University of California Berkeley 
 
 IN HONOR OF JOHN HORSLEY 
 
 UPON HIS RETIREMENT IN 2005 
 
 FROM THE COUNCIL OF THE FRIENDS OF 
 
 THE BANCROFT LIBRARY 
 AFTER HIS YEARS OF VALUABLE SERVICE 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 J*?. ; r 
 
 
 
 
 

 ~v X > ^ ( ' 
 
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THREE 
 
 DIALOGUES 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 Hylas and Pbiknow. 
 
 The Defign of which .'T- 
 
 IS plainly to demonftrate ' the Reality and 
 Perfection of Humane Knowlege, the In- 
 corporeal Nature of the Soul, and the Im- 
 mediate Providence of a D E I T Y : 
 
 In Oppofition to 
 
 SCEPTICS and ATHEISTS. 
 
 ALSO, 
 
 To open a METHOD for rendering the 
 SCIENCES more eafy, ufeful, and 
 compendious. 
 
 By George Berkeley, M. A. 
 Fellow of 7r//fy-College, 
 
 'Dublin. 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed by G. James, for HENRY CLEMENTS, 
 at the Half-Moon, in S. Paul's Church- 
 yard. MDCCXIII. 
 
R 
 
 
To the RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 THE 
 
 Lord Berkeley of Stratton, 
 
 Mafter of the Rolls In the Kingdom of 
 Ireland, Chancellor of the Dutchy of 
 Lancafter, and one of the Lords of 
 Her Majeflys Moft Honourable Privy- 
 Council. 
 
 MY LORD, 
 
 H E Vertue, Learning^ and 
 good Senfe, which are ac- 
 knowleged to diftinguifti 
 Your Character , wou'd 
 tempt me to indulge my- 
 felf the Pleature Men naturally take, 
 in giving Applaufe to thofe, whom 
 they efteem and honour : And it 
 fhouM feem of Importance to the 
 Subjects of Great Britain, that they 
 knew, The eminent Share You en- 
 joy in the Favour of Your Sovereign, 
 
 A a and 
 
 3G4310 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 and the Honours She has conferred 
 upon You, have not been owing to any 
 Application from Your Lordfhip, but 
 entirely to Her Majefty's own Thought, 
 arifing from a Senfe of Your Perfonal 
 Merit, and an Inclination to reward it. 
 But as Your Name is prefixed to this 
 Treatife, with an Intention to do Ho- 
 nour to myfelf alone, I (hall only fay, 
 that I am encouraged, by the Favour 
 You have treated me with, to addrefs 
 thefe Papers to Your Lordfhip. And I 
 was the more ambitious of doing this, 
 becaufe a Philofophical Treatife cou'd 
 not fo properly be addrefled to any one, 
 as to a Perfon of Your Lordfhip's Cha- 
 racter, who, to Your other valuable 
 Diftindions, have added the Know- 
 lege and Relifli of Philofophy. I am, 
 with the greateft Refpeft, 
 
 MT LORD, 
 
 Tour Lord/hip's moft Obedient., and 
 
 Mofl Humble Servant, 
 
 GEORGE BERKELEY. 
 
THE 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 HO ft //#.r &? general Opi- 
 nion of the World, no left than 
 the Defign of Nature and Pro- 
 vidence, that the End of Spe- 
 culation be Practice, or the Im~ 
 ' provement and Regulation of 
 our Lives and Aft ions ; Yet thofe, who are 
 mo ft additted to fpeculative Studies*, feem as 
 generally of another Mind. And, indeed, if 
 we confider the Pains that have been taken, to 
 perplex the plainefl Things, that Diftruft of 
 the Senfes, thofe Doubts and Scruples, thofe 
 Abftrat'tions and Refinements that occurr in the 
 very Entrance of the Sciences^ it will not 
 feemflrange, that Men of Leifare and Curio- 
 
 A 3 fit) 
 
The Preface. 
 
 Jity ffiou'd lay themselves out in fruitless Dif- 
 quifitions, without descending to the practical 
 fans of Life, or informing themselves in the 
 more necejjary and important Parts of Know- 
 lege. 
 
 Upon the common Principles of Philosophers^ 
 we are not affured of the Exiftence of Things 
 from their being perceived. And we are taught 
 to diftinguijh their real Nature from that which 
 falls under our Senfes. Hence arife Scepticifm 
 and Paradoxes. It is not enough, that we fee 
 and fee^ that we tafte and fmell a thing. Its 
 true Nature, its absolute external Entity isflill 
 concealed. For, tho it be the Fittion of our own 
 Brain, we have made it inaccejjible to all our 
 Faculties. Senfe is fallacious, Reafon defe- 
 ftive. We fpend our Lives in doubting of 
 thofe things which other Men evidently Inow^ 
 am believing thofe things which they laugh 
 at y and defpife. 
 
 In order, therefore, to divert the bufy Mind 
 of Man from vain Researches y it feemed necef- 
 fary to inquire into the Source of its Perplexi- 
 ties j and, if pojfible, to lay down fuch Prin- 
 ciples, as, by an eafy Solution of them, together 
 with their own native Evidence, may, at once, 
 recommend themselves for Genuine to the Mind, 
 and refcue it from thofe endlefs Purfuits it is 
 engayd in. Which, with a plain Demonftra- 
 
 tion 
 
The Preface. 
 
 tion of the immediate Providence of an All- 
 feeing GOD, and the natural Immortality of 
 the Soul, Jkorfd feem the readieft Preparation^ 
 as well as -the ftrongeft Motive, to the Study 
 and Practice of Venue. 
 
 This Defign I proposed, in the Firfl Part 
 of a Treatife concerning the Principles of Hu- 
 mane Knowlege, published in the Tear 1710. 
 But, before I proceed to publijh the Second Part, 
 I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and 
 fully of certain Principles laid down in the Firft y 
 and to place the?n in a new Light. Which is 
 the Bufineft of the following Dialogues. 
 
 In this Treatise, which does not prefuppofe 
 in the Reader, any Knowlege of what was 
 contained in the former, it has been my Aim to 
 introduce the Notions I advance, into the Mind, 
 in the moft eafy and familiar manner ; efyecial- 
 ly, because they carry with them a great Oppo- 
 fition to the Prejudices of Philofophers, which 
 have fo far prevailed againft the common Senfe 
 and natural Notions of Mankind. 
 
 If the Principles, which I here endeavour to 
 propagate^ are admitted for true -, the Confe- 
 quences which, I think, evidently flow from 
 thence^ are^ that Atheifm and Scepticifm will 
 be utterly deflroyed^ many intricate Points made 
 plain, great Difficulties fofoed, federal ufelefs 
 
 Parts 
 
The Preface. 
 
 Parts of Science retrenched, Speculation referred 
 to Practice 5 and Men reduced from Paradoxes* 
 to common Senfe. 
 
 And altho it may, perhaps, jeem an uneafy 
 Reflexion to fome, that when they have taken a 
 Circuit thorow fo many refined and uniwlgar 
 Notions, they Jhoifd at loft come to think like o- 
 ther Men Tet, methinks, this' Return to the 
 Jimple Dictates of Nature, after having wan- 
 dered thorow the wild Mazes of Phihfophy, is 
 not unpleafant. It is like coming home from a 
 long Voyage: A Man reflects with Pleafure 
 on the many Difficulties and Perplexities he has 
 faffed thorow, fets his Heart at eafe, and enjoy r 
 himfelfwith ?nore Satisfaction for the future. 
 
 As it was my Intention to convince Sceptics 
 and Infidels by Reafon,fo it has been ?ny Endea- 
 vor ftriffly to obferve the moft rigid Laws of 
 Reasoning. And y to an impartial Reader^ I 
 hope, it will be manifeft, that the fublime No- 
 tion of a GOD y and the comfortable Expeffa- 
 tion of Immortality, do naturally arife from a 
 clofe and methodical Application of Thought : 
 V/hatever may be the Result of that loofe y ram- 
 bling Way, not altogether improperly termed 
 Free-thinking., by certain Libertines in "Thought^ 
 who can no more endure the Reftraints of Logic^ 
 than thofe of Religion, or Government. 
 
 It 
 
The Preface. 
 
 It will, perhap^ be objected to my Defign y 
 thai fo far as it tends to eafe the Mind of dif- 
 ficult and ufelefs Inquiries, it can cffeff only a 
 few jpeculaiive Perfons ; 'but, if by their Spe- 
 culations rightly placed, the Study of Morality 
 and the Law of Nature were brought more in- 
 to Fashion among Men of Parts and Genius^ 
 the Difcourage?nents that draw to Scepticifm 
 removed, the Meafuret of Right and Wrong 
 accurately defined^ and the Principles of Natu- 
 ral Religion reduced into regular Syjlems^ a* 
 artfully difpofed and clearly connected as thoft 
 ofjome other Sciences : 'There are grounds to 
 think, thefe Effetfs wou'd not only have a gra- 
 dual Influence in repairing the too much defa- 
 ced Senfe of Vertue in the World, $ but alfo y 
 by Jhewing y that fuch Parts of Revelation, as 
 lie within the reach of Humane Inquiry^ are 
 moft agreeable to Right Reafon, wou'd difpofe 
 all prudent^ unprejudiced Perfons 5 to a modefl 
 and wary Treatment of thoje Sacred Myfteries y 
 which are abo^e the Comprehenfion of our Fa- 
 culties. 
 
 It remains, that I defire the Reader to with- 
 hold hisfenfure of thefe Dialogues, till he has 
 read thtin thorow. Otherwise, he may lay them 
 afide in a Miftah of their Dejign, or on account 
 of Difficulties or Objections which he wou'dfind 
 answered in the Sequel. A Treatise of this Na- 
 ture 
 
The Preface. 
 
 ture wotfd require to be once read over cohe- 
 rently^ in order to comprehend its Defign, the 
 Proofs Solution of Difficulties, and the Con- 
 nexion and Difpofition of its farts. If it be 
 thought to defers a Second Reading ; this ? I 
 imagine, will make the intire Scheme very plain : 
 TZfpecially, if Recourfe be had to an EJJay I 
 wrote^ fome Tears fmce, upon Vifion, and the 
 Treatife concerning the Principles of Humane 
 Knqwlege. Wherein divers Notions advan- 
 ced in thefe Dialogues, are farther purfued^ or 
 placed in different Lights > and other Points 
 handled^ which naturally tend to confirm and 
 illuftrate them. 
 
 The 
 
^ 
 
 The Firft 
 
 DIALOGUE. 
 
 Philonoiis. L^fnv^^iv^^i Q O D Morrow J 
 
 Hykr, I did not 
 expe& tofindyott^ 
 ibroad/o early. 
 
 Hy/tf/. It is in- 
 deed fomething 
 unufual, but my 
 Thoughts were fo taken up with a Sub- 
 let I was difcourfing of laft Night 3 that 
 finding I eould not fleep^ I refolved to rife 
 and take a turn in the Garden. 
 
 Phil. It happened well, to let you fee what 
 Innocent and agreeable Pleafures you lofe 
 every Morning. Can there be a pleafanter 
 time of the Day, or a more delightful Sea- 
 fon of the Year ? That purple Sky, thefe 
 wild but fweet Notes of Birds, the fra-* 
 grant Bloom upon the Trees and Flowers, 
 the gentle Influence of the rifmg Sun, thefe 
 
 B * 
 
(i) 
 
 and a thouiand namelefs Beauties of Nature 
 infpire the Soul with fecret Tranfports ; its 
 Faculties too, being at this time frefli and 
 lively, are fit for thofe Meditations, which 
 the Solitude of a Garden and Tranquillity 
 of the Morning naturally difpofe us to. 
 But I am afraid I interrupt your Thoughts : 
 for you feemed very intent on fomething. 
 
 Hy/. It is true, 1 was, and fliall be obliged 
 to you if you will permit me to go on in the 
 fame Vein ; not that I w'ould by any means 
 deprive myfelf of your Company, for my 
 Thoughts always flow more eafily in Conver- 
 fation with a Friend, than when I am alone : 
 But my Requeft is, that you would fuffer 
 me to impart my Reflexions to you* 
 
 Phil. With all' my Heart, it is whatlfhould 
 have requefted my felf, if you had not pre- 
 vented me. 
 
 Hy/. I was confidering the odd Fate of 
 thofe Men who have in all Ages, through an 
 Affe&ation of being diftinguifhed from the 
 Vulgar, or fome unaccountable Turn of 
 Thought, pretended either to believe no- 
 thing at all, or to believe the moft extr 
 gant Things in the World. This however 
 might bebprn, if their Paradoxes andScepti- 
 tifm did not draw after them fome Confe- 
 quences of general Difadvantage to Man- 
 kind. But the Mifchief lies here ; that when 
 Men of lefs Leifure fee them who are fuppo- 
 
fed to have fpent their whole time in the 
 Purfuits of Knowlege, profefling an intire 
 Ignorance of all Things, or advancing fuch 
 Notions as are repugnant to plain and conru 
 monly received Principled, they will be 
 tempted to entertain Sufpicions concerning 
 the moft important Truths which they had 
 hitherto held facf ed and unqueftioriable. 
 
 Phil. I intirely agree with you^ as to the 
 ill Tendency of the affefted Doubts of fome 
 Philofophers^ and fantaftical Conceits of o-' 
 thers. I am even fo far gone of late iti this 
 way Of Thinking, that I have quitted feverai 
 of the fublime Notions I had got in their 
 Schools for vulgar Opinions. And I give it 
 you on my Word, fince this Revolt from Me-* 
 taphyfical Notions to the plain Dictates of 
 Nature and common Senfe, I find my Un- 
 derftandirig ftrangely enlightened, fo that I 
 can now eafily comprehend a great many 
 Thirigs which before were all Myftery and 
 Riddle, 
 
 tiyl. I am glad to find there Was nothing 
 in the Accounts I heard of you; 
 
 Phil. Pray, what were thofe ? 
 
 Hyl. You were reprefented in laft Night' $ 
 Converfatiori, as one who maintained the 
 moft extravagant Opinion that ever entered 
 into the Mind of Man, viz. That there is no 
 fuch Thing as material Subftance in the 
 
 B ^ Phil 
 
( 4 ) 
 
 Phil. That there is no fuch Thing as what 
 Philofophers call Material Subftance, I am fe- 
 rioufly perfuaded : But if I were made to fee 
 any thing Abfurd or Sceptical in this, I fliould 
 then have the fame Reafon to renounce this> 
 that I imagine I have now to reject the con- 
 trary Opinion. 
 
 nyl. What! can any Thing be more fan- 
 taftical, more repugnant to common Senfe > 
 or a more manifeft Piece of Scepticifm, than 
 to believe there is no fuch Thing as Matter ? 
 
 Phil. Softly 3 good Hylas. What if it 
 fliould prove, that you, who hold there is, are 
 by Vertue of that Opinion a greater Sceptic^ 
 and maintain more Paradoxes and Repug- 
 nancies to common Senfe, than I who be- 
 lieve no fuch Thing ? 
 
 HyL You may as foon perfuade me, The 
 Part is greater than the Whole, as that, in 
 order to avoid Abfurdity and Scepticifm, I 
 fhould ever be obliged to give up my Opi- 
 nion in this Point. 
 
 Phil. Well then, are you content to admit 
 that Opinion for true, which upon Examina- 
 tion fhall appear moft agreeable to common 
 Senfe, and remote from Scepticifm ? 
 
 HyL With all my Heart. Since you are for 
 raifing Difputes about the plained Things 
 in Nature, I am content for once to hear 
 what you have to fay, 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by 
 a Sceptic ? 
 
 Hyl. I mean what all Men mean, one that 
 doubts of every Thing. 
 
 Phil. He then who entertains no Doubt 
 concerning fome particular Point, with re- 
 gard to that Point, cannot be thought a 
 Sceptic. 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you. 
 
 Phil. Whether does Doubting confift in 
 embracing the Affirmative or Negative Side 
 of a Queftion ? 
 
 Hyl. In neither > for whoever underftands 
 Englijh, cannot but know that Doubting fig- 
 nifies a Sufpenfe between both. 
 
 Phil. He then that denies any Point, can 
 no more be faid to doubt of it, than he who 
 affirms it with the fame Degree of Affu- 
 rance. 
 
 Hyl. True; 
 
 Phil. And confequently,for fuch his Denial 
 is no more to be efteemed a Sceptic than the 
 other. 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege it. 
 
 Phil. How comes it then, Hylas^ that you 
 pronounce me a Sceptic, becaufe I deny what 
 you affirm, viz. the Exiftence of Matter? 
 Since, for ought you can tell, I am as perem- 
 ptory in my Denial, as you in- your Affirma- 
 tion. 
 
 3 Hyl. 
 
Cf> 
 
 Hyl. Hold, Philonou?, I have been a lit- 
 tle out in my Definition ; but every falfe Step 
 fi Marj ma]ces in Difcourfe is not to be infifted 
 on. I faid, indeed, that a Sceptic was one 
 vho dpubted of every Thing ; but I ftiould 
 have added, or who denies tfye Reality atjcl 
 Truth of Things. 
 
 Phil. What Things? Do you mean tfye 
 Principles and Theoremes qf Sciences ? But 
 jjiefe you know are univerfal intelle&ual No- 
 tions, and confequently independent of Mat- 
 ter ; the Denial therefore of this doth not im- 
 ply the denying them. 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. "But are there no othej: 
 Things ? What think you of diftrufting the 
 Senfes, of denying the real Existence of fen- 
 fible Things, or pretending to know nothing 
 of them* Is not this fufficient to denominate 
 a Man a Sceptic ? 
 
 Phil. Shall we therefore examine whicfy of 
 lus it is that denies the Reality of Senfible 
 Things, or profeffes the greatest Ignorance of 
 them ,- fince, if I take you rightly, he is to 
 |>e efteemed the greateft Sceptic ? 
 
 Hyl. That is wfiat I defire. 
 
 Phil. What mean you by Senfible Things? 
 
 Hyl. Thpfe Things which are perceived by 
 the Senfes. pan you imagine that I mean 
 any thing ejfe ? 
 
 fbjl. Pardon me, fjyla^ if I am defirou? 
 plearly to apprehend your Notions, fince this 
 
. 
 
 may much Jliorten our Inquiry. Suffer me 
 then to ask you this farther Queftion. Are 
 thofe Things only perceived by the Senfes 
 which are perceived immediately ? Or may 
 thofe Things properly be faid to be Senfible, 
 which are perceived mediately, or not with- 
 out the Intervention of others ? 
 
 Hyl. I do not fufficiently underftand you. 
 
 Phil. In reading a Book, what I immediate- 
 ly perceive are the Letters, but mediately, or 
 by means of thefe, are fuggefted to my 
 Thoughts the Notions of God, Virtue, Truth, 
 &c. Now, that the Letters are truly Senfi- 
 ble Things, or perceived by Senfe, there is 
 no doubt : But I would know whether you 
 take the Things fuggefted by them to be fo 
 too. 
 
 Hyl. No certainly, it were abfurd to think 
 God or Virtue Senfible Things, tho' they 
 may be fignified and fuggefted to the Mind 
 by Senfible Marks, with which they have an 
 arbitrary Connexion. 
 
 Phil. It feems then, that by Senfible Things 
 you mean thofe only which can be perceived 
 immediately by Senfe. 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Phil. Does it not follow from this, that 
 tho' I fee one part of the Sky Red, and ano- 
 ther Blue, and that my Reafon doth thence 
 evidently conclude there muft be fome Caufe 
 of that Diverfity of Colours, yet that Caufe 
 
 B 4 can- 
 
 
(8) 
 
 cannot be faid to be a Senfible Thing, or 
 perceived by the Senfe of Seeing? 
 
 Hyl. It does. 
 
 Phil. In like manner, tho' I hear Variety 
 of Sounds, yet I cannot be faid to hear the 
 Caufes of thofe Sounds. 
 
 Hyl. You cannot. 
 
 Phil. And when by my Touch I perceive a 
 thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot fay with 
 any Truth or Propriety, that I feel the Caufe 
 of its Heat or Weight. 
 
 Hyl. To prevent any more Queftions of 
 this kind, I tell you once for all, that by 
 Senfihle Things I mean thofe only which are 
 perceived by Senfe, and that in truth the 
 Senfes perceive nothing which they do not 
 perceive immediately : for they make no Infe- 
 rences. The Deducing therefore of Caufes or 
 Occafions from Effects and Appearances 5 
 which alone are perceived by Senfe, intirely 
 relates to Reafon. 
 
 Phil. This Point then is agreed between 
 us, That ftnfible 'things are thofe only which 
 are immediately perceived by Senfe. You will 
 farther inform me, whether we immediately 
 perceive by Sight, any thing befide Light, 
 and Colours, and Figures : or by Hearing, any 
 thing but Sounds : by the Palate, any thing 
 befide Taftes : by the Smell, befide Odors : or 
 by the Touch 3 more than tangible Quali- 
 ties. 
 
 Hyl. 
 
(9) 
 
 Hyl. We do not. 
 
 Phil It feems, therefore, that if you take 
 away all fenfible Qualities, there remains no- 
 thing fenfibk. 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. Senfible things, therefore, are nothing 
 elfe but fo many fenfible Qualities, or Com- 
 binations of fenfible Qualities. 
 
 Hyl. Nothing elfe. 
 
 Phil. Heat then is a fenfible thing. 
 
 Hylf Certainly. 
 
 Phil. Does the Reality of fenfible things 
 confift in being perceived? or, is it fome- 
 thing diftinft from their being perceived, and 
 that bears no relation to the Mind ? 
 
 Hyl. To exifl is one thing, and to be per~ 
 ceived is another. 
 
 Phil. I fpeak with regard to fenfible things 
 only : And of thefe I ask, Whether by their 
 real Exiftence you mean a Subfiftence exte- 
 rior to the Mind, and diftinft from their being 
 perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. I mean a real, abfolute Being, diftinft 
 from, and without any relation to, their be- 
 ing perceived. 
 
 Phil. Heat, therefore, if it be allowed a 
 real Being, muft exift without the Mind. 
 Hyl. It muft. 
 
 Phil. Tell me, Hykr, is this real Exiftence 
 equally compatible to all Degrees of Heat, 
 which we perceive : or, is there any Reafon 
 
 why 
 
(10) 
 
 why we fhould attribute it to fome, and de- 
 ny it others ? And if there be, pray let me 
 know that Reafon. 
 
 Hyt. Whatever Degree of Heat we per- 
 ceive by Senfe, we may be fure, the fame 
 cxifts in the Objeft that occafions it. 
 
 Phil. What the greateft as well as the 
 leaft ? 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, the Reafon is plainly the 
 fame in refpeft of both : They are both 
 perceived by Senfe , nay, the greater Degree 
 of Heat is more fenfibly perceived , and, con- 
 fequently, if there is any Difference, we are 
 more certain of its real Exiftence than we 
 can be of the Reality of a leffer Degree. 
 . Phil. But is not the moft vehement and 
 intenfe Degree of Heat a very great Pain ? 
 
 Hyl. No one can deny it. 
 
 Phil. And, is any unperceiving thing ca- 
 pable of Pain br Pleafure ? 
 
 Hyl. No, certainly. 
 
 Phil. Is your material Subftance a fenflefs 
 Being, or a Being endowed with Senfe and 
 Perception ? 
 
 Hyl. It is fenflefs, without doubt. 
 
 Phil. It cannot, therefore, be the Subject 
 of Pain. 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. Nor, confequently, of the greateft 
 Heat perceived by Senfe, fince you acknow? 
 lege this to be no fmall Pain, 
 
 Hyl. 
 
CO 
 
 Hyl. I grant it, 
 
 Phil. What fhall we fay then of your ex~ 
 ternal Object ; is it a material Subftance, or 
 rio ? 
 
 Hyl. It is a material Subftance with the 
 fenfible Qualities inhering in it. 
 
 Phil. How then can a great Heat exift in 
 it, finee you own, it eannot in a material 
 Subftance? I detire yon wou'd clear this 
 Ppint. 
 
 Hyl. Hold., Philonou^ I fear I was out in 
 yielding intenfe Heat to be a Pain, It fliou'd 
 feem rather, that Pain is fomething diftind 
 from Heat 5 apd the Confequence or Effeft 
 of it. 
 
 Phil. Upon putting your Hand near the 
 fire, do you perceive one fimple, uniform 
 Senfation, or two diftinft Senfations ? 
 
 Hyl. But one fimple Senfation. 
 
 Phil. Is not the Heat* immediately per- 
 ceived ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. And the Pain? 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. Seeing, therefore, they are both im- 
 mediately perceived at the fame time, and 
 the Fire affeds you only with one iimple, 
 pr uncprnpounded Idea, it follows, that this 
 fame fimple Idea is both the intenfe Heat im- 
 jnediately perceived, and the Pain ; and, con- 
 fequently, that the intenfe Heat immediately 
 
 perceived, 
 
perceived, is nothing diftinft from a particu- 
 lar fort of Pain. 
 
 Hyl. It feems fo. 
 
 Phil. Again, try in your Thoughts, Hykr, 
 if you can conceive a vehement Senfation to 
 be without Pain, or Pleafure. 
 
 Hyl. I cannot. 
 
 Phil. Or, can you frame to yourfelf an 
 Idea of fenfible Pain or Pleafure in general, 
 abftra&ed from every particular Idea of Heat, 
 Cold, Taftes, Smells? &c. 
 
 I do not find that I can. 
 
 Phil. Does it not, therefore, follow, that 
 fenfible Pain is nothing diftinft from thofe 
 Senfations, or Ideas, in an intenfe Degree ? 
 . Hyl. It is undeniable $ and to fpeak the 
 Truth, I begin to fufped, a very great Heat 
 cannot exift but in a Mind perceiving it. 
 
 Phil. What ! are you then in that Sceptical 
 State of Sufpenfe, betweeen Affirming and 
 Denying ? 
 
 Hyl. I think I may be pofitive in the Point. 
 A very violent and painful Heat cannot exift 
 without the Mind. 
 
 Phil. It has not, therefore, according to 
 you, any real Being. 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 Phil. Is it, therefore, certain, that there is 
 nobody in Nature really hot ? 
 
 Hyl. I have not denied there is any real 
 Heat in Bodies. I only fay, there is no fuch 
 
 thing as an intenfe real Heat. 
 
 PbiL 
 
03) 
 
 Phil. But, did you not fay before, that all 
 Degrees of Heat were equally real : or, if 
 there was any difference, that the Greater 
 were more undoubtedly real than the Leifer ? 
 
 Hyl. True : But it was, becaufe I did not 
 then confider the Ground there is for diftin- 
 guifhing between them, which I now plainly 
 fee. And it is this : Becaufe intenfe Heat is 
 nothing elfe but a particular kind of painful 
 enfation > and Pain cannot exift but in a 
 perceiving Being , it follows, that no intenfe 
 Heat can really exift in an unperceiving cor- 
 poreal Subftance. But this is no Reafon, why 
 we fliould deny Heat in an inferior Degree, 
 to exift in fuch a Subftance. 
 
 Phil. But, how ihall we be able to difcera 
 thofe Degrees of Heat which exift only in the 
 Mind, from thofe which exift without it ? 
 
 Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You know 3 
 the leaft Pain cannot exift unperceived $ what- 
 ever, therefore,, Degree of Heat is a Pain, 
 exifts only in the Mind. But, as for all other 
 Degrees of Heat, nothing obliges us to think 
 the fame of them. 
 
 Phil. I think you granted before, that no 
 ynperceiving Being was capable of Pleafure, 
 any more than of Pain. 
 
 Hyl. I did. 
 
 Phil. And, is not Warmth, or a more gen- 
 tle Degree of Heat than what caufes Uneafi- 
 riefs, a Pleafure ? 
 
 Hy!. 
 
('4) 
 
 Hyt. What then ? 
 
 Phil. Confequently, it caftnot exift with- 
 out the Mind in any unperceiving Subftance, 
 or Body. 
 
 Hyl. So it feems. 
 
 Phil. Since therefore, as well thofe Degrees 
 of Heat that are not painful, as thofe that 
 are, can exift only in a Thinking Subftance, 
 may we not conclude, that external Bodies 
 are abfolutely incapable of any Degree of 
 Heat whatfoever ? 
 
 Hyl. On fecond Thoughts, I do not think 
 it fo evident that Warmth is a Pleafure, as 
 that a great Degree of Heat is a Pain. 
 
 Phil. I do not pretend, that Warmth is as 
 great a Pleafure as Heat is a Pain. But if 
 you grant it to be even a fmall Pleafure, it? 
 ferves to make good my Conclufion. 
 
 Hyl. I cou'd rather call it an Indolence. 
 It feems to be nothing more than a Priva-> 
 don of both Pain and Pleafure. And that 
 fuch a Quality or State as this may agree to 
 an unthinking Subftance, I hope you will 
 not deny. 
 
 Phil. If you are refolved to maintain that 
 Warmth, or a gentle Degree of Heat, is no 
 Pleafure, I know not how to convince you 
 otherwise, than by appealing to your own 
 Serife. But what think you of Cold ? 
 
 Hyl. The fame that I do of Heat. An in^ 
 tenfe Degree of Cold is a Pain ; for to feel 
 
 a very 
 
(I?) 
 
 a very great Cold, is to perceive a great Un- 
 eafmcfs : It cannot, therefore, exift without 
 the Mind j but a leffer Degree of Cold may - 
 as well as a leffer Degree of Heat. 
 
 Phil. Thofe Bodies, therefore, upon whofe 
 Application to our own,-we perceive a mode- 
 rate Degreee of Heat, muft be concluded to 
 have a moderate Degree of Heat or Warmth 
 in them : And thofe, upon whofe Applica-^ 
 tion we feel a like Degree of Cold, muft be 
 thought to have Cold in them. 
 
 #>(. They muft. 
 
 Phil. Can any Dodrine be true that ne- 
 ceffarily leads a Man into an Abfurdity ? 
 - Hyl. Without doubt, it cannot. 
 
 Phil. Is it not an Abfurdity to think, that 
 the fame thing Ihou'd be at the fame time 
 both cold and warm? 
 
 Hy/. It is. 
 
 Phil. Suppofe now, one of your Hands hot, 
 and the other cold, and that they are both at 
 once put into the fame Veffel of Water, in an 
 intermediate State ,- will not the Water feem 
 cold to one Hand, and warm to the other ? 
 
 Hyl. It will. 
 
 Phil. Ought we not, therefore, by your 
 Principles to conclude, it is really both cold 
 and warm at the fame time, that is, accor- 
 ding to your own Conceffion, to believe an 
 Abfurdity. 
 
 Hyl. I confefs, it feems fo. 
 
 Phil. 
 
CUT) 
 
 Phil. Confequently, the Principles them- 
 felves are falfe, fince you have granted, that 
 no true Principle leads to an Abfurdity. 
 
 Hyl. But after all, can any thing be more 
 abfurd than to fay, there is no Heat in the 
 Fire ? 
 
 Phil. To make the Point ftill clearer ; tell 
 ine, whether in two Gafes exactly alike, we 
 ought not to make the fame Judgment ? 
 
 Hyl. We ought. 
 
 Phil. When a Pin pricks your Finger, does 
 it not rend and divide the Fibres of your 
 Flefli? 
 
 Hyl. It does. 
 
 Phil. And when a Coal burns your Fin-j 
 ger, does it any more ? 
 
 Hyl. It does not. 
 
 Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge 
 the Senfation itfelf occafioned by the Pin^ 
 nor any tiling like it to be in the Pin ,- you 
 ihou'd not, conformably to what you have 
 now granted, judge the Senfation, occafioned 
 by the Fire, or any thing like it, to be in the 
 Fire. 
 
 Hyt. Well, fince it muft be fo, I am con- 
 tent to yield this Point, and ackiiowlege, 
 that Heat and Cold are only Senfations exi- 
 fiing in our Minds : But there ftill remain 
 Qualities enough to fecure the Reality of 
 V external Things. 
 
 PhiL 
 
Phil, But, what will you fay, Hylof, if it 
 fliall appear that the Cafe is the fame with 
 regard to all other fenfible Qualities, and that 
 they can no more be fuppofed to exift with- 
 out the Mind, than Heat and Cold? 
 
 HyL Then, indeed, you will have done 
 fomething to the purpofe j but that is what I 
 defpair of feeing proved. 
 
 Phil. Let us examine them in Order. What 
 think you of Taftes, do they exift without 
 the Mind, or no ? 
 
 Hyl. Can any Man in his Senfes doubt 
 whether Sugar is fweet^ or Wormwood bit* 
 ter ? 
 
 Phil. Inform me, Hylds. Is a fweet Tafte 
 a particular kind of Pleafure or pleafant Sen- 
 fation, or is it not? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil And is not Bitternefs fome kind of 
 Uneafinefs or Pain ? 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. If, therefore, Sugar and Wormwood 
 are unthinking corporeal Subftances exifting 
 without the Mind, how can Sweetnefs and 
 Bitternefs, that is, Pleafure and Pain^ agree 
 to them ? 
 
 HyL Hold, PMonouf, I now fee what it 
 was deluded me all this time. You asked 
 whether Heat and Cold, Sweetnefs and Bit> 
 ternefsj were not particular Sorts of Plea- 
 lure and Pain ,- to which I anfwered (Imply, 
 
 C that 
 
( 18) 
 
 that they were. Whereas I fhould have thus 
 diftinguifhed : Thofe Qualities, as perceived 
 by us, are Pleafures or Pains, but not as exift- 
 ing in the external Objeds. We muft not 
 therefore conclude abfolutely, that there is no 
 Heat in the Fire, or Sweetnefs in the Sugar, 
 but only that Heat or Sweetnefs, as perceived 
 by us, are not in the Fire or Sugar. What 
 fay you to this ? 
 
 Phil. I fay it is nothing to the Purpofe. 
 Our Difcourfe proceeded altogether concern- 
 ing Senfible Things, which you defined to be 
 the Things we immediately perceive by our 
 Senfef. Whatever other Qualities, therefore, 
 you (peak of, as diftinft from thefe, I know 
 nothing of them, neither do they at all be- 
 long to the Point in Difpute. You may, in- 
 deed, pretend to have difcovered certain 
 Qualities which you do not perceive, and af- 
 fert thofe infeniible Qualities exift in Fire and 
 Sugar. But, what Ufe can be made of this 
 to your prefent Purpofe, I am at a Lofs 
 to conceive. Tell me then once more, do 
 you acknowlege that Heat and Cold, Sweet- 
 nefs and Bitternefs, (meaning thofe Qualities 
 which are perceived by the Senfes) do not 
 cxift without the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. I fee it is to no purpofe to hold out, 
 fo I give up the Caufe as to thofe mentioned 
 Qualities : Though I profefs it founds odly, 
 to fay that Sugar is not fweet. 
 
**3 : 
 
 Phil. But for your farther Satisfaction, take 
 
 this along with you : That which at other 
 times feems fweet 3 fliall, to a diftempered Pa- 
 late, appear bitter. And nothing can be 
 plainer, than that divers Perfons perceive dif- 
 ferent Taftes in the fame Food, fince that 
 which one Man delights in, another abhors; 
 And how could this be, if the Tafte was 
 fomething really inherent in the Food ? 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege I know not how* 
 
 PhiL In the next place, Odors are to be con* 
 fidered. And with regard to thefe, I would 
 fain know 5 whether what has been faid of 
 Taftes does not e#a&ly agree to them ? Are 
 they not fo many pleating or difpleafing Seti- 
 fations ? 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 PhiL Can you then conceive it pdffible that 
 they fhould exift in an unperceiving Thing ? 
 
 Hyl. I cannot. 
 
 Phil. Or can you imagine 5 that Filth and 
 Ordure affeft thofe brute Animals that feed 
 on them out of Choice^ with the fame Smells 
 which we perceive in them ? 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. May we not, therefore^ Conclude of 
 Smells, as of the other foremeritioned Quali- 
 ties, that they cannot exift in any but a per- 
 eeiving Subftance or Mind ? 
 
 HyL I think fo. 
 
Phil. Then as to Sounds, what muft we 
 think of them : Are they Accidents really in- 
 herent in external Bodies, or not? 
 
 Hyl. That they inhere not in the fonorous 
 Bodies, is plain from hence , becaufe a Bell 
 ftruck in the exhaufted Receiver of an Air- 
 Pump, fends forth no Sound. The Air, 
 therefore, muft be thought the Subjed of 
 Sound. 
 
 Phil. What Reafon is there for that^ Hy- 
 las? 
 
 Hyl. Becaufe when any Motion is raifed in 
 the Air, we perceive a Sound greater or lef- 
 fer, in Proportion to the Air's Motion > but 
 without fome Motion in the Air, we never 
 hear any Sound at all. 
 
 Phil. And, granting that we never hear a 
 Sound but when fome Motion is produced in 
 the Air, yet I do not fee how you can infer 
 from thence, that the Sound itfelf is in the 
 Air. 
 
 Hyl. It is this very Motion in the external 
 Air, that produces in the Mind the Senfation 
 of Sound. For, ftriking on the Drum of the 
 Air, it caufes a Vibration, which by the Au- 
 ditory Nerves being communicated to the 
 Brain, the Soul is thereupon affected with ths 
 Senfation called Sound. 
 
 Phil. What! is Sound then a Senfation 2 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, as perceived by us^ it is a 
 particular Senfation in the Mind. 
 
 PhiL 
 
Phil. And can any Senfation exift with- 
 out the Mind ? 
 
 Hyl. No certainly. 
 
 Phil. How then can Sound, being a Sen- 
 fation, exift in the Air, if by the Air you 
 mean a fenflefs Subftance exifting without 
 the Mind ? 
 
 Hyl. You muft diftinguilh, PMonom, be- 
 tween Sound as it is perceived by us, and as 
 it is in itfelf ; or (which is the fame thing) 
 between the Sound we immediately perceive^ 
 and that which exifts without us. The for- 
 mer, indeed, is a particular kind of Senfa- 
 tion, but the latter is merely a Vibrative or 
 Undulatory Motion in the Air. 
 
 Phil I thought I had already obviated that 
 Diftin<5tion, by the Anfwer I gave when you 
 were applying it in a like Cafe before. But 
 to fay no more of that ; Are you fure then 
 that Sound is really nothing but Motion ? 
 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. Whatever therefore agrees to real 
 Sound, may with Truth be attributed to Mo- 
 tion. 
 
 Hyl. It may. 
 
 Phil. It is then good Senfe to fpeak of Mo- 
 tion, as of a thing that is loud, fweet, acute, 
 grave, &c. 
 
 Hyl. I fee you are refolved not to under- 
 
 ftand me. Is it not evident, thofe Accidents 
 
 or Modes belong only to fenfible Sound, or 
 
 C 3 Sound 
 
(22) 
 
 Sound in the .Common Acceptation of the 
 Word, but not to Sound in the Real and Phi- 
 lofophic Senfe, which, as I juft now told 
 you, is nothing but a certain Motion of the 
 Air? 
 
 Phil. It feems then there are two Sorts of 
 3ound, the one Vulgar, or that which is 
 heard, the other Philosophical and Real. 
 
 Hyl. Even fo. 
 
 Phil. And the latter confifts in Motion. 
 
 Hyl. I told ypu fp before. 
 
 Phil. Tell me, Hylar, to which of the 
 Senfes, think you, the Idea of Motion be- 
 long : To the Hearing ? 
 
 Hyl. No certainly, but tp the Sight and 
 Touch. 
 
 Phil. It fliopld follow then, that according 
 to you, real Sounds may poffibly be feen ot 
 felt, but neyer hard. 
 
 Hyl. Look you, Philonour, you may if you 
 pleafe make a Jeft of my Opinion, but that 
 will not alter the Truth of Things. I own, 
 indeed, the Inferences .you draw me into, 
 found fpmething odly; but common Lan- 
 guage, you know, is framed by, and for the 
 IJfe of, the Vulgar : we muft not therefore 
 wonder, if Expreffions, adapted to exa& Phi- 
 lofophic Notions, feem uncouth and out of 
 the way. 
 
 Phil. Is it come to that ? I aflfure you I 
 imagine myfelf to have gained no fmall 
 
 Point, 
 
 i y 
 
Point., fince you make fo light of departing 
 from common Phrafes and Opinions ,- it be- 
 ing a main Part of our Inquiry, to examine 
 whofe Notions are wideft of the common 
 Road, and moft repugnant to the general 
 Senfe of the World. But, can you think it 
 no more than a Philofophical Paradox, to fay 
 that red Sounds are never heard y and that the 
 Idea of them is obtained by fome other 
 Senfe. And is there nothing in this contrary 
 to Nature, and the Truth of Things? ^ 
 
 Hyl. To deal ingcnuoufly, I do not like it. 
 And after the Conceflions already made, I 
 had as good grant that Sounds too have no 
 real Being without the Mind. 
 
 Phil. And, I hope, you will make no Dif- 
 ficulty to acknowlege the fame of Colours. 
 
 Hyl. Pardon me : the Cafe of Colours is 
 very different. Can any thing be plainer, than 
 that we fee them on the Obje&s ? 
 
 Phil. The Obje&s you fpeak of are, I fup- 
 pofe, corporeal Subftances exifting without 
 the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phil. And, have true and real Colours in- 
 hering in them ? 
 
 Hyl. Each vifible Objeft has that Colour 
 which we fee in it. 
 
 Phil. How ! Is there any thing vifible but 
 what we perceive by Sight ? 
 
 Phil. There is not. 
 
 C 4 
 
HyL And, do we perceive any thing by 
 Senfe, which we do not perceive imme- 
 diately? 
 
 HyL How often muft I be obliged to re- 
 peat the fame thing ? I tell you., we do not. 
 
 Phil. Have Patience, good Hyks ; and tell 
 me once more, whether there is any thing 
 immediately perceived by the Senfes, except 
 fenfible Qualities. I know, you afferted 
 there was 'not : But I wou'd noiv be inform- 
 ed, whether you ftill perfift in the fame Opi- 
 nion, 
 
 HyL I do. 
 
 Phil, Pray, is your corporeal Subftance 
 either a fenfible Quality, or made up of fen- 
 fible Qualities ? 
 
 HyL What a Queftion that is! whoever 
 thought it was ? 
 
 Phil. My Reafon for asking was, becaufe 
 In faying, each vifible Object has that Colour 
 which we fee in //, you make vifible Objeds 
 to be corporeal Subftances; which implies 
 either that corporeal Subftances are fenfible 
 Qualities, or elfe, that there is fomething be- 
 fide fenfible Qualities perceived by Sight : 
 Bur, as this Point was formerly agreed be- 
 tween us, and is ftill maintained by you, it 
 is a clear Confequence, that your corporeal 
 Subftance is nothing diftin<5t from fenfible 
 Qualities, 
 
 m 
 
Hyl. You may draw as many abfurd Con- 
 fcquences as you pleafe, and endeavor to 
 perplex the plaineft things ; but you fliall ne- 
 ver perfuade me out of my Senfes. I clearly 
 underftand my own Meaning. 
 
 Phil. I wifh you would make me under- 
 ftand it too. But, fince you are unwilling to 
 have your Notion of corporeal Subftance exa- 
 mined, I fliall urge that Point no farther. 
 Only bepleafed to let me know, whether the 
 fame Colours which we fee, exift in exter- 
 nal Bodies, or fome other. 
 
 Hyl. The very fame. 
 
 Phil. What! are then the beautiful Red 
 and Purple we fee on yonder Clouds, really 
 in them ? Or, do you imagine, they have 
 in themfelves any other Form, than that of a 
 dark Mift, or Vapour ? 
 
 Hyl. I muft own, Philonous, thofe Colours 
 are not really in the Clouds, as they feem to 
 be at this Diftance. They are only apparent 
 Colours. 
 
 Phil. Apparent call you them $ how fliall we 
 diftinguifh thefe apparent Colours from real ? 
 
 Hyl. Very eafily. Thofe are to bethought 
 apparent, which, appearing only at a diftance, 
 vanifli upon a nearer Approach. 
 
 Phil. And thofe, I fuppofe, are to be 
 thought real, which are difcoverqd by the 
 inoft near and cxad: Survey. 
 
 Hyl. Right, 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil Is the neareft and exa&eft Survey, 
 made by help of a Microfcope, or by the 
 naked Eye ? 
 
 HyL By a Microfcope 3 doubtlefs. 
 
 Phil. But a Microfcope often difcovers Co- 
 lours in an Objeft different from thofe per- 
 ceived by the unaffiftcd Sight. And in cafe 
 we had Microfcopes, magnifying to any af- 
 figned Degree ; it is certain, that no Obje& 
 whatsoever, viewed thro' them, wou'd appear 
 In the fame Colour which it exhibits to the 
 naked Eye. 
 
 Hyl. And, what will you conclude from 
 all this ? You cannot argue, that there are 
 really and naturally no Colours on Objeds : 
 becaufe, by artificial Managements they may 
 be altered, or made to vanifh. 
 
 PhiL I think it may evidently be concluded 
 from your own Conceffions, that all the Co- 
 lours we fee with our naked Eyes, are only 
 apparent as thofe on the Clouds, fince they 
 yanifli upon a more clofe and accurate In- 
 fpedion, which is afforded us by a Micro- 
 fcope. Then, as to what you fay by way of 
 Prevention : I ask you, whether the real and 
 natural State of an Objed is better difcovered 
 by a very fharp and piercing Sight, or by one 
 which is lefs ftiarp ? 
 
 HyL By the former, without doubt. 
 
 PhiL Is it not plain from Dioptrics, that 
 Microfcopes make the Sight more penetra- 
 
(17) 
 
 ting, and reprefent Obje&s as they wou'd 
 appear to the Eye, in cafe it were naturally 
 endowed with a moft exquifite Sharpnefs ? 
 
 By I. It is, 
 
 PUL Confequently, the Microfcopical Re- 
 prefentation is to be thought that which beft 
 fets forth the real Nature of the Thing, or 
 what it is in itfelf. The Colours, therefore, 
 by it perceived, are more genuine and real, 
 than thofe perceived otherwife. 
 
 Hyl. I confefs, there is fomething in what 
 you fay. 
 
 Phil. Befides, it is not only poflible, but 
 maiiifeft, that there actually are Animals, 
 whofe Eyes are by Nature framed to per- 
 ceive thole things, which, by reafon of their 
 Minutenefs, efcape our Sight. What think 
 you of thofe inconceivably fmall Animals, 
 perceived by Glaffes ? Muft we fuppofe they 
 are all ftark blind ? or, in cafe they fee, can 
 it be imagined, their Sight has not the fame 
 Ufe in preferving their Bodies from Injuries, 
 which appears in That of all other Animals ? 
 and if it hath, is it not evident, they muft fee 
 Particles lefs than their own Bodies, which 
 will prefent them with a far different View in 
 each Qbjeft, from that which ftrikes our Sen- 
 fes ? Even our own Eyes do not always re- 
 prefent Objects to us after the fame manner. 
 In the Jaundice^ every one knows that all 
 things feem yellow. Is it not, therefore, 
 
 highly 
 
(28) 
 
 highly probable, thofe Animals, in whofe 
 Eyes we difcern a very different Texture 
 from that of ours, and whofe Bodies abound 
 with different Humors, do not fee the fame 
 Colours in every Objeft that we do ? From 
 all which, fliou'd it not feem to follow, that 
 all Colours are equally apparent, and that 
 none of thofe which we perceive are really 
 inherent in any outward Objeft ? 
 
 Hyl. It fliou'd. 
 
 PbiL The Point will be paft all doubt, if 
 you confider, that in cafe Colours were real 
 Properties or Affedions inherent in external 
 Bodies, they cou'd admit of no Alteration, 
 without Come Change wrought in the very 
 feodies themfelves : But, is it not evident 
 from what has been faid, that, upon the Ufe 
 of Microfcopes, upon a Change happening in 
 the Humors of the Eye, or a Variation of 
 Diftance, without any manner of real Alte- 
 ration in the Thing itfelf, the Colours of any 
 Qbjeft are either changed, or totally difap- 
 pear ? Nay, all other Circumftances remain? 
 ing the fame, change but the Situation of 
 fome Objects, and they fliall prefent different 
 Colours to the Eye. The fame thing hap- 
 pens upon viewing an Objed in various De- 
 grees of Light. And what is more known, 
 than that the fame Bodies appear differently 
 coloured by Candle-light, from what they 
 do in the open Day ? Add to thefe, the Ex,- 
 
 periment 
 
. 
 
 pcriment of a Prifm, which, feparating the 
 heterogeneous Rays of Light, alters the Co- 
 lour of any Objed ; and will caufe the Whiteft 
 to appear of a deep Blue, or Red, to the na- 
 ked Eye. And now tell me, whether you 
 are ftill of Opinion, that every Body has its 
 true real Colour inhering in it $ and if you 
 think it has, I would fain know farther from 
 you, what certain Diftance and Pofition of 
 the Objed:, what peculiar Texture and For- 
 mation of the Eye, what Degree or Kind of 
 .Light is necefifary for afcertaining that true 
 Colour^ and diftinguifhing it from apparent 
 ones. 
 
 Hyl. 1 own myfelf mtirely fatisfied, that 
 they are all equally apparent ; and that there 
 is no fuch thing as Colour really inhering in 
 external Bodies, but that it is altogether in 
 the Light. And what confirms me in this 
 Opinion is, that in proportion to the Light, 
 Colours are ftill more or lefs vivid > and if 
 there be no Light, then are there no Colours 
 perceived. Befides, allowing there are Co- 
 lours on external Objeds, yet, how is it pof- 
 fible for us to perceive them ? For no exter- 
 nal Body affefts the Mind, unlefs it at firft 
 on our Organs of Senfe. But the only 
 A&ion of Bodies is Motion; and Motion 
 cannot be communicated otherwife than by 
 Impulfe. A diftant Objeft, therefore, can- 
 not aft on the Eye, nor, confequently, make 
 
 itfelf 
 
(30) 
 
 itfelf, or its Properties perceivable to the 
 Soul. Whence it plainly follows., that it is 
 immediately fome contiguous Subftance, 
 which operating on the Eye, occcafions a 
 Perception of Colours : And fuch is Light. 
 
 Phil. How ! is Light then a Subftance ? 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, Philonour, external Light 
 is nothing but a thin, fluid Subftance, whofe 
 minute Particles being agitated with a brisk 
 Motion, and in various Manners refle&ed 
 from the different Surfaces of outward Ob- 
 je&s to the Eyes, communicate different Mo- 
 tions to the Optick Nerves ; which being pro- 
 pagated to the Brain, caufe therein various 
 Impreffions : And thefe are attended with 
 the Senfations of Red, Blue, Yellow, &c. 
 
 Phil It feems then, the Light does no more 
 than {hake the Optick Nerves. 
 
 Hyl. Nothing elfe. 
 
 Phil. And confequent to each particular 
 Motion of the Nerves, the Mind is aflfe&ed 
 with a Senfation, which is fome particular 
 Colour. 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Phil. And thefe Senfations have no Exi- 
 ftence without the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. They have not. 
 
 Phil. How then do you affirm, that Co-^ 
 lours are in the Light, fince by Light you 
 underftand a corporeal Subftance external to 
 the Mind ? 
 
Hyl. Light and Colours, as immediately 
 perceived by us, I grant cannot exift without 
 the Mind. But in themfelves, they confift in- 
 tirely in the Motions and Configurations of 
 certain infenfible Particles of Matter* 
 
 Phil. Colours then, in the vulgar Senfe, or 
 taken for the immediate Obje&s of Sight, 
 cannot agree to any but a perceiving Sub- 
 ftance. 
 
 Hyl. That is what I fay. 
 Phil. Well then,, fincc you give up the 
 Point as to thofe fenfible Qualities, which 
 are alone thought Colours by all Mankind 
 befide, you may hold what you pleafe with 
 regard to thofe invifible ones of the Philofo- 
 phers. It is not my Bufinefs to difpute about 
 them; only I would advife you to think, 
 whether, confidering the Inquiry we are up- 
 on, it be prudent for you to affirm, the Red 
 and Blue which we fee are not real Colourf, 
 but certain unknown Motions and Figures 
 which no Man ever did or can fee are truly fo. 
 Are not thefe ftiocking Notions, and are not 
 they fubjeft to as many ridiculous Inferences, 
 as thofe you before renounced in the Cafe of 
 Sounds ? 
 
 Hyl. I frankly own, Philonow, that it is in 
 vain to ftand out any longer. Colours, 
 Sounds, Taftes, in a word, all thofe term- 
 ed Secondary Qualities, have certainly no 
 Exiftence without the Mind. But by this 
 
 Ac- 
 
(3*) 
 
 Acknowlegement, I muft not be fuppofed to 
 derogate any thing from the Reality of Mat-* 
 ter, or external Obje&s, feeing it is no more 
 than feveral Philofophers maintain, who ne- 
 verthelefs are the fartheft imaginable from de- 
 nying Matter. For the clearer Underftanding 
 or this, you muft know, fenfible Qualities are 
 by Philofophers divided into Primary and Se- 
 condary. The former are Extenfion, Figure^ 
 Solidity, Gravity, Motion^ and Reft 5 and 
 thefe they hold exift really in Bodies. The 
 latter are thofe above enumerated * or, briefly, 
 all fenfible Qualities befide the Primary, 
 which they after t are only fo many Senfa- 
 tions or Ideas exifting no where but in the 
 Mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are al- 
 ready apprifed of. For my part, 1 have been 
 a long time fenfible there was fuch an Opi- 
 nion current among Philofophers^ but was 
 never thorowly convinced of its Truth till 
 now. 
 
 PUL You are ftill then of Opinion, that 
 Extenfion and Figures are inherent in exter- 
 nal unthinking Subftances. 
 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. But, what if the fame Arguments 
 which are brought againft Secondary Quali- 
 ties, will hold good againft thefe alfo ? 
 
 Hyl. Why, then I fhall be obliged to thinly 
 they too exift only in the Mind* 
 
(33) 
 
 Phil. Is it your Opinion, the very Figure 
 
 d Exterifiori which you perceive bySenfe, 
 exift in the outward Object or material Sub- 
 ftance ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. Have all other Animals as good 
 Grounds to think the fame, of the Figure 
 and JExtenfion which they fee and feel ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any 
 Thought at all. 
 
 Phil. Anfwer me, Hylar. Think you the 
 Senfes were beftowed upori all Animals for 
 their Prefervation and Well-Being in Life ? 
 of, wete they given to Men alone for this 
 End? 
 
 Hyl. I make no queftion but they have the 
 fame Ufe in all other Animals. 
 
 Phil If fo, is it not neceflary they fliould 
 be enabled by them to perceive their own 
 Limbs, and thofe Bodies which ate capable 
 of harming them ? 
 
 Hyl. Certainly. 
 
 Phil. A Mite therefore muft be fuppofed 
 to fee his own Foot, and Things equal, or even 
 lefs than it, as Bodies of fome confider- 
 able Dimenfiorij tho at the fame time 
 they appear to you fcarce difcernible, or, at 
 beft, as fo many vifible Points. 
 
 Hyl. I cannot deny it. 
 
 Phil. And to Creatures lefs than the Mite 
 they will feem yet larger. 
 
 D Hyl. 
 
(34) 
 
 Hyl. They will. 
 
 Phil. Infomuch that what you can hardly 
 difcern, will to another extremely minute 
 Animal appear as fome huge Mountain. 
 
 Hyl. All this I grant. 
 
 Phil. Can one and the fame thing be at the 
 fame time in itfelf of different Dimenfions ? 
 
 Hyl. That were abfurd to imagine. 
 
 Phil. But from what you have laid down 
 it follows, that both the Extenfion by you 
 perceived, and that perceived by the Mite it- 
 felt, as likewife all thofe perceived by leifer 
 Animals, are each of them the true Exten- 
 fion of the Mite's Foot ; that is to fay, by 
 your own Principles you are led into an Ab- 
 furdity. 
 
 Hyl. There feems to be fome Difficulty in 
 the Point. 
 
 Phil. Again, have you not acknowleged 
 that no real inherent Property of any Objeft 
 can be changed., without fome Change in the 
 thing itfelf? 
 Hyl. I have. 
 
 Phil. But as we approach to or recede 
 from an Object, the vifible Extenfion varies^ 
 being at one Diltance ten or an hundred times 
 greater than at another. Does it not there- 
 fore follow from hence likewife, that it is 
 not really inherent in the Objed ? 
 Hyl. I own I am at a Lofs what to think, 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. Your Judgment will foon be deter- 
 mined, if you will venture to think as freely 
 with relation to this Quality., as you have 
 done in refped of the reft. Was it not ad- 
 mitted as a good Argument , that neither 
 Heat nor Cold was in the Water, becaufe it 
 feemed warm to one Hand, and cold to the 
 other ? 
 
 Hyl. It was. 
 
 Phil. Is it not the very fame Reafoning to 
 conclude, there is no Extenfion or Figure in 
 an Objed, becaufe to one Eye it fliall feem 
 little, fmooth, and round, when at the fame 
 time it appears to the other, great, uneve^ 
 and angular ? 
 
 Hyl. The very fame. But does this latter 
 Fad ever happen ? 
 
 Phil. You may at any time make the Ex- 
 periment, by looking with one Eye bare, and 
 with the other thro a Microfcope. 
 
 Hyl. I know not how to maintain it, and 
 yet I am loath to give up Extenfion, I fee fo 
 many od Confequences following upon fuch 
 a Conceffion. 
 
 Phil. Od, fay you ? After the Conceffions 
 already made, I hope you will ftick at no- 
 thing for its Odnefs. / 
 
 Hyl. I give up the Point for the pre- 
 fent, referving ftill a Right to retrad my Opi- 
 nion, in cafe I fhall hereafter difcover any 
 falfe Step in my Progrefs to it. 
 
 D 2 Phil. 
 
Phil. That is a Right you cannot be de- 
 nied. Figures and Extension being difpatch- 
 ed, we proceed next to Motion. Can a real 
 Motion in any external Body be, at the fame 
 time, both very fwift and very flow ? 
 
 Hyl. It cannot. 
 
 Phil. Is not the Motion of a Body fwift in 
 a reciprocal Proportion to the time it takes 
 up in defcribing any given Space ? Thus a 
 Body that describes a Mile in an Hour, moves 
 three times fafter than it would in cafe it de- 
 fcribed only a Mile in three Hours. 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you. 
 
 Phil. And is not Time meafured by the 
 Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. And is it not pofliblc Ideas fliould 
 fucceed one another twice as faft in your 
 Mind, as they do in mine, or in that of fome 
 Spirit of another Kind. 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 Phil. Confequently the fame Body may to 
 another feem to perform its Motion over any 
 Space, in half the time that it does to you. 
 And the fame Reafoning will hold as to any 
 other Proportion : That is to fay, according 
 to your Principles (fince the Motions per- 
 ceived are both really in the Object) it is pof- 
 fible one and the fame Body lhall be really 
 moved, the fame way, at once, both very 
 fwift, and very flow. How is this confiftent 
 
 either 
 
 i 
 
(37) 
 
 cither with common Senfe, or what you juft 
 now granted ? 
 
 Hy/. I have nothing to fay to it. 
 
 Phil. Then as for Solidity ; either you do 
 not mean any fenfible Quality by that Word, 
 and fo it is befide our Inquiry : Or if you do, 
 it muft be either Hardneis or Refiftance. But 
 both the one and the other are plainly relative 
 to our Senfes : It being evident, that what 
 feems hard to one Animal, may appear foft 
 to another^ who hath greater Force and Firm- 
 nets of Limbs, Nor is it lefs plain, that the 
 Refiftance I feel is not in the Body. 
 
 Hy/. I own, the very Senfation of Refi- 
 ftance, which is all you immediately perceive, 
 is not in the Body, but the Caufe of that Sen- 
 fation is. 
 
 Phil. But, the Caufes of our Senfations are 
 not Things immediately perceived, and there- 
 fore not fenfible. This Point I thought had 
 been already determined. 
 
 Hy/. I own it was ; but you will pardon 
 me if I feem a little embarraifed : I know not 
 how to quit my old Notions. 
 
 Phil. To help you out, do but confider, 
 that if Extenfion be once acknowieged to 
 have no Exiftence without the Mind, the fame 
 muft neceffarily be granted of Motion, Soli- 
 dity, and Gravity, fince they all evidently 
 fuppofe Extenfion. It is therefore fuperSuous 
 $o inquire particularly concerning each of 
 D 3 them. 
 
them. In denying Extenfion, you have de- 
 nied them all to have any real Exiftence. 
 
 Hyl. I wonder, Philonour, if what you 
 fay be true, why thofe Philofophers who de- 
 ny the Secondary Qualities any real Exiftence, 
 Should yet attribute it to the Primary. If 
 there is no Difference between them,, how 
 can this be accounted for ? 
 
 Phil. It is not my Bufinefs to account for 
 every Opinion of the Philofophers. But a- 
 mong other Reafons which may be affigned 
 for this, it feems probable, that PJkafure and 
 Pain being rather annexed to the former, than 
 the latter, may be one. Heat and Cold, 
 Taftes, Smells, &c. have fomething more 
 vividly pleafing or difagreeable than the Ideas 
 of Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, affed us 
 with. And 5 it being too vifibly abfurd to 
 hold, that Pain or Pleafure can be in an un- 
 perceiving Subftance, Men are more eafily 
 \veaned from believing the external Exiftence 
 of the Secondary, than the Primary Qualities. 
 You will be fatisfied there is fomething in this, 
 if you recoiled the Difference you made be- 
 tween an intenfe and more moderate Degree 
 of Heat 3 allowing the one a real Exiftence, 
 while you denied it to the other. But after 
 all, there is no rational Ground for that Di- 
 ftin&ion ; for furely an indifferent Senfation 
 is as truly a Senfation, as one more pleafing 
 or painful,- and, confequently, ihpuld not 
 / any 
 
. 
 
 any more than they be fuppofcd to exift in an 
 unthinking Subject. 
 
 Hyl. It is juft come into my Head, Philo- 
 nou^ that I have fomewhere heard of a Di- 
 ftin&ion between abfolute and fenfible Ex- 
 tenfion. Now, though it be acknowleged 
 that great and Jmall, confiding meerly in the 
 Relation which other extended Beings have 
 to the Parts of our own Bodies, do not re- 
 ally inhere in the Subftances themfelves, yet 
 nothing obliges us to hold the fame with re- 
 gard to abfolute Extenfion, which is fomething 
 abftra&ed from great and fmall, from this or 
 that particular Magnitude or Figure. So 
 likewife as to Motion, fwift and /low arCval- 
 together relative to the Succeffion of Ideas^in 
 our own Minds. But it does not follow, be- 
 caufe thofe Modifications of Motion exift not 
 without the Mind, that therefore abfolute 
 Motion abftra&ed from them does not. 
 
 Phil. Pray, what is it that diftinguiihes one 
 Motion, or Part of Extenfion, from another, 
 is it not fomething fenfible, as fome Degree 
 of Swiftnefs or Slownefs, fome certain Mag- 
 nitude or Figure peculiar to each ? 
 
 Hyl. I think fo. 
 
 Phil. Thefe Qualities, therefore, ftripped 
 of all fenfible Properties, are without all fpe- 
 cific and numerical Differences, as the Schools 
 call them. 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 D 4 Phil. 
 
( 40 ) 
 
 Pbil That is to fay, they are Extenfion in 
 general, and Motion in general. 
 Hyl. Let it be feu 
 
 Phil. But it is an univerfally received 
 Maxim, that, Every, thing which exiftr, is par- 
 ticular. How then can Motion in general, or 
 Extenfion in general, exift in any corporeal 
 Subftance ? 
 
 Hyl. I will take time to folve your Diffi- 
 culty. 
 
 Phil. But I think the Point may be fpeedi- 
 
 J[y decided. Without doubt you can tell, 
 
 whether you are able to frame this or that 
 
 Idea. Now, I am content to put our Dif- 
 
 pute on*this lifue. If you can frame in your 
 
 Thoughts a diftindt abftrad Idea of Motion 
 
 or Extenfion, divefted of all thofe fenfible 
 
 Modes, as fwift and flow, great and fmall 9 
 
 round and fquare, and the like, which are 
 
 acknowleged to exift only in the Mind, I 
 
 will then yield the Point you contend for. 
 
 But if you cannot, it will be unreafonable on 
 
 your Side, to infift any longer upon what you 
 
 have no Notion of. 
 
 HyL To confefs ingenuoufly, I cannot. 
 Phil. Can you even feparate the Ideas of 
 Extenfion and Motion, from the Ideas of 
 Light; and Colours, hard and foft, hot and 
 cold, with the reft of thofe Qualities which 
 they who make the Diftin&ion^ term Secon? 
 dan. 
 
uo 
 
 Hyl. What ! Is it not an eafy Matter, to 
 confider Extcnfion and Motion by themfelves, 
 abftra&ed from all other fenfible Qualities? 
 Pray, how do the Mathematicians treat of 
 them ? 
 
 Phil. I acknowlege, Uylas^ it is not diffi- 
 cult to form general Propofitions and Reafon-* 
 ings about thofe Qualities, without mention- 
 ing any other , and in this Senfe, to confickr 
 or treat of them abftra&edly. But, how does 
 it follow, that becaufe I can pronounce the 
 Word Motion, by itfelf, I can form the Idea 
 of it in my Mind exclufive of Body ? or, be- 
 caufe Theoremes may be made of Exten-r 
 fion and Figures, without any mention of 
 Great, or Small, or any other fenfible Mode 
 or Quality ? That, therefore, it is poflible fuch 
 an abftraft Idea of Extenfion, without any 
 particular Size, Colour, &c. fliou'd be di- 
 ftinftly formed,and apprehended by the Mind? 
 Mathematicians treat of Quantity, without 
 regarding what other fenfible Qualities it is 
 attended with, as being altogether indifferent 
 to their Demonftrations. But, when laying 
 afide the Words, they contemplate the bare 
 Jdeas, . I believe you will find, they aye not 
 the pure abftraded Ideas of Extenfion. 
 
 Hyl. But, what fay you to pure Intellect? 
 may not abftrafted Ideas be framed by 
 that faculty?. 
 
Phil. Since I cannot frame ahftraft Ideas 
 at all, it is plain, I cannot frame them by the 
 Help of pure Intellect, whatfoever Faculty you 
 underftand by thofe Words. Befides, not 
 to inquire into the Nature of pure Intellect, 
 and its fpiritual Obje&s, as Verlm, Reafon y 
 Godj or the like ; thus much feems manifeft^ 
 that fenfible Things are only to be perceived 
 by Senfe, or reprefented by the Imagination, 
 Figures, therefore, and Extenfion, being ori- 
 ginally perceived' by Senfe, do not belong to 
 pure Intellect. But/or your farther Satisfa&ion, 
 try if you can frame the Idea of any Figure, 
 abftra&ed from all Particularities of Size, or 
 even from other fenfible Qualities. 
 
 Hyl. Let me think a little I do not 
 
 find that I can. 
 
 Phil. And can you think it poflible, that 
 fliou'd really exift in Nature, which implies 
 a Repugnancy in its Conception ? 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. Since, therefore, it is impoffible, even 
 for the Mind, to difunite the Ideas of Exten- 
 fion and Motion from all other fenfible Qua- 
 lities, does it not follow, that where the 
 one exift, there, neceflfarily, the other exift 
 likewife ? 
 
 Hyl. It fliould feem fo. 
 
 ^ Phil. Confequently, the very fame Argu- 
 ments which you admitted, as conclufive a- 
 gainft the Secondary Qualities, are, without 
 
 any 
 
( 4? ) 
 
 any farther Application of Force, againft the 
 Primary too. Befides,if you will truft your Sen- 
 fes ; is it not plain, all fenfible Qualities coexift, 
 or, to them, appear as being in the fame 
 Place ? Do they ever reprefent a Motion, or 
 Figure, as being diverted of all other vifible 
 and tangible Qualities ? 
 
 Hy/. You need fay no more on this Head. 
 I am free to own, if there be no fecret Error, 
 or Overfight, in our Proceedings hitherto, that 
 all fenfible Qualities are alike to be denied 
 Exiftence without the Mind. But my Fear 
 is, that I have been too liberal in my former 
 Conceffions, or overlooked fome Fallacy or 
 other. In fliort, I did not take time to 
 think. 
 
 Phil. For that matter, Hykf, you may take 
 what time you pleafe, in reviewing the Pro- 
 grefs of our Inquiry. You are at liberty to 
 recover any Slips you might have made, or 
 offer whatever you have omitted, which makes 
 for your firft Opinion. 
 
 Hy/. One great Overfight I take to be this : 
 That I did not fufficiently diftinguilh the 
 Objeft from the Senfation. Now, tho this lat- 
 ter may not exift without the Mind, yet it 
 will not thence follow, that the former can- 
 not. 
 
 Phil. What Object do you mean ? the Ob- 
 
 & of the Senfes ? 
 
 Jiyl. The fame. 
 
 Phil. 
 
(44) 
 
 Phil. It is then immediately perceived. 
 
 Hy/. Right. 
 
 PhiL Make me to undcrftand the Difference 
 between what is immediately perceived., and 
 a Senfation. 
 
 Hy/. The Senfation I take to be an Ad of 
 the Mind perceiving , befide which, there is 
 fomething perceived , and this I call the Ob- 
 jetf. For Example, there is Red and Yellow 
 on that Tulip. But then, the A& of percei- 
 ving thofe Colours is in me only, and not 
 In the Tulip. 
 
 PhiL What Tulip do you fpeak of ? is it 
 that which you fee ? 
 
 Hyl, The fame, 
 
 PhiL And, what do you fee, befide Colour, 
 Figure, $nd Extenfion 
 
 HyL Nothing. 
 
 PhiL What you would fay then is, that the 
 Red and Yellow-are coexiftent with the Ex- 
 tenfion ; is it not ? 
 
 HyL That is not all ; I wou'd fay, They 
 have a real Exiftence without the Mind, in 
 fome unthinking Subftance. 
 
 PhiL That the Colours are really in the 
 Tulip which I fee, is manifeft. Neither can 
 it be denied, that this Tulip may exift inde- 
 pendent of your Mind, or mine ; but that 
 any immediate Objed of the Senfes, /'. e. any 
 Idea, or Combination of Ideas, ihould exift 
 in an unthinking Subftance, or exterior ta all 
 
(4?) 
 
 Minds, is in itfelf an evident Contradiction, 
 Nor can I imagine how this follows, from 
 what you faid juft now, viz. that the Red and 
 Yellow were on the Tulip you faw, fmce 
 you do not pretend to fee that unthinking 
 Subftance. 
 
 Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of 
 diverting our Inquiry from the Subject. 
 
 Phil. I fee you have no mind to be pref- 
 fed that way. To return then to your Di- 
 ftin&ion between Senfation and Objetf ; if 
 I take you right, you diftinguifli in every Per- 
 ception two things, the one an Action of the 
 Mind, the other not. 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. And this A&ion cannot exift In, or 
 belong to any unthinking thing $ but, what- 
 ever bcfide is implied in a Perception, may. 
 
 Kyi. That is my Meaning. 
 
 Phil. So that if there was a Perception 
 without any Ad of the Mind, it were pofli- 
 ble fuch a Perception fhould exift in an un- 
 thinking Subftance. 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. But it is impoffible there 
 fliould be fuch a Perception. 
 
 Phil. When is the Mind faid to be a&ive ? 
 
 Hyl. When it produces, puts an end to, 
 or changes any thing. 
 
 Phil. Can the Mind produce, difcontinue^ 
 or change aiay thing but by an At of the 
 Will? 
 
 tfyl 
 
(4*) 
 
 Hyl. It cannot. 
 
 Phil. The Mind, therefore, is to beaccouri- 
 ted a&ive in its Perceptions, fo far forth as 
 Volition is included in them. 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. In plucking this Flower, I am adive, 
 becaufe I do it by the Motion of my Hand, 
 which was confequent upon my Volition ; 
 fo likewife, in applying it to my Nofe. But, 
 is either of thefe Smelling ? 
 
 Hyl. No. 
 
 Phil. I ad too, in drawing the Air thro 
 my Nofe ; becaufe my Breathing fo, rather 
 than otherwife, is the Effed of my Volition. 
 But, neither can this be called Smelling : For 
 if it were, I Ihou'd fmell every time I brea- 
 thed in that manner. 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. Smelling then is fomewhat confe- 
 quent to all this. 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. But I do not find my Will concer- 
 ned any farther. Whatever more there is, as 
 that I perceive fuch a particular Smell, or any 
 Smell at all, this is independent of my Will, 
 and therein I am altogether paflive. Do you 
 find it otherwife with you, Hylas ? 
 Hyl. No, the very fame. 
 
 Phil. Then, as to Seeing, is it not in your 
 Power to open your Eyes, or keep them Ihut ; 
 to turn them this, or that way ? . 
 
 Hyl. 
 
(47) 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt. 
 
 Phil. But does it, in like manner, depend 
 on your Will, that in looking on this Flower, 
 you perceive White rather than any other Co^ 
 lour ? or, directing your open Eyes toward 
 yonder Part of the Heaven, can you avoid 
 feeing the Sun ? or, is Light or Darknefs 
 the Effeft of your Volition ? 
 Hyl No, certainly. 
 
 Phil. You are then 3 in thefe Refpes, alt$- 
 gether Paflive. 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. Tell me now, whether Seeing con- 
 fifts in perceiving Light and Colours, or in 
 opening and turning the Eyes ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt, in the former. 
 Phil. Since, therefore, you are in the very 
 Perception of Light and Colours altogether 
 paflive, what is become of that Action you 
 were fpeaking of, as an Ingredient in every 
 Senfation ? And, does it not follow from 
 your own Conceffions, that the Perception of 
 Light and Colours, including no Aftion in 
 it, may exift in an unperceiving Subftance ? 
 And, is not this a plain Contradiction ? 
 Hyl. I know not what to think of it. 
 Phil. Befides, fince you diftinguiili the 
 ASli've and Pajfive in every Perception, you 
 muft do it in that of Pain, But, how is ic 
 poflible, that Pain, be it as little atfive as you 
 ^ fhould exift in an unperceiving Sub- 
 ftance ? 
 
ttancc ? In fliort, do but confider the Point, 
 and then confcfs ingenuoufly, whether Light, 
 and Colours, Taftes, Sounds, &c. are not all 
 equally Paffions, or Senfations in the Soul. 
 You may, indeed, call them external Objeftr y 
 and give them in Words what Subfiftence you 
 pleale. But examine your own Thoughts^ 
 and then tell me, whether it be not as 1 fay; 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege, Philonous, that upon 
 a fair Obfervation of what paffes in my Mind, 
 I can difcover nothing elfe, but that I am a 
 thinking Being, affected with Variety of Sen- 
 fations j neither is it poflible to conceive, how a 
 Senfation fhould exift in an unperceivingSub- 
 fiance. But then, on the other hand, when I 
 look on fenfible Things in a different View, 
 confidering them as fo many Modes and Qua- 
 lities, I find it neceffarytofuppofe a material 
 Subftratuin, without which they cannot be 
 conceived to exift. 
 
 Phil Material Subflratumc&ll you it? Pray, 
 by which of your Senfes came you acquain- 
 ted with that Being ? 
 
 Hyl. It is not itfelf fenfible ; its Modes and 
 Qualities only being perceived by the Sen- 
 fes. 
 
 Phil. I prefume then, it was by Reflexion 
 and Reafon you obtained the Idea of ifr 
 
 Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper, po* 
 fitive Idea of it. However, I conclude it exift s^ 
 becaufe Qualities cannot be conceived to exift 
 without a Support, 
 
 Phil. 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 Phil. It feems then you hive only a rela- 
 tive Notion of it, or that you conceive it not 
 otherwife than by conceiving the Relation it 
 bears to fenfible Qualities. 
 
 Hyl. Right. 
 
 Phil. Be pleafed therefore to let me know 
 wherein that Relation confifts. 
 
 Hyl. Is it not Efficiently expreffed in the 
 Term Subftratmn^ or Subftance ? 
 
 Phil. If fo, the Word Subftratum fliould 
 import, that it is fpread under the fenfible 
 Qualities or Accidents. 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. And confequently under Extenfion. 
 
 Hyl. I own it. 
 
 PhiL It is,, therefore, fomewhat in its own 
 Nature intirely diftind from Extenfion^ 
 
 Hyl. I tell you, Extenfion is only a Mode, 
 and Matter is fomething that fupports Modes. 
 And is it not evident the Thing fupported is 
 different from the thing fupporting ? 
 
 Phil. So that fomething diftinft from, and 
 exclufive of, Extendon^ is fuppofed to be the 
 Subftratum of Extenfion. 
 
 Hyl. Juft fo. 
 
 Phil. Anfwer me, Hylar. Can a thing be 
 fpread without Extenfion : or is not the Idea 
 of Extenfion neceifarily included in Spread- 
 ing ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 E Phil. 
 
. Whatfoevef, therefore, you fuppofe 
 fpread under any thing, muft have in itfelf 
 an Extenfion diftind from the Extcnfion of 
 that Thing under which it is fpread. 
 
 Hyl Itmuft. 
 
 Phil. Confcquently every corporeal Sub- 
 ftance, being the Subflratum of Extenfion, 
 muft have in itfelf another Extenfion by 
 which it is qualified to be a Subflratum: And 
 fo on to Infinity. And I ask whether this be 
 not abfurd in itfelf, and repugnant to what 
 you granted juft now, viz. that the Subflra- 
 tum was fomething diftinft from, and cxclu- 
 fiveof, Extenfion. 
 
 Hyl. Ay, bur, Philonouf, you take me 
 wrorig. 1 do not mean that Matter is fpread 
 in a grpfs literal Senfe under Extenfion. The 
 Word Subflratum is ufed only to exprefs in 
 general, the fame thing with Sub/lance. 
 
 Phil. Well then, let us examine the Rela- 
 tion implied in the Term Subftance. Is it not 
 that it (lands under Accidents ? 
 
 Hyl. The very fame. 
 
 Phil. But that one thing may ftand under, 
 or fupport another, muft it not be extended? 
 
 Hyl. It muft. 
 
 Phil. Is not therefore this Suppofition lia- 
 ble to the fame Abfurdity with the former ? 
 
 Hyl. You ftill take Things in a ftri& lite- 
 ral Senfe : That is not fair, Philonouf. 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. I ani hot for impofing any Senfe on 
 your Words : You are at Liberty to explain 
 them as you pleafe; Only I befeech you, 
 make me underftand fomething by them* 
 You tell me. Matter fupports dr ftands under 
 Accidents* How I is it as your Legs fupporc 
 your Body ? 
 
 Hyl, No j that is the literal Senfe; 
 
 Phil. Pray let me know any Senfe^ literal 
 Or not literal, that you underftand it in. -- 
 How long muft I wait for an Anfwen Hy+ 
 las ? 
 
 HyL I declare I knovv not what to fay. I 
 oiice thought I underftood well enough what 
 was meant by Matter's fupporting Accidents* 
 But now the more 1 think on it, the leis can 
 I comprehend it ; in ftiort, I find that I know 
 nothing of it. 
 
 Phil. It feems theh you have no Idea at all^ 1 
 neither relative nor pofitive of Matter ; you 
 know neither what it is in kfelf, nor what 
 Relation it bears to Accidents^ 
 
 Hyh I acknowlege it. 
 
 Phil. And yet you aiferted, that you could 
 not conceive^ how Qualities or Accidents 
 fliould really exift, without conceiving at the 
 fame time a material Support of them* 
 
 Hyl. I did; 
 
 Phil* That is to fay, when you conceive 
 the real Exiftence of Qualities, you do with^ 
 
 E a ai 
 
al conceive fomething which you cannot con- 
 ceive. 
 
 Hyl. It was wrong I own. But ftill I fear 
 there is fome Fallacy or other. Pray what 
 think you of this ? It is juft come into my 
 Head, that the Ground of all our Miftake 
 lies in your treating of each Quality by it- 
 felf. Now, I grant that each Quality cannot 
 fingly fubfift without the Mind. Colour can- 
 not without Extenfion , neither can Figure 
 without fome other fenfible Quality. But, as 
 the feveral Qualities united or blended toge- 
 ther form intire fenfible Things, nothing 
 hinders why fuch things may not be fuppofed 
 to exift without the Mind. 
 
 Phil Either, Hykr, you are jefting, or 
 have a very bad Memory. Though, indeed, 
 we went through all the Qualities by Name, 
 one after another; yet my Arguments, or ra- 
 ther your Conceffions, no where tended to 
 prove, that the Secondary Qualities did not 
 fubfift each alone by itfelf, but, that they 
 \ were not at all without the Mind. Indeed, 
 in treating of Figure and Motion, we con- 
 cluded, they could not exift without the 
 Mind, becaufe it was impoflible, even in 
 Thought, to feparate them from all Secon- 
 dary Qualities, fo as to conceive them exift- 
 ing by themfelves. But then this was not 
 the only Argument made Ufe of upon that 
 Gccafion. But (to pafs by all that hath been 
 
 hitherto 
 

 , 
 
 hitherto faid, and reckon it for nothing, if 
 you will have it to) I am content to put the 
 whole upon this Ifiue. If you can conceive 
 it poflible for any Mixture or Combination of 
 Qualities., or any fenfible Objeft whatever, to 
 exift without the Mind, then I will grant it 
 aftually to be fo. 
 
 Hyl. If it comes to that, the Point will 
 foon be decided. What more eafy than to 
 conceive a Tree or Houfe exifting by itfelf, 
 independent of, and unperceived by, any Mind 
 whatfoever ? I do, at this prefent time, con- 
 ceive them exifting after that Manner. 
 
 Phil. How fay you, Hyla^ can you fee a 
 thing which is at the fame time unfeen ? 
 
 Hyl. No, that were a Contradi&ion. 
 
 Phil. Is it not as great a Contradi&ion to 
 talk of conceiving a thing which is uncon- 
 ceiled ? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. The Tree or Houfe, therefore,, which 
 you think of, is conceived by you. 
 
 Hyl. How fhould it be otherwife ? 
 
 Phil. And what is conceived, is furely in 
 the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. Without Queftion, that which is con- 
 ceived is in the Mind. 
 
 Phil. How then came you to fay, you con- 
 ceived a Houfe or Tree exifting independent 
 and out of all Minds whatfoever ? 
 
 E 3 Hyl. 
 
Hyl. That was, I own, an Overfight ; but 
 
 ftay, let me confider what led me into it. 
 
 It is a pleafant Miftake enough. As I was 
 thinking of a Tree in a fqlitary Place, where 
 no one was prefent to fee it, methought that 
 iwas to conceive a Tree as exifting unperceivcd 
 or unthought pf, not confidering that I my- 
 felf conceived it all the while. But now I 
 plainly fee, that all J can dp is to frame Ideas 
 in my own Mind. I may, indeed, conceive 
 in my own Thoughts the Idea of a Tree, or 
 a Houfe, or a Mountain, but that is all. And 
 this is far from proving, that I can conceive 
 them exifting out of the Minds of all Spirits. 
 
 Phil. You acknowlege then that you cannot 
 poffibly conceive, how any one corporeal fen- 
 jible Thing ihould exift otherwife than in a 
 Mind. 
 
 Hyl. I do. 
 
 Phil. And yet, you will earneftly contend 
 for the Truth of that which you cannot fq 
 much as conceive. 
 
 Hyl. I profefs I know not what to think, 
 but ftill there are fome Scruples remain with 
 me. Is it not certain, I fee Things at a Di- 
 ftance; do we not perceive the Stars and 
 Moon, for Example, to be a great way off ? 
 Is not this, I fay, manifeft to the Senfes ? 
 
 Phil. Do you not in a Dream too perceive 
 thofe or the iikeObie&s ? 
 
 HyL I do. 
 
Phil. And have they not then the fame Ap- 
 pearance of being diftant ? 
 
 Hyl, They have. 
 
 Phil. But you do not thence conclude the / 
 Apparitions in a Dream to be without the 
 Mind. 
 
 Hyl. By no means. 
 
 Phil. You ought not, therefore, to conclude 
 that fenfible Obje&s are without the Mind 
 from their Appearance, or Manner wherein 
 they are perceived. 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege it. But doth not my 
 Senfe deceive me in thofe Cafes ? 
 
 Phil. By no Means. The Idea or Thing 
 which you immediately perceive , neither 
 Senfe nor Reafon informs you that it a&ually 
 exifts without the Mind. By Senfe you only 
 know that you are affeded with fuch certain 
 Senfations of Light and Colours., &c. And 
 thefe you will not fay are without the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. True. But befide all that, do you 
 not think the Sight fuggeftsfomethingofCM- 
 neff or Diftance ? 
 
 Phil. Upon approaching a diftant Object, 
 do the viiible Size and Figure change perpe- 
 tually, or do they appear the fame at all 
 Diftances? 
 
 Hyl. They are in a continual Change. 
 
 Phil. Sight therefore does not fuggeft, or 
 
 any way inform you, that the vifible Obje& 
 
 you immediately perceive exifts at a DilUnce, 
 
 E 4 or 
 
or will be perceived when you advance far r 
 ther onward, there being a continued Series 
 of vifible Objeds fucceeding each other, du- 
 ring the whole Time of your Approach. 
 
 Hyl. It does not; but ftill I know, upon 
 feeing an Objeft, what Objeft I Ihall perceive 
 after having paflfed over a certain Diftance : 
 No matter whether it be exactly the fame or 
 no : There is ftill fomething of Diftance fug- 
 gefted in the Cafe. 
 
 Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on 
 the Point, and then tell me whether there be 
 any more in it than this. From the Ideas you 
 a&ually perceive by Sight, you have by Ex- 
 perience learned to colled what other Ideas 
 you will (according to the ftanding Order of 
 Nature) be affe&ed with, after fuch a certain 
 Succeflion of Time and Motion. 
 
 Hyl. Upon the Whole, I take it to be no- 
 thing elfe. 
 
 Phil. Now, is it not plain, that if we fup- 
 pofe a Man born blind was on a fudden made 
 fo fee, he could at firft have no Experience of 
 jvhat may be fuggefted by Sight. 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. He would not then, according to 
 you, have any Notion of Diftance annexed to 
 tfte Things he faw , but would take them for 
 
 a new Sett of Senfations exiftingonly in his 
 
 i t * t ' ; *^ ; 
 
 Hyl* It is undeniable. 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. But to make it ftill more plain : is not 
 J)lftance a Line turned endwife to the Eye. 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil And, can a Line, fo fituated, be per- 
 ceived by Sight ? 
 
 Hyl. It cannot. 
 
 Phil. Does it not, therefore, follow, that 
 Diftance is not properly and immediately 
 perceived by Sight ? 
 
 Hyl. It fliould feem fo. 
 
 Phil. Again, is it your Opinion, that Co- 
 lours are at a Diftance? 
 
 Hyl. It muft be acknowleged, they are on- 
 ly in the Mind. 
 
 Phil. But, do not Colours appear to the 
 Eye as coexifting in the fame place with 
 Extenfion and Figures. 
 
 Hyl. They do. 
 
 Phil. How can you then conclude from 
 Sight, that Figures exift without, when you 
 acknowlege Colours do not , the feniible 
 Appearance being the very fame with regard 
 to both ? 
 
 Hyl. I know not what to anfwer. 
 
 Phil. But, allowing that Diftance was tru- 
 ly and immediately perceived by the Mind, 
 yet it wou'd not thence follow, it exiftcd 
 out of the Mind. For, whatever is imme- 
 diately perceived, is an Idea : And, can any 
 Idea exift out of the Mind ? 
 
 .{' v^ - . - -'. . . J . _ 
 
 Ply I. 
 
Hyl. To fuppofe that, were abfurd. But 
 inform me, Pbilonou^ can we perceive, or 
 fcnow nothing befide our Ideas ? 
 
 Phil. As for the rational deducing of Cau- 
 fes from Effects, that is befide our Inquiry. 
 And by the Senfes, you can beft tell, whe- 
 ther you perceive any thing, which is not im- 
 mediately perceived. And I ask you, whe- 
 ther the Things immediately perceived, are 
 other than your own Senfations, or Ideas ? 
 You have, indeed, more than once, in the 
 Courfe of this Converfation, expreffed your^ 
 felf on thofe Points ; but you teem, by this 
 laft Qjj.eftion, to have departed from what 
 you then thought. 
 
 Hyl. To fpeak the truth, Philonous y I think 
 there are two Kinds of Obje&s, the one per-* 
 ceived immediately, which are likewife cal- 
 led Ideas ; the other are real Things, or ex- 
 ternal Objects, perceived by the Mediation 
 of Ideas, which are their Images and Repre- 
 fentations. Now I own, Ideas cannot exift 
 without the Mind , but the latter fort of Ob-. 
 jefts do. I am forry I did not think of this 
 Diftin&ion fooner > it would, probably, have 
 cut fliort your Difcourfe. 
 
 Phil. Are thofe external Objefts perceived 
 by Senfe, or by fome other Faculty ? 
 
 Hyl. They are perceived by Senfe. 
 
 Phil. How ! Is there any tiling perceived 
 by Senfe, which is not immediately percei- 
 ved ? 
 
Hyl. Yes, Philonour, in fome fort there is." 
 For Example, when I look on a Picture, or 
 Statue of Julius Crffar, I may be faid, after 
 a manner, to perceive him (tho' aot imme-? 
 diately) by my Senfes. 
 
 Phil. It (eems then, you will have our 
 Jdeas, which alone are immediately percei- 
 ved, to be Pidures of external Things : And, 
 that thefe alfo, are perceived by Senfe, inaf- 
 much as they have a Conformity or Refem- 
 blance to pur Ideas. 
 
 Hyl. That is my Meaning. 
 Phil. And, in the fame way that Julius 
 C<tfar y in himfelf invifible, is, neverthelefs, 
 perceived by Sight , real Things, in them- 
 ielves imperceptible, are perceived by Senfe. 
 Hyl. In the very fame. 
 Phil. Tell me, Hylat, when you behold the 
 Pidure of Julius C<efar, 4o you fee with your 
 Eyes any more than fome Colours and Fi- 
 gures, with a certain Symmetry and Compe- 
 tition of the whole 2 
 Hyl. Nothing elfe. 
 
 Phil. And wou'd not a Man, who had ne- 
 ver known any thing of Julius C<efar^ fee as 
 much 2 
 
 Hyl. He wou'd. 
 
 Phil. Confequently, he hath his Sight, and 
 the Ufe of it, in as perfed a Degree as you. 
 Hyl. I agree with you. 
 
 Phil. 
 
(<Jo) 
 
 Phil. Whence comes it then, that your 
 Thoughts are dire&ed to the Roman Emperor, 
 and his are not ? This cannot proceed from 
 the Senfattons, or Ideas of Senfe, by you then 
 perceived ; fince you acknowlege, you have no 
 Advantage over him in that refpeft. It fhould 
 feem, therefore, to proceed from Reafon and 
 Memory : fhou'd it not ? 
 
 Hyl It fliouU 
 
 Phil. Confequently, it will not follow from 
 that Inftance, that any thing is perceived by 
 Senfe, which is not immediately perceived. 
 Tho' I grant, we may, in one Acceptation, be 
 faid to perceive fenfible Things mediately by 
 Senfe : That is, when from a frequently per- 
 ceived Connexion, the immediate Perception 
 of Ideas by one Senfe, fuggefts to the Mind 
 others, perhaps belonging to another Senfe, 
 which are wont to be connected with them* 
 For inftance, when I hear a Coach drive along 
 the Streets, immediately I perceive only the 
 Sound ; but from the Experience I have had, 
 that fuch a Sound is connected with a Coach, 
 I am faid to hear the Coach. It is, neverthe- 
 lefs, evident, that, in Truth and Stridnefs, 
 nothing can be heard but Sound: And the 
 Coach is not then properly perceived by Senfe, 
 but fuggefted from Experience. So likewife, 
 when we are faid to fee a red-hot Bar or 
 Iron ; the Solidity and Heat of the Iron are 
 not the Obje&s of Sight, but fuggefted to the 
 
 Imagination 
 
. 
 
 Imagination by the Colour and Figure, which 
 are properly perceived by that Senfe. In fhorr, 
 thofe things alone are adually perceived by 
 any Senfe, which would have been perceived, 
 in cafe that fame Senfe had then been firft 
 conferred on us. As for other things, it 
 is plain, they are only fuggefted to the Mind 
 by Experience, grounded on former Percep- 
 tions. But, to return to your Comparifon of 
 Pi&ure, it is plain, if you keep to that, 
 
 . 
 
 lV r J , - - 4 - f " ^^^m^^^^^^iM^WJUiM^A^, 
 
 Realon, or Memory I wou d, therefore, fain 
 "know, wMTI^rpiments you can draw from 
 Reafon, for the Exiftence of what you call 
 real Things, or material Objeffs. Or, whe- 
 ther you remember to have ken them former- 
 ly, as they are in themfelves , or, if you 
 have heard, or read of any one that did. 
 
 Hyl. I fee, Philonou^ you are difpofed to 
 Raillery $ but that will never convince me. 
 
 Phil. My Aim is only to learn from you, 
 the way to come at the Knowlege of thofc 
 material Beings. W hatever^ ^J^f^XiS^^ 
 perceived, either immediately, or mediately : 
 By Senfe, or by Reafon and Reflexion. But, 
 
 ^ fhew me 
 
 what Reafon you have to believe their Exi- 
 ftence ; or, what medium you can poffibly make 
 ufe of, to prove it either to mine, or your 
 own Underftanding. 
 
 Hyl. 
 
Hyt. To deal ingenuoufly, PMoMuf, now 
 I confider the Point, I do hot find I can give 
 you any good Reafon for it. But, thus much 
 feems pretty plain, that it is at leaft poffible, 
 fuch things may really exift. 8 And as long 
 as there is no Abfurdity in fuppofing them, I 
 am refolved to believe as I did, till you bring 
 good Reaforis to the contrary. 
 
 Phil. What ! Is it come to this, that you 
 only believe the Exiftence of material Ob- 
 je&s, and that your Belief is founded barely 
 on the Poflibility of its being true ? Then 
 you will have me bring Reafons againft it : 
 Tho ariother would think it reafonable, the 
 Proof fliould lie on him, who holds the Affir- 
 mative. And after all, this very Point which 
 you are now refolved to maintain^ without any 
 Reafon, is, in effeft, what you have^more than 
 otice, during this Difcourfe^ feen good Reafon 
 to give up. But to pafs over all this ; if I 
 underftand you rightly, you fay, our Ideas do 
 not exift without the Mind ; but that they are 
 Copies, Images, or Reprefentations of certain 
 Originals^ that do* 
 
 Hyl. You take me right. 
 
 Phil. They are then like external Things^ 
 
 Byl They are^ 
 
 Phil. Have thofe Things a ftable and per^ 
 ttlanent Nature independent of our Senfes ; 
 or are they in a perpetual Change, upon our 
 producing any Motions in our Bodies, fu- 
 
pending, exerting, or altering our Faculties 
 or Organs of SenTe* 
 
 Hyh Real Things, it is plain, have a fixed 
 and real Nature, which remains the fame 3 
 notwithftanding any Change in our Senfes^ 
 or in the Pofture and Motion of our Bodies ; 
 which, indeed, may affed the Ideas in our 
 Minds, but it were abfurd to think they had 
 the fame Effeft on Things exifting without 
 the Mind. 
 
 Phil. How then is it poffible, that Things 
 perpetually fleeting and variable, as our Ideas, 
 fhould be Copies or Images of any thing 
 fixed and conftant ? Or, in other Words 5 
 fihce all fenfible Qualities, as Size, Figure, 
 Colour, &c. i. e. our Ideas, arc continually 
 changing upon every Alteration in the Di- 
 ftance, Medium, or Inftruments of Senfa- 
 tion -, how can any determinate material Ob** 
 je^ Bejroperly reprefented or painted forth 
 by feveral diftina: Things each of which is 
 fo different from and unlike the reft ? Or, if 
 you fay, it refembles fome one only of our 
 Ideas, how fhall we be able to diftinguiih the 
 jtrue Copy from all the falfe ones ? 
 
 ~~~Byl. I profefs, Philonou^ I am at a Lofs, 
 I know not what to fay to this. 
 
 Phil. But neither is this all. Which arc 
 material Objcds in themfclves, Perceptible or 
 
 Imperceptible ? 
 
 -" 
 
Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing 
 can be perceived but Ideas. All material 
 Things, therefore, are in themfelves infenfi- 
 ble, and to be perceived only by their Ideas. 
 
 Phil. Ideas then are fenfible, and their Ar- 
 chetypes or Originals infenfible. 
 
 Byl Right. 
 
 Phil. But how can that which is fenfible be 
 like that which is infenftble ? Can a real thing 
 in itfelf imj$Ue 9 be like a Colour ; or a real 
 thing which is not audible, be like a Sound ? 
 In a word jj^^anjiny thing be^ like a Senfa- 
 tion or IdeaT^uLi^l^ 1 * Senfation or Idea ? 
 
 Hyl. I muft own, I think not. 
 
 Phil. Is it poffible there fliould be any 
 Doubt in the Point ? Do you not perfe&ly 
 know your own Ideas ? 
 
 Hyl. I know them perfectly ; fince what I 
 do not perceive, or know, can be no Part of 
 my Idea. 
 
 Phil. Confider, therefore, and examine 
 them, and then tell me if there be any thing 
 in them which can exift without the Mind : or 
 if you can conceive any thing like them 
 exifting without the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. Upon Inquiry, I find it is impoflible 
 for me to conceive or underftand how any 
 thing but an Idea can be like an Idea. And 
 it is moft evident, that no Idea can exift with- 
 out the Mind. 
 
Phil. You ate, therefore, by your Prin* 
 ciples, forced to deny the Reality of fenfible 
 Things, fince you made it to confift in anab- 
 fblute Exiftence, exterior to the Mind. That 
 is to fay, you are a downright Sceptic. So I 
 have gained my Point, which was to fliew^ 
 your Principles led to Scepticifm. 
 
 Hyl. For the prefent I am, if not intirely; 
 convinced, at leaft filenced. 
 
 Phil. I wou'd fain know what more you 
 wou'd require in order to a perfect Con- 
 Vi&ion. Have you not had the Liberty of ex- 
 plaining yourfelf all manner of ways ? Were 
 'any little Slips in Difcourfe laid hold and in- 
 fifted on ? Or were you not allowed to retract 
 or reinforce any thing you had offered,as beft 
 ferved your Purpofe ? Has not every thing 
 you could fay been heard and examined with 
 all the Fairnefs imaginable ? In a word, have 
 you not in every Point been convinced out of 
 your own Mouth ? And if you can at prefent 
 difcover any Flaw in any of your former Con- 
 ceffions, or think of any remaining Subter- 
 fuge, any new Diftinction, Colour, or Com- 
 ment whatfoever, why do you not produce 
 it? 
 
 Hyl. A little Patience, Philonous. I am at 
 prefent fo amazed to fee myfelf enfnared, and 
 as it were imprifoned, in the Labyrinths you 
 have drawn me into, that on the fuddain it 
 cannot be expe&ed I fhould find my Way 
 
 F out* 
 
(.66 ) 
 
 out. You muft give me Time to look about 
 me, and recoiled myfelf. 
 
 Phil. Hark; Is not this the College Bell ? 
 
 Hyl. It rings for Prayers. 
 
 Phil. We will go in then, if you pleafe, 
 and meet here again to Morrow Morning. In 
 the mean time, you may employ your 
 Thoughts on this Morning's Difcourfe, and 
 try if you can find any Fallacy in it, or in- 
 vent any new Means to extricate yourfelf* 
 Hyl. Agreed, 
 
 The 
 
The Second 
 
 DIALOGUE. 
 
 BEG your Pardon, Phi* 
 lonou^ for not meeting 
 you fooner. All this 
 Morning my Head was 
 fo filled with our late 
 Converfation, that I had not Leifure to think 
 of the Time of the Day, or, indeed, of any; 
 thing elfe. 
 
 PmonoUf. 1 am glad you were fo intent 
 upon it, in Hopes if there were any Miftakes 
 in your Conceffions, or Fallacies in my Rea- 
 fonings from them, you will now difcover 
 them to me. 
 
 Hyl. I affure you, I have done nothing ever 
 fince I faw you, but fearch after Miftakes and 
 Fallacies, and with that View have minutely 
 examined the whole Series of Yefterday's 
 Difcourfe : but all in vain, for the Notions it 
 led me into, upon Review, appear ftill more 
 
 F 2 clear 
 
(68) 
 
 clear attd evident ; and the more I confidef 
 them, the more irrefiftibly do they force my 
 Affent. 
 
 Phil. And is not this, think you, a Sign 
 that they are genuine, that they proceed from 
 Nature, and are conformable to right Rea- 
 fon ? Truth and Beauty are in this alike, that 
 the niceft Survey fets them both off to Advan- 
 tage. Whilft the falfe Luftre of Error and 
 Difguife cannot endure being reviewed, or too 
 nearly infpe&ed. 
 
 H)/. I own there is a great deal in what 
 you fay. Nor can any one be more intirely 
 fatisfied of the Truth of thofe od Confe- 
 quences, fo long as I have in View the Rea- 
 fonings that lead to them. But when thefe 
 are out of my Thoughts, there feems, on the 
 other hand, fomething fo fatisfa&ory, fo na- 
 tural and intelligible in the modern Way of 
 explaining things, that I profefs I know not 
 how to reject it. 
 
 Phil. I know not what Way you mean. 
 
 Hyl. I mean the Way of accounting for our 
 Senfations or Ideas. 
 
 Phil. How is that ? 
 
 Hyl. It is fuppofed the Soul makes her Re- 
 fidence in fome Part of the Brain, from which 
 the Nerves take their Rife, and are thence 
 extended to all Parts of the Body. And that 
 outward Qbjeds, by the different Impreffions 
 they make on the Organs of Senfe, commjini- _ 
 
 cate 
 
69 
 
 cate certain vibrative Motions to the Nerves," 
 and thefe being filled with Spirits, propagate 
 them to the Brain or Seat of the Soul, which, 
 3ccor3ing to the various Imprcffions or Traces 
 thereby made in the Brain, is varioufly affeft- 
 ed with Ideas* 
 
 **P'hii. And call you this an Explication of 
 the Manner whereby we are afrefted with 
 Ideas ? 
 
 Hyl. Why not, Philonow, have you any 
 thing to objeft againft it ? 
 
 Phil. I wou'd firft know whether I rightly 
 underftand your Hypothesis. You make cer- 
 tain Traces in the Brain to be the Cauies or 
 Occafionsof our Ideas. Pray tell me, whe- 
 ther by the Brain you mean any fenfible y 
 Thing. 
 
 Hyl. What elfe think you I cou'd mean ? 
 
 Phil. Senfible Things are all immediately 
 perceivable j and thofe Things which are im- 
 mediately perceivable, are Ideas ; and thefe 
 exift only in the Mind. Thus much you 
 have, if I miftake not, long fince agreed to. 
 
 Hyl. I do not deny it. 
 
 Phil The Brain, therefore, you fpeak of, 
 being a fenfible Thing, exifts only in the 
 Mind. Now, I wou'd fain know whether 
 you think it reafonable to fuppofe, that one 
 Idea or Thing exifting in the Mind, occafions 
 all other Ideas. And if you think fo, pray 
 
 _, * 1 *-:*Tf * 
 
 F 3 how 
 
(70) 
 
 p you account for the Origine of that 
 Primary Idea or Brain itfclf ? 
 
 Hyl. I do not explain the Origine of our 
 Ideas by that Brain which is perceivable to 
 Senfe, this being itfelf only a Combination 
 of fenfible Ideas, but by another which I 
 imagine. 
 
 Phil. But, are not Things imagined as 
 truly in the Mind as Things perceived ? 
 
 Hyl. I muft confefs they are. 
 
 Phil. It comes therefore to the fame thing j 
 and you have been all the while accounting 
 for Ideas, by certain Motions or Impreflions 
 in the Brain, /. e. by fome Alterations in an 
 Idea, whether fenfible or imaginable, it mat^- 
 f ers not. 
 
 Hyl. I begin to fufped my Hypothefis. 
 
 PhiL Befide Spirits, all that we know or 
 conceive, are our own Ideas. When, there- 
 fore, you fay, all Ideas are occafioned by 
 Impreflions in the Brain, do you conceive 
 f his Brain or no ? If you do, then you talk 
 pf Icjeas imprinted in an Idea, caufingtjiat 
 fame Idea, which is abfurd. If you do not 
 conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, inftead 
 of forming a reafonable Hypothefis. 
 
 Hyl. I now clearly fee it was a meer Dream. 
 There is nothing in it. 
 
 PhiL You need not be much concerned at 
 It; for, after all, this way of explaining 
 Things, as you called it, could never have 
 
 fatisfied 
 
. 
 
 C 71 ) 
 
 fatisfied any reafonable Man. What Con- 
 nexion is there between a Motion in the 
 Nerves, and the Senfations of Sound or Co- 
 lour in the Mind? or how is it poflible thefe 
 fhouldbetheEffeaof that? 
 
 Hyl. Burl cou'd never think it had fo little 
 in it 5 as now it feems to have. 
 
 Phil. Well then, are you at length fatifr 
 fied that no fenfible Things have a real Exi- 
 ftence $ and that you are in truth an errant 
 Sceptic ? 
 
 Hyl. It is too plain to be denied. 
 
 Phil, Look! are not the Fields covered 
 with a delightful Verdure ? Is there not fpme- 
 thing in the Woods and Groves, in the Rir 
 vers and clear Springs, that Iboths, that fof- 
 tens, that tranfports the Soul ? At the Pro- 
 fped of the wide and deep Ocean, or fome 
 huge Mountain whofe Top is loft in the 
 Sky, or of an old gloomy Forreft, are not 
 our Minds filled with a pleafing Horror? 
 Even in Rocks and Deferts, is there not an 
 agreeable Wildnefs ? How fincere a Pleafure 
 is it to behold the natural Beauties of the 
 Earth! To preferve and renew our Relifli 
 for them, is not the Veil of Night alternate- 
 ly drawn over her Face, and does flie not 
 change her Drefs with the Seafons? How 
 aptly are the Elements difpofed ? What Va- 
 riety and Ufe in Stones and Minerals ? What 
 Delicacy, what Beauty, what Contrivance, 
 F 4 in 
 
(7O 
 
 in animal and vegetable Bodies ? How ex- 
 quifitely are all things fuited, as well to 
 their particular Ends, as to conftitute appo- 
 fite Parts of the Whole ! And while they mutu- 
 ally aid and fupport, do they not alfo fet off 
 and illuftrate each other ? Raife now your 
 Thoughts from this Ball of Earth, to all thofe 
 glorious Luminaries that adorn the high Arch 
 of Heaven. The Motion and Situation of the 
 Planets, are they not admirable for Ufe and 
 Order? Were thofe (mifcalled Erratique) 
 Globes once known to ftray, in their repeated 
 Journeys thorow the pathlefs Void ? Do 
 they not meafure Areas round the Sun, ever 
 proportioned to the Times ? So fixed, fo im- 
 mutable are the Laws by which the unfeen 
 Author of Nature actuates the Univerfe. How 
 vivid and radiant is the Luftre of the fixed 
 Stars ! How magnificent and rich that negli- 
 gent Profufion, with which they appear to be 
 icattered thorow the whole Azure Vault ! Yet, 
 if you take the Telefcope, it brings into your 
 Sight a new Hoft of Stars that efcape the 
 naked Eye. Here they feem contiguous and 
 minute, but, to a nearer View, immenfe 
 Orbs of Light at various Pittances far funk 
 in the Abyfs of Space. Now, you muft call 
 Imagination to your Aid. The feeble, nar- 
 row Senfe, cannot defcry innumerable Worlds 
 revolving round the central Fires; and, in 
 thofe Worlds, the Energy of an alUperfe<5t 
 
(73) 
 
 Mind difla'd in endlefs Forms. But. nei- 
 
 ., 
 
 ther Senfe jnpjr ; Jm3gujation are big enough, 
 to comprehend the boundlefs Extent, with 
 all its dazzling Furniture. Tho the labor- 
 ing Mind exert and ftrain each Power to its 
 utmoft Reach, there ftill ftands out ungrafped, 
 a Surplufage immeafurable. Yet all the vaft 
 Bodies that compofe this mighty Frame, how 
 diftant and remote foever, are by fome fe- 
 cret Mccbm {omc divmc Art andToFW 
 
 ImKeH in a mutual Dependence and Iiiter- 
 couFfe with each other, even "with this Earth, 
 which almoft flipt from my Thoughts, and 
 was loft in the Croud of Worlds. Is not the 
 whole Syftem immenfe, beautiful^ glorious, 
 beyond Expreflion and beyond Thought! 
 "What treatment then do thofe Philofophers 
 deferve, who wou'd deprive thefe noble and 
 delightful Scenes of all Reality ? How fliou'd 
 thofe Principles be entertained, that lead us 
 to think all the vifible Beauty of the Creation 
 a falfe imaginary Glare ? To be plain, 
 can you exped this Scepticifm of yours will 
 not be thought extravagantly abfurd by all 
 Men of Senfe? 
 
 Hyl. Other Men may think as they pleafe : 
 But for your Part, you have nothing to re- 
 proach me with. My Comfort is, you are as 
 much a Sceptic as I am. 
 
 Phil. There, Hylar y I muft beg Leave to 
 differ from you, 
 
(74) 
 
 Hyl. What ! Have you all along agreed to 
 the Premifes, and do you now deny the 
 Conclufion, and leave me to maintain thofe 
 Paradoxes by myfelf which you led me into ? 
 This, furely, is not fair. 
 
 Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in 
 thofe Notions that led to Scepticifm. You, 
 indeed^ faid, the Reality of fenfible Things 
 confifted in an abfolutc Exigence out of the 
 Minds of Spirits, or diftinft from their being 
 perceived. And purfuant to this Notion of 
 Reality, you are obliged to deny fenfible 
 Things any real Exiftence : That is, accor- 
 ding to your own Definition, you profefs 
 yourfelf a Sceptic. But I neither faid nor 
 thought, the Reality of fenfible Things was 
 to be defined after that Manner. To me it is 
 evident, for the Reafons you allow of, that 
 fcQfihle Things cannot exiftptherwife than in 
 a Mindjar Spirit. Wher^ } rnn.dnde^ not 
 
 tKafthey have no ye*] Kviftenr.^ hqt that fee^ 
 tng they depepd not on mynrhou^h^ and 
 
 jiave^ Exiftence difHnd from being percei- 
 ^ed by me, there ^jguft be fame $herMind 
 wherein they exifl. As fore, therefore, as the 
 
 \ {enfible World really exifts, fo fure is there 
 
 Ian infinite omniprefent Spirit who contains 
 
 * and fupports it. 
 
 Hyl. What ! This is no more than I and 
 all Chriftians hold ; nay, and all others too 
 
(79) 
 
 who believe there is a God, and that he 
 knows and comprehends all Things. 
 
 Phil. Ay, but here lies the Difference, 
 Men ^goranionl^believe that al^Things are 
 
 by Goc^ becaufcT they 
 of^God 3 whereas J^ on 
 mme3Iatdy-and neceflfarily. 
 
 m 
 
 conciiide_tjie Being of a God, becaufe all 
 fenfible Things muft be perceived by Him, 
 
 Hyl. But fo long as we all believe the fame 
 thing, what matter is it how we come by 
 that Belief? 
 
 Phil. But neither do we agree in the fame 
 Opinion* For Philofophers , tho they ac- 
 knowlege all corporeal Beings to be perceived 
 by God, yet they attribute to them an abfo- 
 lute Subfiftence diftind: from their being per- 
 ceived by any Mind whatever, which I do not. 
 Befides, is there no Difference between fay- 
 ing, There isjijSod, t^ere^rJ^- p&^vesJilL 
 TJytlgt: and faying, fenfible c Fffirigs do realty 
 exift : and if they really exift^ they^are nece- 
 Jarily perceived^ by an infinite Mind: tfa 
 
 there is an injmiuMind^ or God^ This fur- 
 mflies you with a direft and immediate De- 
 monftration, from a moft evident Principle, 
 of the Being of a God. Divines and Philofo- 
 phers had proved, beyond all Controverfy, 
 from the Beauty and Ufefulnefsof the feveral 
 Parts of the Creation, that it was the Work- 
 manfhip of God. But that, fetting afide all 
 
 Help 
 
Help of Aftronomy and natural Philofophy," 
 all Contemplation of the Contrivance, Order, 
 and Adjuftment of Things, an infinite Mind 
 fhould be neceffarily inferred from the bare 
 Exiftence of the feniible World, is an Advan- 
 tage peculiar to them only who have made 
 this eafy Reflexion : That J^^^ibL&Koild 
 is that which we perceive by our feveral 
 Senfes ; and that nothing is perceived by the 
 Senfes befide Ideas ,- and that no Idea, or Ar- 
 chetype of an Idea, can exift otherwife than in a 
 Mind. You may now, without any labori- 
 ous Search into the Sciences, without any 
 Subtilty of Reafon, or tedious Length of Dif- 
 courfe, opjpofe and baffle the moft ftrenuous 
 Advocate tor Atheifm. Thofe miferable Re- 
 fuges, whether in an eternal Succeffion of 
 unthinking Caufes and Effects, or in a for- 
 tuitous Concourfe of Atoms $ thofe wild 
 Imaginations of Vanmi^ Hobbes, and Spino- 
 fa ; in a word, the whole Syftem of Atheifm, 
 is it not intirely overthrown, by this {ingle 
 Reflexion on the Repugnancy included in 
 fuppofing the Whole, or any Part, even the 
 moft rude and fhapelefs of the viiible World, 
 to exift without a Mind? Let any one of 
 thofe Abettors of Impiety but look into his 
 own Thoughts, and there try if he can con- 
 ceive how fo much as a Rock, a Defert, a 
 Chaos, or confufed Jumble of Atoms ; how 
 any thing at all, either Jenfible or imagina- 
 ble, 
 
 
(77) 
 
 ble, can exift independent of a Mind, and he 
 need go no farther to be convinced of his 
 Folly. Can any thing be fairer than to put a 
 Difpute on fuch an IfTue, and leave it to a 
 Man himfelf to fee if he can conceive, even 
 in Thought, what he holds to be true in 
 Faft, and from a Notional to allow it a Real 
 Exiftence ? 
 
 Hyl. It cannot be denied, there is fome- 
 thing highly ferviceable to Religion in what 
 you advance. But do you not think it looks 
 very like a Notion entertained by fome emi- 
 nent Moderns, of feeing all things in God. 
 
 Phil. I wou'd gladly know that Opinion $ 
 pray explain it to me. 
 
 HyLThey conceive that the Soul, being im- 
 material, is incapable of being united with 
 material Things, fo as to perceive them in 
 themfelves, but that fhe perceives them by 
 her Union with the Subftance of God, which 
 being fpiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, 
 or capable of being the immediate Objed of 
 a Spirit's Thought. Befides, the Divine Ef- 
 fence contains in it Perfections correfpondent 
 to each created Being ; and which are, for 
 that Reafon, proper to exhibit or reprefent 
 them to the Mind. 
 
 Phil. I do not underftand how our jL4e,as, 
 
 and inert, 
 
 SSs^ZSjS Part ( or iik 
 of the EfTcnce or Subftance of 
 
 who is an impafllve, indivifiblc, 
 
 , 
 
 Being, 
 
(78) 
 
 Being. Many more Difficulties and Obje- 
 ftions there are, which occur at firft View a- 
 gainft thisHypothefis; but I fhall only add, 
 that it is liable to all the Abfurdities of the 
 common Hypothefes, in making a created 
 World exift other wife than in the Mind of a 
 Spirit. Befide all which it has this peculiar 
 to icfelf ; that it makes that material World 
 ferve to no Purpofe. And if it pafs for a 
 good Argument againft other Hypothefes in 
 the Sciences, that they fuppofe Nature or the 
 Divine Wifdom to make fomething in vain, 
 or do that by tedious round-about Methods, 
 which might have been performed in a much 
 more pfy and compendious way, what fliall 
 we think of that Hypothefis which fuppofes 
 the whole World made in vain ? 
 
 Hyl. But what fay you, are not you too of 
 Opinion that we fee all Things in God ? If I 
 miftake not, what you advance conies near 
 it. 
 
 Phil. I intirely agree with what the Holy 
 Scripture faith, That in God we live, and, 
 move, and have our Being. But that we fee 
 Things in his Eflence after the manner above 
 fet forth, I am far from believing. Take 
 here in brief my Meaning. It is evident that 
 the^Things I pgjpcmgjire my own Ideas, and 
 t]iajioj[c^^ a Mind. 
 
 Nor isTt lets plainjthat thefe Ideas^o^Things 
 ^either themfclves or their 
 
 Archetypes exift independently of my Mind, 
 
 lince 
 
(79) 
 
 fingg^Jg^ to be their Author^ 
 
 jt^hging out of my pow?r *" dprpr m {np at 
 ~ irc 1 what particular Ideas I ihall be a. 
 with ^ipop opening my Eyes or 
 
 They miifLiherefore exift in fomc other 
 Mind 3 whofe Will it is they ihould be^exhL. 
 bited to mc^ The Things, I fay, immedi- 
 ately perceived, are Ideas or Senfations, call 
 them which you will. But how can any Idea 
 or Senfation exift in, or be produced by, any 
 thing but a Mind or Spirit ? This, indeed, 
 is inconceivable : and to affert that which is 
 inconceivable, is to talk Nonfenfe : Is it 
 not? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt. 
 
 Phil. But on the other hand, it is very con- 
 ceivable that they fliould exift in, and be pro- 
 duced by, a Spirit ; fince this is no more than 
 I daily experience in myfelf, inafmuch as I 
 perceive numberlefs Ideas ; and by an Ad of 
 my Will can form a great Variety of them, 
 and raife them up in my Imagination : Tho* 
 it muft be confeffeU, thefe Creatures, of the 
 Fancy are not altogether fo diftinft, fo ftrong, 
 vivid, and permanent, as thofe perceived by 
 my Senfes, which latter are called RealThingr. 
 From all which I conclude^ there is a Mind 
 which_affeftf me evew itfoment ~ with nil 
 Impreffionr I perceive. And from 
 ~tEeYariety, Order, and Manner of thefe, I 
 conclude the Author of them to be wife^ 
 fowerful, and good, beyond Corner ehcnfwn. 
 
N 
 
 (8o) 
 
 Mark it well ; I do not fay, I fee Things by 
 perceiving that which reprefents them in the 
 intelligible Subftance of God. This I do not 
 underftand; but I fay, TheJChin-gs by me 
 perceived are known ^by3icJJndcrftanding 5 
 
 ^ 
 N \| and produced by the Will, ^ 
 
 _ 
 
 Spirit* And Is not all this mod plain and 
 evident? Is there any more in it, than what a 
 little Obfervation of otir own Minds, and that 
 which pafifcs in them hot only enables us to 
 conceive, but alfo obliges us to acknow* 
 lege? 
 
 Hyl. I think I underftand you very clearly ; 
 and own the Proof you give of a Deity 
 feems no lefs evident, than it is furprizing* 
 But allowing that God is the fupreme and 
 Univerfal Caufe of all Things, yet may not 
 there ftill be a Third Nature befide Spirits 
 and Ideas ? May we not admit a fubordinate 
 and limited Caufe of our Ideas ? In a word 5 
 may there not for all that be Matter ? 
 
 Phil. How often muft I inculcate the fame 
 thing ? You allow the Things immediately 
 perceived by Senfe to exift no where without 
 the Mind: But there is nothing perceived by 
 Senfe, which is not perceived immediately : 
 therefore there is nothing fenfible that exifts 
 without the Mind. The Matter, therefore, 
 which you ftill infift on, is fomething intelli- 
 gible, Ifuppofe* fomething that may be dif- 
 covered by Reafon, and not by Senfe. 
 
 Hyl. You are in the right. 
 
 put. 
 
( 81 ) 
 
 Phil. Pray, let me know what Reafoning 
 your Belief of Matter is grounded on ; and 
 what this Matter is in your prefent Senfe 
 of it. 
 
 , Hyl. I find myfelf affefted with various 
 Ideas, whereof, I know., I am not the Caufe j 
 neither are they the Caufe of thernfelves, or 
 of one another, or capable of fubfifting by 
 themfelves, as being altogether inactive, fleet- 
 ing, dependent Beings* They have, there- 
 fore, fome Caufe diftinft from me aftd them : . 
 Of which I pretend to know no more, than 
 that it is the Caufe of my Ideas. And this 
 thixg, whatever it be, I call Matter. 
 
 Phil. Tell me, Hylas, has every one a Li- 
 berty to change the current, proper Signifi- 
 cation, annexed to a common Name in any 
 Language ? For Example, fuppofe a Tra- 
 veller Ihou'd tell you, that, in a certain Coun- 
 try, Men might pafs unhurt thorow the Fife ; 
 and, upon explaining himfelf, you found he 
 meant by the Word Fire that which others 
 call Water : Or, if he fliou'd affert, there are' 
 Trees which walk upon two Legs, meaning 
 Men by the Term Trees. Wou <d you thinK 
 this reafonable ? 
 
 HyL No $ I ihou'd think it very abfurd* 
 Common Cuftom is the Standard of -Pro- 
 priety in Language. And for any Man to 
 aflfed: fpeaking improperly, is to pervert 
 the Ufe of Speech^ and can never fcrve to a 
 
 G better 
 
(82.) 
 
 better purpofe, than to protraft and multi- 
 ply Difputes where there is no Difference in 
 Opinion. 
 
 Phil. And does not Matter, in the com- 
 nion current Acceptation of the Word, figni- 
 fy an extended, folid, moveable, unthinking, 
 inactive Subftance ? 
 Hyl. It does. 
 
 Phil. And has it not been made evident, 
 that no fuch Subftance can poflfibly exift ? And 
 tho it fhouM be allowed to exift, yet how 
 can that which is inaSti^e be a Caufe , or that 
 which is unthinking be a Caufe of Thought ? 
 You may, indeed, if you pleafe, annex to the 
 Word Matter, a contrary Meaning to what 
 is vulgarly received ; and tell me, you un- 
 derftand by it, an unextended, thinking, 
 a&ive Being, which is the Caufe of our Ideas. 
 But what elie is this, than to play with Words, 
 and run into that very Fault you juft now 
 condemned with fo much Reafon ? I do by 
 no means find fault with your Reafoning, in 
 that you colled a Caufe from the Phenomena. 
 But I deny, that the Caufe deducible by Rea- 
 fon, can properly be termed Matter. 
 
 Hyl. There is, indeed, fomething in what 
 you fay. But I am afraid, you do not tho- 
 rowly comprehend my Meaning. I wou'd 
 by no means be thought to deny, that God, 
 or an Infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Caufe 
 of all things. All I contend for, is, that fub- 
 
 ordinate 
 
ordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a 
 Caufeof a limited and inferior Nature, which 
 concurs in the Production of our Ideas, not 
 by any Aft of Will, or Spiritual Efficiency,' 
 but by that Kind of A&ion which belongs to 
 Matter, '*viz. Motion. 
 
 Phil. 1 find, you are at every Turn relap- 
 ling into your old exploded Conceit, of a 
 moveable, and, confequently, an extended 
 Subftance exifting without the Mind. What ! 
 Have you already forgot you were convinced, 1 
 or are you willing I ftiou'd repeat what has 
 been fald on that Head ? In truth, this is not 
 fair Dealing in you, ftill to fuppofe the Being 
 of that which you have fo often acknowleged 
 ro have no Being. But, not to infift farther, 
 on what has been fo largely handled, I ask,' 
 whether all your Ideas are not perfectly paf- 
 five and inert, including nothing of Action in 
 them ? 
 
 Hyl. They are. 
 
 Phil. And are fenfible Qualities any thing 
 clfe but Ideas? 
 
 Hyl. How often have I acknowleged that 
 they are not ? 
 
 Phil. But is not Motion a fenfible Quaj 
 lity? 
 
 Hyl. It is. 
 
 Phil. Confequently, it is no Aftion. 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you* And, indeed, it is 
 
 very plain, that when I ftir my Finger, it re- 
 
 G 2 mains 
 
(84) 
 
 rfiains paflfive ; but my Will, which produ- 
 ced the Motion., is a&ive. 
 
 Phil. Now I defire to know, in the firft 
 place, whether Motion being allowed to be 
 no A&ion, you can conceive any Action be- 
 fide Volition : And in the fecond place, whe- 
 ther to fay fomething, and conceive nothing, 
 be not to talk Nonfenfe : And, laftly, whe- 
 ther having confidered the Premifes you do 
 not perceive, that to fuppofe any efficient or 
 a&ive Caufe of our Ideas, other than Spirit, 
 is highly abfurd and unreafonable ? 
 
 HjL I give up the Point intirely. But tho' 
 Matter may not be a Caufe, yet what hin- 
 ders its being an Instrument fubfervient to the 
 Supreme Agent, in the Production of our 
 Ideas ? 
 
 Phil. Anlnftrument, fay you , pray, what 
 may be the Figure, Springs, Wheels, and Mo- 
 tions of that Inftrument ? 
 
 Hyl. Thofe I pretend to determine nothing 
 of, both the Subftance and its Qualities be- 
 ing intirely unknown to me. 
 
 Pbil. What ? You are then of Opinion, it 
 is made up of unknown Parts, that it hath 
 unknown Motions and an unknown Shape. 
 
 Hyl. I do not believe it hath any Figure 
 or Motion at all, being already convinced, 
 that no fenfible Qualities can exift in an vm- 
 perceiving Subftance. 
 
 Pbil. 
 
(8.O 
 
 Phil. But what Notion is it potfible to 
 frame of an Inftrument void of all fenfible 
 Qualities, even Extenfion itfelf ? 
 
 Hyl. I do not pretend to have any Notion 
 of it. 
 
 Phil. And what reafon have you to think, 
 this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat 
 does exift? Is it that you imagine , God 
 cannot aft as well without it 5 or that you 
 find by Experience, the Ufe of fome fuch 
 thing, when you form Ideas in your own 
 Mind ? 
 
 Hyl. You are always teizing me for Rea- 
 fons of my Belief. Pray, what Reafons have 
 you not to believe it ? 
 
 Phil. It is to me a fufficient Reafon not to 
 believe the Exiftence of any thing^ if I fee no 
 Reafon for believing it. But not to infift on 
 Reafons for believing, you will not fo much 
 as let me know what it is you wou'd have 
 me believe ; fince you fay, you have no 
 manner of Notion of it. After all, let me 
 intreat you to confider, whether it be like & 
 Philofopher, or even like a Man of common 
 Senfe, to pretend to believe, you know not 
 what, and you know not why. 
 
 Hyl. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you 
 Matter is an Inftrument^ I do not mean alto- 
 gether Nothing. It is true, I know not the 
 particular Kind of Inftrument ; but, how- 
 
 G 3 ever, 
 
(86) 
 
 ever, I have fome Notion of Inftmment in ge* 
 neral, which I apply to it. 
 
 Phil. But what if it fliou'd prove that there 
 is fomething, even in the moft general Notion 
 of Inftrument, as taken in a diftinft Senfe 
 from Caufe, which makes the life of it incon- 
 fiftent with the Divine Attributes ? 
 
 HyL Make that appear., and I fliall give up 
 the Point. 
 
 Phil. What mean you by the general Na- 
 ture or Notion of Inftrument ? 
 
 HyL That which is common to all parti- 
 cular Inftruments compofeth the general No- 
 tion. 
 
 Phil. Is it not common to all Inftruments, 
 that they are applied to the doing thofe things 
 only, which cannot be performed by the meer 
 !A& of our Wills. Thus, for inftance, I ne- 
 ver ufe an Inftrument to move my Finger, be- 
 caufe it is done by a Volition. But I fliou'd 
 ufe one, if I were to remove part of a Rock, 
 or tear up a Tree by the Roots. Are you of 
 the fame Mind ? or, can you fliew any Ex- 
 ample where an Inftrument is made ufe of, 
 In producing an Effeft immediately depend- 
 ing on the Will of the Agent ? 
 
 HyL I own, I cannot. 
 
 Phil. How, therefore, can you fuppofe, 
 that an All-perfeft Spirit, on whofe Will all 
 things have an abfolnte and immediate De- 
 pendence., fhou'd need an Inftrument in his 
 
 Opera- 
 
(8 7 ) 
 
 Operations, or not needing it, make ufe of 
 it ? Thus, it feems to me, that you are ob- 
 liged to own the Ufe of a lifelefs, inadive 
 Jnftrament, to be incompatible with the In-. 
 finite Perfe6tion of God ; that is, by your own 
 Confeflion, to give up the Point. 
 
 Hyl. It does not readily occur what I can 
 anfwer you. 
 
 Phil. But methinks you fhou'd be ready 
 to own the Truth, when it has been fairly 
 proved to you. We indeed, who are Be- 
 ings of Finite Powers, are forced to make 
 ufe of Inftruments. And the Ufe of an In- 
 ftrument fheweth, the Agent to be limited 
 by Rules of another's Prefcription, and that 
 he cannot obtain his End, but in fuch a Way, 
 and by fuch Conditions. Whence it feems 
 a clear Confequence, that the fupreme, unli- 
 mited Agent, ufeth no Tool or Inftrument 
 at all. The Will of an Omnipotent Spirit is 
 no fooner exerted than executed, without 
 the Application of Means, whip h, if they are 
 imployed by inferior Agents, it is not upon 
 account of any real Efficacy that is in them^ 
 or neceflary Aptitude to produce any Effeft, 
 but meerly in compliance with the Laws of 
 Nature, pr thofe Conditions prefcribed to 
 them by the firft Caufe, who is Himfelf a- 
 bove all Limitation or Prefcription what? 
 foever. 
 
 G 4 
 
Hyl. I will no longer maintain, that Mat- 
 ter is an Inftrument. However, I wou'd not 
 be underftood to give up its Exiftence nei- 
 ther > fince, notwithstanding what hath been 
 (aid, it may ftill be an Occafion. 
 
 Phil. How many Shapes is your Matter 
 to take ? or, how often muft it be proved 
 not to exift, before you are content to part 
 with it ? But to fay no more of this (tho 
 by all the Laws of Difputation, I may jufi> 
 ly blame you, for fp frequently changing the 
 Signification of the principal Term) I wou'd 
 fain Jcnow what you mean by affirming, that 
 Matter is an Occafion, having already de- 
 nied it to be a Caufe. And when you have 
 jhewn in what Senfe you underftand Occa- 
 fion, pray, in the next place, be pleafed to 
 fliew me what Reafon induceth you to be- 
 lieve, there is fuch an Occafion of our Ideas. 
 
 Hyl. As to the firft Point : By Occafeon, I 
 mean an inactive, unthinking Being $ at the 
 Prefpnce whereof, God excites Ideas in our 
 Minds. 
 
 Phil. And what may be the Nature of that 
 Jnadive, unthinking Being ? 
 
 Hyl. I know nothing of its Nature. 
 
 Phil. Proceed then to the fecond Point, 
 and affign fome Reafon why we ihould allow 
 an Exiftence to this ina&iye, unthinking, un- 
 known thing. 
 
89 
 
 Hyl. When we fee Ideas produced in 
 Minds after an orderly and conftant Manner, 
 it is natural to think they have fome fixed 
 and regular Occailons, at the Prefence of 
 which they are excited. 
 
 Phil. You acknowlege then God alone to 
 be the Caufe of our Ideas, and that he caufes 
 them at the Prefenceof thofe Occafions. 
 
 Hyl. Thatjs my Opinion. 
 
 Phil. Thofe Things which you fay are pre- 
 fent to God, without doubt He perceives. 
 
 Hyl. Certainly ; otherwife they could not 
 be to Him an Occafion of a&ing. 
 
 Phil. Not to infift now on your making 
 Senfe of this Hypothefis, or anfwering all 
 the puzzling Queftions and Difficulties it is 
 liable to : I only ask whether the Order and 
 Regularity obfervable in the Series of our 
 Ideas, or the Courfe of Nature, be not fuffi- 
 ciently accounted for by the Wifdom and 
 Power of God > and whether it does not de- 
 rogate from thofe Attributes, to fuppofe He 
 is influenced, directed, or put in Mind, when 
 and what He is to act, by any unthinking 
 Subftance. And,laftly, whether, in cafe I gran- 
 ted all you contend for, it wou'd make any 
 thing to your Purpofe,it not being eafy to con- 
 ceive,how the external or abfolute Exiftence of 
 an unthinking Subftance, diftinft from its be- 
 ing perceived, can be inferred from my al- 
 lowing that there are certain things perceived 
 
 by 
 
by the Mind of God, which are to Him the 
 Occafion of producing Ideas in us. 
 
 Hy/. I am perfectly at a Lofs what to think, 
 this Notion of Occafion feeming now altoge- 
 ther as groundlefs as the reft. 
 
 Phil. Do you not at length perceive, that 
 in all thefe different Acceptations of Matter^ 
 you have been only fuppofing you know not 
 what, for no manner of Reafqn, and to no 
 kind of Ufe ? - 
 
 Hyl. I freely own myfelf lefs fond of my 
 Notions, fince they have been fo accurately 
 examined. But ftill, methinks, I have fome 
 confufed Perception that there is fuch a thing 
 as Matter. 
 
 Phil. Either you perceive the Being of Mat- 
 ter immediately, or mediately. If imme- 
 diately, pray inform me by which of the 
 Senfes you perceive it. If mediately, let me 
 know by what Reafoning it is inferred from 
 thofe Things which you perceive immediate- 
 ly. So much for the Perception. Then for 
 the Matter itfelf, I ask whether it is Ob j eft, 
 Subflratum^ Caufe, Inftrument, or Occafion ? 
 You have already pleaded for each of thefe, 
 fliifting your Notions, and making Matter to 
 appear fometime in one Shape, then in ano- 
 ther. And what you have offered, has been 
 difapproved and rejefted by yourfelf. If you 
 have any thing new to advance, I wou'd glad- 
 ly hear it. 
 
 Hyl. 
 
Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had 
 to fay on thofe Heads. I am at a Lofs what 
 more to urge. 
 
 Phil. And yet you are loath to part \vith 
 your old Prejudice. But to make you quit it 
 more eafily, I defire that, befide what has 
 been hitherto fuggefted, you will farther 
 confider, whether upon Suppofition that Mat- 
 ter exifts, you can poflibly conceive how you 
 Ihou'd be affe&ed by it ? Or fuppofing it did 
 not exift, whether it be not evident, you 
 might for all that be affefted with the fame 
 Ideas you now are, and confequently have 
 the very fame Reafons to believe its Exiftence 
 that you now can have ? 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege it is poffible we might 
 perceive all things juft as we do now, tho 
 there was no Matter in the World ; neither 
 can I conceive., if there be Matter, how it 
 "fhou'd. produce any Idea in our Minds. And 
 I do farther grant, you have intirely fatisfied 
 me, that it is impoflible there fhou'd be fuch a 
 thing as Matter in any of the foregoing Ac- 
 ceptations. But ftill I cannot help fuppofing 
 that there is Matter in fome Senfe or other. 
 What that is I do not indeed pretend to de- 
 termine. 
 
 Phil. I do not expcft you fhou'd define ex- 
 a&ly the Nature of that unknown Being. On- 
 ly be pleafed to tell me, whether it is a Sub- 
 ftance : And if fo, whether you can fuppofe 
 
 a Sub- 
 
C 91 ) 
 
 v * ^4 MM 
 
 a Suhftance jvithout Accidents , or, in cafe 
 you fuppofe it tcThave Accidents or Qualities, 
 I defire you will let me know what tfiofe 
 Qualities are, at leaft, what is meant by Mat- 
 ter's fupporting them. 
 
 Hy/. We have already argued on thofe 
 Points. I have no more to fay to them. But 
 to prevent any farther Queftions, let me tell 
 you, I at prefent underftand by Matter nei- 
 ther Subftance nor Accident, thinking nor ex- 
 tended Being, neither Caufe, Inftrument, nor 
 Occafion, but fomething intirely unknown, 
 diftind from all thefe. 
 
 Phil. It feems then, you include in your 
 prefent Notion of Matter, nothing but the ge- 
 neral Abftraft Idea of Entity. 
 
 Hy/. Nothing elfe, fave only that I fuper- 
 add to this general Idea, the Negation of all 
 thofe particular Things, Qualities, or Ideas, 
 that I perceive, imagine, or in any wife ap- 
 prehend. 
 
 Phil. Pray where do you fuppofe this un- 
 known Matter to exift ? 
 
 Hyl. Oh PMonow ! now you think you 
 have entangled me, for if I lay it exifts in 
 Place, then you will inferr that it exifts itj^ 
 the Mind, fince it is agreed, that Place or Ex- 
 tenfion exifts only in the Mind : But I am not 
 afhamed to own my Ignorance. I know not 
 where it exifts; only I am fure it exifts not 
 in Place. There is a negative Anfwer for 
 
 you: 
 
. 
 
 you : And you muft expert no other to all 
 the Queftions you put for the future about 
 Matter. 
 
 Phil. Since you will not tell me where 
 it exifts, be pleafed to inform me after what 
 Manner you iuppofe it to exift, or what you 
 mean by its Exiftence. 
 
 Hyl. It neither thinks nor ads, neither per- 
 ceives, nor is perceived. 
 
 Phil. But, what is there pofitive in your 
 abftraded Notion of its Exiftence ? 
 
 Hyl. Upon a nice Obfervation, I do not 
 find I have any pofitive Notion or Meaning at 
 all. I tell you again, I am not alhamed to 
 own my Ignorance. I know not what is 
 meant by its Exiftence, or how it exifts. 
 
 Phil Continue, good Hylar y to ad: the 
 fame ingenuous Part, and tell me fincerely, 
 whether you can frame a diftind Idea of En- 
 tity in general, prefcinded from, and exclu- 
 five of, all thinking and corporeal Beings, all 
 particular things whatfoever. 
 
 Hyl. Hold, let me think a little I pro- 
 
 fefs, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At 
 firft Glance methought I had fome dilute and 
 airy^N^tion^of pure^EflUtvin AbftraU but 
 upon clolef Attention it has quite vanilhed 
 out of Sight. The more I think on it, the 
 more am I confirmed in my prudent Rcfolu- 
 tion of giving none but negative Anfwers y 
 and not pretending to the leaft Degree of any 
 
 pofitive 
 
( 94 ) 
 
 jpofitive Knowlege or Conception of Matter, 
 its Where, its HoB^ its Entity^ or any thing 
 belonging to it. 
 
 Phil. When, therefore, you fpeak of the 
 Exiftence of Mattel:., you have not any Notion 
 in your Mind. 
 
 Hyl. None at all. 
 
 Phil. Pray tell me if the Cafe ftands not 
 thus : At firft, from a Belief of Material Sub-* 
 ftance, you would have it that the immediate 
 Qbjeds exifted without the Mind ; then that 
 their Archetypes ; then Caufes,- next Inftru- 
 mcnts; then Occafions : Laftly, fometUngiri 
 general^ which being interpreted, proves no- 
 thing. So Matter comes to nothing. What 
 think you, Hylas, is not this a fair Summary 
 of your whole Proceeding. 
 
 Hyl. Be that as it will, yet I ftill infift up- 
 on it, that our not being able to conceive 
 a Thing, is no Argument againft its Ex- 
 iftence, 
 
 Phil. That from a Caufe, Effeft, Opera- 
 tion, Sign, or other Circumftance, there 
 may reafonlbly be inferred the Exiftence of a 
 Thing not immediately perceived, and that 
 it were abfurd for any Man to argue againft 
 the Exiftence of that Thing, from his having 
 no direct and pofitive Notion of it, I freely 
 own. But where there is nothing of all this ; 
 where neither Reafon nor Revelation induceth 
 us to believe the Exiftence of a Thing > where 
 
 we 
 
(PO 
 
 we have not even a relative Notion of it ; 
 Where an Abftra&ion is made from perceiving, 
 and being perceived, from Spirit and Idea : 
 In fine, where there is not fo much as the 
 moft inadequate or faint Idea pretended to. 
 I will not, indeed, thence conclude againft 
 the Reality of any Notion, or Exiftence of 
 any thing : But my Inference lhall be, that 
 you mean nothing at all : That you employ 
 Words to no manner of Purpofe, without 
 any Defign or Signification whatfoever. And 
 I leave it to you to confider how meer Jargon 
 fliou'd be treated. 
 
 Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, 
 your Arguments feem in themfelves unan- 
 iwerable, but they have not fo great an Ef- 
 feft on me, as to produce that intire Con- 
 vi&ion, that hearty Acquiefcence which at- 
 tends Demonftration. I find myfelf (till re- 
 lapfing into an obfcure Surmife of, I know 
 not what, Matter. 
 
 Phil. But are you not fenfible, Hylas, that 
 two Things muft concur to take away all 
 Scruple, and work a plenary Aflfent in the 
 Mind ? Let a vifible Objed be fet in never 
 fo clear a Light, yet if there is any Imper- 
 fc&ion in the Sight, or if the Eye is not di- 
 re&ed towards it, it will not be diftin&ly 
 feen. And tho a Demonftration be never 
 fo well grounded and fairly propofed, yet if 
 there is withal a Stain of Prejudice, or a 
 
 wrong 
 
wrong Biafs on the Underftanding^ can it be 
 expeded on^afuddain to perceive clearly, and 
 adhere firmly to the Truth ? No, there is need 
 of Time and Pains : The Attention muft be 
 awakened and detained by a frequent Repeti- 
 tion of the fame Thing placed oft in the 
 fame, oft in different Lights. I h ?ve faid it 
 already., and find I muft ftill repeat and in- 
 culcate, that it is an unaccountable Licence 
 you take, in pretending to maintain you 
 know not what, for you know not whatRea- 
 fon, to you know not what Purpofe ? Can 
 this be paralleled in any Art or Science, any 
 Seft or Profeffion of Men ? Or is there any 
 thing fo barefacedly groundless and unrea- 
 fonable to be met with, even in the loweft of 
 common Converfation ? But perhaps you 
 will ftill fay Matter may cxift, tho' at the 
 fame time you neither know what is meant 
 by Matter, or by its Exiftence. This indeed 
 is furprizing, and the more fo, becaufe it is 
 altogether voluntary and of your own Head, 
 you not being led to it by any one Reafon, 
 for I challenge you to ihew me that Thing in * 
 Nature, which needs Matter to explain or 
 account for it. 
 
 By/. The Reality of Things cannot be 
 maintained without fuppofing the Exiftence 
 of Matter. And is not this, think you, a 
 good Reafon why I fhou'd be earned in its 
 Defence ? 
 
 Phil. 
 
(5>7) 
 
 Phil. The Reality of Things! WhatThings^ 
 fenfible or intelligible ? 
 
 Hyl. Senfible Things. 
 
 Phil. My Glove, for Example ? 
 
 Hyl. That, or any other thing perceived 
 by the Senfes. 
 
 Phil. But to fix on fome particular thing ; 
 is it not a fufficient Evidence to me of the 
 Exiftence of this Glove, that I fee it, and feel 
 it, and wear it ? Or, if this will not do, how, 
 is it poffible I fhou'd be aflured of the Reali- 
 ty of this Thing, which I actually fee in this 
 Place, by fuppofing that fome unknown 
 Thing, which I never did or can fee, exifts 
 after an unknown manner, in an unknown 
 place, or in no place at all ? Howjary^ 
 fupfed Reality of that which is intangible, 
 Be a Proof that any thing tangible really, 
 exifts? or, of that which is invifible, that any, 
 vifiGle thing, or, in general, of any thing 
 which is imperceptible, that a Perceptible 
 exifts ? Do but explain this, aijd I fliall think 
 nothing too hard for you. 
 
 Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to own 
 the Exiftence of Matter is highly improba- 
 ble ; but the direft and abfolute Impoflibility; 
 of it does not appear to me. 
 
 Phil. But granting Matter to be poffible,' 
 yet, upon that account meerly, it can have 
 no more Claim to Exiftence than a Golden 
 Mountain, or a Centaur. 
 
 H Ujl 
 
($8) 
 
 HjL I acknowlege it ,- but frill you do 
 Hot deny it is poflible,- and that which is 
 poffible, for ought you know, may a&ually 
 
 """ 
 
 PUl. I deny it to be poffiblc : And have., 
 if I miftake not,, evidently proved., from your 
 own Conceffions, that it is not. In the com- 
 mon Senfe of the Word Matter, is there any 
 more implied, than an extended, folid > .figu r 
 red, moveablc Subftance exifting without the^ 
 Mind? And, have not you acknow- 
 leged over and over, that you have feen evi- 
 dent Reafon for denying the Pofllbility of 
 fuch a Subftance ? 
 
 Hyl. Ay, but that is only one Senfe of the 
 Term Matter. 
 
 Phil. But, is it not the only proper, ge- 
 nuine, received Senfe? And if Matter, in 
 fuch a Senfe, be proved impoffible, may it 
 not be thought, with good Grounds, abfo- 
 kitely impoffible ? Elfc, how cou'd any thing 
 be proved impoffible ? Or, indeed, how cott'd 
 there be any Proof at all, one way or other, 
 to a Man who takes the Liberty to unfettle 
 and change the common Signification of 
 .Words ? 
 
 Hyl. I thought Philofophers might be al- 
 lowed to fpeak more accurately than the Vul- 
 gar, and were not always confined to the 
 common Acceptation of a Term, 
 
 Phil. 
 
( 99 ) 
 
 PUl. But this now mentioned, is the com- 
 mon received Senfe among Philofophers them- 
 felves. But not to infift on that, have you 
 not been allowed to take Matter in what 
 Scnfe you pleafed ? And, have you not ufed 
 this Privilege in theutmoft Extent, fometimes 
 intirely changing, at others leaving out, or 
 putting into the Definition of it whatever, for 
 the prefent^ beft ferved your Defign, contra- 
 ry to all the known Rules of Ileafon and 
 Logic? And, hath not this fiiifting, unfair 
 Method oflyours,, fpun out our Difpute to an 
 unneceffary Length ; Matter having been par- 
 ticularly examined, and, by your own Con- 
 feflion, refuted, in each of thofe Senfes ? And, 
 can any more be required, to prov^J^jL^ 
 folute Impoffibility of a Thing, than the pro- 
 ving it impoffible in every particular Senfe, 
 that either you, or any one elfe, underftands 
 it in ? 
 
 Hyl. But I am not fo thorowly fatisfied 
 that you have proved the Impoflibility of 
 Matter, in the laft moft obfcure, abftratted, 
 and indefinite Senfe. 
 
 Phil. When is a thing fhewn to be im- 
 poffible ? 
 
 Hyl. When a Repugnancy is demonflxated 
 between the Ideas comprehended in. .its .Dcfi- 
 
 H a 
 
( 100 ) 
 
 Phil. But where there are no Ideas, there 
 no Repugnancy can be demonftrated between 
 Ideas. 
 
 Hy/. I agree with you. 
 
 Phil. Now, in that which you call the ob^ 
 fcure, indefinite Senfc of the Word Matter y 
 "it is plain, by your own Confeifion, there 
 was included no Idea at all, no Senfe, ex- 
 cept an unknown Senfe, which is the fame 
 thing as none. You are not, therefore, to ex- 
 pe& I iliou'd prove a Repugnancy between 
 Ideas, where there are no Ideas ; or the Im- 
 poffibility of Matter taken in an unknown 
 Senfe, /. e. tio Senfe at all. My bufinefs was 
 only to (hew, you meant nothing $ and this 
 you were brought to own. So that in all 
 your various Senfes, you have been fhew'd 
 either to mean nothing at all, or, if any 
 "thing, an Abfurdity. And if this be not fuf- 
 fient to prove the Impoffibility of a Thing, I 
 dcfire you will let me know what is. 
 
 Byl. I acknowlege, you have proved that 
 Matter is impofiible; nor do I fee what more 
 can be faid in defence of it. But at the fame 
 time that I give up this, I fufpevt all my o- 
 ther Notions. For, furely, none cou'd be 
 more feemingly evident than this once was : 
 And yet it now feems as falfe and abfurd as 
 ever it did true before. But, I think we have 
 difcuffed the Point fufficiently for the pre- 
 fcnt. The remaining Part of the Day I 
 
 wou'd 
 
I ( IOT . I . 
 
 wouM willingly fpend^ in, rii^mngibv^',^' 
 my Thoughts the feveral Heads of this 
 Morning's Converfation, and to Morrow flialL 
 {hall be .glad to meet you here again about 
 fhe fame time. 
 
 Phil. I will not fail to attend you. 
 
 The 
 
The Third 
 
 DIALOGUE. 
 
 fbihnous. tf f 
 
 fO, Hyter, What are 
 the Fruits of Yefter- 
 day's Meditation ? 
 Has it confirmed you 
 in the fame Mind 
 you were in at parting ? or have you fmce 
 ieen Caufe to change your Opinion ? 
 
 Hylar. Truly my Opinion is, that all our 
 Opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What 
 we approve to Day, we condemn to Morrow. 
 We keep a Stir about Knowlege, and fpend 
 our Lives in the Purfuit of it, when, alas ! we 
 know nothing all the while : nor do I think 
 it poffiblefor us ever to know any thing in this 
 Life. Our Faculties are too narrow and too 
 few. Nature certainly never intended us for 
 Speculation. 
 
 Phil. What! fay you, we can know no- 
 thing, /ifykr? . . ..- 
 
Hyl There is not that fingle thing in the 
 World whereof we can know the real Na- 
 ture, or what it is in itfelf. 
 
 Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know 
 what Fire or Water is ? 
 
 Hyl. You may indeed know that Fire ap- 
 pears hot, and Water fluid : But this is no 
 more than knowing, what Senfations are 
 produced in your own Mind, upon the Ap- 
 plication of Fire and Water to your Organs 
 ofSenfe. Their internal Conftitution, their 
 true and real Nature., you are utterly in the 
 dark as to that . 
 
 PhiL Do I not know this to be a real 
 Stone that I ftand on, and that which I fee 
 before my Eyes to be a real Tree ? 
 
 Hyl. Know ? no, it is impoffible you or 
 any Man alive fhoud know it. All you 
 know, is, that you have fuch a certain Idea 
 or Appearance in your own Mind. But what 
 is this to the real Tree or Stone ? I tell you, 
 that Colour, Figure, and Hardnefs, which 
 you perceive, are not at all the real Natures 
 of thofe Things, or in the leaft like them. 
 The fame may be faid of all other real 
 Things or corporeal Subftances which com- 
 pofe the World. They have none of them,, 
 any thing in themfelves, like thofe fenfible 
 Qualities by us perceived. We fhou'd not 
 therefore pretend to affirm or know any 
 H 4 thing 
 
104 
 
 thing of them, as they are in their own Na- 
 ture. 
 
 Phil. But furely, Hylas, I can diftinguifli 
 Gold, for Example, from Iron : And how 
 could this he, if I knew not what either truly 
 was ? 
 
 Hy/." Believe me, Philonous, you can only 
 diftinguifii between your own Ideas. That 
 Yellownefs, that Weight, and other fenfible 
 Qualities, think you they are really in the 
 Gold ? They are only relative to the Senfes, 
 and have no abfolute Exiftence in Nature. 
 And in pretending to diftinguifli the Species 
 of real Things, by the Appearances in your 
 Mind, you may, perhaps, a&as wifely as he 
 that fnou'd conclude two Men were of a dif- 
 ferent Species, becaufe their Cloaths were not 
 of the fame Colour. 
 
 Phil. It feems then we are altogether put 
 off with the Appearances of Things, and thofe 
 falfe ones too. The very Meat I eat, and the 
 Cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what 
 I fee and feel. 
 HyL Even fo. 
 
 Phil. But is it not ftrange the whole World 
 ihou'd be thus impofed op, and fo foolifli as 
 to believe their Senfes ? And yet I know not 
 how it is, but Men eat, and drink, and 
 fleep, and perform all the Offices of Life, 
 as comfortably and conveniently, as if they 
 
 realty 
 
really knew the Things they are eonverfant 
 about. 
 
 Hyl. They do fo : But, you know, ordinary 
 Practice does not require a Nicety of fpecu^- 
 lative Knowlege. Hence the Vulgar retain 
 their Miftakes, and for all that, make a Shift 
 to buftle thorow the Affairs of Life. But Phi- 
 lofophers know better things. 
 
 Phil. You mean, they know that they 'know 
 nothing. 
 
 Hyl. That is the very Top and Perfe&ion 
 of Humane Knowlege. 
 
 Phil But, are you all this while in earneft, 
 Uyla? ; and are you fcrioufly perfuaded that 
 you know nothing real in the World ? Sup- 
 pofe you were going to write, wouM you not 
 call for Pen, Ink, and Paper, like another 
 Man 3 and do you not know what it is you 
 call for? 
 
 Hyl. How often muft I tell you, that I know 
 not the real Nature of any one thing in the 
 Univerfe? I may, indeed, upon Occafion, 
 make tife of Pen, Ink, and Paper. But what 
 any one of them is in its own true Nature, I 
 declare poiitively I know not. And the fame 
 is true with regard to every other corporeal 
 thing. And, what is more, we are not only 
 ignorant of the true and real Nature of 
 Things, but even of their Exiftence. It can- 
 not be denied that we perceive fuch certain 
 Appearances or Ideas j but it cannot be con- 
 cluded 
 
eluded from thence that Bodies really exift. 
 Nay, now I think on it., I muft, agreeably to 
 my former Conceffions, farther declare, that 
 it is impoffible any real corporeal Thing 
 ihou'd exift in Nature. 
 
 Phil. You amaze me. Was ever any 
 thing more wild and extravagant than the 
 ^lotions you now maintain : And is it not 
 evident you are led into all thefe Extravagan- 
 cies, by the Belief of material Subftance ? 
 This makes you dream of thofe unknown 
 Natures in every thing. It is this occafions 
 your diftinguiihing between the Reality and 
 fallible Appearances of Things. It is to this 
 you are indebted, for being ignorant of what 
 every Body elfe knows perfectly well. Nor 
 iithis all^ You are not only ignorant of the 
 true Nature of every Thing, but you know 
 not whether any thing really exifts, or whe- 
 ther there are any true Natures at all -, foraf- 
 ajiuch as you attribute to your material Be- 
 ings an abfolute or external Exiftence, where- 
 in you fuppofe their Reality confifts. And as 
 you are forced in the end to acknowlege, 
 fuch an Exiftence means either a direct Re- 
 pugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows, that 
 you are obliged to pull down your own 
 Hypothefis of material Subftance, and pofi- 
 tively to deny the real Ekiftence of any Part 
 of the Univerfe. And fo you are plunged in- 
 to the deepeft and moft deplorable Scepticifti* 
 
 that 
 
that ever Man was, Tell me, Hylas, is it 
 not as I fay ? 
 
 Hyl. I agree with you. Material Subftance 
 was no more than an Hypothefis, and a falfe 
 and groundlefs one too. I will no longer 
 fpend my Breath in Defence of it. But what- 
 ever Hypothefis you advance, or whatfoever 
 Scheme of Things you introduce in its ftead, 
 I doubt not it will appear every whit as falfe: 
 Let me but be allowed to queftion you upon 
 it : That is, fuffer me to ferve you in your 
 own Kind, and I warrant it fliall conduit you 
 thorow as many Perplexities and Contra- 
 ditions, to the very fame State of Scepticifm 
 that I myfelf am in at prefect. 
 
 Phil. I affure you, Hylar y I do not pre- 
 tend to frame any Hypothefis at all. I am 
 of a vulgar Caft, fimple enough to believe 
 my Senfes, and leave Things as I find them. 
 To be plain, it is my Opinion, that the real 
 Things are thofc very Things I fee and feel, 
 and perceive by my Senfes. Thefe I know, 
 and finding they anfwer all the Neceffities and 
 Purpofes of Life, have no reafon to be folicK 
 tous about any other unknown Beings. A 
 Piece of fenfible Bread, for Inftance, wou'd 
 (lay my Stomach better than ten thoufand 
 times as much of that infenfible, unintelligi- 
 ble, real Bread you fpeak of. It is likewife 
 my Opinion, that Colours and other fenfible 
 Qualities are on the Objc&s. I cannot for 
 
 < ' my 
 
 ^ / 
 
 - 
 
(io8) 
 
 my Life help thinking that Snow is white^ 
 and Fire hot. You, indeed, who by Snow 
 and Fire mean certain external, unperceived, 
 unperceiving &ubftances, are in the right to 
 deny Whitenefs or Heat to be AffedUons in- 
 herent in them. But I, who underftand by 
 thofe Words the Things I fee and feel, am 
 obliged to think like other Folks. And, as I 
 am no Sceptic wich regard to the Nature of 
 Things, fo neither am I as to their Exiftence. 
 Tjiat a thing iliouM be really perceived by 
 nly Senfes, and at the fame time not really 
 exift, is to me a plain Contradiction > fince I 
 cannot prefcind or abftraft, even in Thought, 
 the Existence of a fenfible Thing from its be- 
 ing perceived. Wood, Stones, Fire, Water, 
 Flem, Iron, and the like Things, which I 
 name and difcourfe of, are Things that -I 
 know ; otherwife I fhou'd never have thought 
 of them, or named them. And I fhou'd 
 not have known them, but that I perceived 
 them by my Senfes , and Things perceived by 
 the Senfes are immediately perceived > and 
 .x Things immmediately perceived are Ideas; 
 1 and Ideas cannot exift without the Mind > their 
 Exiftence, therefore, confifts in being per- 
 ceived ; when, therefore, they are actually 
 perceived, there can be no Doubt of their 
 Exiftence. Away then with all that Scepti- 
 cifm, all thofe ridiculous Philofophical Doubts. 
 What a Jeft is it for a Philofopher ro queftion 
 
 the 
 
the Exiftence of fenfible Things, till he has 
 it proved to him from the Veracity of God : 
 Or to pretend our Knowlege in this Point 
 falls fhort of Intuition or Demonftration ? I 
 might as well doubt of my own Being, as of 
 the Being of thofe Things I actually fee and 
 feel 
 
 Hyl. Not fo faft, Philonous : you fay you 
 cannot conceive how fenfible Things fhou'd 
 exift without the Mind. Do you not ? 
 
 Phil 1 do. 
 
 Hyl. Suppofing you were annihilated, can- 
 not you conceive it poflible, that Things per- 
 ceivable by Senfe> may ftill exift ? 
 
 Phil. I can ; but then it muft be in ano- 
 ther mind. When I deny fenfible Things 
 an Exiftence out of the Mind, I do not mean 
 my Mind in particular, but all Minds. Now 
 it is plain, they have an Exiftence exterior 
 to my Mind, fince I find them, by Expe- 
 rience, to be independent of it. There is 3 
 therefore, fome other Mind wherein they 
 exift, during the Intervals between the Times 
 of my perceiving them : As, like wife, they 
 did before my Birth, and wou'd do after my 
 fuppofed Annihilation. And, as the fame is 
 true, with regard to all other finite, created 
 Spirits ; it neceffarily follows, there is an 
 Omniprefent, Eternal Mind^ which knows and ^ 
 comprehends all things, and exhibits them to 
 n fuch a manner, and according 
 
 to 
 
(no) 
 
 to fuch Rules as He Himfelf has ordained., 
 and are by us termed the Laws of Nature. 
 
 fjyl. Anfwer me, Philonous. Arc all our 
 Ideas perfe&ly inert Beings ? or, have they 
 any Agency included in them ? 
 
 Phil. They are altogether paflive and inert. 
 Hyl. And is not God an Agent,, a Being 
 purely active ? 
 
 Phil.. I acknowlege it. 
 
 / Hyl. No Idea, therefore, can be like unto, 
 or reprefent the Nature of God. 
 Phil. It cannot. 
 
 Hyl. Since, therefore, you have no Idea of 
 the Mind of God, how can you conceive it 
 poffible, that things fliou'd exift in His Mind ? 
 Or, if you can conceive the Mind of God with- 
 out having an Idea of it, why may not I be 
 allowed to conceive the Exiftence of Matter, 
 notwithftanding that I have no Idea of it ? 
 
 Phil. As to your firft Queftion ; I own I 
 have properly no Idea, either of God or any 
 other Spirit ; for, thefe being a&ive, cannot 
 be reprefented by things perfectly inert, as 
 our Ideas are. I do, neverthelefs, know, that 
 I, who am a Spirit or thinking Subftance, 
 exift as certainly, as I know my Ideas exift. 
 Farther, I know what I mean by the Terms 
 /and Myfelf; and I know this immediately, 
 or intuitively^ thol do not perceive it as I per- 
 ceive a Triangle, a Colour, or a Sound. The 
 Mind, Spirit, or Soul, is that indivifible un- 
 
 extended - 
 
(Ill) 
 
 extended Thing, which thinks, a&s, and per- 
 ceives. I fay, indi^ifibk^ becaufe unextend- 
 ed ; and unextended^ becaufe extended, figu- 
 red, moveable Things,, are Ideas ; and that 
 which perceives Ideas, which thinks, and 
 wills, is plainly itfelf no Idea, nor like an 
 Idea. Ideas are Things inactive, and per- 
 ceived. And Spirits a fort of Beings, alto- 
 gether different from them. I do not, there- 
 fore, fay, my Soul is an Idea, or like an Idea. 
 However, taking the Word Idea in a large 
 Senfe, my Soul may be faid to furnifii me 
 with an Idea, that is, an Image, or Likenefs 
 of God, tho, indeed, extremely inadequate. 
 For all the Notion I have of God, is obtained 
 by reflecting on my own Soul, heightning its 
 Powers, and removing its Imperfe&ions. I 
 have, therefore, tho not an inactive Idea, yet, 
 in myfelf, fome fort of an a&ive, thinking 
 Image of the Deity. And tho I perceive 
 Him not by Senfe, yet I have a Notion of 
 Him, or know Him by Reflexion and Rea- 
 foning. My own Mind, and my own Ideas, 
 I have an immediate Knowlege of; and by 
 the Help of thefe, do mediately apprehend 
 the Poffibility of the Exiftence of other Spi- 
 rits and Ideas. Farther, from my own Be- 
 ing, and from the Dependency I find in my- 
 felf, and my Ideas, I do, by an A& of Rea- 
 fon, neceflarily infer the Exiftence of a God, 
 and of all created Things in the Mind of 
 
 God. 
 
(HZ) 
 
 God. So much for your firft Queftion. For 
 the fecond : I fuppofe, by this time you can 
 anfwer it yourfelf. For you neither perceive 
 Matter objectively, as you do an ina&ive Be- 
 ing, or Idea, nor know it, as you do your- 
 felf, by a reflex Ad : Neither do you me- 
 diately apprehend it by Similitude of the 
 one or the other : Nor yet colleft it by 
 Reafoning, from that which you know imme- 
 diately. All which makes the Cafe of Mat- 
 ter widely different from that of the Deity. 
 
 Hyl. I own myfelf fatisfied in this Point* 
 But do you in earned think, the real Exi- 
 ftence of fenfible Things confifts in their be- 
 ing a&ually perceived ? If fo ; How comes 
 it that all Mankind diftinguifh between them ? 
 Ask the firft Man you meet, and he fliall tell 
 you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exift 
 is another. 
 
 'Phil. I am content, Hykr, to appeal to the 
 common Senfe of the World for the Truth 
 of my Notion. Ask the Gardiner, why he 
 thinks yonder Cherry-Tree exifts in the Gar- 
 den, and he fhall tell you, becaufe he fees 
 and feels it-j in a word, becaufe he 'perceives 
 it by his Senfes. Ask him, why he thinks 
 an Orange-Tree not to be there, and he {hall 
 tell you, becaufe he does not perceive it. 
 What he perceives by Senfe, that he terms a 
 real Being, and faith it iV, or exifts , but that 
 
 which 
 
(II?) 
 
 which is not perceivable, the fame., he faith, 
 has no Being. 
 
 Hyl. Yes, Philonous, I grafit the Exiftence 
 of a fenfible Thing confifts in being perceiva- 
 ble, but not in being actually perceived. 
 
 Phil. And what is perceivable but an Idea ? 
 And can an Idea exift without being adually 
 perceived ? Thefe are Points long fmce agreed 
 between us. 
 
 Hyl. But, be your Opinion never fo trUe f 
 Yet, furely, you will riot deny it is fhocking > 
 and contrary to the common Senfe of Men. 
 Ask the Fellow, whether yonder Tree has 
 an Exiftence Cut of his Mind : What An-* 
 fwer think you he wou'd make ? 
 , Phil. The fame that I fliou'd myfelf, t)/. 
 That it does exift out of his Mind. But 
 then to a Chriftian, it cannot furely be Ihock- 
 ing to fay, The real Tree exifting without his 
 Mind is truly known and comprehended by 
 (that is, exiftf hi) the infinite Mind of God. 
 Probably he may not at firft Glance be aware 
 of the direft and immediate Proof there is of 
 this, inafmuch as the very Being of a Tree, 
 or any other fenfible Thing, implies a Miild 
 wherein it is. But the Point itfclf he cannot 
 deny. The Queftion between the Materia- 
 lifts and me is, not whether Things have 
 a real Exiftence out of the Mind of this or 
 that Perfon, but whether they have an abfo- 
 lute Exiftence, diftinft from being perceived 
 
 I by 
 
\s, by God, and exterior to all Minds; 
 
 indeed, fome Heathens and Philofophers have 
 affirmed, but whoever entertains Notions of 
 the Deity fuitable to the Holy Scriptures, will 
 be of another Opinion. 
 
 HyL But, according to your Notions, what 
 Difference is there between real Things, 
 and Chimeras formed by the Imagination, or 
 the Vifions of a Dream, fmce they are all 
 equally in the Mind ? 
 
 Phil. The Ideas formed by thq Imagina- 
 tion, are faint and indiftin&j they have, be- 
 fides, an intire Dependence on the Will/ But 
 the Ideas perceived bySenfe, i.e. real Things, 
 are more vivid and clear, and being imprint- 
 ed on the Mind by a Spirit diftinft from us, 
 have not a like Dependence on our Will! 
 There is, therefore, no Danger of confound-- 
 ing thefe with the foregoing : And there is as 
 little of confounding them with the Vifions 
 of a Dream, which are dim, irregular, and 
 confufed. And tho they fliou'd happen to be 
 never fo lively and natural, yet by their not 
 being conne&ed, and of a Piece, with the pre- 
 ceding and fubfequent Tranfa&ions of our 
 Lives, they might eafily.be diftinguilhed 
 from Realities. In Ihort, by whatever Me- 
 thod you diftinguifh Things from Chimera? 
 on your own Scheme, the fame, it is evident, 
 will hold alfo upon mine. For it muft be, I 
 prefume, by fome perceived .Difference, and 
 
 I am 
 
c. 1 
 
 I am not for depriving you of any one thing 
 that you perceive. 
 
 Hyl. But ftill, Philonous, you hold, there 
 Is frothing in the World but Spirits and Ideas* 
 And this., you muft needs acknowlege., founds 
 very odly. 
 
 Phil. I own the Word Idea, not being com* 
 monly ufed for Thing, founds fomethingout 
 of the way* My Reafon for ufing it was, 1 
 becaufe a neceifary Relation to the Mind is 
 underftood to be implied by that Term ; and 
 it is now commonly ufed by Philofophers^ to 
 denote the immediate Obje&s of the Under- 
 ftanding. But however odly the Propofitkm 
 may found in Words, yet it includes nothing; 
 fo very ftfange or fliocking in its Senfe, 
 which in effeft amounts tp no more than this, 
 viz. that there are only^Things perceiving., 
 and Things perceived ; or that every un- 
 thinking Being is neceifarily, and from the 
 very Nature of its Exiftence r perceived by, 
 fome Mind ; if not by any finite., created 
 Mind, yet certainly by the infinite Mind of 
 God , in whom we live, and move, and 
 hdve our Beings Is this as ftrange as^to' fay- 
 iThe fenfible Qualities are not on theObjeds: 
 Or 5 That we cannot be fure of the Exiftence 
 of Things., or know any thing of their real 
 Natures., thowe both fee and feel them.,, and 
 perceive them by all our Senfes ? 
 
 J a Hjl 
 
c 
 
 HyL And in Confequcnce of this, muftwC 
 not think there are no fuch Things as Phyii- 
 eal or Corporeal Caufes : But that a Spirit is 
 the immediate Cau-fe of all the Phenomena in 
 Nature ? Can there be any thing more extra- 
 vagant than this ? 
 
 Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant 
 to fay, A thing which is inert, operates on the 
 Mind, and which is unperceiving, is the Caufe 
 of our Perceptions, without any regard ei- 
 ther to Confiftency, or the old known Axiom : 
 Nothing can give to another that which it 
 hath not itfelf. Befides, that which to you, 
 I know not for what Reafon, feems fo extra- 
 vagant, is no more than the Holy Scriptures 
 aflert in a hundred Places. In them God is 
 reprefented as the fole and immediate Author 
 of all thofe Effects, Jphich fome Heathens and 
 Philofophers are wont to afcribe to Nature, 
 Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking Princi- 
 ple. This is fo much the conftant Language 
 of Scripture, that it were needlefs to confirm 
 it by Citations. 
 
 Jiy/. You are not aware, Philonotts, that in 
 making God the immediate Author of all the 
 Motions in Nature, you make him the Aii- 
 - thor of Murder, Sacrilege, Adultery, and 
 the like heinous Sins. 
 
 Phil. In Anfwer to that, I obferve firft, that 
 the Imputation of Guilt is the fame, whether 
 a Perfon commits an A6tion with or without 
 
 an 
 
an Inftrument. In cafe, therefore, you 
 pofe God to aft by the Mediation of an Inftru- 
 ment, or Occafion called Matter. 
 
 1 1 ir r 1 A 1 l" fT 
 
 truly make Him the Author of Sin as I, \vho 
 thint Him the immediate Agent in all thofe 
 Operations vulgarly afcribed to Nature. I 
 farther obferve, that Sin or moral Turpitude 
 docs not confift in the outward Phyfical 
 Aftion or Motion, but in the internal Devia- 
 tion of the Will from the Laws of Reafon 
 and Religion. This is plain, in that the kil- 
 ling an Enemy in a Battel, or putting a Cri- 
 minal legally to Death, is not thought finful, 
 tho the outward Aft be the vjery fame with that 
 in the Cafe of Murder. Since, therefore, Siq 
 does not confift in the Phyfical Aftion, the 
 making God an immediate Caufe of all fuch 
 Aftions, is not making Him the Author of 
 Sin. Laftly, I have no where faid, that God 
 is the only Agent who produces all the Mo- 
 tions in Bodies. It is true, I have denied 
 there are any other Agents befide Spirits : 
 But this is very confident with allowing to 
 Thinking, Rational Beings, in the Produftion 
 of Motions, the Ufe of limited Powers, ulti- 
 mately, indeed, derived from God, but im- 
 mediately under the Direftion of their own 
 Wills, which is fufficient to intitle them to all 
 the Guilt of their Aftions. 
 
 Hyl. But the denying Matter, PMonott*\ 
 or corporeal Subftance ; there is the Point. 
 
 I 3 You 
 
( "8 ) 
 
 You can never perfuade me that this is not 
 repugnant to the univerfal Senfe of Man- 
 kind. Were our Difpute to be determined 
 by moft Voices, I am confident you wou'd give 
 up the Point, without gathering the Votes. 
 
 Phil. I wiih both our Opinions were fairly 
 ftated, and fubmitted to the Judgment of 
 Men, who had plain common Senfe, without 
 the Prejudices of a learned Education. Lee 
 me be reprefented as one who trufts his 
 Senfes, who thinks he knows the Things he 
 fees and feels, and entertains no Doubts of 
 their Exiftence ; and you fairly fet forth witfy 
 all your Doubts, your Paradoxes, and your 
 Scepticifm about you, and I ftiall willingly 
 acquiefce in the Determination of any indiffe- 
 rent Perfon. That there is no Subftance 
 wherein Ideas can exift befide Spirit, is to me 
 evident. And that the Objects immediately 
 perceived, are Ideas, is on all Hands agreed* 
 And that fenfible Qualities are Objefts imme- 
 diately perceived, no one can deny. It is 
 therefore evident, there can be no Subftratuw 
 of thofe Qualities, but Spirit, in which they 
 exift, not by way of Mode or Property, but 
 as a thing perceived in that which perceives 
 it. I deny therefore that there is any un- 
 thinking Subftratttm of the Obje&s of Senfe 3 
 and, in that Acceptation, that there is any 
 material Subftance. But, if by material Sub- 
 fiance is meant only feniible Body 3 that which, 
 
 is 
 

 is fcen and felt, (and the unphilofopliical 
 Part of the World I dare fay mean no more) 
 then I am more certain of Matter's Exiftence 
 than you, or any other Philofopher, pretend 
 to be. If there be any thing which makes 
 the Generality of Mankind averfe from the 
 Notions I efpoufe : It is a Mifapprehenfion 
 that I deny the Reality of fenfible Things : 
 But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and 
 not I, it follows, that in truth their Averfion 
 is againft your Notions, and not mine. I do 
 therefore affert, that I am as certain as of my 
 own Being, that there are Bodies or corpo- 
 real Subftances, (meaning the Things I per- 
 ceive by my Senfes) and that, granting this, 
 the BU!K of Mankind will take no Thought 
 about, nor think themfelves at all concerned 
 in the Fate of, thofe unknown Natures, and 
 Philofophical Quiddities, which fome Men 
 are fo fond of. 
 
 HyL What fay you to this : Since, accor- 
 ding to you, Men muft judge of the Reality 
 of Things by their Senfes, how can a Man 
 be miftaken, in thinking the Moon a plain 
 lucid Surface, about a Foot in Diameter , or 
 a fquare Tower, feen at a diftance, round ; 
 or an Oar, with one End in the Water, 
 crooked? 
 
 Phil. He is not miftaken, with regard to the* 
 Ideas he aftually perceives ; but in the Infe- 
 rences he makes from his pvefpnt Percep- 
 
 I 4 tions. 
 
( 120 ) 
 
 tions. Thus, in the Cafe of the Oar, what 
 he immediately perceives by Sight, is cer- 
 tainly crooked , and fo far he is in the right. 
 But if he thence conclude, that upon taking 
 the Oar out of the Water, he fliall perceive 
 the fame Crookednefs ; or, that it wou'd af- 
 fe<5t his Touch, as crooked things are wont 
 to do : In that he is miftaken. In like man- 
 ner, if he fliall conclude from what he per- 
 ceives in one Station, that, in cafe he advan- 
 ced toward the Moon, or Tower, he fliou'd 
 ftill be affefted with the like Ideas, he is mi- 
 jftaken. gut his Miftake lies not in what he 
 perceives imme3iaely, and at prefent, (it be ? 
 ing a pianifeft Contradiction to fuppofe, he 
 fliou'd err inrefped of that) but, in the wrong 
 Judgment he makes, concerning the Ideas he 
 Apprehends to be cqnne&ed with thofe im- 
 mediately perceived : Or,concerning the Ideas 
 that, from what he perceives at prefent, he 
 imagines wouM be perceived in other Cir- 
 pumftances. The Cafe is the fame, with re- 
 gard to the Copernican Syftem. We do not 
 here perceive any Motion of the Earth : But 
 it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, 
 in cafe we were placed at as great a Diftance 
 from that, as w? are now from the other 
 Planets, we fliou'd not then perceive its Mo T 
 jion. 
 
 Hyl, I underftand you ; and muft needs 
 you fay things plaufible enough : But 
 
(121) 
 
 give me leave to put you in mind of one 
 thing. Pray, Philonou^ were you not for* 
 nierly as pofitive that Matter exifted, as you 
 are now that it does not ? 
 
 Phil I was. But here lies the Difference. 
 Before, my Pofitivenefs was founded without 
 Examination upon Prejudice ; but now, af- 
 ter Inquiry, upon Evidence, 
 
 Hyl. After all, it feems our Difpute is ra- 
 ther about Words than Things. We agree 
 in the Thing, but differ in the Name. That 
 we are affected with Ideas from without, is 
 evident ; and it is no lefs evident, that there 
 muft be (I will not fay Archetypes, but) 
 Powers without th^ Mind, correfponding to 
 thofe Ideas. And, as thefe Powers cannot 
 fubfift by themfelves, there is fome Subject 
 of them neceffarily to be admitted, which I 
 call Matter, and you call Spirit. There is all 
 the Difference. 
 
 Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, 
 or Subjeft of Powers, extended ? 
 
 Hyl. It hath not Extenfion $ but it has the 
 Power to raife in you the Idea of Exten- 
 #bn. 
 
 Phil. It is, therefore, itfelf uncxtendcd. 
 
 Hyl. I grant it. 
 
 Phil. Is it not alfo adive ? 
 
 Hyl. Without doubt : Otherwifc , how 
 we Attribute Powers to it ? 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. Now, let me ask you Tw$ Que- 
 ftions : Firft, Whether it be agreeable to 
 the Ufage either of Pliilofophers or others, 
 to give the Name Matter to an unextended, 
 aftive Being ? And, Secondly, Whether it be 
 not ridiculoufly abfurd, to niifapply Names 
 contrary to the common Ufe of Language? 
 
 Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, 
 fince you will have it fo, but fome Third 
 Nature diftinft from Matter and Spirit. For, 
 what reafon is there, why you fliou'd call it 
 Sjpirit ; does not the Notion of Spirit imply, 
 that it is thinking, as well as a&ive and un* 
 extended ? 
 
 Phil. My Reafon is this : Becaufe I hqvt 
 to h^ve forne Notidn oidMteiiiiilg in 
 
 itl^^ 
 
 : 
 
 ierefbre, when 1 fpeak of an aftive Being, I 
 am obliged to mean a Spirit. Befide, what 
 can be plainer, than that a thing which hath 
 no Ideas in itfelf, cannot impart them to rtie ; 
 and if it hath Ideas, furely it muft be a Spirit. 
 To make you comprehend the Point ftill 
 more clearly, if it be poflfible : .JLa^ferLas 
 well as you, that, fince we are affefted froni 
 without, we muft allow Powers to be with- 
 out, in a Being <Mrnt from ourfelves. So 
 far we are agreed. But then, we differ as to 
 the Kind of this powerful Being. I will have 
 
 it 
 
it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not 
 what (I may add too, you know not what) 
 Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spi- 
 rit. Fronithe Effects I fee produced, I con- 
 clude, there are Actions ; and becaufe A&i- 
 pns, Volitions ; and becaufe there are Voli- 
 tions, there muft be a Will. Again, the Things 
 I perceive, muft have an Exiftence, they or 
 their Archetypes, out of my Mind : But be- 
 ing Ideas, neither they, nor their Archetypes, 1 
 can exift., otherwife than in an Underftand- 
 ing : There is, therefore, an Un<derftanding*' 
 But Will and Underftanding conftitute, in the 
 ftri&eft Senfe, a Mind or Spirit. The powef- 
 fuLCaufe, therefore, of my Ideas, is in ftri& 
 Propriety of Speech a Spirit. 
 
 Hyl. And now, I warrant, you think you 
 have made the Point very clear, little fu- 
 fpe&ing, that what you advance leads dire<&- 
 ly to a Contradi&ion. Is it not an Abfurdi- 
 ty. to imagine any Imperfection in God? 
 1 PhU. Without doubt, 
 
 Hyl. To fuffer Pain, is an Imperfection; 
 
 Phil. It is. 
 
 Hyl. Are we not fometimes affected wkfy 
 Pain, and Uneafinefs, by fome other Be^ 
 iag? 
 
 Phil. We are, 
 
 tiyL And have you not faid, that Being is 
 a Spirk, and is not that Spirit God ? 
 
 Phil. I graat it. 
 
 Hyl. 
 
Hyl. But you have afferted, that whatever 
 Ideas we perceive from without, are in the 
 Mind which affefts us. The Ideas, there- 
 fore, of Pain and Uneafinefs are in God; 
 or, in other Words, ,Gj}djM That 
 
 k to fay, there is an Imperfedion in the Di- 
 vine Nature, which, you acknowieged, was 
 abfurd. So you are caught in a plain Con- 
 tradition. 
 
 Phil. That God knows or underftands all 
 things, and that He knows, among other 
 things, what Pain is, even every fort of 
 painful Senfation, and what it is for His 
 Creatures to fuffer Pain, I make no que- 
 ftion. .But that God, tho' He knows, and 
 fometimes caufes painful Senfations in us, 
 can Himfelf fuffer Pain, I pofitively deny. 
 We, who are limited and dependent Spirits, 
 are liable to Impreflions of Senfe, the Effects 
 of an external Agent, which, being produced 
 againft our Wills, are fometimes painful and 
 uneafy. But God, whom no external Being 
 c^n affeft, who perceives nothing by Senfe 
 as we do., whofe Will is abfolute, and inde- 
 pendent, caufing all things, and liable to be 
 thwarted, or refifted by nothing ; it is evi- 
 dent, fuch a Being as this, can fuffer nothing, 
 nor be affefted with any painful Senfation, 
 or, indeed, any Senfation at all. We are 
 chained to a Body, that is to fay, our Per- 
 ceptions are connected with corporeal Mo- 
 tions. 
 
tions. By the Law of our Nature, we are 
 affe&ed upon every Alteration in the nervous 
 Parts of our fenfible Body : Which fenfible 
 Body, rightly confidered, is nothing but a 
 Complexion of fuch ..'Qualities, or Ideas, as 
 have noExiftcnce diftinct from being percei- 
 ved by a Mind : So that this Connexion of 
 Seniations ""with" corporeal Motions, means 
 no more, than a Correfpondence in the Or- 
 der of Nature, between two Setts of Ideas, 
 or Things immediately perceivable. But 
 God is a pure Spirit, difengaged from all 
 fuch Sympathy, or natural Ties. No corpo- 
 real Motions are attended with the Senfati- 
 ons of Pain, or Pleafure, in his Mind. To 
 know every thing knowable, is certainly a 
 Perfection ; but to endure, or fuffer, or feel 
 any thing by Senfe, is an Imperfe&ion. The 
 former,-! fay, agrees to God, but not the lat- 
 ter. Qodljcnows^or hath^Ideas j but His 
 Ideas '^rc not convj^^to iim by Se|ife^,as 
 ours are. " TouF^not DiiUnguifhing, where 
 there is fo manifeft a Difference, makes you 
 fancy, you fee an Abfurdity where there is 
 none. 
 
 Hyl But, all this while, you have not con- 
 (idered, that the Quariur^of Matter has been 
 demonftratcd td^e"proportional to the Gra- 
 vity of Bodies. And, what can'withftand 
 
 -: J ,. ^ 5 
 
 Uemonftration c* 
 
 Pbil. 
 
Phil. Let me fee how you demonftrate 
 that Point. 
 
 Hyl. I lay it down for a Principle, that 
 the Moments, or Quantities of Motion in Bo- 
 dies, are in a diireft, compounded Reafon, of 
 the Velocities and Quantities of Matter con- 
 tained in them. Hence, where the Velocities 
 are equal, it follows, the Moments are di- 
 re&ly, as the Quantity of Matter in each. 
 But it is found by Experience, that all Bo- 
 dies (bating the fmall Inequalities, arifing 
 from the Refiftance of the Air) defcend with 
 ah equal Velocity , the Motion, therefore, of 
 defcending Bodies, and, confequently, their 
 Gravity, which is the Caufe or Principle of 
 that Motion, is proportional to the Quan- 
 tity of Matter^ which was to be demonftra- 
 
 tty 
 ted. 
 
 Phil. You lay it down as a felf-evident 
 Principle, that the Quantity of Motion in any 
 Body, is proportional to the Velocity and 
 Matter, taken together : And this is made 
 life of to prove a Propofition, from whence 
 the Exiftence of Matter is inferred. Pray^- 
 is not this arguing in a Circle ? 
 
 Hyl. In the Premife, I only mean, that the 
 Motion is proportional to the Velocity^ joint- 
 ly with the Extenfion and Solidity. 
 
 Phil But allowing this to be true, yet it 
 will not thence follow, that Gravity is pro- 
 portional to Matter, in your Philofophte Senfe 
 
 of 
 
of the Word,- except you take it for granted^ 
 that unknown Subftratum,or whatever elfe you 
 call it, is proportional to thofe fenfible (Duali- 
 ties; which to fuppofe, is plaialy begging the 
 Queftion. That there is Magnitude and Soli- 
 dity, orKefiftance, perceived by Senfe, I readi- 
 ly grant; as likewile that Gravity may be pro- 
 portional to thofe Qualities, I will not difpute* 
 But that either thefe Qualities, as perceived 
 by us, or the Powers producing them, do 
 exift in a ?naterial Subftratuwi this is what fc{7 
 deny, and you, indeed, affirm, but, not- 
 withftanding your Demonftration, have not 
 yet proved. 
 
 Hyl. I fliall infift no longer on that Point*' 
 Do you think, however, you Ihall perfuade 
 me the natural Philofophers have been dream- 
 ing all this while > pray 3 what becomes of all 
 their Hypothefes and Explications of the Ph*- 
 iiomena, which fuppofe the Exiftence of Mat- 
 ter? 
 
 Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the Phe- 
 nomena 1 
 
 Hyl. I mean the Appearances which I per- 
 ceive by my Senfes. 
 
 Phil. And the Appearances perceived by 
 Senfe, are they not Ideas ? 
 
 Hyl. I have told you fo a hundred times* 
 
 Phil. Therefore, to explain the Ph<snomena y 
 is to {hew how we come to be affe&ed with, 
 in -that Manner and Series, wherein 
 
 they 
 
(128) 
 
 they are imprinted on our Serlfes. Is it 
 not ? 
 
 Hyl It is* 
 
 Phil. Now if you can prove,, that any Phi- 
 lofopher has explained the Produ&ion of any 
 one Idea in oiir Minds, by the Help of MaU 
 ter^ Ifliall for ever acquiefce and look on all 
 that has been faid againft it as nothing : But 
 if you cannot,, it is in vain to urge the Expli- 
 cation of Phenomena. That a Being endow- 
 ed with Knowlege and Will, fhou'd produce 
 or exhibit Ideas, is eafily underftood. But 
 that a Being which is utterly deftitute of thefe 
 Faculties fliou'd be able to produce Ideas, or 
 in any Sort to affeft an Intelligence, this I 
 can never underftand. This, I fay, tho we 
 had fome pofitive Conception of Matter, tho 
 we knew its Qualities, and cou'd compre- 
 hend its Exiftence, wou'd yet be fo far from 
 explaining Things, that it is itfelf the moft 
 inexplicable thing in the World. And, for all 
 this, it will not follow, that Philofophers have 
 been doing nothing neither $ for, by obferving 
 and reafoning upon the Connexion of Ideas, 
 they difcover the Laws and Methods of Na- 
 ture, which is a part of Knowlege both ufeful 
 and entertaining. 
 
 Hyl. After all, can it be fuppofed God 
 wou'd deceive all Mankind ; do you ima- 
 gine, He wou'd have induced the whole 
 World to believe the Being of Matter., if there 
 
 /" I I -s * 
 
 was no i'uch thing ? 
 
 Phil. 
 
Phil. That every epidemical Opinion ari 
 from Prejudice,, or Paflion, or Thoughtlefnefs^ 
 may be imputed to God, as the Author of it 5 1 
 believe^ you will not affirm* Whatibever Opi-* 
 nion we father on Him., it muft be, either be- 
 caufe He has difcovered it to us by fuperria^ 
 tural Revelation, or, becaufe it is fo evident 
 to our natural Faculties^ which were framed 
 and given us by God, that it is impoffible we 
 fliou'd with-hold our Aflfent from it* But^ 
 where is the Revelation ? or 5 where is the 
 Evidence that extorts the Belief of Matter ? 
 Nay, How does it appear,- that Matter^ taken 
 for fomething diftint from what we perceive 
 by our Senfes, is thought to exift by all Man- 
 kind, or, indeed, by any, except a few Phi* 
 lofophers, who do not know what they wou'd 
 be at $ Your Queftion fuppofes, thefe Points 
 are clear 5 and when you have cleared them 5 
 I fliall think -myfelf obliged to give you aflo- 
 ther Anfwer* In the mean time, let it fuf- 
 fice that I tell yo% I do not fuppofe God has 
 deceived Mankind at all. 
 
 Hyl. But the Novelty, Phitonouf, the No-^ 
 Vdty ! There lies the Danger* New No* 
 tionsfliou'd always be difcouritenanced ; they 
 unfettle Mens Minds^ and no body knows 
 where they will end* 
 
 PhiL Why the Rejecting a Notion that has rid 
 Foundation^ either in Senfe,- in Reafoii^ or irt 
 DiviBeAuthorityjfhouM be thought to unfettle' 
 
 K 
 
 
( 
 
 the Belief of fuch Opinions as are grounded on 
 all or any of thefe, I cannot imagine. That 
 Innovations in Government and Religion, are 
 dangerous, and ought to be difcountenanced, 
 I freely own. But, is there the like Reafon 
 why they fliou'd be difcouraged in Philofo- 
 phy c 1 The making any thing known which 
 was unknown before, is an Innovation in 
 Knowlege : And, if all fuch Innovations had 
 been forbidden, Men wou'd have made a no- 
 table Progrefs in the Arts and Sciences. But, 
 it is none of my bufinefs to plead for Novel- 
 ties and Paradoxes. T^j^QualitiesjKe 
 perceive, are not on the Objeds : That we 
 muft not believe our Senfes : That we know 
 nothing of the real Nature of Things, an'd 
 can never be auured even of their Exiftence : 
 That real Colours and Sounds, are nothing 
 but certain unknown Figures and Motion^: 
 That Motions are, in themfelves, neither 
 fwift nor flow : That there are in Bodies, 
 abfolute Extenfions, without any particular 
 Magnitude or Figure : That a Thing ftupid, 
 thoughtlefs, and inaftive, operates on a Spi- 
 rit : That the leaft Particle of a Body, con- 
 tains innumerable extended Parts. Thefe are 
 the Novelties, thefe are the ftrange Notions 
 which fliock the genuine, uncorrupted Judg- 
 ment of all Mankind ; and, being once ad- 
 mitted, embarrafs the Mind with endlefs 
 Doubts and Difficulties. And, it is againft 
 
 thefe, 
 
thefe, and the like Innovations, I endeavor 
 to vindicate common Senfe. It is true, in 
 doing this, I may, perhaps, be obliged to ufe 
 fame Ambages, and Ways of Speech not com- 
 mon. But, if my Notions are once thorow- 
 ly underftood, that which is moft fingular in 
 them, will, in effed, be found to amount to 
 no more than this : That it is abfolutely im- 
 poflible, and a plain Contradidion to fuppofe, 
 any unthinking Being fliou'd exift, without 
 being perceived by a Mind. And if this No- 
 tion be fingular, it is a fliame it fhou'd be fo 
 at this time of day, and in a Chriftian Couiv- 
 try. 
 
 Hyl. As for the Difficulties other Opinions 
 may be liable to, thofe are out of the Que- 
 ftion. It is your Bufinefs to defend your own 
 Opinion. Can any thing be plainer, than that 
 you are for changing all things into Ideas ? 
 You, I fay, who are not afhamed to charge 
 me with Scepticifm. This is fo plain, there 
 is no denying it. 
 
 Phil You miftake me. I am not for chan- 
 ging Things into Ideas, but rather Ideas into 
 Things; fince thofe immediate Objefts of 
 Perception, which, according to you, are only 
 Appearances of Things, I take to be the real 
 Things themfelves. 
 
 Hyl. Things ! you may pretend what .you 
 pleafe j but it is certain, you leave us nothing 
 
 K 2 bat 
 
( 132- ) 
 
 but the empty Forms of Things, the Outfide 
 only* which ftrikes the Senfes. 
 
 Phil. What you call the empty Forms and 
 Outfide of Things, feem to me, the very 
 Things themfelves. Nor are they empty or 
 incomplete otherwife, than upon your Sup- 
 pofition, that Matter. is an effential Part of all 
 corporeal Things. We both, therefore., a- 
 gree in this, that we perceive only fenfiblc 
 Forms : But herein we differ, you will have 
 them to be empty Appearances, I real Be- 
 ings. In fliort, you do not truft your Sen- 
 fes, I do. 
 
 Hyl. You fay, you believe your Senfes ; 
 and ,feem to applaud youfelf, that in this 
 you agree with the Vulgar. According to 
 you, therefore, the true Nature of a Thing is 
 difcovered by the Senfes. If fo, whence comes 
 that Difagreement ? Why is not the fame 
 Figure, and other fenfible Qualities, percei- 
 ved all manner of Ways ? and, why fhou'd 
 we ufe a Microfcope, the better to difcover 
 the true Nature of a Body, if it were difco- 
 verable to the naked Eye? 
 
 Phil. Stridtly fpeaking, Hylas, we do not 
 fee the fame Object that we feel* neither is 
 the fame Object perceived by the Micro- 
 fcope, which was by the naked Eye. But, 
 in cafe every Variation was thought fufficient 
 to conftitutc a new Kind or Individual, the 
 : cndlefs Number or Confufion of Names wou'd 
 render Language impradicabk. Therefore, 
 
to avoid this, as well as other Inconvenien- 
 cies, which are obvious upon a little Thought, 
 Men ^^ombinej^cther fevcral Ideas^a^grf-. 
 hendecf by divers Senfes, or by the lanie 
 Senfe at different-Times, or in different Cir- 
 cumftances, 'but obferved, however, to have 
 fome Connexion in Nature, either with re- 
 fpeft to Coexiftence or Succeffion ; all which 
 they refer to one Name, and confider as one 
 Thing. Hence it follows, that when I exa*- 
 mine by my other Senfes a Thing I have 
 feen, it is not, in. order to underftand better 
 the fame Objeft which I had perceived by 
 Sight, the Objeft of one Senfe not being per- 
 ceived by the other Senfes. And, when I look 
 thro a Microfcope, it is not that I may per- 
 ceive more clearly, what I perceived already 
 with my bare Eyes, the Objeft perceived by 
 the Glafs being quite different from the for-. 
 mer. But in both cafes, my Aim is only to 
 know, what Ideas are conne&ecl together; 
 and the more a Man knows of the Connexion 
 of Ideas, the more he is faid to know-.of 
 the Nature of Things. What, therefore, if 
 our Ideas are variable ; what. if our Senfes 
 are not in all Circumftances affe&ed with the 
 fame Appearances ? It will not thence fol- 
 low, they are not to be trufted, or, that they 
 are inconfiftent either with themfelves, or any 
 thing elfe, except it be with your preconceived 
 Notion of (I know not what) one fingle, un- 
 changed, unperceivable, real Nature, marked 
 
 K 3 by 
 
by each Name : Which Prejudice feems to 
 have taken its Rife, from not rightly under- 
 ftanding the common Language of Men, fpeak- 
 ing of feveral diftinft Ideas, as united in- 
 to one thing by the Mind. And, indeed, 
 there is Caufe to fufped, feveral erroneous 
 Conceits of the Philolbphers are owing to 
 the fame Original : While they began to build 
 their Schemes, not fo much on Notions as 
 Words, which were framed by the Vulgar, 
 meerly for Conveniency and Difpatch in the 
 common A&ions of Life, without any regard 
 to Speculation. 
 
 Hyl. Methinks, I apprehend your Mean- 
 ing. < 
 
 Pbil. It is your Opinion, the Ideas we per- 
 ceive by our Scnfes, are not real Things, but 
 Images, or Copies of them. Our Knowlege^ 
 therefore, is no farther real, than as our Ideas 
 are the true Reprefentations of thofe Origi- 
 nals. But, as thefe fuppofed Originals are 
 In themfelves unknown, it is impoffible to 
 know how far our Ideas refemble them 5 or, 
 whether they refemble them at all. We can- 
 not, therefore, be fure we have any real 
 Knowlege. Farther, as our Ideas are perpe- 
 tually varied, without any Change in the fup- 
 pofed real Things, it neceflarily follows, they 
 cannot all be true Copies of them : Or, if 
 fome are, and others are not, it is impoffible 
 to diftinguifh the former from the latter. 
 
 And, 
 
( 
 
 And, this plunges us yet deeper in Uncer- 
 tainty. Again, when we confider the Point, 
 we cannot conceive how any Idea, or any 
 thing like an Idea, ftiou'd have an abfolute 
 Exiftence out of a Mind : Nor, confequent- 
 ly, according to you, how there fliou'd be 
 any real Thing in Nature. The Refult of all 
 which is, that we are thrown into the moft 
 hopelefs and abandoned Scepticifm. Now 
 give me leave to ask you, Firft, Whether your 
 referring Ideas to certain abiolutely exifting > 
 unperceived Subftances, as their Originals, 
 be not the Source of all this Scepticifm ? Se- 
 condly, Whether you are informed, either by 
 Senfe or Reafon, of the Exiftence of thofe un- 
 known Originals ? And in cafe you are not, 
 Whether it be not abfurd to fuppofe them ? 
 Thirdly, Whether, upon Inquiry, you find 
 there is any thing diftin&ly conceived or 
 meant by the abfolute or external Exiftence 
 of unperceiving Subftances ? Laftiy, Whether 
 the Premifes confidered, it be not the wifeft 
 way to follow Nature, truft your Senfes, 
 and, laying afide all anxious Thought about 
 unknown Natures or Subftances, admit, with 
 the Vulgar, thofe for real Things which are 
 perceived by the Senfes ? 
 
 Hy/. For the prefenr, I have no Inclination 
 to the Anfwering Part. I woif d much ra- 
 ther fee how you can get over what follows. 
 Pray, are not the Obje&s perceived by the 
 K 4 Senfes 
 
Senfes of one, likewife perceivable to all o* 
 (hers prefent ? If there were an hundred 
 more here, they wou'd all fee the Garden, 
 the Trees, and Flowers, as I fee them. But 
 they are not in the fame manner affefted with 
 the Ideas I frame in my Imagination. Does 
 not this make a Difference, between the for- 
 mer fort of Objects and the latter ? 
 
 Phil. I grant, it does. Nor have I ever 
 denied a Difference between the Obje&s of 
 Senfe and thpfe of Imagination. But, what 
 wouM you infer from thence ? You cannot 
 fay, that fenfible Obje&s exift unperceived^ 
 frecaufe they are perceived by many. 
 
 HyL I own, I can make nothing of that 
 Objection 2 But, it has led me into another. 
 Is it not your Opinion, that by our Senfe? 
 we perceive only the Ideas exifting in oqr 
 Minds ? 
 PhiL It is. 
 
 HyL But the fame Idea which is in my 
 Mindj cannot be in yours, or in any other 
 Mind, Doth it not, therefore, follow from 
 your Principles, that no Two can fee the 
 fame thing And, is not this highly ab- 
 furd ? 
 
 /> PhiL If the Term fa?ne be taken in the 
 vulgar Acceptation, it is certain, (and not at 
 all repugnant to the Principles I maintain) 
 that different Perfons may perceive the fame 
 Thing I or, the fame Thing or Idea exift in 
 
 Afferent 
 
( 137 ) 
 
 different Minds. Words are of arbitrary Im- 
 pofition ; and fince Men are ufed to apply 
 the Word fame where no Diftindion or Va- 
 riety is perceived, and I do not pretend to 
 alter their Perceptions ; it follows, that as 
 Men have faid before, federal faw the fame 
 thing^ fo they may, upon like Occafions, ftill 
 continue to ufe the fame Phrafe, without any 
 Deviation either from Propriety of Language, 
 or the Truth of Things. But, if the Term 
 fame be ufed in the Acceptation of Philofo- 
 phers, who pretend to an abftraded Notion 
 of Identity, then, according to their fundry 
 Definitions of this Notion, (for it is not yet 
 agreed, wherein that Philofophic Identity 
 eonfifts) it may, or may not, be poffible for 
 divers Perfons to perceive the fame thing. 
 But, whether Philosophers fliall think fit to 
 call a thing the fame, or no, is, I conceive, 
 of fmall Importance. Let us fuppofe feveral 
 Men together, all endued with the fame Fa- 
 culties, and, confequently, affected, in like 
 fort, by their Senfes, and who had yet ne- 
 ver known the Ufe of Language ; they wou'd, 
 without queftion, agree in their Perceptions. 
 Tho, perhaps, when they eame to the Ufe 
 of Speech, fome, regarding the Uniformnefs 
 of what was perceived, might call it the fame 
 thing : Others, efpecially, regarding the Di- 
 verfity of Perfons, who perceived, might 
 fhoofe the Denomination of different things. 
 
 But, 
 
, But, who fees not that all the Difpute is 
 about a Word ? Viz. Whether what is per- 
 ceived by different Perfons, may, yet, have 
 the Term fame applied to it : Or, iuppofe a 
 Houfe, whofe Walls or outward Shell remain- 
 ing unaltered, the Chambers are all pulled 
 down, and new ones built in their place ; 
 and that you fliou'd call this the fame^ and I 
 fliou'd fay it was not the fame Houfe : Wou'd 
 we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our 
 Thoughts of the Houfe, confidered in itfelf ? 
 and, wou'd not all the Difference confift in a 
 Sound ? If you fliou'd fay, We differed in 
 our Notions ; for that you fuperadded to your 
 Idea of the Houfe, the fimple abftra&ed Idea 
 of Identity, whereas I did not ; I wou'd tell 
 you, I know not what you mean by that 
 abftr aft ed Idea of Identity ; and fliou'd defire 
 you to look into your own Thoughts, and 
 be fure you understood yourfelf. Why 
 fo filent, Hylas ? Are you not yet fatisfied, 
 Men may difpute about Identity and Diver- 
 fity, without any real Difference in their 
 Thoughts and Opinions, abftraded from 
 Names ? Take this farther Reflexion with 
 you : That, whether Matter be allowed to 
 exift, or no, the Cafe is exactly the fame as 
 to the Point in hand. For the Materialifts 
 themfelves acknowlege, what we immediate- 
 ly perceive by our Senfes, to be our own 
 Ideas. Your Difficulty, therefore, that no 
 
 two 
 
two fee the fame thing, makes equally a~ 
 gainft the Materialifts and me. 
 
 Hyl Ay, Philonour, but they fuppofe an 
 external Archetype, to which, referring their 
 feveral Ideas, they may truly be faid to per- 
 ceive the fame thing. 
 
 Phil. And (not to mention your having 
 difcarded thofe Archetypes) fo may you fup- 
 pofe, an external Archetype on my Principles, 
 external, 1 mean, to your own Mind ,- tho, 
 indeed, it muft be fuppofed to exift in that 
 Mind which comprehends all things; but 
 then, this ferves all the Ends of Identity, as 
 well as if it exifted out of a Mind. And > 
 I am fure, you yourfelf will not fay, It is 
 lefs intelligible. 
 
 Hyl. You have, indeed, clearly fatisfied me, 
 either, that there is no Difficulty at Bottom 
 in this Point ; or, if there be, that it makes 
 equally againft both Opinions. 
 
 Phil. But that which makes equally againft 
 two contradi&ory Opinions, can be a Proof 
 againft neither. 
 
 Hyl. I acknowlege it. But after all, Pbi- 
 lonous y when I confider the Subftance of what 
 you advance againft Scepticifm, it amounts to 
 no more than this. We are fure, that we 
 really fee, hear, feel y in a Word, that we are 
 affe&ed with fenfible Impreffions. 
 
 Phil. And, how are we concerned any far*- 
 ther ? I fee this Cherry, I feel it, I tafte it : 
 
 And, 
 
(140) 
 
 And, I am fure, nothing cannot be feen, or 
 felt, or tafted : It is therefore real. Take 
 away the Senfations of Softnefs, Moifturc, 
 Rednefs, Tartnefs, and you take away the 
 Cherry. Since it is not a Being diftind from 
 thofe Senfations ; a Cherry, I fay, is nothing 
 but a Congeries of fenfible Imprefidons, or 
 Ideas perceived by various Senfes : Which 
 Ideas are united into one thing (or have one 
 Name given them) by the Mind; becaufe 
 they are obferved to attend each other. Thus, 
 when the Palate is affefted with fuch a parti- 
 cular Tafte, the Sight is affeded with a red 
 Colour, the Touch with Roundnefs, Soft- 
 nefs, &c. Hence, when I fee, and feel, and 
 tafte, in fuch fundry, certain Manners, I am 
 fure, the Cherry exifts, or is real ; its Reality 
 being, in my Opinion, nothing abftrafted 
 from thofe Senfations. But if by the Word 
 Cherry, you mean an unknown Nature, di- 
 ftind from all thofe fenfible Qualities ; and, 
 by its Exiftence, fomething diftindt from its 
 being perceived : Then, indeed, I own, nei- 
 ther you, nor I, nor any one elfe, can be fure 
 it exifts. 
 
 Hyl. But what wou'd you fay, Philo- 
 nout, if I fhou'd bring the very fame Rea^ 
 fons againft the Exiftence of fenfible Things 
 in a Mind, which you have offered againft 
 their Exifting in a material Subflratum? 
 
 Phil 
 
Phil. When I fee your Reafons, you fhall 
 hear what I have to lay to them. 
 
 Hyl. Is the Mind extended., or uncxteri* 
 dcd? 
 m , Phil. Unextended, without doubt. 
 
 Hyl. Do you not fay, the Things you per- 
 ceive are in your Mind ? 
 
 .Phil. They are. 
 
 Hyl. Again, have I not heard you fpeakof 
 feniible Impreffions ? 
 
 Phil. I believe you may* 
 
 Hyl r Explain to me now,, O Philonout ! 
 how it is poffible, there fliou'd be room for 
 all thofe Trees and Houfes to exift in your 
 Mind. Can extended Things be contained 
 in that which is unextended ? Or, are we to 
 imagine Impreffions made on a Thing void 
 of all Solidity ? You cannot fay, Objects are 
 in your Mind, as Books in your Study : Or, that 
 Things are imprinted on it, as the Figure of a 
 Seal upon Wax. In what Senfe, therefore, 
 are we to underftand thofe Expreffions ? Ex- 
 plain me this if you can : And I lhall then 
 be able to anfwer all thofe Queries you for- 
 merly put to me, about my Subftratum. 
 
 Phil. Look you, Hylar, when I fpeak of 
 Objects, as exifting in the Mind, or imprint- 
 ed on the Senfes; I wou'dnotbe underftood 
 in the grofs, literal Senfe, as when Bodies 
 are faid to exift in a place, or a Seal to make 
 an Impreffion upon Wax. My Meaning is 
 
 only 
 
( 142- ) 
 
 only, that the Mind comprehends, or per- 
 ceives them; and that it is affe&cd from 
 without, or by fome Being diftinft from it- 
 felf. This is my Explication of your Diffi- 
 culty ; and, how it can ferve to make your 
 Tenent of an unperceiving, material Subftra- 
 turn intelligible, I wouM fain know* 
 
 Hyl. Nay, if that be all, I confefs, I do not 
 fee what Ufe can be made of it. But, are 
 you not guilty of fome Abufe of Language 
 in this ? 
 
 Phil. None at all : It is no more than 
 common Cuftom, which, you know, is the 
 Rule of Language, has authorized : Nothing 
 being more ufual, than for Philofophers to 
 fpeak of the immediate Obje&s of the Un- 
 derftanding, as Things exifting in the Mind. 
 Nor is there any thing in this, but what is 
 conformable to the general Analogy of Lan- 
 guage, moft part of the mental Operations 
 being fignified by Words borrowed from fen- 
 fible Things ; as is plain, in the Terms Com- 
 prehend, Refleff, Difcourje, &c. which, being 
 applied to the Mind, muft not be taken in 
 their grofs, original Senfe. 
 
 Hyl. You have, I own, fatisfied me in this 
 Point : But there (till remains one great Dif- 
 ficulty, which I know not how you will get 
 over. And, indeed, it is of fuch Importance, 
 that if you cou'd folve all others, without be- 
 ing able to find a Solution for this, you muft 
 
 never 
 
(143) 
 
 never exped to make me a Profelyte to your 
 Principles. 
 
 Phil. Let me know this mighty Diffi- 
 culty. 
 
 Hyl. The Scripture Account of the Crea- 
 tion, is, what appears to me, utterly irre- 
 concilable with your Notions. Mojes tells 
 us of a Creation : A Creation of what ? of 
 Ideas? No, certainly, but of Things, <tf 
 real Things, folid, corporeal Subftances. Bring 
 your Principles to agree with this, and I ftiall 
 the fooiier agree with y<5ii. 
 
 Phil. Mofts mentions the Sun, Moon, and 
 Stars, Earth and Sea, Plants and Animals: 
 That all thefe do really exift, and were, ih 
 the Beginning, created by God, I make no 
 queftion. If by Ideas, you mean Fi&ions, 
 and Fancies of the Mind, then thefe are no 
 Ideas. If by Idear, you mean immediate 
 Objefts of the Underftanding, or -fenfibk 
 Things, which cannot exift unperceived, or 
 out of a Mind, then thefe Things are Ideas. 
 But, Whether yoti do, or do not call them 
 Ideas it matters little. *The Difference is otf- 
 ly about a Name. And, whether that Narffe 
 be retained or rejeftcd, the Senfe, the Truth 
 and Reality of Things, continues the fartie. 
 In common Talk, the Objcas of our Senfes 
 are not teamed tde-as, but Thing?. Call 
 them fo ftill : Provided you -do nbt attribute 
 to them'any-abfolute^xttrnal Exigence, anii 
 
 Ifhall 
 
( 144 ) 
 
 1 fhall never quarrel with you for a Word. 
 The Creation, therefore, I allow to have been 
 a Creation of Things, of Real Things. Nei- 
 ther is this, in the leaft, inconfiftent with my 
 Principles, as is evident from what I have 
 now faid $ and wou'd have been evident to 
 you without this, if you had not forgotten 
 what had been fo often faid before, but, as 
 for folid, corporeal Subftances, I defire you 
 to (hew where Mofes makes any mention of 
 them y and, if they fliou'd be mentioned by 
 him, or any other infpired Writer^ it wou'd 
 ftill be incumbent on you to fliew, thole 
 Words were not taken in the vulgar Accep- 
 tatiop, for Things falling under our Senfes, 
 but in the Philofophic Acceptation, for Mat- 
 ter, or an unknown Quiddity, with an abfo- 
 lute Exiftence. When you have proved thefe 
 Points^ then (and not till then) may you 
 bring the Authority of Mofes into our Di- 
 fpute. 
 
 HyL It is in vain to difpute about a Point 
 fo clear. I am content to refer it to your 
 own Conference. Are you not fatisfied, there 
 is fome peculiar Repugnancy between the Mo- 
 faic Account of the Creation, and your No- 
 tions ? 
 
 Phil. If all poffible Senfe, which can te put 
 on the Firft Chapter of Gene.fis^ may be con- 
 ceived as conliftently with my Principles as 
 any other, then it has no peculiar Repugnan- 
 
C'4?) 
 
 cy with them. But there is no Senfe you 
 may not as well conceive., believing as I do* 
 Since., befide Spirits, all you conceive are 
 Ideas ; and the Exiftence of thefe I do not 
 deny. Neither do you pretend, they exift 
 without the Mind. 
 
 Hyl. Pray, let me fee any Senfe you can 
 underftand it in. 
 
 Phil. Why, I imagine, that, if I had been 
 prefent at the Creation, I Ihould have feen 
 Things produced into Being ; that is, become 
 perceptible, in the Order defcribed by the Sa- 
 cred Hiftorian. I ever before believed the 
 Mosaic Account of the Creation, and now 
 find no Alteration in my Manner of believing 
 it. When Things are faid to begin or end 
 their Exiftence, we do not mean this with 
 regard to God, but His Creatures. All Ob- 
 jeds are eternally known by God, or, which 
 is the fame thing, have an eternal Exiftence 
 in his Mind : But, when Things, before un- 
 perceptible to Creatures, are, by a Decree of 
 God, made perceptible to them* then are 
 they faid to begin a relative Exiftence, with 
 refpedt to created Minds. Upon reading, 
 therefore, the Mofaic Account of the Crea- 
 tion, I underftand, that the feveral Parts of 
 the World became gradually perceivable to 
 finite Spirits, endowed with proper Faculties; 
 fo that, whoever fuch were prefent, they were^ 
 in truth, perceived by them. This is the h- 
 
 T 1 
 
 L tera! 3 
 
teral, obvious Senfe fuggefted to me, by the 
 Words of the Holy Scripture : In which is 
 included, no Mention., or no Thought, either 
 of Subftratum.) Inftrument, Occafion, or abfo- 
 lute Exiftence. And, upon Inquiry, I doubt 
 not, it will be found, that moft plain, honeft 
 Men, who believe the Creation, never think 
 of thofe things any more than L What me- 
 taphyfical Senfe you may underftand it in, 
 you only can tell. 
 
 Hyl. But, PMonous, you do not feem to be 
 aware, that you allow created Things, in the 
 Beginning, only a relative, and, confequent- 
 ly, hypothetical, Being : That is to fay, up- 
 on Suppofition, there were Men to perceive 
 them, without which they have no Aduality 
 of ablolute Exiftence, wherein Creation might 
 terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to 
 you, plainly impoffible, the Creation of any 
 inanimate Creatures fhou'd precede that of 
 Man ? And, is not this dire&ly contrary to 
 the Mosaic Account ? 
 
 Phil. In Anfwerto that, I fay, Firft, Crea- 
 ted Beings might begin to exift, in the Mind 
 of other created Intelligences, beiide Men. 
 You will not, therefore, be able to prove any 
 Contradi&ion between Mofef and my No- 
 tions, unlefs you firft fhew, there was no 
 other Order of finite created Spirits in 
 Being, before Man. I fay farther, in cafe 
 we conceive the Creation, as we ihou'd at 
 
 this 
 
(147) 
 
 this time a Parcel of Plants or Vegetables of 
 all forts,, produced by an invifible Power, in 
 a Defert where no body was prefent : That 
 this Way of explaining or conceiving it, is 
 confident with myPrinciples,fince they deprive 
 you of nothing, either fenfible, or imaginable : 
 That it exa&ly fuits with the common, natu- 
 ral, undebauched Notions of Mankind : That 
 it manifefts the Dependence of all Things on 
 God ; and, confequently, has all the good Ef- 
 fed: or Influence, which it is poflible that im- 
 portant Article of our Faith ihou'd have, in 
 making Men humble, thankful, and refigned 
 to their great Creator. I fay, moreover, that 
 in this naked Conception of Things, divefted 
 of Words, there will not be found any No- 
 tion of what you call the Actuality of abfo- 
 lute Exiftence. You may, indeed, raife a Duft 
 with thofe Terms, and fo lengthen our Di- 
 fpute to no purpofe. But I intreat you calm- 
 ly to look into your own Thoughts, and then 
 tell me, if they are not an ufelefs and unintel- 
 ligible Jargon. 
 
 Hyl. I own, I have no very clear Notion 
 annexed to them. But, what lay you to this ? 
 Do you not make the Exiftence of fenfible 
 Things confift in their being in a Mind ? 
 And, were not all Things eternally in the 
 Mind of God ? Did they not, therefore, exift 
 from all Eternity, according to you ? And, 
 how cou'd that., which was Eternal, be crea- 
 
 L 2 ted 
 
( 148 ) 
 
 ted in Time ? Can any thing be clearer or 
 better connected than this ? 
 
 Phil. And, are not you too of Opinion, 
 that God knew all Things from Eternity ? 
 
 Hyl. I am. 
 
 Phil. Confequently, they always had a Be- 
 ing in the Divine Intellect. 
 
 Hyl. This I acknowlege. 
 
 Phil. By your own Confeifion, therefore, 
 nothing is New, or begins to be, in refpedt 
 of the Mind of God. So we are agreed in 
 that Point. 
 
 Hyl. What fliall we make then of the Crea- 
 tion? 
 
 Phil. May we not underftand it to have 
 been intirely in refpeft of finite Spirits ; fo 
 that Things, with regard to us, may proper- 
 ly be faid to begin their Exiftence, or be 
 Created, when God decreed, they fhou'd be- 
 come perceptible to intelligent Creatures, in 
 that Order and Manner which He then efta- 
 blifh'd, and we now call the Laws of Na- 
 ture ? You may call this a relative, or hypo* 
 thettcal Exiftence, if you pleafe. But, fo long 
 as it fupplies us with the moft natural, ob- 
 vious, and literal Senfe of the Mofaic Hifto- 
 ry of the Creation ; fo long as it anfwers all 
 the religious Ends of that great Article ; 
 in a Word, fo long as you can affign no other 
 Senfe or Meaning in its ftead ; why fliou'd 
 we rejeft this ? Is it to comply with a ri- 
 diculous, 
 
. 
 
 diculous, Sceptical Humor., of making every 
 thing Nonfenfe and Unintelligible ? I am 
 fare, you cannot fay, it is for the Glory of 
 God. For, allowing it to be a thing pofii- 
 ble, and conceivable., that the corporeal World 
 ihou'd have an abfolute Subfiftence, extrinfi- 
 cal to the Mind of God, as well as to the 
 Minds of all created Spirits : Yet, how coif d 
 this fet forth either the Immeniity or Om- 
 nifcience of the Deity, or the neceflary and 
 immediate Dependence of all things on Him ? 
 Nay, wou'd it not rather feem to derogate 
 from thofe Attributes ? 
 
 Hyl. Well, but as to this Decree of God's, 
 for making Things perceptible : What fay 
 you, PbildnoUf, is it not plain, God did either 
 execute that Decree from all Eternity, or, at 
 fome certain time, began to will what He had 
 not a&ually willed before, but only defigned 
 to will. If the former, then there cou'd be no 
 Creation or Beginning of Exiftence in finite 
 Things. If the latter, then we muft acknow- 
 lege fomething new to befall the Deity ; 
 which implies a fort of Change : and all 
 Change argues Imperfe&ion. 
 
 Phil. Pray, confider what you are doing. 
 Is it not evident, this Objection concludes 
 equally againft a Creation in any Senfe ; nay, 
 againft every other Aft of the Deity, difco- 
 verable by the Light of Nature : None of 
 which can we conceive, otherwife than as per- 
 L 3 formed 
 
formed in Time, and having a Beginning ? 
 God is a Being oftranfcendentand unlimited 
 Perfections : His Nature, therefore, is incom- 
 prehenfible to finite Spirits. It is not, there- 
 fore, to be expe&ed, that any Man, whether 
 Materialift or Immaterialift^ fliou'd have ex- 
 a&ly juft Notions of the Deity, His Attri- 
 butes, and Ways of Operation ? If then you 
 wou'd infer any thing againft rne, your Diffi- 
 culty muft not be drawn from the Inadequate- 
 nefs of our Conceptions of the Divine Na- 
 ture, which is unavoidable on any Scheme ; 
 but from the Denial of Matter, of which there 
 is not one Word, dire&ly or indire&ly, in 
 what you have now objected. 
 
 Hyl. I muft acknowlege, the Difficulties you 
 are concerned to clear, are fuch only as arife 
 from the Non-exiftence of Matter, and are 
 peculiar to that Notion. So far you are in 
 the right. But I cannot by any means bring 
 myfelf to think, there is no fuch peculiar Re- 
 pugnancy between the Creation and your 
 Opinion ; tho, indeed, where to fix it, I do 
 not diftin&ly know. 
 
 Phil. What wou'd you have ! do I not ac^ 
 knowlege a twofold State of Things? the 
 one Eftypal or Natural, the other Archety- 
 pal and Eternal. The former was created in 
 Time , the latter exifted from Everlafting, in 
 the Mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the 
 common Notions of Divines ? or^ is any more 
 
 than 
 
s * ? ~ -/ 
 
 than this neceflary, in order to conceive the 
 Creation? But you fufped fome peculiar 
 Repugnancy, tho you know not where it lies. 
 To take away all Poflibility of Scruple in the 
 cafe, do but confider this one Point. Either 
 you are not able to conceive the Creation on 
 any Hypothefis whatfoever : And if fo, there 
 is no ground for Diflike or Complaint againft 
 my particular Opinion, on that Score. Or, 
 you are able to conceive it ; and if fo, why 
 not on my Principles, fince thereby nothing 
 conceivable is taken away ? You have all 
 along been allowed the full Scope of Senfe, 
 Imagination, and Reafon. Whatever, there- 
 fore, you cou'd before apprehend, either im- 
 mediately or mediately, by your Senfes, or 
 by Ratiocination from your Senfes ; whatever 
 you cou'd perceive, imagine, or underftand,re- 
 mains ftill with you. If, therefore, the Notion 
 you have of the Creation, by other Principles, 
 be intelligible, you have it ftill upon mine ; 
 if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no 
 Notion at all ; and fo there is no Lofs of it. 
 And, indeed, it feems to me very plain, that 
 the Suppofition of Matter, /. e. a thing per- 
 feftly unknown and inconceivable, cannot 
 ferve to make us conceive any thing. And, 
 I hope, it need not be proved to you, that, if 
 the Exiftence of Matter does not make the 
 Creation conceivable, the Creation's being 
 
 L 4 with- 
 
. 
 
 without it inconceivable, can be no Obje&ion 
 againft its Non-Exiftence. 
 
 Hyl. I confefs, Philonou^ you have almoft 
 fatisfied me in this Point of the Creation. 
 
 Phil. I wou'd fain know why you are not 
 quite fatisfied. You tell me, indeed, of a Re- 
 pugnancy between the Mofaic Hiftory and 
 Immaterjalifm : But you know not where it 
 lies. Is this reafonable, Hylas? Can you 
 expeft I Ihou'd folve a Difficulty without 
 knowing what it is. But, to pafs by all that, 
 Wou'd not a Man think you were affured, 
 there is no Repugnancy between the received 
 Notions of Materialifts and the infpired Wri- 
 tings ?^ 
 
 Hyl. And fo I am. 
 
 Phil. Ought the Hiftorical Part of Scripture 
 to be underftood in a plain, obvious Senfe, 
 or in a Senfe which is metaphyfical, and out 
 of the way ? 
 
 Hyl. In the plain Senfe, doubtlefs. 
 
 Phil. When Mofa fpeaks of Herbs, Earth, 
 Water, &c. as having been created by God 5 
 think you not, the fenfible Things, common- 
 ly fignified by thofe Words, are fuggefted to 
 every unphilofophical Reader ? 
 
 Hyl. I cannot help thinking fo. 
 
 Phil. And are not all Ideas, or Things per- 
 ceived by Senfe, to be denied a real Exiftence 
 by the Dodrine of the Materialifts ? 
 
 Hyl. This I have already acknowleged. 
 
 Phil, 
 
Phil. The Creation, therefore, according 
 to tfiem, was not the Creation of Things fen- 
 $ble, which have only a relative Being, but 
 of certain unknown Natures, which have an 
 abfolute Being, wherein Creation might ter- 
 minate. 
 
 Hyl. True. 
 
 Phil. Is it not, therefore, evident, the Aflfer- 
 ters of Matter deftroy the plain, obvious Senfe 
 of Mofes^ with which their Notions are utter- 
 ly inconfiftent ; and, inftead of it, obtrude 
 on us I know not what ; fomething equally 
 unintelligible to themfelves, and me? 
 
 Hyl. I cannot contradict you. 
 
 Phil. Mofes tells us of a Creation. A Crea- 
 tion of what ? of unknown Quiddities, of 
 Occafions, or Subftratums ? No, certainly ; but 
 of Things obvious to the Senfes. You muft 
 firft reconcile this with your Notions, if you 
 exped I fhou'd be reconciled to them. 
 
 Hyl. I fee, you can affaultme with my own 
 Weapons. 
 
 Phil. Then, as to abfolute Exifience ; was 
 there ever known a more jejune Notion than 
 that $ Something it is , fo abftraded and 
 unintelligible, that you have frankly owned, 
 you cou'd not conceive it, much lefs, explain 
 any thing by it. But allowing Matter to exift, 
 and the Notion of abfolute Exiftence to be as 
 clear as Light $ yet, was this ever known to 
 make the Creation more credible ? Nay^ has 
 
 ( ; , --,- . V '% '* - . 
 
 it 
 
it not furniflied the Atheifls and Infidels of all 
 Ages, with the moft plaufible Argument a- 
 gainft a Creation? That a corporeal Sub- 
 ftance, which hath an abfolute Exiftence, with- 
 out the Minds of Spirits, ihou'd be produced 
 out of nothing, by the meer Will of a Spi- 
 rit, has been looked upon as a thing fo con- 
 trary to all Reafon, fo impoffible and abfurd, 
 that not only the moft celebrated among the 
 Ancients, but even divers Modern and Chri- 
 ftian Philofophers have thought Matter co- 
 eternal with the Deity. Lay thefe things to- 
 gether, and then judge you, whether Mate- 
 rialifm difpofes Men to believe the Creation 
 of Things. 
 
 HyL I own, Philonous^ I think it does not* 
 This of the Creation is the laft Obje&ion I can 
 think of ; and I mull needs own, it has been 
 iufficiently anfwered as well as the reft. No- 
 thing now remains to be overcome, but a 
 fort of unaccountable Backwardness that I 
 find in myfelf toward your Notions. 
 
 Phil. When a Man is fwayed, he knows 
 not why, to one Side of a Queftion ; Can 
 this, think you, be any thing elfe 3 but the Ef- 
 fed of Prejudice, which never fails to attend 
 old and rooted Notions? And, indeed, in 
 this refpeft, I cannot deny the Belief of Mat- 
 ter to have very much the Advantage over 
 the contrary Opinion, with Men of a learned 
 Education. 
 
 Hyl. 
 
. . 
 
 Hyl. I confefs, it feems to be as you fay; 
 
 PhiL As a Balance, therefore, to this 
 Weight of Prejudice, let us throw into the 
 Scale the great Advantages that arife from 
 the Belief of Immaterialifm, both in regard to 
 Religion and Humane Learning. The Being of 
 a God, and Incorruptibility of the Soul, thofe 
 great Articles of Religion, are they not pro- 
 ved with the cleareft and moft immediate Evi- 
 dence ? When I fay the Being of a God, I 
 do not mean an obfcure, general Caufe of 
 Things, whereof we have no Conception, 
 but God, in the ftrift and proper Senfe of the 
 Word. A Being, whofe Spirituality, Omni- 
 prefence, Providence, Omnifcience, Infinite 
 Power and Goodnefs, are as confpicuous, as 
 the Exiftence of fenfible Things, of which 
 (notwithftanding the fallacious Pretences and 
 affe&ed Scruples of Sceptics) there is no more 
 reafon to doubt, thaii of our own Being. 
 Then, with relation to Humane Sciences; 
 in Natural Philofophy, what Intricacies, what 
 Obfcurities, what Contradictions, has the Be- 
 lief of Matter led Men into ! To fay nothing 
 of the numberlefs Difputes about its Extent, 
 Continuity, Homogeneity, Gravity, Divifibi- 
 lity, &c. do they not pretend to explain all 
 things by Bodies operating on Bodies, accor- 
 ding to the Laws of Motion? and, yet, are 
 they able to comprehend, how any one Body 
 ftiou'd move another ? Nay, admitting there 
 
 was 
 
was no Difficulty., in reconciling the Notion 
 of an inert Being with a Caufe ; or in con- 
 ceiving, how an Accident might pafs from 
 one Body to another ,- yet, by all their (train- 
 ed Thoughts and extravagant Suppofitions, 
 have they been able to reach the mechanical 
 Produ&ion of any one Animal or Vegetable 
 Body ? Can they account, by the Laws of 
 Motion, for Sounds, Taftes, Smells, or Co- 
 lours, or for the regular Courfe of Things ? 
 In fine, have they accounted, by Phyfical Prin- 
 ciples, for the Aptitude and Contrivance, even 
 6f the moft inconfiderable Parts of the Uni- 
 verfe ? But, laying afide Matter and corpo- 
 real Caufes, and admitting only the Efficiency 
 of an All-perfeft Mind, are not all the Effects 
 of Nature eafy and intelligible ? If the Phe- 
 nomena are nothing elfe but Ideas; God is a 
 a Spirit, but Matter an unintelligent, unper- 
 ceiving Being. If they demonftrate an unli- 
 mited Power in their Caufe ; God is Active 
 and Omnipotent, but Matter an inert Mafs. 
 If the Order, Regularity, and Ufefulnefs of 
 them, can never be Efficiently admired ; God 
 is infinitely Wife and Provident, but Matter 
 deftitute of all Contrivance and Defign. 
 Thefe, furely, are great Advantages in Pky- 
 faf. Not to mention, that the Apprehenfion 
 of a diftant Deity, naturally difpofes Men to 
 a Negligence in their moral Actions, which 
 they wou'd be more cautious of, in cafe they 
 
 thought 
 
thought Him immediately prefent, and a&ing 
 on their Minds without the Interpofitioh of 
 Matter, or unthinking Second Caufes* Then 
 in Metaphyjics ; what Difficulties concerning 
 Entity in Abftraft, Subflantial Forms, Hylar- 
 chic Principles, Plaftic Natures, Subjects and 
 Adjun6ls,PrincipleofIndividuation,Poflibility 
 of Matter's thinking,Origine of Ideas, the Man- 
 ner how two independent Subftances,fo wide- 
 ly different as Spirit and Matter, fliou'd mu- 
 tually operate on each other ? What Diffi- 
 culties, I fay, and endlefs Difquifitions con- 
 cerning thefe, and innumerable other the like 
 Points, do we efcape, by fuppofing only Spi- 
 rits and Ideas ? Even the Mathematics them^ 
 felves, if we take away the abfolute Exiftence 
 of extended Things, become much more clear 
 and eafy; the moft fhocking Paradoxes and 
 intricate Speculations, in thofe Sciences, de- 
 pending on the infinite Divifibility of finite 
 Extenfion, which depends on that Suppofi- 
 tion. But, what need is there to infift on the 
 particular Sciences : Is not that Oppofition 
 to all Science whatfoever, that Frenzy of the 
 ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the fame 
 Foundation ? Or, can you produce fo much 
 as one Argument againft the Reality of cor- 
 poreal Things, or in behalf of that avowed 
 utter Ignorance of their Natures, which does 
 not fuppofe their Reality to confift in an ex- 
 ternal, abfolute Exiftence ? Upon this Sup- 
 
 pofition, 
 
pofition, indeed, the Objections from the 
 Change of Colours in a Pigeon's Neck, or 
 the Appearances of a broken Oar in the Wa- 
 ter, muft be allowed to have Weight. But 
 thofe, and the like Objections, vaniih, if we 
 do not maintain the Being of abfolute, cxter- 
 ternal Originals, but place the Reality of 
 Things in Ideas, fleeting, indeed, and change- 
 able ; however, not changed at random, but 
 according to the fixed Order of Nature. For, 
 herein confifts that Conftancy and Truth of 
 Things, which fecures all the Concerns of 
 Life, and diftinguifhes that which is real from 
 the irregular Viiions of the Fancy. 
 
 Hyl. I agree to all you have now faid, and 
 muft own, that nothing can incline me to em- 
 brace your Opinion, more than the Advan- 
 tages I fee it is attended with. I am by Na- 
 ture lazy j and this wou'd be a mighty A- 
 bridgment in Knowlege. What Doubts, what 
 Hypothefes, what Labyrinths of Amufement, 
 what Fields of Difputation, what an Ocean 
 of falfe Learning, may be avoided by that 
 fingle Notion of Immaterialifm ? 
 
 Phil. After all, is there any thing farther 
 remaining to be done ? You may remember, 
 you promifed to embrace that Opinion, which, 
 upon Examination, fliou'd appear moft agree- 
 able to common Senfe, and remote from See- 
 pticifw. This, by your own Confeffion, is 
 that which denies Matter, or the abfolute 
 
 Exiftence 
 
Exiftence of corporeal Things. Nor is this 
 all ; The fame Notion has been proved feve- 
 ral Ways, viewed in different Lights,, pur- 
 fued in its Confequences, and all Objections 
 -againft it cleared. Can there be a greater 
 Evidence of its Truth ? or, is it poflible, it 
 ihou d have all the Marks of a true Opinion, 
 and yet be falfe ? 
 
 Hyl. I own myfelf intirely fatisfied, for the 
 prefent, in all refpe&s. But what Security 
 can I have, that I ihall ftill continue the fame 
 full Aflent to your Opinion, and that no un- 
 thought-of Obje&ion or Difficulty will occur 
 hereafter ? 
 
 PM. Pray, Hylas, do you in other Cafes; 
 when a Point is once evidently proved, with- 
 hold your AflTent on account of Objections 
 or Difficulties it may be liable to ? Are the 
 Difficulties that attend the Do&rine of incom- 
 menfurable Quantities, of the Angle of Con- 
 ta&, of the Afymptotes to Curves, or the like, 
 fufficient to make you hold out againft Ma- 
 thematical Demonftration ? Or, will you dif- 
 believe the Providence of God, becaufe there 
 may be fome particular things which you 
 know not how to reconcile with it? If there 
 are Difficulties attending Immaterialifm, there 
 are, at the fame time, direft and evident 
 Proofs for it. But, for the Exiftence of Mat- 
 ter, there is not one Proof, and far more nu- 
 merous and infurmountable Objections lie 
 
 againft 
 
(1(56) 
 
 againft it. But, where are thofe mighty Dif- 
 ficulties you infift on ? Alas ! you know not 
 where, or what they are ; fomething which 
 may poffibly occur hereafter. If this be a 
 fufficient Pretence for withholding your full 
 Affent, you fhou'd never yield it to any Pro- 
 pofition, how free foever from Exceptions, 
 how clearly and folidly foever demonftra- 
 ted. 
 
 Hyl. You have fatisfied me, Philonous. 
 Phil. But, to arm you againft all future 
 Obje&ions, do but conlider, That which bears 
 equally hard on two contradictory Opinions, 
 can be a Proof againft neither. Whenever, 
 therefore, any Difficulty occurs, try if you 
 can find a Solution for it on the Hypothefis 
 of the Materialifts. Be not deceived by 
 Words 3 but found your own Thoughts. 
 And, in cafe you cannot conceive it eafier 
 by the Help of Materialism, it is plain, it can 
 be no Obje&ion againft ImmaUrialifm. Had 
 you proceeded all along by this Rule, you 
 wou'd probably have fpared yourfelf abun- 
 dance of trouble in objecting , fince, of all 
 your Difficulties, I challenge you to fhew one 
 that is explained by Matter, nay, which is 
 not more unintelligible with than without 
 that Suppofition, and, confequently, makes 
 rather againft than for it. You Ihou'd con- 
 fider, in each Particular, whether the Diffi- 
 culty arifes from the Non-extftence of Matter. 
 
 If 
 
(Nfl) 
 
 If it does not, you might as well argue from 
 tfce infinite Divifibility of Extenfion again ft 
 the Divine Prefcience, as from fuch a Diffi- 
 culty againft Immaterialifin. And, yet, upon 
 Recollection, I believe, you will find this to 
 have been often, if not always, the Cafe. 
 You fhouM, likewife, take heed not to ar- 
 gue on a petit io Principii. One is apt to 
 lay, The unknown Subftances ought to be 
 efteemed real Things, rather than the Ideas 
 in our Minds : And, who can tell but the 
 unthinking external Subftance may concurr, 
 as a Caufe or Inftrument in the Produ&ion or 
 our Ideas ? But is not this, proceeding on 
 a Suppofition that there are fuch external 
 Subftances ? And to fuppofe this, is it not 
 Begging the Queftion ? But, above all things, 
 you fliou'd beware of impofing on your- 
 lelf, by that vulgar Sophifm which is cal- 
 led Jgnoratio Elenchi. You talked often, as 
 if you thought I maintained the Non-exi- 
 ftence of fenfible Things : Whereas, in truth, 
 no one can be more thorowly aflfured of 
 their Exiftence than I am : And it is you 
 who doubt j I ihou'd have laid, pofitively 
 deny it. Every thing that is feen, felt, heard, 
 or any way perceived by the Senfes, is, on 
 the Principles I embrace, a real Being, but 
 not on yours. Remember, the Matter you 
 contend for, is an unknown fomewhat, (if, 
 
 M indeed, 
 
indeed, it may be termed fomewhat) which 
 is quite (tripped of all fenfible Qualities, and 
 can neither be perceived by Senfe, nor ap- 
 prehended by the Mind. Remember, I fay, 
 that it is not any Objed which is hard or 
 jfoft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or 
 fquare,(^c,For all thefe things,! affirm^do exift. 
 Tho, indeed, I deny, they have an Exiftence 
 diftinft from being perceived ; or, that they 
 exift out of all Minds whatfoever. Think on 
 thefe Points ; let them be attentively confider- 
 ed, and ftill kept in view. Otherwife, you will 
 not comprehend the State of the Queftion ; 
 without which, your Objections will always 
 be wi^e of the Mark, and, inftead of mine^ 
 may poffibly be dire&ed (as more than once 
 they have been) againft your own No- 
 tions. 
 
 Hyl. I muft needs own, Philonou^ nothing 
 feems to have kept me from agreeing with 
 you, more than this fame rniftaking the Que- 
 ftion. In denying Matter, at firft glympfe, I 
 am tempted to imagine, you deny the Things 
 we fee and feel $ but, upon Reflexion, find 
 there is no Ground for it. What think you, 
 therefore, of retaining the Name Matter, and 
 applying it to fenfible Things? This may 
 be done without any Change in your Sentl*- 
 inents : And, believe me, it wou'd be a 
 jMeans of reconciling them to feme Perfons, 
 
 who 
 
\vho maybe moreftocked at an Innovation hi 
 Words, than in Opinion. 
 
 Phil. With all my Heart : Retain the 
 Word Matter, and apply it to the Ob* 
 jefts of Senfe, if you pleafe , provided 
 you do not attribute to them any Subfi- 
 ftence diftinft from their being perceived. I 
 fliall never quarrel with you for an Expref- 
 fion. Matter, or material. Subftance^ are 
 Terms introduced by Philofophers ; and, as 
 ufed by them, imply a fort of Independen- 
 cy, or a Subfiftence diftinft from being per- 
 ceived by a Mind : But, are never ufed by 
 common People ; or, if ever, it is to fignify 
 the immediate Obje&s of Senfe* One wou'd 
 think, therefore, fo long as the Names of all 
 particular Things^ with the Terms, fenfible 
 Subftance, Body, Stuff, and the like, are re- 
 tained, the Word Matter fhou'd be never 
 miffed in common Talk. And, in Philo- 
 fophical Difcourfes, it feems the beft way to 
 leave it quite out 5 fince there jjs not^ per-^ 
 haps, any one thing that hath more favo* 
 red and ftrengthened the depraved Bent of 
 the Mind toward Atheifw, than the Ufe of 
 that general confufed Term. 
 
 Eyl. Well^ but, Philonous, fince I am con-^ 
 tent to give up the Notion of an unthink- 
 ing Subftance exterior to the Mind, I think 
 you ought not to deny me the Privilege of 
 M iifmg 
 
ufing the Word Matter as I pleafe, and an- 
 nexing it to a Collection of fenfible Quali- 
 ties fubfifting only in the Mind. I freely 
 own, there is no other Subftance, in a ftridt 
 Senfe, than Spirit. But I have been fo long 
 accuftomed to the Term Matter, that I know 
 not how to part with it. To fay, There is 
 no Matter in the World, is ftill ihocking to 
 me. Whereas, to fay, There is no Matter^ 
 if, by that Term be meant, an unthinking 
 Subftance exifting without the Mind : But, 
 if by Matter is meant fome fenfible Thing, 
 whofe Exiftence confifts in being perceived., 
 then there is Matter. This Diftin&ion gives 
 it quite another Turn : And Men will come 
 into your Notions, with fmall Difficulty, 
 when they are propofed in that manner. For, 
 after all, the Controverfy about Matter, in 
 the ftri<5t Acceptation of it, lies altoge- 
 ther between you and the Philofophers , 
 whofe Principles, I acknowlege, are not 
 near fo natural, or fo agreeable to the com- 
 mon Senfe of Mankind, and Holy Scripture, 
 as yours. There is nothing we either de- 
 fire or. fhun, but as it makes, or is appre- 
 hended to make, fome Part of our Happi- 
 nefs or Mifery. But what has Happinefs, 
 or Mifery, Joy or Grief, Pleafure or Pain, 
 to do with abfolute Exiftence, or with un- 
 known Entities, abftra&ed from all Relation 
 
 to 
 
to us ? It is evident. Things regard us only 
 as they are pleafing or difpleafing : And they 
 can pleafe or difpleafe, only fo far forth as 
 they are perceived. Farther., therefore, we 
 are not concerned j and thus far, you leave 
 things as you found them. Yet, ftill there is 
 fomething new in this Dc&rine. It is plain^ 
 I do not now think with the Philofophers, 
 nor yet altogether with the Vulgar. I wou'd 
 know how the Cafe ftands in that refped : 
 Precifely, what you have added to, or altered 
 in my former Notions. 
 
 Phil. I do not pretend to be a Setter-up 
 of New Notions. My Endeavors tend on- 
 ly to unite, and place in a clearer Light, that 
 Truth which was before fhared between the 
 Vulgar and the Philofophers : The former 
 being of Opinion, that thofe Things they im- 
 mediately ferceive are the real Things ; and the 
 latter, that the Things immediately perceived^ 
 are Ideas which exift only in the Mind. 
 Which Two Notions, put together, do, in 
 effect, conftitute the Subftance of what I ad- 
 vance. 
 
 Hyl. I have been a long time diftrufting 
 my Senfes ; methought I faw things by a 
 dim Light, and thro falfe Glafles. Now, 
 the Glafles are removed, and a new Light 
 breaks in upon my Underftanding. I am 
 clearly convinced, that I fee things in their 
 
 native 
 
native Forms 5 - and am no longer in Pain a- 
 bout their unknown Natures, or abfolute 
 Exiftence. This is the State I find myfelf 
 in at prefent : Tho 5 indeed, the Courfe that 
 brought me to it, I do not yet thorowly com- 
 prehend. You fet out upon the fame Prin- 
 ciples, that Academics, Cartejians, and the like 
 Se&s, ufually do , and, for a long time, it 
 looked as if you were advancing their Philo- 
 fophical Scepticifm ; but, in the End, your 
 Conclufions are diredly oppofite to theirs* 
 
 Phil. You fee, Hylas, the Water of yonder 
 Fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a 
 round Column, to a certain Height ; at which 
 k breaks, and falls back into the Bafon, from 
 whence it rofe : Its Afccnt, as well as De- 
 fcent, proceeding from the fame uniform Law 
 or Principle of Gravitation. Juft fo, the 
 fame Principles which, at firft View, lead to 
 Scepticifm^ purfued to a certain Point, bring 
 Men back to common Senfe. 
 
 FINIS. 
 

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