^r 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 M 
 
THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND 
 
 MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS. 
 
 A TREATISE 
 
 CONCERNING THE 
 
 Principles of Human Knowledge. 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D. 
 
 FORMERLY BISHOP OF CLOYNB. 
 
 WITH PROLEGOMENA, AND WITH ANNOTATIONS, SELECT. 
 TRANSLATED, AND ORIGINAL. 
 
 BY 
 CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D.D., 
 
 NORTON PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AND CHURCH POLITY IN THE EVANGELICAL 
 LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY IN PHILADELPHIA; PROFESSOR OF INTEL- 
 LECTUAL AND MOKAL PHILOSOPHY, AND VICE-PROVOST OF 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
 
 1878. 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
 Lippijtoott'i P It ESS, 
 
 1' 11 1 I. A liKI. I'll I A. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Prolegomena : — 
 
 I. Berkeley's Life and Writings 5-17 
 
 II. The Precursors of Berkeley 18-25 
 
 III. Summaries of Berkeley's System ....... 2 5 _ 35 
 
 IV. Berkeleyanism, its Friends, Affinities, and Influence . . . 35~42 
 V. Opponents and Objections 4 2 ~57 
 
 VI. Estimates of Berkeley, his Character, Writings, and Influence . 57-66 
 
 VII. Idealism defined 66-70 
 
 VIII. Sceptical Idealism in the Development of Idealism from Berkeley 
 
 to the Present : Hume 70-72 
 
 IX. Critical Idealism : Kant 72-86 
 
 X. Subjective Idealism : Fichte 86-92 
 
 XI. Objective Idealism : Schelling 92-100 
 
 Jacobi 100, 101 
 
 XII. Absolute Idealism : Hegel 101-105 
 
 XIII. Theoretical Idealism : Schopenhauer 105-122 
 
 XIV. The Strength and Weakness of Idealism 122-142 
 
 XV. Characteristics of the Present Edition 142-144 
 
 XVI. Its Objects and Uses 144-147 
 
 Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
 Knowledge : — 
 
 I. Fraser's Preface, — Berkeley's Preface 151-172 
 
 II. Berkeley's Introduction 173-191 
 
 III. Berkeley's Principles ......... 193-281 
 
 3 
 
 M368ni2 
 
4 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Appendixes : — 
 
 A. Berkeley's rough Draft of the Introduction 285-316 
 
 B. Arthur Collier 317-322 
 
 C. Theory of Vision vindicated 3 2 3S 2 7 
 
 Annotations of Ueberweg, with Additions 3 2 9-4°7 
 
 Index 4°9 
 
PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 I. Berkeley's Life and Writings. 
 
 § i : Early Life and Education. — George Berkeley, born at 
 Kilcrin or Dysert, in the County of Kilkenny, Ireland, March 12, 
 1684-1685,* was a descendant of the noble English house of 
 Berkeley. The commonly accepted statement is that more than 
 twenty years before his birth his great-grandfather, the first Lord 
 Berkeley of Stratton, who had been ennobled by Charles II., 
 came to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant, and settled there, as it 
 would seem, with his son, the grandfather of Berkeley. In fact, 
 the early years and the ancestry of Berkeley are shrouded in 
 mystery. ' He comes forth the most subtle and accomplished 
 philosopher of his time, almost from darkness.' 
 
 George Berkeley, at the age of fifteen, entered Trinity College, 
 Dublin, March 21, 1700, with which he was connected until 1713. 
 He obtained a fellowship in 1 707. Peter Browne, subsequently 
 Bishop of Cork, was the Provost of Trinity. Locke's ' Essay 
 concerning Human Understanding,' and the writings of Bacon, 
 Descartes, Malebranche, and Newton, were diligently studied at 
 that time. 
 
 § 2: Early Works. — In 1707 appeared a Latin Dissertation 
 by Berkeley: 'Arithmetica absque Algebra aut Euclide demon- 
 strata ;' the ' Essay towards a New Theory of Vision' followed, 
 1709; the 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' 1710; Berkeley's 
 next work was the ' Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,' 
 published 1713. 
 
 * This sketch embraces the entire matter of Ueberweg's, in his edition of the Principles, 
 but corrected and very much enlarged from other sources, especially from Prof. Fraser's 
 ' Life and Letters of Berkeley.' Works, vol. iv. 
 
 5 
 
6 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 'In the two writings last named,' says Ueberweg, 'he presents 
 his philosophical doctrine, complete in each of them. The man- 
 ner of presentation, however, is diverse. In the " Principles" we 
 have a systematic development ; in the " Dialogues" there is 
 a personal discussion between Philonous, an adherent of the 
 doctrine of Berkeley, and Hylas, an opponent of it. Hylas 
 does not oppose a fixed, thoroughly developed view to that of 
 Berkeley, but, proceeding from the common confusion in regard 
 to the problem, gradually advances to a more scientific apprehen- 
 sion of the subject, but is driven from one position to another by 
 his antagonist, until at last he acknowledges himself beaten, and 
 only asks a verbal concession to the received mode of speaking, 
 which Philonous, without favouring it, concedes. As the con- 
 cession, however, involves a twofold use of the word "matter," to 
 wit, in the phenomenal and in the transcendental sense, it is open 
 to some objection. In consequence of the life of their mode 
 • of delineation, the " Dialogues" have a peculiar charm ; but the 
 " Principles" present the doctrine in its most original and purely 
 scientific shape.' Fraser calls the Dialogues 'the gem of British 
 metaphysical literature.' 
 
 § 3 : Travels. — The publication of the ' Dialogues' followed 
 upon Berkeley's visit to London, 17 13. He formed an intimate 
 friendship with Swift, Pope, and other writers of the highest dis- 
 tinction. Swift introduced Berkeley to his kinsman the Earl of 
 Berkeley. Atterbury, having heard much of Berkeley, wished 
 to see him, and was introduced to him by the Earl. When 
 Berkeley left the room the Earl said to the Bishop, ' Does my 
 cousin answer your lordship's expectations?' Atterbury, lifting 
 up his hands in astonishment, replied, ' So much understanding, 
 so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did 
 not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this 
 gentleman.' 
 
 It was on a recommendation by Swift to the Earl of Peterbo- 
 rough that Berkeley, as the chaplain and secretary of that noble- 
 man, accompanied him on his journey as ambassador through 
 France to Italy (Nov., 1713, to August, 1714). Soon after his 
 return to London he had a severe attack of sickness. After his 
 recovery, his friend Doctor Arbuthnot wrote playfully to Swift: 
 
I.— BERKELEY' S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 7 
 
 1 Poor philosopher Berkeley has now the idea of health, which was 
 very hard to produce in him ; for he had an idea of a strange fever 
 upon him, so strong that it was very hard to destroy it by intro- 
 ducing a contrary one.' Soon after Berkeley visited France and 
 Italy a second time. He went as the companion and tutor of 
 the only son of the Bishop of Clogher. 
 
 In Paris — according to the common story — Berkeley had a 
 disputation with Malebranche, the distinguished metaphysician, 
 most frequently spoken of in our day in connection with his 
 doctrine that we behold all things in God. 
 
 § 4 : Malebranche. — ' The doctrine of Malebranche,' says Ueber- 
 weg, ' that there are indeed material things which exist without 
 the mind, but that these things have no power of operating upon 
 the mind, but are represented in the divine mind, and that we 
 have intuition of this representation, can easily lead to a view 
 which goes yet further, and denies that material things exist 
 at all ; for as they can effect nothing, to suppose that they exist is 
 to suppose that God has created them wholly without an object' 
 Of this obvious point Berkeley avails himself with much force. 
 
 § 5 : Arthur Collier, an Oxford scholar (1680-1732), had 
 been led into the train of thought suggested by Malebranche. 
 This was mainly due to the influence of the work of John Norris: 
 'Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World,' 2 vols., 1 701-4. 
 
 Collier had reached views in general unison with Berkeley's 
 as early as 1703. These he had expressed privately, and had 
 defended in an unpublished work, ' On the Dependent Existence 
 of the Visible World,' which is dated 1708. Three years after 
 Berkeley's ' Principles,' Collier appeared as an author in his ' Clavis 
 Universalis, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration 
 of the Non-existence and Impossibility of an External World.' 
 London, 17 1 3. 
 
 A full account of Collier's work, with citations from it, will be 
 found in Appendix B. 
 
 It is certain that Berkeley was not influenced by Collier ; and 
 there is no reason to believe that Collier was influenced by 
 Berkeley. So far as the speculation of the two writers agrees, 
 'the agreement may be referred to the common philosophical 
 point of view at the time. The scientific world was preparing 
 
8 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 for that reconstruction of its conception of what sensible things 
 and externality mean, which has since clarified and simplified 
 physical research. Collier in his own way was not wanting in 
 force ; but he expressed his acute thoughts in awkward English, 
 with the pedantry of a schoolman, and wanted the sentiment and 
 imagination and constant recognition of the relation of speculation 
 to human action, which in the course of time made the contem- 
 porary writings of Berkeley an influence that has left its mark 
 upon all later thought. The theory of sense-symbolism, which 
 connected Berkeley with the Baconian movement, and also with 
 religion, is wanting in Collier, whose arid reasonings are divorced 
 from the living interests of men. The starting-point of Berkeley 
 was more in the current philosophy of Locke ; Collier produced 
 the meditative reasonings of a recluse student of Malebranche 
 and the schoolmen.' 1 'The universal sense-symbolism of Berke- 
 ley, his broad recognition of the distinction between physical or 
 symbolical and efficient or proper causation, and his large philo- 
 sophical insight, are all wanting in the narrow but acute reason- 
 ings of Collier. Berkeley's philosophy, owing to its own com- 
 prehensiveness, not less than to the humanity of his sympathies 
 and the beauty of his style, is now recognized as a striking 
 expression or solution of problems of modern thought, while 
 Collier is condemned to the obscurity of a mere reasoner of the 
 schools.' 2 
 
 § 6 : Returns to England — Sails to America. — Berkeley 
 remained in Italy until, probably, 1720. He shows in his Letters 
 and Journal an intense interest in nature, art, and popular 
 manners. 
 
 After his return to England, he spent most of the time in 
 London, from 1721 to 1728. His mind was occupied at this time 
 with a plan for establishing a college in the Bermuda Islands. It 
 was to be modelled in general after Trinity College, Dublin, and 
 its grand aim was to be the extension of Christianity and civiliza- 
 tion in America. The king was greatly interested in the 'pious 
 work.' Sir Robert Walpole promised twenty thousand pounds 
 for the endowment of the college. 
 
 1 Fraser : Life and Letters, 62, 63. 
 
 9 Fraser : Preface to Dialogues. Works, i. 254. 
 
I.— BERKELEY'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. g 
 
 Berkeley was Dean of Derry, ' the best preferment' in Ireland, 
 which he had held since 1724. 
 
 In September, 1728, he sailed for Rhode Island. He had been 
 married August 1st of the same year to Anne, daughter of 
 John Forster, who had been Chief Justice of the Common Pleas 
 and Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. The Dean and 
 his young wife, after a voyage of more than four months, landed 
 at Newport. The inspiration of the prospect of planting arts and 
 learning in America prompted the verses which close with the 
 prophetic words : 
 
 ' Westward the course of Empire takes its way ; 
 
 The four first Acts already past, 
 A fifth shall close the Drama with the day, 
 Time's noblest offspring is the last." 
 
 §7: Returns from America — Alciphron. — Berkeley re- 
 mained in America until Walpole's refusal to fulfil his promises, 
 and the consequent withholding of the needed funds, compelled 
 him to surrender his cherished hopes and plans. He sailed for 
 England in the end of 1731, and early in 1732 was once more in 
 London. The hours of waiting in Rhode Island had not been 
 spent in idleness. He had written there his Alciphron, in which 
 the exquisite scenery of Rhode Island is the drapery of the 
 Socratic Drama. 'Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher,' ap- 
 peared in March, 1732. It is directed against the 'Free-thinkers.' 
 It was aimed especially at Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Collins, 
 and at some of the views of Bishop Browne on theological knowl- 
 edge. It is the largest and ' probably the most popular of his 
 works. It should be studied in the light of the history of English 
 Deism from the time of Hobbes.' 
 
 Shaftesbury (1671-1713) was the author of 'Characteristics 
 of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times ;' ' Inquiry concerning 
 Virtue and Merit ;' ' The Moralists, a Rhapsody.' 
 
 Mandeville (1670-1733) wrote the 'Fable of the Bees,' Lon- 
 don, 1 7 14. Its aim was to prove 'private vices public benefits.' 
 The bee-hive of the Fable was one in which 
 
 1 Every part was full of vice, 
 Yet the whole mass a paradise.' 
 
 Anthony Collins had published, 1713, a 'Discourse of Free- 
 
I0 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 thinking, occasioned by the Rise and Growth of a Sect called 
 Free-thinkers.' In this Discourse ' he boldly took for granted 
 that all believers in supernatural revelation must be hostile to free 
 inquiry. The exclusive claim to free inquiry made by the "Free- 
 thinkers" aroused the indignation of Berkeley.' In the Guardian 
 at the time, and long after in Alciphron, ' he appears as a free- 
 thinking Anti-free-thinker.' He demonstrates the bond-thinking 
 of free-thinkers, and shows, as Wesley expresses it, that, as a 
 class, ' free-thinkers are not deep thinkers.' 
 
 Dr. Peter Browne, in his * Procedure and Limits of Human 
 Understanding,' had argued that the attributes of Deity ' can be 
 known to us only in a secondary or analogical signification 
 of the terms employed to represent them.' This hypothesis 
 Berkeley contests with some severity, and was answered by the 
 Bishop about a year after. 
 
 The title 'The Minute Philosopher' was suggested by a sen- 
 tence from Cicero's Cato Major, which is quoted as a motto of 
 the book: 'Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti philosophi censent, 
 nihil sentiam, non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui phi- 
 losophi irrideant.' (If at death, as some small philosophers think 
 is the case, my sentient being shall cease, I need not fear that the 
 dead philosophers will ridicule this error of mine.) 
 
 Alciphron contains Dialogues to which Fraser assigns a very 
 high rank, pronouncing them ' unrivalled for controversial acute- 
 ness and literary beauty in modern times.' He agrees in Hurd's 
 judgment, that nothing approaches them in perfection of form ex- 
 cept Shaftesbury's ' Moralists' and Addison's ' Treatise on Medals.' 
 They ' are better fitted than any (dialogues) in our language to 
 enable the English reader to realize the charm of Cicero and 
 Plato.* 
 
 § 8 : Becomes Bishop. — Berkeley's old friend Sherlock, now one 
 of the chaplains of Queen Caroline, wife of George II., placed 
 in her hands a copy of Alciphron. As Princess of Wales, she had 
 known and admired Berkeley before his voyage to America. To 
 her friendship was due in large part that mere political consid- 
 erations were overlooked, and that 'an unworldly social idealist 
 and philosopher' was nominated (March, 1734) to the bishopric 
 of Clcyne, in Ireland. In the spring of 1735 he entered upon 
 
I.— BERKELEY' S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 
 
 I I 
 
 his new charge, with the fidelity and devotion which characterized 
 every part of his official life. 
 
 Berkeley showed an interest in the great political and social 
 problems of his day. In 17 12 he published three sermons vindi- 
 cating the principle of passive obedience. They were occasioned 
 by Locke's treatises on government, and advocate high Tory 
 principles. They contain Berkeley's moral philosophy. They 
 gave rise to the report that he was a Jacobite, and for a time 
 stood in the way of his advancement. In 1750 appeared ' Maxims 
 concerning Patriotism.' A Utopian romance, ' Adventures of 
 Signor Gaudentio di Lucca,' 1737, embracing many suggestions 
 in regard to philanthropic reforms, has been attributed to Berke- 
 ley, but was most probably the work of Berington, a Catholic 
 priest. 
 
 § 9 : The Mathematical Controversies. — Several of Berke- 
 ley's writings are devoted to the Mathematical Philosophical 
 Controversies, arising out of the questions concerning the infi- 
 nitely little and the infinitely great. 'The Analyst' is first hinted 
 at in January, 1733-34. It is an argiimentum ad homincm. 'Force 
 is as incomprehensible as grace! ' Reasoners who can accept 
 mysteries, and even what seem to be contradictions, in their own 
 province, are inconsistent in rejecting religion merely because it 
 makes a similar demand upon them.' 
 
 The problem of Fluxions had been dwelt upon by Berkeley in 
 the Principles, § 118 and following. The Infinitesimal Calculus, 
 which had recently been discovered by Newton, and which was 
 rediscovered at a later period and completed by Leibnitz, gave 
 occasion to the discussion. The new mode of computation, as at 
 first presented, had its weak points. These were exposed by 
 Berkeley ; but he did not always confine himself to them. He 
 rejected some things which can be successfully defended. See 
 n. [no]. The Analyst gave rise to 'a controversy which has 
 left its mark in the History of Mathematics,' and which con- 
 tributed to the elucidation of various fundamental notions in it. 
 
 Gibson, Bishop of London, in a letter to Berkeley, says: 
 ' What your lordship observes is very true, . . that the men of 
 science (a conceited generation) are the greatest sticklers against 
 revealed religion, and have been very open in their attacks 
 
I2 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 upon it. And we are much obliged to your lordship for 
 retorting their arguments upon them, and finding them work 
 in their own quarters, and must depend upon you to go on 
 to humble them, if they do not yet find themselves sufficiently 
 humbled.' See notes [107] to [1 10]. 
 
 § 10: Tar- water and Siris. — Berkeley ventured also into the 
 sphere of Medicine. His attention was drawn to it by the sick- 
 ness and suffering of the poor in his diocese, 1739-40. His 
 American experience suggested the medicinal value of tar-water. 
 The most lasting effect of his enthusiasm for tar-water 'has been 
 the curious and beautiful work of speculation in which he cele- 
 brated the virtues of the new medicine.' 
 
 In the spring of 1744 appeared : ' Philosophical Reflexions and 
 Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and divers other 
 subjects connected together and arising one from another.' The 
 title, ' Siris,' and the words ' a chain of,' were added in the second 
 edition. 
 
 In 1752 appeared : ' Farther Thoughts on Tar-water.' 
 
 These works contain a fund of observations in natural science 
 and of philosophical and theological speculation. 'Siris is prob- 
 ably the profoundest English philosophical book of the last cen- 
 tury. This wonderful little book far transcends the unspccula- 
 tive and unlearned age in which it appeared, and shows supposed 
 novelties that minister to modern conceit to be as old as the 
 Neoplatonic or even the Pre-Socratic age. Ecclesiastical life and 
 episcopal office had not spoiled the philosopher: he had been 
 perfected by suffering, and his tone is more unworldly than 
 ever.' ' Siris was Berkeley's ' last word in speculation,' and 
 Berkeley's last words in Siris are : ' He that would make a real 
 progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, 
 the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of truth.' 
 
 § 1 1 : Berkeley at Oxford — His Death. — The last months 
 of Berkeley's life were spent in retired life at Oxford, for which 
 he had for years been yearning. His son George was pursuing 
 his studies there. Berkeley reached Oxford in July, 1752. On 
 the evening of Sunday the 14th of January, 1753, Berkeley, whose 
 health had long been feeble, was resting on a couch, surrounded 
 
 1 Fraser: Life, 297. 
 
/— BERKELEY' S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 
 
 13 
 
 by his family. His wife had been reading aloud the fifteenth 
 chapter of First Corinthians, and he had been making remarks 
 upon the passage. A little while after, his daughter went to offer 
 him some tea. She found him apparently sleeping, but his body 
 was already cold in death. 
 
 In his will he says : ' I do humbly recommend my soul into 
 the hands of my blessed Redeemer, by whose merits and inter- 
 cession I hope for mercy.' 
 
 The feature of it which, to those who suppose that Idealism 
 involves a neglect of all practical preventions, will be most sur- 
 prising, is, that it directs extraordinary precautions to be taken 
 against premature interment. The body was to be kept undis- 
 turbed ' five days above ground or longer,' if unmistakable 
 evidences of change did not appear. 
 
 § 12: Berkeley's Works. — Berkeley's minor writings were 
 published in October, 1752, at Dublin and London, under 
 the title : ' A Miscellany containing several Tracts on various 
 subjects.' 
 
 The editions of Berkeley's complete works are : 
 
 1. London and Dublin, 1784, 2 vols. 4to, with portrait by 
 Cooke. 
 
 2. 1820, 3 vols. 8vo. 
 
 3. 1837, 1 vol. 8vo. 
 
 4. 1843, 2 vols. 8vo. London. Edited by Rev. G. N. 
 Wright, M. A., editor of the works of Reid and Stewart. No 
 one of these editions is complete, nor in any sense critical. 
 
 5. The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of 
 Cloyne. Including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. 
 With Prefaces, Annotations, His Life and Letters, and an Ac- 
 count of his Philosophy. By Alexander Campbell Fraser, M. A., 
 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edin- 
 burgh. In Four Volumes. Oxford. At the Clarendon Press, 
 
 MDCCCLXXI. 
 
 This is the standard edition of Berkeley's works, and is in every 
 respect a masterpiece of editorial taste, judgment, and complete- 
 ness. 
 
 § 13 : Editions of Separate Philosophical Works. — 
 1. New Theory of Vision, 1709 (two editions), 1732. 
 
I 4 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 2. Principles of Human Knowledge. Lond., 1710, 1734, 1776, 
 1820. 8vo. 
 
 3. The Three Dialogues. Lond., 171 3, 1725, 1734, 1776. 8vo. 
 
 4. The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and 
 Explained, 1733, i860 (with annotations by Cowell). 
 
 5. Alciphron. Lond., 1732, 1752 (3d edition), 8vo, 2 vols. 
 From the fourth London edition, New Haven, 8vo, 1803. With 
 a commendatory note by President Dwight, who styles Berkeley 
 ' one of the first philosophers of any age.' The editor is in- 
 debted to Prof. George E. Day, of New Haven, for a copy of this 
 edition. 
 
 6. Siris. Lond., 1744 (three editions), 1746, 1747, 1748, 
 1752. 8vo. 
 
 § 14: Translations into French and German. — The Three 
 Dialogues were translated into French by the Abbe du Gua de 
 Malves, 1750, i2mo; Alciphron by de Joncourt, 2 vols. 8vo, La 
 Haye, 1734; and Siris by Boullier, 1748, i2mo. 
 
 The Three Dialogues were translated from the French trans- 
 lation of 1750 by J. C. Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy at 
 Rostock. The French was used because the translator could 
 not get the English original. The German translation is given 
 in the 'Sammlung' — a collection of the most important authors 
 who have denied the actuality of their own bodies and of the 
 entire corporeal world. Rostock, 1756, 8vo. Eschenbach has 
 incorporated Collier's Key in his volume, and has added notes 
 and an Appendix in confutation of Idealism. 
 
 In 1 78 1, Leipzig, appeared the first volume of Berkeley's 'Phi- 
 losophische Werke,' with a sketch of his life and of his writings. 
 This volume contains the Three Dialogues. 
 
 The philosophical part of Siris has never been translated into 
 German. 
 
 §15: Ueberweg's Edition. — In the ' Philosophische Biblio- 
 thek' — Philosophical Library, or Collection of the Chief Works 
 on Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Times, with the co-cpera- 
 tion of distinguished scholars; edited, translated (when the works 
 are not German), with annotations and biographical notices, by 
 J. H. von Kirchmann, the twelfth volume is Berkeley's Princi- 
 ples of Human Knowledge. 
 
I.— BERKELEY'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. 15 
 
 It was translated into German, with notes explanatory and 
 critical, by Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, ordinary Professor of Phi- 
 losophy in the University of Konigsberg. Berlin, 1869. L. 
 Heimann, Wilhelms-Strasse No. 91. 
 
 In his Preface, which we give entire, Ueberweg says : 
 
 'The lively interest manifested in our day in the History of 
 Philosophy has led to the present work. It seemed to me de- 
 sirable to bring closer to the knowledge of my time, by means of 
 a translation with explanatory and critical notes, the chief work 
 of a thinker like George Berkeley. He represents with decision, 
 has with unsurpassed clearness established, and with the com- 
 pletest strictness and logical sequence developed, a philosophical 
 theory which is possible and is relatively warranted. His work 
 is one of the classic documents of modern speculation. Berke- 
 ley's "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" handle in a 
 somewhat more popular form the same theme that is presented 
 in the " Principles of Human Knowledge." The Dialogues were 
 twice translated into German in the eighteenth century, but the 
 "Principles" now appear for the first time in German. 
 
 'Berkeley's fundamental doctrine is that of absolute immaterial- 
 ism. There exist no material substances, no bodies subsisting in 
 and for themselves — subsisting without the mind. What we call 
 bodies — and to which we must refer the term " matter," if it is to 
 have any legitimate meaning — are complexes of " ideas," that is, 
 of images (Gebilden), which can exist only in the mind, and not 
 without it. " Nothing properly but persons or conscious things I 
 really exist. All other things are not so much existences, as 
 manners of the existence (ideas) of persons." This of course 
 holds good of our own bodies, equally with all other forms of 
 matter : that these latter exist without the body, no one is less 
 inclined than Berkeley to deny. " Ideas" — in the broader sense 
 of the word — are partly furnished through sensuous or internal 
 perception, partly formed by reproduction, analysis, and combina- 
 tion. The former class of ideas is produced in us by God. They 
 are produced in a certain definite order, which we call conformity 
 with the laws of nature, and God produces them not by means 
 of matter existing without us, but without means, immediately. 
 
 ' The second class of ideas we call forth in ourselves by our own 
 
IS PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 wills. The mind is active, it thinks and wills ; but corporeal 
 things, inasmuch as they are ideas or complexes of ideas, exist 
 only in the mind, as objects thought by it, not thinking, not 
 operative objects. 
 
 'This doctrine is the opposite pole to Materialism, and may 
 claim a philosophical as well as a historical interest in our day, 
 in which Materialism has put forth fresh strength. Berkeley's 
 doctrine has in our own day found distinguished representatives 
 in Great Britain. The views of several of the most eminent 
 thinkers in England and Scotland stand in close affinity with it. 
 The edition of Berkeley's complete works by Professor Fraser 
 of Edinburgh attests the lively interest felt in his views. Though 
 in our day the Berkeleyan form of Idealism is unfamiliar, yet it 
 stands in a close relation to the various tendencies which have 
 arisen among us, beginning with Kant, and which condition our 
 present philosophizing. So close is the relation that any one 
 who wishes to be conversant with the present condition even of 
 German philosophy, and to attain a solid judgment in regard to 
 the philosophical discussions now pending, is compelled to take 
 Berkeley's views into consideration. 
 
 'Berkeley's " Theory of Vision" (1709) appeared about a year 
 in advance of the "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human 
 Knowledge" (1710). The "Theory," as Berkeley remarks (Princi- 
 ples, § 44), does not embrace all the aspects of his later doctrine. 
 In the " Theory of Vision" Berkeley asserted that those " ideas" 
 which are peculiar to the sense of sight, those which are perceived 
 through it alone, — such as light and colours, — cannot exist with- 
 out the mind. A similar view had been maintained by Descartes 
 and Locke, and has subsequently been almost universally accepted. 
 But in the "Theory of Vision" Berkeley does not yet explicitly 
 maintain the same view in regard also to the ' ideas' perceived 
 through touch. He endeavours in the ' Theory,' however, to 
 prove that distance is not immediately seen, nor is it inferred from 
 lines and angles, but from perceptions of an entirely different 
 sort. This theory prepared the way for the transition to the more 
 advanced theory of the " Principles," that distance also, and in 
 general extension, figure, dimension, position, and motion, exist 
 in the mind alone, exist as its ideas. 
 
L— BERKELEY'S LIFE AND WRITINGS. ij 
 
 ' The perusal of Berkeley's writings tends in a high degree 
 to stimulate independent thinking. From the general philosoph- 
 ical notions (Begriffen) which tradition is wont to fix, Berkeley 
 invariably falls back upon the concrete intuitions on which those 
 notions rest, and tests the notion by the intuition. This is the 
 evident secret of his power. Among the writings of modern 
 philosophers I know scarcely any which are so free from the 
 untested adoption of traditional abstractions, so independent 
 and bold in reconstruction, such classic models in style, as the 
 " Meditations" of Descartes and the " Principles" of our Berkeley. 
 These qualities give them a pre-eminent adaptation as an intro- 
 duction to philosophical research. 
 
 ' We hardly need say that this recognition of the merits of 
 Berkeley does not involve an acceptance of his doctrine on our 
 part. We have added critical remarks which may stimulate the 
 reader to independent reflection on the problems discussed. We 
 have also given some explanations, especially of the historical 
 references. 
 
 ' Over against the ordinary presuppositions it is the aim of phi- 
 losophy, in part to correct and extend, in part simply to clear up 
 and confirm. Philosophy is not merely to strive after new results, 
 but also to account for those grounds of just supposition, scien- 
 tifically tenable, which escape our consciousness in its primary 
 exercise (zunachst). In our sense-perception, the simple opinion 
 that external things exist, and that they exist there and in the 
 way, where and how, the images in our perception (Wahrneh- 
 mungsbilder) are present to our mind, — this opinion in a certain 
 respect is to be corrected, in another respect is to be justified. By 
 reference throughout to Berkeley's doctrine, both these can be 
 most easily carried through in such a way that the entire circle of 
 the problems to which we are here to have regard is brought into 
 full light. These problems belong in part to Psychology and 
 Theology, in part to Logic. With respect to Logic, I could 
 desire that my critical observations on Berkeley may be regarded 
 as an essential supplement to my views of external and internal 
 perception, which form the first division of my " System of Logic." 
 Bonn, 1857; 3d ed., do., 1868. 
 
 ' K.ONIGSBERG, Jan. 22, 1869." 
 
 2 
 
1 8 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 II. The Precursors of Berkeley. 
 
 § i : Bacon (i 561-1626) and Berkeley. — 'It is in the writings 
 of Berkeley,' says Archer Butler, ' that we are to look for the first 
 exposition of those acute and important reasonings which may 
 be said in these latter days to have reduced the broad practical 
 monitions of Lord Bacon to their metaphysical principles.' 1 
 
 ' Berkeley's theory of physical causation . . . consummates 
 Bacon, and opens the way to the true conception of physical 
 induction.' 2 
 
 Berkeley's judgment, that : 'As the natural connexion of signs 
 with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of 
 rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an in- 
 telligent cause,' is in developed harmony with ' Bacon's con- 
 ception of the interpretability of Nature or the sensible world.' 3 
 The whole spirit of Berkeley is, however, reactive against the 
 speculative superficiality and the one-sided practicalness and 
 materializing tendency of the Baconian System. 
 
 §2: Hobbes (1 588-1679). — Hobbes and Berkeley stand to- 
 gether as defenders of Nominalism. It is almost their sole 
 point of contact. Hobbes assumed, in his explanation of intelli- 
 gent man, that the body accounted for the mind, and that Matter 
 is the deepest thing in the Universe. Berkeley believed that 
 Hobbes' ' wild imaginations — in a word, the whole system of 
 Atheism — is . . . entirely overthrown ... by the repugnancy 
 included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude 
 and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind.' 4 He 
 saw atheistical principles taking deeper root in consequence of the 
 prevalence of false philosophy: 'Pantheism, Materialism, Fatal- 
 ism, are nothing but Atheism a little disguised.' He regarded 
 with horror the fact 'that the notions of Hobbes,' and others of 
 the same school, ' are relished and applauded.' s 
 
 Berkeley seemed determined to a surgery of extirpation in his 
 treatment of the malady of the age. He felt that it was beyond 
 poulticing, and he proposed to remove the cancer with the knife. 
 
 1 Dublin University Magazine, vol. vii. 538 ; quoted in Fraser's B.'s Life, 407. 
 
 a Fraser: Life, 43. 3 Siris, j3 254, and Fraser's note. See [104]. 
 
 4 Second Dialogue (Works, i. 305). 5 Theory of Vision Vindicated (Works, i. 374). 
 
II.— THE PRECURSORS OF BERKELEY. ]g 
 
 As prevalent falsehood abused matter to the overthrow of spirit, 
 Berkeley proposed to settle the warfare by taking away the very 
 material of war. He characterizes ' unthinking matter as that 
 only fortress without which your Epicureans, Hobbe-ists, and the 
 like, have not even the shadow of a pretence.' * 
 
 § 3: Descartes (1596-1650) and Berkeley. — Berkeley 'in- 
 augurated a new and second era in the intellectual revolution 
 which Descartes set agoing.' Descartes rests upon the funda- 
 mental position of Berkeley, that we cognize the idea alone. He 
 inferred from the existence of the idea, in perception, a substantial 
 material world of which it is the idea. Berkeley denies the in- 
 ference. 
 
 There were elements in the developed Cartesianism which 
 could not but provoke opposition on the part of sound thinkers. 
 Descartes did not actually draw some of the extremest inferences 
 of the later Cartesianism, yet his views easily, if not necessarily, 
 ran out into those of his school. 
 
 In Cartesianism matter is but the unknown occasion 2 at the 
 presence of which Ideas are excited in us by the will of God. 
 Matter, in the Cartesian system, is passive and inert. Descartes 
 assumed, as Berkeley did, that external substance is not in any 
 proper sense the cause of our ideas. Berkeley improved on Des- 
 cartes, therefore, by rejecting what on Descartes' hypothesis was 
 useless and encumbering. Descartes had exploded the idea, 
 once recognized, that colors, sounds, and the rest of the sensible 
 secondary qualities or accidents, have a real existence without 
 the mind. Berkeley, 3 accepting this, went on to show that the 
 primary ones — figure, motion, and such like, — cannot exist other- 
 wise than in a spirit or mind which perceives them, and that it 
 follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being 
 of matter, taking that word to denote an 'unthinking substratum 
 of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.' 
 Berkeley clearly saw and exposes the philosophical absurdity of 
 the Cartesian conception of the relation of the external world to 
 the mind of man. 4 ' The modern philosophers, who, though 
 they allow matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the im- 
 mediate, efficient cause of all things.' ' Created beings are there- 
 
 ' Prin., g 23. ' Prin. H. K., § 69. 3 Prin., g 73. 4 Prin. H. K., § 53. 
 
20 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 fore made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done 
 everything as well without them.' ' He refers to Descartes when 
 he speaks of those who, 'after all their laboring and struggle of 
 thought, are forced to own that we cannot attain to any self- 
 evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible 
 things.' In the Hylas and Philonous 2 he alludes to Descartes: 
 ' What a jest it is for a philosopher to question the existence of 
 sensible things till he hath it proved to him from the veracity 
 of God, or to pretend our knowledge on this point falls short of 
 intuition or demonstration.' 
 
 §4: Malebranche (1638-1715) and Berkeley. — 'The Pla- 
 tonism,' says Fraser, ' which pervades Malebranche perhaps 
 tended to encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning 
 that appeared in Berkeley's later writings. 3 But Berkeley is not so 
 much at home in the divine vision of the French metaphysician as 
 among the ideas of the English philosopher (Locke). The mys- 
 ticism of the "Search for Truth" was repelled by the transparent 
 clearness of Berkeley's thought. The slender hold retained by 
 Malebranche of external substance, as well as the theory of 
 merely occasional causation of matter, common to him and Des- 
 cartes, naturally attracted Berkeley.' 
 
 The position of Malebranche, as Berkeley himself states it, is, 
 that matter is not perceived by us, but is perceived by God, to 
 whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our mind. In treat- 
 ing of the views of Malebranche, Berkeley says, ' If it pass for a 
 good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that 
 they suppose nature or the divine wisdom to make something in 
 vain, or to do that by tedious, round-about methods which might 
 have been performed in a much more easy and compendious 
 way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the 
 world made in vain' ? Ibid. ' Few men think, yet all liave 
 opinions. I shall not, therefore, be surprised if some men im- 
 agine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche, though in 
 truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract, 
 general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute 
 external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are de- 
 ceived by our senses and know not the real natures or the true 
 
 > Prin., §88. » p. 324. 3 Pref., p. 113. 
 
II.— THE PRECURSORS OF BERKELEY. 2 I 
 
 forms and figures of extended beings, of all of which I hold the 
 direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no principles 
 more fundamentally opposite than his and mine.' 
 
 § 5 : Spinoza (163 2- 1677) and Berkeley. — An approach to 
 Spinoza may seem to be made by Berkeley's removal of some 
 elements of the Cartesian Dualism. Relatively to this, Berkeley 
 may be called a generic monist. Descartes maintained two genera 
 or kinds of substance, spiritual and corporeal. Berkeley allowed 
 but one kind or genus of substance, to wit: spirit: — Divine spirit 
 and Created spirit. To him all the phenomenal is so far sub- 
 jective that it is either the operation of mind, or operation on 
 mind, which is also of course in its result again the operation of 
 mind, for the passivity of mind can in no case be more than rela- 
 tive. Its passivity is but a conditioned activity. But while 
 Berkeley maintained one genus of substance, he held to objective, 
 real species within it, and to real individuality and personality 
 within the species. The Infinite spirit is a true, individual person, 
 and the finite spirits are true, individual persons. No philosoph- 
 ical writer more thoroughly than Berkeley insists on the person- 
 ality and freedom of God, the personality and freedom of man. 
 He had, as we have seen, no sympathy with the latent Pantheism 
 of Malebranche's vision in God, which, however it may be ex- 
 plained, still leaves the operations of the human mind as proper 
 phenomena of the Divine mind, and effaces the true individuality 
 and personality of man. There is no writer among our English 
 classics whose whole moral tendency is purer than Berkeley's, 
 more completely sundered from the ethical destructivism of 
 Spinoza. His works are a bulwark of the highest faiths, hopes, 
 and aspirations of the heart of man, and they are such, in part, 
 because of their distinct assertion of the personality and freedom 
 of God, the personality, freedom, and accountability of man. 
 
 §6: Locke (1632-1704) and Berkeley. — The system of 
 Locke, which in one line of development easily runs out into 
 materialism, is in another line carried out with equal ease into 
 idealism. To this extreme tended Locke's depreciation of the 
 accepted idea of substance ; a depreciation the danger of which he 
 himself subsequently saw ; he ridiculed the distinction expressed 
 in the terms 'substance' and 'accident' He says (Hum. Und., 
 
22 PROLEGOMEXA. 
 
 II. xiii. 19), 'They who first ran into the notion of accidents, 
 as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, 
 were forced to find out the word " substance" to support them.' 
 Berkeley's theory enlarged and gave scientific shape to Locke's 
 inconsiderate ridicule. 
 
 Another point of attachment to idealism is found in Locke's 
 view of knowledge — his answer to the question, ' What do we 
 know?' To this he returns the reply (iv. i. 1), 'The mind hath 
 no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does 
 or can contemplate ;' and he infers that our knowledge is only 
 conversant about them. He says (iv. ii. 1), 'All our knowledge 
 consists in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the 
 utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties and in 
 our way of knowledge are capable of This is a distinct admis- 
 sion that we have no immediate proper knowledge of the external 
 world. 'The mind knows not things immediately, but only by 
 the intervention of the ideas it has of them.' (iv. iv. 3.) This 
 strictly taken means that we know only our ideas and infer the 
 existence of things. He goes on to say, 'Our knowledge is 
 therefore real only so far as there is a conformity between our 
 ideas and the reality of things.' He ought to have said, to be 
 consistent with himself, our inferences therefore as to things are 
 correct only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and 
 the reality of things. 
 
 Locke was too acute to fail to perceive the embarrassment of 
 his position, but he was not acute enough to relieve it, for in fact 
 it cannot be relieved. That he was acute enough to perceive it 
 is shown by his asking, ' But what shall be the criterion, how shall 
 the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that 
 they agree with things themselves?' 'This,' he says, 'though 
 it seems not to want in difficulty, yet I think there be two sorts 
 of ideas, that we may be assured agree with things.' (iv. iv. 3.) 
 
 In these very words he abandons his position and goes into 
 the discussion of a wholly different question. He raises his 
 question in what Kant would call the sphere of the critical rea- 
 son, and returns his answer in the sphere of the practical reason. 
 His question is, ' How shall I know f His answer is, ' I have 
 good reason to believe.' But, philosophically speaking, we can- 
 
II.— THE PRECURSORS OF BERKELEY. 
 
 '3 
 
 not know what we believe, nor believe what we know. When 
 I speak philosophically and say, ' I believe,' I grant that I do not 
 know, in the strict sense in which we here use the term. 
 
 Locke says (iv. iv. 8), ' To make our knowledge real, it is 
 requisite that our ideas answer their archetypes.' (iv. vi. 16), 
 ' General certainty is never to be found but in our ideas ; it is 
 the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able 
 to afford us general knowledge.' (iv. vi. u), 'The knowledge 
 we have of our own being we have by intuition, the existence 
 of God reason clearly makes known to us ; the knowledge of 
 the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensa- 
 tion, for there being no necessary connection of real existence 
 with any idea a man has in his memory, nor of any other 
 existence but that of God, with the existence of any particular 
 man, no particular man can know the existence of any other 
 being but only when by actually operating upon him it makes 
 itself perceived by him ; for having the idea of anything in 
 our minds no more proves the existence of that thing than 
 the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the 
 vision of a dream makes thereby a true history.' Locke admits 
 in so many words ' the notice we have by our senses of the 
 existence of things without us is not altogether so certain as our 
 intuitive knowledge or the deductions of reason employed about 
 the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet it is an assurance 
 that deserves the name of knowledge.' Here Locke marks three 
 gradations of intellectual certainty : the first and highest grada- 
 tion is our intuitive knowledge, the second and lower is deduc- 
 tions of reason, the third and lowest is the notice our senses take 
 of things without us, the result of which Locke calls assurance ; 
 in a word, I. Intuition, II. Reason, III. Faith. Now, as the first 
 of these is not more than knowledge, the second and third must 
 be less than knowledge, because they are less than the first. 
 Locke feels this, and hence the rhetorical vagueness ' it is an 
 assurance that deserves the name of knowledge' — it is really faith, 
 not knowledge. He says (iv. xi. 9) of this last, ' This knowl- 
 edge extends so far as the present testimony of our senses em- 
 ployed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no 
 further ; for if I saw such a collection of simple ideas, as is wont 
 
24 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 to be called man, existing together one minute since, and am 
 now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, 
 since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute 
 since with his existence now ; by a thousand ways he may cease 
 to be since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence.' 
 He closes the paragraph by saying, 'Though it be highly proba- 
 ble that millions of men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone 
 writing this I have not the certainty of it which we strictly call 
 knowledge, though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt ; 
 but this is but probability, not knowledge.' In these words of 
 Locke there is a distinct assertion of the principle that cognition 
 and belief are distinct, that no amount of belief is strictly equiv- 
 alent to knowledge, and that knowledge proper is limited by the 
 present testimony of our senses, so far as anything external to 
 us is involved. This is not, indeed, Berkeley's doctrine that the 
 unperceived is non-existent ; but it is the doctrine, almost as 
 remote from popular impression, that the unperceived is unknown, 
 — it is that the cognitive esse is percipi, and in a new shape it 
 involves that, on Locke's principles, the external world is not an 
 object of knowledge, but an assumption of faith. In some sense 
 Berkeley developed certain parts of the philosophy of Locke ; 
 in others, he took grounds against it. 
 
 §7: Burthogge (1694). — Richard Burthogge's Essay upon 
 Reason and the Nature of Spirits, 1694, is quoted by Prof. 
 Fraser 1 as presenting ' dim anticipations both of Berkeley and 
 of Kant.' Burthogge says, ' Few, if any, of the ideas which we 
 have of things are properly pictures, our conceptions of things 
 no more resembling them in strict propriety than our words do 
 our conceptions. . . Things . . . are in all respects the very same to 
 the mind or understanding that colours are to the eye. . . Things 
 are nothing to us but as they are known by us; . . . they are not 
 in our faculties, either in their own reality or by way of a true 
 resemblance or representation. . . Every cogitative faculty, though 
 it is not the sole cause of its own immediate (apparent) object, 
 yet has a share in making it. . . In sum, the immediate objects of 
 cogitation . . . are cntia cogitatiouis, all phenomena ; appearances 
 that do no more exist without our faculties in the things them- 
 
 1 Life and Letters, 44. 
 
III.— SUMMARIES OF BERKELEY'S SYSTEM. 2 $ 
 
 selves than the images that are seen in water, or behind a glass, 
 do really exist in those places where they seem to be. . . In truth, 
 neither accident nor substance hath any being but only in the 
 mind, and by the virtue of cogitation or thought.' f 
 
 III. Summaries of Berkeley's System. 
 
 § I : In common with every great thinker of every age, Berke- 
 ley has been misunderstood and misrepresented in various ways. 
 Men of various schools have been unconsciously biased in their 
 judgment of Berkeley's views by their own. 
 
 Where there has been no misrepresentation, there has been a 
 difference in the proportion and prominence assigned by different 
 writers to different parts. 
 
 It will therefore be both interesting and useful to present a 
 number of summaries from distinguished writers of different 
 schools. They will have value as testimony also, where differ- 
 ences of opinion may still exist as to Berkeley's meaning. 
 
 §2: Reid (1710-1796). — 'Berkeley maintains, and thinks he 
 has demonstrated, by a variety of arguments, grounded on prin- 
 ciples of philosophy universally received, that there is no such 
 thing as matter in the universe ; that sun and moon, earth and 
 sea, our own bodies and those of our friends, are nothing but 
 ideas in the minds of those who think of them, and that they 
 have no existence when they are not the objects of thought; 
 that all that is in the universe may be reduced to two categories, 
 to wit, minds, and ideas in the mind.' 2 
 
 §3: Kant (1 724-1 804). — 'Material idealism is the theory 
 which maintains that the existence of objects in space exterior 
 to us is either dubious and incapable of proof, or false and im- 
 possible. The former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, 
 who holds that there is but one empirical assertion which is 
 beyond doubt, to wit, I am ; the second is the dogmatic idealism 
 of Berkeley, who maintains that space, with all the things to 
 which it adheres, as an inseparable condition, is in itself im- 
 possible, and that by consequence the things in space are mere 
 
 1 Chaps, iii. and v., quoted in Life and Letters, 44. Burthogge's Work is in the Phila- 
 delphia Library. 
 
 8 Works (Hamilton), 281. 
 
26 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 imaginings. It is impossible to escape from dogmatic idealism if 
 we look upon space as a quality of things in themselves ; for in 
 that case it is, in common with everything which it conditions, 
 a non-entity.' 1 It is acknowledged that Kant does not state 
 Berkeley's view accurately. 
 
 §4: Platner (1744-1818). — 'I do not know of any dogmatic 
 idealism but that of Berkeley, of which with complete injus- 
 tice Kant says that it regards the difference between a dream 
 and a reality as indemonstrable. Berkeley certainly supposes 
 something real to be the object of our sense-cognition: to wit, 
 the material world in the idea of God, and through the power of 
 God really operating upon us, as in the system of Spinoza. Ex- 
 tension is nothing but God's idea of extension, formed by the 
 power of God. In other words, Berkeley reasons on the assump- 
 tion that the ideal of the material world is in God. As he does 
 not see how a material world can exist without this ideal, or be 
 distinct from it, he infers that what we call the material world, 
 and consider as such, is the divine ideal of it, which floats before 
 us, and by means of the divine power operates upon us. It is 
 consequently a true object, and not a creature of our imagina- 
 tion (Vorstellungs-Vermogens); no fancy, no dream, but some- 
 thing thoroughly real ; and in this object everything is precisely 
 as it is in our conception (Vorstellung). For Berkeley says with 
 truth that on every mode of explanation but his own even the 
 primary qualities must be explained as phenomenon ; while he 
 rejects this explanation and says expressly that the senses thor- 
 oughly represent (vorbilden) that which is without them. This 
 metaphysician concedes consequently to the sense-cognition a 
 more unlimited objective truth than has perhaps ever been 
 ascribed to it. This follows also as a matter of course from his 
 system. See, for example, how he derides the philosophers who 
 deduce colours, cold, warmth, from the primary qualities which 
 are wholly different from them : 2 " I am of a vulgar cast, simple 
 enough to believe my senses and leave things as I find them. It 
 is my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are of the 
 objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white 
 
 1 Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, herausg. v. V. Kirchmann. Drittc Aufl., 1872, pp. 235, 236. 
 
 2 Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 
 
III.— SUMMARIES OF BERKELEY'S SYSTEM. 
 
 V 
 
 and fire hot ; and as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature 
 of things, so neither am I as to their existence.' " 1 
 
 § 5 : Hillebrand (1819). — ' Berkeley was the founder of what 
 may properly be called the dogmatico-psychological idealism. 
 The line of thought in his doctrine is in substance as follows : All 
 cognition begins with the ideas (Vorstellungen). These ideas 
 must be either purely subjective, or there must be real objects 
 correspondent with them without the mind. The latter is im- 
 possible ; for otherwise the external objects must possess the 
 qualities of mind, inasmuch as an idea cannot be absolutely sepa- 
 rated from its object, but the separation itself is again idea. But 
 such a supposition must be absurd. Experience further teaches 
 us that one and the same object operates differently upon different 
 subjects. If now the object as such were really existent without 
 the concipient subject, it must be self-contradictory in its quali- 
 ties, which it is unphilosophical to maintain. Nothing remains, 
 therefore, but to suppose that the entire external world in space 
 is empty appearance without reality ; that it rests only on sub- 
 jective ideas ; that these alone are truly real. As, however, the 
 subjective ideas are not produced by our mind itself, there must 
 be another Being from whom they originate. This Being can be 
 a spirit only, as there is no existence but the spiritual. The mani- 
 fold character and order in the subjective perceptions (there are 
 no abstract ideas), and the mode in which they reach us, justifies 
 the conclusion that this spirit must possess the supremest and 
 noblest attributes — must be the Deity himself.' 2 
 
 § 6 : Tennemann(i76i-i8i9). — ' With extraordinary acuteness 
 Berkeley exposed the difficulties of external experience, the ob- 
 scurity of the notions of substance, accidents, and extension; 
 showed that by our senses we can perceive nothing but sensible 
 qualities, and can by no means perceive the existence and sub- 
 stantiality of a sensible object, and that the supposition that there 
 is a corporeal world distinct from and independent of our con- 
 ceptions is an illusion. There is, therefore, nothing but spirits. 
 Man perceives nothing but his own sensations and conceptions. 
 All these, however, he does not himself originate; and as nothing 
 
 1 Ernst Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen, 1793, i. 409, 410. 
 3 Propaedeutik der Philosophic Heidelberg, 1819, £ 452. 
 
28 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 but spirits exist, they must be imparted by a spirit. Their mani- 
 foldness and conformity with law, in independence of our will, 
 shows that they are imparted by an infinitely perfect spirit, God. 
 Though he be dependent for his cognition on God, yet man, by 
 his practical freedom, is the author of his own errors and evil 
 acts.' 1 
 
 §7: Hegel (1770-1831). — 'Idealism declares that self-con- 
 sciousness, or the assurance of self, comprehends all reality and 
 truth. The extremest form of this idealism asserts that self- 
 consciousness as individual or formal cannot advance beyond 
 the assertion, All objects are our conceptions. This subjective 
 idealism meets us in Berkeley, and in another shape in Hume. 
 This idealism, before which all external reality vanishes, was pre- 
 ceded by the position occupied by Locke, and grows directly out 
 of it. Berkeley represents an idealism which approached very 
 closely to that of Malebranche. Over against the Metaphysic of 
 the Understanding stands forth the view that all the existent and 
 its determinations are a thing of sensation, and wrought into 
 shape by consciousness. Berkeley's fundamental thought there- 
 fore is, " The being of all, which we call things, is alone their being 
 perceived;" that is, what we know is our own determinations.' 2 
 
 §8: Krug (1770- 1 842). — 'Berkeley endeavors to show that 
 through the senses we perceive nothing but a sensible appear- 
 ance, and by no means the existence or substantiality of an actual 
 thing, and that consequently the supposition of a corporeal world 
 independent of us is a pure illusion. Only spirits exist, and the 
 mind of man, strictly speaking, perceives nothing but its own 
 conceptions or ideas. These it does not itself bring forth, but God, 
 the infinitely perfect Spirit, imparts them to it ; nevertheless man, 
 by the absolute freedom of his will, remains the author of his 
 own good and evil actions. 3 
 
 § 9: Rothenflue (1846). — 'The principles and reasonings of 
 Berkeley may be reduced to the following propositions : 
 
 ' I. All properties which we ascribe or refer to external things, 
 such as extension, color, form, &c, are purely subjective sensations; 
 
 * Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philosophic ste Aufl. v. Wendt, 1829, {J 348. 
 
 8 Gesch. d. Philosophic Herausg. v. Michelet. Berlin, 1844, 3c Theil, 441, 442. 
 
 3 W. T. Krug: Allg. Handw. d. philosoph. Wissensehaften. Zweite Aufl., 1832, i. 326. 
 
III.— SUMMARIES OF BERKELEY S SYSTEM. 29 
 
 the objective reality corresponding with which cannot be proved, 
 for they are variously perceived by various subjects ; but as the 
 same object cannot have contradictory properties, those sensa- 
 tions are purely subjective. 
 
 ' II. If we separate or detach the sensible properties of a thing 
 from the thing itself, that thing will no longer be perceptible by 
 the senses ; therefore, according to empiricism, it does not exist. 
 Hence we can neither know that the properties of things, nor the 
 external things themselves, exist. Take for example something 
 which is extended ; extension in so far as it is the perceived 
 property of things is a purely subjective sensation, from which 
 we can draw no conclusion establishing its objective reality. But 
 the thing extended, if extension be cut off from it, is no longer 
 perceptible by the senses, therefore it does not exist : hence we 
 cannot attribute objective reality either to the properties of things 
 or to the things themselves (according to empiricism). 
 
 ' III. Nor can it be said that the sensations associated with out- 
 ward things are, as it were, images through which we have cog- 
 nizance of the external things. For we are not able from a 
 likeness to have knowledge of its prototype original, unless we 
 already have " a priori," through memory or reason, a notion of 
 that original ; but the senses teach us nothing of any relation 
 of images to things, and memory and reason, according to em- 
 piricism, are not sources of knowledge. 
 
 ' IV. Inasmuch as our sensations are mutable, but the objects of 
 them immutable, the sensations cannot be images of the objects. 
 
 ' V. Therefore we have cognizance of nought except of our own 
 purely subjective ideas. 
 
 ' VI. But the cause of those ideas is not our own mind, inas- 
 much as they do not depend upon its free will ; the mind is 
 related to them passively ; hence they come from a spirit dis- 
 tinct from the mind, and their infinite variety and mutual har- 
 mony show that they come from an infinite and perfect spirit, 
 i.e., God : hence, 
 
 'VII. As every idea of an outward world arises in us imme- 
 diately from the will and power of God, we are entirely depend- 
 ent in our cognitions on the divine will. 
 
 ' VIII. In action, however, man is free, i. e., has the power of 
 
3 o PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 self-determination ; for, although the potency itself is from God, 
 the exercise of it is given to man : hence, 
 
 1 IX. The physical reason of action is in God, but the moral 
 reason is in man ; hence sin is not to be attributed to God, but 
 to man, in whose free will lies the proximate reason of all his 
 acts.' 1 
 
 § 10: Nichol (1854). — ' It is necessary to a right understand- 
 ing of Berkeley's speculations that one recall the false concep- 
 tions certainly prevailing at his time regarding the mode or 
 manner in which we know ; we allude to the Theory of the Idea. 
 It was thought that the idea through which we know, and the 
 thing that we know through it, are perfectly distinct. The idea 
 of an object was fancied a sort of image of the object capable of 
 being perceived by the mind : just as the mind, in seeing, discerns 
 not the object but the image on the retina. Adopting this to the 
 fullest extent in respect of all that knowledge which we call the 
 knowledge of external things, Berkeley yet held that knowledge 
 of the mind itself and of its operations comes at once and without 
 the interposition of any medium — through a simple act of internal 
 perception : from which foundation his strict logic led to the 
 following singular superstructure. What are termed external 
 objects being seen not in themselves but through or by ideas, 
 what right have we to imagine the existence of these objects at 
 all? Supposing them real, they are confessedly not discernible 
 by the human mind ; why then assume their existence ? True 
 knowledge, on the other hand, comes to us directly respecting the 
 mind : is not mind and its phenomena therefore — spiritual entities 
 — the sole reality in the universe?' 2 
 
 §11: Brockhaus (1864). — ' The actual, he maintained, is spirit 
 alone; the corporeal world is but an appearance, which arises 
 out of our conceptions ; the involuntary nature of this appearance 
 is the result of original conceptions, which are wrought by the 
 Spirit of spirits, God Himself.' 3 
 
 § 12: Schwegler(i857). — ' Our sense-perceptions,' says Berke- 
 
 1 Institut. Philos. Theoreticae, 1846, vol. iii. 271-273. 
 
 3 Prof. John P. Nichol, LL.D., of the University of Glasgow : Cyclop, of Univ. Biog- 
 raphy, 1854. 
 
 3 Brockhaus : Real-Encyclop. Elfte Aufl., vol. ii., 1864. 
 
III.— SUMMARIES OF BERKELEY'S SYSTEM. 31 
 
 ley, ' are something thoroughly subjective. If we believe that we 
 have perceptions or cognitions of external objects, we are entirely 
 in error : what we have and cognize are our own perceptions. It 
 is, for example, clear that we see neither the distance, the 
 magnitude, nor the form of objects by means of the visual sensa- 
 tions; we only infer them, because we have had the experience 
 that a certain visual sensation is attended by certain sensations 
 of touch. That which we see is only colour, the clear, the dim, 
 &c, and it is consequently totally false to say that it is one and 
 the same thing which we see and feel. Consequently, even in 
 the case of those very sensations to which we by pre-eminence 
 attribute an objective character, we do not go outside of our- 
 selves. Strictly speaking, the objects of our understanding are 
 only our own affections; all ideas are consequently only our own 
 sensations. As little as sensations can exist without the sentient 
 being, so little can an idea have existence without him who has it. 
 What are called things exist consequently only in our conception; 
 their being is simply being perceived. It is a fundamental error of 
 most philosophers, that they suppose corporeal things to exist 
 without the concipient spirit, and do not discern that the things 
 are only something mental. How can material things educe what 
 is so utterly diverse from them as the sensations and conceptions? 
 Consequently there exists no material external world ; there exist 
 only spirits, that is, thinking beings, whose nature consists in 
 conceiving and willing. But whence then do we cfbtain our 
 sense-perceptions, which come to us without our help, which are 
 consequently not the product of our will, as the images of our 
 fancy are ? We obtain them from a spirit superior to us (for only 
 a spirit can bring forth conceptions in us), — that is, from God. God 
 brings forth the ideas in us, or gives them to us ; as it is, however, 
 a contradiction that a Being should impart ideas which itself has 
 none, the ideas we obtain from God exist in God. We may call 
 these ideas in God, archetypes (original images) ; in ourselves, 
 ectypes (derivative images, copies). This view does not involve, 
 says Berkeley, the denial that there is a reality of the objects of 
 our conception, a reality independent of our conception: it is 
 only denied that they exist anywhere other than in our under- 
 standing. Instead, therefore, of speaking of a Nature in which, 
 
3^ 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 for example, the Sun is Cause of warmth, &c, we must, if 
 we would be strictly accurate, express ourselves thus : God 
 announces to us, by the sensation of the eye, that we are about 
 to feel a sensation of warmth. By Nature, therefore, we under- 
 stand only the succession or connection of ideas ; by Laws of 
 Nature we mean the constant order in which ideas attend or 
 follow each other, that is, the Laws of the Association of Ideas. 
 This thorough pure Idealism, which is the complete denial of 
 matter, is, according to Berkeley, the surest mode of escaping 
 Materialism and Atheism.' * 
 
 § 13: Fraser(i86i). — 'He held, with his predecessors, that mind 
 has no objective knowledge of a world of matter; he held, with 
 them, that in this respect the mind is conscious of nothing but 
 ideas; he held, with them, that these ideas must have a cause; 
 he held, with them, that these ideas were not generated from 
 within, but were determined from without. With them, he 
 held that the external cause of our ideas could not be matter ; 
 and, with them, he held that the external cause was God. But if 
 God were the cause of our ideas, why gratuitously suppose the 
 existence of an unknown world of matter ? The world of con- 
 sciousness was known. It was a series of conceptions which the 
 mind was stimulated by the Deity to form. It was a dream, 
 such as that with which the Hebrew prophets were inspired. It 
 was an apocalyptic vision. It was a perpetual trance.' 2 
 
 § 14: Scholten 3 (1868). — 'The other extreme' (the first was 
 materialism) ' into which the empiricism of Locke ran out, was 
 that of one-sided idealism, as it is represented in England by 
 Berkeley. Starting with Locke from the principle nihil est in 
 intellectu, quod non ante fuerit in sensu, he contested the right 
 of the empiricists to infer the existence of a material external 
 world from the reception of sense-impressions. 
 
 'The senses make us acquainted with nothing more than our 
 own perceptions, and, in connection with the internal sense or 
 reflection, with nothing more than our own ideas. From the 
 touch, sight, smell, and taste, for example, of an apple, we are 
 
 1 Gesch. d. Philosophic Dritte Aufl. v. Kostlin, 1857, g 34. 
 9 North British Review, vol. xxxiv. 459 (1861). 
 
 3 Gesch. d. Religion u. Philosophic Ein Leitfaden. Aus dem Hollandischen . . . von 
 Redepenning, Elberfeld, 1868. 
 
III.— SUMMARIES OF BERKELEY'S SYSTEM. 33 
 
 not justified in the conclusion that it has objective being. The 
 only thing that can be established is that man, by means of his 
 different organs of sense, perceives in himself a union of impres- 
 sions which, in order to distinguish them from other more or 
 less complicated perceptions, he is accustomed to call an apple. 
 It follows as a consequence that no material objects exist without 
 us. What is there is the self-percipient subject alone. What we call 
 nature is nothing more than the collection of our own perceptions. 
 The universe is therefore entirely spirit. Nevertheless, the fact 
 that our perceptions rise independently of our will, cohere most 
 closely, are linked into unity, and so far transcend all that we could 
 bring into being by our reflective faculty, this fact demonstrates 
 the existence of a most wise Supreme Being, the perfect Spirit. 
 Thus, then, as in the case of the French sensualists, the earlier 
 dualistic view of the world had gone over into Monism, by denial 
 of the existence of spirit ; in Berkeley's system the antithesis be- 
 tween spirit and matter was set aside, by surrendering the objectivity 
 of the visible tvorld, or matter! 
 
 §15: Ueberweg (1872). — 'Berkeley was the founder of a 
 universal immaterialism (idealism or phsenomenalism). He held 
 that the existence of a corporeal world, having a being in itself, is 
 not only not strictly demonstrable, — and so far Augustine and even 
 Locke had gone, — but is in fact a false assumption. There exist 
 only spirits and their functions (ideas and acts of will). There are 
 no abstract ideas ; there is, for example, no conception of exten- 
 sion without an extended body, a definite magnitude, &c. An 
 individual conception becomes general, as it represents all other 
 individual conceptions of the same kind, as, for example, a single 
 straight line in a geometrical demonstration represents all other 
 lines of the same kind. That our thinking exists, we are imme- 
 diately sure ; that bodies distinct from our ideas exist, we infer ; 
 but this conclusion is fallacious — it has nothing which compels 
 assent, and is confuted by the impossibility of explaining the co- 
 working of completely heterogeneous substances. The esse of 
 unthinking things is percipi. God calls forth the conceptions in 
 us in a well-ordered manner. What we call the Laws of Nature 
 is in fact the order in the succession of our ideas.' l 
 
 1 Gesch. d. Philosoph. d. Neuzeit, Dritte Aufl., 1872, ioo, 101. 
 
34 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 § 16: Vogel (1873). — 'The objects of human knowledge are 
 either the ideas impressed upon the senses, or ideas attained by- 
 observing the soul in its activity and passivity, or, finally, ideas 
 reached by memory and imagination. Besides these ideas exists 
 what I call spirit, soul, or myself, and which is completely dis- 
 tinct from all those ideas. This spirit perceives those ideas, and 
 the existence of an idea consists solely in its being perceived (esse 
 percipi). But our conceptions and feelings exist only in ourselves ; 
 we perceive consequently only our own ideas or sensations, not 
 the objects of sense-perception themselves. As now the whole 
 choir of heaven and the plenitude of earthly objects — in brief, all 
 things which compose the great frame of the world — have no 
 subsistence without the mind, it follows that there is no other sub- 
 stance than mind, or that which perceives. That what are called 
 secondary qualities, such as colours and sounds, exist only in us, 
 is generally conceded ; but the so-called primary qualities, such 
 as extension, figure, movement, rest, which are asserted to be 
 images of matter, can have no independent existence, as an idea 
 can only be like an idea. 
 
 'The notion of a corporeal substance involves a self-contradic- 
 tion. So also the notions great and little, swift and slow, or 
 notions of numbers, are only relative notions, pure mental ab- 
 stractions. But were it granted that corporeal substance exists, 
 we cannot have cognizance of it either by our senses or by 
 thoughts. The senses do not teach us that things exist without 
 the mind; we are shut up therefore to the supposition that we 
 have cognition of them through thought. But can we not think 
 of trees existing in a park, or books standing in a library, when 
 no one perceives them ? Certainly we can. To do this is merely 
 to form in our mind certain ideas (trees, books), and at the same 
 time to omit forming the idea of some one who perceives them. 
 Meanwhile, however, we ourselves are thinking of those objects. 
 To these considerations is to be added, that no activity or power 
 is immanent in the things or ideas; so that they can originate no 
 changes ; but if they cannot do this, they are not the cause of our 
 sensations. This cause must rather be either corporeal active 
 substance or a spirit. A spirit is a simple, active being, which is 
 named understanding, as it perceives ideas, or will, as it originates 
 
IV.—BERKELEYANISM: ITS INFLUENCE. 35 
 
 them. No idea of spirit can be formed, as all ideas are passive, 
 and cannot present us images of that which is active. We have 
 furthermore the faculty of calling forth in ourselves certain ideas 
 at will ; but there is another class of ideas which press upon us 
 from without, of which our will is not the source, — press upon 
 us, in fact, in accordance with well-defined rules, what are called 
 Lcnvs of Nature. There must consequently be another will or 
 spirit which originates them, and this spirit is God. The ideas 
 impressed by the Author of nature on our senses are called actual 
 things, but those which are evoked by our own imagination are 
 ideas in the narrower sense, or images of things. The sense- 
 ideas have indeed more reality, — they are more forcible, more 
 orderly, are less dependent on the percipient spirit, as they are 
 evoked by the will of another — God. God is one only, eternal, 
 infinitely wise, good and perfect ; he works all in all, and through 
 him all subsists ; he upholds all things by the word of his power, 
 and maintains the relation between spirits whereby they have 
 the faculty of knowing the existence one of another. For per- 
 ceiving the different movements, changes, Unkings of ideas, I 
 draw from them the inference that there are distinct, individual, 
 active beings like myself who stand in connection with those 
 movements and participate in bringing them forth. 
 
 ' The object of human knowledge can be only spirits, ideas, and 
 their relations in all their species. The source of all errors Berkeley 
 finds in the supposition of the eternal existence of objects of 
 sense, and in the doctrine of abstract ideas.' 1 
 
 IV. Berkeleyanism: its friends, affinities, and influence. 
 
 § 1 : Influence. — Berkeley's position in the history of Philos- 
 ophy is a commanding one. By direct or indirect influence, by 
 development, or by opposition, he has borne part in all the specu- 
 lative thinking since his day. The removal of Berkeley would 
 take away an essential link in the chain of modern philosophy. 
 Without Berkeley, as Hamann long ago observed, we should 
 not have had Hume, without Hume we should not have had 
 Kant, without Kant the gigantic structure of the speculation 
 
 1 Philosoph. Repetitorium, 1873, 9 2_ 95- 
 
36 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 which ends in the school of Hegel would not have been reared, 
 and without this progressive line of thinkers we should not have 
 had the noble antagonism of witnesses to other forms of thought, 
 essential to the highest development of intellectual man. With- 
 out Berkeley we should neither have had the developed phi- 
 losophy of Germany, nor the developed ' Common Sense' of 
 Scotland. ' Berkeley's doctrine,' says Ueberweg, 1 ' has never had 
 a large number of adherents, but it has had no trifling influence 
 on the further development of Philosophy.' 
 
 § 2 : First reception. — ' It is difficult at this distance of time to 
 ascertain the immediate influence upon philosophical opinion' of 
 Berkeley's new conception of the material world. It is 'said to 
 have made some influential converts in England.' Swift speaks of 
 him in a letter, 1724, as ' founder of a sect called the Immaterial' 
 ists,' and adds, ' Dr. Smalridge (Bishop of Bristol) and many 
 other eminent persons were his proselytes.' ' But even the edu- 
 cated mind was not then ripe for the due appreciation of a doc- 
 trine so paradoxical in its sound. More than twenty years were to 
 elapse before it found an intellectual audience in David Hume, 
 and other Scotchmen and Americans.' 2 
 
 § 3 : Johnson. — The first place in the Berkeleyan roll of honour 
 is due to Dr. Samuel Johnson (1696-1772), the Episcopal mis- 
 sionary at Stratford, Connecticut, Berkeley's American friend and 
 disciple, who was on terms of personal intimacy with him while he 
 resided in Rhode Island. ' The Pri?iciples of Human Knowledge* 
 had early fallen into his hands. His intimacy with Berkeley 
 finished the work of conviction. His ' Elementa Philosophical 
 printed by Franklin, 1752, as a text-book for the University of 
 Pennsylvania, was dedicated to Berkeley. It consists of two 
 treatises — Noctica, or TJdngs relating to the Mind or Understand- 
 ing ; and Ethica, or Things relating to the Moral Behaviour. It is 
 thoroughly Berkeleyan in its main features, though 'the part of 
 the Noetica which deals with the pure Intellect and its notions, 
 and with intuitive Intellectual Light, is more akin to Plato and 
 Malebranche, and even Kant, than to Berkeley's early philo- 
 
 1 B.'s Leben u. Schriften, in his translation of the Principles. See also his Preface, given 
 in Prolegom., I., § 16. 
 
 3 Fraser : Life and Letters, 62. 
 
IV.— BERKELEY ANISM: ITS INFLUENCE. 37 
 
 sophical works.' 1 Johnson was 'one of the most learned scholars 
 and acute thinkers of his time in America.' 2 
 
 § 4: Jonathan Edwards (1703- 175 8). — The second illustrious 
 name also belongs to America. Jonathan Edwards, the prince of 
 the New England theological metaphysicians, was a pupil of 
 Johnson at Yale College. He was a defender of Berkeley's 
 conception of the material world. He nowhere names Berkeley, 
 and there is no evidence that they ever met. Edwards says, 
 ' When I say the Material Universe exists only in the mind, I 
 mean that it is absolutely dependent on the conception of the 
 mind for its existence ; and does not exist as Spirits do, whose 
 existence does not consist in, nor in dependence on, the concep- 
 tions of other minds. . . . All existence is mental . . . the ex- 
 istence of all exterior things is ideal.' 'That which truly is the 
 substance of all bodies is the infinitely exact and precise and per- 
 fectly stable Idea in God's mind, together with his stable Will, 
 that the same shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other 
 minds, according to fixed and exact established methods and 
 laws.' Fraser says, ' If he thus agrees with Berkeley in his 
 account of sensible things, they separate in their theory of causation 
 and free-will. Free agency, which is involved in the Dualism of 
 Berkeley, is argued against by Edwards, whose speculative the- 
 ology or philosophy is hardly to be distinguished from that of 
 Spinoza. Berkeleyism is essentially a philosophy of causation.' 3 
 The influence of Edwards possibly connects itself with the fact 
 that 'the fanciful theory of Bishop Berkeley, as a kind of philo- 
 sophical day-dream, maintained its prevalence for a season' at 
 Princeton. 4 
 
 § 5 : Berkeley in our own Day. — Nor is there wanting in our 
 own day interest in Berkeley's views, and sympathy in various 
 degrees with them. ' I am not without hope,' says Fraser, 5 
 ' that the reappearance of Berkeley in the modern philosophical 
 world, in these latter years of the nineteenth century, under the 
 auspices of the great University with which death has associated 
 
 1 Fraser : Berkeley's Life and Letters, 176. 2 Ibid., 174. 
 
 3 Berkeley's Life and Letters, 182, 404, 405. See also p. 382. 
 
 * Dr. Beaseley (Provost of the University of Pennsylvania) : A Search of Truth. Dedi- 
 cation to Hobart, ii. 
 
 S Preface : Berkeley's Works, I., xvi. 
 
38 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 him, may be the occasion of a candid consideration of this good 
 philosopher's explanation of the meaning of human existence, 
 and of a fresh impulse to philosophy in Europe and America. 
 There are signs which encourage this hope, in a retrospect of the 
 history of recent opinion and metaphysical literature in England. 
 The return to the deeper questions in metaphysics, inaugu- 
 rated by Coleridge and Hamilton more than forty years since, in 
 conjunction with the increased inclination in the interval to dis- 
 cuss first principles in theology and in the physical sciences, in- 
 cluding physiology, is more favourable to the entertainment of 
 the thoughts which occupied so much of Berkeley's life, and per- 
 haps to harmony between science and faith, than the state of 
 things in almost any former period of the history of this country. 
 There are besides definite signs of an inclination to reconsider 
 Berkeley in particular, and to draw from him what may be avail- 
 able for amending our conception of the nature of the existence 
 we are participating in among the phenomena of sense ; or at 
 least for assisting us before we finish our course to inquire what 
 this sense-conscious life through which we are now passing really 
 means.' 'Many,' says Dr. McCosh, 'are turning toward it with 
 longing.' 1 
 
 § 6 : Ferrier. — Among the illustrious thinkers of recent date 
 who have been admirers of Berkeley, we may mention Ferrier. 
 He gives in his adhesion in language such as this: 'The specu- 
 lations of this philosopher [Berkeley], whether we consider the 
 beauty and clearness of his style, or the depth of his insight, have 
 done better service to the cause of metaphysical science than the 
 lucubrations of all other modern thinkers put together.' 'Among 
 all philosophers, ancient or modern, we are acquainted with none 
 who present fewer vulnerable points than Bishop Berkeley. His 
 language, it is true, has sometimes the appearance of paradox; 
 but there is nothing paradoxical in his thoughts, and time has 
 proved the adamantine solidity of his principles. With less 
 sophistry than the simplest and with more subtlety than the 
 acutest of his contemporaries, the very perfection of his powers 
 prevented him from being appreciated by the age in which he 
 lived.' ' The subsequent progress of philosophy shows how 
 
 1 Presbyter. Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan. 1873. 
 
IV.— BERKELEY ANISM: ITS INFLUENCE. 
 
 39 
 
 much the science of man is indebted to his researches. He cer- 
 tainly was the first to stamp the indelible impress of his power- 
 ful understanding on those principles of our nature which since 
 his time have brightened into imperishable truths in the light of 
 genuine speculation.' 1 'Berkeley accomplished the very task 
 which, fifty or sixty years afterwards, Reid laboured at in vain. 
 He taught a doctrine of intuitive, as distinguished from a doc- 
 trine of representative, perception ; and he taught it on the only 
 grounds on which such a doctrine can be maintained.' 
 
 ' The ingenious and acute metaphysical works of the late Pro- 
 fessor Ferrier . . . unfold a system which differs in some im- 
 portant respects from that of Berkeley, being constructed from 
 the ontological, and not, like his, from the psychological point 
 of view. With more form of demonstration, Ferrier leaves in 
 the background the sense-symbolism and intuition of efficient 
 causality, which are essential to the externality and dualism of 
 Berkeley.' 2 
 
 § 7 : Professor Grote. — ' The strikingly candid speculations 
 of the late Professor Grote of Cambridge, which contain some of 
 the most interesting English contributions to the higher philoso- 
 phy of this generation, have also a tendency to Berkeley's point 
 of view.' 3 
 
 Professor John Grote (not to be confounded with George 
 Grote, the historian of Greece and biographer of Plato and Aris- 
 totle) had published (1865) the Exploratio Philosopliica : Rough 
 Notes on Modern Intellectual Science. Part I. His death in 1866 
 left the second part in a fragmentary condition. 
 
 § 8: Mansel. — 'Dean Mansel's learned and closely-reasoned 
 works in philosophy, besides reviving metaphysical discussion 
 in England, have occasionally approached the speculation of 
 Berkeley, bringing valuable critical light.' 4 
 
 § 9: Simon. — ' The assiduous zeal and subtlety of Mr. Collyns 
 Simon, his book On the Nature and Elements of the Material 
 World, and his various essays since, have drawn attention to the 
 subject not only in these islands but also in Germany.' 5 
 
 1 Lectures and Philosophical Remains, ii., 292,293. 2 Fraser: Berkeley's Works, vol. i., 
 Pref., xvii. 
 1 Fraser: Berkeley's Works, vol. i., Pref., xvii. 4 Fraser: Pref., xvii. 
 
 5 Fraser : Berkeley's Works, vol. i., Pref., xvii. 
 
4 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 The second part of the title of Mr. Thomas Collyns Simon's 
 book is Universal Immaterialism, fully explained and newly dem- 
 onstrated. London, 1847 (1862). It is accompanied by a pros- 
 pectus of the terms upon which a prize of one hundred pounds 
 is offered for a conclusive disproof of Universal Immaterialism. 
 
 He had a correspondence in 1852-53 with Sir William Ham- 
 ilton, in which he quotes Sir William as saying that he has seen 
 nothing in Berkeley irreconcilable with his own views. 1 Mr. 
 Simon has written several dissertations for periodicals. 2 
 
 A discussion between Simon and Ueberweg followed the trans- 
 lation of Berkeley's Principles. 3 Mr. Simon has also discussed, 
 from the Berkeleyan point of view, Mill's Examination of Hamil- 
 ton's Philosophy. 4 
 
 § 10: Mill. — John Stuart Mill ably defended Berkeley's The- 
 ory of Vision, of which he says that it ' has remained, almost 
 from its first promulgation, one of the least disputed doctrines 
 in the most disputed and most disputable of all sciences, the 
 science of man. This is the more remarkable, as no doctrine in 
 mental philosophy is more at variance with first appearances, 
 more contradictory to the natural prejudices of mankind. Yet 
 this apparent paradox was no sooner published than it took its 
 place, almost without contestation, among established opinions. 
 The warfare which has since distracted the world of metaphysics 
 has swept past this insulated position without disturbing it; and 
 while so many of the other conclusions of the analytical school 
 of mental philosophy, the school of Hobbes and Locke, have been 
 repudiated with violence by the antagonist school, that of Com- 
 mon Sense, or innate principles, this one doctrine has been recog- 
 nized and upheld by the leading thinkers of both schools alike.' 5 
 
 ' Some chapters in Mr. J. S. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Ham- 
 ilton's Philosophy, and passages in his other writings, show how 
 much in the new conception of the sensible world is appreciated 
 by a fair and able thinker of phenomenalist tendencies.' 6 
 
 1 Veitch's Memoir of Hamilton, 344-349. 
 
 3 Among these may be mentioned ' Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of Matter' in the 
 Journal of Speculative Philosophy, iii., 4 Dec. 1869. Is Thought the Thinker? lb., p. 375. 
 
 3 Ueberweg's Letter to Simon, Fichte's Z. f. Ph., 1869. Simon's Answer, ib., 1870. A 
 brief closing word by Ueberweg, ib., 1871. 
 
 * Hamilton versus Mill, 3 parts, Edinburgh, 1866-68. 
 
 5 Westminster Review, xxviii 318. 6 Fraser: Berkeley's Works, i., Prof., xvii. 
 
IV.—BERKELEYANISM: ITS INFLUENCE. 41 
 
 § 11: Stirling. — 'Dr. J. H. Stirling, by devoting reflection 
 to fresh aspects of questions which Berkeley raised by implica- 
 tion, has prepared some for looking at the perennial problem with 
 a fresh eye.' 1 
 
 § 12: Dublin University. — 'Nor must Berkeley's own Uni- 
 versity be forgotten, where philosophy is now cultivated by men 
 who are not unworthy of its fame, and who, either as expositors 
 or as adverse critics, have not forgotten its greatest names in 
 metaphysics.' 2 
 
 § 13: Fraser. — The admirable and only complete edition of 
 Berkeley's Works, followed by his Life and Letters, we owe to 
 Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., Professor of Logic and Meta- 
 physics in the University of Edinburgh. Professor Fraser regards 
 Berkeley as one of the greatest philosophers of Great Britain. 
 He says that his ' own love for philosophy was first engaged by 
 Berkeley in the morning of life,' and that he ' regards his writings 
 as among the best in English literature for a refined education 
 of the heart and intellect.' Berkeley was 'the greatest metaphy- 
 sician in his own age.' ' The intellectual influence which partly 
 originated in him has since been silently modifying all the deeper 
 thought of the time in physics and in metaphysical philosophy. 
 Is an unknowing and unknown something called matter, or is in- 
 telligence, the supreme reality? and are men the transient results 
 of material organization, or are they immortal beings ? This is 
 Berkeley's implied question. His answer to it, although in his 
 own works it has not been thought out by him into its primary 
 principles, or sufficiently guarded in some parts, nevertheless marks 
 the beginning of the second great period in modern thought, 
 that in which we are living. The answer was virtually reversed 
 in Hume, whose exclusive phenomenalism, reproduced in the 
 positivism of the nineteenth century, led to the Scotch conserva- 
 tive psychology, and to the great German speculation which Kant 
 inaugurated.' 3 
 
 § 14 : Germany. — ' I am inclined to believe,' says Fraser, ' that 
 the present state of German speculation is not unfavourable to a 
 more ample and appreciative consideration of Berkeley than he 
 
 1 Fraser: Berkeley's Works, i., Pref., xviii. 2 Fraser: Berkeley's Works, i., Pref.,xviii. 
 3 Berkeley's Works, i., Pref., viii. 
 
42 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 has hitherto received in the occasional allusions made by the 
 philosophers and historians of philosophy of the chief specula- 
 tive nation of Europe.' He then speaks of Ueberweg's annotated 
 version of the Principles, and adds, ' This translation has, I un- 
 derstand, circulated widely in that country. It has been partly 
 the occasion of recent discussions on Berkeley's philosophy in 
 some of the German periodicals.' 1 
 
 §15: America. — Among the recent American admirers of 
 Berkeley's system may be mentioned Rowland G. Hazard, author 
 of a work on the Will (1864) and of one on Causation (1869). 
 
 ' Berkeley's remarkable relations to America, and the adoption 
 of distinctive parts of his philosophy by two of his eminent 
 American contemporaries, Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Ed- 
 wards, should secure for him a hearing in that great country, 
 whose advancement since he lived in it has almost realized the 
 dream even of his benevolent imagination.' 2 
 
 V. Opponents and Objections. 
 
 § 1 : Ridicule. — The favourite weapon against Berkeleyanism 
 from the beginning has been ridicule ; ' Coxcombs vanquish 
 Berkeley with a grin.' There is but one point to all the jest- 
 ing, and the variation of form is not very marked. Arbuthnot's 
 joke is the first on record. 3 Swift is said to have left Berkeley 
 standing at the door in the rain, on the ground that if his 
 philosophy were true he could as easily enter with the door 
 shut as open. 
 
 Dr. Johnson's confutation by kicking a large stone, ' striking 
 his foot with mighty force against it,' as Boswell happily phrases 
 it, is one for which Ferrier says ' Berkeley would have hugged 
 him.' It embodied the popular common sense unreservedly, and 
 so was superior to the philosophy which accepts that common 
 sense but half way. There is as much argument and more 
 wit in a less-quoted anecdote. When a gentleman who had 
 been defending Berkeley's view was about going away, Johnson 
 said, ' Pray, sir, don't leave us, for we may perhaps forget to 
 think of you, and then you will cease to exist' 
 
 1 Berkeley's Works, i., Prcf., xviii. " Fraser : Berkeley's Works, i., Pref., xviii. 
 
 3 See Prolegomena, I. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 43 
 
 Byron linked a well-worn college pun with a versification of 
 Hume's estimate : 
 
 ' When Bishop Berkeley said, " There was no matter," 
 And proved it, 'twas no matter what he said. 
 They say his system 'tis in vain to batter, 
 Too subtle for the airiest human head: 
 And yet who can believe it?' 
 
 Sydney Smith says, ' Bishop Berkeley destroyed the world in 
 one volume octavo, and nothing remained after his time but mind, 
 which experienced a similar fate from the hand of Mr. Hume in 
 
 1737' 
 
 It is not to the credit of the metaphysicians who have combated 
 Berkeley that so much they have written is but a prosy elabora- 
 tion of the jocose misrepresentation of his views. 
 
 Had Burke carried out his purpose of anwering Berkeley, the 
 world would have had a brilliant book, — a brilliant success or a 
 brilliant failure. 
 
 § 2: Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) declined to discuss Berke- 
 ley's principles in regard to the existence of matter. ' As Clarke,' 
 says Stewart, 'in common with his antagonist, regarded the prin- 
 ciples of the ideal theory as incontrovertible, it was perfectly 
 impossible for him, with all his acuteness, to detect the flaw to 
 which Berkeley's paradox owed its plausibility.' 1 Not only so, 
 but Clarke approaches at times very closely to the Berkeleyan 
 construction of the relation of the universe to mind: 'All things 
 that are done are done either immediately by God himself or by 
 created intelligent beings, Matter being" evidently not capable of any 
 laws or powers whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intel- 
 ligence, excepting only this one negative power, that every part 
 of it will of itself always and necessarily continue in that state, 
 whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is. So that all 
 those things which we commonly say are the effects of the nat- 
 ural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attrac- 
 tion, or the like, are indeed (if we will speak strictly and prop- 
 erly) the effects of God's acting upon matter continually and every 
 moment, either immediately by himself or mediately by some 
 created intelligent beings. . . . Consequently there is no such thing 
 
 1 Works, iii. 53, v. 4, 18. 
 
44 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 as what we commonly call the course of nature or the power of 
 nature. The course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is 
 nothing else but the will of God producing certain effects in a 
 continued, regular, constant, and uniform manner, which course 
 or manner of acting being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, 
 is as easy to be a/tcred at any time as to be preserved.' x 
 
 §3: Andrew Baxter (1687-1750), in his 'Inquiry into the 
 Nature of the Human Soul,' has a section (2d ed., pp. 256- 
 344) entitled ' Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the Existence 
 of Matter and a Material World examined and shown inconclu- 
 sive.' It is the first extended review of Berkeley. Warburton 
 says of the Inquiry, ' He who would see the justest and precisest 
 notions of God and the soul may read this book, one of the most 
 finished of the kind, in my humble opinion, that the present 
 times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.' 2 
 Stewart pronounces this 'splendid eulogy' as beyond the merit 
 of the Inquiry, though he acknowledges 'that it displays consid- 
 erable ingenuity as well as learning.' 3 
 
 Fraser says of the Inquiry, ' Its comparative bulk is almost the 
 only circumstance which entitles Baxter's work to consideration. 
 ... At the best, he is ingenious and acute in the construction of 
 a man of straw.' The truth in regard to Baxter is perhaps mid- 
 way between these estimates. His examination of Berkeley's 
 scheme is fully equal to the best of the later replies in the Scotch 
 school, and in fact anticipates nearly everything that is important 
 in them. 'We perceive, besides our sensations themselves, the 
 objects of them; or we perceive objects existing from without, by 
 the mediation of sensation or motion produced, since we are 
 conscious not only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by 
 some cause beside ourself. . . . This cause we call Matter.' 4 'Our 
 ideas cannot exist without the mind, but their objects may, and do. 
 And they are still sensible objects, though they fall not under the 
 senses at all times and in all places.' . . . ' The perception of a 
 picture shows not only that the soul is immaterial, but that it is 
 united to a material sensory, where the picture is impressed, 
 and to which it applies for the perception of it, or that matter 
 
 1 Works, fol. ed., ii. 697. a Divine Legation, 1st ed., 395. 
 
 3 Works, i. 429, 430. < Inquiry, 2d ed., 1738, ii. 290, 294. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 45 
 
 exists.' The argument of Baxter frequently appeals to the prin- 
 ciple of ' common sense,' as it is generally understood in the 
 Scotch school. He speaks of ' plain truths,' ' truths so plain that 
 a man cannot cast doubt upon them without committing much 
 violence to his reason,' ' plain and well-meaning men,' ' an argu- 
 ment to overturn common sense.' 1 He charges on Berkeley a 
 confusion of classification : ' figure and motion are nicely shuffled 
 in with colour and sound, though they are qualities of a different 
 kind; and in the last, that extended moveable substance is supposed 
 to be a species of idea, . . in which case Dr. Berkeley is very safe 
 in his argument.' 
 
 §4: Reid (1710-1795). — 'Dr. Reid acknowledges the Berke- 
 leyan system to be a logical consequence of the opinions univer- 
 sally admitted by the learned at the time when Berkeley wrote.' 2 
 ' That from those data (which had been received, during a long 
 succession of ages, as incontrovertible articles of faith) both 
 Berkeley and Hume have reasoned with unexceptionable fair- 
 ness, as well as incomparable acuteness, he acknowledges in 
 every page of his works.' 3 
 
 ' I once believed,' says Reid, ' the doctrine of ideas so firmly as 
 to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system along with it.' 4 
 Berkeley's view as epitomized by Reid is this: 'If we have any 
 knowledge of a material world, it must be by the senses ; but by 
 the senses we have no knowledge but of our sensations only ; and 
 our sensations, which are attributes of mind, can have no resem- 
 blance to any qualities of a thing which is inanimate.' 5 
 
 ' Finding other consequences to follow from it,' says Reid, 
 ' which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a material 
 world, it came into my mind more than forty years ago to put 
 the question, What evidence have I for this doctrine that all 
 the objects of my knowledge are ideas in my own mind ?' ' The 
 belief in a material world . . . declines the tribunal of reason and 
 laughs at all the artillery of the logician. It retains its sovereign 
 authority in spite of all the edicts of philosophy, and reason itself 
 
 1 Inquiry, 2d ed., 1738, ii. 344. 
 
 2 Dugald Stewart: Elem. Phil, of Hum. Mind, chap, i., sec. 3. 
 
 3 Dugald Stewart : Essays. Works, v. 90. 4 Works (Hamilton), 283. 
 S Intel. Powers, Essay II., chap. xi. 
 
46 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 must stoop to its orders.' ' If Reason will not be the servant 
 of Common Sense, she must be her slave.' 1 
 
 §5: Henry Home, of Kames (1696-1782), supposes 'the 
 foundation of this terrible doctrine — the ideal system — to be no 
 better than a shallow metaphysical argument, namely, " That no 
 being can act but where it is, and consequently that it cannot act 
 upon any subject at a distance." ' This proposition Lord Kames 
 pronounces false. ' Is there anything more simple or more com- 
 mon than the acting upon subjects at a distance by intermediate 
 means ? When I see a tree . . . the object perceived is the tree 
 itself, not the rays of light, not the picture. In this manner dis- 
 tant objects are perceived without any action of the object upon 
 the mind or of the mind upon the object. . . . The air put in mo- 
 tion . . . makes an impression upon the drum of the ear; but this 
 impression is not what I hear, — it is the thunder itself, by means 
 of that impression.' 2 No burlesque could equal the unconscious 
 richness of this argument. 
 
 §6: Voltaire (1694-1778) says, 'According to this doctor 
 (Berkeley), ten thousand men killed by ten thousand cannon- 
 shots are in reality nothing more than ten thousand apprehen- 
 sions of our understanding.' . . .Voltaire answers Berkeley's argu- 
 ment from the relativity of size thus : ' He had only to take any 
 measure, and say, of whatever extent this body may appear to me 
 to be, it extends to so many of these measures.' ' Extent is not a 
 sensation. When this lighted coal goes out, I am no longer warm; 
 when the air is no longer struck, I cease to hear; when this rose 
 withers, I no longer smell it; but the coal, the air, and the rose 
 have extent without me. Berkeley's paradox is not worth refuting.' 
 ' It is worth knowing how Berkeley was drawn into this paradox. 
 A long while ago I had some conversation with him, and he told 
 me that his opinion originated in our being unable to conceive 
 what the subject of this extension is ; and certainly in his book 
 he triumphs when he asks Hylas what this subject, this sub- 
 stratum, this substance is ? . . . But the subject does not the 
 
 1 Works, 127. See ' Reid and the Philosophy of Common Sense,' Ferrier's Lectures 
 . . and Remains, 1866, vol. ii., 407-459. 
 
 a Elements of Criticism, chap. xxv. Appendix. Note. The first edition appeared 
 in 1762. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 47 
 
 less exist, for it has essential properties of which it cannot be 
 deprived.' " 
 
 § 7 : Diderot (1713-1784). ' The author of the Essay on the 
 Origin of Human Knowledge (Condillac) judiciously remarks 
 that whether we lift ourselves to the very heavens or go down 
 into the abyss, we never go out of ourselves, and it is nothing 
 but our own thinking which we perceive ; but this is the very 
 point reached in the first Dialogue of Berkeley, and is the very 
 foundation of his entire system — extravagant system, which, it 
 seems to me, could have its birth alone among the blind — a sys- 
 tem which, to the disgrace of the mind of man and of philosophy, 
 is of all systems the most difficult to refute, yet is the most ab- 
 surd of all.' 2 On this Stewart, with his characteristic candour, 
 says, ' If the fundamental principle ascribed by Diderot to 
 Berkeley be admitted, it will be found, I apprehend, not merely 
 difficult, but altogether impossible, to resist his conclusion.' 3 
 
 §8: Beattie (1735-1803), in his very untruthful Essay on 
 Truth, handles Berkeley with his characteristic display of shal- 
 lowness and egotism. ' Berkeley's pretended proof of the non- 
 existence of matter, at which common sense stood aghast for 
 many years, has no better foundation than the ambiguous use of 
 a word.' ' This (Berkeley's) argument . . . proves that to be false 
 which every man must necessarily believe every moment of his 
 life to be true, and that to be true which no man since the founda- 
 tion of the world was ever capable of believing for a single mo- 
 ment.' This argument, reduced out of its paraphrase, simply 
 means — you lie ! Beattie states Berkeley's view as involving 
 ' that the sun, moon, and stars, and ocean, and tempest, thunder 
 and lightning, mountains, rivers, and cities, have no existence 
 but as ideas or thoughts in my mind, and independent on me 
 and my faculties do not exist at all, and could not exist if / were 
 to be annihilated ; that food and burning and pain which I feel, 
 and the recollection of pain that is past, and the idea of pain which 
 I never felt, are in the same sense ideas and perceptions in my 
 mind, and nothing else, . . . and thus I have no evidence that 
 
 1 Philosophical Dictionary, London. Art. Body. 
 
 2 Lettre sur les Aveugles, quoted by Stewart, v. 66. 
 
 3 Do. do. 
 
48 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 any being exists in nature but myself.' 1 All this is directly the 
 reverse of Berkeley's real views. Beattie, however, grants that 
 Berkeley did not foresee the consequences of his doctrines : ' His 
 intentions were irreproachable, and his conduct, as a man and a 
 Christian, did honour to human nature.' 2 A portrait of Beattie, 
 with allegorical accessories, was painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds 
 in 1773, in which Truth (as Beattie, we presume) was represented 
 trampling on Infidelity and Scepticism, in the shapes of Voltaire 
 and Hume. 
 
 Dr. Beattie thus defines the common sense to which he appeals: 
 ' The term common sense hath . . . been used to signify that power 
 of the mind which perceives truth or commands belief, not by 
 progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, 
 and irresistible impulse, derived neither from education nor from 
 habit, but from nature, acting independently on our will when- 
 ever its object is presented, according to an established law, and 
 tliercfore properly called a sense, and acting in a similar manner 
 upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and there- 
 fore properly called common sense. 1 Beattie distinguishes common 
 sense from reason, as Reid does, and appeals from reason to it. 
 Hamilton, after a fashion, vindicates Beattie's definition of com- 
 mon sense, and apologizes for his identification of reason with 
 reasoning in common with the great majority of philosophers, 
 and, with enough reservations to leave very little of the definition, 
 insists that there is more in it to be praised than to be censured. 3 
 
 § 9 : James Oswald, in his 'Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf 
 of Religion' (1766-1772), charged mankind in general, and learned 
 men in particular, with neglecting or despising common sense. 
 The result of the rarity of the use of common sense was the 
 neglect of the obvious and useful, and the fruitless pursuit of 
 speculative niceties. This had been the error of the earliest 
 philosophy, and continued to be the fatal mistake of the latest. 
 Locke denied innate ideas. His system runs out into materialism 
 and fatalism. Clarke and others wasted time and talents in a 
 philosophical demonstration of the existence of a God, an exist- 
 ence which the merest glance at nature put beyond all doubt. 
 
 « Essay, 6th ed. London, 1778, 132, 140, 232. • Do. 442. 
 
 3 Hamilton's Reid's Works, 792. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 49 
 
 Berkeley and his school considered man as a mere intelligence, 
 and scarcely noticed his sentient bodily nature. The common 
 calamity was want of common sense, and the sole panacea needed 
 for its cure was the neglected thing of virtue, common sense 
 itself, as possessed by Oswald and all who agreed with him. 
 ' The declamatory, insulting style of Dr. Oswald has met with 
 general disapprobation.' 1 
 
 § 10: Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) says of Berkeley's argu- 
 ments against the existence of the material world, 'They amount 
 to little more than an ingenious and elegant development of some 
 principles of Malebranche, pushed to certain paradoxical but 
 obvious consequences, of which Malebranche, though unwilling 
 to avow them, appears fully to have been aware. These conse- 
 quences, too, had been previously pointed out by Mr. Norris, a 
 very learned divine of the Church of England, whose name has 
 unaccountably failed in obtaining that distinction to which his 
 acuteness as a logician, and his boldness as a theorist, justly en- 
 title him.' 2 Stewart's statement of the Berkeleyan question is as 
 follows : 'As our sensations have no resemblance to the qualities 
 of matter, it has puzzled philosophers to explain in what manner 
 our notions of primary qualities are acquired. It is the difficulty 
 that has given rise to the modern scepticism concerning the non- 
 existence of matter. According to the ancient theory of percep- 
 tion, sensible qualities are perceived by means of images or spe- 
 cies propagated from external objects to the mind by the organs 
 of sense. These . . . ideas were supposed to be resemblances of 
 the sensible qualities. . . . This hypothesis is now commonly dis- 
 tinguished as the ideal theory. On the principles of this theory 
 Berkeley demonstrated that the existence of matter is impossi- 
 ble ; for, if we have no knowledge of anything which does not 
 resemble our ideas or sensations, it follows that we have no 
 knowledge of anything whose existence is independent of our 
 perceptions. If the ideal theory be admitted, the foregoing argu- 
 ment against the existence of matter is conclusive!* Stewart's 
 argument against Berkeleyanism is that the ideal theory is ' unsup- 
 ported by evidence, and is even inconceivable. That we have 
 
 1 Ethical Questions, by T. Cogan, 1817, p. 177. 
 
 » Works (Hamilton), i. 349. 3 Works, ii. 18, 19. 
 
 4 
 
So 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 notions of external qualities perfectly unlike to our sensations, or 
 to anything of which we are immediately conscious, is a fact ; 
 nor ought we to dispute the reality of what we perceive because 
 we cannot reconcile this fact with our received philosophical sys- 
 tems.' 1 Stewart's estimate of Reid is this: ' Dr. Reid, who first 
 called the ideal theory in question, offers no argument to prove 
 that the material world exists, but considers our belief of it as an 
 ultimate fact in our nature. It rests on the same foundation with 
 our belief in the reality of our sensations, which no man has dis- 
 puted.' 2 ' Till the refutation of the ideal theory in Reid's Inquiry, 
 the partisans of Berkeley's system remained complete masters of 
 
 the controversial field Many answers to it were attempted, . . . 
 
 the evidence of the conclusion . . . supporting the premises, and 
 not the premises the conclusion.' 3 Stewart notices that Berkeley 
 confidently appeals to the common sense, the popular belief, to 
 sustain him, as the Scotch school appeal to it to sustain them. 4 
 
 In explaining the frequency of his recurrence to the 'paradox 
 of Hume and Berkeley,' Stewart says, 'It is not that I regard 
 this theory oi idealism, when considered by itself, an error of any 
 serious moment.' s As between Berkeley's attempt to disprove 
 and Descartes' to prove the existence of the material world, 
 Stewart says, ' Both undertakings were equally unphilosophical ; 
 for to argue in favour oi any of the fundamental laws of human 
 belief is not less absurd than to call them in question. In this 
 argument, however, it must be granted that Berkeley had the 
 advantage ; the conclusion which he formed being unavoidable, 
 if the common principles be admitted on which they both pro- 
 ceeded.' 6 The scepticism concerning the existence of the mate- 
 rial world is one, says Stewart, ' which I am inclined to think 
 most persons have occasionally experienced in their early years.' 
 
 § ii : Buhle ( 1 763-1 821). — 'The principal arguments against 
 the Berkeleyan idealism are the following : I. From the argument 
 that all our cognition rests on our subjective sensations and con- 
 ceptions, nothing more follows than that all cognition as such is 
 subjective ; it cannot be inferred from this that there is no objective 
 actuality of external things, which are the real causes of cognition. 
 
 « Works, 19. ■ Do. do. 3 Do. iii. 52. 
 
 4 Works, 54. 5 Do., v. 85. 6 Do., 88. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 5I 
 
 These may exist in themselves, though it be impossible to know 
 them in themselves. 
 
 ' 2. The reciprocal relation of the external things and of our 
 faculty of cognition is unknown ; that is, we cannot see how the 
 external things beget the ideas of themselves, but the mode in 
 which the infinite spirit imparts ideas to the finite is equally 
 incomprehensible. 
 
 '3. The Berkeleyan idealism cannot account for the alternations 
 in psychological conditions, for example, of waking, sleeping, and 
 dreaming ; nor explain the difference between mere imaginings 
 and the conceptions of objects actually present, between accidental 
 and necessary conceptions, or how the emotions of pain and of 
 regret arise. What Berkeley has said in explanation of the dis- 
 tinction between fancies and actual perceptions is entirely insuf- 
 ficient and unsatisfactory. 
 
 '4. The system is incompatible with human freedom. Berke- 
 ley, indeed, held the doctrine of freedom, and needed it to vindi- 
 cate his system against some of the most important objections 
 to it which had suggested themselves to his own mind or had 
 been started by others. But as freedom can never exert itself 
 without ideas, and God begets all ideas which relate to external 
 objects, human action must always be under determinism. 
 
 '5. The consciousness of right and duty involves the existence 
 of a sphere of rational beings external to us, to which the laws 
 of duty have a reference. Hence the common sound under- 
 standing of men and natural feeling directly protest against the 
 Berkeleyan view.' 1 
 
 § 12: Tennemann (1761-1819). — 'The reasoning of Berkeley 
 has great plausibility, and, if we do not distinguish phenomena 
 from things in themselves, cannot be confuted. Nevertheless, 
 consciousness revolts against the result, and resists the inference, 
 even if the premises cannot be confuted. As such doctrines, 
 however well-grounded they may be, can accomplish nothing 
 over against the judgment of the common understanding, it is 
 not to be wondered at that the idealism of Berkeley excited less 
 sensation than might otherwise have been expected. To this 
 
 1 Geschichte d. neuern Philosophic, 1803, v. 129, and Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Philosophic, 
 1802, vfi., 364. 
 
52 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 may be added, that while Berkeley in his youth was regarded as 
 a great genius, in after time he was looked upon more and more 
 as an oddity, to whose whimseys and crotchets the majority of 
 scholars felt little disposition to give attention.' ' 
 
 § 13: Hegel (1770-1831). — 'The want of logical sequence in 
 this system compels it to resort again to God as a drain (die 
 Gosse) ; to Him is committed the solution of the contradiction. 
 In brief, in this idealism the ordinary sensuous view of the uni- 
 verse and the insulation of the actual, as also the system of 
 thoughts, of notionless judgments, remain exactly where they 
 were before ; it changes nothing at all in the contents but that 
 abstract form, to say that all are but perceptions. An idealism 
 like this involves no more than the antithesis of consciousness 
 and of its object, and leaves wholly untouched the extension of 
 the conceptions (Vorstellungen) and the antitheses of the empir- 
 ical and manifold contents. If it be asked what is the True of 
 these perceptions and conceptions, as it was before asked what is 
 the True of these things, it furnishes no answer. It is pretty 
 much a matter of indifference whether our view involves things 
 or perceptions, if the self-consciousness remains filled up with 
 the finitudes of the present life ; it receives its contents in the 
 ordinary way, and is of the ordinary sort. It reels round in its 
 isolation in the conceptions of the entirely empirical existence, 
 without being able to cognize and to grasp anything of the con- 
 tents ; or, in other words, in this formal idealism reason has no 
 proper contents.' 2 
 
 § 14: Erdmann (1842). — 'Berkeley contradicts himself in his 
 notion of God. God is conceived of as spirit, and as He im- 
 parts ideas to other spirits, He must himself have ideas (as we 
 have). If, on the other hand, He is supposed to have ideas in a 
 wholly different way from that in which we have them, He must 
 have ideas without sensation, &c. If we hold fast to this view, 
 it follows He has no sensuous ideas, and can consequently give 
 none. Furthermore, it is hard to attach a definite meaning to 
 the expression wholly different ideas from those we have. No 
 
 1 Geschichte d. Philosophic 1819, vol. xi. 415. 
 
 ■ Vorlesungen u. d. Geschichte d. Philosophic Herausgcg. v. Michelet, Dritte Theil, 
 zw. Aufl., 1844, iii. 444, 445. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 53 
 
 effort avails to remove the contradiction that God is a spirit (and 
 is consequently like us), and yet wholly different from us (and 
 consequently no spirit). In this contradiction Berkeley has in- 
 volved himself in supposing at the same time self-active indi- 
 vidual beings, and a God to whom they are supposed to be 
 passively related.' 1 
 
 § 15 : Dr. Thomas Brown (1 778-1 820) devotes two lectures to 
 ' Dr. Reid's supposed Confutation of the Ideal System.' 'So far 
 is Dr. Reid from having the merit of confuting the universal or 
 even general illusion of philosophers with respect to ideas in 
 the mind as images or separate things distinct from the percep- 
 tion itself, that his own opinions as to perception, on this point 
 at least, are precisely the same as those which generally prevailed 
 before.' To Dr. Reid ' the highest praise is usually given ... as 
 if he had truly established by argument the existence of a mate- 
 rial world. ... I do not discover in his reasonings on the subject 
 any ground for the praise which has been given. The evidence 
 for a system of external things — at least the sort of evidence for 
 which he contends — was not merely the same, but was felt also 
 to be precisely the same, before he wrote as afterwards. Nay, I 
 may add that the force of the evidence (if that term can be justly 
 applied to this species of belief) was admitted in its fullest extent 
 by the very sceptic against whom chiefly his arguments were 
 directed.' He then shows, as Hamilton subsequently did, that 
 Reid's position strengthens ' the force of the scepticism as to the 
 existence of matter.' ' The sceptical argument, as a mere play of 
 reasoning, admits of no reply.' Quoting Reid's words that ' the 
 belief of a material world . . . declines the tribunal of reason,' 
 Brown says, ■ Surely, if it decline the tribunal of reason, it is not 
 by reasoning that it is to be supported, even though the reasoner 
 should have the great talents which Dr. Reid unquestionably 
 possessed. . . . The sceptic and the orthodox philosopher of Dr. 
 Reid's school . . . come precisely to the same conclusion, . . . that 
 the existence of a system of things, such as we understand when 
 we speak of an external world, cannot be proved by argument. . . . 
 There is no argument of mere reasoning that can prove the exist- 
 
 » Leibnitz u. d. Entwickel. d. Idealismus vor Kant, 1842 (Gesch. d. Philos., B. ii., 
 Abth. ii.) : 219, 220. 
 
54 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 ence of an external world ; it is absolutely impossible for us not 
 to believe in the existence of an external world.' 1 
 
 § 16 : Dr. Frederick Beasley (1777-1845), in his 'Search of 
 Truth in the Science of the Human Mind,' discusses the ' theory of 
 Bishop Berkeley,' specially with the aim of showing that it does 
 not legitimately arise from Locke's system, but can be successfully 
 controverted on Locke's principles. Dr. Beasley controverts 
 Reid's position on these points, but in the main coincides with 
 the Scotch school in the structure of his argument: 'The senses 
 are the proper and sole judges in the case. We can give no reason 
 . . . why we believe in the certainty of intuitive truths, but that 
 such are the laws of our constitutions.' 2 
 
 §17: DlCTIONNAIRE DES SCIENCES PhILOSOPHIQUES (1844). 
 
 ' If the doctrine of Berkeley be adopted, I have no guarantee that 
 beings like myself exist exterior to me, and I remain alone in the 
 universe, or rather, with my mind and its ideas, I constitute the 
 universe for my solitary self. My mind and its ideas are the 
 only things which, in a consistent idealism, can escape negation 
 and doubt. Berkeley has not formally avowed this conclusion ; 
 but it fixes itself irresistibly on his doctrine.' 3 
 
 § 18 : The Rev. George Jamieson (1859), in his 'Essentials of 
 Philosophy,' 4 devotes the Introduction to ' the logical proof of an 
 external world,' and an Appendix to ' Berkeley's Principles of 
 Human Knowledge.' He says, ' It is allowed that no logical 
 proof of an external world has as yet been achieved, and philos- 
 ophers at this day confess the impotency which has hitherto 
 attended all the speculations of logic in this field of investiga- 
 tion.' The author therefore feels that he proposes ' to set forth a 
 plea to which no philosopher has successfully established a claim.' 
 Mr. Jamieson's logical proof presents these points : ' I. There is 
 such a phenomenon as consciousness. 2. Consciousness must 
 be the phenomenon of a substantial element — intellect. 3. There 
 is no cognisable phenomenon of intellect which is not presented 
 under the category of consciousness ; we have no evidence but 
 
 1 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 4 vols. Edinb., 1820. Lectures 
 xxvi. and xxvii. 
 « A Search, &c. Philada., 1822. B. ii., chap. v. 
 3 Paris, 1844, vol. i. 319, 320. * Edinburgh, 1859. 
 
V.— OPPONENTS AND OBJECTIONS. 55 
 
 what is resolvable into that of consciousness. 4. Consciousness 
 is from time to time suspended in sleeping. 5. The suspension 
 of consciousness does not interfere with the existence of intellect, 
 regarded as a substantial reality. 6. Intellect, as the subject of 
 suspended consciousness, must, in order to the restoration of con- 
 sciousness, of necessity either arouse itself into conscious activity 
 or be aroused by something out of itself. 7. The influence out 
 of itself, by which intellect is aroused to consciousness, can be 
 ascribed to ideas only, with which alone intellect is immediately 
 conversant. That intellect is conscious only of ideas is the im- 
 perative dictum of philosophy, the universal law of our reason. 
 Ideas are the objects of all intellect's thinking. We know of no 
 other objects of consciousness. It has nothing else that we know 
 to be conscious of. 8. Ideas must needs be conditioned forms 
 emanating from and representative of the facts of an external 
 world. 9. The conditions of the external world, with their forms, 
 must be what they are directly represented to our consciousness 
 by the ideas descriptive of the same. " If," to use the words of 
 Kant, who embraced the view of Berkeley to this extent, " the 
 things we see are not what they are taken for," then, upon the 
 principles of irresistible logic, " the root of our nature is a lie," let 
 Sir William Hamilton and his followers say what they may to 
 the contrary. . . . There can be no trusting to our cognition if we 
 perceive things differently from what they actually are.' 
 
 § 19: Dr. Jas. M'Cosh, in treating of primitive cognitions con 
 cerning body, holds, as involved in this intuitive knowledge, that, 
 ' 1, we know the object as existing or having being; 2, as having 
 an existence independent of the contemplative mind ; 3, as in- 
 volving a knowledge of outness or externality. We know the 
 object perceived, be it the organism or the object affecting the 
 organism, as not in the mind, as out of the mind. Thetee convic- 
 tions set aside all forms of idealism in sense-perception.' ' Berke- 
 ley is wrong in maintaining that we can perceive nothing more 
 than ideas in our own minds. . . . He errs in not unfolding how 
 much is comprised in the object as perceived by us; we perceive 
 body as having being, power, and existence without us and inde- 
 pendent of us. . . . Berkeley was misled throughout by following 
 the Lockeian doctrines that the mind perceives immediately only 
 
56 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 its own ideas, and that substance is to be taken merely as the 
 support or substratum of qualities.' 1 
 
 § 20: Sir William Hamilton (1 788-1 856) maintains that on his 
 own principles Reid reaches a doctrine which ' even supplies a 
 basis for an idealism like that of Fichte.' Just as Reid ' brings 
 the matter to a short issue ' in a doctrine which he thinks shows 
 that the ' ideal system is a rope of sand,' Hamilton says, ' Nothing 
 is easier than to show that, so far from refuting idealism, this doc- 
 trine affords it the best of all possible foundations. . . . Reid (and 
 herein he is followed by Mr. Stewart) . . . asserts the very posi- 
 tions on which this (the simpler and more refined) idealism estab- 
 lishes its conclusions. . . . The doctrine of our Scottish philosophers is, 
 in fact ', the very groundwork on which the egoistical idea/ism reposes. 
 The argument . . .from common sense in their hands is unavailing; 
 for if it be good against the conclusions of the idealist, it is good 
 against the premises which they afford him.' 2 
 
 ' The general approximation of thorough-going realism and 
 thorough-going idealism . . . may at first sight be startling. On 
 reflection, however, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. 
 Both build upon the same fundamental fact, that the extended 
 object immediately perceived is identical with the extended object 
 actually existing; for the truth of this fact both can appeal to the 
 common sense of mankind ; and to the common sense of man- 
 kind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps more 
 logically, than Reid.' 3 
 
 Hamilton held that 'Natural realism and absolute idealism are 
 the only systems worthy of a philosopher ; for as they alone have 
 any foundation in consciousness, so they alone have any consist- 
 ency with themselves.' Natural realism is Hamilton's own view, 
 and of this view Hamilton's successor asks, ' What is the nature 
 of the natural realism by which the ghost of absolute idealism is 
 to be exorcised?' His answer is, 'As matter of consciousness, 
 it is a figment ; as matter of consciousness, a dream.' That the 
 Scotch philosophy has not satisfied the entire Scotch mind, is 
 confessed in the sad words in which Fraser closes the brilliant 
 
 1 The Intuitions of the Mind. New York, 1866 : 109, 147, 148. See also Dr. M'Cosh on 
 Berkeley's Philosophy: Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan., 1873. 
 * Hamilton's edition of Reid, 128, 129. See what is quoted from Brown. Prolegomena. 
 3 Note C, Reid's Works, 817. 
 
VL— ESTIMATES OF BERKELEY. 
 
 57 
 
 review from which we quote: 'The only conviction which the 
 student of the history of human speculation can regard as neces- 
 sary is the conviction of our hopeless ignorance of all the mys- 
 teries of existence. Truth, like the Deity, is hid in darkness. 
 It is not that we are unable to divine the mysteries of the soul 
 and God ; the simplest phenomenon of sense defies our wit. Of 
 the future destinies of philosophy it is in vain to speak. Phe- 
 nomena we can observe ; their laws we are able to ascertain ; 
 existence is beyond our ken. The riddle of the Sphynx has 
 never yet been read ; the veil of Isis has never yet been drawn ; 
 the hieroglyphics of the universe are yet undeciphered.' * 
 
 VI. Estimates of Berkeley — his Character, Writings, and 
 Influence. 
 
 § I : Swift (1667-1745). — ' He is an absolute philosopher with 
 regard to money, titles, and power. ... He most exorbitantly pro- 
 poseth a whole hundred pounds a year for himself. . . . His heart 
 will break if his deanery be not taken from him. One of the 
 first men in this kingdom for learning and virtue.' 2 
 
 Swift is said to have introduced Berkeley to Earl Berkeley 
 with the words, ' My lord, here is a young gentleman of your 
 family. I can assure your lordship it is a much greater honour 
 to you to be related to him, than to him to be related to you.' 
 ' Berkeley,' he says in the Journal, to Stella, ' is a very ingenious 
 man and great philosopher.' 3 
 
 § 2: Warburton (1698-1779). — 'He is indeed a great man, 
 and the only visionary I ever knew that was.' 4 
 
 § 3 : Blackwell(i70I-i737), who was to have been one of the 
 professors in the Bermuda University, says, ' I scarce remember 
 to have conversed with him on that art, liberal or mechanic, of 
 which he knew not more than the ordinary practitioners. With 
 the widest views, he descended into a minute detail, and be- 
 grudged neither pains nor expense for the means of information. 
 ... I admire the extensive genius of the man. . . . Many such 
 
 1 North British Review, xxxiv. 479. 
 
 * Letter to Lord Carteret, in Fraser's Life, 102. See Christian Examiner, July, 1838, 313. 
 
 3 Fraser : Life, vi, 54. 
 
 4 Letters. London, 1809. See article in Retrospective Review, vol. xi. (1825) 239. 
 
5 8 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 spirits in our country would quickly make learning wear another 
 face.' 1 
 
 §4: Hume (1711-1766). — 'Most of the writings of that very 
 ingenious author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism 
 which are to be found either among the ancient or modern phi- 
 losophers, Bayle not excepted. That all his arguments, though 
 otherwise intended, are in reality merely sceptical, appears from 
 this : that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. 
 Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and 
 irresolution and confusion which is the result of scepticism.' 3 
 
 § 5 : Johnson (j 709-1784). — ' Berkeley was a profound scholar, 
 as well as a man of fine imagination.' 3 
 
 §6: Adam Smith (1723-1790) says of the ' New Theory of 
 Vision' that it is ' one of the finest examples of philosophical 
 analysis that is to be found in our own or any other language.' 
 
 §7: Tiedemann (1748-1803). — ' His noble and great heart 
 glowed with zeal for the good and for the promotion of the wel- 
 fare of mankind. ... He left behind him the renown of a man 
 devoid of selfishness, of one full of ardour for the interest not 
 alone of his native land, but of the human race, strict in the per- 
 formance of the duties of his see, and full of magnanimity. . . . 
 Few have equalled him in acuteness and profundity. . . . He has 
 filled up an important break in human thought. ... To attempt 
 to thunder down idealism by a dictum of the popular under- 
 standing is unphilosophical, not to say irrational. . . . Berkeley 
 merits the warmest gratitude of all genuine philosophers.' 4 
 
 § 8 : Platner (i 744-181 8). — ' Berkeley was the first to render 
 idealism demonstrative and to show that the Deity does not 
 deceive us, though matter does not exist.' 5 
 
 §9: Reid (1710-1796). — 'Supposing this principle [that all 
 the objects of our knowledge are ideas] to be true, Berkeley's 
 system is impregnable. No demonstration can be more evident 
 than his reasoning from it.' ' He is acknowledged universally to 
 have great merit as an excellent writer and a very acute and clear 
 
 1 Memoirs of the Court of Augustus, ii. 277. 
 
 ■ Boays. Note N. 3 Boswell, New York, 1850, i. 173. 
 
 4 Geist d. spekulativen Philosophic, 1797, vol. vi. 621, 623, 624. 
 
 5 Aphorismen, i. 413. 
 
VI.— ES TIM A TES OF BERK EL E Y. 
 
 59 
 
 reasoner on the most abstract subjects, not to speak of his vir- 
 tues as a man, which were very conspicuous.' 'The new phi- 
 losophy had been making gradual approaches towards Berkeley's 
 opinion, and whatever others might do, the philosophers had no 
 right to look upon it as absurd or unworthy of a fair examina- 
 tion. Several authors attempted to answer his arguments, but 
 with little success, and others acknowledged that they could 
 neither answer them nor assent to them.' ' The " Theory of 
 Vision" . . . contains very important discoveries and marks of 
 great genius.' ' He possessed uncommon penetration and judg- 
 ment.' ' The principle laid down in the first sentence of his 
 Principles of Knowledge . . . has always been acknowledged by 
 
 philosophers This is the foundation on which the whole system 
 
 rests. If this be true, then indeed the existence of a material 
 world must be a dream.' 1 
 
 §10: Dugald Stewart (1753-1828). — ' Possessed of a mind 
 which was fully equal to that of Locke in logical acuteness and 
 invention, and in learning, fancy, and taste far its superior, 
 Berkeley was singularly fitted to promote that reunion of phi- 
 losophy and the fine arts which is so essential to the prosperity 
 of both. . . . Pope's admiration of him seems to have risen to 
 a sort of enthusiasm. . . . On his moral qualities he has bestowed 
 the highest and most unqualified eulogy to be found in his 
 writings : 
 
 ' " To Berkeley every virtue under heaven." 
 
 ' With these intellectual and moral endowments, admired and 
 blazoned as they were by the most distinguished wits of his age, 
 it is not surprising that Berkeley should have given a popularity 
 and fashion to metaphysical pursuits which they had never be- 
 fore acquired in England. Nor was this popularity diminished 
 by the boldness of some of his paradoxes. The solid additions, 
 however, made by Berkeley to the stock of human knowledge, 
 were important and brilliant. . . . His New Theory of Vision [is] 
 a work abounding with ideas so different from those commonly 
 received, and at the same time so profound and refined, that it 
 was regarded, by all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical 
 
 « Works (Hamilton), i. 280, 281, 283. 
 
60 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical romance than of 
 a sober inquiry after truth. Such, however, has been since the 
 progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the leading 
 and most abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essen- 
 tial part of every elementary treatise of optics, and are adopted 
 by the most superficial smatterers in science as fundamental 
 articles of their faith.' 1 
 
 'The Minute Philosopher,' Stewart says, 'is a book which 
 (notwithstanding a few paradoxical passages connected with the 
 author's system of idealism) may be safely recommended as one 
 of the most instructive as well as entertaining works of which 
 English philosophy has to boast.' 2 
 
 Speaking of other works of Berkeley, Stewart says, ' The illus- 
 trations exhibit a singular combination of logical subtlety and of 
 poetical invention; and the style, while it everywhere abounds 
 with the rich yet sober colouring of the author's fancy, is per- 
 haps superior in point of purity and of grammatical correctness 
 to any English composition of an earlier date.' 
 
 Of Berkeley's system Stewart says, ' Considered in contrast 
 with that theory of materialism which the excellent author was 
 anxious to supplant, it possessed important advantages not only 
 in its tendency but in its scientific consistency, and it afforded a 
 proof, wherever it met with a favourable reception, of an under- 
 standing superior to those casual associations which, in the appre- 
 hensions of most men, blend indissolubly the phenomena of 
 thought with the objects of external perception. It is recorded 
 as a saying of Turgot . . . that " he who had never doubted of the 
 existence of matter might be assured he had no turn for meta- 
 physical disquisitions.'" 3 
 
 § ii : Mackintosh, Sir James (i 765-1 832). — Sir James Mack- 
 intosh, in the very act of characterizing the ' paradoxes ' of 
 Berkeley as ' unfruitful,' mentions, admiringly, ' the unspeakable 
 charm of that transparent diction which clothed' them. 'His 
 immaterialism is chiefly valuable as a touchstone of metaphysical 
 sagacity, — showing those to be altogether without it, who, like 
 Johnson and Beattie, believed that his speculations were scep- 
 
 1 Dissertation. Works (Hamilton), i. 338-340. ■ Do., vi. 355. 
 
 3 Account of Life and Writings of Reid, sect, i, Works, x. 255, 256. 
 
VI.— ESTIMATES OF BERKELEY. 6 1 
 
 tical, that they implied any distrust in the senses, or that they 
 had the smallest tendency to disturb reasoning or alter conduct. 
 Ancient learning, exact science, polished society, modern litera- 
 ture, and the fine arts, contributed to adorn and enrich the mind 
 of this accomplished man.' 
 
 ' Of the exquisite grace and beauty of his diction no man 
 accustomed to English composition can need to be informed. 
 His works are, beyond dispute, the finest models of philosophical 
 style since Cicero. Perhaps they surpass those of the orator in 
 the wonderful art by which the fullest light is thrown on the most 
 minute and evanescent parts of the most subtile of human con- 
 ceptions. Perhaps he also surpassed Cicero in the charm of 
 simplicity.' 
 
 The judgments of William Archer Butler and of Ferrier have 
 been given in another connection. 1 
 
 § 12: The Edinburgh Review (July, 1872). — 'Berkeley be- 
 comes an important link in the history of philosophy. He may 
 be justly said to have contributed, indirectly indeed, but power- 
 fully, towards a more complete and scientific theory of knowl- 
 edge. As connected historically with Descartes and Locke on 
 the one hand, with Hume and Kant on the other, as well as with 
 the modern schools of realistic idealism and extreme sensation- 
 alism, he well deserves to occupy a niche of his own in the his- 
 tory of philosophy, and his writings must be carefully studied in 
 order to follow intelligently its modern development.' 
 
 § 13: Lewes (1871). — 'There are few men of whom England 
 has better reason to be proud than of George Berkeley, Bishop 
 of Cloyne. To extraordinary merits as a writer and thinker he 
 united the most exquisite purity and generosity of character ; and 
 it is still a mooted point whether he was greater in head or heart.' 2 
 
 § 14: Dr. McCosh. — 'Some of his works are worthy of being 
 placed alongside of those of Plato.' ' His style is acknowledged 
 on all hands to be graceful and attractive.' ' Taken apart from 
 his speculations, . . . the general influence of his writings is in- 
 spiring and ennobling, carrying us above the damp earth into the 
 empyrean, where we breathe a pure and delicious atmosphere.' 
 ' There are numbers in these days heart-sick of the unbending 
 
 1 Prolegomena, IV. a History of Philosophy, 4th ed., 1871, ii. 293. 
 
62 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 laws of physics and the pretentious categories of metaphysics, 
 and willing to lose themselves in the " woods and wilds " of the 
 ideal philosophy. The present state and wants of certain schools 
 of philosophy tend in the same direction. It is a curious though 
 by no means an inexplicable circumstance that not a few of those 
 trained by the teaching and writing of Hamilton, especially those 
 who have also felt the influence of Mill, are to be found, if we 
 can catch them anywhere, on the borders of Berkeley's upland of 
 mist and sunshine. Hamilton himself always spoke of Berkeley 
 in a more appreciative tone than most of his predecessors in the 
 Scotch school had done. His more discerning pupils have felt 
 that their great master has left them in a somewhat unsatisfac- 
 tory position: a professing realist, he is in fact the great relativist, 
 and he ends by declaring that man can know nothing of the 
 nature of things. Those who feel that they have no comfortable 
 standing in such a quivering quagmire look with fond eye towards 
 Berkeley, who, in taking away gross matter, leaves them substan- 
 tial mind.' ' I should rejoice to find students of philosophy be- 
 taking themselves to the works of Berkeley; but they will be 
 miserably disappointed if they expect to find there a foundation 
 on which to build a solid fabric. Let them follow him into the 
 labyrinth into which he conducts them, but let them take a thread 
 to guide them back into the light of day.' 1 
 
 § 15: Ritter (1791-1869).— 'The grand merit of Berkeley 
 was, beyond doubt, in the rigid consequences which, in the 
 development of his immaterialism, he deduced from the sensual- 
 istic system. The results which he reached in this way were 
 similar to those of the ancient sceptics : that our senses enable 
 us to know only phenomena, the signs of things, not things 
 themselves. In objective tendency this principle was supported 
 by the prevalent dualism, which conceded to material nature only 
 inertness and passivity. Only the more sharply did dualism now 
 present itself, when substantiality, the sole thing which it had been 
 allowed to have in common with spirit, was denied it. That 
 Berkeley maintained the substantiality of spirit, shows his affinity 
 with Leibnitz's mode of thought.' 2 
 
 " Berkeley's Philosophy, Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, Jan. 1873, x -3°. 
 ' Geschichte d. neuern Philosophic 1853, v °l- > v - 2 %4- 
 
VI.— ESTIMATES OF BERKELEY. 63 
 
 § 16 : Ueberweg (d. 1871) puts a different estimate from that of 
 the Scotch school on Berkeley. He does not decline argument, 
 as the Scotch school does, and considers the position of that 
 school as to ' immediate perception' an untenable fiction. He 
 admits in general the postulate of Berkeley's argument, and yet 
 endeavours to show that it does not justify Berkeley's conclusion. 
 In this Ueberweg's strictures stand alone, that he maintains that 
 inferential idealism is not justified by the premises which, in 
 common with the mass of philosophical thinking, it occupies. 
 He accepts a challenge which in some shape nearly all writers 
 against idealism have declined. He argues the question. He 
 denies that philosophy may waive the question or appeal against 
 Berkeley to so vague a thing as ' common sense.' He shows 
 an appreciation of Berkeley's real greatness and power, which 
 adds greatly to the force and value of his strictures. Coming, 
 as he does, from the survey of all the forms of philosophical 
 thought, doing justice to all, becoming the partisan of none, the 
 sobriety, sound judgment, and clearness of his annotations on 
 Berkeley give them the highest value. His estimate of Berkeley 
 is already given in the Preface to his translation of the Principles. 1 
 He thus estimates the relation of Berkeley to other thinkers : 
 
 ' Hume attached himself closely in certain respects to him, but 
 ran out into a scepticism completely the reverse of Berkeley's 
 religious tendency. Reid and the other philosophers of the Scotch 
 school have battled against Hume's scepticism and Berkeley's 
 idealism. The Scotch school have denied what is assumed by 
 Berkeley, in common with the Aristotelians and Cartesians, that 
 only subjective images or " ideas" are immediately in our con- 
 sciousness, and that consequently external things, if known at 
 all, can be known only by means of their representation through 
 " ideas." Reid's theory, however, of an immediate conscious- 
 ness of the external things — the doctrine of a direct presentation 
 of them — is an untenable fiction. Kant, in his doctrine of the 
 phenomenal world, approximates Berkeleyanism, but removes 
 himself from it in this sphere by his theory that the material of 
 the senses is shaped by a priori forms, and comes into complete 
 
 1 Prolegomena, I. See his Article : 1st Berkeley's Lehre wissenschaftlich unwider- 
 legbar? (Fichte's Zeitschrift, 55 Band, 1869, 63-84.) 
 
64 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 antagonism to Berkeley by his recognition of things in them- 
 selves.' 1 Ueberweg considers Hamilton's doctrine of relativity 
 an approach to Berkeley's view. 2 The pctitio principii in some 
 points, which Ueberweg charges upon Berkeley, is denied and 
 retroverted by Fraser. 3 
 
 § 17: Stirling (1868). — 'In the present disintegration of re- 
 ligion around us, the idealism of Berkeley, of Carlyle, and of 
 Emerson has been to many a man the focus of a creed, of a 
 fervent and sincere and influential faith. It is this that makes 
 Berkeley and idealism in general so interesting now. Berkeley 
 indeed is, in every point of view, a grand and great historical 
 figure. Grand and great in himself, — one of the purest and most 
 beautiful souls that ever lived, — he is grand and great also in his 
 consequences. Hamann, an authority of weight, declares that 
 " without Berkeley there had been no Hume, as without Hume 
 no Kant ;" and this is pretty well the truth. To the impulse of 
 Berkeley largely, then, it is that we owe the German philosophy. 
 And great as is the service, it is to the majority of English and 
 American thinkers much less great than that which they owe to 
 Berkeley himself, either directly or indirectly (through Carlyle and 
 Emerson), especially in the religious reference already alluded to. 
 When we add to these considerations that also of Berkeley's 
 mastery of expression, and of his general fascination as a writer, 
 it is impossible to think of him . . . without that veneration with 
 which the ancients regarded their Plato, their Democritus, and 
 their Eleatic Parmenides, of which last, perhaps, the sublimity, 
 purity, and earnestness of character approach nearest to those of 
 the character of Berkeley. Apart even from the influence of his 
 earlier writings, there attaches now ... a peculiar value to his 
 expressions relative to the philosophies of the ancients in his 
 Siris. ... In all these references Berkeley will be found peculiarly 
 admirable for the spirit of candour and love which he manifests. 
 For systems, flippantly characterized nowadays as pantheistic or 
 atheistic, ... he grudges not, in the sweetness of his own simple, 
 sincere nature, to vindicate Theism. Altogether one gets to admire 
 Berkeley almost more here than elsewhere. The learning, the can- 
 
 1 Berkeley's Prinzipien, XIII. 
 
 " Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos., 3d ed., 1871, iii. 364. 3 Life, 370. 
 
VI.— ESTIMATES OF BERKELEY. 65 
 
 dour, and the depth of reflection, are all alike striking. As com- 
 pared with Hume in especial, it is here that Berkeley is superior, 
 and thai not only with reference to the learning, but with reference 
 to the spirit of faith and gravity, as opposed to the spirit of doubt 
 and levity. The most valuable ingredient in Berkeley is, after 
 all, that he is a Christian.' 1 
 
 § 18: Fraser. — 'The great glory of Irish philosophy is 
 Berkeley. ... To the present day the memory of the mild meta- 
 physician is as dear to his countrymen as that of their most 
 turbulent orators and statesmen. Nor is the instinct of the 
 nation wrong. He was one of the first eminent Anglo-Hiber- 
 nians that were not ashamed of the name of Irishman. He was 
 one of the first Irish Protestants who would honestly tolerate a 
 " Papist." He was, perhaps, the first Irishman who had the 
 courage to tell his countrymen their faults. He was the first to 
 denounce the race of patriots. The character of this great and 
 good man, indeed, is not the exclusive property of his country; 
 it is the common glory of the human race. His life was one of 
 ideal purity. The metaphysician of idealism was an ideal man. 
 He was as nearly a realization of the conception of the Stoic 
 sage as the imperfection of humanity permits. 
 
 'The range of his intellectual accomplishments was almost as 
 wonderful as his virtue was unique. In his "Analyst" he was 
 the first to point out that logical inconsistency in the modern 
 calculus which Carnot attempted to explain by a compensation 
 of errors, which Lagrange endeavoured to obviate by his calcu- 
 lus of functions, and which Euler and D'Alembert could only 
 evade by pointing out the constant conformity of the conception 
 with ascertained results. The "Querist," to use the language of 
 Sir James Mackintosh, " contains more hints, then original, still 
 unapplied in legislation and political economy, than are to be 
 found in any equal space." In his "Minute Philosopher," mod- 
 elled on the Dialogues of Plato, he catches the manner of his 
 master ; and, while tracking the free thought of the day through 
 its various evolutions, exhibits an exquisite elegance of diction 
 that is unsurpassed in the literature of philosophy. It is in ab- 
 stract philosophy, however, that we are to seek his glory. His 
 
 1 Annotations on Schwegler, 1868, 420-422. 
 
 s 
 
66 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 "Theory of Vision," his "Principles of Human Knowledge," his 
 "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," and his "Siris," en- 
 title him as a metaphysician to be ranked with Locke and Hume ; 
 and their publication vindicated the claim of Ireland to an 
 equality with England and with Scotland in the glories of meta- 
 physical research. 
 
 : Berkeley's idealism, in fact, is an epoch in the history of 
 modern speculation.' 1 
 
 VII. Idealism defined. 
 
 § i : Idealism, the general system of which Berkeley is an 
 exponent, is, on the whole, with reference to the part it has played 
 in the history of human thought, the greatest of systems. In its 
 most generic sense, it has been and is now the system of the 
 great mass of thinkers. 
 
 Berkeley therefore, were there no other reason, is worthy of study 
 as one of the great masters in one part of a great school of phi- 
 losophical thinking. He represents with distinguished majesty 
 and grace one grand division of idealism. For idealism is not 
 a narrow province of philosophy, but at least in its mainland a 
 hemisphere of it, and with islands of coincidence stretching 
 over philosophy's whole globe. Like England, its drum-beat 
 follows the sunrise till it circles the world. 
 
 Those who imagine that idealism, in the broad sense of the 
 word, is a feeble thing, or the mere refuge of a few paradoxical 
 minds, either do not know its nature and meaning or are igno- 
 rant of its history. In its principle of cognition it is so strong as 
 to have carried nearly the entire body of thinkers with it. On 
 this they have agreed ; it is on the inferences from it they have 
 divided. Generic idealism is the predominant system of the 
 world, and specific idealism has an immense body of able sup- 
 porters. To see clearly the nature of this distinction, it may be 
 useful to recall some of the various definitions of idealism and 
 idealists. 
 
 § 2 : Wolff (1679- 1 7 54). — 'Idealists is the name given to those 
 who grant no more than an ideal existence of bodies, an exist- 
 
 « North British Review, vol. xxxiv. (1861) 454, 455. 
 
VI L— IDEALISM DEFINED. 67 
 
 ence in our minds, and therefore deny a real existence of the 
 world and of bodies.' 1 
 
 §3: Platner (1744-1818). — 'Idealism shows, 1, from the 
 inconceivableness of material substances, 2, from the origin of 
 what are called the primary qualities of matter, that nothing 
 non-spiritual or material, external to the mind in which these 
 conceptions are, and embracing the matter for them, has any 
 existence ; consequently these conceptions are either the result of 
 our imaginative faculty or are aroused by the operation of an 
 infinite spirit.' 2 
 
 §4: Frederick Schlegel (1772-1829). — 'The essence of 
 idealism consists in holding the spiritual alone as actual and truly 
 real, in entirely denying to bodies and matter existence and reality, 
 in explaining them as mere appearance and illusion, or at least 
 transmuting and resolving them into spirit. The question at 
 once meets us here, What, then, in antithesis to matter is the 
 proper essence of spirit ? To which the reply is, Freedom, 
 activity, living mobility; as substantial permanence, unchangea- 
 bleness, and dead repose are the essence of corporeal materialism. 
 This is the distinctive point in which idealism directly contradicts 
 both materialism and realism. The view taken of the notion of 
 substance properly determines whether a system be idealistic or 
 not, for in true idealism this notion is completely set aside and 
 annihilated.' 3 
 
 § 5: Willich (1798). — ' Idealism is . . . that system of philos- 
 ophy in which the external reality of certain intuitive representa- 
 tions is disputed or doubted, and space as well as external objects 
 are asserted to be mere fancies.' 4 
 
 §6: Lossius (1743-18 13). — 'Idealism is the assertion that 
 matter is only an ideal seeming, and that spiritual essences are 
 the only real things in the world.' 5 
 
 § 7 : Krug ( 1 770-1 842). — ' Idealism is that system of philoso- 
 phy which considers the real (the existent or actual) as a mere 
 ideal. In this system it is held that there is no actual object 
 corresponding to our conceptions of the external world, but that 
 
 1 Psychologia Rationalis, 1734, 1779, § 36. 
 
 2 Aphorismen, 1793, i. § 756. 3 Philosoph. Vorlesungen, i. 
 * Willich : Glossary, in Elements of the Critical Philosophy, London, 1798. 
 5 Lossius: Philosoph. Real-Lexicon. Erfurt, 1803, ii. 607. 
 
68 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 we ourselves objectify — regard as something objective — those 
 conceptions, and consequently first transmute the ideal into a real, 
 as we are of necessity self-conscious of those conceptions.' 1 
 
 §8: Tennemann (1761-1819). — 'Rationalism, in the broader 
 sense, proceeds sometimes from knowledge, sometimes (as in 
 Jacobi's system) from faith, and either explains our conception 
 and cognition by the existence of objects or explains the existence 
 of objects from our conception and cognition. The former sys- 
 tem is Realism, which makes the existence of objects the original; 
 the latter is Idealism, which makes the conception the original.' 2 
 
 §9: Duval Jouve (1847). — 'Idealism is the name given to 
 the philosophical doctrines which consider the idea either as the 
 principle of cognition or as the principle alike of cognition and 
 of being.' 3 
 
 §10: Pierer (1859). — 'Idealism, the philosophical system, 
 which, positing the ideal as original, the real as derivative, either 
 regards things as mere conceptions of the reflecting, actual sub- 
 ject, or looks upon the existence of the world of sense as at least 
 problematical and incapable of demonstration.' 4 
 
 § 11 : Brockhaus (1866). — 'Idealism, in antithesis to realism, 
 is that philosophical view which maintains not only that the spir- 
 itual or ideal being is the original, but that it is the sole actuality, 
 so that we can concede to the objects of the senses no more than 
 the character of a phenomenal world educed by ideal activities.' 5 
 
 § 12 : Other Definitions. — Idealism has been further defined 
 as ' the philosophical view which regards what is thought as 
 alone the actually existent, in opposition to realism ;' 'schemes of 
 philosophy which teach that we are concerned only with ideas 
 and are ignorant of everything else;' 'the doctrine that in exter- 
 nal perceptions the objects immediately known are ideas.' 6 
 
 ' Idealism, in antithesis to realism, is the philosophic view 
 which regards the objects of sense only as products of the 
 conception, and considers the thinking subject, or the thing 
 
 1 Krug : Encycl. Phil. Lex., ii. 496, 2d ed., Leipz., 1833. 
 
 * Tennemann : Grundriss d. Ges. d. Philos., 5th Aufl. von A. Wendt, j5 58. 
 3 Duval Jouve, in Dictionnaire d. Sciences Philosoph., Par., 1847, iii. 180. 
 
 * Pierer's Universal Lexicon, 1859, viii. 774. 
 
 5 Brockhaus: Real-Encyklopaedie, nth ed., 1866, viii. 204. 
 ' General und Universal Lexicon, 1869, ii. 604. 
 
VII.— IDEALISM DEFINED. 69 
 
 thought, as the truly existent ;' ' the designation of many and 
 different systems of philosophy, which only agree in the common 
 principle from which they originate. The principle is the op- 
 position of the ideal and the real, — that is, of ideas and things, 
 the contrariety of mind and body, or of spirit and matter ;' ' that 
 scheme . . . which, carried to its legitimate results, . . . regards all 
 external phenomena as having no existence apart from a thinking 
 subject.' ' 
 
 § 13: Hamilton (1788-1856). — 'If the testimony of conscious- 
 ness be referred to the co-originality and reciprocal independence 
 of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according 
 as the one or other of the terms is placed as the original and 
 genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, Idealism ; is the 
 subject educed from the object, Materialism is the result' ' There 
 is one scheme which, . . . with the complete idealist, regarding 
 the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification 
 of the percipient subject, or at least a phenomenon numerically 
 distinct from the object it represents, endeavours to stop short of 
 the negation of an external world, the reality of which, and the 
 knowledge of whose reality, it seeks by various hypotheses to 
 establish and explain. This scheme, which we would term Cos- 
 mothetic Idealism, Hypothetical Realism, or Hypotlietical Dualism, 
 although the most inconsequent of all systems, has been embraced 
 under various forms by the immense majority of philosophers.' 2 
 
 § 14: Schopenhauer (1788-1860). — We close with Schopen- 
 hauer's definition : ' The fundamental view of idealism is this : 
 that everything which has an existence for cognition, and conse- 
 quently all that is perceived, the entire universe, extending itself 
 in space and time, and linked by the principle of the sufficient 
 reason, is merely object in relation to the subject, the perception 
 of the percipient (the intuition of the intuitant); it is conception, 
 consequently its existence is not absolute and unconditional, but 
 only relative and conditional ; in brief, is not a thing in itself, but 
 is mere phenomenon.' 3 
 
 § 15 : The diversity in these definitions arises very much from 
 
 1 Meyer's Hand-Lexikon, 1872. Cyclopaedia of Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowl- 
 edge, 1838, vol. xii. Encyclopaedia Britannica, xii. 356. , 
 
 2 Sir William Hamilton (1830) : Discussions. New York, Harper & Bros., 1868, 61. 
 
 3 Schopenhauer, Lexicon, v. Frauenstadt, 1871, i. 342. 
 
70 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 their confounding in various ways the essential principle of Ideal- 
 ism and the processes by which it is reached, or with the inferences 
 which are deduced from it. Conflicting modes of arguing it 
 may exist, and conflicting inferences be drawn from it ; but the 
 essential and common feature of idealism is that it holds that 
 the final cognitions, the only cognitions, in the absolute or philo- 
 sophical sense, are those which the mind has of its own states. 
 If it admit that we may in any sense apply the term cognitions 
 more widely than this, it holds that such cognitions are relative 
 merely, and that they are to be vindicated even as relative cog- 
 nitions only by showing that they are of necessity involved in 
 the absolute cognition, the cognition given in self-consciousness. 
 However reached or however developed, any system is so far 
 idealistic which holds ' that the mind is conscious or immediately 
 cognisant of nothing beyond its subjective states.' * 
 
 VIII. Sceptical Idealism in the development of Idealism 
 from Berkeley to the present : Hume. 
 
 § i : Sceptical Idealism, or Idealistic Scepticism, is the sys- 
 tem of Hume (1711-1776). 
 
 The great aim of Berkeley had been a religious one. It was 
 his design to check scepticism ; but the actual result of his system, 
 as it was developed in a special direction by Hume, was the pro- 
 motion of scepticism in the subtlest and ablest form in which it 
 has ever been presented. The clearness of Hume's thinking, and 
 the luminous beauty of his style, gave a popularity to his specu- 
 lations which has rarely been enjoyed by great thinkers. As 
 trophies of intellectual power his philosophical writings are 
 incomparably beyond his history. The chief of these are 
 his ' Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,' ' Enquiry con- 
 cerning the Principle of Morals,' and the 'Natural History of 
 Religion.' 
 
 David Hume proceeded from the empiricism of Locke as a 
 general basis ; but associating with it the speculations of Berke- 
 ley, whom he greatly admired, he denies to human knowledge 
 all objective certainty, on the ground that it is impossible to go 
 beyond ideas so as to reach the essence of things. 
 
 1 Hamilton's statement of Dr. Brown's view : Discussion 62. 
 
VIII.— SCEPTICAL IDEALISM: HUME. yi 
 
 His system may be stated in the following propositions : 
 
 1st. Our perceptions are either impressions or ideas, — either 
 impressions or sensations of that which we hear, see, touch, or 
 are cogitations, — i.e. ideas strictly so called. These ideas, inasmuch 
 as they are combined solely from our sensations or impressions, 
 are themselves no more than feebler sensations or impressions, 
 and, therefore, are even less certain than the sensations. But the 
 sensations themselves are necessarily uncertain, because reason 
 (arguing from the ground of empiricism) supplies no means of 
 knowing that these sensations or impressions are conformed to 
 objects, or indeed have any object at all. 
 
 2d. Hence every cognition is destitute of objective truth. 
 
 3d. For our ideas or judgments are referred either, 1st, to a 
 physical order, and ideas or judgments of this class rest upon the 
 notion of cause; or, 2d, they are referred to a moral order, and 
 ideas or judgments of this class rest upon the notion of liberty 
 and virtue; or, 3d, they have regard to a moral and physical 
 order, so as to explain the origin and unity of it ; and the ideas 
 and judgments of this third class involve the notion of a uni- 
 versal principle of all Being or Entities, that is, a God. 
 
 But all these fundamental notions objectively regarded are 
 mere hypotheses or artificial ideas. Hume takes up the three 
 classes and endeavours to show that this is true of them all. 
 First, of the notions which are referred to a physical order, he 
 argues that here experience merely teaches us the relations of 
 simultaneousness and of succession. Thus experience shows 
 that B co-exists with A or succeeds A ; but from the fact that 
 B co-exists with A to draw the conclusion that the one depends 
 upon the other is impossible, or from the fact that B succeeds 
 A to draw the conclusion that A is the cause of B is impossible. 
 Hence (from the empirical method), we can have no notion 
 objectively real of a cause. But without the notion of cause 
 there are no notions which can be referred to a physical order, 
 inasmuch as without this notion we explain no phenomena, nor 
 can we be certain of the existence of bodies, for we judge that 
 they exist because we think them to be the causes of our sensa- 
 tions. Second, as to the notions referred to the moral order, 
 Hume argues that from experience no man can have any other 
 
72 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 motive for his acts than egoism, selfishness or self-love. But the 
 notion of virtue is distinct from egoism. Hence' the notion of 
 virtue (on the ground of empiricism) is pure hypothesis. 2d. 
 We indeed perceive that we will, but how we will we do not 
 perceive. Hence the notion of moral liberty is merely artificial, 
 and in fact self-contradictory, for free choice cannot exist without 
 motive ; but motive cannot produce ultimate decision unless it 
 be connected with stronger impressions which necessitate the 
 willing. 
 
 Third, the notion of a universal principle or God is clearly im- 
 possible to man, for we can only reach such a notion by ascending 
 from sensation through the notion of cause, from the whole, as 
 an effect, to God as the cause of the whole, — but the notion of 
 cause is without foundation. This doctrine Hume applies to 
 ethics, — to the question of retribution in another life, to the im- 
 mortality of the soul, to religion in general, and to morality. 
 All these, as resting on mere hypotheses, he treats in the same 
 way, and thus out of an empiricism which proposed to lay a sure 
 foundation for human belief he developed a universal scepticism. 1 
 
 IX. Critical Idealism : Kant. 
 Critical or Transcendental (hypothetical) Idealism, the 
 system of Kant (i 724-1 804). We know things only as they 
 appear to us, not as they are in themselves. Things as we know 
 them are mental representations in us, and time and space are 
 forms of our intuiting. There are two sources whence we derive 
 cognition. I. The unfathomable thing in itself, which furnishes 
 the matter for our mental representations ; 2. the subjective 
 forms of our thinking, or the categories. Both must be united 
 to make experience possible. ' Of the two elements whose 
 relation and harmony compose science, — on one side the human 
 mind, the subject, and on the other things, beings, the object, — 
 Kant proposes to suppress the second, and to reduce science to 
 the first. To eliminate the objective forever, as absolutely in- 
 accessible, and to resolve all into the subjective, this is his end 
 and here are the great lines of his enterprise.' a ' Kant's system 
 
 » Rothenflue, Institutiones Philosophise Theoreticre, 1846, iii. 273-275. 
 » Saisset, Essay on Religious Philosophy, 1863, vol. i. 275. 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 73 
 
 is to be designated as Idealism in a completely general sense and 
 in all its parts, for alike the ground of phenomena and the law 
 of conduct it sought in the mind of man and in its laws, innate, 
 independent of experience.' 1 
 
 When we look at the end of the epoch terminating with Hume, 
 it is very clear that a reformation was pressingly necessary. The 
 scepticism of Hume, rising in the empiricism of Locke, threatened 
 not only all that was thought to be known in regard to morals 
 and religion, but subverted the very principles of reason, the 
 foundation of all cognitions, and thus made all science, all real 
 knowledge, impossible. It had become obvious that, whatever 
 might be the speculative force of this tendency, it involved such 
 enormous practical evils that there must be somewhere in it a 
 latent fallacy, — either the premises were incorrect or the reason- 
 ings upon them unwarranted. It was clearly necessary to sub- 
 ject the intellect of man and its operations to a new examination, 
 that knowledge might be built upon a more solid foundation. 
 The great master in this work was Kant. He performed this 
 work in such a way that, as his transcendental idealism was 
 developed and supported by his general system, a number 
 of later writers endeavored to find the ultimate principle, i.e. the 
 absolute, some in the Ego or subjective understanding, others in 
 the non-Ego or in nature, some in the identity of the Ego and 
 non-Ego. The first of these developed into the system of sub- 
 jective idealism, the second into that of objective idealism. 
 Germany was the chief arena of these speculations. It will be 
 seen that in this epoch the evolution of philosophy presents 
 the three results: 1st. Transcendental Idealism ; 2d. Subjective 
 Idealism; 3d. Objective Idealism, one form of which is the doctrine 
 of absolute Identity. 
 
 Emmanuel Kant has been considered, by some not incom- 
 petent judges, the most profound thinker with whom the history 
 of the human mind has acquainted us. Intelligent men who are 
 not his disciples yet acknowledge him to be one of the greatest 
 and most influential metaphysicians. Of Scotch descent on his 
 father's side, and German on his mother's, he largely combined 
 and harmonized the best traits of the great metaphysicians of 
 
 1 Zeller, Geschichte d. deutsch. Philosophic, 1873, S 12 - 
 
74 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 both nationalities. He was thoroughly educated, and early dis- 
 played remarkable powers. He began at the age of thirty to 
 teach philosophy and mathematics in the university of his native 
 place. Originally his philosophical teachings were in accordance, 
 in the main, with those of his immediate predecessors, who were 
 disciples of Wolff, the systematizer of Leibnitz. It was the 
 writings of Hume which first awakened him to the defects of the 
 shallow dogmatism into which the system of Wolff had run. 
 Hume's denial of all universal and necessary cognition, because 
 none such is furnished by experience, and none, therefore, can 
 have objective reality, aroused Kant to the refutation of Hume, 
 and led him to subject the entire faculty of cognition to a critical 
 examination. He proposed to himself three questions : 
 
 ist. What am I able to know? 
 
 2d. What ought I to do ? 
 
 3d. What may I hope for? 
 
 The first of these raises the metaphysical question; the second, 
 the ethical; the third, the religious. 
 
 He maintains that these questions cannot be answered except 
 by showing, by critical process, that reason, taken universally, is 
 the faculty of cognition a priori. To perform this work he pro- 
 posed to treat of three great departments : 
 
 ist. To present a critique of pure theoretic reason or of tran- 
 scendental reason, — that is, of a reason which transcends and goes 
 above mere empirical experience. 1 
 
 2d. The critique of practical reason. 2 
 
 3d. The critique of judgment. 3 
 
 Under the critique of pure reasoning Kant discusses — 
 
 A. The nature of our cognition. 
 
 B. The divisions of the cognitive faculty. 
 
 C. The inferences from the critique of pure reasoning. 
 
 A. (a.) Of the nature of our cognition. All our cognition is either 
 pure, i.e. a priori, or is empirical, i.e. a posteriori. The pure or 
 
 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1781. 2d edit., 1787. 
 3 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788. 
 3 Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1793. 
 Werke: 1. Rosenkranz u. Schubart, Leipzig, 1838-1842. 12 vols. 
 
 2. Hartenstein, 1838, 1839. 10 vols. New edit., 8 vols., 1867-1869. 
 
 3. Von Kirchmann (Philosoph. Bibliothek), 1868, seq. 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. y$ 
 
 a priori cognition grasps what is necessary and universal. Of 
 this nature is mathematical cognition ; as, for example, that all 
 the radii of a circle are equal. The empirical or a posteriori 
 cognition lays hold of something which is single, for — 
 
 (b.) The judgments which involve cognitions are either analytic 
 or synthetic. Analytic judgments are those in which the predi- 
 cate is involved in the concept of the subject: e.g. a circle is 
 round. The synthetic judgments are those in which the predi- 
 cate is not contained in the concept of the subject: e.g. bodies 
 are heavy. 
 
 (e.) Analytic judgments as such are also a priori judgments, 
 inasmuch as they enounce something universal and necessary; 
 but synthetic judgments are partly a posteriori, partly a priori: 
 a posteriori in as far as we know by experience that the predi- 
 cate agrees with the subject, and a priori in as far as they are 
 universal. 
 
 (d.) Inasmuch as synthetic judgments meet us in all theoretical 
 sciences, and as we cannot learn their universality by experience, 
 the question arises how synthetic judgments are possible a 
 priori ? 
 
 (<?.) In answering this question, Kant reasons in the following 
 manner: Synthetic judgments a priori do not wholly come 
 from the object or from experience, therefore at the very least 
 they must come in part from the subject, — the thinking mind. 
 Hence he teaches that our cognitions consist as it were of two 
 elements, one of which pertains to the sense, and the other to 
 the understanding. That which pertains to the sense he called 
 the matter or material of our cognitions, and that which pertains 
 to the understanding he called the form of our cognitions. The 
 forms, therefore, are that something in the mind through which 
 it conceives, in a certain determinate mode, the matter furnished 
 through the senses. 
 
 B. In order to detect what are those mental forms, Kant sub- 
 jected the cognitive faculty of the human mind to an analysis 
 which produced these results : — 
 
 The whole cognitive faculty consists of 
 
 (a.) The sensitive faculty (Sinnlichkeit). 
 
 (b.) The understanding (Verstand). 
 
76 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 (c.) The reason (Vernunft). 
 
 The first of these is a power purely passive — a receptivity of 
 impressions. The two latter are active power involving spon- 
 taneity. 
 
 (a.) The sensitive faculty (sensualitas) embraces both internal 
 and external experience. Its object is that outside of us and 
 that within us, of which we have experience. It receives im- 
 pressions, representations, of objects, which representations the 
 mind looks upon, has intuitions of. Hence Kant calls the repre- 
 sentations which are afforded by the sensitive faculty 'intuitions' 
 (Anschauungen). In these intuitions we must distinguish between 
 the material and the form. The material is that which is supplied 
 by the sense or sensitive faculty; but the mind in its intuition of 
 this, its looking on this, is bound by certain necessary conditions; 
 for we see that the mind is not able to have intuition of the 
 objects furnished by the sense, except — ist, as outside of the mind 
 itself, i.e. as posited in space ; or, 2d, as successive, i.e. in time ; 
 or, 3d, as both in time and space. Hence space and time are 
 necessary conditions of all sensitive intuition. Space is a form of 
 the external sense ; time is a form of both external and internal 
 sense. Now these forms are not (ist) empirical, i.e. derived from 
 the object, although they are prerequisites to all empirical in- 
 tuition. Nor are they (2d) abstract, because to the perception 
 of time or space particular individual objects are already pre- 
 supposed. Hence they are (3d) 'a priori' or 'transcendental,' 
 i.e. transcending all experience, for even though I should think 
 that there were no sensible objects, yet I cannot think of there 
 being no time or space; therefore space and time are forms or 
 necessary conditions of the sensitive faculty. 
 
 (d.) The understanding (intellectus) conjoins the intuitions of 
 the sensitive faculty into the unity of consciousness, and thus 
 forms conceptions (i.e. implicit judgments) and judgments proper: 
 for intuition is not identical with conception. For example, when 
 we look at a house we receive various impressions from various 
 parts of the object, but we do not properly have the conception 
 of a house until the understanding unites the various intuitions 
 of those impressions into unity of consciousness. Intuitions, 
 therefore, are the material of concepts, and concepts are the 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 77 
 
 material of judgments. But in addition to the material of judg- 
 ments the forms are also necessary, which by being applied to 
 the material properly constitute the judgment strictly so called. 
 
 What then are the forms of the understanding which are 
 necessary to form the judgment strictly so called? From an 
 analysis of all our judgments Kant reached the conclusion that 
 all our judgments are to be referred to either (1st) quantity, or 
 (2d) to quality, or (3d) to relation, or (4th) to modality. 
 
 1st. To quantity. Whatever we conceive of, we conceive of 
 either as one or many or all, so that every judgment of ours is 
 either singular as referring to one, or particular in respect to many, 
 or universal as joining the whole. 
 
 2d. As to quality. Every human judgment is either (1st) 
 affirmative, or (2d) negative, or (3d) indeterminate or indefinite. 
 An indefinite judgment is one in which the negation does not 
 affect the copula, but either the predicate or subject. 
 
 3d. Relation. In every judgment the predicate is attributed 
 to the subject either absolutely or hypothetically, or in such a 
 way as not to indicate what predicate is attributed : e.g. a body is 
 either liquid or solid. Hence every judgment is either catego- 
 rical, corresponding with absoluteness, or hypothetical, corre- 
 sponding with the hypothetical, or disjunctive, corresponding 
 with the indefinite. 
 
 Finally, 4th. Modality. For the judgment is either problem- 
 atic, or assertory, or necessary, or, as it is sometimes called, 
 apodeictic. Take this statement, ' If a body be heavy, if the sup- 
 port be removed it will fall : but a body is heavy ; therefore, the 
 support being taken away, it will fall' Then the major is a 
 problematic judgment, because in it weight and gravity are 
 regarded only as possible ; the second is assertory ; the third or 
 conclusion is necessary or apodeictic. Hence the forms, or, as 
 Kant calls them, the categories, of the understanding are : 
 
 1st. Quantity; under which are Unity, Plurality, and Totality. 
 
 2d. Quality; under which are Reality, Negation, and Limita- 
 tion. 
 
 3d. Relation ; under which are Substance, Causality, Simul- 
 taneity (otherwise characterized as action or reaction, or recip- 
 rocity and reciprocation). 
 
78 PRO LEGO ME NA. 
 
 4th. Modality; under which are Possibility, Existence, Necessity. 
 
 Everyone of our judgments is necessarily conditioned in some 
 way by these four forms. Thus the judgment 'Bodies are 
 heavy,' according to the 1st form, is universal; 2d, as to 
 quality, it is affirmative; according to relation the judgment 
 is categorical. According to modality it is assertory. Hence 
 the understanding, that it may be able to judge, and even 
 that it may be able to conceive, has of necessity implanted 
 or innate in it those forms as laws without which it is impossi- 
 ble to form a judgment or even a conception. But these forms, 
 in virtue of the fact that they are transcendental or univer- 
 sally applicable to objects of every kind, cannot be empirical, 
 i.e. drawn from experience, but on the contrary are prerequisite, 
 in order that the understanding, out of the material furnished by 
 the sense, may form a concept and judgment; hence they are 
 forms inherent in the mind a priori. They are purely subjective, 
 and, considered in themselves, void of all objectivity. 
 
 (c.) Reason (ratio), as it is a faculty of arguing and inferring, — 
 a faculty of ratiocination, — in its own nature tends, by the con- 
 junction of judgments in the process of reasoning, to rise from 
 the conditioned to the absolute. Every process of reasoning is 
 so constituted as that the premises contain the condition which 
 involves and necessitates the conclusion; hence it follows that 
 such premises as are themselves conditioned are also conclusions 
 to other premises ; hence it is the function of reason, by its 
 own proper processes, — i.e. rational processes, — to seek premises 
 which are an absolute condition, — i.e. which do not involve or 
 presuppose another condition. 
 
 There are three species of reasoning (ratiocinorum) : 1st, 
 Categorical; 2d, Hypothetical; 3d, Disjunctive. 
 
 1st. The Categorical or Absolute is in accordance with the prin- 
 ciple of inherence, and takes place when the understanding sup- 
 plies the reason with judgments in which the predicate is conceived 
 of as inhering in the subject. 
 
 2d. The Hypothetical is in accordance with the principle of 
 causality, when the predicate is conceived of as agreeing with the 
 subject under some particular condition. 
 
 3d. The Disjunctive is in accordance with the principle of com- 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 
 
 79 
 
 munity, or mutual dependence, when either one of the predicates 
 is conceived as agreeing with the subject so as that the predicate 
 is considered as a part of some particular whole or totality. 
 Hence, reason, through the medium of categorical processes of 
 ratiocination, reaches to the idea of the absolute subject which is 
 not the predicate of another subject. By the medium of hypo- 
 thetical ratiocination it reaches the idea of the absolute cause 
 which is not caused by another cause. By the medium of the 
 disjunctive it reaches the idea of absolute totality, which cannot 
 be a part of another totality. Hence, the reason has three 
 ideas : 
 
 1st, of Absolute Being ; 2d, of Ultimate Principle ; 3d, of Abso- 
 lute Totality. 
 
 1st. Absolute Being, when it considers it as objective, lays the 
 basis of Ontology; when it is subjective, it lays the basis of 
 Rational Psychology. 
 
 2d. The Ultimate Principle of all Essence or Being — i.e. God 
 — lays the foundation of Rational Theology. 
 
 3d. The idea of Absolute Totality — i.e. of the universe — fur- 
 nishes the object or lays the foundation of rational cosmology, 
 and these three are the elements of all metaphysic. 
 
 But these ideas, although they have a regulative validity, — i.e. 
 give law to our own thoughts, — furnish nothing objectively; for 
 
 C. The Critique of Pure Reasoning teaches that all cognition 
 arises by means of impressions made by the objects on the sense 
 or sensitive faculty. So that this sense or sensitive faculty adds 
 at the same from itself the form either of space or of time, or of 
 both, in order that it may have a representation. [This follows 
 from B a.~] 
 
 (a.) Hence the concepts of the understanding concerning 
 objects of which there can be no experience have no objective 
 reality, but are mere forms of the mind. For the understanding 
 forms these concepts from the representations given by the sen- 
 sitive faculty. [This follows from B &] But there are no repre- 
 sentations objectively, without experience ; therefore the concepts 
 also are nothing objectively without experience. 
 
 (b.) Of the objects, also, of which we have experience, — of 
 quantity, quality, and relation or modality, — we know nothing 
 
80 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 objectively real ; for these, as forms of the understanding, are 
 added by the subject to the intuition of the object, but are not 
 known to be really in the object. 
 
 (c.) Hence, also, the ideas of pure reason, as something con- 
 cerning which no experience is possible, are not objectively real; 
 at least, are not certainly demonstrable as such. Hence only 
 those things are known by us as objectively real which are 
 offered to our experience, and these themselves are to us = ;tr, — 
 i.e. to an unknown quantity, of which we know nothing except 
 that it exists. For of an object devoid of the forms of the sen- 
 sitive faculty and the understanding we know nothing, except 
 its existence. But those forms are not in the object, but are 
 added to the subject; so that every cognition objectively real in- 
 volves the coalescence, as it were, of a twofold element, the one 
 element empirical, or a posteriori, the other formal, or a priori, 
 which comes from the understanding. Hence, to the question 
 how synthetic judgments are possible a priori, the answer must 
 be given that the reason can reach no synthetic judgment with 
 apodeictic or absolute certainty, inasmuch as the predicate not 
 involved within the idea itself is, without foundation, attributed 
 to the object itself as something in it, when, in fact, it is added 
 by the mind itself, the mind necessarily operating under forms 
 innate to it. Therefore we know nothing concerning the exten- 
 sion, figure, and other attributes even of the objects which are 
 perceived by the sensitive faculty, because they are mere forms 
 furnished by the sensitive faculty; nor can we know anything of 
 the substance, reality, or other qualities of the same objects, be- 
 cause these are mere forms of the understanding ; much less are 
 we able to draw any conclusion concerning liberty, the immor- 
 tality of the soul, and the existence of God, concerning which 
 no experience is absolutely possible. Hence the arguments for 
 and against these truths have no objective reality, but are a mere 
 play of the mind, and are antinomies — i.e. self-contradictions — 
 which seem supported by reason. Hence, metaphysics proper, 
 or the cognition objectively real of things not subject to the 
 senses and of universals, is impossible. 
 
 If the philosophy of Kant had stopped here, it would have 
 seemed to have had a most impotent conclusion. Kant himself 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 8 1 
 
 clearly perceived this, and, that he might avoid a result from 
 which he shrank, endeavoured to build up with one hand the 
 edifice which he had overthrown with the other. His Critique 
 of Practical Reason has been called the life-boat which he threw 
 out to save the victims of the wreck of the Critique of Pure 
 Reason. He distinguishes in man the practical reason from the 
 theoretic reason ; he says that man is not merely a rational 
 being, having cognition by theoretic reasoning, but also a moral 
 being, directed in his actions by practical reasoning. In the de- 
 velopment of this consists the second part of Kant's system. 
 
 II. Critique of Practical Reason. This has been defined by 
 others as reason operating in the sphere of ethics, as the prac- 
 tico-legislative reason. Kant himself states the point involved 
 thus: 'Theoretic reason has as its object this question, What am 
 I able to know ? Practical reason has this question, What is it 
 my duty to do? and What is it lawful for me to hope? And as 
 reason in general by the very law of its nature seeks unity, the 
 practical reason also here seeks some absolute principle.' Now 
 just as it is in theoretical principles, so also is it in practical 
 principles, i.e. in the things that influence and determine the will: 
 we are to distinguish between two elements, — 1st, the material 
 element, and 2d, the formal element. 1st. The material element 
 is everything which acts empirically on the sensitive faculty and 
 affects the will through the medium of the emotions and passions. 
 2d. The formal element is that which is referred, not to the 
 sensitive faculty, but to reason. Hence the material element, as 
 that which has its foundation in self-love, and hence is always 
 something merely subjective, is not universal nor absolutely 
 necessary. Hence it cannot constitute the absolute principle of 
 morality. Hence it follows that only (2d) the formal element, 
 as that which withdraws itself from every object of sensitive 
 appetite or desire, and prescribes only that to which, by the 
 power of his reason, every rational being is absolutely bound, 
 can supply the absolute principle of morality. That principle thus 
 supplied is this : So act that the rule of thy will might be the 
 principle of universal law. This principle manifests itself to man 
 through his moral consciousness, i.e. his conscience (and con- 
 science through experience), in what Kant calls the form of the 
 
 6 
 
82 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 'Categorical Imperative' — imperative, i.e. giving command; cate- 
 gorical, that is, absolute. By 'Categorical Imperative' he means 
 the absolute prescription of reason through consciousness or con- 
 science; it is categorical or absolute, because without exception 
 it prescribes the doing of good for its own sake, without any regard 
 to the material motive. Hence that alone is to be considered pure 
 virtue which is to be determined autonomically by the moral 
 law, that which is not only conformed to the moral law, but 
 which is moved only by love of the moral law, and without any 
 extrinsic motive; since otherwise the will never would be pure, 
 but always affected by the passions [pathologically]. 
 
 But this principle involves three subordinate principles, three 
 theoretic principles as postulates, i.e. as truths whose objective 
 reality cannot be theoretically proved, to wit: 1st, the postulate 
 of Liberty; 2d, the postulate of the Immortality of the Soul; 3d, 
 the postulate of the existence of God. Without these the absolute 
 principle of ethics cannot be conceived. For 1st, that principle 
 commands us to do good solely from love of the law ; but this 
 cannot be done without liberty, — freedom of the will; for without 
 liberty, a self-determining freedom of will, man cannot be deter- 
 mined in his actions, except by some principle which is extrinsic 
 and is operative in the sensitive faculty. Hence the principle of 
 ethics involves the liberty of man. 2d. This principle commands 
 man that he should establish a perfect harmony between his pur- 
 poses and the moral law, in which harmony, holiness, or ideal 
 virtue, consists. Hence man ought constantly to tend to this 
 ideal; but that ideal, inasmuch as he is subject to the influence of 
 the sensitive faculty which draws him back from virtue, he is 
 not able completely to attain. Hence he ought to approach it 
 continually by a progress which never ceases, and which is 
 unlimited; but this he cannot do unless his soul be immortal. 
 Hence this principle of absolute morality involves the immor- 
 tality of the soul. 3d. Virtue is man's supreme end; for if happi- 
 ness were his supreme end, liberty would not be necessary to it, 
 but instinct would be sufficient. Nevertheless man has an in- 
 vincible desire of happiness, but he is not able to establish a 
 harmony between virtue and happiness ; because, though he is free 
 relatively to virtue, yet relatively to happiness he is dependent 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 83 
 
 on nature, which itself does not in fact establish this harmony ; 
 hence the completion, the consummation of this harmony sup- 
 poses a Being independent of nature, — a Being who can produce 
 this harmony and wills to produce it, and must consequently be 
 endowed with understanding and will; but such a being is God. 
 The absolute principle of morality involves the existence of God. 
 
 Practical reason involves these three postulates; but these 
 postulates are objectively real, for the practical reasoning, de- 
 termining to action, commands effects which are objectively real. 
 But it is absurd to suppose that real effects are produced by 
 unreal principles: if the effects are objectively real the principles 
 must be objectively real. 
 
 III. Critique of the Judgment. Theoretical reason and practical 
 reason present laws opposite in character to each other. The 
 theoretical reason supplies the laws of nature or necessity, the 
 practical reason supplies the laws of liberty. These two classes 
 of laws would forever have remained separated, if man did not 
 possess the faculty of judging, or judgment. (This term 'judg- 
 ment,' it will at once be seen, is used by Kant in a sense peculiar 
 to his system.) That faculty, judgment, applies the laws of 
 liberty to nature in accordance with the principles of agreement 
 of means with an end ; of the agreement which exists in the 
 actions of free beings, and which we ought necessarily also to 
 transfer to the acts of nature in order to make it possible to con- 
 ceive of a union of nature with liberty, which liberty operates 
 in nature and through it. This principle of judgment, however, 
 by no means teaches what the laws of nature are in themselves, 
 or objectively, but simply supplies a subjective rule, which shows 
 in what way we should reason concerning the things of nature. 
 
 The judgment has two modes, — the aesthetic and the teleolo- 
 gic. The judgment is aesthetic when it considers an agreement 
 of means with their end in the forms of things in such a way as 
 to produce the sense of pleasure. The judgment is teleologic 
 when it considers this agreement in a purely logical respect, i.e. 
 simply with reference to obtaining a knowledge of things, without 
 having any regard to the pleasures of feeling or of sense. 
 
 Hence the critique of the aesthetic judgment is a theory of the 
 beautiful and the sublime, both of which are merely subjective. 
 
84 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 The beautiful involves a consciousness of power possessed by the 
 imagination, representing a great variety of things which can be 
 easily reduced to one conception of the understanding; hence it 
 is a sense of the agreement of those faculties with each other, and, 
 as this involves a sense of our power, it is conjoined with satis- 
 faction. The sublime, on the contrary, involves a consciousness 
 of lack of power, of inability to grasp through the imagination 
 the ideas presented by the reason. This feeling of discord and 
 difference between these faculties is, on the one side, attended by 
 an emotion of sadness, because it reminds us of our weakness ; 
 on the other hand it exalts us, because through our reason we 
 perceive that we are superior to the things of sense, however great 
 they may be. 
 
 The critique of the teleologic judgment comprehends the 
 theory of nature, — a theory which, by applying the principle of 
 final causes or of the relation of means to an end, not to the 
 forms of things, but to their constitution or nature, looks upon 
 entities as organized to attain the special end of each, and, re- 
 garding those special ends as subordinate to some supreme and 
 universal end, thus reaches the religious ideas whose objective 
 reality is shown by the practical reason. 
 
 Carrying out these principles, Kant wrote a number of works, 
 especially on ethics and jus, on anthropology and the doctrine of 
 religion as within the bounds of pure reason, in which the tran- 
 scendental idealism of his Critique is carried through. 1 It has been 
 said that there is a parallel between Descartes and Kant in their 
 inability to connect their philosophical results with their philo- 
 sophical principles. Descartes began with consciousness as the 
 sole source of knowledge proper, but went out from this position 
 to attempt to establish the objective reality of God by means of the 
 notion of God reached through the speculations of reason. In 
 a similar manner Kant, it is said, first destroys the entire relations 
 of our speculations with external reality, and confines himself to 
 the sphere of purely subjective ideas, out of which he attempts in 
 vain to break in his Critique of the Practical Reason. For in 
 
 " Die Religion innerhalb der Graenzen der reinen Vernunft, 1793. Metaphysische An- 
 fangsgriinde der Rechtslehre der Tugendlehre ; and under the common title, Metaphysik 
 der Sitten. Anthropologic in pragmatischer Hinsicht. 
 
IX.— CRITICAL IDEALISM: KANT. 85 
 
 attributing a validity to the practical reason which he denies to 
 the theoretical reason, he falls into a manifest self-contradiction, 
 inasmuch as the practical reason necessarily rests upon the ideas 
 furnished by the theoretic reason. If I cannot trust my in- 
 tellectual convictions, why should I trust my moral convictions ? 
 If my mind is forced to work under laws which may have no 
 validity to other beings than man, why may not my moral sense 
 be equally subject to forms which are not valid objectively? The 
 innate moral conviction of duty is not stronger than the innate 
 intellectual conviction that there is an objective world of sub- 
 stance, and if our conviction of the reliableness of the one set 
 of impressions is removed we shall find it hard to rest in the 
 certainty of the other. Kant's distinction between the theoretic 
 and the practical reason is really very much of a piece with the 
 old scholastic system which allowed that a thing might be philo- 
 sophically false and theologically true. If the practical reason 
 is valid for proof of what Kant admits that it proves, it is fairly 
 retrospective, and holds good also as a proof of the objective 
 reality of those things which the pure reason instinctively accepts 
 as real. The ultimate consequence drawn from the doctrine of 
 Kant is that we do not know things as they are in themselves, 
 but as they appear to us in accordance with the constitution of 
 our minds ; that consequently our cognition is confined within 
 the sphere of experience ; and this cognition itself Kant asserts 
 (illogically) to be objectively real. The logic of Kant's system 
 undoubtedly demonstrates that things which are not the objects 
 of sense are not the objects of science or knowledge, but of faith. 
 Hence as a speculative system the critique of Kant is properly 
 styled 'transcendental idealism,' inasmuch as it teaches that every- 
 thing which transcends experience, or anything as far as it tran- 
 scends experience, is merely subjectively ideal. 
 
 It is acknowledged, however, by those who have least sym- 
 pathy with his system that it is one of consummate ability, and 
 that many of its processes and results are of the highest value. 
 Kant has left an impress on the thinking of the world which 
 will abide while the world stands; no system of the future, 
 properly philosophical, can entirely avoid being in some measure 
 a development of Kant's views or an antagonistic force to them. 
 
86 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 The philosophical systems of Germany, France, and England 
 since Kant have all revealed his influence. The speculations 
 of Kant have confessedly settled one great point, to wit, that all 
 cognition, although it begins with experience, does not arise from 
 experience alone, but that in addition to the empirical element it 
 is requisite there should be also an intellectual element, in order 
 to the existence of true cognition. 
 
 The doctrine of Kant was confessedly understood at the begin- 
 ning by very few; it was neither understood, nor misunderstood, 
 in the same way. Winning its way to attention very slowly, it 
 finally attracted universal notice. No system has been more 
 earnestly praised or more completely condemned. Apart from 
 its matter, its method and style were objects of complaint. Its 
 terminology was objected to as unnecessarily abstract and ob- 
 scure. Herder, who greatly admired Kant, nevertheless wrote 
 his Metacritica to show that the Critique of Pure Reason is a 
 thing of mist, of chaos, of confusion. 1 
 
 X. Subjective Idealism: Fichte. 
 
 Subjective Idealism, the system of Fichte (1762-18 14), the 
 identity of thinking and being, of the subjective and objective in 
 the Ego. The completely unknown 'thing in itself,' of Kant, is 
 thrown aside, the sole source of cognition and of being is the 
 subject, the mind : the Ego posits itself and the non-Ego. The 
 ' most absolute' principle is, the Ego is equal to the Ego, A = A. 
 
 From this follows that the non-Ego is not equal to the Ego, and 
 that the Ego is not equal to the non-Ego ; but the Ego is equal to 
 the non-Ego, and the non-Ego is equal to the Ego. The thesis 
 and antithesis are reduced in the synthesis. The Ego posits itself 
 as limited by the non-Ego, and thus becomes cognitive; or the Ego 
 posits the non-Ego as limited by the Ego, and becomes active. 
 
 The idealistic character underlying Kant's system was con- 
 fessed in two ways by its admirers. Those who were not willing 
 to accept idealism endeavoured to strengthen or rather to mend 
 the system at this point of weakness. Those who were not 
 averse to idealism soon availed themselves of the results of the 
 Kantian philosophy. In the former class may be mentioned 
 • Rothenflue, Instltutiones. Synopsis Hlstorise Philosophise, 1846, iii. 276-290. 
 
X.—SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM: FICHTE. 87 
 
 Karl Leonhard Reinhold. In his work on the Theory of the 
 Representative Faculty, 1 — his Elementary Philosophy, — he en- 
 deavoured, from the very concept of representation itself, to 
 establish the objective reality of things. His train of thought 
 was this: Every representation includes in itself the representing 
 subject, the represented object, and the act of representation; 
 hence the represented object must be something objectively real. 
 But this proof was of no value, for it could not relieve the doubt 
 whether the represented object is founded in the subject-mind, or 
 is an object distinct from the mind. This was shown so forcibly 
 by Schulze in his Aenesidemus that Reinhold abandoned his own 
 theory. 
 
 Of the second class there speedily arose writers who en- 
 deavoured to interpret the doubtful and to develop the imperfect 
 idealism in the system. 
 
 Beck, professor at Halle, showed that idealism is an essential 
 element in the critical philosophy: for, according to the critical 
 philosophy, a thing in itself is nothing else than the primitive 
 synthesis or combination of all that is determinate pertaining to 
 the essence of the thing, a synthesis formed by the mind itself. 2 
 
 Fichte's Doctrine of Science appeared between the first volume 
 and the last of Beck. In this, removing from the system of Kant 
 all objective reality, he substituted for that system a pure subjec- 
 tivity. Hence his doctrine is styled Subjective Idealism. It has 
 been said of Fichte that ' his life stirs us like a trumpet. He 
 combines the penetration of the philosopher with the fire of a 
 prophet and the thunder of an orator ; and over all his life lies 
 the beauty of a stainless purity.' 
 
 He conceived of philosophy as 'the science of science' — 'the 
 knowledge of knowledge.' One of his chief works is called the 
 ' Doctrine of Science,' 1795. He transformed the transcendental 
 idealism of Kant into the doctrine of absolute subjectivity. Kant 
 had endeavoured to avoid absolute idealism by granting intuitions 
 
 1 Versuch einer neuen Theorie der menschlichen Vorstellungsvermoegens. 
 
 2 Einzig moeglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die kritische Philosophic beurtheilt werden 
 muss, 1796. The first two volumes of the Erlauternd. Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften 
 des . . . Kant, of which this is the third volume, appeared in 1793. Beck showed very 
 easily that his views were the legitimate consequence of Kant's, but he failed to prove that 
 this was what Kant meant. See Zeller, Gesch. d. deutsch. Philosophic, 596. 
 
88 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 of the sensitive faculty with which corresponded real objects dis- 
 tinct from the mind; but as this involved logical absurdity on the 
 premises of Kant, Fichte pressed his principles to that absolute 
 idealism which seemed to follow logically from them. The 
 notions of Pure Reason, or universal notions, according to Kant, 
 cannot be called objectively real, moreover, because their object- 
 ive reality cannot be proven; but it is equally impossible on 
 Kant's principles to demonstrate the objective reality of the 
 intuitions of the sensitive faculty, — hence these also ought to be 
 considered as mere subjective phenomena. Reasoning therefore 
 logically on the principles of Kant, Fichte maintains that all real- 
 ities are nothing but creations of the Ego, and that all existence 
 is nothing but thought itself. 1 
 
 His philosophy may be reduced very briefly to these divisions: 
 i. Philosophy as a science of science or doctrine of science 
 ought of necessity to proceed from a supreme principle which is 
 per se certain. 
 
 2. But there is no principle which is certain per se except one 
 in which the object or predicate coincides with or is identified 
 with the subject, as, for example, A = A. 
 
 3. Since, however, the Ego has in itself both the A which it 
 judges to be = A, and the form according to which it judges, we 
 may substitute for the principle A = A this, the Ego = the 
 Ego. 
 
 4. But this principle, by positing the Ego, judges. But to 
 judge is to act. Hence the Ego posits itself in an absolute mode 
 through the act of activity or of spontaneity essential to itself. 
 For the Ego is reason active and at the same time convinced of 
 its own activity. [By the word posit Fichte means to put or 
 place to the consciousness, — to make that which is posited 
 become a fact of consciousness.] 
 
 5. But to the Ego is equally essential reflection, through which 
 it acquires self-consciousness, consciousness of self. 
 
 6. But the possibility of reflection is founded in appulsc 
 (Anstoss), opposition, antithesis, contrast; which antithesis cannot 
 be explained by theoretic reason, and hence is postulated. For 
 
 » Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. Grundlage der gesammten Wissensehafts- 
 lehre. 
 
X.—SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM: EI CUTE. 89 
 
 through this alone the Ego becomes conscious of itself, so that 
 it first posits itself as subject, and then opposes to itself that 
 appulse, that antithesis, as object. 
 
 7. Thus, however, the Ego-Object appears in a certain respect 
 as non-Ego in the presence of the Ego-Subject. 
 
 8. The Ego thus determining itself through the non-Ego limits 
 its own activity, and, though itself primarily absolute and infinite, 
 becomes or renders itself finite and divisible. 
 
 9. To wit : the Ego positing itself as determined by the non- 
 Ego is in a certain sense and so far passive; and the Ego 
 positing itself as the determining non-Ego is active ; and this 
 mutual action and reaction between the Ego and the non-Ego is 
 the condition of all representation (Vorstellens). This represen- 
 tation is called cogitation or thought if the Ego is conceived of 
 as active, but is called sensation if the Ego is conceived of as 
 passive. 
 
 Reasoning in the same manner, he explains the other faculties 
 of the mind or the Ego, and establishes in them a twofold reality, 
 — to wit, of the soul and of the outer world, as also of liberty and 
 necessity. 
 
 As the fundamental positions of Fichte's philosophy seem to 
 have peculiar difficulties to English readers, we will present them 
 in a somewhat different manner, following the luminous exposition 
 of them by Scholten : 
 
 1. The Ego or the subject is the sole spring of all human 
 cognition. Philosophy starts from the Ego. That the Ego is, is 
 an incontrovertible fact of consciousness. 
 
 2. The Ego posits itself (Ego = Ego). This Ego or subject, 
 in conformity with the ordinary empirical consciousness, counter- 
 posits to itself an object as non-Ego. (Non-Ego is not = Ego.) 
 
 3. This object or non-Ego cannot, however, be regarded as in 
 truth non-Ego without robbing the Ego of its contents, of that 
 which is involved in it, and thus setting aside the actual being of 
 the Ego itself. 
 
 4. As this cannot be conceded, inasmuch as the being of the 
 Ego is grounded in the Ego itself, it follows that the non-Ego 
 which is posited by the Ego as object is, strictly speaking, nothing 
 else than the Ego itself. (Non-Ego = Ego.) 
 
9 o 
 
 PRO LEG ME X A. 
 
 5. The contradiction which presents itself in this can only be 
 solved by the supposition that the Ego itself posits the non- 
 Ego. 
 
 6. That the Ego posits this particular non-Ego in each case, 
 and not another, points to and involves a necessary though in- 
 explicable self-limitation of the Ego, whereby equally, on the one 
 side, the Ego is determined as passive by the non-Ego, and, con- 
 versely, the non-Ego is determined as active power by the Ego. 
 
 7. Hereby then the external world, the objective, the non-Ego, 
 becomes purely idealistically a subjective though not arbitrary 
 product of the Ego or thinking subject. The non-Ego not 
 merely as Phenomenon, but also as Njfoumenon, is robbed of all 
 reality outside of the Ego. The objective, that which is perceived 
 in the forms of space and time, has no existence in itself inde- 
 pendently of the Ego, — that is, of the thinking subject. 
 
 8. This Ego is not, however, even in the first period of the 
 Fichtean philosophy, the individual empirical Ego of one partic- 
 ular man, but the personality (the Egoity, Ichheit), the universal 
 Ego (the pure Ego). . . . Everything which in the ordinary con- 
 ception is thought of as object, over against man as subject, is a 
 self-revelation or self-objectivating, not of his Ego, but of the 
 universal Ego, or of the universal thinking, which, operating in all 
 individuals in accordance with the same laws, counter-posits the 
 same non-Ego. 1 
 
 II. 1. For, if the intelligent Ego is determined by the non- 
 Ego, and is so far limited and in some measure dependent, the 
 practical Ego, on the contrary, is absolute and free, and hence 
 unlimited and the only true reality. 
 
 2. The practical Ego is conjoined with the intelligent Ego 
 because the former is related to the latter as the cause is related 
 to the effect. 
 
 3. To wit: the absolute Ego, as free, has causality which re- 
 veals itself through the effort of actuating itself as cause. 
 
 4. But that effort, of necessity, has a certain determinate quan- 
 tity of activity, because it always exerts itself to become the 
 cause of some determinate thing, which, as determinate, must be 
 
 * Geschichte der Relig. u. Philosophic Aus dem Hollandischen v. Redepenning, 1868, 
 
 154, 155- 
 
X.— SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM: EI CUTE. 91 
 
 limited : hence the activity of the Ego, which in itself and in its 
 own proper force is infinite, is in act always limited. 
 
 5. But this limitation cannot take place except through the 
 counter-effort or resistance by which it comes to pass that the 
 effort of the Ego is thrown back upon the Ego itself, and thus 
 the Ego opposes a counter-effort or resistance to its own effort; 
 from which arises the non-Ego, by which Fichte means that 
 appulse or opposition in the Ego itself. 
 
 6. Hence the Ego acts upon the non-Ego, thus posited, by 
 determining it in as far as the Ego is causality; but the non-Ego 
 reacts upon the Ego and relatively to it, and this reaction be- 
 comes causality. 
 
 7. Hence arises that mutual action between the Ego and the 
 non-Ego which we call the world (xod/io?), by which it comes to 
 pass that the Ego (as intelligent or understanding) is on the one 
 side dependent on the world or xofffiog, while on the other side 
 the Ego (as practical) is absolutely free. 
 
 III. 1. But, although the Ego be absolutely free, it neverthe- 
 less perceives itself bound by the conception of duty, — a concep- 
 tion which manifests itself in the manner of an Imperative, and 
 impels to the equipoise, co-ordination, or harmony of the Ego 
 and the non-Ego, — i.e. to what Fichte calls 'the realization of 
 the moral order in the world.' 1 
 
 2. This moral order of the world, in which every duty is 
 founded, and to the realization of which the practical Ego puts 
 forth its effort, is the divinity, the essential being of which is, 
 consequently, the sole object of faith. 
 
 '3. Whoever realizes for himself and as his own this order, in 
 that measure approximates to the divinity and walks in that true 
 life which is of God. But he who hinders or disturbs this moral 
 order in his own case, sunders himself from the divinity. 
 
 4. Hence virtue consists in the perfect harmony of knowledge 
 and action, in order to the free realization of this moral order. 
 These views are developed in Fichte's work ' On the Ground of 
 our Faith in the Divine Government of the World. 
 
 The views here presented received important modification in 
 what is called the second period of Fichte. His nature was too 
 
 1 Zur Realisirung der moralischen Weltordnung. 
 
92 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 essentially religious to rest in the dreary abstraction which sub- 
 stituted a moral order for a personal Deity. That position seemed 
 to be equivalent to atheism. It might preserve the name of Deity, 
 but it denied the thing. In the later thinking of Fichte, he brings 
 out, with far greater clearness, that the Ego is not the limited 
 human consciousness, but is God, the primeval original con- 
 sciousness, — what he calls the absolute subject-object (the Eternal 
 One), the eternal universal reason, whose life reveals itself in the 
 infinite multiplicity of relations. This God, thus defined, he re- 
 gards as the ultimate reason of all, — that is, of all essential being. 1 
 God is the infinite thinking, the sum of whose eternal thoughts 
 is the universe. Jacobi happily characterized Fichte's doctrine 
 as an inverted — an idealistic — Spinozism. 2 
 
 Fichte, although greatly influential on the later thinking, can 
 hardly be said to have established a school, though he had a 
 number of devoted admirers. One reason, doubtless, of his es- 
 tablishing no distinct school was that his system was met by the 
 elaborate system of Schelling, who endeavoured to meet the de- 
 fects of both the transcendental and the subjective idealism by 
 fusing them into the system of Absolute Identity. 
 
 XI. Objective Idealism : Schelling. 
 
 Objective Idealism, the system of Schelling (1775-1854): 
 the system of Identity, — the identity of thinking and being 
 even independently of the Ego. In the Absolute, the object, or 
 non-Ego, and the subject, or Ego, are identical. ' Nature sleeps 
 in the plant, dreams in the animal, wakes in man.' Transcen- 
 dental philosophy is the history of consciousness. Ideas are medi- 
 ators between God and things. The Universe is the self-revelation 
 of the Absolute Subject. Nature is visible Spirit; Spirit is in- 
 visible Nature. In Nature there is a self-objectivating and revela- 
 tion of the Spirit, of whom it may be said that he not only tliinks 
 
 1 Rothenflue, iii. 291-294. 
 
 2 Scholtens, 158. The English reader will find of great value in attaining a knowledge 
 of Fichte: 1. The Science of Knowledge, by J. G. Fichte. Translated from the (hi in. 111 
 by A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868. 2. The Science "I" 
 Right, by J. G. Fichte. Translated from the German by A. E. Kroeger. Philadelphia: 
 J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1869. For an estimate of Hchte's life and character, see Zeller, 
 599- 
 
XL—OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SCHELLLNG. 93 
 
 himself, but in Nature also actualizes himself. The Universe or 
 the Absolute is an Organism, which stretches forth from one 
 formative principle into the evolutions of a graduated unfolding. 
 This supreme Principle, this organizing Idea, the Ego of Fichte, 
 is called by Schelling the Soul of the world. 1 
 
 Schelling at first occupied the position of Idealism as main- 
 tained by Fichte, but subsequently rejected it as unsatisfactory to 
 reason, and laid down as the basis of a new system that the 
 primary principle of all essence or real being and of cognition is 
 in the Absolute, considered as the complete identity of the sub- 
 jective and objective. Fichte, as we have seen, laid down as the 
 principle of all being and cognition the subjective Ego. Schel- 
 ling showed, with equal right, that the objective non-Ego, or 
 Nature, could be laid down as the principle of being and cogni- 
 tion. This had been laid down by Spinoza, who had inverted 
 the process of Fichte. As Fichte deduced or constructed the 
 whole non-Ego, or Nature, out of his own subjective Ego, Spi- 
 noza had deduced the Ego from the objectively real, — the non- 
 Ego, or Nature. But, according to Schelling, both Ego and 
 non-Ego are relative, and hence ought to be referred to a prin- 
 ciple above and beyond both ; and this principle, he held, was 
 supplied in the system of absolute identity, according to which 
 all essence and cognition, all matter and spirit, are identified in 
 the Absolute as their ultimate reason. But this absolute identity 
 of the subjective and objective in philosophy is not susceptible 
 of proof in the strict sense, — i.e. it cannot be known mediately 
 or by process of reasoning, inasmuch as it is itself the principle, 
 the beginning of all knowledge, and that which begins cannot 
 follow. But it can be proved that without it all knowledge is 
 impossible, inasmuch as the conformity of knowledge to the 
 object known, which is essentially prerequisite to all knowledge, 
 cannot be conceived of unless the absolute identity of the sub- 
 ject knowing and of the object known be presupposed. Hence, 
 according to Schelling, the absolute identity or absolute indiffer- 
 ence — i.e. the equivalence or perfect unity — of what are called 
 different things is the principle, the unity, the centre of all 
 science, as it is the centre of all existence; and immediate per- 
 
 1 Scholten, 161. 
 
94 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 ception, or the pure intuition of reason, is the sole organ or 
 medium by which man can reach the spring of all truth. The 
 views of Schelling are developed in his Sketch of the Philosophy 
 of Nature, in his System of Transcendental Idealism, in hiswork 
 on the Relation of the Real and the Ideal in Nature, his Annals of 
 Medicine as a Science, and in a Collection of his smaller writings. 1 
 His system may be stated under two general heads : 
 
 1. I. Philosophy is the science of the Absolute, as the com- 
 plete identity both of the subjective and the objective, or the 
 indifference or equivalence of things which are called different, 
 in which difference or identity the essence of the Absolute {i.e. of 
 God) consists. 
 
 2. Hence the Absolute is neither the Infinite nor the Finite, — 
 neither essence nor cognition, neither subject nor object, — but it 
 is that in which all opposition between cognition and essence, 
 between the spirit and nature, between the ideal and the real, 
 and, in fine, all difference, is removed, and the absolute identity, 
 the absolute indifference, or equivalence and unity, is constituted, 
 which is at the same time all that is, or is the whole, — the all. 
 
 3. Hence this absolute identity alone truly is or has essence: 
 outside of it nothing actually is. 
 
 4. Hence this absolute identity is the one only substance, and 
 this substance is God. 
 
 II. 1. For God primarily posits or affirms his own essential 
 existence. His proper self and existence once posited, God, in 
 virtue of the idea alone, is the absolute identity of the universe. 
 
 2. To wit : God, positing himself, posits himself in ways infi- 
 nitely manifold, — i.e. produces a diversity of entities which are 
 nothing but modes or forms of existence of the one absolute 
 identity. This production or outgoing or emanation is some- 
 times revealed, according to Schelling, as a differentiation or 
 dualization (Entzweiung, Differenzirung) of the Absolute; some- 
 times as a manifestation of himself; sometimes as a defection of 
 the Finite from the Infinite, — that is, of ideas from God, — which 
 is virtually a self-defection on the part of God. The theory of 
 
 1 Entwurf der Naturphilosophie. System des transzendentalen Idcalismus. Ueber 
 das Verhaeltniss des Realen und Idealen in der Xatur. Jalirbiicher der Medi/in als 
 Wissenschaft. Sammlung kleinerer philosophiselien Schriften. 
 
XL—OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SCHELLING. 95 
 
 dualization is given in his work, 'Exposition of the True Relation 
 of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Fichtean Doctrine.' 
 The later views are presented in his ' Philosophy and Religion.' 1 
 
 3. Hence existences or entities are both finite and distinct 
 only as they are regarded either as individual or as mutually 
 correlated. 
 
 4. But in God all things are equal and infinite, because to him 
 and in him they are identical. 
 
 5. Hence in the whole universe — in the real world as well as 
 in the ideal world — there is essentially but one and the same 
 power which manifests or evolves itself: in the real world with 
 the preponderance or excess of reality, in the ideal world with 
 the preponderance or excess of ideality (to which he applies the 
 terms duplicity and polarity), and, through the totality, again 
 conjoins them with itself. Hence the fundamental position of 
 Schelling : Identity in triplicity is the law of evolution. This 
 may be called Philosophical Trinitarianism. 
 
 6. Hence anything whatsoever is nothing else than the quan- 
 titative difference of subjectivity and objectivity, or of ideality 
 and reality, and hence is not itself the essence of the Absolute, 
 for that lies in identity, but is only a determinate form of the 
 essence of absolute identity. 
 
 7. A quantitative difference of this kind, so far as anything or 
 any determinate form of the essence is placed in opposition with 
 the absolute essence, is called power. 
 
 8. Hence in no single thing can there be absolute subjectivity 
 or absolute objectivity, but only the identity of both with the 
 preponderance of reality or of ideality in the particular case. 
 
 9. But the Absolute posits itself as the whole of the essence 
 and the whole of cognition, as nature and as spirit : in the 
 former, with the relative preponderance or excess of the objective 
 or of reality ; in the latter, with the relative preponderance or 
 excess of the subjective or of ideality; so that in each is con- 
 tained, entire and undivided, the absolute identity, only that in 
 natuie it is under the form of the essence or reality; in spirit, 
 under the form of cognition or of consciousness, i.e. of ideality. 
 
 1 Darlegung des wahren Verhaeltnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten 
 Fichtes'chen Lehre. Philosophic und Religion. 
 
g6 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 10. Thus, both the ideal and the real appear in corporeal nature 
 under the form of reality, — the ideal as light, the real as matter, 
 whose extension is a manifestation of reality as of gravity. In 
 the spirit each appears under the form of ideality : to wit, the 
 ideal as free or unimpeded activity, the real as restricted or con- 
 fined activity. 
 
 11. But first, in corporeal nature, one of the two potencies, 
 either matter or light, predominates, or both are in equilibrium. 
 If matter predominates, the life of things is in extension or in 
 space; if light predominates, the life of things is in motion or in 
 time; if they are in equilibrium, the life of things is organic, i.e. 
 is the unity of matter and of light. Secondly, in the spirit or in 
 the ideal world there is either an excess or preponderance of 
 restricted activity upon the free, or, in other words, of necessity 
 upon liberty : and this is knowledge or science, whose end is truth ; 
 or there is an excess or preponderance of free activity upon the 
 restricted, or, in other words, of liberty upon necessity : and this 
 is morality, whose end is the good ; or, finally, there is an equi- 
 librium between the two : and this is art, whose product is beauty. 
 
 The scheme of the philosophy of Schelling may be reduced to 
 a tabular view, thus : 
 
 The Absolute Being, God, or the Whole, to -a*, manifests 
 himself in nature, or as absolute indifference in himself differen- 
 tiates himself in nature, — 
 
 as relatively real, as relatively ideal, 
 
 under the following potencies : 
 
 l,] f Matter. Truth, | f Science, 
 
 r "j Motion. Good, r ] Morality. 
 
 > \ Organism. Beautv. ' *- Art. 
 
 Gravitation, 
 
 Light, f \ Motion. Good, j ~\ Morality. Religion. 
 
 Life, i I Organism. Beauty, ' l Art. 
 
 According to the philosophy of Schelling, God alone exists, 
 and all things which do exist are but the phenomenal manifesta- 
 tions of the one sole Absolute; they are equal to him in nature, 
 and really identical with him. The absolute whole of being is 
 really identical with God. His illustration is, ' for as one and the 
 same electric fluid manifests the opposite effects of attraction and 
 repulsion at the two poles, so the primary and absolute unity in 
 nature and intelligence, as it were at two poles, continually puts 
 forth effort to differentiate itself through a series of evolutions, 
 
XL—OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SCHELLING. 97 
 
 out of which arise all the phenomena of the physical and intel- 
 lectual world.' In this way the universal becomes individual, 
 and by the opposite tendency the individual endeavors to become 
 universal by returning to the point of indifference or non-differ- 
 ence : to wit, that point at which, the phenomenal merging itself 
 again in the Absolute, the difference between phenomenal being 
 and non-being ceases. Hence philosophy, according to Schelling, 
 is the science of God and of his manifestation, nature. Hence 
 philosophy necessarily comprehends the study of nature, as that 
 in which, under a sensible form, is manifested or revealed God, 
 the eternal or absolute being, the knowledge of which, philosophy 
 searches for. Hence philosophy is coincident with poetry and 
 with religion, inasmuch as all three tend to the single point of 
 attaining to the Absolute. Philosophy does this by intuition, 
 poetry by description, religion by meditation and adoration. 
 
 These views help to solve the seeming mystery, that the phi- 
 losophy of Schelling gave a powerful impulse toward the natural 
 sciences, and, furthermore, that the positivism which repudiates all 
 speculation really is the offspring of this most attenuated specu- 
 lation. Schelling's system of Absolute Identity is a wonderful 
 co-ordination and evolution of former thinking. It combines the 
 ideas of Plotinus (205-270), of Bruno, (d. 1600), and especially 
 of Spinoza (1632-1677). It gratifies in the highest degree the 
 love of unity; it considers the whole universe as an immense 
 epic without proper beginning and without definite end. In this 
 vast poem the ages are as cantos of books, — the single beings 
 like single words, which separated have no meaning, but have 
 their complete sense when regarded in their due place in the 
 vast poem of identification with the Absolute. 
 
 Schelling went forth from the narrow bounds which Kant had 
 placed to human knowledge. Kant had almost affirmed that we 
 could know nothing. Schelling opened the knowledge of the 
 whole. Nature, which Fichte had represented as a sterile nega- 
 tion, Schelling endows with soul and life ; and while he does not 
 explain its phenomena, he paints them with a vivid enthusiasm, 
 like that of Plato and of the Oriental thinkers. This, beyond 
 doubt, is the chief reason why Schelling at once obtained so 
 large a number of followers. With the appearance of unity he 
 
 7 
 
gS PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 confounds the understanding ; with his brilliant and often poetical 
 style, his images and parallels drawn from nature, he captivates 
 the imagination. These qualities had the greater potency in 
 consequence of the characteristics of his time. The dry and 
 oftentimes barren criticism of Kant, and the scarcely less dry 
 idealism of Fichte, only relieved in its dryness by what seemed, 
 to the popular mind at least, its impiety and its thorough-going 
 egoism, — both systems, alike in their inability to satisfy either 
 the speculative intellect or the common sense of men, were 
 dividing the supremacy in German thinking. Contrasted with 
 these systems, the theory of Absolute Identity had much that 
 was fascinating. Its simplicity of parts, its apparent facility in 
 explaining everything, its modes of construing nature, the many 
 novel and exceedingly beautiful thoughts associated with it, 
 gave it immense popularity. 
 
 But its triumph was of short duration ; its defects and contra- 
 dictions were palpable. The reason, escaping from the charm, at 
 once detected these, and the author's system scarcely outlived 
 him. Against the system various objections, theoretical and prac- 
 tical, have been urged. Theoretically it has been charged not 
 only with lack of foundation, but with positive absurdity. For, 
 first of all, the entire theory rests upon an hypothesis confessedly 
 assumed and really absurd, to wit, that because no beings are con- 
 ceivable without the idea of an Absolute, it follows that all beings 
 are to be identified with the Absolute in its essence. Christian 
 theism grants the former and denies the latter. It is theoretically 
 just as preposterous as to say that because we cannot conceive 
 of the existence of a watch without the idea of a watchmaker, 
 the watch is identical in its essence with its maker. 
 
 Schelling's conception of the nature of God in that cloudy idea 
 of Absolute Identity and Original Indifference is very little more 
 than a tricking out with fresh phrases the Brahma and the Brahm 
 of the Hindoos roused, from his deep slumber. According to 
 the Vedas and the Vedantas (the theological summary of the 
 Vedas), Brahm alone exists, and the phenomena of the universe 
 are only modifications of Brahm as Brahma. Thus, according to 
 Schelling, God alone exists, and this God is the absolute identity 
 of all things. As in the Hindoo system, Brahm aroused from 
 
XI.— OBJECTIVE IDEALISM: SCHELLING. 99 
 
 slumber becomes, of an indeterminate being, a determinate in- 
 telligence, so Schelling's God from the primal absolute indiffer- 
 ence becomes 'Intelligence;' from the non-intelligent, from nature 
 in God, from chaos, comes forth divinity as intelligence. 1 The 
 God who is primarily implicit, in time becomes explicit, or the 
 folded becomes the unfolded. But the question arises, Why does 
 God unfold himself? What reason of evolution is there in him? 
 The Absolute, as such, would seem to have equally at all times 
 the reason of evolution. In attempting to meet this difficulty, 
 Schelling can make no better answer than this, that the self- 
 evolution of God is the result of a certain fatality incapable of 
 explanation. But that which evolves itself under a fatality is not 
 the Absolute, but is dependent. According to Schelling, all the 
 evolutions in the world, and consequently all history, are but a 
 diversification of necessary positings or evolutions of God. In 
 his dissertation on freedom he calls this necessity of evolution 
 ' an act morally necessary/ which in his system can have no in- 
 telligible meaning, for the word moral as an attribute of neces- 
 sary makes it cease to be absolute in Schelling's sense. Morality 
 and freedom are inseparable, and that which is necessitated by 
 fatality is ipso facto not morally necessary. 
 
 In pure despair of harmonizing facts to his theory, he attempts /vyjl 
 to account for the existence of evil by a sort of mythical repre- 
 sentation, by what he calls the defection or apostasy of ideas 
 from the Absolute. This raises the question how anything can 
 fall away from the Absolute when there is nothing beside the 
 Absolute. Evil must be the falling away of the Absolute from 
 itself. 
 
 The God of Schelling, except that he is represented in a con- 
 stant process of becoming, differs little, as we have seen, from the 
 God of Hindoo mythology, in which we have Brahm as passive, 
 Brahma as active. In Schelling's views of God evolving (as active) 
 and the evolutions or phenomena themselves (God as passive), 
 he contradicts himself completely; for whatever pertains to God 
 as passive is to be considered as one of these evolutions of God, 
 consequently man is one of these; but Schelling affirms that man 
 can, by his intellectual intuition, grasp the Absolute : i. e. passive 
 
 1 Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. 
 
IO o PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 evolutions of God — to wit, men — would at the same time be active 
 (capacious of the intuition of the Absolute). Hence his system 
 lacks that logical consistency which marks the Hindoo view. In 
 that system we are supposed to be under an illusion like that of 
 protracted dreams. This Schelling does not admit. To admit 
 this would have been to renounce all scientific cognition; while it 
 was Schelling's peculiar glory to assert that on his system abso- 
 lute cognition of the Absolute was reached. 
 
 Quite as serious are the practical objections to the system of 
 Schelling. It lies open to all the difficulties which are valid 
 against the system of Pantheism. No morality is possible with- 
 out liberty, and Schelling puts even his Absolute under Fate. 
 Consequently Schelling denies in terms that there is liberty in 
 the proper sense, and asserts that good is possible only by a sort 
 of divine magic. It is hardly necessary to say that the system is 
 in conflict not only with the common sense of the illiterate, but 
 equally so with the solid thinking of the cultivated and judicious. 
 Qualified by the religious temperament, it loses itself in mysti- 
 cism, opens the way to fanaticism, to superstition, to all the 
 insanities of disordered imagination. It has, in fact, been laid 
 hold of by schools of the most conflicting extravagances in sup- 
 port of their notions. 1 
 
 Among the ablest of the opponents of this system was Jacobi 
 (1743-1819). He held that all purely speculative philosophy is 
 incapable of reaching a satisfactory system ; that the dogmatic 
 tendency, working itself out by way of demonstration, conducted 
 to fatalism and pantheism; that the critical system led to destruc- 
 tion of all religious faith. Hence he brought back all philoso- 
 phical knowledge or science to Belief, or the immediate notion, 
 as its principle. 
 
 I. He affirmed that every demonstration implied something 
 already demonstrated, and by consequence ended in this, that 
 there must be something back of all, not demonstrable, but which 
 is immediately known, and this primary and consequently im- 
 mediate notion is called Faith, or Belief. 
 
 II. For through sense and through reason in man, and having 
 man for their object, is distinguished a twofold world, a visible 
 
 1 See Zeller, Gesch. d. deutscben Philosoph., 649, 697. 
 
XII.— ABSOLUTE IDEALISM: HEGEL. IO i 
 
 and an invisible world, the existence of which can be equally 
 proved with the existence of the reason and of sense themselves. 
 
 III. For the exterior visible world is manifested to sense 
 through sensation. Hence all cognition here begins through 
 faith in the veracity of sensation and the truth of its results. But 
 the invisible or intellectual world, the intelligible world or world 
 of understanding, is manifested to reason through the internal, 
 the inmost sense, or consciousness. Hence concerning God and 
 divine things we have not a knowledge or notion through pro- 
 cesses of reasoning, but have only Faith, or immediate perception 
 of the manifestation of the divine through the internal sense, or 
 consciousness. 
 
 IV. Hence philosophy is able to evolve this Faith, but not to 
 render a reason for it. 
 
 V. Wherefore Faith in God, and in the manifestation of God 
 through reason, is the principle and essence of all philosophy. 
 Jacobi held, with Descartes, that, humbling as it may be to human 
 pride, we are driven at last to acknowledge that our conviction 
 of the reality of the things of which we seem to be conscious 
 rests upon the veracity of God. Reason is compelled to take 
 refuge in Faith. The intellect without the moral nature — the 
 head without the heart — leaves man essentially pagan. 1 
 
 XII. Absolute Idealism: Hegel. 
 
 Absolute Idealism, the system of Hegel (1770-1831): think- 
 ing is the immanent origin of the Notion, and is the only actual 
 and true, — Schelling's results reached and vindicated by Fichte's 
 general method, — the strictly dialectic. The non-Ego is sub- 
 ordinated to the absolute Ego, but is an essential momentum, an 
 operative, impulsive element or force of the Absolute, in which 
 the Absolute works itself out. All philosophy falls into — 1. Logic, 
 the science of the pure notions of reason, the science of the Idea 
 in and for itself; in other words, the laws of thought, in accord- 
 ance with which the unfolding or process of the universe takes 
 place: 2. the philosophy of Nature, as the science of the Idea in 
 its alterity; that is, the science of the unfolding of the Cosmos 
 
 1 Schriften iiber Spinosa und gegen Mendelssohn. David Hume, iiber den Glauben, 
 Oder : Idealismus und Realismus. 
 
102 FR0LEG0MENA. 
 
 considered as Nature : and 3. the philosophy of the Spirit, the 
 science of the Idea reverting out of its alterity into itself, or the 
 science of the Absolute, as, out of the process of Nature, through 
 successive phases of development, in the spheres of art, religion, 
 and science in mankind, it becomes actual self-conscious spirit. 
 The spirit is subjective, objective, absolute. Nature is a process 
 whose ground is the concept, logic, or, in other words, the abso- 
 lute thinking. 
 
 The relation of the philosophy of Hegel (1770-1831) to that 
 of Schelling is first that of coincidence, and next that of diversity. 
 He coincides with Schelling in the presupposition of an absolute 
 identity between knowing and being, thought and actuality, the 
 subjective and the objective. But at an early period he deserted 
 the theory of Intellectual Intuition, which Schelling considered 
 as the sole organ of science, and contended that the notion of the 
 Absolute is to be reached through the medium of reasoning. 
 Hence the Absolute cannot be laid down as a principle from 
 which all the rest proceed, but, on the contrary, the Absolute is 
 the final conclusion to which reason attains by working out from 
 the indefinite being (Sein, esse). According to Hegel, philosophy 
 is the science of reason, as reason is conscious of itself as the 
 entire being (Sein). The object of philosophy is the idea which 
 is identified with reason. This idea, according to Hegel, can be 
 considered in three ways : 
 
 I. As in itself and for itself, as self-being, — i.e. as the pure Idea; 
 and this is the object of Logic, which Hegel defines to be the 
 science of the pure Idea (der reinen Idee), — i.e. 'of the Idea in the 
 abstract element of thinking.' 
 
 Logic, which Hegel builds on the Trilogie already applied by 
 Fichte, Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, embraces — i. The doctrine 
 of Being (Sein): 1. Quantity; 2. Quality; 3. Measure, ii. The 
 doctrine of Essence (Wesen): 1. the Essence as Ground of Exist- 
 ence ; 2. the Phenomenon ; 3. the Actuality, iii. The doctrine of 
 the Notion (Begriff) : 1. Subjective Notion ; a. Notion as such ; b. 
 Judgment; c. Inference, as the unity of both ; 2. Objectivity; 3. 
 Idea, as the absolute unity of Notion and Objectivity. 
 
 II. Or it may be considered as opposed to itself in 'other- 
 being,' alterity, objectively or in other, — i.e. in its outward muni- 
 
XII.— ABSOLUTE IDEALISM: HEGEL. 
 
 103 
 
 festation as existing out of itself in nature. And this, he says, is 
 the object of Somatology, or the Philosophy of Nature. This 
 divides itself into — i. Mechanics ; ii. Physics ; iii. Organics. 
 
 III. Or the idea may be considered as reverting or returning 
 from ' other being,' alterity, into itself, or the ' self-being.' And 
 this reverting from 'other-being' to 'self-being' is the object of 
 Pneumatology, or the philosophy of Spirit. From the position 
 that the idea is the same as reason, and that reason is the entire 
 being, he infers that the idea is identical with nature and the 
 mind, and that it is the thing essentially which is represented 
 through it, and hence that philosophy is reason itself, having 
 cognition of itself as the identity of mind and nature, — that is, 
 what is reason is nature, what is nature is reason. The laws of 
 thought are the internal logic of the universe. 
 
 Spirit is — i. Subjective in the form of relation to itself, and, as 
 such, object of — 1. Anthropology; 2. Phenomenology; a. Con- 
 sciousness ; b. Self-consciousness ; c. Reason ; 3. Psychology, ii. 
 Objective, — the absolute idea, having being in itself, manifests 
 itself in — a. Jus; b. Ethics; c. Morality, iii. Absolute, — the unity 
 of the subjective and objective Spirit. It forms the highest 
 sphere, — Religion. It reveals itself in — 1. Art; 2. Religion; 
 3. Philosophy. 
 
 The philosophy of Hegel may be characterized as in general 
 the reaching and ripening of Schelling's results by Fichte's 
 method. More particularly, its features are these : 
 
 First. Its principle which lays down the positive conception 
 of spirit, in antithesis to Schelling's vague indifference of the 
 subjective and objective. And 
 
 Second. The method of its dialectic. This had been anticipated 
 in a negative form by Kant in the antinomies of his Critique of 
 Pure Reason; but Hegel has developed it in a positive manner, in 
 which Fichte was his forerunner. 
 
 Hegel has greatly benefited Logic by thoroughly carrying 
 through a principle which had been proposed by Kant, to wit, 
 that there is an inseparable interpenetration of Logic and Meta- 
 physics. In this way Hegel has united into one great system all 
 the laws of thought, categories, forms of conception, and methods. 
 His system is one in which every department of knowledge in all 
 
104 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 its theories finds its place, so that its compass, limits, value, signifi- 
 cance, method, and connection with all the others, are marked and 
 proven. It was this encyclopaedic character which did much in giv- 
 ing the philosophy of Hegel precedence over all the rival schools. 
 His influence has been felt in every direction ; peculiarly so in the 
 Philosophy of Religion. Three great schools have been, in a 
 general sense, followers of Hegel. They are known as the Right, 
 the Centre, and the Left. The Right wing is the Supernaturalistic 
 or Orthodox School; the Left is the Rationalistic; the Centre is 
 a mediating, mystic School which attempts to rise above the 
 Supernatural and the Rationalistic into a region which is freed 
 from these differences by leaving them beneath it. 
 
 The general sentiment had been that the speculations of Hegel 
 were favourable to religion; but four years after his death the 
 appearance of the work of Strauss, which was Hegelian in its 
 philosophy, proved very clearly that if orthodoxy could use 
 Hegel it could not monopolize him. 
 
 Hegel has indeed expressed himself very beautifully in regard 
 to religion. It is only necessary to separate some of his utter- 
 ances from their connections to have what seems profoundly 
 religious. He says, ' Religion is the realm in which all the 
 enigmas of life are resolved, all the contradictions of thought 
 harmonized, all the sorrows of the affections allayed, the realm 
 of eternal truth and of eternal peace. Through it flows the true 
 Lethe from which the soul drinks forgetfulness of all its ills. The 
 mists of time vanish before the unfading brightness. In the con- 
 sciousness of God, the spirit is freed from the forms of the finite. 
 It is a consciousness of absolute freedom and of absolute truth.' 
 
 What this religion is has been well stated thus: 'The panthe- 
 ism of Hegel is not a real pantheism, but a logical pantheism. 
 All that is is but the manifestation of God in the movement of 
 thought. In his system God is everything and is nothing. He 
 is nothing, for he has no consciousness of himself, except in the 
 soul of man. He is everything, for he is the universal sole sub- 
 stance which underlies all consciousness and all existence.' With 
 Hegel 1 the proper development of modern systems is usually 
 
 1 System der Wissenschaft. Phoenomenologie des Geistes. Wissenschaft der Logik. 
 Encyclopaedic des philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. 
 
XIII.— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. 105 
 
 regarded as terminating. He seems to have reached the last 
 possible point. Speculation, moving as we have seen under cer- 
 tain impulses communicated from Locke's system, has gone 
 through the theological idealism of Berkeley to the subjective 
 idealism of Fichte, to the absolute identity of Schelling and Hegel. 
 ' To construct scientifically the totality of the actual out of the 
 Absolute, and from the position of the Absolute, was a problem on 
 whose solution Hegel wrought with amazing power and tension 
 of thought, and thus became the creator of a system which must 
 be regarded as the most perfect form of German idealism, as the 
 ripest fruit of the development through which it has run since 
 Kant. This development closes in Hegel, as the Socratic school 
 closes in Aristotle.' 1 
 
 XIII. Theoretical Idealism: Schopenhauer. 
 
 I. Theoretical Idealism is the name given by Erdmann to 
 the system of Arthur Schopenhauer (1 788-1 860). In this ex- 
 traordinary man the Orient and the Occident combine their influ- 
 ences, so that he presents the anomalous appearance of a Hindoo 
 thinker in the intellectual garb of Europe. He is the Brahmin 
 of our modern metaphysics. This cast was given him in the 
 study of the Indian antiquities, to which he was directed by the 
 Orientalist Majer. He had the large culture produced by travel- 
 ling in France, England, and Italy, and by a thorough acquaint- 
 ance with French and English literature. He had as teachers or 
 as friends some of the most illustrious men of his day. But the 
 greatest mover of his intellectual life was Kant. 
 
 II. Schopenhauer and Kant: Schopenhauer had been ad- 
 vised by his preceptor, Schulze, to confine himself, in his earliest 
 philosophic studies, to Plato and Kant, and not until he had mas- 
 tered these to take up others, especially neither Aristotle nor 
 Spinoza, — advice which he never regretted having strictly fol- 
 lowed. Schopenhauer often declares that he is thankful to Kant 
 above all other philosophers ; that subsequent to Kant none but 
 his own system had a claim to be considered really philosoph- 
 ical, as between himself and Kant nothing had been accomplished, 
 
 1 Zeller, Gesch. d. deutsch. Phil., 775. 
 
106 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 pseudo-philosophy had been supreme, and that he had completed 
 what Kant had begun. 1 
 
 Schopenhauer and Herbart speak in the same general way of 
 their relation to Kant, but in exactly opposite aspects. Herbart 
 clung to the realistic element in Kant, Schopenhauer to his sub- 
 jective and idealistic elements. What to the one was the weak- 
 ness of Kant's system was to the other its strength. 2 
 
 III. Schopenhauer's estimate of Kant is a very high one : 
 'Kant's almost superhuman merit lies therefore in this, that he 
 distinguishes the thing in itself from the phenomenon, and shows 
 that the phenomenon alone is the object of cognition ; so that it 
 amounts to the same thing whether we style it object or phe- 
 nomenon, that is, conception (Vorstellung). The objectionable 
 feature in Kant is that he unnecessarily multiplies the number of 
 the connections through which the Object is formed. This, how- 
 ever, is not the case with the Transcendental ^Esthetics, which, 
 in its results as well as in the manner of its execution, is one of 
 the greatest masterpieces, and in itself sufficient to immortalize 
 the name of Kant, as its principles embrace unanswerable truth.' 3 
 'This cannot be said, however, of the Transcendental Analytic. 
 Among its twelve Categories there is one which is a downright 
 absurdity, — the Category of Reciprocation, which is a monster, 
 like Spinoza's causa sui. But, beside this, the whole twelve, 
 strictly taken, can be reduced to a solitary one, — Causality, — the 
 only one, consequently, which Kant ever brings to exemplifi- 
 cation.' 4 
 
 IV. General Views. — The world is only my conception, my 
 mental representation (Vorstellung). The thing in itself is Will, 
 which presents itself in things as phenomenon. It is the essence 
 of the phenomena. Without a subject there can be no object. 
 Were there no one to perceive things, there could be nothing 
 perceived. 'The antithesis between the ideal and the reed is 
 equivalent to the antithesis between phenomenon (mental repre- 
 sentation — Vorstellung) and the thing in itself! 'The dividing 
 line between the real and the ideal is so run that the whole intui- 
 
 « Kritik der Kant. Philosophic 469. Welt als Wille, 2 Th. 291. 
 
 * Erdnuum, F.ntwickelung d. deutsch. Speculation, s. Kant, ii. 334. 
 
 3 Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic, 492. * Do., 501, 502. 
 
XIII.— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. 
 
 107 
 
 tional world — the world presenting itself objectively, including 
 our own bodies, together with space, time, and causality, involv- 
 ing, therefore, the Extended of Spinoza and the Matter of Locke, 
 — all this, as mental representation (conception — Vorstellung), 
 belongs to the Ideal, while nothing remains as Real but the Will.' 
 'After men had, for thousands of years, regarded the universe 
 of our intuitions as real, — that is, as existing independently of 
 the concipient subject, — Idealism brought to consciousness the 
 fact that, boundless and massive as the universe is, it hangs on a 
 solitary thread, — the thread of the consciousness at the time in 
 which it exists.' ' It is a mistake to suppose that Idealism denies 
 the empirical reality of the external world. The genuine Idealism 
 is not the empirical, but the transcendental! ' In all transcen- 
 dental Ideality the objective world retains empirical reality. The 
 object is not, indeed, the thing in itself, but it is, as empirical 
 object, real. In fact, space is only in my head; but, empirically, 
 my head is in space.' ' The absolute Idealism, holding the ob- 
 jective world to be a mere phantom, a spectre of the brain, is 
 theoretic Egoism! ' Idealism is not to be confounded with Spirit- 
 ualism, for Spiritualism, with its antithesis, Materialism, belongs 
 to Realism, and is, consequently, opposite to Idealism! 'What 
 is mental representation (vorstellung — conception)? A very 
 complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the 
 result of which is the consciousness of an image there.' ' Every 
 object is conditioned by the Subject, and exists only for the Sub- 
 ject, and is the Conception of the Subject. Object and Concep- 
 tion are not different, but are one and the same thing.' ' The 
 being in and for itself of everything must of necessity be a sub- 
 jective one.' x 
 
 V. Idealism, Ancient. — ' Idealism, or the view that the world 
 is but phenomenon, reveals itself not only in Plato's affirmation 
 of the nullity of sensuous things, but in the fact, also, that it is 
 the original doctrine, and that the Hindoo religion, which is 
 worthy of the supremest regard, as it is the oldest religion and 
 the one received by the majority of the race, avows it in its doc- 
 trine that things are but illusion, and that their existence is guilt. 
 
 1 See Schopenhauer- Lexikon, von Frauenstadt, Leipzig, 1871 ; art. Aussenwelt, Ding 
 an Sich, Ideal und Real, Idealismus, Vorstellung. 
 
108 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 With the predominance of Judaism, which is thoroughly real- 
 istic, Realism in philosophy also pervaded the Christian world, 
 as if Judaism were Reason.' 1 
 
 VI. Idealism, Modern, History of its Development. — ' It 
 was reserved for modern philosophy again to return to the true 
 view, and here the first merit belongs to Descartes, who is with 
 justice regarded as the founder of modern philosophy, for he 
 began with self-consciousness, and thus gave a thoroughly sub- 
 jective turn to philosophy. A very important advance was made 
 in this direction by Locke, who vindicated for the subject, by his 
 notion of secondary qualities, a part of that which Realism had 
 ascribed to the object. In this tendency Berkeley went still fur- 
 ther. His chief merit is that he gave up the undue distinction 
 between Conception (Vorstellung) and the object of Conception. 
 Finally, with Kant begins a new period. Not only, with Locke, 
 did he deny as things in themselves what pertains to the senses, 
 but he also showed that what pertains to the intuitive under- 
 standing is not things in themselves, but forms lying in the 
 subject, and decisively established the fact that all objects are 
 but phenomena, — that is, are Conceptions (Vorstellungen). Locke 
 had denied that colour is in the objects, and rightly determined 
 it to be mere sensation of the Subject, yet granted that exten- 
 sion belongs to the objects. Kant, whose Critique of Pure 
 Reason is a continuation of Locke's philosophy, shows that 
 extension — that is, space — is only in the subject, and hence 
 enounces the proposition, thoroughly correct, that if there were 
 no cognizing subject there would be no objects and no world. 
 This is a proposition which, strictly taken, is tautological, as an 
 object in itse/f— that is, not an object to a subject — is a contra- 
 diction.' 2 
 
 VII. The Contemporary Systems contrasted. — 'As the sen- 
 sations are subjective, and the form of causality, whereby they 
 come to be the perceived object, is subjective, it is clear that 
 Realism, which makes the (unconceived) things the causes of the 
 conceptions, and (Fichte's) " Doctrine of Science," which makes 
 the subject the cause of the objects, involve a preposterous doc- 
 
 1 Vierfache Wurzel, § 19. 
 
 • Welt als Wille, 2d B., 83. Vierfache Wurzel, ad edit., \ 16. 
 
XIII.— THE ORETICAL IDEAL ISM. 
 
 109 
 
 trine. Just as preposterous, finally, is the system of Identity 
 (Schelling and Hegel), which is a fusion of the other two.' 1 
 ' The truth is, that represented (conceived) Objects — that is, Phe- 
 nomena — must submit to the law of Causality, for without that 
 law Objects are impossible. It is the condition of Object-to';/^-. 
 It is a matter of course that what holds good of all phenomena 
 holds equally good of our own body, which, as Kant has cor- 
 rectly shown, is only phenomenon, and which we may name the 
 most immediate object.' 2 
 
 VIII. Causality and Final Cause. — Only in the case of Phe- 
 nomena can we speak of Causality. In this sphere, however, we 
 must go back from effects to causes, though an ultimate cause is 
 not thinkable. In spite of the unanswerable proofs by which 
 Kant has annihilated all speculative theology, there are still 
 many who use the absurd expression 'Ultimate Cause,' and non- 
 sensically talk of a cause which is not also effect. They think 
 they are talking in the interest of religion, confounding Religion 
 and Theism, whereas, in fact, Theism is merely Judaism ; and in 
 Buddhist lands, which are decidedly atheistic and pantheistic, 
 Kant's Critique of Reason, the most serious attack ever made 
 upon Theism, would be regarded as an edifying tract, written 
 against the heretics, in defence of the orthodox Idealism. 3 
 
 IX. Man and the Animals. — It is rightly acknowledged that 
 reason distinguishes man from the animal, and this distinction is 
 wrongly made as great as possible. The Orient has not this 
 unamiable pride; only in the Occident, which has bleached man, 
 and to which the old-time primal religions of his home could not 
 follow him, — only in this Occident, man no longer recognizes his 
 brothers, but calls them beasts. All animals, even the most im- 
 perfect, have understanding; 4 for they all know objects, and this 
 knowledge, as motive, determines their movements. The under- 
 standing distinguishes animals from plants, as reason distinguishes 
 men from the animals. The mark which distinguishes the animal 
 from the plant is that its motion does not depend on mechanical, 
 chemical, or physiological causes, but is really voluntary, pro- 
 duced by an object known, which is the motive of that move- 
 
 1 Welt als Wille, g§ 5, 7. * Do. § 6. Vierfache Wurzel, g 22. 
 
 3 Vierfache Wurzel, § 34. * Welt als Wille, § 6. 
 
HO PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 merit. 1 The animals have intuitive, but not abstract, knowledge ; 
 they apprehend the immediate causal connection, and the higher 
 animals can carry it through several links of the chain; but they 
 do not in the strict sense think, for they lack notions, that is, the 
 abstract conceptions. 2 We cannot deny an analogue of morality 
 to the animals if we contrast the diverse animal characters which 
 meet our view. Contrast, for example, the dog and the elephant 
 with the cat, the hyena, and the crocodile. This empirical char- 
 acter may very well be the exhibition of an intelligible one. 3 The 
 life of animals is a clear exemplification of the nullity and the 
 suffering of life. It is the nature of animals, more than of man, to 
 be satisfied with mere existence. They give themselves up to 
 the present ; they are the present personified, and heartless man 
 robs them of their little all. The bird, organized to sweep over 
 a hemisphere, he mews up in a narrow space; and on his most 
 faithful friend, the dog, endowed with such rare intelligence, man 
 fastens the chain. 4 
 
 X. Metaphysics, Nature of. — ' Philosophy, or Metaphysics, 
 as the doctrine of Consciousness and of what is involved in it, as 
 a matter of course does not enter into the circle of the other 
 sciences. As it does not follow the Principle of the Ground, but 
 considers this Principle itself, which, in the nature of the case, does 
 not allow of being grounded by demonstration, we may say that 
 Philosophy takes up things where the Sciences leave them. 
 Hence it considers things in a manner wholly different from that 
 of the Sciences. It does not ask whence the world is, nor where- 
 fore it is, but what it is. It does not ground and demonstrate 
 in the way in which the Sciences do, but that which first of all 
 is given as feeling it seeks, that it may exalt it to knowledge, 
 and may picture in abstract the essence of the world, so as to 
 render itself a repetition and mirroring of the world in abstract 
 notions.' 5 ' Hence it follows inevitably that there can be no other 
 Philosophy than a Philosophy of Reflection. Any other is mere 
 twaddle. Metaphysics embraces, therefore, all the cognitions a 
 
 1 Sehen und Farben, 3d edit., 18 seq. 
 
 ■ Welt als Wille, 3d edit., ii. 62-66. Ethik, 2d edit., 33, 34. 
 
 8 Memorabilien, 314, 315. * l'arerga, 2d edit., 318, 403. 
 
 5 Welt als Wille, § 15. 
 
XII L— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. m 
 
 priori which relate to time, space, and matter, and forms the tacit 
 presuppositions of the Sciences. 1 ' 
 
 ' Hence Metaphysics is idealistic through and through, and 
 the proposition, The World is nothing but Conception, is synony- 
 mous with Kant's assertion, The World is phenomenon, and is 
 identical with the proposition, The World is subject to the Princi- 
 ple of the Ground.' 2 
 
 XI. The World not a Dream. — Were we simply to abide by 
 the results thus far reached, this world would be little more than 
 a dream conformed to laws. Kant shows a way out of this in 
 teaching us to distinguish the In-itself from the phenomena. 
 (When he forgets this, and for example places objectivity simply 
 in conformity with law, he coincides entirely with Leibnitz, 
 who had maintained that the actual phenomena are distinguished 
 from those in dreams only by their strict conformity to law.) 
 The question now rises, if the world to this point offers only 
 relations, is merely Conception, is it nothing more ? is it an in- 
 substantial dream, or is it something more? and if it be, what is 
 it? 3 The response to this question Schopenhauer considers the 
 most marked step in his system, by which it removes itself, 
 more than by any other, from Kant. 4 First of all, nothing is 
 given but what has already been considered, that is, Conscious- 
 ness. To this our own body is object, like all other objects, only 
 more intimate, more immediate: as our body, however, is in time 
 and in space, and is material, we have an objective knowledge 
 of it, or, what is the same thing, it, with all its circumstances, 
 movements, and such like, is Phenomenon. 
 
 But the observation we make that our bodily movements follow 
 not simply on causes and excitations, but on motives also, shows 
 clearly that in these movements, in addition to their being 
 objective changes, something else articulates itself, of which the 
 Subject is conscious in a purely immediate manner. This some- 
 thing is Will? 
 
 XII. Will, the World is. — 'I am conscious of my Will in a 
 manner wholly different from that in which I am conscious of 
 Objects, even of my own body, and hence I have not an objective 
 
 * Welt als Wille, 2 Th. 51. ' Do., ffl 1-16. 3 Do., g 17. 
 
 4 Do., 2 Th. 193. s Welt als Wille, ? 15. 
 
112 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 but an immediate cognition of my Will. Of my body, to wit, I 
 am conscious under the three forms of Space, Time, and Causality 
 (Matter). The cognition of my own Volition is free from two 
 of these forms. It is true that in cognizing my Will it appears 
 to me under the form of Time, as a train of acts, and so far my 
 cognition is not exhaustive; yet it is so much more intimate and 
 immediate than my consciousness of my other objective being, 
 that Kant's doctrine of the incognizableness of the thing in itself 
 must be so far modified as that the Subject is conscious in its 
 material being of its phenomenon ; and, on the other hand, is in 
 its Will conscious of its In-itself. 1 Kant himself seems to have 
 had a surmise of the fact that when the Subject is conscious of 
 his Volition he cognizes more than the mere phenomenon ; for 
 when he speaks of things in themselves there are at once sug- 
 gested to him practical determinations, that is, determinations of 
 Will. In the knowledge of our Volition we have a cognition 
 with which no other can be compared, which is neither a priori 
 nor a posteriori is neither a physical nor a logical truth, but is 
 the philosophical truth by pre-eminence. 2 
 
 ' To the position that the Will is the proper In-itself of man 
 is opposed the prejudice that knowledge is the primary, and that 
 Volition is a mere accident of the Intellect. To meet this preju- 
 dice, attention must be directed to the fact that the Will has the 
 proper primacy in self-consciousness, for that which is recognized 
 in self-consciousness, our effort, our fear, our pleasure and dis- 
 pleasure, is aroused or repressed Volition. The Will is, there- 
 fore, what is properly substantial in us ; the Intellect is the 
 secondary, the accessory; whence it is that we come only in 
 a supplementary way to know our Volition (our Character), 
 Hence also our Volition constitutes the identity of person. Con- 
 sequently every man has, in himself, the experience that he is 
 Phenomenon, that is, Conception ; and that he is an In-itself 
 transcending the phenomenon, that is, he is Will. If now we 
 would avoid theoretic Egoism, the view that ourself alone is in 
 existence, a view which it is hard to believe any one in his senses 
 has ever seriously held, we must concede that as our phenomenal 
 Ego is related to the world of phenomena, so precisely our In- 
 
 ' Welt als Wille, 2 Th. aoo seq. « Do., ? 18, a Th. 199. 
 
XIII.— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. 
 
 "3 
 
 itself is related to that which it is in itself. This train of reason- 
 ing leads to the proposition to which Schopenhauer devotes the 
 Second Book of his chief work, to wit, The World is Will. 
 
 XIII. Will defined. — The word Will is here to be taken in a 
 broader sense than the ordinary one ; for we are not to confine it 
 to conscious will, but are to understand by it what unfolds itself 
 in nature in various gradations, and reveals itself in its supremest 
 form in conscious human volition, which gives it its name as a 
 denommatio a potiori, a term for the genus derived from what is 
 its pre-eminent species. This extension of the meaning is justi- 
 fied by the fact that there is an identity of essence with Will in 
 every striving and operative power in nature. Force is a sort of 
 willing. The In-itself is the Will, that is, that which is not object 
 (conception), and which, in order to think it, must be compared 
 with and named after that which has most completely stripped 
 off the forms of objectivity, and that is the human Will. 1 
 
 It lies in the nature of the case that the predicates which be- 
 long to the phenomena must be denied of the Will. The Will 
 as universality and unity, exalted above all multiplicity, must be 
 thought of as the one which is all, the iv xal xav. 
 
 XIV. Universality of the Recognition of the World as 
 Will. — The true, not the mere phenomenal in the world is 
 therefore nothing but this One Will, which reveals itself as the 
 pressure of waters to the Deep, the turning of the magnet to the 
 North, the longing of the iron for the magnet. 2 
 
 In perfect independence of this system, the greatest investi- 
 gators of nature have gradually begun to recognize the Will as 
 the proper agent in nature. This is true of Brandis, Meckel, 
 Burdach, when they speak of plants ; it is true of the comparative 
 anatomists when they explain the structure of the animal by its 
 character and inclinations ; it is true of the physicians when 
 they speak of the healing power of nature; it is true of the 
 astronomers when they construe gravitation as a mode of willing. 5 
 
 Were the world conception only, it would justify the attempt 
 to reduce everything to the simplest relations a priori, that is, the 
 arithmetical relations, and to construe everything into one huge 
 
 * Welt als Wille, g§ 17-29. * Do., \ 24. 
 
 3 Ueber den Willen in der Natur. 
 
 8 
 
114 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 sum in arithmetic, as Fichte's Doctrine of Science seems to have 
 accomplished it, — merely seems. As primarily in my own body 
 this double side comes to my consciousness, that my body is 
 phenomenon, and that it is the thing in itself, to wit, Will, it 
 becomes my key to this double cognition of the entire world. 
 According to the view we have now reached, the world is 
 nothing but the objectivation of One Will ; and Spinoza is right 
 when, speaking of freedom, he says that if a stone were con- 
 scious it would speak of its falling as its Will. As the character 
 of man consists in his Will, so is it with the quality of things 
 which make up their character. 1 Kant was right when, following 
 Priestley, he regarded the essence of matter as forces. 2 
 
 XV. The Brain. — The brain is an organ in which the supremest 
 objectivation of the will reveals itself. With this organ alone, 
 at a single stroke, the world, as conception, comes forth with all 
 its forms, object and subject, time, space, multiplicity, causality. 
 The brain, with all its conceptions, whether they be merely intui- 
 tive, as in the animal brain, or abstract, as in man, is in the main 
 no more than an instrument of the Will. In the objective mode 
 of looking at the matter, the brain is the efflorescence of the 
 organism. Not until the organism reaches its highest perfection 
 and complication have we the brain appearing in its greatest 
 development. The brain, with its attachments, the nerves and 
 spinal marrow, is a mere fruit, a product, of the rest of the organ- 
 ism, — is, in fact, a parasite of it, in as far as it does not directly 
 interlock into its mechanism, but serves the aim of self-preserva- 
 tion only as it regulates the relations of the organism to the 
 external world. Tiedemann was perhaps the first who compared 
 the cerebral nervous system to a parasite. The comparison is 
 striking, so far as the brain, with its attachments, the nerves and 
 spinal marrow, is as it were planted into the organism, and 
 nourished by it, without itself directly contributing anything to 
 the economy. Hence life can exist without brain, as in the case 
 of brainless abortions, and of tortoises, which can live for three 
 weeks without their hearts, if the medulla oblongata, which is 
 an organ of respiration, is left. A hen from which Flourens had 
 removed the entire brain lived ten months, and did well. Even 
 
 » Welt als Wille, g 27. « Do., \ 27. Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 87. 
 
XIII.— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. 
 
 115 
 
 in the case of man the destruction of the brain brings on death 
 not directly, but first through the lungs, then through the heart. 
 The brain, with its function of knowing, is nothing but a vedette 
 stationed by the Will, which looks out from its watch-tower; the 
 heart, through the window of the senses, gives warning of dan- 
 gers, and gives notice of the approach of what is useful, that the 
 Will may decide itself by its reports. 1 
 
 XVI. The Senses. — It is a decided error that we come to ob- 
 jects through the senses. The senses only impart sensations, 
 that is, subjective conditions. The very sensations which we 
 are quickest in referring to objects — the sensations of light and 
 colours — are but actions of our retina. In the retina, therefore, 
 there is actual polarity, not, as Goethe supposes, in the physical 
 conditions of our sensation. It is the activity of our eye which 
 is quantitatively and qualitatively divisible, not, as the Newtonians 
 suppose, the light itself. Thus this activity begets the three, or 
 the infinitely many, pairs of colours, in which the one is always 
 the complement to the other for the full activity of the eye. 2 The 
 specific diversity of perception in each of the five senses has its 
 cause not in the nervous system itself, but only in the way in 
 which it is affected. Hence we may regard every sensation as 
 a modification of touch, or of the capacity of feeling which is 
 spread over the entire body. For the substance of the nerves 
 (apart from the sympathetic system) is one and the same 
 throughout the body. The mode in which it is affected is deter- 
 mined partly by the nature of the agent (light, sound, aroma), 
 partly by the apparatus through which it offers itself to the im- 
 pression of this agent. 3 
 
 XVII. The Ideal and the Real not identical. — Their diver- 
 sity is the topic which, since Descartes, has most occupied the 
 philosophical world. Kant has established this diversity with such 
 force that they who speak of the identity of the two are mere 
 wind-bags. Philosophy has a transcendental (ideologic) and a 
 physiological side. On the former side it is idealism, on the 
 latter realism. It amounts to the same thing whether we say 
 (idealistically) the world is conception, or (realistically) it is brain- 
 
 • Weltals Wille, 3d ed., ii. 273. Ueber den Willen in Natur, 3d ed., 23, 24. 
 2 Ueber das Sehen und die Farben, $$ 5, 6. 3 Do., 3d ed., 9. 
 
Il6 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 function. It is the same in effect whether we had said (idealistic- 
 ally) Locke took the side of the senses, Kant that of the under- 
 standing, or whether we now say (realistically) Locke has shown 
 that what belongs to the organ of sense, Kant that what belongs 
 to the brain, does not belong to the things themselves. 1 
 
 XVIII. Music stands completely out of the circle of the other 
 arts. While they by the presentation of single things excite the 
 knowledge of ideas, music objectivates the entire will; and while 
 other arts speak of the shadow, it speaks of the substance. In 
 it, therefore, the essential being of the world repeats itself: in the 
 fundamental bass, inorganic, massive nature; in the principal 
 voices singing the air, the thoughtful life and effort of man: the 
 ripieno voices repeat what remains, which, from the crystal to the 
 animal, gathers to a whole its self-sustained consciousness. Music, 
 like philosophy, is the complete and just repetition, the expression, 
 of the world. It is, to parody the familiar words of Leibnitz, un- 
 conscious metaphysics. Music is the melody of which the world 
 is the words. We may as well call the world incorporated music 
 as incorporated will. 
 
 XIX. Theism and Polytheism. — Faith in God (Theism) has its 
 root in Egoism. It is not the product of cognition, but of will. 
 Necessity, the constant fearing and hoping, brings man to the 
 hypostatizing of personal Being, that he may have some one to 
 pray to. At the beginning there were various gods, but in later 
 time the necessity of bringing consistency, order, and unity into 
 knowledge led to the subordination of them to one, or the reduc- 
 tion of them to one. As polytheism is the personification of the 
 particular parts and powers of nature, monotheism is the personi- 
 fication of all nature, — at a single stroke. 
 
 XX. Buddhism. — It is the resorption into the primal spirit of 
 the Nirvana of the Buddhists, which is desired by all those in 
 whom the Will has turned and denied itself, and to whom the real 
 world, with all its suns and galaxies, is nothing. 2 Buddhism, in 
 view of its having more adherents than any other system, and 
 of its admirable internal character and truth, is to be regarded as 
 the principal religion on earth. Buddhism is strictly idealistic and 
 pessimistic, and decidedly and in express terms atheistic, which 
 
 • Ueber den Willen in der Natur, 91. ' Welt als Wille, g 71. 
 
XII L— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. uy 
 
 shows how mistaken those are who make Religion and Theism 
 pure synonyms. A special disadvantage of Christianity is that 
 in the main matter ... it revolves around a single event, and 
 makes the destiny of the world depend on it. A religion which 
 makes a solitary event its foundation rests on a very weak foun- 
 dation. How wise, on the other hand, is it in Buddhism to 
 accept the thousand Buddhas! The moral system of Christianity 
 is inferior to that of Buddhism and Brahminism, in that it does 
 not have regard to the animals. Buddhism has the most perfect 
 harmony with Schopenhauer's philosophy, in its idealism, atheism, 
 and pessimism, — and in its considering physical evil as the result 
 of moral defect, — in the doctrine that nature is to be redeemed 
 by man. The Buddhist antithesis of Sansara and Nirvana cor- 
 responds with Schopenhauer's affirmation and negation of the 
 Will to live. Sansara is the world of perpetual re-births, of 
 pleasure and longing, of the illusion of the senses and of shifting 
 forms, of infancy and prime, of old age, sickness, and death. 
 Nirvana, the Quenching, is redemption from all this, and marks 
 what enters after the negation of the sinful Will. 1 
 
 XXI. The One and All. Pantheism. — The doctrine of the One 
 and All, the Zv xm xav, — that is, that the inner essence of all things 
 is one and the same, — was, subsequently to the Eleati, thoroughly 
 taught by Scotus Erigena, Iordano Bruno, and Spinoza. Schelling 
 has revived the doctrine, and it has been generally grasped in our 
 time. But what this One is, and how it comes to present itself as 
 the Many, is a problem whose solution I have been the first to 
 present. From the earliest times man has been spoken of as a 
 Microcosm. I have inverted the proposition, and have shown 
 that the world is a Makranthropos, in that Will and Conception 
 exhaust the world's being, as they exhaust man's. With the 
 modern Pantheists I hold indeed the Zv xa\ xav, that the One is 
 also the All, but I do not hold their 77av Mo-, — that God is the All. 
 My views as distinguished from theirs involve these points: 
 
 i. Their dkos is an x, an unknown quantity; my ' Will,' on the 
 contrary, is most accurately known. 
 
 2. Their Bkoq, their God, manifests himself animi causa, to 
 unfold his glory, and to cause himself to be admired; with me 
 
 1 Frauenstadt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Buddhaismus. 
 
H8 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 the Will, by its objectivation, comes, in what way soever, to 
 self-knowledge, whereby its turning, its redemption, becomes 
 possible. 
 
 3. I proceed from self-consciousness. 
 
 4. While Pantheism is Optimism, and hence the world is re- 
 garded as the total possibility of all being, with me the world 
 also has space for the negation of the Will. 
 
 5. To the Pantheists the intuitional world is an unexplained 
 manifestation of God; to me, on the contrary, it is a conception 
 per aeeidens, inasmuch as the Intellect is primarily only a medium 
 for the more perfect phenomena of Will, and subsequently, in a 
 perfectly definable way, rises to objective intuition. 
 
 Pantheism is a misnomer, for the word God means a personal 
 Creator, whom true philosophy denies. Spinoza represented his 
 system as Pantheism, that is, called his substance God, only to 
 escape the fate of Bruno and Vanini. 1 Pantheism presupposes 
 the existence of Theism. The idea would never originally come 
 into any mind, or a mind free from prejudice, to look upon this 
 world as a God. 
 
 XXII. Spinoza and his Disciples. — Spinoza himself stood far 
 above the modern distortions of his system. His blunder is his 
 Optimism, that 'Behold, it was very good,' which stuck to him 
 as a Jew, so that he calls his substance God, and makes of it a 
 Jehovah who lacks nothing but personality. Hence his Ethics is 
 weak, often revolting. With me, the essence of the world is 
 rather the crucified One, — crucified Saviour, or crucified Male- 
 factor, as he himself determined it, — and my Ethics harmonizes 
 with the Christian, and with the Brahminical and Buddhistic- 
 Those, finally, who in their fear of fatalism substitute for it the 
 going forth of the world from a free act of will (as Jacobi does) 
 forget that there is a third view, the one I offer : the Act of Will, 
 out of which the world springs forth, is our own. This Will is 
 free, for the Principle of the Ground, from which, above all, neces- 
 sity derives its significance, is the mere form of its phenomenon. 2 
 
 XXIII. Pessimism. — Optimism regards the phenomena as the 
 true, this world as the best. This view is impious; it is heathen- 
 ish in the worst sense of the word. It presents itself in Judaism 
 
 » Welt als Wille, ?§ 17-29. a Do., vol., ii. 63^-640. 
 
XI II.— THE ORETICAL IDEAL ISM. 
 
 II 9 
 
 with its ' Behold, it was very good,' and most glaringly in Islam, 
 the newest, and therefore the worst, religion. In direct opposition 
 to this view, the oldest and truest religion — which, in view of its 
 possessing these qualities, we may call Pessimism — regards all 
 being as guilt and as misfortune. The only true and profound 
 thing in Judaism is its dogma of the Fall. This is the only point 
 at which real Christianity coheres with Judaism. Hence Chris- 
 tianity rightly teaches original sin, and properly uses the words 
 world and evil as synonyms. 1 
 
 'In fact, it is mockery to speak of that as the "best world" 
 in which life is but the alternation of pain and weariness, where 
 the happiest has no moments more blissful than those of slum- 
 ber, and the hopeless no moment more wretched than the 
 moment of waking. Because Life is guilt, it is punished with 
 Death. How much nearer the truth on this point does Hume 
 stand than Leibnitz, whose Optimism has no other merit than 
 that of having occasioned Voltaire's CandideP* 
 
 XXIV. Death and Life. — To say I shall pass away, but the 
 world will continue to run its course, is not, strictly speaking, 
 correct. We should rather say, The world (which I see) shall 
 pass away, but I (my true being) am eternal. The death of the 
 individual is for the race what falling asleep is to the individual, 
 and hence the life of the race seems like an oscillation, the vibra- 
 tions of which are produced by the passing away of the persons 
 that have lived and the entrance of the new. The primary aimj 
 of all religions and philosophical systems is to furnish an anti- 
 dote to the certainty of death. When a man dies a world per- 
 ishes, — the world which he bore in his head. The more intelli- 
 gent the head, the more clear, significant, and comprehensive was 
 its world, the more terrible is its destruction. With the animal 
 perishes only a poor rhapsody, or sketch of a world. The cause 
 of old age and death is not a physical one ; it is metaphysical. 
 From the cessation of the organic life of an individual we are 
 no more to infer that the force which actuated that life is annihi- 
 lated than we are to infer that the spinning-girl is dead because 
 her wheel stands still. We know well what we lose by death, 
 but we know not what we gain. A comfort which can always 
 
 1 Welt als Wille, g 63. ' Do., vol. ii. ch. 46. 
 
I2 o PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 be grasped by every one is: Death is as natural as life. The indi- 
 viduality of the most of men is so pitiful that they lose nothing 
 in losing it. The only thing in them of value is the common 
 humanity, and that will never pass away. In fact, every indi- 
 viduality is at bottom only a special error, — something which 
 had better not be, — hence, something which ought not to be, — 
 and that is the reason we cease to be. Death, even more than 
 sorrow, has the power to hallow. Every death is in some sense 
 an apotheosis, and hence the dead body of the lowliest of the 
 race cannot be looked upon without reverence. What the bad 
 man most fears is certain to come to him, — that is, death. It is 
 just as certain to the good man, but to him it is welcome. The 
 fear of death is independent of all knowledge. The animal has 
 it, though it knows nothing of death. Everything that is born 
 brings this fear with it into the world. 
 
 XXV. Estimates of Schopenhauer. — Imperfect as is this pre- 
 sentation of Schopenhauer's views, we think that the reader can- 
 not fail to be struck with their wonderful brilliancy. Herbart, 
 who is of so different a school, in speaking of the great men 
 who have developed the system of Kant, pronounces ' Fichte 
 the profoundest, Schelling the most comprehensive, but Schopen- 
 hauer the most lucid, the most versatile, the most attractive.' 
 He says that it is an extremely rare thing to find an extended 
 acquaintance with literature so variously and felicitously used to 
 render luminous the objects of speculation as in Schopenhauer's 
 ' World as Will,' through whose seven hundred pages scarcely a 
 sentence reveals the decline of the life which glows through it. 
 The image, clouded with such obscurities in Fichte and Schel- 
 ling, is clearly mirrored in Schopenhauer, whose book, because 
 of its clearness, is best adapted to show that ' this most recent, 
 idealistic Spinozistic philosophy, in whatever way it shifts, in 
 whatever form it reveals itself, is and remains alike erroneous.' 1 
 
 The general estimate of Schopenhauer which Zeller has 
 given makes any other unnecessary : ' Schopenhauer does not 
 merely take an exalted position in philosophical literature as a 
 writer, but was a man of extraordinary intellectual endowments, 
 of many-sided culture, and adapted, in a decided measure, for 
 
 1 Herbart's Review, 1819, in his Works, xii. 369. 
 
X III.— THEORETICAL IDEALISM. I2 i 
 
 philosophical investigation, by the acuteness of his thinking, the 
 force of his intuition. That it was„nevertheless, in common with 
 Beneke, his destiny long to remain little known, that not until 
 toward the end of his life, and subsequently, he attracted any 
 general or appreciative notice, is to be accounted for in part by 
 the character of his philosophy and its antagonism to the pre- 
 vailing modes of thought, but is due in no little measure to his 
 personal peculiarities and conduct. High as was his scientific 
 aspiration, lively as was his feeling for the beautiful, cultivated 
 as was his taste, and strong as was the ideal impulse of his na- 
 ture, it is no less true that, on the other side, his sensuality was 
 indomitable, his self-esteem . and self-laudation boundless, his 
 vanity pitiful, his ambition consuming, and his selfishness illimit- 
 able. Incapable of drawing out of himself, and lifting himself 
 by science above his personal infirmities, he carried over into his 
 system all the whimseys of his capricious nature. Every defence 
 and every success of a contemporary system he regarded as an 
 attempt on the life of his own renown, and this aroused his im- 
 placable hatred, which poured itself out in passionate invectives. 
 Instead of continuing patiently to labour for the position which he 
 felt entitled to claim, he withdrew himself into a corner and pouted. 
 'Schopenhauer's philosophy is the idealistic counterpart of 
 Herbart's Realism. Both proceed primarily from Kant; both 
 passed through Fichte's school, the one in Jena, the other in 
 Berlin ; both were as little satisfied with him as with Schelling 
 and Hegel, and desired to construct a new system on a Kantian 
 basis, to draw out more correctly the consequences of Kant's 
 Criticism. But in their apprehension of Kant, and in their judg- 
 ment of what was needed to improve him, they sundered from 
 each other in exactly opposite directions. What the one extolled 
 as his highest merit the other regarded as his greatest weakness. 
 Herbart, to avoid Fichte's Idealism, turned back to Leibnitz and 
 Wolff. Schopenhauer, little as he was willing to confess it, and 
 with all the malevolence and depreciation with which he judged 
 Fichte, did no more than go back to Fichte to improve and 
 complete his Idealism. As Herbart's Realism went over into 
 Idealism, so Schopenhauer's Idealism went over into a hard 
 Realism, a materialistic Pantheism. 
 
122 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 ' . . . A system which runs into such gross contradictions may 
 certainly embrace many fruitful thoughts, many valuable obser- 
 vations, — and we willingly concede that Schopenhauer's system 
 is not wanting in these ; but as a whole, as a system it is, in its 
 most favourable aspect, no more than a brilliant paradox.' x 
 
 XIV. The Strength and Weakness of Idealism. 
 
 It is impossible to understand the weakness of a system without 
 understanding its strength. The strength and weakness of Ideal- 
 ism connect themselves with the same facts and principles, so that 
 they can readily be grouped in pains and reduced to parallels. 
 
 I. It rests on generally recognized principles in regard to con- 
 sciousness [ 1I7 ]. Its definition of consciousness is the one most 
 widely received : the mind's recognition of its own conditions. 
 It maintains that the cognitions of consciousness are absolute and 
 infallible, and that nothing but these is, in their degree, knowledge. 
 In all these postulates the great mass of thinkers agree with 
 Idealism. The foundation of Idealism is the common foundation 
 of nearly all the developed philosophical thinking of all schools. 
 Idealism declares that while consciousness is infallible, our inter- 
 pretations of it, on which we base inferences, may be incorrect; and 
 nearly all thinkers of all schools agree with Idealism here. No 
 inference, or class of inferences, in which a mistake ever occurs 
 is a basis of positive knowledge. Hence, says Idealism, only 
 that which is directly in consciousness is positively known, and 
 nothing is directly in consciousness but the mind's own states. 
 Therefore we know nothing more [ II8 ]. So completely has this 
 general conviction taken possession of the philosophical mind, 
 that even antagonists of Idealism, who would cut it up by the 
 roots if they could cut this up, have not pretended that it could be 
 done. Dependent on and involved in its postulate regarding con- 
 sciousness, is the idealistic postulate, ' An idea can be like no- 
 thing but an idea;' that is, the mental image cannot be like some 
 supposed material thing, of which it is asserted to be an image. 
 To a certain point at least, nearly all the thinking of philosophers 
 is consonant with this postulate. The subjective cannot be like 
 
 1 Zeller, Gesch. d. deutschen Philosophic (1873), 872-874, 894. 
 
XI V.—A N ES TIM A TE OF IDEAL ISM. 
 
 123 
 
 the objective ; the idea of a house cannot be like a house. The 
 proposition, taken in one way, is a truism. The idea of a house 
 cannot be like a house : the idea is intellectual, the house is ma- 
 terial ; the idea is in my mind, the house is external to my mind; 
 the house is a complex of modifications of materials, the idea is 
 a modification of the immaterial ; my idea in no respect is a cause 
 of the house, the house is in a certain respect one of the causes of 
 my idea ; the idea depends on acts on the mind, acts in the mind, 
 acts of the mind, the house depends on none of these. Bricks 
 and mortar are not like mental modes. ' The beings of the mind 
 are not of clay.' 
 
 But while Idealism has here a speculative strength, which it 
 is not wise to ignore, it is not without its weakness, even at this 
 very point, for its history shows that it is rarely willing to stand 
 unreservedly by the results of its own principle as regards con- 
 sciousness. If it accept only the direct and infallible knowledge 
 supplied in consciousness, it has no common ground left but this, 
 — that there is the one train of ideas, which passes in the con- 
 sciousness of a particular individual. A consistent Idealist can 
 claim to know no more than this, — that there exist ideas in his 
 consciousness. He cannot know that he has a substantial per- 
 sonal existence, or that there is any other being, finite or infinite, 
 beside himself. And as many Idealists are not satisfied with main- 
 taining that we do not know that there is an external world, but go 
 further, and declare that we know that there is not an external 
 world, they must for consistency's sake hold that an Idealist knows 
 that there is nothing, thing or person, beside himself. Solipsism, 
 or absolute Egoism, with the exclusion of proper personality, is the 
 logic of Idealism, if the inferential be excluded. But if inference, 
 in any degree whatever, be allowed, not only would the natural 
 logic and natural inference of most men sweep away Idealism, 
 but its own principle of knowledge is subverted by the terms of 
 the supposition. Idealism stands or falls by the principle that 
 no inference is knowledge. We may reach inferences by knowl- 
 edge, but we can never reach knowledge by inference. 
 
 ' An idea can be like nothing but an idea.' We have said that 
 in one sense this is a truism. There is another sense, in which it 
 is a sophism. As a truism it is like the proposition that the most 
 
124 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 perfect portrait cannot be like the face, that a picture can only be 
 like a picture. The face is flesh and blood, the picture is oil and 
 colour; the face changes its hues and expression, the picture can- 
 not change; the face is rounded and diversified to the touch, the 
 painting is on one surface. And yet the portrait is like the face, 
 and the idea is like the object. The portrait is like the face in 
 this, that through the light which it modifies, as its medium, it 
 produces certain effects on the consciousness like those which the 
 face itself produces through the same medium. Under the same 
 laws, the idea is like the object, in that it is a faithful mental pic- 
 ture, drawn under divine laws, by the touches of the senses, con- 
 formably to the innate conditions of the mind itself. It is the 
 picture of the object, painted by the object itself, through its 
 media, on the canvas, which is conscious of the picture it bears; 
 or rather it is a photograph which becomes a picture by the 
 modification produced through the media, and by the internal 
 changes of the sensitive substratum, which co-acts responsively to 
 the media. The object is as it seems to the mind, and the idea 
 is like the object, so far, that there is a real correspondence, cor- 
 relation, analogy, conformity, between the object mediating through 
 its means of force and the idea co-mediated by these means, and 
 by the powers, connate or educated, of the mind itself. That which 
 produces the phenomenon is in the real accord of natural cause and 
 effect with the phenomenon. Different phenomena imply differ- 
 ent objects, or different conditions of the same object. In Ideal- 
 ism there is no object beyond the mind and correspondent with 
 the phenomenon, but the phenomenon itself exhausts the whole 
 conception of object. It is not the phenomenon of an object, but 
 is itself object. Hence Idealism proper holds that in the phe- 
 nomenon we in no sense grasp anything beyond it, while Idealistic 
 Realism holds that in an important sense, though mediately, 
 we do grasp the thing beyond, — in other words, that the medium 
 establishes a real relation between the object itself and the mind. 
 
 2. Idealism seems to be strong in the fact that it rests upon 
 
 generally accepted principles in regard to the personality of 
 
 man. The common view, with which Idealism concurs, is that .. 
 
 v-4-not the whole man, which is the Ego, but that only man's mind, 
 
 is the Ego ; that man is not a person, but merely has a person : 
 
XI V.—A N ES TIM A TE OF IDEAL ISM. 
 
 125 
 
 in brief, that man is not man. It assumes the simplicity of man 
 proper. The Cartesian construction of man and of person is the 
 received one, and this is the construction on which Idealism 
 builds. When we are conscious of our self, we are not conscious 
 of the material nature associated with our self. The assertion 
 of Idealism which strikes most persons as the extremest of its 
 absurdities, to wit, that we have not substantial bodies, or do not 
 directly know we have them, is a mere logical necessity from the 
 commonly-received principle, — a principle very probably held by 
 the very people who ignorantly stand aghast at its inevitable in- 
 ference. The dualistic Realists, on their own principles, no more 
 know that they have bodies than the Idealists do; and hence some 
 of the strongest dualistic Realists, like the Scotch school in gen- 
 eral, lay the foundations of an extreme Idealism in the very effort 
 to overthrow the older and weaker one. In denying Berkeley 
 they unconsciously assert Fichte. 1 This school has consequently 
 shown a tendency, in some of its latest and noblest representa- 
 tives, to run out into a sad indeterminism, or to go over to the 
 Idealism against which it has fought for a century. 2 
 
 But the seeming strength of idealism here is really a weakness ; 
 for, in common with the received dualism, it accepts a false con- 
 struction of the personality of man. The attestation of conscious- 
 ness is as real to the substantial existence of our bodies, as an 
 integral part of our person, as it is to the substantial existence 
 of our minds. There is no sort of proof proper that man is 
 spirit, apart from proof that he also is body [ II9 ]. 
 
 3. Closely connected with the false dualism of the popular 
 system in regard to the person of man is its construction of the 
 relation of matter to mind. This also has always been a tower 
 of strength to Idealism ; and it is one of its unquestionable bene- 
 fits, that it has shown the untenableness of the old position. If 
 the choice must lie between occasionalism, pre-established har- 
 mony, and materialistic physical influence on the one side, or 
 Idealism on the other, every sound thinker will accept Idealism, 
 at least provisionally, as not so great an evil as the others. The 
 ignorant physicist sometimes says, " We know that there is matter. 
 Why need we go further to an unknown something called mind ?' 
 
 1 See Prolegomena, V. 10, 15, 20. * See Prolegomena, IV. 6, 13, VI. 14. 
 
126 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 But his very assertion is self-destructive. It implies the priority 
 of the something knowing to the something known. He has 
 not been able to assert matter without postulating mind. You 
 not only cannot prove matter, you cannot define it, without im- 
 plying the existence of mind. In its assertion that mind is first, 
 Idealism is beyond all successful assault. 
 
 Berkeley here did a great work in pulling down the false, in 
 showing the defects of the existing, systems. Descartes and 
 Malebranche accepted matter, and were at a loss what to do with 
 it. It was simply in their way. Locke's was the magnificent 
 chaos of all systems. It only needed selection to determine 
 whether his views should be developed into scepticism, material- 
 ism, idealism, or realism. Were Berkeley but a blind giant, it 
 was, at this point at least, not in the temple of a true God that 
 he reached forth his hands to feel the pillars. It was Philistia's 
 temple of false theories that fell. If Berkeley was not a Solomon, 
 he was at least a Samson. His argument against matter is, as 
 directed against some of the dominant theories he assailed, simply 
 invincible. If matter were no more than what they assumed it 
 to be, could do no more than they supposed it to do, it was a 
 mere obstruction, which it was a relief to sweep out of the way. 
 If the battle was not won, the deck was at least cleared for 
 action. 
 
 Yet at this point it is a weakness of Idealism that, in regard 
 to the relation of mind and matter, it attempts to set aside false 
 theories by repudiating well-grounded facts. The evidence that 
 facts are facts is not weakened by the false theories that are 
 broached to account for them, nor by our inability to offer any 
 theory which explains them. Idealism may overthrow occasional- 
 ism, or pre-existent harmony, or physical influence, or any and 
 every theory as to the mode in which the non-Ego operates on the 
 Ego; but the fact that the non-Ego does operate on the Ego re- 
 mains untouched. In denying the fact, Idealism is forced out of 
 itself into scepticism, its own theory becomes chaotic and pre- 
 posterous, and it reacts into realism, or even materialism, or runs 
 out into nihilism. We know too little of the ultimate nature and 
 relations of matter and mind to venture beyond the ground of 
 facts in regard to them. In matter are hidden divine forces ; it 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 127 
 
 too is worthy of God ; it too is an out-thought of God ; and we 
 cannot measure it, because we cannot measure Him. We cannot 
 think too highly of spirit, but we can think too little of matter. 
 Matter, too, is in the sphere of faith. We cannot walk all through 
 its domains by sight merely. There are three spheres of wonder 
 in thought. The lowest is simple matter, with its mysteries 
 and beauty and grandeur. The highest is pure Spirit, the self- 
 existent Cause of the Universe, and his angels. Midway between 
 is the being in whom spirit takes to itself matter, not that they 
 may mechanically cohere with their wonders separated, but that 
 a new world of wonder may arise, — mysterious forces, and forces 
 which neither simple matter, nor pure spirit, in their isolation, 
 possesses. Matter and mind conjoined do not merely add their 
 powers each to each, but evolve new powers, incapable of exist- 
 ence outside of their union. 
 
 4. Idealism in its best forms addresses a powerful appeal to 
 confidence in making so much of the universe as a thing of 
 thought. Its Platonic harmony with the idea as the primal thing, 
 the presupposed model of the existent in nature, is part of its 
 strength. Against the theories of blind fate, of aimless chance, 
 of evolution, without mind to guide it, of unconscious nature 
 fretting itself into form or consciousness, in the happy accidents 
 of millions of ages of failure, — against the theories that in any 
 sense make mind the product or function of matter, or put it after 
 matter, or co-ordinate it with matter, — the best Idealism, in 
 asserting spirit as the glorious original, asserts plan as before all 
 evolution, asserts that the entire phenomenal, whether physical 
 or spiritual, finds its last root and cause in personal reason. 
 
 But while it is a strength of Idealism that it confesses the 
 thought in the universe, it is its weakness that it denies the word. 
 The word is the body of the thought, the medium through which 
 thought awakens thought, and by which mind is operative on 
 mind. After all its efforts, Idealism totally fails to give an intel- 
 ligible account of the excitation of thought. Berkeley is totally 
 unsatisfactory in the explanation of the impartation of the divine 
 ideas to us, and simply helpless when he confesses, but leaves 
 unexplained, the fact that the mind of one man communicates 
 excitation to the mind of another. Fichte confesses that the 
 
128 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 positing of the non-Ego, as the non-Ego inevitably appears in 
 every man's experience, is incapable of explication ('unbegreif- 
 liche') ; and Schelling, in his Fichtean period, acknowledges that 
 while the limitation of the Ego, in. a general way, can be explained, 
 'the definite limitation of it is the incomprehensible and inexplicable 
 demand in philosophy.' 1 
 
 Berkeley appeals to the omnipotence of God as capable of 
 making direct impressions on the mind ; but the first sentence 
 of the Principles shows that God is not the object of human 
 knowledge, — we have no more than our knowledge of our idea 
 of Him. We know the idea, not the Being. Berkeley can find 
 no solution of the facts he admits, except by a tacit desertion of 
 his own principles of knowledge. Matter, in many of its aspects, 
 may be considered as the medium of thought, the interpreting 
 word of God's mind, — the necessary condition of man's con- 
 scious relation to man; but of all these, in its Gnostic undervalua- 
 tion of matter, Idealism has persistently taken no notice. 
 
 5. Closely allied with the position it assigns to thought, is the 
 strength which Idealism derives from the conception of the 
 phenomena of the universe, as language in which mind speaks to 
 mind, or speaks to itself. ' Day unto day uttereth speech, and 
 night unto night showeth knowledge; there is no speech nor 
 language, where their voice is not heard.' 
 
 Yet, while Idealism speaks much of language, it is a language 
 without words, without lip, and without ear. It has no words, 
 for words are not ideas, but the representatives of ideas, and the 
 media of expressing them ; and Idealism has no medium be- 
 tween minds, — it has mind speaking without words, articulating 
 without organs, and heard without an ear. Its words are self- 
 uttered, that is, unuttered, — self-heard, and therefore unheard. 
 
 But while objective nature is like language in that it reveals 
 mind to mind, it is even as a revealer greatly unlike language in 
 many respects. Objective nature is not only a means to an intel- 
 lectual end, but is also in some respects an end to itself. And 
 even when it is a means, it is, in its first and most direct intent, a 
 means to a natural, not to an intellectual, end. The bird has 
 faculties for itself alone ; and those which it has for me it shares 
 
 1 System des transcendental Idealismus, 118. 
 
XIV.-AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 129 
 
 with me. It does not only sing for me, it sings for itself also. 
 The flowers that blush unseen are not lost, and the sweetness 
 shed on the desert air is not wasted. The intermediate purposes 
 of nature do not find their analogy in language, and hence the 
 conception of language fails to cover the whole problem. It 
 does not answer to build a system on the straining of a metaphor. 
 But the secret force of the analogy, even as far as we grant it, is 
 not what it ought to be for the ends of Idealism. Objective 
 nature has not the arbitrary character of language. Talking man 
 has innumerable languages, — man as the excitant of the percep- 
 tions of his fellow has but one language, and to percipient man 
 nature addresses but one. The man of spoken language is 
 'homo,' and 'anthropos,' — and the nation of 'homo' does not 
 understand ' anthropos ;' but nature's man is man himself, as- 
 serting himself to the normal perception of the whole race in the 
 one perception, in its kind identical and unmistakable. If nature 
 finds in language some of her parallels, she finds in it, in others, 
 her contrasts. She is so vast, and so manifold, that she soon ex- 
 hausts the figure and leaves it behind her. The spoons of our 
 Systems never throw back the tide-line of her ocean. 
 
 6. Idealism has been strengthened by the obscurity, confusion, 
 and vacillation of thinkers in regard to the notion of substance, 
 or of the ' thing in itself! 
 
 Yet Idealism itself involves all the most serious demands of 
 the notion of substance, falls into its greatest difficulties, and 
 complicates instead of relieving them. The difficulties touching 
 substance are in the sphere of the ideal. But although it raises 
 the difficulties, it never settles them. It has all the empirical 
 difficulties in accounting for what seems, and then the compli- 
 cating difficulty, which haunts it all through, that this only seems. 
 It is encumbered with the perplexity of treating physical sub- 
 stance as if it were a fact, while it yet conceives of it as a fiction. 
 In a word, it is encumbered with all the embarrassments brought 
 in by the idea of physical substance, yet can avail itself of none 
 of the relief the idea brings. 
 
 7. Closely allied with the notion of substance is that of cause 
 and causality, whose obscurities have given a place of shelter to 
 idealistic speculation. 
 
 9 
 
130 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 But Idealism is no less weak than other systems in its inter- 
 pretation of causality, The causal relation of intellectual forces 
 and effects, of mental precedences and successions, is not only 
 as obscure in its own nature as is physical causation, but is, in 
 fact, the source of difficulty as regards the physical. It is the 
 adjustment in the mental construction which creates the per- 
 plexity. Here, as in regard to substance, Idealism is compelled 
 to accept experience as a source of difficulties, yet dare not use 
 it as a means of relief from them. 
 
 8. It is an element of strength in Idealism, in common with 
 all monistic systems, that it appeals to the love of unity natural 
 to the mind. All great tendencies in human nature point in 
 some way to great truths, — to some truth possessed or some 
 truth needed. When they swing and tremble, it is still under a 
 prevailing drawing toward the true; and when they at last lie 
 still and point steadily, they point to the pole. One of the most 
 marked desires of human thought is toward unity, to make as 
 nearly as may be the One the All. The great struggle of think- 
 ing has been toward a monistic construction of the facts, and 
 this has given us Pantheism, Materialism, Idealism, and the Doc- 
 trine of Identity. 
 
 It is a weakness of Idealism, in common with Materialism and 
 Pantheism, that it finds unity not in the harmony of the things 
 that differ, but in the absorption of the one into the other. Two 
 sets of things are before us in the natural construction of expe- 
 rience, as all schools alike admit, — things spiritual, things mate- 
 rial. Before they begin to philosophize, the Materialist and the 
 Idealist wholly agree on the phenomenal facts. There seems to 
 be a world external to me, and I seem to be conscious that there 
 is. But when they begin to philosophize, the Materialist insists 
 that, as such a thing as mind is supposed to be can neither act 
 on matter nor be acted on by matter, there can be no mind. The 
 Idealist, holding to the fundamental mode of the Materialist 
 construction, simply inverting the terms, says, 'As such a thing 
 as matter is supposed to be can neither act on mind nor be 
 acted on by mind, there is no such thing as matter. Each is a 
 dogmatist, arbitrarily assuming the element, by which he will 
 stand, as separate from the other, and each, by the thing he re- 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 131 
 
 jects, making void the thing by which he holds. For there is 
 no genuine proof that there is matter which is not a proof that 
 there is mind, no genuine proof that there is mind which is not 
 a proof that there is matter. All proof of the existence of matter 
 links itself with the consciousness which the mind has of certain 
 facts which involve the existence of matter; all proofs of the ex- 
 istence of mind are linked with the evidences that matter operates 
 on it and is operated on by it. Matter isolated from mind is un- 
 known, and mind isolated from matter is unknowing. As sub- 
 ject and object are correlate terms, and the real existence of the 
 thing in one term of the relation implies the real existence of the 
 other, so mind and matter are not opposites, but correlates. As 
 philosophy alone knows them, there can be no mind conceived 
 without matter, no matter conceived without mind. Materialism 
 and Idealism are alike forms of direct self-contradiction. 
 
 9. It is a source of strength to Idealism that with its principles 
 various speculative errors, especially Materialism, seem to be 
 most effectually overthrown. The hope of accomplishing this 
 was one of Berkeley's practical incentives. That he has not ac- 
 complished this in the manner and to the degree he proposed is 
 certain, but his labours were nevertheless not a failure. Berke- 
 ley has helped to lay an immovable foundation for a true esti- 
 mate of the value of the soul and of the majesty of mind. Quite 
 outside of this peculiar speculation, in which many may decline 
 to follow him, — and, indeed, the more potently if we drop it, — 
 he has helped to fix forever, to thoughtful men, evidence of the 
 personality, the independent existence, the amazing faculties of 
 man's spirit. If he has not demonstrated that there is no sub- 
 stantial body, he has demonstrated that, whatever body may be, 
 it is for the soul ; that matter is for mind ; that the psychical 
 rules the physical ; that the spirit is the educator of the organs ; 
 that the universe is expressed thought and embodied plan ; it is 
 conceived by mind for mind, is the language in which the In- 
 finite Spirit speaks to the created spirits; that law is but the 
 revelation of will, nature an eternal logic and aesthetic ; that 
 man is an indivisible person, and that his essential personality is 
 inherent in his soul ; that soul is not the result of organism, but 
 that organism is the result of soul ; that the universe we know 
 
132 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 cannot exist without mind. The esse of the known is percipi, 
 man is the measure of his own universe, and there is no mans 
 universe outside of man. 
 
 On the other hand, Idealism promotes Materialism by reaction, 
 as all extremes, in the same way, produce their counterparts. To 
 make a real thing nothing, is the best preparation for making it 
 everything. The soil of the most matured Idealism is, equally 
 with that of a one-sided Realism, the soil of the most extravagant 
 Materialism. The land of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is the 
 land of Feuerbach, Vogt, and Moleschott, as the land of Bacon, 
 Hobbes, and Locke is the land of Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. 
 Many in the world of thinkers, nearly all in the every-day world 
 of what is called ' common sense,' if fairly pinned down to the 
 choice between 'no substantial mind,' 'no substantial matter,' 
 would say, 'If this be so, there is no substantial mind.' To the 
 populace throughout, and to nearly all the cultivated, the thing 
 seen, felt, heard, tasted, is the substance ; not the thing which 
 sees, feels, hears, tastes. That is to most men the shadow. If 
 you can make them doubt of what they have seen, how can they 
 continue to believe in that which they have not seen ? 
 
 10. Closely associated by misconstruction and one-sided ex- 
 travagance with Materialism is the doctrine of Realism, against 
 whose abuses the best Idealism is arrayed. The common sense 
 of the Occidental races is prevailingly realistic, but realistic be- 
 yond all the metes and bounds which any system of intelligent 
 thinking can endure. All philosophers are agreed that in a cer- 
 tain aspect the popular interpretation of consciousness is demon- 
 strably false. It is so false that half an hour's talk will satisfy 
 any man of ordinary intellect that he has misconstrued the testi- 
 mony of his own eyes, ears, and touch. When the refined sense 
 of the race becomes realistic, it tends to Materialism. Those 
 who are terrified at Idealism would do well to contrast its work- 
 ings not merely with their own sober Realism, but with the 
 workings of Materialism ; to put side by side materialistic Fiance 
 and idealistic Germany, or in Germany to contrast even the ex- 
 travagances of Idealism with the reactionary extravagances of 
 Materialism, remembering that the abuse of Realism is the direct 
 stronghold of Materialism. 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 
 
 133 
 
 But if the extravagances and mistakes of Realism are favorable 
 to Idealism, there is a strength, naturalness, and consistency in a 
 sober Realism, which make it a very formidable antagonist in the 
 sphere of speculation, and an invincible one to the practical mind. 
 Not only so, it is invincible to the idealistic mind in its practical 
 moods. Fichte himself says, ' Idealism can never be a tvay of 
 thinking, but is speculation only. When it comes to action, 
 Realism presses upon every man, even upon the most decided 
 Idealist.' 1 'Idealism is the true reverse of life.' Fichte else- 
 where says, ' If I do not acknowledge practically what I must 
 acknowledge theoretically, I put myself in an attitude of clear 
 self-contradiction.' 2 And in saying this he passes judgment on 
 his own system. 
 
 11. It is a great source of strength to Idealism that, appealing 
 to the reason as its ground, those who are its antagonists have 
 so often failed in meeting it successfully, — have so often insisted 
 that the whole question is to be carried out of philosophy and 
 put to the popular vote, — or, accepting the challenge to meet 
 Idealism in the sphere of speculation, have, on that sphere, failed 
 to overthrow it. 
 
 If the antagonists of Idealism have strengthened it by their 
 differences, the friends of Idealism have weakened it by their 
 vital differences. Its friends have failed to agree. 
 
 12. It is one of the great attractions of Idealism to thinkers 
 that it meets the problems of thought in a. philosophical spirit. If 
 it does not solve them, it tries to solve them. If it does not 
 answer the question, it does not give it up. If its heroes are 
 vanquished, they fall in battle, with their harness on. 
 
 There is often a great misconception of the whole purpose of 
 philosophical effort. It is not to find a ground of practical con- 
 viction sufficient for the routine of every- day life. That ground 
 is common to all the systems. The most absolute Idealist and 
 the most positive Realist are undistinguishable here. The whole 
 circle of the phenomenal is the same to both. It is not the 8rt but 
 the oiorc which divides them. It is indeed one of the marvels of 
 the case, that Idealists have so often been distinguished in the 
 
 1 Philosoph. Journal, v. 322, 323, n. 
 
 3 Brief an Reinhold, 5. See Krug, Idealismus. 
 
134 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 largeness and pureness of their practical thinking and of their 
 active lives. One grand object of philosophy is to vindicate the 
 sensations or instincts to the reason, or to correct both by the 
 reason, or reason by both, or to show that they lie out of the 
 range of reason and must be accepted without hope of harmon- 
 izing them. It is the object of philosophy to ascend as high as 
 it is given to man to ascend, to adjust our beliefs and our cog- 
 nitions, and to escape the error of simply believing what we ought 
 to know, or of assuming to know what we can only believe. 
 When divine revelation is accepted, we must believe in order to 
 understand. Is this the canon of philosophy too? Under which 
 flag, Credo ut, or Intelligo ut ? A great school, the school of 
 Belief, replies, Credo ut : another school would totally deny the 
 Credo ut. 'However harmless,' says Kant, 'psychological Ideal- 
 ism may appear as regards the essential aims of metaphysics 
 (though in fact it is not harmless), yet it would remain a per- 
 petual scandal to philosophy and the common reason of our race 
 to be compelled to assume, simply on belief, the existence of things 
 external to us, — the very things from which we derive the entire 
 materials for the cognitions of our internal sense, — and when any 
 one doubts their existence to be at a loss for a sufficient proof of 
 it.' 1 Brave words; but Kant never reached the point at which he 
 could pretend to say, on speculative grounds, Intelligo. His heart 
 went over from the philosophers to the vulgar, and tried to staunch 
 the wounds of the ' Pure' with the bandages of the ' Practical;' 
 but the bandages of the 'Practical' could only be found in the re- 
 pository of the 'Pure,' and from thence Kant had removed them. 
 His ' reason' affirmed Idealism. His instinct clung to Realism. 
 Kant perpetually unravelled in one what he wove in the other. 
 The shroud of Penelope was never completed. Fichte, Schel- 
 ling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and hundreds of others, have worked 
 upon it, but it is unfinished. If the work is ever stayed, it will 
 not be by its completion, but by the coming of some Ulysses of 
 metaphysics who shall bring it to an end by removing its motive. 
 Meanwhile it cannot be denied that the Idealists have been 
 marked by bold, persistent labour, and by great fidelity to specu- 
 lative processes. They have refused all compromise with 'com- 
 
 « Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, Vorrede. Ed. Kirchrminn. Dritt. Aufl., Berlin, 1872, p. 41. 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM 135 
 
 mon sense,' have pushed away persistently the friendly but coarse 
 hand of empiricism. There is an air of the heroic characteristic 
 of the school, in its unceasing warfare with all, however strong 
 or popular, which does dishonour to man as a being of specula- 
 tive thought. They cannot be driven or bribed into compromising 
 the dignity of science, the majesty of mind. 
 
 But though Idealism has nobly represented in its best names the 
 philosophical spirit, it has by no means a monopoly of such names 
 or of this spirit. Other systems have worthy names, and some 
 very bright ones are found arrayed against Idealism. Many of 
 the most illustrious thinkers of England, Scotland, France, and 
 Germany have resisted its premises, and yet more frequently 
 its inferences. Some of its masters sit uneasy on their thrones, 
 put there against their protest by their disciples. All recent 
 Idealism is the exaggeration or isolation of principles of Kant ; 
 but if Idealism is Kantianism, Kant did not understand his own 
 system. If his creed was idealistic, his faith was realistic. 
 Recent Idealism is the disavowed, if not the illegitimate, child 
 of the great thinker it claims as its father. 
 
 13. Idealism has nurtured many of the noblest spirits of the race, 
 and claims the power of begetting exaltation of mind and charac- 
 ter. Berkeley is a sublime embodiment of the true philosophical 
 spirit; of the loftiness of its aims, the singleness of its purpose, 
 the invincible persistence of its fidelity to conviction. Without 
 disloyalty to the practical turn of the English mind, he has been 
 true to purely intellectual interests. He at least has not degraded 
 philosophy to the kitchen. His intellectual life is consistent with 
 his own utterances: 'The first spark of philosophy was derived 
 from heaven. . . . Theology and philosophy gently unbind the 
 ligaments that chain the soul down to earth, and assist her flight 
 toward the Sovereign God.' 1 Idealism in its best forms is char- 
 acteristically the system of noble, intellectual, and pure men. If 
 it does not lift men to the heavens to which they aspire, it at least 
 keeps them out of the slough and the mire. 
 
 Yet Idealism has also, in some cases, nurtured, even in noble 
 spirits, an overweening Titanic arrogance. Not even the noble 
 nature of Fichte could hide this tendency, or rather the frankness 
 
 1 Siris, $$ 301, 302. 
 
I3 6 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 of a true manliness brought it into consistent relief. It stands 
 forth like a spectral giant of the Brocken on every mountain peak 
 of his speculation. One passage will be sufficient to illustrate it: 
 'And now with this view — that there is no objective being 
 correspondent with our conceptions — be free, O Mortal ! — be re- 
 deemed forever from the fear which has been thy humiliation and 
 torment! Thou shalt tremble no more before a necessity which 
 exists but in thy thoughts. Thou shalt no longer fear that thou 
 shalt be crushed by things which are but the products of thine 
 own mind. Thou shalt no longer class thyself, the thinker, with 
 the thoughts which go forth from thee. As long as thou wert 
 able to believe that such a system of things, as thou didst describe 
 to thyself, actually existed, external to thee, independent on thee, 
 and that thou mightest be a mere link in the chain of this system, 
 so long thy fears were well grounded. Now thou art redeemed, 
 and I resign thee to thyself!' 1 
 
 14. Idealism has been and is, in some shape, received by 
 immense portions of the race, — predominatingly in the philo- 
 sophical races of Asia, and to no little extent in Europe. ' In 
 Asia,' says Schopenhauer, 'Idealism is, both in Brahminism and 
 Buddhism, a doctrine of the religion of the people even. In 
 Hindostan, in the doctrine of the Maja, it is universal; and in 
 Thibet, the main seat of the Buddhist church, it is taught in the 
 most popular form.' 2 
 
 It is equally true that the Western mind is not inclined to 
 accept Idealism. The Oriental mind receives it through the 
 channel of Pantheism. To that mind it is theology rather than 
 philosophy. 'Idealism in Europe,' says Schopenhauer, 'is bare 
 paradox, — it is known as a paradox scarcely to be seriously 
 thought of, confined to a few certain abnormal philosophers.' 
 
 15. Idealism is a system of great versatility, and has the 
 power of associating its fundamental position with structures of 
 the most diverse kind. 
 
 But it is also true that if it can be built in with the strong and 
 noble, it can also be built in with the weak and unworthy. If it 
 
 » Rcstimmung des Menschen, 159-162. 
 
 a Ueber . . . Grunde, 3d Aufl., 32. Parerga, 2d Aufl., ii. 40. Ueber den Willen in 
 der Natur, 3d Aufl., 133. Frauenstadt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Idealismus. 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 137 
 
 has won to itself the self-sacrificing Christian heart of Berkeley, 
 and has drawn into it his profound theistic convictions, it has also 
 woven in with itself the dreamy Pantheism of the Orient, and the 
 more vigorous Pantheism of the West. It has adjusted itself to 
 Fichte's Moral Order of the World as an ideal God; toSchelling's 
 God, of his first era, as 'the absolute indifference of Antitheses;' 
 of his second era, as the God 'who attains to perfected being by 
 theogonic process;' and of his third era, with the various modi- 
 fications of his mystic theosophic tendency. It has been bound 
 up with Hegel's Religion, as ' Man's consciousness of God, and 
 of God's consciousness of himself in man ;' and with Schopen- 
 hauer's unpaling Atheism, Pessimism, and Animalism. Beginning 
 in the spirit with Berkeley, it has ended in the flesh with 
 Materialism, and has taken in all between. It surely has 
 established no claim to be a religious or ethical regulator. 
 
 In its native soil it is the philosophy of Brahminism and Bud- 
 dhism, which are systems of Atheism and Pessimism. The Maja, 
 which is the popular form of the Idealism of the Hindoos, is 
 'the veil of illusion, which shrouds the eyes of mortals, and 
 causes them to see a world of which it cannot be said that it 
 is, nor even that it is not; for it is like a dream, or like the 
 sunlight on the sands, which the distant traveller mistakes for 
 water, or like the thong which he takes for a serpent in his way. 
 Suicide is the masterpiece of Maja.' 1 
 
 16. As Idealism is one of the earliest, so does it claim 
 to be the latest, and therefore the ripest, result of speculative 
 thought. 
 
 As a philosophical system, not as an adjunct to a pantheistic 
 theology or mythology, or to the atheistic systems of the East, 
 Idealism is not earliest in its rise, and its ripeness is of no value 
 unless the fruit be good. But Idealism is not the last result of 
 philosophical ripening. Already the marks of transition are 
 manifest. The philosophy of the future is one which will' be 
 neither absolute Idealism nor absolute Realism, but will accept 
 the facts of both, and fuse them in a system which, like man 
 himself, shall blend two realities as distinct yet inseparable. The 
 duality of natures harmonized, yet not vanishing, in the monism 
 
 1 Frauenstadt, Schopenhauer-Lexikon, art. Maja. 
 
138 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 of person, a universe of accordant not of discordant matter and 
 mind, held together and ever developing under the plan and con- 
 trol of the one Supreme, who is neither absolutely immanent nor 
 absolutely supramundane, but relatively both, — immanent in the 
 sense in which Deism denies his presence, supramundane in the 
 sense in which Pantheism ignores his relation, — not the mere 
 Maker of the universe, as Deism asserts, nor its matter, as Pan- 
 theism represents him, but its Preserver, Benefactor, Ruler, and 
 Father, who, whether in matter or mind, reveals the perfect 
 reason, the perfect love, the perfect will, the consummate power, 
 in absolute and eternal personality. 
 
 17. The facts we have presented upon the one side justify the 
 language in which a distinguished thinker of Germany does 
 homage to the strength of Idealism in the very preparation to 
 expose its weakness : x 
 
 ' Idealism is in substance and tendency closely allied with 
 Spiritualism ; but it is profounder, more imposing, more tower- 
 ing. Among all philosophical systems, the boldest and loftiest 
 is Idealism ; the idea of the self-dependence of the mind is in it 
 carried to its supremest height ; the omnipotence of the Ego is 
 its fundamental dogma; the Ego, the thinking mind, is the centre 
 of the universe, it is the solitary fixed point in the being of 
 things, the primal spring of all existence ; the Ego is God. It 
 is in the fullest and highest sense of the word the system of 
 freedom and self-dependence. Everything in it is freedom, free 
 activity, the spontaneity of the Ego, — knowing no limits but those 
 of its own imposition; for outside of the Ego is nothing which 
 can set bounds to it, — the whole external world, the non-Ego, is 
 but empty seeming or product of the self-active Ego itself. In 
 this lies the gigantic power with which Idealism so often lays its 
 grasp on the mind of men of great force and independence of 
 character. This explains the enchantment with which it often 
 lures especially the young man, who feels most vividly the 
 self-dependence of his spirit. Idealism is the system of fiery, 
 active, free youth ; Realism the system of sober, cold, calm 
 old age. 
 
 1 Heinrich Th. Schmid (1799-1836), Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg: Vorle- 
 sungen iiber das Wesen der Philosophic, Stuttg., 1836. 
 
X I V.—A N ES TIM A TE OF IDEAL ISM. 
 
 139 
 
 ' Hence also it is that the moral element in man finds its most 
 potent stimulus in Idealism ; for Idealism, by pre-eminence, 
 reposes on the self-dependence and freedom of the mind. 
 
 ' As in Pantheism it is the religious view of the world which 
 predominates, in Idealism it is the ethical view. A potent, ex- 
 alted, and strict style of moral thinking arises from the idealistic 
 principle. This principle involves Egoism indeed, but it is an 
 Egoism of the noblest, purest kind, standing in harmony with the 
 most genuine morality. For it throws into the first line, not the 
 empirical, sense-bound Ego, but the pure rational Ego. Thus at 
 least it appears in its highest shape, in one whose strong, lofty, 
 masculine soul lived wholly in Idealism. We mean Fichte, as 
 he presents it in its rugged completeness in his " Doctrine of 
 Science." ' 
 
 The same illustrious writer, whose eloquent tribute to the 
 strength of Idealism will heighten the value of his exposure of 
 its weakness, has said, 1 ' Let us look now at the shadow-side of 
 Idealism, — for in truth it lacks not in very dark and mournful 
 shadows. It has been remarked, in speaking of Pantheism, how 
 intolerable to the common understanding of man is the view that 
 the world of the senses is but deception and seeming. This con- 
 tradiction to the ordinary view of the world is greatly strengthened 
 in Idealism, as according to it not merely the finite world of the 
 senses, but the entire Universe, Nature, Man, and God, the 
 Natural and the Supernatural, the Corporeal and the Spiritual, — 
 in brief, all that is actual, external to the Ego, — is annihilated. 
 Nothing but the Ego with its activity has true substantiality; the 
 entire external world is but show and illusion, is no more than 
 an empty, insubstantial play of images which the Ego calls into 
 being and then allows to vanish, is no more, as Fichte expresses 
 it, than " the mirage of our divine Ego." Thus the Ego finds 
 itself alone i if the boundless waste of emptiness and nothingness 
 which circles it all round. Can any man, endowed with emotion, 
 feel satisfied with such a view? Must it not make any man 
 shiver, vividly to actualize to himself the desolate loneliness in- 
 volved in this idealistic view of the world ?' 
 
 18. Jean Paul has painted, with his characteristic matchless 
 
 1 Schmid, Vorlesungen, 268. 
 
140 
 
 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 eccentricity and vigour, the desolate condition to which an actual- 
 ized Idealism brings the mind : ' The worst of all is the pinched, 
 aimless, perked-up, insular life that a god must live. He has no 
 society. If I am not (as the idealistic Ego) to sit still all the 
 time and to all eternity, if I am to let myself down as well as I 
 can, and make myself finite, just to have something about me, I 
 shall be like the poor little princes ; I shall have nothing about 
 me but my own servile creatures to echo my words.' 'Any being 
 whatever — the Supreme Being himself, if you choose — wishes 
 something to love, something to honour. But Fichte's doc- 
 trine of every man his own body-maker leaves me nothing at all, 
 not even the beggar's dog or the prisoner's spider. For, granted 
 that those two animals existed, the dog, the spider, and I 
 would only have the nine pictures which we would paint of our- 
 selves and of each other, but we would not have each other.' 
 ' Something better than myself — that better something to which 
 the flame of love leaps up — is not, if Idealism be true, to be 
 had. The mantle of love, which for ages has been narrowed to 
 the canonical four fingers' breadth of the bishop's pallium, now 
 goes up in a blaze, and the only thing a man has left to love is 
 his own love. Verily I wish there were such things as men, and 
 I wish I were one of them.' ' If it has fallen to my lot, unhappy 
 dog that I am, that nobody really exists but myself, nobody is 
 as badly off as I am.' ' No sort of enthusiasm is left me but 
 logical enthusiasm. All my metaphysics, chemistry, technology, 
 nosology, botany, entomology, runs down into the old principle, 
 Know thyself. I am not merely, as Bellarmin says, my own 
 Saviour, but I am also my own devil, my own messenger of 
 death, and master of the knout in ordinary to my own majesty. 
 Around me stretches humanity, turned to stone. In the dark, 
 desolate stillness glows no love, no admiration, no prayer, no 
 hope, no aim. I am so utterly alone! no pulsation, no life, any- 
 where. Nothing about me, and, without me, nothing but nothing. 
 Thus come I out of eternity, thus go I into eternity. And who 
 hears my plaints and knows me now? Ego. Who shall hear 
 me and who shall know me to all eternity? Ego.' 
 
 19. The picture drawn by Jean Paul is gloomy enough, yet it 
 has a solitary point of light and relief. The Ego itself is left : one 
 
XIV.— AN ESTIMATE OF IDEALISM. 
 
 141 
 
 only, it is true, but each man will consider that his own. And 
 it is the fact that Idealism is supposed to leave this great some- 
 thing secure that has given it a fascination to men, who feared 
 that other systems would leave them nothing, not even them- 
 selves. A self-conscious, a possibly immortal, something, — this, 
 at least, is gain. 
 
 When everything else sinks in the ocean of idealistic nothing- 
 ness, does not the personal Ego stand unshaken, a rock towering 
 in solitary grandeur above the sweep of all the billows of specu- 
 lative doubt ? On that long line of coast, chafed by waves which 
 ever pile it with fresh wrecks, will not that rock of personal 
 consciousness furnish a base for one light-house of the mind ? 
 Alas! no; for the logic of Idealism robs us of consciousness of 
 self. If, as Berkeley and all Idealists assert, ideas without cor- 
 relate realities are the only objects of knowledge, the personal 
 mind itself is either mere idea or it is unknown. 
 
 Idealism can only affirm ' There is consciousness,' but it does 
 not knozv what is conscious. If the Ego be assumed to be the 
 object of knowledge, it is in that very fact transmuted into idea; 
 it is the mirage of a mirage. Two things which God hath 
 joined together cannot be put asunder without loss to both. 
 The murder of matter is the suicide of mind. 
 
 20. Tested, then, by its own logic, where does Idealism end ? 
 We shall not answer the question for it, but accept the answer 
 of its pure and great representative, Fichte. ' There is,' says 
 he, 1 'nothing permanent, either within me or external to me. 
 All is ceaseless change. I know of no being, not even of 
 my own. There is no being. I know nothing and am 
 nothing. There are images: they are the only things which 
 exist, and they know of themselves after the manner of images, 
 — images which hover by, without there being anything which 
 they hover by, — which hang together by images of images, — 
 images which have nothing to image, unmeaning and aimless. I 
 myself am one of these images. Nay, I am not so much as that; 
 I am only a confused image of images. All reality is changed 
 to a marvellous dream, without a life which is dreamed of, with- 
 out a mind which dreams ; a dream which hangs together in a 
 
 1 Bestimmung des Menschen, 142. 
 
142 PROLEGOMENA. 
 
 dream of itself. Intuition is the dream; thought — the source of all 
 the being and of all the reality which I frame to myself, source 
 of my being, source of my power, source of my aims — is the 
 dream of that dream.' 
 
 XV. Characteristics of the Present Edition. 
 
 It is designed that the present edition of the great philosophical 
 Classic of Berkeley shall be in every respect the standard one. 
 
 1. It contains the text of the Principles given in Berkeley's 
 works, collected and edited by Alexander Campbell Fraser, M.A., 
 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edin- 
 burgh. This edition was printed in 1 871, at the Clarendon Press, 
 Oxford, 4 vols. 8vo, the fourth containing a life of Berkeley. 
 
 The text of the English edition is thoroughly critical, printed 
 with great accuracy, giving the various readings of all the editions 
 of the Principles. The present text is a careful reproduction of 
 that of Fraser, except that a few typographical errata have been 
 corrected, after collation with the other editions. It is claimed 
 for the present text of Berkeley that it is more accurate than any 
 other. 
 
 2. It contains the entire illustrations by which Professor Fraser 
 has enriched his edition of the Principles, — his Preface and Notes, 
 which are entirely worthy of his reputation as a thorough scholar, 
 an acute thinker, and a brilliant writer. His notes are historical, 
 critical, and exegetical ; they imply admiration of Berkeley, and 
 a sympathy, though not a blind or indiscriminate one, in his gen- 
 eral thinking. They largely concur in Berkeleyanism, partly 
 qualify it, and in certain directions aim at developing it. 
 
 3. To the Principles have been added three Appendixes of great 
 value. The first is ' Berkeley's Rough Draft of the Introduction 
 to the Principles.' It possesses ' a biographical and literary, as 
 well as a philosophical interest,' illustrating the rise and growth 
 of one of the most extraordinary productions of human specula- 
 tion. The second appendix gives an account of Arthur Collier; 
 who nearly cotemporaneously with Berkeley, and in entire inde- 
 pendence on him, reached the same general results as to the non- 
 existence of an external world. To this account is added the 
 Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis. The third appendix 
 
XV.— CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS EDITION. 
 
 H3 
 
 is • The Theory of Vision Vindicated' by a number of the most 
 important instances of the ' experience of persons born blind.' 
 Cheselden's paper is reprinted entire, and Mr. Nunnely's account 
 of a case, ' one of the last and most philosophically described,' 
 is given unabridged. These cases have a special bearing on 
 Berkeley's theory, but they are of great importance in their rela- 
 tion to all the theories of sense-perception, and have an interest 
 to thoughtful readers of all classes. 
 
 4. In this edition will be found the entire notes and illustrations 
 of Dr. Frederick Ueberweg, late Professor of Philosophy in the 
 University of Konigsberg. In the ' Philosophische Bibliothek,' 
 edited by J. H. von Kirchmann, which is confined to the master- 
 works of philosophy in ancient and modern times, the first work 
 from an English hand is Berkeley's Principles. The preparation 
 of it was intrusted to Ueberweg, one of the greatest scholars of 
 our age. He is known to English readers by the translation of 
 his Logic and of his History of Philosophy. His estimates and 
 critiques on Berkeley are admirable. Thoroughly appreciative 
 of the greatness of Berkeley and the value of his views, the ad- 
 verse judgments of Ueberweg are the more important. It may 
 be fairly claimed for his notes that they present some of the best 
 estimates and critiques ever made in connection with Berkeley's 
 system, and that they have done something toward that confuta- 
 tion of Berkeley's Idealism which some of his admirers have pro- 
 nounced impossible. Ueberweg says that his notes are essential 
 to the completion of his work on Logic. The many English 
 readers who possess and value Ueberweg's Logic will on that 
 account, were there no other, be glad to have his notes on 
 Berkeley. 
 
 To the notes of Fraser and of Ueberweg the editor has added 
 much that is important and interesting from the best sources, 
 with a large amount of original matter. These notes of Ueber- 
 weg and of the editor are numbered, and at the points at which 
 they illustrate the text there will be found in it the numbers of 
 the notes, in heavy brackets [ ]. The subjects of the notes are 
 given in their titles. In the various annotations will be found 
 the most important parallels and illustrations of the Principles 
 furnished by Berkeley himself in his other works. 
 
144 PRO LEG OMEN A. 
 
 5. The editor has prepared extended Prolegomena, embracing 
 — A Sketch of Berkeley's Life and Writings ; an Account of 
 his Precursors ; Summaries of his System ; Berkeleyanism : its 
 Friends, Affinities, and Influence ; Opponents and Objections ; 
 Estimates of Berkeley: his Character, Writings, and Influence; 
 Idealism Defined; History, Outlines, and Criticisms of the Ideal- 
 istic Systems, from Berkeley to the Present; Hume; Kant; 
 Fichte ; Schelling ; Hegel ; Schopenhauer ; The Strength and 
 Weakness of Idealism. 
 
 6. This edition contains a very full Analytical Index to every 
 part of the work. 
 
 7. As the attention of all readers of philosophical works is now 
 drawn to the great German thinkers, and as the metaphysical 
 terminology of that language has peculiar niceties and peculiar 
 difficulties, the editor has believed that he would render a special 
 service by making this book, in some degree, a clue to these diffi- 
 culties and a guide to these niceties. This he has done, first, by 
 inserting before Uebervveg's notes the terms of this class which 
 he uses in rendering Berkeley ; second, by adding Ueberweg's 
 German terms of this class to the translation of his notes; and 
 third, by giving the leading German terms in the Index. 
 
 XVI. Its Objects and Uses. 
 
 1. This edition is meant to meet the intense and peculiar inter- 
 est felt at this time in Berkeley's views. It at once proves and 
 intensifies this interest that, in such close proximity in time, we 
 should have from the successor of Hamilton an edition of the 
 complete works of Berkeley, and from one who held the chair 
 of Kant an annotated translation of Berkeley's Principles. 
 
 2. The mere text of the Principles, as it is here presented, can 
 only be had elsewhere in connections which oblige the buyer to 
 make a large outlay, and compel the purchase of much in which 
 he may feel no interest. But to those who are able to purchase, 
 but have not purchased, Fraser's Berkeley, this edition of the 
 Principles may prove at least an advertisement, perhaps a stimu- 
 lant, to the securing of those noble works, no fragment of which 
 is destitute of value. If this book attains its end, it will lead to 
 a larger study of all that Berkeley has written, a larger sale of 
 
XVI.— ITS OBJECTS AND USES. 145 
 
 his works. But even to those who possess Berkeley's works, 
 this edition of the Principles may serve as an introduction and 
 companion to the philosophical portion of them. 
 
 The very able notes of Fraser, vindicating the views of Berke- 
 ley, and the notes of Ueberweg, which, with distinguished mod- 
 eration, qualify and criticise them on purely scientific grounds, 
 will help to make this book the most able and attractive expo- 
 nent we have in English of the two great systems, Idealism and 
 Realism. 
 
 Berkeley's Principles thus annotated has just claims to be taken 
 as a text-book, either direct or collateral, in all the higher insti- 
 tutions of education in our country. It is hoped that this edition 
 will be regarded as one with which no intelligent reader, student, 
 or professor of the intellectual sciences can afford to dispense. 
 
 3. The Principles of Berkeley is the best book from an English 
 hand for commencing thorough philosophical reading and inves- 
 tigation. At the outstart, as the very preliminary to all thinking, 
 is the question, 'What can I know ?' and this is but another shape 
 of the question, 'How can I know ?' This is Berkeley's question, — 
 and it is the same question with which Kant opened the great 
 revolution in modern philosophy; it is the question of the 
 Critique of Pure Reason, urged with such a general analogy to 
 Berkeley's Principles that the Critique was at first neglected, as 
 virtually no more than a reproduction of Berkeleyanism. No 
 student can make a solitary real step in genuine philosophical 
 thinking until he understands Idealism, and there is no other 
 such guide at the beginning of this as Berkeley's Principles. 1 
 
 4. The universal judgment is that the Principles is not a 
 classic in philosophy merely, but in literature also. For, in com- 
 mon with the other works of Berkeley, it possesses that rare 
 union of qualities which commands at once the admiration of 
 the scholar and of the general reader. The thought is so clear 
 that no amount of depth prevents seeing to the bottom. Like 
 Plato, Berkeley conjoined the highest poetry with powers of the 
 abstrusest meditation. Rich in his imagery, at times, as Jeremy 
 Taylor, he is yet as luminous as Addison. His style is one which 
 Sir James Mackintosh 'envied for all writers on such subjects.' 2 
 
 J See Prolegomena, I. 2, 15. a See Prolegomena, VI. 
 
 IO 
 
I 4 6 PRO LEGO MEN A. 
 
 5. This book has been arranged so as to make it in some sense 
 an Introdnctio7i to Philosophy. Whenever it stops, it tries to give 
 the clue to the student which shall enable him to go farther. It 
 is meant to show the student the processes of investigation and 
 arrangement, to help him to help himself; it opens up to him a 
 large body of philosophical works of a high order, and individu- 
 alizes them to him by quotation. 
 
 6. This book is meant in part as an aid in making instruction in 
 mental science at once more deep and attractive. The experience 
 of the editor, as Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, 
 has borne a part in leading him to prepare this edition. He has 
 for several years delivered lectures to the Senior Class of the 
 University, on the Modern Systems of Philosophy, from Bacon 
 to Hegel and Cousin, stating the views of the writers in their 
 own words, criticising them, and inviting criticisms upon them. 
 He has found that, in this mode of treatment, aversion or indif- 
 ference to philosophical studies has invariably given way, and, in 
 a majority of cases, has been converted into enthusiasm. One 
 of the most cheering tokens of this has been the desire on the 
 part of many in the classes for guidance in a larger course of in- 
 dependent reading. There is certainly no difficulty in indicating 
 to students much that is worthy of perusal ; yet there is hardly 
 a book in the English language which is precisely what is most 
 desirable for such a class of readers. The great philosophical 
 works of the present cannot be appreciated by the student with- 
 out a knowledge of the past. There is no thorough study of 
 philosophy without historical aids, and the greatest historical 
 aids are not books about the past, but the master-works of the 
 past themselves, and these need annotations to relieve their ob- 
 scurities and to link them with the present. It is very important 
 that there should be a series of 'Philosophical Classics' which 
 shall furnish at once what is needed for the library and the class- 
 room, which shall be companions to the lecture and aids in pri- 
 vate study, books which the professor shall study with the learner, 
 and not alone for him, and which shall prove at once an incentive 
 and guide to ampler reading. 
 
 It is hoped that this edition will meet these wants so far as 
 Berkeley is concerned, and that it will be received with a favour 
 
XVI.— ITS OBJECTS AND USES. 147 
 
 which may encourage the publishers to add to the ' Philosophical 
 Classics ' other works adapted to aid in extending and satisfying 
 an interest in this grand department of knowledge, in giving 
 broader views of the nature, the capabilities, and the charms of 
 the intellectual sciences, and in promoting that deep and healthy 
 reflectiveness which is the greatest need of our whole land and 
 of our whole time. 
 
 In the preparation of this work, a very large portion of which 
 has been made during the summer holidays (and what holiday is 
 like a summer with Berkeley ?), the editor has been encouraged by 
 the sympathetic judgment of friends. The kind reception given by 
 the 'Princeton Club' to a paper entitled 'Ueberweg on Berkeley,' 
 which was read before them at their request, and the judgment 
 they expressed that an edition of the Principles with Annotations 
 would be valuable, was the immediate occasion of the offer of the 
 work to a publishing house. In the preparation of it the editor 
 was compelled, in matters of references, to depend mainly upon 
 his own library. Next to his own he has used our venerable City 
 Library ; and to the kindness of Lloyd P. Smith, Esq., and Mr. 
 George M. Abbott, its Librarians, he is indebted for the unre- 
 stricted use of its treasures, which, in spite of the lack of proper 
 public appreciation and liberality, furnish the most important aid 
 to which the scholars of Philadelphia have access. 
 
 This work is, the editor believes, the first of its kind from an 
 American hand. Though we have had, and now have, scholars 
 who would have enriched the thinking world by labours of this 
 sort, none of them, he believes, have attempted an extended illus- 
 tration of a philosophical classic. Nor is the editor aware that 
 there is in our language, nor even in the German, incomparably 
 rich as it is in literature of this class, any body of Annotations, of 
 the same relative extent as this, on a modern philosophical classic. 
 But publishers are rarer than authors. The editor feels that the 
 distinguished publishing house which so promptly accepted this 
 work is richly entitled to the gratitude of the public, if gratitude 
 shall be the feeling with which the work is received. 
 
THE ENGLISH EDITOR'S PREFACE 
 
 TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 149 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE 
 
 TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 BERKELEY'S Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Know- 
 ledge is the most systematically reasoned exposition of his peculiar 
 philosophy which his works contain. 
 
 Like the New Theory of Vision, its pioneer, it was composed at 
 Trinity College, Dublin. The first edition, 'printed by Aaron Rhames, 
 for Jeremy Pepyat,' appeared in Dublin in 1 710. The next, which con- 
 tains some additions and other changes, was published in London in 
 1734, 'printed by Jacob Tonson,' the Three Dialogues between Hylas 
 and Philonous being conjoined with it in the same volume. This 
 edition was the last in the author's lifetime. The variations in these 
 are carefully marked in the present edition. 
 
 An edition of the Principles appeared in London in 1776, more than 
 twenty years after Berkeley's death, 'with Remarks on each section, 
 in which his doctrines are carefully examined, and shewn to be repug- 
 nant to facts, his principles incompatible with the constitution of human 
 nature, and the reason and fitness of things.' To this edition, likewise, 
 the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous are appended, followed by 
 'A Philosophical Discourse on the Nature of Human Being, containing 
 a defence of Mr. Locke's Principles, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's 
 Essay on Truth,' by the author of the Remarks. 
 
 To the edition of 1776 the following 'Advertisement' is prefixed: — 
 
 ' Bishop Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, and his Dialogues 
 between Hylas and Philonous on the same subject, being out of print, 
 and both being much inquired for, the Editor thought a new edition 
 of them, with an Answer thereto, might not be unacceptable to the 
 
 151 
 
152 
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 public. The tenets maintained in the Dialogues are precisely the same 
 with those in the Principles, and the arguments are the same, though 
 put into a different form; but it was thought quite unnecessary to make 
 any Reply to them, as the Remarks on the former are equally applicable 
 to the latter. 
 
 ' How far the author of the Remarks is right in believing they contain 
 a full refutation of the doctrines of the Bishop must be left to the 
 judgment of the candid reader; he has, however, the satisfaction of 
 knowing the rectitude of his intentions, and the pleasing hopes he en- 
 tertains that his endeavours may be attended with some success in the 
 cause of truths of the greatest importance.' 
 
 The Remarks are printed on the right-hand page of the 1776 edition, 
 in sections corresponding in number and length to those of the Prin- 
 ciples. Their acuteness and conclusiveness, however, is by no means 
 proportioned to their bulk: many of the glaring and ludicrous mis- 
 representations of which Berkeley's philosophy has been the subject 
 are here gathered and served up. 
 
 Although this Treatise is the fullest explanation of Substance and 
 Power, the two central conceptions of Berkeley's philosophy, that he 
 has given, it bears the marks of an unfinished work. It is expressly 
 designated 'Part I,' and in the Preface to the Dialogues between Hylas 
 and Philonous the author promises a Second Part, which never appeared. 
 Passages in the work itself, as well as allusions in Berkeley's Common- 
 place Book, suggest that only a portion of what is required to complete 
 his conception is here executed. In referring Dr. Samuel Johnson, of 
 New York, many years after their publication, to this and his two other 
 early metaphysical essays, Berkeley thus describes their character: — 
 'I had no inclination to trouble the world with large volumes. What 
 I have done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men, 
 who have leisure and curiosity to go to the bottom of things, and 
 pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times reading these 
 small tracts, and making what is read the occasion of thinking, would, 
 I believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off 
 that shocking appearance which hath often been observed to attend 
 speculative truths.' 
 
 The contents and language of the Principles of Human Knowledge 
 prove that Berkeley had been a careful student of Locke's Essay, pub- 
 lished twenty years previously, and dedicated, like the Principles, to 
 the Earl of Pembroke. This was to be expected, for the Essay, partly 
 through the influence of William Molyneux, the friend and correspond- 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 153 
 
 ent of Locke, had become an authority in Trinity College in Berkeley's 
 undergraduate days. The Principles are proposed as a refutation of 
 leading doctrines in the Essay. The term ' idea' is as characteristic 
 of the former as of the latter; in both it stands for the immediate object 
 of consciousness — alike in external and internal intuition — in memory, 
 imagination, and generalization. With both, the only objective uni- 
 verse of which we are directly aware consists of the 'ideas' that we are 
 conscious of, and by both this is assumed as a self-evident truth. Both 
 appeal exclusively to this experience as their final test. Locke's classi- 
 fication of ideas as simple and complex, with some of his divisions and 
 sub-divisions in each class, re-appear, sometimes in altered phraseology, 
 in the Principles. Berkeley's whole theory of Substance and Cause, 
 Matter and Mind, Space and Time, is a bold and subtle modification 
 of Locke's theory of 'ideas.' A distinguishing feature in Berkeley is, 
 that he recognises signs of independent reality in one order of Locke's 
 'ideas' — those given in the senses, and is thus able to dispense with the 
 reasonings in the Fourth Book of the Essay on behalf of a real material 
 world. Then, the meaning of the word 'Substance,' which perplexes 
 Locke, is resolved by Berkeley into the concrete and familiar meaning 
 of the word T {ego) — the permanent synthesis of ideas perceivable in 
 sense being, according to him, substances only in a secondary meaning 
 of that term. 'Cause' or 'Power' he finds exclusively in voluntary 
 activity. Finite 'Space' is with him experience in unresisted organic 
 movement, which is capable of being symbolised in the visual con- 
 sciousness of coexisting colours. Finite 'Time' is the apprehension of 
 changes in our ideas, length of time being measured by the number of 
 changes. 'Infinite Space' and 'Infinite Time,' because inapprehensi- 
 ble by intelligence, are dismissed from philosophy, as terms void of 
 meaning, or which involve contradictions. 
 
 Next to Locke, the influence of Malebranche is apparent in the fol- 
 lowing Treatise ; but Berkeley is not so much at home in the ' Divine 
 vision' of the French metaphysician as among the 'ideas' of the 
 English philosopher. The mysticism of the Recherche de la Verite 
 was repelled by the transparent clearness of Berkeley's thought. The 
 slender hold that is retained by Malebranche of external substance, as 
 well as the theory of merely occasional causation of matter, common 
 to him and Des Cartes, naturally attracted Berkeley, however, to the 
 Cartesian school, then dominant in France, and reproduced in its 
 mystical form in England by Mr. Norris. 
 
 The Platonism which pervades Malebranche perhaps tended to 
 encourage the Platonic thought and varied learning that appear in 
 
154 
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 Berkeley's own later writings; but Locke, Malebranche, and Des Cartes 
 are almost the only philosophers directly or indirectly recognised in 
 the Principles of Human Knowledge. In fact, this juvenile Treatise 
 moves, as it seems on the surface, towards the opposite pole from Pla- 
 tonism and a Platonic idealism; for, Berkeley by 'ideas' means phe- 
 nomena and sensible things, not supersensible realities and Divine 
 Reason of Ontology. 
 
 The 'Introduction' to the Principles proclaims war with Universals, 
 and more immediately war with Locke. Its remedy for the disorders 
 of philosophy is the expulsion of abstract ideas — which, as understood 
 by Berkeley, involve a contradiction; and the restriction of philoso- 
 phers to the intelligible, concrete objects of which mind can be con- 
 scious. The metaphysician is here required to resolve the meaning of 
 such terms as Matter, Substance, Space, and Time into ideas, relations 
 of ideas, and mind which is the one necessary condition on which all 
 ideas and their relations depend; and he is promised that, as the con- 
 sequence of this, the real world, hitherto obscured by abstractions, will 
 become intelligible. All ideas — in other words, all phenomena or 
 objects of which we can be conscious — must, it is argued, be concrete 
 and particular. It is relations among objects of which we can be con- 
 scious, and not pretended abstractions, that can be signified by univer- 
 sal terms. Abstract Matter, abstract Substance, abstract Space, abstract 
 Time — that is Matter, Substance, Space, and Time which are supposed 
 to be what cannot be resolved into particular ideas, and relations 
 among such ideas — are thus in the sequel proved to be absolutely unin- 
 telligible. Berkeley's reformed doctrine of abstraction, and of the 
 office of language, virtually banishes them all. With him, 'abstract 
 ideas' are absurdities, resulting from an unlawful analysis, which at- 
 tempts to penetrate beneath perception or conscious experience — that 
 essence or ground of existence; and the lesson of the 'Introduction' is 
 virtually, that objective existence must consist exclusively of what is 
 particular and concrete. The only lawful kind of abstraction is, that 
 through which we have what Berkeley calls notions of relations among 
 ideas, as distinguished from ideas themselves. And, as names are re- 
 quired to constitute notions, this introductory polemic against abstract 
 ideas, or pretended analyses of the original synthesis of knowledge and 
 existence in perception, takes the form of what is called Nominalism*. 
 
 * The relation between the Phenomenalism (apt at first to be confounded with the as- 
 sertion of Protagoras) and Nominalist Idealism of Berkeley's early metaphysical writings, 
 on the one hand, and the Platonic Realism and Idealism of his Siris, on the other, is one 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 155 
 
 The first two of the 156 sections which compose the Principles of 
 Human Knowledge contain a classification of the objects of which we 
 are conscious, and a recognition of Mind as the one condition com- 
 mon to them all. 
 
 When we reflect upon our knowledge, we find (sect. 1) that its ideas 
 or immediate objects are — (a) the phenomena presented to us in or 
 through our different organs of external sense ; (b) those of which we 
 are conscious in our internal thoughts, feelings, desires, and volitions ; 
 and (c) representations (or misrepresentations) of both of these in 
 memory and imagination. Of these three sorts of ideas, the sensible 
 ones are found in experience to be associated together independently 
 of the will of the percipient, in objective groups, forming what are 
 commonly called 'sensible things,' or (in the popular meaning of sub- 
 stance) material substances*. And all, whether called phenomena, or 
 objects, or ideas ; whether presented in external senses, or feelings and 
 operations confined to the individual who is conscious of them, or 
 merely imaginary objects — inasmuch as they are all objects of con- 
 sciousness — imply (sect. 2) a subject, mind, self, or ego, that perceives 
 them, remembers them, and judges of their relations. On mind they 
 must all depend, so far at least as they are actual objects of conscious- 
 ness, that is to say, so far as they are ideas. 
 
 What is immediately given to us in experience thus consists of Mind 
 or Spirit, in the state of being conscious of ideas or objects that be- 
 long to one or other of the three classes already mentioned. Spirits 
 and ideas constitute Berkeley's Dualism. (The exact definition of this 
 duality has been one of the difficulties in his philosophy.) 
 
 The lawful aims of human intelligence accordingly seem to be: — 
 
 1. The observation of particular ideas, i. e. objects or phenomena. 
 
 2. The scientific determination of the relations of particular ideas to 
 one another. r 
 
 of the most important, and yet hitherto least considered, aspects of his philosophy. In 
 Siris (e. g. sect. 335, &c.) he distinguishes the Platonic Ideas (a) from the ' inert, inactive 
 objects' or phenomena of which we are conscious, in our presentative and representative 
 experience (i. e. his own ' ideas') ; and also (b) from ' abstract ideas, in the modern sense.' 
 Plato's Ideas are characterised by Berkeley as ' the most real beings, intellectual and un- 
 changeable ; and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, 
 wanting stability, cannot be subjects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge." 
 
 * According to Berkeley, we are immediately percipient in sense only of simple ideas ; 
 our so-called perception of sensible things (i. e. combinations of simple ideas) is in a great 
 degree mediate — involving a representative, along with a purely presentative, perception. 
 When we see what we recognise to be an apple, but without touching, tasting, or smelling 
 it, we have already learned by custom to combine its qualities ; and we have learned also 
 to represent in idea its other than visible qualities, on occasion of the purely visual state 
 of being conscious of the colour, which alone is visible. 
 
156 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 3. The philosophical recognition of their common relation of de- 
 pendence on Mind ; and the study of Mind, as manifested in various 
 orders of intelligent beings. 
 
 But, according to the old ' Principles' of metaphysicians, this is not 
 philosophy at all. Philosophy has to do with what is real, absolute, 
 or substantial — with Matter or Substance, and other attractions, which 
 are assumed to be independent of, i. e. external to, the perceptions of 
 every mind. 
 
 The design of the sections which follow the two first is, to state and 
 defend new universal or philosophical Principles, for the regulation of 
 the understanding in its attempts to conceive and reason about the 
 universe. They are proposed instead of the old ones which assumed 
 that real things must be abstract entities, independent of Mind. The 
 sections in which they are explained, defended, and applied, may be 
 arranged in three Divisions, thus : — 
 
 I. (Sect. 3 — 33.) Here the new Principles of philosophical knowl- 
 edge are stated, illustrated, supported by facts and abstract reasoning, 
 and contrasted with the old Principles to which Berkeley attributes the 
 confusion and scepticism involved in all previous attempts. They are 
 virtually three in number — one negative and two affirmative, viz. — 
 
 1. The negation of Matter, in the philosophical meaning, or rather 
 no-meaning, of the word ; i. e. as signifying an unperceiving and un- 
 perceived substance and cause. 
 
 2. The affirmation, as Substance proper, of what is signified by the 
 terms mind, spirit, soul, or self — in short, by 'I' {ego); and, as Cause 
 proper, of what we are conscious in voluntary effort — a reasonable 
 will. 
 
 3. The affirmation of matter, in the only intelligible meaning of 
 that term, viz. as consisting of the ideas, objects, or perceptions of 
 sense — which appear, disappear, and re-appear, independently of the 
 will of the mind that is conscious of them, in uniform order of co- 
 existence and succession, so that their changes may be foreseen, and 
 which are the medium of intercourse between one mind and another; 
 of material substances, or groups of co-existing sense-perceptions, 
 united in conscious experience independently of our will, and com- 
 monly called 'sensible things;' and of material causes, or uniform 
 antecedents in the permanent and rational order of sensible changes. 
 
 In short, the universe in which we find ourselves is a universe that 
 consists, in the last analysis, of mind conscious of ideas or phenomena. 
 The ideas of sense appear in an order which, because independent of 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 157 
 
 our individual will, may be called external to each of us; and which, 
 being uniform, is capable of being interpreted; while it affords, through 
 its meaning or reasonableness, exercise and development to reason, 
 and, as a whole, perpetually illustrates the universal supremacy of Di- 
 vine Mind. Abstract or unperceived Matter, and abstract or uncon- 
 scious Mind, are banished from philosophy and from the universe; 
 particular ideas or objects, perceived or imagined, and dependent for 
 their existence on conscious minds, capable of interpreting their rela- 
 tions, are alone recognised as real, by the new Principles. What we 
 have, or can have, to do with in the universe, must, accordingly, con- 
 sist of the conscious experience of conscious agents, in the indefinite 
 varieties of that experience which each may manifest. Unexperienced . 
 abstractions are negation or absurdity, to be exploded under the 
 name of 'abstract ideas.' They can neither be believed in nor con- 
 ceived. 
 
 II. (Sect. 34 — 84.) A series of supposed Objections to the fore- 
 going Principles of the philosophical knowledge of the world and man 
 are stated and refuted in succession in these sections. 
 
 III. (Sect. 85 — 156.) The logical Consequences of the new Prin- 
 ciples, in their application to our knowledge of (a) the ideas or object- 
 ive things, and (b) the minds or subjective things that constitute the 
 universe, are here unfolded. A restoration of belief, and a simplifica- 
 tion and purification of the sciences, by the exclusion of unmeaning 
 abstract questions, are represented as among their chief advantages. 
 
 Let us now look at the grounds, in faith, reasoning, and experience, 
 on which Berkeley rests these new Principles, in the thirty-one sections 
 which form the First Division of his work. The discussion may be 
 said to take its rise from a question which is virtually proposed in sec- 
 tion 3. The objects of conscious experience — in a word our ideas — 
 were alleged, in section 1, to be (a) sense-given or external phenom- 
 ena, (b) internal phenomena, (c) phenomena which may be repre- ^ 
 sentative or misrepresentative of both these. The question proposed, 
 by implication, in section 3 is this : — 
 
 Are any of these phenomena not ideas merely, but also things that 
 exist absolutely — that is to say, independently of their ideal character, 
 and in complete abstraction from a conscious mind ; or, if the very 
 phenomena of which we are immediately percipient be not themselves 
 thus independent of being perceived, do all, or any of them, represent 
 something that does exist absolutely? In short, are we, can' we be, 
 
) 
 
 158 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 either directly or indirectly, cognisant of aught existing unintelligibly 
 or without a Mind ? 
 
 Now, the objects or phenomena of which we are conscious in the 
 senses, i. e. our sense-'i&zzs, or perceptions, are, it is assumed, the only 
 ones about which this question can be raised. Hence the problem 
 of this Division of the Treatise is — to find whether the phenomena 
 presented in the five senses, are either the?nselves in substance exter- 
 nal, or represent things that are in substance external — meaning by 
 'external,' without (i.e. unperceived and unconceived by) a mind, 
 foreign to all conscious experience. 
 
 That the ideas or phenomena actually presented to us in the five 
 senses cannot themselves be qualities of what is external, in this meaning 
 of the term ' external,' is affirmed (sect. 3) to be ' intuitively evident.' 
 \n object is called an idea because it is present in a conscious experience. 
 Now, we have no sensible proof that it continues to exist when it is not 
 thus present; and every sensible thing includes qualities which, by the 
 consent of all who think, are dependent on a sentient organization. 
 
 But, although our very sense-given ideas themselves cannot exist 
 substantially, when divested of their ideal or immediately objective 
 character, and put out of all relation to a conscious mind, may they 
 not, it is asked (sect. 8), represent what exists in an unthinking sub- 
 stance? This supposition, it is answered, is a mere unproved supposi- 
 tion, and it even involves a contradiction. Those supposed solid, 
 extended, and coloured originals or archetypes of our sense-ideas are 
 themselves perceived, or they are not. If they are perceived, they are 
 ipso facto ideas ; for, an idea is simply that which, whatever else it may 
 be, is the immediate object of a conscious mind. On the other hand, 
 if they are not themselves, and cannot be, contained in a conscious 
 experience, they cannot resemble what is so contained. 'An idea can 
 be like nothing but an idea.' A quantity of conscious experience can 
 be like nothing but another quantity of conscious experience. This 
 conclusion cannot be evaded, it is argued (sect. 9), by Locke's favour- 
 ite discrimination of the qualities of this unperceiving and unper- 
 ceived Matter into primary and secondary: so that if solid, extended, 
 coloured substances exist, per se, or absolutely, it is impossible that we 
 should come to know this ; and, if they do not thus exist, we should 
 have exactly the same reason for believing in their absolute existence 
 that we now have (sect. 20). 
 
 The very supposition, however, of the existence of anything out of 
 conscious experience involves, Berkeley further argues, a contradiction 
 in terms (sect. 23). We may, indeed, imagine trees in a park, or 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 $9 
 
 books in our study, with no one at hand to perceive them, and main- 
 tain their existence in a presentative experience. But, are we not 
 ourselves, in the very act of thus imagining them, keeping them in 
 existence in our representative experience ? Thus, when we do our 
 utmost, by imagination, to conceive bodies existing externally or ab- 
 solutely, we are, in the very act of doing so, making them ideas — not 
 of sense, indeed, but of imagination. The supposition itself of their 
 unideal existence makes them ideas ; inasmuch as it makes them im- 
 aginary objects, dependent on an imagining mind. 
 
 On the whole, to say that sensible objects either themselves are, or 
 themselves represent substances that exist independent of Mind, is to 
 say what involves a contradiction in terms, or it is to use words which 
 mean nothing. It is to speak unintelligibly, in short, according to the 
 general conclusion of this part of the Treatise. 
 
 In thus banishing Absolute Material Substance, Berkeley does not 
 allow that he has banished Substance — a substantiating or uniting 
 principle, in which phenomena have their ground and meaning. He 
 substitutes an intelligible, because intelligent, substantiating principle, 
 of which we are conscious, for an unintelligible and contradictory 
 one of which we neither are nor can be conscious. Here Berkeley's 
 thought becomes obscure. I think it may be worked out in this way : 
 — Absolute Material Substance is, he says, an empty abstraction of 
 metaphjsicians, and every real substance must be either perceived or 
 percipient ; for we cannot go below experience or consciousness. Now, 
 every percept or phenomenon perceived implies a percipient, and every 
 percipient implies a percept. Are substances, then (i. e. the ultimate 
 ground of phenomena), percepts, or are they percipient minds? When 
 we compare these, we find that the deepest and truest ground of things 
 lies in the latter, and not in the former ; in a mind, and not in per- 
 cepts or phenomena which depend upon a mind. We are aware in 
 memory of the mysterious identity of the former, and to this persona/ 
 identity there is no counterpart in the perpetual changes of the perceived 
 or objective world. The substances of the universe are thus properly 
 the minds or persons that exist in it. There is, strictly speaking, ' no 
 other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives' (sect. 7). 
 
 It is next argued (sect. 25 — 27), that voluntary mental activity is 
 the only Causation in the universe — that all Power, as well as all Sub- 
 stance, is essentially mental. To satisfy ourselves that changes among 
 phenomena are only the passive effects of spiritual agency, it is main- 
 tained that we have only to observe them. As the essence of all phe- 
 nomena has been proved to consist in perception of them, it follows 
 
l6o EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 that they cannot contain anything of which the percipient is incog- 
 nisant. Now, power or activity is not exhibited by any. Sensible 
 (or other) phenomena, therefore, cannot be the cause of our being con 
 scious. Nor can they cause the changes which occur among themselves : 
 phenomena are related to each other as signs and significates, not as 
 causes and effects. 
 
 But, while the universe of ideas or phenomena is void of causality, 
 power (implied in the changes of the objects of consciousness) must 
 exist. As it cannot be attributed to ideas, it must belong to that on 
 which they depend. Now, Berkeley has already concluded that what 
 they depend on must be conscious Mind, Self, or Ego. To conscious 
 Mind, Self, or Ego, accordingly, he refers all the changes in existence. 
 Minds not only substantiate phenomena ; they cause changes. 
 
 But there is a plurality of powers at work among ideas. Each one 
 of us finds, on trial, that his personal power over the phenomena of 
 which he is conscious varies (sect. 28 — 33). We can make and un- 
 make at pleasure the objects of imagination ; the ideas of the senses 
 are independent in a much greater degree of the mind to which they 
 are present. When in broad daylight we open our eyes, it is not in 
 our power to choose whether we shall see or not, or to determine Avhat 
 particular objects shall present themselves to our view. In our sense- 
 experience we find ourselves confronted by the signs of a larger reason 
 and a firmer will than are exhibited in the arbitrary constructions of 
 our own imagination ; we encounter the Supreme Power signified by 
 the steady natural laws of sense-given phenomena. In and through 
 our senses, we awaken to the discovery, that our individual conscious 
 life is, in the sense-given part of it, a portion of the Universal System, 
 which is evolved in a manner so orderly and constant that we can, by 
 interpreting what we perceive, foresee the future, and regulate our lives. 
 What we perceive places us habitually in relation to Supreme or Es- 
 sential Intelligence expressed in the laws of nature; and to other 
 minds, like our own, who share with us this experience of the senses, 
 and who, through its means, can (we find) convey to us, and we to 
 them, indications of our respective experiences. The ideas which are 
 given to us in the Senses are thus distinguished from all our other 
 ideas. Their arrangements of co-existence and succession are not 
 merely the arbitrary results of our own imaginative activity; they are 
 independent of, or external to, our will. They thus reveal to us the 
 only contemporaneous External World of which we have any proof, 
 or of which we can even conceive the possibility — a world in other 
 minds. Ideas of this sort (if, indeed, one should call them 'ideas' at 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 161 
 
 all) may emphatically be distinguished from all other ideas, as real 
 ones; and their established combinations are what men commonly 
 call 'real things.' 
 
 These sections (28 — 33) are among the most important in the 
 Treatise. They express Berkeley's reasons for distinguishing groups 
 of real or sense ideas — which, irrelative to anything beyond, can 
 neither be representative nor misrepresentative — from ideas in an in- 
 dividual imagination. All truth and all error belong to the latter, not 
 to the former. Physical truth is the true interpretation of real or sense 
 ideas. Physical error is the misinterpretation of these ideas. But 
 sense-ideas themselves, which may be thus interpreted or misinterpreted, 
 represent nothing — except, indeed, the Divine meaning of which their 
 laws are signs, and of which human science is the imperfect interpreta- 
 tion. They can have no archetypes behind them, existing in an un- 
 conscious substance. Imagination is the only representative faculty. 
 A representative sense-perception is an absurdity*. The ideas of sense 
 are what they are, and we cannot go deeper. If they were themselves 
 representations of other ideas, then these others would become the 
 real ideas, and those so called would be relegated to imagination. 
 And Absolute Matter is not their archetype, which, as it cannot be 
 perceived in sense, can as little be suggested by custom and association, 
 inferred by abstract reasoning, or believed in by the common faith or 
 reason of men. The world of material things is thus substantially 
 syntheses of phenomena in conscious minds, and Intelligence is the 
 essence of the universe. 
 
 Such in spirit are Berkeley's new Principles, with the grounds in 
 reason and experience to which he refers them. What I have called 
 the Second Division of the Treatise (sect. 34 — 84) is devoted to the 
 statement and refutation of supposed Objections to the Principles. 
 
 The objections and answers may be briefly presented as follows: — 
 
 First objection. (Sect. 34 — 40.) The preceding Principles banish 
 from existence all that is real and substantial, and substitute a universe 
 of mere ideas or chimeras. 
 
 Answer. This objection is a play upon the popular meaning of the 
 word 'idea.' That word may be used to signify objects of sense — in 
 respect of their necessary dependence upon mind; and not merely 
 fancies and chimeras, the 'ideas' of popular language, creatures of indi- 
 vidual minds, which may, and often do, misrepresent the real ideas of 
 
 * Illustrations of this statement, and a comparison of Berkeley's presentative perception 
 with that of the Scotch psychologists, will be given afterwards. 
 
 II 
 
162 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 the natural system that is independent of our will, while dependent on 
 Divine Mind and Will. An idea, in the language of this system, is 
 simply that of which we are conscious. 
 
 Second objection. (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles abolish the 
 distinction between Perception and Imagination — between imagining 
 one's self burnt and actually being burnt. 
 
 Answer. Real fire differs from the mere thought or fancy of it, as 
 real pain does from the mere thought or fancy of pain; and yet no one 
 supposes that real any more than imaginary pain can exist unperceived, 
 or in an unperceiving substance. 
 
 Third objection. (Sect. 42 — 44.) We see sensible things actually 
 existing at a distance from us. Now, whatever is thus seen at a 
 distance is surely seen as external, which contradicts the foregoing 
 Principles. 
 
 Answer. Distance, or outness, is absolutely invisible. It is a con- 
 ception which is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connec- 
 tion between colours (which alone we see) and visual sensations that 
 accompany seeing, on the one hand, and certain varieties of tactual 
 and locomotive experience, on the other — as was proved in the Essay 
 towards a New Theory of Vision, in which the mere ideality of the 
 visible world is demonstrated*. 
 
 Fourth objection. (Sect. 45 — 48.) It follows from the new Princi- 
 ples, that real things, i. e. combinations of real or sense-ideas, must be 
 at every moment annihilated and created anew. 
 
 Answer. On the contrary, it is quite consistent with the new Prin- 
 ciples that a sensible thing may actually exist, in the sense-experience 
 of other minds, during the intervals of perception by an individual 
 mind ; for the Principles do not affirm their substantial and causal de- 
 pendence on this, that, or the other mind, but on Mind. They imply, 
 indeed, a constant creation or presentation in finite minds; but the 
 conception of the universe in a state of constant creation was familiar 
 to the Schoolmen and other Theists, and enables us impressively to 
 realise Divine Providence. 
 
 Fifth objection. (Sect. 49.) If extension and the other primary 
 qualities of matter can exist only in mind, it follows that extension is 
 an attribute of mind — that mind is extended. 
 
 Answer. Extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind not as 
 modes or attributes, which is unintelligible, but as ideas, or objects of 
 
 * Moreover, even if the outness or distance of things were visible, it would not follow 
 that eithei they or their distance exist unperceived. On the contrary, the very hypothesis 
 implies that they are perceived visually. 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 163 
 
 which Mind is percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the 
 supposition that mind itself is extended or solid*. 
 
 Sixth objection. (Sect. 50.) The Newtonian and other discoveries 
 in natural philosophy proceed on an assumption of external Matter, 
 and are thus inconsistent with the new Principles. 
 
 Answer. On the contrary, external Matter — if ' external ' means 
 what exists in absolute independence of Mind — is useless in natural 
 philosophy, which is conversant exclusively with particular ideas, phe- 
 nomena, or concrete things, and not with mere abstractions. 
 
 Seventh objection. (Sect. 51.) It is absurd, because at variance with 
 the universal use of language, to exclude power or causation from 
 Matter, and to attribute every sensible phenomenon to Mind, as the 
 foregoing Principles do. 
 
 Answer. While we may continue to speak as the unreflecting mul- 
 titude do, we should learn to think with the reflecting or philosophical. 
 We may still speak of physical causes, even when, as philosophers, 
 we have recognised that all true efficiency is in mind, and that the 
 material world is only a system of sensible symbols regulated by mind. 
 
 Eighth objection. (Sect. 54, 55.) The Common Sense or universal 
 belief of men is inconsistent with the exclusively ideal character of 
 real or external things. 
 
 Answer. This is doubtful, when we consider that, in their natural 
 confusion of thought, ordinary men do not comprehend the metaphysi- 
 cal meaning of their own assumptions; and it seems a small objection, 
 when we recollect the prejudices, dignified as Common Sense, which 
 have successively surrendered to philosophy. 
 
 Ninth objection. (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is inconsistent with 
 the common belief in the existence of an external world must be rejected. 
 
 Answer. The fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the 
 cause of changes in our sense-ideas, which we gradually learn by ex- 
 perience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the common belief in 
 externality, and is what men really mean by the word. 
 
 Tenth objection. (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles concern- 
 ing Matter and Mind are inconsistent with various established rules in 
 mathematics and natural philosophy. 
 
 * It is also to be remembered that sensible things may exist ' in mind,' without being 
 mine— meaning by ' mine' the creatures of my will. Mind and they are connected, but 
 not as cause and effect. Properly speaking, that only is mine in which my will exerts 
 itself. But, in another view, my involuntary states of feeling and imagination are mine, 
 because their existence depends on my individual consciousness of them ; and even sen- 
 sible things are mine, because, though present in many minds in common, they are, for 
 me, dependent on my mind. 
 
164 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 Answer. The laws of motion, and the other truths here referred to, 
 may be all conceived and expressed in perfect consistency with the 
 new Principles about the substantiality and causality of Minds, and the 
 absence of all proper substance and causation in Matter. 
 
 Eleventh objection. (Sect. 60 — 66.) If, according to the foregoing 
 Principles, the material world is merely the series of phenomenal or 
 ideal effects of which we are conscious in our senses, the elaborate 
 contrivances which it contains are useless. 
 
 Answer. These elaborate contrivances, while unnecessary as causes, 
 are relatively necessary as signs : they express to us the occasional 
 presence of other finite minds, the constant presence and power of 
 Supreme Mind, and the Divine Ideas of which the objective universe 
 is the symbol. 
 
 • Twelfth objection. (Sect. 67 — 79.) Although the impossibility of an 
 Absolute Material Substance that is active, solid, and extended may be 
 a demonstrable Principle, this does not prove the impossibility of one 
 that is inactive, and neither solid nor extended, which may be the occa- 
 sion of our sense-ideas, or which at any rate may exist. 
 
 Answer. This supposition is unintelligible : the words in which it 
 is expressed cannot convey any meaning. 
 
 Thirteenth objection. (Sect. 80, 81.) Notwithstanding the foregoing 
 Principles, Matter may be an unknown somewhat, neither substance 
 nor accident, cause nor effect, spirit nor idea; and all the reasonings 
 against the notion of Matter, conceived as something positive, fail, 
 when this purely negative notion is maintained. 
 
 Answer. This is to use the word 'Matter' as people use the word 
 'nothing:' the supposed abstract existence cannot be distinguished 
 from nothing. 
 
 Fourteenth objection. (Sect. 82 — 84.) Although we cannot, in oppo- 
 sition to the new Principles, infer by reasoning the independent or 
 absolute existence of Matter, according to any possible conception, 
 either positive or negative, of what Matter is ; and although we may 
 be unable even to understand what the word means, yet Holy Scripture 
 is sufficient to convince every Christian of the existence of an external 
 material world — as an object of faith. 
 
 Answer. The absolute or independent existence of a material world 
 is nowhere affirmed in Scripture, which employs language in its popu- 
 lar and practical meaning. 
 
 In what I have called the Third Division of the Treatise (sect. 85 — 
 156), the new Principles, thus guarded against objections, are applied 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 165 
 
 to invigorate belief, which was suffering from the paralysis of meta- 
 physical Scepticism. They are also employed to purify and simplify 
 the sciences which relate to the ideal world of the senses — the Physical 
 Sciences; and those which relate to spirits, by whom ideas are sus- 
 tained, and their changes determined — the science of Minds, and 
 Theology. It may be thus subdivided : — 
 
 I. (Sect. 85 — 134-) Application of the new Principles, concerning 
 Matter, Mind, Substance, and Cause, to our knowledge of the object- 
 ive and physical world of ideas — 
 
 1. To the refutation of Scepticism, as to the existence of sensible 
 
 things (sect. 85 — 91); and of God (sect. 92 — 96); 
 
 2. To the liberation of Thought from the bondage of unmeaning 
 
 abstractions (sect. 97 — 100) ; 
 
 3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by correcting para- 
 
 doxical conceptions of Time, Space, and Motion (sect. 101 
 -116); 
 
 4. And of Mathematics, through criticism of our notions of 
 
 Number and Extension, and by the abolition of the contra- 
 dictions involved in the common doctrine of Infinites (sect. 
 117— 134). 
 
 II. (Sect. 135 — 156.) Application of the new Principles to our 
 notions of Mind or Spirit — 
 
 1. To explain and sustain our faith in our natural Immortality 
 
 (sect. 137—144); 
 
 2. To explain and vindicate the belief which each man has in the 
 
 existence of other men (sect. 145) ; 
 
 3. To vindicate belief in the existence of Supreme Mind (sect. 
 
 146—156). 
 
 It was only by degrees that this scheme of Berkeley's philosophy 
 attracted the attention due to so original and ingenious a mode of 
 conceiving the Universe. A fragment of metaphysics, by a young and 
 almost unknown author, published at a distance from the centre of 
 English intellectual life, was apt to be overlooked. In connection 
 with the Essay on Vision, however, it drew enough of regard to carry 
 its author with eclat on his first visit to London, three years after the 
 publication of the Principles. He then published the immortal Dia- 
 logues between Hylas and Philonous, in which the absurdity of Absolute 
 Matter is illustrated, and the doctrine defended against objections, in 
 a manner meant to recommend to popular acceptance what, on the 
 first statement, seemed an unpopular paradox. 4- C. F. 
 
A TREATISE 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE 
 SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND 
 IRRELIGION, ARE INQUIRED INTO. 
 
 First Printed in the Year 1710. 
 
 167 
 
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE 1 , &c 
 
 KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND 
 
 ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST 
 
 HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL. 
 
 My Lord, 
 You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the 
 honour to be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in 
 this manner. But that a man who has written something with a design 
 to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make 
 choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by 
 any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of 
 the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an or- 
 nament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced 
 me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not en- 
 couraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a 
 part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, that the ex- 
 traordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to shew towards 
 our Society 2 gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance 
 the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined 
 me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I 
 was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most 
 profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the 
 world so justly admires in your lordship, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your lordship's most humble 
 
 and most devoted servant, 
 
 GEORGE BERKELEY. 
 
 1 Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of Pembroke and fifth Earl of Montgomery, the friend 
 of Locke — who dedicated his Essay to him as a work ' having some little correspondence 
 with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so 
 new, exact, and instructive a draft of — and representative of a family renowned in 
 English political and literary history. He was born in 1656 ; was a nobleman of Christ 
 Church, Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his titles in 1683 ; was sworn of the Privy Council 
 in 1689; and was made a Knight of the Garter in 1700. He filled some of the highest 
 offices in the state, in the reigns of William and Mary, and of Anne. He was Lord Lieu- 
 tenant of Ireland in 1707, having previously been one of the Commissioners by whom the 
 union between England and Scotland was negotiated. He died in January, 1733. 
 
 a Trinity College, Dublin. 
 
 169 
 
THE PREFACE. 
 
 What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry 1 , 
 seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known — particu- 
 larly to those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstra- 
 tion of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immor- 
 tality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader 
 should impartially examine j since I do not think myself any farther 
 concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable 
 to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request 
 that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the 
 whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the 
 subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages 
 that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) 
 to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd conse- 
 quences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to 
 follow from them ; so likewise, though the whole should be read over, 
 yet, if this be done transiently, it is very probable my sense may be 
 mistaken ; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself it will be through- 
 out clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singu- 
 larity 2 which some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I 
 hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely 
 be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who 
 shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration 3 , for no other 
 reason but because it is newly known 2 , and contrary to the prejudices 
 
 1 In his Common-place Book Berkeley seems to refer his speculations to his boyhood. 
 The theory of the sensible world propounded in the following Treatise was obviously con- 
 ceived by him before the publication of the New Theory of Vision, which was a first in- 
 stalment of it. 
 
 * Cf. Locke, in the ' Epistle Dedicatory' of his Essay. As regards the ' novelty' of the 
 chief principles of the following treatise, viz. the negation of Abstract Entities (absolute or 
 unperceived Matter, absolute Space, absolute Time, absolute Substance, and absolute 
 Cause) ; and the affirmation of Mind, as the Synthesis, Substance, and Cause of all ideas 
 or objects — the best preceding philosophy, ancient and modern, was a dim anticipation 
 of it. 
 
 3 Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c, in illustration of the demonstrative character of Berkeley's dis- 
 tinctive doctrine. 
 
 171 
 
172 THE PREFACE. 
 
 of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, 
 if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to 
 condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it 4 . 
 
 * Berkeley's one request to his reader, here and throughout his writings, is, to take 
 pains to understand his meaning. This especially requires us to avoid confounding his 
 sense-ideas with mere fancies or chimeras — arbitrary creations of the individual mind. 
 The history of this doctrine has been a history of its misinterpretation. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and 
 truth 1 , it may with reason be expected that those who have spent 
 most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and se- 
 renity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, 
 and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. 
 Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk the 
 high road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dic- 
 tates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them 
 nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to 
 comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in 
 their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. 
 But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow 
 the light of a superior principle — to reason, meditate, and reflect 
 on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our 
 minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to 
 comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts 
 discover themselves to our view ; and, endeavouring to correct 
 these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, 
 difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us 
 as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered 
 through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we 
 were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism 2 . 
 
 2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or 
 the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It 
 is said, ' the faculties we have are few, and those designed by na- 
 
 1 ' Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things.' Locke. 
 
 2 The purpose of these early essays of Berkeley was to reconcile philosophy with common 
 sense, by employing demonstration to make common sense reveal itself truly. Cf. the 
 closing sentences in the Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 
 
 173 
 
1 74 INTRO D UC TIO N. 
 
 ture for the support and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into 
 the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind 
 of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of in- 
 finity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and 
 contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extri- 
 cate itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be compre- 
 hended by that which is finite 3 .' 
 
 3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing 
 the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong 
 use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right 
 deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences 
 which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should 
 believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men 
 than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he 
 had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to 
 the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever 
 appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually 
 furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not 
 fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think 
 that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have 
 hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowl- 
 edge, are entirely owing to ourselves — that we have first raised 
 a dust and then complain we cannot see. 
 
 4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those 
 Principles are 4 which have introduced all that doubtfulness and 
 uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several 
 sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought 
 our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural 
 dulness and limitation of our faculties 3 . And surely it is a work 
 well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the 
 First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them 
 on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to sus- 
 
 3 Cf. Locke's Essay, Introduction, sect. 4 — 7; B. II. ch. 23, # 12, &c. Locke (who is 
 here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the perplexities of philosophy to our narrow faculties, 
 which are meant, he maintains, to regulate our lives, and not to explain the mysteries of 
 Being. See also Des Cartes, Priitcipia, I. 26, 27, &c. ; Malebranche, Recherche, III. 2. 
 
 4 The assumption that Matter, Space, Time, Substance, Cause, may ami do exist a.s 
 abstract entities, i.e. unperceived and unconceived by a mind, is, with Berkeley, the funda- 
 mental false principle, to which is due the alleged confusion and inconsistency of philosophy, 
 and the consequent inclination to philosophical and religious scepticism. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 175 
 
 pect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the 
 mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness 
 and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understand- 
 ing, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted 
 on, and might have been avoided. 
 
 5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may 
 seem, when I consider what a number of very great and extraor- 
 dinary men have gone before me in the like designs 3 , yet I am 
 not without some hopes — upon the consideration that the largest 
 views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted 
 will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a 
 close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better 
 eyes. 
 
 6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier 
 conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by 
 way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Lan- 
 guage. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some 
 measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what seems 
 to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and 
 perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and diffi- 
 culties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion 
 that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of 
 things 6 . ['] He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings 
 and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no 
 
 5 A work previously undertaken under the same designation, by Des Cartes in his Prin- 
 cipia, and, in fact if not in name, by Locke in his Essay. 
 
 6 Here ' abstract idea' and ' notion' are used convertibly. Cf. sect. 142. Cf. with what 
 follows against abstract ideas in the remainder of the Introduction, sect. 97 — 100, 118 — 
 132, 143 ; New Theory of Vision, sect. 122 — 125 ; Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5 — 7 ; Defence of 
 Free Thinking in Mathematics, sect. 45 — 48 ; Siris, sect. 323, 335, &c, where he distin- 
 guishes the Platonic Ideas from the ' ideas' and Nominalism of his own early philosophy. 
 
 In the following sections Berkeley has Locke chiefly in view. He appears here as the 
 second great modern defender of Nominalism, and is so referred to by Hume, Treatise of 
 Human Nature, B. I. part 1, ch. 7. Hobbes was the first. Berkeley's reasonings, in the 
 sections which follow, have become commonplace in later discussions of the question, 
 What are we cognizant of when we use the common terms on which human science de- 
 pends? According to Berkeley, it is not an idea, inasmuch as all ideas (i.e. presentative 
 and representative objects) must either be particular or else involve contradictory charac- 
 ters ; it is, he concludes, a relation among ideas that we know when we employ general 
 terms. Yet, many who have accepted his reasonings against abstract ideas have not dis- 
 cerned their connexion with his abolition of abstract Matter and Space. 
 
176 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in 
 a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences 
 which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that 
 which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime 
 learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled 
 in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, 
 and that it is well acquainted with them. 
 
 7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of 
 things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and 
 separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended 
 together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind 
 being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from 
 those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means 
 frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by 
 sight an object extended, coloured, and moved; this mixed or 
 compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent 
 parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame 
 the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it 
 is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension ; but 
 only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of 
 colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both 
 colour and extension. 
 
 8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular 
 extensions perceived by sense there is something common and 
 alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure 
 or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it con- 
 siders apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making 
 thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, 
 surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea 
 entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by 
 leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which 
 distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only 
 which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract which 
 is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate 
 colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly 
 not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it 
 describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract 
 
INTRODUCTION. \yy 
 
 idea of motion is framed ; which equally corresponds to all par- 
 ticular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. 
 
 9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities 
 or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation, 
 attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings 7 which in- 
 clude several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having 
 observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in cer- 
 tain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out 
 of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James and 
 any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining 
 only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein 
 all the particulars equally partake — abstracting entirely from and 
 cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might 
 determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner 
 it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, 
 humanity, or human nature ; wherein it is true there is included 
 colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it 
 can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because 
 there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So 
 likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, 
 nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted 
 from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a 
 great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but 
 not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those 
 parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which 
 are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, 
 which abstracts not only from all particular men, but also all 
 birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of the 
 abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous 
 motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or 
 figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, 
 without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c, nor 
 yet naked : hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distin- 
 guishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left 
 out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous 
 motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping ; it is 
 
 7 Cf. sect. 1 of the Principles. 
 
 12 
 
i 7 8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to 
 conceive. 
 
 10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting 
 their ideas 8 , they best can tell : for myself, [ 9 I dare be confident I 
 have it not] I find indeed I have indeed a faculty of imagining, 
 or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I 
 have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. 
 I can imagine a man' with two heads, or the upper parts of a man 
 joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, 
 the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of 
 the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have 
 some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that 
 I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, 
 a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. 
 I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above 
 described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the ab- 
 stract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which 
 is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear ; and the like 
 may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoeVer. To 
 be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I 
 consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, 
 with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is pos- 
 sible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can 
 abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities 
 which it is impossible should exist so separated ; or that I can 
 frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the 
 manner aforesaid — which last are the two proper acceptations of 
 abstraction. And there is ground to think most men will acknowl- 
 edge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which 
 are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions 10 . It is 
 said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and 
 
 8 Cf. Derodon's Logica, P. II. c. 6, 7 ; Philosophia Contractu, I. i. \ 7 — 11 ; and Gassendi, 
 Leg. Jnstit., I. 8, for reasoning similar to what follows in this section. Also Cudworth, 
 Eternal and Immutable Morality, B. IV. ; Browne's Procedure of the Understanding, B. 
 II. ch. 4; Bolingbroke's Works, vol. I. pp. 117, &c. 
 
 9 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 10 ' abstract notions' — here used convertibly with ' abstract ideas.' Cf. sect. 142, on the 
 meaning of the term notion. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 179 
 
 study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there 
 be, they are confined only to the learned. 
 
 II. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the 
 doctrine of abstraction", and try if I can discover what it is that 
 inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote 
 from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late 
 ["excellent] and deservedly esteemed philosopher [ 2 ], who, no 
 doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think 
 the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest differ- 
 ence in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. ' The 
 having of general ideas,' saith he, ' is that which puts a perfect 
 distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which 
 the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is 
 evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of gen- 
 eral signs for universal ideas ; from which we have reason to im- 
 agine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making gen- 
 eral ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general 
 signs.' And a little after. ' Therefore, I think, we may suppose 
 that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from 
 men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly 
 separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, 
 if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some 
 [ 3 ] would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. 
 It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain 
 instances reason as that they have sense ; but it is only in par- 
 ticular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They 
 are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and 
 have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of 
 abstraction.' — Essay on Hitman Understanding, B. II. ch. 11. § 10 
 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the facul- 
 ties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then 
 if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, 
 I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned 
 
 11 Here assumed to mean, that we can perceive or imagine Entities, from which all phe- 
 nomena of experience have been abstracted, and which are thus abstract objects or ideas, 
 e. g. ' Existence,' after abstraction of all the phenomena in which it manifests itself to us ; 
 or ' Matter,' after abstraction of all the phenomena which appear in the senses — perception 
 or intelligence being abstracted, in short. 
 
 12 Omitted in second edition. 
 
!8o INTRODUCTION. 
 
 into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we 
 have no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas 
 is, that we observe in them no use of words or any other general 
 signs; which is built on this supposition — that the making use 
 of words implies the having general ideas. From which it fol- 
 lows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize 
 their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will 
 further appear by his answering the question he in another place 
 puts : ' Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come 
 we by general terms?' His answer is : ' Words become general 
 by being made the signs of general ideas.' — Essay on Human Un- 
 derstanding, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems that a word 13 be- 
 comes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general 
 idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indiffer- 
 ently suggests to the mind 14 . For example, when it is said 'the 
 change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,' or that 
 ' whatever has extension is divisible,' these propositions are to be 
 understood of motion and extension in general ; and nevertheless 
 it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of 
 motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction 
 and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of 
 extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great 
 nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any other determinate 
 colour. It is only implied that whatever particular motion I con- 
 sider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or 
 oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds 
 equally true. As does the other of every particular extension, it 
 matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that 
 magnitude or figure. 
 
 1 2. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better 
 judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I 
 do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there 
 
 »3 ' To this I cannot assent, being of opinion that a word,' &c. — in first edition. 
 
 ** Though we cannot have the logical extent and content of our concepts intuitively ex- 
 hibited to us, either in a percept or in an image, it is to be noted that we may have resem- 
 bling signs of conceptual relations, as well as verbal or non-resembling signs. We think 
 by means of specimen-objects, in which our concepts are exemplified; as well as by means 
 of arbi rary verbal symbols — in short, after the analogy of geometry, as well as after the 
 analogy of algebra. Cf. the following section. 
 
INTRODUCTION. I g'i 
 
 are any abstract general ideas 15 ; for, in the passages we have quoted 
 wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed 
 that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in 
 sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, 
 and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall 
 acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, 
 becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other 
 particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an ex- 
 ample, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of 
 cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black 
 line of an inch in length : this, which in itself is a particular line, 
 is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it 
 is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever ; so that 
 what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other 
 words, of a line in general. And, as tliat particular line becomes 
 general by being made a sign, so the name ' line,' which taken 
 absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. And 
 as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an 
 abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that may 
 possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its gen- 
 erality from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines 
 which it indifferently denotes. 
 
 13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of 
 abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall 
 add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understand- 
 ing, [ 4 ] which is as follows : "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or 
 easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. 
 If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant 
 and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect 
 upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and con- 
 trivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not 
 so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, 
 does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea 
 
 r 5 Berkeley distinguishes between (a) reasoning or thinking, e>. g. about length without 
 any reference to breadth, which he allows ; and (b) having an idea or intuition of length 
 without breadth, which he denies the possibility of. Length and breadth combined make 
 only one idea, or sensuous presentation or representation. All ideas, whether in sense or 
 imagery, must be particular. We rise above them only in a less or more extensive appre- 
 hension of their relations, — not by the apprehension of ideas different in kind, because 
 abstract, and which were supposed to be the object-matter of metaphysics. 
 
182 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, compre- 
 hensive, and difficult) ; for it must be neither oblique nor rect- 
 angle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and 
 none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that 
 cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and 
 inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this 
 imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste 
 to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and en- 
 largement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much 
 inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks 
 of our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the 
 most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is 
 first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest 
 knowledge is conversant about." — B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man 
 has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle 
 as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out 
 of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader 
 would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an 
 idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone 
 to perform. What more easy than for any one to look a little into 
 his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to 
 have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is 
 here given of the general idea of a triangle — which is neither 
 oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but 
 all and none of these at once 16 ? 
 
 14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry 
 with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. 
 And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and 
 labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular 
 objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are 
 conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural 
 consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the 
 forming abstract ideas was not necessary {ox communication, which 
 is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if 
 they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by 
 constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain 
 know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that 
 
 '« Cf. Alciphron, Dial. VII. 7. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 183 
 
 difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps 
 for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it 
 seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains 
 therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the 
 great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions 17 will 
 be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing 
 to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of 
 their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, 
 till they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, 
 and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed 
 them to every common name they make use of? 
 
 15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlarge- 
 ment of knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point 
 much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about 
 universal notions 18 , to which I fully agree; but then it does not 
 appear to me that those notions' 8 are formed by abstraction in 
 the manner premised — universality, so far as I can comprehend, 
 not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of 
 anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified 
 or represented by it ; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, 
 or notions 18 , being in their own nature particular, are rendered 
 universal 1 ?. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition con- 
 cerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the 
 universal idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be understood 
 as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equi- 
 lateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural ; but only that the particular 
 triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, 
 doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles what- 
 soever, and is in that sense universal. All which seems very plain 
 and not to include any difficulty in it. 
 
 »7 In Berkeley's language, we have notions but no ideas of substance proper (i. e. Mind), 
 or of relations among particular phenomena. Sensible objects, passive states of mind, and 
 representations (or misrepresentations) of these in imagination, are alone ideas. Cf. sect. 
 142 ; also Siris, sect. 308. 
 
 18 See note 17. 
 
 »9 i. e. ' things' and ' notions' which are resembling, and ' names' which are non-resem- 
 bling signs, are in themselves particular, as every immediate object of which we are 
 conscious must be. They are universalized in the act of thinking their relations — the ap- 
 prehension of relations being the essence of thought. Note that ' notions' are here said to 
 be particular ; which they are, in as far as they must be capable of being individualized or 
 exemplified in individual experiences. Notion seems here to be used for 10 ative image. 
 
1 84 IN TRODUC TION. 
 
 16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any pro- 
 position to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first 
 seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which 
 equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demon- 
 strated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence 
 follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all 
 respects is not the same with it. For example, having demon- 
 strated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle 
 are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude this 
 affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right 
 angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain 
 this proposition is universally true, we must either make a par- 
 ticular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is im- 
 possible, or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a 
 triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake 
 and by which they are all equally represented. To which I an- 
 swer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the 
 demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular 
 triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may never- 
 theless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of 
 what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right 
 angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are 
 at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I 
 have in view includes all these particulars, but then there is not 
 the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. 
 It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because 
 one of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending 
 it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews that the 
 right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and 
 for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this 
 reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular 
 or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-angled 
 equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposi- 
 tion of the abstract idea of a triangle. [ 2 °And here it must be 
 acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as trian- 
 gular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, 
 or relations of the sides. [ 5 ] So far he may abstract ; but this 
 
 30 What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the 1734 edition. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 185 
 
 will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, incon- 
 sistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter 
 so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal, without framing the 
 forementioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch 
 as all that is perceived is not considered.] 
 
 17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the 
 Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the 
 manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their 
 doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them 
 into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned 
 dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty 
 advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things 
 at this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it 
 had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined to 
 those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When 
 men consider the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so 
 many ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement of 
 the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater part 
 of them remain full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes 
 that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought 
 to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations 
 contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to 
 the understandings of men, and that, taking all together, a very 
 small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, 
 otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement 21 
 — I say, the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into 
 a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may 
 perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have ob- 
 tained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, 
 hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of spec- 
 ulative men than this 22 of abstract general ideas. 
 
 18. I come now to consider the source oi this prevailing notion, 
 and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less 
 extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion 
 
 ai So Bacon in the Novum Organon. 
 
 82 Cf. Introduction, sect. 1 — ' this that we have been endeavouring to overthrow' — in first 
 edition. 
 
1 86 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other 
 reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of 
 abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to 
 naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had 
 been no such thing as speech or universal signs 23 there never had 
 been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and else- 
 where of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us examine 
 the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that 
 mistake. — First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought 
 to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines 
 men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that 
 constitute the true and only immediate signification of each gen- 
 eral name; and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas 
 that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. 
 Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite 
 signification 24 annexed to any general name, they all signifying 
 indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which does 
 evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly 
 appear to any one by a little reflection. To this it will be objected 
 that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one 
 certain signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be ' a 
 plain surface comprehended by three right lines,' by which that 
 name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To 
 which T answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the 
 surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides 
 are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are 
 inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, 
 and consequently there is no one settled idea 25 which limits the 
 signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a 
 name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it 
 stand everywhere for the same idea 25 ; the one is necessary 26 , the 
 other useless and impracticable. 
 
 2 3 This should include resembling as well as non-resembling signs — relative images as 
 well as verbal symbols. But no particular image can represent in the phantasy the content 
 and extent of a notion, which imply the recognition by the mind of a relation among a 
 plurality of particular objects. 
 
 ** This must be understood of the denotation of names. 
 
 »s i.e. presentative or representative intuition. 
 
 96 A definition determines the ideas or particular objects to which the name is applicable, 
 but the notion signified by the name cannot be individualized in an abstract object. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 187 
 
 19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce 
 the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a 
 received opinion that language has no other end but the commu- 
 nicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an 
 idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names 
 which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always 
 mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded 
 that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names 
 in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to 
 others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, 
 is what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover 
 that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant 
 names which stand for ideas should, every time they are used, 
 excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for — 
 in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as 
 letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be 
 marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that 
 in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular 
 quantity it was appointed to stand for 27 . 
 
 20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is 
 not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. 
 There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting 
 to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some 
 particular disposition — to which the former 28 is in many cases 
 barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these 
 can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently 
 happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to 
 reflect with himself, and see if it does not often happen, either in 
 hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, 
 hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately 
 in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any 
 ideas 2 9 coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have 
 occasioned ideas 2 ^ that were fitting to produce those emotions ; 
 
 -i See Leibnitz on Symbolical Knowledge {Opera Philosophica, pp. 79—80, Erdmann), 
 and Stewart on 'Abstraction,' in his Elements, vol. I. ch. 4, $ 1. Names are constructive 
 in their office, as ministers of thought. Cf. Principles, sect. 1. 
 
 28 i. e. the communication of ideas — in other words, the excitement of particular images 
 in the fancy, which verbal language often supersedes to a great extent. 
 
 =9 'ideas,' i.e. images of particular objects to which the words are applicable. 
 
1 88 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language is once 
 grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the charac- 
 ters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first 
 were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas 2 ? that are 
 now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with 
 the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what 
 it is ? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient to 
 excite a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely 
 to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger in ab- 
 stract? If any one shall join ever so little reflection of his own 
 to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to 
 him that general names are often used in the propriety of language 
 without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas 2 9 in his 
 own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. 
 Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with 
 a design to bring into our view the ideas 2 ? of those individuals 
 that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a 
 schoolman tells me 'Aristotle hath said it,' all I conceive he means 
 by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference 
 and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And 
 this effect is often so instantly produced in the minds of those 
 who are accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that 
 philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, 
 writings, or reputation should go before. [ 3 °So close and imme- 
 diate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the very word 
 Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds 
 of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, 
 but why should I insist on those things which every one's expe- 
 rience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? [ 6 ] 
 
 21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. 
 We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest 
 patrons ; and endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those 
 ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have 
 traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears 
 evidently to be language. — It cannot be denied that words are of 
 excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge 
 
 3° This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 189 
 
 which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men 
 in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the 
 possession of one single person. But most parts of knowledge 
 have been [ 3I so] strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse 
 of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered, 
 [ 3I that it may almost be made a question whether language has 
 contributed more to the hindrance or advancement of the sci- 
 ences]. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the under- 
 standing, [ 3I I am resolved in my inquiries to make as little use 
 of them as possibly I can]: whatever ideas I consider, I shall en- 
 deavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out 
 of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and 
 constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may 
 expect to derive the following advantages : — 
 
 22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely 
 verbal — the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences 
 has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound 
 knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate 
 myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has 
 so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men ; and that 
 with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and 
 more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was 
 he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long 
 as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas 32 divested of words, I 
 do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, 
 I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking 
 I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to 
 imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are 
 not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there 
 are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any 
 compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite 
 than an attentive perception of what passes in my own under- 
 standing. 
 
 23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose 
 an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare 
 
 3 1 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 3° ' My own ideas," i.e. the particular objects of which I am presentatively or represent- 
 atively conscious. 
 
190 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an 
 union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that 
 betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been 
 very much increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long 
 as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it 
 does not seem strange that they should use words for ideas — it 
 being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and 
 retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly 
 inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those 33 
 who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying 
 aside all use of words in their meditations, and contemplating 
 their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of 
 late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and 
 insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. 
 And, in order to remedy these evils, they 33 advise well, that we 
 attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the 
 words which signify them. [ 7 ] But, how good soever this advice 
 may be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a 
 due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only 
 immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the im- 
 mediate signification of every general name was a determinate 
 abstract idea. 
 
 24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with 
 greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that 
 knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle him- 
 self in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to 
 any name. And he that knows names do not always stand for 
 ideas 34 will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where 
 there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that 
 every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear 
 view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them all 
 that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute 
 to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we 
 extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the 
 
 33 He probably refers to Locke. 
 
 34 Inasmuch as they may stand for relations of ideas, whether in sense or imagination ; 
 and for a Mind or Self, as distinguished from any of its particular ideas. Cf. sect. 142. 
 In the state which Leibnitz calls 'symbolical consciousness' we can use words without 
 realizing their meaning. 
 
INTRODUCTION. I 9I 
 
 earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and 
 trace the dark footsteps of antiquity — we need only draw the 
 curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose 
 fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 
 
 25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of 
 Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words, we may 
 make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw 
 consequences from consequences, and be never the wiser. The 
 farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irre- 
 coverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mis- 
 takes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, 
 I entreat him that he would make my words the occasion of his 
 own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts 
 in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be 
 easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He 
 will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I 
 do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his 
 own naked, undisguised ideas. 
 
PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 I. IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects* 
 p] of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually im- 
 printed on the senses ; or else such as are perceived by attend- 
 ing to the passions and operations of the mind ; or, lastly, ideas 
 formed by help of memory and imagination — either compound- 
 ing, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived 
 in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and 
 colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I 
 perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and 
 of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. 
 Smelling furnishes me with odours ; the palate with tastes ; and 
 hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone 
 and composition. And as several of these are observed to ac- 
 
 x This threefold division of the objects or phenomena of which we are conscious — viz. 
 (a) Sense-ideas or presentations ; (b) the ideas of the 'passions and operations' of mind, 
 by some called internal presentations ; (c) representations, which may be more or less 
 elaborated — nearly corresponds to Locke's simple ideas of sense and reflection, and his 
 complex ideas. The two first are Hume's ' impressions,' and the last his ' ideas.' But 
 Berkeley raises a question which Locke did not conceive, viz. Do any of the three classes 
 of objects or ideas of which we are conscious exist independently of a conscious mind ;• 
 or, if not, do any represent or suggest what exists thus absolutely? Are they, or at any 
 rate do they stand for, ' things in themselves ' — substances from which all perception or 
 consciousness may be abstracted? Can we, in short, find in perception, by any analysis, 
 Mind and Matter existing in a mutually independent duality ? This treatise is an answer 
 to this question. Cf. sect. 86, 89. 
 
 13 193 
 
194 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 company each other, they come to be marked by one name, and 
 so to be reputed as one thing 2 . Thus, for example, a certain 
 colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed 
 to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the 
 name apple ; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, 
 a book, and the like sensible things — which as they are pleasing 
 or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and 
 so forth. 
 
 2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of 
 knowledge, there is likewise something 3 which knows or per- 
 ceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagin- 
 ing, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is 
 what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not 
 denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from 
 them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby 
 they are perceived — for the existence of an idea consists in being 
 perceived 4 . 
 
 3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed 
 by the imagination, exist without the mind 5 , is what everybody 
 will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the various 
 sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or 
 
 2 This is the synthetic or constructive function of names, according to Berkeley. He 
 here and elsewhere distinguishes between sensible things properly so called, and the simple 
 ideas or objects of sense, of which ' things' are composed. Cf. sect. 33, 38. 
 
 3 This 'something' is the Ego or conscious subject, which the object-world implies, 
 through which it is united and becomes intelligible, and by which it is causally regulated. 
 But Berkeley does not affirm of the Ego, any more than of the world of ideas, that it 
 exists absolutely, i. e. independently of being conscious — that the percipient is independent 
 of ideas, any more than that these last are independent of a percipient. — For Berkeley's 
 notion of Self, as distinguished from his ideas, cf. sect. 7, where he speaks of the Self or 
 Ego as the only 'substance;' and sect. 27, 125 — 140. Though he affirms, in this section 
 and elsewhere, that Self and its ideas are ' entirely distinct ' from one another, he denies 
 that they are distinct substances. The Dualism of Berkeley — spirits and ideas — does not 
 underlie perception, but is, so to speak, co-extensive with it. It is resolvable into the dis- 
 tinction between the Ego, as permanent or identical, and the phenomena of which each 
 Ego is conscious, in sense or otherwise, as changing — with whatever is implied in this, 
 which, however, he does not try to analyse. 
 
 * i. e. by a percipient — but not necessarily by me. Cf. sect. 48. An idea must now be, 
 or have been, or hereafter become, part of the experience of a mind, in order to its pres- 
 ent, past, or future actual existence. Cf. sect. 6. 
 
 5 ' without the mind,' i.e. unperceived and unimagined. 
 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. . 195 
 
 combined together (that is, whatever objects 6 they compose), 
 cannot exist otherwise than in a mind 7 perceiving them. — I 
 think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one 
 that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied 
 to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I 
 see and feel it ; and if I were out of my study I should say it 
 existed — meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might per- 
 ceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it 8 . 
 There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, 
 that is, it was heard ; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by 
 sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and 
 the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute ex- 
 istence of unthinking things without any relation to their being 
 perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is 
 percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of 
 the minds or thinking things which perceive them. [°] 
 
 4. 9 It is indeed an opinion 10 strangely prevailing amongst men, 
 that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, 
 
 6 Here ' objects' = sensible things. This is the popular meaning of the term object, as 
 distinguished from its more extensive or philosophical meaning. Cf. Theory of Vision 
 Vindicated, sect. 9 — 11. 
 
 7 ' in a mind,' i. e. as phenomena of which a mind is conscious. The main problem of 
 the book is, To determine whether those objects or ideas which constitute what are com- 
 monly called real or sensible things are independent of a conscious mind, in a way that 
 thoughts and passions and fancies are not — whether, in short, the presented world of the 
 senses is non-egoistic, in another manner than the presented world of our own feelings, or 
 than the representative world of imagination ; and, if so, what that manner may be. 
 What should we mean when we say that w«j?-ideas — in other words, objects of sense — 
 are ' external?' Is it that they exist independently of a percipient mind ; or merely of my 
 mind, they being my medium of intercourse with other minds, and of other minds with 
 me? Berkeley's solution, here given by anticipation, is that sense-ideas, like all other 
 objects of consciousness, cannot exist actually, otherwise than in a mind perceiving them 
 (i.e. as objects immediately present to an intelligence). He afterwards enumerates marks 
 by which real or sensible are distinguishable from merely imaginary objects. See sect. 
 29—33- 
 
 8 This is part of Berkeley's interpretation of our belief in the distinct and permanent 
 existence of sensible things. It is a belief that they are conditionally presentable in sense 
 — ' permanent possibilities of sensation,' as Mr. J. S. Mill would say. See Examination 
 of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 220-33, third edition. 
 
 9 Sect. 4 — 24 contain Berkeley's proof of his doctrine, contained in sect. 3, about sensi- 
 ble ideas and things. 
 
 10 He does not mean to say that this opinion can be held intelligently by those to whom 
 he here attributes it. Cf. sect. 54, 56. 
 
196 . OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being per- 
 ceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance 
 and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the 
 world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question 
 may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradic- 
 tion. For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we 
 perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own 
 ideas or sensations ? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one 
 of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived" ? 
 
 5. If we throughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be 
 found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For 
 can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the 
 existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to 
 conceive ["] them existing unperceived? Light and colours, 
 heat and cold, extension and figures — in a word the things we see 
 and feel — what are they but so many sensations, notions 12 , ideas, 
 or impressions on the sense ? and is it possible to separate, even 
 in thought, any of these from perception ? For my part, I might 
 as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in 
 my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things 
 which, perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I 
 imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or con- 
 ceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So 
 far, I will not deny, I can abstract — if that may properly be called 
 abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such 
 objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived 
 asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend 
 beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. ["] Hence, 
 
 11 That all the objects of which we are actually percipient are ideas or sensations (in 
 Berkeley's meaning of the words) during the percipient act, inasmuch as they are then 
 objects-perceived, — whatever besides and in other circumstances they may be, — is self- 
 evident. They are at least ideas, i. e. perceived-objects, while a mind is in the act of being 
 sensibly percipient of them. Whether they ever exist otherwise; or whether, if not, they 
 represent what is existing otherwise, are two questions which Berkeley proceeds to an- 
 swewn the negative. He argues that their uncognised existence is not merely unproved 
 but involves a contradiction in terms, or, at least, can mean nothing. 
 
 »• The term notion, elsewhere either restricted to minds or applied to concepts, seems to 
 be here applied to the immediate object-world of the senses. Locke uses it with similar 
 looseness. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 197 
 
 as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual 
 sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in 
 my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct 13 from the sen- 
 sation or perception of it. [ 14 In truth, the object and the sensa- 
 tion are the same thing 15 , and cannot therefore be abstracted from 
 each other.] 
 
 6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that 
 a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this 
 important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furni- 
 ture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the 
 mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a 
 mind, that their being is to be perceived or known ; that conse- 
 quently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do 
 not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must 
 either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some 
 Eternal Spirit — it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all 
 the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them 
 an existence independent of a spirit. [ l6 To be convinced of 
 which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own 
 thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.'] [ I3 ] 
 
 7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other 
 Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives 17 . [ I4 ] But, for the 
 fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered the sensible 
 
 x 3 i.e. existing distinct from perception. 
 
 x * This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 »5 With Berkeley ' object,' ' idea,' or ' sensation,' with reference to our sense-experience, 
 signify what is assumed to be numerically the same, and which cannot therefore be distin- 
 guished from itself by abstraction. An absolute negation of meaning, or else a contradic- 
 tion in terms — which are virtually equivalent — alone remain, when an attempt is made to 
 disentangle ' sensible things' from a perception of them. 
 
 16 In the first edition, instead of this sentence, we have the following : ' To make this 
 appear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken 
 the reflexion of the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and 
 turn his thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarras of words 
 and prepossession in favour of received mistakes.' 
 
 »7 Berkeley thus holds a duality of ' things' (viz. spirits and ideas), and a unity of ' sub- 
 stance.' Moreover, he does not say that this ' substance' may exist unpercipient of any 
 ideas, whilst ideas or objects necessarily depend on being perceived. On the contrary he 
 goes on to say that ' there can be no unthinking substance or substratum' of ideas. And 
 elsewhere he argues that a mind must be always conscious. Cf. sect. 98, and also sect. 
 139, where he appears to hold that the very existence of a spirit or substance consists in 
 perceiving ideas or being conscious — that its esse is feixipere. 
 
198 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, &c, i. e. the ideas 
 perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving 
 thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as 
 to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure,.&C. exist must 
 perceive them ; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking sub- 
 stance or substratum of those ideas. 
 
 8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist 
 without the mind 18 , yet there may be things like them, whereof 
 they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the 
 mind in an unthinking substance 19 . I answer, an idea can be like 
 nothing but an idea; [ 15 ] a colour or figure can be like nothing 
 but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into 
 our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a like- 
 ness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether those 
 supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the 
 pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If 
 they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point ; but 
 if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to 
 assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, 
 like something which is intangible; and so of the rest. [ l6 ] 
 
 9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and 
 secondary qualities 20 . [ 17 ] By the former they mean extension, 
 figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number ; by 
 the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, 
 sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they 
 acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing 
 without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of 
 the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which 
 exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they 
 call Matter. [ l8 ] By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an 
 inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion 
 do actually subsist. But it is evident, from what we have 
 already shewn, that extension, figure, and motion are only [ IQ ] 
 ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but 
 
 '8 As Sir W. Hamilton (e.g. Reid's Works, pp. 883, &c.) seems to say the immediate 
 objects or ideas of sense do. 
 
 »9 As some who hold a representative perception say. 
 
 20 Here again In- refers to Locke, whose notion of material substance is charged with 
 being self-contradictory. See Essay, B. II. ch. 8. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 199 
 
 another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their arche- 
 types can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain 
 that the very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal sub- 
 stance, involves a contradiction in it. [ 2 °] [ 2I Insomuch that I 
 should not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its 
 absurdity. But, because the tenet of the existence of Matter 
 seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, 
 and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be 
 thought prolix and tedious than omit anything that might con- 
 duce to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.] 
 
 10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the 
 primary or original 22 qualities do exist without the mind in un- 
 thinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that 
 colours, sounds, heat, cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do 
 not — which they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, 
 that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, 
 and motion of the minute particles of matter 23 . This they take 
 for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all 
 exception. Now, if it be certain that those original qualities are 
 inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even 
 in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows 
 that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect 
 and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive 
 the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible 
 qualities. [ 2I ] For my own part, I see evidently that it is not j 
 in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and' moving, 
 but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality 
 which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. [ 22 ] In short, 
 extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, 
 are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities 
 are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere 
 else 24 . 
 
 21 What follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 22 Sometimes called objective qualities — which are supposed to exist without a mind or 
 unperceived, and in an unperceiving substance. Cf. First Dialogue between Hylas and 
 Philnnous, pp. 279, &c. 
 
 *) Cf. sect. 10. See Locke"s Essay, B. II. ch. 8, § 18 ; ch. 23, § 11 ; B. IV. ch. 3, § 24— 
 26. 
 
 ■4 ' in the mind, and nowhere else' — i. e. perceived or conceived, and in no other man- 
 ner. Cf. Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 346. 
 
 «/ 
 
200 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 11. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist 
 nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing 
 as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The ex- 
 tension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great 
 nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are 
 nothing at all. [ 23 ] But, say you, they are extension in general, 
 and motion in general : thus we see how much the tenet of ex- 
 tended moveable substances existing without the mind 25 depends 
 on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but 
 remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of 
 Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers 
 are run into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated 
 and so-much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in 
 Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot 
 be conceived ; since therefore it has been shewn that extension 26 
 exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true 
 of solidity. 
 
 12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind 27 , even 
 though the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be 
 evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different 
 denomination of number as the mind views it with different 
 respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, 
 according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, 
 or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's 
 understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should 
 give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one 
 book, one page, one line, &c. ; all these are equally units, though 
 
 *5 'without the mind'— without a mind, or in an absolute negation of all intelligence, 
 Divine or finite. 
 
 26 Extension is thus the fundamental characteristic of the material world. Both geo- 
 metrical and physical solidity, as well as motion, are said to imply extension. But Berke- 
 ley's analysis rather resolves extension into a locomotive experience in sense, which visual 
 sensations of colour may symbolize. 
 
 *7 ' the creature of the mind,' i.e. dependent on being conceived by a mind. Cf. Siris, 
 sect. 288. This dependence is here illustrated by the relation of number to the point of 
 view of the individual mind ; as the dependence of the other primary qualities was illus- 
 trated by their relations to the organization of the percipient. In this, the preceding, and 
 the following sections, Berkeley argues the inconsistency of the absoluteness attributed to 
 the primary qualities, with their acknowledged dependence on our organization, and on 
 our intellectual point of view. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 201 
 
 some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is 
 plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas 
 arbitrarily [ 2 <] put together by the mind 28 . 
 
 13. Unity I know some 29 will have to be a simple or uncom- 
 pounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That 
 I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find ; 
 and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the con- 
 trary, it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since 
 it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all 
 the ways of sensation and reflexion. [ 2S ] To say no more, it is 
 an abstract idea. 
 
 14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern 
 philosophers prove 30 certain sensible qualities to have no exist- 
 ence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be like- 
 wise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for 
 instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the 
 mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the cor- 
 poreal substances which excite them, for that the same body 
 which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. [ 20 ] 
 Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension 
 are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, 
 because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a differ- 
 ent texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot 
 therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate with- 
 out the mind ? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really 
 in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the 
 sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise 
 vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not 
 without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind be- 
 come swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower 
 without 31 any alteration in any external object ? 
 
 15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are 
 thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only 
 in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be 
 
 28 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107 — no. 
 =9 e.g. Locke, Essay, B. II. ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § 1. 
 3° ' certain sensible qualities' — ' colours, tastes, &c.' — in first edition. 
 31 ' without any alteration in any external object' — ' without any external alteration' — in 
 first edition. 
 
202 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and mo- 
 tion 32 . Though it must be confessed this method of arguing 
 does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in 
 an outward object 33 , as that we do not know by sense which is 
 the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments 
 foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or 
 extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should 
 exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that 
 there should be any such thing as an outward object. 
 
 16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. — It is said 
 extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the 
 substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would ex- 
 plain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say 
 you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I 
 answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any mean- 
 ing at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter ; 
 though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to 
 know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by 
 its supporting them. It is evident ' support ' cannot here be 
 taken in its usual or literal sense — as when we say that pillars 
 support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? 
 [34 For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that 
 can be applicable to it.] 
 
 17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers 
 declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find 
 them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those 
 sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the rela- 
 tive notion of its supporting accidents.[ 27 ] The general idea of 
 Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible 
 of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have 
 just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense 
 of those words ; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, 
 but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider 
 
 y Cf. First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 278 — 285. 
 
 33 ' an outward object,' i. e. an object abstracted from all intelligence — an absolute 
 object, which is alleged to be a contradiction, all objectivity implying a relation to an intel- 
 ligence, and the qualities in question relation to an embodied intelligence, with its organic 
 variations. 
 
 34 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 203 
 
 the two parts or branches which make the signification of the 
 words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct 
 meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble our- 
 selves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or sup- 
 port of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities ? Does 
 it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And 
 is not this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable ? 
 
 18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable 
 substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the 
 ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know 
 this ? Either we must know it by sense or by reason 35 . — As for 
 our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensa- 
 tions, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by 
 sense, call them what you will : but they do not inform us that 
 things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those 
 which are perceived.[ 28 ] This the materialists [ 2 ^] themselves ac- 
 knowledge. — It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge 
 at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their 
 existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But 
 ( 3<5 I do not see) what reason can induce us to believe the exist- 
 ence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since 
 the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is 
 any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas ? I say it 
 is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frensies, 
 and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might 
 be affected with all [ 3 °] the ideas we have now, though there were 
 no bodies existing without resembling them 37 . Hence, it is 
 evident the supposition of external bodies 38 is not necessary for 
 the producing our ideas ; since it is granted they are produced 
 
 35 ' reason," i. e. reasoning, or inference from our immediate sense-experience — our sen- 
 sations or ideas of sense. It is argued, in this and the next section, that the absolute 
 existence of Matter cannot be proved, either by the senses, or by reasoning from our 
 sense-perceptions. 
 
 3 6 Omitted in the second edition, and the sentence converted into a question. 
 
 37 But the ideas or objects of which we are cognizant in dreams, &c. differ in important 
 characteristics from the ideas or objects of which we are conscious in sense. Cf. sect. 29 — 
 33. The former are not in harmony with what may be called the universal and well- 
 ordered dream of real life. 
 
 38 • external bodies," i. e. bodies that exist absolutely or unperceived — independently of 
 any sense-experience. 
 
204 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same 
 order, we see them in at present, without their concurrence. 
 
 19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations 
 without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive 
 and explain the manner of their production, by supposing exter- 
 nal bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise ; and so it 
 might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that 
 excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said ; 
 for, though we give the materialists [ 3I ] their external bodies, they 
 by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our 
 ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to com- 
 prehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is 
 possible it should imprint any idea in the mind 39 . Hence it is 
 evident the production 40 of ideas or sensations in our minds, can 
 be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal sub- 
 stances 41 , since that is acknowledged to remain equally inex- 
 plicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were 
 possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they 
 do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion ; since it is to 
 suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumer- 
 able beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of 
 purpose. [ 32 ] 
 
 20. In short, if there were external bodies 42 , it is impossible 
 we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we 
 might have the very same reasons to think there were that we 
 have now. Suppose — what no one can deny possible — an intel- 
 ligence without the help of external bodies 42 , to be affected with 
 the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in 
 the same order and with like vividness in his mind 43 . I ask 
 whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the 
 
 39 i. e. they cannot shew how the unintelligible or contradictory hypothesis of Absolute 
 Matter accounts for our having the sense-experience we have had, are conscious of having, 
 or expect to have ; or which we suppose other conscious minds to be having, to have hid, 
 or to be about to have. 
 
 <° ' the production,' &c, i. e. the fact that we and others actually have sense-percep- 
 tions. 
 
 4» • Matter," in an intelligible meaning of the term, he not only allows to exist, but 
 maintains its existence to be intuitively evident. 
 
 ** i. e. bodies existing without being perceived or concejgH^^any knowing substance. 
 
 43 i. e. to have all our sense-experience. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 205 
 
 existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and 
 exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believ- 
 ing the same thing ?[ 33 ] Of this there can be no question — 
 which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable 
 person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may 
 think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the 
 mind. 
 
 21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the 
 existence of Matter 44 , after what has been said, I could instance 
 several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) 
 which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned number- 
 less controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of 
 far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the 
 detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments 
 a posteriori l 3 *"] are unnecessary for confirming what has been, 
 if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I 
 shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them 45 . 
 
 22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly 
 prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to 
 dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evi- 
 dence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least 
 reflection ? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so 
 trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or 
 figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unper- 
 ceived. This easy trial 46 may perhaps make you see that what 
 you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I 
 am content to put the whole upon this issue: — If you can but 
 conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or, in 
 general, for any one idea,[ 35 ] or anything like an idea, to exist 
 otherwise than in a mind perceiving it 47 , I shall readily give up 
 the cause. And, as for all that compages of external bodies you 
 contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot 
 
 44 i. e. absolute or uncognised Matter — not interpretable sense-perceptions, the existence 
 of which last Berkeley assumes. 
 
 45 Cf. sect. 85— 156. 
 
 4« The appeal here and elsewhere is to reflection — directly upon our own experience 
 and indirectly upon that of others. 
 
 47 i. e. otherwise than as an idea — perceived or conceived — a presented or represented 
 object. 
 
 <. 
 
206 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign 
 any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possi- 
 bility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that 
 it is so. 
 
 23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to 
 imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, 
 and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there 
 is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more 
 than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books 
 and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any 
 one that may perceive them ? But do not you yourself perceive 
 or think of them all the while 43 ? This therefore is nothing to 
 the purpose : it only shews you have the power of imagining or 
 forming ideas in your mind ; but it does not shew that you can 
 conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist with- 
 out the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you con- 
 ceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a 
 manifest repugnancy. [ 36 ] When we do our utmost to conceive 
 the existence of external bodies 4 ?, we are all the while only con- 
 templating our own ideas 50 . But the mind taking no notice of 
 itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing 
 unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they 
 are apprehended by or exist in itself 51 . [ 37 ] A little attention will 
 discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, 
 and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the 
 existence of material substance. 
 
 24. [ 52 Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, 
 
 4 8 There seems to be a confusion of existence in sense with existence in imagination, iu 
 this section. To exist as an object in fancy is indeed to exist, but not as part of the 
 universal system of sensible order ; and it is the apparently interrupted existence of this 
 system, on his doctrine, that Berkeley has to reconcile with the common belief, on which 
 we all act. 
 
 49 ' to conceive the existence of external bodies,' i.e. to conceive bodies that are neither 
 perceived nor conceived — that are not ideas or objects at all, but which exist absolutely. 
 To suppose what we conceive to be thus unconceived, when we are actually conceiving it, 
 is, it is argued, to suppose a contradiction in terms. Such Being is absolutely unapproach- 
 able by intelligence. 
 
 s° ' ideas' — i. e. ideas of imagination, not of sense. 
 
 S" A delusion which is at the root of those objections to metaphysics which overlook the 
 subjective phase of all physics. 
 
 5' This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 0? 
 
 we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] 
 It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, 
 to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant 
 by the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without 
 the jnind 53 . To me it is evident those words mark out either a 
 direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. [ 38 ] And to convince 
 others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat 
 they would calmly attend to their own thoughts ; and if by this 
 attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does 
 appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It 
 is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence 
 of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which in- 
 clude a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and 
 earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader. 
 
 W 25. All our ideas, sensations, notions 54 , or the things which 
 we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, 
 are visibly inactive — there is nothing of power or agency in- 
 cluded in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot 
 produce or make any alteration in another 55 . To be satisfied of 
 the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare ob- 
 servation of our ideas. For, since they and every part of them 
 exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them 
 but what is perceived : but whoever shall attend to his ideas, 
 whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any 
 power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained 
 in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very 
 being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch 
 that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, 
 to be the cause of anything : neither can it be the resemblance 
 or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8. [ 3 9] 
 
 53 ' The absolute existence of sensible objects, i.e. in themselves or without a mind,' is 
 the principle which Berkeley argues against as either meaningless or contradictory — not 
 the existence of a material world or sensible order, regulated independently of our individual 
 will, and to which our actions must conform if we are to avoid pain and secure pleasure. 
 
 54 Here again ' notion' applied to ideas or inactive things. 
 
 55 In this and the next section, Berkeley argues that there can be no power or causality 
 proper, in the world of ideas or objects, uniformities of co-existence and succession alone 
 being either immediately or mediately perceivable — the doctrine of Hume, Brown, Comte, 
 and Mr. Mill. 
 
208 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion 
 cannot be the cause of N our sensations. To say, therefore, that 
 these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, 
 number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false. 
 
 26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are 
 anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There 
 is therefore some cause 56 of these ideas, whereon they depend 57 , 
 and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot 
 be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the 
 preceding section. It must therefore be a substance 58 ; but it has 
 been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance : it 
 remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active 
 substance or Spirit. 
 
 27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it per- 
 ceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or 
 otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Hence there 
 can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit ; f or all ideas whatever, 
 being passive and inert, (vid. sect. 25,) they cannot represent unto 
 us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little atten- 
 tion will make it plain to anyone that to have an idea which shall 
 be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is ab- 
 solutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which 
 acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects 
 which it produceth 59 . [ 4 °] If any man shall doubt of the truth of 
 what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame 
 the idea of any power or active being ; and whether he has ideas 
 of two principal powers, marked by the names will and under- 
 standing, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of 
 
 56 Berkeley here assumes as granted the metaphysical and synthetical principle of caus- 
 ality — that every phenomenal change implies a cause — which cause, he goes on to shew, 
 cannot be itself phenomenal. 
 
 57 ' depend' — not for their very existence, which, according to Berkeley, depends upon 
 their being perceived, but for the changing forms in which they exist relatively to one 
 another. 
 
 5 8 He here connects the metaphysical and synthetical principles of Cause and Substance 
 — finding them united and realized in actively conscious Mind. 
 
 59 In other words, it cannot be an object of perception, though its effects can. We are 
 conscious of it as percipient only, not as perceived. Does this consciousness of being per- 
 cipient imply consciousness of active will ? For Berkeley's treatment of the objection that 
 mental substances and causes are as unmeaning or contradictory as material substances or 
 causes, see Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 327 — 329. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 209 
 
 Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its sup- 
 porting or being the subject [ 4I ] of the aforesaid powers — which is 
 signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold ; but, 
 so far as I can see, the words will, ^"understanding, mind,'] soul, 
 sprit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at 
 all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and 
 which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any 
 idea whatsoever. [ 6l Though it must be owned at the same time 
 that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the 
 mind 62 ; such as willing, loving, hating — inasmuch as we know 
 or understand the meaning of these words.] [ 42 ] 
 
 28. I find I can excite ideas 63 in my mind at pleasure, and vary 
 and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than will- 
 ing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy ; and by 
 the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. 
 Thfs making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denomi- 
 nate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on 
 experience : but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of ex- 
 citing ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with 
 words 64 . 
 
 29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I 
 find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like depend- 
 ence on my will 65 . [ 43 ] When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it 
 
 60 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 61 This sentence is not contained in the first edition. 
 
 62 In sect. 1 he speaks of ideas perceived by attending to the operations of the mind.' 
 
 6 3 'ideas,' i.e. of imagination. 
 
 6 * With Berkeley the object-world of ideas is partly distinguished from Self by its essen- 
 tial passivity. Every object is caused ; nothing except a Self or Ego causes. Cause or 
 power is with him of the essence of our notion of mind, to which we necessarily attribute 
 power or activity — thus distinguishing our Self from the changing ideas of which we are 
 conscious. Except figuratively, we never attribute action to ideas or objects. Cf. Siris, 
 sect. 249, 250, 292 — 295. 
 
 6 S In this and the four following sections, Berkeley mentions marks by which sense-phe- 
 nomena are found in experience to be distinguished from all the other ideas of which we 
 are cognisant, and in consequence of which they are termed ' real,' ' external,' or properly 
 'objective;' while other phenomena (those of feeling and imagination) are called subjec- 
 tive or individual. The changes in the ideas or phenomena presented in the senses are 
 found to be part of Universal External Order — external, inasmuch as it is independent of 
 the will of the sense-percipient — the interpretation of which enables us to foresee (sect. 31) 
 more or less of our future sense-experience ; thus determining our pleasures and pains, and 
 also informing us of the existence of other conscious minds. 
 
 14 
 
2IO OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to de- 
 termine what particular objects shall present themselves to my 
 view ; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the 
 ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is 
 therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them. [ 44 ] 
 
 30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than 
 those of the imagination 66 ; they have likewise a steadiness, order, 
 and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are 
 the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or 
 series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the 
 wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the jet r ules_ or 
 established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in 
 us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature ; [ 45 ] and these 
 we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such 
 ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary 
 course of things. 
 
 31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regu- 
 late our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we 
 should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act any- 
 thing that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the 
 least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire 
 warms us ; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the 
 harvest ; and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such 
 or such means are conducive — all this we know, not by discover- 
 ing any necessary 67 connexion between our ideas, but only by the 
 observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we should 
 be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more 
 know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant 
 just born. [ 46 ] 
 
 32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evi- 
 dently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit 
 whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading 
 our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after 
 second causes. For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense 
 
 66 This mark — the superior strength, liveliness, and distinctness of our sense-ideas — was 
 afterwards noted by Hume. See Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. II. 
 
 *7 Berkeley insists throughout his writings on the arbitrary character of the laws of 
 nature in general, and of those by which the phenomena of vision symbolize those of touch 
 in particular. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 211 
 
 constantly followed by other ideas, and we know this is not of our 
 own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas 
 themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which 
 nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for exam- 
 ple, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain 
 round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the 
 idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the 
 sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the 
 motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are 
 inclined to think the latter the effect of the former 68 . [ 47 ] 
 
 33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature 
 are called real things : and those excited in the imagination being 
 less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly 69 termed 
 ideas, or images of tilings, which they copy and represent. But 
 then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are never- 
 theless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by 
 it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ide as of Sense 
 are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more 
 strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind ; but 
 this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are 
 also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which 
 perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and 
 more powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no 
 idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a. mind 
 perceiving it 7 °. 
 
 68 So Schiller, in Don Carlos, Act III, where he represents the sceptics as failing to see 
 the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. Berkeley, like Hume, Brown, Comte, 
 Mill, &c, eliminates all power or causality from the material world; but, unlike them, he 
 recognises power or causality, properly so called, in conscious mind — in the Ego — distin- 
 guished from the ideas of which it is immediately cognisant as contemporaneous and suc- 
 cessive. ' Physical causation,' or constant order in the co-existence and succession of phe- 
 nomena, accordingly, is not causation proper, but the effect of it. 
 
 *9 In popular language ' idea' is applied exclusively to the representations and misrepre- 
 sentations of fancy or thought, and not, as with Berkeley, to the ' real things' present in the 
 senses. See Leibnitz, De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis. 
 
 70 In the thirty-one preceding sections, two relations should be carefully distinguished — 
 that of conscious mind to the sense-ideas of which it is conscious, and which depend upon 
 conscious mind for their very existence ; and that of mind to the changes of such ideas or 
 phenomena. The former relation — that of percipient and percept — is not the relation of 
 cause and effect at all, but is sui generis. The latter and correlative relation, also involved 
 in our consciousness, is alone causal, and is our only proper example of causality — the 
 orderly relations of phenomena to one another being only results of causal energy — of in- 
 
212 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some 
 time in answering objections 71 which may probably be made 
 against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of 
 which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I de- 
 sire I may be excused, since all men do not equally apprehend 
 things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one. 
 
 First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all 
 that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, 
 and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. 
 [ 48 ] All things that exist exist only in the mind, that is, they 
 are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, 
 and stars ? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, 
 trees, stones ; nay, even of our own bodies ? Are all these but 
 so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy ? To all which, and 
 whatever else of the same sort maybe objected, I answer, that by 
 the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in 
 nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or un- 
 derstand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There 
 is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chi- 
 meras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 
 33, where we have shewn what is meant by real things, in opposi- 
 tion to chimeras or ideas of our own framing; but th en they both 
 equally exist in the mind, and in that sense 72 are alike ideas. 
 
 35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that 
 we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things 
 I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really 
 exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose ex- 
 istence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal 
 
 tending volition — and not power or causality itself. Note also that while Berkeley regards 
 all phenomena as dependent on an intelligence and a will, he regards the changes in sense- 
 phenomena as emphatically independent, for all practical purposes, of the will of the finite 
 sense-percipient. 
 
 t- Sect. 34 — 84 contain Berkeley's answers to supposed objections to the foregoing prin- 
 ciples, concerning the true meaning of the terms ' Matter' and ' Mind,' 'Substance' and 
 'Cause;' and to his distinction between the presented realities of the material or sensible 
 world, and the chimeras of imagination. 
 
 7* To be an ' idea' is, with Berkeley, to be the object of a conscious intelligence. But 
 he does not define precisely the relation of ideas to minds conscious of them. ' Existence 
 in the mind' is existence in this relation. His problem (which he determines in die nega- 
 tive) is, the possibility of the existence of sense-ideas — objects of sense-experience — out of 
 this relation. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 213 
 
 substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the 
 rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist 
 indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his 
 impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost 
 a great handle for trifling and disputation. ["But that is all the 
 harm that I can see done.] 
 
 36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality 
 of things, [ 4 9] he is very far from understanding what hath been 
 premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an 
 abstract of what has been said : — There are spiritual substances, 
 minds, or human souls, which will or excite 74 ideas in themselves 
 at pleasure; but these 74 are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect 
 of others they perceive by sense — which, being impressed upon 
 them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak them- 
 selves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human 
 spirits 75 . These latter are said to have more reality in them than 
 the former ; — by which is meant that they are more affecting, 
 orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind 
 perceiving them 76 . And in this sense the sun that I see by day 
 is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of 
 the former. In the sense here given of reality, it is evident that 
 every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the 
 mundane system, is as much a real being by our principles as by 
 any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality 
 different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own 
 thoughts and see 77 . 
 
 37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that 
 we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, 
 that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense — for a 
 combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, 
 weight, and the like — this we cannot be accused of taking away ?8 : 
 
 73 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 74 i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28 — 30. 
 
 75 Cf. sect. 29. 
 
 7 s Cf. sect. 33. ' Not fictions,' i. e. they are presentative, and therefore cannot be mis- 
 representative in their character. 
 
 77 The metaphysic of Berkeley is an endeavour to convert the word ' real ' from being 
 the symbol of an unintelligible abstraction into that of the conscious experience of a 
 mind. 
 
 78 With Berkeley substances are either (a) conscious minds, which are substances 
 
214 0F THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 but if it be taken in a philosophic sense — for the support of ac- 
 cidents or qualities without the mind 78 — then indeed I acknowl- 
 edge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that 
 which never had any existence, not even in the imagination. [ 5 °] 
 
 38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat 
 and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it 
 does so — the word idea not being used in common discourse to 
 signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are 
 called things ; [ 5I ] and it is certain that any expression which 
 varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and 
 ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, 
 which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and 
 clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our 
 senses ? 9. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, 
 figure, or suchlike qualities, which combined together 80 constitute 
 the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist 
 only in the mind that perceives them ; and this is all that is meant 
 by calling them ideas ; which word if it was as ordinarily used 
 as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. 
 I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the 
 expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink 
 and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot 
 exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is 
 more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called 
 things rather than ideas. 
 
 39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, and 
 do not rather in compliance with custom call them things; I 
 answer, I do it for two reasons : — first, because the term thing, 
 in contradistinction to idea, is generally supposed to denote 
 somewhat existing without the mind ; secondly, because thing 
 hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including 
 spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the 
 objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thought- 
 proper, or (b) the divinely conceived and constituted groups of sense-phenomena called 
 ' sensible things,' which are substances conventionally. 
 
 79 And which, because perceived, are ideas — an idea being with Berkeley a perceived 
 or imagined object. 
 
 80 'combined together,' i. e. as ' sensible things," according to the natural laws of the 
 contemporaneity and succession of ideas or phenomena. Cf. sect. 33. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 215 
 
 less and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea, which 
 implies those properties 81 . 
 
 40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to 
 reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any argu- 
 ments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of 
 them. [ 52 ] Be it so ; assert the evidence of sense as high as you 
 please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, 
 and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more 
 doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the 
 testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of 
 anything which is not perceived by sense 82 . We are not for 
 having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses ; on the 
 contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable ; 
 nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than 
 those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn 83 . 
 
 41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference 
 betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dream- 
 ing or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so : if you 
 suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put 
 your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. [ S3 ] 
 This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To 
 all which the answer is evident from what hath been already 
 said 84 ; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very 
 
 81 Berkeley's philosophy is a system of Intelligible Realism or Dualism, rather than 
 of Idealism in the popular meaning of idea — for, he uses the word idea merely to mark 
 the fact, that he recognises the existence of objective things only so far as they are per- 
 ceived and passive objects of a conscious mind ; and he does not, as the term Idealism 
 suggests, regard ' sensible things ' as created or constructed by the voluntary activity of 
 the individual mind in which they appear. They are perceived, but neither created nor 
 regulated, by the finite percipient, and are thus external in the only practical meaning of 
 that term. 
 
 8» The existence of Matter, out of the relation of percept and percipient, cannot, with- 
 out a contradiction, be said to be sensibly perceived. Therefore, our sense-perceptions, at 
 any rate, do not justify us in affirming more about their immediate objects than that they 
 are ideas or objects of which we are sentient. Custom, not sense, according to Berkeley, 
 induces our imagination and expectation of such and such future sense-perceptions, in- 
 consequence of such and such present and actual ones. But cf. Siris, sect. 347 — 349. 
 
 8 3 Cf. sect. 87 — 91, against the scepticism which originates in the alleged fallacy of the 
 senses. 
 
 84 It is always to be remembered that with Berkeley the presented ideas or objects of 
 sense are themselves the archetypes or real things, whilst the ideas of imagination are 
 images of, or derived from, the archetypes of sense. 
 
2i6 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it 
 occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet 
 nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, 
 in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its 
 idea 85 . 
 
 42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually 
 without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not 
 exist in the mind ; it being absurd that those things which are 
 seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as 
 our own thoughts 86 . In answer to this, I desire it may be con- 
 sidered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at 
 a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are ac- 
 knowledged to have their existence only in the mind. [ 54 ] 
 
 43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth 
 while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things 
 placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see 
 external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, 
 others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what 
 hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The 
 consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay 
 towards a New Theory of Vision, which was published not long 
 since 87 [ 55 ] — wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is 
 neither immediately of itself perceived by sight 88 , nor yet appre- 
 hended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath 
 a necessary connexion with it 8 * ; but that it is only suggested to 
 our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending 
 vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude 
 or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance 9°; 
 
 8s Here feelings are spoken of as in the same relation to a consciousness of them as 
 sensible things are, i. e. both are alike dependent on, but not of the essence or substance 
 of, the percipient — the conscious person. 
 
 86 That our percepts should be seen ' at a distance of several miles' is not inconsistent 
 with their being dependent on a percipient, if the distance — the ambient or external space 
 — is itself only an object-perceived, and therefore dependent on a percipient. Cf. sect. 
 67. 
 
 8 7 See the Editor's preface to the Essay. 
 
 88 Essay, sect. 2. 
 
 *> Ibid. sect. 11—15. 
 v Ibid. sect. 16—28. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 2I 7 
 
 but, by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to sig- 
 nify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words 
 of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for 91 ; 
 insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, 
 would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without 
 his mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore- 
 mentioned treatise. 
 
 44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely 
 distinct and heterogeneous 92 . The former are marks and prog- 
 nostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither 
 exist without the mind, nor are the images of external things, 
 was shewn even in that treatise 93 . Though throughout the 
 same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects — not 
 that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing 
 the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my pur- 
 pose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning Vision. 
 So that in strict truth the ideas of sight 94 , when we apprehend 
 by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest 
 or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only 
 admonish us what ideas of touch 95 will be imprinted in our 
 minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence 
 of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been 
 said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and 
 elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are 
 the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend 
 informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, 
 in case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But 
 for a fuller information in this point I refer to the Essay itself. 
 
 45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing prin- 
 ciples it follows things are every moment annihilated and created 
 
 ? x Essay, sect. 51. 
 
 92 Ibid. sect. 47 — 49, 121 — 141. 
 
 9i Md. sect. 43. 
 
 94 i. e. what we are conscious of in seeing. 
 
 95 i.e. ta:tual sensations. Touch is here taken in its wider meaning, and includes our 
 muscular and locomotive experience, which with Berkeley is involved in the conception 
 of distance. Cf. Mr. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, chap. 13, in 
 third edition. 
 
218 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 anew? 6 , [s 6 ] The objects of sense exist only when they are per- 
 ceived ; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the 
 parlour, no lo.iger than while there is somebody by to perceive 
 them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is 
 reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again 
 created. In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has 
 been said in sect. 3, 4, &c, and desire he will consider whether 
 he means anything by the actual existence 97 of an idea[ 57 ] dis- 
 tinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest 
 inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything 
 else is meant by those words ; and I once more entreat the reader 
 to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed 
 on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas 
 or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give 
 up the cause ; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is un- 
 reasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not 
 what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not 
 assenting to those propositions Which at bottom have no mean- 
 ing in them. 
 
 46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received prin- 
 ciples of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pre- 
 tended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon 
 closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be 
 reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers com- 
 monly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light 
 and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects 
 of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are 
 
 96 To define the condition of sensible things during the intervals of our perception of 
 them, consistently with the belief of all sane persons regarding the material world, is a 
 challenge which has been often addressed to the advocates of an Intelligible Realism. 
 According to Berkeley, there are no intervals in the existence — either actual, i. e. as per- 
 ceived, or potential, i.e. as perceivable — of sensible things. They are permanently per- 
 ceivable, under the laws of nature, though not perpetually perceived by this, that, or the 
 Other finite percipient. In other words, they always exist actually in the Divine Concep- 
 tion, and potentially, in relation to finite minds, in the Divine Will, the evolutions of ex- 
 ternal nature being the constant expression of that Will. — As to creation, cf. Sirk, sect. 
 325 — 328, &c. 
 
 97 Berkeley allows to unperceived bodies a potential or conditional, though not an 
 actual, existi nee relatively to us. When we say a body exists potentially, we mean that 
 if, in (he light, we open our eyes, anil look towards it, we shall see it, and that If we place 
 our hand where it is we shall feel it. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 219 
 
 perceived? [ 58 ] Again, it may to some perhaps seem very in- 
 credible that things should be every moment creating, yet this 
 very notion is commonly taught in the schools. [ 59 ] For the 
 Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter? 8 , 
 and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are 
 nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine 
 conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual 
 creation". 
 
 47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we 
 allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will 
 unavoidably follow, from the principles which are now generally 
 admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none 
 of them exist whilst they are not perceived. [- 50 ] For, it is evident 
 from sect. 1 1 and the following sections, that the Matter philos- 
 ophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath 
 none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under 
 our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this 
 more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of 
 Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved 
 and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles 
 demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is 
 an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter [ 6l ] which 
 are not perceived by sense 100 . The reason therefore that any par- 
 ticular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only 
 
 9 s ' Matter,' i. e. material substance or Matter existing per se. 
 
 99 ' Those who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that natura 
 naturans (to use the language of the Schoolmen) is God, and that the Divine conserva- 
 tion of things is equipollent to and in fact the same thing with a continued repeated crea- 
 tion ; in a word, that conservation and creation differ only as the terminus a quo. These 
 are the common opinions of Schoolmen ; and Durandus, who held the world to be a ma- 
 chine, like a clock made up and put in motion by God, but afterwards continued to go of 
 itself, was therein particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach a doctrine not 
 unlike the Schools— mens agitat molem (Virgil, .Eneid, VI). The Stoics and Platonists are 
 everywhere full of the same notion. I am not therefore singular in this point itself, so 
 much as in my way of proving it.* (Berkeley's Letter to Dr. Samuel Johnson of New 
 York.) Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. sect. 14; Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 
 17, &c. ; Siris, passim, but especially in the latter part. See also Correspondence between 
 Clarke and Leibnitz. Jonathan Edwards, in his book on Original Sin, and elsewhere, 
 maintains the continual creation of all existing persons as well as things, and employs it in 
 defence of his theology. In several of his writings Edwards approaches the peculiar doc- 
 trines of Berkeley regarding the material world. It is worthy of note that when Berke- 
 ley was in Rhode Island, Edwards was settled in Massachusetts. 
 
 100 Cf. sect. 123 — 132. 
 
220 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 a finite number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no 
 more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but 
 because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. [ 62 ] In 
 proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it per- 
 ceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object 
 appears greater, [ 63 ] and its figure varies, those parts in its ex- 
 tremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to 
 bound it in very different lines and angles from those perceived 
 by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various changes of 
 size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body 
 shall seem infinite. [ 64 ] During all which there is no alteration in 
 the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered 
 in itself, is infinitely extended, [ 65 ] and consequently void of all 
 shape and figure. From which it follows that, though we should 
 grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal 
 as certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles 
 forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies per- 
 ceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. 
 Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them in- 
 finite and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety 
 of bodies which compose the visible world, any one whereof does 
 not exist longer than it is perceived. 
 
 48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in 
 sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles 
 we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all 
 against our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of 
 sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; 
 yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except 
 only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some 
 other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever 
 bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would 
 not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all 
 minds whatsoever 1 . It does not therefore follow from the fore- 
 going principles that bodies are annihilated and created every 
 moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our per- 
 ception of them. [^3 
 
 « Cf. sect. 2, 3, &c, and the Second and Third Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 22 1 
 
 49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and 
 figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended 
 and figured ; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to 
 speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject [ 6? ] in which 
 it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they 
 are perceived by it — that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but 
 only by way ofidea*; [ 68 ] and it no more follows the soul or mind 
 is extended, because extension exists in it alone, than it does that 
 it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknow- 
 ledged to exist in it, and nowhere else 3 . As to what philosophers 
 say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unin- 
 telligible. For instance, in this proposition f a die is hard, ex- 
 tended, and square,' they will have it that the word die denotes 
 a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and 
 figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This 
 I cannot comprehend : to me a die seems to be nothing distinct 
 from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And, 
 to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those 
 
 2 i. e. ' mode or attribute,' as philosophers employ these terms, when they (unintelligibly) 
 distinguish modes or attributes from absolute material subjects or substances. With Berke- 
 ley, the ' substance' of matter (when the term is applied at all to sensible things) is the estab- 
 lished group of phenomena of which a particular thing consists. Now extension, and the 
 other so-called qualities of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, related to mind either 
 (a) according to the unmeaning relation of subject and attribute, of which philosophers 
 speak, nor (b) as one sense-idea or phenomenon is related to another sense-idea or phenom- 
 enon, in the group of sense-phenomena which constitutes, with him, the (perceivable) sub- 
 stance of a material thing. A mind and its sense-perceptions are, on the contrary, related 
 as percipient or person to the ideas or objects perceived — whatever ' otherness' that sui 
 generis relation implies. Berkeley sees in this relation a certain sort of duality, i. e. (1) 
 mind or person, and (2) its ideas ; but it has been disputed whether this distinction of per- 
 sons and their ideas is with him a properly numerical, or a merely logical distinction. At 
 any rate, he rejects the unintelligible hypothesis that sense-ideas exist as entities that are 
 independent of all intelligence of them— Divine or finite ; and he also refuses to regard 
 them as mere creations or constructions, due to the will of the finite thinker who is con- 
 scious of them. Sense-ideas are signs of that Universal Divine Order, which God enables 
 us, through immediate perception and custom or suggestion, to become so cognisant of in 
 physical science, as that the Order is in a measure understood by us. And the sense-ideas 
 present in one mind are numerically different from the sense-ideas present in another — 
 like different copies of the same book, all suggesting a like (i. e. the same) meaning. Cf. 
 Collier's theory of the ' inexistence' of Matter in human minds, and the existence of all 
 minds in the Adyo«. Parr's Metaphysical Tracts, pp. 116, &c. 
 
 3 Moreover, mind can conceivably exist without perceiving extended or sensible objects, 
 for it may exist conscious of objects of another sort ; but extended objects cannot exist 
 without being perceived. Hence mind is distinct from any of its ideas. 
 
222 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only 
 an explication of the meaning of the word die. \^~\ 
 
 50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things 
 explained by matter and motion ; take away these and you destroy 
 the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechan- 
 ical principles which have been applied with so much success to 
 account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have 
 been made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the 
 study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that corporeal 
 substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that 
 there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition 
 which may not as well be explained without it, as might easily 
 be made appear by an induction of particulars. [ 7 °] To explain 
 the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such 
 occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how 
 Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it 4 , is 
 what no philosopher will pretend to explain ; it is therefore evident 
 there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, 
 they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal 
 substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are 
 in truth no more than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the 
 cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25. 
 
 51. Seventhly 1 it will upon this be demanded whether it does 
 not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every- 
 thing to the immediate operation of Spirits ? We must no longer 
 say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that 
 a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly 
 laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he 
 would so ; in such things we ought to ' think with the learned, 
 and speak with the vulgar.' They who to demonstration are 
 
 * Philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in perception as one of cause 
 and effect — the result, according to Berkeley, of illegitimate analysis or abstraction, which 
 creates a fictitious duality of substance. By his new principles, philosophy is based on a 
 recognition of the fact that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but 
 in a relation to it that is sui generis and ultimate. Cf. Prof. Ferrier on ' perception' and 
 ' matter,' in his Institutes of Metaphysics, Prop. IV., and Remains, Vol. II. pp. 261 — 288. 
 407—409. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 223 
 
 convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do neverthe- 
 less say ' the sun rises,' 'the sun sets,' or ' comes to the meridian ;' 
 and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would 
 without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on 
 what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of 
 language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance 
 from the admission of our tenets. 
 
 52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, 
 so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to 
 act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false 
 soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. 
 Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by 
 custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not 
 always the truest. Hence it is impossible — even in the most 
 rigid, philosophic reasonings — so far to alter the bent and genius 
 of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to 
 pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous 
 reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and con- 
 nexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate 
 modes of speech which use has made inevitable. 
 
 53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this 
 has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is 
 of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they 
 allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate 
 efficient cause of all things s . These men [ 7I ] saw that amongst j 
 all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or 
 activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise 
 true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, 
 like unto the immediate objects of sense 6 . But then, that they 
 should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, 
 which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one 
 effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of 
 purpose, since God might have done everything as well without 
 
 5 He refers to Des Cartes, and especially Geulinx, Malebranche, &c, who, while they 
 argued for material substance, denied the causality of sensible things. With them, as with 
 Berkeley, there are no causes in the material or phenomenal world — only effects, which are 
 evolved in a constant order, contemporaneous and successive, and thus express the mean- 
 ing of the Supreme Power. See Malebranche, Entretiens, VI., VII. 
 
 6 i. e. of their hypothetical material world, existing unperceived. 
 
224 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 them — this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet 
 be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition 7 . 
 
 54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of 
 mankind 8 may be thought by some an invincible argument in 
 behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we 
 suppose the whole world to be mistaken ? And if so, what cause 
 can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? — I 
 answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be 
 found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of 
 Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe 
 that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it 9, is 
 impossible ; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of 
 that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. 
 In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter 
 exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensa- 
 tions, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present 
 to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they 
 should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, 
 and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not 
 able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men im- 
 pose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those proposi- 
 tions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have 
 no meaning in them. 
 
 55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never 
 so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak 
 argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number 
 of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with 
 the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far 
 greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes 
 and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurd- 
 ities even by men of learning : and if it be considered what a 
 
 7 On the principle, ' Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.' 
 
 8 Commonly called the argument from Common Sense, and illustrated in the writings 
 of Reid and other Scotch psychologists. That the unreflecting part of mankind should 
 hold an unintelligible, or at least confused, Realism is not to be wondered at, when we 
 recollect that it is the very office of philosophy to interpret the sensible reality, which they 
 and philosophers acknowledge in common to be ' external,' in some meaning of the term. 
 
 9 Sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 225 
 
 small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find 
 that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsider- 
 able footing in the world. 
 
 56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, 
 and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, 
 that men knowing they perceived several ideas 10 , whereof they 
 themselves were not the authors — as not being excited from 
 within nor depending on the operation of their wills — this made 
 them maintain those ideas 10 or objects of perception had an 
 existence independent of and without the mind, without ever 
 dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, 
 philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of 
 perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree 
 corrected the mistake of the vulgar" ; but at the same time run 
 into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are 
 certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a 
 subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are 
 only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects 12 on 
 the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin 
 to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious 
 that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which 
 they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which 
 therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on 
 which they are imprinted. 
 
 57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be 
 excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have 
 recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, 
 first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, 
 as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, 
 as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because 
 
 10 i. e. j«7j*-ideas. — Though his own sense-ideas or objects are independent of the will 
 of the finite percipient, it does not follow that they are independent of his perception. Cf. 
 sect. 29 — 33. 
 
 " By recognising that what we are immediately percipient of must be ideal, or at least 
 that it is only known by us in sense as ideal — as a sense-percept. 
 
 12 i. e. by the unperceived or absolute objects which, on this hypothesis of a representa- 
 tive sense-perception, were assumed to exist behind the properly perceived objects or ideas, 
 and to be (according to some) the cause of their appearance in our consciousness. Cf. 
 Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 359. 
 
 IS 
 
226 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is 
 not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite 
 collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, 
 complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His 
 operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of 
 nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the 
 presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on 
 in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflection ; 
 their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the 
 greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so 
 constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the im- 
 mediate effects of a Free Spirit ; especially since inconsistency 
 and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked 
 on as a mark o{ freedom 13 . 
 
 58. Tenthly, [? 2 ] it will be objected that the notions we advance 
 are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and 
 mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now 
 universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the 
 clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing 
 principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only 
 an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not : but the 
 motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that 
 tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the prin- 
 ciples we have premised ; for, the question whether the earth 
 moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, 
 whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been ob- 
 served by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such 
 circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from 
 the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among 
 the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of 
 them ; ["] and this, by the established rules of nature which we 
 have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the 
 phenomena. 
 
 59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train 
 
 «3 Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that the Divine Ideas and Will, and the 
 Laws of Nature, are coincident. But in fact the scientific discovery of laws in nature, 
 instead of narrowing, extends the sphere of intelligible Divine agency. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 227 
 
 and succession of ideas 14 in our minds, often make, I will not say- 
 uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions 
 concerning the ideas 14 we shall be affected with pursuant to a 
 great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment 
 of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in 
 circumstances very different from those we are in at present. 
 Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve 
 its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. 
 It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like 
 sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other 
 discoveries in astronomy or nature. [ 74 ] 
 
 60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose 
 serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal me- 
 chanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and 
 shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their 
 motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts 
 so elegantly contrived and put together ; which, being ideas, have 
 nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary 15 
 connexion with the effects ascribed to them ? If it be a Spirit 
 that immediately produces every effect by z. fiat ox act of his will, 
 we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether 
 of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though 
 an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement 
 of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew 
 would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all 
 this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which 
 directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why 
 may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains 
 of making the movements and putting them together? Why 
 does not an empty case serve as well as another ? And how 
 comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of 
 a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in 
 
 '4 ' ideas," i. e. sense-ideas or sensations. This ' experience' consists of the established 
 association of sensations or percepts in the order of external nature, not mere 'association 
 of ideas' — in the popular meaning of the word idea. 
 
 x s Cf. sect. 25, and also various passages in Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon 
 the arbitrariness of the so-called causal relations among sensible things, and the conse- 
 quent sense-symbolism of Nature. It is thus that he speaks of a language of Vision. Cf. 
 Theory of Vision Vindicated, passim. 
 
228 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right 
 again ? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, 
 great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to 
 be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, 
 how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or 
 any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies 
 and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the 
 common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and 
 serve to explain abundance of phenomena ? 
 
 61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some 
 difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the 
 uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could 
 not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could 
 be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things 
 which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and 
 rigour of demonstration 16 . [ 7S ] Secondly, but neither are the re- 
 ceived principles free from the like difficulties ; for, it may still be 
 demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods 
 of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one 
 can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His 
 will without all that apparatus: nay, if we narrowly consider it, 
 we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force 
 on those who hold the existence of those machines without the 
 mind ; for it has been made evident [ 76 ] that solidity, bulk, figure, 
 motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to 
 be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. 
 Whoever therefore supposes them 17 to exist (allowing the sup- 
 position possible) when they are not perceived does it mani- 
 festly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to 
 them 17 , as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those 
 perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything 
 but Spirit. 
 
 62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that 
 though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not ab- 
 
 16 Cf. sect. 3, 4, 22 — 24. 
 
 »7 ' them," i. e. the solid and extended objects, which are supposed to exist unperceived 
 and unpercipient — as distinguished from the Intelligent Cause to whom Berkeley attrib- 
 utes the orderly appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of ideas or objects in the 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 229 
 
 solutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary 
 to the producing of things in a constant regular way according to 
 the laws of nature. ["] There are certain general laws that run 
 through the whole chain of natural effects : these are learned by 
 the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as 
 well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of 
 life as to the explaining the various phenomena — which expli- 
 cation consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phe- 
 nomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same 
 thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production 
 of natural effects ; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to 
 the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for 
 appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these 
 regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme 
 Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that 
 a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are neces- 
 sary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the 
 producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. 
 Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intel- 
 ligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might 
 if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions 
 on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the 
 movements and put them in it : but yet, if He will act agreeably 
 to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and 
 maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of 
 the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly 
 adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; 
 as also that any disorder in them be attended with [ ?8 ] the per- 
 ception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which 
 being once corrected all is right again. 
 
 63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the 
 Author of nature display His overruling power in producing 
 some appearance out of the ordinary series of things 18 . Such 
 exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise 
 and awe men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but 
 
 18 So far as that series has been interpreted by us. The nature and moral office of 
 miraculous or supernatural events, in a system of Universal Providence, is here touched 
 upon. 
 
230 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain 
 reason why they should fail of that effect. [ 7 ?] Besides, God seems 
 to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the 
 works of nature, which discover so much harmony and con- 
 trivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom 
 and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into 
 a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events. 
 
 64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe 
 that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no 
 more than this : — ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, 
 there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to 
 that of cause and effect : there are also several combinations of 
 them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem 
 like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid 
 as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing 
 those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, 
 being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the phi- 
 losopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to 
 what purpose is that connexion ? And, since those instruments, 
 being barely inefficacious perceptions^ in the mind, are not sub- 
 servient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why 
 they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned 
 why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His 
 works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, 
 and so much according to rule; it not being [ 2 ° credible] that He 
 would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and 
 regularity to no purpose. [ 8o ] 
 
 65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of 
 ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of 
 a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is 
 not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but 
 the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that 
 I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the 
 ambient bodies, but the sign thereof 31 . Secondly, the reason why 
 ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular conir 
 
 «9 Cf. sect. 25. 
 
 30 ' imaginable' — in first edition. 
 
 21 According to Berkeley, Minds, Spirits, Persons are the only proper causes ; and it is 
 only by an abuse of language that the term ' cause' is applied to the Ideas or objects which 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 031 
 
 binations, is the same with that for combining letters into words 22 . 
 That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number 
 of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined 
 together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, 
 these combinations must be made by ride, and with wise con- 
 trivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed 
 unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such 
 actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting 
 such and such ideas — which in effect is all that I conceive to be 
 distinctly meant when it is said 2 3 that, by discerning the figure, 
 texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether 
 natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and 
 properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. 
 
 66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the 
 notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production 
 of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great 
 absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper 
 and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only 
 as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching 
 after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may 
 so call it) of the Author of nature, that ought to be the employ- 
 ment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to ex- 
 plain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have 
 too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, 
 that supreme and wise Spirit ' in whom we live, move, and have 
 our being.' 
 
 67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that — 
 though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no 
 
 are invariable antecedents of other ideas or objects — the prior form of their objective or 
 phenomenal existence. He contrasts so-called Physical with Spiritual Causation — the 
 latter being implied in our conception of mind ; the former consisting in the observable 
 relations of phenomena, in which causation proper is unperceived, and therefore non- 
 existent. Physical Science is the interpretation of natural signs, and is only confused 
 (Berkeley would say) by reference to an unconscious agency which is inconceivable. 
 
 22 Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal 
 Natural Symbolism as the true character of the sensible world. See next section, which 
 describes the orderly co-existences and sequences of nature as not causally necessary, but 
 arbitrarily constructed— -in order to be a means of social intercourse, and for the use of 
 man in his contemplation of the Supreme Mind. 
 
 n See Locke's Essay, B. IV. ch. 3, § 25—28, &c. 
 
232 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, move- 
 able substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers 
 describe Matter — yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of 
 matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, 
 and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless 
 substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is 
 the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is 
 pleased to excite ideas in us — [ 8l ] it doth not appear but that 
 Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to 
 which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a sub- 
 stance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without 
 a substance 24 . But secondly, though we should grant this un- 
 known substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed 
 to be? That it exists not in the mind 25 is agreed; and that it 
 exists not in place is no less certain — since all place or extension 
 exists only in the mind 26 , as hath been already proved. It re- 
 mains therefore that it exists nowhere at all. 
 
 68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given 
 us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; 
 for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, 
 unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of 
 negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under 
 or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports 
 nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of 
 a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the 
 unknown occasion^, at the presence of which ideas are excited in 
 us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything 
 can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor 
 reflection, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor 
 is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. 
 
 2 4 With Berkeley, material substance is merely the complement of simple ideas or 
 phenomena which arbitrarily constitute a particular thing. (Cf. sect. 37.) The Divine 
 Will is, with him, the cause of phenomena being thus constituted, combined, or substan- 
 tiated. His substance-proper, i.e. mind, is necessary, because an object-perceived neces- 
 sarily implies a percipient. 
 
 2 5 i. e. that it is not perceived. 
 
 36 i.e. ' place ' exists only as perceived or conceived by an intelligence — sense-percep- 
 tion being its real, and conception its imagined existence. Mind is thus, with Berkeley, 
 the place of locality and of space. Cf. Siris, sect. 285, &c. 
 
 *7 He refers to the Cartesian theory of occasional causes. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 233 
 
 The words ' to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken 
 in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able 
 to comprehend. 
 
 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far 
 as I can gather from the common use of language, that word 
 signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else some- 
 thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordi- 
 nary course of things. [ 82 ] But, when it is applied to Matter as 
 above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses ; for 
 Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent 
 or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of 
 all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our per- 
 ceptions in the latter sense — as when the burning my finger is 
 said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What there- 
 fore can be meant by calling matter an occasion ? This term is 
 either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from 
 its received signification. 
 
 70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not per- 
 ceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the 
 occasion of exciting ideas in our minds 28 . For, say you, since 
 we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and con- 
 stant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain 
 constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That 
 is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of 
 Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not 
 excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as 
 being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are never- 
 theless to God, by whom they are perceived 29 , as it were so many 
 occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on 
 our minds — that so things may go on in a constant uniform 
 manner. 
 
 71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter 
 is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence 
 
 28 So Geulinx and Malebranche. 
 
 ^ As known by the Divine intelligence, they are accordingly ideas. And, if this means 
 merely that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate 
 archetype — that the Ideas of God are symbolised in our senses, to be interpreted or mis- 
 interpreted by human minds, as reason in man is applied or misapplied — this theory allies 
 itself with the Platonic. It is partly worked out in Siris, 
 
234 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being 
 perceived ; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not 
 what sort, in the mind of God, [ 83 ] which are so many marks or 
 notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in 
 a constant and regular method — much after the same manner 
 as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that 
 harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a 
 tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, 
 and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter 
 (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from 
 what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to 
 deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against 
 what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unper- 
 ceived substance. 
 
 72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant 
 uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wis- 
 dom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds ; but this is all 
 that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, 
 it is evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and 
 powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances 
 of nature 30 . But, as for inert, sense/ess Matter, nothing that I per- 
 ceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts 
 of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest 
 phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, 
 though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for 
 its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of 
 that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I 
 think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. 
 It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to 
 God of exciting ideas in us ; and what this amounts to we have 
 just now seen. 
 
 73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which 
 induced men to suppose the existence of material substance ; that 
 so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those 
 motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent 
 
 30 ' It seems to me,' says Hume, ' that this theory of the universal energy and operation 
 of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently 
 apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined 
 in all its operations.' Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. VII. p. i. 
 
OF H UMA N KN O IV L EDGE. 235 
 
 that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that 
 colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or 
 accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for this reason 
 it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or sub- 
 stance wherein they did exist — since they could not be conceived 
 to exist by themselves 31 . Afterwards, in process of time, men 
 being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, 
 secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they 
 stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities 32 , 
 leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which 
 they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently 
 to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn 
 that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a 
 Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows [ 84 ] that we have 
 no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter 33 ; nay, that 
 it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long 
 as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of quali- 
 ties or accidents wherein they exist without the mind. 
 
 74. But — though it be allowed by the materialists themselves 
 that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting acci- 
 dents, and, the reason entirely ceasing 34 , one might expect the 
 mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the 
 belief of what was solely grounded thereon — yet the prejudice is 
 riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to 
 part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is 
 indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we apply to I know 
 not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, 
 though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. 
 For, what is there on our part, [ 8s ] or what do we perceive, 
 amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on 
 our minds, either by sense or reflection, from whence may be 
 inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived oc- 
 
 31 Is the assumption of the need for substance of some sort, percipient if not corporeal, 
 regarded by Berkeley as a truth of the absolute or common reason ? 
 
 3 2 e. g. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c. 
 
 33 That is, if we mean by Matter, something existing unperceived and unperceiving. 
 But ' matter,' in another and intelligible meaning of the word, according to Berkeley, may 
 and does exist. 
 
 3* Seeing that sensible phenomena are sufficiently ' supported ' by mind. 
 
236 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 casion ? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient 
 Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even 
 suspect He is directed by an inert occasion 35 to excite ideas in 
 our minds ? 
 
 75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of preju- 
 dice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains 
 so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a 
 stupid thoughtless somewhat, [ 86 ] by the interposition whereof it 
 would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and 
 remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though 
 we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, 
 when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion 
 on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge our- 
 selves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason 
 to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is — that 
 there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God ; for this, if 
 anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard 
 to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the 
 
 \ thing, but for the name. 
 
 76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, 
 and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not 
 dispute 36 . But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking sub- 
 stance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible quali- 
 ties, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be 
 any such thing ; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities 
 should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance 37 . 
 
 yy. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thought- 
 less support of extension and the other qualities or accidents 
 which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unper- 
 ceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incom- 
 prehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we 
 
 35 unless that ' occasion ' is only another term for His own Ideas. 
 
 3 6 Berkeley's philosophy seems to imply the existence of Divine Ideas, which receive 
 expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect interpreta- 
 tion. In this view, the assertion of the existence of Matter, material substance, or occa- 
 sion is simply an assertion that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a 
 reasonable «r interpretable universe ; and that it would be actually interpreted, if our 
 conceptions were harmonized with the Divine or Absolute Conception which it expresses. 
 The Divine Thought would thus be Absolute Truth or Being. Cf. Siris passim. 
 
 37 Cf. sect. 3—24. 
 
OF H UMA N- KN OWLEDGE. 
 
 237 
 
 have not a sense adapted to them. [ 8? ] But, if we had a new sense, 
 we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind 
 man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. — I 
 answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the 
 unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether 
 there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us ; and I 
 do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we 
 know not what, and we know not why. 
 
 78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish 
 us with new ideas or sensations ; and then we should have the 
 same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance 
 that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, 
 colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing 
 else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving 
 them ; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted 
 with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever. 
 
 79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe 
 the existence of Matter ? what if I cannot assign any use to it or 
 explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that 
 word ? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, 
 and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas ; 
 though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to 
 any particular explication of those words may be attended with 
 great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a 
 meaning, you may put them together as you please without 
 danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for exam- 
 ple, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you 
 do not take the words of that proposition in their usual accepta- 
 tion but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same 
 reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance with- 
 out accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall 
 understand just as much by one proposition as the other. 
 
 80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause 
 of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is-an unknown 
 somewhat — neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, 
 thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no 
 place ? For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance 
 
238 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, 
 hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter 
 is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use 
 the word ' Matter' in the same sense as other men use \ nothing,' 
 and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after 
 all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition 
 — the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either col- 
 lectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is 
 any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from 
 what is excited by the term nothing. 
 
 81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is 
 included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing — the 
 positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, in- 
 deed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract 
 general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say 
 they, the most abstract and general notion of all ; that is, to me, 
 the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great 
 variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose facul- 
 ties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author 
 of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And 
 for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted, narrow 
 inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the 
 Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost 
 folly and presumption — since there may be, for aught that I know, 
 innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one 
 another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from 
 sounds 38 . But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge 
 the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless 
 variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any 
 one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from 
 spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I suspect, 
 a downright repugnancy and trifling with words. — It remains 
 that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on 
 the part of Religion. 
 
 3 8 Matter and physical science is relative, inasmuch as we may suppose an indefinite 
 number of additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of sense-experience, of 
 course at present inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of 
 all J<r«J*-perceptions, and having ideas or objects of another sort altogether. 
 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 239 
 
 82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for 
 the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be 
 allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures 
 are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good 
 Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more 
 than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts 
 related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, 
 mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies 39 . To which 
 I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, 
 which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or 
 so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their 
 
 * truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things 
 do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, 
 when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable 
 to our principles : and the difference betwixt tilings and ideas, 
 realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 
 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philoso- 
 phers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind 4 °, 
 is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. 
 
 83. Again, whether there be or be not external things 41 , it is 
 agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking 
 our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived 
 by us ; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid 
 down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and sig- 
 nificancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, 
 so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems 
 so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the 
 premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. 
 
 84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much 
 of their stress and import by our principles. What must we 
 think of Moses' rod ? was it not really turned into a serpent, or 
 
 39 Holy Scripture, and the assumed possibility of its existence, added to our natural 
 tendency to believe, are the grounds on which Malebranche and Norris infer the existence 
 of a material world. Berkeley's material world needs no proof — unless of its permanent 
 orderliness, which he rests on suggestion and custom. His aim is not to prove that the 
 material world exists, but to explain what we should mean when we say that it exists. 
 
 *° i. e. existing uncognised by any intelligence — finite or Divine. 
 
 4» ' external things,' i. e. things existing absolutely, or out of all relation to any cognitive 
 agent. 
 
240 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators ? 
 And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the 
 marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and 
 taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or 
 idea only of wine ? The same may be said of all other mira- 
 cles ; [ 88 ] which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must 
 be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. — 
 To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and 
 the water into real wine. That this does not in the least con- 
 tradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 
 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already 
 so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the' 
 difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone 
 before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to 
 resume the explication of it in this place. [ 89 ] I shall only observe 
 that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and 
 taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with tne there 
 could be no doubt of its reality 42 ; — so that at bottom the scruple 
 concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on 
 the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than 
 against what has been said. 
 
 85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to 
 propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and 
 weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of 
 our tenets in their Consequences 43 . Some of these appear at first 
 sight — as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which 
 abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely 
 banished from philosophy. ' Whether corporeal substance can 
 think,' ' whether Matter be infinitely divisible,' and ' how it oper- 
 ates on spirit' — these and the like inquiries have given infinite 
 amusement to philosophers in all ages ; but, depending on the 
 
 *» The simultaneous consciousness of, or participation in, the ' same ' j«««-ideas, by 
 different persons, as distinguished from the purely individual or personal consciousness 
 of imaginary objects and emotions, is here referred to as a test of the reality of the 
 former. 
 
 43 They are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Treatise, sect. 85 — 156 : those 
 which apply to ideas and sensible things in sect. 86 — 134 ; what belongs to spirits, or sub- 
 jective substances and powers, in the remainder of the Treatise. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 24 1 
 
 existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our prin- 
 ciples. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to 
 religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce 
 from what has been premised ; but this will appear more plainly 
 in the sequel. 
 
 86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human 
 knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads — that of ideas 
 and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order. 
 
 And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge 
 of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we 
 have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two- 
 fold existence of the objects of sense 44 — the one intelligible or in 
 the mind, the other real and without the mind; [ 9 °] whereby un- 
 thinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their 
 own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I 
 mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd 
 notion, is the very root of Scepticism 4S ; for, so long as men 
 thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that 
 their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable 
 to real things, it follows they could not be certain that they had 
 any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the 
 things which are perceived are conformable to those which are 
 not perceived, or exist without the mind? [ 9I ] 
 
 87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered 
 only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, 
 there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they 
 are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes 
 existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. 
 We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. 
 What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really 
 and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but 
 only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things 
 
 44 Berkeley's 'principles' abo'ish this representative idea in perception, and recognise as 
 the real object only what we are sensibly conscious of— not any uncognised archetype. 
 
 45 So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who see in the hypothesis of a representative per- 
 ception, implying ' a twofold existence of the objects of sense,' the germ of scepticism. 
 Berkeley claims that under his interpretation of what reality, externality, and existence 
 mean, an intuitive knowledge of the real existence of sensible things is given to us. 
 
 16 
 
242 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even 
 whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really exist- 
 ing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for 
 aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom 
 and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things exist- 
 ing in rerum natura. All this sceptical cant follows from our 
 supposing a difference be ween things and ideas, and that the 
 former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It 
 were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments 
 urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of exter- 
 nal objects. [ 4<5 But this is too obvious to need being insisted on.] 
 88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking 
 things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only im- 
 possible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real 
 unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we 
 see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence 
 of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their 
 own bodies. And, after all their labouring and struggle of thought, 
 they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or 
 demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things 47 . 
 But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the 
 mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, 
 vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse 
 ourselves with the terms ' absolute,' 'external,' 'exist,' &c. — sig- 
 nifying we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of 
 my own being as of the being of those things which I actually 
 perceive by sense ; it being a manifest contradiction that any 
 sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or 
 touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since 
 the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being per- 
 ceived**. 
 
 * 6 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 47 This is admitted by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke. 
 
 +* On Berkeley's own principles, there is no contradiction in the non-existence in sense 
 of these ' qualities' of a material substance which we are not at the moment sensibly per- 
 cipient of — which we merely infer we should be percipient of on certain conditions, e. g. 
 the smell, &c. of an orange whilst we are only looking at it. Their non-existence in 
 imagination, when they are suggested by what we are sensibly conscious of, is indeed, on 
 his principles, contradictory. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 243 
 
 89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a 
 firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof 
 against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a 
 distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence ; 
 for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of 
 things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have 
 not fixed the meaning of those words 4 ?. Tiling or Being is the 
 most general name of all ; it comprehends under it two kinds 
 entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing 
 common but the name, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are 
 active, indivisible, [ 5 ° incorruptible] substances : the latter are 
 inert, fleeting, [ 5 °perishable passions,] or dependent beings, which 
 subsist not by themselves 51 , but are supported by, or exist in 
 minds or spiritual substances. [ 52 We comprehend our own 
 existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits 
 by reason 53 . We may be said to have some knowledge or notion 
 of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict 
 sense we have not ideas 54 . In like manner, we know and have a 
 notion of relations 55 between things or ideas — which relations 
 are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the 
 latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. 
 To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their 
 
 49 The chief end of the Berkeleian philosophy is to reach an intelligible conception of 
 Being, Existence, or Thing, (favourite terms with philosophers) ; which, according to 
 Berkeley, are not, as Locke would have it, simple ideas, but general names. Being or 
 Existence, as explained by Berkeley, may be viewed either in relation to its permanent or 
 to its variable element. In the former aspect it is the spiritual substance or self; in the 
 latter, when manifested in the j*«.r*-given co-existences of simple ideas or objects, it is 
 what we call material or sensible existence. Spirits and also syntheses of sense-given 
 objects may be called ' things.' With Berkeley the word ' thing' stands, not for an arche- 
 type of the associated groups of phenomena of which a mind is percipient, but either for 
 the groups themselves, or for the minds cognizant of them, and who cause the changes 
 which they manifest. 
 
 so Omitted in second edition. 
 
 5 1 But whilst ideas or objects depend on being perceived, do not spirits depend on ideas 
 in order to be percipient ? 
 
 5 2 What follows to the end of this section was added in the second edition. 
 
 53 "reason, 'i.e. reasoning or inference, from the changes in the sense-ideas or phenomena 
 of which we are conscious. 
 
 54 Cf. sect. 139 — 142. 
 
 55 ' Notion' is thus applied by Berkeley to our knowledge of minds, and to our knowl- 
 edge of relations among ideas. 
 
244 0F THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 respective kinds the object of human knowledge and 5 * 5 subject of 
 discourse ; and that the term idea would be improperly extended 
 to signify everything we know or have any notion of] 
 
 90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really 
 exist 57 ; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist with- 
 out the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances 
 of any archetypes existing without the mind s8 : since the very 
 being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an 
 idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived 
 by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin — 
 in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but 
 imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. 
 Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 'without the mind' in 
 another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind ; thus, 
 when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it 
 must be in another mind 59 . 
 
 91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates 
 in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on 
 the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all 
 sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to 
 subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are 
 allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and 
 consequently cannot subsist by themselves. 60 Thus far it is 
 agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived 
 
 s6 ' and ' = or (?), — unless ' object ' is used in a vague meaning, including more than 
 idea. Cf. sect. 1; also New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. IX, 12; Siris, sect. 297, 
 308. 
 
 57 Cf. sect. 33, for the meaning of the term ' real.' 
 
 58 i.e. without or unperceived by any mind, human or Divine; which is quite consistent 
 with their being ' external ' to a finite percipient, i.e. independent of his will, and deter- 
 mined by the conceptions of a higher mind than his — consistent also with the existence of 
 archetypal Ideas in the Divine Mind. 
 
 59 Berkeley here explains what he regards as the legitimate meanings of the term exter- 
 nality. Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world — in some con- 
 ception of the term 'external.' It is the business of the philosopher to say what that 
 conception ought to be. Berkeley here acknowledges (a) an externality in our own pos- 
 sible experience, past and future, as determined by natural laws, which are independent 
 of the will of the percipient ; and (b) an externality to our own conscious experience, 
 in the contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future, experience of other minds, finite 
 or Divine. 
 
 60 i. e. they are not properly substances, though Berkeley sometimes speaks of them as 
 such. Cf. sect. 37. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 245 
 
 by sense an existence independent of a substance or support 
 wherein they may exist [ 92 ], we detract nothing from the received 
 opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that 
 respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthink- 
 ing beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from 
 being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other sub- 
 stance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits 
 which act and think and perceive them ; whereas philosophers 
 vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, ex- 
 tended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter — to which 
 they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking 
 beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind what- 
 soever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they sup- 
 pose only ideas of the corporeal substances 61 created by Him: 
 if indeed they allow them to be at all created 62 . 
 
 92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal 
 substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepti- 
 cism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all 
 the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great 
 a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out 
 of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philoso- 
 phers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have 
 thought Matter^ to be uncreated and coeternal with Him. How 
 great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages 
 were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so 
 visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner- 
 stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to 
 the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow 
 a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched 
 sect of Atheists. 
 
 61 ' ideas of the corporeal substances' — whereas Berkeley might say real ideas which 
 are themselves our world of sensible things. 
 
 62 On the scheme of intelligible Realism, ' creation' of matter is the production, in 
 finite minds, of sense-objects or ideas, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in a 
 language which God employs for the expression of His Ideas, and of which human science 
 is the partial interpretation. Cf. Skis, sect. 326. 
 
 6 3 'Matter,' i.e. an unperceiving and unperceived Substance and Cause — to which 
 Atheists attribute our personal existence and that of the universe in which we find our- 
 selves. Such Matter once allowed, what proof that it is not Supreme or Absolute Being ? 
 
246 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in 
 with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding 
 immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and 
 subject to corruption as the body ; which exclude all freedom, 
 intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and in- 
 stead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance 
 the root and origin of all beings ; that they should hearken to 
 those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind 
 over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of 
 events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the 
 impulse of one body on another — all this is very natural. And, 
 on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the 
 enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, 
 and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce 
 everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them 
 deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fort- 
 ress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like[ 93 ], 
 have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most 
 cheap and easy triumph in the world. 
 
 94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not 
 only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the 
 same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms 
 depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, 
 and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations 
 in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being 
 perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship 
 their own ideas — but rather address their homage to that Eternal 
 Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things. 
 
 95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the 
 articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Chris- 
 tians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples 
 and objections have been raised by Socinians and others ? But 
 do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition 
 that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the 
 form or that which is perceived by sense 64 , but the material sub- 
 stance, which remains the same under several forms? Take 
 
 6 « Of which Berkeley does not predicate a numerical identity. Cf. Third Dialogue 
 between Hylas and I'hilonous, pp. 343 — 345. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 247 
 
 away this material substance — about the identity whereof all the 
 dispute is — and mean by body what every plain ordinary person 
 means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and 
 felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, 
 and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. 
 
 96. Matter 65 being once expelled out of nature drags with it 
 so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible num- 
 ber of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns 
 in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so 
 much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have 
 produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to 
 me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, 
 peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. 
 
 97. Beside the external 66 existence of the objects of percep- 
 tion, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard 
 to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it 
 hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in 
 the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and 
 perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, 
 appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, 
 and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody 
 knows ; but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysi- 
 cian, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by 
 men of ordinary sense. Bid -'our servant meet you at such a 
 time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the 
 meaning of those words ; in conceiving that particular time and 
 place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not 
 the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those 
 particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the 
 continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will 
 perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. 
 
 98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple 
 idea of time[W\, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my 
 mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I 
 
 6 5 ' matter,' i.e. absolute Matter, unknowing, and unknown by any intelligence. 
 
 66 ' external,' i. e. in the philosophical, but not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. 
 sect. 90, note. 
 
248 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no 
 notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, 
 and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd 
 thoughts of my existence 67 ; — since that doctrine lays one under 
 an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away 
 innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihi- 
 lated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. 
 Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of 
 ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit 
 must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding 
 each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain 
 consequence that the soul always thinks ; and in truth whoever 
 shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence 
 of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task 68 . 
 99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and 
 motion from all other qualities, and consider them by them- 
 selves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great ex- 
 travagances. [^ Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the 
 ' fire is not hot,' nor ' the wall white,' &c, or that heat and colour 
 are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which 
 depend on a twofold abstraction ; first, it is supposed that exten- 
 sion, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible 
 qualities ; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be 
 abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, 
 and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, 
 acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and 
 alike real ; that where the extension is, there is the colour too, 
 i.e. in his mind 7 °, and that their archetypes can exist only in 
 some other mind**\ and that the objects of sense 72 are nothing 
 
 6 7 i.e. of what Mind, Self, the Ego means, of its relation to time, and what personal 
 identity consists in. Berkeley sometimes seems to imply that the existence of the Ego is 
 independent of rime or succession, in an eternal present (an / am), amid the changes of 
 phenomena of which it is conscious. 
 
 68 As the esse of sense-ideas or sensible objects is percipi, according to Berkeley, so the 
 esse of minds or persons is percipere. The existence of a Mind thus depends on con- 
 sciousness, and the sensible existence of Matter depends on a sense-percipient. 
 
 69 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 7° Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43, &c. 
 
 ?' i. e. as ideas, sensible or intelligible — human or Divine. 
 
 7* ' objects of sense,' i.e. sensible or external things. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of 
 thing, as distinct from object-proper or simple idea. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 249 
 
 but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) 
 concreted together ; none of all which can be supposed to exist 
 unperceived. [ 73 And that consequently the wall is as truly white 
 as it is extended, and in the same sense.] 
 
 100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every 
 one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happi- 
 ness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from 
 everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So like- 
 wise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas 
 of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words 
 stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons 
 and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and 
 the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect one 
 may make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being 
 the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave him- 
 self in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his 
 neighbours than he did before. This hint may suffice to let any 
 one see the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed 
 towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. [ 9S ] 
 
 101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant 
 about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and 
 Mathematics ; with regard to each of these I shall make some 
 observations. — And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Phil- 
 osophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All 
 that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties 
 and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally 
 from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness 
 as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, 
 and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, 
 by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of 
 things. The real essence™, the internal qualities and constitution 
 of every the meanest object, is hid from our view ; something 
 
 73 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 74 With Berkeley, the nominal or logical essence is the real essence of things, in as far 
 as things are in sense what they are conceived to be. But this is quite consistent with the 
 fact that we may and do misinterpret the sensible symbols which constitute our material 
 universe ; and thus our conceptions of their meaning are often misconceptions — so that 
 their logical or nominal essence becomes different from their real essence. 
 
250 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is 
 beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or com- 
 prehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all 
 this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false 
 principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think 
 we know nothing of those things which we perfectly compre- 
 hend. 
 
 102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves 
 ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that every- 
 thing includes within itself the cause of its properties ; or that 
 there is in each object an inward essence which is the source 
 whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. 
 [9 6 ] Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult 
 qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical 
 causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, 
 of insensible particles? 5 ; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent 
 or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well 
 as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to 
 endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by 
 figure, motion, magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in 
 vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not 
 at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those in- 
 stances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of 
 another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations 
 are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by 
 this doctrine ?6 . 
 
 103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. 
 That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the 
 moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But 
 how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? 
 Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that 
 it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being 
 impelled or protruded towards each other ? But, nothing is 
 
 75 e.g. Locke's Essay, IV. 3. 
 
 7 6 Berkeleyism is so far a Spiritual Positivism, which eliminates all causation from the 
 objective world, concentrates it in Mind, and seeks among phenomena or ideas only for 
 the laws of their constant co-existence and succession. But the modern Positivists deny 
 thai we may thus infer the ultimate causality of Mind, holding that the ultimate cause or 
 power is incognisable — that the universe is a ' singular effect." 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 25 I 
 
 determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for 
 aught we know) be termed ' impulse,' or ' protrusion,' as ' attrac- 
 tion.' [97] Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, 
 and this also is accounted for by attraction ; but, in this as in the 
 other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides 
 the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is 
 produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much 
 as aimed at. 
 
 104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and 
 compare them together, we may observe some likeness and con- 
 formity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to 
 the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, 
 crystallization, &c, there is something alike, namely, an union or 
 mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like 
 phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who 
 has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that 
 only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and 
 out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies 
 should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange, 
 because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, 
 that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the 
 moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it 
 is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts 
 take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain 
 similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that 
 argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards 
 each other, which he denotes by the general name ' attraction,' 
 whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. 
 Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous 
 globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or 
 anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law 
 of nature. 
 
 105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt 
 natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their know- 
 ledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter 
 knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them — for that can 
 be no other than the will of a spirit — but only in a greater large- 
 ness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agree- 
 
252 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 merits are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular 
 effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, 
 which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed 
 in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought 
 after by the mind ; for that they extend our prospect beyond what 
 is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable 
 conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great 
 distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come; 
 which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected 
 by the mind. 
 
 106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are 
 apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice 
 of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried 
 to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in 
 the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears 
 in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it uni- 
 versal ; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body 
 is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas 
 it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each 
 other; [9 8 ] and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to 
 bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to 
 shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the 
 elasticity of the air. ["] There is nothing necessary or essential 
 in the case 77 , but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing 
 Spirit ?8 , who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend 
 towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps 
 others at a fixed distance ; and to some He gives a quite contrary 
 tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient. 
 
 107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down 
 the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse 
 themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient 
 cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the 
 
 77 According to Sir W. Hamilton, for example, we are intellectually necessitated to 
 think that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in another form — but not 
 necessarily in this, that, or the other particular form ; for a knowledge of which we are 
 indebted to experience. 
 
 7 8 In other words, what the preceding form of any new phenomena actually w.is, li.is 
 been determined by the Supreme Will, and is, in that sense, arbitrary. God is the proper 
 cause of the antecedent and consequent forms or phenomena of existence being what we 
 actually find them to be. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 253 
 
 whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it 
 should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts 
 (contrary to what some hold 79 ) about the final causes of things ; 
 [ 8o for, besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertain- 
 ment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not 
 only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also 
 direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications 
 of things;] and I must confess I see no reason why pointing out 
 the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for 
 which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, 
 should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and 
 altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been 
 premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should 
 not still be studied, and observations and experiments made — 
 which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw 
 any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable 
 habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of 
 God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the 
 world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation 
 of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general 
 laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena ; I 
 do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend 
 on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uni- 
 formly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for 
 principles 8l — which we cannot evidently know. 
 
 108. [ 82 It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent 
 methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of 
 its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and 
 directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life. And 
 to me] Those men who frame 83 general rules from the phenomena, 
 and afterwards derive 84 the phenomena from those rules, seem 8s 
 
 79 He probably refers to Bacon. 
 
 80 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 81 Our assumed ' principles,' or supposed laws of nature, maybe subordinate or special, 
 and therefore variable, associations of sensible signs which, in their ultimate meaning, 
 express a perfect, and therefore necessary, Divine Idea. 
 
 82 Omitted in the second edition. 
 
 8 3 i.e. inductively. 
 8 * i.e. deductively. 
 
 8 S * seem to consider signs rather than causes ' — ' seem to be grammarians, and their 
 
254 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 to consider signs rather than causes. 86 A man may well under- 
 stand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able 
 to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very pos- 
 sible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of 
 general grammar-rules ; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, 
 it is not impossible we may extend 8? the analogy too far, and by 
 that means run into mistakes. 
 
 109. [ 88 To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other 
 books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense 
 and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical 
 remarks on the language ; so, in perusing the volume of nature, 
 methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exact- 
 ness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or 
 shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to our- 
 selves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with 
 a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural 
 things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the 
 grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to 
 make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, sub- 
 servient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the 
 sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. [ I0 °] 
 
 no. [ 89 The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural 
 Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated 
 Treatise of Mechanics^] [ I01 ] In the entrance of which justly 
 admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into 
 absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar ; 
 
 art the grammar of nature. Two ways there are of learning a language — either by rule 
 or by practice' — in first edition. 
 
 86 'A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the gram- 
 mar of it, or being able to say,' &c. — in first edition. 
 
 8 7 ' extend ' — ' stretch' — in first edition. 
 
 88 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 S9 In the first edition, instead of this sentence, the section commences thus : ' The best 
 grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of 
 Mechanics, demonstrated and applied to nature by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation 
 whom all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the perform- 
 ance of that extraordinary person; only some things he has advanced so directly opposite 
 to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due 
 to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.' He refers, of 
 course, to Newton. The first edition was published in Ireland — hence ' neighbouring 
 nation.' — On absolute Space, cf. Siris, sect. 270, &c. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 255 
 
 — which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, 
 does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the 
 mind ; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to 
 sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they 
 bear no relation at all. 
 
 in. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or ab- 
 stracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence 
 of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what 
 has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the 
 rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, 
 which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and 
 immoveable ; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, 
 being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible 
 bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. Place he defines 
 to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and 
 according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. 
 Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from ab- 
 solute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one re- 
 lative place to another. [ I02 ] And, because the parts of absolute 
 space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged 
 to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and 
 motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable. 
 But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our 
 senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to 
 be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved 
 relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same 
 body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with 
 contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place 
 is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the 
 apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which 
 should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true 
 we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions 
 by the following properties. — First, in true or absolute motion all 
 parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, 
 partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being 
 moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body 
 moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion 
 of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed 
 
256 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourth ly, 
 true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body 
 moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no 
 centrifugal force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or 
 absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion. 
 
 112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess 
 it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than 
 relative**', so that to conceive motion there must be at least con- 
 ceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to 
 each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being 
 it could not possibly be moved. This to me seems very evident, 
 in that the idea I have of motion does necessarily include rela- 
 tion. — [ 9I Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little atten- 
 tion may satisfy them.] 
 
 113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive 
 more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, 
 namely, that on which the force causing the change in the dis- 
 tance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however 
 some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved 
 which changes its distance from some other body, whether the 
 force p 2 or action] causing that change were impressed on it or 
 no, yet as p 3 I cannot assent to this ; for, since we are told] rela- 
 tive motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in. 
 the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common 
 sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I 
 ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along 
 the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, be- 
 cause they change distance with his feet ? To me it appears that 
 though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet 
 it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated 
 from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not 
 think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which 
 
 90 On motion, cf. Analyst, qu. 12, and De Motu. See also Malebranche, Recherche, I. 8. 
 All attempts to imagine space imply the thought of locomotive sense-experience — an 
 unimpeded, as distinguished from an impeded power of locomotion. Cf. sect. 116. 
 
 9' Omitted in second edition. 
 
 9 a Added in second edition. 
 
 93 Omitted in second edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 257 
 
 is not therefore itself in motion, [)> 4 I mean relative motion, for 
 other I am not able to conceive.] 
 
 114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion 
 which is related to it varies 95 . A man in a ship may be said to 
 be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet 
 move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in 
 respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the 
 common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define 
 the place of any body ; and what is quiescent in respect of that 
 is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a 
 greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of 
 things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order 
 therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal 
 world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to 
 be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound 
 our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute mo- 
 tion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than rela- 
 tive motion thus defined. For, as has been already observed, 
 absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incompre- 
 hensible ; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-men- 
 tioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion 
 will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of 
 the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular 
 relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experi- 
 ment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae Naturalis 
 Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the 
 vessel [ x ° 3 ] at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest 
 relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at all; as is plain 
 from the foregoing section. 
 
 115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, 
 that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other 
 body; secondly, that the force occasioning that change be im- 
 pressed on it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, 
 agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, 
 a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is 
 possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance 
 
 94 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 95 See Locke's Essay, B. II. 13. § 7—10. 
 
 17 
 
258 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 from some other to be moved, though it have no force * 6 applied 
 to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it 
 is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined 
 by us to be [ 97 applied or] impressed on that body thought to 
 move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing 
 to be in motion which is not, and that is all, [ 98 but does not 
 prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body is 
 moved merely because it changes distance from another; since 
 as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving force 
 was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. 
 So, on the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof 
 preserve a given position between themselves) is imagined to 
 exist, some there are who think that it can be moved all manner 
 of ways, though without any change of distance or situation to 
 any other bodies ; which we should not deny if they meant only 
 that it might have an impressed force, which, upon the bare 
 creation of other bodies, would produce a motion of some cer- 
 tain quantity and determination. But that an actual motion 
 (distinct from the impressed force or power productive of change 
 of place in case there were bodies present whereby to define it) 
 can exist in such a single body, I must confess I am not able to 
 comprehend.] 
 
 116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic 
 consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute 
 Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related 
 to bodies ; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear 
 upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other 
 objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire narrowly, we shall 
 find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all 
 body. This I must confess seems impossible^, as being a most 
 abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, 
 if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space ; but if I 
 find a resistance, then I say there is Body : and in proportion as 
 the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is 
 more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, 
 
 9« ' applied to' — ' impressed on' — in first edition. 
 
 97 Added in second edition. 
 
 9 s What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 99 ' seems impossible' — ' is above my capacity' — in first edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 259 
 
 it is not to be supposed that the word 'space' stands for an idea 
 distinct from or conceivable without body and motion — though 
 indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a 
 distinct idea that may be separated from all others ; which has 
 occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all 
 the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there 
 still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only 
 that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved 
 on all sides without the least resistance ; but if that too were 
 annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no 
 Space 100 . Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing does 
 furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from 
 what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and 
 distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concern- 
 ing Vision. 
 
 117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those 
 disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned 
 concerning the nature oipure Space. But the chief advantage aris- 
 ing from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to 
 which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject 
 imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real 
 Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which 
 is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which 
 may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is cer- 
 tain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, 
 have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or 
 annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some 
 of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommuni- 
 cable attributes of God agree to it 1 . Which doctrine, hqw un- 
 worthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must 
 confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we 
 adhere to the received opinions. 
 
 118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make 
 some enquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative 
 
 100 i.e. pure Space, as immediately perceived, is ultimately the sensation of an unresisted 
 motion of the body, or of any of its organs. See this less fully developed in New Theory 
 of Vision. 
 
 1 Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which appeared in 1706. 
 
2 6o OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 knowledge, to wit, Mathematics 2 . These, how celebrated soever 
 they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, 
 which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless 
 be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if so be that in their 
 principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the 
 professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathe- 
 maticians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height 
 of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the considera- 
 tion of quantity: and they do not ascend into any enquiry con- 
 cerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the 
 particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, 
 does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. 
 That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and 
 their way of deduction from those principles clear and incon- 
 testable, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain 
 erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathe- 
 matics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though 
 tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science ; 
 and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are dif- 
 fused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect 
 the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other 
 men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general 
 ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. 
 
 119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object ab- 
 stract ideas of Number ; of which to understand the properties 
 and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative 
 knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of 
 numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philos- 
 ophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and 
 elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling 
 numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve 
 only for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the 
 minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries 
 involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural 
 things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into our own 
 thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps 
 entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, 
 a Sect. 118— 132. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6l 
 
 and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many difficilcs 
 nugce, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote 
 the benefit of life. [ IO *] 
 
 1 20. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, 
 from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly 
 follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a 
 'collection of units,' we may conclude that, if there be no such 
 thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number 
 in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The 
 theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the 
 names and figures, as likewise from all us.e and practice, as well 
 as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have 
 nothing at all for their object ; hence we may see how entirely 
 the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune 
 and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere 
 speculation. 
 
 121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the 
 specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time 
 in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, 
 it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the 
 vanity of that pretence ; and this will plainly appear by taking a 
 view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that 
 originally put men on the study of that science, and to what 
 scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, 
 for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of count- 
 ers, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each 
 whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of what- 
 ever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found 
 out the more compendious ways of making one character stand 
 in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation 
 of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repe- 
 tition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification 
 of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may 
 be most aptly expressed ; which seems to have been done in 
 imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed be- 
 twixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures 
 answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, 
 corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to 
 
2 62 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were 
 contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of 
 the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the 
 whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the 
 same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to 
 read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly 
 known. For then the number of any particular things is said to 
 be known, when we know the name or figures (with their due 
 arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to 
 them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations 
 of arithmetic know the srgns of any part of the particular sums 
 signified by them; and, thus computing in signs, (because of the 
 connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes 
 of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly 
 to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we 
 intend to number. 
 
 122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things but the 
 signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but 
 because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and 
 dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeeably to what we have 
 before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens 
 here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by 
 numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of 
 particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into 
 a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe 
 that it is evident from what has been said, those things which 
 pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in 
 reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numer- 
 able things, except only names and characters, which originally 
 came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, 
 or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men 
 had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for 
 their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as 
 if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and sub- 
 serviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent 
 criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely 
 verbal. [i°s] 
 
 3 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 263 
 
 123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension*, which 
 is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite ex- 
 tension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom 
 or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the 
 same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable 
 and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations 
 in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or 
 make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source 
 from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes 
 which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense 
 of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a 
 mind not yet debauched by learning ; so is it the principal occa- 
 sion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the 
 study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if 
 we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumer- 
 able parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at 
 once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of diffi- 
 culties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a 
 reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment 
 thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto 
 has been. 
 
 124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be 
 the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, 
 and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, there- 
 fore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension 
 that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it ; but, it 
 is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any 
 particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, 
 or figure to myself in my mind : wherefore I conclude they are 
 not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the 
 extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas ; and 
 it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into 
 an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not in 
 finitely divisible 5 . If by finite extension be meant something 
 
 4 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 122 — 125, 149 — 160. 
 
 5 Infinitely divisible extension, being unperceived, must be non-existent — if existence 
 necessarily depends on a percipient, and must be actually perceived. The only possible 
 extension is then sensible extension, which cannot be infinitely divided, but only divided 
 down to the point at which its parts become insensible or non-existent. 
 
264 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, 
 and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. [ Io6 ] But if the 
 terms ' extension,' ' parts,' &c, are taken in any sense conceiv- 
 able, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension 
 consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a 
 contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be 
 so;[ 107 ] and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of 
 any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and 
 slow degrees, as a converted Gentile 6 to the belief of transubstan- 
 tiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into prin- 
 ciples ; and those propositions which once obtain the force and 
 credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise what- 
 ever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all exami- 
 nation. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this 
 means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. 
 
 125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doc- 
 trine of abstract general ideas may be [ 7 easily] persuaded that 
 (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract 
 is infinitely divisible. And any one who thinks the objects of 
 sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be 
 brought to admit that 8 a line but an inch long may contain in- 
 numerable parts — really existing, though too small to be dis- 
 cerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geo- 
 metricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their 
 reasonings ; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the 
 arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite 
 divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [ 9 But this, if it 
 be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to 
 treat of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only ob- 
 serve in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond 
 and tenacious of that doctrine. 
 
 126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems 
 and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal 
 ideas (sect. 15. Introd.) ; where it is explained in what sense this 
 
 6 ' converted Gentile' — ' pagan convert' — in first edition. 
 
 7 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 8 ' will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that," &c. — ' will not stick to affirm 
 that,' &c. — in first edition. 
 
 9 Omitted in second edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6$ 
 
 ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures 
 included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable 
 others of different sizes ; or, in other words, the geometer con- 
 siders them abstracting from their magnitude — which does not 
 imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not 
 what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but 
 looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Hence 
 it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be 
 spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is 
 regarded not in itself, but as it is universal ; and it is universal 
 only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines 
 greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand 
 parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. 
 After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a 
 very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through 
 mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature. 
 
 127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is 
 possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is 
 said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is 
 true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things 
 signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their 
 thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described 
 on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such 
 thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch ; but there is of a 
 mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that 
 inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take 
 one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the 
 radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or 
 more ; for, though the ten thousandth part of that line considered 
 in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected 
 without any error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, 
 being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it 
 may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it follows 
 that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be 
 taken of 10,000 parts or more. 
 
 1 28. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the 
 end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we 
 speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained 
 
266 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine 
 the matter throughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot 
 conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a 
 thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than 
 an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a line is 
 infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great 10 . 
 What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, 
 to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been 
 thought necessary in geometry. 
 
 129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed 
 from this false principle might, one would, think, have been 
 esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not 
 what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori [ 10 *~\ are not to be 
 admitted against propositions relating to infinity — as though it 
 were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contra- 
 dictions ; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a 
 necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever 
 considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived 
 on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather 
 acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go 
 through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever 
 embraced for true. 
 
 130. Of late [ IO °] the speculations about Infinites have run so 
 high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no 
 small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present 
 age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding 
 that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, 
 do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself 
 subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a 
 second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there 
 are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c, without 
 ever coming to an end: so that according' to them an inch does 
 not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of 
 an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be 
 who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing 
 at all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is 
 
 10 ' we must mean a line,' &c. — ' we mean (if we mean anything) a line," &c. — in first 
 edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 267 
 
 any positive quantity or part of extension which, though mul- 
 tiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. 
 [ IIG ] And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think 
 the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, should 
 itself be nothing at all ; which they who hold infinitesimals of 
 the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged 
 to maintain. 
 
 131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both 
 in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts 
 infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any 
 finite quantity ? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it 
 will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and 
 those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing 
 a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To 
 this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and 
 promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and 
 unshaken on our principles — that science considered as practical 
 will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has 
 been said. But to set this in a due light, and shew how lines and 
 figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, with- 
 out supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible, may be 
 the proper business of another place". For the rest, though it 
 should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts 
 of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any pre- 
 judice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence 
 derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to 
 be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application 12 
 would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ 
 them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of 
 life, or have a more direct influence on the manners. 
 
 132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are 
 discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, 
 which could never have been if their existence included a contra- 
 diction in it — I answer that upon a thorough examination it will 
 not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of 
 
 11 See Analyst. 
 
 12 ' men of great abilities and obstinate application,' &c. — ' men of the greatest abilities 
 and most obstinate application,' &c. — in first edition. 
 
268 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities 
 less than the minimum scnsibile ; nay, it will be evident this is 
 never done, it being impossible. ['3 And, whatever mathematicians 
 may think of fluxions, or the differential calculus and the like, a 
 little reflection will shew them that, in working by those methods, 
 they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what 
 are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and 
 almost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or infinitesimals of in- 
 finitesimals, if they please ; but at bottom this is all, they being 
 in truth finite — nor does the solution of problems require the 
 supposing any other. But this will be more clearly made out 
 hereafter.] 
 
 133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very 
 numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those 
 false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of 
 this treatise ; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the 
 same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence 
 do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true 
 philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the ab- 
 solute 1 * existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that 
 wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, 
 whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength 
 and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real exist- 
 ence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allow- 
 ing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, 
 no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great 
 many inexplicable difficulties arise ; if the supposition of Matter's 
 is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one 
 single reason ; if its consequences cannot endure the light of 
 examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the 
 dark and general pretence of infinites being incomprehensible;' 
 if withal the removal of this Matter** be not attended with the 
 least evil consequence ; if it be not even missed in the world, 
 
 »3 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. 
 
 M ' absolute,' i. e. unperceived or irrelative existence — supposed to be either something 
 extended, or something of which we have no positive conception at all. 
 
 •5 i. e. absolute or unperceived Matter, but not the relative or perceived material world 
 of the senses. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 269 
 
 but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; 
 if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon 
 supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is 
 perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion — methinks we 
 may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though 
 it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of 
 Matter 15 had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have 
 evidently demonstrated that it is not. 
 
 134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, 
 several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean 
 parts of learning, are rejected as useless [ l6 and in effect conversant 
 about nothing at all]. But, how great a prejudice soever against 
 our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply 
 engaged, and made large advances in studies of that nature, yet 
 by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike 
 to the principles and tenets herein laid down — that they abridge 
 the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, 
 compendious, and attainable than they were before. 
 
 135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning 
 the knowledge of Ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the 
 next place to treat of Spirits 17 — with regard to which, perhaps, 
 human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. 
 The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant 
 of the nature of spirits is — our not having an idea of it. But, 
 surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human under- 
 standing that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is mani- 
 festly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I 
 mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall 
 here add — that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance 
 or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but 
 
 J S See note 15 on previous page. 
 
 16 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 «7 Sect. 135—156 treat of the consequences of the new Principles of Human Knowl- 
 edge, in their application to Spirits or Minds — the second of the two correlatives in the 
 dualism of Berkeley. This dualism Berkeley does not sufficiently explain. When he 
 speaks of Mind as a Substance, and of minds in the plural, he cannot mean by ' substance' 
 what Spinoza means — that which for its existence needs nothing beyond itself. Mind, 
 with Berkeley, needs ideas, and must be conscious ; and finite minds are dependent on 
 God, in a relation which he does not define. 
 
270 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself 
 be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd. 
 
 136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some 
 have imagined 18 ) proper to know substances withal, which, if 
 we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To 
 this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon 
 us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas 
 of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by 
 the terms soid and substance is only some particular sort of idea 
 or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly con- 
 sidered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, 
 in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active 
 thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them 
 for not being able to comprehend a round square. 
 
 137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the 
 manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and 
 heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the 
 soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced 
 a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from 
 their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an 
 idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the existence 
 whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or 
 likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other 
 refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. 
 But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble 
 a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may 
 in some other respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or 
 image be in all respects like the original. 
 
 1 38. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible 
 it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the 
 power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there re- 
 mains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, 
 by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and 
 perceives ; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of 
 that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those 
 powers should be represented in an idea ['^or notion], it is evident 
 there can be no idea [ I9 or notion] of a spirit. 
 
 18 Locke. «» Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 14a. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 Jl 
 
 139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by 
 the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, 
 or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or 
 signify a real thing — which is neither an idea nor like an idea, 
 but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. 
 What I am myself — that which I denote by the term / — is the 
 same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. [ 2 °But if 
 I should say that /was nothing, or that /was an idea or notion, 
 nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these pro- 
 positions.] If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word, 
 and that, since the immediate significations of other names are by 
 common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why 
 that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not par- 
 take in the same appellation, I answer, all the unthinking objects 
 of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their 
 existence consists only in being perceived ; whereas a soul or 
 spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being 
 perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking 21 . It is therefore 
 necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding 
 natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish 
 between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. 
 
 140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea 
 [ 22 or rather a notion] of spirit; that is, we understand the mean- 
 ing of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything 
 of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds 
 of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be 
 resemblances of them ; so we know other spirits by means of 
 our own soul — which in that sense is the image or idea of them ; 
 it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by 
 me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another 23 . 
 
 20 Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142. 
 
 81 If the existence of a mind consists in perceiving, it follows that mind is as dependent 
 on ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind. 
 
 22 Introduced in second edition, in which he professes to apply the term notion exclu- 
 sively to our knowledge of the Ego, and to our knowledge of relations among our ideas. 
 Sect. 142. 
 
 *3 We know other minds or Egos phenomenally, i. e. through phenomena, or by infer- 
 ence from them, but not as ideas or phenomena of which we ourselves are conscious. Cf. 
 sect. 148. It is thus a phenomenal knowledge that we have of other finite minds — of Ego 
 viewed empirically and in plurality. The real meaning of Ego in the plural number, dis- 
 
2?2 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 141. [ 24 The natural immortality of the soul[ 1 "] is a neces- 
 sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we at- 
 tempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that 
 tenet.] It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural 
 immortality of the soul 25 are of opinion that it is absolutely in- 
 capable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator 
 who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken 
 or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They 
 indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or 
 system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the 
 body ; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a 
 being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of 
 the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion has been 
 greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, 
 as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue 
 and religion. [ II2 ] But it has been made evident that bodies, of 
 what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the 
 mind — which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than 
 light is from darkness 26 . We have shewn that the soul is indi- 
 visible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorrupt- 
 ible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, 
 decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befal natural 
 bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) can- 
 not possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance: 
 such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature ; 
 that is to say, ' the soul of man is naturally immortal 27 .' 
 
 142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our 
 souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inac- 
 tive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so 
 wholly different, that when we say 'they exist,' 'they are known,' 
 
 tinguished from the absolute or transcendental Ego, is a question which Berkeley has not 
 discussed. 
 
 *4 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 *5 ' the soul,' i. e. the finite mind or empirical Ego. 
 
 36 Tli is is an emphatic assertion of the dualism of Berkeley — Minds or Egos being dis- 
 tinguished from their ideas or objects. 
 
 *i Although minds are dependent on ideas, as well as ideas on minds, yet minds are 
 not, by any abstract necessity, dependent on sense-ideas or physical organization. Hence, 
 while pure materialism is, on Berkeley's principles, a contradiction, the continued exist- 
 ence of a disembodied spirit involves no necessary absurdity. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 273 
 
 or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything 
 common to both natures 28 . There is nothing alike or common 
 in them ; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlarge- 
 ment of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we 
 do a triangle 29 , seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a 
 sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of mo- 
 ment towards clearing several important questions, and prevent- 
 ing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the 
 soul. [ 3 °We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea 
 of an active being, or of an action 31 , although we may be said to 
 have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my 
 mind, and its acts about ideas — inasmuch as I know or under- 
 stand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have 
 some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion 
 may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so ; but 
 yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish 
 things very different by different names. It is also to be re- 
 marked that, all relations including an act of the mind 32 , we can- 
 not so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of 
 the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the mod- 
 ern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and 
 acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.] 
 
 143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract 
 ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate 
 and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual 
 things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions 
 
 28 The objective essence of matter, or the sense-given non-ego, is, with Berkeley, purely 
 phenomenal or ideal ; the essence of mind — the Ego — is substantial and causal. Sense- 
 ideas or phenomena are at once dependent on mind, and symbolical of the intentions of 
 mind. Mind and its ideas are, in short, at the opposite poles of existence — being related 
 as subject knowing and object known, as cause and effects, as substance and phenomenon. 
 But he does not say that these poles, thus opposed, are numerically distinguishable as 
 things independent of each other. 
 
 =9 i. e. objectively — as an object or idea. 
 
 3° What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which the term notion is 
 denned, and assists to express Berkeley's duality in things. 
 
 3 1 Yet he speaks elsewhere (sect. 1, &c.) of ideas formed by attending to the ' operations' 
 of the mind. He probably refers to the effects of the operations, holding that the effects, 
 but not their cause, are ideal. 
 
 3* Here is the germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind 
 which constitutes relation, as distinguished from the personal acting of will. Cf. remarka- 
 ble passages in Siris, sect. 297, 308, &c. 
 
 18 
 
274 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded 
 as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective 
 objects and effects. [" 3 ] Hence a great number of dark and am- 
 biguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been 
 introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have 
 grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. 
 
 144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards 
 engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the 
 nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak 
 of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For ex- 
 ample, the will is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a 
 belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and 
 determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by 
 the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors 
 of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, 
 may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, 
 could but philosophers be prevailed on to [ 33 depart from some 
 received prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into them- 
 selves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [ 33 But the 
 difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disqui- 
 sition than suits with the design of this treatise.] 
 
 145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know 
 the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, 
 or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, 
 changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are cer- 
 tain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and 
 concur in their production. [ II4 ] Hence, the knowledge I have 
 of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my 
 ideas ; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred 
 to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant 
 signs 34 . 
 
 33 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 34 This is one of the most important sections in the book. It has been common (see 
 Reid's Essays, VI. 5, &c.) to allege that, on Berkeley's principles, I have no reason to be- 
 lieve in the existence of other minds or wills — a plurality of Egos, or at any rate in other 
 Egos than my own, and the Supreme or Absolute. I can design or intend ; all the rest is 
 God's — my volitions and His determine the phenomenal universe. Now, Berkeley holds 
 that we have the same sort of reason to believe in the existence of other human minds that 
 we have to believe in the existence of God, viz. the sense-symbolism which implies the 
 existence of other finite minds, embodied like our own, as its only reasonable interpreta- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 27$ 
 
 146. But, though there be some things which convince us 
 human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident 
 to every one that those things which are called the Works of 
 Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations 
 perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills 
 of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them ; 
 since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. 
 See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant re- 
 gularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising 
 magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exqui- 
 site contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together 
 with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but 
 above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, 
 and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions 
 of animals — I say if we consider all these things, and at the same 
 time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, 
 Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly per- 
 ceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, 'who works all in 
 all,' and 'by whom all things consist.' 
 
 147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and 
 immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from 
 ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far 
 more evidently perceived than the existence of men ; because the 
 effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable 
 than those ascribed to human agents 35 . There is not any one 
 mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does 
 not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the 
 Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other per- 
 sons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion 
 of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be 
 
 tion. Cf. sect. 147, 148. Both are beliefs gathered from the suggestions of experience. 
 This enables us to infer the existence not merely of other, and by us, at present, unper- 
 ceived phenomena, in our own past or future experience; and phenomena in the present, 
 past, or future experience of other minds ; but also, as implied in the latter, the existence 
 of other minds — other selfs. His mode of looking at the universe leaves the evidence for 
 the existence of other men as it was before (although our ideas and those of other men are 
 with him not numerically identical, but only in a harmony of similarity) ; while his 
 theory was believed by him to intensify the evidence of Divine Presence and Providence. 
 See Alciphron, Dial. IV., and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c. 
 35 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. 8 — 14; Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8. 
 
276 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends 
 wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, ' uphold- 
 ing all things by the word of His power,' maintains that inter- 
 course between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the 
 existence of each other 36 . And yet this pure and clear light 
 which enlightens every one is itself invisible [ 37 to the greatest 
 part of mankind]. 
 
 148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd 
 that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as 
 we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey 
 His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the 
 Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view 
 than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine 
 we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate 
 view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing 
 that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine 
 is 38 , I must confess, to me incomprehensible. [ II5 ] But I shall 
 explain my meaning : — A human spirit or person is not perceived 
 by sense, as not being an idea ; when therefore we see the colour, 
 size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain 
 sensations or ideas excited in our own minds ; and these being 
 exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark 
 out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like our- 
 selves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man — if by man is 
 meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do — 
 but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think 
 there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to our- 
 
 3 6 God so regulates the sense-given phenomena or ideas of which spirits are individually 
 conscious, as that these phenomena, while numerically different in each mind, are never- 
 theless a practical medium of intercourse between minds. Egoism is seen not to be a ne- 
 cessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be conscious of m> own experience, 
 when we recognise that persons only are powers, and that / am not the cause of all the 
 changes which my ideas or phenomena exhibit. Without being themselves conscious of 
 my consciousness, we may infer that other persons or minds arc at work to modify it. In 
 short, our experience of power or volition, and of our own limited power, is essential to 
 Berkeley's recognition of a plurality of minds or substances — to his escape from the unity 
 of Absolute Egoism, and to his scientific recognition of his external world. 
 
 37 Omitted in second edition. 
 
 3 8 Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. According to Malebranche we see mate- 
 rial or sensible things in God, who transcends, and in transcending unites the substantial 
 antithesis of Mind and Matter. See Recherche, liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 '■77 
 
 selves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same 
 manner we see God ; all the difference is that, whereas some one 
 finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human 
 mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and 
 in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity — everything 
 we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or 
 effect of the power of God ; as is our perception of those very 
 motions which are produced by men 39 . 
 
 149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to 
 any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence 
 of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, 
 producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which 
 continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire 
 dependence, in short ' in whom we live, and move, and have our 
 being.' That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near 
 and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of 
 so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of 
 men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifest- 
 ations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they 
 seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light. 
 
 150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production 
 of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate 
 and sole operation of God ? I answer, if by Nature is meant 
 only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our 
 minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain 
 that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all 4 °. 
 But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well 
 as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must 
 confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelli- 
 gible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a 
 vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just 
 notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, 
 it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Chris- 
 
 39 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c. 
 The eternal existence of conscious Mind, and the present existence of other finite minds 
 than my own, are both inferences, according to Berkeley. The former, however, follows 
 from the assumption that something must be eternal, because something now exists; 
 seeing that this ' something," as existing, must be a mind conscious of ideas or objects. 
 
 4° Cf. sect. 25, 51—53, 60— 66, &c. 
 
278 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 tians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly 
 ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen 
 philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. 'The Lord He causeth 
 the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He 
 bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. ' He 
 turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the 
 day dark with night.' Amos v. 8. ' He visiteth the earth, and 
 maketh it soft with showers : He blesseth the springing thereof, 
 and crowneth the year with His goodness ; so that the pastures 
 are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.' 
 See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant 
 language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion 
 from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. 
 Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute 
 some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may 
 believe Saint Paul) ' He be not far from every one of us.' 
 
 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected, that the slow, gradual, 
 and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural 
 things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand 
 of an Almighty Agent 41 . Besides, monsters, untimely births, 
 fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, mis- 
 eries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments 
 that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and 
 superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But 
 the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from 
 sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are 
 absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and 
 general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which 
 argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. [«* For, it doth 
 hence follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the 
 resolved and careless sinner, which gives him an opportunity to 
 harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. 
 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine 
 of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike 
 on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unper- 
 ceivable to men of flesh and blood. ' Verily' (saith the prophet) 
 ' thou art a God that hidest thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 1 5. But, though 
 
 *» Cf. sect. 60 — 66. ** Omitted in second edition. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 279 
 
 the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, 
 who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an un- 
 biassed and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible 
 than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regu- 
 lates, and sustains the whole system of beings 43 . [^Secondly.] It 
 is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating 
 according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our 
 guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of 
 nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all 
 human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; 
 it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or 
 powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration 
 abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may 
 thence arise. 
 
 152. But, we should further consider that the very blemishes- 
 and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make 
 an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest 
 of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter 
 and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to ex- 
 amine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and 
 accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to 
 full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not 
 the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent 
 and saving mortals 45 . In man indeed a thrifty management of 
 those things which he cannot procure without much pains and 
 industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine 
 that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs 
 the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production 
 than a pebble does ; nothing being more evident than that an 
 Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere 
 fiat or act of his will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid pro- 
 fusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or 
 prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked 
 on as an argument of the riches of his power. 
 
 153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the 
 world pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of 
 
 43 So Pascal in the Pensees. ** Omitted in second edition. 
 
 43 So Butler, in his Analogy. Also cf. sect. 60 — 66. 
 
2 8o OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is 
 indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects 
 are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one 
 particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil ; whereas, 
 if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, 
 connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and 
 in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the 
 nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put 
 into the world ; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those 
 particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be 
 evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with 
 the whole system of beings 4S . 
 
 154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any con- 
 sidering person, that it is merely for want of attention and com- 
 prehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism 
 or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting 
 souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence 46 — [ II6 ] the 
 beautyand order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be 
 at the pains, to comprehend ; but those who are masters of any 
 justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, 
 can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and 
 Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But 
 what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that by 
 an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not 
 escape seeing it, at least with a full and direct view ? Is it there- 
 fore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever 
 intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the 
 eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evi- 
 dence of the Being of God which might be expected in reason- 
 able creatures ? 
 
 155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid 
 as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced 
 of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be 
 feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian 
 
 *S So Butler, in his Analogy. 
 
 * 6 A constant Divine Thought and Providence in the changes of the phenomena] world, 
 rather than the original creation of finite minds and of their ideas or phenomena, is the 
 conception which runs through Berkeley's philosophy, conspicuously in Siris. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 28 1 
 
 countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, 
 sunk into [ 47 a sort of Demy-] Atheism. [ 43 They cannot say there 
 is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For 
 what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret mis- 
 givings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of 
 God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety?] 
 Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlight- 
 ened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and 
 justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless 
 violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate 
 and dwell on those important points ; that so we may attain con- 
 viction without all scruple ' that the eyes of the Lord are in every 
 place beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and 
 keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to 
 eat and raiment to put on ;' that He is present and conscious to 
 our innermost thoughts; in fine, that we have a most absolute 
 and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great 
 truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circum- 
 spection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, 
 and the best guard against Vice, 
 
 156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies 
 is the consideration of God and our Duty; which to promote, 
 as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I 
 esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have 
 said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence 
 of God ; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren 
 speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, 
 the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary 
 truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practise is the highest 
 perfection of human nature. 
 
 47 Omitted in second edition. Our alleged necessary ignorance of the ultimate cause 
 and meaning of the Universe in which we find ourselves is, in the present day, a common 
 objection to the assumption that its phenomena may be interpreted as significant of Su- 
 preme or Absolute Mind. As Hume or Comte would have it, the Universe is a singular 
 effect or complement of phenomena, which we can interpret only so far as our secular 
 wants and duties are concerned. They look to the physical or phenomenal, and not to the 
 moral and spiritual evidence. 
 
 4 s Omitted in second edition. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
A. 
 
 BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION 
 TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 [After the Principles of Human Knowledge had passed through the 
 press, I found Berkeley's autograph of a rough draft of the Introduction, 
 in the manuscript department of the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. 
 It seems to have been written in November and December, 1708. I 
 here present it to the reader, who will find that it varies considerably 
 from the published version, besides containing erasures and interlinea- 
 tions which have a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical 
 interest. As this Introduction forms Berkeley's early attack upon 
 metaphysical abstractions, and his reasoned exposition of what has since 
 been called his Nominalism, it may be well to have so important a part 
 of his philosophy placed before us in various verbal forms which it 
 successively assumed when it was struggling into the final expression. 
 The student of his mind may like also to compare these with still 
 earlier illustrative fragments in the Commonplace Book, appended to 
 his Life and Letters, as well as with the theory of universals in Alciphron 
 and especially in Sin's. What Berkeley here means to deny is the ex- 
 istence of any physical reality, corresponding to general names, apart 
 from actual or imagined sensible phenomena. In this early attack 
 upon 'abstract ideas,' his characteristic ardour carried him in appear- 
 ance to the extreme of rejecting the universalizing element, by which 
 Mind constitutes and gives objectivity to things, and of resting knowl- 
 edge on the shifting foundation of phenomena or ideas — particular, 
 contingent, and subjective. But if he seems to do this in the Intro- 
 duction, he virtually proceeds in the body of the Principles upon the 
 assumption that personal substantiality and efficient or voluntary cau- 
 sality are universal and uncreated necessities of Being — axiomatic truths 
 involved in all concrete consciousness of phenomena. This assumption 
 (along with the assumed general fact of established cosmical order) 
 redeems his philosophy from subjectivity, and gives cohesion and fixed- 
 ness to knowledge. This stable intellectuality is more manifest in Siris. 
 But he everywhere leans on living acts, not verbal formulas. 
 
 A. C. F.] 
 285 
 
286 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and 
 truth, it may seem strange that they who have spent much time 
 and pains in it, do usually find themselves embarrass'd with more 
 doubts and difficulties than they were before they ['came to that 
 study. There is nothing these men can [ 2 touch] with their hands 
 or behold with their eyes but has its inaccessible and dark sides. 
 Something] they imagine to be in every drop of water, every 
 grain of sand which can puzzle [ 3 and confound] the most clear and 
 [ 4 elevated] understanding, and are often by their principles led 
 into a necessity of admitting the most irreconcilable opinions for 
 true, or (which is worse) of sitting down in a forlorn scepticism. 
 
 The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, 
 together with the natural weakness and imperfection of our under- 
 standing. It is said the senses we have are few, and these design'd 
 by nature only for the support of life, and not to penetrate into 
 the constitution and inward essence of things. Besides, the mind 
 of man being finite when it treats of things which partake of 
 infinity, it is not to be wonder'd at if it run into absurdities 5 and 
 contradictions, out of which it is [ 3 absolutely] impossible it should 
 ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be 
 comprehended by that which is finite 6 . 
 
 But I cannot think our faculties are so weak and inadequate in 
 respect of things, as these men would make us believe. I cannot 
 be brought to suppose that right deductions from true principles 
 should ever end ' in consequences which cannot be maintain'd or 
 made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more 
 bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong 
 desire for that which he had placed quite out of their reach, and 
 so made it impossible for them to obtain. Surely our wise and 
 good Creatour would never have made us so eager in the search 
 
 1 On the opposite page of the MS., instead of what follows within brackets — ' meddled 
 with that study. To them the most common and familiar things appear intricate and 
 perplex'd, there's nothing but has its dark sides. Somewhat' 
 
 * ' handle.' 
 3 Erased. 
 
 * ' comprehensive.' 
 
 5 ' absurdities' instead of ' inconsistencys' erased. 
 
 6 on the margin of this paragraph is written — ' Nov. 15, 1708.' 
 
 7 ' end' instead of ' terminate' erased. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 287 
 
 of truth meerly to baulk and perplex us, to make us blame our 
 faculties, and bewail our inevitable ignorance. This were not 
 agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, 
 whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth 
 usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, 
 will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole my opinion is, that 
 the far greatest part, if not all, of those difficultys which have 
 hitherto amus'd philosophers, and block'd up the way to knowl- 
 edge, are entirely owing to themselves. That they have first rais'd 
 a dust, and then complain they cannot see. 
 
 My purpose therefore is, to [ 8 try if I can] discover p and point 
 out] what those principles are which have introduc'd all that 
 doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurditys and contradictions 
 into the several sects of philosophy, insomuch that the wisest 
 men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise 
 from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And at 
 the same time to establish such principles in their stead, as shall 
 be free from the like consequences, and lead the mind into a clear 
 view of truth. And surely it is a work well deserving of our 
 pains, to try to extend the limits of our knowledge, and [ IO do 
 right to] human understanding, by making it to appear that those 
 lets and difficultys which stay and embarrass the mind in its 
 enquirys [" after truth] do not spring from any darkness and 
 intricacy in the objects, or [ I2 natural] defect in the intellectual 
 powers, so much as from false principles which have been insisted 
 on, and might have been avoided. 
 
 How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, 
 when I consider what a number of men of very great and extra- 
 ordinary abilitys have gone before me, [ 9 and miscarry'd] in the 
 like [ I3 designs, yet] I am not without some hopes, upon the con- 
 sideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and 
 that he who is shortsighted will be apt to draw the object nearer, 
 and by a close and narrow survey may perhaps discern that which 
 had escaped far better eyes. 
 
 8 Instead of ' endeavour to.' » Erased. 
 
 10 Instead of 'beat down those mounds and barriers that have been put to.' 
 « Within brackets in the MS. 
 •» Instead of incurable' erased. 
 "3 Instead of ' undertakings." 
 
288 APPENDIX A. 
 
 ["» In my entrance upon this work] I think it necessary to take 
 notice of [ IS that w ch seems to have been the source of a great many 
 errours, and to have made the way to knowledge very intricate 
 and perplex'd, that w ch seems to have had a chiefe part in ren- 
 dering speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have been the 
 source of innumerable errours and difficulties in almost all parts 
 of knowledge] — and that is the opinion that there are Abstract 
 Ideas or General Conceptions of Things. He who is not a per- 
 fect stranger to the writings and [ l6 notions] of philosophers must 
 needs acknowledge that [ I7 no small] part of [ l8 them] are spent 
 J 9 about Abstract Ideas. These are, in a more special manner, 
 thought to be the objects of those sciences that go by the name 
 of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the 
 notion of the most abstracted and sublime philosophy. In all 
 which [ 20 speculative sciences] you shall scarce find any question 
 handled [ 2 °by the philosophers] in such a manner as does not 
 suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is very well 
 acquainted with them ; [ 2 °so that these parts of learning must of 
 necessity be overrun with [very much] useles wrangling and 
 jargon, [innumerable] absurdities and contradictions [opinions], 
 if so be that Abstract General Ideas are perfectly inconceivable, 
 as I am well assur'd they [never were — cannot be] conceived by 
 me, [ 2I nor do I think it possible they should be conceiv'd by 
 any one else].] 
 
 By abstract idea, genera, species, universal notions, all which 
 amount to the same thing, as I find these terms explain'd by the 
 best and clearest writers, we are to understand ideas which equally 
 
 *4 Instead of ' But here in the entrance, before I proceed any further.' On the blank 
 page opposite we have — ' In my entrance upon this work [before I descend to more par- 
 ticular subjects] [and] [to more particular enquirys].' 
 
 '5 Instead of—' y* w h seem to me [one] very powerful and universal cause of error and 
 confusion throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages'— and the opposite page, ' that 
 which seems to me a wide-spread [in philosophical enquirys] throughout the philosophy 
 of all sects and ages.' 
 
 »« Brackets in the MS. 
 
 «7 Instead of ' very great." 
 
 18 Instead of their disputes and contemplations [speculations].' 
 
 '9 ' concerning' instead of ' about' erased. 
 
 *> Erased. 
 
 « On opposite page—' and I very much question whether they ever were or can oe by 
 any one else.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 289 
 
 represent the particulars of any sort, and are made by the mind 
 which, observing that the individuals of each kind agree in some 
 things and differ in others, takes out and singles from the rest 
 that which is common to all, making thereof one abstract general 
 idea; which ["general idea] contains all those ideas wherein the 
 particulars of that kind agree [ 22 and partake], separated from 
 and exclusive of all those other concomitant ideas whereby they 
 [ 22 individuals] are distinguished [ 22 from each other] one from 
 another. [ 22 To this abstract general idea thus framed the mind 
 gives a general name, and lays it up and uses it as a standard 
 whereby to judge what particulars are and what are not to be 
 accounted of that sort, those onely which contain every part of 
 the general idea having a right to be admitted into that sort and 
 by that name.] 
 
 For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and 
 John, &c, resemble each other in certain common agreements of 
 shape and other quality, leaves out of the complex idea it has of 
 Peter, James, &c, that which is peculiar to each, retaining onely 
 that which is common to all. And so it makes one [ 23 abstract] 
 complex idea, wherein all the particulars partake, abstracting 
 entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differ- 
 ences which might determine it to any particular existence : and 
 after this manner you come by [ 24 the] precise abstract idea of 
 [ 22 a] man. In which [ 22 idea] it is true there is included colour 
 because there is no man but hath some colour, but then it can be 
 neither white [ 22 colour] nor black [ 22 colour] nor any particular 
 colour, but colour in general, because there is no one particular 
 colour wherein all men partake. In like manner you will tell me 
 there is included stature, but it is neither tall stature nor low 
 stature, nor yet middling stature, but stature in general. And so 
 of the rest. [ 25 Suppose now I should ask whether you compre- 
 hended, in this your abstract idea of man, the ideas of eyes, or 
 ears, or nose, or legs, or arms [this might perhaps put you to a 
 stand for an answer, for] you will own it to be an odd and mu- 
 
 » Erased. =3 Instead of general.' 2 4 Instead of ' a clear.' 
 
 a 5 Erased. On opposite page, but erased, are the words — ' an odd and mutilated idea, 
 
 that of man without all these.' And on the same page — ' it must needs [make an odd and 
 
 frightful figure the idea] of [a] man without all these,' also erased. 
 
 19 
 
290 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 tilated idea of a man \v ch is without all these. Yet it must be 
 so to make it consistent with the doctrine of abstract ideas, there 
 being particular men that want, some arms, some legs [some 
 noses, &c.]] 
 
 [ 27 But supposing the abstract idea of men to be very conceiv- 
 able, let us proceed to see [ 26 how] it comes to be enlarg'd into 
 the more general and comprehensive idea of animal.] There 
 being a great variety of other creatures [ 27 as birds] that partake 
 in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind 
 leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining 
 those onely which are common to all the living creatures, frames 
 the idea of animal, [ 27 which is more general than that of man, 
 it comprehending not only all particular men, but also all birds, 
 beasts, fishes, and insects.] The constituent parts whereof [ 27 of 
 the complex idea of animal] are body, life, sense, and spontaneous 
 motion. By body is meant body [ 27 in general], without any par- 
 ticular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common 
 to all animals, without covering either of hair, or feathers, or 
 [ 28 scales], and yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers [ 28 scales], and 
 nakedness being peculiar distinguishing properties of [ 27 the] par- 
 ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the [ 29 abstract] 
 idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be 
 neither walking nor flying nor creeping, it is nevertheless a motion, 
 but what that motion is it is not easy to say. 
 
 In like manner a man [ 27 having seen several lines] by leaving 
 out of his idea of a line [ 3 °the particular colour and length] 
 comes by the idea of a line which is neither black, nor white, 
 nor red, &c, nor long nor short, which he calls the abstract idea 
 of a line, and which, for ought that I can see, is just nothing. 
 [ 27 For I ask whether a line has any more than one particular 
 colour and one particular length, which [when they are] being 
 left out, I beseech any 3I one to consider what it is that remains.] 
 
 Whether others have this [ 3a wonderful] faculty of abstracting 
 their ideas, they can [ 33 best] tell. For myself, I dare be con- 
 
 36 Instead of ' by what steps and abstractions.' »7 Erased. 
 
 38 Instead of ' fins.' ^ Instead of ' general.' 
 
 3° Instead of ' all particular colour, and all particular length.' 
 
 3' ' one' instead of ' man.' 3» Instead of ' marvellous.' 
 
 33 Instead of better.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 29 1 
 
 fident I have it not; [ 3(5 and I am apt to think that some of those 
 who fancy themselves to enjoy that privilege, would, upon look- 
 ing narrowly into their own thoughts, find they wanted it as much 
 as I. For there was a time when, being banter'd and abus'd by 
 words, I did not in the least doubt my having it. But upon a 
 strict survey of my abilitys, I not only discover my own deficiency 
 in that point, but also cannot conceive it possible that such a 
 person should be even in the most perfect and exalted under- 
 standing.] I find I have a faculty of imagining, conceiving, or 
 representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have 
 perceiv'd, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I 
 can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man 
 joyn'd to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the 
 eye, the nose each by itself [ 34 abstracted or] separated from the 
 rest of the body. But then whatever eye or nose I imagine, they 
 must have some particular shape and colour. The idea of man 
 that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a 
 tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling sized 
 man. I cannot by any effort of [ 3S thought] frame to myself an 
 idea of man [ 36 prescinding from all particulars] that shall have 
 nothing particular in it. [ 36 For my life I cannot comprehend 
 abstract ideas 3 ?.] 
 
 And there are grounds to think [ 38 most] men will acknowledge 
 themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which are 
 simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is said 
 they are difficult and not to be attained without much study and 
 speculation, we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such 
 there be, they are altogether confin'd to the learned. 
 
 But it must be confess'd, I do not see what great advantage 
 they give them above the rest of mankind. He who considers 
 that whatever has any existence in nature and can any wise affect 
 or concern [ 36 is] him is particular, will not find great cause to be 
 discontent with his facultys, if [ 39 they] cannot reach a piece of 
 knowledge as useless as it is refin'd ; [ 3<5 and] which whether it 
 
 34 Instead of ' singled out and.' 35 Instead of ' imagination." 36 Erased. 
 
 37 On opposite page the words — ' I can conceive well enough what is meant by ade- 
 quate and inadequate, clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd [ideas], but' — are written 
 and erased. 
 
 38 Instead of ' the far greatest part of.' 39 Instead of ' he.' 
 
292 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 be to be found even in those deep thinkers may well be made a 
 question. 
 
 For besides the [ 4 °incomprehensibleness] of abstract ideas to 
 my understanding (which may pass for an argument, since those 
 gentlemen do not pretend to any new facultys distinct from those 
 of ordinary men), there are not wanting other proofs against them. 
 [ 4I It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be 
 conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive 
 that which God cannot cause to be ? Now it is on all hands 
 agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to 
 exist; whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so 
 much as an ideal existence in the understanding.] 
 
 [ 42 1 do not think it necessary to insist on any more proofs, 
 against the doctrine of abstraction in this place, especially for that 
 the absurditys, which in the progress of this work I shall observe 
 to have sprung from that doctrine, will yield plenty of arguments 
 a posteriori against it.] I proceed [ 42 therefore] to examine what 
 can be alleged in defence [ 43 of the doctrine of abstraction], and 
 try if I can discover what it is that [ 44 inclines] the men of specu- 
 lation to embrace an opinion so pregnant of absurditys, and so 
 remote from common sense as that seems to be. 
 
 There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteem'd phi- 
 losopher, to whose judgment, so far as authority is of any weight 
 with me, I would pay the utmost deference. This great man, no 
 doubt, has very much countenanc'd the doctrine of abstraction 
 by seeming to think [ 45 it] is that which puts the widest difference 
 in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. Thus speaks 
 he : ' The having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect 
 distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which 
 the facultys of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evi- 
 dent we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general 
 signs for [ 46 making] universal ideas; from which we have reason 
 
 4° Instead of ' incomprehensibility,' and on opposite page, but erased — ' incomprehen- 
 sibleness to my understanding by any [intellect — understanding] whatsoever. 1 
 
 4' Erased. On opposite page — ' That a contradiction cannot be conceiv'd by any human 
 anding whatsoever is, I think, agreed on all hands. And to me it is no less clear 
 that the description of an abstract idea doth include a contradiction in it.' 
 
 42 Erased. « Instead of ' thereof.' 4* Instead of ' has inclined.' 
 
 45 Instead of 'the having abstract ideas.' 4« Within brackets in the MS. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 293 
 
 to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making 
 general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other gen- 
 eral signs.' And a little lower: ' Therefore I think we may sup- 
 pose that 'tis in this that the species of brutes are discriminated 
 from men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly 
 separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For 
 if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some 
 would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. 
 It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain 
 instances reason, as that they have sense, but it is only in partic- 
 ular ideas, just as they receiv'd them from their senses. They 
 are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and 
 have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of 
 abstraction.' [Essay on Human Understanding, Book 2, chap 11. 
 s. 10, 11.) I readily agree with this authour that the faculties of 
 brutes can by no means attain to the making of abstract general 
 ideas. But then if that inability to abstract be made the distin- 
 guishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of 
 those that now pass for men must be reckon'd into their number. 
 The reason which is here assign'd why we have no grounds to 
 think that brutes have general ideas, is that we observe in them 
 no use of words or any other general signs — which is built on 
 this supposition — that the making use of words implys the having 
 of general ideas, and that [ 47 on the other hand] those who have 
 general ideas fail not to make use of words, or other universal 
 signs, [ 48 whereby] to express [ 48 and signify them], [ 4 *That this 
 is the] From which it must follow, that men who use language 
 are able to abstract and generalize their ideas, but brutes [ 49 that] 
 use it not are destitute of that faculty. That this is the sense 
 and arguing of the authour of the Essay, will farther appear, by 
 his answering the question he in another place puts. Since all 
 things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general 
 terms ? His answer is — ' Words become general by being made 
 the signs of general ideas.' (Essay on Humaii Understanding, b. 
 3. c. 3. s. 6.) From which assertion I must crave leave to dissent, 
 being of opinion that a word becomes general by being [ 5 °the] 
 
 *7 Instead of ' reciprocally." 4 s Erased. 
 
 « Instead of ' who.' 5° Within brackets in the MS. 
 
294 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 made the sign, not of a general idea, but of many particular 
 ideas. Sure I am, as to what concerns myself, when I say the 
 word Socrates is a proper [ 52 or particular] name, and the word 
 man an appellative or general name, I mean no more than this, 
 viz. that the one is peculiar and appropriated to one particular 
 person, the other common to a great many particular persons, 
 each [ 5I of which] has an equall right in propriety of language to 
 be called by the name man. [ 52 This, I say, is the whole truth 
 of the matter, and not that I make any incomprehensible abstract 
 idea whereunto I annex the name man. That were to [make] 
 my words stand for I know not what.] 
 
 That great man seems to think the necessary ends of language 
 could not be attain'd [ ;2 to] without the use of abstract ideas. B. 
 3. c. 6. s. 39 [ 52 he shews it] and elsewhere he shews it to be his 
 opinion that they are made in order to naming. B. 3. c. 1. s. 3 
 he has these words : ' It is not enough for the perfection of lan- 
 guage that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs 
 can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things : 
 for the multiplication of words would have perplex'd their use, 
 had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified 
 by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a farther 
 improvement in the use of general terms whereby one word was 
 made to mark a number of particular existences, which advan- 
 tageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the 
 ideas they were made signs of. Those names becoming general 
 which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining 
 particular where the ideas they are used for are particular.' Now 
 I would fain know why a word may not be made to comprehend 
 a great number of particular things in its signification, without the 
 [ S3 help] of a general idea? Is it not possible to give the name 
 [ S4 colour to black, white, and red, &c] without having first made 
 that strange and to me incomprehensible idea of ["colour in 
 abstract] ? Or must we imagine that a child upon sight of a par- 
 ticular body, and being told it is called an apple, must first frame 
 to himself an abstract general idea [ s6 exclusive of] all particular 
 
 51 Instead of 'whereof.' 5» Erased. 53 Instead of ' interposition.' 
 
 54 [nstead of ' man to Peter, James, and John." 
 
 55 Instead of ' man which shall have nothing particular in it.' 
 
 5 6 Instead of ' thereof, abstracting from.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 295 
 
 colour, tast, and figure before he can attain to the use of the word 
 apple, and apply it to all the particulars of that sort of fruit that 
 come in his way? [ s8 This surely is a task too hard and meta- 
 physical to be perform'd by an infant just beginning to speak.] 
 Nay, I appeal to the experience of any grown man, whether this 
 be the course he takes in acquainting himself with the [" right] 
 use and signification of any word ? Let any man take a fair and 
 impartial view of his own thoughts, and then determine whether 
 his general words do not become so only by being made to mark 
 a number of particular existences, without any the least thought 
 of abstraction. For what, I pray, are words but signs of our 
 thoughts ? and how are signs of any sort render'd universal other- 
 wise than by being made to signify, or represent indifferently, a 
 multitude of particular things? 
 
 The ideas that are in every man's mind ly hid [ 58 den], and 
 cannot of themselves be brought into the view of another. It 
 was therefore necessary, for discourse and communication, that 
 men should institute sounds to be signs of their ideas, which 
 being [^excited] in the mind of the hearer [^ might] bring 
 along with them [ s8 into his understanding] such ideas as in the 
 propriety of any language were annex'd to them. But because 
 of the almost infinite number and variety of our [ 6l ideas], it is 
 impossible, and if it were possible would yet be a useless thing, 
 to appropriate a particular [ s8 word to a] sign or name to every 
 one of them. From which it must necessarily follow, that one 
 word be made the sign of a great number of particular ideas, 
 between which there is some likeness and which are said to be 
 of the same sort. [ 62 But then these sorts are not determin'd and 
 set out by nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor yet 
 are they limited by any precise abstract ideas settl'd in the mind, 
 with the general name annexed to them, as is the opinion of the 
 authour of the Essay, nor do they in truth seem to me to have any 
 precise bounds or limits at all. For if [there were] they had I 
 
 57 Instead of ' proper.' 58 Erased. 59 Instead of ' raised.' 
 
 60 Instead of ' shall.' <>' Instead of ' thoughts.' 
 
 62 Erased. On the opposite page we have — ' Every one's experience may convince him 
 that this is all that's meant by general names, and that they do not stand either for universal 
 natures distinct from our conceptions as was held by the Peripatetics and generality of the 
 Schoolmen, nor yet for universal notions or ideas as is the opinion of that sort of School- 
 men called Nominals and of the authour of the Essay.' 
 
296 APPENDIX A. 
 
 do not see how there could be those doubts and scruples about 
 the sorting of particular beings which [that authour insists on as 
 a good proof] are observ'd sometimes to have happen'd. Neither 
 do I think it necessary the kinds or species of things should be 
 so very accurately bounded and marked out, language being 
 made by and for the common use of men, who do not ordinarily 
 take notice of the minuter and less considerable differences of 
 things.] From [ 63 all] which to me it seems evident that the 
 having of general names does not imply the having of general 
 ideas, but barely the marking by them a number of particular 
 ideas, and that all the ends of language may be and are attain'd 
 without the help of any such faculty as abstraction. 
 
 Which will be made yet more manifest if we consider the 
 different manners wherein words [ 63 and ideas [are] do stand for 
 and represent things] represent ideas, and ideas things. There 
 is no similitude or resemblance betwixt words and the ideas that 
 are marked by them. Any name may be used indifferently for 
 the sign of any idea, or any number of ideas, it not being deter- 
 min'd by any likeness to represent one more than another. But 
 it is not so with ideas in respect of things, of which they are 
 suppos'd to be the copies and images. They are not thought to 
 represent them [ 63 any] otherwise than as they resemble them. 
 Whence it follows that an idea is not capable of representing 
 indifferently anything [^whatsoever], it being limited by the 
 likeness it beares to some particular [ 6s thing] to represent it 
 rather than any other. The word man may equally be put to 
 signify any particular man I can think of. But I cannot frame 
 an idea of man which shall equally represent and correspond to 
 each particular of that sort of creatures that may possibly exist. 
 
 I shall [ 63 only] add one more passage out of the Essay on 
 Human Understanding, which is as follows : ' Abstract ideas are 
 not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind 
 as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men 'tis only 
 because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For 
 when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general 
 ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry diffi- 
 culty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are 
 
 6 3 Erased. 6 * Instead of ' or number of things.' 6 s Instead of ' existence.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 297 
 
 apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains 
 and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none 
 of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult), for it must be 
 neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor 
 scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? In effect, it is some- 
 thing imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts 
 of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 'Tis 
 true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, 
 and makes all the hast to them it can, for the conveniency of 
 communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which 
 it is naturally very much enclin'd ; but yet one has reason to 
 suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this 
 is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are 
 not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, 
 nor such as its earlyest knowledge is conversant about.' B. 4. c. 7. 
 s. 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an 
 idea of a triangle as is here describ'd, it is in vain to pretend to 
 dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is 
 that every one would fully and certainly inform himself whether 
 he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard 
 task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one 
 to look a little into his own understanding, and there try whether 
 he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with 
 the description here given of the general idea of a triangle which 
 is neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, 
 nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? He that can 
 conceive such manifest contradictions and inconsistencys, 'tis fit 
 he enjoy his privilege. For my part [ 66 I am well assur'd] 6? l 
 have not the power of so doing, nor consequently of making to 
 myself these general ideas ; neither do I find that I have any 
 need of them either for the conveniency of communication or the 
 enlargement of knowledge [ 66 for the conveniency of communi- 
 cation and enlargement of knowledge. For which I am not 
 sorry, because it is here said one has reason to suspect such 
 ideas are marks of our imperfection. Tho', I must own, I do not 
 
 66 Erased. 
 
 6 7 On opposite page — erased — ' I must own I have so much ol the brute in my under- 
 standing, that.' 
 
2 9 8 APPENDIX A. 
 
 see how this agrees with what has been above quoted [out of the 
 same authour], viz. the having of general ideas is that which puts 
 a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency 
 which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.] 
 
 It is observable [ 68 what it is here said] of the difficulty 
 that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill that 
 is requisite to the forming [ 66 of] them. To the same purpose 
 Aristotle (who was certainly a great admirer and promoter of the 
 doctrine of abstraction) has these words : %eddv de xai ^ah-wraza 
 yvaipi'etv Tu'iq avOpdrxoiq Vr^ ret paha-a r.aOoXou izoppwrazia yap raiv ai<;- 
 ffTJaetuv Wc. There is scarce anything so incomprehensible to men 
 as the most universal notions, because they are most remote from 
 sense. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2 ^. It is on all hands agreed, that 
 there is need of great pains and toil and labour of the mind, to 
 emancipate [ 7 °our thoughts] from particular ideas such as are 
 taken in by the senses, and raise [ 7 ° them] to those lofty specu- 
 lations [j 1 which] are conversant about abstract and universal 
 ones. 
 
 From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, 
 that so difficult a thing as the forming of abstract ideas is not 
 necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all 
 sorts of men, even the most barbarous and unreflecting. But we are 
 told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, 'tis only because 
 by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain 
 know at what time it is men are employ'd in surmounting that 
 difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary [^ma- 
 terials] of discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for 
 then they are not conscious of any such pains-taking. It re- 
 mains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And 
 surely the great and multiply'd labour of framing general no- 
 tions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a 
 hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot commune 
 one with another of their sugar-plumbs and rattles, and the rest 
 of their little trinkets, till they have first tack'd together number- 
 's Instead of ' that which is [here] said by that authour on this occasion." 
 *9 Text as in Schwegler — ax^bv 6e /cat ^aAe7rwrara ravra yvupi&iv role uvdpunoic, rH 
 UuTuara KaOo?.ov noppuTuru yup tCiv aioQijaeuv iartv. 
 7° Instead of ' it.' 7* Instead of ' that.' 
 
 7 a Instead of ' praeliminarys.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 299 
 
 less inconsistencys, and so framed in their minds general abstract 
 ideas, and annex'd them to every common name they make use 
 of? 
 
 Nor do I think they are a whit more needful for enlargement 
 of knowledge, than for communication. For tho' it be a point 
 much insisted on in the Schools that all knowledge is about uni- 
 versal, yet I [ 73 can by no means see the necessity of] this doc- 
 trine. It is acknowledg'd that nothing has a fairer title to the 
 name of knowledge or science than geometry. Now I appeal to 
 any man's thoughts whether, upon the entrance into that study, 
 the first thing to be done is to try to conceive a circle that is 
 neither great nor small, nor of any determinate radius, or to make 
 ideas of triangles and parallelograms that are neither rectangular 
 nor obliquangular, &c. ? It is [ 74 true] one thing for a proposition 
 to be universally true, and another for it to be about universal 
 natures or notions. ["Because] that the three angles of a tri- 
 angle are equal to two right ones is granted to be a proposition 
 universally true, it will not therefore follow that we are to under- 
 stand it of universal triangles, or universal angles. It will suffice 
 that it be true of [ 74 any particular tri] the particular angles of 
 any particular triangle whatsoever. 
 
 But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition 
 to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it 
 demonstrated of the general idea of a triangle, which equally 
 agrees to and represents them all ? For because a property may 
 be demonstrated to belong to some one particular triangle, it will 
 not thence follow that it equally belongs to [ 74 some] any other 
 triangle which in all respects is not the same with the former. 
 For instance, having demonstrated that the three angles of an 
 isosceles, rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I can- 
 not therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles 
 which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems 
 therefore, that to be certain this proposition is universally true, 
 we must either make a particular demonstration for every partic- 
 ular triangle, which is impossible, or else we must, once for all, 
 demonstrate it of the general idea of a triangle in which all the 
 
 73 Instead of [could never] bring myself to comprehend.' 
 
 7* Erased. 75 Instead of ' Thus [notwithstanding].' 
 
3 oo APPENDIX A. 
 
 particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all 
 equally represented. 
 
 To which I answer, that notwithstanding the idea I have in my 
 mind, whilst I make the demonstration, be that of some partic- 
 ular triangle, e. g. an isosceles, rectangular one whose sides are 
 of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain that it 
 extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness 
 soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the 
 equality, nor determinate length of the legs are at all concern'd 
 in the demonstration.' Tis true the diagram I have in my view 
 does include these particulars, but then there is not the least men- 
 tion made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said 
 the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them 
 is a right angle, or because the legs comprehending it are [ 7<5 equal] 
 of the same length ; which sufficiently shews that the right angle 
 might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and yet the dem- 
 onstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I con- 
 clude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I 
 had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle ; 
 and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the general 
 idea of a triangle which was all and none, it not being possible 
 for me to conceive any triangle whereof I cannot delineate the 
 like on paper. But I believe no man, whatever he may conceive, 
 will pretend to describe a general triangle with his pencill. This 
 being rightly consider'd, I believe we shall not be found to have 
 any great [ 76 want] need of those eternal, immutable, universal 
 ideas about which the philosophers keep such a stir, and without 
 which they think there can be no silence at all. 
 
 But what becomes of these general maxims, these first principles 
 of knowledge, [ 77 so frequently in the mouths] of [ 76 the] meta- 
 physicians, all w ch are suppos'd to be about abstract and universal 
 ideas ? To which all the answer I can make is, that whatsoever 
 proposition is made up of terms standing for general notions or 
 ideas, the same is to me, so far forth, [ ?6 absolutely] unintelligible : 
 and whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest 
 and profound study attain'd to an elevation of thought above the 
 reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, or whatever else be 
 
 76 Erased. n Instead of ' these curious speculations.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 301 
 
 the cause, sure I am there are in their writings many things which 
 I now find myself unable to understand. Tho' being accustom d 
 to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty 
 in them. But this one thing seems [ 8l to me] pretty plain and 
 certain. How high soever that goodly fabrick of metaphysics 
 might have been rais'd, and by what venerable names soever it 
 may be supported, yet if [ 8l withall] it be built on [ ?8 no other] 
 foundation [ 79 than] inconsistency and contradictions, it is after 
 all but a castle in the air 8 °. 
 
 It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the 
 Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, and all others 
 whether ancient or modern logicians and metaphysicians, thro' 
 those numerous inextricable labyrinths of errour and dispute, 
 which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have 
 led them into. What bickerings and controversys, and what a 
 learned dust has been rais'd about those matters, and what 
 [ 8l great] mighty advantage has been from thence deriv'd to 
 mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need to be 
 insisted on by me. Nor has that doctrine been confin'd to those 
 two sciences, that make the most avowed profession of it. The 
 contagion thereof has spread through [ 8l out] all the parts of 
 philosophy. It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of 
 physic and divinity, and even the mathematicians themselves 
 have had their full share of it. 
 
 When men consider the great pain, industry and parts that have 
 [ 8l in] for so many ages been lay'd out on the cultivation and 
 advancement of the sciences, and that [^notwithstanding] all 
 this, the far greatest part of them remain full of doubts and 
 uncertainties, and disputes that are like never to have an end, 
 and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear 
 and cogent demonstrations do contain in them paradoxes that are 
 perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that 
 taking all together a very small portion of them does supply any 
 real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent 
 diversion and amusement — I say upon the consideration of all 
 this, men are wont to be cast into an amazement and despondency, 
 
 78 Instead of ' the sandy." Tt Instead of ' of.' 
 
 80 On margin, 'Dec. 1.' Sl Erased. 8s Instead of ' for.' 
 
302 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 and perfect contempt of all study. But that wonder and despair 
 may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles and wrong 
 foundations of science [ 86 which] that have been made use of. 
 Amongst all which there is none, methinks, of a more wide and 
 universal sway over the thoughts of studious men than that we 
 have been endeavouring to detect and overthrow. [ 86 To me 
 certainly it does not seem strange that unprofitable debates and 
 absurd and extravagant opinions should abound in the writings 
 of those men who, disdaining the vulgar and obvious informations 
 of sense, do in the depth of their understanding contemplate 
 abstract ideas 83 .] 
 
 I come now to consider the [ 84 source] of this prevailing 
 [ 8s notion], and that seems to me most evidently to be language. 
 And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have 
 been the source of an opinion, as epidemical as it is absurd. 
 That [ 86 words are] the conceit of abstract idea ows its birth 
 and origine to words, will appear, as from other reasons, so also 
 from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of y l doctrine, 
 who [ 86 do] acknowledge that they are made in order to naming ; 
 from which it is a clear consequence that there had been no such 
 thing as speech, or universal signs, there never had been [^ab- 
 stract ideas] any thought of abstract ideas. I find it also declared 
 in express terms that general truths can never be well made known, 
 and are very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed 
 in words; all which doth plainly set forth the inseparable con 
 nexion and mutual dependence [ 86 on each other] that is thought 
 to be between words and abstract ideas. For whereas it is else- 
 where said [ 86 there could be no communication by general names 
 [ 8? vvithout there being] also general ideas of which they were to 
 be signs ; we are here, on the other hand, told that] that general 
 ideas [ 88 are] necessary for communication by general names; 
 here, on the other hand, we are told that names are needfull for 
 the understanding of [ 86 abstract notions] general truths. Now 
 by the bye, I would fain know how it is possible for words to 
 make a man apprehend that which he cannot apprehend without 
 
 8 3 On margin — ' Dec. 2.' ** Instead of ' cause.' 
 
 8 s Instead of ' imagination in the minds of men.' 8* Erased. 
 
 *7 Instead of ' except there were.' n Instead of ' were.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 303 
 
 them. I do not deny they are necessary for communication, and 
 so making me know the ideas that are in the mind of another. 
 But when any truth, whether [ 8 9 about general or part] about 
 general or particular ideas, is once made known to me by words, 
 [ 8 9l cannot see any manner of] so that I rightly apprehend the 
 ideas contained in it, I see no manner of reason why I may not 
 omit the words, and yet retain as full and clear a conception 
 of the ideas themselves, as I had [ 8 9of them] while they were 
 cloathed with words. Words being, so far as I can see, of use 
 only for recording and communicating, but not absolutely appre- 
 hending [ 8 9 of] ideas. [ 8 9 1 know there be some things which pass 
 for truths that will not bear this [stripping — being stript] of the 
 attire of words, but this I always took for a sure and certain sign 
 that there were no clear and determinate ideas underneath.] I 
 proceed to show the manner wherein words have contributed to 
 the growth and origine of that mistake. 
 
 That which seems [ 89 to me principally] in a great measure to 
 have drove men into the conceit of [^abstract] ideas, is the 
 opinion, that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise 
 and settl'd signification: which inclines pmen] them to think 
 there are certain abstract, determinate, general ideas that make 
 the true and only immediate signification of each general name, 
 and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a gen- 
 eral name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas there 
 is in truth [ 9I a] diversity of significations, in every general name 
 whatsoever [ 89 except only the proper names]. Nor is there any 
 such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to each 
 [ 89 appellative] name. All which does evidently follow from what 
 has been already said, and will [ 8 9be] clearly appear to any one 
 by a little reflexion. 
 
 But [ 8 9here] to this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every 
 name that has a definition is thereby tied down and restrain'd to 
 p 2 one certain] signification, e. g. a triangle is defin'd to be a plain 
 surface comprehended by three right lines, by which that name 
 is limited to denote one certain idea, and no other. To which I 
 answer, that in the definition it is not said, whether the surface 
 
 89 Erased. 9° Instead of ' general.' 
 
 91 Instead of ' an homonomy or.' 9* Instead of ' a particular.' 
 
304 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 be great or small, black or white or transparent, or whether the 
 sides are long or short, equal or unequal, or with what angles they 
 are inclin'd to each other. In all which there may be great 
 variety, and consequently there Js no one settled idea which limits 
 the signification of the word triangle. Tis one thing for to keep 
 a word [^everywhere] constantly to the same definition, and 
 another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea: [ 93 that] 
 is necessary, but [ 94 this] is useless and impracticable. [^Nor 
 does it avail to say the abstract idea of a triangle, which bounds 
 the signification of that name, is itself determin'd, tho' the angles, 
 sides, &c. are not. For besides the absurdity of such an idea, 
 which has been already shown, it is evident that if the simple 
 ideas or parts, i. e. the lines, angles, and surface, are themselves 
 various and undetermin'd, the complex idea or whole triangle 
 cannot be one settled determinate idea.] 
 
 [ 95 But to give a farther account, how words came to introduce 
 the doctrine of universal ideas, it will be necessary to observe 
 there is a notion current among those that pass for the deepest 
 thinkers, that every significant name stands for an idea. It is 
 
 93 Instead of ' the former.' 94 Instead of ' the latter.' 
 
 95 On the opposite page, we have, instead of this paragraph, the following: — ' But to 
 give a farther account how words came to introduce the doctrine of general ideas, it 
 [* must be observ'd] that [ s it is a receiv'd opinion] that language hath no other end than 
 the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This 
 being so, and it being withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether 
 insignificant, do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they 
 stand for general ones. 
 
 ' That there are many names in use amongst speculative men, which do not always sug- 
 gest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will 
 deny. [3 And that there are significant names denoting things, whereof it is a direct repug- 
 nancy that any idea should be form'd by any understanding whatsoever, I shall in its due 
 place endeavour to demonstrate that it is] not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) 
 that significant names which [3 are marks of ideas] stand for ideas shou'd every time they 
 are used excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to [3 signify] stand for. In 
 reading and discoursing names are for the [3 thinking on] most part us'd as [3 figures in 
 casting up a sum in which to compute exactly is not necessary] letters are in Algebra, in 
 which, tho' a particular quantity be mark'd by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not 
 requisite that in every step [3 you have these particular quantitys in y view. Tho' you 
 regard only the letters themselves without ever thinking on what was denoted by them, 
 yet if you work according to rule, you will come to a true solution of the question] each 
 letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity [* which] it was appointed to 
 [5 stand for]. 
 
 i Instead of ' Is necessary to observe." a Instead of ' the common opinion of philosophers It,' 
 
 ■? Erased. 4 Instead of ' whereof.' 5 Instead of ' be the fi^re tu make— denote." 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 305 
 
 said by them that a proposition cannot otherwise be understood 
 than by perceiving [ 96 the agreement or disagreement of] the 
 ideas marked by the terms [ 97 thereof] of it. Whence it follows, 
 that according to those men every proposition that is not jargon 
 must consist of terms or names that carry along with them each 
 a determinate idea. This being so, and it being [certain] withal! 
 certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insig- 
 nificant do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway 
 concluded that they stand for general ones. 
 
 In answer to this I say, that names, significant names, do not 
 always stand for ideas, but that they may be and are often used 
 to good purpose [tho' they are] without being suppos'd to stand 
 for or represent any idea at all. And as to what we are told of 
 understanding propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of the ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many 
 cases seems absolutely false. For the better clearing and demon- 
 strating of all which I shall make use of some particular instances. 
 Suppose I have the idea of some one particular dog to which I 
 give the name Melampus, and then frame this proposition — 
 Melampus is an animal. Where 'tis evident the name Melampus 
 denotes one particular idea. And as for the other name or term 
 of the proposition, there are a sort of philosophers will tell you 
 thereby is meant not only a universal conception, but also [cor- 
 responding thereto] a universal nature or essence really existing 
 without the mind, whereof Melampus doth partake, as tho' it 
 were possible that even things themselves could be universal. 
 And [But] this with reason is exploded as nonsensical and ab- 
 surd. But then those men who have so clearly and fully detected 
 the emptyness and insignificancy of that wretched jargon [of 
 S.G.W.(?)], are themselves to me equally unintelligible. For they 
 will have it that if I understand what I say I must make the name 
 animal stand for an abstract general idea which agrees to and 
 corresponds with the particular idea marked by the name Melam- 
 pus. But if a man may be allow'd to know his own meaning, I 
 do declare that in my thoughts the word animal is neither sup- 
 pos'd to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, 
 which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other. 
 
 96 Erased. 97 This and some words that follow are within brackets in the MS. 
 
 20 
 
3 o6 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Nor does it indeed in that proposition stand for any idea [at all] 
 at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this — that 
 the particular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be 
 called by the name animal. And I do intreat any one to make 
 this easy tryal. Let him but cast out of his [thoughts] the words 
 of the proposition, and then see whether two clear and determi- 
 nate ideas remain [9 8 in his understanding] whereof he finds one 
 to be conformable to the other. I perceive it evidently in myself 
 that upon laying aside all thought of the words ' Melampus is an 
 animal,' I have remaining in my mind one only naked and bare 
 idea, viz. that particular one to which I gave the name Melampus. 
 Tho' some there be that pretend they have also a general idea 
 signified by the word animal, which they perceive to agree with 
 the particular idea signified by the word Melampus, [which idea 
 is made up of inconsistencys and contradictions, as has been 
 already shown.] Whether this or that be the truth of the matter, 
 I desire every particular person to consider and conclude for 
 himself] 
 
 And this methinks may pretty clearly inform us how men 
 might first have come to think there was a general idea of animal. 
 For in the proposition we have instanc'd in, it is plain the word 
 animal is not suppos'd to stand for the idea of any one particular 
 [anima] [creature] animal. For if it be made stand for another 
 different from that is marked by the name Melampus, the 
 proposition is false and includes a contradiction ; and if it be 
 made signify the very same individual that Melampus doth, it is 
 a tautology. But it is presumed that every name stands for an 
 idea. It remains therefore that the word animal stands for [the] 
 general abstract idea [of animal]. In like manner we may be able 
 with a little attention to discover how other general ideas [of all 
 sorts] might at first have stolen into the thoughts of man. 
 
 But farther to make it evident that words may be used to good 
 purpose without bringing into the mind determinate ideas, I shall 
 add this instance. We are told [that] the good things which God 
 hath prepared for them that love him are such as eye hath not 
 seen nor ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the heart of man to 
 conceive. What man will pretend to say these words of the 
 
 98 Erased. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. ^07 
 
 inspir'd writer are empty and [sesf?)] insignificant ? And yet 
 who is there that can say they bring into his mind [determi] clear 
 and determinate ideas, or in truth any ideas at all [ideas] of the 
 good things [pre] in store for them that love God ? It may per- 
 haps be said that those words lay before us the clear and deter- 
 minate abstract ideas of good in general and thing in general ; 
 but I am afraid it will be found that those very abstract ideas are 
 every whit as remote from the comprehension of men as the 
 particular pleasures of the saints in heaven. But, say you, those 
 words of the Apostle must have some import. They cannot be 
 suppos'd to have been utter'd without all meaning and design 
 whatsoever. I answer, the saying is very weighty, and carrys 
 with it a great design, but it is not to raise in the minds of men 
 the abstract ideas of thing or good, nor yet the particular ideas 
 of the joys of the blessed. The design is to make them more 
 chearfull and fervent in their duty ; and how this may be com- 
 pass'd without making the words good things [to be] stand for 
 and mark out to our understandings any ideas either general or 
 particular, I proceed to show. 
 
 Upon mention of a reward to a man for his pains and perse- 
 verance in any occupation whatsoever, it seems to me that divers 
 things do ordinarily ensue. For there may be excited in his 
 understanding an idea of the particular good thing to him pro- 
 posed for a reward. There may also ensue thereupon an alacrity 
 and steddiness in fulfilling those conditions on which it is to be 
 obtain'd, together with a zealous desire of serving and pleasing 
 the person in whose power it is to bestow that good thing. All 
 these things, I say, may and often do follow upon the pronuncia- 
 tion of those words that declare the recompence. Now I do not 
 see any reason why the latter may not happen without the former. 
 What is it that hinders why a man may not be stirr'd up to dili- 
 gence and zeal in his duty, by being told he shall have a good 
 thing for his reward, tho' at the same time there be excited in his 
 mind no other idea than barely those of sounds or characters ? 
 When he was a child he had frequently heard those words used 
 to him to create in him an obedience to the commands of those 
 that spoke them, and as he grew up he has found by experience 
 that upon the mentioning of those words by an honest man it has 
 
3 o8 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 been his interest to have doubled his zeal and activity for the 
 service of that person. Thus there having grown up in his mind 
 a customary connexion betwixt the hearing that proposition and 
 being disposed to obey with cheerfulness the injunctions that 
 accompany it, methinks it might be made use of, tho' not to intro- 
 duce into his mind any idea marked by the words good thing, 
 yet to excite in him a willingness to perform that which is requir'd 
 of him. And this seems to me all that is design'd by the speaker, 
 except only when he intends those words shall [be the mark of] 
 signifie the idea of some particular thing: e. g. in the case I men- 
 tion'd 'tis evident the Apostle never intended the words [good 
 things] should [mark out to] our understandings the ideas of 
 those particular things our faculties never attain'd to. And yet I 
 cannot think that he used them at random and without design ; on 
 the contrary, it is my opinion that he used them to very good 
 purpose, namely, to beget in us a cheerfulness and zeal and per- 
 severance in well-doing, without any thought of introducing into 
 our minds the abstract idea of a good thing. If any one will 
 joyn ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I 
 doubt not it will evidently appear to him that general names are 
 often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's 
 designing them for marks of ideas in his own which he would 
 [them] have them raise in the understanding of the hearer. 
 
 [99 Even] proper names themselves are not always spoken with 
 a design to bring into our view the ideas of those particular 
 things that are suppos'd to be annex'd to them. For example, 
 when a Schoolman tells you that Aristotle hath said it, think you 
 that he intends ['thereby] to [ra] excite in your imagination the 
 idea of that particular man ? All he means by it is only to dis- 
 pose you to receive his opinion with that deference and submis- 
 sion that custom has annex'd to that name. When a man that 
 has been accustom'd to resign his judgment [of] to the authority 
 of that philosopher [shall] [upon] in reading of a book meet with 
 the letters that compose his name, he forthwith yields his assent 
 to the doctrine it was brought to support, and that with such a 
 quick and sudden [ 2 glance of thought] as it is impossible any 
 
 99 ' Nor is it less certain that' erased. * Erased. 
 
 a ' action of the mind' — on opposite page. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 309 
 
 idea either of the person or writings of that man should go before 
 — so close and immediate a connexion has long custom establish'd 
 betwixt the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and 
 reverence in the minds of some men. 
 
 I intreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not 
 oft happen, either in hearing, or reading a discourse, that the 
 passions of delight, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, &c. ["do 
 not] arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain 
 words without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the 
 words might have occasion'd ideas that may be apt to produce 
 those emotions of mind. But if I mistake not, it will be found 
 that when language is once grown familiar, 3 to a man the hearing 
 of the sound or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended 
 with those passions which at first were wont to be produc'd by 
 the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. 
 
 [ 4 Further], the communicating of ideas marked bywords is 
 not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd. 
 There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting 
 to or deterring from an action. 5 To which the former is in many 
 cases barely subservient, and sometimes 6 entirely omitted when 
 these can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently 
 happen in the familiar use of language. 
 
 I ask any man whether [ 7 every time] he tells another that such 
 an action is honourable and vertuous, with an 8 intention to excite 
 him to the performance of it, he has at that instant ideas of honour 
 and virtue 9 in his [thoug] view, and whether in reality his inten- 
 tion be to raise [ zo that] idea, together with their agreement to the 
 ["particular] idea of that particular action, in the understanding 
 of him he speaks to ["or rather whether this be not his full pur- 
 pose, namely, that those words should excite in the mind of the 
 hearer an esteem of that particular action, and stir him up to the 
 performance of it]. 
 
 3 ' to a man" erased. * ' From which it follows, that' erased. 
 
 5 On opposite page — ' the putting the mind in some particular disposition. Hence we 
 may conceive how it is possible for the promise that is made us of the good things of 
 another life excite in us suitable dispositions, tho' the words good things do not bring into 
 our minds particular ideas of the pleasures of heaven, nor yet the ideas of good in general 
 or things in general.' 
 
 6 ' entirely' erased. 7 ' when' erased. 
 
 8 ' vertuous, with an' substituted for ' vertuous.' 9 ' virtue' substituted for ' vertue.' 
 
 10 ' those abstract' erased. ™ Erased. 
 
3"> 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 [ I5 Upon hearing the words lie [&] rascal, indignation, revenge, 
 and the suddain motions of anger do instantly [ensue] in the 
 minds of some men, without our attending to the definition of 
 those names or concerning the ideas they are suppos'd to stand 
 for — all that passion and resentment having been by custom con- 
 nected to those very sounds themselves and the manner of their 
 utterance 12 .] 
 
 It is plain therefore that a man may understand what is said to 
 him without having a clear and determinate idea annexed to and 
 marked by every particular [ I3 word] in the discourse he hears. 
 Nay, he may perfectly understand it. For what is it, I pray, to 
 understand perfectly, but only to understand all that is meant by 
 the person that speaks ? which very oft is nothing more than 
 barely to excite in [ I4 his mind] certain emotions without any 
 thought of those ideas so much talk'd of and so little understood. 
 For the truth whereof I appeal to every [man's] one's experi- 
 ence. 
 
 I know not how this doctrine will go down with those [philos- 
 ophers] who may be apt to give the titles of gibberish and jargon 
 to all discourse whatsoever so far forth as the words contained 
 in it are not made the signs of clear and determinate ideas, who 
 think it nonsense for a man to assent to any proposition each 
 term whereof doth not bring into his mind a clear and distinct 
 idea, and tell us [ I5 over and over] that every pertinent [ l6 word] 
 [ 17 hath an idea annexed unto] which never fails to accompany it 
 where 'tis rightly understood. Which opinion of theirs, how 
 plausibly soever it might have been maintain'd by some, seems to 
 me to have introduced a great deal of difficulty and nonsense into 
 the reasonings of men. Certainly nothing could be fitter to bring 
 forth and cherish the doctrine of abstract ideas. For when men 
 were indubitably conscious to themselves that many [ l8 words] 
 they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should 
 
 13 On opposite page — ' Innumerable instances of this kind may be given — arise. But 
 why should I be tedious in enumerating these things, which every one's observation will, 
 I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?' 
 
 '3 ' name' — on opposite page. ** ' the hearer' — on opposite page. 
 
 '5 Erased. x6 ' name' — on opposite page. 
 
 «7 ' is the mark of an idea' — on opposite page. 
 
 ,8 ' names' — on opposite page. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 3II 
 
 be thought altogether insignificant, they were of necessity driven 
 into the opinion that they stood for [^ general ones]. 
 
 But more effectually to show the absurdity of an opinion that 
 carrys with it so great an appearance of [clearness and strength 
 of] reason, but is [ 2 °in fact] most dangerous and destructive both 
 to reason and religion, I shall, if I mistake not, in the progress 
 of this work demonstrate there be names well known and familiar 
 to men, which tho' they mark and [stand] and signify things, 
 cannot be suppos'd to signifie ideas of any sort, either general or 
 particular, without the greatest nonsense and contradiction ; it 
 being absolutely impossible, and a direct repugnancy, that any 
 intellect, how exalted and comprehensive soever, should frame 
 ideas of these things. 
 
 We have, I think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas. 
 We have consider'd what has been said in behalf of them by 
 their ablest patrons, and endeavour'd to demonstrate they are of 
 no use for those ends to which they "are thought necessary. 
 And, lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they 
 flow, which appears evidently to be language. 
 
 Since therefore words have been discover'd to be so very apt 
 to impose on the understandings of men, .1 am resolv'd in my 
 ["inquiries] to make as little use of them, as possibly I can. 
 Whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare 
 and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I 
 am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly 
 united to them. 
 
 Let us conceive a solitary man, one born and bred in such a 
 place of the world, and in such circumstances, as he shall never 
 have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas. 
 That man shall have a constant train of particular ideas passing 
 in his mind. Whatever he sees, hears, imagines, or anywise con- 
 ceives, is on all hands, even by the patrons of abstract ideas, 
 granted to be particular. Let us withall suppose him under no 
 necessity of labouring to secure himself from hunger and cold, 
 but at full ease, naturally of good facultys, [ 2 3and] contemplative. 
 Such a one I should take to be nearer the discovery of certain 
 
 »9 ' good sense and sound' — on opposite page. *> Instead of ' withall.' 
 
 21 ' are' instead of ' were.' ** Instead of ' reasonings.' 2 3 ' but" erased. 
 
312 APPENDIX A. 
 
 great and excellent truths yet unknown, than he that has had 
 the education of schools, [ 24 has been instructed in the ancient 
 and modern philosophy], and by much reading and conversation 
 has [furnish'd his head] attain'd to the knowledge of those arts 
 and sciences that make so great a noise in the [ 24 learned] world. 
 It is true, the knowledge of our solitary philosopher is not like 
 to be so very wide and extended, it being confin'd to those few 
 particulars that come within his own observation. But then, if 
 he is like to have less knowledge, he is withall like to have fewer 
 mistakes than other men. 
 
 It cannot be deny'd that words are of excellent use, in that by 
 their means all that stock of knowledge, which has been pur- 
 chas'd by the joynt labours of inquisitive men in all ages and na- 
 tions, may be drawn into the view, and made the possession of 
 one [ 24 particular] single person. But there [ 25 are some] parts of 
 learning which contain the knowledge of things the most noble 
 and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have 
 had the ill fate to be so signally perplex'd and darken'd by the 
 abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they are 
 deliver'd, that in the study [ 26 of them] a man cannot be too 
 much upon his guard, [ 27 whether] in his private meditations, or 
 in reading the writings or hearing the discourses of other men, to 
 prevent his being cheated [ 24 by the glibness and familiarity of 
 speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, in 
 truth, stand for none at all : which grand mistake it is almost 
 incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over the under- 
 standings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted. 
 
 I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [ 28 to put 
 myself in the posture of the solitary philosopher. I will confine 
 my thoughts and enquiries, to the naked scene of my own par- 
 ticular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following 
 advantages. 
 
 First. I shall be sure to get clear of all [ 29 verbal] controversies 
 purely verbal. The [ 3 ° springing up of] which weeds in almost 
 all the sciences has been [ 2 ? the] a most fatal obstruction to the 
 
 *4 Erased. "S Instead of ' is one.' »* Instead of ' thereof.' »7 Instead of ' cither.' 
 28 Erased. On the opposite page — ' to take off the mask of words, and obtain a naked 
 view of my own particular ideas.' 
 *9 Erased. 3° Instead of ' insisting on.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 31, 
 
 growth of true and sound knowledge: and accordingly is at this 
 day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complaint of 
 the wisest men. 
 
 Secondly. 'Tis reasonable to expect that [ 3I by this] the trouble 
 of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion may 
 be very much abridg'd. For it oft happens that a notion, when 
 it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to 
 be conceiv'd, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas 
 shrink into a narrow compass, and are view'd almost by one 
 glance of thought. 
 
 Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other men 
 seem to have had. [ 32 Because] I find myself to want several 
 of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philoso- 
 phers do usually spend much pains and study. [ 2 9 nay, even 
 of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that 
 pass for simple, particular ideas. It [is inconceivable what] can- 
 not be believ'd what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity of ideas 
 that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his 
 meditations. 
 
 Fourthly. Having remov'd the veil of words, I may expect to 
 have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my under- 
 standing. To behold the deformity of errour we need only un- 
 dress it.] 
 
 Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [ 33 way] to extricate myself 
 out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas ; which has so 
 miserably perplex'd and entangled the minds of men, and that 
 with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and 
 the more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper 
 was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held therein. 
 
 Sixthly. So long as I confine my [ 34 thoughts] to my own ideas 
 divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. 
 The objects I consider I [ 35 clearly] and adequately know. I can- 
 not be deceiv'd in thinking I have an idea which I have not. 
 Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea that I 
 have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own ideas are 
 
 31 Instead of ' hereby.' 32 Instead of ' For that.' 
 
 33 Instead of ' means whereby.' 34 Instead of ' contemplations.' 
 
 35 Instead of ' perfectly.' 
 
3*4 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern the agree- 
 ments and disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what 
 simple ideas are included in any [ 36 compound] idea, and what 
 not, [ 37 there is nothing requisite but] an attentive perception of 
 what passes in my own understanding. 
 
 But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose 
 an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare 
 scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a 
 union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a habit, as that 
 betwixt words and ideas. 
 
 Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas'd by 
 the [ 38 doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought 
 abstract ideas were annex'd to their words, it does not seem 
 strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an im- 
 practicable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract 
 idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. 
 This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about 
 words, to which they suppos'd abstract ideas were connected, 
 and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be con- 
 ceiv'd, tho' they could not without them. [39 But surely those 
 ideas ought to be suspected that cannot endure the light without 
 a covering.] 
 
 Another thing which makes words and ideas thought much 
 [ 4 ° harder to separate] than in truth they are, is the opinion that 
 every name stands for an idea. [ 4l For] it is no wonder that men 
 should fatigue themselves in vain, and find it a very difficult 
 undertaking, when they endeavour'd to [ 42 obtain a clear and 
 naked] view of [ 43 those] the ideas marked by those words, which 
 in truth mark none at all ; [ 43 as I have already shown many 
 names often do not, even when they are not altogether [insignifi- 
 cant], and I shall more fully show it hereafter]. 
 
 [ 44 This] seems to me the principal cause why those men that 
 
 3« Instead of ' complex.' 
 
 37 Erased here — ' all this I can do without being taught by [another], there being requi- 
 site thereto nothing more than.' Also — [' the writings and discoveries of other men or 
 without having any great parts of my own] thece is nothing more requisite.' 
 
 38 Instead of 'opinion of abstract ideas." » Erased. 
 
 4° Instead of more inseparable.' *« Instead of ' Now.' 
 
 +» Instead of ' strip and take a.' « Erased. ** Instead of ' These.' 
 
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 315 
 
 have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside 
 the use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their 
 bare ideas, have yet been so little able to perform it themselves. 
 Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions, 
 and insignificant disputes, that grow out of the abuse of words. 
 In order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend 
 to the ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from 
 the words that signify them. But how good soever this advice 
 may be that they have given others 45 men, it is plain they little 
 regarded it themselves, so long as they thought the only imme- 
 diate use of words was to signifie ideas, and that the immediate 
 signification of every general name was a determinate abstract 
 idea. 
 
 Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now, 
 with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of 
 words. Pie that knows he hath no other than particular ideas, 
 will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the ab- 
 stract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names 
 [ 5 °when made use of in the propriety of language] do not always 
 stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas 
 where there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now 
 remov'd, I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost 
 endeavour to attain a clear and naked view of [ 46 the] ideas he 
 would consider [ 4 ? by separating] from them all that varnish and 
 mist of words, which so fatally blinds the judgment and dissi- 
 pates the attention of men. 
 
 This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and 
 cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend 
 our views into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth. 
 In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men, 
 and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw 
 the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, 
 whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of [ 48 our hand]. 
 
 Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge 
 from the [ 49 incumbrance and delusion] of words, [ s °the conse- 
 quences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings 
 
 4S ' men' erased. *f> Instead of ' his own." *i Instead of ' having separated.' 
 
 4 s Instead of ' [any man] to pluck it.' « Instead of ' cheat.' s° Erased. 
 
3 i6 APPENDIX A. 
 
 upon them to no purpose. We may [ 5I deduce consequences 
 from] consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, 
 we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the 
 deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. 
 
 I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following 
 sheets, that he would make my words the occasion of his own 
 thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in 
 reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be 
 easy for him [ 52 to discover the truth or falsity of what I say]. 
 He will be out of all danger of being deceiv'd by my words. 
 And I do not see what inducement he can have to err in consid- 
 ering his own naked, undisguised ideas. 
 
 That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my 
 thoughts [ s ° to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I 
 shall throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest, 
 plainest, and most familiar "manner, abstaining from [ 5 °all flourish 
 and pomp of words], all hard and unusual terms which are 
 [ s ° commonly] pretended by those that use them to cover a sense 
 [ 5 ° intricate and] abstracted and sublime. 
 
 [ 5 °I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and 
 [ s °accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable 
 man.] 
 
 5° Erased. 5» Instead of ' lose ourselves in.' 
 
 S» Instead of 'whatever mistakes I might have committed.' 
 53 After ' manner' ' I shall' erased. 
 
ARTHUR COLLIER. 
 
 The simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of sensi- 
 ble reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has been 
 considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am induced 
 here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis : or, a 
 ?iew Inquiry after Truth, being a Demo?istration of the Non-existence, 
 or Impossibility, of an External World *. The reader of Berkeley may 
 thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis 
 regarding the inexistence of the material world. 
 
 Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680 — more than 
 four years before Berkeley — at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wilt- 
 shire. He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He 
 succeeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1 704, and continued 
 to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours, 
 during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English 
 Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of Ati Essay towards the 
 Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701 — 4), who died in 171 1. 
 
 From his own account, Collier seems to have adopted his new 
 thought regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about 
 1703, though he did not publish it till 1713, in the early part of which 
 year the Clavis Universalis appeared. 
 
 Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his 
 notion of Matter, are given in Benson's Memoirs. Two of them were 
 written in 1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written 
 in 1 715 is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to 
 Samuel Low, a grammarian ; another was sent to Dr. Waterland ; and 
 the last is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. 
 
 Collier seems to have been more disposed than Berkeley to apply 
 philosophical speculation directly to Christian theology. His theologi- 
 
 1 The motto of this work, taken from Malebranche, is Vulgi assensns et approbatio, 
 circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum fahitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur. 
 — De Inquir. Verit. Lib. III. p. 194. 
 
 317 
 
3H 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 cal speculations occupied a considerable share of his life, and involved 
 a subtle modification of Arianism — according to which the sensible 
 world exists in the mind of man ; the mind of man exists in Christ ; 
 and Christ exists in God — all exemplifying what he calls ' in-existence,' 
 or dependent existence. This chain of inexistcnt being he deduces 
 from speculative reason, and also from the words of Scripture. Collier 
 was a friend and correspondent of Whiston, whose theory of ' Primitive 
 Christianity' was discussed about that time. 
 
 Collier was a Tory and High Churchman, and curiously, like Berke- 
 ley, he published a sermon on the Christian obligation of submission 
 to the higher powers, founded on Romans xiii. i. 
 
 It does not appear that Berkeley and Collier ever met, nor is he 
 once named by Berkeley, though Berkeley is more than once named 
 by him. 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS, 
 
 ' Wlierein the Question in General is explained and stated, and the whole 
 subject divided into two particular heads. 
 
 Though I am verily persuaded that, in the whole course of the 
 following treatise, I shall or can have no other adversary but prejudice ; 
 yet, having by me no mechanical engine proper to remove it ; nor 
 being able to invent any other method of attacking it, besides that of 
 fair reason and argument; rather than the world should finish its 
 course without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists, ( and 
 for one reason more, which I need not name, unless the end desired 
 were more hopeful) ; I am at last, after a ten years pause and deliber- 
 ation, content to put myself upon the trial of the common reader, 
 without pretending to any better art of gaining him on my side, than 
 that of dry reason and metaphysical demonstration. 
 
 The Question I am concerned about is in general this — Whether 
 there be any such thing as an External World. And my title will 
 suffice to inform my reader, that the negative of this question is the 
 point I am to demonstrate. 
 
 In order to which, let us first explain the terms. 
 
 Accordingly, by World, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by 
 the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c, if there be 
 any other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or 
 any of these terms. 
 
 And now nothing remains but the explication of the word External. 
 
ARTHUR COLLIER. 
 
 319 
 
 By this, in general, I understand the same as is usually understood 
 by the words, absolute, self-existent, independent, &c. ; and this is 
 what I deny of all matter, body, extension, &c. 
 
 If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the word external, I am 
 like to meet with no adversary at all, for who has ever affirmed, that 
 matter is self- existent, absolute, or independent ? 
 
 To this I answer, What others hold, or have held in times past, I 
 shall not here inquire. On the contrary, I should be glad to find by 
 the event, that all mankind were agreed in that which I contend for as 
 the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be, independent, absolute, or 
 self-existent. In the mean time, whether they are so or no, will be 
 tried by this. 
 
 Secondly, and more particularly, That by not independent, not 
 absolutely existent, not external, I mean and contend for nothing less 
 than that all matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in dependence 
 on, mind, thought, or perception ; and that it is not capable of an 
 existence, which is not thus dependent. 
 
 This perhaps may awaken another to demand of me, How? to which 
 I as readily answer — just how my reader pleases, provided it be some- 
 how. As for instance, we usually say, An accident exists in, or in 
 dependence on, its proper subject; and that its very essence, or reality 
 of its existence, is so to exist. Will this pass for an explication of my 
 assertion? If so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of the 
 words. Again, we usually say (and fancy too we know what we mean 
 in saying,) that a body exists in, and also in dependence on, its proper 
 place, so as to exist necessarily in some place or other. Will this 
 description of dependence please my inquisitive reader ? If so, I am 
 content to join issue with him, and contend that all matter exists in, 
 or as much dependently on, mind, thought, or perception, to the full, 
 as any body exists in place. Nay, I hold the description to be so just 
 and apposite as if a man should say, A thing is like itself: for, I sup- 
 pose I need not tell my reader that when I affirm that all matter exists 
 in mind, after the same manner as body exists in place, I mean the 
 very same as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of body, and so 
 its place, as that it is not capable of existing in any other place, or in 
 place after any other manner. Again, lastly, it is a common saying, 
 that an object of perception exists in, or in dependence on, its respect- 
 ive faculty. And of these objects there are many who will reckon with 
 me, light, sounds, colours, and even some material things, such as 
 trees, houses, &c, which are seen, as we say, in a looking-glass, but 
 which are, or ought to be, owned to have no existence but in, or 
 respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who perceive them. But, 
 to please all parties at once, I affirm that I know of no manner in which 
 an object of perception exists in, or on, its respective faculty, which I 
 will not admit in this place to be a just description of that manner of 
 in-existence after which all matter that exists is affirmed by me to exist 
 in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak my mind freely I should 
 choose to compare it to the in-existence of some, rather than some 
 other objects of perception — particularly such as are objects of the 
 
320 APPENDIX B. 
 
 sense of vision ; and of these, those more especially which are allowed 
 by others to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as objects 
 seen in a looking-glass, by men distempered, light-headed, ecstatic, 
 &c, where not only colours, but entire bodies, are perceived or seen. 
 For these cases are exactly parallel with that existence which I affirm 
 of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever. 
 
 Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader 
 notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence 
 of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms, 
 what I do not mean by it. 
 
 Accordingly, I declare in the first place, That in affirming that there 
 is no external world, I make no doubt or question of the existence of 
 bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It is with 
 me a first principle, that whatsoever is seen, is. To deny or doubt of 
 this is errant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part or 
 office of a disputant, or philosopher ; so that it will be remembered 
 from this time, that my enquiry is not concerning the existence, but 
 altogether concerning the ^ra-existence of certain things or objects; 
 or, in other words, what I affirm and contend for, is not that bodies 
 do not exist, or that the external world does not exist, but that such 
 and such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist externally ; 
 or in universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world. 
 
 Secondly, I profess and declare that, notwithstanding this my asser- 
 tion, I am persuaded that I see all bodies just as other folks do ; that 
 is, the visible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, seems to 
 me, to be as much external or independent, as to its existence, on my 
 mind, self, or visive faculty, as any visible object does, or can be pre- 
 tended to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, as I know 
 of, another nature, nor another knack of seeing objects, different from 
 other persons, suitable to the hypothesis of their existence which I here 
 contend for. So far from this, that I believe, and am very sure, that 
 this seeming, or (as I shall desire leave to call it) quasi cxterneity of 
 visible objects, is not only the effect of the Will of God, (as it is his 
 Will that light md colours should seem to be without the soul, that 
 heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that 
 it is a natural and necessary condition of their visibility : I would say 
 that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one 
 visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet, by the condition 
 of its being seen, it would, and must be, quasi externa/ to the percep- 
 tive faculty ; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually 
 seen in this visible world. 
 
 Moreover, thirdly, When I affirm that all matter exists dependently 
 on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by 
 this — that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for instance, when I 
 affirm or say, that the world, which I see, exists in my mind, 1 cannot 
 be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the 
 bodies which I see exist in that which common use has taught me to 
 call my body. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because 
 
ARTHUR COLLIER. 
 
 321 
 
 experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake 
 me in this particular. 
 
 Fourthly, When I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or 
 dependently on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be 
 understood to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and per- 
 ceptive faculty. In like manner I would be understood, when I affirm 
 in general, that all matter or body exists in, or dependently on, mind. 
 I say this to acquit myself from the imputation of holding that the 
 mind causes its own ideas, or objects of perception ; or, lest any one 
 by a mistake should fancy that I affirm — that matter depends for its 
 existence on the will of man, or any creature whatsoever. But now, 
 if any such mistake should arise in another's mind, he has wherewith 
 to rectify it ; in as much as I assure him, that by mind, I mean that 
 part, or act, or faculty of the soul which is distinguished by the name 
 intellective or perceptive ; as in exclusion of that other part which is 
 distinguished by the term will. 
 
 Fifthly, When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no 
 matter is external, I do not mean that the world, or any visible object 
 of it, which I (for instance) see, is dependent on the mind of any 
 other person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any 
 other person sees, is dependent on mine, or any other person's mind, 
 or faculty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant, 
 that the world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which 
 Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the 
 same in this as in any other case of sensation ; for instance, that of 
 sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of 
 music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the same notes or 
 melody ; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not 
 the very same with the sound which another hears — because the souls 
 or persons are supposed to be different ; and therefore, the sound which 
 Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John, and 
 that which John hears is external to the soul or person of Peter. 
 
 Lastly, When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but 
 necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished 
 by the proper names of John, Peter, &c, I have no design to affirm 
 that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must 
 needs exist in some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe 
 that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather 
 merely created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are 
 thousands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there 
 is an Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numeri- 
 cally different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. 
 By this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice 
 created) matter, by which all things are produced ; or rather, (as my 
 present subject leads me to speak,) by which the great God gives sen- 
 sations to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not 
 are preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were. 
 
 And now I presume and hope, that my meaning is sufficiently 
 
322 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 understood, when I affirm, That all matter which exists, exists in, or 
 dependently on, mind ; or, that there is no such thing as an External 
 World. 
 
 Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems 
 already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two. 
 For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs 
 be one article to shew that the visible world is not external ; and when 
 this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any 
 opinion yet entertained by men, yet something still is wanting towards 
 a full demonstration of the point at large, and to come up to the 
 universal terms in which the question is expressed. 
 
 Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. First, to shew that the 
 visible world is not external. Secondly, to demonstrate more at large, 
 or simply, that an external world is a being utterly impossible. Which 
 two shall be the subjects of two distinct Parts or Books.' 
 
 Collier in the end resolves the difference between sense-perception 
 and imagination into a difference in degree merely. To imagine an 
 object is to perceive it less vividly than we perceive it in the senses. 'I 
 can no more,' he says, 'understand how we can create the objects we 
 imagine than the objects we are said to see.' What is imagined 'exists 
 as much, to all appearance, without, or external to, the mind which 
 perceives it as any of those objects usually called visible — but not so 
 vividly ; and this is that whereby I distinguish the act which we call 
 imagination from the act which we call vision : but why is this, but 
 because the common cause of both, viz. God, does not, in the former 
 act, impress or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If He 
 did, both acts would become one, or require the same name; and there 
 would be no difference between seeing and imagining 2 .' So Hume 
 afterwards. Berkeley's position in relation to the difference between 
 sense-perception and mere imagination I have elsewhere noted. 
 
 The difference is surely more than one of degree. There is a differ- 
 ence in kind between real existence in place, and a subjective imagi- 
 nation, peculiar to an individual mind. Is not this difference consistent 
 with the real things present in sense, and also the space or place in 
 which they exist, being alike dependent for their actual existence on 
 Mind — in short, with their being grounded on Knowing, and not on 
 an abstracted Unknown ? May not space be the uncreated or necessary 
 condition of the possibility of all sense-experience like ours, but yet 
 dependent for its actual existence upon the existence of the sense- 
 experience? This is not to make it the abstract space against which 
 Berkeley argues, nor need it involve quantitative infinity. 
 
 a See Benson's Memoirs of Collier, pp. 26, 27. 
 
c. 
 
 THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 
 
 Experience of Persons born blind. 
 
 In the last Section of the Vindication (p. 299), Berkeley refers to 
 the now well-known experiment of Cheselden, in which sight was 
 given to a boy born blind. As this case is described imperfectly in 
 the Vindication, and as it is often referred to in the controversy as to 
 whether our power of interpreting the tactual, muscular, and locomo- 
 tive meaning of visual signs is, on the one hand, original and instinct- 
 ive, or, on the other hand, the acquired result of mental association 
 and habit, I here reprint the entire Communication, given in the 
 Philos. Trans., No. 402 : — 
 
 ' An account of some observations made by a young gentleman, who 
 was born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no rettiembrance 
 of ever having seen, and was couched between 13 and 14 years of age. 
 By Mr. Will. Chesselden, F.R.S., Surgeon to Her Majesty, and to St. 
 Thomas's Hospital. 
 
 Tho' we say of the gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all 
 people who have ripe cataracts, yet they are never so blind from that 
 cause but that they can discern day from night ; and for the most part 
 in a strong light distinguish black, white, and scarlet ; but they can- 
 not perceive the shape of anything; — for the light by which these 
 perceptions are made, being let in obliquely through the aqueous 
 humour, or the anterior surface of the chrystalline (by which the rays 
 cannot be brought into a focus upon the retina), they can discern in 
 no other manner, than a sound eye can thro' a glass of broken jelly, 
 where a great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light that the 
 several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye into their 
 proper foci ; wherefore the shape of an object in such a case, cannot 
 be at all discern'd, tho' the colour may. And thus it was with this 
 young gentleman, who though he knew these colours asunder in a good 
 light, yet when he saw them after he was couch'd, the faint ideas he 
 had of them before were not sufficient for him to know them by after- 
 
 323 
 
324 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 wards; and therefore he did not think them the same, which he had 
 before known by those names. Now scarlet he thought the most 
 beautiful of all colours, and of others the most gay were the most 
 pleasing, whereas the first time he saw black, it gave him great uneasi- 
 ness, yet after a little time he was reconcil'd to it; but some months 
 after, seeing by accident a Negroe woman, he was struck with great 
 horror at the sight. 
 
 When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about 
 distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he 
 express'd it) as what he felt did his skin ; and thought no objects so 
 agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho' he could form 
 no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object that was 
 pleasing to him : he knew not the shape of anything, nor any one 
 thing from another, however different in shape or magnitude; but 
 upon being told what things were, whose form he knew before from 
 feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again ; 
 but, having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them; 
 and (as he said) at first he learn'd to know, and again forgot a thousand 
 things in a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I 
 will relate : — having forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he 
 was asham'd to ask ; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) 
 he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, 
 said, ' So, Puss ! I shall know you another time.' He was very much 
 surpris'd that those things which he had lik'd best did not appear most 
 agreeable to his eyes, expecting those persons would appear most 
 beautiful that he lov'd most, and such things to be most agreeable to 
 his sight that were so to his taste. We thought he soon knew what 
 pictures represented which were shew'd to him, but we found after- 
 wards we were mistaken; for about two months after he was couch'd, 
 he discovered at once, they represented solid bodies; when to that 
 time he consider'd them only as party-colour' d planes or surfaces diver- 
 sified with variety of paint; but even then he was no less surpris'd, 
 expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and 
 was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow 
 appear'd now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd 
 which was the lying sense, — feeling or seeing? 
 
 Being shewn his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, 
 and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly sur- 
 pris'd ; asking how it could be that a large face could be express'd in 
 so little room, saying, it should have seem'd as impossible to him as to 
 put a bushel of anything into a pint. 
 
 At first he could bear but very little sight, and the things he saw he 
 thought extreamly large; but upon seeing things larger, those first seen 
 he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond the 
 bounds he saw; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part 
 of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house could 
 look bigger. Before he was couch'd he expected little advantage from 
 seeing, worth undergoing an operation for, except reading and writing; 
 for he said he thought he could have no more pleasure in walking 
 
THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 
 
 325 
 
 abroad than he had in the garden, which he could do safely and readily. 
 And even blindness, he observ'd, had this advantage, that he could go 
 anywhere in the dark much better than those who can see ; and after 
 he had seen, he did not soon lose this quality, nor desire a light to go 
 about the house in the night. He said every new object was a new 
 delight, and the pleasure was so great that he wanted ways to express 
 it; but his gratitude to his operator he could not conceal, never seeing 
 him for some time without tears of joy in his eyes, and other marks of 
 affection ; and if he did not happen to come at any time when he was 
 expected, he would be so griev'd that he could not forbear crying at 
 his disappointment. A year after first seeing, being carried upon 
 Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly 
 delighted with it, and called it a new kind of seeing. And now being 
 lately couch' d of his other eye, he says that objects at first appeared 
 large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other ; and 
 looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it look'd about 
 twice as large as with the first couch'd eye only, but not double, that 
 we can anyways discover.' 
 
 No very satisfactory inference can be drawn from a narrative so 
 deficient in the refinement of thought and expression which the subject 
 requires. The question is too subtle for experiments conducted in this 
 fashion. Nor can more be said in favour of a succession of somewhat 
 similar experiments recorded in the Philosophical Transactions. The 
 most important are the following : — 
 
 1. Case described by Mr. Ware, Surgeon, in the Philos. Trans. 
 (1801). 
 
 2. Two cases described by Mr. Home, in the Thilos. Trans. (1807). 
 
 3. Case of the lady described by Mr. Wardrop, Surgeon, in the 
 Philos. Trans. (1826). 
 
 To these maybe added Stewart's 'Account of James Mitchell, a boy 
 born deaf and blind,' in the seventh volume of the Transactions of 
 the Royal Society of Edinburgh. See Hamilton's Edition of Stewart's 
 Works, Vol. III. Appendix, pp. 300 — 370; also p. 388. 
 
 As I have quoted one of the earliest described cases — that of Ches- 
 elden, I shall end by giving the following, which is one of the last 
 and most philosophically described of any I have met with. It is con- 
 tained in Mr. Nunnely's valuable scientific treatise on The Organs of 
 Vision : their Anatomy and Physiology (1858) : — 
 
 ' The case was that of a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years of 
 age, who had congenital cataract of both eyes, in whom the retina was 
 
326 APPENDIX C. 
 
 more perfect than it commonly is at so advanced an age, as shown by 
 the excellent sight he subsequently acquired. He had always lived in 
 a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds. 
 He could find his way all about this place. Walking along the middle 
 of the road, when he heard any object approaching, he at once stopped, 
 groped his way to the side of the road, and remained perfectly still until 
 it had passed. Any one whom he knew he was able to recognise by 
 the sound of the voice, and by passing his hands over the face and 
 body of the person. He could perceive the difference between a 
 bright, sunny, and a dark, cloudy day, and could follow the motions 
 of a candle without discerning what it was. He had been sent to 
 school for some time, and by means of models and a raised alphabet, 
 could by touch alone arrange the different letters into short words. I 
 presented to him in succession a great number of different objects, each 
 one of which he took into both hands, felt it most carefully over with 
 both, then with equal minuteness with one, turning the object over and 
 over again, in every direction ; the tongue was next applied to it ; and 
 lastly, he applied it so near to the eye as to touch the eyelids, when 
 he pronounced his opinion upon it, and generally with correctness, as 
 to the nature and form of the object, when these were distinct. Thus 
 he recognised books, stones, small boxes, pieces of wood and bone of 
 different shapes, a broken piece of hard biscuit. A cube and a sphere 
 he could readily recognise, saying the one was square and the other 
 round, and that both were made of wood; but a sphere which was 
 made of perfectly smooth, hard wood, he was very confident was bone. 
 In an object where the angles were not very distinct, he made con- 
 stant mistakes in the shape, first saying that it was square, then that 
 it was round. Very bright light colours, when touching the eyelids, 
 he could at once recognise, calling them all white ; all dull and dark 
 colours he said were black. Between a thin circle of wood and a 
 sphere or a cube he instantly decided by the hand alone. On putting 
 half-a-crown piece into his hands he immediately said it was money ; 
 but for long was undecided whether it was half-a-crown or a penny ; 
 however, after carefully turning it over for some time, so as frequently 
 to bring every part into contact with the hand, then putting it to the 
 tongue, and afterwards so close to the eye that it touched the eyeball 
 itself, he said decidedly, " It is half-a-crown." 
 
 The lenses were very large, milky, with caseous particles, quite white 
 and opaque, the capsules being clear and transparent. As is well 
 known, in most cases, before this period of life, the lens itself has been 
 absorbed, leaving only a leathery, opaque capsule, and, of course, not 
 nearly so favourable for such observations as this one. After keeping 
 him in a dark room for a few days, until the opaque particles of lenses 
 were nearly absorbed, and the eyes clear, the same objects, which had 
 been kept carefully from him, were again presented to his notice. He 
 could at once perceive a difference in their shapes ; though he could 
 not in the least say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw 
 they were not of the same figure. It was not until they had many times 
 been placed in his hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the 
 
THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 
 
 327 
 
 one which he had just had in his hands, from the other placed beside 
 it. He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it was 
 only after several days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone, 
 which was the sphere and which the cube ; when asked, he always, 
 before answering, wished to take both into his hands ; even when this 
 was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were placed before 
 the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. Of distance he had not the 
 least conception. He said everything touched his eyes, and walked 
 most carefully about, with his hands held out before him, to prevent 
 things hurting his eyes by touching them. Great care was requisite 
 to prevent him falling over objects, or walking against them. Im- 
 provement gradually went on, and his subsequent sight was, and now 
 is, comparatively perfect.' 
 
 None of these experiments, taken by themselves, unequivocally de- 
 termine the question — Whether the power of interpreting the visual 
 signs of real or tangible extension is inspired, or is, on the contrary, 
 acquired by association and constructive activity of intellect. But 
 they confirm the conclusion, that visible signs are not less indispensable 
 to an imagination of trinal extension than the artificial signs of lan- 
 guage are necessary to abstract thought and reasoning — that one born 
 blind can have only a vague perception of an external world. More- 
 over, when once we are experimentally acquainted with distances, a 
 mathematical analysis of the perspective lines leading from any object 
 to the eye is possible, with an involved sense of necessity, which seems 
 to presuppose relations common to the visible signs and the felt reality. 
 The difficulty which confronts Berkeley is, that on his theory space 
 and its mathematical relations are relative to sensations which, per se, 
 are contingent and phenomenal, and thus wanting in the element 
 which alone gives absolute stability to mathematical science : quanti- 
 tative infinity disappears, and space and its relations are the real but 
 arbitrary results of creation or the voluntary activity of God. 
 
ANNOTATIONS 
 
 ON 
 
 BERKELEY'S PRINCIPLES, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 UEBERWEG'S NOTES ENTIRE, 
 
 WITH ADDITIONS, TRANSLATED, SELECTED, AND 
 ORIGINAL. 
 
 329 
 
ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 [i] Idea. — Abstract ideas. 
 
 Berkeley, Intr., § 6 : 'the opinion that the mind (Geist) hath a 
 power (Vermogen) of framing abstract ideas or notions (Begriffe) of 
 things.' 
 
 Ueberweg: '"Idea" was used by Plato in the objective sense, as 
 designation of the pure, archetypal essence of homogeneous things. In 
 the course of time, mainly because of the Aristotelian Scholastic doc- 
 trine that the human mind, in the act of perceiving things, receives into 
 itself the form or shape (Idia, eldos) without the matter of them, the 
 word came to have a subjective force as well as an objective one. In 
 the subjective sense it denotes the psychical image of the objective 
 form, and consequently came to be more and more limited to the sub- 
 jective sense. It thus came in Descartes, and still more in Spinoza 
 and Locke, to have the meaning ' psychical image' or conception 
 (Vorstellung), in the wide sense of that word which embraces the 
 image in sense-perception. In this sense some recent psychologists 
 have employed it. 
 
 ' In Berkeley, who did not regard the subjective forms as images of 
 objective forms, "idea" has exclusively the sense "psychical image." 
 As he uses the term, "ideas" exist partly through sense-perception, 
 partly through reflection on the psychical antecedents, partly through 
 the reproduction, decompounding, and combining of the conceptions 
 which have risen. 
 
 f In the translation of Berkeley's work we retain the term " idea." In 
 this use of it we must guard against the mistake of supposing that the 
 word refers merely to reproduced images, or to mere images of the 
 fancy at all. 
 
 ' This mistake would be most effectually guarded against, if, as has 
 been suggested by T. Collyns Simon, one of Berkeley's adherents, the 
 term phenomenon (Erscheinung) were used. 
 
 33* 
 
332 
 
 ANN OTA TIONS. 
 
 'The objections to this rendering are: 
 
 ' i. That " Erscheinung" is a translation of phenomenon rather than 
 of idea, and would consequently be a displacement of the word " idea" 
 rather than a rendering of it. 
 
 ' 2. That exactly the opposite mistake would be encouraged, as if 
 the conceptions of the imagination were not included. 
 
 '3. That "Erscheinung" rather denotes a complex of sense-ideas 
 than the separate constituents of this complex. 
 
 ' 4. That the being in the subject, or that "esse," which is the same 
 as "percipi," indubitably presents itself in the word "idea," not in 
 the word "Erscheinung" (phenomenon). 
 
 '5. That "Erscheinung" (phenomenon) either presupposes a "thing 
 in itself," of which it is the phenomenon (a supposition which Berkeley 
 rejects), or, as Berkeley himself uses the word phenomenon, stands in 
 antithesis to the "essence" or "law," whose cognoscibility Berkeley 
 does not deny.' 
 
 Editor : 1 : Berkeley discusses abstract ideas in the New Theory of 
 Vision : 
 
 § 122 : 'I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in ab- 
 stract.' 123 : 'I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise 
 frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of.'. . . 124: 
 ' It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract extension.' 
 125 : ' After reiterated endeavours to apprehend the general idea of a 
 triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible.' 
 
 Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5-7 : ' May not words become general by 
 being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular ideas, which, 
 from a mutual resemblance, belong to the same kind, without the in- 
 tervention of any abstract general idea? May we not admit general 
 ideas though we should not admit them to be made by abstraction, or 
 though we should not allow of general abstract ideas? . . . A particular 
 idea may become general by being used to stand for or represent other 
 ideas, and that general knowledge is conversant about signs or general 
 ideas made such by their signification.' 
 
 A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics (§ 45-48): ' I hold that 
 there are general ideas, but not formed by abstraction in the manner 
 set forth by Mr. Locke. . . . According to Locke, the general name 
 colour stands for an idea which is neither blue, red, green, nor any 
 other particular colour, but somewhat distinct and abstracted from 
 them all. To me it seems the word colour is only a more general name 
 applicable to all and each of the particular colours; while the other 
 specific names, as blue, . . . and the like, are each restrained to a 
 
ABSTRACTION. 333 
 
 more limited signification. . . . Nothing is easier than to define in 
 terms or words that which is incomprehensible in idea; forasmuch 
 as any words can be either separated or joined as you please, but ideas 
 always cannot. It is as easy to say a round square as an oblong square, 
 though the former be inconceivable.' 
 
 2 : Berkeley has noted the difference between Plato's use of ' idea' 
 and his own (Siris, § 335): 'In Plato's style the term idea doth not 
 merely signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is used 
 as synonymous with ahiov and dp^vj, cause and principle.' 
 
 [2] Locke. 
 
 Berkeley, Intr., § 11: 'There has been a late excellent and de- 
 servedly esteemed philosopher. ' 
 
 Ueberweg : John Locke, b. 1632, d. 1704. His chief work is 'An 
 Essay concerning Human Understanding,' in four books. First edit., 
 London: 1690. 
 
 [3] Brutes. 
 
 Berkeley, Intr., § 11 (quoting Locke): 'For if they (the brutes) 
 have any ideas (Vorstellungen), and are not bare machines (as some 
 would have them).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The reference is to the Cartesians, followers of the 
 system of Ren6 Descartes, b. 1596, d. 1650. 
 
 ' The bold separation which Descartes made between spirit and 
 matter, which allowed of their having nothing in common, led to the 
 alternative either of ascribing to brutes souls, which like those of men 
 are spiritual in kind, and consequently independent of the body and 
 separable from it, or the entire denial of their possessing souls, and 
 the conceding that they had nothing more than "vital spirits," which 
 were capable of none of the psychical functions, no sensation, no per- 
 ception, or the like. Descartes accepted the second horn of the 
 dilemma. He also ascribed to man material vital spirits, which he 
 supposed to be the medium of the relation between the soul and the 
 grosser parts of the body.' 
 
 [4] 
 
 Berkeley, § 13 : 'The Essay on the Human Understanding.' 
 
 Ueberweg : See Note 2. 
 
 [5] Abstraction. 
 Berkeley, § 16: 'And here it must be acknowledged that a man 
 may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the 
 particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.' 
 
334 ANNO TA TIONS. 
 
 Uererweg : ' This admission on the part of Berkeley is sufficient to 
 secure for abstraction rightly understood its full value in scientific in- 
 vestigation. His discussion of abstraction at this point is of great value. 
 
 ' No contradiction arises unless it be maintained that an idea can be 
 entirely definite and at the same time be abstract ; for universal defini- 
 tiveness, as the Leibnitzians correctly maintained, is the distinguishing 
 character of the individual conceptions. By abstraction is to be under- 
 stood no more than the exclusive consideration of that in which the 
 entire ideas of a particular group coincide with one another. 
 
 ' In a certain measure the process of abstraction is completed inde- 
 pendently of our conscious concurrence, because of the predominance 
 which the concurrent marks, in consequence of their frequent occur- 
 rence, have over the marks which differ and which are presented singly. 
 Abstraction is aided by the use of the common term which is associated 
 with every idea of the group involved ; it comes to completeness by 
 means of the conscious logical formation of definitions, in which the 
 common element is brought to consciousness in a complete and well- 
 arranged order, and is distinguished from the differing elements. 
 
 ' Abstraction involves the power of attributing common predicates 
 to all the objects of a group, in such a way that through what is defined, 
 and by means of the highest development of the definitory conscious- 
 ness in regard to the common marks of this group, it is accurately 
 bounded. Such, for example, is the power of making assertions in 
 regard to conic sections which hold good of every particular figure 
 of this kind, so that by means of the consciousness we have of the 
 marks of a conic section, all figures which are conic sections are accu- 
 rately distinguished from all others. 
 
 'This capacity is in fact a prerogative of man, and in its highest 
 degree a prerogative of the man of scientific culture. Without it 
 there would be no scientific knowledge.' 
 
 [6] Tricks of phrase. 
 
 Berkeley, Intr., § 20 : ' those things which every one's experience 
 will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him ?' (ins Bewusstsein 
 ruft ?) 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here admirably characterizes the mystery of 
 phrase, of that false rhetoric, the aim of which is to produce great effects 
 upon the minds of the uneducated and half-educated, at the expense 
 of truth and rectitude. 
 
 'Where reasons are wanting, the Shibboleth is still mighty. The 
 commonplace, the formulary, still stirs men like the roll of the drum 
 
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 335 
 
 or the ensnaring tinkling of the lute. The feelings carry away the 
 judgment.' 
 
 [7] Words. 
 
 Berkeley, Intr., §23: 'they advise well that we attend to the 
 ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify 
 them. ' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'Locke says: "I endeavour as much as I can to deliver 
 myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by 
 taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowl- 
 edge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear 
 and distinct significations." (Ess. of Human Underst., 11. xiii. 18.) 
 
 ' " Men who abstract their thoughts and do well examine the ideas of 
 their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking, however they may 
 perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of 
 the several schools or sects they have been bred up in." (lb. 28.)' 
 
 [8] Objects of knowledge : ideas. 
 
 Berkeley, Principles, § 1 : * It is evident to any one who takes a 
 survey of the objects (Gegenstande) of human knowledge.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'As Berkeley here designates " ideas" as the objects of 
 human knowledge, he assumes the very thing he ought first to prove, 
 and, without this, is guilty of begging the question. 
 
 ' By ideas he means phenomena which exist in our consciousness, 
 sensations, and the complex of perceptions, and that which proceeds 
 from them. 
 
 'Anyone disposed to dispute the truth of Berkeley's assertion might 
 reply that ideas are not the objects of our knowledge, but the means of 
 it. We have cognition by means of our ideas. Our ideas have actual 
 existence in our souls, or are something subjectively real or psychically 
 real. By means of our ideas we have cognition of the objectively real 
 external world standing over against us, inasmuch as a primitive think- 
 ing (primitives Denken) coalesces with sensation (sinnlichen Empfin- 
 dung) and in conjunction with it forms the sense-perception (seeing, 
 hearing, etc.). See Ueberweg's System der Logik, § 41, seq. 45-47, 
 etc. (tr. by Lindsay, London). 
 
 ' This primitive thinking, not reflecting upon its separate elements 
 (Momente), but bringing only the results to consciousness, interprets 
 the image furnished in perception, and has the power to give it shape, — 
 for example, to bear its part in determining the form of the firmament, 
 a power not possessed by the subsequent reflective thinking, which 
 meets shapes already fixed. 
 
336 A NNO TA TI O NS. 
 
 ' The complexes of sensations or ideas co-determined or shaped by 
 the primary thinking are subjective images, or at least subjective signs, 
 of the external world. 
 
 ' But to these complexes of sensations Berkeley assigns names, such as 
 apple, tree, mountain, house, which, according to the usage of lan- 
 guage and the popular consciousness on which that usage rests, desig- 
 nate external objects, by which apparently, but only apparently, it is 
 proven that the so-called "external objects" exist in the spirit, for 
 "ideas" (phenomena) have no other existence than in the percipient 
 spirit. 
 
 ' The fixing on the complexes of sensations the names which pertain 
 to the external objects wears an appearance of truth, because of an 
 error in which the common view is involved. 
 
 ' The common view is that what is in fact our sensation, that is our 
 psychical reaction toward the operation proceeding ffom the external 
 thing, the operation exercised directly or by certain media upon our 
 senses, that this is an attribute of the outer thing as such ; as, for ex- 
 ample, it supposes the green colour to be a quality of the leaf as such, 
 the warmth a quality of the fire as such. 
 
 ' Now as Berkeley considers and treats this error as if it were a truth, 
 in accepting the inseparableness of the object from these qualities, and 
 consequently, in accordance with the popular consciousness, refers the 
 names of the things to those objects to which these qualities pertain, 
 and as he then goes on to show that these qualities consist of sensa- 
 tions of the subject, in Berkeley's view those objects (as the apple, 
 etc.) are identified with these sensations as something existing in the 
 subject. 
 
 'The popular apprehension considers these sensations as outward, 
 inasmuch as it considers our sensations as qualities of objects, and not 
 our own sensations, which are only possible in the subject. 
 
 'Berkeley considers the objects as internal, that is, in the subject, in- 
 asmuch as he considers our sensations as qualities of the objects (to wit, 
 ideas), but at the same time apprehends these (qualities) as our own 
 sensations. 
 
 'But the argument of Berkeley presents the fittest occasion to sepa- 
 rate in the distinctest manner the correct and incorrect in the popular 
 opinion as regards the existence and qualities of external objects, 
 and not simply to claim concession for what is really scientifically 
 justified, but over against Berkeley's very thorough and acute negation 
 to seek proofs of it. In this lie the suggestiveness and the abiding 
 scientific value of the paradox of Berkeley. Cf. notes 10 and 90.' 
 
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 337 
 
 Editor: i : Ueberweg, in his Logic, treating of the 'Combination 
 of Internal and External Perceptions,' says, § 41 : ' The knowledge of 
 the outer world depends upon the combination of external with internal 
 perceptions. Our corporeal circumstances, sensibly perceived by our- 
 selves, are in orderly coherence with circumstances belonging to our 
 internal perceptions.' § 42 : ' Extending his consideration of the ex- 
 ternal world, man recognizes the internal characters of other things 
 chiefly by means of the related sides of his own inner existence.' § 43 : 
 ' Every phenomenon objectively founded, as this very act of becoming a 
 phenomenon testifies, and as the scientific investigation of the laws of 
 nature makes evident, is to be traced back to some active power as its 
 real basis.' § 44: 'The order in space and time belonging to real 
 objects mirrors itself in the order in space and time of external and 
 internal perception. Sense-qualities, however, colours, sounds, etc. 
 are as such subjective only. They are not copies of motions, but are 
 regularly and connectedly related to determinate motions as their sym- 
 bols.' § 45 : 'The individual conception, or intuition, is the mental 
 image of the individual existence, which is objective or at least is 
 imagined to be.' § 46 : 'Individual intuitions gradually arise out of the 
 original confused aggregate image of perception, when man first begins 
 to recognize himself an individual being in antithesis to the outer 
 world.' § 47: 'As the individual conception corresponds generally to 
 the individual existence, so its different kinds or forms correspond to 
 the different kinds ox forms of individual existence.'' 
 
 2 : By ' objects of knowledge ' Berkeley means the objects of un- 
 mediated cognition. For the objector to say that the ideas are not the 
 objects but the means of knowing the objects, is to admit that the 
 objects, in the objector's sense, are not known except, through a 
 medium, to wit, the ideas. This means that the medium is itself known 
 directly, and that the object whose medium it is is known mediately. 
 But it is immediate knowledge of which alone Berkeley is speaking, so 
 that the opponent meets him by repeating his affirmation with a change 
 of phrase. 
 
 3 : The Cartesian and post-Cartesian definitions of ' idea ' illustrate 
 both the usage and the argument of Berkeley. Syrbius (d. 1738) 
 defines idea : exemplar rei in cogitante, — the copy of the thing in the 
 thinker. Locke (1. i. 8) defines it 'whatsoever is the object of the 
 understanding when a man thinks; whatever is meant by phantasm, 
 notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed 
 about in thinking.' In the Letter to the Bishop of Worcester: 'the 
 things signified by ideas are nothing but the immediate objects of our 
 
338 
 
 A XX OTA TIOXS. 
 
 minds in thinking. Ke that thinks must have some immediate object 
 of his mind in thinking, i.e. must have ideas. 1 Le Clerc defines idea 
 'the immediate object of the mind.' 
 
 Schubert : ' Representation in the soul is that operation by which 
 the characters of any object are expressed in the soul. That state of 
 soul which arises from this operation is called idea, and if the object 
 of representation be a universal entity it is called notion.' 
 
 4: Kant regarded the fixing of the proper sense of the word 
 ' idea' as of great importance. ' I beseech those who have the in- 
 terests of philosophy at heart, — and this involves more than is com- 
 monly imagined, — . . . to protect the term idea in its original sense, 
 so that it be not confused among the words with which, in careless 
 disorder, all kinds of mental representations (Vorstellungen) are 
 ordinarily designated, to the great detriment of science. There is no 
 want of appellations adapted to every species of mental representa- 
 tion, completely obviating any necessity of encroaching on the proper 
 province of others." 
 
 Kant then gives these terms in a graduated list, which Mellin* has 
 reduced to a very convenient tabular form : 
 
 GRADUATED LIST OF THE MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS (Vorstellungen). 
 
 without Consciousness. 
 
 with Consciousness. 
 Perception. 
 
 Subjective, 
 Sensation, 
 Empfindung. 
 
 Objective, 
 Cognition, 
 Erkenntniss. 
 
 I 
 immediate, 
 
 Intuition, 
 
 Anschauung, 
 
 mediate, 
 Concept, 
 Begriff. 
 
 Empirical, 
 
 Pure Sense, 
 reiner Sinnlichkeit. 
 
 The Understanding, 
 Verstande, 
 Notion. 
 
 Pure, 
 proceeding from 
 
 L 
 
 The Reason, 
 Vernunft, 
 Idea. 
 
 • Krit. d. rein. Vern., II. Th. ii. Abt. 1. Buch. 
 
 Marginalim (1794). 87. 
 
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 339 
 
 5. Among the most serious difficulties which the English reader and 
 translator of German metaphysics encounters is the perplexity he rinds 
 in the use of the terms Vorstellung, Begriff, and Idee. The perplexity 
 arises from the shifting senses attached to these words by the various 
 schools of philosophy. In ordinary life a German will say, ' I can form 
 no Begriff, no Idee, no Vorstellung of it,' just as we say in English, 'I 
 can form no notion, no idea, no conception of it.' The three terms 
 have this in common, that they involve the activity of a thinking being. 
 Each of them is sometimes used to translate idea, notion, and concep- 
 tion, and those three terms are used in translating each one of the 
 German words. 
 
 Vorstellung is generally used as equivalent to Reprsesentatio and 
 Perceptio, and covers everything which is wrought by the activity of 
 the mind. It is a generic term for mental operation, mental presenta- 
 tion, and representation, external and internal perception. It is often 
 best rendered in a translation by Conception. ' Under the term Vor- 
 stellung,' says Krug, 'may be embraced everything which we call 
 Intuition, Sensation, Notion, Thought, and Idea. Consequently, all 
 our Cognitions rest on Vorstellungen.' 
 
 Begriff is an element of a judgment. Kant and his school depart 
 from the common usage by confining Begriff to the allgemeinen 
 Begriffe, the universal Notions. They give the name Begriff simply 
 to the Verstandes Begriff, the Concept of the Understanding, the 
 Notion. 
 
 Those who call the Vorstellung of individual things a Begriff do so 
 on the ground that there are also single judgments, which present a 
 logical relation between individual things. 1 
 
 The most generally available English representative of Begriff is 
 Notion. 
 
 Hamilton says, 'The distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and 
 notions, under the contrast of Anschauungen and Begriffe, has long 
 been . . . established with the philosophers of Germany.' 'No longer 
 Begriffe, but Anschauungen ; i)0 longer Notions or Concepts, but images.'' 
 'The terms Begriffe (Conceptions), etc.' 2 
 
 The term Representation as a translation of Vorstellung does not 
 correspond with Hamilton's usage. ' The term Representation I 
 employ always strictly as in contrast to Presentation, and, therefore, 
 with exclusive reference to individual objects, and not in the vague 
 generality of Representatio, or Vorstellung, in the Leibnitzian and sub- 
 
 1 Synonymik : Eberhard, Maas und Gruber, 1826, vi. 168. 
 » Reid's Works, 291, 365, 407. 
 
340 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 sequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cognitive 
 act, considered, not in relation to what it knows, but to what is known ; 
 that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensa- 
 tions, Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, etc. as species.' 1 See 
 Schubert's definition under 3 in this note. As a rule the translator 
 of Ueberweg's notes represents Begriff by 'Notion,' Vorstellung by 
 'Conception,' Idee by 'Idea.' See Index. 
 
 [9] Esse — percipi. 
 
 Berkeley, § 3 : ' Their esse is percipi. Nor is it possible they should 
 have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive 
 them.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Beyond question the being (esse) of ideas (phenom- 
 ena) is identical with their being perceived (percipi) ; but it does not 
 follow from this that there are not other things, "unthinking things," 
 which condition the existence of ideas (phenomena), things whose 
 existence is independent of the percipient subject, an existence in 
 itself, and not a mere being perceived. 
 
 'Such "things in themselves" must be accepted, if a connection of 
 natural phenomena in accordance with natural laws is not merely to 
 be asserted but actually demonstrated.' (See further in notes which 
 follow.) 
 
 Editor : If the esse is percipi, the percipi is also esse ; that is, the 
 thing perceived is the thing that is, and the thing as it is. Then arises 
 the difficulty in regard to the mistakes in sense-perception. The one 
 percipi in which a bush is taken for a man is corrected by a second 
 percipi, in which the man is cognized. Is each percipi in this case the 
 esse? 
 
 [10] Things perceived. 
 
 Berkeley, § 4: 'And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of 
 these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived ?' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'The first thing necessary in the investigation is clearly 
 to fix what is meant by the expression "things perceived" (as an apple, 
 tree, etc.). In popular language, by such terms are meant things which 
 exist outside of our mind, and which yet have qualities, such as 
 greenness, warmth, and such like, which can only be sensations of the 
 percipient subject. 
 
 ' If it be acknowledged that there is a contradiction in this, it is only 
 possible to retain one of the two elements which are united in popular 
 language in the same expression. 
 
 1 Reid's Works, 805, n. 
 
ABSTRACTION. 34I 
 
 'As essential to this we must avoid the paralogism into which Berke- 
 ley himself has fallen, of accepting as truths in this old and common 
 sense of the word what can be established only in the new sense of the 
 word. 
 
 ' Either one sense or the other must be taken, to the exclusion of the 
 other in the argument. If, on the one hand, we take the "things per- 
 ceived" as meaning the complexes of sensation, images in perception, 
 we do what Berkeley does. In this case it is not only true, but it is a 
 truism, that these are in our consciousness only ; but it is false to hold 
 this as proven in regard to what is understood in popular language by 
 the "thing perceived;" for example, the apple which I see, feel, and 
 eat; in this usage "the thing perceived" means a real thing external to 
 my mind, and that this thing is in fact reducible to a mere complex of 
 sensation is what Berkeley has not proved. Or if, on the other hand, 
 we must, as in correspondence with the general tendency of language, 
 understand by the "things perceived" external things, in this must also 
 be conceded that in perception is involved a primary thinking, which 
 blends with sensation, through which we infer (schliessen) (cf. Obs. 8) 
 the external things; but from this would follow no more than this, 
 that the external things do not exist wholly as we perceive them, but 
 not that they do not exist at all. 
 
 ' As we do not call the knowledge which we have of the intellectual 
 life of our friend his intellectual life itself which is known, just as little 
 do we call the image in our perception of an object the object per- 
 ceived. 
 
 1 By the object perceived we understand the external thing itself, 
 whose non-existence has been demonstrated by no proof. ' 
 
 [n] Abstraction. 
 Berkeley, § 5 : 'So as to conceive them existing unperceived.' 
 Ueberweg : * Not to them, but to those external things, is directed 
 the supposition of existence in itself. 
 
 ' The error designated by Berkeley lies not in abstraction as such, but 
 in the supposition that by means of abstraction distinct things (such as 
 the existence of the idea, and its being perceived) can really be sep- 
 arated. Abstraction (a<paipt<rt^), rightly understood and properly 
 applied, is thoroughly proper and indispensable. (See Obs. 5.) The 
 fault which has most commonly characterized its use (the fault which 
 Aristotle calls ^«//>j<7//o?, separation) has no necessary connection 
 with it.' 
 
342 A NN OTATIO NS. 
 
 [12] Abstraction. 
 
 Berkeley, 5 : 'But my conceiving or imagining power (Fahigkeit 
 zu denken oder vorzustellen) does not extend beyond the possibility 
 of real existence or perception.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The possibility of Abstraction stretches itself, however, 
 
 in fact beyond this, for we are able to consider separately what in 
 
 every act of perception is united with something else. This takes 
 
 place, for example, in forming the notion (Begriff) of a mathematical 
 
 body.' 
 
 [13] Being and Perception. 
 
 Berkeley, § 6: 'To be convinced of which, the reader need only 
 reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being (Sein) of a 
 sensible (sinnlich wahrnehmbaren) thing from its being perceived.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Correct as is that which Berkeley says in reference to 
 our complexes of sensation or images in perception, he has not proven 
 that there are not things existing in themselves which operate in such 
 a way upon our senses that, in consequence of the excitation thus 
 received, the psychical principle dwelling within our organism begets 
 the sensations and their regular complexes (the images in perception); 
 and to those things existing in themselves— which, as the correlates of 
 our perceptions, maybe called the " objects perceived," so far as in the 
 course of investigation sufficient grounds for accepting them are fur- 
 nished—is to be ascribed an existence independent of the act of per- 
 ception itself. 
 
 ' This independence of the act of perception does not, however, ex- 
 clude the supposition that between the things existing in themselves 
 and perceptible, and the mind capable of perception, there exists a 
 primitive affinity and correlation. Those things are the fore-steps of 
 the mind ; they condition it genetically, as on their side they are con- 
 ditioned by it teleologically ; by means of them the mind has intel- 
 lectual existence and perceives : they exist, at the most, for the sake 
 of the mind. By no means, however, do they exist in our mind.' 
 
 [14] Spirit the only Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 7 : ' From what has been said, it is evident there is not 
 any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This would only follow if the things in themselves 
 were identical with the images in perception, which they are not.' 
 
THE PERCEIVABLE. 343 
 
 [15] An Idea like an Idea. 
 
 Berkeley, § 8 : 'An idea can be like nothing but an idea.' 
 Ueberweg : ' This proposition is not proven, and is false. There is 
 nothing to prevent our supposing that the figure of an image in per- 
 ception — for example, the image we get of the course of a stream, or 
 of the path of a planet — is like the figure of the course or path itself, 
 although the one figure exists in the mind, the other outside of it. 
 
 ' Not every figure is an "idea," although every colour is an " idea" 
 (something purely subjective). See Obser. 17.' 
 
 [16] The Perceivable. 
 
 Berkeley, § 8 : ' I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a 
 colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like some- 
 thing which is intangible ; and so of the rest.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'Only the double use of the word perceivable (to 
 which we have already alluded) leads to this dilemma. 
 
 ' The originals are not perceivable in such sense that they can them- 
 selves be perceptions, but in this sense that they by means of our 
 perception come to our consciousness. 
 
 'When, through touch and the eye, with the co-operation of the 
 primitive mental action (Denken), which consists of involuntary asso- 
 ciations, we obtain a perceptive image of the stream, we call this result 
 "perceiving the stream." 
 
 ' I see, feel, perceive, not the image, and not the constituents of the 
 image (the ideas), but the external object by means of the image. 
 
 ' On the other side, it must be conceded that usage does not designate 
 exclusively the external things, — what is seen, heard, perceived, — but 
 also the particular qualities, as, for example, redness, sound (as we say, 
 I see the redness of the cheeks, I hear a sound), which are, in fact, 
 purely sub^ctive. 
 
 ' This language is used, however, only on the erroneous supposition 
 that they are objective, so that the tendency of the language here also 
 remains unchanged ; that is, to conjoin the objective as grammatical 
 object with the verb "perceive." What is manifestly subjective, as, 
 for example, a "pain," is not perceived, but is felt — is not the object 
 of sense-perception, but of sensation (nicht " sinnlich wahrgenommen," 
 sondern "empfunden").' 
 
344 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 [17] Primary and Secondary. 
 
 Berkeley, § 9 : ' Some there are who make a distinction betwixt 
 primary and secondary qualities.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'This distinction, which is drawn by Locke, is a cor- 
 rect one; only it would be better to style them Qualities in the pri- 
 mary sense (inhering in the object itself), and Qualities in the second- 
 ary sense (operations of the things on us; qualities of sensation, which 
 they, the things, excite in us). 
 
 ' The Geometrical is both objective and subjective. Everything else 
 in the sense-perception is purely subjective, but linked with the object- 
 ive, in conformity with laws : for example, every separate sound and 
 every separate colour is linked with vibrations of a separate kind.' 
 
 Editor: See Hylas and Philonous. First Dialogue. Works (Fraser), 
 i. 279. 
 
 Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. viii. 
 
 Hamilton's Reid, pp. 313-318, and Note D, pp. 825-875. 
 
 [18] Matter. 
 
 Berkeley, § 9 : 'By Matter, therefore, we are 10 understand an 
 inert (trage), senseless (empfindungslose) substance, in which exten- 
 sion, figure, and motion do actually subsist.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' It is entirely unnecessary to conceive of matter as 
 purely "inert," without force. Something internal, on which rest its 
 motions (its forces, the analogues of our conceptions), may and must 
 be conceded to matter.' 
 
 Editor : Leibnitz was the first thoroughly to bring to scientific 
 consciousness ' force' or power as an essential element of matter. 
 
 [19] Only Ideas. 
 Berkeley, § 9 : 'Are only ideas.' 
 Ueberweg: 'The "only" is not proven.' 
 
 [20] Matter or Corporeal Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 9 : ' Hence it is plain (offenbar) that the very notion 
 ( der Begriff ) of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves a 
 contradiction in it.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This would be plain (offenbar) only in case the un- 
 proved assertion were true, that a figure can be only an " idea." 
 
 'The true proposition — that those figures which are in our perceptive 
 images are something psychical — Berkeley has incorrectly converted 
 into the proposition that figures exist only in the mind.' 
 
QUALITIES OF MATTER. 345 
 
 [21] Extension and Movement. 
 
 Berkeley, § 10: 'to reflect (nachzudenken), . . try (erproben), . . 
 abstraction of thought (Vorstellungszerlegung), . . without all other 
 sensible (sinnlichen) qualities.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'That extension and movement which is in the per- 
 ceptive image (Wahrnehmungsbilde) can certainly not exist outside of 
 the mind sundered from the other constituents of the perceptive image. 
 This requires no argument. The real question is, Is there anything 
 eke ? — to wit, is there an objective extension existing outside the mind, 
 with figures and movements which are similar to the subjective ? 
 That this is impossible Berkeley has affirmed, but has not proved.' 
 
 Editor : Much of the difficulty of this question has arisen from the 
 loose and conflicting senses in which the terms ' similar ' and ' like ' are 
 used. 
 
 Strictly or materially taken, the external objective cannot be 'like' 
 the subjective, — matter cannot be ' like ' a condition of mind, — but 
 the differences between the mental states produced by different objects 
 really correspond with, have real analogues in, the objects differing. 
 With refere?ice to each other, objects have a relative likeness to the 
 subjective state they produce. A real lion has this sort of likeness to 
 the mental image of a lion, — it is like the mental lion in a sense in 
 which an ox or a flower is not. So, too, the picture of a lion is 
 materially neither like a real lion nor the mental image of a lion, but 
 it has a relative likeness to both — such a likeness as the picture of an 
 ox has not. 
 
 [22] Qualities of Matter. 
 
 Berkeley, § 10 : ' which is acknowledged to exist only in the 
 mind (Geiste).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' It has already been observed that matter to which the 
 objectively real extension, figure, and motion belong is not to be con- 
 ceived of as having no other qualities. 
 
 ' But the nature of these other qualities is not as readily and as surely 
 known as the nature of the geometrical qualities of matter. 
 
 ' If they are analogues of our conceptions, they are nevertheless cer- 
 tainly not in our mind, and are not identical with its sensations (sinn- 
 lichen Empfindungen). The questions bearing on this point will not 
 come up in a methodical discussion until the problems relating to the 
 primary qualities are solved.' 
 
346 A NN 0TAT10 NS. 
 
 [23] Great and Small. 
 
 Berkeley, §11: 'The extension, therefore, which exists without 
 the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; 
 that is, they are nothing at all.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This false inference is reached by confounding the 
 position of scientific observation with that of the popular view. Scien- 
 tific observation shows that great and little are relative conceptions ; 
 that consequently where no relation exists we can no longer, in the 
 strict sense, speak of greatness or littleness; from the fact that what 
 only in this strict sense can be called neither great nor little is to be 
 taken for something which is neither large nor small in the popular 
 sense (and consequently where the comparison is complete), the infer- 
 ence is drawn that an extension which is neither great nor little is 
 " nothing at all." 
 
 ' The fallacy is the same as in the Thesis (which has often been 
 adduced, and may be justified by the relativity of the notion of poison), 
 "Aut omnia aut nulla venena," with which is linked the inference that 
 it makes no difference whether we eat bread or arsenic. 
 
 ' Every real extension is one distinct extension and no other (not at 
 all, however, as Berkeley immediately after imputes it to the defend- 
 ers of the objectivity, "extension in general"). But the notion of 
 greatness or littleness cannot be applied to it without a comparison 
 which we ourselves make. 
 
 ' The same is true of motion. A planet moves around the centre of 
 its system in a certain path, which, by means of a particular motion 
 (not " motion in general"), can be measured. Whether the motion is 
 to be called swift or slow depends upon the comparison which we make. 
 
 'The motion of Mars, for example, is slow in comparison with the 
 motion of the earth, but swift in comparison with the motion of 
 Uranus; in itself, not compared with other motions, it is neither swift 
 nor slow. But this would not justify us in saying "that as it is in itself 
 neither swift motion nor slow motion it is nothing at all." 
 
 ' The setting aside of antithetical predicates, which apart from com- 
 parison have no meaning, does not set aside the thing itself. Nor 
 indeed is the comparison always a purely subjective one, but in many 
 cases, and those of the highest scientific importance, it is brought out 
 in objective connections.' 
 
 [24] Unity. 
 
 Berkeley, §12: 'in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to 
 some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily (willkiirlich) put to- 
 gether by the mind.' 
 
COLD AND WARM. 347 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The mind proceeds not arbitrarily, but in conformity 
 with objective relations, when it considers three persons or three trees 
 as three entities, and not as ten or twenty cubic unities, the size of each 
 of which is taken into consideration. 
 
 ' Number as number is a structure of the mind which summarizes what 
 is homogeneous ; but the unity of measure is only in certain cases 
 and in a certain degree arbitrary. So far as individuals exist it is object- 
 ively grounded.' 
 
 [25] Unity: Locke. 
 
 Berkeley, § 13: 'all the ways of sensation and reflection (der sinn- 
 lichen und inneren Wahrnehmung).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Ess. on H. U., 11. xiii. 26), "There is not 
 any object of sensation or reflection (sinnlichen und inneren Wahrneh- 
 mung) which does not carry with it the idea of one." He maintains 
 (do., 11. xvi. 1) that no idea is so simple as that of unity, and that it is 
 most intimately interwoven with all our thoughts. This proposition 
 of Locke is here controverted by Berkeley.' 
 
 [26] Cold and Warm. 
 
 Berkeley, § 14: 'the same body which appears cold to one hand 
 seems warm to another.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This argument (as Berkeley himself grants) is not in 
 itself sufficient to prove that there is no particular grade of caloric in 
 the external object itself, — a grade which may be ascertained objectively 
 by the thermometer. The argument does no more than bring before us 
 the obvious fact that the expressions "hot" and "cold," as they involve 
 a comparison with the grades of warmth in parts of our body, cannot be 
 used without a subjective reference. We cannot, therefore, just " as 
 well," but rather can just " as little" infer that there is no particular 
 figure and no particular extension belonging in every case to the external 
 object involved. The conclusion, however, that the sensation of 
 warmth cannot be an image of an objective quality of caloric, while 
 yet the perception of a form can be an image of the perceived form of 
 the external object, rests upon different premises. 
 
 'All the qualities of sensation can be excited by processes of motion. 
 These latter must as sUch be objective, for otherwise the presupposition 
 of an objective, causal (nexus), a thing established by all the results of 
 physical investigation, falls away with them. See (45).' 
 
348 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 [27] Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 17 : 'but the idea of being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines 
 Seienden) in general (liberhaupt), together with the relative notion 
 (Begriff) of its supporting (Tragens) accidents.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'Locke (H. Und.,11. xii. 3-6) reduces complex ideas 
 (zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen) to three classes: 1. Modes (Acci- 
 dentien), 2. Substances, 3. Relations (Verhaltnisse). Under modes or 
 accidents he understands "complex ideas which contain not in them 
 the supposition of subsisting by themselves (fur sich bestehend), but are 
 considered as dependencies on or affections of substances" inhering in 
 certain substances. 
 
 ' " The ideas of substances," says Locke, "are such combinations of 
 simple ideas (Vorstellungen) as are taken to represent distinct particular 
 things subsisting by themselves" (fur sich bestehende). The "relation 
 consists in the comparing one idea (Vorstellung) with another." 
 
 • "Under accidents" says Locke (H. U., II. xiii. 19), " is understood 
 a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in," — something 
 real, which of necessity presupposes some other thing in which it sub- 
 sists. "Substance is that which supports accidents," — their substratum. 
 He adds, " Of substance we have no idea what it is, but only a con- 
 fused, obscure one of what it does." "The idea of substance we neither 
 have nor can have by sensation or reflection (aussere innere Wahrneh- 
 mung) (1. iv. 18); it is furnished to us only by the constant association 
 of certain simple ideas. As we are unable to conceive how these can 
 subsist in themselves, we are accustomed to suppose some certain 
 substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result j 
 which, therefore, we call substance' (H. U., II. xxiii. 1). 
 
 'Only the constant combination of properties is given to us; the 
 nature of substance is hidden from us (do. do., 3-6). 
 
 ' " He has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of sub- 
 stances who has gathered and put together most of the simple ideas 
 which do exist in it" (do. do., 7). 
 
 ' It is true Locke would have been more logical, without, however, on 
 that account by any means reaching Berkeleyanism, if he had rejected 
 as an empty fiction the conception of substance as a something distinct 
 from qualities, and had acknowledged only the reciprocal combination 
 of qualities as real. As he, however, regarded this inference (sub- 
 sequently drawn by Hume) as doubtful, he confined himself to charac- 
 terizing as dark and of little use the idea of substance as something 
 distinct from all qualities. 
 
IDEAS AS OBJECTS. 349 
 
 ' In the Platonic Aristotelian view of material substance extension is 
 embraced. 
 
 1 By Berkeley's negation of the existence of extension extra mentem 
 the notion of material substance is, as he justly says, also taken away ; 
 but the converse is by no means true, that the negation of that dark 
 something necessarily involves the negation of the objective reality of 
 extension.' 
 
 [28] Ideas as Objects. 
 
 Berkeley, § 18: 'Reason (Denken), Sensations (Sinnesempfind- 
 ungen), immediately perceived by sense (unmittelbar sinnlich wahr- 
 genommen werden) : but they do not inform us that things exist 
 without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'We have here again a return to the terminology which 
 has already been objected to, in which "ideas" are designated as the 
 objects of knowledge and of sense-perception; indeed, as "the objects 
 immediately perceived." 
 
 1 In fact, ideas are only objects of contemplation in internal percep- 
 tion ; that is, in reflection on an internal psychical image. 
 
 ' Berkeley is indeed so far entirely right that it is actually only these 
 complexes of sensation (perception) which are immediately in our 
 consciousness; the reference of them to the corresponding external 
 objects takes place by means of an accessory primitive thinking, which 
 presupposes partly nearer, partly more remote analogues of our own 
 existence, of which we know by internal perception on occasion of 
 those complexes of sensation, and indeed as the external causes of 
 them ; the perception (sight, touch, etc.), to the extent to which it is 
 more than mere sensation, already involves that primitive act of 
 thinking. 
 
 ' But the complexes of sensation, though alone immediately in our 
 consciousness, are not therefore necessarily the immediate object of 
 sense-perception, to wit, if they be at all not the object but the means 
 of it ; our attention, in the case of the complexes of sensation, is 
 directed entirely to the external things manifested to us through them ; 
 the external thing is that which I see, handle, perceive. 
 
 ' The complexes of sensation are, as such, late in becoming the object 
 of psychological reflection. 
 
 ' The act of thinking which enters into the sense-perception itself, 
 and forms a constituent part of it, is an elementary one, through which, 
 it is true, the existence of external objects is known ; but the distinction 
 is by no means yet consummated, which shows what constituents of 
 the complex of sensation correspond in a fuller and what in a more 
 
35o 
 
 A XX OTA TIONS. 
 
 restricted measure with the particular nature of their objects; this dis- 
 tinction (which Descartes and Locke have in the main correctly carried 
 through) only takes place as the product of a far-advanced scientific 
 penetration.' 
 
 [29] Materialists. 
 
 Berkeley, § 18: 'The Materialists.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'That is, those who hold to the existence of a matter 
 external to the mind, — defenders of the doctrine of matter.' 
 
 [30] Dreams. 
 
 Berkeley, § 18: 'With all the ideas.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' With all ? In accordance with the order of natural 
 laws, assuredly not ! 
 
 ' Consequently no more follows than what is beyond doubt, aside from 
 the facts here urged by Berkeley, that the inference as to the existence 
 of external objects is in certain cases deceptive, and that the condi- 
 tions under which the inference holds good must be ascertained. The 
 images in dreams and visions would not be possible without antecedent 
 affections made through actual external objects ; they are the result of 
 a reproduction and metamorphosis of the presentations furnished by 
 memory. If Berkeley's argument held good, the existence of other 
 persons — which can also be dreamed of — would, equally with the ex- 
 istence of "unthinking objects," be taken away. The weakness of the 
 argument is shown in its proving too much. ' 
 
 [31] Materialists. 
 
 Berkeley, § 19 : ' The Materialists.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Here appears yet more clearly than above (29) that 
 Berkeley uses the term "Materialist" in a sense different from the 
 received one. 
 
 'The ordinary meaning of " Materialist" is one who believes that 
 nothing exists but material substance. Berkeley applies it to all who 
 hold that material substances exist, although at the same time they may 
 hold to the existence of spiritual substances.' 
 
 [32] Intercourse. 
 Berkeley, § 19 : 'And serve to no manner of purpose.' 
 Ueberweg: 'They serve at least to render possible, in a manner 
 conformed to natural laws, the intercourse between intellectual beings, 
 if indeed the very possibility of the existence of conscious being be not 
 conditioned through them. 
 
A POSTERIORI. 351 
 
 'Language is the medium through which thought is imparted. Grant 
 that the word spoken by me can exist only in certain ideas linked to 
 my thoughts, which ideas, like the word itself, exist purely in the 
 mind ; and grant that the air itself exists only as the complex of ideas 
 in illocal essence or spirits, yet it would still be inconceivable why 
 similar ideas should be aroused by that word in the mind of another 
 who is near me (the nearness itself cannot be one of a local kind, on 
 this system), and still less would it be intelligible how a writing, long 
 after the death of its author, could continue to produce the same kind 
 of effects. 
 
 'All conformity to law would be the mere association of ideas in the 
 individual subject ; for all relations between persons we must have 
 recourse to the immediate or miraculous working of the divine Omnipo- 
 tence. But if outside of the mind of the person who speaks or who 
 writes, and of the mind of the hearer or reader, the air and other 
 material media have an existence, the intermediation can be explained 
 by physics and the other natural sciences in a manner which cannot 
 be contemptuously set aside. 
 
 ' It is true that something still remains unexplained ; but the path 
 to the explanation is broken, and the difficulty made so prominent by 
 Berkeley is diminished, if we do not regard matter and spirit as so 
 utterly heterogeneous as Descartes and even Locke, and their cotem- 
 poraries, have done. 
 
 ' The view of Berkeley, on the other hand, removes all possibility 
 of an explanation based upon natural science.' 
 
 [ 33 ] Dreaming. 
 
 Berkeley, § 20: 'That you can possibly have for believing the 
 same thing.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Undoubtedly ; and in dreaming we actually have the 
 very belief without any grounds for it. But the supposition that waking 
 is but dreaming with open eyes can only be carried through by the 
 removal of all objective order of nature, of everything which goes 
 beyond the bare association of ideas in the individual subject.' 
 
 [34] A Posteriori. 
 
 Berkeley, § 21 : 'Arguments a posteriori.' 
 
 Ueberweg: "'Arguments a posteriori" in the old Aristotelian Scho- 
 lastic sense of the term, according to which the argumentation a priori 
 (to wit, ad posterius) implies the inference from the cause, as that 
 which in its nature is earlier (<p wet npdrspov) to the operation or effect, 
 
352 
 
 ANN OTA TIONS. 
 
 or that which in nature is later {<pb<su uff-spnv), while the argument a 
 posteriori (to wit, ad prius natura) implies the inference from the opera- 
 tions or effects to the cause, — the inference from the fuazt uarepuv to the 
 
 <pb<T£l -pOTSpOV. 
 
 ' In the inference a posteriori, the later (the operations) is, according 
 to natural sequence, the nearer to us (xpoTepov xpds rjpas), or that which 
 is earlier and more easily recognizable by us, — yvwpipwzepov ijfitv, — from 
 whence we go back to the earlier, — the Causes ; we argue in this case 
 regressively, while in the a priori (ad posterius) we argue progress- 
 ively. For the use of the terms a priori and a posteriori which has 
 reference to the Course of Argumentation, Kant, partly following 
 Hume and others, has substituted a completely heterogeneous use. 
 According to Kant's use the distinction of a priori and a posteriori is 
 referred to the judgment as such; by knowledge a posteriori he means 
 the knowledge derived from experience, empirical ; by knowledge a 
 priori, the knowledge (erroneously assumed by him as possible and 
 actual) which we have apart from experience.' 
 
 [35] Extended Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, §22: 'If you can but conceive it possible for one ex- 
 tended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The subsumption of " extended moveable substance," 
 under the term " idea," already implies the Berkeleyan doctrine. The 
 opponent of the view must consequently challenge this questionable 
 position itself, and must refuse to concede what it tacitly assumes. 
 Nego suppositum. As Berkeley here, however, simply repeats his 
 former positions, we could do no more than repeat our former objec- 
 tions, which is unnecessary.' 
 
 [36] External Things. 
 Berkeley, § 23 : 'Which is a manifest repugnancy.' 
 Ueberweg : ' The existence of external things without my thinking 
 of them can very well be granted, but my consciousness that external 
 things can exist is not possible, unless I am thinking of these very things. 
 The periods of the formation of the earth, during which there were 
 no living creatures, have existed without being perceived by men ; but 
 we can know or conjecture that they existed, in no other way than by 
 having them in our thought. Berkeley does not separate the two 
 things. While the Opponent, whom he supposes to present himself, 
 directs his reflection only to the existence of the external object, 
 Berkeley makes this very reflection of the thinking subject upon the 
 
THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 
 
 153 
 
 object the starting-point of his argument, and in the abstraction of 
 the object from the subject, made by the Opponent, does not follow 
 him. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that the possibility 
 of performing this abstraction does not in itself demotistrate that things 
 in themselves exist ; but he is not justified in maintaining that this 
 possibility does not exist, because we, when we reflect upon it, do then 
 certainly (in addition) think about the Things.' 
 
 [37] Representation. 
 
 Berkeley, § 23 : ' Though at the same time they are apprehended 
 by (vorgestellt) or exist in itself?' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Not the things, but only a representation (Vorstellung) 
 of them, exists in me, just as, when I think of a psychical being dis- 
 tinct from myself, it is not this being, but a representation of it, which 
 exists in me.' 
 
 [38] Things in themselves. 
 
 Berkeley, § 24 : ' Those words mark out either a direct contradic- 
 tion or else nothing at all.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The alleged contradiction, as we have before shown, 
 does not exist. 
 
 'Were there such contradiction, there would be equally a contra- 
 diction in supposing that there was a time previous to my own exist- 
 ence. For to suppose this I must think of that time; it is consequently 
 in me ; consequently it does not exist without me, or outside of me ; 
 consequently not before my existence : for that anything should be in 
 me, without myself being, is a palpable contradiction. 
 
 ' The solution of Berkeley's argument is the same as that of the paral- 
 ogism just given. I think of the past now as I now generate an image 
 of it in me, — not the past itself, but an image of it, is now in me ; 
 but the past itself has existed without me. I cannot know that it has 
 existed without me without (now in addition) thinking of it ; but it 
 can have existed, and has existed, without this thinking of mine. 
 
 ' In the same way, things which exist in themselves are thought of by 
 me when I generate in me an image, more or less accurate, of them : 
 the things themselves are not in me, but this image of them is in 
 me ; but they themselves exist independently of my image. I cannot 
 know that they exist in themselves without thinking of them, but they 
 can exist, and many of them do, in fact, exist, indubitably, without 
 this thinking of mine. The objection made by Berkeley is brought 
 up again by Fichte, who denies Kant's assumption of "Things in 
 themselves" (Dingen an sich). The same thing is done by Reinhold 
 
 23 
 
354 
 
 ANN OTA TIONS. 
 
 Hoppe. In his work on the Sufficiency of the Empirical Method 
 in Philosophy (" Zulanglichkeit des Empirismus in der Philosophic," 
 Berlin, 1852), he argues for a doctrine allied to that of Berkeley. 
 Hoppe shapes his statement in this form, — that the opposition be- 
 tween Actuality and Cognition involves a contradiction, for in as far 
 as Actuality is discussed, investigated, brought into contrast, so far 
 is it thought of; from which he infers that everything we affirm of 
 it relates, in fact, only to our own thinking. 
 
 ' The objection, however, in this mode of conception, is that it 
 involves a mingling of two grades of thinking, — to wit, that in which 
 thinking is simply concerned with the truth (meaning that there is a 
 harmony of our subjective apprehension with the objective Actuality ; 
 as, for example, the harmony of our apprehension of the assassination 
 of Csesar with the assassination as it actually occurred), and that in 
 which it is concerned with our insight into the essence of the truth. 
 Our notion of objective actuality belongs only to the second grade (in 
 its antithesis to the subjective apprehension). To this grade, too, 
 exclusively belongs the notion of cognition, and it is a matter of 
 course that we cannot have these notions without thinking them. It 
 is the first grade, indeed, which alone enables us to account for the 
 second ; and in connection with this first grade we have to do merely 
 with the existence of that harmony, not with our knowing of its 
 existence ; and in this it is not our thinking of the Actuality, but the 
 Actuality itself, which is determinative, — that is to say, the thing 
 which exists or which has happened, which is not dependent on my 
 knowledge of it (or is, in other words, " the thing in itself" — " an sich 
 ist"), but which conditions my knowing.' 
 
 Editor : It can exist without my knowing it, but I cannot know it 
 without its existing. 
 
 [39] Incitement of Ideas. 
 
 Berkeley, § 25: 'or pattern of any active being, as is evident 
 from § 8.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'The argument in § 8 has already been met. The 
 inactivity of ideas is by no means established by self-observation : the 
 association of ideas testifies to exactly the opposite. The supposition 
 that our ideas are incited by external objects has not been proven false 
 by Berkeley. 
 
 ' It is indeed false to suppose such a relation between mind and the 
 external world as imputes all the activity to the external world and 
 considers the mind as a passive substratum, like a writing-tablet or a 
 
SOLIPSISM. 
 
 355 
 
 piece of wax ; but just as false is the opposite theory, which claims all 
 activity for the mind exclusively. The expression " incitement" (Anre- 
 gung) or "affection" marks the actual relation most accurately 
 
 [40] Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 27: 'only by the effects which it produceth.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'Locke says (Hum. Und., 11. xxiii. 5), " the operations 
 of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., ... we concluding 
 not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to 
 body, or be produced by it, are apt to think them the actions of some 
 other substance, which we call Spirit." 
 
 'According to Locke, we think of Spirit as the substratum of activi- 
 ties which we perceive in our own (psychical) internal nature, as we 
 conceive of bodies as the substratum of qualities which affect our 
 senses. 
 
 ' We have, according to Locke, no distinct idea either of corporeal 
 or of spiritual substance, but can on this account no more deny the 
 existence of one than of the other. 
 
 ' Berkeley denies corporeal substance in behalf of spiritual substance ; 
 but at a later period Hume denied both, or, at least, declared them 
 equally doubtful, and adopted a self-dependent subsistence of concep- 
 tions in their reciprocal connection. 
 
 ' Kant explained the notion of substance as an original notion of the 
 understanding, which, just because of this its subjective origin, is 
 applicable only to phenomenal objects, which are in our consciousness. 
 By this view the skepticism is not confuted, but rather strengthened. 
 In fact, we form the notion of substance on the ground of the knowl- 
 edge of ourself (in virtue of internal perception), as of an individual, 
 by transferring the notion thus formed to personal and impersonal 
 objects.' 
 
 [41] Subject. 
 
 Berkeley, § 27 : 'of its supporting or being the subject (zu tragen 
 oder ihr Substrat zu sein).' 
 
 Ueberweg : '" Subject" in the ancient Aristotelian Scholastic sense 
 (unoxet/xevov, substratum).' 
 
 [42] Solipsism. 
 
 Berkeley, § 27: 'Though it must be owned at the same time that we 
 have some notion (Begriff ) of soul, spirit, and the operations of the 
 mind (den psychischen Thatigkeiten), such as willing, loving, hating, 
 inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Whether our consciousness of the psychical should be 
 
356 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 designated by the term "idea" or "notion," is rather a question of 
 verbal than of practical interest. It is worthy of remark, however, that 
 if we propose to designate the " notions" of the mind in regard to other 
 minds and their operations, as objects of cognition, in the manner in 
 which Berkeley in the case of sense-perception designates " ideas'" as 
 the objects perceived, using in part the same arguments on which he has 
 grounded the conclusion that we know only our own ideas, and not 
 bodies, which are external to our mind, it would warrant the inference 
 that we know only our own " notions" of spirits, and not spirits them- 
 selves, which have an existence outside of our own. Berkeley's argu- 
 ments would lead to the acceptance of the sole existence of the person 
 arguing, — to what is called "theoretic Egoism," or "Solipsism," — and 
 as it proves too much must be faulty.' 
 
 [43] Senses. 
 
 Berkeley, § 29 : ' But whatever power I may have over my own 
 thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like 
 dependence on my will.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Locke, in his " Essay concerning Human Under- 
 standing," treats in Book iv. chap. xi. "of our knowledge of the ex- 
 istence of other things," external to us. He supposes that we are 
 compelled to trust our senses, which give us notice of the existence of 
 other things, by which the senses are affected. No man can be so skep- 
 tical as to doubt of the existence of these things (do., § 3). Among 
 the grounds of conviction he reckons also the circumstance which 
 Berkeley here mentions, that when our eyes are open we cannot avert 
 the entrance of the ideas (Vorstellungen) which sun and light occasion 
 in us. Locke draws the inference (§ 5) that the thing which evokes in 
 me ideas of this or that kind must be the impression of an external 
 object affecting my senses. In place of this cause Berkeley substitutes 
 the immediate operation of Deity on our souls.' 
 
 [44] Activity and Passivity. 
 Berkeley, § 28 : ' When in broad daylight I open my eyes — ' 
 ' There is, therefore, some other Will or Spirit that produces them.' 
 Ueberweg : ' If our spirit is susceptible of an operation, through 
 which another being calls forth ideas in it, it follows that it is not in 
 its own nature a perpetually active being, but is also capable of pas- 
 sivity. It is worth giving prominence here to the fact that by this 
 view the distinction between Activity and Passivity is shown to be a 
 relative one.' 
 
CAUSALITY. 357 
 
 [45] Laws of Nature. 
 
 Berkeley, § 30 : < Now the set rules or established methods wherein 
 the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the 
 laws of nature. ' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' From the position of Berkeley, an order conformable 
 to the laws of nature, inasmuch as he interprets this as the order of our 
 own ideas, may be maintained ; but no laws of nature can be actually 
 demonstrated, so that by them we can explain the natural phenomena. 
 If, for example, the course of the planets is to be explained, that is, re- 
 ferred to laws universally holding good, it is impossible to do so by 
 merely taking into account our own perceptions in their mutual rela- 
 tions. For in these perceptions, if they be regarded in themselves, a 
 precise fixed order does not reveal itself. Such an order can only be 
 found if we suppose a causality which limits the subject (in the act of 
 seeing) with material objects external to the subject, to wit, the heavenly 
 bodies, which carry on their movements in consonance with the laws 
 of gravitation, the laws which Newton discovered. They carry them 
 on, not within our consciousness, but independently of it, and did 
 carry them on probably long before human consciousness existed, 
 though we are able to develop our consciousness supplementally 
 concerning them. It is not this supplemental consciousness which 
 works upon our eyes, but the real external course of the planets.' 
 
 [46] Causality. 
 
 Berkeley, §31: 'This gives us a sort of foresight, . . . and a 
 grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life 
 than an infant just born.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Hum. Und. , B. 11. xxvi. 1) : "In the notice 
 that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but 
 observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to 
 exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application 
 and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our 
 ideas of cause and effect. ' ' He gives as an example that in the sub- 
 stance we call wax, fluidity is constantly produced by the application 
 of a certain degree of heat ; we call fluidity therefore the effect and heat 
 the cause. Locke concedes that, in this, the manner in which cause 
 brings forth effect remains unknown. 
 
 'Berkeley's theory of cause and effect is an application, in the most 
 subjective shape, of this doctrine of Locke. Hume's sceptical Reflec- 
 tions on the Notion of Cause, which he traces to our habitually finding 
 
358 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 certain perceptions linked with certain others, found here a point of 
 connection, as his sceptical reflections found their point of attachment 
 in sections xvi., xvii., and xxvii. In the internal perception of our will 
 and of the effort we make in overcoming obstacles, Reid and some 
 others of the Scotch school found the solution of our notion of causality, 
 and among French thinkers Maine de Biran adopted this view. Kant 
 on the contrary regarded this notion and that of substance as a primary 
 notion, originally immanent in the mind, "a category." With this 
 view he imagined that he had vanquished the scepticism of Hume, 
 while in fact he had only promoted the extremest subjectivism, — a 
 subjectivism which soon emerged in Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, but 
 shifted round into the objectivism of Schelling, which objectivism in 
 turn has led to new attempts at solution. Adhuc sub judice lis est.' 
 
 [47] Causal Connection. 
 
 Berkeley, § 32: 'Perceiving (wenn wir wahrnehmen) the motion 
 (die Bewegung) and collision (Zusammenstoss) of bodies to be attended 
 with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect (Wirkung) of 
 the former.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Here again holds good what was observed before, that 
 the Causal Connection, if it be apprehended as merely the order estab- 
 lished by God in the ideas which are in the subject, can merely be 
 asserted, not actually demonstrated and formulated. But if the Causal 
 Connection be associated with the external things, it is explained in 
 conformity with mathematical mechanical laws. For example, the 
 union of collision with sound is explained by the displacement con- 
 nected with the visible motion of bodies in the motions of the minute 
 parts of body.' 
 
 [48] Prejudice. 
 
 Berkeley, § 34 : 'It will be objected that by the foregoing princi- 
 ples all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the 
 world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Berkeley has only too much to justify him in believing 
 that the first objections urged against a theory which departs from the 
 current opinion will be of the kind he here describes. As children 
 are wont to say No, when anything is demanded of them which they 
 have not themselves imagined or desired, so adults thrust away what is 
 strange to them, simply because it is strange. They cry out that it is 
 odd and absurd, while the only real question is whether it is asserted 
 
EATING AND DRINKING IDEAS. 359 
 
 on sufficient grounds. Berkeley's task is easy enough with this class 
 of objections ; there is another class which has more weight.' 
 
 [49] Reality. 
 
 Berkeley, § 36 : 'If any man thinks this detracts from the existence 
 or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been 
 premised in the plainest terms I could think of.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'As Locke, who (iv. xi. 8) characterizes the negation 
 of the corporeal world as a view according to which "all we see and 
 hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the 
 series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no 
 reality." ' 
 
 [50] Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 37: 'If it (substance) be taken in a philosophic sense 
 for the support (Trager) of accidents or qualities (Eigenschaften) with- 
 out the mind, then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one 
 may be said to take that away which never had any existence, not even 
 in the imagination (blossen Vorstellung).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The two questions are not identical, whether there be 
 extended things without our minds, and whether there be substance 
 which is the support of qualities. It is not true that Berkeley simply 
 contests the second supposition, and is on other points in unison with 
 the common view. The existence of extension, figure, magnitude, and 
 impenetrability, and also of gravitation and of forces in general, with- 
 out the percipient mind, is the very essence of the question. Locke's 
 notion of substance can be denied without denying that existence 
 without the percipient mind. He who denies this existence denies 
 indeed of necessity, at the same time, the notion of corporeal sub- 
 stances, but not merely this. To this add that Berkeley himself 
 acknowledges spiritual substances as the supports of the inherent.' 
 
 [51] Eating and Drinking Ideas. 
 
 Berkeley, § 38 : 'It sounds very harsh to say, we eat and drink 
 ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so, — the 
 word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several 
 combinations of sensible qualities which are called things.'' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Were this the only ground, it would sound less harsh 
 to say that we eat and drink sense-perceptions. The true ground is 
 that the things we eat and drink are things existing without our con- 
 sciousness (in themselves), and are not ideas in the mind of the per- 
 cipient subject, and are regarded as such by the non-philosophic also. 
 
360 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 The theory of Berkeley does not deviate from the ordinary use of 
 language merely, but from the conviction which lies at the root of this 
 usage. To be sure, this is no proof that Berkeley's theory is not right; 
 but the deviation is unmistakable. 
 
 ' Berkeley himself not only acknowledges that he deviates from the 
 ordinary use of language, but subsequently (§ 39, with which compare 
 the beginning of § 56) acknowledges his deviation from the common 
 supposition on which the usage of language rests. With this is not in 
 consonance the assertion made in § 35, and frequently elsewhere, "the 
 only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call 
 matter or corporeal substance." Berkeley's assertion, moreover, that 
 we eat and drink ideas, is not only opposed to the usage of language 
 and the common presuppositions on which that usage rests, but to 
 Berkeley's own position, which is at once necessary on the one side 
 and untenable on the other. Nothing of the colour and taste of the 
 apple or of wine enters into the stomach, — the stomach neither sees 
 nor tastes; the processes of assimilation run through their normal 
 course with scarcely any recognition on the part of consciousness. 
 How, consequently, can "ideas," or sensations, or sensible qualities, be 
 eaten ? The chemical processes which science has gradually, in part, 
 discovered, are known only in their effects. So long as they are 
 unperceived, they are upon the one side, according to Berkeley's 
 principles, nothing, and on the other side, as they are associated with 
 operations, they are something, — which is a complete contradiction. 
 Consequently, the negation of things which exist without the con- 
 sciousness (and of whose existence we can only gradually attain a con- 
 sciousness) is untenable. See the note on § 52.' 
 
 Editor: Schulze, 1 who rejects Berkeley's view, says, 'The system 
 seems ludicrous only because our modes of speech and of thought are 
 not in conformity with it.' It may be said, however, that the language 
 which Berkeley uses is not self-consistent, for the eating is as ideal as 
 the thing eaten. We have the eating-idea of the apple-idea, the 
 dressing-idea of the raiment-idea. The relation in Berkeley is not 
 that of an objective act brought to bear on an ideal thing, but of ideal 
 on ideal. On the other hand, if the idea is, the thing, the idea is the 
 apple, the idea is the eating. Strictly speaking, the apple of Berkeley 
 is not the idea of an apple, but is an idea-apple ; the eating is not the 
 idea of eating, but is the idea-eating. Berkeley himself falls into 
 the trap of the every-day formulary in the first part of the phrase. 
 As he defines reality, the idea-eating of the idea-apple is a real eating 
 
 » Grundr. d. philosoph. Wissenschaft, 2 v., 1788, i. 23. 
 
THE SENSORIUM. 361 
 
 of a real apple 5 but this makes our psychical activity depend on God 
 as much as our psychical passivity, and overthrows the infallibility of 
 our consciousness to our own mental acts. My idea that I am eating 
 is not a mere sense-impression, but a consciousness of will. 
 
 [52] Testimony of the Senses. 
 
 Berkeley, § 40 : ' But, say what we can, some one perhaps may 
 be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any 
 arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'Compare Locke, iv. xi. 3: "This is certain, the 
 confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest 
 assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. 
 . . . Our senses do not err in the information they give us of the 
 existence of things without us, when they are affected by them." 
 
 'He says further (§8), "the certainty of things existing in rerum 
 natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as 
 great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs." ' 
 
 [53] Fire and the Idea of Fire : Locke. 
 
 Berkeley, § 41 : 'if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which 
 you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with 
 a witness.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'Locke (iv. xi. 7): "He that sees a fire may, if he 
 doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too" ; (§ 8) : 
 " if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass 
 furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, 
 by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty 
 greater than he could wish." ' 
 
 [54] The Sensorium. 
 
 Berkeley, § 42 : ' In a dream we do oft perceive things as existing 
 at a great distance off, and yet, for all that, those things are acknowl- 
 edged to have their existence only in the mind.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' It must undoubtedly be acknowledged that all the 
 perception-images which are outside the perception-image of our own 
 body are by no means on that account without our mind. But this 
 does not forbid that there should be without the entire sphere of the 
 perception-images those real objects which affect our senses, and that 
 there should be organs of sense which are affected, from which organs, 
 by means of the sensible nerves, the affections are conveyed to the 
 central parts, in which we are to look for the seat of the sensorium 
 
362 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 commune, and the seat consequently, also, of the perception-images 
 themselves. The following figure may be of service in elucidating the 
 statement just made : 
 
 ' AB is the external object ; ba is the image of AB in the right and 
 in the left eye ; b'd is the image of AB in the sensorium commune ; 
 Od is the right eye ; Os is the left eye ; C is the brain (linear, half the 
 natural size) ; od, os, c, the represented (vorgestellten) places of the 
 right and left eye and of the brain. 
 
 ' The sensorium lies within the real brain C, but within the sensorium, 
 in addition to images of the rest of objects, lie the images of our eyes, 
 of our head, of our retina, of our optic nerves, and of the brain itself, 
 so far as we know them by anatomy; it is a mistake to seek the objects 
 here.' 
 
 [55] 'New Theory of Vision.' 
 
 Berkeley, § 43: 'The consideration (Erwagung) of this difficulty 
 it was that gave birth to. my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision 
 (Sehens), which was published not long since.' 
 
 Ueberweg : • " An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision" appeared 
 1709. In this Essay Berkeley maintained that we do not estimate the 
 remoteness of the object by the "optic axes," or the lines from the two 
 eyes to the object seen, and the angle which they form with each other 
 by their concurring at the object. 
 
 ' In defence of this opinion he advanced three arguments : 
 
 1 1. We do not perceive these lines and angles, and yet our estima- 
 tion of distance can only rest on what is perceived. 
 
 '2. These lines and angles have no real existence in nature, but are 
 merely a geometrical hypothesis (Voraussetzung). 
 
'NEW THEORY OF VISION.' 363 
 
 '3. Though we should grant their real existence, and that it is 
 possible for the mind to perceive them, they would yet be insufficient 
 to explain the phenomena of distance. 
 
 ' In accordance with the clearness or confusion of the perceptions of 
 colours, and in accordance with other changes which associate them- 
 selves with certain sensations of touch (Tastempfindungen), the person 
 seeing judges in regard to distances, judges, consequently, on the 
 ground of experience. 
 
 ' From this Berkeley draws the conclusion that if a person born blind 
 should recover his sight by an operation, he would at first have no idea 
 of distance, and that sun and stars, and all the remotest objects, 
 equally with the nearest, "would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in 
 his mind." (Essay, § 41.) This supposition of Berkeley's has been 
 confirmed by the fact that persons born blind who have obtained sight 
 by an operation do not at first know how to estimate distances, but 
 are obliged to learn to do it gradually. Such persons, also, while they 
 can distinguish forms from each other, as, for example, a dog from a cat, 
 are not able at once to connect with them the shapes which had pre- 
 viously become familiar by touch. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in 
 maintaining that we judge of the third dimension — Depth — only accord- 
 ing to certain signs, though many other signs are to be added to those 
 which he makes prominent. This judging takes place through that 
 primary thinking which is performed by virtue of associations involun- 
 tarily arising, a thinking which exercises an essential influence in 
 shaping the perception-image, — for example, in producing the form of 
 the firmament. There is another question, however, Whether the 
 shaping in vision in general rests only in this primary thinking, or 
 whether a beginning of the shaping already lies in the original sensa- 
 tion (Empfindung) itself. The great physiologist John Muller 
 (1 801-185 8) adopted the latter view, as he grants that the superficial 
 shape of the image on the retina (or of a representation of it within 
 the sensorium?) immediately, as such, reaches the consciousness. 
 
 'Others, for example Lotze, suppose that no shape as such enters 
 immediately into the consciousness, but that all apprehension of form 
 fashions itself in us out of qualitative distinctions ; the theory of the 
 punctual existence of the soul necessitates this latter assumption ; and 
 this assumption seems also on its part necessarily to presuppose that 
 punctual position of the soul, inasmuch as in a soul not punctual there 
 must of necessity already be some grouping in the Sensations (Empfind- 
 ungen) themselves. 
 
 'The "Empiristic (Empiristische) theory" represented by Helm- 
 
364 A NNO TA TIO NS. 
 
 holtz, which aims at reducing all apprehension of form to uncon- 
 scious inferences, must either advance to the doctrine of punctual 
 position or return to Muller's doctrine. The controversy is still 
 undecided.' 
 
 Editor : Berkeley's New Theory is generally regarded as a discovery. 
 Such it is in the only sense in which anything intellectual is a discovery : 
 it is the actualizing and culmination of a series of efforts. There are 
 hints of the theory in Descartes, dim anticipations of it in Malebranche 
 (Rech. d. 1. Verite, i., ch. 9), and in Glanville's Scepsis Scientifica 
 (ch. 5), and a nearer approach in Molyneux's Dioptrics (1690), and in 
 Locke's Essay (4th ed., 1694), B. 11., ch. ix. § 8. 
 
 [56] Constant Creation. 
 
 Berkeley, § 45: 'Fourthly, it will be objected (eingewandt) that 
 from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment anni- 
 hilated (vernichtet) and created anew.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This objection to Berkeley's doctrine is well grounded : 
 the objection is but a special form of the more general one, that the 
 actual existence of any causality of nature is not compatible with 
 Berkeley's view. The opening and shutting of the eyes produces in 
 the same person, at the same place, and at the same time, and accord- 
 ingly under the same psychical conditions, entirely different results 
 according as long ago a gardener or a carpenter has or has not bestowed 
 a certain activity on the place which lies before his eyes, according as 
 a storm or a fire has or has not destroyed the results of that activity. 
 This can only be explained in conformity with natural laws, if the 
 results of that activity relate to objects, which exist in themselves with- 
 out the consciousness, experience changes by the labours of certain 
 persons, or by the operations of external circumstances, and in con- 
 formity with these operate on the senses of other persons. If such 
 objects are wanting, then there is wanting between the earlier and later 
 processes the connection established by the laws of nature, and the 
 sequence of our ideas, which in dreaming is explained by the images 
 stored in memory and by subjective laws of association, can in our 
 waking time be explained only by an interference of divine Omnipo- 
 tence at once immediate and without order.' 
 
 [57] Existence of an Idea. 
 Berkeley, § 45 : ' I . . . desire he (the reader) will consider whether 
 he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its 
 being perceived.' 
 
INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 365 
 
 Ueberweg: 'By the actual existence of an idea (perception, or 
 representation of imagination) certainly not, but by the existence of the 
 object, through whose operation on us the idea is excited in us.' 
 
 [58.] 
 
 Berkeley, § 46 : ' Philosophers . . . agree on all hands that light 
 and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, 
 are mere sensations (sinnliche Empfindungen), that exist no longer 
 than they are perceived.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' But that which can excite these sensations continues, 
 according to the common doctrine, to exist.' 
 
 [590 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' that things should be every moment creating 
 ... is very commonly taught in the schools.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This is taught only so far as the subsistence of matter 
 is regarded as a preservation of it by God, and this — as Augustine had 
 taught — is compared to a constant creation ; but not in such sense as 
 to involve an interruption of existence.' 
 
 [60.] 
 
 Berkeley, § 48 : ' Though we allow the existence of Matter or Cor- 
 poreal Substance, yet it will follow from the principles which are now 
 generally admitted that the particular bodies of what kind soever do 
 none of them exist whilst they are not perceived.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' If, to wit, these bodies be connected with the Berke- 
 leyan subjectivating of magnitude, form, and motion.' 
 
 [61.] 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' Hence (from the infinite divisibility of matter) it 
 follows that there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of 
 matter which are not perceived by sense.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'To wit, potentially, not actually; that is, matter is 
 infinitely divisible, but not actually infinitely divided. It lies in the 
 very nature of infinite division that it shall never be completed, and 
 that every actual division can be carried yet further.' 
 
 [62] Infinite Divisibility. 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' but because the sense is not acute enough to dis- 
 cern them.' 
 
 Ueberweg : * And because the parts are not actually sundered one 
 
366 A NNO TA TIONS. 
 
 from another into an infinite number, — for even on the Atomistic 
 theory they are divided only into a very great number, — that rather 
 only the divisibility is unlimited.' 
 
 [63] Sense infinitely acute. 
 Berkeley, do. : 'that is, the object appears greater.' 
 Ueberweg : 'This does not necessarily follow, if the parts as they 
 grow in number diminish in bulk in the same ratio. A "sense in- 
 finitely acute" would know the "infinitely small parts" as infinitely 
 small, while our senses cannot pass beyond the "sensible minima. ' ' The 
 eye, for example, can perceive two points separated, only by means of a 
 certain extremely minute angle of vision. The microscope does not 
 change this angle of vision at all, but only allows other points of the 
 object to form it with our eye.' 
 
 [64] Sense infinitely acute. 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' When the sense becomes infinitely acute the body 
 shall seem infinite.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Entirely wrong ; because it wholly leaves out of con- 
 sideration the diminution in the size of the parts, which takes place in 
 inverse proportion to the increase of their number.' 
 
 [65] Infinite Extension. 
 Berkeley, do. : ' is infinitely extended.' 
 Ueberweg : ' For this assertion not even a show of proof is adduced.' 
 
 [66] Intervals of Perception. 
 
 Berkeley, § 58 : 'or exist not at all during the intervals between 
 our perception of them.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'This reply to the objection involves the supposition 
 that one uniform object subsists. But in fact if the being of the object 
 in itself be set aside, and no existence be ascribed to it beyond that 
 which it has in individual percipient spirits, what we call a house is 
 rather a number of houses, each one of which exists in a single percip- 
 ient spirit. Each single one of this multitude is certainly annihilated 
 and created anew with the closing and re-opening of the eyes. Add 
 to this that there are frequently intervals during which no one pen rives 
 particular objects. Are we, for instance, to say that the Herculanean 
 Manuscripts did not exist during the centuries through which they 
 remained buried, and that God at a later period created them anew ? 
 The restoration is certainly not to be explained by an order established 
 
SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE. 367 
 
 by natural laws. This order subsists only in case that there is an ex- 
 istence without all (finite) minds during the interval. The existence 
 in the divine mind cannot explain the permanence of the object, inas- 
 much as this supposition would involve too much, to wit, an eternal 
 existence of the object, which nevertheless has a beginning and an 
 end in time; there must, consequently, be an object distinct from 
 God's idea of the object, which subsists during the interval in which 
 no finite spirit perceives it.' 
 
 [67] Subject. 
 
 Berkeley, § 49 : ' Since extension is a mode or attribute which (to 
 speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject (Substrat) in which 
 it exists.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'The term "subject" is not used here in the special 
 sense given it in modern philosophy, as designating merely the sub- 
 stratum of the psychical phenomena. Berkeley uses it in the older 
 sense, in which it corresponds with the Greek vnoxst/ievov, designating 
 the substratum in general. It is a term which can also be employed 
 to designate the grammatical subject in a sentence. This paragraph 
 shows very clearly how, out of the original use of the word, has 
 grown on the one side the grammatical sense, and on the other the 
 prevalent philosophical one.' 
 
 [68] Extended Idea. 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' but only by way of idea.' 
 
 Ueberweg: ' How an extended "idea" can be in an unextended 
 being is absolutely inconceivable, and is not in the least explained by 
 Berkeley, or even made plausible. An object may have in it objects 
 which are red or blue, without at the same time being itself as a whole 
 red or blue ; but it cannot have extended objects in it without itself 
 being extended. If the meaning is that the idea of a thing extended 
 is not itself extended, that would be in part false, in part in conflict 
 with Berkeley's principles, according to which there is no extended 
 different from the idea of the extended, but that idea is itself the ex- 
 tended.' 
 
 [69] Substance and Essence. 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' but only an explication of the meaning of the 
 word die.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The Aristotelians understand by the subject or sub- 
 stratum (vTzoxstp.evov') the support of the qualities. By substance (obaia 
 or t( ioTtv), they meant in addition to this substratum the complex of 
 
368 A NN OTA riO NS. 
 
 the essential ; that in virtue of which the thing is what it is, and which 
 is consequently stated in its definition (6pt<r/i6<;). This essential with- 
 out the substratum is essence abstractly conceived, what Aristotle calls 
 to ti 7 t v eivat. To the constituents of -this essence — the essentialia — 
 are yet to be added, according to Aristotle and his followers, the 
 <Tu/j.js l ir i x6ra, the accidentia or modi. These definitions Berkeley rejects.' 
 
 [70] Natural Science. 
 
 Berkeley, § 50 : 'as might easily be made appear by an induction 
 of particulars.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'This is an assertion unproven and false. Not a solitary 
 fact is adduced to support it, and it is in conflict with the entire con- 
 dition of the physical sciences. The mathematico-physical explanation 
 of the mechanical operations in the stricter sense, of the acoustic and 
 optical processes, of electricity and of magnetism, rests entirely upon 
 the supposition that certain movements exist without our minds, which 
 stand partly in a causal connection with each other, partly so operate 
 upon our senses as to affect the optic, the auditory, and other nerves ; 
 and in consequence of these affections there rises in us a consciousness 
 partly of shapes and movements as such, partly of colours, sounds, et 
 cetera. And here come in, in a pre-eminent sense, what Berkeley 
 could not know, as they belong to the most recent scientific discoveries, 
 the facts that mechanical movements can be transmuted into heat and the 
 converse, by virtue of the transposition of the movement of entire bodies 
 into the movement of molecules, and the converse, and in general the 
 explanation of the transposition of one group of physical phenomena 
 into another group, in conformity with the laws of the conservation of 
 force. In what manner the movements result has been differently ex- 
 plained by the physicists in the time of Berkeley and of a later period ; 
 as, for example, whether the ray of light is to be regarded as the recti- 
 linear progress of a material object or as the transmission of undulatory 
 movements, in which the material particles have a vibratory motion. 
 The next assertion of Berkeley is certainly correct, that the operation 
 of matter on spirit has remained unexplained. The Cartesian theory of 
 a complete heterogeneousness between the two substances rendered im- 
 possible any attempt at an explanation of the matter which rested upon 
 the connection of the processes of nature. But the true inference from 
 this was that the Cartesian philosophy needed a reshaping of principles, 
 and not that the results of natural science reached by mathematico- 
 mechanical investigations should be despised, or that a new path which 
 no one had actually struck out should be entered on.' 
 
ASTRONOMICAL MOVEMENTS. 369 
 
 [71] Occasionalists. 
 
 Berkeley, § 53 : ' These men.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'The "Occasionalists" Geulinx and Malebranche, who, 
 proceeding from the Cartesian view of the complete heterogeneousness 
 of soul and body, denied that a reciprocal operation exists between the 
 two, and supposed that on occasion of the one process God wrought the 
 other ; for example, that God takes the occasion of an affection of my 
 senses to call forth the corresponding perception, and takes the occa- 
 sion of my desire and moves my arm. Bodies can only operate on 
 bodies, and conceptions can only operate on conceptions (Vorstel- 
 lungen). From occasionalism, and especially from the doctrine of 
 Malebranche, that we know objects by means of the representation of 
 their essence in the divine mind, and that we behold, in general, all 
 things in God, the transition was easy to the Berkeleyan view.' 
 
 [72] The Ninth Objection. 
 
 Berkeley, § 58: 'Tenthly.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'What has become of the ninth objection? It must lie 
 in § 56, and § 54 should begin, " In the eighth and ninth place." ' 
 Editor: The ninth objection is stated and answered in §§ 56, 57. 
 
 [73] Astronomical Movements. 
 Berkeley, § 58 : ' and appearing in all respects like one of them.' 
 Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here seems in two respects to lower the sig- 
 nificance of the question. First, with respect to the processes of 
 movement as such; secondly, with respect to the forces on which 
 these processes depend. In the first respect, and still more in the 
 second, the actual view, taken by the artificial aids which astronomy 
 calls into its service, the view from a fixed position, has an advantage 
 of completer truth, as compared with the view from a second position. 
 This better view Berkeley has not touched. The advantage it presents 
 is of the same kind as the view that the dancer moves round the room, 
 has over the view that the room moves round the dancer. The first 
 theory can only be maintained under distinctly subjective determina- 
 tions ; the second is not bound in the same way to such determinate 
 conditions, and does not offer itself, therefore, in the same isolated 
 way, but holds equally good in the main under an infinite diversity of 
 conditions, and in this very way demonstrates its objective superiority. 
 If, however, we consider the movements with respect also to the forces 
 by which they are produced, in conformity with the Newtonian law of 
 
 24 
 
3 y A NN OTATIO NS. 
 
 gravity, we reach the certainty that only the one view holds good object- 
 ively, that is, is in harmony with the process as it takes place in itself, 
 in the material world apart from our consciousness of it ; for the earth 
 has not the force to move daily the universe around it, and in addition 
 give to the sun its annual course. The other conception, on the con- 
 trary, solves the processes by the mathematical mechanical explanation. 
 See Note 103.' 
 
 [74] Order of Nature. 
 Berkeley, § 59: 'or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.' 
 Ueberweg : ' We can reply to this in a similar manner. The pos- 
 sibility of forming well-grounded anticipations cannot be explained 
 merely by the laws of the association of ideas, but requires the refer- 
 ence of the Subject to 1 normal order of nature, an order which com- 
 prehends objects existent without the Subject.' 
 
 [75] Proofs untenable. 
 Berkeley, § 61 : ' which may be proved a priori.' 
 Ueberweg: 'Were it not that the "proofs," as we have seen, are 
 entirely untenable.' 
 
 [76] Begging the Question. 
 
 Berkeley, do. : ' for it has been made evident.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'As if this proof (given in § 25) did not rest upon the 
 very supposition which his opponent contests, that figure, etc., can 
 exist only as an idea in the mind of the Subject.' 
 
 [77] Order of Nature. 
 
 Berkeley, § 62 : ' the laws of nature.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This answer of Berkeley's is in itself admirable ; it is 
 the very one which must also be given from the point of view opposed 
 to his own. But this very answer, run out into its consequences, can 
 be turned against Berkeley himself. If he made no appeal to an order 
 conformed to the laws of nature, and if he ascribed to his God an 
 operation without order, a thing of freak, as it were (as if He were 
 like Setebos, the god of Caliban's dam, in Shakspeare's Tempest), his 
 view might perhaps be beyond confutation, though it would be com- 
 pletely unproven and totally destitute of probability. But the moment 
 he concedes the order of nature his position becomes untenable, as 
 from it the conformity with natural laws, as we have seen, may indeed 
 be asserted, but cannot be carried out. If I take my watch to be put in 
 order, and when I get it back find that it keeps good time, the pro- 
 
THE WATCH. 37 1 
 
 cesses in my consciousness have been taken for themselves alone, and 
 manifestly not in connection with the result fixed by the laws of nature. 
 For, instead of the perception that my watch goes right, which followed 
 taking it away and returning it, there might just as readily have been 
 the exactly opposite result ; if, for instance, the watchmaker had been 
 unskilful or had put the watch into the hands of a bungling workman. 
 With the conceptions and operations of this zvorkman, however, my 
 ideas stand in no normal connection, unless this connection be brought 
 about by an external object, which, from the consciousness of the one 
 (the workman), experiences effects, and which, when it is afterwards 
 brought to the other (the owner), produces effects on his consciousness. 
 But this is the very thing which Berkeley denies. His negation is 
 consequently untenable.' 
 
 [78] The Watch. 
 
 Berkeley, § 62 : ' As, also, that any disorder in them be attended 
 with the perception (Wahrnehmung) of some corresponding disorder 
 in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' According to this, the irregularity we perceive in the 
 movement of the hands seems to be the prior and conditioning thing, 
 and the derangement in the interior of the watch, which, on Berkeley's 
 principles, does not exist until it is perceived, is the subsequent and 
 conditional thing; the natural mechanical connection, however, is 
 exactly the reverse. By what antecedent perceptions or "signs" is 
 the irregularity of the whole conditioned? If, for example, a little 
 dust, which no one has perceived, has got into the watch and put it 
 out of order, the result is linked with something unperceived in the in- 
 terior of the watch. This thoroughly unperceived something, of which 
 not even a dim suspicion exists, is, according to Berkeley, a nothing, 
 and out of the nothing comes the change in the running of the watch. 
 But that this, as a thing self-contradictory, is not possible, must, to 
 adopt Berkeley's way of speaking, be clear to any one who will reflect 
 even a little. The recognition of the fact, therefore, that nature is 
 regulated by law, draws with it irresistibly the inference that material 
 objects exist without the mind. What we see to be true in the com- 
 paratively simple relations of the parts of a watch holds good in a yet 
 stronger degree in complex organisms, where none of the subtler pro- 
 cesses are perceived, and where they yet are the conditions of processes 
 which are palpable. Between the perceptions we have, for example, 
 of the taking of food and drink, and those we have of the growth of 
 the body, there lie not only certain sensations, but a multitude of pro- 
 
372 A NNO TA TIONS. 
 
 cesses also, which, though not perceived, are not nothing, but must be 
 acknowledged to be processes which go on without all finite conscious- 
 ness. Of existence in the consciousness of God, we have spoken in 
 Note 66.' 
 
 [79] Miracles. 
 
 Berkeley, § 63 : ' otherwise there is a plain reason why they should 
 fail of that effect.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' It cannot be denied that Berkeley succeeds, by this 
 reflection, in harmonizing the recognition both of the laws of nature 
 and of miracles; but it is manifest that in attaining this end he presses 
 the analogy of the divine education of our race, so as to bring it very 
 close to the style of thinking natural to a schoolmaster.' 
 
 [80] Sign and Link. 
 
 Berkeley, § 64 : 'it not (being credible) that He would be at the 
 expense (Aufwand) (if one may so speak) of all that art and regu- 
 larity to no purpose.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'The difficulty does not lie in the fact that these groups 
 of ideas come forth at a later period, and that we consequently are also 
 able to base anticipations on them, but rather in this fact, that they did 
 not come forth at an earlier period, were not in our consciousness, when 
 they must yet have served as intermediate links between our earlier and 
 our later ideas, so that they consequently must have existed before they 
 existed. This is the contradiction involved, and the solution of it can 
 hardly be any other than this, that what becomes by degrees better 
 known — as, for example, the chemical process connected with the act of 
 digestion — must have previously existed, and consequently have existed 
 without the consciousness ; in which case it could not have served as a 
 sign, for that which is unknown to us cannot be a sign to us, but must 
 have been a link in the chain of mechanical causes.' 
 
 [81] Analogues. 
 
 Berkeley, § 67 : ' or at the presence whereof God is pleased to ex- 
 cite ideas in us.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'It would have been more correct to proceed in exactly 
 the opposite way, to drop the negative determinations and to hold fast 
 to the positive mark extension (by which the question as to the where 
 is decided; a question which, from the Berkeleyan position, also exists 
 in reference to other minds), and at the same time to ascribe to 
 substances, by whose movements our senses are affected, operativeness, 
 power, and, indeed (unconscious), analogues of our conscious concep- 
 
THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 373 
 
 tions. In a certain respect Leibnitz had struck into this path ; but 
 Leibnitz supposes each of his "monads" to have merely representations 
 (Vorstellungen) and forces, a place also, but not extension and form. 
 The view of Herbart is in affinity with that of Leibnitz. Nor is the 
 view of Spinoza remote from it, so far as with this philosopher we 
 have in view less the uniform substance than the individual as imma- 
 nent modes of it down to the minutest corpuscles ; in all of which, 
 according to the fundamental doctrine of Spinoza, in virtue of the 
 inseparable union of the attributes extension and cogitation, there 
 must exist, at the same time with size and form, an internal something, 
 a mode of "cogitation," consequently an analogue of our conceptions. 
 To the method of Berkeley, which proposed the aggregation of mere 
 negations, lies nearest that which Kant struck out in his doctrine of 
 the "thing in itself." The difference is this, that Kant denies exten- 
 sion to the "things in themselves," but does not expressly mention 
 the existence of the sensitive faculty, though he is inclined to recog- 
 nize it. Kant's view rests on his a priori method, which has been 
 disputed by Beneke, Ueberweg, v. Kirchmann and others, and in 
 certain respects by Herbart and his school. Fichte's rejection of 
 the "thing in itself" brings his doctrine very close to Berkeley's; 
 but Fichte considers the Ego itself as the Producer of the Non-Ego. 
 The philosophy of Schelling and Hegel throws out the problem en- 
 tirely by objectivating the subjective, etc. ; as, for example, in optics, 
 by adopting Goethe's theory of colours, in this respect returning to 
 the simple hypotheses.' 
 
 [82] Occasion. 
 
 Berkeley, § 69 : ' what is meant by occasion (Veranlassung), — the 
 agent which produces any effect (Erfolg), or else something that is ob- 
 served to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Not the being observed as accompanying the effect or 
 as going before it, but the presence of it as the condition of the effect, 
 is its characteristic. That which is to God the occasion need not in 
 every case fall into the sphere of our observation. We may also 
 venture to speak of an occasion where we cannot directly observe it, 
 but can only in some way reach it by inference.' 
 
 [83] Things in themselves and Ideas of God. 
 
 Berkeley, § 71 : 'as the notion (Begriff) of matter is here stated 
 (gefasst) ... in the mind (Geiste) of God, which are so many marks 
 (Merkmale) or notes (Zeichen) . . . sensations (Sinnesempfindungen) 
 
374 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 . . . tune (Tonstuck) . . . perceive (wahrnehmen) . . . extravagant 
 (ausschweiffend) . . . senseless (empfindungslose).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This is the shape which the question assumes on 
 Berkeley's principles, while those whom he supposes to combat his 
 views by no means, from their own position, regard of necessity the 
 "things in themselves" as ideas of God. The aim of the assumption 
 is, in fact, rather the very reverse : its aim is to restore between our 
 earlier and later perceptions a normal causal connection by means of 
 natural media which exist in themselves, without our mind. The ideas 
 of God are eternal, the objects of nature are temporal. But even the 
 doctrine which concedes that the things in themselves are ideas of God, 
 is by no means as extravagant and baseless as Berkeley would represent 
 it. The comparison with the musician suggests the idea that God 
 needs some mnemonic aid, an idea whose inadequacy is instantly felt 
 by every one; but it does not follow that the same is true of a hypoth- 
 esis which is built upon a speculation not in regard to God's power, 
 but in regard to his will, his volition to act in accordance with a 
 natural order or normal regularity. This order, however, demands 
 those intermediate links which, as they do not exist in our conscious- 
 ness, must either exist in themselves or in the mind of God. So much, 
 however, is to be conceded, that as this hypothesis in both forms, in 
 regard to the "things in themselves" or "ideas of God," either dis- 
 regards or explicitly denies order in space, it loses the best part of its 
 force. For the actual conceivableness of an order of nature links itself 
 with special tenacity to the order in space reached by mathematical 
 study. This arrangement, in view of the affections experienced by 
 our senses, is not merely valid as an order within our consciousness, 
 but must be recognized as reaching beyond it ; as an order common 
 to our consciousness and to the things which exist without it.' 
 
 [84] Existence external to the Mind. 
 
 Berkeley, § 73 : 'to stand in need of a material support (Tragers) 
 ... it follows that we have no longer any occasion to suppose the 
 being of matter.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This inference is false. Were it granted that none of 
 the qualities known to us had an existence without the mind, yet on the 
 basis of the normal order of nature we would still be justified in in- 
 ferring from the incitation of our sensations that something external to 
 the mind, some "thing in itself," exists; and the only inference justi- 
 fied on this supposition would be that attributes pertained to it of 
 which we were ignorant.' 
 
A SOMEWHAT. 375 
 
 [85] Consciousness, its External Stimulations. 
 
 Berkeley, § 74 : ' being (seienden) . . . What is there on our part 
 (was fiir einen Anhalt haben wir) . . . sensations (Sinneswahrneh- 
 mungen) . . . notions (Begriffen) . . . reflection (Selbst-betrachtung) 
 inert (tragen) . . . directed (geleitet).' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'In Notes 32, 45, 54, 77, and elsewhere, it has been 
 shown that our consciousness, in its empirical determination, is not 
 without distinct external stimulations. In this lies what there is "on 
 our part" to induce us to suppose that there is an "occasion," though 
 it is not necessarily to be regarded as something absolutely "inert" 
 and heterogeneous to the mind.' 
 
 [86] A Somewhat. 
 Berkeley, § 75 : 'a stupid thoughtless somewhat {Etwas) ... in- 
 terposition (Einschiebung) . . . forsakes us (uns im Stich lassen) . . . 
 if anything (wenn iiberhaupt irgend etwas).' 
 
 Ueberweg: '"The things in themselves," says Herbart, "are 
 not to be banished by reproaches." Herbart is right; and this fact 
 is a proof, not of the power of prejudice, but of the power of sound 
 reason. But it is not necessary to conceive of "the things in them- 
 selves" as a mere incognizable "somewhat." ' 
 
 [87.] 
 
 Berkeley, § 77: ' support (Trager) . . . inert (trage) . . . because 
 we have not a sense adapted to them (weil wir keinen auf sie einge- 
 richteten Sinn haben).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The point here made puts into the mouth of the op- 
 ponent a false turn. It is out of place at this point to take refuge in 
 other possible senses. The right way would be to mark that it would 
 be hard for us to refer the sensations (sinnlichen Empfindungen) to 
 their two co-operative causes, the subjective or psychical force and the 
 external excitant (Reiz), and to apprehend the external purely in ac- 
 cordance with its own nature (Beschaffenheit). He who regards this 
 as impossible must regard the nature of "matter," or, still better, of 
 "things in themselves," as something completely unknown, and may 
 yet have good ground, in conformity with the laws of causality, to infer 
 the existence of this thing unknown. It is, nevertheless, to be noted, 
 in conformity with what was before said, that the inference is robbed 
 of some of its force if it be denied that the extension, with the forms 
 and movements in our sense-perceptions (Sinneswahrnehmungen), is the 
 
376 A NN OTATIO NS. 
 
 representation, for the most part faithful and capable of increasing 
 fidelity, of a homogeneous extension, with its various shapes and 
 movements, situate without our mind.' 
 
 [88] Miracles. 
 Berkeley, § 84 : ' The same may be said of all other miracles.' 
 Ueberweg: 'That is, of all the biblical miracles, which alone Berke- 
 ley has in view, and for which his solution is adequate. It is doubtful, 
 however, whether it would suffice for the miracle of transubstantiation, 
 maintained by the Catholics, which Berkeley indeed did not believe. 
 In that miracle substance as such comes directly into consideration, 
 and is said to be transubstantiated, though the accidents, especially the 
 taste of bread and wine, remain. This assertion does not seem capa- 
 ble of ready harmonizing with a view according to which we could 
 only give the designation of substance of bread and wine either to the 
 mind of the participant or to the unity of the accidents, that is, to their 
 connection with one another. Yet the difficulty may be met perhaps 
 if we might understand by substance, not the substratum or support, 
 but the sum or complex (Inbegriff ) of the essential (Wesentlichen), and 
 might then say that in the religious act there was an access of Christ's 
 body and blood, and a union of them with bread and wine, and that 
 the qualities of the bread and wine as bodily food ceased to be essential 
 and sank into mere accidents ; so that instead of the earlier substance 
 there was now another substance present. This explanation would also 
 allow of a harmony of the Catholic and of the Lutheran doctrine.' 
 
 Editor: Ueberweg's harmony of transubstantiation with idealism 
 turns upon a mere verbal play. Transubstantiation in its own nature 
 denies that esse is percipi. It has an esse which it is impossible percipi 
 by the natural powers. What is perceived is not the esse, and the real 
 esse is entirely unperceived. Berkeley's doctrine is in conflict, also, 
 with the church doctrine of the incarnation and of the resurrection. 
 
 [89] Miracles of two classes. 
 
 Berkeley, § 84 : 'it were an affront to the reader's understanding 
 to resume the explication of it in this place.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'The objection, so far as the wine is concerned, is 
 certainly met, in the sense of Berkeley's doctrine and use of words, 
 by what has been said before ; but Berkeley is not entirely justified in 
 assuming that the difficulty in regard to the serpent is equally met, for 
 in the case of the serpent the question involves more than its being 
 perceived in the vicinity of the spectators, and more than the concep- 
 
OBJECTS OF SENSE. Z77 
 
 tion of these persons that the snake is possessed of animation. The 
 question involves the actual animation of the serpent, an animation 
 existing outside of the consciousness of these persons. The change of 
 water into wine involves, according to Berkeley, merely the change of 
 one set of perceptions into another set. But the change of a staff into 
 a serpent involves this also in part, but in addition to this the trans- 
 mutation of the staff into the soul of the animal, a soul which is also 
 furnished with perceptions. It is, consequently, a potentiated miracle, 
 whose special features deserved a separate consideration. A well- 
 grounded objection to the Berkeleyan principles is nevertheless just as 
 little to be deduced from this as from the rest of the miracles. In 
 spite of the judgment of some recent writers to the contrary, it must be 
 conceded that these principles are in as good harmony with the mira- 
 cles, as they are irreconcilable with a recognition, severely carried 
 through, of the conformity of nature to law.' 
 
 [90] Objects of Sense. 
 
 Berkeley, § 86 : ' the one intelligible, or in the mind, the other 
 real and without the mind.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' It is worthy of note that Kant applies this very term 
 "intelligible" to the ''things in themselves," which exist without the 
 mind of the percipient and thinking subject ; while he holds that the 
 phenomena, which are in our consciousness merely, are to be accepted 
 as the things or objects which are empirically real in us. Those phi- 
 losophers, however, who accept a real existence of material things with- 
 out the mind, may very well grant that the forms (IS tat) of them exist 
 representatively (abbildlich) in the mind also, — and this is explicitly 
 taught by the Aristotelians, — but they can only metaphorically give the 
 title objects of sense to those sense-images which they suppose to have 
 an existence in the mind, and to " be immediately perceived. ' ' The use 
 of this expression readily misleads ; and to speak of a twofold existence 
 of the "objects of sense" would be as preposterous (verkehrt) as if I 
 were to call my conception (Vorstellung) of the spirit of Caesar the 
 immediately presented Caesar, and the spirit of Caesar himself the 
 mediately presented Caesar, and should consistently with this speak 
 of a twofold existence of Caesar. The objects of sense exist only extra 
 mentem — without the mind. See Notes 8, 12, 28.' 
 
378 A NNO TA TIONS. 
 
 [91] Conformity of the Perceived to the Unperceived. 
 
 Berkeley, § 86 : ' How can it be known that the things which are 
 perceived are conformable (conform) to those which are not perceived, 
 or exist without the mind (Geistes) ?' 
 
 Ueberweg : • Berkeley here touches upon a real, though by no 
 means insoluble, difficulty. But, besides this, he need not oppose it in 
 the exclusive manner in which he has here done it, to the represent- 
 atives of the views which conflict with his own ; for the same difficulty, 
 though in a narrower compass, also exists if we accept his position, to 
 wit, in so far as the knowledge of other spirits, outside of the mind of 
 the cognizant subject himself, is concerned. In the history of states, 
 of culture, of religions, of the sciences, and similar departments, the 
 main object is the intellectual life of the time antecedent to our own. 
 This life may, in fact, have passed completely outside the conscious- 
 ness of the historical investigator, who, as a rule, was not living in 
 the era in which occurred the events with which he desires to make 
 himself familiar. His knowledge is true, or has validity in reference 
 to the reality to be known, so far as it is conformed to that reality. Our 
 historical apprehension of the Homeric religion, of the Platonic phi- 
 losophy, or of the Arabian astronomy, is true or has objective reality 
 (or, to speak more accurately, has validity in respect to the reality to 
 be known, which in this case is an intellectual reality) in as far as it 
 is conformed to Homer's mode of religious thought, to Plato's specu- 
 lation, to the astronomical conceptions of the Arabians. Here, too, 
 the question arises, How can I know that my knowledge which is in 
 my consciousness is conformed to such (intellectual) objects as are not 
 in my consciousness, but have been in the consciousness of other per- 
 sons centuries ago ? But we must not press these questions here, nor 
 in reference to the external things which are without our consciousness, 
 as if they were unanswerable, and as if the theory on which they rest is 
 absurd. They are to be pressed solely for the purpose of finding an 
 answer. The assurance of the harmony of my knowledge with the 
 thing to be known, if this thing lies without my consciousness, can 
 never be reached directly, by comparison, as I can never pass beyond 
 the bounds of my own consciousness; but I can reach it indirectly, by 
 inferences, which rest upon the presupposition that there is a causal 
 nexus linking itself in with my consciousness. See Ueberweg, System 
 of Logic, §§ 41-44.' 
 
 Editor: See additions from Ueberweg's Logic to Note 8. As the 
 question here raised is perhaps on the whole the greatest which arises 
 
CONFORMITY OF THE PERCEIVED, ETC. 379 
 
 in metaphysical speculation, it may be well worth while to give a 
 synopsis of the entire view of Uebervveg, as presented in his ' System 
 der Logik:' 
 
 ' 1. Perception is the immediate cognition of things existing in juxta- 
 position and in succession. External or sense-perception is directed 
 to the external world ; internal or psychological perception to the 
 psychical life. 
 
 ' 2. The immediateness of the cognition in perception is, however, 
 always merely relative, since in it there are fused, even with the very 
 activity of the sense, many operations of the mind. These operations, 
 though they do not enter separately into consciousness, conjointly 
 condition the total result. 
 
 ' 3. Perception (Wahrnehmung) is distinguished from simple sensa- 
 tion (Empfindung) by this, that in sensation consciousness is fixed upon 
 the subjective condition only, while in perception is involved a refer- 
 ence to something perceived. This percept, whether it belongs to the 
 external world or the subject himself, is opposed to the act of percep- 
 tion, as in some respect objective. 
 
 ' 4. Perception is distinguished from thought (Denken) by its rela- 
 tive immediateness. Thought may, however, be used with a latitude 
 which makes it embrace perception. 
 
 '5. To logic, as the doctrine of cognition, belongs the question, 
 Whether in sense-perception (sinnlichen Wahrnehmung) things appear 
 to us as they exist in actuality, that is, as they are in themselves ? To 
 returning an affirmative answer to this question, is opposed, first of all, 
 the sceptical argument that the consonance of Perception with Being 
 would not, even if such a consonance existed, be cognizable ; as the 
 sense-perception can never be compared with its object, but only with 
 another perception. The doubt is confirmed when we reflect upon the 
 essential nature of sense-perception. For as an act of our mind the 
 perception must either be of purely subjective origin, or in any case 
 contain in it a subjective element: on either supposition, the theory that 
 it renders the proper real being of the percept undisturbed and ex- 
 haustively can be sustained only by artificial hypotheses, which it is 
 difficult to justify. The character of the phenomenal world is, in any 
 case, conditioned by the subjective nature of our senses. . The senses 
 may be differently constructed in other beings, and may, consequently, 
 lead to a different sort of sense-intuition of the world. From all these 
 the actuality as such, as, apart from every particular mode of appre- 
 hending it, it is in itself, that is, the " Ding an Sich," is different. 
 
 ' 6. Not only can we adjust, on the basis of sense-perception alone, 
 
380 
 
 ANN OTA TIONS. 
 
 the proportion in which it is conditioned by what is objective, but we 
 cannot even at all cognize the existence of the affecting objects. For, 
 as the perceptions are acts of our own minds, they cannot as such lead 
 us beyond ourselves. The conviction of the existence of external ob- 
 jects, which affect us, is grounded on the hypothesis of causal relations, 
 a hypothesis which does not rest upon sense-perception alone. 
 
 ' 7. The doctrine of the Scotch School (Reid, Beattie, and others), 
 that " Common Sense" reveals immediately the existence of an external 
 world, and the affiliated doctrine of Jacobi, who claims the same power 
 for Feeling or Belief, is a fiction, which dispenses with a scientific 
 foundation. 
 
 ' 8. Internal or psychological perception, or the immediate cognition 
 of the psychical acts and images, can apprehend, with material truth, 
 its objects as they are in themselves. ' 
 
 Logik, Dritte Aufi., §§ 36-41. Ueberweg's development from this 
 point is given in [8]. 
 
 [92] Substance. 
 
 Berkeley, § 91 : 'an existence independent of a substance, or sup- 
 port (Trager), wherein they may exist.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'Berkeley argues as if the difficulty he urges (§ 16) 
 against the notion of substance as a "support" (Trager) of accidents 
 involved exclusively the notion of material substance, and were not of 
 equal and perhaps of higher force against the notion of a spiritual sub- 
 stance. Berkeley says rightfully that in regard to spirit he harmonizes 
 with the dominant view of substance as a support (Tragerin) of acci- 
 dents ; but he shows neither here nor elsewhere that he rightfully holds 
 fast to this supposition, and that in this respect his argumentatio ex 
 concessis is an argumentatio ex concedendis, that his argument from 
 things conceded is an argument from things that ought to be conceded.' 
 
 [93] Epicureans and Hobbists. 
 
 Berkeley, § 93: 'and supposing (voraussetzen) . . . fatal (verhiing- 
 nissvollen) . . . impulse (Einwirkung) . . . without which your 
 Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like have not even the shadow of a pre- 
 tence (Vorwands).' 
 
 Uederweg: 'Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), following Democritus, 
 taught that the universe came into being by the concourse of atoms 
 without the co-operation of a Deity. Similar views were taught by 
 Hobbes (1588-1679), who is more generally known by his political 
 absolutism than by his philosophy of nature. He maintains that 
 matter can have sensation and thought.' 
 
ABSTRACTION. 38 1 
 
 [94] Time. 
 
 Berkeley, § 98 : ' Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of 
 time . . . cogitation (Denken).' 
 
 Ueeerweg : 'According to Aristotle (Phys., iv. ii.), time is the 
 number of movements (of change) in relation to earlier or later. Ac- 
 cording to him (Phys., vi. ii.), time and space are equally infinitely 
 divisible. According to the doctrine of Locke (Hum. Und., B. 11., 
 ch. xiv., §§ 3, 5, 17), reflection on the train of ideas, which appear 
 one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the 
 notion of succession; the distance between any parts of that succession, 
 or between the appearance of any two ideas in our mind, is that we 
 call duration; and duration, set out by certain periods and marked by 
 certain measures or epochs, is time — duration designated by a definite 
 measure. Though the notion of duration has arisen from reflection 
 on the sequence and number of ideas, it is yet applicable to things 
 which exist while we do not think, as the notion of the extension of 
 bodies, though it has been derived from the impressions of sight and 
 touch, can be applied to distances where no body is seen or felt.' 
 
 [95] Abstraction. 
 
 Berkeley, § 100 : 'the doctrine of Abstraction has not a little con- 
 tributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The definite demarcation of the groups of conceptions, 
 of which each can be represented by a definite word, by means of com- 
 plete and well-arranged specification of the material constituents which 
 come into the consideration of those conceptions, in other words, by 
 means of definition, is an indisputable demand of all scientific reflection. 
 There is great merit in Berkeley's denial, on principle, of the false 
 substantializing of abstracts, and in his own striving to give a complete 
 basis to general notions and judgments in the corresponding concrete 
 conceptions. Yet we cannot approve of his polemic against the effort 
 to form and define the most general notions. In the ethical sphere the 
 expressions of Berkeley are in complete opposition to the Socratic 
 basing of all ethical action on the notional cognition of the ethical. 
 There is a justifiable polemic against a one-sided over-estimate of the 
 notion and of the rule. This polemic has been directed, in the sphere 
 of ethics, against Kantianism, especially by F. H. Jacobi, who, in his 
 polemic, gives prominence to the moral tact, and who lays stress on 
 the ethical right of the individual, as Schleiermacher also does. But 
 this polemic is exposed to the peril of falling into a one-sidedness of 
 
382 A NNO TA TIONS. 
 
 an opposite kind, when it arrays itself not simply against an over- 
 estimate of the general notion, but against the thing itself. Scholastic 
 and sceptical errors are to be overcome by genuine science, not by 
 returning to a pre-scientific position. This latter, however, though it 
 was not Berkeley's design, seems to be a very easy result of the assault 
 which, without the proper restrictions, he makes upon the attempts to 
 define certain very general notions.' 
 
 [96] Essence. 
 
 Berkeley, § 102 : ' that everything includes within itself the cause 
 of its properties, or that there is in each object (Dinge) an inward 
 essence (inneres Wesen), which is the source whence its discernible 
 (unterscheidbaren) qualities flow, and whereon they depend.' 
 
 Ueberweg; 'This is the view of Aristotle and of the Scholastics, 
 by whom essence (obaia), that is, the sum of the essential or of that 
 which is involved in the definition, is regarded as the cause of the 
 qualities (itoid).' 
 
 [97] Gravitation. 
 
 Berkeley, § 103: 'and it may as truly (for aught we know) be 
 termed "impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction."' 
 
 Ueberweg: ' Undoubtedly Newton himself has left this possibility 
 open ; but the majority of those who adopt his views have found in at- 
 traction an essential property of matter. The Cartesians, on the 
 contrary, denied the doctrine of attraction, and endeavoured to ex- 
 plain the turning aside of the celestial bodies from a rectilinear course, 
 as also the falling of the terrestrial bodies, on the theory of an impulse 
 imparted by cether. This hypothesis of Descartes was held by French 
 scholars as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, but more and 
 more lost its hold as the conviction grew more general that every por- 
 tion of matter in the universe attracts every other, in conformity with 
 the Newtonian law of gravitation [i.e., with a force proportional directly 
 to the quantity of matter they contain, and inversely to the squares of 
 their distances]. The comets especially, whose course it is impossible 
 to co-ordinate with that of the aether, furnish a powerful argument, 
 in fact, an unanswerable one, for the Newtonian school. There has 
 been a growing tendency to consider attraction as an immanent prop- 
 erty of all matter. Yet the mooted question has remained and yet 
 remains undecided, whether there can be an "actio in distans." 
 Such an "actio" seems demanded by attraction, yet leaves it incon- 
 ceivable, what the former is while it traverses the space intervening 
 between the masses, whether it be a substance or a property. And if 
 
GRAVITATION UNIVERSAL. 383 
 
 we suppose — as it seems thoroughly necessary we should — that there 
 is a substantial continuity filling all space, within which the corporeal 
 atoms exist, still the question as to the mode of the extension of 
 power or force remains unsolved. Kant's Dynamic, but still more 
 Herbart's doctrine that the approximation rests on modifications of 
 the "internal conditions," Schiller's comparison of attraction with 
 love, and Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will, seem to shed some 
 light on the darkness.' 
 
 [98] The Fixed Stars. 
 
 Berkeley, § 106 : ' Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no 
 such tendency towards each other.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' That Berkeley is mistaken in this assertion is, in our 
 day, placed beyond all dispute. The error into which he falls was a 
 pardonable one in his day, for astronomy at that time very properly 
 concentrated itself on the investigation of our planetary system, and 
 the question in regard to the movement of the fixed stars had not yet 
 been seriously looked at. In our day the movement of the fixed stars 
 is no longer a matter of doubt. It is known that all the bodies belong- 
 ing to the system of our Milky Way move around a common centre of 
 gravitation. Madler maintains that this centre is in or near the Pleia- 
 des; but the question is not settled.' 
 
 [99] Gravitation universal. 
 
 Berkeley, § 106: 'as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and 
 the elasticity of the air.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'These errors also of Berkeley no longer need a con- 
 futation. Every part of the growing plant and of the elastic air has 
 gravity. The gravity itself does not cease, though its operation be 
 paralyzed by counter-operations and be transmuted into its counter- 
 part. But, throughout, where several forces co-operate with each 
 other, and in part compensate one another, it is impossible, in accord- 
 ance with Berkeley's principles, to trace and acknowledge the efficacy 
 of the very laws of nature which clearly reveal themselves in the more 
 simple, uncomplicated cases; for, on Berkeley's principle, the results 
 follow the immediate operation of God. 
 
 ' These laws appear as if they were not of universal validity, though 
 they really are so, and only seem to yield to other laws, to which we 
 can, therefore, ascribe no more than a very limited validity. The 
 principle of Berkeley, as we again see, though it may be harmonized 
 with a sort of general recognition of the laws of nature as rules of the 
 
384 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 divine activity, cannot be brought to unison with an acknowledgment 
 of the laws of nature, scientifically carried through.' 
 
 [ioo] The Practical. 
 
 Berkeley, § 109 : f God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort 
 of ourselves and fellow-creatures.' 
 
 Ueberweg : \ If Berkeley's advice were acted on, the result would 
 be a zealous striving after material good, and a comfortable enjoyment 
 of life on work-days, and a striving equally zealous, on Sundays and 
 church-festivals, after heavenly blessedness. Another result would be a 
 theology in correspondence with these practical tendencies, and with 
 both we should have the sort of science and art which is wont to fall 
 very short in the striving after the true and the beautiful without 
 regard to subordinate aims, either mundane or supramundane. 
 Though this result is not that at which Berkeley aims, yet in this way 
 what he here recommends does in fact most commonly take shape.' 
 
 Editor : Berkeley's advice, interpreted by his intellectual and prac- 
 tical life, hardly justifies Ueberweg' s stricture. 
 
 [101] Newton. 
 
 Berkeley, §110: 'The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural 
 Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise 
 of Mechanics. ', 
 
 Ueberweg : ' In § 114 Berkeley gives the full title of this Treatise. 
 It is Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, first pub- 
 lished 1687. The distinctions which Berkeley here cites and contro- 
 verts are presented in the Scholion to the Eighth Definition in 
 the Introduction to his Principia (edit, of 1687, p. 5, seq.).' 
 
 [102] Motion Absolute and Relative. 
 
 Berkeley, § 1 1 1 : ' Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of 
 a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is 
 from one relative place to another.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'According to this, in the figure given in Note 54a 
 movement in the external object AB would be an absolute movement, 
 a movement of the image a'b' among the other images in the space of 
 consciousness would be a relative movement. Yet this determination 
 is not exactly correct, inasmuch as the movement of the external object 
 AB may be referred in part to absolute space, in part to particular ex- 
 ternal objects. This latter relation, also, is not merely brought into 
 consideration by us, but is grounded in the real co-operation of the 
 
NUMBERS. 385 
 
 powers of nature itself. Thus, for example, the double motion of the 
 moon, the one motion around the earth, the other, with the earth, 
 around the sun, is the result of a twofold attraction, an attraction to 
 the earth and an attraction to the sun. Our subjective relative notions 
 in general rest upon objective relations : for example, the subjective 
 relative notion of number rests upon the objectively real existence, 
 one with another, of individual things with like natures ; the sub- 
 jective relative notion embodied in the word "and" rests upon an 
 objective connection; and so in other cases.' 
 
 [103] Movement. 
 
 Berkeley, § 114: ' For the water in the vessel at that time wherein 
 it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion has, I think, no 
 motion at all.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The water is supposed to be in a vessel which is attached 
 to a cord and suddenly whirled round. The water is gradually drawn 
 into the movement of the vessel. — If Berkeley's theory be correct, that 
 in every movement the power of God operates directly, or without 
 " secondary causes," it is not very clear what is meant by saying that 
 God directs his power, not to our ideas of the heavens, but to our ideas 
 of the earth, and in our apprehension of what seems to be offered to 
 the senses there may be an error in this direction.' 
 
 [104] Numbers. 
 
 Berkeley, § 119 : 'so far as they are not subservient to practice, and 
 promote the benefit of life.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'This utilitarian view of Berkeley's, like various others 
 which he expresses in depreciation of the pure mathematics, reminds us 
 greatly of Bacon of Verulam. We may regard it as an illustration of 
 what was said in Note 100. There have been various fantastic specula- 
 tions in numbers, which rest upon a spurious attributing of substantial 
 character to the results of abstraction. There have been mystic dream- 
 ings, such as the definition which Xenocrates, the Platonist, gives of 
 the soul, that "it is a self-moving number," or the Pythagorean defi- 
 nition of rectitude as a square number. But Berkeley makes a mistake 
 in placing in a line with these fancies the serious, strictly scientific 
 theory of numbers. We admit that this theory is not directly "sub- 
 servient to practice," and that it rests on very broad and compre- 
 hensive abstractions. But these abstractions are of the class which are 
 scientifically justifiable ; they are abstractions which concentrate the 
 
 25 
 
386 A NNO TA TIO NS. 
 
 observation on particular aspects of the total object, and do not involve 
 the vice of a false substantializing of that which is viewed abstractly.' 
 
 [105] Number. 
 Berkeley, § 122 : 'or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.' 
 Ueberweg : ' It would be far more correct than this to compare the 
 theory of numbers with the investigation of the laws of language. That 
 which in a certain respect is a sign may yet have in it a certain con- 
 formity with law, which makes it worth while to estimate it, not as a 
 mere auxiliary, but as itself an object of investigation.' 
 
 [106] Extension. 
 
 Berkeley, § 124: 'If by finite extension be meant something dis- 
 tinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so 
 cannot affirm or deny anything of it.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Though Berkeley cannot, from his point of view, 
 accept any extension subsisting outside of the mind, yet this, as has 
 been shown, by no means proves that the supposition he rejects is 
 false. In extension in itself there is no minimum. In our subjective 
 perception as such there are minima, the minutest separations, in which 
 two tactual impressions on the end of the finger, the back of the hand, 
 the tip of the tongue, the lips, and other parts of the body, two exci- 
 tations of the retina, the distance of which from each other is con- 
 ditioned by the visual angle, call forth two separate or distinguishable 
 sensations. 
 
 ' As, however, any external object, say, for example, an inch line 
 drawn on paper, at different degrees of closeness, and especially when 
 we call the microscope to our aid, allows us to see a different number 
 of parts, restricted in fact to no precise limits, it follows that we cannot 
 fix any minutest perceptible part of an object, — at least any minutest 
 part perceptible by sight. The microscope shows us even the ten- 
 thousandth part of an inch.' 
 
 [107] Sum and Members of a Series. 
 
 Berkeley, § 124: 'to say a finite quantity or extension consists of 
 parts infinite in number, is so manifest and glaring a contradiction 
 that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so.' 
 
 Ueberweg: 'Berkeley has simply asserted this "contradiction;" 
 he has not proved it. A contradiction is the affirmation and denial 
 of the same thing. It would be a contradiction to call the sum of a 
 series both finite and infinite, or to call at the same time the number 
 
THE CALCULUS. 387 
 
 of the members of that series both finite and infinite ; but to call the 
 sum finite and the number of the members infinite is not a contradiction, 
 either on the supposition that the magnitude of the collective members 
 is an infinitely little one, or that the magnitude of the individual mem- 
 bers diminishes, in a definite manner, infinitely. Locke, however 
 (Hum. Und., 11. xxiii. 31), holds that "the divisibility in infinitum 
 of any finite extension involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in 
 consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions 
 consistent." ' 
 
 [108] A posteriori. 
 
 Berkeley, § 129 : ' it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be 
 admitted against propositions relating to infinity.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here uses the teim " proofs a posteriori" in 
 the good old sense — pi oofs which are drawn from the effects (the oarzpov 
 fu<7£i, natura posterius). He knew nothing of the Kantian abuse of 
 terms, in which a priori implies an independence of what is empirically 
 given, an independence which has in fact no existence whatever, and, 
 in harmony with that definition, makes a posteriori completely synony- 
 mous with empirical.' 
 
 [103] The Calculus. 
 
 Berkeley, § 130 : 'Of late the speculations about infinites have run 
 so high.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' Especially after Newton had discovered the method 
 of computation by fluxions. With this method essentially coincides 
 the differential and integral calculus, brought forward by Leibnitz soon 
 after, and in fact before Newton had made his own discovery public. 
 Both come together under the notion of the "infinitesimal calculus." 
 The difference is only in form; but the notation and mode of operation 
 presented by Leibnitz must be acknowledged to be preferable. New- 
 ton began in 1665 to develop the "Arithmetic of Fluxions," and up 
 to 1672 had communicated it to particular friends, rather, however, by 
 way of hints than of complete statement. He first presented it to the 
 world in his Principia Philosophise Naturalis, 1687. Leibnitz, perhaps 
 not entirely without some knowledge of Newton's hints, sustained, 
 however, by his own earlier investigations of series, had, with at least a 
 relative independence, reached the new calculus in 1676, and first gave 
 it to the public in the "Acta Eruditorum," 1684.' 
 
388 A NN TA TIONS. 
 
 [no] Infinitesimals. 
 
 Berkeley, § 130 : ' thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine 
 there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multi- 
 plied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.' 
 
 Ueberweg : 'Not "with good reason," but simply because of a 
 pure misunderstanding of the notion of infinitesimal quantities, this 
 idea of Berkeley's has been maintained by some. Such a misunder- 
 standing is only possible when the representatives of the opposite view 
 foster the error that the infinitesimal can be a fixed quantity. By an 
 " infinitesimal" is not to be understood a fixed quantity, but a quan- 
 tity which, by a fixed law, takes diverse values which have zero as the 
 ultimate value. The ultimate value is that value which a variable 
 quantity constantly approximates without ever reaching it, and so that 
 the distance from it may be less than any particular fixed quantity you 
 may name. In a series which has zero as the final value it must con- 
 sequently always be, name what fixed quantity you please, that a mem- 
 ber can be found which, in common also with all that follow it, is less 
 than that fixed quantity named. Thus, the infinite quantity in the 
 mathematical sense — or the reciprocal value of an infinitesimal — is not 
 a fixed quantity, but one which in accordance with the series takes 
 diverse values, and may because of that fact be greater than any fixed 
 quantity which can be named. 
 
 ' Two quantities which are infinitely small or infinitely large may 
 be compared with one another by comparing with one another the 
 corresponding members of the two series, from which arises a series of 
 relations. The ultimate value of this series makes the relation of the 
 one infinitely little or infinitely great quantity to the other. 
 
 ' The augmentation of a quantity simply by infinitesimals is continu- 
 ous. The series in which a single infinitesimal is represented need by 
 no means, however, consist of members which differ from one another 
 simply by infinitesimals, yet it can become continuous by the unlimited 
 insertion of members. 
 
 ' Let, for example, the first series be as follows : 
 
 'hbh&> • • • 
 
 ' Let the other series be the following : 
 
 '&*■«.*. • • • 
 ' These series are so formed that the common member of the first is 
 
 — , the common member of the second is — „ -f- — - = . 
 
 2"' 2 n ^ 2 m 2 m 
 
INFINITESIMALS. 389 
 
 ' If we call the first infinitesimal a, the second is = 2a + <**• On 
 the dependence of n rests the association of the members. 
 
 'If we now compare with one another the corresponding members of 
 both series, we obtain the series of relations : 
 
 4, *h 
 
 16' 
 
 whose common member is 2 -L — = . Now, the members 
 
 2 n 2 a 
 
 of the third series have an ultimate value, which they approximate be- 
 yond every difference however minute, yet without ever wholly reach- 
 ing it. This ultimate value is = 2, because the ultimate value of the 
 fraction yet to be added to 2 (which fraction coincides with a, as given 
 before) is = o. The ultimate value 2 is not .the relation of any two 
 members to one another. If we should consider it as the relation of 
 the last members, or of the members in process of vanishing, we should 
 involve ourselves in a contradiction, for there are no last or vanishing 
 members. As long as we remain within the first two series, and com- 
 pare two corresponding members with each other, the relation is not 
 = 2, but > 2 ; but if we go beyond to the ultimate values of the first 
 two series, both of these are = o, their relation to one another is con- 
 sequently = %, which, again, is not = 2, but is something wholly in- 
 determinate. But we are involved in no contradiction if we seek 
 neither a relation of the last members, nor a relation of the ultimate 
 values, but the ultimate value of the relation of the entire members. 
 This answers for all applications, as in them we have also to do with 
 ultimate values. Thus, for example, the tangent has the position to 
 which, as the ultimate position, the chords protracted from the point 
 of contact, constantly, by continuous diminution, approximate, beyond 
 every angular difference however minute. As upon both sides, in the 
 arithmetical consideration and in the geometrical application, the ulti- 
 mate values are regarded, an absolutely accurate result may be attained ; 
 the mistake would be to identify an ultimate value with one member of 
 the series. 
 
 ' It may, however, happen that the members of the series of relation 
 itself increase or diminish infinitely. In this case the one infinitesimal 
 is considered as an infinitely small portion of the other, that is, as an 
 infinitesimal of the second order. If, for example, we take the first 
 series we have given, and make the second \, -fa, -g- 1 ^, -^, . . . (or, 
 make the first quantity = a, the second = a*), the series of relation is 
 identical with the first series, and consequently diminishes infinitely; 
 the quantity therefore which runs through the values in the second 
 
390 A NN O TA TI O NS. 
 
 series is an infinitesimal of the second order. With this determination 
 of the notion, which coincides with that of Eisenstein, R. Hoppe, and 
 others, all the contradictions which Berkeley and others have urged 
 against the doctrine of Infinitesimals fall away. They are contradic- 
 tions, which in fact have no existence, unless the infinite be regarded 
 as a fixed quantity.' 
 
 Editor: Playfair (Prel. Dissert., Enc. Brit., 650) says of the Con- 
 troversy on Fluxions, ' Though the defenders of the calculus had the 
 advantage, it must be acknowledged that they did not always argue the 
 matter quite fairly, nor exactly meet the reasoning of their adversary. 
 The true answer to Berkeley was that what he conceived to be an acci- 
 dental compensation of errors was not at all accidental, but that the 
 two sets of quantities that seemed to him neglected in the reasoning 
 were in all cases necessarily equal, and an exact balance for one an- 
 other. ... If the author of the Analyst has had the misfortune to 
 enroll his name on the side of error, he has also had the credit of pro- 
 posing difficulties of which the complete solution is only to be derived 
 from the highest improvements of the calculus.' 
 
 [111] Immortality of the Soul. 
 
 Berkeley, § 140 : • The natural immortality of the soul is a neces- 
 sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The soul consequently has not merely an immortality 
 conferred on it by the grace of God, as Justin and some others of the 
 early fathers maintained in express opposition to Platonism. At a 
 later period, mainly through the mighty influence of Augustine, the 
 Platonic doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, an immortality 
 grounded in its very essence, became the predominating doctrine of 
 the Christian Church.' 
 
 Editor: On hardly any point did Christianity find a completer 
 chaos of human thought than on the doctrine of the future state. The 
 confusion yielded very slowly. 
 
 [112] Opinion and Character. 
 
 Berkeley, § 141 : 'And this notion (Vorstellung) has been greedily 
 embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most 
 effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion.' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This position of Berkeley involves a support of the 
 argument by the moral degradation of the opponent. Its confirmation 
 in experience is not without exceptions. There has been faith in im- 
 
HOW CAN MIND COMMUNICATE WITH MIND? 391 
 
 mortality which has not been conditioned by character, and character 
 not conditioned by this faith.' 
 
 Editor : Berkeley simply speaks of a class, and, thus qualified, his 
 remark is true. Opinion is not the sole shaper of the external life, but 
 it is the mightiest of moral forces ; but it often requires a long time 
 and a multitude of examples to determine what is the influence of 
 opinions. Centuries of experience have left some questions of this 
 class still in doubt. 
 
 [113] Sundering of the Faculties. 
 
 Berkeley, § 143: 'Men have imagined (sich vorgestellt) they could 
 frame abstract notions (Begriffe) of the powers and acts of the mind, 
 and consider them prescinded (abgelost) as well from the mind (Seele) 
 or spirit (Geiste) itself, as from their respective (beziiglichen) objects 
 and effects (Wirkungen).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' This attack of Berkeley's on the abstractive sundering 
 or hypostasizing of the "faculties of the soul" has great merit ; it would 
 require, however, to be carried much farther to lead to the results 
 which long after followed upon Herbart's resumption of it.' 
 
 [114] How can Mind communicate with Mind? 
 
 Berkeley, § 145 : 'I perceive (nehme . . . wahr) several motions, 
 changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform (bekunden) me there 
 are certain particular agents (bestimmte einzelne thatige Wesen) like 
 myself, which accompany them and concur (Theil haben) in their pro- 
 duction (Hervorbringung).' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' How this concurrence (Antheil) is to be conceived 
 of, is obscure. The concurrence of the mind in the evoking of its own 
 ideas has been defined by Berkeley, § 28-30; but how, in any 
 ordinary manner, can my mind operate on other minds, or in any way 
 whatever concur in their operation? According to the doctrine of 
 Berkeley I cannot evoke thoughts in others immediately, but only by 
 means of my own "ideas." My "ideas," however, and their changes, 
 as, for example, in the complex of ideas which I call my body, can, 
 according to this very doctrine, produce no operations in another 
 person, nor evoke ideas in him. How do the complexes of ideas in 
 different persons come into relation to one another? The answer 
 " by the will of God" of course helps out in every case ; but a cogni- 
 zable order of nature falls before such a view. Without the supposition 
 of a connection conformed to the laws of nature, I can only infer the 
 existence of God, not the existence of finite beings beside myself. On 
 
39 2 A NN O TA TIONS. 
 
 the supposition of this connection, however, words, writing, and other 
 signs can only be the means of producing a relation between different 
 thinking beings, in as far as they are not mere ideas, but are changes 
 in certain objects existing in themselves ; on which objects the one 
 mind produces operations, and these thereby modified operate in their 
 way on the mind of the other person.' 
 
 [Ueberweg has alluded to this argument against Berkeleyanism in his 
 Sketch of the History of Philosophy, vol. iii., 2d edit., Berlin, 1868, 
 p. 331: 'the relations between thinking beings must be mediated by 
 real unthinking beings.'] 
 
 He has developed the argument in the Zeitschrift fur Philosophic, 
 Bd. 54, Heft 2. Halle, 1869. 
 
 [115] Berkeley and Malebranche. 
 
 Berkeley, § 148: 'Not that I imagine (stelle mir. . . vor) we see 
 God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view, or see cor- 
 poreal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents 
 them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me 
 incomprehensible. ' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' The doctrine referred to is that of the Cartesian, 
 Malebranche (1 638-1 715), that we see all things in God. Berkeley 
 expresses himself more at large on this point in his " Dialogues between 
 Hylas and Philonous," a little before the middle of the Second Dia- 
 logue (Works, Fraser, i. 308). Berkeley does not say, as Malebranche 
 does, that we see the things by perceiving that by which they are 
 represented in the infinite substance of the Godhead, but only that 
 the things which we perceive, that is, our ideas, are known in virtue 
 of the will of an infinite Spirit. According to Berkeley, our ideas, 
 which are purely passive, cannot be like the divine substance, which is 
 wholly active, nor even like a part of this substance, which is wholly 
 indivisible. In the system of Malebranche, moreover, the existence of 
 a material universe, whose " perfections" are embraced in the spiritual 
 essence of the Godhead, is accepted in a completely purposeless way, 
 and involves Malebranche's theory in all the contradictions to it, 
 which are derived from the supposition that material things exist out- 
 side the mind.' 
 
 [116] Providence. 
 
 Berkeley, § 154: 'Little and unreflecting souls may indeed bur- 
 lesque the works of Providence. ' 
 
 Ueberweg : ' But not as such. Berkeley from his own point of view, 
 not that of the supposed antagonist, regards the phenomena in question 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 393 
 
 as the works of Providence. If he did take that view, he would involve 
 himself in gross self-contradiction ; as he does not, it would greatly aid 
 in establishing his own view if he would enter thoroughly into the antag- 
 onistic position to evince its untenableness. It is admitted that among 
 modern thinkers this has been done most thoroughly by Leibnitz 
 (1646-1716). In his Theodicee, which appeared in the same year as 
 Berkeley's Principles (17 10), he examines the problems here touched 
 upon.' 
 
 [117] General Recognition of the Basis of Idealism. 
 Definitions of Consciousness. Definitions of Realism. 
 
 Editor : It is an element of strength in Idealism that beyond other 
 systems it seems at least to have these elements : 
 
 1. It sharply defines consciousness ; 2. It separates the primary and 
 unmistakable acts of consciousness from the inferences made from those 
 acts ; 3. It maintains the absolute infallibility of consciousness ; 4. 
 It denies, or puts on a lower plane of evidence, whatever is not thus 
 infallibly testified to. That its position here is a strong one will be 
 apparent from the definitions generally given of Consciousness. 
 
 ' Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own 
 mind.' * 
 
 ' To the mind is attributed apperception, as it is conscious to itself 
 of its own perception. Leibnitz uses the term apperception, as synony- 
 mous with consciousness in the writings of Descartes.' 2 
 
 Consciousness, self-consciousness ; Apperceptio (Leibnitz), Consci- 
 entia (Descartes) ; Bewusstseyn, Selbstbewusstseyn ; perception, con- 
 science, sentiment interieur. This word is used by Kant in two senses: 
 
 1. It means consciousness of self, that is, the simple conception of 
 the Ego. When a subject capable of conceptions has conceptions, 
 there is constantly linked with them the further conception that it (the 
 subject) has them. The second conception, that I, the concipient 
 subject, have these conceptions, is called consciousness of myself, or 
 apperception. 
 
 2. Kant understands by the term thefacully (Vermogen) of conscious- 
 ness the faculty of accompanying the conception with the conception 
 of the Ego. 3 
 
 ' Those changes in the mind by which it is made possible to it to 
 conceive things external to itself are called in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian 
 system perceptions. If with these is united the consciousness of self, 
 
 » Locke, Hum. Und., II., i. 19. * Wolff, Psychol. Empir., \ 25 (1732), Verona, 1779. 
 3 Mellin, Worterbuch d. kritischen Philosophic, 1797. 
 
394 
 
 ANN OTA TIONS. 
 
 as well as of the things perceived, we have apperception. 1 'Conscious' 
 ness is that condition in which we distinguish from each other, and 
 from ourselves, the conceptions of things as changes in us, and with 
 them their objects." 
 
 Stewart : ' Consciousness denotes the immediate knowledge which 
 the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its 
 present operations.' 2 
 
 Krug : ' Consciousness is knowledge of being, an immediate linking 
 of both.' 3 
 
 Reid: 'Consciousness is . . . used ... to signify that immediate 
 knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, 
 in general, of all the present operations of our minds.' 4 
 
 Hamilton : ' This knowing that I know or desire or feel, this 
 common condition of self-knowledge, is . . . consciousness.' 
 
 'Consciousness is . . . the recognition by the mind or Ego of its acts 
 and affections.' 
 
 Regis: 'We obtain this knowledge [of our own minds] by a simple 
 and internal intimation, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and 
 which I call consciousness (conscience).'' * 
 
 Brown : 'Consciousness . . . is only a general term for all our feel- 
 ings, of whatever species these may be, — sensations, thoughts, desires ; 
 in short, all those states or affections of mind in which the phenomena 
 of mind consist.' 6 
 
 Porter : ' Consciousness is . . . the power by which the soul knows 
 its own acts and states. ' 7 
 
 'Consciousness is the term applied to the internal perception of that 
 which is presented and takes place in us as determination of the mental 
 life.' 8 
 
 Fraser: 'By being conscious I mean knowing phenomena, whether 
 extended or unextended, which are immediately and actually present 
 to the conscious mind, — with all the conditions or relations implied in 
 this.' 9 
 
 Morell: 'Locke's fundamental principle that all our knowledge 
 consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness (is) a principle 
 
 1 Lossius, Real-Lexicon, 1803. 
 
 » Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, 1793, 1801. Works (Hamilton), 1854, 
 i. 13- 
 
 3 Knig, Handwort., 1832. * Reid, Int. Powers, Ess. I. 
 
 5 Syst. de la Philosoph., quoted by Blakey, Hist, of Philos., ii. 297. 
 
 6 l'hilos. of Human Mind., Lect. XL 1 Human Intellect, New York, 1869, 83. 
 
 8 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex., Elft. Aufl., 1864, iii. 189. 
 
 9 Life and Letters of Berkeley, Works, iv. 389. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 395 
 
 which had never been questioned from the time when it was asserted 
 by Plato and Aristotle to the time when it was put into so clear a light 
 by the great author of the "Essay on the Human Understanding." ' * 
 To this may be added that few out of the entire body of metaphysicians 
 have doubted it since. 
 
 It may be useful to have some of the definitions of Realism before 
 us. (For definitions of Idealism, see Prolegomena, VII.) 
 
 ' Realism as opposed to Idealism is the dogmatic affirmation that the 
 things in the?nselves are as we perceive them in our conception.' * 
 
 'The reality of mind and the reality of matter, — Natural Realism.' 
 'A scheme which endeavours, on the one hand, not to give up the 
 reality of an unknown material universe, and, on the other, to explain 
 the ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of . . . 
 Hypothetic Realism.' 3 
 
 ' Realism has different meanings, according to the different antitheses 
 which it involves. In antithesis to Idealism it is the system which 
 maintains that the existent, that which constitutes the foundation of the 
 phenomena, is independent of the thinking subject, and of thought in 
 general.' 4 
 
 ' Realism, as opposed to Idealism, is the doctrine that in perception 
 there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, 
 while, according to Idealism, our knowledge of an external world is 
 mediate and representative, i.e. by means of ideas.' 5 
 
 'Realism, . . . the system which maintains that what is exists external 
 to and independently of the concipient subject.' 5 
 
 'Realism, the philosophical doctrine which ascribes to external 
 things an actual being independent of our conceptions.' 7 
 
 The reader can hardly fail to be struck at some of the approximating 
 points of the definitions of Idealism and Realism, with the illustrations 
 of Iordano Bruno's principle of the 'Coincidence of Opposites.' He 
 can understand how some thinkers have hesitated between the two, 
 how some have defended the one system on the principles of the other, 
 how some have passed from one to the other, how some have declared 
 for both, and some have refused either, and some again are claimed on 
 both sides, and some have left their relations to the two theories wholly 
 insoluble. 
 
 1 Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth 
 Century, New York, 1851. 2 Lossius, Real-Lexicon : Realismus. 
 
 3 Hamilton, Reid's Works, 748, 749. * Pierer, Realismus. 
 
 5 Fleming, Vocabulary,— edited by C. P. Krauth, Philad., Smith, English & Co., i860. 
 
 6 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex. : Realismus. 
 
 7 Heyse, Fremdworterbuch, 12th ed., 1859. 
 
396 A NNO TA TIONS. 
 
 Hamann said that 'only the scholastic reason separates Idealism and 
 Realism, — genuine philosophy knows nothing of such a separation.' 
 The point at which the modern tendencies divided is, according to 
 Erdmann, a point at which philosophy was neither Realism nor Ideal- 
 ism. ''The attempt to prove the existence of the things of sense, says 
 Jacobi, leads to the denial of them, — that is, to Idealism. The most 
 that can be reached in that way is an empty thing of the understanding, 
 a non-entity, — chaos, in fact. He says that Kant's position was that of 
 a chameleon shifting between the hues of Idealism and Realism ; had 
 he been consistent with his position that the transcendental object is 
 but an x, an unknown quantity posited by consciousness, he would 
 have been an idealist. Fichte was the true Messiah of speculation, 
 Kant was no more than its John the Baptist, Reinhold its Nathanael. 
 There are only two logical systems, the Material-Idealism of Spinoza, 
 or the inverted Spinozism, the Ideal-Materialism of the moderns, 
 especially of Fichte. ** 
 
 All this connects itself with what Hamilton calls 'the startling' 
 'general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going 
 Idealism.' " 
 
 It is hoped, however, that the definitions will at the same time be an 
 aid to the reader in determining the precise question involved in these 
 controverted cases. 
 
 [118J Idealism — what is not and what is its Question. 
 
 Editor : Consciousness in its direct' attestation, according to the 
 general judgment of thinkers of all schools, absolutely demonstrates no 
 more than the mind's own states or acts. (See [117].) It cannot then 
 directly attest the external causes of those acts or states. The proof 
 of the external world, in every philosophy, on this basis, is therefore an 
 inference from the facts of consciousness proper. The inference may 
 be justified, may be regarded as necessary and intuitive, but it is an 
 inference, and is not, in any case, in the precise grade of certainty that 
 the act of consciousness itself is. 
 
 When Sir William Hamilton says that the object non-Ego is given in 
 consciousness, he can only with propriety mean that it is logically or 
 mediately given, or necessarily involved logically in the consciousness 
 of the Ego: it is given in the idea of consciousness, not in its act : it 
 is implied, not expressed. 
 
 In other words, Ego and non-Ego are intuitional logical correlates 
 in consciousness. Both, as more than empirical, are involved in the 
 1 See Prolegomena, V. 20. 
 
IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 397 
 
 inferences of a logic which is intuitional, or, at least, undistinguishable 
 from the intuitional. But the Ego is no more conscious of itself in 
 consciousness than the eye sees itself 'in seeing. Self-consciousness, as 
 the consciousness of intellectual acts and states, is directly and infalli- 
 bly known ; but if it means that we have consciousness of a self apart 
 from acts and states, or distinct from the acts and states while it is in 
 them, it is not true that we have j^-consciousness. Consciousness 
 itself is a specifically conditioned state; and to know ourselves apart 
 from or distinct from a conditioned state would imply two absurdities : 
 one, that mind, as known, is unconscious ; the other, that the mind 
 knowing, which in this case is the same mind which is known, is 
 unconscious. Furthermore, unconsciousness itself is a state. To be 
 conscious of absolute self is a contradiction in terms. To be conscious 
 of self in its states and acts, or through its states and acts, is to be 
 conscious of the acts and states, that is, to have an immediate cognition 
 of them, while our judgment of the essence or substance acted upon 
 and acting is mediate. We can make a dialectic separation of a mind 
 from its states, but there can be no real separation. And in the dia- 
 lectic separation there would be left to the mind nothing but dialectic 
 being. So far as conceivable reality is concerned, its being would be 
 equivalent to non-being. There is no absolute to man's cognition. 
 He does not know substance, either matter or spirit. The Ego itself 
 we know then only in and by its acts and states, not apart from them. 
 Mental acts and states are alone the objects of immediate or strictly 
 philosophical cognition. The real pritnary question hinges on this 
 point only. The sole and consequently infallible utterance of con- 
 sciousness is on the mind's own states and acts. Out of the facts thus 
 testified to, and acknowledged in general, alike by every school of 
 philosophy, everything else is to be built up. On this general ground, 
 the ground of the phenomenal facts, there is no controversy whatever 
 between Berkeley and the extremest of his opposers. That the thing 
 to which consciousness testifies, as the act of putting the finger into 
 the fire, is followed by what consciousness testifies to as the sensation 
 of pain, is as certain on Berkeley's view as on Locke's and Reid's. 
 The world of the phenomenal, both as regards causes and effects, is left 
 untouched by Idealism. Body and spirit remain phenomenally as dis- 
 tinct as ever ; our fellow-men stand in every phenomenal relation as 
 before. Our own bodies are known as they were known before. The 
 divergence belongs to the sphere of the supersensuous. The question 
 is, What is that something to which consciousness does not immediately 
 testify, which is the cause on which are conditioned those mental acts 
 
398 A NN O TA TIONS. 
 
 or states to which consciousness does immediately testify by being 
 their inseparable condition? 
 
 There are then two distinct questions. The first is, — What is it to 
 which consciousness immediately testifies? The second question is, — 
 What is involved mediately in that testimony ? There is a question of 
 testimony and a question of judgment. 
 
 On the first question, Idealism, as we have seen, accepts the com- 
 mon answer of philosophy, past and present, — the mind is conscious 
 not of what is not in it, but of what is in it, and nothing can be in it 
 but its own acts and states. Nothing is known immediately but what is 
 known to consciousness, and whatever is known to consciousness is 
 known immediately. The worlds of immediate knowledge and of 
 consciousness are conterminal; each is in each. The mental state 
 associated with the sense-perception of a tree is immediately known, 
 because there is no medium between the state and the consciousness, — 
 the mental state is consciousness itself. The tree itself is mediately 
 known, if it be known at all; though Idealism and other schools of 
 thought concur in the principle that mediate knowledge is no knowledge. 
 The tree is known through a medium, or rather through a series of 
 media, terminating in the final excitant of the perceptive act, which 
 excitant may be called the medium of the media. Nearly all thinkers 
 agree that there is no consciousness of this excitant; we only know 
 the state which results from it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural 
 Realism' assumes that there is a consciousness of it, — it is the only 
 non-Ego of which we are conscious; but as the great non-Ego, the 
 external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it 
 is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which 
 he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe 
 which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than 
 with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being 
 thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are com- 
 pelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a 
 restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of 'a representative 
 entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch 
 school combated Idealism had reached a point at which 'there is no 
 escape from confession but in suicide;' and Hamilton's Natural 
 Realism is the proof that 'suicide is confession.' 
 
 But neither on the ordinary view, nor on Hamilton's, can the mind 
 be conscious of the tree. On either theory it can only be conscious 
 of a state, for which it supposes, or does not suppose, the existence of 
 a material, substantial tree, external to the mind and the body, as a 
 
IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 399 
 
 necessary cause ; for the state itself and the act of reference of that 
 state, or the refusal to refer, are both in itself. It cannot indeed shake 
 off the empirical reference. The world of an idealist's experience is 
 precisely that of every other man. He sees a tree as a Materialist sees 
 it. Fichte, born idealist as he was, acknowledges that Idealism cannot 
 be a way of thinking, — can only be speculation, though he none the 
 less held that it was the veritable truth in speculation. It is the specu- 
 lative reference on which the question hinges. It is time thrown away, 
 therefore, to attempt to settle the question with an idealist by the 
 mere urging of the empirical phenomena as in themselves decisive. As 
 empirical, Nature puts them more emphatically than Beattie and Reid 
 can put them. No idealist ever, in this respect, doubted them, or 
 could doubt them, or pretended to doubt them, and no realist ever 
 felt himself in any degree strengthened by an argument at this point. 
 
 So far as the direct reaching of the empirical facts is concerned, 
 nearly all philosophy is idealistic, and hence going so far only does not 
 constitute what is pre-eminently and by antithesis Idealism. It is 
 simply generic, not specific, Idealism. Generic Idealism has been the 
 predominant view of thinkers in all ages. Specific Idealism has by no 
 means shared so largely in the philosophic confidence. 
 
 When we come, therefore, to the second question, we come to the 
 dividing point. The phenomenal or empirical being conceded, the 
 great facts being, in general estimation, beyond dispute, how are we 
 to account for them? 
 
 Through the whole range of the perceptive acts of all educated 
 consciousness there rises a phenomenal external world, whose normal 
 features are generically the same to the masses of men of all lands and 
 of all time. How are we to account for that phenomenal world ? 
 
 The first answer is, The phenomenal, empirical, external world 
 involves, as its concause, the existence of a real, substantial, material 
 world, which is brought into mediated relations to the mind through 
 the organs of sense, or by the act of God to which they furnish occa- 
 sion, or by a pre-established harmony, or in some unknown way. The 
 world is substantially real, the mind is substantially real ; phenomena 
 are the results, in some sense, of the existence of both. This is the 
 answer of Realism. [117.] 
 
 The second answer is, either: The phenomenal world involves no 
 more than the existence of mind, real, substantial spirit, which, by 
 the action of another mind or other minds on it, or by the laws of 
 its own self-originated conditions, attains its various states and acts ; or, 
 That world involves no more than ideas, conscious states and acts, — 
 
40O 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 the question, What is conscious? being thrown out, as beyond the reach 
 of knowledge. The systems involved in these answers, and pre- 
 eminently the second (and, if logic be laid to the line, only the second), 
 are Idealism. 
 
 But as the generally received Realism of philosophy is idealistic in 
 the recognition of the first principles of human knowledge, so a great 
 deal of Idealism, and especially that of Berkeley and his school, has 
 been realistic, in acknowledging real spirit, and in real spirits real 
 phenomena (that is, phenomena objectively produced, by object-spirit, 
 not by the subject-mind). 
 
 It is not true that Berkeley maintains that all is mere 'show,' or 
 'illusion,' or 'idea.' In Berkeley's view neither that which receives 
 nor that which imparts ideas is an idea. Both the giver and the 
 recipient are substantial realities, and the 'ideas' themselves, either 
 directly or by succession, spring from God. They are not illusions, 
 but divine verities. The objection is not that they are incredibly 
 unreal, but that they are incredibly real ; they are not revelations 
 through media, but revelations direct. In an overwhelming sense, in 
 Berkeley's view of man, 'the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him 
 understanding.' The theophany of nature is one in which God speaks 
 to man face to face. Berkeley's world is one in which a Peniel is 
 never far off. Our realities are indeed subjective, for they are ours; 
 but our subjectivities are realities, for their cause, their objective base, is 
 a substantial personal God. In this aspect Berkeley claimed to be the 
 true realist, — his opponents were charged with unrealism. 
 
 The philosophical division between the generally accepted Realism 
 and the various forms of Idealism turns entirely upon the answers 
 given to the second question. There is an unmixed Realism which 
 acknowledges nothing but the objectively real, and makes the seemingly 
 subjective real no more than a phenomenon of the objective. There is an 
 absolute subjective Idealism which acknowledges nothing but the idea, 
 and makes the seemingly real in both matter and mind mere conditional 
 ideas. But the mass of philosophers are idealistic realists, holding 
 to direct consciousness of the idea alone, but regarding the realistic 
 inference as valid. On the other hand, Berkeley is a realistic idealist; 
 holding that the realistic inference is invalid as regards matter, but 
 conceding it as regards mind. He holds to real substantial spirits, 
 God and man. Hence, too, his monism is only generic. He holds to 
 a monism of genus, — to spirit alone ; but he concedes a dualism of 
 species, — infinite Spirit, the Cause of ideas, and finite spirits, the 
 recipients of them. But this his strength is also his weakness. Every 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 
 
 401 
 
 moral advantage of his Idealism over its successors is secured at the 
 expense of its development and of its logical consistency. 
 
 [119] Mind and Matter. Spirit and Body. 
 
 Editor : No Physics can ever be worthy of its name which excludes 
 Metaphysics; no Metaphysics is entitled to attention which does not 
 accept and attempt to harmonize the facts of Physics. Both by the 
 law of its genesis, and of its intellectual supremacy, J/^/^physics must 
 be after Physics, and Physics has no intellectual value except as it 
 prepares the path and the materials for Metaphysics. Metaphysics is 
 after Physics, but Mind is before both, and by Mind both consist. The 
 great weakness of psychology has been that it has not done justice to 
 the personal unity of man. Receding, as it ought, from the monism 
 which annihilates either mind or matter, spirit or body, it has run into 
 the dualism which hopelessly antagonizes them. Man is a unit, beyond 
 all the ordinary concessions of his unity. Up to the last point at which 
 human philosophy can trace him he is an inseparable unity. When 
 the bond of that unity is broken, philosophy knows him no more. He 
 has passed out of the world whose best souls can only love wisdom, to 
 that world whose pure intelligences possess it. Philosophy must not 
 be a philosophy of mind apart ; she must not emphasize the and, and be 
 a philosophy of mind and body, but, taking what God offers her, 
 become a philosophy of man. Except as man she knows not soul ; 
 except as man she knows not the human body, for when matter is 
 severed from the knitting soul which made it body, it no longer is for 
 her ; philosophy surrenders it to the dissecting-table or the grave. 
 
 No theory of the body of man is worthy of attention which does not 
 acknowledge the soul as the controlling force of the body. No theory 
 of the soul, as we know the soul in philosophy, is entitled to respect, 
 which ignores or diminishes the reality of the personal union into 
 which it has taken the body with itself, — a union the most consummate 
 and absolute of which we know, or of which we can conceive, infinitely 
 transcending the completeness of the most perfect mechanical and 
 chemical unions, — a union so complete that, though two distinct 
 substances are involved in it, it makes them, through a wide range of 
 observations, as completely one to us as if they were one substance ; so 
 that we can say the human body does nothing proper to it without the 
 soul, the human soul does nothing proper to it without the body. As 
 the soul operates through the body, the body operates by the soul. 
 The soul cannot perform the most exquisite act of abstract thinking 
 without a co-operation of the body which can be distinctly demon- 
 
 26 
 
402 
 
 ANNOTATIONS. 
 
 strated, and the most involuntary and trifling acts distinctive of the 
 body involve and demonstrate the presence of the soul. So much is 
 this the case that, if the body gave no other evidence of the presence 
 of the soul than the distinctive tremulousness of the smallest muscle, 
 or the slightest conceivable act involving true muscular movement, it 
 would constitute ample evidence that the soul was still there. The 
 best modern science accepts, practically at least, these principles. The 
 extremest spiritualist in philosophy, though he may talk the old jargon 
 which treats the body as, if not a prison, at least a mere mechanical 
 and chemical appendage of the soul, cannot think or write without 
 showing the extravagance and hollowness of his view. To nothing 
 does the common, as well as the educated, consciousness more positively 
 testify than to the personal unity of man ; his body is not an append- 
 age to himself, but it is a part of himself. He is not, as he has been 
 called, an 'intelligence served by organs,' but he is a being in whom 
 two natures constitute one indivisible person, — that is, so constitute 
 the person that if divided from each other, absolutely and forever, the 
 personality itself, as it now exists, would lose its completeness : there 
 would remain after such a dissolution, not man, but at most the spirit 
 of man, a higher and nobler part, and yet but a part. The soul of 
 man is but a part of man. 
 
 The dualism of the current speculation, most commonly allied with 
 what passes for orthodoxy, is so shallow that it has been the great pro- 
 moter of the monism of Materialism. Over against the dualism which 
 persists in yoking together two heterogeneous incompatibles, on the one 
 side, and the spurious monism which ignores or perverts the most 
 important and well-grounded half of the facts, on the other, Idealism 
 comes in to reach a higher Monism by throwing out utterly the false 
 everything of Materialism, and the disturbing, helpless, useless one- 
 thin^ — matter — of dualism. Materialism abuses matter, and the re- 
 ceived dualism cannot use it ; and Idealism comes in to take out of 
 the way what is either not used or misused. To this hour Berkeley's 
 sarcasm retains its point. The mass of sticklers for substantial matter 
 do not know what to do with it when they have it, and if it could be 
 quietly taken away from them they would never miss it. It is true 
 that over against even this poor dualism, Idealism demonstrates 
 nothing. So far it has no advantage over the other view. It is 
 guess against guess. But it has the charm of simplicity. It offers 
 one great absorbing mystery, instead of a thousand frittering, irritating 
 difficulties. Instead of the perplexity of tracing, and of attempting 
 in vain to trace, the manifold streams to their obscure springs, it brings 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 403 
 
 before the mind an all-embracing ocean of speculative mystery. It 
 goes forth 
 
 ' dread, fathomless, alone." 
 
 It is at least deep enough for a despairing man to drown himself in. 
 Some of the systems spread out great shallow morasses on bottoms of 
 mud. You may be stifled in them, but you cannot be drowned. 
 Idealism is like the old Church of the West, resting on one idea, the 
 idea of the One, building all conclusions on a solitary premise, giving 
 you all, to the last, if you grant but the first. Not without a mighty 
 charm for the active mind in the proud independence it offers him, 
 Idealism also has its fascinations for souls weary of the many and of 
 the much, ready to cry, — 
 
 ' The world is too much with us.' 
 
 It is the cloister of the system-worn thinker. Relatively it meets some 
 great tendency of the human mind. Many of the greatest minds have 
 been tempted by it, — some of the greatest have yielded, others have 
 resisted it ; some have dreaded ; but no real metaphysician has despised 
 — no real metaphysican can despise — it. If it be an error, it is the 
 error most difficult to sound; if it rest on sophisms, they are the most 
 perplexing of sophisms. Herbart, the greatest of its direct assailants 
 in recent time, says, ' Idealism is an opponent we dare not despise ; it 
 plants itself in our way, and we must arm ourselves for the battle.' 1 
 
 It is on grounds of great importance then that able works on ' Body 
 and Mind,' even though written with a prevailingly physical or medical 
 aim, have a great attraction to the true metaphysician. Metaphysics 
 shall be perfect in all its theories so soon as physics shall be perfect in 
 its collection of all its facts. The contempt which ignorant or arrogant 
 physicists heap on metaphysics is really the disgrace or the misfortune 
 of the physical sciences. Reach the demonstrably absolute in physics, 
 and we shall not demand in vain that the thinkers of the race shall 
 give us a demonstrably absolute philosophy. On the general theme, 
 Mind and Matter, Spirit and Body, the ages have pondered. A great 
 body of literature exists in connection, in various aspects, with their 
 relations. Tuke, one of the most recent writers on Body and Mind, J 
 enumerates ninety works among the principal authorities to which he 
 refers. Nearly all of these are English, or translations into English ; 
 a few are French. Not one, except through translations, is German, 
 
 1 Metaphysik, Werke, iv. 265. 
 
 » See a review of his 'Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body,' 
 Penn Monthly, Oct. 1873, 722-728. 
 
4 4 A NN OTA riO NS. 
 
 though the German possesses, beyond all other languages combined, a 
 fund of books bearing on this theme. In addition to the ample treat- 
 ment of the topic in the systems, and the more general psychological, 
 anthropological, practical, and religious works, there are special treatises 
 by Erdmann (1837, 1849), Ennemoser (1825), Beneke (1826), Beraz 
 (1836), Hilgers (1834), Messerschmidt (1837), and by others of more 
 recent date, devoted to the discussion of the essential conception of 
 body and soul, their relation to each other, their distinctness, their 
 intimate reciprocal action, and the connection between just views of 
 them and of man's moral freedom and accountability, the question 
 whether the phenomena of intellectual activity are mere operations of 
 a high organization, or of an essence, united intimately indeed with 
 it, but distinct, spiritual, immortal. 
 
 The whole body of evidence in regard to mind and matter justifies 
 certain conclusions in regard to soul and body. First, they prove that 
 soul and body are distinct. Their laws of action on each other belong 
 neither in species nor in genus to any of the departments of physical 
 power. No analogies exist to them, even in the subtlest forms in which 
 matter is operative. Matter is operative on mind, but under laws 
 wholly distinct from those by which it operates on unpsychical matter. 
 Light operates on the mind in awakening consciousness, perception, 
 certain sensations of pleasure, but not as it operates in the whole sphere 
 of the unpsychical. The operation of light and of all matter on the 
 body is accompanied by entirely distinct sets of results, when the body 
 is possessed of the soul, and again when it is destitute of it. Fire 
 will not burn a living body in precisely the same manner in which it 
 burns a dead one, and the vast array of forces which dissolve the dead 
 body are the elements of the life and power of the living body. 
 Oxygen consumes the dead body : the living body consumes oxygen 
 and converts it into force. 
 
 Second, the facts show that though body and soul are distinct, their 
 unity is very close, so close and peculiar that out of it arises what is so 
 transcendently wonderful that up to this hour it has failed of due 
 recognition, though the evidences of it have such overwhelming force 
 that glimpses of it exist from the earliest time and through all time. 
 This great ignored or imperfectly recognized principle is the principle 
 of the personal 'fellowship of attributes ; that is, that in the unity of the 
 person, by it, and in consequence of it, the two essences really share 
 each other's properties, so that we have a personally corporeal soul and 
 a personally psychical body. In consequence of this the body receives, 
 in its personal union with the soul, real attributes which it cannot have 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 405 
 
 outside of that union, and which, within it, give to it capacities which 
 mere impersonal matter cannot possess. The 'seeing eye' and ' hearing 
 ear' are not mere forms of phrase, but the eye does really see by the 
 soul, as the soul sees through the eye. The nerve which thrills with the 
 pain feels pain by the soul, as the soul feels pain through the nerve. 
 There is one real, indivisible, personal act. 
 
 Every sensation, perception, cognition, imagination, involves a real 
 conjoint affection or action of the personal soul, and of the personalized 
 organ. The soul is not a spider in the centre of a cobweb of nerves, 
 but is an essence, which has evolved organism by taking matter into 
 personal union with itself, and which gives to the nerves power to feel 
 by it, as it uses the nerves in turn to receive influence through them, 
 neither ever acting apart from the other. The two sets of acts are, in 
 a certain sense, distinct as the essences themselves are ; in some cases 
 the intervals can be marked by time, but their coalescence is the act 
 of consciousness, the act of their complete unity. The separate action 
 of touch upon the nerves is conveyed with an ascertainable interval to 
 the soul, but t he perceived touch is that in which the separation ceases, 
 and the one indivisible act of consciousness, in the personal mind and 
 the personalized body, takes place. There is no interval in perception. 
 It takes place indivisibly, in the mind through the nerve, and in the 
 nerve by the mind. The motion which becomes a co-factor in percep- 
 tion takes time, but the perception takes none. Meanwhile, the nerve 
 has not acted apart from the mind ; the soul has not been separated 
 from it in the interval of unconsciousness; the soul has given the nerve 
 its nerve-power. The power of the nerve to transmit depends upon its 
 personal organic union with the soul. The nerve of a dead body 
 carries no force from a touch. The nerve receives real attributes from 
 the soul in the union, and in this personal connection, and because of 
 it, though real matter, does what matter, as such, cannot do, — it feels ; 
 feels none the less really because it feels by the soul. The people and 
 the philosophers here, as in many cases, divide the truth between them. 
 The illiterate man thinks that the pain is in his toe, and not in his 
 mind ; the philosopher thinks the pain is in his mind, and not in his toe. 
 The fact is, it is in both. The nerve has real pain by the mind, the 
 mind real pain through the nerve. The pain is in both, indivisibly, — 
 not two pains, but one pain ; not two parts of one pain, but a pain 
 without parts in one person ; in the mind as person, in the body as 
 personalized by the mind. It can exist in neither without the personal 
 co-operation of the other. Take away the nerve from the organism, 
 and neither nerve nor mind can feel pain ; abstract the mind by an 
 
4 o6 A NN O TA TIONS. 
 
 intense interest, and neither mind nor nerve feels pain. We can hold 
 a burning coal within our hand by thinking on the frosty Caucasus, — 
 on a simple condition, — that we think of nothing else. We assert that 
 there is no cure for the spurious monism of Materialism and Idealism 
 on the one side, and for the hopeless dualism which reigns in the 
 current philosophy and the popular thinking on the other, except in 
 the recognition of the personal unity of man, — the monism of person 
 harmonizing the duality of natures. Man is not two persons, or a 
 jumble of person and non-person, — a muddle of spirit resenting matter, 
 and of matter clogging and embarrassing spirit. Man is a personal 
 unity. Man is a unity of two parts. In this is implied that the parts 
 are not co-ordinate and independent. Two, as two, cannot be one. 
 One must be first, the other second; one must be higher, the other 
 lower; one must depend, the other sustain; one must have personality, 
 the other must receive it. 
 
 Physics and Metaphysics, the former negatively, the latter positively, 
 demonstrate that the psychical is the first, the higher, the sustainer, 
 the personal; the physical is the second, the lower, the dependent, the 
 personalized. The entire world of the conscious, taking the term 
 conscious in its widest reach, shows that the psychical in the organism 
 is that for which the physical in it exists. The reason why the matter 
 of an oyster's organism is not left inorganic is found in the psychical 
 element of the oyster. The matter in his organism is all arranged in 
 adaptation to his little circle of sensations and perceptions. Taking 
 it for granted that all conscious being is in part an object for itself, the 
 conscious element is that to which the material element is adjusted. 
 All nature illustrates this. The inorganic is for the organic. The 
 organic is for the psychical in it. The psychical, then, is first. It is 
 the conditioning power of the material. It is the organizing force 
 which lifts the organic out of the inorganic. The reason why that 
 which grows from the germ of an oyster differs from that which grows 
 from the germ of a man, is not in the material, as physical science 
 knows it. The difference in the material is already conditioned with 
 reference to the character and purpose of the psychical. The chemical 
 and all the physical differences between the two germs shed no light 
 on the differences of the result. The psychic is not a mere undis- 
 covered material force, — it is a force generically different from matter. 
 
 The elementary psychical is as multiform and varied as the element- 
 ary physical, and out of its varieties, assimilating the varieties of the 
 material, each to its own wants, arises the organic world. 
 
 What are the psychical and the organic? They are the embodiment 
 
MIND AND MATTER. 407 
 
 of two great ideas, — creator and creature, artificer and workmanship, 
 the plastic power and the moulded matter. The universe is the out- 
 thought of God, and God's out-thought can be nothing other than the 
 revelations of his own mind and activity. He is conscious, free Cre- 
 ator, Artificer, Moulder. His work is creation, the Divine Art of 
 Nature, the shape through which the finite shifts in the eternal and 
 infinite line of grace, power, and mystery. In the psychical, God 
 posits the forces which are shadows and remembrancers of his own 
 creative, plastic power, and puts it into nature for its work of sub- 
 creation. The psychical is, in a larger or smaller sphere, a Vice- 
 Creator, in which a determinate set of forces is divinely immanent. 
 The psychical enfolds the plan, the material submits to plan, and the 
 organic is the result. The organic is the harmony of the psychical 
 and material in plan. As the psychical is a little sub-creator, the 
 organic is a little sub-creation, in which the psychical remains imma- 
 nent, as the sub-cause. Each organism is the rising of a new world 
 of order out of the chaos of the inorganic. On each little deep, minia- 
 ture of the vast whole, hovers and broods the psychic spirit, with the 
 less or greater measure of embodied force appointed to it. This power 
 of the psychic on the physical is followed, as God pleases, by the feeble 
 glimmer of mere sensation, never growing, or by the day-spring of a 
 light whose noon is the resplendent glory of reason and immortality. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 The leading topics of the Prolegomena are indexed by the divisions 
 and paragraphs. The pages are given where a minuter subdivision is 
 necessary. 
 
 The Prefaces of Fraser and Berkeley are indexed by the page. 
 
 The Introduction and the Principles of Berkeley are indexed by 
 paragraphs, and this Index answers for every edition of them. The 
 Appendixes are indicated by Letters. 
 
 The Annotations are indexed by their Numbers in brackets [ ]. 
 
 ABBREVIATIONS. 
 
 /^(troduction) of Berkeley. 
 
 Prefaces) of Fraser and Berkeley. 
 
 jPr»*(ciples). 
 
 ./V<?/(egomena) . 
 
 «(otes) by Fraser, at the foot of the page. 
 
 Abbild (image), Prin. \ 140. 
 Absolute dependence, Prin. \ 88, 155. 
 " matter, 18. 
 " space, no. 
 " truth, 76. 
 Absoluteness of primary qualities, Prin. \ 
 
 12, n. 
 Abstract existence, Prin. \ 4. 
 Abstract ideas, In. \ 6, 10, «., II, 12, 14, 
 
 15, 18; Prin. \ 5, 11, 17,97, 143. 
 Abstract ideas, Ueberweg on, [n]. 
 Abstraction, Pref. 154; In. \ 8, 10, II, 
 
 17, 19, «., 23; Prin. \ 5, [n, 12,] 100, 
 
 [95] ; App. A. 
 Abstraction, Ueberweg on, [5, n, 12]. 
 Accidents, Prin. \ 73. 
 Activity, Prin. \ 61. 
 
 Advantages of considering ideas apart 
 from names, In. \ 21-24, [7]; App. A. 
 Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 8. 
 Algebra, names like the letters in, In. \ 19. 
 America, Berkeley visits, Prol. I. \ 6. 
 
 " lines on, 6. 
 
 " returns from, 7. 
 
 " adherents of Berkeley in, Prol. 
 
 IV- \ is- 
 
 Analogies, caution in, Prin. § 106-108. 
 Analyst, on motion, Prin. \ 112, ». 
 
 " on infinite divisibility, 130, «., 
 [no]. 
 Annihilation and creation every moment, 
 
 Prin. \ 45, 56, [57], 48, [66]. 
 'An sich,' existence, things, [9, 81, 86, 
 90]. 
 
 409 
 
4io 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Antipodes, Prin. \ 55. 
 
 A posteriori arguments, Prin. \ 21, [34, 
 
 108], 129. 
 Apparatus, Prin. § 61. 
 Appendixes to Principles, Prol. XV. $ 3. 
 " A. Rough draft of Principles, 
 
 283. 
 " B. Arthur Collier, 317. 
 
 " C. Theory of Vision vindi- 
 
 cated, 323. 
 Apperception defined, [117] 
 Apple, Prin. \ 1. 
 A priori arguments, Prin. §21, [34, 108], 
 
 129. 
 Arbitrary character of laws of nature, 
 
 Prin. \ 31, [46]. 
 Archetype of sensible system, the divine 
 
 idea the ultimate, Prin. \ 71, [83]. 
 Archetypes, external, Prin. \ 87; Pref. 
 
 158; Prin. \ 9, 41, «., 99. 
 Aristotelian scholastic definition of idea, 
 
 CO- 
 
 Aristotle, materia prima, Prin. §11. 
 Arithmetic, its object, Prin. \ 119, 121. 
 
 " regards signs, not things, 122. 
 
 Arrogance, fostered by Idealism, Prol. 
 
 XIV. \ 13. 
 Atheism, atheists, Prin. \ 35, 92, 94, 
 
 [116], 154, 155. 
 Attraction, Prin. \ 103, 104, [97]. 
 Attribute defined, Prin. \ 49. 
 Attributes, personal, fellowship of in man, 
 
 [119]. 
 Augustine, existence of an external world 
 
 not demonstrable, Prol. III. \ 15. 
 
 Bacon and Berkeley, Prol. II. § I. 
 
 " In. $ 17; Prin. \ 107. 
 Baxter, Andrew, opponent of Berkeley, 
 
 Prol. V. \ 3. 
 Beasley, F., Dr., opposes Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 V. § 16. (See Princeton.) 
 Beattie, opponent of Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 8. 
 
 " defines 'common sense,' \ 8. 
 Beck shows that the critical system is 
 
 Idealistic, 87. 
 Begriff, -e, a notion, Prin. \ 74, 140, 142. 
 notions, 143; In. \ 6. 
 
 Begriff, -e, ideas, [46]. 
 Being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seien 
 den), incomprehensible, abstract idea 
 of, Prin. § 17, 74. 
 Being, conception of intelligible, Prin. \ 
 
 99, n. 
 Being, and being perceived, Prin. \ 6. 
 
 " Ueberweg on, [13]. 
 Beneke disputes Kant's method, [81]. 
 
 " on body and soul, [119]. 
 Beraz, on body and soul, [119]. 
 Berkeley, Life and Writings, Prol. I. : 
 early life, works, travels, # 1-3, 6, 7; 
 bishop, 8 ; controversies, mathematical, 
 9; death, at Oxford, 11 ; works, 12, 
 13; translations of, 14. 
 Berkeley, precursors of, Prol. II. 
 
 " System, summaries of, Prol. III. 
 " estimates of character, writings, 
 and influence, Prol. VI. (See 
 Berke/eyanism.) 
 " Principles, present edition, char- 
 acteristics of, Prol. XV. 
 " a student of Locke's Essay, Pref. 
 
 153- 
 
 " influenced by Malebranche, 153. 
 
 " combats Locke, 154. 
 
 " Idealism and Realism, 155, n. 
 
 " follows Locke, In. \ 6, n. 
 
 " proof of his doctrine, Prin. \ 3, 
 
 4, «. 
 " held unity of substance, 7. 
 " assumes causality, 26, n. 
 " connects cause and substance, 
 
 37. »• 
 
 " what meant by his potential ex- 
 istence, 45, 11. 
 
 " on continual creation, 46, n. 
 
 " ort miracles, 84. 
 
 " abolishes representative idea in 
 perception, 86, n. 
 
 " holds a sort of spiritual positiv- 
 ism, 102, n. 
 
 " a true realist, [118]. 
 
 " his monism only generic, [118]. 
 
 " his dualism, [1 18]. 
 Berkeleyanism, its friends, affinities, and 
 influence, Prol. IV. ; influence of, § 1 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 411 
 
 first reception, 2; opponents and objec- 
 tions to, V.; ridicule of, I. 
 
 Bewusstseyn, consciousness, [117]. 
 
 Blackwell, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. 
 
 2 3- 
 Bodies, external, useless, Prin. \ 18, 19, 
 20; denied by Ueberweg, [32]. 
 " exist in the mind, 23 ; denied by 
 
 Ueberweg, [37]. 
 " do not exist when not perceived, 
 47, [60]. 
 Body, spirit and, [118]. 
 Bolingbroke on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. 
 Brahm, Brahma, and Schelling's God, 
 
 Prol. XI. 9S-100. 
 Brain, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 1 14. 
 Brockhaus (Real-Encyclop.): 
 
 " summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 III. I II. 
 " Idealism defined, VII. \ II. 
 
 " Realism defined, [117]. 
 
 Brown, Thomas, Dr., on Idealism, and 
 Reid, Prol. V. \ 15. 
 " on power in ideas, Prin. \ 25, n. 
 
 " eliminates all power from material 
 
 world, 32, n. 
 " • definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Browne, Peter, Bishop, controversy with 
 Berkeley, Prol. I. \ 7. 
 " on abstract ideas, In. \ IO, n. 
 
 Bruno and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97. 
 " and Spinoza, 1 18. 
 " coincidence of opposites, [117]. 
 Buddhism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 
 116, 117. 
 Buhle, arguments against Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 V.? 11. 
 Burthogge, Prol. II. \ 7. 
 Butler, Bishop, on atheism, Prin. \ 145, n. 
 
 Calculus, differential, Prin. \ 132. 
 
 " infinitesimal, 130, [109]. 
 
 Cartesian theory of occasional causes, Prin. 
 §69. 
 " " of nature, 102. 
 
 " " of brutes, Ueberweg, [3]. 
 
 Causality, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 109. 
 
 Causality and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 7. 
 " principles of, assumed and inter- 
 preted by Berkeley, Prin. \ 
 26, n. 
 " notion of, 31, 32. 
 " views of Locke, Hume, Reid, 
 Maine de Biran, Kant, Fichte, 
 Schelling, [46,47]. 
 Causation, physical, contrasted with spirit- 
 ual, Prin. $ 65, u. 
 Cause, final, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 109. 
 " and Idealism, XIV. \ 7. 
 " free voluntary activity, Pref. 165. 
 " substance connected with, Prin. \ 
 
 27, n. 
 " corporeal, 53, [71]. 
 " and effect, 65. 
 " spirit the only efficient, 102. 
 Che>eh'en's account of the blind boy, 
 
 App. C, 323; Prol. XV. I 3. 
 Chimeras, difference between real things 
 
 and, Prin. \ 34. 
 Clarke, S., opposed to Berkeley, Prol.V.g 2. 
 " approaches his views, V. 2. 
 " on continual creation, Prin. \ 46, n. 
 " on the being and attributes of God, 
 117, n. 
 Coexistent qualities, idea of, In. \ 9. 
 Collier, theory of matter, Prin. \ 49, n. 
 " incidents of his life, App. B. 
 " theory of inexistence, App. B. 
 " his philosophy applied to Chris- 
 tian theology, App. B. 
 " introduction to his Clavis, App. B. 
 " makes sense-perception and im- 
 agination differ only in degree, 
 App. B. 
 and Berkeley, Prol. I. \ 5 ; App. B. 
 Colour and extension, In. \ 7, 8 ; Prin. \ 99. 
 Colours, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 9, 10. 
 " exist no longer than perceived, 
 46; [58]. 
 Commonplace Book, Pref. 171, n. 
 Common sense, argument from, Prin. \ 
 
 54, n. 
 Communication, abstract ideas not neces- 
 sary for, In. \ 14. 
 
412 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Comte, on power in ideas, Prin. \ 25, n. 
 
 " eliminates all power from material 
 world, 32, tt. 
 
 " on the universe, 155, «. 
 Conceive, we cannot, of things existing 
 
 unconceived, Prin. \ 23 ; Ueberweg on, 
 
 [36]. 
 Conform, [91]. 
 Conformable, the perceived, to the unper- 
 
 ceived, Prin. \ 86; [91]. 
 Conscious experience, objects of, what, 
 
 Pref. 157. 
 Consciousness, generally recognized prin- 
 ciples in regard to, Ideal- 
 ism rests on, Prol. XIV. 
 
 Si. 
 
 " definitions of, [117]. 
 
 Consequences of Principles of Human 
 Knowledge, Pref. 157; Prin. \ 86. 
 
 Copernican system, Prin. \ 51. 
 
 Corporeal causes, Prin. \ 53. 
 " substances, 19. 
 
 Creation, continual, advocated by school- 
 men, Prin. \ 46, [59]. 
 
 Creative act continuous, Prin. \ 152. 
 
 Cudworth on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, «. 
 
 • Darstellen ' — present themselves, Prin. 
 
 S29. 
 Day, our own, Berkeleyanism in, Prol. IV. 
 
 15- 
 
 Death and life, Schopenhauer on, Prol. 
 
 XIII. I 24. 
 Deception of words, In. \ 23, 24. 
 Definition, [95]. 
 Demi-atheism, Prin. \ 155. 
 Demonstration, Berkeley claims, Prin. \ 
 
 61, [75]- 
 Derodon on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. 
 Descartes and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 3. 
 " theory of matter, Pref. 154; 
 
 Prin. I 73, n. 
 " on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, n. 
 " on principles of knowledge, 5, n. 
 " on causality in sensible things, 
 
 Prin. § 52, ;/. 
 " on the existence of sensible 
 things, 88, H. 
 
 Descartes on idea, [1]. 
 
 " on animals, In. \ II, [3]. 
 
 " on consciousness, [117]. 
 Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, 
 
 objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 17. 
 Diderot opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. 
 
 I 7- 
 Distance, Prin. \ 42, 43, [54]. 
 Distrust of senses by philosophers, Prin. 
 
 §88. 
 Divine ideas and will coincident with 
 laws of nature, Prin. \ 
 57, n. 
 " " ultimate archetype of sen- 
 
 sible system, 72, n. 
 Divine thought, absolute truth, Prin. \ 
 
 76, n. 
 Divisibility, infinite, Prin. \ 47, [61, 62, 
 
 63, 64, 65], 124, [107]. 
 Divisible, infinitely, Prin. \ 128, 129, 130, 
 
 [no]. 
 
 Douval, Jouve, Idealism defined, Prol. 
 
 VII. \ 9. 
 Dreams, ideas in, Prin. \ 18, [30]. 
 Dualism, Berkeley's, Pref. 155, [118]. 
 " or intelligible Realism, Prin. \ 
 
 3. »• 
 " spurious, [119]. 
 Duality of existence held by Berkeley, 
 
 Prin. \ 7, n. 
 Dublin University and Berkeley, Prol. IV. 
 
 §12. 
 Durandus, the world a machine, Prin. \ 
 
 46, «. 
 Duty, Prin. \ 156. 
 
 Edinburgh Review on Berkeley, Prol. VI. 
 
 (12. 
 Editor, American, Prolegomena, 1-148. 
 " translation of Ueberweg's notes on 
 
 Berkeley, 329-407. 
 " additional notes: idea, abstract 
 
 idea, [1]. 
 " on objects of knowledge, ideas, 
 
 [8], 337-340. 
 " on esse, percipi, [9]. 
 " on primary and secondary, [17]. 
 " on matter, [18]. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 413 
 
 Editor, American, on similar and like, 
 [21]. 
 " on things in themselves, [38]. 
 " on'eatinganddrinkingideas,'[5l]. 
 " on New Theory of Vision, [55]. 
 " on transubstantiation, [88]. 
 " on Ueberweg's view of the con- 
 formity of the perceived to the 
 unperceived, [91]. 
 " on infinitesimals, [no]. 
 " on immortality of the soul, [in], 
 " on opinion and character, [112]. 
 " Idealism, basis of; consciousness; 
 
 Realism, [117]. 
 " Idealism, its question, [118]. 
 " body and mind, matter and spirit, 
 [II 9 ]. 
 Edwards, Jon., views in consonance with 
 Berkeley's, Prol. IV. \ 4. 
 " said to be in affinity with Spi- 
 noza's, 4. 
 Efficient cause none but spirit, Prin. \ 
 
 102. 
 Ego is substantial and causal, Prin. \ 
 142, n. 
 the non-Ego given in, [118]. 
 Eleati, Pantheists, Prol. XIII. 117. 
 Ennemoser, body and soul, [1 19]. 
 Entity, abstract idea of, Prin. \ 81. 
 Epicureans, Prin. \ 93, [93]. 
 Erdmann, objections to Berkeley's sys- 
 tem, Prol. V. \ 14. 
 " point of modern division, 
 
 ["7]. 
 
 " on body and mind, [119]. 
 
 Esse is percipi in unthinking things, Prin. 
 
 I 3- 
 Ueberweg on, [9]. 
 Essence nominal, Prin. § 102. 
 
 " oiiala, [96]. 
 
 Exist (existiren), existence, Prin. \ 3, 
 
 [9], 35- 
 Existence, abstract idea of, Prin. § 81. 
 " of an idea consists in its being 
 
 perceived, 2. 
 " intelligible conception of, 89, n. 
 Experience, conscious objects of, what, 
 Pref. 157. 
 
 Experience, presentative and representa- 
 tive, Pref. 159. 
 Extension (ausdehnung), &c, only ideas, 
 Prin. I 9 ; denied by Ueber- 
 weg, [19]. 
 " neither great nor small, is no- 
 
 thing, 1 1 ; denied by Ueber 
 weg, [23]. 
 " and colour, 99. 
 
 " and figure, 49, [68]. 
 
 " abstraction frames the idea of 
 
 colour exclusive of, In. \ 8. 
 " a primary quality, Prin. \ 9. 
 
 " and motion, 10, 161. 
 
 " Ueberweg on, [21]. 
 
 " the characteristic of the mate- 
 
 rial world, II, ft. 
 " an accident of matter, 16. 
 
 " an object of geometry, 123. 
 
 " finite, 124, [106, 107]. 
 
 External bodies, supposition of, Prin. \ 
 19, 20. 
 " " their existence within 
 
 our knowledge im- 
 possible, 20. 
 External things (aussere) are perceived 
 
 by sense, Prin. \ 90. 
 Externality, how seen, Pref. 156; Prin. \ 
 
 90, n. 
 Eyes, Prin. § 29, [43]. 
 
 Fall, dogma of, Schopenhauer on, Prol. 
 
 XIII. 119. 
 Ferrier, Prof., on perception and matter, 
 Prin. \ 50, n. 
 " friend of Berkeleyanism, Prol. IV. 
 §6. 
 Fichte, system of, Prol. X. 
 
 " compared with Schelling, 97, 98. 
 " his trilogie, Hegel adopts, 102. 
 " and Hegel, 103. 
 " illustration of the arrogance of 
 
 Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 13. 
 " ■ thing in itself,' Prol. X., [81]. 
 " 'Messiah of Idealism,' [117]. 
 Figure, a primary quality, Prin. § 9. 
 Fire, idea of, and real fire, Prin. \ 41. 
 " Locke on, [53]. 
 
414 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Fleming, Realism defined, [117]. 
 Fraser, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. 
 
 §13- 
 
 " on Berkeleyanism in our day, Prol. 
 
 IV. \ 5- 
 friendly to Berkeleyanism, 13. 
 opinion of Baxter, Andrew, Prol. 
 
 V. §3- 
 on Hamilton's natural Realism, 20. 
 estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. 
 
 §18. 
 edition of Berkeley's works, Prol. 
 
 XV. I 1; XVI. \ 1,2. 
 notes to Principles, Prol. XV. \ 2. 
 definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Freedom, Prin. \ 57, 93. 
 
 Gassendi, on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. 
 General, how idea becomes, In. g 12. 
 General ideas not denied, In. \ 12. 
 Generalization, Locke on, In. \\\. 
 Geometry, objects of, Prin. \ 123. 
 German metaphysical terms, Prol. XV. \ 8. 
 Germany, Berkeley in, Prol. IV. \ 14. 
 Geulinx, on causality in sensible things, 
 Prin. I 53, n. 
 " on matter, 70, «., [71]. 
 God, natura naturans is, Prin. § 147, 148, 
 152. 
 " his existence known like that of 
 
 men, 145, n. 
 " is known certainly, 164, 174. 
 " ideas of, 71, [83]. 
 " seeing things in, Malebranche's view, 
 148, [115]. (See Nature, author 
 of, language of.) 
 Gravitation. (See Attraction.') 
 
 " not essential to bodies, Prin. 
 
 §106. 
 " denied by Ueberweg, [99]. 
 
 Grote, Prof. John, tends to Berkeley- 
 anism, Prol. IV. \ 7. 
 
 Hantaan, Berkeley and Hume, Prol. VI. 
 ?I7. 
 " Idealism and Realism, [117]. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir William, on Reid, Stewart, 
 Idealism, Prol. V. \ 20. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir William, natural Realism 
 of, Fraser's estimate of, Prol. 
 V. \ 20. 
 " on Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 14. 
 
 Idealism defined, Prol.VII. §13. 
 " consciousness defined, [117]. 
 
 " Realism defined, [117]. 
 
 " Idealism and Realism, [117]. 
 
 " his ' natural Realism,' [118]. 
 
 " ideas of sense exist without the 
 
 mind, Prin. \ 8, n. 
 " on representative perception, 
 
 86, n. 
 " on previous existence of every 
 
 new phenomenon, 106, n. 
 Happiness, Prin. \ 100. 
 Heat and cold, Prin. \ 14, 32. 
 
 " " Ueberweg on, [26]. 
 
 Hegel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. 
 
 §7. 
 " objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. 
 
 813. 
 
 " system of, Prol. XII. 
 Hegel, [81]. 
 
 Hegelian schools, Prol. XII. 104. 
 Herbart and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 
 
 106, 121; [81,86]. 
 Herder, on Kant, Prol. IX. 86. 
 Heyse, Realism defined, [117]. 
 Hilgers, on soul and body, [119]. 
 Hillebrand, summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 HI. I 5- 
 Hobbes and Berkeley, Prol. II. 2. 
 " referred to, In. § 6, [93]. 
 Hobbists, Prin. g 93, [93]. 
 Home, Henry, of Karnes, opposed to 
 
 Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 5. 
 Hume, on Berkeley's philosophy, Prol. 
 VI. 4. 
 Idealism of, Prol. VIII. 
 " refers to Berkeley as a nominalist, 
 
 In. \ 6, n. 
 " on power in ideas, Prin. \ 25, «., 
 
 30, n. 
 " eliminates all power from material 
 
 world, 32, n. 
 " on theory of universal energy of 
 Supreme Being, 72, n. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 415 
 
 Hume, on representative perception, Prin. 
 § 86, n. 
 " on the universe, 155, ft. 
 " as pessimist, 119. 
 
 Idea. (See Ideas.) 
 
 defined, Prin. § 5, «., 49, «., 89. 
 none of substance, In. g 14, n. 
 nor of spirit, Prin. (j 135. 
 its esse is percipi, 2. 
 implies passiveness, 25. 
 denied by Ueberweg, [39]. 
 in contradistinction to thing, 39. 
 history of the word : how should it 
 be expressed in German in trans- 
 lating Berkele-y , Ueberweg on, [ I ] . 
 " can be like nothing but an idea, 8. 
 " Ueberweg denies it, [15]. 
 " distinct from its being perceived, 
 
 45. [57]- 
 Ideal and real not identical, Prol. XIII. 
 
 US- 
 Idealism defined, Prol. VII. 
 
 " definitions of, diversity, \ 15. 
 
 " development of, from Berkeley 
 
 to the present, Prol. VIII.- 
 
 XIII. 
 " sceptical, Prol. VIII. 
 
 " critical, Prol. IX. 
 
 " sub'ective, Prol. X. 
 
 " objective, Prol. XI. 
 
 " absolute, Prol. XII. 
 
 " theoretical, Prol. XIII. 
 
 " ancient, Schopenhauer on, 107. 
 
 " modern development, history 
 
 of, by Schopenhauer, 108. 
 " systems of, contemporary with 
 
 Schopenhauer, contrasted, 
 
 108. 
 M strength and weakness of, Prol. 
 
 XIV. 122-142. 
 " received in the East, rejected in 
 
 the West, \ 14. 
 " versatility of, 15. 
 
 " not ripest result of speculation, 
 
 16. 
 " logical issues of, 19. 
 
 " Fichte's description of, 20. 
 
 Idealism and Realism, Berkeley's, Pref. 
 
 »55- 
 
 " basis of, general recognition of, 
 
 [»7]. 
 " what is not and what is its 
 
 question, [118]. 
 " leaves the phenomenal un- 
 
 touched, [118]. 
 " its advantage over the current 
 
 dualism, [119]. 
 Ideas, phenomena, sensible things, Pref. 
 154- 
 " archetypes of, 157. 
 " advantages of considering them 
 
 apart from names, In. \ 22. 
 " relations of to principles of knowl- 
 edge, Prin. \ 1-8. 
 " visibly inactive, 25. 
 " cause of, 26, 27. 
 " succession, 26, 28. 
 " of sense and imagination, 33. 
 " and things, 38, 39. 
 " divine, ultimate archetype of sensi- 
 ble system, 70, «. 
 " and spirits make up the whole of 
 
 knowledge, 86. 
 " are real things, 90. 
 " scheme of, not chimerical, 34, [48]. 
 " succession of, 59, [74]. 
 " abstract, In. \ 6-16. 
 " (vorstellung, -en), 21, 22; Prin. g 
 
 5-11, 13,97, 125, 143. 
 " occasion of, Prin. \ 69. 
 " sensible, 144. 
 " train of, 59, 71, 77. 
 " universal, 126. 
 Idolatry (gotzendienst), Prin. \ 94. 
 Images of things, ideas, Prin. \ 33. 
 Imagination, its power, Pref. 160. 
 
 " confounded with sense, Prin. J 
 
 23, n. 
 " ideas o r , 30. 
 
 " Colli -r and Hume on, App. B. 
 Imagining, faculty of, In. £ 10. 
 Immortality of the soul, Prin. \ 141, 
 
 [ill, II2"I. 
 
 " proved by Berkeley's Princi- 
 
 ples, Pref. 165. 
 
4i6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Impenetrability a secondary quality, Prin. 
 
 89. 
 
 Inch, Prin. \ 127. 
 
 Inexistence of sensible things, Collier's, 
 
 App. B. 
 Infinite divisibility of finite extension, 
 
 Prin. \ 124. 
 Infinites, speculations about, Prin. \ 124, 
 
 [109]. 
 Infinitesimals, Prin. \ 130, [no]. 
 Infinity, difficulties about, In. \ 2. 
 
 " quantitative, App. B. 
 In itself (in sich), In. \ 102. 
 Intelligence, an, without help of external 
 
 bodies, Prin. \ 20, [33]. 
 Intelligible Realism and dualism, Prin. \ 
 39, n., 91, n. 
 " existence of sense-objects, 86. 
 
 " meaning of, [90]. 
 
 Jacobi, F. H., on Fichte's doctrine, Prol. 
 X. 92. 
 " system of, 100, 101. 
 " on ethics, [95]. 
 " the world as free act of will, 118. 
 " on Fichte, Kant, Reinhold, and 
 Spinoza, [117]. 
 Jamieson, George, opposes Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 V. \ 18. 
 Jean Paul (Richter), picture of Idealism, 
 
 Prol. XIV. \ 17. 
 Johnson, Samuel, of Stratford and New 
 York, a Berkeleyan, his 
 works, Prol. III. \ 3. 
 " Berkeley addresses him on his 
 
 essays, Pref. 152. 
 " addressed by Berkeley on con- 
 
 tinual creation, Prin. \ 46, n. 
 Johnson, Dr. Samuel, on Berkeley, Prol. 
 V. \ 1 ; VI. 5. 
 
 Kant, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 3. 
 " system of, Prol. IX. 
 " compared with Sthelling, Prol. XI. 
 
 97- 
 " and Hegel, Prol. XII. 103. 
 " and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 105. 
 " Schopenhauer's estimate of, 106. 
 
 Kant lies nearest to method of Berkeley, 
 [81]. 
 
 " use of term 'intelligible,' [90]. 
 
 " definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Kantianism, in Berkeley, Prin. \ 142, «. ; 
 
 in the sphere of ethics, [95]. 
 Knowledge, objects of human, defined, 
 
 Pref. 155. 
 Kroeger, translation of Fichte, Prol. X. 
 
 92, «. 
 Krug, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 8. 
 
 " definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. 
 
 17; 
 
 " definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 
 Language, phenomena of universe as, 
 Prol. XIV. J 5. 
 " difficulty of, Prin. \ 144. 
 
 " its nature and abuse, In. \ 6, 
 
 139- 
 
 " cause of error, 18-20. 
 
 " visible ideas are a, Prin. \ 44. 
 
 " of Author of nature, 66. 
 
 " use of, 83. 
 
 " and numbers, study of, 122, 
 
 Cos]. 
 
 Laws of nature, Prin. \ 30, 62, [45, 77]. 
 " divine ideas and will coincident 
 with, 57, «. 
 Leibnitz on symbolical knowledge, In. \ 
 19, ;/. 
 " on the idea, Prin. \ 33, n. 
 " on continual creation, 46, n. 
 " fheodic<5e, [116]. 
 " apperception, [117]. 
 Leibnitz, [81, 109]. 
 Lewes's estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 
 
 13- 
 Life and death, Schopenhauer on, Prol. 
 
 XIII. \ 24. 
 Locke and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 6. 
 
 " a friend of Molyneux, Pref. 152. 
 
 " essay introduced into Trinity Col- 
 lege by Molyneux, 153. 
 
 " Berkeley a student of the essay, 
 153, In. I 6, n. 
 
 " combated by Berkeley, Pref. 154. 
 
 " quoted, 171, H. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 417 
 
 Locke on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, tt. 
 
 " principles of knowledge, 6, n. 
 
 " on abstraction, 11. 
 
 " on generalization, 11. 
 
 " on abstract ideas, 12, 13. 
 
 " on abuse of words, 23. 
 
 " ideas of sense and reflection, Prin. 
 \ 1, n. 
 
 " notion of material substance self- 
 contradictory, 9, n. 
 
 " on matter, 10, «., 73, n. 
 
 " on unity, 13, «. 
 
 " on methods for exciting ideas, 65, 
 «. 
 
 " on existence of sensible things, 88, 
 
 K. 
 
 " on being, 89, n. 
 
 " on motion, 114, tt. 
 
 " quoted by Ueberweg, [2, 4, 7, 17, 
 
 25. 27, 53. 94]. 
 " anticipations of ' Theory of Vision,' 
 
 [55]. 
 " definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Locomotive experience in sense, Prin. \ 
 
 II, ft. 
 Logic, In. g 6. 
 
 Lossius, Idealism defined, Prol. VII. \ 6. 
 " consciousness defined, [117]. 
 " Realism defined, [117]. 
 
 Mackintosh, Sir James, estimate of Berke- 
 ley, Prol. VI. I 11. 
 Maja, popular form of Hindoo Idealism, 
 
 Prol. XIV. \ 14, 15. 
 Majer and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 
 
 105. 
 Malebranche and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 4. 
 Malebranche, In. \ 2, tt. ; Prin. \ 70, tt. 
 " influence of, on Berkeley, 
 
 Pref. 153. 
 " causality of insensible 
 
 things, Prin. \ 53, n. 
 on matter, 73, «., 82, «., 88, 
 
 tt. 
 '* on motion, 112, tt. 
 
 " seeing in God, 148, [71, 
 
 "53- 
 
 " Norris a disciple of, App. B. 
 
 Malebranche, occasionalism, [71]. 
 
 Man and the animals, Schopenhauer on, 
 
 Prol. XIII. 109. 
 Man, powers of, their feebleness, In. \ 2. 
 
 " personal unity of, [119]. 
 Manicheism, Manichean heresy, Prin. \ 
 
 154. 
 Mankind, assent of, Prin. \ 54, 55. 
 Mansel approaches Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ 8. 
 Materia prima of Aristotle, Prin. \ 11. 
 " " modern notion of matter 
 
 resembles, 11. 
 Material substance defined, Prin. ^ 17. 
 " motives for supposition of, 73. 
 Material world, extension the characteris- 
 tic of, Prin. g 11. 
 Materialism, Idealism as opposed to, Prol. 
 
 XIV. \ 9. 
 Materialists acknowledge that the senses 
 do not prove the existence 
 of matter, Prin. \ 18. 
 " cannot tell how our ideas are 
 
 produced, 19. 
 " invent matter to support acci- 
 
 dents, 74. 
 " Berkeley's peculiar use of the 
 
 word, [29, 31]. 
 Mathematics, application of Berkeley's 
 principles to, Pref. 165. 
 " a province of speculative 
 
 science, Prin. \ 58, 118, 
 119, 123. 
 " discussed, 101. 
 
 Mathematicians, Prin. \ 132. 
 Matter, what, Prin. \ 9-76. 
 
 " Descartes' theory of, Pref. 1 54. 
 
 " a negative notion, 156. 
 
 " Locke on, Prin. \ 10, tt. 
 
 " substratum of external qualities, 
 
 16. 
 " infinite divisibility of, 47. 
 " unknown occasion, 67, 68, 70, 
 
 [81]. 
 " support of accidents, 72, 73, 74. 
 " unknown somewhat, 75, 80. 
 " Scriptures on existence of, 82. 
 " idea of, pernicious, 26, 96, 133. 
 " inert, 9. 
 
 27 
 
4i8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Matter, denied by Ueberweg, [18]. 
 
 " involves a contradiction, Prin. \ 9. 
 
 " denied by Ueberweg, [20]. 
 
 " and its qualities, Ueberweg on, 
 
 [22]. 
 
 " relation of, to mind, Prol. XIV. 
 
 83- 
 
 " and mind, [119]. 
 M'Cosh, Dr. Jas., against Berkeley, Prol. 
 V. \ 19. 
 " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. 
 
 \ 14. 
 
 Mellin, graduated list of Kant's terms, [8]. 
 
 " definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 
 Messerschmidt, body and soul, [119]. 
 
 Metaphysics, nature of, Schopenhauer on, 
 
 Prol. XIII. no. 
 
 " abstract ideas, objects of, In. 
 
 I 6. 
 " true position, [118]. 
 
 Mill, J. S., defends ' Berkeley's Theory of 
 Vision,' Prol. IV. \ 10. 
 " permanent possibilities of sen- 
 sation, Prin. \ 3, n. 
 " on power in ideas, 25, n. 
 " eliminates all power from ma- 
 terial world, 32, n. 
 " on touch, 44, n. 
 Mind, the acting perceiving spirit, Prin. \ 
 
 2. 
 
 " sensible qualities must be in the, 10. 
 " acts and powers, not to be pre- 
 scinded, 143, [113]. 
 " its omnipresence, 148. 
 " and matter, [118]. 
 
 Mind, Prin. g 2. 
 
 Minimum, sensibile, Prin. \ 132. 
 
 Miracles, relation to Berkeley's princi- 
 ples, Prin. I 84, 63, [79, 88, 89]. 
 
 Mitchell, James (deaf and blind), case 
 of, App. C. 
 
 Molyneux, William, ma-le Locke's Essay 
 known in Trinity College, Pref. 152. 
 
 Monism, systems of, Prol. XIV. § 8. 
 
 MoreU, on Locke's definition of con- 
 sciousness, [1 17]. 
 
 Moses' rod, Prin. \ 84. 
 
 Motion of the earth, Prin. \ 58, 186, [73]. 
 
 Motion, absolute and relative, Prin. \ no, 
 
 III, 112, 113, 114, 115, [102, 103]. 
 Music, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116. 
 
 Names, like letters in algebra, In. $ 19. 
 Natura naturans, is God, Prin. § 46, n. 
 Natural effects, uniformity in producing, 
 
 Prin. \ 62. 
 Natural philosophy, purified by the Prin- 
 ciples, Pref. 165. 
 " " discussed, Prin. \ 101. 
 
 Nature, laws of, Prin. \ 30-32. 
 
 " laws of, coincident with divine 
 
 ideas and will, 57, n. 
 " sense symbolism of, 60, n. 
 " methods of, styled language of 
 its Author, 33, 64, 66, 106, «., ' 
 107. 
 " volume of, how to read, 109, 
 
 [100]. 
 " what, 150. 
 Necessary connection between ideas, no, 
 
 Prin. \ 31. 
 Newton, Sir Isaac, on motion, Prin. g 
 114. 
 " treatise on mechanics, no, 
 
 [101]. 
 " on infinites, 130. 
 
 " and Leibnitz, the calculus, 
 
 [109]. 
 Nichol, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 
 
 10. 
 Nirvana and Sansara, Prol. XIII. 117. 
 Noblest spirits, many, nurtured by Ideal- 
 ism, Prol. XIV. \ 13. 
 Nominal essence, the real essence of 
 
 things, Prin. \ 101, n. 
 Nominalism, Pref. 119. 
 Nominalist, Berkeley not a, App. 416, n. 
 Nominals, App. A. 
 
 Norris, John, of Bemerton, a Male- 
 branch ian, Pref. 153. 
 " on material world, Prin. \ 82, n. 
 " a neighbor of Collier, App. B. 
 Nothing, Prin. \ 8a 
 Notion (begriff) and idea (idee), Prin. \ 
 
 27, [42]. 
 Notions of relations, Pref. 154. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 419 
 
 Notions, particular or universal, In. \ 15, 
 n. 
 " how represented in the phantasy, 
 
 18, «. 
 " how applied to the object- world 
 
 of the senses, Prin. \ 5, n. 
 " visibly inactive, 25. 
 Number, a primary quality, Prin. § 9. 
 " a creature of the mind, 12. 
 " abstract ideas of, object of arith- 
 metic, 119. 
 Nunneley, on case of born blind, App. C. 
 
 Object, external, Prin. \ 14. 
 
 " outward, a contradiction, 15, n. 
 " signification of, 5, n. 
 Objections to Berkeley's Principles of 
 Knowledge, Pref. 157, 162 ; 
 Prin. \ 34-84. 
 " ninth of these, [72]. 
 
 Objects of knowledge, defined, Prin. \ I. 
 " perceived by sense, defined, 91. 
 " ideas as objects of knowledge, 
 
 Ueberweg on, [8]. 
 " of conscious experience, what, 
 
 Pref. 157. 
 
 " in themselves, a contradiction, 
 
 Prin. \ 24; denied by Ueber- 
 
 weg, [38]. 
 
 Occasion, Prin. \ 68, 69, 70, 74, [82, 85]. 
 
 Occasional causes, theory of, Prin. § 53, 
 
 68, «. 
 Occasionalists, [71]. 
 Omnipresence of mind, Prin. \ 148. 
 One, the, and all, Schopenhauer on, Prol. 
 
 XIII. \ 23. 
 Optimism, Prin. \ 153, [116]. 
 
 " Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 
 " Leibnitz, and Voltaire's Can- 
 
 dide, Prol. XIII. 119. 
 Origin of Essay towards a New Theory of 
 
 Vision, Prin. \ 43. 
 Oswald, James, against Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 V.? 9- 
 Outness, Prin. \ 43. 
 
 Pain in the world, Prin. \ 153. 
 
 Pantheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 
 |23- 
 
 Parr, on mode or attribute, Prin. \ 49, «. 
 Passiveness implied in an idea, Prin. \ 
 
 25- 
 Pembroke, Earl of, dedication to, Pref. 
 
 169. 
 Perceivable, Prin. \ 8. 
 Perceivable, Ueberweg on the term, [16]. 
 Perception of God, Prin. \ 147, 148, n. 
 
 " images of, [54]. 
 
 Perceptions, inefficacious, Prin. \ 64. 
 
 " defined, [117]. 
 
 Personality of man, and Idealism, Prol. 
 
 XIV. I 2. 
 Pessimism, Schopenhauer's, Prol. XIII. 
 
 §23- 
 Phantasy, notion how represented in, In. 
 
 \ 18, »• 
 Phenomena, sensible things, ideas of 
 sense, Pref. 154. 
 " objects of human knowl- 
 
 edge, Prin. \ 1, n. 
 " numerically different in each 
 
 mind, 147, n. 
 " explained without matter, 
 
 5°- 
 " denied by Ueberweg, [70]. 
 
 Philosophical spirit, and Idealism, Prol. 
 
 XIV. I 12. 
 Philosophical Transactions, Cheselden's 
 
 and other cases, App. C. 
 Philosophy defined, In. \ 1. 
 Physical causation, contrasted with effi- 
 cient or spiritual, Prin. \ 65, n. 
 Physics and metaphysics, [118]. 
 Pierer (Univ. Lex.), Idealism defined, 
 Prol. VII. I 10. 
 " Realism defined, [117]. 
 Platner, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. 
 
 u- 
 
 " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 
 
 8. 
 " definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. 
 
 §3- 
 Plato and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97. 
 
 « idea, [1]. 
 Plotinus and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97. 
 
420 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Polytheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 
 §116. 
 Porter, definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Positivism, spiritual, Berkeleyanism a sort 
 
 of, Prin. \ 102, n. 
 Potential existence, what Berkeley meant 
 
 by, Prin. \ 45, «. 
 Potentially, sensible things exist, Prin. \ 
 
 45. »■ 
 
 Power, voluntary activity, Pref. 153. 
 " impossible in world of ideas, Prin. 
 I 2 5) n. 
 
 Practical, arithmetic should be, Prin. §119, 
 [104]. 
 
 Prediction, scientific, Prin. \ 59. 
 
 Presentati ve and representative experience, 
 Pref. 159. 
 
 Primary qualities, ideas of, Prin. \ 9. 
 " " their absoluteness, 12, 
 
 n. 
 
 Primary and secondary qualities, distinc- 
 tion between, Prin. § 9. 
 
 Primary and secondary qualities, Ueber- 
 weg on, [17]. 
 
 Princeton, Berkeleyanism at, Prol. IV. 
 
 2 4. 
 
 Princeton Club, Prol. XVI. \ 6. 
 
 Principles of Human Knowledge, present 
 edition, objects and uses of, 
 Prol. XVI. 
 " Berkeley's, best book for com- 
 mencing reading, Prol. XVI. 
 
 §3- 
 
 " a classic in philosophy and lit- 
 erature, Prol. XVI. \ 4. 
 
 " arranged as an introduction, 
 Prol. XVI. § 5. 
 
 " criticiMns of, Pref. 1 5 1 . 
 
 " editions of, Pref. 151. 
 
 " analysis of, Pref. 155. 
 
 " consequences of, Pref. 157. 
 
 " objections to the, Pref. 157, 
 162; Prin. \ 85-156. 
 
 " universals combated in, Pref. 
 154. 
 
 " against sceptics, Pref. 171. 
 
 " original introduction to, App. 
 A. 
 
 Principles of human knowledge investi- 
 gated, In. \ 4. 
 
 Production of ideas, Prin. \ 19. 
 
 Prolegomena to Principles, 1-148. 
 
 Proof, Berkeley's, of his doctrine, Prin. \ 
 4, n. 
 
 Prcwidence, immediate works of, little 
 souls burlesque, Prin. \ 154, [116]. 
 
 Psychical and physical, [119]. 
 
 Psychology, its weakness, [118]. 
 
 Qualities, do not exist apart, In. \ 7. 
 " coexistent, idea of, 8. 
 
 " primary and secondary, Prin. 
 
 I 9- 
 " primary, can exist only in the 
 
 mind, 73, [84]. 
 Quiddity, abstract idea of, Prin. \ 81. 
 
 Real and substantial in nature, what, Prin. 
 
 \ 34, 3°- 
 
 Real, sense-ideas are, Prin. \ 90. 
 Realism defined, [117]. 
 Realism and Idealism contrasted, Prol. 
 XIV. \ 10. 
 
 " Berkeley's, Pref. 155, «. 
 
 " or dualism, intelligible, Prin. § 
 
 39. «• 
 
 " foundation of, 92. 
 Reality in ideas, Prin. \ 36. 
 " meaning of, 89. 
 " of things, 91. 
 " not denied, 36, [49]. 
 Reason gives us knowledge of external 
 
 things, Prin. \ 18. 
 Reasoning and thinking, distinction be- 
 tween, In. \ 12, ». 
 Reflection, Locke's ideas of sense and, 
 
 Prin. \ I,*. 
 Regis, definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Reid, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. 
 
 \ 2- 
 " first accepts, then rejects, his views, 
 
 Prol. V. \ 4. 
 " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 9. 
 " on representative perception, Prin. 
 
 \ 86, ;/. 
 " on plurality of Egos, 145. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 421 
 
 Reid, on definition of consciousness, 
 
 C«7]. 
 
 Reinhold, K. L., argument against Ideal- 
 ism, Prol. X. 87. 
 Relativity of motion, &c, Prin. \ 113. 
 Religion, Hegel on, Prol. XII. 104. 
 Representative idea in perception, Prin. \ 
 
 86, n. 
 Representative and presentative experi- 
 ence, Pref. 159. 
 Rest, a primary quality, Prin. § 9. 
 Ritter, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 15. 
 Rothenfiue, summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 HI. \ 9- 
 of Hume, Prol. VIII. 
 of Kant, Prol. IX. 
 " of Fichte, Prol. X. 
 
 of Schilling, Prol. XI. 
 " of Jacobi, Prol. XI. 
 
 of Hegel, Prol. XII. 
 
 Satze, propositions, Prin. \ 129. 
 Sansara and Nirvana, Prol. XIII. 117. 
 Scepticism, refuted by Berkeley's Princi- 
 ples, Pref. 165. 
 " its causes, In. \ 1. 
 
 " its root, Prin". \ 86. 
 
 Sceptics, Principles useful to, Pref. 171. 
 Schelling, system of, Prol. XI. 
 
 " relation to Hegel, Prol. XII. 
 
 102. 
 Schiller, on the laws of nature, Prin. \ 
 
 32, n. 
 Schlegel, Frederick, Idealism, definition, 
 
 Prol. VII. \ 4. 
 Schmid, Heinrich Th., on the strength 
 and weakness of Idealism, Prol. XIV. 
 
 §17. 
 Scholten, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. 
 
 §14. 
 " Fichte's system, Prol. X. 89, 92. 
 
 " on Schelling, Prol. XI. 93. 
 
 Schoolmen, their doctrine of abstraction, 
 In. \ 17. 
 " argue for a continued crea- 
 tion, Prin. \ 46. 
 Schopenhauer, definition of Idealism, Prol. 
 VII. \ 14. 
 
 Schopenhauer, Idealism of, Prol. XIII. 
 
 " estimates of, by Herbart 
 
 and Zeller, Prol. XIII. 
 
 Schwegler, summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 III. \ 12. 
 Scotch school, runs into Idealism, [118]. 
 Scotus Erigena, pantheist, [117]. 
 Scripture, on existence of matter,Prin. \ 82. 
 Secondary qualities, their occasion, Prin. 
 
 \ 9- 
 Sensation, signification of, Prin. \ 5, n. 
 Sensations, cannot exist but in a percipient 
 mind, Prin. \ 3. 
 " visibly inactive, 25. 
 
 " uniformity of, 72. 
 
 " in the mind are perfectly 
 
 known, 87. 
 Sense, and reflection, Locke's ideas of, 
 Prin. \ 1, n. 
 " ideas of, exist without the mind, 
 
 Sir William Hamilton, 8, n. 
 " locomotive experience in, II, n. 
 " and imagination confused, 23, «. 
 " ideas of, 29, [43]. 
 " supposed want of a, 77, [87]. 
 Sense, common, Beattie's definition, Prol. 
 
 V. §8. 
 Sense-ideas, how distinguished from imag- 
 ination, Prin. \ 28-30. 
 Sense-objects, archetypes of real things, 
 
 Prin. \ 41, n. 
 Sense-symbolism of nature, Prin. \ 60, n. 
 Senses are to be believed, Prin. \ 40, n. 
 [52] ; distrusted by philoso- 
 phers, 88. 
 " do not prove matter, 18; Ueber- 
 weg on, [28]. 
 Senses, the, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 
 
 Sensibile, minimum, Prin. \ 132. 
 Sensible objects, have no abstract exist- 
 ence, Prin. \ 4. 
 " " Ueberweg on, [10]. 
 
 Sensible qualities, are the secondary, Prin. 
 
 2 9- 
 
 " " must be in the mind, 
 
 10, n. 
 
422 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sensible system, divine ideas ultimate 
 
 archetype of, Prin. \ 72, n. 
 Sensible and perceivable, the terms, 
 
 Ueberweg on, [16]. 
 Sensible things, exist potentially, Prin. \ 
 
 45- 
 " " existence of, 88. 
 
 Shaftesbury, Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 7. 
 Sight, ideas of, distinct from those of 
 touch, Prin. \ 44. 
 " gives the idea of light and colour, 1 . 
 Sign, a word a sign of general ideas, In. 
 I n. 
 " relation of with thing signified, 
 Prin. I 65, [80]. 
 Signs, regarded by arithmetic, not things, 
 
 Prin. I 22. 
 Simon, Collyns T., a Berkeleyan, Prol. 
 IV. \ 7. 
 " suggested rendering of 'idea,' [1]. 
 Sinneswahrnehmung, 'sensation,' Prin. 
 
 \ 137, 146. 
 Siris, Prol. I. § 10. 
 
 " its relation to the Principles, Prin. 
 I 67, «• 
 Solidity, a primary quality, Prin. \ 9. 
 " figure, &c, have no activity, 61, 
 [76]. 
 Somewhat, matter as, Prin. \ 75, [86]. 
 Soul, its natural immortality, Prin. \ 141. 
 " and body do not act apart, [119]. 
 " and body distinct, yet in unity, 
 [II 9 ]. 
 Sounds, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 10. 
 Space, absolute, Prin. § 112, n. 
 Spinoza and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 5. 
 " and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97. 
 •* Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. \ 
 
 21, 22. 
 
 " on substance, Prin. g 135, n. ; 
 idea, [1]. 
 Spirit, defined, Pref. 160 ; Prin. \ 27, 
 [40], 89, 138. 
 " is the only substance, 7; Ueber- 
 weg on, [14, 40]. 
 " alone can act, 57. 
 " the only efficient cause, 102. 
 " no idea of, 135. 
 
 Spirit and body, [118]. 
 Spirits and ideas, or phenomena, every 
 thing known, Prin. \ 86. 
 " heterogeneous, 89. 
 " other, how known by us, 145, 
 [114]. 
 Spiritual causation, contrasted with physi- 
 cal, Prin. I 65, n. 
 Spiritual positivism, Berkeleyism a sort 
 
 of, Prin. \ 102, «. 
 Stars fixed, not attracted, Prin. \ 106; 
 
 denied by Ueberweg, [98]. 
 Stewart, Dugald, on abstraction, In. \ 
 19, n. 
 " " on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3. 
 
 " " on Diderot, 7. 
 
 " " on Berkeley, 10. 
 
 " " on Malebranche,Norris, 
 
 and Reid, 10. 
 " " estimate of Berkeley, 
 
 Prol. VI. \ 10. 
 " " definition of conscious- 
 
 ness, [117]. 
 Stirling and Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ II. 
 " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 
 17 
 Strauss and Hegel, Prol. XII. 104. 
 Subject, Prin. \ 27, [41], 49, [67]. 
 " or substance, 49. 
 " Aristotelian distinctions, [69]. 
 Substance, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 6. 
 " meaning of, Pref. 153, 156, 
 
 159; Prin. \ 37. 
 " no idea of, [50], 14, n. 
 
 " unity of, held by Berkeley, 7, ». 
 
 " is spirit, soul, 135. 
 
 " no unthinking, 139. 
 
 " connected by Berkeley with 
 
 cause, 26, n. 
 " cause of ideas must be a, 27. 
 
 " in vulgar sense, 37. 
 
 " as a support of qualities, 91. 
 " cannot be an idea, [92], 135. 
 
 " and accidents, 17; Ueberweg 
 
 on, [27]. 
 " extended moveable, an idea, 
 
 22; denied by Ueberweg, 
 [35]- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 423 
 
 Substantial and real in nature, Prin. \ 34. 
 Substratum, no unthinking, Prin. \ 7. 
 " matter is a, 16. 
 
 " of qualities, 77. 
 
 Succession of ideas, Prin. \ 26, 59, 98. 
 Suggestion of experience, Prin. \ 145. 
 Swift, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. I. \ 3 ; 
 
 VI. I 1. 
 Symbolical knowledge, Leibnitz on, In. 
 
 I 19, »■ 
 Symbolism, sense-, of nature, Prin. \ 60, «. 
 Symbolism of nature, universal, Prin. \ 
 
 65, n. 
 
 Tar- water, Prol. I. \ 10. 
 Tastes, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 100. 
 Tennemann, summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 III. \ 6. 
 " objections to Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 V. \ 12. 
 " definition of Idealism, Prol. 
 
 VII. \ 8. 
 Theism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 1 1 6. 
 Thing, meaning of, Pref. 155, «., Prin. § 
 89, n. 
 " in contradistinction to idea, 38, 
 
 [50- 
 
 " real, 33, 172. 
 
 " not regarded by arithmetic, but 
 sign, 122, 219. 
 Things, reality and existence of, not de- 
 nied, Prin. g 36, [49]. 
 Thinking and reasoning, distinction be- 
 tween, In. \ 12, n. 
 Thought, universe as a thing of, Prol. 
 XIV. \ 4. 
 " divine, absolute truth, Prin. \ 
 76, n. 
 Tiedemann, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 VI. § 7. 
 Time, finite, apprehension of changes of 
 our ideas, Pref. 153. 
 " idea of, Prin. § 98, [94]. 
 Touch and sight, heterogeneous, Prin. \ 
 44. 
 " the ideas acquired by, 1. 
 Transcendental, Prin. \ 118. 
 Tuke, literature on mind and body, [119]. 
 
 Ueberweg, edition of Principles, Prol. I. 
 
 §15. 
 " Preface, 15. 
 
 " summary of Berkeley, Prol. 
 
 HI. I 15. 
 " correspondence with Simon, 
 
 Prol. IV. \ 9. 
 " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. 
 
 I 16. 
 " Annotations on the Principles, 
 
 Prol. XV. \ 4; XVI. j 329. 
 " Logic, Prol. XV. \ 4. 
 
 Understanding implies spirit, Prin. \ 27. 
 Uniformity, in production of natural ef- 
 fects, Prin. g 62. 
 " of sensations, 72. 
 
 Unity, love of, Idealism appeals to, Prol. 
 XIV. \ 8. 
 " an abstract idea, 13. 
 " arbitrary, 12. 
 " denied by Ueberweg, [24]. 
 " Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg, 
 
 [25]- 
 
 " in abstract denied, 1 20. 
 " of substance held by Berkeley, 7, 
 n. 
 
 Universal assent of mankind, an argu- 
 ment for matter, Prin. \ 54. 
 
 Universal or particular notions, In. \ 15, 
 n. 
 
 Universality, in -what it consists, In. \ 16, 
 147. 
 
 Universals combated in the Principles, 
 Pref. 154. 
 
 Vanini and Spinoza, Prol. XIII. 118. 
 Virtue, strongest incentive of, Prin. \ 155. 
 Visible ideas, are a language, Prin. \ 44. 
 Vision, origin of Essay towards a New 
 Theory of, Prin. \ 4 3> [553- 
 
 " essay on, referred to, 1 16. 
 Vogel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 
 
 16. 
 Voltaire, opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. § 
 
 6. 
 Voraussetzung, principle, Prin. \ 129. 
 Vorstellung, Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 
 
 106, 107. 
 
4 2 4 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Vorstellung, notion, Prin. \ 130, 141, 
 142. 
 idea, [43]. 
 
 Warburton, on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3. 
 
 " on Berkeley, Prol. VI. § I. 
 
 Watch, illustration from, Prin. \ 62, 
 
 [78]. 
 Will, the world is, Schopenhauer on, Prol. 
 XIII. in, 112. 
 " defined, 113. 
 " world as, universal recognition of, 
 
 "3- 
 
 " is active spirit, Prin. \ 27. 
 
 " or spirit, some other produces our 
 
 ideas, Prin. \ 29. 
 " Ueberweg on, [44]. 
 Willich, Idealism, definition of, Prol. VII. 
 IS- 
 
 Wolff, definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. 
 
 8 * 
 
 " definition of consciousness, [117]. 
 Words, deception of, In. g 23. 
 " Locke on abuse of, 23. 
 " embarrass and delude, 24. 
 " men amuse themselves with, Prin. 
 
 §24. 
 " Ueberweg on, [6]. 
 " Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg, 
 
 [7]. 
 World not a dream, Schopenhauer on, 
 Prol. XIII. III. 
 " is will, III. 
 " a makranthropos, 117. 
 
 Zeller on Beck, Prol. X. 87. 
 " on Hegel, Prol. XII. 105. 
 " on Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. g 25. 
 
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