:.NRLF 
 
DEC 29 
 
 tZDtie Wini\itvsiitp of Chicago 
 
 STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY 
 OF LANGUAGE 
 
 I. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SAMENESS OF SPEECH 
 
 SOUNDS 
 
 II. THE FUNCTION OF IMITATION IN SPEAKING 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY ;4lV£^^ 1/ 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 
 Karl Friedrich Muenzinger 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed by 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 1918 
 
C{)e Wini\ittsiitp of Cfitcaso 
 
 STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY 
 OF LANGUAGE 
 
 I. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SAMENESS OF SPEECH 
 
 SOUNDS 
 
 II. THE FUNCTION OF IMITATION IN SPEAKING 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
 
 OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE 
 
 IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY 
 
 BY 
 
 Karl Friedrich Muenzinger 
 
 Private Edition, Distributed by 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES 
 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 1918 
 
Note : I wish to express my gratitude to my teachers, Dean J. R. Angell, Professor 
 G. H. Mead, Professor E. Prokosch, Professor F. A. Wood, and especially to Professor 
 C. D. Buck for their assistance and guidance in the preparation of these studies. To 
 the latter I owe above all a scientific introduction to the complexity of the problems 
 of sound change, two of which are approached here from a psychological point of view. 
 
 K. F. M. 
 
 June, 1918. 
 
A. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SAMENESS OF 
 SPEECH SOUNDS 
 
 
 The articulation of a speaking person produces certain acoustic 
 phenomena, a 'speech continuum,' of which we may get an objective 
 record on a phonograph or grammophone. If we examine an enlarged 
 transcription of such a record^ we are surprised to find how the 
 smallest elements vary continually, how their characteristics change 
 by a gradual shading into each other, and how impossible it seems 
 at first to mark off larger units representing what we call sounds and 
 words. And yet a person hearing a speech continuum will have no 
 difficulty in distinguishing sounds and words, provided the speaker 
 belongs to the same speech community. We must suppose that the 
 stimulation produced at the auditory receptor, the ear, corresponds 
 closely to the speech continuum. How is it then that what the 
 hearer perceives is not a sound continuum, but sounds and words? 
 
 A 'perception' we are ususally informed is a compound of an im- 
 mediate stimulation plus some past experience. Such a definition, 
 however, does not do justice to the 'meaning' of a perception, or 
 in other words to its function as a part of a larger psychic process. 
 What is necessary to admit in the definition of perception beside 
 the reference to the past is a reference to the future. This is con- 
 tained in Professor Mead's conclusion that "percepts .... are 
 compounds of the experience of immediate stimulation and the im- 
 agery of response to which the stimulation will lead. The object can 
 be properly stated in terms of conduct."^ That is, to illustrate, the 
 pencil here by my side is never a mere pencil; it is usually a pencil 
 to write with, but it may also be an object to keep a certain place in 
 a book, or various other instruments which the situation calls for. 
 This functioning of the "imagery of the response to which the stimu- 
 lation will lead" is determined, so it seems to me, by the present 
 conscious attitude. Not any random past experience may merge 
 
 * Scripture, E. W., Elements of Experimental Phonetics, Plate I; cp. also Muen- 
 zinger, K. F., A New Apparatus for the Enlargement of Phonographic Records, Bull. 
 Univ. Texas, 1915, No. 24, Plates II and III. 
 
 * Mead, G. H., Jour. Phil. Psych, and Sc. Meth., X, 401. 
 
 1 
 
2.\ : : .; •*; .S.xudje&in t-he Psychology of Language 
 
 with the sensation, but whatever is selected must fit somehow into 
 the present situation and its bearing upon the future. In order to 
 bring out this relation to the future more clearly, one ought to speak 
 of the direction of an attitude. 
 
 The problem becomes immensely compUcated if the percept is an 
 element of a larger process, where it is partly merged with the sur- 
 rounding elements, and where the process is perceived as a unit and 
 in return leads to a response of similar complexity, as is the case in the 
 conversation of two persons. And yet it seems to me that Professor 
 Mead's interpretation must and can still be applied to the elements 
 of the process. We must conceive of the total response to a social 
 situation as prepared by and composed of a number of minor re- 
 sponses that are all merged in that total response which alone stands 
 out with a distinct unity. 
 
 Let us suppose that in a conversation one sentence uttered by one 
 person calls out a response by another also in the form of a sentence. 
 The process going on in this second person must represent something 
 like this. The attitude created by perceiving the first sentence is 
 what we usually call the meaning or the contents of the sentence. 
 This attitude is modified by other processes going on in the listener's 
 consciousness, imagery of past experience, present stimulation other 
 than those speech sounds, and finally the social situation thus 
 created leads to the response of uttering another sentence. What 
 is commonly termed an "expression of thinking" is in terms of conduct 
 a response to a social situation. Just before the utterance takes 
 place the attitude represents what Wundt calls the Gesamtvorstellung, 
 whose elements are to appear in the following analytic-synthetic 
 process of speaking. The perception of the words and sounds while 
 hearing the sentence is a process secondary in importance to the 
 process of perceiving the meaning. This is sometimes expressed by 
 stating that our attention is primarily directed towards the meaning 
 of a sentence. 
 
 The hearer listening as the speaker produces the speech continuum 
 by his articulation could at any moment reproduce most of the words 
 he had heard so far, although the sentence stimulates him as a unit. 
 And yet the perception of the words is not the primary object of the 
 process of listening; it is the meaning of the sentence which is to be 
 received. This meaning is synthesized through whatever the words 
 impart. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 3 
 
 The fact that the speech continuum is split up, so to speak, into 
 words is on the one hand due to that past experience which had 
 a similar sound sequence as a unit of stimulation followed by, or 
 rather determine by, a unit of response. This is exemplified by 
 listening to utterances in a foreign tongue in which one has only a 
 limited vocabulary. It is often impossible then to say how many 
 words one has heard, on account of the unfamiliarity of certain 
 sound combinations. On the other hand the analysis is also due to 
 the direction of the attitude, or the 'context' here, which selects 
 with reference to the future. Our punsters make use of the excep- 
 tional situations where the attitude may have two possible directions. 
 
 The uncertainty that sometimes exists as to whether we shall 
 write an expression as German zustandekommen in one, two {zustande 
 kommen), or three words {zu stande kommen) does not disprove the 
 existence of separate words, but rather adds some value to our 
 principle.^ The entire expression zustandekommen answers to one dis- 
 tinct meaning, i.e., calls out a single response. Since the parts stande, 
 zu, and kommen have also appeared time and again as separate and 
 distinct bearers of meaning, they have some independence which 
 expresses itself in the uncertainty of the convention of writing. The 
 units of responses next to the sentence are the phrases, and these 
 again contain the words as smaller units. The degree of independence 
 of the smaller units is not a fixed quantity, but varies according to 
 the context and sentence accent. The adjective blue is more indepen- 
 dent in the phrases a blue dress, a blue sky than in a bliiebird, or a 
 blue print, whether convention makes us write the latter in three 
 words or in two, a blueprint. 
 
 Considered as a sound experience the word appears to be the same 
 under different circumstances, i.e., at different times, in different 
 sentences, or if spoken by different persons. This means, expressed 
 in term of conduct, that our reaction to it as far as its physical 
 nature is concerned, its phonetic material, is the same, since it is the 
 reaction which determines the perception. Compared objectively, 
 the parts of the speech continuum which we mark oflf as representing 
 the 'same' words are sometimes quite varied in appearance, but in 
 our consciousness they are the same inasmuch as they have a func- 
 tional identity. The problems which arise in regard to these phenom- 
 
 ' Bloomfield, L., Trans. Am. Phil. Ass., XLV, 66. 
 
4 Studies in the Psychology or Language 
 
 ena are similar in the case of speech sounds. They will be more 
 properly treated in that connection. 
 
 The splitting up of a part of the speech continuum proceeds, of 
 course, without any distinct presence of past imagery of a similar 
 sound combination. This is fused with the sensation and does not 
 appear separately, at least not in the act of hearing. 
 
 Besides the word as a sound experience we have also its function 
 as the bearer of a meaning. This meaning is determined by past 
 responses to the word, which have been of a varied nature. The 
 particular response needed here is selected by the present situation, 
 i.e., the part of the sentence already elapsed with its synthesized atti- 
 tude pointing in a certain direction. The partially evolved meaning 
 of a part of a sentence determines the meaning of the word, and this 
 in turn modifies the direction of the attitude. Duerr, in speaking of 
 the word, calls it a formula to be filled in by the sentence. 
 
 This attitude in the process of synthesis during the listening to a 
 sentence is of an active type which is always ahead of the modifying 
 elements of the moment. In a general way the contents of the sen- 
 tence is vaguely constructed before the listener has heard the end. 
 The attitude runs along the well known schema of the sentence and 
 produces a predisposition (Einstellung) for each word or phrase to 
 follow. It seems to happen very frequently also that words or parts 
 of words are not presented as actual sensations, but are supplied from 
 past experience entirely. At any rate the auditory sensation does not 
 pass through the center of consioucness as a continual sound exper- 
 ience of constant broadness, but it supplies only a number of 'cues' 
 that are woven into a whole. The space between cues may then 
 be entirely lacking or be present only in a dim way. Again, all this 
 is implied by saying that our attention is directed towards the mean- 
 ing. 
 
 Under ordinary circumstances the word functions in the way just 
 described. But it may itself also become the object of attention. 
 This brings it outside the process of speech and makes it a part of 
 the physical world. 
 
 The synthesis of the attitude which finally appears as the meaning 
 of the sentence is dependent entirely on habits. The quick succession 
 of the words, their fleeting character as perceptions, would hardly 
 allow them to function as they do if they were not parts of a chain 
 of highly mechanized acts. The ability to think stands in direct 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 5 
 
 relation to the amount of mechanized language processes one pos- 
 sesses. 
 
 Up to a certain point the problem of the perception of speech sounds 
 is similar to that of the word. Within the speech continuum which 
 gives rise to a word smaller elements are again split off. This depends 
 here as there on the past experience in which a sound as such has been 
 a unit of stimulation, i.e., where it has been responded to as such. 
 
 Inasmuch as the perception of a speech sound depends upon the 
 response to the stimulation it is not surprising to find that the 
 acoustic phenomena which at various occasions lead to the perception 
 of the 'same' sound are in fact never quite alike. Let us go back one 
 more step and look at the articulations producing the sound waves. 
 They belong to the most deeply ingrained habits of the human being. 
 Not only have we the habitual movements of one particular set of 
 muscles in order to produce a certain sound, but we also have the 
 correlation of the action of several muscular systems, such as those 
 of the vocal organs proper (lips, jaws, tongue, velum, larynx), of the 
 chest, and of a large region of the trunk. Furthermore the transition 
 from one articulation to another requires some special movements, as 
 any one can see for himself if he tries to pronounce a sound sequence 
 that does not occur elsewhere in the language he speaks.'' This com- 
 plicated mechanism does not work machine-like; it does not produce 
 the same results under all circumstances. Habitual movements under 
 similar circumstances attain only a certain degree of exactness. They 
 are hardly ever identical from act to act. In a certain sense the 
 articulation is the resonance of the tonic condition of the body and 
 of the emotional character of consciousness. More than that, the 
 surrounding articulations leave their trace or show their effect 
 before they are actually performed, e.g., a yfeis articulated at different 
 places of the roof of the mouth accordingly as it is followed by an 
 a, e, or o. Still another reason for variation in articulation is the 
 difference of the speech apparatus between persons; compare only the 
 extreme differences between a child and an adult, a man and a woman. 
 
 In speaking of these fluctuations as far as they pertain to one speak- 
 ing individual the term 'zone of variations' has sometimes been used.^ 
 
 * Sievers, E., Grimdzuge der Phonetik.^ 
 
 * Sievers, E., op. cit., 272; cp. also Passy, P. E., fyude surles changements phonitiques, 
 40; Paul, H., Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,* 54; Wundt, W., Volker psychologic,^ I, 
 387; Oertel, H., Lectures on the Study of Language, 104. 
 
6 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 It would be better, it seems to me, to extend the term so as to include 
 also the articulations of individuals of the same community, because 
 it is not any objective condition of the physical world that creates 
 the zone of variations, but a psychic activity that holds together 
 sounds of various quahties and recognizes them as 'belonging to the 
 same type' even if spoken by different persons. 
 
 The social situation where one sentence as a stimulus calls out 
 another sentence as response, the 'expression of thinking,' must be 
 supposed to exist in a secondary way already in the act of listening. 
 That is, the understanding of a spoken sentence implies already an 
 organized set of responses. It must be borne in mind that the atten- 
 tion is turned towards the attitude which will finally produce the 
 answer, so that the motor responses play a less prominent part in 
 consciousness. These do not stand out as separate processes, but are 
 merged in the synthetic process leading up to the Gesamtvorstellung. 
 But the fact that they are not analyzed distinctly in the stream of 
 consciousness does not mean that they are not present. They must be 
 present, because their effect is felt in shaping the attitude of under- 
 standing. Thus the analysis of the field of stimulation represented by 
 the speech continuum into words and sounds does not exist as so many 
 separate acts, and yet it is there, because the change of one sound 
 (Cp. English hat: had; hat: hot) or the addition of a sound like the 
 inflectional 5 changes the 'meaning.' This reservation must not be 
 forgotten in a discussion of this kind, lest one commit the well known 
 'stimulus error.' 
 
 A certain sound experience will be accepted by consiousness as the 
 'same' whether that sound appears in different words, or is pronounced 
 with more or less force, or in a higher or lower pitch, or even by differ- 
 ent persons, although, as I have pointed out, it will objectively be 
 different in all these cases. The sound a as in father is the 'same' 
 whether pronounced by my sister or brother, whether spoken with a 
 loud or soft voice, in joy or in sadness. The 'consciousness of same- 
 ness' as regards such a sound is then distinctly a psychic creation 
 in which certain kinds of objective differences are ignored. In terms 
 of behavior we have an identity of reaction in each case. If we were 
 to say that the sound is recognized as 'belonging to a certain type,' 
 we should not state the facts quite accurately. For it is primarily 
 not the past experience present in some typified imagery that creates 
 the 'consciousness of sameness,' but the response itself, or the 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 7 
 
 attitude of response, depending on the function of the sound. Wher- 
 ever slightly different phonetic elements have a functional identity 
 there is the tendency to produce identical responses. If we turn 
 back again in introspection upon such experience, we find a 'con- 
 sciousness of sameness,' which does not necessarily have to be pre- 
 sent at the time of the original hearing as a clearly distinct process. 
 
 It is a well known fact that out of the great variety of speech sounds 
 which are possible and are observed to exist in one language or an- 
 other, only a limited number are employed in any one language. 
 What is a common sound in one language may be wholly lacking in 
 another. Furthermore, the number of distinct sounds recognized 
 in a given language by accurate phonetic analysis is greater than the 
 number distinguished by the discrimination of the phonetically 
 untrained speaker, whether literate (in which case he may be strongly 
 biased by the visual image of the written form) or illiterate. 
 
 This selective simplicity of the phonetic system of a language 
 is also in accord with two general considerations. 
 
 On the one hand there is the general reason for the creation of 
 types in our conscious processes. In terms of conduct the type is a 
 stimulation which leads to uniform responses. A number of physical 
 objects are all tables to us on account of the similar response or 
 attitude to sit down before them or to put things upon them. This 
 'type,' or unified response, is alone active in consciousness if I hear 
 of 'a table.' The type plus some specific response will be called out 
 by 'the table.' In the first case individual traits are of no account, 
 i.e., they have no meaning, they are not needed. Thus it is with the 
 consciousness of sameness of speech sounds. All that is needed is a 
 number of unified responses or attitudes which go to make up the 
 perception of the word and finally of the sentence. A word will 
 therefore be the 'same' where and however it occurs, and the sounds 
 that compose it will be the 'same' in other words. 
 
 On the other hand there is an historical reason for the assumption 
 of the simplicity of phonetic systems, namely, the fact of sound 
 change. We know definitely that a sound change often comprises 
 the entire zone of variations, that the whole zone changes in a certain 
 direction, and that the individual sounds do not all fall a prey to the 
 surrounding influences of other sounds, but follow one direction. 
 And wherever a special condition is strong enough to cause a split 
 in the zone of variations, the new sound usually falls together with 
 one represented by another zone. 
 
8 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 From the point of view of an associational psychology it is the 
 association of slightly different sounds that holds together the zone 
 of variations, so that the individual sounds do not fall out of line 
 through assimulating influences. Wundt says: ^^Wirken die Laut- 
 kontakte differenzierend, . ... so wirken umgekehrt die Lautassozia- 
 tionen uniformierend, indem sie solchen Lautgruppen und Einzel- 
 lauten, die durch hdufigen Gebrauch in hoherem Mass eingeiibt sind, 
 mehr und mehr das Ubergewicht verschaffen iiber andere, seltenere.''^ 
 The criticism as regards such a view is a general one: The principle 
 of association does not explain the process as yet; the principle 
 itself must be accounted for.'' 
 
 There is another fact which shows that the sound possesses some 
 independence: The possibility of such 'mistakes' which in philology 
 are called metathesis, dissimilation, and distant assimilation of 
 sounds. Compare Old English waxan from wascan, Latin celebrum 
 for cerebrum, cocodrillus for crocodillus, Italian grolioso for glorioso. 
 
 In contrast to the consciousness of sameness just described, there 
 also exists a consciousness of difference of speech sounds. We hear 
 the 'same' sound to be sure under different conditions, but we are 
 also aware of its being different, or at least of its different import. 
 Referring to the instance given above, we are aware by whom the 
 sound a in a given word is pronounced and also in what mood it is 
 uttered. Actual variations as regards pitch, force, and quantity 
 may be partly analyzed as such in the field of stimulation, although 
 usually they are not, but variations in quality very rarely appear as 
 separable or distinguishable experiences. Looked at from the view- 
 point of import, those variations that play a part in forming the 
 understanding of the sentence are the ones that can be separated 
 in the field of stimulation. They are those characteristics which 
 represent the dynamic and chromatic accent. But the differences 
 which impart the mood of the speaker, his tonic bodily condition, his 
 personality itself, can as a rule not be analysed, There is danger 
 then of taking the term 'consciousness of difference' just as the term 
 'consciousness of sameness,' too literally, and against this we must 
 guard. Just as we found that in terms of conduct the perception of 
 similar sounds really means a functional identity and consequently 
 a similar response, so the difference in the perception of similar 
 
 * Wundt, W., op. cit., 532; cp. Karsten, G., Phonetische Studien, III, 8. 
 "> Mead, G. H., Psych. Bull, I, 380. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 9 
 
 sounds means in fact a functional difference and consequently a 
 difference in response. Two persons may pronounce a sound or a 
 sound combination, a word, in precisely the same manner, so that 
 they are seemingly 'the same' in both experiences of the hearer, and 
 yet each single experience also contains the reference to the speaker. 
 I can tell without analysis or reflection who it is that speaks in the 
 next room, my brother or my sister. Besides the various attitudes 
 called out by the stimulation of the utterance as already indicated 
 there is also present an attitude directed towards the speaker implying 
 his personality. Such an attitude can attain any degree of intensity, 
 from the actual perception of the speaker as a self to the very dim 
 awareness of his presence. Similarly it is with the other imports 
 of the consciousness of difference. Objectively considered, the 
 variations caused by the varying emotional states of the speaker's 
 consciousness may exist, but it depends on our response whether 
 and to what degree we shall be aware of them. 
 
 II 
 
 The existence of a unified response to a particular group of similar 
 speech sounds for which I have used the term 'consciousness of same- 
 ness, is of considerable importance in regard to the problem of uniform 
 sound change.* 
 
 This dogma of uniform change is now about 40 years old. Long 
 before the seventies of the last centruy the fact of great regularity 
 in many sound changes had been recognized. Thus Grimm had found 
 that Indo-European surd stops are replaced in Germanic languages 
 by spirants (compare Latin pater: English /a^/fer, Latin tres: English 
 three, Latin cornii: English horn), and many other sweeping changes 
 had been recognized and tabulated. More and more "phonetic laws ' 
 were discovered. But even those scholors who emphasized most 
 forcibly the importance of such laws did not hesitate to assume casual 
 exceptions; and it was not until 1876 that Leskien stated that 
 "language is not a fit subject for scientific investigation" if we 
 allowed the "exceptions" to stand beside the "regularity of sound 
 laws." If we find that a sound change is not what it ought to be 
 according to the "sound law" then we must account for its occurrence 
 
 ^ For a history of the dogma see Wechssler, E., debt es Lautgesetze? , 77 ff. with 
 full bibliography; also Oertel, H., op. cit., 258. 
 
10 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 instead of regarding it as a matter of chance.^ The following ten 
 years saw one of the most violent battles ever fought in any science. 
 The philologists were separated into two clearly distinct camps. 
 Along with Leskien, the "Junggrammatiker," among whom were 
 Brugmann, Osthoff, Paul, Delbrueck, and Sievers, defended the dogma 
 that in a given dialect and period all phonetic laws work without 
 exceptions, unless they are counteracted by other forces such as 
 analogy. Against these stood another group of eminent linguists, 
 among whom were Curtius, Whitney, Easton, Schuchardt, Bezzen- 
 berger, Collitz, Tobler, and Jespersen, who maintained that an abso- 
 lute uniformity was inconceivable, because speech as a psychical 
 process could not be expected to be subject to laws similar to those 
 of the physical world, since the conditions were all too varied and 
 unanalyzable. 
 
 Present linguistic science recognizes a measure of truth and value 
 in both positions and tends towards less dogmatism in theory but 
 greater strictness in practice. On the one hand the uncompromising 
 assertion of uniformity served to discredit the loose assumption of 
 casual exceptions, and led in countless specific cases to a satisfactory 
 explanation of apparent exceptions. Futhermore, it is universally 
 admitted that a great proportion of phonetic changes exhibit uni- 
 formity under like conditions which are capable of formulation; that 
 is, not merely under absolutely identical conditions the insistence 
 in which would make any formulation impractical, but under ap- 
 proximately like conditions in which minor differences may be ignored 
 like the remoter decimals in a mathematical calculation. Again the 
 principle of causality finally led to attempts not only to account for 
 the 'exceptions,' but also for the 'laws' themselves. On the other 
 hand the insistence on the fact that variations do exist in great num- 
 bers as shown in our everyday speech, has opened the eyes of the 
 linguist to the complexity of conditions that accompany sound 
 production and sound change. Besides the relatively simple factors 
 which the supporters of the dogma had in mind at first as determining 
 like and unlike conditions (surrounding sounds, accent, etc.) there 
 are many others which, while often practically negligible, must also 
 be reckoned with. It has also paved the way for a clear distinction 
 between variations of sounds in any direction due to momentary 
 
 * Leskien, A., Die Deklination im Slavisch-Lilauischen und Germanischen, p. xxviii. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 11 
 
 conditions, as emotional or bodily states, and changes of sounds 
 arising out of persistent variations in one direction due to phonetic 
 tendencies. 
 
 As a result of adverse criticism we now find such carefully worded 
 statements as that of Paul : ''Wenn wir daher von konsequenter Wirkung 
 der Lautgesetze reden, so kann das nur heissen, dass bei dem Laut- 
 wandel inner halt desselbe^i Dialektes alle einzelnen Fdlle, in denen die 
 gleichen lautlichen Bedingungen vorliegen, gleichmdssig behandelt 
 
 werden Man muss dabei natiirlich sdmtliche Momente der Laut- 
 
 erzeugung inhetracht Ziehen. Namentlich muss man auch das Wort 
 nickt isoliert, sondern nach seiner Stellung innerhalb des Satzgefuges 
 betrachten. Erst dann ist es moglich die Konsequenz der Lautgesetze zu 
 erkennen.^'^^ In theory there seems to be no objection to such a 
 principle, but the study of any living dialect shows that there are 
 very few cases of 'like conditions.' A careful observer like Weigand 
 for instance denies them entirely.^^ The lack of uniformity in a given 
 dialect has also been shown by Gauchat^^ who has given us the most 
 interesting dialect study we have and whose results are in striking 
 contrast to those of Rousselot.^^ And even if we should agree with 
 Paul's assertion (arrived at by a logical process carried too far) that 
 "we must distinguish as many languages as there are individuals"^* 
 there would still be the different social situations which cause the 
 individual to speak differently at times as well as his own changing 
 bodily and mental states. Our 'consciousness of difference' is a 
 sufficient indication of ever changing conditions in speaking. 
 
 Imitation has been recognized as the most potent factor that works 
 towards uniformity in the group though one particular type of 
 imitation may disturb uniformity. Its mechansim will be analyzed 
 in the second of these studies. That consciousness of sameness 
 functions in a similar way in regard to the speech of one individual 
 will be shown in the following pages. From the point of view of con- 
 
 " Paul, H., op. cit., 69. 
 
 " Weigand, G., Linguistischer Atlas des dako-rumanischen Sprachgebietes, 19. 
 ^^ Gauchat, L., L'unite phonetique dans la patois d'une commune in Festschrift fiir 
 Morf, 175. 
 
 *^ Rousselot, J., Les modifications phonetiqites du langage — etudiees dans la patois 
 d'une famille de Cellefrouin. Ret. des patois Gallo-Rom., IV, 65; V, 412 ff. 
 " Paul, H., op. cit., 37. 
 
12 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 duct both processes are somewhat alike in so far as they rest upon 
 identity of responses. 
 
 Ill 
 In order to prove the possibihty of uniform change of a sound in 
 all words of the language of an individual, Brugmann and Paul 
 argue that it must be the motor image of a single sound that changes 
 and not that of a word: ^^Das Bewegungsgefiihl bildet sich ja nicht 
 fiir jedes einzelne Wort besonders, sondern iiberall, wo in der Rede die 
 gleichen Elemente wiederkehren, wird ihre Erzeugung durch das gleiche 
 Bewegungsgefiihl geregeli."^^ This opinion is supported by the fact 
 that whenever a child is able to pronounce a new sound it will use 
 it in all the words where its own small community uses it. Meringer 
 ventures a flat contradiction: "Ich halte das einfach fur falsch. Die 
 Aussprache wird in der Tat fiir jedes einzelne Wort besonders gelernt, 
 was man gleich sehen wird, wenn man beobachtet, wie vorsichtig tastend 
 wir oft ungewohnliche Worter sprechen. Diese werden wirklich buch- 
 stabierend hervorgebracht, aber geldufiges Reden ware wohl ohne die 
 Worts prechbilder unmoglich."'^^ This argument refers only to such 
 'unusual words' which contain unfamiliar sound combinations. 
 It overlooks the fact that not only the articulation of a sound is 
 based on habits, but also its joining to the preceding and following 
 sounds. We can pronounce without difficulty or hesitation new words, 
 e.g., proper names, as long as they contain besides famihar sounds 
 also familiar sound sequences. It is for the absence of these latter 
 that foreign names are often difficult and that we proceed hesitatingly 
 in trying to pronounce them. 
 
 A necessary sequence to the theory that the word changes as a unit 
 would be that a sound change must be transferred from one word to 
 another in order to become uniform. This is Weigand's position who 
 bases his statement "Die Lautverdnderungen gehen von einzelnen 
 Wdrtern aus^'' upon a multitude of observations in modern Roumanian 
 dialects. Gauchat^* observes the change of a certain sound in some 
 words and not in others in the case of the same individual, and in 
 more words in the speech of some individuals (usually the younger) 
 
 « Ibid., 69. 
 
 " Meringer, R., und Mayer, K., Versprechen und Verlesen, 7; cp. Wechssler, E., 
 op. cit., 22. 
 
 17 Weigand, G., op. cit., 37. 
 " Gauchat, L., op. cit., 205. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 13 
 
 than in others. TarbelP^ and Whitney^" cite the New England 
 shortening of the long o in whole, stone, etc., which occurs only in 
 certain words, varying in different communities. Wheeler referring 
 to this change-^ expresses the opinion that all "ultimate uniformity" 
 is brought about in this way. According to him the difference be- 
 tween a new and an old pronunciation of one sound in one word is 
 carried over to the same sound in other words; this is "the compelling 
 force".! confess I cannot see a "compelling force" in the mere difference 
 between two pronunciations even if one were felt as new and the other 
 as old. There may be an uncertainty in regard to the choice of either 
 pronunciation, but then an additional cause would be needed to fix 
 one or the other of the alternatives. 
 
 It seems to me that this issue of sound or word change is not a 
 real one. Judging from different sets of facts each side is correct in 
 part, but neither could prove its point entirely. For it is not at all 
 a question of either-or, whether we speak on the basis of motor 
 images of sounds or of words. The fact is, we have and use both. 
 Furthermore, the articulation of a single sound consists in the co- 
 ordination of a number of muscular systems. If Paul's reasoning 
 is correct, it ought to apply to the elements of such a coordination 
 as well, which indeed it seems to do when we find that in a language 
 all voiced stops irrespective of their place of articulation are shifted 
 to voiceless stops. The function of a motor image of a sound is not so 
 very different from that of a word. Both contain highly complex 
 coordinations, the word more so than the sound, so that we may 
 regard both from the point of view of the execution of habitual 
 movements as similar actions, but of a different order. 
 
 Opinions of this kind are sometimes coupled with a rather too- 
 mechanical interpretation of the relation of habitual movements, 
 to their corresponding images. It is no doubt correctly supposed that 
 a certain neural disposition, a diathesis as Oertal calls it," lies at 
 the bottom of such a movement and it is further implied that a stim- 
 ulation of the diathesis always creates the same movement as a 
 mould can impress but one form. A movement as well as a sensation 
 is modified by past imagery and the present 'situation.' For this 
 
 " Tarbell, F. B., Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc, 1886, p. 5. 
 " Whitney, W. D., Indogerm. Forsch., IV, 32. 
 " Wheeler, B. J., Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc, 1901, 14. 
 ^ Oertel, H., op. ciL, 102. 
 
14 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 reason it is ever varying. Furthermore it exhibits a constant variation 
 according to specific surrounding movements, as is the case in 
 sound articulations of a fixed sequence. How it is that in spite of 
 these modifying influences similar sounds are kept together so to 
 speak to develop all along a definite line or to remain stationary 
 will be shown in the following pages as being due to the consciousness 
 of sameness (or functional identity) of speech sounds. 
 
 For our purposes all gradual phonetic changes may be grouped 
 into three classes: 
 
 First, we have the case of a uniform sound shift that affects a 
 certain sound in all words and under nearly all conditions as for 
 instance the shift of Indo-European p to Germanic/. These we may 
 call generic changes. Cases of uniform shifts under all possible con- 
 ditions are extremely rare. 
 
 Secondly, a sound under special conditions may be diverted from 
 the type to which it belongs, a process which we may call a singular 
 change. If this type happens to be changing, the sound may show either 
 a retardation or an acceleration of the change in a number of words 
 where a special condition exists, as the Indo-European p remained 
 a /> if a spirant preceded, or it was shifted not only to /, but also to 
 V if it happened to be the the final of an unaccented syllable. If the 
 type happens to be stationary, the diversion from type can of course 
 happen in only one way, namely, that a sound is changed under a 
 special condition while similar sounds under other conditions remain. 
 These two classes of changes have usually been called 'spontaneous' 
 and 'conditioned,' terms which reflect the argumentation as regards 
 the invariability of phonetic laws. Generally one of the 'conditions' 
 of a change of the second class was easily recognized, as in the case 
 of the stationary sp the preceding spirant, but did this mean that 
 a change of the first class, as that of p to /, was unconditioned? 
 Delbriick remarks truly: "Es ist anzunehmen, dass bei fortschreitender 
 Erkenntnis sich fiir uns das Gehiet des bedingten Lautwandels gegeniiber 
 dem unbedingten immer mehr erweitern wird."^^ 
 
 Thirdly, a sound may change only in one word or in a number of 
 words of a particular class and remain stationary elsewhere even 
 where similar phonetic conditions seem to exist. This has often been 
 termed a sporadic change, though at one time owing to the too free 
 
 ^ Delbriick, B., Einleitung in das Studiutn der indogermanischen Sprachen, 150. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 15 
 
 assumption of "sporadic changes" the term fell into discredit. Most 
 (not all) examples of metathesis, distance association and dissociation 
 are of this character, likewise changes in words of special use, as in 
 greetings or auxiliaries. 
 
 I have stated before that the historical material which gives us 
 numerous cases of changes, namely generic changes of sounds or 
 rather zones of variations under nearly all conditions, is one of the 
 reasons for the assumption of a consciousness of sameness. It now 
 remains to show the way in which this consciousness of sameness 
 must be supposed to function in regard to phonetic change. 
 
 What is presented in consciousness as a single sound includes in 
 fact a number of different phonetic elements. A sound then repre- 
 sents a zone and not a point, a sound change a band and not a line. 
 Generally speaking the usually unanalyzed differences giving rise 
 to responses termed the 'consciousness of difference,' (see above, p. 8) 
 do not take part in a change; they are contained alike in the two zones 
 at the beginning and end of a change, where beginning and end very 
 often mean in a continuous process of shifting only two stages which 
 happened to become reflected in the written documents of the periods. 
 It is exactly that group of variations in quality which is of 'no account' 
 and is therefore responded to by a unified reaction that takes part 
 in the shift. At the same time the identity of function remains stable; 
 we must suppose it to be at the final stage of the shift what it was at 
 the initial, for the same sound occupies in both instances the same 
 positions in the different words. (Cp. English'/Mn' : German 'Jiinn'; 
 English 'fa/Aom': German 'Fac?en.') In other words, the consciousness 
 of sameness is stationary while its actual content is being shifted. 
 
 This fact is referred to by linguists when they state that gradual 
 phonetic change goes on 'unnoticed' by the speakers. The explanation 
 of this phenomenon is supposed to lie in the direction of attention. 
 This is not entirely correct, if attention be taken with its usual conno- 
 tation, for I can Hsten intently to every sound of the speaker and yet 
 fail to notice any differences. It is the direction of the response called 
 out by the speech sounds that creates the consciousness of sameness. 
 The listener is not concerned with the speech sounds as physical 
 phenomena or objects, but about their meaning, the attitude which 
 the utterance of the speaker is about to create. Attention must be 
 identified with the direction of the response; the analogy of the field 
 
16 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 and its focus is misleading, or at least, while appropriate for 'content' 
 of consciousness, it is insufl6cient in regard to its processes. 
 
 The zone of variations of a speech sound, as far as only its quality 
 is concerned, is the result of two groups of influences, the momentary 
 conditions such as emotional and physical states, and the phonetic 
 tendencies. Of these there are in the first place those particular ten- 
 dencies which are characteristic of a language and which produce 
 generic changes. In the second place there are the universal tendencies 
 whose effects can be seen in many widely scattered languages, and 
 they tend to produce those singular changes in a limited number 
 of words, of which the assimilations are the most characteristic 
 ones. 
 
 Usually one is satisfied to 'explain' an assimilation by referring 
 to the special condition which existed in the word before the change 
 had taken place. Perhaps it is not the duty of philology to go further. 
 But a linguistic psychology must ask the question: Why does a 
 certain assimilation occur in one language and not in another, al- 
 though apparently the same phonetic conditions exist in both? For 
 instance, the sequence pt becomes in the Western Romance languages 
 U (Latin septem becomes in Italian sette, Spanish siette, Old French set) 
 while it remains pt in the Eastern languages (Roumanian sapte). It 
 generally remains unchanged in the Germanic languages (Cp. English 
 kept, German schnappte) except in isolated cases (The German 
 auxiliary hatte from Old High German hapta). 
 
 The fact is that not all the universal singular tendencies, although 
 existing in most languages, are able to divert the specially condi- 
 tioned sounds from their type or from the direction of the particular 
 dialectic shift, but that the generic tendencies are stronger so to 
 speak than the singular tendencies. Otherwise the historical material 
 would present a picture of similar changes in all dialects wherein 
 those corresponding to the generic changes would appear as 'except- 
 tions.' As it is, the generic changes are the most easily recognizable 
 traits of dialectic developments with the singular changes appearing 
 as exceptions to such a degree that they have been and still are some- 
 times so called. The question asked above should from this point 
 of view be formulated thus: Why does a generic change affect a 
 sound under all or most conditions; why are so few stragglers left on 
 the road or others to take a different path? What is the process by 
 which the zone of variations, as regards quality, is kept within certain 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 17 
 
 limits; why is it not more frequently split up into several zones, as 
 indeed we ought to expect it on the basis of the many existing singular 
 tendencies? 
 
 Consciousness of sameness implies in a negative way the absence 
 of awareness of any differences. It is sometimes quite remarkable 
 how sounds are perceived as the same which are in fact widely apart. 
 This appears especially in adapting one's self to a foreign language. 
 A German learning English will almost invariably use the same 
 initial combination / plus sh in 'germ' as well as in 'chamber'. In his 
 language only this combination exists; he does therefore neither 
 'hear' the g (d plus z as in 'azure'), nor is he able to pronounce it 
 until he is made to distinguish between the voiced and voiceless 
 character of the two, i.e., until his field of stimulation is analyzed to 
 a greater degree. 
 
 Under such circumstances it may very well be that the generic 
 and the singular tendencies, which I suppose to be active during the 
 adult life of the individual, actually cause a broadening of the zone 
 of variations in regard to quality. The results of the universal 
 singular tendencies which work under special conditions in a limited 
 number of words may actually be productive without the speaker's 
 noticing it. Sounds affected in this way still belong to the zone of 
 variations with which he once started his life's career as a speaking 
 being. The identity of function for these sounds remains the same 
 in his speech and consequently the consciousness of sameness in 
 regard to them. 
 
 For instance, if a generic tendency shifts the vowel e (as in 'bet') 
 towards a closer pronunciation in the direction of i (as in 'bit'), 
 it may well happen that a singular tendency works towards retaining 
 the e before an r on account of the hollow shape which the tongue 
 assumes in articulating this consonant. This actually happened in 
 Gothic, where the e was generally shifted to i (cp. Gothic hilpan: 
 help), while it remained an e before r (and Ji). At the beginning of 
 this shift we may assume that two qualitites of e, one closer than 
 the other, existed side by side unnoticed by the speakers. 
 
 The only possible way it seems to me where the consciousness 
 of sameness for a group of sounds might thus be broken up is in the 
 learning process, but this may also cause a giving up of differentia- 
 tions and consequently cause a narrowing of the zone of variations. 
 
18 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 It is a well observed fact that children do not learn all the sounds 
 of their mother tongue at once. Before they have attained complete 
 mastery in speaking they substitute for an unacquired sound the 
 one from among the acquired sounds which is nearest to it in acoustic 
 effect or place of articulation. Thus for / and th they may use only 
 /"; or instead of t and k they may use only t {free for three; tome for 
 come). As the process of adaptation is going on, thechild will substitute 
 each new sound as soon as it has learned it wherever it belongs, i.e., 
 wherever its function demands it according to the language of the 
 environment. A functional identity of / is thus eventually broken 
 up into two; / and th. 
 
 As soon as a new member is added to the sound system of the 
 learner, a number of unfamiliar sequences are created which have to 
 be mastered as well as the new sounds. This is a stage where the singular 
 tendencies produce their quickest results. Child language abounds 
 in assimilations. They seldom become strongly fixed by habits, but 
 appear rather sporadically. It is only in words of a special use that 
 they may be retained. In most words, usually in all, the assimilations 
 are by and by replaced by well mastered sound sequences, since the 
 identity of function insists on the putting in place of the new sound, 
 according to the model of the speech of the group. 
 
 It is important to note that such sequences are 'new' in the sense 
 that they have been acquired through a mechanical process by the 
 child himself and need not represent the variations of adult speech 
 produced by the singular tendencies after the learning process had 
 been finished. It seems possible then that singular changes occur in a 
 minute way constantly in the speech of adult individuals without 
 leading anywhere, because they are lost with them, while their 
 children start on a fresh course; in such a way the zone of variations 
 of a speech sound is narrowed by every new generation, because the 
 articulation of a new speech sound is introduced into the phonetic 
 material already existing as a type movement fresh from the mould, so 
 to speak, in every instance and is joined to the neighboring sounds 
 by movements that arise in a mechanical way. 
 
 It is to be supposed that the subsequent development of the child's 
 language may arrive at two different ends. On the one hand, his 
 number of speech sounds, i.e., zones of variations, may coincide 
 with that of the speech community of the adults about him and may 
 remain so. This means that the child has definitely accepted the 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 19 
 
 phonetic material as handed down to him at the stage to which the 
 tendencies had shifted it without allowing for the beginning of a new 
 movement in the direction of a singular change (Diagram I, column 2). 
 This must be the more universal case, since otherwise we should 
 experience singular changes more frequently. 
 
 On the other hand, the number of the zones of variations which 
 his consciousness of sameness distinguishes may not coincide with 
 that of his environment. That is, either two zones may have fallen 
 together, which, although closely touching each other, must still 
 have been separate in the speech of the older generations. (Note: 
 Cp. the falling together of the Indo-European hh and the specially 
 conditioned p at the end of an unaccented syllable in Germanic v) 
 Or a zone of variations may be broken up in two so that a sound is 
 diverted from the type to which it belonged and may now move into a 
 direction prescribed by special conditions. In such a case the ob- 
 jectively noticeable differences may be about the same in the speech 
 of the adult as in that of the child, but where there is one zone of 
 variations as regards the consciousness of sameness in the one, there 
 are two zones in the other (Diagram I, column 4). 
 
 For instance, a mother may pronounce the sound a with slight 
 variations according to what other sound follows. In the diagram 
 the small index figures are to indicate such variations. The child 
 may learn for all the different a's just one sound a. But it will soon 
 also develop the variations, because the singular tendencies remain 
 the same. But its child in turn, the third generation, may split up 
 the zone of consciousness in two so that it has substituted two sounds 
 for one. 
 
 DIAGRAM I 
 
 First Generation 
 
 Second Generation 
 
 Third Generation 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 Variations 
 
 Vowel heard 
 
 Variations 
 
 Vowels heard 
 
 Variations 
 
 produced 
 
 and attempted 
 
 produced 
 
 and attempted 
 
 produced 
 
 Op 
 
 a 
 
 flp 
 
 a 
 
 dp 
 
 a. 
 
 a 
 
 a. 
 
 a 
 
 a. 
 
 ah 
 
 a 
 
 ah 
 
 a 
 
 ah 
 
 ai 
 
 a 
 
 ai 
 
 d 
 
 di 
 
 Or 
 
 a 
 
 Or 
 
 a 
 
 dr 
 
 a„ 
 
 a 
 
 a«, 
 
 a 
 
 d„ 
 
20 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 Such a difference of sharper distinction may also exist in the case 
 of two persons of the same generation. At any rate, as soon as the 
 distinction is a general one in the majority of the group there is the 
 chance of the rapid development apart of the two sound qualities. 
 
 If the position which I have here taken is correct, then one part 
 of our question, namely, why is it that so few singular sound changes 
 occur despite the constant presence of singular tendencies, has been 
 answered. But the other part, why it is that singular changes occur 
 in one dialect and not in another, is still left without an answer. 
 And I do not see how the ultimate reason for this fact can be found 
 anywhere except in the racial characteristics of the peoples speaking 
 those dialects. My analysis has carried the problem only one step 
 farther back. I have found that where a singular change starts, 
 a zone of variations has been broken up. In place of a consciousness 
 of sameness for one sound, we now have one for two. The analysis of 
 the speech continuum has been more minute so that two types now 
 share the place of one before. But whence does this finer sense for 
 distinctions come? What racial trait does it indicate? 
 
 Sporadic changes are those that occur only in one word and not 
 in others although similar phonetic conditions may exist there. As 
 a rule it is only our incomplete analysis or knowledge which causes 
 us to suppose such a similarity. Often we overlook the additional 
 conditions of increase or decrease in tempo or energy of articulation 
 which are a constant accompaniment of such words and which do 
 not appear in the written documents. 
 
 But besides all possible variations of mechanical conditions, 
 there is a wholly different factor involved in changes characteristic 
 of certain classes of words. Greetings; exclamations of fear, wonder, 
 and joy; curses and benedictions; proper names — all these appear 
 to suffer more change than other words. Not infrequently it happens 
 that these same words if used as a part of a sentence retain their 
 regular form. As a greeting a speech community may use morn or 
 moin, while it pronounces the word as morning when used as a part 
 of a sentence. 
 
 The case is somewhat different with words which are sometimes 
 classed, rather vaguely, as particles, auxiliaries, etc. and which 
 Meillet groups together under the expressive term "mots accessoires" .^* 
 
 ^ Meillet, A., Introduction d I' etude comparative des langties Indo-Europeennes,* 13. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 21 
 
 Of such a word there may occur two forms determined largely 
 by the sentence accent, as Old High German nio-wiht and nicht 
 which have merged into Modern German nicht. 
 
 Common to both cases is that the phonetic type of a word has 
 been split in consequence of a separation of a particular attitude, 
 called out by a particular situation, from the group of all possible 
 attitudes. A word, as I have stated above, out of the range of mean- 
 ings determined by previous experience receives its particular meaning 
 through the context. Our response towards it is in part determined 
 by the responses to the surrounding words. Now if it happens that 
 it frequently stands alone or in a phrase as a single response to a 
 social situation (as a greeting), or if it appears frequently in the same 
 function in a sentence (as an auxiliary), the particular reaction called 
 out by it will become fixed as a definite experience and separated as a 
 different experience from the reactions which may ordinarily be 
 called out by it. The word then is no longer one, but two. Additional 
 conditions, such as accent, may then produce a result in one, and 
 not in the other. 
 
 A necessary preliminary to changes of this kind is a specialization 
 of meaning to such a degree that all or most other possible meanings 
 are excluded. To be sure, words do assume all possible shades of 
 special meanings in different situations, but those are processes 
 of momentary significance only. Such special shades of meanings 
 are accompanied by particular sound variations, which will not 
 lead to a change, however, because they counteract each other. 
 Only if one shade of meaning is singled out so that it becomes a 
 distinct habitual response, the sound variation peculiar to this 
 meaning may lead to a permanent change, because there are then no 
 other variations to counteract it. 
 
 It is not incorrect then to speak in such instances of the change of a 
 word in contrast to sound change, since the word as a whole has broken 
 away from the 'regular' development and follows its own particular 
 path. Strictly speaking, the sound changes it suffers are just as 
 'regular' as those of other words; only they occur under very singular 
 conditions. 
 
 In connection with these sporadic changes it would not be uninter- 
 esting to mention an older theory which tried to explain them as 
 caused by a too frequent use of the words. Friedrich Schlegel said 
 that a word might be smoothed off by much use and circulation 
 
22 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 just like a coin. Schuchardt holds the same view: "Sehr selten 
 gebrauchte W drier hleiben zurilck, sehr hdufig gebrauchte eilen voran."^'^ 
 Thus howdy would resemble the smooth nickel, as compared with 
 how do you do, the coin that has preserved its lettering nicely. Wechss- 
 ler's reply: "Wenn wir die Sachlage vom Standpunkte des Psychologen 
 beirachten, dann miissen im Gegenteil oft gebrauchte Worter ah Erinner- 
 ungsvorstellungen oder Geddchtnisresiduen umso fester geworden sein^'^^^ 
 is not quite to the point, because we might also say that much re- 
 peated articulations afford the singular tendencies a better chance 
 to differentiate the sounds. Frequency is a factor in these changes, 
 but not the only one, nor the important one. Frequency of a particular 
 response may separate it from other similar responses, i.e., one 
 particular shade of meaning from the rest, whereupon we may have 
 a 'sporadic' sound change. Mere frequency of the word in all its 
 shades of meaning could not produce such a change on account of the 
 counteracting influence of the varying conditions. 
 
 One particular fact in regard to these words must not be lost sight 
 of. Greetings, curses, and other expressions or words that are used 
 with a restriction to one meaning are the objects of the creative 
 powers of the speaker more often than other words. Thus a form like 
 darned may be due to a special dissimilation of the nasals in damned, 
 but it may also have been created at one time on the spur of the mo- 
 ment. 
 
 Summary: 
 
 1. The word as well as the speech sound has a distinct psychological 
 existence, although the (minor) responses called out by them are 
 fused in the (total) response called out by hearing the entire sentence. 
 
 2. The identity of function of a given speech sound under different 
 conditions gives rise to like responses and consequently to a conscious- 
 ness of sameness of that sound. Or in other words, consciousness of 
 sameness of a speech sound is a unified response called out by a 
 group of similar sounds that possess an identity of function. 
 
 3. The responses called out by the variations of a sound under 
 different conditions produce the consciousness of difference, which 
 need not be an actual awareness of differences. 
 
 2* Schuchardt, H., Uber die Lautgesetze, 24; cp. Schlegel, Fr., Sprache und Weisheii 
 der Indier, 15; Thurneysen, R., Die Etymologie, 20, 
 ^^ Wechssler, E., op. cit., 134. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 23 
 
 4. A sound change means that the consciousness of sameness of a 
 sound (identity of function) has remained stationary, while its 
 actual contents have been shifted. 
 
 5. A generic (spontaneous) sound change is conditioned psycholo- 
 gically through the consciousness of sameness working towards 
 uniformity, especially in the stage of language acquisition of children. 
 
 6. A singular (conditioned) sound change is conditioned by the 
 ever present possibility that the consciousness of sameness of a single 
 sound (in the older generation) may appear as a discrimination of 
 tivo sounds during the stage of lanuage acquisition (in the younger 
 generation). 
 
 7. The position of a word in which it occurs very frequently with a 
 definite shade of meaning may be singled out through the specificity 
 of function from the other positions in which it may assume a variety 
 of meanings. The counteraction of consciousness of sameness is 
 then suspended and that word may suffer a sporadic change when 
 functioning in that particular shade of meaning. 
 
B. THE FUNCTION OF IMITATION IN 
 SOUND CHANGE 
 
 I 
 
 The dogma of the uniformity of sound change (see p. 9) naturally 
 was the starting point for the discussion of the question whether the 
 whole group took part in a sound change or whether it originates in 
 one or a few individuals and then spreads to the rest by imitation. 
 This issue did not produce such a clear division among philologists as 
 the dogma itself. On the whole the more common opinion is that 
 imitation not unlike fashion causes one member of the group to 
 talk like the rest and to follow the phonetic development of its 
 dialect. (For the following compare especially E. Wechssler, debt 
 es Laiitgesetze? , 176ff ; and H. Oextel, Lectures on The Study of Language, 
 136.) 
 
 Whitney says: "Not that the speakers of a language act in unison 
 and simultaneously to produce a given change. This must begin in an 
 individual, or more or less accordantly in a limited number of indivi- 
 duals, and spread from such example through the community. 
 .... What he (the individual) suggests by his example must be 
 approved by the imitation of his fellows, in order to become lang- 
 uage."^® Even more definitely Collitz states: "Dze lautliche Um- 
 wandlung .... iihertrdgt sick allmdhlich auf eine grosser e Anzahl von 
 Individuen. Sie gefdlU denen, welchen sie aufgefallen ist, sie ivird 
 Mode."^'' This view has had strong supporters in modern times. 
 Meringer expressed himself in the following drastic way: "Ein 
 Lautgesetz ist um nichts merkwiirdiger als das Gesetz des roten Schirmes 
 und schwarzen Kopftuches beim Bauernweib, der Krinoline, der Puf- 
 drmel zu andern Zeiten.'^"^^ 
 
 An entirely opposite view is held by Rousselot: ^^La cause dS- 
 terminante de revolution (phonetique) est d'ordre general; elle agit sur 
 
 » Whitney, W. D., article Philology in Encycl. Brit. (1911), v. XXI, 424. 
 
 *' Colhtz, H., Anzeigerf. deutsches Altertum, 1879, 321; cp. also Miiller, F., Techmer's 
 Zeitsckrift, I, 213; Bezzenberger, A., Gottinger gel. Anzeiger, 1879, 651; Schuchardt, H., 
 op. cit., 12. 
 
 ** Meringer, K.,Aus dem Leben der Sprache, 239; cp. Meyer-Luebke, W., Grammatik 
 der rumanischen Sprachen, I, 69; Bremer, O., Deutsche Phonetik, p. xiv; Sievers, E., 
 op. cit., 267. 
 
 24 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 25 
 
 la masse de la population. C'est une sorte d'epid^mie cL laquelle personne 
 n'6chappe."^^ This evolution is prepared in the parents, but it 'breaks 
 out' in the children: "Ce principe est dans V enfant. Ou bien c'est 
 une tendance absolue et hereditaire qui le porle a modifier dans un sens 
 determine le jeu des organes de la parole."^° This seems to be borne 
 out by the facts observed by Rousselot himself and also by the re- 
 markable case presented by Gauchat, who found that the differences 
 between the speech of two generations in one Swiss village (Charmey) 
 were exactly paralleled by those found in another village (Cerniat), 
 although there was no intercourse between the two.^^ It is interesting 
 also that Gauchat states emphatically: '^Nos matiriaux n'' of rent 
 
 aucune trace d'influence personelle J^ai etudie, d'une fagon 
 
 sommaire, environ 50 langues individuelles et je n'y ai rien trouvi 
 dHndividuel.'^^^ However, he does not deny imitation absolutely; 
 he notices it in cases of 'infiltration' from other dialects. But how 
 shall we reconcile his statement which I have quoted with that of 
 Weigand, another careful observer of dialects: "Die lautlichen 
 Verdnderungen gehen vom Einzelnen aus"^^? Can it be possible that 
 linguistic conditions in Roumania are so essentially different from 
 those in French Switzerland that one could arrive at exactly opposite 
 conclusions? Hardly so. It seems that Gauchat is speaking only for 
 communities that lead a relatively secluded life, while Weigand 
 devoted himself to a large group of dialects where he constantly met 
 those 'infiltrations' which the former has also noticed. 
 
 An intermediary position is taken by others. Oertel, leaning 
 more towards one side than the other, says: "Only a small number of 
 linguistic changes of whatever kind arise simultaneously in many 
 individuals. The bulk originates in one individual and gains currency 
 when imitated by others."^* Wundt's position is somewhat reversed: 
 "Nun spielt zwar die Nachahmung im gesellschaftlichen Leben iiberall 
 eine mitwirkende Rolle von nicht zu unterschatzender Bedeutung, aber 
 bei den tiefer greifenden und allgemeineren Verdnderungen kommt ihr 
 niemals die Eauptrolle zu. Vielmehr erweisen sich diese Verdnder- 
 
 " Rousselot, J., Rev. des patois Gallo-Rom., V, 413; cp. Meillet, A., op. cit., 15, 
 
 " Rousselot, J., Rev. des patois Gallo-Rom., V, 412. 
 
 " Gauchat, L., op. cit., 227. 
 
 ^UbU., 231. 
 
 » Weigand, G., op. cit., 19. 
 
 ^ Oertel, H., op. cit., 147; cp. Delbruck, B., op. cit., 98. 
 
26 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 ungen, wo wir imstande sind ihren Bedingungen nachzugehen, regel- 
 massig als solche, die nicht von einem Individuum und nicht einmal 
 von einer bestimmt hegrenzten Zahl von Individuen ausgehen, sondern 
 auf Einflussen beruhen, die entweder die sdmtlichen Mitglieder einer 
 Gemeinschaft oder mindestens deren iiberwiegende Masse tre^ffen."^^ 
 Wechssler makes the distinction that a common change is possible 
 only in a small community whose speaking is controlled only by 
 hearing, while in the written and spoken language of a larger district, 
 the KoivT} or Kultursprache, we have a single starting point for a 
 change.^® 
 
 It seems then that the two kinds of changes are existing. Indeed, 
 even the historical material, aside from all studies of modern con- 
 ditions, forces us to account for both. I shall call imitative a change 
 that originated in one or a few individuals and spread to others by 
 imitation; and a change that takes place through a tendency in 
 the majority of the group I shall call tendential. These terms are not 
 a substitution for Oertel's 'primary' and 'secondary' or 'imitative' 
 changes, since he is evidently using these only in regard to the language 
 of the individual.^^ I shall use the terms 'tendential' and 'imitative' as 
 regards the language of the group. This change of terminology is 
 desirable since, as will be seen below, a 'tendential' change affecting 
 the whole group is already a compound of primary and secondary 
 changes as regards the individual. 
 
 There are some important reasons why we must postulate a 
 tendency which it would be difficult to point out as an active force 
 by direct observation. (If Gauchat's observations (see p. 25) could 
 be repeated in the same villages at intervals of perhaps ten years, 
 we might then actually 'observe' a tendency.) If all sound changes 
 started in individuals then the development of a dialect would be 
 entirely haphazard. We should expect to find a zig-zag line, because 
 different individuals would add different innovations, which are in 
 turn imitated by the rest. The historical material which we possess 
 shows in many cases a remarkably straight line, which points to a 
 persistent sound change in one direction for many centuries. It is 
 inconceivable that from generation to generation individuals should 
 
 » Wundt, W., op. cit., 22. 
 *• Wechssler, E., op. cit., 36. 
 »' Oertel, H., op. cit., 136. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 27 
 
 spring up who would all produce innovations in the same direction, 
 or that the rest of the community should imitate only these individuals 
 and no others who might have produced other deviations. 
 
 It is therefore best to conceive of such changes as being produced 
 by a majority of the group. Furthermore, since they are spread out 
 over a large period of time, we must suppose a constant ultimate 
 cause — in the last analysis perhaps some racial characteristic — 
 underlying the whole movement, in other words a cause producing a 
 tendency to shift certain sounds in one definite direction. 
 
 Some members of the group will always be unproductive, just 
 as we always find some that do not exhibit the peculiar traits of 
 the group. The others probably will take a more or less active part in 
 the tendential change. Despite these individual differences we always 
 have a comparative uniformity in the dialect of a group. This process 
 of levelling out is due to imitation. Thus every tendential change is 
 is in the end a resultant of a tendency and imitation. 
 
 My own position can be formulated thus: If we find a change 
 that has persisted for some time in the same direction we must suppose 
 that it is caused by a tendency which affects a majority of the group, 
 individual differences between the members of the group being leveled 
 out by imitation. 
 
 Besides this partially tendential change, a purely imitative change 
 seems possible, as is in fact attested by several historical instances, 
 e.g., the spread of the uvular r in Germany. Such changes take their 
 origin in one or a few individuals and may be due to various causes, 
 to an individual tendency, to a defect in articulation, or even to 
 mistakes. As regards the way in which they affect the community 
 they are purely imitative. Again the ultimate cause is not imitation, 
 but some cause that lies beyond it, as superiority of the leaders, 
 class distinction, etc. It is due to these that among the many in- 
 dividual innovations in a community only a few are selected and made 
 universal. 
 
 As to the character of both of these types, the tendential and the 
 imitative, we can state with some definitness only in regard to the 
 first that it is gradual in its movement. It may proceed faster or 
 slower under different circumstances, but hardly in leaps and bounds. 
 That is, if a tendency works at all, we must expect a gradual shifting, 
 say from p to /, and not a substitution. On the other hand it is 
 
28 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 probable that an imitative change is usually sudden, i.e., proceeds 
 by substitution. In the majority of cases, e.g., pure substitution, 
 dissimilation, some distant assimilations — this is fairly certain, while 
 in others the character is more difficult to determine, as in umlaut. At 
 any rate we can say that sudden change is always imitative, while 
 gradual change may be imitative or tendential; or tendential change 
 is always gradual, while imitative change is as a rule though not 
 always, sudden. In case it works in connection with tendential 
 change it is always gradual. 
 
 For my purposes here I shall draw the line a little more roughly 
 and speak of pure imitative change as if it were always sudden in 
 contrast to secondary imitative change, the complement of tendential 
 change, which is always gradual. 
 
 DIAGRAM II 
 
 Tendency ^_^_____— Imitation 
 
 tendential imitative 
 
 i .-—-'"1 
 
 gradual *---" sudden 
 
 The real difficulty for philology lies in determining whether a 
 sound change, of which only the beginning and end have been re- 
 corded, has been a gradual one or whether it does not go back to a 
 sound substitution by a single individual adopted by the rest. Some 
 are clearly recognized as imitative changes, as the introduction of the 
 uvular r in the dialects of many German cities. Others are doubtful, 
 as the German umlaiil. Others are clearly recognized as tendential, 
 as 'Grimm's Law.' 
 
 II 
 
 The function of imitation in speaking is twofold. 
 
 L In communities in which the individuals show differences 
 in the amount of variations, i.e., where some go further along a certain 
 direction of an existing tendency than others, imitation has a levelling 
 effect; it causes the members who are almost unaffected by the ten- 
 dency to accept at times the pronunciation of those who are greatly 
 affected and vice versa. 
 
 2. In a community where an individual or a number of individuals 
 have produced an innovation in pronunciation, this may be accepted 
 through imitation by the rest of the community. What causes the 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 29 
 
 other members to imitate is a different question. Imitation is here 
 only the immediate cause, the instrument through which a more 
 remote cause can be active. 
 
 Uniformity is the result of imitation in both cases. In the first, 
 however, it is a tendency producing the change, while in the second 
 it is imitation, provided the change has started at some particular 
 point. 
 
 More clearness in regard to the functioning of imitation will be 
 gained by analyzing the conscious processes involved in it. Most 
 psychologists^^ regard imitation as an instinct. Others have rejected 
 such a theory. Wundt, while rejecting the idea that imitation is an 
 instinct or some other kind of special mental function, would reduce 
 the processes that fall under this term to an association between af- 
 fects and actions.^^ The defect of such a theory is that the crucial 
 point of the question, namely, how the association, supposing its 
 existence, has come about, is left unexplained if one does not choose 
 to leave it entirely to accident. But there are many cases where we 
 cannot assume a previous association between feeling and action, 
 and where we can do this, we must wonder why such a general feeling, 
 say of pleasantness, is all that causes one action in one instant and 
 an entirely different one in another. 
 
 There is one analysis of imitation which, besides covering a multi- 
 tude of facts, though not all as I intend to demonstrate, has the 
 advantage that it emphasizes the purely social character of imitation. 
 It is based on the observation that a person who produces a social 
 stimulation, especially a vocal gesture, is thereby stimulating not 
 only another, but also himself, and in response thereto he will 
 naturally fall into the ways of acting like some other self. In taking 
 the roles of others as a response to self stimulation we get 'imitation,' 
 this is Professor Mead's point of view. "The response to the social 
 stimulation of the self may be in the role of another — we present 
 his arguments in imagination and do it with his intonations and 
 gestures Not that we assume the roles of others toward our- 
 selves, because we are subject to a mere imitative instinct, but 
 because in responding to ourselves we are in the nature of the case 
 taking the attitude of another than the self that is directly acting, 
 
 38 James, W., Principles of Psychology, II, 408; Angell, J. R., Psychology, 360; 
 McDougall, W., Social Psychology,^^ 105. 
 3» Wundt, W., op. cit., 39. 
 
30 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 and into this reaction there naturally flow the memory images of 
 those responses of others which were in answer to like actions."*" 
 
 It is important to note that such an analysis does away with the 
 distinction between conscious and unconscious imitation as two 
 different types, for it is clear that the reaction may assume all kinds 
 of shades of awareness, from the 'unconscious' to the intentionally 
 produced. 
 
 This taking of the roles of others is most dramatic in childhood. 
 The child, if left to himself will create imaginary companions to take 
 part in the events of his play. His consciousness is then a stage on 
 which his own self is only one among other actors. These may repre- 
 sent persons of his actual little community, or they may be entirely 
 fanciful. But even the kings, the fairies, and the goblins bear a strong 
 resemblance to those that move in his everyday life. 
 
 During this period the child acquires his habits of articulation. 
 This process is not quite as mechanical as Watson supposes.*^ A 
 large part of it is really 'social,' i.e., depending on imitation in Meads' 
 sense. The problems of the succeeding steps of adaptation and of the 
 degree of exactness of adaptation of a child's language are such that 
 can be treated by close observation of particular cases and by a 
 statistical method. 
 
 However, the problem to be treated here is in regard to the adapta- 
 tion which is going on in the speaking process of an adult after he has 
 mastered the language. 
 
 The child's play has now been abandoned. But it is only the 
 proscenium, the wings, and the setting of the stage that have been 
 left behind. The acting has remained in its essential traits and is 
 now called thinking. At any moment, of course, a stage can be re- 
 built with all the colors and reality of childhood play, but it is seldom 
 that we do so. Thinking is the social process of converse brought 
 within one consciousness. We still have stimulus and response as 
 between two selves, but these two selves are now the agents of but 
 one consciousness; they are actors whose personalitites are quite 
 faded out as compared with the child's imaginary playmates.*^ 
 
 *" Mead, G. H., Jotir. Phil. Psych, and Sc. Meth., X, 377. 
 
 " Watson, J. B., Behavior, 330. 
 
 « Mead, G. H., Jour. Phil. Psych, and Sc. Meth., X, 377. 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 31 
 
 The well known observation that a child has a greater adaptability 
 to his environment, that he learns a language easier than an adult 
 has often been referred — and without doubt correctly — to the greater 
 plasticity of his neural organism. But may it not be that the difference 
 in adaptability is also due to the loss of realistic appearance of the 
 agents of the 'inner forum'? 
 
 If we now come to apply Professor Mead's fundamental analysis 
 of imitation to the facts of sound change outlined above, we have to 
 enlarge his conception. Imitation exists not only where one's self 
 takes the role of another, but also, where he in taking his own role 
 produces certain characteristics which were formerly not his own, 
 but the other's. In the first and fundamental case the entire response 
 is that of the other; in the second case the major response — the utter- 
 ance of the sentence — is essentially his own and yet it contains minor 
 responses belonging to the other self. He has borrowed so to speak 
 for his own action some of the colors of the make-up from the other 
 actor. In as far as such minor responses, one particular sound or 
 word or accent, are concerned we might still speak of taking the other's 
 role, but it seems better to consider these modified processes as a 
 different type of imitation. 
 
 This partial imitation — as we may call it in contrast to Professor 
 Mead's total imitation — is the one with which we are primarily 
 concerned in analyzing the mechanism of sound changes. It appears 
 in two different types accordingly as the character of a sound change 
 is gradual or sudden, tendential or imitative. 
 
 Now let us examine a little more in detail how one individual 
 imitates another's speech, which already contains the new pronun- 
 ciation that is to become a sound change. 
 
 In total imitation, i.e., in taking the other's role entirely, along 
 with the familiar intonation and sound qualitites of that person a 
 new accentuation of a word may be imitated, as address ior address*^ 
 or a new vowel quality as a (as in father) for ce (as in had) in a word 
 like past. To the imitating individual all the elements imitated are 
 primarily those that form the basis of the consciousness of difference. 
 I have pointed out elsewhere that consciousness of difference does 
 not imply an actual awareness of the factors of differentiation, it 
 only implies an attitude of awareness towards the personality of the 
 
 ^' Bloomfield, L., The Study of Language, 152. 
 
32 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 speaker and his emotional and physical status. To imitate totally 
 then means to step into the center of that self towards whose speaking 
 one has responded frequently with a consciousness of difference and 
 to act from that center so that the own self would react again in the 
 same way with the same consciousness of difference. It means to 
 create with one's own action a response from the self as if another 
 well known self were stimulating the own self. 
 
 When the individual again takes his own role, he of course relaxes 
 into his own usual ways of speaking. But now, two things can happen. 
 He may use, while always acting in his own role, a word like past 
 with a new sound a substituted for the old (b, and he is usually aware 
 of such cases. Or he may pronounce a certain sound throughout 
 with the slightly different quality characteristic of the pronunciation 
 of the other speaker, e.g., an initial t as an asporated t; of such cases 
 he is usually not aware. 
 
 These two cases of 'partial' imitation, which are typical of the 
 two sound changes, the imitative and the tendential, are, so it seems 
 to me, sufficiently different from Mr. Mead's case of 'total' imitation 
 to be treated as separate types, and they are also sufficiently distinct 
 from each other to require separate analyses. 
 
 They may to some extent depend on previous 'total' imitation, but 
 not necessarily so. For in the first place, the taking of the roles of 
 other individuals is in ordinary thinking a rather colorless process in 
 adult life as compared with the dramatic realism of a child's thinking 
 or playing. And in the second place we often use peculiarities of 
 another's speech without having had a chance to imitate him in 
 inner speech or even in 'thinking aloud.' 
 
 Ill 
 
 The first case of partial imitation is prevalent in the kind of sound 
 change which I have called imitative, i.e., where a certain inno- 
 vation of pronunciation by one or a few individuals is accepted by 
 the rest of the community. Clear instances of this kind are those 
 of substitution. 
 
 Suppose that in a certain community the older pronunciation 
 oifast with cb (as in had) is being replaced by a pronunciation with a. 
 An individual who is still using the old pronunciation but hears 
 occasionally the new, has in his vocabulary two doublets, i.e., two 
 words that are slightly different, although they answer to the same 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 33 
 
 meaning; one form is in his 'active' vocabulary and the other, the 
 new, in the 'passive.' Some additional cause, as that of fashion for 
 instance, must then be active to induce him to use the new word. 
 There may now be a period where the two forms are used inter- 
 changeably, but if that additional cause is still activei, then the new 
 form will soon gain the preponderance and replace the old one 
 entirely. Imitation in such a case reduces itself to the substitution of 
 a response of other individuals brought about by the fact that both 
 responses, the one substituted and the old one, fit one single stimulus. 
 Awareness of such a change is a common characteristic, since it 
 does not take place within the consciousness of sameness for one 
 sound. 
 
 The second case of partial imitation is a necessary hypothetical 
 process wherever a tendential change takes place as pointed out 
 before. This kind of imitation must be supposed to work at any 
 given time towards the leveling of the variations caused by the uneven 
 strength with which a tendency probably works in dififerent members 
 of the community. 
 
 In addition it must be supposed to work also between variations 
 that are due not to common tendencies, but to individual tendencies. 
 Any one with a pronunciation differing from that of the others is a 
 potential factor of imitative sound change for the rest of the com- 
 munity. It is very unlikely, however, that he should really cause 
 a common sound change, unless an additional cause is active. His 
 own difference may also be so great that to a hearer's consciousness of 
 sameness he pronounces a different sound and consequently different 
 words. In such a case an imitative change may come about in the way 
 already described, by imitation through substitution. 
 
 The second case of partial imitation is, however, easily noticeable 
 wherever one individual enters another community with a dialect 
 slightly different from his. Without noticing it he undergoes a process 
 of transformation until he is in all respects a regular member of that 
 community. Since such a case of single absorption exemplifies in my 
 opinion also the mechanism of leveling, which is an absorption of 
 each by the rest, I shall try to analyze only such an adaptation of one 
 individual. 
 
 When he enters the new community the contents of some of his 
 zones of variations are slightly different from those of the original 
 
34 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 members. His differences will probably not be noticed as such by 
 them, but they will enter their consciousness of difference in regard to 
 his speech, just as he has a somewhat uniform consciousness of 
 difference in regard to all the others. (Chinese faces are all alike to 
 us as long as their racial difference is responded to by us as an indivi- 
 dual difference.) 
 
 Without doubt the type of imitation analyzed by Professor Mead 
 will now play an important part in the thinking process of the strang- 
 er. The roles in which he will respond to his own stimulations will all 
 have an aspect of uniformity by reason of that uniform consciousness 
 of difference. Such an experience cannot be without effect upon 
 his own actions. But it cannot be all, there must still be another 
 type of imitation when he acts in his own role, for it is this which is 
 gradually transformed. This experience of taking the roles of others, 
 important as it is, does not seem to me even necessary to bring about 
 the transformation. What is necessary only is the hearing of the 
 speech of the others. 
 
 One of the functions of that complex of past sound experience 
 which we may call the auditory speech image is its control of articula- 
 tion. This does not mean that an ordinary image actually precedes 
 an articulation like a picture set up as a model. On the contrary, the 
 image is usually merged in the action and its incoming sensations. 
 
 The auditory image is not a stable and perfectly rigid thing, it is 
 a psychic process which is compounded of past experience, especially 
 that of the most recent and the most vivid. If this experience varies, 
 or more precisely, if it shows a preponderance of a certain variation 
 in one direction, as in hearing the sound / often pronounced /'', it 
 does not remain unaffected, it also changes in that direction. Whether 
 the hearing of others' or of one's own pronunciation plays the dom- 
 inant part in this experience is a moot question and difficult to 
 determine. But at least we are certain that the whole of the ex- 
 perience, including taking the roles of others, is a potent agent in 
 this respect. 
 
 The speech image thus affected will in turn influence the articula- 
 tion. At first the variation in the direction of the change will become 
 more frequent, and at last the center so to speak of the zone of varia- 
 tions will have been moved in that direction. 
 
 Such a change takes place unnoticed, unless it is experienced by a 
 phonetician instead of an unsophisticated individual. It is a change 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 35 
 
 within the consciousness of sameness of a sound. The response in 
 
 regard to that particular sound will have the same function all the 
 
 time, and will consequently appear as the 'same' in consciousness, 
 
 while its content has actually undergone a transformation. We have 
 
 here then a type of imitation which consists in the change of a response, 
 
 while its function remains identical, through the modification of one 
 
 of its controlling factors. 
 
 DIAGRAM III 
 
 Imitation 
 (taking the role of another) 
 
 gradual sudden 
 
 (change of controlling factor of response) (substitution of response) 
 
 The difference between this type and the one described above lies 
 in the fact that here in regard to its function the response is the same, 
 although slightly modified in contents, while there one response 
 is substituted for another, both serving the same function. This 
 difference accounts for the fact that the element of awareness is always 
 absent in the one type and may be present in the other. Mathematically 
 considered, both cases might be called substitutions, but processes 
 of consciousness have to be considered from their own point of view, 
 which is here that of conduct. Doing this we find a radical difference: 
 Consciousness of sameness of response, and substitution of responses. 
 
 The situation is quite different, if our hypothetical case occurs 
 in a community whose speech contains sounds that are unfamiliar 
 to the stranger. Unfamiliarity of a sound means that it is not con- 
 tained in any of the zones of variations of the speaker's language. 
 First there will take place the substitution of a familiar sound which 
 comes nearest in acoustic effect to that of the unfamiliar sound in 
 place of this one. Thus the word that may be pronounced dat by a 
 Swede and zat by an Italian. Unless by some additional process the 
 speaker learns the new sound, he will not be able to produce it. 
 
 The matter seems paradoxical: A considerable variation which 
 can with the proper guidance easily be detected by any one, is not 
 
36 Studies in the Psychology of Language 
 
 imitated, and a slight one which goes unnoticed is imitated. How can 
 a modification be imitated that is not perceived as such? 
 
 The answer lies in the mechanism of the control of habitual 
 movements through the corresponding images. A zone of variations 
 of a particular articulation contains all the possibilities of this set 
 of movements. This zone is accompanied by a range of shades of 
 the auditory image which is in a certain sense parallel to it. The 
 proof for the existence of such shades, although we may not be aware 
 of the difiFerences, is afforded by the possibility of intentionally 
 producing a speech sound which fits only one situation, as in the 
 case of acting or other kinds of taking the role of another. Now what 
 is imitated unnoticed by an individual in a strange community must 
 already be contained in his possibilities of articulation, i.e., in his 
 zone of variations: One particular shade of the auditory image gains 
 the preponderance over the others and along with it goes the cor- 
 responding variation of articulation. 
 
 In the case of an entirely diflFerent and unfamiliar sound there is 
 nothing in the past experience of the individual that can be influenced. 
 The imagery called out by the sensation, combining with it to form 
 the perception, functions as in any ordinary auditory illusion. And 
 there can never be an imitation until the different articulation has 
 been produced by the speaker through a process of conscious syn- 
 thesis, as in foreign language instruction based on phonetic methods. 
 A foreign language course is full of examples of this kind; it proves 
 this point almost every day: Familiar to many is the way in which 
 such German sounds, as the so-called ich and ach sounds are acquired 
 by American students. The only possible road is a conscious syn- 
 thesis of the new articulation followed by a constant drill until it 
 has become a habit, i.e., a new zone of variations. 
 
 Summary 
 
 1. Imitation is not a specific process of response. While there may 
 be outward resemblances, as the copying of a model, different types 
 of processes, each with its own essential characteristics, are found in 
 different sets of cases. 
 
 2. In addition to the fundamental type (I) of 'total' imitation 
 analyzed by Mead as a process of taking the roles of another, we must 
 on the basis of linguistic facts recognize two partly related types of 
 'partial' imitation; namely, (II) Imitation through (conscious) sub- 
 
Studies in the Psychology of Language 37 
 
 stitution of one response for another where both fit the same stimulus, 
 and (III) imitation through the (usually conscious) modification of the 
 controlling imagery of a response. 
 
 3. Imitation through a modification of the controlling speech 
 image can lead only to an action that has previously been executed; 
 a familiar sound can be imitated, but not an unfamiliar one. 
 
 4. Gradual phonetic change may be both tendential and imitative. 
 To which of these a certain sound change belongs must be determined 
 on the basis of the historical material. 
 
 5. Tendential change is possible in a majority of the group while 
 the rest of the group may follow through imitation, just as the differ- 
 ences between individuals will be leveled out by this process. Imita- 
 tion in this cases will be of type III. 
 
 6. A purely imitative change is usually a sudden change. After it 
 has taken place in the pronunciation of one or a few individuals it is 
 accepted through imitation by the rest of the community, but not 
 without some additional cause. Imitation in this case will be of type 
 II. 
 
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