GIFT or I ^ LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS PniNTED IN- ENGLAND AT THE OXFORD UXIVEKSITV PRESS Carnegie Endowiiient for International Peace DIVISION OF ECONOMICS AND HISTORY John Bntes Clark, Director LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODEUN AV A R S AUSTRIA-HU>GARY; FRANCE 1?Y GASTON BODART, iA..l>- MILITARY SELECTION AND RACE DETEinORATION nv VERNON LYMAN KELLOGG EDITED BY HARALD WESTERGAARD, LL.D. MEMBER OK CO.MMITrEE Or RESEAni II OXIOKI): AT THE CLARENDON TRESS London, Edinbnrgh, New York, Toronto, Melbourne and Ron4)ay HUMIMTHEV MILIOIU) lUlG -<; ^ ^ 1589.11 .dfi-^ w I *} v^ IXTKODUCTORY NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR The Division of Economics and History of the Carnen;ie Endowment for International Peace is organized to ' promote a thorough and scientific investigation of the causes and results of war '. In accordance with this purpose a conference of eminent statesmen, publicists, and economists was held in Berne, Switzerland, in August 1911, at which a plan of investigation was formed and an extensive list of topics was prepared. The programme of that Conference is presented in detail in an Ap})endix. It will be seen that an elaborate series of investigations has been undertaken, and the result- ing reports may in due time be expected in printed form. Of works so prepared some will aim to reveal direct and indirect consequences of warfare, and thus to furnish a basis for a judgement as to the reasonableness of the resort to it. If the evils are in reaUty larger and the benefits smaller than in the common view they appear to be, such studies should furnish convincing evidence of this fact and afford a basis for an enlightened policy whenever there is danger of inter- national conflicts. Studies in the causes of warfare will reveal, in particular, those economic influences which in time of peace bring about clashing interests and mutual suspicion and hostihty. They will, it is beheved, show what policies, as adopted by different nations, will reduce the conflicts of interest, inure to the common benefit, and afford a basis for international con- fidence and good-will. They will further tend to reveal the natural economic influences which of themselves bring about more and more harmonious relations and tend to substitute general benefits for the mutual injuries that follow unintol- liijent self-seeking. Economic internationalism needs to be fortified by the mutual trust that just deahng creates ; but 359b06 vi INTRODUCTORY NOTE jii>t conduct itself iimy be favoured by economic conditions. Tliese, in turn, may be created partly by a natural evolution and partly by the conscious action of governments ; and both evolution and public action are among the important subjects of investigation. An appeal to reason is in order when excited feelings render armed conflicts imminent ; but it is (juite as surely called for when no excitement exists and when it may be forestalled and prevented from developing by sound national policies. To furnish a scientific basis for reasonable international poHcies is the purpose of some of the studies already in pro- gress and of more that will hereafter be undei-taken. The publications of the Division of Economics and IIist(»ry are under the direction of a Committee of Research, the membership of which includes the statesmen, publicists, and economists who participated in the Conference at Berne in 1911, and twe who have since been added. The list of members at present is as follows : Eugene Borel, Professor of Public and International Law in the University of Geneva. LuEO Brentano, Professor of Economics in the University of Munich ; Member of the Royal Bavarian Academy of t?ciences. Charles Gide, Professor of Comparative Social Economics in the University of Paris. H. B. Greven, Professor of Political Economy and Statistics in the University of Leiden. Francis \V. Hirst, Editor of The Economist, London. David Kinley, Vice-President of the University of Illinois. Henri La Fontaine, Senator of Belgium. His Excellency Luigi Lueeatti, Professor of Constitu- tional Law in the University of Rome; Secretary of the Treasury, 1891-13 ; Prime Minister of Italy, 1908-11. Gotaro Ogawa, Professor of Finance at the University of Kioto, Ja})an. Sir George Paish, Joint Editor of The Staiisty London. INTRODUCTORY NOTE vii Maffeo Pantaleoxi, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Rome. EuGEN Philippovich vox Philippsberg, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Vienna ; jMember of the Austrian Herrenhaus Hofrat. Paul S. Reixsch, United States Minister to China. His Excellency Barox Y. Sakataxi, recently Minister of Finance ; Present Mavor of Tokio. Theodor Schiemanx, Professor of the History of Eastern Europe in the University of Berlin. Harald Westergaard, Professor of Political Science and Statistics in the University of Copenhagen. Friedrich, Freiherr von Wieser, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Vienna. The function of members of this Committee is to select collaborators competent to conduct investigations and present reports in the form of books or monographs ; to consult with these writers as to plans of study ; to read the completed manuscripts, and to inform the officers of the Endowment whether they merit publication in its series. This editorial function does not commit the members of the Committee to any opinions expressed by the writers. Like other editors, they are asked to vouch for the usefulness of the works, their scientific and literary merit, and the advisability of issuing them. In like manner, the pubhcation of the monographs does not commit the Endowment as a body or any of its officers to the opinions which may be expressed in them. The standing and attainments of the writers selected afford a guarantee of thoroughness of research and accuracy in the statement of facts, and the character of many of the works will be such that facts, statistical, historical, and descriptive, will constitute nearly the whole of their content. In so far as the opinions of the writers are revealed, they are neither approved nor condemned by the fact that the Endowment causes them to be pubhshed. For example, the |)ul)lication of a work describing the attitude of various socialistic bodies viii INTHODrCTOUV NOTE on the subject of peace and war implies nothing as to the views of the otlicers of the Endowment on tlie subject of socialism ; neither will the issuing of a work, describing the attitude of business classes toward peace and war, imply any agreement or disagreement on the j)art of the officers of the Endowment with the views of men of these classes as to a protective })olicy, the control of mono})oly, or the regulation of banking and currency. It is necessary to know how such men generally think and feel on the great issue of war, and it is one of the jnn-poses of the P^ndowment to promote studies which will accuratelv reveal their attitude. Neither it nor its Committee of Research vouches for more than that the works issued bv them contain such facts ; that their state- ments concerning them may generally be trusted, and tliat the works are, in a scientific way, of a quality that entitles them to a reading. John Bates Clark, Director. s/ CONTEXTS AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 1618-191:3 CHAPTER PAGE I. The Years of War and Years of Peace in the PAST Three Centuries ..... 3 II. Duration of the Wars in which Austria-Hungary HAS been Engaged ; the Number and Fre- quency of Battles, Engagements, and Sieges in each ....... 7 III. General Observations concerning the Loss of Human Life in the Wars of Modern Times . 11 IV. The Proportion of Killed to Wounded . . 18 V. Losses of the Lmperial Armies in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-48 21 VL Losses of the Imperial Armies in the Turkish Wars of the Seventeenth Century . . 23 VIL Losses of the Imperial Armies in the Wars with Louis XIV, 1G73-1714 2G VIII. The Quadruple Alliance against Spain . 32 IX. The Two Turkish Wars of Emperor Charles VI 33 X. War of the Polish Succession, 1733-5 . . 3-i i/ XL Wars of Austria with Frederick the Great . 3-i XII. The War of Joseph II against Turkey, 1788-90 38 XIII, Insurrection in the Austrian Netherlands, 1789-90 39 XIV. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1792-1801 . 39 *^ XV. The Napoleonic Wars, 1805-15 . . 13 XVI. MiNOK Wars, 1816-48 49 XVII. The Wars of the Revolutionary Period, 1848-9 50 XVIII. The War with France and Sardinia, 1859 . 55 XIX. Danish-German War of 1864 .... 56 CONTENTS CIIAPTKlt XX. The W.m; with Prissia or ISGG a\d the Austro- Italian Wak of 1800 XXI. The Occip.\tion of Bosnia anij IIekzegovina XXII. SiPPRESsioN or Uprisings in Soi theun Dalmatia AND Krivoshian, 1809, 1882 .... XXIII. The Boxer Uprisinc; in China, 1000 . XXIW Comparative Losses of Aistria and other CotNTRIES ....... XXV, The Oificer-losses of Alstrian Armies . Appendix, Recapiti lation of Casualties among Generals AND STAFl-OrFICERS. 1018-191.3 page 57 04 05 05 GO 07 09 FRANCE. 16U-191;3 I. Wars of France in the last Three Centlries II. General Remarks on the Losses of Men in \Va III. Period or the Thirty Years" War, 1018-18 IV. The Wars of Lolis XIV .... V. \Vars iNDER Lolis XV and Loiis XVI. 1715-92 THE KrA or THE WaRS OF FwEDERICK THE GrEAT VI. Tm. Wars of the Revolition. 1792-1802 . VII. The Xapoleonic Wars. 1804-15 Vin. Wars of Modern France from 1810 to 1871 IX. The Franco-German War, 1870-1 X. The Coji.mlnard Insirrection, 1871 . XI, The Colonial Wahs of France since 1871 XI I. Conclusion ...... 81 83 89 98 HU 110 138 144 152 1 53 155 ]\ULITARY SELIOCTION AND RACE DETERIORATION A Preli.minary Report and Discussion , INDEX 103 203 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS AUSTRIA-nUXGARY 10l8-ll)l.-3 BY GASTON BODART, LL.D. Ijfi911 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 1G18-1913 CHAPTER I THE YEARS OF WAR AND YEARS OF PEACE IX THE PAST TIHIEE CENTURIES In the number and significance of the wars in which she has been engaged in the last three hundred years, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ranks second among the mihtary Powers of Europe, only France surpassing her in this respect. Chief among the causes of these numerous conflicts have been, first, the geographical position of Austria-Hungary as frontier State and bulwark against the greed for concjuest of the Ottomans ; second, the imperial dignity which lias usually appertained to the wearers of the crown of Stephen and Wenzel, and which has forced them to take part in all the struggles of the empire with its warlike neighbour, France ; and third, the various hereditary claims of the Hapsburgs to dominion in Italy and Spain. The tables which follow (Xos. 1, 2, and 3) are designed to show in chronological order the wars in which the Monarchy has taken part in the last three hundred years, and to exhibit graphically the years in each century to be designated as war-years and peace-years respectively. From the tables it will be seen that while the number of wars to the century has grown constantly greater, the number of years of war has, on the other hand, steadily decreased. B2 4 LOSSES OF LIFE IX MODERN WARS In tabular form, the actual numbers for Austria-Hungary are a> follows; : Century. Scvt'llti-ciltii KiLrhtcc'tilh NilK-f CCMtll A'o. of H«r.s. 12 If) 21 So. of Years of nor. 77 59 25 During tlic first thirteen years of the twentieth century, the Monarchy had only one occasion to take up arms. This was at the time of the Boxer uprising in China in 1900. wlien lier embassy had to be protected by marines. T.vui.i: 1 Waiis or Arsrni \-IIr\(;. \RV IN Tin: Sr.A *r.N-TF.K NTH C KVTl IIV 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 i()07 l»)o8 1609 Kilii li>I 1 iMij loi ; 1(114 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1640 1650 1 65 1 1652 1653 1654 it)55 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 i(;()7 1(»().S ii)()9 1670 lUJl 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 I. 1600-6. Turkish War (from 1593)- 2. 1615-17. Uskok War with V cnicc. 3. 1618-48. Thirty Viars" War. 4. 162 9-30- War of thi- Maiitiiaii Succession. 5. i()57-6o. War of the Polish . VuxiHarics. • 6. 165 8-62. Fiixhtiii^' in llnii<,'ary and Siibinl )uri,'(n. 7. i6( '3-4- \Var witli Turki v. 8. 1670. Suppression of Majinatcs' Conspiracy in Hungary. I). 1672-82. Knrnc Insurrection in IlnnLTary. 10. 1673-8. War with France. 11. l683-f)N. (Jreat Turkish War. 12. 1689-0)7. War with France (LeaLTUe of AuL'shuri:)- These twelve wars occupieii seventy-seven years, leaving only twenty-three years of peace in the century. ^ Tlie Itlaek liirnres denote years of war ; the liylit limires years of peace. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Table 2. Wars of Austria-Hungary in the Eigiiteentu Century ^ 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 172O 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 173b 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 174., 175.) 1 731 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1754 1765 1766 1767 i7(hS ijhtf 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1701 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 179.S 1799 1. 1701-14. War of the Spanish Succession. 2. 1703-11. Insurrection in Hungary. 3. 1715-18. War with the Turks. 4. 1718-20. War with Spain (Qua(iruj)le Alhance). 5. 1731-2. Relief of Imperial Forces in Corsica. *'• iJij-S- ^^'^r of the Polish Succession. 7. 1737-9. Turkish War. 8. 1740-8. War of the Austrian Succession. 9. 1756-63. Seven Yi-ars' War. 10. 1778-9. War of the Bavarian Succession. 11. 1784-5. \Vallaehian Insurrection in Sielx'nburgen. 12. 1784-5. War with Hollaiid (Scheldt War). 13. 1788-90. War with the Turks. 14. 1789-9G. Insurrection in the Austrian Xttherlaiuls. 15. 1792-7. War of the First Coalition against France. 16. 1799. Beginning of the War of the Second Coalition. The proportion of peace-years to war-years in the eighteenth century is somewhat more favourable than that of tlie seventeenth, but the war-years are still in excess — fiftv-nine to forty-one. It should be noted, however, that the wars under Nos. 5, 11, 12, and 14 are hardly worthy of this designa- tion ; they were rather armed interventions for the restora- tion of order. ' Black figures represent war-years ; liglil ligures, peace-years. LOSSES OF r.IFK I\ :\rODKRX WARS 'r.\i!i.i. ;j. W.vns OK Ai"stui.\-IIin(;aiiv in tiu; NiNT.Tr.KVTii Century^ 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 lS-5 l82() 1827 1828 1829 l8j;o 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1830 1840 1.S41 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 i860 1861 i8b2 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 i8(>8 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1870 1877 1878 1579 1880 1 88 1 1882 1883 1884 1885 i88b 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1S99 1. 1800-1. War of the Second Coalition ajrairist France (from 1799)- 2. 1805. War of the Third C'oahtion au'ainst France. 3. 1809. War with PVanee. 4. 18 1 2. War with Russia. 5. 1813-15. Wars of Liberation. 6. 1815. War. with Xa|)les. 7. 1821. {^iKUinfi of Disturbances in Piedmont. 8. 1831. Occupation of thi- Duchies of Modeiia and Parma. 9. 1835-46. Puniti\e expeditions against tlie Bosnians. 10. 1838. Punitive expeditions ajjainst the Montenegrins. 11. 1840. Participation in the War ajjainst Etjypt. 12. 1846. QuelHni; of disturbances in GaUeia. 13. 1848. War with Sardinia. QueUinf,' of disturbances in Pramic, Cracow, and Vienna. 14. 1849. War with Sardinia. 15. 1848-9. Insurrection in Hungary. 16. 1859. \N:ir with I'raner and Sardinia. 17. l8()4. NVar witli Denmark. 18. l8()(). War with Prussia and Italy. 19. l86(). Su|)prission of uprisini; in .Soutlurn Dahuatia. 20. 1878. Oeeui)atit)n of Bosnia and lI<.r/.c-;,'o\ ina. 21. 1882. Suppression of uprisinLj in Southern Dahnatia. Tlie nunil)or of peace-years here bofjins to exceed tliat of the war-years — twenty-five years of war against seventy-five of peace. ' lilaek fw^'ures reprcsiiit war-years ; li^ht figures, peace-years. AUSTRIA -HUNGARY 7 Arranged according to the nationality of her antagonists, Austria-Hungary has carried on, during the last three hundred years, the following wars : Total lenatli of iVars. Jlnlagotiist. No. of Wars. Years. France . 14 76 Turkey . • • • 8 44 Sardinia (earlier, Piedmont ; later, Italy) 6 15 Prussia « • • 5 16 Saxony . 5 14 Spain . 4 30 Bavaria • • • 4 21 Ilunijariaii Insurircnts • • • 4 39 Sweden • • • 2 23 Denmark . • a • 2 5 The Netherlands • • • 2 33 Great Britain • • • I 8 Russia • • • I I China . I I In this tabulation, the less important military interven- tions are not taken into account. CHAPTER II DURATION OF THE WARS IN WHICH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY HAS BEEN ENGAGED ; THE NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF BATTLES, ENGAGEMENTS, AND SIEGES IN EACH It is of some importance for the later investigations into the relative losses suffered in the 'Carious wars, to raise and answer the question of the length of eacli and the number of im[)ortant engagements it occasioned. In regard to the length of the wars, it is clear from the foregoing tables that they become notably shorter as we approach the twentieth century. This is still more strikinglv shown in the following tabulation bv centuries. LOSSES OF LIFK IN MODERN WARS Sevknteenth Century — 12 Wars I of 30 years— Thf Thirty Years* War. I of lO ye^irs Tin (Inat Turkish War, I of f) years Waroftht Lea<,'iie of Au^burg. I of 7 years War with Kraiiee, l()73-8. 'I'he reinaiiuier. from one to four vears. KiGIITKENTH C'ENTrRY — lb WaKS ' 1 of 13 years War of the Si)aiiish Sueeessioii. 2 of 8 ye^irs — Hungarian Insurreetion and War of the Austrian Succession. I (»f 7 years — Seven Years' ^Var. 1 of 5 years — War of the First Coahtion. The rciiiaiiulcr. from one to three vears. XiNF.Tr.KNTlI ("eNTI HV -21 WaKS I of 2 years — Tin; War of Liberation. All the rest of one ytar or less. Tlie most important wars in which the Monarchy iias been engaged in recent times have lasted barely a few months, as shoNvn in the following table : War. Danish-GtTnian War of 1864 War with Sardinia of 1848 War witli Franee of 1805 War with Kranee of 1815 War with Franee of 1809 Italian C'ain{)aifjn of l85() War with Italy of 1800 War with I'rnssia of 1866 War with Sardinia of 184(1 Ihira ll'in. Munlhs. Days. () 12 -\ 20 3 28 •) [The ■ Hundred Days) . ) 2 > M I 22 I t) Not all the wars of the period under consideration gave rise to im])ortant engagements. Many which lasted ten or more years have not as many great battles to show as mnne- rous ones in recent times lasting but a few months. A^ we AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 9 approacli the twentieth century, the conduct of wars becomes more energetic, and the important battles follow in nmch more ia})id succession. In order to make comparisons, it is necessary to deter- mine the number of significant battles in each war, reckoned on the basis of the combined losses of both antagonists. On the assumption of a minimum loss in killed and wounded on both sides of two thousand men, the actual number of important engagements in the wars named is shown by the following table : War. War of the First Coalition War of the Second Coalition . War of the Spanish Succession Seven Years' War Tliirty Years' War Wars of Liberation War of the Austrian Succession War with France War with France War with France War of the League of Auj^sburfj Iluni,'arian Insurrection War of the Year i8oO . Turkish War War of the Polish Succession Turkish War ^Va^ with France ^Var with Sardinia llunizarian Insurrection To determine the relative frequency of the important l)attles, a specified period of time must be taken as a unit. Selecting for this purpose the interval of one month, the number of battles taking j)lace per month in any war will be represented by a fraction with the total number of battles of the war for a numerator, and the number of months of its duration for a denominator. Comi)ut('(l in thi> way. the .Vo. of Dale. •irciil bultks 1792-7 183 1 799-1801 132 I7OI-I4 115 i75<>-^3 III 1618-48 8() 1813-14 86 1740-8 74 1809 34 ib73-8 28 1805 27 1088-97 25 1848-9 19 1866 19 ^75(^9 18 1733-5 17 1787-92 13 1815 12 1848-0 12 1703-11 10 10 LOSSES OF LIFE L\ MODERN WARS battle-lrecjuency of the different Older in tlie table below : Mar. War with France- .... War of tlu- Year i8b6 War i)f tin- Third C\)alitiou \Vars (»f Lihiratioii War with Russia .... War of the Second CoaHtion . War of the Hiuulred Days War of the First Coahtion ItaUan War ..... War of the Polish Succession . Seven Years' War .... IIun favour, to magnifv his success, and make it seem as com})lete as possible by extrava- gant rej)orts of enormous losses in men and munitions of war on the side of hi> opponent, while reducing his own losses to a minimum. The vanipiished leadei-, on the con- trary, follows a natural tendency to minimize his los>es (in AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 13 so far as they may be unknown to the victor), and to represent the alleged victory of his opponent as having been bouglit with dispro})ortionate sacrifices. As accurate figures of the losses in wars of earlier centuries are generally entirely wanting, the statistician is driven to take refuge in esti- mates. Even in modern wars, not all official figures are to be accepted at once as completely corresponding to the truth. The category ' wounded ', in particular, is quite elastic. In official lists, for obvious reasons, only those disabled for figliting are counted ; but in the service narra- tives of individuals, every wound or contusion, however slight, is included. Thus very different results will be reached, according to the way in which the investigator attempts to get at the facts. The more remote in time the battle, thc more meagre are the available sources, and with so much the more reservation must their statements be accepted. With regard to the wars since 1848, it must be admitted that the numerous official publications leave little to be desired in the way of thoroughness of documentary study and accuracy of statistical data ; they manifest, in general, a praisewoithy effort not to evade the often unpleasant truth. The losises which are naturally of greatest interest are those inflicted directly by the enemy in hostile operations against the armed forces of the opposing Power, having for their object the disabling or rendering ineffective of as many combatants as possible. Among these are to be distinguished the casualties (killed and wounded, including wounded taken prisoners), and those taken prisoners not wounded. Tender the caption of * missing ', in the ordinary tables of losses may be included both sorts of losses, on the one hand dead and wounded who could not be found, and on the other, prisoners whose fate remained unknown to their comrades, a^ well as deserters and dispersed troops. The fate of the ' missing ' is not generally learned until long after the close of tlie war. In nianv armies thev are counted with the 14 LOSSES OF LIFE IX :\IODKKX WARS dead, very often erioneou>lv >o. The nuiirnitude of a victory depends upon the amount of war munitions ca})tured (cannon, liand-arms, amnuinition, flags, .standards, ])rovisions, wagons, hordes, tents, bridge material. Arc), as well as upon the relative loss in men inflicted upon the enemy. In naval warfare, the number of ships cajjtured, sunk, destroyed, or disabled is even more significant than the human loss. The percentage of casualties ^ufferetl by armies in war has varied widely in the last four hundred years, and in spite of the progressive improvement in weapons, shows a tendency to decrease. Comparative investigations have been made of the casual- ties of the thirty greatest battles of the sixteenth century, the results of which show that the losses in killed and wounded were, on the average, for the victors ten per cent, and for the defeated army forty per cent of the effective strength. The number of killed was considerably in excess of the number wounded, and in comparison with the battles of later centuries, few prisoners were taken. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a rude professional soldiery of Swiss and mercenaries formed the main contingent of the armies of France, Spain, the Empire, and Venice. Battles were decided in hand-to-hand combat, and commonly ended with the ruthless cutting down by the victors of any portion of the opposing forces they could lay hands on. Quarter was given only to knights, nobles, and the higher olHcers, from whom a high ransom might be extorted ; common soldiers were put to the sword. A further ground for the high losses in battle at this period is the large ])roportion of religious ami civil wars, which are alwavs bloodier in character than conflicts between states and nations. The battles of the Peasants' Wars (15124-5) fretjuently ended in the complete extermination of the peasant armies, and in the Huguenot NVars also, the slaughter wa> nuich greater than in the conflicts of the same period between France and the Empire, Spain or \'enice. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 15 A similar statistical study of the thirty most important battles of the Thirty Years' War shows an average of casual- ties of fifteen per cent for the victorious, and thirty per cent for the defeated armv. The number of killetl begins to fall below that of the wounded, and the number of i)risoners rises steadily. During the wars of Louis XIV, despite numerous raids and the deliberate destruction of flourisli- ing towns and laying waste of whole provinces, the conduct of war becomes more humane and chivalrous. The casualties of this period (lG-i8-1715) amount to eleven per cent for the victors and twenty-three per cent for the vanquished. The number of prisoners not wounded often equals the total casualty loss, as at Hochstiidt (August 13, 1704), where the French lost 15,000 killed and wounded and the same number of prisoners. During the Xortliern War of 1700-21 and the W-ar of the Polish Succession (173:3-5), the above percentages do not vary significantly. The age of Frederick the Great, also, though rich in great battles, closes with an average loss of eleven per cent for the victors and seventeen per cent for their antagonists. The number of prisoners rises notablv, not infrequently exceeding that of the killed and wounded. This was the case, e.g. at Rossbach (November 5, 1757) and Leuten (December 5, 1757). The wars of the French Revolution bring the figures still lower, to nine per cent and sixteen per cent respectively. But in the thirty greatest battles of the Napoleonic era (1805-15), the percentages revert sharply toward those of the period of Louis XIV. The victors here show an average loss of fifteen per cent, the defeated army twenty per cent. The explanation of these high relative losses is to be found in the fact that Napoleon I, to a greater degree than almost any other general in history, employed his troops unsparingly in the attainment of his ends, demanding and receiving from them performance which remains unequalled to the present day. In a succession of wars conducted with unexam})Ied 16 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS enerpv. tlic «;reut battle emperor developed armies that found no iival> in rnilitarv ctliciency, and were animated by a spirit which enabled them to bear with indifference the greatest losses. The casualties at Austerlitz reached 15- 15 per cent, at Wagram 20 per cent, Auer.'»tadt 25 per cent, Borodino 27 per cent. Aspern 29 per cent. Eylau 31-4 per cent, and Albuera 44 j)er cent. The wars following; the Napoleonic })eriod were far less bloody. The average casualty losses is shown in the follow- ing table : ]V,ir. 'rurkisli-liussiiiii War . . . , Polish-lJussiiin War .... Sardinian-Austrian War Hungarian Instirrt-ction Crimean War .... Italian War ..... Aniirican Civil War ... Warofi8()(j .... Franco-Gc-rnian \Var .... Tnrkish-Kussian NVar .... Boer War ..... Hnsso-.Japniu'sc ^^ar No official data aie yet available for the Balkan War. still in progress at the time of writing. Such information as has been made public indicates that the battles of the Greeks and Serbs a> easily c to be explained by the effort f)f the officer to set before his men a good example in cool and courageous conduct. In several armies the relative loss of officers and men has not varied in the course of the wars of the last one hundred and lifty years ; hence the casualty loss of the men can be calculated with reasonable certaintv from that of the officers. This circura- stance is very important for the estimation of losses in battles for which no statements, or very defective ones, were given out. Examples are the numerous engagements of the French armies in the wars of the Revolution and during the Napoleonic period, where the bulletins often gave hardly a fourth of the actual losses. This ever-recurring normal proportional loss of officers is observed especially in battles in the open field. In sea-fights, in storming fortified places, and in crossing rivers in the face of the enemy, the percentage exceeds the normal figure. CHAPTER IV Till-: pijopoirrrox or Kii.i.F.n to worxDKn Op the casualtv losses an ainiv >u>tain>. the most keenlv felt are those which completely and permanently deprive it of a number of its combatants. Tliese include those killed outright and those so seriously injured that they subsequently die of their wounds. A comj)arativc' investigation ot several Imndred battles of modern and recent times witli respect to the proportion of killed and wounded sliows that the relation may be ex- pressed by the numerical ratio of 10 to J35. That is, out of every 45 men put out of action, 10 on the average are killed, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 19 or about three times as many are ordinarily wounded as killed outri^^ht. In the most recent wars, the proportion is somewhat more favourable to the wounded. In the war of 1870-1 1 he Germans had 17,821 killed against 95,9i38 wounded, or for every 100 men killed, 538 were wounded, a ratio of 10 to 54. In the late war in the Far East, 47,152 Japanese were killed against 220,813 wounded, a ratio of 10 to 47. When the numbcM- wlu. subsequently died of their wounds is taken into consideration, the proportion is naturally qmte sicvniticantly changed for the worse. Of the wounded Germans 10 710 died, making the hnal ratio 100 : 336. Of the Japanese 47 387 wounded later succumbed, and when these are trans- ferred to the side of the killed, the ratio stands at 10 : 18. The very KMi death-rate of the Japanese wounded is unique in the history of war. Normally, from twelve to fifteen per cent of the wounded later die of their wounds ; in the case of the Japanese, the figure is ahnost twenty-two per cent. The principal cause of this melancholy increase in mortality is not to be sought in any deficiency of medical attendance or ill the hygienic conditions. In a greater degree it was due to the fact that in the assaults on the fortifications ot Port Arthur, carried out with unparalleled bravery by the Japanese, only head-wounds were likely to be received, and these very often result fatally. In the case of many casualty lists, where the number ot killed is more than one-third or even half that of the wounded, and particularly where it equals or exceeds the latter, very special conditions must have obtained. Some of these seem to merit a little further consideration. In some instances the high percentage of killed .eems accounted for, and would not be called in question. I Ins is especially true of naval t)attles, where to the destructive effect of the enemy's artillery on large masses of men conhned within a small space is added death by drowning, consequent on the sinkinu, >tranding, or ramming of ships Or again, fires may break out and suffocate or burn whole crews, or 20 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS cause magazine explosions demolishing the vessels. In such cases, the j)roportion of killed is very high. In the naval battle of Abukir, 1798, for examplo/the French lost 2,000 killed. 1,1(M) wounded. Other exain])les of a high ])ro])ortion of kiili'd are: the Halllo of Li^sa (18G6), Italian losses 620 killed, 80 wounded; Trafalgar (1805), Franco-Spanish loss 5,000 killed, ^,000 wounded ; Tsushima (1905), Russian loss 3,500 kdled, 7.500 wounded. Death by drowning has not infrequently played a large role in land battles as well, and has strongly affected the ratio of killed to wounded. The occasion has sometimes been a disastrous river-crossing under fire of the enemy, as at the crossing of the Beresina in 1812, where the French lost 10,000 killed and an equal number wounded. Similarly in those battles where a part of the defeated army is finally driven into lakes or rivers. Examples are the losses of the Dutch at Denain (1712), of the Turks at St. Gotliard (1664), Zenta (1697), and Martinestie (1789), the Russians at Auster- litz (1805), and the French at the Katzbach (1813). In those battles of earlier periods which entled in furious hand-to-hand struggles, the proportion of killed to wounded was often relatively high. Such was the case in the battles of the religious antl civil wars, where quarter was never given ; also in the murderous conflicts of the Seven Years' War— at Zorndorf (1758), Prussian losses, 3,700 killed, 7,300 wounded ; Russian losses, 7,200 killed. 10,800 wounded ; Prussian losses at Kunersdorf (1759), 6,100 killed to 12,600 wounded ; proportion of killed to wounded, 10 : 20, and 10 : 15 for the victorious and the defeated armies respectively. The storming of strong iield-works often costs the attacking force disproj)ortionate losses in killed, while the effective bombardment of fortified j)oints may similarly affect the defenders. In artillery duels also a disproportionate per- centage of wounded is on record. According to the nature of the battle the attacking force generally loses more men killed than do the defenders. Thus AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 21 Napoleon's armies, almost always conducting a brisk and energetic offensive campaign, even though victorious, often lost more in killed than their defeated opponents. In earlier times, at the capture by storm of strong and stubbornly defended fortifications, the defending force often suffered fearful losses in killed, for such martial exploits commonly degenerated into a general butchery of their foes by the victorious troops. Illustrations are afforded by the Turkish losses at the storming of Oczakow (1737, 1788) and Ismaila (1790), and the Polish losses at the storming of Warsaw by the Russians (1794, 18131). At such times the number of deaths has occasionally been greater among the civil population of the captured city than among the garrison of the place (as, e.g., at Magdeburg, 1631, Saragossa, 1809, Badajoz, 1812, and San Sebastian, 18113). CHAPTER V LOSSES OF THE IMPERIAL ARMIES IX THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1G18-48 This great war, which shook Central Europe to its founda- tions, has found many historians, yet the sources for the losses of the contending armies are very meagre. State- ments are based chiefly on estimates of more or less partisan colouring, and widely disagree in their accounts of the results even of the most important battles. A reliable estimate of the total loss of life in the war is an impossibility. There are fair grounds for asserting, however, that the loss of life on the part of non-combatants nmst have been con- siderably greater than that of the armies. The responsibility for this fact rests in the first instance on the barbaric and brutal conduct of the war. Other causes were the havoc wrought by an often unpaid, loot-greedy army rabble, the dehberate and methodical wasting of entire districts, and the 22 LOSSES OF LIFE L\ MODERN WARS diseases and plagues wliicli iolluwccl evfi\ wlifii- in tlie wake of the armies and carried off uncounted thousands. The Austrian forces figured most prominently in lliis struggle, a great number of the regiments still existing in the Monarchy tracing their origin back to the Thirty Years' War. On the side of Austria, however, were liavaria and the Catholic League, as well as Spain. The military con- tingents of these Powers fought shoulder to shoulder in all the greater battles, and it is consequently diflicult, if not impossible, to separate by States the losses suffered. On account of the deficiency of source material, the statements regarding losses are limited also to those nit)re imj)ortant engagements with respect to which credible information has come down from that time. The following statistical tabulation of the opposing forces and the losses they sustained relates only to those battles in which Austrian troops took part. The contem])oraneous conflicts of Spanish. Bavarian, and other Leaguist troops with the French will be treated in a separate chapter, in couiiexion with the discussion of the French losses. Losses of the Empire and Spain. — Victories Dale. Probahit' cffectnr Camtalties. JinltU'. Per slrcii0h. So. 3.000 500 cenl. ZaI.lat June lo, 1619 170 \\ (.isstii IkTgf .... Nov. 18, 1620 28,000 1,500 5-3 ^Vin^pfcn .... May 6, 1622 20,000 5.000 250 Hochst .luiie 9, 1622 26,000 2,000 80 Studllolin .... Aug. 6, 1623 28,000 1,000 3-5 Dessau Uridpc .... Apr. 25, 1626 16,000 1,000 6-3 Luttxir am Uarcnbergc Aug. 27, 1626 17,000 2,000 120 Niircnihcru .... Aug. 24, 1632 60,000 1,500 2-5 Kcj,'(iisl)urLr .... July 19, 1634 30,000 8,000 26-6 Nonllin^'tii .... Sept. 6, 1634 35,000 2,000 57 Thionvillc .... June 7, 1639 14,000 1,400 100 I.a.Marfif . . . . July 6, 1 64 1 10,000 1,000 lo-o 'i'lilllin^icii .... Nov. 14, 1043 22,000 1,000 4-5 Mcr^cnlluim .... May 5, 1645 10,000 700 70 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 23 Losses of the Empire and Spain. — Defeats Losses. Probable Cn.s-ualties. Other Losses. lialllf. Dale. ejjectivt strength. No. Per ctul. So. Per cent. Neuhiiusel July ID, 1 62 1 12,000 3.000 25-0 \Viesk)c-li Apr. 29, 1622 17,000 2,000 1 20 Stnilsund (Siege of) . Feb.-Aug., 1628 24,000 12,000 50-0 Ilreitenfeld Sept. 7 163 1 34,000 8,000 24-0 4,000 120 liain a. Lech . Apr. 15, 1632 27,000 3,000 no Lutzen . Nov. 16, 1632 25,000 5,000 20 -o Olditulorf June 28, 1633 15,000 7,000 470 3,000 200 Wattweiler Mar. 2, 1634 6,000 1,500 25-0 500 90 Liegnitz . May 13, 1634 12,000 4,000 330 400 30 Wittstock Sept. 24, 1636 30,000 10,000 330 8,000 270 Hluinfclden Feb. 21, 1638 4,000 700 180 2,300 580 Wittinwcier July 30, 1638 17,000 2,000 120 1,400 80 Kerupen . Jan. 17, 1642 9,000 4,000 450 3,000 330 Schweidiiit/. May 21, 1642 18,000 3,000 17-0 1,200 70 IJrtittiifeUl Nov. 2, 1642 30,000 10,000 330 5,000 170 Freiburg . Aug. 3-5, 1644 16,000 4,000 250 Jiinkau . Mar. 6, 1645 16,000 4,000 25-0 4,500 280 Allirslieim Aug. 3, 1645 16,000 4,000 25-0 2,000 12-5 Ziisrnarsluiuseii May 17, 1648 10,000 1,800 180 200 20 CHAPTER VI LOSSES OF THE IMPERLVL ARMIES IN THE TURKISH WARS OF THE SEVEXTEEXTH CEXTURY In' the war of the Mantuan Succession (1629-'30), at the .same period as the Thirty Years' War, Austria was only sHghtly involved ; her ally, Spain, being the leading opponent of the French. The Austrian contingent in the field was small, and as the actions wliich took place were of secondary imj)ortance, the losses of this contingent need not be troated in detail. Tlie sameapplies to the war with Sweden (lG57-()0), in which Austrian troops played only a small part. Equally unimportant in engagements of military signiHcance, and hence equally unimjiortant witli respect to the los.ses incurred, were tiie Magnates' Conspiracy War in Hungary in IGTO, 24 LOSSKS or LIl'K IN .MoDKKN WARS and tlie Kuruc u])iisin<; iinniediatcly f(jllo\ving (1672-82), which yielded only minor skirmishes with the insurgents. Of the greatest importance, on the contrary, were the two Turkish wars of the second half of the seventeenth century. This is true not merely because of their influence upon the development of the defensive power of Austria and because of the military results achieved, but more especially because they represented the successful rej)ulse of the last great onslaught of the Turks against the heart of the Monarchy. The existence of the Empire was in the balance, and tlie lighting on botli sides was of the most stubborn and bitter character. The losses of both parties were heavy, but those of the Turks much the higher, for tlie inijierial forces were almost uniformly victorious, and commonly followed up their successes with a general butchery of their foes. A. The rurhish War of 1663-4 This war grew out of fighting between the Turks and the Princes of SiebenbiJrgen, which had been carried on since 1658, and in which the Turks came out victorious. At Gyalu, May 22, 1600. Prince George Rakoczy was defeated and killed (army losses, 5,000 out of 8,000 engaged) ; Prince Kemeny met a similar fate in the unfortunate battle of Schassburg. January 2i3, 1662 (losses, 4,000 men out of 6,000). After August 1663, the war was vigorously pushed on the imperial side, and a few brisk battles brought it to a conclusion in tlieir favour within a vear. In the onlv engagement in which they were defeated (Parkiiny, August 7, 1663), the losses of the Austrians were 2.000 men out of 5,000, In all tlie remaining im])ortant actions they were victorious, but in two of them their losses cannot be determined (battles of Ciran River. May 16, and Lewencz, July 20, lf)61). The greatest battle of the war was that of St. Got hard, in which the imj)erial forces won a brilliant victory, losing, out of 30,000 men, barely 2,000. or seven AUSTRIA HUNGARY 25 per cent. As the struggle was of short duration and the Austrians were almost always victorious, their losses in this war were relatively small. Much richer in military actions was the great conflict to wliich wo now turn. B. The Great Turkish War, 168:3-99 Impkkiai. Losses. — VicroniES Effect iit strength. ('llSllllllilS. liulllc. Datr. No. Per cent. Hisamhcrj; .... .Aug. 24, 1683 13,000 1,300 100 Defence of Vienna July-Sept. 10S3 10,000^ 5.000 500 6,000 2 1,700 280 Kahlenbcrg Sept. 12, 1683 76,000 5,000 6-5 l*arkany .... Oct. 9, 1683 28,000 1,000 3-5 ^Vaitze^ (Vacz) . June 27, 1684 32,000 300 10 Hamszabeg July 22, 1684 10,000 400 40 Ciran ..... Aug. 10, 1685 60,000 600 10 Biula .... Aug. 14, 1686 50,000 500 10 Siege of Kuda June-Sept. 1686 60,000 20,000 330 Ilarsany .... Aug. 12, 1687 50,000 2,000 40 Derwent .... Sept. 5, 1688 3»ooo 300 lO-O Storming of Belgrade . Sept. 6, 1688 53.000 1,300 ^•5 Kostajniea .... July 25, 1689 20,000 200 10 Batodsehina Aug. 20, 1689 18,000 400 2Z Nish Sept. 24, 1689 17,000 400 ^•5 Slankanien .... Aug. 19, 1691 50,000 8,000 160 Zenta .... Sept. II, 1697 50,000 2,100 4-2 Imperial Losses. — Defeats iMsses. Casualties. Other losses. Hatile Date. Effective strength. So. Per \o. Per cent. cent. Unsuccessful Siege ofBuda July-Oct. 1 084 34.000 17,000 500 Kachanik Jan. II, 1690 3.500 2,500 700 Tohany .Aug. 21, 1690 4,000 1,000 250 2,000 50-0 Loss of Belgrade Oct. 8, 1690 5,000 4.500 900 Un.successful Siege of Belgrade July-Sept., 1693 30,000 8,000 270 Lugos Sept. 20, 1605 8,000 5.000 62 Olaschiii July 29, i6c)6 50,000 5.000 TOO ^ Garrisc n. 2 Citi zens. 26 LOSSES OF LIFE IX MODERN WARS Tlic above are the most important battles regarding which statistics are to be had. The proportionately very low figures for the losses incurred in the greatest victories of the imj)erial forces nmst be taken with a degree of caution. Besides the battles named in the table, there were in this war of sixteen vears' duration a vast number of minor engagements and skirmishes and attacks on fortified towns, respecting which no data are forthcoming. It is known, however, that the im})erial armies suffered severely from swamp fever in the marshy lowlands of the Theiss and the Save, many regiments being decimated. The number of killed and wounded in the important engagements tabulated reaches nearly 100,000. With respect to the great number of remaining encounters, and in view of the long duration of the war and the unhcalthful climatic conditions of the country, it is safe to assume that the Great Turkish War cost the imperial armies at least 1300.000 men. Of these probably 120,000 were killed. Only a tliird of these losses, however, are to be ascribed to Austria proper, as it was an imperial war and each of the German States furnished its quota of troops. An estimate of the number of non- combatants or civil persons who lost their lives in this barbarously conducted war is an impossibility because of the lack of data. CHAPTEU MI LOSSES or THE IMPERIAL ARMIES I\ THE WAKS WITH i.oiTs XIV. icr;} itu An opponent of the House of Ilapsburg no less obstinate than the Turks was the Grand Monarch of France. It was this ruler's aml)itious foreign policy, brutally disregardful of others' interests, which called into being among the land and naval Powers of Europe those coalitions for the preservation of the balance of power into which the im])ulse of self- preservation and reasons of state drove Germany and AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 27 Austria. Side by side with Austrian and Hungarian troops in almost all the battles with the French, fought the German contingents, and Dutch, Spanish, Piedmontese, British, and often even Danish and Swedish troops, as well. As a separa- tion of the effective strength and relative losses of these different nationalities is impossible, only the combined figures for all the alhes are given in the tabulations which follow. On account of the Turkish wars in progress at the same time, in which Austria was protagonist, com})aratively few Austrian troops fought against the French in the wars of the second half of the seventeenth century. This was particularly true of the lighting in Germany and the Netherlands ; in Italy, in consequence of the geographical situation, the Austrian forces outnumbered those of her allies. Down to the year 1704, the French armies and generals showed themselves superior to those of the allies. It required a hard struggle and the combined efforts of nearly all Europe finally to overcome the exhausted French. The battles were hotly contested and the losses heavy. In Germany, the barbarous conduct of operations on the part of the French, recalling the devastations of the Thirty Years' War, entailed much suffering, particularly upon the peaceful ])opulation. The systematic desolation of whole districts rendered thousands homeless, and as all their property was destroyed, many could but perish miserably. Compared with the earlier wars, a large increase in the size of the armies is to be noted ; 90,000 to 100,000 men under the command of a single general are not infrequently met with, where formerly 530,000 had been the maxinunn. A. The War of 1673-8 This war was not fought mainly on German soil ; the most important battles took place in the Netherlands and against the Spaniards in Sicily, and in these Austria had no j)art. In Germany also, the figliting was princi})ally done by the Nortli German contingents (Hanoverians and Brandenhurgcrs). 28 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS Hence, excepting the siege of riiilipp-sbuig, the Austrian troops sustained no heavy losses. Imperial Losses. — Victories Date. Effective .strength. Casualties. liullle. No. Per cent. Altenheini .... Consarhriick Siege of I'liilippsburg . Aug. I, 1675 Aug. I I, i'>75 June-Sept. 1070 22,000 17,000 60,000 3.000 1,100 10,000 140 6-5 i6-6 Impeuial Losses. — Defeats Jiattk. Dale. Effective strength. Losses. Casualiies. Other losses. So. 2,500 8,600 4,000 300 900 Per cent. No. Per cent. Sinsheini Senefle En.sisheini MiihJhausen Tiirkheini . June 16, 1674 Aug. II, 1674 Oct. 4, 1674 Dec. 29, 1674 Jan. 5, 1675 7.500 70,000 32.000 5.000 30,000 339 12-2 12-5 6-0 30 5.400 900 2,500 7-8 180 8-3 B. The War of 1689-97 {League of Augsburg) On account of the contemporaneous Great Turkish War, only a few Austrian troops fought against the French in this conflict. In the Netherlands, principally British, Dutch, and Brandenburgish troops were engaged ; in Italy, chiefly Pied- montese, with a few Austrians. Engagements in wliich no German troops were opposed to the Frencli are not included in the tabidation. The Austrians sustained no notable losses in this war. Losses of Lmperial Forces and Allies. — Victories nate. July-Sept. 1080 Sept.-Oet. 1689 July-Sept. 1695 Effective strength. Casualties. JidHlc. No. Per cent. Siege of Mainz Siege of ik)nn Siege of Naniur . 60,000 30,000 80,000 5.000 4,000 18,000 8-3 130 23-5 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 29 Losses of Impkrial Forces and Allies. — Defeats Losses. Battle. Date. Effective strc7igth. Casualties. Other losses. No. Per cent. No. Per cent . Loss of Philippsburg Oct. 1688 2,000 2,000 Fleurus . July I, 1690 38,000 11,000 29-0 8,000 2I-0 Staminia Aug. 18, 1690 18,000 2,800 i6-o 1,200 7-0 Leuze Sept. 19, 1O91 12,000 1,500 12-5 400 3-3 Steenkerken Aug. 3, 1692 63,000 6,600 IO-5 1,400 2-3 Neerwinden July 29, 1693 50,000 12,000 24-0 2,000 4-0 Marsaglia Oct. 4, 1693 36,000 9,000 25-0 2,000 5-5 C. The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-14 In this struggle, Emperor Leopold I, himself one of the pretenders to the Spanish throne, was foremost among the opponents of Louis XIV. The armed force which Austria sent into the world-wide confhct was of very considerable size, and was called upon to fight on the most widely separated fields. The emperor's claims were upheld in battle in Bavaria and Swabia, on the Rhine and in the Tyrol, in the Netherlands, northern and eastern France, upper Italy, Provence, and on the Iberian Peninsula, in both Spain and Portugal. In all these places the Austrians were represented by strong contingents, in spite of the fact that a civil war — the Hungarian Insurrection — was raging in the interior of the country. The Austrian losses, it is true, were relatively not so heavy as those of the allied British and Dutch ; yet they were considerable, and taken absolutely, in view of the long duration of the war, may be called high. It will be safe to place the casualties of the Austrian armies alone at 100,000 men at the least, and of these from 35,000 to 40,000 were killed or died of wounds. The combined losses of the other German contingents may be assumed to have been equally high ; those of the Dutch and English together may be estimated at 250,000, and those of the Piedmontcse at not less than 50,000. The allies must therefore have lost 500,000 30 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS men altofijctlier, in killed and wounded. As the losses of the Frencii, Bavarians, and Spaniards were certainly still greater, the grand total for the losses of the War of the Spanish Succession was well over a million men. of whom at least 4(10. OOO sacrificed their lives. This estimate, moreover, is limited to the troops actually engaged, and takes no account of non-combatants and the civil population. As there were during the war an extraordinary number of sieges of populous cities, and as in many districts, stripped bare by the armies, famine and pestilence became prevalent, the total loss of human life was undoubtedlv vastlv higher still. In the tables following, only those battles are considered in which German troops took part. In the discussion of the French losses, the remaining battles will receive more detailed treatment. Losses of Imperial Forces and Allies. — Victories i Casualties. Date. Effective Battle. 1 strength. \o. Per cent. Carpi .... July 9, 1 701 15,000 100 6-5 Chiari .... Sept. I, 1 701 22,000 200 10 Siege of Kaiserswert Apr.- June, 1702 38,000 9,000 235 Luzzara .... .Aug. 15, 1702 20,000 2,700 13-5 Siege of Landau . June-Sept., 1702 46,000 3,000 6-5 Donauwiirth July 2, 1704 25,000 6,000 24-0 Iliielistiidt .... Aug. 13, 1704 50,000 13.000 260 Siege of Landau . Sept.-Nov., 1704 30,000 5,000 16-5 Kaiuillies .... May 23, 1706 60,000 5,000 8-4 Turin .... Sept. 7, 1706 30,000 4.300 14-5 Oudenarde .... July II, 1708 90,000 6,000 6-7 Wynendael Sept. 28, 1708 10,000 1,000 100 Siege of Lille Aug.-Uec., 1708 35.000 14,000 400 Siege of Tournai . June-Sept., 1709 40,000 5.400 13-5 Malplacjuet Sept. II, 1709 93,000 25,000 270 Sic<,'c of Douai .\pr.-June, 17 10 60,000 8,000 13-5 .Mnicnara .... July 27, 1 710 24,000 400 1-7 Saragossa .... .Vug. 20, 1 710 22,000 1,600 7-4 Siege of lU'thune . .Iuly-.\ug., 1 7 10 31,000 3,000 100 Siege of .\irc Sept. Nov., 1710 28,000 7,000 250 Si«-g«- of MoMcliaiii . . j Aug.-Sept., 171 1 30,000 ■^.000 100 Siege of I,e Quesnoy June-July, 171 2 i8,c^ ^.lxx^ 17-0 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 31 Losses of Imperial Forces and Allies. — Defeats Losses. Battle. Dale. Effective strength. Casualties. Other Losses. No. Per cent. No. Per cent. Cremona . Feb. I, 1702 8,000 800 100 400 50 Friedlineiburg Nov. 16, 1713 9.300 3,600 380 D. Huliftarian Insurrection, 1701-11 Lmpeuial Losses. — Victories Casttalties. Date. Effective strength. Buttle. No. Per cent. Raab(Gyor) . . . . June 13, 1704 3,600 200 5-5 Pata Oct. 8, 1704 3,000 100 3-3 Tvrnau ..... Dec. 26, 1704 7,000 500 7-2 Zsibo Nov. 1 1, 1705 13.000 600 4-6 Trencsin ..... Aug. 4, 1708 10,000 500 50 I M r 1 : R I A LI ST Losses . — Defeats Date. Effect ii'e strength. Casualties. Battle. No. Per cent. Schnxillnitz .... Kolesd ..... May 28, 1704 Sept. 2, 1708 2,400 3.500 1,600 3,000 670 850 32 LOSSES OF LIFE IX MODERN WARS In comparison witli the contomporaneous War of the Spanish Succession and tlie Northern War, the Hungarian Insurrection was a conflict of the second order only. The forces levied were inconsiderable, seldom exceeding 10.000 men on the imperial side. Tlie insurgent armies, though commanded by competent military leaders, and usually superior in numbers, consisted chiefly of irregulars. The losses of the imperial armies in the war were not noteworthy, those of the insurgents disproportionately higher. The con- duct of the war was brutal and inhuman, as is generally the case with civil strife. Many inhabitants of the district desolated by fire and sword lost tlieir lives. CHAPTER VIII THE QFADUUPLE ALLIANCE AGAINST SPAIN In this war also, the chief scene of which was the island of Sicily, the forces placed in the field by each side were not large, the armies numbering only from 20,000 to 30,000 men. The battles, however, were rather stubbornly contested, and the losses not inconsiderable. In the battle of Milazzo, October 15, 1718, the Austrians lost twenty-five per cent in killed and wounded (1,500 out of 6,000 men) ; in the defeat at Francavilla, June 20, 1719, the percentage of losses was 14-5, or 3,100 out of 21,000. The capture of Messina, October 20, 1719, cost the Austrians 5,200 men out of an effective force of 18,000, a loss of thirty per cent, and the killed and wounded on the Austrian side in the whole war probably reached the number of 15,000. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 33 CHAPTER IX THE TWO TURKISH WARS OF EMPEROR CHARLES VI A. War of lim-lS This war lasted only two years, an unprecedentedly short duration for that time, and thanks to the capable leader- ship of their commander-in-chief, Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Austrians were victorious in all the decisive actions. In spite of these facts, however, they lost over 40,000 men in killed and wounded, a number which speaks for the obstinate bravery of the Turks. Losses of the Austrian Armies !),ilr. Effective strenglh. Casualties. Bat:le. No. Per cent. Petervarad Tcincsvar .... Belgrade .... Siege of Belgrade Aug. 5, 1716 Oct. 14, 1716 Aug. 16, 171 7 Junc-Aug., 1717 63,000 43,000 .SO.'jOO 1 ' ■. . I'J 4.500 4.500 5.400 20,000 61 lo-o IO-8 20-0 B. IFor 0/1737-9 By her alliance with Russia, Austria was involved in the Turkish-Russian War, which broke out in the year 1736, and which ended for the iMonarchy in disaster as great as had been the glory and extension of sovereignty won by the ])receding Turkish War. The Austrian generals kept always on the defensive, and there was only one imjiortant engage- ment, the Battle of Grocka. July 23, 1739. In this the Austrians were defeated, with a loss of 5,600 men out of 40,000, or fourteen per cent. Tlie total losses of the Austrian troops, exclusive of deatli by disease, probably did not exceed 20,000 men. loG'J U D 34 LOSSES OF LIFE IX AIODEKX WARS CHAPTER X WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION', 17.'i3-5 I.\ this war also, the Austrian arms were unsuccessful. As so often before, Italy was the princij)al scene of the war, and the allied French, Spaniards, and Sardinians were victorious in the more important battles. Operations were not energetically ])ushed bv either side, es])ecially on the Rhine, where the German contingents of the Empire were engaged. In Italy there were many more sieges than battles. In the whole war, Austria probably did not lose more than 30,000 uKMi in killed and wounded. AUSTHIAN LOSSKS. DEFEATS Dale. Ejjeclive strength. CasudHies. liattlc. No. Per mil. Bitonto ..... Parma ..... Guastalla .... May 25, 1734 June 29, 1734 Sept. 19, 1734 6,200 37,000 - 1,000 6,000 0,000 i6-2 22-2 CHAPTER XI WARS OE AUSTUIA WITH Fm:i)Kl{U K THE (;reat A. The War of the Austrian Succession, 1710-8 In this (jreat war, which was for hor a strujxijle for exis- tence, Austria, supported by Great Britain and Holland on the north and Sardinia on the south, opposed the combined powers of Prussia, Ravaria, Saxony, France, and Spain. She was com])elled to strain every resource to defend lierself against opponents greedy for a rich inheritance and com- manded by the a))lest military leaders of Iho lime, King Frederick II of Prussia and the French Marshal, Count AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 35 Moritz of Saxony. Fiercely contested battles had to be fought, involving losses both relatively and absolutely high ; the number of killed and wounded for Austria alone may be placed at 120,000. The cam])aigns in the Netherlands were principally carried on by English and Dutch troops, and the important engagements will be treated in connexion with the French losses. Austrian Lossks. — Victories Dote. Effective strength. Casualties. Battle. No. Per cent. Campo Santo .... Dettingen .... Piacenza .... Rottofreddo .... Feb. 8, 1743 June 27, 1743 June 16, 1746 Aug. 10, 1746 11,000 35,000 40,000 30,000 1,600 2,500 3,000 2,500 15-0 7-2 7-6 8-2 AusTRi.vN Losses. — Defeats Battle. Date. Effective strength. Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. Per cent. No. Per cent. Mollwitz . Chotusitz . C'unco Huhciifriedeberg Bassignano Soor Kesselsdorf Apr. 10, 1 74 1 May 17, 1742 Sept. 30, 1744 June 4, 1 745 Sept. 27, 1745 Sept. 30, 1745 Dec. 15, 1745 15,800 28,000 -5,000 75,000 30,000 38,000 35,000 3,000 3,000 3,600 9,600 1,000 4,500 3,800 i8-7 no 14-4 12-8 3-3 I2-0 II-O 1,500 3.300 900 5,600 1,500 3,000 6,700 9-5 12-4 3-6 75 50 8-0 19-0 B. The Seven Years' War, 1756-63 In Pnissia's memorable struggle for the position of a Power of the first rank, tremendous issues were at stake, and the losses were corres]Dondingly great. The last applies especially to Prussia, who found arrayed against her a coali- tion of the strongest military ])owers, Austria, France, and Russia, and Sweden in addition. The armies wliich Prussia put into the field are among the largest which any nation has ever offered on the altar of patriotism, and the final D2 3G LOSSES ()!• LIFK IN MODERN WARS tiiiinipli was ])iirchnsc(l with fearful satiifices of human hfe. Austria also, from of old the lea(liii«j; Power of Central Euro])e, emerj^ed from the stru<]:^lo morally strengthened and with new military «iK»ry. Tiie Prussian losses were undoul)tedly heavier tiian I he Austrian, as Prussia had to contend desperately with Russia and Prance at the same time. The losses of tlie Austrian armies were as follows, accordini; to tlic ofhcial records: Killc.i Died til" wduiids or disfase Lust, unnccoiinti'fi for Ti.tal (li;i(l Prisoners Dcsi-rtcrs Discharged for disal>ility . T(»tal losses 32,622 '^3,408 10,592 I45.62i 78,3^ 62,222 17.388 303.592 To these should he added those wounded who recovered and returned to duty, i.e. the *sli -'.200 I2-0 Maxell Dtc. .11, 1759 3'-^- ■ 1,000 271 1 Lnndcslnil .luiie 23. 1760 38,700 3,000 7-7, .Storiiiin;,' of Sehweiil- 1 1 iiit/. Utt. I. 1701 14,000 1,700 120 KrMsdorf . Oct. 15, 1762 50.000 1,400 2-8 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 37 AusTRi^vN Losses. — Defeats Losses. Battle. nalc. Effective strength. Casualties. Other losses. Xo. Per cent. No. Per cent. Lobositz Oct. I, 1756 33.000 2,200 6-7 800 -i-4 Prague May 6, 1757 61,000 9,200 15-1 4,400 7-2 Leuthen Dec. 5, 1757 65,000 io,ooo 15-4 17-000 26-1 Loss of Rreslaii Dec. 19, 1757 17,000 17,000 100 -o Loss of Schweidnitz Apr. 16, 1758 8,000 8,000 1000 Liegnitz Aug. 15, 1760 30,000 3,800 13-4 2,200 6-7 Torgau Nov. 3, 1760 66,000 9,000 13-6 7,000 IO-6 IJurkcrsdorf . July 21, 1762 20,000 1,800 90 1,200 60 Iteichenbach Aug. 16.. 1762 32,000 1,200 37 700 -5-3 Loss of Schweidnitz Aug.-Oct. 1762 12,500 3,500 28-0 9,000 72-0 Freiberg Oct. 29, 1762 31,000 3,000 97 4,400 143 C. War of the Bavarian Succession, 1778-9 Although the opposing armies in this contest were several times as strong as those of either opponent in the Seven Years' War, there was not a single important engagement in the ten months of its duration. Operations were con- ducted on a small scale, battles were insignificant, and losses correspondingly small. With respect to disease, however, conditions were unusually bad, and fifty times as many men died from this cause as were killed in battle. The number of deserters also was considerable — in the Prussian army in particular, extraordinarily large. The official losses of the Austrian troops are shown by the statement following : Killed or died of wounds NVountitd (not fatally) Missing Prisoners . Discharged for disability Deserters . Died of disease . Total losses . Generals. Ollnr njjiccrs. Min. 9 265 4 1-23 137 62 2,802 26 372 3,012 74 i-:,546 175 19,257 38 LOSSES OF LII-K I\ MODKRX WARS These luimlH'is represent ten per cent of the fighting strenioo 43,000 24,000 43.000 60,000 90,000 22,500 50,000 28,000 28,000 41,000 27,( >. . I 36,000 44,000 28,000 36,000 28,000 26,000 40,000 CaauaUiea. Sn. 2,000 900 1,000 3.000 1,300 1,800 1,000 1,500 2,800 3,000 700 1,000 3.000 700 1,600 1,200 1,000 800 2,800 1.300 Per cent. 6-2 2-3 1-9 7-0 5-5 4-3 1-7 1-7 12-5 60 2-5 3-5 7-5 2-6 44 30 00 2-3 100 50 I2-0 AusTRi.\.N Losses. — Defe.vts lilllllc. .Iemai>|)ts Ilondschootc . Unsuccessful Siege of Dunkerque . Wattigniis Weissenburg Lines Tourcoing Fleurus . Nov. 6, 1 792 Sept. 8, 1793 Sept. 1793 Oct. 16, 1793 Dec. 1793 May 18, 1794 June 26, 1794 Effrclhr stniiiilh iMssrs. CfisiKtIlies. Other losses. No. Per cent. 13,200 1,000 8<3 16,000 1,600 lO-O 37,000 2,000 5-5 30,000 2,500 8-3 30,000 3.000 lo-o 74,000 4,000 5-5 46,000 5.000 110 No. 500 1,400 500 1,500 1,500 Per cent. 4-0 8-8 1-7 50 2-0 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 41 AusTKiAN Losses — Defeats {continued) Losses. Casualties. Other losses. Hal tie. Date. Kjjeclive itrengtit. So. 1,500 Per cent. No. Per cent. Sj)riinont Sept. 18, 1794 18,000 8-5 1,000 4-3 Aldenhuvcii Oct. 2, 1794 77,000 3,000 40 800 1-2 Loano Nov. 23, 1793 18,000 3,000 16-5 4,000 22-5 Fightin<:j in the Mari- time Alps Apr. 11-14,1790 28,000 1,400 50 4,200 I5-0 Lodi May 10, 1796 9,500 400 4-5 1,700 17-5 Altenkirchen . June 4, 1796 14,000 1, 000 ; ■ 1 1,500 IO-5 .MaLsch . July 9, 1796 45,000 1,300 2-8 1,300 2-8 Loiiato . Aug. 3, 1796 15,000 1,000 7-0 2,000 130 Castiehstadt II(;lK(ilin(len Mincio River losses. Casualties. Other losses. Bailie ritinie Mar. I, 1799 .Mar. 6, 1799 Mar. 25, 1799 Mar. 25, 1799 Mar. 26, 1709 May 1, 1799 May 25, 1799 June 12, 1799 .June 20. 170'j .■\Ug. 1(>, I J',') Sept. 25, 1799 -May 3. 1800 May 5, iSc>) May c^, 1 8( x 1 May .June, iSoo June <;. i8cx) June 1.}, i8tK) .June 19, i8(X) iJec. 3, i8 v> 3,4LX) 2,200 6,500 6,000 8,800 8,000 10,000 6,000 8,000 4,400 10,000 72,000 48,000 20,000 So. 170 i 400 1,000 500 I 2,000 600 2,200! 750] 1,000 I 400 ' 1,500 3,000 2,400 1,250 Per cent. 50 22-0 i6-o 8-3 22-0 7-5 22-0 12-5 12-5 91 15-0 4-2 51 6-3 So. Per cent. 2.830 83-0 1,100 50-0 4,000 62 i.yxj 249 1,500 i8-o 2,000 245 3,000 300 1,650 27-5 1,300 150 1,800 40-9 3.500 35-0 4,000 5-5 1,600 3-3 2,750 13-7 2,ULXJ I2*U 8,000 48-0 2,100 I 13-0 2,200 ; 140 7,000 ; 22-4 I 4,000 ' 130 1,000 I lo-o 3,000 300 52,000 j 5,200 j lo-o j 6,700 : 130 50.000 14,100! 8-2 ' 4,300 8-6 1 7,1 xje) 16.000 31,000 10,000 AUSTRLV-IIUXGARY 43 CIIArXEK XV THE XAPOLEOMC" WAKS, ISO.') -15 A. War of the Third CoaUtion. 1805 Napoleon I brought this important war to a conchision within two months. Witli tlio single exception of the battle of Caldiero, the Austrians were everywhere unsuccessful, and suffered heavy losses, especially in prisoners and missing. The losses of the different nationalities may be estimated as follows : Killed, wounded, and missing . Prisoners .... Total Austrians. liussians. 20,ooo 25,000 70,000 90,000 25,000 50,000 French. 30,000 5,000 35,000 Austrian Losses. — Victory Date. Effective strength. Casualties. Ballle. No. Per cent. Caldiero .... Oct. 30, 31, 1805 49,000 5.700 I2-0 Austrian Losses. — Defeats nnltlr Date. Effective strength. Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. Per cent. No. Per cent. Ulm Canipaign Capitulation of Dorn- l)irn . Capitulation of Cas- telfranco Obcr Ilollahruiin Austerlitz Oct. 8-20, 1805 Nov. I }, t8^-)5 Nov. 24, 1805 Nov. 16, 1805 Dec. 2, 1805 63,000 4,000 4,800 7,000 1 6,000 6,000 400 1,200 4,000 9-5 8-5 170 250 48,000 4,000 4,000 1,800 2,000 760 100 -O 92-5 25-0 12-5 44 LOSSES OF Lirj-: IN MODERN ^VARS B. Austria against France and the Rliine Confederation, 1809 In this war Austria stood alone ajijainst the main army of France and tlie continnjents of the Confederation of the Kliine, the young ItaHan kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. (About a third of the French forces were scattered over S])ain. ) It was the most sanguinary and most stubbornly contested war Austria has ever waged. It was decided against her in three months, and cost her half her armies, or a sacrifice of 90,000 men killed and wounded and 80.000 prisoners and missing. The casualties of the victors, who were commonly on the offensive, were heavier than those of their opponent. The French armies alone must have lost 90,000 men, and the allied troops at least i20,000. The losses in prisoners and missing of the successful contestants, howevei-, })robably did not exceed 20.000 men. Austrian Losses . — Victories Br t tie Date. Effective sireiiiilh. 30. ( > M 1 lA>sse.s. Cthsualties. Other losses. \n. Per ! ^„ Per cent.] ^°' \cent. Sacile . Aspcrn . Apr. 1 6, 1809 Alay 21, 22, iS 3,600 - 0.000 9-3 — 20-2 1 3,000 1 30 Austrian Losses. — Defeats lialtlc. Date. I Effective strength. 176,000 30,000 25,000 37,000 136,000 60,000 Losses. Casualties. Other losses. .. Per ■^"- cent. .Vf>. Per cent. Battles around Re- mnslturi,' . . Apr. 16-23, 1809 KI)rlsJ)ir<,' . . May 3, 1809 Piavc River . . May 8, 1809 Raab . . . .lime 14, 1809 \\"a;:ram . . .luly 5, 0, 1809 Ziiaiin . . . .Inly 10, II. 1809 17,000 1 y-i 3,000 100 1,900 77 3.500 9-5 19,000 14-0 3,200 5-4 28,000 4,200 1,700 6,500 19,000 3,000 l6-o 14-0 6-8 140 50 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 45 C. Austria's fart in the Russian Campaign of Napoleon, 1812 The Austrian auxiliary coi-ps which took part in the Russian campaign consisted of 33,000 men. Together with the Saxon contingent, these formed the extreme riirht wing of the grand army, and had no part either in the impor- tant battles which were fought or in the disastrous retreat of Napoleon's army. The losses in the different engage- ments, in which the Austrians were generally victorious, amounted to 5,000 men ; 4,000 more succumbed to cold and hardship. D. The Wars of Liberation, 1813-14 In order to fell the Titan, who had returned from the Russian steppes practically without an army, the European States shut him in an iron ring, and Austria was one of the important links of the chain. With the exception of Turkey, every State in Europe took part in the struggle, which represents a tenseness of military effort as yet unequalled, and which could hardly arise again. The role of Austria in the mighty struggle was an important one, as it was her joining the coalition which assured to the allies the numerical superiority. The heaviest losses in the great battles which were fought were borne by Russia and Prussia, as they commenced hostilities at the beginning of the year 1813 — Russia continuing the war of the year before and Prussia as her first ally — while Austria did not enter the coalition until the end of August. The principal battles were fought in the months of May, August, September, and Octobei-, and entailed enormous sacrifices of human hfe. As no records of the losses, or only very defective ones, exist, the statistician is forced to take refuge in estimates. 46 LCJSSES OF LIFi: IN AIODKUX WARS Losses dv Nationamtiizs. — Operations of 1813 yintinniilihj. hiltiil imd xc'ittndtd. .Missing. Prisoners, . 1, 1.514 Feb. 2.-J, 1S14 Mar. 16-20, 1814 Mar. 20-21, 1 814 Mar. 30, 1S14 Effective strength. Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. ■1:' 1 . S • ' 1 ''^' .V • -' 1 30,000 1,900 20,000 1,300 15.000 750 Per enii. yi 6-3 6-5 5-0 So. I,OGO Per rrtil. 30 AiSTiiiAV Losses. — Dkkeats Battle. Date. Effective strength. 32,000 4,000 10,000 4,000 Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. ^^ cait. ^»- i ^Z. Mineio River Mdiitcrcaii Troyis Parma Feb. 8. 18 1 4 Feb. 1 8. 1814 Feb. 23, 1814 •Mar. 2, 1 81 4 2,800 700 800 600 8-8 17-5 80 15-0 1, 20c I 500 1,200 1,700 3-0 37-0 I2-0 420 OPKKATIOXS or 1815 In this * War of the Hundred Days ', as it i> known, Austria was not deeply involved. The issue had alreatly been decided at Waterloo when the Austrian troops reached the eastern boundary of France and opened hostilities. On account of the small numbers of the French forces in Alsace, Lorraine, the Dauphiny, and Savoy, there were no great battles. Operations were practically hmited to the invest- ment of Strassburfj, Belfort, Huningen, and Schlettstadt. It is hardly probable that the total losses of the Austrian troops reached o.UUO, of whom not more than 13,000 were killed and wounded. E. The War uHli Xaplcs The war with Joachim Murat, Kinfj of Naples and brother- in-law of Napoleon, was successfully concluded by the Austrians in two months (April to June 1815). The armies AUSTRIA-III XGARY 49 billed. Wounded, Missing 9 -97 43 1,294 4 310 in the field iuinil)eretl ;JU,UUU 011 eacli side. The official statement of the Austrian losses follows : Officers .... Men .... The numbers are small in comparison with the imj)()itance of the results achieved. The losses of the Neapolitans were I3,0U0 killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners, according to a statement which is probably fairly accurate. There was only one important battle, in which the Austrians won a decisive victory : Battle. Date. Effective strength. Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. Per cent. Xo. Per cent. Tolentino . Maya, 1815 11,000 700 6-3 200 1-9 CHAPTER XVI MIXOU WARS. 1816- 18 The exhaustion of all the European countries in the twenty-four years of warfare against France was followed l)y an interval of peace extending down to the revolutionary year of 1848. This was interruj)ted only by various military interventions, such as that of France in Spain in 1823, and in Belgium in 18;30, and that of tiie naval Powers in the Greek ^Var of Independence, and by a few internal insurrec- tions. Notable among the latter were the Revolution of 1830 in France, the uprising of 1830-1 in Poland, and the (rreek struggle for independence, 1822-9 (with contem- poraneous war l)etween Russia and Turkey). Though Austria had no part in any of these struggles, she was forced to send out a number of minor expeditions. They were by 1569U E 50 LOSSES or LIFE IN MODERN WARS no moans wortliy of llio name of wars, liowcver, and tlic losses incurrctl were in>i> 1845 Punitive Lxni-dition ajiainst the Hosnians . »» 1846 Quelhnjr 0' disturbances in Dahnatia and I'racow • • CHAPTER XMl THE WARS OF THE REVOLITIOXAHV PKriR)!). 1818-9 The great revolutionary movement of the year 1848 shook Austria to tlie depths and threatened the permanence of the Empire. Disorder seethed in every nook and corner of the Monarchy, and the loyal troops liad mucli woik to do, within the country and outside of it a> well. In addition to quelling disturbances in Vienna. Cracow, Lemherg, and Prague, two campaigns were conducted against Sardinia and the States of Upper Italy, whicli were in an uproar. An uprising of the Serbs in southern Hungary and, finally, the determined revolutionary attempt of tlie Magyars, had also to be dealt witli. The troops successfully performed their task, though tlie great Hungarian insurrection was put down onlv witli tlie etlicient hel]) of an auxiliary Rus>ian army 190,000 strong. The relative losses of the troops in all these encounters were light, and as at the same time the numbei> engaged were small (rarely reaching 50,000) the total l()v>o^ wvro also inconsiderable. AUSTIUA-IIUXGARY 51 Thanks to the special studies and investigations of modern wars which the Im})eiial and Royal Military Archives (Military History section of the General Staff) have con- ducted, detailed official casualty lists are available for military operations since 1848. These do not, however, include statistics of the deaths by disease and from hardshi}) among the troops, a subject which has unfortunately received very scant treatment in most of the work of general staffs. The writer of the present monogra})h has taken upon himself the task of verifying or correcting the figures for the casualty losses of officers in the Imperial and Royal Army in all the wars of the Monarchy since 1848. The tabuhited results of this special investigation will be given a place at the conclusion of the discussion. A. The Suppression of the Popular Uprisings of the Year 1848 The overthrow of the internal insurrections cost the Austrian troops the losses shown below. Place and date. Killed. Wounded. Generals. --> Officers. 2 17 Men. Generals. Officers. Men. Cracow, Apr. 25-26, 1848 . Prarruc, .June ii-iS, 1848 , Vienna, Oct. 6, 25-31, 1848 8 12 200^ I I 60 10 47 45 60 1,000* The insurgents had disproportionately higher losses ; of the defenders of Vienna t3,00U to 4,000 were killed. B. War of Austria u'ith Sardinia and the Provinces in Insurrection in Upper Italy, March to August 1848 In this five months' war, the Austrian arms were almost uniformly victorious, but in consequence of the small strength of the opposing forces there were no imj)ortant battles ^ Approximately. E2 52 LOSSES OF r.IFK IN MODERN WARS involvinr; notable losses. The killed and wounded in the principal actions never exceeded tlie number of a thousand men. as is shown in tlie table. AusTKiAN Losses, Saudiman Wau Date. Kffirlivr .strength. Casualiies. Battle. So. 350 700 400 900 600 900 500 Per cent. Santa Lucia .... Curtiitonc .... Ciolto ..... N'icenza ..... Sona ..... Custozza .... Volta May 6, 1848 May JO, 1848 May 30. 1848 June 10, 1848 .July 23. 1848 July 25, 1848 July 27, 1848 19,000 19,000 11,000 31.000 42,000 55.000 19,000 1-7 3-7 3-3 30 1-5 2-7 2-6 The losses of the Austrian troops in Radetzky" of 1848 are stated by the General Staff as follow> Killed Wounded Mi.ssini^ Prisoners Officers. 03 212 16 26 camj)aign Men. 967 3.236 3,826 893 Total 317 8,922 In addition, there were 17,000 men in garrisons at the beginning of the war, who were cut off from as.sistance and lost to Austria. A renewal of the insurrection in the Austrian Provinces and another declaration of war by Sardinia in 1S49 made necessary another campaign by Field-^Iarshal Radetzky. C. Cam]mitria was the suppression of the insurrection in Hungary. The Hungarian re«:iments obeyed the commands of tlieir new ministry, and fought against the imperial forces. As at the same time the Monarchy had several other internal uprisings to deal will), and in addition was compelled to employ a large portion of her best troops against Sardinia, her forces were insufficient to overcome the revolutionists. \Vith the help of a Russian army of IfKI.OOO men. they were subdued after almost a year of fighting. There were few decisive battles in the contest, but many minor engagements. In the two greatest battles (both near Komorn, July !2 and July 11), the Austrians were about 50.000 strong and lost only 900 in each encounter. In this war also, neither the relative nor the numerical losses were large, but many soldiers and non-combatants as well perished from the diseases which became epidemic. Cholera, tyi)hus fever, and malaria wrought much more destruction than did the weapons of the armies. On account of the disturbed conditions of the time, no official casualty lists were published, and the statis- tician is thrown back upon estimates. The probable losses of the Austrian troops are shown in the table. AusTiuAN Losses (Estimatku) Killed and wounded .... Prisoners not wounded Died of tliseasf .... Hlssi.vn Losses (Official ST.VTr.MENT) Officers. Men. Killed in hatllc .... 2- 543 Died of wounds .... zo 313 Wounded, not fatally . . . 129 1.457 Total . 170 2.313 Officers. Men. l>00 16,000 ji < 1 I.]. 1 . V ■ ' •4 . - AUSTRIA-IIIXGARY 55 Deaths from disease reached the fearful number of 13,554, of which 7,809 were from cholera. The total number of men stricken with disease reached 30,000, or nearly sixteen per cent of the troops who went into the war CHAPTER XVIIT THE WAR WITH 1 UAXCE AND SAllDIXIA, 1859 This cam})aign of barely two months in Upper Italy cost both sides large sacrifices. The battles were stubbornly contested and bloody, and the losses high as to both absolute numbers and percentages. The killed and wounded num- bered about the same on both sides, amounting to 30,000, or 24,000 French and 6,000 Sardinians against 30,000 Austrians. The French lost 1,158 officers and the Sardinians 310 ; Austria, 1,109 killed and wounded and 168 missing and prisoners. The French and Sardinians together lost about 5,000 men in prisoners and missing, the Austrians over 15,000. In this struggle, the fortunes of war were against the Austrian arms ; in all the more important engagements she was defeated. Her losses in detail are shown in the table. Austrian Losses Battle. Dnlc. Effective strength. Losses. Casualties. Other losses. No. Per cent. 5-9 9-4 9-2 4-2 lO-I No. 400 500 4,500 I;I40 8,700 Per cent. Montcbellu Paic-stro . MajjtiUa . Mt'lfffiiano Solferino May 20, 1859 May 31, 1859 June 4, 1859 June 8, 1859 June 24, 1859 18,700 18,000 62,000 8.500 130,000 1,100 1,700 5.700 3tX3 13.100 21 2-S 7-3 i3« 6-8 iG LOSSES 01- LUi: IN MODERN WARS CIIAITER XIX ])anisii-(;i:km \\ w \ii or isci In conjuiu-tiini willi Riu»ia, Aii-^tria ]>arliii])ali'd in the exj)edition aj^ainst Denmark in 18G4. Her contingent of 21.000 men finished their part of the work in a five- weeks' campaign, tliough the Prussian army of twice their strength had still to accomplish the main task of storming the trenches at Diippel and crossing to Alsen. This was not effected and the war brought to a successful conclusion until the end of June. The only actions of the Austrians were the battles of Oberselk and Jagel, Oeversee and Veile, in which they were victorious, and the indecisive sea fight at Heligoland. The losses follow : Austrian Losses Officers. Men. Killed . . . . . . . 16 211 Woumlfd ...... 61 751 Missing ...... — 61 Total ..... 77 1,023 Prussian Losses Killed . ^Vr)UIldc (1 Missin;: . Officers. Men. 55 462 I j6 1,696 -> 102 Total . . . . . 163 2,260 The Danish losses may be estimated at 4,000 men killed and wounded and 7,000 missing and prisoners. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 57 CHAPTER XX THE WAPx WITH PRl^SSIA OF 1866 AND THE AUSTRO- ITALIAX WAI{ OF 1866 The antagonism between the two leading Powers of the German Confederation, wliich had been latent for several decades and had repeatedly threatened to break out into armed conflict, led in June 1866 to the great war for the hegemony in Germany. On the side of Austria were Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, the Electorate of Hesse, Nassau, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, and Baden ; with Prussia stood the North German States with the exception of Hanover, and also her southern ally, the young Italian kingdom, to which Venice had been promised as a reward for participating in the war. The hostilities lasted barely a month, but the losses were heavy, especially on the side of the defeated contestant, as the victors were much better armed. The great Prussian victories in Bohemia, and in particular the crushing defeat at Konicrgriitz, brought the war to an earlv conclusion unfavourable to Austria, even though she had triumphed brilliantly over the superior forces of the Italians on both land and sea. The armies opposed in this short war were very large. As in the Napoleonic era, 500,000 men stood in the opposing lines, but with the difference that they did not belong to so manv nationalities as at the time of the Wars of Liberation. Forces of Prussia and iikii Ai Prussian troops . Italian Regulars . Italian Volunteers Total . LI r.s 437,000 166,000 34000 637,000 58 LOSSES OV LII-i: IN MODKKN WARS FOUCES OF AfSTlUA ANU HKH AlMKS Auslr(>-lluii;.';iriaii troops Havarian ('oi)tiii;.'riit Wiirttc-nilHTji contin^fiU Hessian roiitiii^iciit Mlccloratr of llcsst- contingent Ilanovc-riat) contingent liadenese contingent . Saxon contingent Total . . 407,000 53.000 . 7,000 • • * 13.000 . 7.000 . ^0,000 . 5,000 . u.ooo 544,000 Lo.y.sr.y of tlw Austro-HmiLiariau Troops ^ 1. \Vau A(;ainst Phissia A. Campaign in Holieniia (Army of the North) Killed or (lied of wounds Missing (not later heard from) \\'oiHuled (ineluding wounded prisoner.^ Prisoners not wounded Total Officers. Men. 743 6,650 77 11.530 1.377 28,984 382 25.896 .579 73'06o 15. ( ampaign in \\'est Germany (Halm's Brigade) Officers. Men. Killed or died of wounds .... Missing ....... Wounded (including prisoners) Prisoners not wounded .... Total 38 2,350 5 233 — 67 16 398 17 1,652 'J. \\ Alt ACAINST ItAI.V A. Venetian Campaign (.\rmy of the South) Killed or died of wounds Missing Wounded . Prisoners or dispersed Total . fleers. Men. 102 7 1,224 680 200 15 3.710 2,708 324 8,322 ' Results of a special investigation by the present writer. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 59 B. Defence of the T>to1 Killed or died of wounds Missing:; Wounded . Prisoners . Total . Officers. 8 5 3<3 Men. 9-1 4 445 864 C. Battles on the Adriatic Sea Killed or died of wounds Wounded . Total . Officers. 3 17 20 Men. 63 198 261 Summary, War ^VITH Prussia Kiiicd or died of wounds Missing (not later heard from) Wounded (including prisoners) Total casualties . Other losses Total losses Officers. Men. 748 6,883 77 11.597 1,393 29,382 2,218 399 2,617 47,862 27,548 75,410 StTMMARY, War with Italy Killed or died of wounds Missing (not later heard from) Wounded . , . • Total casualties . Other losses Total losses Officers. Men. 113 7 240 i>379 684 4,221 360 20 6.284 3,153 380 9.437 Summary, both Wars combint^d Killed or died of wounds Missing (not later heard from) Wounded (including prisoners) Casualties, both wars . Prisoners not wounded Total losses, both wars Officers. 861 84 1,633 2,578 419 Men. 8,262 12,281 33.^54 2. Losses of the S.^xons Officers. Men. Killed or died of wounds .... 38 203 ^V(»unded ....... 44 1,229 Missing and prisoners ..... — 580 'iotal ...... 82 2,012 .J. Losses of tue IL\NovEniAxs Officers. Men. Killed or died of wounds • • • • 33 34^ Wounded (including prisoners) ... 70 9S1 Prisoners not wounded .... 417 14,846 Total ...... 520 16,173 4. Losses of the B.\denese Officers. Men. Kilh-d or died of wounds .... 5 19 NVounded ....... 3 II2 Missing and prisoners ..... i 56 Total ...... 9 187 5. Losses of the IIessi.\ns Killi-d or died of wounds .... \Vt)unded ....... Missing and prisoners ..... Total ...... 43 942 6. Losses of IIks.sian Electouate Troops Officers. Men. Killed or died of wounds . . . . i — Missing and prisoners ..... i 89 ToUil 2 89 Officers. Men. 10 77 ^7 417 S 448 AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 61 7. Losses of Wurttembeug Tuoops OJJicers. Killed or died of wounds . . . . I2 Wounded . . . . . . . 14 Missing and prisoners ..... 3 Total ...... 29 Men. 55 438 195 688 8. Summary of Losses of Austrian Allies Officers. Men. 424 6,153 449 17.592 Total losses ..... 873 23,745 Total casualty loss of Austrian Allies Other losses of Austrian Allies Losses of the Prussians 1. CAMPAIGN IN BOUEMIA Killed Died of wounds . Wounded . Missing or dispersed Total . Died of disease . Officers. 142 62 521 725 51 Men. 2,231 1,188 12,625 660 16,704 6,116 2. Ca^ipaign IN West Germany Officers. Killed 36 Difd of wounds . ^Vou^ded .... Missing .... Prisoners not wounded Total . Died of disease . 3. Str:kiiiARY of Prussi Killed or died of wounds Wounded . Total casualty losses Missing Prisoners not wounded Died of disease Total Prussian losses 148 10 216 2 VN Losses Officers. 262 669 931 10 5^ 994 Men. 522 251 2,923 125 900 4.721 258 Men. 4,192 15,548 19,740 785 900 6,374 27.799 62 LOSSES OF LITE IX MODERN WARS Losses of the Italians 1 . \ i;nj:ii \n ( AMrAK.s Killed or (lied of wounds .Missiiii,r (not hilcr heard from) Wounded .... Prisoners .... Total OjJicCTH. Men. 76 641 484 257 2.4(^3 43 3.068 376 2. B.\TTLES IN tut: TVHOI, Killed or died of wounds Misbiiifj (not later heard from) Wounderl .... Prisoners .... Total . :j. IJ.VTTLES ON THE ADRIATIC SeA OJJicers. Killed or died of wounds .... 38 Wounded ....... 6 Total ■\\ 4. SuMMAiiv OF It.mjan Losses Killed or died of wounds !Missinjx . . . . Wounded . . . . 'I'dtal casualty losses I'risontrs 'J'olal Kalian losses 497 Comimrisoii of Losses by Xationalities 1. Casualty Losses Prussians . Italians .\ustrians . AiLstrian Allies . Prussians and Italians .•\ustrians and .Mlies 7.256 OJJicers. Men. 15 250 69 46 1,001 16 1.358 2.678 Men. 613 153 766 OJJicers. Men. 129 1.504 — 55i 309 3.617 438 5.674 59 5,026 10,700 OJJicers. Men. 931 20,525 438 5.674 2,578 54.146 424 6.153 J. 369 26,199 3,002 60,299 1 I AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 63 2. Other Losses Officers. Men. Prussians .... ■ • lo 900 Italians .... . 59 5,026 Austrians .... . 419 30,701 Austrian Allies . . 449 17.592 Prussians and Italians . . 69 5.926 Austrians and Allies • 868 48.293 ;j. ToiAi Losses Officers. Men. Prussians .... . 941 21.435 Italians .... . 497 10 700 Austrians .... . • . ^.997 84,847 Allies .... . 873 23,745 Prussians and Italians . . . 1,438 32,135 Austrians and Allies . . 3,870 108,592 The Prussian army lost by cholera 5i3 officers (of wliom three were generals) and 6,37-i men, a total of 6,427 souls. Hence the number who were killed or died of wounds, 262 officers and 4,192 men — total 4,454, was considerably under that of the men carried off by disease and pestilence. In regard to the deaths from disease in the Austrian and Italian armies, we unfortunately possess no clue. The Austro-Hungarian armies show a notably higher pro- portion of their effective strength killed or wounded in battle than do the Prussians. This is brought out by the following tabular statement : Austrian IIklative Losses Effective strength. Killed. }youndeiniile enf^ajrenients : Austrian Lossks. — Victokies Battle. Dale. Kffective strength. 75,000 8,000 Casua Losses. Uies. Other losses. So. Per cent. So. 1,800 Per ceiU. Custozza . Lissa (naval battle) June 24, 1866 July 20, 1866 6,200 200 8-5 2-5 2-4 ArsTiiiAN I.ov^i <._])] II :at>^ Battle. Date. Effect hx: Casua Uies. .sr.v. Other lo sses. atreiigth. So. Per cent- So. Per cent. ^Vysokow Trautcnau Soor Skalitz . Jitschin Konifij^ralz June 27, 1866 June 27, 1866 June 28, 1866 June 28, 1866 June 29, iSd'j July 3, 1 866 31,000 27,000 22,000 23,000 44,000 215,000 3,700 3,600 1,100 3,330 2,900 31,400 12-0 134 5-2 14-5 6-6 146 2,100 1,200 2,700 2,270 2,600 12,900 7-0 4 4 12-3 10 -o 54 6-0 CHAPTER XXI THK (KCUPATIOX OF BOSNIA AND IIKKZKCON I\ \. 1S78 In the Con]iressed. and cost the Austrians 47 officers and 1.144 men kilK'd. and 1:^5 officers and ;>.878 men wounded. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 65 CHAPTER XXH SUPPRESSIOX OF UPRISINGS IX SOUTHERN DALMATIA AND KRIVOSIILVN, 18G0. 1882 Ox two occasions disturbances in the extreme south of the Monarchy, due to dissatisfaction with Austrian rule, and in particular with the execution of new military service laws, have necessitated the presence of troops in these districts. In the year 1869, 12,000 men were required to control the situation, and in 1882, 63,000 were called out. Operations in this rugged and inhospitable region were limited to petty warfare, which was waged with varying success. The losses of the troops in 1869 were 13 officers and 61 men killed, 9 officers and 137 men wounded, and 8 men missing. In the expedition of 1882, 4 officers and 68 men were killed, 13 officers and 242 men wounded, and 8 men missing. In the latter year five of the wounded officers and sixteen of the men died of their wounds, and 450 men also perished by disease. CHAPTER XXIII THE HOXER UPRISING IN CHINA, 1000 In the armed expedition of the Great Powers against the Boxers in China, who were threatening the lives of European residents, Austrian marines also shared. Although present in smaller numbers than those of the other Powers, thev played an active part, fighting bravely in the capture of Tientsin and Peking, and especially in the defence of the legation buildings. They suffered losses as follows : Officers. Seamen. Kilk-d in action ...... 2 5 Succumbed to hardship . . . . i 5 VV^oundcd ....... 3 12 15G911 F 66 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODKUX WARS CHAITKK XXIV COMPARATIVE LOSSES OF AUSTIUA AND OTHER COUNTHIES From the forccroing discussion it will be seen that the Thirty Years' War, the Great Turkisli War. and the Seven Years' War, cost the Austrian .Monarchy the j^reatest losses of life. The wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era involved Austria deeply, it is true, but here her losses, particularly the number who were killed or died of wounds, were usually smaller than those of her antagonists. The recent wars in which she has been engaged have been much less destructive of human life than those of other States in recent times. The Polish-Russian War of 1831, the Crimean War of 1854-6, the American War of Secession of 1861-5, the Franco-German War of 1870-1, the Turkish- Russian War of 1877-8, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, have all cost the contending Powers far greater losses than Austria suffered in the wars of 1859 and 1866. This is true with respect both to the number killed or who dicos of generals and other higher ofticers : Hank. Marslials . CJciuriils ()r(li\ Imuiis . Hri;^ii(iiiT-gciitruls Colonels . Liiiitciiant-coloncls Majors Total . Killed. Woutuled 3 23 43 ■213 1-3 498 262 1,031 lOI 447 769 2,704 1. 301 4.QI6 That i> to say, in eleven years France lost more officer^ killed than Austria has lost in the course of three hundred years. These numbers are most significant. APPENDIX RECAPITI'I.ATIOX OF CASl^ALTIES AMOXG GENERALS AND STAFF-OFFICERS, 1G18-191.3 Thirty Years' War 185 War against Sweden ........ i I'.iiiiatrt'mciits at Siebenbiirgcn ....... 2 Turkish War 6 War against France . . . . . . . . 10 Kuruc Insurrection ......... i Groat Turkisli War 87 War against France ........ 5 Spanish War of Succession ....... 60 War of the Hungarian Insurrection ...... 2 Turkish War 39 Quachuplo .Vlhance against Spain . . . . . . 11 War of Pohsh Succession ....... 25 Turkish War 29 Austrian War of Succession ....... 49 Seven Years' War ......... 87 Turkish War 19 lielgian Insurrection ........ 4 First Coahtion War ........ 69 Second Coahtion War ........ 73 Tliird Coahtion War 17 NVar against France ........ 58 War against Russia ........ 3 War of Liberation 26 Itahan Camjiaign ......... 16 Prague Insurrection ........ I Vienna Insurrection ........ 3 Hungarian Insurrection ........ 24 Italian Campaign ......... 8 War ajjainst Sanhnia and France . . . . . . 31 War against Denmark ........ 4 War against Italy ......... ll \Var against I'russia ........ 57 Insurrection in South Dalmatia ...... i Occupation of Bosnia ........ 6 Insurrection in Krivoscije ....... I Hoxer Insurrection in China ....... i 1,032 The following table shows the casualty losses (killed and vroimded and mi.ssing not later heard from) of Austrian 70 LOSSKS or IJFK IX MODERN WARS ofiicors ill tlic most important battles of the pa>t three centuries. Tlie hist cohimn shows the per cent of the total loss represented by the loss of officers. Date. 702 706 716 717 734 734 739 741 74-: 745 745 746 75<'> 757 757 757 757 758 759 760 760 793 796 799 799 800 805 809 809 813 813 814 840 859 859 soo 806 liiilllr Luz7.:ir:i Turin . PctcrvvanU-in Hcl<:ra(li' Parma . Guastalia Grocka Mcllwilz C'lii>(usit/, Holicnfricdbcr^ Soor Piat'cnza Lobositz Prague Kolin Brrslau Lcutlicn Hoclikirelj KuiuTsdorf Li(i,Miitz Torgaii Nct-rwindcn Arcole . Stockach Novi Marmirn CalditTo Aspcrn Wa<:rani Drt'-sdiii Lcipsiji; Miiicio River N(i\ani Ma^^rnta Solfcrino CuslKZza Koniggriitz The loss of otlicers has per cent of the total 1()>^ Total losx. ^.7 "1 OJJiccT loss. I'rr mil of total. 170 6-3 4.3' X' 239 5-6 4,500 214 4-8 5.400 330 61 6,000 267 4-5 5,800 302 5-5 5.200 335 6-4 3.000 208 6-9 3.000 200 6-6 9,0oo 31O 3-3 4,500 179 4-0 3.000 118 4-0 2,200 127 57 9,200 373 41 6,400 340 5-3 5.300 280 5-4 10,000 492 4-9 5.400 307 57 2,200 118 5-4 3,800 190 50 9,000 286 3-2 2,600 95 37 2,200 75 3-4 2,900 95 3-3 5,100 164 3-2 7,000 258 37 5,700 122 21 21,500 841 3-9 31.000 693 2-2 6,400 172 2-7 14,000 393 2-8 2,800 102 3-6 2,300 1 1(> 5-2 5.700 ^^l 5-6 13,100 05-\ 5-0 6,200 305 4-0 :..,..vv, T.I55 3-8 unounted on the average to four In tlu> wars of the eighteenth century there were proportionately more ollicers in the armies than to-day, hence the higher losses. AUSTRIA-Hl^'GARY 71 RECAPITULATIOX OF OFFICER-CASl'ALTIES, 1848-1013 1848. Italian Campaijja .... 1848. Cracow Insurrection 1848. Prague Insurrection 1848. Vienna Insurrection 1848. Putting down of Serbian Insurrection 1848. Insurrection in Ilungary 1849. Insurrection in Hungary 1840. Italian Campaign .... 1853. Insurrection in Milan 1859. Italian Campaign .... 1864. War against Denmark . 1 866. War against Prussia 1866. War against Italy i8('k). Insurrection in Soutli Dalmatia 1S78. Occupation of Bosnia 1882. Insurrection in South Dalmatia 1900. Engagements in China . Officer-casualties of the Allied Troops Losses of the Russians. 184Q. Insurrection in Hungary . . . . . Losses of the Prttssions. 1864. War against Denmark . 1 866. War against Prussia : Losses of the Badenese . Los.ses of the Bavarians Losses of the Hanoverians Losses of the Hessians . Losses of the Kiirhessen Losses of the Saxons Losses of the Wiirttembergers 386 7 13 07 15 58 490 205 2 1. 109 77 2,218 360 22 182 18 6 5.24O 176 157 8 171 106 3- 4 82 26 429 Since 1848, 1,685 officers have been killed in battle or died of wounds or have been lost and never accounted for ; 3,561 officers have been wounded. These numbers cannot be considered hirrh, since in a single war, the Franco-German War of 1870-1, the German armies lost 6,229 and the French 7,862 officers killed and wounded. I LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS FRANCE 1614-1913 BY GASTON BODART, LL.D. FRAXCE: 1G14-1013 CHAPTER I \\ ARS OF FRAXCE IX THE LAST THREE CEXTURIES The tables which follow (Tables 1 to 4) are designed to show the nuinber of wars in which France w^as engaged in the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, or from 161-i to the present time. The light figures denote years when France was at peace, the heavy figures years of war. The author has thought best not to limit himself to wars with external enemies ; accordingly civil and colonial wars have been included in the tables. Not counting colonial wars, France has in these three centuries passed through 148 years of war and 152 years of peace. The figures by centuries are shown in tabular form as follows : Century. Years of War. Years of Peace. Seventeenth ..... 64 36 Eit,'htcentli 52 48 Xineteenth ..... 32 68 Twentieth ..... — 14 Since 1614 the number of years of war is almost equal to that of the years of peace, and if colonial wars and oversea expeditions are included, the years of war are the more numerous of the two. Table 1. T HE ^V.\Rs OF France IN THE Seventeenth Century 1 1600 I60I 1602 1603 1^104 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 161 1 I()I2 Ihl ] 1614 I')I5 i6i() Ihlj 161S I(>10 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1032 I ''33 I' '34 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 lObi I()()2 !()()] 1664 !')»)=; 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1 67 1 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 jhS,n t^>St 1 1 ..s J 1683 1684 I ' .N ^ lliSti I..,S; 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 i()98 1699 The bluek figures denote years of war ; the light figures years of peace. 76 LOSSES OF LIFE IX MODKPxN WARS 1620-9. ^Var with tlic IIultiu nots, 1624. l';irtitij);iti()ii in tlic \Var of the Grisons. 1627-9. ^^'^^ with England. 1627-31, ^Vilr (tf the Mantuan Succession. 1635-48. Farticij)ati()n in thi- Thirty Years' War. 1635-59. ^^''^^' ^^'t'^ Spain. 1649-53. Insurrection of thi' Fronde. 1663-4. Particij)ation in the war with the Turks. 1666-7. Naval war with England. 1667-S. War witii Holland. 1667-9. Participation in the Defence of Crete. 1672-9. NVar with Holland. 1OS3-4. Naval war witli the liarbary States. 1684. Conquest of Luxemburg. 16S8-97. War with the League of Augsburg. Table 2. AVaus of France in the EicnTEENTu Centuhv 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 171O 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1/22 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 172S 1729 17j'> ^73^ 17^- 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 I74() i7=;o 17SI 17^2 175 -] 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1705 1760 17O7 lyus 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 17S4 178=; 1786 1787 i7,s.s 178.^ 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1701-14. War of the Spanish Succession. 1702-6. Insurrection oi the Caniisards. 1718-20. War with Sjiain. I733~5' ^^'i^l' <*f the Polish Succession. 1741-8. War of the Austrian Succession. 1755-63. Naval and colonial war with England. 1756-63. Particijiation in the Seven Years' War. 1769. Conquest of Corsica. lyySS^. War with England. 1780-3. Participation in the War of Independence of the United Stales. 1791-1803. Insurrections in Santo Domingo. 1792-7. ^Var of the First Coalition. I793~5' ^^•"' ■^^it'i Spain. 1793-6. Insurrection in the Vendee. 1798-9. ("f)n(]U(st of Naples. FRANCE 77 179S-1801. Expedition to Egypt. 1793-1802. War with Eiijirlaud. 1799-1801. War of tlu- Second Civilition. Thus, durin<]; the eighteenth century France had forty- eight years of peace as against fifty-two years of war. T^VBLF. ;3. Waiis of France in the ; Nineteenth Century 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 i8i() 1817 1818 1819 1S20 iSj r 1S22 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 18 ]8 1839 1840 184. r 1842 1843 1844 1845 i84() 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 185; 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 I8()8 i8<)9 1870 1871 1872 187^ 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 188: I 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 189: E 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1800, 1801. War of the Second CoaUtion (from 1799). 1800- 1. Egyptian Expedition (from 1798). 1800-2. War with England (from 17 93)- 1801. War witii Portngal. 1803-15 War with England. 1805. War of the Third Coalition. 1806. Conquest of the Kingdom ol [ Naples. 1806-7. War with Prussia, Saxony, Russia, and S^ kvcden. 1807. Conquest of Portugal. 1808-14 War with Spain. 1809. ^Var with Austria. 1812. War with Russia. 1S13-14 Wars of Liberation. 1815. War of the Hundred Days. 1823. Intervention in Spain. 1827. Intervention in Greece. 1828-9. Morean War. 1830. Jnlv Insurrection. 1830-1. Conquest of Algeria. 1831-2. War witli Holland. 1834-47 • Fighting in .Vlgeria. 183S-9. Interwntion in Mexico. 1844. War with Morocco. 1^45- Intervention in Uruguay. 184S. Revolution. :» L - I^-^— L -j— <»ai»»C axtr-r , Tti'HT.TT 4i. Wjij.. • ^ TtTL TT ~^nr Tjrr TZiciz iQr~ r--_ lacff r-inf t .1^ I • ' FRANCE 79 A comparison of the number of years of active warfare of the Great Powers shows that no other country has been so extensively engaged in war as has France ; she enjoys the gloomy distinction of being the most warlike of the nations, and of having laid upon the altar of patriotism the largest sacrifices of human lives. The following table shows the number and total duration of her wars against her various antagonists A It I (I go nisi. Austria Great Britain Spain Ciirniaii Empire.' Holland . Russia Sardinia (Savoy) F*russia Portuf,'al Sweden China Turkey Denmark . Mexico .Vo. of Wars. 14 10 10 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 I I Total Duralion of Wars. Years. 76 73 62 61 45 17 34 19 47 II 12 14 5 7 A fair idea of the extent of French participation in military activities since 1614 may be obtained by considering the proportion of all important engagements of the military nations in which French armies have been engaged. Defining as an important engagement one in which the combined loss by both antagonists amounted to at least 2,000 men killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, the writer finds that the military history of all the European nations presents a total of 1,700 such actions. Of these, 1,044 were land battles, 122 naval combats, 490 sieges, and 44 capitula- tions in the open field. French forces have been engaged in 652 of the land battles, 6;3 naval actions, 1322 sieges, and 32 of the ca})itulations included, a total of 1,079 engagements, or 63-5 per cent of 80 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS the principal military actions of the whole three centuries, coloniul wars not considered. Wo may say then that France has had an active part in two-thirds of all the military events that have agitated Europe since the sixteenth century. Her wars have been a mixture of successes and reverses ; out of the LOTf) im])ortant battles, she won 584 victories and sustained 495 defeats, or 54-5 and 45-5 per cent respectively of the total. Besides the great number of continental wars. France ha^ been the scene of manv civil conflicts. These alone agcrcfjate thirty-four years of warfare, a fifTurc which exceeds the total for all other countries combined. As civil wars have generally been more sanguinary than struggles between nations or races, this fact must have played a part in the depopulation of certain areas. \Vith respect to colonial wars, it is necessary to distinguish between those carried on in colonies during wars with mari- time powers and conflicts with the natives in taking possession of or pacifying a colony. France has had a large share of both categories of struggles. In most of her wars with England, Holland, and Spain, on the one hand, she has had to defend her colonies, especially in the East and West Indies ; and this has also been a prolific cause of naval battles. On the other hand, the conquest of her possessions in Africa and Asia, in pursuance of the colonial policy inaugurated in 1830, has been and continues to be the occasion of many oversea expeditions. In view of the much smaller size of the armies, the actions in these distant regions are not of course to be compared with those of a European war. Yet they are far from being a negligible quantity, since in the first place their total number is consideraljle — from the conquest of Algeria in 1830 to the ])resent there has practically not a year passed without a battle — and also because the opposing armies of the natives are usually superior in numbers. The relative losses in these colonial FRANCE 81 -wars have generally been heavy, though caused less by the fire of the eneniv than bv the insalubrious cliniate, contajrious diseases, hardships, and exhaustion. In view of these con- siderations, the writer has thought it well to devote a chapter to the oversea expeditions, which have claimed their own share of victims. CHAPTER II GENERAL liEMAllKS OX THE LOSSES OF MEN IN \VAR The losses in men sustained by a belligerent nation are caused either by the hostile arms or by disease, fatigue, and physical exhaustion, capture by the enemy, or by desertion. The losses inflicted by the enemy include the killed, wounded, prisoners of war, and the missing or unaccounted for. Losses of the last-named category are the most difficult to isolate, for they may include individuals belonging imder any of the other captions as well. Among the missing may l;e many dead not found, wounded taken prisoners, prisoners not wounded, and dispersed troops who later regain the lines, as well as others who deliberately leave the Hag, marauders, deserters, and fugitives. The greater part of the losses sustained by a country in the course of a war is usually borne by its regular armed forces on land and sea or by civilians fighting in the national defence — in a word, bv combatants. But there has never been a war wliich has not also claimed many victims among non- combatants, the civil po])ulation of territories invaded by the enemy ; this is particularly true of blockades or sieges of fortified points. The ravages of epidemic diseases are often greater among the civil ])0})ulation than in the armies. As no lists are in existence of the deaths from disease of non-combatants, it is quite impossible to give accurate figures for the total loss of human life caused by any wai- 1569.U G 82 LOSSES OF LT11-: IN MODERN AVARS wliatcNcr. Even lor ifcriit \vai> such >lali>lics are ovit of tliL- i|in.>lioii, since neitlier losses ol {lii> ciiaracter nor those of the troops thonisolves from fatigue and hardships are recorded in the niililary archives. On account of the lack of sources upon wliicli lo tlraw, the present work cannot concern itself with losses caused by sickness or exhaustion, and must l)c linulctl lo a discussion of the losses of French armies inflicted by their enemies. In cases where losses from disease could be ascertainttl, they will be given in the a]i]iropriate connexion. It is a lamentable fact, moreover, that because of the lack of official documents, we are not in a position to give the exact figures for the French losses in a single war of the whole period under consideration. Even in the case of the most recent of all. the Franco-German War of 1870 71, which has been the subject of an interminable literature, official figures for the losses have never been forthcoming, and if the official records for recent wars are defective, an idea may readily be formed of the gaps which exist in those for wars of a more distant date. The archives contain (locuments — and those often incomplete — only for the great pitched battles and notable sieges ; figures are never found for the total losses of the armies in all the battles, engage- ments, and sieges of an entire war. Not being in a position to give figures for total losses in wars, the writer will limit himself to tables of the effective strength and the losses in the battles and actions in regard to whicli lie has been able to find official records. Even this work has necessarily been somewhat crude. While for some periods the official documents furnish reliable data, there are others in which records have been very carelessly kept, even when self-interest has not led to their intentional falsification. .\fter a battle, the first concern of the victor is to report the losses of his antagonisl at as high, and his own at as low, a figure as jiossible, in order to accentuate the decisive character of the residt. The defeated general naturallv I FRANCE 8 o follows the reverse procedure, and it is often years later before liistoric research can correct the figiues first published, often at best leaving large room for doubt. Laborious search has been required to get at the most relial)le sources, and so to obtain results approximating to the truth. The author does not claim absolute accuracy for the tables wliich follow, l)ut offers tliem to the reader simply as the fruit of the most painstaking search of the archives of the great military Powers. The statistics given should be useful, however, as a l)asis for reliable deductions. In connexion with other liistorical data, they give a good indication of the valour of the troops engaged in the various battles and their tenacity in combat, the quality of the leadership, character of their arms, &c., as well as the relative strength of the opposing sides ; and these are the facts with which military history must deal if it is to yield its proper fruits. The most important consideration in connexion with the tables, and that with which the present study is chiefly con- cerned, is that of the losses of France and of her antagonists in the principal battles since 1614. The examination of the curve of loss percentages for this period will afford an indica- tion in quantitative terms of the influence of moral progress on the conduct of war. CHAPTER III PEUIUl) OF THE TIIIKTV VEAUS" WAH, 1G18-48 During the first part of tlie Thirty Years' War, while Germany and Austria were being laid waste by the excesses of a soldiery made iqi of mercenaries of every nationahty, France was carrying on several wars of secondary importance. In consequence of the revolt of the Princes of Conde and Bouillon in 1614, and of the conspiracy of the queen-mother ill 1620, a ninth war of religion divided France into two hostile camps. This war, which was terminated by the G2 ai LOSSES OF LIFH I\ MODERN WAKS Peace of Alui> in 1029, unfavourably for the Huguenots, wa«^ prosecuted ^vitll little vifjour on either side, and was much less destructive of life than the previous Iluf^uenot \var>. It gave rise to skirmishes rather than to battles, and con- sisted largely of sieges. It was only during the period of 1627 to 1629, when England made common cause with the Huguenots, that military operations took on considerable proportions. The reduction of La Uochelle by Cardinal Richelieu, after a memorable siege which cost the defenders over 12,00(1 men, was the prin(i])al feat of arm^ of the struggle. The War of the Mantuan Succession. 1627-;)!. waged by France against Savoy, Sj)ain. and Austria, was the j)relude to her participation in the Thirty Years' War. Although the king (Louis XIII) and Cardinal Richelieu were at the head of the French forces, their effective strength did not exceed 10,000 men. and in spite of the superiority in numbers of the enemy, there was no decisive engagement and the losses were inconsiderable on either side. Like the preceding contests, this war terminated favourably for the French. After the suppression, at the Battle of Castelnaudary in 1632, of the revolt of the Duke of Montmorency, Richelieu took steps toward the carrying out on the desired scale of his j)olicy of weakening and humiliating the house of Hapsburg. This policy led to the active j)articipation of France in the last stage of the Thirty Years' War. 16:55 to 164S. and to the war with Spain, 16J35 to 1659. The effective strength of the o]iposing forces and the losses they sustained arc shown in the tables of })attlc~- in Part I of this work. These tables show that in almost all the engagements the victor, even w^hen on the offensive, suffered nnich smaller losses than the defeated army : this is no longer the rule in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and of our own times, when close comi)at is much rarer in con- sequence of tlie greater range of iinvunis. FRANCE 85 The results of the thirty greatest battles of the Thirty Years' War give an average casualty loss (killed and wounded) of fifteen })er cent for the victors and twice this proportion, or thirty per cent, for the defeated antagonist. The follow- ing tables show tlie relative losses in the most important battles : French Lossics. — Frkncii Victories Buttle. Freibiirix Allcrslu'im \Vitteiuvt'it.'r Zustnarshauson Rheinfelden Keiupen Ijisses in killed and iL-oiiii(leil, per rent Date. of total .strength. 1644 40 IW5 33 1038 12 1648 10 1638 8 1642 5 FuKNCii Losses. — I.mperiai, \ictoiues Date. Losses, per cent of effective strength. Hallle. Killed and ivounded. Prisoners. Total. La MarfOe .... Thiunville .... 'ruttlin^'eii .... Mergentheim 1641 t639 1645 41 33 16 14 '-1 2 Z 18 68 48 ^2 The contem})oraneous Wdtelline War was much more sanguinary ; the losses of the Duke of Rohan in the various battles of 16;>5, ^lazzo, San (xiacomo, Moibegno, often reached twenty per cent of the effective strength, which, however, never exceeded 5,000 men. The French armies in Germany were at no time larger than i20.()0() men ; they reached that figure at Freiburg and Thionville : the effective strength at the battles of Tuttlingen and Nr)rdlingen was 18,000; at Wittenweier 14,000; La Marfee and .Mergentheim 11,000; and at Kempen 7,500 men. The battle of Freiburg, August i5 to August 5, 1644, forms an exception to the rule tliat the victorious army usually 86 LOSSES OF LIFK I\ MODKHN WARS loses less heavily than ilie defeated one. Repeated assaults upon entrenclnnents well defended hv troops of equal courage al\va\ > involve heavier losses for the agf^ressor. 'I'lie total losses of the Frencli forces in the Thirty Years' War against the Empire may be estimated at lUO.OOO men, of whom 8(),()0() were killed or wounded and 2(M)()U taken j)risoner§. A large part of the trooj)s who fought under the F'rencli flag, however, were foreign mercenaries in the pay of France — Swedes, Hessians, Saxons, &c. : liardly half the effective strengtli consisted of men of F'rench nationality. The figures given above do not include losses by disease. The loss by desertion mu>t have been large in the Thirtv Years' War, as would naturallv be the case in view of the character of the armies of the period. The troops were recruited from heterogeneous elements of dubious morality, largely adventurers whom ])revious misdemeanoms and the love of booty impelled to take up a career of arms. It is J unnecessary to add that such a soldiery and their mode of I warfare largely account for the atrocities and horrors which cliaracterized the war. The Sj)anish AVar, which lasted twenty-four years (1635- 59) and was fought in part on F'rench soil, cost France much greater losses than her simultaneous participation in the war in Germany. Other circumstances besides its eleven years' greater length contributed to make it more sanguinary. In Germany, F'rance fought in common with strong allies, the J Swedes and the contingents of the Protestant ])rinces, while ■ ill the S])anis]i War she had to stand alone against the land and naval forces of Spain. In addition, a great civil war, the War of the F'ronde (1()19 53) raised uj) new enemies of the royalist cause and swelled the ranks of the Spaniards, not only with conunon soldiers, but with some of the ablest r'reiich coMunanders a.^ well. The effective strengtli of tlie armies sent against S})ain was greater than that of I he forces employed in (iermanv ; at Avein the French numbered IM-.OOO men ; Turenne com- FUAXCE 87 manded 25,000 at Valenciennes in 1656, and Conde led 23,000 at Rocroi in 164;>. The Spanish War was in a sense an apprenticeshij) for the French navy, which, in response to the efforts of Riclielieu, was beginning to make a notable growth and a very credit- able record of achievement, even rivalling the fleets of l^ngland and Holland. In the naval battles of the war the I'rencli squadrons consisted of from fifteen to thirty vessels of forty to fifty guns each, and with an average personnel of 6,000 to 7,000 men ; they were uniformly victorious, though many of the successes were dearly bought. In the course of the war, two French admirals and twelve captains of vessels were killed, and the Spanish losses were much h.eavier, as they had many ships sunk or l)urned. The I'rench lost hardly more than ten per cent of their forces, except in the naval battle of St. Tropez (or of Genoa), September 1, 1638 ; the losses in killed and wounded in this engagement are not accurately known, but must have been hea\y, as the French had seven captains of vessels kiUed. A noteworthy fact revealed by an examination of the losses in naval combats is the large pro])ortion — much liigher than in the case of land battles — of killed in comparison with the wounded. In land Ijattles the ordinary ratio of killed to \\ ounded is one to three, while in naval actions the number of killed quite commonly exceeds that of the wounded. The explanation is found in part in the nature of the weapons employed, lieavy artillery, and the splinters produced by large projectiles ; further causes are the fallmg of rigging, l)urning and sinking of vessels, and — last but not least — close combat. The last ap])lies particularly to naval contlicts of earlier days, when vessels were captured by hoanling, which always led to murderous hand-to-hand struggles. The following tables show the French losses in the most important battles of the war with Spain : 88 LOSSES OF T.m: i\ :m()Di:i^x wars FnF.N'cu Losf?K.s. — Victorieis Jluttlc. Lens r.ciicah' C'asale Hoenji Dunkirk A vein Kctliel Arras IjOSS in killrd atnl XC0U1 drd (prr cent Date. of ,ff, rthr strength) 1648 28 1637 25 1640 20 it>43 17 1658 13 1635 9 1G50 9 1654 7 Frf.nch I.OSSKS. — DF-FEATS Ihitr. LosH (j>er cent of effcctht strength). Jialtlc. Fontarabia .... Ilonnec'ourt .... Valeneiennos .... 1638 1642 1656 33 20 8 25 16 French Lossf.s. — Xotable Sieges Date. Loss. Siege. Xo. Per cent of effective strength . Saint-Oincr .... Turin Dunkirk ..... Sieges of Lerifla .... 1638 1640 1646 /l642\ 1643 ' 1645 - 1 1646 '1647 6,000 4,000 C,ooo 25.000 (at least) 30 30 20 Taking into account tlic losses of tlic civil war of the Fronde, of P'rench fifj]itiner cent Balllf. Date. of effective slrciiglh) Solcbay 1672 15 Shooruvold - i<373 7 WuIiIktcii . • 1(^73 4 Campenhiin • 1673 9 By order of Louis XI\', the French fleet took no energetic part in the actions, as he wished the English and Dutch to weaken each other ; hence the French losses were incon- siderable. On the other iiand, the naval battles off the Sicilian coast, where Admiral Duquesne won decisive victories, were very bloody ; at Stromboli and Agosthed the predominance of the English navy, which has been main- tained to the ])resent day. The growth in the size of armies and fleets progressed another stage in this war. In 1692 we find Louis XIV at the head of a formidable army of 120,000 men, and Marshal Luxembourg won the battles of Fleurus, Steenkerke, and Neerwinden with 50,000, 57,000, and 80,000 respectively. The English and Dutch required ninety-nine ships of the line and nineteen frigates, carrying 6,756 guns and 40,000 men, at La Hougue, in order to overcome Tourville, who had barely half these forces to oppose to them. In the size of the forces engaged. La Hougue remains the greatest naval battle of modern times. The important battles of this war were bloodier than tho^e of the preceding one, especially for the defeated armies. Below are tables of the French losses : Frenx'H Losses : Land Battles. — Victouies Losses , killed and rvntmded {/ler cent Battle. Date. of effect ive slrengtfi) Staffarda . 1690 17 NccrNvinden • 1693 15 Steenkerke 1692 12 Fleunis 1690 12 Marsaglia . • 1693 8 The French loss in the naval battle of La Hougue, 1692, was twenty-five per cent of the men and thirty-eight per cent of the ships engaged. The total losses of the French in killed and wounded for the war may be estimated at 16{),00{) men : those of her antagonists were not less than 200,000. 94 LOSSES or Lin: l\ modlrx wars The first siejie of Xainur in 1()92 cost T.OIK) men, and the defence of the same phice in 1()95. 8.(M)(I ; tlie siege of Harcelonu in 1(197 cost the lives of ovw 10. 0(1(1 >t leaders, were required to suppress the rebellion. The losses in tlie struggle were enormous, suq)assing those of the previous civil wars. (Jreat numbers of towns and villages were burned, and the suj)pression of the revolt left the ])rovince of Languedoc wasted and de])opulated ; FRANCE 95 it has not to this clay recovered from the effects of that devastation. In the course of the War of the Spanish Succession, both adversaries made prodigious efforts to enlarge their armies. The decisive battles were fought between forces of from 60,000 to 90,000 men on a side, and at the end of the war IMarshal Villars was at the head of lliO.OOO men. In various battles the victor suffered lieavier losses than his opponent, as at Schellenberg and Malplaquet (see Table). Malplaquet was the greatest Ijattle as to number of men engaged, and the bloodiest, of tlie war ; it was a veritable Pyirhic victory for the allies, who lost more than a fourtli of their army of over 90,000 men. There were few naval battles in this war. as the French squadrons were conscious of inferiority and avoided an engagement. This was the beginning of the naval decadence of France. The sea-fight of Velez-]Malaga in 1704 was indecisive, and in 1702 a strong French and Spanish fleet met disaster in the Bay of Vigo. With respect to the curve of relative losses in individual battles, little change can be noted in comparison with pre- vious wars ; the numerical losses were considerablv higher, in view of the larger forces engaged. The tables show the relative losses in different battles : French LOSSKS.- -V ICTOIIIES Losses, killed mid xvnuuded {per cent Battle. Dale. of effcclhv slreiifitln Spcior 1703 22 Villaviciosa 1710 10 Cassano 1705 18 Friedlingen 1702 17 I.uzzara 1702 12 Ecckcrcn . • 1703 13 Alniansa . • 1707 10 Dcnain 1712 9 In the last two battles above, the enemy lost respec- tively thirty-one per cent and thirteen per cent killed and 9() LOSSES OF Lin: IX MODKRX WARS wouiulecl, and forty-four per cent and twenty-one per cent ])risoners. The indecisive battle of Velez-Mala^a. 17l>4. cost the French nine per cent of their effective strength. FRF.xrn Losses. — Detkats Dalr. Tjossea, per cent of effecti ir strength . nnlllr. Killed and icotiiidril. 27 Prisoners. Total. lluchstiidt or Hlrnliritn 1704 27 54 Siirauossa .... 1710 25 25 50 \'iil wars : War. Tliirty Years' War . War with Spain War of tlic Frondf . Fiyhtinf; with piratis ^Va^ of Dfvohition . Di'fciice of ( rite War witli IIolhiiKl War of the League of Augsbuig War of the Spanish Succession . Total Xo.of French General Date. Officers killed. 1643-8 6 1O43-59 42 1649-53 10 1664 X 1667-8 3 1667-9 2 1672-9 29 1688-97 37 1701-14 92 1569 U H 98 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS CHAPTER \ WAHS rXDKK LOTIS X\ AM) LOlIS X\ I 1715-02 THE KUA OF TIIK \\ AUS OV FJ{EDKHRK TlIK GKKAT A. 77/r War of the Quadruple Alliance Oftaiihst Spain, 1718-20 The War of the Quadruple Alliance' with S])ain followed an aerved his apprenticeship for his career as a great general, lie had as allies Bavaria, Saxony, France, and Spain ; the allies of Austria were Sardinia, England, Portugal, and Holland. The great struggle, which resulted in the humilia- tion of the house of Austria and the entry of Prussia into the ranks of the first-class military Powers, was fought out in Austria, Prussia, South Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Alsace and Lorraine, Provence, in the English, French, and Spanish colonies, and on the high seas. The armies put into the field bv France were still larger than those of the War of the Spanish Succession. Hermann-Maurice, Comte de Saxe, Marshal of France, commander-in-chief of the French forces in the Netherlands, led 110,000 men at Rocoux, and 98,000 at Laffeldt. The relative losses were lighter than in the wars of Louis XIV for the French armies, but iieavier for those commanded by Frederick. The total losses of the French in the war may be estimated at approximately 140,000 killed and wounded, and 50,000 ])risoners. The French navy suffered two reverses in 1747 off the heights of Cape Finisterre, losing thirty per cent •of its men in a brave fight against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. The naval loss of France for the war was 20 ships of the line and 16 frigates, carrying 12,000 men and 1,7;38 guns ; England lost 14 ships of the line and 7 frigates, with 7,000 men and 1,012 guns ; Spain, 17 ships of the line and 7 frigates, 11,000 men and 1,276 guns. The French armies lu.--l lieavilv in tlie <:rcat >ieten(l and Maotriclit. i2,000 each. The tables show ilicir losses in the ehief battles: Fiii:nx'ii Losses. — VicroiuKs liallle. Cunoo . iMiiitfiKiy Ilofoux Lafftldt losses (per eeul of Dale. effect iie strength). 1744 15 1745 10 1746 4 '747 10 Frkncu Losses. — DtttAxs fhilllr. Dcttiii^fii I'iuccnzu Date. i74(. 1746 Losses (per cent nf effective strength ). Killett anil icouvded. Prisoners. • • . II 1''. 5 The bloodiest battle of the war was the untortunate affair of Col de TAssiette, in 1747. where the Freneli troops lost forty per cent killed and wounded and four j)er cent prisoners. In the course of the war. France had twenty-six generals and one admiral killed in battle. D. War zc'ith England, 1755-6;>, and Pariicipatwii lit the Seven Years' War, 1756-6^5 In spite of the combined forces of Austria, the majority of the States of the German Empire. France. Sj)ain. Russia, and Sweden. Prussia and England were victorious over all their adversaries, thanks to the militaiv ami diplomatic genius of Frederick the Great and the supremacy of England on the sea. France and Enjiland fought a war to the death on the ocean, on the coasts, in their colonies in A^ia and North America, and on the battlefields of (iermany. It was one of I he mo>t disastrous conflicts France ha>> ever waged ; slic l()>t jier finest colonies in India and the New- World, and more than JJoO.OOO soldiers in addition, of whom ab(Kit half wvw killed or wounded and half prisoners and FRANCE 101 deserters. In no other war have there been so many deserters. The number for the Austrian army exceeded 6^2,000, and for ilie Trussians 80,000; the French probably liad 70,000, and close to 80,000 prisoners. The Frencli navy, which except for the battle of Minorca had only defeats to show, lo^t over 40,000 men, of whom more than half weie killed in action, drowned, or missintr. Besides this loss of men, 20 ships of the line were ca})tured by the enemy, 25 more .sunk or wrecked, 25 frigates captured, and 17 destroyed. Spain, which entered the war only in 1761, lost 10,000 sea- men, 12 ships of the hue, and 4 frigates. England lost about 20,000 seamen, 2 ships of the line, and I3 frigates captured, and seventeen ships of the hne and 14 frigates destroyed. The French armies on land were sometimes 100,000 strong, and almost always superior in number to their foes, but were led by mediocre commanders, and suffered one reverse after anotliei-. Army and navy alike showed a general breakdown ; with rare exceptions the troops, under poor leaders, fought bailly, both courage and fighting spirit as well as disciphne leaving nuich to be desired ; the small relative losses in the few victories and more frequent defeats bear witness to the weak resistance of the French soldiery. The small losses of the French, shown in the tables below, may be compared with those of Frederick the Great, whose battles were ably contested. At Prague his army lost twenty per cent killed and wounded; at Kolin, twentv-six per cent; at Breslau, thirty per cent; Leuthen, eighteen per cent ; Zorndorf, thirty-two per cent ; Hoclikirch, nine- teen per cent ; Ziilliciiau, twenty-five per cent ; Kunersdorf, thiiiy-nine per cent ; and at Torgau, twenty-three per cent. Fhkncu Losses. — Victories Losses (per mil of Baltic. Date. rjjectivc strength). ITastcnbirk .... 1737 4 I.uttciilKTg .... 1758 2 Bergen 1759 5 Korbacli ..... 170^ 3 Klostcr Kiinipcn . . . 17O0 14 •102 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODFUX WARS French Losses. — Defeats nnllle. Date. 1757 •758 1759 1760 1761 1762 iMssrs {per cent of effectiv* strrugth). ^:"':'Z'^ 1 Prisourrs. tcoutiafd. Rosshach .... Knf.l.l .... .Miiidcti .... Warhurif .... \'i llini,'li:nisrii \Vinulin.sthaI 8 II 10 9 3 r. 13 3 4 U 12 The Frt'Hcli foujjht IjctttT in tlic colonies, especially in Canada, where, in the battle of Quebec, in 1759. they were defeated only after lo^inj;: thirty-three jxt cent of their effectives. The unfortunate naval battles of Lapses and Quiberon Bay were also stubbornly contested by tlie Fiench. their ships not surrendering until thirty per cent of their crews had been lost. In the course of the war. the French armies lost seventeen general ofhcers, and the tleets two admirals, killed in battle. E. War with Envjand and participation in the War of Inde- pendence (if the United States of America, 1778-8:) In this struggle, England was pitted against the combined forces of France, S})ain. and Holland, as well as the Neutral League (Denmark. Sweden, and Russia), who were deter- mined to wrest from her the naval su})remacy. Besides this, she had to defend her vast and scattered possessions, and to maintain her sovereignty over her North American coU)nies. The task was a hard one and the conlHct stubborn, and I'ngland, after exhausting her physical and financial resouices, was forced to yield and recognize the intlei)en- dence of the T nited States. She kept her supremacy on the sea, however, thanks to hci- able admirals and excellent sailors, and also saved the greater ])art of her over-sea colonies. England had little reason to fear an invasion. i?i view of the want of naval st remit h and (»f resolution on the FRANCE 1013 part of her adversaries, and employed all her forces in the defence of her over-sea possessions. Hence the fi 76 5 362 6 176 3 210 5 150 3 164 3 102 I 64 13 374 Q 280 3t 2,146 68 2,070 3 164 23 642 17 1.232 47 r.336 20 1.396 70 1,978 104 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODIJ^N WARS It will be seen that tlie losses of fri<;ates were about equal on the two sides ; in ships of the line, however, and especially riairships. those of the allies were notablv the heavier. On file other IuukI. ilic merchant marine of Enjiland suffered onormou>ly during the war ; the fjUghsh lost 2,2UU merchant vessels and 75 privateers, the allien only 1.100 merchant ^hi])s, though !215 j)rivateers. In the absence of official records, it is entirely imj)ossible to give the total losses of men, only those for the great battles being known. The naval campaign in Lidia in 1782 and 178'] cost the English squadron under Admiral Hughes, 1,86G. and the French under de Souffren, 1,782 killed and wounded, or over one-fourth of the effective strength in each case. The total losses of the English in the big naval battles hardly exceeded 6,000 men ; those of the I'rench in the same engagements readied 10,000, not counting ])risoners not wounded, whose number may be estimated at 2,000. The land and naval battles in America and India naturally caused those two countries losses heavier than the numbers given above. rilAriKR VI THE WARS OF TIIK KFA'OT.T TIOX. 1702 1S02 A. War of the First Coalition, 1792-1802 The new regime quickly won for the young Republic the enmity of Prussia and Austria and the other States of the German Empire. The fresh-levied French armies were repulsed at the outset of the camj)aign in Belgium by the seasoned Austrian troo})s ; but under the leadershi}) of Generals Kellermann and Dumouriez, their patriotic enthu- siasm swept everything before tlu^ni at Valmy and Jema})pes in 1792, defeating the Prussian and Austrian veterans luuler the Duke of Brunswick and the Duke of Saxe-Teschen. The FRANCE 105 results of tliese fortunate first strokes of the revolutionary armies were the invasion of Germany and tlie conquest of Belgium. The ra})i(l successes of the French arms and tlie consequent concern foi- the European Ijalance of power on the part of England, Holland, Sardinia, and Spain, ilu-ew these countries into the ranks of the enemies of France ; thus was inaugurated the second era of great coalitions against France, and war followed war for twenty-three years, or until 1815. In spite of the number and power of the hostile armies, general conscription gave the French sufficient forces to resist the invasion threatened on all their frontiers. Ihey were beaten on the sea by the English, but the Republican armies, animated by the most ardent patriotic enthusiasm and led by brave and enterprising young generals, repulsed invasion and carried the war into tlie enemies' territory, where they made extensive conquests. Bonaparte, the greatest captain of modern times, and a large number of the best generals France has had, including Iloche, Kleber, Moreau, Marceau, Desaix, won their first successes in this war. The conquest of Holland in 1795 terminated the war ^vith that country, and Prussia and Spain also made peace the same year. Austria and Sardinia continued tlie struggle until 1797, when they were forced to accept a disadvantageous peace; England alone carried on the war until 18U!2, to resume it in 1803 and continue without interruption until 1815. The gi-eat battles were frequent in this struggle, but nuich less bloody than those of the Seven Years' War. The average loss in killed and woundetl does tiot exceed eight per cent ; even the defeated armies, which in j)revious wars often lost a fourth to a third of their effective strenii;th in killed and wounded, rarely lost over fifteen ])er cent. Wav began to be conducted nuich moie humanely than formerly, the number of French soldiers made ])risoners in the war exceed- ing 150,000, while that of the allies reached 220,000. 106 LOSSES OF LIFE IX MoDKRX WARS But in ^pitc of this fact and the more favourable percentage of rehitive losses, tliis war cost the livey of hiinclreds of thousands of men. A new epoch in the conduct of military operations was inauf^urated by Napoleon : the decisive blows succeeded each otiier more rapidly, the war of sieges and methodical mana'uvres gave phice to new methods, and there were many more battles than formerly. In the course of the war, France lost thirty-seven general officers killeil in battle. The losses in the principal battles are shown in the tables below : Losses. — Fukxch Victories Date. French losses. Enemies' losses. Battles. Killed and wounded. Per cent. Prisoners. Per cent. Killed and xvnunded. Per cent. Prisoners. Per cent. Arc'f)l:i . Iloiulshootc \Vattigiiies Loano . Flfiinis . Kivuli . Tourcoinj: Jemappcs 1796 1793 1793 1795 1794 1797 1794 1792 17-5 12-5 no 100 60 100 4-3 4-5 6-5 '-> - 1 5-0 9-2 lO-O 8-0 20 -o II-O 140 3-5 S- ) 17-0 8-8 220 290 40 4-0 Losses. — Fuencii Dki-kats Date. French losses. Enemies'' losses. Battles. Killed and ivounded. Per cent. Prisoners. Per cent. Killed and rvounded. Per cent. Pri.Honers. Per cent. Faninrs . Ton may KaisiTslautcrii \Viir/l)tir{r 1793 1794 1793 1796 II-O II-O 8-0 6-7 i-o 2-0 3-0 2-0 6-0 3-5 30 li. Iii.surrcctiun of La VcmUw 179:5-0 The Vendean insurrection wa^ a civil war such as France, whose history is so rich in such struggles, had not ]ireviouslv FRANCE 107 experienced, and has not since experienced to the present day. Four j-ears' time and over k)l),()()0 men were required to subdue the rovaUst revolt. The war was fought merci- lessly and to the death, and the battkv"^ were much bloodier than those of the same period between the French armies and the multiplied foes on the frontiers. A new proof was afforded for the thesis that civil wars are much more san- guinary than conflicts between nations or races. The conduct of the war was barbarous and inhuman on both sides, but especially on that of the republican armies. Prisoners taken with arms in their possession were massacred or executed ; it was a war of extermination, resulting in the depopulation of several departments, and France has never ceased to feel its effects. The republican armies had thirteen generals killed, while all the Vendean leaders were killed in action or by the hand of the executioner. The battles of Dol, Entrammes, Cholet, and Le Mans cost the republicans thirty-two, seventeen, sixteen, and ten per cent of their effectives ; the Vendeans lost eighty-six per cent at Savenay, seventy per cent (15,UU0 men) at Le Mans, and twenty per cent (8,000 men) at Cholet. The best generals — Kleber, Marceau, and Hoche — and the most hardened troops were required to suppress the insurrection. As the vanquished, who lost the most heavily, were also Frenchmen, the country suffered doubly from these irreparable losses ; the exact figures are unknown, but they may be estimated at several hundred thousand men. C. Tlie Naval War Kith England, 179;3-1802 Ten vears after the Peace of Versailles the old anta2oni>t> resumed their struggle for the su])remacy on the sea. The French navy had revived during the j)receding war, and had even won some victories over English squadrons. England could not forgive France for this turn of fortune, and did her utmost to relegate the French navv to the humilialin"; 108 LOSSES OF LIFE IN .AIODFHN WARS position it li;i(l occupied at ilic time of the Seven Years*' War. Altli(ni<^li Kn«ili>h tr()oj)s foii<;lit the French in all cimntries and all places where the wars of the Fir>-t and Second Coalition were contested, on the coast> of France and of Italy, in the Kiniidoni of Nai)le^, in F<;ypt. and in i lie colonies, -^till the principal efforts of Great Britain were directed to the destruction of the French navy. Fiance herself assisted Kn«;land in thi^ de>i<:n hv neglecting the development of her sea-})(nvci' and hv (li^|)lacini; her ablest admirals and other officers because they belonged to the nobilitv. The new ideas which were aijitatinir men's minds at the time penetrated to the crews of the vessels, sowing discord, resistance to discipline, and revolt. The English made short work of the untrained personnel and run-down equipment, and the battles were so many defeats for the French navy. The fleets of the Powers allied with France, that of Holland after 1795, and that of S})ain after 1796, shared the same fate in the battles of Camperdown in 1798, and of St. Vincent in 1797, while the Danish scpiadron, the cham])ion of the Neutral League, was practically annihilated in tlie battle of Copenhagen in 1801 ; the trium])h of England was complete. Following are tables of the French losses in the principal naval engagements : Fhkncii T.osses. — Xaval Battucs Killed and J^ri.sDiicrs II ot tvouiidrd. icottiidtd. Ships. lialllr. Hate. Prr cent. Per cent. Per cent r>}i;iiit . ■ '7'H ^7-5 1^-5 -50 Quibrntii liay • 1 7'>5 8-0 M-5 220 (.'ape N\)li ■ >795 9-0 M-o 130 Aboiikir . .7.aS 340 430 85-0 Losses or Ai.i.iks : N aval HArri.ics Killed and •uoiinded. Prisoners. Ships. \nl:-ui. Ilattle. Pair. Percent. Percent. Per rent. Spain . ( ape St. Viiu'riit . 1707 100 13-3 luo Holland . ( ain|Mrilii\vn . 1707 no 40-4 56-0 Denmark . ( opt-nhagcn . iSoi 30-0 50-0 6o-0 FRANCE 109 English Losses : N.w ai. Batiles Btilllf. Percentage. Ushant . . . . 7-0 (';!])(• Noli .... 4-5 (juihcroii Hay . . 2-2 Aboukir .... lo-6 Capo St. Viiucnt . . 5-6 (ampcrdowii . IO-6 (opcniiajicii . ... 15-0 The following table show.s the losses in ships. Tiiis enormous dcstiuction, exceeding; that of tlie naval war of 180J3 to 1815, assured the approaching ruin of the j)iincipal navies of Europe to the profit of England. Notion. Ships of Captured. the Line. Destroyed. 24 5 4 33 20 Guns. Frigates. Guns. Captured. Destroyed. France . Spain . Ilolhuui Denmark 32 5 25 I (.3 4,272 910 1.572 316 33 5 32 70 123 15 9 5,004 616 1,080 292 Total Great Britain 7,070 1.844 149 44 6,992 1.734 The principal sea-battles cost France over 10,000 men killed and wounded and the same number of prisoners not wounded ; England lost only J], 200 killed and wounded. Taking account of numerous minor engagements, of shipwrecks, and of the ravages of disease amonn; the sailors in the colonies and the tropics, the total losses of the French navy in the war may be estimated at 60,000 men : half of these were prisoners. Two admirals and nineteen captains of vessels met death in battle. D. E.rpedifinn Into Roy pi, 1798-1801 On .May 19, 1798, General Bonaparte set sail from Toulon at the head of ;32,000 men (of whofu 1,000 were non-com- batants). The expedition was embarked on 232 transports and convoyed by a squadron composed of thirteen ships of the line and eleven corvettes and armed dispatch boats. no LOSSES OF LIFE IX MODERN WARS I4,CXX3 2,000 8,500 500 25,000 17,000 42,000 crtiTviniT lO.OOO inon witli l,i200 guns. The total number of men was tliiis 42. (KK). The following siimmarv of their fate shows tlie losses of tlie expedition : NuihIkt rftnrtu'd to Fraiu-t- in iSui by Knjrlish vessels when I'-^vpt was aliiindoiud liy the I-Yciu-h ..... SeiinRii fscaiK-d from tin- disasttr of the naval l)attle of .\boiikir St>hliers and seamen made prisoners ...... Number wlio returned \vith lionaparti- to Franee in i~ntcl)ello Marengo . IldluTiliiuicn Miiuio French. Enemies. Killcil ami •couinlrd. Prisoners. Killed nnd jiounrlerf. Prisoners. Pi 1 iCllt. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. J u -u 90 6-0 70 \20 170 4-5 o-o 9-5 90 130 ^6-5 S-5 50 — 150 35«J 50 10 75 5-0 3-6 4-2 5-5 57 51 3-3 g-o 0-5 13-5 -30 13-0 140 23 -2 5-4 2 2-4 130 45 9-6 17-5 60 8-2 S-o I^ossKS. — Frkxch Defeats French. Enemies. Uattlc Ostrach, 1799 . Stockach 1<\-I(ikir(li .Macnano i'assaiio . Zurich. June 4 . 'I'rchhia . Novi (Jenola Kilh il uiiil Per cent. Prisoners. Killed and iLou tilled. Prisoners. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. 30 3-2 1-3 5-5 6-3 6-7 I2-0 I in 87 4-3 250 7-3 ^•3 07 40 2-5 210 13-5 1-3 II-5 140 4-0 270 7-3 I-O The memorable siege of Genoa in 18U0 cost the hves of 8,000 French soldiers and of 15,000 inhabitants who died of hunger and disease. (i. Santo Dotnini^aN Kxpcdifioii, 1802-lJ Fnder the leadership of the n(>gro cliief, Toussaint-L'On- verture, the island of Santo Domingo, which was one of the finest of the French colonies, had thrown off the dominion FRANCE 115 of France. Subsequently a factional warfare between the different races which disputed for the mastery — whites, divided again between republicans and old royalists (creoles), negroes, and mulattoes — had since 1790 been spreading strife, ruin, and terror over the island. In order to subjugate the colony, First Consul Bonaparte in 1802 charged his brother-in-law. General Leclerc, with the task of restoring order and French rule. Leclerc's expeditionary army num- bered J35.000 picked soldiers, connnanded by leaders who had distinguished themselves in the preceding wars. The negro troops were defeated after an obstinate resistance, and Toussaint and most of his men were forced to lay down their arms. But when the French army was attacked and decimated by yellow fever, the negroes again took up arms, and. aided by the mulattoes and royalist Creoles, re-estab- lished negro domination. When the Peace of Amiens was broken in 18053. English fleets came to the assistance of the blacks against the disorganized wreck of the French army, which the fever continued to devour. After stubborn but futile efforts, the last strongholds of the French portion of the island fell in rapid succession, and the ships which attempted to escape with some remnants of the troops either fell into the hands of the English or were sunk at sea. In this attempt to restore the old colonial regime twenty generals perished, including the commander-in-chief Leclerc, and thirty odd thousand French soldiers — an army equal in number and in military efficiency to the army of occupation of Egypt. Two French generals succeeded in prolonging the resistance for a while ; Rochambeau surrendered in November 1803 to the English, while Frerand maintained himself in the ancient Spanish portion of the island until 1810, when he was forced to capitulate to the negro chief Christophe. 12 116 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS CllAi'TEK VII Tin-: XAPOLKOXK \V\|{S, lsOi-1.-) At the uccossioii of Napoleon I to the thioiic. France was at war only witli iMiLjhind. The ^i;j;antic preparations of the new I'iinperoi- foi- the pa>sa> to co-o])erate by means of an auxiliary army. The ensuinii War of the Third Coalition inauijurated the long period of the Wars of the First Em])ire which convulsed Europe for eleven years and ended only with the definitive overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. It wa^ the ])eriod of greatest military tension experienced in modern times. France was at war with England during the whole reign of Napoleon. The war with England la-^teil from IHO)) until 1814. and broke out again in LSI,") duiing the Hundred Days. France was at war with Austria in 180.5. 1809, 181;3-14' and in 1815 : with Russia fnmi 1805 to 1807, 1812 to 1814, and 1815 : with Prussia from 1806 to 18o7. 181:5 to 1814 and in 1815: with Spain from 1808 to 1814: with Portugal from 1807 to 1814 ; with Sweden from 1805 to 1807 and 1812 to 1814- : with the Kingdom of Na])les from 180() to 1807 : with Sardinia in 1814 and 1815 and with Holland tiie same years ; with Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, and the (irand Duchy of Baden from 1813 to 1814 and in 1815 : and witli Saxony in 1806, 18RM4an(l in 1815. During this period, of all the countries of Europe only FRANCE 117 Turkey and Denmark were not at some time at war witli France. It is an indisputable fact tliat Napoleon I was the most bellicose of the monarchs of all time; but in spite of this incontestable truth, to impute to him all the wars of his reign would be to falsify history. The wars of which he was in fact the iii>tio:ator are the following : 1. War witii Naples, 18()G. J2. War with Portugal, 1807. 13. War with Spain, 180^14. 4. War with Russia, 1812. 0. War of the Hundred Days, 1815. The other wars of the First Empire, which were really thrust ujion France, were : 1. War of the Third Coalition, 1805. 2. War with Prussia, 1806. 15. War with Austria, 1809. 4. Wars of Liberation, 1813-14. As to the war with England, of 180J3 to 1814, the two nations were equally instigators. The wars of the First Empire witnessed the mustering of enormous armies, the largest in proportion to the populations of the countries that had ever been put into the field. The numbers in the opposing lines frequently exceeded 1)00,000. The table (p. 118) gives the figures for both sides in the more imj)ortant battles. \Vith regard to the numerical strength of the forces opposed, the battle of Leipsic remained the greatest in history down to 1905, when in the battle of Mukden the number of com- batants passed the 600,000 mark. The absolute and relative losses increased pari passu with the augmentation in the size of the armies. The percentage of killed and wounded on many occasions surpassed even the bloodiest battles of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great. The bitterness of the struggle, the stubbornness of combats 118 LOSSES OF LIFI-: IN MODKHN WARS liaiul-to-liiind aiul at tlu' bayonet's point, tlic desperate efforts of weaker forces against superior numbers, tlie em- |)loyrnent of compact columns and the use of masses of cavalry a2ain>t unvielding infantrv, all contributed toward makiuir the losses hij^her than the military history of the nations had previously seen. liatlle. Leipsic Smolc"Ti-^k Drc-dcii HautzfM Hurddiiio Lilt /.I'll \Vati'rlo<» Aspi-rn I>a HotliicTC Eyiau . IJunv . .TciKi" . Hatishttii Vittoria Denncwitz Laon Austerlitz Frii-dlanfl No other man has sacrificed so many human victim> to the god of war as did Napoleon 1 ; no other man has sowed death broadcast on such a scale ; no commander ever cared less for the lives of his soldiers than he. The table (p. 119) gives the numerical and i>i()])ortional losses of the greatest battles of the Napoleonic era. The bloodiest battles for the French armies were those of Waterloo and Trafalgar, where their losses in killeil and wounded reached forty i)er cent ; they lo-^t a third of their effective strength at Fssling. Albuera, Eylau, Horodino, and Malo Jar()>lawe/„ and at the passage of the Beresina, and about one-fourth at Auorstiidt, Salamanca. Knlm, Leipsic, and Craonne. Forces of Frrnrh and Forcrs of Ihih. Auxiliaries. Enemies, Euein ies. 1813 175,000 Allies 325,000 l8l2 180,000 Russians 120,000 1813 100,000 Allies 200,000 1809 160,000 Austrians 130,000 1813 167,000 Allies 97.000 1812 124,000 Russians 122,000 1813 144,000 .\llics 93.000 1815 72,000 Allies 120,000 1809 66,000 Austrians 99,000 1814 41,000 Allies 123,000 1807 65,000 Russians 95.000 1807 75.000 Russians 83,000 1813 71,000 Prussians 84,000 i8o() g6,ooo Prussians 54,000 1809 72,000 Austrians 78,000 1813 60,000 Allies 90,000 1813 70.000 Allies 80,000 1814 50,000 Allies 100,000 1805 65,000 Allies 83,000 1807 87,000 Russians 61,000 FKAXCK 111) Napolkomc Arm IKS. Enkmiks' AiiMii-.s. Bailie. Date. Effective strength. Killed a III ivoiinded. Prisoners. No. Austcrlitz . . I Trafalu':'" ■ • \ .hwii ■ ■ ■ • AiRTstiidt . • j lltilslmri: . • ; 1 rifilhmd . 1 W ai^rain . • 'I alavcra . • j ( ), aiKi . I'.iisacu . AihlKTll > ilainaiua . r..lot7.k . . .MaloJarushn>ez Krasiioi Bcre-sina Lutzin . llautzcn Dnsden Vittoria Pyrenees Katzbach Kulm DenncNvitz . Leipsic . Craonne Paris Toulousi Ligny . • Quatrc-lii Waterloo a^ 1805 1805 1806 , 1806 ' 1S07 ; 1807 ' 1807 1 1809 1809 1809 j 1809 j 1810 1 1811 1 1S12 ; ' 1812 ! ; 1812 1S12 1812 ; 1812 1813 ' 1813 : 1813 1813 181 3 1S13 1813 1813 1813 1814 1814 1814 , iSij , 1S15 , 1815 65,000 10,000 20,000 8,000 96,000 27,000 75,000 65,000 87,000 6,000 7,000 22,000 12,500 12,000 66,000, 23,000 160,000 33,000 47,000 , 7,000 33,000 2,000 , 58,000 4.5001 23,000 8,000 1 42,000 10,000 ; 34,000 6.000 ' 124,000 42,000 J 24,000 I 8,000 ; 50,000 10,000 1 ; 33,000 10,000 1 144,000: 20,000 j j 167,000 21,000 1 100,000 12,000. 1 60,000 6,000 j ; 60,000' 1 1,000' 60,000 8,000! 37,000 1 9.000 70,000, 8,000 ■ 175,000! 50,000] 23,000 5,600 j 42,000 7.000 32,000 i 4,000 71,000; 11,000 1 21,000 4,000! 72,000 1 30,000 Per cent. 15 40 I 6 1 26 3^ 19 14 35 21 15 1 ^ 35 ; 24 i 18 I 34 i 33 I 20 30 cent. 4*-' 4 24 3^' 14 — 13 — 12 — 10 — 19 7 I ', 24 12 29 25 17 13 16 19 42 9 Kffec- tives. Killed and ivottnded. Prisoners. So. Per cent. Per cent. 83,000 1 10,000 54,000 50,000 j 83,000 , 95,000 61,000 99,000 I 130,000 S 4,000 50,0001 32,000 j 32,000 46,000 22,000 1 122,000 24,000' 90,000 1 87,000 j 93.000 , 97,000 j 200,000 1 90,000 i 55,000, 80,000 103,000 80,000 325,000 j 23,000 j 100,000 I 60,000 I 84,000 ' 32,000 T?o,000 20 28 6 4 2 9 28 2 12 2 I 2 2 II 2 The losses of the opposing forces were rekvfvely l.ghter except where veterat, Uussian troops were engaged these ^flly made a stout resistance. Even '." "-y of «.^^^ ereate'^t victories, the French lost more heavih han then dt fe. ed antagonists, especially where they were t >e aggressors. '^ Tht number of pitcLd battles and .-t f J engagemen s in the Napoleonic wars was enorn>ous, that of t''^ ^"'j'^^ .-elatively Lnall. Taking account onl^■ of act,nns .-here the I^inii Sinnl Capiltiliilions Dale. bailies. baltlrs. Sirgrs. ill Djtrii jirld. 1805 17 — 1 5 1800-7 1 I — 1806-7 n) 20 7 1808-14 60 30 2 1809 27 — I 1812 30 2 — 1813-14 58 — 28 1815 3 — 1S03-13 — - 120 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MoDERX WARS total loss was at least ^1,^^{) imn, the iimnber of enj^agenients of variou-^ cla^'-i'^ for each war i>> >-howii in tlie foliowin*: table : XiMiii H*^ or nATiir-^ IN Nmmiii.iisk W aks War. War of t lit- Third Conlit i(»n W'AT wifli Naples Wat willi I'nissia W'iXT witli Spain War with Austria Hnssiaii ( aiiipaiuMi . NN'ars of Lihcration . War of the Ilnndrt'd Days Naval War . . " . Total ... 221 7 91 15 It is and imi>t leiuaiu iiupo>>.ible to ascertain tlie exact figures for the loss of life whicli these wars of the First Enij)ire cost the countries engaged, as records on the subject do not exist. The archives of the different governments contain only statements of the killed, wounded, and missing in the most important battles. Statistics of the lesser engagements are totally wanting, a fact especially regrettable in view of the prodigious number of actions of this class. Besides this, the recording of the number who died of disease and hardship was entirely neglected, which is also very unfoiiunate, as these losses are known to have j)layed a most important role in all the armies. There are grounds lor believing that, in the Napoleonic armies at least, the losses from disease and exhaustion actually exceeded tlioso inflicted by the weapons of the enemy. Such an assertion gain.-> in pr()l)ability from tlic considcia- iion of the insalubrious climate of some of the region^ which were among the ])rinci])al theatres of war. such a^ tlic marshes of Italy, Spain, Russia, and the Netherlands. It i> known, for example, tliat in the s])ace of a few days the Englisji I()>t J2U,UUU men in tlie Island of Walcheren in 18U9, and that from the verv l)efjinninir '»f the Rn^>-i;ni (iim])aii;n soldier> bv FRANCE 121 thousands perished of disease. Cani])ai<^ns in tlie over-sea colonies in a tropical climate also claimed a large n\nnber of victims, both in the colonial armies and the navies. The superhuman exertions ^vhich the Emperor required of his troops, forced marches, short rations, the burning sun of Spain and the bitter Russian cold, nuist have cost more lives than did the great battles. As already remarked on more than one occasion, it is im- })ossible to give the figures for the losses either of France or of her adversaries. The archives do not contain so much as the total number killed and wounded in a single campaign, and it is only with the greatest difficulty that lists for the great battles are to be found. Data for the calculation of total losses in these wars are simply not to be had. Nevertheless, we shall make an attempt to reach an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded of the armies of France and her allies. The possibility of making a reasonably probable estimate is due to recent labours of the military bureaus, through which have been published the losses of the armies in officers killed and wounded, based on a careful search of the records. Since on the one hand the proportional number of men per officer in the different armies and the various arms of service is known, and since on the other hand the number of men killed or wounded per officer killed or wounded varies but little in the course of the wars of a given country, it is possible from the known number of officers disabled in a campaign to form an idea of the total casualty losses of the troops. The writer has calculated the officer-losses for every engagement, even the minor skirmishes, of all the campaigns of the wars of the First Empire, and he believes it is possible to deduce from them the })robable losses of the men. In the ap])endices will be found tables containing lists of the French officers killed, drowned, assassinated, died of wounds, or disaj)])eared. also those wounded but not fatally, in each war from 1805 to 1815. Corresponding lists contain the numbers of officers of the French auxiliary troops, and still others those of allied forces 122 LOSSES OF LIFK IN MODKHX WARS which fouglit for Napokun in the.se wars. Accordmg to tliese data, tlie number of officers of the French and aUied armies disabled by the weapons of tlie onomy are tabulated below : OFFICKU-LoSSES OI TIM. NaI'OI.KOMC AhMIKS (FuKNCII AM) Al.I.IKS) MV;r. \\ ar ul llir 'I'liinl C ualitioii War with Prussia and Russia \N'ar wit It Naples IViiiiisular War War with Austria . Russian C'ami)ai. The following tables give the distribution ol the ollicer- losses amonix the different ai iii> : FRANCE 123 Ol'FICEn-LOSSES MV AUMS f French Ceneral Staff Service! Aip (Alii ic Total ( French Infantry- Auxiharies lAUics Total I French Cavalry- Auxiharies (AHies Total I French Artillery 1 Auxiliaries I Allies Total I French Engineer Corps Auxiliaries { Allies Total j French Wagon Train Auxiliaries (Allies Total French . Navy-] Auxiliaricb Allies . Total Grand total The average ratio of killed lanes Kilkil. WuHtidi it. Total. 5'M 3,001 3.5 ■» ■» > aiul wounded wa-- thirty-two officers wounded to ten killed or died of wound> ; but tliese figures vary greatly according to the arm of the service, as more clearly shown in the following table, wb.itli give> tlie ratio for the different arms : 124 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS PKoroiiTiON OK Killed to \Voi sued (Officers) Hntiu of killtd .Irni. to iL'ott tided. (icncnil Staff . . . . jo : 54 Infantry . . . . . 10 : 29 (';i\ iilry . . . . 10 : 44 Artilliry . . . 10 : 22 Kngint'tT (Oriis . 10 : 29 \Va;:<»n Train . . . . 10 : 27 Navy . . . . . . 10 : 23 These propoitiuiuil figures show that officers in the artillery and tlie iiavv received in general the most dangerous wounds, the cavalry and ^taff-officers (also usually mounted), the lightest. It must also be taken into account that staff- officers, of whom the majority were of high lank. received more prompt and ])robaljly more careful surgical aid. The next table shows the number of officers disabled in order of commission and rank : Officer-Losses by Ranks lianh. Anny C'oinniandcrs .... Marshals of France .... Corps Commanders .... Division Commanders .... Bri<:adier-Generals .... Colonels ...... Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors Battalion or Scjiiadron Commanders Cajttairis ...... Lieutenants ...... Sub-Lieutenants ..... Total ...... tieneral Ollieers .... Other SujH'rior Ollieers Total Superior (311ieers . i»30l 6,260 Ratios 11 v Ranks ,..,, ,(i (iiueral Oflieer to -z Otlieers. Killed ^ ..,,. . ,,„ (I S>uj»erior Ollieer to >; Ollieers. ... , 1 ' I (ieneral OlFieer to .14 Onie«rs \Nounded ^ ^ I .Superior Ofiieer to (> Olnehow by years and by campaigns the total losses in killed and wounded, as estimated by the writer on the basis of the officer-losses. In the calculation^, account has been taken of the arm of service to which the disabled officers belonged, and of the corres})onding relative losses of officers and proportions of officers to men. 12() I.OSSKS OF LIl-K IN MODKKN WARS liufiiiiaii Campaign and lit treat, 1812 Tn tlii> jxifjantic military enterprise, one of the greatest in Inunan history, more than a milhon combatants stood in tlie ()})j)osin«; lines, and over half of these perished. These enormous losses have been calculated with a fair degree of accuracy. The Grande Armee was composc^ iind Allies ..... 291 'J'"tal 55'3 The effective strenjrth of the infantrj', including foot artillery, was 512,000. C'avaluy Squadrons. French . . . . . .219 Auxiliaries and Allies ..... 261 Total ...... 480 The effective strength of tlic cavalr>', including mounted artillery. was ......... 100,000 T^taJ nunil)cr of combatants who crossed the Russian frontier . 612,000 Employees, domestics, and labourers ..... 25,000 Grooms and stable-boys ....... 43,000 Grand total (68,000 non-combatants) . . . 080,000 These 680,000 men crossed the frontier with iJOO.OOO horses, 1,242 pieces of field artillery, and 130 siege guns. The combatants of the army, numbering 612,000, were divided between 5300.000 French and 1312,000 auxiliary and allied troops. The latter were distributed among various nationalities as follows : AUXILIAUY .\NU Al-UKI) TllOOPS y>'alioiinlily. Sumbc■r^l•l•s Swiss .... Biidt'iiest* Hessians Ucrj^ians (Grand DiU'hy) Germans (.Minor Principalities) Total Sumbtr. 23,000 21,000 15,000 9,000 6,000 5. (XX) 5,( X ), ) 3I2,fXX3 The Russian forces opposed to Napoleon consisted of the following Troops of the first line Troops of the second line Troops of the thin! line Trooj)s of the fourth line Total 190,000 137,000 161,000 135,000 623,000 Of this total, 64,000 were Cossacks and 31.000 militia. The fate of the Napoleonic forces is shown in the fol- lowing list : Number who returned to the frontier Prisoners of war .... In hospitals .... Deserters . .... Killed in battle .... Died of iHiniier, exhaustion, eold, or disease Total ..... 1 12,000 100,000 50,000 50,000 100,000 200.000 612,000 Of the 68,000 non-coml)atants, half deserted and tlic other half perished, so that about 340,000 men, or half of the total number of 680,000, lost their lives in the campaign. The Austrian and Prussian contingents, forming respec- tively the riglit and left wings of the army, suffered relatively the lightest losses, approximately 30,000 Austrian> and 16,000 Prussians recrossing the frontier. In engagements with the enemv the Grande Armee lost 100,000 men killed. U^f 128 LOSSES OF LIFE L\ MODKKN WARS (Irowiu'd, (lied of wouiul^, or unaccoiiiitt'd for, of ^hoin TOJHM) wore French and iJO.OOO auxiliarii's and allies ; l'.M),()(M) French and ()(),()()() auxiliaries and allies were wounded. The>e ti, bore the brunt of tlif enemy"> attack-. The Russian armies h)st ^OO.OOO killed. .')(),()()() dispersed or deserted, and 15().0()() wounded who recovered. This was the greatest and most costly in human life of any of the wars of the Napoleonic era, in spite of the fact that it la-ted but a few months. Losses in Kiirrn and AVot vnrn nv VF.vns 1805 Camimign. KUled. Wounded. Grand French. Allies. Total. French. Allies. \ Total. total. Austrian Campaign 5.300 300 5.600 22,200 1,200 23,400 29,00c Italian ( ainpaiun . 2,100 100 2,200 5.300 400' 5,700 7,900 Naval War . 4.300 1,200 5.500 3.700 1,600 5.300 10,800 Colonial Defence . 200 200 400 400 600 Coast Defence 100 lOO 400 • ' 500 Totals . 12,000 1,600 13,600 32,000 3,200 35.200 48,800 1806 Campais^n. Killed. Wounded. iirana French. AUies. Total. French. AUies. Total. total. Prussian Campaign 7.200 300 7.500 20,000 Soo 20.800 28,300 War with Naples . 1,500 250 1.750 5.000 1.500 0.500 8,250 r'iglitinn in Dal- matia V >(> 300 1. 000 — 1. 000 1.300 Naval War . 700 700 1.300 1,500 2,200 Colonial Difenee . 50 ■ — 50 200 200 250 l'oa>t I)<'r('iiee 50 - — 50 10,350 100 2,'^i'v-^ 100 150 'r..tals . 0.800 550 27.800 ■^^.TOO 40,450 FRANCE 129 1807 Killed. Wotiiuled. Grand total. Catnpaign. French. Allies. Total. French. Allies. 8,000 300 — Total. Prussian Campaign War with Naples Fi 7c K) — 700 icxj 4(jci — 400 41,800 2,800 1,000 1,400 500 Totals . 11,200 2,500 13,700 ' 26,500 , 7,3CAJ 33,800 47.500 ] 811 Campaign. Killed. Mounded. Grand French. Allies. Totnl. 17,000 200 700 1,700 50 19,650 French. 33.000 200 fXX) 3.300 200 Allieif. Total. total. Spanish War ^Var with Najjlcs . Na\al War . Colonial Defence Coast Defence 15,000 2,000 50 150 500 200 1,700 — 50 1 500 400 6,900 39,000 700 1,300 3.300 200 56,000 900 2,000 5.000 250 Totals . 17,300 1 2,350 37,600 44,500 64,150 I8I2 Campaign. Spanish ^Var . Russian Canipaipn War with Xaj)Ies Naval NVar Colonial Defence Coast Defence , Totals KilUd. French. Allies. Total. 10,000 1,500 11,500 70,000 I 30,000 j 100,000 — [ 100 3001 — 50 50 — 80,350 I 31,650 100 300 50 50 112,000 Wounded. French. Allies. Total. 28,000 4.500 32.500 120,000 60,000 180,000 400 400 500 500 200 200 200 200 148,700 65,100 213,800 Grand total. 44,000 280,000 500 250 250 325.800 1 813 Campaign. KilUd. Wounded. 1 Grand total. French. .illies. Total. French. AUies. Total. Sj)anish ^\ ar (iernian ( anipaijjn Italian Canipaij,'n Naval War . Coast Defence Fighting in Denmark . 17.500 53.500 1,200 500 200 1,000 6,500 1,200 200 18.500 60,000 2.400 500 200 200 81,800 40,000 156,500 5.000 700 400 4,000 39,500 5,000 600 44,000 196,000 10,000 700 400 600 62,500 256,000 12,400 1,200 600 800 Totals . 72,900 8,900 202,600 49,100 251,700 333.500 FRANCE 131 1814 Campaign. Killed. Wounded. Grand French. .},L)00 15,000 1,500 400 100 Allies. Total. French. Allies. Total. total. Spanish War Canipaifjnin France Italian Campaign . Naval War Coast Defence 500 4,000 15,000 2,000 400 100 12,000 50,000 4,000 600 300 2,000 2,000 12,000 50,000 6,000 600 300 68,900 16,000 65,000 8,000 1,000 400 Totals . 21,000' 500 21,500 66,900 90,400 I8I5 Campaign. Killed. Wounded. Grand French. Allies. Total. French. Allies. Total. total. Campaign in Belgium Defence of Fortified Points . Fighting in Vendee Naval ^Va^ 13,000 1,300 300 100 35.000 3.700 700 100 48,000 5,000 1,000 200 Totals I4»700 39.500 54,200 Recapitcl.\tion : Losses in Killed and Wounded, N^vpoleonic Wars Year. 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 Totals By Ye.\ks Killed. Wounded. 13,600 35.200 10,350 30,100 21,650 63,600 9.850 31,400 51.950 151.500 13.700 33.800 19,650 44,500 112,000 213,800 81,800 251,700 21,500 68,900 14.700 39.500 370.750 964,000 Total. 48,800 40,450 85,250 41.250 203,450 47.500 64,150 325,800 333.500 90,400 54,200 1.334.750 Distribution between French ant> Allies Killed Wounded Total disabled French. 306,000 764,000 1,070,000 Auriliarirs and Allies. 65,000 200,000 265,000 IJv Wars DaU. KilUd. Wounded. Total. 1805 8,000 29,000 37,000 1806-12 4,000 13.000 17,000 28,000 82,000 110,000 1808-14 91,000 237,000 328,000 i8oc> 31.000 95.000 126,000 1812 100,000 180,000 280,000 1813-14 80,000 262,000 342,000 1815 15.000 40,000 55.000 1805-15 9.750 16,000 26,000 1805-15 3.000 8,000 11,000 1S05-15 1,000 2,000 3.000 370,750 964,000 1.334.750 132 LOSSES OF LIFE L\ MODERN WARS \V(IT. War of tlic Third Coalition War witli Naples \Var witli Prussia and Russia War in Spain . War witli Austria Russian Canipaif^n . NVars of Lilu-ration . War of tlu- Hundred Days Xaval \Var C'ok)nial Defence Coast Defence Total We repeat that these estimates relate only to the losses inflicted on the French troops and those of their allies by the weapons of the enemy. The deaths from exhaustion and from disease, and the victims of cold and of hunger, are not included in the above figures, which give only the losses in battle itself. In the chapter on the Russian campaign were discussed the total losses of both the opposing armies. It is more difficult to estimate the total losses for other wars and camj^aigns. Several writers have essayed to estimate the losses of France in all the wars of the First Em])ire ; we concede that we have not the temerity to follow thcii- examjile, for the reason that as the necessary documents do not exist, we could give only vague conjectures not founded on official records. Historians have placed the loss of human lives by France in consequence of the wars of the First Empire at over 2,000.000 persons ; their mode of reasoning is as follows : The number of men placed by the Senate at the disposal of Napoleon I in the course of his reign, is calculated at 2.02l3,tXX); to these are added the cavalry levy of 17.000 in .January, 181:3, the general levy of 18U, estimated at U;).000, and the volunteers and the national guard of 1814 and I8I0, estimated at 817,000. Thus computed the sum total of all the men the Emperor had under his commaml would have been 3,000,000. FRANCE 13:3 Deducting from this tlie number under arms, prisoners, or nmstered out at the close of the wars in 1815, estimated at 802,600 men, the remainder, or 2,1^7,400, sliould represent the number who lost their lives. We confess that we cannot acce})t either the above figures or the method of reasoning by which they are obtained. If Napoleon had had 817,000 men at his disposal in 1814 and 1815, the wars of that date would |)robably have taken a different course. It is agreed that the military lesources of France were absolutely exhausted at the time, that the lack of men to oppose to the double and treble numbers of the hostile coalitions forced her to abandon the struggle. Again, it must be remembered that many French regiments were recruited by conscription in provinces newly conquered and united to France, and that these soldiers commonly deserted or went over to the enemy at the first favourable oppor- tunity. Another consideration not to be overlooked is the fact that a large proportion of the French prisoners — about 800,000 were taken by each side from 1805 to 1815 — elected not to return home, and remained permanently in the hostile countries. According to our calculation of the losses, the number who were killed or died of wounds in the Napoleonic armies could not have exceeded 400,000. Admitting that 600,000 may have perished by disease, exhaustion, and accidental causes, or fallen victims to starvation or to the rigours of an inhospit- able climate, 1,000,000 men is probably a fair approximation of the total number of fatalities suffered by France and her allies in the wars of the period of the First Empire. As her enemies were repeatedly defeated in bloody battles and suffered their share of disasters, their losses could not have been much inferior to hers. Hence it will not be far from the truth to assert that the wars of the First French Empire cost Europe about 2,000,000 men killed, besides an equal number wounded of whom perhaps fifteen to twenty per cent were disabled for life. 134 LOSSES or LIFE IX MODERN WARS The Xaval War -with England, 1803-15 The Peace of Amiens proved but tlie truce of a year. The conflict of interests between France and England was too great and the differences too important, the questions un- settled or badly settled by the treaty too numerous, to guarantee a long period of peaceful relations. The vast superiority of England in tlie number of ships, in material resources, in experienced seamen and gunners and especially in officers and admirals of the first rank, this time enabled her to accomplish her purpose and annihilate the navies of the French and their allies. The war, which lasted eleven years, cost England over £600.000.000, but it assured her uncontested supremacy on all the seas of the world. She was the only nation that was never forced to bow to the will of Napoleon I, the only one which suffered no defeat and came out absolutely victorious from the wars of the First Empire. She owed her salvation and her success to her island position and the inadequacy of the French navy, especially its lack of able naval commanders, as well as to her own maritime superiority. After 1809, there practically no longer existed a French squadron which dared to venture outside a port and keep to sea. The English troops were transported to Sjiain and Portugal by powerful fleets and co-operated in the liberation of those countries bv lending them not onlv ex])erienced soldiers but superior leadership ; at the same time other fleets captured or destroyed on every sea the remnants of what had once been a great navy, or convoyed other troops which took possession of the colonies of France and her allies. The losses of France in this disastrous war were enormous, suq)assing anything of the kind which had hitherto been seen. The indisputable braveiy of the French crews, who only struck their flags after a stubborn and heroic struggle, rendered the naval actions ver}' destructive of life. The battle of Trafalgar cost the Franco-Spanish fleet forty per cent of its ])ersonnel in killed and wounded (twenty-five per cent killed) and forty per cent prisoners ; the battles FRANCE 135 of Cape Ortegal (1805) likewise cost them forty per cent of the personnel killed or wounded, together with sixty per cent prisoners ; that of Santo Domingo (1806), thirty per cent killed and wounded and thirty-five per cent prisoners. The Entjlish losses in killed and wounded in these encounters hardly exceeded ten per cent. Thanks to several recent publications issued under the direction of the Military Archives at Paris, the present writer has been able to ascertain the losses of officers killed and wounded in all the actions of the Napoleonic fleets and armies from 1805 to 1815. As the officer-losses represent on the average one-twentieth those of the troops, it is possible to estimate approximately the total loss of the armies in killed and wounded. The maritime war was carried on at sea, in the colonies, and on the coasts of France and allied countries. The following table shows the losses of officers killed and wounded in naval combats and in the defence of the colonies and coasts : Officer-Losses. — Naval Battles, etc. year. yaval battles. Colonial ihfiHce. Coast defence. Total. Killed. Wounded . Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded. Killed. Wounded. 1 805 177 242 13 18 3 4 193 264 1806 ■> -. 90 I 18 2 3 25 III 1807 4 4 I 3 4 5 II 1808 20 27 13 31 8 33 66 1809 20 40 20 69 13 75 53 184 1810 16 3-: 8 53 2 15 26 100 1811 22 5^ 57 81 12 79 145 1812 18 27 -> 4 5 20 36 1813 26 17 — 6 26 32 43 1814 12 iS — I 13 24 1815 I 5 4 4 5 9 Total 338 554 "5 277 31 162 484 993 In the officers killed are included all who died of wounds or were drowned or unaccounted for. The figures include the losses of France and of her allies, Spain, Italy, Naples, and Holland. France alone lost 439 Killed. Wounded -271 404 18 39 150 462 136 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS officers killed ami 905 wounded, or more than ninety per cent of the total officer-losses. The total French losses in these battles may be estimated at about 10,000 killed and 16,000 wounded. The number of prisoners must have been con- >iderable, since in the capture of a war vessel or the conquest of a colony the entire crew or garrison become prisoners of war. The number of deaths from disease would naturally have been large on the war vessels and in the colonies, and doubtless greatly exceeded the number killed in battle ; but unfortunately records are entirely wanting u})on wliich any estimate of these losses might be based. The officer-losses given in the table above were distributed as follows : Officer-Losses. — Navai, War Sliips' OfTiccrs ...... Marine Artillery Oilicers .... Inlantry and .Artillery Oilicers Total 439 905 It will be seen that the naval losses in killed were relatively much higher than those of the land forces. The losses of higher officers were also proportionately greater in the navy than in the army, as shown in the tables which follow : Losses of Superior Officers. — Navy Killed. Woutuled. Total. General Oilicers . . . i 3 4 (aptaitis of .Ships of the Line .17 19 36 Captains of Frigates ... 27 31 58 Total Superior Oilicers . 45 53 98 Total Olficers (all classes) . 289 443 732 Losses of Scperior Officers, Reoui,.vr and Colonial Forces Killed. Wounded. Total. General Oilicers ... — 4 4 ('(iloncls ..... 5 9 i^ Lieutenant-Colonels ... 7 13 Batlalion Coininanders . . 7 25 32 Total Superior OlFiccrs . 18 45 63 Total Olficers (all classes) . 150 462 612 FRANCE 137 Proportions : Xa\'y Killed : 6 OfTicers to i Superior OfTicer. Wounded : S Ollicers to i Siij)erif)r Olliccr, Proportions : Land Troops Killed : o Olfieers to i Superior OHicer. Wounded : lo OlRcers to i Superior Officer. In addition to those given above, the French navy suffered other considerable losses in the wars of the First Empire. Naval forces were emjiloyed in the numerous sieges of the war in Spain, and the marine artillei y played an especially im- portant role in the Wars of Liberation in ISl-i and 1815. In the latter war this arm of the service lost 127 officers killed and 403 wounded, which would indicate a probable loss in men of 3,000 killed and 9,000 wounded. The loss of war-vessels as well as that of men was stupendous in this war for the naval supremacy. During the twelve years of its duration, England was forced to fight at some time practically all the smaller navies of Europe and even that of the United States, as well as that of France. She was at war with Turkey from 1807 to 1813, with Spain from 1805 to 1808, with Holland from 1803 to 1810 (the period of union of that kingdom with France), with Russia from 1808 to 1809, and with the United States from 1812 to 1814 ; besides all these, the small navies of Italy and the kingdom of Naples were also opposed to her. The writer has been able to obtain authentic figures for the losses of these various navies, and a comparison of these losses with those of England give a clear idea of the immense superiority of the British Navy over all the others of the world combined at the period in question. The losses are shown in tabular form (p. 138). Thus England captured from her foes in the course of this war, 39 ships of the line and 113 frigates carrying 5,382 guns and about 50,000 men (killed and wounded are included in the number captured) ; she lost but one ship of the line and 14 frigates carrying 496 guns and crews of about 4,000 men. On the other hand, she lost 70 ships of war sunk, wrecked 138 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS or destroyed, against 75 lost in the same way by her enemies. In the absence of records on the subject, the writer has been unable to ascertain the losses among the nayal crews caused by drowning or in the sinking of ships. Supposing that half the crews of such ships were able to saye themselyes, the number drowned would exceed 2o,00U, of whom 11,000 should be attributed to England, 8,000 to France, and 6.000 to other countries. Losses in Smi-^ Ships of the line. Frigates. Sal ion. Cap- tured. (iiin.s. 1.344 376 1,140 Sunk or destroyed. 18 5 5 4 I I Guns. Cap- tured. Guns. Sunk or ,..,..„ destroyed. ^""*' Franee . Spain Hollan.i. Denmark Turkey . Russia . United States. 10 5 15 39 I 1,326 452 340 266 64 74 70 12 7 17 3 4 2,484 370 222 506 118 136 3.836 442 28 946 3 98 2 68 3 92 5 184 Total . Great Britain . 2,860 54 34 17 2,522 1. 170 113 14 41 1,388 53 1.758 CHAFTER VIII \\ AHS OF MODEHX FUANCK I'KOM ISlfi TO 1871 A. Minor Wars and Expeditions Under the head of minor military enterprises may be named the armed interyention of France in Spain in 1823, the participation of a French squadron in the naval battle of Nayarino in 1827, the conquest of Morea in 1828, the Belgian expedition and siege of Antwerp in 1832, the Roman expedi- tion of 1849, and the defence of Rome afjainst Garibaldi in 1876. All these expeditions combined did not occasion a loss exceeding 6,000 men killed and wounded, at the mo>t. FRANCE 139 The intervention in Spain in 1823 cost 110 officers and about 3,000 men disabled. The naval battle of Navarino cost the French squadron 43 men killed and 144 wounded. The losses of the other Powers enf^aged were as follows : England, 75 killed and 197 wounded ; Russia, 59 killed and 139 wounded ; Turko-Egyptian tieet, 4,000 killed and wounded. In the siege of Antwerp in 1832 the French forces lost 34 officers and 772 men by the fire of the enemy, and the capture of Rome in 1849 cost 74 officers and about 1,500 men. These losses, it will be seen, are infinitesimal in comparison with the numbers of casualties under the First Empire. B. The Insurrections of 1830, 1848, and 1851 It is a gloomy fact that intestine struggles and civil wars in the period under consideration cost France vastly greater sacrifices than those suffered in foreign military operations. The losses of the rebels in these barricade combats, it must be remembered, were also French losses, and these were much heavier than those of the troops opposed to them. The following table shows the destruction of life in those dark days: Casuaxties in Insliuuxtions Year. Government forces killed and liuunded. Insurgents killed and icounded. Officers. Men. 1830 1848 1851 60 206 18 1,200 4,000 400 4,500 6,000 1,000 In the ' June Days ' of 1848 the army lost 7 generals, 9 other superior officers, and 45 subalterns killed, and 5 generals, 18 other superior officers, and 122 subalterns wounded. C. Oversea Expeditions and Colonial Wars of this Period Some of these enterprises were of minor importance ; such were the expeditions to Mexico of 1838 and 1839 (San Juan 140 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS d'Ulloa and Vera Cruz) ; to the Marquis Islands and Tahiti (184-4 and 184-6) ; and to Argentina and Uruguay in 1845 (battle of Obligado), where the crew> of the fleet had occasion to distinguish themselves and sustained some losses. Of greater significance were the two Chinese wars of 1856-60 and 1862-4, and the expedition to Cochin China in 1858-62 in which France participated as the ally of England. In addition to these, there were two enter])rises of the first im- j)()rtance : the first was the expedition to and occu])ation of Algeria in 1830, which inaugurated the French colonization of northern Africa, and the other was the Mexican expedition of 1861-7, a disastrous attempt to establish French law and increase French influence in America. The extent of the losses suffered by the expeditionary forces in these various enterprises is unknown. In view of the unhcalthful climate for Europeans, of the epidemic diseases which are known to have infected the troops in those distant regions, of the lack of medical attendance, and of the often defective administrative organization, the losses must have been heavy. We have been able to find the losses in officers killed and wounded, and so are in a position to calculate approximately the losses caused by the enemy's fire, except for the engagements in China and Cochin China, where records are wanting. From 1830 to 1870 hardly a year passed witliout encounters in Algeria, and the conquest and pacification of the new colony and the frequent clashes with the neighbouring Moroccans cost a large number of lives. In the course of those forty years the French forces lost 411 officers killed and 1,360 wounded, which would corre- spond to about 10,000 })rivate soldiers killed and 35,000 wounded. The number of deaths from disease, exhaustion, and hardships must have been much larger. Among the officers killed were counted one commander-in-chief (Denys de Damremont, killed at the attack on Constantina in 1837), 4 brigadier-generals, 8 colonels, 5 lieutenant-colonels, 31 FRANCE 141 battalion commanders, and 362 subalterns. The wounded officers included 3 division commanders, 15 brigadier-generals, 16 colonels, 21 lieutenant-colonels, 86 battalion or squadron commanders, and 1,222 subalterns. The Mexican expedition lost 211 officers killed and wounded and about 5,000 men disabled in the various engagements with the enemy. A foe more destructive than the fire of the opposing forces, however, was the fever, which made enormous ravages in the ranks of the army of occupation. D. The Crimean War, 1854-6 Although a victory for the arms of France and her allies, the English, Turks, and Piedmontese, this great war is bitterly remembered in France for the cruel losses it infficted on the army, losses amounting to a third of its total effective strength. The greatest event of the war, the memorable siege of Sebastopol, lasted over a year and cost the allies 54,000 men killed and wounded, while the Russians lost over 100,000. The bloodiest battle was that at Inkermann, where the loss percentages of the forces engaged recall the battles of the First Empire ; the victorious alhes lost twenty-three per cent and the defeated Russians fully thirty-three per cent of their effectives. In the battles of Alma and of Traktir the losses were lighter — eight per cent and five per cent for the allies, seventeen per cent for the Russians. But it was not the losses by the enemy's fire — high as these were — which so deplorably thinned the ranks of the two antagonists ; it was the ravages of typhoid fever and dysentery and especially of cholera, wjiich raged in the camps and on the war-ships and levied a heavy toll in human lives. The inadequacy of the ambulance and hospital service was cruelly felt on both sides. Official records exist of the enormous losses of both antagonists, and tiie numbers are shown in the following tables : 142 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS FOHCKS AND Ci-\ssiFiED Losses of thk Different Countries Stitiririfiliti/. Effective slrrtifilh jiut in I /if field. Killed or died of riounds. Died of diseiLse. Total fatalities. Wounded but not fatally. French Knjrlisli 3l(),cxx) 98,000 20,240 4,602 75.375 17.580 "5. ''15 22,182 47,000 13.000 Picilmontcsc 21,000 j8 2.166 2,194 Unknown 'J'urks . 230,000 Unknown Unknown 35.000 Unknown Russians 500,000 40,000 60,000 100,000 120,000 Note. — The figures for the Russian losses are approximate. Tilt' two c()iiiinuiKlfi--iii-rliiL'f ot the allio, Mar>lial Lerov de Saint-Arnaiid and Lord Rat amonf; the ofhcers of that arniv the grades of Portepee- fahnrich (en>i<,Mi) and Vize-Fddwebel (sergeant). It has seemed best to eliminate the lifjures for the losses of men of these ranks, for two reasons : In the first place, the grades did not exist in the French army at the time (they now exist there under the title of aspirants), and hence our comparisons between the two armies would be vitiated. Moreover, the duties })ertaining to these grades were hardly those of true officers, but rather those of petty officers. Their number in the lists of killed and wounded is over 900. The followinij; table shows the losses in killed and wounded of both sides in the sixteen most important battles of the war : Riii^vTivi; LossKs Ihitltr. Wcirth .... SpichercM Horny .... Rezonville Gravc'Iottc Beaumont Sedan .... Villiers .... Chanipigny Loipny .... Orleans .... Ik'augeney Le Mans llerieourt Buf/.(ii\al St. Quentiu It will be noted that there were only two battles where the losses on either side exceeded twenty })er cent ; the Germans lost twenty-four per cent at Rezonville and the French nearly thirty per cent at Worth. In both cases the high })roi)ortion of the losses is explained by a great inferiority of numbers in comparison witli the enemv. In the decisive battles of W<)rth, Gravelotte, and Sedan, the Germans outnumbered the French nearly two to one ; in the second part of the war [iemuiu losses. French losses Per cent. Per cejtt. 1 1 -3 20-2 i2-g IO-4 8-3 3-8 237 M-4 IO-5 <'-3 5-0 85 5-^ 180 6-8 77 12-3 7-S 9-2 87 2-4 47 II-7 8-4 4-8 7-0 4-0 3-0 3-0 4-8 77 74 FRANCE 147 the French armies generally had the superiority in numbers but not in regular trooi)s, their armies consisting at this time principally of unseasoned recruits. The German losses were naturally much heavier early in the war when they were opposed by the old soldiers of the regular French army. In spite of the perfection of firearms, longer range rifles, rifled artillery, and machine-guns, the average losses in killed and wounded fall far short of those of the First Empire. The following fables show the effective strength of tlie two antagonists and their losses, according to the campaigns into which the war was divided : German Effectivk Strength Officers. Men. Xuinbcr who crossed the frontier . . . 33>ioi 1,113,254 Number who remained in Germany . . . 9»3I9 338,738 Total number mobiUzed .... 42,420 1,451,992 French Effective Strength Officers. Men. Troops of the Hne and reser\'es who left the sta- tions from .July 15, 1870, to March i, 1871 . 20,740 915,000 Xewly formed coqjs ...... Unknown 735,000 Xational (iuard of Paris ..... Unknown 330,000 Total number mobilized .... 1,980,000 At the cessation of hostilities on March 1, 1871, there were 7i20,000 German soldiers in France and 250,000 ready to entrain in Germanv. The next table shows the total military resources of France at the same date : French Strength, March i, 187 i Active armies ....... 542.000 Number in military' divisions ..... 354,000 Mobilized in instruction camps . .... 55,000 Provisionally inobiii/cd by Prefects .... 54,000 New recniifs. Class of 1S71 ..... 132,000 Married men from j i to 30 years of age subject to call . 250,000 Total ....... 1,387,000 Hardly ten j)er cent of this theoretical potential strcngfii, however, consisted of troops of the Hne. L2 14>8 LOSSES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS Wc now tin II to ilio losses by cain])aii:n<, which arc shown in tlic next two tables : Gkuman Losses ('(im]i(iifiii. Apainst Army of the Hliiiic Against tlu- Army of .Mit/, . Ajjainst the Army of Chalons Ii3 12,000 30,000 148,000 190,000 9,000 16,000 90,000 115,000 10,000 20,000 4,000 34,000 12,000 30,000 40,000 82,000 5,000 13,000 20,000 38,000 2,500 8,000 12,000 3-2,500 2,500 5,000 51,000 58,500 140,000 370,000 580,000 The average strength of the German armies in tlic war, taking account of diminutions caused by losses and disease and of successive additions of reinforcements, may be placed at 887,000 men. This number has been taken as a basis for the percentage calculation of the total German losses, which arc classified in the followinc tabic : German Losses. — Killed Officers. Mm. Killed in battle 1 .04(1 16,539 Died of wounds (.71 10,050 Died from accident . 9 281 Committed suilli OJJicers. Mill. (887,()()0). 1,039 4^842 50 3J^5 86,007 lO-I 103 10,026 114 5,767 138,875 16-24 The diseases which made tlie greatest ravages in the German ranks were typhus fever and dysentery, the former causing 7,UU0 deaths and the hitter 2,000. Tlie exact number of the French losses is not i\nown ; many historians have placed them at double those of the Germans. It would appear that this estimate must be accepted, as the (ilHcer-losses indicate much higher figures for the French than tor the Germans. The table shows bv arm and class the immbers of French officers killed and wounded, and the total tor the German army. Fren'cii Officer -LOSSES. Killed and Killed and died of WOUNTDED Wounded, Arm. wounds. not fatallij. Total Staff .... . 67 210 ^77 Infantry of the Line . . 1,530 3.248 4.778 Cavalry .... . 112 326 438 Artillery .... . 98 329 427 l'-n;,nneer Corps • 15 41 56 NVagun Train . . I 4 5 Navy .... . 79 ^5i 232 National (Juard (.Mol)ile) . 253 771 1,024 .National (iuanl (.Mobilized) . 98 161 259 National (aiard (Stationary, scdcntaire) iz 17 29 I''rcc Corps * 80 2,345 142 224 Grand total 5,402 7.747 Total German Olliccr-losses 1,717 3,725 5,442 There was thu> an excess of i2,i305 French officers killed and wounded (628 killed) over the corresponding losses on the German side. The French losses in general officers and superior officers were more than double those of the Germans, as shown in the following comparative table : 150 LOS.^ES OF LIFE IN MODERN WARS I'"itr.N( 11 AVD G rKKMAN Officer- •LOSSES «Y U. \NK Hank. Grrtnan. French. Killed. O Wounded. Total. Killed. u Wounded. Total. Army C uiMiuaiiilrrs . i Corps C'onunaiulers . I 2 3 2 2 \ Division C'ommaiuliTs o 4 4 5 M ly liripuliiT-diruTiils . 6 -^3 -29 18 55 73 (."oloiuls ^7 45 72 3-: 74 lot) Lieut. -Colonels i8 48 00 4'' 115 104 Majors and Iiattali<»u Com- iiianders 86 1O2 248 151 357 508 Captains 346 672 i,oi8 842 1.852 2,694 lieutenants 320 086 1,006 627 1,512 2,139 Snl)-Lieiitenants 899 I.717 2,082 3.725 2,981 5.442 625 1.432 2,057 Totals 2,351 5.415 7.766 The Gernuiii^ liacl ;3G <^c'iK'ial oHicers disabled, of ns1u)1ii 7 were killed ; tlie French 98 disabled, 25 killed ; 422 German superior officers were killed or wounded against 876 French. These tiojures afford eloquent proof that if fortune did not favour tlie French arms, it was not because of any lack of merit on the part of the officers, whose bravery was worthy of a better fate. The following tables give the proportional losses in officers of the two armies : FllENCII OfFICER-LOSSEIS 15V AUMS .1////. staff . Imperial (iuard Iiilaiiliy of the Line Cavalry Artillery l-Jiniiieer Corjis Per cent nf killed and ivoundcd. 197 17-5 36-3 120 20 -o . I /■//(. Staff . Prussian (.iianl Inlaiilry Cavalr\' Art ill. ry Kn^iiiieer Corps Wagon Train (Jermsn Officer-losses bv Arms Per rent of killed and icdundcd. 14-0 29-6 -'7 5 0-4 iS-o 8-4 1-4 FRANCE 151 The Germans lost -i general officers and 12 superior officers by death from disease, the Frencli 5 general officers and G8 superior officers from the same cause, wliicli is sufficient indication that the Frencli army nuist have suffered mucli heavier losses by disease than did tlie Germans. During the Crimean War, in wliicli over 75,U()0 men of the French contingent })erislied from this cause, the number of superior officers who died did not exceed 52. The most probable estimates place the total losses of the French armies in 1870-1 at 280,000 officers and men killed and wounded, distributed a})proximately as follows : Kilkd and died of wouiuls ....... 6o,000 Died in prison ......... I7,cxx) Died in Switzerland and lk'l<,nuni (after being disarmed) . . 2,000 Died of disease or exhaustion ...... 61,000 Total ......... 140,000 ^Vounded, not fatally ........ 140,000 Grand total (ineluding Olficers) ..... 280,000 The number of French prisoners was enormous, surpassing anything of the kind down to recent times. The armies of Chalons and of Metz, each of over 100,000 men, were cap- tured entire, and became prisoners of war. The jjrisoners were classified as follows : Officers. Men. Prisoners eaptured and sent into Germany . . . 11,860 372,000 Disiirmed at the capitulation of Paris, but not obliged to change residence ...... 7,456 242,000 Entered Switzerland, diNarnied by Swiss troops . . 2,192 88,000 Entered Helgiuin after the disaster of Sedan, disarmed by Belgian troops ...... 300 6,000 At the time of the ca})itulation of Paris, 21,808 officers and 708,000 men were either in captivity among the enemy or disarmed at Paris or in neutral territory. Many sick and wounded were included auKmg the jirisoners. Typhus fever and small-pox raged furiously in the French camps, causing almost as great loss of life as the enemy's fire. These diseases were also responsible for the death of multitudes among the civil population. 152 LOSSES OF LIFK IN MODKHN WARS OfTicial statist ic> >ho\v an excels of deaths over the number for tiie year 18(i9 of 183,000 for 1870, and 407,000 for 1871. The Freneli looses in nnniitions of war were Hkewise enormous, and without a paraUel in history ; 107 standards and Ha<^s, 1.915 field pieces, 5,520 })ieees of fortress- artilk'ry, 855,000 infantry rifles, 12,000 wa«;ons of all kind^, 50 loco- motives, and ()00 railway ears fell into the hand-^ of the enemv, who themselves lost only 2 flags and () field . Tiie money cost of the war to France has been e>ti mated at 14,000,000,000 francs, distributed as shown below : Francs. Kxpciiscs imdtr tlu- l''ni[iiro ..... i ,ooo.ooo,cxx3 Requisitions l)y tin- I'juiiix ..... 593,cxx>,OCX) National (Juani of Paris ...... i40,cxx3,ooo Cost of organization of the national defence in tlu- |)n»- vinces ........ Ooo,cxx),ooo Value of |)roi)erty destroyed ..... 6,667,ooo,cxx) Indemnity paid to Germanx ..... 5.cxX3,ooo,ooo Total ........ 14.000.000,000 This was the greatest war of the nineteenth centurv, and the most disastrous that France has ever waged in all her history. CHAPTER X THE COMMUNAUI) LXSl UUEtTIOX. 1871 The fratricidal strugfjie whicli immediately followed the war with Germany came as a climax to the misfortunes of France. For two months, or from March to May. 1871. the army of Versailles, 100,000 strong, waged a merciless wai. and conducted a second siege of Paris, defended by the revolting C\)nnnimards. The rebels had organized an army of 8,8()G ofhcers and 205,000 men, composed of battalions of the national iruard of Paris, which had been formed during the war just closed, 'i'he second siege of Paris was a murderous struggle in the streets and barricades, and cost FRANCE 153 the French army losses equal to those of a bloody battle. A large part of the German troops were still in France, and were spectators of the insurrection, which, like an epilogue of the great drama that had just closed, was enacted before their eyes. Tlio victory of the army of Versailles was hotly contested, and Paris had to be taken by assault. The Versailles army lost about 15,000 men killed and wounded, of wliom nearly a third were killed or died of wounds. Five general officers were killed and 6 wounded, 1-1 other superior officers were killed and 48 wounded ; 159 officers in all were killed or died of wounds, and 554 more wounded. The insurgents suffered enormous losses : 15,000 were killed or wounded in the battles outside the fortifications, and 25,000 in the fighting in the streets and l)arricades ; 41,000 were taken prisoners, of whom 3,000 ilied in prison, 270 were executed, and 7,500 were deported. It will be seen that the numbers of the losses in this in- surrection were equal to those of an important war. CHAPTER XI TIIE COLONIAL WARS OF FKAXCE SINCE 1871 The colonial policy of France after the annee terrible frequently forced the Government to employ a part of its land and naval forces in over-sea expeditions. Some of these were required to re-establish French power by su])pressing insurrections in districts previously conquered, as the insurrec- tion in Algeria in 1871, and the extension of French dominion in Senegal and in Cochin China ; others were for the founding of new colonies, as Madagascar, Tonkin, Tunis, and Morocco. These expeditions into distant regions, often with a climate very unhealthful for Europeans, cost the lives of many l)rave soldiers and marines. The ravages of diseases, and especially of fever, caused many more deaths than the fire 154 lossp:s of life in modern wars of the enemy. The battles themselves, however, must have ocTasionod very considerable losses, as the number of officers killed or wounded lias been large. Our own investigations on this .subject tix the number (»f oflicers killed in all the over-sea expeditions from 1871 to 1908 at 287, wliicli would indicate a loss of about 8,000 ])rivates killed or fatally wounded ; similarly, the 590 officers wounded correspcjnd to a figure of about 18,000 for the troops. We give below a table of th<' officer-losses by colonies or expeditions : Offickk-i.osses by Coix)ny ok KxPKDrrioN (i 871-1908) Coloiiif, d-c. Killed. \Youmlcd. Total. Algeria .... ■\^ iz-s 160 Tunis .... 15 ^5 40 Sfruj.ral iiixl .SoiidiitJ ^5 64 89 Cochin ( liina }, 7 10 Dahomey, expedition iScjC) ■» 5 7 Daliunuv. expedition i8q2 10 25 35 War of 'J'onkin . . . . 131 202 333 .AIada 29 Wounded . . . . . 5 lOI Died (if Disease . . . , 9 D AMUMKV lOxPEDlTlON, 1892 Officers. Men Killc.I 10 67 \\<.iitid( (1 . . . . . ^5 436 Tonkin \\.\u. 1SS4-5 Killed and wounded 333 ofnccrs. 3.889 men Died of disease 5*223 nun Money cost .... 335,000,000 francs FRANCE 155 Madagascar Expicdition, 1895 Oflicers Soldiers Marines Non-combatants Total Dialfis. 3.441 1,137 1,143 5.756 ^ Pacification- of Madagascar, 1896-9 Officers. Men. iz 201 21 280 (Europeans) 478 (Natives) Wotmdcd .... 13 422 Total .... 46 1,381 l\illr(i ami tiruwiifd Died of disease CHAPTER XII CONCLUSION The stagnant position of tlie population in France has given rise to a discussion by many writers of the question as to whether the wars of the nineteenth century in which that nation has played so large a part may be in any degree responsible for this lamentable condition. The first part of the present discussion has proved, we think, tliat France has been the most warhke nation of modern times. Now wars have always cost and must always cost large numbers of human lives ; and as the lives extinguished are largely or exclusively those of soldiers, the individuals removed from society are the relatively young, strong, and healthy, and hence those most likely to leave strong and healthy offs})ring. When a large number of the youth of a country, of its best blood, are exterminated either in Inittle or by disease and hardshij), the population must surely and immediately feel the effects of such a loss. ' 'riiirty-four from disease. - Nearly all fniiu disease. 156 LOSSKS ()!• lAlK IN MODKHN WARS The wars of the Kcvohition ctMiainly co^t rrance a niilhon luiniaii hves, the wars of the First Kinj)ire wroiitjht an e([ual destruction, and iliose of recent tinio probably chiinied anotlier equal iuind)er of victims. That is, from 1192 to 1914. war lias (lej)rive(l France of S.OOO.OIK) men. The evidence seems convincing that these losses have played their lar^je part in l)rinf!;ing about the present state of stajjj- nation. Again, we nuist not lose sight of the fact that a large ])roj)ortion of the soldiers who escape the j)eriK of war bear through life the marks of their (•am])aigns in enfeebled health or disfifrurini'' wounds, while a lar-s jif and enable the liardior to ■>invive. ■ '2. Clumires in modes of warfare affect tlie degree but not the direction in wliiili this |)rinci])le works. Quite to ihe ])resent time ainiies made of liardy material stand the test of cam})aigns and battles better than those made of weak material. * i5. Prof^ress in warfare includes improvement in organiza- tion and in sanitation, and the superiority of the personally hardy may become a less domiHant factor, thouf^h still a factor. ' 4. This ])rogress early substitutes enslaving conquered enemies for exterminating them. \Vhile the stronger are likely, in wai-, to conquer the weaker, the slaves taken may or may not, after a lapse of time, be the weaker element in the concjuering ])opulation. B ' 1. As between combatants and non-combatants in each country the necessities of the case comj)el a selection of a hardy ]iart of the jiopulation in A\^S^I:hat test the strength of the countries engaged. The destruction of a part of the force so selected leduces the ratio its numbers sustain to that of the whole ])0])ulation. ' 52. If the war draws out the whole lit(jire nHtli( ale dii reernlenient des arnu'es et de aulres in- stitutions miiitaires chez divers peuples anciens et niodcrnes *, in Annalcs il'IIifpihic ])iiltli(iiir, 2""' seric. Tonic xx. |)p. 5-82. l.so.'l. ^ M. Houdin, * I-.tudts cthnologifiues sur la taille et le poids de Ihoninie ehez divers j)eui»les.* in lu cik il dc Mnuoircs dc Mcdccitic, dc Chininiic ct de Pfiarfiiacie 7nililain\ '.\'"<^ .serie, tome ix, pp. 1G9-207 ; toniex, j>p. 1— 1;{. I8n:i. * Paul JJroea. " Sur ia pretendue degenercsccnce de la population frnn<;'aisc,' in Bull, de I' Acad. Imj). de Mt'dccive, tome xxxii. pp. 547 ff.. 1807. RACE DETERIORATION 167 pouillon/ Tschouiiloff,- Ecker,' Carlier,' Livi,^ Collignon,'* Brandt," Amnion,'^ and the Report of the British Inter- Departniental Committee on Physical Deterioration.'* repre- sent most of the various points of view as well as both the kinds of statistics and the methods of their treatment charac- teristic of most of the students of racial moditications, especially as studied on the basis of military anthropology. — The underlying problem is, of course, the classic one of j nature and nurture. Are one's stature and general physical X make-up determined by heredity or by acquirement due to environment ? Or, if both factors are contributory, which plays tlie major part ? — * The approach to the problem of possible race-modification through excessive militarism leads the investigator at once to this formidable crucial question of the relative impor- tance — because certainly there is no absolute control by either — of the modifvino- influence of inheritance working through selection, and of environment working through re])etitive acquirement. It is nearly superfluous to say that biologists, anthro- 1 M. C'liainpnuillon (Mi'dcein-cn-chef de riln[)ital Militaire do Saint- Martin). ■ l^tudc sur le dt'veloppoment de la taille ct de la constitution dans la population civile et dans rannee en France," in liecueil de Mnnnircs de Medecine, de Chirurgie et de Pharniacie wilitairc, 2>"6 serie, tome xxii, pp. ^.'JO-Gt. isr.o - M. Tscliouriioti, ' Etude sur la degenerescence physiologiquc des peuples civilises,' in Revue d'Antliropologie, pp. 605-64, 1876. ^ A. Kcker. ' Statistik der K(>rper® serie. tome i. 1S!)J-. ' G. Hrandt. Die Korpergrtissc der Wchrpjlichtigen des lieichslandes Eiiass-Lothringen, 1898. * Ammon. Otto, Ziir .itithropologic der linttenrr, ISOO. ' Report of the Inter-Departmental ('i)mmitt<'e on IMiysical Deteriora- tion, in vol. xx.xii of the British I'arliamentan,- Papers for 1U04. 168 MILITARY SELECTION AM) polofjists, and sociologists are ^iion^'ly divided in opinion in re of anv study of the question up to the ])re>ent orn in Kuropi, and it has been assinned that better nutrition, or j)erhaps better hy<;ienie and eeononiie eonditions in <,'cneral, ini<,'lit inerease the stature of the people. These conclusions were eonfirnied by Bowditch's measurements of tlie sehot)l children of IJoston and by Peekham's anthropometric work in Mihvaukte. Tlusi- ehanfjes in stature due to eliaiifjiiif; eonditions have recently been dcmoiistratid in Kuropi-, wlure Anunon has shown that the j><>j)ulati(tii of liaden has materially increased in size during the last thirty y( ars. It may be added that Boas claims, on the basis of his own observations among the immigrants and posterity of RACE DETERIORATION 169 immigrants in New York, to have donionstrated marked changes in stature due to changed conditions. It would not be difficult to criticize the conclusions of Boas and those who believe with him in the marked race- modifying influence of environment. It is not at all improb- able that these changes, which may equally well be called differences, of stature among pooi- and well-to-do ])eople are due to the same cause that is responsible in large degree for their j)overty or prosperity — namely to their differences in inherited capacity. The children of the poor are perhaps not small because their parents are ]ioor, but the reason for the povei-ty of the parents as well as the small size of the children may be that they come from defective stock, have the inheritance of incapacity, lack of vigour, and small size. And exactly this criticism is strongly driven home by the believers in the dominant influence of heredity. There is no doubt that among biologists and anthro- pologists, at least, and probably also among sociologists, there is a strong preponderance of belief in the major impor- tance of nature, that is heredity, as compared with nurture, that is environmental influences, in the determination of racial characteristics and racial modifications. The character of the inheritance, which is determined by the character of the stocks from which the race is reproduced, is the great factor in the determination of the kind of man any given population shall represent. All the recent extraordinary advance in the study and knowledge of the results of heredity lends its weight to this belief. Therefore in our search for a possible race-modifying influence of militarism, a modifica- tion either for better or for worse, we are justified in expect- ing to find the most im]H)rtant of these influences to be those de]iending on heredity, that is on a selective reproduc- tion within a given j)opulati()n, lather than to be such influences as seem to depend on environment, or differences in hicn-ctre. To be sure, the ])ossibility of tlie presence of the results of environmental influence in any case of a])parent 170 MIIJTAHV SKLFXTION AM) raco inoditicaiion must, of course, never be lost sij^ht of, and tlie fact tliat such results can he direct Iv produced hy certain conilitions of niilitarisin, will tend to keep the student of race nioditication open-nunded and catholic in face of the ])ossil)Ie explanation of any such niodilication that may he offeied to hinu or which he niav he inclined to offer to others. Ill Race nioditication t!irou<;h iidieritance due to direct military selection nuist ol)vit>uslv he ditVuult to distinguish with com])lete satisfaction from tluctuatinjjj modilications due to cn\ ironmental causes, sucli as industrial changes. &c., which owe their existence to wars of j^reat mortality, or such as excessiye conscription in times of ])eace as a means of military preparedness. And for the defender of the thesis that excessive militarism modities the general poj)ulation, such a distinction may seem of no «j;reat imj)ortance. For in both cases the apparent results may be about the same. lUit it is of o;reat importance to determine the real character of the results. And it is also im]>ortant to lind answers to the followin*:^ questions: Are these results all bad ones? Are they all »j;ood ones ? Ov if some he bad and some good, which outrank the other? Some of the many conditions which may jjuide one in the undert^iking of a study of militarism in relation to race are j)resenteil in the words of Professor John Rates Clark, as given in the note of ]>reface to this paper. In the face of so many anil such various consiilerations that nuist be taken into ai-count in any attem])t to trace the conseqiuMices of war, and militarism generally, on the constitution of the lace, it is not sur])rising that in a pioneer study much tiiue is likely to be spent in the acquirement of statistics antl facts whose bearing on the sid)ject becomes very ditVicult or e\ en impossible to determine in a lirst attempt to draw up a balance sheet of re^idt^^. And exactly HACK DKTKlUOHA'riOX 171 this coiulilion obtains in regard to the present study. It is with some dismay that I ])ereeive how hirge a part of my gatherings cannot be consicU'red in a first or trial I)alanee- sheet. Tliis is not to say, however, tliat witli tlie growl li of an understanding ol the ramifying rehitions of mihtarism to human biology and sociology, these data may nt)t have their positive use. The kind of data wliich among ot liers seem to me obviously to be such as bear upon the subject, and in the search for some of which I have at least made a l)eginning, may be sufjjzested bv the followinii list taken from sonu' notes which 1 made at the conunencenuMit of my search, for my ]>ersonal guidance. Delinite statistics and facts with regard to tiie physical requirements of recruits and conscripts ; physical selection anH)ng conscripts ; proportion of men selected for war, by voluntary recruiting or conscription to total males in a given population ; numbers of soldiers lost by death and disease, both in war and peace times ; numbers returned wounded, or injured by temporary disease or affected b\ chronic disease ; other changes in character in returning legions, such as acquired licentiousness, mental inertia and lack of initiative due to machine work during fuililary service, &c. Facts and statistics of tlie r.ile and character of births in a stay-at-home ])opulation during ])rotracted wars com- pared with that during times of peace; the nature of the death-rate in a stay-at-home population during war and during peace (changes in pro])ort ion, in causes, &c.) ; character of the stay-at-home po])ulation as revealed by ])ossible stagnation of progress, by lack of appearance of unusual men ami by a lessoned mental, mechanical, industrial, political, literary, and artistic protluctiveness. Facts and statistics of the types and j)revalence of diseases and congenital troubles among the stay-at-home po])ulation during war conq)ared with conditions before wai, and after the retiu n of the legions. Facts and statistics of the ])hysical 172 MILITARY SELECTION AM) status (includinjT mental diseases, &c.) of a po})ulation long at war witli ^iicli status of the same ))o])ulation before the war and with such status in a comijarable po])ulation never or hut litth* at war. To tiiese categories of data may easily be added others. And in any search for statistics and data bearing upon war's effects, one constantly tinds oneself attracted by the 0})por- tunity to acquire data of categories that, while of no such obvious relation to these effects as are the data listed in the above paragra])hs, yet may be thought likely to yield some- thing worth while in the final working over of material. Also it is immediatelv discovered bv the investigator that the past and the ])resent state of the gathering and })reserva- tion of vital statistics render most of the categories of data listed above extremely difficult to a])])roach. However, some are certainly approachable, and it is to the setting out of the character and the significance of certain of these data that this preliminary rejiort is devoted. IV Militarv selection obviouslv concerns soldiers, first of all, and not all of a given po])ulation is ever composed wholly of soldiers. It is then a first matter of interest and impor- tance to determine how many and what kind of persons of a po})ulation are soldiers. This, of course, varies for different ])0])ulations and for each of these for different times. But it is not difficult to determine closely enough for our ])ui-])ose, for any ])0])ulation, just how large and of just what })ar- ticular character the soldier ])art of the ])o])ulation i>-. Ill tlic lirst ])lace it is a group of individuals not chosen at random from the ])0])ulation, representing both sexes, all ages and weak and strong alike, but it is a jiart of the popula- tion chosen first for sex, then for age, and finally for stature, strength, and freedom from infirmity and disease. It is chosen either from groups of young men voluntarily offering RACE DETERIORATION 173 their services, or from the whole crroiip of young men of a certain age, final choice from this grou]) being made by- lot. The first is the method of voluntary enlistment as exemplified in England and the United States ; the second is that of conscription, typically exemplified in France and Germany. The requirements that these young men must meet in order to be accepted or chosen to ' join the colours ' are much the same in all countries in times of peace, making reservation of differences due to average racial differences of height, &c. But in times of war these requirements may change swiftly, depending on the need of increasing materially the proportion of soldiers to the total population, and on the serious results of long-continued wars in draining the population of young men of the most desired type. For example, in the Roman Empire the minimum age for soldiers was normally seventeen years and the maximum thirty-five. But at various times men were liable to military duty from seventeen to forty-five, and even to fifty and sixty. In the most strenuous times, enrolment was made entirely without reference to age. Rome, in maintaining an army of about JjoO.OOO men, required an annual recruit- ment of nearly half that number. The time came, how- ever, savs Seeck, when actually not more than 10,000 suitable men of Roman citizenship could be raised each year. In France, Louis XIV in 1701 fixed the minimum heiglit of soldiers at 1,624 mm. But Napoleon reduced it in 1799 to 1.598 mm. (an inch lower), and in 1804- he lowered it two inches further, namely to 1,5-14 mm. It remained at this figure until the Restoration, when (1818) it was raised by an inch and a quarter, that is, to 1,570 mm. In 18;]0, at the time of the war with Spain, it was lowered again to 1,540 nun., and finally in 18i32 again raised to 1,560 mm. Napoleon liad al>() to reduce the figure of minimum military age. Taking countries and centuries together, however, the requirements of recruiting and conscription result in making 174 -MILITARY SELECTION AND a selection of a greater or less number of men between eighteen and twenty-five years of age measuring in height and girth of chest not less than fixed minima which are the average of tlie well-develoj)ed racial type of that age, and notably free from infirmity and disease. For special service a ])remium is often })ut on special develop- ment and vigour. For example, in the British Army the standard for men in 1786 raised ' for the Light Cavalry and the Infantry shall be five feet five inches ; no recruit is to be taken even of that size who exceeds thirty-five years of age, or who is not stout and well made. Lads between sixteen and eighteen vears of age, who are well-limbed and likelv to iirow, mav be taken as low as five feet four inches '.^ In llSll. wliile recruits for the infantry were not to be less than five feet five inches nor over thirty years, ' except grow- ing lads may be five feet four inches ', those for the light cavalry could not be less than five feet seven inches nor over twenty-five vears.- In 1895, while the height requirements for the infantry of the line service had dropped to five feet four inches, the age being between eighteen and twenty-five years, and the chest measurement from thirty-three to thirty-five inches, the height of recruits for the First and Second Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards was fixed at five feet eleven inches to six feet one inch, and the chest at thirty-six inches. Heavy Dragoons were five feet eight inches to five feet eleven inches, with chest of thirty-four to thirtv-five inches, the Medium Dragoons at five feet seven inches to five feet nine inches, chest thirty-four to thirty-five inches, and the same for the Lancers. The Light Hussars were from five feet six inches to five feet eight inches, with chest from thirtv-four to thirtv- 1 I'miii Military Orders of 17.S0, " Hij^ulations and Instructions for Carrying on \hv Hfc-ruitinfj Scr\-icc for His Majesty's Forces Stationed Abroad'. War Onicc. i)riiitcd IS'.Mi. - ' l{rj:nlat ions and Inst nut ions for Carrying on tlir Hrcruit iny Sit\ ice «if His Majesty's rli working classes do not offer themselves for enlistment, yet it is admittedly true that the British army is not composed exclusively, nor indeed largely, of British liff-raff. The possible objection that the better classes of young men avoid army service can at any rate have no bearing in the case of France and Gel'many. where compulsory service obtains. In these countries the whole body of young men arriving at military age each year is liable to service, a certain proportion from it being chosen by lot to join the colours. For nearly a hundred years France has regularly rejected, as physically unfit, from thirty to forty per cent of those examined each year.^ It will be of profit to examine a little more in detail the conditions wliich attend the selection of that part of the po})ulati()n wliich is to form the army of a nation in which (as in most of the countries of Europe) conscription obtains. T' Every Frenchman reaching the age of twenty years — and about sixty per cent of all male children born in France do reach that age — is bound to respond to the obligation of military service. For each year a list is made of all the youths who reached the age of twenty on oi- l)efore December J31 of the year preceding. This list constitutes the ' class ' of the year from whicli the contingent which shall actually join the colours is chosen. This contingent has of course varied in mimbers at different times in the history of France. In the years around 1820, with a population of ;](),()()(). (H)0. the con- ' Cowptcs rctnliis du Rccrutemcttt ile I'Armcc. ISIJO to date. RACE DETERIORATION 177 tingents were of 40,000 men ; in 1825, tlie contingents were raised to 60,000; in the forties and early fifties, with a popu- hition of ahout 35,000,000, the annual contingents were 80,000. After tliat time, with the population slowly climbing toward 4-0,000,000, the contingents were 100,000 except in 1854, 1855, 1856, and 1859, when they were 140,000. In 1870 and 1871 and since then the contingents have been practi- cally all the young men of the class eligible to service. The number, for each year, of young men in France reaching the age of twenty is now and has been for many years about 250,000. From each class drawings are made by lot to determine who shall actually compose the contingent for the year. These dra\\'ings have to include about twice as many men as the contingent actually numbers, for the Conseils de Revision have to examine just about 200,000 men to find 100,000 that come up to the recruiting requirements of stature and freedom from infirmities. That is, practically every other man, or fifty per cent of the whole, is rejected. In order, then, that France ma}^ maintain her standing army in times of peace on its present footing, she has to draft for examination nearly all her young men reacliing twenty every year, and actually take nearly one-half of them for actual service under the colours. And this is true also of Germany. The point of all this consideration of the methods and facts of conscription and voluntary enhstment is that the main- tenance of a large standing army results in the temporary or permanent removal from the general population of a special part of it, and the deliberate exposure of this part of it to death and disease — disease that may have a repercussion on the welfare of the whole population to a possibly much greater degree than is apparent at first glance. And this part of the people, so removed and injured, is in quite a special way a part of great importance to tlie preservation of the racial integrity of the population. For in the first place it is com])osed ex- clusively of men, its removal tlui^ tending to distiirl) tlie sex 1569.11 >f 178 MILITAHV SKLIXTION AND cquilil)iiiini of tlie ))()])ulati()n, and to prevent normal ami advaniaireous sexual selection. Next, ihese men are both all of \]\v arje of fjreatest life expectancy,^ after reacliinj^ maturity, and of greatest sexual vij^our and fecundity.' Finally, they are men none of whom fall below and most of wh(»m exceed a certain standard of ])hysical vij^our and free- dom from iufuinity and disease. And for each of these men so removed from the *^eneral )K)j)ulation. at least one other man, falling below this standard, has been retained in the civil ])o])ulation. All this is, in effect, the establishment of a kind of selection, a military selection, whereby a most desirable element of the population is restrained from contributing its full and it^ j)articularly imj^ortant influence in the determination, through heredity, of the racial standard of the population. And this element, as regards number> of the })ersons who compose it, is not at all to be regarded as a negligible one in estimating the influences making for racial modification of a population. The standing armies of Germanv and France include more than five per cent of each country's men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Provision exists to increase tliis ])roportion materially at any })eriod of serious war. V What ha})})ens to the soldier^ ? This is naturally the next (juestion aftei- the determination of tlie first query, which is. Who are the soldiers V The answer is not a simple one, for many things may ha])])eu to them, and numerous things leally do. They are, liist of all, removed from their homes, for a longer or shorter j)eiio(i. ke))t together in barracks and ' Sec llic actuarial lahli-s of any life insurance <'onipany. - Duncan and Lewis liavc separately shown on the basis of Scottish statistics thai llic pro|)<»rti<>n of hnsliand-fathcrs to luishands is jxrcatcst for the aiip 1.") to 1!> (.'iS ;{ percent), and ;,MadMall\ decreases hy li\c- year aj;o-jfroups to llu- end of life (lOfl per cent for the ape-group ■1-.5— JO, 51 per cent for 50- ."i 1-, and so on). RACE DETERIORATION 179 caInp^^, exercised and traiiu'd physically and to some extent mentally, and iniluonced, tor weal oi- woe, to some extent morally. But of most of these ha})penings it is difficult to get any even approximate measure of tlie extent, and hence difficult to speak witli any considerable degree of certainty of their good or ill results. Rut of certain other Iia})penings, namely tlisease and death, more definite statements can be made. It is, in the first place, obvious that in war-time there is a higher death-rate among soldiers, that is among the members of this selected })art of the })0})ulation, than in the population outside of the soldiers. The disproportion of these two death- rates can, of course, and does in times of serious war, become very considerable. It is not so obvious that these death-rates should be markedly different in times of peace. Yet until very recent years, the death-rate from disease in all armies, in times of peace, has been notably higher than that of the civil popula- tion. And this has not been due alone to the extra-prevalence of such characteristically army barracks and army camp diseases as enteric (typhoid) fever, dysentery, &c., but the death-rate from other diseases which should not, on the face of it, be particularly encouraged by barrack life, has been higher among soldieis than among civilians. The annual deaths from typhoid fever in the civil population of France during the seventies and eighties averaged about five per U),()00 inhabitants, while in the army at home they averaged nearly thirty.^ In the thirteen years previous to 1888 the total number serving in the French army in France, Algeria, antl Tunis amounted to 5,Jn5,409 men, with a mean annual strengtii of 41;J,49;5 men. The mean annual number of cases of typhoid in the armv were 11,(J4() or one typhoid case to every thirty-six soldiers. It must, however, be borne ^ Fijjures derived from liecueil des Travaiix du Comitt! cousnltatif d'llifnirnc pnblique de France, vols, wiii (188S), xx (1S90), xxi (ISlil), ;ind xxix 11899). N2 ISO MIM'I'AHV SKI.lX'riON AM) ill iniiid thai llit- incicU'iicc of typhoid fever is ])articularly hi'iivy at llie ajro-period from iiftecn to tliirty, which incluile most of the army a^^es, and is particularly light at the ages lioin thirty-five on, whicii arc ages well represented in the civil j)oj)ulation. In recent years typhoid ha^ notably been Ijruught under (•(tntrol in the French army. In the years 1875 to 1889 the army in 329 garrisons in France lost an annual average of 25-5 per 1U,UUU men by typhoid. In the years 1890-6 the loss in the same garrisons was but 10-7 per 10,0UU men. In the years 1876-80, deaths from tA-])hoid in the whole French army averaged 32- 1 per 10,000 men ; in 1881-5, 24- 3 per 10,000 men; in 1886-90, 16-4 per 10,000 men; in 1891-5, 11 i)er 10,000 men; in 1896-1900, 8-7 per 10,000 men; in 1901, 5-7 per 10,000 men.^ Phthisis or consumption is, or was, notoriously prevalent in most of the European armies. The following table com- puted in 1887 by Sir Robert Lawson, Inspector-General of Military IIos]jitals in England, shows the proportions of deaths from phthisis in tlie British army thrc)U 3-8i 483 1870-4 3-39 464 1875-9 3-21 467 1880-4 270 363 As a matter of fact the modern conditions of barrack and cam]) life should make the death-rate among soldiers notably less than among nun of the same ages in civil life. The army is one of the first places in which modern medicine and ' From th(H(|K>rt of llic Comiiiission mi|k riciin- coiiMiltut ivc (niygicnc ct d'Epidciniulogic iiiililuircs, made to llu- .Miiiislcr of \\ ar in IDOG. RACE DETERIORATION 181 sanitary engineering find welcome and immediate ])racticul appreciation. Add to this the selected character of the in- dividual soldiers, received into the army only after passing an inspection which weeds out most organic and all ohvious disease or infirmity, and the conditions are such that a notably low death-rate in the army at home in ])eace time should obtain. A notable dis})roportion, however, between civil and army death-rates, in favour of the latter, does not yet ap})ear, although a l^egiiming in favour of the soldiers is manifest. For example, the Annual Report for 1909 (])ublished in 1912) of the Registrar-General for England and Wales, the annual mortality of males of the civil po})ulation of age twenty is put at J3-658 per 1.000 ; of age twenty-five, 5-271 per 1,000 ; and of age thirty-five, 9-102 per 1,000. For the same year the British army at home (i. e. in England and Wales) had a death- rate of ;31 per 1.000. Its soldiers are mostly included in the ages between twenty and thirty-five. These figures show a distinct disproportion in favour of the army. But if the death-rate of the soldiers in times of peace is now perhaps no greater or is even less than the rate for men of corresponding age in the civil population, there is no question that it is much greater in times of war ; and this from two causes, first, the actual mortality of battles, and, second, the almost always greater mortality from disease. For the pro- tection from disease thrown around the soldiers in times of peace breaks down in war time. The exigencies of hasty camping, the undue crowding, the lack of care of food and water su})plies, and the necessary exposure and over-exertion incident to protracted fighting and swift moving, or long sieges, or of being besieged, inevitably result in conditions of morbidity far graver than those that prevail in barracks in time of peace. The imposing figures of actual human mortality due to war have drawn the attention of many students of human biology. To state that 5,000,000 men were lost in the twenty years of #r 182 -MILITARY SELECTION AND the Wars of tlio Kcvolution and of \hv Empire is indeed to give food for thon^lit. And one l)ecomes more thoiitjhtful when one learns tliat one-third of all these lost men came from a single nation whose total poj)ulaf ion at tlie beginning of the period was but 2o.0( )().()()(). The Thirty Years' War is reputed to have cost Germany nearly three-fourths of her fighting men. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century the direct war losses totalled several millions. The actual losses in dead and severely wounded in battle cannot well be summated as an average, but must be given as percentages or actual figures for specific battles and cam- paigns. At Austerlitz, for example, the French lost fourteen per cent, the Russians about thirty ])er cent, and the Austrians the enormous ])roportion of forty-four per cent of the men engaged. At Waterloo the French lost about thirty-six per cent and the English and Prussians about thirty-one per cent. Taking a score or more of the more im])oi-tant and unusually bloody battles of the last three centuries, the losses on both sides together of dead and woimded run from twenty per cent to thirty-five per cent. In many bloody battles the losses of a single side have gone up to fifty per cent. These are of course the higher figures. At Magenta the French lost seven per cent and the Austrians eight per cent ; at Liitzen the French lost about thirteen per cent and the Prussians and Russians fourteen per cent. At Antietam one man out ot every five engaged was killed or wounded. In fourteen months the English armv under Welliuiiton in the Peninsula lost four per cent by gun-fire, but it lost twelve ])er cent from disease. And this brings us to the consideration of the proportion between the losses in war-time bv gun-tire^ and bv disease. It is notorious that the losses by disease in any })rotracled campaign are nmch greater than those due to gun-fire. Tlie Duke of Wellington laid it down ;i> a i ulc lliat in all times the sick list of an army on active servic'C amounts to at least 10 men in 100. But the data show that actually 20 men to 100 were constant Iv sick in Welliniiton's Peninsular armv. RACE DiyrEIUORATION 183 III October 1811, J3I30 men prr 1,000 of his whole streiif^th were in tlie hospitals. The highest rate of sickness amonij the French soldiers in the Peninsular War was 19-1 per 1,000, the lowest 103 per 1,000, and the average 130 per 1,000. During the Na})oIeonic campaigns there were several in- stances of the loss of more than half a total aimy from disease, and almost as severe losses were met with in the Crimean Wars. ' In the month of January, 1855, the mortality by disease in the English army in the Crimea exceeded the mortality of the terrible montii of September of the Great Plague in London in 1665 ' (Laveran). During tiie long continuous war })eriod of 1793 to 1815 (only one or two years of peace in all this time) the annual jatio of mortality from all causes in the English army was 56-21 per 1,000. The mortality from disease (from 1793 to 1812) was 49-61 per 1,000. The loss from disease was seven times as great as that from gun-fire. The ten to thirty per cent of mortaUty by gun-fire in such bloody affairs as Austerlitz and Wagram, Moscow% Liitzen, Magenta, Solferino and Waterloo was increased by disease in the same campaign-^ to the appalling proportion of sixty and even seventy |)er cent. Turning to more modern wars, we find no change from the rule that disease reaps an inevitable harvest from the armies in times of war, and a harvest })ractically always larger than that from gun-fire. It is a death-rate also that is always much greater than the death-rate for the same time in the civil population. In the short decisive Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 the losses by gun-fire nearly equalled those by disease, but the extension of the war for but a few months longer would have increased materially the disease losses. In the late Spanish-Ameri(;!ii War ihr Tnited States, with a modern scientifically-adviseil war department, lost ten times as many men by disease as by gun-fire. 184 MIJJTAUV SELECTION AM) Jaj)an is the only nation that has maintained a fairly effective control of disease dnring serious war. Ikit this only makes the terrible losses of its army by f^un-iire. mines, &c., stand out the more vividly. There is, however, no question in any one's mind of the actual mortalitv both from <;un-lire and from disease in the ranks of the soldiers during times of war. That is indeed the most conspicuous and dramatic part of war. this bloody and pitiful sacrifice of the men directly ennjaged in it. Another as})ect of this matter of mortality, however, and one not so evident, is that <>! an increase in the death-rate among the civil ])opulation of a state seriously engaged in war. Dr. Dumas has recently sliow n that the death-rate in the civil |)()pulation of both France and Germany was noticeably higher in 1870 and 1871 than in the years inunediately ])re- cedin" and inuuediatelv followinj; these two vears of strenuous wai-. In France, for exam])le, it was 2-34 per 100 in 1869, i2-8l3 in 1870, :}-48 in 1871, and f2-19 in 1872. Dumas found similar examples in the mortality records of Austria, Denmark, and Germany. Theie have been recorded many specific observations of the introduction or distribution of disease in the civil popula- tion by the movements of armies or return home of soldiers from a distant war. The diffusion of typlius in Euroj^e by the Napoleonic ^Vars. the introduction of syphilis into Scotland by Cromwell's troops and into Sweden in 1762 by the Swedish troo})s returning from the Seven Years' War, are examples. During Na])oleon's Egyptian cam]>aign nearly every soldier out of an army of 132.000 men wa> affected by trachoma, and the retuiii of these soldier^ initialed a s])read of the disease through almost all the European armies. Tin- great Eui-()j)ean e])ideniic of >>mall-p(>x of 1871. es])ecially notable in (iermanv. is believed t(» be a>sociated with the Franco-Prussian ^^a^. Cleniow declares, inileed, that there is scarcely a war in ancient or modern times which docs not furnish examples of the special distribution of disease. KACE DETKUIOKATIOX 185 But great nioitality in itself is not necessarily a great racial catastro])he. Indeed it is, in the face of the geometrical progression by which rcprcxhution advances, one of the veritable conditions of advance in animal life. Throughout all the kingdom of life, plant as well as animal, the over- j^roduction of individuals and their reduction by death to a fractional part of the original number is one of the basic- conditions of ])rogress, if Darwinism is a sound explanation of organic evolution. Vnv this death will be i!i the nature of things selective, and hence will make for the modification of the species toward a condition of better adaptation to life conditions. Indeed, the uj)holders of war have used precisely the argument of war's real beneficence to the race. Ammon, for exam})le, consistently develops this thesis, cold-bloodedly, to its logical extreme, and Seeck and numerous others are attracted by it in certain degrees. The crux in the matter is the character of the selection which this mortalitv determines. We have just referred to three different categories of mortality produced by war : a mortality among the civil po})ulation ; a mortality among the soldiers due to exposure and disease ; and a mortality among the soldiers due to gun-fire, /; There must be recognized, of course, in connexion with any attempt to weigh the effects of war on the soldiers participating in it, and hence on the two or more popula- tions furnishing these selected parts of themselves for its maintenance, that differences in the duration and the serious- ness of the campaigning and fighting may entail considerable differences in the effect on the populations. A swift decisive war should entail, not only by its lower percentage of losses but by the very character of its selective working, less injurious effects than more protracted and exhausting wars. A certain quick and positive exposure to privations and diseases of militarism may quickly rid an army of the few- weak and non-imnume members of the soldier group, where the longer exposure and contimied strain would injure even the best of the group. II will be noted, in fact, in tiie next section of this paper, tiiat certain measurable race-modifying results of the severe but short Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 seem to uphold this statement of a possible eugenic effect of war. In contrast, however, will l)e noted whal I believe to be the statistical i)r()ofs of the seriously race- injuring effects on the French j)eople of the long and terrible j | wars of the Napoleonic campaigns. ' 188 MILrrAHV SELECTION AM) Ml The iiH'thods of or«faiiizing and maintaining; armies deter- mine that a particular j)art of tlie j)()piilation, especially selected for sex, youth, physical development, and vij^our, shall comj)ose the army and he esj)ecially exposed in the destructive effects of war. These effects are such as to increase notably the death-rate in this selected part of the po})ulation over the death-rate in the rest of the })o])ulation. These facts, added to our l)iological knowledge of heredity and the method of the ])roduction of racial modifications through selection and inheritance, tend stroni^ly to create a presumption in favour of the probability of the racially disadvantageous working of exaggerated militarism. A human j)oj)ulation exposed to any considerable degree of military selection ought to be, in the light of these conditions, racially injured by it. ^Ve may ask, now, if there is any direct evidence of this injury. To an attempt to find an answer to this question I have devoted not a little time and energy. I realized from the beginning of this attempt that the obvious complexity of the inlluences that may affect human racial modification made the search a very difficult one. The difiiculty, alluded to in the second section of this report, of distinguishing between modifications in the structural ami })hysiological character of a ])eoplc or })o})ulation due })rimarily to selection and heredity, and those due to external infiuences affecting a single generation or several generations in their devclo})- mental stages — that is, in the immature or forming jieriods of the individuals comjxjsing the generations — is a difficulty very real, and one veiy well adapted to make an unequivocal answer to our imporfant (juestion nearly imj)ossible to obtain. Add to this the meagreness and the })ossible unre- liability of the vital statistics, and the necessity, for the sake of safe inter})retati()n, of a considerable knowledge of the industrial life and social conditions of the ])opulation RACE DETEKIOKATIOX 189 which these statistics concern, and the difficulty increases. Yet in the face of all this I believe that the attempt to test the workings of military selection hv appeal to vital statistics is not a hopeless one, antl that from examination and analysis of a certain group of statistics and facts I am justified in making some positive affirmation in regard to the racial effects of mihtarism. This group of facts is contained in the records of stature and physical condition of })ractically all the young men of France arriving at the age of twenty in each of the years since 1816 to the present time, contained, since 1830, in the official Comptes rendus du Recrutement of the French army, and before 1830 in the official records of the ^Va^ Office, available for reference although not published. These figures give a fair measure of the variations in — \ physical condition of the French people through a century.^ As these records concern a whole great body of people not at all homogeneous as to race, nor existing under identical climatic, industrial, and social conditions, but all exposed to the one common rigorous condition of liability to mihtary service and equally shared exposure to the selective effects of conscription and wai-, we have in them an indication and measure of the race-modifying action of this common influence. It is necessary to consider these figures in a large way. It is liighly probable that in times of war oi- threatened war, witli the necessity of taking larger contingents from the annual classes, the rigour of the examinations for fitness may be relaxed so that fewer young men would be exempted, and th(> leaning of the measurers would \)v toward secur- ing larger figures of height rather tlian smaller ones. AIm), it is important to recognize that varying environmental * I luive taken full cofinizance of tin- severe oritieisins of recruiting statistics l)y Hisehoff (I'rhrr die Ifrdiirhhnrktit dcr in irrschirtfoirti curo- pdisclu'ii Stantni vrrdjjcntlicfitrn licsidhitc des lii'kriitiriiiit three months of 1871, that is during and inuneiHately after tlie L'ranco-Prussian \^ar. Tlie recruiting statistics show tliat tliese recruits, aUliough of lower average lieiglit than recruits of tlie ten years just before, were especially vigorous and free from infirmities, i as indicated by the fewer exem})tions for unfitness by reason I of infirmities. This latter condition Collignon explains on the basis of the preponderance in number of vigorous young men included in this class born in November and December 1871 as the children of fathers just returned in ^Lirch and April from the war. These returning soldiers were the stronger of those who went away the year before, the weaker having been eliminated by disease during the campaign. Amnion - has also pointed out that no lesser stature is shown by the Badenese recruits of the earlv nineties, wliich include the recruits conceived in 1870 and 1871 and immedi- atelv thereafter, than bv the classes of other years. If war had worked an injurious selection these classes of the early nineties should show it. But In these attempts to see serious significance in the statistics for a yeai' oi- t wo concerning the recruits of a limited region, the totals being small, and the special environmental conditions, hence })()ssible intluence on the stature of a given geogia])hic and chronologic group of young men being not especially iiuiuired into, one can only recognize the ditficulty and danger that must attend most efforts to get at this com})lex matter. As a matter of fact, Vaclier de I^aponge ^ K. ('(illi^Mioii. ' Antliropolo^io di- la IVancf : Dordognc. ' in Mem. rlr la Snc. d' Aiithrii}). dc I'diis. srric iii. tonu- i, ISJll. - Aiumoii. 1)1 to, Ziir Anthropulogir (lni tlie IJrilish .Army Medieai lleports. RACE DETl-.HIORATION 195 that this friglitful condition lias been o;reatly ameliorated. In 1900 there were but 29o cases per 1,000 men. Hut even this is nearly one for every three men ! In very recent years the fiirures for the British army have been notably lowered. In 1908, for example, the lowest figures on record up to that time were reached. These were 76-8 hospital admissions per 1,01)0 men of total strength of the troops in the United Kingdom and Europe. From 1903 to 1907 the average admissions were 122- J3 per 1,000 men of the whole army. For the troops in the United Kingdom the average was 95 per 1,000; in India, 165 per 1,000; in Egypt, 210 per 1,000 ; and in North Cliina, i3i35 per 1,000. Nor is the British army by any means the greatest sufferer from the scourge. The army of the United States has twice as many hospital admissions for the same cause. Russia has about the same percentage as Great Britain, Austria and France less, and Germany least of all. Germany, indeed, has done much more to control the disease tlian any other great nation, unless it be Japan, for which I have not been able to get data. The following figures from the British Army Medical Report for 1910 show the rates of prevalence of venereal disease in different armies : Germany .... Franco ..... Austria ..... Russia ..... United Kini,'cloni United States A measure of the prevalence of syphilis and oihei- venereal disease in the civil po])ulation is difficult to get at. But certain facts are most suggestive. Of the young men who offered themselves for enlistment in the Britisli army in 1910, 15 per 10,000 were rejected because of syphilis, while for the same year In I he army, 230 per 10,000 were admitted to hospital with syphilis. And for all venereal disease the proportion was 31^ per lO.OOO of those applying for enlist- ment rejected, and 1,000 per 10,000 of those in the army 2 1905-6 190^) 19-8 per 1,000 286 „ „ 1907 1906 54-2 „ „ 627 „ „ 1907 1907 68-4 „ „ 1678 „ „ 1% :^IIIJTAin' SKLECTIOX AND admitted to hospital. In the ten-year ])erio(l. 1899-1908. 2-28 men per 1, ()()() oilVring themselves as recruits in the United Kingdom were rejected because of syphiHs.^ During the same ])eriod the liospital admissions in tlie army in tlie United Kingdom averaged annually more than 100 per 1,000 men. In other words, while the armv recruiting- boards discover in the civil poj)ulation and reject back into it but two f)r three syphilitic men ])er 1.000. the army finds within itself a constant proportion of attainted men of many times that numl)er. I have said that venereal disease ruins but does not kill. It does not select itself out i)y death. The deaths from venereal disease in the British army have rarely ranked more than one to 1,000 of strength, while the cases have ranked as high as 500, and only in the last few years have got as low as 100. Deaths from venereal disease in the civil population of England and Wales were, for 1909, from syphilis 47 per 1.000.000 ; from gonorrhoea, one per 1,000,000. The total deaths from syphilis in Paris in 1909 were -.'397 per 10.000 inhabitants, of which -24 per 10.000 were of children under one year of age." The deaths from tuberculosis of the lungs were 40-5.'3 per 10,000 inhabitants ; from heart disease, 13-67 per 10,000. It is obvious from these figures that venereal disease finds in armies a veritable breeding-ground. That such disease is highly dysgenic, i.e. race-deteriorating in influence, is indisputal)le. The frightful effects of syphilis, and its direct communication from ])arents to children, are fairly well known popularly. But with regard to the serious effects of ^ It is, of c'ourst.', not maintained that tiic comparison gives a fair view of the relative prevalence of syphilis in the anny and in the civil population. Men suffering from syphilis in its acute phases do not frequently offer themselves ns recruits, as it is penerally known that such men will be rejected. Nevertheless, the percentage among rciruits could hardly be so low if the disease were as common in the civil as in the military popula- tion. - Aunnairc stdtistiiinc dc la I'illc dc Paris, .\unce xxx, lUOl) (pul). 1910, Paris). RACE DETERIORATION 197 gonorrhoea, the popular mind is not equally well impressed. Indeed, it is too commonly regarded as a milil and not very shameful disease. But medical opinion is really doubtful whether it is not, in some of its effects, as bad as or even worse than sy})hilis. About fifty per cent of women infected are made barren by it. Many are made chronic invahds. It is the connnonest cause of infant blindness {ophthalmia neonatorum). In Prussia, 130,000 such blind persons are to be found. The congenital transmission of venereal disease is what gives it its i)articularly dysgenic imi)ortance. Such trans- mission has all the force of actual inheritance. Indeed, if tainting the germ-cells so that the fertihzed egg is predeter- mined to develop into a sypliihtic individual is heredity, then syphilis is literally an hereditary disease. But as between a taint at conception and one at birth, either of which can be handed on to successive generations, there is little choice from the point of view of the student of race- deterioration. The effect is typically that of heredity transmission. Indeed, as an authority has strongly })ut it, • Syphihs is tiie hereditary disease par excellence. Its hereditary effects are more inevitable, more multii)le, more diverse, and more disastrous in their results on the progeny and the race than in the case of any other disease. Syphilis, in fact, has a more harmful inlhicnce on the species than on the individual.' Summary As the incidence of the deaths fronVthe wounds and disease of war fallJ not at random on the general })()pulation but on a specially selected part of it, namely, its sturdy young and middle-aged men, and men often not alone of especial physical fitne^s but of unusual boldness and loyalty of sj)irit, and as these deaths may in times of severe and })rotracted wars be very considerable in number and take a heavy toll for several or manv >uccessive years from \\\'\< particular part of the 198 MILITAKV SELECTION AND population, tliiis Icssciiin*^ iniiterially the share which it would otherwise take in the reproduction of the population, it would seem to be inovital)le, in tlu' li^'lit of the knowledge of the reality of race-modification by selection, that serious wars should lead to a racial deterioration in tiic populations concerned. /And such i> actually the claim made by not a few philosophical biologists, sociologists, and anti-militarists. Little attempt has been made, however, to find and expose any specific and measuraljle instances of race-deterioration jiroduced by military selection. Yet there has been enough war, and war serious enough in its mortality, to reveal this result if it does actually occur. It is desirable, therefore, to test the logical claim of a race-deteriorating effect of militaiy selection, by a scrutiny of facts. The serious undertaking of a study of the possible race- modifvinir results of militarism makes manifest innnediatelv very great difliculties in distinguishing between the possible racial injuries produced by military selection and the more temporary personal injuries to many or all of the individuals of a population produced in a few or even many successive years by unfavourable environmental conditions coincident, or even directly associated, with war. It is also conceivable that there are certain possible advantages to a population from war, particularly from wars that are not too serious or protracted. Also, the care and training of soldieis in times of peace may be of such a nature as to seem to be racially advantageous to the population. There may also exist at any given time, in the comj)lexity of influences making toward race-modification, such ones tending toward race-betterment as may mask or overcome a single, even important, one tend- inis toward race-deterioration. Thus there mav be cases of po})ulations exposed at times to serious war, wliich, despite the actual race-deteriorating influence on them of this war, may show in flicir hi^toiy a steady racial improvement, due to the favourable resultant of the many other influences form- ing the great complex of race-modifying conditions. RACE DETERIORATION 191) /_ln this proliniinary contrilnition of the results of a special study undertaken to test the chiini that excessive mihtarism must lead to race-deterioration, or at least must be an influence making for race-deterioration, tliree points, all of which go to substantiate tliis claim, are ])articularly brought out : first, the conditions of the formation of armies (selection of soldiers) ; second, a case of actual, measural)le, ])hysical, racial deterioration caused by excessive mihtarism ; tliird, the conspicuous association witli militarism of certain race- deteriorating diseases^ '-'l^ t- g The recruiting of soldiers from the general ])opulation, both by the methods of voluntary enlistment and of com- pulsory service and conscription, results in the rejection back into the general (civil) population of just about one-half of the young men offering themselves voluntarily or forming the annual classes reaching the military age, for physical unfitness (undersize or infirmities and disease), and the acceptance and taking out temj)orarily or, in case of death in war, permanently from the general })opulation of the other half of these groups of young men. These groups form a fraction of varying size of the general population especially characterized by good ])hysical develo})ment and vigour. This selected fraction is then prevented for a longer or shorter time from taking part in the re])roduction of the population and is deliberately exposed to the extinguishing and weaken- ing effects of war, if war comes, and whether war comes or not, to an unusual degree of danger of contracting certain race- deteriorating diseases. The men rejected as unfit for service in the army and retained in the civil ])oi)ulation are given, therefore, sj)ecial ()])])ortunitv and importance in the repro- duction of the ])0])ulation. Thus the methods of the selection of soldiers and the condition ol flic maintenance of armies combine to form a positive factor of race-deterioration. For a hundred years France has had a comjiulsory army service, all of its young men arriving at military age (twenty years for most of this time) being liable (if })hysically fit and 200 MILTTAKV SKLKCTION AND not subject to exeni])tion for any one of a few other causes) to he called to join the colours. Those who actually are called are determined, iirst, hy a drawinrj of lots, and then by an examination for ])hysical fitness. 'J'iiis annual examina- tion of a considerable fraction (from one-half to nearly all) of the voung men of France reaching the age of twenty, the results of which are preserved in the official records of the War De])artment, and are accessible for examination, affords students of race-modification an im]iortant source of evidence touching; tlie lacial modification ot tiie French peo])le in the last century. Any physical racial changes indicated ))y these statistics are not those simply of a small isolated and homogeneous ])0])ulation subject to common environ- mental changes due to varying industrial conditions, but are those of a large and heterogeneous j)0]ndation with com])ara- tively few common factors of selective or environment^il influence. One such important factor that has determined a selective influence in the history of the French people is the bloody and protracted series of Wars of the Revolution and Empire (the Napoleonic Wars). The race-modifying character of the military selection of this period and of the cessation of this selection after the end of the wars is shown by the fact (revealed by the statistics of recruitment just referred to) that the average height of the men of France began notably to decrease with the coming of age in 1S1;3 and on of the young men born in the years of the Uevolutionary Wars, 1792-1802, and that it continued to decrease in the following years with the coming of age of youths born during the Wars of the Km])ire ; and, then, that with the coming of age, about 1840 and thereafter, of the boys born in the years after these wars the stature began to increase and continued imtil it reached a height one inch greater than that of the earlier generations born in war-time. The average height of the annual conscription contingents born during the Napoleonic Wars was about 1.625 mm. ; of those born later it was a])out l.()55 mm. The recruiting statistics show also a iluctuating i RACE DETERIORATION 201 increase and then decrease of numbers of exemptions made necessaiy for infirmities and diseases running parallel ^vitll this decrease and then increase in height. That is, the race- modifying influence on the French peo})le of the military selection due to the Najioleonic Wars was to reduce the stature and increase the youthful infirmities and disease (due to inherited lack of vigour and disease-resistance) of its male population. And the cessation of this military selection resulted in an increase in stature and decrease of youtliful infirmity and disease. The racial effect of venereal disease (syphilis, gonorrhoea) is admitted. Sv])hilis mav be transmitted from man to woman, from woman to her children, and from these children to their children. It manifests itself in many and terrible forms, all of them weakening and degenerating in character, but its death-rate is very low. Gonorrhoea, although fami- liarly held to be a disease of no veiy serious consequences, is being discovered to have very serious consequences indeed, and consequences of particular race-weakening character. It is transmissible from man to woman and produces, as a veiy common result, chronic invalidism and barrenness on the part of the woman and congenital blindness of her children. Venereal disease is extraordinarilv fostered bv militarism, as the medical statistics of all War Departments show. Only Germany, and ])erhaps Japan, and these countries in only very recent years, have brought venereal disease in their armies under some reasonable degree of control. In the ten-year period 1899-1908 2-28 men per 1,000 offering themselves as recruits in the British armv in the I'nited Kingdom were rejected because of syphilis. During the same period the hospital admissions in the army in the United Kingdom averaged annually more than 100 per 1,000 men of strength. In other words, while the army recruiting boards discover among the young men offering themselves for service but two or three sy])hilitic men per 1,000, the army finds within itself a constant proportion of attainted men of many times 202 MILnAKV SELECTION tliat Miiinht'i, and most of these men, who are not killed in service, arc returned, attainted and racially danj'erou'^, to the general j)()[)nlati(ni. Deaths from all venereal disease in Enjjland and Wales average about fifty per million inhabi- tants. Deaths from such diseases as phthisis and cancer are nearly one hundred times as many. Venereal di>«ease is racially contaminating and deteriorating. It docs not select the less vigorous ty]»es by death. It i-- a very harmful influence . Ali^cria. Con(|uest of, 77, 140, 151. AlIersluiMi, So. Alma, 14-2. AiUfiifan ana}', vtiit'ieal disease, 105. American Civil War, 1(), iM'>. American Ivevoliition. 7<), 1021". Ainiens, Peace ut. 11"), 1.j4. Amnion, 167, 185, 192. Antietam, 182. Antwerp. Siege of. loD. Areola, lot;. Aspern, 10. 118. Auerstiidt. !(>. lis. 119. Austcrlit/,, 1«). 20, 43. lis. I,s2, 183. Austrian Netherlands insurrection, 5, 39. Austrian Succession, War of, 5. 9, 10, 34, ♦)9, 7«>, 99 1". Austro-Pnissian War, 8, 9, 10, 16, 57 f.. 71. Badajo/, 21. IJalkan War. 16. Barcelona, 96. Bautz.n. 118. Bavarian Succession. Wai- of. 5, 37 f. Baxter, 168. Beauliarnais, Eugi-ne. 125. Belgium, intervention 1830, 49. Beresina, 20, 118, 119. Bischofi; 189. Blenheim. 96. Boas, Kranz, 1(^8. Boer War, 16. Borodino, 118. 119. Bosnia and Herzegovina. <'». 61. (;9. Boudin, 166. Bowdites, 168. Bo.xer uprising, 4, 65, 69, 71, 78. Brandt, 167. Breslau, 3(), 87, 70, 101. British annv, physical standards, 174 f. British army, rejections forphysical defect, 175 f. BritLsh army, venereal disease, 194 f. Broca, 166. Brueys, 111. Caldiero, 43, 70. Camisard insurrection, 76, 94, 96 f. Camperduin, 91, 108, 109. Campo Formio, Peace of, 112. I Canopus, 111. ■ Ca])e Noli, 108, 109. Ca])e Ortegal, 135. Cape Saint Vincent, 103, 108, 109. i Carlier, 167. C.isale, 88. Cassano, 95, 114. Ciistelfranco, 43. Castelnauilaiy, 84. Chamj>igny. 147. Champouillon, H'>7. de Chateauneuf. lOo. Chinese War 1856. 7s, 110. Cholera, 54, ()3, 142. Cholot, 107. Clemow, 1S4. Cochin China, e.xpcdition, 78, 140, 154. Colbert, 89. Collignon. 167. 192. Communard insurrection, 78, 154. Cond6, 83, 87, 91. Congress of Berlin, 64. Copenhagen, lOS, 109. 204: INDEX C'rnonne. IIS. 110. Criim-anWar. IC, tiC.T.s, 1 11 1., lol, 1S3. Ciiiieo, yj), !(><». Custozai. ('»}, 7(». Dahomey, expedition, 78. 150. Danish "War iSiU, 5(5. G*.>, 71. D«'ath-rat«.- in arinv in i><*aco, isi. Denain. 20. Di'nncwitz. 11^. 110. Desaix, K»."), Dfttingt-n, ICM). Devolution. War of, 90, 97. Dol, l(i7. Dominica, lOo. Douai, 90. Dresden, 47, 7i>. 11 \ 1 10. Duma.s. 1S4. Diimouriez, 104. Duncan and Lewis, 178. Dunkirk, 8S. Duquesne, 91. Ecker, 167. Kgvi't, expedition. 77. 109 f., 112, lis. Entrannnts, lolis. 110. Heilsberg, 118, 119. Hoche, 105, 107. Hochkirch. 30. 101. Hoclistiidt. 15. 30, 31, 42, 90. Hondshoote. 100. Hughe.«. Admiral, 1<>4. Iluiriienct Wars. 14. 70. S3 f. Hundred Days' War, 8, 10, 48, 77, 117. 120. 132. IIun^Mrian insurrection 1705, 5, 8, 9. lo. 20 IT., 54 f., 94 ; 1848, 0. 9. 10, 50, 09, 71. Inkermann, 141. Ismaila. 21. Italian War IMS 51 f. 71 ; 1S59, 55, 71, 143 f Jemapi^s, 40. 104. 100. Jena, lis. 110. Jordan, David Starr, 163. Katz]>;uli. 2<». 119. Kehl. OS. Kellermann. 104. Kleber. I(i7. 111. Kloster Kami'tii. lol. K(.lin, 101. Komorn, 54. Konig<^M-iitz. 17, 57, 04, 70. Krefeld. 102. Kulm, 118, 119. I i INDEX 205 Kunorsdorf. 20. 3C.. 7. Marengo, 42. 70, 112. 113, 114. Marsaglia, 93. Martinestie. 20, 38. Mazariii, 89. Mercenaries, 14. Mergentheim, 85. Mexican exi)edition, 140. Mexico, intervention, 77. Military selection, eftect on race, 172 ft". Minci..KiNvr, 12, 48, 70. 111. Minden, 102. Modena, 42. Mont Cassel, 91, 92. Montebello. 42.55, 11;J, HI. 111. Moreau, 105, 112, 113. Moscow, 183. Mount Tabor, 110. Mukden. 17. 117. Murat, 48, 125. Namur, Siege of, 94. Naples, War with, 48 f. Napoleon I, 15, 39, 45, 105, 106. 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117.118, 125, 133 tf.. 165, 173. 184. Napoleonic Wars, 10, 43 ff., 116 ff., 183 ; cost in lives, 182 f. ; cost to England, 134 ; effect on stature of recruits, 164 ff., 190 ft:, 200 f. Navarino, 139. Navy, French. 87, 91. 93, 95, 99. 101, 103, 104, 107 f., 134, 137, 138. Neerwinden, 93. Nelson, Admiral, llo. Nimwegen, Peace of, 92. NordlingfU. 8.5. Novara. 53. 70. Novi, 70, 113, 114. Oczakow. 21. Ofticer losst^s. 17 f., 67 ft'., 97, 122 ff., 135 ff, 142 f., 149 ff, 155. Oiihth.dniia neonatorum. r.>7. Oudenarde, 30, 96. Palestro. 55. Paris 119. Parkriny. 21. Parma, 9.S. Peace ye.ii-s. 1 ff.. 75 IV. Pea.s;ints' War. 11. M. Peninsular War, 182. 200 INDEX J'lulil'psljiirg, '.'8. I'ljysital deterioration. Unitt'd Kin;,'»i<»ni. ITU. Pi;i(iii/a. 1. l\.l:in.l. uprising' is:{(». A\). rolisli-Hussinn W:ir \Ki\, m. rclisli SiKcossion. War nf. ">,'.>. 10. 15. ;u. r,'j. 7r,. <»s. J 'ort Arthur. VX Prague, l>i), 1<>1. Pyramids Battl<- of. 1 l, y.s. Quatn-Bras. 110. (Quebec, l<>i». (^liberon Bay, lo-_>, l(»s, l(il». K'aab. 1 1. Kadctzky. 52. Kainillies, :J0, 1M;. Katislx.n, 118. Ko^j^cnslmri;. 11. Revolution of ls:;<>, Fn n.li, V.K Revolutionary movement 1848, 50 IT., 77, i;]i». Rt'zonvillo, 17. 117. Richelieu. M, t>, 100. Rocroi, 88. Rodney, 103. Roman Empire, age i>f" military service, 173. Rossbach, 15, 102. Russian Cami>aif,Mi, 15, 09, 117. 12r,n"., 130. i;;2. Rus.so-.Tapane.se War. It), 17. 11), (Hi. deRuyter, in. S:iinf Denis-1(K-M..ns, HI. 1»2. Saint (Juthanl. 20, i>l, ll;{. Saint (^uentin, 117. Salamanca, lis. 1 11>. San Sebastian, 21. Santo Dnmingn insm riclidii. 7(1. 77. 114f., 135. Saragossii. 21, 30, 90. Sardinia, War 1S4S. «'., S. 1». 1(». 10. Saxe, Cointe de, 99. ScheMt W.ir, 5. Scilellclibclg, 1>5. Sch\v7. Sebjistopol. 1 1. Seconian insurrection, 17. Seven Years' War, 5. S. 9, 1(». 2o. 35 f., 00,09. 7t;. loiil. Shoon<'veld, 91. Sinsheim. 92. Small-pox 1871. ISI. Smolensk. 1 1^. Solebay. 91. Soll'erino, 55. 7ti. ill. 1^5. deSouffren, 103. inl. Souvarov. 113. Sitnnish Succession. War ol, s. 9, 10. 12, 29f., r,9, 70, SO fl".. 91 fl".. 97. Spanisli-American War, 18.3. Si>eier, 95. Sj)encor. Ilcrlu-rt. 103. StalVarda. 93. Statistics ot losse.s, criticism. 12. 82. 120, 145 f. • Steenkirke. 93. Stromb(di. 91. Sweden, War with. 1(557. 23. Syphilis. IM, 191 (Y. Tai-jiing rebellion, 78. Tenon. 1<>I. 'riiionville. s5. Tliird ('oaliti..n. W.ar ol. 1". t:'.. (ID, 77. 117, 120. 132. Thirty Years' War, 8. 9. 1(». II 21 fi'.. 00.09. 70.83 ir.,9, |S2. INDEX 207 Toui-ville, 93. Toussjiint-L'Ouvorture, 114. Trafalcrar, '20, lis. 111). i;}5. Trebbia Kivcr. V2, 11:3, 114. TschourilolV, l(j7. Tsushima, 20. Tuberculosis in British army. ISO. Tunis Conquest, 7.S. Turenne, SO, 1)1, 97. Turin, 9G. Turki^li War 1593, 4; ir,0:l. S. 00, 09 ; 10S3, 10, 24 f. ; 171t;, 5, 33 ; 1736, 5. 9, 10, 33 ; 17S7, 9, 10, 38 ; 1828, 16. Turkish-Russian War 1877, 10. 00. Tut t linden, 85. Tyj)hoitl fever, France, 179 f. Typhus fever, 54, 184. Ulm, 43. Ushant, 108, 109. Valencir-nnes, 87, 88. Valmy, lOt. Valtelline War, S5. Velez-Mahiga, 95, 90. Vende6 insurrection, 76, lOO f. Venereal disease, 193 tl". Verona, 114. Versailles, Peace of, 107. Vigo Bay, 95. \'i"llai-s, 95. Villaviciosa, 95. VilliTuie, 1(54. Vittoria, 118. Wagrani, JtJ. 4 1, 7u. Us, 119, 1S3. Waicheren, 91, 120. War, eftect on racial stock, 104 i\. War years. 4 fV.. 75 If. Warsjiw, 21. Waterloo, 118, 119, 182, 183. Wattignies, 40, 100. Wcllinuton, 182. Wittenweier, 85. Worth, 17, 147. Zenta. 20. Zorndurf. 2<», lul. Zurich, 114. GENERAL APrEXDIX PUBLICATIONS OF THE DIVISION OF ECONOMICS AND HISTORY The Conference which met at licrne in 1911. under tiie auspices of tlie Di\ isioii of Economics and History t)f tlie Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, api)ointed tinve Conmiissions to draft the questions and problems to be dealt with by competent authorities in all countries. The first Commission was entrusted with The Economic ami Historical Causes and Effects of ll'ar ; the second with Armaments in Time of Peace ; the third with The Unifying Infltiences in International Life. Subsequently the suggestions of the three Connnissions were considered and approved by the entire Conference. The questions are to be discussed scientilically, and as far as possible without prejudice either for or against war ; and their discussion may have such important consequences that the questions arc pre- sented below in extenso. Report of the First Commission THE ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF WAR The Conference recommends the following researches : 1, Historical presentation of the causes of war in modern times, tracing especially the influence exercised by the striving for greater political power, by the gro\\'th of the national idea, by the political aspirations of races and by economic interests. 2, Conflicts of economic interests in the present age : (a) The influence of the growth of poinilation and of the industrial development upon the expansion of States. {b) The protectionist policy ; its origin and basis ; its method of application and its influence upon the relations between coun- tries; bounties (open and tlisgnised, public and {)rivatc); most- favoured-nation treatment ; the attitude towards foreign goods and foreign capital: tlie boycott; discouragement of foreign immigration. IJG'J.II 1 p GENERAL APPENDIX (r) Iiilcmational loans ; the policy of guarantees ; the relations of the creditor to tlu- debtor States ; the use of loans for gaining influence over otlur States. {d) Rivalry among States with respect to capitalist investments in foreign e(nnitries : 1. The endeavour to obtain a privileged jxisition in banking enterprises, in the opening and development of mines, in the letting of imblic contracts, in the execution of public works, in the building of railways (Siberian, Manehurian, Persian Bagdad Railway, Adriatic Railway, &c.) ; in short, the organiziition of larger capitalistic enterprises in foreign countries. 2. The hindering of foreign countries by convention from executing jiroductive enterprises on their own soil, i. g. from building railways in their own countries. 3. The anti-militarist movement, considered in its religious and political manifestations. (Only opposition to all military organization is here to be considered.) 1. The position of organized labour and the socialists in the various States on the questions of war and armaments. 5. Is it possible to determine a special interest of individual classes making for or against war, for or against standing armies ? G. The influence of women and woman suffrage upon war and armaments. 7. The extension of obligatory military service in the different States, in times both of war and of peace. (a) The conditions of military service ; the system of enlistment and of general obligatory service, the actual position of aliens. (b) The ratio of the persons obliged to render military ser\ice to the entire population. (c) The influence of the present system oi military obligation and the organization of armies upwi warfare and upon its duration. 8. The economic effects of the right of capture and its influence u\)ou the development of navies. 9. War loans provided by neutral countries ; their extent and influence on recent warfare. 10. The effects of war : {a) Financial cost of war. The mi t hods of met ting it : Taxa- tion ; International Loans ; Extirnal Loans. (b) Losses and gains from the j)oint of view of public and private economic interests; checks to production nnd the destruction of j)roduetive forces; reduction of oj>portunities for business enter- 2 GEXEUAI. APPENDIX prises ; iutfnu[)liuii of fori i^Mi tradi- ami ui' liic imports of food ; the destruetion of jjroperty ; shriukiige of values of propert}', ineluding seeurities ; fmaiieial burden eaused by new taxes, debts, and war indemnities ; iffeets upon private credit and ui)(jn savings banks; advantages to IIiom- industries whieh furnish miUtary materials ; advantages and disadvantages to neutral countries. (f) Tile effects of war upon I hi- supply of thi- world with food and raw materials, with special reference to those States which are in large degree dependent upon other countries for such sui)plies, e.g. Great Britain and Germany ; by diversion of capital from those countries whieh produce food and raw materials (especially the stoppage of railway building and of new investments in agriculture and other industries). {d) The condition of the victorious State : manner of levy and use of contributions and war indenniities ; influince upon industry and social life. (e) The manner in which the energy of nations is stimulated or depressed by war. 11. Loss of human life in war and as a result of war : inlluenee upon population (birth-rate, relation between the sexes, ratio of the various ages, sanitary conditions). 12. The influence of war and of the possibility of war uj)on the protective policy, upon banking conditions (especially upon banks of issue), and upon monetary systems. 13. The influence of annexation upon the economic life of the annexing States, and upon the State whose territory has beenannexetl. 14. The annexation of half-ci\ilized or unci\ ilizcd {)eoples, con- sidered especially from the point of view of the economic interests, which act as motive powers ; the methods through whieh private i-nterprises take root in such ngions and through whieh they bring influence to bear upon their own go\ernments ; the effects ol such annexations upon the development of trade with the annexing State and with other countries, as well as upon the economic and social life of the natives. 15. The progressive exemption of commercial and industrial activities from losses and interferences through war. \Ck Influence of the open door policy upon war and peace. p 2 GENERAL APPENDIX Report of the Second Commission AHMAMFATS IN TIME OF PEACK. MIMTAIIV AM) NAVAI, ESTABLISH- MENTS. THE TMEOHV. rUALTICE, A\I) HISTORY OF MODERN ARMAMENTS. 1. Dcnnition. Annanionts nii^'ht be dcsprihcd as ' the prtjxirations made by a State cither fur defence or for attack '. These would iiichide the provision of food, fmaneial preparations, and also senii- inilitary railways, canals, docks. &c. 2. Causes of armaments. Motives for inereasin<,' ii\ate action. IT U.C.BERKELEY LIBRARIES C0ai061t.b3 11^ v^>^ • • / ^ 2 ■ .6 :d THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY