\ HISTORY OF GREECE; FKOM TlIK EAELIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT. : = . EORGE GROTE, F.R.S., lATs'CELLOTl OF THE TJNIVEESITY OF LOXDOX ; ;h of the ixstitttte of feaxce, and noN. member op the i >1 1 ; :. ,M D UOTAIi ACADEMIES OF ST. PETEHSBUEG, KHAEKOFF, MtrUlCH, AMSTERDAM, TUEIN, BEUSSELS, AND KONIGSBUEG ; HON. MEMBEE OF THE HISTOEICAL SOCIETY OF PHItADEEPHIA, V. S. OF AMERICA. A NEW EDITION. IN EIGHT VOLUMES.— VOL. VL WITH PORTRAIT, MAPS, AND PLANS. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1862. ^) ^ 1 4 The ri(jhl of Trar,ilalion /s nfcrwd. IG^S LONDON : PiilKTED liT W. CLOWES AND SONS. STAMFORD bTEKET. AND CHARING CROSS. ( iii ) CONTENTS OF YOLUME YI. Part IL— CONTINUATION OF HISTOEICAL GREECE. CHAPTER LXVI. Fkom the IIestoration of the Democracy to the Death of Alkibiades. Page Miserable condition of Athens dur- ing the two preceding years . . I Immediate relief caused by the restoration — unanimous senti- ment towards the renewed de- mocracy 2 Amnesty — treatment of the Thirty and the Ten 3 Disfranchising proposition of Phor- misius 4 The proposition rejected — speech composed by Lysias against it 5 Revision of the laws — the Nomo- thetse lb. Decree that no criminal inquiries I should be carried back beyond ■the archonship of Eukleides — B.C. 403 7 Oath taken by the senate and the dikasts modified 8 Farther precautions to ensure the observance of the amnesty . . ih. Absence of harsh reactionary feel- ing, both after the Thirty and after the Four Hundred . . . . 9 Generous and reasonable behaviour of the Demos — contrasted with that of the oligarchy 11 VOL. VI. Page Care of the people to preserve the rights of private property . . . . 12 Repayment to the Lacedemonians 13 The Horsemen or Knights . . . . ib. Revision of the laws — Nikomachus 14 Adoption of the fuller Ionic al- phabet, in place of the old Attic, for writing up the laws .. .. 16 Memorable epoch of the archon- ship of Eukleides. The rhetor Lysias • . . 17 Other changes at Athens — aboli- tion of the Board of Hellenota- miae — restriction of the right of citizenship ib. Honorary reward to Thrasybulus and the exiles 18 Position and views of Alkibiades in Asia 19 Artaxerxes Mnemon the new king of Persia. Plans of Cyrus — Alkibiades wishes to reveal them at Susa ib. The Lacedaemonians con;ointly with Cyrus require Pharnabazus to put him to death 20 Assassination of Alkibiades by order of Pharnabazus .. .. 21 Character of Alkibiades . . . . 22 b IV CONTENTS OF VOLUME Yl. CHAPTER LXVII. The Drama, — Rhetoric and Dialectics. — The Sophists. Page Athens immediately after Euklei- des — political history little known 24 Extraordinary development of dra- matic genius 2^'- Gradual enlargement of tragedy .. 25 Abundance of new tragedy at Athens 26 Accessibility of the theatre to the poorer citizens 27 Theorikon or festival-pay . . - . ib. Effect of the tragedies on the public mind of Athens . . . . 28 ^schylus, Sophokles and Euripides — moditications of tragedy . . 29 Popularity arising from expendi- ture of money on the festivals.. 30 Growth and development of Co- medy at Athens 31 Comic poets before Aristophanes — Kratinus, etc 32 Exposure of citizens by name in Comedy — forbidden for a time — then renewed — Krates and the milder Comedy 34 Aristophanes ib. Comedy in its effect on the Athe- nian mind 35 Mistaken estimate of the comic writers, as good witnesses or just critics 36 Aversion of Solon to the drama when nascent 39 Dramatic poetry as compared with the former kinds of poetry ., ib. Ethical sentiment, interest and de- bate, infused into the drama . . 40 The drama formed the stage of transition to rhetoric, dialectics, and ethical philosophy . . . . 42 Practical value and necessity of rhetorical accomplishments . . ib. Ehetoric and dialectics 49" Empedokles of Agrigentum — first name in the rhetorical move- ment 44 Zeno of Elea — first name in the dialectical movement iJj. Eleatic school — Parmenides . . . . 45 Zeno and Melissus — their dialectic attacks upon the opponents of Parmenides 46 Zeno at Athens — his conversation both with Perikles and with Sokrates 47 Early manifestation, and powerful Page efficacy, of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy 48 Rhetoric and dialectics — men of active life and men of specula- tion — two separate lines of intellectual activity 49 Standing antithesis between these two intellectual classes — vein of ignorance at Athens, hostile to both 50 Gradual enlargement of the field of education at Athens — in- creased knowledge and capacity of the musical teachers .. .. 51 'The Sophists — true Greek meaning of that word — invidious senti- ment implied in it 52 The name Sophist applied by Plato in a peculiar sense, in his po- lemics against the eminent paid teachers 54 Misconceptions arising from Pla- to's peculiar use of the word Sophist 56 Paid teachers or Sophists of the Sokratic age — Protagoras, Gor- gias, &c 57 Plato and the Sophists — two dif- ferent points of view — the re- former and theorist against the practical teacher 58 The Sophists were professional teachers for active life, like Iso- krates and Quintilian .. .. Gl IMisinterpretations of the dialogues of Plato as carrying evidence against the Sophists 63 The Sophists as paid teachers — no proof that they were greedy or exorbitant — proceeding of Pro- tagoras 64 The Sophists as rhetorical teachers — groundless accusations against them in that capacity, made also against Sokrates, Isokrates and others 65 Thrasymachus— his rhetorical pre- cepts — Prodikus — his discrimi- nation of words analogous in meaning 67 Protagoras — his treatise on Truth • — his opinions about the Pagan gods ib. His view of the cognitive process and its relative nature . . . . 69 Gorgias — his treatise on physical CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. CHAPTER IjXYU.— continued. subjects — misrepresentations of the scope of it 70 Unfounded accusations against the Sophists 71 They were not a sect or school, with common doctrines or me- thod : they were a profession, with strong individual j)eculi- arities 72 The Athenian character was not really corrupted, between 480 B.C. and 403 B.c 73 Prodikus — The Choice of Hercules 76 Protagoras — real estimate exhi- bited of him by Plato .. .. 77 Jlippias o f Elis-— how he is repre- sented by Plato 81 Gorgias, Pohis, and Kallikles .. 82 Doctrine advanced by Polus .. 83 Doctrine advanced by Kallikles — anti-social 84 Kallikles is not a Sophist . . . . 85 The doctrine put into his mouth could never have been laid down in any public lecture among the Athenians 86 Doctrine of Thrasymachus in the ' Republic ' of Plato 89 Page Such doctrine not common to all the Sophists — what is offensive in it is the manner in which it is put forward 89 Opinion of Thrasymachus after- wards brought out by Glaukon — with less brutality and much greater force of reason .. .. 91 Plato against the Sophists gene- rally. His category of accusa- tion comprehends all society, with aU the poets and states- men 92 It is unjust to try either the So- phists, or the statesmen of Athens, by the standard of Plato 94 Plato distinctly denies that Athe- nian corruption was to be im- puted to the Sophists . . . . ib. The Sophists were not teachers of mere words, apart from action.. 95 General good eft'ect of their teach- ing upon the youth 96 Great reputation of the Sophists — evidence of respect for intellect and of a good state of public sentiment ib CHAPTER LXVIII. SOKRATES. Different spirit shown towards Sokrates and towards the So- phists 99 Birth and family of Sokrates . . ib. His physical and moral qualities . . 100 Xenophon and Plato as witnesses 101 Their pictures of Sokrates are in the main accordant 102 Habits of Sokrates 103 Leading peculiarities of Sokrates 104 His constant publicity of life and indiscriminate conversation . . ib. Reason why Sokrates was shown up bj' Aristophanes on the stage 106 His persuasion of a special reli- gious mission ib. His Djemon or Genius — other in- spirations 108 Oracle from Delphi declaring that no man was wiser than he .. 109 His mission to test the false con- ceit of wisdom in others .. .. 110 Confluence of the religious motive with the inquisitive and intel- lectual impulse in his mind — numerous enemies whom he made Ill Sokrates a religious missionary, doing the work of philosophy .. 112 Intellectual peculiarities of So- krates 113 He opened ethics as a new subject of scientific discussion . . . . ih. Circumstances which turned the mind of Sokrates towards ethi- cal speculations 114 Limits of scientific study as laid down by Sokrates 115 He confines study to human af- fairs, as distinguished from divine- to man and society .. 117 Importance of the innovation — multitude of new and accessible phaenomena brought under dis- cussion 118 Innovations of Sokrates as to me- thod — dialectic method — induc- tive discourses — definitions .. 119 b 2 Yl CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. CHAPTEK luXYIlI.— continued. Page Commencement of analytical con- sciousness of the mental opera- tions — genera and species . . 120 Sokrates compared with previous philosophers 121 Great step made by Sokrates in laying the foundation of formal logic, afterwards expanded by Plato, and systematised by Aris- totle 123 Dialectical process employed by Sokrates — essential connexion between method and subject .. 124 Essential connection also between the dialectic process and the logical distribution of subject- matter — One in Many and Many in One 126 Persuasion of religious mission in Sokrates, prompting him to ex- tend his colloquial cross-exami- nation to noted men 127 His cross-examining purpose was not confined to noted men, but of universal application •. . . . ib. Leading ideas which directed the scrutiny of Sokrates — contrast between the special professions and the general duties of social life 129 Platonic dialogues — discussion whether virtue is teachable .. 130 Conceit of knowledge without real knowledge — universal pre- valence of it ib. Such confident persuasion, without science, belonged at that time to astronomy and physics, as well as to the subjects of man and society — it is now confined to the latter 132 Sokrates first lays down the idea of ethical science, comprising the appropriate ethical end with theory and precepts 133 Earnestness with which Sokrates inculcated self- examination — efi"ect of his conversation upon others 135 Preceptorial and positive exhorta- tion of Sokrates chiefly brought out by Xenophon 138 This w-as not the peculiarity of Sokrates — his powerful method of stirring up the analytical fa- culties ib. Negative and indirect scrutiny of Sokrates produced strong thirst. Page and active efforts for the attain- ment of positive truth .. .. 139 Inductive process of scrutiny, and Baconian spirit of Sokrates .. 141 Sokratic method tends to create minds capable of forming con- clusions for themselves — not to plant conclusions ready-made .. 143 Grecian dialectics — their many- sided handling of subjects — force of the negative arm 144 The subjects to which they were applied — man and society — es- sentially required such handling — reason why .. .. .. 145 Real distinction and variance be- tween Sokrates and the Sophists 147 Prodigious efficacy of Sokrates in forming new philosophical minds ib. General theory of Sokrates on ethics — he resolved virtue into knowledge or wisdom .. .. 148 This doctrine defective as stating a part for the whole ib. He was led to this general doctrine by the analogy of special profes- sions 1 50 Constant reference of Sokrates to duties of practice and detail 151 The derivative reasonings of So- krates were of larger range than his general doctrine ib. Political opinions of Sokrates .. 152 Long period during which So- krates exercised his vocation as a public con verser 153 Accusation against him by Mele- tus, Anytus, and Lykon .. ,. 154 The real ground for surprise is, that that accusation had not been preferred before . . . . ib. Inevitable unpopularity incurred by Sokrates in his mission .. 155 It was only from the general tole- ration of the Athenian demo- cracy and population, that he was allowed to go on so long . . tb. Particular circumstances which brought on the trial of Sokrates 156 Private offence of Anytus . . . . ib. Unpopularity arising to Sokrates from his connexion with Kritias and Alkibiades 158 Enmity of the poets and rhetors to Sokrates 159 Indictment — grounds of the accus- ers — effect of the ' Clouds ' of CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. Ml CHAPTER hXYIU.— continued. Page Aristophanes, in creating preju- dice against Sokrates .. .. 159 Accusation of corruption in teach- ing was partly founded on poli- tical grounds 160 Perversion of the poets alleged a;iainst him 161 liemarks of Xenophon upon these accusations 162 The charges touch upon the de- fective point of the Sokratic Ethical theory 1G3 Ilis political strictures ib. The verdict against Sokrates was brought upon him partly by his own concurrence 164 Small majority by which he was condemned ib, Sokrates defended himself like one who did not care to be acquit- ted 165 Til e ' Platonic Apology ' .. .. 166 Sentiment of Sokrates about death 168 Effect of his defence upon the Dikasts 169 Assertion of Xenophon that So- krates might have been acquitted if he had chosen it 170 The sentence — how passed in Athenian procedure 171 Sokrates is called upon to propose some counter-penalty against himself — his behaviour .. .. 172 Aggravation of feeling in the Di- Tage kasts against him in consequence of his behaviour T 73 Sentence of death — resolute adher- ence of Sokrates to his own con- victions ib. Satisfaction of Sokrates with the sentence, on deliberate convic- tion 174 Sokrates in prison for thirty days — he refuses to accept the means of escape — his serene death .. 175 Originality of Sokrates 176 Views taken of Sokrates as a moral preacher and as a sceptic — the first inadequate — the second in- correct ib. Sokrates, positive and practical in his end — negative only in his means 179 Two points on which Sokrates is systematically negative . . . . ib. Method of Sokrates, of universal application ISO Condemnation of Sokrates — one of the misdeeds of intolerance . . ih. Extenuating circumstances — prin- ciple of orthodox enforcement recognised generally in ancient times 181 Number of personal enemies made by Sokrates ib. His condemnation brought on by himself 182 The Athenians did not repent it.. 183 CHAPTER LXIX. Cyrus the Younger axd the Ten Thousand Greeks. Spartan empire 184 March of the Ten Thousand Greeks ib. Persian kings -^ Xerxes — Arta- xerxes Longimanus 185 Darius Nothus 46. Cyrus the younger in Ionia — his vigorous operations against Athens 186 Youth and education of Cj'rus .. 187 His esteem for the Greeks — his hopes of the crown 188 Death of Darius Nothus — succes- sion of Artasorxes Mnemon .. 189 Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking his brother .. .. ib. Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of Cyrus 1 DO Strict administration, and prudent behaviour, of Cyrus I'll Cyrus collects his army at Sardis 192 The Ten Thousand Greeks — their position and circumstances .. 193 Xenophon ib. How Xenophon came to join the Cj'reian army 1 94 Cyrus marches from Sardis — Kolossffi — Kela^nse 105 Peltse — Keramon-Agora, Kaystru- Pedion 197 Distress of Cyrus for money — Epyaxa supplies him 198. Thymbrium — Tyri^Tum — review of the Greeks by Cyrus 199 Ikonium — Lykaonia — Tyana .. 200 Pass over Taurus into Kilikia .. ib. VUl CONTENTS OF VOLUME YI, CHAPTER LXIX.— continued. Page Syennesis of Kilikia — his duplicity — he assists Cyrus with money 201 Cyrus at Tarsus — mutiny of the Greeks — their refusal to go farther 202 Klearchus tries to suppress the mutiny by severity — he fails . . ib. He tries persuasion — his discourse to the soldiers 203 His refusal to march farther — well received ib. Deceitful manoeuvres of Klearchus to bring the soldiers round to Cyrus ib. The soldiers agree to accompany Cyrus farther — increase of pay 205 March onward — from Tarsus to Issus ib. Flight of Abrokomas — abandon- ment of the passes 206 Gates of Kilikia and Syria . . . . ih. Desertion of Xenias and Pasion— prudence of Cyrus 207 Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the Euphrates .. 208 Practical reluctance of the army — they ford the Euphrates . . . . ib. Separate manoeuvre of IMenon . . 209 Abrokomas abandons the defence of the river — his double dealing 210 Cyrus marches along the left bank of the Euphrates — the Desert — • privations of the army .. .. 211 Page Pylse — Charmande — dangerous dispute between the soldiers of Klearchus and those of Menon 213 Entry into Babylonia — treason of Orontes — preparation for battle 214 Discourse of Cyrus to his officers and soldiers 215 Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian superiority 216 Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus 217 Cyrus passes the undefended trench ib. Kunaxa — sudden appearance of the King's army — preparation of Cyrus for battle 219 Last orders of Cyrus 220 Battle of Kunaxa — easy victory of the Greeks on their side .. .. 221 Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother — Cyrus is slain .. 222 Flight of Ariaeus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus 223 Plunder of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the Greeks 224 Character of Cyrus 225 If Cyrus had succeeded, he would have been the most formidable enemy to Greece 226 CHAPTER LXX. Eetkeat of the Ten Thousand Gbeeks, Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus offers the throne to Ariaus . . 228 Artaxerxes summons the Greeks to surrender— their reply — lan- guage of Phalinus ib. Ariajus refuses the throne, but in- vites the Greeks to join him for retreat 230 The Greeks rejoin Ariaeus— inter- change of oaths — resolution to retreat together ib. Position of the Greeks — to all ap- pearance hopeless 231 Commencement of the retreat, along with Aria;us — disorder of the army 232 Heralds from the Persians to treat about a truce 233 The heralds conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with pro- visions. March over the ca- nals 234 Abundant supplies obtained in the villages ib. Visit of Tissaphernes — negotia- tions 235 Convention concluded with Tissa- phernes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home 236 Motives of the Persians — favour- able dispositions of Parj'satis towards Cyrus ib. Long halt of the Greeks — their quarrel with Ariaeus 237 Secret despair of Klearchus . . . . 238 Retreating march begun, under Tissaphernes — they enter within CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. IX CHAPTER liKX.— continued. Page the "Wall of Media — march to Sittake 238 Alarm and suspicion of the Greeks — they cross the Tigris . . . . 239 Retreating march up the left bank of the Tigris — to the Great Zab 242 Suspicions between the Greeks and Tissaphernes 24-1 Klearchus converses with Tissa- phernes — and is talked over . . ib. Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals, visit Tissaphernes in his tent 245 Tissajjhernes seizes the Greek ge- nerals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court, and there put to death ib. Slenon is reserved to perish in torture- — sentiments of Queen Parysatis 246 How Klearchus came to be im- posed upon lb. Plans of Tissaphernes — impotence and timidity of the Persians . . 248 The Persians summon the Grecian army to surrender 249 Indignant refusal of the Greeks — distress and despair prevalent among them 250 First appearance of Xenophon — his dream ib. He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and appoint new officers 251 Address of Zenophon to the offi- cers. New generals are named, Xenophon being one .. .. 252 The army is convened in general assembly — speecli of Xenophon 253 Favourable augury from a man sneezing 254 Encouraging topics insisted on by Xenophon ib. Great impression produced by his speech — the army confirm the new generals proposed .. .. 256 Great ascendancy acquired over the army at once by Xenophon — qualities whereby he obtained it ib. Combination of eloquence and con- fidence, with soldier-like re- source and bravery 258 Approach of the Persian Mithri- dates — the Greeks refuse all parley 260 The Greeks cross the Zab and resume their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry ib. Page Sufferings of the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry. Successful precau- tions taken 261 Tissapliernes renews the attack, with some effect 262 Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward 263 Victory of the Greeks — prowess of Xenophon 265 The Greeks embarrassed as to their route — impossibility either of following tlie Tigris farther, or of crossing it ib. They strike into the mountains of the Karduchians 266 They burn much of their baggage — their sufferings from the acti- vity and energy of the Kardu- chians 267 Extreme danger of their situation 268 Xenophon finds out another road to turn tlie enemy's position .. ib. The Karduchians are defeated and the road cleared 269 Danger of Zenophon with the rear division and baggage ib. Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the slain .. . 270 They reach the river Kentrites, the northern boundary of Kar- duchia ib. Difficulties of passing the Ken- trites — dream of Xenophon .. 271 They discover a ford and pass the river 272 Xenophon with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and ef- fects his passage ib. March through Ai-menia. Heavy snow and severe cold .. .. 273 They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad 274 Distressing marches — extreme mi- sery from cold and hunger . . ib. Rest in good quarters — subterra- nean villages well stocked with provisions 275 After a week's rest, they march onward — their guide runs away 276 They reach a difficult pass occu- pied by the Chalybes — raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Clieirisophus about stealing 277 They turn the pass by a flank- march, and force their way over the mountain 278 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. CHAPTER IjXX.— continued. Page March through the country of the Taochi — ■ exhaustion of provi- sions — capture of a hill-fort . . 279 Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom they had yet seen— the Skythini 280 They reach the flourishing city of Gymnias ib. First sight of the sea from the mountain-top Theches — extreme delight of the soldiers .. .. 281 Passage through the Makrones . . ib. Through the Kolchians — who op- pose them and are defeated Kolchian villages — unwholesome honey Arrival at Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond) Joy of the Greeks — their dis- charge of vows to the Gods — their festivals and games . . Appendix on the Geography of the lletreat, between the Tigris and the Karduchian Mountains Page 282 283 285 CHAPTER LXXI. Pkoceedings of the Ten Thousand Greeks, from the time that they REACHED TrAPEZTTS TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LaCED^MONIAN Army in Asia Minor. Greek cities on the Euxine — Sinop^ with her colonies Ke- rasus, Kotyora, and Trapezus 290 Indigenous inhabitants — their rela- tions with the Greek colonists ib. Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine when the Ten Thousand descended among them .. .. 291 Uncertainty and danger of what they might do 292 Plans of the army — Cheirisophus is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting them 293 Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during his absence ib. Adopted by the army— their in- tense repugnance to further marching 294 Measures for procuring trans- ports. Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchi- ans and the Drilse ib. The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along the coast to Kerasus 295 Acts of disorder and outrage com- mitted by various soldiers near Kerasus 296 March to Kotyora — hostilities with the Mosynceki ib. Long halt at Kotyora — remon- strance from the Sinopians .. 297 Speech of Ilekatonymus of Sinope to the army — reply of Xeno- phon ib. Success of the reply — good under- standing established with Si- nope 298 Consultation of the army with He- katonymus, who advises going home by sea 298 Envoys sent by the army to Sinope to procure vessels 299 Poverty and increasing disorganiza- tion of the army ib. Ideas of Xenophon about founding a new city in the Euxine, with the army 300 Sacrifice of Xenophon to ascertain the will of the gods — treachery of the prophet Silanus .. .. 301 Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies against Xenophon — general assembly of the army . . 302 Accusations against Xenophon — his speech in defence . . . . ib. He carries the soldiers with him — discontent and flight of Silanus 303 Fresh manoeuvres of Timasion — fresh calumnies circulated against Xenophon — renewed dis- content of the army ib. Xenophon convenes the assembly again 304 Ills address in defence of himself 305 His remonstrance against the dis- orders in the army ib. Vote of the army unanimously favourable to Xenophon — dis- approving the disorders and di- recting trial 307 Xenophon's appeal to universal suffrage, as the legitimate politi- cal authority. Success of his appeal /6. Xenophon recommends trial of CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. XI CHAPTER LXXJ.— continued. Page the generals before a tribunal formed of the lochages or cap- tains. Satisfaction of the army with Xenophon 308 Manner in wliich discipline was upheld by the officers . . . . ib. Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and his oratory .. 303 Improved feeling of the army — peace with the the Paphlagonian Korylas 310 The army pass by sea to Sinope . . 311 lleturn of Cheirisophus — resolu- tion of the army to elect a single general — they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines — Chei- risophus is chosen .. .. .. ib. The army pass by sea to Herakleia — they wish to extort money from the Herakleots — opposi- tion of Cheirisophus and Xeno- phon 312 Dissatisfaction of the army — they divide into three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achaans. 2. A division under Cheiri- sophus. 3. A division under Xenophon 313 Arcadian division start first and act for themselves — they get into great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon — the army reunited at Kalpe — old board of generals re-elected, with Neon in place of Cheirisophus 314 Distress for provisions at Kalpe — unwillingness to move in the face of unfavourable sacrifices — ultimate victory over the troops of the country ib. Halt at Kalpe— comfortable quar- ters — idea that they were about to settle there as a colony .. 315 Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from Byzantium, toge- ther with Dexippus i'>. Disorder in the army : mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of Dexippus .. 316 Indignation and threats of Kle- ander — Xenophon persuades the army to submit — fear of Sparta 317 Satisfaction given to Kleander. by the voluntary surrender of Aga- sias with the mutinous soldier 318 Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is completely soothed .. ib. Page Kleander takes the command, ex- pressing the utmost friendship both towards the army and to- wards Xenophon 319 Unfavourable sacrifices make Kle- ander throw up the command and sail away ib. March of the army across the country from Kalpe to Chalke- don 320 Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry the army across the Bos- phorus into Europe — false pro- mises of Anaxibius to the army ib. Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediately and go home — first proposition ad- dressed to him by Seuthes of Thrace ib. The army cross over to Byzantium — fraud and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out of the town .. .. 321 Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were going out of the gates ib. Wi-ath and mutiny of the soldiers, in going away — they nish again into the gates, and muster within the town 322 Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town 323 The exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium — danger of all within it — conduct of Xenophon ib. Xenophon musters the soldiers in military order and harangues them 324 Xenophon calms the army, and persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town — message sent by them to Anaxibius — they go out of Byzantium, and agree to accept Koeratadas as their commander 32") Kemarkable effect produced by Xenophon — evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of the Greek mind to persuasive influences 326 Xenophon leaves the army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home. Koera- tadas is dismissed from the com- mand 328. Dissension among the commanders left ib. Distress of the array — Aristarclius arrives from Sparta to supersede xu CONTENTS OF VOLUME VJ. CHAPTER JjXXI.— continued. I 'age Kleander — Polas on his way to supersede Anaxibius 229 Phavnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, ■who now employs Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia 330 Aristarchus hinders the crossing — his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians left in Byzan- tium ib. His treacherous scheme for en- trapping Xenophon 331 Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of the army — he opens negotiations with Seuthes 332 Position of Seuthes — liis liberal offers to the army ih, Xenophon introduces him to the army, who accept the offers . . 333 Service of the army with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay ib. The army suspect the probity of Xenophon - — unjust calumnies against him — he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their confidence 334 Change of interest in the Lace- dajmonians, who become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in order to make war against the satraps ib. Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia — his poverty — he is advised to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichios — beneficial efiects . . 335 He conducts the army across Mount Ida to Pergamus . . . . 337 His unsuccessful attempt to sur- prise and capture the rich Per- sian Asidates ib. In a second attempt he captures Asidates — valuable booty se- cured 338 General sympathy expressed for Xenophon — large share person- ally allotted to him ib. The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of the Lacedamor.ian general Thimbron — Xenophon leaves the army, depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus 339 His subsequent return to Asia, to take command of the Cyreians as a part of the Lacedaemonian army ib. Xenophon in the Spartan service, with Agesilaus against Athens — he is banished ib. He settles at Skillus near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis 340 Charms of the residence - — good hunting — annual public sacrifice offered by Xenophon .. .. 341 Later life of Xenophon — expelled from Skillus after the battle of Leuktra — afterwards restored at Athens 342 Great impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousaiid upon the Greek mind . . . . 343 CHAPTEE LXXII. GkEECE UXDER the LACEDiEMOKIAX EmPIRE. Sequel of Grecian affairs generally — resumed 345 Spartan empire — how and when it commenced ib. Oppression and suffering of Athens under the Thirty . . . . 346 jUteration of Grecian feeling to- wards Athens — the Thirty are put down and the democracy restored ib. The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their tyranny .. .. 347 The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of that ■ which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities, at the commencement of the Spartan empire ib. Great power of Lysander — he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along with a Spartan harmost 348 Intimidation exercised every- where by Lysander in favour of his own partizans 349 Oppressive action of these Dekar- chies ib. In some points, probably worse than the Thirty at Athens .. 351 Bad conduct of the Spartan l.ar- CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. xni CHAPTER LXXU.-contimced. Page mosts — harsh as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them at Sparta . . . . 352 Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with the promises of freedom which she had pre- viously held out 353 Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta — by the Spartan general Brasidas especially 355 Gradual change in the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the Peloponnesian war 356 Language of Brasidas conti'asted with the acts of Lysander . . 357 Extreme suddenness and complete- ness of the victory of ^Egospo- tami left Lysander almost omni- potent ib. The Dekarchies became partly mo- dified by the jealousy at Sparta against Lj'sander. The Har- mosts lasted much longer . . . . 359 The Thirty at Athens were put down by the Athenians them- selves, not by any reformatory intei'ference of Sparta . . . . ib. The empire of Sparta much worse and more oppressive than that of Athens 361 Imperial Athens deprived her sub- ject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty of little or no oppression ib. Imperial Sparta did this and much worse — her harmosts and decem- virs are more complained of than the fact of her empire . . 362 This is the more to be regretted, as Sparta had now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable confederacy throughout Greece 363 Sparta might have recognized the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work well 364 Insupportable arrogance of Lysan- der — bitter complaints against him as well as against the De- karchies 365 Lysander offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and temporary expatri- ation 366 Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta . . . . 3G7 Page Their condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes . . . . 367 After the death of Cyrus, Tissa- phernes returns as victor and satrap to the coast of Asia Minor 368 Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks, who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron with an army to Asia. His ill- success and recall — he is super- seded by Derkyllidas . . . . 369 Conduct of the Cyreians loose as to pillage ib. Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and attacks Phar- nabazus in the Troad and iEolis 370 Distribution of the Per.sian empire: relation of king, satrap, sub- satrap ib. Mania, widow of Zenis, holds the subsatrapy of jEolis under Phar- nabazus. Her regular payment and vigorous government.. .. 371 Military force, personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania . . ib. Assassination of iMania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly refused 372 Invasion and conquest of .Silolis by Derkyllidas, who gets possession of the person of Meidias .. ,. 373 Derkyllidas acquires and liberates Skepsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing the trea- sures of Mania 374 Derkyllidas concludes a truce with Pliarnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia 375 Command of Derkyllidas — satisfac- tion of Sparta with the im^n'oved conduct of the Cyreians .. .. 377 Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his troops in forti- fying the Chersonesus against the Thracians ib. He captures and garrisons Atar- neus 379 He makes war upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, upon the Maeander ib. Timidity of Tissaphernes — he con- cludes a truce with Derkyllidas 3S0 Derkyllidas is superseded by Age- silaus 3S1 XIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. CHAPTER IjXU.— continued. Page Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her allies in Central Greece 381 Great energy imparted to Spartan action by Lysander immediately after the victory of ^gospo- tami ; an energy very unusual with Sparta 382 The Spartans had kept all the advantages of victory to them- selves — their allies were allowed nothing i^>- Great power of the Spartans — they take revenge upon those ■who had displeased them — their invasion of Elis 383 The Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires from it immediately in conse- quence of an earthquake . . . . 384 Second invasion of Elis by Agis — he marches through Triphylia and Olympia : victorious march with much booty 385 Insurrection of the oligarchical party in Elis — they are put down ib. The Eleians are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace . . . . 386 Sparta refuses to restore the Pisa- tans to the Olymjjic presidency 387 Triumphant position of Sparta — she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus and its neighbour- hood 388 CHAPTER LXXIII. Agesilatjs Kikg of Sparta Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the war — introduc- tion of a large sum of gold and silver by Lysander — opposed by some of the Ephors 389 The introduction of money was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances which then became operative on Sparta 390 Contrast between Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C. 391 Increase of peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta .. .. 392 Testimonies oflsokrates andXeno- phon to the change of character and habits at Sparta 303 Power of Lysander — his arrogance and ambitious projects — flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets 394 Keal position of the kings at Sparta 3116 His intrigues to make himself king at Sparta — he tries in vain to move the oracles in his favour — scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as yet lying hidden by a son of Apollo .. 397 His aim at the kingship fails — nevertheless he still retains pro- digious influence at Sparta .. 338 Death of Agis king of Sparta — doubt as to the legitimacy of his — The Corinthian War. son Leotychydes. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander, aspires to the throne 399 Character of Agesilaus 400 Conflicting pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides 401 01)jection taken against Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness — oracle produced by Diopeithes — eluded by the interpretation of Lysander 402 Agesilaus is preferred as king — suspicions which always remained attached to Lysander's interpre- tation 403 Popular conduct of Agesilaus — ho conciliates the Ephors — his great influence at Sparta — his energy, combined with unscrupulous par- tisanship ib. Dangerous conspiracj' at Sparta — terror-striking sacrifices .. .. 404 Character and position of the chief conspirator Kinadon — state of parties at Sparta — increasing number of malcontents .. .. 405 Police of the Ephors — information laid before them 406 Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by the conspirators .. .. 407 Alarm of the Ephors — their man- oeuvres for apprehending Kina- don privately ib. Kinadon is seized, interrogated, CONTEiNTS OF VOLUME VI. XV CHAPTER LXXlll.— continued. Page and executed — his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy broken up 408 Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta 410 Proceedings of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia 41 1 Persian preparations for reviving the maritime war agaiirst Sparta — renewed activity of Konou .. ib. Agcsilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia, accompanied by Lysander 412 Large plans of Agesilaus, for con- quest in the interior of Asia .. 413 General willingness of the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal from Thebes, Co- rinth, and Athens ib. Agesilaus compares himself with Agamemnon — goes to sacrifice at Aulis — is contemptuously hin- dered by the Thebans .. .. ib. Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus — he concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes 414 Arrogant behaviour and over- weening ascendency of Lysander - — offensive to the army and to Agesilaus ib. Agesilaus humbles and degrades Lysander, who asks to be sent away 415 Lysander is sent to command at the Hellespont — his valuable ser- vice there 416 Tissaphernes breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and Pharnabazus — he re- tires for the purpose of organ- izing a force of cavalry .. .. ib. Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but eager in enriching his friends 418 His humanity towards captives and deserted children ib. Spartan side of his character — ex- posure of naked prisoners — dif- ferent practice of Asiatics and Greeks 420 Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure cavalry .. 421 Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and gains a victory near Sardis 422 Page Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes 423 Negotiations between the new satrap and Agesilaus — the sa- traps in Asia Minor hostile to each other ib. Commencement of action at sea an;ainst Sparta — ■ the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money, commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia 424 Rhodes revolts from the Spartan empire — Konon captures an Egyptian corn-fleet at Rhodes . . 425 Anxiety of the Laceda-monians — Agesilaus is appointed to com- mand at sea as well as on land . . ib. Severity of the Lacedsemonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus — • contrast of the former treatment of the same man by Athens . ■ 426 Sentiment of a multitude compared with that of individuals .. •• 427 Efforts of Agesilaus to augment the fleet — he names Peisander admiral 428 Operations of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus ib. He lays waste the residence of the satrap, and surprises his camp — offence given to Spithridates .. 429 Personal conference between Age- silaus and Pharnabazus . . . • 430 Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son of Phar- nabazus — character of Agesilaus 432 Promising position and large pre- parations for Asiatic land-war- fare, of Agesilaus — he is re- called with his army to Pelopon- nesus 433 Efforts and proceedings of Konon in command of the Persian fleet ■ — his personal visit to the Per- sian court 434 Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with Konon 435 Cattle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Ijacedajmonian fleet — death of Peisander the admiral 436 XVI CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. CHAPTER LXXIV. Fkom the Battle of Kkidus to the Rebuilding of the Long Walls OF Athens. Page War in Central Greece against Sparta — called the Corinthian war 43S Relations of Sparta with the neigh- bouring states and with her allies after the accession of Age- silaus. Discontent among the allies ib. Great power of Sparta, stretching even to Northern Greece — state ofHerakleia 439 Growing disposition in Greece to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the war against Persia ib. The Satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos 440 The Persian money did not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out hostile ten- dencies pre - existing. Philo- Laconian sentiment of Xenophon 441 "War between Sparta and Thebes — the Bceotian war 442 Active operations of Sparta against Bceotia — Lysander is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward - — Pausanias conducts an army from Peloponnesus 443 The Thebans apply to Athens for aid — remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in Greece . . 444 Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens •• ib. Political feeling at Athens — good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of the Tliirty . . . . 445 Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes against Sparta 446 State of the Boeotian confederacy — Orchomenus revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Boeotia with his army and attacks Hali- artus ib. Lysander is repulsed and slain be- fore Haliartus 447 Pausanias arrives in Boeotia after the death of Lysander — Thrasy- bulus and an Athenian army come to the aid of the Thebans 448 Pausanias evacuates Bfcotia, on receiving the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial! Anger against Pausanias at Sparta ; he escapes into voluntary exile ; he is condemned in his absence Condemnation of Pausanias not deserved Sparta not less unjust in condemn- ing unsuccessful generals than Athens Character of Lysander — his mis- chievous influence, as well for Sparta, as for Greece generally His plans to make himself king at Sparta — discourse of the sophist Kleon Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from the death of Ly- sander — alliance against her be- tween Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos — the Eubceans and others join the alliance Increased importance of Thebes — she now rises to the rank of a primary power — The Theban leader Ismenias Successful operations of Ismenias to the north of Bceotia — capture of Herakleia from Sparta .. Synod of Anti-Spartan allies at Co- rinth — their confident hopes — the Lacedaemonians send to re- call Agesilaus from Asia . . Large muster near Corinth of Spartans and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the other Boldness of the language against Sparta — speech of the Corinthian Timolaus The anti-Spartan allies take up a defensive position near Corinth — advance of the Lacedaemo- nians to attack them Battle of Corinth — victory of the Lacedaemonians in their part of the battle ; their allies in the other parts being worsted Lacedjemonian ascendency within Peloponnesus is secured, but no farther result gained Agesilaus — his vexation on being recalled from Asia — his large plans of Asiatic conquest Regret of the Asiatic allies when Page 448 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. xvu CHAPTER 1,XXIY.— continued. Page he quits Asia — he leaves Euxe- nus in Asia with 4000 men .. 40 1 Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and marches homeward throu};h Thrace, Macedonia, and Thes- saly 462 Agesilaus and his army on the northei'n frontier of Boeotia — eclipse of the sun — news of the naval defeat at Knidus . . . . ib. Boeotians and their allies mustered at Koroneia 463 Battle of Koroneia — Agesilaus with most of his ai-my is victorious ; while the Thebans on their side are also victorious 464 Terrible combat between the The- bans and Spartans : on the whole the result is favourable to the Thebans 465 Victory of Agesilaus, not without severe wounds — yet not very decisive — his conduct after the battle 466 Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Boeotia — He goes to the Pythian games — sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf — his honour- able reception at Sparta .. .. 467 Results of the battles of Corinth and Koroneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had rather lost by the latter ib. Reverses of Sparta after the de- Pagc feat of Knidus. Loss of the in- sular empire of Sparta. Is early all her maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon .. 468 Abydos holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas 469 Derkyllidas holds both Ab3'dos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of Pharnabazus — anger of the latter 470 Pharnabazus and Konon sail with their fleet to Peloponnesus and to Corinth 471 Assistance and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at Corinth — remarkable fact of a Persian satrap and fleet at Corinth ib. Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic Gulf, and aids him with money to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens . . 472 Konon rebuilds the Long Walls — • hearty cooperation of the allies ib. Great importance of this restora- tion — how much it depended upon accident 473 Maintenance of the lines of Co- rinth against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer than the ensuing year .. 474 CHAPTER LXXV. From the Eebuiloing of the Long Walls of Atheks to the Peace OF Antalkidas. Large plans of Konon — organiza- tion of a mercenary force at Corinth 476 Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, in the Co- rinthian Gulf ib. Land - warfare — the Lacedaemo- nians established at Sikj'on — the Anti-Spartan allies occupv- ing the lines of Corinth from sea to sea 477 Sufferings of the Corinthians from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Co- rinthian proprietors become averse to the war i'>. Growth and manifestation of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of the govern- ment left open nothing but an appeal to force 479 The Corinthian Government fore- stal the conspiracy by a coup iVebit 480 Numerous persons of the philo- Laconian party are banished : nevertheless Pasimclus the leader is spared, and remains at Corintli 482 Intimate political union and con- solidation between Corinth and Argos ih. Pasimclus admits the Lacedse- xvni CONTENTS OF VOLUME YI. CHAPTER l.'X^Y.- continued. Page monians within the Long "Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls 482 The Laccdsemonians are victorious — severe loss of the Argeians .. 483 The Lacedasmonians pull down a portion of the I,ong Walls be- tween Corinth and Lechaeum, so as to open a free passage across. They capture Krommyon and Sidus 484 Effective warfare carried on by the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth— military genius and improvements of Iphikrates .. 485 The Athenians restore the Long Walls between Corinth and Le- chaeum — expedition of the Spartan king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long Walls and captures Le- chicum..- 487 Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result . . 489 Advantages derived by the Co- rinthians from possession of Peirspum, At the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with an army to attack it 49 1 Isthmian festival — Agesilaus dis- turbs the celebration. The Co- rinthian exiles, under his pro- tection, celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the city, and perform the cere- mony over again 492 Agesilaus attacks Peiraum, which he captures, together with the Herffium, many prisoners, and much booty ih. Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The The- bans send fresh envoys to solicit peace — contemptuously treated by Agesilaus 494 Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils the triumph ih. Destruction of a Lacedaemonian mora by the light troops under Iphikrates 495 Daring and well-planned man- oeuvres of Iphikrates ib. Few of the mora escape to Lechaum 497 The LacedaBmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce Page asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates .. ..498 Great effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event. Peculiar feelings of Spartans : pride of the relatives of the slain ih. Mortification of Agesilaus — he marches up to the walls of Corinth and defies Iphikrates — be then goes back humiliated to Sparta 499 Success of Iphikrates — he retakes Krommyon, Sidus, and Peirasum — Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athenians recal Iphikrates . . 500 Expedition of Agesilaus against Akarnania — successful, after some delay — the Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedaemonian confederacy ih. The Lacedemonians under Agesi- polis invade Argos 501 Manceuvre of the Argeians respect- ing the season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and Delphi . . . . 502 Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis — he dis- regards it 503 He marches up near to Argos — much plunder taken — he retires 504 Transactions in Asia — efforts of Sparta to detach the Great King fi'om Athens 505 The Spartan Antalkidas is sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also, from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies ib. Antalkidas offers to surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy throughout the Grecian world — the anti- Sjjartan allies refuse to accede to those terms . . . . . . . . 50G Hostility of Sparta to all the par- tial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under the name of universal autonomy . . ib. Antalkidas gains the favour of Tiribazus, who espouses pri- vately the cause of Sparta, though the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon — Konon's career is now closed, either by death or imprison- ment 507 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. XIX CHAPTER LXXV. -amtin ued. I'age Tiribazus cannot prevail witli the Persian court, which still con- tinues hostile to Sparta. Stru- thas is sent Jown to act against the Lacedamonians in Ionia . . 507 Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and the Lacedaemonian army. Thimbron is slain .'508 Diphridas is sent to succeed Thimbron ib. Lacedasmonian fleet at Rhodes — intestine disputes in the island 509 The Athenians send aid to Eva- goras at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though his alliance had now become inconvenient .. .. 510 Thrasybulus is sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast — his acquisitions in the Helles- pont and Bosphorus 511 Victory of Thrasybulus in Lesbos — he levies contributions along the Asiatic coast — he is slain near Aspendus 512 Character of Thrasybulus . . . . ib. Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus — Ixhodes still holds out against the Lacedamonians 513 Anaxibius is sent to command at the Hellespont in place of Dei'- kyllidas — his vigorous proceed- ings — he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait 514 The Athenians send Iphikrates with liis peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius . . . . ib. Defeat and death of Anaxibius .. 515 The Athenians are again masters of the Hellespont and the strait dues 516 The island of ^Egina — its past history ib. Tlie iEginetans are constrained by Sparta into war with Athens. The Lacedemonian admiral Teleutias at iEgina. He is superseded by Hierax. His re- markable popularity among the seamen 517 Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgopas at ^gina. Passage of the Lacedtcmonian Antalkidas to Asia 518 (Jorgopas is surprised in .iEgina, KaKSvovs ecrofiai, koI fiov\evff(i) '6,ti &r ex&) wa/coi'. The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on ^schines — praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens — is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, Staats-Alterthiimer der Griechen, s. 70. note 9. CiiAP. LXVr. AMNESTY AT ATHENS. 3 had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor,, citizens and metics, the comj)arative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now mani- fest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would be- come so again if that democracy were revived.^ It was the first measure of Thrasybulus and his companions, after concluding the treaty with Pausanias and thus re- Amnesty- entering the city, to exchange solemn oaths, of amnesty the^nifrty"*^ for the past, with those against whom they had just been and the Ten. at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in Eleusis, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in Peirseus. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished : opportunity was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office) ; so that if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others.^ We knoMfr that Erastothenes, one of the Thirty, after- wards returned to Athens ; since there remains a pow^erful harangue of Lysias invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus (the brother of Lysias). Eratosthenes was one of the minority of the Thirty who sided generally with Theramenes, and opposed to a considerable degree the extreme violences of Kritias — although personally concerned in that seizure and execu- tion of the rich metics which Theramenes had resisted, and which was one of the grossest misdeeds even of that dark period. He and Pheidon — being among the Ten named to succeed the Thirty after the death of Kritias, when the remaining members of that deposed Board retired to Eleusis — had endeavoured to maintain themselves as a new oligarchy, carrying on war at the same time against Eleusis and against the democratical exiles in Feiraeus. Failing in this, they had retired from the country, at the time when the exiles returned, and when the democracy was first re- established. But after a certain interval, the intense sentiments of the moment having somewhat subsided, they were encouraged by 1 Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 324. Kai dpwf S-nirov rovs &vSpas if XP'^^'V oXiyco XP""'^" a7ro5et'|ai'Tas Tyjf (/xTrpoaOiV ttoKnuav, &c. - AnJokidos de Mysteriis, s. 90. B 2 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. , their friends to return, and came back to stand their trial of '^accountability. It was on that occasion that Lysias preferred his accusation against Eratosthenes, the result of which we do not know, though we see plainly (even from the accusatory speech) that the latter had powerful friends to stand by him, and that the dikasts manifested considerable reluctance to condemn.^ We learn moreover from the same speech, that such was the detesta- tion of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to cause formal decrees for their expulsion or for prohibiting their coming.^ The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and enjoy their rights of citizens unmolested f a moderation rare in Grecian poli- tical warfare. The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the foianer democracy purely and simply, to )mic file Pisfran- cbising pro- position of Phormisius. choosc by lot Hic uiuc Archons and the Senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals — all as before. It appears that this restoration of the preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Peirseus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to tho. possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedaemonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in move- ables or in land out of Attica ; so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the ^ All this may be collected from va- rious passages of the Orat. xii. of Ly- sias. Eratosthenes did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues, though of course (pur- suant to the psephism of Kanuonus) the vote of the dikasts would be taken about each separately — aAAa -jrapa 'EpaToffOe- VOVS KOl Ttiv TOVTOvt (TVVapX^VTOlV Sl'/CTJI/ KafJi^aveiv fX7]K airovai fiiv rots TpLOLKOvra eTTi^ovKevere, Tzap6vTas S' d<^J)Te* jUTjSe ttjs tuxtjs, ^ tovtovs irape- So>Ke rfj ■ir6\ei, KdKiov v/xlv avrols ^or)- 6ria-r]T€ (s. 80, 81): compare s. 36. The number of friends prepared to back the defence of Eratosthenes, and to obtain his acquittal, chiefly by repre- senting that he had done the least mis- chief of all the Thirty — that all that he had done had been under fear of his own life — that he had been the partisan and supporter of Theramenes, whose memory was at that time popular — may be seen in sections 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91. Tliere are evidences also of other ac- cusations brought against tlie Thirty before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi. c6nt. Theomnest. A. s. 31, B. s. 12). ^ Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosth. s. 36. ^ Demosth. adv. Bceotum de Dote Materu. c. 6. p. 1018. CiiAP. LXVI, DISFRANCHISEMENT REJECTED. 6 importance of Peiraeus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the long walls — Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favourable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances ; but the bulk of them were poor ; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was re- jected ; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and com- posing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.^ Unfortunately we have only a fragment of the speech remain- ing, wherein the proposition is justly criticised as mis- The proposi- chievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large ^"spJedr*** portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and har- ^y^i^ygj'ifs mony, and even of substantial men competent to serve ag'*'"'*'^ i'- as hoplites or horsemen — at a moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never certainly was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue or judgment with wealth — more conspicuously un- masked than in reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thrasybulus was most true^ — that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of Horsemen, all rich men — than the poor majority of the Demos had sanctioned during two generations of demo- cracy. Moreover we know, on the authority of a witness un- friendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on ship-board and elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders ; while the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less orderly in the public service.^ The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the antecedent demo- cracy was restored without qualification, together with Revision of the ordinances of Drako, and the laws, measures, and IheNom"- weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was *'"'''^- found that the latter part of the resolution w^as incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Drako, the perpetrators of enormities under the ' Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysia, c. 32. p. I - Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 41. 526 ; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv., Bekk. ] ^ Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 19. 6 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. Thirty had rendered themselves guilty, and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, on the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and Drake, and re-enact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five Hundred citizens had just been chosen by the people as Nomothetae or Law-makers, at the same time when the Senate of Five Hundred was taken by lot : out of these Nomothetae, the Senate now chose a select few, whose duty it was to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for public inspection before the statues of the Epo- nymous Heroes, within the month then running.^ The Senate, and the entire body of Five Hundred Nomothetae, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions ; the Nomothetae being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved, (first by the senate, afterwards by the Nomothetae) but no others — were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the Portico called Poekile, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the Senate of Areopagus was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally respon- sible for the city during the time occupied in this revision.^ 1 Andokides de Mysteriis, s. 83. 'Oiroffaiv 5' av -Kpoaderi {vofioov^ o'iSe ■^ pT) fj.e V I vo/j-oOeTat vwh t rj s /3 V \ 7) s avaypd(povTfs eV adi/icnv fKTt- 3evrci!V rphs tovs inaivvfiovs, (TKOTreTv td5 tion whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to pi-ovide that such propositions shouki be publicly made known. Xow any PovXofievcfi, Ka\ napaSiSoi/TCiiu rah apxais persons simply invested with this cha- iv Ti25e t£ fx-qvl. rovs Sg TrupaSiBo/x^vovs , racter of a preliminary committee, would vo/xovs SoKLfiatTaTco ir poT e p o v ij ^ov- \ not (in my judgement) be called Xomo- \il Kal oi vo fj-o 6 er a I oiTrevra-l thetse. The reason why the persons kSctioi, ovs oi St] ij. 6t a I e'lXovr o €7r6i5}; dfJ.aiiJ.6Ka(nv. Putting together the two sentences in which the Nomothetae are here men- tioned, Eeiske and F. A. Wolf (Pro- legom. ad Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. cxxix.) think that there were two classes of Nomothetae ; one class chosen by the senate, the other by the people. here mentioned were so called, was. that they were a portion of the Five Hundi'ed Nomothetae, in whom the power of peremptory decision ulti- mately rested. A small committee would naturally be entrusted with this preliminary duty ; and the membei-s of that small committee were to be chosen b>j one of the bodies with whom ulti- This appeal's to me very improbable. ' mate decision rested, but chosen out of The persons chosen by the .senate were 1 the other. invested with uo final or decisive func- | ^ Andokides de Mysteriis, s. 81-85. Chap. LXYI. NEW LAWS MADE. As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly Inscribed in the Puekile pursuant to the above decree, two concludino: , ^ Decroo that laws were enacted which completed the purpose of the no criminal inquirifs citizens. should be The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act boyonu tiie upon, or permit to be acted upon, any law not among Eiikieides— those inscribed ; and declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people, should overrule any law.^ It re- newed also the old prohibition (dating from the days of Klei- sthenes and the first origin of the democracy), to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the votes of 6000 citizens voting secretly. The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal adju- dications and arbitrations which had been passed under the ante- cedent democracy should be held valid and unimpeached — but formally annulled all which had been passed under the Thirty. It farther provided that the laws now revised and inscribed, should only take effect from the archonship of Eukleides ; that is, from the nomination of archons made after the recent return of Thrasybulus and renovation of the democracy.^ ' Andokide.s de Myster. s. 87. \p-fi(picrij.a 5e /.irjSev, fiiire ^ovKtjs firiTe dr]/j.ov (v6- /j-ov), Kvpidnipov elvai. It seems that the word vofMov ought pi-operly to be inserted here: see De- mosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23. p. 649. Compare a similar use of the phrase — lUTjSec KvpiwTepov elvai — iu Demosthen. cont. Lakrit. c. 9. p. 9:37. " Andokides de Myster. s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 15. p. 718) that Andokides has not cited the law fully. He has omitted these words — Hiroa'a 5' iwl twv rptaKOUTa eirpdxdri, ^ i5ia ^ Srjfjioaia. aKvpa (Ivai — these words not having any material connection with the point at which he was aiming. Compare iEschines cont. Timarch. c. 9. p. 25 — koI fcrrw ravra &Kvpa, uxrirep ra evri rwv rpiaKovra, ^ ra ■Kph £,vK\eidov, fi €^ T19 «AA.rj TrdiroTe tol- avrri iyevero ■KpoQiffjj.ia Tisamenus is probably the same per- son of whom Lysias speaks contemjitu- ously — Or. xxx. cont. Nikomach. s. o(3. Meier (De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 71) thinks that thei'e is a contradiction be- tween the decree proposed by Tisamenus (Andok. de Myst. s. 8.5), and another decree proposed by Diokles, cited in the Oration of Demosth. cont. Timokr. c. 11. p. 713. But there is uo real con- tradiction between the two, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Diokles is not correctly given as it now stands. It ought to be read thus: — A.LOK\rjS eltre, Tovs v6/xovs rovs irph Eu- kX^ISov redevTas iv Sr)fji.0KpaTla. koI Saoi eV EvK\elSov ired-qaav, Kal elarly avaye- ypaixfjiivoi, [ott' 'E.VKXii^ov] Kvpiovs elvar rovs 5e fier' Ey/cXei'S?;;' ndevras Kal ToXoiirhv Tide/xivovs, Kvpiov? elyai airh rrjy yj/xepas rjs eKacnos iriQr), it\))v el rc^ irpoayeypaiTTai xp<^''os ovTiva Se? &pxiiv. '^■Kiypd^ai. 5e, Tors fxev vvv Kfip-fyois, rhv ypafj-jxaTia ttJs ^ovK-r)s, TpiaKovra riixepcii/m rh 5e Xonrhu, t>s &»' Tvyxdvr] ypafx/xaTevooy, irpocrypacpfToo TrapaxpVM-^- '''^^ vofxov Kxipiov elvai atrh ttjs -rj/j.^pas ifs eVe'^jj. The words air' 'EiiKXeiSov, which stand between brackets in the second line, are inserted on my own conjec- ture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law througli and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. Tiie ejitire scope and purpose of the ' law is to regulate clearly the time from xchich each law shall begin to be valid. As the fii'st part of the law reads now, without these words, it has uo perti- 8 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. By these ever-memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the Oath taken nomination of the archon Eukleides and his colleagues and the*^° (in the summer of 403 B.C.) were excluded from serving- dikaats - i r ' ' ^ • i 'i* ''P modified. as grounds lor crimmal process agamst any citizen. I o ensure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as w^ell as to that taken by the Heliastic dikasts. The senators pledged -themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give etfect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Eukleides, excepting only against the Thirty and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile.^ To the oath annually taken by the Heliasts, also, was added the clause — " I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who shall remember them ; on the contrary,^ I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws :" which laws pro- claimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Eukleides. A still farther precaution was taken to bar all actions for redress or damages founded on acts done prior to the archonship Farther pre- pt-iii-i-^ /^-vi • tai- /i • • ^ cautions to 01 Euklcidcs. Uu the motion oi Archinus (the principal observance of collcague of Tlirasybulus at Phyle), a law was passed, granthig leave to any defendant against whom such an action might be brought, to plead an exception in bar (or Para- graphe) upon the special ground of the amnesty and the legal prescription connected with it. The legal effect of this Paragraphs or exceptional plea, in Attic procedure, was to increase both the chance of failure, and the pecuniary liabilities in case of failure, on nence — no bearing on the main purjiose contemplated by Diokles in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demo- sthenes afterwards. It is easy to under- stand how the words air' EvK\ei5ov Should have dropt out, seeing that fV EvKKfiSov immediately precedes : an- other error has been in fact introduced, by putting air' EureAei'Sou in the former case instead of 4ir' EvK\ei5ov — which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authoi'ity of some MSS. The law of Diokles, when properly read, fully harmonises with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the SoKi/xaaia v6/j.wv by the Nomothetaj, which is pre- scribed in the decree of Tisamenus. iJut it was not necessary to mention this ex- pressly, since the words '6(rot dalv ava- ■yfypapLfievoi presuppose the foregone SoKiuaaia. ' Andokides de Mysteriis, s. 91. kuI ov Se^ofiai ffSfi^ip oi/Sh aTrayaiy^i' eVe/ca Twv TrpSrepov yeyevrj/Jievocv, tzK7]V tSiv rjs, &c. : also s. 33-45 — trapaica\ov/xfv Chap. LXVI. RESTRICTED CITIZENSHIP. 17 The arclionsliip of Euklcidcs, succeeding immediately to the Anarchy,.(as tlie archonship of Pythodurus, or the period Memorable of the Thirty, was denominated,) became thus a cardinal archoPsLp* point or epoch in Athenian history. We cannot doLd)t xhe'rhetor** that the laws came forth out of this revision considerably ^'y^'^»- modified, though unhappily we possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the political franchise was, on the pro- position of Aristophon, so far restricted for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth except the son of citizen parents on both sides ; whereas previously, it had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen.' The rhetor Lysias, by station a metic, had not only suffered great loss, narrowly escaping death from the Tliirty (who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus) — but had contributed a large sura to assist the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Peirseus. As a reward and com- pensation for such antecedents, the latter proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred upon him ; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards indicted by Archinus as illegal or informal, and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, passed the remainder of his life as an Isoteles, or non-freeman on the best condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the class of metics.^ Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias, who had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, other when combined with the decree of Aristophon above Aulent^— ' noticed, implies a degree of augmented strictness which the Board"^ we can only partially explain. It was not merely the ^„^j!^!!."'el renewal of her democracy for which Athens had now to tJ,e"i'°"^'ff provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation citizensiiip. and administration to her future march as an isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose material changes must have been required : among others, we know that the Board of Hellenotamiae (originally named for the collection and manage- ment of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Tliirty, the general paymasters of the state) was dis- continued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new eV TT? Kpicrei TLix(iipi~iadai rovs rrjv u/uere- \ 61 ; Demosthen. cout. Eubulid. c. 10.. pav vo/xodeffiau a(pavl^ovTas, &C. ' p. 1^)07. The tenor of the oratiou, however, is - Plutai-ch, Vit. X. Oratt. ("Lysias) p. unfortunately obscure. 8'>6; Taylor, Vit. Lysice, p. 53. ' Ispeus, Or. viii. De Kiron. Sort. s. , VOL. YI. C 18 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. officers — the treasurer at war, and the manager of the Theorlkon, or religious festival-fund.' • Respecting these two new departments, the latter of which especially became so much extended as to comprise most of the disbursements of a peace-establishment, I shall speak more fully hereafter ; at present I only notice them as manifestations of the large change in Athenian administration consequent upon the loss of the empire. There were doubtless many other changes arising from the same cause, though we do not know them in detail ; and I incline to number among such the alteration above noticed respecting the right of citizenship. While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the ^gean in in every sort of capacity — as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, &c., which must have tended materially to encourage intermarriages between them and the women of other Grecian insular states. Indeed we are even told that an express permission of connuhium with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Euboea^, — a fact (noticed by Lysias) of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family tie? between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Eukleides, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen ; an an-angement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire — and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Pan-Hellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and contined within the limits of Attica — • there no longer remained any motive to continue siich a regulation, so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian mind, again became predominant. Such is perhaps the explanation of the new restrictive law proposed by AristophoiL Thrasybulus and the gallant handful of exiles who had first Honorary scizcd Phylc, reccivcd no larger rew-ard than 1000 Thrasybulus drachmBB for a common sacrifice and votive offering, exiles. together with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their countrymen.^ The debt which Athens owed to Thra- sybulus was indeed such as could not be liquidated by money. To his individual patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the restoration of the democracy, but its good behaviour when ' See respecting this change Boeekh, Public Ecou. of Athens, ii. 7. p. 180 seq., Eng. Tr. 2 Lysias, Fragm. Or. xxxiv. De non dissolveuda RepulDlicA, s. 3 — aXXa koX Evj3oi6t'crij' eTn.ya,uiav iiroiovfieda, &c. ^ ..lEschines, cont. Ktesiphon. c. i)"2. p. •437; Cornel. ISTepos, Thrasybul. c. 4. Chai'. LXVl. ALKIBIADES IX rnriYGIA. 1^ restored. How different would have been the consequences of the restoration and the conduct of the people, had the event been brought about by a man like Alkibiades, applying gi-eat abilities principally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power ! At the restoration of the democracy, however, Alkibiades was already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at position and jEgospotami, he had sought shelter in the satrapy of ITscIbiadgs Pharnabazus, no longfer thinkino- himself safe from ^^^^^ Lacedaemonian persecution in his forts on the Thracian Chersonese. He carried with him a good deal of property, though he left still more behind him in these forts ; how acquired, we do not know. But having crossed apparently to Asia by the Bosporus, he w'as plundered by the Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before he could reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of personal hospitality which he had contracted with Pharna- bazus four years before,^ he now solicited from the satrap a safe conduct up to Susa. The Athenian envoys — whom Pharnabazus, after his former pacification with Alkibiades in 408 B.C., had engaged to escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate of Cyrus to detain as prisoners — were just now released from their three years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Pro- pontis ; ^ and Alkibiades, by whom this mission had originally been projected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistokles, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the latter; nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernes. The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded Artaxerxes by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon ; ^ but the younger thrii^w"kiug son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last piai'Jof' illness, tried after the death of the latter to suj)plant Aik^bildes Artax'erxes in the succession — or at least was suspected reveaT/bcm of so trying. Being seized and about to be slain, the "'^"*''- queen-mother Parysatis prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he laboured strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the ' Xennph. Hellen. i. o, 12. rov ts Koivhv opxov KiA iSla aA.AjjA.uts wiareis eiroiovvTo. - Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 7. ^ Xenoph. Auab. i. 1 ; Diodor, xiii. Ui8. c 2 20 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. means of dethroning his brother ; a memorable attempt, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alkibiades, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus ; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and auxiliary. Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards The Lace- Lysaudcr and the Lacedaemonians (of which we shall c^rOoTuy^ soon scB plain evidence) —and perhaps towards Cyrus requir/pbar- also, since such wcre the habitual relations of ncigh- pu'rwrn to bouring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedse- deatu. monians and Cyrus were now all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile, and an enemy so dangerous, to both. Accordingly he refused compliance with the request of Alkibiades ; granting him nevertheless permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged, to those against whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise, and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated fears as well as exaggerated hopes. Kot merely Cyrus — but the Lacedaemonians, closely allied with Cyrus — and the Dekarchies, whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, and who held their power only through Lacedae- monian support — all were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alki- biades again in action and command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor can we doubt that the exiles whom these Dekarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who re- mained at home under their government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover the Spartan king Agis still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already (some years before) procured the order to be despatched, from Sp^ta to Asia, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, afloat against Alkibiades— without believing the story of Plutarch, that Kritias and the Thirty sent to apprise Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not stand, so long as Alkibiades was alive. The truth is, that though the Thirty had included him in the list of exiles,' they had much less ' Xeuoph. Helleu. ii. 3, 42; Isukrates, Oi'. xvi. De Bigis, s. 4G. Chap. LXVI. DEATH OP ALKIBIADES. 21 to dread from his assaults or plots, in Attica, than the Lysandrian Dekarchies in the cities of Asia, Moreover his name was not popular even among the Athenian democrats, as will be shown hereafter when we come to recount the trial of Sokrates. Probably therefore the alleged intervention of Kritias and the Thirty, to procure the murder of Alkibiades, is a fiction of the subsequent encomiasts of the latter at Athens, in order to create for him claims to esteem as a friend and fellow-sufferer with the demo- cracy. A special despatch (or Skytale) was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure Assassina- that Alkibiades should be put to death. Accordingly blades by Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, phanmbazus. within whose satrapy Alkibiades was residing, and requested that it might be put in execution. The whole character of Pharna- bazus shows that he would not perpetrate such a deed, towards a man with whom he had contracted ties of hospitality, without sincere reluctance and great pressure from without ; especially as it would have been easy for him to connive underhand at the escape of the intended victim. We may therefore be sure that it was Cyrus, who, informed of the revelations contemplated by Alkibiades, enforced the requisition of Lysander ; and that the joint demand of the two was too formidable even to be evaded, much less openly disobeyed. Accordingly Pharnabazus depatched his brother MagcEus and his uncle Sisamithres, with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alkibiades in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire. Yet Alkibiades, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right-hand, and a cloak wrapped round his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him ; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armour. A female companion with whom he lived — Timandra — wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.^ ' I put together -what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiades from Plutarch, Alkib. c. 38, 39; Diodorus, xiv. 11. (who cites Ephorus, compare Ephor. Fragm. 12(;, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 10 ; Justin, v. 8 ; Isokrates, Or. xvi. De Bigis, s. 50. There were evidently different stories, about the antecedent causes and cu'- cumstances, among which a selection must be made. The extreme perfidy ascribed by Ephorus to Pharnabazus appears to me not at all in the chai-acter of that satrap. 22 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedsemonians did Character of ^^^^ scruplc to enjoiu, uoF the uncle and brother of a Aikibiades. Persian satrap to execute ; and by which this celebrated Athenian perished before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part — for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade — but whether to the advantatre of Athens or not is more questionable. Certain it is, that taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual ; though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual : it emanated rather from a national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man (except Nikias) to turn that adventure into ruin, and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse — Dekeleia would not have been fortified — Chios and Miletus would not have revolted — the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years of political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiarly his own — ^the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in Peloponnesus — proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedaemonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendency through the important victory of Mantineia. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus as satrap : but just at the moment when it behoved Aikibiades to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realise his own promises in the face of this new obstacle — at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably short even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned. If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his ends, and his means — there are few characters in Grecian history who present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public or CuAP. lA'VI. CHARACTER OF ALKIBIADES. as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity ; his means rapacious as well as reckless, from his first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manoeuvres whereby his political enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty in a high degree. But we must recollect that if his enemies were more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generatino- seed was sown by his own overweening insolence, and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social. On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealinfj- with new men and new situations, he was never wanting ; qualities, which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accom- plishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused — Athenian, Spartan, or Persian — oligarchical or democratical. But to none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence ; all successively threw him ofl^. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities as Alkibiades.^ • Cornelius Nepos says fAlcib. c. 11) of Alkibiades — "Hunc infamatum a pie- risque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extuleruut : Thucydides, qui ejnsdem setatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus; et Timaeus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando con- scierunt." We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Ti- mseus. But as to Thucydides, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alki- biades— nothing beyond ; and he had good reason fur doing so. His pic- ture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiades is the reverse of eulogy. The Oration xvi. of Isokrates, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiades, goes into a laboured panegyric of his father's character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the fiicts stated in Thucydides and Xeno- phou. But he is justified m saying — ■ ouSeVoTe ToD Trarphs T]yovixivov Tp6ltaiov vfioii' iffTTjcray ol iro\4fiioi {s. 23). 24: •• HISTORY OF GREECE. Taut IT. CHAPTEE LXVII. THE DEAMA— EHETORIC AND DIALECTIOS.-THE SOPHISTS. Respecting the political history of Athens during the few years Athens im- immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy, after Eu- we have unfortunately little or no information. But in political his- the Spring of 399 b.c, between three and four years known. after the beginning of the archonship of Eukleides, an event happened of paramount interest to the intellectual public of Greece as well as to philosophy generally — the trial, condemna- tion, and execution of Sokrates. Before I recount that memorable incident, it will be proper to say a few words on the literary and philosophical character of the age in which it happened. Though literature and philosophy are now becoming separate departments in Greece, each exercises a marked influence on the other ; and the state of dramatic literature will be seen to be one of the causes directly contributing to the fate of Sokrates. During the century of the Athenian democracy between Klei- Extraordi- sthcncs and Eukleides, there had been produced a deve- lopment of lopment of dramatic genius, tragic and comic, never gouius. paralleled before or afterwards. ^Eschylus, the creator of the tragic drama, or at least the first composer who rendered it illustrious, had been a combatant both at Marathon and Salamis ; while Sophokles and Euripides, his two eminent followers (the former one of the generals of the Athenian armament arainst Samos in 440 b.c.) expired both of them only a year before the battle of ^gospotami — Justin time to escape the bitter humiliation and suffering of that mournful period. Out of the once numerous compositions of these poets we possess only a few, yet sufficient to enable us to appreciate in some degree the grandeur of Athenian tragedy ; and when we learn that they were frequently beaten, even with the best of their dramas now remaining, in fair compe- tition for the prize against other poets whose names only have reached us — we seem warranted in presuming that the best pro- Chap. LXYII. THE ATHENIAN DEAMA. 25 ductions of these successful competitors, if not intrinsically finer, could hardly have been inferior in merit to theirs.' The tragic drama belonged essentially to the festivals in honour of the Sfod Dionysus : beinff orig-inallv a chorus sung- in Gradual en- ...» ,1-, •, 11^ largement of nis honour, to which were successively superadded — tragedy, first, an Iambic monologue, — next, a dialogue with two actors, — lastly, a regular plot with three actors, and the chorus itself interwoven into the scene. Its subjects were from the beginning, and always continued to be, persons either divine or heroic, above the level of historical life and borrowed from what was called the mythical past. The Persse of ^schylus, indeed, forms a splendid exception ; but the tw o analogous dramas of his contemporary, Phrynichus, — the Phoenissae and the capture of Miletus — were not successful enough to invite subsequent tragedians to meddle with contemporary events. To three serious dramas or a Trilogy — at first connected together by sequence of subject more or less loose, but afterwards unconnected and on distinct subjects, through an innovation introduced by Sophokles, if not before — the tragic poet added a fourth or satyrical drama ; the characters of which were satyrs, the companions of the god Dionysus, and other heroic or mythical persons exhibited in farce. He thus made up a total of four dramas or a tetralogy, which he got up and brought forward to contend for the prize at the festival. The expense of training the chorus and actors was chiefly furnished by the Choregi, wealthy citizens, of whom one was named for each of the ten tribes, and whose honour and vanity were greatly interested in obtaining the prize. At first, these exhibitions took place on a temporary stage, with nothing but wooden supports and scaffolding ; but shortly after the year 500 b.c, on an occasion when the poets ^Eschylus and Pratinas were contending for the prize, this stage gave way during the ceremony, and lamentable mischief was the result. After that misfortune, a permanent theatre of stone was provided. To what extent the project was realised before the invasion of Xerxes, we do not accurately know ; but after his destructive occupation of Athens, the theatre, if any existed previously, would have to be rebuilt or renovated along with other injured portions of the city. It was under that great development of the power of Athens 1 The ffidipvis Tyrannns of Sophokles was sm-passecl by the rival composition of Philokles. The Medea of Euripides stood only third for the prize; Eupho- rion, son of ^Eschyhis, being first, So- phokles second. Yet these two trage- dies are the masterpieces now remaining of Sophokles and Euripides. 26 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. which followed the expulsion of Xerxes, that the theatre with its Abundance appurteiiaiices attained full magnitude and elaboration, tri^ldy at ^.ud attic tragedy its maximum of excellence. Sophokles Athens. gained his first victory over ^schylus in 468 B.C. : the first exhibition of Euripides was in 455 B.C. The names, though unhappily the names alone, of many other competitors have reached us : Philokles, who gained the prize even over the Qildipus Tyrannus of Sophokles ; Euphorion, son of ^schylus, Xenokles and Nikomachus, all known to have triumphed over Euripides ; Neophron, Achaeus, Ion, Agathon, and many more. The continuous stream of new tragedy, poured out year after year, was something new in the history of the Greek mind. If we could suppose all the ten tribes contending for the prize every year, there would be ten tetralogies (or sets of four dramas each, three tragedies ^nd one satyrical farce) at the Dionysiac festival, and as many at the Lensean. So great a number as sixty new tra- gedies composed every year,^ is not to be thought of; yet we do not know what was the usual number of competing tetralogies : it was at least three — since the first, second, and third are specified in the Didaskalies or Theatrical Records — and probably greater than three. It was rare to repeat the same drama a second time, unless after considerable alterations, nor would it be ci'editable to the liberality of a Choregus to decline the full cost of getting up a new tetralogy. Without pretending to determine with nume- rical accuracy how many dramas were composed in each year, the general fact of unexampled abundance in the productions of the trao-ic muse is both authentic and interesting. Moreover — what is not less important to notice — all this abun- dance found its way to the minds of the great body of the citizens, ' The careful examination of Welcker j 405 B.C., and was likely dui-ing each (Griech. Tragodie, vol. i. p, 76) makes year to have composed one, if not two, out the titles of eighty tragedies un- , tetralogies ; if he could prevail upon questionably belonging to Sophokles — the archon to gi-ant him a chorus, that over and above the satyrical dramas in ' is, the opportunity of representing, his Tetralogies. Welcker has consider- | The Didaskalies took no account of any ably cut down the number admitted by except such as gained the fii-st, second previous authors, carried by Fabricius or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, as high as 178, and even by Boetkh as and an approximative guess at the con- high as 109 (Welcker, ut sup. p. 6'2). i tents, of 51 lost tragedies of the poet. The number of dramas ascribed ' to ! besides the 1 7 remaining (p. 443) . Euripides is sometines 92, sometimes I Aristarchus the tragedian is afl&rmed 75. Elmsley (in his remarks on the ] by Suidas to have composed 70 trage- Ar'guraent to the Medea, p. 72) thinks ' dies, of which only two gained the that even the larger of these numbers ' prize. As many as 120 compositions is smaller than what Euripides probably [ are ascribed to Neophron, 44 to Achaeus, composed ; since the poet continued 40 to Ion (Welcker, ib. p. 889). composing for fifty years, from 455 to | Chap. LXVII. UNIVERSAL ADMISSION. 27 not excepting even the poorest. For the theatre is said to have accommodated 30,000 persons : ^ here again it is unsafe Accessibility to rely upon numerical accuracy, but we cannot doubt toti,e poorest that it was sufficiently capacious to give to most of ^''"*"*- the citizens, poor as well as rich, ample opportunity of profiting by these beautiful compositions. At first, the admission to the theatre was gratuitous ; but as the crowd, of strangers as well as freemen, was found both excessive and disorderly, the system was adopted of asking a price, seemingly at a time when the perma- nent theatre was put in complete order after the destruction caused by Xerxes. The theatre was let by contract to a manager who engaged to defray (either in whole or part) the habitual cost incurred by the state in the representation, and who was allowed to sell tickets of admission. At first it appears that the price of tickets was not fixed, so that the ])oor citizens were overbid, and could not get places. Accordingly Perikles introduced a new system, fixing the price of places at three oboli (or half a drachma) for the better, and one obolus for the less good. As there were two days of representation, tickets covering both days were sold respectively for a drachma and two oboli. But in order that the poor citizens might be enabled to attend, two oboli were given out from the public treasure to each citizen (rich as well as poor, if they chose to receive it) on the occasion of the festival. A poor man was thus furnished with the means of purchasing his place and going to the theatre without cost, on both days, if he chose ; or, \f he preferred it, he might go on one day only — or might even stay away altogether and spend both the two oboli in any other manner. The higher price obtained for the better seats purchased by the richer citizens, is here to be set against the sum disbursed to the poorer ; but we have no data before us for striking the balance, nor can we tell how the finances of the state were affiected byit.=^ Such was the original Theorikon or festival-pay introduced by Perikles at Athens ; a system of distributinsr the public Thedrikon "^ r • 1 • L- L or festival- money, gradually extended to other festivals m w^hich pay. there was no theatrical representation, and which in later times 1 Plato, Symposion, c. 3. p. 175. - For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compilation — G. C. Sclmeider, Das Attische Theater- Wcsen, Weimar 1835— furnished with copious notes; though I do not fully concur in all his details, and have dif- fered from him on some points. I can- uot think that more than two oboli were given to any one citizen at the same festival ; at least, not until the distributions became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty : see M. Schnei- der's Book, p. 17; also Notes, 29-196. 28 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. reached a mischievous excess ; having begun at a time when Athens was full of money from foreign tribute, — and continuing, with increased demand, at a subsequent time when she was com- paratively poor and without extraneous resources. It is to be remembered that all these festivals were portions of the ancient religion, and that, according to the feelings of that time, cheerful and multitudinous assemblages were essential to the satisfaction of the god in whose honour the festival was celebrated. Such dis- bursements were a portion of the rehgious, even more than of the civil, establishment. Of the abusive excess which they afterwards reached, however, I shall speak hereafter : at present I deal with the Theorikon only in its primitive function and effect, of enabling all Athenians indiscriminately to witness the representation of the tragedies. We cannot doubt that the effect of these compositions upon the Effect of the public Sympathies, as well as upon the public judgtment the public and intelligence, must have been beneficial and moral- Athens, izing in a high degree. Though the subjects and persons are legendary, the relations between them are all human and simple — exalted above the level of humanity, only in such mea- sure as to present a stronger claim to the hearer's admiration or pity. So powerful a body of poetical influence has probably never been brought to act upon the emotions of any other population ; and when we consider the extraordinary beauty of these immortal compositions, which first stamped tragedy as a separate department of poetry, and gave to it a dignity never since reached, we shall be satisfied that the tastes, the sentiments, and the intellectual standard, of the Athenian multitude, must have been sensibly improved and exalted by such lessons. The reception of such pleasures through the eye and the ear, as well as amidst a sympa- thising crowd, was a fact of no small importance in the mental history of the people. It contributed to exalt their imagination, like the grand edifices and ornaments added during the same period to their acropolis. Like them too, and even more than they — tragedy was the monopoly of Athens ; for while tragic composers came thither from other parts of Greece (Achseus from Eretria, and Ion from Chios, at a time when the Athenian empire comprised both those places) to exhibit their genius, — nowhere else were original tragedies composed and acted, though hardly any considerable city was without a theatre.^ 1 See Plato, Laches, c. 6. p. 183 B.; and Welcker, Griech. Tragod. p. 930. Chap.LXVII. effect OF TRAGEDY AT ATHENS. 29 The three great tragedians — ^Eschylus, Sophokles, and Euri- pides — distinguished above all their competitors, as well ^schyius, by contemporaries as by subsequent critics, are inter- fndE'urfpides esting to us, not merely from the positive beauties of ^"^'of^'^' each, but also from the differences between them in ^^Kedy. handling, style, and sentiment, and from the manner in which these differences illustrate the insensible modification of the Athe- nian mind. Though the subjects, persons, and events of tragedy always continued to be borrowed from the legendary world, and were thus kept above the level of contemporaneous life ' — yet the dramatic manner of handling them is sensibly modified, even in Sophokles as compared with vEschylus — and still more in Euri- pides, by the atmosphere of democracy, political and judicial contention, and philosophy, encompassing and acting upon the poet. In ^Eschylus, the ideality belongs to the handling not less than to the subjects : the passions appealed to are the masculine and violent, to the exclusion of Aphrodite and her inspirations:^ the figures are vast and majestic, but exhibited only in half-light and in shadowy outline : the speech is replete with bold metaphor and abrupt transition, — "grandiloquent even to a fault" (as Quintilian remarks), and often approaching nearer to Oriental vagueness than to Grecian perspicuity. In Sophokles, there is evidently a closer approach to reality and common life : the range of emo- tions is more varied, the figures are more distinctly seen, and the action more fully and conspicuously worked out. Not only we have a more elaborate dramatic structure, but a more expanded dialogue, and a comparative simplicity of speech like that of living Greeks : and we find too a certain admixture of rhetorical decla- mation, amidst the greatest poetical beauty which the Grecian drama ever attained. But when we advance to Euripides, this rhetorical element becomes still more prominent and developed. The ultra-natural sublimity of the legendary characters disappears : love and compassion are invoked to a degree which ^schylus would have deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the heroic person : moreover there are appeals to the reason, and argu- mentative controversies, which that grandiloquent poet would have despised as petty and forensic cavils. And — what was worse still, 1 Upon this point, compare Welcker, Griech. Tragod. vol. ii. p. 1102. ■^ See Aristophan. Ran. 104-6. The Autigoue (780 seq.) and the Tx-achinise (498) are sufficient evidence that So- phokles did not agree with ^schylus in this renunciation of Aphrodite. 30 HISTORY OF GllEECE. Part 11. judging from the ^schylean point of view — there was a certain novelty of speculation, an intimation of doubt on reigning opinions, and an air of scientific refinement, often spoiling the poetical effect. Such differences between these three great poets are doubtless referable to the working of Athenian politics and Athenian philo- sophy on the minds of the two latter. In Sophokles, we may trace the companion of Herodotus' — in Euripides, the hearer of Anaxagoras, Sokrates, and Prodikus ; ^ in both, the familiarity with that wide-spread, popularity of speech, and real, serious debate of politicians and competitors before the dikastery, which both had ever before their eyes, but which the genius of Sophokles knew how to keep in due subordination to his grand poetical purpose. The transformati(3n of the tragic muse from ^schylus to Euri- pides is the more deserving of notice, as it shows us how Attic tragedy served as the natural prelude and encou- ragement to the rhetorical and dialectical afxe which was approaching. But the democracy, which thus insensibly modified the tragic drama, imparted a new life and ampler pro- portions to the comic ; both the one and the other being stimu- lated by the increasing prosperity and power of Athens during the half century following 480 b.c. Not only was the affluence of strangers and visitors to Athens continually augmenting, but wealthy men were easily found to incur the expense of training the chorus and actors. There was no manner of employing wealth which seemed so appropriate to Grecian feeling, or tended so much to procure influence and popularity to its possessors, as that of contributing to enhance the magnificence of the national ar.d Popularity arising from expenditure of monoy on the festivals, 1 The comparison of Herodot. iii. 119 with Soph. Antig. 905 proves a commu- nity of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine. The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were dead, for pre- ferring a brother either to husband or child — that she might find another husband and have anotlier child, but could not possibly have another brother — is certainly not a little far-fetched. 2 See Valckenaer, ]Jiatribe in Eurip. Frag. c. 23. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripides, than that of .^schylus or Sophokles, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory : — ' ' Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, iis qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliorem longe Euripidem fore. Nam- que is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum re- prehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurn- us et sonu.s Sophoclis videtur esse sub- liniior) mugis aceedit oratorio generi: et sententiis densus, et rebus ipsis; et in iis quse a sapjientibus tradita sunt, pscne ipsis par ; et in dicendo et respon- dendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro diserti, comparandus. In aff'ectibus vero tvun omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui miseratione constant, facile praccij'uus." (Quintil. Inst. Orat. x. 1.) Chap. LXVII. LATER GROWTH OF COMEDY. 31 religious festivals.^ This was tlie general sentiment both among rich and among poor ; nor is there any criticism more unfounded than that which represents such an obligation as hard and oppres- sive upon rich men. Most of them spent more than they were legally compelled to spend in this way, from the desire of exalting their popularity. The only real sufferers were, the people, con- sidered as interested in a just administration of law ; since it was a practice which enabled many rich men to acquire importance who had no personal qualities to deserve it, — and which provided them with a stock of factitious merits to be pleaded before the Dikastery, as a set-off against substantive accusations. The full splendour of the comic Muse was considerably later than that of the tr^ic. Even down to 460 B.C. (about Growth and the time when Perikles and Ephialtes introduced their ofe^o°P"""' constitutional reforms), there was not a single comic at Athens. poet of eminence at Athens ; nor was there apparently a single undisputed Athenian comedy before that date, which survived to the times of the Alexandrine critics. Magnes, Krates, and Kra- tinus — probably also Chionides and Ekphantides^ — all belong to the period beginning about (Olympiad 80 or) 460 b.c. ; that is, the generation preceding Aristophanes, whose first composition dates in 427 b.c. The condition and growth of attic comedy before this period seems to have been unknown even to Aristotle, who intimates that the archon did not begin to grant a chorus for comedy, or to number it among the authoritative solemnities of the festival, until long after the practice had been established for tragedy. Thus the comic chorus in that early time consisted of volunteers, without any choregus publicly assigned to bear the expense of teaching them or getting up the piece — so that there was little motive for authors to bestow care or genius in the pre- paration of their song, dance, and scurrilous monody or dialogue. The exuberant revelry of the phallic festival and procession — with full license of scoffing at any one present, which the god Dionysus was supposed to enjoy — and with the most plain-spoken grossness as well in language as in ideas — formed the primitive germ, which under Athenian genius ripened into the old comedy.^ It resem- ' Aristophau. Plutus, 11 GO : — IIAovTO) yap Icrrl toCto (rviJiopu>TaTov, Hoteii/ ayCivai yv/iviKOvs fai /noucriifoiis. Compare the speech of Alkibiades, Thuc vi. 16, and Theophrastus ap. Cic. de Officiis, ii. 16. * See Meiueke, Hist. Critic. Coinicor. Gra?cor. vol. i. p. 26 seq. Grysar and Mr. Clinton, following Suidas, place Chionides before the Per- sian invasion; but the words of Aris- totle rather countenance the later date (Poetic, c. 3). 3 See respecting these licentious pro- cessions, in connexion with the Iambus 32 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. bled in many respects the satyrlc drama of the tragedians, but was distinguished from it by dealing not merely with the ancient mythical stories and persons, but chiefly with contemporary men and subjects of common life — dealing with them often, too, under their real names, and with ridicule tlie most direct, poignant, and scornful. We see clearly how fair a field Athens would offer for this species of composition, at a time when the bitterness of poli- tical contention ran high — when the city had become a centre for novelties from every part of Greece — when tragedians, rhetors, and philosophers, were acquiring celebrity and incurring odium — and when the democratical constitution laid open all the details of political and judicial business, as well as all the first men of the state, not merely to universal criticism, but also to unmeasured libel. Out of all the once abundant compositions of Attic comedy, Comic poets nothiug has reached us except eleven plays of Aristo- phmL'^'i&lI^ phanes. That poet himself singles out Magnes, Krates, tinus, etc. ^j^^^ Kratinus, among predecessors whom he describes as numerous, for honourable mention ; as having been frequently, though not uniformly, successful. Kratinus appears to have been and Archilochus, vol. iii. of this His- tory, ch. xxix. p. 68. Aristotle (Poetic, c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (oi i^apxafTes) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time: see Herod. V. 83, and Semus apud Atheua?uin, xiv. p. 022; also the striking descrii^tion of the rural Dionysia in the Acharneis of Aristophanes, 235, 2'jb, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus — iv ToTs Awvvaiois ecpn/j.^voi' avrh Spdv Kol rh (TKiiofj.ua fiipos ri iSoKeL rris eoprrjs- Kol 6 debs Iffws xc"'pf'' (pi-^oyeAws Tis iiv (Lucian, Piscator. c. 25). Compare Aristophanes, Rause, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the iraTpiots Te\iTa7s Alopiktov. The Greek word for comedy — KcapiwSia, tJ) KcaixMSfTu — at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, cri- minative ridicule: Koo/j-cpSeiv koI KaKws Kiyeiv (Xenophou, Repub, Ath. ii. 23) • — KaK-qyopovvrds re Kol KQi/j.wSodvTas a.\- XtJAous Kol al(TXpo\oyovvras (Plato de Repub. iii. 8. p. 332). A i-emarkable definition of Kco/xqiSia appears in Bekker's Anecdota Graeca, ii. 747, 10 — Koo/j-wSia iariv 7) iv /xifftf \aov Karrjyopla, ijyovv Srjiaotn'eucris — "public exposure to scorn before the assembled people :" and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil- doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanes. The definition which Aristotle (Poetic, c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primative comedy : for he tells us himself that Krates, imme- diately preceding Aristophanes, was the first author who departed from the lafifiiKi^ ISe'a : this "iambic vein" was originally the common character. Ifc doubtless included every variety of ridi- cule, from innocent mirth to scornful contemj)t and odium; but the predomi- nant character tended decidedly to the latter. Compare Will. Schneider, Attisches Theater- Wesen, Notes, p. 22-25 ; Bern- hardy, Griechische Litteratur, sect. 67, p. 292. Flogel (in his History of Comic Lite- rature), speaking of the unsparing wit of Rabelais, gives a notice and specimens of the general coarseness of style which marked all the productions of that au- thor's time — mysteries, masks, sermons, &c., " the habit of calling all things by their simplest and most direct names," &c. Chap.LXVII. libels OF THE COMEDY. 33 not only the most copious, but also the most distinguished, among all those . who preceded Aristophanes ; a list comprising Iler- mippus, Telekleides, and the other bitter assailants of Perikles. It was Kratinus who first extended and systematised the licence of the phallic festival, and the " careless laughter of the festive crowd," ^ into a drama of regular structure, with actors three in number, according to the analogy of tragedy. Standing forward, against particular persons exhibited or denounced by their names, with a malignity of personal slander not inferior to the lambist Archilochus, and with an abrupt and dithyrambic style somewhat resembling yEschylus— Kratinus made an epoch in comedy as the latter had made in tragedy ; but was surpassed by Aristophanes, as much as ^Eschylus had been surpassed by Sophokles. We are told that his compositions were not only more rudely bitter and extensively libellous than those of Aristophanes,^ but also destitute of that richness of illustration and felicity of expression which pervades all the wit of the latter, whether good-natured or malig- nant. In Kratinus, too, comedy first made herself felt as a sub- stantive agent and partisan in the political warfare of Athens. He espoused the cause of Kimon against Perikles ;^ eulogising the former, while he bitterly derided and vituperated the latter. Hermippus, Telekleides, and most of the contemporary comic writers followed the same political line in assailing that great man, together with those personally connected with him, Aspasia and Anaxagoras : indeed Hermippus was the person who indicted Aspasia for impiety before the Dikastery. But the testimony of Aristophanes'* shows that no comic writer, of the time of Perikles, equalled Kratinus either in vehemence of libel or in popularity. It is remarkable that in 440 B.C., a law was passed forbidding comic authors to ridicule any citizen by name in their compo- sitions ; which prohibition, however, was rescinded after two years ; an interval marked by the rare phsenomenon of a lenient Xaip', S) (neY axpeioyeAuis iifiiAe TOi'S en-i'/SSais, T^s ig;n€Te'pa5 (roa.u7]s, \ * Aristophau. Equit. 525 seq, VOL. VI. 1> eiriTpfx^"^ "^W X'^P^" TOiS (rKa>fj.fj.a(n Troifi (KporTj'os), dAA.' a.Tr\a>s, Kol, Kara r^y Trapot/xlay, y v /xi/rj rp K f <{> aA-p r l- 6 ri a I T a s ^\affipT]fxias Kara rSiv a.fiapTav6vT(>)V. 3 See Kratinus — 'ApxiAoxot — Frag. 1, and Phitarch, Kimon, 10. 'H KcoficfiSia TToAneverai ivro'is Spd/xaai Ka\ (piKoaocpe?, r] tSjv TctpX rhv KpaTlvov Ka\ ^ hpi(noinlce spectnvisse qiwd es- set veruin, ne veteres quidem latuit. . . . Aristophanes autem idem et secutus sem- per est et srepe professus." (Bergk, de Reliquiis Comoed. Antiq. pp. 1, lU, 20, 2oo, &c.) The criticism of Ranke (Commentatio de Vita Aristophanis, p. CCXLI, cccxiv, CCCXLII, CCCLXIX, CCCLXXITI, CDXXXIV, &c.) adojjts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanes. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the old comedy (Historia Co- mic. Grsee. p. 39, 50, 165, &c.), and similar praises by Westermann — Ge- scbichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechen- land und Rom. sect. 36. In one of the arguments prefixed to the ' Pax ' of Aristophanes, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us absurdly enough, they were for that reason called S i 5 o (t /c a- A I — ovSiv yap ffvjx^ov\o>v Sie' eica- O-TOS, TlavTOfT IXavvoix^voi, To 5e ouAoi' €Treu;^eTat evpiiv AuTojs' out' cjriSepKTa jah' a.v5pa s e w e ^ i o i. ■« Plato, Phffidrus, c. 44. p. 261 D. See the citations in Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. liom. Philosophie, part i. p. 417 seq. ^ Parmenid. Fragm. v. 101, ed. Mul- lach. Chap. LXYIT. ZENO. 47 in a vein similar to that of Zeno, though with much less acuteness ; demonstrating- indirectly the doctrine of Parmenides by deducing impossible inferences from the contrary hypothesis.^ Zeno published a treatise to maintain the thesis above described, which he also upheld by personal conversations and dis- zonoat 1 T , P m • 1 Athens— his cussions, m a manner doubtless lar more emcacious than conversation his writing; the oral teaching of these early philoso- Perii:ies ])hers being their really impressive manifestation. His S'jkrates. subtle dialectic arguments were not only sufficient to occupy all the philosophers of antiquity, in confuting them more or less suc- cessfully, but have even descended to modern times as a fire not yet extinguished.^ The great effect produced among the specu- lative minds of Greece by his writing and conversation, is attested both by Plato and Aristotle. He visited Athens, gave instruction to some eminent Athenians, for high pay — and is said to have conversed both with Perikles and with Sokrates, at a time when the latter was very young ; probably between 450-440 b.c.^ His appearance constitutes a remarkable sera in Grecian philo- sophy, because he first bronght out the extraordinary aggressive or negative force of the dialectic method. In this discussion * See the Fragments of Melissits col- lected by Mullach, in his publication cited in a previous note, p. 81 scq. * The reader will see this in Bayle's Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea. Simjjlicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic, p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues — which cannot be believed without more cer- tain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Rom. Philos. i. p. 4(i9. — Zeno IStov fxev ovSev i^46€TO (sc. TrepJ rwv irav- Toov), StriTr6pri(Te Se irtpl rovrwv in\ ir\e7ov. Plutarch, ap. Eusebium, Prae- par. Evangel, i. 23 D. 3 Compare Plutarch, Perikles, c. 3 ; Plato, Parmenides, p. 126, 127; Plato, Alkibiad. i. ch. 14. p. 1 19 A. That Sokrates had in his youth con- versed with Parmenides, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called Parmenides, which professes to give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with ^Ir. Fynes Clinton, Brandis, and Karsten — in thinking that this is better evidence about the date of Parmenides than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenides and Sokrates (as Mr. Clin- ton places it — Fast. H. vol. ii. App. c. 21. p. 364) at a time when Sokrates was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety would not i)ermit him to take part in conversation with an emi- nent philosopher, at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be en- tered on the roll of citizens, or be quali- fied for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that So- krates must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenides. Sokrates was born in 469 B.C. (per- haps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449; assuming the visit of Parmenides to Athens to have been in 448 k.c, since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 n.c. It is objected th.-it, if this date be admitted, Parmenides could not have beeu a pupil of Xenq- phanes: we should thus be compelled to admit (which perhaps is the truth) that he learnt the doctrine of Xeno- I phanes at second-hand. 48 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. respecting the One and the Many, positive grounds on either side were alike scanty : each party had to set forth the con- Early mani- . . i i m i f i • i i • J fe: tation, and tradictions deduciDle from the opposite hygptliesis, ana cacy, ofthe Zcno professcd to show that those of his opponents were in Grecian the morc flagrant. We thus see that along with the p 1 osop y. jjjgj.}jQ(j;gg(j question and answer, or dialectic method, em- ployed from henceforward more and more in philosophical inquiries — comes out at the same time the negative tendency, the probing, testing, and scrutinising force— of Grecian speculation. The nega- tive side of Grecian speculation stands quite as prominently marked, and occupies as large a measure of the intellectual force of their philosophers, as the positive side. It is not simply to arrive at a conclusion, sustained by a certain measure of plausible premise — ■ and then to proclaim it as an authoritative dogma, silencing or disparaging all objectors — that Grecian speculation aspires. To unmask not only positive falsehood, but even affirmation without evidence, exaggerated confidence in what was only doubtful, and show of knowledge without the reality — to look at a problem on all sides, and set forth all the difficulties attending its solution — to take account of deductions from the affirmative evidence, even in the case of conclusions accepted as true upon the balance — all this will be found pervading the march of their greatest thinkers. As a condition of all progressive philosophy, it is not less essential that the grounds of negation should be freely exposed, than the grounds of affirmation. We shall find the two going hand in hand, and the negative vein indeed the more impressive and cha- racteristic of the two, from Zeno downwards in our history. In one of the earliest memoranda illustrative of Grecian dialectics — - the sentences wherein Plato represents Parmenides and Zeno as bequeathing their mantle to the youthful Sokrates, and giving him precepts for successfully prosecuting those researches which his marked inquisitive impulse promised — this large and compre- hensive point of view is emphatically inculcated. He is admo- nished to set before him both sides of every hypothesis, and to follow out both the negative and the affirmative chains of argu- ment with equal perseverance and equal freedom of scrutiny ; neither daunted by the adverse opinions around him, nor deterred by sneers against wasting time in fruitless talk ; since the multi- tude are ignorant that without thus travelling round all sides of a question, no assured comprehension of the truth is attainable.' 1 Plato, Parmenid. p. 135, 136. | Parmenides speaks to Soki-ates — KoA^ Chap.LXVII. negative PHILOSOPHY. 49 We thus find ourselves, from the year 450 b.c. downwards, in presence of two important classes of men in Greece, unknown to Solon or even to Kleisthenes — the Rhetoricians, and the Dialecti- tians ; for whom (as has been shown) the ground had been gra- dually prepared by the politics, the poetry, and the speculation, of the preceding period. Both these two novelties — like the poetry and other accomplish- ments of this memorable race — grew up from rude indi- ... . . ^ , Rhetoric and genous beginnmgs, under native stimulus unborrowed dialectics— - . „ . , ^P,, , . men of active and unassisted irom without. 1 tie rhetorical teaching ufe and men was an attempt to assist and improve men in the power lion— two of continuous speech as addressed to assembled numbers, onuteiiectul! such as the public assembly or the dikastery ; it was °*^ '^' ^' therefore a species of training sought for by men of active pursuits and ambition, either that they might succeed in public life, or that they might maintain their rights and dignity if called before the court of justice. On the other hand, the dialectic business had no direct reference to public life, to the judicial pleading, or to any assembled large number. It was a dialogue carried on by two disputants, usually before a few hearers, to unravel some obscurity, to reduce the respondent to silence and contradiction, to exercise both parties in mastery of the subject, or to sift the con- sequences of some problematical assumption. It was spontaneous conversation^ systematized and turned into some predetermined channel ; furnishing a stimulus to thought, and a means of im- provement not attainable in any other manner — furnishing to some also a source of profit or display. It opened a line of serious intellectual pursuit to men of a speculative or inquisitive turn, who were deficient in voice, in boldness, in continuous memory, for /xlv ouv Koi de'ia, €v 'icrQi, t] Spfi-^, ^v oppLas Sti &vev ravTTjs ttjs Sia. irdvToov 5ie|J5ou iirl robs \6yovs' 'i\Kvffov 5jj cravrhv koi koI TrAarrjs, a^vvaTov ivTV)(^6vra r^ dA.7j- yvfivaaai ^aKKov 5ia rrjs So/covtrr/s o.xpv- Ge7 vovv axi^f. See also Plato's Kra- (TTov fivai Kal Ka\ovfj.4vr]s vTrb tuiv ttoA- tylus, p. 428 E, about the necessity of Xoiv aSoXeffx'^C'S, fees eTi i/eos €p el Se /xri, tile investigator looking both before and ae Statpev^frai rj aKr^deia. Tis oiiv 6 Tp6- \ behind — afi.a TrpSffcro) Kal oiricrcrQ}. TTos, (pavai {rhv 'S.ooKpd.TT)), S> nap/xiviSf], See also the Parmenides, p. 130 E. — TTJs yv/jLvacrias ; OStos, eiTrerj/ (rhv Hap- i in which Sokrates is warned respecting fjLeviSr]v} Hvirep fJKOvcras Zrivcovos. . . . Xpi} Se Kal ToSe %ri irphs rovTCf) aKoireiv, /u. ^ fl6 V V, ft i (TT IV € K a cr T O V, V IT or l- 6 e jJ. e V O V, (T KOTT ilv TO. ^ V fJ. ^ a l- V ovT a i K T fi s vir 00 4 ff ew s — d A A d Kal, el fX7] ecrri rh avrh tovto, {nroTiOeada i — el fiovXei fxaWov yvfj.- yaadTjvai. . . . 'Ayvoovffi yap ol ttoAAoI | and distinguished VOL. VI. E the avdpdnruv SS^as— against enslaving himself to the opinions of men : com- pare Plato, Sophistes, p. 227 B, C. ' See Aristotel. De Sojiihist. Elenchis, c. 11. p. 172, ed. Bekker; and his To- pica, ix. 5. p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogue ai-e enumerated 50 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. standing antithesis between these two intellectnal classes — vein of ignorance at Athens, hostile to both. stand incr public speaking ; or who desired to keep themselves apart from the political and judicial animosities of the moment. Although there Mere numerous Athenians, who combined, in various proportions, speculative with practical study, yet, generally speaking, the two veins of intellectual move- ment — one towards active public business, the other towards enlarged opinions and greater command of spe- culative truth, with its evidences — continued simulta- neous and separate. There subsisted between them a polemical controversy and a spirit of mutual detraction. If Plato despised the sophists and the rhetors, Isokrates thinks himself not less entitled to disparage those who employed their time in debating upon the unity or plurality of virtue.^ Even among different teachers, in the same intellectual walk, also, there prevailed but too often an acrimonious feeling of personal rivalry, which laid them all so much the more open to assault from the common enemy of all mental progress — a feeling of jealous igno- rance, stationary or wistfully retrospective, of no mean force at Athens, as in every other society, and of course blended at Athens with the indigenous democratical sentiment. Tliis latter senti- ment^ of antipathy to new ideas, and new mental accomplishments, has been raised into factitious importance by the comic genius of Aristophanes, — whose point of view modern authors have too often accepted ; thus allowing some of the worst feelings of Grecian antiquity to influence their manner of conceiving the facts. More- over, they have rarely made any allowance for that force of literary and philosophical antipathy, which was no less real and constant at Athens than the political ; and which made the different literary classes or individuals perpetually unjust one towards another.^ It ^ See Isokrates, Orat. x. ; Helena; En- comium, 8. 2-7 ; compare Orat. xv. De Permutatione, of the same author, s. 90. 1 hold it for certain that the first of these passages is intended as a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in Or. V. ad Philip, s. 84), probably the second passage also. Isokrates, evidently a cautious and timid man, avoids men- tioning the names of contemporaries, that he may provoke the less animosty. 2 Isoki'ates alludes much to this sen- timent, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favour than upon philosophy, in the Orat. XV. De Permutatione, s. 267 et scq. A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental culti- vation by the Aikuios A6yos in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 9-t7 seq. — fa- vourite topics in the mouths of the pugilists "with smashed ears" (Plato, Gorgias, c. 71. p. 515 E, twv to. Sira KaTeaySrccv). ^ There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokrates: see Stahr's Ai'ktotelia, ch. iii. vol. i. p. 37, 68. Ai'istotle was extremely jealous of the success of Isokrates, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter, Kephisodorus and others — as well as by Diktearchus, Eubulides, and a numerous Chap. LXVII. EDUCATION AT ATHENS, 51 was the blessing and the glory of Athens, that every man could speak out his sentiments and his criticisms with a freedom unpa- ralleled in the ancient world, and hardly paralleled even in the modern, in which a vast body of dissent both Is, and always has been, condemned to absolute silence. But this known latitude of censure ought to have imposed on modern authors a peremptory necessity of not accepting implicitly the censure of any one, where the party inculpated has left no defence ; at the very least, of con- struing the censure strictly, and allowing for the point of view from which it proceeds. From inattention to this necessity, almost all the things and persons of Grecian history are presented to us on their bad side : the libels of Aristophanes, the sneers of Plato and Xenophon, even the interested generalities of a plaintiff or defendant before the Dikastery — are received with little cross- examination as authentic materials for history. If ever there was need to invoke this rare sentiment of candour, it Is when we come to discuss the history of the persons called Sophists, who now for the first time appear as of note ; the prac- tical teachers of Athens and of Greece, misconceived as well as misesteemed. The primitive education at Athens consisted of two branches ; gymnastics, for the body — music, for the mind. The Gradual en- word music is not to be judged according to the limited oTtbrfieia signification which it now bears. It comprehended from atAihfns— the beginning everything appertaining to the province knowledge of the Nine Muses — not merely learning the use of the offhemuskai • lyre, or how to bear part in a chorus, but also the teachers. hearing, learning, and repeating of poetical compositions, as well as the practice of exact and elegant pronunciation — which latter accomplishment, in a language like the Greek, with long words, measured syllables, and great diversity of accentuation between one word and another, must have been far more difficult to acquire (than it is in any modern European language. As the range of ideas enlarged, so the words 7nusic and musical teachers acquired an expanded meaning, so as to comprehend matter of instruction at once ampler and more diversified. During the middle of the host of writers in the same tone — arpa- TOJ/ o\ov rwv iTnOffifvcuv 'ApicrroreKei : see the Fragments of Dikrcarchus, vol. ii. p, 225, ed. Didot. — " De ingeuio ejus (observes Cicero iu reference to Epi- curus, de Fiuibus, ii. 25, 80) in his dis- putationibus, non de moribus, quteritur. Sit ista in Grtecorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate disseutiuut." This is a taint noway peculiar to Grecian philosophical controversy: but it has nowhei-e been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern historians cannot be too much on their gutu'd against it. E 2 52 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. fifth century B.C. cat Athens, there came thus to be found, among the musical teachers, men of the most distinguished abilities and eminence ; masters of all the learning and accomplishments of the age, teaching what was known of astronomy, geography, and physics, and capable of holding dialectical discussions with their pupils, upon all the various problems then afloat among intellectual men. Of this character were Lamprus, Agathokles, Pythokleides, Damon, &c. The two latter were instructors of Perikles ; and Damon was even rendered so unpopular at Athens, partly by his large and free speculations, partly 'through the political enemies of his great pupil, that he was ostracised, or at least sentenced to banishment.^ Such men were competent companions for Anaxa- goras and Zeno, and employed in part on the same studies ; the field of acquired knowledge being not then large enough to be divided into separate, exclusive compartments. While Euripides frequented the company, and acquainted himself with the opinions of Anaxagoras — Ion of Chios (his rival as a tragic poet, as well as the friend of Kimon) bestowed so much thought upon physical subjects as then conceived, that he set up a theory of his own, propounding the doctrine of three elements in nature^— air, fire, and earth. Now such musical teachers as Damon and the others above- mentioned, were Sophists, not merely in the natural and The Sophists ^ , PI 11 —true Greek propcr (jrreek scusc 01 that word, but, to a certam extent, meaning of.^ .^ , . . i-i -r-»i that word even m the special and restricted meaning which rlato sentinipnt aftcrwards thought proper to confer upon it.^l A Sophist, Implied init. . ^1 • r i i • - in the genuine sense or the word, was a wise man — a clever man — one who stood prominently before the public as dis- ' See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8. p. 31G D; Laches, c. 3. p. 180 D; Menexeuus, c. 3. p. 236 A ; Alkibiad. i. c. 14. p. 118 C); Plutarch, Perikles, c. 4. Perikles had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 46). 2 Isokrates, Or. xv. De Permutat. e. 287. Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Rom. Philosophic, part i. s. 48. p. 196. 3 Isokrates calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, Sophists (Or. xv. De Perm. s. 251), Plutarch, Perikles c. 4. 'O 5e Aa- ^(iiv eotKiv, &Kpos Sjv ao(pi(rr))s, Kara- Sveadai fxsv els rh Trjs /xovciKris Svofia, iTriKpvn-rSfJLfvos Trphs rovs ttoWovs t)]V hiiv6r7)TU. So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8. p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been Sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also (what Plu- tarch says in the citation just above) that these earlier men refused, inten- tionally and deliberately, to call them- selves Sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name ; and that he (Pro- tagoras) was the first person to call himself oi^enly a Sophist. The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, fiiendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of Sophists spe- cially to these teachers, than any as- sumption of their own. Chap. LXVII. THE SOPHISTS. 53 • • • • "1 tinguished for intellect or talent of some kind, j Thus Solon and Pythagoras are both called Sophists ; Thamyras the skilful bard is called a Sophist :^ 'Sokrates is so denominated, not merely by ('Aristophanes, but by ^schinest^ Aristotle himself calls Aristippus, and Xenophon calls Antisthenes, both of them disciples of Sokrates, I by that name :^ Xenophon,^ in describing a collection of instructive books, calls them " the writings of the old poets and Sophists," meaning by the latter word prose writers generally : Plato is alluded to as a Sophist, even by Isokrates : * ^schines (the dis- ciple of Sokrates, not the orator) was so denominated by his con- temporary Lysias : *' Isokrates himself was harshly criticised as a Sophist, and defends both himself and his profession : lastly, Timon (the friend and admirer of Pyrrho, about 300-280 B.C.), who bit- terly satirised all the philosophers, designated them all, including Plato and Aristotle, by the general name of Sophists.^ In this large and comprehensive sense the word was originally used, and always continued to be so understood among the general public. ■But along with this idea, the title Sophist also carried with it or connoted a certain invidious feeling. The natural temper of a people generally ignorant towards superior intellect"— the same temper which led to those charges of magic so frequent in the 1 Herodot. i. 29 ; ii. 49 ; iv. 95. Dio- genes of Apollonia, contemporary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philoso^ phers or physiologists by the name So- phists : see Brandis, Geschich. der Griech. Rom. Philosoph. c. lvii. note 0. About Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragod. Sophokles, p. 421 — , EIt' ovv o"o(^i(TTi)s KaAa TrapaTratwi' x^Kw, &c. The comic poet Kratiuus called all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, (rocpiaral : see the Fi-agments of his drama 'Apx'^oX"' in Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Grtecor. vol. ii. p. 16. 2 .^schines cout. Timai-ch. c. 34. .(Eschines calls Demosthenes also a So- phist, c. 27. We see plainly from the terms in Plato's Politicus, c. 38. p, 299 B.— ;U€- r€Ci>p6\oyov, aZoXecrx^v riva ffacptcrr^v — that both Sokrates and Plato himself were designated as Sophists by the Athenian public. 3 Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii. 2. p. 99G; Xenoph. Sympos.. iv. 1. Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokrates who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laert. ii. 05), ■* Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 1. ■yfia.ixtxa.ja TToWa, (TuvsiK^yfiivov wair]Twv re Kal ffo- (piffTuv Tuiv fiiSoKifj-ooTdraiv. . . . The word (Tou TToAat a o (p So V avd p Si v, ovs eK^Tuoi icaTiKi-Kvv iv ^i^XioLS ypdipavTes, &c. (Memor. i. 6, 14). It is used in a dif- ferent sense in another passage (i. 1, 11) to signify teachers who gave instruc- tion on physical and astronomical sub- jects, which Sokrates and Xenophon both disapproved, ^ Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 14: see Heindorf 's note on the Euthydemus of Plato, p. 305 C. s. 79. Isokrates is spoken of as a Sophist by Plutarch, Qufcst. Sympos. i. 1. 1. p. 013, 6 Athenrous, xii. p. 612 F. ; Lysias, Fragm. 2. Bekk. <■ Diogen. Laert. ix. 65. "Eo-Trere vvv jxoi, Sffoi TvoXvirpdyfioves iffre crofpiffxai (Diogen. Laert. viii. 74). Demetrius of Trcezen numbered Em- pedoklcs as a Sopliist. Isokrates speaks of Empedokles,, lou, AlkmKon, Parme- nides, Melissus, Gorgias, all as ol Tra\ato\ ffofpiarai — all as having taught ditferent ■Kipmokoyias abotit the elements of tlio physical world (Isok. do Permut. s. 288). 54 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. Middle Ages — appears to be an union of admiration with something- of an unfavourable sentiment^ — dislike, or apprehension, as the case may be ; unless where the latter element has become neutral- ised by habitual respect for an established profession or station. At any rate, the unfriendly sentiment is so often intended, that a substantive word in which it is implied without the necessity of any annexed predicate, is soon found convenient. Timon, who hated the philosophers, thus found the word Sophist exactly suit- able, in sentiment as well as meaning, to his purpose in addressing them. Now when (in the period succeeding 450 b.c.) the rhetorical and musical teachers came to stand before the public at The name ... Sophist ap- Athens in such increased eminence, they of course, as plied by Plato . 'J ' in a peculiar well as other men intellectually celebrated, became *»Gns6? in his iioieniics desig-natcd by the appropriate name of Sophists. But uf ainst the . . . eminent paid there was ouc characteristic peculiar to themselves whereby they drew upon themselves a double measure of that invidious sentiment which lay wrapped up in the name. They taught for pay : of course therefore the most eminent among them taught only the rich, and earned large sums : a fact naturally provocative of envy, to some extent, among the many who bene- fited nothing by them, but still more among the inferior members of their own profession. Even great minds, like Sokrates and Plato, though much superior to any such envy, cherished in that age a genuine and vehement repugnance against receiving pay for teaching. We read in Xenophon,^jthat Sokrates considered such 1 Eurip. Med. 289— Xpr) B' ovTToB' otTTis apTL^puiV ni^vK' a.vr]p, riatSa? 7reptcr(7u)5 eK5t5a(7"K€O"0at coi^ov?. Xwpts 7a.p oAAtj?, ri% ^x^ovatv, apyCa.^, The words 6 TTepicrcrws cro(phs seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word aofpicrryis. 1 Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 6. In another passage, the Sophist Antiphon (whether this is the celebrated Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus, is imcertain ; the com- mentators lean to the negative) is de- scribed as conversing with Sokrates, and saying that Sokrates of course must imagine his own conversation to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars. To which Sokrates replies — "^fl 'Ai/ri(pu>i/, Trap' TJixiV vofxi^iTaL, ri]y icpav Koi Tr]v (To fxev ris apyvpiov ironXfj rw Pov\ofj.4vo), irSpvov avrhv anoKaXovaiv iav Se ris, i)v &«/ yvcJi Ka\6v re Kayadhv epaarTjv uvra, tovtov (p'lKov kavrcf iroir)- rai, (Tiixppova vofxl^ofxey. Kal ttjv ff o-

TT a}\o V VT as, (T o (p I ff r a s 0} ff IT e p ir 6 pv o v s air o- KaKovffiv ZffTis 5«, %v av yvcf eixpva ovra, SidaffKcvv '6,ri hv %XV ^yo.&^fj (pi\oy TToielTai, TOVTOV vofxl^ofJLev, h t^ koKw Kayad^ ttoA/tj; irpoffTjKfi, ravTa iroiuv (Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 13). As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this passage is ex- tremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of .^schines against Timar- chus, and the Symposiou of Plato (p. 217, 218), both receive and give light to it. Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his dislike and contempt of teaching for money, see his Chap. LXVII. TEACHERS FOR PAY. 55 • a bargain as nothing less than servitude, robbing the teacher of all free choice as to persons or proceeding ; and that he assimilated tlie relation between teacher and pupil to that between two lovers or two intimate friends, which was thoroughly dishonoured, robbed of its charm and reciprocity, and prevented from bringing about its legitimate reward of attachment and devotion, by the intervention of money payment. \ However little in harmony with modem ideas,^ such was the conscientious sentiment of Sokrates and I Plato ; who therefore considered the name Sophist, denoting intel- I lectual celebrity combined with an odious association, as pre- 1 eminently suitable to the leading teachers for pay. The splendid genius, the lasting influence, and the reiterated polemics, of Plato, have stamped it upon the men against whom he wrote as if it were their recognised, legitimate, and peculiar designation : though it is certain, that if, Hn the middle of the Peloponnesiari war, any A Athenian had been asked, — " Who are the principal Sophists in I your city ? " — he would have named Sokrates among the first ^ for ' tSokrates was at once eminent as an intellectual teacher, and personally unpopular — not because he received pay, but on other grounds which will be hereafter noticed : and this was the precise combination of qualities which the general public naturally ex- pressed by a Sophist. I Moreover, Plato not only stole the name I out of general circulation in order to fasten it specially upon '"his J opponents the paid teachers, but also connected with it express 1 discreditable attributes, which formed no part of its primitive and I recognized meaning, and were altogether distinct from, though grafted upon, the vague sentiment of dislike associated with it. I Aristotle, following the example of his master, gave to the word Sopliistes, c. 9. p. 223. Plato indeed thought that it was unworthy of a vir- tuous man to accept salary for tlie dis- charge of any public duty: see the Re- public, i. 19. p. 347. The comic writer Ephippus, however, (see Athenaeus xi. .^09 ; Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. iii. p. 332) taunts the disciples of Plato and pupils of the Academy as receivers of pay for teaching ; making evidently no distinc- tion between them and Thrasymachus on this point. Athenaeus construes the taunt a.s including Plato himself ; which goes beyond the strict meaning of the words. ' Ovid, dwelling upon the same gene- ral analogy of the relations between lovers (Amores, i. 10, 38), insists on the baseness of accepting money as a reward for pleading iu behalf of persons accused before justice. " Turpe reos empta miseros defendere lingua." — That it was dishonourable to receive pay for judicial pleading, was the general idea and dominant sentiment of the Romans, in the time of the Republic, and in the early period of the Empire. The Lex Cincia (passed about 200 B.C.) prohibited such receipt altogether. In practice, as we might expect, the prohibition came to be more and more evaded, though it seems to have been at times formally renewed. But the sentiment, in honour- able Romans, continued unaltered cer- tainly down to the days of Tacitus. See Tacit. Ann. xi. 5-7; Livy, xxxiv. 4. A limited maximum of fee was first permitted imder Claudius. See Walter, Rijm. Recht. s. 751. 56 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Sophist a definition substantially the same as that which it bears in the modern languages^—" an impostrous pretender to knowledge, a man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money."' And he did this at a time when he himself, with his estimable contemporary Isokrates, were con- sidered at Athens to come under the designation of Sophists, and were called so by every one who disliked either their profession or their persons.^ Great thinkers and writers, like Plato and Aristotle, have full ^lisconcpp- right to define and employ words in a sense of their own, from Plato! providcd they give due notice. But it is essential that orthe wo"rf ^^^ reader should keep in mind the consequences of such .suphist. change, and not mistake a word used in a new sense for a new fact or phaenomenon. The age with which we are now dealing (the last half of the fifth century B.C.) is commonly distinguished in the history of philosophy as the age of Sokrates and the Sophists. The Sophists are spoken of as a new class of men, or sometimes in language -which implies a new doctrinal sect or school, as if they then sprang up in Greece for the first time — ostentatious impostors, flattering and duping the rich youth for their own personal gain, undermining the morality of Athens public and private, and encouraging their pupils to the un- scrupulous prosecution of ambition and cupidity. They are even affirmed to have succeeded in corrupting the general morality, so that Athens had become miserably degenerated and vicious in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, as compared with what she w^as in the time of Miltiades and Aristeides. Sokrates, on the contrary, is usually described as a holy man combating and exposing these false prophets — standing up as the champion of morality against their insidious artifices.^ Now though the I 1 Aristot. Rhetoric, i. 1, 4 — where he /explains the Sophist to be a person who [has the same powers as the Dialectician, [but abuses them for a bad purpose — Tt yap (roaivofj,evr]s (Tocplas, aW' ovk ovcttjs, &c. - Respecting Isoki-ates, see his Orat. inrdpxovra, Kal rh iroXvTifi-qrov lar- pf7ov aprlcos a.-rroK€K\eLK6Ta, wphs Se tou- Tois, eh Ttaaav av\r]v Kal aKT)vr]v iix-Ki-K-q- XV. De Permutatioue, wherein it is evi- I Sij/cdra- irphs 5e, yaaTpiij.apyov, 6>papTv- deut that he was not only ranked as a Trjv, inl (TTSfxa (pepofievov ev izucri. Sophist by others, but also considered ^ Jq the general point of view here himself as such, though the appellation } described, the Sophists are presented Chap. LXVII. TLATO AND THE SOPHISTS. 57 appearance of a man so very original as Sokrates was a new fact, I of unspeakable importance — jthe appearance of the Sophists was > no new fact : what was new was the peculiar use of an old word ; I which Plato took out of its usual meaning, and fastened upon the I eminent paid teachers of the Sokratic age. | The paid teachers, with whom, under the name of The Sophists, he brings Sokrates into controversy, were Protagoras of paid teachers Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, the^okratlc"*^ Plippias of Elis, Prodikus of Keos, Thrasymachus of IfrZ^ol^' Chalkedon, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus of Olios : to ^'^^' ^^- whom Xenophon adds Antiphon of Athens. These men — whom modern writers set down as The Sophists, and denounce as the moral pestilence of their age — were not distinguished in any marked or generic way from their predecessors. Their vocation was to train up youth for the duties, the pursuits, and the successes, of active life, both private and public. Others had done this before ; but these teachers brought to the task a larger range of knowledge, with a greater multiplicity of scientific and other topics — not only more impressive powers of composition and speech, serving as a personal example to the pupil, but also a comprehension of the elements of good speaking, so as to be able to give him precepts conducive to that accomplisment ' — a con- siderable treasure of accumulated thought on moral and political subjects, calculated to make their conversation very instructive — and discourse ready prepared, on general heads or common places, Ifor their pupils to learn by heart.- But this, though a very important extension, was nothing more than an extension, differing merely in degree — of that which Damon and others had done before them. It arose from the increased demand which had grown up among the Athenian youth, for a larger measure of education and other accomplishments ; from an elevation in the standard of what was required from every man who aspired to occupy a place in the eyes of his fellow-citizens. Protagoras, Gorgias, and the rest, supplied this demand with an ability and success unknown before their time : hence they gained a distinction such as none of their predecessors had attained, were prized all over Greece, travelled from city to city with general admiration, by Bitter, Gescbiclite cler Griech. Philo- sophie, vol. i. book vi. cbap. 1-3. p. 577 seq., 629 seq. ; by BraruUs, Gescb. cler Or. Rom. Philos. sect. Ixxxiv.-l-xxxvii. vol. i. p. 516 seq. ; by Zcllcr, Gescbiclite der Pbilosoph. ii. pp. 65, 69, 165, &c. ; and indeed by almost all wbo treat of tbe Sopbists. ' Compare Isokrates, Orat. xiii. cent.- Sopbistas, s. 19-21. - Ai'istot. Sopbist. Elench. c, 33 ; Ci- cero, Brut. c. 12. 58 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. and obtained considerable pay. \Miile such success, among men personally strangers to tbem, attests unequivocally their talent and ])ersonal dignity ; of course it also laid them open to increased jealousy, as well from inferior teachers, as from the lovers of ignorance generally ; such jealousy manifesting itself (as I have before explained) by a greater readiness to stamp them with the obnoxious title of Sophists. The hostility of Plato against these teachers (for it is he, and Plato and the Hot Sokrates, who was peculiarly hostile to them, as may two'diffeTent he sccu by the absence of any such marked antithesis in vilw-the the Memorabilia of Xenophon) may be explained without andTheorist ^^ all supposing in them that corruption which modern pfacu^f''' writers have been so ready not only to admit but to teacher. magnify. It arose from the radical difference between his point of view and theirs. He was a great reformer and theorist : they undertook to qualify young men for doing them- selves credit, and rendering service to others, in active Athenian life. ■ Not only is there room for the concurrent operation of both these veins of thought and action, in every progressive society , but the intellectual outfit of the society can never be complete without the one as well as the other. It was the glory of Athens that both were there adequately represented, at the period which we have now reached. Whoever peruses Plato's immortal work — 'The Eepubhc' — will see that he dissented from society, both democratical and oligarchical, on some of the most fundamental points of public and private morality ; and throughout most of his dialogues his quarrel is not less with the statesmen, past as well as present, than with the paid teachers, of Athens. Besides this ardent desire for radical reform of the state, on principles of his own, distinct from every recognized political party or creed — Plato was also unrivalled as a speculative genius and as a dialectician ; both which capacities he put forth, to amplify and illustrate the ethical theory and method first struck out by Sokrates, as well as to establish comprehensive generalities of his own. Now his reforming, as well as his theorising tendencies, brought him into polemical controversy wdth all the leading agents by whom the business of practical life at Athens was carried on. In so far as Protagoras or Gorgias talked the language of theory, they were doubtless much inferior to Plato, nor would their doctrines be likely to hold against his acute dialectics. But it was neither their duty, nor their engagement, to reform the state, Chap. LXVII. PLATO AND THE SOPHISTS. 59 or discover and vindicate the best theory on ethics. They pro- fessed to qualify young Athenians for an active and honourable life, private as well as public, in Athens (or in any other given city): they taught them "to think, speak, and act," in Athens-, they of course accepted, as the basis of their teaching, that type of character which estimable men exhibited and which the public approved, in Athens — not undertaking to recast the type, but to arm it with new capacities and adorn it with fresh accomplishments. Their direct business was with ethical precept, not with ethical theory : all that was required of them as to the latter, was, that their theory should be sufficiently sound to lead to such practical ])recepts as were accounted virtuous by the most estimable society in Athens. It ought never to be forgotten, that those who taught for active life were bound by the very conditions of their pro- fession to adapt themselves to the place and the society as it stood. With the Theorist Plato, not only there was no such obligation, but the grandeur and instructiveness of his speculations were realised only by his departing from it, and placing himself on a loftier pinnacle of vision; while he himself not only admits, but even exaggerates, the unfitness and repugnance, of men taught in his school, for practical life and duties.^ ^ See a striking passage in Plato, The- pctet. c. 24:. p. 173, 174-. 2 Professor Maurice, in his History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy (vi. 2. 1, 6), remarks as follows: "We at once accept Mr. Grote's definition of the Sophist as the Platonical and the true one. He was the professor of wis- dom : he taught men how to think, speak, and act. We wish for no other and no worse account of him. If mo- dern authors have thrown any darker shades into their picture, we believe they have done him a benefit instead of an injury. Their climisy exaggeration hides the essential itglincss which Mr. Gi'ote's flattering sketch brings out in full relief." The essential vgliness here noticed, is described by Professor Maurice as con- sisting in the fact, that — "Each held out the acquisition of political power as a prize to be obtained. There was their common point of agi'eement: possibly there was no other. The young Athe- nians wanted to know how to think, act, and speak on all subjects, that thej mitjht (j'lidc the people according to their pleasure. For this purpose they sought the aid of a sophist or professor." (s. 9. p. 108.) " By the necessity of his calling, the So- phist who taught to think, to act, and to speak, would come to regard the last part of his profession as that which in- cluded both the others. He would be- come a rhetorician and a teacher of rhe- toric. If his object was to influence the mind of a mob, he was at least in con- siderable danger of leading his pupils to give the word sophistry that force with which we are most familiar " (p. 109). What Professor Maurice calls the "essential ugliness," resides (according to his own showing), not in the Sophists, but in the young Athenians whom the SojAists taught. These young men wanted political power. To gi-atify am- bition was their end and aim. But this was an end which the Sophists did not implant. They found it pre-existing, learnt from other quarters ; and they had to deal with it as a fact. Let us read what Xenophon says about Prox- enus and Gorgias. " Proxeuus the Boeotian, even in his early youth, de- sired to become a man competent to achieve great deeds ; and through this desire he gave money to Gorgias the Leontine. Having frequented his so- ciety, Proxenus conceived himself to ;/ 60 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. To understand the essential difference between the practical and the theoretical point of view, we need only look to Isokrates, the have thus become fit for command, for alliance with the fii'st men of his time, and for requiting to them all the good service which they might render to Lim " (TlpS^evos Se 6 Boiwrtos evOiis /u-fv fieipcLKiov Siv €7r€0Ujiiei yeveadai auT}p ra fj.€ya\a -KpaTriiv iKavos- Kol 5ia ravTTjv T'ljv iiri6v/j.iav eSoiK^v apyvpiou Topyia toS Ai0VTiv(fi. 'EtteI 5f ffweyfyero iKiivtf, iKavhi -^Stj vofxiaas elvai Koi &pxeLV, Kal (l>i\os ibv ToTs irpdrois, fj.rj rirraadai ivep- yerwv), &c. (Anabas. ii. 6, 16). So again in the Protagoras of Plato, So- krates introduces Ilippokrates to Pro- tagoras with these words — "This Hip- pukrates is a youth of one of our great and wealthy Athenian families, and is not inferior in talents to any of his con- temporaries. He desires to become re- nowned in the city {(WSytfios yevdadai iv TTJ iroAei) and he thinks he shall be most likely to attain this object through your society." (Plato, Protag. c. 19, p. 163 A.) Here we see that the end and aim was not one inspii-ed by the Sophist to his pupils, but set by the pupils to them- selves; just like the ends of Alkibiades and Kritias, when they sought the society of Sokrates. And it is the end which Professor Maurice conceives as the great vice and generating cause of evil. I For the means, however, though not for the end, the Sophist is fairly re- sponsible. What were the means which he communicated ? The power of per- .suasion, with its appropriate stock of knowledge, memorial aptitude, and com- mand of words, subject to the control of free public discussion or counter-per- suasion from others. To call this ac- ' quisition an evil, can only pass current under that untenable assumption which represents speech as a mere organiza- tion for deceit ; against which I need . not add anything to the protest of Aris- 'totle and Quintilian. That speech may be used for good or for evil, is indisputable : speech in all its forms, not less the colloquy of So- ki'ates than the oratory of Demosthenes ; speech not less in the mouth of a rude Spartan (who was as great a deceiver as any man in Greece) than in that of an accomjjlished Athenian ; nay, not merely sjjeech, but writing, which is only an- other mode of reaching the public feel- ing and conviction. (The ambitious man 'may and will misemploy all these wea- j)ons to his own purposes. There is but ^ one way to lessen the proportion of evil belonging to them. It is to ensui-e free scope to those who would persuade for better purposes ; to multiply the num- ber of competent speakers, with the op- portunities of discussion; and thus to create a public of competent hearers jaud judges. Nowhere was so near an approach made to this object as at Athens, nor were there any persons who contributed more directly towards it than the Sojahists./ For not only they increased the number of speakers ca- pable of enlisting the attention of the public, and thus of making discussion agreeable to the hearers ; but even as to the use of oratorical fallacies, their nu- merous pupils served as checks upon each other. If they taught one ambi- tious man to deceive, they also taught another how to expose his deceit, and a third how to approach the subject on a different side, so as to divei-t atten- tion, and prevent the exclusive predo- minance of any one fallacy. It will probably be argued by Pro- fessor Maurice that the personal con- tentions of ambitious political rivals are a miserable apparatus for the con- duct of society. Granting this to be " true, it is still a prodigious improve- ment (for which we are indebted alto- gether to Greece, and chiefly to Athens, with the Sophists as auxiliaries) to have brought these ambitious rivals to con- tend with the tongue only, and not with the sword. But if the remark be true at all, it is not less applicable to Eng- lish than to Athenian politics ; to every counti-y where any free scope is left for human energy. By what else has Eng- land been govei'ned for the last century and a half, except by these struggles of rival parties and ambitious politicians ? If Plato dispai'aged the debates in the Athenian assembly and dikastery, would he have felt any greater esteem for those in the Houses of Lords and Commons ? If he thought himself entitled to de- spise the whole class of Athenian states- men, Themistokles and Perikles among them, as " mere servants of the city {SlukSvovs TTJs iroA.ecos — Plato, Gorgias, c. 154. p. 152 A, 155 A), supplying Athens with docks, harbours, walls, and such like follies, but making no provi- sion for the moral improvement of the CiiAP. LXVIT. ISOKRATES A SOPHIST. 61 pupil of Gorg-ias, and himself a Sophist. Though not a man of commanding abilities, Isokrates was one of the most The sophists estimable men of Grecian antiquity. He taught for fes'^.fJa'i" money, and taught young men to "think, speak, and acuve'-fe"" act," all with a view to an honourable life of active I'^e isokratss ... . . . ^^'^ Q\im- citizenship ; not concealing his marked disparagement ' *'"*»• citizens" — would his judgement have been more favourable on Walpole and Pulteney — Pitt and Fox — Peel and Rus- sell — the ' Times ' and the ' Chronicle ' ? ^ When we try Athens by the ideal j standard of Sokrates and Plato, we I ought in fairness to apply the same \ criticism to other societies also, which Iwill be found just as little competent Ito stand the scrutiny. And those who, like Professor Maurice, assume that in- tellectual and persuasive power in the hands of an ambitious man is an instru- ment of evil — which is implied in the assertion that the Sophist, to whom he owes the improvement of such power, is a teacher of evil — will find that they are passing sentence \ipon the leading men in the English Houses of Loi'ds and Commons, not less than upon the pro- minent politicians of Athens. In both the "essential ugliness" is found — if that be the name which it deserves — of qualifjnng themselves to think, speak, and act, in order that they may gain or keep "political power as the prize," and may "guide the people according to their pleasure." It will probably be said that this is not absolutely true of all English poli- ticians, but only of some; that others among them, more or fewer, have de- voted their knowledge and eloquence to persiiading for public-minded pin-poses, and with beneficial results. Such re- serves, if made for England, ought to be made for Athens also ; which is quite enough as a reply to the censure pro- nounced by Professor Maurice against the Sophist. The Sophist imparted in- tellectual and persuasive force to the high-minded politicians, as well as to the ambitious. To those pupils who combined in different proportions the one and the other class of motives (as must have happened very frequently "i, his teaching tended to foster the better rather than the worse. The verj' topics iipon which he talked ensured such a tendency : the materials, out of which persuasion is to be manufactured, must be, for the most part, of a public-minded, Jofty, and beneficent bearing — though jan ambitious talker may choose to mis- employ them for his own pei-sonal power- peeking. As to the influence of ambitious mo- tives in politicians, when subject to the necessity of persuasion and to the control of free discussion — though I do not con- cur in the sweeping censure of Professor Maurice, I admit that it is partly evil as well as good, and that it rarely leads to great or material improvement, be- yond the actual state of society which the ambitious man finds. I But the So- h^ phist does not represent ambition. He represents intellectual and persuasive force, reflecting and methodized so a.s !\to operate upon the minds of free hearers, yet under perfect libei-ty of opposition: persuasion against the am- bitioiLS man, as well as by him or for him. 1 It is this which I am here up- holdmg against Professor Maurice, as not only no evil, but (in my judgement) Sone of the grand sources of good in Athens, and essential to human improve- ment everywhere else. There are only two modes of governing society, either by persuasion or by coercion. Discredit 'the arguments of the Sophist as much as you can by others of an opposite tendency : but when you discredit his weapon of intellectual and persuasive force, as if it were nothing better than cheat and imposture, manufactured and sold for the use of ambitious men — you leave open no other ascendency over men's minds, except the crushing en- gine of extraneous coercion with as- sumed infallibility. 1 Isokrates, Orat. v. (ad Philip.) s. 1-t; Orat. x. (Enc. Hel.) s. 2 ; Orat. xiii. adv. Sophist, s. 9 (compare Heiudorf's note ad Platon. Euthydem. s. 79); Orat. xii. (Panath.) s. 126; Orat. xv. (Perm.) s. 90. Isokrates, in the beginning of his Oi'at. X. Encom. Helena;, censures all the speculative teachers — first Anti- sthenes and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sutticiently by their doctrines), next Protagoras, Gor- gias, Melissus, Zcno, &c., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching 62 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II, of speculative study and debate, such as the dialogues of Plato and the dialectic exercises g-enerally. He defends his profession much in the same way as his master Gorgias, or Protagoras, would have defended it, if we had before us vindications from their pens. Isokrates at Athens, and Quintilian, a man equally estimable at Rome, are in their general type of character and professional duty, the fair counterpart of those whom Plato arraigns as The Sophists. / We know these latter chiefly from the evidence of Plato, their (pronounced enemy : yet even his evidence, when construed can- on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teach- ing with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events — abandoning these useless studies (s. 6). It is remarkable that what Isokrates recommends is j ust what Pi'otagoras and Gorgias are represented as actually do- ing (each doubtless in his own way) in the dialogues of Plato; who censiu'es them for being too pi-actical, while Iso- krates, commenting on them from va- rious publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations. In the Oration De Permutatione, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (s. 10 — the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially Orat. xiii. against the Sophists, see s. 206), Isokrates stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most inte- resting oration, as a defence of the edu- cators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, &c., against the reproaches of Plato. This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athenian sense of the word Sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense which Plato and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest sense, as dis- tinguished from iSiwrais (s. 159) : it meant literary men or philosophers generally, but esj)ecially the profes- sional teachers : it carried however an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible bj^ themselves — as much as possible by those who dis- liked them. Isokrates, though he does not will- ingly call himself by this unpleasant name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one of the pro- fession, in the same category as Gorgias (s. 165, 179, 211, 213, 231, 256), and defends the genei-al body as well ag himself; distinguishing himself of course from the bad members of the profession — those who pretended to be Sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (s. 230). This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indiscriminately by these words— o< (ro(ptffTai — ol Trep] ryjv (pLXocrocpiav diarfjipovns — rr/j' LKoffO(pias, (ire diaTpi^rjs (s. 53, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean the same pi-ocess of training — that is, general mental training as op- posed to bodily (s. 194, 199), and in- tended to cultivate the powers of thought, speech, and action — irphs rh \4y€LV Kol (ppove7v — tov (ppovflv fv Kctl Xeyeiv — r^ Xiynv Kcd irpdrTetv (s. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330). So again in the Bush-is, Isokrates represents Polykratcs as a ao(\>i(Tr7)s, making an income by , pupils. ♦ "I make no stipulation beforehand: when a pupil parts I from me, I ask from him such a sum as I think the time and the circumstances warrant ; and I add, that if he deems the demand too great, he has only to make up his own mind what is the amount of improvement which my company has procured to him, and what sum he considers an equivalent for it. I am content to facile intelligat non ad fidem faciead^, sed ad lusum jocumque, esse compa- 1 Plato, Sophistes, c. 52. p. 2G8. " Cicero, Academ. iv. 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise De Venatioue (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the Soi:)liists, with very little that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching command and artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims — of speaking for purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and ad- dressing themselves to rich pupils for pay — while the philosopher gives his les- sons to everj' one gratuitously, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction a-s that taken by So- krates and Plato, between the Sophist and the Philosojsher : compare Xenoph. de Vectigal. v. 4. Chap. LXYIL RHETORICAL TEACHING. 65 accept the sum so named by himself, only requiring him to go into a temple and make oath that it is his sincere belief.'" ' It is not easy to imagine a more dignified way of dealing than this, nor one which more thoroughly attests an honourable reliance on the internal consciousness of the scholar ; on the grateful sense of improvement realised, which to every teacher constitutes a reward hardly inferior to the payment that proceeds from it, and which (in the opinion of Sokrates) formed the only legitimate reward. Such is not the way in which the corruptors of mankind go to work. That which stood most prominent in the teaching of Gorgias and the other Sophists, was, that they cultivated and The sophists improved the powers of public speaking in their pupils ; teacher— '^^ one of the most essential accomplishments to every ^cusa^tfons Athenian of consideration. For this, too, they have "f^thatca-^" been denounced by Ritter, Brandis, and other learned afso^agauTst^ writers on the history of philosophy, as corrupt and '^^Jra& immoral. " Teaching their pupils rhetoric (it has been ^'^'^ others, said), they only enable them to second unjust designs, to make the worse appear the better reason, and to delude their hearers, by trick and artifice, into false persuasion and show of knowledge without reality. Rhetoric (argues Plato in the dialogue called Gorgias) is no art whatever, but a mere unscientific knack, enslaved to the dominant prejudices, and nothing better than an impostrous parody on the true political art." Now though Aristotle, following the Platonic vein, calls this power of making the worse appear the better reason, "the promise of Protagoras " ^ — the accusation ought never to be urged as it bore specially against the teachers of the Sokratic age. It is an argument against rhetorical teaching generally ; against all the most distiu- 1 Plato, Protagoras, c. 16. p. 328 B. Diogenes Laertius (ix. 58) says that Protagoras demanded 100 miuaa as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a those of the great dramatic actors (s. 168). - Aristot. Rhetoric, ii. 26. Ritter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) quote very statement, nor is it possible that he unfairly the evidence of the ' Clouds ' could have had one fixed rate of pay. ' of Aristophanes, as establishing this The story told by Aulus Gellius (v. 10) charge, and that of corrupt teaching about the suit at law between Prota- generally, against the Sophists as a goras and his disciple Euathlus, is at body. If Aristophanes is a witness least amusing and ingenious. Compare ' against any one, he is a witness against the story of the rhetor Skopelianus, in ! Sokrates, who is the person singled out Philostratus, Vit. Sophist, i. 21, 4. for attack in the 'Clouds.' But these Isokrates (Or. xv. de Perm. s. 166) authors, not admitting Ai-istophanes as affirms that the gains made by Gorgias an evidence against Sokrates whom he or by any of the eminent Sophists had ' does attack, nevertheless quote him ;»s never been very high ; that they had an evidence against men like Protagoras been greatly and maliciously exagge- and Gorgias whom he docs not attack, rated; that they were very inferior to I VOL. VI. F 66 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part IT. guished teachers of pupils for active life, throughout the ancient world, from Protagoras, Gorgias, Isokrates, &c., down to Quin- 'tilian. Not only does the argument bear equally against all, but it was actually urged against all. Isokrates^ and Quintilian both defend themselves against it: Aristotle^ was assailed by it, and provides a defence in the beginning of his treatise on Rhetoric : nor was there ever any man, indeed, against whom it was pressed with greater bitterness of calumny than Sokrates — by Aristophanes in his comedy of the ' Clouds,' as well as by other comic composers. Sokrates complains of it in his defence before his judges;^ characterising such accusations in their true point of view, as being "the stock reproaches against all i who pursue philosophy." They are indeed only one of the manifesta- tions, ever varying in form though the same in spirit, of the antipathy of ignorance against dissenting innovation or superior mental accomplishments ; which antipathy, intellectual men them- selves, when it happens to make on their side in a controversy^ are but too ready to invoke. Considering that we have here the materials of defence, as well as of attack, supplied by Sokrates and Plato, it might have been expected that modern writers would have refrained from employing such an argument to discredit Gorgias or Protagoras ; the rather, as they have before their eyes, in all the countries of modern Europe, the pTofession of lawyers and advocates, who lend their powerful eloquence without distinction to the cause of justice or injustice, and who, far from being regarded as the corruptors of society, are usually looked upon, for that very reason among others, as in- dispensable auxiliaries to a just administration of law. Though writing was less the business of these Sophists than personal teaching, several of them published treatises. Thrasy- machus and Theodorus both set forth written precepts on the art of Rhetoric;^ precepts which have not descended to us, but which 1 Isokrates, Or. xv. (De Permut.) s. ' 3 Plato. Sok. Apolog. c. 10. p. 23D. to 16. vvv 5e Aeyei juer (the accviser) iis Kara irdvruy rwy (piXoaocpovTwy irpSx^'pa iyw Tovs iJTTOvs \6yovs Kpe'iTTOvs Svya- . ravra Xeyovcriv. on ra /ierecopa Kal ra iiirh fiai TTOLilv, &c. yvs, KOI 6eovs /xri vofxi^nv, Ka\ rhv ■^ttoj Ibid. s. 32. neifjaTal /xe Sia^dWetv, ' \6yov Kpfirro} Troielv (SiSdcTKoo). Compare i)S dia(p9eipa) Tovi veccTepovs, Atyeiv Si- a similar expression iu Xenophon, Memo- SdcTKoiv Koi Trapa rh S'iKaiov iv toTs ayuai rab. i. 2, 31. rh koivt) to7s v 6 fiios rod avOpuTTov. I give the words partly from Dio- genes, partly from Sextus, a& I think they would be most likely to stand. ^ Xenophanes ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 49. the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the necessity of flight. Protagoras spoke — Uaa-av exuiv tj)v KaKriv iwt€iKe{r)i- Ta fjiev oil ot XpaiV^irjcr', aAAa vyrji ineiiaUTo, opa fijj OVTOJS SwKpaTiKoj' Ttivuv ^xpov noTOv 'AtSa. Svr). Chap. LXVII. PROTAGORAS. 69 of the cognitive process, and of truth generally. He taught that " Man is the measure of all thino;s, both of that which "is view of • the cosrnitivG exists, and of that which does not exist:" a doctrine process and canvassed and controverted by Plato, who represents nature. that Protagoras affirmed knowledge to consist in sensation, and considered the sensations of each individual man to be, to him, the canon and measure of truth. We know scarce anything of I the elucidations or limitations with which Protagoras may have accompanied his general position : and if even Plato, who had good means of kno\\ing them, felt it ungenerous to insult an orphan doctrine whose father was recently dead, and could no longer defend it ^ — much more ought modern authors, who speak with mere scraps of evidence before them, to be cautious how they heap upon the same doctrine insults much beyond those which Plato recognises. In so far as we can pretend to understand the theory, it was certainly not more incorrect than several others then afloat, from the Eleatic school and other philosophers ; while it had the merit of bringing into forcible relief the essentially relative nature of cognition^ — relative, not indeed to the sensi- 1 Plato, Theffitet. 18. p. 164- E. Ouri ay, oifJLai, Si (pi\e, ettrep ye 6 Trarrip rov krepov Koyov %Qi) — aKKa iroWa tiv i]/xvve- vvv 5e op^avov avrhv ovra tj/x^ls ■Kpoirr)- XaKl^ofiiv dAAa Stj aiirol k iv- Bwevaofxev t o u SiKoiou e y e k avTCf ^0T]6e7v. This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called Themtetus, p. 1.52 seq., in a long, but desultory way. See Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhonic. Hy- pol. i. 216-219, et contra Mathematicos, vii. 60-64. The explanation which Sex- tus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be de- rived from the treatise of Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word i;'A.r? in the philosophical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle. It is difficult to make out what Dio- genes Laertius states about other tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine of "man being the measure of all things," as explained by Plato (Diog. Laert. ix. 51, 57 J. - Aristotle (in one of the passages of his Metaphysica — wherein he discusses the Protagorean doctrine — x. i. p. 1053 B.) says that this doctrine comes to nothing more than saying, that man, BO far as cognizant, or so far as perci- pient, is the measure of all things ; in other words, that knowledge, or percep- tion, is the measure of all things. This Aristotle says — is trivial, and of no value, though it soimds like something of importance — UpccTaySpas S' a.vQponz6v cj)r]rn TravTwu elvai. fj.€Tpov, wainp hv et r^v iTTiffTriiJiova f'nrwv fj rhv airrQavofxevov TovTovs 5' OTi exovaiv 6 fiev aXaOriariv 6 56 iTri(Trr}fj.7]v a (pafiev flvai fxirpa Toiv vTvoKiLfXivaiv. OvQtv Srj Kiytav irfpiTrhi' (palviTai Ti \eyeiv. It appears to me that to insist upon the essentially relative nature of cogni- zable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine, as Aristotle pronounces it to be ; especially when we compare it with the unmeasured conceptions of the objects and methods of scientific reseai'ch, which were so common in the days of Protagoras. Comj'^are Metaphysic. iii. 5. p. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine seemingly fui-ther than Pi'otagoras. Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astro- nomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. Thi.s remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day— iKiyx<>iv tovs yeufierpas (^Aristot. 7:0 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. tive faculty alone, but to that reinforced and guided by the other faculties of man, memorial and ratiocinative. And had it been even more incorrect than it really is, there would be no warrant for those imputations which modern authors build upon it, against the morality of Protagoras. No such imputations are counte- nanced in the discussion which Plato devotes to the doctrine : indeed, if the vindication which he sets forth against himself on behalf of Protagoras be really ascribable to that Sophist, it would give an exaggerated importance to the distinction between Good and Evil, into which the distinction between Truth and False- hood is considered by the Platonic Protagoras as resolvable. The subsequent theories of Plato and Aristotle respecting cog- nition, were much more systematic and elaborate, the work of men greatly superior in speculative genius to Protagoras : but they would not have been what they were, had not Protagoras as well as others gone before them, with suggestions more partial and imperfect. From Gorgias there remains one short essay, preserved in one Gorgias-his of the Aristotcliau or Pseudo- Aristotelian treatises,^ on treatise on i • i i • tt physical a mctaphysical thesis. He professes to demonstrate subjects — K .'' . ^ • f 1 ' ... , inisiepresen- that nothing cxists ; that it anything exist, it is unknow- scopeofit. able ; and granting it even to exist and to be knowable by any one man, he could never communicate it to others. The modern historians of philosophy here prefer the easier task of denouncing the scepticism of the Sophist, instead of performing the duty incumbent on them of explaining his thesis in immediate sequence with the speculations which preceded it. In our sense of the words, it is a monstrous paradox : but construing them in their legitimate filiation from the Eleatic philosophers imme- diately before him, it is a plausible, not to say conclusive, de- duction from principles which they would have acknowledged.^ The word Existence, as they understood it, did not mean phge- nomenal, but ultra-phsenomenal existence. They looked upon the phsenomena of sense as always coming and going — as something essentially transitory, fluctuating, incapable of being surely known, Metaph. iii. 2. p. 998 A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been desei-ved, to assent to the general strictures of Ritter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. i. p. 633. ' See the treatise entitled De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia in Bekker's edi- tion of Aristotle's Works, vol. i. p. 979 5^5'. ; also the same treatise with a good preface and comments by Mullach, p. 62 scq. : compare Sestus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii. 65, 87. - See the note of Mullach, on the treatise mentioned in the preceding note, p. 72. He shows that Gorgias followed in the steps of Zeno and Melissus. Chap. LXVII. GORGIAS. 71 and furnishing at best grounds only for conjecture. They searched by cogitation for what they presumed to be the really existent Something or Substance — the Noumenon, to use a Kantian phrase — lying behind or under the phaenomena, which Noumenon they recognised as the only appropriate object of knowledge. They discussed much (as I have before remarked) whether it was One or Many — Noumenon in the singular, or Noumena in the plural. Now the thesis of Gorgias related to this ultra-phse- noraenal existence, and bore closely upon the arguments of Zeno and Melissus, the Eleatic reasoners of his elder contemporaries. He denied ihat any such ultra-phaenomenal Something, or Nou- menon, existed, or could be known, or could be described. Of this tripartite thesis, the first negation was neither more untenable, nor less untenable, than that of those philosophers who before him had argued for the affirmative : on the two last points, his conclusions were neither paradoxical nor improperly sceptical, but perfectly just, — and have been ratified by the gradual abandon- ment, either avowed or implied, of such ultra-phaenomenal re- searches among the major part of philosophers, j It may fairly be presumed that these doctrines were urged by Gorgias for the purpose of diverting his disciples from studies which he considered as unpromising and fruitless ; just as we shall find his pupil Isokrates afterwards enforcing the same view, discouraging specula- tions of this nature, and recommending rhetorical exercise as preparation for the duties of an active citizen.^ Nor must we forget that Sokrates himself discouraged physical speculations even more decidedly than either of them, j If the censures cast upon the alleged scepticism of Gorgias and Protagoras are partly without sufficient warrant, partly unfounded without any warrant at all — much more may the same aga'i'Mt'the remark be made respecting the graver reproaches sophisu. heaped upon their teaching on the score of immorality or cor- ruption. It has been common with recent German historians of philosophy to translate from Plato and dress up a fiend called " Die Sophistik " (Sophistic) — whom they assert to have poisoned and demoralised, by corrupt teaching, the Athenian moral cha- racter, so that it became degenerate at the end of the Pelopon- nesian war, compared with what it had been in the time of Miltiades and Aristcides. Now, in the first place, if the abstraction " Die Sophistik " ^ Isokratus De PermutioDc, Or. xv. s, 287 ; Xcuopli. Memorab. i. 1, 1-i. 72 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. is to have any definite meaning, we ought to have proof that the S w r persons styled Sophists had some doctrines, principles, not a sect or or mcthod, both common to them all and distinguishing school, with , P, -r, 1 •••i. common them irom others, xiut such a supposition is untrue : doctrines or , , , . . . ■, method: there were no such common doctrines, or principles, a profession, or mcthod, belonging to them. Even the name by hidividuai"^ which they are known did not belong to them, any more pecuhanties ^^^^^ ^^ Sokratcs and others ; / they had nothing in common except their profession, as paid teachers, qualifying young men " to think, speak, and act " (these are the words of Isokrates, and better words it would not be easy to find) with credit to themselves as citizens.! Moreover, such community of profession did not at that time imply so iftuch analogy of character as it does now, when the path of teaching has been beaten into a broad and visible high road, with measured distances, and stated in- tervals : Protagoras and Gorgias found predecessors indeed, but no binding precedents to copy ; so that each struck out more or less a road of his own. And accordingly, we find Plato, in his dialogue called ' Protagoras,' wherein Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias are all introduced — imparting a distinct type of character and distinct method to each, not without a strong admixture of reciprocal jealousy between them ; while Thrasymachus, in the Republic, and Euthydemus, in the dialogue so called, are again painted each with colours of his own, different from all the three above-named. We do not know how far Gorgias agreed in the opinion of Protagoras — " Man is the measure of all things : " and we may infer even from Plato himself, that Protagoras would have opposed the views expressed by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic. It is impossible therefore to predicate any- I' J thing concerning doctrines, methods, or tendencies, common and I peculiar to all the Sophists. There were none such ; nor has the abstract word — " Die Sophistik " — any real meaning, except such qualities (whatever they may be) as are inseparable from the profession or occupation of public teaching. And if, at present, every candid critic would be ashamed to cast wholesale aspersions on the entire body of professional teachers — much more is such censure unbecoming in reference to the ancient Sophists, who were distinguished from each other by stronger individual pecu- liarities. I If, then, it were true that in the interval between 480 b.c. and the end of the Peloponnesian war, a great moral deterioration had taken place in Athens and in Greece generally, we should have to Chap. LXVII. ATHENS NOT CORRUPTED. 73 f search for some other cause than the imaginary abstraction called I Sophistic. But — and this is the second point — the matter The Athe- of fact here alleged is as untrue, as the cause alleged is richer was unreal. Athens, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, "o^rupfi was not more corrupt than Athens in the days of Mil- 4grBTald tiades and Aristeides, If we revert to that earlier ^osbx. period, we shall find that scarcely any acts of the Athenian people have drawn upon them sharper censure (in my judgement, un- merited) than their treatment of these very two statesmen ; the condemnation of Miltiades, and the ostracism of Aristeides. In writing my history of that time, far from finding previous historians disposed to give the Athenians credit for public virtue, I have been compelled to contend against a body of adverse criticism, imputing to them gross ingratitude and injustice. Thus the con- temporaries of Miltiades and Aristeides, when described as matter of present history, are presented in anything but flattering colours ; except their valour at Marathon and Salamis, which finds one unanimous voice of encomium. But when these same men have become numbered among the mingled recollections and fancies belonging to the past — when a future generation comes to be present, with its appropriate stock of complaint and denunciation — then it is that men find pleasure in dressing up the virtues of the past, as a count in the indictment against their own contemporaries. Aristophanes,' writing during the Peloponnesian war, denounced Ithe Demos of his day as degenerated from the virtue of that f Demos which had surrounded Miltiades and Aristeides ; while Isokrates,^ writing as an old man between 350-340 B.C., complains in like manner of his own time, boasting how much better the , state of Athens had been in his youth : which period of his youth ifell exactly during the life of Aristophanes, in the last half of the jPeloponnesian war. I Such illusions ought to impose on no one without a careful com- parison of facts ; and most assuredly that comparison will not bear out the allegation of increased corruption and degeneracy, between the age of Miltiades and the end of the Peloponnesian war. Throughout the whole of Athenian history, there are no acts which attest so large a measure of virtue and judgement pervading the whole people, as the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nor do I believe that the contemporaries of Miltiades would have been capable of such heroism ; for that ' Aristoplian. Equit, lolG-1321. ' IsokratcS; Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 170. 74 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. appellation is by no means too large for the case. I doubt whether they would have been competent to the steady self-denial of re- taining a large sum in reserve during the time of peace, both prior to the Peloponnesian war and after the peace of Nikias — or of keeping back the reserve fund of 1000 talents, while they were forced year after year to pay taxes for the support of the war^ — or of acting upon the prudent, yet painfully trying policy recom- mended by Perikles, so as to sustain an annual invasion without either going out to fight or purchasing peace by ignominious con- cessions. If bad acts such as Athens committed during the later years of the war, for example, the massacre of the Melian popula- tion, were not done equally by the contemporaries of Miltiades, this did not arise from any superior humanity or principle on their part, but from the fact that they were not exposed to the like temptation, brought upon them by the possession of imperial power. The condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusse, if we suppose the same conduct on their part to have occurred in 490 B.C., would have been decreed more rapidly and more unceremoniously than it was actually decreed in 406 B.C. For at that earlier date there existed no psephism of Kannonus, surrounded by prescriptive respect — no Graphe Paranomon — no such habits of established deference to a Dlkastery solemnly sworn, with full notice to defendants and full time of defence measured by the water-glass — none of those securities which a long course of democracy had gradually worked into the public morality of every Athenian, and which (as we saw in a former chapter) interj^osed a serious barrier to the impulse of the moment, though ultimately overthrown by its fierceness. A far less violent impulse would have sufficed for the same mischief in 490 B.C., when no such barriers existed. Lastly, if we want a measure of the appreciating sentiment of the Athenian public, towards a strict and decorous morality in the narrow sense, in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, we have only to consider the manner in j which they dealt with Nikias. I have shown, in describing the Sicilian expedition, that the gravest error which the Athenians I ever committed, that w^hich shipwrecked both their armament at 1 Two years before the invasion by in every way : but it is by no means to Xerxes, the Athenians cUd indeed forego be compai-ed, for self-denial and esti- a dividend about to be distributed to mate of future chances, to the effort of each of the citizens out of the silver paying money more than once out of mines of Laureium, in order that the , their pockets, in order that they might money might be applied to building of ; leave untouched the public fund of lUOO tiiremes. This was honourable to them ! talents. Chap. LXVIL NO SOPHISTICAL POISON. 75 Syracuse and their power at home, arose from their unmeasured esteem for the respectable and pious Nikias, which blinded them to the grossest defects of generalship and public conduct. Dis- astrous as such misjudgement was, it counts at least as a proof that Uhe moral corruption, alleged to have been operated in their 'characters, is a mere fiction. Nor let it be supposed that the nerve and resolution which once animated the combatants of Marathon and Salamis, had disappeared in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war. On the contrary, the energetic and protracted struggle of Athens, after the irreparable calamity at Syracuse, forms a worthy parallel to her resistance in the time of Xerxes, and maintained unabated that distinctive attribute which Perikles had set forth as the main foundation of her glory — that of never giving way before misfortune.' Without any disparagement to the armament at Salamis, we may remark that the patriotism of the fleet at Samos, which rescued Athens from the Four Hundred, was equally devoted and more intelligent ; and that the burst of effort, which sent a subsequent fleet to victory at Arginusae, was to the full as strenuous. If then we survey the eighty-seven years of Athenian history, between the battle of Marathon and the renovation of the demo- cracy after the Thirty, we shall see no ground for the assertion, so often made, of increased and increasing moral and political corruption. It is my belief that the people had become both morally and politically better, and that their democracy had worked to their improvement. The remark made by Thucydides, on the occasion of the Korkyrsean bloodshed — on the violent and reckless political antipathies, arising out of the confluence of ex- ternal warfare with internal party-feud^ — wherever else it may find its application, has no bearing upon Athens : the proceedings after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty, prove the contrary, iknd while Athens may thus be vindicated on the moral side, it is indisputable that her population had acquired a far larger range of ideas and capacities than they possessed at the time of the battle 1 Thucyd. ii. 64 — -yvwre 5' vvofxa jj-e- •yiffrov avT^v {t))v tt6Kiv) %xo^^°'^ ^^ TTciaLV avQpdnrois, 5ia to tols ^vjX(popa7s - Thucydides (iii. 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to Sophists or sophistical teaching; though Braudis (Gesch. der Gr. Rom. Philos. i. p. 518. not. f.) drags in "the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time," as if it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydides, i. 76. v. 105. There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion ; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignoi-aut, that such words as "the sophistical spirit" (Der sophis- tische Geist) are understood by a mo- dern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense. 76 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. of Marathon. This indeed is the very matter of fact deplored by Aristophanes, and admitted by those writers, who, while de- nouncing the Sophists, connect such enlarged range of ideas with the dissemination of the pretended sophistical poison. | In my judgement, not only the charge against the Sophists as poisoners, but even the existence of such poison in the Athenian system, deserves nothing less than an emphatic denial. Let us examine again the names of these professional teachers, Prodikus- beginning with Prodikus, one of the most renowned. Hircuies. iWho is tlicrc that has not read the well-known fable called " The Choice of Hercules," which is to be found in every book professing to collect impressive illustrations of elementary morality ? Who does not know that its express purpose is, to kindle the imaginations of youth in favour of a life of labour for noble objects, and against a life of indulgence ? It w^as the favourite theme on which Prodikus lectured, and on which he obtained the largest audience.^') If it be of striking simplicity and effect even to a modern reader, how much more powerfully must it have worked upon the audience for whose belief it was specially adapted, when set off by the oral expansions of its author! Xenophon wondered that the Athenian Dikasts dealt with So- krates as a corruptor of youth : Isokrates wondered that a portion of the public made the like mistake about himself : and I confess my wonder to be not less, that not only Aristophanes,^ but even the modern writers on Grecian philosophy, should rank Prodikus in the same unenviable catalogue.^ This is the only composi- » Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1. 21-34.— Kal XlpSBiKos Be 6 (ro(phs iv rif avyypaixfxari T^ Trepl 'HpaKA.eoi/s, (iwep S rj Kal ■nXiio'Tois i TT iB e i Kv VT a I, iiaavTuis ■jrepl T7)s apiTrjs aTocpaiverai, &c. Xenophon here introduces Sokrates himself as bestowing much praise on the moral teaching of Prodikus. ^ See Fragment iii. of the TayriviaTol of Aristophanes — Meineke, Fragment. Aristoph. p. 1140. 3 Upon Prodikus and his fable called the "Choice of Hei'cules," Professor Maurice remarks as follows (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, iv. 2, 1, 11. p. Iu9; : — "The effect of the lesson which it inculcates is good or evil, ac- cording to the object which the reader proposes to himself. If he wishes to acquire the power of draining marshes and killing noisome beasts, all must bless him for not yielding to the voice of the Goddess of Pleasure. If he merely seeks to be the strongest of men, by resisting the enchantress, it might have been bettor for the world and for himself, that he should have yielded to her blandishments. Mr. Grote is not likely to have forgotten the celebrated paradox of Gibbon re- specting the clergy — ' That their virtues are more dangerous to society than their vices.' On the hypothesis which Gib- bon no doubt adopted, that this order is divided into those who deny them- selves for the sake of obtaining domi- nion over their fellow-countrj^men, and those who yield to animal indulgence — his dictum may be easily admitted. The monk who restrains his appetites that he may be more followed and idolized as a confessor, does more harm to others, is probably more evil in him- self, than the sleek abbot who is given Chap. LXVII. PRODIKUS. 77 tion ' remaining from him — indeed the only composition remaining from any one of the Sophists, excepting the thesis of Gorgias above noticed. It serves, not merely as a vindication of Prodikus against such reproach, but also as a warning against implicit confidence in the sarcastic remarks of Plato — which include Prodikus as well as the other Sophists — and in the doctrines which he puts into the mouth of the Sophists generally, in order that Sokrates may confute them. I The commonest candour would teach us, that if a polemical writer of dialogue chooses to put indefensible doctrine into the mouth of the opponent, we ought to be cautious of condemning the latter upon such very dubious proof. I Welcker and other modern authors treat Prodikus as " the most innocent" of the Sophists, and except him from the Protagoras- sentence which they pass upon the class generally. Let exhibited of us see therefore what Plato himself says about the riato. up to his liawks and hounds. The prin- cijile is of universal application. We must know whether Prodikus departed from the general rule of the professorial class, by not holding out pjolitical power as his prize — before we can pro- nounce him a useful teacher, because he taught his pupils how they might obtain the bone and nerve of Hercules." With the single reserve of what Pro- fessor Maurice calls "the general rule of the professorial class," against which assertion I have already shown cause in a previous note — I fully admit uot merely the justice, but the importance, of his general remark above transcribed. I recognise no merit in self-denial, un- less in so far as the self-denying person becomes thereby the instrument of in- creased security and happiness to others or to himself — or unless it be conducive to the formation of a character of which such is the general result. And re- specting Pi'odikus himself, I willingly accept the challenge. He marks out, in the most distinct and emphatic man- ner, the achievement of good to others, and the acquisition of esteem from others, as going together, and consti- tuting in combination the prize for which the youthful Herakles is ex- horted to struggle — iire inrh (piKoiv iOf- \eis ayairaaOai, rohs l\ovs evepyeT7]T€6f efre vTr6 rivos irSXecos fTriOvfjifTs ri/xaaBat, T'/]y ttoKlv d)(t>(:\r)T4ov 6it€ virb rrjs 'EA- XciSos iraaris d|io7s iir' apfrfj dav/xd^effOat, tV 'EA\d5a irfipaTe6f eZ iroiely, &c. fXen. Mem. ii. 1, 28). I select these few words, but the whole tenor and spirit of the fable is similar. Indeed the very selection of Herakles as an ideal to be followed, is of itself a proof that the Sophist did not intend to point out the acquisition of personal dominion and pre-eminence, except in so far as they naturally sprang from services rendered, as the grand prize to be contended for by his jjupils. For Herakles is, in Greek conception, the type of those who work for others- one condemned by his destiny to achieve great, difficult, and um-ewarded exploits at the bidding of another (Suidas and Diogenianus, vi. 7, imder the words T€TpaSi yeyovas — eVl T&ji/ &Wots irovovv- riav, &c.) ^ Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus's lecture, not his exact words. But he gives what may be called the whole substance, so that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. We cannot say the same of an extract givei>^(iu the Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Axiochus, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus — re.'ipecting the miseries of huma^ life j^ervading all the various professions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly either how much really belongs to Pro- dikus, or what was his scope and pur- pose, if any such lecture was I'eally delivered. 78 ^ HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part 11. rest of them, and first about Protagoras. If it were not the established practice with readers of Plato to condemn Protagoras beforehand, and to put, upon every passage relating to him, not only a sense as bad as it will bear, but much worse than it will fairly bear — they would probably carry away very different in- ferences from the Platonic dialogue called by that Sophist's name, and in which he is made to bear a chief part. That dialogue is itself enough to prove that Plato did not conceive Protagoras either as a corrupt, or unworthy, or incompetent teacher. The course of the dialogue exhibits him as not master of the theory of ethics, and unable to solve various diiEculties with which that theory is expected to grapple ; moreover, as no match for Sokrates in dialectics, which Plato considered as the only efficient method '. of philosophical investigation. In so far therefore as imperfect acquaintance with the science or theory upon which rules of art, or the precepts bearing on practice, repose, disqualifies a teacher from giving instruction in such art or practice — to that extent Protagoras is exposed as wanting. And if an expert dialectician, like Plato, had passed Isokrates or Quintilian, or the large majority of teachers past or present, through a similar cross- examination as to the theory of their teaching — an ignorance not less manifest than that of Protagoras would be brought out. The antithesis which Plato sets forth, in so many of his dialogues, between precept or practice, accompanied by full knowledge of the scientific principles from which it must be deduced, if its rectitude be disputed — and unscientific practice, without any such power of deduction or defence — is one of the most valuable portions of his speculations : he exhausts his genius to render it conspicuous in a thousand indirect ways, and to shame his readers, if possible, into .the loftier and more rational walk of thought. But it is one thing Ito say of a man, that he does not know the theory of what he fteachcs, or of the way in which he teaches ; it is another thing to say, that he actually teaches that which scientific theory would not prescribe as the best ; it is a third thing, graver than both, to say that his teaching is not only below the exigences of science, but even corrupt and demoralising. Now of these three points, it is Ithe first only which Plato in his dialogue makes out against Protagoras : even the second, he neither affirms nor insinuates ; and as to the third, not only he never glances at it, even indirectly, but the whole tendency of the discourse suggests a directly con- trary conclusion. As if sensible that when an eminent opponent was to be depicted as puzzled and irritated by superior dialectics, Chap. LXVII. PROTAGORAS. 79 it was but common fairness to set forth his distinctive merits also — Plato gives a fable, and expository harangue, from the mouth of Protagoras,^ upon the question whether virtue is teachable. This harangue is, in my judgement, very striking and instructive ; and so it would have been probably accounted, if commentators had not read it with a pre-established persuasion that whatever came from the lips of a Sophist must be either ridiculous or immoral.^ 'fft is the only part of Plato's works wherein any account is rendered of the growth of that floating, uncertified, self-pro- pagating, body of opinion, upon which the cross-examining analysis of Sokrates is brought to bear — as will be seen in the following chapter. Protagoras professes to teach his pupils " good counsel " in their domestic and family relations, as well as how to speak and act in the most effective manner for the weal of the city. Since this comes from Protagoras, the commentators of Plato pronounce it to be miserable morality : but it coincides, almost to the letter, with that which Isokrates describes himself as teaching, a generation afterwards, and substantially even with that which Xenophon represents Sokrates as teaching : nor is it easy to set forth, in a few words, a larger scheme of practical duty.^ And if the measure 1 Plato, Protagoras, p. 320 D. c. 11 et seq., especially p. 322 D, where Pro- tagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a social community who has not in his bosom both 5i»ctj and alSa>s — that is, a sense of reciprocal ob- ligation and right between himself and others — and a sensibility to esteem or reftroach from others. He lays these fundamental attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume or ex- act in every man. - Of the unj ust asperity and contempt with which the Platonic commentators treat the Sophists, see a specimen in Ast, Ueber Platons Leben und Schriften, p. 70, 71 — where he comments on Pro- tagoras and this fable. ^ Protagoras says — Th Se /xd6r)fj.d (ffTiv, eu/SouAi'a irepi t€ tcDi/ oiKawv ottojs h.v &piffTa ryv avrov o'lKiav SioiKoi, Kal TrepI Twv rrjs TrSheus, owcos ra. rrjs tto- Aeojy SvvaTcoTaTos etT/ koL wpaTTfiv Ka\ Kij^iv. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318 E.) A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other Sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in theii- private ca- pacities — is given in Plato, Meno. p. 91 B, E. Isokrates describes the education which he wished to convey almost in the same words — Tous to. roiaina. jxav- davovras Koi jxeXiTuiVTas e^ '^^ >^°-^ "^^^ KlOV o'lKOV Koi TO. KOLVOL TO. Trjs TT^Xfa'S Ka\a)s dtOLKT^crovcnv, uivTrep tviKa koI tto- VrjTfOV Kol (pl\offO(p7JT€0V KOl TTOLVTa TTpUK- Tiov iffTi (Or. XV. De Permutat. s. oU4 : compare 289). Xenophon also describes, almost ia the same words, the teaching of So- krates. Kriton and others sought the so- ciety of Sokrates, ovk 'Iva 57)ij.rjyopiKol r] St- KaviKol yivoivro, a,\\"iya kuKoI re KdyaOol yivufievoi, Kal oi/cij) koi oi/ceVais Kal olKtiots Kal (p'lKois Kul ir6Kii Kal iroKirais dvvaivro KaXws xpvJo'Sai (Memor. i. 2, 48). Again, i. 2, G-t — ^aviphs fjV '2,wKpari)S rwv iv ovx oi-io- \oy u) '£70) Si i.v yu^ (re avThi/ e u a ovTa /xapTvpa Trapacxco/^ai S/xoXo- yovvTa Trepl wv Ae'-yco, ovSiv olf.iai &^ioy \6yov IJ.01 TTiTTepdvOai irepl S>y &»/ rjfuv 6 \6yos jT. G 2 84 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart U. here represented, doubtless, as laying down doctrines openly and Doctrine as'owcdly anti-social. He distinguishes between the law advanced by„ ^ ^ ^ /ii- i 'ij. Kaiiikies 01 nature and the law (both written and unwritten, social. for the Greek word substantially includes both) of so- ciety, j According to the law of nature (Kallikles says) the strong 'man — the better or more capable man — puts forth his strength to the full for his own advantage, without limit or restraint ; overcomes the resistance which weaker men are able to offer ; and seizes for himself as much as he pleases of the matter of enjoyment, j lie has no occasion to restrain any of his appetites or desires ; the more numerous and pressing they are, so much the better for him — since his power affords him the means of satiating them all. The many, who have the misfortune to be weak, must be content with that which he leaves them, and submit to it as best they can. This (Kallikles says) is what actually happens in a state of nature ; this is what is accounted just, as is evident by the practice of independent communities, not included in one common political society, towards each other ; this is justice, by nature, or according to the law of nature. But when men come into society, all this is reversed. The majority of individuals know very well that they are weak, and that their only chance of security or comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain the strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him like a young lion whilst his mind is yet tendex, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equality which the law enjoins. jHere, then, is justice according to the law of society ; a factitious system built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. \ Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favourite of nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many ; regaining that glorious position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature — -and justice by law and society — are thus, according to Kallikles, not only distinct, but mutually con- tradictory. He accuses Sokrates of having jumbled the two together in his argument.^ It has been contended by many authors, that this anti-social 1 This doctrine asserted by Kallikles will be found in Plato, Gorgias, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484. Chai'. LXVir. KALLIKLES. 85 I reasoning (true enough, in so far as it states simple ^ matter of fact and probability — immoral, in so far as it erects the Kaiukies is power of the strong man into a right ; and inviting many n"'a'^''i''''s'- comments, if I could find a convenient place for them) represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called Sophists at Athens.^ I deny this assertion emphatically. Even if I had no other evidence to sustain my denial, except what has been already extracted from the unfriendly writings of Plato himself, respecting Protagoras and Hippias — with what we know from Xenophon about Prodikus — I should consider my case made out as vindicating the Sophists generally from such an accusation. If refutation to the doctrine of Kallikles were needed, it would be obtained quite as efficaciously from Prodikus and Protagoras as from Sokrates and Plato. But this is not the strongest part of the vindication. 'First, Kallikles himself is not a Sophist, nor represented by Plato as such.' He is a young Athenian citizen, of rank and station, belonging to the deme Acharnse ; he is intimate with other young men of condition in the city, has recently entered into active political life, and bends his whole soul towards it ; he dis- ' See the same matter-of-fact strongly stated by Sokrates in the Memorab. of Xenophon, ii. 1, 13. - Schleiermacher (in the Prolegomena to his translation of the Theretetus, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kal- likles ; which supposition he sustains by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was 7io such thin<) as justice by nature, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kallikles is the direct contrary of that which Schleier- macher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalli- kles not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner — explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength with- out any regard to others — and puts it above the j ustice of law and society, in respect to authority. Ritter and Brandis are yet more in- correct in their accusations of the So- phists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581) — "It is af- firmed as a common tenet of the So- phists — there is no right by nature, but only by convention:" compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert : and Preller actually im- putes the contrary tenets to the So- phists (Histor. Philosoph. c. 4. p. 130, Hamburg 1838) with just as little au- thority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the Sophi.«t3 with wickedness for this alleged tenet — for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention; a doc- trine which had been maintained before them by Achelaus (Diogen. Laert. ii. UV). Now Plato I Legg. x. p. 889), whom tliese writers refer to, charges certain wise- men — ao^ohs iSniras re koI iroi-qras (he does not mention Sophists) — with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite ; because they did acknowledije a right hij nature, of greater authority thiii the riijlit laid do'rn by the legislator; and because they encouraged pupils to fol- low this suijposed right of nature, dis- obeying the law ; interpreting the right of nature as Kallikles does in the Gor- gias ! Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis, for the ne- gative, and by Plato (if he here means the Sophists), for the affirmative doc- trine. 86 HISTOKY OF GEEECE. Part 11. The doctrine put into his mouth could never have been laid down in any public lec- ture among the Athe- nians. f parages philosophy, and speaks with utter contempt about the Sophists.^ If then it were even just (which I do not admit) to infer from opinions put into the mouth of one Sophist, that the same were held by another or by all of them — it would not be the less unjust to draw the like inference from opinions professed by one who is not a Sophist, and who despises the whole pro- fession. Secondly, if any man will read attentively the course of the dialogue, he will see that the doctrine of Kallikles is such as no one dared publicly to propound. So it is conceived both by Kallikles himself, and by Sokrates. The former first takes up the conversation by saying that his pre- decessor Polus had become entangled in a contradiction, because he had not courage enough openly to announce an unpopular and odious doctrine ; but he (Kallikles) was less shamefaced, and would speak out boldly that doctrine which others kept to themselves for fear of shocking the hearers. " Certainly (says Sokrates to him) your audacity is abundantly shown by the doctrine which you have just laid down — you set forth plainly that which other people think, but do not choose to utter.^" Now, opinions of which Polus, an insolent young man, was afraid to proclaim himself the champion, must have been revolting indeed *to the sentiments of hearers. How then can any reasonable man believe, that such opinions were not only openly propounded, but seriously inculcated as truth upon audiences of youthful hearers, by the Sophists ? We know that the teaching of the latter was public in the highest degree ; publicity was pleasing as well as profitable to them ; among the many disparaging epithets heaped upon them, ostentation and vanity are two of the most conspicuous. Whatever they taught, they taught publicly ; and I contend, with full conviction, that had they even agreed with Kalhkles in this 1 Plato, Gorgias, c. 37. p. 481 D ; c. 41. p. 485 B, D; c. 42. p. 487 C ; c. 50. p. 495 B; C. 70. p. 515 A. av fiev airh^ &pTl &pXil- TTpOTTeiV TO T7JS TToAfOlS TTpay- fxara. : compai'e c. 55. p. 500 C. His contempt for the Sophists, c. 75. p. 519 E, with the note of Heindorf. 2 Plato, Gorgias, c. o%. p. 482 E. e/c TauTTjs yap ail Trjs ofioXoylas avrhs virh ffov (Tf/UTToSicrfleiJ ev Tois \6yois eiretrTo- /j-icrdTj (Polus), alcrx^vOels & iv6eL elirelv ffv yap tiS uvn. Si 'S.aiKpaTfS, els ToiavTa ayas (popriKa Kal S-q/xTiyopiKa, KaWiK\e7s, ine^epxei t^ \6ycj> Trappriffta^dneyos' (T a

v Xoywv tification of the people, witliout any re- 'eKacrroi x^^'povai, rep Be aWoTpicp &x- gard to their ultimate or durable benefit 6ovTai. 88 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart H. of the law of nature, contrived to disappoint the Alkibiades or Napoleon among you of his natural right to become your master, and to deal with you petty men as his slaves. All your unnatural precautions, and conventional talk, in favour of legality and equal dealing, will turn out to be nothing better than pitiful impotence,^ as soon as he finds a good opportunity of standing forward in his full might and energy — so as to put you into you proper places, and show you what privileges Nature Intends for her favourites ! " Conceive such a doctrine propounded by a lecturer to assembled Athenians ! A doctrine just as revolting to Nikias as to Kleon, and which even Alkibiades would be forced to affect to disapprove ; since it is not simply anti-popular — not simply despotic — but the drunken extravagance of despotism. The Great man as depicted by Kalllkles stands in the same relation to ordinary mortals, as Jonathan Wild the Great in the admirable parody of Fielding. That Sophists, whom Plato accuses of slavish flattery to the democratlcal ear, should gratuitously insult it by the proposition of such tenets — is an assertion not merely untrue, but utterly absurd. Even as to Sokrates, we know from Xenophon how much the Athenians were offended with him, and how much it was urged by the accusers on his trial, that in his conversations he was wont to cite with peculiar relish the description (in the second book of the Iliad) of Odysseus following the Grecian crowd when running away from the agora to get on ship-board, and prevailing upon them to come back — by gentle words addressed to the chiefs, but by blows of his stick, accompanied with contemptuous reprimand, to the common people. The indirect evidence thus afforded that Sokrates countenanced unequal dealing and ill-usage towards the Many, told much against him in the minds of the Dikasts. What would they have felt then towards a Sophist who publicly professed the political morality of Kalllkles ? The truth is — not only was it impossible that any such morality, or anything of the same type even much diluted, could find its way into the educational lectures jof professors at Athens, — but the fear would be in the opposite direction. If the Sophist erred in either way, it would be in that which Sokrates imputes — by making his lectures over-democratical. Nay, if we suppose any opportunity to have arisen of discussing the doctrine of Kalllkles, he would hardly omit to flatter the ears of the surrounding democrats by enhancing the beneficent results 1 Plato, Gorgihists 92 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Taut II. I call particular attention to this circumstance, without which Plato against '^'^ canuot fairly estimate the Sophists, or practical ^enfra'ii''*'^ tcachers of Athens, face to face with their accuser- His allegory o-eueral — Plato. He was a ffreat and systematic theorist, of accusation o ... .... comprehends whosc oplnlons ou ctliics, politlcs, coo'nition, relidon, &c,, all society, i ' ^ i i • • i i with all the were all wrougfht into harmony by his own mmd, and poets and . , , ^• • i • i • i i r statesmen, stamped With that peculiarity which is the mark ot an original intellect. So splendid an effort of speculative genius is amonff the marvels of the Grecian world. His dissent from all the societies which he saw around him, not merely democratical, but oligarchical and despotic also, was of the deepest and most radical character. Nor did he delude himself by the belief, that any partial amendment of that which he saw around could bring about the end which he desired : he looked to nothing short of a new genesis of the man and the citizen, with institutions calculated from the beginning to work out the full measure of perfectibility. His fertile scientific imagination realized this idea in the ' Republic' But that very systematic and original character, generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is pre- sented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are de- scribed, by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied them- selves to the ei'istic or controversial dia- logue (Euthyd. c. 1. p. 272 C ; c. 3. p. 273 E). Schleiermacher himself ac- counts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenes and the Megaric school of philosophers (Prole- gom. ad Euthydem. vol. iii. p. 403, 404, of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Krito blames Sokrates for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them before many persons (p. 305 B, c. 30). The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, started by Euthydemus, that false propositions or conti-adictory pro- positions were impossible, because no one could either think about, or talk about, that which was not or the non- existent (p. 284 A; 286 C). This doc- trine is said by Sokrates to have been much talked of "by Protagoras and by men yet earlier than he." It is idle to infer from such a passage any connec- tion or analogy between these men and Protagoras — as Stallbaum labours to do thi'oughout his Prolegomena ; affirming (in his note on p. 28t) C) most incor- rectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about rh fj.r] hv or the non- existent, because he had too great faith in the evidence of the senses — whereas we know from Plato that it had its rise with Parmenides, who rejected the evi- dence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24. p. 237 A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum's notes). Diogenes Laer- tius (ix. 8, 53) falsely asserts that Pro- tagoras was the first to broach the doc- trine, and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first — it was a doctrine following plausibly from the then received Real- ism, and Plato was long perplexed be- fore he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theatet. p. 187 D). I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialec- tical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose a dia- logue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokrates. But to treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as sam- ples of "The Sophists," is altogether unwan-anted. Chap. LXYIT. PLATO AND THE SOrHISTS. 93 which lends so much value and charm to the substantive specu- lations of I^laio, counts as a deduction from his trustworthiness as critic or witness, in reference to the living agents whom he saw at work in Athens and other cities, as statesmen, generals, or teachers. jHis criticisms are dictated by his own point of view, according to which the entire society was corrupt, and all the instruments who carried on its functions were of essentially base metal. AVhoever will read either the ' Gorgias ' or the ' Republic,' will see in how sweeping and indiscriminate a manner he passes his sentence of condemnation. Not only all the Sophists andiill the Rhetors ^ — but all the musicians and dithyrambic or tragic poets — all the statesmen, past as well as present, not excepting even the great Perikles — receive from his hands one common J stamp of dishonour.) Every one of these men are numbered by Plato among the numerous category of flatterers, who minister to the immediate gratification and to the desires of the people, without looking to their permanent improvement, or making them morally better. "Perikles and Kimon (says Sokrates in the 'Gorgias') are nothing but servants or ministers who • supply the immediate appetites and tastes of the people ; just as the baker aud the confectioner do in their respective departments, without knowing or caring whether the food will do any real good — a point which the physician alone can determine. As ministers, they are clever enough : they have provided the city amply with tribute, walls, docks, ships, and such other follies : but I (Sokrates) am the only man in Athens who aim, so far as my strength permits, at the true purpose of politics — the mental improvement of the people.^" j So wholesale a condemnation betrays itself as the offspring, and the 1 consistent offspring, of systematic peculiarity of vision — the pre- judice of a great and able mind.j It would be not less unjust to appreciate the Sophists or the 1 Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58. p. 502, 5(»3. - Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73. p. 517 (Sokrates speaks). 'AAT/fleTs &pa ol ffi- irpo(r6fv xSyoi ^jcrav, '6ri ovSeva rj/xus XafXiv &v5pa ayadhv yfyoi'6Ta ra TroXiTiKO. (V rfjSe ry -KoKei. 'CI SatixSvK, ovS' iyu ypeyw rovrovs (Perikles and Kimon) S>s ye S laK 6- vovs elvai n6\€ws, aWd fJ-oi SoKOvai Twv "ye vvv SiaKoviKWTepoi yeyove- uai Koi fxaWov oloi re iKiropi^eiv rrj t^6- A6I Siv fTredvp.fl. 'AWa yap nera^tfia.- (eii/ Tos eTri6vp.las kcu fxr) eTnTpfireiv, irtl- Oovre? Kal pia(6/xeyoi etrl iovto, '6dev ejxeWov afxeivovi ecreoOai oi iro\7Tat, ws eiros flirely, ovSev tovtuiv Sif(pepov eKfT- vof Hirep jiovov fpyov fffriv ayaOov iro- KlTOV. ""Avev yap croKppocrvvrjs Ka\ SiKaio(Tvt/r]s, KipLfviiiv Ka\ rfix<^v Kal veoipiwv Kal V ifurre- 7rAT)Kucri ttjv ■k6\iv (c. 74, p. 5I9,A). Olp.at (says Sokrates, c. 77. p. 521 D) yueir' oKiyoiv 'AOrivaioov, 'iva fxi) fXnoi fjiSvos, eirtxetpeTv rfj ws a\r]6ws iroXiTiKfj Tt^vri Kal TTpaTTfiv TO. iroKiTiKo, fxivos Twv vvv, are ovv ov vpbs X'^P"' ^eyaiv rovs \6yovs ots \eyTTri iro\ffilCv (Nubes, 418). ev6vs jxeipaKiov Siv iTrfdvfjLei yevfffOat avrip I * Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 10. p. 23 C TO. fxiyaXo. ir paTT e ly i Kav6s- Koi Prot;igonv>, p. 328 C. 96 HISTORY OP GREECE. Part II. young men of wealth ; a fact, at whicli Plato sneers, and others General copy him, as if it proved that they cared only about of°he^?''' high pay. i But I do not hesitate to range myself on the upon'tife s^^6 of Isokrates,^ and to contend that the Sophist himself youth. jj^(j much to lose by corrupting his pupils (an argument used by Sokrates in defending himself before the Dikastery, and just as valid in defence of Protagoras or Prodikus ^) and strong personal interest in sending them forth accomplished and virtuous — that the best taught youth were decidedly the most free from crime and the most active towards good— that among the valuable ideas and feelings which a young Athenian had in his mind as well as among the good pursuits which he followed, those which he \ learnt from the Sophists counted nearly as the best-(— that, if the I contrary had been the fact, fathers would not have continued so to I send their sons, and pay their money. It was not merely that \ these teachers countervailed in part the temptations to dissipated enjoyment, but also that they were personally unconcerned in the acrimonious slander and warfare of party in his native city — that the topics with which they familiarized him were, the general interests and duties of men and citizens — that they developed the germs of morality in the ancient legends (as in Prodikus's fable), and amplified in his mind all the undefined cluster of associations connected with the great words of morality — that they vivified in him the sentiment of Pan-hellenic brotherhood— {and that in teaching hira the art of persuasion,^ they could not but make him feel the dependence in which he stood towards those who were to be persuaded, together with the necessity under which he lay of so conducting himself as to conciliate their good will.j The intimations given in Plato, of the enthusiastic reception which Protagoras, Prodikus, and other Sophists * met with in the various cities — the description which we read (in the dialogue called Protagoras) of the impatience of the youthful Hippokrates, on hearing of the arrival of that Sophist, insomuch that he awakens Sokrates before daylight, in order to obtain an introduction to the new- comer and profit by his teaching — the readiness of such rich young men to pay money, and to devote time and trouble, for the Great repu- tation of the Sophists — evidence of respect for intellect and of a good state of public sentiment. 1 See Isokr. Or. xv. De Perm. s. 218, 233, 2:55, 245, 254, 257. 2 Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 13. p. 25 D. ' See tbe.se points strikingly put by Isokrates — in tbe Orat. xv. De Permu- tatione, tbrougbout, especially in sect. 294, 297, 305, 307— and again by Xe- noph. Memorab. i. 2, 10, in reference to the teaching of Sokrates. * See a striking passage in Plato's Re- public. X. c. 4. p. 600 C. Chap. LXVJI. ESTIMATION OF THE SOPHISTS. 97 purpose of acquiring a personal superiority apart from their wealth and station — the ardour with which Kallias is represented as employing his house for the hospitable entertainment, and his fortune for the aid, of the Sopliists — all this makes upon my mind an impression directly the reverse of that ironical and con- temptuous phraseology with which it is set forth by Plato. Such Sophists had nothing to recommend them except superior know- ledge and intellectual force, combined with an imposing personality, making itself felt in their lectures and conversation. It is to this that the admiration was shown ; and the fact that it was so shown, brings to view the best attributes of the Greek, especially the Athenian mind. It exhibits those qualities of which Perikles made emphatic boast in his celebrated funeral oration ' — con- ception of public speech as a practical thing, not meant as an excuse for inaction, but combined with energetic action, and turning it to good account by full and open discussion beforehand — profound sensibility to the charm of manifested intellect, without enervating the powers of execution or endurance. Assuredly a man like Protagoras, arriving in a city with all his train of admiration laid before him, must have known very little of his own interest or position,, if he began to preach a low or corrupt morality. If it be true generally, as Voltaire has reiparked, that " any man who should come to preach a relaxed morality would be pelted," much more would it be true of a Sophist like Pro- tagoras, arriving in a foreign city with all the prestige of a great intellectual name, and with the imagination of youths on fire to hear and converse with him, — that any similar doctrine would destroy his reputation at once. Numbers of teachers have made Itheir reputation by inculcating overstrained asceticism ; it will be ttiard to find an example of success in the opposite vein.^ 1 Thucyd. ii. 40. v avOpanreicov ad Sif\4yero, cr k o- TT wv, Ti eiiiTe/Ses, r i atreySe'y t'l KaXhv, tI aicTxp^"- ri SiKatoy, t'l &Sikov Ti afSpia, Ti SeL\ia' ti (Tccv axiv rois av- vovcri, Ti fKacTTov etr) t u v 6 v- T 0} V, V S 4 TT o r' i Kt] y €. 1 Aristopli. Nubes, 105, 121, 362, 414; Aves, 1282; Eupolis, Fragment. lucert. ix., X., xi., ap. Meineke, p. 552; Ameip- sias, Fi-agmenta, Konnus, p. 703, Meineke — Diogen. Laert. ii. 28. The later comic ^\Titers ridiculed the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeuo the Stoic, on gi-ouuds very similar: see Diogenes Laert. vii. 1, 24. 104 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. member of the Senate of Five Hundred, and one of the Prytanes on that memorable day when the proposition of Kalbxenus against the six generals was submitted to the public assembly. His determined refusal, in spite of all personal hazard, to put an unconstitutional question to the vote, has been already recounted. That during his long life he strictly obeyed the laws,^ is proved by the fact that none of his numerous enemies ever arraigned him before a court of justice : that he discharged all the duties of an upright man and a brave as well as pious citizen, may also be confidently asserted. His friends lay especial stress upon his piety, that is upon his^xact discharge of all the religious duties considered as incumbent upon an Athenian.^ Though these points are requisite to be established, in order that we may rightly interpret the character of Sokrates Leading ., n t tit i-ii- • i. peculiarities — it IS uot trom them that lie has derived his eminent place in history. Three peculiarities distinguish the man. 1. His long life passed in contented poverty, and in public, apostolic, dialectics. 2. His strong religious persuasion — or belief of acting under a mission and signs from the gods ; especially his Daemon or Genius — the special religious warning of which he believed himself to be frequently the subject. 3. His great intellectual originality, both of subject and of method, and his power of stirring and forcing the germ of inquiry and ratiocina- tion in others. Though these three characteristics were so blended in Sokrates that it is not easy to consider them separately — yet in each respect, he stood distinguished from all Greek philosophers before or after him. At what time Sokrates relinquished his profession as a statuary, w^e do not know : but it is certain that all the middle Ills constant ' . . „ , , i • i publicity of and later part of his life, at least, was devoted exclusively discriminate to the sclf-imposcd task of teaching ; excluding all other conversation. ,. ,f,. . ,, , /•n business, pubhc or private, and to the neglect ot all means of fortune. We can hardly avoid speaking of him as a teacher, though he himself disclaimed the appellation:^ his practice was to talk or converse — to prattle or prose,"^ if we translate ' Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 1. Nur; eycb ■Kpwrov tTrl SiKa(TT7]piov ava^i^y)Ka, €Tf) yeyovws ■rrXeica efiSo/XT^KOvra. 2 Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 2-20 ; i. 3, 3 Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21. p. 33 A. iyw 5e 5i5a(TKa\os /xev ovSevhs irtoTrore iyivuixT]v: compare c. 4. p. 19 E. Xenoph. Memor. iii. 11, 16. Sokrates — iTTiffKuiTTTdov T71V ko-VTOv aTTpay/iioavvriv —Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18. p. 31 B. ■* ' A5o\ecrxe7v — see Ruhnken's Anim- adversiones in Xenoph. Memor. p. 293. of Schneider's edition of that ti'eatise. Compare Plato, Sophistcs, c. 23. p. 225 E. Chap. LXVIII. NOTORIETY OF SOKRATES. 105 the derisory word by which the enemies of philosophy described dialectic conversation. Early in the morning he frequented the public walks, the gymnasia for bodily training, and the schools where youths were receiving instruction. He was to be seen in the market-place at the hour when it was most crowded, among the booths and tables where goods were exposed for sale : his whole day was usually spent in this public manner.^ lie talked with any one, young or old, rich or poor, who sought to address him, and in the hearing of all who chose to stand by. Not only he never either asked or received any reward, but he made no distinction of persons, never withheld his conversation from any one, and talked upon the same general topics to all. He con- versed with politicians, Sophists, military men, artisans, ambitious or studious youths, &c. He visited all persons of interest in the city, male or female : his friendship with Aspasia is well known, and one of the most interesting chapters^ of Xenophon's Memo- rabilia recounts his visit to, and dialogue with, Theodote — a beautiful Hetaera or Female Companion. Nothing could be more public, perpetual, and indiscriminate as to persons, than his con- versation. But as it was engaging, curious, and instructive to hear, certain persons made it their habit to attend him in public as companions and listeners. These men, a fluctuating body, were commonly known as his disciples or scholars ; though neither he nor his personal friends ever employed the terms teacher and disciple to describe the relation between them.^ Many of them came, attracted by his reputation, during the later years of his life, from other Grecian cities ; Megara, Thebes, Elis, Kyrene, &c. 1 Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. 1. p. 17 D; 18. p. 31 A. olov Srj jxoi SoKe7, 6 Ofhs i/xe rrj Tr6\ft irpocrredei- K^vai towvtSv riva, ts v/xcis iydpocv Kal we'iOwv, Kol ovfiSi^cov eva iKacTTOv, ovSev, iravofxai, t 7] u 7] fXf p av SAtjc iraj'- TOXoS irpoffKaOl^coy. 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 11. ' Xenophon in his Memorabilia speaks always of the companions of Sokrates, uot of his disciples — ol awovres al/rc^ — 01 cTvvovffiacTTat (i. 6, 1) — ol (rvvSiarpl- l3ovTes — 01 (TvyyLyvofjLevoi — ol ercupoi — ol o/xiXovvTes avTCfi — ol ffvvr\deis (iv. 8, 2) — ol fjiiQ' avTov (iv. 2, 1) — ol iindvfxiiTai (i. 2, GO). Aristippus also, iu speaking to Plato, talked of Sokrates as 6 tralpos 7)1X0)1' — Aristot. Rhetor, ii. 24. His ene- mies spoke of his disciplos, in au invi- dious sense — Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 21, p. 33 A. It is not to be believed that any com- panions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to So- krates at Athens, during the last year.s of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theajtetus re- presents Eukleidos of Megai-a as allud- ing to his conversations witli Sokrates only a short time before the death of the latter (Phito, Theoctetus, c. 2. p. 142 E.). The story given by Auliis Gellius — that Eukleides came to visit Sokrates by night in woman's clothes, from Megara to Athens — seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (De Mega- ricorum Doctrinii, p. 5) is inclined to believe it. /" 106 HISTORY OF GREECE. - Taut II. Now no other person in Athens, or in any other Grecian city, appears ever to have manifested himself in this perpetual Keason why .... . „ . sokrates was and indiscriminate manner as a public talker for mstruc- shown up by . '■ p i • i Aristophanes tiou. All tcachcrs Cither took money for their lessons, on the stage. , , p i i • i • or at least gave them apart trom the multitude m a private house or garden, to special pupils, with admissions and rejections at their own pleasure. By the peculiar mode of life which Sokrates pursued, not only his conversation reached the minds of a much wider circle, but he became more abundantly known as a person. While acquiring a few attached friends and admirers, and raising a certain intellectual interest in others, he at the same time provoked a large number of personal enemies. This was probably the reason why he was selected by Aristophanes and the other comic writers, to be attacked as a general repre- sentative of philosophical and rhetorical teaching ; the more so, as his marked and repulsive physiognomy admitted' so well of being imitated in the mgfsk which the actor wore. The audience at the theatre would more readily recognise the peculiar figure which they were accustomed to see every day in the market-place, than if Prodikus or Protagoras, whom most of them did not know by sight, had been brought on the stage. It was of little importance either to them or to Aristophanes, whether Sokrates was repre- sented as teaching what he did really teach, or something utterly different. This extreme publicity of life and conversation was one among His per- the characteristics of Sokrates, distinguishing him from suasion of , . i c f i • -vt i • a special all tcachcrs either beiore or alter hira. JNext was, his religious . „ ..... . . i. • i. • mission. pcrsuasiou 01 a special religious mission, restraints, im- pulses, and communications, sent to him by the gods. Taking the belief in such supernatural intervention generally, it was indeed noway peculiar to Sokrates : it was the ordinary faith of the ancient world, insomuch that the attempts to resolve phaenomena into general laws were looked upon with a certain disapprobation, as indirectly setting it aside. And Xenophon^ accordingly avails himself of such general fact, in replying to the indictment for religious innovation of which his master was found guilty, to affirm that the latter pretended to nothing beyond what was included in the creed of every pious man. But this is not an exact statement of the matter in debate ; for it slurs over at least, if it does not deny, that speciality of inspiration from the gods, which those who 1 Xeuoph. Mem. i. 1, 2, 3. CiiAP. LXVIII. SPECIAL MISSION FPvOM THE GODS. 107 talked with Sokrates (as we learn even from Xenophon) believed, and which Sokrates himself believed also.^ V'ery different is his own representation, as put forth in the defence before the Dikas- tery. lie had been accustomed constantly to hear, even from his childhood, a divine voice ; interfering, at moments when he was about to act, in the way of restraint, but never in the way of insti- gation. Such prohibitory warning was wont to come upon him very frequently, not merely on great, but even on small occasions, intercepting what he was about to do or to say.^ Though later writers speak of this as the daemon or genius of Sokrates, he him- self does not personify it, but treats it merely as a " divine sign, a prophetic or supernatural voice." ^ He was accustomed not only ' See the conversation of Sokrates (reported by Xenophon, Mem. i. 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods — "What Kill be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokrates) that the gods care about you ? " " When they send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you (replies Aristodemus), to tell me what to do, and what not to do." To which Sokrates replied, that they answer the questions of the Atlienians, by re- plies of the oracle — and that they send prodigies {repara) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court {OepaTreviiy) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitory information about doubtful events (i. 4, 18). So again in his conversation with Eu- thydemus, the latter says to him — Sol 5e, d> SaJKpares, io'iKaaiv eri cpiXtKoo- repoy ^ To7s aWois xPVC^O'h o'lye /UTjSe iirepooTw/ji.ei'oi virh crov Trpocrr]- ixaivovffiv, iiTe XP^ iroalv Koi & (jlt] (iv. o, 12). Compare i. 1, 19 ; and iv. 8, 11 — where the fact of perpetual communica- tion and advice from the gods is em- ployed as an evidence to prove the su- perior piety of Sokrates. 2 Plato, Ap. Sok. 0. 19. p. 31 D. TovTov 5e a'lTi.6v iffriv (that is, the rea- son why Sokrates had never entered on public life) & v fj.e7 s i fMov w oWd k is a KTi K 6 ar e w oWaxo v \('yovTos, OTL fxoi 6f16v ri KCLi ha.ijx6viov ylyperai, t 5?) Kal iv rfj ypa(pfj iiriKCtifj.CiiSaii' MeATjTOs iypd^aTO. 'Efiol 5e tout' iaTiv 4 k ttoi- Sbs a p^d fxs V V, (pdivt] iis yiyvo^evrt, ^ '6Tav yivr\Tai, a.i\ diroTpeTrei /ue tovtov h &v jXfWu TrpaTTeiv, irpOTpiirei 5e ov- ■KOTe. ToCt' iariv '6 /xoi ivavriovTai ra woXiTiKO, TrpaTTeiv. Again, c. 31. p. 40 A, he tells the Di- kasts, after his condemnation — 'H yap flcadvld fxoL fxavTiKr] i] tov Zaijiovlov i v fxfv T cfi IT p Off e V xp^^V tto-vtI ■K av V TT V KVT] a el ?i v Ka\ ir dvv 4 it I ff /x t K po7s fvavTiovfji.evr], ejf ri H e Wo I /x I /MT} 6 p 6 a> s tt p d^e iv. Nuj/i Se ^vfi^e^riKe fiot, dirfp opare koX ahrol, TauTi, a ye Sr; olr]6fir] &v rts Kal vojxi^erat ccxttTa kukSiv elvai. 'E/j.o\ Si ovre il'iovTi ewOev otKoQiv rjvavrididr] r h TOV 6 e u ff -t) fj. el V, ovre T}viKa avi- ^aivov ivTavOo7 4irl rb SiKaffrripiov, ovt' iv rcf \6yci) /xeWovrl ri ipuv k a 'it o i iv 6.W01S \6yois TToWaxov S r) /X6 eir e ff x^ \iy vt a fx st a^v. He goes on to infer that his line of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit — seeing that the sign has not manifested itself. I agree in the opinion of Schleier- macher (in his Preface to his translation of the Apology of Sokrates, part i. vol. ii. p. '185, of his general translation of Plato's works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokrates actually said to the Dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher, there is one which may be noticed. So- krates predicts to the Dikasts, that if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put them- selves forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30. p. 39 D). Now there is no reason to believe that such prediction was realized. If therefore Plato puts an ei'roneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokrates, this is probably because Sokrates really made one. 3 The words of Soki-ates plainly indi- 108 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. to obey it implicitly, but to speak of it publicly and familiarly to others, so that the fact was well known both to his friends and to his enemies. It had always forbidden him to enter on public life : it forbade him, when the indictment was hanging over him, to take any thought for a prepared defence : - and so completely did he march with a consciousness of this bridle in his mouth, that when he felt no check, he assumed that the turning which he was about to take was the right one. Though his persuasion on the subject was unquestionably sincere, and his obedience constant — yet he never dwelt upon it himself as anything grand or awful, or entitling him to pecuhar deference ; but spoke of it often in his usual strain of familiar playfulness. To his friends generally, it seems to have constituted one of his titles to reverence, though neither Plato nor Xenophon scruples to talk of it in that jesting way which doubtless they caught from himself.- But to his ene- mies and to the Athenian public, it appeared in the light of an offensive heresy ; an impious innovation on the orthodox creed, and a desertion of the recognized gods of Athens. Such was the Daemon or Genius of Sokrates as described by himself and as conceived in the genuine Platonic dia- His'Dsemon or Genius- other inspi' or Genius— jogues ; a voicc always prohibitory, and bearing exclu- sively upon his own ])ersonal conduct.^ That which Plutarch and other admirers of Sokrates conceived as a Daemon or intermediate Being between gods and men, was looked upon by the fathers of the Christian church as a devil — by Le Clerc as one of the fallen angels — by some other modern commentators, as mere ironical phraseology on the part of Sokrates himself.* With- cate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher — appended to his translation of the Platonic Apology — Platons Werke, part i. vol. ii. p. 432. 1 Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8, 5. 2 Xenoph. Sympos. viii. 5 ; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5. p. 272 E. 3 See Plato (Thetetet. c. 7. p. 151 A ; Phsednas, c. 20. p. 242 C; Republic, vi. 10. p. 496 C) — in addition to the above citations from the Apology. The passage in the Euthyphron (c. 2. 129). Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice ge- nerally as a divine communication with instruction and advice to Sokrates, so that he often prophesied to his friends and was always right (Memor. i. 1, 2-4; iv. 8, 1). * See Dr. Forster's note on the Eu- thyphron of Plato, c. 2. p. 3. The treatise of Plutarch (De Genio Socratis) is full of speculation on tho p. 3 B) is somewhat less specific. The subject, but contains nothing about it Pseudo-Platonic dialogue Theages re- which can be relied tipon as matter of tains the strictly prohibitory attribute fact. There are various stories about of the voice, as never in any ease im- | prophecies made by Sokrates, and vei-i- pelling ; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokrates himself, but refen-ing to the conduct of his friends also (Theages, c. 11, 12, p. 128, fied by the event, c. 11. p. 582. See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller, Philo- sophic der Griechen, v. ii. p. 25-28. CuAP. LXVIII. ORACLE FROM DELPHI. 109 out presuming to determhie tlie question raised in the former hypotheses, I believe that the last is untrue, and that the conviction of Sokrates on the point was quite sincere. A circumstance little attended to, but deserving peculiar notice, and stated by himself — is, that the restraining voice began when he was a child, and con- tinued even down to the end of his life : it had thus become an established persuasion, long before his philosophical habits began. But though this peculiar form of inspiration belonged exclusively to him, there were also other ways in which he believed himself to have received the special mandates of the gods, not simply checking him when he was about to take a wrong turn, but spurring him on, directing, and peremptorily exacting from him, a positive course of proceeding. Such distinct mission had been imposed upon him by dreams, by oracular intimations, and by every other means which the gods employed for signifying their special will.^ Of these intimations from the oracle, he specifies particularly one, in reply to a question put at Delphi, by his intimate oracie from friend, and enthusiastic admirer, Chaerephon. The ques- ^larl'ngtbat tion put was, whether any other man was wiser than "IseriLair* Sokrates ; to which the Pythian priestess replied, that ^'^■ no other man was wiser.^ Sokrates affii'ms that he was greatly perplexed on hearing this declaration from so infallible an autho- rity, — being conscious to himself that he possessed no wisdom on any subject, great or small. At length, after much meditation and a distressing mental struggle, he resolved to test the accuracy of the infallible priestess, by taking measure of the wisdom of others as compared with his own. Selecting a leading politician, accounted wise both by others and by himself, he proceeded to converse with him and put scrutinising questions ; the answers to which satisfied him, that this man's supposed wisdom was really no wisdom at all. Having made such a discovery, Sokrates next tried to demonstrate to the politician himself how much he wanted of being wise ; but this was impossible : the latter still remained as fully persuaded of his own wisdom as before. " The result which I acquired (says Sokrates) was, that I was a wiser man than he, for neither he nor I knew anything of what was truly good and honourable ; but the difference between us was, that he fancied ' Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 22. p. 33 C. 'E^ol ] tr a^f it pdrr e iv. 5e TovTO, ois iyu (prifxi, irpoffTeTaKrai vnb \ • Plato, Apol. Sok. C. 5. p. 21 A. So- rov 6eov Trpdrreiv koI 4 k fxavr e iw v krates offers to produce the testimony Koi «' I ivv-Kviuv, Kol Travrl r p 6 ir (f j of the brother of Chajrephon (the latter (firtp tIs it or e k a\ &\Xt] 6 ela ^ himself beiug dead) to attest the reality jitorpo a v p (!) ir Cfi Kal dr lovv w pocr- [ of this question and answer. 110 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. he knew them, while I was fully conscious of my ovra ignorance : I was thus wiser than he, inasmuch as I was exempt from that capital error." So far therefore the oracle was proved to be right. Sokrates repeated the same experiment successively upon a great number of different persons, especially those in reputation for dis- tinguished abilities ; first, upon political men and rhetors, next upon poets of every variety, and upon artists as well as artisans. The result of his trial was substantially the same in all cases. The poets indeed composed splendid verses, but when questioned even about the words, the topics, and the purpose, of their own compo- sitions, they could give no consistent or satisfactory explanations : so that it became evident that they spoke or wrote, like prophets, as unconscious subjects under the promptings of inspiration. Moreover their success as poets filled them with a lofty opinion of their own wisdom on other points also. The case was similar with artists and artisans ; who, while highly instructed, and giving satisfactory answers, each in his own particular employment, were for that reason only the more convinced that they also knew well other great and noble subjects. This great general mistake more than countervailed their special capacities, and left them, on the whole, less wise than Sokrates.^ " In this research and scrutiny (said Sokrates on his defence) I His mission havc bccn loug eugao^ed, and am still engaged. I inter- to test the ^ r i ^- T u- ^ a, false conceit Togatc every man oi reputation : 1 prove nim to be others. ° defective in wisdom ; but I cannot prove it so as to make him sensible of the defect. Fufilling the mission imposed upon me, I have thus established the veracity of the god, who meant to pronounce that human wisdom was of little reach or worth, and that he who, like Sokrates, felt most convinced of his own worthlessness as to wisdom, was really the wisest of men.^ My service to the god has not only constrained me to live in con- stant poverty^ and neglect of political estimation, but has brought upon me a host of bitter enemies in those whom I have examined and exposed ; while the bystanders talk of me as a wise man, because they give me credit for wisdom respecting all the points on which my exposure of others turns." — " Whatever be the ' Plato, Ap. Sok. C. 7, 8. p. 22. | koI ipeww KaTO. rhv Oehv, Koi rSiv affTav "^ Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9. p. 23. I give ' Koi twv ^4vuv 6.v riva oXicfiai crocphv elvai, here the sense rather than the exact | koI iTreiSdv fxoi fXTj Soktj. t^ 6 e ai fiorj- words — OvTos iifxccv ffo(p(i)TaT6s iffriv„ Q Si v ivSe'iKvvfjLai on ovk (crri ovvTd, fx.€ 5f7v ^^y, Koi i^era- (ovTa i/xavrbv koi rovs &Wovs, ivravOa Se (po$T]de\s f) Oavarov ^ &\Ko 6riovv Trpayfxa Xi'Koift.i T-qv Ta^iv. 2 Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17. p. 29 C. s Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18. p. 30 D. * Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28. p. 38 A. 'Eoj/ T6 yap Ktyoj, '6ti t^ 6e^ aneiOuv tout' sctt], Kcd Sia TOVT aSvyaTov rjcrvxiai' &yeiv, oil ireifffffde fj.01 iii eipu)i'evofJ.ey(f 4dv r' ai/ \4yw '6ti koL Tvyxo.yei fj.4yiTrov yvdiixij alperda ii'6- \ ti.v t\4cj) &jt, ffrj/j-airetv. ijLiCiv flvat- Ta 5e /.liy terra roiv eV ' 118 HISTOIIY OF GEEECP:. Tart II. of the inno- vation — rnultituilo of new and accessible phajnoraena brought under dis- cussion. evidences of their care for the human race.^ To seek access to these prophecies, or indications of special divine intervention to come, was the proper supplementary business of any one who had done as much for himself as could be done by patient study. ^ But as it was madness in a man to solicit special information from the gods on matters which they allowed him to learn by his own diligence — so it was not less madness in him to investigate as a learner that which they chose to keep back for their own specialty of will.=* Such was the capital innovation made by Sokrates in regard to Importance the subjcct of xitheniau study, bringing down philoRophy (to use the expression of Cicero) ** from the heavens to the earth ; and such his attempt to draw the line between that which was, and was not, scientifically discoverable : an attempt, remarkable, inasmuch as it shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began the former ended. It was an innovation, inestimable, in respect to the new matter which it let in ; of little import, as regards that which it professed to exclude. For in point of fact, physical science, though partially discouraged, was never absolutely excluded, through any prevalence of that systematic disapproval which he, in common with the multitude of his day, entertained. If it became comparatively neglected, this arose rather from the greater popularity, and the more abundant and accessible matter, of that which he introduced. Physical or astronomical science was narrow in amount, known only to few ; and even with those few it did not admit of being expanded, enlivened, or turned to much profitable account in discussion. But the moral and political phsenomena, on which Sokrates turned the light of speculation, were abundant, varied, familiar, and interesting to every one ; comprising (to translate a Greek line which he was fond of quoting) " all the good and evil which has befallen you in your home ; ^ " connected too, not merely with the realities of the present, but also with the literature of the past, through the gnomic and other poets. The motives which determined this important innovation, as to ' Xeuoph. Mem. i. 4, 15; iv. 3, 12. When Xenoplion was deliberating whe- tber he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokrates, who advised him to go to Deljihi and submit the case to the oracle (Xen. Anabas. iii. 1, 5). ^ Xeuoph. Mem. iv. 7, 10. 3 Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 9 ; iv. 7, 6. ■* Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 4, 10. ^ "Otti toi eV /.ifydpotcri KaK6v t' d^a- Qov T6 rervKTai. Chap. LXVllI. LOGICAL DISTRIBUTION. 119 Innovations of Sokrates as to method — dialectic method — inductive discourses — subject of study, exhibit Sokrates chiefly as a religious man and a practical, philanthropic preceptor — the Xenophontic hero. His innovations, not less important, as to method and doctrine, place before us the philosopher and dialectician — the other side of his character, or the Platonic hero ; faintly traced indeed, yet still recognised and identified, by Xenophon. " Sokrates (says the latter ^ ) continued incessantly discussing human affairs (the sense of this word will be understood by what has been said above, p. 116), investigating — What is piety? What is impiety? What is the honour- able and the base ? What is the just and the unjust ? What is temperance, or unsound mind ? What is courage ^definitions, or cowardice ? \Vhat is a city ? What is the character fit for a citizen ? What is authority over men ? What is the character befitting the exercise of such authority? and other similar questions. Men who knew these matters he accounted good and honourable ; men who were ignorant of them he assimilated to slaves." Sokrates (says Xenophon again, in another passage) considered that the dialectic process consisted in coming together and taking common counsel to distinguish and distribute things into Genera or Families, so as to learn what each separate thing really was. To go through this process carefully was indispensable, as the only way of enabling a man to regulate his own conduct, aiming at good objects and avoiding bad. To be so practised as to be able to do it readily, was essential to make a man a good leader or adviser of others. Every man who had gone through the process, and come to know what each thing was, could also of course define it and explain it to others ; but if he did not know, it was no wonder that he went wrong himself, and put others wrong besides.^ Moreover, Aristotle says — " To Sokrates we may 1 Xenopli. Mem. i. 1, 16. - Xeuoph. Mem. iv. 5, 11, 12. 'A\Xa ToTs iyKpareffi fx6vois eletrri (TKoireTv ra Kpariara riov ■Kpa.ynaTuiv, Koi K 6 y c^ k ai epycf) SiaAeyovras Kara yfvr), TO fiev ayaOa TrpoaipeTcrOai, twv Se KaKUiv anex^ffOai. Ka.l ovtws t^r) apiffTovs re Koi iv'SaifxavfCTTaTOvs avSpas ylyvfcrdai, Kol S ia\ ey ( ff 6 ai SwaTcoTUTOvs. E7j Bav/xacTTOv fluat, aiiTovs Se acpdWecOai koI &Wovs ffCpdWfiy. ^nv iViKO. (TKOTTOOV (TVU ToTs (Tuvovat, Ti '^KaffTov fXri tS>v ovtwv, ovSe- ttot' lAr)76- rio^'Ta fj.fv ovv, fi S tw p l- ^eTO, iro\v tLV tpyov elfrj Zn^iXdiiv iv Sffots Se Ka\ t6v Trpoirov ttjs iirtffKi^ews S-qKcicreiv olfiat, Toaavra \4^(a). 120 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. Commence- ment of ana- lytical con- sciousness of the mental operations — genera and species. unquestionably assign two novelties — Inductive Discourses — and the Definitions of general terms.^ " I borrow here intentionally from Xenophon in preference to Plato; since the former, tamely describing a process which he imperfectly appreciated, identifies it so much the more completely with the real Sokrates — and is thus a better witness than Plato, whose genius not only conceived but greatly enlarged it for didactic purposes of his own. In our present state of knowledge, some mental effort is required to see anything important in the words of Xenophon ; so familiar has every student been rendered with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification, — such as Genus — Definition — Individual things as comprehended in a Genus — what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, &c. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process, of which, in 440-430 b. c, few men besides Sokrates had any conscious perception. Of course men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form and language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. They explained their meaning clearly and forcibly in particular cases : they laid down maxims, argued questions, stated premises, and drew conclusions, on trials in the Dikastery, or debates in the assembly : they had an abundant poetical literature, which appealed to every variety of emotion : they were beginning to compile historical narrative, intermixed with reflection and criticism. But though all this was done, and often admirably well done, it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men — speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude — were asso- 1 Aristot. Metaphys. i. 6, 3. p. 987 b. "XcDK parous 5e Trepl /x€v ra r]diKa irpay/xu- revo/xevov, irepl 5e ttjs oArjs (pvaews ouSiv iv IJLeVTOl TOI/TOIS TO KaQoKoV Qt]TOVVTOS /cal Trepl bpicrfx-wv iTricrrriaavTos Trpurov T^v Ziavoiav, &c. Again, xiii. 4, 6-8. p. 1078 b. Avo yap eariv a rty Uv airoSoiri 2&>/cpdT6i SiKaltes, r ov s r en a kt i- Kovs \6yovs Kal to 6 p I (e ff 6 ai KaOoKov : compare xiii. 9, 35. p. Iu86 b ; Cicero, Topic, x. 42. These two attributes, of tlie discus- sions carried on by Sokrates, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the accurate talkers or precisians — E/c fi apa riov aTTeVAtre At0o^oo5, .efi'O/xo- 'H.KXrji'uiv cTTaoiSbs a/cpi^oAdyous aTro- <#) jj I' a s, TilvKrqp, pr)Top6ixvKTO^ , VTraTTiKos, eipwf evri)s . (ap. Diog. Laert. ii. 19.) To a large proportion of hearers of that time (as of other times), accurate thinkiwj aiul talking appeared petty and in bad taste — ri aKpi^oKoyia jxiKpoTrpeiris (Aristot. Ethic. IS'ikomacli. iv. 4. p. 1122 b; also Aristot. Metaphys. ii. 3. p. 995 a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (The- sctet. c. 102. p. 184 C). No doubt Timon used the word aKpi-^oKoyovs in a sneering sense. CuAP. LXVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF ANALYSIS. 121 dated together in groups favourable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical, narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalisation, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, compare, and rectify, their own mental process, was only just beginning. It was a recent novelty on the part of the rhetorical teachers, to analyse the component parts of a public harangue, and to propound some precepts for making men tolerable speakers. Protagoras was just setting forth various grammatical distinctions, while Prodikus discriminated the signifi- cations of words nearly equivalent and liable to be confounded. All these proceedings appeared then so new ' as to incur the ridicule even of Plato : yet they were branches of that same analytical tendency which Sokrates now carried into scientific inquiry. It may be doubted whether any one before him ever used the words Genus and Species (originally meaning Family and Form) in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names (called by logicians names of the second intention), which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticise it in detail — then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Sokrates. To comprehend the full value of the improvements struck out bv Sokrates, we have only to examine the intellectual sokratfs •' 1 1 1 • 1 • compared paths pursued by his predecessors or contemporaries, -nithpre- T-r i«i(«T' 1 • n 11 vious philo- He set to himselt distinct and specitic problems — sophers. " What is justice ? What is piety, courage, political government ? What is it which is really denoted by such great and important names, bearing upon the conduct or happiness of man ? " Now it has been already remarked that Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Demo- kritus, the Pythagoreans, all had still present to their minds those vast and undivided problems which had been transmitted down from the old poets ; bending their minds to the invention of some system which would explain them all at once, or assist the imagina- tion in conceiving both how the Kosmos first began, and how it ' How slowly gi-ammatical analysis \ haliu, Geschichte der Klassischen Phi- proceeded amoug the Greeks, aud how , lologic im Alterthum, s. 89-92, &c. loug it was before they got at what are j On this point, these Soj^hists seem to now elementary ideas in every instructed j have been decidedly in advance of their man's mind — mav be seen in Griifen- I age. 122 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. continued to move on.^ Ethics and physics, man and nature, were all blended together ; and the Pythagoreans, who explained all Nature by numbers and numerical relations, applied the same explanation to moral attributes — considering justice to be sym- bolised by a perfect equation, or by four, the first of all square numbers.^ These early philosophers endeavoured to find out the beginnings, the component elements, the moving cause or causes, of things in the mass ; ^ but the logical distribution into Genus, Species, and individuals, does not seem to have suggested itself to them, or to have been made a subject of distinct attention by any 1 Tliis same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as Phj^sics, is discernible in the Hippo- kratic treatises, and even in the treatise de Antiqua Medicina, which M. Littre places first in his edition, and considers to be the production of Hippokrates himself, in which case it would be con- temporary with Sokrates. On this sub- ject of authoi'ship, however, other cri- tics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i. eh. xii. p. 295 scq. Hippokrates (if he be the author) begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. '2), and farther protests against the pi-o- cedure of various medical writers and Sophists, or philosophers, such as Em- pedokles, who set themselves to make out "what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed" (c. 20). This does not belong (he says) to medi- cine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing refer- ence to its own end: "You ought to study the nature of man, what he is with reference to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupa- tions or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each" — o,ti icrnv &v6pcii- TTOS TTpbs TO, icr6i6/j.€va koI TnvSjxeva, koX o,Tt -nphs TO &.K\a iiriTriSii/fxaTa, Koi o,ti av dp er w v rijv goreans, that they referred the virtues 6 e cop lav iiroie7ro (Ethic. Magn. i. 1). to number and numerical relations — not \ ^ Plato, Phsedon, c. 102 seq. p. 96, giving to them a theory of their oWn — | 97. ras yap aperas els tovs apiBfioiis ava-ywv . J-. 124 ' HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. (lialogists answers implying complete inattention to it, exposed afterwards in the course of the dialogue by Sokrates.^ What was now begun by Sokrates, and improved by Plato, was embodied as part in a comprehensive system of formal logic by the genius of Aristotle ; a system which was not only of extraordinary value in reference to the processes and controversies of its time, but which also, having become insensibly worked into the minds of instructed men, has contributed much to form what is correct in the habits of modern thinking. Though it has been now enlarged and recast, by some modern authors (especially by Mr. John Stuart Mill in his admirable System of Logic) into a structure commensurate with the vast increase of knowledge and extension of positive method belonging tQ the present day — we must recollect that the distance, between the best modern logic and that of Aristotle, is hardly so great as that between Aristotle and those who preceded him by a century — Erapedokles, Anaxagoras, and the Pythago- reans; and that the movement in advance of these latter com- mences with Sokrates. By Xenophon, by Plato, and by Aristotle, the growth as well as Dialectical the liabitual use of logical classification is represented as ployed by concuiTent with and dependent upon dialectics. In this essential mcthodised discussion, so much in harmony with the between marked sociability of the Greek character, the quick method and p i j j* i jr i subject. recurrence oi short question and answer was needtul as a stimulus to the attention, at a time when the habit of close and accurate reflection on abstract subjects had been so little cultivated. But the dialectics of Sokrates had far greater and more important peculiarities than this. We must always consider his method in conjunction with the subjects to which he applied it. As those subjects were not recondite or special, but bore on the practical life ' Aa one specimen among many, see ' Little stress is to be laid on this cir- Plato, Thesetet. c. 11. p. 146 D. It is cumstance, I think; and the terms in maintained by Brandis, and in part by which Xenophon describes the method C. Heyder (see Heyder, Kritische Dar- of Sokrates {5ia\4yovras /caret -yeyyi to stellung und Vergleichung der Aristo- Trpdyixara, Mem. iv. 5, 12) seem to im- telischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, j ply the one process as well as the other: part i. p. 85, 129), that the logical pro- [ indeed it was scarcely possible to keep cess, called Division, is not to be con- them apart, with so abundant a talker sidered as having been employed by ] a.s Sokrates. Plato doubtless both en- Sokrates along with definition, but be- j larged and systematised the method in gins with Plato : in proof of which they i every way, and especially made greater remark that in the two Platonic dia- ! use of the process of Division, because logues called Sophistes and Politicns, he pushed the Dialogue further into wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokrates is not the conductor of the conversation. positive scientific research than So- krates. Chap. LXVIII. DIALECTICS OF SOKEATES. 125 of the house, the market-place, the city, the Dikastery, the gym- nasium, or the temple, with which every one was familiar — so Sokrates never presented himself as a teacher, nor as a man having new knowledge to communicate. On the contrary, he disclaimed such pretensions, uniformly and even ostentatiously. The subjects on which he talked were just those which every one professed to know perfectly and thoroughly, and on which every one believed himself in a condition to instruct others, rather than to require instruction for himself. On such questions as these — What is justice ? — ^Vhat is piety ? — What is a democracy ? — What is a law ? — every man fancied that he could give a con- fident opinion, and even wondered that any other person should feel a difficulty. When Sokrates, professing ignorance, put any such question, he found no difficulty in obtaining an answer, given offhand, and with very little reflection. The answer purported to be the explanation or definition of a term — familiar indeed, but of wide and comprehensive import — given by one who had never before tried to render to himself an account of what it meant. Having got this answer, Sokrates put fi^esh questions applyino- it to specific cases, to which the respondent was compelled to give answers inconsistent with the first ; thus showing that the defini- tion was either too narrow, or too wide, or defective in some essential condition. The respondent then amended his answer, but this was a prelude to other questions, which could only be answered in ways inconsistent with the amendment ; and the respondent, after many attempts to disentangle himself, was obliged to plead guilty to the inconsistencies, with an admission that he could make no satisfactory answer to the original querv, which had at first appeared so easy and familiar. Or if he did not himself admit this, the hearers at least felt it forcibly. The dialogue, as given to us, commonly ends with a result purely negative, proving that the respondent was incompetent to answer the question proposed to him, in a manner consistent and satis- factory even to himself. Sokrates, as he professed from the beginning to have no positive theory to support, so he maintains to the end the same air of a learner, who would be glad to solve the difficulty if he could, but regrets to find himself disappointed of that instruction which the respondent had promised. We see by this description of the cross-examining path of this remarkable man, how intimate was the bond of connexion between the dialectic method and the logical distribution of particulars into species and genera. The discussion first raised by Sokrates 126 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Essential connexion also between the dialectic process and the logical distribution of subject- matter — One in Many and Many in One. turns upon tlie meaning of some large generic term : the queries whereby he follows it up, bring the answer given into collision with various particulars which it ought not to comprehend, yet does — or with others which it ought to comprehend, but does not. It is in this manner that the latent and undefined cluster of association, which has grown up round a familiar terra, is as it were pene- trated by a fermenting leaven, forcing it to expand into discernible portions, and bringing the appropriate function which the term ought to fulfil, to become a subject of distinct consciousness. The inconsistencies into which the hearer is betrayed in his various answers proclaim to him the fact that he has not yet acquired any- thing like a clear and full conception of the common attribute which binds together the various particulars embraced under some term which is ever upon his lips — or perhaps enable him to detect a different fact, not less important, that there is no such common attribute, and that the generalisation is merely nominal and falla- cious. In either case, he is put upon the train of thought which leads to a correction of the generalisation, and lights him on to that which Plato ^ calls seeing the One in the Many, and the Many in the One. Without any predecessor to copy, Sokrates fell as it were instinctively into that which Aristotle- describes as the double track of the dialectic process — breaking up the One into Many and recombining the Many into One. The former duty, at once the first and the most essential, Sokrates performed directly by his analytical string of questions — the latter, or synthetical process, was one which he did not often directly undertake, but strove so to arm and stimulate the hearer's mind, as to enable him to do it for himself. This One and Many denote the logical dis- tribution of a multifarious subject-matter under generic terms, with clear understanding of the attributes implied or connoted by each terra, so as to discriminate those particulars to which it really applies. At a moment when such logical distribution was as yet novel as a subject of consciousness, it could hardly have been probed and laid out in the mind by any less stringent process than the cross-examining dialectics of Sokrates — applied to the analysis » Plato, Phaedrus, c. 109. p. 265 D ; Sophistes, c. 83. p. 253 E. - Aristot. Topic, viii. 14. p. 164, b. 2. 'Etrrl fxkv yap oiy air\u>s flireTv SiaAeKTiKhs 6 irfioTaTiKhs Kol ivcnari- k6s. 'Ecrri 5e t6 /uer TrpoTeiveaOai, ev ■TrojetJ' Ttt IT \e Iw (Set yap fv oKws \r](p6rjvai irphs h 6 \6yoi) rh 5' eVtcrra- a6ai, rh e v tt o A \ a- ^ yap Siaipe7 f) avaipel, rh fxev 5i5oi/s, rh S" ov, ruv TTpoTeivo/j-evoov. It was from Sokrates that dialectic skill derived its great exteusion and de- velopmeut (Aristot. Metaphys. xiii. 4. p. 1U78 b). Chap. LXVIIT. LARGE PUKPOSE OF SOKExiTES. 127 of some attempts at definition hastily given by respondents ; that " inductive discourse and search for (clear general notions or) defi- nitions of general terms," which Aristotle so justly points out as his peculiar innovation. I have already adverted to the persuasion of religious mission under which Sokrates acted in pursuing this system of persuasion conversation and interrogation. He probably began it misslof'in* in a tentative way,' upon a modest scale, and under the prompfin„ pressure of logical embarrassment weighing on his own h|"uiitquiaf mind. But as he proceeded, and found himself sue- ^iaali^nto cessful as well as acquiring reputation among a certain noted men. circle of friends, his earnest soul became more and more penetrated with devotion to that which he regarded as a duty. It was at this time probably, that his friend Chaerephon came back with the oracular answer from Delphi (noticed a few pages above) to which Sokrates himself alluded as having prompted him to extend the range of his conversation, and to question a class of persons whom he had not before ventured to approach — the noted politicians, poets, and artisans. He found them more confident than humbler individuals in their own wisdom, but quite as unable to reply to his queries without being driven to contradictory answers. Such scrutiny of the noted men in Athens is made to stand pro- minent in the ' Platonic Apology,' because it was the His cross- principal cause of that unpopularity which Sokrates at pu^Jse"Jfa3 once laments and accounts for before the Dikasts. It tonotelfmeli was the most impressive portion of his proceedings, .in u"j\°/rsai the eyes both of enemies and admirers, as well as the application, most flattering to his own natural temper. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to present this part of the general purpose of Sokrates — or of his divine mission, if we adopt his own language, — as if it were the whole ; and to describe him as one standing forward merely to unmask select leading men, politicians, sophists, puets, or others, who had acquired unmerited reputation, and were puffed up with foolish conceit of their own abilities, being in reality shallow and incompetent. Such an idea of Sokrates is at once inadequate and erroneous. His conversation (as I have before remarked) w'as absolutely universal and indiscriminate ; while the mental defect which he strove to rectify was one not at all peculiar ' What Plato makes Sokrates say iu | active career of Sokrates: compare the the Euthypbron, c. 12. p. 11 D — "Kkwv Hippias Minor, c. 18. p. o7o B; Laches, eljxl (To(phs, &c., may be accouuted as , c. 33. p. "200 E. true at least in the begiuuing of the | 128 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. to leadin"- men, but common to thora with the mass of mankhid — though seeming to be exaggerated in them, partly because more is expected from them, partly because the general feeling of self- estimation stands at a higher level, naturally and reasonably, in their bosoms, than in those of ordinary persons. That defect was, the " seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality," on human life with its duties, purposes, and conditions — the know- ledge of which Sokrates called emphatically " human wisdom," and regarded as essential to the dignity of a freeman ; while he treated other branches of science as above the level of man,^ and as a stretch of curiosity, not merely superfluous, but reprehensible. His warfare against such false persuasion of knowledge, in one man as well as another, upon those subjects (for with him, I repeat, we must never disconnect the method from the subjects) — clearly marked even in Xenophon, is abundantly and strikingly illustrated by the fertile genius of Plato, and constituted the true missionary scheme which pervaded the last half of his long life : a scheme far more comprehensive, as well as more generous, than those anti-Sophistic polemics which are assigned to him by so many authors as his prominent object.^ In pursuing the thread of his examination, there was no topic upon which Sokrates more frequently insisted, than the contrast between the state of men's knowledge on the general topics of man and society — and that which artists or pjofessional men pos- 1 Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-16. nJ- repiv TTore vofiiffavTes 'tKavcos ^Stj ray- Opdoireia eiSeVai ipxovrai (the physical philosophers) itrl rh irepl rSiv toiovtoiv (ppovTL^fiv r) TO /j-iv avOpcineia irapevres, TO Se Sai/j-ovia ffKOTrovPTes, r]yovvrai ra TTpOCTT^KOVTa TTpOLTTflV .... AvThs Sf irepl Twv avOpcoTTflcov a el S le \ 4- •y 6 T 0, (TKOiroiv, TL evffe^es, r'l acre/Sey, koX irepX rwv &Wcov, & rohs /xev eiSoraj rjyf'iTO KaXovs KayaOovs tlvai, tovs 5e 017^0- o ii VT as avSpairoSwdfis i.v SiKaius KfKXriadai. Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 5. p. 20 D. TjTrep iffrlv laws avOponrivrj crotpia- rep ovTL yap KivSw(vo> TavTTjv elvai ao(p6s' ovToi Se rax &'') ovs &pri. tXiyov, /ueifco riva r\ /car' &i/6p(tnrov aocplav ao(j)ol''iliv, &c. Compare c. 9. p. 23 A. ^ It is this narrow purpose that Plu- tarch a-scribes to Sokrates, Qusestiones PlatonicEe, p. 999 E : compare also Tennemann, Gesehicht. der Philos. part ii. art. i. vol. ii. p. 81. Amidst the customaiy outpouring of groundless censure against the Sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one asser- tion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokrates to put down the Sophists, since their shallow- ness and worthlessuess, after a short period of vogue, had ah'eady been de- tected by intelligent men, and was be- coming discredited. It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the ?era when Protagoras, Prodikua, Hippias, &c., reached the maximum of celebrity. And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokrates put down the Sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenes — both emanating from Sokrates — are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those sceptical and disputatious pro- pensities with which the Sophists are reproached? Chap. LXVIII. ANALOGY OF SPECIAL AETS. 129 sessed in their respective special crafts. So perpetually did he reproduce this comparison, that his enemies accused him Leading of wearing it threadbare.' Take a man of special vo- directed the cation — a carpenter, a brazier, a pilot, a musician, a a^krate^— surgeon — and examine him on the state of his profes- be"weenthe sional knowledge — you will find him able to indicate the j^^To^ns'ai^d persons from whom, and the steps by which he first duues""*^ acquired it : he can describe to you his general aim, with ^""'^^ '''^^• the particular means which he employs to realise the aim, as well as the reason why such means must be employed and why precautions must be taken to combat such and such particular obstructions : he can teach his profession to others : in matters relating to his pro- fession, he counts as an authority, so that no extra-professional person thinks of contesting the decision of a surgeon in case of disease, or of a })ilot at sea. But while such is the fact in regard to every special art, how great is the contrast in reference to the art of righteous, social, and useful living, which forms, or ought to form, the common business alike important to each and to all ! On this subject Sokrates^ remarked that every one felt perfectly well- informed, and confident in his own knowledge — yet no one knew from whom, or by what steps, he had learnt : no one had ever devoted any special reflection either to ends, or means, or obstruc- tions : no one could explain or give a consistent account of the notions in his own mind, when pertinent questions were put to him : no one could teach, another, as might be inferred (he thought) from the fact that there w-ere no professed teachers, and that the sons of the best men were often destitute of merit : every one knew for himself, and laid down general propositions confi- 1 Plato, Gorgias, c. 101. p. 491 A. Kallikles. 'n,s ael ravTo, Keyeis, Si ^(iiKparfs. Sokrates. Ou ixSvov ye, & Ka\\tK\i7s, aWa irepl ruv avrwv. Kal- likles. Nt) Toiis deovs, aTfx"^^ ye afl 12-14. p. 108, 109, 110, c. 20. p. 113 CD. Xenoph. Mem. iii. 5, 21, 22 ; iv. 2, 20-23; iv. 4, 5 ; iv. 6, 1. Of these passages, iv. 2, 20, 23 is among the most (T KVT 4 a s Kal Ky a

v ehSai/xoves iffovrai — koX ovKiTi TrpoffSe? ip4(Tdai. "van. Se PovXeTai evdaifiwy elvai. ; aWa reAoj SoKet ex^"' T] airiKpicns ; compare Euthydem. c. 20. p. 279 A; c, 25. p. 281 D. Plato, Alkibiades, ii. c. 13. p. 145 C. "OffTis 6.pa Ti tSiv ToiovTwv oiSev, eay fxev TrapeTTTjTai avrcp rj rov ^ f \t i- € \i fx.0 V — T4povs koi irpetr^vTe- povs, /nTJTe (Tu>y.a.TWV iTnfJLi\u(T8ci.i /uvjre Xp7),uaTa)j' -Kponpov /tiTjre ovra a(po5pa, us T7)S ypVXV^t OTTWS WS apKTTT] IcTaf Kiyoiv OTi ovK 4k xPVH-°'''^^f aperri ylyvf- TOt, oAA' e| a p er TJ s XPVH-^^'''^ '"'' T^AAa ayaOa toTs avOpwTTOis a-K av T a Ka\ iSia Kal 5 7} fi o a I a. Zeller (Die Philosophic der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic Ethics to human security and happiness as then' end ; while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Rom. Philosoph. ii. p. 40 seq.) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it and to explain away the direct testimony of Xeno- phon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokrates. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that "the eudaemo- nistic basis of the Sokratic Ethics dif- fers from Sophistical moral p/iilosophi/, not in principle, but only in result " (p. 61). I protest against this allusion to a Sophistical moral philosophy, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as Sophistical moral philo- sophy. Not only the Sophists were no sect or school, but farther — not one of them ever aimed (so far as we know) at establishing any ethical theory : this was the gi'eat innovation of Sokrates. But it is perfectly true, that between the preceptoi-ial exhortation of So- krates, and that of Protagoras or Pro- dikus, there was no great or material difference ; and this Zeller seems to admit. ' The existence of cases foi-ming ex- ceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Soki-ates in Xeu. Mem. iv. 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i. 6. p. 331. C, D, Ej ii. p. 382. C. Chap. LXVIII. INCULCATION OF SELF-SCRUTINY. 135 deduced from a theoretical survey of the subject-matter, and taught with precognition of the end — and mere artless, irrational, knack or dexterity, acquired by simple copying or assimilation, through a process of which no one could render account.^ Plato, with that variety of indirect allusion which is his charac- teristic, continually constrains the reader to look upon Earnestness human and social life as having its own ends and pur- sokrare^'in- ])Oses no less than each separate profession or craft ; and e^m^nation' impels him to transfer to the former that conscious ana- ^n^erLuon^ lysis as a science, and intelligent practice as an art, «p™otiiers. which are known as conditions of success in the latter.^ It was in furtherance of these rational conceptions — " Science and Art " — that Sokrates carried on his crusade against " that conceit of knowledge without reality," which reigned undisturbed in the moral world around him, and was only beginning to be slightly disturbed even as to the physical world. To him the precept, inscribed in the Delphian temple — "Know Thyself" — was the holiest of all texts, which he constantly cited, and strenuously enforced upon his hearers ; interpreting it to mean, Know what sort of a man thou art, and what are thy capacities, in reference to human use.^ His manner of enforcing it was alike original and effective, and though he was dexterous in varying his topics^ > Plato, Phsedon, c. 88. p. 89 E. 6.vfv Tfxvris T7]s Trept TayflpcoTreio o roiov- Tos ;(p7)(r0ai iirtx^ipi^ to7s avOpdnrois' ei yap irov /x€Ta Te'xcTjs iXPV'Oj wcrTrep €xei, ovTus hv rjyijaaro, &c. i^ ttoKitik^ Te'xi"?, Protagor. c. 27. p. 319 A. Gor- gias, c. 163. p. 521 D. Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4. p. 20 A, B; Euthydeinus, c. 50. p. 2y2 E.— ri's itot' ((TtIv eTTicTTTjyUTj tKcij/Tj, ^ Tifius evSaifxovas TToiricreLev; .... The marked distinction between rex^rj, as distinguished from &Texvos rpi^r] — akoyos rpL0^ or ifxireipia, is noted in the Phtedrus, c. 95. p. 260 E. and in Gorgias, c. 42. p. 4C3 B; c. 45. p. 465 A ; 0. 121. p. 501 A — a remarkable pas- sage. That there is in every art, some assignable end to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is agaiu laid down in the Sophistes, c. 37. p. 232 A. - TliLs fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Soki'ates, between the special professions, and social living geaerally — U'ansferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived End, a Theory, and a regulated Prac- tice or Art, which are observed in the former — is strikingly stated in one of the Aphorisms of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi. 35 — Ovx ^pSs, ttws ol Pdvavcroi rexi'iTOj ap^SCovrat ix\v &XP^ rifhs irphs rovs ISiiiras, ovSiv riaffov fjiiVToi avT 4 x^vr a I t ov \6y o v t rj 9 T4xVf\S, KoCL T OVT O V UTT O (TT TJ V at ovx viroufvovtriv; Ov Setubv, ei & apxi-TiKTiiiv, Kal b larphs, fxaWov aiSe- aouTai rh p T-fjs tSias r 4 X"''! ^ \ 6y V, ^ o &ydpa)iros Th v e av- T o V, ts avTtfi Koiv6s iffri nphs rovi deovs; 3 Plato (Phffidr. c. 8. p. 229 E; Char- mides, c. 26. p. 164 E; Alkibiad. i. p. 124 A; 129 A; 131 A). Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 24-26. outcos eavrhv iin(TKe\pdfJi€vos, birolos iffrX trphs TrjV avQpwirivriv XP*'"''' '^JvuKi T^y avTov Swafj-iv. Cicei'O (de Legib. i. 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well- kuoNvu text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Soki-ates. ■* See the striking convei-sations of Sokrates with Glaukon and Charmides, especially that with the former, iu Xeu. Mem. iii. c. 6, 7. 136 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. and queries according to the individual person with whom he had to deal, it was his first object to bring the hearer to take just measure of his own real knowledge or real ignorance. To preach, to exhort, even to confute particular errors, appeared to Sokrates useless, so long as the mind lay wrapped up in its habitual mist, or illusion of wisdom : such mist must be dissipated before any new- light could enter. Accordingly, the hearer being usually forward in announcing positive declarations on those general doctrines, and explanations of those terms, to which he was most attached and in which he had the most implicit confidence, Sokrates took them to pieces, and showed that they involved contradiction and incon- sistency ; professing himself to be without any positive opinion, nor ever advancing any until the hearer's mind had undergone the proper purifying cross-examination.^ It was this indirect and negative proceeding, which, though only a part of the whole, stood out as his most original and most conspicuous characteristic, and determined his reputation with a large number of persons who took no trouble to know anything else about him. It was an exposure no less painful than surprising to the person questioned ; producing upon several of them an effect of permanent alienation, so that they never came near him again,^ but reverted to their former state of mind without any permanent change. But on the other hand, the ingenuity and novelty of the process was highly interesting to hearers, especially youthful hearers, sons of rich men and enjoying leisure ; who not only carried away with them a lofty admiration of Sokrates, but were fond of trying to copy his negative polemics.^ Probably men ' There is no part of Plato, in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wis- dom, is more earnestly repi'obated than in the Sophistes — with notice of the Elenchus, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fun- damental vice of the mind ; as the true purifying process (Sophistes, c. 33-35. p. 230, 231). See the same process illustrated by Sokrates, after his questions put to the elave of Menon (Plato, Menon, c. 18. p. 84 B; Charmides, c. 30, p. 166 D). As the Platonic Sokrates, even in the Defence where his own personality etauds most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without real- ity — fi a/xadia auri] t] iwoyeiSiffTOS, v rov oie(T0ai flSevat cL ovk olSev, C. 17. p. 29 B — so the Xenophontic Sokrates, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to mad- ness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge or conscious ifpiorance — Mavlav ye fiiju ivavriov fj.ev ' e, & &*> &\\ov CuAP. LXVin. EFFECT OF SOKRATES' CONVEESATION. 137 like Alkibiades and Kritias frequented his society chiefly for this purpose of acquiring a quality which they might turn to some account in their political career. His constant habit of never suffering a general term to remain undetermined, but applying it at once to particulars — the homely and effective instances of which he made choice — the string of interroo^atories each advancing- towards a result, yet a result not foreseen by any one — the indirect and circuitous manner whereby the subject was turned round, and at last approached and laid open by a totally diflPerent face — all this constituted a sort of prerogative in Sokrates, which no one else seems to have approached. Its effect was enhanced by a voice and manner highly plausible and captivating — and to a certain extent, by the very eccentricity of his Silenic physiognomy.' What is termed "his irony" — or assumption of the character of an ignorant learner asking information from one who knew better thau himself — while it was essential ^ as an excuse for his practice as a questioner, contributed also to add zest and novelty to his conversation ; and totally banished from it both didactic pedantry and seeming bias as an advocate ; which, to one who talked so much, was of no small advantage. After he had acquired celebrity, this uniform profession of ignorance in debate was usually con- strued as mere aflfectation, and those who merely heard him occasionally, wnthout penetrating into his intimacy, often suspected that he was amusing himself with ingenious paradox.^ Timon the Satirist, and Zeno the Epicurean, accordingly described him as a buffoon who turned every one into ridicule, especially men of eminence.'' eleAe'^lw. ' c. 39. p. 215 A, that he too must have Ibid. c. 10. p. 23. C. Uphs Se rov- been much affected by the singular phy- rois, ol vfoi fjiot fTraKo\ov0owTes, oTs fxa- siognomy of Sokrates : compare Xenoph. Ki(TTa crxof^v icrriv, ol ruiv irKovcncoTardiv, Sympos. iv. 19. avrSfxarot ■x^aipovffiv cLKovovn^ e^fra^o- i - Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 32. fxivuv Twv avOpdoTTciiv, Kol avTol iroWaKts ' p. 183. b. 6. Compare also Plutarch, e'/ue /xi/xovvrai, elra i-Kix^ipovaiv &\Kovs , Quecst. Platonic, p. 999 E. Tbv oZv i^era.^€Lv, &c. iKfyKTiKhf \6yov Si t^I k lct r a fih v av rh v * The beginning of Xen. Mem. i. 4, IjlSifrdparTev, airXov (tt ar a Se is particularly striking on this head — Et \ Ka\ cra(p4a'TaTa i^-qyt'iTo a re evo- S4 rives 'SiUKpaTTju vofiiQovffiv (Jos evtoi I /J-tC^v elSivai 5e?y, Kol & i-jriTrjdeveiv Kpd- ypdcpova'i re Kcd \4yov(n irepl avrov T^K/jLaLpi/J-evoi) tt p or p 4ip acr 6 a i fiev dvOpuiTTovs eir' aperrjv KpoLTicrrov yeyo- vfvai, TT p o ay ay el V 5e eV avTi]v ovx iKavSv — cr/ceif/ct/xerot /iit; fx 6 v ov & k k e7- V o s KoKaffTTipiov '4 v e k a r oh s ■K dvT olofjiivovs els f V at 4 p u- T 5}V ^A.e-yx**') oXXh. KOi & \4yuv ffvv- Sirijxepeve toTs avvSiarpl^ovaiv, SoKifia- TtffTa eJvat. Again, iv. 7, 1. "On fiev oSk ottAcos t))J' eavTov yvufi-qv airecpaivero ^wKpdryjs irphs Toiis bjxiKovvTas avr^, SoKet fj,oi SrjAov eK rwv elpri/j-evoov eivai, &c. His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Soki-ates could speak plainly, directly, and posi- tively : so much better known was the ^uvTwv, el iKavhs ^v fieXriovs Troietj/ tovs \ other side of his character. CuAP. LXVIII. NEGATIVE METHOD. 139 power of exciting scientific impulse and capacity in the minds of others. It was not by positive teaching that this eftect was produced. Both Sokrates and Plato thought that little mental improvement could be produced by expositions directly commu- nicated, or by new written matter lodged in the memory.' It was necessary that mind should work upon mind, by short question and answer, or an expert employment of the dialectic process,^ in order to generate new thoughts and powers : a process, which Plato, with his exuberant fancy, compares to copulation and pregnancy, representing it as the true way, and the only effectual way, of propagating the philosophic spirit. We shoujd greatly misunderstand the negative and indirect vein of Sokrates, if we suppose that it ended in nothing more than simple negation. On busy or ungifted minds, "n^ indirect . . . • 1 1 • • scnUiiiy of among the indiscriminate public who heard him, it Sukratespro- probably left little permanent effect of any kind, and tbirstand active efforts ended in a mere feeling of admiration for ingenuity, or for the perhaps dislike of paradox : on practical minds like of posuive Xenophon, its effect was merged in that of the pre- ceptorial exhortation. But where the seed fell upon an intellect having the least predisposition or capacity for systematic thought, the negation had only the effect of driving the hearer back at first, giving him a new impetus for afterwards springing forward. The Sokratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced an immediate effect like the touch of the torpedo.^ The newly- created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating — a season of doubt and discomfort, yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence uMtil the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Sokrates not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition, of future progress. It was the middle point in the ascending menfal scale; the lowest point being ignorance unconscious, self satisfied, ' Plato, Sophistes, c. 17. p. 230 A. fiira Se iroWov irduov rh vovderTiTiKhv elSos TT)S iraiSeias fffxiKpbv clvvt^lv, &c. Compare a fragmout of Demokritus, iu Mullacli's edition of the Fragin. Compare Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 343, 344. - Compare two passages in Plato's Protagoras, c. 49. p. 329 A, and c. 94. p. 348 D ; and the Phtedruji, c. 138-140. Demokrit. p. 175. Fr. Moral. 59. TJ)j/ p. 276 A, E. olSfievou v6ov ^x^iv 6 voudeTiuv fiaraio- | •* Plato, Men. c. 13. p. 80 A. o/xoio- 140 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. and mistaking itself for knowledge ; the next above, ignorance conscious, unmasked, ashan*ed of itself, and thirsting after know- ledge as yet unpossessed ; while actual knowledge, the third and highest stage, was only attainable after passing through the second as a preliminary.^ This second stage was a sort of pregnancy, and eveiy mind either by nature incapable of it, or in which, from w-ant of the necessary conjunction, it had never arisen — was barren for all purposes of original or self-appropriated thought. Sokrates regarded it as his peculiar vocation and skill (employing another Platonic metaphor), while he had himself no power of reproduction, to deal with such pregnant and troubled minds in the capacity of a midwife ; to assist them in that mental parturition whereby they were to be relieved, but at the same time to scrutinise narrowly the offspring w^iich they brought forth, and if it should prove distorted or unpromising, to cast it away with the rigour of a Lykurgean nurse, whatever might be the reluctance of the mother- mind to part with its new-born.^ Plato is fertile in illustrating this relation between the teacher and the scholar, operating not by what it put into the latter, but by what it evolved out of him ; by creating an uneasy longing after truth — aiding in the elaboration 1 This tripartite graduation of the intellectual scale is brouglit out by Plato in the Symposion, c. 29. p. 204 A, and in the Lysis, c. 33. p. 218 A. The intermediate point of the scale is what Plato here (though not always) expresses by the word cpiXoaocpos in its strict etymological sense — "a lover of knowledge;" one who is not yet wise, but who, having learnt to know and feel his own ignorance, is anxious to become wise — and has thus made what Plato thought the greatest and most difficult step towards really becoming so. ^ The effect of the interrogatory pro- cedure of Sokrates in forcing on the njinds of youth a humiliating conscious- ness of ignorance and an eager anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler lan- guage of Xenophon, than in the meta- phorical variety of Plato. See the con- versation with Euthydemus in the Jle- morabilia of Xenophon, iv. 2; a long dialogue, which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39) — 'AvayKdC^i /xe ravra o/xoXoyelv Si]\ov6ti tj ifi^ v ayaQuiv prfTopoiv fii /jLiv r}yovixT]v, toiovtov 5' ou5ej/ eTra- (Txop, ovSe Tedopv$r]TO fMOv tj v^i/x^ ovS' TiyavaKTei ais avSpairodooSics S i a- K e I fj.e V ov. 'AA.A.' virb tovtov tov Mapcrvov iroWaKis 87; ourco SieredTjv, ware fxoL 5o|ai ^t; /Sicorbf elvai exovTi Compare also the Meno, c. 13. p. 79 E, and Theoetet. c. 17. 22. p. 148 E, 151 C, where the metaphor of preg- nancy, and of the obsteti'ic art of Sokrates, is expanded — irda-xovcn Se St; 01 ifiol ^vyyiyvofxevoL Ka\ rovro rahrhv Tois TiKTOvcrais- oiSivoviTi yap Kal otto- plas ifiTTifi-KXavTai vvktols re Kal yjfifpas TToAu fiaWov ^ 4Ke7vai. TavTT)v re t))v u^lva iyelpeiv re Kal aizoTravnv t) i/xij Te'xcTj Si/farai — 'Eviore Se, ol hv fii\ fio i S 6 ^cti (T iv ey Kv fj.ov e s elvai, yvovs '6 T I ovSev efjLOv S e pt a t, irai/v eh- fj.eyus irpofx.ya>fj.ai, &c. Chap. LXVIII. BACONIAN SPIRIT. 141 necessary for obtaining relief — and testing whether the doctrine elaborated possessed the real lineaments, or merely the delusive semblance, of truth. There are few things more remarkable than the description given of the colloquial magic of Sokrates and its vehe- inductive ment effects, by those who had themselves heard it and fc"uUnJ^Md felt its force. Its suggestive and stimulating power was fpi^iT'of a gift so extraordinary, as well to justify any abundance '^'^krates. of imagery on the part of Plato to illustrate it.^ On the subjects to which he applied himself — man and society — his hearers had done little but feel and affirm : Sokrates undertook to make them think, weigh, and examine themselves and their own judgements — until the latter were brought into consistency with each other as well as with a known and venerable end. The generalisations embodied in their judgements had grown together and coalesced in a manner at once so intimate, so familiar, yet so unverified, that the particulars implied in them had passed out of notice : so that Sokrates, when he recalled these particulars out of a forgotten experience, presented to the hearer his own opinions under a totally new point of view. His conversations (even as they appear in the reproduction of Xenophon, which presents but a mere skeleton of the reality) exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself without conscious march or scientific guidance — of the intellectus sibi permisms — upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells. Amidst abundance of instantice nec/ativce, the scientific value of which is dwelt upon in in the ' Novum Organon,' ^ — and negative instances too so dexte- ' There is a striking expression of procedure by compai-ing the sentence Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, about , which Bacon pronounces upon the first Sokrates and his conversation (i. 2, ! notions of the intellect — as radically vicious, 14) : — ! confused, badly abstracted from things, and "He dealt with every one just as needing complete re-examination and re- he pleased in his discussions," says vision — without which (he says) not one Xenophon — rors Se Sia\eyoij.(vois avrifi of them could be trusted : — ■ iraffi XP'^M*''*"' *'' ■'""'^^ \6'yois '6-irws ffiov- I "Quod vero attinet ad notiones pri- A.6T0. mas iutellectiis, nihil est eorum, quas - I know nothing so clearly illustrat- intellectus sibi pcrmissus congessit, quin ing both the subjects and the method nobis pro suspecto sit, nee ullo modo chosen by Sokrates, as various passages ; ratum nisi novo judicio se stiterit, et of the immortal criticisms in the Xo- secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit." vum Organon. — When Sokrates (as (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the Xenophon tells us) devoted his time to N. 0. p. 168 of Mr. Montagu's edition.) questioning others "What is piety?! — "Serum sane rebus perditis adhi- What is justice? What is temperance, betur remedium, postquam mens ex coui-age, political government?" &c., | quotidiand vitse consuetudine, et audi- we best understand the spirit of his ! tiouibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occu- 142 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part TT. rously chosen as generally to show the way to new truth, in place of that error which they set aside — there is a close pressure on the pata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit. ' .... Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut opus mentis unitersnrii de intcgro resu- ■matur ; ac mens, jam ab ipso princfpio, | nulla modo sihi pennittatur, sed perpetuo i regatur." (lb. Pnefatio, p. 18G.)— " Syllogismus ex propositionibus con- , stat, propositiones ex verbis, verba no- | tionum tesser?e sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsa3 (id quod basis rei est) confusje ' sint et temere a rebus abstractse, nihil in iis quae superstruuntur est firmitu- dinis. Itaque spes est una in induc- tione vera. In notionibus nihil said est, nee in logicis, nee in physicis. Non Substantia, nan Qualitas, Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, boncB notiones sunt; multo minus Grave, Leve, Densum, Tenue, Humidum, Siccum, Generatio, Cor- ruptio, Attrahere, Fugare, Elementum, jVIateria, Forma, et id Genus ; sed omnes phantasticse et male terminatje. Ivotiones infimarum specierum, Ho- minis, Canis, et prehensionum imme- diatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fal- lunt magnopere : reliquce omnes {quib^ts homines hactenus usi sunt^ aberrationes sunt, nee debitis modis a rebus ab- stractse et excitatfe." (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.) — "Nemo adhuc tanta mentis con- i stantia et rigore inventus est, ut deere- verit et sibi imposuerit, theorias et notiones comninnes peniPis abolere, et intel- lection abrasum et wquwn ad particidaria de integro applicare. Itaque ratio ilia quam habemus, ex mHlid fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago qua- dim est et congeries." (Aphor. 97.) — " Nil magis philosophise offecisse de- prehendimus, quam quod I'es qua; fami- liares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non mo- rentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causae quseri so- leant; ut non ssepius requiratur infor- matio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis." (Aphor. 119.) These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be ex- tracted from the Novum Organon, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokrates. He sought to test the fun- damental notions and generalisations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the uncon- scious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars — and from pailiculars too, the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokrates described in his lan- guage as " conceit of knowledge with- out the reality," is identical with what Bacon designates as the primary notions — the puerile notions — the aberrations — of the intellect left to itself, which have become eo familiar and appear so cer- tainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of ex- amining them. The stringent process (or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato's Menou) of the Sokratic Elenchus, af- forded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of the cross-exam- ining Elenchus, as " the gi-eat and sovereign purification, without which every man, be he the great King him- self, is unschooled, dirty, and full of uncleanuess in respect to the main con- ditions of happiness "' — [koI rhv eXeyxof KiKTeov ois apa ixey'iffTt) Kol KvptaiTarT] tSiv KaQapffeaiv iffrl, Kal rhv aveheyKrov ad vojxiCFTiov, av koX Tvyxdvrj (xiyas Pa(TL\evs S}y, TO /xeyiffTa aKaOaprov bvra' a.-Kai^iVT6v re Kal al^xp^v yiyovivai ravra, & Kadapwrarov Kal KaWiarov iirpiire tov ovrais 4(t6ij.€vov evSaifiOva elj/ot — Plato Sophist, c. 34. p. 230 E.) precisely corresponds to that "cross- examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process," which Bacon specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the in- tellect, so as to qualify it for the attain- ment of truth — " Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectias, ut ipse ad 1 veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargu- j tionibus absolvitur ; redai-gutione phi- ' losophiarum, redargutione demonstra- tionum, et redirgtdione 7-ationis humance natiice." (Nov. Organ. Distributio Ope- ns, p. 170 ed. Montagu.) I To show further how essential it is (in the opinion of the best judges) that the native intellect should be i purged or purified, before it can pro- perly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy — I transcribe the introduc- I tory passage of Su* John Herschel's i 'Astronomy': — I " In entering upon any scientific pur- Chap. LXVIII. PURPOSE OF PLATO. 143 hearer's mind, to keep it in the distinct track of particulars, as conditions of every just and consistent generalisation ; and to divert It from becoming enslaved to unexamined formulae, or from delivering mere intensity of persuasion under the authorita- tive phrase of reason. Instead of anxiety to plant in the hearer a conclusion ready-made and accepted on trust,* the questioner keeps up a prolonged suspense, with special emphasis laid upon the particulars tending both affirmatively and negatively ; nor is his purpose answered, until that state of knowledge and appre- hended evidence is created, out of which the conclusion starts as a living product, with its own root and self-sustaining power, consciously linked with its premises. If this conclusion so gene- rated be not the same as that which the questioner himself adopts, it will at least be some other, worthy of a competent and ex- amining mind taking its own independent view of the appropriate evidence. And amidst all the variety and divergence of par- ticulars which we find enforced in the language of Sokrates, the end, towards which all of them point, is one and the same, emphatically signified — the good and happiness of social man. It is not then to multiply proselytes or to procure authoritative assent — but to create earnest seekers, analytical intellects, sokratic me- foreknowing and consistent agents, capable of forming create^mlnds conclusions for themselves and of teaching others — as fomw^on- well as to force them into that path of inductive general- them'sdvM- isation whereby alone trustworthy conclusions can be not to plant •' .' _ Cunclusions formed — that the Sokratic method aspires. In many ready-made. of the Platonic dialogues, wherein Sokrates is broufjht forward suit, one of the student's first endea- science. It is the first movement of vours ought to be to prepare his mind approach towards that state of mental for the reception of truth, by dismiss- purity which alone can fit us for a ing, or at least loosening his hold on, i full and steady perception of moral all such crude and hastily adopted beauty as well as physical adaptation, notions respecting the objects and rela- [ It is the ' euphrasy and rue,' with tions he is about to examine, as may | u-hich we 7nust purge our sight, before ice tend to embai'rass or mislead him ; and , can receive, and contemplate as they are. to strengthen himself, by something of an effort and a resolve, for the unpre- judiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argu- ment; even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without ex- the lineaments of truth and nature." (Sir John Herschel, ' Astronomy ' — Introduc- tion.) I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical phi- losophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purifi- cation: Sokrates not only prescribed it, amination, on the credit of others. | but actually administered it, by means Such an effort is, in fact, a commencem^t-i of his Elenchus, in reference to the sub- of that intellectual discipline which forms ■ jects on which he talked. one of the most important ends of all \ 144 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II . as the principal disputant, we read a series of discussions and arguments, distinct, though having reference to the same sub- ject — but terminating either in a result purely negative, or without any definite result at all. The commentators often attempt, but in my judgement with little success, either by arranging the • dialogues in a supposed sequence or by various other hypotheses — to assign some positive doctrinal conclusion as having been indirectly contemplated by the author. But if Plato had aimed at any substantive demonstration of this sort, we cannot well Imagine that he would have left his purpose thus In the dark, visible only by the microscope of a critic. The didactic value of these dialogues — that, wherein the genuine So- kratlc spirit stands most manifest — consists, not in the positive conclusion proved, but in the argumentative process Itself, coupled w'lth the general importance of the subject upon which evidence negative and affirmative Is brought to bear. This connects itself with that which I remarked in the preceding ,, . ^. chapter, when mentioning Zeno and the first manifesta- Grecian dia- .... lectics— their tlons of dlalcctlcs, rcspectluof the large sweep, the mauy-sided ' } » i ii iiandiiDgof many-sided arg-umentation, and the stren<^tn as well subjects J o ^ o force of the as forwarducss of the negative arm — In Grecian specu- lative philosophy. Through Sokrates, this amplitude of dialectic range was transmitted fi'om Zeno first to Plato and next to Aristotle. It was a proceeding natural to men who w^ere not merely interested in establishing, or refuting, some given particular conclusion — but w^ho also (like expert mathematicians in their own science) loved, esteemed, and sought to Improve, the dialectic process itself, with the means of verification which it afforded ; a feeling, of which abundant evidence is to be found in the Platonic writings.' Such pleasure In the scientific operation — though not merely innocent, but valuable both as a stimulant and as a guarantee against error, and though the corresponding taste among mathematicians Is always treated with the sympathy which it deserves — incurs much unmerited reprobation from modern liistorlans of philosophy, under the name of love of disputation, cavilling, or sceptical subtlety. But over and above any love of the process, the subjects to which dialectics were applied, from Sokrates downwards, — man and society, ethics, politics, metaphysics, &c., were such as par- ticularly called for this many-sided handling. On topics like • ^ See particularly the remarkable passage in the Philebus, c. 18. p. 16, seq. Chap. LXYIII. SUBJECTS FIT FOR DIALECTICS. 145 these, relating to sequences of fact which depend upon a multitude of cooperating or conflicting causes, it is Impossible The subjects to arrive, by any one thread of positive reasoning or theywre induction, at absolute doctrine which a man may reckon mill'ancr upon finding always true, whether he remembers the essen'tiaTiy proof or not ; as is the case with mathematical, astro- handun-— "^"^ nomical, or physical truth. The utmost which science can '^^^^"^ ^'^y- ascertain, on subjects thus complicated, is an aggregate, not of peremptory theorems and predictions, but of tendencies ; ^ by studying the action of each separate cause, and combining them together as well as our means admit. The knowledge of ten- dencies thus obtained, though falling much short of certainty, is highly important for guidance : but it is plain that conclusions of this nature — resulting from multifarious threads of evidence — true only on a balance, and always liable to limitation — can never be safely detached from the proofs on which they rest, or taught as absolute and consecrated formulae.^ They require to be kept in perpetual and conscious association with the evidences, affirmative and negative, by the joint consideration of which their truth is established ; nor can this object be attained by any other means than by ever-renovated discussion, instituted from new and distinct points of view, and with free play to that negative arm which is indispensable as stimulus not less than as control. To ask for nothing but results — to decline the labour of verification — to be satisfied with a ready-made stock of established positive arguments as proof — and to decry the doubter or negative reasoner, who ' See ■ this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, vol. ii. book vi. p. 565. 1st edition. * Lord Bacon remarks in the Novum Organon (A ph. 71): — " Erat autem sapientia Grpccorum pro- fessoria, et ia disputationes eS'usa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adver- sissimuni est. Itaque nomen iMud Sophistarum — quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi vo- luerunt, in autiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protago- ram, Hippiam, Polum— etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicure, Theophraftto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, re- liquis." Bacon is quite right in efifacing the distinction between the two Ijsts of persons whom he compares, and in saying that the latter were just as VOL. VI. much Sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word as well as in eveiy other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in im- puting to either of them this many- sided argiuueutation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has applicatioa to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great per- tinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical sub- jects, they come justly under Bacon's censure. But here again, the fault con- sisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccu- rate axioms without dispute. l-i6 IirSTOEY OF GREECE. Takt II. starts new difficulties, as a common enemy — this is a proceeding sufficiently common, in ancient as well as in modern times. But it is nevertheless an abnegation of the dignity and even of the functions of speculative philosophy. It is the direct reverse of the method both of Sokrates and Plato, who, as inquirers, felt that, for the great subjects which they treated, multiplied threads of reasoning, coupled with the constant presence of the cross-ex- amining Elenchus, were indispensable. Nor is it less at variance with the views of Aristotle (though a man very different from either of them), who goes round his subject on all sides, states and considers all its difficulties, and insists emphatically on the necessity of having all these difficulties brought out in full force, as the incitement and guide to positive philosophy, as well as the test of its sufficiency.^ Understanding thus the method of Sokrates, we shall be at no loss to account for a certain variance on his part (and a still greater variance on the part of Plato, M'ho expanded the method ^ Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii. 1, 2-5. p. 995 a. The indispensable necessity, to a ptilosophei'j of liaving before him all the difficulties and doubts of the prob- lem which he tries to solve, and of looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants — is strikingly set forth in this passage : I transcribe a portion of it — 'Earl 5e TOis euTTopTJcai jSouAOyUeVots irpoupyov rh Siatroprjcrai Ka\uis' 7; yap vcrrepov eviro- pia Xvffis Twv TTpdrepov airopovixiviov iffrl, Xviiv 5' ovK iffTiv ayvoovvras rhv Sefffiov Aih Se? raj Svfrxfpe'as TtdtwpriKivai Trdcras Trp6repov, rovrwv re XdpLV, Kal Bia TO tovs ^rirovvTas &vev rod SiaTTopf/trai irpwrov, ofjLolovs eJvai ro7s Trot Se? ^aSi^dv ayvoovcri, koI irphs TOVTOis oii5' fif wore rh Qrjrovixevov eu- prjKiV, ?; ;U7;, ytyvwaKeiv rh yap teAos rovrcf fxiv ov 5f)Aoi', r£ 51 Trpor]TropT]K6rt SrjAou. "En Se ^iKriov audyKri ex^"' ■jrphs rh Kpiveiv, rhv &cnrfp avriSiKcov Ka\ rSiv afj.cpL Xenoph. Mem. iii. 0, G; iv. 2, Id- 22. SiKaiSrepov Se rbu erriffTafxevov to. S'lKaia rov jx)] iin(rTaiJ.4yov — To call him the j aster man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant : I tran- slate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So ypa/j.- jxaTiKiLrepov (in the sentence before) means, comes nearer to a good ortho- grapher. The Greek derivative adjec- tives in -ik6s are very difficult to render precisely. Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15. p. 372 D — where the same opinion is maintained. Hi^^pias tells Sokrates in that dialogue (c. 11. p. 369 B) that ho fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest. Chap. LXVIII. HIS PRECEPTS OF LARGER RANGE. 151 man. " Well-doing " consisted in doing a thing well after having learnt it and practised it, by the rational and proper constant means : it was altogether disparate from good fortune, syl^riit"'ifio'^ or success without rational scheme and preparation. pJ.'ac'iLe^and " The best man (he said) and the most beloved by the '^^■^"'^• gods, is, he who as a husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry — as a surgeon, those of medical art — in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. But the man who docs nothing well, is neither useful — nor agreeable to the gods." ^ This is the Sokratic view of human life : to look at it as an assemblage of realities and practical details — to translate the large words of the moral vocabulary into those homely particulars to which at bottom they refer — to take account of acts, not of dispositions apart from act (in contradiction to the ordinary flow of the moral sympathies) — to enforce upon all men, that what they chiefly required was, teaching and practice as preparations for act ; and that therefore ignorance, especially ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, was their capital deficiency. The religion of Sokrates, as well as his ethics, had reference to practical human ends. His mind had little of that transcendentalism which his scholar Plato exhibits in such abundance. It is indisputable, then, that Sokrates laid down a general ethical theory which is too narrow, and which states a part of xhederiva- the truth as if it were the whole. But as it frequently [,',gso78o-" happens with philosophers who make the like mistake — onitgeT'^'^ we find that he did not confine his deductive reasonings [;]"^!^,iJ.'^".II within the limits of the theory, but escaped the erroneous doctrine, consequences by a partial inconsistency. For example — no man ever insisted more emphatically than he, on the necessity of control over the passions and appetites — of enforcing good habits — and on the value of that state of the sentiments and emotions which such a course tended to form.^ In truth, this is one particular charac- ' Xenoph. Memor. iii. 9, 14, 15, l continence or self-control was the very 2 Xenoph. Mem. ii. 0, ;;9. ocrai 5' eV basis of virtue — tV eyKpareiav aperfjy avOptinois aperal Xeyovrai ravras Trdffas KpT]Tr7Sa (i. 5, 4). Also that contincnoc crKOTrovfXivos €up-i]ffeLS /xadija'ei re Kal IxfXfTT) av^avo/xevas. Again, the ne- cessity of pi'actice or discipline is incul- cated, iii. 9, 1. When Sokrates enu- merates the qualities i-equisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of. Ho in- cludes also moral excellence, conti- nence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii. 6, 1-5). Moreover Sokrates laid it down that was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv. 5, 10, 11). Sokrates here plainlj' treats eyKpi- Teiav (continence or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have ap^^lied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted iu know- ledge, or iu the excellence of the iutel- 152 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. teristic of his admonitions. He exhorted men to limit their external wants, to be sparing in indulgence, and to cultivate, even in preference to honours and advancement, those pleasures which would surely arise from a performance of duty, as well as from self-examination and the consciousness of internal improvement. This earnest attention, in measuring the elements and conditions of happiness, to the state of the internal associations as contrasted with the effect of external causes — as well as the pains taken to make it appear how much the latter depend upon the former for their power of conferring happiness, and how sufficient is moderate good fortune in respect to externals, provided ihe internal man be properly disciplined — is a vein of thought which pervades both Sokrates and Plato, and which passed from them, under various modifications, to most of the subsequent schools of ethical philo- sophy. It is probable that Protagoras or Prodikus, training rich youth for active life — without altogether leaving out such internal element of happiness, would yet dwell upon it less ; a point of decided superiority in Sokrates. The political opinions of Sokrates were much akin to his ethical, miticai and deserve especial notice as having in part contributed Sukratcs. to liis Condemnation by the Dikastery. He thought that the functions of government belonged legitimately to those who knew best how to exercise them for the advantage of the governed. " The legitimate King or Governor was not the man who held the sceptre — nor the man elected by some vulgar persons — nor he who had got the post by lot — nor he who had thrust himself in by force, or by fraud — but he alone who knew how to govern well." ^ Just as the pilot governed on ship-board, the surgeon in a sick man's house, the trainer in a palaestra — every one else being eager to obey these professional superiors, and even thanking and recom- pensing them for their directions, simply because their greater knowledge was an admitted fact. It was absurd (Sokrates used to lectual man, aloue. Perhaps lie might | means consistent with that practical have said — Knowledge alone will be I conception of human life and its ends, Bufficient to make you virtuous ; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saving the sulSciency of the general doctrine. I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii. ch. 2. p. 78) in think- mg that Sokrates meant by kiwrledije or uisdom, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is pos- sessed only by a god. This is by no which stands so plainly mai-ked in his character. Why should we think it wonderful that Sokrates should propose a de- fective theory, which embraces onlj' one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near an approach to the trutli. 1 Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10, 11. CiiAP. LXVlir. rOLlTICAL GOVERNMENT. 153 contend) to choose public officers by lot, when no one would trust himself on shipboard under the care of a pilot selected by hazard/ nor would any one pick out a carpenter or a musician in like manner. We do not know what provisions Sokrates suggested for applying his principle to practice — for discovering who was the fittest man in point of knowledge — or for superseding him in case of his becoming unfit, or in case another fitter than he should arise. The analogies of the pilot, the surgeon, and professional men gene- rally, would naturally conduct him to election by the people, renewable after temporary periods ; since no one of these profes- sional persons, whatever may be his^ positive knowledge, is ever trusted or obeyed except by the free choice of those who confide in him, and who may at any time make choice of another. But it does not appear that Sokrates followed out this part of the analogy. His companions remarked to him that his first-rate intellectual ruler would be a despot, w^ho might, if he pleased, either refuse to listen to good advice, or even put to death those who gave it. " He will not act thus — (replied Sokrates) for if he does, he will himself be the greatest loser." ^ We may notice in this doctrine of Sokrates the same imper- fection as that which is involved in the ethical doctrine ; a disposi- tion to make the intellectual conditions of political fitness stand for the whole. His negative political doctrine is not to be mis- taken : he approved neither of democracy nor of oligarchy. As he was not attached, either by sentiment or by conviction, to the constitution of Athens — so neither had he the least sympathy with oligarchical usurpers such as the Four Hundred and the Thirty. His positive ideal state, as far as we can divine it, would have been something like that which is worked out in the ' Cyropsedia ' of Xenophon. In describing the persevering activity of Sokrates, as a religious and intellectual missionary, we have really described his ^ • ^ •' _ _ LiODg period life : for he had no other occupation than this continual ^^''^ns wiiich .'... Sokrates intercourse with the Athenian public — his indiscriminate exercised ins ., , T 1 • "TV 1 • vocation as conversation, and mvancible dialectics. Discharging apuwic faithfully and bravely his duties as an hoplite on mili- tary service — but keeping aloof from official duty in the Dikas- tery, the public assembly, or the Senate-house, except in that one memorable year of the battle of Arginusge — he incurred none of those party animosities which an active public life at Athens often ' Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. ' Xeu. Mem. iii, 9, 12 : compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 5G. p. 469, 470. 154: HISTORY OF GREECE. Paut 11. provoked. Ilis life was leg-ally blameless, nor had lie ever been brought up before the Dikastery until his one final trial, when he was seventy years of age. That he stood conspicuous before the public eye in 423 B.C., at the time when the ' Clouds ' of Aristo- phanes were brought on the stage — is certain. He may have been and probably was, conspicuous even earlier : so that we can hardly allow him less than thirty years of public, notorious, and efficacious discoursing, down to his trial in 399 b.c. It was in that year that Meletus, seconded by two auxiliaries, Accusation Anytus and Lykon, presented against him, and hung up by Meletus, in the appointed place (the portico before the office of Lyicon!' ' the second or King-Archon), an indictment against him in the following terms : — " Sokrates is guilty of crime, first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city w^orships, but introducing new divinities of his own — next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is, death." It is certain that neither the conduct nor the conversation of Sokrates had undergone any alteration for many years past ; since the sameness of his manner of talking is both derided by his ene- mies and confessed by himself. Our first sentiment therefore (apart from the question of guilt or innocence) is one of asto- nishment, that he should have been prosecuted, at seventy years of age, for persevering in an occupation which he had publicly followed during twenty-five or thirty years preceding. Xenophon, full of reverence for his master, takes up the matter on much higher ground, and expresses himself in a feeling of indignant amazement that the Athenians could find anything to condemn in a man every way so admirable. But whoever attentively considers The real the picturc which I have presented of the purpose, the fu?pdse^'is, working, and the extreme publicity of Sokrates, will accusa'tton rather be inclined to wonder, not that the indictment preferred"^'' was presented' at last, but that some such indictment before. jj^d not been presented long before. Such certainly is the impression suggested by the language of Sokrates himself, in the ' Platonic Apology.' He there proclaims emphatically, that though his present accusers were men of consideration, it was neither their enmity, nor their eloquence, which he had now prin- cipally to fear; but the accumulated force of antipathy — the numerous and important personal enemies, each with sympathising partisans — the long-standing and uncontradicted calumnies^ — raised against him throughout his cross-examining career. • Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2. p. 18 B; I ^/.(.TrpoaOiv iK^yov, on ivoWr) /.loi aTrt'x- c. IG. p. 28 A. "O 5e Kal iv to7s \ Oeta yiyovi km. irpus ttoAAouj, eu SfcTe CiiAP.LXVIII. HIS LONG UNPOPULARITY. 155 In truth, the mission of Sokratcs, as he himself describes it, could not but prove eminently unpopular and obnoxious, inovitawe To convince a man that, of matters which he felt con- in« umd by (^ 1 PI • Til 1 1^ •• Sokrates in rident ot knownig, and had never thought oi questioning ins mission, or even of studying, he is really profoundly ignorant, insomuch that he cannot reply to a few pertinent queries without involving himself in flagrant contradictions — is an operation highly salutary, often necessary, to his future improvement ; but an operation of ])ainful mental surgery, in which indeed the temporary pain expe- rienced is one of the conditions almost indispensable to the future beneficial results. It is one which few men can endure without hating the operator at the time ; although doubtless such hatred would not only disappear, but be exchanged for esteem and admi- ration, if they persevered until the full ulterior consequences of th(^ operation developed themselves. But we know (from the express statement of Xenophon) that many, who underwent this first pun- gent thrust of his dialectics, never came near hira again : he disre- garded them as laggards,^ but their voices did not the less count in the hostile chorus. What made that chorus the more formidable, was, the high quality and position of its leaders. For Sokrates himself tells us, that the men whom he chiefly and expressly sought out to cross-examine, were the men of celebrity as statesmen, rhetors, poets, or artisans ; those at once most sensitive to such humiliation, and most capable of making their enmity effective. When we reflect upon this great body of antipathy, so terrible both from number and from constituent items, we shall it was only from the wonder only that Sokrates could have gone on so long gmerai lo- . -^ • 1 1 I'-ration of standintj in the market-place to agorravate it, and that vwh ^(OKparovs ovk4tl avT(fi TTpoaijecrai', ovs Kal ;6Aa/cco- repovs iv6/xi(^ei'. - i'lato, Kutliyphron, c. 2. p. 3 C. etSojy '6ti €ii5iaj8oA.o to. rotavra vphs rovs TTOWOVS. 156 HISTORY OF GREECE. Taut IT. with safety and impunity ; and that city was Athens. I have in a previous volume noted the respect for individual dissent of opinion, taste, and behaviour, among one another, which charac- terised the Athenian population, and which Perikles puts in emphatic relief as a part of his funeral discourse. It was this established liberality of the democratical sentiment at Athens which so long protected the noble eccentricity of Sokrates from being disturbed by the numerous enemies which he provoked. At Sparta, at Thebes, at Argos, Miletus, or Syracuse, his blameless life would have been insufficient as a shield, and his irresistible dialectic power would have caused him to be only the more speedily silenced. Intolerance is the natural weed of the human bosom, though its growth or development may be counteracted by liberal- izing causes ; of these, at Athens, the most powerful was, the democratical constitution as there worked, in combination with diffused intellectual and aesthetical sensibility, and keen relish for discourse. Liberty of speech was consecrated, in every man's esti- mation, among the first of privileges ; every man was accustomed to hear opinions, opposite to his own, constantly expressed, — and to believe that others had a right to their opinions as well as him- self. And though men would not, as a general principle, have extended such toleration to religious subjects — yet the established habit in reference to other matters greatly influenced their prac- tice, and rendered them more averse to any positive severity against avowed dissenters from the received religious belief. It is certain that there was at Athens both a keener intellectual sti- mulus, and greater freedom as well of thought as of speech, than in any other city of Greece. The long toleration of Sokrates is one example of this general fact, while his trial proves little, and his execution nothing, against it — as will presently appear. There must doubtless have been particular circumstances, of Particular which wc are scarcely at all informed, which induced his siwices'which accusers to prefer their indictment at the actual moment, the"triai of in spltc of the advauccd age of Sokrates. Sokrates. j^ ^j^^ ^^.^^ place, Auytus, ouc of the accusers of offem-e of Sokrates, appears to have become incensed against him Anytus. ^^ private grounds. The son of Anytus had manifested interest in his conversation : and Sokrates, observing in the young man intellectual impulse and promise, endeavoured to dissuade his father from bringing him up to his own trade of a leather-seller.' ^ See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. s. 29, 30. I neous title, and may possibly not be This little piece bears a very en'O- [ the composition of Xenoiihon, as the Chap. LXVIIL CHARGE OF CORRUPTING YOUTH. 157 It was in this general way that a great proportion of the antipathy against Sokrates was excited, as he himself tells us in the ' Platonic Apology.' The young men were those to whom he chiefly ad- dressed himself, and who, keenly relishing his conversation, often carried home new ideas, which displeased their fathers ; ' hence the general charge against Sokrates of corrupting the youth. Now this circumstance had recently happened in the peculiar case of Anytus, a rich tradesman, a leading man in politics, and just now of peculiar influence in the city, because he had been one of the leading fellow-labourers with Thrasybulus in the expulsion of the Thirty, manifesting an energetic and meritorious patriotism, lie (like Thrasybulus and many others) had sustained great loss of property ^ during the oligarchical dominion ; which perhaps made him the more strenuous in requiring that his son should pursue trade with assiduity, in order to restore the family fortunes. He seems moreover to have been an enemy of all teaching which went beyond the narrowest practicality ; hating alike Sokrates and the Sophists.^ commentators generally affirm ; but it has every appeai'ance of being a work of the time. ' Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10. p. 23 C; c. 27. p. 37 E. In the Cyropsedia of Xenophon, an interesting anecdote appears, illustrating what was often meant by a father, when he accused Sokrates, or one of the So- phists, of "corrupting his son;" also the extreme vengeance which he thought himself entitled to take. (Cyi'opsed. iii. 1. U. 38. 40.) The Armenian prince, with his newly-married youthful son Tigranes, are represented as conversing with Cyrus, who asks the latter — "What is become of that man, the Sophist, who used to be always in your company, and to whom you were so much at- tached?" — "My father put him to death." — " For what offence?" — " Affirni- imj that he corrupted me : thoiujh the man was of such an admirable character, tlud even when he was dying, he called me, and said, ' Be not angry with your father for killing me, for he does it from no bad intention, but from ignorance ; and sins committed from ignorance ought to be reckoned as involuntary.' " — " Alas ! poor man!' exclaimed Cyrus. — The father himself then spoke as follows : " Cyrus, you know that a husband puts to death any other man whom he finds conversing with (and corrupting) his wife. It is not that he corrupts her understanding, but that he robs the husband of her affection, and therefore the latter deals with him as an enemy. Just so did I hate this Sophist, because he made my son admire him more than me.'' "By the Gods," replied Cyrus, "I think you have yielded only to human frailty {ai/dpunrLvd not SoKels afxapreTy). Forgive your father, Tigi-anes." Com- pare a similar train of thought, Cyro- paed. V. 5, 28. As marital jealousy was held, both by Attic law and opinion, to be entitled to the gratification of its extreme vin- dictive impulse, so the same right is here claimed by analogy for paternal jealousy, even to the destruction of a man of exemplary character. The very strong sympathy expressed with offended jealousy is a circumstance deserving notice, and suggesting much reflection. And if we apply the principle of the case to real life at Athens, we shall comprehend how it was that Anytus and other fathers became so incensed against Sokrates and the Sophists of influence and ascendency. The mere fact, that the youth became intensely attached to theu- conversation and so- ciety, would be often sufficient to raise bitter resentment, and was called by the name corruption. " Isokrat. Or. xviii. cont. Kallimach. s. 30. 3 See Plato, Meuon, c. 27, 28. p. 90, 91. / 158 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. While we can thus point out a recent occurrence, wliich had Unpopu- brought one of the most ascendent politicians in the city larity arising ... . • ov 4d.v re vir' &Wov Tivhs fiov\y]Tai rijxaaQai, JlItj 1 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56-59. « Xen. Mem. i. 2, 59. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 55. Kal irapeKci- Aei iTTiiJ.e\e7a9ai tov ws (ppovijidorarov t treipaTai, v iyw vTrtp efxavTov airo\o- &yftv, ov Tre'icricrde fxoi cos fipwvevo/xdvcf). ytladai, &s tjs hv oIolto. a\\' virip vfiwu ^ Plato, Apol. Sok. C. 17. p. 29 A. fir) ri i^ajxapTrtTe irfpl ttjj/ to5 0€ov S6(T v- ' Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 30 B. vpuv ffxov KaTaipTjcpKra/xevoL- iaf yap e/xe * Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17. p. 30 A, B. diro/cTe/i'rjTe, ov fiaSiais 6.K\ov toiovtov o'lofxai oiiSeV ttch vfuv /xel^ov ayaBhv ye- fxiprjcTiTf, &c. vicOai i) TTji/ ijXTiv rif 6i(f virrtpiO'iav. \ 168 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II had always forbidden him from taking active part in public pro- ceedino-s. On the two exceptional occasions when he had stood publicly forward, — once under the democracy, once under the oligarchy, — he had shown the same resolution as at present ; — not to be deterred by any terrors from that course which he believed to be just.^ Young men were delighted, as well as improved, by listening to his cross-examinations. In proof of the charge that he had corrupted them, no witnesses had been produced — neither any of themselves, who having been once young when they enjoyed his conversation, had since grown elderly — nor any of their relatives ; while he on his part could produce abundant testimony to the improving effect of his society, from the relatives of those who had profited by it.^ " No man (says he) knows what death is, yet men fear it as if Sentiment of they kucw Well that it was the greatest of all evils ; about death, which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance — the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they : as I know nothing about Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge ; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either God or man, is both an evil and a shame ; nor will I ever embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which may for aught I know be a good.^ Perhaps you may feel indignant at the resolute tone of my defence : you may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine — that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. 1 have relatives like other men — and three children ; but not one of them shall appear before you for any such purpose. Not from any insolent dispositions on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you — but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy : for I have a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often, by such mean and cowardly supplications ; and you Dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonouring the city.* Apart from any 1 riato, Apol, Sok. c. 20, 21. p. 33. 2 Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22. 3 Plato, Apol. Sok. c, 17. p. 29 B, Contrast this striking and truly So- kratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the commonplace way in which Sokrates is represented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i. 4, 7. 4 Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23. p. 34, 3.5. Chap. LXVIII. EFFECT OF THE DEFENCE OF SOKEATES. 169 reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can : but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality — and it is your duty so to do. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury ; far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not therefore require of me proceedings dishonourable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you ; especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Meletus. I leave to you and to the god, to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you." ^ No one who reads the ' Platonic Apology ' of Sokrates will ever wish that he had made any other defence. But it is the Effect of speech of one who deliberately forgoes the immediate up„n'^thr^ purpose of a defence — persuasion of his judges ; who ^'"^^s's- speaks for posterity, without regard to his own life — " sola poste- ritatis cura, et abruptis vitse blandimentis." ^ The effect produced upon the Dikasts was such as Sokrates anticipated beforehand, and heard afterwards without surprise as without discomposure, in the verdict of guilty. His only surprise was, at the extreme smallness of the majority whereby that verdict was passed.^ And this is the true matter for astonishment. Never before had the Athenian Dikasts heard such a speech addressed to them. While all of them doubtless knew Sokrates as a very able and very eccentric man, respecting his purposes and character they would differ ; some regarding him with unqualified hostility, a few others with respectful admiration, and a still larger number with simple admiration for ability, without any decisive sentiment either of antipathy or esteem. But by all these three categories, hardly excepting even his admirers, the speech would be felt to carry one sting which never misses its way to the angry feelings of the judicial bosom, whether the judges in session be one or a few or many — the sting of " affront to the court." The Athenian Dikasts I translate the substance and not the ; the secui-ity and welfare of those around words. him — ' ' ipsum viventem quidem rc- 1 Plato, Apol. Sok. 0, 24. p. 35. [ lictum, sed sola posteritatis curS, et " These ai-e the striking words of abruptis vitre blandimentis." Tacitus (Hist. ii. 54) respecting the | ^ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25. p. 36 A. last hours of the Emperor Otho, after OiiK av^\in(n6v /xoi YeVove rh yeyovhs- his suicide had been fully resolved tovtv, aWa noAv fxaWov davfj-d^w e/ca- upon, but before it had been consum- j repaiv twv y\ir\v rhu yeyovSTa apiOfxSv. mated; an interval spent in the most j Ou yap ^fx-nv tyaiyi ovrw irap" oXiyov careful and provident arrangements for | ^fffaOai, aWa irapa ttoXv, Sec. 170 HISTORY OF GREECE. Takt II. were always accustomed to be addressed with deference, often with subservience : they now heard themselves lectured by a philosopher who stood before them like a fearless and invulnerable superior, beyond their power, though awaiting their verdict ; one who laid claim to a divine mission, which probably many of them believed to be an imposture — and who declared himself the inspired up- rooter of " conceit of knowledge without the reality," which purpose many would not understand, and some would not like. To many, his demeanour would appear to betray an insolence not without analogy to Alkibiades or Kritias, with whom his accuser had compared him. I have already remarked, in reference to his trial, that considering the number of personal enemies whom he made, the wonder is, not that he was tried at all, but that he was not tried until so late in his life : I now remark, in reference to the verdict, that, considering his speech before the Dikastery, we cannot be surprised that he was found guilty, but only that such verdict passed by so small a majority as five or six.^ That the condemnation of Sokrates was brought on distinctly by the tone and tenor of his defence — is the express testimony of Xenophon. " Other persons on trial (he says) defended themselves in such manner as to concilate the favour of the Dikasts, or flatter, or entreat them, contrary to the laws, and thus obtained acquittal. But Respecting the deatli of Sokrates, \ falloit s'etonner de quelque chose, ce seroit M. Cousin observes as follows (in his I que Socrate ait ete accuse si tard, et Assertion of Xenopliou that Sokrates rnight bave been ac- quitted if he had chosen it. translation of Plato, torn. i. p. 58. Pre- face to the Apology of Socrates) : — " II y a plus : on voit qu'il a reconnu la necessite de sa mort. II dit ex- qu'il n'ait pas ete condamne a une plus forte mrijorite." [It is proper to remark, that Sokrates was tried before the Dikastei-y, not be- presse'ment qu'il ne servirait k rien de | fore the Areopagus.] I'absoudre, parcequ"il est de'cide k m^- I am happy also to add, to the same riter de nouveau I'accusation main- I effect, the judgement of another es- tenant port^e centre lui : que I'exil | timable authority — Professor Maurice, meme ne peut le sauver, ses principes ! in his recent woi'k — Moral and Meta- qu'il n'abandonnera jamais, et sa mis- physical Philosophy — (Pai-t i. Ancient Philosophy, chap. vi. div. ii. sect. " 15):— " How can such a man as Soci'ates, it has been often asked, have been compelled to drink hemlock ? Must not the restored democracy of Athens sion, qu'il poursuivra partout, devant le mettre toujours et partout dans la situation oil il est : qu'enfin, il est inutile de reculer devant la necessite, qu'il faut que sa destinee s'accomplisse, et que sa mort est venue. Socrate avait raison : sa mort etait forcde, et le ' have been worse, and more intolerant, re'sultat inevitable de la lutte qu'il than any power which ever existed ou avait engagee contre le dogmatisme earth? Mr. Grote answers, we think, religieux et la fausse sagesse de son j most reasonably, that the wonder is, temps. C'est I'esprit de ce temps, et how such a man should have been non pas Anytus, ni I'Areopage, qui a suffered to go on teaching for so long, mis en cause et condamne Socrate. j No state, he adds, ever showed so much Anytus, il faut le dire, etoit un citoyen j tolerance for differences of opinion as recommandable : lAreopage, un tri- Athens." bunal equitable et mod^rd : et, s'il \ Chap. LXVIII. ASSEETION OF ZEXOPHON. 171 Sokrates would resort to nothing of this customary practice of the Dikastcry contrary to the laws. Though he might easily have been let off by the Dikasfs, if he tvoiild have d&ne anything of the Jcind even moderately, he preferred rather to adhere to the laws and die, than to save his life by violating them." ^ Now no one in Athens except Sokrates, probably, would have construed the laws as requiring the tone of oration which he adopted ; nor would he himself have so construed them, if he had been twenty years younger, with less of acquired dignity, and more years of possible usefulness open before him. Without debasing himself by un- becoming flattery or supplication, he would have avoided lecturing them as a master and superior^ — or ostentatiously asserting a divine mission for purposes which they would hardly understand — or an independence of their verdict which they might construe as defiance. The rhetor Lysias is said to have sent to him a composed speech for his defence, which he declined to use, not thinking it suitable to his dignityv But such a man as Lysias would hardly compose what would lower the dignity even of the loftiest client — though he would look to the result also ; nor is there any doubt that if Sokrates had pronounced it — or even a much less able speech, if inoffensive — he would have been acquitted. Quintilian^ indeed expresses his satisfaction that Sokrates main- tained that towering dignity which brought out the rarest and most exalted of his attributes, but which at the same time renounced all chance of acquittal. Few persons will dissent from this criticism : but when we look at the sentence, as we ought in fairness to do, fi'om the point of view of the Dikasts, justice will compel us to admit that Sokrates deliberately brought it upon himself. If the verdict of guilty was thus brought upon Sokrates by his own consent and cooperation, much more may the same The sentence remark be made respecting the capital sentence which passed in followed it. In Athenian procedure, the penalty inflicted procedure. was determined by a separate vote of the Dikasts, taken after the verdict of guilty. The accuser having named the penalty w^hich Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 4. 'EKeTros | cum." So E25iktetus also remarked, in ouSej' TiOiKfjae rwv elooOSrcav 4v ri^ SiKa- (TTTfpici) irapa tovs vSfxovs Troifjcai" aWtx. paSicos hv acpiOsls inrh twv SiKaarwi', el Kol /x6Tpia>s TL rovTcov i-Koirjtre, TrpoeiKero reference to the defence of Sokrates- "By all means, abstain from supplica- tion for mercy; but do not put it spe- cially forward, that you icill abstain, fiaWov ro7s v6^oi'! e^fxivoiv anoOavfTv, ^ i unless you intend, like Sokrates, pur- ■Kapavofxcbv (rjv. I posely to provoke the judges " (Arrian, 2 Cicero (de Orat. i. 54, 231)— "So- crates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed mcujistcr aut dominus vidcretur esse judi- Epiktet. Diss. li. 2, 18;. 3 Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii. 15, 30; 1, 10 ; Diog. Laert. ii. 40. 172 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. he thought suitable, the accused party on his side named some lighter penalty upon himself; and between these two the Dikasts were called on to make their option — no third proposition being admissible. The prudence of an accused party always induced him to propose, even against himself, some measure of punishment which the Dikasts might be satisfied to accept, in preference to the heavier sentence invoked by his antagonist. Now Meletus, in his indictment and speech against Sokrates, sokratesis had Called for the infliction of capital punishment. It called upon p c^ -i ■^ i i • to propose was lor bokrates to make his own counter-proposition : counter- and the very small majority, by which the verdict had agrrnsfhim- bccn pronounccd, affbrded suflUcient proof that the Dikasts beh^'iour. wcrc noway inclined to sanction the extreme penalty against him. They doubtless anticipated, according to the uniform practice before the Athenian courts of justice, that he would suggest some lesser penalty — fine, imprisonment, exile, disfran- chisement, &c. And had he done this purely and simply, there can be little doubt that the proposition would have passed. But the language of Sokrates, after the verdict, was in a strain yet higher than before it ; and his resolution to adhere to his own point of view, disdaining the smallest abatement or concession, only the more emphatically pronounced. " What counter-pro- position shall I make to you (he said) as a substitute for the penalty of Meletus ? Shall I name to you the treatment which I think I deserve at your hands? In that case, my proposition would be that I should be rewarded with a subsistence at the public expense in the Prytaneum ; for that is what I really deserve as a public benefactor — one who has neglected all thought of his own affairs, and embraced voluntary poverty, in order to devote himself to your best interests, and to admonish you individually on the serious necessity of mental and moral improvement. Assuredly I cannot admit that I have deserved from you any evil whatever ; nor would it be reasonable in me to propose exile or imprisonment, which I know to be certain and considerable evils — in place of death, which may perhaps be not an evil, but a good. I might indeed propose to you a pecuniary fine ; for the payment of that would be no e\al. But I am poor and have no money : all that I could muster might perhaps amount to a mina; and I therefore propose to you a fine of one mina, as punishment on myself. Plato, and my other friends near me, desire me to increase this sum to thirty minee, and they engage to pay it for me. A fine of Chap. LXVIII. BEHAVIOUR OF SOKRATES. 173 thirty minae, therefore, is the counter-penalty which T submit for your judgement.^ " Subsistence in the Prytaneum at the public expense, was one of the greatest honorary distinctions which the citizens of Ag^avation Athens ever conferred ; an emphatic token of public ui/dIS" gratitude. That Sokrates therefore should proclaim ffj"n'^e'™ himself worthy of such an honour, and talk of assessing 2il%ef°^ it upon himself in lieu of a punishment, before the very i^aviour. Dikasts who had just passed against him a verdict of guilty — would be received by them as nothing less than a deliberate insult ; a defiance of judicial authority, which it was their duty to prove, to an opinionated and haughty citizen, that he could not commit with impunity. The persons who heard his language with the greatest distress, were doubtless Plato, Krito, and his other friends around him ; who, though sympathising with him fully, knew well that he was assuring the success of the proposition of Meletus,^ and would regret that he should thus throw away his life by what they would think an ill-placed and unnecessary self-exaltation. Had he proposed, with little or no preface, the substitute -fine of thirty mina? with which this part of his speech concluded, there is every reason for believing that the majority of Dikasts would have voted for it. The sentence of death passed against him, by what majority we do not know. But Sokrates neither altered his tone, nor sentence of manifested any regret for the language by which he had lute adhe- J *^ O O J rence of himself seconded the purpose of his accusers. On the sokrates to contrary, he told the Dikasts, in a short address prior to convictions, his departure for the prison, that he was satisfied both with his own conduct and with the result. The divine sign (he said) which was wont to restrain him, often on very small occasions, both in deeds and in words — had never manifested itself once to him throughout the whole day, neither when he came thither at first, nor at any one point throughout his whole discourse. The tacit acquiescence of this infallible monitor satisfied him not only that he had spoken rightly, but that the sentence passed was in reality no evil to him ; that to die now was the best thing which could befall him.^ Either death was tantamount to a sound, perpetual, and dreamless sleep — which in his judgement would be no loss, but » Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2G, 27, 28. p. i - See Plato, Krito, c. 5. p. 45 B. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, tlio ' ^ Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 31. p. 40 B; c. substantive propositions, apart from the j 33. p. 41 D. emphatic language of the original. ' 174 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. rather a gain, compared Mith the present life ; or else, if the common mythes were true, death would transfer him to a second life in Hades, where he would find all the heroes of the Trojan War, and of the past generally — so as to pursue in conjunction wdth them the business of mutual cross-examination, and debate on ethical progress and perfection.^ There can be no doubt that the sentence really appeared to Satisfaction Sokrates in this point of view, and to his friends also, wifh'the"'^ after the event had happened — though doubtless not at deube"rate°° the time whcu they were about to lose him. He took his conviction, y^^^ ^^ defence advisedly, and with full knowledge of the result. It supplied him with the fittest of all opportunities for manifesting, in an impressive manner, both his personal ascendency over human fears and weakness, and the dignity of what he believed to be his divine mission. It took him away in his full grandeur and glory, like the setting of the tropical sun, at a moment when senile decay might be looked upon as close at hand. He calculated that his defence and bearing on the trial would be the most emphatic lesson which he could possibly read to the youth of Athens ; more emphatic, probably, than the sum total of those lessons which his remaining life might suffice to give, if he shaped his defence otherwise. This anticipation of the effect of the concluding scene of his life, setting the seal on all his prior discourses, manifests itself in portions of his concluding words to the Dikasts, wherein he tells them that they will not, by putting him to death, rid themselves of the importunity of the cross- examining Elenchus ; that numbers of young men, more restless and obtrusive than he, already carried within them that impulse, which they would now proceed to apply : his superiority having hitherto kept them back.- It was thus the persuasion of Sokrates, that his removal would be the signal for numerous apostles, putting forth with increased energy that process of interrogatory test and spur to which he had devoted his life, and which doubtless was to him far dearer and more sacred than his life. Nothing could be more effective than his lofty bearing on his trial, for inflaming the enthusiasm of young men thus predisposed ; and the loss of life was to him compensated by the missionary successors whom he calculated on leaving behind. Under ordinary circumstances, Sokrates would have drunk the cup of hemlock in the prison, on the day after his trial. But it so 1 Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 32. p. 40 C ; p. 41 B. " Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 30. p. 39 C. Chap. LXVIII. DEATH OF SOKRATES. 175 happened that the day of his sentence was immediately after that on which the sacred ship started on its yearly ceremonial s /urates iu pilgrimage from Athens to Delos, for the festival of Slny days- Apollo. Until the return of this vessel to Athens, it aecr^he*" was accounted unholy to put any person to death by "^^'^"hs public authority. Accordingly, Sokrates remained in serene deatb. prison — and we are pained to read, actually with chains on his legs — during the interval that this ship was absent, thirty days altogether. His friends and companions had free access to him, passing nearly all their time with him in the prison ; and Krito had even arranged a scheme for procuring his escape, by a bribe to the gaoler. This scheme was only prevented from taking effect by the decided refusal of Sokrates to become a party in any breach of the law ; ^ a resolution, which we should expect as a matter of course, after the line which he had taken in his defence. His days were spent in the prison in discourse respecting ethical and human subjects, which had formed the charm and occupation of his previous life : it is to the last of these days that his con- versation with Simmias, Kebes, and PhaeJon, on the immortality of the soul, is referred in the Platonic Dialogue called ' Phaedon.' Of that conversation the main topics and doctrines are Platonic rather than Sokratic. But the picture which the dialogue presents of the temper and state of mind of Sokrates, during the last hours of his life, is one of immortal beauty and interest, exhibiting his serene and even playful equanimity, amidst the uncontrolable emotions of his surrounding friends — the genuine unforced per- suasion, governing both his words and his acts, of what he had pronounced before the Dikasts, that the sentence of death was no calamity to him ^ — and the unabated maintenance of that earnest interest in the improvement of man and society, which had for so many years formed both Iws paramount motive and his. active occupation. The details of the last scene are given with minute fidelity, even down to the moment of his dissolution ; and it is consoling to remark that the cup of hemlock (the means employed for executions by public order at Athens) produced its effect by steps far more exempt from suffering than any natural death which was likely to befall him. Those who have read what has been observed above respecting the strong religious persuasions of Sokrates, w ill not be surprised to hear that his last words, addressed to Krito immediately before he passed into a state of insensibility, 1 Plato, Krito, c. 2, 3 scq. * Plato, Phaedon, c. 77. p. 8i E. 176 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. were — " Krito, we owe a cock to ^sciilapius : discharge the debt, and by no means omit it." ' Thus perished the " parens philosophia3 " — the first of Ethical Originality philosophcrs ; a man who opened to Science both new ofsokrates. matter, ahke copious and valuable — and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculative philosophers, historians, &c., yet other countries, having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and sur- passed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Sokrates, either in or out of the Grecian world ? The cross- examining Elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to snch noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison ; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow ; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation ; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire — how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power. It has been often customary to exhibit Sokrates as a moral Views taken prcachcr, iu which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is indeed a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arkesilaus, and the New Academy,^ a century and more afterwards, of Sokratgs as a moral preacher and as a sceptic — the first inade- quate—the second in- correct. 1 Plato, Phtedon, c. 1.55. p. 118 A. " Cicero, Academ. Post. i. 12, 44, " Cum Zenone Arcesilas sibi omue eer- tamen iustituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quje ad con- fessionem iguorationis adduserant So- crateru, et jam ante Socratem, Democri- tum, Auaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil coguosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri, posse, dixerunt . . . Itatjue Arcesilas negabat, esse quid- quam, quod sciri posset, ne illud qui- dem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reli- quisset : sic omnia latere in occulto." Compare Academ. Prior, ii. 23, 74 ; de Nat. Deor. i. 5, 11. In another passage (Academ. Post. i. 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or ratlier intro- duces Varro as speaking) rather con- fusedly. He talks of " illam Socra- ticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nulla afiSrmatione adhibita, consue- tudinem dissereudi :" but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might (in the opinion of Sokrates) come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties. Again (in Tusc. Disp. i. 4, 8) he admits that Sokrates had a j^ositive ulterior purpose in his negative ques- tioning — " vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi : nam ita facillime, quid veri simillinuim Chap. LXVIII. SOKRATES NOT A SCEPTIC. 177 thoug-ht that they were followinnr the example of Sokrates (and Cicero seems to have thouglit so tooj when they reasoned against everything — and when they laid it down as a system, that against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Sokrates is, in my judgement, not merely partial, but incorrect. lie enter- tained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear (though erroneous) line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a sceptic — he thought that man could know nothing : the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phse- nomena of daily wants : moreover, not only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labour after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Sokrates were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge ; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phaenomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them. Nay, Sokrates went a step further — and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought that every man not only might know these things, but ought to know them ; that he could could not possibly act well, unless he did know them ; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a pro- fession : otherwise he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Sokrates felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, — unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, and patriotism, &c., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitra- hatur." Tennemann (Gesch. der Philos. ii. 5. differed materially. Sokrates main- tained that Ethics were a matter of science, and the proper subject of study. vol. ii. p. 1(39-175) seeks to make out i Pyrrho on the other hand seems to considerable analogy between Sokrates j have thought that speculation was just and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that as useless, and science just as unattaiu- the analogy only goes thus far — that i able, upon Ethics as ujion Physics; both agreed in repudiating all specula- 1 that nothing was to be attended to tions not ethical (see the verses of ] except feelings, and nothing cultivated Timon upon Pyrrho, Diog. Laert. ix. ' except good dispositions. Go). But in regard to Ethics, the two i VOL. VI. N 178 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. rational comprehension of moral ends and means. 33ut when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it — yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here then Sokrates found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal " conceit of knowledge without the reality," against which he declares such emphatic war ; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects. Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards — " Opinio copiae inter causas inopise est." So- krates found that those notions respecting human and social aflPairs, on which each man relied and acted, were nothing but spontaneous products of the " intellectus sibi permissus," — of the intellect left to itself, either without any guidance, or with only the blind guidance of sympathies, antipathies, authority, or silent assimila- tion. They were products got together (to use Bacon's language) *' from much faith and much chance, and from the primitive suggestions of boyhood," not merely without care or study, but without even consciousness of the process, and without any sub- sequent revision. Upon this basis the Sophists, or professed teachers for active life, sought to erect a superstructure of virtue and ability ; but to Sokrates such an attempt appeared hopeless and contradictory — not less impracticable than Bacon in his time pronoimced it to be, to carry up the tree of science into majesty and fruit-bearing, without first clearing away those fundamental vices which lay unmolested and in poisonous influence round its root. Sokrates went to work in the Baconian manner and spirit ; bringing his cross-examining process to bear, as the first condition to all further improvement, upon these rude, self-begotten, inco- herent generalisations, which passed in men's minds for competent and directing knowledge. But he, not less than Bacon, performs this analysis, not with a view to finality in the negative, but as the first stage towards an ulterior profit — as the preliminary purifica- tion, indispensable to future positive result. In the physical sciences, to which Bacon's attention was chiefly turned, no such result could be obtained without improved experimental research, bringing to light facts new and yet unknown ; but on those topics which Sokrates discussed, the elementary data of the inquiry were all within the hearer's experience, requiring only to be pressed upon his notice, affirmatively, as M'ell as negatively, together with the appropriate ethical and political End ; in such manner as to Chap. LXVIII. POSITIVE END OF SOKRATES. 179 stimulate within him the rational eflbrt requisite for combining them anew upon consistent principles. If then the philosophers of the New Academy considereil Sokrates either as a sceptic, or as a partisan of systematic Sokrates, , . . ^ 1 1 • 1 ' \ • 1 positive an A negation, they mismterpreted his character, and mistook practical in the first stage of his process — that which Plato, Bacon, negative and Herschel call the purification of the intellect — for means. the ultimate goal. The Elenchus, as Sokrates used it, was ani- mated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.^ There are two points, and two points only, in topics concerning man and society, with reofard to which Sokrates is a Two points sceptic — or rather, which he denies; and on the negation kratesissys- of which, his whole method and purpose turn. He negative. denies, first, that men can know that on which they have bestowed no conscious effort, no deliberate pains, no systematic study, in learning. He denies, next, that men can practice what they do not know ; ^ that they can be just, or temperate, or virtuous generally, without knowing what justice, or temperance, or virtue is. To imprint upon the minds of his hearers his own negative conviction, on these two points — is indeed his first object, and the primary purpose of his multiform dialectical manoeuvring. But though negative in his means, Sokrates is strictly positive in his ends : his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result ; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory, knowledge — as the con- dition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Sokrates was indeed the reverse of a sceptic : no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye : no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer perception of the road which he was travelling : no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary,^ with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalising comprehension, of a philosopher. 1 Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7. p. 22 A. Ss? Stj vfiAV Triv i/J-h" T(Kavr\v iiri^ii^OLL, Sicrizep rivas ir6vovs tvovovvtos, &C. * So Demokritus, Fragm. ed. Mullach, p. 185. Fr. lol. o{/T€ rfx*'V} otjre ao at Sardis. his general at home, brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for defence of the towns. Ivlearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished ; so that there was concentrated at Sardis a body 7700 Grecian hoplites, with 500 light-armed.^ Others afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a amputati."!, inustisque barbararum lite- of the Phsedon. rarum notis, in longuEj sui ludibrium It is certain, that, on the whole, the reseiTaverant," &c. Compare Diodoriis, public sentiment in England is more xvii. 69; and the prodigious tales of | humane now than it was in that day at cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix. 112; Ktesias, Persic, c. 5-1—59 ; Plutarch, Ar- taxerx. c. 14, 16, 17. Athens. Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the It is not unwoi-thy of remark, that market-place. Much less could they while there was nothing in which the have borne the sight of the prolonged Persian rulers displayed greater inveu- , tortures inflicted on Damiens at Paris tion than in exaggerating bodily suf- in ]757 (a fair parallel to the Persian fering upon a malefactor or an enemy, ' CKd(pevK6res xPVI^^'''a^ 'fo^ merceuaries from Sicily to Egypt (The- rovraiv erepoi a7ro5e5pa;c(^T€y irarfpas Kal i ocrit. xiv. 50-59). firirepa^, oi Se Ka\ tskuu KaTaXnr6vres, \ * Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 4. "firicrxve'iTo VOL. VI. O 194 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. a striking evidence of the manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian patriotism, which we shall recognise more and more as we advance forward. This able and accomplished Athenian — entitled to respectful gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian army and the intellectual world generally — was one of the ^lass of Knights, or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at the battle of Delium.^ Of his previous life we know little or nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of Sokrates ; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the Memorabilia of Xenophon ; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis (a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing: from so authentic a source. On receiving tlie invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much HowXeno- inclined to comply. To a member of that class of to'juin'the Kuights, which three years before had been the main- army, stay of the atrocities of the Thirty (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say), it is probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates ; who, apprehensive lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went : but in truth he had already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking, " whether he ought to go or refuse," — he simply put the question, " To which of the Gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and success in a journey which I am now medi- tating ? " The reply of the oracle — indicating Zeus Basileus as the God to whom sacrifice was proper — was brought back by Xenophon ; upon which Sokrates, though displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the whole project, never- Se aiiroi (Proxenus to Xenophon) tl e\9ot, (piKov Kvpcp ivoiiiaeiv tu avrbs e^57 /cpeiTTOt) kavTcS vajxi^nv rrjs TrorptSos. 1 Strabo, is. p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders, and thus saved his life, — seems too doubtful to enter into the narrative. Among the proofs that Xenophon •wa& among the Horsemen or 'l-mnTs of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and gi'eat skill, in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the duties of its commander, and in all that relates to hoi-ses, as mani- fested in his published works — but also the fact, that his son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horse- men at the combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of ]\Iantiueia (^Diogen. Laert. ii. 54). CiiAP. LXIX. MARCH FROM SARDIS INTO PHRYGIA. 19^ theless advised, since an answer had now been given, that it shoLikl be hterally obeyed. Accordingly Xcnophon, having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about to set forth. Proxenus presented hira to Cyrus, who entreated him earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.^ He was thus induced to stay, yet only as volunteer or friend of Proxenus, without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished, this sentence was not passed against hira until after the battle of Koroneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban allies — nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the sentence. Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother's ambitious views, had sent down various persons b.c. 4oi, to watch hira, yet Cyrus had contrived to gain or Apru. ""^ neutralize these spies, and had masked his preparations Cyrus ^ , , , -^ ^ marches SO skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed to Susa fiomsardis until the march was about to commence. It was only KeianK. then that Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person to warn the King ; who began his pre- parations forthwith.^ That which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the army, to Proxenus as well as the rest, — when Cyrus, having confided the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen, and to his admiral the Egyptian Taraos, coramenccd his march in a south-easterly direc- tion frora Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.^ Three days' raarch, a distance stated at 22 parasangs,^ brought hira to the 1 Xen. Auab. iii. 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22- 24. 2 Xen. Anab. i. 2, 4; ii. 3, 19. Diodorus (xiv. 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first revelation to Arta- xerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt it from the acuteue^s of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But Diodorua on more than one occasion confounds Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. 3 Diodor. xiv. 19. ■* The parasang was a Persian mea- surement of length, but according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia : in some parts, held equivalent to 30 stadia, in othei-s to 4U, in others to 60 (Strabo, xi. p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch der Alten Geo- o 2 196 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. Mseander : one additional march of eight parasangs, after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossae, a flourishing city in Phrygia, graph, vol. i. p. .555). This variability of meaning is noway extraordinary, when we recollect the difference be- tween English, Irish, and German miles, &c. Herodotus tells us distinctly what he meant by a parasang, and what the Persian government of^ his day recog- nised as such in their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well as in their measurements of ter- ritory for purposes of tribute (Herod. V. 53; vi. 43). It was 30 Greek stadia = nearly 3^ English miles, or nearly 3 geographical miles. The distance be- tween every two successive stations, on the road from Sardis to Susa (which was '"'all inhabited and all secure," 5ia oi/ceo^ueVrjs re dnacra Kol a.aXeos), would seem to have been measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a para- sang. It seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the mai-ch of Xerxes (vii. 26), that this road passed from Kapj^adokia and across the river Halys, through Kela!na3 and Kolossa) to Sardis ; and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his mai'ch, from Sardis at least as far as Kelajure, must have been so measured and marked. Xenophon also in his summing wp of the route (ii. 2, 6 ; vii. 8, 26) im- plies the pai'asang as equivalent to 30 stadia, while he gives, for the most part, each day's journey measured in parasangs. Now, even at the outset of the march, we have no reason to be- lieve tliat there was any official mea- svirer of road-progress accompanying the army, like Breton, 6 Brj/xaTftrrv;? 'A\e^di/Spov, in Alexander's invasion ; see Athensous, x. p. 442, and Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon, throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the day's march of the army in para- sangs; not mei'ely in Asia Minor, where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between Thapsakus and Pykc — through the snows of Armenia — and through the territory of the bar- barous Chalybcs. He tells us that in tlie desert of Arabia they marched 90 parasangs in thirteen days, or very nearly 7 parasangs per day — and that too under the extreme heat of summer. He tells us further, that in the deep snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched 15 parasangs in three days ; and through the territory (also covered with snow) of the pug- nacious Chalybes, 50 jiarasangs in seven days, or more than 7 parasangs per day. Such marches, at 30 stadia for the para- sang, are impossible. And how did Xenophon meas^ii'e the distance marched over? The most intelligent modern investi- gators and travellers — Major Rennell, Mr. Aiusworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor Koch, &c., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2*25 geogr. miles : Mr. Aius- worth at 3 geogr. miles : Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, c. 42. p. 200) at something less than 2|- geogr. miles: Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8. p. 207) at 2-608 geogr, miles between Sardis and Thapsakus — at 1'98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kuuaxa — at something less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat. It is evident that there is no certain basis to pi-oceed upon, even for tlie earlier portion of the route ; much more, for the retreat. The dis- tance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calcula- tion ; but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route of march : he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly to plunder Ly- kaouia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the distance between KeUcna; and Kolossse, two places the site of which seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps 52 geographical miles ajoart. Xenophon calls the distance 20 parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang of Xenophon = 2 "6 geographical miles. I have before re- marked that the road between Kolosste and Kelseufe was probably measured and numbered according to jjarasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the num- ber of parasangs between these two l^laces, would be speaking upon official authority. Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes found it not possible to obtain accurate mea- Chap. LXIX. KELiENiE.— REINFORCEMEKTS. 197 wl'.erc Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of 1000 hophtes, and 500 peUasts, — Uolo})es, vEnianes, and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelsense, another Phrygian city, " great and flourishing," with a citadel very strong both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of 1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Kretan bowmen : at the same time Sophsenetus arrived with 1000 further hoplites, and Sosias with 300. This total of Greeks was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelsense : 11,000 hoplites and 2000 peltasts.^ As far as Kelsense, his march had been directed straight towards Pisidia, near the borders of w4iich territory that city is Peita?— situated. So far therefore, the fiction with which he Agora, started was kept up. But on leaving Kelasnse, he Pedion. turned his march away from Pisidia, in a direction nearly north- ward ; first in two days, ten parasangs, to the town of Peltae ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs, to Keramon-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia. At Peltse, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lyksea, with its usual games and siiremeuts, in much of the country tra- versed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii. p. 73). Colonel Chesuey remarks — "From Sardis to Cunasa, or the mounds of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over 1265 geographical miles; making 2"364 geographical miles for each of the 535 parasangs given by Xeuophon be- tween these two places." As a measure of distance, the para- sang of Xeuophon is evidently untrust- worthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xeuophon are measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kela^na;, he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance: it is probable that the same mensuration and mmie- ration continued farther, as far as Ke- ramon-Agora and Kiiystru-Pedion (since I imagine that the road from Kelaua} to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone through these two places) — and jiossibly it may have continued even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches, Xeuophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs: and when he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called tliat lenjth of time by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day's march ; three or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long or very long day. We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xeuophon had no port- able means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide the day into hours, or into any other recognised fraction. The Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were the first to use wprj in the sense of hour (Ideler, Haudbuch der Chronologic, vol. i. p. 239). This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon's meaning, when he talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he liad this meaning uniformly or steadily pre- sent to his mind. Sometimes, it would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of distance. 1 Xen. Anab. i. 2, 8, 9. About Ke- lannp, Arriau, Exp. Al. i. 29, 2; Quint. Curt. iii. 1, (3. 198 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. matches, in the presence of Cyrus, From Keramon- Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of thirty parasangs/ to a city called Kaystru-Pedion (the plain of Kay- strus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no pay for three months (Xenophon had before told us that they Distress of were mostly men who had some means of their own), and money— who uow flockcd rouud his tent to press for their arrears. supp^i^et him. So impoverished was Cyrus by previous disbursements — perhaps also by remissions of tribute for the purpose of popu- larising himself — that he was utterly without money, and was obliged to put them oft' again with promises. And his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from embar- rassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him to give to the Greek soldiers four months' pay at once. As to the Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond their maintenance. Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army to Thyrabrium ; two more to Tyriseum. Each day's march is called five parasangs.^ It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, 1 These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from Keramon-Agora to Kiiystru-Pedion — are the longest re- corded in the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find tliem so; for there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When he reached Kiiystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days' march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon's calculation, comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let in here : so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied six days' march instead of three: five parasangs per day. The whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including the road from Keramon-Agora to Kiiystru-Pedion, lay in the great road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That road (as we see by the march of Xerxes, Herodot. vii. 26; v. 52) passed through both KeltenEe and Kolossse ; though this is a prodigious departure from the straight line. At Kilystru- Pediou, Cyrus seems to have left this great road ; taking a different route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these diflfereut roads crossed, see Mr, Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28. 1 do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon's ac- curacy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium: though several of the places which he mentions are not otherwise known to iis, and their sites cannot be exactly identified. There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But we at the present day assign more weight to that circum- stance than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads, stretching systematically over a large region of country, are not of that age : the com- munications were probably all originally made, between one neighbouring town and another, without much reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any promotion of traffic between distant places. It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to "cut straight roads" in Macedonia — which Tinicy- dides seems to note as a remarkable thing (ii. 100). 2 Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyrireum, Chap. LXTX. EEVIEW AT TYRIJilUM. 199 passed the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic Thymbrium troops were first made to march in order before him, review of cavalry and infantry in their separate divisions ; after by cjrus. which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa in a Harmamaxa (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled four deep, all in their best trim ; brazen helmets, purple tunics, greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.' Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right ; the other generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the Asiatics fled can be identified. But it seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now followed by the cara- vans from Smj'rna to Konieh (Iko- nivmi~), which line of road follows a direction between the mountains called Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tauseud, p. 21, 22), ' Elxoy Se irdvres Kpdvr] x^^i^^t "''*' Xi-Twvas (potviKovs, Koi Kvrifu^as, Kol ras a (TIT I S a s iKKeKadapfj.4vas. When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy, the shield seems to have been carried be- hind him, with his blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn., 1085, 1089-1149): it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Some- times indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wag- gon (Xen. Anab. i. 7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers, could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv. 2, 20; Ari- stoph. 1. c). On occasion of this review, the sliields were unpacked, rubbed, and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Holl. vii. 5, 20); then fastened round the neck or should- ers, and held out upon the left arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its concave or inte- rior side. Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shield, see a curious stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx. 11). The Roman soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27). It is to be remarked that Xeuophon, in enumerating the arms of the Cy- reians, does not mention breast plates ; which (though sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Diou. c. 30) were not usually worn by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible that some of the Cyreiau infantry may have had breastplates as well as sliields, since every soldier provided his own arms: b\it Xenophon states only what was common to all. Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy bi-eastplate, but bad uo shield. 200 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. forthwith, abandoning their property — Epyaxa herself among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified ; much to the satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his own coming success.^ Three days of farther m.arch (called twenty parasangs in all) ikonium— brought the army to Ikonium (now Konieh), the extreme — ryana! city of Phrygia ; where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty parasangs) through Lykaonia ; which country, as being out of his own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder. Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like predatory character : ^ so that Cyrus would be partially reahsing the pretended purpose of his expedition. He tlms too approached near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia ; and he here sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division, over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army ; in order that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,^ in the rear of Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward. Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days' march, twenty-five parasangs) to Dana, or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia ; where he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers, on a charge of conspiring against him.^ This regular pass over Tam'us, the celebrated Tauri-Pylse or Passover Kilikian Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a Kilikia. Toad fit for veliiclcs, it was yet 3600 feet above the level of the sea, narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a wall wdth gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately defended.^ But the Kilikian prince, alarmed 1 Xen. Anab. i. 2, 16-19. - Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 25. * This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli : it led directly to the Kilikian seaport-town Soli, after- wards called Pompeiopolis. It is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 seq. ; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr. ii. p. 209). * Xen. Anab. i. 2. 20. * Xen. Anab. i. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 20. See Mr. Kinneir, Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i. p. 293-354 ; and Mr. Aiuswoi-th, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 scq. ; also his other work, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30. p. 70-77 ; and Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a descrijjtion of this memorable pass, Alexander the Great, as well as Cy- Chap.LXTX. KILIKIAN GATES.— PASS OYER TAURUS. 201 at the news that Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast, evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus ; from whence he again retired, accom- panied by most of the inhabitants, to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus, ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining IMenon and Epyaxa. Two lochi, or companies, of the division of Menon, having dispersed on their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives ; for which the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards his expedition, together with a contingent of troops : in return for which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered, and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were found. ^ It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that the resistance of Syennesis (this was a standing syennesis name or title of the hereditary princes of Kilikia under his dupu- •f ■*■ ^ citv ho the Pei'sian crown) was a mere feint ; that the visit of assists Epyaxa wdth a supply of money to Cyrus, and the money. admission of jNIenon and his division over Mount Taurus, were manoeu^Tes in collusion with him ; and that, thinking Cyrus would be successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the same time to give himself the air of having been over- powered, in case Artaxerxes should prove victorious.^ At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty rus, was fortunate enough to find this impregnable pass abandoned ; as it ap- pears, through sheer stiipidity or reck- lessness of the satrap who ought to have defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning it as Syen- nesis had on the approacli of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii. 4; Curtius, iii. 9, 10, 11). 1 Xen. Anab. i. 2, 23-27. * Diodorus (xiv. 20) represents Syen- nesis as playing a double game, though reluctantly, lie takes no notice of tlio proceeding of Epyaxa. So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in regard to the enmity between Perseus and Deme- trius, the two sons of Philip II. of Macedou: " Crescente in dies Philippi odio in Romanes, cui Pei-seus indul- geret, Demetrius summa ope adversa- retur, prospicientes animo exitum iu- cauti a fraude fraterna juvenis — adj'i- vandum, quod futuriim crat, rati, foreu- damqite sjwm potentioris, Perseo se adjun- 'jxnt," &.C. (Livy, xl. 5). 202 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. days. The army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible Cyrus at purposc of the expedition, for which the Grecian troops mutiny of had bccn engaged ; not one of them, either officer or -thei^re- soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary, except farther? ^° Klcarchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted against the Persian king. Besides the resent- ment at such delusion, they shrunk from the risk altogether ; not from any fear of Persian armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully affected the Spartan king Kleomenes,^ a century before ; most of them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to fight against the Great King.^ Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Kiearchus Xcnias, &c.) Commanded his own separate division, suppress the without any generalissimo except Cyrus himself. Each sevemy-he ^f them probably sympathised more or less in the resent- faiis. ment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be overcome. That such a .man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline. For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence of his soldiers, and unshrinkino; against fatiffue and hardship — yet his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his soldiers ; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required them, — but preferred service under other commanders, when they could obtain it.^ Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed, Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and punish. But he found resistance universal ; he himself, with the cattle who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward, and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt at coercion, he was compelled ' See Herodot. v. 49. " Xen. Anab. i. 3, 1. 3 Xen. Anab. ii. G, 5-15. Chap. LXIX. KLEAPX'IIUS AND THE SOLDIEES. 203 to convene the soldiers in a regular assembly, and to essay persuasion. On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even He tries . Ill • • /-^ • persuasion — weepmg : a remarkable point ni Grecian manners — and •"« discourse exceedingly impressive to the soldiers, who looked on him sowiers. with surprise and in silence. At length he addressed them — " Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me deeply mortified. (^yrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me 10,000 darics, which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness. But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him. AVhether I am doing right or not, I cannot say : but I shall stand by you and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies : while you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand me well : I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune," ^ This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he would not march forward against the King, was heard His refusal bv the soldiers with much delight ; in which those of the farther— "' . . . . well re-' other Greek divisions sympathised, especially as none of ceived. ' the other Greek commanders had yet announced a similar resolu- tion. So strong was this feeling among the soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that 2000 of them left their commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the encampment of Klearchus, Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encoun- tered, sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But Deceitful . n 1 11 1 • manoeuvres the latter, knowino^ well the ffame that he was playing, ofioearcims ° ° -"^ to bring the refused to obey the summons. He however at the same soldiers 1.11 , i /~\ round to time despatched a secret message to encourage Cyrus cyms. with the assurance that everything would come right at last — and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent, in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He ' Xen. Atiab. i. ", 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I translate the sense rather than the words. 204 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. then agfain convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had recently deserted Xenias to join hhn. " Soldiers (said he), we must recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his soldiers, nor he our paymaster : moreover, I know that he thinks we have wronged him — so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near him. He is a good friend — but a formidable enemy ; and has a powerful force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or go ; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest." Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency : but their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be impatient for immediate departure. " If Klearchus does not choose to conduct us back (said this speaker), let us immediately elect other generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels — or at any rate for guides in our return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back ; sending forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes." Klearchus here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for him to continue in command ; but he would faithfully obey any other commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker, who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus either for a guide or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting away ? Who could trust either his ships or his guides ? On the other hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible. The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, con- sisting of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really wanted ; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their resolution accordingly. To this proposition the soldiers acceded ; for it was but too plain that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the CriAP. LXIX. MARCH FROM TARSUS TO ISSUS. 205 question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, Thesoiaiors twelve days' march onward. If he found Abrokomas accompany there, he would punish him as he deserved. If, on the farther- other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again pay. consult what step was fit to be taken. The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per cent, upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.^ This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal made to their reason and judgement — the habit, established more or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to Le done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood, against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward. As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example of Klearchus and his division, the whole army M^rch on- marched forward from Tarsus, and reached Issus, the xaisus^o™ extreme city of Kilikia, in five days' march — crossing ^'*'*"^- the rivers Sarus ^ and Pyramus. At Issus, a flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called, Cyrus was 1 Xen. Anab. i. 3, 16-21. - The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon at 300 feet ; which agrees nearly with the statements of modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tauseud, p. 34). Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir's Journey through Asia Minor, p. 13.5; Col. Chesney, Eu- phi-ates and Tigris, ii. p. 211; Mr. Ains- worth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 54. Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus is ford- ablo. There must have been bridges ; which, in the then flourishing state oif Kilikiii, is by no means improbable. He and Mr. Aiusworth however differ as to the route which they suppose Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus. 206 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. joined by his fleet of 60 triremes — 35 Lacedaemonian and 25 Persian triremes : bringing a reinforcement of 700 hoplites, under the command of the Lacedaemonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the Spartan ephors.^ He also received a farther reinforcement of 400 Grecian soldiers ; making the total of Greeks in his army 14,000, from which are to be deducted the 100 soldiers of Menon's division, slain in Kilikia. The arrival of this last body of 400 men was a fact of some Flight of importance. They had hitherto been in the service of —abandon- Abrokomas (the Persian general commanding a vast passes. force, Said to be 300,000 men, for the king, in Phoenicia and Syria), from whom they now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrjTnen marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning amidst the king's army. So great indeed was that discouragement, that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior ; abandoning three defensible positions in succession — 1, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria ; 2, the pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus ; 3, the passage of the Euphrates. He appears to have been alarmed by the easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more, probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.^ Cyrus had expected to find the Gates of Kilikia and Syria Gates of stoutly defended, and had provided for this emergency Syria. by bringing up his fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one day's march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of near half a mile, between the sea on one side, and the steep cliffs terminating Mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by walls and gates : midway between the two the river Kersus broke out from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this pass against defenders ; but the possession of the fleet doubtless enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it undefended.^ And here we cannot but notice the superior ability and forethought of Cyrus, as compared with the other Persians opposed to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties of his march, ' Diodor. xiv. 21. 2 Xen. Anab. i. 4-, 3-5. 'A^poK6fj.as oh TOVTO inoiricrfv, aW' eirel ijKove Kvpov ev KiXikIo. ovra, a.vacrTp4i^as e/c ^oiv'iKrjs, wapa 0acrtX4a airiiKavvev, &c. 3 Diodor. xiv. 21. Chap. LXIX. FLIGHT OF ZENIAS AND PASION. 207 beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting them ; whereas, on the King's side, all the numerous means and opportunities of defence are successively abandoned : the Persians have no con- fidence except in vast numbers — or when numbers fail, in treachery. Five parasangs, or one day's march, from this pass, Cyrus reached the Phoenician maritime town of Myriandrus ; a nesertion of 1 c •I'linnc Xenias aud place ot great commerce, with its harbour tuli ot mer- Pasion- chantmen. While he rested here seven days, his two Cyrus. generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him ; privately engaging a merchant-vessel to carry them away with their property. They could not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful manoeuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathised. The general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives. But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone, added — " I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantman if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing. No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with me — and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as hostages, at Tralles : ' but even these, shall be given up to them, in consideration of their good behaviour down to the present day. Let them go, if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave worse towards me than I towards them." This behaviour, alike judicious and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best possible effect upon the spirits of the army ; imparting a confidence in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement, in the un- known march upon which they were entering.^ 1 Xen. Anab. i. 4, 6. To require the wives or children of generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have been not im- freqiieut with Persian kings. On the other hand, it was remarked a.s a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian Nikostratus, who commanded the con- tingent of his coxmtrymen serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egj'pt, that he volunteered to bring up his son to the King as an hostage, without being de- manded (Theopompus, Frag. 135 (ed. Wichers) ap. Athense. vi. p. 252). - Xen. Anab. i. 4, 7-9. 208 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part U. Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his fleet,^ and striking with his land-force eastward into the interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross Mount Amanus, by the pass of Beilan, an eminently difficult road, which he was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have defended it, if he had chosen.^ Four days' march brought the army to the Chains (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred by the neighbouring inhabitants ; five more days, to the sources of the river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys ; three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude about 35° 40' N.^ The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth. Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five clays. He was now com- practicaire- pellcd formally to make known to his soldiers the real luctance of '■ _, t ^ • ^ • i t-i the army- objcct 01 the marcD, hitherto, in name at least, disguised. Euphrates. He accordingly sent for the Greek generals, and desired ^ Diodor. xiv. 21. ' See the remarks of Mr, Aiusworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten Thou- sand, p. 58-61 ; and other citations respecting the difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mutzel's valuable notes on Quintus Cui-tius^ iii. 20, 13. p. 101. ^ Neither the Chains, nor the Dara- dax, nor indeed the road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 3G, 37). Respecting the situation of Thapsakus — placed erroneously by Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even in the map annexed to Col. Chesney's Report on the Eu- phrates, and by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir— see Ritter, Erdkunde, part X. b. iii. ; AVest-Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate discussion, p. 972- 978, in the same volume ; also the work of Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is correctly placed in Colonel Chesney's last work (Euphr. andTigr. p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying tliat work ; though I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of Beilan and Thapsakus. Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and best-known pas- sage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a noted point, to which observations and calculations might be conveniently re- ferred, by Eratosthenes and other geo- graphers (see Strabo, ii. p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman em- pire became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the river near Bir or Bihrejek (about the 37th parallel of latitude) became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers. The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra to Karrha; iu Northern Mesopotamia; also from Se- leukeia (on the Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his suc- cessors, Antioch on the Orontes, Se- leukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Tavirum, &c. The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 7u) "is celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On the right bank of the Euphrates ther» are the remains of a paved causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on the opposite side." Chap. LXIX. THEY FORD THE EUPHRATES. 209 them to communicate publicly the fact, that he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother — which to themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs, accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus. Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the real truth ; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon ; as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minae per head (about 191. 5s.), equal to more than a year's pay, at the rate recently stipulated of a darie and a half per month. He engaged to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread. But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate separate division was already in the water, crossing. For Menon Menon. had instigated his men to decide separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before the others had given any answer. "By acting thus (said he) you will confer* special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward. If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat : but he will never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you could for him." Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however, completely : for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the obligation ; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents to Menon separately.^ He passed with his whole army immediately afterwards ; no man being wet above the breast. » Xen. Anab. i. 4, 12-18. VOL. YI. P 210 HISTOKY OF GEEECE. Part IT. What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did ho Abrokomas ^lot defend this passage, where Cyrus might so easily tbe'dlfeme ^lavo boon arrcstsd ? We are told that he had been -hisVoubie t^^^® ^ ^^^^^6 before, and that he had thought it sufficient dealing. ^q jj^j-n all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been never before fordable — always passed by means of boats ; insomuch that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential interposition of the gods in favour of Cyrus: "the river made way for him to come and take the sceptre." When we find that Abrokomas came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of communication between the banks, wathout taking any means to inquire whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.' After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded for nine days' march ^ southward along its left bank, until he came to its affluent the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from Arabia. • Xen. Anab. i. 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17'j analogous ex- pressions of flattery ■ — from the histo- rians of Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially made way for him- — from the inhabitants on the banks of the Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor Tibei'ius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lu- cullus still earlier (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24). The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have been about the end of July or beginning of Avigust. Now the period of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May: the period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November (see Colonel Ches- ney's Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September (Ex- pedit. of Xenophon, p. 277 ). The waters would thiis be at a sort of mean height when Cj'rus passed. Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842 : the steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck vijjon it (p. 72), though the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without diffi- culty in the month of May. - Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty parasangs (Anab. i. 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus: which latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der Zehu Tausend, p. 38). CuAP. LXIX. MARCH DOWN THE EUrHRATES. 211 From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated, he supplied himself with a larji^e stock of provisions, to Cyrus o 1 ' marches confront the desolate march through Arabia on which along tiie they were about to enter, following the banks of the theEu- Euphrates still farther southward. It was now that he uestrt— entered on what may be called the Desert — an endless tbTamy! ° breadth or succession of undulations "like the'sea," without any cultivation or even any tree : nothing but wormwood and various aromatic shrubs.' Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of w^hich afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused themselves by chasing them ; though the wild ass was swifter than any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days' march brought them to Korsote, a town which had been aban- doned by its inhabitants — probably however leaving the provision- dealers behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikla;^ since the army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that they could obtain was required, and was indeed insuffi- cient, for the trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular junctures : efforts, in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with their ornamented attire,^ After these thirteen days of hardship, they reached Pyla?, near the entrance of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest and refresh.'* There was on the 1 See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal observa- tion, to the accuracy of Xenojihon's description of the countiy, even at the present day. - Xen. Anab. i. 2, -li. 3 Xen. Anab. i. 5, 4-8. * I infer that the army halted here five or six days from the stoi-y after- wards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the prophet of tlie army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his brother would not fight for ten day.s fi. 7, 16). This sacrifice must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt — not during the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by Silauus expired on the fom-th day after they left Pj-lse. It is in reference to this portion of the course of the Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the ancient Is, noticed by Hero- dotus, and still celebrated from its un- exhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35^^ and 34° — that Colonel p 2 212 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. opposite side of the river, at or near this point, a flourishing city named Charraande ; to which many of the soldiers crossed over Chesney, in his Report on the Xaviga- tion of the Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks : — "The sceneiy above Hit, iu itself very picturesque, is gi-eatly heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating aque- ducts: these beautiful specimens of art and durability are attributed by the Ai'abs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers, and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks, and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application of hydraulics to domestic fiurposes, of the first and greatest utility — the transport of water. The greater portion is now more or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of stone, firmly ce- mented, narrowing to about 2 feet or 20 inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried various dis- tances towards the interior, from 200 to 1200 yards. " But what most concerns the sub- ject of this memoir, is, the existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably, between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the opening left for commerce, through which the water rvishes with a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from four to eight feet high originally : but they are now frequently a bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons." The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this part of its course, are extremely interesting and ciu-ious, when contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xeno- phou; who mentions that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens, either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to con- struct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the Euphrates began then to acquire gi-eat impoi-tance as the means of communi- cation between the great city of Seleu- keia (on the Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus Nikator and his succesors in the north of Syria and Asia Minor — Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, &c. This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thap- sakus. It can hardly be doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100, speak- ing in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian's invasion, how- ever, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being iu several parts well-cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence. (Ammian. Marc. xxiv. 1.) At the time of Xenophon's Anabasis, there was nothing to give much import- ance to the banks of the Euphrates north of Babylonia. Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the Euphrates, before reaching Pylse, as being now in tlie same condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched through it — " full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting many difficul- ties to the movement of an army. The illustrator was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the Perso-Greek army. Chap. LXIX. DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS, 213 (by means of skins stuffed with bay), and procured plentiful suppHes, especially of date-wine and millet.^ It was during this halt opposite Charmande that a dispute occurred among the Greeks themselves, menacing- to the Py'^e- n /• 11 T 1 • 1 1 T-, 1 Charmande saiety ot all. 1 have already mentioned that Klearchus, -Janger- Menon, Proxenus, and each of the Greek chiefs, enjoyed between , T ,. T • • ^ • , 1 the soldiers a separate command over his own division, subject only ofKiearchus to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the Menon?^* " soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of Menon's soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged. The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only, through the encampment of Menon — one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude against Menon's division ; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther assault. The latter at first refused. Indiff- nant that his recent insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly, he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came gallopping up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand. " Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be the hour of my destruction — and of your own also, shortly after me. For if ^our force be lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107) and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84-) suppose Charmaudo to be the same place as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known town with which we can iden- tify it. and he had to walk a day and a night across these inhospitable regions : so that he can speak feelingly of the difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter." (Travels in the Track, &c. p. 81.) ' I incline to think that Charmande must have been nearly opposite Pyla^ 214 HISTORY OF GREECE. Paet II. ruined, all these natives whom you see around, will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the King." On hearing this (says Xenophon), Klearchus came to his senses, and the troops dispersed without any encounter.^ After passing Pylse the territory called Babylonia began. The Entry into hills tlauking the Euphrates, over which the army had frelJon'df"" hitherto been passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial prepwatTon plains commenccd.^ Traces were now discovered, the for battle. ^^^st throuofhout their lonof march, of an hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence of various Persians possessing his intimate con- fidence, as well as of Klearchus with a guard of 3000 hoplites. Orontes was examined, found guilty, and privately put to death. ^ After three days' march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs, Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand, and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians ; but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of Greeks 10,400 hoplites, and 2500 peltasts ; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, 100,000 men with 20 scythed chariots. The numbers of the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters described the army of Artaxerxes at 1,200,000 men, besides the 6000 horse-guards commanded by Artagerses, and 200 scythed chariots, under the ' Xen. Anab. i. 5, 11-17. i become shorter and more frequent, as " The commentators agree in thinking the river flows through a ti-act of coun- that we are to understand by Pyla3 a I try almost level." Thereabouts it is sort of gate or pass, marking the spot ■where the desert countiy north of Ba- bylonia — with its undulations of land, and its steep banks along the river — was exchanged for the fiat and fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia projier. Perhaps there was a town near the pass, and named after it. Now it appears from Colonel Ches- ney's survey that this alteration in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit. He observes (Eu- phi-ates and Tigris, vol. i. p. 54) — "Three miles below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings that I am inclined to place Pyla;. Colonel Chesuey places it lower down, 25 miles from Hit. Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still. Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as 70 geographical miles lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81J: compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. IG ; xi. p. 755-763. * The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks through the communications of Klearchus) by Xe- nophon, is extremely interesting (Anab. i. 6). I omit it from regard to space. Chap.LXIX. speech OF CYRUS. 215 command of Abrokomas, Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however, that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts represented the numerica. estimation as too great by one-fourth. In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals along with the lochages (or captains) of the Greeks ; Discourse of as well to consult about suitable arrangements, as to h^^mcera stimulate their zeal in his cause. Few points in this and soldiers. narrative are more striking than the language addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on other occasions. "It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom which you enjoy ; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you will have to encounter — vast numbers and plenty of noise : but if you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff you will find in our native men. Behave well, — like brave men, and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your friends at home envy you : though I hope to prevail on many of you to prefer my service to your own homes." " Some of us are remarking, Cyrus (said a Samian exile named Gaulites), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when danger is over As to ability (replied Cyrus), my father's empire reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, south- ward to that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in satrapies among my brother's friends ; all, if we are victorious, will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present a wreath of gold." Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him — " Do you really think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you ? " " Yes, by Zeus (was the reply) : assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle." All the Greeks were earnest with him at the 216 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. same time not to expose his own person, but to take post in the real' of their body.^ We shall presently see how this advice was followed. The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions Conception cmploved bcforc during the dispute between Klearchus formed by ' "^ . ~ ■' ^ . Cyrus of and the soldiers of Menon near Charraande — being, as Grccitiii • < • superiority, they are, genuine and authentic, and not dramatic com- position such as those of ^schylus in the Persae, nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in Herodotus — are among the most valuable evidences respecting the Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared with the cowardice of Asiatics — but also their fidelity and sense of obligation, which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery of the latter ; ~ connecting these superior qualities wdth the political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendour of his own position — was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is ex- pressed by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus ^ in Herodotus. To Xerxes, the conception of free-citizenship — and of orderly self-sufficing courage, planted by a public discipline patriotic as well as equalising — was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible. He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed themselves, and that there was no man who had any rights of his own over them — that the law was their only master, and that in rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for themselves.^ Cyrus knew where 1 Xen. Anab. i. 7, 2-9. ' Xen. Anab. i. 5, 16. 3 See Herodot. vii. 102, 10.3, 209. Compare the observations of the Persian AchflRnienes, c. 236. '' Herod, vii. 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the Lacedaemo- nians — 'EA€v0Epoi yap (ovns, oh iravTa i\(vdepoi (icrr eTreari yap Xen. Anab. i. 8, 21. Kvpos 36, opwv Tovs"E\\r]vas viicwvTas TO Kad' eavTohs Kal SiccKovras, TjSti/xei'os Kal irpoaKwoiififvos ^Srj ws BafftXevs iiTrb Tftji' aij. K f tv, &c. The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other stimulus ex- cept that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of Cyrus. ■* Compare the account of the trans- port of rage which seized the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Phera; in the opposite army ; which led to the same fatal conse- quences (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 82; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 6). See also the reflections of Xenophon on the con- duct of Teleutias before Olynthus. — Hellenic, v. 3. 7. Chap. LXIX. CYRUS IS SLAIN. 223 aim as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass : though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias) could not have been very severe, since Arta- xerxes did not quit the field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his defence : Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew himself, or was slain by order of the King.' The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubt- Flight of less exhibited conspicuously to view. This was a pro- the Asiatic clamation to every one that the entn-e contest was at an Cyrus. end : and so it was understood by Aria^us, who together with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when the King and his forces pursued them ; but fled yet farther back to the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes got into the camp, and began to plunder it without resistance. Even the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian women — of free condition, good family, and education — one from Phoksea, the other from Miletus, brought to him by force from » Xen. Anab. i. 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it o>tt from the brief abstract in Photius — Ktesias, Fragra. c. 58, 59, ed. Biihr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xeno- phon) who hurled the javelin ; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapates, the person who by order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was destroyed by her in the same way. Diodorus (xiv. 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many points, jiartly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon. Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he pro- fesses to have derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially from the narrative in Xenophon. Com- pare also the few w^ords of Justin, V. 11. Diodorus (xiv. 2-i) says that 12,000 men were slain of the king's army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks \inder Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the loss of Cyrus's Asiatic army at 3000 men. But as the Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many in the pursuit ; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great number of peltasts — while hoplites could not have overtaken the flyin^ Persians. 224 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. their parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokaean, named Milto, disthiguished ahke for beauty and accomphshed intelhgence, was made prisoner, and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes ; the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though without her upper garments,' and sought shelter among some Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage. These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable slaughter ; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the Cyreians was completely pillaged, not ex- cepting those reserved waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his Grecian auxiliaries might be certain under all circumstances of a supply.^ While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, w'ho had charged through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia, or 3? miles, between him and Klear- chus with the Grecian division ; so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian fugitives. A})prised, after some time, that the King's troops had been victorious on the left and centre and were masters of the camp — but not yet knowing the death of Cyrus — Klearchus marched back his troops, and met the enemy's forces also returning. He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position, Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack him ; but the Greeks, antici- pating his movement, were first in making the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all enemies, waited Plunder of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the Greeks. 1 Xen. Anab. i. 10, 3. The accom- plishments and fascinations of this Pho- kaean lady, and the great esteem in which she was held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been exaggerated into a romantic story, in Avhich we cannot tell what may be the propoi'tion of truth (see ^lian, V. H. xii. 1 ; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27 ; Justin, X. 2). Both Plutarch and Jus- tin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But as that trans- action certainly hajjpened at the close of the long life and reign of Arta- xerxes, who reigned forty-six years — ■ and as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more — we may fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have been something dif- ferent. Compare the description of the fate of Bereuike of Chios, and Monime of Miletus, wives of JMithridates king of Pontus, during the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18). 2 Xen. Anab. i. 10, 17. This provision must probably have been made dmiug the recent halt at Pylse. Chap. LXIX. CHARACTER OF CYRUS, 225 awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then returned to the camp, which was found strii)ped of all its stores ; so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper, while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at which the battle had commenced.^ It was- only on the next morning that they learnt, through Prokles (descendant of the Spartan king Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece), that Cyrus had been slain ; news which converted their satisfaction at their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.^ Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious hopes as well as the life of this young prince, cijaracter His character and proceedings suggest instructive re- "^y™*- marks. Both in the conduct of this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration in Asia Minor which preceded it he displayed qualities such as are not seen in Cyrus called the Great nor in any other member of the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and long-sighted combination a power of foreseeing difficulties, and providing means beforehand for overcoming them — a dexterity in meeting variable exio-ences and deaUng with different parties, Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers — a conviction of the necessity, not merely of purchasino- men's service by lavish presents, but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and systematic good faith — a power of repressing displeasure when policy commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first consj)iracies of Orontes ; although usually the punishments which he inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits and accomplish- ments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when we contrast this portrait by Xenophon, with the description of the Persian satraps by Isokrates.'^ That many persons deserted from Arta- xerxes to Cyrus — none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to Artaxerxes — has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the judgement of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of 1 Xen. Anab. i. 10, 18, 19. - Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4. 3 Isokrates, Orat. iv. (Panegyric.) s. 175-182: a striking passage, as describ- VOL. VI. iug the way in wliicli political institu- tions work themselves into the indivi- dual character and habits. 226 HISTOllY OF GREECE. Part IT. Artaxerxes with the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus, and not of Cyrus, that Loth these matters were omitted ; and that the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears tlmt Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him like a madman against his brother. The same in- satiable ambition, and jealous fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put to death two first cousins, because they omitted in his presence an act of deference never paid except to the King in person — this same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother, and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in regal families,^ blinded him for the moment to all rational calculation. We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cvrus at Kunaxa. Had he de- throned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestal the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organi- sation against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xenophon ^) If Cyrus had suc- ceeded, he would have been the most forrnid able enemy to Greece. ^ Diodorus (xiv. 23) notices the le- gendary pair c)f hostile brothers, Eteo- kles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare Tacitus, Annal. iv. 60. " Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidiuem po- tentia;, et solita fratribns odin, aceende- Latur iuvidia, quod mater Agi'ippina promptior Xeroni erat," &c. ; and Jus- tin, slii. 4. Compare also the interesting narra- tive of M. Prosper Merimee, in his Life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince com- monly known by the name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of Trau- stamare. At the battle of Navarrete, in 1307, says M. Jle'rimee, "Don Pe'dre, qui, pendant le combat, s'etait jet6 au plus fort de la melee, s'acharna long temps a la poui-suite des fuyards. On le voyait galopper dans la plaine, mont^ sur un cheval noir, sa baunifere armo- riee de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frere partout oil Ton combattait encore, et criaut, echauffe par le car- nage — 'Oil est ce batard, qui se nomine roi de Ca-stille?'" (Histoire de Don Pe'dre, p. 504.) Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simu- lated negotiations into the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle, in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been partially aided by a bystander. This tragical scene (on the night of the 23rd of March, 1.3G9j is grajihically described by M. Me'riiue'e (p. 564-ot5ii). ^ Xen. Auab. iii. 1, 5. 'Tnicrxi'^^'^o Chap. LXIX. CHARACTER OF CYRUS. 227 have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomannus, liad ability or perseverance enough to follow out : none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands, — and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias. 5e aitrhv ('EevocpuiVTa VlpS^evos^ el e\6oi, \ k p e it t cc eavT<5 voj.ii^eiv r ij s (piAov Kvpai TToirjcTfiv t u aiirhs f(pr]\TraTp[dos. Q 2 228 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. CHAPTEE LXX. KETEEAT OF THE TEX THOUSAND GEEEKS. The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was Dismay of exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cvrus, the Greeks „ . •' . "■.,. on leai-niijg for dismav and sorrow : accompanied by unavaumg- the death ' "^ ^ ~ ofcynis. repentance for the venture hito which he and Klearchus offers the had scduccd them. Probably Klearchus himself too Ariieus. repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. 'Never- theless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Prokles and Glus to return to Ariaeus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy re- maining ; that they were about to march onward against Arta- xerxes ; and that if Ariseus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariseus by his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals ; and by kindling fire, to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts. ^ Before any answer could be received from Ariaeus, heralds appeared coming- from Artaxerxes : among them being Artaxerxis ^^ ^ ' o o summons the Phaliuus, a Greek from Zakynthus, and the Greek Greeks to . c t^ • t i "^ • i • p surrender— surgcon Ktcsias ot ivnidus, wiio was \n the service oi language of the Persian king.^ Phalinus, an ofiicer of some military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, ad- ^ Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 5-7. i been there : but such an objection - "We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. seems to me insufficient. Nor is it c. 13) that Ktesias distinctly asserted necessary to construe the words of himself to have been present at this ' Xenophon, -^v S' axnwv ^aklvos eT s interview, and I see no reason why we 'E A. A r; v (ii. 1, 7) so strictly as to nega- should not believe him. Plutarch in- tive the presence of one or two otlier deed rejects his testimony as false, Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified be- affirming that Xenophon would cer- cause he was the spokesman of the tainly have mentioned him, had he | party — a military man. CiiAP. LXX. DEBATE WITH THALINUS. 229 dressed himself to the Greek commanders ; requiring them on the part of the King, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. " If the King thinks himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them." " The King (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects." — " Our arms and our valour are all that remains to us (replied a young Athenian) ; we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure." ^ But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation ; saying that they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgement, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. " If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favour, in the event of a contest with the King, I should advise you to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you against the King's consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself." Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined — "That Vb your opinion: now report our answer. We think we shall be better friends to the King, if we are to be his friends, — or more effective enemies, if we are to be his enemies — with our arms, than without them." Phalinus, in retiring, said that the King proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in their present position — but war, if they moved, either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he intended . to do.2 * Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 12. jutj ovv oKov ra fxova i]fxlv ayaSa uUTa Vfxlv ira^aSu- vixeripctiv ayadwv fiaxavfieda. Xen. Auab. ii. 1, U-'22. Diodorus aeiv dA.Aa (tvu tovtois koI irepl twv (xiv. 25) is soiue\Yliat copious in his 230 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched Ariajus re- to ArisBus returned ; communicathiff his reply that the fuses the „. , ,, 1 x' throne, but' Persiau grandees would never tolerate any pretensions Greeks to OH his part to the crown, and that he intended to depart forretreat. early the next morning on his return ; if the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning- sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against the King — a prohibition, of which he now understood the reason, from having since learnt that the King was on the other side of the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach — but that it was favourable for re- joining Ariseus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariseus at the preceding station about midnight ; not without the alarming symptom however, that Miltokythes the Thracian deserted to the King at the head of 340 of his country- men, partly horse, partly foot. The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariaeus. According to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield ; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariaeus, with his chief companions, a spear.^ The latter, besides the promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks in good faith down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to take ; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any other. To this Ariaeus replied, that the road along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert ; but that he intended to choose another road, which The Greeks rejoin Ari^us — interrhange of oaths — resolution to retreat together. account of the interview witli Phalinus. But he certainly followed other au- thorities besides Xenophon, if even it be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus. 1 Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 7-9. Koch remarks however, with good reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51). CuAP. LXX. CRITICAL POSITION OF THE GREEKS. 231 though longer, would be sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days' marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of the King's forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers. They had now come 93 days' march ^ from Ephesus, or 90 from Sardis.^ The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is, according to Colonel Chesney, about 1205 geographical miles, or 14G4 English miles. There had been at least 96 days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been 189 days, or a little more than half a year : ^ but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not specified in number of days. How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the rositk.nof , . j^^ , the Gipcks field, indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but —to aii ... Ti 111 1 appi'iiraiice still more the undisputed march throughout so long a hopeless. space, left them no serious apprehensions."* In spite of this great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a blow : nay, the King had shrunk from defending the long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were of a very diff'erent character. How were they to find their way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle, would be most formidable in opposing their retreat ? The line of their upward march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus : — yet even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing, in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon to ' Such is the sum total stated by Xeuophou himself (Anab. ii. 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which we should obtain by adding together the separate days' march spe- cified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days' journey (Herod, v. 55); and there- fore the discrepancy is really only to the amount of six, not of nine. See Kriiger ad Anabas. p. ooO; Koch, Zug derZ. T. p. 141. - Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii. p. 2o8) calculates 12G5 geographical miles from Sardis to Ku- naxa or the Mounds of Mohammed. 3 For example, we are not told how long they rested at PylsB, or opposite to Charmando. I have given some grounds (in tlie preceding chaiDter) for believing that it cannot have been less than fiye days. The army must have been in the utmost need of repose, as well as of provisions. ■* Xeu. Anab. i. 5, 9. 232 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. think and provide for themselves ; without knowledge of either roads or distances — without trustworthy guides — without any one to furnish or even to indicate supplies — and with a territory all hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates ; nor does he indeed in his heart seem to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of the King.^ The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and imairines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude SS"" 30'— will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his course. In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult Ariaeus ; who (as has been ah'eady stated) pronounced, with good reason, that return by the same road was impracticable ; and promised to conduct them home by another road — longer indeed, yet better supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach some villages of the Bab \ Ionian territory, as in fact they did ; ^ yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by Commence- ment of the retreat, along with Aria;us — disorder of the army. 1 Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 6, 7. - Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 13. 'EttfI yap rifj.(pa fyevero, inopevovro iv S e- |io f x" "''' ^ ^ rhv ¥i\i.ov, Xoyi^o- fjLevoi ri^eiv cifxa riKitf) hvvovri. eis K(i>/J.as TTJs Ba^u\aivias X'^P"-^' '^"^ tovto fx^v ovK ev^6v(707)crai'. Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter (Erdkunde, part x. 3. p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigi-. p. 219), understand the words here used by Xenoiahou in a sense from which I dissent. "When it was day, the army proceeded onward on their maixjh, having the sun on their right hand" — these words they imderstand as meaning that the army marched northirard : wherea.s in my judgement, the words intimate that the army marched eastward. To have the sun on the right hand, does not so much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise instant when, the sun rises, — but to his diurnal path through the heavens, and to the general direc- tion of the day's march. This may be seen by comparing the remarkable pas- sage in Herodotus, iv. 4'2, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa, from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Gibraltai', by the Phoenicians, under the order of Nekos. These Phoenicians said "tliat in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea) they had the sun on their right hand " — oos ttjv Ai^vtjv TrepnrXci- ovTes rhv t) e \ lo i/ % a xo v f ttI S e- |(S. Herodotus rejects this statement as incredible. Not knowing the phe- nomena of a southern latitude beyond the tropic of Capricoi-n, he could not imagine that men in sailing from East to West could pos.sibly have the sun on their right hand: any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar must, in his judgement, have the sun on the left hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See ch. xviii. of this History. In addition to this reason, we may remai-k, that Ai-iaeus and the Greeks, Chap. LXX. TRUCE PROPOSED BY THE PERSIANS. 200 O'J the supposed approach of some of the enemy's horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did not reach the first villages before dark ; and these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamour, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms ; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded with a talent of silver.- What was the project of route entertained by Ariaeus, we cannot ascertain ; ^ since it was not farther pursued. Herauis _,« /.I 1 • ^ c ^ r^\ ^ from the Tor the efrect of the unexpected arrival or the (jrreeks Persians to . „ , , , , , , treat about as it to attack the enemy — and even the clamour and a truce. shouting of the camp during the night — so intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanour. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at leisure : then, having put his troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates (the place where they had passed the last night but one before the battle of Kunaxa) and march- ing northward, could not expect to ar- rive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the Babylouiaia territory. But they might natui-ally expect to do so, if they marched enstward, towards the Tigris. Nor would they have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact have been some- thing near to a return upon their own previous steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to the Eu- phrates. 1 Xen. Anab. ii. 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic. See the references in Kriiger and Schneider's notes. ^ Diodorus (xiv. 25) tells us that Aria?u3 intended to guide them to- wards Paphlagonia: a very loose indi- cation. 234 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. when they informed him that they had come from the King- with instructions to propose a truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus replied abruptly — " Well then — go and tell the King, that our first business must be to fight ; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing dinner for them." With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned very speedily ; thus making it plain that the King, or the commanding officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the King thought their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded. After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon The heralds the Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired Grelkfto"^ that the guides would conduct the army to those quarters liiibeTwUh where provisions could be had. He was most circum- provisions. _ gpect iu maintaining exact order during the march, Marcu over •• r a o - ■' the canals, himsclf taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of irrigation ; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion, from palm-trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with peculiar strictness. lie carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in the right ; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed remiss — and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.^ As it was not the usual season of irrigation for crops he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their prospective march ; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians that these difficidties were no more than Grecian energy could easily surmount. At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides Abundant ^^r quarters and provision ; and here for the first time our/nedin ^^^Y ^^^ ^ Sample of that unparalleled abundance of the villages. ^\^q Babylouian territory, which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large quantities of corn, — dates not only in great numbers, but of such beauty, freshness, size, and flavour, as no Greek had ever seen or tasted, insomuch 1 Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 7, 13. Chap. LXX. VISIT OF TISSArHERNES. 235 that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was disregarded and left for the slaves — wine and vinegar, both also made from the date-palm : these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious apprehension ; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quantity, brought upon himself and others.' After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian visit of xis- grandees and a suite of slaves. The satrap began to negotiations. open a negotiation with Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece impressed him with a strong interest in favour of the Cyreian Greeks, and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate situation ; that he had solicited the King's permission to save them, as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa : that the Kinsr had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the mean time to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack him ; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty in realising what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied, that the army had come together, and had even com- menced their march, without any purpose of hostility to the King ; that Cyrus had brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always treated them generously ; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return home ; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favour or assistance. With this answer Tis3a[)hernes departed, and returned on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the King's permission to save the Grecian army — though not without great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King's dignity, to suffer those who had assailed him to escape. " I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and exchange 1 Xeii. Anab. ii. :">, 1-i, 17. 236 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. cancluded with Tissa- phemes, who engages to conduct the Greeks home. Motives of the Persians — favourable dispositions of Parysatis towards Cyrus. oaths with you ; engaging to conduct you safely back into Greece, Convention with the couutry friendly, and with a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country : if I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to take them where you can find them," Well were the Greeks content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their side — and by Tissaphernes with the King's brother-in-law on the other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home ; going himself to his own satrapy.^ The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly, and not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for the throne — that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death, — that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who, though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus — and that she showed favourable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks,^ It may seem probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon ; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible ; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.^ And Klearchus might say to his Grecian soldiers — what Xenophon was afterwards preparing to say to them at Kalpe on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also affirmed to the unhappy > Xen. Ariab. ii. 3, 18-27. * Ktesias, Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bahr; compared with the remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius Phalereus ; see also Plutarch, Artaxers. c. 17. 3 Kerodot. i. 103; ii. 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788. CiiAP.LXX. DELAY OF TISSArHERNES. 237 Athenian army whom he afterwards conducted away from Syra- cuse ^ — that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently numerous and well-organised to become at once a city. A body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps en- courage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate the primary object of the con- vention. And it was the more necessary to conciliate the good- will of the Greeks, because there seems to have been but one bridge over the Tigris ; which bridge could only be reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of Babylonia. Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his Long halt of convention. For twenty days did they await his return, thei?q^uarrei without receiving from him any communication ; the ""'"^^"aaus. Cyreian Persians under Ariaeus being encamped near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks ; the more so, as Ariajus received during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and friendly messages from the King, promising amnesty for his recent services under Cyrus, Of these messages the effects were painfully felt, in manifest coldness of demeanour on the part of his Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the King had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more efl'ectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus replied — "I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our tents, it will be a breach of the convention, and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with provisions : we shall have no guides : Ariseus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for us to cross, I know not ; but we know that the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any cavalry, — while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our enemies. 1 Xen. Auab v. 6, KJ; Thiicyd. vii. 238 HISTORY OF GREECE. Taut II. march begun, under Tis- If the King, having all these advantages, really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians." ^ Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his Secret de- own Complete despair of the situation— certainly a very spair of '■ ^ ^ . T-ii Klearchus. natural despair — except by amicable dealing with the Persians ; and also his ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes. That satrap however, after twenty days, at last came back, with Retreatine his army prepared to return to Ionia — with the King's daughter whom he had just received in marriage, — and they enter" ^^'ith another grandee named Orontas. Tissaphernes Wau"of*'^ took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the marchlo Greek troops to purchase ; while Ariaeus and his division sittake. jjow Separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves ; not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the Persians of Ariaeus. After three days' march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with Ariaeus) they came to the Wall of Media, and passed through it,'^ prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other ^ Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 3-8. '- Xen. Anab. ii. 4, 12. AieXOoures Se rpels (T r aO fiov s, acpiKOVTO irphs Th MijSias KaKovfifvov reixos, ical ir a- prjXOov avTov etffia. It appears to me that these three daj^s' march or ffradfjLol can hardly be comj^uted from the moment when they commenced their march vmder the conduct of Tis- saphei-nes. Whoever looks at Plan II., annexed to the'j^re^ent volume, will see that there could not be a distance equal to three days' march between the point from whence Tissaphernes began to conduct thein, and any point of the Wall of Media at which they wei-e likely to pass through it. And if the Wall of Media be placed two daj's' march farther to the southward, it can- not have had the length which Xeno- phou ascribes to it ; since the two rivers come gradually nearer to each other. On the other hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under conduct of Ariaus, we can plainly trace three distinct resting- places {(TTaOfMovs) before they reached the Wall of Media. First, at the vil- lages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii. 2, 13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty days for his return (ii. 3, 14; ii. 4, 9J. Thirdly', one night's halt under the conduct of Tissa- phernes, before they reached the Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting-places, between the station (the fii'st station after passing the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their retreat un- der the conduct of Ariajus, — and the point where they ti'aversed the Waill of j\Iedia. Chap. LXX. THE TIGRIS CllOSSED. 239 or interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen, 100 feet high, and 20 feet broad ; it was said to extend a length of 20 parasangs (or about 70 miles, if we reckon the parasang at 30 stadia), and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed at eight parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they crossed two great ship-canals, one of them over a permanent bridge, the other over a temporary- bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang distant from the other. They were 100 feet broad, and deep enough even for heavy vessels ; they were distributed by means of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil ; and they were said to fall into the Euphrates ; or rather perhaps they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittake, near which the Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of trees ; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighbourino' bridge. As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after supper, a man was brought up who had asked ^larm and for the former at the advanced posts. This man said ofX""'""^ that he came with instructions from Ariaeus. He advised ^Ti'^t'T tney cross the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops ti^e Tigris. concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them during the night — and also to send and occupy the brido-e over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters stated by the in- formant contradicted each other ; for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten, — while, if the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied that it was a great extent of country, 240 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris ; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot were they were ; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris, — on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and the Tigris.^ Such an island was a defensible 1 I reseiTe for this place the consi- deration of that which Xenophou states, in two or three passages, about the Wall of Media and about different canals in connexion with the Tigris— the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands in my text. I have already stated, in the pre- ceding chapter, that in the march of the day nest but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa, the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for de- fence across their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty feet broad close by the Euphrates ; through which gut the whole army passed. Xenophun says, " This trencli had been carried upwards across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris ; four canals, 100 feet in breadth, and exti-emely deep, so that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the Eu- phrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang, and there are bridges over them — napeTeVaTO S' t; Ta,(f>pos &VU Sia tov tt^S'lov iirl SwSeKa irapaaayyas, /J-expi- tov MrjSi'as reixovs, fvda St; (the books print a full stop between reixovs and evda, which ap- pears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without interruption) elffiv ai Slcd- pvX^s, anh rod Tiypriros TroTa/jiOv peov- ffav efff! 5e TeVrapes, rb fx\v evpos v\€- Gpicuai, ^aQilai. 5e ((rxupajy, koX irXola. TrAe? ff avra.7s airaycoya- fLcrfiaWovai Se els rhv Evcppdrrfv, SmAeiTroutrt 5' kKaffrr) Trapaffdyyriv, yicpvpai 5' eneiffiv." The present tense — elaiv at Siwpvx^s — seems to mark the local reference of ev6a to the Wall of Media, and not to the actual march of the army. Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, p. 79-87, &c.), Kitter (Erdkunde, x. p. 16), Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 46, 47), and Mi-. Ainsworth r Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xeno- phon to state that the Cyreian army on this day's march (the day but one be- fore the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four dis- tinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They all indeed contest the accuracy of this latter state- ment; Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigi'is in this f)art of its course is lower than that of the Euphrates ; and that it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to each other. Col. Chesney also con- ceives the army to have passed through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa. It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either the Wall of Media or these four canals before the battle of Kunaxa, but w'ho says (as Kriiger, De Authentia Anabaseos, p. 12, prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him) that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near, the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until long after the battle, when Tissaphernes was con- ducting them towards the Tigris, two days' march befoi-e they reached Sittakd (Auab. ii. 4, 12). It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the direction of the W^all of Media could be verified by actual ruins still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see Jour- nal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. p. 446-473, with Captain Lynch's map annexed) discovered a line of embank- ment which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the western bank of the Tigi'is, in latitude 34° 3', and stretches towards the Euphrates in a direction from N.N.E. to S.S.W. « It is a solitary straight single mound, 25 long paces thick with a bastion on its Chap. LXX. SITTAKE. 241 position, having a most productive territory with numerous culti- vators, so as to furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the western face at every 55 paces, aL(TTOi.o, Sec. Compare the description of Zeus send- ing Oneirus to the sleeping Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad. CiiAP. LXX. DREAM OF XENOPHON. 251 Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up ; upon which the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts, and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by Zeus • the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious — that a great light had appeared to him from Zeus in the midst of peril and suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress, because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the difficulties which hedged him Yet doubtful as the promise was, it was still the message of m. Zeus addressed to himself, serving as a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the initiative movement.^ " ^Vhy am I lying here ? Night is advancing ; at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence. Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a different city, to begin ? " With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the Hesumu- lochagi or captains who had served under his late fi-iend [flherVaV Proxenus. He impressed upon them emphatically the lal^^/he necessity of standing forward to put the army in a l.j'i'poi'ilfnew posture of defence. " I cannot sleep, gentlemen ; neither, "^'^ers. I presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon us at daybreak — prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put an end to a truce by which we were the great losers ; a truce, under which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through ' Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the necessity of con- ciliating him, compai'e various passages in the Cyroptcdia, ii. 4, 19; iii. 3, 21 ; vii. 5, 57. " Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 12, 13. Ue/i- Xen. Anab. iii. 1, 30-46. 254 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. followed by Eleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariseus. Both of them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length, — working up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which the emergency required, — and above all ex- tinguishing all those inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest. Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume Favourable at this liis first official appearance before the army, TmJI^''''^ when the scales seemed to tremble between life and sneezing. ; (Jeath. Taking up the protest of Kleanor against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter ruin — but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was good hope of the favour of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened to sneeze. Immediately the whole array around shouted with one accord the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver ; and Xenophon, taking up the accident, continued — " Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to that god, and at the same time tQ sacrifice to the remaining gods as well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let every man who agrees with me hold up his hand." All held up their hands : all then joined in the vovy-, and shouted the paean. This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical Encouraging ^kill of Xcnophou, was eminently beneficial in raising sistedon'by ^^^^ army out of the depression which weighed them xenopiion. dowu, and in disposing them to listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes, — how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy of such forefathers ; and they would for the future be yet bolder, knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for Ariffius and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion was rather a gain than a less. The enemy were superior in CuAP. LXX. SPEECH OP ZENOPHON. 255 horsemen : but men on horseback were after all only men, half occupied in the fear of losing their seats, — incapable of prevailing against infantry firm on the ground, — and only better able to run away. Now that the satrap refused to furnish them with pro- visions to buy, they on their side were released from their cove- nant, and would take provisions without buying. Then as to the rivers ; those were indeed difficult to be crossed, in the middle of their course ; but the army would march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat, and establish them- selves permanently in the King's own country, defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. "If (said Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our com- panions ' — we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi, to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault, when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order, discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals ; and let us thus show the enemy that we have ten 1 Xen. Anab. iii. 2, 25. 'AK\a. yap 5e5oi/ca //•>;, fei/ ana^ fxa- dcofxev apyol Cv^j '^°-^ ^^ a(p06vois fiio- reueiv, ical Mi'jSa'j/ t€ Kal nepcrwu k a- \a7s Kal ix€ y a \ ai s yvvai^l Kal Trapdevois 6 fi t \ e7v, /xr] aicnrep ol XccT^cpayoi, e'm\a6d!ijj.eda rrjs o^KaSe 65ov. Hippokrates (De Acre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the physical cha- racteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive, forms of the first,— as contrasted with the more com- pact, muscular, and vigorous, type of tlie second, trained for movement, action, and endurance. Dio Chrysustom has a curious pas- sage, in reference to the Pei-sian pre- ference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired even in males au approach to the type of feminine beauty — their eyes and tastes being under the influence only of ajihrodisiac ideas ; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training and naked exercises of the palaestra, boj's competing with boys and youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty attracted towai'ds active power and graceful mo- tion. Ou yap (payephy, Srt ol Heparai evvov- Xovs eTzoiovv Tovs KaKovs, Sttcos avro7s ois KaWicrroi Siai ; Toaovrov Siafpipeiu OlOVTO TTphs KOiWos t}> OTjAv (Tx^Suu Kal irduTes ol Pdpl3apot, Bia ra /xovov to, a(ppo5i(Ti.a ivvoelv. KaKilvoi yvuaiKhs elSos TrepiTtd^affL ro7s appeaiv, 6.\\ws 5' oi/K iiriffTavrai ipSv tacos 5e Kal 7) rpocpri aWia ro7s Tl^pffais, rw /xexp^ ttoWov rpe(p€ff6at vir6 re yvvatKwv Kal evvovxt^v Tuiv irpiCT^VTip-jiv Tra7das Se fx^ra iraiSaiv, Kal (XdpaKia ^lera fxeipaKioiv /xi^ iravv (Tvvi7vaL, /UTjSe yvfjivovadai eV :roA.ai- arpais Kal yv/xvaffiois, &c. (Orat. xxi. p. 270). Compare Euripides, Baccbje, 447 saj. ; and the Epigram of Strato in the Antho- logia, xxsiv. vol. ii. p. 3G7 Brunck. 256 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. thousand persons like Ivlearchus, instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to suggest, let him come forward and state it ; for we have all but one object — the common safety." It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that the Great im- spcecli of Xcnophon ffavc unqualified satisfaction: for pression ^ ... . . produced by wlicn CheiHsophus put the question, that the meeting the array should sauction his recommendations, and finally elect new gene- the ncw gcuerals proposed — every man held up his hand. p'osed.'^" Xenophon then moved that the army should break up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more than two miles distant ; that the march should be in a hollow oblong, with the baggage in the centre ; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedaemonian, should lead the van ; while Ivleanor, and the other senior officers, would command on each flank, — and himself with Timasion, as the two youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard. This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke Great as- Up ; proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another, every man's superfluous baggage — and then to take their morning meal previous to the march. The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more than one point of view.^ It exhibits that suscep- tibility to the influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature in the Grecian character — a resur- rection of the collective body out of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in oflSce as one of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy and name was at that moment all-powerful : Kleanor had been before, not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of officers : — he was an elderly man — and he was an Arcadian, while more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and Achaeans. Either of these two therefore, and various others cendency acquired over the army at once by Xenophon— qualities wliereby he obtained it. ^ A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv. 27). He does not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed throughout all his account of the march. Chap. LXX. DIFFICULTIES OF XENOPHON. 257 besides, enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting- point, for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army. But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military experience : — he was not an officer at all, either in the first or second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus : — he was moreover a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only therefore he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal qualities and previous training ; in spite of which we find him not merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than by the panegyric of her own citizens,' — spontaneous and forward impulse, as well in conception as in execution — confidence under circumstances which made others despair — persuasive discourse and publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business, so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in Spartans — mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy^ in counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on this point to the former than to the latter. If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades — much more was it neces- ' Compare the hostile speech of the I yvwjxr\s fj.T]Se ro7s ^f$aiois Tria-Tevaat, Corinthian envoy at Sparta, prior to the rwv re Seivwv firiSeTroTe oUaOai aTro\v67)- Peloponnesian War, with the eulogistic funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war (Thucyd. i. 70, 71 ; ii. 39, 40). Oi fj.(u ye (ei(rJ\ veairepoTroiol (de- scription of the Athenians by the Co- rinthian speaker) Ka\ iir iv oi) crai 6 ^e7 s K al iir IT e \4 (T a I e py Cfi & hv yvooffiv iifxils Sf (Lacedtcmouians), TO. vwdpxovTa. T€ ad^tiv koI i-niyvSivai fxrjSev, Kal epyai ou5e ravayKatd i^iKfcrOai. AZdiS 5e, 01 /uef, Kal irapa Zvvafxiv roX- fj.7]Tai Kal irapa yvwfJLT]V KivZwevral Kal iir\ TOLS Seii/ois ewe'ATriSss* Tti Se vfifTepov, rrjs T6 SvvdfjLfus ipSeci irpa^ai, ttjs re VOL. VI. areaOai. Kal fj.T]v Kal &oKvoi irphs vfj.ar fifWrjTas, Kal awoSrifxr]Tal irphs eVSrj^o- Tarovs, Sec. Again, in the oration of Periklcs — Kal avTol iJTOL KpivOjXfV T) ivOvfXOVIuLida OpQSlS TO irpayixara, ov tovs K6yovs toIs ipyois ^\a^7]v Tfyovfievoi, aWa. /j.^ irpoSiSaxOij- vai jjlTiWov \6yw, irpSrepov ff eirl & Set epyoi (Kdeiv. Aiacpepovrws p-iv 5t) Kal rSSe fxofJ^^v, w (tt e t o \ fiay re o i avr ol fjLa\i(T r a Kal ire pi wv t it i- Xf^p'riTo/xei' eK\oyi^f(r0arh to7s &\Kois afxaOia fj.iv 6pdTrOT€ ivQvfJLT]- Brjvai vTzdpxov vfuv fxeyeOovs trepl is tt]V apxhv ovt' iycb eV to?? irplv ASyois, o iiS' av vvv expTjffa^Tj^ k o (jltt p w v. This is also the proper explanation of Xeuophon's tone. ' lu a passage of the CyropEedia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets forth in a strikinj voiTo Uv eivai. Mr; fj.4vT0i w s \ 6yo v 7)ix'iv eTTtSei^S/xevoi, oTov ^v eX- TT o IT € w pb s e K acrr ov avT , 9. 262 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. issued forth to charge the Persians, sustained by the hophtes in the rear. So effective was the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in order to strike terror into the enemy.^ At the end of the day's march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa, the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (25 feet in thickness, 100 feet high, seven miles in circumference) attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyra- mid, 100 feet in breadth, and 200 feet high ; the summit of which was crowded with fugitives out tf the neighbouring villages. Another day's march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed the continuation of (or the substitute for) the once colossal Nineveh or Ninus, were completely deserted, — yet the country around them was so w^ll furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and lead for bullets to be used by the slingers." During the next day's march, in a course generally parallel Tissaphemes ^"^''^^^^ the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, att^k^ ^th coming up along with some other grandees, and with a some effect, numcrous army, enveloped the Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers, he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of arrows, darts, and stones. He was however so well answered by the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the Persian bows, many of which were taken and eff"ectively employed on the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village, they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days along a level country, until on the fifth day they reached hilly ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch that ^ Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 1-5. and valuable Assyrian remains. The * Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 17-18. It is bere, legend which Xenophon heard on the on the site of the ancient Xiiieveh, that spot, respecting the way in which these the recent investigations of Mr. Layard cities were captured and ruined, is of a have brought to light so many curious ' truly Oriental character. Chap. LXX. CHANGE OF ARRAY. 263 though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it was inconvenient for the whole array to march in one inflexible, undivided, hollow square ; and they accordingly con- stituted six lochi or regiments of 100 men each, subdivided into companies of 50, and enomoties or smaller companies of 25, each with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in, as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from impe- diments in the road or menaces of the enemy.^ On reaching the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were pro- ceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves as- sailed with unwonted vigour by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it, whose leaders were seen flog-orinor on the men to the attack.^ This charge was so efiicacious, that the Greek light troops were driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid of a double attack. The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ains- w^orth to have been in the fertile country under the comfortable modern town called Zakhu^), were unusually ^jch in uleGrpcks. provisions ; magazines of flour, barley, and wine, having rerStilo'*" been collected there for the Persian satrap. They thlnSwch'^ reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the ^*st onward, numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most com- petent persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had now satisfied them that it was imprudent to con- tirme in march under the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissa- phernes appeared and began to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian assailants began to retire ; for they were always in the habit of taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from the Grecian position ; being 1 Xcn. Anab. iii. 4, 19-23. I iccline to believe that there were six lochi upon eacli flauk — that is, twelve lochi in all; though the woi'ds of Xeno- jihon are not quite clciU'. - Xen. Anab. iii. 4-25. Compare He- rodot. vii. 21, 56, 103. 3 Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tau- scnd, p. G8) is of the same opinion. 264: HISTOEY OF GREECE. Pakt II. very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in their camp, Avhen their horses were tied by the leg and without either saddle or bridle.^ As soon as they had departed, the Greeks resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that the Persians did not overtake tliem either on the next day or the day after. On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up ; so that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed, that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an ac- cessible mountain summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out tl^ summit to Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a detachment to take possession of it and offered to Cheirisophus the choice either of going, or staying with the army. " Choose for yourself," said Cheirisophus. " Well then (said Xenophon), I will go ; since I am the younger of the two." Accordingly, at the head of a select detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first ; and the two detach- ments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with 1 Xen. Anab. iii. 4, 3o; see also Cy- rojifcdia, iii. 3, 37. The Thi-acian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack, that he and his troop kept their horses bridled all night (Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 21). Ml'. Kiuueir (Travels iu Asia Sliuor, &c., p. 481) states that the horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the Eng- lish cavalry in Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians. Chap. LXX. XEXOPHON AND SOTEIIIDAS. 2(J5 the utmost efforts to get before the other, — each being- encouraged by shouts and clamour from the two armies respectively. As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them on and reminding them that their chance of seeing victory of their country and their families all depended upon sue- !!!prowws* cess in the effort before them, a SikyoTiian hoplite in the "f -^e"«pii«° • ranks, named Soteridas, said to him — *' You and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback : — I am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry." Stung with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Soteridas out of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by . the heavy cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put forth all his strength to advance under such double incumbrance, and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around him were so indignant at the proceeding of Soteridas, that they reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted ; but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all directions ; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army, w^hich Cheirisophus accord- ingly conducted safely down into the plain. Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All found them- selves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an addi- tional booty of largl3 droves of cattle, intercepted w^hen on the point of being transported across the river ; where a considerable body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.^ Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of the Persians, who burnt several of the villages ^he Greeks which lay in their forward line of march, the Greeks a^to^thX*^'' became seriously embarrassed whither to direct their steps ; p°"*-^i^^' for on their left flank was the Tigris, so deep that their ?•'l'*^^"f <-';_'■ ^ 101 lowing spears found no bottom, — and on their right, mountains the Tigris • 1 • 1 i 1 11111 farther, or of exceednis' height. As the generals and the lochages of crossing it. ' Xeu. Auab. iii. 4, 30-49 ; iii. 5, 3. 266 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. were taking counsel, a Ehodian soldier came to them with a proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be fur- nished in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank ; and as the villages in their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return back one day's march to those in which they had before halted. Here the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as to the diflferent bearings of the country. The road from the south was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media ; that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them by the interposing Tigris ; east- ward (they were informed) was the way to Ekbatana and Susa ; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable mountains of the Karduchians, — fierce freemen who despised the Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them ; having once destroyed a Persian invading army of 120,000 men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could be crossed near their sources, and from whence they could choose their farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only iu the cities and. on the plains.' Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains They strike into Armenia, but refraining from any public announce- niountains of meut, for fear that the passes should be occupied before- duchians. hand — the generals sacrificed forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a moment's notice. They then began their march a little after midnight, so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with his front divi- sion and all the light troops, made haste to ascend the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath ; while Xenophon, with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower pace, ' Xen. Anab. iii. 5; iv. 1, 3. Pro- bably the place wbere the Greeks quit- ted the Tigris to strike into the Kardii- cliian mountains, was, the neighbour- hood of Jezireh ibn Omai", the ancient Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of the Tigris, is ren- dered impracticable by the mountains closing in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Taa^end, p. 72). Chap. LXX. KAKDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS. 2G7 — not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise, abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge on the mountains ; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions, comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near, and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take v/hat was necessary for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear-o-uard were coming- in at nifi^ht, that some fev/ Karduchians first set upon them ; by surprise and with considerable success — so that if their numbers had been greater, serious mischief night have ensued.' Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains, — an earnest of resistance durinor- the next day; which satisfied They hum " . . much of the Greek generals that they must lighten the army, m theirbaggage order to ensure greater expedition as well as a fuller ferings from complement of available hands during the coming march, and energy (if the Kiir- They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage duchians. except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners ; planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The women however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be abandoned ; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage was still retained : ^ nor could the army make more than slow advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers. Their attack was renewed with double vigour on the ensuing day, when the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen ; the latter, men of consummate skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow paths, ap])roached so near and drew the bow with such surprising force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their > Xeu. Auab. iv. 1, 12. * Xeu. Auab. iv. 3, 19-30. 268 HISTOllY OF GllEECE. Pakt II. lieads : among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedse- inonian named Kleonymus and an x^rcadian named Basias.^ The rear division, more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one occasion however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate) two of their number were made prisoners. Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Kxtremedan- Cheirisouhus to slaclceu the march of the van division ; ccr of their situation. but instead of obeying, Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion ; upon which Xenophon proceeded to rentonstrate with Cheirisophus for prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But the other — pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march, which was beset with numerous Karduchians — defended himself by saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not succeeded.^ To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless ; yet the Xenophon guidcs declared that no other could be taken. Xeno- anotler road phou then bethought him of the two prisoners whom he cnomyV'^° had just capturcd, and proposed that these two should position. ^Q questioned also. They were accordingly interrogated apart ; and the first of them — having persisted in denying, notwith- standing all menaces, that there was any road except that before them — was put to death under the eyes of the second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more comfortable intelli- gence ; saying that he knew of a different road, more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of burden, whereby the pass before them and the occijpying enemy might be turned ; but that there was one particular high position commanding the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise, as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks, having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly de- spatched late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night- march ; while Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the 1 Xeu. xViiab. iv. 1, 18; iv. 2, 28. " Xeu. Autib. iv. 1, 21. Chap. LXX. DANGER OF THE REAR-GUARD. 269 Karduchians in front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct pass. As soon as he was seen crossing tlie ravine which led to this mountain, the Karduchians on the top imme- diately began to roll down vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway in such a manner as to render it un- approachable. They continued to do this all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses, long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.' Meanwhile the detachment of 2000, marching by the circuitous road, and reachinor in the nisjht the elevated position xheKar- (thouM there was another above yet more commandmg') aredefeatoa and the road held by the Karduchians, surprised and dispersed them, cleared, passing the night by their fires. At daybreak, and under favour of a mist, they stole silently towards the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets, shouted aloud, and com- menced the attack, which proved completely successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge of the country ; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front ; some along the regular path ; others climbing up as they could and pulling each other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for farther advance. Xenophon, however, with the rear-guard marched on the circuitous road taken by the 2000, as the most practi- Danger of • 1 1 1 • 1 Xenophon cable for the bao-ffaofe annuals, whom he placed m the ^itt the ^ , . ,. r. , , ■, ■ rear division centre oi his division — the whole array covering a great and baggage. length of ground, since the road was very narrow. During this interval the dispersed Karduchians had rallied, and re- occupied two or three high peaks, commanding the road — from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon's troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But the Karduchians, by a su(fden and well-timed movement, contrived to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders ' Xen. Aiiab. iv. 2, 4. 270 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. with several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they could, in order to join their comrades in the road. En- couraged by such success the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army, occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavoured to open a negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they hurried onward in crowds to occupy it ; beginning again to roll down masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks, Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by his shield-bearer ; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a protection for both in the retreat.^ After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at Anxiety of length fouud themsclves in safety among their comrades, to recover in villages with well-stocked houses and abundance of the bodies of i • n i -v ^ i the slain. com and wme. feo eager however were Aenopnon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide ; a heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great anxiety about the burial.^ For three more days did they struggle and fight their way They reach through the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian Kentrirs'! mouutains, beset throughout by these formidable bowmen b^nindaJ'^'^™ and slingers ; whom they had to dislodge at every diffi- otKarduchia. ^ult tum, and agaiust whom their own Kretan bowmen were found inferior indeed, but still highly useful. Their seven days' march through this country, with its free and warlike inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering, and peril ; far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from Tissaphernes and the Persians. Eight glad were they once more to see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river Kentrites, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains of Armenia — enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the satisfaction of talking o^er past miseries.^ 1 Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 17-21. 2 Xeu. Anab. iv. 3, 23. •* Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had suffered in Karduchia. Kai 01 "EAArjj'es iuravOa aviiraiiffavro dcfj-evoi iS6t'Tes irfSiov aTre^x^ Se TtSv Chap. LXX. HARDSHIPS IN KARDUCHIA. 271 Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian side of the Kentrites, for a breadth of 15 i«ffieuuies miles, was unpeopled and destitute of villages.^ But the Kentritcs— approach of the Greeks having become known to Tiri- xenophon. bazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage ; a precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river. In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks nevertheless attempted the passage of the Kentrites, seeing a regular road on the other side. But the river was 200 feet in breadth (only half the breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid, and with a bottom full of slippery stones ; insomuch that they could not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the stream ; while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap's troops. After various trials, the passage v,-as found impracticable, and they were obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great alarm, they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared nearly desperate. In the night Xenophon had a dream — the first which he has told us since his dream on the terrific night after the seizure of the generals — but on this occasion, of augury more unequivocally good. He dreamt that he was bound in chains, but that his chains on a sudden dropt off spontaneously ; on the faith of which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of preservation ; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims were at once favourable. As the army were taking their morning meal, two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river, where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks came so close on the right bank that the enemy's horse could offer no opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, imme- diately offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards opicov 6 TTOTajJiiis el ■^ errTa trraSia ruv ^fiax^/J-tvoi StfTeXiffav, Kal tiraQov KaKo. KapSoi'Xi'*"'- T(5t€ jUei' oiiv 7)v\iffdri^inarch plcnishcd as wcll as they could, accompanied Cheiriso- theirgJiide P^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^' guidc, but was not put in chains or runs away, under guard : his son remained as an hostage with Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As they marched for three days, without reaching a village, Cheirisophus began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humour, though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as to beat him — yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this head-man made his escape ; much to the displeasure of Xeno- 1 Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 27. KaXafj-oi yo- vara ovk ex"''''"^^- This Armenian practice of sucking tlie beer through a reed, to which the observation of modern travellei-s sup- (No. 28, ed. Schneidewin, Poette Gra3c. Minor.). uxTTrep avKw PpvTOV V 0prjt| diT)p 7) 'Ppvj ejSpufe, &c. The similarity of Armenian customs plies analogies (see Kiiiger's note , illus- : to those of the Thi-aciaus and Phrygians trates the Fragment of Archilochus j is not surprising. I 2 Xen. Anab. iv. 5, 26-36. CuAP. LXX. MARCH THROUGH ARMENIA. 277 phon, who severely reproached Cheirisophus first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon) during the whole march ; a fact very honourable to both, considering the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend. Episthenes retained the head-man's youthful son, carried him home in safety, and became much attached to him.^ Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than march up the course of the river ; and thus, from the villages which had proved so cheering and restorative, they pro- ceeded seven days' march all through snow, up the river Phasis ; a river not verifiable, but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by Grecian geographers : it was 100 feet in breadth.^ Two more days' march brought them from this river to the foot of a range of mountains ; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes, Taochi, and Phasiani. Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheiri- sophus halted until all the army came up ; in order They reach •T _ J I ^ a difficult that the generals mi"-ht take counsel. Here Kleanor passoccu- ^ ° . , pifd by the began bv advisino: that they should storm the pass with chaiybes— ° "^ ^ . '' p 1 1 i-aiUery no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the exchanged . b6t\veen soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better xenophon to avoid the loss of life which must thus be incurred, and risophus to amuse the enemy by feigned attack, while a detach- ing. ment should be sent by stealth at night to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position. " However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that you the full citizens and peers at Spaiia, practise stealing from your boyhood upward ; ^ and that it is held noway base, but even honourable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect, and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you are found out. Here then, you have an excellent opportunity of displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us ; for if we are found out, we shall be well beaten." ^ Xen. Aiiab. iv. (5, \-'6. - Xen. Aiiab. iv. 6, 4. 3 Xen. Anab. iv. G, 10-14. Kai ovK alffXpov etvat, ocAAa k a\h v KAeirTfiv, &c. The reading KaXhv is preferred by Schneider to av ay Kaiov whick had been the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Kriiger. Both are sanc- tioned by autliority of MSS., and either would be admissible : on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider. 278 UISTOllY OF GREECE. Taut II. " Wh}^, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians also, as I learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money — and that too in spite of prodigious peril to the thief : nay, your most powerful men steal most of all — at least if it be the most powerful men among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time for you to exhibit your training, as well as for me to exhibit mine." ' We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially, illus- trates that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and Athens^ — the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed to believe that the crying public evil was, — too great a licence of accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly such was not the conception of Cheirisophus ; nor shall we find it borne out by any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks, what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing demagogues, and if the nume- rous popular Dikasts had been exchanged for a select few judges of the same stamp and class as the official men themselves ? Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues Thoyium that he had just captured a few guides, by laying an ambush for certain native plunderers who beset the rear ; and that these guides acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus, some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and Nikomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army ^ Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 16. /c/jaTiVrot/s fxivroi /xaKicTTa, flmp v^7v ot 'AWa fxfVTOi, e(pri 6 Xfipicrocpos, Kayu) KpariffTOi &px^iv a^iovvrar uicm S>pa koI v/xcis rohs 'AOrivalovs clkovu Seivovs elvai crol ftriSe'iKwaOai ttju TraiSeiai'. KXiimiv TO. Srtij.6(Tia, koI /xdXa oz/to? Set- ^ See Vol. V. ch. Ixi. pp. o32, 3. VOV TOU KLfdllVOV T&J K\f1TT0yTl, KOi TOl/5 tlie pass by a flaiik- inarch, and force their way over the mouu- tain. Chap. LXX. THE TAOCIII. 279 near to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station, making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon however saw them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the Greeks were completely victorious ; while* Cheirisophus was marching up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy were so dispirited by seeing them- selves turned, that they fled with little or no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw ^way their light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the conc^uerors.' Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ofround on the other side, where they found themselves in March . , . , . . 1 i" through the some vdlasfes well-stocked with provisions and comiorts ; cmmtry of the TaoL'hi the first in the country of the Taochi. Brobably they -exhaus- i(-iii •11 *'*'" of pro- halted here some days ; lor they had seen no villages, visions- cither for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine aiiiii-fort. days' march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently- had furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey. Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found no supplies, during five days' march through the territory. Their provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and the cattle of the Taoclii ; without houses or fortifi- cation, but nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent, rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the de- fenders hurled or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combi- nation of bravery and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women seized their children, flung them over the pre- cipice, and then cast themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain named ^neas, seeing 1 Xon. Anab. iv. 0, 20-27. 280 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen, asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants. ^ They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they Through the wcre scvcu days in passing through. These were the ihebra\4'st bravcst warriors whom they had seen in Asia. Their w^iom"hey equipment was a spear of fifteen cubits long, with only se\1i-the one end pointed — a helmet, greaves, stiiffed corselet, Skytuini. ^j^]^ ^^ jjj|j. q^ dependent flaps — a short sword which they employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song. They carried no shield ; perhaps because the excessive length of the spear required the constant employment of both hands — yet they did not shrink from meeting the Greeks occa- sionally in regular, stand-up fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts, the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven days of march and combat — the Clialybes perpetually attacking their rear — they reached the river Harpasus (400 feet broad), where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous ; that of the Skythini was level, and contained villages, wherein they remained three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with provisions.^ Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like They reach of which they had not seen since Opis and Sittake on iug fity'^ot'' the Tigris in Babylonia — a large and flourishing city Gymnias. called Gymuias ; an earnest of the neighbourhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished them with a guide, who engaged to conduct them, after five days' march, to a lyll from whence they would have a view of the sea. This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbours to whom he was hostile ; which territory, as soon as they reached it, the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently ' Xeu. Auab. iv. 7, 2-15 - Xen. Auab. iv. 7, 18. CuAP. LXX. VIEW OF THE SEA. 281 through the territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain called Theches, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.' An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spec- First sight tacle, assuring, as it seemed to do their safety and their ?rom^thr return home. To Xenophon and to the rear-guard — Sp^Tbe'ches engaged in repelling the attack of natives who had come ^fig',[t'of forward to revenge the plunder of their territory — the *'^'^ sowiers. shout was unintelligible. They at first imaghied that the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear, and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent to their feehngs ; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened. As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard distinctly crying out Tlialatta, Thalatta (The sea, the sea), and congratulating each other in ecstacy. The main body, the rear- guard, the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spon- taneous impulse they heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative trophy ; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means afforded — sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a Persian costume, and ten darics in money ; besides several of the soldiers' rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters — as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrones.^ When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrones from that of the Skythini, they perceived the \^^^^l ^^^^ former assembled in arms on the opposite side to resist Makrbues. their passage. The river not being fordable, they cut down some 1 Diodorus (xiv. 29) calls the moun- ] brief description of this interesting tain XrfVLOv — Chenium. He seems to scene, have had Xenophon before him in his | - Xen. Anab iv. 7, 2o-27. 282 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. neighbouring trees to provide the means of crossing. While these Makrones were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood — he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian War, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrones, and to assure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrones, on receiving such assurances in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days' march across their territory.' The army now reached the borderg of the Kolchians, who were Through the fouud iu hostllc array, occupying the summit of a con- who oppose siuerabie mountain which tormed their frontier. Here are defeated. Xcuophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each lochus (company of 100 men) in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depths-addressed to them the following pithy encourage- ment — " Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so." Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single Koichian fii©, uow began to ascend the hill ; the peltasts and unwWeT bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly some honey, pj^ced on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance ; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome ' Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 4-7. CiiAP. LXX. THEY REACH TRArEZUS. 283 honey, which this region still continues to produce — unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine ; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhoea, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It docs not appear that any one actually died.' Two more days' march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the Arrival at . , , . . ^ V 1 T^ 1 1 • Trapezus on mhabitants of Sinope on the coast of the Kolchian theEuxine territory. Here the Trapezuntmes received them with zona). kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley- meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undistm-bed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kol- chians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi -dependence upon Tra- pezus ; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks. These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to joyofthe Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and theTrdi^ despair which succeeded immediately on the massacre v»%vfto°the of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Pre- FesUv7iraud server, to Herakles the Conductor, and to various other «'''^^^- gods, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea ; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to competitors in running, wrest- ling, boxing, and the pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly 1 Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 15-22. Most mo- | of any honey thus naturally unwhole" dern travellers attest the existence, in ; some near the Black Sea. He states these regions, of honey intoxicating and (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. Ill) that poisonous, such as Xenophon describes, j after careful inquiries he could find no They point out the A-^:i!ea I'ontica, as | trace of any such. Not contradicting the flower from which the bees imbibe ' Xenophon, he thinks that the honey this peculiar quality. Professor Koch, j which the Greeks ate must have been however, calls in question the existence ; stale, or tainted. 284 HISTOEY OF GEEECE. Part II. interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius ; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes — for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom however were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain ; and the numerous hard falls of 4he competitors afforded increased interest to the by-standers. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardour of the competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses present.^ ' Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 23-27. A curious and interesting anecdote, in Plutarch's Life of Alexander (c. 41), attests how much these Hetfcrpe accom- panying the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A Macedonian of JEgsi named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly put on a list of ve- terans and invalids, who were on the point of being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected, and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetsera named Telesippa, who was about to ac- company the departing division. "I sj^mjjathise with your attachment, Eu- rylochus (replied Alexander) : let us see whether we cannot })revail upon Tele- sippa, either by persuasion or by i>re- sents, since she is of free condition, to stay behind" ('H^uaj /j.€v, Si Evpvkoxf, trvvipwvras e^^'^' '^P"- ^e ottws ■Kei6w/xev 1} KoyoLS fi SwpoLS Triv Ti\fff'nnrav, ivet.- Srjirep «| iXevOepas iffTi). Chap. LXX. RETHEAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND. 285 APPENDIX TO CHAPTEK LXX. ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND, AFTER THEY QUITTED THE TIGRIS, AND ENTERED THE KAR- DUCHIAN MOUNTAINS. It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of men not to present the reader with a map exhibiting the full length of then- stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities, makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we ai'e left with nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course, and a few negative conditions. Mr. Ainsworth has given in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.') an interesting topographical comment on the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their probable line of march thi'ough Karduchia : but the most important point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of the river Kentrites with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern afHuent of the Tigris — distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had been previously confounded (p. 107). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the Tigris at a village called Til, and "con- stitutes at the present day, a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia" (p. 166). In this identification of the Kentrites with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch agress (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78). If the Greeks crossed the Kentrites near its confluence with the Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevei-theless they must have passed. Their two next days of march, assuming a direction nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond the sources of the Tigris; that is, "beyond the headwaters of the eastern tributaries to the Tigris." Three days of additional march brought them to the river Teleboas — " of no great size, but beautiful " (iv. 4, 4). There appear sufficient rea.sons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black River, which flows through the valley cr plain of Mush into the Murad or Eastern Euplirates (Ainsworth, j). 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it with the Ak-Su or river of Mush— this, according to Ainsworth, "is only a small tributarj' to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of the plain and district." Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and round Armenia give to his opinion the highest av.thority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes however that the Greeks crossed the Kentrites, not near its confluence with the Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort. From hence he supposes that they marched neai-ly north-east in the modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern aflluents to the 286 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Tigris (fiilliug first into the Buhtan-CLai), and which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther, in a line nut far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali- Dagh. This saddle is the watershed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is one (Koch, Zug der Zehu Tausend, p. 82-84). After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have we any means even of determing the general line of route, apart from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to Trebizond. Their first object was to reach and ci'oss the Eastern Euphrates. They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to be fordable, in midwinter, with snow on the ground ? Here Pi-ofessor Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and Colonel Chesney. He affirms that the river would be fordable a little above its conflu- ence with the Tscharbahur, about latitude 39^ 3'. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus (Khinnis). Koch's authority, as the most recent and systematic investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to Erzerum. which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili : see Ritter, Erd- kunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates (Auab. iv. 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified this warm spring — the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of the range of mountains called the Bingol-dagh — in the district called Wardo, near the village of Bashkan. To lay down with any certainty the line which the Greeks followed from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I cannot admit the hj'po- thesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army aci'oss the Arases to its northern bank, carries them up northward to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again across the Harpa-Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which lie identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum. Professor Koch (p. 104-108\ who dissents with good reason from Mr. Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesita- tion and uncertainty) a line of his own, which appears to me open greatly to the same objection as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of mai-ch from the place where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by any probability. The Greeks knew well, that in order to get home they must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15). Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates : and the road from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum, to Trebizond would thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They had no motive to go northward of Erzerum,- nor ought we to suppose it without some proof. I trace upon my map a line of march, much less circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a pos- sible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to complete the reader's idea of the entire ground travelled over by the Ten Thousand. Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardshijw with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states fp. 96) that if they had taken a line as straight or nearly as straight as was practicable, they might have marched fi-om the Euphrates to Trebizond in sixteen or tweutj' days, even allowing for the bad time of the year. Considering that it was midwinter, in that very high and CiiAi'. LXX. RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND. 287 culd couutry, with deep snow tLrougbout; that they had absolutely no advan- tages or assistance of any kind ; that their sick and disabled men, to- gether with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger ; that there were a great many women accompanying them ; that they had beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder, — the prophet Silauus, for example, having pre- served his .jUOO darics in coin from the field of Kuuaxa until his return ; that there was much resistance from the Chalybos and Taochi; that they had to take provisions where provisions were discoverable ; that even a small stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their course to find a ford — considering the intolerable accumulation of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modeni travellers go over these regions in midwinter: but we may see what tra- velling is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of March (Travels in Koord- histan, Letter XV.). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels, p. 853; — "The winters are so severe that all communication between Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow." Now if we measure on Kiopert's map the rectilinear distance — the air-line — from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates — we shall find it 170 English miles. The number of day's journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are 54: even if we include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv. 7, 20), which, properly speak- ing, wei-e directed against the enemies of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the pr.jmotiou of their retreat. In each of those 54 days, therefore, they must have made 3-14 miles of i-ectilinear progress. This surely is not an unreasonably slow jjrogress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of their situation ; nor does it iaii)ly any very great actual departure from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated. The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the Tcho- ruk Su, as Colonel Chesney and Professor Koch suppose. At least it is difiicult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be identified. I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls Gijmnias (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as that which is now called Gumisch-Khaua (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh (Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kin- neir). " Gumisch-Khana (says Mr. Hamilton, Ti-avels in Asia Minor, vol. i. eh. xi. p. 1G8; ch. xiv. p. 234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and con- siderable silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions." Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr. Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to Ei'zerum. Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of situation — but_ the existence of the silver-mines furnishes a plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange: the existence of this "great, flourishing, inha- bited city," inland, in the midst of such barbarians — the Chalybes, the Skythiui, the Makrones, &c. Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after quitting Trebizond ; the last two days having been very long and fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana, reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers represent the road near Guaiisch-Khana as extremely diffi- cult. Mr. Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in the icintcr-road from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 394). "The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of 288 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. valley: all the others cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh^ and at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah Bunar, where they take to the mountains." Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana 18 hours, or 5i calculated post miles; that is, abouf 40 English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p. 389 >. Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days' march which they under- took immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches, towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top of the sacred mountain Theche. Theche was a summit {aKpov, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But unfortu- nately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit on which the interest- ing scene described by Xenophou took place. Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh ; from whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned. D'Auville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge called Tekieh-Dagh to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for the nari-ative in respect of position : but Koch and other modern travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It stands on Kiepert's map at a distance of full Mo Eng- lish miles from the sea, the view of which moreover seems intercepted by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion of the ancient Pary- adres, which runs along pai-allel to the coast. It is to be recollected, that in the first half of Februaiy, the time of Xenophon's visit, the highest peaks would cer- tainly be all covered with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend. There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called Karakaban. This mountain, more than 40oO feet high, lies rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond, and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley, partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just men- tioned. But throixghout all this road, the sea is never seen ; being hidden by the hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland, who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this view of the sea, as particuhu-ly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then again lost. Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, imjiressive, and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point from the land side (as Xenophon of course did\ would find it in his descending route, not in his ascending : and this can hardly be reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian. Moreover, the sub- Chap. LXX. EETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND. 289 sequent marches whicli Xenophoii mentions after quitting the mountain summit Theche, can hardly be reconciled with the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban. It is indeed quite possible (as Mr. Hamilton sug- gests) that Theche may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide may have conducted the soldiers thither for the esjjress pm'pose of showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards. This increases the diffi- culty of identifying the spot. However, the whole region is as yet very imper- fectly known, and perhajis it is not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on Tekieh-Dagh, whence, thi-ough an accidental gap in the inter- vening mountains, the sea might become visible. VOL. VI. 290 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. CHAPTER LXXI. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TENIE THAT THEY REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDEMONIAN ARMY IN ASIA MINOR. We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus — then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization — we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against* the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lace- daemonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus. Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found on u!e"''^* repose, was a colony from Sinope, as were also Kerasus Euxine- and Kotvora farther westward ; each of them receiving SinOpe with -^ ' . . » her coiuuies, au harmost or governor from the mother-city, and paymg KotyOia', to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were pezus. planted on the narrov/ strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinope itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbour, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians, even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinope to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day's journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni. The native tenants of this line of coast, upon -whom the Greek Indigenous scttlcrs intruded themselves (reckoning from the west- "i^r"^ ward), were the Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the ihe Grelk* Paphlagoniaus, the Tibareni, Chalybes, Mosynocki, Drila*, colonies. ^^^^ Kolchiaus. Here as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland pro- duce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries Chap.LXXI. natives NEAR THE EUXINE. 291 to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighbouring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject in the same manner to the Trapezuntines ; ^ and Sinope doubtless possessed a sunilar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce ; from the rich thunny fishery attached to her promontory ; from the olives in her imme- diate neighbourhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard ; fi'om the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper, in the neighbouring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house-furniture, and native slaves." The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinope, more to the eastward — Kotyora, Kerasus, and Trapezus ; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approach- ing nearer and nearer to the shore, left to each of them a more con- fined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the western coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas ; a prince tribu- tary to Persia, yet half independent — since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus ^ — and now on terms of established alliance with Sinope, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city.^ The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided ; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations. Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a de- tachment of Athenian colonists to Sinope,^ and had ex- fij*g'^"f ^^ pelled from thence the despot Timesilaus, — yet neither on the that city nor any of her neighbours appear to have taken when the part in the Peloponnesian ^Var, either for or against sand de- Athens ; nor were they among the number of tributaries among them. to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward * Strabo, xii. p. 542 ; Xen. Anab. iv. 8, 24. - Strabo, sii. p. 545, 54G. ^ Xen. Anab. v. G, 8. ■* Xen. Anab. v. 5, 23. * Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20. u 2 292 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. march of Cyrus, wliich had disturhed all Asia ; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognised as the abode of Kolchians, Ma- krones, and other analogous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias. Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, Uncertainty the Grccks Still nuinbcred, when mustered at Kerasus,^ of what^*^"^ 8600 hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers, wymig t ^^^ making a total of above 10,000 military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Con- sidering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self- confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinope herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established govern- ment. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, some- times with another. No one could ^ predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinope, — or if Korylas the Paphla- gonian were meditating war against that city — here were formid- able auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinope herself. There was no restrain- ing cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army ; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by per- manent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation — but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full inten- 1 Xen. Anab. v. 3, 3 ; v. 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian force, wLeu mustered at Issus after the junction of those 300 men who deserted from Abro- komas, was 13,900 men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before the battle of Ivunaxa, there were mustered however only 12,900 (Anab. i. 7, 10). Chap. LXXI. WISH TO RETURN BY SEA. 293 tion, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families.' We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that It would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered. An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyrelans to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past piansoftbe dangers, and to take pride in the anticipated effect w-hich ch^i^iTo- tlieir unparalleled achievement could not fail to pro- toByzm-"' duce In Greece. Having discharged their vows and pr™u^ celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assem- tiffnsportTng bly to discuss their future proceedings ; when a Thurian *<^™- soldier named Antileon exclaimed — " Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, caiTylng arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these tolls, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus." This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all — Cheiri- sophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibius sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted ; and he departed to execute the project. Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the Regulations . . 1 ^ lie for the absence of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced armypro- • ...,„, ,. ,.. posed by to mamtam itseli by marauding expeditions among the xenophon, hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions accord- absence. Ingly must be put under regulation : neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, with- out giving notice to the generals ; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 8 ; a passage al- i -whicli it had been formerly necessary- ready cited above. Tliis statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers is more authen- to give to those who brought together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the soldiers themselves (Isokrates, tic, as well as less disparaging, than that | Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as contrasted of Isolvrates (Orat. iv. Panegyr. s. 17(i). j with the over-multiplication of unem- In another oration, composed about j ployed mercenaries din-ing his own later fifty years after the Cyreian expedition, time (Ibid. s. 142 seq.). Isukiatos notices the large premiums | 294 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels ; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships which they saw ; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by ;^ so that they would thus acquire the means of trans- port, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march ; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports. All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the Adopted by amiy, exccpt the last. But the mere mention of a re- thei^Ste^se ncwcd land-marcli excited such universal murmurs of to fenhT/^ repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question marching. ^q ^]^g vote. He took upon himself however to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility ; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyora.^ The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon Measures soon appeared ; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his t^aiSpOTu!"^ object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable expeditions time. A pentekonter (or armed ship with fifty oars) Igai^nJt^th?' "^^s borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed ^"d'^the"^ to the charge of a Lacedaemonian Perioekus, namqji Driiffi. Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This man having violated his trust, and em- ployed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates ; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became however gradually more and more diflficult to supply the camp with pro- visions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detach- ^ Xen. Anab. v. 1, 3-13. ! -witli tlie town and region of Pbasis, at 'Op5> 8' iybi irXola -rroXAaKis irapawXe- the eastern extremity of the Euxine. ovra, &c. This is a forcible proof how | " Xen. Anab. v. ], 15. extensive was the Grecian commerce I Chap. LXXI. KERASUS. 295 ments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed ; indeed on one occasioy, two Grecian lochi or companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and me- nacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp ; . while the Trapezuntines — tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighbourhood — conducted the de- tachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilae — the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighbourhood of the Euxine ; well-armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a difficult march and attack, which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat — they returned in the end completely suc- cessful, and with a plentiful booty. ^ At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness deter- The army mined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of pe^us, and vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of ward along the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. Kerasus. All these were accordingly placed on board under the command of Philesius and Sophsenetus, the two oldest generals ; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in the territory called Kolchian ; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining ; besides targeteers and various light troops.^ 1 Xen. Anab. v. 2. " Xen. Anab. v. 3, 3. Mr. Eanneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed, from the analogy of name, that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38"^ 40') corresponds to the Ke- rasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards called Thar- nakia. But it is remarked both by Dr. Cra- mer (Asia Minor, vol. i. p. 281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. XV. p. 250), that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xeno- phon having mai'ched with the ai-my from the one place to the other in three days ; or even in less than ten days, in the judgement of ]\Ir. Hamilton. Ac- cordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus of Xenophon much 296 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Acts of dis- order and outrage committed by various soldiers near Ke- rasus. During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurrq^l, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off sepa- rately with the booty in one of the vessels ; but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities ; but these heralds, being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained with- out inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it. Between Kerasus and Kotyora, there was not then (nor is there March to now) anv regular road.^ This march cost the Cyreian hostilities army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing Mosynoeki. from the sca-shorc, and through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynoeki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynreki refused to grant a friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves ; which alliance was procured for them by the Trape- zuntine Timesitheus, who was proxenus of the Mosynoeki and nearer to Trebizond Tabout long. 39° 20', as it stands iu Kiepert's map of Asia Minor), near a river now called the Kerasoun Dere Su. 1 It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir obtained horses to travel from Kotyora to Kei-asoun by land. The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of travel- ling by land, and ordered a felucca for him ; but was at last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems indeed to have been no regular or trodden road at all: the hills approach close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir "travelled the whole of the way along the shore alternately over a sani]y beach and a high wooded bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes and numerous little bays along the coast ; but the nature of the country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine timber, flowers, and groves of cherry-trees " (Travels in Asia Minor, p. 324). Kerasus is the indigenous cotmtry of the cherry-tree, and the origin of its name. Professor Koch thinks, that the num- ber of days' march given by Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Ko- tyora, is more than consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he supposes that the Greeks must have halted some- where (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 115, ll(j). CnAP. LXXI. KOTYORA. 297 understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fast- nesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description, which I have not space to copy,' The territory of the Tibareni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at first declined the presents, preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them ; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.^ Near Kotyora, which was situated on the coast of the Tibareni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty- Long halt at five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus remonstrance with the transports to carry them away by sea. The sinopiuns. Sinopian Ilarmost or governor did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick ; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyorite villages, partly from the neigh- bouring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinope to remonstrate against their proceedings. These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most Speech of eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army u'usof upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then com- the army- plained of the injury which Kotyora, and Sinope as the xenophon. mother-city of Kotyora, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinope would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks.'^ Xenophon replied that if the Kotyorites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian Harmost in the place ; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the ' Xen. Anab. v. 5, 3. - Xen. Anab. v. 7, 18-25. ^ Xen. Auab. v. 5, 7-12. 298 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. sick, and that they had taken nothing more ; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without ; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices ; that they sought no enemies except through neces- sity, being anxious only again to reach Greece ; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinope, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian array as his auxiliaries.^ This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so Success of much, that they went the length of protesting against what gowrund^- l^e had said, and of affirming that they had come with pro- esubiished positions of Sympathy and friendship to the army, as well with Sinope. ^s with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinope, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyora, and a good understanding established. Such an interchange of goodwill with the powerful city of Sinope was an unspeakable advantage to the army — Consultation . , ^ , . t , . . , . ° „ , . of the army indeed an essential condition to their power oi reaching with Heka- . _„ , . ii> iiii- tonymus, homc. it thcy continued their march by land, it was going home ouly through Siuopian guidance and mediation that they ^ ^^^' could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia ; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinope, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbours, for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversa- tion with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologising for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the 1 Xen. Auab. v. 5, 13-22 Chap.LXXI. envoys SENT TO SINOPE. 299 enemy. Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pass — the Thermodon and the Iris, each 300 feet in breadth — the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth — the Parthenius, also very consider- able. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable ; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyora to Sinope, and from Sinope to Herakleia, was easy ; and the transit from the latter place either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.^ Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick Envoys sent of marching and fighting, in favour of the sea voyage ; to sinOpc to .1 1 ,1 . . . PI.. procure tnougn there were not wantmg suspicions oi the sincerity vessels. of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided ; that they would either depart or remain all in a body ; and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinope to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent — Ariston, an Athenian, Kallimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achaean ; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or assembly.^ During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near Kotyora, with a market provided by the town, and Poverty and with traders from Sinope and Herakleia in the camp, disorganisa- ouch soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, army. subsisted by pillaging the neighbouring frontier of Paphlagonia.^ But they were receiving no pay ; every man was living on his own resources ; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home.* Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline ; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the diffi- culties which would beset the responsible commanders when they 1 Xen. Anab. v. G, 4-11. I ^ Xeu. Anal), v. G, 19 ; vi. 1, 2. 2 Xeu. Anab. v. G^ 14. | 1 Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 8 ; vi. 2, 4. 300 mSTOEY OF GREECE, Part II. should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world. It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the Ideas of idea of employing the army on some enterprise of con- STut'''"" quest and colonisation in the Euxine itself; an idea newcuyin l^Jglib' flattering to his personal ambition, especially as wuif^°^' ^^^ army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enem.y, ^™y- and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population, possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many indigenous neighbours. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-Hellenic city ; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants — though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent Hellenic community.^ He contemplated the emplo}Tnent of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city ; after which, when the establishment was once safely efi'ected, those soldiers who preferred going home to re- maining as settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighbourhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs, — perhaps even the recognised CEkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis, — of a new Hellenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important — was a tempt- ing prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover the sequel will prove, how correctly Xenophon appre- ciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment. It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master Sokrates,^ in grave and doubtful cases where the most careful ' Xeu. Anab. v. 6, 15-30 ; vi. 2, 6 ; I Compare passages in Ms Cyroprcdia, vii. 1, 25, 29. I i. 6, 3 ; De Officio Magistr. Equit. ix. 9. Haken and other commentators do " The gods (says Euriisidcs, in the injustice to Xenophon when they as- ' Sokratic vein) have given us wisdom to cribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyora. " Xen. Memorab. i. 1 , 8, 9. "Ecpri Se (Sokrates) SeTv, a ij.hv jxaQovTas ttol^Iv fSwKav 01 6eol, fxavBdveii'- & Se jxt] SrjAa ToTs avBpwTTois iarl, TreLpaadai Sta /xavTi- Kv)j Trapa tcov deaiv irwddveffdar rovs Otuvs yap, ols av daiv iKiw, ffv/yuaiVei;'. understand and approjjriate to ourselves the ordinaiy comforts of Hfe: in obscure or unintelhgible cases, we are enabled to inform oui'selves by looking at the blaze of the fire, or by consulting pro- phets who understand the livers of sa- crificial victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so ex- Chap. LXXI. XENOPHON AND SILANUS. 301 reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to oifer sacrifice, in full confi- sacrifice of dence that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a fsceruin°the special revelation to such persons as they favoured, gods— "^^ Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication twrophef with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious siianus. to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice ; for which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days — and the prophecy came to pass; which made such an impression on Cyrus, that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of 3000 darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of re- maining in the Euxine, and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favourable ; ^ Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon ; which latter indications he himself began to realise, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.^ cellent a provision for life, who but 1 of these Sokratic thinkers) an essential spoilt children can be discontented, and [ part of the divine government; indis- ask for more? Yet still human pru- dence, full of self-conceit, will sti'uggle to be more powerful, and will pi-esume itself to be ■^viser, than the gods." *A S' £0"t' aayifia, kov ^, yiyv Xen. Anab. v. 6, 30-33. 2 Xen. Anab. v. 6, 34; vi. 4, 13. 3 Xeu. Auab. v. 6, 36. I may here note tbat this Phasis in the Euxiue means the town of that name, not the river. 504 HISTORY OF GREECE. Paet II. that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manoeuvre, much to their discontent and indignation ; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon ; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended, as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own — and something so impro- bable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his — that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon's calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups ; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus. Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal Xenophon assemblages, and the importance of the habitual solem- yy nities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence ^ — Xenophon imme- diately sent round the herald to summon the army into the' regular agora, with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them — refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question convenes the assem' again 1 Xen. Anab. v. 7, 1-3. 'Eirel 5e ■paOdveTO b 'Eevocpuiv, eSo^ev avT(p 0)9 rdxiC'ra (Tvvayaye7v avTWV dyo- pav, Koi fxr] icicraL crvWiyrjvai avTOfj.a.Tovs' Koi e/ceAeue rhv KrjpvKa avWi^ai ayopdv. The prudence of Xenophon in con- voking the assembly at once is incon- testable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers from getting to- gether, and exciting one another to ac- tion, without any formal summons. The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens (described in Thu- cydidos, ii. 22 ; and in Ch. xlviii. of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesiau War, and the first invasion of Attica by the Pelopon- nesians; when the invaders were at Acharnse, within sight of the walls of Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution of going out. And what was much more remarkable — the people, even in that state of excite- ment, though all united within the walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would cei-tainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular as- sembly. The contrast with the Cyreian anny here illustrates the extraordinary em- pire exercised by constitutional forms over the minds of the Athenian citizens. Chap.LXXI. speech OP XENOPHON. 305 would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers. "Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you His address J -r»i • TT 1 • 1 r> '" defence of and carry you to rhasis. Hear me then, in the name of himself. the gods. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished ; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets ; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward — if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on tliis side, and sets on that ? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece ? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent — I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more ? Imagine however that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece ; and what fate can I then expect — a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands ? No — these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you ; jealous, too, without reason — for I neither hinder them from outstripping me in your favour, if they can render you greater service — nor you from electing them commanders, if you think fit. Enough of this now : I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge." ^ Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to Hisremen- create a reaction in his own favour, Xenophon made use against the of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army. the array ; which he depicted as such, that if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars ; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus — the unauthorised and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighbouring ' Xen. Anab. v. 7, 7-11. VOL. VI. X 306 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. village which was in friendly commerce with the army — the nim-der of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong — the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred ; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy.* " If such are to be our proceedings (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggre- gate body,^ will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please ; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy ; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen com- manders, will have no authority ; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast, Cast {i.e. darts or stones), may put to death without trial either officer or soldier as it suits him ; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look now what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he w^as really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity ; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death have brought matters to such a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force ; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take" up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial ; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death ? AVe generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us." ^ 1 Xen. Anab. v. 7, 13-26. 2 Xen. Anab. v. 7, 26, 27. Et ovv ravra roiavTO, ecrrai, OeaffaffBe o'la, 7] Kardcrracris thjav earas ttjs crrpaTiu^. 'T/i€?s fiev oi trdvTes ovk ^(Tea9e Kvpioi, ovt' dvi\4adai. ■KoKiyLOV Si av ^ovKriaOe, ouTe /coTaACtrar ISia Se o ^ovA6fj.evos &^ei (TTpaTivfia i(p' o,Tt hv i64\r;. Koc rives TTphs vjxas 'Iwcri irpecr^eis, ^ flprivrjs 5(6- ixevoi t) &X\ov tlvos, KaTaKaivovres rov- Tovs 01 ^ovX6fievoi, Tzoi-r)(rov(TiV vfxas rwv \oyo>v fj.^ aKovffai, tZv irphs i/fxas ISvToiv. "ETTfiTa 5e, ovs /xiv hv yjuels aTravTes €\ria6e &pxovTas, iv ovSt/iiia. X'^P? eaov- rar SaTis 5' fee iavrbv eATjTat arpaTriyhv, Kol idiKri Ae'-yeii/, BaAAe, BaAAe, ovtos earai 'iKavhs koI ixpxovTa KaraKaiueiv koL ISiwTTiv i>v hv vjxwv iOeXri aKpiTov — hv Siffiv 01 TreKTSfJ-evot avrcji, Hiffirep koX vvv iyiviTo. 3 Xen. Anab. v. 7, 27-30. Chap. LXXI. GKEEK POLITICAL MORALITY. 307 Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in im- vote of the pressing his own sentiment, heartily and unanimously, ?^u'^iy°^°'" upon the soldiers. They passed a vote that the ring- [oXenophon leaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be punished ; "^lang'the that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future, alfj^'l^ecting he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before ^"*'- the lochages or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death ; and that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the prophets, to purify the army.^ This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though xenopiion's deeper and more predominant among its better sections. uni'versaJ In the miscellaneous aggregate, and temporary society, ^Uf u|ui-^ now mustered at Kotyora, Xenophon insists on the c"faii^^o-'' universal suffrage of the whole body, as the legitimate "es^"of^i^g' sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual "Preai. will ; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected, as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority ; the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of each separate man or fraction ; as the condition of all success, all safety, and all conjoint action ; as the only condition either for punishing wrong or protecting right ; as indispensable to keep up their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling. No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards, though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion. And what is not less important to notice — the influence of Xenophon himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to have been sensibly augmented — certainly noway diminished. The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of Xenophon himself,- that the generals themselves should be tried ' Xen. Anab. v. 7, 34, 35. I Tlapatyovi/ros 5e s,evo(pii)vros, Kai rwv 2 Xen Auab. v 7, 35. | ixavT^wv ffv/u.^ovKivSuTui', iSo^e koI KaBa- X 2 308 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Xenophon recommends trial (if the generals before a tribunal formed of the locbages or captains. Satisfaction of the army ■with Xenophon. before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochagcs or captains, in case anyone had complaint to make against them for past matters ; agreeably to the Athenian habit of sub- jecting every magistrate to a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course of this investi- gation, Philesius and Xanthikles were fined twenty minse, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus for the transport of the army :. Sophsenetus, who had the general superintendence of this pro- perty, but had been negligent in that duty, was fined ten minse. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far the severest and most diflicult, especially during the intense cold and deep snow ; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out that he had given him blows, because the man, having been entrusted with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty by burying the dying man alive. ^ This interesting debate (given in the Anabasis at length) ended by a full appro- bation on the part of the army of Xenophon's conduct, accom- panied with regret that he had not handled the man yet more severely. The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the Manner in internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a cipiine was discrcct and well-tempered officer. *' I acknowledge the'officers. (said he to the soldiers) to have struck many men for disorderly conduct ; men who were content to owe their preserva- tion to your orderly march and constant fighting, while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to a man. Sometimes too I struck men who were lagging behind with cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others pai rh /TTparevixa' Koi iyiveTO tcaOap/xSs. eSo^e Se kuI robs cTTpnTOyovs SIktiv viro- (Tx^^" "'""'^ TrapeAriA-vdoTos xpovov. In the distribution of chapters as made by the editoi-s, chapter the eighth is made to begin at the second eSo^e, which seems to me not couveuieut for compreheadiug the full sen.se. I think that the second eSo^e, as well as the first, is connected with the words irapat- vovvTos 'EeyovTos, and ought to be included not only in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sen- tence, without an intervening full stop. 1 Xen. Anab. v. 8, 3-12, Chap. LXXI. INFLUENCE OF XENOPHON. 309 from getting forward : I struck them with my fist,' in order to save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by, and saw me : you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not from any insolence of disposition ; for it was a time when we were all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue ; whereas I now live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days — and yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most in those time of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders in the army. There is Bo'iskus,^ the Thessa- lian pugilist, who pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen of carrying his shield — and now, as I am in- formed, he has stripped several citizens of Kotyora of their clothes. If (he concluded^ the blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are now brought in evidence— I call upon those among you also, to whom I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my favour." ^ Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomnch that Xenophon was not merely acquitted, but stood higher Complete than before in the opinion of the army. We learn from xenopiwn. his defence that tor a commandmg otncer to strike a enceover soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty, was not con- derived from sidered improper ; at least under such circumstances as his frankness, those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, oratory, is, the extraordinary influence which Xenophon's powers of speak- ing gave him over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other generals, Lacedaemonian, Arcadian, Achaean, &c., by having the power of working on the minds of the soldiers • collectively ; and we see that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness — or rather, partly by means of such frank- ness — his ascendency as commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people, — it will be found that though par- ' Xen. Anab. v. 8, 16. eiraiiTa ttv^, Uttws ixri \6'YXV "^"^^ '^'^^ TToKefxiwv TraioiTO. ^ The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled pugilist of the Homeric Gre- cian army, Epeius, confesses his own in- ferioi'ity as a soldier (Iliad, xsiii. 0G7.) 'Ao'eroi' ito), octtis SeVas o'cTETni afx^iKvireXXov IIvy|u.j7 viKrj(yairT*' €7r€t evxojitat eii'at apte ATI 1 ^ • 1 • T army — they And they now began to exclaim that it was disorraceful divide into three frac- to the Arcadians and Achseans, who formed more than tions:— one numerical half of the army and endured all the cadiansand toil — to obey as well as to enrich generals from other 2.'^A*dM- Hellenic cities ; especially a single Athenian who fur- cheirisophus. nished no contingent to the army. Here again it is under" '""^'^ remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon ^^"^p'*''^- caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command had been vested by formal vote in Cheirisophus. So vehement was the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achaean soldiers in the army, more than 4500 hoplites in number, re- nounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three portions — first the Arcadians and Achseans : secondly, 1400 hoplites and 700 Thracian peltasts, who adhered to Cheirisophus: lastly, 1700 hoplites, 300 peltasts, and 40 horsemen (all the horsemen in the army), attaching themselves to Xenophon ; who however was taking measures to sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether, which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavourable sacrifices.' 1 Xen. Anab. vi. 2, 11-16. 314 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Hera- Arcadian kleia, landed at the harbour of Kalpe ; an untenanted stot'tirst promontory of the Bitliynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway themselves bctweeu Ileraklcia and Byzantium. From thence they i^to g!^J,t' marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with the arerescued ^^^w of Surprising the villages, and acquiring"plunder. phon-tbe -^^^ through rashness and bad management, they first nnuedTt Sustained several partial losses, and ultimately became ■^j^iPj^-oid surrounded upon an eminence, by a large muster of the Ked*"^^' i^^tligenous Bithynians from all the territory around. with Neon They were only rescued from destruction by the unex- in place of * ^ ..... cheirisophus. pectcd appcaraucc of Xenophon with his division ; who had left Herakleia somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at Kalpe, where the Arcadians and Achseans, disgusted at the ill-success of their separate expedition, again established the old union and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus, who — afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been first named sole commander and next deposed within a week — had fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.^ The locality of Kalpe was well-suited for the foundation of a Distress for colony, which Xenophon evidently would have been glad atKlIpe— ^^ bring about, though he took no direct measures unwilling- tending towards it ; while the soldiers were so bent on ness to move p . ' in the face returning to Greece, and so iealous lest Xenophon of unfavour- ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • abiesacri- should cutrap them mto remainino' that they almost fices— ulti- 111 T ? 11 mate victory shuuncd the eucampment. It so happened that they over tbe troops of the Were detained there for some days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions, because the sacrifices were not favourable. Xenophon refused to lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices — although the army suspected him of a deliberate manoeuvre for the purpose of de- tention. Neon hov.ever, less scrupulous, led out a body of 2000 men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was defeated with the loss of no less than 500 men ; a misfortune • Xen. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi. 4, 11. Chap. LXXI. KALPE. 315 which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp ; upon which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim was at once favourable ; so that he led out without delay the greater part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become, that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kajpe a supply of barley-meal, cattle, and wine ; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive against the Bithynians, and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned to their camp at Kalpe in the evening, both safe and masters of the country.^ At Kalpe they remained some time, awaiting, the arrival of Kleander from Byzantium, who was said to be about to Halt at . rr-i Kalpe — brines vessels for their transport. They were now abun- comfortable ^ . . *■ . •' quarters — dantly provided with supplies, not merely from the i^-^ii'pus. army until their arrival at Trapezus, and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the con- fidence reposed in him, by running away with the ship to Byzantium. 1 Xeu. Auab. vi. 5. ^ Xeu. Auab. vi. G, 1-5. 316 HISTOKY OF GREECE. Part II. It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the Disorder in wholc army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders mntt™^' had been already promulgated, that whatever was cap- Kieander, tured by cvery one when the whole army was out, the trfach^ should be brought in and dealt with as public property ; of Dexippus. ^iiough on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander ; who desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them, a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best friends of Xenophon — the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man under his protection ; while the soldiers around, incensed not less at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into violent manifestations, called him a traitor, and pelted him with stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled, in alarm ; in spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce — and on the other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedaemonian harmost was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should be interdicted fi'om giving them re- ception.^ It was in vain that the generals, well-knowing the formidable consequences of such an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and believed that Agasias had acted by his order. ^ ^ Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 5-9. ' Xen. Anab. vi. 1, 32; vi. 4, 11-15. Chap. LXXI. OFFENCE TO KLEANDER. 317 The situation now became extremely critical ; since the soldiers would not easily be broua^ht to surrender their comrades , ,. ,. , „ , . Indignation — who had a perfectly rifyhteous cause, though they had a^'d i^reats T . , 1 • 1 ^f Kleander supported it by undue violence — to the vengeance of a — xenopUon traitor like Dexippus. When the army was convened in the army to assembly, several of them went so far as to treat the fear of • menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon "P'^''"'' took pains to set them right upon this point. " Soldiers (said he), it will be no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the cities of Greece : now the Lacedaemonians are the imperial power in Greece, and not merely their authorised officers, but even each one of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedae- monian harmosts in the other cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to Sparta — if, besides, the same repre- sentation should be conveyed to the Lacedaemonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius — we shall be hard pressed either to remain or to sail away ; for the Lacedaemonians are at present masters both on land and at sea.^ We must not, for the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedaemonians command, especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander arraigns ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not only be debarred from the praise and honour which we anticipated, but should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from the Grecian cities." ^ 1 Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 12. Ei(ri jiifv yap ^St] iyyvs al "EWrjvlSes ■iT6\fiS- TTJs 5' 'EAAciSos AaK€SaLfx6viOL ■KpoeaTT)Kaaiv i k av o\ Sc ettrj Ka\ {fj 'i nacr T o s AaKeSat/J-ovlaiv i p ra'is Tr6\i(riv '6,t i PovKovrai S i air p a.T T f ff 6 a I. Ei ovv ouros irpit)- Tov fj.lv ri/xus Bv^avriov ctTro/cAeicrEi, tTreira Se To7s &\\oiS apjxoaTals Trapayye\u els ras ir6\ft9 fi^ Sfxec^o", ais airKTrovuTas AaK^Sai/xoviois Kal avifjLOvs uvras — en Se irphs 'Ava^i^iov rbv vavapxov ovros 6 \6- yos irepl rifJLUV ri^n — x^-Keirhv icrrai Ka\ fieveiv Kal airoTrKe'iv Kal yap 4 v r fj y rj & p xov (T t Auk eS ai fiS V t t Kal iv TTj Q aXaTT ri rhv vvv XP ^ " " v. ' Xen. Anab, vi. 6, 12-10. 318 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon — so signl- satisfaction ficaiit a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and Kr^nder, interference of the Lacedaemonians throughout Greece — voluntary Agasias rose, and proclaimed, that what he had done of Tgasfi ""^3,3 neither under the orders, nor with the privity, of mutinous Xcuophon ; that he had acted on a personal impulse of soldier. wi^ath, at seeinof his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the traitor Dexippus ; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a victim, to avert fi'om the army the displeasure of the Lacedaemonians. This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army ; and the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued, as prisoners to Kleander. Pre- senting himself as the responsible party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous behaviour of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else would he have acted in the same manner ; while the soldier whom he had rescued, and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that no one ought to have been stoned without trial — desired that the persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all the others.^ The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the Appeal to prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But KTeander^°^ they retired with mournful feelings, and Xenophon piet*eiy*^°°^" prcscutly conveucd the army to propose that a general soothed. deputation should be sent to Kleander to implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius the Spartan as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest appeal to Kleander, representing that his honour had been satisfied with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required ; that the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated him now to show mercy and spare their lives ; that they promised him in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the command of them, in order that he might have personal ' Xen. Anab. vi. G, 22-28. Chap. LXXI. KLEANDER IS APPEASED. 319 cognizance of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but com- pletely won over, by this address ; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals belied altogether the representations made to him (doubtless by Dexippus), that they were seeking to alienate the army from the Lacedaemonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them back into Greece.^ The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved ; the more so, as Kleander, on enterino^ upon his new Kieander ' ' . . takes the functions as commander, found the soldiers so cheerful command, expressing and orderly, that he was hinfhly gratified, and exchanged the utmost •^ . OJO _'_ _ ^O friendship personal tokens of friendship and hospitality with Xeno- both to- .5 "Wards the phon. But when sacrifices came to be offered, for army and beginning the march homeward, the signs were so un- xeno'phon. propitious, for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accord- ingly, he told the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it for them, to conduct the army into Greece ; that he should therefore sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange of presents with the soldiers, he then de- parted with his two triremes.^ The favourable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will be found very serviceable hereafter to the unfavour- Cyreians at Byzantium ; but they had cause for deeply gees make regretting the unpropitious sacrifices which had deterred {^row'^up him from assuming the actual command at Kalpe. In the mandTnd request preferred to him by them that he would march as ^*'^ '^'^''^• their commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognise a scheme, and a very well-contrived scheme, of Xeuophon ; who had before desired to leave the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of a commander, unless he were a Lacedaemonian of station and influence, would increase with every step of their ap- proach to Greece. Had Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better treated, while Xeuophon himself might either have remained as his adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the latter course. Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched from Kalpe across Bithynia to Chrysopolis ^ (in the terri- 1 Xen. Anab. vi. 6, 31-36. I ^ Nearly the same cross march was - Xen. Anab. vi. G, '36, 37. j made by the Athenian general Lama- '320 HISTORY OP GREECE. Part II. tory of Chalkedon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, imme- March of diately opposite to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Con- across the stantinople), where they remained seven days, turning fromivaipg into moncv the slaves and plunder which they had col- toChal- •' M f 1 1 T . kedon. Icctcd. Unhappily lor them, the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed lest they should invade^ his satrapy, dispatched a private message to Anaxibius ; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents, to transport the army forthwith across to the Euro- pean side of the Bosphorus.^ Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and the lochages across to Byzantiun, invited the army to cross, and gave them his assurance that as soon as the Pharnabazus soldicrs should be in Europe, he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they would return with this message and take the sense of the army ; but Xenophon on his own account said that he should not return ; that he should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go back to Chrysopolis and conduct the array across ; on the understanding that he should depart immediately afterwards. Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the Thracian prince Seuthes ; who sent Medosades to offer him a reward if he would bring the army across. Xeno- phon replied that the army would cross ; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about that movement ; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the com- mand in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the walls of Byzantium.^ Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of the city, and that he would bribes Anaxibius to carry the array across the Bos- phorus into Europe — false pro- mises of Anaxibius to the army. Intention of Xenophon to leave the army immediiftely and go home — first proposition addressed to him by Seuth§s of Thrace. chus, in the eighth year of the Pelopon- nesian War, after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the waters at the mouth of the river Kalex, in tlie terri- tory of Herakleia (Thucyd. iv. 75). 1 Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 2. Tl4fx\pas T^phs Pdaai rh ffTpaTiVfia e/c t^s 'Acrias, koI inTLffXVftTO irdfTa ■Koi'fiffeiv avToi '6ffu Seat. Compare vii. 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment of this promise. - Xeu. Anab. vii. 1, 5-7. Chap. LXXI. FRAUD OF ANAXIBIUS. 321 be held responsible if they stayed. In truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within the walls, and The amy was well aware that it might be no easy matter to induce trByzan- them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fj-a^dand fraud in promising them pay, which he had neither the jlfg of*^*^*^" ability nor the inclination to provide. Without handing ^^o^'sends' to them either pay or even means of purchasing supplies, once'^ouf of he issued orders that they must go forth with arms and ^^^ '°^°- baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there to be numbered for an immediate march ; any one who stayed behind being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded, and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent with Xeno- phon to defer his departure until he had conducted the army outside of the walls, added — " Go forth as if you were about to march along with them ; when you are once outside, you may depart as soon'as you please." ^ Xenophon replied that this matter must be settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremp- tory. Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accord- ingly, he as well as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedaemonian officer of consideration, noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at the gate, stood close to it in person ; in order that when all the Cyreians had gone forth, he might imme- diately shut it and fasten it with the bar.^ Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the communication of the final orders would occasion i^a^t orders an outbreak among the Cyreians, and was anxious to al ui"*'^'^'"^ defer it until they were outside. But when there re- golng'ourj? mained only the rearmost companies still in the inside ti^^ gates. and on their march, all the rest having got out — he thought the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains, all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the ' Xen. Anab. vii. 1, 7-10. 'AAA.' Sixws ] trrpdrevfxa, rare airaAAarTecrflat. {iciovTa, /ceAeuei w d(T ri r 4 xyri k a\ Hf) X^-^V "■A.eCo'oi cTTi rh ff r p a- T e V ix a ws Ta;(;to'Ta, (col avvexeiv re rh aTaTevfia Kul avvaSpol^nv tUv 5(6- airapfxivwv ws &J' vXeiaTovs Svvr]Tai, Kal TrapayayovTa els Tl^pivOov Sia^i^d^eiv ejs T7}!' 'Acrlav oti rdxicrra' Kai Sidwffiv avrw TpiaK6vTopov, Kal iiri(rro\-]jV Kal &p5pa (Tvfj.nefj.nei KeXevcrovra rohs nepiv- Oiovs cos T a X I- c ''' <"■ s.evocpwvTa nponefx- if'Oi Tois 'Innois inl rh (rrpdrevfia. The vehement interest which Anaxi- bius took in tliis new project is marked by the strength of Xeuophon's language: extreme celerity is enjoined three seve- ral times. Chai". LXXI. DANGER OF XENOPHON. 531 much did his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come into play. We read with indignation that Aris- tarchus, immediately on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented with sending these 400 men out of the town; but seized them, — Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were — and sold them all into slavery.' Apprised of the move- ments of Xenophon with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit into Asia ; laying an embargo on the trans- ports in the harbour, and presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit the soldiers from crossing. W^hen Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct them — Aristarchus replied, " Anaxibius is no longer in functions as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you at sea, I will sink you." On the next day, he sent to invite the generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in, Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation of sacrificing. The behaviour of Aristarchus — who, when he saw the others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they would all come again in the afternoon — confirmed the justice of his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been preserved by this accidental warning.^ It need hardly be added that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the first ; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards sent, was disregarded by all. We have here a Lacedaemonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes His trea- cliorous had practised on the banks of the Zab to enti'ap Klear- scheme for chus and his colleagues — and that too against a Greek, xenopbonf and an officer of the highest station and merit, who had just saved ' Xen. Anab. vii. 2, 6. Kal 6 'Ava^l- Plos rw f.i.iv 'ApiffTapxV f'TiCTeAAei otto- (Tovs h.y ei/poj ec 3v^avri(f) roiu Kvpov crrpa- TiccTcov u7roA.eA€i|U.;U€i'oi/s awuSoffdai' 'O 5e K\eauSpos ovS^va e-TreTrpd/cei. aWa koI rov? Kauvovras (depdirevev olKTeipwv Koi avayKa^aiv oIkIo. Scxec^ctt. 'Aplarapxas S' iirel -^A^e ro-Xi-Tra, ovk i\d,TTOvs re- rpaKOffiwv airsSoTo. 2 Xeu. Auab. vii. 2, 1-1-16. "HSt/ Se vfTwv TTphs T(p Tfi'xfi. it,a-yy(K- Aei Tis TtS 'E^i'ocpa.'vri on, e( eto'eto'i, apvafid(^ T exerciied rous stratagem ; nor did Lysander himself scruple to everywhere enforce, personally and by his own presence, the execution in favour of , ,. p i-'iT 1 l''^ °^n and expulsion or suspected citizens. in many places, partisans, however, simple terrorism probably sufficed. The new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and procured recognition of their usurpa- tion, by the menace of inviting the victorious admiral with his fleet of 200 sail, and by the simple arrival of the Lacedaemonian harmost. Not only was each town obliged to provide a fortified citadel and maintenance for this governor with his garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to 1000 talents annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed rateably upon each city by Lysander.^ In what spirit these new Dekarchies would govern, consisting as they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for oppressive audacity and ambition ^ — who, to all the unscrupulous lust t^esTite- of power which characterised Lysander himself, added a '^^■"^^"es. thirst for personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse themselves for services already rendered to him — the general analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general analogy to guide us ; we have ferther the parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have already been alluded to. These Thirty, with the exception of the difference of number, were to all intents and purposes a Lysandrian Dekarchy ; created by the same originating force, placed under the like circumstances, and animated by the like spirit and interests. Every subject town would produce its Kritias and Theramenes, and its body of wealthy citizens like the Knights or Horsemen at Athens to abet their oppressions, under Lacedaemonian patronage and the covering guard of the Lacedaemonian harmost. Moreover, Kritias, with all his vices, was likely to be better rather than worse, as compared with his oligarchical parallel in any other less cultivated city. He 1 Plutarch, Lysand. c. 1">. iroWals \ Cornelias Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyren. Trapayivifx^vos avThs (TcpayoiS Kal ffvv^K- I i. 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysaud. /SaAAoj;/ rohs rwv cpi\wv e'x^pous, ovk | c. 19; and see Vol. VIII. Ch. Ixv. p. iiri^iKes iSiSov rols "EAArjert SiTyfxa rfjs 302 of this History. AaKeSaiixoviu}!' apxvs, &,c. . 2 Diodor. xiv. 10. Compare Isokrates, lb. c. 14. Kal roiv fifv &\\oiv vSXecav ' Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 151 ; Xen. Hellen. 6/iaA.a)S airacraiv KariXvi ras iroKne'ias iv. 8, 1. Koi KadiffTTi SeKaSapx'tas- iroWihv /xef eV I * Plutarch, Lysand^ c. 13. rod Av- l/cao-T?? (T(paTTO^ivTrwv j-iuWov is tovs Aa- iceSaifiouiov?, aWws re kol TrpoenrSvTODV oTi Ti^v 'EAAaSa iAevOepovaiv. See also iii. 13, 14— the speech of the envoys from the revolted Mitylene, to the Lacedtemonians. The Lacedannouiaii admiral Alkidas with his fleet is announced as crossing over the JEgea.n to Ionia for the purpose of " liberating Greece ;" accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with hina for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object (iii. 32) — tKeyov ov KaXus T7IV 'EAAaSa iKevdepovv avrbv, el avSpas Sie(p6eipfv, &c. ■* Thucvd. iv. 85. 'H fitv eifirejuvfij fxov Kal Tvjs (TTpartus v-rrh AaKeSai/ioviai;/, S> 'AKiivOioi, y€yivr)Tai rrfv aWiav iircXrj- Qevovaa ^t> apxofxevoL rod iroXifi.ov irpoei- rrofj-fv, 'Adrivaiois e\ev6epovi/Tes T 1] f 'E WdS a IT o K i jxri a i Lv. 2 A 2 356 HISTORY OF GllEECE. Part II. enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the Few to the Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign dominion ; and we Lacedaemonians should incur nothing but reproach, instead of reaping thanks and honour for our trouble. We should draw upon ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we are trying to put down Athens ; and that too in aggravated measure, worse than those who have never made honourable professions ; since to men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than open violence.' — If (continued Brasidas) in spite of my assurances, you still withhold from me you cooperation, I shall think myself authorised to constrain you by force. We should not be warranted in forcing freedom on any unwilling parties, except with a view to some common good. But as we seek not empire for ourselves — as we struggle only to put down the empire of others — as we offer autonomy to each and all — so we should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to persist in your opposition." ^ Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the Gradual Hiost strcnuous cfforts ou the part of the people to the^fn-"' contend against the Emperor Napoleon, promised free piaiiTof"'^ constitutions, yet granted nothing after the victory had ^Tird'^the been assured — the Lacedaemonians thus held out the PeToponne^ most emphatic and repeated assurances of general auto- siaii War. nomy iu order to enlist allies against Athens ; disavowing, even ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedaemonians began to think more of empire,^ and less of Grecian freedom ; ' Tlmcyd. iv. 85. Auto's re ouk 67rl KaKoj, iir' iXevdepwaeL 5e raiv 'E\\r]vuv ■irape\7]\v6a, SpKOis re AaKidai/uLovicov Ka- raXa^wv ra Te\r] tois fjnyiaTOis, ^ /jltiv ovs av ijaiye ■npoaaydycofj.ai i^vjxfJLaxovs eaicrdai aiirovSpLOvs. . . . Kal ei" ris iSla TLva SeSioJS &pa, fxi] iyw Tiai ■Kpoadui rrjv it6Klv, aTrp6dvjx6s iari, -k av t oi v fA. d- \ 1 ff T a IT t a T € V (T dr w. O ii yo.p (T V ff T aff id(T wv ^ K (t>, ou5e dca^i} tt}v aKevdepiav voixi^w iTnpepetv, el, r h IX ev, avTo\ tt.v (paivoi/xe6a 4 X' 6 i o V a ^ 6 /xi] vTToSel^as a. p er rj v K aT aKT (ii jxev o I. ^ Thucyd. iv. 87, Ou5e 6(pel\o/j.fv ol AaKeSaifxSvioi fj.-)} koivov tivos aya- 6 o V air i a r ov s fxr] fiovXofieyovs i\€vdepovv. Ot)5' ai) a p xv s f cp I e /J. e 6 a, Travaai Se /xaWov erdpovs (TirevSovTes rovs TrAeiour hv dSiKOiyUer, e i ^v/xTraaip avTOVo/xiav e ir i (p e- p OVT e s iifxus Tovs ivavTiov/jLevovs irepCi- irdrpiov Trapels, rh tt \ 4 o v to7s Soi/xey. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv. (^Pa- 6 \ly o t s, ^ Th eKacraov ro'is Train, Sov- ' negjT.) s. 140, 141. Xdaai/xi. Ka\eircoTepaya.phvrris\ ^ Feelings of the Lacedtemonians dur- a\Ao(pv\ov apxvs e^frj, koI tj/xlv i ing the winter immediately succeeding ToTs AaKedai/jLOvlois ovk h.v avrl it6v(dv Xdpis KaOiarano, avrl 5e Tijjiiis Kol 5(^|77S alria f/.a\\ov oTs re TOi/y 'A6r]yai- ovs iyi<\7)nacri KarairoXefxov- the great Syracusan catastrof)lie (Thuc. viii. 2) — Koi KadfAouTfs ineivovs (the Athenians) avToi ttjs irda-qs 'EWdSos TJSrj affcpaAws fiyrjffeadai. Chap. LXXII. BRASIDAS.— LYSANDEE. 357 which indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia, was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watch- word still continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at as a means to the liberation of Greece.^ The victory of yEgospotami with its consequences cruelly un deceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sane- Language tioned by the solemn oaths of the Lacedaemonian Ephors, coiurasted* in 424 B.C. — and the proceedings of the Lacedaemonian ^ctsVi'iiy- Lysander in 405-404 b.c, the commencing hour of zander. Spartan omnipotence — stand in such literal and flagrant contra- diction, that we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him beforehand. The Dekarchies of Lysander realised that precise ascendency of a few chosen partisans which Brasidas repudiates as an abomination worse than foreign dominion ; while the harmosts and garrison, installed in the dependent cities along with the native Decemvirs, planted the second variety of mischief as well as the first, each aggravating the other. Had the noble- minded Kallikratidas gained a victory at Arginusae, and lived to close the war, he would probably have tried, with more or less of success, to make some approach to the promises of Brasidas. But it was the double misfortune of Greece, first that the closing victory was gained by such an admiral as Lysander, the most unscrupulous of all power-seekers, partly for his country, and still more for himself— next, that the victory was so decisive. Extreme sudden, and imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or and con?-^^ in a position to insist upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, Ihe'vSy^ acting in the name of Sparta, became omnipotent, not tlm1^feu°' merely over enemies, but over allies ; and to a certain ^i^^i^sf"^. degree even over 'the Spartan authorities themselves, "u'^tent. There was no present necessity for conciliating allies — still less for acting up to former engagements ; so that nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan Ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a con- dition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others ; and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the op- pressions of the Decemvirs and Harmosts.- In perfect con- 1 Compare Tlmeyd. viii. 4^., Ti ; viii. 1 fragment of Theopompus preservofl by 46, .i. Theodonis Metocbita, and printed at 2 Tbid is empbatically set fortb in a \ tbe end of the collection of the Frag- 358 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. sistency ' with her misrule throughout Eastern Greece, too, Sparta identified herself with the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect and to uphold it ; a contra- diction to her former maxims of action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus. The empire of Sparta, thus constituted at the end of 405 b.c, maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of Knidus^ in 394 b.c. That defeat de- ments of Theopompus the historian, both by Wichers and by M. Didot. Both these editors however insei't it only as Fragmentum Spurium, on the authority of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who quotes the same sentiment from the comic writer Theopompus. But the passage of Theodorus Metocliita presents the express words QeSirofXTros 6 IffTopiKos. We have therefore his dis- tinct affirmation against that of Plu- tarch; and the question is, which of the two wo are to believe. As far as the sense of the fragment is concerned, I should be disposed to refer it to the historian Theopompus. But the autho- rity of Plutarch is eai'lier and better than that of Theodorus Metochita: moreover, the apparent traces of comic senarii have been recognised in the Fragment by Meineke (Fragm, Com. Grsec. ii. p. 819). The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot). Qe6TrofXTros b IffropiKhs airoffKojirToiu eis Toil? AaKe^aL/xovlovs, eXica^ev avrohs rals (pai\ais KaiT-r)\iffiv , at rdis xp'^M-^""-^ ^7" Xeovcrai ttjj' a.pxh'^ olvov Tjdvy re Kal ev- XpVO"''oy crocpiffriKuis €7rt t?7 Aiji/'ej tov apyvpiov, inOiarepov 7roAe/xw, t^v ap- Xh^ r]Sl(TTa> TrJ/xari ttJs an' 'AOrjuaiccv sKevdepias Kal irpoypdixfiaTi Kal KTjpvyfxari Tovs "EWrjvas SeXedaavras, vaTepov tti- KpSrara acpicriv ijx^at Kal a-qSecrraTa Kpd- fxara l^iorris eTrccSvvov Kal xpVO'i'-^'S irpay- /j.aTooi' a\yeLva>v, irdvv roi KaraTvpavvovv- Tas Tos TToAeis SeKapx'^ais Kal apixoff-rals jiapuTarois, Ko.l ■Kparrofxivovs, & ovrrx^P^^ elvai (T, 14. Compare the I ceflajmoniaua }iacl got possession uf the aaalugous case of Thchcs, after the La- ] Kadmeia (y. 2, o4-ot)). 364 HISTORY OF GREECE. Paet II. president and executive agent of a new Confederacy of Dclos — reviving the equal, comprehensive, and liberal principles on which that confederacy had first been organised. It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of the Sparta Original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible mfrgaS to its valuB. As sooH as the pressing alarm from Persia fcderacy of had passcd ovcr, some had discontinued sending deputies, mtghtnow'' others had disobeyed requisitions, others again had made to'" bought off their obligations, and forfeited their rights work well, gg autonomous and voting members, by pecuniary bargain with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties of her presidency to enforce obedience to the Synod against all reluctant members, made successively many enemies, and was gradually converted, almost without her own seeking, from President into Emperor, as the only means of obviating the total dissolution of the Confederacy. But though such untoward circumstances had happened before, it does not follow that they would now have happened again, assuming the same experiment to have been retried by Sparta, with manifest sincerity of purpose and tolerable wisdom. The Grecian world, especially the maritime portion of it, had passed through trials not less painful than instructive, during this im- portant interval. Nor does it seem rash to suppose, that the bulk of its members might now have been disposed to perform steady confederate duties, at the call and under the presidency of Sparta, had she really attempted to reorganize a liberal confederacy, treating every city as autonomous and equal, except in so far as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the general synod. However impracticable such a scheme may appear, we must recollect that even Utopian schemes have their transient moments, if not of certain success, at least of commencement not merely possible but promising. And my belief is, that had Kallikratidas, with his ardent Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of moral re- solution, been the final victor over imperial Athens, he would not have let the moment of pride and omnipotence pass over without essaying some noble project like that sketched above. It is to be remembered that Athens had never had the power of organizing any such generous Pan-hellenic combination. She had become depopularized in the legitimate execution of her trust, as president of the Confederacy of Delos, against refractory members.^ ' Such is the justification offered by j ately beforethePeloponnesianWar (Thii- the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immedi- | cyd. i. 75, 76). And it is borne out iu Chap. LXXII. AIirtOGANCE OF LYSANDER. J65 She had been obliged to choose between breaking up the Con- federacy, and keeping it together under the strong compression of an imperial chief. But Sparta had not yet become depopularized. She now stood without competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with proper earnestness. Un- fortunately she took the opposite course, under the influence of Lysander ; founding a new empire far more oppressive and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also — never to return. Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her empire, with a tribute of more than 1000 talents imposed upon insupport- them — and continuing to be chief of her landed alliance galfceoT in Central Greece, which now included Athens as a bfue"eon> simple unit — Sparta was the all -pervading imperial ^gah,lu.im, power in Greece.' Her new empire was organized by ggJngttf.g the victorious Lysander ; but with so much arrogance, i^ekarchies. and so much personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees of his own, Decemvirs and Harmosts — that he raised numerous rivals and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy entertained by King Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and Corinth, and the manner in which these new phasnomena brought about (in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as a revived democracy into the Laceda)- monian confederacy — has been already related. In the early months of 403 B.C., Lysander was partly at home, partly in Attica, exerting himself to sustain the falling oligarchy of Athens against the increasing force of Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peira^us. In this purpose he was directly thwarted by the opposing views of King Pausanias, and three out of the five Ephors.^ But though the Ephors thus checked Lysander in regard to Athens, they softened the humiliation by sending him abroad to a fresh command on the Asiatic coast and the Helles- pont ; a step which had the farther advantage of putting asunder two such marked rivals as he and Paus9.nias had now become. That which Lysander had tried in vain to do at Athens, he was the main by the narrative of Thucydides himself (i. I'O). 1 Xeu. Hcllen. iii. 1, 3. ivdai^s rqs 'EA/XaSos Trpoa-Tarai, &C. ^ Xeu. Helleu. ii. 4, 28-30. 306 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. doubtless better able to do in Asia, where he had neither Pausanias nor the Ephors along with him. He could lend effective aid to the Dekarchies and Harmosts in the Asiatic cities, against any internal opposition with which they might be threatened. Bitter were the complaints which reached Sparta, both against him and against his ruling partisans. At length the Ephors were prevailed u])on to disavow the Dekarchies, and to proclaim that they would not hinder the cities from resuming their former governments at pleasure.' Bnt all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the i.ysaiider maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall of Lysander from his command in the Helles- pont, had not Pharnabazus joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations so strengthened the enemies of Lysander at tSparta, that a perem})tory order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to Sparta, but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless power which he had enjoyed on his command, was so insupportable to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the temple of Zeus Amnion in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow to discharge.- He appears also to have visited the temples of Delphi and Dodona,^ with secret ambitious projects which will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal otreiids J'lianuilwzus, will) ])ro- ciires his recall. His disgust and tciiiiioiary expatria- tiuu. ' Xeu. Hellen. iii. 4, 2. 2 Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21. The facts, which Plutarch states re- specting Lysauder, cannot be reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to have taken place in the summer of 403 li.c. Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B.C., after the surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in triumph, in the autumn of 404 i;.C. (Xen. Helleu. iii. 3, 9). He was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 30). Now when Lysander can>e home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his trium- phant return; it was not a recall jiro- voked by complaints of Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other re- turn before the restoration of the de- mocracy at Atliens. The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of this com- mai;d, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems to me neces.?ary, in order to make I'oom for the facts stated respecting Lysander as well as about the Dekarchies, that we should sujjpose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This is no- where positively stated, but I find oiothing to contradict it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated about Lj'sander. It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv. 33), two years later than its real date, which is 403 B.C. ; thus length- ening by two yeai'S the interval between the surrender of Athens and the re- establishment of the democracy. Plu- tarch also seems to have conceived tliat interval as much longer than it really was. * Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25. CiiAP. Lxxir. ASIATIC GKEEKS, .307 softened the jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after a year or two, re-established in great influence and ascendency. He was sent as Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, to Syracuse, where he lent countenance and aid to the recently established despotism of Dionysius.^ The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, ^olis, and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after sunemier the triumph of Sparta at ^nospotami. I have already Asiatic , . Greeks to recounted how, immediately after the great Athenian Persia, ac- catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had re- the tre'luy newed his grasp upon those cities, from which the wuhsparui. vigorous hand of Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years : how Sparta, bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain : how Athens also, in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it." After the battle of ^gospotami, this convention was carried into effect ; though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.^ The latter was Lacedaemonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedaemonians seem still to have retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete com- mand of the Hellespontine iEolis and of the Troad than ever they had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior."* Another element however soon became operative. The con- dition of the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, thoutrh Their con- ■n • 1 • 111 ? dilion is iif- accordinj? to Persian reg^ulations they bclono^ed to the ftciedbyti.c ,. rn- 1 ^ • n f • i pi'sition iiiul satrapy ot 1 issaphernes, was now materially determined, ambitious — first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who wished cyrus, whose to take them away from him, and tried to get such tii(Vseek transfer ordered at court — next, by the aspirations of saphemf-s-^ that young prince to the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian cooperation, it was highly important to him to render himself popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the ^gean. Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper, partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the Grecian cities with one accord to revolt ' Plutarch, Lysauder, c. 2. * Thucyd. viii. 5, 18-o7, 56-58, 84. •' Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Helleu. iii. 1, 9. ^ Xou. Ilellen. iii. 1, 13. 368 niSTOr.Y of GEEECE. Part II. from the latter. All threw themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes interposed in time, slew- the leaders of the intended revolt, and banished many of their partisans- Cyrus, receiving the exiles with distinguished favour, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure their restoration ; while he at the same time threw strong Grecian garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.^ This local quarrel was however soon merged in the more corn- After tbe prehensive dispute respectinsf the Persian succession. death of ' ' r s Cyrus, Tissa- Both parties were found on the field of Kunaxa ; Cyrus returns as With the Greek soldiers and Milesian exiles on one side IitopTo — Tissaphernes on the other. How that attempt, upon A^ia nlnor. which SO much hiiiged in the future history both of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated — I have already recounted. Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedaemonian fleet which left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most difficult country without any resistance, was highly favourable to his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards brought ; so much the greater their alarm, W'hen Tissaphernes, having relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to the seaboard ; more powerful than ever — rewarded ^ by the Great King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well as with the title of com- mander-in-chief over all the neighbouring satraps — and prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kyme ; ^ ravaging the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from them a still larger con- tribution, when the approach of winter rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city. In such state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against the aggravated slavery impending over them.^ The Lacedemo- nians had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus, Moreover the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become ' Xen. Anab. i. 1, 8. I ^ Diodor xiv. 35. - Xen. Anab. ii. 3, 19; ii. 4, 8; Xen. *' Diodor. ut sup. Helleu. iii. 1, 3 ; iii. 3, 13. j CHAP.LXXir. THIMBRON SEXT TO ASIA. 369 diffused throughout Greece, inspirhio- signal contein])t for Persian military efficiency, and hopes of enrichment by war against bc 400-399. the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the Spartan Ephors fheTsiaUc were induced to comply with the petition of their Asiatic ^n^'^o al'k" countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the S'''^!"™-,., l 1 ,, hparta. i he head of a considerable force : 2000 Neodamodes for ^y^V^^A TT 1 1 1 1 • ^^ liiira- Helots who had been enfranchised), and 4000 Pelo- 'jronwioi . ' an army ponnesian heavy-armed, accompanied by 300 Athenian to Asia, horsemen, out of the number of those who had been success and adherents of the Thirty, four years before ; an aid granted is super- by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriv- oerkyiudas. ing in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B.C., Thimbron was reinforced in the spring of 399 b.c. by the Cyreian army, who were brought across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into Lacedaemonian pay. With this large force he became more than a match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians. Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to main- tain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately both friends and foes.^ Such loud complaints were transmitted to Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the Ephors first sent him an order to march into Karia where Tissaphernes resided, — anS next, before that order was executed, dispatched Derkyl- lidas to supersede him ; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B.C. Thimbron on returning to Sparta was fined and banished.^ It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though ex- cellent in the field, yet having been disappointed of conductor reward for the prodigious toils which they had gone {ooseas'^to"* through in their long march, and having been kept on P'>'ag^- short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by Seuthes — were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be -restrained, in the matter of pillage ; especially as Xenophon, their most influential general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under Der- kyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 5-8; Xeu. Anab. I - Xcu. Helleu. iii. 1, 8; Diodor. xiv. vii. 8, 8-16. I "'S. VOL. YI. 2 B 370 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. also partly ascribable to the fact that Xenophon, after a few- months of residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command of his old comrades.^ Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to Derkyiiidas havc acquircd the surname of Sisyphus.^ He had served truce with throughout all the concluding years of the w^ar, and had iis!*and^"^ been Harmost at Abydus during the naval command of riiarnabazus Lysaudcr, who condemned him, on the complaint of Ind Jioiis. Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with his shield on his arm : ^ this v/as (I presume) a disgrace, because an oflficer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonouring him, Derkyllidas now took advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes, to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, bOOO strong, into the territory of the former.* The moun- tainous region of Ida generally known as the Troad — inhabited by a population of ^Eolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous inhabitants), and therefore known as the >^olis of Pharnabazus — was laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as instructive to read. The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies ; Distribution each Satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of si*an^emp[re : auuual tributc, and to hold a certain amount of military ki!rg,"Sirap, foi'ce ready, for the court at Susa. Provided he was i.ub-riatrap. punctual iu fulfilling these obligations, little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies or districts ; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military force — having liberty to govern in other respects as he pleased. Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and fi-om the deputy 1 There is no positive testimony to ' another reason is, the great detail -ndth this ; yet such is my belief, as I have i which the military operations of Derkyl- stated at the close of the last chapter, lidas are described, rendering it probable It is certain that Xenophon was serving that the narrative is from an eye-witness, under Agesilaus in Asia three years after ' - Xen. Hellen. iii. ], 8; Ephorus ap. this time; the only matter left for con- Athenaj. xi. p. 500. jecture is, at what precise moment he ^ Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 9. iffrdOt} ttji/ went out the second time. The mai-ked acr-iriSa ext^v- improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is ■* Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 10; iii. 2, 28. one reason for the statement in the text; Chap. LXXII. MANIA IN iEOLIS. 371 to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extoi'ted from tlie people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one and to the other. ^ This region called ^olis had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a native of Dardanus named Zenis, who, after holding Mania, the post for some time and giving full satisfaction, died z^ni's'illuis of illness, leaving a widow with a son and daughter still ^^frfpy'of minors. The satrap was on the point of giving the ^anmba-*"^ district to another person, when Mania, the widow of ,^eguia?'^a - Zenis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition m^ntand to be allow ed to succeed her husband. Visiting' Pharna- goverument. bazus with money in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain over his mistresses and his ministers^ — she said to him — " My husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you name any other deputy ? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can always remove me, and give the place to another." Pharnabazus granted her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in her payment of tribute — frequent in bringing him presents — and splendid, beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of receiving him whenever he visited the district. Her chief residence was at Skepsis, Gergis, and Kebren — inland towns, strong both by position and by fortification, Jnutary amidst the mountainous region once belonging to the sonai'con- Teukri Gergithes. It was here too that she kept her large tlea- treasures, which, partly left by her husband, partly kania. accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast, comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and probably her own native city the neighbouring Dardanus. She maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for conquest in the neigh- bourhood. She had thus reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, llamaxitus, and Kolonse, in the sonthern part of the Troad ; ' See the description of the satrapy of | system prevalent throughout a large Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, 19, 21, 22) In the main, this division and subdivi- sion of the entire empire into revenue- districts, each held by a nominee re- poi'tion of Asia to the present day. - Xen. Ilellen. iii. 1, 10. ' Ava^ev^acra rhv (tt6Kov, Kol Xf)V),uaTO Xa^ovcra, Sxrre Kal avTw ^apva^d^rj) Sowai, koI Ta7s iraX- spousible for payment of tlie rent or tri- KaKicnv avrov x"/"'"'"'^^"' ^al rois Swa- bute, to the government or to some 1 /ueVois fxa.Ki(TTa irapa ^opca/Saffjj, irro- hiijher officer of the government — is the pevero. 2 B 2 372 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot to witness the attack, and rewarding everyone who distinguished himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask her advice.^ So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia queen of Halikarnassus not only furnished ships among the best- appointed in his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to call a council, stood alone in daring to give him sound opinions contrary to his own leanings ; opinions which, fortunately for the Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to follow.^ Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and Assassina- wcll-providcd, -^olis was the most defensible part of the MMk! and satrapy of Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied byheVson-in- Dcrkyllidas, had not a domestic traitor put an end to who^oiicus' her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias, a Greek of Skepsis, froraPha'rna- ^^^^ whom shc livcd on tcmis of intimate confidence — InTnanti'^ " though shc was scrupulously mistrustful of everyone refTised. g^gg^ as it is propcr for a despot to be " ^ — was so inflamed by his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber. Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a beautiful youth of seventeen. He suc- ceeded in getting possession of the three strongest places in the district, Kebren, Skepsis, and Gergis, together with the accumu- lated treasure of Mania. But the commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply to > Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 15. 2 Herod, viii. 69. 3 Such is the emphatic language of ^oiro, — elaeXOwv aTroTrvT^ai avrriv Aeyerat. For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the Grecian despot XenojAou Hellen. iii. 1, 14) — MfiSias, , lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon Ovyarpbs apT)p avTTJs iiv, avanT^puBels inr6 TivcDV, ws alffxp^v iXr), ywaiKa jxev &pXii-v, avrhv S' ISiurrit' elvai, rovs fiey &Wo V s fj. dX a (j) V \ ar T o fi 4 VT) s av- T rj s, ill air € p i v rvpavviSi tt p o ff- 7} K € I, iKeivco 5e Tn(rT€vov(rr]s kol acrira- ^o/j.4i'rjs, wcriTfp b.v yvvyj yafx^phv aand- called Hieron (i. 12 ; ii. 8-10 ; vii. 10). He particularly dwells upon the multi- tude of family crimes which stained the houses of the Grecian despots, murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, &c. (iii. 8). Chap. LXXII. SUCCESS OF DEEKYLLIDAS. 373 Meidias — " Keep them until I come to seize them — and to seize you also along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to avenge the death of Mania." ^ At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap, Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found invasion and ^olis almost defenceless. The three recent conquests S^by"^ of Mania— Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolonse — surren- ^hS*^^''"' dered to him as soon as he appeared ; while the garrisons fh^periTn'of of Ilium and some other places, who had taken special ^"dias. service under Mania, and found themselves worse off n«w that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district ; with the exception of Kebren, Skepsis, and Gergis, which he was anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving before Kebren, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he remained inactive for four days,^ because the sacrifices were unpropitious ; while a rash subordinate officer, hazarding an unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded. The sacrifices at length became favourable, and Derkyllidas was rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed their commander, who tried to earn the satrap's favour by holding out and assuring to him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the Lacedaemonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately captured, and duly secured, this important town, Derkyllidas marched against Skepsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a con- ference, demanding hostages for his safety. AVhen he came forth from the town, and demanded from the Lacedaemonian commander, on what terms alliance would be granted to him, the latter replied — "On condition that the citizens shall be left free and autono- mous ; " at the same time marching on, without waiting either for ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 13. 1 furnished by the sacrifice — either for 2 Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 18; Diodor. xiv. \ action or for inaction. I have already 38. I noticed (in my preceding chapters) how The reader will remark here how often he diies this in the Anabasis. Xenophon shapes the narrative in such I Such an inference is never (I believe) a manner as to inculcate the piuus duty to be found suggested in Thucydides. in a general of obeying the warnings | 374 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was obliged to give orders that the gate should be opened ; so that Derkyllidas found himself by this rapid manoeuvre, in possession of the strongest place in the district without either loss or delay ; to the great delight of the Skepsians themselves.^ Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skepsis to offer a rerkyiiidas Sacrifice of thanks to Athene, the great patron goddess andTiberatsB of Ilium and most of the Teukrian towns — caused the andGergis, garrison of Meidias to evacuate the town forthwith, and MewTa'sf Consigned it to the citizens themselves, exhorting them the treasures ^^ conduct their political affairs as became Greeks and of Mania. freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of Brasidas in contrast with Ly^-ander, was not less politic than generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still con- ducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses. Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot of the lofty towers of Gergis, The garrison on the walls, seeing Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without dis- charging a single missile. "Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athene, in order that I may there offer sacrifice." Again, Meidias was forced, from fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order ; and the Lacedaemonian forces found themselves in possession of the town. Derkyllidas, distributing his troops round the walls, in order to make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his intended sacrifice ; after which he pro- ceeded to dictate the fate of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his military force — incorporating the latter in the Lacedaemonian army. He then called upon Meidia?. to specify all his paternal property, and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant exaggeration. But ho laid hands on all the property, and all the treasures of Mania— ' Xen. Helleu. iii. 1, 20-23. Chap. LXXII. TREATMENT OF MEIDIAS. 375 and caused her house, which Mcidias had taken for himself, to be put under seal — as lawful prey ; since Mania had belonged to Pharnabazus,^ against whom the Lacedaemonians were making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents of the house, he said to his officers, " Now, my friends, we have here already worked out pay for the whole army, 8000 men, for near a year. AVhatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also." He well knew the favourable effect whicb this intelligence would produce upon the temper, as well as upon the discipline, of the army — especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the dis- comfort of irregular pay and poverty. " And where am I to live ? " asked Meidias, who found himself turned out of the house of Mania. " In your rightful place of abode, to be sure (replied Derkyllidas) ; in your native town Skepsis, and in your paternal house." ^ What became of the assassin afterwards, we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap the anticipated reward of his crime ; the fruits of which were, an important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army, — and a still more important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by Mania — enfranchisement and auto- nomy. This rapid, easy, and skilfully-managed exploit — the capture of nine towns in eight days — is all which Xenophon mentions b.c. 399. as achieved by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having perkyiiidas acquired pay for so many months, perhaps the soldiers trace witV^ may have been disposed to rest until it was spent. But fnd mke?"^' as winter approached, it became necessary to find winter q^Jte^s in quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen ^''i^y'"-'- upon Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 1, 26. E?7re fioi, e(t>ri, Mavla Se tiVos ?;f ; Oi 5e Travres fl-Kov, '6ti ^apva^d^ov. Ovkovv Kal ra iKiiv7)s, % e (t V 5ia tcSi' 'F,Wr]vl5a)u i The expression 4v elp-ljyr) eiiSainoviKws noKiwp, Tidofiivos OTi ifjieWov S^iadai ras > 5iayov(ras has reference to the foreign 378 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. slon and paid no tribute ; the land-force of Derkyllidas affording to them a protection ^ analogous to that which had been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian cata- strophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys (the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus (the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont), soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neigh- bours. That fertile peninsula, first hellenised a century and a half before by the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favourite resort for Athenian citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval power of Athens. The battle of ^gospotami dispossessed and drove home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important ; and its inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the Ephors to dispatch a force for the purpose of building a wall across the isthmus from Kardia to Paktye ; in recompense for which (they said) there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to come, M'ith coast and harbours for export close at hand. Miltiades, on first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a cross wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during the period of Persian supremacy ; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigour — since the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept oiF, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.^ Informed that the request of the Chersonesites had been favourably listened to at Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own anny. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during relations of the cities and to their ex- in many: see the subsequent passages emption from annoyance by Persian arms (iii. 2, 20 ; iii. 4, 7; iv. 8, 1). — without implying any internal freedom i ' Compare Xen, Hellen. iv, 2, 5. or good condition. There were Lacedse- , ' Herodot. vi. 36 ; Plutarch, Pei-i- monian harmosts in most of them, and kles, c. 19 ; Isokrates, Or. v. (Philipp.) Dekarchies half broken up or modified ; s. 7. Chap. LXXII. CAPTURE OF ATAEKEUS. 379 B.C. 398-397. He captures and parri- sons Atar- ueus. the whole .summer in constructing- this cross wall, about 4J miles in length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and workmanlike execution ; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to their lands and harbours. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in, under Lacedaemonian auspices — who were again disturbed, wholly or partially, when the Lacedaemonian maritime empire was broken up a few years after- wards.' On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this work which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided during six months, Derkyllidas under- took the siege of Atarneus, a strong post (on the con- tinental coast eastward of Mitylene) occupied by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedaemonian admiral Kratesippidas had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few years before.^ These men, living by predatory expeditions against Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him as a retreat in case of need — under an Achaean named Drake, whose name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighbouring plain of Mysia.^ Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached him from the Ephors, directing him to march b.c.396. into Karia and attack Tissaphernes. The temporary He makes truce which had hitherto provisionally kept off Persian xissapiiemes soldiers "and tribute-gatherers irom the Asiatic (j reeks, nabazus, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks Meander. had sent envoys to Sparta, assuring the Ephors that Tissaphernes would be constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights o. Persia, and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward across the Maeander into Karia, while the Lacedae- monian fleet under Pharax cooperated along the shore. At the same time, Tissaphernes on his side had received reinforcements from Susa, together with the appointment of generalissimo over all 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. Diodor. xiv. 38. 2 Diodor. xiii. 65. 10; iv. ■* Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 167. 380 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. the Persian force in Asia Minor ; upon which Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but had now returned ^) joined him in Karia, prepared to commence vigorous operations for the ex- pulsion of Derkyllidas and his army. Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed the Maeander, at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his array from Karia to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Mseander, he was marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some sepulchral monuments in the road. He too sent some scouts up to the neighbouring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the Cyreians and the Peloponnesians, Of the insular and Ionian hoplites, from Priene and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the thick standing corn, and fled ; others, who took their places in the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they would stand a charge ; so that the Persians had the opportunity of fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious to attack without delay. Timidity of But Tissaphcmes, who recollected well the valour of the ng^he^""' Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining trace wuh** Grccks wcrc like them, forbade it ; sending* forward Derkyllidas. ^g^alds to demand a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself with a body-guard of the tir.et>t and the best-equipped soldiers,^ advanced to the front of the line to meet them ; saying that he for his part was prepared to fight — but since a conference was demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for conference on the ensuing day. ' Diodor. xiv, 39. ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 18. In the Anabasis (ii. 3, 3) Xenophou mentions the like care on the part of Klearchiia, to have the best-armed and ment to the Cyreian ai'my most imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with Tis- saphernes. Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportimity, to pay an indirect compli- Chap. LXXII. ATtMISTICE. 381 both armies were simultaneously withdrawn ; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys, celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.' This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes, even at a time when he was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground without any serious opposition ; while at the same time it tended to confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility as that escape so forcibly suggested. The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing. Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete autonomy — exemption from Persian interference and tribute ; while the two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedaemonian army should be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedaemonian harmosts from all the Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for reference to the authorities at home ; thus replacing matters in the condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.^ Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus king of Sparta arrived with a large force, and the war in all Derkyiiidas ^ ^ . r? 1 • I '^ superseded respects began to assume larger proportions — oi which byAgesiiaus. more in the next chapter. But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The prostration of the Athenian power had re- Alienation moved that common bond of hatred and alarm which spanahad attached the allies to her headship : while her subsequent among her conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited centra" against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial am- '^""^^'ce- bition which had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian mari- time empire, with a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How far the total of 1000 talents was actually realised durino- each successive year, we are not in a condition to say ; but such was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for her maritime dependencies — enforced too by omni- present instruments of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire the prodigious ascendency on land ' Xen. Helleu. iii. 2, 19; Dioilor. xiv. 39. - Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 20. 382 HISTOllY OF GREECE. Part II. which Sparta had enjoyed before, we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to the truce of 445 B.C. This was not all. From the general dullness of character Great pervading Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state parked to" were hardly ever put forth. Iler habitual shortcomings acuonby' ^^ *^^ momcut of action are keenly criticised by her own hiSifiteiy friends, in contrast with the ardour and forwardness victory of which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle tam?-^an of ^gospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign energy very affairs was fouud in the hands of Lysander; a man not unusual ^ ^ •' ^ with Sparta. Qjjjy exempt from the inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under his direction the immense ad- vantages which Sparta enjoyed from her new position were at once systematised and turned to the fullest account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had it been ever so mo- destly handled, to spread apprehension through the Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition. Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence ; and such impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and others. While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of The Spartans the war, not ouc of her allies had received the smallest aiuho' "^ remuneration or compensation, except such as might be of vtctmy ^ considered to be involved in the destruction of a formidable seit^s— enemy. Even the pecuniary result or residue which were aiiovved Lysaudcr had brought home with him (470 talents re- nothiug. maining out of the advances made by Cyrus), together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by the Lacedaemonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join, to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Chap. LXXIT. SPARTA UNPOPULAR. 383 Sparta, the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.^ Hence there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping dominion, but a hatred of the monopolising rapacity, of Sparta. Of this new feeling an early manifestation, alike glaring and important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peiraeus^ — less than a year after the surrender of Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and Achaeans, too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedaemon, keenly felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with the previous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive their zeal against the common enemy .^ The Lacedaemonians were however strong enough not merely to despise this growing alienation of their allies, but even 3,, 402. to take revenge upon such of the Peloponnesians as had Great power incurred their displeasure. Among these stood con- sparfans— spicuous the Eleians ; now under a government called reveug^e'^upon democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydgeus haXdil'^*' — a man who had lent considerable aid in 404 b.c. to Eitbl^rilwT Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peirseus. The sionofEUs. Eleians, in the year 420 B.C., had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta — had employed their privileges as administrators of the Olympic festival to exclude her from attendance on that occasion — and had subsequently been in arras against her along with Argos and Mantineia. To these grounds of quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption of hostilities in 414 B.C., and a recent exclusion of King Agis, who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle of Zeus Olympius ; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek against Greek.* These were considered by Sparta as affronts, and the voiv Kol 5aTrav7i/xa.T0i>v ^jLereixov firfl 5' itrpa^av & i^ovKovro oi Aa/feSafjuJj/ioi, TToias ^ apxvs ^ ti/utjs ^ iroiwy XRV/Jf-^Tcof fji€Ta5eSwKaras apixocrras KaOtffTwai a|joCcri, ruiv 5e ^vfifiaxoov fAfvdepwv uurcoy, iirfl d/Tv- X'i)(TOLV, 5e(nr(JTa( avaTre- ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 5 ; Plutarch, Ly- sand. c. 27 ; Justin, v. 10. 2 Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 30. * Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 12. KopivOiovs Sf /col "'ApKaSas koL 'Axaiovs tj r] exoi'Tes atpayas iroiovcrt, Kal &.\\ovs re rivas KnivovcTi, Koi '6fxoi6v TLi/a QpacrvSalw aTroKTeivavTes, Tw Tov driixov irpocriaTri. aovro QpaavSaTov clear — BovAo/j-evoi 5e oi Trepl s.euiav rhv I a,Tr(KT0v4vai. . . . 'O Se @paav5a7os tri \iy6fXivov iJi.eSiiJ.vcf> anofierpT^ffaadaL rh ! KadevSwu irvyxO'Vev, ouirep ifx^dvaQ-q. napa tou iruTphs apyvpioy (tV -KdMv) 5i' | Botli tlic words and tlie narrative are VOL. VI. 2 c 386 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part H. in the market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city ; while the people, under the like impression that Thrasydseus was dead, were too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known that he was yet alive ; the people crowded to the government-house " like a swarm of bees," ' and arrayed themselves for his protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and forced them to flee for protection to tlie Lacedae- monian army. Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without B.C. 400. planting a Lacedaemonian harmost and a garrison, toge- The Eieums tlicr witli Xcuias aud the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, to submit a little way south of the river Alpheius. Occupying this of peace. fort (aualogous to Dekeleia in Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydseus and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered their harbour of Kyllene with their ships of war, and relinquished all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion, which was claimed as an Arcadian town.^ Though they pressed strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeiura (between the Arcadian town of Herffia and the Triphylian town of Makistus), on the plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the price of thirty talents paid down — the Lacedaemonians, pro- nouncing this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force, refused to recognise it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly without any reimbursement of the purchase- money either in part or in whole. On these terms the Eleians here very obscure. It seems as if a sf.n- tance had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the mention of the drunken state of Thrasydacus, without having before been told of any circum- stance either leading to or implying this condition. 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 28. Marganels, as Triphylian; which vet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere distinguished from Tri- phylian. I incline to believe that the words in his text, Ka\ ras TpKpvXiSas TToXeis acpe'ivai, must be taken to mean Lepreuni and Makistus, perhaps with some other places which we do not - Sen. Hellen. iii. 2, .30. There is know; but that a koI after a(be7yat has something perplexing in Xenophon's de- ' fallen out of the text, and that the Bcription of the Triphylian townships cities, whose names follow, are to be which the Eleians surrendered. First, taken as not Triphylian. Phrixa and he does not name Lepreum or Makistus. Epitalium were both south, but only both of which nevertheless had joined just south, of the Alpheius: they were Agis on his invasion, and were the most on the borders of Triphyiia — and it important places in Triphyiia ("iii. 2, 25"). ' seems doubtful whether they were pro- Xext, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and peily Triphylian. Chap. LXXII. CLAIMS OF THE TISATAXS. 887 were admitted to peace, and enrolled again among the members of the Lacedseraonian confederacy.' The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching, and the Eleians were probably the more sparta anxious to obtain peace from Sparta, as they feared to be rps"orethe deprived of their privilege as superintendents. The Jile'oi'ymric Pisatans — inhabitants of the district immediately round presidency. Olympia — availed themselves of the Spartan invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with its great periodical solemnity — by the dispossession of the Eleians as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success. It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans, in early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur ; and that the Eleians had only appropriated it to themselves after conquering the territory of Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all Greece. Accordingly, the Lacedaemonians, on this ground, dismissed the ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 30; Diodor. xiv. 34 ; Pausan. iii. 8, 2. This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different years: it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second, and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), is a point upon which critics have not been unanimous. Following the chronology of Diodorus, who jilaces the beginning of the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in 401 B.C. (Fa.sti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Man- tinea, p. 382), who places it in 398 B.C. According to Mr. Clinton's view, the principal year of the war would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival. But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all parties, as to be specifically men- tioned. In my judgement, the war was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the festival did arrive. Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date assigned by Dio- dorus to the Eleian war, squares both ■«ith the date which Diodorus gives for the death of ^Agis, and with that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of Agesilaus — better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers) prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21. Tovrccv 5e irpaTTOfAevciiv iv rrj 'Airia virh AepKvWiSa, AaKi5aifji.6vwt Kara Thv avThv xP'^^ov ird- Xai opyi^Sjxevoi tois 'HXeiois, &c. This fiassage i.s certainly of some weight; yet 1 think in the present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accu- racy as to date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic afiairs. Not a single proceeding of the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnesus, since the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command of Der- kyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it comprehended the whole. Sievers more- over compresses the whole Eleian war into one year and a fraction ; an inter- val, shorter, I think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon. 2 c 2 388 HISTOKY OF GEEECE. Paet II. claimants, and left the superintendence of tlie Olympic games still in the hands of the Eleians.^ This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis placed the Lacedae- Trimnpbant mouians in a condition of overruling ascendency through- Spam-°^ out Peloponnesus, such as they had never attained before. the aiJSe- To complete their victory, they rooted out all the remnants pelopon-"^ of their ancient enemies the Messenians, some of whom had r^Dei'^h^ been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others in the bourhood. island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were now expelled, in the hour of Lacedsemonian omnipotence, from the neighbourhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in Sicily, others at Kyrene.^ We shall in a future chapter have to commemorate the turn of fortune in their favour. » Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 31. 2 Diodor. xiv. 34 ; Pausan. iv. 26, 2. Chap. LXXm. SPARTA — CLOSE OF THE WAE. 389 CHAPTER LXXIII. AGESILAUS KING OF SPAKTA.— THE COKINTHIAN WAR. The close of the Peloponnesian War, with the victorious organiza- tion of the Lacedaemonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as a period carrying with it increased suffering to those towns which had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what they had endured under Athens — and harder dependence, unaccompanied by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks : first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Ilimera, Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina — next from the overruling despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse. Sparta alone had been the gainer ; and that to a prodigious ex- tent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and ™i™r,''oT' from the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient %''J"e'y,'^e'"^ authors dated the commencement of her degeneracy, j„^''t~n"o°; which they ascribe mainly to her departure from the '^,\^\^™°' institutions of Lykur^us by admittin"- gold and silver silver by J <~j •/ (-J cj LysaTider money. These metals had before been strictly prohibited ; opposed by •' . . . « . some of the no money bemg tolerated except heavy pieces ot iron, Epuors. not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the Ephors strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing, and the ncnv acquisitions were 390 HISTORY OF GREECE. Taut II. The iutro- duction of money was ouly one among a large train of corrupt- ing circum- stances which then became operative on Sparta. received ; though it still continued to be a penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust Plutarch) for any individual to^-be found with gold and silver in his possession.^ To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals were recognised and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes, of the government. There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important phsenoraenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in the bosom of an old-fashioned Spartan, and probably King Archidamus, had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing Epliors. But Plutarch and others have criti- cised it too much as a phsenomenon by itself; whereas it was really one characteristic mark and portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success at ^gospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury — did not by any means ex- tinguish in their bosoms the love of money ; ~ while they had a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love of power. The Spartan kings Leotychides and Pleistoanax had both been guilty of receiving bribes ; Tissaphernes had found means (during the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian AVar) to corrupt not merely the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates ; Gylippus, as Well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like fraud ; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander, enslaved only by his appetite for 1 Plutai'ch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced, vii. 6. Both Ephorus and Theopompus re- counted this opposition to the introduc- tion of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the name of one of the Ephors as taking the lead in it. There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too among high-minded and iutelligeul men, which regarded gold and silver as a cause of midchief imd corruption, and of which the stanza of Horace (Od. iii. 3) is an echo : — Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm Cum terra celat, spemere fortior Quam cogere humanos in usus, Omue sacrum rapiente dextra. * Aristotel. Politic, ii. 6, 23. 'A-iTO/Se'jSTj/if 5e rohvavriov rtp vo/xoOstt] Tov ffvfX(pipovTos' T?;^ fxev yap it6\i.v tte- TTo'iriKiv axp'niJ.a.TOV, robs 5' loiii>Tas v iSlcov (pepoixev. 2 Aiistotel. Polit. ii. G, 23. ^avXus 8' e^et Kai irepl to, koivo. xf7),"aTa to7s STrap- TictT&iS' ovTe yap iv t& koivoj tvjs TroAecos silver then at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between 4U0-371 B.C. ^ See the .speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King Archidamus at IffTiv ovZev, Tro\ifj.ous iJ.eyd\o-JS avajKa- I Sjxxrta (Thucyd. i. 7U-8-lr ; comjiare al.^o ^o/xivovs (pepiiv il &c. About the ^ewriXaaiai of the Spar- tans — see the speech of Perikius in Thucj-d. i. 138. 3 Aristotel. Politic, ii. G, 10. ■* Aristot. Politic, ii. 6, 16-18 ; ii. Chap. LXXIII. SPARTAN CORRUPTION. 393 It is not merely Isokrates,^ who attests the corruption wrought in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that Testimonies foreign empire which followed the victory of yEgospotami ^d'^xeifo^'* — but also their earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After changt°of^^ having warmly extolled the laws of Lykurgus or the amrhawts Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit that his 'itsparta. eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. " Formerly (says he ^) the Lacedaemonians used to prefer their own society and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their possession ; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenelasy or) expul- sion of strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with foreigners ; but now, those, who stand first in point of influence among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy of headship ; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly the Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans would act as their leaders against wrong-doers ; but now they are exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to the Delphian god and to the institutions of Lykurgus. " 1 Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127. 2 Xen. de Republ. Laced, c. 14. OTSa yap Trp6Tepov /xiv AaKe^ai/xoviovs aipovfjLiVovs, OLKOi TO. jx^rpia e^'"''''"^ "■^' \ri\oLS (Tvvtlvai fxaWov, v) ap/xo(ovTas eV Ta7s TriKicn koX Ko\aic€vofj.€vovs SiacpOei- psadai. Kal irpiad^v fiev olSa avrohs (po- ^ovixivovs, XP'^"'""' iX^VTas (paipeaOar vvv 5' iffriv ovs Kol KaWtoTTiCojUfVous iirl T(2 KeKTrjffOai. 'ETriaTafiaL 5e Kal irpS- ffdeu TOUTOv eveKa ^ei/TjAaaias yiyvoi-Levas, Ka\ a7ro57);U,e?i' ovk (Eou, oirois jut; paSiovp- yias oi iroXlraL awh tSiv ^4vwv 6U7ri/x- TrAaiVTO- vvv S' i-Kiaraixai rohs SoKovvras TTpdoTovs elcai icrTov5aK6ras ws /xT)Se!roT6 Trav(x}VTai. apfXuCovTes iirl leVrjj. Kal T/r /nhv, (Ire iir e fXiXovvT o , uttws a|ioi e/ej' 7')7e7rr6ar vvv 5e ttoAi) ixaWov irpayfxa- Tfvuvrai. oTra)9 ap^ovffiv, -}) oiroos a^ioi Toi'iTov iffovTai. ToLyapovv ui "EWiji'ts TTpSrepov ixev ISvres els AaKsSai/xova e'Se- OVTO avTwv, r}yi7(rdai enl rovs Sokovvtus aSiKett"- vvv Se ttoAAoI TrapaKaKovaiv a.\- ArjKovs iirl rh S la k ai \v e lv ap^ai ■K a\iv au T n V s. Ovoiv fx^vToi Se? dav- /xd^eiv TovToov rZv iirt^poywv aurois yiyvo- /xevcav, iireidij (pavepoi elffiv ovre t<^ 06^ Trei66iJ.evoL ovre to7s AvKovpyov vS/nois. The expression "taking measures to hinder the Laceda;moniaus from again exercising empire " — marks this treatise as probably composed some time be- tween their naval defeat at Knidus, and their land-defeat at Lenktra. The former put an end to their maritime empire — the latter excUided them from all pos- sibility of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such recovery was by no means impossible. 894 HiSTOKY OF GEEECE. Pakt II. This criticism (written at some period between 894-371 b.c.) from the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject cities : we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt constrained to admire.^ All the vices, here insisted upon by Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire. The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition — of which the Corinthians complain,^ but for which Kino^ Archidaraus takes credit, at the beofinnino' of the Peloponnesian War — is found exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for emancipation of the great men from the sub- duing^ equality of discipline enacted by Lykurgus. Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 b.c), and Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (408-394 b.c), were the two kings of Sparta at the end of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was for the time ^ greater than either of the two kings, who had the right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only Pausanias, but also several of the Ephors and leading men at Sparta, as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap ; thus indirectly bringing about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial discouragement of the Dekarchies throughout Greece, and Power of Lysander — his arro- gance and ambitious projects — fliitiery lavished upon him by sophists and poets. 1 The Athenian envoy at Melos saj's — AaKedai/xdvwi yap irphs /u-iv a(pas avTovs Kal TO, iiTix^pia v6iu.LiJ,a, ivX^'iffTa aperij ^paii'rai' Trphs Se tovs aWovs — ivicpave- OTara &v tffjxev to fji.\v ^5ea Ka\a vojxi- ^ovcri, TO 5e ^vfKJiepovTa Si'koio (^Thucyd. V. 105). A judgement, almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi. 48). 2 Thucyd. i. G9, 70, 71, 84. apxai6- Tpoira vnwv to eViTTjSeu^uaTa — aoKvoi irphs vfj.as /ueAArjTos Kal OTroSTjjtiijToI Trpbs ivSr]- fioTOLTovs : also viii. 24. ^ STropTrjz' Sa/xacrl/x^poTov (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum, c. 1). ■* See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii. G, 22) about tlie function of admiral among the Lacedtemouians — eVi yap rols ^affiXivcriv, ovai aTpaT7]yo7s di'Siois, ■^ vavapxi-o- (Tx^Shv erepa fiaaiK^ia Ka64- ffrrjKe. This reflection, — which Aristotle inti- mates that he has borrowed from some one else, though without saying from whom — must in all iirobaHility have been founded upon the case of Lysan- der; for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedcemoniau admiral enjoying a jjower which could by possibility be termed exorbitant or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the Peloponnesian War, much censure was cast upon the Lacedtcmonian practice of annually changing the admu'al (Xen. Hellen. i. 6, 4). The Lacedaemonians seem to have been impressed with these ci'iticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet also — in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been done befoi'e (Xeu, Hellen. iii. 4, 28). Chap. LXXIIL FLATTERY TO LYSANDEK. 395 the recall of Lysander himself from his command. It was notwith- out reluctance that the conqueror of Athens subuiitted to descend again to a private station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis oi;, Pausanias : that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born of the lineage of Eury- sthenes and Prokles, but by selection out of all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one ;^ and that the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Herakles, but a worthy parallel of Herakles himself. AVhile paeans were sung to the honour of Lysander at Saraos^ — while Choerilus and Antilochus composed poems in his praise — while Antimachus (a poet highly esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited ejjic verses called Lysandria, and was surpassed by Nikeratus — • there was another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikar- nassus, named Kleon,^ who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well earned the regal dignity — that personal excellence ought to prevail over legitimate descent — and that the crown ought to be laid open to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot reasonably believe that Lysander really ordered the composition of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor or defendant before the Dikastery used to arm himself with a speech from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally through such a prose com- position, whether the project were first recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of admirers ; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent poet Anti- lochus.* And the composition would be put into the form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their writings, as we may see in Isokrates — especially in his sixth dis- course, called Archidamus. 1 Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps lie may have beeu simply a member of tiie tribe called Hylleis, who probably called themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysauder wished to caiige the kiii^'^i to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply out of the Ilei'a- kleids. This is less probable. - Duris ap. Atheiiicum, xv. p. 696. •* Plutarch, Lysaud. c. 18 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20. ^ I'lutaich, Ly;;aud. c. 17. 396 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others, Reaiposi- Lysanclcr came now to conceive the idea of breaking the ki^gs'it'^* succession of the two regal families, and opening for Sparta. himself a door to reach the crown. His projects have been characterised as revolutionary ; but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 b.c. In this view the associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern reader" misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any modern sense of the term ; not only they were not absolute, but they were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor was any Spartan their subject ; every Spartan was the member of a free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern ; nor did he reign, in the sense* of haAdng government carried on in his name and by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the Ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional, though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was, arrested, tried, and punished for misbehaviour in the discharge of his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of state ; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain military and judicial functions, which passed as an universitas by hereditary transmission in his family ; but subject to the control of the Ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.^ Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when sent on foreign service ; yet a law was made, requiring him to take deputies along with him, as a council of war without whom nothing was to be done. The Ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit ; and they brought Pausanias to trial and punishment, for alleged misconduct in his command.^ The only way in which the Spartan kings formed part of the sovc- tbe same footing, as that on which the office of the kings oi' sufFetes of Carthage stood ; who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the ^aaiAus at Sparta with those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in favour of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan hereditary transmission (Arist. Polit. ii. 8, 2). .2 Thucyd. v. G3 ; Xen. Helleu. iii. 5. 25; iv. 2, 1. 1 Aristotle (Polit. v. 1, ■'5) represents justly the schemes of Lysander as going TTptis rh fxipos ri KivriffaL rrjs woAireias' olov a.pxvv Tiva Karaarriaai. rj avekelv. The Spartan kingship is here regarded a.s apxv Tis — one office of state, among others. But Aristotle i-egards Lysander as having intended to destroy the king- ship- — KaraXvaai ti^v ^aaiXiiav — which does not appear to have been the fact. The plan of Ivysander was to i-etain the kingship, but to render it elective in- stead of hereditaiy. He wished to place the Spartan kingshijj substantially on Chap. LXXIII. SPAETAN KINGS. 397 reign power in the state, or shared in the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had votes ex officio in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns ; the government having then been really carried on by them or by their orders. But in the year 400 B.C., Agis and Pausanias had become nothinof more than great and dignified hereditary officers of state, still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by election from their number, might be a change better or worse : it was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that any of the various priest- hoods, which were hereditary in particular families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs ; but it cannot properly be styled revolutionary. The Ephors, the Senate, and the public assembly, might have made such a change in fiill legal form, without any appeal to violence ; the kings might vote against it, but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made, the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in principle, just what it was before ; although the Eurystheneid and Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less true, that the associations, connected with the title of king in the modern mind, do not properly apply to them. To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies of an unusual character must be employed. Hisin- Quitting Sparta soon after his recall, he visited the oracles make Mni- of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon in Libya,^ in order sparu-he 1 • i* • • i- i j_L tries in vaiu to procure, by persuasion or corruption, injunctions to the to move the oracles in his favour — scheme laid for the pro- duction uf sacred docu- ments, as yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo. Spartans countenancing his projects. So great was the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that Kleomenes Ibad thus obtained the deposition of King Demaratus, — and the exiled Pleistoanax, his own return f bribery having been in both cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate. None of these oracles could be induced, by any oflfers, to venture upon so grave a ' Diodor. xiv. 13 ; Cicero, de Divinat. 43, 96 ; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 3. 2 Plutarch, Lysand. c, 25, from Epbo- rus. Compare Herodot. vi. G6; Thucyd. V. 12. 398 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. sentence as that of repealing the established law of succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of Amnion, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to denounce his proceeding ; upon which accusation Lysander was put on his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes thus far miscarried — and he was com- pelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo ; an assertion which found extensive credence, notwith- standing various difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making known at Sparta this new birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts- and inspired records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody of the Delphian priests ; not to be touched or consulted until some genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the connivance of some among the pi'iests, certain oracles were fabricated agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden records ; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny, were pre- pared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them, recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the best citizens.^ So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that His aim at Silcuus actually presented himself at Delphi, and put.in fails-nfver- his claim. But one of the confederates either failed in smi'retains ^^^ couragc, or broke down, at the critical moment ; so illCence'at tbat the hidden records still remained hidden. Yet Sparta. though Lysauder was thus compelled to abandon his plan, nothing was made public about it until after his death. It might probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper courage and cunning — when we consider the profound and habitual deference of the Spartans to Delphi ; upon the sanction of which oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly understood to rest. And an occasion presently ' Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2G. Chap. LXXIII. AGIS.— LEOTYCHIDES. 399 arose, on which the proposed change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence ; though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his enterprise, and employed his in- fluence, which continued unabated, in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for himself^ — like Mucian in reference to the Emperor Vespasian. It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that King Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heraea in b.c. 399. Arcadia, and carried back to Sparta, where he shortly J?^**^' ?*■ , afterwards expired. His wife Timaea had given birth sparta- X 1'T^ 11 Of doubt as to to a son named Leotychides, now a youth about fifteen uie legui- years of age.^ But the legitimacy of this youth had sonLeoty- always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, Agesiiaiw, when the birth of the child was first made known to him, Lysander. that it could not be his. He had been frightened out of the'throne! his wife's bed by the shock of an earthquake, which was construed as a warmng from Poseidon, and was held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time ; during which interval Leoty- chides was born. This was one story : another was, that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it was 1 Tacit. Histor. i. 10. "Cui expedi- tius fuerit trad ere imperium, quam ob- tinere." The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on veiy suf- ficient testimony — that of Ephorus ; to whom perhaps the words (paai rives in Aristotle may allude, where he men- tions this conspiracy as having been narrated (Polit. v. 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as K. 0. Miiller (Hist, of Do- rians, iv. 9, 5) and others, erroneously represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to after Lysander re- turned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia; which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied Agesilaus out, in the spring of 59(5 B.C. — did not return to Greece until the spring of 395 B.C. — and was then employed, with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that expedition against BcEotia wherein he was slain. The tampering of Lysander ^\-ith the oracle must undoubtedly have taken place pi-ior to the death of Agis— at some time between 403 B.C. and 399 B c. The humiliation which he received in 39ij B.C. from Agesihxus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind the renewal of his former plans, but he can have had no time to do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v. 6, 2) alludes to the humiliation of Ly.san- der by the kings as an example of inci- dents tending to i-aise disturbance in an aristocratical govei-nment ; but this hu- miliation probably alludes to the manner in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C. — which proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21) — not to the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plu- tarch, Lysand. c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in 390 B.C.: whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at Delphi, is uncertain ; perhaps after it. - The age of Leotychides is approxi- mately marked by the date of the pre- sence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414—413 B c. The mere rumour, true or false, that this young man was the son of Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to certify his age. '400 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart IT. alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully recognised him ; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during his last illness.^ As in tliie case of Demaratus about a century earlier ^ — advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself. Agesilaus was the son of King Archidamus, not by Lamplto the Character of mothcr of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. Agesilaus. jjg ^-^g ^^^y ^^ (-j^g maturc age of forty,^ and having been brought up without any prospect of becoming king — at least until very recent times — had passed through the unmitigated rigour of Spartan drill and training. He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues : exemplary obedience to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military as well as civil — emulation, in trying to surpass every competitor — extraordinary courage, energy, as well as facility in enduring hardship — sim- ])licity and fi'ugality in all his personal habits — extreme sensibility to the opinion of his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or adherents, he was remarkable for fervour of attachment, even for unscrupulous partisanship, with a readiness to use all his in- fluence in screening their injustices or shortcomings ; while he was comparatively placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.* His manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing ; though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he laboured under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,^ which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be^ taken.'' He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power. In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet been tried in any military command, though he had probably ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 3, 2 ; Pausanias, iii. 8, 4 ; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 3. - Herodot. v. 66. 3 I confess I do not understand how Agesil. vii. 3; Plutarch, Apophth. La- conic, p. 212 D. 5 Plutai'ch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii. 1. Xenophon can affirm, in his Agesilaus, ] It appears that the mother of Agesi- i. 6, 'AyriaiXaos roivvv en jxiv veos &>v laus was a veiy small woman, and that ervxe rvs fiaiTiXelas. For he himself ', Archidamus had incurred the censure says (ii. 28), and it seems well estah- I of the Ephoi'S, on that especial ground, lished, that Agesilaus died at the age of for marrying her. above 80 (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40;; and I *' Xenoph. Agesil. xi. 7; Plutarch his death must have been about 360 B.C. Agesil. c. 2. ■* Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. | Chap. LXXIII. AGESILAUS AND LEOTYCIIIDES. 401 served in the army cither at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character therefore hiy as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant, inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy, he stood distinguished only for accom,- ])lishments, efforts, endurances, and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint, and the habit of smother- ing emotions, generated by a Spartan training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,' both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of discipline ; a strong illustration of the equalising character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of poor parents and condition.^ He made the mistake of supposing Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable ; and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned, if by his means Ajyesilaus became kin"-, on a grreat increase of his own influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as ostensible general, at least as real chief under the titular headship of the new king. Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the funeral of a kin fxwv i (T 6 l € IV ahr wv. The expression is Homeric — v KiraScuj' ai: iy pa'i/ ^1 as containing an affirma- tion from Xenophon that Kinadon could write. In my judgement, these woi'ds, taken in conjunction with what pi-ecedes, and with the probabilities of the fact de- scribed, do not contain such an affirma- tion. The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after havhvj heard from Ki- nadon u-luj his accomplices were, to lorite the names down and seiul them to the Ephors. It is to be presumed that they executed these instructions as given ; the more so, as what thej^ were com- manded to do was at once the safest and the most natural proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for joorsonal stature and courage (rh elSos koI t]]v •^uxh^ (vpoxTTOS, iii. 3, 5), so that tliose who seized him would find it an indispensable precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could write— yet if he were to write, he must have his right arm free. And why should the guards take this risk, wlicn all which the Ephors required was, that Kiuadon should pronounce the names, to be wiitten down by others? With a man of the qualities of Kinadou, it probably required the most intense pressure to force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth ; it would probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by the more delibei-ate act of writing. I conceive that ijKev iinrivs, (pipuiv ra ovdfxara Siv 6 KLvdSoov aireypa^e is to be construed with I'efereuce to the preced- ing sentence, and announces the carry- ing into effect of the instructions then reported as given by the Ephors. "A guard came, bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in." It is not necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names with hia own hand. In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis), Pythoi'ikus gives information of a mock celebration of the mysteries, committed by Alki- biades and others ; citing as his witness the slave Andromachus; who is accord- ingly produced, and states to the as- sembly viva voce what he had seen and who were the persons present— npcSros fxhv ovTos (Andromachusj ravra 4fii]vv(Te, Koi air ey p a\p € toutous (s. 13). It is not here meant to afiBrm that the slave Andromachus wi'ote down the names of these persons, which he had the moment before publicly annovmced to the assembly. It is by the words oLTTiypa^l/i TovTovs that the orator de- scribes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which was for- mally noted down by a secretary, and which led to legal consequences against the persons whose names were given in. So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makart. p. 1068), 'Airoypa 5e rhv fj.ri iroiovvra Tavra 6 fiovXofjLivos irphs rhv apxovra ; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. *A e/c ToJr vofjioiv tw Idiwry TC. 397. which is specially indicated in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the motives (as had happened in 424 b.c. on occasion of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on distant and lucrative military service. Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three years, ag'ainst Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, Proceed- •' ? ^ ^ ings of Der- with so much efficiency and success, as both to protect kyiudasand the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and to intercept all the in Asia. revenues which those satraps either transmitted to court or en- joyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B.C.), and besides obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissa- phernes in 396 B.C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for renewing the maritime war against Sparta.^ It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who having- saved himself with nine triremes from the „ . ° . • 1 /• 1 1 Persian pre- defeat of ^ffospotami, had remamed for the last seven parations for years under the protection of Ji,vagoras, prince oi maritime •' A cj 1 war £iso,inst Salamis in Cyprus. Konon, having married at Salamis, sparta-re- and having a son ^ born to him there, indulged but faint vuy of hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, for- tunately for him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eaircr for an efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in Cyprus — and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with Queen Parysatis^ — orders were obtained, and funds provided, to equip in Phoenicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of Konon. While that ^ Diodor. xiv. 39 ; Xen. Hellen. iii. , tioned as concerned — Polykritus of 3 13. 1 Mende; and a Kretan dancer named - Lysias, Orat. xix. (De Bonis Ari- i Zeno — both established at the Persian stophanis) s, 38. ! court. 3 See Ktesias, Fragmenta Persica, c. 63, ed. Biihr; Plutarch, Artax. c. 21. We cannot make out these circum- There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which is so much to be regretted as this ; relating transac- stances with any distinctness; but tlie ; tions, in which he was himself con- general fact is plainly testified, and is cerned, and seemingly giving original besides very probable. Another Gre- | letters. cian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is men- i 412 HISTORY OF GEEECE. P^kt II. ofRccr began to show himself, and to act with such triremes as he found in readiness (about forty in number) along the southern caost of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunus ^ — further prepara- tions were vigorously prosecuted in the Phoenician ports, in order to make up the fleet to 300 sail.- It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment Agesiiaus is rcachcd Sparta — in an age of the world when diplomatic land force lo rcsldeuts wcre as yet unkno\m. A Syracusan merchant panted by'"' named Herodas, having visited the Phoenician ports for Lysander. trading purposcs, brought back to Sparta intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among themselves, and communicating with their neighbouring allies, when Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty full Spartan citizens or Peers, as a sort of Board or Council of Officers ; 2000 Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the Ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected from the bravest and most formidable ; and GOOO hoplites from the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans Lysander intended to be leader, and thus reckoning on his pre established influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phoenician fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth of Tissaphernes during the late war ; while the Cyreian expedition had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired ascendency in re- establishing everywhere the Dekarchies, which had excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression, that even the Ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding them, so that they had been iu several places broken up or modified.^ If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic in its aim, than that of Lysander — it was at the same time yet more unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamt of dethroning, or at least of expelling fi-om Asia Minor 1 Diodor. xiv. 30-79. - Xen. Helleu. iii. 4, 1. ^ Xeu. Hellen. iii. 4 2. Chap. LXXIH. AGESILAUS IN ASIA. 413 and the coast.^ So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian expedition over the schemes and imagination of ener- getic Greeks ; so sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for which no one before bad given him credit. Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the i-^rge plans .'tability of the Lacdaemonian empire was concerned, lor conquest' rpi , . ^ 111 1 in the interior Inat empire ought to liave been made sure by sea, of Asia, where its real danger lay, before attempts were made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes of conquest, there was no need of further reinforcements in Asia Minor ; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force com- ])etent to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless the Lacedcemonians embraced the plan eagerly ; the more so, as envoys were sent from many of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of the expedition, with as large a force as he required." No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed num- ber of men from the allies, since there was great promise General wiii- of plunder for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered &"pl^lin°au'ies position of Sparta with respect to her most powerful {heexpedi- allies was betrayed by the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, refusarfrom and Athens, to take any part in the expedition. The refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the city ; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not yet repaired. But the' latter, at least, had already begun to conceive some hope from the projects of Konon.'' The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance Agesilaus to the enterprise. The Spartan kings, in their function hi^^eir^ of leaders of Greece, conceived themselves to have inhe- meimwu- rited the sceptre of Agamemnon and Orestes;"* and f^crlceai Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition to a <^"'tp~^ new Trojan war — an efibrt of united Greece, for the jered'b-'the purpose of taking vengeance on the common Asiatic itebans. enemy of the Hellenic name. The sacrifices having been found Tbebes, Corinth, and Athens. ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 1. t\7ri5as exovTa l-ieyaKas alpriaeiv fiacriKea, &c. Compare iv. 2, 3. _ Xen. j\gesilaus, i. 36. iinvoCov Ka\ eX- •n-i'^'tjc KaTuAvcreiv ri]v inl r))V 'EAA.t£5a ffrpa/rexxfaaav irpSripov apxvi't &". ■•^ Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5. ^ Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 5 ; Pausau. iii. 9, 1. ■• Herodot. 1. 68 ; vii. 1 59 ; Pausan. iii. lii, 13. 414 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. favourable, Agesilaus took measures for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Gersestus, the southern point of Euboea ; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice at Aulis, the port of Boeotia where Agamemnon had offered his memorable sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without asking permission from the Thebans ; moreover he was accompanied by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and com- pelled him to desist from the sacrifice.^ Not taking part them- selves in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan- hellenic character of a second Agamemnon ; and they thus in- flicted a humiliation which Agesilaus never forgave. Af>"esilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus ; an armistice in- tended to allow time for mutual communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas — of autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with the Persian court — adding that he hop^d to be empowered to grant the demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides, for three months ; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.^ While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Arrogant Ephcsus, the couduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable jealousy in the superior officers ; and most of all, in Agesilaus. So great and established was the reputation of Lysander — whose statue had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis ^ as well as in many other cities — that all the Asiatic B.C. 396. Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus— he Concludes a fresh armi- stice with Tissaphernes, beliaviour and over- weening ascendency of Lysander — offensive to the army and to Agesilaus. » Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 3, 4; iii. 5, 5 ; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 6; Pausan. iii. 9, 2. * Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 5, 6 ; Xen. Age- silaus, i. 10. The term of three months i.s specified only in the latter passage. The former armistice of Derkyllidas was probably not expired when Agesilaus first arrived. ^ Pausan. vi. 3, 6. Chap. LXXIII. INSOLENCE OF LYSANDER. 415 Greeks looked upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the great victory of ^Egospotami — the Lacedaemonians having then also sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule that the same man should not serve twice as admiral.^ It was through the insti- gation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence, that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus ; a prince as yet_ untried and unknown. So that Lysander — taking credit, with truth, for having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important appoint- ment — intended for himself, and was expected by others, to exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town the discomfited or enfeebled Dek archies. Numbers of his partisans came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners were seen following his steps everywhere ; while Agesilaus himself appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover Lysander resumed all that insolence of manner which he had con- tracted during his former commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar degree.^ The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named to preside, finding themselves neither consulted AgesUaus by him, nor solicited by others, were deeply dissatis- Se^adesL"/- fied. Their complaints helped to encourage Agesilaus, ^l^tobe''" who was still more keenly wounded in his own personal ®^'** *^*y- dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess. He succes- sively rejected every petition preferred to him by or through Lysander ; a systematic purpose, which, though never formally announced,^ was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. » Xen. Hellen. ii. 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander in 403 B.C. It is possible indeed, that he may have been again sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as commander. - Plutarch, Agesilau.s, c. 7. '^ The sarcastic remarks which Plu- tarcli ascribes to Agesilaus, calling Ly- sander "my meat-distributor" (Kpeo- SaiTTiv), are not warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the circumstances (Phitarch, Lysaud. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8). 416 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. He was forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury and not a benefit to them ; that they must desist from obsequious attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus. With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account — "Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends." — " Ay, to be sure (was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I am ; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not know how to repay with due honour." — Lysander was constrained to admit the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some mission apart ; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might be employed.^ This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus Lysander is than to himsclf, being readily assented to, he was mand°it°the dispatchcd ou a mission to the Hellespont. Faithful to his vaTmibie" ^^^ engagement of forgetting past offences and serving service ihere. ^jj.}^ zcal, lic fouud mcaus to gain over a Persian grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of 200 horse to join Agesilaus ; who was thus enabled to inform himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the territory called Phrygia in the neighbourhood of the Propontis and the Hellespont.^ Tlie army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at B.C. 395. the moment when his timidity induced him to cunclude Tissaphernes the first amiistice with Derkvllidas. But additional breaks the . . , . "^ , , . truce with remtorcements, received since the conclusion of the wiiomaites sccoud and more recent armistice, had raised him to him and such au exccss of confidcucc, that even before the —he retires Stipulated three months had expired, he sent to insist plLeoV"^' on the immediate departure of Agesilaus from Asia, Ttwcro"^ and to proclaim war forthwith, if such departure were cavahry. delayed. While this message, accompanied by formidable reports of the satrap's force, filled the army at Ephesus with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7, 8 ; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23. It is remarkable that in the Opuscu- liim of Xenophon, a special Panegyric called Aijcsila.is, not a word is said about this highly characteristic proceeding be- tween Agesilaus and Lysander at Ephe- sus : nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned. " Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 10. Chap. LXXIII. RETEEAT OF AGESILAUS. 417 satrap for perjuring- himself in so fla^ant a manner, as to set the gods against him and ensure their favour to the Greek side.' Orders were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Maeander, and attack Tissapherues in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on the route were required to pro- vide magazines, so that Tissaphernes, fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive ; while he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Maeander, with a view to overwhelm -Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over that level terri- tory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But the Lacedaemonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent, suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap, who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and villages, and collected abundance of pro- visions, plunder, and slaves. Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching as little as possible over the })lains, he carried on lucrative and unopposed incursions as far as the neighbourhood of Daskylium, the residence of the satrap himself near the Propontis. Near the satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry, under Rhathines and Bagffius ; who attacked them vigorously, and drove them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus him- self coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does not specify them) on the spirits of the army w^as discouraging. On the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavourable for farther advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He reached Ephesus about the close of autumn ; resolved to employ the winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved to be indispensable.^ This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious. Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 11, 12; Xen. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9. Agesil. i. 12-14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9. These militnry operations of Agesilaus 2 Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 13-15; Xen. ' are lootiely adverted to in the early part Agesil. i. 23. 'Ewfl fj.4vroi ovSe iv rf of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Dio- ^pvyia aua to, Tre'Sia iSvi^aro (TTpareveaQai, i dorus. Sitt Tiiv ^apva^a^ov iinrfiav, &C. I VOL. VI. 2 E 418 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. merits of his hero Agesilaus ; in doing which he exhibits to us Asiediaus ancient warfare and Asiatic habits on a very painful money for sldc. In common both with KalUkratidas and Lysander, eager in though uot with the Ordinary .Spartan commanders, his"frieiids. Agcsilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich prizes or vahiable prisoners ; which advantages, if he had chosen, he might have appropriated to himself But he made it a practice to throw both tlie booty and the honour in the way of some favourite officer ; just as we have seen (in a former chapter), that Xenophon himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large portion of his ransom.' Again when the army in the course of its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack. It was difficult to keep or cai-ry what was bought, and opportunity for resale did not seem at hand. Agesi- laus, while he instructed, the auctioneers to sell upon credit, with- out insisting on ready money — at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned, bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large profits.^ We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured His human- for Affcsilaus many warm admirers; thoug^h the eulomes ity towards n-c-i f i/»i i captives and 01 Xcnophon ought to have been confined to another dpscrtcd children. poiut iu his couduct, uow to be mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town surrendered to him on terras, his exactions were neither ruinous nor grossly humiliating.^ Amidst all the plunder realised, too, the most valuable portion was, the adult natives of both sexes, hunted down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor victims from ill-usage ; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, ' Xen. Ageail. i. 19; Xen. Anabas. I ^ Xen. 7\gesil. i. 18. irdures va/xTTkriCri vii. 8, 20-23; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. xP'''m'^''"« ^^a^ov. Prsecept. p. 809 B. See above, Chapter ^ Xeu. Agesil. i. 20-22. Ixxii. of this Jlistorv. I Chap. LXXIII. HUMANITY OF AGESILAUS. 419 " not of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under guard as men."' It was the practice of the poorer part of the native population often to sell their little children for exportation to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to main- tain them. The children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns. But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these slave-mercliants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare indeed in a Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.^ ' Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i. 28. roiis mh tuv \riaToov aMcTKOfxi- vov^ PapPdpovs. So the word Atjctt^s, used in i-eference to the fleet, means the commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hel- len. ii. 1, oO). 2 Xen. Agesil. i. 21. Kal iroWaKis liifv TTpoTjySpfve Tols crrpaTiccTats t o v s aAicTKOfxevovs ja^ i> s aS I k o v s T i fjLoi p ii a d ai, dAA.' ois avQpw- ir V s uvras (pv \d.(T ff e iv. TloWaKis Se, OTTore ixeTaffTparoneSevoiro, el aX- a o IT KaTa\e\eifjifx4i'a ir a i- S d p ta fx i K pa i uir 6 po>v, (& ttoA- Ko\ i TT w \ o vv, S la to v o fii ^ e iv fj./] h V V aa Q ai ttf (p 4 p e iv avT a Kai T p 6 ((> € iv) eire^ueAero Kal tovtwv, Sircos (TvyKon'i^oLTS wor toTs S' av Sia yrjpas KaTaKi\€Lfj.iJ.4vnis alx/J-aXuiTois irpo- (TeTaTTev iirifi^KitaQai avrwv, i>s fjL-i)T€ Vnh KVVWV, fiTid' VIVO \VKC0V, SLav vapd yap To7ai ^apfidpoiai Ti/xiciTepoi elai ol eucoi'xoi, iricTTios f'lvfKa ttjs irdaris, Toiv iyopx'^^'y- Boys were necessary, as the operation was performed in child- hood or youth — iralSes eKTOfxiai (Hero- dot, vi. 6-.';2 : compare iii. 48). The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute, had to furnish to the Persian court annually 5U0 -iralSas eKTo/j,ias (Herodot. iii. 92). For some farther remarks on the preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services of fi/vovxoi, see Dio Chrv- sostom. Orat. xxi. p. 270 ; Xenoph. Cy- ropjed. vii. 5, (31-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed that the Per- sians had derived both the persons so employed, and the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians. When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the Kalmucks, little children of two or three yeai-s of age, were often tendered to him for manijo" in Martial — "Sed Mitylensei sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway'a roseus mangonis ephebus " Martial, vii. i Travels, ch. xvi. p. 65, 66). 2 E 2 420 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. Spartan side of bis ciiaracter — exposure of naked pri- soners — different practice of Asiatics and Greeks. This interesting- anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend to unveil, demonstrates the compas- sionate disposition of Agesilaus. We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus — being then busily employed in training his troops to military efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing campaign — thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale in a state of ^perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a thing never done, and even held dis- graceful, by the native Asiatics ; while among the Greeks, the practice was universal for purposes of exercise — or at least had become universal during the last two or three centuries — for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling on this poiiA had j)revailed throughout Greece. It was one of the obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs' — that in the former, both the exercises of the palaestra, as well as the matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually ; Alexander prince of Macedon had done so, when he ran at the Olympic stadium^ — also the combatants out of the great family of the Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic pankratlum — and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth his com- plimentary odes. On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked ; not at all by way of insult, but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier who contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and frequent exposure — and how inferior was the condition of men whose bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to be borne in carriages instead of walking: or ' Herodot. i. 10. Trapa yap rolcn Au- SoTci, (TxeSbi' Se Trapa rolai &Woi(n fiap- ^apoiai, Kol avSpa 6((>6?^vai yv/xuhp, is alarxvvriv fieydXrjv (pepet. Compare Tbu- cvd. i. 6; Plato, Republic, y. 3 p. 452 D. - llerodot. v. 22. Chap. LXXIII. AGESILAUS AT El'HESUS. 421 running- ; from whence we indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances. And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered ; since his soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence, thought that "the enemies against whom they had to contend were not more formidable than women." ^ Such a method of illustrating 'the difference between good and bad physical training would hardly have occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean rules. While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them through- Efforts of out the winter under hard work and drill, as well in the ^Trah^fis palaestra as in arras. A force of cavalry was still wanting. toTw'curc To procure it, he enrolled all the richest Greeks in the ^^^^'o-- various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to serve on horseback ; giving each of them leave to exempt himself, however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment — man, horse, and arms.^ Before the commencement of spring, an adequate force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into tolerable exercise. Throughout' the whole winter, that city became a place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On parade as well as in the palaestra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given to the diligent and improving, among hoplites, horsemen, and light troops ; while the armourers, braziers, leather-cutters, &c., all the various artisans whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in the fallest employment. " It was a sight full of encouragement (says Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on their heads ; and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess." '^ Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations ' Xen. Helleu. iii. 4, 19. 'Hyov/xevos Sf, Kal rh Karafppovilv roiV TToKiixiwv pw- fj.T)!' Tifa i/xPaWeiv irphs rh yLax^aOai, trpoe'iTre ro7s Kripv^t, rovs vno rciiv \ri- ariiv aAicrKO/xeuous ^apfidpovs yv/xvovs irco- Xe7v. 'OpoovTis ovv ol (TTpariaiTai Aev- Kohs fJ-iv, Zla rh firjS 4tt or e eKSve- ffQai, jxaXaKoiis Se koX a.Tv6vovs,^ia rh ael E7r' oxi)P-''-'^'^v elvai, ev6fii(xav, ovSfU Sioi- ffetv rhu ■K6Kifxov ^ et yvvai^\ Siot fJ-a- XecrOat. Xen. Agesil. i. 28— where be has it — irluvas Se Kol airovovs, 5ja rh aei fir' oxv- fidraii/ (Ifai (Polya3aus, ii. 1,5; Plutiuclj, Agesil. c. 9). Frontiniis (i. 18) i-ecoimts a proceed- iii2 somewhat similar on the part of Geloii, after his great victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in Sicily : — " Gelo Syracnsai'um tyrannus, bello ail- versus Pocnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum qiiemque proDci- pue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in couspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet coutemnendos." - Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i. 2j. Compare what is related about Scipio Afrieaims — Livy, xxix. 1. ^ Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil, i. 20, 27. 422 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over. B.C. 395. Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, Agesiians re- superseding the first tliirtv under Lysander, who all went news the war * <• V • i mi * ■ 1 against Tis- home torthwith. Ihe array was now not only more ajid gaiMa iiumcrous, but better trained, and more systematically s^rciiZ "'^'^'^ arranged, than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus distributed the various divisions under the command of different members of the new Thirty ; the cavalry being assigned to Xenokles, the Neodamode hoplites to Skythes, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march straight against Sard! s. Nevertheless Tissaphernes, who was in that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander as he had done in the preceding campaign ; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched as he had announced, in the airection of Sardis. For three days he plundered the country without seeing an enemy ; nor was it until the fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to oppose him ; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching the banks of the river Paktolus, the Persian cavalry found the Greek light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently however Agesilaus himself came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge, anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could aiTive in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack — victory soon declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of them drov,ned in the Paktolus. Their camp too was taken, with a valuable booty ; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed mastery of all the territory round Sardis. He carried his ravages to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented ground, proclaim! rg liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes to come out and fight.' 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 21-24; Xen. [scribe this battle; but Lis description Agesil. i. 32, 33 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10. is hardly to be reconciled with that of Diodorus (xiv. 80) professes to de- j Xenophon, which is better authority. Chap. LXXIII. TITIIEAUSTES SATltAT. 423 The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its cIujc. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly com- Artaxerxes plained of him as leaving them undefended, from cow- s'lphwifes' ardice and anxiety for his own residence in Karia ; deiuhfand" while the court of Susa was now aware that the powerful g^dby reinforcement which had been sent to him last year, litiiraustc-s. intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was added a court-intrigue ; to which, and to the agency of a person yet more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim. The Queen Mother Parysatis had never forgiven him for having been one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus. Her influence being now re-established over the mind of Artaxerxes, she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer of this order, seized him by stra- tagem at Kolossse in Phrygia, while he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.^ The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta with vigour, by sea as well as by ' " land ; and also for fomenting the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this year in Greece. At first, xtgotia- however, immediately after the death of Tissaphernes, tween'^tiie Tithraustes endeavoured to open negotiations with Agesi- and .\^'/s1? laus ; who was in military possession of the country round s;",r^''in Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occu- hoswe^to""^ pied by Ariseus — probably the same Persian who had each other, formerly been general under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.^ Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the King for having punished the late satrap ; out of whose perfidy (he aflBrmed) the war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the King's name, to evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed, it would have secured Among other points of difference, Dio- dorus affirms that the Persians had 50,000 infantrj'; and Pausanias also states (iii. 9, 3) that the number of Persian infantry in this battle was gi-eater than had ever been got together since the times of Dai-ius and Xerxes. Whereas Xenophon expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and took no part in the battle. 1 Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv. 80; Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 25. - Xen. Hellen. iii. 14, 25 ; iv. 1, 27. 424 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. these Greeks against Persian occupation or governors ; a much milder fate for them than that to which the Lacedsemoniaus had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes sixteen years before,' and analogous to the position in w^hich the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens, under the peace of Nikias;^ subject to a fixed tribute, yet autonomous— with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an armistice fur six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that of Pharna- bazus ; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards the tem- porary maintenance of the army.^ These satraps generally acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than cooperating colleagues ; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian empire. When Agesilaus had reached the neighbourhood of Kyme, on his march northward to the Ilellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.* For the first time since the battle of yEgospotami, the maritime mandsa''fl™'t empire of Sparta was beginning to be threatened, and of eighty sail increased efforts on her part were becominar requisite. on tlie coast _ r o t. of Kaiia. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court of Arta- xerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phoenicia, to act under the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedaemonians.^ That officer — with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of the remainder was yet complete — had advanced along the southern coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was besieged by the Lacedaemonian fleet of 120 triremes under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet ol Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger ; so that Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes. The neighbourhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened B.C. 395. Commence- ment of action at sea against Sparta— the Athenian Ko non, assisted by I'ersian ships and 1 Thucyd. viii. 18, 37, 58. ^ Thucyd. V. 18, 5. ^ Xen. Helleu. iii. 4, 26 ; Diudor. xiv. 80. i^a/LiriViaiovs avoxas. * Xeu. Holleu. iii. 4, 27. ' Diodor. xiv. 39; Justin, vi. 1. CiiAP. LXXIII. KEVOLT OF KHODES. -125 the llhodians to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the L^eiieral detestation of the Lacedsemonian empire, dis- Kiiwipsre- o r ' volts from OTaced in so many different cities by the local Dekar- t^e spurtan chies and by the .Sijartan harmosts, first manifested Koi.ontap- •* ^ ^ lurt'S an itself. And such was the ardour of the Rhodian popula- Egyptian tion, that their revolt took place while the fleet of Pliarax Rhodes. was (in part at least) actually in the harbour, and they drove him out of it.' Konon, whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection, presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage ; for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards, sent by Nephereus the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt against the Persians) with marine stores and grain to the aid of the Lacedaemonians. Not having been apprised of the recent revolt, these vessels entered the harbour of Rhodes as if it were still a Lacedsemonian island ; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by Konon and the Rhodians.- In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had Anxiety of occasion to point out more than once that all of them monians-^* took place not merely in the absence of any Athenian ap%°iiu"dTo force, but even at the instigation (in most cases) of a se™rs weif present hostile force — by the contrivance of a local party *'*' '^^ '''"^- — and without privity or previous consent of the bulk of the citi- zens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and indignation among the Lacedaemonians. They saw themselves about to enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncer- tainty in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to ensure unity of operations ; ^ though a distinction of functions, which they had hitherto set great value upon main- taining, was thus broken down — and though the two commands ' Dioflor xiv. 79. 'PSSioi 5^ ^K^aXov- T€S rhv tSjv TleAoirovvqalcov v Plutarch asserts to hsve taken place be- e^eracrr^is rwv KXaTrevrav, &c. tween Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot ^ Xen. Helleu. iv. 1, 27 ; Plutarch, have occurred on the departure of the Agesil. c. 11. latter, but must belong to some other Since the flight of Spithridates took occasion ; as indeed it seems to be re- place secretly by night, the scene which presented by Xenophon (Agesil. v. 4). CnAP.LXXIIl. AGESILAUS AND PIIARNABAZUS. 431 of the other. ^Ve have from Xenophon, himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview. Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down .upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes, they next shook hands ; after v/hich Pharnabazus, who as the older of the two had been the first to tender his right-hand, was also the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not in- formed. " Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you Lacedsemonians while you were at war with Athens : I furnished you with money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me with ever having played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word or deed. Yet after this behaviour, I am now reduced by you to such a condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favours received, and eager to requite them ? Pray answer me this question ; for perhaps I have yet to learn what Is holy and just." The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this emphatic appeal. They all held their peace ; while Agesilaus, after a long pause, at length replied — ^" You are aware, Pharna- bazus, that in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of eaCh other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to war, fight with each other, and sometimes by acci- dent even kill each other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we, being at war .with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions as enemy's land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters, in place of your present master ; I ask you to become our ally, and to enjoy your own property as a freeman — bowing before no man and acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a freeman, and yet 432 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Part II. poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me — if you thus continue a freeniao and become rich, what can you want farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man ?" " I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on me, so strong is the point of honour, that I shall continue to make war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else." ^ Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said — " Would that with such high-minded sentiments you could become our friend ! At any rate, let me assure you of this — that I will immediately quit your territory ; and for the future, even should the war continue, I will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my arms against any other Persians." Here the conversation closed ; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and rode away. His son by Parapita, however — at that time still a handsome youth — lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and exclaimed — " Agesilaus, I make you my guest." " I accept it with all my heart " — was the answer. " Remember me by this " — rejoined the young Persian — putting into the hands of Agesilaus the hue javelin which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental trappings from the horse of his secretary Ida-us, and gave them as a return present, upon M-hich the young man rode away with them, and rejoined his father.^ There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropaedia. The pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus were not forgotten by either. The latter — being in after-days impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt — was compelled to take refuge in Greece ; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home, and even went so far as to employ influence in ftivour of an Athenian youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian youth had outgrown Friendship established between Agesiluus and the son of Pharna- bazus — character of Agesilaus. ' Xen. Hellen. iv. 1, 38. 'Eav ^livroi fxoi rrjv apxv" ""'poffTdrrr), toiovtov ri, ws eoiKe, (piXoTifila iffrl, fii XPV e'Sei'aj, Sti TToXefjLrjcra} v/mlv i>s ay Svpoo/xat ipiffra. Compare about (pi\oTi/j.ia, Herodot. iii. 53. 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 1, 29-41 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14 ; Xen. Agesil. iii. 5. Chap. LXXIIL AGESILAUS AND PllARNABAZUS. 4.33 the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium ; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference, over- ruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.^ The stress laid by Xenophon upon this favour illustrates the tone of Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to him- self, Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroach- ments, and screening the injustices, of his friends.^ The unfair privilege which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself, could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to severe censure. Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus — which was now pretty well exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tith- j, c. 394. raustes must have expired — Agesilaus took up his camp promising near the temple of Artemis, at Astyra in the plain of ia°ge'pre-" Thebe (in the region commonly known as ^olis), near asuuc"^ ^°'^ the Gulf of Elseus. He here employed himself in bring- fare. o?Age- ing together an increased number of troops, with a view ig'rec^ied to penetrate farther into the interior of Asia Minor aray'toPe- during the summer. Recent events had greatly in- loponnesus. creased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his superior strength ; so that he received propositions from various districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian Dekarchies in the Greco- Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible sharp inflic- tions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this direction, we cannot tell ^ — nor can it have been possible, indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and lessening the political power of his own partisans ; neither of which he did. His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possiWe, of the western portion of Persian Asia. What he would have perma- nently accomplished towards this scheme, cannot be determined ; for his aggressive march was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in the next chapter. ^ Xen, Hellen. iv. 1, 40. ttoi't' eVotT)- crey. Zirus av 5i' iKe7vov iyKpiO^ir) els rh (TTadioi' if 'OAVjUTTi'a, fxiyiaros &iv TraiSaiu. 2 Plutarch, Agesil, c. 5-13. VOL. VI. 2 F 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 1, 41 ; Xen. Agesil. i. 3.")-38 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v. (Philipp.) s. 100. 434 HISTOllY OF GREECE. Part IT. Meanwhile Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go B.C. 394. and take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia rroceedfn"gs ^nd the south of Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. comnmmi'of Since the revolt of Rhodes from the Lacedaemonians (in fleet^-ht''" ^^^ summer of the preceding year 395 B.C.), that active ITthTper-^" Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst of activity, sian court, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the Persian court, had been paralysed by the jealousies of the Persian com- manders, reluctant to serve under a Greek— by peculation of officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops — by mutiny in the fleet from absence of pay — and by the many delays arising while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war, waited for orders and remittances from court.^ Hence Konon had been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those months when the Lacedaemonian fleet was increased to nearly double its former number. At length he resolved — seemingly at the instigation of his countrymen at home ^ as well as of Euagoras prince of Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encou- ragement of Ktesias, one of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court — on going himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes. Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsacus on the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others — with bis confident en- gagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counter- act the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put into efficient action — produced a powerful eflTect on the mind of the monarch ; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedaemonians as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not only approved his views, but made to him ' Compare Diodor. xv. 41 ad fin.; and Thucyd. viii. 4.5. ^ Isokrates (Or. -viii. de Pace, s. 82) alludes to " many embassies " as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia, to protest against the Lacedce- monian dominion. But this mission of Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of Knidus. Probably Demus the son of Pyri- lampes, an eminent citizen and trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias as having received from the Great King a present of a golden drinking-bowl or (piaKt] ; and I do not know on what other occasion he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27). Chap. LXXIII. PERSIAN FLEET WITH KONON. 435 a large grant of money, and transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should be active in prosecuting the maritime war. What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any Persian whom he chose, as admiral jointly with phama- himself. It was by his choice that Pharnabazus was nameVad- called from his satrapy, and ordered to act jointly as ™'™/th''°'" commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and ^onon. most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy ' by Agesilaus, cooperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly Phoenician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior in number even to the newly-organized Lacedaemonian fleet under Peisander.^ Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,^ not only provided many triremes, but served himself personally on board. It was about the month of July, 394 b.c, that Pharnabazus and Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia Minor ; flrst probably to the friendly island of Rhodes, next ofi^ Loryma'* and the mountain called Dorion on the penin- 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 6. 2 The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv. 81 ; Justin, vi. 3, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3 ; Ktesise Fragment, c. 62, 63, ed. Bahr. Isoki'ates (Orat. iv. (Panegyr.) s. 165: compare Orat. ix. (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedaemonians before Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes, unless we are to understand his tliree years as referring to the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phoenicia, brought to Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them ; and even then the statement that the Persian fleet remained iroAiop- Kovfxevov for all this time, would be much exaggeratea. Allowing for ex- aggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the authorities above noticed. It would appear that Ktesias the phy- sician obtained about this time permis- sion to quit the court of Persia, and come back to Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokedes of Kroton 120 years before) to promote the views of Konon in order to get for himself this permission. In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63) mention is made of some Lacedsemonian envoys who were now going up to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way. This mission can liardly have taken place before the battle of Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It must have taken place, I presume, after the battle. 3 Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. ¥,vay6pov Se aijr6v re irapaffx^v- TO?, KoL Trjj Suj'a^uecDS T)^v trXiicnrjv irapacTKeudaavTos. Compare s. 83 of the •same oration. Compai-e Pausanias, i. 3, 1. ■* Diodor. xiv. 83. SieTpi^ov irepl Aco- pv/xa rrjs Xtpaov-ficrov. It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word Chersonesus here (and in xiv. 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the Hel- lespont—but the peninsula on which Kuidus is situated. 2 F 2 436 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. B.C. 394. Battle of Knidus — complete defeat of the Lace- daemonian fleet- death of Peisander the admiral. sula of Knidus.' Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies, sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for a battle. The numbers of the Lacedaemonians are reported by Diodorus at eighty-five triremes ; those of Konon and Phamabazus at above ninety. But Xenophon, without particularising the num- ber on either side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater ; stating that the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phoenician ships under Pharnabazus.^ In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military skill, he possessed a full mea- sure of Spartan courage and pride ; moreover — since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by the assumed superiority of his fleet — had he confessed himself too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed round the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly he sailed forth from the harbour of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite to each other, and the battle was about to commence — so manifest and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians, that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the greatest valour. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken in various places by the beaks of the enemy's ships, and forced back upon the land, to- gether with a large portion of his fleet. Many of the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to the conquerors. Peisander too might have escaped in the same way ; but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Phama- bazus was complete. More than half of the Spartan ships was either captured or destroyed, though the neighbourhood of the land enabled a large proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number of prisoners were taken. ^ Among the allies of Sparta, the chief loss of course fell upon those who were ^ Pavisan. vi. 3, 6. wepl KviSov Ka\ opos "rh Aiipiov ovofxa^6^ivov. " Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 12. iapvafia^ov, vavapx^v ovra, ^vv Ta7s ^oivicrcrais flvai. K6vciiva St, T^ 'E,\KriVLKhv %xovTa, rtrdx' 6ai e/xirpocrdfv avrov. *Aj/TnropoTa|a(UfVou 5e rov TliiadySpov, koI ttoAi; i Kar t 6- V ai V avT(f rwv v e w v

v T Ul V ailTOV T V HfTO, K6 vu V s 'E Wri V I K o V, &c. 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv. 83; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi. 3. Chap. LXXIII. BATTLE OF KNIDUS. 437 most attached to her cause ; the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the beginning. Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus ; the reversal of that of Lysander at ^gospotami eleven years gc. 394. before. Its impoiiant effects will be recounted in the -^^s^^^^'^- coming chapter. 438 HISTORY OF GEEECE; Part II. CHAPTER LXXiy. FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE EEBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS. Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events WarinOen- down to the battle of Knidus, in the beo:inninff of tral Greece ' , ° *= agains^ August, B.C. 394, at which period war was already tailed the rag'ino' on the other side of the JEsean, in Greece Corinthian ° *= i i i ,. r War. Jrroper — i now take up the thread oi events Irom a period somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly called the Corinthian War, began. At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 b.c, the Relations of powcr of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to the neigh- Thcssaly, was greater than it had ever been, and greater sta^erfnd than any Grecian state had ever enjoyed before. The allies after burdcu of the loug war against Athens she had borne in o^ Agesliaus! ^^.r Icss proportion than her allies ; its fruits she had mnong'the Tcapcd cxclusivcly for herself There prevailed conse- aiiies. quently among her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions ; either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in Peirgeus — or of Agis against the Eleians — or of Agesilaus against the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled by the invasions of Agis. All the other cities in Peloponnesus, from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her authority — with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing her contingent, like the restf to be commanded by the xenagus — or officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such foreign con- tingents. In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 li.c. (about two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been Chap. LXXIV. LAND-POWER OF SPARTA. 439 so unable to protect her colony of Heraklei^, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf, near the strait of Thermopylae, that the Great power Boeotians were obliged to send a garrison thither, in stre^wng order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Athens. Northern They even went so far as to dismiss the Lacedaemonian s^tror harmost.^ In the winter of 40il-408 B.C., another disaster ^erakieia. had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedaemonian harmost was slain.^ But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a central post for keeping down the people in the neighbourhood of Mount Qita and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas the Lacedaemonian was sent thither to repress some factious move- ments, with a force sufficient to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious party in the place, and to put them to death, 500 in number, outside of the gates.^ Carrying his arms farther against the Qiltaeans and Trachinians in tl.e neighbourhood, who had been long at variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and children into Thessaly.* Hence the Lacedaemonians were enabled to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a basis — which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for their dominion over the northern regions. With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample Growing influx of tribute — and among cities who had not merely fn^Greecrto long recognised her as leader, but had never recognised igainst^ any one else — it required an unusual stinmlus to raise I^Jfen^sh any formidable hostile combination against her, notwith- standing a large spread of disalfection and antipathy. The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures ^'^■^*'''- the means had been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Pha3nicia, which had prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was doubtless circulated and heard with satis- faction among the Grecian cities unfriendly to Sparta ; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take service under that prince — aggravated in the case of the Thebans by a positive becomes engaged in the "ar against ' Thucyd. v. 52. 2 Xeu. Hellen. i. 2, 18. ' Diodox'. xiv. 38; Polyocu. ii. 21. •* Diodorus, nt sup.: compai-e xiv. 81. Tovs Tpax^viuvs (pivyovras in rwv TraTpi- Sicf vTvb AaKeSaLjjLoviwy, &,c. 440 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part TI. B.C. 395. The satrap Tiihraustes sends an envoy with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta — his success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. offence given to hinf on the occasion of his sacrifice at Auhs — was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home. It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigations and promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the following year ; and not jnerely promises, but pecu- niary supplies, with news of revived naval warfare threat- ening the insular dominion of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap who had put to death and succeeded Tissa- phernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly to the Lacedaemonians, with a sum of fifty talents ; ^ directing him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes, having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter), so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes. The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating the Spartans, has been already noticed ; and we may fairly presume that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian enemies, was con- siderable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, dis- tributing his funds. He concluded engagements, on behalf of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into com- 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 1. Tleft-irei Tifio- Kparriv 'Po5ior e$ t))v 'EA.\a5a 5oi)s XP^' ffiov is TzevriiKOVTa rd\avTa apyvpiov, Kal KeAevei ireLpacrdai, TTLffra. to fj.fyi(TTa Aafi- ^avovra, SiSdvai rois 'Kpoe(rT7)K6cnv 4v Tats irSXecnv, €monian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority of number, and something which even im- plies that it must have been nearly equal (iv. 2, 13) — though he is always disposed to compliment Sparta where- ever he can. ■* Fi'om a passage which occurs some- what later (iv. 4, 1 ,">), we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the 456 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Large muster near Corinth of Spartans and Pelopon- nesians on one side, of anti-Spavtan allies on the other. that in that city the moment was one of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites fi'om Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achasan towns, but their number is not given ; so that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedaemonian side. The cavalry, 600 in number, were all Lacedaemonian ; there were moreover 300 Kretan bowmen — and 400 slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.^ The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Corinth : 6000 Athenian hoplites — 7000 Argeian — 5000 Boeotian, those from Orchomenus being absent — 3000 Corinthian — 3000 from the different towns of Euboea ; making 24,000 in all. The total of cavalry was 1550 ; composed of 800 Boeotian, 600 Athenian, 100 from Chalkis in Euboea, and 50 from the Lokrians. The light troops also were numerous — partly Corinthian, drawn probably from the serf-population which tilled the fields ^ — partly Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians. The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their Boldness of plans, Came to a resolution that the hoplites should not a^ilfst^*^* be drawn up in deeper files than sixteen men,^ in order that there might be no chance of their being sur- rounded ; and that the right wing, carrying with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first time acting against their old leader Sparta, is sur- prising. " There is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus) and fighting the Lacedaemonians at or near their own home. We must burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth to sting us. The Lacedae- monian force is like that of a river ; small at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which it receives, in proportion to the length of its course." * The wisdom of this Sparta — speech of the Corin- thian Ti- molaus. Phliasiaus were not veiy well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of excuse ascribed to the Mantiueians (v. 2, 2), ' Diodorus (xiv. 83) gives a total of 23,000 foot and 500 horse on the Lace- da3monian side, but without enumerat- ing items. On the side of the confede- racy he states a total of more than 15,000 foot and 500 horse (c. 82). 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 17. Kal \piKhu Se, li/f To7s Tuiv KopivQiwv, irXiov i^v, &c. Compare Hesychius, v. Kvv6rao- they affirmed) with the loss of only eight men, and ^^IjJ^^j^p^ inflicting heavy loss upon the Athenians in the battle, as lopunnesus is sGcurt'd well as upon the remaining confederates in their return but no far- • mi 1 1 4 1 • IT rf 1 tluT result from pursuit. 1 hough the Atlieman hoplites suiterecl gained, thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,^ who kept the fiekl until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was not satisfied with their behaviour. But on the other hand, all the 1 Xen. Hellcn. iv. 2, 20-23. The allusion to this incident in De- mosthenes (adv. Leptiuem, c. 13. p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct. * Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 19. Kal yap ^v Ka.ffiov TO x^^piov — which illustnitos the exjiression in Lysias, Orat. xvi. (pro Mautitheo) s. 2U. eV KopivOtf x^P''^" Itrx^pH^'v /caT€iA.7j;UyueVci)i'. 3 Lysias, Orat. xvi. (pro Mantitheo) 3. 19. Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17. p. 245 E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to " bad ground " — ^PV'^"'!^^'"^'' ^vax'^P^t- 460 HISTORY OF GREECK. Part 11. allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedaemo- nian side was 1100 ; on the side of the confederates, 2800.^ On the whole, the victory of the Lacedaemonians was not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it completely secured their ascendency within Peloponnesus. We observe here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta. They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection. The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 b.c, seem- ingly about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedaemonians been able to defer the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Boeotia on the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubless went home in disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus. That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from Agesilaus— the Ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, oiTbring're" J^^ '^^ ^^® samc time with patriotic submission. He had Asia-his™ augmented his army, and was contemplating more exten- ofTsiatic* sive schemes of operations against the Persian satrapies conquest. in Asia Miuor. He had established such a reputation for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him from difierent inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be emancipated from Persian dominion, and inviting him to come to their aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian cities on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan oligarchies and Spartan harmosts — yet seemingly with greater practical moderation, and less licence of oppression, than had marked the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of his aspirations — all these conquests were to be made at the expense, not of Greeks, but of the Persian. He was treading in the footsteps of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy. ' Diodor. xiv. S3. ou the side of the confederates, is a The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. manifest exaggeration ; if indeed the vii. 5) that near 10,000 men were slain reading be correct. CiiAP. LXXIV. AGESILAUS AND HIS ALLIES. 461 All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his sad message, and peremptory summons, from the Regret ..f Ephors, In the chagrin and disappointment of Agesi- aiileswben laus we can sincerely sympathise ; but the panegyric lfhT'ie!vts'* which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his AsTa'^wUh" ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.' There was ^ooomen. no merit in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the Ephors ; because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been re- called, the extinction of the Lacedaemonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus would have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On receiving his orders of recall, he con- vened an assembly both of his allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his departure ; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations of sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps ; in the interim he left Euxenus, with a force of 4000 men, for their protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication, combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to reflect, that it was a service against Greeks ; not merely unpopular in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by proclaim- ing prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries, to be distributed at Sestos in the Chersonnesus, as soon as they should have crossed into Europe : prizes for the best equipment, and best- disciplined soldiers in every different arm.- By these means he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his army to undertake the march along with him ; among them many of the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head. Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on ^ Xen. Agesil. i. 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. la. Coruelius Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of Ids panegyric, when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the disobedience of Julius Cpesar in his prcjvince to the orders of the Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their provinces was then matter of recent history. "Cujus ex- emplum (says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent ! " - Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 2-5; Xen. A"e- sil. i. 38; Plutarch, Agesil, c. IG. 462 HISTORY OF GREECE. Paut II. B.C. .394. Agesilaus crosses the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Jlacedoiiia, and Thes- saly. hoisting the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread in the footsteps of the Persiaii Xerxes in his march from the Thracian Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylae and Boeotia. Never since the time of Xerxes had any army undertaken this march ; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of Sardis.^ Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he reached Amphipolis on the Strymon, where he was met by Derkyllidas, who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing- of the deaths of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united, to emancipate Asia Minor.^ Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance, he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter country, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes, raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition of this country, no systematic resistance could be organ- ized against him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he beat and dispersed, with the death of Poly- charmus their leader. As the Thessalian cavalry however was the best in Greece, Agesilaus took great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by himself in Asia ; backed however, it must be observed, by skilful and effective support from his hop- lites.^ After having passed the Achaean mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylae to the frontier of Phokis and liceotia. In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the Ephor Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much as possible and attack the Boeotians. He was further joined by two Lacedoemonian regiments * from Corinth, and by fifty young Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon. He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians — rected by Moi'us ad Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 15) states two moree or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth: Xeuophon alludes only to one, besides that mora which was in garrison at Or- choraenus (Hellen. iv. 3, 15; Agesil. ii. 6). Agesilaus and his army on the noi ttiern frontier of Boeotia — eclipse of the sun — news of the naval defeat at Knidus. 1 Xen. Hellen. iii. 4, 24. - Xen. Agesil. vii. 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16. =» Xen. Hellen. iv. 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv. 83. ■• Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17 ; compare also Plutarch, Apopth. p. 795, as cor- Chap. LXXIV. ALLIES AT KORONEIA. 463 in addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the peltasts, and the cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing force when he reached the neighbourhood of Chseroneia on the Boeotian border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the sun, on the 14th of August, 394 B.C. ; a fatal presage, the meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a messenger bearino- news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter affected with this irreparable blow. He fore- saw that, when known, it would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause of Sparta to be ascendent and profitable.^ Accordingly, he resolved, being now within a day's march of his enemies, to hasten on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in which the Lacedas- monians had been victorious, though Peisander himself was slain — he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round presents of congratulcition ; which produced an encouraging effect, and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious. To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Koroneia, the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made Bceotians known, spreading hope and cheerfulness through their aiiiesmus- ranks ; though we are not informed what interpretation Koroneia. they put upon the solar eclipse. The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the ^Enianes in place of the Malians ; but probably each contingent was less numerous, since there there was still a necessity for occupying and defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were now drafted off by lot to march into Boeotia, against both a general and an army of high reputation — there prevailed much apprehen- > Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 13. 'O ;uej' ouv ' Ay7]ffi\aos TrvOofievos ravra, rh fjLfV TTpicrov ;^oA.€7rcis ((pfpev iirel jx4v- Toi ivedvfxriOr), '6ti rod arparfv/xaTo? rh ■KXelffTov fir) avT<^, oiov ayaOwv fiiv yi- yvo)Xivu>v •^Se'ois /xeT^x^i-v, ei S4 ri x"'^^' Tthu optfev, oiiK audyKriv eivai K0ivu>V6iV avTOis, &C. These indirect iutiraatious of the real temper even of the philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming from Xenophon, as they contra- dict all his partialities, and are dropped here almost reluctantly, from the neces- sity of justifying the conduct of Agesi- laus iu publishing a false proclamation to his army. 464 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. sion and some reluctance ; as we learn from one of them, Manti- theus, who stood forward to volunteer his services, and who after- wards makes just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.' The Thebans and Boeotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended. The camp was established in the territory of Koroneia, not far from the great temple of Itonian Athene, where the Pamboeotia, or general Boeotian assemblies, were held, and where there also stood the trophy erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about fifty years before.^ Between the two armies there was no great difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have taken much part in the battle. Having marched from Chseroneia, Agesilaus approached the Battle of plain of Koroneia from the river Kephissus, while the Agesilaus Thebans met him from the direction of Mount Helikon. with most of • i i • i • p i • ^ r\ ^ his army is He occuDied the right wmo' of his army, the Orchomeni - victorious ■ o o j ' whue the ' ans being on the left, and the Cyreians with the Asiatic Thebans on ,,. ., _. ... , ^ni i their side allics lu the centrc. In the opposite line, the Ihebans torious. were on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached slowly and in silence until they were separated only by an interval of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run ; the rest of the line following their example. When they got within half a furlong of the Lacedaemonians, the centre divi- sion of the latter under the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and advanced at a run to meet them ; seemingly getting beyond their own line,^ and coming first to cross spears with the enemy's centre. After a sharp struggle, the divi- sion of Herippidas was here victorious, and drove back its ()])po- nents. Agesilaus on his right was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the Thebans on their own right, completely beat back the Orchomenians, and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him as conqueror, immediately wheeled 1 Lysias, Orat. xvi. (pro Mantitheo) S. 20. (po^ovfievcDV kiravTosv fiKorais, &C. = Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. ^ Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 17. avre^fSpa- fxov airh rrjs 'AyrjcnAdov (paAayyos, &C. CiiAi'. LXXIV. BATTLE OF KOEONEIA. 465 combat be- tween the Thebans and Spar- round to complete his victory by attacking the Thebans ; who on their side also feced about, and prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their comrades on Ilelikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he preferred the more honourable victory of a conflict face to face. Such is the colouring which his panegyrist Xenophon ^ puts upon his manoeuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass, he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades were at hand to sustain them — and also that having never yet fought against the Tiiebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of their prowess. The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all Grecian military experience,^ leaving an indelible xen-ibie impression upon Xenophon who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing shields against each |tie^wh*^Jie, other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass behind flivouTbieto impelling forward the foremost ranks — especially in the ti^e xhebans. deep order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combat- ants were thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually marked the charge of a Grecian army ; the silence was only broken by a medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.^ Agesilaus himself, who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered with wounds from different weapons ■* — was trodden down — and only escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers who formed his body- guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the irresistible cour- age and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to march onward and rejoin their comrades ; not without sustaining some loss by attacks on their rear.^ ^ Xen. Helleu. iv. 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. u. 12. - Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, IG; Xen. Agesil. ii. 9. ^ ^ ^ Aiy]yi]CTOjxai 5e Koi ri)v /jlclxV'^' nal yap iyeueTO o'la ovk aWij rcov y' i(p' rifxSiv. 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii. 1-2. KaX (TVfji.^aX6uT€s ras dcnri'Sas ecaOovvTO, ifxaxovro, airficTeiVoy, airiOvrjcrKOV. Kol VOL. VI. Kpavy)^ /xeu oiiSe^ia Traprjv, oh fXTjv ovSe (Tiyi)- (pcovij Se rts ^v roiairt), o'iav opyrj T€ Kol /J-dxV Tfapacxoir' av. •* Xen. Agesil. ii. 13. 'O 5e, Kaiirtp TToWa rpaii/jiaTa e^wi' TrdvTucre Kal Trav- TOiois '6ir\oiS, &C. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18. * Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii. 12. 2 H 466 HISTORY OF GEEECE. Part II. Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having victoiyof gained a victory over his opponents taken collectively- no^^thout But so far as concerns the Thebans separately, he had wounds- not only gained no victory, but had failed in his purpose decMvl-"^ of stopping their progress, and had had the worst of the after"thr'' combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was battle. brought back on men's shoulders to give his final orders, and was then informed that a detachment of 80 Theban hoplites, left behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athene as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity of the spot, he commanded that they should be dis- missed unhurt, and then proceeded to give directions for the night- watch, as it was already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle ; Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies ; around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.' He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior of his phalanx : the troops then took their supper, and rested for the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer sacrifices of cheer- fulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly playing, accord- ing to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead upon it ; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected in a separate heap and placed within the Lacedaemonian lines.^ He was however soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead ; the understood confession of defeat. The ' Xen. Agesil. ii. 14. 'ETrei ye ix^jp elau (paKayyos, iSenrvoTroiriffavTo Kai e\7}^€y 7) fJ.a.xr\, trapriv Stj Oedaaadat ev6a j iK0iixri6r]ffav, crvv4irecruv aWriXois, r-qv /xev yr}v aiuari Schueider in his note on this passage, ■KiKpvpfjLevrjv, v€Kpovs 5e Keifx-dvovs (ptXiovs 1 as 'well as ad Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 21 — Kttt TToXefiiovs fxer' a\\7]Xa)y, aairiSas Se ' condemns the expression ruv TroXe/xioiv SiaTeOpvu/ufvas, Sopara avvTiQpavafji.4va, as spurious and unintelligible. But in f'7Xf'P'5'a yvixva kovK^wv to ixiv xctM^^U my judgement, these words bear a plain TO. 5' eV adifjiacn, ra S' en fxera x^^pos. i and appropriate meaning, which I have - Xen. Agesil. ii. 15. Tore ixiv ovv endeavoui'ed to give in the text. Com- {kol yap -fiv ^Sr] oi//e) (TweXKiiaavTes , pare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. T ii s T Si p Tro\e/j.ioi>v v e k p u v s ] Chap.LXXIV. KESULT TO SPARTA. 467 request was immediately granted ; each party paid the last solem- nities to its own dead, and the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Boeotia. Xenophon does not state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at GOO on the side of the confederates, 850 on that of the LacedaBmonians.' Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where Army of the Pythian games were at that moment going on. He wuMraws here offered to Apollo the tithe of the booty acquired during tia-he"^*^' his two years' campaigns in Asia ; a tithe equal to 100 py\hian^^ talents.^ Meanwhile the polemarch 'Gylis conducted the S^h^e- army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion ^e'^cori!^^ into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of ^^j^^js ^o"'^ the Lokrian light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted ceptiontr' upon his troops a severe check, and cost him his life, sparu. After this the contingents in the army were dismissed to their re- spective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf? He was received at Sparta with every demon- stration of esteem and gratitude, which was still farther strength- ened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance of the public discipline ; an exactness not dimished either by long absence or enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before. His colleague Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was won over by his judicious and conciliatory behaviour, into the most respectful deference.* Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little more than a month (July and August) — those of Corinth, b.c. 394. Knidus, and Koroneia ; the first and third on land, the rcsuUs of second at sea, as described in my last chapter. In each corinth and* of the two land-battles the Lacedaemonians had gained a sp^anaTad victory: they remained masters of the field, and were noting by solicited by the enemy to grant the burial -truce. But if and had"' we enquire what results these victories had produced, the by'Jhe'"^' answer must be that both were totally barren. Tlie posi- '''"^'"• ' Diodor. xiv. 84. - Xen, Hellen. iv. 3, 21 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter says — els AeK- (povs aireKoixiaBri U v 6 l a} 1/ ay fj. 4 v ai v, &c. Manso, Dr. Arnold, aud others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games were cele- brated, upon grounds which seem to me very insuflScient. 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 22, 23 ; iv. 4, 1. " Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 20. 2 H 2 468 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. tlon of Spcarta in Greece as against their enemies had undergone no improvement. In the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal superiority, and acquired much honour. But at the field of Koroneia, the honour of the day was rather on the side of the Tliebans, who broke through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the Ephor Diphridas) to invade Bceotia, completely failed.^ Instead of advancing, he withdrew back from Koroneia, and returned to Peloponnesus across the Gulf from Delphi ; which he might have done just as well without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply coloured as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off" by every one from the field of Koroneia was that of the tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites — a foretaste of what was to come at Leuktra ! If the two land victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at ^gospotarai — the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the signal for count- less following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon, with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and from one continental seaport to another, in the ^gean, to expel the Lacedeemonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopu- larity, the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of Knidus.^ Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies ; that each Reverses of Sparta after the defeat of Knidus. Lioss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly aU her mari- time allies revolt to join Phar- nabazus and Kouon. 1 Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4. " Obsistere ei co- nati sunt Atheuienses at Boeoti," &c. But they did more than endeavour : they succeeded in barring his way, and com- pelling him to retreat. " Xenoph, Hellen. iv. 8, 1-5. Chap. LXXIV. ANTI-SrAIlTAN FEELING. 4G9 of them severally would cost him a long siege ; and that a comhi- nation would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedaemonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege, Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythra?, Ephesus, Mitylene, Samos, all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new conquerors.^ Pharnabazus pre- sently disembarked at Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy ; leaving a .fleet of forty triremes under the com- mand of Konon.? To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary Abydos huids exception, ihat town, steady m hostility to Athens,^ sparta, had been the great military station of Sparta for her kyiiidas. northern Asiatic warfare, during the last twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to acquire possession of Abydos — there was nothing which the Abydenes dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedaemonian protection ; and it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta that the able and experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to communicate the victory to the allied cities ; ^ neither of thera at that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending. The presence in Abydos of such an officer — who had already^ acquired a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity with Pharnabazus — com- » Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv. 84. About Samos, xiv. 97. Compare also the speech of Derkylli- das to the Abydeues (Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 4) — "OffCfi Se fj.aWov al aWat ir6Xets ^vv rrj TvXV o.ireffTpdcp'qarai' rjp.wv, ro- (pauflr) av, &C. - 'Ek yap 'AjSuSou, Tfjs rhv airavTa Xpivov vjxiv tx^pas — says Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristo- krat. c. 39. p. (572; compare c. 52. p. 688). 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 3, 2. 470 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. blned with tlie standing apprehensions of the Abydenes — was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight, and when anti-Spartan manifestations, often combined with internal revolutions to overthrow the Dekarchs or their substitutes, were spreading from city to city — Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes, heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while others were fallino: off ; assuring^ them that she would still be found capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened to with favour. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a good state of defence, and became the only harbour of safety for the fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European. Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the Derkyllidas Strait to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the European side, in the Thracian Chersonese.^ In that fertile peninsula there had been many new settlers, who had come in and acquired land under the Lacedae- monian supremacy, especially since the building of the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the security of their tenures — and of the refugees from various cities all concentrated under his protection — Derkyllidas maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos ; defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them. The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands round Abydos ; but without any result. His WTath against the Lacedaemonians, already considerable, was so aggra- vated by disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and Sestos under blockade.^ holds both Abydos and the Cherso- nesus oppo- site, in spite of Pharna- bazus— anger of the latter. ^ Lysander, after the victory of ^gos- potami and the expulsion of the Athe- nians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district as a settlement for the pilots and Kelustse aboard his fleet. But the Ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably however the new set- tlers would remain in part upon the lands vacated by the expelled Athe- nians. ■' Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 4-6. Chap. LXXIV. KONON WITH THE FLEET. 471 As soon as spring' arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful fleet equipped by Konon ; directing his course b.c. 393. to Melos, to various islands amonon the Cvclades, and Pbamabazus "-'•'' and koiioa lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus. They here spent ^f\ ^jj^'; some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia, dis- Peloponnesus embarking at several points to ravage the country, crimh. They next landed on the island of Kythera, which they captured, granting safe retirement to the Lacedaemonian garrison, and leaving in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophemus. Quitting then the harbourless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed up the Saronic Gulf to the Isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the confederates — Corinthian, Boeotian, Athenian, &c. — carrying on war, with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedaemonians at Sikyon. The line across the isthmus from Lechseum to Kenchreae (the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of operations, so as to confine the Lacedaemonians within Peloponnesus ; just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while possessing both Megara and Pegae, had been able to maintain the inland road midway between them, where it crosses the high and diflScult crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which a Lacedaemonian army could march from the Isthmus of Corinth into x\ttica or Boeotia.^ Pharnabazns communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.^ The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, Assistance ^ , , ' and encou- "was a phaenomenon astounding to Grecian eyes, xind ragement . ° . • _ given by if it was not equally offensive to Grecian sentiment, this Pbamabazus 111 fi"i 1 I'l to the allies was in itself a melancholy proot 01 the degree to which at corinth— Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the Pelo- fact of a ponnesian War and the Spartan empire. No Persian satrap and tiara had been seen near the Saronic Gulf since the corintb. battle of Salamis ; nor could anything short of the intense per- sonal wrath of Pharnabazus against the Lacedaemonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far away from his own ^ See Sir William Gell's Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Erust Ciirtius — Pelopon- nesos — p. 25, 26, aud Thucyd. i. 108. - Xen. Ilellen. iv. 8, 7, 8 ; Diodor. xiv. 84. 472 '- HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon. Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued B.C. 393. without any walls round her seaport town Peirgeus, and pharnabazus without auv Louff Walls to councct her city with Peirseus. leaves the JO J fleet with Xo this state she had been condemned by the sentence Konon m the •; SaronicGuif, of her cnemics, in the full knowledge that she could and aids him /. i • • i i -i with money havc little trade — few ships cither armed or mercantile — the Long poor defeucc even asalnst pirates, and no defence at all Walls of ^ , ' r ^ ■ p J^ ir Athens. ao-amst a^ffression Irom the mistress oi trie sea. Jlonon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in re- building the fortifications of Peirseus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contribu- tions from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peirseus with their complete and con- nected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which she had reaped fi'om the long struggle of the Peloponnesian War. Indignant as he now was against the Lacedsemonians, Pharnabazus sympathised cordially with tliese plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sura of money towards the expense of the fortifications.^ Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without Konon re- delay. Hc had quitted Athens in 407 b.c, as one of Long'walis ^hc joiut admirals nominated after the disgrace of deration ^°" Alkibiadcs. He had parted with his countrymen finally of the allies, q^ ^.hc catastrophc of yEgospotami in 405 b.c, preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 b.c, as a second Themi- stokles, the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence. All hands were set to work ; car- penters and masons being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Boeotians and other neighbours lent their aid zealously as volunteers^ — the same who eleven years before had danced to the • Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 9, 10. 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diotlor. xiv. 85. Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) men- tions fifty talents as a sum received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by liim to this public work. This is not improbable; but the CuAP. LXXIV. LONG WALLS OF ATHENS. sound of joyful music when the former walls were demolished ; so completely had the feelings of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty cooperation, the work was finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without any opposition ; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified Peirasus and harbour, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel, joining it securely to the city. The third or Phaleric Wall (a single wall stretching from Athens to Phalerum), which had existed down to the capture of the city by Lysandcr, was not restored ; nor was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security to PeiraBus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden wreath in the acropolis, as v/ell as by the erection of a temple in Peiraeus to the honour of the Knidian Aphrodite, who was w^orshipped at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.^ He farther celebrated the completion of the walls by a splendid sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honour.^ The importance of this event in reference to the future history of Athens was unspeakable. Thouo-h it did not restore Great im- to her either her former navy, or her former empire, it thisrestora- 11 • 1 1 f 1 • • 1 tion— how reconstituted her as a city not only seli-determining but "'uch u d.- even partially ascendent. It re-animated her, if not into accident. the Athens of Perikles, at least into that of Isokrates and Demo- sthenes : it imparted to her a second fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived (eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon in his restoration was favoured by unusual combinations such as no one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest force, was total sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must pro- bably have been much greater. * Demostheu. cont. Audrotion. p. GKi. c. 2L Pausauias (i. 1, 3) still saw this temple in Peirccus — very near to the sea ; 550 years afterwards. - Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. lii. p. 477, 478; Atheuceus, i. 3; Cornelius Nepos, Couou, c. 4. 474 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part TI. a most' unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy, though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests of Persian power — but simply by his own violent personal wrath against the Lacedaemonians. And this wrath would probably have been satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impa- tience, when he found himself unable to expel his old enemy Derkyllidas from the important position of Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap's personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds, for the erection of the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy ; in which case he would have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own side of the ^gean ; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufl!icient to keep the Lacedaemonian navy from again becoming formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peirseus (if we may borrow an expression of Plato) " to continue asleep in the bosom of the earth." ^ But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It was requisite further that the interposition of Sparta should be kept off" not merely by sea, but by land — and that too during all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lecheeum to Kenchrese, with Corinth as a centre.^ But they were unable to maintain this line even through the ensuing year — during which Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break throufrli it while the fortifications of Mainte- nance of the lines of Corinth against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of rebuild- ing the Long Walls. The lines ' were not maintained longer than the ensuing year. 1 Plato, Legg. vi. p. 778. Ka9fvSeiv fav iv TTJ yi] Karaueifjieva ra TflxVf &C. * The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen. Hellen. v. 4, 19, and Andokides, Or. iii. De Pace, s. 26. Chap. LXXIV. LONG WALLS OF ATHENS. 475 Athens were yet incomplete, she would have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded. Here then was the second condition, which was realised during the summer and autumn of 393 B.C., but which did not continue to be realised longer. So fortunate w^as it for Athens, that the two conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year ! 470 HISTORY OF GREECE. Taut II. CHAPTEK LXXV. FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS. The presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding B.C. 393. force in the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which Large plans fhg former furnished pecuniary aid to the latter for of Konon — _ _ _ . . p , organiza- rebuilding the full fortifications of Athens, as well as to mercenary the Corinthiaus fof the prosecution of the war — seem to force at, tipt o Corinth. havc givcu preponderance to the confederates over feparta for that year. The plans of Konon ^ were extensive. He was the first to organise, for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted v,ith greater eflS- ciency by Iphikrates ; and after he had finished the fortifications of Peiraeus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the founda- tions of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with the view of despatching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him into connexion with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salarais in Cyprus, the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which he sought to strengthen by oflTering to Dionysius his sister in marriage.^ There was a basis of sympathy between them arising from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phenicians both in Phenicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities witli the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and colonists) in Sicily. Nevertheless the proposition met with little or no success. We find Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta. Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians Naval con- Strengthened their fleet at Lechseum (their harbour in corhithi^iJ^ the Corinthian Gulf) so considerably, as to become d^'Jnonians. masters of the Gulf, and to occupy Rhium, one of the iintwan"' ^^^ oppositc capcs whicli bouud its narrow entrance. Gulf. To oppose them, the Lacedaemonians on their side were « 1 Harpokration, v. ^^viKhy eV KopiVO&j. I ^ Lysias, Orat. xis. (De Bonis Aris- Philochorug, Fragm. loo, ed. Didot. | topliauis) s. 21. Chap. LXXV. CORINTHIAN WAE 477 driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems to liave taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally dis- ])layed at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. At length the Lacedaemonian admiral Ilerippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after his predecessor Poleniarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency in the Corinthian Gulf ; which his successor Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, still farther completed.^ While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last half of 393 B.C. and the full year of 302 B.C.), so as 3.0.392. to put an end to the temporary naval preponderance ^and-war- of the Corinthians — the latter were at the same time lI^^-^ bearing the brunt of a desultory, but continued, land- ™^^™^^d warfare ao^ainst the garrison of Lacedaemonians and atsikyon— o o _ the anti- Peloponnesians established at Sikyon, Both Corinth spartan ^ IP allies occii- and Lechaeum were partly defended by the presence 01 pyingthe PI -K • . • * , • lines of Co- conrederate troops, ijoeotians, Argeians, Athenians, or rinthfrom • 1 1 A 1 -r> 1 • 1 ■ 1 . , , sea to sea. mercenaries paid by Athens, rsut this did not protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy. Tiie plain between Corinth and Sikyon — fertile and extensive (speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), sufferings of and constituting a large part of the landed property of thiaus from both cities, was rendered uncultivable during 393 and carried on in" 392 B.C. ; so that the Corinthian proprietors were obliged tory. Jiany to withdraw their servants and cattle to Peiraeum^ (a prupdetors portion of the Corinthian territory without the Isthnms averefto properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a ^^^ "^'^''^ line between that eminence and the Megarian harbour of Pegae). Here the Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls of Corinth, which connected that city by a con- tinuous fortification of 12 stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its harbour of Lecha?ura. Nevertheless the loss to the proprietors of the deserted plain was still so great, that two suc- cessive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a stronij aversion to the war ; ^ the more so, as the damage fell 1 Xeu. Hellen. iv. 8, 11. 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 4, 1 ; iv. 5, 1. 3 I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M. Rehdautz (Vitre Iphi- cratis, &c. c. 4, who in the main agrees with Dodwell's Annales Xenophontei) in their chronological arrangement of these events. They place the battle fought by Prax- itas within the Long Walls of Coiinth 478 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. exclusively upon them — their allies in Boeotia, Athens, and Argos, having as yet suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated their discomfort. There was another circum- stance also, doubtless not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to diminish the fear which she inspired in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the Lacedffimonian mora or division by Iphi- krates (the monthly date of which is mai'ked by its having immediately suc- ceeded the Isthmian games), in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C. ; the latter in 390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C. If we study the narrative of Xeno- phon, we shall find, that after describ- ing (iv. 3) the battle of Koi'oneia (Au- gust 394 B.C.) -Rath its immediate con- sequences, and the return of Agesilaus home — he goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C. But in Chapter 8 of Book iv., he leaves the land-war, and takes up the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug. 394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the .iEgean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at or near Midsummer 393 B.C. Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chaji- ter, come, in point of date, before the seditious movements and the co'qj d'etat at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in Mid- summer 393 B.C., the narrative of Xe- nophon (iv. 8, 8-10) leads lis to believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously, and without discon- tent: the money and encouragement which Pharnabazus gave them were cal- culated to strengthen such ardour. It was by aid of this money that the Co- rinthians fitted out their fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime command of the Gulf. The discontents against the war (re- counted in chap. 4 sc/.) could not have commenced until a considerable time after the departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only took effect after a long continuance — the hardships of the land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy to- wards Attica and Boeotia as being un- disturbed, &c. The Lacedremonian and Pelojjonnesian aggressive force at Si- kyon cannot possibly have been estab- lished before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C. Its eS"ects were brought about, not by one great blow, but by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance ; and all the effects which it produced previous to Midsummer 393 b.c. would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts, and the encouragement of Pharna- bazus with his powerful fleet. More- over, after his departure, too, the Co- rinthians were at fii-st successful at sea and acquii-ed the command of the Gulf, which however they did not retain for more than a year, if so much. Hence it is not likely that any strong discon- tent against the war began before the early part of 392 B.C. Considei'ing all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to believe that the coup d'etat and massacre at Corinth took place (not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but) in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long "Walls rather later in the same year. Next, the opinion of the same two authors as well as of Dodwell — that the destruction of the Lacedaemonian mora by Iphikrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C. — is also, in my view, erro- neous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack all the events men- tioned in Xenophon, iv. 4, into the year 393 B.C. ; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the mora did not occur in the spring of 392 B.C., we know that it could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is, the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years after- wards. And this last will be found to be its true date ; thus leaving full time, but not too much time, for the antece- dent occurrences. Chap. LXXV. DISCONTENT AT CORINTH. 479 to the Corinthians ; next, to rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as well as warlike, of Athens ; — a revival well calculated to bring back a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some of the trade of Corinth may have been actually driven away by the disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater security of Peirseus. Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed b.c. 392. at Corinth, presently acquired sufficient strength, and ^auTfe'^ta-'^ manifested itself with sufficient publicity, to give much pbuo°Laco- alarm to the government. The Corinthian government "ij^corfmh had always been, and still was, oligarchical. In what Oligarchical •I / _ . fonn of the manner the administrators or the council were renewed, government ... . . . ' left open no- or how lonof mdividuals continued m office, indeed, we thing but 1 T> p ^ -I'll t'^" appeal do not know, liut 01 democracy, with its legal popular to force. assemblies, open discussions, and authoritative resolves, there was nothing.^ Now the oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian, consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves menaced by a powerful opposition-party, which had no constitutional means for making its sentiments pre- dominant, and for accomplishing peaceably either a change of administrators or a change of public policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such a consummation could be brought about ; a fact notorious to both parties — so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the meetings and conver- sations going on, knew well that they had to expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial recital of Xenophon ; who states that Pasimelus, the philo-Laconian leader, was on his guard and in preparation- — and counts it to him 1 Plutarcb. Dion. c. 53. - Xen. Helleu. iv. 4, 2. Tv6vTfs 8e 01 'Ap76?ot KoX BoiwToi Ko.\ ' KBr)valoi koL Ko- pivQiwv u'i re rwu Tra^a ^amhews XP'JM"' ' / __ ..^\ .? _.r. \J 'jroif7(T6at. iv. 4-, 4-. Oi Se vedrepoi, vTroirTevcrav- Tos nacrifJiriKov rh /xfWov eaecrOai, rfcrv- X'lj' icr\ov if rw Kpaviqi- is 5e t^s Kpav- TtjlV /xeT€0'X'')K<^''"6S, KoiX o\ ToC TroKf/XOV y'i]s TJcrdovTO, Kol tpivyovris TIV€S fK TOU alTidiTaToi yey^vr]fiivoi, cos, ei fxi) iKiro^cxiy iroiTjffaiUTO Tovs eirl t7V elprjvriv rerpa/x- /.Uvovs, KivSvuevcrei 'ko.Kiv t) ttoAis KaKw- irpdy/xaTos acpiKOVTO irpbs avTovs, (k tov- Tov avaBpaiJ.6t'TiS Kara rhv 'AKpoKSpii/Oou, irpoa^a\6vTas ixfu 'Apyelovs Kal rovs &K- \ov9 aneKpovaavTO, &c. 480 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the Lacedgemonians. Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent The Co- it by a coup d'etat. They threw themselves upon the rintbian •' n ^ n. .. ,. ^ ■> • c k government assistancB 01 their alhes, mvited m a body or Argeians, t'orestal the i , • , t i ^^^^.■^ conspiracy and made their blow the more sure by striking it on the d'etat. last day of the festival called Eukleia, when it w^as least expected. Their proceeding, though dictated by precaution, was executed v/ith the extreme of brutal ferocity agg'ravated by sacri- lege ; in a manner very different from the deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan Ephors when they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon — and more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year of the Peloponnesian War) when they broke into the assembled Senate, and massacred Peithias with sixty others in the Senate-house.^ While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide — and while the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators — a number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, w^ith leaders designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre. Others again fled in terror, to embrace the altars or statues in the market-place — which sanctuary nevertheless did not save their lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested — repugnant as it was to the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings generally — until 120 persons had perished.^ But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men ; for the younger portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately assembled under their leader Pasimelus, in the gymnasium and cypress-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find too that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the moment that they heard the clamour in the market-place and learnt from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city) and got possession of the citadel ; which they maintained with such force and courage, that the Argeians, and the Corin- thians who took part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed ' Thucyd. iii. 70. I ber, which seems very credible. Xeno- - Diodorus (xiv. 86) gives this num- | phoii (iv. 4, 4) only says iroAAoi. Chap. LXXV. ■PASIMELUS. 481 in the one-sided narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and affords good ground for believing that Pasimelus and his friends tvere prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it, until the festival was over, — a scruple which the government, in their eagerness to forestal the plot, disregarded ; employing the hands and weapons of Argcians who were comparatively unimpressed by solenniities peculiar to Corinth.' Though Pasimelus and his friends were masters of the citadel and had repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the recent coup ^ In recounting this alternation of violence projected, violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy — which formed the moilus operandi of opposing parties in the oligarchical Corinth — I invite the reader to contrast it with the democra- tical Athens. At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, there were precisely the .same causes at worlc, and precisely the same marked antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth. There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed the vs^ar with Sparta from the first ; next, when the war began, the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and cattle, so that they ob- tained no returns. The intense discon- tent, the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which these circum- stances raised among the Athenian citi- zens — not to mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible epi- demic — are marlied out in Tliucydides, and have been recorded in a preceding volume of this history. Not only the positive loss and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian War, than at Corinth in 392 Ti.c. Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority resort to a conspiracy — or the majority to a coup d'etdt — or either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other? No- thing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was practically iden- tical with the totality of the citizens. Their opposition, though pacific as to VOL. VI. acts, was sufficiently animated and vio- lent in words and propositions, to serve as a real discharge for imprisoned angiy passion. If they could not carry the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity of gaining partial victoi-ies which took ofl' the edge of a fierce discontent; witness the fine im- posed upon Perikles (Thucyd. ii. 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly afterwards a strong reaction in bis fa- vour. The majority, on the other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assemblj% against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain forms and rules pre- scribed by the constitution ; attachment to the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical citi- zens of Athens that characteristic in- sisted upon by Kleon in Tliucydides— "constant and fearless security and ab- sence of treacherous hostility among one another'" {^la yap rh KaO' ri/x^pav aSees Kal aveiri^ovXevTov irphs d\A7)Aoi/r, Kal is Tovs i,x)fx^a.xovs rb avro tx^Te — Thuc. iii. 37 1, tlie entire absence of which stands so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the oligarchi- cal Corinth. Pasimelus and his Corin- thian minority had no assemblies, di- kasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of free debate and accusation, to appeal to ; their only available weapon was armed violence, or treacherous cor- respondence with a foreign enemy. On the part of the -Corinthian government, superior or more skilfullj- used force, or superior alliance abroad, was the only weapon of defence, in like manner. 2 I 482 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Pakt IT. d'etat had been completely successful in overawing their party Numerous j^ the citv, and deprivino: them of all means of commu- persons of ^' i o _ thephiio- nicatinff with the Lacedsemotiians at Sikvon. Feenng Lacoman o . . , , ' i • j party are uuable to maiutam themselves, they were besides banished :.., -, . ti xiT neverthe- frightened by menacmg omens, when they came to otter meiusthe sacrifice, in order that they might learn whether the splred.'and gods encouragcd them to fight or not. The victims were Corinth! ^ found so alarming, as to drive them to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them (according to Dio- dorus 500') actually went into exile; while others, and among them Pasimelus himself, were restrained by the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn assurances of peace and security from the government ; who now probably felt them- selves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These pacific assu- rances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was done to any citizen. But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by Intimate an cxtrcmc intimacy of alliance and communion now political T'i» 1 I'T'i • 1 union and formed With Argos ; perhaps combined with reciprocal consolidation .,,,.., • i p i i i rr-i between Co- Hghts ot intermarriage, and ot purchase and. sale. Ine Argos. boundary pillars or hedges which separated the two tei ri - tories were pulled up, and the city was entitled Argos instead of Corinth (says Xenophon). Such was probably the invidious phrase in which the opposition party described the very close political union now formed between the two cities ; upheld by a strong Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Boeotians as a garrison in the port of Lechseum. Most probably the government remained still Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though partly also upon the other two allies. To Pasimelus and his friends such a state of things was B.C. 392. intolerable. Though jicrsonally they had no ill-usage Pasimelus ^o complaiu of, vct the complete predominance of their admits the _ _ i^ _ ' •' . . Lacediemo- political cuemies was quite sufficient to excite their most ni ins within '■ . , . r^\^ the Long vehement antipathies. They entered into secret cor- Wallsof '.._,. -^ , .^ ^ Corinth. rcspondencc with Praxitas, the Lacedaemonian com- Battle within ^ „.. . ^ . . „ , those walls, maudcr at hikyon, engaging to betray to him one ot the gates in the western Long Wall between Corinth and Lechseum. The scheme being concerted, Pasimelus and his partisans got 1 Diodor. xiv. 86 ; Xen. Hellen. iv. 4, 5. Chap.LXXY. battle WITIITN THE LOXCi WALLS. 483 themselves placed,^ partly by contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate ; an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed, Praxitas — presenting himself with a Lacedaemonian mora or regiment, a Sikyonian force, and the Corithian exiles, — found the treacherous sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,^ he then conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between the two Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side towards the city ; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day. On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full force ; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedaemonian left ; while the Lacedaemonians themselves were on their own right, opposed to the Corinthians from the city ; and the Argeians, opposed to the Sikyonians, in the centre. It was here that the battle began ; the Argeians, bold from superior numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, J^e L.,ce- ^ , ' . •Ill v, 6 Se K aT a 6 d\av KopivOiwv (pvydcri, kv- K\a} TTipl rh &arrv riif Kopivdicoi/ icrrpa- revovTO (iv. 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before, the capture- of Lechccum by Agesilaus; for it has re- ference to the general contempt shown by the Lacedaemonians for the peltasts of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that he represents Lechseum to have been captured by Agesilaus and Teleutias ; and that the other words, 6/c TOV Aex^iov opfxwfxevui, if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be regarded as an inaccuracy. I will add that the chapter of Dio- dorus, xiv. 86, puts into one year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in that same year. Had Lechseum been in possession and occupation by the Lacedsemonians, iu the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias, Xeuophou would surely have mentioned it in iv. 4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyou, for acting against Corinth. Chap. LXXV. ALAEM AT THEBES AND ATHENS. 489 any second rebuilding of the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athe- niiwis became impossible. After this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he nor his Lacedeemonian hoplites, especially the Amyklseans, were ever willingly absent from the festival of the llyakinthia : nor did he now disdain to take his station in the chorus,^ under the orders of the choric conductor, for the paean in honour of Apollo. It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athe- nians in the precediiig year, were again permanently bc.39i. overthrown, and the road for Lacedaemonian armies to ASs°ind march beyond the Isthmus once more laid open. So much /iJe^^capmre were the Athenians and the Boeotians alarmed at this LongVaiis new success, that both appear to have become desirous of pro'o'""'' peace, and to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans g^aruto'*" are said to have offered to recoum as an undisturbed shelter for thecwin-^ the Corinthian servants and cattle, and a source of sub- po'iesjon"of sistence for the city. Peirseum was an inland post north- At'tii" hi'- east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which thTexUes'^ sei)arates the two innermost recesses of the Krisssean „,!*£* Gulf — the Bay of Lechseum on its south-west, the Bay *"'"'*'' "''^ J ' J ail army to called Alkyonis, between Kreusis and Olmise (now ^"ackit. Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across this latter bay Corinth conmmnicated easily, through Peirseum and the fortified port of CEnoe, with Kreusis the port of Thespiae in Boeotia.^ The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from Peirseum — partly in order that they might also appropriate to themselves the honour of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were just approaching. The Spartan King accordingly marched forth, at the head of a force composed of Lacedaemonians and of the Peloponnesian allies, first to Lechseum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so called ; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schoenus on the Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated. It was the month of April or beginning of May, and the festival had actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city who were in alliance with Argos ; a body of Argeians being present as guards.^ But on the approach of Agesilaus, they ^ Xen. Agesil. ii. 18. 1 about April or perhaps the beginning 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 1; Plutarch, j of May (the Greek months being lunar, Agepil. c. 21. I no one of them would coincide regu- Xenophon, who writes his history in j larly with any one of our calendar the style and language of a partisan, , months, year after year); and in the says that "the Anjeuins celebrated the second and fourth OlynijDic years. From festival, Corinth having now become Thucydides, viii. 9, l(i, we know that Argos." But it seems plain that the this festival was celebrated in April 412 truth was as I have stated in the text — 1 B.C. ; that is, towards the end of the and that the iVrgeians stood by (with fourth year of Olympiad 91, about two others of the confederates probably also) i or three months before the festival of to protect the Corinthians of the city in ! Olympiad 92. the exercise of tlieir usual privilege; ] Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi. 2, just just as Agesilaus, immediately after- cited i, Corsini (Diss. Agonistic, iv. 8), wards, stood by to protect the Co- and Schneider in his note to this passage rinthiau exiles while they were doing of Xenophon — all state the Isthmian the same thing. | games to have been celebrated in the The Isthmian games were trieteric, ' first and third Olympic years ; which is, that is, celebrated in every alternate , in my judgement, a mistake. Dodwell year; in one of the spring months, erroneously states the Isthmian games 492 HISTORY OF GEEFXE. Part II. immediately retired to the city by the road to Kenchrese, leaving their sacrifices half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and. distributed the parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus marched away to attack Peirseum. He had no sooner departed than the Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival, and distributed the wreaths, a second time. Peirseum was accupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march directly towards Corinth. Probably many of the citizens were at that moment absent for the second celebration of the festival ; so that those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus, apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste to Peirseum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having learnt that these troops had passed by in the night, Agesilaus forthwith again turned his course, and marched back to Peirseum, which he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along the Bay of Lechseum, near the Therma, or warm springs which are still discernible ; ' while he sent a mora or division of troops to get round the place by a mountain- road more in the interior, ascending some woody heights command- ing the town, and crowned by a temple of Poseidon.^ The move- B.C. 390. Isthmian festival — Agesilaus disturbs the celeliration. The Corin- thi.in exiles, under his protection, celebrate it ; then, when he is gime, the Corin- thians from the city, and perform the ceremony over again. Agesilaus attacks Peira'um, which he captures, together with the Hi'ra>um, manj- pri- soners, and much booty. B.C. 390. mentioned in Thucydides, viii. 9, to have been celebrated at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter of the fourth year of Olympiad 91 : a mistake pointed out by Kriiger (ad loc.) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold ; although the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the Lacedaemonian festival of the Hya- kinthia, is extremely uncertain. It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games (Aunal. Xenoph. ad ann. o9'2). ' See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschun- gen in Griechenland, chap. i. p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutraki de- rives its name from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peirajum ; on the side of the bay opposite to Lechsum, but near the point where the level gi-ound con- stituting the Isthmus (properly so- called), ends — and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the west- ernmost portion of Geraneia i^or the peninsula of Peirseum), begins. The language of Xenophon therefore when he comes to describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate — ^877 5' eKTreTTfpa/coTos avrov to Oepfia is rh wXaTv rod Aexaiou, &c. (iv. 5, 8). ^ Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 4. Xenophon here recounts how Agesi- laus sent up ten men with fire in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm themselves; the night Chap. LXXV. CAPTURE OP PEIRJ^UM. 493 ment was quite effectual. The garrison and inhabitants of Peiraeum, seeing that the place had become indefensible, abandoned it on the next day with all their cattle and property, to take refuge in the Herjpum, or sacred ground of Here Akraea, near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops descending from the heights attacked and captured QCnoe ' — the Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over against Kreusis in BcEotia. A large booty here fell into their hands, which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all in the Herseum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men, women, and children — freemen and slaves — with cattle and other property — Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in the massacre at Corinth in the market-place should be handed over to the vengeance of the exiles ; and that all the rest should be sold as slaves.- Though he did not here inflict any harder measure than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most contemporary commanders, condenmed numbers of free Corinthian men and women to a life of degradation, if not of misery — will understand by contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna ; when he refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either the JNIethymnaean or the Athenian captives — and when he proclaimed the exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by any permission of his.^ As the Lacedsemoaians had been before masters of Lechseum, Krommyon, and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side, and cut off its communication with Boeotia. The city not being in condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay their plans for sin-prising it by aid of friends within.^ being very cold and rainy, tlie situation very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or warm cover- ing to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the neighbouring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt. 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 5. This (Enoe must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that name, whicli lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Boeotia. So also the town of Peirteum here noticed must not be confounded with another Peiraeum, which was also in the Corinthian territory, but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus (Thucyd. viii. 10). - Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 5-8. 3 Xen. Hellen. i. 5, 14. See Ch. Ixiv. of this History. The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the encomiums of his biographers (Xeu. Agesil. vii. G; Cornel. Nep. Agesil. c. 5). ■• Xen. Agesil. vii. G; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. b. 494 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part 1 1. position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth. The Tlie- bans send fresli en- voys to solicit peace — contemp- tviously treated by Agesilaus. So triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were Triumphant all in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys to him to solicit peace. His antipathy to- wards the Thebans was so vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by, though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to introduce them. Absorbed in this overweening pride, and exultation over con- quered enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pa- vaiofbad vilion, on the banks of the lake adjoining the Herseum,' news, which .,,. r> ^ it • p gpoiisthe — With his eyes nxed on the long train oi captives ""™P • brought out under the guard of armed Lacedaemonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a crowd of spec- tators^ — when news arrived, as if mider the special intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the prospect of affairs.^ A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet of Agesilaus ; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear, and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to accompany him without a moment's delay ; leaving orders with the general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in march ; but he had not gone far The story of Polysenus (iii. 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this poiut of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to find proper places for tlie sixty-three different stratagems which Polygeuus ascribes to Iphikrates. ^ This lake is now called Lake Vulias- raeni. Considerable ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French siu'vey, near its western extremity ; on which side it adjoins the temple of Here Akrsea, or the Heroeum. See M. Bob- laye, Recherches G^ographiques sur les Raines de la Mor^e, p. 36 ; and Colonel Leake's Peloponnesiaca, p. 399. - Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 6. Toov 5e AaKedaifiovicnv airh rcov '6tt\(j}v avv TOis S6pa(n ■jrap7)KoKovBovv (pvKaKes Toov aiXf^oXiiiTcov, fj.d\a virh tS>v Trap6vrwy Qewpuvfxivor ol yap evrvxovvres Kal Kpa- Tovvres aei ttws a^ioOeaToi SoKova'ii' elvai. Ert 5e Ka6T]fj.4uov rod 'AyrjcriXdov, Kal ioiKSro^ ayaWoiJ,iV(i3 to7s Tmrpayiiivois, t-mrevs ris -KpoffrjKavve, koI fxaXa icrxvpios iSpovfTi TtS 'Ittttw- VTrh TToKXwv 5e ipajTw- /xepos, '6,Ti ^yyeAAot, ovZ^vX aTreKpivaTo, &c. It is interesting to mark in Xenophou the mixture of philo-Laconian compla- cency — of philosophical reflection — and of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so constant a point of effect with Gre- cian poets and historians. 3 Plutarcli, Agesil. c. 22, fnaOe Sk irpay/xa ye/xeffr]Thv, &c. Chap. LXXV. THE LACED^.MONIAN MORA. 405 when three fresh horsemen met and informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt, and returned to the Heraeum ; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news, he sold all his captives by auction.' This bad news — the arrival of which has been so graphically described by Xenophon, himself probably among the ^^^^ ^ bystanders and companions of Agesilaus — was nothing tionota less than the defeat and destruction of a Lacedaemonian nian mora T • • 1 ' T 1 by the light mora or muitary division by the light troops under troops under T 1 -1 /^ * • 1 1 • •! j» j_i Iphikrates. Iphik rates. As it was an understood privilege ot the Amykkcan hoplites in the Lacedaemonian army always to go home, even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hya- kinthia, Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechseum. The festival day being now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechaeum to Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch commanding at Lechaeum, leaving that place for the time under watch by the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedaemonian mora which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of 600 hoplites, and of a 7nora of cavalry (number unknown) — to protect the Amyklaeans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth. Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three miles of the friendly "town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and turned back with his mora of hoplites to Lechaeum ; still however leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklaeans as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on the return march.^ Though the Amyklaeans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to be in danger of attack from Corinth in Baring and their march, and though the force in that town was niall^l^Jfvres'* known to be considerable, it never occurred to the «>f ipi^ikratis. Lacedaemoiiian polemarch that there was any similar danger for his own mora of 600 hoplites ; so contemptuous was his estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which tliese peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedaemonians. But Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he now saw from the walls of Corinth the 600 hoplites returning separately., without either cavalry or light troops, con- 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 7-9. * Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 11, 12. 496 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. ceived the idea — perhaps in the existing state of men's minds, no one else would have conceived it — of attacking' them with his peltasts as they repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites in Corinth, warmly seconding the pro- ject, marched out his troops, and arrayed them in battle order not far from the gates ; while Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedsemonian mora in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance, he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to be carried forward to Lechaeum.^ But even the youngest soldiers, encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an unavailing pursuit, tliey sought to resume their places in the ranks, the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march forward ; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to halt ; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those between 18 and 33 years of age, whereas on the former occasion, it had been those between 18 and 28) to rush out and drive them off. ' '^ But the result was just the same : the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss of their bravest and most "forward soldiers, when they tried to rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedaemonians attempted to make progress, these circum- stances were again repeated, to their great loss and discourage- 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 14. Tovrovs fj-ev iK4\fvop rovs vTzaaiTiffTas apafx^vovs awo- (pfpeiv is Ae'xaioi'' ovtoi k al fj.6y o i T rj s fi 6 p a s T77 a\T] 6 e i a i a co 67)- a av. We have hei-e a remarkable expres- sion of Xenophon — "These were the ouly men in the mora who were really and truly saved." He means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved without the smallest loss of hon- our ; being carried off wounded from the field of battle, and not haviug fled or deserted their posts. The others who siu-vived, preserved themselves by flight ; and we know that the treatment of those Lacedsemonians who ran away from the field {01 rpeaavTes), on their return to Sparta, was insujjportably hu- miliating. See Xenoph. iiep. Laced, ix. 4 ; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between the treatment of these wounded men here carried ofi^, and that of the other survivors of the beaten mora. The vTracrirLffTal, or slfield-bearers, were probably a certain number of attendants, who habitually carried the. shields of the officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 39; Anab. iv. 2, 20). per- sons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to be presumed that eveiy hoplite had an v-rraaTna-r^s, in spite of what we read about the attend- ant Helots at the battle of Platsea (He- rod, ix. lU-29) and in other places. - Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 1.5, 16. rh Siku a w 6.6 e I ir f p iij e cr ay. If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the test, I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon. 3 Xen. Hellen. vi. 4, 16. Chap. LXXV. CONDUCT OF AGESILAUS. 499 characteristic of the intense mental effect of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by death. Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see Mortifica- them, after the news of the battle, their tone was com- sj^rusihf ' pletely altered. They said not a word about peace, but toTte waTs merely asked permission to pass through and comrauni- af,d^defies- cate with their countrymen in Corinth. " I understand iTjJe^hf^^ your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling) — you want to ^un^nfJied witness the triumph of your friends, and see what it is ^'^ ^p^-^^^- worth. Come along with me and I will teach you." Accordino-ly, on the next day, he caused them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates of Corinth, — defying those within to come out and fight. The lands had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedaemonians now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his recent advantage by hazarding a second battle ; so that Agesilaus had only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field, and then retired to encamp at Lechseum ; from whence he sent back the Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or division at Lechaeum, in place of that which had been defeated, he marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedaemonian troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he was to pass ; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat. Accordingly he commenced his day's march before dawn, and did not halt for the night till after dark : at Mantineia, he not only did not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had broken.' There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of compulsion which dictated their continued adherence ; a fact which we shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the history. 1 Xen. Hellcu. iv. .', 16. 2 K 2 500 HISTORY OF GREECE. Pakt II. Successes of Iphi- krates— he retakes Krommyon, Sidus, and Peiraum — Corinth re- mains pretty well undisturbed by enemies. The Athe- nians recall Iphlk rates. The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enter- prise on the part of Iphikrates ; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had been garrisoned by Praxitas — as well as Peirseum and CEnoe, which had been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the Lacedaemonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechaeum, yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march by land from that place to Lechaeum, under the walls of Corinth — but communicated with Lechaeum only by sea.^ In truth we hear of no farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian orators ^ even in the next generation never ceased to extol, that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering ; and he tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of Corinth — putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion ; but they caused the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.^ It was either in the ensuing summer — or perhaps immediately afterwards during the same summer, 390 b.c. — that Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Akarnania ; at the instance of the Achaeans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the Lacedaemonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the ..^tolian district of Kalydon, had brought the neighbouring villagers into a city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achaean confederacy. But the Akarnanians — allies of Athens as well as Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Q^Lniadae — attacked them there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants, and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at Rhium with a considerable B.C. 390-3S9. ExpeditiDn of Agesilaus against Akaniania — success- ful, aft<^r some delay — the Akar- nanians submit, and enrol them- selves in the Lace- daimonian confederacy. 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 5, 19. - Demosthenes — irepl ^.vvra^eoos — C. 8, p. 172. ^ Diodor, xiv. 92; Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 34. Ai'isteides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as their own, but that they generously refused to do so. Chap. LXXV. AGESILAUS IN AKARNAKIA. ' 501 force of Spartans and allies, and the full muster of the Achaeans. On his arrival, the Akarnanians all took refuge in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands, to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achaeans, but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to become allies of Sparta — found his demands resisted, and began to lay- waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security ; after which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty ; merchants pro- bably accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and well- combined hill-movements, — which probably reminded Xenophon of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the Ten Thousand — he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achseans, whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was indeed in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat been facilitated by the compliance of the ^Etolians ; who calculated (though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus, then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achseans.^ Partial as the success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys to Sparta to solicit peace ; con- senting to abstain from hostilities against the Achaeans, and to enrol themselves as members of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.^ It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the b.c. 389-388. other king, took the command. Having found the J^^,^^^;^ border sacrifices favourable, and crossed the frontier, he ""j,'|,'i^g')^r sent forward his army to Phlius, where the Peloponnesian ^"de Argos. allies were ordered to assemble ; but he himself first turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus. • 1 Diodor, x.v. 73. - Xen. Helleu. iv, 6, 1-14; iv. 7, 1. )02 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. of the Ar- geians re- specting the season of the holy truce. Agesipolis consults tbe oracles at Olympia and Delphi. It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more Manoeuvre than onc previous occasion,^ when an invading Lacedae- monian army was approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message, intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian or other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing better than a fraud ; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedaemonian invasion. But though the du- plicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover in the existing confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some un- certainty as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon ; no Dorian state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian. It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle of Zeus ; whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse to accept the holy truce, if the Argeiars should now tender it. The oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.^ This was accepted by Agesipolis as a 1 Xen. Hellen. iv. 7, S.^Oi 8' 'Apyewi, iTrel eypwaav ov hvv7](r6)xevoi KcaXvetv, fne/j.^av, w crir e p e i u 9 e a av, fcrre- (pavwij-ivovs Svo KTjpvKas, virocpfpovTas - Xen. Hellen. iv. 7, 2. 'O 5e 'Ayrj- ffiiroKis — ^KQwv els rrjv 'OXv/xwiav Kal XP'»7CTr)piafJ^€i'os, iinjpdoTa rhv Bihv, el oaiccs av ex"' avri^, /j,^ SexofJ-evcp r^s ffirovShs Tuiv 'Apyeiwv '6t i oh x> owor e kolQ-tj Ko I 6 XP °'"> s, aW' OTT or e ifi^dWety f.L 4 Wo i e v Aa- HeSaifJi,6vioi, Tt^re vir e

Asiatic when we recollect that four years before, there was coast-his . . • -r> • 1 acquisitions scarcely a single trireme in reirseus, and not even a i" the Hei- wall of defence around the place. Though sent imme- Bospiioms. diately for the assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it ex- pedient to go first 'to the Hellespont ; probably from extreme want of money to pay his men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no Lacedaemonian fleet in the strait ; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic side — the latter being under the friendly satrap Pharnabazus. Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in alliance with Athens ; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance was still further cemented by the change of its government into a demo- cracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of Chalkedon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine ; ^ leaving doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of Thrace.'' From Byzantium Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylene, which was 1 Lysias, Orat. xix. (De Bonis Ari- stoph.) s. 27-44. 2 Xen. Eellen. iv. 8, 25-27. Polybius (iv. 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position, in the ancient world — as well as about the dues charged on the merchant-vessels going in to, or coming out of, the Euxine— and the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade. ^ Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 7. 512 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. already in friendship with Athens; though Methymna and the Victory of other cities in the island were still maintained by a force Thrasybu- . . . •' _^^. , lusinLes- under the Lacedaemonian harmost Iherimacnus. With levies con- thc aid of the Mitylenseans, and of the exiles from other along the" Lcsbiau citics, Thrasybulus marched to the borders of coast-he Mcthymna, where he was met by Therimachus ; who had Aspendur"^ also brought together his utmost force, but was now com- pletely defeated, and slain. The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless Thrasybulus, in spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylene, still thought himself not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he w as not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed from Lesbos along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, levying contributions at Halikarnassus ' and other places, until he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia ; where he also obtained money and w^as about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants that they attacked him by night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.^ Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Character Athcus owed uot Only her renovated democracy, but its buius. wise, generous, and harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected eulogy.^ His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration. But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character — a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character generally — is, that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1, near Lesbos — which Xenophon does 20. 2 Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv. 94. Tlie latter states that Thrasybiilus lost twenty- three triremes by a storm not notice, and which seems impro- bable. 3 Xen. Hellen. iv. 8. 31. Kal Qpao-v- ^ovXos jJLfv 5r), /uaAa ZokSiv avrip ajaBhs Chap. LXXV. ATHENIAN TOLL AT BYZANTIUM. 513 example himself of acquiescing in the loss of his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by the highest political prudence. AVe find, in an oration of Lysias against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross peculation — insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character. Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little evidence ; but when we reflect that the oration was spoken after the death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.^ The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet Agyrrbms ^ ^ •! ^ _ succeeds went to Rhodes, its oriffinal destination — thouffh Xeno- Thrasy. 11 1 11-1 bulus- pnon does not expressly say so ; the rather as neither Rhodes stm Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedaemonian commander against the appears to have become master of the island, in spite of mans, the considerable force which they had there assembled.^ The Lacedaemonians however, on their side, being also much in want of money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians) to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.^ When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that Anaxibius, having great influence with the Ephors of the time. ' Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii. s. 9. Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power, oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation for his own profit, dur- ing the course of the expedition of Thrasybulus ; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the Bospho- rus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the audit (s. 5) ; implying (so far as we can understand w^hat is thus briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should not be obliged to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic command. Ergokles, however, VOL. VI. probably one of these colleagues, re- sented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to seize Byzan- tium, to retain the fleet, and to many the daughter of the Thracian pruice Seuthes. It is also afiirmed in the oration that the fleet had come home iu very bad condition (s. 2-4), and that the money, levied with so much cri- minal abuse, had been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated. We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to death. His pi'operty was confiscated, and was said to amount to oO talents, though he had been poor before the expedi- tion ; but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx. cont. Phi- lokrat. s. 3). - Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 31, 3 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 2. 2 L 514 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part IT. Anaxibius is sent to command at the Hel- lespont in place of Derkyllidas • — his vigor- ous pro- ceedings — he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait. prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years. Having been the officer originally em- ployed to procure the revolt of the place from Athens (in 411 B.C.)/ Derkyllidas had since rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta, during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus. But it was supposed, that he ought to ha,ve checked the aggressive plans of Thrasybulus ; moreover Anaxibius promised, if a small force were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived Athenian influence. He was pre- sumed to know well those regions, in which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon and the Cyreian army first returned : the harshness, treachery, and corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.^ With three triremes, and funds for the pay of 1000 mercenary troops, Anaxi- bius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations with considerable vigour, both against Athens and against Pharnabazus. While he armed a land-force, which he employed in making in- cursions on the neighbouring cities in the territory of that satrap, — he at the same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of the harbour of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the merchant- vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her allies.^ The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to secure the strait-revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without farther addition. Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens, having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with 1200 peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in the Helles- pont : which now became again the scene of conflict, as it had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War ; the Athenians from the European side, the Lacedaemonians from the Asiatic. At first the warfare consisted of desultory, privateer- ing, and money -levying excursions on both sides.'' But at length, the watchful genius of Iphikrates discovered opportunity for a suc- Tho Athe- nians send Iphilcrates ■with his peltasts and a fleet to the Hellespont. His strata- gem to surprise Anaxibius. 1 Thncyd. viii. 61: compare Xenoph. Anab. v. 6, 24-. 2 See above, Chapter Ixxi. ^ Xen. HeUen. iv. 8, 32, 33. '^ Xen. Ilellen. iv. 8, 35, 36. to niv •Kp9ei, eV apyvpo\oyiav firavcLTreirXev- Kivai. CiiAP. LXXV. DEFEAT AND DEATH OF ANAXIBIUP. 515 cessful stratag-cm. Anaxlbius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance, had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it, with his Lacedsemonian and mercenary forces, as well as 200 hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous region of Ida, southward to the coast of the Gulf of Adramyttium. Accordingly Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return, crossed over in the night from the Cher- sonese, and planted himself in ambush on the line of return march, at a point where it traversed the desert and mountainous extremi- ties of the Abydene territory, near the gold mines of Kremaste. The triremes which carried him across were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that Anaxibius might be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion. The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy Defeat and at hand, marching in careless order and with long- Anaxiwus. stretched files, as well from the narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to fight, he had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken no pains to ascertain that the victims were favourable ; so Xenophon informs us,^ with that constant regard to the divine judgements and divine warnino-s w4iich pervades both the Hellenica and the Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the van to pass, sud- denly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius with the Lace- daemonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the mountain pass into the plain of Kremaste. His appearance struck terror and confusion into the whole army ; unprepared in its disorderly array for stedfast resistance — even if the minds of the soldiers had been ever so well strung — against well-trained peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except to die like a brave man. Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer to hand to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him — " Friends, my honour commands me to die here ; but do you hasten away and save yourselves before the enemy close with us," Such order was ' Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 36. 'O 'Ava- koL is ttSAiv (piXlav, koI '6ti iJKovf rZv ^'ijSios aireTTopiveTO, ws ixiv iAeyeTO, d-KavTwvTwv, rhv 'icpiKpdrriP duaTTfTrAev- ovSk Tuv lepSiy y ey e V7] jxe v w v Ktpai tjjj/ iirl UpoiKovvricrov, afxiXiffTioov avrw fKfivy t j; r) fie pa, aWa /ca- iiropeveTo. raippoviiaas, on Sia (pt\ius re iiropevero 2 I. 2 516 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. hardly required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one accord towards Abydos ; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot. No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight was "no true preservation" (in the language of Xenophon '), but simply prolongation of life under in- tolerable disgrace at home. But what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the same honourable death.^ So strong was the mutual devotion which this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphrikates as far as the gates of Abydos, with the slaughter of 50 out of the 200 Abydene hoplites, and 200 of the remaining troops. This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the TheAthe- rcputatiou of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the Bosphorous and the Hellespont, ensuring mans are th?Heii°s^- ^oth the levy of the dues and the transit of their trading- the straft vessels, But while the Athenians were thus carrying on dues. naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began to experience annoyance nearer home, from ^Egina. That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peirseus, as Perikles The island w^s wout to Call it) had becu occupied fifty years before ilsfist^~ by a population eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards history. couqucrcd aud expelled by her — at last again captured in the new abode wliich they had obtained in Laconia — and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian War, ^gina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers or kleruchs ; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of ^Egospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to the remnant of the former population — as many of them at least as he could find. ' See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat aud destruction of the Lacedaemonian mora by Iphikrates, near LechiEum, page 496. " Xen. Helleu. iv. 8, 39. Kal ra waiSiKO, fxevToi avr^ irape/xetve, koI tuv AaKfBai/j.oviaii' Se tuiv v a.p!JLO(Tr-i)pu>v ws 5a>SeKa /xa- X^fxevoi (Tvva-wiQavov ol S' &\\oi (pev- yovTes eirnrTov. (Jhap.LXXV. ATHENS and ^GINA. 517 These new vEginetans, though doubtless animated by associa- tions highly unfavourable to Athens, had nevertheless ians^f"*^" remained not only at peace, but also in reciprocal com- ™"s'^'ma'^ merce, with her, until a considerable time after the '".'°^'''^^ . . ^'"^1^ Athena battle of Knidus and the rebuilding- of her Long- Walls. The Lace- dEBinoniiiri And so they would have continued, of their own accord — admiral 1 11 '1 Ti 1 Til 1 Teleutias at Since they could gain but little, and were likely to lose ^gina. all the security of their traffic, by her hostility — had they seded by not been forced to commence the war by Eteoiiikus, the His reniark- Lacedsemonian harmost in the island ; ^ one amidst many lari'ty "''^^ examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian sSmen. "^ states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the ambition of the greater — by Sparta as well as by Athens.^ With the concurrence of the Ephors, Eteonikus authorised and encouraged all ^ginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica ; which aggression the Athenians resented, after suffering considerable inconvenience, by sending a force of ten triremes to block up ^gina from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pam- philus to construct and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however, was soon driven ojQF (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the fort) by Teleutias, who came to -^gina on hearing of the blockade ; having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes, in an expedition among the Cyclades for the purpose of levying contributions. He seems to have been now at the terra of his year of command, and while he was at ^gina, his successor Hierax arrived from Sparta on his way to Rhodes to supersede him. The fleet was accordingly handed over to Hierax at JEgma, while Teleutias went directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the 1 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 1. &v Se irdXiv \ from Sparta, after having obtained the 6 'Et€<$j/i/cos if rfj Alyivrj, Koi 6Tr(/ui|ia ■)(^pti}fx.4voov rhv irpScrdeu xpJj'oz/ rwv Alyi- Vl]Tcav Trpbs Toi/s 'AOrjvaiovs, fTrel iriffi A.r)i^e(T0ai Thv $ov\6fievov iii rrjs 'At- TIKTJS. The meaning of the word iraKiv here is not easy to determine, since (as Schneider i-emarks) not a word had been said before about the presence of consent of the Ephors {^w^Si^av Kal rot's i KaipcS a.(pi^6fj.euoi. Schneider doubts whether the words TrpoirapdaxiTe S4 fioi are correct. But they seem to me to bear a very per- tinent meaning. Teleutias had no money ; yet it was necessary for his purpose that the seamen should come furnished with one day's provision beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask them to get provision for them- selves, or to lend it, as it were, to him ; though they were already so dissatisfied fi'om not having received their pay. Chap.LXXV. TELEUTIAS SURPRISES PEIE^US. 521 reigned there, especially since the death of Gorgopas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbour was open, as it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of the Pelopon- nesian War) attempted the like enterprise from the port of Megara.^ Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power, it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it to be impossible ; and it only failed because the assailants became terrified and flinched in the execution. A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbour of yEgina, without tellinff any one whither he was ffoinof. Rowing _ o • _ o o o Unprepared leisurely, and allowino; his men alternate repose on their »"'• ^n- in !• /> • • ' t i> •! guarded oars, he found himself before mornmi? within half a mue condition n -rt . . ^ Ml • 1 • of Peir»us 01 reiraeus, where he waited until day was lust dawning, — Teieutias . . . gains rich and then led his squadron straight into the harbour, plunder. Everything turned out as he expected ; there was not the away in least idea of being attacked, nor the least preparation for ^ ^ defence. Not a single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were moored without their crews, together with merchant- vessels, loaded as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron to drive against the triremes, and disable them ; but by no means to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad, and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with surprise and consternation. Loud aud vague cries transmitted the news through all Peirseus, and from Peiiseus up to Athens, where it was believed that their harbour was actually taken. Every man having run home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously down thither, with one accord — hoplites as well as horsemen. But before such succours could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships, seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard. Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire cargoes were also towed away ; and even three or four tri- remes. With all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiraeus, sending some of his squadron to escort the prizes to ^Egina, while he himself with the remainder sailed southward alono- the coast. As he was seen to come out of Peiraeus, his triremes were mis- ' Thucyd. ii. 94. 522 HlSTOrvY OF GllEECE. Pakt II. taken for Athenian, and excited no alarm ; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats, and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to Athens — together with some merchantmen carrying com and other goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into -^gina.^ The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and neisen- exccutcd witliout the loss of a man, procured for him a bis'seamen^ plentiful booty, of wliich probably not the least valuable rf-^he fleet portlou coHsistcd in the men seized as captives. When inflicteV"*^ sold at JEgina, it yielded so large a return that he was num Mm-*^* enabled to pay down at once a month's pay to his seamen ; merce. ^Jjq becamc more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes in animated and active service under his orders.^ Admonished by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now doubtless careful both in guarding and in closing Peir»us ; *as they had become forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasldas. But in spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the ^ginetan privateers, quite sufficient to make them weary of the We cannot doubt indeed that the prosecution of the war must B.C. 387. have been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, Financial from 395 B.C. dowuward to 387 b.c. How they made condition of ^ ^ ^ •> ;^"^*^2,*- . good the cost, without any contributory allies, or any rikon. foreign support, except" what Konon obtained during one year from Pharnabazus — we are not informed. On the revival of the democracy in 403 B.C., the poverty of the city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property abroad. At a period about three years afterwards, it seems that the Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts due to the Boeotians on account of damage done ; that they were too poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient ; that the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.^ Even the pay to 1 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 18-22. I at least witliout any sucli gates as - Xen. Helleu. v. 1, 24. would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. 3 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 29. v. 4, 20). Even ten years after this, however, \ * Lysias. Orat. xxx. cont, Kikoma- when the Laceda?mouian harmost Spho- chum, s. 21-30. drias marched from Thespiee by night i I trust this Oration so far as tlie to surprise Peirseus, it was without J matter of fact, that in the preceding gates on the landside — aTruAwros — or i year, some ancient sacrifices had been Chap. LXXV. THE TIIEOrJC BOAUD. 523 those citizens who attended the public assemblies and sat as Dikasts in the dikasteries — pay essential to the working of the democracy — was restored only by degrees ; beginning first at one obolus, ftnd not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before the capture, until after an interval of some years.^ It was at this time too that the Theoric Board, or Paymasters for the general expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established ; and when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was probably great necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements connected with this object had been administered, before 403 b.c, not by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamise, or treasurers of the tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403 B.C., as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.^ A portion of the money disbursed by the Theoric Board for the religious festivals, was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all — not merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.^ This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to obtain places at the theatrical representations in honour of Dionysus ; but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the religious idea connected with the festival ; not simply because the comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival — but because the collective eff'ect of the ceremony, in honouring and propitiating the god, was believed to depend in part uj)on a multitudinous attendance and lively manifestations,^ Gra- dually, however, this distributon of Theoric or festival money came to be pushed to an abusive and mischievous excess, which is omitted from state-poverty ; but the maimer in which the speaker makes this fact tell againt Nikomachiis, may or may not be just. 1 Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310. 2 See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptt. Gi'oecor. — Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii. 7. p. 179, 180, Eugl. trausl. — and Schomann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Grace, s. 77. p. 320. 3 Demosthenes, Philippic, iv. p. 141. s. 43 ; Demosth. Orat. xliv. cout. Leo- charem, p. 1091. "s. 48. ^ It ia common to represent the fes- tivals at Athens as if it were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at the public expense. But the primi- tive idea and sentiment of the Grecian religious festival — the satisfaction to the god dependent upon multitudinous sjjectators sympathising, and enjoying themselves together {aix/xiya iravras) — is much anterior to the development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531. s. 6G ; Homer, Hymu. ApoUin. 1 47 ; K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdieustlich. Alterthiimer der Griechen, s. 8. 524 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. brought before our notice forty years afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that time, we have no materials for speaking of it ; and what I here notice is simply the first creation of the Theoric Board. The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying Direct pro- her troops sent as well to Boeotia as to Corinth, must have taxes. been derived mainly from direct assessments on property, called eisphorse. And some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken place during these years ; though we know no details either as to frequency or amount.^ But the ^ See such direct assessments on pro- perty alluded to in various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristophan. s. 31, 45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epi- ki-atem, s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont. Philo- krat. s. 14. Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv. 4. p. 493, Engl, transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition of the German ori- ginal, p. 642) affirms that a propo- sition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of one-fortieth, or 2^ per cent., vfas made about this time by a citizen named Euripides, who an- nounced it as intended to produce 500 talents ; that the proposition was at first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured for its author unbounded popularity ; but that he was presently cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk. Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that this was a real proposition of a property-tax of 2J per cent, made by Euripides. After having alleged that the Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most unscrupu- lous injustice in confiscating the pro- perty of rich citizens — referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of which establishes his conclusion — Sievers goes on to say — "But that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus a new scheme of finance, which however wats presently discovered to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at fii'st the most extravagant joy." He adds in a note : "The scheme pro- ceeded from Euripides ; it was a pro- i perty-tax of 2J per cent. See Aiisto- | phan. Ekklesiaz. 823 ; Boeckh, Staat- shaush. ii. p. 27." In my judgement, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a pro- position for a property-tax. It is as follows : — To S'li'tt-yx"? o^X ai'ii'Tes i^^eis dj/xm/^tei' TaXavT eo'eaOav Trei/raKOcrta rrj no\eL T^S Te(T<7'apaK0crT))s, r)v eTvopKT Eupi7ri67;s ; Kev9u5 Karex^pvcrov Tra? ainr]p Eupi7ri6))i'' 'Ore 67) 5* avacncoTTOvfj.ei'Oi'; ef^atrero *0 Alb? Koptv^os, Koi TO Trpayp.' ovk ■^pKeaei', TlaKlV KOT67riTTOV TTas diTjp EuptTTlS))!'. What this "new financial scheme" (so Sievers properly calls it) was, which the poet here alludes to — we have no means of determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainfvil to the city, and procured for its author very great popu- larity ; but which on farther examina- tion, proved to be mere empty boasting (6 Albs Kopipdos). How can this be said about any motion for a property- tax? That any financier should ever have gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense sum of 500 talents (which Schomann estimates as the pro- bable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Grsec. s. 73. p. 313) at one blow by an assessment upon property ! It would be as much as any financier could do to bear up against the tremen- dous unpopularity of such a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him, were the necessity ever Chap. LXXV. DIRECT TAXATION. 525 restitution of the Long "Walls and of the fortifications of Peiraeus by Konon, was an assistance not less valuable to the finances of so pressing. How odious are propo- sitions for direct taxation, we may know without recun-ing to the specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Phi- lippics and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis, Or. xiv. s. 33. p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for raising 5u0 talents by direct property-tax as something extra- vagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear mentioned. Moreover — unpopularity apart — the motion for a property-tax could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose some mea- sure which promises gain to the state without such undisguised pressure upon individuals. Lastly, there is nothing delusive in a pi'operty-tax — nothing which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther examination (avacTKOTrov- fxevots) to be false or uncertain. It may indeed be more or less evaded ; but this can only be known after it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for. Upon these grounds, I maintain that the TeffcrapaKoarri proposed by Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was, I do not pretend to say; but Teaaapa- KocTT^ may have many other meanings ; it might mean a duty of 2^ per cent, upon impoi'ts or exports, or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion ; or it might mean a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the Chian rea-aapaKoffral (Thucyd. viii. lOo). All tliat the passage really teaches us, is, that some financial proposition was made by Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that Euripides pro- mised a receipt of 500 talents ; this sum is oulj' given to us a comic exag- geration of that which foolish men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons ("erroneously, in my judge- ment) as if this 500 talents was a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to 2^ per cent, upon the taxable pi'operty of the Athenians. He says (iv. 8. p. 520, Engl, transl.) that "Euripides assumed as the basis of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital of 20,000 talents" — and that " his proposition of ^ was calculated to produce 500 talents." No such con- clusion can be fairly drawn from Ari- stophanes. Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow her, the young man replies (v. 1006) — 'AW OVK avdyKri fiovcTTLV, el fir} twv i)i.iav Trji/ vevTaKoaiocTTriv (caTe'flrjKos r!} noKei. Boeckh himself admits (iv. 8. p. 520) that this passage is very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyr- whitt was so perplexed by it that he altered ifiZv into ircov. Without pi'e- suming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter of historical fact, that a property- tax of jig had recently been levied at Athens, shortly before the representa- tion of the EkklesiazusEC. I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by Sievers from a third passage in this same play — the Ekklesiazuste (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende der Pelop. Kriegs bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101). He says — "How melancholy is the pic- ture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the Ekklesiazusse and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the restoration of the de- mocracy ! What an impressive se?-iousness (welch ein erschlitternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of Praxagora !" (v. 174 seqq.). I confess that I find neither serious- ness, nor genuine and trustworthy co- louring, in this speech of Pi-axagora. It is a comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce and full of Aristophanic humour. And it is surely preposterous to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading feminine character, as if it were 526 HISTORY OF GREECE. Part II. Athens than to her political power. That excellent harbour, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again safe for the residence of metics and the importations of merchants, became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non- Ilellenic persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.' Both the port- duties, and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as in part to countervail the costs of war. Never- theless these costs, continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by ^ginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose the Athenians to peace. In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the B.C. 387. decline, but had become seriously menacing. After going Antaikidiis from ^giua to Ephesus in the preceding year, and TiribaLrto sending back Gorgopas with the ^ginetan squadron, succe^^at Autalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under conrt-he" ^is Secretary Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the tteT™sTf Hellespont for the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, loTiT '^^^'^^ ^^^^ repaired to Tiribazus, by whom he was conducted up led'b^' the*' *^ ^^^^ court of Susa. Here he renewed the propositions Gi-pat'King, for the pacification of Greece — on principles of universal forced by autouomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject iiisname. absolutcly to the Persian king — which he had tried in ^'ain to carry through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity^ as to gain the royal favovir personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded in prevailing upon the King formally to adopt the peace, and to proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it, empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have proved a great impediment to this measure, the King was farther induced to invite the satrap historical evidence as to the actual : ing comic wit into serious matter of condition or management of Athens, i evidence ; and no histoi-y has suffered Let any one follow the speech of Praxagora into the proposition of re- form which she is made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citinj so much from the proceeding as that of Athens. ' Xenoph. Kellen. v. 1, 19-24: com- pare vii. 1, 3, 4 ; Xenoj^h. De Vecti- her discourse as if it were an harangue j galibus, chapters i. ii. iii., &c.; Xenoph. in Thucydides. History is indeed l)e Repub. Athen. i. 17. strangely transformed by thus turn- I * Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22. Chap. LXXV. ANTALKTDA.S AT ABYDOS. 527 Pharnabazus up to court, and to honour him with his daughter in marriage ; leaving the satrapy of Daskyhum under the temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest of Antalkidas.' Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the spring of 387 b.c, not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by the King's seal but commanding ample means to carry it into effect ; since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco- Italian towns, sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedaemonians.^ On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under Iphikrates ; who, with thirty-two sail, were occupying the European side of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet up the strait towards the Propontis ; spreading the rumour that he was about to attack Chalkedon, in concert with a party in the town. But he stopped at Perkote, and lay Athenia hid in that harbour until he saw the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnesus. The strait being now clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and Italian ships, which he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to which his recent manoeuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number which were under preparation in the various ports of lonia.'^ Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont since the battle of iEgospotami, was so much superior to anything that could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta — that the Antalkidas in com- mand of the Lacede- monian and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Per- sian aid. His suc- cesses against the ians. 1 Xen. Helleu. V. 1, 28. - Xeu. Hellen. v. 1, 25-27. ^ Diodor. xv. 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuiug year for the jn'osecution of the war agaiust Evagoras. 528 HISTOEY OF GREECE. Paet II, Distress and discou- ragement of Athens — anxiety of the anti- Spartan allies for peace. cut off. Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering which they had already undergone fi'om Ly- sander. A portion of such hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by Antalkidas ; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the .^ghietan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting trade of Attica ; and this combination, of actual hardship with prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of success through their own forces ; while the Argeians also, hitherto the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedaemonian invasions of their territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden.^ Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when Tu-ibazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come down from Susa, He produced the original edict, and having first publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows : — " King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Klazomenee and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both small and great — except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with money." ^ Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terras of s°arta for' *^^^ cdict to their respective cities, and to meet again at acceptance Sparta for acccutance or rejection. When the time of or rejec- -^ _ ^ ^ -, . r . tion. All meeting- arrived,^ all the cities in spite of their repugnance parties ° . . re accept. The to the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks and partly also Thebansat i i p i i i first accept to the secoud condition, nevertheless lelt themselves over- serve for ruled by superior force and gave a reluctant consent. On tian cities, taking the oaths, however, the Thebans tried indirectly to B.C. 387. Tirabazus summons them all to Sardis to hear the conven- tion which had been sent do mi by the Great King. Terms of the conven- tion, called the peace of Antalkidas. ' Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 28, 29. " Xeu. Hellen. v. 1, 31. Ill this document there is the same introduction of the first person imme- diately following the third, as in the correspondence between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i. 128, 129). ^ Diodor. xiv. 110, Chap. LXXV. PEACE OF AXTALKIDAS. 529 make good an exception in their own case, by claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on behalf of the Boeotian cities generally ; a demand which Agesilaus in the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen. " You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be shut out from the treaty." It was with nmch delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory sentence, which placed Thebes in so humi- Agesilaus liating a dilemma. Antipathy towards the Thebans was luow the one of his strongest sentiments, and he exulted in the reserv^^, and hope that they would persist in their refusal ; so that he cunditiona"' would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to His'elger^' crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the Satred'^T expected triumph, that immediately on the departure of L'l^fnto^ the Theban deputies, and before their answer could ^jfenrii^'ie- possibly have been obtained, he procured the consent of };™'J*'''- '^^^ r J ' r ^ 1 hebans are the Ephors, offered the border sacrifice, and led the *^biigedto ^ _, , . accept uiicon- Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he ditionaiiy. not only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of the Perioeki, but also sent forth the officers called xenao-i to the cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch, his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared to take the oath for Thebes alone, recoo'nisinjT the other Boeotian cities as autonomous. Afjesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and considerable, of having degraded Thebes from her federal headship, and isolated her from the Boeotian cities.^ The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus, attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice ; for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and her officers during the ensuing years. There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth ; • Xen. Helleu. v. 1, 32, 33. . VOL. VI. 2 M 530 HISTORY OF GREECE. Tart II. and the Corinthian government might probably think that the Agesiiaiis terms of the peace, leaving their city autonomous, per- co'rTnUiians mitted them to retain or dismiss these auxiliaries at away"^heir their owu discrction. But it was not so that Agesilaus ^uffiiaries. coustrucd the peace ; and his construction, right or wrong, Argeraii'"' ^'^s backed by the power of enforcement. He sent to in- go'^nt'o'''"* form both Argeians and Corinthians, that if the auxi- exue: the liarlcs wcrc not withdrawn, he would march his army philo-Laoo- ' y nian Curin- forthwith luto both territories. No resistance could be thians are . , restored. offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retu'ed from Corinth ; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians — espe- cially those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the Eukleia — retired at the same time into voluntary exile, think- ing themselves no longer safe in the tov.n. They found a home partly at Argos, partly at Athens,^ where they were most hospit- ably received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who, in concert with the Lacedssmonian garrison at Lechaeum and Sikyon, had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in Corinth — were immediately readmitted into the city. According to Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice of the Corinthian citizens.^ But we shall be more correct in affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.^ The restoration of the exiles from Lechffium on the present occasion was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been eighteen years before, at the close of the Peloponnes:an War — or than that of the Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.* 1 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 34-; Demosthen. Coi-inthian and Tliel>an exiles should be adv. Leptin. c. 13. p. 473. j restored. Tlie Corinthian exiles had 2 Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 34. Of S' &\Xot [ lieen actively co-operatiug with Agesi- ■KoXlrai fKovTes KaTi^ix°^'''° '''ovs irpd- 1 laus against Corinth. Of Theban exiles 0-661' (peiyovras. \ we have heard nothing ; but it is very ^ Such is in fact the version of the ' probable that there were several serv- Btory in Xenophou's Encomium upon ' ing with Agesilaus — and also pretty Agesilaus (ii. 21), where it is made a ' certain that he would insist upon their matter of honovir to the latter, that he ; restoration, would not consent to peace, except -nnth j ■• Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8. a compulsory clause (JjvdjKacre) that the | END OF VOL. VI. UDSDON : FRIKTED LY W. CLOV f.S AND SOKS, STASIFOKU 6TKI FT, AKD CHARIKG CU0S6. 35° -:f y ? ^./ ^ MAP^ltEPRESENTlN G TH E ENTIRE ITPWARD 3IAHCH * RETREAT OF THE TEN rHOrS.VXU OltEEKS. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. REC'D LD-URL DEC 2 7 1983 RECD taaRB AUG04T fltffV) vo^^^ StP^ \\'0> QL AP-^ ' r irn 'i»m J 'j 1971 ^^ 3 1158 00439 5728