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 Makers of National History 
 
 Edited by W. H. HUTTON, B.D. 
 
 VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH
 
 4 
 
 THE RT. HON. HENRY ROBERT STEWART 
 LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH 
 
 After the original picture by T. Laiorence, R.A,
 
 VISCOUNT 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A. 
 
 STUDENT AND FORMERLY CENSOR OF CHRIST CHURCH, 
 
 AND EXAMINER IN MODERN HISTORY, OXFORD 
 
 (AUTHOR OF " THE LIFE OF BOLINGBROKE," ETC.) 
 
 LONDON: SIR ISAAC PITMAN & SONS, LTD. 
 No. 1 AMEN CORNER, E.C. 1908
 
 Printed by Sir Isaac Pitman 
 & Sons, Ltd., London, Bath 
 and New York - - 1908
 
 I ft LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 MAKERS OF 
 NATIONAL HISTORY 
 
 It is intended in this series to commemorate im- 
 portant men whose share in the making of national 
 history seems to need a more complete record than 
 it has yet received. In some cases the character, 
 the achievements, or the life, have been neglected 
 till modern times ; in most cases new evidence has 
 recently become available ; in all cases a new estimate 
 according to the historical standards of to-day seems 
 to be called for. The aim of the series is to illustrate 
 the importance of individual contributions to national 
 development, in action and in thought. The foreign 
 relations of the country are illustrated, the ecclesias- 
 tical position, the evolution of party, the meaning 
 and influence of causes which never succeeded. No 
 narrow limits are assigned. It is hoped to throw 
 light upon English history at many different periods, 
 and perhaps to extend the view to peoples other than 
 our own. It will be attempted to show the value in 
 national life of the many different interests that have 
 employed the service of man. 
 
 The authors of the lives are writers who have a 
 special knowledge of the periods to which the subjects 
 of their memoirs belonged. 
 
 W. H. HUTTON. 
 
 S. John's College, Oxford.
 
 •/ 
 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
 
 In his memoirs, Greville sums up the characteristics 
 of Castlereagh in a masterly fashion. " Londonderry's 1 
 talents were great, though he owed his authority 
 more to his character than his abilities. His ap- 
 pearance was dignified and imposing ; he was 
 affable and agreeable in society. His great feature 
 was cool and determined courage. As a speaker, 
 he was prolix, monotonous, and never eloquent ; 
 but full of good sense and argument. He was 
 considered one of the best managers of the House 
 of Commons that ever sat in it." 
 
 This description of Castlereagh, written by a no 
 means friendly critic, is, if we except the remarks 
 about his abilities, though somewhat terse, an accurate 
 summary of his chief characteristics. 
 
 But the attention of historians and essayists 
 has been almost exclusively directed towards the 
 short period of Castlereagh's life subsequent to the 
 year 1815. With the exception of the brilliant essay 
 by the late Marquess of Salisbury, now supplemented 
 by the memoir published by the Marchioness of 
 Londonderry, no attempt has hitherto been made to 
 estimate the value of Castlereagh's services at the 
 time of the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 While the careers of most, if not all, of England's 
 statesmen during the last three centuries have been 
 fully described, no adequate estimate of Castlereagh's 
 life and work has yet been given to the world. 
 
 vii
 
 . 
 
 Vlll PREFACE 
 
 In consequence, the ignorance of that statesman's 
 career still remains as deep as ever. What is worse, 
 the growth of misconception with regard to the 
 character and value of his life-work has steadily 
 increased, and he is judged entirely upon the policy 
 which the Cabinet adopted between 1815 and 1822. 
 
 Castlereagh's career previous to the War of 
 Liberation thus remains to most Englishmen a 
 closed book, and it is not recognised that from 1798 
 he was occupying an important position in the 
 councils of Great Britain, and was gaining invaluable 
 political experience as Secretary for Ireland, as 
 President of the Board of Control, as War Secretary, 
 and as Foreign Secretary. By the time that the 
 crisis of 1813 arrived, and Europe had become one 
 vast camp, Castlereagh had acquired an unrivalled 
 knowledge of political affairs, and was fully equipped 
 for dealing in a masterly fashion with the momentous 
 and complicated questions which were connected 
 with the fall of Napoleon and with the reorganisation 
 of Europe. 
 
 Castlereagh's administrative genius first found 
 full play and ample recognition during the rebellion 
 of 1798, and the subsequent struggles which centred 
 round the question of the Union of Great Britain and 
 Ireland. During that exciting and trying period 
 Cornwallis found him a valuable coadjutor, and speaks 
 in warm praise of his " talents, temper and judg- 
 ment." Castlereagh clearly appreciated the necessity 
 of granting the Roman Catholic Claims, and the 
 justice of doing so. Till his death he always advo- 
 cated the concession of the rights of full citizenship 
 to the Roman Catholics. During his period of 
 office under Addington, and afterwards under Pitt,
 
 PREFACE IX 
 
 he stamped his own individuality upon several 
 of the measures of each ministry. 
 
 As President of the Board of Control under Adding- 
 ton, he steadily supported the policy of the Marquess 
 Wellesley, whose administration forms an epoch 
 in the relations of Great Britain with India, and 
 during Pitt's second ministry he fjfst inaugurated 
 that policy of making a diversion in Northern 
 Germany in order to hamper Napoleon's efforts in 
 Central Europe. 
 
 As President of the Board of Control, as Secretary 
 of State for War and the Colonies, and as one of 
 Pitt's chief advisers, Castlereagh had shown that, 
 though inferior to Canning in debate, he possessed all 
 those qualities which are summed up in the word 
 statesmanship. It is believed that a sort of rivalry 
 between Castlereagh and Canning began while they 
 were outwardly united in opposing the Ministry 
 of all the Talents. At any rate, with the accession 
 of the Portland ministry to office in 1807, the impa- 
 tience felt by the mercurial Canning at having 
 to work with a colleague whose methods were so 
 different from his own soon showed itself. Canning's 
 strength lay in debate, while he was inferior to 
 Castlereagh in administrative powers. Castlereagh 
 was his superior as a parliamentary tactician, and 
 trusted to patronage and the manipulation of boroughs 
 to secure a parliamentary majority. Canning, on the 
 other hand, while aiming at the leadership of the Tories 
 in the House of Commons, despised those laborious 
 tactics which were then necessary in order to obtain 
 for the ministers regular support in Parliament. 
 The Walcheren Expedition and its unpopularity 
 seemed to presage the fall of Castlereagh and the
 
 PREFACE 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 + 
 
 a5 
 
 triumph of Canning. But the latter's injudicious 
 conduct resulted in a duel with Castlereagh and the 
 retirement of both ministers from office. To Canning 
 the events of the year 1809 constituted little less 
 than an overwhelming disaster. His political career 
 received a serious check from which it never recovered. 
 Owing to his impatience he missed the opportunity 
 of taking a leading share in the conduct of the affairs 
 of Great Britain at one of the most momentous 
 crises in her history, and from 1809 to 1822 had 
 practically no influence in British politics. To 
 Castlereagh, however, the events of 1809 merely 
 constituted a temporary check in his career. In 
 March, 1812, he succeeded Lord Wellesley as Secretary 
 for Foreign Affairs, — a post well suited to his tastes 
 and abilities, — while on the death of Perceval, in 
 May of the same year, he became leader of the House 
 of Commons, the duties of which he performed till 
 his death. 
 
 In spite of his laboured and awkward style of 
 oratory, he soon established his influence in the 
 House of Commons, guided the foreign policy 
 of the Government, and defended the home 
 administration of Lord Sidmouth. 
 
 In bringing about the fall of Napoleon, Castlereagh 
 deserves unstinted praise. It was he who first 
 recognised the military abilities of Wellington, and 
 it was he who constantly supported the plan of 
 keeping a large army in the Peninsula. When few 
 but himself believed in the policy of the Peninsular 
 War, Castlereagh supported Wellington in every 
 possible way. In 1812 he showed similar foresight 
 in advocating and supporting the European 
 resistance to Napoleon in Germany. His diplomatic
 
 PREFACE XI 
 
 success in effecting in 1813 a junction between the 
 Austrian troops and those of Russia and Prussia, 
 and in thus rendering the plans of Napoleon futile 
 and the victory of the Allies at Leipzig possible, 
 justify us in regarding Castlereagh as the chief of 
 the factors which contributed to the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 Castlereagh's triumph in 1814, followed by a still 
 greater triumph in 1815, after the victory of Waterloo, 
 crowned the successful efforts of a masterly foreign 
 policy. No minister since the days of the elder 
 Pitt and the Seven Years' War had been in a position 
 similar to that occupied by Castlereagh. Byron 
 might write his "Ode to Napoleon," and speak 
 of " the thieves (the Allies) being in Paris," but 
 the House of Commons, composed as it was of 
 men of every shade of public opinion, recognised 
 the immense debt which Great Britain, and indeed 
 Europe, owed to the perseverance, courage, and 
 statesmanship of the reserved and impassive British 
 minister. 
 
 The ignorance which is shown of Castlereagh's 
 career by writers of the History of Great Britain 
 is due partly to the influence of the Whigs, who could 
 not forgive the Tories for keeping them out of office 
 for so many years, partly to Castlereagh's own 
 personal characteristics. He never courted the mob, 
 he never sought popularity; he ever, as in Dublin in 
 1821, shrank from the applause of the multitude. 
 
 Castlereagh's claims to the gratitude of all the 
 nations who opposed Napoleon is undoubted. But 
 to the inhabitants of Great Britain his clearsightedness 
 and resolution were especially valuable. For he 
 not only supported the War in the Peninsula, but 
 by his diplomacy kept together that great European
 
 Xll PREFACE 
 
 Coalition which brought to an end the domination 
 of France, Moreover, after 1815, undeterred by 
 the venomous and shortsighted attacks of his political 
 opponents, he guided Great Britain through the 
 inevitable period of reaction which after a great war 
 is always accompanied by distress and suffering. 
 Under the excitement of the struggle against Napoleon 
 the British had borne with equanimity many hard- 
 ships, but once the struggle was over and the bill 
 had to be paid, the existing ministers became the 
 objects of hostility and attack. It required no 
 little courage to advocate what was termed " coercive 
 and reactionary legislation." Nevertheless the 
 necessity for such legislation was undoubted, and 
 Castlereagh was as resolute in protecting the nation 
 from anarchy at home as he had been in defending 
 it against Napoleon's projects. Moreover, the idea 
 so popular with Whig writers that Castlereagh after 
 1815 was " the champion of absolutism in the Councils 
 of Europe," has been entirely dispelled. 
 
 " Few statesmen of George Ill's reign," it has 
 recently been said, " have left a purer reputation or 
 rendered a greater service to this country." This 
 estimate of the position held by Castlereagh is much 
 in advance of the views held half a century ago. 
 Contemporary opinion is often shortsighted, and the 
 impression left on one's mind after reading many 
 of the memoirs of the time is that few Englishmen 
 during the first fifteen years of the last century realised 
 the magnitude of the crisis through which they were 
 passing. Consequently they entirely failed to 
 estimate at its proper value the immense services 
 rendered to Great Britain and to Europe by Castle- 
 reagh. The time has now come for a calm and
 
 PREFACE Xlll 
 
 dispassionate estimate of the value of Castlereagh's 
 services, and it would seem that he ought to be placed 
 in the same category as the Elder Pitt, though it 
 must always be remembered that Castlereagh guided 
 Great Britain through a period far more critical 
 than was that of the Seven Years' War. 
 
 It is impossible until the numerous letters and 
 despatches bearing on Castlereagh's official career 
 have been given to the world to do more than indicate 
 the attitude which that statesman took with regard 
 to the events of his day. The Correspondence relative 
 to the Convention of Cintra which appeared in The 
 Times of Sept. 21st, 1908, gives some indication of the 
 wealth of material which will be available for a future 
 biography of Castlereagh. 
 
 To my friends the Rev. W. H. Hutton, B.D., Editor 
 of the Series, and to the Rev. A. H. Beaven, I am 
 under deep obligations. Both have made valuable 
 suggestions, while the latter has revised the proof 
 sheets, and has given me the benefit of his very wide 
 and accurate knowledge of English History. 
 
 A. H.
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 A LIST OF THE CHIEF AUTHORITIES FOR THE 
 STUDY OF THE LIFE OF CASTLEREAGH 
 
 I 
 
 Castlereagh Correspondence, 12 Vols. 1850-1854. 
 
 Cornwallis Correspondence (1859). 
 
 Rose : Diaries and Correspondence. 
 
 Malmesbury's Diaries, Vol. IV. 
 
 The Marchioness of Londonderry : Memoir — Robert Stewart, 
 
 Viscount Castlereagh. 
 Buckingham : Court of the Regency. 
 Pellew : Life of Sidmouth (1847). 
 The Creevey Papers. Edited by Sir Herbert Maxwell. 
 Stanhope : Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 
 Teignmouth; Reminiscences of Many Years. 
 Ellesmere : Personal Reminiscences of the Duke of 
 
 Wellington. 
 Alison : Life of Lord Castlereagh (1861). 
 
 II 
 
 Lecky: History of England in the 18th Century, Vols. VI 
 
 and VII. 
 Walpole : History of England. 
 Martineau : History of England. 
 Macfarlane : Cabinet History of England. 
 Oman : Peninsular War. 
 Atkinson : A History of Germany, 1715-1815. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Falkiner : Studies in Irish History. 
 
 Robert Marquess of Salisbury : Essay on Castlereagh in 
 
 Essays on Foreign Politics. 
 Gentleman's Magazine, April, 1821, vol. 1, p. 374. August, 
 
 1822. 
 
 IV 
 
 Hammond : Charles James Fox. 
 
 Temperley : Canning. 
 
 Thornton : Foreign Secretaries of the 18th Century. 
 
 Marriott : George Canning and his Times. 
 
 Zimmern : Henry Grattan. 
 
 Roxby : Henry Grattan. 
 
 Rosebery : Pitt. 
 
 Rose : Napoleon I ; and Napoleonic Studies. 
 
 Maxwell, Sir Herbert : Life of Wellington. 
 
 Twiss : Life of Eldon. 
 
 Article in Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
 
 Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
 Biographie Universelle. Supplement. 
 
 xv
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGB 
 
 PREFACE . . . • vii 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .XV 
 
 i. castlereagh's early life, 1769-1797 . 1 
 
 II. THE REBELLION OF 1798 . . .10 
 
 III. THE UNION . . . . .26 
 
 IV. THE FALL OF PITT'S MINISTRY, 1801 . 42 
 
 V. CASTLEREAGH AND THE ADDINGTON 
 
 MINISTRY . . . . .52 
 
 VI. 
 VII. 
 
 PITT'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION, 1804-1806 64 
 
 75 
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT AND THE FAILURE 
 OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY . 
 
 VIII. THE SEIZURE OF THE DANISH FLEET AND 
 THE CRISIS IN SPAIN — COPENHAGEN 
 BAYLEN, CINTRA, AND CORUNNA 
 
 IX. THE VICTORY OF TALAVERA AND THE 
 FAILURE OF THE WALCHEREN EXPEDI 
 
 TION, 1808-1809 
 
 X. OUT OF OFFICE, OCTOBER, 1810, TO MARCH 
 
 1812 .... 
 
 XI. CASTLEREAGH AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE 
 
 1812 .... 
 
 XII. THE FALL OF NAPOLEON . 
 
 xvii 
 
 87 
 
 106 
 
 123 
 
 133 
 145
 
 XV111 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP; PAGE 
 
 XIII. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE 
 
 BATTLE OF WATERLOO . . .170 
 
 XIV. AFTER THE FALL OF NAPOLEON, 1815-1822 188 
 
 XV. castlereagh's FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 
 
 1815 208 
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 APPENDIX I . 
 II 
 III 
 
 229 
 235 
 237 
 239
 
 VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 castlereagh's early life 
 1769-1797 
 
 Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh (by courtesy) Castle- 
 
 in 1796, and on the death of his father in 1821 second r A ea S h '* 
 
 Ancestry 
 Marquis of Londonderry, was born on June 18th, 1769. 
 
 The same year marks the birth of the Great Napoleon, i- 
 
 and of his conqueror Arthur Wellesley. Castlereagh • 
 
 belonged to an ancient Scottish family which in the 
 
 middle of the twelfth century gave Scotland her 
 
 first Lord Stewart. To the same family belonged 
 
 the Stewart kings, and in 1603 one of these kings, 
 
 James I, gave lands in Ireland to his Stewart 
 
 relatives. Of these John Stewart received in 1610 
 
 an estate in Donegal known as Stewart's Court or 
 
 Ballylawn, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
 
 centuries his family acquired distinction. In 1690 
 
 Colonel William Stewart, great-grandson of John 
 
 Stewart, fought bravely for the Protestant cause, 
 
 and against James II. His son, Alexander Stewart, 
 
 who lived from 1700 to 1781, moved the family 
 
 residence from Donegal to Co. Down, and his residence 
 
 of Mount Pleasant, now Mount Stewart, remained 
 
 from henceforth the principal seat of his immediate 
 
 I— (2211) 1
 
 2 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 descendants. This Alexander Stewart married in 
 1737 Mary Cowan, his cousin, and heiress of an East 
 Indian merchant ; his son, Robert Stewart, who 
 consistently supported Pitt and the Tories, was 
 created Baron of Londonderry in 1789, Viscount 
 Castlereagh in 1795, Earl of Londonderry in 1796, 
 and Marquis of Londonderry in 1816. The latter's 
 famous son, Robert Stewart, was the only surviving 
 child of his first marriage with Lady Sarah Seymour, 
 daughter of that Marquess of Hertford who in 1766 
 was lord-lieutenant of Ireland. By his second 
 marriage with Lady Frances Pratt, eldest daughter 
 of Lord Chancellor Camden, the colleague and friend 
 of the elder Pitt, he had several children, of whom 
 Charles Stewart, the soldier and diplomatist, is the 
 best known. By his first marriage the elder Robert 
 Stewart was brought into close connexion with many 
 of the great Whig families, while by his second 
 marriage he became brother-in-law of Lord Camden, 
 Viceroy of Ireland, a relationship which proved of 
 incalculable value to young Castlereagh. 
 Mount ^ in her life of Castlereagh, Lady Londonderry has 
 
 written a beautiful description of the home of the 
 young statesman. " His home was on the shores 
 " of Strangford Lough, one of the most beautiful 
 " indentations of the Irish coast, bordered on the 
 " south-west by the picturesque Mourne Mountains. 
 "It is studded with islands, alive with myriads of 
 " seabirds, and haunted by the liquid whistle of 
 " the curlew. Mount Stewart itself is a large demesne 
 " consisting of low hills, crowned with woods of 
 " beech, Scotch and silver fir. The house lies with 
 
 " Only a strip of sea-scented beach 
 
 " between it and the water, yet buried in a grove 
 
 Stewart.
 
 EDUCATION 3 
 
 " of dark green ilex trees, which show the shining 
 " silvery sheen of their under-leaves when ruffled 
 " by the slightest breeze." 1 . 
 
 Young Castlereagh had from an early age consider- His Early 
 able promise and an alert mind. William Steel Life - 
 Dickson, a Presbyterian minister, has left a 
 description of him in the year 1782, when he took 
 part in a review of the Volunteers at Belfast. " In 
 " a sham fight the day after the review, Robert 
 " Stewart, now Viscount Castlereagh, then only in 
 " his thirteenth year, commanded the light infantry 
 " of the Ards Independents. His company 
 " consisted mostly of boys a few years older than 
 " himself." Then he describes the conduct of the 
 young leader. " The manner in which he conducted 
 " his boyish band through the variegated and long- 
 " protracted engagement displayed such genius of 
 " spirit and judgment, as excited admiration, 
 " extorted applause, and laid the foundation of 
 " that popularity which he afterwards obtained." 
 From that time high expectations were raised with 
 regard to the future career of Robert Stewart 
 throughout the country. " From that day many 
 " began to look forward to and to speak of him as 
 " their future representative. ' If such be the 
 " ' boy, what may we not expect from the man ? ' 
 " was to be heard in almost every company ; and 
 " I own that my expectations were as extravagant, 
 " and my attachment as enthusiastic as that of 
 " any man living." 
 
 The promise which was shown by Castlereagh at At College 
 
 an early age led Lord Londonderry to form the ^"nt'nent 16 
 
 1 Lady Londonderry : Robert Stewart, Viscount 
 Castlereagh, p. 4.
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Views on 
 
 highest hopes for his future, and determined him 
 to plunge his son as soon as possible into political 
 life. After a year's residence at St. John's College, 
 Cambridge, where he showed considerable ability, 
 Castlereagh was sent at the age of eighteen to the 
 Continent. He visited Paris, Genoa, Rome, and 
 Vienna, and returned home with some knowledge 
 of political affairs on the Continent. Some of his 
 remarks with regard to the position in France at 
 the close of 1791 are worth reproducing. 
 
 On November 11th, 1791, he had written his 
 the French v j ews w ^j 1 regard to the character of the Legislative 
 Assembly which had begun its sittings a month 
 earlier. " From what I have said you will not 
 " rank me among the admirers of the French Revolu- 
 " tion as the noblest work of human integrity and 
 
 " human wisdom I feel as strongly as any 
 
 " man that an essential change was necessary for 
 " the happiness and for the dignity of a great people 
 
 " long in a state of degradation If I could 
 
 "do it without seeming to approve the principles 
 " professed by their leaders, principles which I shall 
 " ever condemn as tumultuous pedantry, tending 
 " directly to unsettle government, and ineffectual 
 " in its creation, I should on all occasions worship 
 " and applaud the feeling which led the way to this 
 " unparalleled change." No phrase has ever yet 
 been used which describes the Girondist position 
 and principles more accurately than that of 
 " tumultuous pedantry." 
 
 At the time of his return to Ireland, Castlereagh 
 had already shown that he possessed qualities which 
 admirably fitted him for his future duties. His 
 personal courage was undoubted, his love of work 
 
 In the Irish 
 Parliament.
 
 IN THE IRISH PARLIAMENT 5 
 
 was unbounded, his powers of observation had been 
 proved, and he soon developed an aptitude for 
 politics which enabled him to occupy the prominent 
 place among the leading statesmen of the day. 
 
 He had just reached the age of twenty-one when 
 in 1790 he was returned member of the Irish 
 Parliament for his own County of Down. The 
 seat, which had to be won from the Hillsborough 
 interest, proved a costly one. The election expenses 
 reached the enormous sum of £60,000, and the 
 contest entailed heavy sacrifices on the part of 
 Castlereagh's father. The money saved by his 
 grandfather and father for the completion of Mount 
 Stewart was all spent, and a number of family 
 pictures had to be sold. 
 
 Castlereagh was now launched on his political 
 career. At first he joined the Opposition in the Irish 
 House of Commons, but when through the develop- 
 ment of the French Revolution and the intrigues of 
 Wolfe Tone the land was threatened with anarchy, 
 he threw all his influence upon the side of order. 
 In 1794 he married Lady Emily Hobart, daughter 
 of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, a most beautiful 
 woman who was keenly interested in politics. Their 
 correspondence shows the deep affection which 
 throughout their lives Castlereagh and his wife bore 
 to each other, and as far as possible they were 
 inseparable. 
 
 Among his early formed friendships, that with 
 Arthur Wellesley is the most interesting, and Sir 
 Jonah Barrington relates how in 1793 he was intro- 
 duced by the Speaker to Mr. Wellesley and Mr. 
 Stewart, about whom he says, no one could predict 
 " that one would become the most celebrated of his
 
 ance. 
 
 6 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " era, and the other one of the most mischievous 
 " statesmen and unfortunate ministers that has ever 
 " appeared in modern Europe." He then remarks, 
 with perhaps a grain of truth, that it was " to the 
 " personal intimacy and reciprocal friendship of these 
 " two individuals they mutually owed the extent of 
 " their respective elevation and celebrity ; Sir Arthur 
 " Wellesley would never have had the chief command 
 " in Spain but for the ministerial manoeuvring and 
 " aid of Lord Castlereagh, and Lord Castlereagh never 
 " could have stood his ground as a minister but for 
 " Lord Wellington's successes." 
 Personal It is quite evident from the opinions of contem- 
 
 Appear- poraries and from the portraits by Sir Thomas 
 Lawrence, that Castlereagh was one of the handsomest 
 men of his day. His portraits depict a man " with 
 *' beautiful features and calm, clear gaze," and 
 endowed with a clear intellect, the highest talents, 
 a strong will, a cool brain, and great self control. 
 His boldness and absolute fearlessness roused the 
 admiration even of his opponents. With his some- 
 what cold temperament, and unflinching determina- 
 tion, he was admirably fitted to cope with opposition 
 whether in Ireland or England. While adamantine 
 in furthering the cause which he had at heart, he was 
 always generous to opponents. In the midst of 
 popular clamour he always remained calm and im- 
 perturbable. Whether engaged in saving Ireland 
 from its incapable legislature, or in defending Great 
 Britain from the French, or in suppressing popular 
 disorder at home, Castlereagh always showed the same 
 foresight, calmness and intrepidity. This was the 
 man who now began his political career during the 
 stormy period of the French Revolution, and in a
 
 IRELAND 
 
 land which was honeycombed with sedition and 
 madly excited by political passions. 
 
 From 1793, when the British Government 
 granted the franchise to the Roman Catholics, 
 Castlereagh like Clare saw that union was inevitable. 
 Till then he had recommended " Concession to the 
 Dissenters and resistance to the Catholics." He 
 did not regard the alliance between the northern 
 Presbyterians and the Catholics as likely to continue, 
 and he felt sure that if once concessions were made 
 to the former body their pretended enthusiasm for 
 Catholic emancipation would soon evaporate. To 
 the Irish Protestants the maintenance of the existing 
 Constitution in Church and State was absolutely 
 essential, and the idea of sharing the Government 
 of the country with Catholics was abhorrent to those 
 who, like Charlemont, belonged to the ruling class. 
 The share taken by a large number of Catholics in 
 promoting the Rebellion of 1798, which had for its 
 object the independence of Ireland, completely and 
 finally alienated the loyal Protestants from any 
 sympathy with the Catholics, and rendered the 
 Union inevitable. 
 
 The development of the French Revolution, too, 
 contributed to throw Castlereagh upon the side of 
 the Tories, and led him to support the English 
 Government. On the outbreak of war between 
 Great Britain and France in February, 1793, he 
 became Colonel of the Londonderry Militia, and his 
 military duties necessitated frequent absences from 
 Parliament. In December, 1796, when the danger 
 from Hoche's expedition was a real one, Castlereagh 
 was with his regiment at Bantry Bay. Had it not 
 been for the tempestuous state of the weather, the 
 
 Ireland 
 after 1793. 
 
 Danger of 
 
 French 
 
 Invasion. 

 
 8 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 expedition would certainly have landed, and 
 Castlereagh would have seen some real warfare. 
 As it was, the anticipations of the Irish rebels as 
 represented by the lines : — 
 
 The French are in the Bay, 
 
 Said the Shan van Voght. 
 The French are in the Bay, 
 
 Said the Shan van Voght. 
 The French are in the Bay, 
 They'll be here without delay, 
 What will the foemen say ? 
 
 Said the Shan van Voght. 
 Etc., etc. 
 
 were doomed to disappointment, and adverse winds 
 saved Ireland from invasion. 
 
 Writing at this critical juncture from Cork, he 
 says, " I am just arrived to find the wind has saved 
 " us the trouble of driving the French away. There 
 " is not a ship left in Bantry Bay ; it is said some 
 " have foundered, and others have been taken, but 
 "all I can collect in the confusion of Gen. Stuart's 
 " orderly room — all his aides being complete fools — 
 " is that they are all gone, and that there is a prospect 
 " that they may fall into the hands of the English 
 " fleet." 
 
 The year 1796 was indeed an anxious one for 
 the loyal inhabitants of the North of Ireland. 
 Disloyalty was rampant, and the French victories 
 had raised the spirits of the seditious, who were 
 anxiously expecting a French invasion. The militia 
 were regarded with suspicion by the authorities, and 
 during the autumn and winter large bodies of loyal 
 yeomanry were enrolled. In Ulster, however, dis- 
 affection and sedition remained for a time unchecked. 
 On November 4th, 1796, Castlereagh wrote to Pelham, 
 the Chief Secretary, describing the seriousness of the
 
 THE NORTH OF IRELAND 9 
 
 conspiracy in Ulster, and bringing forward the question 
 
 " Whether it is wise to anticipate (the disloyal 
 
 " people) or to wait for their attack in the gross 
 
 " _f or in the detail we are at present suffering from 
 
 " it. The policy entirely depends upon the contin- 
 
 " gency of their receiving foreign assistance." 
 
 However, owing to Castlereagh's personal influence, Change in 
 
 tact, and ability, a sudden and satisfactory change Attitude 
 
 „ .-..-, .,-, i fii i u- oi Northern 
 
 was effected in the attitude of the tenants on his Irish . 
 
 father's estate. There the terrorism had been so 
 effective that in 1796, " Scarcely one of Lord 
 " Londonderry's tenants would dare to speak to 
 " him, if they met him on the road, or would show 
 " him the slightest mark of respect." At the end 
 of the year, however, a sudden change had taken 
 place, and some 1 ,700 men on the estate came forward 
 to take the oath of allegiance. This change in the 
 attitude of the tenantry has always been ascribed 
 to the tact and personal influence of Castlereagh, 
 who all through his life exercised a great influence 
 upon those with whom he was in close contact. 
 
 From this period Castlereagh's rise in the world 
 of politics was rapid. Besides sitting for Co. Down 
 in the Irish Parliament, he was also member for 
 Tregony in the English Parliament from 1794 to 
 May 1796, when he was elected for Or ford in Suffolk, 
 a pocket borough which was the property of his rela- 
 tive, Lord Hertford. Meanwhile events of importance 
 were taking place in Ireland. 
 
 [The extracts from Castlereagh's letters are taken from 
 the sketch of the " Life of Robert Stewart, Viscount 
 Castlereagh," by the Marchioness of Londonderry.]
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE REBELLION OF 1798 
 
 Castlereagh The arrival in March, 1795, of Lord Camden (the 
 Chief successor to Fitzwilliam) as Lord Lieutenant, with 
 
 i7g8*ri$oi Pelham as his Secretary, implied that in the future 
 the Catholics and Reformers must expect no 
 remedial measures. Camden's influence obtained for 
 his brother-in-law promotion to a viscounty in 
 October, 1795, and to the earldom of Londonderry 
 in August, 1796. In the latter month he made 
 Robert Stewart (his sister's step-son), now Viscount 
 Castlereagh, Keeper of the Privy Seal. In May, 
 1798, Pelham returned to England, and owing to 
 illness practically gave up his office. From the date 
 of his departure Castlereagh performed the duties 
 which should have fallen to Pelham as Chief Secre- 
 tary, and on the latter's resignation in November, 
 1798, he definitely became Chief Secretary, and held 
 that office till 1801. Castlereagh had now an oppor- 
 tunity of showing that his father's confidence in him 
 had not been misplaced. At the age of twenty-seven 
 he was called upon to face a crisis infinitely more 
 dangerous and difficult to deal with than that which 
 Pitt had encountered in 1784. 
 Condition England was in the throes of a war with France ; 
 
 of Ireland. Ireland was honeycombed with disloyalty and 
 disaffection. The grant of legislative independence 
 to Ireland in 1782 had by no means tranquillized 
 the island, where after the outbreak of the French 
 
 10
 
 WOLFE TONE 11 
 
 Revolution sedition was rampant. The Presby- 
 terians and Dissenters in the north of Ireland were 
 republican by tradition ; the Catholics, downtrodden 
 by the Protestant Church and Parliament, were 
 equally discontented. In 1791 Wolfe Tone, a young 
 Irish lawyer, had founded The Society of the United 
 Irishmen, and advocated a close alliance between 
 the republican Presbyterians and the Catholics. 
 To please both sections, Tone at first contented 
 himself with formally supporting Parliamentary 
 Reform and Catholic emancipation. But his 
 estimate of the situation in the north of Ireland 
 was faulty, and the political developments which 
 took place there proved fatal to his plans. • The 
 Volunteer movement, which had originated in the 
 necessity for self-defence, had become in the view 
 of the British Government dangerous to the peace 
 of Ireland, and was accordingly suppressed before 
 1793. The French Revolution had aroused con- 
 siderable attention in Ireland, and in the northern 
 parts of the Island had been received with violent 
 enthusiasm. Paine's " Rights of Man " became 
 very popular in Belfast, and Wolfe Tone for a time 
 hoped that the northern Irish would prove his most 
 valuable allies in his crusade against the English 
 connexion. For a time it seemedi that, having 
 secured parliamentary reform, the Ulster Presby- 
 terians would join with the Catholics in founding an 
 independent Irish Republic. 
 
 Both the English Government and Wolfe Tone, p iicy of 
 however, gauged the situation inaccurately. A Wolfe 
 large majority of the inhabitants of Ulster were Tone « 
 loyal to George III and the English connexion. 
 The Protestant Revolution of 1688 was far more
 
 12 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 a reality to them than was the French Revolution 
 of 1789, and the memory of William III dearer 
 to them than the French watchwords of Liberty, 
 Equality, and Fraternity. In 1790 Castlereagh had 
 joined with the other members of the northern 
 Whig Club in drinking to " The Sovereignty of the 
 " People," and the Conquerors of the Bastile. But 
 in doing so he simply reflected the views of English 
 Whigs such as Fox, who felt no opposition to the 
 idea of monarchy, and never anticipated the over- 
 throw and death of Louis XVI, and the supremacy 
 of Robespierre. In fact as early as 1791 it was 
 beginning to be quite apparent that the " Kid Glove 
 Radicalism of the Whig Club " had little in common 
 with the views which were later openly held by the 
 United Irish Society. In that year Wolfe Tone, 
 who made strenuous efforts to invent a system which 
 would keep together " the Whigs and Nationalists, 
 " Protestants and Catholics, in a common hostility 
 " to English rule," found himself faced by the 
 unconquerable opposition of the Protestants to 
 any attempt to place the Catholics on a political 
 equality with them. Tone himself, like Tyrconnel 
 in the reign of James II, desired by " fair and open 
 war to procure the separation of the two countries." 
 As the success of such a policy implied the absolute 
 supremacy of the Catholics, who formed the majority 
 in Ireland, the United Irishmen of Belfast refused 
 to accept his proposition that " no reform of 
 " Parliament, which did not include the Roman 
 " Catholics would suffice," and he then realised 
 that a very large majority of the Irish Protestants, 
 though apparently anxious for reform, desired 
 " rather a monopoly than an extension of liberty."
 
 THE ACTS OF 1792 AND 1793 13 
 
 Against this rock of religious sectarianism the waves 
 
 of Tone's eloquence beat in vain. The admission 
 
 of the Catholics to the franchise was as early as 1791 
 
 distinctly and avowedly repugnant to the feelings 
 
 of a large number of the members of the United 
 
 Irishmen. 
 
 That this is so is at once apparent from a study The Acti 
 
 of Irish history after 1793. The Acts of 1792 and of }??* 
 
 J and 1793. 
 
 1793 conceded the elective franchise to the Catholics 
 
 and repealed the laws excluding Catholics from juries. 
 It was evident to all men of foresight or political 
 experience that these concessions would inevitably 
 lead to a demand for further privileges, " including 
 " admission to Parliament and eligibility for the 
 " great offices of the State." The enfranchisement 
 of the Roman Catholics led almost immediately to 
 a violent division of opinion among the hitherto 
 ostensibly united opposition to the English Govern- 
 ment. The Catholic aristocracy indeed declared 
 themselves satisfied with the concessions of 1793, 
 and it was left to the lower orders of the Catholic 
 population to yield to the urgent demands of the 
 " little knot of revolutionary politicians," and 
 in 1798 to rise in rebellion. All moderate men 
 among the Protestants realised that the victory of 
 United Irish principles would leave the Protestant 
 party in a minority in Ireland. It only required 
 the organization of the Catholics under the title 
 of " Defenders," and the threats of French invasion 
 to lead the Protestants of the north to declare their 
 loyalty to the Crown and their opposition to all 
 ideas of treason. Under the impulse of strong 
 patriotic and Protestant feelings, Ulster abandoned 
 its flirtation with revolutionary ideas, and the Orange
 
 14 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 • 
 
 t > * 
 
 movement which originated in 1795 became the 
 centre of the opposition to the United Irishmen. 
 
 Thus in the years 1792 and 1793 Pitt had adopted 
 
 a policy which has been much criticised. In order 
 
 to break up the alliance which then existed between 
 
 the Catholics and the Northern Presbyterians he 
 
 had carried measures for the relief of the former. 
 
 All educational disabilities were removed, the legal 
 
 profession with the exception of the highest posts 
 
 was thrown open to the Catholics, and a Relief Act 
 
 was brought forward which admitted Catholics 
 
 to the grand juries, the magistracy, and to the 
 
 franchise. 
 
 The Effect The Act of 1793 convinced Castlereagh, as it did 
 
 of the Act Clare, that Union was inevitable. During his travels 
 
 Castle- ' he had spent some months in France, and in 
 
 reagh's November, 1791, had seen the Legislative Assembly 
 
 opinion. a { yyoj-k Th e principles of the Girondists, who 
 
 formed the most considerable body in that Assembly, 
 
 he describes in a letter as " tumultuous pedantry," 
 
 and in the same letter makes some very sensible 
 
 remarks about the condition of Ireland. There, 
 
 he says, the situation is precarious. " I am inclined 
 
 " to think," he continues, " that it will not remain 
 
 " long as it is. The government of it I do not like, 
 
 but I prefer it to a revolution. There is great 
 
 room and necessity for amendment, and our 
 
 " connexion would not be weakened by it. The 
 
 " people begin to grow very impatient, the abuses 
 
 " are considerable, and their weight nothing. The 
 
 " Catholics are calling for emancipation. I dread 
 
 " a collision between them and the dissatisfied 
 
 " Protestants." In 1793 he writes a still more 
 
 striking letter in which he points out that if the 

 
 FITZWILLIAM 
 
 15 
 
 elective franchise be given to the Catholics, Ireland 
 will in a few years be governed by them. Under 
 these circumstances the Protestant Church could 
 not remain " the establishment of a State of which 
 " the Protestants do not comprise an eighth part." 
 Then he points out that the Acts of 1792 and 1793 
 will merely be used by the Catholics as stepping 
 stones towards further reforms. " Nothing short 
 " of co-equal rights will satisfy them ; and these 
 " you cannot yield if you wish to preserve your 
 " Church and State. Therefore, though the 
 " Catholics may have equal rights, they cannot have 
 " equal enjoyments. Depend upon it they will 
 " struggle as much for the practical enjoyment 
 " as they do now for the theoretical privileges of 
 " the Constitution." He then forcibly condemns 
 the policy of 1793. " You have made an unwise 
 " alliance with that body (the Catholics) ; give them 
 " anything rather than the franchise, for it forces 
 " everything else." Pitt and his ministry, however, 
 thought otherwise, and from that moment Castlereagh 
 like Clare saw that a Union between England and 
 Ireland was inevitable and absolutely necessary. 
 
 In 1794 the appointment of Lord Fitzwilliam Recall of 
 in succession to the Earl of Westmorland as Viceroy, Swum 
 had led the Catholics in Ireland to expect further 179,5. 
 concessions, including their admission to Parliament. 
 When in the autumn of 1794 a conference of 
 ministers — which included Pitt, Portland, Spencer, 
 Grenville, Windham and Fitzwilliam — was held, 
 it was settled that Fitzwilliam should go as Lord 
 Lieutenant, " but on the explicit understanding 
 " that there should be no new system of men or 
 " measures in Ireland ; that he should, if possible,
 
 16 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " prevent any agitation on the Irish question ; 
 " that in any case, on that or any other important 
 " measure, he should transmit all the information 
 " he could collect, with his opinion, to the Cabinet ; 
 " and that he should do nothing to commit the 
 " Government to such matters without fresh 
 " instructions." Nevertheless, Pitt seemed at this 
 meeting to be strongly impressed with the strength 
 of the claims of the Catholics to be relieved from 
 all remaining disqualifications, and undoubtedly 
 Fitzwilliam understood that " if the Catholics should 
 " appear determined to stir up the business, and 
 " to bring it before Parliament [he] was to give it 
 " a handsome support on the part of the Government." 
 
 Though Fitzwilliam had no direct mandate from 
 the British Government to make concessions to 
 the Irish Catholics, his arrival early in 1795 was 
 regarded as the first step towards Catholic emancipa- 
 tion. It has been said that had the Catholics been 
 given adequate reforms, and had the most glaring 
 of the abuses connected with the ecclesiastical and 
 agrarian systems been removed, the raison d'etre 
 of much of the political agitation would have been 
 removed, and the hopes of the republican agitators 
 destroyed. This view, however, entirely ignores 
 the position which would have been occupied by 
 the Protestant (and in 1795 dominant) minority 
 had Catholic emancipation been granted. 4 Fitz- 
 william's arrival in Ireland, however, was regarded 
 by the excitable Catholic population as implying 
 the adoption by the British Government of a policy 
 of conciliation and emancipation. 
 
 He arrived in Ireland on January 4th, 1795 ; on 
 the 8th he wrote to Portland assuring him that he
 
 HIS RECALL 17 
 
 would do his best to put a stop to the Catholic 
 agitation. On the 15th, however, he wrote stating 
 his opinion that, " not to grant cheerfully all that 
 " the Catholics wish, will not only be exceedingly 
 " impolitic, but perhaps dangerous." In the same 
 despatch he urged Portland to discuss without delay 
 the whole matter with Pitt. No reply was sent to 
 Fitzwilliam till February 15th, when Portland wrote 
 advising him not to countenance the immediate 
 adoption of a measure for Catholic emancipation. 
 In the meantime the Irish Parliament had met, 
 and Fitzwilliam had expressed his determination to 
 support a bill for the immediate grant of Catholic 
 emancipation, to be followed by a Reform Bill. 
 Fitzwilliam's determination caused the greatest alarm 
 among the government officials in Ireland, no less 
 than among the Members of the Cabinet, and on 
 February 19th, 1795, he was hastily recalled. 
 
 The recall of Fitzwilliam forms a landmark in pj tz . 
 Irish history. It implied that the doubts expressed William's 
 by Castlereagh and Clare as to the wisdom of the Landmark 
 Act of 1793 were fully justified. Fitzwilliam openly in Irish 
 proposed to dismiss from their posts all who opposed history. 
 Catholic emancipation. He obviously intended to 
 develop the policy of concession implied in the Act 
 of 1793, and his arrival in Ireland " had encouraged 
 " extravagant expectations in the popular mind." 
 With a rashness which is unique in the history of 
 the representatives of a Government, Fitzwilliam 
 deliberately and openly disregarded the arrangements 
 which had been " definitely sanctioned and prescribed 
 " by the Cabinet," and committed acts and indicated 
 the adoption of a policy which were entirely counter 
 to the directions which he had received from Pitt. 
 
 2— (22Il)
 
 18 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Rebellion 
 and 
 
 anarchy 
 inevitable. 
 
 Fitzgibbon (Lord Clare), the Irish Chancellor, who 
 was hated by the popular party in Ireland, saw his 
 influence seriously threatened and his position being 
 undermined. As a strong opponent of the Catholic 
 claims, and as Pitt's " most trusted adviser on Irish 
 " affairs," he at once informed the Cabinet of 
 Fitzwilliam's intentions, and caused George III 
 to be told that the admission of Catholics into 
 Parliament would be a breach of his Coronation 
 Oath. In that " narrow and obstinate but scrupulous 
 " mind, this belief was now irrevocably imbedded." 
 Pitt declared that Beresford's dismissal 1 was in direct 
 opposition to the Cabinet understanding, and as 
 Fitzwilliam's conduct was not even defended by 
 his closest friends in the Cabinet, he was on February 
 19th, 1795, suddenly recalled. 
 
 Lord Camden was appointed Viceroy, and his 
 appointment was understood to imply a restoration 
 of the system of government which had existed under 
 Lord Westmorland. Pitt had now determined 
 not to pursue the policy to which the Act of 1793 
 and the appointment of Fitzwilliam had apparently 
 committed him. Riots took place in Dublin, all 
 hope of satisfying the extreme Catholics was at an 
 end, and the Catholic population became the tools 
 of the revolutionary Society of United Irishmen. 
 One result of this action on the part of the Catholics 
 was to throw the majority of the northern Protestants, 
 whether Churchmen or Presbyterians, on the side 
 of the Government. In 1795 the Orange Society 
 was formed in Ulster, and henceforward was the 
 
 1 John Beresforcl, who was dismissed from his post by 
 Fitzwilliam, was a leader of the Protestant Ascendancy 
 party, and was virtually King of Ireland.
 
 THE REBELLION OF 1798 19 
 
 centre of the opposition to Defenderism, as the 
 Catholic organisation was called. On September 
 21st, 1795, the Battle of the Diamond (so-called from 
 the name of the hamlet where it took place) was fought 
 between the contending parties, resulting in a victory 
 for the Protestants. Henceforward till the Union, 
 Ireland was the scene of anarchy, which in 1798 
 developed into a definite rebellion on the part of 
 the Catholics and the United Irishmen. 
 
 The increasing anarchy in Ireland seemed to 
 arouse at times a certain amount of attention in 
 England. One of Maria Josepha Holroyd's friends 
 wrote, in July, 1795, and told her that she had lately 
 heard from the Rev. G. Coxe, who found on his 
 arrival in the neighbourhood of Kelly that the 
 ' Defenders " had again become very daring ; 
 ' burning houses, laming cattle, and roasting people 
 " alive (!) : harassing the military, who are day and 
 " night out." 
 
 Such indications of the condition of Ireland as are 
 given in the above letter were valuable, in that they 
 brought home to residents in England the misery 
 which was caused to dwellers in Ireland by the 
 anarchic conditions which prevailed in many parts 
 of the island. 
 
 Castlereagh had now attained to a position of Castlereagh 
 considerable importance in Ireland. In the Irish an <* the 
 House of Commons he had ably defended Ireland's Jf^tJS" 
 trade, and in April, 1798, his talents and patriotism 
 were recognised by the bestowal upon him of the 
 Freedom of the City of Dublin. On the gold box 
 which was presented with it is inscribed the fact 
 that the Freedom of the City was conferred upon 
 Castlereagh in testimony of the high esteem which
 
 20 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 / 
 
 
 was entertained for his wisdom, talents, and 
 patriotism. Those qualities were already required 
 by the young statesman, for the "famous rebellion 
 of 1798 was on the verge of breaking out. That 
 rebellion, while tending towards the dismemberment 
 of the Empire, was also directed against " the persons 
 ' and property of the well affected, and against the 
 ' Courts of Justice." But the main object of the 
 leaders of the rebellion was " A republican form of 
 ' government, and separation from England, and 
 ' not Catholic emancipation or the establishment 
 ' of the Catholic religion." Wolfe Tone's corre- 
 spondence leaves no doubt on this matter. " To 
 ' subvert the tyranny of our execrable government, 
 ' to break the connexion with England, the never- 
 ' failing source of our political evils, and to assert 
 ' the independence of my country, these were my 
 ' objects." These words, written by Tone, express 
 with great candour the aims which he and his fellow 
 conspirators hoped to achieve. " No fact can be 
 " more established than that the Society of United 
 " Irishmen from the first moment of its institution 
 " has been with respect to its leading members a 
 " band of systematic traitors." And it is apparent 
 that the most vigorous measures on the part of the 
 Government were necessary and justifiable. 
 
 Castlereagh was largely responsible for the 
 administration during the rebellion, and urged that 
 its suppression should be carried out by a proper 
 military force, and not entrusted to local Orange 
 Volunteers. " I consider," he wrote to Pitt, " it 
 " peculiarly advantageous that we shall owe our 
 " security so entirely to the interposition of Great 
 '' Britain. I have always been apprehensive of
 
 ALEXANDER KNOX 21 
 
 " that false confidence which might arise from an 
 " impression that security had been obtained by 
 " our own exertions. Nothing would tend to make 
 " the public mind impracticable with a view to that 
 " future settlement without which we can never 
 " hope for any permanent tranquillity." There is 
 no doubt that Castlereagh was right, and that 
 English soldiers alone should have been used. As 
 it was, the Yeomanry who were mainly though not 
 entirely Protestant, and who numbered some 37,000, 
 saved Ireland. Their employment, however, only 
 strengthened the traditional hatred between the 
 Catholics and Protestants. 
 
 During the troubled period of the rebellion, Alexander 
 Castlereagh received admirable assistance from his Knox and 
 secretary, Alexander Knox. This remarkable man, | ri e shl ^eJ, e 
 who was three years older than Castlereagh, had 
 studied Irish politics in a most thorough manner. 
 At first, in agreement with Grattan, he had been 
 " a sincere and zealous advocate for a limited 
 ' parliamentary reform." But like all men of 
 statesmanlike views, he had viewed the methods 
 and policy of the United Irishmen with disfavour, 
 and opposed all concessions to such a revolutionary 
 organisation. In 1795, his " Essays on the Political 
 " Circumstances of Ireland " showed a remarkably 
 accurate acquaintance with the " true inwardness 
 " of the United Irish movement, long before the 
 " danger had been substantiated by the Reports 
 " of the Secret Parliamentary Committees, of the 
 " most instructive of which, that of the Irish House 
 " of Commons in 1798, Knox was himself to be the 
 "author." 1 
 
 1 Falkiner, " Studies in Irish Hi9tory," p. 61.
 
 22 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Suppression 
 of the 
 rebellion. 
 
 The year 1798 proved the turning point in the 
 history of the rebellious movements in Ireland. The 
 United Irishmen were in close correspondence with 
 the London Corresponding Society, and treasonable 
 designs, some even involving the murder of the king, 
 were discussed. In February the Irish Revolutionary 
 Committee resolved to agree to no terms which did 
 not provide for the total separation of Ireland from 
 Great Britain. To this resolution the Irish Govern- 
 ment replied by arresting on March 14th the whole 
 Executive Committee, fourteen in number, with 
 the exception of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, a younger 
 son of the Duke of Leinster, and nephew of the Duke 
 of Richmond. On May 19th, however, he was 
 arrested in Dublin after a violent struggle, and died 
 on June 4th. The prospects of the rebels were 
 practically ruined by the death of their able leader. 
 The rebellion had broken out on May 23rd, 1798, 
 and the excesses of the rebels so alarmed the English 
 Government that, yielding to Castlereagh's repeated 
 demands, reinforcements were sent from England. 
 With these troops General Lake attacked the rebel 
 forces on Vinegar Hill, on June 21st. The rebels 
 had 14,000 men and 13 guns, while Lake had only 
 10,000. The royal troops, however, soon proved their 
 superiority, and aided by the militia won a decisive 
 victory. 
 
 On June 22nd Castle reagh wrote to General Lake 
 pointing out that while the leaders were just objects 
 of punishment, the mass of the rebels " were mere 
 " instruments in the hands of the more wicked." 
 He recognized that among the rebels there was an 
 irreconcilable minority which was thoroughly disloyal 
 and which considered that it was perfectly justifiable
 
 LORD CORNWALLIS 23 
 
 to invite a French invasion. In a memoir signed by 
 A. O'Connor, Thomas Emmet, and W. J. Macnevin, 
 it was stated that " the people (under certain con- 
 " ditions) had a right to resist, and were free to 
 " seek for allies wherever they were to be found. 
 " The English revolutionists of 1688 had called in 
 " the assistance of a foreign republic to overthrow 
 " their oppressors." 
 
 Castlereagh, into whose hands the above memoir The Views 
 had fallen, became quite convinced in 1798 that of Castle- 
 the only way to make Ireland a loyal member of rw^fnis 
 the Empire was to effect a Legislative Union. And 
 henceforward all his efforts were directed to that 
 end. On June 11th, Cornwallis had succeeded 
 Camden as Viceroy, and at once concurred with 
 Castlereagh in ordering the adoption of merciful 
 measures to the vanquished. The appointment of 
 Cornwallis as successor of Camden was undoubtedly 
 a wise measure. The latter had been practically 
 pledged to resist concessions to the Roman Catholics, 
 and was connected in men's minds with the recall 
 of Fitzwilliam. Cornwallis, whose name is usually 
 associated with the disaster at Yorktown, had 
 shown considerable capacity during the period of 
 his Governor-Generalship in India. He was well 
 fitted for the difficult task of ruling Ireland at this 
 critical time. Honest, straightforward, patriotic, 
 Cornwallis was an admirable example of that 
 devotion to duty which characterized the most 
 distinguished Englishmen of that day. The task 
 before him was a most difficult one, for it was nothing 
 less than to carry a Legislative Union between England 
 and Ireland. 
 
 On his arrival in Ireland, he at once endeavoured
 
 24 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 to remove the religious element from the struggle, 
 and to substitute the word Jacobinism for Catholicism 
 as the foundation of the rebellion. 
 
 In his correspondence, Cornwallis spoke in the 
 highest terms of the services which Castlereagh had 
 performed during this anxious period. Both men 
 were in favour of acting liberally towards the 
 insurgents, but their views were not fully endorsed 
 by the English Government, which, however, 
 appreciated Castlereagh's generous views with regard 
 to the difficult question of Catholic emancipation, 
 and recognised that he and Cornwallis were 
 admirably adapted for furthering the scheme for a 
 union of England and Ireland. 
 
 From the moment of his arrival, Cornwallis 
 insisted that the rebellion was Jacobin, and neither 
 religious nor national. While he gave no mercy to 
 those who held Jacobin opinions, he attempted 
 to conciliate the Catholics by publishing an amnesty 
 for all who would lay down their arms. In the 
 words of Castlereagh, it was the earnest wish of both 
 himself and Cornwallis that " the amnesty should 
 " have all the grace possible, and be pushed as far 
 " as compatible with the public safety." Owing, 
 however, to the intervention of the English 
 Government, the exceptions insisted upon were 
 very numerous, and the amnesty consequently 
 did not have the full effect designed by its 
 The French authors. 
 
 expedition gy man y the amnesty was regarded as a sign of 
 
 to Ireland, , , , j 
 
 1798. weakness, and anarchy reigned over many parts 
 
 The of Ireland. The suppression of the roving bands 
 
 Castlebar Q f re b e i s took some months, and was enlivened by 
 1798.' the landing of a French force in Killala Bay in
 
 HUMBERT'S EXPEDITION 25 
 
 August. Under General Humbert 800 Frenchmen 
 aided by 1,000 armed Irish peasants, put to flight 
 some 2,000 disaffected militia in a battle known as 
 the Castlebar Races. But Lord Cornwallis with 
 some reliable troops, acting in conjunction with 
 Admiral Warren, who destroyed the French squadron 
 which was bringing reinforcements, forced the 
 invaders to surrender on September 8th. The 
 disaffected militia were no longer employed, and 
 their place was taken by English and Scottish 
 regiments. The failure of the French invasion 
 lessened the confidence of the rebellious Irish in their 
 power to resist the Government, and Castlereagh con- 
 sidered it " peculiarly advantageous that we " shall 
 owe our security so entirely to the interposition 
 " of Great Britain." 
 
 The rebellion was over, but Ireland had suffered Union with 
 much from the devastation caused by the years En s land 
 of strife. Moreover, the danger of renewed French 
 invasions still remained. It was evident that the 
 whole system of the Government of Ireland must, 
 without any delay, be entirely remodelled. The 
 only satisfactory safeguard against a continuance 
 of anarchy, and against a renewal of French attempts 
 lay, in the opinion of Pitt and Castlereagh, in a close 
 union between England and Ireland. 
 
 [The quotations from Castlereagh's letters and speeches 
 are taken from Alison's " Life of Castlereagh."]
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE UNION 
 
 The The events of the late rebellion in Ireland, and the 
 
 necessity continued threats of a French invasion tended to 
 Union strengthen Castlereagh's conviction that a Union was 
 
 necessary. The strife of parties in Ireland was so 
 deep-rooted and bitter, that in his opinion unless 
 the whole system of government was changed, and 
 the island ruled on imperial principles, there was 
 no chance of Ireland remaining a possession of Great 
 Britain. Pelham had definitely resigned his post 
 of Chief Secretary in November, 1798, as he was 
 strongly opposed to any concessions to the Roman 
 Catholics, and it was left to Castlereagh, his successor, 
 and to Cornwallis, the successor of Camden, to carry 
 out the Union of Ireland with England. Both men 
 had already declared their views. The Union of 
 England and Ireland together with Catholic emanci- 
 pation would in their opinion bring peace to Ireland, 
 which would in future be a source of strength and 
 not an element of weakness to England. On this 
 subject Cornwallis had already written strongly to 
 Pitt, and stated that, " if it is in contemplation ever 
 " to extend the privileges of the Union to the Roman 
 " Catholics, the present appears to be the only 
 " opportunity which the British ministry can have 
 " of obtaining any credit from the boon which must 
 " otherwise in a short time be extorted from them." 1 
 
 1 This happened in 1829. 
 
 26
 
 PITT AND CASTLEREAGH 27 
 
 In spite of the pressing exigencies of the war with Castle- 
 France, Pitt's attention was absorbed in the Irish "agh 
 problem, and he fully agreed with the views of secretary. 
 Castlereagh and Cornwallis. The resignation of 
 Pelham had enabled him to appoint Castlereagh 
 as Chief Secretary, and that in spite of the rule 
 hitherto observed, that the Chief Secretary should 
 not be an Irishman. At first Pitt had been reluctant 
 to break the rule, but as early as August, 1798, he 
 had been so impressed by the ability and impartiality 
 shown by Castlereagh during the rebellion, that he 
 had decided to nominate Castlereagh as Pelham's 
 successor as soon as the latter should have resigned. 
 Castlereagh's definite appointment as Chief Secretary 
 gave the greatest satisfaction to Cornwallis, who in a 
 letter to the Duke of Portland spoke in the highest 
 terms of Castlereagh's intimate knowledge of the 
 characters and connexions of the principal 
 personages in Ireland. " He is," declared Cornwallis, 
 " so very unlike an Irishman " that, " although I 
 " admit the propriety of the general rule, I think 
 " he has a just claim to an exception in his favour." 
 
 Castlereagh had indeed shown a remarkable 
 aptitude for his difficult post, and Pitt was fully 
 capable of estimating at their real value the judg- 
 ment, talents and tact that the young Irishman had 
 already shown during the trying period of the 
 rebellion. 
 
 No man was better fitted to carry the Union in the The Views 
 
 of Castle- 
 Irish House of Commons, of which he was now ex reag h and 
 
 officio the leader. The difficulties before him and Cornwallis. 
 
 Cornwallis were immense. Both men recognised 
 
 that under the existing system justice to the Catholics 
 
 was impossible, and that there was no hope of
 
 28 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 securing the admission of the Catholics to the Irish 
 Parliament. It was also equally apparent to them 
 that the admission of the Catholics, who were in a 
 large majority in the country, to the Irish Parliament 
 would be immediately followed by the permanent 
 predominance of Catholicism in Ireland, and by the 
 confiscation of the property of the Protestants. 
 Any attempt, therefore, to admit Catholic represen- 
 tatives into the Irish Parliament would be at once 
 followed by a civil war of extermination. The 
 Catholic rebels were still openly bent on the extermin- 
 ation of the Orangemen, while the Protestants never 
 ceased attacking the Government for its leniency 
 towards the Catholic rebels. 
 The In spite of much that has been said to the contrary, 
 
 necessity ft seems certain that, although the idea and 
 Union. expediency of a legislative union had been at times 
 
 considered by Pitt and other statesmen, there 
 existed before the rebellion in 1798 no definite 
 project for bringing about such a measure. And 
 even as late as June 20th, 1798, the date of the 
 landing of Lord Cornwallis in Ireland, there was no 
 intention on the part of the English Cabinet to 
 effect a union. Shortly, however, after his arrival 
 in Ireland, the idea was definitely broached, and 
 Castlereagh received a letter from Lord Camden 
 in which it was stated that " the King and every 
 " one of his ministers are inclined to an Union, and 
 " it will certainly be taken into consideration here." 
 Castlereagh had long been in favour of the union, 
 and when in the autumn of 1798 he and Cornwallis 
 consulted several leading Irish politicians, they were 
 much gratified to find that " the difficulties and 
 " disadvantages of the present system " were pretty
 
 THE QUESTION OF UNION 29 
 
 generally recognised, though opinions as to the best 
 remedy widely differed. 
 
 Pitt had already made up his mind that union 
 was absolutely necessary. The rebellion had shown 
 that in a great struggle such as Great Britain was 
 then carrying on with the French Revolution, the 
 constitution which had been granted to Ireland in 
 1782 was a source of danger to the Empire, and that 
 it was imperative that a legislative union between 
 Ireland and Great Britain must be effected without 
 delay. Without such a Union Ireland had no 
 chance of securing tranquillity. The rebellion had 
 left the Protestants and Catholics arrayed against 
 one another, and though the latter had in 1793 
 obtained the suffrage, it was impossible to grant 
 them emancipation, seeing that they far outnumbered 
 the Protestants. Pitt therefore resolved to bring 
 about a legislative union between Ireland and Great 
 Britain, but after October, 1798, owing it is said to 
 the arguments advanced by Lord Clare, who visited 
 him at Holwood, he seems to have recognised that 
 emancipation must follow and not be coupled with 
 his scheme of a union. 
 
 That Pitt, Cornwallis and Castlereagh were Its Justi- 
 justified in insisting upon the union there can be Nations, 
 little doubt. The " Grattan Constitution " had 
 practically been a failure ; the treasonable intercourse 
 of Wolfe Tone and Fitzgerald with the French had 
 revealed a constant and immense danger to England, 
 the outbreak of the rebellion of 1798, and rendered 
 it impossible to prolong the period of legislative 
 independence. Had Pitt carried his original scheme 
 with regard to Irish commerce, and had it been 
 rendered impossible for the two legislatures to adopt
 
 30 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 divergent lines of policy on important, nay vital 
 constitutional questions, the development of Irish 
 history after 1782 might have taken a course widely 
 different from that which ended in treasonable 
 negotiations with France and the rebellion of 1798. 
 But Pitt, Cornwallis and Castlereagh all intended 
 that a measure of Catholic emancipation, i.e., the 
 final removal of Catholic disabilities, should 
 accompany or immediately follow the union. 
 Agitation T n October, 1798, the leading Dublin newspaper 
 
 had sounded the alarm, and from that time till the 
 union was effected, Ireland was rent by dissensions. 
 Had it not been for the rebellion of 1798 the English 
 Government could not have hoped to find any 
 support in Ireland for their proposal. But the 
 alarms and disturbances which preceded the 
 rebellion, together with the discredit into which 
 the Irish Parliament had fallen, shook the confidence 
 of many in the existing system of government, and 
 rendered them ready to consider the question of 
 union. A large number of the Protestants in Ireland 
 now realised that at any moment their lives might 
 be at the mercy of the Catholic population, and that 
 the presence of a strong English force was necessary 
 for their protection. The Catholics on their part 
 resented the triumph of the insulting Orange faction, 
 and owing to their exclusion from Parliament 
 saw no chance of relief so long as the present 
 governmental system existed. Castlereagh relied 
 to a great extent upon the realisation of the Irish 
 Protestants that they owed their safety to English 
 aid. But, unfortunately, that aid had not arrived 
 till the crisis was over, and the Protestants, attributing 
 the late anarchy to the concession, by England's
 
 THE POLITICAL SITUATION 31 
 
 influence, of the suffrage to the Catholics, maintained 
 that their ascendancy was absolutely necessary for 
 the welfare of the country. Grattan and his 
 followers were united in resisting the idea that union 
 was the only cure for Ireland's evils. Given 
 parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, and 
 the commutation of tithes, they were convinced 
 that the condition of Ireland would rapidly improve. 
 But Castlereagh never showed any liking for 
 Grattan 's desire to see Catholics in the Irish Parliament 
 Like Pitt, he recognised that their admission would be a 
 most dangerous experiment, and would at once provoke 
 a civil war. One of the chief reasons for his advocacy 
 of the Union was that it would lead to the emancipa- 
 tion of the Catholics, and at the same time would 
 remove all danger of their political preponderance in 
 Ireland. 
 
 Thus while it may be said that a large majority 
 of the Protestants were opposed to any measure 
 which might threaten their ascendancy, the Catholics 
 were on the whole not opposed to the idea of a union, 
 so long as they had ' ' reason to expect that Union 
 ' would be followed by emancipation, a provision 
 ' for the clergy, which would entail a royal power 
 " of veto over episcopal appointments, and the 
 " commutation of tithe." 
 
 In November, 1798, Castlereagh wrote that " there situation 
 " appears no indisposition on the part of the leading a * the end 
 " Catholics — on the contrary I believe they will ° * 79 ' 
 " consider any transference of power from their 
 "opponents as a boon." Persistent efforts were 
 being made at this time by Castlereagh to influence 
 not only the borough owners but also public opinion 
 generally. The chief provincial newspapers were 
 
 The
 
 32 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 bought, and every possible attention was paid to 
 the press. Payments were made to the Catholic 
 priests and to Presbyterian ministers with a view 
 of securing their support. 
 
 The opinions, too, of many Protestants seemed 
 to justify Castlereagh's hope that even in Ulster 
 support would be obtained for a union between 
 Great Britain and Ireland. The prospect of free 
 trade with England and tithe legislation as results 
 of the Union induced many manufacturers and 
 others in Ulster to favour the project, and moreover 
 not a few of the northern republicans who realised 
 the dangers arising from the possible supremacy of 
 the Roman Catholics agreed with the views already 
 expressed by Wolfe Tone, that failing separation, 
 a union with England was desirable. A union 
 appeared to several of these northern republicans 
 as unlikely to damage Ireland politically, but 
 certain to benefit her commercially. 
 
 In November, 1798, Cooke, the Irish Under- 
 Secretary, drew up and issued a pamphlet giving 
 the official statement of the case and advocating 
 the intending union. Though published anony- 
 mously, its importance was at once recognized, and 
 it had an immense circulation. At the opening of 
 1799 it would seem that on the whole the attitude 
 of Ulster was encouraging. " The measure," wrote 
 Castlereagh, " as yet had made no sensation in the 
 " north." There was always the hope, which was 
 apparently well-founded, that the Belfast merchants 
 would recognise that a union would immensely 
 benefit the trade of Belfast. Before the end of 1798 
 Castlereagh had written in a still more favourable 
 tone : " The general disposition of the north is
 
 THE IRISH PARLIAMENT, 1799 33 
 
 " favourable to the measure, particularly the linen 
 " trade." 
 
 But though certain classes of manufacturers and 
 merchants might be favourable to the project of 
 union, and though the Catholics might be won over, 
 the decision of the matter lay with the Irish 
 Parliament. For carrying the measure through 
 Parliament, it was necessary to win over the borough 
 interest. Cornwallis was convinced that if the 
 borough owners realised that the Government was 
 in earnest they would support the union. Further, 
 in the autumn of 1799 Castlereagh had visited 
 London, and had been assured that the Cabinet 
 was favourable to the principle of Catholic 
 relief, though it was not thought expedient that 
 any direct assurance should be given to the 
 Catholics. 
 
 On January 22nd, 1799, the Irish Parliament Meeting of 
 met, and though the Union was not expressly the Irish 
 mentioned, the question was practically raised by tfjr'f!^*' 
 the King's Speech, which recommended " some 
 " permanent adjustment, which may extend the 
 " advantages enjoyed by our sister kingdom to every 
 " part of this island." For some weeks previously 
 the Castle authorities had undoubtedly attempted 
 by means of corruption to win votes, and after a 
 debate which lasted more than twenty hours the 
 Government carried the address by one vote. 
 However, when the report of the address was 
 discussed, the opposition to the Union carried by 
 a majority of five a motion to omit the clause relating 
 to the Union. The defeat 
 
 The defeat of the Government was the signal for 2? th ® 
 wild rejoicings in Dublin, which was illuminated, ment. 
 
 3— (221 1).
 
 resolution. 
 
 34 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castlereagh, in explaining the defeat which the 
 administration had received, acknowledged that the 
 opposition was mainly composed of country gentle- 
 men. These, it must be remembered, represented 
 public opinion, while many of those who voted 
 with the Government held offices under the Crown. 
 Pitt's _ It was only the firm conviction of Pitt and the 
 
 English Government that the precarious position of 
 the British Isles then threatened by French attacks 
 made a union absolutely necessary, that justified 
 their perseverance in a measure so distasteful to the 
 real representatives of the Irish people. 
 
 Pitt himself never flinched from his resolution to 
 effect the Union, and on January 31st, after the 
 arrival of the result of the debate in the Irish House 
 of Commons, he made a powerful speech in its favour. 
 The distribution of 10,000 copies of this speech in 
 Ireland would, it was hoped, have some effect upon 
 the trend of public opinion, and at the same time 
 Castlereagh began to make arrangements for granting 
 pecuniary compensation to the boroughs. The very 
 violent attitude of Dublin to the idea of Union only 
 convinced Castlereagh of the necessity of pressing on 
 the measure. " The language and conduct, both 
 ' within and without doors," he wrote, " has been 
 " such on a late occasion as to satisfy every thinking 
 " man that if the two countries are not speedily incor- 
 " porated, they will ere long be committed against 
 "each other." And though the independent members 
 in the Irish House of Commons, headed by Foster, 
 the Speaker, and aided by his brilliant speeches, might 
 make a brave show, the fact remained that the late 
 rebellion had rekindled the bitter animosities that 
 divided the Protestants from the Catholics, and that
 
 PITT'S DETERMINATION 35 
 
 there was continual danger of another civil war so long 
 as the Established Church was " opposed to the 
 religion " of the great majority of the country," and 
 so long as " the land remained in the hands of a small 
 " Protestant minority." 
 
 It must be remembered, too, that a large propor- Justifica- 
 tion of the Catholics in 1799 were in favour of the p° t " s ° f 
 Union, as were the linen merchants and the greater attitude, 
 part of the inhabitants of Londonderry. Moreover, 
 anarchy continued to reign in Mayo and Galway, 
 and it is said that in that part of Ireland property 
 to the amount of £100,000 was destroyed in two 
 months. " Hordes of armed ruffians .... 
 ' ' traversed the country every night .... houghing 
 " the cattle of gentlemen and farmers, and murdering 
 " all who dared to oppose them." Juries were 
 intimidated, and dared not convict, and few men 
 had the courage to prosecute. Robbery and murder 
 was, however, by no means confined to Connaught ; 
 the neighbourhood of Dublin itself was equally 
 insecure ; and the whole of the south was disaffected 
 and ready to welcome a French invasion. A 
 Coercion Act became absolutely necessary, and the 
 realisation of its necessity convinced many that the 
 Union alone would restore tranquillity to Ireland. 
 Before 1799 had proceeded far, the condition of 
 Ireland more than justified Pitt and Castlereagh 
 in pushing on the Union. The bad harvest of 1799 
 aggravated the general misery, while the tendency 
 to rebellion and the desire for a French invasion 
 seemed steadily to increase. Castle- 
 
 The means by which the minority in the Irish reagh's 
 Parliament in favour of the Union was converted Measures 
 into a majority are well known. While the soul the Union.
 
 36 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 of Cornwallis revolted against the corruption by 
 which alone success could be attained, Castlereagh 
 " pursued his course with a quiet, businesslike 
 " composure." His task was, in his own words, 
 " to buy out and secure to the Crown for ever, 
 " the fee simple of Irish corruption which had so 
 " long enfeebled the powers of government and 
 " endangered the connexion." To men of that 
 day there was nothing especially repellent in the 
 means taken to carry the Union. Mr. Lecky points 
 out that " the heads of the Catholic Church, and 
 " nearly all the heads of the Established Church in 
 " Ireland approved of what he was doing," and he 
 further notes that Wilberforce showed no dis- 
 approbation at the manner in which the Union was 
 carried. Castlereagh himself, in a letter to 
 Alexander Knox, his private Secretary, declares 
 that the measures which he and others had to take 
 were pursued honestly in the interests of Ireland. 
 The method adopted for securing a majority in the 
 Irish Parliament for the Union was bribery of the 
 borough-owners. 236 members sat for 118 boroughs, 
 a large number of which would be disfranchised 
 by a union. The compensation of the owners was 
 perfectly justifiable, and moreover was essential for 
 the success of Pitt's policy. Eventually the price 
 of each borough was fixed at £15,000, and eighty-four 
 were disfranchised. Bribery, however, played a con- 
 siderable part in the history of the Union. During 
 1800 numerous vacancies occurred in the Irish House 
 of Commons, and many of these were filled up by 
 Government nominees. Moreover, a certain number 
 of peerages were conferred, and a large number 
 of places and pensions were given away in order
 
 HIS JUSTIFICATION 37 
 
 to strengthen the Unionist party in the Irish 
 Parliament. 
 
 Mr. Hunt, in his history of England from 1760 to His Justi- 
 1801, has put the whole matter in a very concise fication. 
 form. " Pitt," he writes, " did not corrupt the 
 ' Irish Parliament ; it was corrupt already ; he 
 " merely continued the immemorial methods of 
 " dealing with it on a larger scale than before. 
 " Nobles and gentry chose to sell themselves, and 
 " in order to rid Ireland of a source of trouble and 
 " danger, and Great Britain of a cause of weakness, 
 " he paid them their price." 1 
 
 Castlereagh held the same opinion, and looked 
 upon the whole matter from a business point of 
 view. The borough owners had their price, and 
 it was Castlereagh 's business to pay it. He was 
 convinced that only by a process of wholesale 
 corruption could the Union be carried, and that by 
 " one supreme, shameless, wholesale effort he could 
 "put an end to it for ever." The carrying of the 
 Union thus meant the end of a system maintained 
 for many years by corruption, and dependent upon 
 the ascendancy of a narrow-minded Protestant 
 minority whose supremacy was detested by the 
 mass of the Irish people. 
 
 The last session of the Irish Parliament was The last 
 opened on January 15th, 1800, and on February session of 
 17th a resolution in favour of a legislative union SJ^ J^jSL* 
 between Great Britain and Ireland was carried by 1800. 
 a majority of 46. During the previous four weeks 
 the debate on the question of Union raised by an 
 amendment to the address by Sir Lawrence Parsons, 
 
 1 Hunt : " History of England from 1760 to 1801," p. 449. 
 (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1907.)
 
 38 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 pledging the House to maintain an Independent 
 Parliament in Ireland, had produced speeches of 
 unusual merit. On January 15th the debate lasted 
 for eighteen hours, and was remarkable for the 
 fierce tone of the speeches. Castlereagh showed 
 coolness and courage in the face of the storm, and 
 opened the debate by declaring that the project of 
 Union " was now approved by a great majority of the 
 " people." The Opposition emphatically denied the 
 truth of this statement, and received support from 
 the Ulster Orangemen, who were now opponents of 
 the Union, and from all classes in Dublin which 
 derived much benefit from the presence of Parlia- 
 ment. After the debate had continued for fifteen 
 hours, Grattan, who was suffering from the effects of 
 severe illness, appeared and made a memorable 
 speech in favour of the continued existence of the 
 Irish Parliament. 
 
 In spite of his eloquence, the amendment was 
 rejected on the morning of January 16th by 138 
 Foster and v °tes to 96. On February 5th Castlereagh moved 
 Plunket. in an able speech the formal introduction of the 
 Union. He pointed out that the Scottish Union 
 had encountered opposition similar to that with 
 which the project of an Irish Union was now meeting, 
 and he declared that lighter taxation would be 
 a result of the Union. Without promising Catholic 
 emancipation, he contented himself with sajang 
 that " strength and confidence would produce 
 " liberality," and that " an arrangement, both for 
 " the Catholic and Dissenting clergy, had been long 
 " in the contemplation of his Majesty's Government." 
 The speech was a long, elaborate, and weighty 
 defence of the policy of the Government, and on 
 
 Speeches of 
 Castle- 
 reagh,
 
 THE UNION EFFECTED 39 
 
 February 6th (the debate having lasted from four 
 o'clock on the 5th till one o'clock on the following 
 afternoon) , when the division was taken, the opposition 
 could only muster 115 votes to their opponents' 158. 
 Even now all cause for anxiety had not disappeared. 
 Some supporters of the Union refused to vote for it 
 till the nation had been consulted, and Lord 
 Cornwallis wrote on January 31st that " the clamour 
 ' against the Union is increasing rapidly. . . . The 
 ' Roman Catholics .... are joining the standard 
 " of opposition, to which they have been much 
 " impelled by the imprudent speeches and the abuse 
 " cast on them by our friends." On February 17th, 
 when the Union passed into Committee, Foster, the 
 Speaker, made a remarkable speech against the 
 Union, but neither his arguments nor the continual 
 opposition of Plunket to the measure were of any 
 avail. Plunket had been for many years the fore- 
 most champion of the Catholic cause ; he was an 
 equally strong opponent of the Union. In January, 
 1799, his speech it was said decided the question 
 against the Government, and throughout the debates 
 upon the Union the " invective of his speeches, and 
 " particularly of his attacks upon Castlereagh .... 
 " rises to an extraordinary pitch of passionate 
 " vehemence." During the stormy controversies 
 of the Union, the question of the defence of Ireland 
 against French invasions did not occupy, as it should 
 have, done, the chief place. And yet it seems clear 
 that until the Union was accomplished Ireland was 
 constantly in danger of being subdued by a French 
 expedition. 
 
 On March 28th, 1800, the Union was carried in The Union, 
 both Houses, and the Irish Parliament adjourned
 
 40 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 to give time for the British Parliament to consider 
 and pass the resolutions. Cornwallis remained very 
 anxious. "The word Union," he wrote, "will not 
 " cure the evils of this wretched country. It is a 
 " necessary preliminary, but a great deal more must 
 " be done." In May the British Parliament had 
 agreed to the resolutions, which were sent back to 
 Ireland, where on May 26th the Bill was read for a 
 second time. In June the Union was finally effected, 
 and the Bill received the royal assent on August 1st. 
 The question of Catholic emancipation remained 
 unsettled. Pitt, Dundas and Cornwallis had wished 
 to make Catholic emancipation part of the Union, 
 and when that was found to be impracticable, it was 
 generally understood that on the first opportunity 
 the ministry would introduce the measure of Catholic 
 emancipation in Parliament. Pitt was honestly 
 determined to do justice to the Catholics, and 
 regarded Catholic emancipation as more important 
 even than the Union. The Union was, in his view, 
 merely a necessary preliminary to Catholic 
 emancipation, and with this view Cornwallis and 
 Castlereagh fully concurred. 
 
 On August 2nd, 1800, the Irish Parliament was 
 prorogued. It never sat again. Castlereagh, whose 
 skill as a parliamentary leader was now fully 
 acknowledged, only regarded the Union as a 
 preliminary measure. He seems to have been 
 convinced that the Union would do little by itself, 
 and that the admission of Catholics to Parliament 
 and to public offices was absolutely necessary. He 
 was in London in the autumn of 1800, and pressed 
 the question of emancipation upon the Cabinet. 
 By means of Catholic emancipation and the other
 
 OPTIMISM 41 
 
 measures which have been alluded to, he was 
 convinced that the Irish Catholics would become 
 attached to the English connexion, and that the 
 spirit of disaffection would disappear. With these 
 views Pitt fully concurred. But they had not 
 reckoned upon the King. 
 
 [The quotations from Castlereagh's speeches are taken from 
 Alison's " Lives of Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart."]
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 The 
 
 question of 
 the Irish 
 peerages. 
 
 Castlereagh 
 and 
 
 Catholic 
 emancipa- 
 tion. 
 
 THE FALL OF PITT S MINISTRY 
 1801 
 
 No sooner was the Union carried than Castlereagh 
 met with unexpected difficulties with regard to 
 certain promises which he had made relative to the 
 grant of sixteen peerages. In consultation with Pitt 
 both he and Cornwallis had been given to understand 
 that sixteen peerages would be granted to certain 
 influential supporters of the Union. After the pass- 
 ing of the Union Bill Cornwallis sent to Portland a list 
 of the sixteen peerages which he had promised, but to 
 his astonishment he received a letter on June 13th 
 from the minister declining to submit more than half 
 the names to George III. Both Castlereagh and Corn- 
 wallis at once decided to resign. In a letter to Lord 
 Camden, written on June 18th, 1800, Castlereagh spoke 
 in a most decided fashion : — " If the Irish Govern - 
 " ment is not enabled to keep faith with the various 
 " individuals who have acted upon a principle of 
 " confidence in their honour, it is morally impossible 
 " that either Lord Cornwallis or I can remain in our 
 " present situation ; ... it will remain a breach of 
 " faith, as injurious to the character of Government 
 " as to our own, having given an assurance, which we 
 " were not enabled to fulfil." 
 
 In two subsequent letters on June 21st and June 
 25th to Mr. Cooke, Under-Secretary for Ireland, 
 Castlereagh speaks in almost stronger terms of the 
 necessity of carrying out the promised arrangements. 
 
 42
 
 RECOGNITION 43 
 
 The idea of breaking faith on the first possible occa- 
 sion with those who had served the Government so 
 well, seems to indicate that the British ministry had 
 never realized the nature of the struggle in which 
 Castlereagh had been engaged for two years. It 
 seems incredible that the Government should have 
 been willing to run the risk of alienating the leading 
 Irish supporters of the Union at a time so critical in 
 the history of Great Britain. How far Portland's 
 attitude was due to the opposition of the King to 
 the creation of the peerages is not known. At any 
 rate, and fortunately for Portland, the conduct of 
 Castlereagh and Cornwallis had the desired effect. 
 
 That it required the threatened resignations of Recogni- 
 Cornwallis and Castlereagh to induce the British £°" tl °_ f 
 Government to carry out what amounted to solemn rea gh's 
 promises is a sufficient proof of the general ignorance Services, 
 that prevailed in England, and even among Cabinet 
 ministers, of the political situation in Ireland. That 
 the services of Castlereagh were fully appreciated is, 
 however, seen from a letter of the Duke of Portland, 
 written on June 27th, 1800. Castlereagh had every 
 right to ask that a British peerage should be conferred 
 on his father, Lord Londonderry. But so many 
 peerages had to be created in 1800 that both Castle- 
 reagh and Londonderry agreed not to press their 
 claims. The gratification felt by the Government 
 in this act of abnegation is shown in a letter written on 
 June 27th, 1800, by Portland to Cornwallis, in which 
 he authorizes the latter to assure Londonderry and 
 Castlereagh that the King will confer the British 
 peerage on Lord Londonderry, or any of his 
 descendants, whenever he or any of the latter should 
 express a desire to possess it.
 
 44 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 
 It would have been well for Ireland, and, indeed, 
 
 question of f or the British Empire, had the King been as acquies- 
 emancipa- cen * w ^ n re g ar d to the Catholic claims as he was with 
 tion. regard to the question of the Irish peerages. Though 
 
 no distinct pledge had been given, it was generally 
 recognised by both Cornwallis and Castlereagh, and, 
 indeed, by the leading Roman Catholics, that Catholic 
 emancipation would immediately follow the Union. 
 The necessity and justice of such a measure had been 
 recognised by all far-seeing statesmen. Canning, in 
 a speech in the House of Commons, had given as one 
 important reason for the Union, that when once the 
 Irish Parliament should be united with that of Great 
 Britain it will become possible " to concede to the 
 " Catholics what may remain to be conceded, without 
 " the appearance of intimidation." To the Protes- 
 tants, one attractive feature of the Union was that it 
 freed them from all danger of a Catholic domination, 
 while to the Catholics the prospects of emancipation 
 induced them to favour the suppression of the Irish 
 Parliament. Such were the views of Canning, of 
 Pitt, and indeed of every responsible statesman at 
 that time. That the Union did not bring peace and 
 prosperity to Ireland, and that the changes following 
 that Union have not been as beneficial as were 
 anticipated, was due to a variety of causes. But the 
 chief cause undoubtedly was that the promised 
 emancipation of the Catholics did not immediately 
 follow the Union. In October, 1800, Lord Cornwallis, 
 in a letter to General Ross, indicates a fear on his part 
 that the English Cabinet was in danger of making a 
 fatal blunder. " I cannot help," he wrote, " enter- 
 " taining considerable apprehensions that our Cabinet 
 " will not have the firmness to adopt such measures
 
 CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION 45 
 
 " as will render the Union an efficient advantage to 
 " the Empire. Those things which, if now liberally 
 " granted, might make the Irish a loyal people, will 
 " be of little avail when they are extorted on a future 
 " day." These words, the importance of which can- 
 not be overestimated, indicate the well-considered 
 opinions of all who had studied the situation. To 
 Pitt, Castlereagh had submitted in the autumn of 
 1800 a memoir containing all the unanswerable 
 arguments on behalf of the immediate emancipation 
 of the Catholics, and on December 17th, 1800, he 
 went over to England in order to interview the 
 Government. He found on his arrival that the 
 King, who had lately become aware of the views 
 of Pitt, was resolutely set against Catholic emanci- 
 pation, which he regarded as a breach of his 
 coronation oath. 
 
 In a long and statesmanlike letter, Castlereagh, on Pitt's 
 January 1st, 1801, stated his views, which were, Jjjjjjjj® the 
 indeed, shared by Pitt. In that letter he declared Emancipa- 
 that only by holding out hopes of emancipation had tion . 
 he been able to secure the support or neutrality of the ques l 
 Catholics during the long and bitter struggle for the 
 Union. 
 
 In consequence of the assurances of the Cabinet he 
 and Cornwallis had not hesitated to call forth the 
 Catholics in favour of the Union. 
 
 But neither he nor Cornwallis had reckoned on the 
 extraordinary conduct of Pitt, who apparently had 
 not taken the King into his confidence on the subject, 
 nor on the equally extraordinary shortsightedness of 
 many members of the Cabinet, nor on their ignorance 
 of the state of Ireland and the immense, nay vital, 
 importance of the question. Nor could Castlereagh
 
 46 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 have reckoned on the existence of any opposition in 
 the Cabinet to emancipation, for in the autumn of 
 1799, when he came over to consult Pitt and his 
 colleagues with regard to the best means of carrying 
 the Union, the Cabinet were unanimous in favour of 
 the principle of Catholic relief. Further, he was then 
 authorized by the ministers to assure Cornwallis that 
 " he need not anticipate any difficulty in dealing with 
 " the Catholics, so far as the Cabinet were concerned ; 
 " and that he was fully warranted in soliciting from 
 " the Catholics every support for the Union which 
 " they could afford." The fears of Cornwallis and 
 Castlereagh were, indeed, justified. At the time of 
 George Fitzwilliam's recall the King had closely questioned 
 
 III 's fatal t} ie Chancellor with regard to Catholic emancipation, 
 tion. " anc * had asked whether, in his opinion, he (the King) 
 could consistently with his coronation oath consent 
 to a law freeing the Catholics and the Dissenters from 
 the disabilities and restrictions they were under. 
 This, and other questions of a like nature, showed 
 that as early as 1795 George was already considering 
 what his attitude should be towards Catholic emanci- 
 pation ; and it was at that time that, alluding to 
 Dundas, he said to the Chancellor that " he had 
 " among his ministers some most valuable men, 
 " but he did not like the mixture of Scotch 
 " metaphysics." 
 
 Nothing more seems to have passed between the 
 King and any of his ministers till October, 1800, 
 when a letter from Lord Clare was shown George by 
 Lord Westmorland. 
 
 In that letter Clare stated that the question of 
 Catholic emancipation was again to be raised, 
 whereupon the King became much agitated, and
 
 GEORGE III 47 
 
 gradually made up his mind to refuse his consent to 
 any measure giving the Catholics the right to sit in 
 Parliament. 
 
 Clare's information proved correct, for the Cabinet 
 in September had considered a paper sent by Lord 
 Castlereagh, containing three questions for discus- 
 sion : (1) A provision for the Catholic clergy, and if 
 granted a provision for the Dissenting clergy also ; 
 (2) The admission of Catholics to Parliament ; (3) 
 Some arrangement about tithes. Though Castlereagh, 
 who was present at the consultations of the Cabinet 
 in September, could declare that no actual engage- 
 ment had been made with the Catholics, there is no 
 doubt that the leading Catholics had been encouraged 
 to expect that emancipation would shortly follow 
 the Union. 
 
 In his " Diaries and Correspondence" 1 Mr. Rose 
 declares that the Cabinet in the autumn of 1800 were 
 divided on the subject, the members favourable to 
 emancipation being Pitt, Grenville, Dundas, Wind- 
 ham and Spencer ; while opposed to it were the 
 Chancellor, Portland, Westmorland, Liverpool and 
 Chatham. Nevertheless, in spite of the ominous 
 attitude of the King and of Lord Loughborough (the 
 Chancellor), Pitt continued to reassure Castlereagh. 
 As late as January 22nd, 1801, Cornwallis wrote to 
 Castlereagh, " All your last letters have administered 
 " real comfort to me. We shall now turn that great 
 ' ' measure of the Union to real profit, at the same 
 " time that we are adopting the only means of resisting 
 " the hostility of almost all Europe." 
 
 But neither Castlereagh nor Pitt seems to have 
 
 1 Rose : " Diaries and Correspondence," vol. I, p. 287 seq.
 
 48 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 realised the strength of the views held by the King 
 on the Catholic question. From some hitherto 
 unexplained reason Pitt had never explained to him 
 what had passed between the Cabinet and Castle- 
 reagh. The King, however, had gathered from other 
 sources that several members of the Cabinet were 
 favourable to emancipation, he had become very 
 alarmed, and was naturally indignant at the way in 
 which he had been treated. 
 
 Pitt, consequently, found himself in a very awkward 
 position. He had approved of the " engagements 
 " tacitly undertaken" by Cornwallis and Castlereagh, 
 and at the same time he felt unable to carry Catholic 
 emancipation against the strong opposition of 
 George III. On February 5th, 1801, Pitt resigned, 
 and with him Grenville, Spencer, Camden, Dundas 
 and Windham left the Cabinet. 
 Explana- Pitt had never realised the strength of the objec- 
 
 p?" oi tions felt by the King to Catholic emancipation. He 
 Conduct. had, too, entirely ignored the possibility of intrigues 
 on the part of any member of his party. He, there- 
 fore, took no steps in the autumn of 1800 to acquaint 
 the King with his own views and those of Cornwallis 
 and Castlereagh with regard to the Catholic question. 
 In the early autumn of that year he summoned a 
 Cabinet Council to discuss the matter. Before it 
 met on September 30th Loughborough, who had 
 been staying at Weymouth, showed the King Pitt's 
 letter, and at the Cabinet meeting declared his own 
 opposition to the admission of the Catholics to 
 Parliament. His declaration came like a thunderbolt 
 to his colleagues. Up to that moment Pitt had 
 apparently no idea that there would be any serious 
 opposition to his proposal, but he soon realised that
 
 FALL OF PITTS MINISTRY 49 
 
 some of his colleagues — Hawkesbury, Chatham, West- 
 morland, and Portland — did not agree with his views 
 on the subject. 
 
 Even after the Cabinet meeting, which was 
 adjourned, he continued to be quite unconscious of 
 the strength of the opposition which was rapidly 
 growing to any measure of Catholic relief. At the 
 time of Fitzwilliam's recall the King had made up his 
 mind that the admission of Catholics to Parliament 
 would be contrary to his coronation oath, and his 
 views had been reinforced by the written opinions of 
 the Primate of Ireland and of the Archbishop of 
 Canterbury. Knowing the difference of opinion in 
 the Cabinet, and, most unwisely, not thinking it 
 necessary to take the King into his confidence, Pitt 
 determined to carry the measure, and in January, 
 1801, assured Castlereagh of the fact. 
 
 On January 28th George made to Dundas the Pitt's 
 following remark at a levee : — " What is it this young resi 6 natlon - 
 " Lord (Castlereagh) has brought over which they 
 " are going to throw at my head ? The most Jaco- 
 ' binical thing I ever heard of" ! On January 29th 
 he said Addington had asked him to prevent Pitt 
 " from ever speaking on a subject on which he could 
 " scarcely keep his temper." On February 5th Pitt's 
 resignation was accepted. 
 
 There is no doubt that in not telling the King early 
 in 1800 that he contemplated bringing in a measure 
 of Catholic emancipation, Pitt made a grievous 
 blunder. Unintentionally, no doubt, he deceived 
 both Cornwallis and Castlereagh. Both these men 
 never doubted that Pitt would carry the measure, 
 and, in consequence, were led to adopt measures and 
 to make statements which placed them later in a 
 
 4— {2211)
 
 50 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 false position. It is not at all certain that under any 
 circumstances would he have been able to persuade 
 the King of the necessity of the measure, but at any 
 rate he would not have excited among the Catholics 
 hopes which could not be fulfilled, and the non-fulfil- 
 ment of which became one of the chief causes of the 
 future unrest in Ireland. 
 
 The seriousness of the crisis caused by Pitt's 
 resignation will be at once recognised when it is 
 remembered that Great Britain was in the throes of 
 war and threatened by the Northern Coalition. 
 That Pitt intended to grant Catholic emancipation 
 is undoubted. He continued to hope that after a 
 short period the King's opinions would change, and 
 that the ministers would be able to make the necessary 
 concession to the Catholics. That this was Pitt's 
 hope seems to be proved from a letter of Castlereagh 
 to Cornwallis four days after Pitt's resignation. In 
 that letter he says that it is Pitt's wish that " Corn- 
 " wallis, without bringing forward the King's name, 
 " should make the Catholics feel that an obstacle 
 " which the King's ministers could not surmount, 
 " precluded them from bringing forward the measure 
 " whilst in office ; . . . and that they retired from 
 " the King's service, considering this line of conduct 
 ' ' as most likely to contribute to the ultimate success 
 " of the measure." He went on to say that "in the 
 " meantime Mr. Pitt would do his utmost to establish 
 " their cause in the public favour, and thus prepare 
 " the way for its ultimate success." Pitt would have 
 done an immeasurable service to Ireland and to the 
 Empire if he had insisted on giving the Catholics 
 emancipation. But, unfortunately for the future 
 relations between England and Ireland, he refused
 
 BROKEN PROMISES 51 
 
 to press the question. " The Catholics," wrote 
 Castlereagh to Cornwallis, " must distinctly under- 
 stand " that Pitt would not concur in a hopeless 
 " attempt at this moment to force it " (Catholic 
 emancipation). 
 
 He concludes his letter by a striking expression of 
 opinion : — " From what has already passed, the 
 " prospect of a change of sentiment on the part of the 
 " King seems too hopeless to be held out, in fairness 
 " to the Catholics, as any solid ground of hope ; and 
 " his death is that solution of the difficulty which all 
 " parties must equally deprecate." 
 
 The King's illness in February prevented the 
 resignations of the ministers from taking effect ; and 
 it was not till March that Addington succeeded Pitt 
 as Prime Minister, and that Charles Abbot, afterwards 
 Lord Colchester, was appointed Chief Secretary in 
 place of Castlereagh, while it was not till May that 
 Lord Hardwicke became Lord-Lieutenant. 
 
 For some weeks during the spring of 1801 Castle- Castlereagh 
 reagh was seriously ill. The anxiety caused by the and Pa- 
 late events, following upon his labours during the 
 preceding years, resulted in a fever. From the 
 middle of April till the middle of May his condition 
 excited the most serious apprehensions of his friends. 
 His recovery was followed by an increased intimacy 
 with Pitt, who recognised in the young Irish noble- 
 man a man who possessed great administrative 
 powers, an imperturbable courage, and talents of the 
 highest order.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 CASTLEREAGH AND THE ADDINGTON MINISTRY 
 
 The 
 
 formation 
 
 of the 
 
 Addington 
 
 Ministry, 
 
 18014 
 
 Castlereagh 
 advocates 
 Catholic 
 emancipa- 
 tion. 
 
 From March, 1801, to July, 1802, Castlereagh 
 remained out of office. During that period the 
 Addington ministry was formed, and the war with 
 Napoleon was brought to a close by the Treaty of 
 Amiens. In the new Cabinet, Portland, Westmor- 
 land and Chatham retained their seats, and Hawkes- 
 bury was promoted to a place in that body. Of the 
 remaining members, Hobart and Pelham had both 
 been Irish Secretaries under Pitt, and Eldon had been 
 his Attorney-General. The new blood was supplied 
 by St. Vincent, Lewisham and Charles Yorke. 
 Loughborough, whose treacherous conduct to his 
 colleagues over the Catholic emancipation deserves 
 the highest condemnation, was excluded from the 
 ministry, but received the solace of an earldom. 
 
 Until July, 1802, when he succeeded Lewisham 
 as President of the Board of Control, Castlereagh 
 wrote several able and instructive papers on 
 Ireland for the benefit of the ministry. He was 
 resolved, as far as in him lay, to redress the most 
 flagrant grievances, for he recognised that unless 
 such a policy was adopted Ireland would continue to 
 be discontented, and would remain an admirable 
 field for foreign intrigue. A French invasion was 
 quite within the bounds of possibility, and Castlereagh 
 realised that unless the chief grievances of the Irish 
 nation were redressed Ireland could easily become a 
 very serious danger to the British Empire. He was 
 
 52
 
 DANGEROUS SITUATION 53 
 
 well aware of the disappointment felt by the Catholics 
 at their exclusion from the British Parliament, and 
 in view of a possible French invasion it was all the 
 more necessary to remove their grievance. On the 
 Catholic question he submitted to the government a 
 very able memoir. In it he pointed out that the 
 British Catholics now numbered three millions, and 
 were daily growing in wealth and influence. It is, he 
 declared, quite impossible to keep such an important 
 body in their present position. Such a policy would 
 leave the Catholics in a perpetual state of irritation 
 and, moreover, would be a policy entirely indefensible 
 and unjustifiable. As long as the Catholics and 
 Dissenters remain unemancipated they were open to 
 an alliance with Jacobinism. As things are, he 
 declared, with prophetic insight, the " difficulty of 
 " governing the country will rapidly increase, as 
 " every year adds materially to the relative impor- 
 " tance of the Dissenting interests." He then 
 showed the impossibility of governing Ireland upon a 
 garrison principle, and urged that the Union itself 
 would do little towards the establishment of an orderly 
 government unless followed up by emancipation and 
 other necessary measures. 
 
 Of these he mentioned as especially important the The tithe 
 adjustment of tithes. At that time tithes were question, 
 collected in kind by the Protestant incumbents from 
 the Catholic parishioners. Such a system was 
 obviously a continual source of discontent, irritation 
 and contention. From his residence in Ireland 
 Castlereagh was well aware of the constant disputes 
 " often ending in blood " caused by the collection of 
 the Protestant tithes, and though the amounts 
 themselves were often very small, the existence of
 
 54 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 the tithe system tended each year to increase the 
 animosity felt by the Catholics towards the Pro- 
 testant clergy. In 1631 the tithe question in Scotland 
 had been settled satisfactorily, by the amount due 
 being laid as a direct burden upon the landlord. 
 Castlereagh now proposed to introduce a similar 
 system, with improvements rendered advisable by 
 experience. Had Castlereagh's suggestions been 
 carried out, a satisfactory solution would have been 
 found for a most difficult question. 
 His He further recommended that the salaries of the 
 
 endowment Roman Catholic clergy should be paid by the State, 
 p an " and that the payments should be made in proportion 
 
 to their rank. An Archbishop would receive £750 a 
 year, and the parochial clergy would each receive on 
 an average about £40 a year. By this means the 
 priest would not be dependent on his congregation, 
 and the close alliance existing between the priests 
 and their flocks would be weakened. Castlereagh's 
 views on this question show a toleration and broad- 
 mindedness not shared by the majority of English 
 politicians, who allowed their religious intolerance to 
 blind them to the advisability of a wise act of policy. 
 The Castlereagh thus showed a most intelligent appre- 
 
 defence of ciation of the needs of Ireland. He recognised fully 
 Ireland. ^ a t un i ess £j ie Catholic claims were satisfied and the 
 Catholic grievances redressed, not only would the 
 work of the Union be rendered useless, but that the 
 majority of the Irish population would remain in a 
 condition of constant unrest and irritation. He fully 
 appreciated, too, the fact that this unrest and irrita- 
 tion would develop rapidly into disloyalty, if not 
 into civil war. England being engaged in a life and 
 death struggle with France, it was all the more
 
 THE TREATY OF AMIENS 55 
 
 necessary to render Ireland peaceful and contented. 
 Otherwise she would become, owing to her geo- 
 graphical position, a constant and serious danger to 
 England. To provide for the protection of Ireland 
 from foreign invasions, Castlereagh wrote a very 
 remarkable memoir on the defence of Ireland. He 
 began by stating that " It is a common observation 
 " among historians that a powerful invasion of an 
 " insular State is generally successful ; and if a judg- 
 " ment may be formed from the history of England 
 " the observation is by no means unfounded." 
 The Addington ministry, though in office for a The 
 
 short period, witnessed many stirring events. On British 
 
 successes 
 April 1st, 1801, Nelson won the battle of the Baltic, and the 
 
 and Denmark was forced to submit. The death of Treaty of 
 the Tsar Paul, who was the " life and soul of the *™ [ * ns ' 
 " northern confederacy," on March 23rd, and the 
 accession of Alexander, brought about a change in 
 the policy of Russia, which, together with the over- 
 throw of the Danes, led to the establishment of peace 
 in the north of Europe. Meanwhile, on March 21st, 
 the French army in Egypt was defeated at the battle 
 of Alexandria, and in September the evacuation of 
 Egypt by the French took place. On March 27th, 
 1802, peace with France was concluded by the Treaty 
 of Amiens. The terms of the Treaty were not very 
 favourable to Great Britain, but Castlereagh, like 
 Pitt, was of opinion that the pacification was only a 
 truce, during which Great Britain could make 
 preparations for the outbreak of hostilities. In a 
 secret memoir to the Cabinet he pointed out that 
 Great Britain should, at the first sign of French 
 encroachment, take a decided line, and " adopt a 
 ' vigilant system of conduct " ; and he urged that in
 
 56 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castlereagh 
 becomes 
 President 
 of the 
 Board of 
 Control, 
 July, 1802. 
 
 Castlereagh 
 and India, 
 
 the event of the reopening of war with France prepara- 
 tions should be so pushed on that at the outbreak of 
 war we should be enabled " to reap the full fruits of 
 " our maritime superiority in striking an early blow 
 " against the colonies of the enemy." No better 
 proof is required to show how accurate was Castle- 
 reagh's grasp of the situation. " What I desire is," 
 he wrote in July, 1802, " that France should feel that 
 " Great Britain cannot be trifled with," and he makes 
 it quite clear that in his opinion any attempt by 
 France to destroy the independence of Holland 
 should be at once resisted. 
 
 His opinions carried great weight, and all the more 
 so from the fact that, in spite of his views upon 
 Catholic emancipation, he had on July 6th been 
 appointed President of the Board of Control. In 
 October he was given a seat in the Cabinet. He took 
 office at a critical time. In India there was much 
 opposition to the extension of British influence ; in 
 Ireland there was disaffection ; the conduct of 
 Napoleon, whose aggressions in time of peace never 
 ceased, rendered the renewal of wars with France 
 merely a matter of months. 
 
 As President of the Board of Control, Castlereagh 
 was able to assist in dealing an overwhelming blow 
 to the hopes which Napoleon held of ousting the 
 British from India and of establishing there French 
 influence. In spite of the defeat and forced 
 withdrawal of French troops from Egypt, Napoleon 
 continued to indulge in hopes of driving the British 
 from Egypt, of converting the Mediterranean into a 
 French lake, and of establishing French supremacy 
 in India. 
 
 In spite of the critical condition of affairs in Europe
 
 INDIA 
 
 57 
 
 Castlereagh never allowed his attention to be diverted 
 from the affairs of India. As President of the Board 
 of Control, he followed closely the startling series of 
 events which resulted in the firm establishment of the 
 British Empire in India. After the overthrow of 
 Tippoo the danger of a Mahratta confederacy became 
 especially serious, as with the reopening of the war 
 with France came the renewal of Napoleon's ambi- 
 tious schemes. In " the complex, fanatical, and 
 " irreconcilable antagonism of England and revolu- 
 " tionary and Napoleonized France," India played 
 no small part. Napoleon was bent on conquering 
 England in India. French agents were to be found 
 at the Courts of the leading Mahratta chiefs, and 
 Napoleon aimed at using Shah Alum, the Emperor at 
 Delhi, as a political tool. A French faction was 
 already supreme in Scindia's dominions, and decided 
 action was necessary unless we were to be " caught 
 " unprepared in the tornado of Indian warfare, 
 " reinforced by Gallic blasts." 
 
 Wellesley's policy in making a strict alliance with Wellesley's 
 the Peishwa by the Treaty of Bassein in December, policy in 
 1802, was a statesmanlike act. By it the Mahratta the Treaty 
 confederacy would be deprived of the authority of its of Bassein. 
 executive head. By it the French would be pre- 
 vented from landing on the long Mahratta western 
 seaboard, and could not hope to obtain access to 
 Guzerat. By it many of the smaller chieftains were 
 propitiated, and, what was of immense importance, 
 future occupation of Bundelcund, which would " turn 
 " the flank of Scindia " and of his French adviser 
 Perron in Hindostan, was facilitated. Wellesley 
 considered that his duty was " to defend, consolidate, 
 " and improve the British Indian Empire," and in
 
 58 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Wellesley's 
 victories 
 in India. 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh's 
 Indian 
 policy. 
 
 view of the alarming progress made from 1804 to 
 1810 by the French Empire towards subduing Europe 
 it was well not only that British interests in India 
 were controlled by a man of Wellesley's mettle, but 
 that in 1803 and 1804 a statesman like Castlereagh 
 presided at the Board of Control. In August, 1803, 
 war was declared by Wellesley upon Scindia and the 
 Raja of Berar. 
 
 On September 23rd, 1803, Scindia with his French 
 allies was beaten in the battle of Assaye, and shortly 
 afterwards, on December 15th, he and the Raja of 
 Berar were entirely defeated in the battle of Argaum. 
 At the same time General Lake was winning similar 
 successes in the valley of the Ganges, and on Novem- 
 ber 1st had won the great battle of Laswari. By 
 the treaties which these defeated Rajas made with 
 Wellesley, the province of Cuttack and some strong 
 places in the Dooab became British possessions. In 
 1804 Holkar renewed the struggle, and it was not till 
 the end of 1805 that the struggle came to an end, 
 leaving the British the victors. 
 
 Before news of Wellesley's victories had reached 
 Europe, Castlereagh had considered carefully the 
 policy adopted in India, and on March 4th, 1804, he 
 sent Wellesley a long and interesting despatch 
 containing some criticisms of the Treaty of Bassein. 
 In it he intimated that, in his opinion, the Treaty 
 ought to be so altered as to restore the Peishwa " to 
 " a state of more ostensible independence, and to give 
 " to the alliance less the aspect of aiming at an inter- 
 " ference in Mahratta affairs." Both Castlereagh 
 and the Directors feared that Wellesley's policy 
 would involve the Company too much in Mahratta 
 politics, and while approving of a defensive alliance
 
 WELLESLEY AND LAKE 59 
 
 with the Peishwa, they deprecated any attempt (such 
 as the terms of the Treaty of Bassein implied) to give 
 the Company a commanding influence at Poonah. 
 
 Owing to the long period required for communica- 
 tion between England and India, a Governor-General 
 was practically absolute, and Castlereagh's despatch 
 was on its arrival in India of little value. Neverthe- 
 less, to this despatch Wellesley wrote a very able 
 reply. He pointed out that the Company's Govern- 
 ment in India was connected with the Home Govern- 
 ment, and as an Asiatic power was liable to be 
 " involved in wars with European powers possessing 
 " territories in India whenever His Majesty shall be 
 " at war with those powers." He then explained the 
 aggressive nature of the Mahratta Confederacy, and 
 showed that the Treaty of Bassein would eventually 
 conduce to the establishment of peace in India, 
 especially as it would check intrigues between the 
 Mahrattas and European powers. 
 
 On hearing of the victories of Wellesley and Lake 
 in the autumn of 1803, Castlereagh sent the former 
 his warmest congratulations " on the series of events 
 " than which none have ever occurred in the military 
 " history of our country more proudly calculated to 
 " confirm and even exalt the reputation and glory of 
 " the British arms." 
 
 Though Castlereagh can claim to have had little 
 share in the victories of the British in India, he had 
 done Wellesley good service in two ways. He had 
 steadily supported him against the Board of Directors 
 who, perhaps, naturally dreaded a policy of expan- 
 sion, and feared a consequent reduction of dividends ; 
 he had abandoned a great part of his official patronage 
 leaving Wellesley to make what appointments seemed
 
 60 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 to him best ; he had liberally supported the College 
 of Fort William. Wellesley himself gives striking 
 testimony to the admirable manner in which Castle - 
 reagh discharged the duties of the President of the 
 Board of Control. Castlereagh had certainly no 
 reason to be otherwise than satisfied with his tenure 
 of office, during which he had seen the destruction of 
 the French power in the East. He came to the 
 chief conduct of Indian affairs at a most critical 
 period in the history of India ; he had supported 
 Wellesley in the conduct of his war with the Mah- 
 rattas ; and he had successfully defended Wellesley's 
 policy in Parliament. Castlereagh, unlike many of 
 his contemporaries, realised the great objects for 
 which Wellesley was striving, and had every right to 
 congratulate himself and Great Britain on the success 
 of his Indian policy. As President of the Board of 
 Control, Castlereagh had witnessed an important and 
 necessary development of the British power in India. 
 The Treaty of Bassein had, as he anticipated, involved 
 us in further complications, but the overthrow of the 
 Mahratta Confederacy proved to be an enormous boon 
 to the people of India, and a necessary step in the 
 development of the East India Company. But 
 neither he nor Wellesley could persuade the Court of 
 Directors to introduce free trade. Supported though 
 they were by Dundas and the mercantile interest in 
 England, they were unable to overcome the opposition 
 of the Company. In 1805 Wellesley, finding that his 
 whole policy was objectionable to the Court of 
 Directors, gave up his post and returned to England. 
 During his long period of office he had established 
 " throughout India the ascendancy of the British 
 " power."
 
 NAPOLEON AND THE EAST 61 
 
 It was, indeed, most fortunate that Wellesley and Napoleon's 
 Castlereagh had the affairs of India under their designs 
 control. Three months after the Treaty of Amiens upon 
 Napoleon had sent General Decaen to India in order 
 to revive and strengthen French influence there. His 
 secret instructions prove to the hilt the perfidy of 
 Napoleon, and had they been published in 1803 
 would have justified, and no doubt occasioned, a 
 declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. 
 Decaen was to be " quietly reinforced by troops in 
 " French pay sent out by every French, Spanish, or 
 " Dutch ship going to India, so as to avoid attracting 
 " notice." All this was to take place while France 
 was ostensibly at peace with Great Britain, and 
 while Fox and other English whigs were loud in 
 proclaiming the straightforwardness and pacific 
 nature of Napoleon. Had Decaen had time to 
 organise and send his battalions to the aid of Scindia 
 the battles of Assaye and Argaum might have proved 
 disastrous to the British. Luckily, however, 
 Wellesley, aware of the precarious nature of the 
 Anglo-French relations, had refused to hand over 
 Pondicherry to the French, and Decaen was forced to 
 witness in inglorious inactivity the overthrow of all 
 his hopes in the campaigns of Arthur Wellesley and 
 of Lake. 
 
 Perron, the French agent at Scindia's Court, 
 angry at the incapacity of the Mahrattas, retired 
 from his post, and thus " in three months the results 
 " of the toil of Scindia, the restless ambition of 
 " Holkar, the training of European officers, and the 
 " secret intrigues of Napoleon, were all swept to the 
 " winds." But, though foiled in India, Decaen 
 continued to use his French ships to inflict damage
 
 62 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Renewal of 
 war with 
 France, 
 1803. 
 
 upon British commerce, and endeavoured to obtain 
 from the Imaum of Muscat " a station for commercial 
 " purposes at that port." Wellesley, however, had 
 foreseen the possibility of such a demand, and had 
 contracted an alliance with the Imaum, who in the 
 autumn of 1803 refused Decaen's request. On all 
 points Napoleon's oriental policy was defeated, and 
 this in itself would render noteworthy the period of 
 Castlereagh's tenure of the office of President of the 
 Board of Control. 
 
 During 1803, too, schemes for the acquisition by 
 France of Van Diemen's Land [Tasmania] failed 
 owing to Lord Hobart, the Colonial Secretary, who 
 by his foresight checked once and for all the Australian 
 plans of Napoleon. 
 
 At home the year 1803 opened in gloomy fashion. 
 The hostile designs of Bonaparte caused deep distrust, 
 which was increased by the non-removal of French 
 troops from Holland, and by the publication on 
 January 30th of Sebastiani's report, in which it was 
 stated that " six thousand French would at present 
 " be enough to conquer Egypt." This official avowal 
 of hostile designs against Great Britain decided the 
 Government to retain Malta, and to demand from 
 Napoleon an explanation. Instead of acceding to 
 the British demands, Napoleon continued making 
 military preparations, gave assistance to Emmet, 
 the head of a band of Irish conspirators, and 
 demanded that we should evacuate Alexandria and 
 Malta. Though Napoleon desired the continuance 
 of peace until he had built an effective navy, his pride 
 would not allow him to accede to the British demands, 
 and war broke out between Great Britain and France 
 in May, 1803.
 
 THREATS OF INVASION 63 
 
 During the remainder of 1803 Napoleon continued 
 to make extensive preparations for the invasion of 
 England. For this purpose a flotilla of flat-bottomed 
 boats, and the temporary command of the Channel 
 were required. Until the autumn of 1804 Napoleon 
 seems to have hoped that circumstances would enable 
 him to carry out his scheme for the invasion of 
 England. 
 
 Before the year closed it became evident that the Fall 
 
 country desired the return of Pitt to power. The ° f .^ e . 
 
 . . . . , r ii Addington 
 
 ministry inspired no confidence, and the general ministry, 
 
 uneasiness was increased when early in 1804 it was May, 1804. 
 
 discovered that the Navy was in a very inefficient 
 
 state. On April 23rd Fox called attention to the 
 
 inadequate condition of the defences of the country. 
 
 Pitt supported him, and the Government's position 
 
 was much shaken. Early in May the ministry 
 
 resigned.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Pitt's 
 second 
 administra- 
 tion, 
 May, 1804. 
 
 Influence 
 
 of 
 
 George III. 
 
 PITT S SECOND ADMINISTRATION 
 1804-1806 
 
 On May 10th, 1804, Pitt returned to office. England 
 was at that time passing through a severe crisis. 
 War had recently been declared, and the country 
 was for several months threatened by an invasion 
 from France. It was obvious that a strong ministry 
 was necessary. As early as April 29th, Pitt, in a 
 letter to the King, had advocated a combined 
 administration, and was anxious to admit Fox and 
 Grenville into the ministry. The King was opposed 
 to the admission of either, but after a long interview 
 with Pitt on May 7th he agreed to the inclusion of 
 Grenville into the ministry, but refused under any 
 circumstances to admit Fox. 
 
 The whole history of the formation of the ministry 
 illustrates the influence which George III wielded 
 in politics, and the views which he expressed in the 
 autumn of 1804 make it very evident that he followed 
 the careers of the most prominent men of the time 
 with the closest interest. He approved of the 
 exchange of Lord Harrowby for Lord Hawkesbury 
 at the Foreign Office, as he rated the talents of the 
 former very high, and thought the latter unfit for 
 the situation. He, however, did not at all approve 
 of the appointment of Huskisson to the Secretaryship 
 of the Treasury, considering that his views were too 
 liberal and his temper not good. About Castlereagh 
 he was indifferent, though he said he was glad that it 
 
 64
 
 PITT IN OFFICE 65 
 
 was not proposed to make him Secretary of State, as 
 it might have led to his putting himself at the head 
 of an Irish party. Nor did he like Lord Wellesley, 
 whom in spite of his great merits he considered as 
 inflated with pride, and as assuming to himself the 
 exclusive merit for all that had been done in the past. 
 
 Pitt had hoped to form an administration on a Pitt and 
 broad basis. He had resolved from considerations the Whigs, 
 of loyalty to the King not to bring forward the 
 question of Catholic emancipation again during 
 the King's life, and he thought that if Fox was 
 included in the ministry the question would be 
 shelved indefinitely. The King, however, refused 
 to agree to the inclusion of Fox in the ministry, 
 though he yielded with respect to Grenville, Spencer, 
 Windham, and others. Pitt, however, thought that 
 after a few months he would be able to reconcile 
 the King to the admission of Fox into the Cabinet, 
 and he had thus every hope of forming a strong 
 ministry. These expectations were, however, dashed 
 to the ground by the loyalty of the Whigs tc 
 Fox. On the evening of May 7th two meetings 
 were held at Camelford House (the residence of 
 Grenville). One of these meetings was attended 
 by the friends of Fox, and the other by the friends 
 of Grenville. It was unanimously agreed at both 
 meetings that no friend of Fox or Grenville should 
 take any office unless Fox should be admitted to the 
 Cabinet. At a meeting at Carlton House it was 
 also decided that no friend of the Prince should join 
 the Government till Fox was a member of it. 
 
 Thus, as Grenville and his friends refused to 
 serve without Fox, the patriotic efforts of Pitt 
 proved fruitless. 
 
 5 — (2211)
 
 66 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The new 
 Cabinet. 
 
 Napoleon 
 and the 
 invasion of 
 England. 
 
 On May 18th Napoleon was declared Emperor, 
 and on that day Pitt took his seat in Parliament 
 (after his re-election). Owing to the attitude adopted 
 by the Whigs, Pitt was compelled to compose his 
 Cabinet exclusively of Tories. It included Eldon, 
 the Chancellor ; Portland, President of Council ; 
 Westmorland, Privy Seal ; Chatham, Master- 
 General of Ordnance ; Melville, First Lord of the 
 Admiralty ; Harrowby, Secretary for Foreign Affairs ; 
 Camden, Secretary for War and the Colonies ; 
 Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; 
 Montrose, President of the Board of Trade ; Hawkes- 
 bury, Secretary for the Home Department. Castle- 
 reagh was President of the Board of Control, and 
 from June, 1805, when Camden became President 
 of the Council, he performed also the duties of 
 Secretary for War and the Colonies. 
 
 Many of these had served under Addington. 
 Of Pitt's eleven colleagues, only Castlereagh had a 
 seat in the House of Commons, and on him devolved 
 the duty of representing the Government. 
 
 The defence of Great Britain engrossed the 
 attention of the ministry, for the camp at Boulogne 
 had already been formed, and preparations for the 
 invasion of England were being openly made. 
 " Nothing," wrote Castlereagh to Wellesley, " can 
 " exceed the spirit of the nation, as well as of the 
 
 " Parliament, on the subject of the War 
 
 " The plan of raising 50,000 men to be officered by 
 " officers of the line is in progress." He then stated 
 that the total number of armed men would reach 
 nearly 200,000, though as a matter of fact that 
 number was far exceeded. 
 
 In January, 1805, the ministry was strengthened
 
 1805 67 
 
 by the accession to its ranks of Lord Sidmouth Changes in 
 (Addington), who became President of the Council, th « 
 of the Earl of Buckinghamshire (Hobart), who became mmistT ?- 
 Chancellor of the Duchy ; Mulgrave succeeded 
 Harrowby at the Foreign Office owing to the latter's 
 ill-health, Portland retiring from office for a similar 
 reason, but retaining his seat in the Cabinet. In 
 April, Melville, accused of a misapplication of the 
 public money, resigned his post at the Admiralty, and 
 was succeeded by Sir Charles Middleton, now created 
 Lord Barham. In consequence of this affair Sidmouth 
 and Buckinghamshire retired, and a rearrangement of 
 offices took place. Harrowby found himself suffi- 
 ciently restored to health to succeed Buckinghamshire 
 as Chancellor of the Duchy, Camden becoming in July 
 President of the Council, and Castlereagh Secretary 
 for War and the Colonies, though he still retained 
 his post as President of the Board of Control. 
 
 The following months will ever be known as The 
 perhaps the most exciting period in British history. a u tumn 
 Till August the prospect of a French invasion of ° l ° 5 ' 
 England was ever before the British nation. It 
 was not till the close of August that Napoleon found 
 that owing to Villeneuve's failure to appear in the 
 Channel, all hope of effecting a landing on the South 
 Coast of England had to be abandoned. While he 
 at once threw his army into the heart of Germany 
 and captured Ulm on October 20th, the British 
 fleet under Nelson met the combined French and 
 Spanish fleets under Villeneuve, and on October 21st 
 won the battle of Trafalgar. From that day all 
 prospect of a French invasion of England disappeared. 
 During this anxious period Castlereagh, as head of 
 the War Department, had been brought into intimate
 
 68 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 relation with Nelson and other naval officers, and 
 took a keen interest in a plan for the destruction of 
 the Boulogne flotilla. In a memorandum on the 
 subject he shows a very intimate knowledge of the 
 conditions necessary for a successful attack on the 
 French town. The failure of this attack was due 
 to circumstances beyond Castlereagh's control, and 
 by the end of September, owing to Napoleon's march 
 into Germany all danger from the Boulogne flotilla 
 had passed away. 
 The war What was, however, of far greater importance 
 
 CoaHtion was ^ e consideration of some effective plan to 
 1805. check Napoleon's victorious progress in Germany. 
 
 Already, owing to Russia's initiative, Great Britain, 
 Russia and Sweden, alarmed at Napoleon's provoca- 
 tions, had come together, and though Pitt and 
 Harrowby the Foreign Minister refused to accede 
 to Russia's demands with regard to Malta and the 
 maritime code, the formation of the Third Coalition, 
 which on August 9th, 1805, was joined by Austria, 
 was effected. 
 
 During the autumn of 1805 various projects were 
 entertained for inflicting injury on France, and of 
 strengthening the league against her by securing 
 the adhesion of Prussia. No sooner had Napoleon 
 marched for Ulm, than it was proposed to attack the 
 flotilla in Boulogne harbour. To Castlereagh were 
 submitted numerous proposals " for an attack by 
 " means of submarine boats and Congreve rockets." 
 Sir Sidney Smith was entrusted with the duty of 
 attacking the Boulogne flotilla, but he soon discovered 
 that without the co-operation of a land force he 
 could effect nothing. • General Moore, who was 
 consulted, was opposed to the scheme, and Pitt
 
 PITT AND PRUSSIA 
 
 69 
 
 wrote to Castlereagh on October 6th, saying that 
 Moore's report left him convinced that any attempt 
 at landing will be attended with too much risk to 
 justify the experiment. 
 
 During the autumn, too, constant efforts were 
 made by the British and Russian Governments to 
 induce the Prussian king to join the alliance. 
 
 Unfortunately, the Cabinet had only come to 
 their decision to intervene actively in the north of 
 Germany in the autumn, and after Napoleon had 
 begun his famous march into Germany. In spite, 
 therefore, of Castlereagh's energetic efforts, the 
 British Army under Lord Cathcart arrived too late 
 to effect the decision of the Prussian king to remain 
 neutral. Indeed, had the Austrians and Prussians 
 not adopted the fatal resolution to fight the French 
 Emperor at Austerlitz, it is not improbable that 
 the presence of the large British force in north 
 Germany, to be shortly reinforced by Russian, 
 Swedish, and Danish troops, all under the command 
 of the Swedish king, would have induced the 
 Prussian king to support actively the Coalition. 
 Castlereagh estimated that in the spring of 1806 
 there would be in north Germany an army of about 
 100,000 men, which would at once expel the French 
 from Hanover and Holland, and then act against 
 Napoleon in whatever manner should be then judged 
 to be best. Till Austerlitz, it seemed that this Grand 
 Alliance would be crowned with success. In the 
 autumn of 1805 Pitt had made strenuous efforts to 
 induce Prussia to join the Coalition. Harrowby 
 was sent to Berlin in November, and found that the 
 King was bent on securing Hanover. Although the 
 British Government declined even to consider the 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh 's 
 plans for 
 British 
 interven- 
 tion in 
 North 
 Germany.
 
 70 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Austerlitz 
 
 and the 
 
 Prussian 
 
 alliance 
 
 with 
 
 France. 
 
 cession of Hanover, Harrowby continued to urge 
 Prussia to take vigorous action. His arguments 
 were in vain, and it has been held, perhaps without 
 due consideration of the real condition of the Prussian 
 army, that " the question of the Electorate ruined the 
 " coalition in those critical days, when the accession 
 " of 180,000 Prussian troops would have more than 
 " repaired the losses sustained at Ulm and 
 " Austerlitz." 
 
 Some time before the arrival of Harrowby in 
 Berlin, preparations had been begun under the 
 superintendence of Castlereagh for the despatch 
 to the north of Germany of a large army, the greater 
 portion of which did not arrive till December. 
 
 Napoleon was in the heart of Austria, and according 
 to some writers the Allies seemed to have nothing to 
 do but retreat to surround him in Moravia with 
 overwhelming forces, and thus " to restore, by a 
 " victory like that of Leipzig, the balance of European 
 power." 
 
 But the French victory at Austerlitz, followed 
 by Prussia's alliance with France on December 15th, 
 and by a Treaty concluded on January 15th in which 
 Prussia agreed to close all the rivers of northern 
 Germany against the British, produced a complete 
 change in the policy of the British Government. 
 The news of the king of Prussia's conduct followed 
 by his request that the Anglo-Russian forces should 
 withdraw from Hanover proved to be Pitt's death 
 warrant. The news of Prussia's decision caused 
 the expedition to be at once recalled and re-embarked 
 at Bremen in February, 1806. Thus, owing to the 
 rash policy of Russia and Austria, and to the vacil- 
 lation and selfishness of Prussia, an admirable
 
 CONDITION OF GERMANY 71 
 
 opportunity of dealing a serious blow at Napoleon's 
 power was lost. It was not for some years that a 
 similar opportunity again presented itself, and then 
 only after Europe had gone through the mill of 
 French domination. 
 
 Castlereagh had already fully realized the Castle- 
 immense advantages possessed by Great Britain f eagh's 
 
 or j views 
 
 owing to her insular position. With her navy pre mature. 
 
 supreme on the sea, Great Britain could land troops 
 at whatever point was thought desirable. He 
 recognised how invaluable would be the possession 
 of " an active force disposable at the shortest notice." 
 His views, which were shown during the ensuing 
 years to be correct, were put into force later on in 
 the cases of Portugal and of the Walcheren Expedi- 
 tion. The Walcheren Expedition indeed failed, 
 not because the conception of such an expedition 
 was wrong, but owing to the command being placed 
 in incapable hands ; the intervention in the Spanish 
 Peninsula succeeded because the operations were 
 entrusted to a man of consummate ability. But 
 the failure of Cathcart's expedition to north Germany 
 in 1805 is not to be regretted. The battle of 
 Austerlitz, followed by the alliance of the king of 
 Prussia with Napoleon, indeed killed Pitt. But had 
 his plans been successful in 1805 and 1806 would 
 Europe have greatly benefited ? There is little 
 doubt that the defeat of the French and the collapse 
 of the Napoleonic Empire at that time would have 
 been an unqualified disaster. With the exception 
 of Great Britain there was hardly a country in 
 Europe which did not require a thorough overhauling. 
 The selfishness of Austria had been overwhelmingly 
 demonstrated in 1799 and 1800 ; little improvement
 
 72 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 could be detected in the policy of her rulers in 1805. 
 For Prussia, her overthrow in 1806 at Jena and her 
 enforced subordination to France was not only a 
 well-merited punishment for her vacillation and 
 rapacity in the autumn of 1805, but proved the 
 greatest blessing ever conferred upon her. The 
 abolition of the Holy Roman Empire, and the 
 formation of the Confederation of the Rhine tended 
 to recreate a Germany which gradually entered upon 
 a new and prosperous career. The Revolution of 
 1789 brought in the end benefits to France ; the 
 European revolution was equally necessary, and in 
 1805 was only begun. 
 A period of Pitt and Castlereagh, confident in the honesty 
 discipline f then policy and in the necessity of defending 
 "or° Europe. Great Britain against Napoleon, showed no realization 
 of the difference between the political condition of 
 their land and that of the rest of Europe. In political 
 development Great Britain was immeasurably 
 superior to that of other European countries. It 
 was not till the flood of French conquest had passed 
 over Europe, destroying effete institutions and 
 compelling the rulers of the various states to 
 recognise the existence of popular rights, and to 
 learn the meaning of the word patriotism, that 
 British money and armies could hope to overthrow 
 the French Conqueror. It was not till 1808 that 
 the Austrian Government listened to the voice of a 
 statesman, Stadion, and for the first time in her 
 history represented national aspirations ; it was 
 not till 1812 that the rise of a new Prussian nation 
 showed that the lessons taught by its conquest 
 by France had penetrated into all ranks of the North 
 German people.
 
 THE DEATH OF PITT 73 
 
 Though not realised by Pitt and Castlereagh, 
 or indeed by any prominent British statesman, 
 Napoleon's defeat at Austerlitz would have been an 
 unqualified disaster. No better proof of the necessity 
 of a process of purgation, to be carried out throughout 
 the length and breadth of Europe, can be found than 
 in Fox's description of the conduct of the Prussian 
 king. " The conduct of Prussia," he declared in 
 Parliament, " has been a union of everything that 
 " is contemptible in servility, with everything that 
 " is odious in rapacity. Other nations may have 
 " been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many 
 " of their provinces ; but none, except Prussia, has 
 " been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, 
 " that of being compelled to become the ministers 
 " of the rapacity and injustice of a master." 
 
 Though it was undoubtedly fortunate for the The efforts 
 future of Europe that Napoleon's arms did not gjgjj and 
 receive a decisive check in 1805, there is no reason reagh. 
 to deny to Pitt and Castlereagh the credit for having Pitt's death 
 attempted to aid Russia and Austria in checking jgo^ 23, 
 the flood of French conquest. Before his death 
 Pitt had evidently realised the futility of small 
 detached expeditions, and both he and Castlereagh 
 recognised that it was only by the united efforts of 
 Europe that Napoleon could be definitely checked. 
 It was due to a lack of harmony in the Cabinet, 
 and to the hesitation of the Continental Powers 
 that delays had ensued which prevented the whole 
 British force from arriving on the Continent till 
 the beginning of January, 1806, some three weeks 
 after Austerlitz, and when the treaty between Prussia 
 and France had been agreed upon. The experience 
 gained during the autumn of 1805 proved invaluable
 
 74 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 to Castlereagh, who, in the later stages of the struggle 
 against Napoleon, carried out the policy which he 
 had learned from Pitt. 
 
 On January 23rd, 1806, on hearing of the Prussian 
 alliance with Napoleon, Pitt died, and after the 
 failure of the King to persuade Lord Hawkesbury 
 to take office, a Coalition Government was formed 
 under Lord Grenville, known as the Ministry of All the 
 Talents.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE TREATY OF TILSIT AND THE FAILURE OF 
 BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 The death of Pitt was followed by the fall of the The 
 Tory ministry. It had never been a strong ministry, ^ ir JJi[ r [ he 
 though, as we have seen, Pitt had been willing, Talents, 
 in consequence of the crisis through which Great 
 Britain and indeed Europe was passing, to secure 
 the services of several illustrious Whigs. His death 
 removed the one strong element in the Cabinet, 
 and Lord Hawkesbury felt unequal to the task of 
 forming an administration. Castlereagh himself 
 was anxious that Hawkesbury should become Prime 
 Minister, and on his refusal hoped that Grenville 
 would lead an administration which should include 
 men of all parties. The European crisis required a 
 strong government. Fox, however, had uniformly 
 condemned the war policy of the Tories, and he and 
 Grenville seem to have thought that a strong and 
 united Coalition Ministry would bring about peace. 1 
 The Tories as a party being therefore unwilling to 
 take office, the King was compelled to have recourse 
 to the Whigs, and an administration was formed 
 known as the Ministry of All the Talents. In that 
 
 1 Sidmouth was a member of the Cabinet, and Buckingham- 
 shire, Bragge and Bathurst, who were his followers held non- 
 Cabinet offices. It must also be noted that Grenville, 
 Spencer, and Windham had served under Pitt. In the 
 Cabinet, Fox, Grey and Henry Petty represented pure 
 Whiggism. 
 
 75
 
 76 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castlereagh 
 and 
 
 Canning 
 lead the 
 Opposition. 
 
 The policy 
 of the 
 Ministry 
 of All the 
 Talents, 
 1806-7. 
 
 ministry Lord Grenville was First Lord of the 
 Treasury, and Fox was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The Opposition was led by Castlereagh and 
 Canning. The former had already shown that he 
 possessed administrative qualities of a high order, 
 while the latter was recognised as an orator of great 
 merit. But the relations between the two men do 
 not seem ever to have been of a cordial nature. 
 Castlereagh never shone in debate. He was no 
 orator, and has been described as a clumsy debater. 
 He often caused amusement by his Irishisms. On 
 the other hand, he was very painstaking ; he had 
 acquired considerable knowledge of home and 
 foreign affairs, and though he has been somewhat 
 contemptuously termed a "laborious party tactician," 
 he was destined to prove himself the most trusted 
 leader of the Tories in the House of Commons and 
 a brilliant and successful Foreign Minister. It may 
 be that he despised Canning as the son of an actor, 
 but the fact remains that the two men never worked 
 very harmoniously together till after the fall of 
 Napoleon. Canning, with his brilliant oratorical 
 powers, never appreciated a colleague like Castlereagh, 
 whose character differed in so many respects from 
 his own, and with whose policy during the next 
 few years he was to find himself at times strongly 
 opposed. 
 
 During the years 1806-7, when the government 
 was in the hands of the Ministry of All the Talents, 
 Castlereagh justified his reputation as one of the 
 ablest of the young Tories by the skill which he 
 showed in the debates on financial matters. Further, 
 the whole course of foreign affairs during the period 
 when he was in opposition justified the course
 
 FOX AND PEACE 77 
 
 which he had wished to pursue in the autumn of 
 
 1805. Though on taking office Fox honestly 
 
 believed that Napoleon was actuated by a sincere 
 
 desire for peace, he was soon undeceived, and his 
 
 efforts during the first six months of 1806 to come 
 
 to some lasting pacific arrangement with the 
 
 Emperor failed. 
 
 Napoleon's object was to obtain the mastery in Peace 
 
 the Mediterranean, and it became evident in the JV^ 1 *: , 
 ' tions, iooo. 
 
 summer of 1806 that he was resolved to secure 
 Sicily. In fact, while negotiating with Fox he ordered 
 his brother Joseph to seize the island and expel 
 the English. These plans were rudely upset by Sir 
 John Stuart's brilliant victory of Maida on July 4th, 
 and Sicily remained in British hands. 
 
 Negotiations, however, proceeded during the month 
 of July, Talleyrand holding secret conferences with 
 Oubril, the Russian plenipotentiary, and hoping to 
 force the hand of Lord Yarmouth, the British 
 representative. The latter was soon afterwards 
 replaced by Lord Lauderdale, who resisted Napoleon's 
 efforts to continue his career of aggrandisement 
 with the aid and connivance of Great Britain In 
 September Fox died, but not before he had realised 
 the correctness of the views which had been held by 
 Pitt and Castlereagh with regard to the necessity 
 of opposing Napoleon by land and sea. His 
 successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Howick, 
 indeed continued to negotiate with Napoleon, who 
 at the same time was pursuing his course of 
 conquest. 
 
 The overthrow of Prussia in the battles of Auerstadt 
 and Jena was accomplished with all the more ease 
 as the Whig Cabinet made no efforts to take part in
 
 78 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 ■v 
 
 The Treaty 
 
 of Tilsit, 
 
 1807, 
 
 caused 
 
 by the 
 
 ineffective 
 
 British 
 
 foreign 
 
 policy. 
 
 18 »j 
 
 IV* 
 
 the Continental War. In 1807 the Whigs had a still 
 better opportunity for intervention. At Eylau, 
 on February 7th, the Tsar held his own against 
 Napoleon, and an interval occurred before the battle 
 of Friedland was fought. Had " Castlereagh's 
 " system then been acted upon, and had 50,000 
 " British troops been landed in the North of Germany," 
 they could, with the addition of Hanoverians to the 
 amount of 20,000, have thrown themselves across 
 Napoleon's communications. Austria, defeated but 
 by no means subdued, would have been encouraged 
 to rise, and Napoleon's career would have received 
 a decided check. 
 
 The failure to come to his aid caused Alexander's 
 overthrow at Friedland, and fully justified him in 
 making terms with Napoleon at Tilsit.' Instead 
 of acting in decisive fashion, the Whig Government 
 had confined its efforts to sending out small and 
 ineffective expeditions to various parts of the world, 
 and had refused to give any pecuniary or military 
 aid to Alexander. One expedition under Whitelocke 
 suffered a disgraceful disaster at Buenos Ayres, 
 another failed in Egypt, and a third under Sir John 
 Duckworth was forced to retire from the Dardanelles. 
 Alison is perhaps justified in his trenchant remark 
 that " if the forces thus wasted in desultory and 
 " eccentric operations had been concentrated in the 
 " proper quarter, they would have brought the war 
 " to a glorious termination in this very year " (1807). 
 The Government ought most certainly to have sent 
 an effective force into the Baltic early in 1807. 
 Stralsund, Danzig and Colberg, coast fortresses of 
 immense strategical value, should have been occupied 
 by British and Swedish troops, and Stettin should
 
 ALEXANDER I 79 
 
 have been seized. By concentrating her efforts on 
 North Germany, Great Britain, in the early months 
 of 1807, might have inflicted a severe check upon 
 Napoleon, and with Russia and Prussia formed a 
 strong coalition. 
 
 That catastrophe known as the Treaty of Tilsit, Summary 
 as has already been said, was to a great extent due J o| . 
 to the shortsighted policy of the Ministry of All the of the 
 Talents. While Napoleon was reorganizing his ^'"jjj'j. 
 forces preparatory to another great effort, the Talents. 
 Russian and Prussian rulers had drawn up on April 
 26th the Treaty of Bartenstein, anticipating in a 
 manner the policy adopted by the Allies in 1813 
 after the battle of Leipzig. The object of this 
 Treaty was to force France to be satisfied with reason- 
 able boundaries, to restore Prussia to its position 
 before the battle of Jena, to establish Germany as 
 a free " Constitutional federation," to enable Austria 
 to regain the Tyrol, to make the Mincio her frontier 
 in Italy, and generally to secure for Europe " the 
 blessings of a solid peace." 
 
 Unfortunately, the Grenville ministry showed no 
 inclination to support in any active manner the 
 efforts of Russia and Prussia, with whom Sweden 
 was allied. £500,000 instead of the £6,000,000 
 asked for was indeed paid to Russia, but no steps 
 were taken to adopt the policy pursued in Queen 
 Anne's reign and afterwards adopted by Castlereagh, 
 viz., of sending a large and effective force to co- 
 operate with the aflies on the Continent. No 
 attempt had been made to despatch a British 
 expedition to the north coast of Germany, and it 
 was quite evident to Alexander that his schemes 
 against Turkey were not viewed with favour by
 
 80 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Summary 
 
 of All the 
 Talents. 
 
 the British Cabinet. He did not understand British 
 politics, and could not appreciate the real import 
 of the fall of the Whigs and the accession of the 
 Portland ministry to office. 
 The Ministry of All the Talents had indeed pursued 
 °x ^ e Acts a policy very disastrous to the fortunes and fame of 
 Ministry Great Britain. The failures of Whitelocke, of 
 Duckworth and of Fraser at Buenos Ayres, Constanti- 
 nople and Alexandria respectively, were all due to 
 the mistaken policy of the Grenville Administration 
 in sending out small expeditions instead of adopting 
 the policy which Castlereagh had advocated in 1805, 
 namely of sending a large and well equipped force 
 to the north of Germany which should rally round 
 it all the opponents of Napoleon, and distract his 
 attention from the main objects of his policy. The 
 result of these misdirected efforts on the part of the 
 Grenville ministry was that the prestige of Great 
 Britain was distinctly impaired, and that Alexander 
 was afforded some justification for his decision in 
 June, 1807, to abandon all idea of an alliance with 
 England, and to come to terms with Napoleon. 
 
 To the Russian Autocrat, Party Government was 
 naturally a mystery, and he naturally concluded 
 that the British nation could no longer be relied upon. 
 The Ministry of All the Talents had failed to make 
 a diversion on the Continent, and had declined to 
 facilitate the loan which was a matter of vital 
 importance to the Tsar. Further, the Russians 
 naturally complained that England, instead of 
 co-operating in a common cause, had used her 
 forces in South America and Egypt, "at a time 
 " when, by giving them a different destination, the 
 " necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the
 
 THE TORY MINISTRY 81 
 
 " Danube might have been prevented, and the 
 " disposable force on the Vistula proportionally 
 " increased." 
 
 The Ministry of All the Talents had thus by their 
 shortsighted policy been the cause of a most serious 
 crisis in the history of Europe, and one which now 
 demanded the utmost vigilance on the part of the 
 British Cabinet. 
 
 The new Tory administration was established The 
 on April 8th, 1807, and till the Reform Bill period Portland 
 the Tory party remained in power. In the ministry Ministry, 
 which succeeded that of All the Talents, the Duke 
 of Portland was Premier, and Mr. Perceval, Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. 
 Canning was Foreign Secretary and Castlereagh was 
 again Secretary for War. It also included Eldon, 
 Camden, Westmorland, Hawkesbury (who became 
 Lord Liverpool on his father's death at the end of 
 1808), Mulgrave. 
 
 The accession of Castlereagh to office marks a new The 
 period in his career. Up to the summer of 1807 political 
 Great Britain had signally failed in her efforts against SItuatlon - 
 the extension of French revolutionary influences 
 in Europe and against the development of Napoleon's 
 Empire. She had indeed inflicted a check upon 
 Napoleon's plans in Egypt ; she had won the battle 
 of Maida, and she held Sicily. But these checks 
 seemed to be but temporary ones, and in 1807 
 Napoleon felt fully justified in forming ambitious 
 schemes which implied the complete subservience 
 of Great Britain. Hitherto Europe had shown no 
 signs of appreciating the nature and aims of 
 Napoleon's ambition, nor did the rulers of the various 
 states realise that their failure before the French arms 
 
 6 (2211)
 
 82 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 was due to the political condition of their respective 
 countries. But as the Napoleonic conquests 
 continued, and Central Europe, Italy, and Spain 
 became subservient, the necessity of checking the 
 career of the French Emperor became imperative. 
 After Tilsit his schemes included the complete 
 domination over the Baltic and Mediterranean, 
 the expulsion of the British from those seas, the 
 supremacy of France in Eastern Europe. With 
 the final subjection of Spain and Portugal, the 
 Mediterranean would become a French lake ; with 
 the establishment of French influence over Denmark 
 and Sweden, the Baltic would also be closed to 
 British ships and British commerce. 
 
 The new ministry came into office none too soon. In 
 spite of the critical position of affairs on the Continent, 
 the Whigs had not only wasted the resources of Great 
 Britain on small expeditions to South America and 
 elsewhere, but had neglected to support adequately 
 the Tsar Alexander, who after Jena was left to 
 struggle single-handed against the victorious forces 
 of Napoleon. In order to save £4,000 a month 
 the Whigs had totally dismantled the transport 
 service, and had declined to guarantee a loan which 
 Alexander wished to negotiate after the battle of 
 Eylau. 
 
 The policy of the Whigs had thus prevented their 
 successors from coming at once to the rescue of 
 Alexander, and on April 22nd Lord Cathcart, the 
 British military expert, reported that only 12,000 
 men, too few for any successful operation, were 
 available for a Baltic expedition. North Germany 
 was ripe for revolt, and Friedland had not yet been 
 fought. The despatch in May of a large force to
 
 TILSIT 83 
 
 North Germany, which could at least have seized 
 Stralsund and roused North Germany, would have 
 changed the whole aspect of affairs on the Continent. 
 No force, however, left England till June 17th. On 
 June 14th the battle of Friedland had been fought, 
 and on June 25th Alexander and Napoleon had their 
 famous interview on a raft moored in the river 
 Niemen. 
 
 " I hate the English as much as you do, and I T f h £... T . reat y 
 " will second you in all your actions against them." iSoy." ' 
 Such are the words which Alexander is reported 
 to have used at the beginning of the interview. 
 It is said that Alexander had no choice but to 
 conclude a treaty with Napoleon. A cabal at the 
 head of which was the Grand Duke Constantine, 
 the heir presumptive, had been formed to further 
 the establishment of peace, and throughout the 
 length and breadth of Russia there was a universal 
 desire for the cessation of hostilities. Till the last 
 moment, Francis J. Jackson, brother of Sir George 
 Jackson, whose Diaries and Correspondence give 
 much information about the state of Europe at this 
 time, hoped that the Tsar would remain firm to the 
 British Alliance. At the same time he was fully 
 alive to the risk of relying too much on the uncertain 
 ruler of Russia. " How far," he wrote, " can we 
 " rely on the constancy of our allies ? The 
 " Emperor Alexander's character is our surest 
 " guarantee. But is that proof against all the 
 ' impressions which it is attempted to make upon 
 ' him ? . . . . The Emperor of Russia is the only 
 ' person in his court or army on whom we can rely 
 ' His' Imperial Majesty's intentions are excellent, 
 " and it is certainly no reproach to him if he is unable
 
 84 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " fully to execute them, for want of proper support 
 " from his ministers and generals." 
 
 Jackson's fears were soon to be justified, and the 
 Treaty between Russia and France was rapidly 
 arranged. By a secret Treaty of Alliance the two 
 monarchs agreed that if Great Britain did not accept 
 their terms by December 1st, they would " summon 
 " the three Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and 
 " Lisbon to close their ports against the English 
 " and declare war against England. If any one of 
 " the three Courts refuse, it shall be treated as an 
 " enemy by the high contracting parties, and if 
 " Sweden refuse, Denmark shall be compelled to 
 " declare war on her." 
 Alexander's Alexander's desertion of the Coalition against 
 making the Napoleon has naturally been the subject of much 
 contention. His army, even after Friedland, was 
 by no means shattered, and Great Britain, though 
 late, had decided to take part in the wars on the 
 Continent. On June 17th Alexander declared to 
 Lord Granville Leweson-Gower, our ambassador, that 
 " he would never stoop to Bonaparte ; he would 
 " rather retire to Kazan or even to Tobolsk." But 
 he soon changed his mind, and on June 25th concluded 
 with Napoleon the Treaty of Tilsit. 
 
 There seems no doubt that at this time Alexander 
 was actuated by a deep hatred of England. The 
 conduct of the Whigs justified that hatred, and 
 during the three months succeeding their fall the 
 Tory Cabinet was unable to convince Alexander 
 that a complete change in foreign policy had taken 
 place. The peculiarities of the British Constitution 
 were a mystery to him, and there was much in the 
 conduct of the Ministry of All the Talents to justify 
 
 Treaty of 
 Tilsit,
 
 A DANGEROUS CRISIS 85 
 
 his hatred of England. Moreover, his generals were 
 bringing pressure on him, and it is said that 
 Bennigsen was plotting against him. A few days, 
 however, before Friedland, he had written to 
 George III that " there was no salvation to himself 
 " or to Europe but by eternal resistance to Bonaparte." 
 
 This sudden change of front was a striking Alexander 
 indication of Alexander's peculiar character, of which l and h >» 
 Castlereagh had now his first experience. In the P ro J ects - 
 future Castlereagh was destined to come into close 
 contact with this extraordinary man, whose influence 
 upon the course of European politics steadily grew. 
 An impressionist, and almost a visionary, Alexander 
 changed his convictions at times with bewildering 
 rapidity. At this time he was full of resentment 
 at Great Britain's apparent callousness and failure 
 to realise the importance of the Russian resistance 
 to Napoleon. He was, moreover, anxious to have 
 his hands free in order to prosecute his designs upon 
 Turkey ; he was ready to believe that Great Britain's 
 policy of wasting her energies upon small, detached 
 expeditions was conceived with the definite aim of 
 securing her supremacy at sea and of opening new 
 markets for her commerce. No doubt, too, his 
 imagination was dazzled by the idea pressed upon 
 him by Napoleon that the two rulers of Russia and 
 France should divide the world. Otherwise it is 
 difficult to explain his sudden and base desertion of 
 Prussia. Full of impulses, Alexander was now 
 carried away by the prospect of being a great 
 Emperor of the East, and of avenging himself upon 
 Great Britain. At the same time this serious crisis 
 in European history was undoubtedly due in part 
 to the British system of Government by party, and
 
 86 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 
 situation 
 in Great 
 Britain at 
 the time of 
 Portland's 
 accession 
 to office, 
 April, 1807. 
 
 afforded ample justification to Alexander for his 
 distrust of British foreign policy, and for his decision 
 at Tilsit to attend simply to the interests and 
 security of his own dominions. 
 
 Canning described the position of things when 
 the Portland ministry took office in very downright 
 style. The transport system, he said, owing to the 
 false economy of Lord Henry Petty, was so completely 
 dismantled that the new ministry found it had not 
 a single transport at its disposal. Had the transport 
 system not been interfered with, the ministry would, 
 he averred, have been able to have sent out immedi- 
 ately 20,000 troops, who would have turned the scale 
 at Friedland. 
 
 The Portland ministry, on coming into office on 
 April 8th, had at once made preparations for 
 intervening on the Continent. On June 17th the 
 Cabinet undertook to send 20,000 men to North 
 Germany, and on June 23rd agreed to take into its 
 pay 18,000 Swedes. Further, it arranged to pay 
 a large subsidy to Prussia, and to despatch troops 
 as soon as possible to the north of Europe. But 
 this decision came too late to save Europe from 
 experiencing a long period of French domination, 
 for on July 7th the Treaty of Tilsit was formally 
 signed, and the complete command of the west 
 seemed to have passed to Napoleon. The British 
 ministry was, however, preparing to strike a blow 
 in defence of the liberties of Europe.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SEIZURE OF THE DANISH FLEET AND THE CRISIS 
 IN SPAIN — COPENHAGEN, BAYLEN, CINTRA, 
 AND CORUNNA 
 
 The Treaty of Tilsit represents the highest point The vital 
 reached by Napoleon. Although he continued till necessity 
 1812 to dominate Europe, signs of resistance to his European 
 schemes began to show themselves. Before a year resistance 
 had elapsed it became evident to anyone closely in to the 
 touch with the currents of thought on the Continent Tilsit, 
 that a feeling of general uneasiness, if not of absolute 
 dissatisfaction, with Napoleon's absolutism pervaded 
 all Europe. The air was becoming charged with 
 electricity, and the barometer indicated the near 
 approach of storms. Such an arrangement as that 
 indicated by the Treaty of Tilsit implied a European 
 revolution of the most drastic character. Charles 
 the Great had endeavoured to rule Europe from 
 Aachen, but he had realised that his Empire would 
 break up as soon as he was dead. Charles V had 
 failed in his attempt to form an Empire, which 
 should look only to him for political and religious 
 guidance. Was it likely that the whole of Europe 
 would rest contentedly under the rule of the French 
 and Russian Emperors ? 
 
 WTiile Germany was quietly gathering strength, Great 
 Great Britain and Spain began that resistance to the tffe^Balttc 
 policy of Tilsit which culminated in Waterloo. With 
 regard to the question of the extension of the 
 Napoleonic system over the Baltic, and the consequent 
 
 87
 
 88 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 necessity for the British seizure of the Danish fleet, 
 Castlereagh, in his Correspondence, speaks in very 
 precise terms. The Treaty of Tilsit had no sooner 
 been signed than " the British Government found 
 " means to obtain positive information of the hostile 
 " plans projected against this country. ... It was 
 " discovered that one of the first objects of France 
 " would be to secure the Danish fleet." About July 
 16th the British government had made a momentous 
 decision. It resolved to compel Denmark to ally 
 with us, or to maintain a strict neutrality. On this 
 matter Castlereagh was in full agreement with 
 Canning, who recognised the necessity of preventing 
 Denmark from being forced to become the close ally 
 of France. Napoleon had resolved to convert the 
 Baltic into a French lake. " If England," he wrote, 
 " refuses Russia's mediation, Denmark must choose 
 " either to make war against England or against me." 
 Immediate action on the part of the British Cabinet 
 was, therefore, necessary if the Baltic was not to 
 become a mare clausum. There was no time to be 
 lost, and the British Government, recognising the 
 urgency of the danger, acted with most commendable 
 promptitude. Near Hamburg was a large force of 
 Spanish troops serving under French orders, and 
 these, combined with a French army under Berna- 
 dotte, might at any time invade and coerce Denmark. 
 It was necessary then for the British Government to 
 take immediate action and to prevent the Danish 
 fleet from falling into the hands of Napoleon. 
 The On July 15th the first division, and on July 29th 
 
 the Danish the second division of the British fleet sailed from 
 fleet. England, and on August 15th the expedition arrived 
 
 off Dibeck, a village situated between Copenhagen
 
 THE COERCION OF DENMARK 89 
 
 and Elsinore. The following day Admiral Gambier 
 and Lord Cathcart issued a proclamation to the 
 Danish Government. The Danish Crown Prince was 
 offered a defensive alliance, armed assistance in case 
 he was attacked by France, and £100,000 as a subsidy, 
 on condition of his handing over the Danish fleet to 
 the British Government. Somewhat naturally the 
 Prince refused, and the Danes made a gallant but 
 ineffectual resistance to the British attack on Copen- 
 hagen. On September 7th the city capitulated, and 
 shortly afterwards the Danish fleet was carried off to 
 England. It included 29 ships, 4 frigates, 6 brigs, 
 and 25 gunboats. 
 
 Very severe criticism was naturally levelled at this The results 
 action of the British ministry. Its justification was of f this h 
 to be found in the secret articles of the Treaty of t he British 
 Tilsit. But these articles could not be produced, Govem- 
 and the name of the agent who informed the ministry ment - 
 of their tenour could not be disclosed. So Castlereagh 
 and Canning had to listen to the bitter attacks and 
 scathing criticisms of their opponents, whose opinions 
 were those of every European Court, without being 
 able to make any effective reply, or to state fully the 
 grounds which they held were sufficient to justify 
 their action. To the world Great Britain had 
 emulated the conduct of the French when the latter 
 overran Switzerland. 
 
 The most unsatisfactory part of the affair from the 
 point of view of the British ministry was that it did 
 not lead, as had been confidently anticipated, to the 
 formation of a great Northern League. Sweden had 
 been compelled, on August 20th, to hand over 
 Stralsund to a French force, and Gustavus, irritated 
 at the withdrawal of Cathcart *s force from Pomerania
 
 90 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The Justifi- 
 cation of 
 the seizure 
 of the 
 Danish 
 fleet. 
 
 to Denmark, which was the immediate cause of the 
 French occupation of Stralsund, refused to rely on 
 Great Britain any longer. Sweden thus, owing to 
 the departure of Cathcart and his troops from 
 Pomerania to take part in the coercion of Denmark, 
 could no longer be regarded as a possible ally of 
 Great Britain. The coercion of Denmark, too, gave 
 the Tsar an excuse for adopting a pronounced hostile 
 attitude to Great Britain. Till October the British 
 Cabinet had hoped that Alexander would not resent 
 our action against Denmark ; and on September 
 22nd Castlereagh, who fully agreed with Canning on 
 the necessity of the Danish expedition, wrote to 
 Cathcart : " Russia does not show any disposition to 
 " resent or to complain of what we have done at 
 " Copenhagen." And he went on to say that " the 
 " tone of the Russian Cabinet has become much more 
 " conciliatory to us since they heard of your opera- 
 " tions at Copenhagen." As late as October 1st, our 
 representative at St. Petersburg wrote that not only 
 was public opinion " decidedly averse to war with 
 " England," but that " the English name was scarcely 
 " ever more popular in Russia than at the present 
 " time." But Alexander was in reality much 
 irritated at what he called an act of " unheard-of 
 violence," and early in November he formally 
 adopted the Continental System. 
 
 Nevertheless, the policy of Castlereagh and 
 Canning had won a signal success. The Copenhagen 
 expedition had been successful, and as a consequence 
 the Swedish, no less than the Danish fleet, was no 
 longer in danger of falling into the hands of Napoleon. 
 In the Baltic the British fleet rode supreme, and the 
 Russian fleet could not venture outside Cronstadt.
 
 PORTUGAL 91 
 
 Though the project of the formation of a great 
 Northern Confederacy had not been carried out, a 
 decisive blow had been struck at Napoleon's plan of a 
 naval combination in the North which should threaten, 
 if not destroy, Great Britain's naval supremacy. 
 
 During the ensuing few months Castlereagh and Continued 
 Canning were able to frustrate another design formed *£ ^J 
 by Napoleon of seizing the Portuguese fleet and British 
 uniting it with a Russian squadron under Siniavin in Govern- 
 antagonism to England. 
 
 And while one result of the outbreak of hostilities 
 with Denmark was the firm establishment of British 
 supremacy in the Baltic, a further result was the 
 capture on December 24th of the Danish Islands of 
 St. Thomas, St. John, and Santa Cruz by troops 
 from Barbadoes. But their capture, together with 
 that of Curacoa and Madeira, was a very inadequate 
 compensation for the loss of Buenos Ayres by General 
 Whitelocke in July, and for the openly-declared 
 hostility of Russia. 
 
 Though the project for the formation of a great Napoleon 
 Northern League, which should oppose that of Russia |^ 
 and France, had fallen through, the capture of the 
 Danish fleet had entirely upset the plans of Napoleon 
 in the North of Europe. But even before the British 
 fleet had sailed for Denmark he had begun to devise 
 schemes for the subjugation of Portugal, and for her 
 inclusion in the Continental S}'stem. As early as 
 July 19th, before he had heard of the British expedi- 
 tion to Copenhagen, he had informed the Government 
 of Portugal that her ports must be closed to England ; 
 and no sooner was the danger from Copenhagen 
 averted, than it became necessary for the British 
 Cabinet to make preparations to prevent Portugal 
 
 Portugal.
 
 92 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 from becoming an integral portion of the French 
 system. Before the close of November the British 
 fleet conveyed the Prince Regent of Portugal and his 
 Court across the Atlantic. When Junot, on November 
 30th, arrived at Lisbon, he found that the royal 
 family had sailed for South America, and that the 
 Portuguese fleet was beyond the reach of Napoleon. 
 The King's Thus, at the opening of the English Parliament on 
 
 Jan C 2ist J anuar Y 21st > 1808 > the King's Speech contained 
 1808. much that was of supreme interest. It began by 
 
 stating that " no sooner had the negotiations at 
 " Tilsit confirmed the influence of France over the 
 " Powers of the Continent than His Majesty heard 
 " that France intended to combine those powers in 
 " one general confederacy, for the purpose either of 
 " entirely subjugating Great Britain, or imposing on 
 " Great Britain an insecure and ignominious treaty." 
 It then went on to explain that for the purposes 
 stated the above Powers had " determined to force 
 " into hostility to Great Britain, Denmark and 
 " Portugal, and to use their fleets. Thus the whole 
 " naval force of Europe would be brought to bear 
 " upon different points of His Majesty's dominions." 
 In face of these dangers the Government, so it was 
 stated in the Speech, had not been idle. The Portu- 
 guese fleet had been secured, and the Danish fleet had 
 been seized by force. The general situation was 
 then summed up thus : — Russia, Austria, and Prussia 
 are now numbered among Great Britain's foes ; 
 owing to the machinations of France peace is not yet 
 made with Turkey ; retaliatory measures (the Orders 
 in Council) in answer to the French decree declaring 
 Great Britain and her colonies in a state of blockade, 
 are being taken. After an allusion to the refusal of
 
 IN PARLIAMENT 93 
 
 the President of the United States to ratify a Treaty 
 of Commerce and Amity which had been signed by 
 Commissioners on December 3rd, 1806, the Speech 
 was concluded by a declaration that the war against 
 France, as far as Great Britain was concerned, was 
 just and national " if ever one existed," that it was 
 purely defensive, and that the King only desired a 
 secure and honourable peace. 
 
 On January 28th, 1808, Lord Hawkesbury in the The 
 Lords and Castlereagh in the Commons moved votes debates fa 
 of thanks to the navy and the army which had been 
 employed in the attack on Copenhagen. Though 
 these proposals were carried in both Houses, Ponsonby 
 on February 3rd attacked the Danish expedition in 
 the House of Commons, and moved for the produc- 
 tion of the information which led to that expedition. 
 Opposition was at once offered to his proposal by 
 both Canning and Castlereagh. The latter asserted 
 that various endeavours had been made to bring the 
 Court of Denmark to an explanation of its conduct, 
 that the Crown Prince had secretly favoured the 
 views of France, and that an occupation of Zealand 
 would not have been a satisfactory alternative to the 
 measures taken. On Mr. Ponsonby's motion being 
 put, 108 voted for it and 253 voted against it. 
 
 Five days later, on February 8th, the Duke of 
 Norfolk in the House of Lords called attention to 
 this important matter. " The expedition to Copen- 
 " hagen," he said, " had deeply affected the character 
 " of the country," and he demanded that the House 
 should be furnished with every kind of information on 
 the subject. To his motion for the production of all 
 communications relating to the Danish expedition 
 the Marquess Wellesley replied that Napoleon had
 
 94 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The French 
 invasion 
 of Spain. 
 The capitu- 
 lation of 
 Baylen, 
 July, 1808. 
 
 expected that Portugal and Denmark would declare 
 war upon England on September 1st, that without 
 Holstein, whence she drew her provisions, Denmark 
 could not defend herself against Napoleon, and, 
 further, that her commercial interests, founded on 
 the principles of the armed neutrality, made her 
 inclined to lean towards France. Lord Hawkesbury 
 also pointed out that Denmark must have yielded to 
 Napoleon's wishes, for " since Austerlitz, Jena, and 
 " Friedland, there was nothing on the Continent 
 " that could effect any resistance to France." He 
 further emphasized the fact that had Denmark been 
 willing to join Great Britain an attempt at defending 
 Zealand would have been made. While 48 voted 
 for the Duke of Norfolk's motion, 105 voted against 
 it ; the supporters of the motion including Lords 
 Moira, Grey, Darnley, Sidmouth, St. Vincent and 
 Buckinghamshire ; and its opponents Lords Jersey, 
 Harrowby and Mulgrave. This debate is moreover 
 of interest in that it brought the Marquess Wellesley 
 into prominence as a strong supporter of the Govern- 
 ment. That remarkable man had returned from 
 India just before the death of Pitt, whose great friend 
 he was, and (as a letter in the possession of the Rev. 
 W. H. Hutton, editor of this series shows) was cordially 
 welcomed by Castlereagh. From the day of his arrival 
 he at once showed a keen interest in foreign affairs. 
 During the early months of 1808 French troops 
 poured into Spain, the conquest of which was regarded 
 by Napoleon as a comparatively easy matter. These 
 troops, owing to " the contempt which the Emperor 
 " entertained, not only for the Spanish Government 
 " but for the Spanish nation," were far inferior in 
 quality to the victors of Austerlitz and Friedland,
 
 HELP TO PORTUGAL 95 
 
 and, moreover, were largely reinforced by Italians, 
 Germans, and even Irish. One result of Napoleon's 
 mistake in underrating the possible strength of the 
 Spanish resistance was the capitulation of Baylen in 
 July, 1808, when some 17,000 men under Dupont 
 laid down their arms. The capture of a whole 
 French army by a Spanish force sent an electrical 
 thrill through Europe. It forced Napoleon to modify 
 his contempt of the Spanish powers of resistance, it 
 determined him to arrange the famous Conference 
 with Alexander of Russia at Erfurt in the autumn of 
 1808 ; it stimulated the resistance to the French in 
 Spain ; and it encouraged Castlereagh to form plans 
 for British intervention in Portugal. 
 
 On June 8th, 1808, the Asturian deputies, Viscount Castlereagh 
 Materosa and Don Diego de la Vega, arrived in f nd British 
 London. They brought with them the tidings that (faf!? 1 " 
 Northern Spain had risen against the French. The Portugal, 
 news that a national rising of some magnitude was l8 ° 8 - 
 taking place in Spain had a magical effect upon the 
 British mind. 
 
 Hitherto successive governments had preferred to 
 send small isolated expeditions, apparently with the 
 hope that they would form the nucleus of important 
 national risings. The failure of such expeditions, as 
 those sent in 1807 to Buenos Ayres, Egypt and 
 Constantinople, had discredited this system of 
 " pin-pricks," and this " policy of filching sugar 
 " islands." In 1808 public opinion was decidedly in 
 favour of the policy favoured by Castlereagh since 
 1805, namely, of sending a large well-equipped force 
 to the scene of operations. Changes and reforms in 
 the British military system, due in great measure to 
 Castlereagh, now enabled the Government to act
 
 96 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Expedition 
 to Portugal 
 decided 
 upon. 
 
 with vigour on the Continent. Moreover, there was 
 no longer any danger of a French invasion, and at the 
 time of the arrival of the Spanish envoys Castlereagh 
 was planning an attack on the French ships which lay 
 in Boulogne harbour, while a force was being collected 
 in Ireland for the purpose of recapturing Buenos 
 Ayres. The imminent return, too, of some 10,000 
 men under Sir John Moore from the Baltic placed a 
 large force at the disposal of the ministry. 
 
 Castlereagh's reply to the Asturian envoys marked 
 a momentous epoch in British foreign policy. He 
 decided to forego all idea of sending an expedition to 
 South America, and to concentrate the efforts of 
 Great Britain upon the Spanish Peninsula. In 
 making this decision he was acting in consonance 
 with public opinion in England. The rising of the 
 Asturians, and the arrival in England of the Asturian 
 envoys, stirred up a strong feeling in this country, 
 which found expression in articles in The Times. On 
 June 29th, 1808, a strongly- worded article appeared 
 calling upon the ministers to take immediate action. 
 Alluding to the Asturian envoys we find the following 
 remarks : " And now we would ask the British 
 " ministers with the utmost earnestness, whether 
 " such men and such a cause are to be betrayed, and 
 " betrayed they will be, if they are not supported by 
 " the whole vigour of which this nation is capable. 
 " . . . There is not a man in England who does not 
 " now wish the whole of the British army, if it were 
 " properly commanded, at once transported to the 
 " Spanish territory, to take its part at least in annihi- 
 " lating and driving out of the peninsula of Spain a 
 " people so base and treacherous." Sir Arthur 
 Wellesley, in whose abilities Castlereagh had the
 
 VTMEIRO 97 
 
 greatest confidence, was placed in command of an The 
 expedition, which in the summer of 1808 sailed from Convention 
 Cork. For the arrangements connected with its Aue^oth 
 transport, commissariat and equipment, the Duke 1808. 
 of York and the War Office were responsible. On 
 this subject Wellesley, in a letter to Castlereagh on 
 June 29th, 1808, expressed himself very strongly. 
 His criticisms were well grounded, for rarely has an 
 expedition more inefficiently provided left the shores 
 of Britain. Professor Oman, in his " History of the 
 " Peninsular War," remarks with truth that, " Such 
 " little contretemps were common in the days when 
 " Frederick, Duke of York, with the occasional 
 " assistance of Mrs. Mary Ann Clark, managed the 
 " British Army." The lack of proper arrangements 
 for the expedition might, however, have been 
 remedied in time, but what was far more serious 
 was the intervention of the Duke of York and the 
 War Office with regard to the command of the 
 expedition. Unable to realise the value of Wellesley's 
 experience of war on a large scale in India, the War 
 Office placed over Wellesley two senior officers, Sir 
 Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Before he 
 heard that he was to be superseded in the command 
 of the troops in Portugal, Wellesley had already 
 landed at Mondego Bay. His victory at Vimeiro on 
 August 21st was deprived of valuable results by the 
 appearance of Burrard, who took the command and 
 refused to advance. On the next day Sir Hew 
 Dalrymple, an old man with very little experience 
 of warfare, superseded Burrard. Unfortunately, 
 though with the best intentions, Castlereagh had 
 written to him recommending him to " take Sir 
 " Arthur Wellesley into his particular confidence," 
 7 — (2211)
 
 98 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 and " to make the most prominent use of him which 
 " the rules of the service would permit." Somewhat 
 naturally, Dalrymple at once conceived a dislike for 
 Wellesley, whose plan of campaign he rejected. The 
 proposal by Junot for an armistice was received with 
 undisguised pleasure by Dalrymple, and the Conven- 
 tion of Cintra was agreed upon on August 30th. By 
 it the French army of over 25,000 was allowed to 
 embark at Lisbon for France. Though the evacua- 
 tion of Portugal by the French troops was thus 
 effected, the rage of the Portuguese authorities was 
 only equalled by the indignation felt in England at 
 this Convention, which, though possessing advantages 
 from a military point of view, was only judged from 
 a political standpoint. 
 
 Some arrangement had also to be made with 
 regard to the Russian fleet, which Admiral Sir Charles 
 Cotton had kept under blockade since 1807. The 
 Russian Admiral Siniavin was on bad terms with 
 Junot, and preferred not to be included in the Conven- 
 tion of Cintra, but to make his own terms with the 
 British Admiral. On September 3rd a convention 
 was therefore drawn up between Cotton and Siniavin, 
 in accordance with which the Russian fleet, which 
 was composed of nine sail of the line and one frigate, 
 in the Tagus was surrendered on the condition that 
 it should be restored on the conclusion of peace 
 between Russia and Great Britain. Siniavin, his 
 officers, and crews, were not to be considered as 
 prisoners of war, and were to be sent back to Russia 
 in English ships. By securing the Russian ships 
 Cotton was doing a good service to his country, for 
 it was a matter of great importance to reduce the 
 number of ships under the power of Napoleon.
 
 THE CONVENTION OF CTNTRA 99 
 
 The Convention of Cintra caused great dissatisfac- Criticism 
 
 tion in England, and Lord Castlereagh, who, as war oi the 
 
 • • , , i j j u j r Convention 
 
 minister, had recommended some decision confirm- f cintra. 
 
 " atory " of the Convention by the Cabinet, was 
 
 specially singled out for abuse. Canning was not 
 
 present at the meeting of the Cabinet which confirmed 
 
 the Convention, and dissented from the decision 
 
 arrived at by his colleagues respecting it. After a 
 
 careful investigation of all the circumstances relating 
 
 to this famous Convention, Professor Oman comes to 
 
 the conclusion that, " while on the military side it 
 
 " was justifiable, it presented grave political faults." 
 
 What was more serious than the grave faults and 
 mistakes of Dalrymple in arranging the Convention 
 was the delay in making any forward movement 
 after the Convention was signed. 
 
 " I do not know what Sir Hew proposes to do," 
 wrote Wellesley on September 1st, to Colonel Charles 
 Stewart, " or is instructed to do ; but if I was in his 
 " situation I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in 
 " less than a month from this time." 
 
 The Convention of Cintra, as Lord Malmesbury 
 says, was most unpopular in England, and with good 
 reason, for the faults and mistakes made by Dal- 
 rymple in arranging it were innumerable. In the 
 House of Commons Lord Henry Petty (afterwards 
 Marquess of Lansdowne) moved resolutions con- 
 demnatory of the Convention ; and on November 17th 
 the Court of Inquiry began its sittings. In the 
 meantime Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley had 
 returned home, the last named sailing from Lisbon 
 on September 20th, and arriving at Plymouth on 
 October 4th. 
 
 In the " Memoirs of a Highland Lady," edited by
 
 100 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Wellesley's 
 letter to 
 Castle- 
 reagh, 
 Oct., 1808. 
 
 Lady Strachey, it is related by Miss Grant of Rothie- 
 murchus how the Master of University College, 
 Oxford, on hearing of the return of the British 
 Generals from Spain, wrote the following lines : — 
 
 Sir Arthur, Sir Hew and Sir Harry, 
 Sailed boldly from England to Spain ; 
 
 But not liking long there to tarry, 
 They wisely sailed all back again. 
 
 Before he sailed Wellesley had written to Castle- 
 reagh a letter, the importance of which it is impossible 
 to overrate. In it he showed that the Spanish armies 
 were of little value, and that no reliance could be 
 placed upon them. " A thousand French," he says, 
 " with cavalry and artillery will disperse thousands 
 " of them." The only efficient plan of operations 
 was, in his opinion, for the British Army in Portugal 
 to move up the Valley of the Douro into Northern 
 Spain, basing its advance upon the Asturias and 
 Galicia. The army would thus be on the right flank 
 and rear of any French force advancing to Madrid. 
 In case Napoleon himself should resolve to attack 
 the British force, a line of retreat must be left open, 
 and " that retreat must be the sea." To Castlereagh 
 belongs the credit of recognising the superiority of 
 Wellesley's advice to that of others who were expa- 
 tiating upon the patriotism and resources of the 
 Spaniards. In consequence of his conviction that 
 Wellesley's despatch contained suggestions which, 
 if carried out, would upset all Napoleon's calculations, 
 and mar his project for the conquest of Spain, Castle- 
 reagh embodied Wellesley's views in the orders 
 which were sent to Moore on September 25th. Hence- 
 forward he never wavered in his consistent support
 
 SIR JOHN MOORE 101 
 
 of Wellesley, whose plan of operations was carried 
 out by Sir John Moore, ending with the battle of 
 Corunna and the complete disarrangement of 
 Napoleon's schemes for the subjugation of Spain. 
 
 Castlereagh's relations with Sir John Moore, and Sir John 
 the detailed account of the movements which ended Moore - 
 at Corunna, are fully described in " The Diary of 
 " Sir John Moore," which has lately been published. 
 During 1807 and the early part of 1808 Moore had 
 been employed in the Baltic with the hope that he 
 would be able to keep " the mad and impracticable ,: 
 King of Sweden true to the English alliance. The 
 Swedish Alliance was regarded by the ministers as 
 of great importance ; but in June the King of Sweden 
 placed under arrest Moore, who thereupon, in July, 
 managed to escape. On his arrival in England he 
 was coldly received by the ministers, though the King 
 and the Duke of York treated him with great consider- 
 ation. On hearing that he was to be employed in 
 Spain in a subordinate position to Sir Hew Dalrymple 
 and Sir Harry Burrard he was naturally indignant, 
 and in an interview with Castlereagh expressed his 
 views very warmly. " It may," he said, " perhaps, 
 " be my lot never to see. you again. I, therefore, 
 " think it right to express to you my feelings of the 
 " unhandsome treatment I have received from you. 
 "... Had I been an ensign, it would hardly have 
 " been possible to treat me with less ceremony. . . . 
 " I have a right, in common with all officers who 
 have served zealously and well, to expect to be 
 " treated with attention, and when employment is 
 " offered to me, that some regard should be had to 
 " my former services." 
 
 In a letter which was sent after Moore, Castlereagh
 
 102 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Moore's 
 character. 
 
 Moore in 
 Spain. 
 
 assured him that nothing but the urgency of the 
 situation prevented him from advising His Majesty 
 " to relieve you from a situation in which you 
 " appeared to consider yourself to have been placed 
 " without a due attention to your feelings as an 
 " officer." 
 
 The fact was that both Castlereagh and Canning, 
 especially since Moore's experiences in Sweden, had 
 good reason to distrust the General's diplomatic tact. 
 The situation in Spain required careful handling, and 
 Moore, though a great General, probably was inferior 
 to Wellington in the power of dealing with political 
 difficulties. Both Castlereagh and Canning, there- 
 fore, were justified in their apprehension that Moore's 
 qualities did not fit him for dealing with a situation 
 in Portugal " where judicious handling of sensitive 
 " individuals was only second in importance to 
 " military prowess." 
 
 Canning, especially, was very dissatisfied with the 
 temper of mind in which Moore had left England ; 
 and Stapleton, in his " Life of Canning," recounts 
 that when Canning heard at a Cabinet meeting 
 Castlereagh's account of his interview with Moore, 
 he exclaimed, " Good God ! And do you really 
 " mean to say that you allowed a man entertaining 
 " such feelings with regard to the expedition to go ? " 
 
 However, Moore set sail, and it does credit to both 
 him and Castlereagh that during the General's 
 short but highly important campaign they did not 
 allow their personal feelings to interfere with their 
 efforts to further the national interests in the struggle 
 against Napoleon. At the same time in his Diary 
 he has no hesitation in expressing his own private 
 views. Thus, for instance, he styles a despatch
 
 CORUNNA 103 
 
 which Sir Hew Dalrymple had received from Castle- 
 reagh at the beginning of September as " plausible 
 " verbose nonsense," and shows how impossible it 
 was for a minister in London to direct operations in 
 Spain. On October 7th Moore was entrusted with 
 the chief command of the British army in Spain, and 
 till his death at Corunna busied himself in upsetting 
 Napoleon's plans " for the subjugation of the Penin- 
 " sula." During this period he was in frequent 
 communication with Castlereagh, to whom he 
 described the difficulties which he had to encounter 
 in November and December. It is impossible to 
 overrate the importance of Moore's campaign. With- 
 out it Napoleon, for a time at any rate, would have 
 easily subjugated Spain and Portugal. Without it 
 Wellington's Peninsula Campaign would have been 
 rendered impossible. 
 
 Owing to Moore's attack on the French line of The value 
 supplies, Napoleon was forced to give up his plan for of Moore's 
 the immediate subjugation of Spain, and to devote ^corunna. 
 his energies to crushing Moore's force. 
 
 Napoleon's failure to carry out his intention led to 
 his own return to France, and enabled Wellesley to 
 enter upon the Peninsular War in the following year. 
 On January 1st, 1809, Napoleon, at Astorga, decided 
 to leave Soult to continue to follow Moore. His 
 decision implied a recognition of the magnitude of 
 Moore's services to the civilized world. 
 
 Canning, in the House of Commons, rightly esti- 
 mated Moore's advance on Sahagun, when he de- 
 scribed how that movement contributed to draw off 
 the French army from Madrid and " from the prosecu- 
 " tion of operations against the capital and the 
 " Southern provinces."
 
 104 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Though the ministry had been led to believe that 
 the state of things in Spain was flourishing, no sooner 
 was it realised by them that they had been wrongly 
 informed than preparations were made to reinforce 
 Moore. 
 
 To Castlereagh Moore wrote very fully with regard 
 to what was urgently required, and Castlereagh at 
 once sent immense quantities of biscuit to Corunna ; 
 but, we are told, " the district was so denuded of 
 " transport, and the silver difficulty at the time it 
 " was most wanted was so great," that it could not 
 be forwarded. 
 
 Though Moore's death and the return of his army 
 to England seemed to imply the abandonment of 
 active operations in the Peninsula, this was far from 
 being the case. Moore's campaign rendered further 
 intervention in Spain not only possible, but likely to 
 be fraught with the best results. In consequence, 
 Wellesley was early in 1809 appointed to the command 
 in Portugal. 
 
 The Court of Inquiry into the circumstances 
 leading to the Convention of Cintra issued its report 
 on December 22nd, 1808. Though Dalrymple and 
 Burrard were credited with " fair military reasons " 
 for their conduct, it was quite clear that their services 
 would not again be required. Wellesley, on the other 
 hand, was complimented for his action down to the 
 battle of Vimeiro, and four months later he was 
 appointed to the command of the army in the Penin- 
 sula. For some three months after the battle of 
 Corunna British operations in the Peninsula were 
 practically suspended. The British troops at Lisbon 
 were commanded by Sir John Cradock, who main- 
 tained a defensive attitude, while in Spain the
 
 ARTHUR WELLESLEY 105 
 
 Spanish troops suffered a series of defeats at the 
 hands of the French. 
 
 During this period Castlereagh had frequent confer- 
 ences with his brother, Colonel Charles Stewart, who 
 had accompanied Moore on his campaign, and with 
 Arthur Wellesley. The opinion of the latter with 
 regard to the possibility of defending Portugal had no 
 little effect in confirming the views of the Cabinet on 
 the subject. " I have always been of opinion," 
 Wellesley wrote, " that Portugal might be defended 
 " whatever might be the result of the contest in 
 " Spain ; and that, in the meantime, the measures 
 " adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly 
 " useful for the Spaniards in their contest with the 
 " French." 
 
 Meanwhile, affairs both abroad and at home Attacks on 
 remained in a very unsatisfactory state. On the 16th Cast } e - 
 of January, 1809, the battle of Corunna was fought, j an , f '^oo^ 
 followed by the return of the British troops to 
 England. It was openly said by Grenville that the 
 English war in Spain was, according to the reported 
 opinions of the ministers, practically over. Grenville 
 also spoke of " the squabbles among the ministers, 
 " the usual consequence of embarrassments and 
 " disgraces which each labours (in such cases) to throw 
 " upon his colleagues." He also declared that the 
 ministers " all agree in falling foul of Lord Castle- 
 " reagh." Fortunately, Castlereagh was strong 
 enough to insist upon the necessity of prosecuting 
 the war with Napoleon, was sufficiently capable to 
 carry out the reorganisation of the militia system 
 (above alluded to), and had sufficient influence to 
 secure for Arthur Wellesley the command of the 
 British forces in Portugal.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE VICTORY OF TALAVERA AND THE FAILURE OF 
 
 THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION 
 
 1808-1809 
 
 Military The year 1808 had seen the beginning of the 
 reorganisa- Peninsular War. With the arrival of Arthur 
 Wellesley in Portugal in the spring of 1809, the 
 British intervention in the Spanish Peninsula became 
 a matter of European importance, and slowly but 
 surely contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon. 
 That such intervention was possible and that it 
 proved effective was entirely due to the reorganisation 
 of the British army which had been carried out by 
 Castlereagh in 1808 and 1809. While the militia 
 system was made the basis of the military establish- 
 ment, a system of second battalions was partially 
 put into force. The losses which the regular army 
 „ might incur were to be supplied by annual volunteer- 
 
 ing from the regular militia, which itself was to be 
 kept up partly by ballot, partly by voluntary 
 enlistment. The militia was then used as a recruiting 
 ground for the regular army. By these means the 
 army in the Peninsula was adequately supplied, 
 and was able when well led to defeat Napoleon's 
 most trusted veterans. 
 
 The appointment of Wellesley to the command 
 of the troops in Portugal, the responsibility of which 
 rests entirely with Castlereagh — as a letter from 
 the King proves — implied the transference of Sir 
 John Cradock, who was then at Lisbon and of 
 
 106
 
 WELLESLEY IN PORTUGAL 107 
 
 superior rank to Wellesley, to some other post. The 
 Cradock had shown ability while in Portugal, and appoint- 
 Castlereagh in offering him the command at Arthur 
 Gibraltar took the opportunity of referring to his Wellesley 
 services in laudatory terms. In his letter to Cradock, t0 the 
 Castlereagh openly avowed the immense belief , n t h e 
 which he felt in Wellesley 's military fitness for his Peninsula, 
 new post. " It would neither be kind nor manly 9 * 
 " in me," he wrote, " not to avow that the advice 
 " the King's ministers have felt it their duty to 
 " offer to the King on the present occasion, has been 
 " dictated by the peculiar value they are disposed 
 " to attach to Sir A. W.'s services generally, and 
 " particularly in Portugal, which in times and under 
 " circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has in every 
 " instance met with their unqualified approbation." 
 Sir John Cradock accepted the appointment at 
 Gibraltar, and Wellesley succeeded to the command 
 of the army in Portugal. 
 
 Castlereagh's instructions to Wellesley, who landed 
 in Portugal on April 22nd, 1809, were characterised 
 by his usual good sense. He spoke of the necessity 
 of at once reorganizing the Portuguese army, and 
 teaching it to co-operate with the British troops. 
 The Portuguese army was under the charge of 
 Beresford, with whom Wellesley was to be in close 
 communication. The defence of Portugal was, 
 however, to be Wellesley's first concern, but 
 Wellesley was to use his own judgment with regard 
 to the most suitable time for advancing into Spain, 
 the interests of which were so closely connected 
 with those of Portugal. The whole despatch shows 
 that Castlereagh placed implicit confidence in the 
 judgment and military skill of Wellesley. And
 
 108 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh *s 
 support of 
 Weliesley. 
 
 Results 
 of the 
 Talavera 
 campaign. 
 
 this confidence was fully justified in the Talavera 
 Campaign. After having on May 26th effected the 
 passage of the Douro and driven Soult out of 
 Portugal, Weliesley defeated Victor on July 27th 
 in the famous battle of Talavera. Confronted by 
 unexpected difficulties, however, Weliesley was 
 forced to retreat, and to establish his headquarters 
 between the Tagus and the Douro. 
 
 The short but brilliant campaign fully justified 
 Castlereagh's confidence in Weliesley, who on 
 September 4th was given the rank of Viscount with 
 the title of Wellington. During the progress of the 
 campaign, Castlereagh did all in his power to supply 
 the needs of the army, and, moreover, sent out 
 reinforcements to the amount of 5,000 men, who 
 proved of service at Talavera. " I am doing what 
 " I can to promote it " (your future success), 
 Castlereagh wrote to Weliesley on May 26th, " by 
 " strengthening you from hence, and I shall press 
 " everything forward as much as possible." On 
 June 1st he wrote congratulating Weliesley on the 
 passage of the Douro, and assuring him that " the 
 " result of the present operation, under the relative 
 " circumstances of the two armies, has in no respect 
 " fallen short of what might have been expected 
 " from the talents of the General and the gallantry 
 " of the troops." Castlereagh, satisfied with the 
 outlook in Portugal, then authorised the advance 
 into Spain, and Weliesley won the battle of Talavera. 
 
 The campaign had great direct and indirect 
 advantages. The projects and calculations of the 
 French were upset ; Galicia, Asturias, and part of 
 Leon were permanently freed from the enemy, and 
 the invasion of Portugal was postponed for a year,
 
 TALAVERA 109 
 
 during which Wellesley had time to strengthen his 
 army and to construct the lines of Torres Vedras. 
 Moreover, he had been able to estimate at their real 
 value the Spanish troops, whose conduct at Talavera 
 had shown that no reliance could be placed on them. 
 " I don't think," wrote Wellesley to Castlereagh 
 on August 1st, " that the Spaniards are yet in a state 
 " of discipline to contend with the French, and I 
 " prefer infinitely to endeavour to remove them 
 " from this part of Spain by manoeuvre to the trial 
 " of another pitched battle." He further stated 
 that not only were the Spanish troops in a miserable 
 state of discipline, but that they suffered from the 
 want of properly qualified officers. In a further 
 letter, on August 27th, to Castlereagh, Wellesley 
 spoke highly of the Spanish artillery, but described 
 in some detail the cowardice of the Spanish infantry, 
 some 2,000 of whom, frightened by the noise of their 
 own fire, ran off on the evening of July 27th. These 
 troops, who were neither attacked nor threatened 
 with any attack, fled, leaving their arms and 
 accoutrements on the ground, their officers with 
 them, " and they and the fugitive cavalry plundered 
 " the baggage of the British army which had been 
 " sent to the rear. Many others went whom I did 
 " not see." It was as obvious to Castlereagh as it 
 was to Wellesley that the time had not yet arrived 
 for a serious invasion of Spain, and that in view of 
 an organised attempt on the part of the French to 
 drive the British from the Peninsula, it was necessary 
 for Wellesley to fortify himself in Portugal, and to 
 endeavour to withstand the attacks which would 
 certainly be made upon him. 
 
 In a masterly despatch of September 14th,
 
 110 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh 's 
 views 
 on the 
 campaign. 
 
 The Orders 
 in Council. 
 
 Castlereagh shows a remarkable grasp of the situation 
 in Portugal, and of the measures necessary for the 
 defence of that country. Moreover, in a speech 
 on the Talavera campaign, he alluded to the losses 
 sustained in the battle itself in terms which should 
 commend themselves to a generation accustomed 
 to the letters from special correspondents. " The 
 " loss on that day," he said, " has been much dwelt 
 " upon, and none can lament the brave men who 
 " perished on that occasion more sincerely than I do. 
 " Sharing as I do to the very utmost that feeling, 
 " I must at the same time deprecate that careful 
 " searching into the details of loss which is calculated 
 " to unnerve the military energy of the country." 
 Wellesley's retirement into Portugal, however, more 
 or less connected with the failure of the Walcheren 
 expedition, strengthened the criticisms of the 
 opposition upon the policy of the Government and 
 the hostile feeling to Castlereagh, who as War Minister 
 was regarded by the general public as answerable 
 for all military failures and disasters. 
 • Meanwhile, the Government, in addition to its 
 intervention in Portugal, had endeavoured in other 
 respects to defend British interests against the 
 hostility of Napoleon. The " Continental System," 
 which had been established by the Berlin Decree 
 of November 21st, 1806, in order to ruin British 
 trade, had been answered by the Orders in Council in 
 January, 1807. Napoleon, in reply to these orders, 
 had in 1808 still further extended the Continental 
 System by including in its scope Italy and Austria. 
 The rising in Spain in 1808 had, however, thrown open 
 that country to British commerce, and had afforded 
 some relief to British traders.
 
 THE PENINSULAR WAR 111 
 
 It was therefore of paramount importance to The 
 Great Britain to prevent the dependence of Spain importance 
 and Portugal upon France. By preserving their Bri t jsn 
 independence, Great Britain was compelling interven- 
 Napoleon to postpone indefinitely his plans for the * ion . in 
 partition of Turkey and for an attack upon the 
 British power in India. The British intervention 
 in Spain was thus of vital necessity, not only to 
 Great Britain, but to the whole civilised world. 
 Owing to that intervention, the Spanish rising 
 became each year more formidable, Great Britain 
 was enabled to exist in spite of the " Continental 
 System," and Napoleon's dreams of Eastern conquests 
 vanished into thin air. 
 
 That such vital interests were at stake was, very Opposition 
 characteristically, not recognised in Great Britain to the 
 during the early months of 1809. Parliament met £° ^ 
 on January 13th, 1809, and while Lord Grenville Govern- 
 in the House of Lords attacked the policy of sending ment « 
 an English expedition into Spain, Lord Henry Petty 
 moved in the House of Commons a vote of censure 
 upon the ministers on account of the Convention of 
 Cintra. Both motions were easily defeated, as was 
 a motion by Ponsonby, the leader of the Whigs in 
 the House of Commons, for an enquiry into the 
 affairs of Spain. Nevertheless, it was clearly 
 apparent that the ministry was far from occupying 
 a strong position. The Convention of Cintra was 
 by no means forgotten, and had roused a great 
 amount of discontent, which vented itself upon 
 Castlereagh as War Minister. For a time, however, 
 the attention of the House of Commons was directed 
 from foreign affairs to the conduct of the Duke of 
 York as commander-in-chief. His former mistress,
 
 112 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Mrs. Clarke, had transferred herself to a Colonel 
 Wardle,^a member of Parliament, who now accused 
 the Duke of being cognisant of corrupt practices 
 carried on in the past by Mrs. Clarke. The Duke 
 had proved an excellent administrator, and most 
 unfortunately the ministry decided to hold an enquiry 
 into the accusations. After a Committee of the 
 whole House during nearly two months (from 
 January 26th to March 20th) had conducted the 
 enquiry the House by a small majority acquitted 
 him of all the charges brought against him. The 
 Duke, however, late in March resigned his post of 
 Commander-in-Chief. The zeal for reform of abuses 
 was nevertheless stimulated by the smallness of the 
 majority in favour of the Duke, and many cases of 
 corruption were unearthed. Both Castlereagh and 
 Perceval were shown to have used on certain 
 occasions undue influence, but the only result of 
 the agitation was a bill brought in by Perceval himself 
 to check the sale and brokerage of offices. 
 The Meanwhile, stirring events were taking place on 
 
 Wagram the Continent. On April 6th the Archduke Charles 
 1809. ' of Austria issued a proclamation calling upon the 
 Austrians to deliver Germany from the French. 
 For a time " all hopes of European independence 
 " centred in Wellesley and the Archduke Charles." 
 But while Wellesley was able to hold his own, the 
 Archduke was overthrown on July 6th in the battle 
 of Wagram, and Austria was compelled to accept the 
 humiliating terms of the Treaty of Vienna. Had a 
 strong British force landed in Hanover or at some other 
 place in northern Europe in 1809, Napoleon's attention 
 would have been distracted, and the overwhelming 
 disaster of Wagram would have been averted.
 
 FATAL DELAY 113 
 
 But Great Britain and Austria were still formally 
 at war. In Vienna and in London negotiations 
 advanced slowly, and promptitude did not characterise 
 the proceedings in Downing Street or at the 
 Austrian Court. Wagram was fought on July 6th ; 
 it was not till July 29th that the Austrian ratification 
 of peace was received by the British ministry. 
 As early as January, 1809, the idea of British 
 intervention at the mouth of the Elbe had been 
 definitely raised. Canning sent by way of Trieste 
 £25,000 to Austria, but George III seems to have 
 insisted that a formal peace between Great Britain 
 and Austria should be concluded before any 
 assistance on a large scale was given to the Viennese 
 Court. 
 
 Other reasons, too, contributed to the delay on Causes of 
 the part of the Cabinet in finally determining upon British 
 the expedition. An intrigue in the Cabinet to 
 remove Castlereagh from his post had been entered 
 upon as early as April, 1809, and the knowledge 
 of this intrigue did not contribute to united action 
 on the part of the ministers. The resignation, too, 
 of the Duke of York in March was a most unfortunate 
 event, and deprived the country of a capable Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. His successor, Sir David Dundas, 
 was singularly incapable of dealing with a situation 
 which demanded ability and energy. No sooner had 
 he succeeded to the post lately held by the Duke of 
 York than he asserted that we could not spare 1 5,000 
 men for foreign service, and in consequence of this 
 opinion no definite steps were taken till June, when 
 it became apparent from the muster rolls that as 
 many as 40,000 troops could be spared for foreign 
 service. Consequently the project known as the 
 
 8— (2211)
 
 114 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Walcheren Expedition was not finally accepted by 
 
 the Cabinet till June 14th. 
 
 The For that project Castlereagh was mainly respon- 
 
 Walcheren iW j A -j lg07 when h took offi Castlereagh 
 
 expedition, f ' j *j 
 
 1809. had drawn up a memorandum advocating a 
 
 Walcheren expedition. In the autumn of 1808 
 
 he again brought forward the matter, and suggested 
 
 that Sir John Moore should be placed in command. 
 
 On April 1st, 1809, he placed before the Cabinet 
 
 a most exhaustive memorandum on the subject, 
 
 in which he specified the exact number of ships 
 
 necessary, and showed a remarkable knowledge 
 
 of all the details connected with the proposed 
 
 expedition. The results of immediate action on 
 
 the part of the ministry, and the despatch of the 
 
 expedition under an able commander would have 
 
 been stupendous. Napoleon was then engaged in 
 
 a desperate struggle with the Austrians on the 
 
 Danube, and received a serious check at Aspern on 
 
 May 22nd. In the Peninsula Soult was rapidly 
 
 retiring from Portugal. It was not till July 6th that 
 
 the battle of Wagram was fought, and Austria again 
 
 forced to submit to Napoleon. The despatch of the 
 
 Walcheren Expedition early in June under able 
 
 leaders was therefore of the utmost importance. 
 
 The Cabinet, however, insisted on consulting a 
 
 number of military men whose opinions widely 
 
 differed, and it was not till June 14th that the 
 
 expedition was decided upon. Further delays took 
 
 place, and it was not till July 28th, three weeks after 
 
 the battle of Wagram had been won by the French, 
 
 that the expedition set sail. An Englishman 
 
 describes how he saw " the departure of the grandest 
 
 " fleet that ever sailed, at once, from the shores of
 
 WALCHEREN EXPEDITION 115 
 
 " England. Above three hundred vessels spread 
 " their wings to the wind, and from North Foreland 
 " to South the Channel was one cluster of moving 
 " vessels — a sight never to be forgotten whilst 
 " ' memory holds a seat.' " 
 
 The failure of the expedition was due to the Its failure, 
 incapacity of Lord Chatham, who deliberately 
 disobeyed Castlereagh's explicit instructions. Every- 
 thing depended upon an immediate dash at Antwerp, 
 which was practically undefended. All French 
 ships and arsenals in the Scheldt could then have 
 been destroyed, and a very serious blow would have 
 been struck at Napoleon's power. Castlereagh's 
 instructions to Lord Chatham were most explicit : 
 " Your lordship will consider the operation in 
 " question as, in its execution, more immediately 
 " directed against the fleet and arsenals of France 
 " in the Scheldt. The complete success of the 
 " operation would include the capture or destruction 
 " of the whole of the enemy's ships, either building 
 " at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire 
 " destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, 
 " Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering, if 
 " possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships 
 " of war." Chatham was further ordered " to 
 " advance at once a considerable corps against 
 " Antwerp," and at the same time to attack and if 
 possible take Flushing. 
 
 Unfortunately, instead of attacking Antwerp and 
 Flushing at the same time, Chatham only attacked 
 Flushing. The delay which followed gave Napoleon 
 time to reinforce Antwerp, disease broke out among 
 the British troops, and the expedition proved a 
 disastrous failure. A French General at the time
 
 116 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The project 
 
 justifiable. 
 
 assured an English officer that " if the British troops 
 " had immediately attacked Antwerp, they must 
 " have succeeded in taking that place, and in the 
 " destruction of the French fleet." 
 
 The conception of the Walcheren Expedition was 
 
 statesmanlike, and Castlereagh had formed a correct 
 
 idea of the immense value to England and Europe 
 
 of a successful attack upon Antwerp. Moreover, 
 
 Wellington himself approved of the expedition, and 
 
 writing on August 25th to Castlereagh, he remarked, 
 
 ' It may be satisfactory to you to know that I don't 
 
 ' think matters would have been much better if you 
 
 ' had sent your large expedition to Spain instead 
 
 ' of the Scheldt. You could not have equipped 
 
 ' it in Galicia or anywhere in the north of Spain. 
 
 'If we had had 60,000 instead of 20,000 in all 
 
 ' probability we should not have got to Talavera 
 
 ' to fight the battle, for want of means and of 
 
 ' provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we 
 
 ' could not have gone further." 
 
 The 
 
 ordinary 
 
 version 
 
 of the 
 
 causes 
 
 of the 
 
 duel 
 
 between 
 
 Castlereagh 
 
 and 
 
 Canning. 
 
 Castlereagh's plan, so wisely conceived, had thus 
 been ruined by errors in its execution. On him, 
 however, fell the whole brunt of the dissatisfaction 
 felt in England. This dissatisfaction was increased 
 by the news that after Talavera Wellington had 
 retired into Spain. It was just at this time that 
 the intrigue in the Cabinet for his overthrow came 
 to the ears of Castlereagh. That intrigue had for 
 its object the substitution of the Marquess Wellesley 
 for Castlereagh as Secretary for War. Canning was 
 the originator of the movement against Castlereagh. 
 On April 2nd, 1809, he had informed Portland that 
 he would resign unless Castlereagh was removed
 
 CANNING 117 
 
 from his office. The Duke never mentioned the 
 subject to Castlereagh, but gave Canning to under- 
 stand that after the close of the session in June 
 Castlereagh should be transferred to some other 
 department. Throughout, Portland seems to have 
 been acting with the King's full cognisance. But 
 after the close of the session Portland took no steps to 
 acquaint Castlereagh with the views of the Cabinet 
 and it was not till September that Castlereagh heard 
 of what had been going on from his brother-in-law, 
 Lord Camden. This account of the main features 
 of the intrigue against Castlereagh is probably 
 correct. The exact details with regard to what 
 occurred between April and September vary. The 
 supporters of Canning represent the position some- 
 what as follows. The Duke of Portland himself, 
 they say, recommended that the proposed removal 
 of Castlereagh to some other office should be con- 
 cealed from that minister till the end of the session. 
 Canning repeatedly protested against this conceal- 
 ment, and Perceval, on hearing at the close of the 
 session from Portland of the intended removal of 
 Castlereagh, remonstrated strongly against the whole 
 transaction. On September 2nd Chatham's abandon- 
 ment of the expedition to Flanders was announced, 
 and Canning in a letter called upon Portland to 
 replace Castlereagh by Lord Wellesley. As a way 
 out of the difficulty, Perceval, on September 4th, 
 suggested to Portland that he (the Duke) should 
 now resign, so that some new arrangements might 
 be made which " should cover Castlereagh 's removal 
 " to some other office." To this the Duke, who was 
 in bad health, consented. 
 
 It is not easy to arrive at the exact truth with Summar7.
 
 118 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 regard to the whole affair, but it seems clear that 
 the Duke of Portland had promised Canning by 
 letter (1) that on the close of the Walcheren 
 expedition Castlereagh should be removed from his 
 department to some other office ; (2) that Lord 
 Wellesley should succeed to the War Department. 
 It is also certain that on September 6th Canning 
 resigned on hearing from Portland that if 
 Castlereagh's resignation was insisted upon he (the 
 Duke) and Perceval would resign. 
 
 On hearing from Camden an account of the intrigue 
 which had been in existence since April, to procure 
 his removal from the War Office, Castlereagh very 
 naturally was most indignant. He had practically 
 been under sentence of dismissal ever since April, 
 and in spite of that fact, he had been allowed 
 to equip and send out the Walcheren expedition. 
 " In this state of delusion," he had been permitted 
 " to continue to conduct the entire management 
 " of the campaign and to engage in a new expedition 
 " of the most extensive, complicated, and important 
 " nature under the full persuasion, not that Mr. 
 " Canning had supplanted him in office, and possessed 
 " in his pocket a promise of his dismissal, but that 
 " he really enjoyed (as during the period he in outward 
 " show and daily concurrence experienced) Mr. 
 " Canning's sincere, liberal, and bond fide support as 
 " a co-operating and approving colleague." It was 
 most unfortunate that Canning had acquiesced 
 in Portland's determination to delay making a 
 communication to Castlereagh. On September 6th 
 Canning had resigned, and on September 20th 
 Castlereagh wrote a letter to Canning in which he 
 rested " his ground of complaint principally and
 
 THE DUEL 119 
 
 " almost exclusively on the concealment from himself 
 " of the whole transaction, and everything connected 
 " with it till after the Expedition to Walcheren 
 " was over," and demanded satisfaction. 
 
 The above represents the hitherto accepted version What was 
 of the circumstances which led to this famous duel. {J| s jJ[* 
 It has, however, been stated that the immediate cause cause Q f 
 of the duel was a proposal by Canning that the the duel. 
 Government should "throw over Moore's reputation," 
 and acquiesce in the popular judgment — which for the 
 moment was hostile — of the dead General. Until, 
 however, the publication of Castlereagh's letter to 
 the King, explaining the immediate causes of the 
 duel, we must be content to merely state what were 
 considered at the time to be the circumstances which 
 brought it about. At any rate, in a letter from 
 Castlereagh to his brother Charles, written on 
 September 22nd, it is distinctly stated that one of 
 Canning's reasons for dissatisfaction with the existing 
 state of things was that " Moore was not given up." 
 In fact that letter places Canning's position in a most 
 unsatisfactory light, and confirms the view expressed 
 by Croker, that Canning's genius was " liable to 
 " every gust of wind, and every change of weather. 
 " .... If he does not take care, the Canning 
 " bonfire will soon burn itself out." 
 
 In the Diaries and Correspondence of George Rose, 1 The duel 
 is a full account of the " affair " which he received between 
 from Charles Ellis, who had acted as Canning's Castlereagh 
 second in the latter 's duel with Castlereagh, which Canning, 
 took place early on the morning of September 
 21st. " On the first fire both escaped. Mr. Ellis 
 
 1 Rose : " Diaries and Correspondence," vol. II, p. 385 seq.
 
 120 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " then said to Lord Yarmouth (Castlereagh's second) 
 " he supposed enough had been done, but it must be 
 " as Lord Castlereagh wished, as Mr. Canning came 
 " there only to satisfy him. Lord Yarmouth then 
 " talked with Lord Castlereagh, and addressing 
 " himself to Mr. Ellis said there must be another 
 " shot, after which he should leave the ground, as 
 " he would not witness any further proceedings. 
 " The parties then fired together a second time," 
 " and Mr. Canning was wounded in the flesh of the 
 " upper part of the thigh, the ball passing through." 
 After his wound had been attended to in a cottage 
 near the spot by Mr. Home, a surgeon, Canning 
 returned to his own house in London. In the 
 Creevey Papers is an amusing letter from Lord 
 Folkestone on the subject of the duel. Writing 
 on September 21st, the day of the duel, he says 
 " (Canning) well nigh this morning quitted this 
 " sublunary globe, as well as the Foreign Office, for 
 " his friend Castlereagh on Wimbledon Common 
 " about 7 o'clock this morning, as neatly as possible 
 " sent a bullet through the fleshy part of his thigh. 
 " These heroes have quarrelled and fought about 
 " the Walcheren affair — Castlereagh damning the 
 " execution [performance] of Lord Chatham, and 
 " Canning the plan of the planner, and being Lord 
 " Chatham's champion." He goes on to state that, 
 while Chatham's friends declare that the latter has 
 a complete case against Castlereagh, who it is said 
 will never have anything more to do with his present 
 colleagues. Castlereagh had, like Canning, resigned 
 his office before the duel took place, and thus at a 
 grave crisis in her history the country was deprived 
 of two men whose abilities, diverse yet considerable,
 
 CASTLEREAGH'S RESIGNATION 121 
 
 were more than ever required to guide her through 
 the dangers of the Napoleonic War. 
 
 Of the invaluable services rendered by Castlereagh The va j ue 
 during his tenure of office as War Minister, students of Castle- 
 of the history of the period are fully cognisant. He rea £. h ' s 
 
 services as 
 
 was the first minister to recognise the futility of war 
 sending out a number of small and isolated expedi- Minister, 
 tions when measures of far greater magnitude were 
 rendered necessary by the successes and ambition 
 of Napoleon. He had supported Canning in the 
 attack on Denmark, and the removal to England 
 of its fleet. He had inaugurated the intervention 
 of Great Britain in the Spanish Peninsula, and had 
 never swerved from his early belief in the abilities 
 of Wellington. By the interventions in Denmark 
 and Portugal a decisive blow had been given to 
 Napoleon's ambitious maritime projects. The 
 principle underlying the Walcheren Expedition was 
 correct, and had Castlereagh's plan been carried out a 
 very serious blow would have been dealt at Napoleon's 
 power. As it was, the incompetence of Chatham, 
 like the obstinacy of Cuesta in Spain, led to disasters, 
 the causes of which were ascribed to Castlereagh. 
 The proposed attack on Antwerp and the advance 
 of Wellington into Spain were conceived on the 
 soundest principles, and might easily have proved 
 brilliant successes. 
 
 Though circumstances forced Castlereagh to 
 relinquish office, it was impossible that during the 
 crisis through which it was passing, the country 
 could long forego the services of one of the few 
 Englishmen who were capable of carrying out a 
 resolute and statesmanlike policy. 
 
 At the time of his resignation in 1809 he could at
 
 122 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 any rate congratulate himself that he had secured 
 the independence of England, established an army 
 scheme, arrested the course of French victories and, 
 by the appointment of Wellesley to the command 
 of the army in Portugal, had " set in motion a train 
 " of events which finally produced the decline and 
 '* fall of Napoleon." 
 
 The legend, so dear to some writers, that Castlereagh 
 was an incapable War Minister is thus at once 
 dissipated, if his work in that capacity be carefully 
 and impartially examined.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 OUT OF OFFICE 
 
 October, 1810 to March, 1812 
 
 Meanwhile, the Duke of Portland had died on Debates 
 October 30th, shortly after his withdrawal from in Parlia- 
 office, and the Government had been reconstituted ment » l I0 - 
 under Perceval as Prime Minister. Hawkesbury, now 
 Earl of Liverpool, became Secretary for War and the 
 Colonies ; the Marquess Wellesley, on his return from 
 Seville in December, became Foreign Secretary. The 
 post of Secretary at War, which had been filled since 
 the preceding June by Lord G. Leveson-Gower, who 
 now retired, was given to Lord Palmerston, who held 
 it for eighteen years. It was not till February, 1812, 
 that on the resignation of Wellesley, Castlereagh 
 re-entered the Cabinet. During the intervening 
 two years he supported the ministry as an independent 
 member. His advocacy of the Government was 
 all the more necessary, as the Whigs during the next 
 two years attacked the Home and Foreign policy 
 of the ministry in a most violent manner. Although 
 Great Britain was engaged in a life and death 
 struggle with Napoleon, the opposition never ceased 
 their attempts to defeat every measure that was 
 brought forward. Parliament met on January 23rd, 
 1810, and a stormy session ensued. In the King's 
 Speech deep regret was expressed at the unavailing 
 exertions made in the previous year by the Emperor of 
 Austria against Napoleon. Though Austria, it stated, 
 " entered upon the war without any encouragement 
 
 123
 
 124 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Opposition 
 to our 
 support of 
 Spain. 
 
 " from Great Britain, nevertheless, we did what we 
 could," and though the Walcheren Expedition, so 
 far as its principal objects were concerned, was not 
 successful, still "it is hoped that Great Britain will 
 " profit from the demolition of the docks and arsenals 
 " of Flushing." Wellington's " glorious victory of 
 " Talavera " was alluded to, and it was declared 
 that the Government intended to continue its efforts 
 to frustrate the designs of France against the 
 independence of Spain and Portugal. 
 
 During the ensuing weeks the policy of the 
 Government was bitterly opposed. Wellington's 
 operations in Spain were violently attacked, and 
 the Walcheren Expedition was severely criticised. 
 A Committee of Enquiry was appointed, 195 voting 
 for it and 186 against it. Before that Committee 
 numerous witnesses, including Sir David Dundas 
 and Lord Chatham, were examined. In the debate 
 on the Walcheren question, which lasted from six 
 on the evening of March 26th to two on the 
 morning of the 27th, Lord Castlereagh spoke for 
 three hours in support of the expedition. On 
 March 30th the debate came to an end, the House 
 exculpating both the land and the naval service, 
 the votes being : for the Government, 275, and 
 against 227. Meanwhile, other questions had 
 provoked Castlereagh into taking a definite position 
 as a supporter of the ministry. The disappointment 
 caused by Wellington's retreat into Portugal had 
 strengthened those who, like Lords Grenville and 
 Grey agreed with Mr. Whitbread in deprecating 
 the continued prosecution of the Continental War, 
 and in advocating the abandonment of the Peninsular 
 struggle. The opposition had the support of all those
 
 CRITICISM OF THE WAR 125 
 
 who were disappointed at Wellington's retirement, 
 and of the City of London whose Common Council, 
 with remarkable shortsightedness, presented George 
 III with a petition urging the views of Whitbread 
 and his friends. The defeat of Austria at Wagram, 
 the failure of the Walcheren Expedition, and the 
 retreat of Wellington into Portugal, had indeed 
 strengthened the views of those who held what has 
 been called " a Carthaginian view " of the struggle 
 with Napoleon, and who preferred that England 
 should wage war on " commercial rather than on 
 " military considerations." Those who held these 
 views considered that England's true policy was to 
 grant subsidies to those Powers who were opposing 
 Napoleon on the European Continent, and to devote 
 her main energies, as she did during the Seven Years' 
 War, to breaking through the hostile cordon wherever 
 possible. The expeditions to Sicily, Turkey, Egypt, 
 and even Buenos Ayres, all illustrated the efforts of 
 Great Britain to prevent Napoleon " from hermeti- 
 cally sealing up all foreign markets against us." 
 Nevertheless, to those who held these views, 
 Wellington's position in Spain ought to have appealed. 
 Owing to our occupation of Portugal, we were enabled 
 to enjoy free trade not only with Brazil but generally 
 with the markets of Central and South America. 
 
 British merchants thus profited enormously by British 
 Napoleon's mistaken policy in alienating the Spanish 
 nation, and during 1809 a great impetus was given 
 to British 'commercial enterprise. Though it is 
 customary to abuse successive governments for 
 adopting the " pin-prick " policy, it remains true 
 that Great Britain, " in waging war on commercial 
 " rather than on military considerations," had no
 
 126 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castlereagh 
 supports 
 Wellington 
 1810. 
 
 alternative. She could not compete with Napoleon 
 as a military power, and we were thus forced to 
 concentrate our efforts upon keeping open markets 
 for our broadcloth and hardware. The Walcheren 
 Expedition had as its primary object the seizure 
 of the naval and mercantile depot of Antwerp ; 
 the expedition to Portugal was in the first instance 
 directed to preventing Napoleon from closing the 
 Spanish Peninsula to our trade. The more the 
 situation in 1809 is examined, the more justifiable 
 appears Castlereagh 's policy with regard to the 
 expeditions to Antwerp and Portugal. 
 
 Castlereagh fully realised the necessity of combating 
 the popular desire to withdraw Wellington and his 
 troops from Portugal, and on February 1st, 1810, 
 he made a forcible reply in Parliament to General 
 Tarleton, who opposed a vote of thanks to Wellington 
 and the army for their services at Talavera. He 
 explained the object of the operations which had 
 culminated at Talavera, showing that Wellington 
 had acted in accordance with a definite plan, and 
 claimed that his victory had been attended by most 
 important and beneficial consequences. At the close 
 of his speech Castlereagh deprecated strongly the 
 practice of drawing attention to the losses sustained 
 in a battle. He always, and wisely, resisted the 
 popular tendency to search into the details of loss 
 as calculated to unnerve the military energy of the 
 country. 
 
 Talavera marked, moreover, an epoch in the 
 British resistance to Napoleon. The reputation of 
 the British army was established, and Great Britain, 
 which hitherto had appeared in the eyes of Europe 
 as a great naval power, now assumed the position
 
 DESPONDENCY 127 
 
 of a great military power. This speech extorted 
 praise even from Mr. Whitbread, and no division 
 on the vote of thanks to Wellington and the army 
 took place in the House of Commons. 
 
 Nevertheless, during 1810 there was no enthusiasm 
 felt in England at the way in which Wellington held 
 his own in Portugal. The expedition under Moore 
 had ended in failure ; the intervention in Flanders 
 had resulted in loss and disaster. Was it likely that 
 Wellington with 50,000 or 60,000 men would succeed 
 in beating off the attacks of Napoleon's Marshals in 
 the Peninsula ? The Perceval ministry somewhat 
 naturally took a gloomy view of Wellington's powers 
 of resistance, and during 1810 he was practically told 
 that " he must shift for himself." 
 
 Castlereagh, however, did not share in the general y° e "^ s 
 despondency with regard to the Peninsular War. jSio. 
 He realised the immense value to the cause of 
 European liberty of the British occupation of 
 Portugal. He believed that sooner or later 
 Napoleon's arbitrary conduct would lead to a general 
 rising on the Continent. His hope was that 
 Wellington would hold his own in Portugal, and 
 prolong the struggle in the Peninsula till the expected 
 general insurrection in Central Europe took place. 
 As long as the Spaniards continued to resist, and 
 as long as Wellington remained firmly entrenched in 
 Portugal, Napoleon was unable to use the naval 
 resources of Spain, or to secure its valuable trade. In 
 these views he was supported by Wellington, who 
 had realised the natural advantages of Portugal 
 for purposes of defence. His construction of the 
 lines of Torres Vedras was fully justified, and in 
 November, 1810, Massena, recognising the futility
 
 128 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 of further attempts to expel Wellington from 
 Portugal, was forced to retreat into Spain. His 
 retreat fully justified the confidence felt by 
 Castlereagh in Wellington's ability to hold Portugal 
 against the French, and in the immense importance 
 of prolonging the struggle against Napoleon. 
 Valuable time had been gained, and when in 1811 
 Napoleon began to withdraw many of his best troops 
 from the Peninsula in order to lead them to Moscow, 
 the wisdom of Castlereagh 's policy became apparent. 
 The But during the trying year of 1810 the difficulties 
 
 Committee m tne wa y of supplying Wellington with specie were 
 1810. immense. Cash payments in England had been 
 
 suspended for many years, and no means had been 
 devised for obtaining gold and silver sufficient for 
 the payment of the troops. At one time it seemed 
 possible that this lack of specie might lead to the 
 complete abandonment of the Peninsula campaign. 
 In order to collect information on this difficult subject, 
 the Government appointed a Bullion Committee 
 which included Horner (the Chairman), Canning, 
 Vansittart, Castlereagh and several others. The 
 majority drew up their celebrated report (published 
 on September 20th, 1810) which among other sugges- 
 tions advocated the resumption of cash payments in 
 1812. Vansittart and Castlereagh were in the 
 minority, and differed on various points from the 
 majority. Both men opposed the compulsory 
 resumption of cash payments in 1812. Castlereagh, 
 in an able speech delivered on May 11th, argued 
 against the report of the Bullion Committee. ' I 
 thoroughly admit," he said, " a recurrence to cash 
 " payments, when circumstances will permit, to be 
 " essential to public credit," but as long as the struggle
 
 ALBUERA 129 
 
 with Napoleon continued, a resumption of cash 
 payments was, in his opinion, to be deprecated. His 
 speech carried great weight, and on May 15th, 1811, 
 the report of Horner's Committee was not accepted 
 by the House of Commons, 75 voting for and 156 
 voting against it. 
 
 Meanwhile Wellington, who had defeated Massena The y ear 
 at Bussaco in September by means of the Lines of : "" 
 Torres Vedras, had forced him to retreat from 
 Portugal in November, fought the battle of Fuentes 
 d'Onoro on May 3rd to 5th, 1811, while Beresford, 
 on May 16th, won the battle of Albuera. This 
 victory gave Castlereagh an opportunity on June 7th, 
 when a vote of thanks to Beresford was moved in 
 Parliament, of speaking enthusiastically of the cause 
 of the Allies in Spain. The year 1811 was a year of 
 great distress in England, and " must be regarded as 
 " the crisis of the commercial struggle between us and 
 " our mighty antagonist. Machinery was ever in- 
 " creasing our productive power at home, and was 
 " displacing hand labour. Work was scarce and 
 " bread dear after the bad harvests of 1810 and 
 ' 181 1." 1 Further, a reaction had followed the 
 impetus to trade afforded in 1809 by the opening 
 of the markets of Central and South America, and 
 in January, 1811, it was stated that " Confidence in 
 " the commercial world seems nearly at an end," 
 and that in Manchester, in Birmingham, Sheffield, 
 and other towns, trade was at a standstill. 
 
 The result was that at the time when Castlereagh 
 made his speech about Albuera, the war was being 
 more and more regarded in England as burdensome, 
 and very despondent views were held with regard 
 
 1 J. Holland Rose : " Napoleonic Studies," p. 194. 
 
 9 — (22 II)
 
 130 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 to its effects upon the trade and commerce of the 
 country. Castlereagh, therefore, felt strongly the 
 necessity of encouraging the English nation to 
 persevere in the struggle. " No one," he said, 
 " can doubt that the war as at present maintained 
 " is a great burden, but is any man prepared to say 
 " that the time has arrived when it should be 
 " abandoned." 
 * he At the close of 1810 the question of a Regency 
 
 question, arose. In November George III lost his reason as 
 1810-1811. well as his sight. The death of his favourite daughter, 
 the Princess Amelia, on November 2nd, had been a 
 serious blow to him, and occurred at a time when he 
 had been much disturbed by the failure of the Wal- 
 cheren Expedition, and by the disgrace of the Duke of 
 York. On November 1st, Parliament met and a 
 Committee was appointed to confer with the physi- 
 cians, whose report held out such little hope of the 
 King's recovery that the ministers brought forward a 
 bill to make the Prince of Wales Regent so long as the 
 King's malady continued. A debate took place on 
 December 31st, 1810, on the proposed bill, the opposi- 
 tion declaring against the restrictions which it was 
 proposed to place on the power of the Regent. In 
 the debate Castlereagh, whose views received the 
 general support of Canning, defended the proposed 
 restrictions in a speech of considerable vigour, and 
 the bill was carried on February 4th, 1811, by 105 to 
 102 in the Lords and by 217 to 214 in the Commons. 
 As the Regent had always been closely allied with 
 the Whigs, it was thought that a change of ministry 
 would follow the Prince's formal acceptance of the 
 Regency on February 5th, 1811. But the dictatorial 
 tone adopted by the leading Whigs, Lords Grenville
 
 THE YEAR 1811 131 
 
 and Grey, was resented by the Prince, who after a 
 short interval declared his intention of supporting 
 the Perceval ministry. 
 
 In the following month Castlereagh made a speech Castle- 
 which was practically a vindication of his conduct defence of 
 as War Minister. After alluding to the fact that upon the War in 
 his head had fallen the odium of all the necessary l8tI - 
 measures since 1805 for levying men, he declared 
 that his efforts had achieved the object to which 
 they were directed : " That the zeal and perseverance 
 " of the nation, in cheerfully submitting to these 
 ' burdens, has been rewarded by the powerful army 
 " which it now possesses, unexampled in any former 
 " period of our history, and which has now left to 
 " Parliament only the easier task of upholding what 
 " by past labours has been created. The army," he 
 said with justifiable pride, " now consists of 211,000 
 "regulars, 24,000 artillery, and 80,000 militia, in 
 " all respects in as efficient a state as the line. 
 " Compare this with its state in 1805, viz., regulars 
 "150,000; militia, 90,000 ; artillery, 14,000 ; thus 
 " showing an increase after supplying all the waste 
 " of war of 56,000 regulars, and a decrease of 10,000 
 " militia." The year 1811, however, was a critical 
 one for Wellington. Unable to secure adequate 
 reinforcements from England, and confronted by 
 the superior forces of the French headed by Marmont 
 and Soult, Wellington had to rely upon his own 
 efforts to resist his foes. As it was, he held his own 
 in Portugal, but from want of reinforcements was 
 unable to adopt an aggressive attitude, and at the 
 same time had to reckon upon the possible reappear- 
 ance of Napoleon in Spain. Fortunately for the 
 British cause, and indeed for the future of Europe,
 
 132 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Napoleon decided in 1811 upon the Moscow 
 Expedition, which took place the following year. 
 For that expedition immense preparations were 
 made. Large numbers of veteran troops were 
 withdrawn from Spain, and Wellington, freed from 
 all fear of the advent of Napoleon at the head of an 
 overwhelming force, was enabled to adopt early in 
 1812 an aggressive policy, and to capture Ciudad 
 Rodrigo (January 19th) and Badajos (April 6th). 
 Before, however, Badajos had fallen, Castlereagh 
 had in February, 1812, been readmitted to office as 
 Foreign Secretary, in succession to Lord Wellesley. 
 Possessed of greater abilities than any of his 
 colleagues, and aware of the necessity of supporting 
 actively the British operations in Portugal, Wellesley 
 was constantly thwarted by his colleagues in his 
 endeavours to further the efforts of his brother in 
 the Peninsula. He therefore retired from office on 
 February 19th, 1812, and thus made way for 
 Castlereagh, who remained at the head of the Foreign 
 Office for the rest of his life.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 CASTLEREAGH AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE 
 
 1812 
 
 In March, 1812, Castlereagh entered upon his duties Castle- 
 at the Foreign Office, and he remained Foreign r ^lL' s 
 Secretary till his death in 1822. During that period, Foreign 
 1812-1822, he was one of the most, if not the most Minister, 
 prominent figure among leading Englishmen. Of 
 all men in Europe he may be said to have been most 
 instrumental in bringing about the fall of Napoleon. 
 And he devoted himself to bringing about that event 
 from his return to office in 1812 to the battle of 
 Waterloo. 
 
 His influence in the House of Commons became 
 gradually paramount, and the recognition of his 
 merits does credit to its members. For Castlereagh, 
 though he had " the advantages of a splendid presence 
 " and a graceful bearing," was no orator. Indeed, 
 his Irishisms, which are often quoted, supplied his 
 opponents and critics, such as Brougham, Moore, 
 and Byron, with ample opportunities for ridicule and 
 sarcasm. Nevertheless, though Castlereagh was, 
 like Walpole, neither a wit nor a scholar, he was 
 essentially a statesman. And no better proof of the 
 recognition by the men of his day of his qualities as a 
 statesman can be found than in the enormous influence 
 which he wielded in Parliament in those exciting 
 years — 1813, 1814, 1815, which witnessed the final 
 struggle of Europe with Napoleon. 
 
 In the early days of 1815, before the Conferences 
 
 133
 
 134 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 at Vienna had ended, Lord Liverpool insisted on his 
 immediate return to England, on the ground that 
 nobody else was capable of managing the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 The very existence of the Government depended 
 for many years on the presence of a man who, in 
 spite of verbosity and blunders of speech, had won 
 and preserved till his death the confidence of members 
 of the Lower House. The late Lord Salisbury, in his 
 illuminating essay on Castlereagh, says that he " had 
 " not the talents that captivate the imagination, or 
 " the warmth of sympathy that kindles love. Men 
 " felt to him as to the pilot who had weathered an 
 " appalling storm, the physician who had mastered 
 " a terrible calamity." 1 He had none of the popular 
 qualities which characterised the two Pitts, and he 
 never sought popularity, nor sought popular applause. 
 A calm, cold, and self-contained Castlereagh was not 
 calculated to attract a large following of devoted 
 and enthusiastic admirers. But no British states- 
 man has shown more courage and patience in times 
 of difficulty, and it is impossible to overrate " the 
 " faultless sagacity which contributed so much to 
 political " lib era te Europe, and to save England in the crisis 
 outlook. " of her fate." Europe was passing through one of 
 the most critical periods in her history. The power 
 of Napoleon was apparently not likely to be seriously 
 diminished in the near future. Though the seizure 
 of the Danish fleet, and the continued presence of 
 Wellington in Portugal, had checked Napoleon's 
 designs in the Baltic and in the Spanish Peninsula, it 
 was uncertain how long Great Britain would be able 
 
 1 Salisbury, Robert Gascoyne, Marquess of : " Essays 
 Biographical," p. 67.
 
 THE OUTLOOK 135 
 
 to maintain her costly struggle with the French 
 Empire. Moreover, the outlook in America was 
 threatening, the depression of our foreign trade was 
 unparalleled, the distress in our manufacturing 
 districts was beyond all precedent. Only the 
 Spaniards and Portuguese could be numbered among 
 our allies. 
 
 It was at this juncture, when the outlook both at 
 home and abroad seemed so dark, that Castlereagh 
 was restored to office. Castlereagh at once inspired 
 new life into the conduct of British foreign policy, 
 while his accession to office coincided with remark- 
 able developments in the European situation. 
 Wellington had already taken Ciudad Rodrigo, and 
 was making preparations for his successful assault 
 upon Badajos. These successes were to prove the 
 prelude to a general advance by Wellington into 
 Spain. This advance was to be facilitated by the 
 concentration of the attention of Napoleon upon his 
 invasion of Russia. Hitherto, the Cabinet, fearful of 
 hostile criticism, and unable to grasp the vital impor- 
 tance of sending adequate supplies of men and money 
 to Wellington, had refused to yield to the urgent 
 representations of Wellesley. Castlereagh's accession 
 to office, however, was marked by a change in the 
 attitude of the British Government towards the 
 operations in Spain. 
 
 Moreover, on April 17th, Napoleon, in view of the Napoleon's 
 coming Russian campaign, made overtures to the J552L-- 
 British ministry for the conclusion of peace between !8i 2 . 
 Great Britain and France. 
 
 He offered : (1) The renunciation by France of 
 all extension of her empire on the side of the Pyrenees ; 
 (2) That the reigning dynasty in Spain should be
 
 136 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Death of 
 
 Perceval. 
 
 Lord 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 premier. 
 
 May, 1 812. 
 
 Canning's 
 refusal to 
 join the 
 ministry. 
 
 declared independent ; (3) That the House of 
 Braganza should reign in Portugal ; (4) That Murat 
 should continue to rule Naples ; (5) That Spain, 
 Portugal, and Italy should be evacuated by the 
 French and British forces. 
 
 Apart, however, from Napoleon's evident deter- 
 mination to maintain Joseph Bonaparte on the 
 Spanish throne, it was evident that these proposals 
 for peace with Great Britain were merely caused by 
 a natural desire on the part of the French Government 
 to have its hands free in Spain and Italy during the 
 progress of the expedition to Russia. Before, how- 
 ever, Castlereagh had been in office three months, 
 Perceval was assassinated on May 11th in the lobby 
 of the House of Commons by a man named Belling- 
 ham. For a time it seemed likely that the Tories 
 would be succeeded by the Whigs, as the Prince 
 Regent had always regarded the latter as his special 
 friends. At first the Prince hoped to form a coalition 
 ministry under Wellesley, and failing him, under 
 Moira. But the Whig leaders and the Prince Regent 
 differed over the question of the nomination to 
 certain household posts, and eventually in June 
 Lord Liverpool was given the task of forming an 
 administration composed entirely of Tories. 
 
 He at first attempted to secure the services of both 
 Wellesley and Canning. The former refused to serve, 
 as he was in favour of Catholic emancipation, a 
 subject which Liverpool's Cabinet would not discuss ; 
 the latter was willing to enter the ministry on condition 
 that with the Foreign Office should devolve upon 
 him the leadership of the House of Commons. 
 Castlereagh was willing to resign the Foreign Office, 
 but insisted on retaining the leadership.
 
 CASTLEREAGH FOREIGN MINISTER 137 
 
 The result was that Castlereagh remained Foreign 
 Minister and leader of the House of Commons during 
 the rest of his life, while Canning was excluded from 
 all share in directing Great Britain's policy during 
 one of the most eventful periods of modern history. 
 He said himself with regard to this period that " Two 
 ' ' years at the Foreign Office would have been worth 
 " ten years of life." As it was, it devolved upon 
 Castlereagh to conduct the foreign policy of Great 
 Britain, and to mould its international destinies 
 during those eventful years which saw the fall of 
 Napoleon and the reconstruction of Europe. 
 
 Of the ministers who had served under Perceval, Liverpool's 
 Castlereagh, Eldon, Westmorland and Mulgrave ^ 1 I n ^ try ' 
 retained their offices. Otherwise considerable changes 
 were made : his personal followers, Sidmouth, became 
 Home Secretary ; Buckinghamshire, Vansittart and 
 Bragge-Bathurst entered the Cabinet ; Harrowby 
 became President of the Council ; Earl Bathurst, 
 Secretary for War and the Colonies. This re-con- 
 stituted Tory ministry was destined to guide Great 
 Britain through the exciting years which saw Napo- 
 leon's fall ; and of the ministers who had a leading 
 share in bringing about that fall Castlereagh was the 
 chief. Upon Castlereagh, who with Vansittart repre- 
 sented the ministry in the Lower House, devolved the 
 duties of leader of the House of Commons, and till 
 his death he held that position, together with the 
 Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. Castle- 
 
 Before the final arrangements with regard to the reagh's 
 constitution of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet had been w j t h 
 made, Castlereagh had exerted successfully his Russia, 
 influence in order to bring about peace between ^ s ey ' 
 Russia and Turkey. It was obviously a matter of i8 X2 ,
 
 138 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 supreme importance in the coming invasion of Russia 
 by Napoleon that Alexander should be able to 
 concentrate all his forces upon the defence of his 
 country. Castlereagh, therefore, was instrumental 
 in revealing to the Ottoman Government those 
 articles in the Treaty of Tilsit which dealt with the 
 future partition of Turkey. Realising that its best 
 chance of safety lay in the weakening of France, 
 the Sultan willingly made the Treaty of Bucharest 
 with Russia on May 28th, and on July 18th signed 
 a Treaty with Great Britain. Thus mainly through 
 Castlereagh's efforts, Russia's left flank was ren- 
 dered secure from a Turkish attack during the 
 Moscow Campaign. Equally successful were Castle- 
 reagh's efforts to bring about a Treaty between 
 Sweden and Russia, so as to secure the latter's right 
 wing from all danger of attack by Bernadotte. War 
 between Sweden and Great Britain had indeed 
 broken out in 1810, but it was conducted in a very 
 half-hearted manner, Bernadotte being more anxious 
 to add Norway to his possessions than to inflict 
 injury upon British commerce. Finding that the 
 relations between Sweden and France were very 
 strained, owing to Napoleon's refusal to unite 
 Norway with Sweden, Castlereagh sent Mr. Thornton, 
 an English diplomatist, early in 1812 to the Court 
 of Stockholm. The accession of Bernadotte to the 
 ranks of Napoleon's enemies could, however, only be 
 secured by the promise of the cession of Norway to 
 Sweden. Though Castlereagh disliked the project, 
 he recognised the necessity of securing the alliance 
 or the neutrality of Sweden, and accordingly made 
 no opposition to the Treaties which on April 5th 
 and 8th, 1812, were concluded between Sweden and
 
 ENERGETIC POLICY 
 
 139 
 
 Russia. On condition that Sweden aided Alexander 
 in the coming p war with France, Norway was 
 guaranteed to Sweden. On July 12th peace between 
 Great Britain and Sweden was concluded at Orebro, 
 and as far as Sweden was concerned, the Continental 
 System was no longer enforced. 
 
 Not only had Castlereagh been instrumental in Castlereagh 
 rendering the flanks of the Russian army during and the 
 Napoleon's march to Moscow free from attacks, war. 
 he had at the same time infused new energy into the 
 British campaign in the Peninsula. He was as 
 resolved as ever that the war in Spain should be 
 conducted in the most vigorous manner. In June, 
 1812, he dispatched to Wellington 51,000 troops, 
 of which 6,546 were cavalry, and in October he sent 
 an additional force of 20,000 men. 
 
 By these measures Castlereagh may be said to 
 have largely contributed to the fall of Napoleon. 
 The presence of Wellington in the Peninsula 
 compelled Napoleon to keep large bodies of troops 
 in Spain, while the conclusion of Treaties, advocated 
 by Castlereagh, by Russia with Turkey and Sweden 
 enabled the Tsar to devote his undivided attention 
 to the overthrow of the French army, which in the 
 autumn of 1812 advanced as far as Moscow, only 
 to be decimated during its famous retreat to 
 France. 
 
 On July 18th a treaty was concluded between 
 Great Britain and Russia, and by it an important Great 
 step was taken towards the removal of that distrust Brita » n « 
 of the British Government which the Tsar had felt 
 ever since 1807. Henceforward, the Tory Govern- 
 ment remaining in office and Castlereagh being able 
 to pursue a consistent policy, Alexander was justified 
 
 Russia and
 
 140 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Repeal 
 of the 
 Orders in 
 Council. 
 The 
 Luddite 
 Riots, 
 1812. 
 
 in his confidence in British promises and in the 
 continuity of British policy. 
 
 On June 16th Brougham moved the repeal of 
 the Orders in Council which had been issued when 
 Castlereagh was Minister for War. Owing to the 
 resentment felt in America with regard to the Orders, 
 trade between the United States and Great Britain 
 had practically ceased. In England itself distress 
 was widespread, and was, it was said, aggravated 
 by the policy which dictated the Orders in Council. 
 There was no question as to the existence of wide- 
 spread misery in England. The Luddite riots caused 
 by the belief that this misery was due to the intro- 
 duction of machinery, had broken out in the autumn 
 and winter of 1811, and in 1812 these riots became 
 so serious that drastic means were taken by the 
 Government for their suppression. The depression 
 of industry which led to these riots was due partly 
 to Napoleon's Continental System : partly to the 
 American Non- Intercourse Act, which, re-enacted 
 in February, 1811, had closed the American market 
 to the products of British Industry ; partly to the 
 great improvements which had been effected in 
 the spinning and weaving industries. In his speech 
 on June 18th, Brougham laid especial stress upon 
 the effect of the Orders in Council on our trade 
 with America. The Non-Intercourse Act prohi- 
 bited all commercial intercourse with Great Britain 
 and France, and closed an immense market for 
 British manufactured goods at a most critical period 
 in our history. Between Napoleon's Continental 
 System and the American Non-Intercourse Act, 
 British traders seemed likely to be completely ruined, 
 and Great Britain to be forced to withdraw from
 
 THE AMERICAN CRISIS 141 
 
 her herculean struggle against France. In his speech 
 
 Brougham insisted that " the alarming decline in our 
 
 " exports was owing, not so much to the hostility of 
 
 "Napoleon, or to the Continental System ... as to 
 
 " the British Orders in Council, which had given rise 
 
 " to the American Non-Intercourse Act and had lost 
 
 "to us the North American market." 
 
 He then enlarged upon the immense value to Great J h * Non " 
 
 . Intercourse 
 Britain of her American trade, and of the necessity A ct> 
 
 of re-establishing friendly relations with the United 
 States. In his reply Castlereagh defended the Orders 
 in Council, which he declared were only issued after 
 the Berlin Decree as a measure of retaliation. The 
 Orders in Council had been a political, not a com- 
 mercial measure, and had had beneficial results. 
 But the passing of the American Non-Intercourse 
 Act had not been foreseen by the British Government, 
 and had done British trade great injury. Con- 
 sequently the Government were prepared to cancel 
 the Orders in Council. " As against France," 
 Castlereagh declared in his speech, " the retaliating 
 " system adopted has perfectly succeeded. Severely 
 " as our commerce has suffered in the struggle, hers 
 " has suffered still more considerably. It was not 
 " the effect of the Orders in Council or the Continental 
 " System of the enemy which has caused the distress 
 " so severely felt in this country during the last 
 " year, but the interruption of our commercial 
 " intercourse with America in consequence of the 
 " Non-Intercourse Act passed in that country." 
 On June 23rd the Orders in Council were repealed, 
 but to the notice of repeal which appeared in the 
 London Gazette was added a declaration that " if the 
 " American Government did not after due notice
 
 142 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 War with 
 the United 
 States, 
 1812. 
 
 Salamanca. 
 
 Moscow. 
 
 " repeal the Non-Intercourse Act, this revocation 
 " should become null and the original orders revive." 
 
 Before, however, news of the repeal had reached 
 America, the Government of the United States, 
 anxious to conquer and annex Canada, had declared 
 war (June 18th) upon Great Britain, and till 
 December, 1814, a large number of British troops 
 were employed in America. The remainder of the 
 year was marked by a series of important events. 
 In July Wellington won the battle of Salamanca, 
 and in August entered Madrid ; while on September 
 14th Napoleon at the head of his army entered 
 Moscow, which was shortly afterwards burnt by the 
 inhabitants. On September 29th the Prince Regent 
 dissolved Parliament, and on November 24th the 
 new Parliament met. The year ended with 
 Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Russia, and with 
 the rising of Prussia against the French yoke. For 
 Great Britain the close of the year was full of hope. 
 Not only had Napoleon's victorious career received 
 a signal check, but the attempts of the Americans 
 to gain a hold upon Canada had ended in failure. 
 There seemed at last to be some justification for 
 Castlereagh's optimism, and for his belief in the 
 possibility of inflicting a decisive check upon the 
 ambitious schemes of Napoleon. Russia's lapse 
 from the Continental System was now assured, and 
 Napoleon's belief in his power of stamping out the 
 Spanish rising was seen to be groundless. England 
 has shown that she was not as he believed " in her 
 " last agonies," and all chance of a French partition 
 of Turkey to be followed by the establishment of a 
 French Empire in the East was gone for ever. 
 
 Though, however, these events justified optimism
 
 THE STRUGGLE IN SPAIN 143 
 
 on the part of the opponents of Napoleon, there were The 
 
 vet manv obstacles to the complete emancipation political 
 
 ,,-. f iii- x. i i-uT7 situation 
 
 of Europe from the French yoke. The Emperor at the 
 
 Francis looked with suspicion upon the presence close of 
 of the Russians in Germany and upon the " Pan- l8l2< 
 " Germanism preached by Prussian enthusiasts." 
 Moreover, the French power in Spain was as yet 
 by no means broken, and Wellington had some 
 months of hard fighting before he was able to enter 
 France. 
 
 Though out of office, Lord Wellesley had continued 
 to urge upon the Government the adoption of 
 adequate measures in the Peninsula, where his 
 brother still lacked reinforcements. On July 22nd, 
 1812, Wellington had won the battle of Salamanca, 
 and on August 12th had entered Madrid. But 
 want of money, political difficulties, and the lack of 
 reinforcements compelled Wellington to retreat for 
 the last time into Portugal. It was the necessity 
 of this retreat which drew from Lord Wellesley 
 a powerful speech in Parliament on November 30th. 
 The opening of Parliament, says the painter Haydon, 
 was a very grand affair. He went into the House 
 of Lords, where, as he relates, " the beautiful women, 
 " educated, refined, and graceful, with their bending 
 " plumes and sparkling eyes, the Chancellor 
 
 " The sceptre and the ball, 
 " The sword, the mace, the crown imperial, 
 " The tissued robe of gold and pearl," 
 
 " gave a grand sensation." 
 
 The Prince Regent read the King's speech " with 
 " the greatest perspicacity, and without the slightest 
 " provincialism — pure English. He appeared affected 
 " at the conclusion."
 
 144 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 In the speech the victory of Salamanca was 
 mentioned, though that victory was qualified by the 
 eventual retreat of Wellington into Portugal. 
 Allusion was also made to the conclusion of peace 
 with Sweden and Russia, and the latter's gallant 
 resistance to Napoleon on his Moscow expedition. 
 Notice was also taken of the war which had broken 
 out with the United States, of the acts of hostility 
 on the part of the Americans towards the Canadians, 
 and of the efforts of the government of the United 
 States to seduce the inhabitants of Canada from 
 their allegiance to George III. In the evening 
 Lord Wellesley, we are told, made a fine, energetic 
 speech. " He affirmed, in a strain almost amounting 
 to frenzy, that Lord Wellington's means were 
 inadequate, that before the battle of Salamanca, 
 so far from his retiring to draw the enemy on, he 
 was in full retreat .... and that it was entirely 
 owing to an error of Marmont that the battle was 
 gained." He went on to say that Wellington had 
 not the means of transport for his artillery, and 
 towards the end of his speech appealed to his hearers 
 thus : " My Lords, if your hopes of success are 
 " grounded on the errors of French Generals, I fear 
 " they have a very shallow foundation."
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 
 
 It is impossible to overrate the importance of the year The year 
 1813. The issues at stake, the character and career 1813. 
 of Napoleon, the determination of his opponents, 
 — all gave a special interest to the struggle in 1813. 
 The French Revolution had done its work, and had 
 resulted in a European Revolution of immense 
 proportions. In no part of Europe had that 
 revolution been more effectually and drastically 
 carried out than in Germany. Under Napoleon 
 the desire for despotic power over the Continent had 
 taken the place of those generous impulses which 
 had characterized the early French Revolutionists. 
 Writhing under his tyranny, Europe determined to 
 regain its freedom, and before " the rising of the 
 nations," Napoleon fell. 
 
 No man took a greater share in bringing about Castle- 
 that fall than Castlereagh, and it is impossible to feagh's 
 overestimate the value of his services to Europe Influence, 
 at this critical time. It was not sufficient to drive 
 the French from Russia, and later to overwhelm 
 Napoleon at Leipzig and to force him to retire into 
 France. To bring about the liberation of Europe 
 from the thraldom of Napoleon, to re-establish 
 Prussia as a strong kingdom, to free Germany from 
 its dependence upon France, required unity of action 
 on the part of the Great Powers. The aims and 
 objects of Austria were often so diametrically opposed 
 to those of Russia and Prussia, the jealousies so 
 
 145 
 
 10 — (tan)
 
 146 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh's 
 determina- 
 tion. 
 
 His 
 
 influence 
 
 on the 
 
 Spanish 
 
 and 
 
 German 
 
 resistance 
 
 to 
 
 Napoleon. 
 
 unavoidable among rulers united for the moment 
 in a coalition were so deep-seated, that the rupture 
 of the ties which bound together Great Britain, 
 Austria, Russia and Prussia seemed often on the 
 verge of taking place. 
 
 In the task of bringing together the Great Powers, 
 and, having done so, in keeping them united, the 
 value of the influence of Castlereagh cannot be 
 overestimated. It is not too much to say that the 
 downfall of Napoleon was due as much to Castlereagh 
 as it was to the armies of the Continental Powers. 
 
 In the field of diplomacy Castlereagh stood 
 supreme, and under his guidance Great Britain 
 took the lead in bringing about the overthrow of 
 Napoleon. Over and over again during the ensuing 
 three years it becomes more and more evident that 
 the forces of the Coalition which overwhelmed 
 Napoleon owed their success to the skill, courage, 
 and determination of Castlereagh. " England " 
 during these years " was in effect Lord Castlereagh," 
 whose tact and practical views were never more 
 strikingly illustrated. The Radicals in England 
 might snarl, and do all in their power to hamper 
 Great Britain's efforts, and Goethe might ruin his 
 reputation for political foresight by declaring that 
 Napoleon would prove too strong for the German 
 national uprising, but Castlereagh never wavered 
 in his determination to free Europe from the French 
 yoke. 
 
 Already Castlereagh's influence and determination 
 had been rewarded in Spain. He had steadily 
 supported Wellington ever since the beginning of 
 the Peninsular War, and the British General's 
 pertinacity and victories had contributed to rouse
 
 THE SITUATION IN 1813 147 
 
 and encourage the resistance to Napoleon in Central 
 Europe. In 1813 Castlereagh's efforts were mainly 
 directed to strengthening that resistance in Central 
 Europe and to providing money for those States 
 which had risen against the French domination. 
 It would probably have been utterly impossible for 
 Russia and Prussia to have continued the struggle 
 after Liitzen and Bautzen had not Castlereagh 
 provided immense sums to enable them to keep their 
 armies in the field. It would certainly have been 
 impossible for Austria to join the Allied Sovereigns 
 in August, 1813, and to play the notable part she 
 did in bringing about Napoleon's overthrow without 
 the subsidies with which Castlereagh lavishly supplied 
 her. But not only in providing the sinews of war 
 was Great Britain's assistance invaluable ; it was 
 due to Castlereagh's diplomacy and to that of his 
 agents that Bernadotte, Prince Regent of Sweden, 
 was kept firm in his opposition to Napoleon. 
 
 The situation at the beginning of 1813 was certainly The 
 calculated to encourage Castlereagh. Wellington's European 
 eventual success in Spain seemed assured, while the ^fthe " 
 overthrow of Napoleon's grand army in Russia had spring of 
 encouraged a national uprising in Germany. The l8l 3- 
 Treaty of Kalisch united the Tsar and the Prussian 
 King, and Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, 
 had already been won over to the side of the opponents 
 of the French Emperor. Castlereagh's most pressing 
 care was to keep Bernadotte true to his policy of 
 opposition to Napoleon and to bring about the 
 landing of a large Swedish army in the North of 
 Germany. He had also to encourage the resistance 
 of the Russians and Prussians to Napoleon, and at 
 the same time to continue his efforts to induce
 
 148 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 
 influence 
 of Sir 
 Charles 
 Stewart. 
 
 Austria to throw in her lot with the Allies. Rarely, 
 if ever, has a British statesman essayed a more 
 difficult task, and never has a British statesman 
 achieved a more brilliant diplomatic success. The 
 entry of the Allies into Paris in the spring of 1814 
 was a remarkable testimony to the foresight, tact 
 and tenacity of Castlereagh. 
 
 In his Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles 
 Stewart, Alison draws attention to the valuable 
 assistance given by the latter to his half-brother. 
 Stewart had a practical knowledge of military affairs, 
 understood the methods adopted by Wellington in 
 the Peninsula, and emphasized the immense 
 importance of supporting the Spanish opposition to 
 Napoleon. It was in no small measure due to 
 Stewart's explanations that Castlereagh was able 
 during 1812 to persuade the Cabinet to continue 
 to send reinforcements to Wellington. In conse- 
 quence, by the close of 1812, Wellington was in 
 a position to prepare for the eventual expulsion of 
 the French from Spain. 
 
 No less useful did Stewart prove in the important 
 task of encouraging the warlike feeling in Prussia 
 and of bringing the Courts of St. James and Berlin 
 into intimate relation. Further, upon Stewart 
 devolved the even more difficult task of keeping 
 Bernadotte, the Crown Prince of Sweden, faithful 
 to and in close touch with the Russian and Prussian 
 monarchs. 
 
 On April 9th, 1813, Castlereagh wrote to Stewart 
 a formal letter, which, while notifying to him his 
 appointment as minister at the headquarters of 
 the King of Prussia, explained the duties which 
 he was called upon to fulfil. "It is His Royal
 
 AUSTRIA'S POSITION 149 
 
 Highness's pleasure," so ran the letter of appoint- 
 ment, which was written by Castlereagh from the 
 Foreign Office, " that you should consider yourself 
 " specially charged with the military superintendence 
 " so far as Great Britain is concerned, of the Prussian 
 
 " and Swedish armies In order to give greater 
 
 " weight to your representations, His Royal Highness 
 " has been pleased to accredit you to his Prussian 
 " Majesty, to whose headquarters you will in the 
 " first instance proceed, for the purposes of presenting 
 " your credentials, and of discussing, in concert with 
 " Lord Cathcart, Ambassador to the Emperor of 
 " Russia, the plan of operations to be executed by 
 " the respective armies. Whilst His Majesty's 
 " Ambassador to the Court of Russia shall continue 
 " with the armies, it is His Royal Highness's pleasure 
 " that the British mission to the Courts of Berlin and 
 " Stockholm should correspond with his Lordship 
 " as well as with this office." 
 
 Before he despatched Stewart on his mission, The policy 
 Castlereagh had received from Lord Walpole, who of Austria, 
 had just returned from a secret mission to Vienna, 
 some information regarding the views of the Aus- 
 trian Government. That Government, taught by 
 experience, was anxious not to make a false step, 
 and had adopted a waiting policy. It realized the 
 importance of the Treaty of Kalisch, lately concluded 
 by the Russian and Prussian monarchs, but it was 
 resolved to watch events, and in the meantime by 
 preparing for all eventualities, to be able at a later 
 stage in the struggle to interpose with decisive effect. 
 
 The Austrian Court had no sympathy with 
 Stein's idea of a United Germany, and, moreover, 
 was already alarmed at the prospect of Russian
 
 150 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 predominance in Europe. Until August Austrian 
 diplomacy had for its aim reconciliation with 
 Napoleon. As months passed, the value of the 
 Austrian alliance increased, and thus by her 
 neutrality during the first half of 1813 Austria was 
 able to exercise a predominant influence in the final 
 settlement of Germany. 
 
 Lord Walpole had in vain attempted to secure 
 the alliance of Austria by offering to assure to her 
 the restoration of the Tyrol, Illyria and Venetia. 
 Similarly Napoleon endeavoured to win her to his 
 side by making the tempting offer of Silesia. 
 Castle- In the meantime, while Austria watched events, 
 
 support of anc ^ Russia and Prussia prepared to wage open war 
 Prussia and with the French, Castlereagh never ceased his efforts 
 Russia. to strengthen the opposition in Germany and Sweden 
 to Napoleon. On April 19th Stewart landed at 
 Hamburg, and before long arranged with Castlereagh 
 for the despatch of arms and accoutrements from 
 England. By this means the universal arming of 
 the Prussians was expedited, and to Castlereagh 's 
 action can in part be ascribed the success which 
 attended the efforts of the Prussians in the ensuing 
 campaigns. Since the opening of the year the 
 preparations of the Russians and Prussians for the 
 ensuing campaign in Germany had not ceased, while 
 Austria, fearful of Russia and jealous of Prussia, 
 endeavoured to bring about a general peace. 
 
 Her efforts met with no favourable response 
 from Castlereagh, who justly considered that by 
 involving herself in negotiations, Great Britain 
 would tend to weaken the efforts being made by 
 Russia and Prussia. Moreover, Castlereagh had had 
 experience of Napoleon's intractability, and further,
 
 PLESWITZ 151 
 
 he was in honour bound not to relax his efforts to 
 aid the Spaniards, no less than the Swedes and 
 Russians. Before the end of May Napoleon had 
 won the battles of Llitzen and Bautzen, but the 
 Russian and Prussian armies had retired in good 
 order, and Napoleon had merely won the first 
 round in a struggle in which he was doomed to be 
 overwhelmed. 
 
 On June 4th the Armistice of Pleswitz, or Poischwitz, The 
 was signed, and in signing it Napoleon " signed his armistice 
 own death warrant." For by agreeing to a suspen- ? e Aue** 
 sion of arms for two months Napoleon gave time to 1813. 
 Prussia and Russia to reorganize their armies after 
 the battles of Llitzen and Bautzen. During the 
 suspension of hostilities, too, Austria gradually 
 realized the impossibility of making terms with 
 Napoleon, and decided to throw in her lot with 
 Prussia and Russia. Further, the period of the 
 suspension of arms was utilized by Castlereagh for 
 strengthening and encouraging the European 
 opposition to Napoleon. For Castlereagh, as indeed 
 for every opponent of the French Emperor, the 
 summer of 1813 was an anxious time. Would the 
 Coalition hold together, and would Austria join 
 the Allies ? The irresolution of the Emperor Francis 
 had been increased by Napoleon's successes at 
 Liitzen and Bautzen, and Castlereagh's anxiety on 
 the subject of the Alliance holding together and 
 with regard to the line which Austria would take 
 was only natural. Far-sighted men were already 
 prophesying that the Emperor Francis would bring 
 his vacillating policy to an end by making some 
 inglorious compromise with Napoleon. On June 
 23rd he wrote to Sir Charles Stewart : " We are in
 
 152 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " great anxiety to hear from you upon the Armistice. 
 " Its extension to the 20th of July puzzles and 
 " alarms us for the temper of Austria. We have 
 " done everything to prevail upon the Prince Royal 
 " (Bernadotte) to manage matters with your parties, 
 " and I trust all may be arranged before the 
 " resumption of hostilities." 
 
 position of A11 tnrou gh the spring Castlereagh had been 
 Bernadotte. endeavouring to obtain some definite assurances 
 from that crafty and astute adventurer. His chief 
 aim was to secure Norway, and on March 3rd, 1813, 
 we, reluctantly, by the Treaty of Stockholm agreed 
 to support the Russo-Swedish compact of 1812, by 
 which Norway was assured to Sweden. We also 
 promised to pay £1,000,000 to Bernadotte for the 
 support of a Swedish army, which was to be used 
 against Napoleon, and we promised to present to 
 Bernadotte the Island of Guadaloupe. In a letter 
 addressed to Bernadotte on March 23rd, Castlereagh 
 had urged in the strongest language the necessity 
 of immediate action on the part of the Swedes, who 
 should " take a prominent part in the advanced 
 " operations of the Allied armies." He stated 
 clearly that he should regret any delay which " may 
 " retard the moment when your operations may 
 " assume a more enlarged character." Bernadotte 
 did indeed land at Stralsund with 24,000 men on 
 May 18th, but his language and actions became so 
 equivocal, and his movements were so slow, that the 
 suspicions of Alexander were aroused. The Armi- 
 stice of Pleswitz on June 4th threw him, however, 
 into a state of panic, and he wrote urging the Tsar 
 not to make peace with Napoleon. Castlereagh's 
 suspicions as to Bernadotte's good faith had led him
 
 BERNADOTTE 153 
 
 to despatch Sir Charles Stewart to the Swedish 
 Camp, and on June 9th the latter wrote an account 
 of his conversations with the Prince Royal of Sweden. 
 In it he described Bernadotte's " engaging manners, 
 " spirited conversation, facility of expression, and 
 " talent." Stewart's opinion was that behind " his 
 " brilliancy," the " warmth of his expressions," and 
 the " splendours of his designs," there was nothing 
 to justify confidence. He did not think it was 
 possible to believe him fully in earnest until he was 
 seen fairly in action at the head of his Swedes with 
 French troops for his opponents. " He clothed 
 " himself in a pelisse of war, but his undergarments 
 " were made of Swedish objects and peace." In 
 a later despatch to Castlereagh, Stewart made it 
 quite clear that Bernadotte intended to keep the 
 Swedes in reserve, and as far as possible "to prevent 
 " them from being even brought into collision with 
 " the French troops." But there seems no doubt 
 that Bernadotte was personally hostile to the French 
 Emperor. At the same time he was suspicious of 
 Russia, though he had an unqualified admiration 
 for the Prussian monarch and people. The cause 
 of his halting policy would seem to be explained 
 by the fact that while he desired to become Emperor 
 of the French in place of Napoleon, he had no wish 
 to alienate the French nation. The Tsar had en- 
 couraged these hopes, and we can thus understand 
 the alarm felt by Bernadotte lest the Armistice of 
 Pleswitz should prove a second Tilsit. _. 
 
 During these weeks Castlereagh never ceased Treaties of 
 his efforts to unite closely the enemies of Napoleon. Reichen- 
 While Austria was wavering, and by her conduct r*jr ' ~^ e 
 rousing the suspicions of the Allies, Great Britain 15th.
 
 154 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 was exerting her influence in favour of strength- 
 ening the resistance of Russia and Prussia to France. 
 On June 14th and 15th treaties were signed at 
 Reichenbach with Russia and Prussia, the latter 
 owing to Cathcart's efforts consenting to an increase 
 in the territories of Hanover, and, what was of vital 
 importance to the continuance of the Russo- 
 Prussian resistance to the French Emperor, Castle- 
 reagh agreed, on the understanding that Prussia 
 maintained 80,000 men in the field and Russia 
 16,000, to pay a subsidy of two-thirds of a million 
 pounds to Prussia and a million and a third to Russia. 
 Great Britain also supported by her credit the issue 
 of paper money to the extent of five millions, which 
 was nominally also guaranteed by Russia and 
 Prussia. Castlereagh further offered to advance 
 £50,000 to Austria as soon as she had definitely 
 thrown in her lot with the Allies. But for a time 
 Austria persisted in preserving her neutrality, and 
 Castlereagh 's anxiety " on the subject of the 
 Alliance holding together," and with regard to the 
 attitude of Austria became intense. On June 22nd 
 he wrote to his brother to say how anxious the 
 Cabinet was with regard to the temper of Austria, 
 and on June 30th he wrote to Cathcart: "In the 
 " present wavering state of Austrian politics, I 
 " have deemed it advisable to direct your Lordship 
 " to endeavour to bring the Court of Vienna to a 
 " private explanation of its views. It is not for 
 " Great Britain to goad other powers into exertions 
 " which they deem inconsistent with their own 
 " safety ; but it is material that we should know 
 " on whom we have to reckon as well as to evince 
 " the disposition we feel, as far as our means will
 
 STANHOPE'S EXPERIENCES 155 
 
 " permit, to sustain the Continental powers in 
 " accomplishing their own, as well as the general 
 " safety ; and as a proof that such is our disposition 
 " towards Austria, your Lordship is authorized 
 " to make them an advance if actually en lutte against 
 " France. The rapid progress of the British arms 
 " in Spain will, I trust, prove that we are not 
 " disposed to be inactive, and that it is not by pecu- 
 " niary efforts alone that we are ready to contend 
 " for a better order of things." 
 
 As the only available British forces were fully 
 occupied in Spain and Canada, and as Bernadotte 
 on the first sign of weakness on the part of the Allies 
 would have undoubtedly retired to Sweden, it was 
 of vital importance to secure the adhesion of Austria 
 to the Russo-Prussian alliance. 
 
 To Stanhope, an English traveller who was in The 
 Germany at this eventful time, the conduct of experiences 
 Austria appeared farsighted and wise. While men stanhope, 
 were taunting the Austrian Cabinet with weakness, 
 imbecility and indecision, Metternich was, in his 
 opinion, playing his part with consummate skill. 
 Had Austria, he says, joined the Allies on their 
 advance, " her conduct would have been attributed 
 " to fear ; and she must have been contented to 
 " assume a secondary position and bend to the pride 
 " of Russia. . . . She waited, on the contrary, till 
 " that pride had been humbled by defeat, till the 
 " Allies were on the point of losing all the advantages 
 " they had gained ; she then summoned them to 
 " her tribunal, and disclosed the terms upon which 
 " she would join the Allies." During the early part 
 of the Armistice, Stanhope stayed in a village near 
 Reichenbach under the care of Lord Cathcart, to
 
 156 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 whom Castlereagh had written on behalf of the 
 young English traveller who makes some interesting 
 remarks upon the condition of affairs. He notes 
 that Cathcart was not on very good terms with 
 either Sir Charles Stewart or with Sir Robert Wilson ; 
 he also saw a good deal of Werry, Cathcart's 
 Secretary of Legation. Werry, who had been in 
 the Foreign Office for some years, was a favourite 
 with Castlereagh, and when he found that the 
 Russians looked upon him with some contempt 
 because he had no military rank, Castlereagh " at 
 " once sent him a Commission in his own regiment 
 "of militia, accompanied by the complete uniform." 
 Before the Armistice had terminated, Stanhope 
 returned to England, travelling by Frankfort and 
 Stralsund. At Stralsund he found Bernadotte with 
 thirty thousand men. Steinheld, the Secretary of 
 Bernadotte, told Stanhope that his master declared 
 that England alone among the Powers had fulfilled 
 her engagements, and as the Russians had not sent 
 him any of the promised troops, that he was not 
 going to advance into the heart of Germany with 
 only thirty thousand men. 1 
 Mettemich Disunion among the Continental powers had been 
 w"™i««,, ^e P r i mar y cause of Napoleon's early successes, 
 and Castlereagh was fully alive in 1813 and 1814 
 to the necessity of bringing the Russian, Prussian 
 and Austrian monarchs to put aside all petty 
 jealousies, and to unite in a great effort to free 
 Europe from the domination of one man. 
 
 The month of July was an anxious one for 
 Castlereagh and the Allies, Metternich's famous 
 interview with Napoleon took place on June 28th, 
 1 Pickering: "Memoirs," pp. 546, 547. 
 
 Napoleon.
 
 THE ARMISTICE 157 
 
 and lasted six hours. Its dramatic character has 
 been often described, while its duration illustrates 
 the importance attached by Napoleon to the influence 
 of Austria. The following day Napoleon and 
 Metternich arranged that the Armistice should be 
 prolonged from July 25th to August 10th. The 
 news of the British victory at Vittoria, gained on 
 June 21st, was known in Germany by the beginning 
 of July, and helped to confirm Metternich in his 
 decision which was soon to be made by the Austrian 
 Emperor of throwing in his lot with the Allies. 
 
 While these issues, so vital to the future of Europe, Attitude to 
 were occupying the attention of the Russian, Prussian, Bernadotte. 
 Austrian and British statesmen, the lighter side of 
 the drama was illustrated by Bernadotte. In a 
 letter written on July 12th, by Sir Charles Stewart, 
 to Castlereagh, a picture of Bernadotte is drawn 
 which explains the comparative uselessness of the 
 Swedish Alliance. After describing the personal 
 fascination of the eloquent language of the Prince 
 Royal, Stewart draws a picture of him, " armed, 
 " as he always is, with a bottle of eau-de-Cologne 
 " in one hand, and a white handkerchief in the 
 " other, inundating everything round him with 
 " the perfume." He then alludes to " the elegant 
 " flattery of this extraordinary man who always 
 " addresses you as mon ami, and admits you 
 " seemingly into his entire confidence." But the 
 conclusion that Stewart arrived at was that 
 Bernadotte's procrastination was the result of 
 careful thought, and that, should Napoleon's 
 ascendancy again be asserted, he would at once retire 
 to Sweden. 
 
 But before the middle of July, Napoleon's pride
 
 158 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Austria 
 joins the 
 Allies, 
 August 
 nth. 
 
 and the compact of Trachenberg lessened, if it did 
 not entirely destroy, all prospects of peace. The 
 influence of Vittoria was very considerable. As 
 Napoleon rightly anticipated, it gave Austria fresh 
 courage, and the news of the victory could not have 
 arrived at a more opportune moment. 1 
 
 On July 12th the important Compact of Trachen- 
 berg was signed, and Bernadotte unreservedly 
 threw in his lot with the Allies. From that time 
 the adhesion of Austria to the allied cause was 
 almost certainly secured, and on July 25th 
 Metternich urged Cathcart to encourage Wellington 
 to invade France. The fixed determination of the 
 allied Sovereigns to resist Napoleon, and the latter's 
 obstinacy, rendered any avoidance of a renewal of 
 war impossible. On August 6th, just before the 
 close of the Armistice, Castlereagh, from the Foreign 
 Office, wrote the following note to Lord Aberdeen, 
 who had been selected as our ambassador at Vienna : 
 ' Your Lordship will collect from these instructions 
 ' that a general peace, in order to provide adequately 
 ' for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, 
 ' ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's Govern- 
 ' ment, to confine France at least within the 
 ' Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine ; and if the other 
 ' Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves 
 ' enabled to contend for such a peace, Great Britain 
 ' is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line 
 ' of policy. If, however, the Powers most immedi- 
 ' ately concerned should determine, rather than 
 ' encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, 
 ' to trust for their own security to a more imperfect 
 
 1 Those who desire more detailed information should 
 consult the "Cambridge Modern History," vol. X.
 
 LEIPZIG 159 
 
 " arrangement, it never has been the policy of the 
 " British Government to attempt to dictate to other 
 " States a perseverance in war which they did not 
 " themselves recognize to be essential to their own 
 " as well as to the common safety." At the time, 
 however, that the above despatch, so moderate in 
 tone, was penned, the Armistice was rapidly drawing 
 to its conclusion. The terms offered by Metternich 
 were rejected by Napoleon, and on August 11th 
 Austria declared war against France. 
 
 The War of Liberation had now entered upon The 
 its final phase, and Castlereagh's policy was at last Leipzfe 
 to be fully justified. Realizing the immense im- 
 portance of the step taken by Austria in declaring 
 war, Cathcart and Stewart at once arranged for the 
 immediate advance to the Court of Vienna of half 
 the subsidy promised at the Treaty of Reichenbach 
 in the event of the Emperor Francis joining the 
 Allies. During the following two months Napoleon 
 held his ground in Saxony, and it was not till the 
 16th of October that his fate and that of Germany 
 was decided at the battle of Leipzig. Till that day 
 Bernadotte had played a waiting game, and it was 
 only at that critical moment which saw the con- 
 cluding struggles round Leipzig, that Sir Charles 
 Stewart forced him to declare himself. Writing to 
 Castlereagh after the close of the battle, Stewart 
 says, " I feel conscious that if I had not been here 
 the Northern Army would have played no part 
 before Leipzig." It was, however, not till October 
 17th (the second day of the battle) that the Swedish 
 army proved of real use. Stewart writes some very 
 frank criticisms of Bernadotte 's attitude. "He is 
 " as subservient to me as need be ; he knows I can
 
 160 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " show him up, and therefore fears me. He has 
 " been made to play his part, however, and perhaps 
 "he is an instrument we may yet need, but I wish 
 " we were not to be the means of confirming his 
 " power, when he has done more than enough to 
 " lose it for ever." The decisive victory of Leipzig, 
 while from a military point of view a triumph for 
 Blucher and Gneisenau, was to a great extent only 
 rendered possible by the efforts of Castlereagh and 
 his brother. Had not the former " provided the 
 " subsidies and established the guaranteed paper 
 " currency .... the forces of Europe would never 
 " have been arrayed on the field of Leipzig," and 
 had not Stewart " forced up Bernadotte and his 
 " army at the decisive moment, that great fight 
 " would at best have been a drawn battle, if not a 
 " defeat." 
 The After Leipzig and Napoleon's retreat to France, 
 
 •rlr!!!t f0rt *-he mos t serious of Castlereagh's difficulties began. 
 With the overthrow of the French army and the 
 destruction of the French predominance in Europe 
 came questions (1) As to the position to be held in 
 the future by France, and (2) Relating to the 
 re-organization of Germany. On November 8th and 
 9th Metternich made at Frankfort offers of peace 
 which Napoleon would have been wise to accept. 
 But he hesitated, made vague answers, and it 
 became evident that he was not in earnest. Charles 
 Stewart discovered the negotiations which Metternich 
 had concealed from Aberdeen, and at once informed 
 Castlereagh. The acceptance by Napoleon of these 
 terms would have defeated the British aims and 
 ruined the Coalition. On the subject of Antwerp, 
 Castlereagh throughout this and the following 
 
 Terms.
 
 DIVERGENT VIEWS 161 
 
 months was adamant. On November 13th A he ' »^/ 
 wrote to Aberdeen : "I must particularly entreat /? 
 
 " you to keep your attention upon Antwerp. The 
 " destruction of that arsenal is essential to our 
 " safety. To leave it in the hands of France is 
 " little short of imposing upon Great Britain the 
 " charge of a perpetual war establishment." There 
 was to be no compromise on the subject of Antwerp, 
 though Castlereagh was otherwise willing to give 
 Napoleon generous terms. 
 
 Gradually the mere idea of allowing France to Necessity 
 keep what Napoleon called her natural frontiers of c *f tle " 
 was put on one side, and it became evident that the presence at 
 Allies were practically decided to take back Belgium, the allied 
 Savoy, Nice, Holland, and the Rhineland, as well camp> 
 as all Italy. But the question of the settlement 
 of Europe was, like that of France, beset with 
 difficulties. The various members of the Coalition 
 were only unanimous with regard to the necessity 
 of clipping the wings of France. On all other points 
 they were more or less at variance. The views of 
 Austria differed widely from those of Russia and 
 Prussia. The Emperor Francis and Metternich 
 were in favour of allowing Napoleon to keep the 
 " natural frontiers," while the Tsar and the King 
 of Prussia were resolved to bring back France to 
 her old boundaries. In the jealousies which always 
 tend to weaken a league lay Napoleon's opportunity, 
 and it is difficult to imagine how those jealousies could 
 have been removed and conccid among the Allies 
 established without Castlereagh's personal inter- 
 vention. Historians have tended to overlook the 
 immense importance of Castlereagh's mission, and 
 Whig writers have concurred in ignoring the effects of 
 
 II — (2211)
 
 <s 
 
 162 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 his personal influence. And yet no one who studies 
 the history of those months, of such vital importance 
 in the history of Europe, can fail to come to the 
 conclusion that Napoleon's final overthrow was 
 due primarily to the energy and tact of Castlereagh. 
 
 Metternich's conduct at Frankfort rendered 
 Castlereagh's presence at the headquarters of the 
 Allies absolutely necessary. On December 31st, 
 1813, Castlereagh left England for Holland, and on 
 January 18th, 1814, he reached Freiburg, the head- 
 quarters of the allied army. He found that, owing to 
 divergence of views and jealousies, the Alliance was 
 on the verge of breaking up. The Tsar wished to 
 replace Napoleon by Bernadotte and to make an 
 immediate advance, while Metternich was prepared 
 to make peace with Napoleon, and agreed with 
 Castlereagh in regarding Bernadotte as a traitor 
 to the Alliance. He was not anxious to advance, 
 as he dreaded a fresh struggle with Napoleon. Stein 
 was anxious for the return of the Bourbons. 
 
 Amid these conflicting interests and aims 
 Castlereagh's influence made itself at once felt. 
 Great Britain had no ulterior aims, had till the 
 beginning of 1813 borne the brunt of the struggle, 
 and was prepared to restore some of her conquests 
 if by doing so she could obtain for Europe a lasting 
 peace. Moreover, had it not been for the advances 
 in money made by Great Britain, the Alliance against 
 Napoleon could not have held together. Thus 
 from the first Castlereagh was able to take up a very 
 strong position among the Allied Sovereigns, a 
 position the strength of which was increased by his 
 firmness, courtesy, and what has been called " the 
 " proud simplicity of his conduct." Thus the
 
 THE INVASION OF FRANCE 163 
 
 obvious disinterestedness of the policy of Great 
 Britain, combined with the personality of Castlereagh, 
 tended to bring about harmony in the allied camp. 
 
 A few days after his arrival the Allies marched The 
 into France, and it was arranged that a Conference advance 
 should be opened at Chatillon-sur-Seine on February p^B-, 
 5th, and that there Caulaincourt, the French envoy, and the 
 should receive the terms of the Allies. Further, Conference 
 it was hoped that one result of the Conference would ° ' on 
 be the strengthening of the Alliance, and the removal 
 of all misunderstandings. Castlereagh had thus 
 two difficult tasks before him. He had to see that 
 at all hazards Belgium and Holland were freed from 
 French influence, and at the same time that the 
 union of the Allies was kept intact. On February 
 7th Caulaincourt was informed that France must 
 give up Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy 
 and Nice. In a word, she was to retain merely 
 her boundaries of 1791. But Napoleon was resolved 
 to keep Antwerp, and sooner than accept the terms 
 offered, he preferred to attempt to overthrow his 
 foes by attacking first Blucher and then Schwarzen- 
 berg. On February 13th he succeeded in inflicting 
 a severe defeat upon Blucher, but he was unable 
 to follow up his advantage, and had to fall back in 
 order to provide for the defence of Paris. This 
 success, however, made Napoleon all the more 
 determined not to yield Belgium and the left bank 
 of the Rhine. His refusal of an armistice alienated 
 his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, and by the 
 Treaty of Chaumont (March 9th) the four Powers 
 bound themselves to continue the war till France Castle- 
 accepted their terms. f ff g f S 
 Castlereagh was naturally much pleased at his successful.
 
 164 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 
 mistake in 
 sending 
 Napoleon 
 to Elba. 
 
 Paris open 
 to visitors, 
 1814. 
 
 success in bringing the three Powers, Prussia, Austria 
 and Russia into harmonious relations. " I send 
 " you my Treaty," he wrote to his Government, 
 " which I hope you will approve. We four ministers 
 " when signing, happened to be sitting at a Whist 
 " Table. It was agreed that never were the stakes 
 " so high at any former party." He then commented 
 upon the immense sums which Great Britain 
 contributed to the Allied Cause. " What an extra- 
 " ordinary display of power ! This, I trust, will 
 " put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have 
 " to an opinion on Continental matters." 
 
 Castlereagh's tact and firmness had proved 
 successful. The battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, on March 
 19th, proved decisive ; on March 31st the Allies 
 entered Paris; on April 11th Napoleon signed his 
 abdication. 
 
 The determination of Castlereagh, and indeed of 
 Alexander, had now been crowned with success. 
 Unfortunately, the Tsar arrived in Paris before 
 Castlereagh and Metternich, and at once made 
 arrangements for Napoleon's exile to Elba. It is 
 justifiable to hold the view that had Castlereagh 
 been present when Caulaincourt made his appeals 
 to Alexander, a different settlement would have 
 been made, and Europe would have been spared 
 the Hundred Days and the Battle of Waterloo. 
 
 At the moment, however, no one anticipated an 
 early renewal of the struggle. Castlereagh had 
 confounded his critics by the brilliant success of 
 his diplomacy, and Paris after many years was open 
 to Europe. 
 
 On April 29th, 1814, William Jerdan, editor of 
 The Sun, sailed from Dover in the Lady Francis,
 
 THE ALLIES IN PARIS 165 
 
 the first regular packet for Calais. At Dessein's 
 Hotel he hired a cabriolet and drove to Paris, passing 
 on the way Russian and Prussian regiments and one 
 Cossack patrolling alone " a central province of 
 ancient France." Jerdan gives a most interesting 
 account of the condition of Paris, where " the gay 
 " and giddy " populace seemed to welcome the 
 Russians and Austrians, but to detest the Prussians. 
 On May 4th Louis XVIII entered Paris, amid a 
 scene of great enthusiasm, the crowds which 
 witnessed his arrival including men from every part 
 of Europe. The same day the Duke of Wellington 
 arrived from Toulouse, " and in plain clothes, so as 
 " to attract no attention, he rode along with Lord 
 " Castlereagh, Lord Aberdeen, and other distinguished 
 " Englishmen, in the cavalcade of the British 
 " Ambassador, Sir Charles Stewart, which swept 
 " up about noon to the grand review of the allied 
 " troops quartered in Paris." Wellington was, 
 however, soon discovered by the crowd, which 
 " hurra'd and shouted as if they were demented 
 " and a French Conqueror of Great Britain had 
 " suddenly descended among them." In the evening 
 of that eventful day Sir Charles Stewart gave a ball, 
 at which were present all the generals and statesmen 
 most renowned in Europe. " It was," writes 
 Jerdan, who owed his appearance there to the 
 kindness of Lord Burghersh, " a strange vision — 
 " Schwartzenberg and Berthier, Bliicher and Ney, 
 " Platoff and Marmont, Wittgenstein and Mortier, 
 " the Archduke Constantine and Talleyrand, 
 " Hardenberg and Augereau, Czernicheff and 
 " Moncey, Davidoff and Brune, Yorke and Servurier, 
 " Woronzoff and Jourdan, St. Priest and Macdonald,
 
 166 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " all strolling about and conversing in the most 
 " amiable manner — a perfect mob of princes, com- 
 " manders, and famous politicians and warriors ; and 
 " still among the foremost — Wellington." 
 
 The ball was opened by the Tsar, who danced 
 with Madame Ney, the Princess of Moskwa. Before 
 he left Paris, Jerdan went to the opera, where he 
 says, " the noble presence of Lord and Lady 
 " Castlereagh eclipsed every other box, and were 
 "admired specimens of the Island race." 1 Shortly 
 after Jerdan's return to England, the painter Haydon 
 visited the French capital, and describes how he 
 found Russians, Poles, Cossacks and Tartars looking 
 at the pictures in the Louvre. " The Russian officers 
 " were," he says, " the most refined, with fair complex- 
 " ions, soft hair, and expressive features, and speaking 
 " French fluently. In the Rue St. Honor6 in the 
 " middle of the day," he says, " you met not only 
 " Cossacks, English, Prussians and Austrians, but 
 " now and then a Bashkir Tartar in the ancient 
 " Phrygian cap with bows and arrows and chain 
 " armour, gazing about him from his horse." 
 The It is difficult to believe, if it were not continually 
 
 Castle ° f forced upon the notice of every student of British 
 reagh's history during the Napoleonic War, that the 
 policy. virulence of the attacks upon the policy of the 
 
 Government increased as the struggle with Napoleon 
 became more and more a life and death one. The 
 similarity of the tactics of the Opposition in 1812 
 and 1813, and those employed by opponents of the 
 Boer War in 1899 and the following years is forced 
 upon the notice of the reader. In the Wellington 
 Despatches will be found complaints by the Duke of 
 1 Jerdan : " An Autobiography," vol. I, p. 193.
 
 ENGLISH OPINION 167 
 
 the Debates in Parliament, and of newspaper 
 comments as currish and likely to embarrass his 
 Commissariat and defeat his measures. It seemed, 
 writes one who lived at that time, "as if between 
 " terror and admiration the opposition writers 
 " had exalted Bonaparte into an idol, and would 
 " rush through the fire to worship this Moloch, 
 " colouring every advantage on his side, and 
 " disparaging every success against him." 
 
 Before Wellington's final successes in Spain, the 
 Chronicle exultingly declared that Napoleon, having 
 finished the war in the north, would send a force 
 to the Peninsula strong enough to compel Wellington 
 to retreat, and " once more leave the enemy the 
 " undisputed occupancy of the greater part of Spain." 
 In utter ignorance of the character of the Napoleonic 
 tyranny, many so-called Liberals in Great Britain 
 expressed a sentimental tenderness for Napoleon, 
 apparently on the ground that his tyranny was not 
 due to any hereditary claim. 
 
 As 1813 proceeded, the desire for the latest Excitement 
 information increased, and the evening newspapers ! n E £S land 
 published frequent editions with the news from the 
 Continent, " which was in one sanguinary ferment 
 " from the Tagus to the Vistula." Frequently 
 a French newspaper smuggled across would be sold 
 for ten, twenty, or even a hundred guineas, if it was 
 of recent date and contained any fresh account of 
 Napoleon's German Campaigns. 
 
 In the House of Commons, after his return from Castlereagh 
 France, Castlereagh made an unanswerable defence j" the 
 of the Treaty of Paris. Having in one triumphant commons, 
 sentence scattered to the winds all the imputations 
 and inaccurate assertions which had been continually
 
 168 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Visit of the 
 allied 
 sovereigns 
 to England, 
 1814. 
 
 made by the opponents of the Government in 
 Parliament and in the Press, regarding the conduct 
 of the war, he continued : " The conduct of Great 
 " Britain has been vindicated ; it has been proved 
 " that she entered into the war from nothing short 
 " of an over-ruling necessity ; and that she was 
 " ready to relinquish everything of which for her 
 " own security she had been obliged to take possession 
 " as soon as it became manifest she could make that 
 " sacrifice without danger." With pardonable pride 
 he then reminded his audience of the proud position 
 in which Great Britain now found herself. " If the 
 " country has for twenty years," he said, " sustained 
 " the most severe burdens, and done so with a noble 
 " fortitude, it is at least gratifying for her to find 
 " that she has come out of the tremendous conflict in 
 " which she had been engaged with the acquisition 
 " of that security for which she contended, and with 
 " a reputation unstained by reproval. She bravely 
 " stood by the Powers of Europe in circumstances 
 " of unprecedented peril, feeling that it was her 
 " duty to enter the lists in defence of all those moral 
 " and political principles which were endangered, 
 " abstaining from too cautious and minute calcula- 
 " tions of the conflict, and leaving the result to 
 " Providence." 1 On July 8th the Tsar and the King 
 of Prussia, accompanied by many distinguished 
 statesmen and generals, including Blucher and 
 Platoff, visited England, where they were received 
 with the utmost enthusiasm. They were entertained 
 at the Guildhall ; they visited Oxford, and traditions 
 of the strength of Blucher's constitution still linger 
 round the rooms which he occupied in Christ Church ; 
 1 Alison : " Life of Lord Castlereagh," vol. I, p. 485.
 
 THE ALLIED MONARCHS IN ENGLAND 169 
 
 they were present at a naval review at Portsmouth 
 and at the Ascot Races. During their stay in 
 England it seemed "as if the British Empire had 
 " been turned into one Greenwich Fair " ; and few 
 anticipated that within a year the Waterloo 
 Campaign would take place.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA AND THE BATTLE OF 
 
 WATERLOO 
 
 The After the first downfall of Napoleon, it was arranged 
 
 Congress that the Great Powers of Europe should meet in a 
 Congress to arrange the terms of a general pacification 
 and to guard against the recurrence of the evils 
 associated with the French supremacy in Europe. 
 The first of a series of European Congresses met 
 at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, and after discus- 
 sions lasting about eight months, the leading 
 European Powers (with the exception of France) 
 decided upon certain territorial rearrangements in 
 Europe, which they hoped would ensure a " real 
 " and permanent equilibrium " among the various 
 states. Owing to Castlereagh's inability to leave 
 England earlier, in consequence of his Parliamentary 
 duties, and owing to the inability of the Sovereigns 
 of Russia and Prussia to arrive at Vienna till 
 September 25th, the Congress did not meet till the 
 29th of the month. In his laborious duties at Vienna 
 Castlereagh was assisted by his brother, Lord 
 Stewart, by Earl Cathcart, British Minister at St. 
 Petersburg, by the Earl of Clancarty, and by 
 Stratford Canning, the British minister at Bern. 
 The settlement arrived at by the Congress was on 
 the whole a satisfactory one. 
 Alexander I The most conspicuous and distinguished of the 
 famous personages assembled at Vienna were 
 undoubtedly the Tsar Alexander, Metternich, and 
 
 170
 
 ALEXANDER I AND METTERNICH 171 
 
 Castlereagh. Alexander I, by the part which he 
 had taken in the overthrow of Napoleon, was already 
 recognized as the most influential potentate in 
 Europe. His personality itself was sufficient to 
 attract the attention of all European statesmen. 
 Placed by destiny at the head of an Empire which 
 could only be ruled by a despotism, Alexander 
 constantly wavered between autocratic and 
 democratic tendencies. His own authority was 
 based on despotic conditions, but at the same time 
 he was open to influences which made for democracy. 
 The democratic bent of Swiss institutions interested 
 him, the emancipation of Greece attracted his 
 sympathy, the growth of the feeling of nationality 
 in Germany roused his favourable attention. He 
 hoped to grant to Poland a full measure of Home 
 Rule, he aimed at founding on the ruins of the darkest 
 despotism a new Byzantine Empire. Intelligent, 
 high-minded, sympathetic, Alexander, by the force 
 of his personality, was one of the most interesting 
 personages at the Congress. 
 
 In Metternich, Austria's Minister of State and of Metternich. 
 Foreign Affairs, the Congress saw one of the ablest 
 diplomatists in Europe. While the policy of 
 Alexander, owing to his impressionable character, 
 was quite incalculable, that of Metternich was definite 
 and decided. In 1813, while anxious to check 
 Napoleon, he had realized the danger of making 
 Russia's position too strong, and henceforward it 
 was his policy to confine both France and Russia 
 within their natural limits. It was Metternich 
 who on the downfall of Napoleon had proposed that 
 all questions concerning the balance of power in 
 Europe should be settled at the Congress of Vienna.
 
 172 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 At this time Alexander not unnaturally regarded 
 him with a suspicion which was not removed for 
 some years. 
 Castlereagh With Metternich Castlereagh had much in common. 
 Metternich fully appreciated the tenacity of purpose, 
 the clearness of mind, the power of decision which 
 characterized the British Minister. During the 
 progress of the Congress the reputation of Castlereagh 
 was enhanced in the eyes of his colleagues, and there 
 is little doubt that the satisfactory and peaceful 
 conclusion of the deliberations of the great European 
 Powers was in a great measure due to the British 
 minister's tact and firmness. At the opening of the 
 Congress, when the foreign representatives appeared 
 in full uniform and covered with medals and orders, 
 Castlereagh very characteristically appeared in his 
 ordinary dress coat, which was merely decorated 
 with the Riband of the Garter. The contrast was 
 sufficiently striking to draw from Talleyrand the 
 exclamation, " Ma foi ! C'est distingue:' " 
 
 At the opening of the Congress, Great Britain, 
 Russia, Austria and Prussia — the Four Allied Powers, 
 "lesquatre," as they were named — at once declared 
 their intention of settling the difficult questions 
 connected with the distribution of the German, 
 Polish, and Italian lands. Talleyrand in vain raised 
 objections to this decision, and the late autumn 
 saw the four great Powers busily engaged in 
 rearranging the map of Europe. In the discussions, 
 which lasted for months, Castlereagh occupied a 
 unique position. Great Britain had secured in the 
 Mediterranean and elsewhere those positions which 
 were necessary for her supremacy at sea, and thus, 
 as she had no ambitions to gratify in Europe, 
 
 Opening 
 of the 
 Congress
 
 ALEXANDER'S VIEWS 173 
 
 Castlereagh found that his influence at the Congress 
 was thereby considerably strengthened. With regard 
 to the Polish-Saxon difficulty, which at one time 
 seemed likely to lead to a break-up of the Congress, 
 if not to actual war between its members, Castlereagh 
 took up a firm attitude. 
 
 That the opposition to the plans of Russia was 
 successful was in great measure due to Castlereagh, 
 and Europe owes him a debt of gratitude for his 
 calm judgment and determination. Alexander had 
 wished to make the annexation of Poland to Russia, 
 and the confiscation of Saxony by Prussia a 
 preliminary to all negotiations. It is said that at 
 Vienna, when the map of Europe was laid upon the 
 table, he had placed his hand upon Poland, saying, 
 " C'est d moi." With an army of 200,000 men in 
 Poland, he imagined that he could defy the wishes 
 of Europe, and that those who opposed his wishes 
 would hesitate before endangering the peace of the 
 world. But though Castlereagh was the last man 
 to wish that the Alliance of the Four Great Powers 
 should be weakened, still less broken up, he was 
 resolved not to acquiesce in Russia's demands. 
 
 In the early stages of the Congress he had advocated 
 the union of all the powers in an effort to save Poland 
 from Russia ; and in order to gain Prussia was 
 prepared to recognize its sovereignty over the whole 
 of Saxony. The prospect, however, of the dis- 
 appearance of Saxony from among the ranks of the 
 smaller German powers raised much opposition among 
 the lesser states. The Prince Regent, as future King 
 of Hanover, became interested in this question, and 
 opposed the project of entirely transferring Saxony to 
 Prussia. The influence of France was thrown on the
 
 174 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castlereagh 
 and the 
 Polish 
 crisis. 
 
 same side, and Talleyrand vigorously defended the 
 cause of the King of Saxony. Public opinion in 
 Bavaria, and throughout Germany, and generally in 
 England, supported Frederick Augustus, and in the 
 British Parliament questions were asked. Castlereagh 
 therefore, finding it impossible to detach Prussia 
 from Russia, changed his views, and henceforward 
 vigorously opposed the absorption of Saxony by 
 Prussia, no less than the absorption of all Poland by 
 Russia. The immediate result of this change of 
 attitude on the part of Castlereagh with regard to 
 Saxony was the increase of the chances of a European 
 war. Prussian troops at once occupied Dresden 
 and several Saxon towns, and Hardenberg declared 
 at Vienna that " Prussia would not restore Saxony. 
 " She had won it and she would keep it." 
 
 In the Autobiography of Metternich, the conduct 
 of Castlereagh during what may be called the Polish 
 crisis is criticised sometimes severely. It is stated 
 that in the early autumn of 1814 he addressed to 
 the Tsar three private memoranda, in which " he 
 " showed with much vigour and sometimes with 
 " little tact the injustice of his conduct and preten- 
 " sions, and the dangers with which his projects 
 " would threaten Europe." According to Metternich, 
 '• the Tsar replied by bad arguments, sometimes in an 
 evasive manner, sometimes with disdain." In any 
 case, Metternich was probably right in styling this 
 private correspondence useless and, moreover, 
 absolutely hurtful to the success of the negotia- 
 tions. " Lord Castlereagh," he says, " was wrong in 
 " undertaking it ; we were wrong in consenting to it." 
 
 In Saxony public opinion declared itself strongly 
 against union with Prussia, and it found support in
 
 THE CRISIS 175 
 
 popular indignation in England and elsewhere. Triple 
 Castlereagh, who at first had hoped by sacrificing alliance 
 Saxony to moderate the Russian demands in Poland, Great 6 " 
 attempted in October to bring about a peaceful Britain, 
 solution of the difficulties. But before Russia and Fran ce, 
 Prussia would assent to a compromise, it was Austria, 
 necessary for England, Austria, and France to unite 
 together. Owing to Castlereagh's insistence, France, 
 as represented by Talleyrand, had been admitted to 
 the Congress, but on the Saxony questions he did not 
 at first support the British Minister. Castlereagh 
 and Metternich urged in vain that the King of Saxony 
 should be consulted with regard to the proposed 
 disposal of his kingdom, and on January 3rd, 1815, 
 a defensive Triple Alliance was secretly but definitely 
 formed between Great Britain, Austria and France. 
 War seemed inevitable, and with its outbreak the 
 return of Napoleon to France was a certainty which 
 had to be faced. 
 
 Warlike preparations had already been made, A critical 
 25,000 Austrian troops marched into Gallicia ; and situation. 
 Bavaria, Holland, Piedmont, and Hanover promised 
 to send contingents. All Europe was thus in arms, 
 and while the forces of the Russians and Prussians 
 numbered roughly 435,000, those of their opponents 
 were estimated at about 535,000. The conclusion, 
 however, of the Peace of Ghent, in December, 1814, 
 between Great Britain and America, contributed 
 to strengthen Castlereagh's hands. Some 30,000 
 veteran British soldiers were now rendered available 
 for service in Europe. Moreover, the very prospect 
 of the outbreak of a war which would in all probability 
 lead to the return of Napoleon to France, caused 
 the Allies to hesitate, and even before the end of
 
 176 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 December signs had not been wanting of the willing- 
 ness of the Tsar and the King of Prussia to abate 
 something of their exorbitant pretensions. By dint 
 of much perseverance, and aided by his conciliatory 
 manner, Castlereagh induced the Tsar to recognize 
 the Austrian claims upon part of Poland, and the 
 King of Prussia to be satisfied with a portion of 
 Saxony. Moreover, Castlereagh made great efforts, 
 which were not wholly unsuccessful, to preserve 
 the nationality of Poland, and to obtain for it a 
 constitution. It was undoubtedly due to Castlereagh 
 that an arrangement on the Polish question — the 
 most difficult one which the Congress had to consider 
 — was satisfactorily arrived at. On December 17th, 
 1814, Castlereagh wrote to the Duke of Wellington : 
 " I consider the Polish question as settled, Prussia 
 " never having contended it in earnest, and Austria 
 " consequently has yielded. The Saxon one is now 
 
 " the only one that is of much difficulty 
 
 " The Saxon point is apparently the only one of 
 much difficulty, or that can lead to serious 
 consequences." The settlement of the Saxon 
 question had, however, never presented any 
 insuperable difficulty and after December ceased 
 Castlereagh to be a danger to the peace of Europe. The Powers 
 successful. now recognized the folly of their divisions, the spirit 
 of compromise was awakened, and a settlement was 
 in the early months of 1815 arrived at by which the 
 King of Saxony was left in possession of part of his 
 kingdom, Prussia obtaining Magdeburg, Wittenberg 
 and Torgau. 
 
 Before the actual conclusion of the Congress 
 Castlereagh had returned to England, leaving the 
 Duke of Wellington to act for him. By that time 
 
 1 1
 
 THE SLAVE TRADE 177 
 
 most of the points to which Castlereagh attached 
 importance had been settled. The union of Genoa 
 with Piedmont had set up a barrier to French 
 aggressions in the direction of Italy, and Prussia 
 had been strengthened on its Western frontier. He 
 had firmly insisted upon the union of Holland and 
 Belgium in a new State which also included the 
 Duchies of Luxemburg and Limburg and the 
 dominions of the Prince-Bishop of Liege. To 
 Castlereagh, the establishment of this new kingdom 
 of the Netherlands was one of the most important 
 of the territorial arrangements arrived at by the 
 Congress. As separate kingdoms, Holland and 
 Belgium would be in danger of falling victims to 
 some strong neighbour ; united they would not be 
 likely to invite attack or absorption. 
 
 On the question of the slave trade Castlereagh The slave 
 was able before his departure for England in trade « 
 February, 1815, to make his influence felt. Since 
 1806 the Slave Trade had come to an end in the 
 British dominions ; since 1807 the same may be 
 said of the United States. During the war the 
 British Navy had effected its almost total abolition, 
 but after the close of the Napoleonic War there was 
 a distinct danger of its revival. France was ready 
 to support the anti-slave trade attitude which 
 Castlereagh adopted at the time of the First Peace 
 of Paris, and Russia, Prussia, and Austria offered 
 no opposition. Spain and Portugal, however, 
 raised objections, but eventually after much discus- 
 sion the eight leading European Powers unanimously 
 agreed to a Declaration which, without binding any 
 one Power to carry out the abolition of Slavery 
 by a definite date, united all Europe in a general 
 
 ia — (aan)
 
 178 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 settlement. 
 
 condemnation of the system. Thus the efforts of 
 Wilberforce and his friends were successful, and when 
 Castlereagh returned to England he was satisfied 
 that the eventual extinction of the slave trade was 
 assured. At the same time Castlereagh was fully 
 sensible of the inappropriateness of the agitation over 
 the slave trade at a moment when Europe was just 
 emerging from its mighty struggle with Napoleon. 
 While the great powers were busy discussing various 
 points connected with the re-establishment of the 
 Balance of Power, and the setting up of barriers 
 against any fresh French irruptions, England had 
 been seized with one of those paroxysms which 
 " though creditable to the warmth of our hearts, 
 " are hardly so to the coolness of our heads." 
 
 Thus, when on February 15th, 1815, Castlereagh 
 
 left the Congress to defend at home by his unimpas- 
 
 sioned and unadorned oratory the ministerial policy, 
 
 the work connected with the resettlement of Europe 
 
 had made rapid strides. " Russia had reduced her 
 
 ' Polish pretensions, the new dominion of Prussia 
 
 ' (including her share of Saxony) had been settled ; 
 
 ' Austria was established in the control of Northern 
 
 ' Italy ; Great Britain had virtually secured 
 
 ' satisfactory boundaries for the Netherlands, while 
 
 ' those of Hanover had been enlarged ; a broad 
 
 ' basis for the Swiss Confederation had been 
 
 ' preserved ; the Kingdom of Sardinia had been 
 
 ' materially strengthened, and the abolition of the 
 
 ' slave trade had been brought within sight." 
 
 Moreover, the cloud threatening disunion, if not 
 
 open hostilities, among the Allies had passed away. 
 
 Castlereagh's hope that the early days of 1815 would 
 
 see the settlement of all the territorial arrangements
 
 CASTLEREAGH'S RETURN 179 
 
 of Europe seemed likely to be realized. In that 
 settlement his tact and influence had made them- 
 selves conspicuous, and the reputation which he had 
 acquired during the march of the Allies upon Paris 
 in the early days of 1814 was now considerably 
 enhanced. 
 
 With the opening of 1815 had arrived at Vienna Return to 
 urgent letters from Lord Liverpool, pressing Lord England. 
 Castlereagh to return to England. "It is," he 
 says in one written on January 16th, " absolutely 
 " necessary that you should be here as soon as 
 " possible after the meeting of Parliament. This 
 " is the unanimous opinion of all my colleagues 
 " and of those members of the House of Commons 
 " whom we are in the habit of consulting on such 
 " matters." Apparently all interest in the proceed- 
 ings at Vienna had evaporated among the members 
 of the House of Commons. The War over, they 
 had begun to turn their attention to domestic 
 matters. " Very few persons," continued Lord 
 Liverpool, " give themselves any concern with 
 " what is passing at Vienna, except so far as it is 
 " connected with expense ; and I never have seen 
 " more party animosity than was manifested in 
 " November, and I understand still appears at the 
 " Clubs and in private societies." What more 
 striking instance could be found of that rapid change 
 of opinion which is so characteristic of popular 
 assemblies ? Apparently, discussions on the Property 
 Tax, on the Bank Restriction, and on the Corn 
 Laws were expected to come on early in the year. 
 All these questions were of considerable importance, 
 and though Peel had already gained great credit, 
 he and other members of the ministry could not
 
 180 
 
 CASTLEREAGM 
 
 His 
 
 triumphant 
 reception 
 in the 
 House of 
 Commons. 
 
 speak on matters not connected with their depart- 
 ments with the authority of Castlereagh. The 
 rapid diminution of expenditure by the Govern- 
 ment, consequent upon the cessation of hostilities, 
 was already causing discontent. Already, before 
 the Battle of Waterloo had been fought, social 
 questions were fast rising into operation which were 
 destined to cause grave embarrassment and make 
 Lord Liverpool's Government very unpopular in 
 the country. The question of finance, too, was 
 giving the Cabinet much anxiety. The expenses 
 connected with the struggle against Napoleon and 
 with the American War rendered it necessary for 
 what amounted to a war expenditure in time of 
 peace. The landed interest were alarmed at the 
 great " fall in the prices of every description of 
 " grain," while the poorer classes were still suffering 
 from the heavy taxation. To a Government weak 
 in effective debaters, the absence of Castlereagh on 
 the Continent had been seriously felt. Equally 
 necessary was his presence for the purpose of 
 defending the arrangements lately made at Vienna. 
 
 On February 15th, 1815, Castlereagh left Vienna, 
 and after a short stay in Paris returned to England. 
 His arrival at Dover was marked by a striking 
 ovation from the assembled crowd, and on his 
 appearance in the House of Commons the whole 
 House spontaneously rose and celebrated his return 
 with vociferous cheers. Probably on no previous 
 occasion had a minister received such a welcome. 
 His return had been anxiously awaited by his 
 colleagues, who felt unable to defend adequately 
 the domestic and foreign policy of the Government. 
 
 Suddenly, when all pointed to a period of peace,
 
 THE ESCAPE FROM ELBA 181 
 
 the news arrived at Vienna on March 4th that The Escape 
 
 Napoleon had on February 25th escaped from Elba. oi 
 
 On March 8th he effected a landing at Cannes, in f r omElba 
 
 April he arrived in Paris, and before the end of that 
 
 month he was apparently master of all France. Then 
 
 ensued a short but famous period in the history 
 
 of Europe. The Allies had lost no time in declaring 
 
 on March 13th that Napoleon was an outlaw, and 
 
 on March 17th Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and 
 
 Prussia made a treaty binding themselves to keep 
 
 150,000 men in the field till " Bonaparte should 
 
 " have been rendered absolutely incapable of stirring 
 
 " up further troubles." As usual, the Allies looked 
 
 and not in vain to Great Britain for pecuniary aid, 
 
 and the ministry at once promised a contribution 
 
 of five million pounds towards the expenses of the 
 
 enterprise. In so acting the ministry was supported 
 
 by the feeling of the whole country, and the 
 
 Opposition to war in the House of Commons could 
 
 only muster 72 votes against 273 in favour of a 
 
 warlike policy. 
 
 The months of May and June proved an anxious The Battle 
 time for all Europe. " Never was there such a °* 
 " period," writes one who lived through it. To j une l8t h 
 the present generation, which remembers how many 1815. 
 men of ability opposed the Boer War, and earned 
 the name of Little Englanders, it may be interesting 
 to know that even during that critical period which 
 ended at Waterloo there were not a few well-educated 
 men who rejoiced when Napoleon threatened to 
 overthrow the liberties of Europe. Hunt, the 
 Radical, on hearing on May 27th of Napoleon's 
 landing at Cannes, said with glee, " He will soon give 
 " an account of Master Wellington," while Hazlitt
 
 182 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The Allies 
 in Paris. 
 
 was much affected at Napoleon's final overthrow. 
 
 He apparently thought that " Crimes, want of 
 
 ' honour, want of faith, and want of every virtue 
 
 ' on earth, were nothing on the part of an individual 
 
 ' raised from the middle classes to the throne, if they 
 
 ' forwarded the victory of the popular principle." 
 
 Leigh Hunt, however, held the view " that there 
 
 ' was less excuse for Napoleon than for hereditary 
 
 ' princes, because they were educated in hatred 
 
 ' of the very constitutional government they affected 
 
 ' to work for, whilst Napoleon had risen on the 
 
 ' shoulders of revolution, and he was deservedly 
 
 ' punished for his misfortunes." One evening in 
 
 June, while crossing Portman Square, the painter 
 
 Haydon met a messenger from the Foreign Office who 
 
 enquired for Lord Harrowby's house, and offered 
 
 the information that the Duke had beaten Napoleon, 
 
 taken 150 cannon, and was marching on Paris. 1 
 
 After the Battle of Waterloo, the allied armies 
 advanced to Paris. The Prussians distinguished 
 themselves by their outrageous conduct, pillaging 
 and destroying " everything that came within the 
 " reach of their rapacity." " You cannot," writes 
 an eye-witness, " conceive the misery which I have 
 " witnessed, and the insolent wantonness of these 
 ' barbarians." Nevertheless, the same writer allows 
 that considering the past aggressions of the French, 
 one cannot wonder at the conduct of the Prussians, 
 and one must " view it in the light of a just retribu- 
 " tion." On July 7th the Duke of Wellington 
 entered Paris, through which the Prussians marched. 
 On July 8th Louis XVIII returned to Versailles. 
 A grand review was held shortly afterwards, and a 
 1 See Havdon'g " Reminiscences."
 
 AFTER WATERLOO 183 
 
 few days later Lady Castlereagh gave a party, at 
 which many distinguished soldiers and statesmen 
 were present, as well as Ouvaroff , the reputed assassin 
 of the Tsar Paul. Owing to Castlereagh's influence, 
 the rapacity of Bliicher and the Prussians was 
 checked, while it was due to his firm representations 
 that Napoleon was sent to St. Helena. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Congress of Vienna had completed 
 its labours, and Great Britain's maritime supremacy 
 met with no opposition. Her position as the pay- 
 master of Europe had placed her in such a unique 
 relation to the other Great Powers of Europe that 
 the question of the balance of maritime power was 
 somewhat naturally not raised. On all questions 
 vital to Great Britain, or to the balance of power in 
 Europe, Castlereagh's influence had been successful. 
 Great Britain came out of the war in possession of 
 Malta, Ceylon, Cape Colony, Heligoland, Corfu and 
 the other Ionian Islands, and Demerara. 
 
 The Second Peace of Paris, signed on November The Second 
 20th, 1815, restricted France to the boundaries of p^f 
 1790 with certain modifications, arranged for the 
 continued occupation of French territory by the 
 Allies, and also for the payment of a war indemnity 
 by the restored monarchy of Louis XVIII. 
 
 After the long period of Napoleonic conquests, 
 it was impossible to satisfy the expectations of each 
 country or the laudable aspirations of every patriot. 
 Europe required repose, and the settlement effected 
 at Vienna gave her a long period of rest. Much 
 of the work which was ratified at the Congress had 
 been already done by means of separate Treaties 
 between sundry of the Great Powers. At Abo the 
 separation of Norway and Denmark had been decided.
 
 184 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 At Toplitz and Frankfort Austria's possession of 
 Venetia had been agreed upon. 
 
 Nevertheless, there was ample room for the exercise 
 of Castlereagh's tact and statesmanship. He was 
 as firmly convinced as any other European statesman 
 of the necessity of setting up barriers to future French 
 aggressions, whether by the union of Holland and 
 Belgium or by the incorporation of Genoa with 
 Piedmont. He was equally convinced of the 
 necessity of strengthening Frederick William's 
 kingdom by the addition of Rhenish Prussia and a 
 portion of Saxony. Castlereagh's immense influence 
 at the Congress of Vienna had most beneficial results. 
 He was ever a strong supporter of the balance of 
 power, and once Napoleon was overthrown, became 
 an ardent advocate of the preservation of European 
 peace. In spite of revolutionary disturbances and 
 of the Greek struggle for Independence, Europe did 
 not witness for some forty years a war between any 
 of the great Powers who met at the Congress of 
 Vienna. 
 Defence of The various accusations that have been made 
 
 CciStlG- 
 
 reagh's against Castlereagh and the Allied Sovereigns are 
 policy. summed up in the charge that the revolutions of 
 
 1830 in France, Belgium and Poland were due " to 
 " the vicious system adopted at Vienna of parcelling 
 " out the populations of Europe like herds of cattle 
 " among the various royal litigants who claimed 
 " to own them." 1 This accusation is easy to make, 
 it appeals to all those who are ignorant of history 
 and who are captivated by telling phrases. But, 
 
 1 Essays by Robert, Marquess of Salisbury, Biographical, 
 p. 29.
 
 PITT'S VIEWS JUSTIFIED 185 
 
 like the commonplace with mob orators that Magna 
 Carta was the work of an oppressed people, it not only 
 is unhistorical, but is absolutely false. Castlereagh 
 in 1813 and 1814 had to recognize accepted facts. 
 He had to accept the arrangements already agreed 
 upon with regard to Italy and Norway, he had, more 
 especially, to see that by no action of his was the 
 somewhat doubtful allegiance of Austria to the 
 Allied Cause endangered. And there is little doubt 
 that his policy was not only wise, but it was the 
 only one possible under the existing circumstances. 
 In the settlement of Vienna it is interesting to notice 
 that Castlereagh in many respects carried out the 
 views which Pitt had held. From 1799, Pitt, 
 realizing that Austria was unwilling, if not unable, 
 to hold the Belgian lands, decided that they ought 
 on the first opportunity to be united with Holland. 
 From that time till 1814 the British Cabinet firmly 
 held to the project of a Dutch-Belgian union. The 
 fulfilment of this project was one of Castlereagh's 
 chief aims, and he never wavered in his determination 
 to secure for Holland an adequate military frontier 
 on the side of France. With regard to the settlement 
 of Italy, Pitt's forecasts proved equally accurate, 
 and his views were endorsed by Castlereagh. Genoa, 
 in his opinion, must belong to Sardinia, and 
 Castlereagh strongly supported the annexation of 
 the republic to the kingdom. 
 
 In other respects Pitt's forecasts were equally 
 accurate. He foresaw that in Italy, and not in 
 Germany, Austria would seek her compensation ; 
 he approved of the idea that Prussia should strengthen 
 herself in the lands west of the Rhine ; he recognized 
 that Great Britain must maintain her hold upon
 
 186 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. The indepen- 
 dence of Switzerland, the evacuation of Italy and 
 Germany by the French, the strengthening of Prussia 
 and Sardinia, the union of Holland and Belgium — 
 all these objects of Pitt's policy were carried out by 
 Castlereagh. 
 The On the much debated question concerning the 
 
 nationality* rec °g nit J° n of the principle of nationality and of 
 popular aspirations, it can be asserted that while 
 Pitt showed no recognition of their importance, 
 many of Castlereagh's measures prepared the way 
 for their development. The union of Genoa with 
 Sardinia proved a valuable step towards Italian 
 unification, the acquisition by Prussia undoubtedly 
 aided in the growth of German national feeling. 
 But it would be inaccurate to pretend that Castlereagh 
 advocated what is called the rights of nationalities 
 at the Congress of Vienna. The attacks that have 
 been made upon his statesmanship on that ground 
 are now recognized to have been due entirely to 
 ignorance or misconception. The cases of Italy 
 and of Belgium are the ones usually brought forward 
 by the critics of his policy. But the idea of a united 
 Italy was in 1815 completely outside the range of 
 practical politics. Italian Unity was not desired 
 by the Italians themselves, and in 1815 it was 
 impossible to effect. The various races in the 
 Italian Peninsula had not forgotten their ancient 
 feuds, and desired to preserve as far as possible 
 the independence of their several states. This 
 historical fact was at that time and is still unpalatable 
 to poetical idealists and imaginative writers, who 
 are either carried away by an inaccurate knowledge 
 of Italian history, or are under the influence of the
 
 THE SETTLEMENT 187 
 
 " spirit-stirring stanzas " of poets. In 1814, Sicily 
 was opposed to an union with Naples, Lombardy 
 merely desired to be ruled by a resident Austrian 
 Archduke. There was in 1814 no national sentiment 
 in Italy. 
 
 Though in 1830 Belgium broke away from Holland, 
 it is none the less, from the condition of European 
 politics of the present day, much to be regretted 
 that Castlereagh's plan of a Dutch-Belgian Union 
 could not have been rendered lasting by the adoption 
 of a reasonable attitude on the part of the Dutch 
 Government. To the hidebound tyranny of the 
 Stadtholder was due the rupture of an arrangement 
 which is an admirable testimony of Castlereagh's 
 statesmanship.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 England 
 after the 
 conclusion 
 of peace. 
 
 Opposition 
 of the 
 literary 
 class to the 
 Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 AFTER THE FALL OF NAPOLEON 
 1815-1822 
 
 After the conclusion of the Great War in 1815 
 Great Britain entered upon a new period in her 
 history. Just as France was in 1815 very different 
 from what she had been in 1789, so the Great Britain 
 of 1815 was far removed from the Great Britain of 
 1793. France in 1815 had passed through the 
 revolutionary and Napoleonic period, while Great 
 Britain was experiencing the results of that 
 Industrial Revolution which, while transforming 
 her into a manufacturing country, had created a 
 class of capitalists and wealthy merchants. Though 
 Great Britain's prestige had been enormously 
 increased by her efforts during the late War, and 
 though she controlled the carrying trade of the world, 
 she found herself during the first years of peace face 
 to face with discontent and increasing misery at 
 home. A great opportunity was thus given to the 
 able but, as far as politics were concerned, ignorant 
 literary class, to attack and belittle the policy of 
 Castlereagh and his colleagues. 
 
 During the years in which Great Britain was 
 struggling against Napoleon, literary criticism was 
 far from being inactive. In February, 1811, Peter 
 Finnerty, an Irish journalist and editor of a news- 
 paper called The Press, was sentenced to eighteen 
 months' imprisonment in Lincoln prison for certain 
 statements which he had made about Castlereagh. 
 
 188
 
 REACTION 189 
 
 This sentence roused the indignation of the poet 
 Shelley, who was overflowing with philanthropic 
 and radical instincts, and for the benefit of Finnerty 
 he published a poem, the sales of which brought in 
 nearly one hundred pounds. Like many other 
 literary men, Shelley seems to have adopted, even 
 during our life and death struggle with Napoleon, 
 an attitude of hostility to the British Government. 
 Notice has already been taken of the unpatriotic 
 character of a portion of the Press during Wellington's 
 Peninsular Campaign, and of the almost open 
 sympathy which was given by a small section of 
 Englishmen to Napoleon until the latter's downfall 
 at Waterloo. 
 
 No sooner, however, had the European settlement T he . 
 
 RMrt on 
 
 been effected by the Congress of Vienna, and the 
 restoration of the Bourbons finally accomplished, than 
 the literary critics of Castlereagh and the Government 
 found that they not only had the support of the 
 Whigs, but that they also gave expression to the 
 discontent which, owing to economic causes, was 
 inevitable. That discontent, which was social and 
 economic rather than political, naturally levelled 
 its attacks upon the Government, which having 
 triumphantly put down Napoleon, and placed Great 
 Britain in the forefront of European Powers, now 
 found itself violently attacked at home. Its political 
 opponents somewhat naturally took advantage of 
 the social discontent in order to push forward their 
 political schemes. Consequently, till his death 
 Castlereagh, while engaged in the difficult task of 
 conducting the foreign policy of the country, was 
 compelled to support drastic and unpopular measures 
 in order to preserve order at home.
 
 190 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Brougham. Among his political opponents were men of 
 consummate ability. Of those opponents Brougham, 
 that " political Ishmael," was probably the most 
 formidable. Both as a writer in the Edinburgh 
 Review and in Parliament (from 1810 to 1812, and 
 from 1816 onwards) he never ceased attacking the 
 Government or advocating important reforms. His 
 influence, based upon a varied knowledge of all 
 questions connected with foreign, domestic, and 
 Colonial policy was at times considerable. He had 
 attacked with some justification the Orders in Council, 
 he urged the suppression of the Slave trade, he 
 pressed the cause of popular education. In 1816 
 the financial policy of Vansittart, the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer, gave him an opportunity of 
 making a fierce attack upon the character of the 
 Prince Regent, whose extravagance had become 
 a matter of public concern. But, though highly 
 gifted, Brougham was not a great man, and allowed 
 himself too often to be influenced by feelings of 
 envy, hatred, and malice. A " swashbuckler " in 
 debate, he was liable to find his statements and accu- 
 sations refuted, and himself compelled to abandon 
 the position which he had taken up. 
 The Early in the year 1817 Brougham and all opponents 
 
 d « St £ CS R °* °^ ^ ie Government found an opportunity of attacking 
 aggravated the policy of Sidmouth and Castlereagh. The 
 by the harvest of 1816 had failed, and much misery among 
 
 Whigs. ^ e p 0orer c l asS es was caused during the winter of 
 
 1816-1817. In Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and Essex 
 riots broke out in consequence of the agricultural 
 depression. Moreover, the sufferings of many were 
 aggravated by the contracted coinage, and by 
 the reduction of expenditure on the part of the
 
 REPRESSION 191 
 
 Government. This suffering was especially acute in 
 the manufacturing districts. The causes of this state 
 of things were unavoidable, and were essentially 
 economic. But the extreme radicals used the social 
 and economic distress to further their own political 
 designs, and most unfortunately were supported by 
 the Whig party generally. Instead of employing 
 their efforts to alleviate the distress which was very 
 real, the Whigs and Radicals did all in their power 
 to stir up the passions of the mob. While the Whigs 
 demanded an immediate return to cash payments 
 by the Bank of England (though the prospect of 
 this return had caused a panic among the bankers, 
 and was one cause of the increase of the general 
 misery), and a further reduction in expenditure by 
 the Government (though this, too, was another 
 temporary cause of the widespread distress), the 
 Radicals demanded various reforms. But the ex- 
 treme members of the Radical Party went much 
 further, and desired to overthrow the monarchy and 
 to establish a republic. They were led by a man 
 named Hunt, who went about the country making 
 inflammatory speeches and recommending the most 
 violent measures. 
 
 December 2nd, 1816, was fixed upon for a large The 
 meeting of the disaffected at Spitalfields, which repressive 
 was to be followed by a general rising. At twelve l8 c I * - ° 
 o'clock a crowd collected, and under Watson and 
 Thistlewood, two well-known Radical leaders, 
 marched to the Exchange. The Lord Mayor, 
 however, had made preparations, the leaders were 
 arrested and the mob dispersed. At one o'clock 
 Hunt had arrived at Spa Fields and addressed a 
 meeting, which was, however, adjourned to " the
 
 192 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh *s 
 defence 
 of the 
 repressive 
 Acts. 
 
 " second Monday after the meeting of Parliament, 
 " viz., February 10th." His object was to secure 
 the adoption of his demands, and for that pur- 
 pose numerous secret societies were formed at or 
 near " Leicester, Loughborough, Nottingham, Mans- 
 " field, Derby, Chesterfield, Sheffield, Blackburn, 
 " Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow." Owing 
 to the general unrest which was apparent in many 
 parts of the country, considerable alarm was felt 
 by the well-to-do classes at the beginning of the year 
 1817. That alarm was increased when on January 
 28th, 1817, the Prince Regent was attacked on his 
 return from opening Parliament, and the windows 
 of his carriage broken by stones. Parliamentary 
 Committees were at once appointed to consider the 
 situation and the truth of the contention that a 
 " secret and widespread conspiracy existed in the 
 country " which had for its object the overthrow of 
 the Government. The report of these Committees 
 which declared that secret societies " are spreading 
 " in some parts of the country to every village," made 
 it evident that vigorous measures were necessary 
 in order to check the growth of sedition. The 
 ministry, fortified by this report, determined to take 
 immediate action, and were perfectly justified in 
 doing so, It is difficult to understand on what 
 ground Whig writers of a later generation have 
 persisted in declaring that the estimate of the 
 situation held by those best qualified to know was 
 an entirely wrong one. 
 
 The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and 
 four other measures, which had for their object the 
 prevention of disorder, were brought forward on 
 February 24th, 1817. They were vigorously attacked
 
 ITS NECESSITY 193 
 
 in Parliament, and Castlereagh was called upon to 
 
 defend the action of the Government. '' It is peculiarly 
 
 painful to me," he said at the beginning of his speech, 
 
 " to find that after having passed through all the 
 
 " dangers and pressure of War, it has become necessary 
 
 " notwithstanding the return of peace abroad, to 
 
 " require the adoption of proceedings that might 
 
 "ensure the continuance of tranquillity at home." 
 
 He then expressed his regret and surprise that the 
 
 close of the French revolutionary period, and the 
 
 restoration of peace should have been followed by 
 
 sedition and riot in England. " I had fondly hoped," 
 
 he continued, " that after the dreadful record of 
 
 ' the sufferings of mankind which the French 
 
 " Revolution had afforded — after the proof which 
 
 ' the annals of the last twenty-five years had 
 
 ' presented, that those who engaged in such hazardous 
 
 " enterprises brought not only destruction on their 
 
 " own heads, but ruin on their country — it would 
 
 " be impossible to find any individual so dead to all 
 
 " feeling of private and public duty as to attempt 
 
 " to lead others on to similar undertakings." He 
 
 then consoled his hearers by declaring that if a 
 
 treasonable spirit exists it was confined to the lower 
 
 and less educated orders of society, and assured 
 
 them that effective measures would at once be taken 
 
 to stamp out the evil. At the same time he did not 
 
 under-rate the influence of the doctrines of the Radical 
 
 and other Societies. " Some of the doctrines, he 
 
 " went on to say, " now taught with so much 
 
 " diligence by the leaders of the movement are so 
 
 " absurd that with men of education and intelligence 
 
 :< they need no refutation. The doctrines of the 
 
 " Luddites, the Spenceans, the Philanthropists, the 
 
 13— (221 1)
 
 194 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 ' Hampden Clubs, which recommend an equal 
 ' division of property, may safely be left with such 
 ' classes to work out their own cure. But it is 
 ' otherwise with the uninformed, ignorant multitude 
 ' to whom they are addressed. With them they 
 ' are only the more attractive, that, like fairy tales, 
 ' they are new, and propose the establishment 
 ' of a state of society in which novelty forms the 
 'basis, but hope gilds the superstructure." 1 He 
 then described to the House the nature of the report 
 on which the bills which were about to be proposed 
 were based. That report was the work of a secret 
 Committee composed of men of all classes and parties, 
 and was unanimous. Castlereagh and the ministry, 
 were, therefore, not only justified but compelled to 
 take action. The report revealed " the existence of a 
 " conspiracy, having for its object not only the 
 " subversion of the Government, but," as Castlereagh 
 declared, " the destruction of every moral and social 
 " principle." The conspirators undoubtedly intended 
 to take immediate action, and the execution of their 
 projects was only prevented by the energetic action 
 of the Government. He then described the real 
 character of the Societies whose fine names — 
 Spencean Club, Union Club, Hampden Club — did 
 not prevent their members from aiming at the 
 destruction of what they termed the privileged orders. 
 In spite of the opposition of the Whigs and Radicals, 
 headed by Burdett, Ponsonby, and Brougham, bills 
 for giving the magistrates extraordinary powers, 
 together with a motion for the suspension of the 
 Habeas Corpus Act, were passed by large majorities. 
 
 1 Alison : " Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles 
 Stewart," vol. Ill, pp. 39-44.
 
 DISCONTENT 
 
 195 
 
 No impartial reader can doubt that the Government 
 was fully justified in taking these precautionary 
 measures. Though the march of the Blanketeers 
 from Manchester to London proved a fiasco, a large 
 district in the centre of England was for some weeks 
 terrorised by a gang who expected support in London 
 and elsewhere. Under these circumstances Sidmouth 
 had no other course open to him but to renew the 
 suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act at the beginning 
 of July. Whether his circular authorizing magis- 
 trates to apprehend persons charged on oath with 
 seditious libel was wise is more questionable. 
 
 For Castlereagh, personally, the year 1817 was 
 noteworthy owing to the attack made upon him in 
 Parliament by Brougham. On July 11th, Brougham 
 accused Castlereagh of being responsible for various 
 acts of cruelty in connexion with the rebellion of 
 1798 in Ireland. Brougham was supported by 
 Burdett and Mr. Grey Bennet, whose speech reflected 
 the narrow and bitter views of many of those 
 composing the Opposition. Castlereagh had no 
 difficulty in overthrowing the feeble arguments and 
 inaccurate statements of his opponents, and was 
 supported by Canning, whose powerful speech was 
 received with much applause. In later days, 
 Brougham, when writing his sketch of Castlereagh, 
 declared that " far from taking part in these atrocities 
 " he uniformly and strenuously set his face against 
 " them." Before the year closed, the death of the 
 Princess Charlotte took place. Her death on 
 November 6th has been termed the chief historical 
 event in 1817, and caused profound grief to the 
 nation. 
 
 From the beginning of 1818 may be dated the 
 
 Brough- 
 am's 
 
 attack on 
 Castle- 
 reagh 's 
 Irish 
 
 administra- 
 tion, July, 
 1817. 
 
 The year 
 1818.
 
 196 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 period of Castlereagh's extreme unpopularity. He 
 had never been a popular minister, though his 
 successful policy during the later years of Napoleon's 
 career had extorted a grudging recognition on the 
 part of many of his political opponents. But after 
 the close of the Great War, it became necessary to 
 adopt drastic measures in order to preserve order 
 in the country, and from that year to the present 
 time it became the fashion with historians — with 
 few exceptions — to belittle the immense services 
 which he had rendered to the country. The year 
 1818, indeed, opened with signs of improvement in 
 the economic condition of the country. In January 
 the Cabinet was strengthened by the admission of 
 Frederick John Robinson, afterwards Lord Goderich, 
 who was President of the Board of Trade and 
 Treasurer of the Navy. Already the importance of 
 finance had been recognized by the Government. In 
 1817 Castlereagh had secured the extension of the 
 restriction on cash payments with very advantageous 
 results to British industry. On May 1st, 1818, a 
 bill was introduced for continuing beyond July 5th, 
 1818, the suspension of cash payments by the Bank 
 of England. This measure was indispensable, and 
 was strongly supported by Castlereagh and the 
 Tory party. But though the bill was conceived in 
 the interests of the people, and was brought in with 
 the object of preventing a return of the distress of 
 1816, it was fiercely opposed by the Whigs, and only 
 carried after a long debate by a majority of 65. 
 The In spite, however, of the paramount importance 
 
 of a peterk>o. °* financial considerations, the year 1819 proved 
 1819. chiefly noteworthy on account of the so-called 
 
 " Manchester or Peterloo Massacre," which took
 
 THE MANCHESTER MASSACRE 197 
 
 place on August 16th, at a suburb of Manchester 
 known as Peter's Fields. The country had continued 
 in a state of political ferment owing to the efforts 
 of several men of extreme views, who received 
 encouragement from certain leading men of the 
 old Whig families. The mischief caused by this 
 encouragement was great, and while the more 
 moderate aimed at radical changes in the representa- 
 tion, the ignorant masses were led to support the 
 revolutionary doctrines of the extreme Radicals 
 who desired to overthrow the Government by force. 
 Violent language had been used at reform meetings 
 in Stafford, Birmingham, Leeds and other places, 
 and extensive drilling of the people had taken place. 
 The meeting in Peter's Fields, where some 50,000 or 
 60,000 people had assembled, was charged by some 
 yeomanry and troops, several persons were killed 
 and wounded, Hunt was arrested, and the meeting 
 was dispersed. 
 
 Parliament met in November, while public opinion 
 was still excited over the massacre of Peterloo. The 
 Government, which had approved of the action of 
 the Manchester magistrates, was in a strong position. 
 Many of the Whigs who were not in sympathy with 
 the views and actions of Hunt and his followers 
 supported the ministerial attitude. " The Radicals," 
 Brougham had written to Lord Grey on October 
 24th, " have made themselves so odious that a 
 " number of their own way of thinking would be 
 " well enough pleased to see them and their vile 
 " press put down at all hazards." 
 
 On November 23rd the speech from the throne The speech 
 admitted the existence of deep distress all over the *T°™ the 
 country, and emphasized the necessity of curbing n v., 1819.
 
 198 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Castle- 
 reagh's 
 speech 
 proposing 
 
 the prevalent seditious spirit. While the depression 
 was deplored, the speech contained the assertion 
 that " the seditious practices, so long prevalent in 
 " different parts of the manufacturing districts of 
 " the country, have been continued with increased 
 " activity." Mention was then made of the depres- 
 sion which still continued in certain branches of 
 manufactures, and of the consequent distress. But 
 the most noteworthy portion of the speech related 
 to " the proceedings incompatible with the public 
 " tranquillity and with the peaceful habits of the 
 " industrious classes of the community," and to 
 the existence of a spirit inconsistent with the political 
 institutions of Great Britain. 
 
 An amendment to the Address was proposed by 
 Tierney, who, supported by a number of members 
 of the Opposition, declared that " the resort to 
 " military force in the absence of any riotous, overt 
 " acts, was an unwarrantable and dangerous inter- 
 ' ference with the right of public meeting." In 
 defence of the Government, Canning made a brilliant 
 oration, while on November 29th Castlereagh in 
 
 the Six Acts a vigorous speech upheld the ministerial policy as 
 i8iq 29th ' re P resente d by the Six Acts. It is quite evident 
 that the Cabinet considered the crisis to be serious 
 and one which required to be dealt with by Parlia- 
 ment in a strenuous manner. He stated that the 
 danger had assumed a tangible and pressing form. 
 Disaffection, he asserted, was proved to exist in 
 Lancashire, in Cheshire, and in Somerset, and he 
 insisted that the working classes were being deluded 
 by specious arguments, with tha result that a state 
 of things bordering on rebellion existed in several 
 of the manufacturing districts, With regard to
 
 THE SIX ACTS 199 
 
 the prohibition of military training by large bodies 
 of men, Castlereagh demonstrated the necessity 
 of that prohibition. He declared that Thistlewood 
 — afterwards so notorious — was boasting that there 
 was no law to prevent the assemblage of 100,000 or 
 of even 1,000,000 men, and that in some manufactur- 
 ing districts 60,000 or 80,000 men could be assembled 
 in a few hours. To meet this organization of the 
 Radicals, the Six Acts were proposed, by which the 
 assembling of large multitudes would be prevented 
 and other measures taken for the protection of 
 Society. 
 
 The large majorities by which the Six Acts were The 
 passed showed that the nation as a whole regarded Six Acts 
 them as necessary, and called for by the circum- ^ essary 
 stances of the time. " One of the Acts, the Training acceptable 
 " Prevention Bill," says Sir Theodore Martin in his t0 * he 
 Life of Lord Lyndhurst (p. 162), "has retained its 
 " place on the Statute Book, and another, the 
 " Misdemeanours Bill, is admitted by Mr. Walpole 
 " (History of England, vol. 1, p. 518) to have been 
 " in its ultimate shape a beneficial reform." With 
 " the other four, which were directed against 
 " blasphemous and seditious libels, incendiary 
 " political journals, seditious meetings, and the 
 " acquisition of arms for seditious purposes, modern 
 " legislation has found itself able to dispense in 
 " Great Britain because of the wholesome changes 
 " in the state of the press and of public feeling." 
 Even Brougham declared that the proceedings of 
 the Radicals were " bad enough to make reflecting 
 " men consider that the time was come for taking 
 " some steps in support of order." And in spite of 
 the inaccurate statements of later Whig writers.
 
 200 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The view 
 of a French 
 writer. 
 
 The return 
 to cash 
 payments, 
 1819. 
 
 there is no doubt whatever that the Acts were 
 approved by " the general verdict of the public 
 " opinion of the day." 
 
 The passing of the Six Acts roused a storm of 
 indignation among the opponents of the Government. 
 Of the literary men, Byron, Shelley and Moore 
 distinguished themselves by the bitterness of their 
 vituperations. A French writer's sarcastic remarks, 
 quoted by Lady Londonderry in her interesting 
 sketch of the life of Castlereagh, with regard 
 to the value of the criticisms of Byron, Shelley, 
 Moore and other literary celebrities, is worth 
 reproducing : " Fallait il laisser p'erir I'Angleterre 
 pour plaire aux poetes. Fallait il seconder les desseins 
 des bruleurs de metiers et des voleurs de maisons ? 
 Lord Castlereagh ne fit que son devoir d'homme d'etat ; 
 il sauve la societe, et que veul on de plus ? Au peril 
 meme de sa renommee ; immense sacrifice de ceux qui 
 se vouent aux idees d'ordre au milieu du desordre." 1 
 
 The necessity of the Six Acts was undoubted, and 
 even if there was no proof as to the objects and 
 designs of the malcontents, there was no dispute 
 about the fact of military training. The Six Acts 
 were therefore necessary and justifiable, and proved 
 successful. But they were very unpopular among 
 the disaffected classes, and were the immediate 
 cause of Thistlewood's plot against the Cabinet, 
 of which the most unpopular members were Sidmouth 
 and Castlereagh. 
 
 Before, however, that series of measures which 
 led to the Cato Street Conspiracy was passed, 
 Castlereagh had been forced to witness the return 
 
 1 The Marchioness of Londonderry : " Robert Stewart, 
 Viscount Castlereagh," p. 60.
 
 RESTORATION OF CASH PAYMENTS 201 
 
 to cash payments, followed, as he anticipated, by 
 a commercial crisis. In February, 1818, a Com- 
 mittee, with Robert Peel as Chairman, was 
 appointed to inquire into the effect of the Bank 
 Restrictions Act, and in its report it recommended 
 a resumption of cash payments. In spite of the 
 opposition of the bankers of London and Bristol 
 to this recommendation, Castlereagh received little 
 support in the House of Commons, and the resump- 
 tion of cash payments took place. A rapid increase 
 in general distress followed at once. " The industry 
 of the nation was speedily congealed, as a flowing 
 stream by the severity of an arctic winter." The 
 3 per cents, fell from 79 in January, 1819, to 65 in 
 December, and the number of bankruptcies in 
 England in 1819 was 531 in excess of those in 1818. 
 To meet the financial distress, Castlereagh supported 
 Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in bringing 
 forward resolutions in favour of a Sinking Fund 
 which were supported by a large majority. 
 
 In an able speech on behalf of Vansittart's finance Castle- 
 resolutions, Castlereagh declared that the object reagh's 
 of the Government was to establish and confirm v a ™iu ° 
 Pitt's plan of a sinking fund. In his opinion the tart's 
 country ought to make some effort to enable it to proposals. 
 *meet the burdens of a new war, should such a 
 " calamity visit it." The ministry, he asserted, 
 claimed to be armed to meet the difficulties and 
 dangers of the State, and— this sentence was received 
 with great applause — " if we are not to be entrusted 
 " with them [full powers] we are willing to resign to 
 " more favoured, perhaps more able, but not more 
 " zealous champions." The proposals were carried 
 by a majority of 197.
 
 202 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The Cato The opening of 1820 was marked by the discovery 
 Street > f the famous Cato Street Conspiracy, at the head 
 
 i82o. PiraCy ' °* which figured the same Arthur Thistlewood whose 
 non-conviction in 1817 had been due to the skill and 
 eloquence of Copley. Since that time the incorrigible 
 Thistlewood had suffered a year's imprisonment for 
 sending a challenge to Lord Sidmouth. On his 
 release he arranged a plot which had for its object 
 the assassination of all the members of the Cabinet. 
 The conspirators finally determined to carry out 
 their project on February 23rd, 1820, on which 
 night all the ministers were to dine at the house of 
 Harrowby, President of the Council, in Grosvenor 
 Square. It was arranged that after all the ministers 
 had been assassinated, the heads of Sidmouth and 
 Castlereagh should be carried away as trophies. 
 The cavalry barracks were then to be set on fire, and 
 the Bank of England and the Tower stormed. The 
 discovery of the plot and the punishment of the 
 chief conspirators proved a death-blow to attempts 
 at anarchy and insurrection, and from that time 
 reformers relied upon political agitation for the 
 furtherance of their political objects. 
 
 In a letter to Lord Stewart at Vienna, Castlereagh 
 gives a very interesting and minute description of 
 the plans of Thistlewood and his fellow conspirators. 
 " Had our information," he wrote, " not been such 
 "as to enable us to watch all their movements, and 
 " to interfere when we deemed fit, the fifteen Cabinet 
 " Ministers would have been murdered yesterday in 
 " Harrowby 's dining parlour. Thistlewood, amongst 
 " this party of assassins when assembled, had 
 " fourteen picked men, all ripe for slaughter. They 
 " would have moved to the attack in ten minutes
 
 CATO STREET CONSPIRACY 203 
 
 " had not the police arrived." After describing the 
 arrest of Thistlewood and his associates, Castlereagh 
 continues, " The whole had been arranged without 
 " a fault, and if you consider that we ministers have 
 " been for months the deliberate objects of their 
 " desperate concerts, planning our destruction, 
 " sometimes collectively, sometimes in detail, but 
 " always intent upon the project, and with our 
 " complete knowledge, you will allow that we are 
 " tolerably cool troops." 
 
 If the Cato Street Conspiracy was not sufficient Riots in 
 vindication of the policy of the ministry in passing Scotland, 
 the Six Acts, the events which occurred in Scotland 
 were an ample justification for a precautionary 
 policy. On April 2nd, a riotous mob near Glasgow 
 was dispersed by the military in what was called 
 the " Battle of Bonnymuir." The policy of the 
 Government had now triumphed, and the policy 
 of the Radicals had failed. Order was restored, 
 secret conspiracies ceased, and the middle classes 
 after a short interval took up in a constitutional 
 manner the cause of parliamentary reform. 
 
 For some months, however, England was agitated The 
 by the proceedings connected with Queen Caroline. Q u . e ^ n | 
 The accession of George IV in January, 1820, had 
 been at once followed by a claim of the Queen to 
 enjoy the status and privileges of royalty. Brougham, 
 as the confidential adviser of the Queen, had been 
 charged with the duty of proposing certain very 
 advantageous terms to her, as an inducement to her 
 to remain on the Continent. Had she been informed 
 of these terms, it is very probable that she would 
 not have returned to England. But Brougham, 
 anxious to increase his own importance, and secure
 
 204 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 all the eclat attaching to the Royal cause celebre, 
 never informed the unfortunate Queen of the 
 proffered terms. The Queen, therefore, returned 
 to England from the Continent, and her return 
 rendered inevitable the famous Bill of Pains and 
 Penalties which the ministry introduced, and with 
 regard to which Castlereagh was much consulted by 
 the King. That Bill was brought forward in August 
 and dropped in November. At first the Queen was 
 " extensively popular with the multitude," while the 
 Whigs rejoiced in the opportunity which was now 
 given them of revenging themselves on the King 
 for their disappointment at the beginning of 1812, 
 and, at the same time of regaining with the masses 
 their popularity, which had latterly become much 
 diminished. The debates on the Divorce Bill had 
 given Brougham an opportunity, of which he fully 
 availed himself, of dealing a severe blow at the 
 Government, which had become very unpopular. 
 After her triumph, when the Bill was withdrawn, 
 the popularity of the Queen, as Eldon had prophesied, 
 rapidly decreased, and at the time of the King's 
 Coronation had almost disappeared. 
 The Under the existing circumstances, however, the 
 
 Coronation Coronation of George IV in July, 1821, roused much 
 p attention. Owing to the strong feeling in many 
 
 1 82 1. ' quarters that the Queen ought to be allowed to take 
 her share in the ceremonial, it was deemed necessary 
 by Lord Sidmouth to collect some 8,000 troops, 
 which were stationed in Palace Yard and in various 
 positions near the Abbey. The attempt of the 
 Queen to force her way into the Abbey by the south- 
 western door and her repulse by the doorkeeper are 
 well-known incidents in the history of George IV's
 
 IN IRELAND 205 
 
 Coronation. In the Reminiscences of Lord Teign- 
 mouth is a description of Castlereagh (Londonderry) 
 on his way to the Banqueting Hall, among peers, 
 ambassadors, and other notables. " His noble 
 " presence and dignified but easy bearing . . . setoff 
 " by the magnificent robes of the Garter, marked out 
 " Lord Londonderry as the ' bright particular star ' 
 " of that brilliant galaxy." 
 
 The Queen's death on August 7th provoked no 
 widespread feeling of regret. It, however, removed 
 from the path of the ministry a difficulty which the 
 Opposition had hoped would prove insurmountable. 
 Beyond the loss of the services of Canning, who 
 owing to his past friendly relations with the Queen, 
 considered that he ought no longer to remain 
 a member of the administration, the ministry 
 suffered no loss of strength. All that was now 
 wanting to the " full measure of Castlereagh's 
 " prosperity was reconciliation with his native 
 Ireland." 
 
 In the autumn of 1821 Castlereagh, and shortly Castle- 
 afterwards George IV, visited Dublin. His father r ? a £ h ' s 
 had died at Mount Stewart on April 8th at the age Dublin, 
 of eighty-two, and Castlereagh succeeded him as 
 second Marquis of Londonderry. Both King and 
 Minister were received with the greatest enthusiasm. 
 In a letter to his wife, dated August, 1821, Castlereagh 
 declares that the visit to Ireland had " been without 
 " alloy — everything perfect. I have not seen a 
 " drunken man in the streets — I have not heard an 
 " unkind word drop from a single individual, and yet 
 " I have mixed unsparingly with the people ; and the 
 " effect is not less strong in the remote parts of 
 " Ireland, where every village has been illuminated for
 
 206 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 " the King's arrival." Castlereagh and Sidmouth 
 were the two Cabinet Ministers in attendance on the 
 King, while Lord Talbot was the Lord Lieutenant. 
 But the festivities which had been prepared had to be 
 considerably curtailed owing to the Queen's death 
 on August 7th, the announcement of which reached 
 the King at Beaudesert, Lord Anglesey's residence 
 in Anglesea, on his way to Ireland. The reception 
 which Castlereagh received on his return to his old 
 quarters after an absence of twenty years was very 
 gratifying. Their attitude resembled that which 
 Grattan had recommended his son to adopt towards 
 Castlereagh. " If you get into the House of Commons," 
 he said, " I must beg you not to attack Lord 
 " Castlereagh. The Union is past, the business 
 " between him and me is over, and it is for the 
 " interest of Ireland that Lord Castlereagh should be 
 " a minister. I must beg you again not to attack 
 " him, unless he attacks you, and make it my dying 
 " request." The crowd evidently realized that 
 Castlereagh, like Grattan, loved Ireland, and hence 
 the cordial greeting which he received while he was 
 at the Castle. There he met Alexander Knox, 
 whom he had not seen for twenty-two years. For 
 two hours they conversed. In 181 1 Castlereagh had 
 written to Knox urging him to write a history which 
 should " dispel the unwholesome mists that over- 
 " hung the Union. . . . The demons of the present 
 " day are at work to make those who carried the 
 " Union odious, as, first, having cruelly oppressed, 
 " and then sold their country. The world's 
 " forgetfulness of the events which are a few years 
 "gone by, enables them to mislead numbers." In 
 1811, however, Knox was in bad health, and "the
 
 IN HANOVER 207 
 
 " Rebellion of 1798 thus lost its best chance of 
 " finding an efficient historian." • ■ ■ 
 
 From the time of his return from Ireland, to his The last 
 death in the following August, Castlereagh's attention J. ear of his 
 was chiefly occupied with foreign affairs. In the 
 autumn of 1821 he visited Hanover. The political 
 situation was by no means assured. In western 
 Europe the danger of popular risings alarmed the 
 members of the Holy Alliance, while in the East the 
 opposition of the Greeks to the Turkish rule threatened 
 new complications. Owing to his resolute policy 
 England was tranquil, the attempts to stir up Jacob- 
 inism had been crushed, anarchy had been checked. 
 He had during the anxious years which followed the 
 fall of Napoleon adopted a resolute policy at home. 
 His attitude towards the Great Powers with regard 
 to the European Question was none the less 
 independent and resolute.
 
 The 
 reaction. 
 
 The Tsar 
 
 Alexander 
 
 I. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 castlereagh's foreign policy after 1815 
 
 The downfall of Napoleon after Waterloo was 
 followed by the triumph of reactionary views in all 
 the States of Europe. To many this result of a 
 long period of revolutionary movements came as a 
 bitter disappointment. Some enthusiasts had hoped 
 that the liberation of Europe from the domination 
 of France would be signalized by the abolition of 
 armies and by the return to the Golden Age. Under 
 these new conditions Europe would be governed by 
 a Central Constitution, and would form a sort of 
 Christian republic. To such theorists the actual 
 results of the overthrow of Napoleon came as a cruel 
 shock. The Allies were convinced that France 
 must be prevented from ever endangering the peace 
 of Europe by her own unaided efforts, and that in 
 order to carry this intention into effect, Russia, 
 Austria, Prussia and Great Britain should, as 
 representing United Europe, form a close union. 
 
 The victory at Waterloo had removed all immediate 
 danger from France, but the downfall of Napoleon 
 gave an opportunity for Alexander of Russia to 
 dominate the Councils of Europe. His influence 
 was at once realized, when on September 26th, 1815, 
 he announced his scheme of the Holy Alliance, which, 
 according to its author, was designed " to give a 
 " lofty satisfaction to Divine Providence," but which 
 according to Metternich, was a " loud sounding 
 " nothing." Alexander, who was at that time 
 
 208
 
 THE TREATIES OF PARIS 209 
 
 influenced by the Evangelical revival, which had 
 made some way on the Continent, honestly believed 
 in his power of introducing Christian principles into 
 the conduct of all public relations. To Castlereagh 
 the manifesto of Alexander was merely " a piece of 
 " sublime mysticism and nonsense," and he was 
 saved from the necessity of giving it his signature 
 by the action of the Prince Regent, who as a 
 Sovereign Prince, but not as " the mouthpiece of 
 " the responsible Government in power," wrote a 
 letter expressing his individual agreement with the 
 principles laid down in the manifesto. 
 
 To Castlereagh, and to all European statesmen, The 
 the two treaties signed at Paris on November 20th, Treaties of 
 1815, had far greater political importance. Of these, ans * 
 one dealt with the situation in France. The reception 
 given to Napoleon on his escape from Elba had 
 naturally aroused a feeling of deep distrust of the 
 French people in the minds of the Allied Powers, 
 who decided by the first Treaty that a Committee 
 of their ministers should be established in Paris, 
 partly in order to watch events in France, partly 
 to tender advice to the French Government. The 
 second Treaty aimed at consolidating the alliance 
 between the four Sovereigns, who should meet at 
 fixed intervals to consider such measures as "at 
 " each one of these epochs shall be judged most 
 " salutary for the peace and prosperity of the nations 
 " and for the prosperity of Europe." 
 
 Alexander of Russia undoubtedly desired that he Castle- 
 and his allies should continue indefinitely to regulate reagh's 
 and interfere in the internal affairs of France, of those oi 
 which country he entertained a deep distrust. To Alexander. 
 Castlereagh such a policy was most undesirable. 
 14 — (2211)
 
 210 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Though fully aware of the immense value of the 
 work already done by the Concert of the Powers, 
 he was strongly averse to any unnecessary interference 
 in the internal affairs of France. Like most English 
 politicians, he steadily opposed the view held by 
 Alexander that the Allied Powers should pose as 
 " umpires in the constitutional struggles " which 
 might arise in France. Should any action of the 
 French people seem to endanger the peace of Europe, 
 then, and not till then, should the Great Powers 
 consider the question of interfering. Not that 
 Castlereagh objected in 1815 to a system of European 
 Congresses. The late events had, in his opinion, 
 proved conclusively the value of the existence of 
 close and friendly relations between the Great 
 Powers. To preserve those friendly relations and 
 to maintain peace in Europe, no better arrangement, 
 in his opinion, could be devised than a system of 
 meetings between the representatives of the Allied 
 Sovereigns. Events in France justified Castlereagh's 
 opposition to a strong and undisguised interference 
 on the part of the Allied Sovereigns in the affairs 
 of France, and to their posing as " umpires in the 
 constitutional struggles " of that monarchy. In 
 the autumn of 1816, the " Chambre introuvable " 
 was dissolved, and in the ensuing elections the 
 moderate royalists had an overwhelming majority. 
 From that time France entered upon a period of 
 prosperity, and the distrust of the French people 
 which had hitherto been felt by the Allied Sovereigns, 
 began steadily to disappear. Till 1820 the influence 
 of the Constitutional Party, i.e., of the upper middle 
 class, was supreme in France, and a period of quiet 
 re-organization was entered upon. On October 9th,
 
 ALEXANDER'S VIEWS 211 
 
 1818, the Allies, satisfied that France no longer 
 constituted a danger to Europe, decided upon the 
 evacuation of that country. At the Congress of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, which had met on October 1st, 1818, 
 France was represented by the Due de Richelieu, 
 though on the question whether France should be 
 formally admitted to the Grand Alliance, there was 
 a marked difference of opinion. Castlereagh, 
 though he naturally recognized that the formation 
 of the Grand Alliance was due to a mistrust which 
 he himself felt of the French people, was on the whole 
 in favour of the admission of France on equal terms 
 to the European Concert. But the other represen- 
 tatives of the Quadruple Alliance were opposed to 
 the inclusion of France in that Alliance, and the 
 Congress was destined to mark, " the highest point 
 " reached in the dictatorship of the Concert of the 
 " Powers." The Tsar, at the opening of the Congress, 
 produced an idealistic scheme which was in some 
 respects a return to the principles of the Holy 
 Alliance. Alexander wished to combat not only 
 revolutionary agitation, but also the action of those 
 governments which " persevere in their old arbitrari- 
 " ness in internal administration, and partial 
 " alliances in external relations." He wished the 
 Quadruple Alliance to be developed into ' the 
 " alliance of all the States." This general alliance 
 would guarantee legitimate sovereignty and the 
 territorial status quo. By this means a permanent 
 peace would be established, revolution would be 
 checked, the stability of all European States would 
 be secured, and the " liberties of the peoples wisely 
 " regulated " would gradually be developed. In spite 
 of the Tsar's honest desire to unite " all nations in
 
 212 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Influence 
 of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 
 " the tie of brotherhood," the scheme was regarded 
 with distrust by Metternich and with undisguised 
 opposition by the British Cabinet. Castlereagh 
 only expressed the opinion of Canning and the rest of 
 his colleagues when he declared his inability to 
 support " an international organization established 
 "on a principle vague in itself, and capable of 
 " indefinite expansion." 
 
 The instructions on which Castlereagh acted 
 proved an absolute bar to an acceptance of 
 Alexander's proposals, and though Castlereagh 
 recognized the Tsar's sincerity and his anxiety to 
 act according to " the purified morale of the Gospel," 
 he found himself compelled to sweep aside the 
 abstractions which filled Alexander's mind and to 
 express the views of the British Cabinet in clear, 
 if in somewhat ironical, language. " The benign 
 " principles of the Alliance of the 26th of September, 
 " 1815, maybe considered," he wrote, " as constitut- 
 " ing the European System in the matter of political 
 " conscience. It would, however, be derogating 
 " to this solemn act of the sovereigns to mix its 
 " discussions with the ordinary diplomatic obliga- 
 " tions which bind State to State, and which are 
 "to be looked for alone in the treaties which have 
 " been concluded in the accustomed form." 
 
 The results of this declaration of the British 
 Government were that (1) On November 15th, 1818, 
 the Quadruple Alliance was secretly renewed ; and 
 (2) A Treaty, which was joined by France, was 
 drawn up, declaring the intention of the Great Powers 
 to preserve peace and to respect treaties. * 
 
 Thus ended all hope of the Tsar's idealistic 
 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," vol. X, p. 17.
 
 THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 213 
 
 schemes being acted upon, and a decided check was 
 given to the principle of intervention in the affairs 
 of those States of Europe which might act in a way 
 not agreeable to the views of the sovereigns of 
 Russia, Prussia, and Austria. It was henceforward 
 impossible " to provide the transparent soul of the 
 " Holy Alliance with a body." The influence of 
 Great Britain, aided by Spain, was also successful 
 in defeating a project for enforcing the views of 
 the autocratic sovereigns of Europe upon the 
 Spanish Colonies in South America. But owing to 
 the jealousy of the British sea power, no effort was 
 made by the European States to suppress the slave 
 trade, and at the same time, mainly owing to Great 
 Britain's opposition to any plan involving the 
 establishment of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, 
 no steps were taken to suppress the Barbary pirates. 
 The close of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle marks 
 an epoch in the history of Europe. From that time 
 Alexander's plan of governing Europe by Congresses 
 was gradually recognized to have failed. Its failure 
 was due in great measure to the attitude of Great 
 Britain and to the firmness of Castlereagh. Though 
 Wellington and Canning accompanied Castlereagh 
 to Aix-la-Chapelle, the policy of non-intervention 
 originated with Castlereagh, though it took a bolder 
 form later on under the influence of Canning. But 
 Castlereagh, during the period from the Battle of 
 Waterloo to his death, realized the necessity of 
 preserving good relations with the Great Powers. 
 Though he steadily refused to allow Great Britain 
 to recognize the Holy Alliance or to adopt generally 
 the views of Alexander, Metternich, and the King 
 of Prussia, he kept on good terms with the sovereigns
 
 214 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 European 
 events 
 after the 
 Congress of 
 Aix-la- 
 Chapelle. 
 
 The 
 
 murder of 
 Kotzebue 
 and the 
 Carlsbad 
 decrees. 
 
 and their ministers. After the Congress of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, we find Castlereagh writing to the Tsar 
 (by the latter's wish), and telling him very plainly 
 his views with regard to Russia's true policy towards 
 Turkey. He was equally intimate with Metternich 
 and Hardenberg, but his friendship with them was 
 quite compatible with the expression of dissatisfac- 
 tion at their attitude with regard to a system of 
 intervention. 
 
 Castlereagh's views on foreign affairs, and his 
 independence of character, are further illustrated by 
 the events on the Continent between the Congress of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle and his death. For a time it 
 seemed that there was some justification for 
 Metternich's consistent opposition to liberal views 
 and popular tendencies. England was the scene of 
 reactionary measures necessitated by the discontent 
 of the lower orders ; in France the progress of liberal 
 agitation, and of the forces of liberalism compelled 
 Louis XVIII to adopt a reactionary policy, and 
 when the Due de Berri was murdered on February 
 13th, 1820, to restrict the freedom of the Press, and 
 by means of an electoral law to secure for the 
 Government a majority in the Chamber. Richelieu, 
 who had succeeded Decazes in 1820 as head of the 
 Ministry, gave way in 1821 to the reactionary, Villele, 
 and at last France could take her place among the 
 conservative Powers of Central Europe. 
 
 Meanwhile, the murder of Kotzebue, a poet, 
 pamphleteer and sympathizer with the Tsar's 
 monarchical views, on March 23rd, 1819, seemed 
 to justify Metternich's desire for a repressive policy in 
 Germany, and on September 20th, 1819, the issue of 
 the famous reactionary Carlsbad Decrees marked
 
 THE CARLSBAD DECREES 215 
 
 the triumph of the Austrian minister's policy. At 
 Vienna, in 1820, these decrees " were established 
 "asa permanent bulwark of sovereigns against their 
 " people ; and a perennial discontent was taken 
 " for granted." * Though these Decrees may be said 
 to mark the highest point reached by Austrian 
 influence in Germany, they were not received with 
 universal approval in all the States of Europe. 
 Castlereagh at once protested. To him the Decrees 
 represented an intention of interfering in most 
 unjustifiable fashion with the internal affairs of 
 independent states, while Alexander who was still 
 an avowed supporter of liberty, refused to lend his 
 support to the enforcement of the Decrees. But 
 the murder of the Duke de Berri shook Alexander's 
 determination, and from that time he agreed with 
 Metternich's policy of repressing all popular move- 
 ments. Ever since Kotzebue's murder, events had 
 tended to reinforce the arguments in favour of the 
 Austrian Chancellor's views. A military revolt at 
 Cadiz, in July, 1819, had been followed by the 
 outbreak of one revolution in Spain in January, 1820, 
 and by that of another in Portugal in August, 1820, 
 while in July of the same year the Neapolitans, 
 fired by the example of Spain, rose and forced the ^ 
 
 King to accept a liberal constitution. These 
 revolutions naturally had a very disquieting effect 
 upon all supporters of the monarchical regime, 
 and in some cases, notably in that of Spain, led to 
 a long period of civil war. 
 
 These events made at once apparent the real lack Revolution 
 of unanimity among the Great Powers. Upon in Spain, 
 Alexander the effect was stupendous, and from 
 
 1 " Cambridge Modern History," vol. X, p. 370.
 
 216 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 that period his conversion to Metternich's views 
 was complete. With his usual promptitude and 
 with the eagerness of a convert he proposed that a 
 Russian army should at once quell the Spanish 
 insurrection, and that a Conference should be 
 summoned. To these proposals Castlereagh and 
 Metternich offered strenuous and successful opposi- 
 tion ; that of the former on the ground that inter- 
 vention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state 
 was to be deprecated. Moreover, British trade 
 interests were naturally opposed to any action on 
 the part of the British Government which should 
 have the effect of enabling Spain to strengthen 
 herself in her contest with her South American 
 Colonies. A strong Spanish government might 
 mean the reconquest of those Colonies, followed by 
 the erection of obstacles in the way of the lucrative 
 trade which had grown up between them and Great 
 Britain. 
 
 It is not surprising that these successive revolutions 
 in Spain, Naples and Portugal should have alarmed 
 the military empires of Europe. In the case of both 
 Spain and Portugal, the Army had led the way in 
 the demand for a liberal constitution ; while in 
 Naples the revolution had met with no resistance, 
 and the kingdom had " crumbled before a handful 
 " of insurgents that half a battalion of good soldiers 
 " might have crushed in an instant." Before such 
 a state of things the military monarchs considered 
 themselves fully justified in adopting acts of precau- 
 tion and repression. Anxious not to give Russia an 
 opportunity of taking a leading part in carrying out 
 a policy of repression, Metternich attempted to secure 
 the assent of all the Great Powers in the suppression
 
 THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU 217 
 
 of the revolution in Naples without using the 
 machinery of a Congress. 
 
 But Castlereagh refused to give beforehand a Congress of 
 general assent to Metternich's proposal, though he Troppau, 
 agreed with those who considered the revolution in 
 Naples as " wanton and unprovoked." The 
 Congress of Troppau met on October 20th, 1820, 
 and England was represented by Lord Castlereagh's 
 brother, Lord Stewart, the Ambassador at Vienna. 
 Before the Congress actually met, Castlereagh had 
 written a strongly-worded declaration of British 
 policy with regard to revolutions, which was in 
 direct opposition to the views of Metternich, who 
 had urged that the Great Powers should never 
 recognize revolutions which had proceeded from 
 below. In it Castlereagh asserted most emphatically 
 that if it should be desired " to extend the Alliance 
 "so as to include all objects present and future, 
 " foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its 
 " character to such an extent and carry us so far, 
 " that we should see in it an additional motive for 
 " adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the 
 " Alliance move away from us, without our having 
 " quitted it." 
 
 The Congress was a short one, and is chiefly note- 
 worthy as marking the definite weakening of the 
 Concert of Powers, and foreshadowing the later 
 grouping of the European monarchs into two groups, 
 one including Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and the 
 other Great Britain and France. At Troppau, 
 Metternich and Alexander forsook their suspicions 
 of each other, and the latter finally decided to 
 support the Austrian " Conservative system." 
 Metternich had triumphed. The Carlsbad Decrees
 
 218 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Congress is 
 moved to 
 Laibach. 
 
 Revolutions 
 in Naples 
 and North 
 Italy, 1 821. 
 
 had been established "as a permanent bulwark of 
 " sovereigns against their people," and now he had 
 the support of Russia in his repression of liberal 
 ideas and movements in Italy. The Neapolitan 
 revolt was put down by Austrian soldiers in March, 
 1821, and shortly afterwards Ferdinand was restored 
 to his throne. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Conference at Troppau had re- 
 opened its sittings at Laibach in January, 1821, 
 and Castlereagh had notified the Powers that Great 
 Britain would preserve an attitude of neutrality 
 with respect to the revolution in Naples. This 
 declaration roused the indignation of Metternich 
 and Alexander, both of whom were determined that 
 Great Britain should endorse the views laid down 
 in the Troppau Protocol. Stewart, the British 
 representative at Laibach, however, stood firm, 
 and, in spite of the angry remonstrances of the three 
 allied Sovereigns, declared that Great Britain held 
 exactly opposite views to those expressed in the 
 Protocol. A permanent split would have taken 
 place in the alliance had not dramatic developments 
 in the East of Europe created a new situation, which 
 till 1830 temporarily but substantially altered the 
 relations of the various States to each other, and 
 postponed the division of the Great European 
 Powers into two groups, one represented by Russia, 
 Prussia, and Austria, the other by Great Britain and 
 France. 
 
 The events in Italy were certainly of a stirring 
 character. A revolution had taken place in Naples, 
 and in February, 1821, the Allied Powers assembled 
 at Laibach declared that they would not recognize 
 the revolutionary authorities. Moreover, Austrian
 
 CASTLEREAGH'S LAST SPEECH 219 
 
 troops at once marched to the South of Italy, suppressed 
 the revolution both in Naples and Sicily, and on 
 May 12th the King was restored. In North Italy 
 the Carbonari had organized an insurrection on 
 March 13th, in the hopes of distracting the attention 
 of the Austrians from their suppression of the 
 Neapolitan rising. But this movement was easily 
 suppressed by an Austrian force, and the authority 
 of the King re-established on April 12th. 
 
 These events stirred the feelings of many of the Debate in 
 Whigs in England, and on February 21st, Sir James pS^Rax 1 
 Mackintosh, in Parliament, condemned the action 
 of the Austrians, and enquired into the conduct of 
 the British Government with reference to that 
 action. In reply, Castlereagh made an admirable 
 speech, which is of especial interest as being the last 
 which he delivered upon foreign affairs. 
 
 He at once defended the general policy of support- Castte- 
 ing an alliance of continental sovereigns, an " alliance rff£~*. 
 " which I hope will long continue to cement the n foreign 
 " peace of Europe." With regard to the Neapolitan affairs, 
 rising, he asserted that it was a matter with which 
 Austria, and Austria alone, had to deal. " Great 
 " difficulty may arise hereafter as to how Naples, 
 " after its military occupation, is to be governed ; 
 " and that being the case, nothing could be more 
 " impolitic in a British minister than to involve 
 " himself or his country in it. ... I have always 
 " held out to the Allied Sovereigns that Great 
 " Britain was not at all interested in the transaction, 
 " and had so far separated herself from it, as to be 
 " no party to it whatever." He then pointed out 
 the folly of, without accurate knowledge of the facts, 
 taking it for granted that a constitution of the
 
 220 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 British type was suited to the Italians. ' I 
 
 " deprecate," he said, " the doctrine that the subjects 
 
 " of governments which do not enjoy a representative 
 
 " system are justified in throwing off their allegiance 
 
 " and resorting to arms in order to obtain one." 
 
 Such a form of government had a few years previously 
 
 been introduced into Sicily by Lord William Bentinck, 
 
 and had proved an entire failure. Castlereagh then 
 
 asserted that the tyranny of the late Government 
 
 of Naples had been grossly misrepresented. It had 
 
 done a great deal for the benefit of the nation ; had 
 
 rendered all the population equal before the law, 
 
 had improved the system of justice, had abolished 
 
 many abuses. The revolution had been due to a 
 
 great extent to the Carbonari, and it was " the sect 
 
 " into whose hands the consolidation of Italy was 
 
 "to be entrusted." Castlereagh, therefore, felt 
 
 justified in saying that he trusted that England 
 
 would not be called upon to interfere. " The 
 
 " revolution against which Austria has now armed," 
 
 he declared, " has been brought about by fraud and 
 
 ' secrecy upon an organized plan between the 
 
 ' military and the Carbonari, got up in the style of 
 
 ' the worst period of the French Revolution. It 
 
 ' was so artfully managed by these means that it 
 
 ' succeeded, though it began only by the act of 
 
 ' 150 dragoons, three lieutenants of police, and one 
 
 ' priest." He then covered his opponents in 
 
 Parliament with ridicule by informing them that 
 
 the King of Naples, without being allowed a moment's 
 
 deliberation, was advised by his ministers to offer 
 
 the Spanish Constitution, not one line of which had 
 
 been read by any member of the Council. " Surely," 
 
 he said in conclusion, " the British Government
 
 CASTLEREAGH'S AIMS 221 
 
 " were not much to blame if they hesitated to 
 " recognize an authority thus violently imposed 
 " upon a sovereign prince." 
 
 This debate, at the close of which the ministers Its effects, 
 had a majority of 69, made it manifest to the country 
 that there was no truth in the ridiculous contention 
 of the Whigs that Great Britain had joined in a 
 " Crusade against the freedom of mankind." From 
 that time the ministry became more popular, and 
 men began to realize that their condemnation of 
 Castlereagh as a reactionist was groundless. 
 
 During these years Castlereagh had pursued a clear The 
 and straightforward line of action. From 1815 to 1820 character 
 it was absolutely necessary for all the Great Powers reag h's 
 to remain united, and to adopt the same policy, policy. 
 No one could tell what new dangers Europe might 
 be called upon to confront, no one could anticipate 
 what political developments might mark the period 
 immediately following upon the French revolutionary 
 epoch and the long period of Napoleonic supremacy. 
 At the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 
 1818 it was becoming evident that the dangers 
 anticipated in 1815 were not likely to occur, and 
 that individual States might safely be left to work 
 out their own salvation. Castlereagh was as fully 
 alive as was Canning, who accompanied him to 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, of the importance of the doctrine of 
 non-intervention, and it was Castlereagh, and 
 Castlereagh alone, who steadily from 1818 onwards 
 " prevented the international acceptance of the 
 " doctrine of interference," so dear to Alexander 
 and Metternich. 
 
 In protesting against the doctrines enunciated 
 at Laibach, he laid down clearly the principles which
 
 222 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 Proposed 
 interven- 
 tion in 
 Spain by 
 France, 
 1822. 
 
 The 
 
 Eastern 
 
 Question. 
 
 guided British foreign policy. " England," he wrote, 
 " stands pledged to uphold the territorial arrange- 
 " ments established at the Congress of Vienna. 
 " The invasion of a weaker state by a stronger state 
 " for the purposes of conquest would demand our 
 " immediate interference. But with the internal 
 " affairs of each separate State we have nothing to do. 
 " We could neither share in nor approve, though we 
 " might feel called upon to resist the intervention 
 " of one ally to put down internal disturbances in 
 " the dominions of another. We have never com- 
 " mitted ourselves to any such principle as that, 
 " and we must as a general rule protest against it." 
 In 1822 the French minister, M. de Montmorency, 
 who was a supporter of Metternich's " European 
 " System," was anxious that France should interfere 
 in Spain just as Austria had interfered in Naples 
 and Piedmont. The close connexion which existed 
 between Great Britain and Spain, apart from other 
 reasons, rendered Great Britain's opposition to this 
 proposal a matter of certainty, and the mere sugges- 
 tion of such action tended to make still wider the 
 gulf which separated Great Britain from the 
 Autocratic Powers. It was only through the personal 
 intervention of the King, strengthened by, the 
 imminence of complications in the East that 
 Castlereagh agreed to be present at the Congress of 
 Verona. 
 
 Further causes of the weakening of the Concert 
 of Europe were to be found in the developments 
 which were taking place in Eastern Europe. In 
 1821 the Eastern Question had raised new and 
 important problems, and in October of that year 
 Castlereagh had an interview with Metternich in
 
 CASTLEREAGH'S DEATH 223 
 
 Hanover. The revolt of Greece had seemed to 
 Alexander to offer a justification and a favourable 
 opportunity for a Russian attack upon Turkey. 
 Castlereagh agreed with Metternich in the undesir- 
 ableness of encouraging the Russian anti-Turkish 
 policy, which would lead to " destructive confusion 
 " and disunion .... not only within Turkey but 
 " in Europe." Alexander was pledged not to 
 separate himself from the Alliance of all the Great 
 Powers, and as a result of the diplomacy of 
 Castlereagh and Metternich, he agreed to postpone 
 his warlike, anti-Turkish projects, and to be present 
 at the Congress of Verona, which after a preliminary 
 conference at Vienna in September, was to meet 
 in October, 1822. Castlereagh himself was preparing 
 to set out for Vienna when on August 12th he put 
 an end to his own life. 
 
 For some time past, Castlereagh had shown signs Castle- 
 of suffering from the effects of overwork. That JJjJjJj' 8 
 work had been enormous. " His official correspon- Aug. '12, 
 dence," writes Lady Londonderry, " alone fills 1822. 
 " seventy large volumes, and every draft, both at 
 " the War Office and Foreign Office, are in his own 
 " handwriting." One contemporary asserts, and 
 probably with accuracy, that " his overwrought 
 " mind had evidently brooded on imaginary political 
 " reverses. He would cast despairing looks on the 
 " benches of the House of Commons behind him, 
 " supposing that though really thronged they were 
 " deserted." 1 On August 9th, 1822, the King wrote 
 him a kind letter, begging him to see his doctor 
 before he returned to the country. A few days 
 
 1 The Marchioness of Londonderry : " Robert Stewart, 
 Viscount Castlereagh," pp. 62, 63.
 
 224 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The concert 
 
 of 
 
 Europe. 
 
 Castle- 
 
 reagh's 
 
 attitude 
 
 after the 
 
 Congress 
 
 of Aix-la- 
 
 Chapelle. 
 
 later the King wrote a second letter. But before 
 it arrived Castlereagh was dead. 
 
 It is difficult to overestimate the value of 
 Castlereagh's diplomatic labours between 1815 and 
 1822. He was mainly instrumental in bringing 
 about and maintaining that close union of the Great 
 Powers which in 1814 led to the first overthrow 
 of Napoleon. It was he, too, who was mainly 
 instrumental in preserving that union till all danger 
 from Napoleon and from an agitated Europe had 
 disappeared. As soon as the necessity for close 
 watchfulness on the part of the Great Powers had 
 passed away, Castlereagh steadily opposed the views 
 of Russia, Prussia and Austria with regard to 
 intervention in the affairs of independent States. 
 He thus may be said to have definitely inaugurated 
 that new foreign policy which Canning developed 
 after his death. Castlereagh's instructions in July, 
 1822, to the Duke of Wellington, whom he proposed 
 to send as Great Britain's representative to the 
 Conferences of Vienna, where the affairs of Italy, 
 Spain and Greece were to be discussed, leave no 
 doubt that, though he will always be regarded as 
 the advocate of the Concert of Europe during the 
 critical years following the fall of Napoleon, he was 
 clearly alive to the necessity of adopting new methods 
 for the new problems which after 1818 were rapidly 
 forcing themselves upon the attention of Europe. 
 
 At the time of his death, and indeed ever since 
 the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, there was no longer 
 any necessity for suppressing popular movements 
 by means of the united action of the Great Powers. 
 The temper of the French people in 1814 and 1815 
 was unmistakably dangerous to the Peace of Europe,
 
 AFTER AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 225 
 
 and Castlereagh had supported the action of united 
 Europe with regard to France. But though the 
 danger from France passed away, Metternich was 
 ready and anxious to interfere in the affairs of Spain, 
 Naples, and Piedmont. He even complained of 
 the support which he asserted was given in England 
 to revolutionary agitation, and was much irritated 
 at the tone of the speeches made in Parliament. 
 Metternich, however, was not the first European 
 statesman who failed to understand the character 
 of the British nation and its institutions. Canning's 
 accession to office was signalized by no break in the 
 policy pursued by Castlereagh. Events no doubt 
 were leading to fresh developments, both with regard 
 to the relations of Spain to her Colonies, and to the 
 relations of Turkey with the Western Powers and with 
 Russia, but Canning, with regard to Great Britain's 
 relations to the European monarchies, simply acted 
 upon principles laid down by Castlereagh. No 
 doubt Castlereagh's death was a great blow to 
 Metternich. The two men, with Alexander of Russia 
 and the Prussian King, had acted together ever since 
 1813. They had brought to an end the Napoleonic 
 rule in France, and they had freed Europe from all 
 fear of a return to the Napoleonic supremacy. They 
 had together passed through the crisis which closed 
 at Waterloo ; they had united in the work of the 
 reconstruction of Europe, and till his death 
 Castlereagh was perhaps naturally dazzled by the 
 vision of the Confederation of Europe. During the 
 years immediately following the Congress of Vienna, 
 Castlereagh had acted loyally with the rest of the 
 Allies, and though after the Congress of Aix-la- 
 Chapelle he and Metternich differed on certain 
 15 — (2211)
 
 226 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 important points, the latter always believed that 
 the British statesman and he agreed on the main 
 lines of the policy to be pursued in Europe ; and 
 though Castlereagh had several times pointed out 
 that the British Parliament controlled British 
 foreign policy, Metternich and the rulers of Russia 
 and Prussia had continued to think that the 
 protests of Great Britain against the high-handed 
 conduct of the Allies were " no more than sops 
 thrown to " public opinion," and " mingled with 
 the air." 
 Castle- Consequently, the death of Castlereagh was, on 
 
 reagh's personal as well as on general grounds, a severe blow 
 blow to the to the Allies. Had Castlereagh lived longer, there 
 Allies. is little doubt that the Allied Powers would have been 
 
 compelled to realize the genuineness of his attitude 
 with regard to Spain. In continuing and developing 
 the policy of Castlereagh, Canning showed un- 
 expected vigour and resource. His policy was an 
 admirable complement of that of his predecessor, 
 and he simply endorsed the views of Castlereagh 
 when in 1825 he wrote to the Russian Ambassador 
 that " the pervading principles " of the Alliance 
 " are those established by the treaties of Vienna : 
 " the preservation of the general peace, and the 
 " maintenance against all ambition and encroach- 
 " ment of the existing territorial distribution of 
 " Europe." Castlereagh had steadily protested, 
 both in 1820 and later, against " the collective 
 " interference of the Powers in the affairs of other 
 " States." Europe owes more than is commonly 
 recognized to Castlereagh's sound judgment and 
 courage both before and after the fall of Napoleon. 
 During the seven years that followed the battle of
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 227 
 
 Waterloo, British tendencies and those of Russia, 
 Prussia and Austria tended to drift apart, and 
 Castlereagh undoubtedly incurred, though he did not 
 merit, unpopularity by his efforts to preserve the 
 union between the great European Powers. The 
 instructions which Castlereagh had drafted for his 
 own use at the Congress of Vienna or Verona in 1822 
 were given to Wellington by Canning on Castlereagh 's 
 death. Beyond supplementing them with regard 
 to the Eastern Question, which was rapidly approach- 
 ing a serious stage, Canning made no further 
 alteration, not even in the matter of Spain or of 
 Spanish America. 
 
 It is often forgotten that Castlereagh had spent Castle- 
 his life in fighting revolution. In that struggle he reagh's 
 had learnt to appreciate the importance of united "cognition 
 action on the part of the great Powers. He placed value of the 
 a very special value on the alliance of Austria, with European 
 which country Great Britain had acted during the Concert 
 critical period of the Congress of Vienna. Though 
 after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle British 
 tendencies and those of Russia, Austria, and Prussia 
 tended to drift apart, Castlereagh avoided all open 
 rupture, though he vigorously protested against 
 the collective interference of the Great Powers in 
 the affairs of other States. 
 
 Shortly before his death the Eastern Question 
 was attracting attention. Great Britain was 
 interested in preventing a Russian invasion of 
 Turkey, and one of Castlereagh's last acts was to 
 induce the Tsar Alexander to postpone the declaration 
 of war against Turkey. To Castlereagh, the preserva- 
 tion of the peace of Europe outweighed all other 
 considerations. It was not till after Castlereagh's
 
 228 
 
 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 The 
 foreign 
 policy of 
 Canning a 
 develop- 
 ment of 
 that of 
 Castlereagh 
 
 Castlereagh 
 a great 
 statesman. 
 
 death that the real import of the Greek insurrection 
 was appreciated by European statesmen. 
 
 There are two distinct views held with regard 
 to the aims and character of Castlereagh 's foreign 
 policy after 1815. One set of historians maintain 
 that Canning simply continued and developed 
 Castlereagh's ideas, that the latter condemned the 
 Continental System as represented by Metternich, 
 and that the policy which he intended to pursue 
 with regard to Spain was similar to that maintained 
 by his successor. On the other hand, some writers 
 maintain that Castlereagh was insincere, that he 
 in reality approved of Metternich's Continental 
 System, and that some of his letters were written 
 in order " to throw dust in the eyes of the Parliament." 
 
 Castlereagh had many enemies, and even now his 
 Irish and European policy is often misrepresented. 
 But there are no real grounds for believing that he 
 ever acted otherwise than honourably and straight- 
 forwardly. The more his whole political life is 
 examined, the more will his statesmanlike qualities 
 be appreciated. During the greatest and most 
 prolonged crisis through which Europe has ever 
 passed, he not only safeguarded the interests of 
 Great Britain, but largely contributed to the 
 re-establishment of order and peace in Europe. 
 
 He lies among other distinguished ministers in 
 Westminster. Opinions may differ as to the wisdom 
 of his policy at various epochs of his career, but no 
 student of his life will deny him a place among 
 England's greatest administrators.
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 Castlereagh stands in the highest rank of British Castle- 
 statesmen. Like the two Pitts, he helped to guide posf tio n 
 Great Britain through a crisis in which her very among 
 independence was threatened. Godolphin and ^atesmen 
 Walpole were both eminent ministers, and Carteret 
 had a profound knowledge of European politics. 
 But none of these three men had to face a crisis of 
 such magnitude as that with which Castlereagh had 
 to deal. It may also be said that Europe has never 
 passed through so momentous a period as was 
 comprised within the years 1810-1815. And yet 
 the man whose tact and determination alone kept 
 the Coalition together in the years 1813 and 1814 
 is judged either from an inaccurate appreciation of 
 the aims of his policy as Irish Secretary or from 
 a misunderstanding of the political and economic 
 situation in England after the fall of Napoleon. 
 
 Castlereagh 's fame and reputation as a statesman 
 must rest upon his conduct and policy during that 
 Titanic struggle against Napoleon's despotism, which 
 is often described as the rising of the nations. 
 
 Whig writers of the nineteenth century persisted whig and 
 in judging Castlereagh entirely from the internal J*ish 
 policy pursued by the Government during the last 
 few years of George Ill's reign. They have taken 
 it for granted that that policy was worthy of 
 condemnation, though at the time it had the support 
 of the greater part of the Whigs, and with a curious 
 partisan unreasonableness have not sought to discover 
 
 229
 
 230 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 the reasons which rendered that policy necessary. 
 What would be thought of a writer of English History 
 who judged Edward III by the events of the last 
 five years of his reign, or Elizabeth by her policy to 
 Mary Queen of Scots, or Cromwell by his conduct 
 to Wexford, and in describing their lives omitted 
 all the great transactions in which they took part ? 
 And yet this is what Whig writers and so-called 
 Irish historians have to a great extent done, and 
 with less excuse than the critics of Edward III, 
 Elizabeth and Cromwell, seeing that the domestic 
 policy of Castlereagh from 1815 to 1822, if unpopular, 
 was absolutely necessary for the preservation of life 
 and property. While the former have failed entirely 
 to realize the immense debt which Europe owes to 
 Castlereagh for his action during the greatest crisis 
 through which Europe has ever passed, the latter 
 have persistently ignored the fact that Castlereagh 
 always held the view that without Catholic emancipa- 
 tion the Union of Ireland, though itself necessary, 
 would bring in its train innumerable dangers and 
 difficulties. They have also ignored the bitter 
 hostility of France, which at the close of the 
 eighteenth century had become doubly dangerous 
 owing to disaffection in Ireland. The statement 
 that that disaffection could have been removed by 
 granting Catholic emancipation, while allowing the 
 continuance of Ireland's legislative independence, 
 exhibits an ignorance of the general condition of 
 Ireland and a lack of appreciation of the state of 
 public opinion in England and among the Irish 
 
 Irish Protestants, as well as of the danger from France, 
 
 Opinion ^at can on jy De d e pi orec i 
 
 historical. Though on George IV's visit to Ireland, shortly
 
 WHIG INFLUENCES 231 
 
 after his accession, the mob received Castlereagh in 
 Dublin with enthusiasm, Irish opinion has declared 
 against him. The grounds upon which that opinion 
 has been formed are of the flimsiest character, the 
 reasons assigned are worthless, the arguments used 
 have no historical basis. Irish patriot leaders have 
 never shown less historical accuracy than in their 
 statements with regard to Castlereagh. Their 
 dislike for an Irishman who rarely showed any 
 traces of his Celtic blood is perhaps not surprising, 
 but unfortunately for their reputation for accuracy, 
 they have given reasons for that dislike which are 
 absolutely misleading and unhistorical. He is 
 accused by them of having instigated the Rebellion 
 of 1798, of showing a small-minded jealousy of the 
 patriot leaders, and of having trampled upon the 
 religious liberties of Irishmen. The first charge is 
 as absurd as it is untrue, and was itself confuted by 
 Brougham, one of Castlereagh's chief opponents ; 
 the measures which Castlereagh took to shield 
 Grattan disprove the second charge, while the history 
 of Castlereagh's life shows that he was always a firm 
 and consistent supporter of Catholic emancipation. 
 
 I cannot believe that the usual judgments passed Lasting 
 upon Castlereagh's career based upon the views of c ^ a ^j er 
 that statesman's political opponents can be the influence, 
 result of a careful perusal of the Castlereagh Corre- 
 spondence, or indeed can represent an intelligent 
 study of the times in which he lived. Young 
 essayists whose knowledge is limited, and older 
 historians who have less excuse, seem to lose all 
 sense of honesty, and indeed of truthfulness, when 
 they write of Castlereagh. And the constant and 
 worn-out comparison of Canning with Castlereagh,
 
 232 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 much to the advantage of the former, shows such 
 an ignorance of the real relation of the work of the 
 latter to that of the former that one despairs of ever 
 eliminating political prejudice from the minds of 
 many writers of history. In great measure, no 
 doubt, the travesty of Castlereagh's career which 
 has been presented to the world by so-called 
 historians, who ought to have confined themselves 
 to the writing of fiction, is due in the first place to 
 Whig influences, which on the whole dominated 
 England from 1830 to 1874. And no better example 
 of this influence can be found than in an article 
 which appeared in the Edinburgh Review in the 
 early sixties. 1 In that article the writer describes 
 Castlereagh in terms which, happily, are rarely to be 
 found in the annals of political partisanship. And 
 yet the reviewer only summarized in a condensed 
 form the views of a number of writers who, ignoring 
 the immense services of Castlereagh during the 
 struggle with Napoleon, judged him entirely from 
 their biassed and inaccurate estimate of the domestic 
 policy of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet during the 
 anxious years immediately succeeding the final 
 overthrow of Napoleon. 
 Defence of Even, however, during the sixties, there were men 
 reaeh" ^ e ^ e ^ ate Marquess of Salisbury and Sir George 
 
 Cornewall Lewis who recognized the immense debt 
 which the Empire owed to the firmness and sagacity 
 of Castlereagh's statesmanship. No one would 
 admit that Mr. Gladstone's long tenure of office was 
 not at times marred by mistakes. But no one on 
 that account would deny him the title of statesman. 
 And similarly, to take the most criticised period of 
 1 Edinburgh Review, April, 1862, p. 186.
 
 DEFENCE OF CASTLEREAGH'S POLICY 233 
 
 Castlereagh's life, viz., from 1815 to 1820, no 
 impartial historian, remembering that Europe was 
 slowly emerging from a long revolutionary period, 
 would deny that there was some justification for 
 the alarm felt at the discontent in parts of England 
 and Scotland, the exact character and magnitude 
 of which it was impossible to gauge. It has also 
 been customary to criticise very severely the arrange- 
 ments made at the Congress of Vienna, and to assert Castlereagh 
 that they were the cause of the revolutions and * nd the 
 disturbances which followed the Settlement of Vienna. 
 Europe in 1815. These critics cannot have under- 
 stood the political condition of Europe at the time 
 of the overthrow of Napoleon ; they cannot have 
 realized the necessity of a period of firm government 
 in the case of almost every state in Europe. Firm 
 and wise rulers were required, but it was not 
 Castlereagh's fault that in many cases during the 
 ensuing half-century the rulers of European States 
 showed neither firmness nor wisdom. Until Europe 
 had settled down, after a period of twenty-five years 
 of almost constant war, it was impossible to grant 
 those concessions which the ardent champions of 
 reform demanded, often in a menacing fashion. 
 
 It was by no means certain that the militant 
 energy of France had ceased, and it was naturally 
 considered absolutely necessary to build dykes 
 which should restrain all danger of a future French 
 flood, and at the same time carry out the engage- 
 ments which had been made during the struggle 
 against Napoleon. As a statesman Castlereagh 
 stands very high, and must be placed with men like 
 Walpole, the two Pitts, Peel, Beaconsfield, and 
 Salisbury. None of these men, however, had to
 
 234 CASTLEREAGH 
 
 control the fortunes of Great Britain in times as 
 critical as those in which Castlereagh passed the chief 
 years of his life. And in organizing and keeping 
 together the Coalition against Napoleon, he was 
 executing a more difficult task than that which was 
 performed by the Elder Pitt during the Seven Years' 
 War. It is seldom sufficiently realized that the 
 uprising of the nations in 1813 might have ended 
 in a terrible fiasco had it not been for the determina- 
 tion, sagacity, and diplomatic skill of Castlereagh. 
 The successful march of the Allies to Paris in 1814, 
 and the downfall of Napoleon was primarily due to 
 him.
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 castlereagh's parliamentary constituencies 
 
 He was elected for Down county to the Irish Parlia- 
 ment at the general election of 1790 after a contest 
 lasting 42 days. The numbers were : — 
 
 Lord Hillsborough . . . . 3,534 
 
 Hon. Robt. Stewart .. .. 3,114 
 
 Hon. Edwd. Ward . . . . 2,958 
 
 George Mathers . . 2,223 
 
 Stewart and Ward standing as colleagues against the 
 Marquess of Downshire's eldest son and Mr. Mathers. 
 When Hillsborough succeeded to the peerage in 1793 
 Mr. Francis Savage became Stewart's colleague, and 
 both were re-elected in 1797 and held their seats till 
 the Union, when they became members of the British 
 Parliament. 
 
 Castlereagh's first seat in the English Parliament 
 was for Tregony, which he represented from 1794 till 
 the general election of 1796, his colleague being 
 Matthew Montague, afterwards fourth Lord Rokeby. 
 In 1796 he was returned for Orford, a pocket borough 
 of the Hertfords in conjunction with Lord Robert 
 Seymour, the patron's brother, but in July, 1797, 
 he accepted the Chiltern Hundreds and was succeeded 
 by the Earl of Yarmouth, the patron's eldest son, 
 
 235
 
 236 APPENDIX I 
 
 afterwards so well known as Marquess of Hertford 
 (the " Monmouth " of Coningsby and the " Steyne " 
 of Vanity Fair). From 1797 to 1800 Castlereagh 
 held no English seat, but on January 1st, 1801, he 
 became, without further election, M.P. for Down 
 county in the British Parliament, and was re-elected 
 in 1802 without a contest. In August, 1805, on 
 accepting office as Colonial Secretary, his re-election 
 was successfully opposed by the Honble. John 
 Meade, who received the support of the Downshire 
 interest. Castlereagh headed the poll during the 
 first eleven days of the polling, being twelve ahead 
 at the close of the eleventh day, but on the following 
 day the numbers stood : Meade, 1,523 ; Castlereagh, 
 1,481 ; and he then retired from the contest, and, 
 no more votes being tendered on his behalf, Meade, 
 who continued to poll his voters, was returned by a 
 majority of 450. He was elected for Boroughbridge 
 in the following January (1806), to fill the vacancy 
 caused by the death of Eldon's eldest son, but at 
 the general election of the same year he transferred 
 his services to Plympton (a pocket borough of Lord 
 Mount-Edgecumbe, whose wife was half-sister to 
 Lady Castlereagh), where he was re-elected on taking 
 office in April, 1807, at the general election of that 
 year, and also on resuming office in 1812. On the 
 dissolution in the latter year he recovered his old seat 
 for Down county and was again elected in 1818 and 
 1820, but in 1821 his accession to the Irish peerage 
 made him ineligible for an Irish constituency, and he 
 was once more elected for Orford, which seat he 
 retained till his death. Below is a summary of his 
 parliamentary services : —
 
 APPENDIX I 237 
 
 Ireland. 
 Down County, 1790-1800. 
 
 England. 
 
 Tregony, 1794-96. 
 Orford, 1796-97. 
 
 Great Britain. 
 
 Down County, 1801-1805. 
 Boroughbridge, J an. -Oct., 1806. 
 Plympton, 1806-1812. 
 Down County, 1812-1821. 
 Orford, 1821-1822. 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 Summary of Official Services. 
 
 Keeper of Privy Seal in Ireland (under Pitt), 1797- 
 
 1801; 
 Secretary for Ireland (under Pitt), 1797-1801 ; 
 President of the Board of Control (under Addington), 
 
 1802-1804 ; 
 Ditto (under Pitt), 1804-1806. 
 Secretary for War and Colonies (under Pitt), 1805- 
 
 1806; 
 Ditto (under Portland), 1807-1809 ; 
 Foreign Secretary (under Liverpool), 1812-1822. 
 
 These two appendices have been drawn up by the Rev. 
 A. H. Beaven, who has most kindly allowed me to use them. 
 
 A. H.
 
 APPENDIX III 
 
 i 
 
 CHIEF DATES IN CASTLEREAGH'S POLITICAL 
 
 CAREER 
 
 Born 1769. 
 
 At St. John's College, Cambridge, 1788. 
 
 M.P. for Down, 1790-1805. 
 
 Acting Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 
 
 179*1798. 
 Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1799-1801. 
 President of the Board of Control, 1802. 
 Secretary for War and Colonies, 1805-1806. 
 Secretary for War and Colonies, 1807-1809. 
 Out of Office, 1809-1812. 
 Foreign Secretary, 1812-1822. 
 Becomes Marquis of Londonderry, 1821. 
 His death, 1822. 
 
 II 
 CASTLEREAGH AND SIR JOHN MOORE, 1807 
 
 General Sir J. P. Maurice, in his edition of Sir John Moore's 
 Diary (vol. II, pp. 288-9), points out that some of the most 
 important data (viz. much of the correspondence between 
 Castlereagh and Moore) " for judging of the circumstances 
 of the campaign " have not yet been given to the world. It 
 is to be hoped that this very important series of State Papers 
 will become better known. 
 
 Ill 
 
 EXTRACT FROM THE TIMES OF 1808 
 
 Tuesday, June 28th. 
 
 " The two foreigners, whose arrival we announced yesterday, 
 are Spanish Noblemen, and have been brought hither in his 
 
 238
 
 APPENDIX III 239 
 
 Majesty's Ship Alcmene, Capt. Tremlett, as Deputies from the 
 province of Gallicia. The Captain of the above mentioned 
 vessel, having occasion to go into the port of Corunna under a 
 flag of truce, was received by the inhabitants of that place 
 with the most marked attention, and invited to be present 
 in person at a meeting of the committee by which the affairs 
 of the insurgents are at present managed. He was there 
 informed of the determination of the province of Gallicia to 
 resist the French ; and he coincided with the nobles assem- 
 bled as to the propriety of opening a communication with 
 Great Britain by means of deputies, himself engaging to con- 
 vey two, that were thereupon nominated, to this country. 
 These gentlemen state, in the strongest terms, the fierce 
 hostility which rages in every Spanish bosom against their 
 French oppressors, and they add that a general levy had taken 
 place in the northern provinces of Spain, amounting to 
 300,000 men, whose first operation would be an attempt to 
 rescue Madrid from the bloody tyranny of Murat." 
 
 IV 
 
 EXTRACT FROM THE TIMES OF JUNE 30th, 1808 
 
 " It is now three weeks since Viscount Materosa and Don 
 Diego de la Vega arrived in London. — 
 
 " ' Their cause and forms conjoined, Preaching to stones, 
 would make 'em capable.' And yet what has been done ? 
 All that we can speak of with certainty, exclusive of a few 
 arms, which have been sent, is that exactly on this day 
 fortnight Sir Arthur Wellesley left England to take command 
 of an expedition, said to be bound for Gibraltar ; and by letters 
 from Ireland, we find that he had not quitted Dublin on 
 Sunday last. We verily believe that Lord Chatham would 
 ere now have had British troops upon the Spanish frontier." 
 
 THE DUEL BETWEEN CASTLEREAGH AND 
 CANNING. SEPTEMBER, 1809 
 
 On this subject see the Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 1 1 , 
 p. 394, and The Life of Sir C. Napier, Vol. 1, p. 40. In a 
 letter written by Castlereagh on September 22nd, 1809, the 
 complaints of Canning are dealt with. Of these the second 
 is that Moore was not given up.
 
 240 APPENDIX III 
 
 VI 
 
 THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION 
 
 On February 2nd, 1810, the enquiry by the House of Commons 
 into the Walcheren expedition began. By 178 to 171 Mr. 
 Whit bread's motion for papers relating to the expedition 
 was carried, the vote implying censure upon Lord Chatham 
 and the vindication of Sir Richard Strachan. The latter, 
 according to the testimony of a naval captain, though dis- 
 approving of Chatham's plan of operations, had worked with 
 zeal and spirit throughout the operations on the Scheldt, 
 and did all he could to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
 
 VII 
 
 A CHARACTERISTIC SCENE IN ENGLAND DURING 
 THE PENINSULAR WAR 
 
 The painter, Haydon, relates that on August 16th, 1810, 
 while he was at Bristol, the mail arrived dressed out with 
 laurels, bringing the news that despatches had arrived from 
 Wellington announcing a victory. Two eagles and flags were 
 hanging out of the window. The people, he says, were all 
 rejoicing, all in a bustle, longing for the Gazette, cursing the 
 French, and praising Wellington. On the road the coachman 
 pointed out to the passengers General Whitelocke, of Buenos 
 Ayres fame, who lived near. 
 
 VIII 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 
 
 To commemorate the battle of Waterloo, ^500,000 was voted 
 for a monument in which painting, sculpture, and architecture 
 were to have been united. The Academy, however, in order 
 to avenge some previous affront which it thought it had 
 received from the Government, refused to give any advice 
 respecting the proposed monument. Castlereagh and the 
 committee were so disgusted with this conduct of the 
 Academicians that they dropped the whole matter.
 
 APPENDIX III 241 
 
 IX 
 
 THE COERCIVE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT, 
 
 1817-1822 
 
 Mr. Spencer Walpole, in his History of England, proves very 
 conclusively that there was good ground for alarm in 1817 
 owing to the projects and actions of the " Radicals." He 
 shows how widespread was the discontent, how deep the 
 ramifications of secret societies, and states that " the 
 " general discontent had produced a series of lamentable 
 " outrages." He then blames severely the Government for 
 taking precautionary measures, and declares that it ought 
 to have had recourse to " mild remedies." He treats with 
 contempt the reports of both Houses of Parliament which 
 agreed in describing the situation in the country as necessi- 
 tating strong measures for the defence of life and property, 
 and questions their infallibility ! It is allowable to ask 
 how any ministry entrusted with the government of the 
 country could have adopted any other course than the one 
 decided upon ? As Castlereagh said in 1817, " was Parliament 
 to sit inert and inactive until the means of perpetrating them 
 [crimes] had been brought to maturity? " 
 
 CASTLEREAGH AND THE RADICALS 
 
 In Bamford's " Life of a Radical," I, p. 166, is an amusing 
 account of " the surprise of the Radical leaders when they were 
 apprehended and examined before the Privy Council and 
 brought in presence of those whom they had been taught to 
 regard as cruel bloodthirsty tyrants." — " Lord Castlereagh, 
 the good-looking person in a plum-coloured coat, with a gold 
 ring on the little finger of his left hand, on which he sometimes 
 looked while addressing them ; Lord Sidmouth, a tall, square, 
 and bony figure, with thin and grey hairs, broad and promi- 
 nent forehead, whose mild and intelligent eyes looked forth 
 from their cavernous orbits ; his manners affable, and much 
 more encouraging to freedom of speech than was expected." 
 
 16 — (3211)
 
 242 APPENDIX III 
 
 XI 
 
 THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH 
 Lord Liverpool to Mr. Peel. 
 
 "London, August 12th, 1822. 
 
 "I must beg of you to break the dreadful intelligence, of which 
 this messenger is the bearer, to the King. 
 
 ' ' Poor Londonderry [Castlereagh] is no more : he died by 
 his own hand at nine o'clock this morning. There never was 
 a clearer case of insanity. The King is in some degree 
 prepared for the sad event ; he knows what was the state of 
 
 his mind when he saw him on Friday last what 
 
 a sad catastrophe this is, private and public ! What a con- 
 clusion to such a life ! may God have mercy on his soul ! " 
 (" Sir Robert Peel," edited by C. S. Parker, p. 319.) 
 
 XII 
 
 "THE JOURNAL OF SIR WALTER SCOTT" 
 (Edinburgh ; David Douglas, 1890, vol. I, p. 291.) 
 
 Sir Walter Scott visited Lord Granville in Paris in Novem- 
 ber, 1826, and found him occupying the same house as 
 Castlereagh did in 1815. 
 
 " Here I saw much of poor Lord Castlereagh — a man of 
 sense, presence of mind, courage and fortitude, which carried 
 him through many an affair of critical moment when finer 
 talents might have stuck in the mire. He had been, I think, 
 indifferently educated, and his mode of speaking being far 
 from logical or correct, he was sometimes in danger of becom- 
 ing almost ridiculous, in spite of his lofty presence, which had 
 all the grace of the Seymours, and his determined courage. 
 But then he was always up to the occasion, and was an orator 
 to convince, if not to delight his hearers. He is gone and my 
 friend Stanhope also, whose kindness this town so strongly 
 recalls. It is remarkable they were the only persons of sense 
 and credibility who both attested supernatural appearances 
 on their own evidence, and both died in the same melancholy 
 manner." — (Extract from journal of Nov. 1st, 1826.)
 
 INDEX 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 
 
 211, 213, 214, 224, 227 
 Albuera, Battle of, 129 
 Alexander I, 55, 78-80, 82-86, 
 
 95, 138-140, 147, 149, 153, 
 
 161, 162, 164, 171, 208-218, 
 
 221,223 
 Amelia Princess, 130 
 America, North, 135, 140, 142, 
 
 144, 175, 177 ; South, 216 
 Amiens, Treaty of, 55, 61 
 Anne, Queen, 79 
 Antwerp, 115, 116, 121, 126, 
 
 160, 161, 163 
 Arcis-sur-Aube, Battle of, 164 
 Aberdeen, Lord, 160, 161, 165, 
 
 166 
 Abbot.Charles (Lord Colchester), 
 
 51 
 Abo, 183 
 Acts of 1792 and 1793, the, 13- 
 
 15 
 Addington, 51, 55 
 Argaum, Battle of, 58, 61 
 Aspern, Battle of, 114 
 Assaye, Battle of, 58, 61 
 Astorga, Battle of, 103 
 Asturian envoys, the, 95, 96 
 Auerstadt, Battle of, 77 
 Austerlitz, Battle of, 70, 94 
 Australia, 62 
 Austria, 68-73, 78, 79, 92, 112- 
 
 114, 123-125, 145, 146, 148- 
 
 166, 177, 184, 185, 187, 217, 
 
 224 
 
 Badajos, 132, 135 
 
 Balance of Power, The, 178, 
 
 184 
 Baltic, The, 78, 82, 87, 88, 90, 
 
 91, 96, 134; battle of the, 55 
 Barham, Lord, 67 
 Barrington, Sir Joseph, 5 
 Bartenstein, Treaty of, 79 
 Bassein, Treaty of, 58-60 
 Bathurst, Earl, 137 
 
 Bautzen, Battle of, 147, 151 
 Baylen, Capitulation of, 95 
 Belgium, 163, 175, 186, 187 
 Bennigsen, 85 
 Bentinck, Lord W., 226 
 Beaudesert, 206 
 Berar, Raja of, 58 
 Beresford, 18; General, 129 
 Berlin Decree of Nov. 21st, 
 
 1806, 110 
 Bernadotte, 88, 147, 148, 152, 
 
 153, 155-160 
 Berri, Due de, 215 
 Birmingham, 192 
 Blackburn, 192 
 Blanketeers, The, 195 
 Blucher, 160, 163, 168 
 Board of Control, The, 56-63 
 " Bonnymuir, Battle of," 203 
 Brazil, 125 
 Brougham, 133, 140, 190, 195, 
 
 197-199, 204 
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 138 
 Buckinghamshire, Lord, 94, 137 
 Buenos Ayres, 78, 80, 91, 95, 
 
 96, 97, 125 
 Bullion Committee, The, 128, 
 
 129 
 Burdett, Sir F., 192, 194, 195 
 Burrard, Sir H., 97-99 
 Bvron, 133 
 
 Cambridge, 4 
 
 Camden, Lord Chancellor, 2 ; 
 
 Lord, 2, 10, 18, 23, 28, 48, 80, 
 
 118 
 Cannes, 181 
 Canada, 142, 144, 155 
 Canning, 76, 81, 86, 90, 91, 99, 
 
 113, 116-121, 198, 205, 213, 
 
 227, 228 
 Cape of Good Hope, 186 
 Carbonari, The, 219, 220 
 Carlsbad Decrees, The, 215, 217, 
 
 218 
 
 243
 
 244 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Caroline Queen, 203-205 
 Castlebar Races, The, 24, 25 
 Castlereagh — Ancestry and 
 early years, 1 - 4 ; in the 
 Irish Parliament, 4, 5, 19, 
 20, 26-41 ; his support of 
 Catholic emancipation, 33, 
 35-41, 43-51, 53; President 
 of the Board of Control, 56 ; 
 his policy to India, 57-61 ; 
 in Pitt's Second Administra- 
 tion, 65, 66 ; Secretary for 
 War, 67-71 ; his policy pre- 
 mature, 71-73 ; in opposition, 
 76 ; Secretary for War in the 
 Portland Ministry, 81-121 ; 
 his appointment of Wellesley 
 to the Peninsular command, 
 107 ; out of office, 123-132 ; 
 the question of a Regency, 
 130 ; Foreign Minister, 133- 
 224 ; his influence, 145-147 ; 
 his services during the War 
 of Liberation, 151-164; the 
 Treaties of Reichenbach, 154 ; 
 his presence with the Allies 
 in France, 1814, 161-164 ; his 
 reappearance in the House of 
 Commons, 167, 168; at the 
 Congress of Vienna, 170-179 ; 
 his reception in the House of 
 Commons, 1815, 180 ; after 
 Waterloo, 182, 183; his 
 statesmanship, 184-188 ; the 
 repressve policy of the Go- 
 vernment, 191, 192 ; Castle- 
 reagh's defence, 192-195 ; 
 Castlereagh and the Six Acts, 
 198, 199 ; The Cato Street 
 Conspiracy, 202 ; Castlereagh 
 and the Queen's Trial, 203, 
 204 ; his visit to Dublin, 205, 
 
 206 ; his visit to Hanover, 
 
 207 ; his foreign policy after 
 1815, 208-228 ; his death, 
 223-224 ; estimate of his 
 character and work, 229-234 
 
 Castlereagh, Lady, 183 
 Cathcart, Lord, 82, 89, 90, 149, 
 
 154-156, 158, 159, 170 
 Catholic Emancipation, 16-20, 
 
 136 
 Cato Street Conspiracy, The, 
 
 200, 202, 203 
 Caulaincourt, 163, 164 
 
 Chambre introuvable, 210 
 Charlemont, 7 
 
 Charles, The Archduke, 112 
 Charles the Great, 87 ; V, 87 
 Charlotte, Princess, 195 
 Chatham, Lord, 47, 49, 52, 
 
 115 
 Chatillon, Conference of, 163 
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 163 
 Cheshire, 198 
 Chesterfield, 192 
 Christ Church, Oxford, 168 
 Cintra, Convention of, 97-99 
 
 104, 111 
 Ciudad, Rodrigo, 132, 135 
 Colberg, 78 
 
 Clare, Lord, 7, 17, 29, 46, 47 
 Confederation of the Rhine, The, 
 
 72 
 Constantinople, 95 
 Continental System, The, 90, 
 
 110, 111 
 Cooke, 32, 42 
 Copenhagen, 88-91 
 Cornwallis, Lord, 23, 27, 30, 39, 
 
 40, 44-50 
 Corunna, Battle of, 103-105 
 Cotton, Admiral, 98 
 Cradock, Sir John, 104, 106, 107 
 Creevey, Papers, The, 120 
 Croker, 119 
 Cuesta, 121 
 
 Dalrymple, Sir Hew, 97-99 
 
 Danzig, 78 
 
 Dardanelles, The, 79 
 
 Darnley, Lord, 94 
 
 Decaen, 61, 62 
 
 Defenders, The, 19 
 
 Denmark, 55, 69, 82, 84, 88-92, 
 
 121, 183 
 Diamond, Battle of the, 19 
 Dibeck, 88 
 Dickson, W. S., 3 
 Divorce Bill, The, 204 
 Douab, The, 58 
 Derby, 192 
 Dessein's Hotel, 165 
 Douro, Valley of the, 100, 108 
 Duckworth, Sir John, 78, 80 
 Dublin, 18, 19, 22, 30, 33-35, 38 
 Dundas, 46-49 ; Sir David, 113, 
 
 124 
 Dupont, 95
 
 INDEX 
 
 245 
 
 East India Company, 56-63 
 Eastern Question, The, 222, 227 
 Egvpt, 55, 56, 78, 80, 81, 95, 125 
 Elba, 164, 181, 209 
 Eldon, 52, 81, 137 
 Emmet, Thomas, 23, 62 
 Erfurt, 95 
 European Revolution, The, 145, 
 
 146 
 Eylau, Battle of, 78, 82 
 
 Finnerty, Peter, 188, 189 
 
 Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, 22 
 
 Fitzwilliam, Lord, 15-18, 23, 46 
 
 Flushing, 115 
 
 Fort William, 60 
 
 Fuentes, d'Onoro, Battle of, 129 
 
 Foster, Speaker, 34, 38 
 
 Fox, 12, 61, 63, 76, 77 
 
 France (see Napoleon), 4, 7, 8, 
 11, 12, 24, 26, 53, 57, 58, 60- 
 62, 65, 79, 81-103, 108-116, 
 122, 124-127, 129-179, 181- 
 186, 188, 189, 208, 210, 214, 
 222 
 
 Francis, the Emperor, 70-72, 
 113, 149-151, 161, 163 
 
 Frankfurt Terms, The, 160-162, 
 184 
 
 Fraser, General, 78, 80 
 
 Freiburg, 162 
 
 Friedland, Battle of, 70, 82, 85, 
 94 
 
 French Revolution, The, 4, 6, 
 11, 12, 145 
 
 Gambier, Admiral, 89 
 
 Genoa, 185, 186 
 
 George III, 42-51, 130 ; IV, 
 
 203-206, 224, 225 
 Ghent, Treaty of, 175 
 Gibraltar, 107 
 Girondists, The, 14 
 Glasgow, 192, 203 
 Gneisenau, 160 
 Grant, Miss, 100 
 Grattan, 21, 29, 31, 206 
 Greece, 223 
 Grey, Bennett, 195 
 Guadaloupe, 152 
 Grenville, 15, 48, 79, 80, 130 
 Grey (see Howick), 94, 131, 197 
 Gustavus, King of Sweden, 89 
 j6a — (i2n) 
 
 Habeas Corpus Act, suspension 
 
 of, 192, 194, 195 
 Hampden Club, The, 194 
 Hamburg, 88, 150 
 Hanover, 70, 207, 223 
 Hardenberg, 214 
 Hardwicke, Lord, 51 
 Harrowby, Lord, 64, 66-70, 
 
 94, 137, 182, 202 
 Hawkesburv (see Liverpool), 49, 
 
 52, 66, 74, 75, 81, 93, 94 
 Haydon, 143, 166 
 Hazlitt, 181, 182 
 Hertford, Lord, 9 
 Hobart, 52, 62 
 Hoche, 7 
 Holkar, 58, 61 
 
 Holland, 62, 163, 175, 186, 187 
 Holroyd, Maria Josepha, 19 
 Holv Alliance, The, 207, 213 
 Horner, 128 
 
 Howick, Lord, 77 (see Grev) 
 Humbert, General, 28 
 Hunt, 181, 191, 197 
 Huskisson, 65 
 
 Imaun of Muscat, 62 
 India, 56-62,94, 111 
 Industrial Revolution, The, 188 
 Ireland, 1-55, 205-207, 230, 231 
 Italy, 79, 82, 83, 136, 177, 186, 
 187, 215-220, 222, 223 
 
 Jackson, Francis (Ambassador 
 to Denmark), 83, 84 ; Sir 
 George, 83 
 
 Jacobinism, 24, 53 
 
 James I, 1 ; II, 1 
 
 Jena, Battle of, 77 
 
 Jerdan, 164-166 
 
 Joseph Bonaparte, 77, 136 
 
 Junot, 92 
 
 Kalisch, Treaty of, 147, 199 
 
 Killala Bay, 24' 
 
 Knox, Alexander, 21, 35, 36, 
 
 206, 207 
 Kotzebue, 214, 215 
 
 Laibach, 218, 221 
 
 Lake, General, 22, 58, 59, 61
 
 246 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Lancashire, 198 
 
 Laswari, Battle of, 58 
 
 Lauderdale, Lord, 78 
 
 Lawrence, Sir Thomas, 6 
 
 Lecky, Mr., 36 
 
 Leigh Hunt, 182 
 
 Leipzig, Battle of, 79, 145, 159, 
 
 160 
 Leveson-Gower, 84 
 Lewisham, Lord, 52 
 Little Englanders, 181 
 Liverpool, Lord (1808), 123, 
 
 134, 136, 179 (see Hawkes- 
 
 bury) 
 London Corresponding Society, 
 
 The, 22 
 Londonderry, Lady, 2 ; Lord, 
 
 the first, 2, 205 
 Louis XVIII, 165, 182 
 Liitzen, Battle of, 147, 151 
 Loughborough, Lord, 47, 48, 52 
 Luxemburg, Duchy of, 177 
 Luddite Riots, The, 140 
 
 Macniven, 23 
 Madrid, 100, 103, 143 
 Mackintosh, Sir James, 219 
 Mahrattas, The, 57-61 
 Maida, Battle of, 77, 81 
 Malta, 62, 186 
 Manchester, 192 
 Manchester (Peterloo) massacre, 
 
 The, 196, 197 
 Marmont, 131, 144 
 Massena, 127, 128 
 Mediterranean, The, 77, 82 
 Metternich, 155-162, 164, 170- 
 
 172, 174, 208, 212, 214-218, 
 
 221, 222-223, 228 
 Moira, Lord, 94, 136 
 Mondego Bay, 97 
 Moore, Sir John, 68, 69, 100, 
 
 105, 119 
 Moscow Expedition, The, 132, 
 
 142, 144 
 Mount Stewart, 2, 3, 5, 206 
 Mulgrave, Lord, 94 
 Murat, 136 
 
 Naples, 215, 216-219, 225 
 Napoleon, 56, 76-88, 90-95, 100, 
 101, 103, 105, 111, 114, 117, 
 122, 126-129, 132. 134-138, 
 
 142, 144-148, 150-154, 156- 
 
 164, 166, 171, 175, 178, 180- 
 
 183, 209, 232, 233 
 Nelson, 55 
 Nice, 161, 163 
 Non-Intercourse Act, The, 140, 
 
 141 
 Norfolk, Duke of, 93, 94 
 Northern Coalition, The, 50 
 Norway, 152, 183 
 
 O'Connor, A., 23 
 
 Oman, Professor, 97 
 
 Orange Society, The, 18, 19, 30 
 
 Orders in Council, The, 110, 140 
 
 Orebro, Treaty of, 139 
 
 Oubril, 77 
 
 Oxford, 168 
 
 Paine, Tom, 11 
 
 Palmerston, 124 
 
 Paris, First Treaty of, 167 ; 
 
 Second Treaty of, 183 
 Parsons, Sir Lawrence, 37, 38 
 Paul, 1, 55, 183 
 Piedmont, 225 
 Peishwa, The, 57, 59 
 Peel, Robert, 201 
 Pelham, 8-10, 26, 27, 52 
 Perceval, 80, 81, 112, 117, 123, 
 
 131 
 Perron, 57, 61 
 Petty, Lord H., 86, 99, 111 
 Pitt, W., 10, 16, 25-30, 34, 41, 
 
 47-51, 77, 94, 201 ; The 
 
 elder, 224 
 Platoff, 168 
 
 Pleswitz, Armistice of, 150-153 
 Plunket, 39 
 Poland, 171, 176, 184 
 Pomerania, 89, 90 
 Pondicherry, 61 
 Ponsonby, 93, 111, 194 
 Portland, Duke of, 15-17, 27, 
 
 42,43,49,52,80,81, 116-118, 
 
 123 
 Portugal, 82, 84, 91, 92, 94, 95, 
 
 100, 110, 124-128, 136, 215, 
 
 216 
 Pratt, Lady Francis, 2 
 Prussia, 79, 92, 145-151, 161, 
 
 164, 173, 174-177, 186, 208, 
 
 213, 217, 224, 225
 
 INDEX 
 
 247 
 
 Radicals, The, 146, 191, 199, 
 
 203 
 Rebellion of '98, 9 seq. 
 Regent, The Prince, 130, 136, 
 
 142-144, 192, 209 
 Reichenbach, Treaties of, 153- 
 
 155, 159 
 Richelieu, Due de, 211, 214 
 Robinson, F. J. (Lord Goderich), 
 
 196 
 Russia, 79, 140, 145-155, 208, 
 
 216, 217, 224 
 
 St. Vincent, 2 ; Lord, 52, 94 
 
 St. Helena, 183 
 
 Salamanca, Battle of, 143, 
 
 144 
 Salisbury, Robert, Third Mar- 
 quess of, 134 
 Sardinia, 178, 185, 186 
 Savoy, 161, 163 
 Saxony, 159, 173-176, 178 
 Schwarzenberg, 163, 165 
 Scindia, 57, 58 
 Scottish Union, The, 38 
 Sebastiani, 62 
 Seven Years' War, The, 224, 
 
 234 
 Shelley, 189 
 Sicily, 81, 219 
 Sidmouth, Lord, 94, 137, 202- 
 
 204, 206 
 Sheffield, 192 
 Siniavin, Admiral, 91, 98 
 Six Acts, The, 199, 200 
 Slave Trade, The, 176-178 
 Somerset, 196 
 Soult, 131 
 Spa Fields, 192 
 Spain, 82, 87, 88, 96, 131, 146, 
 
 148, 155, 167, 177, 215, 216, 
 
 220, 222 
 Spencer, 15, 48 
 Stanhope, 155, 156 
 Stein, 149 
 Steinheld, 156 
 Stettin, 78 
 Stewart, Sir Charles, 148, 150, 
 
 151, 153, 157, 159, 160, 170; 
 
 Alexander, 2 ; Charles, 2 ; 
 
 Robert, 1, 2; Lord, 202, 
 
 217, 218 
 Stockholm, Treaty of, 152 
 Strachey, Lady, 100 
 
 Stralsund, 78, 83, 88-90, 152, 
 
 155 
 Strangford Loch, 2 
 Stuart, Sir John, 77 
 Sweden, 84, 138, 139, 147, 152, 
 
 153, 157 
 Switzerland, 178 
 
 Talavera, Battle of, 108, 109, 
 
 116, 124, 126 
 Tarleton, General, 126 
 Talleyrand, 77, 172, 174, 175 
 Thistlewood, 191, 199, 200, 202, 
 
 203 
 Thornton, 138 
 Tierney, 198 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 78, 79, 82, 86- 
 
 88, 138 
 Tippoo, 57 
 
 Tithe Question, The, 53, 54 
 Toplitz, Treaty of, 184 
 Torres Vedras, 109, 127, 128 
 Trachenberg, Compact of, 158 
 Troppau, Congress of, 217 
 Turkey. 78, 79, 85, 92, 111. 137, 
 
 138, 142, 143, 227 
 
 Ulster, 8, 9, 11-14, 18, 32, 38 
 Union, The Irish, 15, 23, 26-46 ; 
 
 The Scottish, 38 
 United Irishmen, The, 11-13, 
 
 18-22 
 United States, The, 93 
 University College, Oxford, 
 
 Master of, 100 
 
 Van Diemen's Land, 62 
 Vansittart, 128, 137, 190, 201 
 Verona, Congress of, 223, 233 
 Victor, Marshal, 108 
 Vienna, Treaty of (1809), 112; 
 Congress of, 133, 134, 183, 
 184, 186, 189 ; Conference at, 
 223, 224, 227 
 Vimeiro, Battle of, 97, 104 
 Vinegar Hill, Battle of, 22 
 Vittoria, Battle of, 157, 158 
 
 Wagram, Battle of, 112-114 
 Walcheren Expedition, The, 
 110, 114-116, 118, 124. 130
 
 248 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Walpole, Spencer, 199 ; Lord, 
 150 
 
 Wardle, Colonel, 112 
 
 Warren, Admiral, 25 
 
 Waterloo, Battle of, 87, 169, 
 180-182 
 
 Wellesley, Arthur, Duke of 
 Wellington, 5, 6, 58-62, 96-98, 
 102, 105-109, 112, 124-128, 
 132, 139, 144, 146-148, 158, 
 165-167, 176, 182, 213, 224 
 
 Wellesley, Marquess, 93, 94, 
 132, 143, 144 
 
 Wellington. See Wellesley, 
 Arthur 
 
 Werry, 156 
 
 Westmoreland, Earl of, 15, 18, 
 46, 47, 49, 52, 81 
 
 Weymouth, 48 
 
 Whitbread, Mr., 80, 124, 125, 
 
 127 
 Whitelocke, General, 78, 80, 
 
 91 
 Wilberforce, 178 
 William III, 12 
 Wilson, Sir Robert, 156 
 Windham, 15, 47, 48 
 Wolfe Tone, 5, 11, 12, 13, 20, 29 
 
 Yarmouth, Lord, 77, 120 
 
 Yeomanry, The, 21 
 
 York, Duke of, 97, 111-113, 
 
 130 
 Yorke, Charles, 52 
 
 THE END 
 
 Printed by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., Bath. 
 (221 1)
 
 UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME 
 Makers of National History 
 
 Each in crown 8vo, cloth gilt, with frontispiece, 3s. 6d. net. 
 
 This is a new series of Historical Biographies of great English- 
 men, edited by W. H. Hutton, B.D. The following volumes 
 are now ready: — 
 
 Cardinal Beaufort 
 
 By The Rev. L. B. RADFORD, D.D. 
 
 " With this volume a new series of biographies, which is to 
 appear under the general title of Makers of National History, 
 makes an excellent start. The story of ' The Cardinal of 
 England ' is well worthy of the closest study. Hitherto the 
 poet has done more than the historian to familiarise us with 
 the man. The Beaufort of Shakespeare's Henry VI has scarcely 
 a single merit to redeem his faults. ' Scarlet hypocrite ' 
 is one of the least objectionable of the epithets applied to him, 
 but it is now bevond doubt that the dramatist lent his genius 
 to a grave misrepresentation. Dr. Stubbs a generation ago 
 did a great deal to remove the cloud that for more than two 
 and a half centuries had undeservedly lain on Beaufort's memory. 
 The present work will do more. Though the setting of the 
 biography has involved writing of a period of history where 
 the work of acknowledged masters has made it ' dangerous to 
 be independent and impossible to be original,' Mr. Radford 
 has succeeded in putting his subject in a new light. Those 
 who have been debating the questions raised by the recent 
 visit of a Papal legate to our shores will find special interest in 
 the chapters dealing with Beaufort's tenure of that office." 
 Scotsman. 
 
 Archbishop Parker 
 
 By W. M. KENNEDY, B.A. 
 
 Parker's Primacv being, perhaps, the most important in the 
 history of the Church of England, it is surprising that no Life 
 has been called for. The present author has gone over all the 
 documents and printed books of the period, and in this volume 
 deals fully with the life and work of the Archbishop. 
 
 LONDON : SIR ISAAC PITMAN & SONS, LTD., 
 No. 1 AMEN CORNER, E.C.
 
 TRAVEL 
 
 France of the French 
 
 By E. HARRISON BARKER 
 
 In Imperial 16mo, cloth gilt, gilt top, with thirty-two full page 
 plate Illustrations, 6s. net. 
 
 In the series of books to which this volume belongs the aim 
 which each writer keeps in view is that of giving to the reader 
 a faithful, though not necessarily learned nor exhaustive 
 description of a country in its various aspects — political, reli- 
 gious, social, literary, artistic, and so forth. Too often the 
 visitor to a foreign country is, for want of help and instruction, 
 obliged to content himself with seeing the sights, while he 
 remains perfectly, though not contentedly, ignorant of nearly 
 the entire life of the people among whom he is sojourning. 
 How vastly the interest of his visit would be heightened by his 
 making some acquaintance with the national life and institutions 
 it is not necessary to prove ; everyone would admit it. France 
 of the French is written with the object of showing the reader and 
 the traveller what the French are like at home. 
 
 UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE 
 
 Italy of the Italians 
 
 By HELEN ZIMMERN 
 
 " The reading public owe a debt of gratitude to Miss Helen 
 Zimmern for this truly admirable book. . . . The knowledge 
 and judgment displayed in the volume are truly astounding, 
 and the labour the author has expended on it has made it as 
 indispensable as Baedeker to the traveller, as well as invaluable 
 to the student of modern times. . . . There is no padding in 
 this volume, interesting as it is ; no words wasted in flowery 
 description or mawkish sentiment. It is just what it should 
 be, and what books with similar objects so seldom are, and it will 
 long remain a monument to the author's talents. Miss Zimmern 
 leaves us no excuse for not understanding the Italy of to-day." — 
 Daily Telegraph. 
 
 LONDON : SIR ISAAC PITMAN & SONS, LTD. 
 No. 1 AMEN CORNER, E.C.
 
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 announcing the early publication amongst others of the 
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 ROODSCREENS AND ROODLOFTS. By Frederick Bligh 
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 With 100 full-page collotype plates, and upwards of 300 other 
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 I HE INNER LIFE OF THE NAVY. By Lionel Yexley. 
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 10s. 6d. net. 
 
 REMINISCENCES OF MY LIFE. By Sir Charles Santley. 
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 demy 8vo, cloth gilt, gilt top. With 18 illustrations, including 
 two in photogravure. 24s. net. 
 
 THE LIFE OF SIR ISAAC PITMAN. Inventor of Phonography. 
 By Alfred Baker. With about 50 illustrations, portraits, 
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 THE PRACTICAL WISDOM OF THE BIBLE. By J. St. Loe 
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 THE BOOK OF ISAIAH. Translated from a text revised in 
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 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN ENGLAND. By J. Fovargue 
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 OUTLINES OF THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND. A 
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 LONDON : SIR ISAAC PITMAN & SONS, LTD. 
 No. 1 AMEN CORNER, E.C.
 
 
 
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