X 
 
THE MONKOB DOOTKINE. 
 
THE 
 
 MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 A CONCISE HISTORY 
 
 OF ITS 
 
 ORIGIN AND GROWTH 
 
 BY 
 
 f^LA^A^ 
 
 GEORGE F. TUCKER 
 * f 
 
 OF THE BOSTON BAR 
 
 (AuTHOB OF "Manual OF Wills*') 
 
 WITH 
 
 SUPPLEMENT TO 1905 
 
 ( CHAPTER XI, **VE1NEZUELA" ) 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 PUBLISHED BY GEORGE B. REED 
 Law Bookseller and Publisher 
 
 1885 
 
 Of THt 
 
 VNIYEHeiTY 
 

 Copyright, 1885^ A^€ U^ ^ 
 By George F. Tucker. 
 
/ 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter Page 
 I I. The Causes which led to the Declara- 
 tion OP President Monroe .... 1 
 
 ^ II. The Declaration itself ...... 12 
 
 III. The Panama Congress 23 
 
 IV. Yucatan 37 
 
 V. V. The Interoceanic Canal and the Clayton- 
 
 Bulwer Treaty 43 
 
 J VI. Cuba 77 
 
 VII. The French Intervention in Mexico . 92 
 
 VIII. America North of the United States . 108 
 
 IX. Minor Occasions on which the Doc- 
 
 ' trine has been applied 116 
 
 X. Conclusions 122 
 
 Index 133 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The design of the author is to present a con- 
 cise and impartial history of a subject which for 
 more than sixty years has been of importance 
 to the nation and of interest to the people. 
 
 He desires to acknowledge the aid derived 
 from the collection of authorities by Mr. J. F. 
 Jameson, Ph. D., in President Oilman's " Life of 
 Monroe," and to express his thanks to his friend 
 Mr. W. E. Foster, of the Providence Free Public 
 Library, for several timely suggestions. 
 
 G. F. T. 
 Boston, Feb. 2, 1885. 
 

^ 
 
 THE MONEOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE DECLARATION 
 OF PRESIDENT MONROE. 
 
 By the treaty of Nov. 30, 1782, Great Britain 
 formally acknowledged the' sovereignty and in- 
 dependence of the United States. The struggle 
 terminate^ ^y this convention left the American 
 people poor in material possessions, but rich in 
 those experiences which, however trying, are 
 ever designed to shape individual character, 
 and thus to contribute to national prosperity. 
 Pertinent to our inquiry is the consideration of 
 the growth of a popular conviction that it was 
 impolitic for this continent to become a party 
 to European disturbances, and that European 
 monarchical institutions should not be allowed 
 a foot-hold here. 
 
 The growth of a national sentiment was slow. 
 First came the Confederation, — only a weak 
 
2 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 expression of a national idea, but followed in a 
 few years by that closer union which at its in- 
 ception seemed to derive a measure of vigor from 
 the directive genius of Washington. Even t hen 
 , . the Fathers recognized the advantage of their 
 f isolation. A wide ocean separated them from 
 i their former foe. Now and then some foreign 
 enthusiast wrote or sung of the coming land 
 beyond the sea/ or some advocate of absolutism 
 deprecated the apparent success of the Ameri- 
 can experiment; but the majority of Europeans 
 were doubtless indifferent to the expansion of 
 the new Republic. However, there was an ap- 
 • prehension on the part of many Americans that 
 foreign Governments viewed the growing power 
 of the United States with disfavor and alarm. 
 This apprehension occasionally found expression 
 in the public prints and in the speeches of pub- 
 /lie men. T he opinion was p revalent that Amer- 
 I ica belonged to Americans, and that to preserve 
 our institutions we must not become a party to 
 i any foreign alliance. / Copious quotations might 
 be made ; ^ but the declaration of Washington in 
 his Farewell Address is sufficient : — 
 
 ^ See Sumner's Prophetic Voices. 
 
 2 See Gilman's Life of Monroe, chap. vii. (American 
 Statesmen Series). 
 
 \ 
 
 ■41 
 k 
 
 ^ 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLAKATION. 3 
 
 " The great rule of conduct for us in regard to 
 foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial rela- 
 tions, to have with them as little political connection 
 as possible. So far as we have already formed en- 
 gagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good 
 faith. Here let us stop. 
 
 " Europe has a set of primary interests, which to 
 us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she 
 must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes 
 of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. 
 Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to impli- 
 cate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicis- 
 situdes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations 
 and collisions of her friendships or enmities. 
 
 " Our detached and distant situation invites and 
 enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain 
 one people, under an efiicient Government, the period 
 is not far off when we may defy material injury from 
 external annoyance ; when we may take such an atti- 
 tude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time 
 resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected ; when 
 belligerent nations, under the impossibility of mak- 
 ing acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard 
 the giving us provocation ; when we may choose 
 peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall 
 counsel. 
 
 *' Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situa- 
 tion ? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign 
 ^lound? Why, by interweaving mvrjlestiqy with 
 that of any part of Europe, entangleour peace- and 
 
4 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rival- 
 ^hip, interest, humor, or caprice ? " 
 
 Whether, as is often maintained, the declara- 
 tion of President Monroe is the logical deduction 
 from this emphatic warning of Washington, it is 
 not our purpose to inquire ; but certain it is that 
 , /'this American idea of non-intervention in Euro- 
 pean affairs and of opposing European interven- 
 *tion in ours at last obtained such a hold upon 
 ffie popular mind that nothing was necessary 
 1)^ an occasion to call forth from the highest 
 constituted authority its assertion as a national 
 doctritie. 
 
 "^ Fhat the Monroe Doctrine^ therefore, is some- 
 thing difficult to understand, as many seem to 
 believe, is far from the truth. It is the enun- 
 ^ciation of a patriotic principle by a patriotic 
 President, and it was called forth in the fbllow- 
 ing way. 
 
 The right of every European State to increase 
 its "dominions by pacific measures has been long 
 admitted. But there has been publicly acknowl- 
 edged for more than two centuries a right of 
 interference whenever the ambitious designs of 
 any of the great rulers has tended to_ the d* 
 turbance of the proper distribution of pow 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLAKATION. 5 
 
 This doctrine is called the " balance of power.'* 
 It does not prohibit colonization or the acquisi- 
 tion of territory outside the limits of Europe, 
 nor does it include States beyond those limits, as 
 they have no apparent influence on European 
 affairs. 
 
 By many this doctrine has been lauded as the 
 best possible means of preventing any disturb^'^ 
 ance of a necessary ratio of power ; by others ^ 
 it has been denounced as an adherence to a j 
 barbarous principle and as a pretext for unjus- / 
 tifiable interference. It has been repeatedly 
 held up by John Bright as the cause of dis- 
 honorable and bloody conflicts, and it has been • 
 characterized by Robert Lowe as " that tradition / 
 which has been the pest of Europe.'' ^ 
 
 After this right had received full confirmation 
 by positive acts of interference, it was natural 
 that a more extreme claim should be main- 
 tained. Accordingly.^several European powers 
 at the time of the French Revolution avowed 
 the right to put down any revolutionary move- 
 ment in that continent even when their aid 
 was not invoked by the established Government. 
 The continental powers were not slow to make / 
 this claim good by actual interference in the 
 
 » Speech at Croydon, " Times," Sept. 13, 1876. 
 
b THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 affairs of France ; but a declaration of war on 
 the part of England was regarded as hardly jus- 
 tifiable, as she was indebted to a revolution for 
 the development of her own institutions. A 
 pretext, however, was not long wanting, and 
 she soon became a participant in that fearful 
 contest which deluged Europe in blood for 
 nearly a quarter of a century. 
 
 y With the downfall of Napoleon came the for- 
 midable arrangement known as the Holy Alli- 
 ance, the parties to which were Russia, Austria, 
 and Prussia, and which was generally believed 
 to be hostile to popular rights and to the 
 freedom of nations. This was succeeded in 
 September, 1818, by the Congress of Aix-la- 
 ChapeHe^^tlt-which the five great Powers parti- 
 cipated ; namely, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, 
 
 } Austria, and France. (This alliance accomplished 
 the removal of the army of occupation from 
 France, and it is said that some of the contract- 
 ing parties at least expressed extreme views as 
 to the necessity of interference whenever the 
 supremacy of absolutism was endangered.N At 
 the Congress held at Troppau, in Silesia, October, 
 1820, which was removed later in the same year 
 to Lay bach, in Styria, it was proposed to interfere 
 
 ^ in the affairs of Naples, where a revolution had 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLARATION. 7 
 
 broken out; but England resolutely protested. 
 However, the revolution was suppressed by Aus- 
 trian arms, and_ absolutism was restored. An- 
 other Congress met at Verona, in October, 1822, 
 to consider the insurrection which broke out in 
 Spain in the middle of the preceding year. 
 
 It should be remembered that Spain, the 
 proudest and perhaps the most powerful nation 
 in Eiu-ope in the days of Charles V. and Philip 
 II., had now degenerated into a second-rate 
 Power. She was not only unable to quell her 
 own internal dissensions, but her long-prized 
 American dependencies were in open revolt, 
 and were slipping from her grasp. At this 
 Congress of Verona, England, through her en- 
 voy, the Duke of Wellington, again declined 
 to become a party to any agreement of inter- 
 ference. But a French army, with the approval 
 of the other Powers, soon after occupied Spain 
 and suppressed the insurrection. 
 
 These proceedings at Verona hastened the 
 formal publication of the declaration known as 
 the Monroe Doctrine. The subject of helping 
 Spain to recover her revolting colonies in Amer- 
 ica was there discussed, but the proposal again 
 met with the vigorous opposition of England. 
 
 The commercial supremacy of England at 
 
8 THE MONKOE DOCTEINE. 
 
 that period was unquestioned, — a supremacy 
 which she was zealous to maintain. Her trade 
 with the South American colonies was both con- 
 siderable and increasing, and it was natural that 
 she should view with alarm any intervention 
 by European powers which should result in the 
 resubjugation of those countries to Spain, and 
 
 \ consequently in the readoption by the latter of 
 a restrictive commercial policy. On the other 
 hand, to do her justice, she was the most ad- 
 vanced nation in Europe, and it was natural 
 that, in the remembrance of her own constitu- 
 tional development, she should deprecate Euro- 
 
 V pean interference in American affairs. Besides, 
 she was fast moving along in the plane of civil 
 progress. Already there were indications that 
 the extension of popular suffrage could not be 
 long delayed. Only a decade was to elapse 
 before the passage of the Reform Bill, which 
 was not many years after to be followed by 
 
 \/ the Repeal of the Corn-Laws. 
 
 While, therefore, she may have been some- 
 what influenced by sympathy with a struggling 
 people, her chief motive was unquestionably, 
 a selfish one. Her administration of foreign 
 affairs at this period was in the hands of Mr. 
 Canning, who was not only eminently fitted by 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLARATION". 9 
 
 attainments and experience to discharge the 
 duties of the position, but thoroughly committed 
 to that policy which should advance her commer- 
 cial interests. Our minister at the Court of St. 
 James was RiVhf ^rd Rnsh^ a gentleman of varied 
 attainments and great abilities ; while our Secre- 
 tary of State was J ohn Quincy Adams^ who had 
 at heart not only the interests of this country 
 and continent, but from his experience in vari- 
 ous diplomatic positions in Europe was probably 
 of all Americans the best acquainted with the 
 temper of European courts, and thus the best 
 fitted to thwart, by a vigorous policy, their 
 aggressive intentions. 
 
 While the danger was impending, Mr. Can- 
 ning, in August, 1823, proposed to Mr. Rush 
 that the Governments of England and of the 
 United States should publish '^a joint declara- 
 tion before Europe,'' in opposition to the designs 
 of the alliance in regard to this continent ; the 
 substance of which should be, that while the two 
 Governments desired no portion of those colonies 
 for themselves, they would not view with indif- 
 ference any foreign intervention in their affairs, 
 or their acquisition by any third Power. He was 
 most earnest and persistent in urging upon our 
 minister the necessity of such a step ; and he 
 
10 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 declared that a proposal would be made for a 
 \^ European Congress, to consider the affairs of 
 Spanish America, and that Great Britain would 
 not participate in its counsels unless the United 
 States was also represented. As to the Congress, 
 Mr. Rush replied that it was the traditional pol- 
 icy of the United States to take no part in the 
 ^ politics of Europe ; and as to the declaration, 
 he remarked that he was without instructions 
 from his Government ; yet he would assume the 
 responsibility, provided England would comply 
 i^ with one request. | The United States had already 
 acknowledged the independence of the Spanish- 
 American republics, and their acknowledgment 
 by England was the condition precedent upon 
 the performance of which Mr. Rush agreed for 
 his own country to unite in the " joint declara- 
 tion." This, Mr. Canning declined to do, and the 
 declaration was never made. | 
 
 Upon the rejection of his proposal by Mr. 
 Rush, Mr. Canning felt that he must emphati- 
 cally discountenance the apparent designs of the 
 Government of France. Accordingly he boldly 
 asserted to the Prince de Polignac that Great 
 V Britain would not permit any European inter- 
 vention in Spanish- American affairs ; and to his 
 great surprise the Prince disavowed for his 
 
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLARATION. 11 
 
 Government any intention so to interfere, and 
 acquiesced in the opinion of Mr. Canning that 
 the reduction of the colonies by Spain was ut- 
 terly hopeless. 
 
 Mr. Canning's biographer remarks as follows : 
 
 " By the declarations of the Prince de Polignac in 
 this important conference, it is not unfair to conclude 
 if the projects of the French Cabinet were, as they 
 were supposed to have been, to have indemnified 
 France for the expenses of the invasion of Spain by 
 territorial acquisitions in Spanish America, that those 
 projects were in a great degree laid aside in con- 
 sequence of the firm and decided tone taken by 
 Mr. Canning. But whether they were abandoned or 
 not, the conviction of the French Government that 
 ' it was utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America 
 to the state of its former relations to Spain ' be- 
 ing avowed, and 'the design of acting iii any case 
 against the colonies by force of arms ' being ab- 
 jured, were of the utmost value in preparing the way 
 for the ultimate measure of recognition on which, in 
 the event of their being gratified, Mr. Canning had 
 resolved." ^ 
 
 1 Stapleton*s Life of Canning, li. 32, 33. 
 
 d 
 
12 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 a; 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE DECLARATION ITSELF. 
 
 -4-S it is our purpose to dwell «hiefly upon the 
 genesis and development of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, it becomes important to consider a few 
 events which preceded the declaration of Presi- 
 dent Monroe. 
 
 In the early days of this century the title to 
 the northwestern territory of North America 
 was claimed by Great Britain, Russia, and the 
 United States. The settlement of their differ- 
 ences will be considered later on ; ^ but for a 
 long time each pushed its claim with firmness 
 and persistency. 
 
 In a communication to Mr. Rush, dated July 2, 
 1823, in relation to this controversy, Mr. Adams 
 made the following statement.: — 
 
 *' These independent nations [thai is, those of South 
 America and Mexico] will possess the rights incident 
 to that condition, and their territories will of course 
 
 1 See chap. viii. 
 
THE DECLARATION ITSELF. ^ 13 
 
 be subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their 
 vicinity, or of access to them by any foreign nation. 
 A necessary consequence of this state of things will 
 be, that the American continents henceforth will ncW 
 longer be subject to colonization. Occupied by civil- 
 ize^iations, they will be accessible to Europeans and 
 e^^Jother on that footing alone ; and the Pacific 
 I, in every part of it, will remain open to the 
 Fgation of all nations in like manner with the 
 3lantic." 
 
 A few days after, on the 17th of the same 
 month, Mr. Adams remarked to Baron Tuyl, in J 
 an interview relative to this territorial dispute, 
 that " we shoal d^ contest the right of Russia ^o 
 a7ii/ territorial establishment on this continent, .^ 
 and that we should assume distinctly the princi- 
 ple that the American continents are no longer 
 subjects for any new European colonial estab- 
 lishments.^ ^" Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the 
 editor of the Diary from which this is taken, 
 appends a note to the effect that this is "the 
 first hint of the policy so well known after- 
 ward as the Monroe Doctrine." 
 
 Just after this interview between Mr. Adams, 
 and Baron Tuyl the conversations between Mr. 
 Rush and Mr. Canning took place, to which ref- 
 erence has been made in the preceding chapter. 
 
 1 Diary, vi. 163. 
 
 X 
 
14 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 A full account of Mr. Canning's suggestions or 
 requests, as well as his information of the atti- 
 tude of the continental Powers, was at once 
 transmitted by Mr. Kush to Mr. Adams, and 
 the matter was brought to the notice of the 
 President. The latter considered the situ^fcn 
 so grave a one that he solicited the opii 
 of the ex-Presidents Madison and JefferJ 
 Mr. Madison stated that the circumstances 
 the case and our relations to the new republics 
 were such as to call " for our efforts to defeat 
 the meditated crusade."^ Mr. Jefferson was 
 even more explicit: — 
 
 " The question presented by the letters you have 
 sent me is the most momentous which has ever been 
 offered to my contemplation since that of Independ- 
 ence. That made us a nation ; this sets our compass 
 and points the course which we are to steer through 
 the ocean of time opening on us. And never could 
 we embark on it under circumstances more auspi- 
 cious. ^OxLr first and fundamental maxim should he, 
 never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. 
 Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle 
 with CIS-Atlantic affairs, America, North and South, 
 has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, 
 and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have 
 a system of her own, separate and apart from that 
 
 1 Works, iii. 339. 
 
THE DECLAKATION ITSELF. 15 
 
 of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the 
 domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be 
 to make our hemisphere that of freedom." 
 
 The President's message bears date Dec. 2, 
 1823. Shortly after its beginning appears the 
 following passage : — 
 
 ^At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Govern- 
 ment, made through the minister of the Emperor re- 
 siding here, a full power and instructions have been 
 transmitted to the minister of the United States at 
 St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, 
 the respective rights and interests of the two nations 
 on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar 
 proposal had been made by his Imperial Majesty to 
 the Government of Great Britain, which has like- 
 wise been acceded to. The Government of the United 
 States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, 
 of manifesting the great value which they have inva- 
 riably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and 
 their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding 
 with his Government. In the discussions to which 
 this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements 
 by which they may terminate, the occasion has been 
 judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which 
 the rights and interests of the United States are 
 involved, that the American continents, by the free (^ 
 and independent condition which they have assumed 
 
 1 Works, vii. 315. 
 
16 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 / and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered 
 ^; as subjects for future colonization by any European 
 powers." 
 
 Later on, just before the close of the message, 
 the President says : — 
 
 " It was stated at the commencement of the last 
 session that a great effort was then making in Spain 
 and Portugal to improve the condition of the peo- 
 ple of those countries, and that it appeared to be 
 conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need 
 scarcel}^ be remarked that the result has been so far 
 very different from what was then anticipated. Of 
 events in that quarter of the globe, with which we 
 have so much intercourse, and from which we derive 
 our origin, jsp have always been anxious and inter- 
 ested spectators. The citizens of the United States 
 cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the 
 liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that 
 ( side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European 
 \ J powers, in matters relating to themselves we have 
 2\ never taken any partj nor does it comport with our 
 ( policy so to do.; It is only when our rights are in- 
 vaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or 
 make preparation for our defence, v With the move- 
 'y { ments in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more 
 ^ immediately connected, and by causes which must 
 be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. 
 The political system of the Allied Powers is essentially 
 different in this respect from that of America. This 
 
THE DECLARATION ITSELF 17 
 
 difference proceeds from that which exists in their 
 respective Governments. And to the defence of our 
 own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much 
 blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of 
 their most enlightened citizens, and under which we 
 have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation 
 is devoted. We owe it, th erefore^ to candor^ and to th e 
 amicable relations exi sting between th&- Umted^ States -^' 
 ^nd~tJiose Powers, to declare that we should consider 
 any attempt on their part to extend their system to any 
 portion of, this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
 safety, '^With the existing colonies or dependencies 
 of any European power we have not interfered and 
 shall not interfere ; but with the Governments who 
 have declared their independence and maintained it, 
 and whose independence we have on great consider- 
 tion and on just principles acknowledged, we could 
 not view any interposition for the purpose of oppress- 
 ing them, or controlling in any other manner their 
 destiny, by any European power, in any other light 
 than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition ^ 
 toward the United States. In the war between those N 
 new Governments and Spain we declared our neu- 
 trality at the time of their recognition, and to this 
 we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, 
 provided no change shall occur which, in the judg- 
 ment of the competent authorities of this Gov- 
 ernment, shall make a corresponding change on the 
 part of the United States indispensable to their 
 security. 
 
 2 
 
18 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 " The late events in Spain and Portugal show that 
 Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no 
 stronger proof can be adduced than that the Allied 
 Powers should have thought it proper, on a principle 
 satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force 
 in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent 
 such interposition may be carried on the same prin- 
 ciple is a question to which all independent powers 
 whose governments differ from theirs are interested, - 
 even those most remote ; ^nd surely none more so 
 than the United States. Our policy in regard to 
 ; Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the 
 ' wars which have so long agitated that quarter of 
 the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, 
 not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its 
 Powers ; to consider the government de facto as the 
 legitimate government for us ; to cultivate friendly 
 relations with it, and to preserve those relations by 
 a frank, firm, and manly policy ; meeting, in all in- 
 stances, the just claims of every Power, submitting 
 to injuries from none. But in regard to these conti- 
 nents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously 
 different. ,^ It is impossible that the Allied Powers 
 should extend their political system to any portion 
 of either continent without endangering our peace 
 and happiness ; nor can any one believe that our 
 Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt 
 it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, 
 therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in 
 any form, with indifference. If we look to the com- 
 
THE DECLARATION ITSELF. 19 
 
 parative strength and resources of Spain and these 
 new Governments, and their distance from each other, 
 it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. 
 It is still the true policy of the United States to 
 leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that 
 other Powers will pursue the same course." 
 
 In his annual message of Dec. 7, 1824, the 
 President again referred to Spanish-American 
 affairs as follows : — 
 
 " Separated, as we are, from Europe by the great 
 Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars 
 of the European Governments, nor in the causes 
 which produce them.J The balance of power between 
 them, into whichever scale it may .turn in its various 
 vibrations, cannot affect us. |lt is the interest of the 
 United States to preserve the most friendly relations 
 with every Power, and on conditions fair, equal, and 
 applicable to all./ But in regard to our neighbors 
 our situation is different. It is impossible for the 
 European Governments to interfere in their concerns, 
 especially in those alluded to which are vital, without 
 affecting us ; indeed, the motive which might induce 
 such interference in the present state of the war be- 
 tween the parties, if a war it may be called, would 
 appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratify- 
 ing to know that some of the Powers with whom we 
 enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these 
 views have been communicated, have appeared to 
 acquiesce in them." 
 
20 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 While the President emphatically declares 
 the policy of this country in regard to Europe 
 to be " not to interfere in the internal con- 
 cerns of any of its Powers/' we must espe- 
 cially note and continually bear in mind during 
 the remainder of this history that the sub- 
 stance of the declaration is contained in three 
 inhibitions : — 
 
 1. No more European colonies on these continents, 
 
 2. No extension of the European political system 
 to any portion of this hemisphere, 
 
 3. No European interposition in the affairs of the 
 Spanish' American republics. 
 
 In the reference to colonization the British 
 nation did not seem to concur; but according 
 to Mr. Rush/ that part of the declaration which 
 dealt with European intervention was hailed by 
 the entire English people with joy and exulta- 
 tion ; and in the British Parliament it was the 
 subject of extravagant encomiums from such 
 men as Mr. Brougham, Sir James Mackintosh, 
 and Lord John Russell. The Spanish- American 
 deputies in London were transported with joy, 
 and Spanish-American securities at once rose 
 in value ; the allies soon abandoned their hos- 
 tile intentions, and intervention proved to be 
 nothing more than a mere purpose or threat. 
 
THE DECLAEATION ITSELF. 21 
 
 On the 20th of January, 1824, Henry Clay, 
 then Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
 moved the following resolution in committee of 
 the whole on the state of the Union : — 
 
 " Resolved^ hy the Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives of the United States of America^ in Congress 
 assembled^ That the people of these States would not 
 see, without serious inquietude, any forcible inter- 
 vention by the Allied Powers of Europe, in behalf j 
 of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those? 
 parts of the continent of America which have pro- 
 claimed and established for themselves, respectively, 
 independent governments, and which have been sol- 
 emnly recognized by the United States." 
 
 This resolution was never caUed-rrpT^nd one 
 
 of like tenor offered by Mr. Poinsett, of South 
 
 ' Carolina, met with a similar fatec 
 
 ^ Thus very soon after its announcement the 
 
 Monroe Doctrine failed to receive legislative 
 
 confirmation. 
 
 It becomes important before dismissing this 
 subject to refer to the part presumably taken 
 by Mr, Adams in the preparation of those por- 
 tions of the message we have already quoted. 
 There has recently come to light the following 
 extract ^ from the diary of William Plumer, who 
 
 1 Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vi. 358. 
 
f 
 
 22 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 was a member of Congress during Monroe's 
 administration : — 
 
 " I have strong reason to believe that this part of 
 the message [that is, that relating to foreign affairs] 
 bears the direct impress of Mr. Adams's genius. The 
 ground assumed and the doctrines inculcated are 
 certainly his, and if he did not write that part of the 
 message (as the minister writes the king's speeches 
 in England), I have little doubt that he submitted 
 to the President in writing his views of what the 
 message ought to contain so far as his department 
 was concerned, and that the President, in preparing 
 his message, followed very closely not only the views 
 but the language of the Secretary. Adams told me 
 that the President had doubts about that part of 
 it which related to the interference of the Holy Alli- 
 ance with Spanish America ; said he believed it had 
 better be omitted, and asked him if he did not think 
 so too ? 
 
 " Adams replied, ' You have my sentiments on 
 the subject already, and I see no reason to alter 
 them.* ' Well,' said the President, ' it is written, 
 and I will not change it now.' This was a day or 
 two only before Congress met.'* 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 23 
 
 4 
 
 CHAPTEE m. 
 
 THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 
 
 The quotation from the diary of Mr. Plumer 
 which concludes the preceding chapter confirms 
 the opinion generally entertained, that Mr. 
 Adams did something more than merely contrib- 
 ute to those passages of the President's message 
 which refer to the threatened intervention of 
 European powers. Mr. Adams's fervid patriot- 
 ism was doubtless quickened by an apprehen- 
 sion, amounting almost to a conviction, that the 
 adherents of absolutism in Europe were deter- 
 mined to let no opportunity slip to impede in 
 some way the progress of democratic institutions 
 on this continent. His continuance in public 
 office, therefore, was a guaranty of the continu- 
 ance of his foreign policy ; and very soon after 
 his accession to the Presidency as the successor 
 of Mr. Monroe an opportunity to continue that 
 policy was presented, in the invitation of several 
 of the South American republics to the Govern- 
 
24 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 ment of this country to participate in tlie de- 
 liberations of the Congress of American States 
 to be held at Panama. 
 
 These South American republics were now 
 rejoicing in the assurance of their own auton- 
 omy. It was in 1808, nearly twenty years 
 before, that the interference of Napoleon in the 
 affairs of Spain enabled them to sever their 
 connection with the mother country and to 
 assert their independence. Even then a long 
 struggle was inevitable. In vain they looked 
 to the monarchies of Europe for succor or ap- 
 proval; their only hope of recognition was in 
 the Government of the United States. Mr. Clay 
 became particularly prominent in the espousal 
 of their cause. Early in the year 1818 he made 
 Sb passionate appeal in the House of Representa- 
 tives for immediate recognition; and it seems 
 that the condition of those provinces was, on 
 May 13, 1818, one of the subjects of discussion 
 at a meeting of the Cabinet.^ Recognition of the 
 new republics by this country was delayed for 
 four years longer, and it was followed not very 
 long after by their acknowledgment by Great 
 Britain. The inference therefore is natural, that 
 upon his acceptance of the office of Secretary 
 
 * See Works of John Quincy Adams, iv. 91. 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS, 25 
 
 of State under President Adams, Mr. Clay was 
 as ready to join in any effort to extend help to 
 the new republics as he had been to champion 
 their cause in the House of Representatives. 
 
 Spain had not yet given up all hope of re- 
 subjugating her former dependencies ; but co- 
 ercion without the aid of some other European 
 power was practically an impossibility. Their 
 sovereignty and independence thus acknowl- 
 edged by the two great English-speaking na- 
 tions, the young republics began to agitate the 
 calling of a Congress at Panama, to which the 
 Governments of the American States (includ- 
 ing the Government of this country) should 
 be invited to send representatives to discuss 
 questions and adopt measures particularly affect- 
 ing the welfare and development of the Ameri- 
 can continents. 
 
 Here it should be noted that Mr. Clay, in his 
 instructions of March 25, 1825, to Mr. Poinsett, 
 Minister of the United States to Mexico, directed 
 him to urge upon the Government of that coun- 
 try the utility and expediency of asserting the 
 principles laid down in the message of Presi- 
 dent Monroe of Dec. 2, 1823. In regard to 
 the principle that the American continents are 
 not henceforth to be considered as subjects for 
 
 ^7»R A^ y 
 ^ Of THI 
 
 VNIY£PI61TY 
 
 Of 
 
V 
 
 26 THE MONROE DOCTRIN"E. 
 
 future colonization by any European power, 
 Mr. Clay remarked: "There is no disposition 
 to disturb the colonial possessions, as they may 
 now exist, of any of the European powers ; but 
 it is against the establishment of new European 
 colonies upon this continent that the principle 
 is directed."^ 
 
 At about the time when these instructions 
 were given to Mr. Poinsett, Mr. Clay informed 
 the ministers of Colombia and Mexico, Messrs. 
 Salazar and Obregon, that the President thought 
 that the United States ought to be represented 
 at Panama if preliminary points could be satis- 
 factorily arranged ; " such as the subjects to 
 which the attention of the Congress was to be 
 directed, the nature and the form of the powers 
 to be given to the diplomatic agents who were 
 to compose it, and the mode of its organization 
 and its action." ^ 
 
 Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, on the 2d and 
 3d of the following November respectively, 
 addressed communications to the Secretary of 
 State, defining in a general way the probable 
 subjects of discussion at the Congress. Mr. Clay 
 replied on the 30th of the same month that 
 
 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 487. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 457. 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 27 
 
 there-was^ not a jsatisfactory compliance with 
 the President's desire as to the arrangement 
 of preliminary points; yet the President had 
 decided to send commissioners, provided the 
 Senate should give their advice and consent* 
 The same intention was also on the same day 
 communicated to Mr. Canaz, the representa- 
 tive of the Government of Central America. 
 
 Only a few days after, on the 6th of Decem- 
 ber, appeared the President's message, in which 
 he announced the acceptance of the invitation 
 of the republics of Colombia, of Mexico, and of 
 Central America to the United States to take part 
 in the deliberations of the Congress at Panama. 
 
 On the 26th of the same month the President 
 sent a special message to the Senate, in which 
 he stated his motives for acceding to the meas- 
 ure and also the probable subjects of discussion at 
 Panama. He concluded by nominating Richard 
 C. Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, 
 of Pennsylvania, to be Envoys Extraordinary 
 and Ministers Plenipotentiary. The following 
 passage from the message particularly refers to 
 our subject of inquiry : — 
 
 " An agreement between all the parties repre- 
 sented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its 
 own means, against the establishment of any future 
 
 y 
 
28 THE MONEOE DOCTEINE. 
 
 European colony within its borders, may be found 
 advisable. This was more than two years since 
 announced by my predecessor to the world as a 
 principle resulting from the emancipatiorL.iif_both 
 ^ the American continents. It may be so developed 
 to the new southern nations that they will all feel it 
 as an essential appendage to their independence." ^ 
 
 >^ On March 15, 1826, the President submitted 
 a message to the House of Representatives in 
 which, after referring to that portion of President 
 Monroe's message deprecating future European 
 colonization, he remarked as follows : — 
 
 " The principle had first been assumed in the ne- 
 gotiation with Russia. It rested upon a course of 
 reasoning equally simple and conclusive. With the 
 exception of the existing European colonies, which 
 it was in no wise intended to disturb, the two con- 
 tinents consisted of several sovereign and independ- 
 ent nations, whose territories covered their whole 
 surface. By this their independent condition the 
 United States enjoyed the right of commercial in- 
 tercourse with every part of their possessions. To 
 attempt the establishment of a colony in those pos- 
 sessions would be to usurp, to the exclusion of others, 
 a commercial intercourse which was the common pos- 
 session of all. It could not be done without encroach- 
 ing upon existing rights of the United States. The 
 Government of Russia has never disputed these posi- 
 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 391. 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 29 
 
 tions, nor manifested the slightest dissatisfaction at 
 their having been taken. Most of the new American 
 republics have declared their assent to them ; and 
 they now propose, among the subjects of consultation 
 at Panama, to take into consideration the means of 
 faking- effectual the- assertion of that principle, as 
 well as the means of resisting interference, from 
 abroad, with the domestic concerns of the American 
 Governments. 
 
 *' In alluding to these means it would obviously 
 be premature at this time to anticipate that which is 
 offered merely as matter for consultation, or to pro- 
 nounce upon those measures which have been or may 
 be suggested. The purpose of this Government is 
 to concur in none which would import hostility to 
 Europe, or justly excite resentment in any of her 
 States. Should it be deemed advisable to contract 
 any conventional engagement on this topic, our views 
 would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of 
 the parties to the compact, f^o maintain the principle 
 in application to its own territory^ and to permit no 
 colonial lodgments or establishment of European juris- 
 diction upon its own soil ; I and with respect to the 
 obtrusive interference from abroad, if its future char- 
 acter may be inferred from that which has been, and 
 perhaps still is, exercised in more than one of the 
 new States, a joint declaration of its character, and 
 exposure of it to the world, may be probably all that 
 the occasTon would require." ^ 
 
 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 450. 
 
30 THE MONROE DOCTRIKE. 
 
 Later on, the President considers the ques- 
 tion whether the acceptance of the invitation 
 might not have a tendency to change the pol- 
 icy, advocated by Washington, of avoiding for- 
 eign alliances.^ He argues that the counsel of 
 Washington "was founded upon the circum- 
 stances in which our country and the world 
 around us were situated at the time when it 
 was given;" that Europe has still her set of 
 primary interests, and that our distant and de- 
 tached situation remains the same ; but that 
 the Spanish- American colonies have now been 
 transformed into eighty independent nations with 
 reference to whom our situation is neither dis- 
 tant nor detached. Our territorial expansion 
 and national development in the interval have 
 been such that America has now " a set of 
 primary interests which have none, or a re- 
 mote relation to Europe." 
 
 The President therefore concludes that the 
 acceptance of the invitation, " far from conflict- 
 ing with the counsel or the policy of Washing- 
 ton, is directly deducible from and conformable 
 to it ; " and that it was no less conformable to 
 the declaration of President Monroe that the 
 extension of the European political system to 
 
 ^ See page 3. 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 31 
 
 any portion of this hemisphere would be re- 
 garded as dangerous to our peace and safety.^ 
 After quoting this particular declaration Mr. 
 Adams proceeds as follows : — 
 
 "To the question which may be asked, whether this 
 meeting, and the principles which may be adjusted 
 and settled by it, as rules of intercourse between the 
 American nations, may not give umbrae to the Holy 
 League of European powers, or offence to Spain, it is 
 deemed a sufficient answer, that our attendance at 
 Panama can give no just cause of umbrage or offence 
 to either; and that the United States- willatipulate 
 Bothing there which can give such cause. Here the 
 right of inquiry into our purposes and measures must 
 stop. The Holy League of Europe itself was formed, 
 without inquiring of the United States whether it 
 would or would not give umbrage to them. The 
 fear of giving umbrage to the Holy League of Europe 
 was urged as a motive for denying to the American 
 nations the acknowledgment of their independence. 
 That it would be viewed by Spain as hostility to her, 
 was not only urged, but directly declared by herself. 
 The congress and administration of that day con- 
 sulted their rights and duties, and not their fears. 
 Fully determined to give no needless displeasure to 
 any foreign Power, the United States can estimate the 
 probability of their giving it, only by the right which 
 any foreign State could have to take it, from their 
 1 British Foreign and State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 453. 
 
32 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 measures. Neither the representation of the United 
 States at Panama, nor any measure to which their 
 assent may be yielded there, will give to the Holy 
 League, or any of its members, nor to Spain, the right 
 to take ofPence. For the rest, the United States must 
 still, as heretofore, take counsel from their duties 
 rather than their fears." 
 
 The debate in the Senate upon the proposed 
 mission was extremely acrimonious. / Serious 
 charges were brought against the President, and 
 the policy and purposes of the administration 
 were denounced as of a dangerous character. 
 It was claimed that a participation in the de- 
 liberations of the Congress could be of no ben- 
 efit to this country, and might be the means 
 of involving us in international complications.! 
 However, the Senate at last concurred in the 
 appointment of Messrs. Anderson and Ser- 
 geant as Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers 
 Plenipotentiary. 
 
 The concurrence of the House was required 
 in order to afford the appropriation necessary to 
 carry the Executive measure into effect. Dan- 
 iel Webster was then a member of that body, 
 and in April, 1826, in committee of the whole, 
 he delivered a remarkably able speech upon 
 the duty of the House. It was not their duty 
 
THE PANAMA C0:N"GRESS. 33 
 
 constitutionally to decide, he said, " what shall 
 be discussed by particular ministers, already ap- 
 pointed, when they shall meet the ministers of 
 the other Powers," but simply to vote the neces- 
 sary appropriation. The matter would thus be 
 left, where the Constitution had left it, — " to 
 Executive discretion and Executive responsi- 
 bility." After reviewing the events which 
 preceded the declaration of Mr. Monroe, he 
 declared : — 
 
 " I look on the message of December, 1823, as 
 forming a bright page in our history. I will neither 
 help to erase it or tear it out ; nor shall it be by any , 
 act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the y 
 sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish 
 that honor. It elevated the hopes and gratified the 
 patriotism of the people. Over those hopes I will 
 not bring a mildew ; nor will I put that gratified 
 patriotism to shame." ^ 
 
 The statement by Mr. Adams in regard to 
 the parties to be represented at the conference 
 that " each will guard, by its own means, against 
 the establishment of any future European colony 
 within its borders " ^ has been often criticised, 
 and sometimes denounced as a limitation of the 
 inhibition by Mr. Monroe of European coloniza- 
 
 1 Works, iii. 205. « See page 27. 
 
34 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 tion. Mr. Dana maintains that on the assump- 
 tion " that a sovereign State would not permit 
 other sovereign States to appropriate its terri- 
 tory by colonization/' Mr. Monroe simply de- 
 clared " ihe fady that the whole continent was 
 within the territory of some responsible State, 
 and not ferce naturce, and so open to appropria- 
 tion ; " and therefore that the proper view of 
 Mr. Adams's proposal is " that each State repre- 
 sented at the Congress should make for itself 
 the declaration which Mr. Monroe made for the 
 United States in 1823, — that is, that its territo- 
 ries were not open to appropriation by coloniza- 
 tion, — and pledge itself to resist any attempts 
 in that direction." ^ 
 
 It is proper to remark that Mr. Adams's ad- 
 ministration was not a popular one, and it is 
 therefore probable that much of the opposition 
 to the mission was inspired by personal feelings 
 and partisan motives. Few measures in the 
 history of the country have excited more in- 
 temperate discussion, or created greater antago- 
 nism between a President and Senate. 
 
 Messrs. Anderson and Sergeant, provided with 
 elaborate instructions from Mr. Clay, at last set 
 
 1 Wheaton, edited by Dana, § 67 n. 
 
THE PANAMA CONGRESS. 35 
 
 out to attend the meeting at Panama ; but be- 
 fore their arrival that Congress had assembled, 
 discussed the three considerations of independence, 
 peace, and security, and adjourned. On March 3, 
 1829, nearly three years after, the President, in 
 laying before the Senate a copy of Mr. Clay's 
 instructions to the deputies, said, that while 
 there was no probability of the renewal of nego- 
 tiations, |^Hhe purpose[s] for which they were 
 intended are still of the deepest interest to our 
 country and to the world, and may hereafter 
 call again for the active energies of the Govern- 
 ment of the United States." ^| 
 
 If this statement may be regarded as a proph- 
 ecy, then the recent action of the United States 
 Congress in making an appropriation for send- 
 ing three commissioners to the countries south 
 of us may be regarded as its fulfilment. Just 
 before the late President Garfield was shot he 
 made the resolution, which was carried out by 
 his successor, of issuing invitations to all the 
 independent Governments of North and South 
 America to meet in a Peace Congress at Wash- 
 ington. These invitations were afterward re- 
 called or suspended, in order that Congress 
 might give an opinion upon the expediency of 
 
 ^ Benton's Abridgment, x. 252. 
 
36 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 the step ; and on the 7th of July, 1884, an act 
 was approved making the appropriation referred 
 to above, and providing that "said commissioners 
 shall ascertain the best modes of securing more 
 intimate international and commercial relations 
 between the United States and the several coun- 
 tries of Central and South America, and for that 
 purpose they shall visit such countries in Cen- 
 tral and South America as the President may 
 direct." ^ 
 
 1 U. S. statutes, 1883-1884, chap. 333, p. 235. 
 
YUCATAN. 37 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 YUCATANT. 
 
 In his annual message of Dec. 2, 1845, Presi- 
 dent Polk, in reiterating the doctrine of Mr. 
 Monroe, and expressing his "cordial concur- 
 rence in its wisdom and sound policy," added 
 that the "existing rights of every European 
 nation should be respected ; but it is due alike 
 to our safety and our interests that the efficient 
 protection of our laws should be extended over 
 our whole territorial limits, and that it should 
 be distinctly announced to the world as our 
 settled policy, that no future European colony 
 or dominion shall, with our consent, be planted 
 or established on any part of the North Ameri- 
 can continent." ^ 
 
 These remarks were made as the conclusion 
 to a long statement relative to the differences 
 subsisting between the Governments of Great 
 Britain and the United States as to the disputed 
 territory in the northwest.^ On the 14th of 
 
 ^ Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st session. 
 * See chap. viii. 
 
38 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 the following month leave was asked in the 
 Senate to introduce a joint resolution practi- 
 cally embracing the principle announced in the 
 President's message. In resisting its introduc- 
 tion, Mr. Calhoun expressed views which a little 
 over two years later were more forcibly and 
 elaborately expressed in the debate in the same 
 body upon the bill to enable the President to 
 take military occupation of Yucatan. 
 
 On April 29, 1848, the President in a special 
 message called the attention of Congress to the 
 fact that the w^hite population of Yucatan had 
 called upon the United States for help against 
 the Indians, who were waging against them a 
 war of extermination ; offering, if aid should be 
 granted, to transfer the " dominion and sover- 
 eignty " of the peninsula to the United States, 
 and stating that similar appeals had been made 
 " to the Spanish and the English Governments." 
 He further stated that while it was not his pur- 
 pose to recommend a policy of acquisition, yet 
 the situation of the peninsula of Yucatan was 
 such as to render its transfer to any European 
 power an element of danger to our peace and 
 security ; and he declared that he had authentic 
 information, that if the aid was not granted by 
 the United States, it would probably be obtained 
 
YUCATAN. 39 
 
 from some European power likely hereafter to 
 assert a claim to " dominion and sovereignty " 
 over Yucatan. 
 
 The United States was at that time at war 
 with Mexico ; and the President admitted that 
 Yucatan had never declared her independence, 
 but was treated by this country as a State of 
 the Mexican Kepublic.^ 
 
 A bill to enable the President to take tem- 
 porary military occupation of Yucatan was im- 
 mediately introduced in the Senate. In the 
 discussion which followed, Mr. Calhoun took an 
 active part, and as his speech is a limitation, if 
 not a denial, of the principles of the Monroe 
 Doctrine as generally understood, it deserves 
 an extended notice. 
 
 Mr. Calhoun made the following points : — 
 
 1. The declaration of Mr. Monroe that the ex- 
 tension of the European political system to this 
 country would be regarded as dangerous to 
 our peace and safety referred only to the Allied 
 Powers; and the events which called it forth 
 have passed away forever. 
 
 2. The declaration of Mr. Monroe that Euro- 
 pean interposition in the affairs of the new 
 Spanish- American republics would be regarded 
 
 ^ Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st session. 
 
40 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 as manifesting an unfriendly disposition toward 
 the United States, also belongs to the history of 
 that day. But suppose this not to be the case, 
 there is no evidence of any interposition in the 
 affairs of Yucatan on the part of England or any 
 other European power with the design of op- 
 pressing her or changing her destiny. Should 
 England interpose, it will not be as a hostile 
 Power, but at the solicitation of Yucatan ; and 
 if she should assert her sovereignty, it would 
 not bring the case within the declaration, be- 
 cause it would not be an interposition to change 
 the government and oppress the country, 
 
 3. President Polk plainly rests his recommen- 
 dation upon the declaration of Mr. Monroe that 
 the continents of America are not henceforth to 
 be considered as subjects of colonization by any 
 European power. "Colonization" means the es- 
 tablishment of a settlement by emigrants from 
 the parent country ; this is the case of " sur- 
 rendered sovereignty" over a people already 
 there. Yucatan would thus become a province 
 or a " possession " of Great Britain, but not a 
 colony. 
 
 Mr. Calhoun then states his impression that 
 this portion of the message originated with Mr. 
 Adams, and never became a subject of delib- 
 
YUCATAN. 41 
 
 eration in Mr. Monroe's cabinet.^ It was in- 
 accurate in stating that these continents have 
 asserted and maintained their freedom, because 
 as a whole such was not the case ; and it was 
 improper when viewed in conjunction with the 
 declaration which preceded it, because we were 
 acting in concert with England on a proposition 
 coming from herself, and hence the declaration 
 should have been in accordance with British 
 feeling. As it was, it so offended her that she 
 refused to co-operate with us in settling the 
 Russian question. 
 
 Mr. Calhoun remarks that in stating the ori- 
 gin and character of these declarations he has 
 discharged a duty to his country and, to use 
 his own language, " a duty to the cabinet of 
 which I was a member, and am now the only 
 survivor." 
 
 4. The declarations of Mr. Monroe contain 
 no reference to resistance. 
 
 5. The principle which lies at the bottom of 
 President Polk's recommendation goes danger- 
 ously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration. It puts 
 it in the power of other countries on this conti- 
 tinent to make us a party to all their wars. 
 
 6. Resistance to interposition, however, may 
 
 * See Mr. Plumer's statement, p. 22. 
 
42 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 sometimes be necessary ; but each case must be 
 decided on its own merits. Interposition ought 
 not to be allowed, for example, in the case of 
 Cuba and of Texas ; but Yucatan is a worth- 
 less country, and its possession would contribute 
 nothing to the defence of the passage between 
 it and Cuba. Besides, its military occupation 
 would impose upon us a very heavy cost of 
 both men and money, and probably bring us 
 into conflict with England, and perhaps Spain 
 also. Military possession would likewise be a 
 breach of good faith with Mexico, with which 
 country we have agreed upon the terms of a 
 treaty. 
 
 7. Our only duty is to do for the white popu- 
 lation of Yucatan all that humanity requires.-^ 
 
 The discussion soon ended, as news was re- 
 ceived from Yucatan that the whites and Indians 
 had settled their differences by treaty. 
 
 ^ Works, iv. p. 454. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 43 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL AND THE CLAYTON- 
 BULWER TREATY. 
 
 The main object of the early navigators of 
 the Atlantic Ocean was the discovery of a more 
 direct route to the East Indies. When Colum- 
 bus first reached this continent he fondly be- 
 lieved that the dream of his life would be 
 realized ; and it was many years before a more 
 accurate knowledge of this hemisphere forced 
 the early explorers to abandon the long-cher- 
 ished hope. Then the feasibility of severing 
 the Isthmus by a canal, or of establishing some 
 kind of communication across it, was suggested ; 
 and it is a fact that within the last three centu- 
 ries and a half over forty projects have been 
 advocated or entertained looking to the estab- 
 lishment of some l^ind of easy and permanent^ 
 transit^ither across the Isthmus or the Central 
 American Continent.^ 
 
 1 See The Liternational Canal and the Monroe Doctrine, 
 1880, p. 115. 
 
• 44 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 \. So early as 1825 attention in this country 
 was directed to the subject ; and ten years later, 
 
 ^on March 3^ 1835, a resolution was adopted by 
 the Senate of the United States requesting the 
 President to enter into negotiations with the 
 Governments of other nations, and particularly 
 with those of Central America and New Gra- 
 nada, for the purpose of protecting those who 
 might attempt the opening of communication, 
 and of securing the free navigation thereof. 
 On Dec. 12, 1846, a treaty between this Gov- 
 ernment and that of New Granada (now the 
 United States of Colombia) was signed, by Arti- 
 cle XXXV. of which the Government of New 
 Granada guaranteed to the Government of the 
 United States " the right of way or transit across 
 the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of com- 
 munication that now exist, or that may be here- 
 after constructed ; " and the United States on 
 its part guaranteed to the Government of New 
 Granada the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus, 
 and the rights of sovereignty and property of 
 New Granada over the territory of the same.^ 
 
 In 1849, the year following that in which our 
 war with Mexico terminated, Mr. Hise, our rep- 
 resentative in Guatemala, signed a treaty with 
 
 1 Public Treaties, 1875, p. 558. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 45 
 
 the Republic of Nicaragua, without instructions 
 from this Government, by the terms of which 
 Nicaragua granted to the United States an ex- 
 clusive right of way across her territory for the 
 construction of a canal ; and the United States 
 guaranteed to Nicaragua the protection of her 
 territory and assured her of support in any war 
 for its defence. 
 
 The relinquishment by Great Britain of all 
 claim to the disputed territory west of the 
 Rockies by the treaty of June 15, 1846, and 
 the vast accessions to the territory of the United 
 States consequent upon the termination of the 
 war with Mexico by virtue of the treaty of 
 Guadalupe Hidalgo of Feb. 2, 1848, demon- 
 strated to this country the necessity of some 
 kind of established Isthmian communication. 
 \But as the completion and successful operation 
 of a water-way which should thus make possible 
 the most direct communication by sea between 
 Western Europe and the commercial centres of 
 Asia was quite as likely to subserve the inter- 
 ests of Great Britain as those of the United 
 States, it was natural that the former country 
 should lay claim to a participation in the 
 arrangements or stipulations which might ^be 
 necessary before the prosecution of the work. \ 
 
46 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 It seems that there had long dwelt upon the 
 eastern shore of the Atlantic coast of the Isth- 
 mus a tribe of Indians called Mosquitoes, over 
 whom Great Britain claimed to exercise some 
 \ kind of protection. In the latter part of the 
 seventeenth century a Spanish ship freighted 
 with negroes was wrecked upon the coast ; and, 
 as they were saved, considerable negro blood 
 was in time grafted upon the original Mos- 
 quito stock. These people were without laws or 
 any kind of political organization ; they had 
 only a slight regard for the institution of mar- 
 riage, and in instincts and habits were little 
 superior to-xifdinary savages. The British claim 
 was, that as the result of a friendship between 
 the Mosquitoes and the early buccaneers these 
 Indians sought and secured the protection of 
 England about the middle of the seventeenth 
 century, and that the British protectorate was 
 [ never discontinued or renounced. 
 
 Differences arose between these Indians and 
 the Kepublic of Nicaragua, and on Jan. 9, 1848, 
 the Nicaraguans hoisted their flag in San Juan 
 del Norte (called Grey Town), which was gener- 
 ally regarded as the necessary terminus of any 
 railroad or canal across the Isthmus ivitkm the 
 territory of Nicaragua. Only a few weeks after, 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 47 
 
 on February 2, the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
 between this country and Mexico was signed, 
 and immediately after, Great Britain espoused 
 the cause of the Mosquitoes and forced the 
 Nicaraguans to terms. c*^-;^. -.^^ 
 
 As the generality of Americans regarded 
 the British protectorate of the Mosquitoes as 
 a mere assumption, they viewed the seizure by 
 Great Britain of the port of San Juan del Norte 
 4iot only as an unjustifiable interference in the 
 affairs of Nicaragua, but as an admission of 
 regret upon her part that the valuable posses- 
 sions of Mexico upon the Pacific coast should 
 have been ceded to this country, and of fear 
 that if she did not intervene, a canal might 
 be constructed across the Isthmus with Ameri- 
 can money and under American protection and 
 control. The relations between Great Britain 
 and the United States soon began to assume 
 a threatening aspect, and the signing of the 
 treaty by Mr. Hise in the following year did 
 not tend to harmonize the differences. 
 
 One of the first acts of President Taylor was 
 the appointment of a diplomatic agent in Cen- 
 tral America, who was instructed to look closely 
 after the interests of this country. Soon after 
 his arrival the British took forcible possession 
 
48 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 of the islands in the Bay of Fonseca on the 
 Pacific side, ostensibly to enforce claims for in- 
 demnity of British subjects against the States of 
 Honduras and San Salvador; but in reality, as 
 Americans believed, to call the attention of this 
 country to the desirability of an agreement rela- 
 tive to the construction and operation of the 
 proposed canal. At any rate, it was plam that 
 delay might augment the misunderstanding and 
 perhaps precipitate a conflict with Great Britain. 
 The path was open to negotiation; and the 
 mutual efforts of Mr. Clayton, then Secretary 
 of State for this country, and of Sir Henry 
 Bulwer, representing the Government of Great 
 Britain, resulted in the treaty of April 19, 1850, 
 known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, of which 
 there have been the most varying interpreta- 
 tions, and over which there have been warm 
 and protracted discussions. 
 
 The following is a synopsis of the treaty : ^ 
 
 The convention is stated to be for the purpose 
 of setting forth and fixing the views and inten- 
 tions of the two Governments, " with reference 
 to any means of communication by ship-canal 
 which may be constructed between the Atlantic 
 
 1 See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 322. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 49 
 
 and Pacific oceans by the way of the river San 
 Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the 
 lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or 
 place on the Pacific Ocean." 
 
 Art. I. ^^either Government " will ever obtain 
 or maintain for itself any exclusive control over 
 the said ship-canal); " nor erect or maintain any 
 fortifications, " or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, 
 or assume or exercise any dominion over Nica- 
 ragua, Costa Kica, the Mosquito Coast, or any 
 part of Central America ; nor make use of any 
 protection which either aJBfords or may afford, 
 or any alliance which either has or may have 
 to or with any State or people,'' for any of the 
 above purposes, nor use any alliance or influ- 
 ence that either may possess with any State or 
 Government through whose territory the canal 
 may pass, for the purpose of acquiring for the 
 citizens or subjects of the one any rights of 
 commerce or navigation " which shall not be 
 offered on the same terms to the citizens or 
 subjects of the other." 
 
 Art. II. Vessels of both countries, in case of 
 war between them^ shall, while traversing the 
 canal, or at such a distance from the two ends 
 thereof as may hereafter be established, be ex- 
 empted from blockade, detention, or captureX 
 
50 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 Art. III. Those constructing the canal under 
 the authority of the local Governments to be 
 protected in person and property. 
 
 Art. IV. The contracting parties will use 
 their influence with local Governments to facili- 
 tate the construction of the canal; and also 
 their good offices to procure the establishment 
 of two free ports. 
 
 Art. Y. When completed, the contracting 
 parties guarantee the protection and neutrality 
 of the canal;) which may be withdrawn by 
 either party upon six months' notice to the 
 other, if the regulations concerning traffic " are 
 contrary to the spirit and intention of this 
 convention." . 
 
 Art. VI. The contracting parties engage to 
 invite friendly States " to enter into stipulations 
 with them similar to tho^e which they have en- 
 tered into with each other); " also to enter into 
 treaty stipulations with the Central American 
 States " for the purpose of more effectually 
 carrying out the great design of this conven- 
 tion;" and also to use their good offices to settle 
 differences between the States of Central Amer- 
 ica " as to right or property over the territory 
 through which the said canal shall pass." 
 
 Art. VII. The contracting parties agree to 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 51 
 
 give their support to such reliable persons or 
 company as may first offer to commence the 
 construction of the canal ; priority of claim to 
 protection to belong to any person or company 
 having made preparations therefor. 
 
 Art. VIII. Both Governments " agree to 
 extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to 
 any other practicable communications, whether 
 by canal or railway across the Isthmus," and 
 especially to those " which are now proposed to 
 be established by the way of Tehuantepec or 
 Panama." Both Governments shall approve of 
 the charges or conditions of traffic. Equal 
 privileges shall be granted " to the citizens and 
 subjects of every other State which is willing 
 to grant thereto such protection as the United 
 States and Great Britain engage to afford.' 
 
 Not long after ratifications were exchanged, 
 Great Britain put forth pretensions to dominion 
 over certain territory which this Government 
 maintained was covered by the terms of the 
 treaty. . The British claim to Honduras and 
 the occupation by that Government of the Bay 
 Islands were regarded by this country as plain 
 violations of the treaty engagements. A discus- 
 sion was opened between the two Governments, 
 
52 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 which was prolonged for nearly a decade. The 
 ambiguous passages in the treaty were sub- 
 jected to rigid scrutiny^ it was attempted to 
 throw light upon the intentions of the contract- 
 ing parties by reference to the opinions of the 
 meaning of the treaty current at the time of 
 its ratification, and Great Britain even pro- 
 posed to submit the matter to the arbitrament 
 of a friendly power. It is authentic that the 
 United States Senate was largely influenced in 
 its ratification by the supposition, if not the as- 
 surance, that the construction of the canal was 
 not to be long delayed. This disagreement 
 between the two Powers was an effectual ob- 
 stacle to the commencement of the undertaking. 
 (^However, in 1856 it was believed that a satis- 
 factory settlement would be perfected.; On the 
 17th of October of that year the Clarendon- 
 Dallas treaty, with separate articles, was signed 
 by the terms of which the Mosquito question 
 and other differences as to dominion over Cen- 
 tral American territory were set at rest. This 
 treaty was ratified by the Senate with the ad- 
 dition of certain amendments, in which, however, 
 the British Government declined to concur ; so 
 that the relative position of the contracting 
 parties remained unchanged.j 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 53 
 
 The discussion was at once resumed, but in 
 1859 and 1860 the British Government signed 
 certain treaties with three of the Central Amer- 
 ican Governments, by the terms of which the 
 former so renounced or modified its claims to 
 Central American territory as to at least pacify 
 the Government of the United States. These 
 were as follows : — j 
 
 1. Convention with the Eepublic of Guate- 
 mala relative to the boundary of British Hon- 
 duras, signed April 30, 1859. 
 
 2. Treaty with the Republic of Honduras 
 respecting the Bay Islands, the Mosquito In- 
 dians, etc., signed Nov. 28, 1859. 
 
 In this treaty Great Britain recognized "as 
 belonging to and under the sovereignty of the 
 Republic of Honduras the country hitherto oc- 
 cupied or possessed by the Mosquito Indians ; " 
 and the Republic agreed to grant money for 
 their education. 
 
 3. Convention with the Republic of Nica- 
 ragua relative to the Mosquito Indians, signed 
 Jan. 28, 1860. 
 
 It was agreed that a district within the terri- 
 tory of the Republic of Nicaragua should be 
 assigned to the Mosquito Indians, and that 
 the port of Grey Town, or San Juan del Norte, 
 
54 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 should be a free port under the sovereign au- 
 thority of the Kepublic.^ 
 
 : During the American Civil War the project 
 of Isthmian transit was allowed to slumber; 
 but on June 21, 1867, the Governments of the 
 United States and of the Republic of Nicaragua 
 concluded a treaty, by the terms of which the 
 former was granted the most liberal rights of 
 transit between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
 through the territory of the latter ; and while 
 the United States guaranteed the neutrality and 
 innocent use of the same, it was agreed that the 
 Government of that country might employ mili- 
 tary forces for the protection of persons and 
 property, if the Government of Nicaragua failed 
 so to do, when such employment was necessary. 
 The treaty was to remain in force for fifteen 
 years, either party to give the other twelve 
 months* notice before the expiration of that 
 period of its intention to terminate or alter 
 the treaty ; and, in default of such notice, the 
 
 ^ For these three treaties see British " Accounts and Papers," 
 Ixviii. 
 
 These treaties seem to have set the vexed Mosquito question 
 at rest. The Mosquito Indians were apparently fast deterio- 
 rating, and a number of years before, on March 9, 1853, Mr. Clay- 
 ton remarked in the United States Senate that there were not 
 more than five hundred of them in existence, and that they were 
 rapidly disappearing from the earth. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 55 
 
 treaty to remain in force until twelve months 
 from the day on which either party should no- 
 tify the other of its intention to abrogate or 
 alter the same.^ 
 
 Another decade elapsed, and still no work was 
 begun; but on May 15, 1879, there was held at 
 Paris,! at the call and imder the direction of no 
 less a personage than Ferdinand de Lesseps, an 
 " Interoceanic Canal Congress," to which this 
 Government deemed it advisable to send two 
 representatives. These were instructed not to 
 commit their Government to the choice of any 
 particular route for a canal, or to offer aid in its 
 construction. \ Their reception was not a cour- 
 teous one, and the cause has been ascribed to the 
 fact that the meeting was composed largely of 
 penniless adherents of Napoleon III., who were 
 now anxious to repair the fortunes which had 
 been shattered during the ineffectual attempt of 
 that ruler to force a monarchy upon Mexico. 
 
 The deliberations of this Congress pointed 
 unmistakably to the early construction of a 
 canal which has since been undertaken by way 
 of Panama, and not through Nicaragua. The 
 announcement of this project created some dis- 
 
 1 See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 566, Arts. XIV., XV., XX. 
 
56 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 turbance of popular feeling in this country ; and 
 soon after, on June 25th of the same year, 
 Mr. Burnside introduced the following resolu- 
 tion in the Senate of the United States : — 
 
 " Whereas, the people of this Union have for up- 
 wards of fifty years adhered to the doctrine asserted 
 by President Monroe 'as a principle in which the 
 rights and interests of the United States are in- 
 volved, that the American continents, by the free 
 and independent condition which they have assumed 
 and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered 
 as subjects for future ' occupation ' by any European 
 power ; ' Therefore, 
 
 " Resolved^ That the people of these States would 
 not view, without serious inquietude, any attempt 
 by the Powers of Europe to estabHsh under their 
 protection and domination a ship-canal across the 
 Isthmus of Darien ; and such action on the part 
 of any European power could not be regarded 'in 
 any other light than as the manifestation of an un- 
 friendly disposition towards the United States.' *' 
 
 The resolution was referred to the Committee 
 on Foreign Eelations. 
 
 Several resolutions were afterward introduced 
 in the National House of Kepresentatives, re- 
 asserting the Monroe Doctrine as a cardinal 
 principle in our national polity, and declaring 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 57 
 
 that any Isthmian canal by whomsoever con- 
 structed must be under the protection of the 
 United States. Of these the most conspicuous, 
 introduced by Mr. Crapo of Massachusetts in 
 December, 1880, was as follows : — 
 
 " Resolved^ That the construction of an interoceanic 
 canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pa- 
 cific oceans by means of foreign capital under the 
 auspices of or through a charter from any European 
 Government, is hostile to the established policy of the 
 United States, is in violation of the spirit and dec- 
 laration of the Monroe Doctrine, and cannot be sanc- 
 tioned or assented to by this Government ; that the 
 United States will assert and maintain such control 
 and supervision over any interoceanic canal as may 
 be necessary to protect its national interests and 
 means of defence, unity, and safety, and to advance 
 the prosperity and augment the commerce of the 
 Atlantic and Pacific States of the Union." ; 
 
 ^The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom 
 this resolution was referred, gave the subject 
 prolonged attention, and finally made a report 
 in which they heartily sustained the resolution ; 
 but the session closed without the adoption of 
 the report. 
 
 President Hayes, in transmitting to the Senate 
 on March 9, 1880, copies of correspondence 
 
58 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 and other papers relative to a ship-canal 
 across the Isthmus, expressed the following 
 views : — 
 
 1. The policy of this country is a canal under 
 American control. If existing treaties or the 
 rights of sovereignty or property of other na- 
 tions stand in the way of this policy, negotia- 
 tions should be entered into to establish the 
 American policy consistently with the rights 
 of the nations to be affected by it. 
 
 2. The capital invested in the enterprise must 
 look for protection to one or more of the great 
 powers of the world. No European power can be 
 allowed to intervene for such protection. The 
 United States " must exercise such control as 
 will enable this country to protect its national 
 interests and maintain the rights of those whose 
 private capital is embarked in the work." 
 
 3. Such a canal would virtually be "a part 
 of the coast line of the United States;" and 
 its relations to this country "are matters of 
 paramount concern to the people of the United 
 States. No other great power would, under 
 similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful 
 control over a work so closely and vitally af- 
 fecting its interest and welfare." ^ 
 
 ^ See Congressional Record, vol. x. p. 1399. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 59 
 
 At the time of the inauguration of President 
 Garfield the construction of the proposed canal 
 by foreign capitalists without an understanding 
 as to an American protectorate was still viewed 
 with great concern. In his inaugural the Presi- 
 dent said : "" We shall urge no narrow policy, 
 nor seek peculiar or exclusive privileges in any 
 commercial route ; but, in the language of my 
 predecessor, I believe it to be ' the right and 
 duty of the United States to assert and maintain 
 such supervision and authority over any inter- 
 oceanic canal across the Isthmus that connects 
 North and South America as will protect our 
 national interests.' " 
 
 fH is probable that the interests of the United 
 States relative to the undertaking of M. de Les- 
 seps received early attention in the cabinet of 
 President Garfield, for the first communication ^ 
 of Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. Lowell, 
 our Minister to Great Britain, bears the early 
 date of June 24, 1881. After referring to the 
 reports current as to a guarantee of the neutral- 
 ity of the proposed canal on the part of Euro- 
 pean powers, Mr. Blaine states the position of 
 
 ^ Most of the correspondence on this subject hereinafter re- 
 ferred to is given in British '< Accounts and Papers," Ixxx., and 
 all of it in '♦ Foreign Relations," 1881, 1882, and 1883. 
 
60 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 the United States in language substantially as 
 follows : — 
 
 1. The United States recognizes a proper 
 guarantee of neutrality as essential ; and this 
 has already been provided for by our treaty of 
 1846 with the Republic of New Granada. 
 
 2. The United States will not interfere with 
 the enterprise as a commercial one ; but its 
 political control must be in the hands of this 
 country. 
 
 The United States does not desire exclusive 
 privileges accorded American ships in time of 
 peace ; but " the possessions of the United States 
 upon the Pacific coast are imperial in extent 
 and of extraordinary growth." They would 
 supply the larger part of the traffic through 
 the canal, and it is this domestic function which 
 has caused the project to be regarded as of vital 
 importance by this Government. 
 
 3. An agreement between the powers of 
 Europe to jointly guarantee the neutrality and 
 in effect control the political character of the 
 canal would be viewed by this Government 
 with the gravest concern. 
 
 4. The United States has never offered to 
 take part in agreements in which European 
 powers have united, such as guarantees of 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 61 
 
 neutrality touching the political condition of 
 certain European States ; and it is the long- 
 settled conviction of this Government that any 
 extension to our shores of the political system 
 of Europe " would be attended with danger to 
 the peace and welfare of this nation." 
 
 5. The position of the United States " is noth- 
 ing more than the pronounced adherence of the 
 United States to principles long since enunciated 
 by the highest authority of the Government, 
 and now, in the judgment of the President, 
 firmly inwoven as an integral and important 
 part of our national policy." 
 
 Earl Granville replied to Mr. Hoppin, Secre- 
 tary of Legation, Nov. 10, 1881, acknowledging 
 receipt of a copy of Mr. Blaine's despatch to 
 Mr. Lowell, and stating that the position of 
 Great Britain was determined by the provisions 
 of the Clay ton-Bulwer treaty, 
 /^o this statement Mr. Blaine replied in his 
 letter to Mr. Lowell of Nov. 19, 1881. The 
 following is a summary of his views : — 
 
 1. [The Clayton-Bulwer convention was made 
 more xhan thirty years ago, under conditions 
 which "were temporary in their nature and 
 which can never be reproduced." The re- 
 markable development of the United States 
 
62 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 on the Pacific coast since that time has created 
 duties for the Government, the discharge of 
 which requires some modifications in the 
 treaty. 
 
 2. "The operation of the treaty practically 
 concedes to Great Britain the control of what- 
 ever canal may be constructed/' It is incum- 
 bent upon Great Britain, with its extended 
 colonial possessions, " to maintain a vast naval 
 establishment, which in our continental solidity 
 we do not need." Hence if the United States 
 binds itself not to fortify on land. Great Britain 
 would have an advantage which would prove 
 decisive in the possible case of struggle for the 
 control of the canal. 
 
 3. The treaty binds the United States not 
 to use its military force in any precautionary 
 measure, while it leaves the naval power of 
 Great Britain perfectly free and unrestrained. 
 If no American soldier is to be quartered on the 
 Isthmus, no war vessel of Great Britain should 
 be allowed in the waters controlling either 
 entrance to the canal. 
 
 4. ^ This Government, with respect to Euro- 
 pean States, will not consent to perpetuate any 
 treaty that impeaches our rightful and long- 
 established claim to priority on the American 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TKEATT. 63 
 
 continent." \ The United States seeks to defend 
 its interests as Great Britain defends hers. It 
 would be as reasonable for the United States 
 to demand a share in the fortifications by which 
 Great Britain excludes all other powers from 
 the waters of the Red Sea and thus virtually 
 controls the Suez Canal, or to demand their 
 neutralization, as for England to make the same 
 demand in perpetuity from the United States 
 with respect to the transit across the American 
 continent. 
 
 5. The possessions of the United States upon 
 the Pacific Ocean are now of vast extent. The 
 money value of their surplus for export will in 
 the near future " be as large as that of British 
 India, and perhaps larger." India is a distant 
 colony, but "the region on the Pacific is an 
 integral portion of our National Union." The 
 inhabitants of the former " are alien from Eng- 
 land in race, language, and religion ; the citi- 
 zens of the latter are of our own blood and 
 kindred." Great Britain cannot therefore ob- 
 ject to the United States adopting measures 
 ^^for holding absolute control of the great 
 water-way which shall unite the two oceans, 
 and which the United States will always insist 
 upon treating as part of her coast line." 
 
64 THE MONEOE DOCTKINE. 
 
 6. By the supervision of the United States 
 alone can the canal be secured against the ob- 
 struction incident to war. The United States 
 is least likely of all Governments to be engaged 
 in war; so that while for self-protection she 
 asserts her right to control the canal, she also 
 offers its absolute neutralization as respects 
 European powers. 
 
 7. Other leading nations since 1850 have 
 greatly enlarged their commercial connections 
 with Central America. The canal scheme now 
 projected finds a national sponsor in the Re- 
 public of France, and non-intervention on the 
 part of the United States would paralyze its 
 arm in any attempt to assert the plain rights 
 and privileges which the Government acquired 
 through its treaty with the Republic of 
 Colombia. 
 
 8. One of the motives which induced the Gov- 
 ernment to assent to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 
 plainly inferable from every line of it, was the 
 expected aid of British capital. That expecta- 
 tion has not been realized. The changed con- 
 dition of this country since 1850 has diminished 
 any advantage to be derived from that source. 
 The resources of our own Government and 
 people are sufficient to construct it. Foreign 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 65 
 
 capital cannot enter as an essential factor into 
 the determination of this problem. 
 
 9. Mr. Blaine then proposes a modification of 
 the treaty /in five particulars : — 
 
 (1) Every part which forbids the United States 
 fortifying the canal and holding the political 
 control of it in conjunction with the country in 
 which it is located, to be cancelled. 
 
 (2) Every part in which Great Britain and 
 the United States agree to make no acquisi- 
 tion of territory in Central America, to remain 
 in full force. 
 
 (3) No objection to maintaining the clause 
 looking to the establishment of a free port at 
 each end of the proposed canal. 
 
 (4) The clause to the effect that treaty stipu- 
 lations should be made for a joint protectorate 
 of any railway or canal never having been per- 
 fected, to be regarded as obsolete. 
 
 (5) The distance from either end of the canal 
 where, in time of war, captures might be made, 
 to h^ as liberal as possible. 
 
 10\ Th pUnitpd States will act in ent ire har- 
 mony ^ithjlia_iiavernia£^ ter- 
 ritorv j jie canal shall be locate d a and it shall 
 be used only for the development and increase 
 of peaceful commerce among all nations- 
 
 6 
 
66 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 In a communication to Mr. Lowell dated Nov. 
 29, 1881, Mr. Blaine refers to the early dissatis- 
 faction with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and to 
 the differences of interpretation of the same. 
 After referring to the attempt to adjust all 
 differences by the ineffectual Clarendon-Dallas 
 treaty negotiated on the 17th of October, 1856, 
 he makes copious extracts from the communi- 
 cations of General Cass, Secretary of State under 
 President Buchanan, and of Lord Napier the Brit- 
 ish Representative, looking to a modification of 
 the treaty, as " it was frankly admitted on both 
 sides that the engagements of the treaty were 
 misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly 
 comprehended, contradictorilj'' interpreted, and 
 mutually vexatious." That these last commu- 
 nications of Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell had the 
 sanction of President Arthur, is presumed from 
 the reference to the subject in his first message 
 to Congress, shortly after those communications 
 were sent.^ After referring to the treaty of 
 1846 with Colombia, he states that he has sup- 
 plemented the action of his predecessor " by 
 proposing to her Majesty's Government the 
 modification of that instrument [that is, the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty], and the abrogation of 
 
 1 See President Arthur's Message, Dec. 6, 1881. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 67 
 
 such claims thereof as do not comport with the 
 obligations of the United States toward Colom- 
 bia, or with the vital needs of the two friendly 
 parties to the compact." 
 
 Earl Granville's answer to Mr. Blaine's letter 
 to Mr. Lowell of Nov. 19, 1881, is contained 
 in his communication to Mr. West, the British 
 Minister at Washington, bearing date of Jan. 7, 
 1882. Earl Granville' thinks that the princi- 
 ples upon which the argument of Mr. Blaine 
 is founded are novel in international law. He 
 denies any analogy as to the Suez Canal, and 
 questions Mr. Blaine's statements as to that 
 canal as practically and historically incorrect. 
 He thinks that the • development of the United 
 States on the Pacific coast was within the view 
 of the statesmen who were parties to the treaty 
 of 1850. Great Britain's colonial possessions 
 upon the Pacific coast have also greatly devel- 
 oped since the treaty was signed. Great Britain 
 desires the security on a general international 
 basis of the universal and unrestrained use of 
 the canal. The fortifications by one power 
 would be followed by those of another. If the 
 United States insists on treating the water-way 
 which shall unite the two oceans " as part of 
 
68 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 her coast line/' intermediate States will certainly 
 become less independent than at present, j 
 
 To Mr. Blaine's letter of Nov. 29, 1881, to 
 Mr. Lowell, Earl Granville replies in his com- 
 munication of Jan. 14, 1882, to Mr. West. He 
 quotes freely from despatches relating to the 
 controversy between the Governments which 
 was carried on from 1856 to 1860, and makes 
 an ingenious and able argument. He declares 
 that Mr. Blaine's account of negotiations ends 
 at a point where the most important episode 
 commences ; namely, that in 1859 and in 1860 
 treaties were concluded between Great Britain 
 separately with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nica- 
 ragua in settlement of all questions relating to 
 Central American differences, and that President 
 Buchanan, in his message to Congress of Dec. 3, 
 1860, said that the discordant constructions of 
 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty " have resulted in a 
 final settlement entirely satisfactory to this Gov- 
 ernment." Earl Granville concludes by saying, 
 " I have been forced to give the above extracts 
 at considerable length, and I refrain from adding 
 other passages which would tend to illustrate 
 and confirm them." A perusal of them, he 
 thinks, will sufl&ce to show certain points which 
 are briefly as follows : — 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 69 
 
 1. That the differences between the two Gov- 
 ernments simply had their origin in a stipulation 
 which Mr. Blaine still proposes in great part to 
 maintain. 
 
 2. That the declarations of the United States 
 Government during the controversy were dis- 
 tinctly at variance with any such proposal as 
 that just stated. 
 
 3. That at a time when the British Govern- 
 ment had been induced by the long contin- 
 uance of the controversy to contemplate the 
 abrogation of the treaty, they were only will- 
 ing to do so on the condition of reverting 
 to the status quo ante its conclusion in 1850 ; a 
 solution which was at that time possible — 
 though, as the United States Government justly 
 pointed out, it would have been fraught with 
 great danger to the good relations between 
 the two countries — but which is now ren- 
 dered impossible by the subsequent events. 
 
 4. That a conclusion was effected by the vol- 
 untary action of Great Britain. She practically 
 conceded the points in dispute, and President 
 Buchanan, as stated above, declared the settle- 
 ment entirely satisfactory to his Government. 
 
 Mr. Frelinghuysen, who succeeded Mr. Blaine 
 as Secretary of State, transmitted to Mr. Lowell, 
 
70 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 on May 8, 1882, a communication of which the 
 following may be regarded as a synopsis : — 
 
 A protectorate of the United States and of 
 the republic whose territory the canal may 
 cross only required. A protectorate by Euro- 
 pean nations would be in conflict with the 
 Monroe Doctrine, which " is cherished by the 
 American people, and has been approved by 
 the Government of Great Britain." Great 
 Britain exercises dominion over Balize, or Brit- 
 ish Honduras, and the impression prevails that 
 •since 1850 the English inhabitants of that dis- 
 trict have spread into the territory of the neigh- 
 boring republics. Both countries have not the 
 right to exercise dominion over or to colonize 
 one foot of territory in Central America. If 
 Great Britain has violated and continues to 
 violate that provision, the treaty is voidable at 
 the pleasure of the United States. 
 
 President Buchanan, in his message of Dec. 3, 
 1860, referred to the dispossession of Great 
 Britain of the occupation of one end of the 
 Nicaragua route, and not to the colonization 
 of British Honduras. Mr. Frelinghuysen nar- 
 rates how the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was en- 
 tered into, and shows that the object was to 
 insure at the earliest possible moment the 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 71 
 
 completion of the canal. Steps were taken, but 
 the project failed. The canal now in question 
 is on the Panama, and not on the Nicaragua 
 route. Article VIII. of the treaty relates to 
 transit other than by the Nicaragua route. But 
 the United States entered into the treaty of 
 1846 with New Granada, which is still in force. 
 Article VIII. relates only to those projects 7iow 
 proposed to be established, and contemplates fur- 
 ther " treaty stipulation " before Great Britain 
 can join the United States in the protectorate 
 of the canal by the Panama route. 
 
 Earl Granville's reply was to Mr. West, dated 
 Dec. 30,1882: — 
 
 1. He cannot agree with Mr. Frelinghuysen 
 as to the meaning of Article VIII. of the Clay- 
 ton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 2. He claims that the United States cannot 
 abrogate that treaty by reason of the existence 
 of things which has prevailed, to their knowl- 
 edge, before as well as since its ratification, to 
 which the treaty was never intended to apply, 
 and notwithstanding the known existence of 
 which they have more than once recognized the 
 treaty as subsisting. 
 
 3. He does not think, as Mr. Frelinghuysen 
 
72 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 suggests, that any necessity exists for a fresh 
 agreement between the two countries having 
 for its object the retention and renewal of cer- 
 tain provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 In his communication of May 5, 1883, to 
 Mr. Lowell, Mr. Frelinghuysen replied to Lord 
 Granville's communication of Dec. 30, 1882. 
 After reiterating his former views, he remarks : 
 "In the conviction, therefore, that the argu- 
 ments heretofore presented by the United States 
 remain unshaken, the President adheres to the 
 views set forth in the instruction to you of 
 May 8, 1882.'' 
 
 Lord Granville replied Aug. 17, 1883, reiter- 
 ating his former views, and stating not only that 
 the Monroe Doctrine was not adhered to by all of 
 Mr. Monroe's successors, but that the mere fact 
 that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was entered into 
 by the two Governments to jointly protect the 
 communication which might be made between the 
 two oceans is a sufficient answer to the statement 
 that that doctrine is applicable to the case. 
 
 Mr. FrelinghuysSn t)riefly replied in a letter 
 to Mr. Lowell bearing date^Nov. 22, 1883. 
 
 In concluding this subject, it should be ob- 
 served that there is "very little question but 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 73 
 
 that Mr. Clayton intended, in negotiating the 
 treaty of 1850, to disregard the Monroe Doc- 
 trine as in any sense binding. Such was his 
 own avowal when, on becoming a member of 
 the United States Senate only a few years after, 
 he was drawn into a bitter and protracted dis- 
 cussion with General Cass of Michigan as to the 
 origin and meaning of the treaty and as to the 
 intentions of the contracting parti e§| However, 
 it has been ever since maintained by American 
 statesmen that a departure in one instance from 
 the spirit and letter of President Monroe's dec- 
 laration is in no sense its abandonment as a 
 national doctrine. 
 
 (j'he discussions and writings to which the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty has given rise would 
 fill volumes )i but it is fair to say that for 
 many years there has been a growing con- 
 viction among conservative Americans that an 
 occasion is offered for the application of the 
 principle of international law, — that when the 
 circumstances wh ich accompan y the negotia- 
 tion of a treaty have changed, and the move- 
 ments in population and wealth have made it 
 necessary, either party has a right to avoid 
 the treaty, provided fEe other refuses to agree 
 to appropriate modifications. 
 
74 THE MONROE DOCTKINE. 
 
 On Feb. 12, 1856, Mr. Wilson of Massachu- 
 setts, in a speech in the United States Senate, 
 expressed the following sentiments : — 
 
 "The only way, in my judgment, to get out of 
 our present embarrassment is to declare the Clayton- 
 Bulvver treaty null and void, — to negotiate in Central 
 America for the protection of our transit routes across 
 that country. It is the policy which will, in my judg- 
 ment, promote the future peace and interest of the 
 country. I would vote against the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty if it were before us to-day ; for I can never 
 agree to make an arrangement with England or any 
 other foreign Power that we will not ^exercise domin- 
 ion over any portion of this continent." ^ 
 
 In urging upon Lord Granville their reasons 
 why a modification of the treaty was both de- 
 sirable and necessary, it is probable that both 
 Secretaries Blaine and Frelinghuysen bore in 
 mind not only the rule of international law just 
 referred to, but the striking example of the modi- 
 fication of a treaty in recent times ; an allusion 
 to which may appropriately close the chapter.^ 
 
 By the treaty of Paris, March, 1856, which 
 terminated the Crimean War, it was agreed that 
 
 1 Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st session ; Appendix 
 
 2 See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1870, p. 257; 1871, p. 275. Herts- 
 let's Map of Europe by Treaty, iii. 1904-1924. 
 
THE CANAL AND THE TREATY. 75 
 
 the Black Sea should be neutralized. In Octo- 
 ber, 1870, Prince GortschakofF called upon Lord 
 Granville for modifications of the treaty, assign- 
 ing as a cause that certain Powers had been 
 guilty of infractions thereof; "in presence of 
 which," he said, " it would be difficult to affirm 
 that written law, founded upon respect for trea- 
 ties as a base of public law and rule for the re- 
 lations between States, has preserved the same 
 moral sanction which it may have had in other 
 times." 
 
 In a communication in the following month 
 of November, the Prince said : " Earl Granville 
 will agree that the Europe of to-day is very far 
 from being the Europe which signed the treaty 
 of 1856. It was impossible that Russia should 
 agree to remain the only Power bound indefi- 
 nitely to an arrangement which, onerous as it 
 was at the time when it was concluded, became 
 daily weaker in its guarantees." 
 
 (it is fair to remark that in the following year 
 an agreement was arrived at by several of the 
 Powers, that no party is at liberty to abolish a 
 treaty or withdraw from it without the consent 
 of all parties in interest. This gave Great Britain 
 an opportunity to gracefully yield to the demands 
 of her adversary, and a treaty was signed by the 
 
76 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 great Powers in the^arly part of 1871, modify- 
 ing the treaty of 1856J and thus practically grant- 
 ing all the concessions which Russia desired.^ 
 
 ^ The construction of the proposed water-way is at present a 
 subject of great popular interest. There is little probability 
 that M. de Lesseps' canal at Panama will be completed for 
 several years, if at all. A vast sum of money has been already 
 expended, and only a beginning has been made. But as Co- 
 lombia is in a constant state of insurrection and bankruptcy, 
 the fear of Americans is that it would '' be easy for the French 
 at an opportune moment to make an issue with the local 
 authorities; the home Government would be called upon to 
 protect its subjects, and in such a case there is no reason to 
 believe that it would not try to realize, if it could, the dream 
 of French statesmen as to the role of France in countries of 
 Latin origin.'* See the Nation, vol. xxx. p. 90. In this con- 
 nection the words of M. de Lesseps himself in the North Ameri- 
 can Review, vol. cxxx. p. 12, may be of some interest : "The 
 Monroe Doctrine, so far from being opposed to our enterprise, 
 is directly favorable to it, inasmuch as it is the Republic of 
 the United States of Colombia which has granted the conces- 
 sion for the Panama Canal; and the decree of the President of 
 the United States of Colombia, of the 3d of September, 1879, 
 as well as the letter of the Governor of Panama, which informed 
 me of that decree, very plainly signify that the nations of that 
 part of America are heartily enlisted in the undertaking." 
 
 In regard to Nicaragua, the intention of intersecting that 
 country is still entertained, and a treaty between the Govern- 
 ments of Nicaragua and the United States, giving the latter the 
 most liberal rights over a water-way through the territory of 
 the former, failed of ratification in the United States Senate 
 Jan. 29, 1885; but an amendment looking to the abrogation or 
 modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was adopted. 
 
 For an able discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty from an 
 English stand-point, see "Some Disputed Questions in Inter- 
 national Law," by T. J. Laurence, recently published. 
 
CUBA. 77 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CUBA. 
 
 The history of Cuba is the history of political 
 disturbance. This is especially true of the isl- 
 and since the deposition of the royal family of 
 Spain by Napoleon I., in the early part of this 
 century. Cuba remained loyal to the Spanish 
 crown, and has ever since been in the hands 
 of successive Captain-Generals, who have been 
 sent out from Spain armed with authority 
 almost unlimited. The antagonism between 
 these rulers and the native Cubans has been 
 intense ; the latter of whom the Spanish crown 
 has in vain endeavored to subjugate or sup- 
 press. 
 
 Cuba is not only rich in resources, but a 
 glance at the map will show that she commands 
 the approaches to a large portion of our national 
 frontier. It is plain, also, that any increased 
 facility of Isthmian transit, such as a successfully 
 operated canal, must result in placing the com- 
 merce benefited thereby more or less under the 
 
78 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 supervision of the fleets which find a haven in 
 her numerous harbors. 
 
 After the cession to the United States by 
 France of Louisiana in 1803, and more particu- 
 larly by Spain of Florida in 1819, Cuba was 
 naturally regarded by many Americans as a 
 probable, if not necessary, acquisition by this 
 country. ; But Spain was loath to parLjsith so 
 valuable a possession, even though it was the 
 theatre of constant insurrection and warfare; 
 and England seconded her in her resolution, 
 because she apprehended that the transfer of 
 that island to the United States would to a 
 certain extent jeopardize the commercial inter- 
 ests of Great Britain, especially in the event of 
 the completion and operation of an interoceanic 
 canal. 
 
 The separation of the Spanish- American colo- 
 nies from the mother country was the admitted 
 failure of Spanish colonial policy. It was nat- 
 ural, therefore, to suppose that the true de- 
 velopment of the resources of Cuba would be 
 impossible under Spanish dominion. Hence the 
 apparently well-grounded apprehension of emi- 
 nent Americans that England or some other 
 European power contemplated the acquisition of 
 that island, or its government under a European 
 
CUBA. 79 
 
 protectorate, with the real design of protecting 
 European shipping which might eventually pass 
 through the contemplated canal. 
 
 Mr. Clay, while Secretary of State, in a com- 
 munication to Mr. Brown, the American Minis- 
 ter to France, dated Oct. 25, 1825, referred to 
 the fact that in the preceding summer " a large 
 French fleet visited the American seas and the 
 coast of the United States ; '' and stated " that 
 the purpose of any similar movement, hereafter, 
 made in a season of peace, should be communi- 
 cated to this Government."^ 
 
 In regard to the islands of Cuba and Porto 
 Eico, he said : — 
 
 " The views of the Executive of the United States 
 in regard to them have been already disclosed to 
 France by you, on the occasion of inviting its co- 
 operation to bring about a peace between Spain and 
 her former colonies, in a spirit of great frankness. 
 It was stated to the French Government that the 
 United States could not see, with indifference, these 
 islands passing frpm Spain to any other European 
 power; and that(for ourselves, no change was de- 
 sired in their present political knd commercial condi- 
 tion, nor in the possession wl^ch Spain has of them. 
 In the same spiriVand with the hope of guarding, 
 beforehand, against any possible difficulties on that 
 subject that may arise, you will now add that we 
 
80 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 could not consent to the occupation of those islands 
 by any other European power than Spain, under any 
 contingency whatever. Cherishing no designs on 
 them ourselves, we have a fair claim to an unreserved 
 knowledge of the views of other great maritime 
 Pqwers in respect to them." ^ 
 
 \hi regard to the fleet whose presence in the 
 American seas so disturbed the Government of 
 the United States, the French Government re- 
 plied that its purpose was to look out for French 
 interests to the south of this country; and in 
 regard to the attitude of France toward Cuba, 
 Mr. Clay was assured that there was an entire 
 concurrence by the French Government in the 
 views expressed by him. 
 
 But this did not wholly allay apprehension. 
 There was still entertained in this country a 
 general hostility to any suggestion of the pos- 
 session of Cuba by any European power except 
 Spain ; and those who entertained it found a 
 ready exponent in Mr. Webster, in his speech 
 in the House of Representatives in April, 1826, 
 on the Panama Mission,^ and also in Mr. Calhoun, 
 in his speech in the Senate on May 15, 1848, 
 on the Proposed Occupation of Yucatan ; the 
 
 1 British and Foreign State Papers, 1825, 1826, p. 425. 
 
 2 See page 32. 
 
CUBA. 81 
 
 latter of whom used the following emphatic 
 language : — 
 
 *(So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, 
 — a friendly Power, a Power of which we have no 
 dread, — it should continue to be, as it has been, the 
 policy of all administrations ever since I have been 
 connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain 
 there ; but with the fixed determination, which I 
 hope never will be relinquished, that if Cuba pass 
 from her, it shall not be into any other hands but 
 ours." ^ 
 
 The acquisition of that island seemed so 
 desirable to President Polk, that in 1848 he 
 directed our Minister at Madrid to ascertain if 
 Spain wasyivilling to transfer the same to the 
 United States for a liberal compensation ; but 
 the Minister of State replied " that he believed 
 such to be the feeling of the country that, 
 sooner than see the island transferred to any 
 Power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in 
 the ocean.'\ 
 
 In 1849 an adventurer named Narcisco Lopez 
 made preparations in this country, with the 
 design of attacking the island of Cuba; but 
 his expedition was defeated by the vigilance 
 of the Government of the United States. He 
 
 1 See page 39. 
 6 
 
82 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 subsequently managed, however, to elude the 
 United States authorities ; as two more expe- 
 ditions fitted out by him, one in 1850 and the 
 other in 1851, were successful so far as a 
 landing on the island was concerned, although 
 otherwise abortive. The popular uprising upon 
 which Lopez had built his hopes of the success 
 of his last adventure did not occur ; his forces 
 were routed, and he himself was captured and 
 executed. 
 
 The intelligence of these events produced a 
 profound sensation in Europe, and the Govern- 
 ments of Great Britain and France were at once 
 aroused. Louis Napoleon was now President of 
 the French Republic ; and it is probable that 
 both he and his English ally not only viewed 
 with alarm the extension of our national terri- 
 tory which followed the successful issue of the 
 war with Mexico, but apprehended that these 
 spasmodic forays of Lopez were only precur- 
 sors of an organized effort on the part of this 
 Government for the seizure and annexation of 
 Cuba. 
 
 Accordingly, early in 1852, when Mr. Fill- 
 more was President and Mr. Webster Secretary 
 of State, the two Governments of Great Britain 
 and France resorted to the novel, and in the 
 
CUBA. 83 
 
 judgment of many Americans the impertinent, 
 procedure of proposing to the Government of 
 the United States that the three Governments 
 should enter into a certain tripartite arrange- 
 ment relative to Cuba, which is so unusual that 
 we give it entire.^ 
 
 Preamble. 
 
 Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom 
 of Great Britain and Ireland, the Prince President 
 of the French Republic, and the United States of 
 America, having judged it expedient, with a view- 
 to strengthen the friendly relations which happily 
 subsist between them, to set forth and fix, by a 
 convention, their views and intentions with regard 
 to the island of Cuba, have named as their respec- 
 tive plenipotentiaries for that purpose ; that is to 
 say,— 
 
 Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land, etc.. 
 
 The Prince President of the French Republic, etc.. 
 
 And the President of the United States of Amer- 
 ica, etc.. 
 
 Who, after having communicated to each other 
 their respective full powers, found in good and due 
 form, have agreed upon and concluded the following 
 articles : — 
 
 1 Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite Convention rela- 
 tive to Cuba, p. 13. 
 
84 .THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 Art. I. The high contracting parties hereby sev- 
 erally and collectively disclaim, both now and for 
 hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the 
 island of Cuba ; and they respectively bind them- 
 selves to discountenance all attempt to that effect 
 on the part of any Power or individuals what- 
 ever. 
 
 The high contracting parties declare, severally and 
 collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain, 
 for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any ex- 
 clusive control over the said island, nor assume nor 
 exercise any dominion over the same. 
 
 Art. II. The present convention shall be ratified, 
 
 and the ratification shall be exchanged at , as 
 
 soon as possible within months from the date 
 
 thereof. 
 
 In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentia- 
 ries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto 
 the seals of their arms. 
 
 Done at Washington, the day of , in the 
 
 year of our Lord 1852. 
 
 It will thus be observed that the two foreign 
 Governments were so considerate as to present 
 to the United States a form of a treaty which 
 needed only the signatures of the respective 
 plenipotentiaries and the exchange of ratifica- 
 tions, to give it the character of a perpetual 
 obligation. 
 
CUBA. 85 
 
 The Earl of Malmesbury, in his letter ^ of 
 April 8, 1852, to Mr. Crampton, the British 
 Minister at Washington, remarked that as the 
 Government of the United States had " repeat- 
 edly declared that it would not see with indif- 
 ference the island of Cuba fall into the possession 
 of any other European power than Spain," so 
 her Majesty's Government "could never see 
 with indifference the island of Cuba in the pos- 
 session of any Power whatever but Spain." 
 I In his letter to Mr. Webster of July 8, 1852, 
 Mr. Crampton stated the true motive of the 
 Allied Powers when he said that the nation 
 possessing Cuba mi^/d either protect or obstruct the 
 commercial routes from one ocean to the other ^al- 
 though he added that Spain was put to great 
 expense in keeping an armed force in Cuba, 
 and that, relieved of the apprehension which 
 was the cause of these armaments (namely, an- 
 ticipated expeditions from the United States, 
 like those of Lopez), she could more easily meet 
 her engagements to her French and English 
 creditor^ He was also of opinion that a stipu- 
 lation li¥e the foregoing would be an induce- 
 
 ^ The communications on this subject hereinafter referred to 
 will be found in " Correspondence on the Proposed Tripartite 
 Convention relative to Cuba.'* 
 
86 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 ment to her to lower her tariff at Havana, the 
 high rates of which were a subject of complaint 
 in the United States. 
 
 Mr. Everett was Mr. Webster's successor as 
 Secretary of State. In a communication to the 
 Comte de Sartiges, dated Dec. 1, 1852, he stated 
 with remarkable clearness and power the rea- 
 sons of the declination of the President to enter 
 into the tripartite arrangement. 
 
 Th^y were substantially as follows : — 
 
 1. \The President fully concurs with his prede- 
 cessors "that the United States could not see 
 with indifference the island of Cuba fall into 
 the possession of any other European Govern- 
 ment than Spain.'' The President does not covet 
 the acquisition of Cuba for the United States ; 
 at the same time he considers the condition of 
 Cuba as mainly an American question. 
 
 2. The convention proposed would be viewed 
 with disfavor by the United States Senate. 
 
 3. It is doubtful whether the Constitution 
 of the United States would allow the treaty- 
 making Power to impose a permanent disability 
 on the American Government. 
 
 4. Among the oldest traditions of the Federal 
 Government is an aversion to political alliances 
 with European powers. 
 
CUBA. 87 
 
 5. The compact, although equal in its terms, 
 would be very unequal in substance. France 
 and England, by entering into it, would disable 
 themselves from obtaining possession of an island 
 remote from their seats of government, belong- 
 ing to another European power, while the United 
 States would disable themselves from making an 
 acquisition which might take place without any 
 disturbance of existing foreign relations, and 
 in the natural order of things. The island of 
 Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the ap- 
 proach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the 
 shores of five of our States. It bars the en- 
 trance of that great river which drains half the 
 North American continent, and, with its tribu- 
 taries, forms the largest system of internal water 
 communication in the world. It keeps watch at 
 the doorway c^ our intercourse tdth California hy the 
 Isthmus route, \ 
 
 But any designs against Cuba on the part of 
 this Government are emphatically disclaimed ; 
 and the President has given ample proof of 
 the sincerity with which he holds these views 
 by throwing the whole force of his constitu- 
 tional power against all illegal attacks upon 
 the island. 
 
 6. The proposed convention would be a tran- 
 
88 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 sitory arrangement, sure to be swept away by 
 the irresistible tide of aiSairs in a new country. 
 (To illustrate this Mr. Everett refers to the com- 
 parative history of Europe and America during 
 the preceding century. His enlargement upon 
 the material development of this country is ex- 
 tremely graphic and powerful.) 
 
 7. The conclusion of the proposed treaty 
 would not put an end to the attacks made 
 upon Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers 
 from the United States, as claimed by the Brit- 
 ash Government, but would give a new im- 
 ipulse to them. It would strike a death-blow 
 tt© the conservative policy hitherto pursued in 
 this country toward Cuba, and would accom- 
 plish the overthrow of the administration en- 
 tering into it. 
 
 The communication, of which the above is 
 an abstract, is regarded by many as one of the 
 ablest of American State papers. Lord John 
 Russell, who succeeded the Earl of Malmesbury 
 in the British foreign office, seems to have been 
 offended by Mr. Everett's glowing picture of 
 our national expansion; for he declared in a 
 communication to Mr. Cramp ton dated Feb. 16, 
 1853, that there was no occasion for Mr. Everett 
 to refer to events with which the two foreign 
 
CUBA. 89 
 
 Governments were already familiar. This let- 
 ter was sent after Mr. Everett's retirement 
 from the Department of State, but he felt that 
 it was his duty to answer it as a private indi- 
 vidual. His reply, dated at Boston on the 17th 
 of the following September, is an able vindica- 
 tion of the arguments contained in his commu- 
 nication in the preceding December. 
 
 With the falling through of the tripartite 
 arrangement, our relations with Spain grew 
 less friendly than ever. The Cuban authori- 
 ties manifested an ofi&cious vigilance in sub- 
 jecting American citizens to frequent acts of 
 annoyance and injury, and in interfering with 
 American commerce. This invasion of our na- 
 tional rights culminated in the seizure by the 
 Cuban authorities of the American steamer the 
 ^' Black Warrior," in the latter part of February, 
 1854. Deeming the purchase of the island by 
 the Government of the United States as the 
 only means of preventing the recurrence of 
 such acts of violence. President Pierce sent 
 directions to Mr. Soul^, the American Min- 
 ister at Madrid, to meet Messrs. Buchanan 
 and Mason, our ministers respectively to Great 
 Britain and France, "for a full and free inter- 
 
90 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 change of views in order to secure a concur- 
 rence in reference to the general object." ^ 
 
 The three ministers met at Ostend on Oct. 9, 
 1854, and drew up a paper known as the 
 / Ostend Manifesto, in which they arrived at 
 the conclusion that an immediate " effort ought 
 to be made by the Government of the United 
 States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any 
 price for which it can be obtained, not exceed- 
 ing the sum of $ ." It was in their opinion 
 
 advisable that the proposal should be presented 
 through the necessary diplomatic forms to the 
 Cortes about to assemble. However, when the 
 question came up for discussion in that body 
 not many weeks after, the declaration of the 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, that in his judg- 
 ment " to part with Cuba would be to part 
 with the national honor," was not only franti- 
 cally applauded in the galleries, but received 
 the sanction of the house. 
 
 In the session of 1858-1859 of the United 
 States Senate a bill was introduced by Mr. 
 Slidell, of Louisiana, providing for the placing of 
 the sum of thirty million dollars in the hands 
 of the President, with a view to the acquisition 
 
 1 See Executive Documents, 2d Session, 33d Congress. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
CUBA. 91 
 
 of Cuba. An animated and protracted discus- 
 sion ensued; but the bill was eventually with- 
 drawn by its author.^ 
 
 * The subsequent differences between the United States and 
 the Cuban authorities have not called for the application of the 
 Monroe Doctrine ; but it is worthy of note that a reciprocity- 
 treaty between this countiy and Spain, with twenty-eight articles 
 and three comprehensive tariff schedules, has just been signed, 
 and is now (Jan. 29, 1885) before the United States Senate for 
 ratification or rejection. 
 
92 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 CHAPTER YII. 
 
 THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 
 
 The release of Mexico from the dominion 
 of Spain in 1821 brought the former country 
 more than ever under the tyrannical rule of 
 the Church. A Liberal party, however, soon 
 sprang up; and the antagonisms of these two 
 parties — the Church and the Liberal — gave 
 rise in thirty-three years to thirty-six different 
 forms of government. From 1857 to 1861 the 
 political condition of Mexico was peculiarly 
 disturbed. The triumph of the Liberal party 
 in 1857 resulted in the establishment of a con- 
 stitutional federal government. The Church 
 party soon set aside this constitution and main- 
 tained a tottering government, which fell when 
 President Miramon was defeated by the Liberal 
 army under Juarez, on the 17th of November, 
 1860. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that during 
 these three years of discord the constitutional 
 government under Juarez continued to exist, 
 although the Diplomatic Corps recognized 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 93 
 
 the insurrectionary party as the Government 
 de facto. 
 
 Certain enormities, most of. which were com- 
 mitted by the Church party prior to the victory 
 of Juarez, were regarded by the creditor Gov- 
 ernments of Great Britain, Spain, and France 
 as sufficient to justify an armed intervention in 
 Mexican affairs. 
 
 These, for convenience, may be stated as 
 follows : — 
 
 1. (The claim of England\ 
 
 In obedience to the orders of Miramon, whose 
 party was in pecuniary embarrassment, a party 
 of armed men broke into the house of the Brit- 
 ish legation on Nov. 16, 1860, and against the 
 protest of the Spanish Minister, who happened 
 to be present, and in spite of the English flag 
 and the seals of the office, rifled the safes of 
 £152,000 sterling, belonging to English bond- 
 holders, deposited there for safe keeping. 
 
 In this connection it is important to note that 
 a writer in Eraser's Magazine of December, 1861, 
 states that prior to the date of foreign interven- 
 tion grave complaints were made by Mexicans 
 that merchants, in order to elude payment of 
 the high rate of duty on the exportation of sil- 
 ver connived, with British officers, who, for a 
 
94 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 compensation, secreted upon their persons and 
 carried upon board the war-ships of England 
 great loads of the precious metal. Hence he 
 concludes that the Mexican generals, " in at- 
 tacking the British consulates, were probably 
 actuated rather by a rude theory of their own 
 on the subject of justifiable reprisal, than by a 
 mere senseless hostility to foreigners or rapa- 
 cious desire for plunder." 
 
 The above, however, was England's principal 
 cause of complaint; although she also claimed 
 that Marquez, the coadjutor of Miramon, on the 
 8th of April, 1859, murdered, among others, a 
 surgeon who was either an English subject or 
 of English descent. 
 
 2.Q[^he claim of SpainX 
 
 In September, 1859, the insurrectionary party 
 concluded a treaty with Spain, known as the 
 Mon- Almonte treaty, which recognized the va- 
 lidity of ^certain claims denied by the consti- 
 tutional government. Upon the triumph of 
 Juarez the latter government disavowed the 
 treaty. 
 
 This was Spain's cardinal ground of complaint, 
 although she was also aggrieved at the summary 
 dismissal by Juarez of M. Pacheco, the Spanish 
 Ambassador. 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 95 
 
 3. (The claim of France\ 
 
 Jecfeer, an embarrassed Swiss banker, and 
 Miramon designed a means of mutual enrich- 
 ment, which was formulated on the 29th of 
 October, 1859, in a decree in the name of the 
 insurrectionary administration creating an issue 
 of bonds to the amount of $15,000,000, which 
 was only calculated to raise the comparatively 
 paltry sum of $750,000. Without entering 
 into the details of this financial measure, let it 
 suffice to say that upon the failure of Jecker, 
 in May, 1860, the bonds passed into the hands 
 of his creditors. 
 
 France was likewise prompted to interfere, in 
 order to seek redress for her alleged (and prob- 
 ably largely fraudulent) claim of $12,000,000, 
 on account of certain wrongs committed by 
 Mexico up to the year 1861. 
 
 While, therefore, the foreign creditors main- 
 tained that international obligations must be as- 
 sumed by the successive governments of a state, 
 the constitutional party claimed that the admin- 
 istration of Miramon was in no sense a govern- 
 ment, but only an unsuccessful insurrection. 
 
 The way for foreign intervention was proba- 
 bly prepared by Miramon, Almonte, and other 
 members of the Church party, who were anxious 
 
96 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 that that party should regain some of the 
 wealth and privileges of which it had been 
 deprived by the constitutional government. 
 Accordingly they were active in creating the 
 belief abroad that Mexico was neither capable 
 of self-government nor adapted to republican 
 institutions. 
 
 The three Powers signed a convention in 
 London, in October, 1861, the following article 
 of which is important : — 
 
 " Art. II. ^he high contracting parties engage 
 not to seek for themselve^ in the employment of the 
 coercive measures contemplated by the present Con- 
 vention, ^sny acquisition of territoryj nor any special 
 advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs 
 of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice 
 the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to 
 constitute freely the form of its government." ^ 
 
 They further agreed \fo simply demand -their 
 debts, \nd if payment was refused, to take 
 possession of Mexican ports and sequestrate 
 the customs towards the liquidation of their 
 claims. 
 
 I It is unnecessary to dwell upon subsequent 
 ents. Hardly had the troops of the Allied 
 
 * See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 467. 
 
THE FKENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 97 
 
 Powers disembarked at Vera Cruz, when the 
 designs of the unscrupulous Emperor of the 
 French were disclosed. England and Spain 
 indignantly withdrew, and Napoleon III. was 
 thus left unrestrained to accomplish his pur- 
 pose, long but covertly entertained, of plac- 
 ing an Austrian prince upon the Mexican 
 throne. 1 
 
 Our interest in the invasion centres in the 
 attitude of the Government of the United States 
 from the announcement of the intentions of the 
 foreign Powers to the ultimate withdrawal of 
 the forces of Napoleon, i It is the common opin- 
 ion that the Emperor would never have com- 
 mitted himself to this unfortunate undertaking, 
 had he not entertained the idea that the dis- 
 solution of the American Union had already 
 begun?\ He was thus relieved of all fear of in- 
 terference on the part of this Government, as 
 its available resources were employed in the 
 attempt to suppress the insurrection in the 
 South. 
 
 That this Government, however, even in its 
 crippled condition, was unchanged in its adher- 
 ence to the Monroe Doctrine, appears from the 
 following considerations : — 
 
98 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 LylVom the moment when intervention seemed proh- 
 ahle, explanations were demanded of France^ and 
 the assurance was given that her sok purpose was 
 the enforcement of the claims of the subjects of the 
 
 Emperor \ 
 
 The first communication was from M. Thou- 
 venel to Mr. Dayton, the American Minister 
 in Paris, in the fall of 1861, to the effect that 
 "whatever England and France might do, it 
 would be done in reference to realizing their 
 money debt only." 
 
 This avowal was followed by another equally 
 positive and plain. On June 5, 1862, Mr. Day- 
 ton wrote to Mr. Seward that M. Thouvenel had 
 again assured him in regard to Mexico, " that 
 'the French troops did not go there to interfere 
 with the form of government, nor to acquire 
 an inch of territory, nor remain indefinitely in 
 the country. All France sought was, that her 
 existing ^griefs' should be settled, and some 
 government established which other countries 
 could treat with, and which would protect their 
 commercial agents." ^ 
 
 Mr. Seward, on Aug. 23, 1862, wrote to Mr. 
 Dayton : " This Government, relying on the 
 explanations which have been made by France, 
 
 1 Foreign AfEairs, 1862, p. 348. 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 99 
 
 regards the conflict as a war involving claims 
 by France which Mexico has failed to adjust to 
 the satisfaction of her adversary, and it avoids 
 intervention between the belligerents." ^ 
 
 The perfidy of Napoleon is apparent from the 
 letter which he addressed to General Forey upon 
 his assuming command of the French forces soon 
 after the landing at Vera Cruz : — 
 
 " It is our interest that the United States shall 
 be powerful and prosperous, but it is not at all to 
 our interest that she should grasp the whole Gulf 
 of Mexico, rule thence the Antilles as well as South 
 America, and be the sole dispenser of the products 
 of the New World. ... If, on the contrary, Mexico 
 preserves its independence and maintains the integ- 
 rity of its territory, if a stable government be there 
 established with the aid of France, we shall have re- 
 stored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean 
 its force and prestige,'''' ^ 
 
 2\l)uring the entire period of the French occupa- 
 tion ojMexico the Government of the Umted States 
 recognised only the Government of Juarez.) 
 
 Upon the acceptance by Maximilian of the 
 Mexican throne in the summer of 1863, Napo- 
 leon saw that the pacification of the country 
 
 1 Foreign AfEairs, 1862, p. 377. 
 
 2 See North American Review, vol. ciii. p. 106. 
 
100 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 could be more easily achieved if the new Gov- 
 ernment should be immediately recognized by 
 that of the United States. 
 
 Mr. Seward stated in his letter of Sept. 26, 
 1863, to Mr. Dayton, that while the United 
 States had " neither the right nor the disposi- 
 tion to intervene by force on either side in 
 the lamentable war which is going on between 
 France and Mexico/' yet it knew well that 
 the normal opinion of the people of Mexico, 
 influenced by popular opinion in this country, 
 " favors a government there republican in form 
 and domestic in its organization;" and that in 
 the view of the President "this popular opin- 
 ion of the United States is just in itself, and 
 eminently essential to the progress of civiliza- 
 tion on the American continent." He then 
 remarked with great plainness, " that if France 
 should, upon due consideration, determine to 
 adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the Amer- 
 can opinions and sentiments which I have de- 
 scribed, that policy would probably scatter 
 seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies 
 which might ultimately ripen into collision 
 between France and the United States and 
 the other American republics." ^ 
 
 1 Foreign Affairs, 1863, p. 709. 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 101 
 
 Still later, in his letter to Mr. Dayton, of 
 October 23, after referring to the fact that 
 M. Drouyn de THuys (who succeeded M. Thou- 
 venel as Foreign Minister) had intimated that 
 an early acknowledgment of the proposed em- 
 pire of Maximilian by the United States would 
 be convenient to France, Mr. Seward stated, 
 " that M. Drouyn de I'Huys should be informed 
 that the United States continue to regard 
 Mexico as the theatre of a war which has not 
 yet ended in the subversion of the Government 
 long existing there, with which the United 
 States remain in the relation of peace and 
 sincere friendship ; and that, for this reason, the 
 United States are not now at liberty to consider 
 the question of recognizing a government which 
 in the further chances of war may come into 
 its place. The United States consistently with 
 their principles can do no otherwise than leave 
 the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her 
 own people, and recognize their sovereignty 
 and independence in whatever form they them- 
 selves shall choose that this sovereignty and 
 independence shall be manifested."^ 
 
 In the mean time the attitude of the Em- 
 peror gave rise to warm discussions in the 
 
 1 Foreign Affairs, 186^ p. 726. 
 
102 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 Congress of the United States. On Feb. 3, 
 1863, Mr. McDougall, of California, in the Senate 
 denounced "the proceedings of France as the 
 most flagrant robber outrage that has been at- 
 tempted by any modern civilized State." -^ And 
 on April 4, 1864, a little less than two months 
 before the landing of Maximilian at Vera Cruz, 
 the joint resolution relative to Mexican affairs 
 was passed by the National House of Repre- 
 sentatives without a dissenting voice. It de- 
 clared that " the Congress of the United States 
 are unwilling by silence to have the nations of 
 the world under the impression that they are 
 indifferent spectators of the deplorable events 
 now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and 
 that they therefore think fit to declare that it 
 does not accord with the policy of the United 
 States to acknowledge any monarchical gov- 
 ernment erected on the ruins of any republi- 
 can government in America under the auspices 
 of any European power."^ Mr. Davis, of Mary- 
 land, stated as the policy of the administration, 
 " to cultivate friendship with our republican 
 brethren of Mexico and South America, to aid 
 
 1 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3d Session; Appendix, 
 p. 94. 
 
 2 Ibid., 38th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1408. 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 103 
 
 in consolidating republican principles, to retain 
 popular government in all this continent from 
 the fangs of monarchical or aristocratic power, 
 and to lead the sisterhood of American republics 
 in the paths of peace, prosperity, and power." ^ 
 
 The passage of this resolution and the debate 
 thereon produced great excitement in France, 
 and war actually seemed imminent. When 
 Mr. Dayton visited M. Drouyn de I'Huys at the 
 Department of Foreign Affairs on April 21, the 
 first words of the latter were, " Do you bring us 
 peace, or bring us war ? " However, President 
 Lincoln was wisely conservative, and Mr. Day- 
 ton quieted the apprehensions of the French 
 Minister by reading his instructions from Mr. 
 Seward. These were frank and explicit, and 
 concluded with the statement "that the pro- 
 ceedings of the House of Eepresentatives were 
 adopted upon suggestions arising within itself, 
 and not upon any communication of the ex- 
 ecutive department, and that the French Gov- 
 ernment would be seasonably apprised of any 
 change of policy upon this subject which the 
 President might at any future time think it 
 proper to adopt. 
 
 »2 
 
 i Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, Ist Session, p. 1408. 
 2 See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 528. 
 
104 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 ^X^ter the termination of the Civil War in the 
 United States, the Government at Washington was 
 more pronounced than ever in warning the Govern- 
 ment of France of the consequences likely to follow 
 the prolonged stay of the French troops in Mexico\ 
 
 It is true that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded 
 Mr. Dayton as Minister to France, stated that 
 the Government of the United States would 
 recognize the empire of MaximiHan upon the 
 immediate withdrawal of the French troops 
 from the territory of Mexico. But this state- 
 ment, made upon his own authority, was dis- 
 approved by the President. The Government 
 of the United States was determined that the 
 withdrawal of the French troops should de- 
 pend upon no condition precedent. Accord- 
 ingly Mr. Seward boldly declared the wishes 
 and intentions of his Government. The diplo- 
 matic correspondence upon this subject is too 
 voluminous to quote entire ; but the following 
 extract from a communication of Mr. Seward 
 to Mr. Dayton, dated Dec. 16, 1865, leaves 
 nothing to be desired by way of plainness and 
 candor : — 
 
 " It has been the President's purpose that France 
 should be respectfully informed upon two points; 
 namely : — 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 105 
 
 ''First. That the United States earnestly desire 
 to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with 
 France. ^ 
 
 " Second, ijhat this policy would be brought into 
 imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it con- 
 sistent with her interest and honor to desist from the 
 prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to over- 
 throw the domestic republican government existing 
 there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign 
 monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugu- 
 rated in the capital of that country.'*^ 
 
 \After further correspondence it was officially 
 announced on the 5th of April, 1866, that the 
 French troops should evacuate Mexico ; and in 
 a little less than a year from that date they had 
 all departed. It is generally believed, at least 
 in this country, that this determination of the 
 Emperor was largely due to the presence of 
 General Sheridan on our southwestern frontier 
 with a large detachment of the army placed 
 in the field by the order of Congress for the 
 national defence?\ 
 
 In conclusion, it is proper to remark that 
 during this period the agitation of this subject 
 in the Congress of the United States continued. 
 
 1 See Foreign Relations, 1865 ;j Annual Cyclopaedia, 1865, 
 p. 321. 
 
106 THE MONROE DOCTKINE. 
 
 Numerous resolutions were offered, especially 
 in the House of Representatives, denouncing 
 the conduct of the Emperor ; and it was even 
 proposed to aid the republicans of Mexico by 
 a substantial national loan. 
 
 \The sentiment of many Europeans upon the 
 French occupation of Mexico found expression 
 in the remark of a writer in the " London Times '' 
 in 1862, that the Emperor Napoleon had done 
 a great political service to the world " in con- 
 firming the previous actions, of Spain in e:vtin' 
 guishing the Monroe Doctrine,\ A similar view 
 was entertained by a writer m the " Westmin- 
 ster Review'' of October, 1863, who asserted 
 that " the occupation of Mexico is the extinc- 
 tion of the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine, 
 it must be owned, is both absurd and arrogant 
 in theory and in practice." \^ut that there 
 were Europeans candid enough to admit that 
 the policy of this Government was consistent 
 with its previous adherence to the Monroe 
 Doctrine, appears from the following impar- 
 tial statement of Sir Edward S. Creasy : — 
 
 " The United States (occupied by their own Civil 
 War which was then raging) did not actually 
 send troops to oppose the French in Mexico, but 
 
THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO. 107 
 
 they steadily refused to recognize Maximilian, or 
 any government except a republican government, 
 in Mexico; and the language of their statesmen 
 exhibited the fullest development of the Monroe 
 Doctrine.""^ 
 
 1 Fitst Platform of International Law, p. 122. 
 
108 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 This subject is naturally treated in two di- 
 visions : — 
 
 1. The disputed territory/ in the northwest. — We 
 have already seen that this dispute largely influ- 
 enced President Monroe to declare his interdic- 
 tion of further European colonization upon this 
 continent;^ but the subject should not be dis- 
 missed without brief reference to the other parti- 
 cipants in the controversy, and to the peaceable 
 adjustment of their long-standing differences. 
 
 The Spaniards early navigated the Pacific, 
 and sent exploring parties northward along the 
 line of the coast. They claimed by discovery 
 in 1774 Nootka Sound, so called, on the west- 
 ern shore of Vancouver's Island; and in 1789 
 a Spanish expedition seized several English 
 vessels moored there. The British Government 
 at once assumed a hostile attitude and demanded 
 reparation. The differences of the two Powers 
 were settled by a treaty dated Oct. 28, 1790; 
 
 1 See pages 12-16. 
 
AMEEICA NORTH OF THE XJNITED STATES. 109 
 
 the terms of which chiefly applied to questions 
 of navigation and fishery, and to trade with 
 the natives, and did not determine the rights 
 of either party to the sovereignty of any por- 
 tion of America.^ 
 
 By the Florida Treaty of Feb. 22, 1819, be- 
 tween Spain and the United States, his catholic 
 Majesty ceded to the United States " all his 
 rights, claims, and pretensions to any territo- 
 ries " north of the 42d parallel of latitude ; so 
 that Spain at once retired as a claimant to any 
 territory north of that line. 
 
 The pretensions of Great Britain and the 
 United States to the disputed territory were so 
 indefinite that neither could possess a perfect 
 title to the sovereignty of the same. Hence 
 a treaty was signed on Oct. 20, 1818, by 
 the provisions of the third article of which all 
 the territories claimed by both parties, west 
 of the Kocky Mountains, were left free and 
 open to the citizens or subjects of both na- 
 tions for two years ; and by the convention of 
 Aug. 6, 1827, those provisions were extended 
 for an indefinite period, either party to give 
 
 * For all the teeaties referred to in this chapter which were 
 negotiated before 1845, see Greenhow's " History of Oregon 
 and California and the other Northwestern Territories." 
 
110 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 twelve months' notice to the other of its inten- 
 tion to annul and abrogate the same. Finally, 
 by the treaty of June 15, 1846, the 49th 
 parallel of north latitude was fixed as the 
 dividing" line, England renouncing all claim to 
 the territory south t^ereof.^ 
 
 Early in the present century a misunderstand- 
 ing arose between Russia and the United States 
 in regard to the trade carried on by citizens of 
 the latter with natives of the North Pacific 
 coast. In 1809, soon after diplomatic relations 
 were established between the two nations, a 
 desire was expressed by the Government of 
 Russia for the adoption of some arrangement 
 looking to a discontinuance of differences ; but 
 the correspondence terminated at once when 
 it appeared that the Russian American Com- 
 pany claimed the entire coast from Behring's Strait 
 southward to and beyond the mouth of the Columbia 
 River. 
 
 The historic incidents related above, espe- 
 cially down to and including the treaties of the 
 United States with Great Britain in 1818 and 
 with Spain in 1819, are important in their 
 bearing upon the validity of the claim of the 
 United States to territory which Russia also 
 
 1 See Public Treaties, 1875, p. 320. 
 
AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES. Ill 
 
 claimed as her own. On the 16th of September, 
 1821, the Emperor of Eussia issued an ukase, 
 or edict, relative to trade on the northwest coast 
 of America, accompanied by sixty-three rules 
 establishing the boundaries for navigation along 
 the coast and the order of naval communication. 
 In these articles Russia asserted a territorial 
 claim extending to the 51st degree of north 
 latitude, and interdicted to all commercial ves- 
 sels other than Russian, upon the penalty of 
 seizure and confiscation, the approach upon the 
 high seas within one hundred Italian miles of 
 the shores to which that claim was made to 
 apply.^ 
 
 The Governments of both Great Britain and 
 the United States were emphatic in the expres- 
 sion of dissent. A correspondence was at once 
 begun between Mr. Adams, then Secretary of 
 State, and the Chevalier de Poletica, the former 
 denying the claim of Russia, and the latter 
 asserting it upon the grounds " of first discov- 
 ery, first occupation, and upon that which 
 results from a peaceable and uncontested pos- 
 session of more than half a century." 
 
 The discontinuance of this correspondence 
 
 1 See British and Foreign State Papers, 1821, 1822, p. 472, 
 et seq. 
 
112 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 was the simple admission of an inability to 
 agree. The United States did not abate one 
 iota of their demands, and in July, 1823, Mr. 
 Adams made the remark to Baron Tuyl already 
 referred to, that we should contest the Russian 
 territorial establishments on this continent, and 
 that no new European colonial estahlishments on 
 this continent would he allowed} 
 
 A few months after, on December 2, came the 
 declaration of President Monroe in his annual 
 message, to the effect that while the differences 
 with Russia and Great Britain as to the north- 
 western territory were likely to be settled by 
 amicable negotiation, the occasion was an appro- 
 priate one to declare that the American con- 
 tinents " are henceforth not to be considered 
 as subjects for colonization by any European 
 powers." ^ 
 
 This declaration evoked from the Govern- 
 ments of Great Britain and Russia a decided 
 protest; and it was regarded by many as pre- 
 mature, in that it defeated the arrangement 
 already proposed for a joint convention between 
 the three nations having claims to the disputed 
 territory.^ However, by separate conventions, 
 
 1 See page 13. 2 gee page 16. 
 
 » See Remarks of Mr. Calhoun, on p. 41. 
 
AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 113 
 
 one between the United States and Eussia, 
 signed at St. Petersburg on the Vn of April, 
 
 1824, and the other between Great Britain and 
 Russia, signed at the same place, Feb. ^728? 
 
 1825, the southern boundary of the Russian 
 possessions was finally agreed upon and deter- 
 mined. Forty years after, when the ratification 
 of the treaty^ whereby these possessions were 
 to be conveyed to the United States was under 
 discussion in the United States Senate, Mr. 
 Sumner remarked that by it " we dismiss one 
 other monarch from the continent. One by 
 one they have retired ; first France ; then 
 Spain ; then France again ; and now Russia ; 
 all giving way to the absorbing Unity declared 
 in the national motto, E Plurihus TJnum!^ ^ 
 
 2. Canada, — In 1837 and 1838 an insurrec- 
 tion of a serious nature broke out in Canada. 
 This was the occasion of the sending of Lord 
 Durham to the revolting provinces, whose 
 efforts at reorganization are so graphically por- 
 trayed by Mr. Justin McCarthy.^ There was 
 some discussion in this country as to the appli- 
 cation of the Monroe Doctrine; but the only 
 real difference with the British authorities was 
 
 1 Public Treaties, 1875, p. 671. 2 Works, xi. 223. 
 
 8 A History of Our Own Times, vol. i. chap. iii. 
 8 
 
114 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 in relation to the capture and destruction of 
 the steamboat '^Caroline/' which was employed 
 upon the St. Lawrence by Canadian insurgents 
 in carrying passengers and munitions of war 
 from the American to the Canadian shore. 
 Lord Ashburton in behalf of the British Gov- 
 ernment made a satisfactory acknowledgment, 
 and the matter ended.^ 
 
 The conflicts between Upper and Lower Can- 
 ada about twenty years ago suggested the idea 
 of a legislative union between the various Brit- 
 ish North American colonies. It is thought that 
 the termination of our Civil War by the suppres- 
 sion of the insurrection in the Southern States 
 also demonstrated to the Canadian people the 
 practical advantages of such a union. At any 
 rate, the union was effected by the Imperial 
 act known as " the British North American 
 Act, 1867;" and under the name of the Domin- 
 ion of Canada were included Upper and Lower 
 Canada (now called Ontario and Quebec), Nova 
 Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
 Manitoba, and British Columbia. / 
 
 It was maintained by many that this consoli- 
 dation was in derogation of the spirit of the 
 
 1 Woolsey's International Law, § 163. 
 
AMERICA NORTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 115 
 
 Monroe Doctrine ; and a resolution was intro- 
 duced in the House of Representatives, — but 
 never put to a vote, — declaring the uneasiness 
 of this country in the contemplation of " such 
 a vast conglomeration of American States es- 
 tablished on the monarchical principle, such a 
 proceeding being in contravention of the tra- 
 ditionary and constantly declared principles of 
 the United States, and endangering their most 
 important interests." ^ 
 
 1 See Creasy's First Platform, p. 121. 
 
116 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MINOR OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE DOCTRINE HAS 
 BEEN APPLIED. 
 
 The following are occasions which called forth 
 little if any legislative discussion, but in which 
 the Doctrine seems to have been applied from 
 what might be termed a popular stand-point. 
 
 1. The annexation of Texas to the United States. — 
 The independence of the Republic of Texas was 
 acknowledged by the United States in 1837, by 
 France in 1839, and by England, Holland, and 
 Belgium in 1840. Mexico, however, did not 
 relinquish her hopes of resubjugation ; hence 
 the final annexation of the republic to the 
 United States, in 1845, gave rise to the war of 
 Mexico with this country, commonly called the 
 Mexican War. 
 
 The Northern opposition to the admission of 
 Texas into the Union was due to a deep-seated 
 aversion to the extension of slavery; but there 
 was an argument at that time in favor of the 
 admission which naturally received a strong 
 
THE DOCTRIKE APPLIED. 117 
 
 popular support. It was this ; there was an 
 apprehended danger of an infringement of the 
 principle of the Monroe Doctrine, as Great 
 Britain and France made no secret of their 
 desire to see Texas under an English or a 
 joint protectorate without slavery, and free 
 from the control of the United States. 
 
 2. The Spanish Invasion of Santo Domingo, — 
 Santo Domingo, or the Dominican Republic, 
 comprising the eastern portion of the island 
 of Hayti, declared its independence in 1844. 
 Disorders continued until 1861, when Pedro 
 San tana, a prominent political character, dis- 
 heartened with the condition of affairs, invited 
 Spain to resume dominion over the island. 
 The Dominicans kept up a guerilla warfare, 
 which, aided by the malarious climate and 
 the irregular character of the country, proved 
 very destructive to the Spanish troops. An 
 appeal was made by the Dominicans to the 
 United States and the other American repub- 
 lics for aid ; but, occupied with the war with 
 the South, the Government and people of this 
 country could only offer their sympathy. 
 
 Convinced that the subjugation of the island 
 could be attained only by the loss of blood and 
 treasure, the Spanish Government determined 
 
118 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 upon its abandonment. In July, 1865, the 
 Spanish Governor-General insisted that as a 
 condition precedent to his retirement, the Do- 
 minican Government should record a national 
 declaration that the war which Spain had been 
 waging was just and lawful, and that Spain 
 withdrew, out of " respect to the preference of 
 the Dominican people for an independent nation- 
 aUty." The Governor-General was compelled 
 to recede from this position, but not until he 
 had been informed by one of the Dominican 
 commissioners that " the united Dominican peo- 
 ple, without regard to rank or color, had planted 
 the white cross of the republic on the principle 
 enunciated hy the Great Mother of free nations^ that 
 America hehngs to Americans, and we will endure all 
 our trials over again sooner than desert itr ^ 
 
 3. The war of Spain with Peru and Chili. — 
 Differences growing out of claims of Spanish 
 residents of Peru against that country resulted 
 in the forcible seizure by Spain in March, 1864, 
 of the guano-yielding Chincha Islands. • Great 
 indignation was expressed not only by Peru- 
 vians but by all foreigners resident in Peru ; 
 and the citizens of the United States residing 
 at Lima and Callao met April 27 and passed 
 
 ^ See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1865, p. 754. 
 
THE DOCTRINE APPLIED. 119 
 
 six resolutions emphatically affirming the prin- 
 ciple of the Monroe Doctrine, and declaring that 
 in the recognition of that doctrine " consists the 
 safeguard and only defence of the sister repub- 
 lics of this continent." ^ 
 
 Early in 1865 a treaty was signed by the 
 belligerents, which was afterward repudiated 
 by Peru. Thereupon the republics of Bolivia, 
 Chili, and Ecuador formed a defensive alliance 
 with Peru, and on March 31, 1866, the Span- 
 ish fleet bombarded Valparaiso. This was suc- 
 ceeded by only a nominal continuance of the 
 war; and on April 12, 1871, a peace confer- 
 ence was held at Washington under the presi- 
 dency of Mr. Hamilton Fish, our Secretary of 
 State. Its deliberations resulted in a conven- 
 tion which was signed by Mr. Fish as well as 
 by the representatives of the other Powers, 
 and in which the Government of the United 
 States played an important part, as appears by 
 the first two articles. 
 
 "AJEiT. 1. By this convention the suspension of 
 hostilities existing de facto between Spain on the one 
 hand, and the allied republics of Bolivia, Chili, Peru, 
 and Ecuador on the other, is changed into an armis- 
 tice, or general truce. 
 
 1 See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1864, p. 654. 
 
120 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 "Art. 2. This armistice shall last indefinitely, 
 and it cannot be broken by any of the belligerents 
 until three years after express and explicit notifica- 
 tion shall have been given by one to the other of 
 the intention to renew hostilities. In this case such 
 notification must he made through the Grovernment of 
 the United States. ^^ ^ 
 
 4. The War of Chili with Peru and Bolivia. — 
 This recent contest has only partially called 
 for an application ofj; the Monroe Doctrine ; 
 but much has been said about its probable re- 
 currence, — a subject to which Mr. Albert G. 
 Browne, Jr., has adverted in his able paper 
 upon " The Growing Power of the Republic of 
 Chili." 2 
 
 It was feared that the annexation of the 
 nitrate-bearing provinces of Peru to Chili might 
 
 1 See Annual Cyclopaedia, 1871, p. 706. The interest of the 
 United States in the affairs of the Southern republics is further 
 shown by their mediatorial services in relation to the boundary 
 dispute of Chili with the Argentine Republic. This vexed ques- 
 tion was settled by treaty dated Oct. 2, 1881. In referring to 
 the subject in his message to the Congress of the Argentine 
 Republic in May, 1882, President Rocas said: "I must not 
 omit to remind you of the names of the distinguished ministers 
 plenipotentiary of the United States in Chili and the Argentine 
 Republic. As you are aware, the question was at the worst 
 when these gentlemen interposed their influence for the opening 
 up of the new channels of negotiation, and continued using it 
 until the final solution." 
 
 2 Read before the American Greographical Society on the 
 evening of Feb. 18, 1884. 
 
THE DOCTRINE APPLIED. 121 
 
 lead to the interposition of the foreign creditors 
 to whom those provinces had been hypothe- 
 cated, and also that Peru might seek a Euro- 
 pean protectorate to save her from anarchy. 
 However, none of the events consequent upon 
 the termination of the late war have necessi- 
 tated any fresh assertion by the Government 
 of the United States of the application of the 
 Monroe Doctrine, although the subject has given 
 rise to much discussion by the press. 
 
122 THE MONKOE DOCTEINE. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 We present a summary of the views enter- 
 tained both by the opponents and the advocates 
 of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 r The arguments in denial of the doctrine as a 
 (y}rule of action or as a principle of international 
 
 (law are briefly these : — 
 
 /It is claimed that the doctrine is in a sense 
 tfer'outgrowth of the traditional American pol- 
 icy of non-intervention in European affairs ; but 
 this policy has not always obtained, — notably 
 in the action of the United States relative to the 
 liberation of Kossuth from Turkish restraint, and 
 his removal from Turkish soil upon a United 
 States war steamer in 1851.^\ 
 
 1 When Kossuth fled to Turkey ii;i 1849, his extradition 
 was demanded by Austria and Russia; but on Sept. 1, 1851, 
 he was allowed to embark on the United States war steamer 
 " Mississippi," which in accordance with a resolution of the Unite^ 
 States Senate had been despatched to carry him to America as 
 the guest of the nation. Although he was received by both 
 branches of the National Congress, there was a discussion in 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 123 
 
 i The Monroe Doctrine has always failed of 
 legislative confirmation, j The President has 
 no right to declare a principle obligatory upon 
 foreign nations, or even upon this country. 
 This is not only the opinion of Europeans, but 
 of many Americans, such as Calhoun, Clayton,^ 
 and Wilson, the last of whom, in a speech de- 
 livered in the United States Senate on Feb. 12, 
 1856, declared : — 
 
 " I am ready here to-day to vote for the Monroe 
 Doctrine as laid down and defined by Mr. Adams in 
 his message on the Panama mission ; but until the 
 Senate and House of Representatives adopt it, I 
 think the less our statesmen at home and diploma- 
 tists abroad say about it, in dealing with interna- 
 tional questions, the better."^ 
 
 (President Monroe condemned foreign coer- 
 cion ; that is, the forcible extension by the Allied 
 
 those bodies — especially in the Senate — as to whether the 
 course pursued by the Government was or was not a departure 
 from the policy of non-intervention in European affairs. (See 
 Congressional Globe, vol. xxiv. part 1, and vol. xxv.) 
 
 1 See pages 21, 56, 57. It is proper to remark that for the 
 past half-century resolution after resolution upon the subject has 
 been before both branches of Congress, only to be withdrawn 
 or to be adversely reported upon by the committee to whom 
 intrusted. 
 
 2 See pages 72, 73. 
 
 * Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, Ist Session ; Appendix, 
 p. 87. 
 
124 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 Powers of despotical institutions to this hemi- 
 sphere, and not voluntary acceptance of the 
 monarchical principle. He had in view mili- 
 tary and political, and not social and industrial 
 movements.^ Hence all the arguments in favor 
 of the modern appli<i^-tion of the doctrine are 
 illogical and untenable^ 
 
 (The principle of colonization is dead. If 
 the language of President Monroe '^ expressed 
 the intention that the South American re- 
 publics should be prevented from freely sur- 
 rendering their territory for the purposes of 
 colonization, this was going altogether too far ; 
 it was avowing a rule of interference on our 
 part equally to be condemned with the, similar 
 one acted on by European absolutists./ ^ Be- 
 sides, Mr. Adams, when President, practically 
 qualified this part of the doctrine.^ 
 
 Finally, as maintained by Mr. Calhoun, the 
 declaration refers only to the Allied Powers, 
 and contains no reference to resistance ; and, so 
 far as the Spanish-American republics are con- 
 cerned, such recommendations as those of Mr. 
 Polk upon the disturbance in Yucatan oblige 
 
 1 See Catholic World, vol. xxxi. p. 133. 
 
 2 Article of President Woolsey in Johnson's Cyclopaedia, vol* 
 iii. p. 590. 
 
 * See page 27. 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 125 
 
 us to become a party to all their wars.^ This 
 view is fortified by the consideration that the 
 Latin races have never been successful colo- 
 nists. The separation of the Spanish American 
 colonies from the mother country did not bring 
 stability, and was not followed by progress. 
 There has been a constant fulfilment of the pre- 
 dictions of Bolivar, the Liberator of Colombia 
 and Peru, that the South American countries 
 would " inevitably fall into the hands of the 
 unbridled rabble, and little by little become 
 a prey to petty tyrants of all colors and 
 races." ^ To become involved in their wars or 
 disputes is to expose ourselves to annoyance, if 
 not danger. 
 
 Eesistance to foreign interposition may some- 
 times be necessary; but each case must be 
 decided upon its merit§i This is the very far- 
 thest the Government would be justified in 
 going.^ 
 
 The following may be regarded as a fair ex- 
 position of the arguments of those who support 
 the doctrine : — 
 
 * See chap. iv. 
 
 2 Bolivar's letter of Nov. 9, 1830, to General Flores. 
 
 8 See pages 41, 42. 
 
126 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 The removal of Kossuth from Turkish soil on 
 an American war vessel, and his subsequent re- 
 ception by the United States Congress, may pos- 
 sibly constitute an exception to the cherished 
 traditional policy of non-intervention in European 
 affairs; but the subject is one upon which Amer- 
 ican statesmen are not agreed. It must not be 
 forgotten that by the adherence to that policy, 
 even before its enunciation by Washington, the 
 United States incurred the displeasure of France, 
 under whose direction thousands of American 
 ships were destroyed and their cargoes confis- 
 cated, — a proceeding which eventually gave 
 rise to what is known as the " French Spoliation 
 Claims." Notwithstanding this hardship, the 
 policy was never renounced, ^^ow the case of 
 Kossuth was peculiar in this : the United States 
 did not violate the rules of international law or 
 of international comity, nor was their action ^jjiided 
 hy any obligation to or with any foreign Power\ On 
 the other hand, whenever an invitation has been 
 extended by any European Government to that 
 of the United States to enter into any arrange- 
 ment relative to a contemplated movement in 
 this hemisphere, it has, with one exception^ 
 been declined. The rule is shown by the dec- 
 lination of Mr. Rush for this Government to 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 127 
 
 participate in the contemplated European Con- 
 gress upon Spanish- American affairs ; ^ and by 
 the refusal of the Government to become a 
 party both to the proposed tripartite arrange- 
 ment in 1852^ and to the armed intervention 
 in Mexico in 1862. The exception to the rule 
 is the ^layton-Bulwer treaty jj which, according 
 to the principles of international law, is void- 
 able at the pleasure of the United States Gov- 
 ernment, provided Great Britain declines to 
 agree to the desired modifications.^ As to the 
 affairs of these continents, Mr. Adams clearly 
 shows that the acceptance by this Government 
 of the invitation to participate in the delibera- 
 tions of the Panama Congress was in accord 
 with the policy of non-intervention.* 
 
 vf he declaration that the principle of coloniza- 
 tion is dead is too sweeping and unguarded. It 
 is true that the inhibition of President Monroe 
 upon this subject was called forth by the dis- 
 pute over the territory in the northwest.^ But 
 the word "henceforth" has plainly a future ref- 
 erence ; and the statement ^ of Mr. Adams, which 
 is declared by many to be a limitation of the 
 Monroe Doctrine, as applied to colonization 
 
 1 See page 10. 2 gee chap. vi. 
 
 » See page 73. •* See page 30. 
 
 ^ See pages 12-16, and chap. viii. ® See pages 27-29. 
 
128 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 simply refers to the advisability of each Ameri- 
 can State to make for itself the declaration which 
 Mr. Monroe made for the United States in 1823.^ 
 Interference by France in the affairs of Colom- 
 bia ^ may present a recurrence of the question at 
 any moment ; and the present restless ambition 
 of the French people for colonial extension 
 affords a cause for apprehension. 
 
 ^he relation of the United States to the 
 soumern republics is a consideration of cardi- 
 nal importance. The United States were the 
 N^ first nation to recognize their independence^ and 
 1 from that moment their resubjugationby Spain 
 became an impossibility. Their subsequent 
 recognition by Great Britain, therefore, was of 
 no practical advantage. Hence the declara- 
 tion of Mr. Canning in the House of Commons 
 in December, 1826, "I called the New World 
 into existence, to redress the balance of the 
 Old,"^ was nothing but grandiloquence. The 
 position taken by the United States in relation 
 to those republics is well shown by their ac- 
 tion during the French intervention in Mexico) 
 The careful but firm policy of Mr. Seward 
 during this trying period was supplemented by 
 
 1 See page 34. 2 gee note, page 76. 
 
 * Annual Register, vol. Ixviii. p^. 204. 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 129 
 
 his frank avowal in his letter of June 2, 1866, 
 to Mr. Kilpatrick, the American Minister to 
 ChiH: — 
 
 " We maintain and insist, with all the decision and 
 energy compatible with our existing neutrality, that 
 the republican system which is accepted by the peo- 
 ple in any one of those (that is, Spanish-American) 
 States shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall 
 not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by Euro- 
 pean powers. We thus give to those republics the 
 moral support of a sincere liberal, and we think it 
 will appear a useful, friendship. . . . Those who think 
 that the United States could enter as an ally into 
 every war in which a friendly republican state on 
 this Continent became involved, forget that peace is 
 the constant interest and unswerving policy of the 
 United States." ^ 
 
 The predictions of Bolivar have never been 
 realized. This disappointed patriot failed to 
 look into the future and behold the effect of the 
 influence of the United States upon the social 
 and political condition of the southern republics, 
 (fhis influence has been exerted in extending 
 their good offices to further the settlement of 
 boundary disputes and wars.^' 
 \llte argument that the Monroe Doctrine can 
 
 1 Foreign Relations, 1866, part ii. p. 413. 
 
 2 See pages il9 and 120, note. 
 
 9 
 
130 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 have no validity because it has never received 
 legislative sanction, carries with it no weight. 
 Many rules of international law impose an ob- 
 ligation derived from usage alone. The origi- 
 nal declaration of Mr. Monroe is a precedent 
 acknowledged by the American people, and to 
 a certain extent acquiesced in by European 
 authorities. Hardly a President since Mr. Mon- 
 roe has omitted to refer to it in language of 
 approval. ^It has always been regarded as a 
 question independent of party politics, save 
 perhaps in its application to the Congress at 
 Panama^ ? It has been persistently asserted by the 
 majority oT American statesmen; and to declare 
 tiiat it cannot obtain as a universal obligation 
 is practically to throw discredit upon Washing- 
 ton's Farewell Address^ whose recommenda- 
 tions, though never embodied in statutes or 
 approved by resolution of Congress, have fre- 
 quently shaped the foreign and domestic policy 
 of the Governmentj 
 
 These positions are rendered impregnable 
 by the fact, that though the doctrine gradually 
 developed,^ it was, to use the language of Mr. 
 Everett, (finally announced by President Monroe, 
 " not merely with the approval of the British 
 
 1 See chap. i. 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 131 
 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, hvi at his earnest and 
 often repeated solidtathns.r 
 
 Finally, the Monroe Doctrine is to America 
 what the Balance of Power is to Europe. The 
 analogy may not be complete, because several 
 nations in Europe unite to preserve a ratio of 
 power, while on this hemisphere the influence 
 of the United States is paramount. But it is 
 this feature which is especially worthy of note. 
 When or where has the Government of the 
 United States extended its mediatorial services 
 to its sister republics, save in the mterests of 
 peace and for the promotion of just and stable 
 government ? It was the influence of popular 
 opinion in the United States upon the people 
 of Mexico to which Mr. Seward emphatically 
 referred in his communication of Oct. 9, 1863, 
 to Mr. Motley, the American Minister to Aus- 
 tria. That the administration believed that 
 this popular opinion had something more than a 
 mere local influence, appears from the following 
 passage from the same instructions : — 
 
 '^ The President, moreover, believes that this popu- 
 lar opinion of the United States is just in itself, and 
 eminently essential to the progress of civilization on\ 
 
 1 Letter in the " New York Ledger," Oct. 3, 1862. See also 
 Sumner's " Prophetic Voices," p. 157. 
 
132 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 the American continent ; which civilization he be- 
 lieves can and will, if left free from European resist- 
 ance, work harmoniously together with advancing 
 refinement on the other continents.*' ^ 
 
 This prediction has been amply fulfilled in 
 the twenty years which have elapsed since its 
 announcement ; and there never was a period 
 when an adherence to the principles of the 
 Monroe Doctrine was more likely to be pro- 
 ductive of beneficial results to the people of 
 both American continents than the present. 
 
 1 Foreign Relations, 1863, part ii. p. 936. 
 
VENEZUELA. 133 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 (Supplementary.) 
 VENEZUELA. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine has been, in recent 
 years, applied in the case of disturbances in. 
 Venezuehi. 
 
 1. The controve7'sy as to teri^itorial juris- 
 diction. — For a long period before 1895 a dif- 
 ference had existed between the governments 
 of Great Britam and Venezuela as to the 
 boundary line between the last-named country 
 and British Guiana. 
 
 The United States Congress, on Feb. 22, 
 1895, in joint resolution, approved President 
 Cleveland's suggestion that this dispute be 
 referred to arbitration; and on July 25, 1895, 
 Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, sent a letter to 
 the American ambassador in London, assert- 
 ing with force the application of the Monroe 
 Doctrine to this controversy. " Today," he 
 declared, '"the United States is practically 
 sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law 
 upon the subjects to which it confines its in- 
 terposition." 
 
134 THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 
 
 In the first of two notes, dated ^ov. 26, 
 1895, Lord Salisbury questioned both the 
 soundness and the application of the Monroe 
 Doctrine; and in his second note, of the same 
 date, he stated at length the contention of 
 Great Britain as to the disputed territory, and 
 refused to submit the difference to arbitration. 
 
 Thereupon President Clevehmd submitted 
 to Congress a message in which he asserted 
 that the Monroe Doctrine '* has its place in 
 the code of international law as certainly and 
 as securely as if it were specifically mentioned." 
 He also suggested that Congress appropriate 
 money '' for the exjDcnses of a commission, to 
 be appointed by the Executive," who should 
 make investigation and report. " When such 
 report is made and accepted it will, in my opin- 
 ion, be the duty of the United States to resist 
 by every means in its power, as a wilful 
 aggression upon its rights and interests, the 
 appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or 
 the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over 
 any territory which, after investigation, we 
 have determined of right to belong to Vene- 
 zuela." 
 
 The Commission was soon after appointed; 
 but as Great Britain and the United States 
 had agreed to submit the controversy to arbi- 
 
VENEZUELA. 135 
 
 tration, this commission eoiicludecl to formu- 
 late no report. 
 
 The arbitrators appointed met in Paris in 
 1899, and in October of that year dehvered 
 their unanimous award, definitely fixing the 
 boundary line. AYhile this award was gener- 
 ally regarded as favorable to the British con- 
 tention, the fact that the British government 
 in agreeing to arbitration practically receded 
 from its fii-st position, was declared by many 
 Americans as a recognition of the Monroe 
 Doctrine.^ 
 
 2. The attempt by Germany and England 
 to enforce their money claims. 
 
 This recent event may be briefly treated. 
 It is not contended that the government of 
 y enezuela repudiated its obligations ; in fact, 
 that government only objected to the amount 
 of the claims, and proposed that they be passed 
 upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the 
 creditor nations urged their reference to a 
 mixed commission. The method adopted — 
 the sinking of Venezuelan war vessels and the 
 bombardment of Venezuelan ports — is believed 
 
 ^ An account of the Venezuelan Boundary Controversy, the 
 Commission appointed by fPresident Cleveland, Diplomatic 
 Correspondence and the Arbitration Treaty, is given in the 
 Annual Cyclopaedia, 1895, p. 741 et seq. and 1896, pp. 819- 500, 
 806. 
 
13(5 THE MONROE DOCTIUNE. 
 
 to be one of the first attempts in history to 
 enforce commercial demands l)y virtual acts 
 of war. It is to be noted, howevei*, that both 
 Great Britain and (rermany disavowed to the 
 American government in advance any inten- 
 tion to acquire territory, the German ambassa- 
 dor assuring- the State Department: '• We 
 declare especially that under no circumstances 
 do we consider in our proceedings the acqui- 
 sition or the permanent occupation of Vene- 
 zuelan territory." 
 
 The withdrawal of the German and British 
 war vessels from the blockade of Venezuelan 
 ports and the ad()])tion of measures for the 
 settlement of the ditficulty Avithout any dis^ 
 turbance of the autonomy of Venezuela or 
 appropriation of her territory, and that too 
 through the mediation of Mr. Bowen, the 
 American representative, have, in the opinion 
 of many, given additional efficacy to the dec- 
 laration of President Moiu-oe.^ 
 
 ' An account of the revolution in Venezuela and the question 
 of the claims of foreigners against the government is given in 
 Annual Cyclopaedia, 1901, p. 783 et seq. and 1902, pp. 824-830. 
 The volume for 1903, wliich will soon appear, may be con- 
 sulted for the conclusion of the subject. 
 
INDEX, 
 
 ADAMS, CHARLES FRANCIS, ^'^^ 
 
 remarks of, as to Monroe Doctrine 13 
 
 ADAMS, JOHN QUINCY, 
 
 part taken by, in the Monroe Doctrine, 12-14, 21, 22, 40, 
 
 41, 111, 112 
 
 interest of, in the Panama Congress ...*.. 23-34 
 ANDERSON, RICHARD C, 
 
 envoy to Panama Congress 27, 32, 34 
 
 ARTHUR, PRESIDENT, 
 
 views of, upon Isthmian Canal 66 
 
 BALANCE OF POWER, 
 
 what it is 4, 5 
 
 BLAINE, JAMES G., 
 
 communications of, upon Isthmian Canal .... 59-66 
 BOLIVAR, SIMON, 
 
 predictions of 125, 129 
 
 BRIGHT, JOHN, 
 
 denunciation of Balance of Power by 5 
 
 BROUGHAM, HENRY, 
 
 views of, upon Monroe Doctrine 20 
 
 BULWER, SIR HENRY, 
 
 negotiation of Clayton-Bulwer treaty by 48 
 
 BURNSIDE, AMBROSE E., 
 
 resolution of 56 
 
 CALHOUN, JOHN C, 
 
 views of, upon the Monroe Doctrine 38-42 
 
 upon Cuba 80, 81 
 
134 INDEX. 
 
 Pages 
 
 CANNING, GEORGE, 
 
 part taken by, in Monroe Doctrine 8-11 
 
 boast of 128 
 
 CASS, GENERAL, 
 views of, upon Clayton-Bulwer treaty 73 
 
 CLAY, HENRY, 
 
 resolution of 21 
 
 espousal of southern republics by 24 
 
 interest of, in Panama Congress 25-27, 34, 35 
 
 communications of, as to Cuba 79, 80 
 
 CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY 
 
 (See Interoceanic Canal). 
 
 CLAYTON, JOHN M., 
 
 negotiation of treaty by 48 
 
 views of, upon treaty 73 
 
 COMMISSIONERS, 
 to South America 35, 36 
 
 CRAMPTON, MR., 
 
 communications of, upon Cuba ........ S5 
 
 CRAPO, WILLIAM W., 
 resolution of 57 
 
 CREASY, SIR EDWARD S., 
 views of, upon French intervention 106, 107 
 
 CUBA, 
 
 American interest in 77-81 
 
 attack of Lopez upon 81,82 
 
 proposition of France and Great Britain as to . . . 82-89 
 proposition for purchase of, by United States . . . 89-91 
 
 DANA, R. H. Jr., 
 
 opinion of, upon colonization 34 
 
 DAVIS, HENRY WINTER, 
 
 views of, upon American policy 102, 103 
 
 DAYTON, WILLIAM L., 
 
 communications of, upon French intervention . . .98, 103 
 
 EVERETT, EDWARD, 
 communication of, upon Cuba 86-88 
 
INDEX. 135 
 
 FERDINAND DE LESSEPS, ^'^ 
 
 interest of, in interoceanic canal . . . • • . 65, 76 n. 
 
 FISH, HAMILTON, 
 participation by, in Peace Conference 119 
 
 FRELINGHUYSEN, F. T., 
 views of, upon Isthmian Canal 69-72 
 
 GARWeLD, PRESIDENT, 
 
 views of, upon South American affairs 35 
 
 upon Isthmian Canal 58 
 
 GRANVILLE, EARL, 
 
 communications of, upon Isthmian Canal 61, 67, 68, 71, 72 
 
 HAYES, PRESIDENT, 
 views of, upon interoceanic canal 57, 58 
 
 INTEROCEANIC CANAL, 
 
 projects for 43 
 
 treaty with New Granada as to 44 
 
 events leading to Clayton-Bulwer treaty as to . . . 44-48 
 
 synopsis of that treaty 48-51 
 
 discussion over 51-76 
 
 resolutions as to 56, 57 
 
 JEFFERSON, THOMAS, 
 opinion of, as to intervention ..••••... 14 
 
 KOSSUTH, LOUIS, 
 case of 122, 125, 126 
 
 LOWE, ROBERT, 
 views of, upon Balance of Power 5 
 
 MACKINTOSH, SIR JAMES, 
 
 views of, upon Monroe Doctrine ........ 20 
 
 MADISON, JAMES, 
 
 opinion of, as to intervention 14 
 
 MALMESBURY, EARL OF, 
 
 communications of, upon Cuba 85 
 
136 INDEX. 
 
 McDOUGALL, ^'**' 
 
 remarks by, upon French intervention 102 
 
 MEXICO, INTERVENTION IN, 
 
 claims which led to 92-96 
 
 agreement of the Powers as to 96 
 
 withdrawal of Spain and Great Britain from .... 97 
 
 attitude of the United States as to 98-107 
 
 MONROE DOCTRINE, 
 
 what it is 4 
 
 events leading to publication of 7 
 
 first hint of 13 
 
 enunciation of 12-21 
 
 resolutions as to .... 21, 56, 57, 102, 115, 123, note 1 
 
 fails of legislative confirmation 21 
 
 Occasions of its application, 
 
 Panama Congress 23-36 
 
 Yucatan 37-42 
 
 interoceanic canal 43-76 
 
 Cuba 77-91 
 
 French intervention in Mexico 92-107 
 
 the Northwest and Canada 108-115 
 
 Texas 116, 117 
 
 Santa Domingo 117, 118 
 
 war of Spain with Peru and Chili 118-120 
 
 war of Chili with Peru and Bolivia 120, 121 
 
 arguments against 122-125 
 
 in favor of 125-132 
 
 MONROE, JAMES 
 
 (See Monroe Doctrine). 
 MOSQUITO INDIANS, 
 differences over 46, 47, 52-54 
 
 NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY, 
 disputed claims to 12, 13, 37, 108-113 
 
 OSTEND MANIFESTO, 
 what it was 89,90 
 
INDEX. 137 
 
 Pages 
 PANAMA CONGRESS, 
 
 what it was 25, 35 
 
 PIERCE, PRESIDENT, 
 
 directions of, as to purchase of Cuba 89, 90 
 
 PLUMER, WILLIAM, 
 
 extract from diary of 21, 22 
 
 POINSETT, J. R., 
 
 resolution of 21 
 
 instructions of, from Mr. Clay 25 
 
 POLK, PRESIDENT, 
 
 views of, upon Monroe Doctrine 37-39 
 
 proposition of, as to Cuba 81 
 
 RUSH, RICHARD, 
 part taken by, in Monroe Doctrine . . . . 9, 10, 12, 14 
 
 RUSSELL, LORD JOHN, 
 
 views of, upon Monroe Doctrine 20 
 
 communication of, upon Cuba 88 
 
 SERGEANT, JOHN, 
 
 envoy to Panama Congress 27, 32, 34 
 
 SEWARD, WILLIAM H., 
 
 attitude of, as to French intervention 98, 100, 101, 103-105, 
 
 128, 129, 131 
 
 TAYLOR, PRESIDENT, 
 
 appointment of diplomatic agent by 47 
 
 TREATIES, 
 
 Holy Alliance 6 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle 6 
 
 Troppau 6 
 
 Verona 7 
 
 United States with^ Great Britain, Nov. 30, 1782 ... 1 
 
 with New Granada 44 
 
 with Great Britain, June 15, 1846 . . 45, 110 
 
 with Mexico 45 
 
 with Great Britain, April 19, 1850 ... 48 
 
 with Nicaragua 54 
 
138 INDEX. 
 
 Pases 
 TREATIES, — continued. 
 
 United States with Spain 109 
 
 with Great Britain, Oct. 20, 1818 ... 109 
 
 with Russia 113 
 
 Great Britain with Guatemala 53 
 
 with Honduras 53 
 
 with Nicaragua 53 
 
 with France and Spain 96 
 
 with Spain 108 
 
 with Russia 113 
 
 South American Republics with Spain 119 
 
 treaty of Paris, March, 1856 74-76 
 
 of Chili with the Argentine Republic . . . 120 u. 
 Treaties not ratified. 
 
 United States with Nicaragua 44, 45, 47 
 
 with Great Britain, Oct. 17, 1856 . . 52 
 
 with Nicaragua 76 n. 
 
 with France and Great Britain . . 83, 84 
 
 with Spain 91 
 
 TRIPARTITE ARRANGEMENT, 
 text of 83,84 
 
 WARS, 
 
 of whites and Indians in Yucatan 36, 42 
 
 of Nicaraguans and Mosquito Indians 46, 47 
 
 of French and Mexicans 97-107 
 
 of Spain with Peru and Chili 118-120 
 
 of Chili with Peru and Bolivia 120, 121 
 
 WASHINGTON, 
 views of, upon intervention in foreign affairs 2-4, 30, 126, 130 
 
 WEBSTER, DANIEL, 
 
 approval of Monroe Doctrine by 32, 33 
 
 views of, as to Cuba ^ . . . . . 80 
 
 WILSON, HENRY, 
 
 views of, upon Clayton-Bulwer treaty 74 
 
 upon Monroe Doctrine 123 
 
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