also firmly persuaded that parties and organi- zations which do accept this invitation will also accept the inflexible obligation to apply in reality all decisions of that Conference. It is now easy to understand why the Soviet particularly emphasized the necessity for all socialistic minorities to be present at Stockholm. They were the only parties capable of sharing in the programme, tactics, and the discipline of Zimmerwald-Kienthal. On May gth the Executive Committee of the Soviet sent special telegrams to England, France, Italy, Switzer- land, and Sweden in order to " invite comrades Brizon, Longuet, and other representatives of the French Socialistic Opposition, representatives of the Inde- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 89 pendent Labour Party, the British Socialist party, and the Italian Social Democratic party to send their delegates to Petrograd." This was not very much different from Robert Grimm's invitation to Stockholm, extended in the name of the Berne I.S.C. to " parties and organizations sharing the watchwords : war against the conciliation of parties, renewal of the class war, demand for an immediate armistice, and the conclusion of peace with- out contributions and annexations on the basis of free self-determination of peoples." This " third Zimmerwald Conference " was to meet on May i8th, ten days before the date initially fixed by the " Dutch-Scandinavian Committee " for a general Socialistic Conference, in order " to work out a uniform platform " and to control the latter (cf. supra, p. 57). It is worth while enumerating the socialistic organiza- tions which received Robert Grimm's invitation : the list will show at once the sphere of the influence of Zimmerwald-Kienthal doctrine and tactics. They are : The Soviet of Working Men and Soldiers. The Central Committee and the Organization Committee of The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. The Central Committee of Russian Social Revolutionary Party of an Internationalist Tendency. The Central Committee of Jewish Labour " Bunds " in Poland, Lithuania and Prussia. The German Independent Social Democratic Labour Party. The French Social Democratic Minority of Zimmerwald Tendency. The Italian Social Democratic Party. The Polish Socialistic Party. The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (the " Left " one). Rumanian Social Democratic Party. British Independent Labour Party. 90 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Social Democratic Unions ol Young Men. Norwegian Social Democratic Party. Serbian Social Democratic Party. Attempts of the Entente Socialists to change that state of mind of the Soviet were quite hopeless. The Belgians decidedly refused to confer with the Germans. The French Deputies (Moutet, Cachin, Lafont) were so strongly impressed by the Soviet's extremism that on their return to France they advocated a policy of the largest concessions. Arthur Henderson, after having agreed with his colleagues in a common refusal to participate in a full conference, finally consented to a consultative con- ference. Albert Thomas, who was particularly re- sponsible for the first Coalition compromise, was also especially eager to help the Russian Socialistic Govern- ment to the anticipated military success. However, he consented to accept the Conference with certain reservations, which were practically equivalent to a refusal. The French party, as represented by its Permanent Administrative Commission, had just (April 27th) denied the right of the Dutch Socialists to speak in the name of the International, and had refused to go to a Conference convoked under an obvious incite- ment of the Austro-German Socialists who had not yet repudiated their guilt of complicity with their aggressive Government, and who now hoped that an amnesty would be extended to them by the Russian Revolution. But as soon as the National Congress of the party (May 29th) learnt from Messrs. Cachin and Moutet of the initiative of the Soviet, the draft of a resolution strongly denouncing the International's PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 91 powerlessness was withdrawn, and was replaced by one accepting " the initiative of the Russian comrades," and consenting to send a delegation to Stockholm in order " to prepare for peace according to the principles formulated by the Revolutionary Government and by the Socialists in Russia." A Russian delegation, sent by the Soviet, was also hurrying to Stockholm, and National Socialists of the Allied countries were happy to elicit at least one con- cession from the Soviet, to wit, a consent to discuss matters previously at an inter-Allied Socialist Con- ference in London. On their arrival in London the Russian delegates were met by Messrs. Jowett, Ramsay Macdonald, Roberts, and Wardle, in the name of the I.L.P., whose guests they were considered to be. This was quite sufficient to classify them truly with the Extremists of this country and to warn the great majority of real Workmen's organizations against them. A manifesto issued by the " League of British Workmen " severely criticized their declaration, asked the Russian " comrades " to mind their own business, and expressed an " earnest hope that neither the Parliament nor the nation will permit itself to be lulled by words," while ignoring the fact that " the ideas of the Russian Revolutionaries run counter to British national sover- eignty." In vain Arthur Henderson tried to conciliate Labour opinion and to persuade it to reconsider the decision, taken half a year before by the Trade Union Congress, not to go to the Conference. In Paris the Russian delegates also met with difficulties concerning the composition of the proposed Conference : the French would not admit the newly-formed minorities and their central organ in Berne ; while the Russians, 92 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER as we have seen, were making of it a leading feature and an unalterable condition of the renascence of the International. Whether or not Russian Zimmerwaldism would succeed in wringing involuntary concessions from the socialistic majorities of the Allied countries, entirely depended on the success or failure of that enterprise which forced Allied Socialists to coax the Russian tovarischi (comrades) of the Soviet the Russian offensive. In the third week of July news came to hand reporting that after the first brilliant successes of the Russian offensive, exclusively due to newly-organized " shock battalions " and to the personal gallantry of the officers, the body of the army, without being defeated in battle, turned their backs to the enemy. Before the end of July it became clear that the retreat was not accidental, and that it was not to be stopped by Mr. Kerensky's means of persuasion. On July zgth General Denikin told it to the Revolu- tionary War Minister in the same plain and outspoken manner as he was wont to use when addressing the authorities of the ancient regime. He quoted a number of instances in order to show just how inadequate and transient the impression of Mr. Kerensky's speeches was on the army, and, on the other hand, how thoroughly destructive was the process of the so-called " democrat- ization " of the army for preserving its discipline and its loyalty to the commanding staff. Among other things General Denikin quoted a report of the Com- mander of the ist Corps of the Siberian Army, which I reproduce here in order to show how utterly unjust and misleading it is to explain the Russian defeat PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 93 by anything else than the state of mind of soldiers depraved by an extremist propaganda : Everything promised the success of the operations : a care- fully-worked-out scheme, powerful artillery which worked admirably, favourable weather which hindered the Germans' use of the superiority of their aviation, our numerical prepon- derance, facilities for moving reserves at any chosen moment, the abundance of munitions, a happy choice of the sector for attack, permitting us to place our artillery in the vicinity of the enemy's trenches without observation, a large number of guns well hidden owing to the configuration of the ground, the short distance between the two lines, an absence of natural obstacles which would force us to attack under enemy fire. . . . A success, a brilliant success crowned our effort with compara- tively small losses on our side. Three fortified lines were taken. There remained before us only a few fortifications, and the battle might soon have taken the character of a complete destruction of the enemy, whose artillery was silenced ; more than 1,400 were taken prisoners, a great number of machine guns were captured. Besides, the enemy suffered great losses in dead and wounded, and one might, with certainty, say that ere long the units before us would have been entirely disabled. . . . Barely three or four batteries kept firing on our front, and, now and then, as many machine guns. Rifle shots were scarce. . . . But night came. ... I immediately began to receive disquieting news from commanders. Quite a mass of soldiers, by whole companies, began of their own will to retreat from the first line which remained unattacked. In certain regiments only commanders with their staffs and a few soldiers stayed within the zone of fire. . . . Having thus, within the space of one day, passed from the joy of approaching victory wrung from the enemy under most favourable circumstances to the horror of seeing the fruits of this victory voluntarily abandoned by the combating masses, at the moment when victory was as much a necessity to our native country as air and water are to man, I was brought to understand that we, the chiefs, were quite powerless to change the fatal psychology of the masses, and I wept long and bitterly. . . . On the receipt of news of the Russian military collapse, readiness to defer to the wishes of the Soviet at once disappeared. " Let us not shut our eyes to reality," one of the Russian delegates, Mr. Rubanovitch, 94 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER said to the Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies on September gth. " If the appeal to Revolutionary Democracy on behalf of peace is to be heeded, the fighting force of the Russian Revolutionary Army must be reconstituted. Failing this, there is no sal- vation, and no struggle for peace is possible." Indeed, all leading Socialists who committed them- selves to the Soviet proposal now hastily withdrew their consent, on the plausible pretext that the Russian Government themselves no longer insisted on backing the Stockholm Conference. Arthur Henderson, who still favoured it, at the end of July had to resign his place in the Cabinet (July 29th) ; a month later (August 22nd) he was disavowed by the Trade Union Congress in Blackpool, which, by an overwhelming majority of 2,049,000 against 91,000, carried a resolu- tion to the effect that, " At present a Conference in Stockholm has no chance of success." Albert Thomas proved more flexible and farseeing. Already on August 2nd, in his speech delivered at Champial, he declared that the Conference was " un- timely," and that the chief reason for consenting to it namely, " the feeling of admiration for the Russian Revolution, and the desire to help it in an active way " no longer existed, because " the effort we were willing to make is not considered desirable by the Russian Government." As a consequence of that change, differences of opinion among Moderate Socialists on the subject of Stockholm so much increased, that the preliminary inter-Allied Conference in London (August 29th to September 2nd) proved unable to come to unanimous conclusions. The declaration of the majority, in slightly PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 95 veiled expressions, acknowledged the failure of the Russian Revolution " to rouse popular energy against the militarism of the Central Empires," and formally limited the meaning of all three principles of the Russian " democratic " formula : " without contribu- tions," " without annexations," and " self-determina- tion." Even Mr. Henderson had now to declare that, owing to " the inability of the inter- Allied Conference to come to any even approximate agreement," the International Conference " would be not merely harmful, but disas- trous." " We cannot meet in an International Con- ference so long as no common ground of understanding between the working classes of the Allied nations has been discovered." The only " common ground " was, indeed, that of Zimmerwald-Kienthal ; and as soon as it appeared useless to seek for it any longer, even such hypocritical and half-hearted concessions as had been made to the Russian Revolution were withdrawn. Even the " optimist," M. Vandervelde, discussing the new situation a little later, made some melancholy remarks which may serve for drawing the veil over the past. " Riga is taken ; Courland is conquered ; the lines in the north are broken, and, which is infinitely more grave than the worst defeats, the question is being asked if the Revolutionary armies are still capable, not of a great offensive, but simply of holding out against the attacks of the enemy. Meanwhile, in the interior the authority of the Provisional Government is tottering. The Soviets are discussing when they should be acting, party and class antagonisms are dominating the preoccupations of public safety, and 96 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER in this immense country, where so many nationalities meet, one looks in vain for any sign of a national spirit. We must expect in these conditions that in Paris, as in London, the Conservatives, who have been forced to keep silence during the first successes of the Revolution, will to-day open their mouths to judge and to condemn." M. Vandervelde was perfectly right in his forebodings, with the exception that, perhaps, he, too, might open his mouth in order " to judge and to condemn " the kind of help given by his colleagues to bring about that lamentable result. In London, in Paris and in Berlin, too the greater part of public opinion, Par- liaments, and Government resumed an uncompromising attitude : the period of concessions to Internationalism had passed with the passing success of the Russian Revolution. In Berlin the parliamentary bloc which carried the Reichstag resolution of July igth (on " a peace of understanding," with which " forced acquisitions of territory are inconsistent ") was dissolved in October : the " Independents " were isolated, and while they were carrying on a criminal propaganda in the Navy, the old party declared itself at the Wiirzburg Congress (October i4th-2Oth) ready to change their irrespon- sible attitude towards the State. The new Chancellor Michaelis, whose nomination was intended to conciliate the parliamentary bloc without making them any sub- stantial concessions, told the Budget Committee of the Reichstag that the Government reserved for them- selves full liberty of action so far as war aims were concerned, and the Foreign Minister, Kiihlmann, finally declared (October gth) that Germany will never yield on the Alsace-Lorraine question. PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 97 The newly-built Jingo " party of the Fatherland " had won the ascendancy, and, as a result, Michaelis had to go (October 28th), his place being taken by a still more conservative politician, Count Hertling, nominated by the Emperor without previously consulting the Reichstag, as had been the case with Michaelis. In France the drift of events was in the same direction. At the Congress of Bordeaux (October 6th-gth) the Socialist Majority reasserted its predominance. The resolution of the Congress is a curious mixture of former internationalist illusions still retained, at least so far as terminology is concerned, and a dawning consciousness of " the meaning of events and the pressure of realities," which " oblige the Allies to bring up to the maximum their military, diplomatic, and economical action," and " not to neglect any form of action (i.e. including par- ticipation in the Cabinet and the voting of credits)." They still asserted their willingness to participate in the International Conference (which had been postponed on the pretext of the refusal of passports to the Ex- tremists by the Governments) ; but having grown suspicious, they now wanted " all " Socialist parties (i.e. the Zinimerwaldian minorities included) and " particularly and fraternally " the Russians of the Soviet to speak their mind fully and openly and to present a " detailed " answer to the Dutch-Norwegian " Questionnaire " as they themselves had done. The resolution was carried by 1,552 votes against two dis- sentient groups of the minority, one of which was ready to vote war credits (about 400), and another which was against any help to the Government (about 120). Partisans of the Russian compromise preached by Messrs. Lafont and Moutet had lost ground and abstained 7 98 BOLSHEVISM : AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER from voting, but they were few (85). Mr. Alexander Varenne was right when he summed up the final result as extremely favourable, " the majority for sharing in the Government having reached two-thirds, and the majority for voting credits four-sixths." That is why the Government felt strengthened and unswervingly repudiated internationalist views on " secret diplomacy " and on " war aims." Ribot and Painleve could answer Kuhlmann's " Never " : " We shall have both victory and Alsace-Lorraine." To be sure, the composition of the Government, owing to the combined attacks from both extreme wings, Royalist and Socialist, had been twice modified. After Painleve (August 3oth), Clemenceau took up the presidency (November I3th). But the spirit of national resistance was only strengthened by the change. " I shall make no promises, I shall make war," M. Clemenceau was heard saying in his declaration. Interrupted by a Deputy, " What about your war aims ? " M. Clemenceau gave a plain answer : " My aim is victory ! We will try to be a Government. I share many of your (Extreme Left) prejudices, but I differentiate from you when you wish to introduce perspectives of pure reasoning into the world of reality." And he proudly concluded : "If we see the dawn of the day when we can hail victory, I wish you on that day to inflict the vote of censure on me. I will then retire satisfied." M. Clemenceau has lived up to the day he so confidently predicted. Internationalism was on the wane all over Europe just at the moment when it carried its decisive victory in Petrograd. It seemed as if the advent of Bolshevism in Russia was to mark the end of Bolshevism as an 99 international peril. Far from that being the case, the danger was only beginning to develop. 5. THE BOLSHEVIST COLLAPSE IN WAR AND TRIUMPH IN PROPAGANDA. Not only in order to be fair to the Bolshevist leaders, but simply to understand them, one must not judge them by the immediate results of their " direct action " Did not Lenin himself say (supra, pp. 20 and 65) that one must be naive and ignorant to think that a backward country like Russia is capable of becoming a Socialistic Community over night ? And did not the Bolsheviks always protest against the supposition that, while destroying the Russian Army and putting their country at the mercy of Germany, they really expected the German " imperialists " to favour Russia with a " demo- cratic peace." A few days after the Bolshevist trial revolt in July, Mr. Lenin repeated what he said twelve years earlier, namely, that Russia was not ripe for an immediate socialistic overthrow. And Mr. Trotsky, in his published account on his part in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, says, of course, a little post factum : " When the will of history summoned revolutionary Russia to initiate peace negotiations, we had no doubt whatever that, failing the intervention of the decisive power of the world's revolutionary proletariat, we should have to pay in full for over three and a half years of war. We knew perfectly well that German Imperialism was an enemy imbued with the consciousness of its own colossal strength, as manifested so glaringly in the present war." 100 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER No, the Bolshevik leaders were neither " naive " nor " ignorant." They " perfectly well knew " what the immediate result of their tactics was bound to be. If, in full consciousness of their ominous conduct, they were determined to disregard this result, it was because of the final aim they pursued, which is known to us as the aim and the tactics of Revolutionary Syndicalism. According to those tactics " direct action " was the aim in itself, quite independently from its practical results, owing to its intrinsic educational value. Was not the Revolution, in the view of the Syndicalists, the work of " every day and every hour ? " The result will come sooner or later : that was the firm belief of that revolutionary doctrine, but the only means to hasten its advent was to go on fighting for it. Mr. Lenin states it in utterances which might be signed by Georges Sorel. " If Socialism," he says to the Congress of the Peasants a fortnight after his triumph in Petrograd (November 1917), " can only be enacted when the intellectual development of all will permit it, we shall not see the advent of Socialism even after 500 years. But more advanced elements such as the Bolshevist Party in the present case must carry with them the masses without letting themselves be stopped by the fact that the average mentality of the masses is not what it ought to be. We must lead the masses by using the Soviets as organs of popular initiative." Mr. Trotsky repeats the same refrain in his book. " One must always remember that the masses of the people have never been in possession of power, that they have always been under the heel of other classes, and that therefore they lack political self-confidence PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 101 Any hesitation shown in revolutionary centres has an immediate deteriorating effect upon them. Only when the revolutionary party firmly and unflinchingly speeds to its goal can it help the working masses to overcome all the slavish instincts inherited from centuries, and lead the masses to victory. Only a resolute offensive secures victory with a minimum ex- penditure of strength and with the fewest losses." It is only when we consider in this light the " resolute offensive " now begun by the Bolsheviks for the " democratic peace " that we can understand why people who were not at all stupid, and some of whom were clever, were unable to foresee the results obvious to everybody. Theirs was a method of unswerving bluff, almost grandiose in its unattainable cynicism. " Soldiers ! Workmen ! Peasants ! " the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Trotsky, shouted four days after the Bolshevist victory : " Your Soviet Government will not permit your despatch anew to slaughter under the cudgels of a foreign bourgeoisie. Do not be afraid of menaces. The peoples of Europe, attenuated by suffering, are with us. They all want an immediate peace. Our prcposal of an armistice will resound as a bell of salvation. The peoples of Europe will not permit the bourgeois Governments to strike at the Russian people, whose only fault was to wish for peace and the fraternity of peoples." That very day (Novem- ber nth) Lenin explains to the Central Executive Committee that it was in consequence of the same system that the Russians were not going to address themselves for opening negotiations with the enemy to supreme military authorities, but that " it was necessary to address the soldiers directly, because 102 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER peace was to be concluded not from above, but from below, thanks to the activity of the soldiers themselves." " That is why," Lenin said, " we addressed our appeal to fraternize not to the army, but to every single regiment." Could that self-reliance be abashed by severe lessons administered to Bolshevist negotiators by German generals ? Of course not. The more insolent the Germans were, the worse the conditions of peace they proposed the best for the aims of the world's propaganda of Bolshevism. Well, Mr. Trotsky says in his inimitable slang (November igth), the representatives of the Kaiser have consented " to pass under the yoke " of the great Bolshevist power. " While sitting with them at the same table (instead of discussing peace with the ' peoples ') we shall put to them un- equivocal questions, and we shall admit no subterfuges. The whole trend of negotiations, every word uttered by us and by them, will be recorded and sent by wireless to all the peoples who will be judges of our negotiations. The German and the Austrian Governments, under the pressure of their lower strata, have already consented to be subpoenaed to sit on the defendants' bench. Be sure, comrades, that the Public Prosecutor, in the person of the Russian revolutionary dele- gation, will prove the right man in the right place ! " Moreover, " France and England will be obliged to join in peace negotiations. If they do not join, then their peoples, after having been informed of the trend of the negotiations, will drive them there with lashes, and the Russian representative will make their accu- sations at the bar of justice " (November 2ist). A few days later Mr. Trotsky is a little aston- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 108 ished. The Germans, past masters in bluff, easily outran their inexperienced pupils. " It must be can- didly admitted," Mr. Trotsky states, " that we did not anticipate that the actual proposals of the German Imperialists would be separated by such a wide gulf from the formulae presented to us by Kiihlmann on December 25th as a sort of plagiarism of the Russian Revolution (no annexations, etc.). We, indeed, did not expect such an acme of impudence." But, of course, General Hoffmann was no match for Leo Trotsky. What is the use of proposing " predatory conditions of peace " on the part of the Germans ? what is the reason for fear on the part of the Bolsheviks ? Anyhow, these are " no negotiations. We shall have to carry on other negotiations with Germany, when Liebknecht is at the head of the revolutionary proletariat of Germany, and together with him we shall readjust the map of Europe." To attain that aim one single thing is necessary : time to edify the European masses. Propaganda is the chief point, and the very negotiations present an interest for the Bolsheviks only so far as they give opportunities for propaganda and protract the con- clusion of peace. " We do not take into consideration that it is peace negotiations we carry on with Germany. We speak to them our customary revolutionary lan- guage." " Other negotiations, a true diplomacy of the trenches " will be carried in the ranks of the Austro- German Army through a special newspaper, the Torch, published in German. " We declared that on this point we shall not enter into discussion with German generals, but we will only talk with the German people." It is true that already in October the German 104 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER " Independents " wished their Russian comrades to know that " we cannot expect a Revolutionary move- ment in Germany to come soon : our Russian comrades must not count upon it." But the Russian comrades were bound to count upon it, because otherwise their game of hazard was lost. Even if they were wrong, and failed, it would not matter. Anyhow, it would be a new and better record for the future. They were really lost only in one case : if they became untrue to their final aim. " We made it the aim and purpose of our diplomacy," Mr. Trotsky says in his book, not to win a good peace for Russia which was impossible but to " enlighten the popular masses, to open their eyes as to the nature of the policy of their respective Governments, and to fuse them in one common struggle against, and hatred of, the bourgeois-capitalist regime." "In so far as we could not pledge ourselves to change the balance and correlation of the world's powers in a very short period of time, we openly and honestly declared that the Revolutionary Government might, under certain circumstances, be compelled to accept an annexationist peace. For not the acceptance of a peace forced upon us by the course of events, but an attempt to hide its predatory character from our own people, would have been the beginning of the end of the Revolutionary Government." It was, as one may see, quite an easy game : one had only to oppose to every step of German diplomacy a renewed appeal to the " peoples," without heeding any practical consequences. Even if Germany had to win, to dismember Russia, to defeat her Allies, to establish its domination over Europe, what did it PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 105 matter ? The " common struggle against, and hatred of, the bourgeois-capitalist regime " was bound to come anyhow. Measured by that supreme criterion, every- thing else dwindled down to insignificance, and it was quite immaterial whether that final result was attained by victory or by temporary compromise, by promises given and not fulfilled, by any kind of " predatory peace " extorted by the " capitalists " and forcibly acceded to by the Internationalists. Anything that might hasten the final upshot was to be resorted to, while no promise and no obligation could be con- sidered binding towards " sworn enemies of the ' pro- letariat.' " Of course, it is not only the Messianic idea of a Com- munist millennium to come that makes the Bolsheviks believe in the infallibility of their tactics. It is also their reading of current events, in which they display extreme credulity in regard to the signs of approaching catastrophe. It was not mere bluff when the Pravda stated on November 13, 1917 : " William knows that in case he gives an unsatisfactory answer German proletarians and peasants will reply by an outburst of indignation, a cry of revolt which will prove fatal to him." This also was the state of mind of Trotsky during the Brest - Litovsk negotiations. " In the interval, which lasted ten days," he says in his book, " serious disturbances broke out in Austria, and strikes took place among the labouring class there." This he describes as " the first act of recognition on the part of proletariat of the Central Powers of our methods of conducting the peace negotiations, in the face of the annexationist demands of German Imperialism." Later on, the official Isvestia will agree, to be sure : 106 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER " we were deceived by the Austro-German strike, which made us to use Herzen's expression mistake the second month of pregnancy for the ninth." But directly they console themselves with a new manifes- tation of their self-conceit. " In our turn we repaid the German Imperialists a hundredfold when we induced them fatally to believe that on the fields of Champagne they might look forward to as speedy successes as they reaped on the snowy plains of Russia." The Bolsheviks thus even construe the military successes of the Allies as one more proof of the intrinsic merits of their inter- nationalist method of fighting with words ! Pursuing that course, after many more deceptions and disillusions, Mr. Trotsky finally recurred to means " unused in the world's history," to use his grandilo- quent style. He declared that he would neither sign, nor fight. To confound the guilty conscience of the " imperialist " enemy Government, the Russian Army was to be formally demobilized. The Russian front, thus left without defence, was " handed over to the protection of German workmen." That was, of course, consistent with the doctrine, but not in the least convincing. " Imperialistic " Germany immediately made use of that charitable decision and . . . started on the occupation and subsequent dismemberment of Russia. This, too, was explained by the Bolsheviks as the very pitch of Russian success ! Mr. Zinoviev, the dictator of Petrograd, on January 30, 1918, wrote in his Red Journal : " We dealt a terrible blow to the world's Imperialism, when, three months ago, we began our peace negotiations. Now we deal to that Imperial- ism a deadly blow by our new formula < " He meant Mr. Trotsky's formula : Neither peace nor war. PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 107 There was a system in this madness. And it was this system which, in a sense, revealed its strength. Both German and Bolshevist plenipotentiaries at Brest- Litovsk understood very well where that strength lay. Mr. Kamenev, one of the negotiators, stated quite frankly to a French journalist (Robert Vaucher) : " We protracted negotiations for three months," he said, " in order to give time for our propaganda to pervade Germany . . . and as soon as the Germans saw that we were dragging out discussion they at once changed their tone. . . . They became arrogant as soon as they heard Trotsky speak of the revolution in Germany. ' These people,' they said to themselves, ' have come here not to make peace, but to foment revolution.' And indeed we had many opportunities of meeting soldiers who were disaffected. ..." As a matter of fact, during the negotiations Mr. Kamenev was particularly anxious to extract from the German military command a direct permission to send Bolshevist incendiary pamphlets to the German trenches, and through Germany to the French and British front. He candidly avowed that this was an integral part of " the system of the revolutionary struggle for peace." Moreover, the Bolsheviks did not even wait for per- mission. A pamphlet signed by Lenin and Trotsky was spread " in millions of copies " among the German soldiers at the very time when negotiations were being carried on. The secretary of the Russian delegation, Mr. Karahan, had a serious talk on this subject with the German delegates. They drew his attention to the " disloyalty " of the method under which the Russian Government was openly preaching rebellion against the very Government with whose representatives it 108 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER was treating. " It looks as if the Russians do not mean it seriously and are not sincere in their desire to conclude peace. . . ." Of course, they were sincere in that they considered the peace negotiations as one of the means for making propaganda and for preparing the international con- flagration. And the worse this peace was for their country, the better it suited their purpose. They did not make any secret of their point of view. They were quite outspoken and candid. In hundreds of speeches, newspaper articles, formal declarations, they were never tired of repeating the same basic idea. The Revolution in Russia did not aim at making Russia a Socialistic State. It was to last as long as it was necessary to kindle the fire elsewhere. That is why propaganda was an essential feature of the whole scheme : and this in a double sense. In the first place, the new Soviet organization, by the very fact of its existence, was to work as a sample, a living means of propaganda. In the second place, the Communist Government had to make use of its power in order to apply to other countries the system used by the Germans towards the Bolsheviks. It has now become possible for them to use for international propaganda the financial resources of the Russian State. The only leading idea, the beginning and the end of the Bolshevist political wisdom, was to remain long enough in possession of that power to see the results of their international work. They had no doubt as to the fruition of these results. Their only apprehension was lest Bolshevism in Russia should be stifled beforehand by foreign " capitalists " and " imperialists." But, according to a new version of Bolshevist PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 109 optimism, " capitalists " were themselves doing Bolshe- vist business. Three weeks after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace, and a week after its ratification by the All-Russian Soviet, the Petrograd correspondent of the Daily News formulated Mr. Lenin's theory as follows (March 22, 1918) : " The task of the Soviets is to hold on until the mutual exhaustion of the fighting groups of European capital brings about revolution in all countries." Meantime, Mr. Trotsky, who ex- changed the Foreign Office for the War Office, would prepare his voluntary and democratic " Red Army " in order to impose his Communist law on a revolu- tionized world. The events which followed Brest-Litovsk did not seem to justify these sanguine forecasts. The German armies flooded the South Russian plain. Count Mirbach played the master in Moscow and treated the Bolshevik authorities in a high-handed way. Puffed up with their victory in the East, the German armies were preparing for a final blow in the West. In Germany itself and in the Reichstag there was no more talk of " peace by negotiation." The peace that was to follow the successful offensive of April and May had to be a " German peace." The democratic formula of the parliamentary bloc of July igth was no more spoken about, or it was even openly repudiated. The Allied countries France particularly lived through what was called their " darkest hour." If the spirit was un daunted, human material was becoming exhausted while the Americans were only just beginning to cross and their military value was as yet unknown. The hour seemed to have struck for the German victory on the continent. Was it within the limits of human 110 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER foresight to surmise that before a half-year elapsed all that glory would pass away like a summer dream ? The Bolsheviks knew it better than anybody else. A curious mixture of crazy dreamers in their aims, and cynical realists in their methods of action, they learnt by Russian experience just how exceptionally favourable the conditions of wartime and war weariness were for their revolutionary propaganda. The only doubtful point was whether Germany, so famous for her civic discipline, would dissolve as easily as the country of Tolstoy had done. They were quite confident that Germany would. They knew that the same process of dissolution of the army which brought them to power in Russia was at the same time going on in the ranks of the German soldiers. Doubtless they were in contact with " Spartacists." Rosa Luxembourg had written to a Russian Socialist as early as July 1917 (quoted by John Reed in his leaflet Red Russia) : " The Russian Revolution was everything to us, too. Everything in Germany was tottering, falling. . . . For months the soldiers of the two armies fraternized, and our officers were powerless to stop it." Since November, after the Bolshevist victory, the contact with German (and foreign, in general) revolutionaries had become much more regular. New means of action were now available. One of them, and a very efficient one, was the teaching of internationalist doctrines to German and Austrian prisoners in Russia, and then sending them home. This was just what the Germans had been doing and the effect was similar. During the summer months of 1918 Germany more than once acknowledged the success of that propaganda by repeatedly protesting against it. On May loth PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 111 Count Mirbach addressed his ultimatum to the Soviet Government, enjoining them to stop their revolutionary propaganda amongst the war prisoners. On June 6th Kiihlmann sent a note to the Soviet demanding the immediate dissolution of committees for war prisoners and the arrest of their presidents. Austria, also, insisted that revolutionary propaganda among the Austro-Hungarian prisoners should be discontinued. A week later the Viennese Press deplored the Bolshevist epidemics let loose in Austria by prisoners back from Russia. The agitation had become still easier since the day (May 2nd) when Mr. Joffe unfolded the Red Banner on the Bolshevist Embassy in Berlin. Berlin was shocked by the fact that the new Ambassador, instead of starting on a round of official visits, entered directly into contact with the German Socialist Minority. The systematic financing of the " Spartacists " evidently dated from this time. It was now fair to state that the Bolsheviks were " repaying " the German " capital- ists " who had supplied them with money for their original propaganda and " direct action." Curiously enough, for a time, both the old and the new tactics of working with the Germans for " peace propaganda " in Allied countries, and working against the Germans for a revolution in their own country, went together. Up to the last detail the Bolsheviks used all the methods of German agitation and " destruction." A special " Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda " was " attached to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs." They printed pamphlets and periodicals in every foreign language, and they used diplomatic couriers and friendly Legations in order to spread that literature 112 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER in and outside Europe. A Weltr evolution (World Revolution) was published for the Germans. The Troisieme Internationale " (The Third International) was issued by the " French section " in French. Series of " Russian Revolutionary Pamphlets " by Lenin, Philips Price, etc., had been published in English in Petrograd and in Moscow, before they began to be printed by the I.L.P., B.S.P., or W.S.F. in London. It is easy to understand the exultation of the Bol- sheviks at the first symptoms of the real German collapse. Was not it the beginning of the realization of their prophecies, and did not it strengthen enormously the probability of their forecasts for a World Revolution to follow ? Vorwarts was the first to recognize their part in it, in an editorial which was prohibited by the German censor, but as a sign and a proof of mutual contact appeared in the Bolshevist Pravda (Truth) on October igth. " The cause of that complete change in the situation," Vorwarts asserted, " must not be sought in military success or defeat, but in the fact that the hopes of the Russian Bolsheviks begin to accomplish themselves. The Universal Revolution is already in sight. Bolshevism is not confined to Russian frontiers. Conditions necessary for its existence obtain in all countries. In all countries the spirit of Bol- shevism has made immense progress, and it becomes a danger for the bourgeoisie. From this point of view the armistice and the peace negotiations were considered as a subterfuge used by the international bourgeoisie in order to save their cause from the social revolution." And the editorial of the Truth on the subject was boldly entitled: "League of Nations or ... the Third International." " The Government of the PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 113 working class alone can liberate Germany from an inevitable smash and can fearlessly reject the judgment of the international bigot (Wilson), while giving over the cause of peace to the new Third International." " We must recollect," Lenin said at the solemn meeting of the Moscow Soviet Central Executive Committee, on October 22nd, " that in the chain of revolutions the chief link is the German one. The success of the World Revolution depends on it much more than on any other." But " the same force that has destroyed Germany is also at work in England and in America." And he reviewed the state of internationalist propaganda in Bulgaria and Serbia, in the small States of Austria, in Germany, in Italy, in France, and in England. His conclusion was : " That is how a universal phenomenon reveals itself before us : Bolshevism has become the universal theory and practice of the world's proletariat." " Never before was the universal proletarian revolution as close as it is now." A few days later the Petrograd dictator, Zinoviev, developed the same subject at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet. " Let them laugh at the fact that there will be a working men's revolution in Berlin. The bourgeoisie is so blind as to say : let the revolution come wherever it likes, but not in our country. Well, the advent of a revolution in Berlin means its simultaneous growth in Paris. . . . The bankers of France and of London will soon learn that the revolution in Berlin was not a feast, but a memento won', which had to remind them of their coming per- dition." At that very time Liebknecht was set free from his prison (October 23rd), and the Russian work- men's organizations greeted him as a leader of the World Revolution. " We know it for sure that you 8 114 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER will put yourself at the head of German workmen, soldiers, and peasants, and after having helped them to the victory over their own bourgeoisie, you will, shoulder to shoulder with the Russian proletariat, advance on the last and decisive struggle with the expiring world's imperialism, and build on its ruins the world's social Republic of the Soviets." Trotsky, in his turn, at a popular meeting in Petrograd on October igth, ventures to " prophesy " : " Let only the ring of German militarism be disjointed, and a revolution will be kindled in France. The barricades in Berlin will the very next day bring forth barricades in Paris. In full confidence we now say to Poincare, Clemenceau, and to the bigot Wilson : ' You will not frighten us ; you will have your revolution, and we must only wait and keep in being.' ' Of course, the Bolsheviks were very far from adopting " wait and see " tactics. They proved extremely active in coming into contact with kindred Extremist Internationalist elements all over the world, sending them money, leaflets, and instructions through the agents of their foreign propaganda. After the Armistice, in a still larger degree than during the war, they considered written and oral propaganda to be their chief aim and weapon. And they made everything else subservient to it. They expected the opposite side, the bourgeoisie and the Governments, to be as keen and to become as active in defending their interests as they themselves were. That is why Lenin declared that, in spite of the proximity of the World Revolution, " the situation was never so dangerous for Bolshevism as it has become now." After the Armistice they expected the Allies to pass through the Straits to PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 115 Southern Russia, and they, in Trotsky's speech on October I2th, beforehand declared that the Southern Front, and particularly the Don region, will now " become the wedge of the World Revolution." Events have since proved that they strongly overrated the cleverness and the capability of the Allies for large scale initiative. The new " Holy Alliance " of the bourgeois Governments was late in coming. Moderate Socialism and Labour opinion strongly favoured the Russian Soviet experi- ment. And instead of an Allied armed force, there finally came to Moscow from the Paris Peace Conference, the " Prinkipo " proposal of January 22, 1919. The " bigot " Wilson, far from taking up the part assigned to him by the Bolsheviks, namely, that of " the leader of the common bourgeois front " as opposed to " Lenin's front of the World Revolution," has shown an un- mistakable leaning towards recognizing the Bolshevik Government as representing the real will of the Russian people. After the first moments of astonishment and in- credulity, the Bolsheviks at once saw their chance and tried to use it. They never refused a proposal to come and to discuss matters not even at Brest- Litovsk. Discussion meant propaganda. We have an interesting account of an extraordinary meeting of a Bolshevist War Council at the Kremlin, in Moscow, upon the reception of the Entente invitation. The story is told by a Bolshevik official, who enjoyed Lenin's confidence, but who served the Bolsheviks against his will and convictions. 1 All the leading Bolsheviks 1 See Daily Chronicle of March 6th, a telegram from Geneva, re- producing a correspondence from Kiel, whither the said official flew from Moscow. 116 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER were present : Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin, Lunachar- sky, Rakovsky, Kamenev, Karakhan, and Zinoviev, Trotsky reported on the military and political situation. Although the Soviet armies were able to hold their own, he said, they would hardly prove capable of withstanding an attack by disciplined, well-equipped troops with heavy artillery. The internal situation was very critical, almost desperate, as the Soviet Republic was being dangerously undermined by famine, plague, crime, and the utter moral disintegration of the Russian people. Accordingly, Trotsky insisted on sending delegates to Prinkipo in order to obtain a truce a new " breathing space," to use Lenin's utter- ance in Brest-Litovsk days and, if possible, recognition from the Allies. The chief objection of Zinoviev and Kamenev was, that the character of the Soviet Republic would be altered and eventually destroyed by nego- tiations with bourgeois Governments. But Chicherin, Trotsky's successor in the Foreign Office, retorted that, on the contrary, such negotiations would give them new means of struggle. Recognition would enable the Soviet to send Ambassadors to all European capitals ; the Ambassadors would enjoy the usual prerogatives of diplomatic secrecy, and thus ideal opportunities would be given for effective propaganda and the pre- paration of a World Revolution. The method had been already successfully used by Joffe in Berlin, and by Lit vino v in London. And then Lenin developed his theory of using that method. ' The successful development of the Bolshevik doctrine throughout the world," he declared, " can only be effected by means of periods of rest during which we may recuperate and gather new strength for further exertions. We are PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 117 to-day in the position of a victorious army, which has conquered two-thirds of the enemy's territory, but is forced to interrupt its offensive in order to establish new lines of communication, organize new depots, and bring up more heavy guns, ammunition, and fresh reserves. I have never hesitated," he asserted, " to come to terms with bourgeois Governments, when by so doing I thought I could weaken the bourgeoisie and strengthen the proletariat in all countries. It is sound strategy in war to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of a mortal blow possible. This was the policy we adopted towards the German Empire, and it has proved success- ful. The time has now come for us to conclude a second Brest-Litovsk Treaty, this time with the Entente. We must make peace not only with the Entente, but also with Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, and all the other forces which are opposing us in Russia. We must be prepared to make every concession, promise, and sacrifice in order to entice our foes into the conclusion of this peace. They will proclaim to the world that they have subdued us, and that the Soviet Republic has capitulated unconditionally. Let them ! We shall know that we have but concluded a truce, permitting us to complete our preparations for a decisive onslaught which will assure our triumph." A decision was here- upon adopted, which has since greatly served pro- Bolsheviks in the Allied countries to confound public opinion and really to entice a part of it to pass to the side of the Bolsheviks : namely, it was decided not only to accept the Entente's proposal to come to Prinkipo, but even to offer financial guarantees and economic concessions to the " greedy 118 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER capitalists " in such regions of Russia as were not possessed by the Bolsheviks, such as the Urals or Siberia. Did the Soviet really mean to be false to the prole- tarian " character of the Soviet republic," and thus to sap its moral and theoretical foundations ? Of course, not in the least. Just a couple of weeks before the Kremlin decision was taken on January 23rd Lenin had in his turn sent by invitation a wireless : not to discuss matters with the bourgeois Governments, but to convene the first Congress of the new (the " Third ") International, whose origins in Zimmerwald and Kienthal we already know. The full doctrine of " Revolutionary " Communism is here restated. The wireless states the dangers which menace the World Revolution, namely : (i) the " complete bankruptcy of the two Socialist and Social Democratic parties since the war and the Revolution " ; and (2) the " coalition of the capitalist States in order to stifle the Revolution, under the hypocritical banner of the League of Nations." The very reason for convoking the Third International was that the " traitor " Socialists were convoking the Second, in order to " aid once more their Governments and their bourgeoisie to cheat the working class." The Moscow invitation reminded the pro-Bolsheviks in Europe that " the old International divided itself in three principal currents : (i) That of Socialists " openly patriots," against whom " only a fight without mercy is possible " ; (2) " Minoritarians," led by Kautsky, always wavering and incapable of taking a decisive line of action : towards such the right tactics consist in " severely criticizing their leaders, detaching from them truly revolutionary elements, and syste- PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 119 matically disjoining their followers " ; (3) in the third place, the " left revolutionary wing." The invitation to take part in the Congress was addressed to this last category : to Revolutionary " Socialists and Com- munists of Zimmerwald and Kienthal colouring." It is important to point out just which were the parties invited from different countries and classified with the Bolsheviks. Here is the list in full, as it is given in the telegram : 1. The " Spartacus " League (Germany). 2. The Bolsheviks, or the Communist party (Russia). The Communist parties of 3. German Austria. 4. Hungary. 5. Finland. 6. Poland. 7. Esthonia. 8. Latvia. g. Lithuania. 10. White Russia. 11. Ukrainia. 12. The revolutionary elements of the Czechs. 13. The Socialist Democratic party of Bulgaria. 14. The Socialist Democratic party of Rumania. 15. The left wing of the Social Democratic party in Serbia. 16. The left wing of the Social Democratic party in Sweden. 17. The Socialist Democratic party in Norway. 1 8. The groups recognizing the principle of class struggle in Denmark. 19. The Communist party in Holland. 20. The revolutionary elements of the Workmen's party in Belgium. 21 and 22. Groups and organizations belonging to the Socialist and Syndicalist movement in France, which are, in general, united. 23. The left wing of the Social Democratic party in Switzer- land. 24. The Socialist party in Italy. 25. The elements of the left wing of the Socialist party in Spain. 120 BOLSHEVISM: AN INTERNATIONAL DANGER 26. The elements of the left wing of the Socialist party in Portugal. 27. The British Socialist Party (the elements closest to us are represented by MacLean). 28. I.S.P.K. (England). 29. I.W.W.K. (England). 30. I.W.W. (Great Britain). 31. The revolutionary elements of the working organizations in Ireland. 32. The revolutionary elements of the Shop Stewards (Great Britain) . 33. S.L.P. (America). 34. The elements of the left wing of the Socialist party in America (tendencies represented by Debs and by the League of the Socialist propaganda). 35. American W.W. (Workers of the World ?) 36. W.W. in Australia. 37. American Workers' International Industrial Union. 38. The Socialist groups of Tokio and of Samoa, represented by Genkkayma ; and 39. The Socialist International youth. These were the elements likely to represent the ' Third International," the " revolutionary," according to Lenin. His views as to the common platform uniting all these groups are also settled. The following is an abstract of principles to be laid down as the basis of the new " organ of combat," which was to be started by the proposed Congress : 1. The present period is that of the dissolution and the break- down of the whole capitalist system of the world. 2. The task of the proletariat to-day consists in immediately taking possession of the power of government, in order to sub- stitute for it the apparatus of the proletarian power. 3. This new apparatus of government must incorporate the dictatorship of the working class, and in some places also that of petty peasants and agricultural workers, i.e. the weapon of a systematic overthrow of the exploiting classes. 4. The dictatorship of the proletariat must pursue the direct expropriation of capitalism and the abolition of private owner- ship of the means of production, which implies under the name of Socialism the suppression of private property and its transfer PROGRESS THROUGH WAR 121 to the proletarian State, under the Socialist administration of the working class . . . the abolition of capitalist agricultural production, monopolization of great commercial firms. . . . 5. In order to secure the Socialist Revolution, the disarmament of the bourgeoisie and of its agents, as well as the general arming of the proletariat, are necessary. 1 We see that Lenin was right while asserting that the only aim of his proposals to the Entente was to secure a longer life for the existence of the Russian Bolshevist experiment, in order that he might prepare the "mortal blow" to its enemy, "capitalism." Before we proceed further, it is important to learn what was, then, the answer of the " central " and the " patriotic " Socialists to that attempt to organize international Zimmerwaldism and to make war on the old organization of the " Second " Inter- national. This answer has been given by the Congress of the Second International, which really took place in Berne on February 3-8, 1919. It is couched in terms of the resolution proposed by Hjalmar Branting, and voted by the great majority of the Conference. Taken as a whole, particularly if one does not know anything about the debates, the resolution sounds very sa