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 IMIVERSiTV OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 .RIVERSIDE
 
 STATESMEN SERIES. 
 
 PRINCE METTERNICH, 
 
 (All Rvjhts lleserved.)
 
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 PRINCE METTERNICH.
 
 STATESMEN SERIES. 
 LIFE OF 
 
 PRINCE METTERNICH 
 
 BY 
 
 COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.L 
 
 SECOND EDITION, WITH PORTRAIT. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO., LIMITED, 
 
 13, WATEULOO I'LACH, PALL MALL, S.W.
 
 THE STATESMEN SERIES. 
 
 Crown 8uo, Cloth Gilt, Is. each. With Portrait 
 
 Vols. I.— VII., READY. 
 
 GLADSTONE. By II. W. Lucy. 
 
 BISMARCK, V,y CnARr,EH Lowe, M.A. 
 
 MARQUESS WELLESLEY. By CI. G. B. 
 Mallkson, C.S.I. 
 
 VISCOUNT PALMERSTON. By Lloyd C. 
 Saxdkrs. 
 
 MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE. By Captain 
 
 ]j. J. 'i'UOTI'K};. 
 
 LORD DERBY. 15y T. B. Kkbbel. 
 BEACONSFIELD. l!y T. E. Kkbhel. 
 
 NEXT VOLS. 
 
 METTERNICH. By Colonel iAIalleson, C.S.L 
 PRINCE CONSORT. By Citaulotte M. Yonge,
 
 PKEFATORY NOTE. 
 
 Ix writing this sketch of" the statesman whose career 
 occupies so great a space in the history of Europe for 
 fifty years I have consulted, amongst others, the following 
 works : (I) " The Autobiography of Prince Metternich " ; 
 (2) Binder's " Fiirst Clement von Metternich und sein 
 Zeitalter, 1836"; (3) " Neuer Plutarch," vol. v.; 
 
 (4) Thiers' " Histoire du Consulat et de I'Empire " ; 
 
 (5) Capefigue's " Diplomates Contemporains " ; (G) Gcr- 
 vinus's Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts " ; 
 (7) Maurice's "Revolutions of 1848-49"; (8) Alder- 
 stein's " Chronologisches Tagebuch der Magyarischen 
 llevolution " ; (0) " Napoleon and his Detractors." 
 
 G. B. M.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 Early Training. 1773-1806 1 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 The Embassy to Paris. 1806-1809 15 
 
 CHAPTER HL 
 
 From the War of 1809 to the Retreat from Moscow. 
 
 1809-1812 46 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 From the Winter of 1812 to the Armistice of Pleiswitz. 
 
 1812-1813 80 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 From the Armistice of Pleiswitz to the Renewal op Hos- 
 tilities. June-August, 1813 104 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 From the Rupture of the Armistice of Pleiswitz to the 
 
 Fall of Napoleon. August, 1813, to March, 1814 . 120 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Crisis before the Hundred Days — and after. JIaroh, 
 
 1814, to November, 1815 129
 
 viii CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Continental System oe Metternicii ; its Rise and 
 
 Progress. 1815-1830 142 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Decline and Fall of Metternich's System in Europe. 
 
 1830-1848 171 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 CoNCLrsiON— Character. 1848-1859 191 
 
 Index 198
 
 LIFE OF 
 PEINCE METTBENICH. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EAKLY TRAINING. 
 
 1773-IS05. 
 
 During the first moiety of the present century, that is, 
 from the year 1800 to the year 1848, Continental Europe 
 was alternately ruled by two men. One of these, he who 
 ruled from 1800 to 1814, made his hand so heavy on the 
 nations he had subdued and crushed, that, on the first 
 great opportunity, they rose against him, and, by a 
 stupendous effort, cast him down from his place of 
 supremacy. To ensure the potential character of that 
 effort, to render it absolutely decisive, no one contributed 
 more than the second of the two men to whom I have 
 referred. He had his reward. When Waterloo had 
 completed the overthrow which Leipsig had initiated, 
 Prince Metternich stepped quietly into the seat whence 
 Napoleon had been hurled, and, for the thrcc-and-thirty 
 years that followed, directed, unostentatiously but very 
 surely, the policy of the Continent. Throughout that 
 period his was the central, the omnipotent, figure, to which 
 
 B
 
 2 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICIL 
 
 sovereigns referred for advice and guidance, and before 
 which nations bowed. His system differed, in its essen- 
 tials, from that of the great conqueror to whose seat he 
 had succeeded. The despotism of Napoleon was the 
 despotism of the conqueror who had swept away the old 
 system, and who terrorised over its former supporters. 
 The despotism of Metternich, not less actual, used as its 
 willing instruments those very supporters upon whose 
 necks Napoleon had placed his heel. His system was the 
 more dang'erous to human freedom because it was dis- 
 guised. He was as a Jesuit succeeding an Attila ; and 
 when, after enduring it long, the peoples of Europe 
 realised its result in the crushing of every noble aspira- 
 tion, of every attempt to secure real liberty, we cannot 
 wonder that they should have asked one another whether 
 it was to obtain such a system that they had combined to 
 overthrow Napoleon. AVhen the awakening was com- 
 })lete, retribution speedily followed. The peoples, who, 
 led in 1813 by the kings upon whom Napoleon had 
 trampled, had, after completing their mission, trusted 
 their leaders, rose in 1848 to rid themselves of those 
 very leaders. During the earlier epoch, Metternich had 
 been the leading spirit to insj)ire the uprising ; in the 
 later, he was the first victim. His system, established by 
 the successful "rising of the nations," was destroyed by 
 the " rising of the peoples." But it had lasted over thirty 
 years. It had procured for Europe, wearied by twenty 
 years of constant war, if not internal repose, at least 
 external tranquillity. Contrasted with the system on the 
 ruins of which it rose, it thus captivated, for a period, the 
 generous spirits who had contributed to establish it. Men 
 were long unwilling to believe that so much blood had 
 been shed, so much enthusiasm evoked, only to substitute 
 a velvet-gloved despotism for the despotism of the sword ;
 
 EABLT TBAINING. 3 
 
 that the one result of the " rishig of the nations " had 
 been to ensure the more perfect triumph of absolutism. 
 When, at length, tlicy did realise that one more crime 
 had been committed in the name of liberty, they hastened 
 to avenge the chief profaner of the sacred temple. But 
 the time required for the general awakening was long. 
 The despotic reign of Napoleon had lasted, dating from 
 Marengo, barely fourteen years. The despotism of 
 Metternich endured thirty-three. It is the object of this 
 little book to pourtray the qualities and character which 
 made such a result possible ; to show how a young 
 German diplomatist became so great a force in Europe 
 as, on more than one occasion, to hold in his hands the 
 fate of the most famous man the world has ever seen : — on 
 one, especially critical, to bind together the combination 
 "which ensured his overthrow ; finally, to rise on his ruin ; 
 to occupy, virtually, his seat ; to hold it for thirty-three 
 years ; and then to descend from it at the indignant call 
 of the people he had betrayed ; and — a contrast to his 
 predecessor — to be forgotten ever after. The name of 
 Napoleon still lives : supreme as a warrior, great as a 
 statesman, great in the enthusiasm it may even yet evoke. 
 The name of Metternich arouses no recollection but that 
 of the aphorism to which, in the plenitude of his power, 
 he is said to have borrowed from Louis XV. : " Apres 
 moi le deluge." 
 
 The career of Metternich divides itself naturally into 
 ten epochs. The first, from his birth to the endiassy to 
 Paris in 1806 ; the second, from 1806 to the outbreak of 
 the war in 1809 ; the third, from the war of 1809 to the 
 retreat from Moscow ; tlie fourth, from the winter of 1812 
 to tlie armistice of Pleiswitz ; the fifth, from the armistice 
 of Pleiswitz to the renewal of hostilities ; the sixth, from 
 the rupture of the armistice to the fall of Napoleon in 
 
 B 2
 
 4 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEENICH. 
 
 1814 ; the seventh," during the crisis before the Hundred 
 Days — and after ; the eighth, the rise and progress of the 
 Continental system he established ; the ninth, the decline 
 and fall of that Continental system ; the tenth, the 
 conclusion of his career. I shall begin, without further 
 preface, with the first. 
 
 Clement Wenceslas Nepomuk Lothair Metternich- 
 belonged to an old noble family located on the Lower 
 Rhine. His father, Francis George Metternich, a diplo- 
 matist of some repute, had married Maria Beatrix Aloisa,, 
 Countess of Kageneck, and of this marriage the subject 
 of this sketch was the first issue. Clement Metternich 
 was born at Coblentz the 15th of May, 1773. Until 
 he attained the age of fifteen he was educated at home with, 
 his brother, eighteen months younger than himself, by- 
 three successive tutors. In 1788 he proceeded to complete 
 his studies at the University of Strasburg. The year he 
 went there, he tells us in his memoirs, the youthful Napoleon 
 Bonaparte had just left. " Wc had," he adds, " the same 
 professors for mathematics and fencing." At the Univer- 
 sity, Metternich went through the usual course, but he 
 had not yet completed his studies when, in Octoher, 1700^ 
 he was summoned by his father to Frankfort, to assist 
 there at the coronation of the Emperor Leopold. After 
 this ceremony he resumed his studies, not at Strasburg, 
 but at the University of Mayence, to read law and jurisr 
 prudence. He was then only seventeen, but already he 
 had seen something of the world, for, at Frankfort, he 
 had made the acquaintance of the Archduke, who 
 subsequently became the Emperor Francis, and many- 
 other members of the Imperial family. He had also 
 taken his first step as an official, for he was chosen there 
 by the Catholic Imperial Courts of the Westphalian 
 llench to be their Master of the Ceremonies. The French:
 
 EABLY TRAINING. 5 
 
 Hevolution was then in its early initiatory stages. *^ From 
 that moment," he writes, " I was its closest observer, and 
 subsequently became its adversary ; and so I have ever 
 remained." At Mayence, Metternich divided his time 
 between his studies, and a society of which he writes, that 
 it was " as distinguished for intellectual superiority as for 
 ■the social position of its members." This society was 
 composed mainly of French emigrants of the higher 
 classes, whose exile was voluntary. Association with 
 them confirmed the hatred of the Revolution previously 
 imbibed. He evidently regarded these emigrants as the 
 true representatives of the French nation, for he writes of 
 them : " In this way also I came to know the French ; I 
 learned to understand them, and to be understood by them." 
 
 From Mayence, Metternich was summoned, in 1792, 
 to proceed to Frankfort to attend the coronation of the 
 Emperor Francis, who had been elected successor to his 
 brother Leopold. Again was he selected to perform the 
 same ceremonious offices as had been entrusted to him on 
 the previous occasion, and again did he improve his 
 .acquaintance with the frequenters of the courtly circle. 
 Amongst these he notes especially Prince Anton Ester- 
 liazy, the principal ambassador of the Emperor ; and the 
 Princess Louise of Mecklenburg, afterwards Queen of 
 Prussia. This illustrious lady, mother of the late 
 Emperor of Germany, was two years younger than 
 Metternich, but he had known her from childhood, for 
 iher grandmother, by whom she had been brought up 
 at Darmstadt, had been on intimate terms with his 
 mother. 
 
 From the University of Mayence, Metternich proceeded, 
 first to Coblentz, and then to Brussels, in the University 
 of which city he became a student. But his occupations, 
 ait this period, would seem to have been of a very
 
 6 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICK 
 
 desultory character. The French armies were invading 
 the Low Countries, and IMetternich relates that his studies 
 were interrupted by having to pass to and fro between 
 Brussels and the Austrian army, sometimes with com- 
 missions from his father, sometimes to see his friends. 
 In this manner, visiting also the scenes of military 
 operations, he passed the winter of 1793-4. In the 
 beginning of the latter year he accompanied the chief 
 treasurer of the Netherlands Government on a mission ta 
 London. There, not only was he received by the King 
 " with unusual kindness and affability," but he came to 
 know, personally, William Pitt, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, 
 Grey, and other leading men. He frequented the sittings 
 of Parliament, and followed with the deepest attention the 
 trial of Warren Hastings. He adds: "I endeavoured 
 to acquaint myself thoroughly with the mechanism of 
 the Parliament, and this was not without use in my 
 subsequent career." Amongst those with whom he 
 became intimate was the Prince of W^ales, " one of the 
 handsomest men I ever saw," and of whose abilities he 
 formed a high opinion. Whilst in London, the young- 
 diplomatist received from his Court his nomination to the 
 post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary at the Hague, The passage to the Continent 
 was difficult, as a French fleet was in the channel. 
 Metternich proceeded then with the sanction of the King, 
 to see the English fleet which had assembled at Ports- 
 mouth to sail, under Admiral (soon to become Lord) 
 Howe, against the enemy. The sight of this fleet, and of 
 a large convoy of merchant ships under its wing, from the 
 top of the hill behind Cowes, on which Metternich had 
 posted himself, was, he relates, the most " beautiful sight 
 I have ever seen — I might say, indeed, the most beautiful 
 that human eyes have ever beheld ! " So impressed was
 
 EARLY TRAINING. 7 
 
 he, that he requested the Admiral to allow him to remain 
 on board his ship, to see the impending- fight; but the 
 Admiral would not. Two days later was fought the 
 famous battle of the 1st of June. 
 
 The journey of Metternich to the Continent was accom- 
 panied by many circumstances attended with danger, but he 
 finally reached Holland, visited Amsterdam, part of North 
 Holland, and the Hague, and thence proceeded to the 
 Lower Rhine to take up his post, the French armies 
 having rendered a prolonged stay in the Netherlands 
 impossible. 
 
 The progress of the French arms continuing, and the 
 Metternich estates on the Rhine having been confiscated, 
 Metternich was called by his father to Vienna, and, a 
 little later, was sent to Bohemia to manage the family 
 property in that kingdom — the only property remaining 
 to them. After settling this property he returned to 
 Vienna, where he found his parents busily engaged in 
 arranging for his marriage with a grand-daughter of the 
 famous Prince Kaunitz. This marriage was celebrated, 
 Sept. 27, 1795, at Austerlitz — a place destined, ten years 
 later, to become so liimous. 
 
 By this time the experience he had acquired of diplo- 
 macy had quite disgusted Metternich with his career. 
 He had determined, he says, " to remain in private life, 
 and to devote my time to the cultivation of learning- and 
 science." But events were too strong for him, or possibly, 
 the disgust was only of a passing character. Though for 
 two years he adhered to his resolution, devoting himself 
 to science and the society of scientific men, the request 
 made to him by the Counts of the Westphalian " Colle- 
 gium" to represent them at the Congress of Rastadt, 
 drew him back to the world of di])lomacy and politics. 
 He accompanied thither his father, the first pi^nipoten-
 
 8 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 tiary of the German Empire, and remained there till the 
 middle of March, 1799. Then he returned to Vienna, 
 his respect for diplomatists and diplomacy not apparently 
 increased, and resumed his scientific studies. His life at 
 this period, he writes, " was that of a ma,n who sought 
 exclusively good society. The day was usually given 
 entirely up to business, and the evening was divided 
 between work and recreation. I frequented those salons 
 by preference in which I was sure to find pleasant 
 conversation, convinced that such conversation tends to 
 sharpen the intellect, correct the judgment, and is a source 
 of instruction to those who know how to keep it from 
 degenerating into mere babbling." It was at this period 
 that he made the acquaintance of Pozzo di Borgo, then 
 employed as a secret agent by the English Cabinet, and 
 remarkable at a later time for the rancorous hatred he 
 bore to Napoleon ; of the Prince de Ligne ; of the 
 Princess Liechtenstein ; and of others moving in the same 
 circle. Still maintaining his attitude of reserve on the 
 subject of official employment, he yet occasionally visited 
 the Foreign Minister, Baron Thugut, and sometimes 
 waited on the Emperor. The latter lost no opportunity 
 of rallying him on what he termed his " indolence." On 
 one occasion, however, just before the retirement of 
 Thugut in 1801, Francis said to him: "You live as I 
 should be very happy to do in your place. Hold yourself 
 ready for my orders; that is all I expect from you at 
 present." 
 
 The retirement of Thugut in 1801 in consequence 
 of the conclusion of the Peace of Luneville, rendered 
 necessary a complete redistribution in the liersonnel of 
 the Imperial diplomatic service. One of the secondary 
 posts, that of Dresden, was offered to Metternich, with 
 the alternative of that of Copenhagen, or of remaining at
 
 EABLY TB AWING. 9 
 
 home as Minister for Bohemia in the German Reichs- 
 tag. After some consideration, Metternich, warning the 
 Emperor that he submitted to his commands to enter a 
 sphere for which he beheved he had no vocation, selected 
 Dresden, as, " being one stage on the way to Berlin oi 
 St. Petersburg," it was " a post of observation which might 
 be made useful." 
 
 Nominated in January, 1801, Metternich did not join 
 his new post till the close of that year. Though peace 
 nominally prevailed, a considerable agitation, based on 
 apprehension regarding the future, pervaded all the great 
 countries of Europe. Under the First Consulship of 
 Napoleon the French Eepublic existed only in name ; the 
 German Empire was visibly approaching its dissolution ; 
 the violent death of the Emperor Paul, in March of that 
 year, had increased the general tension. At Dresden, 
 however, none of this anxiety was felt. The city, and 
 especially the Electoral Court, formed a contrast to the 
 universal agitation. " To judge from this Court alone," 
 wrote Metternich, " one might have believed the world 
 was standing still." " If etiquette, costume and precise 
 iregulations, could be a solid foundation for a kingdom, 
 Electoral Saxony would have been invulnerable." 
 
 As a post of observation on the Northern Courts, 
 Metternich found that he had not exaggerated the value 
 of the embassy to Dresden. He kept his eyes and ears 
 open, and was thus able to transmit to his Court exact 
 intelligence of all important matters that were discussed. 
 The Elector, Frederick Augustus, appears to have im- 
 pressed him as a man of solid ability, better fitted, how- 
 ever, for a peaceful era than for the stormy times in which 
 he lived. On the whole, we may gather that the period 
 of about eighteen months passed in Dresden by the 
 budding diplomatist was a period usefully employed, and
 
 10 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNWE. 
 
 that the experience acquired there was helpful to hira in 
 his subsequent career. 
 
 That he gave satisfaction to his own Court was proved 
 by his nomination, in the summer of 1803, to the embassy 
 of Berlin. Leaving Dresden, he proceeded first to 
 Ochsenhausen, to take possession of the abbey-lands- 
 which the Emperor had granted to his father as a com- 
 pensation for the hereditary estates on the left bank of 
 the Ehine confiscated by the French Eepublic ; thence to 
 Vienna ; and thence, after a short stay, at the end of the 
 year, to Berlin. 
 
 The situation in Berlin during the year 1804 required 
 the exercise, on the part of the representative of Austria, 
 of tact and judgment of no ordinary character. This 
 was especially the case when, in May of that year, 
 Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor of the French. France 
 was at war with England, and, whilst threatening an 
 invasion of that country, was preparing for that 
 Continental struggle which no man more than the 
 Emperor knew to be inevitable. England, at the same 
 time, was doing her utmost to stir up Austria and 
 Prussia to join her in the struggle she was making, as 
 her statesmen believed, against the subjugation of 
 Europe. She had found at Vienna willing listeners ; 
 sovereign, ministers, and people in full sympathy with 
 her ; eager to begin, whilst anxious to obtain the co- 
 operation of Prussia. At Berlin, however, the task was 
 not so easy. There, there were two parties — the one, the 
 patriotic party, led by Ilardenberg, anxious for the Anglo- 
 Austrian alliance, which, they foresaw, could alone save 
 the country and Europe from the domination of one man ; 
 the other, under the inspiration of Count Ilaugwitz, 
 desirous of maintaining a selfish neutrality, partly from 
 fear of Napoleon, partly from the conviction that by con-
 
 EABLY TBAINING. 11 
 
 niving at the despoiling of Austria, they would increase 
 the relative importance of Prussia, and might even, per- 
 chance, receive the bone of Hanover as a reward for their 
 neutrality. Such was the situation in Europe, and such 
 the state of parties at Berlin, when Metternich arrived in 
 that capital. 
 
 The task entrusted to Metternich was naturally that of 
 convincing the Prussian Court that its interests would best 
 be served by a cordial co-operation with England and 
 Austria. And not alone with those two powers. The 
 Emperor Alexander, anxious to take a great part in the 
 affairs of continental Europe, and desirous to wipe out the 
 recollection of the disastrous result of the last campaign 
 of Suwarrow, was bound, heart and soul, to Austria. He 
 was now, by means of his ambassador, urging the Court 
 of Berlin to declare itself. Attributing, after a time, the 
 long hesitations of that Court to want of energy on the 
 part of his representative, he endeavoured to persuade 
 Metternich to supply by his advocacy the deficiencies of that 
 official. Tired out, at last, by the continued evasiveness of 
 the language employed by the Prussian cabinet, Alexander, 
 to force its hand, pushed on his army to the frontiers of 
 Prussia. Still the King vacillated. Nor could the pro- 
 spect of an interview with the Czar bring him to a decision. 
 War with Austria had by this time broken out, and the 
 catastrophe of Ulm, though they knew it not, was impend- 
 ing. The utmost that could be wrung from the King, in 
 reply to the urgent solicitations of the Czar, at this period, 
 October 6, 18U5, was the assurance that he had offered 
 the neutrality of Prussia to the belligerent Powers, and 
 that he should consider himself at war with the Power 
 which should violate that neutrality. How, in making 
 this declaration, the King's mind was acted upon by dread 
 of Napoleon, was proved by the fact that when, a few
 
 12 LIFE OF PBTNCE METTERNICE. 
 
 hours later, he heard that the French army, to outflank 
 the Austrian army concentrated at Uhn, had violated the 
 territory of Anspach, he did not declare war against 
 France, but contented himself with informing the Czar 
 that the frontiers of his kingdom were open to him. 
 
 On receiving this message Alexander set out for 
 Potsdam. Then began, not only the negotiations for the 
 entrance of Prussia into the alliance existing between the 
 two Imperial Courts ; but, what is more germane to this 
 narrative, the intimacy, speedily increasing to friendship, 
 between the Emperor Alexander and Metternich. From 
 this period, in fact, dates the mfluence which, after the 
 fall of Napoleon, the Austrian statesman exercised, with 
 the most important results, on the mind of Alexander. 
 
 Never was more necessary the exercise of that supreme 
 tact which it is given only to a very few to possess. For 
 whilst, on the one hand, Metternich had to impose a curb 
 upon, to moderate the impetuosity of, Alexander ; he had, 
 on the other, to meet the tortuous suggestions of Count 
 Haugwitz and the French party. In his interesting 
 autobigraphical memoirs he states very frankly how he 
 v/as beset. " From the first moment," he writes, " the 
 Emperor and I fell under the ill-will of the Prussian 
 negotiators. With ill-concealed anger they resorted to 
 every imaginable pretext to protract the arrangements 
 which, in face of the calamitous circumstances of the war 
 on the Danube, grew more and more urgent." At length, 
 after a too great delay, the King of Prussia, yielding 
 apparently to the arguments and representations of 
 Alexander and of Metternich, signed on November 3rd a 
 treaty of alliance with Eussia and Austria. But, as if he 
 thought that he had gone too far, the King, always 
 temporising, despatched Count Haugwitz to the French 
 head-quarters, avowedly to intbrm Napoleon that such a
 
 EARLY TEAINING. 13 
 
 treaty had been signed, and that Prussia would inevitably 
 join the allies unless the French armies should halt in their 
 victorious career. In entrusting this communication to a 
 partisan of the French alliance the King might feel 
 tolerably secure that circumstances would be allowed to 
 decide as to whether it should be delivered or withheld. 
 
 So, indeed, it happened. Haugwitz, who delayed pur- 
 posely his departure for eight days beyond the time agreed 
 upon, joined Napoleon at Briinn, beyond Vienna. Once 
 in the presence of Napoleon, Haugwitz did not dare 
 to deliver the message in its entirety, but gave to it a 
 character purely complimentary. Napoleon, not deceived, 
 sent back Haugwitz to Vienna, there to wait events. 
 Those events were precipitated by the rashness of 
 Alexander, who pressed forward to Austerlitz, and there 
 met his fate — for the time. Haugwitz presented himself 
 to the Emperor on his return as a conqueror to Vienna — 
 and offered him his congratulations. To the Emperor's 
 sarcastic question as to whether, if he had returned 
 defeated he would have spoken to him of the friendship 
 of the King, his master, Haugwitz made no reply. He 
 bargained, however, for the cession of Hanover, and this, 
 Napoleon, to embroil Prussia with England, and to under- 
 mine the bases on which the German Empire rested, not 
 unwillingly granted. 
 
 Thus it happened that the labours of Metternich at 
 Berlin Mere to a great degree fruitless. Thanks to the 
 vacillation of the King of Prussia, and to the duphcity of 
 Haugwitz, the treaty negotiated by the Emperor Alexander 
 and himself proved powerless to change the current of 
 events. But, for himself, the qualities he had displayed 
 had not been displayed in vain. They procured for him, 
 as I have said, the lifelong friendship and esteem of the 
 Czar. His own sovereign, too, the Emperor Francis, had
 
 14 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 noted with approval the tact, the talent, and the quick 
 decision, displayed by his envoy under circumstances of 
 great difficulty. He marked that approval by conferring 
 upon the young Minister the Grand Cross of St. Stephen, 
 and by nominating him to represent the Austrian Empire 
 at the Court of Europe which required, above all others, in 
 an ambassador, the possession of acuteness, tact, firmness, 
 and penetration — the Court of the Emperor Napoleon.
 
 ( 15 ) 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 
 
 1806-1809. 
 
 The battle of Austerlitz had been followed by the Peace 
 of Pressburg. That treaty ceded to Italy, Venetia ; the 
 principality of Eichstadt, part of the Bishopric of Passau, 
 the city of Augsburg, Tirol, the possessions of Austria in 
 8uabia, in Brisgau, and Ortenau, to Bavaria and 
 Wiirternberg, the rulers of which were created kings. 
 The Peace of Pressburg, in fact, completed the dissolution 
 of the old German Empire, and secured for France a pre- 
 dominating influence in central and southern Germany. 
 
 At Vienna, it followed naturally that the Ministers 
 who had instigated a war which resulted in so disastrous 
 a peace should no longer hold office. Count Stadion, 
 then, who had been ambassador at St. Petersburg, was 
 directed to replace Count Colloredo at the Foreign Office ; 
 •and, at the express instance of the Emperor Alexander, 
 Metternich was ordered to succeed Stadion. For the 
 embassy at Paris, Count Philip Cobenzl had been named, 
 but Napoleon objected to him, and had indicated 
 Metternich as the man most suitable to strengthen the 
 relations he was anxious to see established between the 
 two Empires. Metternich learned this change in his
 
 16 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 destination only when he had reached Vienna on his wajr 
 to take up, as he believed, the embassy at St. Petersburg. 
 
 To himself the change was most unwelcome. It came 
 upon him, he tells us, " like a thunderbolt." We cannot 
 wonder. The relations between himself and the Czar 
 had been of a most cordial character, and he had looked 
 forward with real pleasure to a residence in a country 
 with the sovereign of which he had so many sympathies. 
 For, alike at this time and always, Metternich hated the^ 
 French Revolution and all its offspring. He regarded 
 Napoleon, he tells us, as its " incarnation." Alexander^ 
 at that time, completely shared his views on this point. 
 He had not been discouraged by Austerlitz ; not even 
 sufficiently humiliated to recognise as an Emperor and 
 an equal a man whom he regarded only as a Corsican 
 adventurer. All that, and more, were to come. But, in 
 the beginning of 1806, the Czar still employed the con- 
 temptuous utterances regarding the great Emperor which 
 the jackals, who for ten years grovelled before him, used 
 after his fall. 
 
 Well, indeed, might Metternich, holding the views he- 
 did, and animated by the prejudices which influenced him 
 all his life, shrink from the embassy to Paris. But the 
 sacrifice of his personal wishes had become a necessity. 
 Though Austria had been vanquished, she had not been, 
 wholly discouraged. So much, in war, depends on 
 fortune, and the Emperor Francis felt that fortune had 
 been unkind. The selection of Mack to be Commander- 
 in-chief had been a mistake such as would never be 
 repeated. Then, from a military point of view, the Czar 
 had been the evil genius of the cam])aign. Francis had 
 always urged that no battle should be fought at Auster- 
 litz, but that the French should be lured on to the 
 extremities of the Empire, when an attempt should be
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 17 
 
 made to destroy their long line of communication ; but 
 Alexander would insist on fighting. Though the allies 
 had been beaten, then, the Austrian Court was not dis- 
 couraged. All that they wanted was time — time to rally, 
 time to reorganise, time for recuperation ; and Francis 
 felt that he could most surely obtain that time by sending 
 to Paris as his ambassador a man agreeable to the French 
 Emperor, and yet upon whose tact and knowledge of the 
 world he could thoroughly depend. When, therefore, 
 Napoleon expressed his desire to see Metternich at Paris, 
 Francis, who knew Metternich well, very readily complied. 
 Fie received him on his arrival in Vienna with his usual 
 kindness ; praised him for his conduct in Berlin ; and set 
 before him the necessity of accommodating himself to 
 what he called his destiny, with expressions which made 
 it impossible for him to oppose his wishes. 
 
 But the soft words of his sovereign did not hide from 
 ?iretternich the difficulties which would await him at Paris. 
 France was still at war with England ; no peace had 
 been made with Russia ; a very guarded conduct was 
 necessary for the Austria whose interests he would 
 represent. Then, too, there was Prussia, grovelling at 
 the feet of Napoleon ; rejoicing in her heart of hearts at 
 the humiliation of her ancient rival ; and yet dreading 
 lest the next blow should fall on her. If, argued Metter- 
 nich, hostilities might be averted till Austria could recoup 
 herself, then all might go well ; if not, the next state of 
 Germany would be worse than that then existing. Still 
 he did not despair. He had belief in himself: belief in 
 his power to win the confidence of others, without betraying 
 his own secret views. He would enjoy, moreover, the 
 opportunity — golden to a cold, determined nature such 
 as he possessed — to study the character of the man who 
 held in his hand the fate of Europe, and to keep his 
 

 
 18 LIFE OF PBINCE 3IETTEBNICR. 
 
 master well informed as to the chances which might 
 befall. 
 
 The new ambassador quitted Vienna for his destination 
 in July, 1806. At Strasburg he was delayed for a time, 
 as Napoleon was then endeavouring to arrange terms of 
 peace with Russia, and, apparently, he did not wish that 
 Metternich should arrive until the Russian agent should 
 have departed. Consequently it was not till the first 
 week in August that he reached Paris. The first im- 
 portant personage he called upon was the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, the courtly Talleyrand. The impression 
 he received of that statesman was favourable. He found 
 him courteous and inclined to meet the views he put 
 forward. For he at once asserted his own position, 
 explaining to the minister, when he spoke of his desire 
 to cultivate friendly relations with Austria, what the 
 Emperor Francis understood by friendly relations, 
 " which," he added, " must not be confounded with 
 submission." 
 
 This interview Metternich himself calls the beginning 
 of his public life. " All that had gone before," he writes, 
 " might have shown the independence of my character. 
 As a man of principles, I could not and I would not bend 
 when it came to the point of defending them. Within a 
 short space of time destiny had placed me face to face 
 with the man who at this epoch ruled the affairs of the 
 world ; I felt it my duty, and I had the courage, never to 
 offer to mere circumstance a sacrifice which I could not 
 defend to my conscience both as a statesman and a 
 private individual. The voice of conscience I followed ; 
 and I do not think it was a good inspiration of Napoleon's 
 which called me to functions which gave me the oppor- 
 tunity of appreciating his excellence, but also the possi- 
 bility of discovering the faults which at last led him to
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 19 
 
 ruin, and freed Europe from the oppression under which 
 it languished." 
 
 Metternich was right. Napoleon never made a greater 
 mistake than when he invited to his Court this most 
 implacable enemy. Yet there are few sentences in the 
 Autobiography of Metternich which reveal his character 
 more completely than that which I have just quoted. The 
 intense self-appreciation ; the allusion to the voice of 
 conscience, as if in him the voice of conscience had 
 been other than an intense desire to rid Europe of the 
 incarnation of the hated revolution. Those who follow 
 his career will not fail to recognise that from 1806 
 to 1814 this was the one aim, the solitary purpose, 
 to which the Austrian ambassador, more Austrian in 
 this respect than his own sovereign, directed all his 
 efforts. That aim never left him. It was with him 
 alike when intriguing with the Russian ambassador and 
 with Talleyrand, and when apparently enjoying the 
 friendly conversation of Napoleon and the Empress. At 
 the Court of the Emperor, whom he never ceased to regard 
 as a ^parvenu,' he had made himself liked — only that he 
 might enjoy better opportunities of studying, in order 
 to find the weak points in, the character of the man who 
 was in it the prominent figure. 
 
 Metternich was extremely well received at Paris, alike 
 by Napoleon and the members of the Imperial family, 
 and in general society. Young, with a physiognomy 
 which might well be called distinguished, with the 
 courtly manners of the old regime, talking well and 
 possessing the wit which is nowhere more appreciated 
 than in France, having, besides, a special interest in 
 making himself agreeable, he could scarcely fail to make 
 good his footing. His real opinion regarding Napoleon 
 breaks out repeatedly in his Autobiography. He read 
 
 2
 
 20 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 him, he tells us, <at their first interview. The fact that 
 Napoleon kept on his hat on the occasion when Metter- 
 nich presented his credentials ; that, possessing, as the 
 Austrian ambassador records, a short broad figure, and 
 dressing negligently, the P^mperor should have endea- 
 voured to make an imposing effect, " combined," he 
 writes, " to weaken in me the feeling of grandeur 
 naturally attaching to the idea of a man before whom the 
 world trembled." This first impression, he tells us, was 
 never entirely effaced from his mind. 
 
 What follows is more curious still. The impression 
 thus formed, adds the same authority, helped to show him 
 the man as he was, " behind the masks with which be 
 knew how to cover himself In his freaks, in his fits of 
 passion, in his brusque interpellations, I saw prepared 
 scenes, studied and calculated to produce a certain effect 
 on the person to whom he was speaking." 
 
 When Metternich tells us that he discovered all this, 
 and imbibed an impression regarding Napoleon which 
 was never entirely effaced, from what passed at their first 
 interview, we turn with some curiosity to the recorded 
 account of that interview. We are fortunately able to 
 present that record on the authority of one to whom 
 Metternich himself would have offered no objection, for it 
 is his own story. " I presented myself to Napoleon," he 
 writes, "without delivering an address at the first 
 audience I had at St. Cloud, as was the custom of my 
 colleagues. I confined myself to stating that as, in 
 accordance with his own wishes, I had been chosen to 
 represent the Emperor of Austria at his Court, I should 
 strive on every occasion to strengthen the good relations 
 between the two empires on that basis upon which alone a 
 lasting peace could be established between hidependent 
 states. Napoleon answered me in the same simple style,
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 51 
 
 and our subsequent personal relations took their tone 
 from this first meeting," This is the " unvarnished " 
 account. The other represents the version compiled 
 in later years, based upon the violent antipathy inspired 
 by the incarnation of the Revolution in the mind of a 
 representative of the ideas which prevailed prior to 1789. 
 
 The same spirit is displayed by Metternich when he 
 attempts to describe, and to ridicule when describing, the 
 hospitalities of Fontainebleau. " The aspect of the Court 
 at Fontainebleau," he wrote in 1807, " could not but offer 
 many objects of curiosity to an impartial observer. This 
 Court sometimes endeavoured to go back to the old forms, 
 and sometimes rejected them as beneath the dignity of 
 the moment. The Emperor hunted forty miserable deer 
 which had been brought from Hanover and other parts of 
 Germany to refill a forest twenty leagues round, because 
 the kings too had their fixed days for hunting. He did 
 not really care for the sport, except for the violent exercise, 
 which suited his health ; and, besides, he merely went at 
 full speed, right and left, through the forest without 
 regularly following the hunt." It was, in fact, in the eyes 
 of the aristocratic Austrian, who had imbibed his ideas 
 in the society of the emigres, the Court of a parvenu. 
 
 It is easy to understand why, with the feelings which 
 animated him, Metternich was anxious that Napoleon 
 should not wage war with Prussia. Austria lay disarmed 
 and bleeding, yet secretly determined to prepare to use 
 the first fitting occasion to recover what she had lost. 
 Prussia, full of resources, and still possessing the prestige 
 which Frederick II. had won for her, was to be humbled 
 before Austria could recover. Such was the Imperial 
 programme, and Napoleon set out to execute it just two 
 months after the arrival of Metternich in Paris. During 
 the war, then, which ended in the dismemberment of
 
 22 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 Prussia, Metternicli remained in the French capital, 
 noting, he says, the impression which the news of 
 Napoleon's victories produced there. He states that the 
 impression was certainly not one of joy ; that it was 
 simply one of satisfaction that France had escaped the 
 consequences, and that her internal peace was not en- 
 dangered. When, at last, Napoleon returned, "intoxi- 
 cated with victory," from the banks of the Niemen to 
 Paris, and all the representatives of Foreign Powers 
 crowded to his reception to welcome him, Metternich 
 records how they all had in turn to hear unpleasant things 
 from the mouth of the conqueror. He adds : " I came off 
 best, although," with respect to certain negotiations 
 regarding the boundary between Austria and Italy which 
 had just been concluded — " the feeling of Napoleon 
 betrayed itself in a way anything but satisfactory to the 
 wishes of Austria." 
 
 From that moment dates the study of the character 
 of Napoleon which Metternich used with so much effect 
 subse(iuently to 1809. He had many opportunities, for, 
 as I have said, he could make himself more than agree- 
 able, and Napoleon, enjoying his society, revealed himself 
 to him. Recognising, as he records, all the great qualities 
 of Napoleon, his vivid intellect, his clear and precise con- 
 ceptive power, his love of action when his resolution was 
 taken, the directness of his aims and views, and yet his power 
 to modify them at any given moment, his marvellous in- 
 sight, the abstract justice of his mode of arguing, the fact 
 that he was never rooted to his own opinions when reason 
 could be shown on the other side, never influenced in public 
 affairs by afl'ection or by hatred ; he was keenly alive, on 
 the other hand, to his failings. He found hira full of 
 faults ; a gambler on a great scale, thinking of nothing 
 but to advance, reckoning alike on the weaknesses and
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 23 
 
 errors of his adversaries. It was the abuse of the last- 
 named habit in which Metternich recognised, even during 
 the time of his embassy to Paris, the charmed weapon 
 which, if Austria would but hold herself in readiness, could 
 be used with deadly effect against the Revolution and its 
 living incarnation ; which Austria did attempt to use in 
 1809, coming much nearer to success than the casual 
 reader would suppose ; and which she did wield with 
 triumphant result in 1813-4. 
 
 The triumph of Napoleon over Prussia had culminated 
 in the Peace of Tilsit and an agreement for future action 
 with the Czar. Almost from the day of his return to 
 Paris the Emperor began to set in motion the design he 
 had already conceived of replacing the Bourbons of Spain 
 by a member of his own family. The observations which 
 Metternich had been able to make at this period by means 
 of his intimacy with the several ambassadors at Paris had 
 convinced him that, to use his own phrase, " France had not 
 one friend in Europe." He did not foresee, no one at the 
 moment foresaw, the extent to which the projected occupa- 
 tion of Spain would swallow up the material, and weaken 
 the moral, resources of the conqueror. But, in his heart he 
 welcomed the new departure as likely to give to Austria 
 a larger and less scrutinised field for her preparations than 
 that which she could enjoy whilst Napoleon was in Paris 
 watching her every move. As time went on, and the 
 nature of the abyss — " the great Spanish ulcer," as he 
 called it at St. Helena — which Napoleon was preparing 
 for himself became clearer and clearer, the hopes which 
 Metternich had begun to entertain became stronger, the 
 preparations of Austria more decided. First, there came 
 as a great encouragement, the news of the catastrophe of 
 Baylen, 20th of July, 1808. Surely if a French army, com- 
 manded by a general of whom Napoleon had so hio-h an
 
 24 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 opinion that he was about to bestow upon hiui the staff of 
 a Marshal, could be forced to surrender by the despised 
 Spaniards, there must be hope for Austria. Napoleon 
 was travellino^ in the south of France when he heard 
 of Baylen. He had received shortly before warnings 
 regarding the intentions of Austria, and, knowing that the 
 news of Baylen would stimulate her to press forward her 
 preparations, he was very eager to return at once to 
 Paris, and demand explanations from jMetternich. But 
 he had announced that after visiting the southern depart- 
 ments he would proceed to La Vendee, and he was unr- 
 willing to make a change in his programme which might 
 be attributed to anxiety. He therefore continued his 
 journey to Rochefort and Rochelle, to Nantes and 
 Saumur ; was received everywhere with the greatest 
 enthusiasm. Thence he hurried to Paris, arriving there 
 on the eve of his/e^e, the night of the 14th of August. 
 
 The next day he received, with great ceremony, the 
 diplomatic corps. What happened at that reception has 
 been recorded by Metternich in his Autobiography in the 
 following acrid style : 
 
 " Just before noon the diplomatic corps was conducted 
 to the audience chamber. I took my usual place in the 
 circle, having Count Tolstoy on my right, the rest of the 
 diplomatic corps being arranged in a semicircle, in the 
 centre of which was the Emperor. After some minutes 
 of unusual silence Napoleon advanced towards me with 
 great solemnity. He stopped two feet in front of me and 
 addressed me in a loud voice and pompous tone : ' Well, 
 Sir Ambassador, what does the Emperor, your master, 
 want — does he intend to call me back to Vienna ? ' This 
 address did not disconcert me ; I answered him calmly, 
 and in no less elevated tones. Our conversation, the 
 longer it lasted, took, on Napoleon's side, more and more
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 25 
 
 the character of a public manifestation, Napoleon raising- 
 his voice, as he always did when he had the double end in 
 view of intimidating the person he was addressing, and of 
 making an effect on the rest of his hearers. I did not 
 alter my tone, and met his worthless arguments with the 
 weapon of irony. From time to time Napoleon appealed 
 to Count Tolstoy as a witness ; but when he observed that 
 the Count preserved an unbroken silence, he turned round, 
 breaking off in the middle of a sentence, and strode to the 
 Chapel without completing the round of the circle. This 
 scene lasted more than half an hour." 
 
 The termination of the Incident is curious, especially if 
 it be remembered that the instincts of Napoleon had led 
 him to a conclusion which was perfectly accurate, though 
 he did not possess the proofs, " As soon," continued 
 Metternich, " as Napoleon had left the audience-chamber, 
 all my colleagues thronged round me, to congratulate me 
 on having, as they said, given the Emperor a lesson. A 
 few hours afterwards I went to the hotel of Count Cham- 
 pagny, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who gave a great 
 banquet in honour of the day. On my entrance he said 
 to me he was ordered by his master, the Emperor, to assure 
 me that the scene at the audience had nothing personal 
 in it ; and that his master's intention had been merely to 
 explain the position. I assured the minister that I, too, 
 put the same construction on the incident ; and, for my 
 part, did not regret that the Emperor had given me an 
 opportunity to explain before assembled Europe what the 
 monarch whom I had the honour to represent wished, and 
 what he did not wish. " Europe," I continued, " will be 
 able to judge on which side reason and right are to be 
 found." Champagny made no answer. 
 
 Before I ask my readers to accept this narrative, I must 
 beg them to recollect that it is the narrative of one of the
 
 ^6 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 interested parties ; that it was written long after the date 
 of the events purported to be recorded, and that, inasmuch 
 as it exalts the narrator, and consigns to a ridiculous 
 position the great master of legions, it bears improbability 
 on its face. Fortunately we have another, and certainly 
 a more probable account of the same interview, written at 
 the time by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
 abridged for his readers by a historian who has occupied 
 the highest position in his own country. The memoirs of 
 Metternich are of great importance to history, for they 
 are the memoirs of an eye-witness. But, inasnmch as 
 many of those memoirs were written after he had 
 triumphed ; after his chief enemy had disappeared ; as, 
 moreover, there is much confusion in their arrangement, 
 and there are abundant proofs, one of which I shall shortly 
 notice, of their having been edited ; especially, moreover, 
 as they invariably glorify their author and depreciate the 
 several adversaries of the author ; — it is only right that the 
 traditional grain of salt should be at hand when they are 
 perused ; that, whenever o])portunity offer, they should 
 be tested. Now, I have set before the reader the account 
 given by Metternich of this famous interview ; I append 
 that recorded by M. Thiers, based on the memoir of 
 Champagny above referred to. 
 
 " Although Napoleon," he writes,* " resting on Russia, 
 would have nothing to fear from the Continent, yet the 
 determ.ination to transport a portion of the grand army 
 from the Vistula to the Ebro was so grave ; the displace- 
 ment of his forces from the north to the south might so 
 embolden his enemies, that he was resolved, before doing 
 it, to force Austria to explain herself, to know exactly 
 the view he ought to take of her. If she wanted war, he 
 would prefer to make it immediately, to make it with his 
 
 * Histoire du Consulat et de VEmpire, tome ix., p. 253.
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 27 
 
 full strength, without invoking even the aid of the Russians, 
 to finish for ever with her, to fall back then from the 
 Danube to the Pyrenees to subdue the Spaniards, and to 
 throw the EngHsh into the sea. But this was only an 
 extreme measure. He preferred not to have to wage a 
 new war. . . . Thus it was that, without wishing to pro- 
 voke Austria, he was bent on obtaining from her the 
 clearest explanations. 
 
 " Receiving the representatives of the Powers as well as 
 the principal officials of the Government, on the 15th 
 August, he seized the occasion to have with M. de 
 Metternich, not a passionate, aggressive explanation, such 
 as he had had with Lord Whitworth, and which had led 
 to war with England, but an explanation, calm, quiet, yet 
 peremptory. He showed himself courteous, even gracious, 
 with the ministers of all the Court, engaged with M. de 
 Tolstoy, although he had to complain of his military 
 follies ; friendly, frank, but pressing with M. de Metter- 
 nich. Without attracting the attention of those present 
 by the loudness of his voice, he yet spoke in a manner to 
 be heard by some of them, especially by M. de Tolstoy. 
 * Do you want to make war on us, or to frighten us ? ' 
 he said to M. de Metternich. M. de Metternich haviner 
 declared that his cabinet desired neither the one nor the 
 other, Napoleon replied at once, in a calm but positive 
 tone : ' Then why your armaments which agitate you, 
 which agitate Europe, which compromise peace, and ruin 
 your finances ? ' Receiving the assurance that these arma- 
 ments were purely defensive, Napoleon set himself, as 
 profoundly cognisant of the circumstances, to prove to 
 M. de Metternich that they were of quite another 
 character. " If your armaments," he said to him, 
 
 " were, as you pretend, purely defensive, they would bo less hurried. 
 "When one wants to create a new organisation, one takes time, one
 
 28 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 does not riisli at it, because one docs better that which one does slowly. 
 But one does not form magazines, one does not order the assembling of 
 troops, one does not buy horses, especially artillery horses. Your 
 army is nearly 400,000 strong ; your militia number probably almost as 
 many. If I were to imitate you, I should have to add 400,000 men to 
 my effective, and that would be a senseless armament. I have no 
 need to call out so many. Less than 200,000 conscripts will suffice to 
 maintain my grand army on a formidable footing, and to send 100,000 
 old troops into Spain. I shall not then follow your example, for in 
 that case it would soon become necessarj' to arm women and chil- 
 dren, and we should revert to a state of barbarism. But, meanwhile, 
 your finances suifer, your exchange, already low, is getting lower, and 
 your commerce is stopped. And for what ? Have I asked anything^ 
 of you? Have I laid claim to a single one of your provinces? The 
 treaty of Pressburg has smoothed all differences between the two 
 empires ; the word of your master, in the interview we had together, 
 ought to have terminated all dispute between the two sovereigns. 
 There remained only some arrangements to make on the subject of 
 Braunau, which remained in our hands ; on the subject of the Isonzo, 
 the road through the valley of which (Thalweg) had not been 
 sufficiently determined, but which has been settled by the convention 
 of Fontainebleau. I ask nothing of you, I deshe nothing of you but 
 friendly and peaceful relations. Are there any difficulties — is there 
 one single difficulty — between us? Let me know what it is, that it 
 may be settled at once." 
 
 " M. de Mettcrnich having again affirmed that his 
 Government was not dreaming of" attacking France, and 
 alleging as a proof that it had ordered no movement of 
 troops, Napoleon replied to him at once, with the same 
 calmness but with the same firmness, that he was in error ;. 
 that troops had been assembled in Galicia and in Bohemia, 
 on the borders of Silesia, in face of the quarters of the 
 French army ; that these massings could not be contested ; 
 that the immediate consequence would be to oppose to 
 them other massings not less considerable ; that instead of 
 completing the demolition of the strong places in Silesia, 
 he was going, now, to place some of them in a state of 
 repair, to arm and provision them, to call on the con- 
 tingents of the Confederation of the Rhine, and to
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 29 
 
 i-cplace everything' on a war footing. " I sliall not allow 
 them to take me by surprise, you know very well," he 
 added, 
 
 "I shall be always ready. You count, perhaps, on the Emperor of 
 Russia, and you deceive yourselves. I am sure of his adliesion, of the 
 formal disapprobation he has manifested on tlie subject of your arma- 
 ments, and of tlie resolution which he will take under the circumstances. 
 If I had any doubt, I would at once wage war on you and on him, for 
 1 do not intend to allow the situation of aflairs on the Continent to be 
 nit all doubtful. If I confiue myself to simple precautions, it is because 
 I am absolutely confident regarding tlie affairs of the Continent, 
 because I am completely so with respect to the Emperor of Russia. 
 Do not then indulge in the belief that the occasion is a good one to 
 attack France ; that would be a grave mistake ou your part. You do 
 not want war, M. de Metternich ; I believe that of you ; I believe 
 it of your Emperor, and of the enlightened men in your country. But 
 the German aristocracy, discontented with the changes which have 
 come about, is filling Germany with its hatreds. You allow yourselves 
 to be touched ; you communicate your emotion to the masses, pushing 
 them to arm. By degrees, arming and arming, you arrive at an extra- 
 ordinary situation, impossible to endure long ; and, by little and little, 
 you will be led to the i^oint when a crisis, a solution, becomes 
 tksirable, and this crisis, this solution, can only be war. Moral nature 
 and physical nature alike, when they arrive at the pent-up period 
 ■which precedes the storm, feel the need of an explosion to clear the 
 air, and to bring back calm. That is what I fear from your present 
 conduct. I repeat to you," added Napoleon, " I do not want anything 
 from you ; I ask for nothing but peace, peaceful and sure relations 
 with you ; but if you continue to make preparations, I also shall make 
 such as will ensure the superiority of my arms to as great an extent as 
 in preceding campaigns, and then, to preserve peace, we shall have 
 brought about war." 
 
 The reader will not fail to notice that whilst there is 
 not a word in this account inconsistent wdth the account 
 given by Metternich himself, there is absent from this the 
 impression which the other conveys that the attitude of 
 Metternich made the Emperor appear ridiculous. The 
 circumstances of the time lend credit to the idea that the 
 French record is absolutely true. Austria was resolved 
 at that very time to take advantage of the first tnrn in the
 
 30 LIFE OF PBINCE 3IETTEBNICR. 
 
 fortunes of Napoleon. Napoleon instinctively knew it. 
 He was on the eve of starting- for Erfurt to hold there 
 with the Emperor Alexander the interview which should 
 consolidate the alliance. From Erfurt he would proceed 
 in person to Spain, to finish with the risings and the 
 English intervention in that country. To attain such a 
 result he would naturally diminish largely his garrisons in 
 Germany ; and he foresaw, as Metternich and the Em- 
 peror Francis foresaw, that his own departure, and the 
 diminution of the army in Germany, would give a Power, 
 whose pride he had lowered, and who was thirsting for 
 revenge, opportunities which she might not be able to let 
 pass. Therefore on this solemn occasion, the day after 
 his return from La Vendee, a month only before his 
 departure for Erfurt, on his way, so to say, to Spain, 
 Napoleon solemnly warned Metternich, in the presence 
 of the whole diplomatic corps, that he was thoroughly 
 acquainted with the dispositions of the Austrian court, 
 and that a continuance of a policy such as that it was 
 pursuing could only lead to war. 
 
 Writing in his Autobiography of this period, Metternich 
 admits and justifies the course then pursued by Austria ; 
 and thus, in spite of himself, justifies also the course 
 adopted by Napoleon at this famous interview. Telling- 
 us that under the weight of the unhappy issue of the war 
 of 1805 Austria had collapsed ; that the Confederation of 
 the Rhine had taken the place of the German Empire ; 
 that Tirol had been given to Bavaria, and that the duchy 
 of Warsaw had been pushed in between Russia and 
 Austria ; that the peace of Tilsit had brought about an 
 alliance between Russia and France, " the twofold object 
 of which was the silent assent of the former Power to the 
 attacks of the latter, and the partition of the Ottoman 
 Empire between the two, adjusted on the supposition of
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 31 
 
 its impending fall," he adds this confession : " Austria, 
 therefore, was not in a position in which she could possibly 
 maintain herself." 
 
 Then peeps out the fear, which subsequent events 
 proved to have been utterly unsubstantial, but which 
 pervaded the Court of Vienna, and inspired all its action : 
 *' Napoleon was so convinced of it that he looked upon 
 Austria as a prize in prospect for one of his new German 
 allies." The justification of Napoleon's warning of the 
 15th August follows : 
 
 " Not only, then, was the renewal of war in the nature of things, but 
 it was for our Empire an absolute condition of its existence. The 
 question was to imy mind settled. But the points which remained, 
 and, in my view, required ripe consideration, were, the choice of the 
 right moment for beginning the war, and the settling of the plan of 
 operation." 
 
 Here we have the keynote to the policy of Metter- 
 nich during the entire period of his embassy to Paris. 
 It was to cover, to conceal, to hide from view, the 
 preparations for war made by Austria ; to foment, as we 
 shall see later on, discontent and intrigue against the 
 French Emperor in Paris ; to knit friendly and confiden- 
 tial relations with foreign ministers, notably, as we shall 
 also see, with the Russian ambassador, for the same 
 purpose; to watch for the most favourable opportunity 
 for the commencement of hostilities. 
 
 Napoleon reached Erfurt the 27th September. The 
 Court of Vienna was represented there by Baron Vincent. 
 The Russian ambassador at Paris, Count Tolstoy, whose 
 sympathies were strongly allied to those of Metternich, 
 went thither also to meet his sovereign. Metternich, 
 whose repeated solicitation to be allowed to accompany 
 Napoleon had been refused, remained at Paris. From 
 that city he kept up a correspondence with his friends at
 
 32 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICR. 
 
 Erfurt, Tolstoy and Vincent. These, not well Informed 
 themselves, responded as best they could. But, either 
 their reports were faulty, or the conclusions which he 
 drew from them did no credit to his prescience. He de- 
 clared his belief that the interview was " a trap laid for 
 the Russian monarch on the part of the French Emperor." 
 The " trap," if laid at all, was laid, not by Napoleon, but 
 by Alexander. It was he who, in his many conversations 
 with the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. de 
 Caulaincourt, first expressed his ardent desire, for a fresh 
 interview as soon as possible, 2^our nous entendre, et 
 maitriser VEuroj^e." * 
 
 Despite all his efforts Metternich was unable to dis- 
 cover the secrets of the conference at Erfurt. Four persons 
 alone were present at the political discussions which had 
 taken place there : Napoleon and his Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, M. de Champagny ; Alexander and the Chan- 
 cellor of the Empire, M. de Romanzoff. To the Austrian 
 minister, Baron Vincent, no confidences were made, and 
 when he complained, he was told that as Austria was 
 arming, for a ])urpose which she declined to explain, it 
 was impossible to take her into the confidence of two 
 monarchs of whom she might at any moment declare 
 herself the enemy. It may safely be concluded, then, 
 that during the continuance of the conference, Metternich 
 obtained no reliable evidence regarding the matters 
 discussed there. On that subject his Autobiography is 
 virtually a blank. 
 
 Returning to him in Paris, we find that on the 30th of 
 that month he wa-ote to Count Stadion that 
 
 "tlic return of General de Vincent must have secured for his Imperial 
 Majesty full information as to the conference at Erfurt and the turn 
 
 * Thiers, ix. 269.
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 33 
 
 ■whicli matters have taken there. I have the less hurried to send off 
 this courier that I might be able to tell your Excellency of the return 
 of the Emperor to his capital and his departure for Bayonne, for which 
 place he started yesterday afternoon." 
 
 Napoleon, in foct, had quitted Erfurt the 14th Octoher ; 
 reached St. Cloud the 18th ; made all his arrangements 
 to finish with Spain ; and had set out for Bayonne the 
 29th. Six days before this departure he had received the 
 diplomatic corps, when, towards Metternich personally, he 
 had, by the admission of that ambassador, shown great 
 politeness. 
 
 During the Emperor's absence Metternich renewed his 
 intimacy with Count Tolstoy, and his acquaintance with 
 the Russian Chancellor, Count RomanzofF. The latter 
 he describes as "having been caught in the nets of 
 Napoleon," which is as much as to say that he repre- 
 sented, at that period, the views of his master, the Czar. 
 Metternich became, too, intimate with Talleyrand, who, 
 towards the end of 1808, had begun to use his vast 
 faculty for intrigue to undermine Napoleon — a purpose 
 he adhered to steadfastly till it had been accomplished. 
 Jt can easily be conceived how, in this man, Metternich 
 found a congenial spirit ; how he revelled in the revela- 
 tions, true or false, which Talleyrand made to him of his 
 secret interviews with Alexander at Erfurt. Recording 
 his impressions of an interview with that faithless in- 
 triguer at this period, Metternich thus writes in a memo- 
 randum he drew up at the close of the year : 
 
 "The first day of his arrival (at Erfurt) Talleyrand presented 
 himself to the Emperor Alexander, and said to him the memorable 
 ■words : ' Sire, what are you going to do here ? It rests with you to 
 save Europe, and you can only accomplish this by resisting Napoleon. 
 The French people are civilised, its sovereign is not; the sovereign of 
 Eussia is civilised, and his people arc not; it is therefore for the 
 eovercigu of Russia to be allied with the French people.' " 
 
 D
 
 34 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 In another interview he stated that he had said to him r 
 " The Ehine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, are the conquests of 
 France. The rest are the conquests of the Emperor of 
 France, and we shall not hold them." Talleyrand, who 
 had always been a supporter of the Austrian alliance, 
 further told Metternich, on his return to Paris from 
 Erfurt, " that since the battle of Austerlitz the relations 
 of Alexander with Austria have not been more favour- 
 able ; " and, again, that Napoleon's ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg, Caulaincourt, was entirely devoted to his — 
 Talleyrand's — point of view, and had been instructed to 
 second all the steps of the Austrian ambassador, Prince 
 Schwarzenberg. 
 
 Full of hopes inspired by his conversation with this 
 man and others like him, who, whilst wearing the livery 
 of the Empire, were doing their best to undermine it, 
 Metternich applied for, and was granted, leave to proceed 
 to Vienna. He arrived there the 10th November,* and 
 at once saw Count Stadion, the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. From him he learnt that Austria was far nearer 
 to war than he had thought when he left Paris. Met- 
 ternich entered with his whole heart into the scheme, the 
 innermost secrets of which were then revealed to him. 
 The day following he saw the Emperor. From a con- 
 versation which lasted several hours with Francis he came 
 to the conclusion that whilst there was no difference of 
 opinion between the Emperor and his Cabinet as to the 
 necessity of war — a conclusion which amply justified the 
 prevision of Napoleon — the former was not so decided as 
 tlie latter as to the right moment for waging it. The 
 interview ended with a request made by Francis to his 
 ambassador at the French Court that he would examine 
 
 * In his Autobiof^rapliy he slates " 10th of October," but that is 
 evidently a mispriiit ; Metternich was in Paris all October.
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 35 
 
 the question thoroughly, and assist the cabinet with his 
 advice. 
 
 Of all tasks this was the most congenial to Metternich. 
 Hating, as he did — we cannot too often repeat it — the 
 Revolution and its offspring, the Napoleonic system ; 
 believing that that system was personified in one man, 
 and that it required only his humiliation to cause it to 
 fall ; that, moreover, it lay in the power, and that it was 
 the duty, of re-strengthened Austria to ensure that 
 humiliation by choosing the opportune moment to strike 
 a blow with all her force ; he felt that the request of his 
 sovereign had vested him with power to decide the 
 selection of that opportune moment. Francis would no 
 longer resist the Cabinet if Metternich could show that 
 the policy of the Cabinet was based on reason ; the 
 Cabinet would yield to Francis if Metternich could lay 
 before it a justification of the views of Francis. 
 
 In this spirit Metternich began his task. It resulted 
 in three memoranda addressed to the Emperor Francis. 
 In these he entered very fully into the relative conditions 
 of France and Austria at the time, 1806, when he 
 proceeded as ambassador to Paris ; showed how the 
 Peace of Pressburg had undermined the last rampart of 
 the independence of Europe, and caused even the people 
 of Germany to believe that Austria's safety was only to 
 be found in a close alliance with France, or, at least, in a 
 system of the strictest neutrality ; that few statesmen had 
 then realised that " fi'iendship and neutrality " are two 
 words void of meaning to Napoleon ; that the campaigns 
 of 1806-7 proved, however, that the part of a neutral 
 was not less difficult to sustain than that of an enemy ; 
 that even before the close of that campaign Napoleon 
 had prepared the destruction of Spain ; that the resolu- 
 tion thus to destroy " the oldest, the most tried, the most 
 
 D 2
 
 36 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 disinterested of the allies, not only of Napoleon, but of 
 all preceding Governments of France, must prove to the 
 world that friendship is unavailing to preserve any 
 Power, if that Power cross the path of the Emperor of 
 the French." * 
 
 This being the preamble, the demonstration that the 
 part of enemy, the part of neutral, the part of friend, 
 were all equally powerless to save a continental nation 
 from the devouring ambition of Napoleon, Metternich 
 proceeded to argue that the only chance of being able to 
 shake off a yoke, which in any one of its three diverse 
 forms was intolerable, was to watch the opportunity 
 when the dominant Power should be hampered by one of 
 the schemes into which its insatiable ambition would 
 certainly draw it, and then, having meanwhile prepared, 
 to strike. Such an opportunity, he proceeded, was now 
 approaching. " Providence determines the limits of 
 every usurping Power. Spain was called to save 
 Europe ; yet," he added, " these chances, too, would 
 have passed in vain, if we had waited for them to occur 
 before taking up the only attitude proper to us." 
 
 Proceeding to prove, then, that France was tired of 
 fighting ; that the wars she was waging were not her 
 wars, but simply the wars of her ruler ; that a strong 
 party was forming in France, guided by men of the 
 intellectual strength and calibre of Talleyrand and 
 
 * In the Autdbiorjra'pluj of Prince Metternich the memoirs from which 
 the summary in tlic text has been made are thus lioiidcd : '' Two 
 memoirs by Metternich, drawn up in Vienna, December 4, 1808." 
 Upon this I desire to remark that though it is jjossible they may havrt' 
 been written in outline in tliat year, they contain internal evidence that 
 they ■were considerably touched up afterwards. Thus, referring to the 
 action of Napoleon in establishing the two Spanish princes, Ferdinand 
 and Carlos, at Valen9ay, the property of Talleyrand, the memoir adds : 
 " where they lived at the expense of the proprietor, till the day when 
 their House was restored." Their House was restored in 1814. Yet.
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 37 
 
 Fouche, to oppose the destructive plans of the Emperor, 
 and to bring- back peace on terms consistent with the 
 well-being of the nations of Europe ; that the interview 
 at Erfurt had been arranged by Napoleon with the 
 express object of persuading the Czar to take active 
 measures against Austria whilst he and his army should 
 be engaged in Spain; that, owing to the energetic 
 administration of the heads cf the departments, Austria 
 was now ready or nearly ready for war ; that Napoleon's 
 war with Spain had divulged the fact that he had but one 
 army, the Grande Armee, which had fought under his 
 command in 1805, 18U6, 1807; that that army had 
 suffered serious losses in Spain, that, deducting those 
 losses and the other troops he had sent to that country, 
 he could not put into the field against Austria more than 
 206,000 men, of whom only 107,000 would be French ; 
 that the war with Spain would exhaust him far more than 
 his contests with Germany, the conditions of warfare in 
 that country being much less favourable to an invader ; 
 Metternich inquired, only that he might answer the 
 inquiry in the negative, whether Napoleon could abandon 
 Spain in order that he might bring all his forces against 
 Austria. He arrived, then, at the conclusion that under 
 the most favourable circumstances for Napoleon, his 
 forces would be weakened by more than 120,000 men 
 necessary for the occupation of the Peninsula ; and that, 
 thus, " the forces of Austria, so inferior to those of France 
 before the insurrection in Spain, will be at least equal to 
 them after that event." 
 
 as I have said, the memoir bears the date of ISOS. Tliroughout the 
 Autobiograpliy there runs a coincidence of advice with accomplished 
 events, which, with such a proof of editing as I have given, ought to 
 make the reader suspect the prescience which Metternich claims for 
 himself.
 
 38 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICR. 
 
 But it was not upon Austria alone that her statesmen 
 at that period counted. Count Stadion and his colleagues 
 reckoned much on the strong antagonism to French 
 domination which had risen, and was daily increasing, in 
 North Germany ; they were hopeful, too, that if they 
 could gain a first striking success in the field, Bavaria 
 might rememher that she was, after all, a German power ; 
 and that, under the same circumstances, even the Czar 
 mif^ht return to his old alliances. Metternich did not 
 share those views. Austria must, he said, indulge in no 
 illusions; she must trust to herself alone. His opinion 
 was shared by the illustrious prince to whom Austria was 
 about to entrust the command in chief of her armies, the 
 Archduke Charles. ]\Ieanwhile, the o])posing ideas, 
 which I may call the ideas of the Cabinet, were being 
 acted upon. It was only at the last moment that the 
 opinion of the Archduke and of Metternich prevailed, 
 and the military plans were modified accordingly. The 
 fatal result of divided counsels, and of completely 
 changing the military plan within a short time of the 
 breaking out of hostilities was manifested at the moment 
 when Austria, a fortnight too early, decided the question 
 of peace or war, by seizing the person of the bearer of the 
 French despatches. 
 
 Metternich was engaged in stimulating the preparations 
 of Austria, when information reached Vienna that Napoleon 
 had quitted his army when in pursuit of the English, and 
 that he was on his way to Paris. Knowing the speed at 
 which the Emperor travelled, and that his own absence 
 from Paris when Napoleon should arrive there might 
 precipitate matters, Metternich made immediate prepara- 
 tions to return thither. The winter was a severe one, 
 but in spite of the rigour of the season, he travelled day 
 and night, and reached Paris early on the morning of the
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 39 
 
 1st January (1809). Napoleon had not arrived, but 
 the Empress held a reception, and this the Austrian 
 ambassador attended. He was cordially welcomed 
 by the several members of the Government — with 
 whom, as well, let it always be remembered, as with 
 the Imperial family, he was a great favourite — for his 
 return dissipated the apprehensions which some among 
 them had begun to feel regarding the cause of his 
 prolonged absence. He found public opinion in Paris 
 excited and rather depressed about Spain. An inter- 
 view which he had with the Foreign Minister, M. de 
 Champagny, afforded him no information on any subject. 
 But, though the utterances of the minister were of the 
 vaguest character, Metternich could read under them the 
 earnest personal desire of Champagny for the main- 
 tenance of peace. In his despatch to Count Stadion, 
 dated a few days later, 11th January, however, he stated 
 that, from the frontiers of Austria to the centre of Paris, 
 he found but one conviction prevailing, and that was that, 
 by the coming spring, at latest, Austria would take the 
 field against France. Those who thus reasoned, he 
 continued, base their opinion on the fact that Napoleon 
 was occupied at a distance of 600 leagues from the 
 frontiers of Austria ; that the greater part of his forces 
 were directed to that distant point; that Austria was 
 strong and ready for war ; that Russia might be induced 
 to change her system, and join Austria ; and that the 
 increasing impatience of French domination might lead 
 the North German people to follow the same course. 
 
 On the 16th January, Metternich saw Talleyrand. 
 The interview was long and interesting, leaving, as it did, 
 no doubt on the mind of the Austrian that the discarded 
 Foreign Minister was plotting against his master. The 
 reader will recollect how the Austrian ambassador had
 
 40 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 reported to the Emperor Francis the advice pressed upon- 
 the Czar by Talleyrand at Erfurt ; he heard him now utter 
 similar sentiments. In his despatch to Count Stadion,, 
 dated 17th January, reporting this interview, he says, 
 referring to a previous report on the same subject : " I 
 do not know how to add to what I sent by my last 
 courier about M. de Talleyrand. I see him, and his 
 friend Fouche, always the same — very decided to seize 
 an opportunity, if one offer, but not having sufficient 
 courage to make one." It is clear from the tone of this 
 despatch that the position of the French army in Spain, 
 and the uncertainty regarding Napoleon himself, had 
 inspired Metternich with the absolute conviction that the 
 Austrian projects would, if vigorously carried out at the 
 right moment, have a great cliance of success. 
 
 On the night of the 22nd, Napoleon arrived. He had 
 made a remarkable quick journey, having taken only six 
 days from Valladolid to Paris. From the former to 
 Burgos he had ridden the whole way. On the 24th he 
 received the ambassadors at a diplomatic audience. A 
 fresh outburst against Austria had been expected; but 
 the expectants were at fault. The Emperor addressed 
 Metternich a few commonplace words on his first round, 
 and not at all on the second. 
 
 It goes far to prove how completely Metternich had — 
 to use a vulgar but expressive term — " taken in " Na- 
 poleon, that, despite his secret machinations, the private 
 relations of the Austrian ambassador with the Emperor 
 and the Imperial family were never more friendly than at 
 this period. "Napoleon continued," writes Metternich, 
 "to treat me with his customary kindness. ... If the 
 Paris })ublic judged from my relations to the ('ourt, it 
 must have been difficult for it to believe in the impending 
 outbreak of a new war \\ ith Austria." This circumstance-
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 41 
 
 tends to show that, even at this period, Napoleon desired 
 to avert the hostilities on which, he was well aware, 
 Austria and her ambassador were alike bent. The 
 Chancellor of the Russian Empire, M. de RomanzofF, had 
 accompanied Napoleon from Erfurt to Paris, and during 
 the Emperor's visit to Spain, he had remained at that 
 city. He was one of the men whom Metternich had 
 failed to seduce. He believed in Napoleon, and, in 
 common with many others, thought that Austria would, if 
 she were to declare war, rush upon her doom. Napoleon, 
 immediately after his return, spoke to this Minister with 
 perfect frankness on the subject. " It would seem," he 
 said to him and to others whom he trusted, " that the 
 waters which wash the walls of Vienna are the waters of 
 Lethe and not the waters of the Danube. ... I do not 
 desire war with Austria ; I have no interests to serve by 
 such a war ; all my efforts are directed to the field of 
 battle which England has chosen, that is, Spain. But, 
 unless she disarm, I shall have to make upon her a war 
 of destruction." A few days later, wishing to prove to 
 the Russian ]\Iinister the sincerity of his desire for peace,, 
 the Emperor requested him to communicate with the 
 Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg his proposal to offer 
 to the Emperor of Austria the joint guarantee of France 
 and Russia for the maintenance of his actual dominions. 
 Foreseeing, nevertheless, that Austria would neither 
 disarm nor accept his guarantee, he made preparations for 
 every possible danger by calling out 80,000 men of the 
 reserves ; then, in order to warn Austria that he was 
 prepared at all points for any movement she might make, 
 he ordered the division Dupas from the shores of the 
 Baltic to Magdeburg, replacing at the same time by 
 Polish-Saxon troops the detachments of French troops at 
 Dantzig, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. He ordered
 
 42 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 Marshal Davout to march from Saxony into Franconia, 
 to fix his headquarters at Wurzburg, and to send a division 
 to occupy Bayreuth. He directed General Oudinot to 
 obtain the consent of the King of Bavaria to his march 
 from Hanau to Augsburg ; whilst he despatched the 
 divisions Carra Saint-CJyr and Legrand from the environs 
 of Paris to Metz ; the divisions Boudet and Molitor from 
 Lyons to Strasburg. To the commanders of the various 
 corps in Italy, he also sent instructions so to dispose their 
 troops as to be ready to meet any demonstration on the 
 part of Austria. To obtain, likewise, accurate informa- 
 tion as to the location of the several Austrian corps, he 
 directed his ambassador at Vienna, General Andreossy, 
 to apply for permission to visit Paris, and, on his journey 
 thither, to take the route of the centres where, it was 
 probable, he would have the opportunity of obtaining 
 information on that head. 
 
 But Austria had gone too far to retire now, and the 
 movements of French troops, far from frightening her, 
 only roused in her the conviction that she must strike 
 immediately if she would win. Her agents had been 
 busy in Tirol, which had been transferred to Bavaria by 
 the Peace of Pressburg, and Tirol was ready to rise. 
 Delay in that quarter was impossible. The army had 
 been thoroughly reorganised, and was on a war footing. 
 The Landwehr had been created to serve as a reserve, 
 and was thoroughly organised. Enns had been strongly 
 fortified to guard against a hostile advance from the side 
 of Bavaria ; Briick-on-the-Mur, to protect Vienna on the 
 side of Italy; and Koniorn, to serve as a point of retreat 
 and rallying in Hungary. The Archduke Charles had 
 ready in hand for immediate hostilities an army 300,000 
 stronf, with reserves numberinij 200,000. 
 
 Meanwhile Metternich remained at Paris. He received,
 
 TEE EMBASSY TO PABIS. 43 
 
 he says, "no instructions from Vienna," probably because 
 the Emperor Francis, knowing that he was secretly 
 aware of the intentions of his Court, considered that he 
 would be better able to play his part if he were left 
 perfectly untrammelled. Naturally enough, he records 
 in his Autobiography, he regarded war as certain. He 
 knew it because his Court had, on his reports, finally 
 resolved upon it. He gathered much, too, there can be 
 no doubt, from the studied reserve of Napoleon. Whilst 
 he was cordially received in the Imperial circle, the 
 Emperor and the members of his family never broached 
 to him the subject of the political situation. The Em- 
 peror was, it would seem, deceived to the very last in 
 the character of Metternich. Fatally for himself, as was 
 proved in 1813, he never realised the intense personal 
 and political hatred which Metternich felt for his system, 
 and for himself as the corner-stone and sole support of it. 
 To crush that system, or rather to accumulate means 
 whereby it might be crushed, had been the one object of 
 Metternich's embassy, and was to continue the one object 
 of his life till it had been accomplished. Napoleon failed 
 to read that inscrutable face. He was deceived to the 
 last by that courtly and impressive manner. 
 
 Matters were still unsettled when the answer of 
 Alexander to the proposal of a joint guarantee reached 
 Paris. He preferred, he said, to deal with Austria direct. 
 There can be no doubt but that Alexander was most 
 desirous to prevent the outbreak of a war between France 
 and Austria. He preferred, he said, to act alone, be- 
 cause an Emperor could be more yielding, more able to 
 yield with a good grace, than two ambassadors. " Let 
 me act and speak," he said to Caulaincourt, " if war can 
 be avoided, I will avoid it." Napoleon agreed at once 
 to this proposal, and despatched to the Czar a secret
 
 44 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 authority to promise, not only the double guarantee, but 
 the complete evacuation of the territory of the Confedera- 
 tion of the Rhine, that is to say, the withdrawal of the 
 French troops from Germany.* 
 
 Alexander made, then, the proposal to the Austrian 
 ambassador at his Court, Prince Schwarzenberg. He 
 told him frankly that peace was a necessity to him to- 
 carry out certain plans which he had at heart, and that he 
 would employ all his forces against that power, whichever 
 it might be, which should embroil Europe in war. The 
 report of this conversation had the effect the exact opposite 
 of that it was intended to produce. Austria had, I have 
 already said, gone too far, and, still hoping that a first 
 success would change the dispositions of Alexander, she 
 sent orders to her troops to march, and to Metternich to 
 inform the Foreign Minister at Paris that, in conse- 
 quence of the demonstrations made by Napoleon since 
 his return to Paris, she had been obliged to place her 
 forces on a war footing. Champagny replied in a sar- 
 castic tone, stating that to bring an army from a peace 
 to a war footing was the work of six months ; that the 
 Emperor had not been deceived ; that he had long known 
 of Austria's preparations ; that he was prepared ; and 
 that if the war were to result disastrously for Austria, it 
 would not be his fault. After some further conversation 
 the two ministers separated, each convinced that war was 
 inevitable. 
 
 Napoleon would have preferred peace for many reasons. 
 If there had been no other, there was this all-important 
 one, that all his best troops were in Spain. Seeing, 
 however, that Austria was bent on war, he pushed 
 forward his preparations to wage it with effect. What 
 these were it does not come within the scope of this book 
 ♦ Hidoire du Consulat et de V Empire, tome x., pp. 78, 79.
 
 THE EMBASSY TO PARIS. 45 
 
 to relate. It must suffice to record that, in the first week 
 of April, the Austrians seized, at Braunau, a French 
 officer, the bearer of despatches from the French lega- 
 tion in Vienna to their legation in Munich. Furious at 
 this breach of the law of nations, Napoleon ordered, as 
 a reprisal, the immediate arrest of all Austrian couriers 
 within reach. On the 10th April the Archduke Charles 
 crossed the Inn — at the time, his Rubicon. On the 
 night of the 14th Napoleon quitted Paris to join his 
 army. On the morning of the loth Metternich received 
 a message from Champagny telling him that he had 
 orders to give him his passports, but that, until an 
 exchange of the personnel of the embassy should have 
 been effected, he would not be allowed to leave Paris. 
 He remained there for about six weeks, enjoying the 
 pleasures of society just as though there had been no 
 rupture between the two countries. On the 16th May, 
 Fouche wrote to him that, in consequence of the orders of 
 the Emperor, he had to request him to go to Vienna, 
 there to be exchanged for the personnel of the French 
 embassy. He quitted Paris the 26th, and, travelling by 
 Luneville, where he heard that the French had lost a 
 decisive battle, referring to Aspern; and by Strasburg — 
 where he saw the Empress Josephine, who, he found, 
 fully believed in the report as to the issue of the battle, 
 and went so far as to express her belief that Metternich 
 might possibly meet Napoleon returning to France — he 
 reached Vienna the 5th June.
 
 4G LIFE OF FBINCE METTEBNICH, 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 FKOM THE WAE OF 1809 TO THE EETKEAT FKOM 
 
 MOSCOW. 
 
 1S09-1812. 
 
 Vienna was occupied by the French. The bulk of their 
 army was massed in the Isle of Lobau, whence it was to 
 issue just one month later to fight the battle of Wagram. 
 It could not be expected that Napoleon, smarting under 
 the repulse of Aspern, or, as the French call it, of 
 Essling — a battle which might have cost him half his 
 army, if, in the very crisis of it, the Archduke Charles, 
 who commanded the Austrians, had not been paralysed 
 by a nervous attack, which, for three hours, deprived him 
 of the use of his faculties — would grant any favour to an 
 Austrian minister whilst the French diplomatic agent, 
 seized before the outbreak of the war, should remain a 
 prisoner. Accordingly, on the morning of the 7th, Met- 
 ternich was invited to take up his quarters in a country- 
 house belonging to his mother, at Griinberg, a mile and 
 a half from Vienna, and close to the garden of Schon- 
 brunn. He proceeded thither, with his effects, the fol- 
 lowing morninw. In the interval he had had time and 
 opportunity to notice, he says, that public spirit had been 
 aroused in Vienna by the result of the two days' battle of
 
 THE WAB OF 1809. 47 
 
 Essling, and that the French had lost confidence. Cham- 
 pagny, indeed, with whom he dhied the evening of the 
 6th, told him that the Emperor was " in a good humour " 
 as to the result of the campaign. It was but natural, 
 nevertheless, that the real author of the war should, 
 after the battle already fought, indulge in hope as to the 
 issue of the campaign, and it is certain that at this period 
 that supreme consoler in times of difficulty and danger 
 was the constant companion of the ex-ambassador. 
 
 A few days after he had installed himself at Griinberg^ 
 Metternich received a visit from General Savary, a man 
 whom he knew to be in the confidence of Napoleon, and 
 employed when the Emperor particularly desired to bring 
 about a given result. It soon appeared that the aim of 
 Savary was to persuade the Austrian statesman to enter, 
 as it were casually, the garden of Schonbrunn, which was 
 but a step from his own, for the purpose of encountering 
 Napoleon. Savary added that the Emperor was in the most 
 peaceful disposition, and that a meeting between the two 
 might result in his being commissioned to convey an im- 
 portant message to the Emperor Francis. It would appear 
 from Metternich's version of this incident that he repulsed 
 the proposal of his visitor, somewhat haughtily, " with a stiff 
 upper lip." It was a salve to his pride to regard himself 
 as a prisoner at Griinberg. He concluded, then, his 
 conversation with Savary with this repelling remark : 
 " I have nothing to say to your master, and nothing to 
 hear from him. I am practically a prisoner, and prisoners 
 of my kind consider themselves, if they do their duty, 
 as dead." It was clear that hope was strong within him, 
 for he similarly refused an overture of the same charac- 
 ter made to him by Champagny, because, we gather 
 from his Autobiography, he saw that Napoleon shrank 
 from the risk of another battle, whilst he himself liopetJ
 
 48 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 everything from a second meeting of the two armies, and 
 would do nothing which might prevent it. 
 
 Metternich, then, did not see Napoleon at Vienna. 
 On the 2Gth June he left Griinberg under an escort to 
 be exchanged against the French officer who had been 
 seized and detained by the Austrian Government. The 
 exchange was to take place at Acs, in Hungary, beyond 
 Pressburg, a little place which had been declared neutral 
 for the purpose. Metternich relates an incident of the 
 journey thither, which, for the moment, he did not pro- 
 bably find amusing. " Opposite the place where, near to 
 Gonyo," he writes, " the high road runs along the banks 
 of the Danube, an Austrian battery had been erected. 
 The officer in command of it, when he saw a train of 
 carriages coming forward, guarded by a strong escort, 
 thought it must be the retinue of the Viceroy of Italy, 
 and fired a volley at once. Although the zeal was 
 misplaced, I could not but do justice to the skill of our 
 artillerymen. Of the first two shots one went through 
 the w heel of my carriage, the other passed two feet above 
 the roof of it. Upon this, my escort left the high road, 
 and took me as quickly as might be across the fields." 
 
 Metternich was exchanged at Acs on the 2nd July, 
 three days before the battle of Wagram began. He is 
 not sufficiently candid to admit that his detention, such as 
 it was, was due entirely to the action of his own Govern- 
 ment in seizing the French oflScer with despatches before 
 the declaration of war, and keeping him a prisoner until 
 he could be exchanged. In the minds of the authors 
 of the Holy Alliance a deed, good or bad, changed its 
 <:haracter according as whether the perpetrator was 
 Napoleon or one of themselves. The one could do no 
 good, the others could do no wrong. 
 
 On the evening of the ord (July), he reached Wolkers-
 
 THE WAB OF 1809. 49 
 
 (lorf, a little villa,2:e some fifteen miles from Vienna, on 
 the road to Briinn, and the headquarters of the Emperor 
 Francis. He saw the Emperor the same evening, found 
 him "quiet and firm as ever, penetrated with the 
 difficulty of the situation," daily expecting- an event 
 decisive of the " war." Francis, who had been eagerly 
 expecting Metternich, informed him that he intended to 
 keep him with him during the remainder of the campaign. 
 Metternich then visited Count Stadion, whom he found 
 in the depths of despondency. 
 
 The day of July the 4th was spent by both sides in 
 preparations for the impending battle. The following 
 day it began. " On the morning of July 5," writes 
 Metternich, " I joined the Emperor on the battlefield on 
 which the fate of the Empire was to be decided. The 
 battle was soon general, and we did not return to 
 Wolkersdorf till nightfall, amid the blazing buildings 
 which covered the Marchfeld. When we repaired to 
 our post of observation in the grey of the early morning 
 of the next day, we witnessed the apparently decisive 
 result of the right wing of our army. About one o'clock 
 in the afternoon, however. Count Colloredo, a general- 
 adjutant of the Archduke, came with the information to 
 the Emperor, that his Imperial Highness had ordered 
 the retreat of the army. AVithout losing his self-posses- 
 sion, the Emperor asked the messenger whether the 
 Archduke had only determined on the retreat, or whether 
 it had already commenced. When the Emperor heard 
 that the army was in full retreat, he said to the adju- 
 tant, * Very well,' and, turning to me, added, ' We shall 
 have much to retrieve.' His Majesty gave immediate 
 orders to remove his headquarters to Znaim." 
 
 The battle of Wagram, won by Napoleon chiefly be- 
 cause the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais, obeyed 
 
 E
 
 50 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNlCn. 
 
 Iiis orders and joined him with the army which had been 
 operating in Italy, whereas the commander of the Austrian 
 forces opposed to liim, the Archduke John, did not obey 
 his brother's orders to join him, but remained idle at 
 Pressburg while the battle was raging, was, in no sense, 
 a decisive battle. The Austrians were forced to retreat, 
 but the retreat never became a rout ; they lost no cannon, 
 and their army, if it had fallen back upon Hungary or 
 Moravia, and taken up that of the Archduke John, would 
 have been very capable of prolonging the war, and of 
 making its opponent, compelled to move further and 
 further from his base, feel more and more strongly every 
 day the insecurity of his position. Of this no one was 
 more sensible than Napoleon. Spain was engulfing his 
 best troops ; he had in front of him an army which, though 
 beaten, was equal in numbers to his own ; whilst around 
 him he had a seething Germany, ready, as the events of 
 1813 proved, to rise en masse against him, should it 
 appear that Fortune had abandoned him. His clear, 
 penetrating, mind read the situation in all its bearings, 
 and he determined, by the means at his disposal, to force 
 peace on the Emperor Francis. 
 
 That sovereign, on the other hand, ought, in his own 
 interest and in the interest of his people, to have insisted, 
 as, in similar circumstances, Alexander insisted in 1812, 
 on the continuance of the war. It is due to the Austrian 
 Emperor to admit that he recognised the wisdom of 
 such a course ; but he was liable to be despondent, to 
 act upon impulse. He had, however, by his side, a man 
 who recognised the situation almost as clearly as did 
 Napoleon, and who, at the moment, occupied the position 
 which would enable him to give effect to his convictions. 
 For, on the morrow at Wagram, Count Stadion, the 
 Foreign Minister who had prematurely begun the war,
 
 THE WAR OF 1809. 51 
 
 resigned his office. He was actually, though not at the 
 moment nominally, succeeded in it by Metternich, who had 
 gained the confidence of his master by his services at 
 Paris, and who kept it to the last hour of the Emperor's 
 life. The selection, under the circumstances, was a 
 specially happy one, for Metternich had made of the 
 character of Napoleon a study, and his keen, cold, and 
 unimpassioned intellect had recognised its strong and its 
 weak points alike. He was resolved that, so far as he 
 could influence events, there should be no humiliating 
 peace — that is, no peace which should weaken Austria as 
 Prussia had been weakened ; that, rather, the war should 
 be continued until, from alarm at his isolated position and 
 the events surging around him, the French Emperor 
 should be forced to retreat. Then, when he should have 
 evacuated Austrian territory, Metternich would treat for 
 a peace which should be solid. 
 
 But events were too strong for Metternich. He could 
 not command the army, and the Archduke Charles, who 
 did command it, committed at this period one of those 
 mistakes which, in war, is almost always irretrievable. 
 Instead of retreating, after Wagram, upon Hungary — a 
 retreat which would have drawn to him the army of his 
 brother John, assured to him all the resources of that 
 fertile country, and drawn the French dangerously far 
 from their base — or upon Moravia, he chose to fall back 
 into Bohemia, the very line which Napoleon himself would 
 have prescribed to him had he had a voice in the matter. 
 For a short interval the French generals, sent to pursue 
 the Austrian army, were puzzled as to the line the enemy 
 had taken, there being some indications that a portion 
 of their troops were trending towards Moravia. The 
 sagacity or the happy inspiration of Marmont solved the 
 doubt. Certain indications produced in the mind of that 
 
 E 2
 
 52 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 general the conviction that Znaim would prove the 
 covering angle of the retreat. Upon Znaim, then, despite 
 every temptation to pursue another route — and these were' 
 not wanting — Marmont unhesitatingly pressed ; estab- 
 lished himself in front of the Austrian corps occupying 
 the place the afternoon of the 10th (July) ; was joined in 
 the morning by Massena. That famous general, the 
 greatest in the French army after Napoleon, at once 
 attacked the Austrian position, reinforced during the 
 night by the Archduke in person, and carried it. The 
 cavalry not having arrived, the enemy could not be 
 pursued. 
 
 Meanwhile Napoleon arrived on the ground. Almost 
 simultaneously there came Prince John of Liechtenstein 
 to demand a suspension of arms, and to promise the 
 opening of a negotiation for the conclusion of immediate 
 peace. After a short consultation with his marshals,^ 
 Napoleon consented, simply requiring from Prince John 
 a promise that plenipotentiaries should be at once ap- 
 pointed to negotiate the conditions of a truce. Thi& 
 demand was conceded, and Prince John nominated Baron 
 Wirapffen as negotiator on behalf of Austria. Napoleon 
 named Berthier, 
 
 The men to negotiate a permanent peace were^ 
 naturally, the statesmen of the two countries. The day 
 after the truce had been arranged. Napoleon sent 
 Champagny to Komorn, where Francis and Metternich, 
 bearing the title of Minister of State, had taken up their 
 abode, to propose the carrying into effect the arrangement 
 he had come to with Prince John of Liechtenstein. 
 Francis being inclined to agree, IMetternich arranged 
 with Chamj)agny that the negotiations should be carried 
 on at the town of Altenburg, in Hungary, by the two 
 Foreign JMinisters in person. Meanwhile Prince John of
 
 THE WAR OF 1809. 53 
 
 Liechtenstein took command of the Austrian army, in 
 place of the Archduke Charles who resigned, and, a few 
 days later, Francis moved to Totis, the headquarters of 
 the new Coumiander-in-chief. It is necessary to add 
 t'.iat Count Bubna was appointed military commissary for 
 the Emperor with Napoleon, and that Count Nugent was 
 nominated to act as second negotiator under Metternich. 
 
 The real thoughts of the Austrian plenipotentiary at 
 this period may be gathered from a letter written to his 
 niotlier from Altenburg, dated August 1, 1809 : 
 
 " It is true it is not we who haug back, it is true it is we who desire 
 peace, hut it must be a peace which sliall rid us of the necessity of 
 ■watching our safety every hour of the day and night, which shall 
 allow us to enjoy the blessings of peace — to disarm, to flatter ourselves 
 with the possibility of remaining quiet for a time. Again, if we do 
 not wisli to undergo certain death in six months, if we do not wish to 
 throw the monarcliy out of the window, and that window one from 
 which the leap would be equivalent to the Emjieror's last resource, we 
 must not desire it. If Napoleon desire the destruction of Austria — at 
 «,ny rate it is better to fight him with 300,000 men, than with 50,000." 
 
 The meaning of these words is too clear to be mis- 
 understood. " We want peace, but not a Napoleonic 
 peace — a peace which will cripple our resources, and 
 reduce our army to the level to which the Prussian army 
 has been reduced. Better to fight now when we still have 
 300,000 men, than to make a humiliating peace, only to 
 fight a few years later, when our army shall have been 
 reduced to 50,000." 
 
 No doubt this was a true and a patriotic view. But on 
 this occasion Metternich was neither so cool nor so clear 
 in his purpose as we shall see hira at a later epoch. It is 
 impossible to read his letters to his mother without beino- 
 driven to tlie conclusion that despair was beginning to 
 lessen his self-confidence. Certainly in one important 
 respect, the basis of his action was wrong : for, if his
 
 54 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 Autobiography is to be trusted, he did not correctly read" 
 the motives of the French Emperor in assenting to a 
 truce. He says .that he did not beheve that the Emperor 
 was serious in his negotiations for peace ; that he regarded 
 his treating as a mode of gaining time to recruit his 
 forces to renew the war, unless, by this demonstration, 
 he could terrify Austria into accepting a peace which 
 should so cripple her resources as to render her powerless 
 to resist further aggressions on the part of the conqueror. 
 Now it is abundantly evident that at this time — and 
 Metternich learnt it at a later period — Napoleon was 
 resolved to make peace with Austria, peace on his own 
 terms if he could, but almost any peace rather than 
 continue the war. Matters were not progressing well in 
 Spain. The jealousy — that bane of French commanders 
 in the Peninsula — of Marshal Victor had not only 
 extricated Sir Arthur Wellesley from a false position at 
 Talavera : it had caused the loss of a battle. Then a 
 formidable English army was approaching the shores of 
 Holland. The continuance of the war with Austria would 
 involve Napoleon in a campaign which might, if the 
 Austrians should be led by a man who understood the 
 situation, be long and tedious. Already Napoleon had 
 been surprised at the solidity of the resistance which he 
 had encountered. In 1806, Prussia had fallen before 
 him like a house of cards. Austria, on the contrary, had 
 beaten him at Essling, and though he claimed, and justly 
 claimed, Wagram as a victory, it was a victory by which 
 he gained merely the ground on which the battle had 
 been fought. If, then, he could obtain, as he believed he 
 could obtain, by the prestige of his position as occupying 
 the enemy's capital, and as supporting his army on the 
 enemy's country, terms of peace which, while satisfying 
 his vanity as victor, should yet somewhat, though not to
 
 TEE WAR OF 1809. 55 
 
 the extent he had originally determined, diminish the 
 resources of Austria, he would hold his hand, and divert 
 to Spain the resources which would be no longer required 
 in Southern Germany. 
 
 At the outset of the negotiations it seemed as though 
 the distance between the pretensions of the two Powers 
 was so vast that it would be very difficult to find a middle 
 way. If we are to believe the historian of the Consulate 
 and the Empire, Metternich demanded that Austria 
 should be dealt with in a large and generous spirit ; that 
 she should not be required to make any cession of territory. 
 Treated thus, he added, Austria would become to France 
 a firmer and more constant ally than Russia-; less given 
 to change, and at least as powerful ; that such a procedure 
 would be far more advantageous to Napoleon than would 
 be the despoiling of the Austrian Empire for the benefit 
 of ungrateful Powers such as Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and 
 Saxony. A peace of that character, he added, would of 
 all solutions be the solution most favourable to French 
 interests, but if such a basis were inadmissible, it only 
 remained to bargain how much Austria should resign ; 
 that such a method would be cruel for Austria, and really 
 disadvantageous for France ; further, that if that method 
 were adopted, it would not be for him, but for the French 
 negotiator, to take the first step.* 
 
 Champagny replied that the first system had been tried 
 after Austerlitz, and had failed ; that, after such an experi- 
 ence, it was no longer possible to be generous ; that it was 
 necessary that war should be made costly to those who 
 entered upon it so lightly, and with so little scruple. 
 After some further conversation he presented the proposal 
 of treating on the basis of the uti iwssidetis. To this 
 claim, which, it will be readily understood, was not 
 
 * Thiers: tome xi., pp. 255-8.
 
 56 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICR. 
 
 seriously put forward, IMetternich replied that rather 
 than discuss it Austria would fioht so lono- as there was a 
 man left to bear a sword. 
 
 Of this conversation there was no written record. 
 Napoleon had objected to the use of protocols, and 
 though he subsequently withdrew his objection, it was 
 only, according to IMetternich, when he had resolved to 
 carry out the negotiation in a manner peculiarly his own. 
 After the conversations I have recorded the two negotiators 
 remained for a time inactive, waiting, it would seem, for 
 instructions. At length the French Minister, acting on 
 his master's orders, made the first move. The Emperor, 
 said Champagny, reserving the question of Italy, will be 
 content with the cession of, on the Danube, the line of 
 the Enns, to form tliere the frontier of Bavaria. As this 
 cession would transfer to Bavaria 800,000 souls, and bring 
 her frontier to within about a hundred miles of Vienna, 
 it was clear that Austria could not accept it ; but, before 
 replying, Metternich insisted on learning the French 
 propositions regarding Italy. These proved to be at least 
 as startling. Napoleon, forced to reply, demanded through 
 his Minister, Carinthia, Carniola, and the right bank of 
 the River Save, from its source at Wochein in Carniola 
 to the frontiers of Bosnia. JSuch terms were impossible, 
 and it is certain that Napoleon knew that they would be 
 so considered. But they produced the effect he intended, 
 that is, they produced on Metternich and on the Austrian 
 Emperor a feeling of profound discouragement ; the belief 
 that Napoleon, who was in his heart not only eager but 
 nervously anxious for peace, was determined to reduce 
 Austria to nothino-, or to continue the war. For the 
 moment, then, Metternich gave an evasive reply, asking 
 whether this demand included all the sacrifices required 
 by the French Emperor.
 
 TEE WAR OF 1809. 57 
 
 It did not. On the 4th September, Napoleon completed 
 liis demand. lie required, he said, three circles of 
 Bohemia to be given to his ally, the King of Saxony, and 
 about one half of Galicia, to add to the Grand Duchy of 
 Warsaw. If all these demands should be granted the 
 population of Austria would be diminished by five millions. 
 *' The Austrian legation," writes M. Thiers, " still made 
 no reply, but M. de Mettemich continued in his private 
 conversations to deplore the system of peace adopted by 
 Napoleon, calling it narrow, cruel, bargained (inarclie), 
 instead of a generous peace which would have assured a 
 long period of repose, and a definitive pacification." 
 
 The silence of Austria, a silence which was the result 
 of the profound discouragement created by the demands 
 made upon her and by the fear lest the negotiations should 
 be broken oft' and hostilities renewed, was so little satis- 
 factory to Napoleon that he determined, more suo, to finish 
 with the matter. On the 7th September, he directed 
 Count Bubna, who, I have stated, had been appointed 
 Austrian Military Commissary at the headquarters of 
 the French Emperor, to request the Emperor Francis to 
 send Prince John of Liechtenstein to Vienna. " The 
 diplomatists," added Napoleon, " do not know how to 
 manage an affair like the present ; we soldiers understand 
 each other better," and more of the same sort. Bubna 
 presented the intentions of Napoleon with respect to the 
 conditions of peace as more favourable than had appeared 
 pi'eviously ; but as he brought with him no guarantee, 
 nothing but empty words, Francis, who was not under the 
 spell of the fascination exercised by Napoleon upon his 
 Commissary, declined for the moment to accede to the 
 request; but sent back Bubna with a letter stating that 
 the conditions indicated by Napoleon in his conversation 
 with that official were not such as Austria could accept —
 
 58 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 that further concessions were necessary, if the French 
 Emperor desired a peace wliich should be stable. 
 
 This reply responded so little to the wishes of Napoleon 
 that he resolved to take measures such as he thought 
 would intimidate Austria into compliance. Making it 
 clear to Count Bubna that his army had been reinforced, 
 that he was ready to recommence hostilities, he sent him 
 back to Francis to declare that the message of which the 
 Count had been the bearer on his previous journey was his 
 ultimatum, and that if that were rejected, hostilities would 
 be at once renewed. 
 
 If Metternich had been the Emperor Francis, it i& 
 almost certain that the proposal would have been rejected 
 and the war been renewed, unless, at the last moment, 
 Napoleon should himself have given way. But Metternich 
 was not even by the side of his master ; and Francis, afraid 
 to take upon himself the responsibility of renewing^ 
 hostilities, the result of which, if adverse, would be the 
 breaking up of his Empire, and hoping something from, 
 compliance, despatched Prince John of Liechtenstein with 
 Count Bubna to Vienna. 
 
 Of the nature of the mission entrusted to Prince John 
 there are two versions. M. Thiers asserts that the Prince 
 went to Vienna with power to consent to the principal 
 bases posed by Napoleon at his first interview with Count 
 Bubna, but instructed to endeavour to obtain concessions 
 with respect to the sacrifices demanded in Upper Austria ; 
 to the contributions required for the expenses of the war, 
 and, generally, to the details. IMetternich, on the other 
 hand, declares that Prince John, who stojtpod at Altenburg 
 to see him on his way to Vienna, brought him a letter 
 from the Emperor Francis telling him that the mission 
 had no other object but to arrive at a knowledge of 
 Napoleon's intentions ; tiiat the Field Marsiuil (Prince
 
 THE WAR OF 1809. 69 
 
 John) had orders to listen to everything, but not to enter 
 into any discussion. It is clear, however, that Prince 
 John showed him his more extended powers ; for, he adds, 
 that he informed the Prince of the mistake he was com- 
 mitting in proceeding on such an errand. 
 
 "When the Prince," he writes, " had informed me of the instructions 
 he had received, I said to him : ' If I had been aware of j^our mission, 
 rather than you should have passed the outposts of the French armj', 
 I would have taken upou myself to request you to wait, till I had 
 spoken to the Emperor. We are no longer in Altenburg ; you arc 
 within reach of the hostile army, and must go on. But I tell you 
 "beforehand, that of two things one will happen : either Napoleon 
 will lead you to do something which will compromise our cause, or he 
 will prevent you from returning to your post. The army must have 
 its commanders ; this Napoleon knows, and has drawn you away from 
 it. He will either constrain the Emperor to conclude a peace which 
 he ought not to conclude, or he will deprive him of the means of 
 carrying on the war.' The Prince, who was much agitated by what 
 I said, declared he was ready to go back to Totis. I showed him that 
 he must perform the commission he had undertaken, but must make 
 every effort not to depart from it." 
 
 When the Autohiograpliy of Frince Metternich first 
 appeared, the passage I have just quoted was one of the 
 passages which especially „ attracted attention. To me, 
 after close examination, it appears to bear, as so many 
 passages in the Autobiography appear to bear, the signs 
 of havinfj been "edited." The reader will not fail to 
 notice that the action of Francis in sending Prince John 
 to Vienna, even as jNIetternich asserts, that he might play 
 there only the part of a listener, was to take the negotiation 
 out of the hands of Metternich and Champagny. Then 
 again, is it reasonable to believe that Prince John was 
 sent merely as a listener, when Count Bubna had already 
 twice fulfilled that function ? ^^'hy should the Com- 
 mander-in-chief of the Austrian army accept a position, 
 the duties of which had been ably performed by the sub-
 
 €0 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 ordinate to whom they properly belonged, and in which 
 he could do little more than act the part of a mute. " The 
 Field-Marshal had orders to listen to everything, but not 
 to enter into discussion on any subject," writes Metternich. 
 It seems the height of absurdity to suppose that the Field- 
 Marshal would accept such a mission. Scarcely less 
 absurd is the plea put forward by jNIetternich as to ^^■hy 
 he refrained from accepting Prince John's offer to return 
 to his post, after he had enlightened that Prince as to the 
 alternative which lay before him. " We are no longer in 
 Altenburg," says Prince Metternich. But they were in 
 Altenburg. " The Prince stopped to see me at xVlten- 
 burg ; " then followed the conversation on which I am 
 commenting. If he would not take upon himself the re- 
 sponsibility of stopping and sending back Prince John 
 before passing the cordon of French troops round Altenburg 
 there seems no reason why, if he considered the danger 
 so great, he should not have detained him for at least a 
 few hours until he could communicate with his master. 
 Equally fanciful, it seems to me, is the notion, prominently 
 set forth, that Napoleon had invited Prince John to 
 Vienna, in order to deprive the Austrian army of its 
 Commander-in-Chief. Such a policy would have been in- 
 telligible if the (Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army 
 had been a Hannibal, a Prince Eugene, a Villars, a 
 Frederick, or a Massena ; but to deprive an army of a 
 Prince John of Liechtenstein was surely not very much. 
 The Prince had assumed the command but a few days 
 before ; distinguished as a fighting soldier, he had never 
 held a separate command. On the other hand, the reason 
 why Napoleon wanted Prince John at Vienna is clear. 
 ]Ie had had previous relations with him of a very friendly 
 character ; it was Prince John who had negotiated the con- 
 ditions of the armistice after Austerlitz, and who had signed
 
 THE PEACE OF VIENNA. 61 
 
 the Peace of Pressburg. Napoleon knew the generous 
 nature of the man, and felt sure he could attain his ends 
 more surely by working upon that nature, than by con- 
 tinuing to negotiate with Mctternich. For these reasons 
 I cannot regard the account given by Metternich of the 
 origin and progress of the negotiations of Prince John of 
 Liechtenstein with Napoleon as other than an ebullition 
 of spleen, produced by the feeling that the matter had 
 been, without warning and somewhat cavalierly, taken out 
 of his hands. 
 
 What followed may be compressed within a few words. 
 Prince John and Count Bubna proceeded to Vienna the 
 27th of September, and, on the 30th, agreed with 
 Napoleon as to the conditions of peace. The only point 
 left unsettled was that which referred to the payment of 
 an indemnity. To obtain definite instructions on this 
 point, Bubna proceeded to Totis, to take there the orders 
 of his master. Bubna found great uncertainty at the 
 Austrian headquarters as to whether a continuance of 
 the war was not preferable to a peace which would enor- 
 mously reduce the resources of the Empire. But if we may 
 believe M. Thiers, a well-timed intimation from Russia 
 that if Austria were to continue the war, she, Russia, would 
 be compelled to assist Napoleon in the field, almost 
 decided the Emperor Francis. Prince John then took, 
 upon himself to take a step beyond his instructions, and, 
 on the 1 4th October, signed the Peace of Vienna. 
 
 To that peace, and to its terms, Metternich was an 
 absolute stranger. He goes so far as to assert that 
 Napoleon obtained it by unworthy artifices, and, having 
 procured the signature of the Austrian Commissioners, 
 announced the fact to the citizens of Vienna by the firing 
 of a cannon so as to render it impossible for Francis to 
 disavow it. Here again, I think his Autobiography is not
 
 62 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 a safe guide. He says that the treaty, which Prince John 
 believed to be only " the project of a treaty to be sub- 
 mitted to the Emperor of Austria," was signed the night 
 of the loth, and communicated by the firing of cannon to 
 the Viennese on the morning of the 14th ; that he himself 
 was aware of it from the mouth of Prince John himself 
 on the evening of the same day : 
 
 " Yet," he continues, " without compromising himself anJ his 
 Empire in a most dangerous manner, the Emperor could not reject the 
 conclusion of a peace which had been already announced, amid the 
 rejoicings of the people in the capital, and in more than a third part 
 of the country still remaining to him. The Emperor ratified the 
 treaty." 
 
 Surely, what is this but to declare that it was at any 
 moment in the power of an unscrupulous man such as 
 Metternich believed Napoleon to be, to fire cannon and 
 to send out couriers to announce peace which had not been 
 concluded, in order thus to obtain thereto the consent of 
 his antagonist. If this treaty was, as Metternich asserts, 
 no treaty, but only the project of a treaty, how was it that 
 Prince John did not at once denounce it ? 
 
 The treaty having been ratified, Metternich became, by 
 title as well as in fact, Chancellor of the Empire and 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. In that capacity he returned 
 with Francis to Vienna at the end of November, and 
 devoted himself to the task of seeing that the conditions 
 of the treaty were loyally carried out. He could not but 
 recojjnise that the war of 1809 had resulted most dis- 
 astrously for his coinitry, in that the peace which was the 
 consequence of it had bound it with a circle of iron ; de- 
 prived it of its communication with the Adriatic ; and, by 
 a secret clause, had limited the maximum of the Austrian 
 forces to 150,000 men. Still, he maintained his lofty 
 attitude— still he hoped The success of Napoleon in
 
 THE MABRIAGE. G3 
 
 this campaign would, he believed, still more inflate his 
 pride. 
 
 " I foresaw," he wrote, " that neither he nor his undertakings would 
 escape the consequence of rashness and extravagance. The when and 
 the how I could not pretend to :determine. Thus my reason pointed 
 out to mo the direction I had to take in order not to interfere with the 
 natural development of the situation, and to keep open for Austria the 
 chances which the greatest of all powers — the power of circumstances^ 
 might ofl'cr, sooner or later, under the strong government of its 
 monarch, for tiie much-threatened prosperity of the Empire." 
 
 We find him acfain tracing all the misfortunes of 
 Europe back to the Revolution, " which," he says, 
 " found its highest expression in Napoleon." 
 
 At Vienna, then, JMetternich resumed the role he had 
 played at Paris — the role of master-conspirator against 
 Napoleon. The fact that the secret combinations made 
 between 1806 and 1809 had resulted in a further 
 dismemberment of the Austrian Empire and a large 
 diminution of its resources, in no way abated his pride or 
 lowered his confidence. He still remained the centre, the 
 soul, the hope, of those to whom the name of Napoleon 
 was abomination. He was that centre, that soul, and 
 that hope, when an event occurred which caused him, for 
 a brief moment, to reconsider his position. 
 
 At a masked bail at Paris, given by the Arch-Chancellor, 
 Cambaceres, Napoleon sounded Madame Metternich as 
 to whether she thought that the Archduchess, Marie 
 Louise, would accept his hand, and whether her father 
 would agree to the alliance. Madame Metternich re])licd 
 that that was a matter on which the then Austrian 
 ambassador. Prince Schwarzenberg, not she, should be 
 consulted ; and, the same evening she mentioned the 
 conversation to that Prince. The following- mornino-. 
 Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, called on the Austrian 
 ambassador, and " in the name of the Emperor and with
 
 64 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 the knowledge of liis mother, the Empress Josephine," 
 made the same offer. Prince Schwarzenberg at once 
 referred the matter to Vienna. 
 
 We are bound, it seems to me, to accept MetternichV 
 version of what happened at Vienna when the courier 
 arrived there with the despatch containing the offer, for, 
 in it, he and the Emperor Francis were alone concerned. 
 "As soon as the courier brought me this news," he 
 writes, " I repaired to the Emperor. Your jNIajesty," 
 said I, " is here placed in a situation in which the ruler 
 and the father can alone say yes or no. One or other 
 must be spoken by you, for a doubtful or hesitating 
 answer is not possible." On the Emperor asking Metter- 
 nich what he would do in his place, the cautious states- 
 man replied that there were cases in which it was im- 
 possible for one man to put himself in the place of another, 
 and that this was one of them. Finally Francis resolved 
 to leave the decision entirely to his daughter, and Metter- 
 nich at once waited upon Marie Louise. The interview 
 was short but decisive. The Archduchess placed herself 
 absolutely in the hands of her father, to be disposed of as 
 high policy, that is, the interests of Austria, might dictate. 
 The Emperor Francis, believing that the marriage would 
 secure to Europe some years of political peace, despatched 
 a courier to Paris to accept the offer, with the sole 
 reservation that on neither side should any condition be 
 attached to it.* This was the event which, I stated in 
 
 * 111 his AutoLiograpliy IMcttcrnich repeatedly brings into prominent 
 notice the manner in whicli he was gnitled by his conscience. In the 
 matter of the marriage of INIaric Louise it has often been wondeiccl 
 how the consciences of the higli dignitaries of the Roman Catholic 
 Church, as well as the Emperor of Austria and his family, should have 
 sanctioned a divorce, when divorce is contrary to the law of the 
 Church. ]Metternic]i, with a strange forgctfuiness of facts, denies that 
 there was any dilliculty. He says; "One question wLicli naturally
 
 THE MABBIAGE. 65 
 
 a preceding page, caused Metternich for a brief moment 
 to reconsider the situation. " That this event," he wrote, 
 "drew a line between the past and present is quite 
 evident." 
 
 "Was that line a line of effacement ? Would the 
 conqueror, admitted within the pale of the ancient regimes, 
 put his sword in its sheath, and build up the future of 
 France ? Or, would he, with the help of Austria, found 
 a dynasty, and yet continue his system of conquest? 
 These were the questions which occurred to Metternich, 
 and which he felt he could not solve at Vienna. He 
 therefore requested his master to allow him to proceed to 
 Paris at the same time as the new Empress, and to remain 
 there until he could satisfy his mind. Francis assented ; 
 whereupon, after the marriage had been celebrated, by 
 proxy on the part of Napoleon, at Vienna (March 11, 
 1810), IMetternich set out for Paris, though not by the 
 same road as that taken by Marie Louise and her suite. 
 
 had a great interest for the public was the divorce of Napoleon and 
 Josephine. For the Church the question did not exist, and therefore 
 not for the Emperor. Napoleon had contracted a civil marriage with 
 the express understanding that the union could be dissolved ; in the 
 eyes of the Churcii, therefore, it was not a valid marriage. Indeed, 
 liad it been othericise, the scheme could not have been entertained for 
 a moment. The dissolution of the first marriage, so called, had only, 
 therefore, the value of a mere formality sucli as the French civil law 
 required." Thus Metternich. The trutli, however, is that Napoleon 
 and Josephine, who had, indeed, been only civilly married under the 
 Directory, were religiously united, two days before the Coronation, by 
 Cardinal Fescli, before an altar which had been erected in the 
 Emperor's cabinet. This fact, which the historians of the time do 
 not fail to mention, is placed beyond all doubt by the memoirs of 
 Madame de Remusat. Did Metternich and the Austrian Court, 
 then, voluntarily shut their eyes to a fact, which, according to 
 Metternich, would have prevented the entertaining for a moment of the 
 idea of the marriage? It is very difficult to believe that tJi«y did 
 not 
 
 V
 
 G6 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 lie did not, thus, meet Napoleon until after the latter had 
 seen his bride. 
 
 Napoleon welcomed Metternich " with visible signs of 
 satisfaction." He spoke to him, amongst other pleasant 
 matters, of "an entire forgetfulness of the past, of a 
 happy and peaceful epoch, of the impossibility that any- 
 thing- should disturb the natural relations between us." 
 Regarding the war of 1809, the Emperor admitted, for a 
 moment, that if in the month of September, Austria had 
 recommenced hostilities, " I should have been lost ; " but 
 noting the effect of the word " lost " on his listener, 
 he withdrew it, and substituted the phrase, " in great 
 difficulties." But Metternich insisted on the first 
 expression, held to it in his argument ; and, there can be 
 very little doubt, so used it as to inspire those with whom 
 he conversed with the conviction of its truth. The time 
 was to come when Alexander would be, after the battle of 
 La Moslvowa (Borodino), in a position almost analogous 
 to that of Francis after Wagram. Rendered wise by the 
 experience of others, he declined to treat. 
 
 Metternich enjoyed many confidential conversations with 
 the Emperor at Compiegne, and these were continued 
 when he returned to Paris. There, he tells us, Napoleon 
 placed at his disposal the Hotel of Marshal Ney with a 
 complete household. It would seem that Napoleon's 
 remarks on political matters were characterised by great 
 frankness and sincerity. Talking of Russia he expatiated 
 at length on his relations with that Power, convincing his 
 listener that Austria would require to exercise prudence 
 and wisdom to avoid a rupture with her. He displayed a 
 strong desire to render himself usefid and agreeable to 
 Austria ; and in these first moments left upon the mind 
 of Metternich the belief that the Emperor was animated 
 by a very decided conviction that the existence of Austria,
 
 TEE MABIilAGE. 67 
 
 TAV from being incompatible witb that of aggrandised 
 France, "would serve him as a shield." Everything 
 seemed to show that the impressions of the Austrian 
 Chancellor were correct. There existed at this period a 
 very strong feeling of antagonism between Napoleon and 
 Pope Pius VII. By a decree, dated 17th May, 1809, 
 issued from Vienna, the Emperor had incorporated with 
 the French Empire all the estates of the Church, and 
 had declared Rome an imperial and free city. The Pope 
 had replied, 10th June, by a bull of excommunication. 
 Whereupon, Napoleon had caused the Quirinal to be 
 surrounded, and the Pope conveyed to Savona, where he 
 was detained a prisoner. He was still a virtual prisoner at 
 Savona when Metternich visited Paris, and Napoleon was 
 desirous to avail himself of the mediation of his guest to in- 
 duce Pius VII. to return to Rome. Metternich undertook 
 the task, and despatched an envoy upon whom he could rely, 
 the Chevalier Lebzeltern, to Savona with propositions for a 
 compromise, on the understanding, however, that the Pope 
 was to return to Rome, and accept the disposal of the States 
 of the Church made by Napoleon at Vienna. Lebzeltern 
 saw the Pope, and seemed for an instant to have thought 
 that the matter might be arranged if Napoleon would 
 make only a few more concessions ; but a letter from 
 Pius VII. to Metternich, dated the 21st May, dissipated 
 this illusion. The Pope declined " to make conditions not 
 suitable to the dignity of the Holy See, and to the Vicar 
 of Jesus Christ " ; and the mediation failed. 
 
 These and other confidences which passed between the 
 Emperor and his guest went far, if not to remove, at least 
 to weaken, some of the prejudices against Napoleon 
 which up to that time had formed a part and parcel of 
 Metternich's moral being. It is just possible that if he 
 had left Paris then, when he had been there but tw© 
 
 F 2
 
 68 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 months, he would have modified his previous views, and 
 jiossibly his pohcy. But he was but half convinced that 
 the " Incarnation of the Kevolution " had been so meta- 
 morphosed by his marriage as to have become, in all his 
 ideas and sympathies, as one of the family with which ho 
 was now allied. When, then, in May, he broached to the 
 Emperor the question of the prolongation of his stay \n 
 France, and the Emperor warmly responded, Metternich, 
 who was less anxious to talk of the past than to obtain 
 a glimpse of the future, clutched eagerly at the suggestion. 
 The conversation on the subject illustrates the extreme 
 cordiality which existed at this period between the two 
 men, one of whom was, in spite of himself, at heart, the 
 irreconcilable opponent of the other. Metternich having 
 told the Emperor of the duties which required his presence 
 at Vienna, had added : 
 
 " The Emperor Francis wished me to accompany his daughter into 
 France ; I liave come by his orders, but it must be evident to you that 
 my wish goes beyond this, and I would gladly find a guiding principle 
 for my political action in a more remote future." " I understand 
 you," answered Napoleon; "your wish corresponds with my own. 
 Stay with us a few weeks, and you will leave us with satisfaction." * 
 
 * "According to my conviction, Napoleon never knew me, never 
 divined me. The cause is very simple. Napoleon was the man in ail 
 the world who most despised the human race. IIo had a strange 
 aptitude for discovering tlic weak sides of men, and all passions are 
 weak sides, or produce thcra. He loved only men with strong 
 l^assions, or great weaknesses ; he judged the most opposite qualities 
 in men by these defects. In me he encountered a calmness which 
 must cause despair to one who founded his calculations on passions. 
 Hence he denied the existence in me of every quality bearing on pure 
 reason, or which is reason itself I have often involimtarily laughed 
 in Napoleon's presence, when I remarked that he judged me falsely. 
 Therefore I knew Napoleon much better than he knew me. Seven 
 years of resolute study suflice to know a man, especially a man 
 whose nature and actions are all external — that is, for a calm observer 
 who is not led astray by any feeling of fear and awe." — Autohlorjraph-jj 
 of Frince Metternich, vol. ill
 
 METTEBNICH IN PABIS, 69 
 
 Metternich thus stayed to find " a guiding principle " 
 for the policy of Austria towards France ; to satisfy 
 himself" whether the husband of Marie Louise had become 
 a different man to the husband of Josephine. He enjoyed 
 many opportunities of forming an opinion. He accom- 
 panied the newly-married pair to Cambrai, on their way 
 to Brussels, and was an eye-witness to the enthusiasm 
 with which the young Empress was everywhere received 
 by the people. On his and their return to Paris, he 
 continued his cordial relations with Napoleon. He 
 mentions more than once that the Emperor seemed to be 
 anxious to convince him of the many-sidedness of his 
 character ; that he was as clear-headed and capable as an 
 administrator as he had proved himself to be as a warrior. 
 Still he watched, and watched in vain, for the uplifting of 
 the veil which hid from him the secret dispositions of his 
 host. To no purpose did Napoleon give him every 
 opportunity to see and converse with Marie Louise alone, 
 that he might hear from her all that she might choose to 
 say to her father's friend and confidant ; it was witliout the 
 result he desired that he was asked to act as the friend of 
 her childhood had a right to act, that is, to give her 
 advice whenever he might think advice necessary ; that 
 Napoleon showered upon him attention after attention. 
 He remained unsatisfied ; calculating ; suspicious ; waiting 
 the hour when Napoleon should make the sign which 
 should enlighten him. That the closer intercourse into 
 which he was now drawn increased his intellectual 
 appreciation of Napoleon as a man of genius is evident 
 from the expressions which appear so constantly in his 
 journal of this period ; but, though he listened with 
 admiration, he always listened with the hope of hearing 
 more. At last his patience was rewarded. In September, 
 after six months' careful watching, the veil was lifted.
 
 70 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 The occasion was the election of Marshal Bernadotte to 
 the vacated throne of Sweden. In a conversation on this 
 event Napoleon showed, in a manner to convince his- 
 guest, that he had prompted this with the view of giving 
 a check to Russia, careless if it should lead to a Franco- 
 Russian complication. Russia could not fail to see, in the 
 selection of a French Marshal for such a throne, a pledge 
 between the new sovereign and his people for the re-con- 
 quest of the territories which she herself had but just 
 conquered, and the conquest of which had been one of the 
 stipulations of Tilsit. Referring to this subject. Napoleon 
 let fall the mask, and showed himself, in the eyes of 
 Metternich, as the untamed and untameable Incarnation of 
 the Revolution. 
 
 " I consider," he said, " the Swedish aifair as a more or less distant 
 motive for a war with Kussia. . . . The time will soon approach — and 
 I am very far from hastening it eitlier by my wishes or my deeds — 
 when hostilities will be inevitable. What part will you play ? " 
 
 Then, telling Metternich how, he was confident, the 
 possession by France of the Illyrian provinces must be 
 galling to Austria, he added : 
 
 " Will you one day refuse to confer with me for the exchange of an: 
 equal portion of Galicia for those provinces? Whenever 1 find it 
 necessary to make war witli Russia, I should liave a great and powerful 
 ally in a King of Poland. I shall not need your provinces, and you 
 too will find this combination not less useful to you." * 
 
 The conversation continued in the same strain. Napoleon 
 tollin"- his guest that it was confidential, that he had not 
 spoken on the subject to Champagny, and that he did not 
 
 * Of tlic genuineness of this conversation there can, I think, be no 
 douljt. The editor of the Autobiography writis tliat the sketch of it 
 was written in ricriiiaii for the Emperor Francis under the frcsli 
 impression of tlic occurrence ; and tliat the sketch follows exactly the 
 text of the Autobiogrupliy.
 
 METTEBNICR IN VIENNA. 71 
 
 wish that anyone should know of it except the Emperor 
 Francis and himself. After listening to it, Metternich 
 left St. Cloud, conscious that he had at last obtained 
 light ; that the object of his stay in Paris had been 
 attained. On the 24^1 of the same month he had his 
 farewell audience with the Emperor, obtained from him 
 the revocation of the secret article by which Austria had 
 been limited to the maintenance of an army of only 
 150,000 men, and proceeded, by way of Vienna, to join 
 the Emperor Francis at Gratz. There, having had 
 ample time for reflection, he laid before his master the 
 result of his more than six months' stay in Paris. They 
 were, if we can trust his Autobiography,* that, in the 
 spring of 1812, Napoleon would range his own forces, 
 greatly strengthened, and those of his allies, to strike a 
 great blow at Russia ; that, in such a case, it would 
 behove Austria to take a neutral part, and to take such a 
 position as would ensure to her the power to take decisive 
 action during the war and at the end of it ; that, mean- 
 while, she must prepare for that eventuality. 
 
 A curious circumstance connected with this affair is 
 that at the very time that Napoleon was confiding to 
 Metternich his conviction that war with Russia was, 
 sooner or later, inevitable, the Adjutant of the Emperor 
 of Russia, Count Schuvaloft', arrived at Vienna, witli a 
 plan, cut and dried, for an alliance in case of a new war 
 with France. It was clear that the Swedish affair had 
 directed the thoughts of Napoleon and the Czar simul- 
 
 * The editor states that this report was merely verbal, and that no 
 record of it exists. It corresponds so closely with the events which 
 did actually happen, that it is not absolutely free from suspicion. On 
 the other hand, knowing as we do, that the conversation with 
 Napoleon was genuine, we are bound to admit that the advice 
 Metternich gave to his master is just the advice which a maoi 
 possessing his cold, calculating character would have given.
 
 72 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 tancoiisly to the same conclusion. Austria rejected the 
 ])rojcct. 
 
 The real hopes which INIetternich entertained were 
 displayed in the communications which he made, at this 
 period, to the Prussian Cabinet. Confident that war 
 between France and Russia would ensue, and hoping that 
 snch a war would or might ensure the deliverance of the 
 sovereigns and the aristocracies of Europe, he placed 
 before King Frederick William III. the true position of 
 Austria and Prussia with respect to Napoleon, showed 
 him that those positions were identical, and that their 
 only hope lay in time and the vicissitudes of Fortune. 
 This advice, backed up by the promise that when that 
 time should arrive, Austria would stand by Prussia as a 
 firm friend, was, it will be well to recollect when we come 
 to the professed mediation of Austria in 1813, given in 
 1810. 
 
 When, then, in October of that year, Metternich 
 resumed at Vienna the portfolio of the Foreign Office, 
 his line of policy was fixed. It was to nurse the finances 
 of Austria, to strengthen her army, and to prepare her 
 for the opportunity which was to com.e in two years. For 
 the financial operations he had at his side a minister, 
 Count Wallis, who allowed himself to be guided by the 
 firmer will and more extended views of the Chancellor of 
 the Empire. But in the War jMinister, Count Pellegarde, 
 Metternich possessed a friend who was able to enter into 
 all his plans, and whom he trusted implicitly. Pegarding 
 this statesman ]\Ietternich uses a phrase which explains 
 very neatly and very curtly the principle he himself had 
 adopted in his intercourse with Napoleon. He says : " He 
 understood as well as I did the value of letting men talk." 
 
 One defect whicli almost at once forced itself upon his 
 attention at this epoch was the ^veakncss of the central
 
 METTEBNICn IN VIENNA. 73 
 
 power in Austria. To obtain that unity of action whicli, 
 he had seen, constituted one of the great forces of 
 Napoleon, it was necessary to organise a body which, 
 without restricting the exercise of the separate rights of 
 the provinces, should secure to the common head of the 
 Empire the disposal of supreme sovereign power. Such a 
 body, organised by Kaunitz under the title of Council of 
 State, had to a certain extent exercised such functions in 
 the time of Maria Theresa, but, originally somewhat 
 faulty in construction, it had fallen into decay. Metter- 
 nich proceeded then to revive it on an improved system. 
 His idea was to make of the Council of State a deliberatino- 
 body, selected by and associated with the Emperor, and 
 procuring for him, by its management of details, greater 
 leisure and facility for carrying on his own work. 
 Whilst thus the Council would constitute a deliberating 
 and advising body, the entire executive power would still 
 remain vested in the Emperor alone. It was a plan 
 which, from time immemorial, has been the delight of 
 despots ; to place by the side of the sovereign a body, not 
 elected but selected, which should nominally advise him 
 but really take his ideas, and impart to them the form o£, 
 legality. The same principle, put in action in England, 
 formed the Star Chamber under Charles I. ; and, in 
 France, constituted the Council of State under Napoleon. 
 It secured, in fact, a firmer concentration of power in the 
 hands of the sovereign. Such, disguised under a few 
 specious phrases,* was the Metternich system, to force 
 
 * Fur instance : " Tliere lies in the existence of a well organiseil 
 council, filled with able men, ready to advise the mouurch on every 
 oocnsion witli cnliglitcned and impartial counsel, so high a degree of 
 security for the wliole body politic, that this feeling will soon become 
 general, and secure to the Government strength and repose in equal 
 measure." (Minute by Metternich on the organisation of au Imperial 
 Council.)
 
 74 LIFE OF PBINCE 3IETTERNICR. 
 
 which upon Europe in the name of freedom it was- 
 essential first to beat down Napoleon. 
 
 I have stated in an earlier portion of this sketch how, 
 at a certain period of his career, Metternich had taken 
 refuge from the strife of politics in the congenial study of 
 literature and science.* From that most charming and 
 engrossing of all studies he had divorced himself, some- 
 what unwillingly, at the bidding of the Emperor Francis ; 
 and, once divorced, he had not returned to the society of 
 the siren. But there were at Vienna those who re- 
 membered the delightful days when he who had become 
 Chancellor of the Empire had been their cherished 
 companion. They showed their appreciation of him and 
 of his merits at this period by suggesting that he should 
 be nominated Curator of the Academy of Fine Arts. 
 The idea was carried out, to the surprise — for it was quite 
 unexpected — and gratification of the recipient of the 
 honour. He calls it, in his Autobiography, "an unexpected 
 and honourable appointment, wliich opened up to me an 
 unfamiliar but congenial sphere of activity, in which there 
 was full scope for my strong consciousness of duty, 
 heightened as it was in this case by my inclination." 
 
 Not for a moment, however, did he lose sight of his 
 main object. The year 1811 passed, he tells us, as he 
 had foreseen. Napoleon advanced his forces as far as the 
 Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and made Dantzig a 2Joinf 
 d'appui for the supplies necessary for a great campaign. 
 The armies of the States belonging to the Confederation 
 of the Ehine were preparing to join the Grande Armee, 
 already strengthened by the Spanish, Portuguese, and 
 Italian contingents. Prussia, depressed and suffering, 
 was endeavouring, as nmch as she dared, to stir up a 
 patriotic feeling in North Germany by means of the 
 * Pa<'e8 7-S.
 
 TEE WAB OF 1812. 75 
 
 Tugenhund. Austria alone seemed quiescent and pacific, 
 " supposed," as the director of her policy writes, " to be 
 exclusively occupied in healing the wounds which the last 
 war had inflicted on the Empire." The aspect of Europe 
 appeared to the Austrian Minister, than whom no one 
 was better qualified to judge, not as that of the calmness 
 which, in nature, precedes the storm, '•' but the sad aspect 
 of a general humiliation of princes and people under the 
 verdict of an inexorable fate." 
 
 At length the dreaded year arrived, and Napoleon, 
 notifying to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna his intention 
 of invading Russia, demanded the active support of the 
 sovereigns they represented. Prussia could only reply in 
 the affirmative. Austria, guided by Metternich, was 
 more reserved. Metternich had devised a plan whereby 
 he might, while yielding to the demands of the French 
 Emperor, maintain still his relations with Alexander. 
 Napoleon, he saw, did not require an Austrian contingent 
 so much for fighting purposes as for a material guarantee 
 that the rest of the Austrian army should be retained 
 within the limits of the Austrian dominions. Whilst, 
 then, he raised no difficulty to the signing with France, 
 the 14th March, 1812, of a treaty by which Austria 
 agreed to furnish an auxiliary corps of 30,000 troops 
 for the invasion, receiving in exchange, besides the 
 guarantee of her integrity, a promise that, in the event of 
 the reconstitution of the Kingdom of Poland, she should 
 recover Illyria, or, that portion of it the loss of which, as 
 it included Trieste, she lamented the most, Metternich 
 stipulated that the treaty should be kept secret as 
 long as possible in order that he might take credit w ith 
 Russia, and pose before lier as a neutral. The Czar, it 
 would seem, thoroughly understood the powerlessness of 
 Austria to act other than she did act, and, notwith-
 
 76 LIFE OF FBINCE METTEENICIL 
 
 standing the presence in the line of Napoleon's army of 
 the corps of 30,000 men, he never, throughout the 
 campaign, regarded her other than as neutral or friendly. 
 Metternich goes so far as to state that Alexander con- 
 sidered the closing of the Austrian territory as a useful 
 defence for the southern provinces of the Russian Empire. 
 On the 21st April Alexander quitted St. Petersburg 
 for Wilna, having renounced all hope of staving off the 
 war. As soon as he heard of this departure Napoleon 
 resolved to hasten to Dresden, to receive there the vassal 
 sovereiirns of the several States of the Continent of whose 
 contingents he was about to dispose, and to communicate 
 to them his final hopes and his final intentions. Amongst 
 those who received invitations to proceed to Dresden were 
 the Emperor and Empress of Austria. They accordingly 
 quitted Vienna for that purpose, accompanied by 
 Metternich, timing their departure so as to arrive the 
 day after Napoleon, that is, on the 17th of May. For 
 the twelve days that followed, Dresden presented a 
 spectacle such as has rarely been equalled. The 
 Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the Kings 
 of Bavaria and Saxony, and other lesser stars, paid their 
 homages to the great conqueror whom, in a few short 
 months, they were to attack with all the bitterness of 
 stored-up hatred. At Dresden, in that month of May, no 
 one doubted the triumph of Napoleon. The proudest 
 spirits bent before him. Even Metternich, coldly calcu- 
 lating, and in his heart desiring the triumph of Alexander, 
 did not believe in it. He resumed here, he tells us, his 
 old confidential intercourse with Napoleon — the inter- 
 course of 1810. The conclusion he drew was that 
 Napoleon did not deceive himself as to the greatness of 
 the undertaking upon which he was entering; that he 
 looked upon his success as " the keystone of an edifice
 
 THE WAR OF 1812. 77 
 
 wiiicli hovered before his mind as a Carlovlngian Empire 
 under a Bonapartist dynasty." It is quite possible that if 
 he had foHowed the phin of campaign which he unfolded 
 to Metternich, he would have realised this idea. He 
 spoke to the Austrian Minister the words I am about to 
 quote, and which, that Minister most truly says, subse- 
 quent events have made for ever memorable : 
 
 " jMy enterprise is one of those the solution of wliich is to be found 
 in patience. Victory will attend the most patient. I shall open tlio 
 campaign by crossing the Niemen. It will be concluded at Smolensk 
 and Minsk. There I shall stop. I shall fortify these two points, and 
 occupy myself, at Wilna, where the chief headquarters will be during 
 the next winter, with the organisation of Lithuania, which burns witli 
 impatience to be delivered from the yoke of Russia. I shall wait and 
 see which of us tires first : I, of feeding my army at the expense of 
 Eussia ; or Alexander, of sustaining my army at the expense of his 
 country. Perhaps I myself may pass the most inclement months of 
 the winter at Paris." 
 
 Metternich continues : " To my question what he would 
 do in case the Emperor Alexander did not vouchsafe to 
 make peace because of the occupation of Lithuania," 
 Napoleon answered : 
 
 " In that case I should in the following year advance quite to the 
 centre of the Empire, and I shall be as patient in 1813 as I shall have 
 been in 1812. The affair, as I told you, is a question of time." 
 
 It was difficult for Metternich, thus confidentially 
 informed of his plan by the i^reatest captain of the age — 
 a captain who, he had seen, had beaten this same enemy, 
 when he was allied, as in 1805 with Austria, and, as in 
 1806-7 with Prussia, and who now wielded against him 
 all the resources of Continental Europe, to doubt the 
 result of a campaign based upon a plan so prudent and 
 apparently so certain. Metternich did not doubt. Yet, 
 true to his nature, writhing vmdcr the domination exer- 
 cised by the parvenu — as he always regarded Napoleon —
 
 78 LIFE OF PEINCE METTEBNICU, 
 
 who controlled the destinies of every nation on the Con- 
 tinent, he never forjj^ot that although the chances might be 
 fifty to one in favour of France, yet the possibility always 
 existed that Eussia might prevail. That chance was, 
 indeed, too remote to be counted upon. It was hardly to 
 be seriously thought of. Nevertheless it was a chance, 
 and, as a chance which would bring him his heart's desire, 
 1)6 deemed it prudent to regulate his conduct, secretly, as 
 though it might happen. Thus we find him, from the 
 very outset of the campaign, renewing, endeavouring to 
 knit together more closely, the ties between Vienna and 
 Berlin. There exists, in the handwriting of Metternich, 
 written in 1851, a note on a letter received by him from 
 Frederick Gentz, dated July 24, 1812, which fully explains 
 the aims of the Austrian Minister, not only at this period, 
 but throughout the period of the Napoleonic sway. 
 Gentz had detected, at his epoch, symptoms of what 
 Metternich calls " the Providential beginning of Napoleon's 
 -end." Metternich writes on this : " That I have helped 
 this forward as much as lay in my power — history will 
 testify." He was right. History will testify to that fact, 
 but, in testifying to it, she will also demand an account 
 of the use he made of the power he acquired through the 
 accomplishment of that task ; how he treated the generous 
 spirits, who, in fighting against Napoleon, believed, as 
 they had been led to believe, that they were fighting for 
 their emancipation from political thraldom. 
 
 Meanwhile he followed the movements of the Napoleonic 
 army with the keenest interest. When he saw that 
 Napoleon, tempted by the constant retreat of the Russians, 
 was abandoning the safe programme he had revealed at 
 Dresden, his hopes that the one chance might become a 
 certainty increased. For the French army to winter at 
 Moscow instead of at Smolensk would, he saw, be a
 
 THE BETBEAT FBOM MOSCOW. 79 
 
 mistake which a determined enemy might, without much 
 difficulty, turn into a misfortune. Not foreseeing yet the 
 retreat with all its horrors, he might reasonably argue that 
 the position of Napoleon at jNIoscow after Borodino was 
 much less favourable than the position of the same leader 
 at Vienna after Wagram ; and he had Napoleon's own 
 admission, made to him in 1810, that if Austria had then 
 refused peace he would have been lost. Day by day his 
 hopes grew stronger. At last the catastrophe came. Then 
 lie felt that upon him would probably devolve the mastery 
 of the situation — and to accomplish that end he began at 
 once to act. How, and with what effect he acted, must be 
 considered in the next chapter.
 
 80 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 CHAPTER lY. 
 
 FROM THE WINTER OF 1812 TO THE ARMISTICE OF 
 PLEISWITZ, JUNE— AUGUST, 1813. 
 
 1812-1813. 
 
 The army-corps, contributed by Austria to the grand 
 invading army of Napoleon, amounting to 30,000 men, had 
 done little, and had suffered little. Practically, it was 
 intact. AYlien Mctternich first realised the full extent of 
 the disaster which had befallen the French Emperor, he 
 was unwilling that this corps, which had been joined by 
 the Saxon contingent, should be utilised to cover the 
 French retreat. He did not at once, it is true, direct it 
 against Napoleon, as Prussia did as soon as she safely 
 could, with the troops she had contributed, but wishing, as 
 he states, to prepare to strike a decisive blow at a decisive 
 moment, in 1813, he transmitted orders to the Commander 
 of the corps Prince Schwarzenbcrg, to fall back upon 
 Galicia. Then, by no means certain that the power of 
 Napoleon had been destroyed ; thinking it quite possible 
 that, if he would but moderate his demands, he might yet 
 preserve a position which might be preponderating if not 
 predominating ; unwilling to run once more the chance of 
 being on the losing side ; yet resolved, as resolved as was 
 Prussia, to break the despotic chain with which the French 
 Emperor bound Continental Europe ; to restore the equili-
 
 THE WINTER OF 1812-13. 81 
 
 "brium of 1803 or 1805, according as might be decided in 
 consultation with Prussia, Metternich, carefully reviewing 
 the situation, and calculating how it might be possible 
 to constitute a new German Confederation on the ruins 
 of the Confederation of the Pihine, came to the conclusion 
 that, for the moment, Austria should temporise, in the 
 meanwhile increasing her army, until the moment should 
 arrive when she could strike with effect. Eussia and 
 Prussia were confident that they had only to push forward 
 to bring to a decisive issue the advantages which the 
 terrible Piussian winter had in part secured for them. 
 3[etternich was not nearly so confident. On the contrary, 
 he was convinced that, even after so great a disaster, 
 those two powers would not be a match for Napoleon. 
 The Machiavellian policy, then, would be, to arm and 
 wait until the allies, feeling their impotence without 
 Austria, should demand, nay, implore, Austria's aid ; that, 
 manoeuvring meanwhile so as to hoodwink Napoleon, 
 already too confiding on the strength of his marriage with 
 a daughter of the Habsburgs, he would intervene forcibly 
 at the critical moment. This is the policy which he says 
 he thought out at the time, and which he actually adopted. 
 It is as well that the reader should bear this in mind when 
 he comes to study the period of the armistice of 1813. 
 All the calculations of the Austrian Minister in the winter 
 of 1812-13 were based upon the conviction that it would 
 become necessary that Austria should join Eussia and 
 Prussia to effect the overthrow of Napoleon. Upon that 
 overthrow he was throughout bent. Every line he h.is 
 written proves that he never dreamt it would be possible 
 for Austria, under any circumstances, to unite with 
 Napoleon. "The Emperors of Austria and of Russia, 
 the King of Prussia, and their three cabinets," he says, 
 \writing of this period, " were never really separated." 
 
 a
 
 82 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 The first necessity for the successful carrying" out of this 
 policy was to impose upon Napoleon. " All that re- 
 mained," he wrote to his father, *' was to find the oppor- 
 tunity of carrying out my intentions without running any 
 serious risks." So, in January, 1813, he commissioned 
 Count Bubna to proceed to Paris to assure the Emperor 
 of the fidelity of Austria, but to urge upon him the advisa- 
 bility of securing peace, and, to attain such a result, to 
 propose the mediation of Austria. Count Bubna had a 
 certain success. Napoleon, unfortunately for himself, was 
 under the delusion that the Emperor Francis would not 
 turn against his son-in-law, and though he could not fail 
 to recognise the bad faith of Austria in the instructions 
 sent to Prince Schwarzenberg, he had still the conviction 
 that he was strong enough to defeat combined Russia and 
 Prussia, and that, once triumphant over them, Austria 
 would declare herself in his favour, in the hope to profit 
 by his victory. When Count P)ubna arrived, then, 
 Napoleon called together an extraordinary Council to 
 consider the course to be pursued. This Council com- 
 prised the most eminent statesmen of the Empire. There 
 were present, Talleyrand, Caulaincourt, Cambaceres,. 
 Champagny, Maret (Duke of Bassano), MM. de la 
 Besnadiere and d'llauterive. To them Napoleon gave a 
 summary of the situation ; then posed the question whether 
 France should wait to receive proposals of peace, or 
 whether she should make them ; in the latter case, whether 
 she should address herself directly to Pussia, or avail her- 
 self of the mediation of friendly Austria. Caulaincourt, 
 Cambaceres, and Talleyrand, gave their voices in favour 
 of direct negotiation with Pussia : the Duke of Bassano, 
 who was supposed to express the inner thought of Napoleon, 
 expressed the same confidence — I should rather write — 
 the same false confidence his master felt in the sincerity
 
 THE WINTER OF 1812-13. 83 
 
 of Austria, and urged the advisability of taking advantage 
 of her mediation. He was supported by the other three 
 members. Napoleon was of the same opinion, for, totally 
 misled as to the real views of the guiding spirit of Austria's 
 policy, he believed that the offer to restore to her Illyria, 
 without conditions, would range her at once secretly on 
 his side. After seeing, then. Count Bubna, he addressed 
 a letter to his father-in-law, in which, beginning by an 
 account of the campaign of 1812 painted in colours dis- 
 tinctly French, he stated that he would very shortly be in 
 a position to throw back the Kussians on the Vistula and 
 from the Vistula on the Niemen ; but that, in spite of that 
 certainty, he desired peace, and that to obtain peace, he 
 was ready and willing to avail himself of the intervention 
 of Austria. He added, however, a proviso which, at the 
 moment, he could have scarcely believed would be accept- 
 able. He w^ould not, he said, accept conditions of peace, 
 he would impose them ! 
 
 To this letter, which M. Thiers, arguing that it might 
 have been possible at that critical moment by liberal con- 
 cessions to have gained Austria, calls " a fatal letter," the 
 Duke of Bassano added another, addressed to Metternich 
 in terms even less conciliatory. At the moment when all 
 Europe was rising in arms against the French Empire he 
 warned Metternich that the several nations of Europe 
 might have to repent bitterly their conduct if they were to 
 choose such a period to wound the just susceptibilities of 
 the French nation. He added, that whilst France was 
 willing to accept the intervention of Austria, that Power 
 must remember that France would accord to Russia the 
 conditions only which she had granted at Tilsit ; to 
 Austria the conditions she had granted after Wagranu 
 As a counterpoise, and a counterpoise which he thought 
 would attach Austria, he added that the King of Rome, 
 
 G 2
 
 84 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 the grandson of the Emperor Francis, was about to be 
 crowned, and that the Regency of France, in the event of 
 any accident to the Emperor, would be secured to JMarie 
 Louise. Nothing is more clear to the student of the 
 despatches of this period than the fact that the Austrian 
 matrimonial alliance blinded the usually clear intellect of 
 the Emperor; it w^as the lure which led him to his 
 destruction. 
 
 The replies of Napoleon and his Minister to the 
 proposal of the Austrian Court made through Count Bubna 
 could not but confirm Metternich in his secret policy ; the 
 policy of arming and waiting the opportune moment to 
 strike. His main difficulty at this period and later was to 
 restrain the enthusiasm of the German population of 
 Austria. Prussia, through the defection of the contingent 
 she had supplied to the Grand Array had greatly 
 augmented the difficulties, the dangers, and the losses of 
 the retreat, only declared herself openly as the ally of 
 Russia and the enemy of France in March ; the King of 
 Saxony, so long the ally of Napoleon, had not been able 
 to withstand the enthusiasm caused throughout Germany 
 by this event, and had retired into Bavaria, there to await 
 the possibilities of the future. These events had roused tre- 
 mendous excitement in German Austria. But neither the 
 Emperor Francis nor his Minister had been so brought 
 under the personal influence of the Czar, animated as he 
 was by a desire to pose as the saviour of Europe, as had 
 been the King of Prussia. They both regarded the action 
 of that sovereign, in declaring against Napoleon whilst 
 Napoleon could yet wield against them considerable re- 
 sources, as dangerous and premature. They were equally 
 determined to fall neither under the spell of Russia nor 
 under the yoke of popular clamour, but to act, as became 
 statesmen in their position, so as to secure the interests of
 
 THE WINTER OF 1812-13. 86 
 
 Austria. They were far from believing that Napoleon 
 was destroyed. A premature declaration against him 
 might ensure, they felt, the destruction of Austria. For 
 these reasons Metternich resolved to allow nothing to 
 cause him to deviate from the line he had marked out — 
 to arm and to wait. 
 
 ]\Ieanwhile he held many conferences with the French 
 Minister at Vienna, M. Otto, with the view of discovering, 
 if possible, the advantages which it might be possible for 
 Austria to secure in the event of a general peace. When 
 he found that Otto was unable to speak authoritatively on 
 this subject, he communicated to him, with the view 
 doubtless of the report of the conversation reaching 
 Napoleon, the views held by himself. As, he urged, it 
 was no longer possible for France to maintain against 
 England the continental blockade, Russia and Prussia 
 having renounced it, it would certainly be for the interest 
 of France to resign those places which were useful to her 
 solely for the enforcing of that blockade. In this view 
 the Hanseatic towns and their dependencies had become 
 rather a burden to France, and might well be abandoned. 
 Similarly, as, after the campaign of 1812, it would be 
 impossible to dream of the reconstitution of Poland, it 
 would be advantageous to France to see a strong Prussia, 
 as the barrier of the rest of Europe against Russian 
 barbarism : then, whilst England might possibly admit 
 the union of Holland with France, she would always be 
 firm on the subject of Spain. That point Napoleon would 
 have to yield. Again, with regard to the Confederation 
 of the Rhine, already doomed by the opinion of Germany 
 and useless to France, France nmst be content with the 
 boundary afforded by that river, and must leave Germany 
 beyond it to herself. Finally Metternich allowed the 
 French Minister to divine that if Napoleon would lower
 
 86 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 his pretensions sufficiently to accept a general peace on 
 the terms about to be indicated, then it might be possible 
 for Austria to support him. The terms were : the resti- 
 tution of Spain to the Bourbons ; of the Hanscatic towns 
 to Germany ; the suppression of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine ; the partition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
 between Russia, Prussia, and Austria ; and, as to the 
 latter power herself, the restoration to her of Illyria, and 
 the rectification of her frontier on the Inn. But, whilst 
 indicating these conditions as constituting a fair basis, 
 Metternich was careful to commit himself to nothing. He 
 had sketched an outline to which he would not bind him- 
 self, and which events might modify any day. 
 
 Meanwhile, in pursuance of the reply of Napoleon to 
 the mission of Count Bubna, he proceeded to use Austria 
 as a mediator between the contending parties. From 
 every quarter he met rebuffs. England, by the voice of 
 Lord Castlereagh, declared, whilst courteously acknow- 
 ledging the reception of the message, that the language 
 of Napoleon proved that he would accept no reasonable 
 terms. Russia not only gave a similar reply, but added 
 that Austria herself would soon recognise the impossibility 
 of coming to an understanding with a man so insatiably 
 ambitious as Napoleon ; that when that time should arrive, 
 when she, Austria, should resume her natural position as 
 ally of the rest of ]*]urope, she would be recognised as 
 arbitress of the situation, as dictator of the conditions of 
 peace. These replies Metternich transmitted at once to 
 Paris, adding, in the despatch communicating them, that 
 he had requested Prince Schwarzenbcrg, who had com- 
 manded the Austrian corps in the campaign of 1812, to 
 proceed to that city, to endeavour to obtain from the 
 Emperor explanations more frank than those of which 
 Count Bubna had been the recipient ; that he the more
 
 TEE WINTEB OF 1812-13. 87 
 
 confidently reckoned on the realisation of his hope in this 
 particular, inasmucli as the Prince had been the negotiator 
 •of the marriage ; the lieutenant of Napoleon during the 
 last war ; and had remained his constant and sincere 
 admirer. 
 
 Unfortunately for Napoleon he remained, in spite of 
 t:ie tone of the despatches of the Austrian Foreign 
 ^Minister, still under the delusion engendered by his 
 marriage with a Princess of the Imperial House. This 
 delusion prevented him from reading the set purpose of 
 I\Ietternich ; concealed from his usually clear vision the 
 fact that at this period as I have already quoted, " the 
 Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of 
 Prussia and their cabinets were never really sepai-ated." 
 Not in vain had the Austrian Minister studied, in the 
 intimacy of private intercourse, in diplomatic controversy, 
 in the confidential conversations covering the period of the 
 six months immediately subsequent to tlie marriage, the 
 character and habits of thought of the man who to him 
 was always, and never more than in 1813, the incarnation 
 •of the hated Revolution. Great as was Napoleon on the 
 battlefield, he was, at this moment, on this diplomatic 
 tilting-ground, an infant in the hands of Metternich. 
 The situation may be described in a sentence : Napoleon 
 trusted Metternich — a man whom he liked, whom he had 
 admitted to the closest intimacy, whom he cherished as 
 one of the main supporters of his marriage, and whom he 
 believed he could dazzle by holding before him the prospect 
 of possessing not only lUyria, but that Silesia for which 
 Maria Theresa had shed tears of blood. Metternich, on the 
 other hand, knowing that he had made an impression of 
 this nature on the mind of Napoleon, used it deliberately 
 to destroy him. The nearer we approach the date of 
 the famous interview at Dresden, the more clearly are
 
 88 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 disclosed the methods employed by jNIettcrnich to hood- 
 wink, to lead on, his victim. At that meeting, the 
 reader will see, the mask is dropped altogether. We 
 might draw the same conclusion from his own testimony. 
 " History," he wrote in his Autobiography, referring to 
 the negotiations and events of 1812-3, " will bear 
 witness to my having made use of all the means in my 
 power to second the hands of God." 
 
 Napoleon, then, still influenced by the opinion re- 
 garding Metternich and the views of Austrian policy 
 mentioned in the preceding paragraph, confident that he 
 could beat combined Russia and Prussia, and almost as 
 confident that he could tempt Austria to share with him 
 the inevitable despoiling of the latter, had not only made 
 no attempt to dissuade Austria from arming, but had 
 even pressed her to arm. Informed at the period at 
 which we have arrived, March 1813, of the mission of 
 Prince Schwarzenberg, he went a step further ; replaced 
 M. Otto at Vienna by M. de Narbonne, and com- 
 missioned the new ambassador to urge Austria to 
 debouch with 100,000 men from Bohemia into Silesia, 
 taking the allies in flank whilst he should attack them in 
 front, and thus finish the war in one sliort campaign. 
 The share of Austria in the spoil should be Silesia^ 
 Illyria, and a part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 
 whilst Prussia should be hurled back beyond the Oder. 
 Anxious above all things to join his army, he had given 
 these instructions to M. de Narbonne, had made dis- 
 positions regarding the regency and other pressing 
 matters, and was on the point of setting out, when 
 Prince Schwarzenberg arrived (5th April). For any 
 result from his mission he might as well have remained 
 at Vienna. He "found Napoleon determined to fight, 
 confident of victory, not at all mistrustful of Austria, or
 
 THE SPRING OF 1813. 89* 
 
 doubting her ultimate co-operation. These thoughts he 
 expressed in the rapid and decided manner habitual with 
 him. SchAvarzenberg was not at Paris to contradict him. 
 Either obeying the instructions he had received to listen 
 rather than talk, or overpowered by the confident asser- 
 tions of Napuleou, he made no attempt to disclose the 
 secret thoughts of his master, or of his master's foreign 
 minister. He preferred, according to M. Thiers, to 
 mutter a few inconsequent words ("il profera quelques 
 mots sans force et sans suite "), and went so far as to 
 allow the Emperor to believe that Austria would be true 
 to the treaty of the 14th March, 1812, and to declare that 
 the corps which he had commmanded should march with 
 the corps of Prince Poniatowski into Upper Silesia.* A 
 few days later, loth April, Napoleon set out for his army. 
 The campaign of 1813 had begun. 
 
 Whilst Prince Schwarzenberg was thus, as it were, 
 effacing himself at Paris, and M. de Narbonne wa& 
 journeying to Vienna, Metternich was steadily working 
 for the issue he had at heart. To pass gradually from 
 the position of ally of France to that of ally of Russia 
 and England, by assuming the intermediary position of 
 mediator, to retain that intermediary position as long a& 
 it could be held with safety, or until events should force 
 Austria to declare herself, and then — unless Napoleon 
 should have gained a success so striking as to make him 
 irresistible — to join the allies with all the troops she was, 
 at the express wish of Napoleon, engaged in arming; 
 
 * "Napoleon tlit done au Prince de Schwarzenberg qu'il allaifc 
 cxpe'dier h, ce corps des ordres, pour qn'il s'avan^at avcc le Prince 
 Poniatowski vers la haute Silc'sie, et qu'il (speiait que ces ordres 
 seraient executes. Le Prince de Schwarzenberg, qni savait bicn que 
 son gouvernement ne voulait plus tirer un coup de fusil, craignit do 
 I'avoucr a Napoleon, et eut la faiblesse de lui rcpondre que le corps 
 Autrichien obeirait." — Thiers, tome xv., p. SOU
 
 90 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 such was his policy. In the presence of a man so imperious 
 and so searching as was Napoleon, the task was attended 
 with some risk, though not with so great a risk as some 
 historians have represented, for, in point of fact, Napoleon, 
 with the English and Spaniards on his hands at one 
 extremity, and the allies in front of him, had all his work 
 cut out for him ; and, besides, it cannot be too often 
 repeated, he was specially at this period under the glamour 
 of his marriage.* So strongly did Metternich realise this, 
 that he even ventured to carry his intrigues further, and 
 to endeavour to detach the King of Saxony completely 
 from the French alliance. That prince had, during the 
 excitement caused in Germany by the disasters of the 
 Moscow retreat and the declarations of Prussia, sought 
 a refuge from the solicitations of his countrymen, first 
 at Ratisbon, afterwards at Prague. There Metternich 
 entered into secret negotiations with him, urging him to 
 renounce his claims to the Grand Dukedom of Warsaw, 
 and to promise to act as Austria should act, and at the 
 same time. Tliere remained yet another arrangement 
 which could only be furthered by the diplomatic dexterity 
 of which Metternich was a master. The reader will re- 
 collect that at Paris Prince Schwarzenbcrg had promised 
 Napoleon that the Austrian corps he had commanded 
 should accompany the Franco-Polish corps under Prince 
 
 * After Napoleon hnd quitted Paris for the army, Prince Schwarzen- 
 bcrg, who remained Lcliind, was more open in his couvcrsations with 
 M. de Bassano than he liad ventured to be with tlic Emperor. One 
 day, wlien he had given Bassano many reasons why Austria should not 
 jmt her troops in line with those of France, Bassano urged the 
 marriage as a decisive reason why she should. Schwarzenbcrg, 
 transported by sudden impulse, exclaimed : " The marriage, tlie 
 marriage ! . . . Policy made it, and policy may unmake it." Bassano, 
 according to Tliicrs, did nut report tlicse words to Napoleon, " lest," 
 he adds, "he should irritate him against Austria." Such conduct was 
 not faithful service.
 
 TEE SPBING OF 1S13. 91 
 
 Poniatowski into Upper Silesia. The two corps were 
 cantoned, side by side, in Polish and Austro-Polish 
 territory, and Poniatowski had received instructions not 
 to let the Austrians out of his sight. Finding the 
 presence of Poniatowski dangerous to the scheme he was 
 meditatnig, Metternich had recourse to an expedient, 
 extremely hazardous in itself, but one which, under the 
 circumstance of Napoleon being at the moment actually 
 engaged on the field of battle, he thought he would be 
 able to excuse. He made a secret convention with the 
 llussians, whereby the latter, by a pretended display of 
 superior forces, should appear to compel the Austrians to 
 repass the Vistula, and to fall back into Galicia, taking 
 with them the corps of Poniatowski. That corps, then, by 
 the orders of the King of Saxony, who, as Grand Duke 
 of Warsaw, was its sovereign, and who had agreed to the 
 design, might be disarmed. This convention, which was 
 made at Kalisch towards the end of April, was but 
 another Aveb in the net which Metternich was weaving 
 round Napoleon. 
 
 Metternich virtually gained for the moment, the King 
 -of Saxony. Having by this means arranged to rid himself 
 of the Franco-Polish troops on the Austrian borders, he 
 turned his attention to Bavaria. To treat of defection 
 from Napoleon to the King of that country was a business 
 requiring special delicacy of touch, for Bavaria had been 
 something more than the immemorial ally of France. 
 She was the country in Europe which had the most 
 benefited from that alliance, and benefited, moreover, at 
 the expense of Austria. To her the triumph of the 
 allies, if Austria were to join the alliance, would 
 mean the renunciation of Tirol, the Salzkammero-ut, 
 and portions of the valley of the Danube. Yet, notwith- 
 standing the difl[iculty of the task, Metternich attempted
 
 92 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 it, and made an impression which revealed itself after 
 Leipsig-.* 
 
 Meanwhile, M. de Narbonne arrived in Vienna, and 
 was received there with the greatest distinction. Metter- 
 nich talked to him in the same sense as regarded the 
 conditions of a general peace in which he had talked ta 
 his predecessor. The French ambassador soon, in a 
 manner presently to be stated, recognised the fact to 
 which all his countrymen had been blind, which Napoleon 
 himself, duped by the marriage, had never admitted, that 
 Austria not only would not lend herself to the designs of 
 his Emperor ; she would do her utmost to thwart them.f 
 He discovered the truth in this wise. Shortly after his 
 arrival he received from the Duke of Bassano instructions 
 to propose to Austria to constitute herself a mediator 
 between the contending powers in the sense of a supporter 
 of the views of France ; that is, to notify to the allies 
 that unless they would agree to the terms proposed by 
 France and Austria conjointly, terms really dictated by 
 France, she would launch an army of 100,000 men into 
 Silesia. Metternich listened to the proposal with liis 
 usual calmness ; then quietly inquired what were the 
 
 * On the 8th October, eight days before the beginning of the 
 battle of Leipsig, Count Wrede, who commanded the Bavariau forces, 
 persuaded his sovereign to sign a convention witli tlie allies by- 
 virtue of which Bavaria joined the alliance. AVrede, then, with 
 an army G0,000 strong, proceeded to occupy a position at Ilaiiau, 
 between Leipsig and France, in order to cut oli Napoleon. The Frenclx 
 Emperor, retreating from the fatal field, and liaving in hand only 
 17,000 men at the moment, came upon the position occupied by 
 Wrede, barring his further progress. He at once proceeded to recon- 
 noitre, tlien, turning to his generals and exclaiming, " Poor Wrede ! I 
 made him a Count, but I never succeeded in making him a General,"' 
 attacked and dispersed his army. 
 
 t Napoleon at St. Helena used these words : " Until the arrival of 
 M. de Narbonne at Vienna, we had been the dupes of Austria: he had 
 Dot been there fifteen days before he discovered everything."
 
 THE SPRING OF 1813. 93 
 
 conditions which woukl be proposed to the allies in the 
 event of their preferring, under the circumstances, peace 
 to war. On that point Narbonne was only expecting in- 
 structions. Metternich then retired to consider what 
 profit he could derive from the proposal made to him. 
 
 It seemed to him that the profit might be very great 
 indeed — greater, far greater, than he had dared to hope 
 for. By acce])ting the role of mediator, proposed by 
 Napoleon — by accepting that role, that is to say, not as 
 Napoleon understood it, but as Austria might choose to 
 understand it — Austria would, without any announcement, 
 abandon the perplexing position of ally then held under 
 the provisions of the treaty of March, 1812. Then, 
 again, the acceptance of that role would necessitate 
 further arming to make it a role which could be re- 
 spected. Such acceptance would, besides, sufficiently 
 ex})lain the action of Prince Schwarzenberg's corps in 
 retreating behind the Galician frontier. After taking, 
 for appearance' sake, some time for reflection, though in 
 point of fiict, his mind had been made up on the instant, 
 Metternich saw again ]M. de Narbonne, and told him that 
 on all the important parts of his recent communication he 
 was happy to find himself in perfect agreement with the 
 French Emperor ; that the Emperor Francis thought, and 
 he also recognised, that it was no longer possible for 
 Austria to confine herself to the secondary role she had 
 occupied in 1812 ; that the circumstances being very 
 different, her action should be different also ; that Austria 
 had foreseen this, and was prepared for it ; that it was 
 because she had perceived it that she had armed, 
 and was now ready, including the corps she had with- 
 drawn into Galicia, to concentrate 100,000 men in 
 Bohemia. As to the mode of presenting herself to the 
 allies, Austria again had the happiness to be in perfect
 
 94 LIFE OF PBINCE METTETtNICH. 
 
 accord with Napoleon ; there was but one way, and that 
 uas to pose as an armed mediator. She would propose 
 to the Powers to cease hostilities, to agree to an armistice, 
 to appoint plenipotentiaries. If they would consent to it, 
 then would be the time to produce the conditions, and he 
 would await with impatience those promised from France. 
 If, on the contrary, they should refuse to agree to peace 
 on any terms, then would be the time to act, and to 
 arrange how the armies of France and Austria could best 
 work for a common end. Metternich concluded by again 
 alluding to the necessity which had arisen for the with- 
 drawal of the Austrian auxiliary corps from Poland, and 
 by repeating the intense pleasure he felt at being in 
 perfect agreement with Napoleon. 
 
 " Never," writes M. Thiers, " iu tliis formidable and complicated 
 game of dii^lomacy, has one played better and gained more than did 
 M. de Metternich on this occasion. With one blow, in fact, ho had 
 solved all his difficulties. From being an enslaved ally he had boldly 
 made himself not oaly mediator, but armed mediator. He had dared 
 to declare that the treaty of alliance of March 1812 was no longer 
 applicable to existing circumstances ; he had given reasons for his 
 armaments to which France could not oifer a single objection ; he had 
 solved in advance a great difficulty, fast approaching him, that of how 
 to employ the auxiliary Austrian cnrjis. As to the olTer to enter into 
 the views of France, to act with her to finish the overthrow of Ger- 
 many, to displace Prussia, that is, to destroy her, to take Silesia, &c., 
 it is not necessary to add that Austria would not have it at any price, 
 not indeed from love for Prussia, but for love for the common inde- 
 pendence. She eluded then tliis ofier, by professing to regard the case 
 as a case of war, with which she would occupy her.sclf later on, when 
 the belligerent Powers should have refused every overture for peace, a 
 result in the highest degree improbable. M. de IMetternich terminated 
 his declaration by announcing that a courier extraordinary would at 
 once start for Paris to convey a copy of it to Prince Schwarzcuberg." 
 
 This is quite true. Metternich carried his powers of 
 deception so far as to make it appear that he accepted 
 the French scheme, whereas he simply intended to use it
 
 THE SPBING OF 1813. 95 
 
 to concert measures with the allies against Napoleon. 
 It was another and a very important mesh in his web. 
 Yet his success was not quite so great as the reader 
 mig-lit gather from the perusal of the commentary of 
 M. Thiers. He mystified, but he did not take in M. de 
 Narbonne. The French ambassador was too clear- 
 headed a man to fail to be struck by the facility with 
 which the Minister agreed to all his proposals. Not so 
 readily, he thought to himself, would Austria, in the 
 circumstances then existing, assent to a proposition which 
 would place, according to his view of it, in the hands of 
 Napoleon, the direction of the forces she had raised and 
 armed with so much haste. For granting, as one could 
 not fail to grant, that the allies would refuse the pro- 
 posals of Napoleon, though presented by the hand of 
 Austria, that was the logical alternative, the only alter- 
 native, of his proposals, as he intended them to be 
 understood. If Metternich had understood him in a 
 different sense, then there must be a further explanation. 
 Yet he had seemed to understand him — and had not 
 raised one objection. Puzzled, convinced that all was 
 not right, Narbonne endeavoured, by further questioning, 
 to get behind the real meaning of the Minister. To 
 accomplish this, he asked him what would happen if 
 France and Austria could not agree on the terms of 
 peace to be offered to the allies. This was to beg the 
 whole question. Metternich, recognising this on the 
 instant, conscious that a direct answer would show the 
 Frenchman that he was being played with, hastened to 
 elude a reply by an adroit interruption. " The question 
 of conditions does not disturb me," he hastened to 
 interpose. 
 
 " Your master •will be reasonable — it is impossible lie should n«t be. 
 What ! ho would not risk everything for that ridiculous chimera of the
 
 96 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEENICH. 
 
 Gmnd Duchy of Warsaw, for that not less ridiculous protectorate of 
 the Coafederation of the Rhine, for those Hauseatic towns which will 
 be of no further use to liim on tlie day when, signing a general peace, 
 he shall renounce the Continental blockade — no, no, it is not possible." 
 
 Still Narbonue was not satisfied. He pushed Metternich 
 more closely, until finally he posed the home question as 
 to what Austria would do in case Napoleon should not be 
 reasonable. Thus pressed, Metternich, impatient, anxious 
 to finish, had to declare that Austria, as mediator, and iis 
 armed mediator, would be an arbiter who had in her 
 hands the means of compelling respect for right and 
 justice. As though he had in this said too much, he 
 added, that all the prepossessions of the arbiter were in 
 favour of France. " But," replied the persistent French- 
 man, resolved to probe the question to the bottom, " in 
 certain eventualities you would side against us ? " " No, 
 no," answered Metternich, anxious by any subterfuge 
 to be rid of further interrogation, " we should not do 
 that, because you would be reasonable." This reply, 
 Avhich practically finished the conversation, left no doubt 
 in the mind of the ambassador as to the real object 
 of Metternich, and he reported his opinion to his master. 
 From that moment he watched all the movements of 
 tlie Austrian statesman, demanding explanations on every 
 doubtful point, and subjecting him to a cross-examination 
 which Metternich found most embarrassing. 
 
 Napoleon received the reports of his ambassador at 
 Mayence on his way to join the army. Believing that a 
 ■decisive victory over the allies would solve every difficulty, 
 lie wrote to M. de Narbonue telling him that whilst he 
 understood the double game Austria was playing, it was 
 not advisable to push her to an immediate declaration; 
 that it was as well to soothe her till he should have cut 
 the Gordian knot at Dresden. He quitted Mayence the
 
 LVTZEN AND BAUTZEN. 97 
 
 26th April; met and defeated the allies at Liitzen the 3r(l 
 May ; followed them, and again encountered and defeated 
 them at Bautzen the 20th and 21st of the same month. 
 This last defeat decided Metternich to throw off the 
 mask. Before I proceed to describe how, and with what 
 determination to prevent peace, to push matters to ex- 
 tremities against Napoleon, he carried out this operation, 
 it is necessary to say a few words as to the line he had 
 followed with the French ambassador at Vienna since we 
 I: ft him in the middle of April. 
 
 The reader will recollect the manoeuvre by which 
 ]\Ietternich had enticed the Austrian auxiliary corps 
 which had been stationed in Poland, with the corps of 
 Prince Poniatowski accompanying it into Bohemia. 
 Once in that country he had experienced no difficulty in 
 persuading the King of Saxony to direct that it should 
 bo disarmed. Napoleon heard of this extraordinary 
 interference with the Polish troops at Mayence, and not 
 quite understanding it, despatched thence a courier 
 to Poniatowski to forbid him to deliver up his arms on 
 any pretext whatever. 
 
 Narbonne, to whom these instructions had also been 
 communicated, was very uneasy as to what might happen 
 if the Austrian Government should persist in its intention, 
 and, whilst Napoleon was fighting at Liitzen, he was 
 engaged at Vienna in endeavouring to procure from 
 Metternich a satisfactory assurance with respect alike to 
 Poniatowski's corps and to the auxiliary Austrian corps, 
 both of which, he contended, were still by treaty under the 
 orders of the French Emperor. I\Ietternich, bound by his 
 secret convention with Russia to keep these troops out of 
 the fighting line, strove first to elude the demand, saying 
 that it was impossible to be at the same time mediator 
 and combatant. Pressed, however, by Narbonne to 
 
 H
 
 98 LIFE OF PItlNCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 explain his intentions categorically ; to say directly 
 whether Austria was, or was not, bound by the treaty of 
 the 14th March, 1812, Metternich, greatly embarrassed, 
 replied, with all the suavity he could command, that it 
 \\as true that Austria was still the ally of France and 
 wished to remain so ; but she was mediator also, and, 
 in that capacity, her role as belligerent was for the 
 moment suspended. He begged, then, the French am- 
 bassador not to push him further ; not to insist on the 
 recommencement of hostilities with Hussia, for, as he 
 could not accede to that demand, to persist in it would 
 be to place him in a false position. Tlien he added the 
 words with which he felt confident he could win his 
 interlocutor — words of specious appearance, but as false 
 in their real significance as any words ever spoken by 
 a minister. Resolved, thoroughly resolved, as he was 
 at the moment he uttered them, to make common cause 
 with the allies ; waiting only for the time when he could 
 make the interference of Austria most decisive agfainst 
 Napoleon ; he added, " if I refuse you 30,000 men 
 to-day, it is only that I may give you 150,000 later on, 
 when we shall have agreed upon a peace which will be 
 acce])table to all Europe." But Narbonne was not under 
 the spell of the minister. Flis early doubts regarding 
 him had now become absolute distrust. Unconvinced, 
 then, by the reply of Metternich, he transmitted to him 
 a formal note requiring the Court of Vienna either to 
 execute the treaty of March 14, or to say that it no 
 longer existed. At the time that lie gave in that note 
 he demanded a personal interview with the Emperor, in 
 order that, before a reply to the note should be sanctioned, 
 he might have the opportunity of ])utting before Francis 
 the grave results which must follow the rejection of his 
 demand. The interview was at once granted. Francis,
 
 L UTZEN AND BA UTZEN. 9 9 
 
 who had learned his lesson, replied to Narbonne's in- 
 sistance in terms almost identical \\'\i\\ those used by 
 Metternich. lie even went so far as to express a tear 
 lest the ambassador was not overstepping the spirit of" 
 his instructions in demanding a categorical reply to his 
 note. The latter, then, could only repeat the grave 
 apprehensions he felt on the subject, and declined to 
 ■withdraw his note. 
 
 Forced to reply to that note, driven also to dissemble 
 and deceive till the time for action should arrive, Metter- 
 nich could only fall back upon the verbal assurance he 
 had already given, to the effect that Austria, being 
 mediator as well as ally, the role of the latter must be 
 suspended till the duties of the former should have been 
 accomplished. To soften the practical refusal contained 
 in this answer, he added to it an engagement that no 
 attempt should be made to disarm Poniatowski's corps 
 during its march through Austrian territory. 
 
 ]\Iatters were in this condition at Vienna when the 
 ne^vs of the result of the battle of Liitzen arrived there. 
 At first, as often happens, rumours prevailed, and, being 
 conformable to the wishes of the Court, were believed, 
 that the advantage had been with the allies. Soon, 
 however, the information that whilst the French were at 
 the gates of Dresden, the allies had been compelled to 
 cross the Elbe, reveahid the truth. The moment there 
 could be no longer any doubt on this point IMetternich 
 hastened to the French ambassador, and, tellinfr him 
 that he was not surprised at Napoleon's success, inasmuch 
 as he had based all his pacific calculations upon his 
 victories, added that the result of the success at Liitzen 
 -would be that the pretensions of the allies would be 
 diminished by two-thirds ; that he had counted on such a 
 result ; that he had felt that the one-third which remained 
 
 H 2
 
 100 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 of the allied propositions embodied the principle upon 
 which a lasting peace could be secured ; that Austria could 
 now seriously take up her role of mediator ; that, to 
 carry it to a successful issue, he proposed to send Count 
 Bubna to the headquarters of Napoleon, and (^unt 
 Stadion to the headquarters of Alexander. lie went on 
 to express himself more decidedly than he had ventured 
 to do before rejiardinof the conditions which commended 
 themselves to the C^ourt of Vienna as reasonable. They 
 comprised — the sacrifice by France of the Grand Duchy 
 of Warsaw to be restored mainly to Prussia ; the disso- 
 lution of the Confederation of the Rhine ; the giving-up 
 of the Ilanseatic towns ; and the restoration to Austria 
 of the Illyrian provinces. Nothing was said of Holland.. 
 or of Spain, or of Italy. 
 
 Napoleon, informed during the interval between Liit- 
 zen and Bautzen of what had been passing at Vienna, 
 was fast repenting the confidence engendered by the 
 marriage which had impelled him to propose to Austria 
 the role of mediator. He realised now, to a certain 
 extent, though not yet completely, the use, or rather the 
 misuse, she would make of that role, and he was inclined 
 to find fault with his ambassador for having pushed her 
 so closely as to force her to make the declaration that in 
 the presence of her duties as mediator, Iwr role as active 
 ally had ceased.* An accident, a chance, came at this 
 ])eriod to confirm his suspicions of the bad faith of 
 
 * At St. Helena, Napoleon wrote: "The penetration of M. de 
 Narbonne was more injurious than .scrvice;ible to my intcresls. 
 Austria, recognising that he had divined her intentions, tlirew off the 
 mask, and hastened her action. Had there been less penetration on 
 our part, she would liave been more reserved, more slow. She would 
 have prolonged her natural indecision, and, during that time, we should 
 have had other chances." — Memorial de St, Upline, by Count de 
 Las-Cases, tome iii. p. 95.
 
 LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN. 101 
 
 Austria. At Dresden the French captured a courier 
 conveying- despatches from the Kussian Minister at 
 Vienna to the Russian Chancellor with the Czar. These 
 despatches gave abundant evidence of the double game 
 Metternich was playing. They were full of excuses for the 
 delay of Austria in making common cause with the allies. 
 The Minister reported in them that ]\Ietternich had pleaded 
 the manner in which he was fettered by the treaty of the 
 1-lth jNIarch, 1812 ; by the marriage ; by the danger of 
 declaring prematurely ; by the backwardness of Austria's 
 preparations. The despatches contained, besides, ex- 
 pressions which went far to show that the heart of the 
 Austrian statesman was with the enemies of France. 
 M. Thiers argues that this revelation should have made 
 Xapoleon more willing to accept the conditions which 
 jMetternich had proposed to M. de Narbonne as the 
 conditions which Austria would impose on the allies. 
 But we, to whom Metternich has revealed himself in his 
 Autobiography, may well doubt whether he would have 
 been true to those conditions. Certainly, during the 
 armistice after Bautzen, he went far beyond them. I am 
 inclined to think that the instinct of Napoleon was more 
 true when, on discovering this double-dealing on the part 
 of Metternich, he decided to recur to the policy of 
 Caulaincourt and Talleyrand, that is, to treat directly 
 with Kussia, passing by the mediation of Austria. Suc- 
 ceeding in that, that is, in making peace with llussia, lie 
 was prepared to agree to the terms imposed by England 
 regarding Spain, in order that he might be free the more 
 effectually to punish the two German powers which had 
 betrayed him. lie instructed, then, his ambassador at 
 Vienna to press Metternich no more ; to recognise, even, 
 that the treaty of March 14th was not ap})licable to 
 existing circumstances ; to let him plainly see the extent
 
 102 LIFE OF PlilNCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 of the resources of the Emperor in Italy, in Bavaria, and 
 in France. At the same time he despatched Prince 
 Eugene into Italy, to raise there an army of 100,000 
 men ; made fresh arrangements regarding his reserves ; 
 and effected a reconciliation with the King of Saxony, 
 who had come to Dresden for the purpose. He was in 
 these dispositions regarding Metternich and Austria when 
 the plenipotentiary despatched by the former to nego- 
 tiate the mediation, Count Bubna, arrived at Dresden. 
 
 At that moment Napoleon was on the eve of setting 
 out to deal to the allies a blow which he hoped might 
 finish everytliing. He gave the Austrian envoy a very 
 cold reception, but this latter, a man of resource, had the 
 happy inspiration to draw from his portfolio a letter 
 addressed to Napoleon by his father-in-law. This letter 
 revived the false hopes based on the matrimonial alliance 
 between the two crowns, and induced Napoleon to listen 
 with patience, and something more than patience, to the 
 proposals of mediation of which Bubna was the bearer. 
 
 Napoleon was prepared to yield something, though not 
 all that Austria asked for. As his armaments were not 
 completed, he caught rather too readily, in the course of 
 conversation, at the idea, suggested by Bubna, of an 
 armistice, and concerted with that envoy a letter which 
 the latter should write in his own name to Stadion, then 
 at the headquarters of the Czar, in which should be 
 suggested the proposal for the meeting at IVague of a 
 congress to arrange conditions of a general peace. 
 Bubna, having written this letter under the eye of 
 Napoleon, and despatched it, returned to Vienna, very 
 satisfied with his mission, the bearer of a letter from 
 Napoleon to his father-in-law. In view of the negotia- 
 tions whicli took place in consequence of Bubna's mission, 
 and to enable the reader thoroughly to understand and
 
 THE AB3nSTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 103 
 
 appreciate the conduct of Metternicli, it is necessary to 
 add that this letter contained an earnest, even an affec- 
 tionate a})peal to Francis, to protect, in the negotiation^ 
 tlie honour of his son-in-law. Napoleon said, in fact, 
 that whilst earnestly desirous of peace, he valued his 
 honour more; that, son-in-law of the Emperor Francis, 
 he confided his honour to his care ; that he preferred it 
 to the exercise of power ; that he would rather die than 
 accept humiliating terms. 
 
 Having- despatched Bubna to A^ienna, and Caulaincourt 
 to the headquarters of the allies to open negotiations with 
 the Czar, Napoleon quitted Dresden, 18th May, to join 
 his army, and attack the allies. I have already recorded 
 that he attacked and defeated them at Bautzen on the 20th 
 and 21st May. If Marshal Ney, after having carried the 
 village of Preititz on the second day, had at once marched 
 upon Hochkirch, the war would have been then and there 
 ended, for, in all probability, the Czar and the King oi 
 Prussia would have been captured. But though this mis- 
 take prevented the victory from being absolutely decisive, 
 it was nevertheless a victory, which, but for Metternicli and 
 the lingering trust placed by Napoleon on his matrimonial 
 alliance with the House of llabsburg, might have been 
 used with decisive effect. The enemy were driven beyond 
 tlie Oder; their commander-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly, 
 strongly urged a further retreat into Poland ; had Napoleon 
 followed them without intermission, the coalition must 
 have been dissolved. At this decisive moment, by one of 
 those fatalities which come to mar fortune, Napoleon, half 
 trusting, half distrusting, Austria ; believing, too, that 
 time would work more for him than for the enemy ; agreed, 
 at Pleiswitz, to an armistice. That armistice became, by 
 the intervention and careful plotting of jMetternich, the 
 most fatal act, up to that time, of his career.
 
 104 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 FROM THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ TO THE 
 RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES. 
 
 June-August, 1813. 
 
 IMetternich was at Vienna when, at four o'clock on 
 the 29th, he received news of the loss of tlie battle of 
 Bautzen. He proceeded at once to report the fact to the 
 Emperor. His mind was made up as to the course to be 
 ])iirsued. He writes : 
 
 "I had made my choice. Tlio point was this — to prevent Napoleon's 
 onward march, and to remove all uncertainty as to the decision of 
 tlie Emperor from the minds of the Emiieior Alexander and King- 
 Frederick William. Tho lUitisiau army was much demoralised ; it had 
 but one wish — to get back into its own territory. The Emperor 
 Alexander had indeed resolved to carry on the war ; but the will of 
 tho army might at last have got the better of his intentions. The 
 allied armies had decided to retreat towards Silesia. This manoeuvre, 
 well-planned from a military point of view, clearly showed the 
 intention of the Emperor Alexander, who desired to drive Austria into 
 a corner and oblige her to join the alliance. If Austria Avere to show 
 that she was not inclined to take part in the war against Napoleon, 
 tliis would give tho Russian monarch the excuse to cross the Warta, 
 and conclude the wur." 
 
 Thus resolved to put Au.<tria in the line with Prussia 
 and Russia ao-ainst Prance, yet conscious that Austria was 
 not quite ready to play her part: — conscious, too, that it
 
 TEE ABMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 105 
 
 was yet in the power of Napoleon to decide the retreat 
 of Kussia before Austria could make an effective demon- 
 stration, Metternich, to be near enough to the allies to 
 carry on his intrigues successfully, persuaded his master 
 to accompaiiv him to a locality midway, or nearly midway, 
 between Dresden and the headquarters of the Czar. The 
 village of Gitschin appeared to them, from its position on 
 the map. to be such a locality. They accordingly at once 
 proceeded thither, arriving there the ord June. 
 
 On their way to that village, the illustrious travellers 
 had, on the 2nd, met Count Nesselrode, sent by Alexander 
 to urge Austria to a rapid decision. After giving a reply of 
 an eminently encouraging character, they continued their 
 journey, and arrived at Gitschin, as I said, on the 3rd. 
 The next day ]\[etternicli sent to the French headquarters 
 to demand a personal interview with the Duke of Bassano, 
 and to inform him that Francis had quite determined to 
 give the necessary authority to the proposals for mediation. 
 But, on the proposition of Count Bubna, the armistice of 
 Pleiswitz had been signed that vei-y day. ]\Ietternich 
 states that he expected the answer of the French minister 
 to be evasive ; that he wanted it to be evasive, in order to 
 furnish him with a pretext for concerting measures 
 personally with the Czar. The reply was not, in point of 
 fact, evasive, though Metternich calls it so. The date of 
 it was the 4th of June, and Napoleon, busy with his 
 troops, only reached Dresden on the 10th, and the time 
 of his arrival was then uncertain. Taking advantage, 
 then, of the fact that the reply of Bassano mentioned the 
 absence of Napoleon, and did not, because it could nor, 
 fix a date for an interview, ^Metternich hurried off to 
 Opoeno, the place appointed by Alexander to meet him. 
 The Czar, accompanied by his sister, the Grand Duchess 
 Katharine ; by Count Nesselrode ; by Count Stadiun, the
 
 lOG LIFE OF PBINGE METTEBNICR. 
 
 liead of the anti-French party in Austria ; and by 
 Lebzeltern, the envoy employed by Metternich m 1810 
 to negotiate between Napoleon and the Pope, had been 
 there some hours when Metternich arrived. 
 
 The first interview, which took place at once, lasted 
 two hours. It was decisive as to the question of the 
 co-operation of Austria. Metternich treated it as an 
 arrangement absolutely resolved upon. When Alexander 
 ex})ressed some fear lest Napoleon should accept the 
 meditation of Austria, and that this acceptance might 
 derange the plans of the allies, the reply of Metternich 
 rang clear and unalterable. Tlie meditation, he was 
 determined, should lead to nothing. 
 
 "If," he said, "Napoleon decliuc the mediation, the armistice 
 lapses ; if he accept, the negotiations will prove that ho does not wish 
 to be wise or just, and the result will be the same. In any case, we 
 shall have gained the time necessary to bring our troops into such a 
 position that we need not fear a separate attack made either upon them 
 or you, and we shall be able, in our turn, to assume the offensive." * 
 
 In subsequent interviews, Metternich succeeded in 
 regaining entirely the confidence of Alexander. We have 
 the testimony of Frederick Gentz, who was at Opocno at 
 the time, that the ruling desire of xVlexander, the idea 
 which had taken possession of his somewhat narrow mind, 
 was to pose as the saviour of Euroj)e. 
 
 * This admission on the part of Metternich proves the enormous 
 mistake Napoleon made in consenting to an armistice. Before the 
 armistice he had scattered llussia and Prussia, and he was in a posi- 
 tion to turn round and rend unprepared Austria. Prince Napoleon 
 (Napoleon and his Detractors) writes on this point : " Napoleon has 
 been reproaclicd wilh that armistice as a fault. It would, doubtless, 
 have been a military mistake had Napoleon been certain of Austria's 
 treachery." "Why was he not certain of a treachery which was so 
 evidently predetermined? It was simply because he never believed 
 tliat the Emperor of Austria would proceed to extremities against the 
 husb.iud of his daughter. Alas ! tbat fatal marriage 1
 
 THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 107 
 
 " I could see,'' wrote Gcutz, Juuo 22u(l, " that the idea of witli- 
 drawiug from the war, without tlie attaiuiuent of the great cud witli 
 which he had been liattered, pierced liis very soul, and that he (such 
 is his feeling) would give a kingdom if he could stir up Austria without 
 any attempt at peace. Yet he seems to see that it is utter insanity to 
 continue the war witliout Austria's concurrence." 
 
 Five days alter Geiitz had penned these words, the 
 Austrian envoy with the Czar, Count Stadion, signed at 
 Keichenbach, in Silesia, with the full concurrence of 
 Metternich, a treaty with Russia and Prussia for the 
 overthrow of Napoleon. The reader will remember that 
 this took place whilst Austria was acting as mediator 
 between Napoleon and the allies, and after she had freed 
 herself from the obligations of the treaty of March 14, 
 1812, on the plea that she could not be at the same time 
 ally and meditator.* 
 
 The salient points of this treaty were, (1) that Austria 
 bound herself to Russia and Prussia to declare war on 
 France, unless, before the 20th of July of that year 
 (changed afterwards to the 10th August), France should 
 have accepted the conditions laid down by the Emperor 
 of Austria as " indispensable to a state of equili- 
 brium and durable tran(]uillity in Euro])e : " (2) con- 
 
 * The treaty of Reicheubach was kept a profound secret, so secret 
 that it never eveu came to the knowledge of M. Thiers, and is uevei- 
 referred to by him in his history of the events of the period. This may 
 be accounted for by the fact that Thiers accepted too blindly the 
 assurances of Metternich, whom he greatly admired, and with whom 
 he was in constant communication. It would have lifted the veil from 
 the impression which Metternich desired to produce on the French 
 politicians of the period if he had allowed BI. Thiers to read a 
 document which proved that it was not Napoleon, but Austria, which 
 was bent on the rupture of the armistice. Of the authenticity of the 
 treaty there can be no doubt. Metternich alludes to it in the 
 documents appended to his Memoirs (V^ol. ii., p. 4G5, French edition). 
 The full text of it is given by Prince Napoleon in his iidmirable work. 
 Napoleon and his Detractors, Appendix, p. 373, Ewjlish edition.
 
 108 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 tains the conditions, which were the same as those pre- 
 viously formulated : (3) contains a promise on the part 
 of Austria that should those conditions not be accepted, 
 she will employ all her available forces to secure their 
 adoption : (4) " reciprocally, the two Courts of liussia 
 and Prussia ent^agc to act henceforth in concert with 
 Austria in the capacity of allies, and each with those of 
 her forces available at the time : " (5) regulates the 
 number of troops to be employed : (6) " as soon as w^ar 
 shall have begun, the three allied Courts shall I'egard, as 
 the aim of their simultaneous efforts, the execution of the 
 articles expressed by the Russian and Prussian cabinets 
 in their notes of May 16, which shall be construed in the 
 widest acceptation." (These articles included : the retro- 
 cession of Hanover to England ; the renunciatiom by 
 France of all the territories on the right bank of the 
 Rhine-, the independence of the intermediate States 
 between the Rhine and the Alps ; the reconstitution of 
 the frontiers of Austria and Prussia, on the basis of 1805) : 
 (7) the three Courts to agree to nothing except by mutual 
 consent : (8) each Court to appoint officers to arrange 
 the plan of campaign with the Commander-in-chief of the 
 Austrian army : (D) the allied Courts most solemnly 
 bind themselves not to enter into any separate agreement 
 with France : (10) a similar engagement on the part of 
 Austria alone: (11) the convention to be kept secret; 
 the consent of Austria being required to its disclosure : 
 (12) the convention to be ratified within six days. 
 
 Metternich quitted Opocno seven days before this con- 
 vention had been actually signed. He had, however, 
 arranged all its provisions, and he could return with a 
 liijht heart to Gitschin, This he did on the 20th, and 
 there he found a pressing invitation from Bassano to come 
 to Dresden. Before he accepted the invitation he coir-
 
 THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 109 
 
 municated with the Kusso-Prusslan cabinet sitting at 
 Rcichenbach, and assured them that they could depend 
 on him. On their side, he writes, "there was much 
 dejection." Evidently they did not quite trust him. 
 They had not realised, they could not realise, that 
 Metternich, having carefully studied the three sovereigns, 
 was really aiming at the domination of the Continent ; the 
 first essential step to which was the fall of Napoleon. 
 They might have safely trusted him. Already, whilst on 
 his road to Dresden, to treat nominally with Napoleon for 
 peace, he was hurrying the levy of troops; establishing 
 magazines ; removing supplies from places likely to be 
 occupied by the French ; laying tetes-de-pont on the Elbe 
 and the Moldau. He tells us plainly that these pre- 
 parations were being made, not that they might aid 
 Austria to pose effectually as a mediator, but to serve 
 Austria and the Allies, when war should have succeeded 
 to the armistice. 
 
 Metternicb reached Dresden the 24th June. Napoleon 
 was, at the moment, absent, and did not return till the 
 following day. On that day occurred the historical 
 interview between the Emperor and the Austrian 
 Minister. 
 
 Of that interview there are two versions, differinfr from 
 each other in all essential points. And yet, one of the 
 two is the only possible version. There were only two 
 men present at the interview. Only those two, therefore, 
 could have certainly known what passed on the occasion. 
 All other versions must be imaginary and fictitious. \\e 
 are, then, in this predicament for historic truth ; that each 
 of the two principals has left a record of what passed at 
 an interview which was to decide the question of peace 
 or war, and the two records are irreconcilable. Which 
 is the true one ?
 
 110 LIFE OF PRINCE 3IETTERNICK 
 
 To help us to answer that question it is well that we 
 shouhl ascertain the spirit which animated the two actors 
 immediately prior to the interview. This has been done 
 with great eii'ect and with ])erfect impartiality by Prince 
 Napoleon in the book* to which I have more than once 
 referred. The Prince, at all events., may be accepted as 
 an authority for the frame of mind which he has discerned 
 in his uncle. That which animated Metternich is told too 
 |;lainly iu his Autobiography. 
 
 To begin with the Emperor. " With his shrewd 
 mind," writes the Prince, " Napoleon wanted a longer 
 armistice ; he admitted the neutrality and mediation of 
 Austria, but looked for some prospective basis of a 
 durable peace." He concludes, then, that Napoleon went 
 to the interview really w'ishing for a peace which should 
 be based on durable principles, but determined not to 
 accept terms for ever shifting and expanding according 
 to the accident of the hour. 
 
 Metternich, on the contrary, went to the interview in a 
 frame of mind absolutely hostile to Napoleon and liis 
 cause. lie records T)ne or two little incidents or im- 
 pressions at this particular moment w-hicli tend to give 
 evidence of his bitterness against the Emperor, of his 
 conviction that the time for striking had come. On tlie 
 first head he uses this expression : " Na])oleon's head- 
 ([uarters were at the 3Iarcolini Garden, near the Elster 
 meadows, lie had not the courage to live in the town." 
 This remark, directly impugning the courage of the man 
 who never spared himself on the battlefield, besides being 
 an imputation reflecting on the mind of the man who 
 made it, shows a bitterness of soul, an aggravation of 
 v'indictiveness, which would ill prepare the uttcrer for 
 friendly intercourse with the man against whom it was 
 * Napukon and /;/.s Detractors, pp. 17G-8.
 
 TEE ABMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. Ill 
 
 directed. There was n. very good reason ^\hy Xapoleon 
 should have his headquarters in the 3Iarcolini palace. 
 First, it had attached to it a large garden ; secondly, it 
 was near his troops. The Marcolini palace and garden, 
 now used as an hospital, are situated in a suburb of 
 Dresden called Friedrichstadt. They had the reputation 
 of being healthy, and the garden was beautifully laid 
 out. \Mien Kapoleon had occu])ied \"ienna he had taken 
 up his residence at the Schonbriinn palace, because it was 
 a palace with a garden, in which he could walk and 
 meditate without attracting attention. He did the same 
 for the same reason at Dresden. Yet Metternich, on the 
 eve of an interview which was to decide the fate of 
 Europe, writes down his antagonist as a coward because 
 he preferred a palace with a garden to the crowded 
 streets of a large city. The remark may be trifling in 
 itself, but few will dispute that it betrays a concentrated 
 bitterness of soul and a prejudice sufficient to render 
 dispassionate judgment impossible. 
 
 Then, again, Metternich states that he had discerned 
 a great and rising feeling against Napoleon amongst a 
 large section of Frenchmen ; that the army sighed for 
 peace, and had little confidence in the issue of the war. 
 Surely, the knowledge of the existence of such feelings 
 among the subjects of his enemy could not but steel the 
 heart of the Austrian against peace, when he was con- 
 fident that in continuing the war he would be fightiny- 
 Napoleon with two forces: with the enthusiasm of 
 oppressed and revolting Germany; and the disillusion 
 and weariness of the French people. 
 
 But these are not the only indications which Metternich 
 gave of his determination to prolong the war at all 
 hazards. First, we have the convention of Reichenbach. 
 arranged before he quitted Opocno, and signed the 27 ih
 
 112 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEENICH. 
 
 June. Then wc have this preijfnant sentence, already 
 given in nearly the same words, hut wliich will hear 
 repetition, 
 
 " "\Vl)at will become of our cause," asked Alexander at Opocuo, "if 
 Napoleon accepts the mediation." "If he should decline it," I 
 answered, " the armistice will cease as a matter of course, and you will 
 find us among the number of your allies. If he should accept it, the 
 negotiations will prove Napoleon to be neither wise nor just, and 
 the result will be the same. In any case, we sliall have gained the 
 time we required, and we shall be able to take the offensive." 
 
 Constrained, then, to accept only one of the two 
 versions, we are bound to reject that of the man who 
 went to the interview with his mind fully bent on a 
 continuance of the war, who had a bitter personal spite 
 against Napoleon, and whose memoirs have been so 
 touched and re-touched as to be only reliable when the 
 events they record are supported by concurrent testimony. 
 The version dictated by Napoleon is, on the other hand, 
 borne out by the knowledge we have of the views and 
 hopes and plans he entertained at the period. We accept 
 it, therefore, in its entirety. 
 
 " So you have come, Mefternich," said Napoleon to the Austrian 
 statesman on his entering the room. " You are welcome. But, if you 
 wish for peace, why come so late ? We have already lost a month, and 
 your mediation grows almost hostile by reason of its inactivity. It 
 appears that it suits you no longer to guarantee the integrity of the 
 French Empire. Let it be so. But why did you not say so before? 
 Why did you not frardvly inform me of it on my return from Russia, 
 by Bubna, or, more recently, by Schwarzenberg? I might, perhaps, 
 liave been in time to modify my plans ; I might not even have entered 
 the field. 
 
 "By allowing me to get cxliausted by new ctToits, you doubtless 
 relied on less rapid events. Victory crowned those bold efforts. I win 
 two battles. My enemies, weakened, are on tlic point of recovering 
 from their illusions. You suddenly glide in between us. You speak 
 to me of armistice and mediation; to them of alliance. You embroil 
 everything. But for your fatal intervention, peace would now be 
 signed with the Allies.
 
 THE ABMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 113 
 
 " What have hitherto beea tho rcBults of the armistice ? I am not 
 acquainted with any other than the two treaties of Ruichenbach, which 
 Eiipfland has just wrung from Prussia and Russia. Another treaty 
 witii a third Power is also mentioned. But M. de Stadioji is on tho 
 spilt, Metternich, and you ouglit to be better informed than I on that 
 subject. 
 
 *' Admit, that since Austria assumed the title of mediator, she no 
 longer sides with me, that she is no longer impartial ; she is hostile. 
 y<iu were on the point of declaring against us, when the victory of 
 Liitzen startled you. Seeing me still so powerful, you felt it necessary 
 to develop your strength, and were anxious to ^uin time. 
 
 " To-day, your 200,000 men are ready. Schwarzeiiberg commands 
 them. He assembles them, near by, behind the curtain formed by the 
 mountains of Bohemia. And, because you believe yourselves to be in 
 a position to dictate the law, you come to me. The law, indeed ! And 
 why, pray, do you wish to dictate it only to me ? Am I no longer the 
 same man whom you defended yesterday ? If you are really a 
 mediator, why not, at least, hold the balance even? 
 
 " I have divined your intentions, Metternich : your Cabinet wishes 
 to take advantage of my difliculties, and increase them as much as 
 possible, in order to recover the whole or part of what has been lost. 
 'Die main point for you to ascertain is whether you can obtain a 
 ransom from me without fighting, or whether you will have to rank 
 openly with my enemies. You are not yet quite sure which alternative 
 will be most advantageous, and, perhaps, you only come here to 
 ascertain it. Well ! I do not refuse to come to terms. What do you 
 want?" 
 
 This was a sharp attack. M. de Metternich met it 
 with a complete array of diplomatic phrases. The only 
 advantage the Emperor, his master, was jealous of 
 acquiring was the influence which would impart to the 
 Cabinets of Europe the spirit of moderation, and respect 
 for the rights and possessions of independent States, with 
 which he himself was animated. Austria was desirous of 
 establishing a state of things which, by a wise rfc-partition 
 of power, would place the guarantee of peace under the 
 protection of a confederation of independent States. 
 
 " Explain yourself," interrupted the Emperor, " and let us come to 
 the point. But remember that I am a soldier who understands better 
 how to break than how to bind. I offered you Illyria as the price of 
 
 I
 
 114 LIFE OF PRINCE 3IETTEBNICH. 
 
 your neutrality. Are you satisfied? My army is quite suffieicnt to 
 bring the Russians and tlie Prussians to terms, and your neutrality is 
 all I ask." 
 
 " Why, Sire," replied quickly M. de Mettcrnich, " should your INTajesty 
 remain unsupjjorted in the contest ? "Why should you not double your 
 forces? You can do so, Sire, for it rests entirely with you to make use 
 of them. Indeed, things have reached a climax, and we can no longer 
 remain neutral ; we must declare either for or against you." 
 
 Then the conversation became almost inaudible, and 
 the Emperor led M. de Metternich to the map-room. 
 After a rather long interval, the Emperor again raised 
 his voice, and said : 
 
 " "What ! not only lUyria, biit half Italy, and the return of the Pope 
 to Rome ! the giving up of Spain, Holland, the Confederation of the 
 Rhine, and Switzeilund ! That is what you call the spirit of mode- 
 ration with which you are animated ! You only think of taking 
 advantage of every opportimity. Your sole preoccupation is to transfer 
 your alliance from one camp to the other, in order to be always ia that 
 iu which a share of plunder is to be had, and you speak of your 
 respect for the rights of independent States ! In fact, yea want Italy, 
 Russia wants Poland, Sweden wants Norway, Prussia wants Saxony, 
 and England insists on the possession of Holland and Belgium. In 
 short, peace is only a pretext ; you are all longing for the dismember- 
 ment of the French Empire ! And, to realise such a scheme, Austria 
 thinks it sufficient for her to declare herself! You expect here, by a 
 stroke of the pen, to bring down the ramparts of Dantzig, Kiistrin, 
 Glogau, Magdeburg, Wesel, Mayence, Antwerp, Alessandiia, Mantua, 
 and of all the strongest fortresses of Europe, the keys of which I only 
 obtained after numerous victories ! As for me, docile to your policy, I 
 should have to evacuate Eurojje. half of which I still occupy, to bring 
 back my legions behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as 
 though I had been vanquished ; and subscribing to a treaty which 
 would only amount to a vast capitulation, I should thus surrender to 
 my enemies, and rely, for a doubtful future^ upon the generosity of the 
 very men whom I have now crushed ! At a time when my colours 
 are still flying over the mouths of the Vistula and the hanks of the 
 Oder, when a victorious army is threatening Berlin and Breslau, when 
 I am myself hero at the head of 300,000 men, Austria, without striking 
 a blow, without even drawing the sword, presumes to comi)el me to 
 subscribe to such terms ! Without drawing the sword ! Such 
 pretension is indcbd outrageous! And it is my father-in-law who-
 
 THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ. 115 
 
 entertains such a design ! It is he who sends you ! In what i^osition, 
 then, does he wish to place nio towards the Frencli people? He is 
 strangely mistaken if he believes tliat in France a mutilated throne 
 can shelter his daughter and his grandson ! Aii ! Metternicli, how 
 mucii did England give you to decide you to act thus towards me ? " 
 
 On hearing these words, which Napoleon was unable 
 to control, Metternich changed colour. Deep silence 
 followed, as, with long strides, they continued pacing 
 across the room. The Emperor's hat fell on the floor. 
 They repeatedly passed it. On any other occasion M. de 
 Metternich would have hastened to pick it up. In this 
 instance, he allowed the Emperor to do so himself. 
 
 Some time elapsed before they both recovered. 
 
 Napoleon, having calmed himself, resumed the con- 
 versation. He declared that peace would not yet be 
 despaired of by him, if Austria would consent to listen to 
 her own interests. He further insisted on the summoninop 
 of the Congress, and formally requested that, in the 
 event of the re-commencement of hostilities, negotiations 
 should still be continued, in order that an opportunity 
 might yet be left open for the reconciliation of nations. 
 
 When parting with J\I. de Metternich, the Emperor 
 expressly informed him that the cession of Illyria was not 
 his last word.* 
 
 The day following the interview Metternich saw the 
 Duke of Bassano, and told him he was about to send him 
 a note containing the proposal for the Austrian mediation. 
 Move than ever resolved now to strike, but anxious to 
 avoid the error of striking too soon, Metternich sent that 
 night to the Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army. 
 Prince Schwarzenberg-, to inquire, 1st, whether a prolonga- 
 tion of the armistice would be useful for the purposes of 
 
 * The account of this interview is taken from Prince Napoleon's 
 work, Napoleon and his Detractors, Appendix, Part II. 
 
 I 2
 
 116 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICH. 
 
 the crowned conspirators ; 2nd, to ask " the most useful, 
 and consequently the only allowable, extreme length of 
 such a prolongation." Within thirty-two hours he 
 received the following reply : " My army would, in twenty 
 days, add to its strength 75,000 men, I should consider 
 the possibility of obtaining this extension a happy circum- 
 stance ; the twenty-first day would be a burden to me." 
 Naturally enough, under the circumstances, Metternich 
 used all his efforts to obtain that extension of twenty days. 
 The only means by which such an arrangement could be 
 arrived at was to again practise deception on Napoleon. 
 I shall now proceed to state the means Metternich em- 
 ployed to accomplish this purpose. 
 
 Four days after the historical interview I have recorded, 
 IMetternich was on the point of leaving Dresden when he 
 received a message from Napoleon requesting to see him 
 before he should leave. The interview between them 
 took place the same day (June 30th). Napoleon had 
 resolved to put to the test the professions of Austria. 
 Accordingly he took Metternich with him into a private 
 room, saying: " Perhaps we shall understand each other 
 better — you and I. Come into my private room, and let 
 us come to some agreement." 
 
 Seated in the private room, Bassano being also present, 
 Napoleon asked Metternich to formulate his conditions of 
 the mediation. Metternich then and there formulated 
 them, and Na})oleon then and there accepted them. 
 
 The conditions drafted by Metternich and accepted by 
 Napoleon were as follows : (1) the acceptance by Napoleon 
 of the armed mediation of Austria ; ('I) the arrangement 
 for the plenipotentiaries of the Towers to meet at Prague 
 the 10th July ; (3) the 10th August to be the last day of 
 the negotiations ; (4) hostilities to cease till that date. 
 
 Now, the reader will recollect that the armistice would
 
 THE ABMISTICE OF PLEISWIIZ. 117 
 
 expire the !20tli .Tuly. Let him add the twenty days 
 required by rriiice Schvvarzenberg to that date, and wc 
 come to the 9th August, but one day short of the 
 period inserted by Metternlch in the document he drew 
 up for Napoleon to sign ! He did more. When 
 Napoleon, unsuspicious of double-dealing, noticed the 
 date, and suggested that to arrange it it would be 
 necessary to prolong the armistice to the 10th August, 
 Metternich, whilst professing his personal inability to pro- 
 long the truce, agreed to give a guaranteeonbehalf of the 
 two allied monarclis, that it should be prolonged. Nay, 
 more. Finding Napoleon in a facile humour, he persuaded 
 him to sanction the transport from Austrian territory, of 
 provisions for the allied armies to enable them to subsist 
 for the twenty days necessary to enable the Austrian army 
 to be increased to an efficient strength. 
 
 The precise views indulged in by Metternich at this 
 period may be gathered from a report he addressed from 
 Brandeis, in Bohemia — whither he had gone to be near 
 the place where the negotiations were to be carried on — 
 to his master. This report, dated 12th of July, and the 
 Emperor's reply to it, dated 18th idem, prove that whilst 
 Austria was prepared, in the event of Napoleon refusing 
 her minimum, to throw her whole weight on behalf of the 
 Allies, she was not ready to act similarly towards Napoleon 
 in the case of the Allies refusing the same conditions, 
 Metternich had asked his master if he could rely upon his 
 firmness in case Napoleon should not accept the pre- 
 liminaries demanded by Austria ; whether, in the event of 
 such non-acceptance his Majesty was " unalterably deter- 
 mined " to cast in his lot with the Allies. The reply to 
 this, he said, would be the corner-stone of his instructions, 
 the basis of his future policy. Francis answered in the 
 sense I have indicated. Fie gave to his minister the
 
 118 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 assurances he required, but, like him, he provided only for 
 the event of a refusal comhig from one only of the con- 
 tracting parties ; in the meanwhile military preparations 
 were made as though that refusal had heen already 
 pronounced. 
 
 To Metternich, in fact, the circumstances bore a strong 
 resemblance to the position of affairs after Wagram. Then, 
 he had complained, Napoleon had negotiated over his 
 head, and obtained a peace which he would not have 
 granted. lie could not but remember, now, the ex- 
 pression on this subject which Napoleon used to him at 
 Paris, to the effect that if he had not obtained that })eace, 
 he would have been " lost." The position of the Allies, if 
 Austria were to join them, would now be infinitely better 
 than the position of isolated Austria after Wagram ; whiL-'t 
 that of Napoleon was less favourable than at that period. 
 If Napoleon would have been " lost " then, if peace had 
 not been made, what would happen to him now ? 
 According to all rule he was doomed. 
 
 The phrase used by Napoleon in 1810 was never at 
 this period absent from the thoughts of the Austrian 
 minister. He displayed then no earnestness regarding 
 the assembling of the Congress at Prague. He caused 
 its meetings to be postponed from the 10th to the 
 12th of July. In consequence of a misunderstanding 
 on the part of the allied generals as to the date on 
 which hostilities were to reconnnence in the event of 
 the proceedings at the Congress proving abortive, a 
 further delay occurred. j^Teanwhile Napoleon had pro- 
 ceeded on a tour of military inspection. The delays 
 initiated by the Allies caused delays also on the side of 
 the French. W'iien the negotiators at last met, Metter- 
 nich raised objections to the presence at the Congress of 
 the first French ])lenipotentiary, the Duke of Vicenza,
 
 BENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES. 110 
 
 because his credentials had not arrived. It was in vain 
 that the Duke declared that it was a mere formality, that 
 the credentials were on their way. The consequence of 
 all these delays was that the 10th of August came and 
 went before any serious business had even been attempted. 
 As the clock struck twelve that night Metternich caused 
 to be lighted the beacons which were to announce to the 
 allied sovereigns that Austria had declared war against 
 Xapoleon, and that the allied troops were free to cross 
 the Silesian frontier. 
 
 The war which those beacons heralded was not, though 
 its authors were careful to declare it to be so whilst it 
 lasted, a war for the enfranchisement of the nations. So 
 far as it related to the Continent, it was a life and death 
 struggle for supremacy between Metternich and Napoleon.
 
 120 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICU. 
 
 CHAPTER YI. 
 
 FROM THE EUPTURE OF THE ARMISTICE OF PLEISWITZ 
 TO THE FALL OF NAPOLEON. 
 
 August, 1813, to March, 1814. 
 
 The alliance had scarcely been formed Avhen it became 
 apparent that, unless the allied sovereigns woukl submit 
 to their new master, it might break up at any moment. 
 Metternich tells us that a few days after the armies, 
 obedient to his signal, had crossed tlie Silesian frontier, 
 Alexander sent for him, and announced his intention of 
 conferring tlie command-in-chief of the allied forces upon 
 Moreau, who had just returned from Americii to bear 
 arms against the French Emperor. Metternich at once 
 declared that if such an intention were persisted in, Austria 
 would withdraw from the alliance. Alexander, after some 
 conversation, agreed to defer the question. The gunners 
 of the French army, some indeed say, Napoleon himself, 
 decided it ibr him, two days later, at the battle of 
 Dresden. 
 
 It was on the 2Gth of August that the Allies, now com- 
 manded by the Schwarzenberg whom we have seen am- 
 bassador at Paris, attacked Napoleon at Dresden. The 
 result of that and of the following day's fighting has thus 
 been described by a great poet :
 
 TEE FALL OF NAPOLEON. 121 
 
 "Dresden surveys three despots fly once more 
 Before their sovereign — sovereign as before." 
 
 Alas ! that we must add : 
 
 " But there exhausted Fortune quits the field, 
 And Leipsig's treason bids the unvanquished yield; 
 The Saxon jackal leaves the lion's side 
 To turn the bear's, and wolf's, and fox's guide ; 
 And baclvward to tlie den of his despair 
 The forest monarch shrinks, but finds no lair." * 
 
 The doctrine of Juvenal, " Nullum numen ahest, si sit 
 prudent ia ; nos te, nos facimus, Fortuna, deam," was 
 never better illustrated than at the battle of Dresden. 
 The battle was won. Napoleon, had he personally directed 
 the pursuit of the enemy, would have made it the decisive 
 battle of the century. The schemes and intrigues of 
 Metternich would have vanished into thin air ; but, at the 
 critical moment, Napoleon was summoned back to Dresden 
 by news which he had received from the armies of Oudiuot 
 and Macdonald. His magic touch was thus withdrawn 
 from the pursuit. The Allies were on the point of being 
 destroyed ; Vandamme blocked up the way of exit ; other 
 marshals were on their track. Just at the critical moment 
 St. Cyr failed to give to Vandamme the support that was 
 essential ; and the latter was overwhelmed by the whole 
 army of the Allies. By this accident — for it was an 
 accident — the results of the victory of Dresden were lost, 
 and more than lost. 
 
 Metternich passes over this event, contenting himself 
 with the simple record that it led to the battle of Leipsig. 
 
 " The mysterious attitude of Napoleon," he -writes, " after the defeat 
 at Kulm.of the corps under the command of Vandamme, which Iiad 
 tbrccd its way into Bohemia, reversed tlie position of tliings, and 
 Prince Schwarzeuberg availed himself of that fa\ourable moment to 
 
 * Byron's Tlie Age of Bronze, y.
 
 122 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 •carry out liis first plan of operation, which culniiuatoJ in tlic battle of 
 Leipsig. By that event, the power of Napoleon beyond the frontiers 
 of his own empire was crushed, and in order to terminate the first 
 •campaign of the Allied Powers, nothing more was now required but to 
 clear the German provinces between the Pleiss and the Ithiue of the 
 French forces." 
 
 He makes no allusion to the incident which Lord Byron 
 truly styled the "Saxon treason"* which decided the 
 <iay, although he had prepared it in the long winter and 
 :;pring of 1813. 
 
 The battle of Leipsig accomplished, and more than 
 accoro])lished, the aims which the Austrian Minister had 
 propounded in his intercourse with the allied sovereigns 
 and with Napoleon prior to the assumption of arms by 
 xVustria. Practically, it had driven the French across 
 the Rhine. Would he, would the Allies, be sati.<fied 
 with that result? Vie will let Metternich answer the 
 question. 
 
 "The object of the war of 1813," he writes, "was obtained — 
 Napoleon was repulsed and driven back over tjie llhine. What w>is 
 to be done next year? This was what we had to decide. 
 
 " On the following points we were all agreed : (1) to carry the war 
 beyond the llliine into the interior of France; (2) by this proceeding 
 to strike a blow at the very existence of Napoleon which might be 
 •decisive in its consequences ; (3) to wait to see wliat ciiect the mis- 
 fortunes of the two last campaigns and the invasion of the French 
 territory would have on the mind of the French nation; farther, 
 (4) it was resolved, at my suggestion, that if once the heights of the 
 Vosges and the Ardennes were occupied, a plan must be made for the 
 military operations which would amount to a tliird campaign, deciding 
 the future fate of France, and therefore also the triumph of the 
 Quadruple Alliance." 
 
 Metternich did well to insert the words, "at my 
 suggestion," for at this period — from the moment, in fact, 
 
 * At the critical nioniont of tlie batlle (of I,{'ipsig) sevenioen Saxon 
 battalions and some regiments of cavalry (juittcd tlie Freucii ranks, 
 and turned their tire against their former comrailes.
 
 TEE FALL OF NAPOLEON. 123 
 
 that he had realised the extent of the disasters of the 
 campaign of 1812 — he was the soul, the guiding- mind, 
 the promoter from motives purely personal, of the con- 
 spiracy against Napoleon. The Austrian marriage — that 
 fatal Austrian marriage — had been the main snare with 
 which he had lured the great Emperor into quiescence 
 until Austria could complete her preparations, to be used 
 against him. At Dresden, knowing Napoleon thoroughly 
 — for Napoleon liked him, and had opened himself to him 
 more than to any other foreign minister — he had so 
 manoeuvred as to render peace impossible ; and now, 
 when all Europe was prepared to make peace on the 
 conditions of leaving to France her natural frontiers — the 
 Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, he was determined to 
 be content with nothing less than the dethronement of 
 Napoleon. He states this in his memoirs with a frank- 
 ness which, considering that he wrote, or professed to 
 write, at the time when the Allies were declaring their 
 willingness to treat on the terms 1 have stated, is almost 
 brutal. Appended to the quotation I have just given — 
 that in which he states the measures which were decided 
 *' at his suggestion " — is a reference to his residence at 
 Langres for " the important reasons which decided me to 
 this course." Turning to an account of that residence, 
 also given in the first person, we find him writing thus : 
 
 " Every peace with Napoleon which would have thrown him back 
 to the old boundaries of France, and which would have deprived liiiu 
 of districts tliat had been conquered before he came to power, would 
 only have been a ridiculous armistice, and would Iiave at once been 
 repelled by him. There remained, therefore, only three possibilities : 
 the recall of the Bourbons ; a regency till the majority of Napoleon's 
 aon ; the nomination of a third pertou to the throne of France." 
 
 Such were the thoughts which determined IMetternich, 
 in the autumn of 1813, that is, after Leipsig, to work for
 
 124 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNIC3. 
 
 the })er50ual overthrow of Xa})oleon, and for iiothiii<^ short 
 of that. 
 
 The ta>k of hiducing' the Allies to agree to a fixed ])lan 
 was not altofjether easv. Of tlie three <rreat Continental 
 Powers, Prussia, which had never forgiven her easy 
 overthrow at Jena — and its consequences — was the only 
 one thoroughly in earnest. The Emperor Francis believed 
 in the sincerity of Napoleon's advances after Leipsig, and 
 would gladly have come to terms, had jNIettornich allowed 
 him. But Metternich had already obtained the ascend- 
 ency over his master which he subsequently exercised over 
 Alexander and the Court of Berlin. Alexander, desiring 
 above all things to pose as the arbiter of the situation, and 
 influenced at the moment by the revolutionary Laliarpe, 
 the deserter Jomini, and the Prussian organiser Stein, 
 was willing to do anything which should secure to him 
 the lofty position to which he aspired. Metternich, then, 
 availed himself of the savage earnestness of Bllicher, bent 
 on the sack of Paris, to influence the consultations. The 
 result was that, during that winter, a plan was formed for 
 the march on Paris, which should terminate the hated 
 Revolution, and di>pose for ever of the man who was at 
 once its life and its incarnation. 
 
 The dominant influence which the Austrian minister 
 exercised on the deliberations of the Allies was proved by 
 an incident which occurred before the opening of the cam- 
 paign of 1814. As was to be expected, the generals of 
 the allied armies continued to difler as to the plan of the 
 campaign. Alexander, especially, strongly opposed the 
 plan of Prince Schwarzcnberg, who had proposed to 
 violate the neutrality of Switzerland. The differences 
 became so pronounced that it was finally resolved to choose 
 an arbitrator whose decision should be absolute. For this 
 post Metternich was selected. It is needless to add that
 
 TEE FALL OF NAPOLEON. 125 
 
 he dockled In favour of" the plan which he had previously 
 settled with Schwarzenberg-, or that by the exercise of that 
 tact which was one of his chiefest powers he obtained the 
 adhesion of the (^zar. 
 
 On the 20th December the Austrian army crossed the 
 Rhine between Sehaffhausen and Basel. Actual hostilities 
 did not beii'in till towards the close of the followino- month. 
 Before that period Metternich met at Basel one whose 
 desire for the overthrow of Napoleon equalled his ov.-n — 
 the English Minister, Lord Castlereagh. 
 
 " A few hours' conversation," he writes, " sufSced to lay the fuimda- 
 tion of a good feeling between this upright and enlightened statesman 
 and myself, which the following years cemented and enlarged." 
 Further : " I soon saw that his ideas about the reconstruction of 
 France in a manner comiiatible with the general interests of Europe 
 did not materially differ from mine." 
 
 They both believed that by evicting Napoleon they 
 would kill the Revolution. Napoleon was evicted — but 
 the Revolution ? The damming up of its waters produced 
 the overthrow which in time was to sweep even the astute 
 Metternich Into obscurity. 
 
 From Basel Metternich proceeded with the sovereigns 
 and the English minister to Langres, the 25th of January, 
 there, he tells us, to be occupied with negotiations of the 
 greatest importance, and which, he adds, would remain 
 unknown if he had not recorded them. The nature of 
 those negotiations may be summed up in a single phrase. 
 They were to decide upon the most suitable successor to 
 the doomed Napoleon. Alexander wanted to appeal to 
 the French nation. This view Metternich combated with 
 all his force. To him it meant the unchaining anew of 
 the Revolution. He went so far with Alexander as to 
 threaten that Austria would then and there withdraw her 
 foi'ces if the idea were persisted in.
 
 126 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNIGH. 
 
 " Napoleon's pcwcr is broken, never to rise again . . . there only 
 remain the Bourbons to take posscssioii of their unilying rights . . . 
 The Emperor Francis will never favour any other dynasty." 
 
 The campaign — the marvellous campaign in which 
 Genius had to combat numbers, and, in the last decisive 
 moment, treachery — began. Almost simultaneously a 
 Congress opened (February 4) at Chatillon, Metternich 
 leaves us in no doubt as to the feelings which induced him 
 to assent to such a meeting. " I saw only great advan- 
 tages from these attempts at negotiation, without any fear 
 that an untimely settlement would delay the return to a 
 better order of things ; " that is, he was resolved that no 
 peace with Napoleon should prevent the return of the 
 Bourbons. He naturally appointed, then, Count Stadlon, 
 the leader of the anti-Napoleonic party at Vienna, to 
 represent Austria. Needless to add that the Congi'ess 
 broke up the 19th of March following, having accomplished 
 nothing — the result foreseen and aimed at. 
 
 One moment before the final catastrophe doubt fell upon 
 the Allies. It was v/hen they heard of Napoleon's masterly 
 movement from St. Dizier to act upon their communications 
 — a movement which, if Paris could have but held out for 
 three days, would have been fatal to them. But treason, 
 " still his only master," stepped in to save them. Tlie de- 
 fection of Marmont compelled the abdication of Napoleon. 
 
 The arrangement reganling the location of the great 
 Emperor in the little island of Elba had been made before 
 Metternich reached Paris, though the treaty had not been 
 actually signed. Astonished at a provision which would 
 ])lace the dethroned Emperor so near to the country he 
 had governed, Metternich protested against it, and declared 
 that he would take u])on himself to refuse to sign on 
 behalf of Austria until he should have obtained his 
 master's express orders to that effect.
 
 THE FALL OF NAPOLEON. 127 
 
 It would seem, as Prince Napoleon asserts, that, even 
 in 1814, Metternich was contemplating St. Helena. The 
 negotiations, however, had proceeded too far, and Metter- 
 nich siofned that evening. 
 
 In the great duel between the two men the astute 
 intriguer had triumphed over the impetuous soldier. 
 There was to be a brief interval, and then the system of 
 Metternich was to rise on the ashes of the system of 
 Napoleon. The new Avatar had, at least, the advantage 
 of knowing the weak points of the methods which his 
 predecessor had established. 
 
 "The vast edifice Napoleon had constructed," wrote Metternich,. 
 " was exclusively the work of his hands, and he was himself the key- 
 stone of the arch. But this gigautic construction was essentially 
 wanting in its foundation ; the materials of which it was composed 
 were nothing but the ruins of other buildings ; some were rotten from 
 decay, others had never possessed any consistency from their very 
 beginning. The keystone of the arch has been withdrawn, and the 
 whole edifice has fallen in. 
 
 " Such is, in a few words, the history of the French Empire. Con- 
 ceived and created by Napoleon, it only existed in him ; and with 
 him it was extinguished." 
 
 It was not so. The events passing before our eyes 
 prove the shallowness of Metternich's judgment alike 
 regarding the man and his work. It was, nevertheless, 
 his judgment — the judgment of the man who had accom- 
 plished more than any other individual man to bring about 
 the withdrawal of the keystone from the arch. And now, 
 this man, who finds so fatal a flaw in the work of the 
 mason he has caused to be evicted, is himself to be 
 entrusted with the construction of an edifice on the 
 ground left vacant by the disappearance of the old one. 
 Will his experience of the faults of his predecessor 
 enable him to raise an edifice, of the arch of which he 
 himself shall not be the keystone; which shall not
 
 128 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 be wantlno^ in its foundation ; which sliall be composed 
 of something: else than the ruins of other buildinfrs; 
 and which will not fall in when the keystone shall be 
 withdrawn ? 
 
 That is the question which the second part of the career 
 of Metternich will answer.
 
 ( riD ) 
 
 CHAPTER YII. 
 
 THE CRISIS BEFOEE THE HUNDRED DAYS— AND AFTER. 
 March, 1814, to November, 1815. 
 
 Napoleon deposed and banished, the victors prepared to 
 divide the spoiL This operation gave rise to many heart- 
 burnings; to so many, in fact, that but for the return at 
 the critical moment of the Emperor from Elba, it is more 
 than probable that the despoilers would have come to 
 blows. 
 
 At first all was rose-colour. Metternich believed that 
 the return of the Bourbons was acceptable to a vast 
 majority of the French people, but even he was struck by 
 the attitude of the crowd in the streets when, on the 4th 
 of May, Louis XVIII. made his public entry into Paris. 
 "The most opposite feelings," he wrote, "were depicted 
 in their faces, and found expression in the cry ' Vive le 
 roi^ from the Eoyalists, and the sullen silence of the 
 enemies of the monarchy." But he cared little for that. 
 He had struck down the lion, and he could afford now to 
 exchange jests at the lion's expense with the respectable 
 mediocrity who had taken his place. 
 
 With the rejoicings which followed at Paris — the 
 rejoicings, not of the French people, but of the allied 
 Sovereigns ; with the visit of some of them to England ;
 
 130 LIFE OF FBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 this narrative has no concern. By degrees the transports 
 subsided, as joy at deliverance gave place to greediness 
 for spoil. There was scarcely a Power that did not want 
 something. France, indeed, by the convention of Paris 
 (23rd April, 1814) had secured the boundaries she pos- 
 sessed on the 1st January. 1792. But Sweden claimed 
 Norway, though Norway was united to, and wished to 
 remain united to, Denmark. Other claims were hinted 
 at, if they were not at the moment urged. In the first 
 impulse it had been resolved that all these weighty 
 questions should be debated at a Congress of the 
 European Powers, to be held at Vienna, and the opening 
 of which had been fixed for the 29th of July. But the 
 visit of the allied Sovereigns to England had rendered a 
 postponement necessary, and it was not till the very end 
 of September that the Congress conunenced its sittings. 
 Even then there remained certain preliminaries to be 
 adjusted, such as the relative rank of the great contracting 
 parties. When this had been amicably settled, the real 
 business began. 
 
 Frederick Gentz, the alter ego of IMetternich, his 
 protege, his intimate friend, his confidant, has left on 
 record a memorandum indicating very clearly the aspira- 
 tions of the several Powers, and the characters of the 
 men who represented them at the Congress. In this 
 memorandum Gentz does not beat about the bush ; he goes 
 straight to the ])oint. 
 
 " The grand phrases of ' reconstruction of social orchr,' " he wrote, 
 " ' regeneration of the political system of Europe,' ' a lasting peace 
 founded on a just division of strength,' &c. &c., were uttered to 
 tranquilli.se the people, and to give an air of dignity and grandeur to 
 this solemn assembly ; but the real purpose of the Congress was to 
 divide amongst the conquerors the spoils tahcn from the vanquished. 
 
 It soon appeared that the Czar, who liad up to that
 
 TEE DIVISION OF TEE SPOIL. 131 
 
 time posed as the disinterested champion of humanity, 
 wanted the ^Yhole of Pohmd ; that Prussia, who, but a 
 year before, had risen against Napoleon because he had 
 annexed the territories of other States, was resolved, if 
 she could manage it, to incorporate Saxony with her 
 dominions ; and that, in this resolution, she Avas supported 
 by Alexander, to whose plans regarding Poland she, in 
 return, gave her countenance. I have already spoken 
 about the claim preferred by Sweden to rob Denmark of 
 Norway. Austria was more moderate. She desired from 
 Bavaria the retrocession only of Tirol and the Voralberg, 
 proposing to take large territorial indemnities in Italy. 
 As Italy was practically unrepresented at the Congress, 
 there was little chance that the claims of Austria, with 
 respect to the country which to Metternich never repre- 
 sented by its name aught but " a geographical term," 
 would be contested. 
 
 It can easily be understood that the claims which most 
 disturbed the equanimity of the Congress were the claims 
 of liussia and Prussia. Again was Metternich the leadino- 
 spirit, the soul, of the opposition to the pretensions of the 
 two Powers which, but for him, would never have recovered 
 from the defeat of Bautzen. Between Alexander and 
 himself there had already been some friction. Alike with 
 respect to the neutrality of Switzerland, the plan of the 
 campaign, the treatment of Napoleon after his abdication, 
 the two men had had serious differences. Alexander, 
 wrote Gentz, had accustomed himself to look on Met- 
 ternich as a permanent obstacle to his designs, as a man 
 eternally occupied in opposing and thwarting him; at 
 last, as a sworn enemy. Gentz continues : 
 
 " The calmness and serenity with which M. de Metternich always 
 opposed to these prejudices, instead of softening the Emperor, 
 appeared only to embitter him the more ; private feelings, above all a 
 
 K 2
 
 132 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 strong jealousy of i\I. do Jletternicli's success, both in politics and 
 society, increased this irritation. At last it reached the point of an 
 implacable hatred, and during his stay in Vienna, his daily explosions 
 of rage and frenzy afforded an inexhaustible fund of curiosity and 
 amusement to frivolous minds at the court, whilst sensible men 
 deplored them as a great calamity. This hatred is the key to most of 
 the events of the Congress." 
 
 The fecling-s entertained by Alexander towards the 
 English Minister, Lord Castlereagh, were only a shade 
 less hostile than those which he felt towards Metternich. 
 He called him " cold and pedantic," 
 
 "and there were moments,' continued Geutz, " when he would have 
 treated him as he did M. de Metternich, if extreme fear of openly 
 compromising himself with the British Govcruiueut (the only one 
 before which he trembled) had not forced him to dissimulate." 
 
 He had little more regard for Talleyrand, the representa- 
 tive of France, whose then master, Louis XVIH., he had 
 never forgiven for having adopted a system of Government 
 different from that which he had advised ; for Maximilian- 
 Joseph, King of Bavaria, controlled by Metternich ; or for 
 the King of Denmark. Prussia was his sole ally, and 
 Prussia was his ally mainly because its King, Frederick 
 AVilliam HL, described by Napoleon to Admiral Cock- 
 burn during the voyage to St. Helena as " une pauvre 
 hete," had subordinated his will to the stronger will of 
 the Czar ; partly, also, because, equally bent on rounding 
 their borders at the expense of their neighbours, they had 
 come to an arrangement whereby the pretensions of the 
 one should dovetail with the ambition of the other. 
 
 It gradually came about, then, that whilst the union 
 between Russia and Prussia became every day more 
 accentuated, there grew the tendency on the part of 
 Austria, France, and England, to unite to oppose preten- 
 sions which they regarded as unjust and unreasonable.
 
 THE DIVISION OF THE SPOIL. 133 
 
 Metternich was, I repeat, the soul of this opposition. In a 
 very able paper, dated the 10th December, he pointed 
 out that whilst it was the interest of Austria that Prussia 
 should be strong and consolidated, he could not agree to 
 the entire incorporation of Saxony by the latter power. 
 
 " Germany," he wrote, " must constitute herself a political body ; 
 the frontiers between the great intermediary Powers should not 
 remain undecided ; the union Ijetween Austria and Prussia must, in a 
 word, be perfect, for this great work to be consummated." 
 
 Now, the annexation of Saxony would be an impedi- 
 ment to that work ; it would prevent the arrangement 
 of the Germanic Federal agreement, inasmuch as the 
 principal German powers had declared that they would 
 not join a Federal agreement on a basis so menacing to 
 their own safety as that of the incorporation of one of the 
 principal German States by one of the Powers called on 
 to protect the common country. Metternich was able to 
 speak with the greater force, inasmuch as he, acting for 
 Austria, had behaved with the greatest liberality towards 
 Bavaria, the incorporation of which with Austria had 
 been the dream of the Court of Vienna from the time of 
 Maria Theresa, and preferring — short- sigh tedly, I venture 
 to think — to indemnify Austria in Italy, had only required 
 the restitution of Tirol and the Voralberg. 
 
 Matters at last proceeded to a condition so critical 
 that, as I wrote in the first sentence of this chapter, the 
 conquerors seemed to be on the verge of coming to blows 
 over the spoil. In fivct, Russia and Prussia on the one 
 side, and England, France, and Austria on the other, 
 prepared for war. Alexander despatched a messenger to 
 halt his armies in Poland ; the Cabinet of Berlin called 
 out its contingents, declaring that Prussia had conquered 
 Saxony, and would keep it ; Austria put her armies in 
 Galicia on a war footing ; France was invited to suspend
 
 134 LIFE OF PlilNCE METTEBNICK 
 
 the disarming' of that army which " had made the tour of 
 Europe •," British troops were despatched to Belgiunf. 
 More than that, on the 3rd February, Enghmd, Austria, 
 and France signed a secret treaty, offensive and defensive, 
 whereby they contracted mutually to support each other 
 if one should be attacked ; to maintain, each of them, an 
 army of 150,000 men for that purpose ; and to regulate 
 their views by the terms of the treaty of Paris. 
 
 This treaty was not so secret but that the terms of it 
 leaked out. Several notes were interchanged, and finally 
 the northern robbers abated their pretensions. Russia 
 agreed to limit her aspirations with regard to Poland, and 
 Prussia to be content with a part, instead of the whole, of 
 Saxony. Still, considerable friction remained, and there 
 is no saying how the negotiations might have resulted when 
 on the 7th March, on the eve of a great ball, Metternich 
 received information that Napoleon had left Elba. 
 
 The position of Napoleon on that little island had been 
 more than once discussed at the Congress. Early in 
 February the advisability of removing him from so close 
 a vicinity to Italy had been mooted. The Portuguese 
 Minister had suggested the Canary Islands, Lord Castle- 
 reagh St. Helena or St. Lucia, as a more fitting, because, 
 as far as related to the Interests of the Allies, a safer ])lace 
 of residence. But again on this point Alexander and 
 Metternich were at variance. The former took his stand on 
 the treaty of Fontainebleau, to which he said he had pledged 
 his personal honour. ^Metternich shook his head. Always 
 doubting the policy of the provision of that treaty which 
 allowed Napoleon to locate himself so near to the shores 
 of France, knowing the inner mind of the Emperor better 
 than any man in Europe, he could not resist the conviction 
 that the soaring genius which had so long swayed the 
 destinies of Europe would never become reconciled to the
 
 NAPOLEON AT ELBA. 135 
 
 confined limits to which the AlHes had restricted It ; that, 
 if a fair opportunity to break loose should offer, Napoleon 
 would be impelled to seize it. So strongly did the 
 Austrian IMini^ter become impressed with the ])os-ibility 
 of such a contingency, tnat he wrote, at this period, to the 
 Duke of Otranto, begging him to give him his opinion, 
 confidentially, as to what would happen in France (1) if 
 Napoleon were suddenly to return , (2) what, if the King 
 or Kome, with a squadron oi horse, were to appear on the 
 frontier ; (o) what France would do if left to her own 
 spontaneous action. Fouche replied with perfect frank- 
 ness. If, he said, Napoleon were to land, and one 
 regiment sent against him were to range itself on his side, 
 the whole army would follow its example ; if the King of 
 Rome were to be escorted to the frontier by an Austriart 
 regiment, the whole nation would instantly hoist his- 
 colours ; left to her own spontaneous action, France would 
 seek refuge in the Orleans dynasty. This reply served 
 only to confirm Metternich in his ideas, and to increase 
 his caution. 
 
 It was the misfortune, not the fault, of Napoleon, that 
 the return from Elba took place just a fortnight too soon. 
 By means of a confidential agent, 31. Menevi.l, he had 
 heard in February that the question of deporting him to 
 an island in the Atlantic was being seriously discussed at 
 Vienna. Through the same agency he learned that the 
 sovereigns present in that capital would separate on the 
 20th of February at the latest. Whilst his mind was 
 under the influence of ideas produced by this information 
 he received from France a batch of newspapers, the 
 perusal of which convinced him not only of the extreme 
 unpopularity of the Bourbons, but that the army and the 
 nation were alike ripe for revolution. This conviction 
 decided him. Just then a visit from M. Fleury de
 
 1S6 LIFE OF PItlNCE METTERNICE. 
 
 Chaboulon, an emissary of the devoted ]\Iaret, Duke of 
 Bassano, confirmed the impressions which the newspapers 
 had made. Resolved then to act, he was forced to act 
 at once. To evade the vigilance of British cruisers it 
 was necessary to sail whilst the nights were long, and ho 
 was approaching the season when they would become 
 short. Then, he believed that the sovereigns had 
 separated. Once separated, it would be difficult for 
 them to agree upon a united action. Another reason, 
 too, weighed with him. The question of deporting him 
 had, he knew, been discussed : if the sovereigns had 
 separated — and his information led him to believe that 
 they had separated — that question had been decided. 
 But which way ? That he could not know until, if 
 ag-ainst him, an Enfjlish man-of-war should anchor in the 
 roadstead of Porto Ferrajo to carry him off. All these 
 circumstances combining to advise an immediate de- 
 parture, Napoleon made his preparations accordingly ; 
 sailed from Porto Ferrajo at seven o'clock of the evening 
 of the 2Gth of February ; and landed near Frejus the 1st 
 of March. 
 
 Such was the intelligence which reached Metternich 
 on the evening of the 7th of the same month. Upon 
 the allied sovereigns, and the ministers of tlie allied 
 sovereigns, it came like a thunderbolt. Immediately 
 their minor differences were forgotten or deferred. 
 Prussia dissembled her rapacious greed ; Eussia her 
 insatiable appetite for spoil ; Austria her hypocritical pro- 
 fessions of disinterestedness; the one question they all 
 had to consider was what, in the presence of this new and 
 great danger, they should do. Here, for five months, had 
 they been debating, quarrelling, recriminating, almost 
 coming to blows, as to the division of the spoils they had 
 reft from Napoleonic France ; and, now, this one man
 
 TEE HUNDRED DATS. 137 
 
 had landed, who might not only drive them from the yet 
 undevoured carcase, but reduce them to their previous 
 state of vassalage. At this crisis it was union alone that 
 could assure them strength. Had the information on 
 which Napoleon had acted been correct ; had the sover- 
 eigns separated, as they had intended to separate, before 
 the end of February ; the chances of the Emperor would 
 have been enormously increased. After the bickerings 
 and the recriminations which had ensued ; after the ex- 
 posure of their naked selfishness, of the secret aspirations 
 of each member of the crowned confederates ; separation 
 would have meant distrust : distrust might have led to the 
 union of one or more, always for selfish ends, probably for 
 the spoliation of a friend, with the returned Napoleon. 
 But, still in each other's presence, reading in familiar 
 glances familiar fears, every despot deriving comfort from 
 the close propinquity of another despot, there was no room 
 for any feeling but an intense desire to combine ; to crush 
 this man who had risen from a living tomb to stand 
 between them and their prey ; whose very name had 
 dried, to the point of cracking, the lips wet with eager 
 longing ; and the tone of whose proclamations drove the 
 blood from faces inflamed by the long-delayed enjoyment 
 of prospective spoil. 
 
 But a resolution must be taken. Every day's post 
 brought tidings more and more alarming. First that the 
 landing had been successfully accomplished ; then that 
 the conqueror had taken the road for Paris by way of 
 Gap ; then that the garrison of Grenoble had joined him ; 
 then, that he was making a triumphant progress towards 
 Lyons. As they stared grimly into one another's faces 
 the despots could no longer doubt that the house of cards 
 they had erected with so much care at Paris had fallen 
 with tiie first push.
 
 138 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 A resolution must, therefore, be taken. And the man 
 was there who w as ready to formulate one in all respects 
 consonant to the feelings which pervaded the breasts of 
 the allied sovereigns. The occasion was one peculiarly 
 adapted, in fact, to the pre-eminently cool, unimpassioned, 
 calculating intellect of Metternich. At the first formal 
 meeting held to deliberate on the course the Allies should 
 adopt (March 12), he, then, took the lead. His object 
 being to encourage, to unite, he took advantage of a 
 proclamation issued by Napoleon on his victorious march 
 in which he declared that he had returned to France with 
 the concurrence of Austria, and that he wor.ld soon be 
 supported by that power with 100,000 men, to urge upon 
 the assembled sovereigns the expediency of announcing 
 to all Europe and to the world that they would make no 
 terms with Napoleon ; that they w ould support the King 
 of France with their whole forces. Resolutions to this 
 effect were passed, and measures were promptly taken to 
 carry those resolutions into effect. 
 
 It forms no part of my plan to tell the history of the 
 Hundred Days. I shall confine myself to narrating, as 
 clearly as I have been able to ascertain it, the part which 
 Metternich took in deciding the issue. Practically, his 
 part was accomplished when he had determined the 
 Allies to appeal to the God of battles, and to make no 
 terms with Napoleon. It would seem, however, that he 
 was not altogether confident of the issue of that appeal, 
 for we find him writing on the 9th April to Fouche, to 
 express the desire of Austria to make peace with France 
 provided Napoleon were eliminated. " The Powers will 
 not have Napoleon Bonaparte. They will make war 
 with him to the last, but do not wish to fight with France.'* 
 He beo-ffcd Fouche to despatch a man in whom he had 
 confidence to Basel to confer there with a person whom
 
 TIIE HUNDBED DAYS. 139 
 
 he would send, and who would make himself known by 
 certain signs. To this confidential person (a certain 
 Ottenfels) Mctternich gave instructions that he might 
 discuss with Fouche's envoy as to the prince who might 
 occupy the throne of France, limiting the choice, however, 
 to, (1) Louis XVIII. ; (2) to the Duke of Orleans ; (3) 
 to the regency of Marie Louise. Of the three, he added, 
 the choice of the last would be least agreeable to Austria. 
 Nothing came of this ; and, a little later, the event of 
 the 18th June decided the fate of Napoleon. Metternich 
 had gone to Heidelberg to watch events. Thence he 
 wrote, 22nd June, to his daughter, an account, as he had 
 received it, of the battle of Waterloo. From Heidelberg 
 he proceeded to Paris to take part in the arrangements 
 which would naturally follow the triumph of the Allies. 
 Arrived in Paris, he was once more in his element, 
 rejoicing over the defeat of Napoleon, exchanging con- 
 gratulations with the Sovereigns, and helping so to 
 arrange that there should be no possibility of future 
 disturbance on the part of any one bearing the name of 
 Bonaparte. It is curious, as one reads his memoirs, to 
 notice how the recollection of his old intercourse with 
 Napoleon haunted him. He tells his daughter how he 
 dined with Bliicher " in the room I have conversed for 
 hours and hours with Napoleon." As the savage hussar 
 crossed the gallery of St. Cloud, Metternich records how 
 he remarked : " That man must have been a regular 
 fool to have all this, and go running after Moscow." 
 Moralising to himself after listening to this classic obser- 
 vation, Metternich congratulates himself, in so many 
 words, that he is not as other men are, least of all like 
 Napoleon. His precise words are : " Let us at least 
 carry away the remembrance of having done some good — 
 and in this respect I would not exchange with Napoleon "
 
 140 LIFE OF FRINGE METTEBNICH. 
 
 — with Napoleon, of whom he had written in the same 
 letter : " he is still at Rochefort, and that place, including 
 the port, is so completely blockaded that we have every 
 hope of being able to capture him." 
 
 For that " greatest of all captains," the end had come 
 at last. Rather than fall into the hands of the Sovereigns 
 of the Continent, Napoleon, appealing to the magnanimity 
 of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, had voluntarily 
 surrendered to the captain of the Belleroplion (15th July). 
 In announcing this action to Marie Louise, Metternich 
 assured her that " according to an arrangement made 
 between the Powers he (Napoleon) will be sent as a 
 prisoner to Fort George, in the north of Scotland, and 
 placed under the surveillance of Austrian, Russian, French 
 and Prussian commissioners. He will be well treated 
 there, and will have as much liberty as is compatible with 
 the certainty that he cannot escape." On the 13th 
 August following he writes to her again, to tell her that 
 Napoleon " is on board the Northumberland, and en route 
 for St. Helena." He gave her, apparently, no explana- 
 tion as to why St. Helena had been substituted for Fort 
 George. 
 
 As for France, the Allies made her pay, and pay 
 dearly, for her complicity with Napoleon. On the 20th 
 November she had to agree to restore certain territories* 
 on the left bank of the Rhine which had been guaranteed 
 by the treaty of 1814 ; she had to pay £28,000,000, for 
 the expenses of the war, as well as other indemnities, 
 making a total of £61,400,000 ; to allow the fortresses 
 on her northern borders to be occupied for five years, 
 she defraying the cost ; and to restore the works of art 
 
 * These were, the fortresses of Landau, Sarre-Louie, Pliilipville, 
 anil MarieTiburg, with the territory appertaining to each ; and Versoix, 
 ceded to Geneva.
 
 THE HUNDRED DAYS, 141 
 
 captured during the wars of the Revolution and the 
 Empire. 
 
 But before that treaty was signed Metternich had put 
 his hand to a work which was to influence his subsequent 
 career. The consideration of this demands a new chapter ; 
 for, with the adhesion of the Continental Powers to the 
 Holy Alliance begins the planning out of the new edifice 
 which was to take the place of the destroyed Walhalla of 
 Napoleon.
 
 142 LIFE OF FRINGE METTEFNICR. 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM OF jMETTERNICH: ITS 
 RISE AND PROGRESS. 
 
 1815-1830. 
 
 Metternich relates that during the negotiations for 
 the second Peace of Paris, the Emperor Alexander sent 
 for him, and informed him that he was occupied with 
 a great undertaking about which he desired especially to 
 consult the Emperor Francis. The matter, he added, was 
 not one of business, or he would have asked the advice of 
 Metternich : it was a matter purely of sentiment and 
 feeling, and, as such, was a matter which monarchs alone 
 were capable of deciding. Metternich at once reported 
 the conversation to his master, and the two sovereigns 
 saw each other a few days later. 
 
 After the interview between them Francis handed to 
 Metternich a document which Alexander had left with 
 him, and on which he had desired his opinion. Francis, 
 to whom Metternich had become indisjiensable, and who, 
 since the end of the year 1810, had seen only with his 
 eyes, and heard only with his ears, desired to have 
 the opinion of his minister, to enabh; him then to declare 
 his own. 
 
 Metternich, perusing the document, found it, he tells us, 
 to be nothing more than,
 
 GOVERNMENT BY BEPBESSION 143 
 
 " a iiliilanthropic aspiration clothed in a religious garb, which 
 supplied no material for a treaty between the monarchs, and which 
 contained many phrases that might even have given occasion to 
 religious misconstructions." 
 
 His master, he found, had imhibcd the same impression. 
 The King of Prussia, to whom the document was then 
 shown, agreed with Francis and his minister in the main, 
 " but hesitated to reject entirely the views of tlie Czar." 
 Metternich was consequently commissioned to suggest 
 to Alexander certain alterations to make the document 
 acceptable to his brother sovereigns. In this Metternich 
 succeeded, though " not without great ditficulty ; " and 
 the Austrian Emperor, *' although he did not approve 
 the project even when modified, agreed to sign it, for 
 reasons which I, for my part, could not oppose." 
 
 "This," adds Metternich, "is the history of the Holy 
 Alliance." 
 
 Such as the document was, it was worthy of the narrow 
 and fanatical brain of the Czar, from which it emanated. 
 In it the contracting parties declared their intention 
 to conduct their domestic administration and foreign 
 relations according to the precepts of Christianity, and 
 bound themselves to observe three points: (1) to give 
 mutual assistance for the protection of religion, peace, 
 and justice ; (2) to regard themselves as delegated by 
 Providence to govern three branches of one Christian 
 nation ; (3) to admit any other Powers which should 
 declare their adherence to the same principles. 
 
 Metternich takes some pains to declare that this 
 document was simply " a loud-sounding nothing " ; that 
 it was " an overflow of the pietistic feelings of the Emperor 
 Alexander " ; that it " was not an institution to keep down 
 the rights of the ])cople, to promote absolutism or any 
 other tyranny " ; that after it had been signed, it was
 
 144 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 never mentioned between the Cabinets. We may admit 
 a great part of this, but the fact still remains that the 
 principles embodied in the Holy Alliance were the 
 principles upon which the three sovereigns who signed it 
 proceeded to base their internal administration. Trans- 
 lated into ])lain language, it was a league of three despots, 
 each guaranteeing the other against his subjects. The 
 name, likely enough, was not bandied between them in 
 correspondence, but its principle was thoroughly well 
 understood and acted upon. The proof is that the control 
 of the policy of the three signatories gradually fell into the 
 hands of the statesman who managed most skilfully to put 
 in action the principles of this league of sovereigns, by tlie 
 repression of free thought, of free speech, of free aspira- 
 tions, throughout his master's dominions. This statesman 
 was Metternich. 
 
 The Holy Alliance was signed in September, 1815. It 
 was the keystone of the arch which Metternich was 
 building to replace the fallen temple of Napoleon. 
 England, by the mouth of Lord Castlereagh, refused, 
 naturally enough, to accede to it. 
 
 The state of the Continent, at the close of 1815, 
 offered a great opportunity to a real statesman. Twenty- 
 three years of almost incessant warfare had produced a 
 longing for peace, for an era of deOnite tranquillity, such 
 as has rarely been equalled. But the French Revolution 
 had, in spite of its excesses, widely disseminated its 
 principles throughout Europe. Peace, that is to say, 
 security against invasion, might indeed be attained ; but 
 no peace could be real which did not concede to the 
 people some share in the gains of the victory which the 
 ]jeople had achieved. The uprising of Germany in 1813 
 had done much to assure the fall of Napoleon. The men 
 who had fought, and bled, and vanquished, in that great
 
 GOVERNMENT BY REPBESSION. 145 
 
 cause, had earned the right to be treated as free men. 
 They did not want much. Some small recognition would 
 for the moment have satisfied them. But they wanted 
 something, and a clear observer would have detected that 
 unless they should obtain that something, an era of 
 universal peace, accompanied, as it would be, by material 
 prosperity, would be a period fruitful of opportunities for 
 the exchange of ideas, for the birth of discontent ; and 
 that such ideas and such discontent would end probably 
 in a resolve to obtain by force the rights which had been 
 denied to abstract justice. The opportunity for statesman- 
 like action was, then, such as might rarely recur. The fall 
 of Napoleon had left a tabula rasa upon which to write the 
 principles of a new departure. A little, I repeat, would 
 have sufficed. If Metternich had given that little, or had 
 allowed that little to be given, he would at all events 
 have laid the foundation of a structure which might have 
 become durable. 
 
 It seems strange that he did not. He had condemned 
 Napoleon's system because he himself had been the 
 keystone of the arch, which, on his removal, had fallen, 
 leaving only ruins. Yet, having that experience, he 
 proceeded to erect a structure on the same principle ; 
 that is, a structure of the arch of which he him- 
 self should be the keystone. Such a structure had 
 even less chance of durability than that of Napoleon. 
 Napoleon's arch had at least been cemented by glory. 
 He had made France the dominant factor in the 
 continental system ; and he was continually gratifying 
 the pride, and appealing to the generous instincts, of a 
 peculiarly imaginative people. Metternich had no such 
 veneer with which to smear his structure. He had 
 nothing to gratify the tastes of the various races un/1er 
 the sway of his master, some as imaginative as the 
 
 L
 
 146 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 French, haters of German rule, and who, tnouga they 
 might be long-suffering, were dangerous when roused. 
 He might have recollected that Italy had been made 
 something more than a geographical expression by 
 Napoleon ; that Illyria had enjoyed the benefits of the 
 Code Napoleon ; and that both might feel something like 
 repulsion — the one at being degraded to the position of a 
 conquered province, the other at being brought again 
 under the hard measure of Austrian law.* It is probable 
 that mider no circumstances would Mettcruich have 
 played a liberal part. In his mind liberalism was closely 
 connected with revolution, and, above all, with the French 
 revolution, and ho hated it. He had hated Napoleon 
 simply because he was the child, the embodiment, the 
 living presence of revolution. Therefore it is, I repeat, 
 probable, that under no circumstances would he have 
 consented to give liberal institutions to the countries 
 which he controlled. But there is a curious passage in 
 his memoirs which shows that even if he had, at any time, 
 been so inclined, he would have abandoned the idea after 
 the experience of Napoleon in 1815. Referring to the 
 battle of Waterloo, he wrote : 
 
 " Even if this battle bad not rcsulfed in tlic success due to tlie 
 iron resolution of the English general, and the courageous assistance 
 of Field-lMarshnl IJlUchcr, tlie cause of Napoleon would have been 
 irretrievably lost. The Austrian and Eussian armies together, with 
 the contingent of the German Confederation, moving towards the 
 Eliine, would have spread over France. The foicer xr.hicU she 
 possessed before under the Empire teas completely hrolien in consequence 
 
 * "When I first visited Cariiiola, in 1871, I found the semi-Italian 
 people of that province full of traditionary love for the period when 
 their j)rovince was under French rule. Ailministration was better in 
 Austria then, it is still better now, but more tlian lialf a century after 
 the re-trnnsfer to Austria the French period had a warm place in the 
 hearts of the people.
 
 GOVERNMENT BY REPBESSION. 147 
 
 of ilie destructive cnnresf:ions iclilch Napoleon was constrained to make 
 during the Hundred Days." 
 
 With such an example of the result of concessions to 
 popular clamour it could not be expected that Metternich 
 woukl make any. In his eyes all concession was destructive. 
 
 Metternich, then, having a free hand, being in a 
 position in which he could dictate a policy and inaugurate 
 a system which would be supported by the armed force 
 of continental Europe, cast to the winds the generous 
 ideas which the sovereigns had enunciated in the hours 
 of their distress, and went in for repression and one-man 
 rule. In an admirable work dealing with this subject,* 
 Mr. C. Edmund Maurice has put his position so clearly 
 and forcibly that I shall be excused for quoting it in this 
 place. After indicating the leading position which 
 Metternich occupied in the councils of Europe on the fall 
 of Napoleon, Mr. Maurice adds : 
 
 " The system of the new ruler resembled that of Napoleon in its 
 contempt for the rij^hts of men and nations ; but it was to be varnished 
 over with an appearance of legality, a seeming respect for the rights of 
 kings, and a detLrmination to i^reserve peace and avoid dramatic 
 Fensations, which made it welcome to Europe after eighteen years of 
 almost incessant wars or rumours of wars." 
 
 Describing, then, how Metternich had persuaded 
 England — the England of Lord Castlereagh — to look on 
 calmly at the despoiling of Italy ; how greed for territory 
 had displaced eagerness for popular rights in the feeble 
 mind of the King of Prussia ; Mr. Maurice proceeds 
 thus to deal with the Emperor Alexander : 
 
 " There were two difBculties," lie writes, " which seemed likely to 
 hinder the prosperity of Mettcrnich's reign. Those were the character 
 of Alexander I. of Eussia, and the aspirations of the German nation. 
 
 * The Bevolutionary Movement of 1848-9 in Italy, Austria-Hungary 
 and Germany, ivith some Examination of the lirevious TIdrty-three 
 Years," bv C. Edmund Maurice, 1887. 
 
 L 2
 
 148 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 " Altxamler, iudecd, if occasionally irritating Mettcrnicli, evidently 
 aflforded him consiikrablc amusement, and the sort of pleasure which 
 every man finds in a suitable subject for the exercise of his peculiar 
 talents. For Alexander was eminently a man to be managed. 
 Enthusiastic, dreamy, and vain ; now bent on schemes of conquest, 
 now on the development of some ideal of liberty, now tilled with some 
 confused religious mysticism ; at one time eager to divide the world 
 with Napoleon, then anxious to restore Poland to its independence ; 
 now li-teniug to the appeal of Mctternich to his fears, at another time 
 to the nobler and inore liberal suggestions of Stein and Pozzo di 
 JJorgo ; only consistent in the one desire to play an impressive and 
 melodramatic part in European aifairs." 
 
 Such a character was capahle of passing from one 
 extreme to another, from the extreme of friendship to the 
 extreme of hatred, and, therefore, eminently required 
 management. The danger for Metternich was that the 
 Czar, who, during 1814-15, had been constantly asserting 
 liberal sentiments, and had chosen as his confidants men 
 of the Revolution, should be swayed to antagonism by 
 the aspirations for liberty which the rising against Napo- 
 leon had awakened in all the countries of Europe except 
 his own, in Spain, in Italy, and in Germany. But 
 Mctternich had studied Alexander as he had studied 
 Napoleon, and, having read him thoroughly, knew how 
 to direct his enthusiasm into channels so craftily contrived 
 that whilst his liberalism exhausted itself in words, the 
 strength it embodied v.as used to support the desjiotic 
 system. Thus it happened, that in spite of occasional 
 outbursts, that system had no surer supporter than 
 Alexander, 
 
 lie had more trouble^ with Germany. The King of 
 Prussia, indeed, he had to a great extent enlisted in his 
 cause. Frederick AV'illiam was weak and selfish, but 
 there was the fact that to no peoj>le in Europe had 
 promises been so freely made, in the last three years of 
 the great struggle, as to the people of Northern
 
 GOVERNMENT BY BEPRESSION. 149 
 
 Germany. In the early hours succeeding victory these 
 promises had been remembered by the monarch who had 
 made them. They were remembered, however, only to 
 be deliberately broken when the time for their fulfilment 
 arrived : to be broken, indeed, with so little regard for 
 the rights of the human race, that within two years of the 
 triumph which the devotion and valour of his people had 
 gained for him, the King of Prussia had become the most 
 unpopular sovereign in Europe. Indications, in rapid 
 succession, were given of the rising feeling, but it was not 
 until Kotzebue, the friend of the Czar and the apostle of 
 absolutism, had been murdered by Ludwig Sandt, and the 
 Universities of Germany, encouraged by the Duke of 
 Weimar, had made a determined effort to secure the 
 teaching of freedom of opinion, that Metternich resolved 
 to interfere. He had been waiting for some such revolt 
 against the system of repression on which he was bent, to 
 inaugurate an iron rule against which there could be 
 no appeal. Acting, then, on the fears of Frederick 
 William, he persuaded him to dismiss one professor, to 
 arrest another, and to force a third into flight. A little 
 later, in the manner about to be described, he procured 
 the assembly of a Conference at Carlsbad to crush the 
 revolutionary spirit displayed by the very moderate 
 demands of the Universities. 
 
 Prior to the meeting of this Conference, Metternich 
 had had, at Teplitz, an interview with the King of 
 Prussia (July, 181D). He found that monarch hesitating 
 as to whether he should, or should not, grant his people a 
 Constitution. Nothin"- could be more frank than the 
 language used by Metternich on this point. He told the 
 King, in so many words, that Prussia was the focus of 
 revolution ; that help to him would be forthcoming only 
 on the condition that he did not introduce representation
 
 150 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 of the people into his kingdom, " which," he added, " is 
 less fitted for it than any otlier," and he succeeded in 
 brino-in"" Frederick William to his views. In a con- 
 versation a few days later with the Prussian ministers, he 
 convinced them likewise of the necessity for the repression 
 of free thought and free opinion. And, in agreement 
 with them, he summoned a Conference, in which the 
 several Germanic States should be represented, to meet 
 at Carlsbad, to formulate the action which should be 
 necessary to carry out his views. 
 
 The mode in which INletternich proposed to combat the 
 revolutionary feeling is thus formulated by him in a memo- 
 randum drawn up for the Emperor Francis, and dated 
 the 1st of August. In this, he states that the measures 
 to be adopted at the coming Conference must be (1) the 
 .suspension of the licence of the press ; (2 ) the appoint- 
 ment of commissions for the investigation of the German 
 Universities, and the removal of notoriously bad pro- 
 fessors ; (3) the formation of a special judicial commission 
 a.cting in the name of the whole Bund, to investigate the 
 conspiracy discovered against the Bund. 
 
 The Conference met the same month, cari'ied out the 
 views of Metternich under his own personal auspices, and 
 nominated a Central Investigation ('ommission " for the 
 protection of social order and the calming of all the well- 
 disposed in Germany." 
 
 There remained l)Ut one thing necessary to complete 
 the woik ; to give the death-blow to aspirations for con- 
 stitutional government. When the allied sovereigns were 
 still under the influence of the gratitude engendered by 
 the exertions which had recovered for them freedom and 
 power, they had inserted a clause in the Treaty of Vienna 
 which suggested the granting of (Constitutions by the 
 several rulers of Germany. Tlie existence of this clause
 
 GOVEBNMENT BY BEPBESSION. 151 
 
 had now become a danger. To the men fresh from a 
 crusade against the teachings of the Universities it was 
 an abomination. Metternich, then, again called the 
 representatives of the German States to Vienna to discuss 
 the obnoxious clause. He met, indeed, with some opposi- 
 tion. The King of Bavaria wrote through his minister 
 that he declined to perjure himself. The King of 
 Wiirtemberg also protested. But the Conference never- 
 theless opened on the 20th of November, and carried out 
 all Mettcrnich's wishes. Tlienceforth there was an affree- 
 ment that the Princes of Germany should not be hindered 
 in the exercise of their power, nor in their duty as 
 members of the Bund, by any constitutions. 
 
 To understand a man thorouglily it is necessary to dive 
 into his inmost thoughts. This is not always possible 
 even when a man writes his owu memoirs, because memoirs 
 may be subsequently altered to suit circumstances. When, 
 however, a conceited and successful man praises himself, 
 such an understanding may be arrived at ; for then, we 
 know, he does not lie. The passage I am about to quote 
 will give a better and clearer idea of the opinion of 
 Metternich regarding himself, and of his absolute 
 supremacy in Germany, at this period, than it would be 
 possible to draw from official correspondence. When he 
 had mastered the initial difficulties at the Conference, and 
 had seen clearly that he was about to have an easy victory, 
 he made this entry in his journal : 
 
 " I have found a moment's quiet. The business of the Conference 
 proceeds very well. I have gone to tlie root of this matter — a rare 
 thing in moral and political discussions. I told my five-and-twenty 
 friends in an upright and decided manner what we want and what 
 we do not want. On this avowal there was a general declaration of 
 approval, and each one asserted that lie had never wanted more or 
 less, or, indeed, hardly anything difirnnt. Now, I am surrounded 
 by people who are quite enchanted witli their own force of will, and
 
 152 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 yet there is not one amongst them who a few days ago knew what he 
 wants or will want. This is the universal fate of such an assembly. 
 It , ha3 been evident to me for a long time that among a certain 
 number of persons only one is ever found who has clearly made out 
 for himself what is the question in hand. I shall be victorious hero 
 as at Carlsbad: that is to say, all will wish what I wish, and since I 
 only wish what is just, I believe I shall g;dn my victoryk. But what is 
 most remarkable is that these men will go home with the firm 
 persuasion that they have left Vienna with the same views with which 
 they came." 
 
 Can we wonder that with the conviction of his own 
 superiority expressed in the words I have quoted ; carrying 
 with him the whole strength of Austria ; having moulded 
 Frederick William to his will, and secure in the support 
 of the Czar, Metternich should be supreme in Germany ? 
 The words he himself recorded prove that he was not only 
 supreme, but that he felt that he, and he alone, possessed 
 the genius necessary to direct the course of all the rulers 
 of the States composing Germany. It is melancholy to 
 have to record that, disposing of this absolute power, he 
 wielded it in a manner which gained for him the hatred 
 of the races over whom he ruled : he used it to repress 
 liberty, to crush thought, opinion, action ; he used it, in 
 a word, to enslave the people to whose valour and pa- 
 triotism Germany owed her deliverance from Kapoleon. 
 
 80 much for his treatment of Germany up to the year 
 1820. Turn we now to Italy. 
 
 Under the Napoleonic system Italy had ceased, or had 
 almost ceased, to be only a geographical expression. But 
 after the catastrophe of Waterloo she was again parcelled 
 out into appanages for princes who were not always 
 Italians. Naples was restored to the Bourbons ; the 
 Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was established for Austria; 
 Piedmont was given back, with hard conditions, to the 
 KiniT of Sardinia : and various others Dukedoms and 
 Principalities were allotted to dispossessed princes or
 
 GOVERNMENT BY BEPBESSION 153 
 
 princesses. One fact remained clear ; Austria was pre- 
 ponderant in Italy. It was to her that Ferdinand I. of 
 Naples, and Victor 'Emanuel of Sardinia, alike looked to 
 support them against their own people. 
 
 Metternich did not possess in Italy the same power 
 for repression which he had accumulated to himself in 
 Germany. The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was 
 governed by an Archduke of the Imperial House, and 
 not all the Habsburgs were so submissive to the Chan- 
 cellor as was the easy-going Francis. Still, he could 
 urge, could advise, and, in a sense, could command ; 
 that is, he could command in the name of his master. 
 And he did watch and supervise the Imperial interests in 
 Italy as jealously as it was possible for a man whose 
 duties kept him in the German provinces of the Empire 
 to watch and supervise them. 
 
 He had but just completed the measures for the poli- 
 tical enslavement of Germany which I have narrated, 
 when information reached him that, in sympathy with 
 those Spaniards who had been driven to revolt by the 
 bad faith of the Bourbon sovereign whom the allies had 
 restored to rule over the peninsula, the Neapolitans had 
 forced their Bourbon king to consent to the appointment 
 of a provisional Junta, and to swear to accept a constitu- 
 tion on the basis of that to which the Spanish Bourbon 
 had with equal sincerity promised to adhere. 
 
 Metternich was at Baden, sixteen miles from Vienna, 
 when (15th July, 1S20) the news of this attack on his 
 system reached him. He started for Vienna the same 
 day, and proceeded, the following morning, to see the 
 Emperor, who was at the Imperial castle of ^Veinzlerl. 
 On his way thither he had leisure to calculate the effect 
 on his general policy which such a revolt would produce. 
 He records that it was an event, *' beyond all calculation ;
 
 loi LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNIGE. 
 
 the consequences will be quickly seen, the remedies must 
 not be long waited for." Believing that the movement 
 had been caused by Russians, anxious to please their 
 sovereign ; believing, also, that it would cause blood " to 
 flow in streams," he addressed himself to the Czar, and 
 persuaded him to agree to a Conference of the Powers at 
 Troppau, in Austrian Silesia, to arrange the best mode of 
 suppressing the ebullition. The Conference was fixed for 
 October 20th. On that day Alexander arrived. Metter- 
 nich had preceded him by twenty-four hours. 
 
 Before we proceed to consider the deliberations at 
 Troppau I would ask the reader to spare a moment to 
 consider one or two entries in the diary of the powerful 
 minister the sketch of whose career I am endeavouring 
 to set before them. In those entries we see the inner 
 soul of the man, his conceit, his narrowness, his hatred 
 for all who had opposed him or whom he had opposed ; 
 his intense self-appreciation. On the 15tli of August, 
 the birthday of Napoleon, for instance, we come upon this 
 entry : 
 
 "August 15th (Napoleoustng). 
 " This is the day of the great accursed ! If ho were still ou tlie 
 throne, aud he were alone in the world, I should be happy." 
 
 Then, regarding his master, the Emperor Francis : 
 
 " Heaven has placed me near a man who seems as if he liad been 
 made for me." 
 
 Again : 
 
 " Tho Emperor and I will give the world a great example ; we wfll 
 not leave our pnsts. If wo arc destroyed, many will have to smart for 
 their crimes and their folly fust. Tlie high cliaracler of tlte Carbomxri, 
 the party which has led all the otliers, is the anxiety." 
 
 In another ])lace, commenting on a declaration said to 
 have been made by the Czar, that he was conscious that 
 he had, since 1814, been mistaken as to the mind of the 
 public, Metternich makes tiiis remark : " The man who
 
 GOVERNMENT BY BEPEESSION. 155 
 
 allows errors to be seen is no statesman ; " adding, how- 
 ever, that the admission of a mistake proves that the man 
 is honourable, and that Alexander was that. Again : 
 
 " My head is tired aud my heart dried up* and in this state I feel 
 the world resting on my shoulders. If I should deceive myself for a 
 moment I am brought to recollection by the arrival of some courier 
 with the declaration, ' What will j^ou do ? ' They say, ' We have 
 confidence only in you. Our fate is in your hands; what shall we 
 do ? ' That is the substance of all the despatches which arrive, and 
 two-thirds of the questioners are always ready to perpetrate some 
 folly, because they have neither spirit nor courage." 
 
 To return to Troppau. There Metternich found that 
 Alexander had come entirely round to his views. The 
 Emperor admitted, with many expressions of penitence, 
 that in 1813-14 he had sinned, but that he was now more 
 than ever convinced of the correctness of the doctrines on 
 vihich Metternich had acted. " You are not altered," 
 said the Czar to him, " I am. You have notliing to 
 regret, but I have." Commenting upon this, and upon 
 other conversations with the same high personage, 
 Metternich wa-ites : "People might think that the 
 Emperor had only just come into the world and opened 
 his eyes. He is now at the point where I was thirty years 
 ago." A day or two later the Conference f opened. 
 There Metternich was successful, though not quite so 
 successful, as he had been at Teplitz and Vienna. He 
 scored, he tells us, only eighty-five per sent, of the 
 victories. But, whilst he was scoring these the party of 
 
 * An allusion to the loss of his married daughter who had then 
 recently died. 
 
 f There were present at it, besides the Emperors of Austria and 
 Russia, tlie Grand Duke Nicholas of Eussia; the King and the Crown 
 Prince of Prussia ; the Austrian diplomatists, Metternich, Gentz, 
 Zichy, and Mercy ; those of Russia, Nesselrode, Capo d'Istria, 
 Golowkin, Alopaus; those of Prussia, Harck-nberg and Bemstofi'; of 
 England, Stewart ; of France, de la Ferrouays.
 
 156 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICH. 
 
 freedom was not idle. The cry of " The Constitution of 
 1812 " was raised likewise in Sicily. Then the King of 
 Na])lcs, impatient alike of his concessions and of his 
 position, announced his intention of attending the 
 Conference, now become a Congress. The sovereigns 
 and ministers present heard of this resolution on the 24th 
 December. It wjis at once resolved to make a move to the 
 milder climate and more convenient situation of Laibach. 
 
 The Congress did not adjourn, however, without having 
 arrived at conclusions common to Austria, Russia, and 
 Prussia, which were to constitute the basis for further 
 action. These conclusions were formulated in a despatch, 
 dated 8th December, which the three Powers transmitted 
 to their agents at the German and Northern Courts. Tlie 
 purport of this despatch was the enforcement and develop- 
 ment of the principles the germ of which was contained in 
 the Holy Alliance, viz., the agreement of the sovereigns to 
 put down what they called '• rebellion " in the dominions 
 of any one of them. To this England and France were 
 invited to agree ; they were further asked to send 
 representatives to Laibach. 
 
 Metternich reached Laibach early in January, and the 
 sovereigns and diplomatists quickly followed him. Again 
 were they obedient to the will of their master. By 
 the advice of Metternich it was arranged to despatch 
 60,000 Austrian troops to " restore order " — that is, 
 the despotic rule of the Bourbon, with all its repressions 
 — in the south of Italy. On the Gtli I'cbruary an army 
 composed of that number of men crossed the Po for that 
 ])ur])()se. A cam])aign of thirteen days sufficed to put 
 down the insurrection, and, although, in the meantime, 
 Piedmont had risen, and demonstrations had been made 
 even in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, the faith of 
 Metternich in the power of bayonets never wavered.
 
 GOVERNMENT BY BEPRESSION. 157 
 
 Writing to Count Rcchberg from Lai bach, under date 
 the 31st March, he says : 
 
 " We shall finish the Piedmontese affair as we did the Neapolitan. 
 Another French Eevoliition could alone interpose grave — perhaps 
 insurmountable — obstacles to this second enterprise. 
 
 " All the venom is at present on the surface. The cure will be so 
 much the more radical; and what we began together in July, 1819, 
 can be finished with tlie help of God and for the salvation of the 
 world in 1821. It is therefore from Carlsbad that the Era of 
 Salvation must be dated." 
 
 The Czar was not only an accomplice in the movement 
 of the Austrian troops : he was even eager that his own 
 should be employed. Finally it was arranged that 
 he should despatch 120,000 men to his frontier with 
 orders to move at the first sign Metternich should give. 
 Metternich never gave that sign. He was anxious that 
 the work of repression should be carried out by Austria 
 alone — by that Austria which, he claims in his memoirs, * 
 had contributed two-thirds of the main force which won, at 
 Leipsig, the " battle of the nations." She had won that 
 battle to fight, eight years later, against the victors, the 
 battles of the despots. 
 
 The conclusions arrived at at the Congress of Laibach 
 were but a confirmation of the agreement of Troppau. 
 They were contained in a declaration signed by the 
 representatives of the three Powers, and communicated by 
 Metternich to the Austrian agents at Foreign Courts in 
 an explanatory circular despatch dated the 12th May. 
 For the moment the policy was successful. Austrian 
 soldiers repressed the rising in Piedmont as easily as 
 they had put down that in Naples. Metternich then 
 applied his energies to restore order, somewhat dis- 
 arranged by sympathetic demonstrations, in Lorabardy. 
 
 * Vol. iii., p. 390 (English translation).
 
 158 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 In the work from which I have aheady quoted,* Mr. 
 Maurice states that Metternich estabhshed an Aulic 
 Council at Vienna to superintend the affairs in the 
 Lombardo- Venetian kingdom, and to crush out any local 
 independence ; that Count Federig-o Conftilonieri, who had 
 founded the literary movement which was to instruct his 
 countrymen, was arrested and condemned to death. Mr. 
 Maurice continues : " His case excited sympathy, even in 
 Vienna, where the Empress interceded for his life : and 
 at last, after long entreaty, his sentence was commuted to 
 imprisonment for life in the fortress of Spielberg. There 
 Metternich tried in vain to extort from him the betrayal 
 of his fellow-conspirators." The imprisonment of such a 
 man, and the ignominious treatment in his prison fortress, 
 roused a feeling throughout Italy which, at a later period, 
 bore abundant fruit for the cause on behalf of which 
 Confalonieri suffered. 
 
 In 1821 and the following year the affairs of Moldavia 
 and Wallachia and Greece came before the Cono-ress. 
 Metternich, who recognised the necessity of maintaining the 
 >*^ultan, found it very difficult to give to the mind of the Czar 
 the impression he desired. But he knew the weak points 
 of that impressionable mind, and he played his game with 
 so much art that he believed he had won it. On the 3rd 
 June, 1822, he wrote to the Emperor Francis to tell him 
 that the work of Peter the Great was destroyed ; that 
 
 " what Eussia loses in moral strength the Porto gains. We have 
 (lone tliem here a service wliich they can never snllicicntly reward, and 
 it will maintain our influence as well as that of England." 
 
 A few days later he again congratulates himself on the 
 result of his influence. He writes : 
 
 " My position again is very remarkable ; I am at the centre as the 
 
 * Revolutions of 1848-9 in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.
 
 GOVEBNMENT BY REPRESSION: 159 
 
 chief motive power in an affair which is quite simple, but lias for 
 months been embarrassed by unreason and unjustifiable measures.' 
 
 He was expecting- and hoping that Lord Londonderry 
 would come to Vienna when he heard of his suicide. His 
 exclamation on hearing it is characteristic. "What a 
 blow ! I am armed against all contingencies ; my cause 
 will only be lost if I fall myself ! " Yes ; but what a 
 commentary on his condemnation of Napoleon's system, a 
 condemnation based on the ground that Napoleon was the 
 keystone of the arch, which would fall when the keystone 
 was removed ! 
 
 The Powers had resolved to hold a Congress at Verona, 
 and it was at that Congress that Metternich had hoped to 
 have the support of Lord Londonderry. 
 
 " I awaited him here," he writes from Vienna, " as my second 
 self. . . . He was devoted to me in heart and spirit, not only from 
 personal inclination, but also from conviction. My work would have 
 been reduced by one half, because I should have had him to share it 
 with me ; now I am left to my own strength. I am not alarmed at 
 that ; but I feel myself overburdened. I have just requested the 
 presence of the Duke of Wellington, the only man who can in a 
 measure replace him." 
 
 On the 22nd October following, Metternich writes from 
 Verona that he had just begun his greatest work ; that 
 the Congress was composed of honest men, who had 
 confidence in him ; that his personal relations with the 
 Czar were 
 
 «' the most intimate possible, as, for the peace of the world, they ought 
 to be. He believes in me just as my Emperor does, and the business 
 thereby gains as it would by no other combination." 
 
 But Metternich soon found that his forecast had been 
 a little premature. In England Canning had succeeded 
 Lord Londonderry at the Foreign Office, and although 
 the Duke of Wellington came to Verona to represent
 
 160 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 England, he came not to register the decrees of Mctter- 
 nich, but to support the views of the British Cabinet. 
 The main object of the assembhng of the sovereigns and 
 the representatives of the powers at Verona* was to restore 
 the perjured Ferdinand of Spain to the throne he had 
 disjiraced, and to secure which for him the blood of 
 England had been from 1801) to 1814 poured out like water. 
 The influence of ]\Ietternich and the despotic desires of 
 the sovereigns did indeed ensure an agreement to 
 authorise France to intervene in Spain, but England was 
 no party to it. All that the Duke of AVellington could 
 be persuaded to undertake was to communicate to the 
 four Powers his views on their application of the prin- 
 ciples of the Holy Alliance to Spain, in a confidential 
 note, and that note plainly showed that England was 
 averse to all aggressive interference of one nation in the 
 internal affairs of another. 
 
 The substitution of Canning for Londonderry in 
 England had then the result of throwing Mettcrnich 
 more completely into the arms of Russia. The change 
 was congenial to him, for the Eastern question and the 
 question of Greece, which was then an important part 
 of that question, seemed to demand a prompt settlement. 
 It is true that an agreement of a nature which he hoped 
 would settle all difl'erences had been arrived at at Verona. 
 But it soon became clear that the main provision of this 
 agreement — the provision namely, that thePorte should her- 
 self pacify Greece — was unworkable. Upon that question, 
 then, he would have to come to a complete understand- 
 
 * There wcro present at the Crinp;rcss of Yernnn, tlic Emperors of 
 Austria and of Russia, the Kinj,'s of Prussia, of the two Sicilies ami of 
 Sardinia, sevtral minor princelots of Italy ; the Duke of AVcllinirlon, 
 representing England ; the Duke of Jlontmorency and Chatcautiriand 
 representing Eriince ; Mettcrnich, Pozzo di Borgo, Bernstorff and 
 Hardenberg.
 
 GOVERNMENT BT BEPRESSION. 161 
 
 jng with Alexander. Metternich never for a moment 
 doubted his ability to accomplish this result. He had, 
 he believed, the Czar in leading strings. It was about 
 this time, December 1822, that he obtained the adhesion 
 of that sovereign and of the King of Prussia, equally 
 Ijound to his chariot-wheel, to establish at Mayence a 
 secret Committee of Inquiry, composed of three members, 
 one from each nation, to exercise espionage over the so- 
 called conspirators of Central Europe. 
 
 The year 1823 was inaugurated by a small occurrence 
 which, nevertheless, excited the anger of the secret ruler 
 of the Continent. The King of Wiirtemberg, taking 
 offence at the high dealing of Austria at Verona, had 
 caused to be addressed to the diplomatic agents of his 
 Cabinet a circular despatch in which Austria was roundly 
 accused of appropriating to herself " the heritage of 
 influence in Europe arrogated to himself by Napoleon ; " 
 and which, whilst criticising the words and actions of the 
 three despots, protested against the consequences which 
 the political procedure of their Courts might have on the 
 independence of sovereigns of the second order. The sting 
 of this circular lay in its absolute truth. Its effect soon 
 passed, however, as events proceeded to develop themselves 
 in the order Metternich had arranged. France invaded 
 Spain and abolished the Constitution. On the other 
 hand, the Greeks obtained several victories over the Turks, 
 and it became necessary that Metternich and his master 
 should have another personal interview with the Czar. 
 They met consequently at Czernowitz,the Emperor Francis 
 posing as the lay figure, ]\[etternich as the worker. At 
 tlie conference Aletternich found that to work in harmony 
 with Russia on the Eastern question he would have to 
 modify the ideas which had enabled him to act in concert 
 with England ; and, England having ceased to be the 
 
 M
 
 1 G2 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 England of Casllereagh, ho modified them accordingly. 
 The result was that in the matter which affected the 
 occupation of the Principalities he sup])orted the "just 
 views " of Russia, whilst the question of Greece was left to 
 be solved at a Conference of the Powers, which, Metter- 
 uich rect)mmended, should be held at St. Petersburg. 
 
 The following year the internal condition of Germany 
 seemed to demand a reminder that the pilot who, in 1819,. 
 had, by the issue of the Carlsbad decrees, repressed the 
 development of free opinion at the Universities, was still 
 at the helm. Reporting to the Emperor, in July, how 
 completely those decrees had purified the Universities,, 
 crushed the Press, and searched out and baffled the plans 
 of the demagogues, Metternich suggested that both 
 Bavaria and Baden, in which countries State Assemblies 
 Avould be convened the following year, should be re- 
 minded that they must carry into execution the repressive 
 system so successfully inaugurated at Carlsbad ; that no 
 ])ublicity should be given to their proceedings, for that 
 the nail must be driven right up to its head. The 
 Emperor Francis approved of the sketch of the Presi- 
 dential ])roposition prepared by his Minister, and the 
 Courts of Bavaria and Baden accepted its principle. Tcv 
 add to the apparent trium])h of the authors of this arbitrary 
 action Prussia signified her adhesion to the same plan,, 
 and JNIetternich, replying to the satisfactory assurance on. 
 this point which he received in a letter from Frederick 
 \Villiam III., was able to assure his Royal correspondent 
 that his life, " for some time, has bad but one aim — that 
 of assuring, by my feeble efforts, the noble cause which 
 the raonarchs, for the welfare of the world, have sought 
 to maintain." 
 
 Tiie question of Greece occupied a great part of his 
 attention during the year 1824. Naturally Metternich had
 
 G VEBNMENT B Y BEPBESSION. 1 G3 
 
 but little sympathy with the aspirations of the Greeks — 
 2)er se. His life, since 1815, had been spent in combating 
 the princi})le on which they were acting-. Yet he was too 
 closely associated with the policy of the Czar to act with 
 perfect freedom. 
 
 " Honour and duty," he ■wrote, addressing the Austrian minister in 
 London, Prince Esterhazy, "compel them (the Allies) to serve the 
 cause of the peace of Europe ; this cause is that of the Emperor 
 Alexander." 
 
 He could not or would not believe that that Emperor 
 aimed either " at conquests, or at the thorough emancipa- 
 tion of the Greeks, or at the establishment of a new and 
 revolutionary power." x\s Austria did not entertain such 
 a belief, and as the Greeks, certainly, and if not the 
 Emperor Alexander personally, the secret directors of the 
 liussian policy, probably, did entertain it ; it is not sur- 
 prising that the question of Greek independence was 
 rather strengthened than otherwise by the reliance of 
 Austria on the moderation of Alexander — strengthened, 
 that is to say, by the trust displayed by Austria, in spite 
 of the wishes of Austria. This was more especially 
 apparent when, some seven or eight years after the death 
 of the Czar, the union between his successor and Metternich 
 became even closer than it had been with Alexander. 
 
 In September of this year (1824) the sovereign whom 
 the Allies had imposed upon France in 1814, and again 
 in 1815 — Louis XVIII. — died, and was succeeded by his 
 brother, Charles X. The accession of the new sovereign 
 was specially agreeable to Metternich. " Charles X.," he 
 v.rote, " is peacefully seated on his brother's throne. This 
 quiet change, which marks an historical episode of the 
 Kevolution, undoubtedly proves that moral regeneration 
 has made some progress in France." He had but one 
 fear — whether, in his anxiety to obtain popularity, the new 
 
 M 2
 
 1C4 LIFE OF PlilNCE METTERNICE. 
 
 Kinn^ had not made too many concessions to the Left ; 
 whether he wonld be able " to resist the Liberal influence 
 which the Dauphin seems to exercise over his father." 
 The clear-sightedness which, after patient study, had read 
 the character of Napoleon, was evidently beginning to fail. 
 The year following, the real views of Russia on the 
 Greek question — views held not the less strougly because 
 they were not disclosed — produced a coolness, or, as 
 Metternich describes it, a tension, in the relations between 
 Austria and liussia. Metternich could not get away from 
 the point that Greece was in insurrection against the Porte ; 
 that Greece aimed at independence ; that the Powers 
 could not support Greece in her pretensions, because they 
 were at peace with the Sultan. In fact, according to the 
 principles of the Holy Alliance — principles on which the 
 signatories to it acted in Spain, in Naples, in Northern 
 Italy — they were bound rather to wish well to the Sultan. 
 As the year went on some dim consciousness of the views 
 of l\ussia, exhibited by a change of tone in the despatches, 
 and in the silence of the Czar, stole over the mind of tlie 
 Austrian IMinister. 
 
 "At St. Petersburg:," he writes in October, " tliey seem to be very 
 much offended with inc." 
 
 Again, the same day : 
 
 " Thick mists lie on the Neva, but they will soon be dissipated, for 
 they begin again to see that the road they liave taken is not the right 
 one ; but as tliis view of things is disagrecabh', they will for some time 
 longer seek elsewhere what they can only find at home." 
 
 Still, no progress was made towards a solution, and 
 in December, Metternich was startled by receiving a 
 despatch telling him that Alexander had died at Taganrog. 
 " In spite of my coldbloodedness," he wrote, " this unex- 
 pected catastrophe has touched me most deeply." Without
 
 GOVEBNMENT BY REPBESSION. 1G5 
 
 hesitation he fixed ujjon the Grand-Duke Constantine as 
 Alexander's successor, and he proceeded to make a fore- 
 cast as to how he could mould him. lie recorded the 
 conclusion at which he had arrived in a letter addressed, 
 the 18th, to Baron Ottenfels. 
 
 " His policy will be entirely pacific. The bent of his mind has two 
 objects : in politics, the support of the monarchical principle ; in an 
 administrative point of view, the internal amelioration of the empire. 
 I deceive myself, if the Ilistury of Eussia does not begin where the 
 liomance of Russia ends." 
 
 This comparison between History and Romance was, it 
 will be admitted, rather severe on that Alexander whom the 
 writer had kept steadfast to the league against Napoleon ; 
 v.hose generous impulses he had ever exerted himself to 
 pervert ; whom he had made his accomplice for the repres- 
 sion of the development of those aspirations which dis- 
 tinguish mankind from the brute creation, and who had 
 only displayed some symptoms of revolt from the yoke on 
 a question with I'egard to w hich a Czar of Russia is forced 
 to obey the national feeling. But it serves to show the 
 character, the cold, hard, unfeeling, selfish character of 
 the man. Looking at him as he was, the author of the 
 policy of repression, with kings as his accomplices and 
 peoples as his victims, we can see how he felt that the 
 continuance of his policy depended on a continuance of 
 accomplices of the same mould ; and, realising, as he must 
 have realised, that without a central commandinor fio-ure 
 to sustain and put into action the common idea, the 
 system must collapse, we can understand how, reviewing 
 in the privacy of his chamber the situation, he must have 
 foreseen that when tlie keystone of his arch should be 
 withdrawn, the arch, too, would fall. 
 
 But Nicholas succeeded, not Constantine. And thouo-h 
 Metternich had so far committed himself as to write to
 
 106. ■ LIFE OF PBINCE METTEENICE. 
 
 the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to tell him 
 that his spirit " was transported by the new era he saw 
 commencing " under Constantino's rule, he was able 
 nevertheless, in a later despatch, to express his pleasure 
 at "the calmness and rectitude of principle" displayed by 
 Nicholas. 
 
 Shortly after the accession of Nicholas, and before any 
 decisive step in the Eastern question had been taken, 
 ]\retternich met Lord Hertford. He was delighted with 
 this stern, unbending Tory of the old school. 
 
 "I had not for years,"' he writes, "met with so iiiilepcndcnt, 
 thoughtful, and clever an Englishman. His words were like an echo 
 of the past." 
 
 In the English peer, with regard to his intense dislike 
 of Canning and his hatred for the very name of " reform," 
 Metternich found an ardent sympathiser, and he could 
 not help recording that he felt that Lord Hertford 
 liked him as much as he liked Lord Hertford. Yet 
 it is curious to note how incorrect were the forecasts 
 made at this time by this experienced statesman with 
 reference to the burning question of the day, the ques- 
 tion of the attitude of Russia towards Turkey and the 
 Greek revolt, and how correct by comparison were those 
 of Canning. In his despatch to the Austrian Ambassador 
 in London dated June 8 of this year (182G), Metternich 
 once again expressed his conviction that Russia regarded 
 a rupture with the Porte as " a very disastrous event," 
 and that by no possibility could that Power desire to see 
 the Greeks freed from their dependence on Turkey. As 
 the year went on, however, he began to fear lest the sway 
 he had exercised over the mind of Alexander had found 
 no place in the sterner nature of his brother ; that " the 
 crafty and unscrupulous mind of Mr. Canning," as he
 
 GOVEBNMENT BY ItEPBESSION. . 167 
 
 describes it, niifrht exercise an influence over the Czar 
 suificient to crush the Holy Alhance, so far as it affected 
 Russia. His alarm on this subject was very real. " If," 
 he wrote to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersbui-g, 
 *' the Continental courts fall into the snare " — that is the 
 snare laid by Canning — " the cause will be lost." It was 
 a terrible moment for the man who had led xVlexander as 
 and how he liked. In a letter to the Prince of Hesse- 
 Homburo-, then at St. Petersburg, he poured out the 
 anguish of his soul. He stated that he was conscious that 
 the Czar had a certain dislike for himself ; that — and the 
 reader will mark all the point of the expression, considering 
 the relations w hich had existed between the writer and the 
 lute Czar — " till now he stands alone, not having yet found 
 the man whom he could regard as a powerful instrument 
 to perform his will." 
 
 This letter, evidently written to be shown to Nicholas, 
 and which was probably shown to him, did not at the 
 moment produce the desired effect. England, guided by 
 Mr. CanninjT, was bent on securing the independence of 
 Greece, and Russia had, by her ambassador in London, 
 consented to this course. To the mind of Metternich the 
 acknowledgment of such independence was to recognise 
 the right of rebellion. Against such a right he had 
 directed the policy of Continental Europe since 1815, and 
 he laid the blame of deviation from the sure path the 
 I'owers had trodden, on the misleading influence of that 
 l*ower which, even when guided by Castlereagh, had 
 declined to subscribe to the ])rinciples of the Holy 
 Alliance, and which now, directed by the "faux esprit" 
 of Canning, was urging Europe towards " inextricable 
 complications." We cannot wonder that when the year 
 ended, the mind of the Austrian Minister was still in a 
 state of great perplexity.
 
 1G8 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 Under the liap})ler auspices of the new year that 
 perplexity began to disappear. In February, Mcttcrnich 
 recognised with delight that the (^ourt of St. Petersburg 
 was inclined to make appniaches to Austria. Although 
 he Mas inclined to receive them in the friendliest spirit, 
 he had not yet realised that a great Power which had 
 professed and acted upon well-defined anti-revolutionary 
 principles in the face of Europe, was prepared to act in a 
 sense absolutely contrary when her own interests were 
 involved. Thus it happened that he met in a spirit, not 
 intended to be repelling, but which did repel, the advances 
 of Russia. AVhen it had been decided to hold a Con- 
 ference of the five Powers in London, the instructions 
 sent by Metternich to the Austrian Ambassador were thus 
 directly opposed to the policy which Russia had resolved 
 to pursue. So opposed indeed were they that they drew 
 from the Russian Ambassador a Declaration of " the 
 most lively regret that the Court of Austria brings 
 forward proposals which differ from those of his Imperial 
 Majesty, and do not adhere to the project of a treaty and 
 to the measures which he had communicated to that 
 Court." The reply of Metternich to this rebuke was full 
 of dignity. It expressed in so many words, his regret 
 that Austria could not be a party to a step which would 
 bring the whole power of Europe to bring pressure on 
 Turkey in an unrighteous cause. In consequence of 
 Metternich's attitude, neither Austria nor Prussia 
 acceded to the Treaty of London between England, 
 Prance and Russia (July Gth, 1S27), an alliance which 
 resulted, three montlis later, in " that untoward event," * 
 the battle of Navarino and the consequent destruction of 
 the Turkish fleet, and, a little later still, in the war 
 
 * The expression used in llio i>pccch from the Throne at the opening 
 of the Session of 1828.
 
 GOVEBNMENT BY BEPBESSION. 1G9 
 
 between Russia and Turkey which terminated in the 
 treaty of Adriano])le, and the recognition by the latter of 
 the independence of Greece. 
 
 Vainly had Metternich tried, and we are bound to 
 render him the fullest justice for his earnest efforts in 
 this respect, to save the Porte from her impending fate. 
 Russia had taken advantage of the generous desire of 
 England to free the Greeks to make of her a consentinof 
 party to a deadly blow which she sought to deal at her 
 ancient enemy. The warnings of Metternich, then, 
 ■whilst they were accepted with expressions of fervent 
 gratitude by the Sultan, did not affect the result. 
 Navarino, whilst it pained, did not surprise Metternich. 
 His expression, when he received the news was : " It has 
 begun a new era for Europe." 
 
 The death of Mr. Canning, and the accession to power 
 of the Duke of Wellington, gave Metternich some hope 
 that the old cordial relations which existed between tlie 
 two countries in the time of Castlereagh might be 
 restored, and he instructed the Austrian Ambassador to 
 make advances in that sense. The residt was a 
 temporary understanding between the two cabinets as to 
 the policy to be pursued on the Eastern question. When, 
 in the autumn of 1829, the exhausted army of Diebitch 
 reached Adrianople, Austria, acting with France and 
 England, was instrumental in procuring for the Porte the 
 peace which bears the name of that city, and which, in 
 the state of the Russian army, she needed not. Well 
 advised, Turkey might have extorted, unaided, far better 
 terms. But she possessed neither the moral courage nor 
 the man. Europe stood aloof, indifferent; and thus it 
 came about, for the second time in history, that, at a 
 crisis which might have been used to crush her herediatry 
 enemy, the Ottoman Empire was, to use the emphatic
 
 170 LIFE OF PBINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 words of the Austrian statesman, "shaken to its founda- 
 tions." 
 
 One result of the war between Russia and Turkey had 
 been the dissolution of the trij)le alliance. There had, 
 however, been no corresponding rapprochement between 
 Austria and the Czar. To obtain such an understandin"; 
 as had existed prior to the death of Alexander, ^Metternich 
 was directing his efforts, when he was startled by the 
 overthrow, in Paris, of the branch of the family which he 
 had been twice instrumental in forcing upon the French 
 people.
 
 ( i'i ) 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE DECLINE AND FALL OF METTEENICH'S SYSTEM 
 IN EUROPE. 
 
 1830-1848. 
 
 The manner in which the Revolution of 1830 would 
 affect the policy of Metternich, and the stability of the 
 Empire whose destinies he was guiding, would depend, 
 he saw at a glance, on the use which the French people 
 would make of their reconquered freedom of action. 
 When it transpired that tlicy would be content with the 
 transfer, under certain guarantees, from the elder to the 
 younger branch of the same family ; when, moreover, it 
 became a})parent, as it did very soon become apparent, 
 that the representative of the younger branch, King Louis 
 Phihppe, was disposed to be conservative, peaceful, and, 
 as far as he dared, autocratic, the three despots of Europe 
 realised that it might yet be possible to enforce the 
 system of repression whicli had been inaugurated on the 
 fall of Napoleon. They took heart accordingly, and each 
 proceeded, in his fashion, to crush the ebullitions which 
 the first news from Paris had caused. 
 
 For the moment they encountered little difficulty. 
 Nicholas laid his heavy hand on Poland, and the rising 
 in Poland collapsed. Metternich, confronted by Italy, 
 Germany, and Hungary, had a task less easy, because it
 
 173 LIFE OF PRINCE METTERNICE. 
 
 dealt with more than one nationality. But, resting on 
 his prestige, his alliances, and his power to employ force, 
 he was equal to the occasion. In Italy, a rising in 
 Bologna was sternly repressed by Austrian troops. In 
 Germany, in three kingdoms of which — Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
 berg, and Saxony — the desire for freedom had taken the 
 form of proclaiming constitutions, Metternich caused an 
 enactment to be passed by which every ruling prince of 
 Germany became bound to reject petitions tending to the 
 increase of the power of the Estates at the expense of the 
 power of the sovereign. In Hungary, the aspirations of 
 whose nobles had caused him some trouble prior to 1830, 
 he succeeded for the moment in staving off a solution 
 which, nevertheless, so clearsighted a statesman ought to 
 have regarded as simply adjourned, but which he believed, 
 nevertheless, would never be brought up for settlement. 
 England, indeed, had broken for ever with absolutism ; 
 but, since the death of Castlereagh, jMetternich had never 
 hoped much from England. With a Russia forced by 
 events to recur to the old friendship ; a Prussia, and there- 
 fore a Germany, completely dominated ; and a France 
 governed by a pacific Bourbon bent only on securing the 
 family interests ; he thought he would yet be more than a 
 match for the revolutionists who were raising their heads 
 in Italy, and who had begun to underiuiMo Hungary. 
 
 But the crushing of the rising in Bologna did not 
 mean the permanent repression of the longings of the 
 Italian ])atriots. ivlazzini, who, on the outbreak of the 
 revolution of 1830, had been arrested and imprisoned on 
 the ground that he was fond of solitary walks by night, 
 and habitually silent as to the subject of his meditations, 
 had arrived at the conclusion that a stronger society than 
 that of the Carbonari — a society which should appeal to 
 the natural aspirations of the Italians for unity and
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF HIS SYSTEM. 173 
 
 liberty — was required to save Italy. When, after some 
 interrogatories, it was recognised by the King of Sardinia, 
 Charles Felix, that proof of absolute crime was absolutely 
 wanting, that monarch, still regarding him as dangerous, 
 gave him the choice of remaining under surveillance 
 in Italy, or of exile. Mazzini chose the latter ; pro- 
 ceeded by way of Geneva to Lyons, where he published 
 his first work picturing the rising of Romagna, called 
 " The Night of Rimini " ; thence, after a short sojourn 
 in Corsica, to Marseilles. Here, in the early days of 
 18o2, his prison thoughts found expression in the founding 
 of the " Society of Young Italy." The avowed purpose 
 of this society was to make Italy free, united, and 
 republican. These aims were avowed and preached in 
 a journal called after the name of the society, " Giovine 
 Italia." 
 
 The character of the founder, the principles which 
 appealed to the reason and passions of a highly-gifted 
 people, kept in a state of bondage by foreign bayonets, 
 soon obtained for the Society a vast number of adherents : 
 amongst them, some of the noblest of the sons of Italy. 
 As naturally, the same causes brought to the front a number 
 of powerful enemies. Prominent amongst these — the first, 
 in fact, to take action — was the sovereign who owed his 
 throne to a revolution, Louis Philippe of France. The 
 publication of the paper was prohibited, its numbers were 
 confiscated when they appeared, and finally Mazzini and his 
 friends had to quit Marseilles and find a refuge in free 
 Switzerland. Establishing himself at Lugano, there, on 
 the very borders of Italy, Mazzini received the fugitives 
 from the tyranny which overshadowed his native land. 
 Thence in February 1834, the patriots marched to strike a 
 blow for freedom. The blow failed, and Mazzini was forced 
 to flee, first to Paris ; thence, a little later, to London.
 
 174 LIFE OF PniNCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 Metternich had been neither hlhid nor indifferent to, 
 nor had he nnderrated the importance of, Mazzini's 
 movement. The pubhcation of Giovine Italia ; the lofty 
 sentiments it inspired; the ability with which it was 
 conducted ; had roused the quick suspicions of his sensi- 
 tive mind. Early in 1S34 he had written to his princij)al 
 agent in Northern Italy to warn him of the new danger, 
 and especially of its author. Nor when, a year later, the 
 expedition from Lugano failed, did the astute Austrian 
 statesman consider the danger at an end. He had 
 Mazzini tracked to his halting-place in Paris, and thence 
 to his lair in London. There his every movement was 
 watched, and thence copies of all his publications were 
 carefully despatched to Vienna. The task of reading 
 these was a long one, for, despite of an occasional inter- 
 ference with his correspondence and his privacy, Mazzini 
 stayed in London till the overthrow of the throne of the 
 barricades indicated to the oppressed peoples of Europe 
 the road to unity and freedom. 
 
 But IMetternich had on his hands at the earlier stage of 
 this epoch other matters at least as serious as the movements 
 and action of Mazzini, These I shall briefly indicate. 
 
 No portion of the territories which acknowledged the 
 sway of the House of Habsburg had made more sacrifices 
 for that House than Hungary. She had saved the 
 monarchy of Maria Theresa : she had poured out her 
 blood like water to resist Napoleon, Hungary possessed 
 a Constitution, under the operation of which the laws were 
 administered by means of county assemblies, empowered 
 to raise taxes and levy soldiers ; to refuse obedience to all 
 orders save those which bore the stamp of legality. 
 Those asseml)lies had no power, however, to alter the laws. 
 This power devolved on the Diet, composed of representa- 
 tives from the several counties. The maintenance of this
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF HIS SYSTEM. 175 
 
 Constitution formed part of the contract by virtue of wliich 
 the sovereignty over Hungary had devolved on the House 
 of Habsburg. 
 
 In the hour of Austria's need, when Francis, on the 
 instigation of his Minister, had resolved to strike the 
 blow which should be fatal to his son-in-law, he had 
 convened the Hungarian Diet. But from 1813 to 1825, 
 the Minister who governed in his name had not once called 
 it together. Having, however, been baffled, in 1823, in 
 an attempt to raise taxes unauthorised by any law passed 
 by the Diet, Metternich, wanting money, was constrained 
 to convene it in 1825. This Diet witnessed the forma- 
 tion of the constitutional opposition, destined, in later 
 years, to achieve so great results. The leader of this 
 movement was Count Stephen Szechenyi, a member of 
 one of the great families of Hungary, and one who 
 lamented the system, introduced by Metternich, of 
 attracting the great nobles of Hungary to Vienna, with 
 the view to divert into other channels aspirations naturally 
 Hungarian. Szechenyi's main object was to restore the 
 use of the Magyar language, and to revivify Hungarian 
 social life. On both these points Metternich opposed 
 him, and for the moment the schemes of the patriot 
 Hungarian, though pushed with a vigour and self-sacrifice 
 rarely surpassed, did not ripen. 
 
 Again, in 1830, was the Diet summoned, representing 
 alike Hungary and Transylvania. The first demand 
 made by the Government was one to which no opposition 
 was anticipated. It was simply a demand for new 
 recruits for the army. But the revolution of July had 
 taken place : new aspirations had seized the imaginations 
 of thoughtful men in the two countries, and much opposi- 
 tion was raised to the measure. Again were the 
 questions of the use of the Magyar language, and the
 
 17G LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 employment of Hungarian officers with Hungarian 
 soldiers strongly urged, but the Diet was dissolved 
 (December, 1830) before any deiinite resolution had been 
 arrived at. 
 
 Again was it called together in December, 1832. This 
 time the Austrian Government and the advocates of the 
 rights of the peasants, represented by Francis Deak, were 
 found on the one side, the nobles and privileged classes on 
 the other. Whilst the discussions on this subject were still 
 proceeding, the Emperor Francis died (2nd March, 
 1832). His son, Ferdinand,* who succeeded him, though 
 a prince of weak intellect, was good-natured and kind- 
 hearted, and he insisted that some concessions should be 
 made to the popular demands. jMetternich made them 
 accordingly, but so grudgingly that the effect which 
 might have otherwise been expected from them was sadly 
 marred. It was in this Diet that Kossuth took the lead 
 as a supporter of the popular feelings. 
 
 During the next three years Metternich made serious 
 attempts to allay the growing feeling against Austrian 
 predominance in Hungary. Full of hope that he had 
 attained this end, he summoned a new Diet in June, 
 1839. To test its loyalty he at once demanded a 
 contribution of four million florins and 38,000 recruits. 
 But, like our own Charles I., he found the popular 
 leaders still determined to harp on the old theme. 
 Before the Diet had been summoned he had caused the 
 most eminent of them, Kossuth, Wesselenyi, and others, to 
 
 * Ferdiiiiind, eldest son of Francis by liis second wife, Maria 
 Tlicresa, daughter of the King of the Two Sicilies, was born in 1793. 
 From his cliildliood he was weak and delicate, and his education was 
 shamefully neglected. The very day his motiicr died, the tutor in 
 charge of him was dismissed ; the successor was subject to a mental 
 malady which rendered him incapable as an instructor ; the third and 
 fourth were better, but the change came too late.
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF EIS STSTE3L 177 
 
 be placed under arrest. The Diet refused to discu.-s any 
 ])roposition of the Government until those members should 
 be released. Metternicli had to give way, alike on that 
 point and on another with respect to the peasants' dues 
 which he had caused the Emperor to impose in 1836. 
 The demands of the Government were then granted, but 
 the check which Metternich had received "was severe, and 
 foreboded ill for the future. The Diet did not separate 
 until the question regarding the Hungarian language 
 had been practically settled in favour of the Magyars. 
 
 In the Diet which sat in 1843-4 these concessions 
 y\QV(i confirmed and enlarged. The capability of possess- 
 ing- land and of holding offices was extended to classes 
 not born in the ranks of the nobility, and by a new 
 language-law the predominance of the Magyars was 
 definitely established. The year 1847, in fact, witnessed 
 the till then unheard-of circumstance of the Emperor- 
 King opening its proceedings by a speech in the Magyar 
 tongue. When, however, the Government brought 
 forward its propositions regarding various important 
 reforms, the Opposition, led by Kossuth, demanded the 
 prior consideration of the freedom of the Press, the 
 nomination of a responsible ministry, the union of 
 Transylvania with Hungary, the equal imposition of 
 taxes, equality before the law, reform of the law enforcing 
 compulsory labour on the peasant, and the question of 
 triennial elections. These questions were being debated 
 when the revolution of February, 1848, broke out in 
 Paris. 
 
 The attitude of Metternich in the presence of de- 
 mands made by the other nationalities of the Empire 
 for reform, following one another in rapid succession, 
 had been that of a temporiser who thinks that by 
 skilful manceuvring, he can, in time, defeat, by causing 
 
 K
 
 178 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 disunion among, his adversaries. In Hungary he did 
 not dare to phiy the game with the hard, repressive 
 measures which he had no hesitation in enforcing in 
 Germany and in Italy. The Hungarian Constitution was 
 a contract the validity of which had been recognised by 
 the Habsburgs even when they had infringed its pro- 
 visions. In that country, then, there was a point beyond 
 which his opposition to peculiar demands, energetically 
 urged, could not go. Although, then, no one better 
 than he understood the underhand means, well-known to 
 tyrants, the methods of seduction, of dividing by sowing 
 suspicion in the ranks of one's adversaries, yet, in his 
 dealings with Hungary, he not only disdained to have 
 recourse to those methods, but, either from over-confi- 
 dence in his own position, or because he had found that 
 yielding always incited fresh demands, he acted in a 
 manner which united against him all the elements of 
 opposition. He even went so far as to infringe the 
 Constitution by directing Count Aj)ponyi, whom he 
 had made Chancellor of Hungary in succession to 
 the popular Count ]\Iailath — removed for the purpose — 
 to supersede the County Assemblies by adminii^trators 
 appointed by himself. Jiy this action, and by obstinately 
 refusing to concede, even slightly, to the demands of the 
 Diet of 1817, he prepared the way for that outburst of 
 national feeling which obeyed the signal to Europe given 
 by the mob of Paris in February of the following year. 
 
 But if Metternich made for himself dilflculties in 
 Hungary, others were being prepared for him in Ital\-, 
 and even in Germany. In the former country, for some 
 years after the expulsion of Mazziui, the surface had 
 been calm. Only the surface, however. The seeds dis- 
 persed all over Europe by IMazzini from his sanctuary in 
 London were taking root everywhere, and in many places
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF HIS SYSTEM. 179 
 
 tlie hardy stalk was forcing its way upwards. In 1844, a 
 rising had been concerted in Cahibria. The plans were 
 well considered, and it is possible, even probable, that 
 they nrlght have succeeded, had not Sir James Graham, 
 the Postmaster-General of Great Britain, opened 
 ^Nlazzini's letters and communicated their contents to the 
 Austrians. The executors of the plot, then, marched into 
 a trap, and paid the penalty with their lives. For a 
 moment the surface became again calm. Two years 
 later, however, the seizure of Cracow by the democratic 
 party in Poland, spread hope anew. But when Metter- 
 nich replied to this demonstration by boldly annexing 
 Cracow to Austria, the under-swell, which had not then 
 in Italy broken the surface, subsided. The calm, how- 
 over, lasted but for a moment. An event occurred just 
 afterwards in the canton of Ticino which proved the 
 little cloud which was to increase and burst forth into 
 storm. 
 
 The cause did not seem at the outset to be one of those 
 which bring about great convulsions. In the early part 
 of 1846, Ticino, a canton of Switzerland, on the Italian 
 slope of the Alps, had asked Charles-Albert, King of 
 Sardinia, to allow it to transmit the salt it manufactured 
 through Piedmont. It happened that a predecessor of 
 Charles-Albert had made with Austria, in 1751, a treaty 
 whereby, in consideration of Austria granting to Piedmont 
 the privilege of sending through Lombardy the salt it 
 was selling to Venice, the latter agreed to renounce his 
 trade with the Swiss cantons. To grant the request of 
 Ticino would, then, be to infringe, technically, the treaty 
 of 1751. Nevertheless, Charles-Albert did grant it. 
 
 The information of this action on the part of Charles- 
 Albert roused Metternich to a white heat. Of all the 
 cantons of Switzerland Ticino was the most hated. It 
 
 N 2
 
 180 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 was Ticino whicli bad been tbe abode of, wbich bad 
 given refuge to, Mazzini and bis band. It was from 
 Ticino tbat tbey bad made tbcir abortive attempt on 
 Italy ; and now, Cbarles- Albert, bimself always under 
 suspicion, and sometbing more tban suspicion, of 
 cberisbing designs little compatible witb tbe predominance 
 of Austria in Italy, had conferred a favour on Ticino. 
 Metternich acted witb bis accustomed decision and vigour. 
 He declared to Cbarles-Albert tbat Austria regarded tbe 
 treaty of 1751 as violated. A few days later, be retaliated 
 by increasing the custom duty on wines sent from 
 Piedmont to Lombardy, taking special care at tbe same 
 time to inform him that this cliange would apply only to 
 Piedmont, and to none of tbe other States of Italy. 
 Charles- Albert retorted by lowering the wine duties 
 between Piedmont and France, and when the Austrian 
 ambassador, alarmed at this act, offered to recall his 
 Government's action if Cbarles-Albert would withdraw 
 tbe concession to Ticino, tlie latter absolutely refused. 
 Not only did be refuse, but recognising tacitly tbe posi- 
 tion which bad been assigned to him by the truest lovers 
 of Italian unity, he began to take measures to prepare for 
 an event which, in the excited condition of feeling in 
 Italy, might at any moment be ])recipitated. 
 
 The feeling tbat Cbarles-Albert might be depended 
 upon was gradually making its way through Italy, 
 especially in the Papal States, when Pope Gregory XVI. 
 died (June 1st, 184G). Fifteen days later, mainly 
 through the influence of the reforming party to which he 
 was sup])0sed to belong, Giovanni Mastai Ferretti was 
 elected bis successor. Tbe new Pope, who took tbe 
 name of Pius IX., began his papal career by issuing a 
 general amnesty to those condemned for political offences. 
 By this act, though it was hedged witb conditions ; and
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF HIS SYSTE2L 181 
 
 by the support accorded to liim by men who greatly 
 influenced the minds of young Italy ; Pius IX., a few 
 months after his installation, found himself regarded 
 throughout the peninsula as the national hero. This, too, 
 in spite of one or two attempts he made to restrict the 
 operation of the favours he had granted. Even in Milan, 
 the headquarters of the Austrlans, hymns to Pio Nono 
 were sung at the theatre, whilst the Viceroy and his 
 family were received there in silence.* 
 
 Metternich had fairly taken the alarm. Whether he 
 instigated, or was aware of, or sympathised with, a con- 
 spiracy which was organised by the Austrian party in 
 Rome to get rid of Pio Nono on the occasion of a 
 popular demonstration which took place, and was foiled, 
 on the anniversary of the amnesty of 1846, may, indeed, 
 never be known. But the idea of a revolutionary Pope 
 — and to him reform and revolution were synonymous — • 
 was an abomination. His reply to the Papal concessions 
 was the occupation of Ferrara by Austrian troops. This 
 action roused a bitter cry throughout Italy. It quad- 
 rupled, and more than quadrupled, the hatred against 
 Austria. The impression spread rapidly that the time 
 had arrived when the Pope and the King of Sardinia 
 must combine to expel the hated foreigner. Before, how- 
 ever, any movement could be inaugurated, Lord Palmer- 
 ston, who was then wisely directing the foreign policy of 
 England, had sent Lord Minto to Italy to encourage the 
 various princes to stand firm to the cause of reform, 
 whilst he had urged upon Metternich the necessity 
 of evacuating Ferrara. Most unwillingly did the 
 Austrian Minister consent, but he did yield to necessity, 
 
 * Muurice's BcvoJidions of 1848-9 in Italy, in which these 
 occurrences are detailed at far greater length than I am able to devote 
 to them.
 
 182 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEIiNICR. 
 
 and in December, 1S47, the Imperial troops evacuated 
 Ferrara. 
 
 But this was not the only blow dealt to the anti- 
 revolutionary policy of Mettcrnich at this period. He 
 was to experience the truth of the saying that the worst 
 foes a man can have are those of his own household. If 
 he could have trusted any one, it would have been 
 the Austrian prince who ruled in Tuscany. But not only 
 did Leopold of llabsburff, who reigned at Florence, refuse 
 the urgent demand of jNIetternich to dispense with the 
 services of his Liberal councillor, Cosimo Ridolfi, but, 
 as time went on, he showed an increasing sympathy with 
 many of the objects of the reformers. Soon a crisis arose 
 which tried to the utmost the patience of the nations. 
 Under ])ressure, put upon him by his subjects, a pressure 
 which he had provoked by his unwisdom, the Duke 
 of Lucca had taken advantage of a clause in the treaty of 
 Vienna to resign his territories to Leopold of Tuscany. 
 The same clause which enabled Leopold to accept the 
 transfer necessitated the surrender by him of the district 
 of Fivizzano to the Duke of Modena. The people of 
 that district refused to be transferred ; whereopon the 
 Duke, summoning to his aid the troops of jMarshal 
 Radetzky, marched into the town of Fivizzano and 
 massacred the inhabitants. Troops of the same nation 
 shortly afterwards occupied l*arma, and although the 
 Duke of Modena was forced to yield his pretensions to 
 the towns of Pontremoli and Bagnone, the transaction 
 reffardiu"- Fivizzano and the action of the Austrian 
 troops still more embittered the Italians against the 
 foreigner. 
 
 Matters were not ])rogressing more favourably for 
 Mettcrnich in the south of Italy. The rule of the Bourbon 
 prince, who ruled at Naples under the title of Ferdinand
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF EIS SYSTE3L 183 
 
 II., but who is better known as King Boniba, had been 
 characterised by a tyranny of the worst description. His 
 .subjects had shown their sense of its harshness by 
 spasmodic outbreaks. They had risen at Aquila in 1841 ; 
 at Cosenza in 1S44 ; and, as I have previously recorded, 
 at Calabria, in July of the same year. In every instance 
 the insurgents had been suppressed, and the sctifFold and 
 the prisons had restored momentary order. But the 
 S])irit which inspired those outbreaks defied the tyranny 
 of the monarch, and, as the repression of all that makes 
 life valuable to a man became more severe, the resolution 
 to buy freedom at whatever cost became more fixed. 
 This resolution developed into action at Messina, the 1st 
 September, 1847. 
 
 The rising at Messina was repressed, and, as usual, its 
 repression was sealed with blood. But failure had not 
 deprived the Italian and Sicilian wooers of freedom 
 of their courage. Naples rose, Palermo rose, Ferdinand 
 was driven from every place in Sicily except the castle of 
 Messina, and he was forced, 29tli January, to grant 
 a Constitution to Naples. The granting of this Constitu- 
 tion, poor as it was, produced a marked effect on the 
 spirit and the proceedings of the reformers in Rome and 
 in Northern Italy. In the former, the Pope, who liad 
 already issued a decree assuring separate and independent 
 responsibility to each of his ministers, now promised 
 a secular ministry and an increase of the army. In 
 Lombardy the patriotic feeling it evoked caused the 
 Archduke Rainier and his councillors to invoke the earnest 
 attention of Marshal Radetzky. A little later, and 
 Radetzky established martial law in Milan. In Turin, 
 Charles-Albert was compelled, though with great reluct- 
 ance, to grant a Statuto, which had the form, though at 
 first not the substance, of a Constitution. In Venice,
 
 184 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 Daniel jNIanin called upon the Venetian congregation to 
 demand a real representation. 
 
 All this time Metternich had been, as usual, endeavouring 
 to devise schemes whereby the po])ular feeling might be; 
 repressed. At first he had sent a confidential agent 
 to strengthen the hands of Rainier in Lombardy. The 
 agent had succeeded no better than the Archduke, 
 and both had agreed to invoke the armed aid of Ivadetzky. 
 That miglit sufiiice for Lombardy. But Sicily was lost : 
 Eome, Tuscany, Piedmont, had accepted the constitutional 
 principle ; Venice had joined in the cry for freedom ; 
 Hungary, vi& have seen, had wrung from him many 
 concessions. Everywhere, in those regions, except in 
 Lombardy kept down by force of arms, the cause of 
 absolutism seemed lost. Nor, whilst it was gliding from 
 his practised hand in the countries more immediately 
 under his own domination, had it prospered elsewhere. In 
 Switzerland he had supported the reactionary adherents 
 of the Sonderbund and had been forced to witness their 
 humiliating defeat.* With respect to Denmark, the King 
 of which country had issued a proclamation declaring that 
 all the provinces under his Crown formed one sole 
 and the same State, he had been placed in this dilemma : 
 that if he o])posed the King, and asserted the claims 
 of llolstein, he would serve the national party ; if he were 
 to support him, he would infringe the Treaty of Vienna. 
 IS'or, with respect to Germany, were the pr()sj)ects at all 
 reassuring. Frederick William IIL, King of Prussia, his 
 ally against Napoleon, had died in 1840. His successor 
 
 * Lord Palmcrston announced to the Frencli Covcrnment, when 
 (Juizot was hesitating wlitthor he shouhJ, or should not, tlirow the 
 iiiUucnco of France on tlie side of the SondLrbuud, tluit any 
 demonstration in its favour would be met by a couutcr-dcmonbtratiou 
 on the part of England.
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF UIS SYSTEM. 185 
 
 Frederick William IV., began his reign by according 
 <\n amnesty to political offenders, by giving a certain 
 amount of liberty to the press, and by granting extended 
 powers to the Provincial Estates. These acts were 
 accomplished in o})position to the warnings of the Austrian 
 Minister who had guided the policy of his father. The 
 King did not indeed proceed so far as to redeem the 
 promise made by his father in ] 813-14, and broken on the 
 morrow of Napoleon's downfall — the promise to grant his 
 people a Constitution. He excused himself on the ground 
 that a written Constitution indicated want of confidence, 
 lie expressed himself clearly on this point, when, in 
 January, 1847, he summoned to Berlin the representa- 
 tives of all the Provincial Estates to discuss affairs. " I 
 do not wish," said he, " that a piece of parchment should 
 come between me and my subjects." Even this action, 
 which was not intended to carry much weight, was 
 regarded by Metternlch as the insertion of the thin end 
 of the wedge, and he regarded it as fraught with evil 
 consequences. 
 
 But if Metternich looked upon the small concessions of 
 the King of Prussia witli apprehension, with far greater 
 indignation did he view the movements in those Germanic 
 States which had been, as he thought, completely brought 
 mider his influence by the decrees of Carlsbad and the 
 Conferences of Teplitz and Laibach. Twice had he 
 crushed the national as))irations in Baden ; once, very 
 decisively, in Bavaria and AViirtemberg. But in 1845 
 there had arisen in Baden a movement, which, though he 
 imprisoned its author, he could not suppress. In the 
 beginning of 1848 the Liberals of that Grand Duchy were 
 ready to place themselves at the head of a movement foi- 
 the unity of Germany. In Wiirtemberg, the progress had 
 been made more gradual ; but even there, it had far
 
 186 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 ])assed bevoud the limits allowed by j\retteniieli, for in 
 IS-!? the King bad placed a Liberal Ministry in power, 
 and that Ministry had summoned a representative 
 chamber. In Bavaria, at the same time, the Liberals 
 had forced the King-, the lover of Lola jMontez, to 
 abdicate, llis son, Maximilian, confirmed the decree 
 wrung from his father to summon a parliament. In Hesse 
 Cassel, in Ilesse Darmstadt, and in Nassau, Liberal 
 decrees were wrung from half-willing, often unwilling, 
 rulers, and the system of Metternich seemed everywhere 
 tottering to its fall. 
 
 Contemj)oraneous with these events came the shock, the 
 electric shock, of the revolution in Paris. That revolution 
 decided the Liberals of Saxony, and drastic reforms were 
 conceded by the helpless king. In Vienna, the arrival of 
 the news was speedily followed by the posting of placards 
 announcing the approaching downfall of Metternich. For 
 the first time in the crisis of revolution through which he 
 had been passing the Austrian autocrat was really alarmed. 
 For the first time in his life he began to admit the necessity 
 of making concessions to the spirit of reform. But he did 
 nothing. lie still hoped that the crisis might be tided 
 over. Vienna would not move unless the impulsion should 
 come from without, and, taking a survey of Germany, he 
 did not see whence it should come. Like Napoleon in 
 1813, he trusted to time to dissolve the alliance against 
 him. 
 
 But, though he had scanned Germany, and had even 
 glanced at Italy, he had omitted to take Hungary into his 
 calculations, and it was from Jlungary that the blow came 
 which was to strike him down. The most recent action 
 of jMetternich towards Hungary, spoken of in a previous 
 ))agc, had convinced Kossuth thattliero could be no peace 
 with fcuch a man. As Metternich had felt towards
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF HIS SYSTE3L 187 
 
 Napoleon in 181o-15, so Kossuth felt regarding Metter- 
 nicli in 1848. On the 3rd of March the Hungarian 
 leader made a speech in the Pressburg assembly, pointing 
 out in glowing terms the hindrances which had prevented 
 a constitutional union between the two countries ; de- 
 claring that the freedom of any part of the Empire could 
 only be assured by working for the freedom of the whole, 
 and urging that an address should be submitted to the 
 Emperor embodying the reforms actually essential. The 
 circulation of this speech in Vienna caused the greatest 
 excitement, and a certain jirofessor, Dr. Eohner, at a meet- 
 ing of the Keading and Debating Society of the University 
 of that city, proposed that negotiations on the subject 
 should be opened with the Estates of Lower Austria — 
 then about to sit in Vienna. This proposal was nut 
 adopted. In place of it, a petition for moderate reform 
 received the aj)proval of the Pi-ofessors. The students, 
 bolder and more enthusiastic, took their stand on a pro- 
 gramme far more advanced, but in itself just and moderate. 
 Still IMetternich under-rated the danger. Still he 
 showed himself opposed to such concession as would have 
 calmed the rising feeling. Still he calculated that time 
 was with him. Time was not with him. Every ])ost 
 brought news showing that the desire for the unity of 
 Germany was universal ; that the committees of the several 
 States of Germany had sunnnuned a Constituent Assemblv 
 to meet at Frankfort to ensure that unity. This news so 
 greatly encouraged the reformers that even the Professors 
 resolved to take the advanced step of adding to their pro- 
 gramme a clause demanding the removal of jMetternich. 
 They presented their petition to the Emperor Ferdinand 
 on the 12th of JMarch. The Em])eror received them 
 coldly, and curtly replied that he would consider the 
 matter. With this rej)ly the Professors returned to the
 
 188 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEBNICR. 
 
 students, whom they had begged to await the result of 
 their action. The students heard the result with a laugh 
 of defiance, and resolved to act for themselves on the 
 morrow. 
 
 Accordingly, on the loth, they gathered in great 
 numbers in the large hall of the University, and marched 
 thence, in serried ranks, to the Landhaus — the meeting- 
 place that day of the Estates of Lower Austria. As they 
 marched on, their numbers increased rapidly. The 
 })eople were evidently with them. At length they arrived 
 in front of the Landhaus. The Estates within its walls 
 were sitting, awaiting the prescribed hour to begin dis- 
 cussion. ^\'hilst many of them were urging their Presi- 
 dent to waive ceremony and to begin at once, and the 
 President was stating his reasons for refusing, a confused 
 murmur of voices was heard outside ; a few minutes later 
 the door was burst open, and the students rushed in. 
 After some discussion it was agreed that a deputation of 
 twelve of the students should be present at the debates 
 which were about to begin, and the crowd withdrew to 
 elect these delegates. In their absence the Estates rapidly 
 a"-reed upon the petition which they would present to the 
 Emperor, and their spokesman went out to read it to the 
 crowd. Its demands were so totally inadequate that the 
 crowd rejected it with indignation ; and, further roused 
 by the reading of Kossuth's great speech, forced their way 
 once more into the Landhaus, and insisted that the terms 
 of it should be enlarged. Finally the President set off 
 with the petition, and the crowd, now reinforced by many 
 who had come on hearing that the soldiers ^^ ere marching 
 to attack the students, pressed on and forced their way 
 within the city walls. 
 
 jNIeanwhile, Metternich was in the castle, bent on 
 ix'sistance. He who had hated revolution, who had spent
 
 DECLINE AND FALL OF EIS SYSTEM. 189 
 
 the best years of his life in readinn-, in order to overthrow 
 him, tlie character of the man who, in his eyes, was the 
 Incarnation of the Revolution, was now face to face with 
 the Revolution itself. Not for an instant did he flinch. 
 His proud face was as proud, as calm, as unruffled, as 
 when it had looked at Dresden in 1813, with the 
 assurance of coming triumph, on the features of Napoleon. 
 Not a single point would he yield. Vainly did the 
 President of the Estates, warning him of the danger 
 outside, entreat him to comply with the request of which 
 he was the bearer. Noticing in the attitude and 
 language of the commandant of the castle, Count Latour, 
 some signs of hesitation, Metternich desired him to make 
 over his command to Prince Windischgriitz, a man, he 
 knew, of iron resolution. In this action the Imperial 
 Council, the members of which were present, concurred. 
 But the majority of them declined, for the moment, to 
 accord their sanction to a further proposal of Metternich's, 
 that Windischgratz should also be appointed military 
 dictator of the city, with power to use cannon against the 
 people. 
 
 Meanwhile, the people were asserting themselves with 
 effect against the not too willing soldiers. It soon 
 appeared, too, that the sympathies of the great middle 
 class were with them. As a last resource, one of the 
 Archdukes ordered the gunners to fire on the crowd. 
 The master-gunner refused either to obey his orders or to 
 allow the gunners to obey them. A few minutes later, 
 and the deputations of citizens forced their way into the 
 castle. Treated at first somewhat roughly, they main- 
 tained their ground firmly, demanding the immediate 
 resignation of Metternich. For a short space of time 
 their demand was not listened to, but the news that the 
 students had obtained arms and were pressing on,
 
 190 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICE. 
 
 changed the tone of the courtiers. At last, Mettcrnich, 
 yielding to the urgent pressure of the Archduke John, 
 and, I am convinced, to the general safety rather than to 
 care for his own, stepped forward and declared that as 
 they all told him that his resignation would restore peace 
 to Austria, he resii>-ned, and he wished f^ood luck to the 
 new Government. Of all the Council, the only man who 
 ])rotested against his resignation was AVIndischgratz. 
 The Archdukes and the other members seemed glad to 
 be rid of a master. 
 
 Thus fell the man before whom Napoleon had fallen. 
 Thus fell with him, the edifice of autocratic absolutism 
 which he had constructed. He fell, conscious of no faults, 
 believing himself a martyr, steadfast in his adherence to 
 his own system. " If," he wrote four years later, " I had 
 to begin my career again, I would follow again the course 
 I took before, and would not deviate from it for an 
 instant.'*
 
 ( I'^i ) 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 CONCLUSION— CHARACTEE. 
 
 1848-1859. 
 
 So little had Metternich apprehended the real character 
 of the crisis which overthrew him that he had expected to 
 be able to retire quietly from the Castle to his own villa. 
 He soon learned, however, that not only had his villa 
 been burned, but that his very life was in danger. With 
 infinite difficulty he succeeded in making his way to 
 Dresden. But he was not safe there. He pushed on, 
 then, with all possible despatch into Holland, and crossed 
 thence to England. There he remained secure from the 
 tempest still raging on the Continent, until November 
 of the following year, when, the storm having nearly 
 spent itself, he recrossed the cnannel, and took uj) his 
 residence at Brussels. Nineteen months later (June, 
 1851), he was able to revisit and occupy his Castle of 
 Johannisburg, on the Rhine. There he received a passing 
 visit from the King of Prussia. His stay there, however, 
 was short, for, towards the close of the same year, he 
 returned to Vienna, to reside there permanently. 
 
 A new Emperor, Francis Joseph, ruled and reigned in 
 Austria ; and, from him, Metternich at an early period 
 after he had installed himself in his house, received a 
 visit. There was no question of his return to office. It
 
 102 LIFE OF PBINCE METTEFiNICE. 
 
 was never ofFered to him, and, had it been, it is almost 
 certain he would not have accepted it. The policy of 
 the Austrian Empire, though still absolutist, showed 
 symptoms of diverging in a direction contrary to that 
 which Metternich had ever pursued. He loved, however, 
 to criticise, to give advice, to say how he would have 
 acted in this or that circumstance ; and the Emperor, very 
 young, impressionable, still in very difficult position, was 
 Mad to converse with a statesman who had ffuided the 
 fortunes of the Austrian Empire in times still more 
 difficult, and when its very existence was at stake. !Put 
 thouo-h he listened with interest and attention to the 
 advice Metternich was glad to offiir, Francis Joseph was 
 too shrewd, too well advised, to follow it. Probably he 
 recognised that the world in which he had been called 
 to play so great a part was not the world of which 
 Metternich had cognizance. The old statesman soon 
 realised that bis words no longer carried the weight of 
 former days; but even from this he was able to derive 
 consolation. The policy of regenerated Austria was not 
 always a wise policy, and when its failure was conspicuous 
 Metternich was able to comfort himself with the belief — 
 that grand resource of retired statesmen — that if he had 
 still directed affairs, a more fortunate issue would have 
 resulted. This thought must have been an especial 
 support and consolation to the unbending absolutist when 
 he witnessed the undoing, bit by bit, of the work of his 
 lifetime. Within five years of his fall, he saw a Napoleon 
 seated on the throne of France, acknowledged as Emperor 
 with effusion by England, and recognised by all Europe. 
 He lived to witness the two Powers, who in his years 
 and mature manhood had been persistent enemies, France 
 and England, wage war against his friend of the same 
 period, the Russia which, for the ten years between 1815
 
 CONCLUSION. 193 
 
 iind 1825, he had bent to his will. He lived still to see 
 Napoleon III. repeat, towards the Austrian ambassador 
 in Paris, Baron Iliibner, the scene in which he himself 
 had taken part witli the great Napoleon prior to the war 
 of 1809 ; and, exactly half a century later, to witness 
 the complement of that scene in the breaking out of war 
 between the two countries. As in 1809 Eckmiihl and 
 Wagram followed the declaration of war, so, in 1859, did 
 Magenta and Solferino. 
 
 Fortunately for him he was spared the knowledge 
 of the later incidents of that war. He lived long enough 
 to hear of the early advantages of the French at Monte- 
 bello and Palestro, but he died the 5th of June — the day 
 after Magenta had been fought. He was thus spared the 
 pain of learning, not merely of that defeat, and of the 
 defeat of Solferino, but what would have pained him far 
 more — of the signing of that Peace of Villafranca w'hich 
 dealt a fatal, and, in its results, a decisive blow to his 
 Italian policy of 1815. 
 
 jMetternich was thrice married. His first wife, I have 
 stated in its place in this book, was the grand -daughter of 
 the famous Kaunitz, She bore him seven children, four 
 of whom died in his lifetime. Of those w^ho survived, 
 three daughters, the eldest married Count Sandor ; the 
 other two remained single. The Countess dying in 1825, 
 Metternich married, the 5th November, 1827, the 
 Baroness Maria- Antoinetta von Leykham. She died in 
 childbirth the 12th January, 1829, after having given 
 birth, on the 7th, to a son, who, called Richard, was, in 
 later years, ambassador at Paris. Metternich married for 
 the third time, the 30th January, 1831, the Countess 
 Melanie Zichy, who bore him three children, and died in 
 March, 1854. 
 
 Metternich was a very accomplished man. He was 
 

 
 194 LIFE OF PRINCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 passionately attached to art, to science, and to letters. 
 He was well-read, a gootl talker, an excellent listener, 
 was skilled in the use of his pencil and paint-brush, and 
 thoroughly versed in those thousand and one artifices 
 which make a man a success in the drawing-room. His 
 appearance was eminently spirituel. Though he wrote 
 in later years to Humboldt, and though he recorded in 
 hi& journal in his youth, that he felt that his vocation 
 ealled him to art and a study of the exact sciences, he 
 was, in very deed, admirably adapted for the role which 
 he filled between his entrance into public life and 1815. 
 His calm imperturbability, his invincible, unshakablCy 
 " stability " (his own word when describing himself), were 
 weapons which he used with marked success against 
 Napoleon. Nor was his patience a less valuable quality 
 in that great encounter, l^rought into contact with a man 
 whom he regarded as the incarnation of a prlnci])lc which 
 he detested — a principle fraught, he believed, with ruin to 
 society and to nations — he set to work to study, so as at 
 the proper moment to be able to foil, that man. For 
 seven years he listened to his every word, he watched his 
 every gesture. All this time he completely imposed on 
 his intended victim. The charm of his manner and 
 conversation completely deceived Napoleon. Even the 
 aristocratic hauteur, which he knew so well how and when 
 to display, fascinated the imrvenu Emperor. Napoleon 
 believed in him : believed, that is to say, that Metternich 
 had a personal regard for himself. Thus it happened that 
 the ambassador whom of all the ambassadors at his Court 
 he ought to have trusted the least, he trusted the most. 
 But for Metternich, the Austrian marriage — that fatal 
 event in the career of Naj)oleon — would not have taken 
 place. The iVustrian Em})eror, on receiving the ])roposal, 
 consulted Meiternich before he s])oke to his daughter.
 
 CONCLUSION. 195 
 
 One word from Metternich would have stopped the 
 negotiation. It is not only probable, it is morally certain, 
 that Metternich, knowing Napoleon as he did, would not 
 speak that word because he saw that the marriage would 
 engender a confidence in the friendship of Austria which 
 might lead Napoleon into ventures from Avhich Austria 
 would reap advantage. That happened in the mind of 
 Napoleon which Metternich had foreseen. Whilst he, 
 cold-blooded and calculating in all his political measures, 
 and the Emperor Francis, were firmly resolved that the 
 interests of Austria should count for everything, and the 
 marriage for nothing, in the contest with Napoleon, the 
 French Emperor, misreading Metternich, calculating on 
 the pride, instead of on the humiliations he had forced him 
 to undergo, of the Habsburg Emperor, always looked 
 upon the marriage as a reserve which he could employ 
 with effect when all other resources should fail. He was 
 not undeceived even by the language used by Metternich 
 at the famous interview at Dresden. Even after Leipsig 
 he could not believe that an Emperor of Austria would 
 allow a son-in-law of the Habsburgs to be deposed. 
 All this was the work of Metternich. He had wruno- 
 confidences from Napoleon and had not only given him 
 none in return, but had insinuated false hopes which could 
 scarcely fail to lead him to his ruin. And they did lead 
 him to his ruin. It was his trust in his father-in-law that 
 induced Napoleon to continue the exhausting war in Spain 
 whilst he armed all the Continent against Russia. It was 
 the same trust that led him, after the catastrophe, to 
 refuse terms which would have still left France greater 
 than he had found her. 
 
 In the events, then, which led to the fall of Napoleon 
 Metternich was the chief factor, the chief conspirator, 
 the principal agent No man contributed so largely to 
 
 2
 
 106 LIFE OF PlilNCE METTEBNICH. 
 
 that event as he. It niin^ht with truth be said that, but 
 for him, it might not have occurred. To say this is, 
 ])erhaps, to open a subject too wide for discussion in the 
 last pages of an liistorical sketch. But this at least is 
 certain : it ^vas the too great confidence of Napoleon 
 in Austria that sealed his overthrow. That confidence 
 was the consequence of his marriage with ]\rarie Louise. 
 The marriage with Marie Louise was the work of Metter- 
 nich. If, then, the overthrow of Napoleon was an un- 
 mixed advantage to Europe, ^letternich is entitled to 
 receive the chief praise for the accomplishment of a task 
 to which, in my belief, I repeat, no individual man con- 
 tributed so much as he. 
 
 There are many, then, who can regard his career up 
 to 1815 with unmixed admiration. But after 1815? 
 He had struck down Napoleon because he was the em- 
 bodiment of the Revolution ; because he had established 
 a system which was unsupportable to the sovereigns of 
 Europe. Between 1815 and 1820 he obtained an in- 
 fluence such as would have enabled him to lay the 
 foundations of a system which might ensure, by gradual 
 means, to the suffering peo})los of Europe, to the peoples 
 who had endured so much, who had made sacrifices with- 
 out stint, to ensure the triumph of his anti- Napoleonic 
 ])olicy, the realisation of those aspirations the desire for 
 which separates the man from the brute. Did he do this ? 
 Did he take a single step towards accomplishing this end 
 — an end which is the goal of all statesmanship worthy 
 of the name ? Did he not, on the contrary, em])loy all his 
 power, all his influence, all his untiring energy, to the forging 
 of new fetters for the human race ; for the development 
 of plans which should keej) the peoj)lcs slaves for ever ? If 
 Napoleon rested on brute force — a hy])othcsis which can 
 be argued — Mettcrnich rested on it also, a truism which
 
 CONCLUSION. 197 
 
 cannot be denied. Can we wonder that when he fell 
 there was no man to pity him, no voice to cry " God 
 save him ? " The Napoleonic Legend survived the death 
 of Napoleon, and bore fruits in our own time. It may 
 bear them yet again. The system of Metternich died with 
 Metternich. No power can ever recall it from the tomb. 
 
 I am indeed, spared the trouble of writing the 
 epitaph of Metternich, for he unconsciously wrote it him- 
 self. He wrote it when he thought he was writing the 
 epitaph of Napoleon. These are his own words : " The 
 vast edifice which he had constructed was exclusively the 
 work of his hands, and he himself was the keystone of 
 the arch. But this gigantic construction was essentially 
 wanting in its foundation ; the materials of which it was 
 composed were nothing but the ruins of other buildings ; 
 some were rotten from decay, others had never possessed 
 consistency from the very beginning. The keystone of 
 the arch has been withdrawn, and the whole edifice has 
 fallen in." 
 
 Such, in a few words, is the history of the system which 
 Metternich established on the ruins of the French 
 Empire.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 AlEXANDER, Czar of Eussia, is 
 desirous, in 1805, to induce 
 Prussia to join him against 
 Napoleon, 11 ; visits Potsdam, 
 12 ; signs a treaty with Prussia, 
 12 ; insists upon fighting at 
 Austerlitz, 13 ; regards Napoleon 
 as a Corsican adventurer, 16 ; 
 signs the peace of Tilsit, 23 ; 
 interview of, with Napoleon, at 
 Erfurt, 31, 32 ; vainly attempts 
 to preserve peace between France 
 and Austria, 43, 44 ; quits St. 
 Petersburg for Wilna to meet the 
 preparations of Napoleon, 76 ; 
 receives Mettemich at Opocno, 
 105 ; gains confidence in him, 
 106 ; and signs the treaty of 
 Eeichenbach, 107, 108; strives 
 to liave Moreau made com- 
 mander-in-chief of the allied 
 forces, 120 ; yields to Metter- 
 nich's influence, 124; arranges, 
 in Metfcrnich's absence and 
 against his views, for the re- 
 moval of Napoleon to a sovereign 
 po-sition at Elba, 126; requires 
 the whole of Poland as his share 
 of the plunder, 129, 130 ; regards 
 Metternich as a permanent 
 obstacle to his designs, 130, 131 ; 
 feelings of, regarding Castlercngh 
 and Talleyrand, 131; confesses 
 his sins to Metternich and is 
 absolved, 154; divergence of the 
 policy of. and that of Metternich, 
 regarding Oreece, l(i2, 164 ; death 
 of, at Tiigunrog, 164. 
 
 Altenburg, in Hungary, the Frerch 
 and Austrian foreign ministers 
 meet at, to negotiate peace, 52 ; 
 negotiations at, 54—56; strange 
 incident which terminated the 
 negotiations at, 57-62. 
 
 Aspern, vide Essling. 
 
 Austerlitz, Metternich is married 
 at, 7 ; theEmperor Alexander in- 
 sists upon fighting at, 13 ; the 
 battle of, is followed by the Peace 
 of Pressburg, 15 ; was fought 
 against the advice of the Emperor 
 Francis, 16, 17. 
 
 Austria, Ferdinand, Emperor of, 
 the concessions made by, dis- 
 please Metternich, 176 ; intellect 
 and training of, note to 176. 
 
 Austria, Francis Joseph, Emperor 
 of, nature of intercourse of, with 
 Metternich, 191-193. 
 
 Austria, Francis, Emperor of, suc- 
 ceeds his brother Leopold, 5; 
 notices Metternich and tells him 
 to hold himself in readiness for 
 his orders, 8 ; sends Metternich 
 to Dresden as minister, 9; and 
 afterwards to Berlin, 10 ; confers 
 tipon him tlio cross of St. Stephen, 
 14 ; was ojiposed to fighting at 
 Austerlitz, KJ, 17; encourages 
 Metternich to accept tlie embassy 
 to I'aris, 17; requests Metter- 
 nich to examine and report on 
 the advisability of peace or war 
 witli France, 34 ; preparations 
 for war, made by, 42 ; autliorises 
 seizure of tlie liearer of French 
 despiitches and tints precipitates 
 war, 44, 45 ; is joined by Metter-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 199 
 
 ■nich before AVagram, 49 ; wit- 
 nesses the two days' battle of 
 "Wagrani, -19 ; refuses, then con- 
 sents, to send Prince John of 
 Liechtenstein as negotiator to 
 Napoleon, 57, 58 ; ratifies peace, 
 C2 ; appoints Metternich foreign 
 minister and chancellor, 03 ; asks 
 Metternich to speak to Marie 
 Louise on the subject of a 
 marriage with Napoleon, 64 ; is 
 informed by Metternich of 
 Napoleon's intention to wage war 
 with Kussia, 71 ; accompanied by 
 Jiis Empress, meets Napoleon at 
 Dresden, 76; is merely the 
 mouthpiece of Metternich, 98, 
 99; effect of the letter of, on 
 Napoleon, 103; proceeds, with 
 Metternich, to Gitschin, to be 
 near to Alexander and Napoleon, 
 106 ; anti-Napoleonic dealings of, 
 118, 119; engages in war against 
 Napoleon, 120 ; is swayed by 
 Metternich against Napoleon, 
 126 ; spares Bavaria to indemnify 
 Austria in Italy, 132 ; is regarded 
 by Metternich as if " made for 
 him," 154 ; meets the Czar, 
 attended by Metternich, 160-163.; 
 dies, 176. 
 
 B. 
 
 Baden follows Austria's policy of 
 repression, 162 ; awakening of, 
 185. 
 
 Barclay de Tolly urges a retreat 
 behind the Oder after Bautzen, 
 104. 
 
 Bassano, Duke of, the confidential 
 minister of Napoleon in 1813, 
 advises Napoleon to choose 
 Austria as a mediator, S3 ; ad- 
 dresses " a fatal letter " to Atis- 
 tria, 83, 85 ; arranges a meeting 
 of Metternich with Napoleon at 
 Dresden, 106, 109 ; is present at 
 the second interview between 
 Napolion and Metternich at 
 Dresden, 117. 
 
 Bavaria, Metternich intrigues with 
 
 the king of, 91, 93 ; incident re- 
 garding the army of, note, to 93 ; 
 generous treatment of^ by Austria, 
 131-134 ; king of, writes to 
 Metternich that he declines to 
 perjure himself, 151 ; follows 
 Metternich 's policy of repression, 
 162 ; awakens, 185. 
 
 Bautzen, Napoleon wins the battle 
 of, 97, 105 ; mistake of Ney at, 
 105 ; eifect on Metternich of the 
 battle of, 106. 
 
 Baylen, effect of the catastrophe of, 
 on Metternich and on Napoleon, 
 23, 24. 
 
 Berlin, the state of parties at, in 
 1804-5, described, 10, 11. 
 
 Bliicher, characteristic remark of, 
 as he noticed the glories of St. 
 Cloud, 140. 
 
 Bubna, Count, appointed Austrian 
 military commissary with Napo- 
 leon, 53 ; is sent to the Emperor 
 Francis to propose the despatch 
 of Prince John of Liechtenstein to 
 Napoleon, 57; again, 58; is sent 
 to Paris to negotiate with 
 Napoleon, 82 ; is sent to treat 
 with Napoleon at Dresden, 103 ; 
 happy insiiiration of, 103 ; re- 
 turns to Vienna with proposals 
 for an armistice, 104. 
 
 c. 
 
 CambacerIis, the Arch-Chancellor, 
 advises Napoleon to treat direct 
 with Russia, 82. 
 
 Canning, Mr., policy of, not agree- 
 able to Metternich, 160, 106, 167 ; 
 hopes entertained by Metternich 
 on the death of, 169. 
 
 Carlsbad, Conference of, 149, 150. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, declares that the 
 language of Napoleon i)roved 
 that he would accept no reasou- 
 able terms, 87 ; interview of, with 
 Metternich, and opinion of the 
 latter of, 127; Alexander finds 
 him " cold and pedantic," 133 ; 
 suggests the deportation of
 
 200 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Napoleon to St. Helena or St. 
 Lucia, 135 ; regrets of Mitteruich 
 on hearing of the suicide of, 159. 
 
 Caulaincourt, Count, is ambas- 
 sador of France at St. Peters- 
 burg, 34 ; advises Napoleon to 
 treat direct with Russia, 83. 
 
 Cliampagny, Count, record made 
 at the time by, of the scene 
 between Napoleon and Mettcr- 
 nich in 1808, difters materially 
 from the record made at a later 
 period by the latter, 24-29 ; is veiy 
 reticent in liis communications 
 to Metternich, o9 ; proves to Met- 
 ternich that France has not been 
 deceived by Austria, 43, 44 ; sends 
 Metternich his passports, 45; 
 conversation of, with Metternich, 
 at Vi(!nna, 4G, 47 ; is appointed to 
 negotiate Avitli Metternich after 
 the combat of Zuaim, 52 ; negoti- 
 ations and pourparlers of, with 
 Metternich, 55-57 ; abrupt ending 
 to the negotiations of, 58-63. 
 
 Charles X. succeeds his brother 
 Louis on tlie throne of France, 
 IC:') ; mistaken views of Metter- 
 uicli regarding the liberalism of, 
 and of the L)aui)hin, 103, 164 ; 
 expidsiou of, from France, 170. 
 
 Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, 
 concedes some advantage to the 
 canton of Ticino, 179; forces 
 Metternich to abate his preten- 
 sions, 179, ISO. 
 
 Charles, Archduke, plans of, for the 
 war of 1809, 42 ; crosses the 
 Kubicon, 44 ; a nervous attack 
 paralyses the energies of, at the 
 crisis of the battle of Essling, 46 ; 
 commits the mistake of retreating 
 on Bohemia instead of on Hun- 
 gary or Moravia, 51 ; resigns the 
 command to PriHce Jolm of 
 Liechtenstein, 53, 55. 
 
 Charles Felix, King of Sardinia, 
 action of, relative to Mazziui, 
 173. 
 
 Chat: Hon, Congress of, abortive 
 eHnrts of the, 128. 
 
 Cobenzl, Count Philip, is designed 
 
 to succeed Count Stadion at the- 
 St. I'ctcrsburg embassy, but is 
 objected to by Napoleon, 15. 
 
 Colloredo, Count, is replaced by 
 Count Stadion at the Austriau 
 foreign office after the peace of 
 Press burg, 15. 
 
 Confalonieri, Count Federigo, Met- 
 teruich's treatment of, 158. 
 
 Constantino, prediction by Metter- 
 nich regarding tlie succession of, 
 to the throne of Itussia, 164, 165. 
 
 D. 
 
 Deak, Fkaxcis, l)egin3 to take a 
 lead in the Hungarian constitu- 
 tional party. 176. 
 
 Dresden, Metternich is appointed 
 Minister at, 9 ; his description ot^ 
 the Court of, 9 ; Congress of 
 Emperors and Kings at, 76; 
 remarkable conversation of 
 Napoleon with IVIetternich at,. 
 77 ; Napoleon at, 105 ; historical 
 interview between Napoleon and 
 Metternich at, 109-116; battle 
 of, won by Napoleon, 122, 123; 
 great results of, neutralised by 
 the accident of Kidm, 123; 
 IMetternich with difficulty escape* 
 to, 191. 
 
 E. 
 
 Kmicres, Frencli, influence of, on 
 the mind of ]\Ietternich, 5. 
 
 Erfurt, i^roccedings of the famous 
 interview at, are a sealed book 
 to all but four, 32. 
 
 Essling, battle of, ought to have 
 been won by the Austrians, 48. 
 
 Europe, situation of, at the time 
 Metternich undertook tlie em- 
 bassy to I'aris in 1806, 17, 18; 
 situation of, in 1848, 185; in 
 1859, 193. 
 
 F. 
 
 Fleuuy de Cuaboulon, M., visits 
 Elba, and contirms the impres'
 
 INDEX. 
 
 201 
 
 sion that France is longing for 
 the return of Napoleon, KJG, 137. 
 
 France is accordnl. in 1814. the 
 boundaries of 17'J2, 131 ; price 
 demanded of, fur licr complicity 
 ■with Napoleon, 141. 
 
 Frankfort visited by Metteruich, 4 ; 
 again in 1792, 5. 
 
 G. 
 
 Gentz, Fredeiuck, correspondence 
 of, with ^Metteruich, 7S ; opinion 
 of, of Alexander, 107 ; exposure 
 by, of the plunderinj^ instincts 
 of the Allies alter 1814, 131-133; 
 divines the inetincta of Alex- 
 ander, 132, 133. 
 
 Gitschin selected, for reasons given 
 by the Emperor Francis and 
 Metternich, to be their head- 
 quarters during the armistice of 
 Pleiswitz, 107. 
 
 Graham, Sir James, opens the 
 letters of Mazzini at the Post- 
 Office and communicates their 
 contents to the Austrian Govern- 
 ment, 179. 
 
 Greece, the question of the inde- 
 pendence of, puzzles IMetteruich, 
 1G2-1(j4 ; the independence of, 
 acknowledged, 1G8. 
 
 Griinberg, villa of, assigned to 
 Metternich, 4G ; adventure at, 47. 
 
 H. 
 
 HAGt'E, The, Metternich is ap- 
 pointed ambassador at, 6 ; is 
 visited by Metternich, 7. 
 
 Hardenberg, Baron, is the partisan 
 at Berlin of the Austrian Alli- 
 ance, 10. 
 
 Haugwitz, Count, is the partisan 
 at Berlin of tlie French Alliiiuce, 
 10 ; is despatched to the French 
 head-quarters, 12; and is fooled 
 by Napoleon, 13. 
 
 Hertford, ISIarquis of, intimacy of, 
 with Metteruich, IGG. 
 
 History and Romance, mistaken 
 ideas of, regarding the, of Russia, 
 1G.5. 
 
 Holy Alliance, the, origin and 
 purpose of, 142-144. 
 
 Howe, Lord, refuses to allow Met- 
 ternich to join the English fleet 
 before the battle of June 1st, G, 7. 
 
 Hungary, dealing of Metternicli 
 with, 174-177 ; relations of be- 
 tween, and the House of Habs- 
 burg, 174, 175: motle of Met- 
 ternich in his transactions with, 
 178. 
 
 Hundred Days, prominent part 
 taken by Metternich in deciding 
 the action of the Allies during 
 the, 137-140. 
 
 I. 
 
 Italy is regarded by Metternich 
 as " a geographical expression,"' 
 132 ; treatment by Metternich of, 
 150 ; resuscitation of, 172-193. 
 
 J. 
 
 John, Archduke, inexplicable con- 
 duct of, at the battle of Wagrain, 
 49, 50 ; indicates to Metternich 
 the necessity that he resign, 189. 
 
 John, Prince of Liechtenstein, suc- 
 ceeds the Archduke Charles in 
 command of the Austrian army» 
 and negotiates an armistice with 
 Napoleon, 52 ; Napoleon asks 
 that, be sent to Vienna, 57 ; two 
 versions of the mission of, 58-Gl ; 
 previous negotiations of, with 
 Napoleon, GO ; arranges terms of 
 peace with Napoleon, 61 ; con- 
 clusion that he was empowered 
 so to act, and therefore so acted, 
 G3. 
 
 Josephine, the Empress, entertains 
 Metternich on his way to Vienna, 
 45 ; marriage and divorce of, note 
 toGG.
 
 202 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kagexeck, 'MAraA Beatrix Aloisa, 
 marries the father of Clement 
 Metternich, 4. 
 
 Kossuth, Louis, begins to take a 
 lead in Hungarian politics, 175 ; 
 is imprisoned, 175 ; becomes con- 
 vinced that there can be no peace 
 ■with Metternich, 186 ; effect in 
 Vienna of the great speech of, 
 186, 187; the reading of the 
 speech of, stimulates the courage 
 of the students and others, 187; 
 and is the nctive cause of the fall 
 of Metternich, 188-190. 
 
 L. 
 
 Laibach, Congress of, 156, 157. 
 
 Lebzeltern, the Chevalier, is sent 
 by Metternich to Savona to en- 
 deavour to procure an under- 
 standing between the Pope and 
 Napoleon, 67. 
 
 Leipsig, fatal results for Napoleon 
 of tlie battle of, 122 ; treason of 
 the Saxon troops at, note to 122. 
 
 Liechtenstein, Prince John of, suc- 
 ceeds the Archduke Charles in 
 command of the Austrian army, 
 and agrees to a suspension of 
 arms with Napoleon, 52, 53 ; sets 
 out for Vienna to negotiate willi 
 Napoleon, 58; interview on the 
 way with Metternich, 59, 60 ; 
 proceeds to Vienna and signs 
 peace, 60-62 ; improbabilify of 
 Mettcrnich's version of the con- 
 duct of, 6U-62. 
 
 Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom, es- 
 tablished under an Austrian 
 prince after 1814, 151, 153 ; Met- 
 ternich appoints an Aulic coun- 
 cil to superintend the affairs of 
 the, 158; excitement in the, 
 towards tlu; close of Metternich's 
 reign, 181, 184. 
 
 Louis XVUI., opposite feelings dis- 
 
 plaved in Pari.s on tlie return of, 
 129"; death of, 163. 
 
 Louis Pliilippe, of Orleans, reac- 
 tionary policy of, 171 ; severe 
 measures taken by, against 
 Mazzini, 173. 
 
 Liitzen, battle of. Napoleon gains 
 the, 96, 97 ; effect produced by, 
 on Metternich, 99, 101. 
 
 M. 
 
 Marie Louise consents to become 
 Napoleon's wife, 64 ; fatal effect 
 of the marriage with, on the 
 fortunes of Napoleon, 81, 82, 84, 
 87, 90,andHo<(',lU2,103, 195,190. 
 
 Marinont, IMarsiial, ()rescionce of, 
 discovers the true line of retreat 
 of the Anstrians after Wagram, 
 51, 52 ; fatal consequence of the 
 treason of. in 1814, 127. 
 
 Masseiia, Marshal, carries the 
 Austrian position at Znaim, 52. 
 
 Maurice, Mr. C. Edmund, opinion 
 of, regarding the system of 
 Metternich, 145, 146 ; excellent 
 work of, note to 145 ; opinion 
 regarding Alexander, 146, 147 ; on 
 Metternich's dealing with Italy, 
 158 ; indebtetiness of the author 
 to, 7iotci to p. 181. 
 
 IMayence, Metternich proceeds to 
 the University of, 5 ; Napoleon 
 reaches, 96; quits it to win the 
 battle of Liitzen, '.h;, 97; a secret 
 police inquiry otlice established 
 at, by Metternich, 158, 160. 
 
 Slazzini, treatment of, on the out- 
 break of the Kevolution of 1830, 
 172, 173 ; subsequent movements 
 of, 173, 174; correspondence of, 
 opened and contents shamefully 
 coinnninicated to Austria by tSir 
 James Graham, 177, 179. 
 
 Meneval, M., visits Elba, and 
 informs Napoleon of the design 
 of the Congress of Vienna to 
 have liim deported, 135. 
 
 Metternicli, Clement, character of 
 antagonism of, to Napoleon, 1-3 ;
 
 INDEX. 
 
 203 
 
 birth and training of, 4 ; imbibes 
 bis ideas of France from French 
 ^migr(fs, 5 ; visits England, and 
 studies the F.nglish constitution, 
 6 ; impressed by the English fleet, 
 6, 7 ; entry into diplomatic life 
 and marriage of, 7 ; disj)lays dis- 
 taste for politics and a strong 
 love of literature and art, 7, 8 ; 
 is told by the Emperor Francis 
 to hold liimself in readiness, 8 ; 
 becomes Minister at Dresden, 9 ; 
 is transferred to Berlin, 10 ; 
 comes in contact with the Em- 
 peror Alexander, 11 ; difficult 
 position of, 12 ; not the fault of, 
 that his labours at Berlin are 
 fruitless, 13 ; obtains the ap- 
 proval of his sovereign, 14; is 
 nominated to succeed t^tadion at 
 St. Petersburg, 15 ; despair of, 
 at learning that he is to be 
 transferred to Paris, 16 ; his 
 views regarding Napoleon, 16 ; 
 is encouraged by the Emperor 
 Francis, 17 ; sets out for Paris, 
 and sees Talleyrand, 18 ; first 
 impressions of, 18 ; the one aim 
 he mentally traced to himself, 
 19 ; is well received in Paris, 19 ; 
 opinion of, regarding Napoleon, 
 19, 20 ; variation of opinion of, 
 regarding Napoleon, 20, 21 ; his 
 sentiments those which he had 
 in early life imbibed from the 
 Emigre's, 21 ; reasons why he 
 endeavours to stave off war with 
 Prussia, 21, 22; further impres- 
 sions his study of the character 
 of Napoleon make upon, 22 ; 
 deduces that France has not one 
 friend in Europe, 23; derives 
 hopes from the catastrophe of 
 Baylen, 23 ; record made by, of 
 the manner in which Napoleon 
 addresses him on his return to 
 Paris, 24, 25; doubts as to the 
 correctness of the record of, 25-29 ; 
 views indulged in by, regarding 
 the chances of Austria, 30 ; the 
 keynote to the policy of, 31 ; 
 erroneous opinion of, regarding 
 
 the origin of the conferences at 
 Erfurt, 32 ; is unable to find out 
 what passes at Erfurt, 32 ; in- 
 trigues of, with Talleyrand, 33; 
 proceeds on leave to Vienna and 
 inspires the Emperor and the Aus- 
 trian Cabinet with his sanguine 
 hopes, 34 ; writes a memorandum 
 on the position, 35-37 ; proof 
 that his Autobiography had been 
 edited, 36, note ; concurrence of 
 ideas of, with those of the Arch- 
 duke Charles, 38 ; returns to Paris, 
 and renews his intimacy with the 
 French malcontents, 38- 40 ; is 
 received with great kindness by 
 Napoleon, 40 ; is left " a free 
 hand " by the Court of Vienna, 
 42 ; is not addressed on the sub- 
 ject of politics by Napoleon, 43 ; 
 is ordered to inform Napoleon 
 tliat Austria has placed her troops 
 on a war footing, 44 ; receives his 
 jDassports, 45 ; journeys to Vienna, 
 and is allotted a house near the 
 capital as his residence, 46; 
 receives a visit from Savary, 47 ; 
 haughty bearing of, 47 ; incident 
 on the way to Acs to be ex- 
 changed, 48 ; joins the Emperor 
 Francis, and witnesses the battle 
 of AVagram, 49 ; sticcecds Count 
 Stadion as foreign minister, 51 ; 
 is appointed to negotiate for 
 peace with the French Foreign 
 Minister, Count Champagny, 
 52-57 ; Prince John of Liechten- 
 stein is sent to negotiate over his 
 liead, 57, 58 ; soreness of, and im- 
 probable version of the mission 
 given by, 58-62 ; becomes Chan- 
 cellor of the Empire, 62 ; and 
 resumes his anti-Napoleonic role, 
 63 ; negotiates the marriage of 
 Napoleon with Marie Louise, 
 63, 64 ; untrue reason given by, 
 regarding tlu^ divorce, 64, note ; 
 sets out for Paris once more to 
 study Napoleon, 65 ; is admitted 
 into the confidential intimacy of 
 Napoleon, 66-69; discovers that 
 Napoleon intends war with
 
 204 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Russia, 70 ; makes his plans 
 accordingly and retiinis to take up 
 his post, 71 ; partly unveils him- 
 self to the King of Prussia, 72 ; 
 constitutes a kind of " Star 
 Chamber" for the better admhiis- 
 tratioii of internal aiVairs in 
 Austria, 73 ; dabbles with liter- 
 ature and art, 7-1 ; signs the 
 treaty of March 14, 1812, with 
 Napoleon, engaging to put 30.000 
 troops in line against Russia, 75 ; 
 secret understanding of, witli the 
 Czar, 75, 76; accompanies tlie 
 Emperor and Empress of Austria 
 to Dresden, 76 ; coulidences of 
 Napoleon towards, 77; helps 
 forward "tiie providential be- 
 ginning of Napoleon's end," 78 ; 
 sees the catastrophe arrive, 79 ; 
 withdraws the Austrian con- 
 tingent into Galicia, 80 ; views 
 of, at this period, 81 ; sends 
 Count Bubna to Paris to en- 
 deavour to obtain for Austria the 
 position of mediator, 82; is 
 confirmed by the action of Na- 
 poleon in his secret policy, 8i ; 
 negotiations of, with Count Otto, 
 85 ; sends Prince Schwarzenberg 
 to Paris, 86 ; is bent on destroying 
 Napoleon, 87; endeavours to 
 detach Saxony from Napoleon, 
 89-91 ; negotiates with Count 
 Narbonnc, 92 ; his purpose de- 
 tected by that ambassador, 93-99 ; 
 opens fresh ground on hearing of 
 Napoleon's victory at Liitzen, 
 99, 101 ; sends Count Bubna with 
 proposals to Napoleon, 101 ; 
 resolution arrived at by, on learn- 
 ing the loss of the battle of 
 Bautzen, 105; proceeds witli 
 the Emperor Francis to Citschin 
 to be near to the Allies as well as 
 to Napoleon, 106 ; hurries off to 
 see the ICmperor Alexander, 106 ; 
 result of meeting of, witli Alex- 
 ander, 106, 108; negotiates a Ircaty 
 of alliance and returns " with a 
 light heart" to Gitsehin, 108, 109; 
 proceeds to Dresden to havo the 
 
 " historical " interview with Na- 
 poleon, 110; reasons for mis- 
 trusting version of that interview 
 given by, 111-113; true record 
 of interview of, with Napoleon,. 
 113-116; second interview of, with. 
 Napoleon, 117; manoeuvres otV 
 to prolong the armistice and yet 
 to prevent the success of the 
 negotiations, 115-119; gives the 
 signal for war, 120; protests 
 against the desire of Alexander 
 to give the command in chief 
 to Moreau, 121 ; suggests, after 
 Leipsig, a policy of extermination, 
 as regarded Napoleon, 122, 124 ; 
 works his way to the position of 
 arbiter in the councils of the 
 allies, 125; opinion of, of Lord 
 Castlereagli, 125 ; again intrigues- 
 against Napoleon at Langres, 
 125; disapproves of the deporta- 
 tion of Napoleon to Elba as iu- 
 suflScient, 126 ; his opinion of 
 Napoleon's system, 127; believes 
 the return of the Bourbons ac- 
 ceptable to the French people^ 
 128 ; takes the lead at the Con- 
 gress of Vienna, 131; jealousy 
 of, of Alexander, 131, 132 ; sides 
 with Franco and England against 
 Russia and Prussia, 133, 134; hears 
 of the departure of Napoleon from 
 Elba, 134 ; inspires the Congress 
 to come to a formal resolution 
 against him, 137, 138; hears of 
 the battle of Waterloo, 138; 
 comments on Napoleon, 139 ; is 
 sounded by Alexander on the sub- 
 ject of tlie " Holy Alliance," 141 ; 
 liis account of, and excuse for it, 
 142, 143 ; opportunities open to, 
 143, 144 ; builds up his edifice on a. 
 narrow and vulgar basis, 144, 145 ; 
 hatred of "liberalism" of, 145; 
 system of, descril)ed by Mr. 
 IMaurice, 146 ; finally gains 
 Alexander, 147; also the King^ 
 of Prussia, 149 ; dissuades that 
 king from granting his people 
 a constitution, 149, 150; memo- 
 randum of, of the means to-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 201 
 
 <'onibat the revolution, 150; 
 exalted opinion of liiniself of, 
 151, 152 ; dealings of, witii Italy, 
 152, 153; conduct of, on hearing 
 of the revolt at Naples, 153 ; 
 entries iu the diary of, regarding 
 Xapolcon, 154 ; carries nearly all 
 his views at the Conference of 
 Troppau, 154, 15G ; and at 
 Laihacli, 157 ; establishes a 
 Council at Vienna to crush free 
 thought in Italy. 158; comments 
 of, on hearing of the suicide of 
 Lord Castlereagli (Londonderry) 
 159 ; tries to settle the Eastern 
 question in concert with the Czar, 
 1(J0, IGl ; forces repression of 
 opinion on Baden and Bavaria, 
 1(j2 ; his theory and action re- 
 garding the independence of 
 •Greece at variance, 1G3 ; incorrect- 
 ne^s of the forecast of, regarding 
 Charles X. and tlie Dauphin, IGo, 
 1G4 ; cooling of the relations of, 
 with the Czar, 1G4 ; incorrect fore- 
 cast regarding the eft'ect of the 
 death of Alexander on the liistory 
 of Russia, 1G4, 1G5 ; meets Lord 
 Hertford, and imbibes a sincere 
 admiration for him, IGG ; distrust 
 conceived by, of Canning, IGG, 1G7; 
 tries to gain the Czar Nicholas, 
 1G7 ; but cannot bring himself to 
 support the Russian policy in the 
 East, 168 ; exjiression of, on 
 liearing of the battle of Navarino, 
 1G9; hopes to derive advantage 
 from the accession to power of 
 the Duke of Wellington on tho 
 death of Canning, IG'J ; is trying 
 to improve his relations with 
 Russia when he is startled by the 
 Revolution of 1830, 170; op- 
 posing attitude taken by, towards 
 tliat Revolution, 171 ; represses 
 Germany and Italy, and staves 
 off oj^position in Hungary, 172 ; 
 alarmed at INIazzini's efforts, 
 traces him to his lair in London, 
 173, 174; dealings of, with 
 Hungarv, 174 ; up to 1830, 175 ; 
 lip to 1839, 176 ; up to 1848, 177 ; 
 
 difference of mode of dealing of, 
 with Hungary, compared with 
 the other states of the Empire, 
 ] 78 ; dealings of, with Italv, 
 178, 179 ; Willi Cracow, 179 ; with 
 the King of Sardinia. 179, 180 ; 
 alarm of, at the reforming atti- 
 tude of Pio Nono, 181 ; tries to 
 re))ress the popular feeling in 
 Italy, 182, 183; defeat of the 
 Swiss policy of, 184 ; difficulties 
 of, with respect to Holstein, 184 ; 
 looks with apprehension on the 
 small concessions of the new 
 King of Prussia, 185 ; and on the 
 rise of liberalism in Germany, 
 185, 180 ; movement in Hungary 
 against the policy of, 186, 187 ; 
 underiates the danger, 187 ; when 
 tho tumult in Vienna arises, is 
 bent on resistance, 188 ; gives 
 the command of the castle to 
 Prince Windischgratz, but is 
 restrained from giving him per- 
 mission to tire on the people, 189; 
 resigns, 189 ; still convinced that 
 liis policy was right, 190 ; reaches 
 Dresden with difficulty, and 
 proceeds thence to England, 191 ; 
 returns to Austria, 191, 192 ; con- 
 versations of, with the Emperor 
 Francis Joseph, 192 ; lives to 
 witness the total overthrow of 
 his policy, 192, 193; death of, 193 ; 
 domestic life of, 193 ; summary 
 of the first part of the career ofi 
 194, 166 ; of the second part, 190, 
 197; self-written epitaph of, 
 197. 
 
 Metternich, Francis George, father 
 of the Austrian statesman, 4 ; 
 summons his son to Frankfort for 
 the Emperor's coronation, 4 ; 
 summons him to Vienna, and 
 negotiates his marriage, 7 ; is 
 granted the abbey-lands of 
 Ochsenhausen, 10. 
 
 Metternich, Madame, is questioned 
 by Napoleon as to the possibility 
 of an Austrian marriage, 63. 
 
 Moreau, General, meets his fate at 
 Dresden, 1£1.
 
 206 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 N. 
 
 Naples, tho Bourbons restored to, 
 152 ; the people of, force their 
 king to accept a coiistitutiou, 151 ; 
 the people of, rise against King . 
 Bomba, 182, 183; wlio is forcetl 
 to grant a constitution, 183; ex- 
 citement throughout the kingdom 
 of, 183, 184. 
 
 Napoleon, contrast between system 
 of, and that of Mettcrnich, 1-3 ; 
 had the same professors as 
 Metternich for mathematics and 
 fencing, 4 ; is joined at Briinn 
 by Count Haugwitz, 13; requests 
 that Metternich may be appointed 
 to the embassy at Paris, 15 ; mis- 
 take made by, in so doing, 19 ; 
 gives Metternich a cordial recep- 
 tion, 19 ; impression made by, 
 upon Metternich, 19-21 ; pro- 
 gramme of, with respect to 
 Prussia in ISOG, 21 ; qualities 
 of, as they appeared to Metter- 
 nich, 22, 23 ; makes the peace of 
 Tilsit, 23 ; action of, on learning 
 the capitulation of Baylen, 23, 24 ; 
 reception given by, to JMetteruich, 
 as related by Metternich, 24, 25 ; 
 the same, as related by tho French 
 minister for foreign affairs, 2G- 
 30; meets the Czar at Erfurt, 
 31 ; has only one French and one 
 Russian witness, 32 ; sets out for 
 Bayonne, 33 ; returns to Paris, 
 and receives Metternich with his 
 customary kindness, 40 ; sees 
 through the designs of Austria, 
 41 ; is deceived in tho character 
 of Metternich, 43; would have 
 preferred peace, 44 ; but Austria 
 forces on war, 44, 45 ; wins tho 
 battle of Wagram, 49, 50 ; agrees 
 to a suspension (jf arms, and 
 Bends Chainpagny to Komorn to 
 negotiate, 52 ; his real object mis- 
 understoiid Ijy Metternich, 54; 
 status his dcniiuids, 50, 57 ; im- 
 patient of the delay of the nego- 
 tiators, opuua commuuicatiou 
 
 with tho Emperor Francis, 57, 
 58 ; and makes peace, 58-62 ; 
 sounds Madame Metternich re- 
 garding the possibility of an 
 Austrian marriage, 03 ; marries 
 Marie Louise, G5 ; receives Met- 
 ternich at Paris, and gives him 
 his confidence, 00-70 ; lets out 
 that he intends war with llussia, 
 70 ; advaupes his forces as far as 
 Dantzig, 74 ; notifies to his allies 
 his intention of invading llussia, 
 75 ; obtains, Tuider certain stipu- 
 lations, a cori)S of 30,000 men 
 from Austria, 75, 70 ; receives the 
 vassal sovereigns at Dresden, 76 ; 
 wisdom of the course traced by, 
 in confidential communication 
 with Metternich, 76, 77 ; asks the 
 advice of his councillors after the 
 catastrophe of the retreat, 82 ; 
 addresses the Emperor of Austria 
 as to his plans, 83; delusion 
 engendered in the mind of, by his 
 marriage, 87 ; sends M. do Nar- 
 bonne ; to Vienna to cope with 
 Metternich, 88 ; reaches Mayence 
 and sends fresh instructions to 
 Narbonnc, 96 : defeats the allies 
 at Liitzen, 97 ; repents having 
 conferred upon Austria the role 
 of mediator, 100 ; resolves to 
 treat directly with Eussia, 101 ; 
 defeats the allies at Bautzen, 103 ; 
 fatal conduct of, in agreeing to 
 an armistice, 103 ; historical in- 
 terview of, with Metternich, 109- 
 114; at the second interview 
 agrees to a congress, 116 ; cU'ect 
 of a phrase of, used in 1810, on 
 Metternich, 118 ; Austria declares 
 war against, 119 ; wins tiie battle 
 of Dresden, 120 ; but the result 
 more than neutralised by tho 
 remissness of St. Cyr, 121 ; is 
 beaten at Leipsig, 122 ; campaign 
 of 1814 ruined by Marmont's 
 treachery, 12.5, 120; life-work of, 
 judged by .Metternich, 127 ; learns 
 that tiie allies arc proposing to 
 deport him to St. Helena, 134 ; 
 ia forced to act at ouce, 135 ;
 
 INDEX. 
 
 207 
 
 triiimplial maroli of, 137 ; fate 
 of, decided at Waterloo, 139; is 
 sent to St. Helena, 140; the 
 legend of, survives, 197. 
 
 Narbonne, M. de, replaces Baron 
 Otto as French Ambassador at 
 Vienna, 88, 89 ; is well receive d, 
 92 ; sets himself to read Slctter- 
 nich through and through, 92- 
 99 ; and succeeds, JOO ; a ques- 
 tion whether the penetration of, 
 was not a misfortune, 100 and note. 
 
 Nicholas, succeeds his brother 
 Alexander on the throne of 
 Russia, 165 ; efforts made by 
 IMitteruich to conciliate, 166- 
 170; concludes the treaty of 
 Adrianople, 168 ; lays his heavy 
 hand on Poland, 171. 
 
 o. 
 
 OcHSENHAUSEN, abbey lands of, 
 granted to tlie elder Metternich, 
 10. 
 
 Opocno, selected by the Czar for 
 his head-quarters during the 
 armistice of Pleiswitz, 105 ; he 
 is Tisited there by Metternich, 
 105-107. 
 
 Otranto, Fouche Duke of, question 
 put to, by ]\[etternich, and reply 
 of, regarding result of possible 
 return of Napoleon from Elba, 
 135. 
 
 Otto, Baron, pourparlers of, with 
 Metternich at Vienna, 85, 86 ; is 
 replaced by IM. de Narbonne, 88. 
 
 Palmerston, Lord, wise foreign 
 policy of, 181 ; note to 184. 
 
 Piedmont, is restored to the king of 
 Sardinia, 151. 
 
 Pius IX., Giovanni Mastai Ferotti 
 is elected Pope as, 180; liberal 
 tendencies of, 181 ; issues a 
 decree granting separate re- 
 sponsibility to his ministers, 183. 
 
 Pleiswitz, armistice of, 104, 119. 
 
 I'rague, Napoleon signs an agree- 
 ment with jNIetternich for a con- 
 gress at, 116; reasons why the 
 congress of, was abortive, 119. 
 
 Pressburg, the peace of, follows the 
 battle of Austerlitz, 15 ; con- 
 ditions of, 15. 
 
 Prussia, Frederick William III., 
 king of, vacillation of, in 1804, 
 11 ; opens his frontiers to the 
 ( 'zar and signs a treaty at Pots- 
 dam, 11, 12 ; despatches Haug- 
 witz to Napoleon, 12 ; accepts 
 Hanover from Napoleon, 13; is 
 informed by Metternich, in 1811, 
 of the secret designs of Austria 
 in his favour, 72 ; meets Napoleon 
 at Dresden, 70 ; signs the treaty 
 of RciL-henbach, 107, 108 ; desires 
 after 1814 to incorporate the 
 w hole of Saxony, 130 ; opinion of 
 Napoleon regarding, expressed to 
 Admiral Cockburn, 132 ; truly 
 contemptible character of, 148, 
 149 ; is like clay in the hands of 
 tlie potter Metternich, 149, 150 ; 
 supports the reactionary policy 
 of, 162; death 0^, 184. 
 
 Prussia, Frederick William IV. 
 begins his reign by measures 
 which alarm Metternich, 185. 
 
 K. 
 
 Eeichenbach, treaty of, 107 ; why 
 the knowledge of the existence 
 of the, was hidden from tlie 
 world, note to 107 ; provisions of 
 the, 107, 108. 
 
 Remusat. M;i(lame de, testimony 
 of, to the real marriage of Na- 
 poleon and Josephine, 64, 65, nate. 
 
 Revolution, after a life spent in 
 combating, Metternich is brought 
 face to face with, and succumbs, 
 187, 188. 
 
 Revolution of 1830, Metternich is 
 startled in his plans of concili- 
 ating the Czar by the, 170 ; how 
 the, aifected generally the policy 
 of Metternich, 171.
 
 268 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 riomanzoff, Chancellor of tlie 
 Kussiiiu Empire, is one of the 
 four admitted to tlie secret coun- 
 cils of Erfurt, 32 : is, according 
 to Mettcrnich, "caught in the 
 nets of Napoleon," 38 ; is one of 
 the men Metternich failed to 
 seduce, 40, -ll ; communication of 
 Napoleon to, regardmjj Austria, 
 41. 
 
 S. 
 
 St. Cyr, General, fails to support 
 Vandamrae at the critical mo- 
 ment, 121. 
 
 Savarv, General, visits Metternich 
 at Griinberg, and makes a i^ro- 
 posal to him, 47. 
 
 Saxon army, treason of the, causes 
 the loss of the battle of Leipsig, 
 121, 122; andwo^e to 122. 
 
 Saxony, coveted by Prussia as a 
 reward for lier efforts in 1813-14, 
 130 ; opinion of Metternich on 
 the proposed transfer of, 132 ; 
 awakens to the necessities of 
 freedom, 184. 
 
 "Saxony, the Elector of, as he ap- 
 peared to Metternich, 9 ; King of, 
 dubious conduct of, 84 ; intrigues 
 of Metternich with, 90, 91 ; orders 
 the dislianding of Poniatowski's 
 corps, 91 ; returns to his alliance 
 with Napoleon, 102. 
 
 Sclnvarzeuberg, Prince, Austrian 
 ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 34 ; is ambassador at Paris and 
 gives a masked ball, 03 ; com- 
 mands tiie auxiliary Austrian 
 corps in the liussian Campaign, 
 72 ; proceeds on a mission to 
 Paris, 88, 89 ; under Nai)ok'on'8 
 influence is dumb, 89 ; opinion of, 
 regarding the pelitieal inlhienco 
 of the marriage of INlarie Louise, 
 »(0<e to page 90 ; questions put 
 to, as commander-in-chief of tlie 
 Austrian army, by Metternicli, 
 11.5; reply of, IIG; attacks 
 Napoleon at Dresden and i8 de- 
 feated, 120, 121. 
 
 Sonderbund, the policy of Metter- 
 nich and Louis Philippe re- 
 garding the, defeated by Lord 
 Paliuerston, 182 and note. 
 
 Spain, dealings of Napoleon witli, 
 23; policy of Napoleon how 
 affected by the turn of affairs in, 
 50. 
 
 Stadion, Count, replaces Count 
 CoUoiedo as Austrian Foreign 
 Minister after the Peace of Press- 
 burg, 15; informs Metternich 
 that Austria is nearly ready for 
 war, 35 ; reckons on the support of 
 Northern Germany, 38 ; resigns, 
 50 ; is sent to tiie 1. cad-quarters 
 of the Czar, 100 ; accompanies 
 the Czar to Opocno, 105 ; signs 
 the treaty of Reichenbach, 107 ; 
 represents Austria at Chatillon, 
 12G. 
 
 Sweden claims Norway as a reward 
 for her services in 1813-14, 129. 
 
 Szechenyi, Count, jiatriotic eflbrts 
 of, in Hungary, 175. 
 
 T. 
 
 Talleyrand, Piunce, courtesy of, 
 to Metternich at their first inter- 
 view, 18 ; begins to undermine 
 Napoleon, 33 ; speeches of, to 
 the Czar, at Erfurt, 33, 34 ; leaves 
 on the mind of Metternich the 
 impression that ho is plotting 
 against Napoleon, 39, 40 ; advises 
 Napoleon to treat direct with 
 Kussia, 82 ; represents France at 
 the Congress of Vicuna, 131. 
 
 Tei>litz, interview between Frede- 
 rick William IIL and Metter- 
 nich at, 149. 
 
 Thugut, Baron, retires from the 
 position of Austrian Foreign 
 31inister on account of the peace 
 of Luneville, 8. 
 
 Ticino, Mazzini takes refuge at 
 JjUgano in, 171, 173; abortive 
 attemjit made from, 172, 173 ; 
 becomes the boue of couteutioQ
 
 INDEX. 
 
 209 
 
 between Sardinia and Austria, 
 177, 178. 
 
 Tolstoy, Count, Eussian IMinistex 
 at Paris, appeal made to, at the 
 famous interview between Napo- 
 leon and Metteruich in 1S08, 
 2-1-29 ; sympatliies of, allied to 
 those of Metternich, 31. 
 
 Troppau, CoDference of, 152-156. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vandamme, General, fatal misfor- 
 tune of, at Kulm, caused by 
 ■want of support on the part of 
 St. Cyr, 121. 
 
 Vienna, Congress of, heartburnings 
 at covetous greed engendered at 
 the, 129-133 ; it is proposed at, to 
 deport Napoleon to St. Helena 
 or the Canary Islands, 133 ; the 
 terror excited at the, by the 
 return of Napoleon, hushes up 
 all divisions, 135, 137 ; good luck 
 of the allies in that the members 
 of the, had not dispersed, 137. 
 
 w. 
 
 Wagbam, Battle of, is witnessed 
 
 from a hill by the Emperor Fran- 
 cis and Metternich, 49 ; causes of 
 the loss of the, by the Austrians, 
 49, 50. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, at the Con- 
 gress of Verona, 157, 159 ; succes- 
 sion of, to Canning, fills the mind 
 of Metternich with hopes, 169. 
 
 Wcsseknyi, Count, a popular leader 
 in Hungary, is imprisoned by 
 order of INIetternich, 176. 
 
 Windischgratz, Prince, is entrusted 
 at the last moment with the com- 
 mand of the castle in Vienna, 
 189. 
 
 Wrede, Coimt, attempts to bar the 
 load to Napoleon ; mot and action 
 of the latter, note to p. 92. 
 
 Wiirtemberg, King of, protests 
 against the policy of Metternich, 
 150; denounces Austria as " ap- 
 propriating to herself the heritage 
 of Napoleon," 161 ; liberal move- 
 ments sanctioned by the, 185. 
 
 z. 
 
 Znaisi, the Austrian rearguard at- 
 tacked and beaten by Marmont 
 and Masse'na at, 52.
 
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