LIBRARY OF THE University of California. EDUC. PSYCH. FIRST LINES OF THE HUMAN MIND. BY JOHN FEARN. JLontion: PRINTED BY A. J. VALPV, HED ETON COURT, FLEET STREET, AND SOLD BY LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME AND BROWN, PATERNOSTER ROW; BLACK, KINGSBURY, PARBURY AND ALLEN, LEADENHALL STREET; AND ROLAND HUNTER, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD. 1820. 'bFid LIBRARY EDUC. PSYCH. LIWARY a£i^£KAL TO THE REV. DR. SAMUEL PARR; AND BASIL MONTAGU, ESQ. Much Revered Sirs, In dedicating to you the fruits of my more mature labor, and the present time being one in which the sentiments of every individual appear to be pregnant with some consequence, I first desire to prostrate myself with ineffable gratitude and adoration to Almighty God, for having bestowed upon me, together with existence, three of the most precious gifts which any sublunary being can enjoy; — a desire to contemplate the general laws of His Providence ; — an age and country in which I have liberty to express my conceptions of them ; — and means to relinquish otlier pursuits in favor of this bent, without stooping to solicitation, or dependence upon aid, M'hich might have pre- vented my choice, or biassed my opinions. IV DEDICATION. While I trust the avowal of this feeling will not be unacceptable to you, inasmuch as it is a test of the spirit in which the present offering is made ; I beg to assure you, it has never tended to diminish my sensibiUty to friendly manifestations of any sort, and far less could it operate to make me overlook what I conceive to be a debt, both of a private and a public nature. If the following Volume should be found to contain any new truth, worthy the philo- sophical consideration either of our contemporaries or of those who shall come after us ; I desire it may bear testimony, that to you I stand particularly in- debted for a warm and uniform interest displayed for the success of these inquiries. To one of you, I am obliged for that spontaneous and unequivocal approbation of my earlier endea- vours, which, when I reflected upon the pre-emi- nence of erudition whence it came, was sufficient to encourage my perseverance against a very rare combination of forbidding circumstances. To the commendation received from such a quarter, my best acknowledgments are certainly due. To the other, the circumstance of locality has admitted of my being additionally indebted, for the edification and pleasure received in his converse, and for a course of obliging civilities, during a series of years ; which have proved at DEDICATION. V once a stimulus to my endeavours and a solace under the languor induced by them. Among the few external circumstances that could have made me proud, is the reflection that to these pursuits, and to no other origin, I owe the honor of your friendship. And I shall consider it among the most gratifying events of my life, if I continue, duringthe remainder of it, to possess any share of your regard. I am, Gentlemen, With much Veneration, Your faithful Servant, JOHN FEARN. V O"^ THE ^^ \ yrnVERSlTY 1 TO DUGALD STEWART, ESQ., F. R. SS. LOND. AND EDINB., &c. &c. &c. Formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy IN THE University of Edinburgh. Sir, As it is impossible I should think of going before the public with the following work, mthout providing a clear understanding of the merits of the subject which has been matter of discussion between us during the last three years ; I yield with extreme reluctance to the ne- cessity under which I am placed. In resorting to the only alternative left me, for re- moving an intolerable pressure upon both my past and future exertions, in the pursuit to which I have sacrificed a considerable portion of my life ; I cannot by any consideration be prevented from rendering to you the acknowledgments due to your great intellectual attainments, and no less so to your high general character. In addition to this, I owe your hav- ing been pleased, in your last letter to me, to express yourself in terms for which it appears I am under deep obligation to our common friends, and which render it a task of inexpressible irksomeness to be under the ne- cessity to follow out this discussion. Although you have left me no hope of iittaining my object from any farther private reply ; and though I cannot but feel the Vlll diflference between being obliged to justify myself in a publication like the present, and being righted by you in a vehicle of such extensive circulation as an Encyclo- pedia ; 1 have no feeling toward you but what is in perfect consonance with a trust that you can explain the maitei to your own satisfaction; while I cannot doubt of the impression which my case must carry to every impartial understanding. I shall proceed, with the utmost possible brevity, to narrate the facts in question. In the course of following out some speculations with regard to the Human Mind, which were first submitted to the press near ten years since, I was led, by successive steps, to eflfect what I apprehend to be an analysis of the Act and Phenomena of Perception ; — a matter which, as it advanced, I laid before the public, in two or three small evanescent Tracts upon the subject. The generic principle of this analysis, is the fact that a variety of colors is necessary for the formation of every visiOteJigure or outline: and the consequence deduced from this gene- ric principle is, that visible figure or outline is purely a relation of contrast between txvo of our own ideas. Before I proceed farther ; it is important to remark, that the consequence of demonstrating that tzm various colors are necessary for an act of perception of visible outline, (whereas it had always heretofore been assumed that one color only is requisite for that purpose) is that of transferring the Subject of Perception, from the Province of mere Inductive Science, to which it had without any exception been always supposed to belong, to Science that is genericully mathematical or demonstrative. I believe I run no hazard of being contradicted when I affirm, that the difierence between the whoJe philosophi- cal structure which can be erected upon this last founda- tion, and that which can possibly be raised upon the as- sumption that Perception is a subject of mere inductive evidence, is incalculable. Under favorable auspices; I might certainly have expected that a matter of this aspect would have excited curiosity and immediate general attention. But I had launched it from any thing other than vantage ground. At length, however, it was very fairly taken up by public criticism ; whose even-handed strictures furnish indubitable evidence of impartiality; while I am happy to be able to declare, that I know not the quarter whence it came : and you were judged to be loudly called upon to defend your own positions, or those of your venerable Predecessor, which are therein supposed to be successfully questioned. Still, the matter had but a very limited circulation, beyond my own friends ; and the obstruction appeared to be wholly unaccountable. It was in this state of the case that T first found leisure to take up your '^Dissertation,*' prefixed to the Fifth Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica and published in the year 1815 ; the perusal of which I had till then postponed, owing to languid health and pressing avoca- tions. That work, I was aware, was professedly Histori- cal; and, certainly, although I deemed the perusal of it to be indispensable, I was less in haste about it, inas- much as nothing was farther from my expectation than to find in it any thing of the appearance of original matter. In the course of going over it, however, I was struck with indescribable surprise, upon finding, toward the latter part, that you had suggested, (expressly with a view " toward a solution " of a certain problem proposed by Mr. D'Alembert,) that a variety of col' rs is neces- sary to the act of perceiving Visible Figure or Outline. — Having started this suggestion ; you introduce a very conspicuous Foot Note at the bottom of the pa^e (iOl), of which the following is a copy : " 111 Dr. Reid's Inquiry, he has introduced a discussion " concerning the perception of visible figure, which has " puzzled me since the first time (more than forty years " ago) that I read his work. The discussion relates to " this question, ' Whether there be any sensation proper " ' to visible figure, by which it is suggested in vision V " The result of the argument is that our eye might have ^' been so framed as to suggest the figure of the object, " without suggesting colour, or any other quality ; and, of " consequence, that there is no sensation appropriated to " visible figure, this quality being suggested immediately " by the material impression upon the organ, of which " impression we are not conscious.— To my apprehen- '^ sion nothing can appear more manifest than this, that " if there had been no variety in our sensations of colour, ''and still more if we had had no sensation of colour " whatever, the organ of sight could have given us no *' information, either with regard io figures or to distan- " ces." Now Sir, I will only suppose that any reader, who had been perusing one of my prior publications of the analysis of Perception, {in which the fact of a variety OF COLORS forms the fundamental Principle,) had taken up your " Dissertation," and had read the Foot Note in question ; and I will then leave it to the judgment of any impartial person, or to your own candor, if they must not have been struck with violent doubts of my originality, and even of my ingenuousness of character ? As, from your last letter, you altogether admit that there is no hint of any such matter as the operation of A variety of colors in perception, in any one of your prior writings up to the appearance of your Disser- tation in the year 1815 ; it must be allowed to have been a most unfortunate accident for me, that you should have brought before the public a claim to a long antecedent XI knowledge of the fact in question, just after I had made two or three successive attempts to bring the matter into not'< e as my own original suggestion. And it must also be admitted, that, to those who may have perused my statements, it w^as giving the matter an aspect of some implied particular meaning, that you deemed it worth your while to bring the claim forward in a Work profes- sedly only Historical, when you had never thought it wor- thy of notice in any of your Volumes which treat directly of the Subject. I must however request you to observe, that I have never at all imputed to you any intention to injure me by this proceeding : On the contrary, I have, throughout the discussion, I hope with the utmost consi- deration for your station and character, always made the supposition of its being merely an accidental co-incidence. But I cannot help expressing my surprise that yoo should have been so slow to understand, what I have repeatedly endeavoured to impress upon your attention, namely, that although I never was '* ojf ended ," nor supposed injury to have been meant, I was unfortunately laboring under an intolerable pressure from what you had published ; which, until it should be removed by your explanation in some public channel, must actually amount to a suffocation of my past and future endeavours ; and that, too, attended with additional very painful feelings. Sir; It is impossible for any person for a moment to doubt, what the eifect of your Foot Note must haie been ,- and, unless counteracted, must continue to he ; upon the minds of that very large and important class of readers who will make it a point to read your Dissertation ; and, (much more than this,) upon that far larger number which will continue to find your Foot Note recorded in a Vehicle of such extensive circulation as the Encyclopedia Britan- nica. I blush when 1 yield to the necessity od' feeling, that every one of that class of persons, who may happen to take up either any former publication of mine or any Xll that I may still be enabled to produce, including the Volume now submitted to the Public, if they be not aware of any thing to the contrary, whenever they perceive that I am endeavouring to advance any matter as deduced iiom. the generic principle of a variety of COLORS, they cannot choose but throw the thing from them with unqualified disgust, under the impression that I was attempting to impose upon the public us an ori- ginal matter of my ozcn, a thing which had been known to Professor Stewart '' more than forty years^ But, although this certainly is the most painful con- sequence of what you have published ; there is another eflfect, which, if not counteracted, must present a complete bar to my hope of being useful in the walk in which I have been engaged. This is, that you have mentioned the matter concerning a variety of colors as a mere barren inconsequential fact ; and the natural conclusion with readers, from this, must be, that I am en- gaged in some very mistaken or frivolous research, when I offer to the public, as a matter pregnant with the most extensive philosophical consequences, a fact which, although it has been known to Professor Stewart more than forty years, has not been found by him to involve any philosophical consequence whatever. It was under the pressure of these two evils that I privately addressed you, between two and three years ago, and have repeated the appeal in several subse- quent letters, to request that you would explain the matter, and place me, as far as possible, in safety from its effects, by acknowledging my priority in the suggestion of the generic principle in question, in some public chan- nel, especially in the Second Dissertation which it was understood you were to furnish to the Encyclopedia; this being the only channel commensurate with that in which I am a sufferer. XIU After several intermediate communications with which you honored me, of an indecisive tenor ; you have, at length, under date the 30th of August last, vouchsafed me the satisfaction of admitting that priority which I claimed : but, although you acknowledge this in so far as regards yourself, you have qualified the recognition with an intimation that the matter at issue is of an older origin; and this alone would place me under the necessity to ani- madvert upon a part of your letter, which I shall for .this purpose transcribe. But farther, I am to observe, you have not for a moment listened to my request that you would counteract the evil pressing upon me, by offering an explanation of the matter in any public chan- nel. Nothing therefore is left for me, but to endeavour to right myself in the channel of my own publication. Your last letter being in answer to my urgent repre- sentation, that I was upon the very eve of publishing the following Volume, and that I could not possibly go before the public without noticing the matter ; you of course intended the answer to be final, and that I should make this use of it. It appears therefore necessary for me to offer some observations upon the following part of it. " You refer to something I have said about Varieties " of colour ; and call on me to acknowledge your priority. " The only passage I can discover in which I have used " that expression, is in pp. 100, 101, where I have men- " tioned as a self-evident proposition, that ' if there had " ' been no variety in our sensations of colour, and still " ' more if we had had no sensation of colour whatever, " * the organ of sight could give no information either with " ^ respect to figures or to distances.* If this be the pas- " sage which has given you offence, I must take the " liberty of observing, that I have taken no credit to my- *' self for the novelty of the remark, and which is to be XlV ** found in various books written fifty years before I ever " heard of your name. I shall only mention the first ^' volume of Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress of " Language, where it is expressly said, that ' Colour is " ' the primary perception of the sense of Seeing, and that " ' the others are only consequential. Figure and Magni- " * tude' (he adds) ' are nothing else but colour of a certain " ' extent and terminated in a certain manner.' (Vol. i. 2d " Edit, page 26. Edin. 1774.) Should this really be the " observation you allude to (and I cannot possibly think " of any other), you have my free consent to take the cre- " dit of the discovery ; nor shall I ever dispute your " originality. I have only to request, on the other hand, " that you shall not insist on any acknowledgment on " my part, that I learned it from your publications. — If " from this principle which has so long remained barren " in the hands of others, you have been able to deduce " any important consequences, the greater is the praise " due to your inventive powers, and to your philosophi- " cal sagacity.'* With regard to this passage of your letter ; I must, in the first place, beg to point out to you a most important consideration ; namely, that although it is your own Foot Note that you have quoted in it, and which cer- tainly is the very matter of which I have complained, you have entirely omitted that part of it which asserts that the matter in question had been contemplated by you "more than forty years ago." Now this assertion, of yo\ir forty years knowledge of the fact, is the very point which, it is quite manifest, has borne with intolerable weight, not only upon my subject and prospects, but also upon my claims to sincerity or ingenuousness ; because it naturally leads any reader to conclude, that you must have mentioned so old a fact in some one or other of your former writings XV which treat properly of the Mind; and that, from the nature of my studies, I could not have been ignorEuit that y6u were before me in it. Yet you omit this part of your Note ; and persevere in supposing that I am " offended :'* when the unfortunate truth is that I am not offended, but am very seriously harmed, and have only sought for relief. Next ; With regard to the " discovery'' of the generic fact in question, namely, that A variety of colors is necessary for the perception of visible outline ; although I shall state my reasons for confidently believing that the fact resides with myself, I freely acknowledge it is so self-evident a thing that I shall never plume myself upon the discernment of it, unless from the negative con- sideration that it never has been adverted to by those who have gone before me. And, as the deduction of the Four Specific Laws of Vision is the matter in which all the importance of the Subject lies ; and there is no fear that I can be deprived of the originality of this mat- ter ; it would certainly not be worth a controversy to insist upon my claim to the mere generic fact. But, as I have had occasion to mention repeatedly, both in former publications and in the course of the following Volume, that it is not to be found in any author with whom I am acquainted ; and, as it will greatly conduce to the advancement of the Subject to have the merits of the fact clearly ascertained, at the same time that I feel it to be absolutely incumbent upon me to justify my own assertions ; it is impossible for me to forego a specific answer to this part of your letter. First ; As you say the generic fact is " to be found " in various books ;" and have quoted Lord Monboddo's work as a particular instance ; it may be presumed you had no better one in your recollection, at the moment. You must. Sir, then allow me to express my surprise, that you should for a moment offer the passage from Lord XVI Monboddo's work, as an instance of an assertion that a VARIETY of colors is necessary to the perception of visible outline. You have quoted the passage correctly. But; Does the assertion that " Figure and Magnitude are '* nothing else but colour of a certain extent, and terminated '^ in a certain manner,'* furnish the most distant hint of the MANNER in which color is terminated'^ Upon this occasion I must observe, after many years intense study of this part of our constitution, that there is a subtilty in the phenomena of vision, which renders even the most self-evident facts extremely diffi- cult to hit ; although nothing can be more manifest the moment after they have struck us. You acknowledge that you have looked into the Essay on Consciousness, which I had the honor to send to you in the year 1812. Now, in page 47 of that Volume I incipiently broached the fact concerning a variety of colors ; but it was not until the year 1813 that I was able to publish a clear statement even of the generic principle ; and it was some- what later than that, that I was first enabled to deduce the other three laws of vision, so as to form the general analysis of perception ; — every one of which laws, however, is as self-evident as the generic fact itself. I state these circumstances merely to show, that Philo- sophers might, and indeed I have myself all along pointed out the fact that they always have entertained the supposition that '' Visible Figure is nothing else but color terminated in a certain manner" but, that this is being {in point of consequences) no less than an infinite distance from discerning the simple self-evident truth of nature, that visible figure i$ nothing but a contrast between two colors. As a proof of this ; the supposition of Lord Mohboddo, or of any other of the adherents of the Ideal Theory, leaves the Subject of Perception within the Province oimexe physical or inductive science ; whereas, the moment we recognize that a visible line is only a contrast between two of our own sensations of colors. ±S ii we discern that a line is an eternal and necessary result of the phenomena, and Perception becomes instantly ac- knowledf^ed for demonstrative science, strictly speaking ! When a writer is treating philosophically of the na- ture of Visible Magnitude and Figure, as was the case with Lord Monboddo ; and makes use, as he did, of the phrase " terminated in a certain manner;" there are but two possible meanings which this expression can con- vey ; either it betrays that the writer does ^ot know the manner, so as to be able to state it precisely or philo- sophically, or else, that a description of it would demand some inconvenient expense cf words. Now I put it to the. common sense of every person ; Whether, if an author had at all known the strict simple fact, that a visible figure is the TERMINATION OF ONE COLOR by ANOTHER COLOR, he would have expressed himself in such a dark, im- meaning, and in such case unnecessarily affected and pompous phraseology, as to say that visible figure is " colour terminated in a certain manner." The matter speaks for itself: — the phrase " terminated in a certain " manner " is a manifest indication of the ignorance of the particular manner in which it IS terminated. And here I must beg to impress upon your attention, the infi- nite difi'erence th^re is between a truth being self-evident ti'hen suggested, and its being infallibly evident without being pointed out. All the Propositions in the analysis of Perception are as self-evident as the Axioms of Geo- metry; and yet, the present discussion will furnish ample evidence that the truths which those Propositions affirm have in all ages escaped detection. I will myself suggest to you the name of an author who, I think, has approached far more nearly to the fact under consideration than Lord Monbdodo ; but who is yet vastly distant from the truth in question.' Bishop Berkeley, (in his 'New Theory of t^ision, Prop. 156.,) where he is inquiring what progress a Spirit, en* Hu, Mi. . b XVIU dowed with no Sense except that of Sight, could make in the knovyleclge of Geometry, expresses himself in the following terms. — *' All that is properly perceived by *' the Visive Faculty amounts to no more than Colours '' with their Variations and different proportions of light " and shade." — And then he says, — " It's true, there be '' divers of 'em perceived at once ; and more of some, *' and less of others ; But accurately to compute " their Magnitude, and assign precise determinate Pro- '' portions between things so variable and inconstant, " if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a *' very trifling and insignificant labour." What Berkeley has said in this passage with regard to Geometry, is manifestly just : but the fact he de- scribes, if he had seen a little farther into it in its charac- ter of a fact of Perception, would have shown him a vast field of consequences in Pneumatology, which, as it happened, he entirely overlooked. As it is ; any per- son who is not accustomed to contemplate those distinc- tions between the connected phenomena of the mind, which to an ordinary observer appear to be hardly any distinctions at all, but which involve vast results in science, would naturally suppose, that an author who has expressed himself as Berkeley has done in the above passages, must certainly have discerned the simple strict fact that visible figure or outline is the termination of one color hy another color : nay, after all the attention I have paid to the subject, it appears to me a miracle that Berkeley should not have discerned this : and yet I will venture to believe that his whole writings bear the most indisputable evidence of his having been en- tirely in the dark with regard to this simple fact. Not only are there no such expressions in his works, as that of Visible Figure or Outline being at all a Partition between TWO Colors ; but, more than this, he in one place talks positively of Visible lines as being them- XIX SELVES COLORS. Thus iti Prop. 131, of his New The- ory of Vision, he says, " A Blue and a Red line 1 can '^ conceive added together into one sum, and making one " continued line." How, then, is it possible that Berkeley should have discerned that a Visible Line is a thing be- tween, two colors ; when we have his express affirma- tion that A VISIBLE LINE IS ITSELF SOME ONE COLOR, such as "a Blue," or "a Red line?" Besides this; Berkeley never supposed Perception to be any other than a subject of Inductive Science; whereas if he had for a moment adverted to the fact that a line is a thi)i; OF A BELIEF IN A CONTINUANCE OF THE LAWS OF NATURE. 1. Of the Fh^st of these two Subjects, — Exposition of arbitrary assumptions with regard to it. In eommencing the present Section, I am under the necessity to remark, that the distinguished wri- ter upon whose doctrines I have already so re- peatedly animadverted^ at the same time that he has pronounced it to be unphilosophical to attempt to argue either against or in favor of the exist- ence of a material world, has nevertheless made this problem a very conspicuous object of his so- licitude, in each of his succeeding Volumes, From the fact of the interdiction which I have already noticed ; it might naturally be conjectured, that these repeated resumptions of the subject were for the sole purpose of exhorting philosophers not to meddle with it, one way or the other: But this »BCT. IV.] FIRST LINES, 8cc. 101 is far from beino^ the case. On the contrary, Mr. Stewart is a principal and a very zealous advo- cate, on one side of the question. In the Second Vohimeof his Elements, especially, he has resumed the subject, with augmented animation : and there- in he appears to anticipate the most decisive suc- cess in the general opinion ; partly from a sug- gestion drawn from the speculations of Mr\ Turgot^ and partly from two or three 72ew considerations^ suggested by himself, as arguments " lohich might " more particularly have been pressed upon Berkeley^ " as proofs hoxv incompatible his ?wtio?is ivere with " those laws of human belief, to which the learned *' and the unlearned must in common submit." The striking inconsistency of interdicting a sub- ject, as being unphilosophical ; and, then, continu- ing to resume it, from time to time, with a suggestion of new arguments upon one side of it, cannot I think be rendered more manifest than by the simple statement of the fact. But as, in addi- tion to this, I am under the necessity to think, that the manner in which Mr. Stewart has treat- ed the subject, first and last, but more particu- larly in his Second Volume, is arbitrary in a most extreme degree ; and as I am strongly impressed with the necessity there is to point out and refute his assumptions in the most explicit manner, in order to rescue the Subject from a certain and de- plorable declension; 1 deem it unavoidable to examine, to a certain extent, what he has ad- vanced in that Volume with regard to it. 102 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. in one of the foregoing passages from the writ- ings of this author; it is remarked, that, "to " argue in favor of any of the fundamental laws " of human belief, is not less unphilosophical than " to call them in question." In expressing this remark, in the place alluded to, it is arbitrarily meant by Mr. Stewart, that to argue against the existence of a material world is to argue against a fundamental law of human belief The matter, moreover, is tranquilly assumed ; as if it were a self-evident truth which no one could ever think of doubting. We are, nevertheless, entitled to demand the proofs of this assumption. In this and similar cases, the inquirer is referred, by the Scotish Philosophers, to " Common Sense ;^' an authority which the School of Reid, strongly tenacious of its original assumption, still continues to recognise, notwithstanding the number of times it has been subjected to the pointed animadver- sion of different writers. The just, I cannot say the decorous severity, with which this Idol of the Northern Writers has been treated by some of their opponents, renders it unnecessary for me to be diffuse in commenting upon it here. I shall therefore only offer two, or three, im- pressive instances of the absurdity of subject- ing our judgment to this authority ; which evi- dences, I apprehend, must prove abundantly con- clusive. In the first place, however, I would briefly ob- serve, that there are two distinct kinds of common «KCT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 103 sense, which are extremely different in their natures; although hoth kinds appear to be confounded toge- ther by the advocates in favor of a material world. The one is legitimate and infallible ; the other spurious and very usually fallacious. By the former we judge the self -evident relations betzveen our ideas : by the latter we mistake i^elative truths for absolute ones, and apparent facts for realities, I shall offer an example of each kind. Spurious Common Sense informs mankind, that the earth is fixed, and the sun and stars in motion round it ; that there is an absolute up and down, and that men always walk with their heads up- permost ; that the blade of an oar seen in the water, and the steeple of a church through a waving pane of glass, are crooked ; that red, blue, and yellow, and all other phantoms of colors, are with- out the mind and at various distances from it ; that we perceive external objects, and that these objects are made of ^/z i'sert solid substa?2ce called matter. Now every one of these judgments, reserving only the two last, is notoriously known to be absolutely false and chimerical. It is therefore undeniable that the two last-mentioned judgments are found in very bad society, and they are therefore legitimate objects of suspicion and of scrutiny. Legitimate or Intuitive Common Sense, on the con- trary, comprehends, among its innumerable objects, such propositions, or judgments, as the following. It is impossible for blue to be yellow, or for crook- ed to be straight ; for right to be wrong ; or for truth to be falsehood. Each of these is a law, 104 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. which no man of sane mind, either ignorant or learned, ever attempted to disbelieve, ivhtther he believed in the real existence of right and wrong, or of any of the other named principles, or not ; because this law merely affirms a necessary relation between two of our own ideas. But, hereupon I would ask ; Does Mr. Stewart mean to assume, that there never was any man of sound mind who disbelieved the existence of a ma- terial world ? Or Can it be meant, that we have the same sort of evidence of the existence of a mate- rial world, that we have of the equality of two and two? Dr. Beattie, however, asserts fully to this amount. Not to repeat such names as those of Male- branche and Berkeley, in our own quarter of the globe ; Can it be necessary, again, to put philo- sophers in mind, that a large proportion of the most enlightened part of the species, during a long succession of ages, has uniformly rejected the be- lief of a material world, as a mere delusion ? What then becomes of the assumption that a belief in matter, is a fundamental law of human belief? Can any procedure be more directly contrary to the spirit of the inductive philosophy, or more un- conformable to the analogy of the development of science among the species, than to attempt to uphold the mere natural prejudices of mankind, against the results of their mature observation and profound re^ flection ? The utmost that Mr. Stewart was warranted by induction, that is by the general history of the philo- SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 105 sophical opinions of the species at large, to have assumed in the present case, was, that to argue against a material world would be to argue against a universal prejudice of untaught men. Now, How many such prejudices are known to be totally void of foundation in reality? Will it for a moment be denied, that every man, except philosophers, is as confidently assured that the phantoms we call red, blue, and yellow, are xvithout the mind and at "various distances from it, as he Is of the existence of a material world ? But all philosophers are firmly convinced that one of these conceptions is false : Then, Why may not the other be false, also ? So late, in the progress of human knowledge, as the time of Bacon, it was as fair an opinion, for any philosopher, to have urged, (upon the autho- rity of what the Scottish writers have called Com- mon Sense) that the earth is fxed, as it now is for Professor Stewart to assert the existence of a mate- rial world, upon the same authority. — Dr Reid and his distinguished Successor would be confidently forward to teach mankind, that, in believing the earth to be fixed, they have been prof oundly imposed upon by this very kind of Common Sense which, they hold up as the sole authority for our belief in the existence of matter ! Can any procedure, then, be more absurd, than to reject this authority as ignorant in the one case, and yet not to suffer it so much as to he doubted m the other 1 It is not to be wondered at, though it is to be re- gretted, that a pertinacious maintenance of such arbitrary and contradictory assumptions as these, 106 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. should have irritated a late celebrated writer, to a tone of animadversion that was certainly discre- ditable to philosophy. The only supposed evidence that any person what- ever has, of the existence of matter, is the belief of ordinary men that they touch its solidity. So late as the time of Locke and of Newton, the opinion was universal and unshaken, that this belief was founded on a reality : Bodies were supposed to act upon other bodies by the medium of contact and impulse. But, What (it may be asked) has now become of this doctrine of contact and impulse, so long estal)lished and so consecrated in the opini- ons of natural philosophers? The answer is, that it is now universally acknowledged, by men of science, to be false and groundless in all the of^di- nary cases in which it was believed to ham existed ; and it is not known to be true in any case what- ever. Had not, indeed, the natural prejudice of the species been too strong for the control of reason in time past, there can be no doubt that the con- traction and the bending of metals, (without requir- ing any other evidence or consideration) ought to have led mankind to reject the notion of solidity, the characteristic quality of defined dead matter. It is now known and undisputed, on all sides, that a pressure of less than about eight hundred pounds weight cannot bring a square inch of the body of a man, into what is called physical contact with any other body. Mankind, therefore, are certainly deceived, when they think that they touch matter. What, then, becomes of the supposed fun-, damental lofw of human bdief by which men, upon \ SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 107 this very supposed but unreal fact alone, assume the existence of matter ? Neither the ancient believers in matter, nor yet such modern Apostles of Materialism as Hobbes and Spinosa, perhaps, ever doubted the doctrine of touch or contact. It was natural, therefore, and defensible in them to believe in the existence of matter. But can it be defensible in the philoso- phers of the present age, to preach this slavish subjection to a prejudice, after it has been uni- versally acknovi'ledged, that to a very great extent, and so far as we know, it is found to be void of truth ; which, certainly, leaves a strong presump- tion that it is void of truth altogether ; even without taking in such conclusive evidences as the occa- sional contraction of the most dense substances. The proofs, however, of the non-existence of matter, I must here remark, will have to be dis- tinguished as being of two essentially different kinds. One of these is, that what mankind have, until of late years, taken for solidity, is found to be NOT SOLIDITY : this proof is fully recog- nised in physical science, and has been touched upon here only incidentally. The other (which will be the proper object of analysis in the sequel) is, that the Extension which is vulgarly taken for the Extensioji of matter, is in reality the extension of ovR OWN Minds. Upon this occasion it is important to remark, how inconsistently Professor Stewart has reasoned, 108 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. in what he has advanced upon the present subject, which occupies a very considerable part of the Second Volume of his Elements. In Chap. 1. Sect. 3. of that Work, in which place he adverts to " The argument from universal " consent on which so much stress is laid by the " ancients" — (* This the Greek says, and this the * barbarian says, and the inhabitant of the Con- * tinent, and the Islander ; and the wise, and the * unwise;') he continues his observations thus. " It cannot be denied, that, against this sum- " mary species of logic, when employed without *' any collateral light, as an infallible touch-stone of " philosophical truth, a strong objection immedi- ** ately occurs. By what test (it may be asked) is " a principle of common sense to be distinguished " from one of those prejudices to which the whole " human race are irresistibly led in the first in- " stance by the constitution of their nature ? If no " criterion of truth can be pointed out but univer- " sal consent, may not all those errors which Bacon " calls idola tribus claim a right to admission among " the incontrovertible axioms of science? And " might not the popular cavils against the suppo- *^ sition of the earth's motion, which so long ob- " structed the progress of the Copernican system, ** have been legitimately opposed, as a reply of pa- " ramount authority, to all the scientific reason- " ings by which it was supported ?" Upon reading this passage ; Are we not strongly called upon, to mark how powerfully and con- clusively it turns to the demolition of Mr. Stewart's SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 109 own argument for the existence of a material world ? Will it, for a moment, be said, that we have any ** collateral light,'' (beside our natural prejudice) which can bring the belief of a material world within the exception which he has made from the general rule ? Has not Dr. Reid himself con- clusively acknowledged, that the belief in a ma- terial world " disclaims the authority of reason ?" Or, Will Professor Stewart continue, in his future Editions, to retain that passage, wherein he tells the world that Reid's meaning has been " grossly " misapprehended;' and that Reid " appeals to rea- " soning, and to reasoning alone,'' in his contro- versy with Berkeley upon this subject ? Mr. Stewart appears, indeed, to lean, for support, upon a criterion of a first truth suggested by Father Buffier, namely, " That its practical influ- " ence should extend even to those individuals " who affect to dispute its authority." But this, I must observe, is no other than a deplorable so- phism, when attempted to be applied to the belief of a material world; and I cannot help adding, that this sort of misconception appears to me to pervade what Mr. Stewart has advanced on the subject, in this part of his work, in a very surprising degree. It may serve to give the reader a clear appre- hension of the merits of the following discussion, to observe, in this place, that the denial of a ma- terial world, is not a denial of an external world, but is a vastly different thing. The differ- ence between these two conceptions will be fully no FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. illustrated in the course of this section. At pre- sent, all that is requisite for me to observe farther, with regard to it, is, that neither the Hindoo sys- tem nor even that of Berkeley at all denies the ex- istence of an EXTERNAL WORLD ; And, likewise, that my own view of the subject, which is vastly foreign to that of Berkeley, and perhaps does not coincide exactly with that of the Hindoo philoso- phy, recognises an external world in the fullest extent. If Mr. Stewart, therefore, had only asserted, that every man who pretends, in his speculations, to deny the existence of an external world, never- theless believes it in his practice ; he would have asserted a first truth according to the criterion of Buffier. But if he meant to imply, (as his whole reasonings throughout leave no doubt he did,) that a belief in an external world is necessarily a belief in a material world, he has confounded two things that are as different from each other as light and darkness ; a misconception which, there is reason to think, has been very prevalent in the world, but which one would not expect to be en- tertained by a philosopher of such eminence. As an evidence, however, that this has been done in the present instance ; I remark the follow- ing observation of Mr. Stewart : " Had Copernicus " not only asserted the stability of the Sun, but, *' with some of the Sophists of old, denied any " such thing as motion existing in the universe, ** his theory would have been precisely analogous ** to that of the non-existence of matter; and no " answer to it could have been thought of more per- SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. HI " tinent and philosophical, than that which Plato " is said to have given to the same paradox in the " mouth of Zeno, by rising up and walking before " his eyes." I have no doubt that my judgment will suffer, here, in the opinion of Mr. Stewart, when I hazard the avowal of an intention to argue, in the sequel, as a matter of demonstrative evidence, that the laugh, in this case, must turn against Plato, in so far at least, that, although there be motion in the universe, it can never be perceived by us. But, whether this fact shall be established or not, I confidently venture to affirm that there is a vast and infinite difference between a denial of motion in the universe y and a denial of the existence oj matter. For, if it should be rigidly demonstrated, as I think it will, that we never can perceive motion ; it will neverthe- less remain, not only that we shall act upon a belief in motion^ but that we shall also legitimately infer its existence from our reasonings. But, contrary to any analogy of this, if the existence of matter should be logically disproved, the philosophical part of mankind will then reject the belief of mat- ter, both in speculation and in practice ; and all that they will retain, upon this subject, will be an irresistible belief, not in matter, but in an ex- ternal WORLD OF SPIRITUAL BEINGS AND THEIR ENERGIES ; which energies must, in their operation, have the same effect upon us that the qualities of matter could have if they existed. The truth, then, is, that, '* Had Copernicus not " only asserted the stability of the Sun, but denied " any such thing as motion in the universe ;" his 112 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. theory would have been precisely analogous to that of a denial of an external world ; but it would, certainly, 7iot have been in the smallest degree analogous to a denial of a material world. I confess, I entertain a confident hope, that the distinction which I have now pointed out, and the farther illustration of it which will be submitted in the course of the section, will place the sophistry of Mr. Stewart's reasonings upon this subject in a most satisfactory light, and will clear the way com- pletely for the speculation which is to follow in the next Chapter. In a former part of the same Section, this author has a passage, which appears to me to be an- other striking instance of the same kind of sophistry. He says — " The paramount autho- " rity of common sense or common reason of " mankind, being equally recognised by all par- " ties," (Surely, what Mr. Stewart, Dr. Reid, and Dr. Beattie, have called common sense, has not been recognised, as paramount, by all parties) ** all^ " that remained for examination was, — whether " the belief of the existence or that of the non-ex- *' istence of the material world, was sanctioned by "this supreme tribunal. For ascertaining this " point, nothing more was necessary than an ac- " curate analysis of the meaning annexed to the '' word existence; which analysis would ha^^e at " once shown, not only that we are irresistibly led " to ascribe to the material world all the indepen- *' dent reality which this word expresses, but that SECT. ly.] THE HUMAN MIND. 113 " it is from the material world that our first and " most satisfactory notions of existence are drawn.' '* The mathematical affections of matter (extension " and figure,) to which the constitution of the mind " imperiously forces us to ascribe existence, not ^' only independent of our perceptions, but ne- ** cessary and eternal, might more particularly " have been pressed upon Berkeley, as proofs how " incompatible his notions were with those laws of ^' belief, to which the learned and the unlearned " must in common submit." Throughout the whole of this passage, as in many other places, the very thing in dispute (the reality of matter) is over and over assumed as if all parties were agreed with regard to it ; and it is curiously asserted, that the controversy is to be settled by an accurate analysis of the import an- ' Has not Mr. Stewart shown, from a supposed case, in the 1st. Vol. of his Elements, Chap. 1. Sect. 4, " that, even on the sup- " position that certain impressions on our organs of sense arene- ** cessar\ to awaken the Mind to a consciousness of its ownexist- " ence ; yet all this might have happened, without our having *' any knowledge of the qualities, or even of the existence, of a " material world?' — And, instead of the notion of our existence being drawn, properly speaking, from the material world, atall; Has not Mr. Stewart, in the same place, and in various other parts of his writings, insisted that '* The moment a sensation happens,^ " man must necessarily acquire the knowledge of two facts at '* once ; that of tlie existence of the sensation, and that of his " own existence, as a sentientbeiug ]" How, then, does this author, in the above passage, assert, that, "ft is from the material " WORLD that our first and most satisfactory notions of exist- ** ence are drawn?" — Can any contradiction be more manifest 1 Hu, Mi, ' H 114 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. nexed to the word existence^ which would at once show that we ascribe to matter all the independent reality which this word expresses. Thus it is made to appear, that it is not matter, but only its independent existence that is in dispute. 1 do not pretend to understand the distinction which is herein meant to be implied : but I will venture to believe that a more glaring mass of sophistry than the whole passage comprises is not often to be met with. In the close of it, for one instance, it is first arbitrarily assumed that extension and figure are mathematical affections of matter : and then our being forced to ascribe to these an existence inde- pendent of our perceptions, is appealed to, as a proof of the EXISTENCE of matter. Can it possibly be expected that men will prostrate their under- standings to a continual repetition of such gra- tuitous assumptions as these ? Who has proved that extension is an affection of matter, rather than of MIND ? Is not this the very question in dispute ? The Hindoo system (and that view also which I propose to follow out) asserts the independeiit reality of external space; the belief of whose existence, in- dependent of our perceptions, is certainly forced upon us : but, undeniably, this belief is as compati- ble with the supposition that space is filled only with MIND and ITS ENERGIES, as that it is filled with MATTER and ITS QUALITIES; and, in order to ascertain which of these two supposi- tions is founded in truth, we must resort to very different arguments. SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 116 2, Of a Belief in the continuance of the Laws of Nature, — ■ No argument in favor of a Material World, — If coupled with an assumption of the existence of Matter^ leads directly to Atheism, The views which have been entertained by Pro- fessor Stewart, of the foregoing subject, being continued upon more advanced ground than that of his Predecessor ; and some of his reasonings, with regard to it, appearing to superficial observa- tion, to bear with very considerable moment upon the question concerning the existence of a material world ; I am under the necessity, before I quit the subject, to examine the merits of what he has far- ther superadded to the reasonings of Dr. Reid upon this head. For this purpose, therefore, I quote the follow- ing passages from his Philosophical Essays. He commences the Second Chapter of his Se- cond Essay, with saying, that " Reid's account of " the existence of matter, although correct so far " as it goes, does not embrace all the circum- " stances of the question." This, together with the subsequent matter which he advances upon the subject, I may observe by the way, is one of the many instances of his manner of enforcing the doc- trine that it is unphilosophical to argue either against or in favor of a material world. Four or five pages 116 FIRST LINES OF [chap. i. farther on, however, he expresses himself as fol- lows. " In treating of a very different subject, I had *' occasion, in a former work, to refer to some phi- " losophical opinions of Mr. Turgot, coinciding " nearly with those which I have now stated. " These opinions are detailed by the author, at con- " siderable length, in the article * existence' in the *' French Encyclopedic ; but a conciser and clear- '' er account of them may be found in Condorcet's " discourse prefixed to his Essay, On the applica- " tion of analysis to the probability of decisions " pronounced by a majority of votes. From this " account it appears that Turgot resolved * owr " * belief of the existence of the material world into " ' our belief of the continuance of the lazvs of nature;'' " or in other words, that he conceived our belief of " the former of these instances, to amount merely " to a conviction of the established order of physi- " cal events, and to an expectation that, in the '* same combination of circumstances, the same *' event will recur. It has always appeared to me, " that something of this sort was necessary to com- " plete Dr. Reid's speculations on the Berkeleian *^ controversy." &c. After some continuation of this passage, Mr. Stewart adds, " To myself the difficulty appears " to resolve itself, in the simplest and most philo- *' sophical manner, into that law of our constitu- " tion to which Turgot, long ago, attempted to " trace it. If this conclusion be admitted, our *' conviction of the permanent and independent SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 117 " existence of matter" (ivrATTER) " is but a particu- " lar case of a more general law of belief extend - " ing to all other phenomena. The generalisation " seems to me to be equally ingenious and just ; " and while it coincides perfectly in its spirit and " tendency with Reid's doctrine on the same point, " serves to render that doctrine at once more pre- " cise and more luminous." From the triumphant tone in which the above passages are expressed, there can be no doubt that Professor Stewart advanced them as contain- ing one of the most luminous and happy concep- tions of modern philosophy, in support of the as- sumption of a material world. They seem, in his opinion, to consummate the glory of Dr. Reid, upon the great question at issue; and, to leave us nothing to desire. From the imposing attitude which is thus assumed, there can be little question, that, in the opinion of many of Mr. Stewart's readers, they have appeared to be unanswerably conclusive. The result of the present discussion, however, I trust, will furnish an impressive lesson to such persons as are but slightly acquainted with the subject, how unsafe it is to trust to spe- cious assumptions and the authority of great names. At least, I hope not to fail in satisfying my readers, that it is a mere sophism to attempt to bring in the suggestion of Turgot, to support the reasoning of Dr. Reid in favor of a material world. In the first place, however, I am to observe, that, if the supposition be made, that our reliance 118 FIRST LINES OF [chaf. j. on the existence of a material world is a funda- mental law of human behef, I shall follow out this supposed law to consequences which have been very little anticipated by Mr. Stewart. But I shall postpone this consideration, to the more immediate one. Supposing, therefore, that our belief in the ex- istence of an external world resolves itself into a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature ; I ask, Upon w^hat authority has Mr. Stewart as- sumed that we are therefore to believe in the ex- istence of MATTER ? I humbly conceive that a more unwarranted assumption is not any where to be found, than this one. The laws of nature, it is well know^n, are no- thing more than a continued repetition of similar facts, in similar circumstances. These facts, them- selves, are nothing but changes of phenomena. The existence, or continued existence, of these changes, doubtless, implies the continued existence of some cause which occasions them. But, I would ask. By what effort of thought can any one discover, from this daturriy any reason whatever, which can incline him, in the slightest degree, toward a belief that this cause is a dead material substance, rather than a living spiritual one ? The specious manner in which Professor Stewart has assumed, that the conclusion of Turgot is a decisive evidence of the existence of " matter," is manifestly of a nature to captivate the opinion of a large proportion of his readers, and to induce SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 119 them to yield an implicit confidence in the judg- ment which he has formed of it; and, among those who may so lend their assent, there may, in all probability, be some who may, in the course of their lives, turn their attention seriously to philoso- phical speculations. In this, and other such cases, if the judgment in question be grounded on sophistry, it becomes of essential importance to point out its fallacy in the clearest way possible. I am therefore urged to solicit the reader's attention to the following exposition. It is altogether deplorable, to what a degree the doctrine of the non-existence of a material world has been misunderstood, even by the learned part of mankind, in this quarter of the globe. As for persons of any other description ; it is impossible that they should yield their assent to a proposition, the nature of which they cannot so much as com- prehend, in the abstract and unexplained terms in which it is usually put. When an ordinary person is told, in the language of Berkeley, that the chairs, the tables, the horses and the carts, which he perceives, are nothing but ideas in his own mind ; he internally blesses his lot, in having been endowed with good wholesome sound sense, which preserves him from being invaded by any such pitiable chimeras. — Horses and carts, nothing but ideas ? The thing is too much for any cool clear headed man, who is quite sure that he knows the taste of his bottle of wine, from the no FIRST LINES OF [chap, k idea he has of the same thing when he is not drinking it. The case, however, must be considerably altered, when it is explained to any such person, that, under the term idea, Berkeley and all other modern phi- losophers comprehend not only the thought of the taste of wine, but also the very sensation or taste of wine, itself. In other and more general terms, we are to observe, our ideas, which are of a great Variety of species, comprehend our most vivid and most agonising sensations, as well as our recollec- tions of these, and all our lightest or most shadowy thoughts. When, therefore, a man looks at a bottle of wine, he has a sensation, (which is an idea) of a dark color; which sensation (it will be demonstrated in its proper place) is all that he calls seeing his bottle. When he grasps if, in his hand, he has a sensation of touch ; which is all that he calls feeling his bottle. And when he takes some of the contents, in his mouth, he has a sensation of taste ; which is all that he calls tasting his wine. The color, the touchy and the taste, moreover, all which are 7nere sensations, he combines together, into a unity of object in his imagination, as the several qualities of one same substance ; and thus he forms the complex idea of wine : to which, if he be a man of any infor- mation, he may add some ideas of its various medicinal and other properties. In this case, accordingly, I confidently apprehend, the Berkeleian may challenge any person to show that a PERCEIVED bottle of wine is any thing else SE«T. iV] THE HUMAN MIND. 121 than an assemblage of sensations in the mind of him who perceives it. The great fault of the system of Berkeley, therefore, (besides his denial of Space) consists in this, that, instead of recognising our sensations for affections or certain states of our mind^ superinduced by the energies of some unper- CEivED external Power, he supposed these sensa- tions to be permanently-existing detached beings, which flit, like swallows, into and out of our mind ; — a supposition which, besides its revolting absurdity, leaves us entirely at a loss to conceive how these ideas are either produced or regulated, by the Great Mind which must be supposed to be, in some way or other, their Source and Governor. How simple and beautiful is it, in this case, to turn our attention, upon the other hand, to the vastly different nature of the Hindoo system ; which con- ceives the Creator to fill all space, and, by the Energies of his Omnipotent Power, to excite in our minds, from time to time, all those sensations, affections, or estates, of color, of touch, and of taste, which we, combining together, in our reason and imagination, contemplate as being individual complex wholes, of various kinds : while we are beneficently deceived into a belief, that they are things without, and at various distances from us ? This explanation, it is hoped, may serve to show, that ordinary persons are under a most profound and certain mistake, when they imagine (as they invariably do) that the things we perceive, if sup- posed to be in the mind, can have no reality of ex- 122 FIRST LINES OF [chap, i^ istence. The taste of a cherry, and the pain of the amputation of a limb ; are not only as vivid and as strong, but they are identically/ the very same, whe- ther we suppose the System of Berkeley, the Hin- doo System, or the Vulgar Opinion, to be that which really exists in nature. And a man, who should run under a cart wheel, would be as really crushed, agonised, and disjointed, upon any one of these schemes, as upon either of the other two. The truth of this exposition is unanimously ac- knowledged, by all persons who understand the subject; although sufficient attention has not been paid, by writers, to explain the thing in a popular manner, so as to remove the very general miscon- ception which is entertained with regard to it. In an enlightened and inquisitive age, like the present, it may be expected that the general igno- rance concerning this momentous fact must soon give place, to a knowledge more suitable to the other acquisitions of the day. And, especially, it may be hoped, that the learned part of the com- munity will be attracted by a subject which has suffered so deplorably from that general neglect and incredulity which has hitherto prevailed, with regard to it, not only among the great bulk of the reading community, but even among readers of a higher description. To return, now, to the afore-mentioned assumption of Professor Stewart ; It is quite clear that a conti- nuance of the lawsof nature, must be as much a reality SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 123 upon the supposition that all our perceptions are caused by the energies ofaspiritual substance, as upon that of their being caused by the modifications and changes of matter. Bishop Berkeley would have been as ready to suscribe to the conclusion of Turgot as Mr. Stewart has been, provided that conclusion had been explained, or modified, to regard only the existence of an external spiritual world ; and all that he would have objected to, would have been its perversion to assume the existence of A DEAD material woi'ld. — That Professor Stewart has gratuitously perverted it, and that his as- sumption is wholly unsupported by any logical foundation, I will venture to affirm. And I may with confidence assert, that our belief in the con- tinuance of the laws of nature, whether it be a law of the mind or not, is not at all applicable^ one way or the other, to the inquiry whether the external world is material or immaterial. I must there- fore, in the most express terms, protest against the use which Mr. Stewart has made of the suggestion of Turgot; as being an arbitrary assumption, which, from its speciousness and its exulting tone, there is reason to fear, might otherwise prove as destruc- tive to the interests of sound philosophy, as it is certainly unfounded in itself. 2. The remaining consideration of the present sub- section, is one which, I imagine, will be admitted to be of some importance, on account of the con- 124 FIRST LINES OF [chjip. i. sequences which it involves, whichever side of the subject be embraced. From our knowledge of analogous facts, there can be no doubt, that, if a child were but once hit by a stone, it would, upon the very next approach of a similar visible object, expect a similar painful sensation. If a second instance occurred, how- ever, with a blown bladder, instead of a stone, and, consequently, no hurt were to follow upon a stroke received from this object, the result of the approach of any third instance would be a degree of scepticism or doubt of the power of the object to produce pain. If, then, a third experiment were tried, with a visible lump, which, to the child's apprehension, appeared to be a stone, but which, upon contact, proved to be in reality nothing more than a mass of froth ; the consequence would be, that, in any fourth instance, the expectation of hurty and even the notion of solidity, would be left out of the child's imagination, in great part, or per- haps altogether. Thus the notion of solidity or of resistance, is attached by us to all bodies only through the teaching of induction ; and this a slow, and in some cases perhaps a very fluctuating induc- tion. The continual repetition of instances of contact, with hard and soft bodies, however, and a course of unavoidable observation, soon bring every hu- man being to a conviction, that similar objects, in similar circumstances, are followed by uniform re- sults. Let it therefore be supposed, that, from ex- perience, we acquire a confident belief in the con- SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 125 TiNUANCE of the laws of nature : and let it be fully assumed, that this belief is founded in an original suggestion of the mind that an object will in future affect us in the same way that it has done before. Having, therefore, once assumed the continuance of the laws of nature through the course of to- morrow^ precisely as they exist in our experience to-day ; I imagine it must be very difficult for us to assign any logical reason why we should believe that they will ever cease to exist ; for it must be absurd to talk of a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature, if we can at the same time believe that they may not exist the next hour ? If any one should attempt to escape this dilem- ma, by supposing that we believe in the perma- nency of the order of external events under a qualification^ namely, that the Deity may put an end to this order, whenever it shall please Him ; it must be ridiculous to talk of any such conjec- ture as this, as being a law of belief. Every law must point some particular way. A law, therefore, which leaves us permission to go directly and instantly in the face of it, can be no law at all. As the actual fact really is, in human thought, I grant we have a confident expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature; but if this be assumed for a law of the mind, I conceive it mani- festly forbids the supposition that the laws of nature can ever fail, to all eternity. If this view of the subject be admitted, its con- sequences are most important ; because, if it be a 1^ FIRST LINES OF [chap. r. law of our constitution to believe in the continu- ance of the laws of nature during the eternity to come; this will undeniably involve an obligation to believe that they have existed during the eter- nity PAST ; since, whatever can have no end, can never be supposed to have had a beginning. And thus, by a very short and demonstrative process, the assumption oi a belief in the permanence of the order of external events, if the subjects of this order be supposed to be composed o/* material substance, kads directly to Atheism. It is here to be remarked, that the result of such a law of the mind, when coupled with a belief in matter, is manifestly quite congenial with the opi- nions of many of the French Philosophers: But we cannot suppose it to be so to the views which are cherished by. Professor Stewart. It is now, on the contrary, to be suggested, how vastly different a result, from that above-mentioned, arises to our view, when a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature is coupled with an admission that these laws are no other than a regulation of the exerted energies of a Universal Spiritual Pow- er which is commensurate with the whole of infi- nite space, and which thus uniformly orders these energies, to the great end, that inferior spirits should thereby be enabled to anticipate the future, and govern their proceedings for the present from an experience of the past. The bare suggestion of such a view, must, doubt- SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 127 less, stimulate every deep reflecting mind, and even every mind that is at all actuated by a liberal curiosity, to examine any evidences which may be proposed, as being of a nature to authorise the admission of it as a reality, upon the basis of legi- timate science. At present, all that I desire to assert upon the subject immediately before the reader, is, that a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature, if assumed for a fundamental law of human belief is a subject either of a most welcome or a most inauspicious aspect, according as it is joined with a belief in the ej:istence of matter, or with an ad- mission that the external cause of our sensations is a SPIRITUAL AGENT. In the former case, it leads, or rather actually amounts, to sheer Atheism. In the latter, it presents a bulwark against Atheism, which must be the more secure the more we dis- cover the existence of arrangements in nature which promise to render its laws immutable and eternal. It must be obvious to remark, that the recent discoveries which have been made by Astrono- mers, which indicate an immutability of the pre- sent order of our planetary system, is a matter which bears with very serious moment upon the present subject. Nor need it be said what melan- choly results have been produced, in the opinion of those very minds which have made these sub- lime discoveries 5 — results arising in consequence of 128 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap, u a conclusion that this eternal order is that of a blind necessity ruling the chan^^es of unintelligent inert matter. From this consideration alone, it behoves all those who are at all in the subject, to weigh well the consequences which are likely to follow in the scientific world, according as men shall embrace one side, or the other, of the present question. If the laws of nature be imynutable, and be at the same time the ruled Energies of an Intelligent Being; we may with confidence hope, that there is an arrangement comprised in them, for the best possible destiny of the intellectual beings which exist under such a system. But if they be the laws of a necessary fate, ruling the phenomena of such a thing as dejined dead matter , their immuta- bility presents us only with a frightful and dis- tracting prospect, which cannot be contemplated with composure by any mind that is capal)le of reflection. I think I could not close the present chapter with any consideration more impressive, than leav- ing this consequence to operate with its real mo- ment upon the thoughts of ray readers. 1^ CHAPTER II. OF PERCEPTION, Jb ROM the nature of that analysis which I pro- pose to submit in the present chapter; it would have been the most desiraj>le way in other re- spects, to state it's principles as immediately as their requisite illustration would permit. But, owing to the subject being so little generally known, and the opinions of philosophers with regard to it being still so imperfectly understood, I apprehend it to be indispensable that I should previously furnish a comparative summary of the most considerable doctrines which have been ad- vanced concerning it. In the execution of this part of my design, I shall study the utmost pos- sible brevity* But as my purpose, with regard to that part of our constitution which is the subject of the analysis, is to render our views of it as com- Hu. ML I 130 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. plete as lies in my power, after having made it so peculiarly the object of my research ; I conceive it is incumbent upon me to endeavour to leave no material obscurity over the principal re-actions which the incompatible opinions of philosophers exhibit ; at the same time that I hope to be able to remove some of the confusion, which is to be found in the animadversions which writers have offered upon the views of each other with respect to it. If I should ultimately succeed in establishing the principles of the analysis, on that basis upon which I suppose it to rest ; I feel persuaded that no competent judge of the subject will deem this preparatory speculation either unimportant or re- dundant. Besides this summary ; I deem it requisite to occupy two distinct sections, with two other and collateral topics ; the pne, regarding the e.vternal mere physical occasion of our sensations of colors; the other, the essential object of primary perception. And I farther conceive it expedient, to offer a section immediately introductory of the proposed analy- sis ; for the purpose of stating an account of a par- ticular fact asserted by Proclus and by Earrow, whose concurrent opinions I have, upon a former occasion, found useful to appeal to, in soliciting the general attention to my own views. 131 SECTION FIRST. OF THE VIEWS WHICH HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED BY PHI- LOSOPHERS ON THE SUBJECT OF PERCEPTION. I 1 Of the Ideal Theory; Of ifs various Modifications and if s two different Si/stems. — Of the Theory of Reid. — It's Sole Foundation an Arbitrary Assump- tion, disproved by the case of the Youth who was couched by Cheselden. In all ages of the learning of the European World, from that of the earliest speculations of Greek philosophy down to the present time, it has continued to be the greatest desideratum of metaphysical research, to be able to show, upon any scientific or certain ground, what is the nature, and more especially what is the true place of residence^ of those poj^tions of figured extension w^hich appear to us to form the bases and the limits of our various sensations of colors. The importance of the solution of this problem, may be in some degree understood from what has appeared in the foregoing chapter: but it may upon this occasion be farther remarked, that its real importance is infinitely greater than has usual- ly been supposed, by the Philosophers of ancient Greece, or of modem Europe. Nothing, certainly, is 132 FIRST LINES OF [chap, tu more hid from ordinary observation, than that chain, which, when scientifically applied, is capable of connecting the nature of our Sensations of Co- lors with the Moral Conduct of our Species. But, from what is already advanced, it is evident I have in view to insist, that there is in reality such a chain : and I would here propose this fact, for a brief answer to the very natural question that first arises in the mind of every ordinary person, when he opens a book which has our Powers of External Perception for it's Subject ; namely. What is the Object or Utility of such speculations ? It was the opinion of Plato, and has been that of every philosopher from Plato down to Hume, that the extended objects in question are no other than the proper bases of our sensations of colors, such as they obviously appear, both to the ordinary man and to the philosopher. But it must be con- fessed, that this opinion has always rested upon no better foundation than that of obvious appear- ance. For, in the first place, it seems to have been very generally supposed, that the affections which we call sensations, are an order of beiiigs substan- tially distinct and detached from the mind itself And, secondly, an impervious obscurity has always hun^ over ihe process by which we perxeive visible figure or boundary line, through the instrumentality of our sensations. The earlier inquirers were led to believe, that those phantoms of the mind which we call 7xd, SBCT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 133 bluCy and yellow, are a sort oijilms eontinually sent off from the surfaces of bodies, and entering the mind by the channel of sight. And this puerile conceit, refined from time to time by various hypo- thetical modifications, has prevailed even down to the latest age, under the well-known title of the Ideal Theory. This theory of Ideas, moreover, had, until of late, increased in absurdity with it's growth; insomuch, that one of it's modern advo- cates, and this no less a philosopher than Mr. Hume, went the length of asserting, that ideas may be supposed capable of emst'mg by themselves, with- out requiring any mind as a subject of inhesion. With regard to this scholastic general hypothe- sis of loose detached ideas, whether it be that extreme modification of it which supposes their existence without any supporting mind, or any other variety by means of which the existence of a mind must be thought requisite for their support, it appears at present to be only deserving of the following brief remark, namely, that it is not only totally void of evidence, but that, if the supposition of it be made, it can present us with no means of ascer- taining, in the least degree, what is the real nature, or place, of those perceived figures which accom- pany our sensations of colors ; because, if the sensations of colors, themselves, be supposed to be things foreign to the thinking subject, it is self- evident that the figures which appear along with them must be supposed equally foreign. Accordingly, therefore, in taking the most cur- 134 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. sory view of the Ideal Theory, it is impossible to avoid remarking the surprising degree of oscitancy and absurdity which is the common fault of it's very best advocates ; and which renders their speculations, with regard to it, more like what we should expect to be the effusions of the most ordinary persons on the subject, than like the severe investigations of men of science, or the so- ber reflections of men of learning. Three conspicuous instances of the truth of this remark may be adduced, in the space of almost as few lines ; and the bare mention of these may sup- ply the place of a more extended animadversion. By Mr. Locke, our ideas have been placed some- times, and indeed for most part, in the mind ; but at other times in the brain. The Bishop of Cloyne has supposed our ideas to be sometimes in one mind, and sometimes in another. Mr. Hume had the singularity to suggest, that ideas appear to re- quire nothing for their support, and may therefore be supposed to exist without an inhesion in any mind at all ; and yet, by a surprising flight of in- consistency, he himself appropriated to the most vivid classes of these ideas the title of "impres- sions," — a name which manifestly involves the exist ence of some Substantive Intellectual Being that js impressed f One of those abstractions of mind, during which a person hunts about for any thing and at length finds it in his own hand, is not more ludicrous than this proceeding of Mr. Hume. And yet, it was Hume's Scepticism, in this very case, that I SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 135 spread alarm among the metaphysicians of the last age, and roused up some of them to a grave refutation of that which had heen thus remarkably refuted by it's author, in the very moment of it's ut- terance. The Metaphysical School of Reid presents the first systematic opposition which has been offered to the Ideal Theory, considered principally as consisting of the general hypothesis of loose detached ideas. Dr. Reid, urged by the danger apprehended from the above-mentioned Scepticism of Hume with regard to the existence of minds, resolved to attack this scholastic fabric : and to him is justly to be ascribed a great part of the credit of bringing it into merited contempt. But justice obliges us to acknowledge, that the labor and ingenuity of this achievement were in part anticipated by the approximation made toward the truth of the mat- ter by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and others. Both these French Philosophers, together with our countryman Hobbes, had ridiculed the conceit of supposing ideas to be films, flying off from the surfaces of bodies and entering the mind by the channels of the senses. And we do not find that Locke ever lent the smallest counte- nance to any such conceit. It therefore required scarcely a step farther, of sound rationality, to recognise our sensations, and other thoughts or ideas, as being nothing but occasional modifications or affections of the mind itself. 136 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. It must be granted, that it requires courage, if not genius, to point out and assert even the most in- dubitable dictates of reason itself, when the denial of them has been long consecrated and generally respected as an irrefragable truth. There is, even, much merit in logically pointing out, and uniform- ly insisting upon, a fact of the greatest moment in philosophy, which, to a very great extent, had cer- tainly been overlooked, and concerning which the best writers had deplorably vacillated. But it is, however, to be observed, agreeably with what I have already remarked in the foregoing chapter, that the fact in question was far from having been overlooked altogether. It is expressly acknowledged, both by Dr. Reid and by his distinguished Successor, that the asser- tion of the substantial identicalness of our ideas with the mind itself predominates in the writings of Locke : although it is worthy of remark, that nei- ther of those philosophers ascribe any merit to Locke for this; evidently because the latter consi- dered certain classes of these ideas to be extended. It is, moreover, to be remarked, that Dr. Reid was anticipated in his view of the subject by Anthony Arnauld, who also asserted the identicalness of our ideas with the mind ; though it is to be ac- knowledged that Arnauld, as well as Locke, wa- vered in opinion. i' Besides these instances, (to go no farther) it may be observed, that occasional expressions are to be found in the writings of Malebranche, of Berkeley, and of Hume, (the most determined advo- SBCT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 137 cates of loose detached ideas) which, at unawares, confess the truth of nature with regard to this point. The historical fact, indeed, is surprising; and, if it were not for the notorious oscitancy and in- consistency which so often occur in the specula- tions of Idealists, it would be scarcely credible ; but certain it is, that the hypothesis of detached ideas has always been entertained together with a con- comitant admission of the contrary, at least with re- gard to those vivid classes of our ideas which are called sensations. I think it may be rendering essential service to the subject, and must serve to put a reader upon his guard against taking the consistency of any authority upon trust, to state the particular evidence of this fact. Bishop Berkeley, in his New Theory of Vision, Prop. 41 , says, that to a man born blind and made tA see, " The objects intromitted by sight, would seem ** to him, (as in truth they are) no other than a new ** set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as " near to him, as the perceptions of pleasure or " pain, or the most inward passions of his soul." Here, then, we have a just acknowledgment, though at unawares, that our sensations o/'cglors and other such feelings, are not loose detached ideas, sometimes in one mind and sometimes in an- other, but are actually " passions of the soul." Perfectly in accordance with this sound doc- trine ; Malebranche has admitted, that " The things " in the mind are its own modifications, its sensa- '* tions, its imagination, its pure intellections, its 138 FIRST LINES OF [chap. h. " passions and affections. These are immediately " perceived; we are conscious of them, and have no " need of ideas to represent them to us." — I quote this passage from Dr. Reid's Essays, Essay 2, Chap. 13 ; not having Malebranche's Recherche by me. In addition to these evidences ; it hardly need be repeated, that the " Impressions" of Hume, and ih^ Impressions of Ari^toti^'e., are in a complete harmony and co-incidence with the above con- cessions of Berkeley and of Malebranche. I have considered it due, both to the subject and to the human understanding, thus to advert to the fact — that a recognition of the identicalness of our ideas with the mind itself, as being its own proper affections y originated by no means so lately as the speculations of Dr. Reid. It is, in reality, one of those great truths which nature tells to all men ; yithout, however, furnishing them with any such constraining^ and at the same time obvious proofs of it, as should prevent their being, in the infancy of science, warped out of their belief of it by some sinister accident; and, afterwards, from one ge- neration to another, misled by a deference to authority. It is a sufficient proof of the truth of this, to observe the most zealous and logical ad- vocates of the Ideal Theory occasionally forgetting themselves, and uttering expressions which justify the truth of nature, in manifest contradiction of their own general hypotheses. The visionary fabrics of detached ideas, which the Idealists, in different ages, have superadded to, or as it were huilt over, the true conclusion in which SECT. I.] • THE HUMAN MIND. 139 they have all concurred as above-mentioned ; present, indeed, in the light of modern science, an impressive proof of the unphilosophicalness, not to say the puerile and ridiculous conceits, with which all pneumatological speculations have been con- ducted, until within a very late period. The jilms of Epicurus ; The sensible species of Aristotle ; The seeing of all things in the ideas of the Divine Mind, conceived by Father Malebranche ; The supposi- tion of ideas being in the brain, suggested by Des Cartes and embraced by many modern metaphysi- cians ; The scheme of detached ideas, residing occasionally in the mind, but existing permanently when not therein, which was the manifest hypothesis of Berkeley ; And Lastly, The conceit of a congre- gation of loose ideas, unconnected by any tie or any mind to support them, which we owe to the genius of Hume ; All these different hostile and incompa- tible hypotheses, every one of xvhich, however^ agrees to deny the substantial identicalness of our ideas with the mind or thinking subject, are the various principal modifications under which the Ideal Theory has been presented for the approbation of mankind. The instance of Aristotle, himself, who enter- tained the supposition of sensible species flying off' from bodies, and nevertheless along with this held that the mind receives the form without the matter of things, affords a striking and conclusive illustration of the truth of my remark, that the general hypo- thesis of loose detached ideas has always been maintained in concomitance with a recognition of the identicalness of our sensations with the mind. 140 FIRST LINES OF • [chap. ii. And, I apprehend, the exposure of this vast incon- sistency brings the subject under the most sim- ple and satisfactory view. It is time to resume the view of that opposi- tion which has been set up against this multiform and chimerical fabric of ideas, by the School of Reid. Had Dr. Reid, in his philosophical speculations, only arrested the oscitancy of Locke, with regard to the nature of our primary ideas, and merely asserted, with uniform consistency, the prevalent and better doctrine of the latter upon this part of our constitution; the accession which Reid ac- tually brought to the subject would then have been without any alloy. But, unfortunately, a previous scholastic bias, with regard to the supposed nature of the mind, forced Dr. Reid to differ from Locke so far, as to deny that our sensations (of color and of touch) are extended : which step was, manifestly, a vastly different thing from only denying that these sensations are loose detached beings. By this denial of the extension of our sensations or phantoms of colors. Dr. Reid placed himself in an entirely new situation, and in a most extreme state of opposition, not only to the opinion of Locke, but also, as he himself freely confesses, to every other philosopher, from Plato downward, until the broaching of his own scheme. Moreover, the new doctrine of this philosopher violated the universal apprehension of all ordinary men, if pos- sible, in a still greater degree than it did the united ppinions of the learned ; for it is expressly acknow- ledged, both by Reid himself and by his Successor, jiBCT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 141 that " it is a natural bias in us to conceive white, " blue, and yellow, as something spread over the siir- ^' faces of bodies." — *' Elements of the Philosophy " of the Human Mind." Vol. I. Chap. 1. Sup. 2. I have cited this last passage for the particular purpose of animadverting upon a very momentous assumption with which it is coupled in the minds of the Scottish Philosophers, and which, indeed, is implied in one of it's own terms ; — an assumption which, in its want of any foundation in evidence, I must say, too much resembles some others, that have called for more pointed remark from the tranquil and therefore captivating manner in which they are insinuated, especially when proceeding from such high authority. By the word " bias,'' in this passage, it is meant to signify, that our sensations of colors are not in REALITY spread out, although they appear to us to be so. And thus it is arbitrarily and most aston- ishingly assumed, that we are grossly mistaken in the most confident judgments we form upon the phenomena of our own consciousness. All parties, with regard to this subject, are per- fectly agreed, that white, blue, and yellow, are \^\xve\y phenomena of conscious?iess. But, since this is so ; I confidently apprehend, it must be quite as easy for any man to be mistaken as to whether ^ sensation is in reality white, blue, oryelloxv, as for him to mistake whether it is in reality spread out. This is not the place where I propose ultimately 142 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. to refute the above-mentioned assumption, which has filled this department of the Philosophy of the Mind with mystery, embarrassment, and fallacy. The Second and Fifth Sections of this Chapter will contain the more full and regular evidence for that purpose. But I shall however, in this place, propose the following question, because I hope to show that it is altogether unanswerable ; while it is the only quarter from which the School of Reid appears to have looked for any support from induction, — I think, indeed, it cannot fail to prepare the mind of a reader for the result, in the sequel. — To point out the expediency of examining the question at this stage of the subject ; it is to be observed, that the thing in question is the funda- mental assumption of the philosophy of Reid, and the whole fabric of that philosophy must stand, or fall, with the fate of this assumption. First therefore, I would ask ; When the young man, who was couched by Cheselden, Jirst began to see. Did he thereupon become conscious of phantoms of colors which he conceived to be "SOT spread out ? Or, Did he fall, by degrees, into a BIAS of conceiving them to be spread out, after nature h3,d, Jirst of all, displayed to him white, blue, and yellow, not spread out ? It is known that this youth, first of all, con- ceived the very truth of nature, in so far as to feel convinced that every thing he saw touched his eye. I SECT. I] THE HUMAN MIND. 143 or, more properly speaking, was a phantom in his own mind. After this, by degrees, he fell into a BIAS and error, (common to the whole species,) under which he conceived all colors to be with- out AND AT A DISTANCE from him. Now the question which concerns the present subject is this ; Did the young man, in the vert/Jirstinstdince of his being conscious of color, believe that colors are NOT spread out ; in the same way that he, at first, believed they were i^ot at a distance ? If Professor Stewart is not prepared to go the whole length of answering this question in the affirmative ; he has certainly, in this case, used the word " bias' in the very face of induction. And, as this Philosopher has, after a lapse of many years, very recently repeated this arbitrary asser- tion ; I mean in the Second Volume of his Elements, wherein he observes (Chap. 4. Sect. 1.) that it is by " a natural bias or association,'' that we connect our sensations of color with figure and extension ; I think I cannot be too particular in pointing out the entire want of evidence of this assumption, and, what is still more, the positive and decisive evi- dence against it. With this purpose, therefore, I now observe, that the assumption in question is to be regarded as the INVENTION q/" the School of Reid. It is not the as- sumption of any Sect of philosophers, either an-' cient or modern; but is entirely confined to the two eminent writers of the School just mentioned ; unless it can be supposed to lend any strength to 144 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. their opinion to add the vague suffrage of Dr. Hutchison, which conveys no definite meaning whatever. It is fortunate, therefore, that it appears not impossible to ascertain what was the immediate origin of Dr. Reid's view of the subject. And if I shall be enabled to trace his error with regard to it, to it's very source ; I conceive the refutation of it must prove the more satisfactory to the reader, and cannot but be interesting to those who may con* template it s future history. The truth of the matter is, that Dr. Reid, in his Inquiry, which is the first of his publications on the subject and which appeared many years prior to his Essays, has used the very language employed by Cheselden, and has expressly referred to that author, with regard to the capability and operation of the organ of sight ; and, in so doing, it is in the most conclusive manner evident that he has pro- foundly mistaken the sense of Cheselden, by con- struing the words of the latter as being favorable to his views, while they import directly the contrary. As I have little doubt of being able to satisfy my readers of the truth of this last remark ; I am led to conjecture, that, after Dr. Reid had become dissatisfied with the Berkeleian theory, (to which before he had been attached) and when he was casting about, in his own contemplation, to gain such a view of facts as could enable him to con- trovert that theory, he happened to fall upon the account given by Cheselden of the youth who was couched by him ; and, the mind of Reid being then under a strong determination, he was led to put a SECT, i] THE HUMAN MIND. 145 construction upon the words of Cheselden, which he never could have done had his imagination been unbiased. How far I am right in this conjecture, will appear from the following extracts and obser- vations. In his " Inquiry," Chap. 6. Sect. 8. Dr. Reid supposes that if the eye of a person were so con- stituted, that the rays of light coming from any one point of an object were diffused over the whole sur- face of the retina ; " the operation of such an eye ** would be precisely similar to that of hearing and " smell ; it would give no perception of figure or ex- " tension, but merely of color." — " Nor is the suppo- " sition we have made" (says he) ** altogether imagi- " nary : for it is nearly the case of most people who ** have cataracts, whose chrystaline, as Mr. Chesel- ** den observes, does not altogether exclude the ray« " of Hght ; but diffuses them over the retina, so thai " persons see things as one does through a glass " of broken jelly ; they perceive the color, but no- " thing of the figure or magnitude of objects." This illustration i^, in substance, and partly in words, precisely the same as that offered by Che- selden himself He says, " they can discern ** in no other manner than a sound eye can " through a glass of broken jelly, where a great " variety of surfaces so differently refract the light, " that the several distinct pencils of rays cannot be " collected by the eye into their proper foci ; " wherefore the shape of an object in such case " cannot be discerned, though the color may." Hu, Mi. K 146 FIRST LINES OF [chap.ti. As neither Dr. Reid nor his Successor has ap- pealed to any other authority ^ evidence, or argument, than that which Reid has thus adduced from the case communicated by Cheselden; and as Reid has brought this case forward in his very first broach- ing of the subject ; and, lastly, as, previously io this, he was a believer in the Berkeleian theory itself; I shall, upon these grounds, leave it entirely to the judgment of the reader, whether it is not warrantable to conclude that it was this very case that led to the view which Dr. Reid, upon his revolt from the Berkeleian Theory, adopted. But, be this as it may, I shall now proceed to show the far more important fact of the manifest error into which Dr. Reid fell, in his apprehension of this case. If we look through a glass of broken jelly, at a man in a blue, a yellow, or a scarlet coat; we shall immediately become conscious of a sensation of color of blue, of yellow, or of scarlet, of some irregular fi- gure ; which sensation we shall, in the popular sense, call the co/or of Me coat; but we shall not be able to perceive the figure of the coat. This is the meaning, the only meaning, which Cheselden, or Reid, either did or could annex to their words, when they severally said, that persons laboring under a cataract ^^ perceive the color hut nothing of *' the figure or magnitude ^objects." By the word objects, it certainly never entered the thought of Cheselden to refer to the jelly ; but only to some object beyond the jelly, some ob- ject which we are said to look at through the jelly : SECT, i] THE HUMAN MIND. 147 and he was manifestly right in his assertion that we cannot discern the shape of any ulterior ob- ject, through any such medium. How a philoso- pher, like Dr. Reid, could possibly mistake a mat- ter so obvious to remark, can only be accounted for from the state of his mind at the time : but cer- tain it is, he concluded, from Cheselden s account, that a person in a cataract is conscious of color with- out being able to perceive that this color it self is figur- ed or extended. In assuming this, it is at the same time most clear and conclusive, that Reid's very language refutes his assumption: and both the language and the facts stated by Cheselden dis- tinctly refute it, as I shall now show. So far is Cheselden from supposing, for a mo- ment, that the color we are cojiscious of when look- ing through a glass of broken jelly, is not extended; that, on the contrary, he expressly asserts, that the light is so differently refracted by ^* a great variety of " surfaces,'' that the several distinct pencils of rays CA^'NOT BE COLLECTED. Thus, upon the evidence of Cheselden, it is because of the diffusion or EXTENSION of color 171 the mind that the shape of any object seen through a cataract cannot he dis- cerned : for, to say that the rays of color " cannot ** be collected^' is manifestly but another mode of saying that they are scattered or extended. But this decisive language is not that of Chesel- den alone : for it is equally that of Dr. Reid him- self; however strangely he has overlooked it. In the passage already quoted from his Inquiry, he observes that the ** ChrystaUne*' of a person la- 148 FIRST LINES OF [chap. u.J| boring under a cataract ** does not exclude the "rays of light, but diffuses them over the J " retina." Now, What is diffusion, but exten- sion? And what, but some very overwhelming bias, could have betrayed Dr. Reid into so glaring a contradiction, as that of denying the extension of color in the face of this concession ? There is one other consideration; which, be- cause it is of a distinct nature, and is, even, if possible, still more critical than what has pre- ceded it, I shall state, before I have done with this case. We have the indisputable authority of Mr. Cheselden for the fact, that, when the youth who was couched by him ^'^rst saw^ he was so far ** from making any judgment about distances, that " he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes " (as he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin." Now the use I intend to make of this fact does not regard the distance of objects ; but regards the extension of color. The rigid fact, which is our datum to reason upon in the present case, is, that the youth " thought all objects whatever touched " HIS EYES." But, I ask. How could he think that colors touched his eyes, if he did not think i them EXTENDED? It is a plain and incontroverti- ble fact, that nothing has a capability of touching another, but something that is itself extended. To say that the youth at first thought that colors touched his eye, but that he did not think them f extended ; would be an assertion, the ridicule of which, we may be satisfied, no philosopher will SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 149 ever venture to encounter. Touching is, self- evidently, a property oi extended things only. I have thus been at the labor to trace the fun- damental assumption of Dr. Reid and of his Suc- cessor, to its origin, or to the only shadow of evidence to which they have ever attempted to appeal in its support. And, when the magnitude of the con- sequences is duly weighed, I trust it will not be con- sidered an unimportant labor to have follovved into its last recess, and to have critically shewn the fallacious nature of a sophism, which has been the sole support of the most mischievous assump- tion, short of downright Materialism, that modern philosophy has attempted to force upon the world. These consequences, moreover, will, doubtless, give a sufficient degree of interest to the subject of the following sub-section. 2. Historical fact of the change of Dr\ Reid, from the Idealism of Berkeley to his own Theory. — Astonish- ing unphilosophicalness of this procedure. In the school of Reid, we have an instance of two very enlightened Philosophers, (together, doubt- less, with some other intelligent persons who have imbibed their principles as points of education,) who are agreed in opinion, not only against an other- wise united world, but also directly in the face of 150 FIRST LINES OF [ghap, rr. positive induction, that we ought to reject our most confident judgments ^Yith regard to the nature of our conscious 'phenomena^ and to ascribe to those phenomena the most opposite nature that can be imagined. The dissent of any two minds, how- ever acute and enlightened, against such odds of opinion, exhibits, it must be confessed, but a very Wk slender opposition. But, it is not to be dissembled, that it presents a very serious fact for philosophy, and a very melancholy subject of reflection for man- kind, if it should appear that any two really en- lightened, and at the same time M??pr^W/ce^ minds, after having made the subject their particular study during a series of years, have found them- selves obliged to report the most obvious pheno- mena of our consciousness to be of a nature direct- ly the contrary of what these phenomena are found to be by all the rest of the species, unlearned and learned, put together. Universal Scepticism could never have desired a more complete triumph, than thus to see the first and most imperative class of human evidences set in array against itself. In a case of so uncomfortable a complexion, therefore, it is fortunate that we are saved from such a state of chaos in philosophy as must other- wise have ensued, by a most remarkable occur- rence in the ori^iw of Dr, Reid's principles ; which fact, as being a matter of vital importance to the opinion which we are to form of his judgment on the present subject, I shall now lay before the reader, together with such observations upon it as it appears indispensably to demand. SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 151 As for the subsequent assertion of Dr. Reid's principles, by his distinguished Successor; the whole history of philosophy proves, that there is no young and ductile mind but what must be sup- posed liabk to be biassed, and that to a very great degree, by the opinions of a revered philosophical preceptor. If, therefore, it shall be satisfactorily shown that the preceptor, in this case, had given origin to his own principles, only by subjecting his understanding to the most indefensible conditions; we shall then be bound to make a proportionate deduction from the assent, or assertions, of his dis- ciple ; however splendid, or solid, the general at- tainments of the latter may in reality be. Urged by this consideration, I shall proceed to relate, in the history of Dr. Reid's Theory, one of the most extraordinary revolutions in opinion, that has ^ver been exhibited in the case of any one philoso- pher. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay 2. Chap. 10., in giving an account of the Berkeleian system. Dr. Reid has expressed himself in the fol- lowing terms. " If I may presume to speak my own sentiments, " I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly, " as to have embraced the whole of Berkeley's " system in consequence of it, till finding other " consequences to follow from it, which gave me " more uneasiness than the want of a material ** world, it came into my head, more than forty " years ago, to put the question, What evidence 1^ FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. " T have for this doctrine, that all the objects of *' my knowledge are ideas in my own mind ?" Upon this passage, 1 shall in the first place offer the collateral remark, that it fully proves Dr. Reid to have had, in the beginning, no predilection in favor of a material ivorld; and it shows, therefore, that his whole anxiety was, (as he himself has ex- pressly avowed) to oppose the scepticism of Hume with regard to the e.vistence of minds ; of which scepticism, Mr. Hnme has furnished that remark- able suicide which I have already pointed out. But with regard to the consideration directly before the reader ; I am now to observe, it is probable that most persons who have read the above passage in Dr. Reid's book, have viewed it in no other light than that in which it was undoubt- edly meant by its author, that is to say, as a mere avowal of the particular occasion of his conversion from the Berkeleian system, without at all suppos- ing it to convey any thing which could re- act upon the philosophical judgment by which he was convert- ed. But, the moment our attention is called to the thing, it cannot fail to flash conviction upon us, that no avowal could have been more unfortunate for the judgment of Dr. Reid, or more fortunate for philosophy, than that in question : for the sys- tem of Berkeley is this ; That our sensations of color and of touch are the only extension and figures in nature; — That it is " impossible so much ** as in thought to separate or abstract color from " extension ;" That a man being born blind, and subsequently made to see ; " the objects intromit- I SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 153 " ted by sight would appear to him (as in truth •* they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or " sensations, each of which is as near to him as " the perceptions of pleasure and pain." Before 1 proceed to show how this Berkeleian principle operates upon the soundness of Dr. Reid's judgment, in his relinquishment of it ; I must here observe that, in Professor Stewart's life of Reid, he informs us, (apparently in the way of ex- tenuation,) that the latter had previously embraced the system of Berkeley (I think the words are) " without e.vamination" Now, this proceeding, if it really was so, was only an error common to many speculative men. But it is of vital import- ance to the opinion we must form of Dr. Reid's judgment in this matter, to ascertain in what sense Mr. Stewart's apology can possibly be received as true. To solve this question; I must beg to remind my readers, that the general hypothesis of the Ideal Theory, and especially that of Berkeley, consists of two priucipal positions ; First, that ideas are beings substantially detached from the mind in which they occasionally reside ; and. Secondly, that certain classes of these ideas are the thin2:s which we call e.vtended and figured objects. Now we can have no hesitation in receiving Professor Stewart's assertion, as importing that Dr. Reid embraced the hypothesis of loose detached ideas " with- ** out ejoamination'' This, indeed, is not at all sur- prising, because ideas are affections which appear 164 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. to come and go, (although they certainly do not do so in their actual identity;) and any inexperienced person, paying a natural deference to the opinions of learned men in all former ages, may readily be supposed to have taken the scholastic assumption upon trust that ideas are an order of detached be- ings, — But vastly different is the case, when vre turn to consider the other position : for it is mani- festly impossible that Mr. Stewart could mean to say, that Dr. Reid, " without ej:amination,'' received from Berkeley the belief that sensations of colors are the things we call extended objects. Dr. Reid had been familiar with his own sensations of colors from his infancy ; and, therefore, if he had not uniformly felt (like all other men) that white, blue, and yellow, are spread out, he would inevitably have recoiled at the very first proposal of Berkeley'* system, as being a monstrous violation of one of the most imperative dictates of consciousness. Dr. Reid never tells us that he had any such struggle, before he yielded to theBERKELEiAN^j/,?^e/w; and it is quite certain that, up to the age at which he embraced the " whole of that system,'' he felt like all other men, including Berkeley himself, namely, that phantoms of colors, such as red, blue, and yel- low, are the extended objects of our visive percep- tion. There cannot be a doubt, that it was af- ter his dissatisfaction^ with the system of Berkeley that he first began to suppose our sensations of colors are not spread out. In the act of revolt, therefore, Dr. Reid had two great objects to accomplish, vastly different in sfiCT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 155 their natures : The one, was to put the question, What evidence we have for the existence of loose de- tached ideas in the mind ? The other, to deprive our sensations of colors of that outspread or extended na- ture which, both as a Berkeleian and as an ordinary man, he must always, prior to that time have ascribed to them. It would be altogether nugatory in this place, to object, that Berkeley denied the reality of exten- sion : for, although it is true that he did so, it is at the same time certain, he confidently maintained that our sensations of colors and of touch are the things, and the only things, which mankind call ex- tended : and this is all I would demand of the school of Reid to acknowledge ; for we may trust to the good sense of mankind, to put a proper value upon Berkeley's extravagant denial of the reality of all extension; and we know that the school of Reid itself has sufficiently contemned that ex- travagance. What, then, are we to say of the judgment of any person, however respectable his understanding may be in any other case, who, after having lived to the full maturity of a philosophical time of life (like other men) in the firm conviction that his sensations of colors are as truly extended as any thing in the world is extended ; and after having embraced a Theory of Perception ^^;y^0Je basis w this very assumption; afterwards cashiers his ozvn understand- ing , as having been guilty of uniform false evidence, and then sets up a new philosophy, upon the 156 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. opposite and unheard of assumption that not one of his sensations has any point or resemblance to any thing like figure or extension ? To render this proceeding, if possible, still more indefensible ; Dr. Reid informs us, not, as would have become an inductive philosopher, that he had been led originally to his change of opinion by having discovered something new in the nature of the FACTS ; but, on the contrary, that he was per- fectly content with Berkeley's system, including the want of a material zvorkl^ ** until finding other " consequences to follow from it, it came into his " head to put the question," &c. It is a well known opprobrium of metaphysical speculations, that men have usually, and upon the most important points of doctrine, brought their ultimate opinions to square with their prior views of consequences. It is certainly to be admitted, that a procedure of this kind may take place with the very best inten- tions, and altogether unwittingly by the philosopher who thus becomes his own deceiver. But, in a case wherein the deepest interests of philosophy and the happiness of mankind are demonstrably at stake, it is a duty incumbent upon us not to spare such an unwarrantable and absurd proceeding, when it can be so satisfactorily made out as I trust the present case has been. And, since a most fallacious system of pneumatology, grounded upon no other foundation than that which has been here exposed, is, with reiterated endeavours, now per- SKCT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 157 tinaciously upheld by a diffusion of literary splen- dor, or at least recommended by the captivating force of its well-merited influence, it becomes ab- solutely imperative, to exhibit, in its true light, that fatuity of prejudice, which, from one step to ano- ther, has led the founder of this Scheme to blow alternately, hot and cold, upon the most obvious characters of his most obvious sensations. Were I at all disposed to indulge, here, in a similar strain to that which Dr. Reid has held in his criticisms on the systems of Berkeley and of Hume ; it were a very easy matter to have ren- dered the foregoing animadversions far more pointed than I have thought fit they should be. At the same time, I deem it well to advert to Dr. Reid's own style; in order that I may not be charged with having treated his philosophical opinions with any undue severity ; than which, nothing has been more foreign to my wishes. 3. Of the Non-reality of Impulse and Contact, as sup- posed to be favorable to Reid's Theory of Perception, Although there has always been a perfect co-in- cidence of opinions, on the subject of perception, between Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart, until that important demur which was started by the last- mentioned writer in his Dissertation, published 16^ FIKST LINES OF [chap. ii. in the year 1815; it is to be observed that Mr. Stewart has, upon the whole, adopted a much more cautious logic, than was employed by his Preder cessor in following out this subject. He no where expressly asserts the non-extension of the mind. And he expressly admits an intimate connection be- tween mind and body ; — a concession which, al- though it's importance appears to be entirely over- looked, amounts to as full an acknowledgment of the extension of the mind as could be made by a volume of facts affording each a positive proof of the truth in question ; because this intimate connec- tion recognises the fact of the mind*s locality, and locality is a relation to place, which is utterly in- compatible with the doctrine of unextended mind. But, to counteract these concessions. Professor Stewart insists upon that gratuitous assumption of Reid which I have already so minutely refuted, namely, that our sensations of Color and of Touch have not any point of resemblance to figure or ex- tension ; which assumption virtually affirms the non-extension of the mind ; and, consequentiy, leads directly to an inference of the existence of a material zvorld, revealed to our perception in a mys- terious and unsearchable manner. The consideration, however, to which I would here solicit the attention of the reader, is, that of a particular argument which has been skilfully made use of by Mr. Stewart, with a view to give a pre- ponderating verisimilitude to the above-mentioned unfounded assumption of Reid. The matter to SECT. I] THE HUMAN MIND. 150 which I now allude will unfold itself in the course of the following observations. Besides the profound obscurity which has always hung over our philosophical notion of the relation ofQamality ; it is to be observed, that a great change has taken place, (chiefly since Dr. Reid began to write) in the general opinion of philosophers with regard to the nature of matter or body, and with respect to the manner in which one body operates upon another ; and it is now universally admitted, that, in any of the apparent colHsions of bodies, there is no proof of their ever coming into real contact. The result of experiment, moreover, actually proves that real contact does not take place, in most of those instances in which it was heretofore sup- posed to have existed ; and this result goes strongly to support the presumption that no such fact ever happens, in any case at all. This important discovery, both in physics and in pneumatology, one should have expected would infallibly have been seized upon by the professors of the latter science, as a striking and powerful evidence against the existence of any such sub- stance as dead brute matter. But the obliquities and resources of the human understanding are won- derful; and, under a peculiar bias, the above fact has been embraced by the distinguished writer in ques- tion, for the very opposite purpose of upholding the assumption of a material world. It is obvious to remark, that the discovery of the non-reality of contact between bodies, took away 160 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. that ground, which had all along, previously to this event, appeared to exist, for the concurrent opinions of Locke, Clarke, and New^ton, that the mind receives e.v tended impressions through the medium of IMPULSE. Accordingly, therefore. Professor Stew^art has seized upon this advanced view of the subject, with intent to invalidate the judgment of these philosophers; and has placed it conspicuously in the front of his own speculations, that is to say, in the early part of his First Volume, in which it makes a very principal figure. This proceeding was certainly judicious, in de- fence of that doctrine which Mr. Stewart was desi- rous to uphgld ; and there can be no question that its specious and imposing appearance has carried persuasion to the minds of a considerable number of intelligent readers. It, in truth, appears, upon the first blush, to be luminously philosophi- cal, to follow up what may be called the negative argument, (i. e. mens supposed ignorance of the rationale of any real efficient cause,) by an appeal to the positive fact that supposed impulse and contact are mere illusions ; — and, then, — to point to this po- sitive discovery, as an evidence which manifestly knocks away the sole prop or foundation that Newton and other philosophers supposed they had, for concluding that the mind receives extended im- pressions. \ From the moment that this specious argument is thus plausibly stated, the conception of Locke and of Newton must, in the apprehension of general readers, assume the appearance of an erroneous SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. jL61 and indeed a mere vulgar conceit, fit only to be classed with the pneumatological speculations of the most visionary writers : while the Scheme of Reid, upon the other hand, appears to rise in our view, to an admirable sublimity ; having cer- tain and progressive science for its basis, and a supposed most flattering conclusion with regard to the nature of the mind for its result. This supposed result, moreover, is peculiarly of a complexion to prove seductive to human vanity, and to operate upon every class of readers ; by placing an essen- tial and infinite difference between the nature of mind and that of a supposed inert and corruptible substance : it being all the while deplorably over- looked, that mankind have no rational evidence whatever, and nothing but a mere blind prejudice, in favor of the vulgar opinion that supposed body is dead matter. I have been desirous to do ample justice to the judgment and ingenuity with which the argument from efficient causality, or rather the argument from certain physical phenomena, has been embraced and wielded by Professor Stewart, with a view to defend the instinctive theory of his Predecessor. And I shall now proceed, I confess with no ap- prehensions for the result, to show, that a more innocent, or a more irrelevant argument could not possibly have been adduced, than this one in reality is, when attempted to be applied to the ultimate use for which Mr. Stewart has brought it. The simple and incontrovertible truth of the Hu. Mi. L 162 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. matter is, that an analysis of the fact and pheno- mena of perception has ?iot/nng at ail to do with the extemal efficient of these phenomenu; nor yet with any efficient^ nor witli any fact, or consideration at all, except those of the constituent elements of perception itself, including the sensations which are subservient to it. It is true, that, for want of having fallen upon any method of analysing the phenomena of perception, Locke, and other philosophers who reasoned in the same manner, have had recourse to the supposed external efficient of our se?isations, as i'urnishing a presumjjtive evidence of the fact that the mind receives extended impressions. And, in so doing, they naturally concluded, agreeably with the uni- versal analogy of extended things, that dodi^ operates upon mind in the same uay that one body operates upon another; which way, they supposed^ was by impulse. But 1 must repeat here, that, in an analysis of the phenomena of perception itself, no consideration whatever enters into the subject, except the sensa- tions which are its elements^ and our own intuitive mental acts of discerning the relations of contrast between these sensations. It is unavoidable here, in order to rescue the sub- ject from the otherwise fatal influence of Mr. Stew- art's plausible argument ; to point out the fact, that, in the species of analysis which was furnished by Locke, or by any other writer, there is no such thing as a comparison of a sensation of blue with a sensation of yellow, or any one sensation with another^ and thence deducing, as a necessary result, a third iA SECT, i] THE HUMAN MIND. 163 phenome?io?if namely, that mental relation of con- trast which we call a visible line. This, however* I am under the necessity to remark, is the only sort of investigation that can at all be thought to be of the nature of an analysis of perception. From this statement, therefore, it becomes plainly manifest, that any argument which Professor Stewart cotdd have brought, from the supposed nature of the ex- ternal CAUSE of our sensations, could have had no bearing or application whatever upon such an analysis as I have now adverted to. Neither was it possible that Mr. Stewart could have had any such species of analysis in view, when he advanced his argument from causality. Nothing, therefore, I trust, is more clear, than that the argument of Professor Stewart, in this case, falls entirely to the ground. It is to be granted, indeed, that, against the ar- gument from efficient causality which was enter- tained by Locke and his associates in opinion, the argument of Mr. Stewart is applicable; be- cause both parties, in this case, are equally out of the subject of perception itself, and both are merely aiming to furnish some true conception of the nature of perception itself, by either investigat- ing or gainsaying the nature of its supposed ex- ter^nal cause. But, while I grant that Professor Stewart's argument is applicable against the view of Locke and of Newton ; I do not, however, con- ceive that it applies with any efficacy whatever, 164 FIRST LINES OF [chap, ii. when duly examined ; and I consider it of some importance, in this place, to point out what I ap- prehend to be it's entire want of cogency. For this purpose, therefore, I shall ^r^/ observe, that, although it is now, contrary to all former opi- nion, generally acknowledged that the essence of bodies is not such as admits of real contact or impulse, in any instance with which we are ac' quainted ; yet, this discovery has not set philosophers upon denying the extension of bodies. Then why (I would ask) should this discovery afford anjfiesh reason to deny the extension of minds ? Secondly ; I would observe, that, although it is here granted that a greater pressure than any man can exert is not sufficient to bring his hand into mere physical contact with any other body ; yet, the slightest application of a seal, to so dull a substance as melted wax, is sufficient to make an impression upon the wax, which is so very like as to be, to sense, ajac simile of that upon the seal. Thus the non- reality of the fact of impulse, or contact, does not prevent correspondent impressions from being conveyed, by some means, from body to body : Then, Why should not correspondent impressions be convey- ed, by the same means, from the external energies of a spiritual agent, to our minds, without either impulse or contact ? Here I must particularly request my rea- ders to observe, that I am not arguing to prove by what sort of external efficiency the mind be- comes impressed with its sensations. On the contrary, I am only showing the inejjicacy of the reasoning of Professor Stewart, when he attempts, SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 165 upon hypothetical ground, to invalidate the hypotheti- cai reasonino; of Locke and of Newton : for it is, certainly, as hypothetical in Mr. Stewart to assume that the mind cannot receive extended impressions because contact is exploded, as it was in Locke and Newton to believe in the facts of contact and impulse : and the assumption of Mr. Stewart is an hypothesis which farther labors under the decisive imputation of being contradicted by a most general analogy of nature^ certainly known, namely, that of the correspondent impressions made by extended things upon each other. In any appeal to external facts, in order to help our conjecture as to whether or not the mind re- ceives impressions from things without; I must here particularly suggest, that the logical ques- tion is not properly as to Whether or not impressions made upon bodies are produced by contact or impulse, but Whether the impression re- ceived by one body corresponds with the parti- cular FORM of the other. Now, we find, it uni-^ formly follows, that every body which is hit, or impressed, with a sufficient force, receives not merely an impression, but an impression of that VERY PATTERN which constitutcs the form of the impressing body. When such a general result as this, therefore, is continually experienced ; Can there be a moment's doubt that one of the bodies, in every such case, actually receives a pattern /ro??? the OTHER ; although we be in total ignorance of the precise manner in which this stamp or character is 16G FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. effected ? Or, Can it, in the least, weaken our con- viction that there is a real correspondence be- tween every two extended bodies, when the one im- prints any pattern upontheother; although Profes- sor Stewart has called our attention to the discovery that impulse and contact are mere chimeras of our imperfect senses ? If the consideration which I have now suggested could derive strength from any at- tempt at farther illustration ; I would beg to remind my readers that the only evidence we have of the existence of other human be'mgSy besides ourselves, is precisely of the same genus with that which we have for the fact that 072e body receives correspondent impressio7is from another. The voices, the persons, and the motions, of other men, make similar i?npressions upon our minds, to those which we re- ceive from our own voice, and person, and motions ; and it is in the correspondency and similitude ALONE (and not upon any supposition of the manner in which the impressions are made) that we recognise, or believe in, the existence of other sensitive and intellectual beings like ourselves. It follows, I trust, in the most conclusive man- ner, that, unless Professor Stew^art will undertake to assert, that, because impulse and contact are ex- ploded, therefore, bodies do not receive correspondent impressions from other bodies ; it must be altogether vain to pretend that, for want of contact, our minds cannot be impressed by the energies of any external spiritual agent. And I may conclude this topic by observing, that the universal fact of correspofi- SECT. I] THE HUMAN MIND. 167 dent impressions, in all the extended things around us, is a most powerful argument (though not an argument which I here intended to appeal to) in favor of the conclusion that the mind must be impressed in some manner analogous. There is yet another consideration ; which, al- though it cannot be discussed in this place, appears nevertheless of an importance which atleast claims our momentary notice. The matter to which I now allude, is a doubt, which I apprehend may justly be entertained, with regard to the accuracy of the usual mode of reasoning on the supposed facts of impulse and contact. Although thefact beadmitted, that, in a multitude of cases of collision which come under our actual observation, there is no instance of real contact with any thing solid; yet it is manifest that, in all such cases, there is a uniform point of proximity re- quisite, to enable one body to impress, or to move another, by what is called impulse. It would therefore appear, that, so far is the fact of real con- tact from being exploded, by any positive evidence, that, on the contrary, w^e ought rather to conclude that, in every such instance, there is a real contact of THAT SPHERE OF ENERGY which surround^ the one body and that which surrounds the other. This consideration, if duly followed out, might perhaps be found to reduce the modern doctrine of non- contact, to little better than a mere verbal inno- vation. But the topic is one which lies entirely 16S FIRST LINES OF, &c. [chap. ii. out of my subject ; and I submit this hint of it, merely to close those animadversions which I could not avoid offering, since it was absolutely necessary to present an effectual barrier against that argument from external efficiency, which Professor Stewart had, with such imposing effect, placed in the advance of his own speculations. Upon the supposed strength of this argument, he has treated the reasoning of Locke and Newton upon the subject, with a severity due only to the most puerile conceits : but I have no hesitation in desiring to share any disgrace which shall be found imputable to their conclusion upon the subject, when it is duly ejcamined and modified ; and, I confess, I have not the smallest apprehension that the objec* tions founded upon the doctrine of the non-reality of contact will be able, for a moment, to stand against the plain considerations which have herein been opposed to it. A 1G9 SECTION SECOND. OF THE EXTERNAL GENERIC OCCASION OF OUR SEN- SATIONS OF COLORS ;— AND OF THE GREAT POPULAR DECEPTION WITH REGARD TO THE PLACE OF THESB PHENOMENA. 1. The object of the present section, is to remove a universal and deep rooted prejudice, which operates with a very pernicious influence upon the general opinion with regard to the subject of perception ; although it does not relate to the act, or phenomena, of perception itself, but regards only the mere physical general occasion of our sensations of colors. It is universally assumed, not only by writers upon the various branches of physical science, but also by those who take the phenomena of the mind for their subject, that the external general occasion of our sensations of colors is light reflected from distant objects. This uniform assumption has vastly contributed to fix that natural prejudice of 170 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. mankind, by which they are led to conceive that their sensations of colors are the distant things of an external world. It is therefore a matter of es- sential importance, preparatory to an analysis of perception, to point out this procedure as a most erroneous one, which has unaccountably been suf- fered to discredit the inductive study of the mind ; since there is no fact in natural science more indu- bitably ascertained, than that light reflected from external objects is only one of several different species, of a well known generic occasion of our sen- sations of colors ; — which general occasion is, cer- tainly, a vastly different thing from the reflected light in question. It may indeed be considered as a reproach to the philosophy of the mind, that it should be necessary, in the present advanced state of natural knowledge, to point out a fact so obvious to remark as the one now to be insisted upon ; but, at any rate, the follow- ing mere mention of a few of the most prominent species of the general occasion, ought to be suffici- ent to prevent any future oversight of this matter ; and, I hope, may serve to rescue the subject from a very injurious neglect. In a work such as the present, however, I conceive it to be farther proper to suggest two or three obvious examples of ihe fact in question ; which, therefore, I shall present at the end of the section. When the organ of vision is acted upon, by light reflected from distant objects,-— by blows I SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 171 or by pressure, — by any of the consequences of dreaming, — or by the various effects of bodily derangement, — the mind then undergoes a set of visive sensations, variously arranged. Such are those beautiful ^phantoms or spectres of which we be- come conscious when we look at a Landscape, a rain-bow, a display of flowers, or any other as- semblage of objects which we familiarly know by the names of red, white, blue, &c. When, mving to collateral evidences, we judge these residents of our mind to be occasioned by distant objects (which is the ordinary case du- ring our daily intercourse with the w^orld) we then invariably conceive these phantoms to be the distant objects themselves; because, by a profound deception imposed upon us, they appear to be a sort oiskiriy spread over and adhering to the surfaces of distant things. But there is no fact in all phi- losophy concerning which there is a more uni- versal consent, than that red, white, and blue, and all the rest of this beautiful tribe of appearances, are nothing in the world but occasional modif cations or affections of our own miiids. In other words ; it is a fact agreed upon, by all contending sects of pneumatologists, as a truth in the last degree in- controvertible, (to use the language of Dr. Reid) that " appearances of colors are only a species OF THOUGHT." It is to be regarded as a matter fortunate, in the highest degree, that the certitude with regard to this fact is so complete as we actually find it ; be- 17^ FIRST LINES OF [cHiiP. ii. cause this mgle datum, or fundamental principle, is the sole basis upon which some of the most momentous conclusions in philosophy are ulti- mately to rest. It is (with the exception of the analogous fact of Touch) the sole fact which imme- diately connects the iix)rld without us with the ti:orld xoithin ; and it is from this fact alone (after the nature of our sensations of colors shall be risro- rously ascertained, by means of an analysis of their various combinations) that we shall be ena- bled to draw a legitimate conclusion, as to whether the great external surrounding agent, which excites all our exterior sensations, is of a matei^ial or a spiritual nature. Ho we vex certainly it is known, to all those who are in any degree conversant on the subject,, that phantoms of colors, which appear to be ex- ternal and distant things, are in reality nothing but affections of the mind itself; and notwith- standing the important consequences which de- pend upon this fact ; it is nevertheless a truth iii nature which has always been so deplorably neglected, even by the learned part of mankind, that it is at this moment a great desideratum to bring it into general notice. The subject is one which ought to claim a most powerful interest on account of its own intrinsic nature, altogether be- side its infinite importance ; and, if it were not for the consideration of its fate in time past, one should think it could require little labor to recommend it to the general attention. It is however to here- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 173 corded, as a lesson for the philosophers of poste- rity, that, long after the Copernican System had completely triumphed over the evidence of sense and the natural prejudice of the species, the resi- dence of colored objects in the mind has remained a fact utterly unknown and unsuspected by the great bulk of the reading world. Curious indeed it is to remark, that, while the fact under consideration is one of the most magni- ficent as well as most beneficial contrivances of the known Creation ; yet, this wonderful arrangement of Providence, in all its stupendous grandeur and utility, has hitherto existed in the presence of hu- man ignorance, and has thus continually been let RUN TO WASTE ; uulcss wc may except the splendid era of the ancient Hindoo Philosophy. The general apathy on the subject has, even, so astonishingly kept pace with the advancement of the species in other branches of natural know^ ledge, that the bare mention of the fact, of red, white, and blue, being no-where except in the initid, if it should accidentally occur in a company of well educated persons of the present day, would scarcely fail to produce a deeper sentiment of incredulity and contempt, than that with which the same party w^ould listen to a legend of a ghost, or the predictions of a fortune-teller. And a similar ignorance, or at least oblivion of the fact^ is not unusually to be met with in persons who cannot have been altogether unschooled with regard to it. It must be confessed, that the general ignorance of the subject is, in a considerable degree, awing 174 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. to the brevity and passing- terras in which it is usually mentioned by philosophers themselves. For, although all Sects of Pneumatologists equally acknowledge the fact ; yet, it is a matter that is scarcely ever dwelt upon, or particularly pointed out, by any writer. The great truth upon which I am now insisting, is simply this ; that all those beautiful scenes and visions, which have, from our earliest infancy to the present hour, delighted our sense and fed our ima- gination, in a daily variety and succession of colored appem^anceSi were in reality an order of beings which existed not without, but within our- selves. Since this is the case, therefore, Might we not reasonably expect, that every person of a liberal curiosity would be forcibly struck and in- delibly impressed, upon being inducted into a knowledge of that new world, which bursts upon his intellectual view when he is first told, and the fact is verified to him by the most simple and de- cisive experiments, that the things which he had all along before taken for the hues and tints of external and distant objects, are in reality nothing but the furniture of his own mind ? It is true, an induction into this vast arcanum of Divine Providence, does not make a man acquainted with any objects except those which he knew before : which is one reason why the discovery is usually so little impressive. The only information it affords him, is, that those colored appearances which he had all along contemplated as the external objects of naturcy are not in the same place, and not of the same essence as he had uniformily sup- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 175 posed. He had alvrays believed them to be the things of a material world : but, on the contrary, lie now iinds that they are beings of A MENTAL WORLD WITHIN HIMSELF. AsSUredly, nevertheless, this may, in a very good sense, becalled an induction into the knowledge of A new world ; since it is an introduction to a region ; of whose existence no ordinary man has any conception. The utility and the delight which we derive from the sense of seeing, has been eloquently des- canted upon by our most popular Essayists of the last age ; and these topics are, certainly, very tit themes of eulogium and of popular interest. — But it is to be regretted that those writers did not em- brace the opportunity, which their talents and era afforded them, to suggest to the understandings, and impress upon the imaginations, of the reading hulk of the community, some idea of that wonderful ADAPTATION OF THE MIND, by which it's Bene- ficent Creator has formed it to be the place of COLORS ; — a contrivance which renders the utility and the delight we derive from those appearances an object of far greater wonder and adoration. From contemplating this arrangement on ac- count of it's intrinsic nature and immediate utility ; it is a rational transition to contemplate it on ac- count of it's philosophical consequences, or those great truths which it ultimately serves to indicate. The indubitable truth then, is, that a knowledge of the fact that appearances of colors exist no-where except in the mind, is the first step which can 176 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. ever be taken, toward ascertaining what is the most general nature of that U7iperceived surrounding agent which excites our sensations ; which agent has, during all ages of the world, been believed, by the great bulk of mankind, to be an inert material substance; but which, in the case of a satisfactory result of the forthcoming speculation, must be con- cluded to be in reality no other than spirit or MIND. Having thus suggested the consideration of the existence of the fact under notice, and of its principal application; I shall, previously to offering some concluding observations with regard to it, proceed to supply two or three of the most obvious exam- ples of its reality ; although, to some of my readers the statement of any such proofs must be altoge- ther unnecessary. 2. Eiyerbnental Proofs of the fact that Colors are only Affections of Mind, — The Proofs of this Fact open to all Classes of Persons, — It's Importance to the Moral Coduct of the Species, If we commence a gentle pressure of the hand, upon the closed eye, we shall presently become conscious of a field of sensation; which, at first, is usually of a faint bluish color : And if the pressure be continued, and gradually increased, we shall become farther conscious of a surface of luminous sensations^ of a bright yellow metallic appearance, SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 177 which sensations will vary, in shaipe and in she, in proportion to the continuance and the strength of the pressure, until, at length, the sense of splendor will equal that of the sun's disk when viewed on a clear day. This general fact, which depends not upon any nicety or skill in the experiment, is as much the ordinary result of continued pressure upon the closed eye, as that of seeing what we call distant objects is the consequence of looking at them in noon-day light. The fact, therefore, while it furnishes the most decisive proofs that sensations of colors are not dependent upon light reflected from distant objects, nor yet upon the existence of distant objects in any w^ay whatever, affords us, at the same time, the last degree of certitude that these phantoms of the mind are spread out ; because we can contemplate these affections for any desired length of time, and we invariably perceive that they have certain shapes^ and sizes, as perfectly mani- fested as any which we ever discern when our eyes are open. It would, unquestionably, be as sane an act to deny that these sensations are yellow, or luminous, as to deny that they have ex- tension and figure. This class of phenomena, of itself alone, if it had been duly attended to, ought certainly to have deterred any philosopher from so hopeless a pro- ject, as that of endeavouring to persuade mankind that red, white, and blue, and all other colors, are not extended. Hu, Mi. M 178 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. In addition to the class of sensations just now mentioned, may, in a still more important light, be considered that well known appearance, of which we become conscious when we press the end of a finger upon the open eye. The concentric circles which we perceive in any such case, and which, by moving the finger all round the pupil of the eye, may be made to appear to travel round it in an opposite direction, are so vivid, that those other sensations of colors, which we receive at the same time from looking at external objects, are quite faint in comparison with them. One would think it hardly possible that this familiar experi- ment, which must be known to most persons, could ever have been made without calling the observer to discern that deception which nature imposes upon us, when it makes us believe that colors are distant and moving objects. With regard to this well known phenomenon, I would suggest, for special attention, that it is in a two-fold degree important ; because it at once detects two great fallacies whose joint operation has given them irresistible power over the imagina- tion of the species. For we not only confidently believe that colors are distant things ; but we as confidently believe that they move about ; which last we must naturally think would be impossible for them to do if they were affections of the Mind. The truth, however, will be shewn, that they only appear to move : while it is here rendered indubi- table that they are in the mind, and not at a dis- tance from it. SECT. If.] THE HUMAN MIND. 179 In a future speculation I propose to show, upon this ground, that we never perceive real motion. The subject is one of some curiosity. The only other example which I consider it necessary to suggest, in proof of the general fact now under consideration, I shall take from that class of visive sensations which have very unphi- losophically been called accidental colors, — as if all colors were not essentially accidental. Attach a red wafer, to a sheet of white paper. Look steadfastly at the wafer ; and, in a short time, there will be felt a sensation of a faint light green color, apparently forming a narrow rim round the edge of the wafer. When this sensation of green has become somewhat vivid ; cover the wafer, and direct the eye to any other part of the paper. It will now be found, that the sensation of green will remain in the mind, and will be of the same shape and size as before, namely, that of a circle a little larger than the wafer : and this phantom will appear to move about, as the direction of the eye changes ; or, else, to adhere to any part of the paper to which the direction of the eye is fixed ; until the irritation of the optic nerve has ceased. Wafers which, from the difference in the texture of their minute parts, are said to be of different colors, will produce different but correspondent sensations of colors. This fact, therefore, is a de- cisive proof, that various sensations of colors are not the result merely of various kinds of light, but are, generically speaking, the result of various kinds of ISO FIRST LINES OF [chap, ii, ACTION UPON THE OPTIC NERVE ; wllicll actioil, (it is fully certified) may be produced by other sorts of stimulants, besides light. Such simple and easy experiments as those which have just been suggested, while they are within the reach of every one, and completely ex- pose the popular delusion of believing colors to be without and at a distance from us, furnish, at the same time, a proof equally decisive that the phan- toms of colors in our own mind, are the emended and Jigured things which we call the bodies of an external world. This evidence, indeed, is not at all of the same nature with that analytical process which I all along contemplate, and from which it is duly to be distinguished : but, upon the present species of evidence, every philosopher, from Plato down to Hume, has been fully satisfied that every instance of color, figure, and extension, ever per- ceived by us, is in some way or oW\^\ 'present to the mind itself; although, to popular apprehension all these appearances seem to be the distant things of an external world. What, then, shall we say, when any enlightened mind has, in the face of such experiments as are here adverted to, been able to work itself up to a persuasion, that our affections of red, white, and blue, are not spread out, and have no more resemblance to extended and Jigured objects, " than the words of a language have " to the things which they denote f^ The truth of the matter is, that, the moment a man is inducted, by such experiments, into the general fact under consideration, he discovers that SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 181 his MIND is, actual!]/, and in the most obvious sense, 2i MICROCOSM OR LITTLE WORLD ; and he is thus convinced, that what he, perhaps, liad before supposed to be merely a visionary flight, or at best but a sublime mystery of Plato and of other ancient Philosophers, is no other than the cer- tain reality of nature. He recognises in his own mind, literally, A MIRROR OF THE SURROUND- ING CREATION ; the e.vtension and figures of his own sensations hsxin^, indubitably, a correspondencj/, and what may be called a precise similitude, to the extension and figures of CERTAIN ENERGIES, which are exerted by some unknown or unperceived EXTERNAL AGENT, under certain uniform laws. Experience certainly proves, that, after a per- son has been inducted into the fact, of colors be- ing residents of the mind, it requires intention to retain this knowledge by means of repeated con- templations ; without which it is soon overpowered by the strength of the natural prejudice, and either fades away in the memory altogether, or is remem- bered with a degree of scepticism or incredulity, spite of all the incontrovertibleness of the proofs by which it is established. The reason of this result is perfectly manifest. The popular delusion, with regard to the place of colors, is every mo- ment at hand to impose upon our imagination ;* and^ unless reason or philosophy happen to be upon the watch, the deep rooted fallacy is sure to pre- 182 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. vail. Hence the difficulty of bringing this great fact home to popular apprehension. It may indeed be questioned, whether any num- ber of Philosophers, themselves, (unless we may ex- cept the ancient Sages of the East) have ever ex- ercised their minds in a habitual contemplation of this fact ; so as to have enabled them to carry a sense of its existence about with them, in the transaction of their ordinary affairs. But it is, surely, a confession of the imbecility of human na- ture, that a fact of such magnitude should exist, without the shadow of a doubt, in the knowledge of philosophers ; and yet, that they, while they do know it, should never, at ordinary times, be able to think up to it; and, even, should seldom put them- selves upon the discipline of so thinking. It may, however, be safely affirmed, that no man can ever have any thing like a true conception of what sort of constitution his Creator has been pleased to form him, who does not, sometimes, recal to his at- tention the fact that all the colored objects which he ever contemplates are contained only in the scenic region of his own mind. It is not to be doubted that this fact might be rescued, from that injurious neglect under which it has so long continued to exist. In order to effect this, nothing appears wanting but that the attention both of philosophical and of popular writers, should be directed to give to the public mind a bias toward the subject ; and that it should become a matter of public notoriety, like that of SECT, ii] THE HUMAN MIND. 183 many other great truths in science, the actual knowledge of which is removed from ordinary- reach. For the truth of this observation, we need only appeal to cases that are perfectly analogous. Where is there a person now to be found, in the middling classes of society, who in the least dis- believes that the earth revolves about its own axis, and performs a periodical course round the Sun ? Yet it is certain, not only that these truths offer the utmost violence to the affirmations of sense ; but, also, that not one in a hundred of believers in them can assign a7iy reason at all for the creed which they have thus confidently adopted, except the uncontradicted voices of authors on the sub- ject. How vastly more ought the result to be in favor of promulgating the great truth that the mind is the Scenic World of our perception? For, although the affirmations of sense are as strongly violated in this case, as in that of the motion of the earth ; yet, every man, by barely pressing the end of hisjinger upon the organ of sights or by trying any one of a variety of the most simple and easy experiments, may satisfy his own reason^ against his sense, and thus render his mind superior to a trust in autho- rity, with regard to the truth under notice. It is altogether undeniable, therefore, that the fact of the microcosmic nature of the Human Mind, is a truth infinitely more within the reach of the great bulk of the species, than those great truths of the Copernican System which may now be said to be popularly established in the world. And 184 FIRST LINES OF, &c. [chap. ii. an ordinary man might justly feel himself more elevated by the former subject, than by the latter ; because nature has put the evidences of that vast arcanum within his own reach, and he may be so far upon a footing with philosophers themselves. In fine ; The certainty, and the accessibleness to all classes of mankind, of the fact here insisted upon, manifests itself to be of that universal cha- racter, which ought to belong to and to distinguish a truth, that is formed (among its other uses) to operate as a great lever upon the moral conduct of the Species. At first sight, indeed, nothing so little appears as that there is any chain of causes which can connect the fact of colors being residents of the mind, wdth the moral bent of the species : To an ordinary observer, no two things can appear to have less of relation bewteen them than these. But, after the examination of a few forthcoming self-evident propositions, I trust the judgment of mankind will decide, that All Causes must be Spi- ritual, And then, the connection between this belief and moral conduct can be neither doubt- ful nor obscure. 185 SECTION THIRD. OF THE ESSENTIAL GENERAL OBJECT OF PERCEPTION. The exercise of onr aggregate powers of per- ception enables us to conceive various notions of things, which are usually supposed to be the qua- lities of an external inert subject, called matter. These qualities have been the theme of many and ample discussions among philosophers, both ancient and modern. Perhaps they may now most fitly be defined to be a variety of energies, with which certain portions of extended space are unaccountably endowed ; by means of which, under certain laws, and in certain circumstances, these particular bulks appear enabled to effect a succes- sion of changes upon each other, and also to excite in our minds those changes or gross thoughts of which we become conscious during the exercise of any of our organs of external sense. For the purpose which I have at present in view ; the only remark that appears necessary to be offered, with regard to these qualities of body, is, 186 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. that there is not one of them, singly taken, but whose very genus may be supposed to be annihi- lated, without annihilating body itself; excepting only the attribute extension, and the necessary result of its finite modification, which is figure. A late ingenious writer went the length of sup- posing that the extension itself of body is annihila- ble, (without involving any violation of the laws of nature) inasmuch as it is now known that body is to an uncertain extent compressible. But, if we were to admit this for a true assumption, we should still have left to us an intuitive certainty, that the space or matrix which has once been filled with any quality, is itself incapable of destruction. "Whatever else can be annihilated ; it, at any rate, must remain, a being necessarily existent. From this fleeting or destructible nature of all the other objects of our perception, and from the per- manent nature of Extension or Space, it must be evident that Extension (with whatever qualities^ energies, or garb, it may at any time be cloathed, by the pleasure of the Omnipotent Being, in order to effect his purposes,) is the only generic object about which our understanding can be concerned, espe^ cially in any attempt to solve the problem with regard to the most general nature of the mind, or that of the external cause of its sensations. All the other objects of our primary or immediate per- ception are merely accidental : This alone is essenf* tial. Extension, indeed, cannot itself be apprehended except through the medium of some one, of the SECT. III.] THE HUMAN MIND. 187 qualities, or energies, with which it is cloathed. But, whichever of these qualities shall be chosen : Whether it be in the province of Sight, or in that of Touch : Whether, in the former, it be red, blue, or yellow ; or, in the latter, hot, cold, hard, or soft; neither of these vehicles, in particular, is essential to perception ; and, when we have selected that which appears best adapted to the purpose of ana- lysis, we have nothing farther to do with any of the qualities of body, whether secondary or primary. It is also to be observed, that the quality we choose is to be regarded, not in itself, but only as a mere medium, through which we are to contemplate the phenomena of extension and figure, and to ascertain the relation or rather the identicalness of these phe- nomena and our own sentient principle or mind. By thus drawing the line, between what is per- manent and necessary and what is only accidental and transient in the subject, we make the first step in the science of perception ; and, in so doing, we are called upon to contemplate, with the deep- est interest, that eternity of nature which belongs to its essential object. We no sooner arrive at a matu- rity of understanding to be acquainted with the ob- vious nature of any portion of Extension, than a transcendental suggestion of our intellect impera- tively proclaims to us, that this finite expanse is not limited to the small portion of it which we now per- ceive, nor its existence to the time at which we do perceive it ; but, on the contrary, that its expansion and duration must be produced without end. 188 FIRST LINES OF [chap. n. This infinite expanse, and matrix of all things, we can conceive, might have been left altogether void of those various energies which we call the qualities of body. But our experience has fully established the fact, that, throughout its whole extent, so far as human observation has reached, and equally in all its most minute recesses, this Space is, literally speaking, a theatre of causes, OR OF passing events. If therefore these events be at all ascribed to the energies of mind, as their ultimate cause ; there does not then appear to be a more logical conclusion, indicated by the pheno- mena, than that mental energies demand a theatre of extension for their exercise. Nor, upon the other hand, can any conceit appear more absurd, than to suppose a power which has no relation to place ; since this is the same thing as to suppose a power which operates no where. Those writers who have not been able to sub- scribe to the reality of space, are at least consistent in supposing that mental energies have no relation to space. But as for those philosophers who admit the reality of space, and who recognise a world of successive events caused by the energies of mind, as going on in this real expanse, but who at the same time deny that mind partakes at all of an extended nature ; I cannot help thinking they present us with one of the most revolting assumptions that ever was exhibited under the influence of scholas- tic prejudice. In siding with a Locke, a Clarke, and a Newton, against such a conceit ; we loose sight of the sanction of these illustrious names, i SECT. III.] THE HUMAN MIND. 189 and are only conscious of yielding to an irresistible dictate of the unsophisticated understanding. With regard to the schism which subsists be- tween philosophers, concerning the reality of space; I shall upon this occasion only remark, that it has always appeared to me to be not only the most groundless, but at the same time the most surprising, of all the disputes of speculative minds ; and, that, hopeless as the controversy may seem to be, yet, inasmuch as I humbly conceive there appears a most important oversight, ascribable to the disputants on both sides of the controversy, I have not been discouraged from hazarding a spe- culation on the nature of space, which will form an appropriate chapter in the sequel. As for that specific quality, which may be sup- posed to be the best medium adapted for our ap- prehension of space or extension, with a view to the solution of the problem of perception ; I con- ceive that the external quality, or energy, which occasions in our minds the various sensations of colors, is by far preferable to that which occasions those of touch; especially, in so far as regards the perception oijigure or outline. In our perception of mere superjicial or field ex- tension, our sensations of sight and those of touch may perhaps be found equally fit for the purpose. But the latter are far behmd the former in that pre- cision, which enables us to discern exquisitely fine 190 FIRST LINES OF, &c. [chap. ii. lines between contiguous sensations ; and, as our entertaining the subject with regard to the pheno- mena of two different senses would only tend to distract attention, I apprehend it to be unquestion- ably the best way to select sensations of colors for the subject of analysis. At the same -time, it may be remarked, that if sensations of touch were cho- sen ; the solution of their various combinations would only lead to analogous results to those which will follow from the intended process. In adopting sensations of colors, for the subject; I, in point of fact, only follow the general usage of Pneumatologists. But I am led to do this by rea- sons that are peculiar to the species of analysis which is to be submitted ; namely, the consideration of hreadthless lines, and the principal of rela- tion between the phenomena ; considerations which do not at all enter into any other account of per- ception. 191 SECTION FOURTH. OF A PARTICULAR FACT OF PERCEPTION ASSERTED BY PROCLUS AND BY BARROW. Some time after I first ventured to lay before the public, in a small evanescent tract upon the subject, a statement of those principles of primary visive perception upon which I am now to insist ; it was mentioned to me, that there is a fact asserted by Proclus, which also, 1 have since found, is unequi- vocally although very slightly noticed by Dr. Barrow, which, if admitted, involves a distinct col- lateral proof of the truth of these principles. The matter which I was then endeavouring to bring to the notice of my contemporaries, being in a pecuUar degree foreign to any preceding view of the subject ; and the chance of its gaining a ready attention being, upon this and upon various other accounts, very far from encouraging ; I was g ad to avail myself of such names as those of Proclus and of Barrow, in a republication of the subject ; — still in the compass of a small and transient missive, comprising such steps of advance as I had made in it, beyond the general ground sug- gested in my first work upon the phenomena of the mind, published about ten years since. 192 FIRST LINES OF [chap, ii, I have reason to think that this procedure was fortunate, in attracting the attention of some scien- tific readers, who might not otherwise have inclined to believe that any thing satisfactory was ever likely to appear in this department of our know- ledge. Besides this use of the authority of these two illustrious geometricians ; I consider that a brief account of the bearings of the fact assumed by them, will naturally introduce the proposed ana- lysis to the reader in the most simple and obvious manner; and I therefore conceive, that the follow- ing statement of these two concurrent authorities, will form the best preface which I could annex to it, even upon the present occasion; although I hope that a sufficient interest has already been ex- cited among some who are conversant on the sub- ject, (aided, I now trust, by circumstances which must lead to its general investigation,) to secure the proximate object I had in view with regard to it. The fact to which I alluded, is assumed by Proclus, in his Commentaries on the First Book of Euclid's Elements, according to the following translation by Mr. Taylor. " We should admit the followers of Apolionius, " who say, that we obtain the notion of a line when '' we are ordered to measure the lengths alone of " ways, or walls ; for then we do not subjoin either " breadth or bulk, but only make one distance the " object of our consideration. But a line may be- SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 193 " come the object of our sensation if we behold tlie "divisions of lucid places from those which are " dark, or survey the moon when dichotomised ; for "this medium has no distance with respect to lati- " tude, but is indued with longitude, which is " extended together with the light and shadow." * With regard to the fact which is thus asserted ; I shall first remark, that it does not appear to be in any wdi^ proved by Proclus ; but is only assumed by him upon the above description We are, how- ever, to observe, that it is at least the assumption of a first rate geometer, in the course of a mathe- matical commentary; and therefore it must be taken with the utmost rigor, if it cannot be altogether re- jected. The same remark is also to be made with regard to the notice which is taken of this fact by Dr. Barrow. In his Mathematical Lectures, (Lect. U.) he observes, that *' Almost the same or like " attributes belong to lines; by these are reckoned " the distances of things ; according to these are " directed the rays of light, the descent of heavy " bodies, and all sorts of motion ; by these are dis- '* tinguished the confines of light and shadow ; "about these, at rest, are bodies revolved." It is almost unnecessary for me to remark, that these two concurrent authorities contradict the prevalent opinion of modern mathematicians ; be- cause it is sufficiently known that a mathematical or breadthless Hne is not usually supposed to be a possible (►bject of sense, or imagination. It is even perfectly manifest, by their having pointed out the above particular fact as an eAxeptiofi, that neither Hu. Mi. N 194 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. Proclus nor Barrow in the least conceived the fact M possible i?i any other case, except that wherein we ™ discern * the confines of light and shadow: Upon this, however, I am under the necessity to remark, i|| it appears strange that any philosopher, who had once adverted to the fact in the particular case of light and shadow, should not have intuitively dis- cerned, as a general corollary, that the same sole result must hold, universally, in all cases of a PERCEIVED PROPER LINE WHATEVER, since it is self evident that " the moon when dichotomised^' or any other instance of ^ lucid place divided from one that is dark, can only produce in our mind two different and contrasted sensations of colors, with a line betwee7i them ; precisely as must always hap- pen when we look at any two contiguous objects of different or contrasted colors. If any person should choose to deny the truth of the fact in question, even in that limited parti- cular case in which it is asserted by the above- mentioned authorities ; I might, if it were necessary to my purpose, insist upon the matter with perfect confidence. Having been myself originally struck by the fact, and finding it to be not of a physical but of a mathematical character ; I was thereupon led to state it in the form of a demonstration, without in the least suspecting that it had ever before been adverted to by any one. If, therefore, any thing in the analysis were required to be found- ed upon the matter ; it might be done with safety. SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 195 But I would here particularly solicit attention to the circumstance, that nothing in the following principles of perception has any dependence whatever upon this fact. On the contrary, whe- ther we suppose a visible line to be altogether bread tiiless, or to have gross breadth in any desired degree, it is perfectly indifferent to the principle upon which we perceive any such line. So essentially is this the case, that the analysis distinctly recognises no less* than three different species of visible lines ; two of which species are lines with breadth, I have considered this explanation necessary, inasmuch as I found, that some intelligent persons, who, however, have concurred in their judgment with me with regard to the nature of breadthless lines, have appeared to suppose that the whole essence or strength of the analysis lies in demon- strating the fact of visible lines being void of breadth;— a misconception to which, perhaps, I incautiously gave rise, myself, by letting the de- monstration of this fact form a conspicuous feature in mv earlier publications of the subject. My reason for bringing forward the assumption of Proclus and of Barrow, was not at all as deem- ing it necessary to maintain what they had asserted, how true soever I apprehend it to be ; but was only to show, that both these geometricians had taken such a view of the subject (at least in one particular case) as, when viewed in another light, and duly followed out, leads to a discernment of this conse- quence, namely, that every visible line is a rela- tion between two of our own ideas. 196 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap. ii. If it were not for peculiar circumstances, which |jl are adverted to in their proper place ; it would be hardly necessary for me to remark, that the par- ticular fact adverted to by these Philosophers, 'did not suggest to either of them a conception that it ^ was a matter in any way capable of bein^ applied to advance the general subject of perception : which is perfectly manifest from their entire silence with regard to any such consequence, and from the utter oblivion, or neglect, into which the fact observed by them has been suffered to fall, by those who have come after them ; insomuch, that no hint of the necessity, or use, of « variety of colors in perception, is to be found expressed throughout the whole controversy which has been carried on, during a century past, with regard to this part of our con- stitution ; but many expressions, on all sides, to the contrary. 197 SECTION FIFTH. OF THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION OF VISIBLE FIGURE OR OUTLINE. The immediate preparatory step to be taken, in order to enter upon the. following analysis, is, to lay down the line which divides the province of Sensation or Consciousness from that of Intuition, The faculty of Sense, I am here to observe, is vastly less extensive in the field of its objects than has been usually supposed. This faculty, strictly speaking, has cognizance only of such minute or elementary parts of any sensation, (of color for example) as do not admit of any farther perceptible division. The faculty of Intuition, on the contrary, is the dividing, as it is also the connecting Power ; and it has for its objects the relations per- ceptible between any two elements of sensation, or between any two other subjects whatever. As an instance of the very different operations of these two faculties, especially in a case of vi- sive perception ; suppose we are contemplating a 198 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. sensation of color, occasioned by our looking at a red wafer. In this case, according to the univer- sally received doctrine of the subject, we should be said to be conscious of a sensation of red. But, contrary to this view of the matter, I must here suggest, that, in point of fact, Se?isation or Con- sciousness has only a part, and that perhaps the smaller part, in this operation ; which, in reality, is a very complex one. For, although Sen.se takes cognizance of every sensible poifit,ih'dt goes to make up the whole magnitude of the surface of red, of which we are now conscious ; yet Sense cannot CONNECT any two of these points together^ and there- fore it cannot combine all the points into one whole or surface of sensation, such as that we are now con- templating, or such as we contemplate in ordinary, when it is said, in the usual phrase, that we have a sensation of color. On the contrary, it belongs to the faculty of Intuition, in any such case, to com- bine all the sensible points of any sensation of color, into one mass or surface ; which, in ordi- nary, is considered to be a single sensation, although, in philosophical strictness, it is an assemblage or con- gregationofa number of elementary sensations, per- fectly resembling one another, and thus formed into one whole. This view of the distinct provinces of Sense and of Intuition, especially in the act of visive percep- tion, leads me to suggest, that the perception of Jield extension or mere surface, although it is effected by the same twofaculties^ and upon the very same SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 199 principle, with those employed in the perception oi figure or outline, is yet produced under a very different modification of phenomena ; which, if not explained, might lead any person to suppose that the two kinds of perception are quite of a foreign nature to each other. In the case of apprehending mere superficial extension, we perceive the con- nection of the elementary parts by our faculty of Intuition, although the surface in question be of ONLY ONE color ; as, for example, any patch of the color of jxd. And, herein, the Intuitive fa- culty performs its office by distinguishing that there 2ire part, s beyond parts, although these parts are not marked out or distinguished from each other by any variety of colors, but are only differenced from one another by peculiarity of place. But here it becomes self evident, the moment the matter is proposed, that no one vnyaried sensation of color can ever afford us a perception of any figure or OUTLINE ; because, in order to effect this, there must be some contrast of two colors, one against another. In a certain refined intellectual sense of the word perception, it may indeed be said that we can perceive figures, or lines, upon any one uniform surface or sensation of color ; because our intui- tive faculty can discern that every surface in reality contains such divisions and elementary scites, although they be not actually marked out. But this is not perception, properly speaking ; by which last act is meant only the discernment of an object that is depicted by our sensations. 200 FIRST LINES OF [chap, lu There is another consideration to be adverted to here. It having been assumed by the School of Reid, that our sensations of colors are not in 7^eality spread out ; I am therefore debarred from assummg the contrary, without proof; and, al- though this contrary has, 1 trust, been already most decisively proved upon other ground^ yet, I do not choose, in this place, to avail myself of any proof except upon the ground of the proposed analysis. Hence the reader will perceive the lo- gical necessity I am under, oi Jirst analysing the perception of FIGURE or outline. When any Philosopher chooses to assume, that red, white, or blue, is not spread out ; he indeed places himself in a direct hostility of opinion to the great bulk of the species, both vulgar and learned : yet, upon this ground he may remain re- fractory, notwithstanding any force of reasoning that can be brought against him. But, fortunately, the School of Reid, although it has assumed that COLORS are not spread out, has never chosen to assert that ouTLfNE or figure is not spread out ; and we are satisfied that the writers of this school will never attempt any such plea. If therefore the present analysis shall establish the fact that visible figure or outline is nothing but a relation of contrast in the mind, between two of our own sensations of dif- ferent colors ; we may then venture to hope that the controversy with regard to this subject must be for ever at an eud. From the consideration just now explained ; it is to be observed, that what has here been said SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 201 with regard to the perception of superficial or field extensloti, is mentioned only incidentally; and what I have thus observed concerning it, as well as any farther notice which it may require in the sequel, is to be considered as being subordinate to the analy- sis of outline OR FIGURE. The preliminary considerations which appeared necessary to be suggested, for the complete under- standing of the present analysis of perception, is now before the reader, in the several Sections of the work which have been submitted ; and 1 feel, that, in the extensive mass of matter which was unavoid- ably requisite for this purpose, I have been obliged to allude to it very repeatedly, before I was enabled to arrive at the statement of it. As, however, I have never intended to mention the thing unne- cessarily ; 1 must throw myself entirely upon the consideration of my readers, in this particular. The following four general facts, together with their various modifications and other involved matter, comprise the analysis itself; upon which I shall only farther observe, that it is, in the pre- sent instance, followed out to a much greater extent than was delineated in any of my former publica- tions. It now includes an analysis of the three dif- ferent special modifications of visible lines : com- prising, I believe, all the varieties of which the subject is susceptible : whereas the former statements contained only that of one species, namely, the bread thless line ; which last is the 202 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. 1 most ordinary object^ and may therefore be called j ihegtn' trill object, of perception. I confess; 1 would fain hope, that the subject is \ not now wanting in any essential consideration. 2. Of the Four Laws of Primary Vision. THE FIRST LAW. This General Fact is, That no unvaried sensation ; of color can ever be accompanied by a perception i of any visible jigure, any line^ or any point. The proof of this proposition necessarily divides itself into two different kinds : The one ei'perimental or inductive : The other intuitive or mathematical. An inductive proof of the fact at any time, as a thing existing^ is had when we look at any large piece of water, or at the zenith of an unclouded sky : for, in either of these cases, we become con- scious of one unvaried sensation of color, but have therewith no perception of any figure, any line, or any point ; there being no definite object, or termination of any kind, visible in this uniform scene. The intuitive proof of the eternal necessity of the fact, is supplied by the understanding in the mo- ment of our experiencing any instance of the fact itself; for then (if the thing be suggested to our attention) we intuitively discern the impossi- biUty of any visible ^gure, any line, or any point, being ever perceivejd without the presence of SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 203 some second color. This truth we discern by the very same faculty, and precisely in the same manner, as that by which we discern any of the axiomatical truths in geometry. From this first step of analysis, the most careless reader cannot fail to discern, that a law of primary vision is not merely a law of nature or contin- gent fact ; but is, at the same time, both a law of nature, (like any other physical law) and a mathe- matical or neces.sary truth. Hence it is plain that the subject of perception, which has all along been taken for a mere phy.sical subject, is in reality made up of what have hitherto been considered the two most opposite sciences in nature. It is merely a subject of physical science so far as regards our sensations of colors ; which form the data thai are subservient to the act of judgment which we call PERCEPTION : But, the moment we enter upon the 2ict of percept ion itself, we are actually departed from physical science and have got upon mathematical or demonstrative ground; and every proposition with which we have in future to do, in this analysis, is, strictly speaking, one of those simple theorems called an a^viom. If there could arise any cavil, which would in the least affect the subject, with regard to its claim to be called mathematical; I might here throw my- self into the arms of Proclus and of Barrow. But I prefer to observe, that any cavil of the sort would be altogether nugatory ; because it never can for a moment be denied that each of the four laws 204 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. of vision is a necessary truth; — thai its evidence is not induciivey but intuitive; — and, that every visible line is purely a relation, either of contiguity or some other sort of locality, between two extended phenomena. Now all the truths of Geometry are, in like manner, nothing but relations betzceen definitions of parts of Extension or Space; and thus, I think, the generic identity of the Science of Geometry and the Science of Perception is placed beyond any controversy. Nor could it in the least be denied, that the subject of perception is equally A demon- strative subject; even if we chose arbitrarily to assume that it is not a mathematical one, THE SECOND LAW. When any two different unsoftened sensations of colors are felt at the same time ; they must meet, and their meeting is that local relation of contiguity and contrast which we call by the name of a visi- ble LINE. An inductive proof of this fact is had when we look at the sea and the sky at the same time; namely, at that part of each, where they appear to meet or join together, and so form that visible line which we call the horizon. The line which we perceive when we look at the ridge of any house-top, as it appears joined to the sky, affords another and very familiar instance of the same fact. And, in short, most objects, in ordina- ry, as they appear to be of different colors, and joined in contiguity with other objects on each SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 205 side of them, furnish continual instances of this Second law. The intuitive discernment of the eternal necessi- ty of this fact, is supplied by the understanding in every instant of perceiving the fact itself. For example : Let any one try to conceive any two full or unsoftened sensations of colors, at once, such as a red and a white, or a blue, and a yellow, with- out co72ceiving them to present a line of contrast be- tween them ; and he will find this to be utterly im- possible. He might as soon conceive a triangle with only two sides. THE THIRD LAW. When any two different unsoftened sensations of colors are felt at the same time, and are so dis- posed that one of them surrounds or embraces the other ; their common line of meeting must return into itself and so enclose a space ; by doini? which it must form what is called a superficial figure, such as a circle, a squar^e, a triangle, or any more irregular shape. An inductive proof of this fact is had when we look at the moon, surrounded by the azure color of the sky. For, in this case, we become conscious of two different unsoftened sensations of colors at the same time, namely, a sensation of silver white surrounded by a sensation of azure ; and the com- mon line of their meeting returns into itself, by 206 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. which it forms that circular figure which ordinary persons take for the identical outline of the exter- nal moon. The intuitive discernment of the necessity of such a result, is supplied, as in the former cases, by the understanding itself; which perceives that it never can happen otherwise. This Third law is, manifestly, no other than a mere modification of the Second One. For in both, alike, we perceive any visible line upon the very same general principle. And the only difference between the two laws is, that one of them compre- hends only such lines as do not return into themselvesj and consequently which can form only what may be called an element of figure, not complete figure itself ; whereas the other law is that more perfect modification of the general fact, by which is formed any complete superficial figure, such as we usually contemplate under the name of an object. It becomes manifest here, that it is upon the common principle, of the Second and Third laws, that we perceive every visible line, or figure, which the mind ever apprehends, at any time. It proves at the same time manifest, in the high- est degree, that, since two different sensations of colors are necessary for the production of every visible line ; it is not color, but contrast that is the ESSENCE of every such line : or, in other SECT. 1V-] THE HUMAN MIND. 207 words, it is plain that a visible line is nothing but a relation of locality between two of our own sensations. Hence it is evident, upon one hand, that a visir ble line is not an object of sense, as was thought by- Berkeley, and by Hume, and by all the advocates of the Ideal Theory in general : And neither, upon the other hand, is the perception of a line supplied to us unaccountably and unsearchably, as is asserted by the School of Reid : But, contrary to both those schemes, a line, as I have already said, is a Relation between two of our own Ideas; and it is discerned by a legitimate act of intuition, of the very same nature with that judgment which we form when we say that a whole is greater than any of its parts, or that any one thing is not another. The simple truth is, that, when a man distin- guishes OR JUDGES between a blue and a yellow, or between a black and a ivhite, he perceives a line; — and, when he makes no such judgment, he never perceives any line. To perceive any line, therefore, is to distinguish between two Sensations : but the Object of any such distinc- tion can be nothing but a Relation ; and Color is not a Relation ; neither is any Relation ever per- ceived unaccountably, because it is always discerned by a legitimate act of the understanding. 208 FIRST LINES OF [chap, ii, THE FOURTH LAW. When any two different sensations of colors are felt at the same time, but are so sojtened, at their nearest edges, as that they blend into each other and thus leave no sensible contrast^ where they meet ; in this case they never can be accompanied by a perception of any figure, or any line, not even if their remote parts should be of the most opposite colors, or black and white. A proof of this fact is had when we look at the dawniiig of day, either in the morning or in the even- ing : for in this case we become conscious of two very opposite sensations of colors^ the one from the dark part of the sky and the other from that part which is enlightened, without, however, perceiving any thing like a lint of distinction between the two sensations ; which, manifestly, is because the two sensations of colors steal insensibly into each other, so that the understanding cannot discern any relation of contrast, in any one place. Various other instances of the same general fact occasionally present themselves, in the objects of nature; although this sort of object is vastly less numerous, than that wherein two colors meet abruptly and furnish those relations of contrast which we call lines. This Fourth law affords a striking illustration, I SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 209 although not any superior evidence, of the general principle upon which all figures, or lines, are per- ceived. For, in the case of this law, we become conscious of two different sensations of colors at the same time, and yet we have herein a nega- tion of all figure, or line, between • them : And thus it is proved, by a new. kind of result, that it is not sensation of color, nor yet a variety of sen- sations of colors, that is the essence of Tmy per- ceived line ; but it is purely a relation of con- trast that is this essence. To say, therefore, that we perceive any visible line, is the same as to say that we perceive the local arrangement or disposition of any two of our own sensations of colors. Finally ; We are to recollect, that our sensa- tions are ideas. And, thus, to perceive any visible line, or figure, is nothing but to discern a relation between two of our own ideas or actual affections. From this species of analysis, therefore, it results, as it had done before from various species of evi- dence of a very different kind, that the common doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle, of Newton and of Locke, is perfectly faithful to the reality of nature. The mind, according to them, receives extended impressions, in some ivay or other, from some eMernal unperceived pozver; and the idea of a circle, or a triangle, which is thus supposed to be impressed upon the mind, is in reality itself a Hu. Mi O 210 FIRST LINES OF [chap. n. circle or a triangle. And, according to the de- monstrative propositions now stated, the same holds rigorously true. It remains, then, that the perceiving mind is, in the most obvious and literal acceptation of the phrase, a mirror of the sur- rounding CREATION, as it has been called by Plato. And, unless the principles of the present analysis shall be shown to be fallacious, this con- clusion, I apprehend, must be subscribed to upon a basis of strict legitimate science, which cannot yield in evidence to any demonstration in geo^ metry. Extraneous Suggestion. Before I proceed to enter upon the several viodl- jications of the subject of perception, and while the impression of the general form of the analysis is yet fresh in the mind of the reader ; there is a very important consideration, of quite a different na- ture, which I would here suggest to momentary notice : although the thing cannot be prosecuted in this place, but will form a distinct subject of spe- culation in the subsequent part of the volume. The matter to which I allude, is the following. It is not merely the Subject of Perception, alone, that is affected by the principles of the analysis now submitted : for a change of equal magnitude is thereby produced with regard to the modem doctrine of Causation, or Real Efficiency. I deem it, accordingly, of some importance to mention the fact here ; both with a \iew to excite a due curiosity SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 211 on the subject, and to prepare the mind of the reader, while the proofs are yet new in his recol- lection, for that analysis of the subject of Real Efficiency, which will occupy a considerable por- tion of the present work. At this stage of the subject, therefore, 1 would merely put the following question : After the statement of the Four Axioms or Necessary Truths which are herein called Laws of Vision ; What becomes of the doctrine '* that there is no instance ** in which we are able to perceive a necessary " connection between two successive events ; or •* to comprehend in what manner one proceeds " from the other, as it's cause V Although 1 have quoted this doctrine in the words of one particular writer, I desire to be un- derstood as not ascribing it to him exclusively. On the contrary, it is sufficiently known to be the general^ 7iay the universal opinion of the suhject. I only desire to call the reader's attention, in this place, to the decisive and vast extent to which this opinion is refuted by every one of the four general laws of vision. There is another consideration, to which it appears still more proper to advert in this place. I therefore intimate, that, when it is at any time, in the course of the present analysis, demonstrated, or affirmed, that a visible line is a Relation ; it is thereby meant, as must indeed be manifest throughout, that a Uneh a distinct partition, that OF TH^ \ 2U FIRST U^BS, &c. [chap. ii. is, a thing possessing the nature of a party-walk between two colore. But it is here at the same time to be remarked, that this is a vastly differ- ent thing from the import of the term Relation in the estimation of logicians and philosophers ; by whom it is uniformly understood that Relation im- ports no third thing or real partition between any two Relatives, but is only a certain comparative view of two different subjects taken together ; or, in other words, that Relations and Relatives are convertible terms. The investigation which I propose in the sequel, of the General Subject of Relation, in con- sequence of the great and essential difference of my own views of the subject from that which uni- foniily obtains, will fully explain what is here al- luded to. In the interim, I observe, that I con- ceive the present analysis of perception is one o^ the best preparatives that could be, for the ap- prehension of what I suppose to be the real na- ture of Relation ; while it is at the same time to be observed, that, when the reader conies to the sub- ject in question, it will be found far more preg- nant with subtilty, as well as with importance, than most persons can imagine until they have gone through an analysis of it's various species. SECTION SIXTH. OF THE MATHEMATICAL OR DEMONSTRATIVE NATURE OF THE SCIENCE OF PERCEPTION.— AND OF THE CON- TINUATION OF THE ANALYSIS. 1. The most remarkable consideration, by far, of any that appears attached to the knowledge we gain in perception, is that of it's being of a demon- strative nature. This character of the subject there- fore claims a distinct section, here ; although the mention of it has been unavoidably anticipated, in the course of what is already advanced. It must be sufficiently known, to every person who is in the least conversant on this part of our constitution, that perception has never been sup- posed to be any other than a mere physical subject. Nothing, therefore, one should think, ought more strongly to excite our curiosity, than to find that this continual daily operation, by which we hold intercourse with the things around us, is purely a repeated discernment of necessary relatiojis between our 0Ztn ideas; which, we are to observe, is the generic description of « mathematical act. Of the real nature of this process, I have already 214 FIRST LINES OF [chap. u. given such illustrations, as I think must be of them- selves altogether conclusive. With regard to the Second and Third laws of vision, however, con- sidered as being only two different modifications of one same general fact, I shall offer the follow- ing observation, over and above what has gone before. Suppose the eye of an observer, in traversing the face of the unclouded heaven, at length arrives at, and takes in, some second color , such as that of the land, or of the sea. In this case, it is plain, the mind can have no knowledge of the presence of any second color, eacept by the very act o/' distin- guishing THE SECOND from the first ; because the words, ''Jirst"' and ** second,'' are mere rela- tive terms, each of which iiecessarily implies the present existence of the other relative. This can hardly require illustration, because it is manifest that, in the case of any two co-existent things, we could not call one of them by the name o^Jirst, ex- cept in reference to the presence of that which we call second; nor could we call the other second, ex- cept in reference to the Jirst. Hence it is rigorously shown, that the very knozvledge that we have two sensations at any time in the mind, consists in a discernment of their contrast. But this dis- cernment of contrast, between any two of our ideas or sensations of colors, is precisely of the same nature with any simple mathematical act, For, as in Geometry we cannot contemplate a whole and it's part, without contemplating the re- lation of inequality between this whole and it's SECT, vf.] THE HUMAN MIND. 215 part ; so in Perception we cannot contemplate a blue and ayellmv, without contemplating the relation oj contrast between the blue and the yellow. It is to be granted, indeed, that all necessary or demonstrable truth is jiot mathematical truth. The following, therefore, are some of the grounds upon which I conceive the Science of Geometry and the Science of Perception are generically one and the same Science. 1. The two subjects are identical, not only in the class of their evidence^ that is in the self-evident necessity of their truth; but, also, as I have before observed, in this, that the olvjects of each, alike, are Space or Extension and its Relations. No specijie difference, therefore, I think, which may exist between them, can affect this generic identity. 2. The Elements of Euclid and the Elements of Perception, are, each alike, made up of two most different classes of thoughts. One of these classes contains only contingent ideas, which either may or may never arise in any mind. The other class is formed of necessary relations between these contingent ideas, 3. A geometrical axiom is a simple theorem, ex- pressing a necessary relation between some two substantive or defined ideas of space, intuitively perceived, without the intervention of any third idea. Now each of the four laws of vision is such a theorem ; The Second law, for instance, affirms ?16: FIRST LINES OF |chap.u. that a visible line is a necessary relation between any two unsoftened sensations of colors ; and our understanding immediately discerns that this must be an eternal result of the data. 4. Sensations of colors must ever be a mere physical subject : their existence is contingent, and their evidence merely inductive or experimental. But VISIBLE LINES must cvcr be a mathematical or demonstrable subject : their nature is necessary, provided the data, i. e. sensations of colors, exist* If it should here be said, that our sensations are actual existences ; whereas the principles of geome- try are mere hypothetical conditions, which imply no existence of the things defined ; I apprehend this, certainly, cannot make against the claims of perception to be considered, generically, as a ma- thematical subject. If two cubes of matter be supposed to exist ; the actuality of their existence could not affect the necessity of their equality, nor hinder the relation between them from being strictly a mathematical one, provided the cubes were shown to be equal in consequence of any defi- nitions given of them. Upon the other hand, it is here freely admitted, that the specific difference between the subjects of Perception and the subjects of Geometry is very great; the latter consisting, in general, of precisely defined magnitudes ; while the former do not admit of any such precision, nor are at all concerned with SECT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 217 this kind of measurement. But this specific differ- ence between the two sciences does not at all invalidate the present argument. Finally, however; If any one should still choose to ground a cavil against the general identity of the two sciences ; I leave it, here, as a matter of perfect indifference to the nature and bearings of the present analysis, and as one which can only affect the strict classification of the subject : because no person will for a moment deny that the four ge- neral laws of vision are expressed by propositions that are, in the most legitimate sense, demonstrative. My great object, in the present section, therefore, has not been so primarily to insist upon the mathe- maticaluess of the nature of perception, as it has been to Jiv the attention of readers upon the fact that Perception is not a physical subject. And I apprehend it to have been very requisite to proceed thus, in order to eradicate that inveterate prejudice^ which has for so many ages been estabUshed in the minds of philosophers, namely, that Perception is merely a branch of Physics. After what has been advanced here, I ough indeed perhaps to state, that no specific objection has been started to me, against the claims of the subject to be considered as being generically ma- thematical. But I have nevertheless anticipated the possibility of a difference of opinion upon this head ; and have therefore deemed it expedient to point ont first, its claims, and secondly the perfect 218 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. indifference to my views of any objection that could be started with regard to it. The statement of the four general facts of pri- mary vision which was offered in the last section, constitutes the general form of the proposed analy- sis : and it comprises the substance of all that is contained in any account of the subject which 1 had published prior to the present work. But it is now to be intimated, that there are certain special modifications of the subject of perception ; whose specific differences are remarkably contrasted with that one which has already been investigated ; and the nature of which involves many important dis^ tinctions. These modifications of the subject, therefore, I shall, in the following sections, proceed to con- sider ; with intent to their forming an integral part of the analysis. In so doing, however, it is proper to observe, that there is no new general principle to be introduced or added to those which have gone before. The additional matter is merely an ana- lysis of the subject that displays the same principles of perception^ operating upon some very different modifications of the phenomena of colors : v^Ynch modi' fications we are, in many cases, liable to experience, in our intercourse with visible objects ; although these cases are not near of such frequent recur- rence as those which were contemplated in the general analysis. The varieties now in question, form, in point of SBCT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 21d fact, the most curious and abstruse parts of the whole subject of Perception ; and, I also think, the most interesting. As they are exceedingly deceit- ful in their first or most obvious aspects ; a right understanding of their real nature is requisite, (among other reasons) in order to prevent our being carried back (iu the special cases of per- ception that are here alUided to) into the general fallacy of the Ideal Theor\ , by which error the ad- herents of that Theory uniformly confounded percept iion with mere sensation. 220 SECTION SEVENTH. THAT VISIBLE LINES ARE OF THREE DIFFERENT SPE- CIES.— AND, OF THE FIRST SPECIES OF VISIBLE LINE. It was observed, in a foregoing Section, that visible lines are to be recognised as consisting of more than one species. There are, indeed, three differ- ent sorts of visible appearance which serve to show the figures of extended objects, and which there- fore may be called visible lines ; and the specific differences between these are very considerable, insomuch that they each require a distinct investi- gation, in order adequately to delineate their whole nature. After what I have said of the im- portance of these modifications of the subject, at the close of the last section, I shall proceed to consider their merits without further preface. The species of line which appears to claim our earliest notice, is that which forms at once the Viost perfect and most frequent object of perception. It consists of such lines as are formed by the most sudden or abrupt contrasts, between any two sensations of full or unsoftened colors. It is this species alone which was contemplated in the general analysis that has been already submitted ; and, in that statement, I have perhaps sufficiently explained the particular nature of the line in SECT. vii.J FIRST LINES, &c. 221 question. In the present case it may merely be added, that most of the visible bodies in nature are sufficiently opake, to occasion in our minds such full sensations of colors, as are requisite to pro- duce a perception of this sort of line. As, for example, when we look at a man, a tree, or a piece of furniture, we perceive the outline or visible figure of any such object only by the co-operation of the sky, m^ a wall, or some other general field of color ^ behind it; which field of color must form a contrast with the color of the particular object in question. Now it is perfectly obvious, that most visible bodies in nature are sufficiently opake, to present contrasts of colors of the most abrupt or perfect kind, insomuch as to afford us perceptions of the sort of line here imder consideration. As I apprehend it will sufficiently appear, that the three different species of line, present distinc- tions which indispensably require a distinct appro- priate appellation for each of them; I shall in future refer to this first species under the name of the proper visible line. Proper visible lines, having no color, can have no breadth. This is a general fact upon which, I have already observed, there is nothing whatever to be founded in the principles of perception. Nevertheless, I deem it proper, as forming a fact certainly included in the subject, to re-state, here, that sort of demonstrative proof of the matter which I offered in my original suggestion of it. 222 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. A proper visible line cannot have any one color; because it is shown, by the First Law, that no unvaried sensation of color can have any definite boundary. If therefore a proper visible line have any color, at all ; it must be made up, in some way or other, oi two different colors, because it is proved, by the Second Law, that two different concomitant fall colors must always occasion a proper line be- tween them. But this last supposition would produce a double line between every two visible bodies; which, we know, is manifestly contrary to fact. —If, however, we should, for argument sake, still suppose that a proper visible line is made up of two colors ; the absurdity of this becomes evident, because it is plain that each of the supposed lines is ovX-^ ipart of the surface to which it adheres. Thus, for example, if the circle of the moon (as it is called) be taken for our subject; and if we should take any rim of her white surface^ to serve as one element in the line which we call her circle ; it is plain this rim of white, though it w^ere never so narrow, must be a part of the moons surface; and what is of the nature of surface cannot be that of boundary. The same reasoning will hold if we take any rim from what we call the color of the sky. Hence it is plain, that the proper visible line which we call the circle of the moon can have no color ; and, consequently, no visible breadth. Other demonstrations of this truth, specifically different, but upon the same general principle, might be furnished, if it were of consequence to occupy our farther attention with it. SECt. vnj THE HUMAN MIND. 223 To attempt to invalidate the above proof upon the ground of the imperfection of sense; would only show that any person who undertakes it has not rightly apprehended the terms of the proposition. A visiBtE line, is a line which we SEE. To say, therefore, that A visible /me has invisible breadth^ is a manifest contradiction in terms. A visible line cannot possibly have any quality except those which we discern in it ; and there is no room left for the shadow of a cavil with regard to it. The very i\\m^ assumed in the outset, is the visible cha- racter of the line : and, therefore, to attempt to change, or vitiate this datum, by pretending that the line may have some breadth that is not visible, would be an absurdity which certainly cannot require any further exposition. The truth seems to be, that the imperfection of the instrumentahty of sense, often occasions the perfection of a visible line ; for it frequently make.^ us NOT see breadth, in many cases wherein the external line which we look at has in reality some breadth. For example, when we look at a close joint in a piege of cabinet work, it appears to be a line alto- gether void of latitude ; although in point of fact the joined parts are actually a little separated : But, if we make use of a magnifying power, we shall jfind that the line has breadth, which becomes very sensible. It is here to be observed, however, that such external objects as I have just now mentioned, unless tlie parts be brought actually into physical 224 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. contact, are not of that kind which ought ever to be taken for the subject of our experiment, in order to ascertain the nature of a proper visible line; because all joints or appositions of two different bodies, that are actually separate, however near their parts may otherwise be, are not in themselves lines, but are, strictly speaking, narrow surfaces. It is remarkable to observe the very different cha- racter displayed by such external objects as are best fitted to occasion a perception of a proper visible line, from that which is exhibited by such narrow or insensible surfaces as I have just now ad- verted to. If we look at any single black letter of good print ; and observe the contrast line formed between the edge of any one of the black letters and the white paper which surrounds it ; we shall perceive a line that is manifestly void of breadth. If now we have recourse to a magnifying power, in order to render us sensible of some breadth in this line, (similar to what happens when we use a magnifier to examine any close joint of cabinet work) we shall be surprised and disappointed by finding the perceived line as breadthless as before. And, if we augment the magnifying power, the line perceived will not put on any different general cha-^ racier. It is to be observed, indeed, that, every time we augment the power of the glass, we shall perceive a new line, strictly speaking ; because every such augmentation of power occasions in onr minds two new sensations, namely, a black and a white, that are more developed than those of the preceding experiment; and thus, upon every I SECT, vii] THE HUMAN MIND. 225 change of the magnifying power, we shall perceive a line that is, in its minute features, differently shaped from those which we saw before : but every one of the lines will present the same essential general character of being perfectly void of breadth. Now it is self-evident, that all lines which appear breadthless under a magnifying pozver, must, indis- putably, in the most rigorous sense, appear breadth- less to the naked eye. And thus it is proved, in the most rigid manner, by experiment, as it was before by a process of demonstrative reasoning, that proper visible lines (as perceived by the natural power of man) are totally void of breadth. There is yet another consideration to be sug- gested, before we have done with this species. Proper visible lines are occasioned by two very different classes of objects. One of these classes consists of such sensations of colors as are occa- sioned by painting, or by any sort of various full coloring, upon one same surface; as, for example, by the display of black letter upon white paper, or by the contrasted colors of a picture. The other class is made up of such contrasted sensations of full colors as are occasioned not by stains upon one same surface, but by two separate colored bodies, one of which is at a distance behind the other; such as, when we look at a man, or a statue, whose color appears contrasted with that of a wall that is ten or twenty feet on the other side of it ; or, when we perceive a house, or a tree, from the contrast of the color of the sky beyond it. Hu, Mi P 226 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ir. Now, with regard to these two different classes of objects ; it is proper to distinguish, that the one first-mentioned may, with perfect indifference^ be supposed to be open to the assertion that their colors insensibly blend or' soften into each other where they meet together. I have al- ready, I trust, sufficiently shown, that, were this the case, it could make no difference to the per- fection of a perceived line, provided we were not sensible of the blending ; but, as for the fact itself, of this blending, I have no objection to suppose that it must actually happen, in every instance wherein two different external colors are diffused over one same surface. But what I would here suggest, is, that a very different character is ex- hibited by the other class of objects in question. For, when we look at a man, or a statue, or any such object, as it stands distinguished owing to the co-operation of a colored wall at a distance behind it, it is impossible to suppose that the colors of the two objects soften or blend together, because the objects themselves do not touch each other. It becomes ma- nifest, therefore, that no cavil whatever can hold with regard to this class of phenomena. To this I have only to add ; that the perceived Mnes which are occasioned by our looking at such colored objects as do not touch each other, but are one beyond the other, are by far the most numerous class of perceived lines; and, that it w^as this class that I selected for the subject of analysis, in my original proposal of the subject. I humbly conceive, there- fore, that nothing can be more satisfactory than the SECT, vii] THE HUMAN MIND. 227 evidence that proper visible lines, of the most perfect Nass, are purely void of breadth. In treating this subject ; I have unavoidably in- dulged the usual phraseology, by w^hich we talk of perceiving men, and trees, and zvalls behind them. It is nevertheless to be observed, that it has been ri- gorously demonstrated to be impossible to do so in reality. The meaning, therefore, 'of what has been last advanced, is merely this : that, when we have two different sensations of colors in the mind, occasioned by two external tangible objects which are situated o?2e behind and at a distance from the other; we are certain that the different masses or substances of these two bodies do not blend, and therefore we have no ground for a moment to sup- pose that the txvo different sensations of colors, which they occasion in us, can blend, it is manifestly impossible, even in a philoso- phical treatise of the subject, to lay aside the usual phraseology, or to avoid talking of perceived ob- jects as if they were in reality external and dis- tant things. Allowance therefore is to be made by a reader, for every occasion whereon this un- avoidably occurs ; and he will not upon any such occurrence forget, that this is merely to accommo- date the ordinary conceptions of mankinil. 228 SECTION EIGHTH. OF THE SECOND SPECIES, OR IMPROPER VISIBLE LINE. In entering upon the subject of the present Section ; I would observe, that there is not any part of the analysis that appears to demand so attentive a consideration, in order to render us thoroughly ac- quainted with the general principle of perception, as this one. The matter, however, is readily ac- cessible to every capacity, upon yielding it but a very moderate share of attention ; and the only preliminary remark which it appears to require, is, that the knowledge it conveys is purely demon- strative, although all its propositions are of the most simple or elementary kind. In the outset; I am to suggest, that every visible line, which we ever perceive, possesses two dis- tinct and vastly different characters. One of these is positke : The other merely/ relative. The due distinction of these two natures, in every line, is necessary to prevent the greatest con- fusion, both in the present subject and in philo- sophy in general. In the subject of perception, however, it has almost invariably happened that philosophers, no less than the vulgar, have con- founded these two characters ; and it is only by the complete exposure of this error that we can ever SECT, viii.] FIRST LINES, &c. 229 arrive at a knowledge of the true nature of a per- ceived line; especially in any of those cases wherein we perceive a line either of the Second or of the Third species; both which remain to be de- scribed and investigated. The First species of line has already been shown to possess the remarkable character of being void of breadth. The /Seco/z^ species, on the contrary, of which I am now to treat, is characterised by having a sensible, and often a very considerable breadth. It consists in any stripe of sensation^ of any full color ; by which I mean a color that is not softened at either of its two edges, where those edges join to any other sensations of colors which happen to be contiguous to the stripe in question. Thus, for example, the sensations of black, of which we become conscious when we look at any of the ink diagrams in Euclid's Elements ; or the sensations which are occasioned by the red, or black streaks which divide the money columns of an account book ; either of these are lines of /^e Second Species. Nor is this species confined to stripes of a limited magnitude ; for any field of sensation of color, whose breadth is only in a very small proportion to its length, may, for some purpos- es, be regarded as a line. As this Second Species involves some conse- quences, which render it a very considerable sub- ject of ratiocination; it appears indispensably necessary to distinguish it, as I did the former sort, by an appropriate appellation ; and, I imagine, 230 FIRST LINES OF [chap. n. the name of the improper visible line will be found particularly applicable to it. It is now to be suggested, as a matter which claims our special attention, that the positive cha- racter of every visible line, is usually more ob- vious to remark, or more obtrusive upon our no- tice, than its relative character. It is owing to this obtrusiveness of the positive character, (which usurps the place of the relative one in our ima- gination,) that both the vulgar and the learned have been uniformly imposed upon, so as to have mvariably concluded that every visible line is a mere positive sensation of color ; whereas it has been demonstrated, with regard to the First Species, that a perceived line is purely a relation between two sensations of colors ; and it is now to be shown to be no less so with regard to the Second Species likewise. I shall not here inquire into the reason, why the positive character of a perceived line is generally more obtrusive upon our notice than its relative character ; although I think it would be no diffi- cult matter to account for it. It is sufficient to assume the fact itself; which cannot be denied. At the same time, I do not assume it as a fact which must always hold, without exception ; but only remark it for one that has actually prevailed, in time past, insomuch as to have completely veiled the true nature of perception from the discernment of philosophers ; and one which renders the distinc- tion between the positive and the relative character w T. VIII.] THE HUMAN MIND. 231 of a perceived line one of the most important con- siderations in the whole subject. With regard to this distinction, therefore, I am first to observe, that, if an ordinary person happen to be discoursing upon the nature of a visible line, he always supposes the essence ofsuchaline to consist in some positive stripe of color; and he never, for a moment, adverts to the real fact, namely, that any positive stripe of color, when considered as a LINE, owes its relative character not at all to itself, but entirely to some other colors perceived on each side of it. Nor is the subject viewed in any different light, even by men of science, or by pneumatolo- gists themselves. Bishop Berkeley, in his *' New " Theory of Vision,'' talks of " a red, and a blue " line;'' And, he says, he '^ can conceive these " both added together, and making one sum ;" by which word, " sum," he means one continued line, Mr. Hume, likewise, in his ** Treatise of Human ^* Nature," entertains perfectly similar views of the subject. He supposes no visible line to exist but such as have color; and, in one place, he even pro- poses to distinguish mathematical points by assign- ing a peculiar color to each of them. It is thus that philosophers in general have uniformly sup- posed every visible line to consist in some stripe of color. The philosophers of the School of Reid are not exempt from the charge of having proceeded in this way ; for it is the creed of that School, that it i^ impossible to perceive length without breadth. It is altogether manifest that these philosophers sup- 232 FIRST LINES OF [chap. [i. pose every visible line to consist in a stripe of color; because it is their doctrine that a breadthless line is a thing neither perceivable nor imaginable, but is an object only of abstract conception. The following considerations, I trust, must strike at the root of this long-established fallacy, especially, I mean, in the case of all broad or color- ed lines; for, with regard to such lines as are formed between two full sensations of colors, I apprehend, they, of themselves alone, most completely explode the doctrine that we cannot perceive length with- out breadth. I grant, indeed, that whenever we perceive any breadthless line, it is an object, not of sense, but of our mathematical intuition, as truly as is that species of line which we conceive when we read Euclid's definition of a line, namely, length without breadth. The only difference between the two cases is, that, in the Jii^st, we actually PERCEIVE a breadthless line ; and, in the second, we ONLY CONCEIVE ouc, without having the phe- nomenon depicted in our view. When we contemplate any stripe of sensation of color, in its own intrinsic positive character, red, white, or blue, (however^we or narrow this stripe may be) it is impossible for us, by any effort of logical acumen, to consider it as a line : On the contrary, this object, viewed in itself, without taking notice of any appearance on either side of it, cannot involve, nor give rise to, any relative notion whatever. SECT, viii] THE HUMAN MIND. 233 But, upon the other hand, when we contemplate any stripe of sensation of color in the relative CHARACTER OF A LINE, that is US Something which DIVIDES any one thing from another, the case be- comes so vastly and essentially altered, that now we cannot, by any logical procedure, regard it at all AS A STRIPE OF COLOR ; because, so long as we regard any stripe of color relatively, we are logically bound to sink or annihilate its positive cha- racter, and to consider it as being absolutely a breadthless partition between the two objects which we conceive it as dividing. This important principle, therefore, it is here my intention to illustrate. It is worthy of remark, that the kind of abstrac- tion which I have now suggested, is both ac- knowledged and practised by philosophers, when- ever they would ilkistrate any mathematical rea- soning by the medium of an external diagram. And yet, they have never discerned that the same principle must hold, also, in every instance of per- ception wherein we distinguish between any two objects by means of a broad or colored line. To understand, perfectly, the operation of this prin- ciple, must, I conceive, be to understand the most abstruse part of the subject of perception. I there- fore suppose it will not be thought too particular to illustrate the subject by the following example. If we describe a black stripe, upon a sheet of white paper, in the form of the diagram, A B, and then look upon the diagram in question ; we shall S34 FIRST LINES OF [chap. u. become conscious of a sensation of color, (i. e. of black,) which Bishop Berkeley, and Mr. Hume, as well as every ordinary person, would pronounce to be a black line. At the same time, however, if we were to challenge any person with regard to the fact, he would doubtless acknowledge, that this object, considered in itself, is merely a positive stripe of black, and does not involve the notions of any other objects which it divides. It follows, there- fore, that, considered in its positive character, this black stripe has nothing of the nature of REhATiOii : and, hence, it is not a line, because every line is a relation, that is a division between some two other things, in respect to which it is a line, and the two things so divided are relatives, or correlatives. •B D But if, upon the other hand, we contemplate the same black stripe, A B, in the relative character of a line which divides the superior white surface C from the inferior white surface D ; the sensation of black now loses its positive character, and is trans- formed, in our contemplation, into an object that is purely a relation ; from which moment we have nothing at all to do with its color, or breadth, any more than if it absolutely had none. So long as we view the positive black stripe only in the relative character of a line, that is as a division between the two white surfaces, we must sink or annihilate its color or breadth, in our con- SECT. VIII.] THE HUMAN MIND. 235 templation, upon the same principle that we sink the distance between any two parallel lines when, for the purposes of demonstration, we con- sider tbem as one same line, prom this single example; I trust it is conclu- sively manifest, that, when philosophers talk of rt red, or a blue line, or a Vme of any other color, they talk like the vulgar; and when they introduce this popular language, and the conceptions which suggest it^ into a philosophical treatise of Perception, they let loose the most erroneous conceits and fill the whole subject with confusion. In popular discourse, indeed, it will always be natural and allowable to talk of a red, or a black line : but certain I think it is, that, to talk of any colored line in a treatise ofFer- ception, is to the full as illogical and absurd as to talk of a colored line in Geometry itself. Here another opportunity is afforded us of re- marking, how essentially the subject of perception is a mathematical subject. The universal assumed distinction between a mathematical line and a perceived line, is, that the latter must have some breadth^ while the former has not any : But we have jus discerned, from the above illustration, that, when taken in a strict logical view, it is impos- sible for ANY perceived line whatever to have any breadth; because, even in the case of improper lines, which consist in a positive stripe of color, and therefore have some breadth in themselves, con- sidered intrinsically as phenomena, we are under a rigorous necessity to annihilate the consideration t36 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. of their color and breadth together, and to con- template them as being absolutely breadthless. As the nature of the Second Species of line is of essential importance to the subject ; I hope those readers who may have completely apprehended my meaning from the foregoing illustrations, will not deem the following one redundant. In every perception of any two adjacent ^e/^* of color, considered as divided from each other by a broad or colored line, and, consequently, as being correlative and collateral spaces, we must proceed upon the very same principle as when we con- template any ink diagram of a circle, having a black stripe drawn across it, through its centre, to represent a diameter. — In any such case, we abstract from the breadth of the black stripe, and con- template it only as a mathematical or breadthless line, dividing the two correlative semicircles from one another : In other words, we sink or annihilate both the color and the breadth of the black dia- meter, and regard it as having neither of those qualities. But, in like manner, in any case of perception, wherein we contemplate a stripe of color considered as a mere division between any two other colored objects, we must sink or annihi- late the color and the breadth of the dividing line ; because the breadth or color of this line can have no more to do with its relative character when it forms a distinguishing line between any two ob- jects oi perception, than it can have when it divides two semicircles, or any other two mathematical subjects. The character of the line, in each of the m ECT. viii.] THE HUMAN MIND. 237 two cases, is equality and purely that of a relation or partition ; and the same reasoning that apphes to the one, must apply to the other one also. If there be any person to whom this reason- ing appears inconclusive ; I would request him, instead of the foregoing example, of a circle and its diameter, to suppose the particular subject of our reasoning were a circular cake, with a knife laid across it, in the act of dividing it into two equal paints. In this case, there is no person who could entertain a moment's doubt that the division would be equally just, whether the knife had a thin blade or a thick 07ie, The real truth is, that every spec- tator of this operation would (without in the least attending to his own intellectual proceeding in the business) abstract from the thickness of the knife, whether it were a thick blade or a thin one ; and he would regard this instrument, (which is now serving as a dividing line between the two parts of the cake,) as being absolutely a breadth less one. In this case we are to observe, that the thickness of the knife, (the color of whose back we are supposed to be now viewing,) is its positive character ; and its being the divider of the cake into two equal parts is its relative character. Thus it becomes impossible not to discern, that, in regarding any phenomenon whatever as a line, we are always under a logical necessity to annihilate its positive cha- racter, — The moment we forget this, and regard any stripe of color in itself as a positive color or breadth, we have lost it as a line ; and, thus 2^ FIRST LINES OF [chap. it. considered, it has no longer a relation to any object around it. It is curious to remark, that, in any such case of perception, as that last supposed, the intellectual procedure of a clown, or a child, is completely of one identical sort with that of a philosopher in the boasted process of mathematical abstraction; — a process which is usually, by the best writers, con- sidered to be so very difficult to be apprehended by a beginner in geometry, that it has been men- tioned as a fault, in the teachers of that science^ to attempt to explain this arcanum in the outset. The only difference between the two cases is, that, in the Science of Geometry the philosopher knozvs how /;e ABSTRACTS ; but, in that of Perception the clown and the philosopher are equally in- attentive to the principle upon which they PERCEIVE. It is here that I redeem the pledge which was given in the foregoing part of the analysis ; namely, that there is nothing in the principles of perception that has any dependence upon the fact that we perceive lines void of breadth. The illustrations which have been offered in the present Section, of the nature of the Second Species of visible line, ren- ders it in the fullest manner conclusive, that, if we never perceived objects by any other medium than that of broad or colored lifies, the relative nature of a line, and the intuitive principle upon which we ^BsECT. T] VIII.] THE HUMAN MIND. 289 perceive it, must be precisely the same as it is in the case of breadth less lines themselves. An act of perceiving any visible line^ is, universally, an act of intuitively discerning some local con- trast between two sensations of colors. Therefore, provided the mind be suppHed with any two sen- sations, of a nature to produce such a contrast ; it can be of no consequence to the general character of the result^ whether this contrast be a simple and perfect one, or a complex and imperfect. This will be farther illustrated, when I come to consider the Tiuj^d Species or Blending Line. In the mean time, we in the clearest manner discern the essential principle of a line, which is purely that of rela- tion ; which principle can never be changed, or altered, by any modfication of the phenomena. In appropriating the name of the Improper Line, to the species now under consideration, there is a reason, over and above its having breadth ; which reason it may be proper to explain here. The real fact of the case, when strictly taken, is, that any stripe of full unsoftened color presents to the mind, altogether, not one broad line only, but two complete breadthless lines and a stripe BETWEEN THEM which scrvcs of itsclf far \a third line ; making, in the whole, a very complex object. Thus, for example, if the black: stripe of sensa- tion occasioned by our looking at the ink line A B, be considered as a line which divides the space C from the space D; this stripe actually forms 240 FIRST LINES OF [chap. n. two breadthless lifies of contrast with the white paper, besides its own black breadth. D B For the line of contiguity between the superior edge of the black stripe and the adjoining white of the paper (C) is one breadthless line; and the line of contiguity between the inferior edge of the black stripe and the adjoining while (D) is another breadth- less line; mid, besides both these distinct and sepa- rate lines, we have the black stripe itself. Hence the black stripe is a phenomenon which, if taken in gross to serve for a line, is a very complex object, and is in a high degree an improper line. Its complexness, however, is reformed by the mind, (as I have already fully explained) in the act of per- ception,' without our attending to the logical pro- cedure which w^e thus adopt ; for, by a real and legitimate act of abstraction, we sink or annihi- late the consideration of the black stripe which is between the two breadthless lines, and we bring these two breadthless lines into a perfect ideal congruity, as one same breadthless line. It can hardly be necessary to observe, that the whole of the foregoing reasoning applies only to Jines considered as dividing one body or object from another collateral one. If a line be in any case contemplated lengthwise, as a relation op distance between any two bodies or objects, SECT. VIII.] THE HUMAN MIND. 241 the principle under consideration does not ope- rate at all: for in such cases, it is obvious, we are not to sink the distance. Any case of distance, how- ever, is not a case oi mere distinction of objects; and therefore it does not fall within the scope of the present subject. I have pointed it out, in this place, only to prevent any possible misconception with regard to it. Upon this occasion it may not be superfluous to remark, that, comparatively speaking, we very seldom perceive objects by the medium of the broad fall-colored line; although we certainly do so sometimes. The reason why I have deemed so full- an analysis of this species of line requi- site, is, because philosophers have uniformly supposed that it is the only kind of visible line in 7iature, My object, therefore, has been to show, first, from the section which went before, that the far greater number of visible lines are of a very differ- ent species from this ; and, secondly, in the present section, that, even in those few cases wherein the broad full-colored line occurs, the principle of perception is not that of sensation, but is that of RELATION AND DISTINCTION, as truly as it is the case of the breadthless line itself. To conclude ; The investigation of the nature of the Second Species of line is not the less impor- tant, although it but seldom occurs in the ordinary business of perception ; because it is in this spe- cies that we most clearly discern the identity of procedure of the ordinary perceiver and the mathema- IIu. Mi. Q 242 FIRST LINES OF, &c. [chap.ii. tician. When a farmer is comparing the different aspects of two corn-fields, which are separated by a foot-path, a rivulet, or a carriage-road ; he pro- ceeds precisely in the same manner as a geometer over a diagram. He heeds neither the breadth, nor the color, of the road, or intervening object ; whether it be narrow, or wide, or green, or blue, or yellow ; because he views it only as a mere dividing line or relation of contrast between the two fields, considered merely as two different objects. He there- fore sinks or annihilates the breadth of the road altogether, in his contemplation ; and considers the two fields onli/ by the contrast of their own colors, as completely, as if they had been actually contiguous or without any road, or rivulet, at all between them. Thus, ordinary perception, in every instance oi^n im- proper or broad full-colored line, is no other than mathematical abstraction. 243 SECTION NINTH, OF THE THIRD SPECIES, OR IMPERFECT VISIBLE LINE. 1. In proceeding to consider the third and last species of visible line ; I observe, that it presents us with some very interesting peculiarities, when com- pared with the two other sorts ; and such as throw much additional light upon the general subject of perception. The species of which I am now to treat, consists of such stripes of color as are not full at their edges, but which, on the contrary, soften on either aide, and so blend into any other colors which happen to be next them. A very complete and striking in- stance of this sort of line, is perceived in the sen- sations we experience when we look at a rain-bow; which, by reason of the softening of its various stripes of color, forms itself into several collateral curves or arches. This species of line presents us with a very dif- ferent character from that which was considered in the last section ; because a softened or blended line is not only an improper line owing to its having breadth, but, in addition to this, it is also an imper- fect line, since its edges are not defined, and it 244 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. never can present 2cay precise distinctmihetween any two adjacent objects. This, I apprehend, must M-^arrant the appellation by which I have here ven- tured to distinguish it. Although the imperfect line is of much less frequent occurrence than the line of the First species ; it is, however, to be recognised as being a very frequent and familiar object of perception. It is also to be observed, that, although the blended line is vastly less defined, and therefore less bene- ficial or useful in distinguishing the boundaries of objects, than the proper line, first described, yet it serves tolerably well to display the situations of things, for ordinary purposes. With regard to the principle of perception, of tliis species of line ; the very same general reason- ing holds, which was used with respect to lines of the Second Species : That is to say, the breadth of any stripe of color must be annihilated, in our contem- plation, every time we consider such stripe in the relative character of a line between any two other objects. Thus, for example, if we suppose a rain- bow, consisting of three stripes, — a red, — a blue, — and a yellow ; and if we choose to regard the mid- dle or blue stripe as a line which divides the red from the yellow; we must, in this case, annihilate all consideration of the blue and of its bi^eadth, and must, by a logical fiction of the understanding, consider the red and the yellow as being sepa- rated by nothing but a breadthless line, Jt is to be observed, indeed, that, in carrying SECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 245 this experiment into practice, the blending of the colors will render it impossible for us to divide the red from the yellow with any thing like precision^ even in idea. But, nevertheless, 1 observe, that this is the principle upon which we must proceed. After the repeated illustrations which I have offered of the subject ; I apprehend that any ad- dition to them would be altogether superfluous. I shall only add, therefore, that, every time we pro- ceed upon this principle of perception, we shall treat the subject rationally and justly ; and, every time we omit to take note of this logical process of natural abstraction, we shall, from the mere teaching of nature or experience, perceive things equalli/ well; but vie shall not, in the latter case, have any rational conception of the principle upon which we do perceive. Accordingly, we find, that, from neglect of the procedure of the understanding in the act of perception, most philosophers, in time past, have come to the conclusion that perception is nothing but 7?zere sensation : While, upon the other hand, one particular school, justly discontented wnth this conclusion, has been driven to start a doctrine that the perception of figure or outline is supplied to us, distinctly indeed from sensation, but unaccountably aiid unsearchably by an inspiratioji of the Deity! In this place it is easy to anticipate, that there may be some readers, who may think it a fair opportunity to suppose, that, if we can perceive as well without knowing the principle upon which we 246 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. proceed, as we can when we do know it, it must be a useless labor to investigate the nature of perception, at all. But those who are in the least informed on the matter, need not be reminded, that the subject of perception is investigated here, not primarily for its own sake, but on account of its momentous bearings upon some of the most important questions in philosophy. It may here, however, be remarked, that an investigation of this subject, in that character which it is now shown to possess, namely, as belonging to the Category o/' Relation, of which it forms one of the several great species, is a matter, of itself, of an extent of importance which can only be appreciated after the investigation of the subjectof causality in the sequel. 2. It has already been remarked, that the blended or imperfect line is of less frequent occurrence, and also of less precision and utility, than the proper or breadthless line. But, as if to compensate for this, it is to be observed, that the peculiar nature of the blended line is of much curiosity and of very considerable importance in a philosophical view. In the course of the following observations, I shall endeavour to explain this peculiarity. First, It is to be remarked, that, in every instance in which we perceive ^jorojoer or breadth- less line, and in every instance in which we perceive a full colored line, we must perceive a negation of sensation of color^ between some two colors. For SECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 247 example, when we look at the moon, surrounded by the sky, w^e become conscious of two sensations of colors, namely, a white and a blue ; and we perceive that the line formed between them consists in a negation of all color. And, in like manner, when we look at 2iny full stripe of color, in the relative character of a line, we perceive, (as has been already illustrated by a diagram in the last section) two different breadthless lines, each of which is A NEGATION OF color. Such (I repeat) is the general fact, in the case of both the First and the Second species of visible line. Secondly. But in the case of the TJiird Species vr blended line, I am now to observe, the case is essentially different from that of either of the two iMier ones. If we look at any blended line, such, for example, as the middle stripe of a rain-bozv, considered as dividing the different colors that are on each side of it ; we shall in this case experience NO NEGATION oi scnsation of color between the two outside colors: For, the thing we call the middle stripe, is a sensation of color ; and the stripes which appear one on each side of it, ^xe sensations of colors; and, in like manner, the blendings of the stripes into each other, are equally sensations of colors ; and, thus, there is not one spot, or point, of discontinuity of sensation of color in the whole scene or subject. The conclusions and philosophical general views to which we are directly led by these phenomena of blended lines, as now explained, are very im- portant ; especially if their aid be supposed to be 248 FIRST LINES OF [chap, ii wanted, in the controversy as to whether or not we perceive the identical external objects of a world beyond us. And, however conclusive, and indeed redundant, the foregoing series of proofs (first and last) indisputably appear ; yet I should consider it an injustice to the subject, to omit the notice of so curious and so decisive an additional proof, as that which we have in the phenomena of blended lines. I shall, therefore, now apply these phe- nomena, as a farther and distinct refutation of Dr. Reid's Theory of Perception. First, with this purpose, I am to observe, that Dr. Reid, either in consequence of, or at least sub- sequent to, the same conception which was fallen upon originally by Dr. Hutcheson of Glasgow, assumed that figure is " more properly an idea ac- ^^ companying sensations of sight and of touch, than " sensations of either of those senses." With regard to this discovery of Hutcheson ; it is admitted by Professor Stewart, that he did " not appear to have *' been at all aware of the importance of the criti- *' cism on which he had stumbled." — " The fact is" (says Mr. Stewart) " as I shall have occasion to " show in another Essay, he had anticipated the *' very instances which were afterwards appealed *' to by Dr. Reid, as furnishing an e.vperimentwn *' crucis in support of his own reasonings against " the ideal theory." From this it appears, that both Hutcheson and Reid, in the course of their speculations, had dis- cerned the fact that perceived figure is, in some tvai/ SECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 249 or other, something else besides sensation of COLOR ; but it is equally manifest, that neither of them could in the least make out what it is, or HOW it is perceived. All that Dr. Hutcheson observed, was the vague general fact, that figure is not a sensation of color. And it is sufficiently known that Reid maintained the assumption, that the per- ception of figure is supplied to us unaccountably^ and unsearchably, along with a sensation of color. It is, moreover, equally curious and conclusive to observe, in what way Dr. Reid made use of his, or rather of Hutcheson's discovery, to make it serve for ** an experimentum crucis in support of his own " reasonings against the Ideal Theory." I shall therefore here submit the matter, in the words of the parties themselves ; which, for the sake of includ- ing the views of all parties, I shall extract from the Philosophical Essays of Professor Stewart. In his Note E, at the end of that work, he has cri- ticised the subject in the following terms. " This argument of Berkeley is very clearly and " concisely put by Reid." * If we have any know- * ledge of a material world, it must be by the * senses : but by the senses we have no knozvledge, but * oi our sensatio?2s only ; and our sensations, which * are attributes of Mind, can have no resemblance ' to any quality of a thing that is inanimate.' "It is observed by Dr. Reid," (says Mr. Stewart) " that the only proposition in this demon- " stration, which admits of doubt, is, that by our " senses we have the knowledge of our sensations 250 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. '* only, and of nothing else. Grant this, and the " conclusion is irresistible." I have quoted these passages to show, in the most conclusive manner, that the sole argument which Dr. Reid thought he had become possessed of, and which he conceived to be of such powerful efficacy, for the demolition of the Ideal Theory, was the fact that perceived figure is something ELSE besides sensatio7i. Now the following con- siderations are intended to show, how utterly powerless and innocent this argument is, for the purpose for which Dr. Reid brought it. In the First place it is granted, and indeed it has been the object of an appropriate section of this chapter to show, that visible lines of the First Species are void of color, and therefore void of breadth ; and, as such, it is plainly manifest that this species of line, even in its positive character as a phenomenon, is something else besides a sensation OF COLOR. One would think, therefore, if there were not decisive reasons to the contrary, that Dr. Reid had adverted to what has herein been called the First Species of visible line,^ — But, supposing him ' I have been willing lo suppose, that Dr. Reid had adverted to the existence of breadthless visible lines : but the whole context of his writings prove this to have been impossible. For it is a conspicuous feature in the writings both of Dr. Reid and of his Successor that a breadthless line is not an object either of sense or of imagination. Had Dr. Reid in the least adverted to the phenomena of breadthless lines ; it is impossible he could have I gjECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 251 for the moment to have done this ; the as- sumption he held, in common with Dr. Hutch- eson, is still profoundly erroneous, even with re- gard to the species of line in question : because I have no hesitation in affirming that a breadthless line, considered merely in its positive character, as a phenojnenon depicted to the mind, 7nust be admitted to be of the nature of a sensation, although it is not a sensation o/" color. It is impossible to deny that every breadthless vi- s\\Ae\meA\s^\diY^apositivephenomenonioo\xv view, as truly so as if it \y eve a stripe of color itself, A breadth- less line, therefore, when considered only as a pheno- menon, although it is a negation of sensation of COLOR, is NOT A NEGATION OF SENSATION : On the contrary, in virtue of its being a phenomenon or depicted line of cojitrast between some two colors, it pos- sesses the nature of A sensation of a peculiar exAss ; in a manner analogous to that in whicli black or darkness, which taken by itself is a negation of sensation of color, nevertheless impresses us with a positive sensation every time we become conscious of it missed perceiving that a variety of colors is necessary for the perception of every line, and that the perception of a line is no- thing butadiscernmentof A RELATION OF CONTRAST. But the truth is, that it never entered the conception of Reid that any VARIETY of colors is requisite for the perception of a line. On the contrary, nothing is more clear or complete than the total absence of any hint, either in his writings or in those of Professor Stewart, that more colors than one are requisite for an act of perception ; always excepting the recent demur started by Mr. Stewart, in his ** Dissertation," published in the year 1815. 252 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. in the presence of any color. It was from having adverted to this nature of the fact, that, in my first publication on the Phenomena of the Mind, I ven- tured to suggest ihdii Jigure appeals to our conscious- ness in a peculiar way. The logical distinction to be made in this case, is, that every perceived line possesses, as was already remarked, two essentially different cha- racters: The one positive ; Theother merely relative,. Every line, considered as a line, is merely a relative thing : but every line is a positive thing when it is considered as a mere phenomenon. As a mere phenomenon, therefore, a bread thless line is ^ phejiomenon ^Sense, as truly as can be said of any sensation of color : but, as viewed in the relative character oia line, abreadthless line, as well as every other sort of line, is purely an Object of Intel- lect; for its very e.vistence, in the character OF A LINE, consists in its being viewed as dividing and connecting some two other things, a72d as being in all othe?i respects annihilated in our cojiception. Secondly. But, although what has just now been advanced is, I trust, altogether conclusive against the opinion of the School of Reid that by our senses we have something else besides sensations ; I am farther to observe, that what is yet to follow must place the real merits of the sub- ject in a still more conspicuous light. The fact is, that, while it is here sufficiently conceded that the First Species or proper visible line, considered in itself as a mere phenomenon, is I SECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 253 not a sensation of color ; we are at the same time to observe, that our perceiving objects by the medium of the First Species of line is not essential, but is MERELY ACCIDENTAL ; neither is it uniform, but only occasional. In a very considerable proportion of instances, we perceive objects by the modification of the broad or colored line. And it might have been, that we had never perceived by any other medium. I have already pointed out the fact, that we perceive the figures of the several distinct arches of a rain-bow although there is not a single point of discontinuity of sensation of color between any two of those arches. The whole scene of what we call a rain-bow, even if it were to consist of a thousand arches, apparently covering all the vast expanse of the sky, must, in the most rigorous sense of the phrase, be no other than one varied complex mass of sensations of colors in the mind of the spectator. This mass of sensations, moreover, can only be spoken of in the plural number on account of the varieties which it displays in its different parts ; because, in virtue of its continuity, it is, strictly speaking, ONLY ONE SURFACE OF SENSATION : It is made up, indeed, of parts beyond parts ; but its parts have no other sort oi severalty than that of the parts of space itself. Thus is the microcosmic nature of the mind proved, by the most decisive species of experiment; and we in the clearest manner discern that it is en- tirely in virtue of the contrasts which our sensa- tions present to our understandingy and to the va- rious directions or arrangements of these sensations 2M FIRST LINES OF [chaf. ii. and contrasts, that we are enabled to contemplate any of the 'phenomena of sense in that relative character which we call outline or figure. It being thus rigorously shown, that we do ac- tually, in certain cases, perceive whole assemblages of adjacent objects without any discontinuity of sen- sation of color; to this it is now to be added, that, so far is this from being a singular, or a rare case, that, on the contrary, a very large proportion of all visible objects are perceived solely under this mo- dification of the phenomena. Not only do we perceive the sun, and the moon, very often in this way, which must happen every time they are seen through a cloud ; but it may be observed, in general, that all visible bodies which we ever perceive through a fog, or through any other dense medium, are perceived through the instrumentality of blended lines, in the same way that we perceive the different arches of a rain-bow. Nor is this all : — For it is farther to be observed, that almost all persons whose eyes are in the least defective, either from age or from any other acci- dent, must see objects through the instrumentality of blended lines, when they do not use spectacles. Thus it is indisputably manifest, that a very large proportion of all perceived lines, or figures, discerned by sight, are, in their positive character as phenomena, no other than blended lines or sensor iions of colors, strictly speaking. From what has now been advanced ; it becomes plainly evident, that, if it had pleased our Omnipo- SECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 255 tent Creator, things might have been so constituted that we could have perceived visible objects by no other medium than that of the blended line ; in the very same manner that we now actually perceive the different stripes of a rain-bow. There, certainly, need have been no such thing in the world, as a perceived line consisting in a negation of color. It is, obviously, owing to the sensible opacity of most visible bodies, that we perceive breadthless visible lines ; and, therefore, our perceiving such lines appears to be purely accidental. It is, how- ever, an accident that is extremely useful, as well as delightful to us, in a great variety of cases. Without the capability of discerning this ex- quisite species of line, the ingenuity and progress of mankind would have been vastly impeded, both in the arts and the sciences ; and the pleasures we derive from the symmetry of visible objects would have been greatly curtailed. It is never- theless to be admitted, upon the other hand, that, for all the purposes of mere animal existence, the perception of objects by blended lines would have' answered very sufficiently. It might have been, that, every time any human being opened his eyes, he could have perceived nothing but one continued scene of sensation of color, varied in its different parts, but without any one point of discontinuity throughout the whole ; and in this way he might have perceived the various scenes of town and country, fleets and armies, land and water, in short, the whole world around him, upon the very same principle that we now frequently perceive 256 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. the diflferent curves of a rainbow, or a halo round the moon. I trust ; it may now, on the most conchisive ground, be asked, What becomes of the assump- tion of Hutcheson and of Reid, (in the sense MEANT BY them) that " figure is more properly " an idea accompanying sensations of sight and ".touch, than a sensation of either of those senses?'* If, by figure, they could have meant that positive phenomenon in itself which we perceive be- tween every two full colors, or in other words a breadthless line ; I have shown, in the most rigo- rous manner, that this phenomenon is A sensa- tion occasioned by sight, although not a sensation of COLOR. And, as for a figure or line, considered logically in its relative character, it is, in the highest degree manifest that Dr. Reid never thought of it, one way or the other. Such phrases, as variety of colors, — relation of contrast, — i^elation of contiguity, — and other such terms, — which must be continually made use (j/* when we treat of visible lines, or fi- gures, in their proper relative character ; are not to be found in the speculations of Dr. Reid. I confess, therefore, that I am utterly unable to conjecture what sort of idea Reid could have had in contem- plation, when he supposed that figure is not a sen- sation of sight, but AN IDEA accompanying a sensation of sight. Whatever his conception of this matter was ; I confidently hope that no doubt can remain with regard to the real merits of the subject. I I «ECT. IX.] THE HUMAN MIND. 257 To prevent any possible misconception here, I must not omit to observe, that, whether a breadth- less Hne shall be admitted to be in itself a sensa- tion, or not a sensation, is a matter altogether in- different to the nature and results of the analysis of perception. I have pointed out what I con- ceive to be the true nature of this phenomenon ; and I have inquired how far it could have been this phenomenon that either Hutcheson or Reid could have had in view, in their speculations : but it is a matter entirely the same to my own views, whether a breadthless line be admitted to have the farther character of a peculiar kind of sensation (as I esteem it to have,) or to be only A relation be- tween, and efficiently caused by, two sensations of colors. All that I insist upon, first and last, is, that, in itself, whatever else it is, it is a phenomenon ; and, that it is only the act of our intellect that views it AS A LINE OR RELATION between two other things. The essential object of the latter part of this Section has been to show that we very ex^tensively do, and might altogether, perceive visible objects without breadthless lines, that is to say from our sen-^ sations alone ; and, hence, to demonstrate, rigo- rously, by this peculiar mode of analysis, that we never perceive any external object. Hu. Mi. R 258 SECTION TENTH. THAT ALL LINES WHATEVER, MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL; AND MORAL, ARE OF ONE SAME GENERAL NATURE:— THAT NO EXTENDED OBJECT IN NATURE HAS ANY FIGURE EXCLUSIVELY ITS OWN. Although the act and pbenomena of what is called External Perception has been so copiously treated in the foregoing Sections ; I am never- theless desirous to suggest the following enlarged view of the subject, because it places the nature of it in somewhat a new light, and connects, or, strictly speaking, identifies it with another and more ge- neral object of science. Besides the consequence of contemplating the subject from this point of view ; I conceive it not improbable it may, to some minds, convey a more lively, if not a more clear apprehension of its real nature, than any thing that has yet been advanced with regard to it. The consideration which I would here call to the attention of the reader, is simply this, that the appellation of a line, which obtains in all the three great departments of science, the physical, the ma- SECT. X.] FIRST LINES OF, &c. 259 tliematical, and the moral, is of one same general import in all of the7n, n^me\y, that of a relation between some two other subjects. The proper signification of the word line, is that of 2L partition or division between some two other things. In the science of geometry, (in which we are first to consider it) this relation, when taken in its most elementary nature, must be viewed in two different general characters, namely, as a re- latiojz of distance betw^een some two points^ and otherwise as a lateral relation of contiguity between two surfaces. With regard to these two general characters, I am to observe, that a line is usually defined only in the first of them ; but it cannot be conceived except in the last. A mathematical line, therefore, in that view under which we must conceive it, is a lateral relation, of the very same species with a sensible line, (whether tangible or visible) by means of which we perceive or distin- guish between any two contiguous extended ob- jects. From what has been now said, we are led to discern that any two contiguous bodies can haveo'SL.Y ONE LINE OR BOUNDARY common between them both : Or, in other words, no one of any iivo conti- guous bodies, or objects of perception, can have any out- line, next the other, exclusively its ow^. More- over, I am to observe, that every body or ex- tended object in nature, when it is not contiguous to another body, must be contiguous to Space : and thus 260 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. we discern that neither any extended body, nor yet any limited space, can have any figure exclusively ITS OM^N. The fact which has been jast now suggested, is one which I apprehend is quite contrary to the natural belief of mankind : for there appears reason to think that philosophers, as well as the vulgar, have always supposed every object we perceive, whe- ther by touch or by sight, has an outline or figure exclusively its own. So little did I, at one time, think to the contrary ; that, after I was led to per- ceive that it is not so in the case of visible objects, I still supposed that every tangible object has a figure exclusively its own : but this, I have since discerned, was a premature and an erroneous conclusion. I deem it at present expedient to go into the consideration of this fact, before I pro- ceed farther in the principal subject of the Section. To illustrate the fact with regard to visible ob- jects; it is plain, that when we look at the moon, if we should suppose the moon to be cut out, and a round hole to be left in the sky ; the sky, where it is thus cut, must exhibit the very identical figure which we called that of the 77ioon. The moon may be supposed annihilated ; but, if nothing be sup- posed to rush into its place, its figure must remain ; for the figure we call that of the moon does not belong to itself exclusively, but is common between it and the surrounding space or sky. In like manner, an animal, a tree, or a house, can have no visible figure exclusively its own ; for its visible figure must be a common line of contrast between the color of SECT. X.] THE HUMAN MIND. 261 the paj^ticular object and d^ny field of color behind it ; by means of which, alone, it can be perceived. In the case of tangible objects, this fact is much less obvious than in that of visible ones : but it is not the less certain. When we look at two separate dice, at any convenient distance from ekch other ; we are forcibly struck with a conviction that each of the cubes has a figure exclusive of that' of the other ; and we are right in this conclusion. It is this and similar views of the subject that betray us into a mistake with regard to its real nature. For, although each of the dice has a figure exclu- sive of that of the other ; yet neither of them has any figure exclusive of the figure of that part of SPACE which surrounds it. If we suppose one of the dice to be annihilated, and nothing to rush into its place ; we shall have the figure of the die still left, — not merely an equal and similar figure, but that very identical figure which the die possess- ed ; — because it was not its own figure, exclusively, but was common between it and the surrounding space, and therefore could not be removed. To conclude, then, with regard to the present consideration, and in order to leave no obscurity over the subject ; I am to observe, that, when we consider two separate dice, as two visible objects, we must do this by the medium of some colored space between them ; which extent of color forms a third visible object. Now the visible line which divides either of the dice, from the colored space between them, is a line common between the die and that 262 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. space or color ; and the same is to be observed with regard to the other die, also. And, if we should try to conceive the intermediate color between the two dice annihilated, we could do this onli/ by sup- . posing SOME OTHER COLOR initsplace; for the visi- ble space, between the two visible dice, must bejilled\ by some color. Thus, in the case of two separate visible dice, we readily discern that neither of them can ever have any figure exclusively its own. But, in the case of two separate tangible dice, we are led into error by the following consideration. In treating two dice as objects of Touch, we must insert a finger, or a hand, between the two ; and thus we find them to be completely insulated and independent of each other : We thereupon con- clude, that each of them has a figure exclusively its own. But, all this while, we are treating the two dice only in relation to our own members; and not in relation to their places in the universe. When we handle either one of these two cubical masses, or any other bodies whatever, our hands, or fingers, are occupying that Space to which alone the figure of the thing we handle has an essential or ne- cessary relation. But, whether we handle it or leave it at rest, the necessary truth is, that its figure is not exclusively its own, but is only a relation common between it and the surrounding space. What has been now advanced, I am to observe, is not inductive, but demonstrative reasoning : it is not merely an induction of what has been, but is a IP" THE HUMAN MIND. deduction of what must be. And thus it is shown, that no extended object in nature, whether it be visible or tangible, can ever have any figure e.vclu- sively its own. This, in point of fact, is only an- other view and expression of the universal nature of what is called external perception ; namely, that EVERY PERCEIVED LINE is nothing but A NECES- SARY RELATION between some two of our ideas. In the first publication in which I suggested the general principle of the foregoing analysis ; I solicited the reader's notice to the fact now under consideration, so far as regards visible ob- jects. What has been now added with regard to tangible objects, was wanting to complete the view of it. Having adverted to the universal and purely relative nature of all lines in mathematical and in physical science ; and shown, that, in both these sciences, alike, every line is a necessary relation be- tween our own ideas; hence, that its evidence is strictly demonstrative ; I now proceed to suggest the existence of the very same principle in morals, and propose to run a parallel between the two. As we can never perceive a visible line from the presence of any one unvaried color ; so we can never conceive either good or evil conduct from contemplating any one course of actions. We must have a knowledge (either from experience or from definition) of two different kinds of positive action or conduct, before we can discern that they cause a 264 FIRST LINES OF [chap, n line between them, in regard to which we call the orfe conduct good, and the other evih As for the use of the word, line, in morals ; it i& manifestly a figurative expression, arising from a repetition of acts of one kind; which acts, being con- catenated together through a line of time, in our es- timation of the moral character of the actor, is, from an obvious analogy, called a line of conduct. The parts of this line, are the distinct acts of the agent ; and in each of them, severally taken, we discern an actual point of contrast between it and our imagination of its opposite: Otherwise w^e could not make out any such act to be either virtuous or vi- cious. Thus it becomes manifest, that a line be- tween blue and yellow, and a line between good and evil, are of one same genus, namely, that of a RELATION between some two things. Each, alike, is an object of our intuitive faculty ; and they are both perceived in the same way, generally speaking. I am not offering this suggestion with a view to throw any light on the nature of moral relations ; but, rather, to receive back a reflected light from them, in case it could be supposed yet wanting, or at all useful, in settling the nature of visible lines. It is already sufficiently obvious, that moral actions are objects of our intellect or intuitive discernment only; and, I suppose it to be known that they cannot be discerned except in a contem- plation of their contrasts with actions of an oppo- site nature. It is equally manifest, that the rela- tion or line between good and evil conduct can be neither good nor evil. How then has it happened that philosophers have all along supposecj, that SECT. X.] THE HUMAN MIND. 265 a line httween blue and yellow must be either blue or yelloWy or of any other color whatever ? In tracing the analogy between visible lines and moral ones ; we are farther to observe, that it does not cease here. It is not only in the various cases of breadthless lines, or perfect con- irasts, that it holds ; but equally in all cases. There are certsan positive courses of human actions that answer exactly to those different positive stripes of colors, which, when viewed as relations between other colors on each side of them, acquire, in our estimation, the relative character of a line. These, therefore, I shall briefly consider. Many men in society follow a course of actions^ some of less and some of greater positive latitude, which, in an ordinary sense, cannot be viewed as being either good or evil. Such a course is manifestly a positive object in itself, as much so as a stripe of full color in our view : but, besides this, we may also make it serve in a re- lative character, by viewing it either as a line of contrast between the vicious conduct of the same person in early life and his virtuous conduct in his old age, or by viewing it as a line of contrast between the virtuous conduct of any one of his species and the vicious procedure of another. As it was in a former Section observed with re- gard to improper visible lijies, it is now to be re- marked as to nwral lines, also, that so long as we view any course of human actions without any thought of its morality at all, it cannot be viewed as a MnCj any more than we can view any positive 266 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. stripe of blue, or yellow, in itself, as a line. And, upon the other hand, the moment we view any po- sitive course of actions as a line between good and evil, we must, by a logical fiction of the mind, lose sight of its positive nature or breadth, and must contem- plate it as a breadthless line between the course of those who do good and that of those who do evil. Such, and so perfect, is the general analogy be- tween moral lines and visible ones. What, then, (it may be asked) are the specific differences, between the Lines of Perception, of Mathematics, and of Morals, — since it so plainly appears that the data in each of these sciences are nothing but our ideas, and the reasoning with regard to them is the same: for in Geometry these data are defnitions of magnitudes : In Morals they are our ideas of human actions: In Visive Perception they are sensations of colors : And in all three, alike, our judgments or conclusions regard NECESSARY RELATIONS, which thcsc data, (so often as they exist) must support between them ? The principal difference in question, appears to me to be simply this : Every visible line is a DEPICTED relation: and Every mathematical LINE is ihe perfection of a visible line : But every MORAL LINE is a relation not picturable. The great consequence of this difference is, that we never can mistake the relative nature of a mo- ral line; we are not in any case embarrassed by referring the perception of a moral act, as such, to sense ; we infallibly refer its perception to our in- t SECT. X.] THE HUMAN MIND. 267 telkctual faculty alone ; but, in the case of visible lines, the fact of then- being depicted between the other phenomena of sense has led philosophers uniformly to the erroneous belief that these lines, considered as lines, are objects of no faculty of the mind but that of sense ; and thus they have never referred the perception of them to a dis- tingiiishing act of the intellect. 268 SECTION ELEVENTH. OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE RESULT OF THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS AND THE SPECULATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER. 1. The Proofs against the existence of a Material World conclusive from the admissions of contending Philosophers, To demonstrate, by a rigorous analysis of the combinations of our visive affections, the microcos- mic nature of the riiind ; and thence to deduce, as a direct and legitimate consequence, the conclu- sion that the great agent of our external excite- ments, which we call matter, is no other than a spi- ritual and intelligent substance like our own ; have been, I confess, two objects which I have prose- cuted, in the present work, with peculiar expecta- tion. At length, the evidences, both inductive and demonstrative (for they are of both kinds) which I had to offer in proof of the fact first men- tioned, are now before my readers ; — and it remains only to connect this fact with the momentous conclusion to be deduced from it. With this view, therefore, and previously to my pointing out that unanimity o( opinion which fortu- SECT. XI.] FIRST LINES OF, &c. 269 nately exists among Philosophers with regard to the connection^ in our own quarter of the Globe ; I would once more endeavour to shake the popular preju- dice on the subject, by calling the reader's attention to the great prevailing tenet of that ancient philoso- phy which indisputably possesses very high claims to our consideration. ' At a period long antecedent to the Greek philo- sophy of matter, and at a time so remote that we have no clue to guide us even to a conjecture con- cerning the degree of its antiquity, mankind had, indisputably, attained lights in general science the remaining evidences of which astonish the mo- derns at this day. Moreover, it expressly appears to have been the most confident and general of all their conclusions in that primitive era of science, at least with regard to 7xal existences, that the no- tion of matter is a mere popular deliisionj and that all without us is nothing but spiritual substance and agency. We have not indeed the least remaining guide to a conjecture, by what steps those ancients were led to so sublime a conclusion. But when we duly consider the extent of their general attainments, it would be betraying the most slavish subjection to our natural prejudices, not to confess, that so established a tenet, among a people so enlightened, has very strong claims upon our attention. In this place, therefore, I would again particu- larly remark, what I have alluded to in the intro- ductory chapter of the volume, namely, that it is manifestly unphilosophical to appeal the present 270 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. subject to the ordinary apprehension of mankind ; the sole tribunal to which Dr. Reid and Professor Stewart liave severally consigned it. Would either of these philosophers (it may be asked) have for a moment submitted to appeal the Copernican System to the ordinary appy^ehension of mankind? — Cer- tainly not. — ^Then, upon what principle of reason can they possibly assert, that the question concerning a material world ought to be decided by a tribunal to which they would not consent to appeal that of the great order of visible creation ? I certainly do not expect that the claims of the subject will be decided, in the estimation of any truly scientific and unbiassed mind, by an appeal to authority. But, considering the general state of knowledge on the subject, an appeal to such an extent of authority as the history of the species holds out directly in favor of our views, must doubt- less be of weight in the general estimation. In this case, therefore,! must insist, and I think it is a truth of the most obvious certainty, that the only phi- losophical procedure, in an investigation of the ques- tion concerning a material world, is to appeal AGAINST the ORDINARY apprehension of mankind, to the whole tenor o/' philosophical apprehension. If such a logical proceeding, as this, be institut- ed; let us particularly observe, what would be the consequence. The attempt of Berkeley, in this case, (however faulty in its means) must be ac- knowledged to be so far from being extravagant or singular in its proposed end, that, if we could col- lect all the suffrages of philosophers, it is rather SECT. XI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 271 probable that Berkeley would have the majority on his side; deducting only for such peculiar errors as belong to his Theory alone, and do not at all affect the views he held in common with the Hindoo philosophy. While, therefore, the views which I have enter- tained in the foregoing analysis are to be most widely distinguished from the principles of Berke- ley ; and while I do not know whether they coin- cide precisely with the Hindoo tenet ; I shall con- clude these remarks by observing, that, instead of its being philosophical to treat the ultimate aim of Berkeley with the contemptuous epithet of rccericy or chimera; that charge betrays a view of the subject astonishingly narrow, and unlike what we might have expected, from a mind which had been continually exercised in the most sublime speculations of philosophy and the most elevated conceptions of the constitutions of nature. — The sentence which Professor Stew- art has pronounced, upon the attempt of Berke- ley, I must observe, is no more countenanced by the most sublime of the Greek Philosophers, than it is by the far more weighty sanction of the whole Hindoo race. By ejccluding this vast amount oi philosophical suffrages, therefore, as if it had never existed ; and by stigmatising the attempt of Berke- ley to disprove the existence of a material world, as a wild or visionary scheme ; Mr. Stewart has certainly fallen into one of the most signal acts of philosophical injustice that the history of the sub- ject affords. ^2 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ij. It is not, however, from ancient, or from any other authority, that I shall draw the Jinal and con- clusive suffrage on the side of my own views ; for I shall derive this from those very philosophers, themselves, whose general doctrine has herein been controverted. It is unnecessary, and even impossible, to re- quire a more decided or conspicuous assent, than that which has been severally expressed by the philosophers of the School of Reid, to the assump- tion that nothing can resemble a sensation but an affection of some other mind. This, indeed, has been no less than the watch word of the writers of that School : And nothing has been more openly avowed than the assent of those writers to the conclusion, that, if our sensations be proved extended , there is no support whatever for the assumption of a material world. These philosophers, therefore, cannot go back : they cannot unsay what they have said; nor can we suppose them to wish to do so, to the sacrifice of tmth. Prejudice may hang back from the consequence ; but it can only pre- sent a humiliating spectacle of human weakness if men should refuse to yield even to their own reason- ing, when it is shown to run counter to their na- tural bias. It can hardly be necessary to repeat, here, the very terms of concession which have been made use of by the writers in question : but the infinite moment of the subject at issue may render it a SECT. XI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 273 due precaution. — These expressions are to be found, in the most ample extent, in the various extracts wliich I have already had occasion to give from the writings of those authors ; and they amount to a continual repetition of the following judgment, which has been successively asserted, with one consent, by Bishop Berkeley, by Dr. Reid, and Professor Stewart. " As there can be no notion or thought but in a " thinking being, so there can be no sensation but " in a sentient being. Nothing can resemble a '* sensation, but a similar sensation in the same or " in some other mind. To think that any quality " in a thing inanimate can resemble a sensation is " absurd and a contradiction in terms." This truth being thils placed beyond the reach of controversy; it requires no long chain of reasoning to bring us to a conclusion for, or against, the ex- istence of a material world. Only prove (says the School of Keid) that our sensations are extended; and then the controversy will be for ever at an end : for, in this case, it must be admitted that Extension^ whether perceived or not, can be only an attribute of MIND. — Now, the whole foregoing analysis of the combinations of our sensations in the phenomena of perception, has been submitted as forming a series of proofs both inductive, and demonstrative, that our sensations are in reality extended: And I trust, after the free concession which has been made by Professor Stewart, in his Dissertation already referred to, wherein he expressly grants that a variety of colors is nt- Hu,Mi. * S 274 FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. cessary to the act of perceiving visible outline or figure, there can be little presumption in avowing that I do not anticipate any objection against the prin- ciples of the analysis, since Mr. Stewart has, upon the most mature deliberation, identified his own judgment of the matter with its fundamental Axiom ; which certainly involves the other three necessary laws of perception. There is indeed nothing that I could, for the interest of philosophy, more strongly impress upon the attention of my readers, than the re- markable and complete dereliction of Dr. Reid's Theory, on the part of Mr. Stewart, in that Demur to which I have here again felt obliged to refer. When a philosopher has expressly acknowledged that it is " self-evident" (such is the demonstrative language made use of) that a variety of colors isne- tessaryfor the perception of outline or figure ; it may surely be asked. What becomes of the assumption which is repeated through all the five editions of Professor Stewart's Elements, namely, that 'Ht is just " as difficult to explain how our perceptions are " obtained by this means," (i. e. the means of our sensations) " as it would he upon the supposition " that the mind were all at once inspired with them ** without any concomitant sensations whatever?" Can such a glaring contradiction as this be too strongly pointed out, or too often called to our re- membrance, when the doctrine which it so remark- ably explodes is still held up with an arrogation of . superior authority, as if no such fatal sentence had been self-pronounced by its author against it ? SECT. xi.J THE HUMAN MIND. 276 I am far from exulting in being able to hold up so decisive a refutation at the expence of the con- sistency of the philosopher who has furnished it : but, on account of what is at stake, I do indeed exult; because I have felt, (and I am not sin- gular in the sentiment) that the School of Reid has availed itself of its well-merited literary influence, to deal forth to the world, upon unusually vantage ground, the most arbitrary and unfounded assump- tions, pregnant with deep and unceasing cala- mity to the human species ; — assumptions which I never for a moment doubt the writers of that School believed to be founded in truth and preg- nant with good ; but which T confidently trust are shown to be utterly untrue, upon evidences which, when duly examined, cannot fail to give an entirely new turn to the current of philosophical Opinion. 2. The J^ roofs against the Existence of a Mateinal Woiid are of two different Kinds. Although the conclusion of the spiritual nature of all external agency, has thus been legitimately deduced by the consent of philosophers from the fact of the extended nature of our sensations ; there is yet to be added a consideration which I think must be viewed as very far from being unimportant, in a strict logical view of the subject. The matter to which I now allude, is, that I apprehend the proofs against the existence of a material world 276 FIRST LINES OF [chap. h. are of two distinct kinds, and rest upon foutidations essentially diffe7^ent. The proof which has already been insisted upon, rests upon the judgment that a sensation cannot be resembled by any quality of an inanimate sub- ject : From which it follows, that, our sensations being extended, extension, wheresoever it exists, must be a quality of mind. The other proof, which I would now suggestforthe consideration of the reader, rests upon a very diffe- rent basis, namely, that of the sufficient reason. It consists in this : Since it is proved that the mind of every man is, literally s[)eaking, a Microcosm or little World, in ivhich extended things are stretch- ed cut and cvhibited for all his requisite purposes; therefore, there could he no use for the existence of a world of inanimate substances, and, hence, it would be absurd to suppose the existence of any such thing. With regard to this Second Kind of proof; I particularly request to remark, that I have not suggested it here as a matter hitherto overlooked. On the contrary, the suggestion has been made by different writers, although it has not been ap- preciated by philosophers in general, that the purposes of a material world being proved to be served by other means must of itself (done remove all ground for assuming its existence. The only thing which I desire to point out in this place, is, that, AS A PROOF, it rests upon essentially a different BASIS from that of the judgment that whatever is extended must be mind. In consequence there- THE HUMAN MIND. 277 fore of its bein^, as a proof, thus independent of the other, I conceive it must be admitted to be of great logical importance ; especially when we consider the infinite moment of the thing proved, f To illustrate the matter ; I observe, for example, that if any speculative person were, from a peculiar bias, to assert, perversely, that he does not assent to the judgment that a sensation cannot re- semble any quality of an inanimate thing ; his opi- nion in this case would be subjected, indeed, to the condemnation of those otherwise contending philosophers who have united in that judgment : but, however, he might still retain his conceit, at all hazards ; and he might possibly find some other refractory persons of his opinion. But if he should, upon this hardy assumption, attempt still to palm upon us that of the existence of matter ; Ave have only, in order to dash his presumption, to bid him have his own way with regard to the argunxent from resemblances ; and, then, to point out to him, distinctly, the proof from the sufficient REASON, namely, that our sensations being strictly proved to be extended, and therefore to be such as ANSWER ALL THE PURPOSES of suppostd matter, it becomes plainly absurd to assume the existence of any such thing as matter. No Philosophers, in the present day, will for a moment suppose the ex- istence of a material world, unless he can also suppose some useful purpose which its existence could serve. The fact of the extension of our sensations (of color and of touch) is certainly the sole consideration iii ^^B FIRST LINES OF [chap. ii. which both the above-mentioned proofs against the existence of a material world have their common root. But each of them branches out immediately from this root, as a distinct direct and legitimate infer- ence ; and I presume, with confidence, that there cannot be a doubt of their complete independence upon each other, insomuch that we may conclu- sively rest upon either of them, without a thought of the other. I trust, therefore, that when the impor- tance of the subject is considered, it will be esteem- ed a matter of no light moment that we have two inferences, so logically independent of each other, whereupon to ground our conviction of the most interesting and desirable of all the truths which are likely to be attained by man in his present state. 3. It may be presumed that there is no sound philosopher, who, after having discharged himself of the natural prejudice of the species, will for a moment assert that there is any foundation for as- suming the existence of a material world when it has been previously admitted that ail the extended objects we perceive are the affections of our own minds : there is in this case no logical road, whereby the understanding can turn toward any other con- clusion than that of the spiritual nature of external agency. This has been in the fullest manner con- ceded by the philosophers whose general doc- trines have herein been controverted. But the fact really is, that mankind are universally iramers- SJBCT. XI.] THE HUMAN MIND, 279 ed in the grand deception of believing in appear- ances that are not real ; and it requires attention, and even discipline, to get the better of our natu- ral prejudice upon the subject. In this case, therefore, I am tempted to suggest what may per- haps be of service in counteracting the habitual error in question. First, Every person who is in doubt upon the subject, may call to mind that they are the very same extended things which he has all along inveterately believed to be both external things and INANIMATE ones. But it has been proved in the most rigorous manner that the extended things in question are not external : Then, Upon what ground can he hesitate to believe that they are not inanimate? His prejudice is shocked in the one case, as much as in the other; but, certainly he cannot suffer his reason to yield to it in the one case ; then, Why should it yield in the other? An ordinary person, if he can reason the matter, must be more confident that perceived objects are external, than that they are inanimate ; because it is only from supposing perceived things to be exteh- NAL that he can logically conclude them to be inanimate. This consideration is of great real importance, inasmuch as it shows so conspicu- ously that the conclusion, as to animate or inanimate, depends entirely upon the fact whether perceived objects are in, or out of the mind ; and therefore, unless the proofs of the existence of per- ceived objects in the mind can be successfully controverted, it must be vain for our natural pre- 280 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap. ii. judice to warp us to the fallacy of still continuing to believe that perceived things are inanimate, except indeed we be content to forego every pre- tension to rationality in the matter. The momentous conclusion in question we can- not reject when we listen to the voice of reason : And, if we yield to the mere force of our prejudice, we only let ourselves down to the level of untaught man, by indulging the mere vagary of our imagi- nations. Whoever proceeds in this way, can have no pretension to the name of a philosopher. — If, indeed, any valid objection shall be laid against the evidence of the analysis whereupon the proofs rest ; this will justify the refusal of our assent. But, without this, we have only left the alternative to act like men, or act like childreii ; that is, to hold by the verdict of our reason, or still to hug our natural prejudice, merely because we have been long nursed by it, and are grown to a habitual and pitiable desire of it. i 281 m^ CHAPTER III, OF JUDGMENT AND RELATIONS. SECTION FIRST. OF JUDGMENT AND ITS OBJECTS, IN GENERAL. It has been justly observed, that the various operations of the mind appear, upon a first view of them, to be so infinitely numerous, diversified, and intricate, that it threatens to be an impossible task to unravel and arrange them ; but that upon a closer examination the prospect clears up, and we find all these operations are reduceable under a comparatively small number of faculties, whose different natures admit of being investigated and described. The truth of this remark will con- spicuously appear, in the course of the present chapter, from the vast extent of province which will be found under the jurisdiction of one single faculty. 282 FIRST LINES OF (chap. hi. To that Intellectual Power by which we discern the Relations between Things^ the name of Judgment has very properly been appropriated. A simple description of the primary and most general opera- tions of this faculty, therefore, and of its general extent of province, is the first consideration which I would in this place suggest for attention. In advancing from the mere sensitive part of our constitution, to consider that which properly claims the title of intellectual ; we are called upon to recognise this superior department of the mind as consisting in the two correlative acts of dis- tinction and comparison ; and it will be found, that a very large proportion of the whole business of the understanding consists in various modifications of these two acts. From these two combined operations, results a third one; which is a discei^nment of the precise Relation existing between any two thoughts, or things. It seems to be a question of some difficulty, which of the two operations, whether distinction or comparison, must have been prior in the order of our ideas. But, for the purposes I have in view, it could be of no utility to embarrass the subject with any consideration of this question. With regard to the extent of the province of Relation ; it may be said to resemble that uni- versal immaterial bond, which every where connects, while it also divides, the supposed elementary par- SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. tides of material body, as they are said to be scat- tered throughout the expanse of creation. In every instance in which we compound any of our ideas, and in every instance in which we abstract from them, as well as in all those cases which in the ordinary sense are called perceptions of relations, the mind must proceed by acts of distinction and comparison, and the greater part of the complex ob- ject which it operates upon, in any such case, is made up of relations. We can neither apprehend any complex object of perception, or thought ; nor divide, by abstrac- tion, any two parts of a complex object ; nor in thought connect, divide, or conceive, any two points of space, or of time, by any other means than by Sin 2ict of comparison ; of which act, Relation is the Object. We can have neither reasoning, nor imagination, nor memory, nor simple apprehension^ nor even sensation itself (such as we in ordinary experience it), without an exercise of the act of comparison ; because it can be clearly demon- strated that the whole zveb or tissue (so to sj>eak) of every object, of each of the above-mention- ed different operations, is made up of a texture of Relations, which divide, while they also hold to- gether, ihe positive elements of the object. It will serve, remarkably, to illustrate the truth of these observations; and, at the same time, to introduce a certain species of objects into its proper place or category in the universe of things, to note here, that all our innumerable perceptions 284 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. of outlines or figures are nothing but legitimate OPERATIONS OF OUR JUDGMENT ; every moment comparing, or contrasting, the various sensations of which we are made conscious ; and therefrom discerning their extended and local Relations, betzveen themselves. In the phenomena of Visible Lines, we have an infinitely numerous class of Relations, in addition to the many other species which logicians and philosophers have recognised ; and, from the extent which is occupied by this class alone, the whole visible world proves to be, in great part, a texture of Relations. — So true is this ; that, agreeably with what I have in a former place remarked, the fore- going C/i^jo^er o/Perception ought, strictly speak- ing, to have formed only a Section of the present Chapter of Relation : And 1 here particularly point it out for remark, that I have divided the subject for no more logical reason, than that of a view^ to prevent those consequences, in the mind of a reader, which would be likely to follow from bringing so vast a field of inquiry under one nominal head. In the case of siinple apprehension ; it has not been supposed by logicians that Judgment has any thing at all to do. By suggesting, and briefly il- lustrating the contrary of this opinion ; I shall at the same time show, that our rational faculty must necessarily be employed in every other species oi thought, unless it be in some particular cases of SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 285 sensation. With this view, therefore, I now ob- serve, that when we either perceive, or call up in our imagination, any object, such for example as a horse ; we can recognise this object only by disr cerning that its different parts support similar rela- tions between themselves, to those which we have before discerned in an animal of that species. If it were at any time to happen, that, on our being desired to call up the conception of a horse, our imagination should present us with the figure of an animal with its head and limbs supporting differ- ent relations between themselves, from those which we have been used to contemplate as the relations of the parts of a horse ; we should immediately be struck by this 7iew arrangement of parts, and should tacitly, in our Judgment, deny that the object we now apprehend is a horse. Hence it is plain, that all simple apprehension) generally speaking, comprehends a discernment or Judgment of the Relations between the parts of the object, or scene, apprehended. The fact now suggested, however, does not ap- pear to argue against the usual assumption of logi- cians, that Judgment regards only truth ^nd false- hood; because, as I have already in part observed, every instance of simple apprehension involves a tacit affirmation, or denial. The operation of the Judgment in any case of simple apprehension, or conception, strictly speaking, can be nothing differ- ent, in this respect, from what it is in a case of ac- tual perception itself Now, if any person were to tell another that he will show him a horse, and 286 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. were thereupon to direct his attention to some animal possessing a very different structure or relation of parts ; the moment that the strange re- lations became apparent to the beholder, he would, without any regard to color, or size, tacitly deny that the animal he perceives is a horse ; and no ex- pressed form of words could make this denial more complete in the mind of the person himself. Thus, the apprehension of every object of thought whatever, that has in it any degree of perceptible complexness, can be effected only through an exer- cise of our Judgment in an act of discernment ; which act must involve either affirmation or de- nial. It was already suggested, in the foregoing Chap- ter, that the province of Consciousness is of far less extent, in the field of its present objects, than has been generally supposed. A sensation of color, so mi- nute as that we could only conceive it to be divi- sible into two sensible points, cannot be perceived without an exercise of Judgment. Such a sensation, (and of course any larger one,) is not an object of sense, strictly speaking ; because, in order to per- ceive it, the two sensible points of color must be connected together by an intuitive act of our Judg- ment, which Faculty alone can take cognizance of the bond of Relation which subsists between them. This last example may help to show us, both the vast extent and the minuteness of operation of the faculty of Judgment ; and, also, the commensurate extent of the Predicament or Category real partition hefxveen the two, insomuch that it forms IB ifself a distinct phenomenon in our thought. It Must, tbeuy be 'm the highest degree evident, that the relation of difference between the sweetness of honey and the sweetness of wax, cannot be the i^WERTNEss OF EITHER of these two substances ; SECT. IV.3 THE HUMAN MIND. 349 nor yet aky sweetness at all, because it is merely a difference or partition between two sweet- nesses, as a line is a partition between tw o colors. Secondly. It is self-evident that the generic principle of relation can never fail^ or be wanting, m any sin«jle instance of relation, of whatever species. Hence, therefore, it must be impossible to resolve the relation of difference of sweetness between honey and wax, into either the sweetness of the honey or the sweetness of the wax ; unless we can resolve the relation of distance between the two banks of a river, into one or both of these banks themselves. Such instances as these, I imagine, must preclude every thought of objection. Those relations calU ed proportional may, in some instances, confuse or bewilder the imagination ; though 1 shall endea- vour to explain by what means they do so, in such a manner as will enable us to discern the fallacy, even in those very instances themselves: but, even, if this could not be discerned at all, or not so as to be apprehended by persons in general, it could not give opening to a momf*nt's doubt when we logi- cally throw ourselves upon the fundamental prin- ciple of relation, as demonstrated in the case of lines and of distances. The phraseology now generally in use with regard to relation, appears to have arisen, partly from the views entertained by philosophers ot the subject, and partly for the sake of convenience or 350 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. to avoid circumlocution. The latter of these two causes is an obvious source of verbal error ; and, if the views of philosophers have been erroneous with regard to relation itself, here is a double cause of an erroneous phraseology. It will not be thought that I have any view to a change in the usual language with regard to the subject : but it is of essertial importance, in such an inquiry as the present, to point out the fallacy which I ap- prehend it involves. The truth of the matter, I conceive, is now ma- nifest, that, although, in the foregoing part of this analysis, I have indulged thephraseology of Locke, in treating of the relations o^ father, of friend, and of sweeter ; there actually are no such relations as these in existence. The words father and son are only the names of two relatives, which are joined together by a bond of causality. If, agreeably with the example of Locke, we call this bond the rela- tion of father ; this is as manifestly illogical as if we were to call it the relation of son ; for there certainly is but one simple link which joins a fa- ther to a son, call it by what name we please. This relation, in point of fact, like a vast number of other sorts, has no name. If we call it the rela- tion of Paternity ; this name expresses the nature oi one of the relatives only, and omits that of the other; whereas, in strictness, it should equally indicate both. The impropriation, indeed, appears unavoidable; but then, the fallacy of the expression must nevertheless be adverted to and held in recol- lection, in all logical investigations of the subject. I SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 351 This fallacy of expression obtains in all those innumerable nominal relations called proportional ; such, for example, as greater, lesser, higher, lower, stronger, weaker, and an endless number of other relatives. Now 1 am here to observe, that relations called proportional form the great object of the science of Geometry, We may therefore readily ima- gine, that logicians in general have derived their views of the subject of relation, in most instances, imme- diately jrom those species of relation called proportional. It has actually appeared that this has been the case with Mr. Locke. And I may here remark, that we trace the very same origin in the views which haye been entertained of the subject of relation by Dr. Barrow. Thus, in a quotation already given from this author, we find that he considered *' relations' to be " affected to something else.'' And it will be seen, in another place, that he uniformly mentions relation or proportion as being the affection of a subject, thereby meaning one single subject. From which it appears that Barrow considered relation to be no- thing but that excess, or defect, which resides in any one subject, as compared with another ; that is, like all other logicians in general, he considered either of the mei^e relatives to be the relation. The remarks just now offered, are intended to show only the origin of the views of logicians on the present subject : and I think it is pretty evident that this, in general, has happened in those species of relation called proportional; whereas, had they commenced their investigations with such re- lations as may be depicted to sense, they could not 35!^ FIRST LINES OF [chap. in. have come to the conclusions which they have uni- formly adopted. Having premised this, I shall now proceed to consider those relations called proportional, in the last recess of their subtilty; and shall endeavour to render this subtilty evi- dent, in these species themselves. There is no Relation which appears more fit for our present purpose, than that of gre^r^er. This re- lation is of an aspect perhaps still more imposing than that of sweeter ; because it is a matheinaticsJ relation, and, therefore, is usually, one of bomedt" , jinite p roport ion . If we contemplate a straight line which by sup- position is in length three inches, together with another straight line that is supposed to be only two inches ; we shall immediately pronounce that the former is the greater of the two : But it is here self-evident that this word, greater, is only the wflwc of the larger relative, and is not the name of the DIFFER KNCE BETWEEN the two relatives ; because the difference can no more be greater than it is lesser, for there is only one difference or distance between the two related subjects, from which dif- ference one of the subjects takes the name of greater, and the other that of lesser. To those however, who have not considered the matter except in the usual way, I imagine, it will ap- pear logical to give the following account of any such relation. Since the relation between the two lines, is the difference between them ; and since, SECT, n .] THE HUMAN MIND. 353 when we have measured off from the greater Ihie tivo inches, (equal to the lesser) we shall still have an- other inch remainmg of the greatei^ line ; therefore, this excess of one inch is the difference between the two lines, and hence the relation of greater, in this instance, " is affected" to the line of three inches, that is to say is an inherent quality of the longer line, agreeably with the opinion and lan- guage of Barrow. This view of the subject, I am ready to grant, appears, at first sight, to be a very plausible one. It seems, manifestly, to be the real and whole source of that doctrine of relation which uniformly prevails ; and there appears little doubt that it is the science of mathematics that we are to consider as being the source from which it is derived. But, with all deference, I feel confident that it is never- theless in reality fallacious. It was with an eye to the subtilty now in ques- tion, thati formerly remarked, that there is a certain analogy between the nature of Relation and that of the Objects of General Words. The latter subject, however, as I shall endeavour to show in an ap- propriate speculation, admits of rigid demonstra- tion ; by no other means than that of an argument turn ad absurdum : Whereas, that of Relation, as we have already seen, admits of direct demonstra- tion ; and there is no subtilty in any of its speci es tjiat can resist the proofs of the real nature of those species, the moment we logically submit them to ihe generic principle of relation, to which- they must all be referred. Hu. Mi. Z 354 FIRST LINES OF [chap, hi. But, here, to resume our analysis ; The strict truth is, that it is NOT exclusively in virtue of the one inch of e.vcess in the greater line, that this line is the gixater. For, if the other line did not exist ; and, also, if it were not oi that smaller length which we in this instance call the lesser ; the first line could not be called the greater, Th'e larger line therefore is, by reason of its excess, called re- latively the greater ; and the smaller line is, because of its defect, called relatively the lesser; but these two correlative characters must have been impossible unless there had been some real partition of the nature of a distance betxveen the two lines, (whe- ther discernable by us or not) as in the case of every other relation : for the generic constitution of relation can riever change. If the obscurity of the relation now in question should induce us to argue in the face of this ge- neric principle; we should quickly be involved in a tissue of absurdities, of which the following is an instance. If, in the case of two lines of different lengths, we assume the relation between them to reside in one o/' these lines ; we must equally assume it to reside in the other : because there can be but ONE relation between the two lines. But, at this rate, every two lines of unequal lengths must support TWO RELATIONS between them ; which is manifestly absurd. It is plain that between any two lines consi* dered as being of different lengths, there can be but one single bond of relation between them. This re- lation, like a vast number of others, has no name ; SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 355 and therefore we can imply its existence only by naming one of its relatives. Nor does this appear to be avoidable ; because there is no possible name that could express it fairly. As we look to one of the lines, we might call \t greater : but as we look to the othe7% we should, by the same rule, be under the necessity to call it by the opposite name of lesser ; just as we call a relation of distance between any two towns or houses, an ascent when we look upward, but a descent when we look to a place that is below us ; although the relation of distance in this case, is but one simple relation, which ever of the two names be given to it. It is usual to give to Relations of this last sort the name of either of their Relatives, according to different circumstances. Thus we talk of the " re- ciprocal relations'' of Buyer^ and Seller; as if there were tiuo different j^elations in every exchange of pro- perty. But there are certainly no such Relations as Buyer and Seller ; for the Relation in question is Barter ; and it happens to be one of those that have an appropriate neutral appellation, which must prevent a moment's hesitation concern- ing, its real nature. When we say that onexn^n has bought A. jiojiS'E.iov Fifty Pounds; What is this, but saying that the other has bought Fifty P0UNDSy6>r A HORSE ? -i If we take a rule of two feet long, and place beside it another of only one foot; and if we w^ould ascertain the relation of difference in length ivhich exists between the two ; then, looking to the rule of two feet, we should naturally say, that the 356 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. difference between the two separate lengths lies in the one foot of excess which is a part of the longer rule ; and this would be true in one sense, and for all practical purposes. But, viewing the matter in a strict logical light, this would certainly be fallacious : because, if the shorter rule were a foot longer, there would then he no difference at all between the two separate lengths ; and thus it is strictly evident that the difference of length between a rule of two feet and a rule of one foot, resides no more in the former rule than it does in the latter; that is, it does not reside in either of them, although I believe it would be very difficult to gain a distinct view of it. Our not being able to gain a clear and distinct positive view of the relation in question, cannot for a moment affect our conclusion with regard to the certainty of its existence; because, not only has it been shown to be absurd to suppose it to re- side either in the greater rule or in the lesser one ; but, also, it had previously been placed beyond controversy that the generic nature of relation neces- sarily is that of a real partition betzveen every two relatives, and, therefore, to suppose any one instance to the contrary, would be to suppose the most manifest absurdity. But, over and above * this assurance, I think we gain a glimpse of the thing in question, in some particular cases. Thus there is, as I hinted in a former section, a relation not only between every two colors, but there is also a certain relation, although a very subtle one, be- tween any full color and the line which parts it from SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 357 another color. We cannot call this minute relation a visible line, because a visible line is one of the two relatives which support it ; and all that we can say of it is, that it certainly is a positive rela- tion between a color and its own boundary line. It is much more obscure than a relation of contrast between two colors, depicted to sense ; that is, it is much more obscure than a visible line ; but it is not so obscure as the partition which forms any relation between a greater line and a lesser one. From this view of the evanescent or obscure relation between a color and its own boundary line ; I think we gain a step towards conceiving some positive notion of the nature of the partition which forms the most obscure of those relations called proportional. And, as for the i^eal existence of such a partition, in every proportional relation, whether we are able to discern this partition or not ; I apprehend this to have been demonstrated, to the most conclusive extent, by the general princi- ples of the subject. From the result of the whole foregoing reasoa- ing; lam led to conclude, that every relation whatever, is analogous to a relation of distance between any two relative subjects which cause or support it ; excepting only the relation of equality^ under which is included the relation of perfect simi- litvde. The relation of equality and that of perfect similitude I conceive to be analogous to a relation of CONTIGUITY ; which is the nearest that any two 358 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. relatives can approach each other :• because, if we should attempt to bring them one step nearer, we should reduce the two ixlated subjects to one same thing by destroying their relation of se- veralty, that is destroying all relation between them, since a thing cannot be related to itself. 3. Actions are Relations. — This Species one of the most obvious tests of the Nature of Relation. Having rigidly examined those species of rela- tion which from their subtilty present a difficulty to the imagination, although they are clearly de- monstrated to have a real distinct existence in reason ; I have reserved, for the close of the analysis, one great species, which I think must be much more than sufficient to dispel, in every un- derstanding, any mist that can be cast over the most obscure part of the subject. The two species of relation which I, in the first instance, selected to serve for a standard of the subject, namely, visible lines and relations of distance, are, in point of prominence and precision, perhaps the most remarkable and every way the most fit for the purpose intended. But there is a genus of relation, comprehending an endless number of species; which, in ]^omioi distinctness of the Relation beside its Relatives, are not at all less clear, although they may be less prominent, than either visible I SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 359 iines or relations of distance. This genus, of itself alone, presents so plain and conclusive a refutation of the prevalent doctrine of the subject, that it might have saved the trouble of every other conside- ration ; and nothing appears more unaccountable, than that the matter in question could possibly have been overlooked by logicians, as it certainly appears to have been. The fact is simply this ; — Actions are Rei.a- TiONS, and nothing but relations. In the proposed chapter on Necessary Connectmi; I shall distinctly show, from express authorities, that logicians have not at all considered actions as being relations. By this I do not mean to say it is denied that actions implij relations, that is, are related as attributes of some single being who is understood to be the actor. But what I shall dis- tinctly show, is, that actions have never been sup- posed to be Illations or real partitions between some TWO BEINGS, each of which has an equal share in the support of this partition ; which, I shall insist, is the only thing that can be called action. That all actions are purely relations between two sub- jects, and nothing else, I will venture to believe is one of the most self-evident truths in nature the moment our attention is directed towards it : and this genus of relation is attended by the advantage of being exhibited in the clearest manner, distinct from the two relatives which cause or support it. When two combatants engage in battle, and strike their weapons against each other; this is action^ mutually between the two, and this action is purely 360 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. a relation : but this is not the sense in which the word action is ever defined or understood by logi- cians. It is true that the most ordinary persons, any more than logicians, never fall into such a mistake as that of confounding a stroke with the striker. But the universal error is, that the action is always referred to the striker alone, as being /z/^ 'pro'per attribute; while the person who supports the other side of the relation, and is called the sufferer, is in reality, in a logical view of the matter, as much an actor as the former. In the place already referred to, I shall show that Mr. Locke did not consider action to be relation. If he had ; it ought especially to have prevented his defining the relative instead of the relation in the instance of a friend : for all friend- ship is action, (either of body or of mind) between two persons. The relation between a father and a son may mislead the imagination, partly be- cause it has no nameto indicate its distinct existence : but the relation of friendship has a name, clearly ex- pressive of the difference between this relation and its supporting relatives, and therefore.it is the more surprising that this should not have led Mr. Locke to a different conclusion. The relation of father, however, is, in point of fact, a relation of action; for a man is called a father only because, by his act, he has befathered, begot, or in one sense made an- other human being, who is as much a co-efficient of that act as the father himself! It is a characteristic advantage oi relations of action, that, generally speaking, they all have proper .SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 361 names, distinct from the names of the relatives which cause or support them. In this respect they differ remarkably from proportional relaf'wns; the greater number of which, as has already been seen, have not any distinctive name, except the generic mame of difference or severalty, which is seldom at- tended to. The relation oi equality, indeed, is a relation of proportion which has a name, distinct from that of its supporting relatives. All other relations of pro- portion come under the generic name of inequality. But, since equality is a different thinac from an equal; it follows, by parity of reasoning, that every relation of inequality must be a different thiuii' from its two supporting relatives which we call the greater and the lesser. — The same reasoning must hold with regard to relations of perfect similitude and of all degrees of dissimilitude. In fine, then ; The grand distinction between Relations and Relatives is, that Relatives are adjective or superinduced characters acquired by Substantive Things, or by things considered as Substantives, which additional character they acquire from the mere factoftiieir lxi sting at THE SAME TIME, i. c. simply from then- co- exist- ence. Whereas Relations, on the contrary, are Partitions between Substantive 1 hin-s, or between Things considered as Substantive. Thus Relations and Relatives, in their vastly distinct 362 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. natures, together make up the Whole Universe of Things. And as it is self-evident that not only every two individual wholes, but also every two pri- mary elements of all the wholes in nature, must have one of those Partitions called a Relation between them, without which they could not be two or di- vers things, or elements, but must all be absolutely om same numerical thing; it follows that One half of the whole Universe is made up of Partitions OR Relations. It may, perhaps, have excited very great sur- prise in some of my readers, and indeed, I doubt not, its first effect has been that of confident incredulity, when it appeared, in the beginning of the present Chapter, that I supposed One Half of the Universe to have been overlooked by logicians and philoso- phers, in their never having recognised those Par- titions between things which I have called Rela- tions. But, that any such Partitions have never been acknowledged, is a truth which has appeared most irrefragably from the authorities which I have already brought forward; and the same will incidentally have to appear, in a still farther and very remarkable manner, in the next Chapter. — Now, Whether or not there are in the Universe any such Real Partitions as I have been endea- vouring to demonstrate in the foregoing analysis, is here submitted to the judgment of those who are given to such speculations. But, if it shall be de- cided that there really are such things ; the Con- stitution of the Objects of Philosophy must be SECT. IV.] THE HUMAN MIND. 363 vastly different from what it has at any time been supposed. Confident I am, that Relation, if it he supposed to include Relatives, can never be made no of TWO THINGS ; but it must always be made up of THREE — And this 1 apprehend to be a test of the real nature of Relation. 864 SECTION FIFTH. OF THE PRIMARY DIVISIONS OR GENERA OF RELATIONS. —OF ACTUAL RELATIONS AND IMPUTED OR HYPOTHE- TICAL ONES. Besides the analysis of the subject of Relation, into its proper elements ; there is to be considered, in this Category, a variety of distinctions ; some of which are of great importance. Over and above the classification of relations into a vast variety of greater and lesser species ; there are indicated, to our apprehension, some other sorts of classification with regard to them. One of these I shall now suggest, as appearing to divide them into Actual Relations and Imputed or Hypothetical Ones, Actual Relations are, manifestly, those which are produced by the present actual existence of their relatives or causal subjects. Imputed Rela- tions, upon the other hand, are those which are caused by some act, or circumstance, which once existed, but which no longer actually exists ; al- though the relation caused by it is still assumed as existing. For example; The distance between two towns, or two mile-stones, is an actual relation so long as the two towns, or mile-stones, themselves continue to exist. But that relation which is said to exist SECT, v.] FIRST LINES, &c. 365 between a father and a son is not an actual relation, although the man who is called the father be still living, together with his son ; because the acty which alone constituted the relation, has, long since, ceased to exist. The relation, therefore, be- tween a father and a son is only an imputed rela- tion. It will not be thought, that, by pointing out this distinction, I suppose it in any way affects the reality of moral obligation. On the contrary ; all that is here intended is to suggest the existence of a logical distinction, between two different objects of thought ; which, I believe, are usually confounded together. Imputed Relations comprehend a vast number and variety of species. All relations that are voluntary or instituted are manifestly of this kind. The same also may be said of all the relations of consanguinity. For any purpose which I have at present in view, nothing farther appears to be requisite, with regard to this division of Relations, than merely to sug- gest its existence. 2. Of Real Relations and Fictitious Ones, There appears to be another distinction of rela- tions, besides that already considered ; which divides them into Real Relations and Fictitious 366 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. ones. This division is one Avhich involves some very important logical consequences. In order to suggest the existence of this distinc- tion ; I first here assume the fundamental maxim of all reasoning, namely, That what does not exist can have no pr^operty. This is but a different ex- pression of the axiom, that it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be. It is, moreover, only a third expression of the very same paramount truth to say, that what does 7wt exist cannot be either of the two causal supporters of any relatio7i. It is one of the most important remarks that can be offered, with a view to the following specu- lations, that the fundamental maxim of logic just now mentioned, and which is of prior authority to every other, has been most extensively and con- tinually violated by the assumptions of logicians. It is entirely upon the hope of being able to show, conclusively, that this has been the case, that I depend for success in my endeavours to establish some of the most considerable of my views, in the sequel ; and, therefore, I would solicit attention to what I conceive to be the fallacious procedure which has been followed with regard to this para- mount maxim, in every stage of its operation. It is certain, from the fundamental principle here asserted, that no relation whatever can exist unless both the correlatives which are its supporters actually exist. In this assumption, indeed, I am expressly borne out by the consent of logicians and philosophers in general ] although they have SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 3G7 deeply violated it, in their views of other subjects. Thus, it is admitted by Mr. Harris, who may be regrarded as the voice of the ancients on these sub- jects, that " the fundamental property of relation, " on which the rest all depend, is the necessary co- " existence of relations, which always commence to- '^gether, subsist together, and cease together.''^ It is at the same time to be observed, in the face of this maxim, that mankind are continually busied about a vast variety of assumed relations; in which, either one or both of the relatives do not exist. In every instance in which we compare ivhat is, with what was; or, in which we compare any two things, both of which once existed, but neither of which exist at present ; it is certain we assume a relation which, if set up for a real one, is in direct hostility to the most imperative dictate of reason. From what has now been suggested, it is mani- fest, that, in every instance of assuming any rela- tion whose relatives do not both actually exist, we must proceed by some fiction of the understanding. If we were never to succeed in our attempts to discover what the procedure of the understanding really is, in any such case; this could not for a moment enable us to question the authority of the maxim which governs the whole subject, or to doubt that we proceed by a fiction of some kind : and yet, I conceive that some of the most import- ant mistakes in philosophy have arisen, solely, from overlooking the barrier, and entertaimng the fictions in question /or realities. ^ Philosophical Arrangements, Chap, loth. 368 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. But I do not tliink it impossible, nor indeed difficult, to account in a very satisfactory manner for the procedure of the mind in the case of Ficti- tious Relations. Anil, at the same time, I appre- heud there is true logical ground for the procedure ; although not that ground which we in ordinary suppose, w^hen we assume a relation of this descrip- tion. The Times and the Things that are past, have been present, that is they have existed. And, through the medium of our memory, or of descrip- tion and of history, we can represent them in our imagination. This we do by means of ideas of them; which ideas, although they are no longer supposed to be detached beings floating in the mind, have been shown by a rigorous analysis to be real and literal representatives of the things in question. In other words ; it has been rigorously shown, that all the scenery and objects which v.e have ever actually perceived, like all the actions and scenes which we have depicted in our imagination upon hearing of descriptions or reading of history, are nothing but affections impressed upon our own mind : and it is certain that we can call up repre- sentatives of these scenes and actions in our mind, at pleasure, or by means of some accident ope- rating by association. Every person must know, that when he calls up the idea of the city of Ba- bylon, or of the person of Alexander, he depicts in his imagination some visionary form, w^hich he makes the representative of that which no longer exists, or which he never saw. SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 869 In this way, therefore, we continually compare representatives in our mind, of things which have existed together with any perceived object that does exist; or, compare the representative ideas of any two things which have existed but have both ceased to exist ; and thus we assume a continual succession of Fictitious Relations, by a process which is infinitely useful and delightful, and is a truly logical process when it is duly considered, but is a most illogical or absurd one if we suppose the relations in question to be ixal ones. In the course of investigating the nature of one part of our mental constitution, we sometimes find important light thrown upon the structure of some other part. This truth is well exemplified in the subject of relation. The use to which I intend, in this place, to apply the distinction of real and fictitious relations, is to furnish another distinct refutation of the ac- count which the School of Reid has given of the nature of our ideas. According to Dr. Reid, when we think of any deceased, or absent person, or of any object that is not immediately perceived; we think of the thing itself y and not through the medium of any repre- sentative of it in our mind. But the principles of relation, which have here been insisted upon, prove this to be utterly impossible: for, in order to render it possible, it must be assumed that relations can Hu, Mi, ' • 2 A 370 FIRST LINES OF [chap. in. exist without the existence of their supporting re- latives, either in reality or hy representative* We can contemplate a relation between ancient Tyre and modern London ; although the former no longer exists, and even although we never saw it. But we know, that, in order to contemplate this relation, we must j^^wre to ourselves some imagina- tion, whether true or false, of the ancient city. To attempt to tell us that we can contemplate any ^VLvh fictitious relation^ without having both the cor- relative subjects (at least by their representatives) in actual existence; would be to assert that that which has no existence may have some property, which is manifestly absurd. If it were ever, in a single instance, permitted us to assume any position in science, in defiance of this first of all rational maxims ; it must then be ridiculous to talk of making any distinction between truth and falsehood. The Science of Relation is the Universal Science. Arithmetic and Geometry are but two of its branches. If, therefore, we could in any instance assume so enormous a fallacy, as that of a relation or property belonging to a thing which has no existence, either in reality itself or in some real represent at ivc, there must be an end to every process of rationality, and all logic becomes a chaos of mere dreams. Perfectly in accordance with this principle, when we think of any thing that is absent, we must of necessity call up, both the form and the colors of that thing in our imagination* This, as I have already observed in another place, is a process so SBCT. v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 371 universal and unavoidable, that it amounts to our thinking in colors, as well as in words. Now, when we think of a friend who once existed, but who is dead and his body resolved into its original ele- ments, it may be asked. What and Where can that image be, which represents him in our imaoination? Can we here suppose that any strength of pre- judice will urge a philosopher to tell us, that in such case we have no appearance of our friend be- fore us ? Or, will he choose the other horn of the di- lemma, and assert that we can think of our friend's body itself, which no longer exists and of which therefore it would be absurd and ridiculous to predicate any thing whatever ? Conclusive as this reasoning must be acknow- ledged, whenever it is urged with regard to things that have ceased to exist; it is still probable that per- sons in general may think it a different case when we are thinking of known things that do exist, but are absent from our view. This indeed, I apprehend, is the natural or popular view of the subject ; and it is certainly favorable to Dr. Reid's conception of it : but it is a view which ought not to have been tolerated by any philosopher ; for it is demonstrably a most fallacious one. When we think of an absent friend; it is usually asked with confidence, Do we not think of our friend himself; and will any one attempt to persuade us that we think of him by the medium o^ an idea or image ? Have we not a clear conception of our friend, distinct from the perception of his picture i. 372 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. which now hatigs up in the room before us ? Do we not at this moment think of his pale, or florid countenance ; of his black, or blue coat ; and of all the other colors and shapes which make up his usual dress and appearance; all which, we are confident, is a different thing, and is even, in many particulars, unlike any picture we have ever seen of him ? Such questions as these, at first sight, appear very forcible : they seem to imply what every man must confidently feel, at the moment he is thinking of any absent person; but let us observe what follows, the moment we submit this natural preju- dice to the test of philosophic truth* The real fact, estabhshed upon the most de- cided unanimity of philosophers, is, that our friend's countenance was never either pale or florid ; that his coat was never black, nor blue; and that no part of his person, or dress, ever had any color at all. On the contrary, it is most certain that all those phantoms which we call pale and florid, black and blue, and all other phenomena of vision which we have uniformly contemplated as being qualities inherent in our friend's person, were nothing but sen- sations in our own mind. Concerning this fact there is no dispute. Dr. Reid, himself, any more than any other philosopher^ has never attempted to dispute it. Of the truth of this assertion the following extract must be a deci- sive evidence. — " When a colored body is present" (says Reid) " there is a certain appearance to the " eye, or to the mind, which we have called the " appearance of color. Mr. Locke calls it an idea ; SKCT. v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 373 ** and indeed it may be so called with the greatest ** propriety. This idea can have no existence bnt ** when it is perceived. It is a kind of thought, ** and can only be the act of a percipient or think- ** ing being." : After this decisive concession, it may be asked. What becomes of the popular belief that the faces and apparel of our friends and acquaintance are white, red, and yellow? In other words ; What be- comes of the confident belief that we perceive men and women; when it is thus incontrovertibly proved that we are cut off from perceiving these, themselves, and can perceive only representative images of them, in our own sensations ? Dr. Re id falls into both a useless cavil and a sophism altogether unworthy of his genius, with regard to this subject. Although he admits that what he calls the appearance of color is in the mind, (which is all that we desire him to grant) he affects to consider the name oi color itself to belong to the external cause of this appearance ; and, in order to support his position in this case, he as- sumes that the vulgar consider color to be a quality in bodies. It is true, the vulgar do think so : but this, however, is no other than the profound error by which they confidently believe that colors are a sort of skins or coverings adhering to external objects. For a philosopher to intend to say, that the vulgar have any suspicion of the fact that it is owing to the texture of the minute parts of bodies, Qr to any occult quality in them, that they are calle4 374 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. colors, is an assumption which cannot for a mo- ment be endured. Professor Stewart, himself, has felt the necessity of uttering his express dissent from this part of Reid's doctrine. There is another consideration, which belongs so properly to the present subject, that, in order to complete the proposed refutation of Reid's doc- trine, I cannot properly omit the m'ention of it in this place. An objection has been started by Dr. Reid, in favor of his own views, which, at first sight, ap- pears to have great force; and, no doubt, it has weighed with persuasive influence with many of his readers. It is the supposition, that, if we either perceive or think o f things by the mediation of images or ideas of them, we must certainly have a DOUBLE OBJECT of cvcry thought, that is to say the immediate idea of the thing we think of and the thifig itself. This objection is indeed a \(^i y plau- sible one ; and, prior to reflection, we should be apt to pronounce confidently, that, if it existed, it must be productive of confusion in our thoughts. But, that this is an entire fallacy, is proxed by the most satisfactory evidence, in our actual experi- ence. When we see a company of persons in masque- rade; we must certainly admit that we do not per- ceive a set o^ men and women, but only \\n assem- blage of fanciful coverings. Yet we never for a moment think any other than that we are SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 375 looking at so many men and women. It is not silks, and wool, and other such things, that we think we are beholding, but we are all the while conceiving that we perceive the persons who are hid under these coverings. Here then, undeniably, is A DOUBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT in the casc of every individual person we behold ; and yet there is no confusion, nor any mistake whatever with regard to them. How the mind or understanding actually ma- nages, to reconcile this duplicity of almost every object it perceives^ it would be tedious to detail : but it is very explicable ; and the fact itself is wholly incontrovertible. — Thus, Although we con- tinually think we are beholding our books, our furniture, and the persons of our friends and ac- quaintance; we should not for a moment deny, if the question were put to us, that we for most part behold only some covering of each of these objects. How often do we handle and contemplate objects, which we think of as being wood, metal, or stone; when, all the time, we are only touching and look- ing at some sort of paint, varnish, or covering, whose real nature is foreign to that of the thing we think we are perceiving ? When we handle any thing with our gloves on, such as a sword, a horse, or a saddle ; we never think that we do not touch any of these objects. But the real truth is, that it is impossible we should touch them, even in the vulgar sense of the word touch, because our glove is palpably between them and us. Now, another certain truth, in this and 376 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. in eoery other instance of perception whatever^ is, that Our Sensations are a sort of primary arid natural GLOVES to our Percipient or Mind; and we never perceive any external objects immediately, but always learn the knowledge of their tjcistence by the mediation of these gloves. How momentous do these and all the foregoing decisive evidences become ; and how important it is to contemplate them distinctly, each by itself; when we add the consideration that the proofs of the extension of our sensations, and of the micro- cosmic nature of the mind, lead direcily, by the most logical inference, to the conviction that all the external excitements or proximate causes of our sensations are nothing but the ordered ener- gies OF some Intelligent Spiritual Being ;— a conviction which the vulgar imagination can but slowly admit, but which is the only one that logic or sound philosophy can deduce from the premises or dat^. Of Simple and Complex Relations, Ideas of Relation have been formally classed by Mr. Locke, in the Twelfth Chapter of his Second Book, as complex ideas. And he has no where classed any of them as simple ones, with the exception of the idea of unity ; which he does not appear to consider as a relation, and concerning which I shall have occasion to remark. He must, SECT. Y.] THE HUMAN MIND. 377 therefore, be considered as having taught that all our ideas of relations whatever, are complex ideas. This result, indeed, manifestly follows from the general doctrine of relation advanced in his analy- sis ; since, according to the view therein taken, relation is nothing but a pair of relatives, consider- ed with regard to each other ; and, consequently, it is as necessarily impossible to conceive a simple relation as to conceive any two things to be one single thing. If, however, the analysis which I have offered in the foregoing sections shall be admitted as ex- hibiting the real nature of the subject ; we therein find that the complexness of relatives does not ne- cessarily cause a complexness of the relation which connects them together; and there appears no doubt that very many relations are the most simple objects of thought which the mind can ever con- template. The doctrine of the contrary, with the consequences which that doctrine involves, may, toge- ther, be considered as the greatest blot in Mr, Locke's grammar of human thoughts. With regard to the simplicity of our ideas of re- lation ; it may in the first place be observed, that the greater number of them are oia simplicity more perfect than that of some other of our ideas which have been always classed as simple ones. It is admitted, by all metaphysicians, that our ideas of extension and of duration are simple ideas. But, strictly speaking, the simplest idea we can have of either of these things, is an idea made up of 378 FIRST LINES OF [chap. in. parts, or is what Mr. Locke calls a simple mode, that is the simplest degree of a complex idea. The idea of a relation (i. e. of contiguity ) between any two parts of extension, on the contrary, is per- fectly without composition ; it is impossible to think of dividing it, in any way whatever. In like manner ; the idea of that nameless relation which exists between a cause and its effect, and which has no more proper denomination than that of causality^ is perfectly simple. Equally, in all those nameless and obscure but real relations or partitions, which are implied when we make use of the words higher, stronger, richer, taller, better, wiser, and an endless Yariety of other such names of relatives, the relation implied is perfectly simple. It was remarked, in a foregoing section, that all relations whatever are analogous to a relation of DISTANCE, excepting only relations oi equality and those of perfect similitude; both which are analo- gous to a relation of contiguity. Now it may be observed, in this place, that a relation of con- tiguity and a relation of distance are, both of them, very simple things. Hence we may conceive, that a very large proportion of relations are strictly simple subjects. We can conceive a relation of distance shortened, as we can conceive the smallest idea of extension still divided ; but the short- er relation of distance is a relation of distance, just as the smallest extension is still extension. The one, therefore, is altogether as simple as the other. Independent of this ; it is very manifest, that, SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 379 as it was the geiifnil result of the analysis of Locke to make all relations coniplex, it must be the re- sult of ail oppuj^iie analysis to prove that the ge- neral nature of these partitions is simple ; although special reasons can be shown why some few rela- tions must be compltjc. Thus, while the idea of existence, as Professor Stewart has justly remarked, is perfectly a simple idea ; the idea of our continued identity y which he also mentions as a simple idea, cannot be &trictly simjjlt, because the latter necessarily in\olves the idea of our existence at two aiJJ trait times. The idea of motion, which has usually been considered as a simple idea, is another of the same kind ; because motion must involve an idea of the moving body in two successive times. All such relations as these two are necessajily complex : but even these are not n[iore complex than the simplest idea of td tension, or duration ; and they have nodiing like that de- gree of complexness which Mr. Locke ascribes to our most ordinary ideas of relation; in many of which, according to his account, there are in- cluded, perhaps twenty, forty, or one knows not how many, different ideas, as in that o^ di father, and in that of ?l friend, already quoted. One of the most ordinary or numerous of all relations, is that species called visible lines. Now the perfect simplicity of this relation will never be disputed : — A line between black and white, or be- tween blue and yellow, is an object which no one will ever attempt to decompose. We may annihilate 380 FIRST LINES OF [chap, hi, a visible line gradually by elements, that is by part after part, of its length ; but this is putting it gra- dually out of existence^ and is not decomposing it ; for, so long as a particle of it remains, it is a line. Another and a far more extensive species of re- lations than even that above-mentioned, consists in the innumerable tribe of Actions. But all ac- tions, in general, are perfectly simple relations ; for they admit not any thought of attempting to decompose them. We cannot conceive half of a foot step : nor any fraction of a blow^. We cannot resolve a touch into elements. Every such act is either perfect or else it cannot exist at all : It must be simple, because it can have no parts. Besides our own and all other corporeal acts, moreover, all our thoughts in general are actions. We therefore discern, that the relations of action, which are all simple in general, are infinitely numerous and of continual occurrence. I do not apprehend it to be requisite to carry this enumeration to any greater length. It is here to be observed, upon the other hand, that, although most relations are simple ones, we, in general, do not make use of them simply. On the contrary ; for most part, I think we attend to or employ relations collectively. This is an impor- tant distinction in the subject, which must not be overlooked. Thus, for example, there is no such thing as a relation of distance, properly speaking, excepting a SECT, v.] THE HUMAN MIND. 381 distance between some two mathematical points ; which relation, is as simple a thing as any idea of space, or of time, can be. When, therefore, we talk of the distance between any two towns, or two mile- stones, we can never mean any thing but the dis- tance between some two mathem itical points; one of which is assumed either at the verge or somewhere within each of the complex relative subjects. But the distance between two towns, or two mile- stones, (/'?re regard the whole 0/ Me ^i^« relative subjects, is a collective idea of relation, contain- ing an infinite number of distances, nB^melyy those which exist between every two points in each of the two subjects. In like manner, an action betiveen two armies, or even an encounter between two single combatants, is usually a number of actions ; each of which, in itself, is a simple relation, being a mere blow, or movetnent of some sort, in which, each of two par- ties is a correlative : but the whole battle, taken collectively, is evidently a very complex relation. Such collective ideas of relation, it is manifest, do not go to render the individual relations, contained in them, at all complex. This appears to be all that is necessary to ad- vance, at present, with regard to the division of relations into simple and complex ones. 382 SECTION SIXTH. VIEWS ENTERTAINED OF RELATION BY PHILOSOPHERS NOT YET CONSIDERED. 1 That the French Writers have derived their Judg- ment of the Origin of our Knowledge from Locke's Analysis of Relation, As it was suggested, in the foregoing part of the present chapter, that I conceive Professor Stewart to have labored under a mistake, in considering the erroneous conclusion of the French Philoso- phers, with regard to the Origin and Sources of our Knowledge, as having been deduced from the early part of Locke's Essay ; which mistake I attrilmte to him from the fact of his having quoted only those parts of the Essay here alluded to ; I suppose nothing can be more satisfactory, than to draw the evidence of the truth of my opinion, from the account which has been given of the mat- ter by Mr. Stewart himself. 1 shall therefore, in this place, extract what appears essential for the purpose, from the " Philosophical Essays." " The account given by Locke" (says Mr. Stew- SECT. VI.] FIRST LINES, &c. 383 art) " of the origin of our ideas, which furnished **the chief subject of the foregoing Essays, has, for " many years past, been adopted implicitly and "almost universally, as a fundamental and un- " questionable truth, by the Philosophers of " France." Now it is here and all along admitted, that the writers alluded to have derived their erroneous judgment from some pa7^t of Locke's Essay. The only question that exists, therefore, is, as to What particular part of the Essay has furnished the opi- nion which those writers have entertained. And the answer to this question, I apprehend, will appear very clearly in the following extracts fur- nished by Mr. Stewart himself. " Every idea" (according to Diderot) " must ne- " cessarily, when brought into a state of ultimate " decomposition, resolve itself into a sensible re- " presentation, or picture ; and since every thing *' in our . understanding has been introduced there ** by the channel of sensation, whatever proceeds " out of the understanding is either chimerical, " or must be able, in returning by the same road, " to re-attach itself to its sensible archetype." Upon the admitted assumption that Diderot de- rived this doctrine from some part of Locke'sEssay ; I would here ask, From what part could he have derived such notions as those of the " ultimate decomposition of ideas" except from Locke's Chap- ters on Relation ? But it is in a passage rendered by Mr. Stewart from the writings of Condorcet, that we find a full 384 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. explanation of the matter in question. This pas- sage runs as follows. " It is to Aristotle we owe" (says Condorcet) **that important truth, the first step in the science " of mind, that our ideas, even such as are most ** abstract, most strictly intellectual (so to speak) " have their origin in our sensations. But this " truth he did not attempt to support by any de- " monstration. It was rather the intuitive per- " ception of a man of genius, than the result of a " series of observations, accurately analysed, and " systematically combined, in order to derive from " them some general conclusion. Accordingly ; ** this germ, cast in an ungrateful soil, produced " no fruit, till after a period of more than twenty " centuries." ** At length Locke made himself master of the " proper clue. He showed that a precise and ac- '* curate analysis of ideas, resolving them into " other ideas, earlier in their origin, and more " simple in their composition, was the only means " to avoid being lost in a chaos of notions, incom- *' plete, incoherent, and indeterminate ; destitute of " order, because suggested by accident ; and ad- " mitted among the materials of our knowledge *' without due examination. "He proved by this analysis, that the whole " circle of our ideas results merely from the opera- *' tion of our intellect upon the sensations we have •' received ; or, more properly speaking, that all '^ our ideas are compounded of sensations, offering "themselves simultaneously to the memory, and S5KCT. Yi] THE HUMAN MIND. 386 ** after such a manner, that the attention is fixed, *' and the perception Umited to a particular collec- " tion or portion, of the sensations combined." Upon Mr. Stewart's assumption, all along fully admitted, that Condorcet derived his doctrine of ideas from some part of Locke's Essay ; I apprehend it is impossible to desire more conclusive evidence than is furnished by the above passages, that he derived it from those subsequent chapters wherein Locke has furnished his elaborate analysis of relation. The doctrine of Condorcet, as thus expressed, is actually an abridgement of Locke s aimlysis. The commentary which Professor Stewart has offered upon these passages of Condorcet, is so surprising, that I shall here submit it to the rea- der, with such observations as it appears to me to demand. "The language of this passage" (says Mr. Stewart, alluding to that just now quoted) " is ** so extremely vague and loose, that I should " have been puzzled in any conjecture about its ^' exact import, had it not been for one clause, in " which the author states, with an affectation " of more than common accuracy, as the general " result of Locke's discussions, this short and sim- " pie proposition, that all our ideas are compounded " of sensations. The clause immediately preceding ^' these words, and of which they are introduced ^' as an explanation, or rather as an amendment, *' certainly seems, at first sight, to have been in- ^* tended to convey a meaning very different from Hu. Mi. " 2 B 386 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. " this, and a meaning not liable, in my opinion, " to the same weighty objection. But neither one " interpretation nor the other can possibly be re- " conciled to Locke's doctrine, as elucidated by *' himself in the particular argument to which he " applies it, in various parts of his Essay." For my own part, I have the misfortune to dif- fer entirely from Mr. Stewart, in the sentence he has thus pronounced upon the construction of Locke's doctrine by Condorcet. I grant, indeed, that the passage in question, in various parts, is both loose and inflated : but I think it renders the doctrine of Locke, notwithstanding, with much truth. I may assert, without fear of contradiction, that, according to Locke, all our ideas of relation are nothing but so many bundles of sensations, external or internal ; and, that, in the formation of these bundles. Reason has no other part, than that of gathering them together, as a rea:per gathers ears of corn, in order to make them up into a sheaf. Thus he expressly says, that ''all the ideas we " have of relation are made up, as the others are, ojily ^* of simple ideas!' And he also explains, that, by simple ideas, he means ideas of sensation and reflec- tion, which mean external and internal sensations. Of the truth of this there can be not a moment s doubt. What other office, then, can Reason have in making up those ideas of relation, according to Locke, except that of combining them together in a certain manner ? — Now the account of the matter given by Condorcet is perfectly according SKCT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 387 to Locke's doctrine, and also perfectly consistent with itself. It says, that, " our ideas result from " the operation of our intellect upon the sensations we " have received ; or, more properly speakings that <* all our ideas are compounded of sensations'' Herein is no contradiction, nor yet any deviation what- ever from the principles of Locke's analysis. As a decisive test of this ; let us observe, that, in the particular example of the relation oi father, as given by Mr. Locke, he presents us with a com- pound of all the sensible simple ideas which go to make up the complex idea of the '* man " who is the father, and all the sensible ideas which go to compose the complex idea " of the child also^ What office then, has Mr. Locke left for Reason to perform, in framing the relation of ''father;' except that very office which Condorcet has ascribed to it ? I leave the matter, as it stands here, entirely for the judgment of my readers ; with this only es- sential and most important remark, namely, that, according both to Locke and to Condorcet, Re- lation is not any thing different ivom. Relatives ; that is, Relation is not supposed by either of these philosophers to be any third thing, created by and existing between every two Relatives, but is thought to be merely a certain combined view which the intellect takes of tx&o different bundles of its own sensations, substantive or ideas. In fine ; After observing the analytical phra- seology which characterizes the various parts of the passages from Condorcet, and which cannot ap- ply to the early part of Locke's Essay, but which 'iSS FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. breathes the very doctrine of his subsequent mialy- sis ; I do not apprehend there can be a moment's doubt that the French Philosopher derived his doc- trine immediately from the analysis. And, indeed, independent of this decisive evidence of the fact, it vi^ould be charging him with having done manifest injustice to Locke, and to the subject, to suppose that he had derived it from his earlier chapters. If this statement cannot be controverted ; it must then unavoidably be admitted, that the seve- ral Chapters of Mr. Stewart's First Essay, intended as a criticism upon Locke's doctrine of the Origin and Nature of our Ideas, is entirely beside the sub- ject or unavailing. That it has appeared in a very different light, however, to a large number of his readers, I have little doubt ; and, if so, it is an example of the influence of literary eminence, in the exhibition of views the real merits of which are understood by very few^ As a refutation of Locke's doctrine, apart from its merits as a criticism, Mr. Stewart's speculations on the subject contain one very just and important assumption, which has been already adverted to ; namely, that " many of those ideas which Locke ** calls agreements and disagreements are simple ideas, ** of which no analysis can be given." But this, I must insist, is merely an assumption , on the part of Mr. Stewart, in so many words ; for there is not the shadow of any attempt at analytical proof to support it ; nor is an analysis of the subject of relation ia any shape adverted to, in his strictures SECT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. k^ on the subject. In this state of the case, therefore, I suppose it must be sufficiently manifest, that those pneumatologists who have formed themselves upon the tenor of Locke's Essay, and upon the doctrine of his followers, both upon the Continent of Europe and in this Island, can never be expect- ed to change their opinion of the origin and nature of our ideas, owing to the force of any thing con- tained in the Philosophical Essays. And I there- fore apprehend that a refutation of the doctrine of Locke, with regard to this important part of our constitution, was certainly a desideratum, and one which could only have been attained through an opposite general analysis of the subject of relation. Whether, or not, I have had any success in the foregoing attempt to supply this desideratum ; is for my readers to judge. But, whatever shall be the sentence pronounced with regard to it, it was certainly indispensable that I should provide against any criticisms with regard to the utilitj/ of the at- tempt, by showing, unanswerably, that it had not been previously supplied ; because I expect, that, without this explanation, there might be many per- sons ready enough to suppose that I have therein attempted a very unnecessary task, sofor as regards the Origin and Sources of our ideas. 390 FIRST LINES OF [chap, id 2. Of Dr. Reid's View of the Subject of Relation with reference to Locke s Analysis, Very contrary to his usual copious method of treating the various subjects upon which he wrote; Dr. Reid has touched only with extreme brevity upon that of relation in general : and, in so doing, his observations upon it are far from being clear, or decisive. Toward the end of the First Chapter of his Sixth Essay, he says, " I proposed in the Third " place, to consider our notions of the relations *' of things." After this very comprehensive proposition, how- ever, he comprises all his discussion of the subject in the three remaining pages of the chapter ; — a fact which it is of importance to remark, in order to show how little it had been adverted to by this Phi- losopher^ any more than by Professor Stewart, that the Materialists are not to be met, or confuted, w^ith regard to their erroneous opinion of the Origin and Reality of our Knowledge, upon any other ground than that oia General Analysis of Relation, Yet the brevity of Dr. Reid, upon this subject, is not in my opinion so surprising as the indis- tinctness with \\ hich he expresses himself with regard to it; including his remarkable misappre- hension of what Locke has advanced concerning it. SECT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 391 In the place already referred to, Dr. Reid says, " I think Mr. Locke, when he comes to speak of " ideas of relation, does not say that they are ideas ** of sensation or reflection, but only that they ter- " minate in, and are concerned about, ideas of sen- '* sation and reflection." The First objection which I have to make with regard to this passage, is, that, although it correctly quotes one sentence in the analysis of Locke ; yet, the conclusion which Dr. Reid draws from it, is entirely opposite to the meaning of Locke, in pas- sages that are much more explicit and essential : for Locke expressly says, that " all our ideas of " relation are made up o/"' ideas of sensation and reflection ; and, therefore, no force of acumen can enable any one to deny, that, according to him, these ideas are combinations of two different parcels of ideas of sensation or reflection. Secondly. But another and very important ob- jection comes after. For Dr. Reid has, without any sign of disapprobation, or rather with an ap- pearance of tacit assent, adverted to the assertion so repeatedly made by Locke, that " all our ideas " of relation termiiiate in ideas of sensation or re- " flection." Dr. Reid's conciliatory phrase is, that Mr. Locke ** only" asserts this. Now, if the phrase, " terminate in,* be taken in a strict scientific sense, (as it must be, or else it is no better than jargon on the present subject) it identi- fies our ideas of relation with our ideas of sensa- tion or reflection, in the most indubitable manner : and the express assertion of Locke, that " all our 392 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. " ideas of relation are made up of ideas of sensation *' or reflection," leaves not the shadow of a doubt that this was his meaning, in the use of that phrase. Upon the other hand ; if the principles of the foregoing analysis be admitted, no relation can terminate in either of its supporting relatives, any more than a road between two walls can terminate IN either of those walls, or than one degree of a circle can terminate in another. In a word ; whatever Dr. Reid's opinion was with regard to the origin of our knowledge, it is certain he has not offered any hostility against the general doctrine of relation advanced by Locke; and, therefore, he has left the French Philosophers^ and all other Sceptics with regard to the Origin and Reality of our Knowledge, unopposed by any argument that could have the least chance of effect- ing a change in their opinions. What Dr. Reid has expressly said, in favor of the origin of our knowledge, is simply this ; that " all our notions of relation may more properly be " ascribed 1o Judgment, as their source, than to " any other power of the mind." Now this amounts to about the same as is asser- ted by Professor Stewart, namely, that *' without " the use of reason, or oj understanding, no comment " could enable us to unriddle " certain ternis ; which, wh^n examined, prove to be terms expressive of relations. Btit we have seen, that quite as much as this has umv' SECT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 3S3 been expressly asserted, not only by Locke, but also by Condorcet after him ; who, notwithstand- ing, has founded, upon this very doctrine, a con- clusion directly against the real existence of any object of thought besides our sensations. The desideratum, in this case, therefore, was not to discover that Reason is employed in the forming of our ideas of relation ; for all philosophers have been agreed with regard to this fact; but it was to ascertain what was the particular mode by which our Reason operated therein ; and, thence, to discover whether relations themselves ARE ANY REAL THINGS, distlnCt from OUr SENSA- TIONS. It will certainly be admitted, that the summary, and even rather dubious sentence of Dr. Reid, already quoted, is not of a complexion to present a bulwark against the result of Locke's analysis of relation ; against which, indeed, it is not pointed. And, what is still more unfavorable, is, that Dr. Reid's sentence is founded upon argument-; which are in themselves highly exceptionable. The in- stances he has adduced in support of it, are the fol- lowing. ** Another way in which we get the notion of " relation (which seems not to have occurred to " Mr. Locke) is when, by attending to one of the " related objects, we perceive or judsre, that it ** must, from its nature, have a certain relation to ** something else, which before perhaps we never " thought of 5 and thus our attention to one of the 394 FIRST LINES OF [chap. 11] " related objects produces the notion of a corre- " late, and of a certain relation between them. " Thus when I attend to color, figure, weight, I ** cannot help judging these to be qualities which " cannot exist without a subject. And, again, " By attending to the operations of thinking, me- " mory, reasoning, we perceive or judge, that there '* must be something that thinks" — ** When we " attend to body, we perceive it cannot exist with- ** out space ; hence we get the notion of space " (which is neither an object of sense nor of con- " sciousness) and of the relations which bodies have *^ to a certain portion of unbounded space, as their " place." It is immediately after this passage, Dr. Reid expresses his opinion, that " all our notions of re- " lation may more properly be ascribed to Judg- " ment, as their source, than to any other power of '' the mind." Now, if we accept the word source, (in this pas- sage) in the best sense ; and if we farther suppose that, by an idea of relation. Dr. Reid meant an idea of a third thing distinct between two relatives ; (a matter which he has left in the deepest obscurity, but which would co-incide with my own view of the subject,) — it is still to be remarked, as matter both of curiosity and of importance, how he has ai^rived at those instances of relation which he thought proper to select; for the foundation of his opinion that Judgment is their source. We are therefore to observe, Dr. Reid imagined, that, in some cases, our contemplation of one ah- SKCT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 395 solute subject, suggests to us the notion of another absolute subject, which before perhaps we never thouglit of, and of « relation bettoeen them, I apprehend it is to the honor of Locke's judg- ment that Dr. Reid had to charge him with not having adverted to this road of arriving at the knowledge of relations ; because, if this be a real road to them, I think the whole subject of rela- tion, instead of being a kingdom of demonstrative science, may be called any thing else we please. The conditional result which I have just now asserted, is already very importantly assented to by the Sceptical followers of Locke, in the case of those very instances which have been selected by Dr. Reid, and in selecting which I think he has been singularly unfortunate. Body, Mindy and Space, are the three instances which he has chosen : and it is notorious that both Mind and Space are denied by Materialists; and Body (by which he means Matter) is equally denied by the one half of philosophers, taking in those of ancient as well as of modern times. All relations between Body and Mind, and between either of these and Space, are considered by a great proportion of philosophers to be mere chimeras. To have adduced a set of relations whose real existence is denied by one half of the philosophical world ; and to make these the foundation of a conclusion that Judgment is the source of our ideas of relation, is, surely, not the way to remove difficulties in philosophy. From the tenor of my foregoing speculations, it 396 FIRST LINES OF [chap, hi, lias appeared that I consider the notion of Body OR Matter put entirely out of the question. But with regard to Mind ; in order that what I have just now said may not be misapprehended, I here intimate that I am led to question very deeply the usual assumption of our best pneuraatologists, namely, that all our knowledge of it is merely re- lative. The question, indeed, is one of infinite moment ; because, if I have not mistaken a direct deduction which is to be drawn from the foregoing principles of relation, it must be impossible to have a RELATIVE knowledge of any subject, unless we have had a previous positive knowledge of its genus. This question, therefore, will form a distinct Chapter in the present volume. Of the Recent Views of Professor Stewart with re- gard to the Subject of Relation. From the remarks which I have already offered with regard to the speculations of Professor Stew- art ; it has appeared, that he has touched upon the elementary nature of relation with still greater bre- vity than Dr. Reid himself. This is the case to such an extent, that there is hardly an expression in those parts of his writings already referred to, from which one can draw any certain conclusion as to what are his precise sentiments on the sub- ject ; although I have deduced, from his partial remark with regard to the simplicitt/ of many of our SECT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 3&7 ideas of agreements and disagreements, that his opi- nion, when followed out, 7?mst be essentially hos- tile to the whole analysis of Locke. These observations, however, apply only to the views of Professor Stewart as e.vpressedin his " Phi- losophical Essays." And I am now to remark, that he has touched incidentally upon the subject of relation, in his subsequent work the Second Volume of his Elements ; the tenor of which had not occurred to my recollection while I was framing the foregoing strictures. These recent views of Mr. Stewart, with regard to this subject, present so remarkable a contrast with that which seems to be implied in the Philosophical Essays; that I feel under the necessity to furnish a speci- men of them, here, as a conclusive evidence of the indistinct state of opinion of some of our best logi- cians upon the subject of relation. In the Fourth Section of the Fourth Chapter of the Volume referred to, where he is treating of analogy; Mr. Stewart has expressed himself in the following manner. " An additional proof of this is furnished by the " following consideration. That a resemblance of " objects or events is perceived by sense, and, accord- '' ingly,has some effect even on the lower animals ; " a correspondency (or, as it is sometimes called, *' a resemblance) of relations, is not the object of " sense, but oi intellect, and, consequently, the per- " ception of it implies the evidence of reason." Now I must observe, that correspondency and resemblance are only other names for relation h 398 FIRST LINES OF [chap. in. With regard to this, there will be no dispute. Must we really, then, understand it to have been meant by Mr. Stewart, that only some relations are OBJECTS OF INTELLECT, and THAT Other relations are objects of sense ? It would appear so. If it were possible to construe the passage in question into an oversight ; it would be illiberal to criticise it : but it is not an oversight, but a doc- trine. The words which I have quoted in italics, are thus distinguished in the original ; obviously, in order to mark the intention ; and the repetition of the same assumption, in the context, leaves not a doubt on the subject. " An obvious instance of this occurs" (says Mr. Stewart) " when we attempt to compare the bones " and joints in the leg and foot of a man with " those in the leg and foot of a horse. Were the " correspondence in all the relations perfectly ex- " act, the resemblance between the two objects would " be manifest even to sense ; in the very same " manner that, in geometry, the similitude of two " triangles is a necessary consequence of a precise *' correspondence in the relations of their homolo- '* gous sides." Moreover, in the next paragraph, he places " the '* sensible dissimilitudes between things of different " species"— in contrast with — " that more remote ''correspondence which reason or fancy traces be- " tween the parts of the one and the parts of the " other." The indubitable amount of these repeated asser- tions, is simply this ; — that Reason discerns certain I SKCT. VI.] THE HUMAN MIND. 399 7 emote relations; but that Reason has nothing to do with perceiving relations between any two resem- bhng objects that are present to our perception, such as a distance between two houses, or a con- trast between two colors ; these more obvious re- lations being " perceived by sense." Setting entirely aside (for the moment) all the proofs which have been advanced that every rela- tion is the object of reason alone ; 1 must here re- mark, that, to suppose the Category of Relation to be divided into two general natures, insomuch that some of its species are objects only of Reason, and others are objects q/* sense, is a position which, in despite of the power of words, I cannot for a mo- ment ascribe to a philosopher of Mr. Stewart's eminence. The only question, then, is, how his words can be construed, so as to convey any other meaning ? The matter is not merely dependent upon any of the phrases used by him ; although even these, of themselves, admit of no double construction, namely, the phrases ^'perceived by sense,'' — and — ** the object of sense,'' The most insuperable manifes- tation, consists in Mr. Stewart's having placed Re- lations perceived by Reason, in a state of complete and pointed antithesis with Relations perceived by Sense. In a foregoing Section ; I have myself distin- guished two special relations, as being picturable, and being actually pictured to sense : and I see no reason to change this phraseology ; otherwise, it is manifest, I have still time for so doing. But, 400 FIRST LINES OF [chap. hi. by these phrases, I never meant to assert that those special relations are perxeived by sense^ or that they are at all objects of sense ; and my whole context, both before and after, throughout this chapter, must render this perfectly evident. The reason of my applying those phrases, was, that every perceived relation of distance, and every breadth less visible line, is in itself a positive pheno- menon, depicted to sense; although it cannot be per- ceived AS A LINE OR RELATION between two colors, e.vcept by the intellect or reason : But the same phraseology is not in the least applicable to any relation of resemblance. According to the example suggested by Professor Stewart, of the relation of correspondency between the leg of a horse and that of a man ; it must follow, that the resemblance heiyveen the two legs o/* a man is ** per- ceived BY sense," and is an " object of sense,' because, it is plain, they support a relation oi per- fect similitude, in our view. But, contrary to this, I confidently affirm, that the relation of resem- blance between the two legs of a man, (although this resemblance or relation is a real partition be- tween these two legs) is not a phenomenon or object of sense, Hke a line between two wlors, or like a third color between two other co- lors. On the contrary ; this and every other rela- tion of RESEMBL.Aiatiently wait the perfec- tion of the Philosophy of the Mind. In so far as the original fabricators of language had just ideas ; they may indeed be expected to have found suitable expressions for them : and, thus far, Etymology is an accidental or secondary 408 FIRST LINES OF [chaf. it source in which we may seek for the Nature and Relations of Words. But nothing has proved more contrary to experience, than that mankind in a rude state have ever had just philosophical no- tions. How then shall we look for the philosophy of language, where the philosophy of ideas never yet existed ? In tracing the original meanings of words, we may find (and even this appears in many cases to be a matter of very uncertain issue) how our forefathers thought: but this affords us no ground to assume that they thought justly; and, if they did not do this, it is impossible they could have spoken justly. If I be not greatly mistaken, a very remarkable instance of the truth of this reasoning is furnished by Mr. Home Tooke, himself: and, if so, it is not a little curious, that so striking an example of it should be exhibited by a writer whose acumen had led him, in many respects, so far to transcend his contemporaries, in the science of language. The only strictures, however, which I propose to hazard, upon the speculations of this writer, con- cern his sentiments on the subject of Relation ; and his views of that part of speech which, I hope to be able to show, is the representative of Rela- tion. The following passages, from the work in ques- tion, will furnish the requisite matter for this pur- pose. In the First Volume of the Diversions, page 390, Mr. Tooke says, " I could sooner believe ^' with Lord Monboddo, that there are men with SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 409 " tails, like cats, as long as his Lordship pleases, " than admit that * every kind of Relation is a pure " idea of intellect which can never be ap- " prehended by sense.'" Again ; In his Second Volume, page 499, he ex- presses himself upon the subject in the following terms. " Relative has indeed, within my memory, ** by a ridiculous affectation of false and unfound- ** ed accuracy, crept forward into improper use, to " the exclusion of Relation. Certain precise gen- " tlemen will no longer permit us to call our kin- ** dred our Relations: No, — but our Relatives. " Why ? What is the meaning of the termination " On, and the meaning of the termination Ive; " what qualifies the one, and disqualifies the other ? " They have both appropriate meanings ; without " the knowledge of which how can these gentle- " men determine their proper use ? If they say, " they have not appropriate meanings ; by what " rule do they prefer one to the other ? They who " do not take what they find in use, are bound " to give a reason for it. But these petty foppe- " ries will pass away of themselves, and when the " whim is over, we shall all find our Relations " again, as safe and sound as ever." Although all the authorities which I quoted in the preceding Chapter, in order to show that Relation and Relatives have uniformly been con- founded together as being one same thing, have unquestionably expressed themselves to the full 410 FIRST LINES OF [chap, n . amount of the doctrine which I there attributed to them ; it is certain that not one of them has as- sumed so triumphant a tone, on the same side, as Mr. Tooke has done in these two passages. His sarcastic treatment, however, of those innocent gentlemen who have made a distinction in their phraseok)gy on the subject, must recoil with a pro- portionate force upon his own judgment, if the principles of Relation advanced in the foregoing analysis be admitted. With regard to the distinction, indeed, between Relations and Relatives, which, he observes, " has ** crept in; " it appears that those who have adopt- ed it, have not, however, in any instance been guilty of attempting to analyse their own thoughts with regard to it ; as may be inferred from the tone in which Mr. Tooke has expressed himself con- cerning them. The distinction, therefore, seems to have crept into modern phraseology owing to some difference actually discerned by the minds of par- ticular persons, between Relatives and Relation, but discerned not dejinitdy, or in any manner which could enable them to ascertain the limits which divide these two natures. If I am right in this conjecture ; it may fairly be supposed, that such a vagueness in men s notions with regard to Relation, is a forcible illustration of the truth of Mr. Tooke's judgment, that a know- ledge of Grammar is not to be obtained from what is usually called learning ; because I suspect, that the vagueness in question arises from the circum- stance of writers, and speakers, in general, having SECT. 1] THE HUMAN MIXD. 411 formed their notions of the Category of Relation upon the principles of school logic, which, I have al- ready very fully shown, are directly contrary to the real nature of Relation itself; while the natural dic- tates of the understanding, in its view of things around it, operating together with a general tenden- cy to improvement in our language, has tacitly whispered, to some individuals, a different concep- tion of the nature of Relation from that which scholastic logic has uniformly inculcated. — ^The probability of this conjecture, however, will be illustrated farther on. Having ventured thus much in the way of mere surmise ; I shall now proceed to hazard an answer to Mr. Tooke's question ; namely, Wherein con- sists the distinction between the imports of the two words, Relation and Relatives ? 2. Of the Nature and Use of the Verb. The whole foregoing analysis, I would fain hope, presents a conclusive answer to Mr. Tooke's question, so far as regards Relation and Relatives in themselves, as things existing in the imiverse, either in the ideas of our own minds or in things beyond us : and, I confess, I do not anticipate being able to add any thing to the strength of the evidence therein already adduced. But with regard to what appears to have been the more immediate object of Mr. Tooke's question, namely, Whether or not any. Or, What grammatical distinction 412 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. can be made in the verbal expression of Rela- tives, so as to difference it in reality from the ex- pression of Relation; I shall now submit that view of the subject with which I have been impressed in consequence of the general result of my own previous speculations. First, therefore, I must risk the opinion, that, from want of having any conception of the real nature of Relation itself, the ingenious author of the Diversions of Purley has left entirely unex- plained, and in the same state of darkness in which it appears to have uniformly rested since the invention of language, the real nature of one of the only txvo essential parts of speech y namely, the Verb. If I shall be enabled to substantiate this opinion, together with those consequences of it which I here contemplate; it will be found, that, although much light has been thrown upon the subject of Philosophical Grammar by the Philologer of Pur- ley, his Work, nevertheless, walks deplorably lame upon ONE of its two legs; — a fault which, indeed, it would be most unjust to attribute to this author exclusively,— but which is not the less real though it has been shared by all the rest of the species. Mr. Tooke has set out with assuming, that the only essential parts of speech are the Noun and the Verb. — All the other words, he considers as ab- breviations, for the sake of dispatch. He then shows, that Verbs are '' adjectived" as well as Nouns. And this carries him into a consideration of the SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 413 different ways in which Verbs are adjectived. But he commences and ends his very ingenious speculations, without entering into any explanation of the nature of the simple Verb itself. This, in- deed, he confesses, in a very remarkable passage at the close of his work ; wherein he gives a hint that he intended to make that question the subject of a future speculation. There appears, in the out- set of his Treatise, a sort of passing description of the use of the Verb ; which I take to be perfectly indicative of the vagueness of his conception con- cerning its nature. But the passage in which it is contained, as well as that wherein he acknow- ledges the omission of the subject, will he stated after I shall have in some degree developed my own views with regard to it. To commence this View ; I assume, in concur- rence with Mr. Tooke, that the only essential parts of speech are the Noun and the Verb, The ques- tion, then, which first presents itself, is the follow- ing; namely. Why are the Noun and the Verb the only two essential parts of Speech : Upon what basis is this assumption founded ? The answer, I imagine, is simply this ; that there are only tzvo Primary Genera or Categories OF Things, conceivable in the universe ; that is to say Substantive Natures — and Partitions between them : which Partitions are obviously necessary to give plurality to things, and without which they must be not divers but all one same THING. Assuming this, as the primary constitution of all 414 FIRST LINES OF [chap, n . things known by us ; I am to observe, that Sub- stantive Natures; and also their Inherent Qualities, which may be considered as being substantive in a secondary degixe; may, each of them, be viewed also relatively in regard to any other things, and hence these Substantives take the superinduced character of Relative Subjects : But whether they be regarded in their primary character of Sub- stantives, or in their secondary character of Relatives, they are, in every case, necessarily sigjiified only by Nouns. But, utterly contrary to this nature, I must here suggest, all Partitions (that is to say ALL Relations) between Substantive things must be signified only by Verbs, or by a word which de- fines or modifies a Verb, namely, a Preposition. This last assumption (of the truth of which I have little doubt of being able to satisfy my readers) forms of itself alone a conclusive answer to Mr. Tooke's question, as to what difference gentlemen could possibly specify between Relations and Re- latives : for vast and essential that difference must be, when the signification of the two things in question of necessity demands the two m^ost es- sentially different parts of speech. — But this, I con- ceive, is only the beginning of difference. Philologists, in common with Mr. Tooke, have always been foiled in their atttempts to ascertain the nature or essential import of the Verb, taken simply by itself. But if it should appear satisfac- torily, that Philosophers and Logicians have never conceived the existence of those real Partitions SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 415 between things which I venture to believe the Verb will certainly be found to represent; it is perfectly manifest they never could have formed a true conception of the nature of the Verb itself. And as it is manifest from the language which Mr. Tooke has employed concerning it, that he had not the most distant conception of those Parti- tions between things, as forming real objects of thought; (and, indeed, many classes of them real'i' ties in themselves whether zve think of them or ?iot;) it is perfectly evident he could not reason with pre- cision upon the intrinsic nature of the Verb. — One cannot, indeed, help remarking, in his work, how illogical it appears, to prosecute a long treatise upon the pi^operties of the Verb, without pretending to ascertain the nature of the Verb itself. Other Philologists and Grammarians have at least made some specific estimate of its supposed nature ; be- fore they proceeded to reason upon its properties. To proceed, however, to the evidences of the sub- ject; I here first concur with Mr. Tooke (Vol. 2, page 473,) in opinion, that as '* Case, Gender, Num- " ber, are no parts of the Noun" — " So Mood, ** Tense, Number, Person, ai'e no parts of the " Verb." Next ; I am to observe, that, with regard to the import of the Verb itself, however our two great English Philologists, Tooke and Harris, differ in some respects ; they certainly agree with all other Philologers in this, that the verb imports some- 4ie FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. thing attached, or attributable to, or in some way or other attending upon, some ONE agent or subject exclusively. But this (to borrow the impressive lan- guage of Mr. Tooke upon another occasion) " / denyT — I must deny that the thing signified by any Verb can be attributed to any one subject, as signifying either an act, a quality, or an attribute of any sort, of that subject. This, at the same time, I must observe, is of the very last importance : It is essential and fundamental in the nature of the Verb ; and it will necessarily carry a great part, or one half of all Grammar upon its shoulders. To support it, therefore, I shall begin with stating the following positions. 1. The Verb, I conceive, is a distinct kind of Noun, signifying a Relation between any two Subjects. The Verb, therefore, is, like the thing which it represents, at once a Partition and a Bridge of Connection. It connects two ordinary Nouns, or Pronouns, considered as a Nominative and an Accusative. 2. From this nature of the Verb ; I must farther suggest, it follows, that if any Verb be expressed simply, that is without being conjoined with a Noun, or Pronoun, in the Nominative Case ; it can have no more meaning than a Preposition has that is expressed by itself. 3. Moreover ; If any Verb be expressed with onlij a Nomi7iative Case; I venture to believe, it ^vill still have no meanings unless there be also an Accusative Case either expressed or understood. In other words ; I apprehend, no Verb can be con- SECT. I.J THE HUMAN MIND. 417 ceived, at all, except as signifying both a logical and a grammatical bridge between some two subjects; which subjects, in the language o^ Relation ^ are call- ed a Relative and its Correlative, but in the lan- guage of Grammar are styled a Nominative and an Accusative, The difference, in the general constitution of Grammar, between this view of the nature of the Verb and that which is uniformly assumed, will be manifest to every person who is acquainted with the subject. In its proper place, however, I shall, as matter indispensable upon such an occasion, adduce evidence from various authorities, to show that it is never supposed that the Verb (when it is supposed to assert) must always assert some- thing of an Accusative, by the very same expres- sion in which it asserts any thing of a Nominative. —The cause and the consequences of this vast oversight will appear in the sequel. The only Verb which can have the smallest pre^ tension to be apprehended, or its signification con- ceived, with a Nominative only; is that which has very improperly been called the Substantive Verb. This Verb, namely. Am, or Is, however, signifies purely nothing but existence : and existence, I must observe, is nothing but a relation. The word existence is apprehended, by logicians, to signify the actual being of essence; which, in other words, means the actual being of a sub- Hu, Mi. 2 D 41d FIRST LINES OF [ch\p. iv. stance together with all its inherent qualities. Thus, Johnson quotes Dr. Walts ; " Essence is but " the very nature of any behig, whether it be *' actually existing or no : a rose in winter has " an essence; in summer it has an existence also.' And, upon the same authority, the English Lexicographer explains existence to be, " State of being; actual possession of beings From these expositions, without any other argument, (although there ai^e other and very conclusive ones too,) it becomes perfectly manifest that there is an acknowledged difference between Essence and Existence : and, since the former of these words indubitably means the substantive nature of any thing, without implying its actuality ; the lat- ter, certainly, can mean only an actual relation between that thing and Time and Space. In other words; When the essence or nature of any thing is called into actual existence, this means that its es- sence supports an actual relation of compenetra- tion, or juxtaposition, with Time and Space ; with- out which, nothing whatever can be conceived as an actual reality. As for the old scholastic jargon, concerning things which have no relation to Time, or Space ; it has too long disgraced the page of Philosophy. But, at any rate, if there be such things, they form none of the subjects about which the present spe- culations are at all concerned. Another argument, of equal force, presents itself in the general structure of language ; which would, I SE€T. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 419 of itself alone, prove, conclusively, that Existence means nothing but a Relation. Thus it is univer- sally agreed that the signification of the simple Verb Am, is Exist. What then (it may be asked) is the signification of the Pronoun /, when it is prefixed as a Nominative to Am ^ The Pronoun must mean something : and it indubitably means MY Substantive or essential Nature. What meaning, then, can possibly remain for the Verb Am to have, as subjoined to the Pronoun 7, except to signify a relation of congruence or compenetration zvhick I support with Time and Space ? It cannot affect this argument, that Time and Space are two vastly different and independent realities ; and, also, that we cannot comprehend or imagine any actual partition between these things and any Being which maintains a relation of mutual compenetration with them. For, as Time and Space will be insisted upon, as being absolute reaHties ; and, as we cannot suppose Time and Space to be the same thing with the substantive Beings that are in Time and Space ; it follows, that we must infer a logical relation or partition between them ; and we must, even, in like manner, infer a logical partition between Time itself diin^ Space itself; although we cannot imagine how these relations are actually sustained. If any third argument, in proof of the fact before us, could be required ; we have it in this consider- ation, namely, that Identity is universally acknow- ledged to be a Relation ; and it is certain that 420 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. identity is only a co?2tinued existence ; that is, Exist- ence is only a simple modification of the relation of Identity. Having, I trust, disposed of the pretensions of what has been called the Substantive Verb, by showing that it signifies no substance what- ever, but only a mere relation, as does equally every other Verb; In other words ; having urged that the pretended substantive Verb demands, for its import, to have Time and Space for its Accusative, while it has the Pronoun / for its Nominative ; I am now farther to observe, that the whole tribe of other Verbs, not only the Active Transitive, but equally the Active Intransitive, and the Neuter also, are in a logical sense, and must in a grammatical one, be considered as bridges between two Nouns, OR Pronouns, and,assuch, cannot be conceived with- out an Accusative, as well as a Nominative Case, Grammarians assume, that, when we say '* Peter^ runs,'' the action is necessarily confined to Peter, as it does not pass from him to any one else : but, that when we say " Peter beats Richard ;" the word beats denotes an action proceeding from Peter ; and, as this action does pass, namely, to Richard, the Verb also is transitive or passing. Such, uniform- ly, is the doctrine of the Schools. But, from this doctrine I must venture to dissent most essen- tially. It involves a two-fold error, of the greatest consequence; and a confusion in the subject, which loudly demands to be unravelled. With this view I am to observe, in the First SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 421 PLACE, that, when "Peter runs,'' he beats the GROUND ; and, what is more, the ground at the same time beats him, as certainly as ever he beat Richard. — In thexvmoral import, and in theiY physical consequences also, they are, assuredly, two vastly different things, to beat the ground and to btat Rich- ard, But, I must assert, as a most essential Principle of the subject, that, in a strict logical or philosophical view, what is called the passive sub- ject, in every action, is always, of necessity, as active as the other : and I must here accordingly insist, that, when any man runs, or beats the ground, the ground, in a philosophical sense, beats him and is as active as he is. Secondly. In order to point out the other es- sential error, which I have ventured to suggest, as being involved in the rule of Grammar above alluded to ; I must remind my readers, that it was shown, in a Section of the foregoing Chapter, that ALL Actions are Relations. In this place I am to add, that all Relations are, in a phih)sophical sense. Actions, And, when I «ay ACTIONS ; it will be observed, agreeably with what I have asserted above, that I mean a thing extremely foreign to what is meant by the word ACTION in the uniform acceptation of Grammarians and Logicians. Thus, not only is it assumed, that, in what is called an intransitive act, the action is necessarily confimd to the Nominative or Agent, because it is 422 FIRST LINES OF [chap. it. supposed that the action does not pass ; (which limi- tation of the action to the Nominative, I repeat, is a profound and most consequential error, both in logic and in grammar) but, also, when, in the case of what is called a tr^ansitive act, it is said that the action does pass to the Accusative or Patient, there is created another error, of no less magni- tude : for the truth is, that actions never do pass ; they bear no analogy^ in their nature^ to any thing that can pass from one subject to another. Gram- marians, when they talk of a transitive act, and af- firm that in this case something passes; mean some- thing that passes like a horse, or a great coat, from one man to another. But I must insist upon my position, that a Verb, of any sort, is only a Noun, signifying a Bridge of some kind ; which Bridge separates or divides, while it also connects, any two subjects, considered as a Nominative and an Ac- cusative ; and I feel confident that no Bridge can bear an analogy to any thing that passes, at all. Actions, indeed, pass in one sense ; that is, they pass in Time. But what I assert is, that actions never pass in Space ; because they only connect any two Subjects in Space, as a Bridge connects two Banks of a River. There are two, or three, distinctions to be made here ; which, I think, will serve to illustrate the matter in question. — First ; When one man strikes another, I apprehend, both men, in a logical sense, are equally active ; because each of them supports one end of that Bridge or Action whose name is SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 423 striking : which relation is an actual partition be- tween the two men. — Secondly ; If, in consequmce of this striking^ one of the men receive a wounds or a bruise; this, although indeed it does not pass, but is a thing newly caused or created, is at least something GOT by the Patient. Bat, Thirdly ; If the act in question, instead of simple striking, were to consist of ^ stone thrown, or a horse given, by the one man to the other ; in this case something does pass : but we are here to distinguish, as a matter of essential moment, that this something that does pass, is, certainly, a thing FOREIGN to the action either of hitting or of giving ; and the action, itself, in either case, is purely a species of partition and bridge, which both the men equally contribute to support, without any superior claim of either of them, in a philosophical sense, to be called the ai^ent. As the grand error of Logicians has been to suppose that Relations are Qualities of Things, instead of recognising them for Partitions BETWEEN Things ; So the great error in accredited Grammar which I am here arguing to controvert, and which is no other than the one just mentioned, is that of confounding Actions with mere Ener- gies ; than which, I have suggested, and must here maintain, no two things can be more distinct. The simple truth, 1 apprehend, is, that et;erj/ ACTION in nature must of necessity be the effect of TWO op- posite ENERGIES. Each of these Energies, I grant, is a Quality of some One Subject : but I 4 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. assert that the Partition which must exist between these Energies, when they are mutually exerted, is NOT A Quality, and does not belong to either of the two Subjects; but is a distinct Bridge, which divides^ while it also connects them. Now the Verb is the Word whose office it is simply to signify those Bridges which we call Actions: and certain I think it is, that, to talk of active or passive Bridges must be a manifest absurdity ; and no less so, to assume that any Bridge can stand upon only one leg, any more than it could upon no leg at all. 3. Illustrations of the foregoing Reasoning. It may be proper to illustrate the general view of the subject which has now been stated, by some particular examples. And for this purpose 1 shall begin with stating one of that class which is most unfavorable to the position here asserted, or, at any rate, that is the least obvious to apprehension, namely, the relation which must always be sup- posed to subsist between any Substantive Thing and any one of its Inherent Qualities, Thus when we say that a sensation ^^ an occa- sional inherent affection or quality o/' a mind; we, of necessity, consider the mind and the sensation as be- ing, in a grammatical sense, two distinct things, con- nected by the copula is. But, although the mindy in this case, is usually considered as the Subject, and SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 425 the sensation or quality only as the predicate ; it is certain, that, in a strict philosophical sense, the mind is as much the mind of the sensation, as the sensation is the sensation of the mind. The truth is, that when- ever we predicate any quality, (however inherent) of a subject, we of necessity assume and imply a relation or logical partition between the subject and the predicate ; which, while it connects them to- gether, makes two logical subjects of them. In every other sort of relation, except those es- sentially intimate ones which subsist between Substances and their Qualities, or between Sub- stantive Beings and Time and Space, the view which I am here insisting upon must be plain to every capacity, and its truth self-evident. In the relation (as it is called) of Father, that is in the relation which is supported between a father and a child ; the father is a man w ho has befathered the child, and the child is a human being who, by its existence, has bechilded the father. No per- son will pretend to say that there are two differ- ent relations, which connect these two Correlative Subjects. The begetter and the begotten were equally necessary to give existence to the relation which they now support between them : and it is impossible to give any meaning at all to the Verb beget, without understanding it to have both a Noun in the Nominative case, and another in the Accusative. We might as well endeavour to imagine a Bridge without any thing to support it. 426 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. In like manner ; Constable, or Dictator, is the superinduced relative name of a Subject who sup- ports one side of a certain relation or action be- tween himself and some other persons. The name of this relation, when we look toward him, is governing; but when we look toward those whom he governs, the very same relation is called obeying. Each of these names of the concrete relation, as it exists, or can exist in nature, however, is, for the sake of convenience, usually abstracted and ge- neralised ; and hence we have the Verbal Nouns Government and Obedience or Subjection. But there is no such thing in the u?nverse, as Government^ or Obedience; although there is a great deal of governing and obeying. And I as- sert, agreeaf)ly with all that has gone before, that we cannot use either the Verb Govern or the Verb Obey, without understanding a Noun, or Pronoun, in the Nominative, and another in the Accusative case: so essentially is every Verb the signification of a Connective Partition or Bridge; which cannot be supported without a Sub- ject, signified by a Noun, or Pronoun, on each SIDE OF IT. It is observed, indeed, by writers, that there are some names of Relatives, which do not suggest their Correlatives. Thus Mr. Locke remarks, that the name of Constable, or Dictator, does not obviously suggest its Correlative ; while that of Patron infallibly calls up the notion of a Client. But this observation is not true to any I SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 4'2f extent that can in the least invalidate my present general argument. It is true, we may sometimes hear the name of a Constable, or Dictator, without heeding or attending to any Correlative : but if we were to mention such a conceit, as that of Robinson Crusoe having been a Constable, or Dictator, in his Island without inhabitants ; the absurdity of the thing could not escape the notice of the most ordinary persons. This instance, then, may serve to show us, that the mind recognises the necessary existence of a Correlative to every Re- lative ; although, under many familiar views of the subject, it may not heed that it actually does so. And I assert here, as an axiom in lan* GUAGE, equal in force or necessity to any axiom in GEOMETRY, that Every Nominative must have a Correlative Accusative, understood; and, that every Verb is a Bridge, which can no more be supported without both a Nominative and an Ac- cusative, than London Bridge could be supported by only one or neither bank of the Thames. The mind, indeed, does, in innumerable in- stances, form for itself what may be called resting places of absurdity; and very convenient ones, too : which are deserving of more remark than 1 have here room to bestow upon them. Thus, we add, and subtract, and multiply, and divide Numbers, which we understand to signify no concrete things in existence: And so, in like manner, we may, in many cases, speak of Subjects under Relative cha- racters, xvithout thinking of their Correlatives. But, 428 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. as no man (not even an advocate of General Ideas) will })rptend, that one^ two^ or ten, can exist, that are not one, two, or ten, loaves, or fishes, ov some other concrete things; so no man, that is u|)on his guard, will ever pretend that he can think of any Rela- tive Subject that does not refer to some Correla- tive ; nor, I think, will any person, when put upon his guard, assert that he can think of any Nomina- tive Case which does not of necessity demand an Accusative. The view of the subject which has now been taken, is farther confirmed by the fact, that the SAME Verbs are either active or passive, according to which way the mind considers them. Thus, as Dr. Lowth observes, " When the Agent takes the " lead in the sentence, the Verb is active, and is " followed by the Object: When the Object takes *' the lead, the Verb is passive, and is followed by " the Agent." Now, I must observe, this w^ould be impossible were not the Verbs in question, in them- selves^ in a strict logical sense, at)soluldy neuter, or were not each of them supported between a Nomi- native and an Accusative, without any superior claim of either of these last to be the sole supporter of the Verb : for one same Verb cannot possibly have two opposite natures. Thus it is manifest, that a Verb, of whatever sort, is a mere Standing Bridge or Connective Partition, between some two Nouns, or Pronouns. SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 429 And here it is necessary to take along with us the observation, that, although Verbs denote Actions ; and, each of the supporters of a Verb is, according to the foregoing view, egually active ; yet, Actions themselves are not Active. Thus, though Verbs denote actions, it is impossible they should, as the representatives or signs of action, be themselves J&ro- perl]/ called active. And hence, the terms, or phra- ses, Active Verb and Passive Verb, are absolutely absurd, if they be understood as regarding the na- ture of the Verbs themselves; although it is certainly a very proper Grammatical distinction to call them active and passive, in order to show the posture or direction, of the mind, in its view of the Nominative and the Accusative. The distinctions of Active and of Passive Verbs, I conceive, are useful in Grammar, in a way ana- logous to the use of certain terms that are current in the subject of Relation, Thus, in the last men- tioned suliject, w^e call the very same i^elation of dis- tance by the name of an ascent when we are look- ing from a lower ground upward, and a descent when we are lookinor down : but it would be absurd to suppose that this one relation of distance is two re- lations, or is of two different natures. It would, how- ever, be just as logical to suppose a relation of dis- tance to be of two opposite natures, or even to sup- pose it of « moving or passing nature, and so to talk of an ascending and a descending distance, as to talk of AN active or a passive Verb. Verbs can only signify the effects of contending activities; 430 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. they cannot either be, or be significant of, any things either active or passive, in themselves. These remarks furnish me an occasion to observe, that the analogy between the Verb and a Bridge is much more extensive and complete, than may at first sight appear. This, indeed, will be still more minutely evinced in the next Section : but at pre- sent I am led to suggest the obvious consideration, that, like a Bridge, the Verb not only connects two Nouns together ; but, while it is itself fixed, un- passing, and neuter, between the two, it serves our thoughts to pass, to and fro, from the one Noun to the other. And thus, I insist. Verbs are those re- presentatives of Relations, which, in language, serve our Intellect to step from one individual sub- stantive being to another, throughout the whole known universe of things ; every one of which steps must be made by the Mind upon a Bridge of Re- lation ; and cannot be signified to any other Mind e.vcept by that sort o/' Bridge called a Verb. The essential faults which I ascribe to the views of Philologists in this case, are. First, the assump- tion that Verbs express Attributes or Quali- ties of things ; each one of them being assigned to some one subject, in the same sense that we ascribe any Quality that is signified by an Adjective Noun, And, Secondly, that, in consequence of as- suming this generic principle, Verbs are then divid- ed into several different Species; and one sort is as- sumed to express an Attribute of some Subject called ?in Agest ; and another sort, an Attribute SECT, I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 431 of some Subject called a Patient. While I hope it is sufficiently shown that no Verb can ex- press an attribute of any single subject whatever. To conclude ; In order to show here, what has been one of the principal objects of the present Sec- tion, namely, that every Relation is, in a logical or a grammatical sense, an Action; I shall offer an example of one of the most quiescent Relations that can be imagined ; For this purpose I choose the relation of contact. In ordinary, and even in strict philosophical discourse, we say, ''two things are in contact:' Thus we signify this relation of contact preposte- rously by a Noun, instead of a Verb. But the real truth is, and it ought to be so expressed, that, in all such relations, taken in concrete as they can alone exist, each of the two things in question contacts the other, I doubt not that many persons will be ready to cry out, here, at what they will at first sight pronounce to be a barbarous expression. But I have only to remind those persons that they con- tinually use a perfectly el 7 me and Space ; it is impossible to conceive him to assert any other act at all. Mr. Harris has as- serted this ; and he has been ridiculed for it, by Mr. Tooke: but I confidently agree with the former. But this primary relation need not be expressed, although it must always be implied : nor, upon ihe other hand, is it to be supposed as not implied because it is not expressed. 1 shall have occasion to appropriate a distinct subsection for the purpose of showing, that Verbs in general are expressed elliptically ; and this to a very remarka- ble extent. It must be unnecessary to point out any other evi- dence, to show that the writer in the Encyclopedia of Rees differs essentially and totally in his view of the nature and office of the Verb, from the view which 1 entertain of the sulyect : but the followifig observations may however be added. This writer says; " We now proceed to consider briefly the usual *' division of verbs into active, passive, and neuter : " and this division of verbs we pronounce to be " extremely unphilosophical. And first, as the " expression of active qualities is essential to ** Verbs, there is no such thing as a neuter verb." In differing from this author ; I use only the same liberty, which, for the sake of the subject, I have done with regard to the first authorities who have written upon it ; and I can intend him no mean compliment, in considering his opinion among the 452 FIRST LINES OF [€HAP. iv. number. But it has already appeared that I dif- fer from him so entirely, as not to admit that there is any other sort of Verb except neuter verbs, considering the Verb in itself : and I must here remark, that he has furnished a complete refuta- tion of his own assumption^ by a passage imme- diately following his assertion that there is no such thing as a neuter verb. Thus he says, " All active verbs imply passion, *' and all passive verbs imply action: Hence the " one may assume the form of the other without alter- " ing its nature^ I have distinguished the last sentence by italics; because I conceive it amounts to a demonstration, that, since the same verb may be looked upon as either active or passive, " without altering its nature^' THAT nature must in itself he neuter. This 1 have before insisted upon ; but the above passage has furnished me with a necessary occasion to repeat it. Again ; he farther observes, that "There are, in- " deed, verbs which denote rest, or the cessation " of motion ; but we cannot use even these with- " out connecting them with positive ideas : and " as action is necessary to destroy or support ac- " tion, we can resolve all apparent neuter verbs " into active verbs." I have quoted this last passage, only because it exhibits a repetition of the great and general error of logicians, wherein they assume that action is a quality o/'one agent. Here, therefore, I repeat, that ACTION is NOT necessary {nor possible) to destroy or support action : although two opposite energies SBCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 453 are certainly necessary to support every action. I shall insist farther upon this in the chapter of Ne- cessary Connection : but, in the mean time, as it is certain that every action is nothing but one SAME RELATION between two correlative sub- jects, it is sufficiently established that it is altoge- ther an absurd expression, although a very usual one, to say that ACTION is supported by ACTION. The truth of nature is, that ENERGY must be pitted against ENERGY, in order to produce any one ACTION ; and the ACTION itself is a thing totally INACTIVE. Hence it follows, universally, that the WORD which signifies Action must signify a thing that is inactive, that is a quiescent STANDING BRIDGE between some two active beings, or their energies. 2, Of Assertion or Affirmation and Denial, — No Word in Language has the Virtue or Office of asserting. The opinion of Philologists that the Verb con- tains assertion, has been so very general, that hardly any voice appears to have been raised against it. A large proportion of Grammarians suppose assertion to be the very essence of the Verb : While all the others assume that the Verb consists of an assertion and an attribute. I have already expressed my dissent from both of these views of the subject; I shall therefore state the grounds of my objection. With this intention ; it appears eligible to pro- 454 FIRST LINES OF [chap, iv, secute the subject under that simile which I have hitherto closely embraced : and, in the First place, therefore, I would ask, If every Verb be a mere Bridge, between a Nominative and an Ac- cusative, as I trust has been conclusively shown ; How can the bare expression of the name of a Bridge assert any things either of that Bridge itself, or of either of the two Banks which support it ? If we utter the expression ** Westminster Bridge ;"" nobody will pretend that this is any assert ion, at all. How, then, can it be said that the expression strike, — rw/a,-— or 6J/?2;—- or striking, — running, — or existing; — is an assertion ? But if Am be no asser- tion ; then Is, also, is no assertion, because they are both one same Verb. Secondly. Upon the other hand, it must be granted, that the expression of the Pronoun, He, — Thou, — or I,- — can be no assertion. These words merely suggest to the hearer the notion of my, — ^ow?%— or his, — Substantive Nature or Essence, \y\\h- out affirming that this Nature or Essence now ac- tually exists or maintains a relation with Time and Space. Thirdly; But if we utter the Pronoun / in CONJUNCTION with the simple Verb Am ; we have at once an asSxERTIon of my existence, universally acknowledged, without dispute or question. From this short process of reasoning ; I con- clude, it follows very simply, that assertion is ef- fected purely by the conjunction of a Noun, or Pronoun, with a Verb, And hence it follows that there is no word in language whose virtue, or office, it is to asskrt. SECT. 11,] THE HUMAN MIND. 465 So far, indeed, is the Verb from asserting any thing ; that I must here insist upon what was sug- gested in the early part of the Chapter, and has since been adverted to, namely, that the Verb, when taken by itself, has no meaning whatever^ any more than a Preposition taken by itself. No person, (not even one of the few remaining advo- cates of General Ideas, or General Conceptions) will pretend that the abstract word Man, or Bfidge, means any thing that ej'ists. The abstract word Bridge, then, in order to have any signification of i^ THING existing, must always be referred to sonw individual concrete Bridge, But, when we come down to the solid ground o^ concretes, it will be ad- mitted to be impossible to conceive the notion of any Bridge, without at the same time conceiving the no- tion of the Two Banks which support it ; because a BRIDGE means a CONNECTOR; and it can be no BRIDGE if divested of the character of a connector. In fact, therefore, the word Bridge can have no mean- ing if it be divested, in our ideas, of the accompani- ment of the Banks vf\\\'c\i it connects. But if this rea- soning be admitted; the very same argument must hold true with regard to Verbs : and, hence, to say, ** strike,'' or " rww," without implying both a striker end a stricken, or both a runner and the ground, would be absolutely to utter a sound without any meaning.— But if a Verb can have no meaning at allhy itself; it certainly cannot assert by itself. That assertion, therefore, consists purely in the silent conjunction of a Noun, or Pronoun, with a Verb ; appears to me to amount to demon- 456 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. stration. And the only thing that I think remains to be illustrated, is, the reason why the mere junc- tion of the two has this efficacy. In order to investigate this reason ; I must here first extend a notion, which I have already sug- gested with regard to the Preposition and to the Verb only. The fact, I conceive, is, (and it is a very important fact,) that even the Pronoun, or Nou7i, itself, has no meaning when taken alone. — When we say " Man,'' — " Peter,'' — or " /," simply by itself; I would ask, What meaning can possibly be attached to this expression, before we have sub- joined some such word as Am, Strikes, — or Dies, that is some Verb ? When we express the Pronoun /; the person who sees and hears us knows, from seeing and hearing us, that we exist or hold a relation with that Time and Space: but he does not learn this from any virtue in the sound /. — For, if, instead of the Pronoun I, we were to express the Pronoun He; this sound could convey no meaning, unless it were understood, (from somerecollection) to indicate some being that exists or has existed, that is one who holds, or has held, a relation with Time and Space. Hence, I would here suggest, that, without the subjunction of some Verb, either expressed or understood, no Pronoun, or Noun, can have any meaning whatever, any more than a Verb, or a Pre- position could have in the same solitary situation. Thus, if we say, Man, — Peter, — or He; — and to these actual expressions we add the supposed expres- SKCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 457 siom of " now exists, or has existed, with Time and " Space ;" we shall utter words with meaning : But if we say, Man, — Peter, — or He, — simply, without a Verb either expressed or understood, we signify nothing in the Universe. And, I am here to add, or to repeat, that these sounds can have no meaning as abstract terms, unless they can be solved into a signification of some concrete sub- jects; because abstract terms, in their highest pre- tensions, never refer to any thing that is supposed to EXIST. The general truth which we gain from this rea- soning, is, that as, upon one hand, no Relation can be conceived, without conceiving two Substantives as Correlative Supporters of that Relation; so, upon the other hand, no Substantive Thing can be conceived, without conceiving it to support one side of some Relation, especially the relation of e.r- istence with Time and Space. And, of course, as it is with Things in the Universe, so it must be with the Words which signify or express these things. Hence it plainly appears, that neither a Verb nor a Noun can have any meaning at all, when singly taken ; but each of these words derives its meaning, or efficacy, from the circumstance of CONJUNCTION. After this view of the subject ; I confess, it ap- pears to me that the reason of the efficacy of con- 458 FIRST LINES OF [enAP. iv. junction, in the case of assertion, is something of the following nature. When we say " Man ;" this suggests a notion of the essence of man, without any notion of his actu- ality : but when we add the Verb *^ strikes" this, (as, when Joined to the sign of mans essence it signifies both the actual existence of a man and an adjective act,) constitutes assertion. In order to complete asser- tion, however, it is to be remembered that the Ac- cusative, also, must be understood. Thus assertion appears to me to consist in the mere stringing together of a Nominative, a Verb, and an Accusative; either in our crpression, or in our understanding : and not at all to reside in any one of them. In other words ; assertion appears to be no- thing but A RELATION BETWEEN the Nominative and the Verb ; — to which, also, mustbe added, that it is a relation between the Verb and the Accusa- tive: And this alone, I apprehend, can constitute a complete assertion, sentence, or proposition. With a view to illustrate this, by the familiar simile of which I have already made so much use ; I observe, that, while theVERBis a Bridge between a Nominative and an Accusative; the Assertive is that/<2r more minute connection or Junction, Jirst of the Nominative and the Verb, and ne.vt of the Verb and the Accusative, which correspond to the two Abutments of a Bridge with the two Banks of a River. — ^The truth of this compari- son, or the strict juxtaposition of the simile of the Bridge and the Verb, appears farther clearly I SECT. 11] THE HUMAN MIND. 459 from this ; that, according to what 1 have just now stated, the complete expression of every verb must involve, not one, but two assertions, precisely as a Bridge must have two Abutments, i. e. an Abut- ment upon each of the two Banks of a river : And so, in fact, the thing is ; for it is certain that when we say " He ^^nte," (which involves one assertion,) the Verb can72ot be conceived as existing without adding the Accusative He strikes Richard. Now, I apprehend, "• Strikes Richard'' (coming after ''He") is as much an assertion as " He Strikes ;" and thus, strictly speaking, every expression of a Verb involves two distinct assertions. It will certainly be granted, that, to assert sim- ply that any one strikes; is not the same thing as to assert that he strikes Richard, or any other particular object. And yet, it is impossible to strike, at all, without striking some particular thing. Hence I think it will not be denied, that the ex- pression, or at least the understanding, of every verb must involve two assertions, in the same way as the existence of every Bridge must demand two abutments, one upon each of the two banks of the river which runs between. In this place it may be proper to point out, that the conjunction which has been insisted upon, as having the efficacy or power of asserting, is, in point of fact, that same conjunction or juxtaposition which has been adverted to by the writer in the article Grammar, in Rees's Encyclopedia ; but, the use, or effect, which he has ascribed to it, is vastly different from that which I have here supposed. 4^ FIRST LINES OF [chaimv. In the passage first quoted from that writer ; he assumes that " A Verb'' — *' implies connection!' — " But this connection is not expressed by an inde- '* pendent word but by the juxtaposition or the com- ** bination into one word of the agent and its ob- "ject." Again, he says, " Verbs were originally "the names of things; but, by combining them " with the personal pronouns, they became, in con- " sequence of the association of ideas, to express " not things, but their operations." Now all that is implied in these passages is, that a Verb is constituted by ihe juxtaposition, or the combination into one word, of " a personal pro- noun " with the name of a thing; which silent connec- tion is assumed to have the power or efficacy of denoting the OPERATION of that thing. But the fact which I have been insisting upon, is, that this very juxtaposition, or silent connection, ASSERTS ihat an operation EXISTS, or is now going on ; and does not at all express the NOTION, or NAME, of that operation. The notion of an operation or action, which is the only thing that a simple Verb CAN express, is expressed by the Verb itself; 2i^ striking, or running : — but the assertion that the action of striking, or running, now exists or is going on (I assert) is indicated by the efficacy of the silent conjunction or juxtaposition of the word strike, or ru7i, with the Pronoun /. According to the view of this author ; \he juxta- position of a Pronoun with a Noun, (as '^ I Plough") gives to the two together the nature of a Verb. But, according to my opinion, this juxtaposition only ASSERTS THE EXISTENCE of the action which SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 461 the Verb denotes ; and the Verb itself is a Word, and a simple word, such as, strike, run, or exist. And if, instead of these Verbs, we take others, that bear the names of substantive things, such as Plough, Hand, or Foot; then, I assert, these Verbs must LOSE the character of Nouns, and must be regarded as being totally different words, that is, as being Verbs, although they are the very same sounds under both these denominations. The difference between the two schemes is vast and essential ; and it cannot be mistaken by any person who will afford it due consideration. At the same time, I am to observe, the author in ques- tion has denied that the Verb is Assertion, or even that it contains assertion : it follows, therefore, from his own view of the subject, that assertion must be effected by something that is not « Verb ; and, certainly, assertion cannot reside in a Pronoun, or a Noun. I trust therefore, that it follows, in the clearest manner, that the juxtaposition of a Pro- noun with a Noun or Name of a thing does not constitute a VERB, but it constitutes ASSERTION. Hence ; the Noun Plough and the Verb Plough, although they are both the very same sound, must be regarded as being two essentially different words : And the same must hold good with re- gard to every other Verb. Here I am to observe, that the whole of this rea- soning appears to be in perfect accordance with the me, or import, of the particle of negation. 462 FIRST LINES OF [chap, iv. When we say " He is,'' that is " He exists;' this con- junction of the Pronoun and the Verb, manifestly ASSERTS : but if, between these two words, we in- troduce i\\e particle not, by saying '' He does not exist ;" we thereby sever one end of the Bridge of Ea;istence between the Man and Space, from its Abutment, in a way precisely analogous to knocking away the ground from under one end of any other Bridge. This gives me occasion to remark, that if it should for a moment be thought, that because there is A WORD, namely, not, which signifies nega- tion, therefore there must also be a word that signifies assertion ; this mode of reasoning would be entirely fallacious. For it must, upon the very same principle, be affirmed, that, because it re- quires a wedge or hulk, or at least a real distance of space, to DISCONNECT the end of a Bridge from the bank of a River; therefore it would require a wedge or bulk, or at least a space, to join them together. The rigid truth in this case, is ; and I am de- sirous not to deny, but to point it out ; that the junction or abutment between every Bridge and a bank, is also a relation or real partitio?i; because the junction can be no closer than a coniiguiti/. But upon this I am to observe, that contiguity is that sort of partition which exists when one thing SUPPORTS another : and, by connecting the Verb upon one side with its Nominative, and upon the SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 463 other with its Accusative; we actually support the Verb, as a Bridge is supported by its two banks. Thus we GIVE ACTUALITY to a Verb by connect- ing it with its supporters : and this very act o/* con- necting amounts to asserting, upon the very same principle that placing a Bridge upon its two Abutments gives it existence : For, any mass of wood, or iron, or other matter, is no bridge, when it exists any where except abutted upon two banks; And any sound, or sign, can be no Verb, until it is connected with both its Nominative and its Accu- sative, It follows, very rationally, that, in order to sepa- rate any expressed Verb, from any Nominative that supports it, we must introduce that wedge of negation, the particle not: which disjoiner, by caus- ing an actual separation, destroys the Bridge or Verb, and has the farther grammatical or verbal eflScacy oi annihilating the very matter of it. And I hope it is equally satisfactory, that, when any Verb is expressed, and the wedge of negation is not introduced; the very connection of the Verb with its supporters amounts to assertion ; that is, the mere stringing together of the Nominative, the Verb, and the Accusative, signifies the intention of the speaker to ascribe an actual being to the action which he expresses. "When a man has thrown a tree, or a beam, over a rill of water ; and has made it rest upon the two opposite banks ; he has thereby furnished a type of a Verb : and, so long as this bridge remains con- nected with its banks, I think it may in some 464 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. sort be said that the existence of the bridge is as- serted. But, the moment the connection ceases, the BEAM is no longer a Bridge. If this reasoning be admitted as satisfactory ; there is no word in language that signijies asser- tion. The view which I have been led to take of the nature of Assertion, is so extremely different from that which has been advanced by the author of the Diversions of Purley; and the views of this author upon the subject being, I conceive, vastly prejudicial to the study of the human mind and its operations ; I cannot avoid offering some remarks upon his doctrine with regard to it. I have already shown, that Mr. Tooke makes the essence of the Verb to consist in asser- tion. If there could have been any doubt of the matter, after the reasons which I have assigned for attributing this doctrine to him ; it would be re- moved by the fact of his express denial that asser- tion is an operation, or yet the expression of an operation of the mind. He says, that — *' The business of the Mind, as ** far as it concerns language, extends no farther " than to receive impressions, that is to have sensa- " tions or feelings. What are called the operations " of the Mind, are merely the operations of lan- " guage. A consideration of Ideas, or of the Mind^ ** .—or of Things (relative to parts of speech) will SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 465 " lead us no farther than to Nouns, i. e. to the signs " of these impressions, or names of Ideas." Here then, we find, there is no thought of Rela- tionSy i. e. PartitionSy between what he means by Ideas; and, consequently, Mr. Tooke knew of no word that expresses or signifies these Partitions. But, however, as the word which signifies these /?e- cessary party-walls between things had irresistibly forced itself into all languages, (wherein it stands pre-eminent) namely, the Verb; and as it was there- fore necessary for Mr. Tooke, as well as for all other Philoloj^ists, to fancy some office for the Verb; he could think of no other, than that of its signifying assertion. As a fardier confirmation of this ; he blames Locke for leaning towards the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger, and Port Royal, and for having, " with- ** out sufficiently examining their position, too ** hastily adopted their notion concerning the pre- " tended Copula Is and Is not.'" — He observes, that " Locke supposed, with them, that affirming and " denying were operations of the Mmd; and refer- " red all the other sorts of words to the same ** source, though if different words had been (as he '* was willing to suppose) to be accounted for by "the different operations of the Mind, it was al- " most impossible they should have escaped the ** penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke." To this reasoning ; Mr. Tooke makes his fellow Dialogist, B, put in the following reply ; which I cannot help thinking is extremely just. " By what you have advanced, this matter Hu. ML 2 G I. 46a FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. " seems ten times more unsettled than it was be- " fore : for you have discarded the differences of ** things, and the differences of IdeaSy and the dif- " ferent operations of the Mind, as guides to a di- " vision of language. Novi^ I cannot for my life " imagine any other principle that you have left to " conduct us to the Parts of speech." The fact is ; Mr. Tooke having boldly asserted that language can be concerned about nothing but our sensations ; he consequently admitted of 7io Parts of Speech but what should express these sensa- tions, and such others as should express them with dispatch. He therefore admitted Nouns, as the NAMES of sensations; and the Verb, as being our ASSERTION OF THE EXISTENCE of these sen- sations ; and he admitted the adjectiving of each of these words, under certain modifications, as abbre- viations for the sake of dispatch : And this, I think, is the sum of his system of language. At the same time, He overlooked the Partitions between Things; and he thereby overlooked ONE HALF OF THE WHOLE UNIVERSE: which, of course, reduced him to misconceive, most extremely, the nature of that word which nature has forced upon mankind, in spite of their blindness, to signify these Parti- tions. To return to Mr. Tooke's strictures upon Locke ; In the first place, he appears to have conceived much too high an opinion of Locke's infallibility, when he says that, " if different words had been to *' be accounted for by the different operations of ** the Mind, it was almost impossible they should SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 467 " have escaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke." I trust it has been satisfactorily shown, that assertion is actually an operation of the mind; because it has appeared that no word in language can assert, but that assertion is effected by an act, namely, a PUTTING TOGETHER of a Noun and a Verb. Mr. Locke, therefore, and all those authorities who have held that assertion is an operation of the Mind, were right in this conclusion : but it does not follow, and I hope I have clearly shown that it is not true, that the Verb Ls, or any other Verb u'hatever, is the sign of assertion. Consequently Mr. Locke and those other authorities were in the same error with Mr. Tooke, when they sup- posed that assertion is the essence, or even that it enters at all into the nature of the Verb. The Verb Ls, and every other Verb, is certainly A Copula. It is a copula between a Nominative and an Accusative ; without being which, no sound, or sign, can be a Verb. But a copula is not an ASSERTION ; Or, to speak more rigorously, an ex- pressed or signified copula is not an assertion ; because assertion is that silent or unexpressed copula, not that joins a Nominative to an Accusa- tive, — but that forms the apposition or contiguity of the Nominative and the Verb — and which does the like, also, between the Verb and the Accusative. If we compare a simple sentence to a Sleeve Button; The tioo separate expansions of the button correspond to the Nominative and the Accusative Noun ;-— The link that connects the two expan^ sions, answers to the Verb ; and the connections or FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. articulations between the ends of the link and the EYE of each button^ are analogous to that silent copula or connection which amounts to assertion. This simile of the Verb and its two supporters the Nominative and the Accusative, I must ob- serve, is far less correct than that of a Bridge, which 1 have for most part employed, and which I cannot too much commend as conveying my own conception of the nature of the Verb. But the connection of the parts of a Sleeve Button, I ima- gine, may perhaps afford, to some minds, a more dis- tinct notion of that sort of junction which I con- ceive amounts to assertion^ than even the simile of a bridge itself. 3. Verbs never derived from Nouns, Ther^ appears to be hardly a more confident or more general doctrine entertained by Grammarians, than that Verbs are derived from Nouns. This view I must observe, is the natural fruit of that pa- rent assumption which has been so uniformly received by Philologists, namely, that Verbs signify the attributes of things. The univer- sality of this last doctrine, I have already suffici- ently pointed out : but in this place it may not be improper to notice one other approved writer, who I think has expressed the creed in question with more explicit brevity than any author yet mention- ed. It is asserted by Dr. Crombie, that, " As? SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 46^ " Nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so " Verbs predicate their accidents or properties." This single sentence contains the doctrine of the Verb recognised by all parties of Philologists, with- out exception ; and upon the truth, or falsehood, of this assumption must depend the fact whether or not any Verbs are properly derived from Nouns. Now, as I trust it has been very fully shown that Verbs do not denote the accidents or proper- ties of things ; so I will with some confidence here hazard the assertion, that Verbs are not in any in- stance logically derived from Nouns. When the point in question is duly considered ; I think there cannot be a more striking proof of the want of philosophical consideration in those who have made research into the general nature of language, than the assumption which I am now to controvert. This assumption, indeed, may be ac- counted for from the fact that the nature of Rela- tion itself, which thing the Verb signifies, has been so profoundly misapprehended : but, the moment we recognise the real nature of a Relation, it be- comes manifestly impossible that any Verb or re- presentative of a Relation should ever be derived from the name of either a Substantive or a Rela- tive Subject. To come to the proof of this position ; let it, in the first place, be freely granted that the names of a great number, or, if we please, the great majority of Verbs, are nothing but the names of Substan- tive Things, i. e. simple ordinary Nouns. Thus, " To plough,'"—'' To }ii«,'— or " To eye; " comes 470 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. from the Noun Plough,--' Fan, — or Eye. — But, al- though it is thus admitted that the names of these Verbs have come in some way or other from the Nouns in question ; a moment's consideration may satisfy us that they are no more derived, propeiHy speaking, from these Nouns, than our Ideas of Relation are derived properly from our Sensations. It would be unphilosophical, and absurd, to think of seeking into the Etymology of any lan- guage, or of all the languages in the world, for the origin or derivation of a Verb. Let any person, who desires to know what source the Verb To plough is derived from, only observe a plough- man at his employment ; and then 1 would leave it to himself, if he be unbiased upon the subject, whether he can for a moment believe that the name of the ACTION OF PLOUGHING is, in any philosophi- cal sense, derived from the instrument used in that action; or, whether he can believe that the action ITSELF is not as much, and as originally entitled to A name, as the instrument with which it is per- formed. If it should here be attempted to be said, as no doubt it would agreeably with the usual doctrine of the subject, that Ploughing is an attribute of a plough; and hence, that the Verb plough is certainly and immediately derived from the instru- ment a Plough ; this is that erroneous fundamental assumption, which I all along and here again very confidently deny. Ploughing is an Action : and this action is a Relation or Partition sup- ported between the instrument a Plough and the SKCT. 11] THE HUMAN MIND. 471 Ground, Therefore I insist that the Verb plough, or to plough, (it ought to he ploughing) is no more de- rived from a Plough than it is from the Ground : and it is not derived from either, except in a re- mote, or vague sense, as our Ideas of Relation may be, and have very generally been, in a remote and most unphilosophical sense, said to be derived from our sensations. Thus a Plough, under the hands of the Plough- man, is made to exert an energy against the Ground ; and the Ground, at the same time, exerts an energy against the Plough ; and these two op- posite energies cause a certain sort of Partition between the Plough and the Ground, which Parti- tion is either a contiguity or a distance of some sort ; and this Partition is that Action which bears the naine of Ploughing. Now this account of the action of Ploughing may be applied to everi/ action in nature ; because it will appear, whenever we afford it due consideration, that every action must be a Neutral Partition or Bridge be- tween some TWO energies. As for the supposition of Philologists, that Nouns were the original, and/o?" some time the only sort of words which men knew, or made use of; it seems true, in something like the same extent as the conjecture that Birds were before Eggs, or Eggs before Birds. For certainly, 1 think, Verbs must have followed upon the heels of Nouns as close, or much closer than generation followed animals, or animals the seeds of generation. To be se- rious ; If we take but a momentary view of the 47a FIRST LINES OF [<3HAf. iv. surroundino^ visible and tangible creation, it is impossible for us not to discern that all things, in genera], are continually in a train of sensible mo- tions or actions. And no thinking man can for a moment fail to perceive, that the actions betvxcn things are as important and interesting to our happi- ness, and even to our existence, and therefore as deeply engage our constant attention, as the Things THEMSELVES that act. — Can there, then, be a moment's doubt, that mankind, in every age and country, must, of necessity, have had names for ACTIONS, as soon as they had names for the things THAT PERFORM them ? To these actions, men very naturally gave the same names, (v^^ith various modifications) by which they called the most obvious of the two ^/gtnts em- ployed in the actions. But they, at the same time, involved the subject in a profound obscurity and confusion, by supposing the action to be a QUALITY OR ATTRIBUTE of thlS ONE AGENT ALONE, instead of recognising that two agents are em- ployed in every action. And hence comes the sup- position that Verbs are derived from Nouns ; al- though, I trust, what has been advanced amounts to a demonstration that they are, and must be, derived VOT from Nouns, but from Actions, each of which is a Partition between some two Correlative Nouns, Upon the whole ; such is the close connection between Substantive Things and their Actions ; and such is the importance of actions to us, in our I SECT. 11.] THE HUMAN MIND. 475 intercourse with things ; that a moment's conside- ration must be enough to convince any thinking person, that Nouns could no more serve for lan- guage without Verbs, than Hands could serve with- out Motions, And, to suppose that the most igno- rant savages could remain, for any time at all, unobservant of the difference between a hand and A MOTION of that hand ; would be to turn phi- losophy into a romance. The Verb Move, therefore, I suppose, is not derived from the hand, nor from any other substantive ; but it is derived from that Action, Relation, or Partition, which it signiifies, namely, motion, or more properly moving. It could make nothing against the foregoing reasoning, to say, that, since mankind have all along believed that actions are only attributes of things, therefore, agreeably with their assumption Verbs are derived from Nouns. Because, in the first place, I must object, that, even upon their assumption^ it appears to me to be unpliilosophical, or untrue, to say that Verbs are derived from Nouns, since it must be granted that Verbs are names of phenomena, which substantive things do not exhibit except occasionally; and, when they do exhibit these phenomena, (which indeed they do continually) it i^from the phenomena, and not from the Substantive Things which exhibit them, that the Verb is immediately and properly speak- ing DERIVED ; although, for convenience, men call the phejiomenon or action by the same name which 474 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. they had before employed to denote the Substan- tive Thing to which alone they erroneously refer the action. But, Secondly ; I hardly need observe, that the object of my speculations, in the present chapter, is so far of the same nature with that of Mr. Tooke, in his work already mentioned, that it is not mere technical or conventional Grammar, but the REASONS of Grammar, that I have been consi- dering. Supposing therefore that it be admitted, according to the notion which mankind have uni- formly attached to action, that Verbs have been hithei^to referred to Substantive Nouns, as their source; Or, supposing that in a loose and popular'' sense it may truly be said that Verbs are derived from Nouns ; I presume it will not for a moment be affirmed that this assumption is true in any philosophical sense, or that this loose assumption will be retained in philosophical Grammar, if it shall be admitted that actions are not attributes OF SINGLE SUBJECTS, but are Bridges between Two Subjects ; which are the things that Verbs denote or represent. It would be just as philoso- phical to say, that, because many philosophers have supposed that our notions of Relation termi- nate in and are made up of our sensations ; and that, because it is true in a remote sense that our notions of Relation are a consequence of our sensa- tions ; therefore it is true, m a philosophical or strict sense, that our notions of Relation are derived from sensations, and, that men's thoughts were, for some time, nothing but sensations ! SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 475 4, Abuse in the Verbal Signification of Actions, or Relations, In the sequel of the Section ; I shall hazard some farther remarks with regard to the Verbal ex- pression of Relations. But, previously to this, it appears indicated that I should advert to the idioms or phraseology which appears to have grown out of the views that have been entertained by logicians with regard to the nature of Relation in general. One circumstance which, I imagine, has contri- buted largely toward veiling the real nature of Relation from the apprehension of philosophers, is the fact, that, whereas all actions CMst only in concrete; they have, nevertheless, for the con- venience of speech, been abstracted and genera- Used, and so transformed into fctitious Substantives; consequently, sig?iifed by Nouns, although in their nature, as they exist, they cannot possibly be ex- pressed by any word except Verbs. The confusion of ideas which would be likely to result from this procedure, may readily be anticipated : but it would hardly be supposed what fruits of absurdity it has actually produced, in the most approved forms of language. Preparatory to the evidence of the truth of this observation \ I must first remark, that no- 476 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. thing is more current in speech, than to talk of Battle, of Motion, of Action, and of Thought^ as well as of an endless variety of other Abstract Re- lations ; whereas it is quite certain that there is no such thing in the universe as Battle, or Motion, or Action, or Thought ; although there is a great deal oi fighting, — and moving, — and acting, — and thinking, which are the Concrete Relations meant to be signified by the aforementioned Abstract Nouns. In like manner, we talk of a Blow, — a Walk, — a Ride, — or a Race, and signify each of these things by a Noun; although, in reality, it is a mere action or relation, and can only be signified, according to nature, by a Verb. That these abstractions and generalisations have a logical foundation in our ideas, and that they are convenient or useful in language, is not here denied : but it is nevertheless to be insisted on that they have been abused, by being used in too extensive a latitude. As an example of that species of abuse to which I at present allude ; it may be observed, our most correct and elegant writers, at every turn, inform us that " A BLOW was struck," or " a battle was FOUGHT." What then (it may be asked) is the li- teral import of either of these sentences? Our rea- son will inform us, that, either in a literal or in a figurative sense, a man, or an empire, may be struck, or an enemy may be fought, i. e. fought with : but, to talk oi striking a blow, ox fighting a battle, must be acknowledged, when we afford SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 477 it a moment s consideration, to amount to nothing better than mere conventional jargon. The Participle, (or rather the Verb) striking, in this case, signifies a concrete relation of action between some one substantive thing and some OTHER substantive thing; and the word blow, al- though it is liere metamorphosed into a Noun, sig- nifies nothing whatever except that very identical relation which w^as antecedently expressed by the Fer^ STRIKING. To ''' strike a blow ^' therefore, is to strike a strike ; and the sentence amounts only to a deplorable assertion of the actual existence of an action that is impossible. Such a phraseology as this, moreover, does not appear to be necessary ; although, as it is establish-^ ed by custom, and is moreover a great favo- rite with our very best writers, it is not to be sup- posed that it will ever be discarded. Instead of saying that a blow has been struck; it is, surely, as convenient, and as elegant too, to say that an tvent has taken place; — a town has fallen; — or a fleet was captured. And in the room of asserting that a BATTLE zvas fought; it would, doubtless, sound as well to say that the enemy was fought. Indeed, we, not unfrequently, meet with this propriety of expression ; although the other appears to be far more prevalent. Nor is the phraseology in question confined to such cases as those above mentioned. Thus we talk o{ gaining a battle ; when the thing is, from its very nature, absurd and impossible. We may gain a Victory : but, to gain a battle would be 478 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. to gain a difference ; which in this case was, while it lasted, a real partition between the Victors and the Vanquished, and is, in logical strictness, as much to be attributed to the latter as to the former, notwithstanding the victory was lost. We may gain ^jtown, or an advantage ; or we may give either a wound or an overthrow : but to say we can gain a battle, or give a blow, is (notwithstanding any sanction of usage) an asser- tion of nothing but a simple impossibility ; and I think it is not to be disputed that reason, or com- mon sense, is insulted every time any such phrase- ology is employed. It is a very just observation of Mr. Tooke, that Grammar, although it is the first thing learned by the child, is the last that is understood by the philosopher. The truth is, that, to the Child it is a ritual ; which may be graven in his memory, and retained througli life, as such : but the Philosopher cannot be content with this ; he looks into Gram- mar for a system of rational laws, which constitute a body of legitimate Science ; and he then finds two things, namely, a chaos of matter, and a vast and deep difficulty when he attempts to reduce that chaos to order. Were this not the case, Philolo- gers could not have been so long in the dark witli regard to the nature and use of the Verb as they have remained. When a man looks into the Gram- mar of the English Language ; and attempts to re- concile its rules, its idioms, and its phraseology, to sound reason; he finds himself utterly foiled. Over and above the natural difliculties of Gram- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 479 mar; it would seem, in the art of language, as well as in most other things, that mankind have always preferred the tickling of their sense, to obeying the canons of their understanding. It appears to be in a great degree owing to a predilection for the mere jingle and measure of sounds, that language, instead of exhibiting a rational or consistent system of general rules, presents so large an inter- mixture of arbitrary and contradictory impositions ; which it is impossible to reconcile, or to attend to without offering violation to common sense. The instances to which I have just now been led to advert, furnish a proof of the truth of these remarks. Not only are the cases in question ex- amples of the grossest violation of reason, in the use of language ; but, if we suppose that the infrac- tion of the laws of reason is compensated by the utility of the thing ; and that, from the absurdity being conventional and understood, no inconveni- ence can follow ; it is farther to be observed, that, in addition to the absurdity, we find also the most glaring inconsistency, in the fact that this idiom, while it is both tolerated and highly favored in many cases, is condemned with unqualified disgust in a number of others that are precisely parallel to the former. When a historian, in recording the fate of em- pires, informs his readers that battles have been fought, and blows have been struck; they receive these phrases as appropriate and elegant expres- sions. But if a clown, coming in from the field, were to exclaim that he had xvalked a walky 489 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. or shot a shot; he would be heard with unmixed pity. Can any good reason be assigned, why men feel so differently with regard to two expressions that are perfectly analogous ? It cannot be said, in this case, as it may in some others, that one of the two expressions has lost its moral character, while the other has retained it. The common people talk of striking blows, and of Jighting battles, as frequently as their betters ; and yet, this has not prevented these absurd expres- sions from being cherished by the learned ; while their txmn-br other-phrases are held as illegitimate, and are generally scouted, even from the common conversation of the vulgar themselves. Grammarians, indeed, have not overlooked the fact of the toleration of these phrases: but they have noticed it only as a thing that is fit. Thus it is said, that Intransitive and Neuter Verbs admit an Accusative of the same or a similar signifi- catiwi; as we run a race, — We live a life. Now the abstract or rather the Verbal Noun, in this case, certainly does possess the shozo or appear- ance of a GRAMMATICAL accusativc : but it does not amount to a logical one; on the contrary, it ex- hibits only a manifest absurdity, which puts rea- son to the blush. We are to observe, here, that the mischief done by this form of expression, is not merely verbal: For the truth is, that, while the Verb, disguised, is re- peated, to form its own accusative, there is at the same time, in existence, a real accusative n^on which the Verb properly rests. — When we run, SBCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 481 we mmt run upon the Ground. — When we live, we must live in Time and Space. But if (as was already supposed) it should be said that the convenience of such phrases compen- sates for their absurdity : then, Why not be consis- tent; and, with equal justice, adopt the whole race of them, by saying, when occasion requires, that we have shot a shot, — and hit a hit, — and run a run ? Would it not, agreeably with this, be quite as proper to say that we hdive found ajind, as to say that we h2i\e found a purse ? I apprehend it would certainly be as possible, or as easy a thing, to fnd a find; as to strike a blow, ovfght a battle. And I will venture to believe, that the expression to ""^ fight a battle^' which is precisely the same as '* to fight an action,' is not more tolerable in the eye of reason than to KILL A SLAUGHTER, Or MOVE A MOTION. It will not be supposed that these observations have a view to deny that there is any beauty in the music of language ; or, that I aim them against the due cultivation of a pleasure so justly estimated ; and which, indeed, is so connected with all the refinements of life. — But it is curious and instructive, however, to observe, that while the REASON of language has been sacrificed in a vast extent to its music, the most affected and most for- tunate cultivators of the melody of words, have, in a very remarkable proportion of instances, been found pitiably dead to the ravishing power of ab- solute melody. This phenomenon of the human Hu. Mi. 3 H 48* FIRST LINES OF [chap. iy. mind, although it has been recognised, has not I think been attempted to be accounted for. May we not suppose, that persons in this predicament derive their superior tact and relish of the sounds of concatenated words, from a cause analogous to that which operates in the case of those who acquire an exquisite perception in the gross sense of Touchy in consequence of not enjoying the refined sense of Vision ? The man whose soul thrills with ecstacy at the sounds of absolute melody, may na- turally receive the faint comparative melody of mere language as insipid and uninteresting, and may hold it in general contempt : While he that is denied the feeling of absolute melody, may derive scarcely less than delight from the measured murmuring of verse, or the unmeasured but easy flowing undula- tions of prose composition. The pleasure which savages take in such music as that of an empty cask, to which they will dance, many hours, with incredible vivacity and perseverancfe ; and, indeed, the general character of musical instruments among barbarous nations; seem to bear out the above supposition. If the strictures which have been offered in this subsection should be admitted ; it may be said of technical Grammar, as Dr. Reid (with much more reason than he was at the time aware of) has said of a belief in the existence of a material world; inathely, that ''it dtdlnes the authority of reason^ " aha laifghs at ati tht aridkry oj tht logician,'' In amusing my readers, or myself, with these obser- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 483 vations, however, I am merely suggesting what has stood immediately in the way of my subject ; and ka\fe not made any unnecessary irruption into the regions of the grammarian. All Verbs expressed elUptically, — Most Verbs used in Complexions, of two, or more, involved in One Ex- pression, If the view which I have taken, in the foregoing Chapter, of the subject of Relation, be well found- ed ; I conceive it saves me, in great part, from the charge of any undue presumption in that which I have been led to hazard with regard to its Verbal Signification. But, if this last be admitted ; it seems to follow, that all Verbs are complex, or, more properly speaking, that all Verbs are used in concatenations of two, or more, Verbs together; with only the exception of that one which has, without any just reason, been called the Substantive Verb, In order to explain this ; it would have been re- quisite to begin by analysing the Substantive Verb itself: but this has already been done, in the fore- going section ; and, if the view of it which was there submitted should be deemed satisfactory, the following observation is all that seems to be re- quired in this place. It appears to have been owing only to Grammarians having overlooked that the indicative conjugation of the Verb, I Am, both signifies a Noun, or Pro- 484 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. iwun in the Nominative case, and iMpiiES an- other 2>2 the Accusative, that they can have call- ed this Verb a Verb Substantive. But, not only is it certain that what is called the substantive Verb necessarily demands an accusative Noun, or Pro- noun, for the very possibility of our conceiving it at all, or giving any meaning whatever to the word Am, Be, or Is ; but, more than this, it is manifest, upon a moment's reflection, that to talk of a sub- stantive verb is as absurd as to talk of a cubic circle; because the Verb, purely in itself, can sig- nify nothing but a Relation or Partition; while any Substantive Thing, (although it may be, and always is, in an infinite number of ways a Relative,) can never take the nature of a Relation or Partition, In this place, if not long before, I trust it must be plainly evident, that, in order to understand the nature of the Verb, it was necessary to understand that of Relation : and, especially, that in order to comprehend the true nature of the Substantive Verb, or rather of the Universal Primary Verb, it was necessary to recognise Existence for a Relation, that is to say for a real logical partition, (although it is in fact an actual compenetration) between every Sub- stantive Thing and Time and Space, It therefore appears to have been from a uniform mistaken belief that Existence INCLUDES Substance, that men have called the Verb, Is, or Am, by the name of the substantive verb. In my next position ; I am borne out by Mr. Harris, in a passage which has been treated with much derision by Mr. Home Tooke; but \ SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 485 which, nevertheless, I conceive to be one of the most solid maxims, or, rather, the paramount i^AxiM of reason^ throughout all the subjects of logical investigation. In his Hermes, page 88, he says, ** Previous to every possible attribute, whatever a " thing may be, whether black or white, square or " round, &c. &c., it vnwfit first of necessity exist, "before it can be any thing e/^e." Upon this ground, I confidently insist, that, every time a Subject is intended to have any adjective thing predicated of it, it must be either expressed or un- derstood to EXIST, BEFORE we can predicate any thing else concerning it. If these observations be well founded ; it be- comes plain that the primary Verb is as complete a verb, in itself, as any other Verb in language ; for it cannot be expressed, at all, without an Accusa- tive, as well as a Nominative, either mentioned or understood. But, if this be the case ; it manifestly follows, that, when we use «wy adjective Verb, what- ever, we must use tzvo complete verbs in combination^ that is to say the primary Verb and the adjective Terb. Thus, if we take the Verb to strike, and say, in the indicative mood, I strike; this in reality is an elliptical expression, and it means /, existing in Time and Space, strike. And, even, when these words are introduced, the sentence can have no meaning until we farther add some Noun, or Pro- noun, in the objective case ; such as, /, existing in Time and Space, strike Richard. Here, then, are two complete Verbs, having two distinct No- minatives and two corresponding Accusatives, 486 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. understood^ in order to give any sense to the simple expression " I strike,'' The conjugation of the verb To strike^ if conduct- ed i^on this principle, would run as follows. i, existing in Time and Space, strike or do strike Richard, — or the Ground. I, existing in Time and Space, have struck, shall strike, or may strike the Ground. Thou, existing in Time and Space, strike the Ground. Let him, existing in Time and Space, strike the Ground. As a particular illustration of the fact that all verbs are very eliiptically expressed, in their ordi- nary use ; and, that the full expression of every ad- jective Verb must involve two, or more complete verbs, according to what I have suggested ; I may observe, that upon no other principle can we recon- cile such expressions as " I am he," — " Thou art He,"&c., wherein both the Pronounsare understood to be in the same case. In this form of the Verb, it is undeniably signified that the same thing h two things; and, that these two things have a real relation or partition between them : than which, no greater absurdity can be imagined. But, wh^n we come to reflect upon what in reality exists when any one says " I am He," or " Thou art He ;" we SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 487 readily discern, that, in order to signify what really does so exist, or has existed, it of necessity de- mands two distinct and complete Verbs. When, for example, we say " Thou art He ;" we must mean to refer the same person to two different Times. Thus ; " Thou that art now existing here, art He " that EXISTED at such a Time and Place'' Hence the person in question is made into two Nominatives, that is into a distinct Nominative for each of the two different Times or Places; and these two Times and Places form two distinct real Accusa* tives to those two Nominatives: Consequently, the expression "Thou art He" involves two complete Verbs. But this is not all : For it is both curious and in a logical sense important to observe, that we hardly ever make use of the simple expression, *^ I am He,'' or " Thou art He," without implying four distinct Verbs, with a regular nominative and accusative understood to every one of them. We hardly ever mean simply to signify, that a per- son who is now here, is the same that was in an- other, or the same place, at another time ; because, on the contrary, we usually desire to signify some ADJECTIVE act, beside his act of ejoistence, in any ,Time or Place ; by which adjective act, we re- cognise him at each of the two distinct Times or Places. Thus when a person addresses another with the assertion " Thou art He;" he may mean to signify, "Thou that now existest ^ere, talking f* to the magistrate, art ¥i^ who existed at such a ** Tinie and Place, robbing the man." And, in al- most every other case of using the Verb in a similar 488 FIBST LINES OF [chap. iv. way, it is meant to signify Four distinct Acts, — ^ that is to say two distinct acts of existence and two distinct adjective acts ; all which, together, of course demand to be expressed, or implied, by four distinct Verbs. Viewing the subject in this light ; we discern a good reason why the Pronoun which follows the Verb, is in the same case with the Pronoun which precedes it. As it stands expressed, in the simple sentence " Thou art He; " it is manifestly absurd, because He is, in reality, the Grammatical Accu- sative of the Verb, and yet He is notoriously meant to signify no other being than the Nomina- tive or Subject of the Verb. But the moment we recognise that the sentence " Thou art He," is in reality 2Ln elliptical expression of four, or, in the simplest case, of two Verbs; we discern that the Pronoun " He " is, as it ought to be, the No- minative of the Second, or in some cases of the Third Verb : and thus " Thou" and " He" are two Nominatives, of two different Verbs, whose two distinct Accusatives are to be understood, although they are not expressed. Thus it appears remarkably, according to what has been asserted by different writers, that express language is so far from being a complete significa- tion of our thoughts or ideas, that it rather resem- bles a set of springs, which, upon being touched, put the wonderful mechanism of the mind into operation. But it is at the same time manifest, that a great part of language (if we may so speak) is SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 489 IMPLIED and UNDERSTOOD, witkout being expressed. And those persons who do not so understand it, certainly do not think correctly, either ^\ hen they hear or when they make use of speech. 6. Observations on the Simple Form of the Verb.'^On Participles, Prepositions, and Adverbs, — Conclud- ing Remarks, Grammarians of great eminence are of opinion that the infinitive is the form of the simple Verb. But I have already offered some passing hints to the contrary ; and I must dissent from this doctrine, for three reasons. First, because the infinitive is not expressed by one word. Secondly, because it usually implies activity ; whereas I have shown that activity cannot possibly enter into the nature of any Verb. Thirdly, because the infinitive form of the Verb is, in point of fact, the name of nothing that EXISTS, or can exist, in the Universe,-^! do not object against the infinitive, that it implies nei- ther Assertion nor Time ; because I do not admit that either Assertion^ or Time, or Mood, enters at all into the nature of the Verb. The simple form of the Verb, I am led to con- ceive, from all the foregoing reasoning, can be no other than the form of the Present Participle. 490 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. This Participle, Rlr. Tooke asserts to be the Sim- pie Verb Adjectived, But I must suppose, that, when any Participle is viewed as an Adjective, it loses its pretension to the character of a Verb. The Verb, in its simple form, must be the mere sign oi di concrete Action or Relation, as this Action or Relation exists, or can exist, in nature : such, for example, as fighting, or running. The very sameybr/w, or sound, as that which simply ex- presses the concrete action and therefore forms the naked Verb, is otherwise entertained as a Par- ticiple, because it is then taken to signify an Ad- jective Name of some Substantive Thing, such as the name superinduced uponaperson whofights, or runs. Thus we say, 3. fighting man, — or — ?i running footman. This Adjective Name, in these instances, expresses the ENERGY exerted by a Substantive Being, in an act of fighting, or of running ; which energy isan attribute of that single Being : but, in so doing, the wordfighting, or running, loses /Ae signification of an action, and therefore loses the character of a Verb ; because the action of fighting, or of run- ning, like any other action, cannot be a mere energy or quality o/*any one subject, but is a bridge or partition between some two. The Participle, certainly, implies the existence of the action of fighting, or of running; but it does not expressly signify it ; all that it expressly signifies, is the ENERGY of the man who supports one side of the action or relation of fighting, or of running. If the prefix, To, which is used to express the form of the Infinitive, be assumed to mean Do, SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. #1 or Act ; then, I conceive, the Infinitive might be made to express the Simple Verb, by the fol- lowing modification. — Act striking — Act running '—Act fighting — Act exisfwg, — But I apprehend that the Infinitive, in its usual form, cannot pos- sibly express any action or relation in nature, sim- ply and philosophically. When we would ascertain what is the simple naked expression of that action or partition between a Nominative and an Accusative which is properly signified by a Verb ; I apprehend, the only way to do this, is to behold the concrete ac- tion itself, AS IT EXISTS in nature, and then ob- serve what name is given to it by the general con- sent of people using one language. Thus, for ex- ample, if we saw a man running , or two men fight- ingy and were to ask any Englishman what they are about ; he would have no alternative, in his reply, for there is but onejorm of the Verb that can pos- sibly answer this question, and that is the word runningy or in the other cosefighting, — Fighting, and RUNNING, then, and not to fight and to rww, are, in my humble opinion, the simple forms x>i the two verbs in question : and the same reasoning must hold with regard to every other Verb. If any person should hope to avoid this con- sequence, or to refute the present argument, by putting the question in a different form ; and, in the case of witnessing a fight, instead of asking the natural and just question What are those men doing? were to ask What is the name of that phenomenon which we now observe ? The answer in this case must 49^ IFIRST LINES OF [chap. iy. be " A Battle," — or "a Fight." This answer, moreover, it must be granted, appears to be the in- Jinitive mode, wanting its usual prefix. But the ex- pectation of the person, who should propose this objection, must be instantly quashed by the follow- ing consideration. The answer thus given, al- though it is the usual, or we may say the gramma- tical TLnsweVy is not a true one; for it has no foun- dation in logic or in reason. There certainly nei- ther ever was, nor can be, in the Universe a Fight or a Battle ; although there has been, and may be, a great deal of Fighting or Battling. The word Fight, or Battle, therefore, is not the name of any concrete Action or Relation whatever : on the contrary, it is only a mere fiction of logic, whereby all the different concrete acts or relations of fightmg 2iYe generalised under one name: and, even, the few remaining advocates of the doctrine of General Conceptions never assume that the Ob- ject of any General Term is a thing that exists. But all parties will certainly agree, that the things which Verbs represent, must be things that have EXISTED, DO EXIST, Or CAN EXIST. I trust, therefore, that the above reasoning is altogether conclusive, that the Form of the Present Farticiple is the Form of the naked simple Verb. In this place I am led to notice what has been said upon the subject in question by a writer of very considerable repute, and whose book is furnished with many ingenious remarks;— I SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 493 mean Mr. Pickbourn's " Dissertation on the Eng- lish Verb'' In the speculations of this writer, however, or in any thing- which he has cited from other authors, I do not find that any ground is taken up that in the least approaches to that which I entertain on the subject. He adopts the opinion of Bishop Lowth, with regard to the general na- ture of the Verb. In page 163, he expresses him- self thus ; " Bishop Lowth says, * A Verb is a tvord * which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer.' " This de- " finition 1 think a very good one.*' Accordingly, therefore, Mr. Pickbourn adopts the doctrine of active and passive Verbs. I need say no more to show that our views of the subject are utterly in- compatible. But, although I find no material point of agree- ment between the views of this author and those I have above suggested ; yet there are several passages in his work which I think may be cited to show, that his views ought to have accorded with those in question. One of these is the fol- lowing. In page 4 ; speaking of the Present Participle, he says, "There is a sense in which it may " be called the present participle, but none in " which it can, with propriety, be called the par- " ticiple of the present tense or time : for it is " equally applicable to all divisions of time. It " denotes the gradual progress, or middle, of an " extended action, without any regard either to " the beginning, or end of it ; i. e. it represents an ^ FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. " action as having already begun, as being in " progress, or going on, but as not yet finished. " Thus, yesterday, at ten o'clock, he was writing a "letter," &c. This, I think, is a very just account of the Pre- sent Participle: and it is upon this very ground that I esteem it as expressing the naked simple Verb. It embraces no consideration of Time : it contains no Assertion : it implies no Mode : but it simply expresses an action going on. When Mr. Pickbourn talks of an ** eMended action;'' I may observe, that every action in the Universe is an extended action, for there can be no action that does not occupy Time, Now the thing which a simple Verb signifies, or can signify, is nothing but an ac- tion AS IT IS going on, after it has begun, and BEFORE it has finished. Prepositions are not only connectives, but they are also Definitives, and that of a very high class. Prepositions define Verbs, as Articles define Nouns. In other words; Prepositions eo'press Relations that are involved or con- tained in the Relations compressed by Verbs. Prepositions are not so necessary as Connectives, as they are as Definitives. We often express two sentences of the very same import, the one with a Preposition, and the other without. Thus we say, " I will go to my house ;" and, otherwise, ** / will go home,'' In the latter of these two instances, we Gnd no want of a Preposition, as a connective; but, from custom, we should find a SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 4^5 want of the Preposition in the other form of the sentence, namely, ^^ I will go house.'' This shows that the Preposition might be clispensetl uilh as a CONNECTIVE. But we should find it could not be dispensed with as a definitive of the Verb. Thus the sentence " I will go home,'' which is an elliptical expression, requires to have the Verb GO defined in some one of the following different ways : I will go TO home,-~l will go from home, — 1 will go BY home,— 1 v>ill go in home; each one of which Prepositions expresses a very distinct, and often an existing involved relation, between us and our Home, with regard to our going. I have, in the beginning, mentioned the Preposi- tion, as being in some sort a representative of the Verb. And here I have explained, that, in point of fact, as Verbs express Primary Relations, so Prepositions express other Relations, contained wit km the former. Adverbs appear, in one of their offices, to ope- rate as Abbreviations, in correspondency with Parti- ciples. As, upon one hand, the Participle, when used as an Adjective, expresses One of two Re- lative Subjects which support any Relation, and impltesihe en erg Y of that Subject in the act in ques- tion; so, upon the other hand, the Adverb expresses the OTHER Supporting Subject of the Relation, and implies its energy in the act. Thus, when we say " I wilt go there;" the word there signifies that PLACE. Now that part of Absolute Space to which 496 FIRST LINES OF [chap. iv. we are going, or rather some object in that Space, is the Accusative or Object which supports the other side of the relation of going ; while ihe person who goes supports one side of it. It may be of use to explain, that in an action of GOING, or of COMING, it is NOT the GROUND that is the Accusative or that supports one side of the re- lation. In an action of walking, of runni?ig, or of tiding, (some one of which modes we must use in ei- ther going or coming) the ground is the Accusative which supports one side of the action; while we support the other. Bft going, or coming, is, al- most in all cases, a relation or action between us and SOME object either above or below the ground, but at any rate some distinct object, considered altogether apart from the ground itself. Hence any relation of going, or coming, is a vastly different thing, in the apprehension of the logician, from the relation of contact we support with the ground during our transit. In fine; By way of recapitulation, I now observe, Jirst, that there^are Two, and only Two, Primary Categories of Things in the Universe, namely. Sub- stantive Things fl!w^ Partitions between them, — Ani^i Partitions, (i. e. Relations,) when they are viewed as being the Supporters of other Rela- tions, become in a logical sense themselves Substan- tive Beings. Thus Relations create and support other Relations without end. I hardly need repeat, that Partitions between SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 497 Things are self-evidently necessary, in order to con- stitute A DIVERSITY of things in the Universe: for, otherwise, it would not be a world of Things, but must be absolutely a world consisting of one same NUMERICAL THING, in the strict apprehension of the logician. The assumption, therefore, of Par- titions between things, is founded upon as stable ground as that of any Axiom in Geometry : and, to deny this, would be the very last stage of absurdity. But Partitions (which are of innumerable different sorts) are the things which I have treated under the name of Relations : And hence, of con- sequence, the view which I have hazarded of Phi- losophical Grammar ; because the one must de- pend upon the other. — Now the sum of this view is as follows. 1. SUBSTANTIVE THINGS are signified by NOUNS. 2. PARTITIONS are signified by VERBS. 3. The Silent Conjunction or Apposition of a Nominative with a Verb, amounts to assertion. ~And the like apposition of the Verb and the Accmative, amounts to another assertion.—* And thus every simple sentence in language in- ll solves two assertions, either expressed or im- ^ i)lied. Hu. Mi. IJ I 498 FIRST LINES OP [chap. it. 4. The sign of Negation, namely, the Particle Not, is a sort o/* grammatical wedge ; which, upon being interposed between a Nominative and a Verb, dissevers them by destroying that silent ap- position which amounted to assertion; and thus it destroys assertion. 5. Articles dejine Nouns. 6. Prepositions dejine Verbs. 7. Adjectives denote Energies, Qualities, or Attributes of Subjects : in which office, Ad- jectives stand contradistinguished from Verbs, be- cause Verbs signify nothing but Partitions be- tween two Subjects. 8. Adverbs embrace a very mixed office. Some of them only abbreviate; and some of them define. 9, The Present Participle denotes the sim- ple Concrelt- Action (as it exists, or can exist in nature) which is signified by any Verb : The form of this Participle, therefore, expresses the Sim- ple Verb. — The same word, when used as axi Ad- jective^ denotes not an Action, but onl]^ an Ener- SECT. 11.] THE HUMAN MIND. 499 GY, that is an attribute of one person, (or other subject,) that supports one side of any action. If the view of the Subject which I have been in- duced to hazard should be deemed satisfactory ; it will justify the remark which I ventured to sug- gest in the outset, namely, that Philosophical Gram- mar, instead of being attainable in the mazes of Etymology, must wait the perfection of the Phi- losophy of the Mind. The contrast which my own views of the subject present, to those which have been furnished by the learned and very acute author of the Diversions of Purley, and no less so to the uniform doctrine of logicians, is so ex- tensive, that it is impossible I should avoid feeling a very deep sense of risk; especially when I consider the magnitude of the subject and all that rests upon it : for such as the verbal signification of Relation must be, such, or at least analogous to this, must be the nature of Relation itself But when I reflect on the nature of the ground of Relation to which I have been led in the foregoing analysis ; I confess it appears to me to be so strong, and so irresistibly indicated to that plain sense to which Mr. Tooke has made his ap- peal, that I cannot be discouraged from the pre- sent statement, by all the weight of authority which appears against it. It is now in the hands of its judges ; and I shall await their sentence with great respect. I am aware, indeed, that the whole foregoing 500 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap. iv. view is submitted in the face of a very sweeping condemnation. The following* passage appears in a remarkable Foot Note, near the close of the Pre- face to the En cj eloped ia Britannica. " Discoveries " in Grammar are not indeed to be looked for. " They are nearly allied to those in Metaphysics ; " of which, it has been well observed by one of " the acutest writers of the age, that the very ap- " pearance should be rejected as an error, if not " an imposition, upon mankind." In my humble opinion, the self-sufficiency of man has seldom been expressed in a more arro- gant assumption than that comprised in the passage just now quoted. But, having contributed my endeavours toward throwing some light on the subject, I leave it now to those who are in situa- tions to decide, whether or not any change ought to be introduced into the received doctrines of Grammar ; — especially with regard to the nature and use of that Part of Speech which represents One Half of the Universe of Things, and there- fore constitutes One Half of Essential Gram- mar, namely^ the Verb. 501 CHAPTER V. OF SPACE AND ITS RELATIONS. SECTION FIRST. or THE DIFFERENT VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS WITH REGARD TO THE NATURE OF SPACE. In one sense it may be said, that Space is the Substance of all our thoughts. Without this sub- stratum, it has been rigorously shown, we could not possibly have had any such affections as color, or touch. Space or Extension, therefore, is a component attribute of our Sentient Principle or Mind; and, by its forming the basis of our most primary sensations, it is one of the earliest objects, if not the very earliest object of our knowledge. Owing to its being thus far of a substantive nature. Space appears to claim our consideration in this part of the work. The expedicn y, more- over, of entering into the investigation of it in this place, will be farther evident in the bearings which the subject has upon that of Necessary Connection; which I propose to consider in a future chapter. According to the German Philosopher, Kant ; 502 FIRST LINES OF [chap. t. Space and Time are the Two Forms of our Sensibi- lity : The First is the form of our external senses : The Second, that of all our senses, external and inter- nal. I am not aware whether Kant has grounded these assumptions upon any species of analysis, or whether it is merely that assumption of philoso- phers in general, from Plato downward, by which they maintained that we are immersed in Space and Time. But it has appeared that it forms the grand proximate object of my own speculations, from the beginning, to show, upon the most rigorous analy- tical ground, that this is the real fact in nature. The result of my labor on the subject, therefore, altogether concurs with that of the Philosopher above mentioned : and, as this formed the leading character of my earliest speculations on the pheno- mena of the mind, as well as of those which I have since prosecuted, the co-incidence is the more satisfactory ; especially as, from any accounts I have seen of the Philosophy of Kant, I cannot but regard him as having been gifted with great power of thinking; although I do not, by this avowal, in- tend to identify my own views with those enter- tained by him, any farther than I may expressly specify. In. the Chapter on Time ; I shall have to show, that the doctrine of Kant, with regard to Space and Time being the two forms of our nature, has been completely misapprehended by Professor Stewart, in his strictures on the writings of that Philosopher. But, as this involves some very im- portant considerations with regard to our ideas of SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 50^ Time, it could not with propriety be introduced here. Before I quit the notice of Kant's Philosophy in this place, however, it is requisite to offer a very material criticism upon his phraseology, in the use of the word " Form'' The Form of a thing, ac- cording to Aristotle, who is the inventor of the term, is the essence of the thing, that is the very thing itself. The Mind, therefore, cannot have, or com- prise, two forms : Neither could Space and Time, if they were supposed to be one same thing, be the form of the Mind ; because thought also is necessary, in order to make up its whole essence. — All that can be said upon it, therefore, is, that Space and Time are components in the Form of the Mind; and that, together with Thought, they make up the Whole Form or Essence of the Mind, so far as xve know it. The philosophical world is so divided in opinion with regard to the nature of Space, and the weight of talent and of science on each side of this subject is so nearly equal, that the controversy con- cerning it may be said to be the opprobrium of the human understanding. What renders this subject the more mortify- ing to human pretension, is the circumstance, that, however obscure and intractable it is in itself, it does not appear to involve any such dilemma as is to be met with in various other great questions of philosophy. The question concerning Liberty and Necessity; The opposite pretensions of 504 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. Materialism and Immaterial ism; and other such subjects, involve certain difficulties which ever side of the subject is taken ; and we can therefore, in these cases, easily conceive the possibiHly of a difference in opinion with regard to them. But, with respect to Space, there does not seem to pre- sent any such ground of disunion or variance of judgments ; and, consequently, it must forai a sub- ject of serious anxiety to the truly contemplative mind, if we have in reality no means of solving the problem concerning its real nature. The discomfiture of reason upon this occasion, is aggravated by the fact that there is even a Third Party, or Sect of Philosophers, with regard to the subject ; which Sect, altliough few in number, is yet of no inconsiderable general pretensions in matters of science, and whose doctrine concerning Space, if admitted, would reduce the notions of it entertained by each of the other two great contend- ing parties, to mere chimeras of the imagination. It cannot fail to introduce, into every considerate or philosophic mind, a train of very uncomfortable reflections, if we are doomed, in our most primary and general conceptions, to be the sport of such illusory conceits as may certainly be affirmed of two, out of the th}^ee doctrines of Space to which I have here alluded. Previously to submitting that view of the subject which I have been induced to hazard in the present chapter, I shall present a brief account of the three different general doctrines which are extant with SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 505 regard to it; — a measure wliioli I conceive to be the more requisite, inasmuch as there seems to he a con- siderable, and indeed a profound dej^ree of obscu- rity, in the manner in which the subject has been treated by different writers. By one of the two greater Sects, it is supposed, that Matter exists with three dimensions, namely, length, breadth, and depth ; and it is farther con- sidered, that, if any part of matter were removed, there must actually remain behind a void matrix of the same three dimensions as those oi the mat- ter withdrawn. — Moreover, the void so left is conceived to be indestructible ; and it is farther .conceived, as a transcendental suggestion and im- perative dictate of the understanding, that the space, thus necessarily absolute, is not limited to the size of any finite body, but that it expands, in all directions, to immensity without end. — At the head of this party stand Locke, Clarke, and Newton. By the other great contending Sect, it is sup- posed, in concurrence with the first, that matter exists with three dimensions. This Sect then di- vides into two branches : One of which, uith the French Philosopher Des Cartes at its head, supposes matter to be infinitely extended : The other branch, in which is to be reckoned many philoso- phers of great name, embraces the opinion of Newton and his party, in so far as to conclude that matter or body is finite; but along with this it supposes, that beyond the extension or place of matter there is no such thing as Space or Dimeyimon; 506 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. on the contrary, it is thought by this Sect, that what is called Space beyond matter is nothing more than a posaihility of the existence of more matter. The Third Sect, with regard to this subject, sup- poses that there is no such thing, at all, as real dimen- sion, (i. e. length, breadth, or thickness) in the nature of things. On the contrary, it is held by these philosophers, that Space and Extension is a mere chimera of the mind, — a thing of which, according to Bishop Berkeley, we have " no conception by " way of' mode or attribute, but only by way of ideaJ* From their view of the subject; the notion of either Space or Extension is that, above all others, which scoffs at the most indubitable pretensions of the human understanding. — At the head of this Sect, in modern times, stands the acute and celebrated Bishop of Cloyne. Although I have adverted to the Berkeleian doc- trine of Space, as being one of the three general views which philosophers have entertained of the subject ; I consider it as being so extravagant and revolting, that I do not propose to enter into any particular refutation of it. Indeed, I think, some parts of the writings of Berkeley, bear internal evidence, of his having derived this conceit from his early scholastic reading with regard to the sup- posed nature of the Mind, rather than from his own natural conception of things. This doctrine is con- tradicted, not only by nearly the whole bulk of European philosophers, but equally by the great tenet of the Hindoo Philosophy ; with which last, SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 507 the doctrine of Berkeley has been confounded in the opinion of most persons, but from which it differs most essentially in this fundamental posi- tion. This is a distinction which is always requi- site to be kept in recollection, by those who may have been inclined to think, that the views which have been entertained in my foregoing speculations are of the same nature with those of Berkeley. The preparatory observations which have now been stated, are all that appear to be necessary, previously to going into the nature of the subject itself; which I propose to do in the next section. 508 SECTION SECOND. OF THE ACTUAL REALITY OF SPACE. Of the Direct Argument for the Existence of Space. There is a doctrine which makes a great figure in the philosophy of Aristotle, and which has been very fully indulged by the moderns ; that has held a vital influence over the views entertained of the nature of Space, by one of the two principal con- tending Sects with regard to it. The matter to which I now allude, is the doctrine of capacity. Upon the first broaching of this consideration ; I am urged to hazard the opinion, that it has been the source of some verjfc profound mistakes in phi- losophy. It has, 1 think, especially, been the cause of keeping alive, if not of originating, the controversy which has divided the philosophical world with regard to the nature of Space. I con- fess it is with the hope of being able to render this fact conclusively manifest, that I have been tempted to prosecute the present speculation ; because, while I profess, in the outset, to be among the number of those who subscribe to the actual reality of Space, I think it is scarcely possible to add any SECT. II.] FIRST LINES, &c. 509 thing to the strength of the direct argument which has been usually brought in its favor. I shall, however, submit my own direct view of the subject; previously to entering upon the at- tempt to show, that the opponents of the reality of Space, have been betrayed into a most essential error, in their estimate, by the notion which they have uniformly entertained of the nature of capa- city OR POTENTIALITY. First, therefore, with regard to the direct argu- ment ; It is to be observed, that both the contend- ing sects, now in question, are agreed, that matter exists with tJuxe dimensions. The actual extension of matter or body, therefore, is a first principle, by general consent. Secondly; I would observe, that as it is impossi- ble to conceive any two mathematical quantities actually in the same place, since this would de- stroy the diversity of their being and render them actually one same things there is, consequently, no way of conceiving the equality of any two mathe- matical quantities, except by conceiving each of the quantities to occupy the same space in succes- sion. Those who do not at once perceive the force of this reasoning, may find it fully considered in the Mathematical Lectures of Barrow. I shall how- ever assume, that nothing can be more manifestly absurd, than to attempt to conceive two mathema- tical subjects in the same place. And, upon the 510 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. other hand, I apprehend, nothing can afford a clearer notion of equality, between any two quan- tities, than the supposition of their having Jilled the same space one after another. Having assumed these two principles ; I will now suppose that two cubes of matter have been made to occupy the same place, in succession ; and, that the second cube also has been removed from this place. In this predicament, I would ask. If I can deny, or for a moment doubt, the actual reality of the dimensions of the empty ma- ^n>, which has successively recewed and parted xvith the two cubes in question ; then. By what sugges- tion, or warrant of my understanding, can I pre- tend to believe that the cubes themselves are extended? If it should here be remarked, that I have, in my foregoing speculations, denied the reality of that very matter upon which this argument is founded ; I would observe, that, in place of it, however, I have rigorously shown the real extension of our sensations of color and of touch; and, conse- quently, it must be concluded that the energies of that External Power which excites these sensations must be actually extended. These ener- gies are, doubtless, exerted "cariously in the same place, at different times : and tin's, I insist, in reality answers every purpose which could have been served by matter, and its motion, if it had existed. I shall not attempt to enlarge the diy^ect view of the subject which has now been stated. I appre- hend the conception of Space to be purely a mathe- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 511 matical principle^ or axiom. And, if we can con- ceive the dimensions of Space to be annihilated, upon the removal of any substance, or any energy^ which has once actually Jilled it; I do not then see that we have the least security, or evidence, that every axiom in geometry is not a mere chimera. To the objections which have been brought against the actuahty of Space, I shall afford ample consideration in the following sections. But, in the interim, I deem this to be the best place to state one very remarkable consequence, which must follow from denying the matter ; and which ap- pears to me to form, of itself alone, a most conclu- sive evidence of the absurdity of such denial. The consequence now alluded to, will be rendered manifest by the following supposition. If a carriage should travel upon the high road from London to York ; it would equally be granted, by each of the parties in this controversy, that the vehicle has measured about two hundred "miles of actual distance or exte7ision. But if the earth's atmosphere were to be annihilated ; and if a bird were supposed to fly through the void space, from the top of St. Paul's Cathedral to that of York Minster; those who deny the actual reality of space, must also deny that the bird has moved from the spot first mentioned. Incredible as it may appear, that any such consequence could have been contemplated as that just now adverted to ; there can, I think, be no doubt 512 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. of the fact ; the evidence of which will be adduced in its proper place, and therefore need not be en- tered into at present. I have alluded to the matter, in this place, rather as matter of curiosity and of preparation for the subject, than with any other view. 2. Of the Object ims which have beefi urged against the actual reality of Space. The arguments which have been opposed to the assumption of the actuality of space, appear swell- ed to a bulky extent, in the writings of different authors : but, in point of fact, they amount, or may be resolved into, one only ; w^hich is all that is ne- cessary to be refuted, in order to establish the sub- ject beyond the reach of controversy. The sub- stance of them all, appears to be fully comprised in that account of Space which has been furnished in the article Metaphysics, in the Encyclopedia Bri- tannica ; the writer of which is decidedly an op- ponent of the reality of Space : and I am not aware of any Treatise, in which the reader can find them stated more concisely. 1 shall therefore examine the arguments which have been advanced by phi- losophers on this side of the subject, as they have been re-stated in the work in question. The First argument which it appears requisite to notice, in the place referred to, is that which is siiCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 513 comprised in the following assertion witli regard to the nature of space: " It is certainly not a sub- " stance; neither is it a property, for we have seen '* that the very notion of it, which leads men to " suppose its existence necessary, renders it impos- " sible to be a property of the self-existent Being. " Is it then nothing ? It is in one sense ; it is no- " thing actually existing ; but it is something poten- " tially, for it has the capacity of receiving body " whenever it shall exist. It is not, and it cannot "become any thing itself; but it is that without " which nothing corporeal could exist." With regard to this passage, w^hich, I may ob- serve, is couched in the language of the Author of " Antient Metaphysics," and which agrees in general with that of other writers on the same side ; I shall here, in the first place remark, that I in- cline to suspect many readers, and even some writers, have grounded their construction of it upon a certain erroneous import which they have attached to the word actual, or actuality; and which therefore appears to demand explanation, before I proceed farther in the subject. If the term actual be supposed to imply any power or activity; and, consequently, if it be ima- gined that some active attribute, such as the pro- perty of resistayice, would be necessary to entitlcr space to the name of Q,n actual reality; it may be of importance to point out, that this is not the view of the subject that has been entertained by the principal oppugners of Sp^ce. On the contrary, Hu. Mi, 2 K ^4 FIRST LINES OF [chat. v. those philosophers assert not only the inactivity of Space, but also, and essentially, its want of DIMENSIONS, namely, length, breadth, and thick- ness, I have been led to suggest this distinction, by some expressions which have escaped from very eminent writers on the subject. It is asserted of Space, by Dr. Reid in particular, that " It is so '' much allied to nothing or emptiness, that it seems " incapable of annihilation or of creation." At the same time it is to be remarked, upon the other hand, that Dr. Reid appears in the strongest terms to assert the reality of space. Thus he says that *' Space not only retains a firm hold of our belief, ** even when we suppose all the objects that intro- " duced it to be annihilated, but it swells to im- " mensity. We can set no limits to it, either of " extent or of duration." Presently after, how- ever, he adds the following apparently contradic- tory assertion. " But it is only an immense, eter- " nal, and indestructible void or emptiness. Per- " haps we may apply to it what the Peripatetics '* said of their first matter, that whatever it is, it is '^potentially only, not actually J' — " Esf^ys on the '* Int. Powers, Essay 2. Chap. 19." From the vast oscitancy exhibited in these con- tradictory passages, we gain a decisive light into the view entertained by Dr. Reid of the subject of Space; which is both remarkable and important in this feature, that he appears, in his conchision, to side against the actuality of Space, but does this, however, not from any doubt that void Space pos- SECT, n.] THE HUMAN MIND. 515 sesses DIMENSIONS, but merely from the considera- tion tliat it is an indestructible emptiness, upon which arcoimt alone he supposes it to be '* allied " to nothing,'' and to be ''potentially only, and not " actually."' Now upon the whole of this reasoning I am to observe, that, althouo:h Dr. Reid has in words pro- nounced his ^ufFraoethat space exists potentially only, not actually, he is not at all to be reckoned as being one of that Sect of philosophers who have denied the actuality of Space by denying that it has dimen- sion, and ai^ainst whose view of the subject it is here essential to object. The truth indubitably appears to be, that Reid is a strenuous advocate for Space WITH dimensions; and, that he has ascribed to it a mere potential existence, only from supposi)ig that ACTUALITY implies something more than is contained in mere dimension. Since, therefore, such a view of the subject as this has been entertained by so eminent a philoso- pher as Dr. Reid ; we may be warranted in sup- posinjj; that some other writers, who have given their suffrage against the actuality of Space, have done so upon the same fallacious ground; and it may readily be imagined that a large proportion of readers may have entered into the same con- ception of the subject. In order that no doubt should remain, with re- gard to what is the doctrine of the real iinpugners of Space ; 1 deem it of importance to furnish the following extracts. In the Notes to Archbishop 516 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. King s Origin of Evil ; his learned Commentator, Mr. Law, says of Space, " I cannot possibly frame " any other notion of it, than either, first, as the " viere negation or absence of matter; or, secondly, " as the extension of body, considered abstractly " or separate from any particular body ; or, third- " ly, as a subject or substratum of that same general " extension." To which assumption, after some farther remarks, he adds, with regard to the pas- sage already quoted, that, *' to attribute Extension " or Parts to Space, according to the first notion " of it laid down by us, will be the same as to talk " of the Extension or Parts oi Absence, of Privation, " or of mere not king T It is upon this, and upon other such passages, in different authors, that I ground my conclusion, that the oppugners of Space, in their arguments on the subject, have involved the absurd conse- quence, that a bird which should fly from one housetop to another, through void space, would not thereby move from the spot where it first rested, although the two houses themselves should be fixed on earth, and be never so far asunder. And it is here important to remark, that the view of the subject which has been taken by Dr. Reid, al- though in its verbal expression it appears adverse to the reality of Space, involves no such ood " sense as to say that becauvse we have a different " idea oi darkness from that o{ light, of siltHCt from " that of sound, of the absence of any thing from its ^^ presence; thei'efore darkness, silence, and absence, " must be real things. There are therefore ideas, " and simple ones too, which have nothing ^^/ e.vtra "correspondent to them, no proper ideatum, arche- " type, or objective reality ; and we do not see " why the idea of space may not be reckoned in " that number." The words of the author, from which this argu- ment is derived, are these ; — *' To say that Space " must have existence because it has some Proper- '*^ties, for instance penetral>ility or a capacity of " receiving body, seems to me the same as to say *^that Darkness must be something because it has " the power or property of receiving Light; Silence *^* the property of admitting Sound; and Absence the "property of being supplied by Presence.'" I have given the ori^'iw^/ argument here, along with the statement of the Encyclopedist, because SECT, u J THE HUMAN MIND. 519 I think the nature of the ar;ECument itself so mani- festly ineffiracious. To say, that light is received into the place where darkness was; that sound is admitted into the place where siknct reigned; and that the place where any thino: is absent may be occupied by its presence; would he pe? fectly intel- ligible and just: But to say that darkness re- ceives light; silence admits sound; and ab- sence is supplied by presence, is asserting what is altogether intolerable in philosophical specula- tion. By a certain idiom, indeed, used chiefly as a form of prayer, we say " enlighten our darkness^ But, with such exceptions, it would not pass cur- rent, even in the most ordinary conversation, to talk of darkness receiving light, or silence admitting sound: And I conclude that nothing but the strength of a bias could have occasioned such an argument to be called forth, on the present sub- ject. If, however, any thing should be attempted to be said in its defence ; then, it at least follows, that, by parity of reasoning, joy receives sorrow, —pleasure receives pain, and all our different opposite estates of feeling receive each other; and it is 7iot ourselves as substantive beings, nor yet the PLACE where our mind is, that receives any pleasure, or pain, or any other thought whatever. The manifest truth is, that, instead of there being any intercourse between light and darkness, or between any two of the things in question, of receiving, or admitting, each other ; it is certain, on the contrary, that when light co77ies darkness goes^ just as pleasure goes when pain presents itself: 520 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. They are incompatible tilings and repel, but do not RECEIVE each other. But nobody will attempt to say that Space goes when Body comes; or, that there is any thing repellant in the nature of Space and of Body, with regard to each other, even upon the supposition that matter exists. Space is so nearly allied to the nature of that Body, or that Power, which sensibly occupies it ; that all we know of Body is, that it is Space cloth- ed with Powers. When these Powers, therefore, are present, Space is not absent; as darkness and silence are certainly absent, when light and sound are present. There is, consequently, no analogy between the two cases. There remains but one other argument, to be examined; and this one, in point of fact, constitutes the sole objection that has been started, or that can be started, against the actual reality of Space. It is at least the only objection that is deserving of a serious refutation ; and the whole fate of the sub- ject undoubtedly depends upon the logical merits which it shall be found to possess, after a rigorous investigation : It is stated in the Work already referred to, in the following words. " But it is said that, as we cannot conceive *• Space to be annihilated, it must be some real "thing of eternal and necessary existence. If this " argument had not been used by writers of great *' merit, and with the best intentions, we should " not have scrupled to call it the most contempti- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 521 " ble sophism that ever disgraced the page of phi- " losophy. Whatever now has an actual existence, " must from all eternity have had a possible existence " in the ideas of the Divine Mind. Body, as an ex- " tended substance, has now an actual exi^ience'^ ** and therefore it must from eternity have had dipos- " sihle existence in the ideas of the Divine Mind : " but the possible existence of body is all that we can ** conceive by Space; and, therefore, this argument, " upon which so much stress has been laid, *' amounts to nothing more than that what has " from eternity been possible, can at no period " have been iuipossible. It is evident that the " capaciti/ or potentialitii of every thing existing *^ must have been from eternity : but is capacity or " potentiality a real being? All the men and " women who shall succeed to the present genera- " tion, to the end of time, have at this moment a '•' possible existence, nor can that possibility be *' conceived as an impossibility : but is it " (possi- bility) " therefore any thing actually existing, either *' as a substance or a quality ?" I have quoted this passage fully, because it exhibits the whole extent and force of the objec- tion to be examined. The writer of it professes, on account of the merits and intentions of the par- ties, to be lenient toward what he calls the sophistry of those whom he opposes. If the general merits of a writer could claim respect for his arguments, in the present case, it might assuredly be awarded to the Bishop of Carlisle, from whom the writer in the Encyclopedia has borrowed his principal ^2 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. reasoning*. But the imperative claims of philoso- phy forbid either giving or receiving any grace, or appearance of grace, in the decision of the question we art^ now engaged in. And, if it were otherwise, it must serve as a striking instance of the force of bias, to find a writer tempted to brand an argument of his opponents with the name of" co7> " tempi ihle sophism,'^ who himself, in the same place, has advocated the assertion that ''darkness 7'eceives ^Uight,"' and " silence admits sound / " It now remains to proceed, immediately, to the consideration of the argument from capacity or POTENTIALITY, as it has been above stated. If I be not mistaken in the view which I have been led to form of the subject ; it will be found, that the controversy which has been kept up, and 4ias appeared to become altogether hopeless with regard to the nature of Space, has been entirely owing to overlooking and violating those transcen- dental maxims of reason, wherein the principles of all the sciences, and all our knowledge, including even that of logic itself, is founded. The doctrine of Potentiality has been hand- ed down to us from the Ancients, as a principal feature in the constitution of the School Logic ; and it has been received and entertained in the fullest latitude by modern logicians. According to this doctrine, things e.iist really xvhich do not exist ac- tually ; which means, that all things which shali ejfist hereafter have now a potential existence. SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 52S It is against this doctrine, as being the real founda- tion of the denial of the reality of Space, that I am here first to object. It was insisted upon, in the Chapter of Relation, that the predicating of any property of anything that does not actually exist, either mfact or by supposition, is the grossest absurdity and a violation of the first and most indispensable maxim of rea- son; the least infraction of which must explode the whole fabric of human understanding, and prove it to be nothing but an illusory chaos of thoughts. It is impossible, therefore, to tolerate a single instance of an assumption to the contrary: and, in the present subject, 1 apprehend, we have a signal instance of the consequence of attempting any such thing. It is of the last importance to a true conception of the nature of Space, that we pay obedience to this paramount maxim. This being premised ; 1 am here First to observe, it is said, in the passage referred to, that " What " has now an actual existence, must from eternity " have had a possible existence in the ideas- of the " Divine Mind." Now this objection is certainly couched in the orthodox language of the Sect whose view of the subject it exhibits: but it is manifest, the moment we refer it to the imperative maxim already here assumed, that it amounts to a most sheer absur- dity. The expression of the fact ought to have beeriy that there rnwst from eternitif have been a power in the Divine Mind, to bring into existence, accord- ing to his own ideas, every thing that " has now 524 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. ** an actual existence." And it is a most enormous misapprehension of this principle, to affirm that the things which now exist had th emselves a power of existing before they existed The writers who have fallen into this vast mis- take, could not possibly mean to say that all the future men and women who shall exist are nothing but IDEAS in the Divine Mind. The ideas of them, we may suppose to have existed in that Mind from eternity ; but the men and xvomen themselves, by supposition, do not yet exist; and therefore it is in the plainest manner absurd for a moment to affirm that they have a potentiality or power of fu- tu7^e existence. The potentiality or power of making them exist is purely a quality or attri- bute OF the Divine Mind. It is altogether here agreed, that, in order to ad- mit the existence of any future thing, there must from eternity have been a possibility of its existence. The only objection I offer, is, that the oppugners of Space have supposed this potentiality or power to BELONG to things wMch do not yet exist; whereas, self-evidently, it must be in Some Being which ac- tually NOW EXISTS, because what is not in actuality can have no property. From what has been said, it must be in the sim- plest manner evident, that the oppugners of Spacehavegone upon the general principle oi attri- buting quality, power, or potentiality, to assumed beings which ARE NOT beings, and, which, therefore, ac- cording to the most imperative law of reason, cannot possibly have any thing whatever predi- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 525 cated of them: by which proceeding, also, these philosophers have, at the same time, i^obbed the Deity, who exists, of this Pc^^rer of making things exist ; although it is undeniable that the power to make future men and women, and all other things, can exist only in Him, as a Being who now is. But the error which has now been pointed out, is not all that has constituted that view of the nature of Space which has been taken by its oppugners. For, after having attributed poten-- tiality or capacity to things that do not exist ; they attempt a compensation for this error, by another one, not less essential and manifest, in denying that capacity is any real thing. Thus it is said of Space ; that it " is nothing "actually existing, but it is something potenti- " ally, for it has the capacity of receiving body, " whenever it shall exist." — But, upon this, it is asked ; ^' Is possibility, therefore, any thing ac- ** tually existing, either as a substance or a quality T Now, I am to observe ; the whole issue of this controversy depends upon the validity of the an- swer which shall be given to this last question : for every other doubt with regard to it, I trust, is re- moved by considerations equally simple and de- cisive. In the next sub-section, therefore, 1 shall investigate the nature of Potentiality ; and, from thence, shall submit my ultimate conception of the nature of Space. 526 FIRST LINES OF [chai>. v. 3. Of the Nature of Possibiliti/, Potentiolity or Capacity, — That it is a Quality of a Bang Actually Eanstent. — The Actual Reality of Space the necessary result of this Principle, The doctrine of Capacity, from which the un- favorable view of the nature of Space has been derived, forms, as I remarked in a former place, a conspicuous figure in the logic of Aristotle : and, when we notice the following, among the collateral fruits of this doctrine, we need not be surprised at that which it has produced with regard to the sub- ject in question. The opinion of the Stagirite with regard to the natm^e of the Human Mind, has been commented upon with consent by Mr. Harris, in Iiis *' Phi- losophical Arrangements," Chap. 17. page 415. in the following words ; " The Human Intellect is pure wunixed capacity, " as a sheet of fair writing paper is pure unmixed, " untainted whiteness. The pure unmixed cha- " racter of the intellectual capacity, renders it fit *' for every object of comprehension, as the pure " unmixed character of the paper, makes it ade- *' quate to every specific writing." When we find such an account of the Human Intellect advanced by the acknowledged Prince of Ancient Philosophers, and asserted by Writers of erudition and genius in our own time ; we can- not be surprised that Space should have been SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 527 subjected to the same regimen. With regard to the doctrine contained in the above passa!J:e, there- fore, I am here to observe, that any philosopher who shall assume that the Human Intellect is pure unmLved CAPACITY without a subject of i>3Hesion, can certainly make no more adequate atonement for such an absurd assertion, than that of illus- trating his arirument by the simile of " a sheet of ^^ paper,'' and assuming that this paper is ** pure ^''unmixed, witainted whiteness." Every body knovi^s, that *' a sheet of fair writing ** paper" is NOT'"pwre whiteness;'' but, on the con- trary, is something else in which the quality of exciting White resides. What then, follows ; but that, since whiteness is a quality and must have some SUBJECT OF INHESION ; SO also is Intellect ? I hope it will not be supposed, that I would have entered into any refutation of such an as- sumption, as that the Human Intellect is pure un- mijced capacity, if this refutation had not been so remarkably furnished in the assumption itself, in a manner which I hope must have a decisive effect even upon the most prejudiced minds, in its bear- ing upon the Subject of Space ; for which purpose alone I have brought it forward here. While I am adverting to this consideration, however, I will venture to believe that hardly any of the assumptions of Aristotle have been so preg- nant with absurdity and confusion, as his doctrine of potentiality or capacity. If, indeed, it be supposed to be the meaning of the passage in question, that Intellect is a pure un- 528 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. inLved capacity^ inherent in a subject mind, previously to its being occupied with knowledge; I should be ready to subscribe to this doctrine ; and it would involve every thing that I intend to prove with regard to tlie nature of Space. But the il- lustration of this passage furnished by the author of the Philosophical Arrangements, and the argu- ments we have seen advanced by the opponents of Space, (not to mention some collateral evi- dences which I yet propose to bring forward,) may satisfy any person, that it is the assumed doc- trine that capacity is a thing Hhat can exist BY itself, without A SUBJECT OF INHESION ! Space, it is said, for example, is something poten- tially^ because it has a capacity of receiving body when it shall exist : but it is asked, " Is possibility' (i. e. capacity or potentiality) " any thing ideally exist- ing, either as a substance or a quality .^" Now the only thing that remains to be done, in order to complete the view which I intended to take of the subject, is to furnish, not only from the simple and imperative dictate of reason, but also expressly from the admissioiis of Mr. Harris and of Aristotle themselves, that capacity is a quality and necessarily requires a subject of INHESION. From which it must follow, that Space, according to the most determined of its opponents, must be recognised as an actual subject, in ivfiich the capacity ofjxceiving body resides. In his Hermes, Chap. 8. Mr. Harris expresses SKCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 529 his general opinion of the nature of Capacity in the following terms ; which, we are to observe, are manifestly contradictory of what have been already quoted upon the same subject from his Philo- sophical Arrangements ; but the real merits of which cannot be affected by this circumstance. " All the above Qualities have not only their ** Completion, but their Capacity. Thus not only " the grape when complete (that is to say mature) " possesses a delicious flavour ; but there is a *' Capacity also to produce it, residing in a simple " grape-stone. Even in artijicial substances, there " are in like manner Capacities of explosion ; as in " a musical instrument that of rendering harmony. " If leaving these artijicial and vegetable substan- " ces, we go still higher ; we shall in Animals find " Capacities, commonly known by the name of ** Instincts, to which the frame of every species is " peculiarly accommodated." Now the truth of the whole of this passage is self-evident and manifest to the meanest under- standing ; and it is self-evidently incompatible with any supposition that a Capacity can exist by itself, without any subject of inhesion, as the Ca- pacity of Space is supposed to do by those who deny iis actual reality. Mr. Harris, in the course of his enumeration of capacities, never thought of the Capacity of Nothing ; which he ought to have done, if it be true that while ''Space has the ^'capacity of receiving body,'' it is itself nothing but this very capacity. In another place, namely, in his Philosophical Ar- Hu. ML 2 L 530 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. rangementSy Mr. Harris has farther quoted Aristo- tle's own opinion of the nature of Capacity, in the following words. " Capacity or Power is not a " simple term of one meaning only, but there is one ** sort, when we say of a child, he has a capacity " to be a military leader ; another, when we say " it of a man who is in complete maturity." This is manifestly just : But, in each case, it assumes capacity/ to have a subject of inhesion ; and it does not imply any thing of a capacity of no- thing to become, or to receive anything ; and we may be assured, that the insanity of supposing any such thing will never be denied by any person who is put on his guard concerning it. I trust the absurdity of supposing the mere potentiality of Space is rendered too glaring, by the considerations last urged, to admit of its receiving additional strength from any other argument that could be suggested. And, if so ; the only objec- tion OF a logical show or aspect, which has ever been brought against the imperative force of the direct argument for the actual reality of Space, is done away upon that very logical ground which it had assumed for its supposed foundation. Should this be admitted ; logicians must then be compelled, upon this ground, to admit that Space with its dimensions actually and necessarily exists ; and that, thus actually existing, it has a capacity of receiving either Bodies or Energies, whenever they shall exist. SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. ^V 4 Collatei'd Remarks on the Absurdities of the Argu- ment against the Actuality of Space. As the solution of the problem with regard to the real nature of Space is of infinite importance, even to the pretensions of the Human Under- standing ; it cannot but be interesting, and per- haps may be of some moment in the influence it may have upon opinion in particular instances, to take into consideration what I am now going to advert to, collaterally, as being the views enter- tained of the subject by some other writers who have especially engaged in it, besides those already mentioned. The real opponents of the actuality of Space, (among whom, I may repeat, is not to be reckoned Dr. Reid) are very satisfactorily at variance among themselves with regard to its real nature ; — a mark of insoUdity in their reasonings, which is not to be found among those who have asserted its ac- tual existence. The author of Antient Metaphysics (him- self one of the most conspicuous impugners of the actuality of Space) has very justly animadverted upon the views of Mr. Leibnitz, (who is another leader on the same side) in the following terms. " Mr. Leibnitz asserts that Space is nothing else 532 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. ** but the order of things existing, as Time is the " order of things in succession. This erroneous ** notion of Space has led Mr. Leibnitz to the ab- " surdity of saying, that, supposing the whole sys- " tem of the visible world to be moved out of the '* place which it presently occupies, into some ** other portion of Space beyond the limits of this *' universe, still it would be in the same place " provided the order and arrangement of the bo- " dies, with respect to one another, was continued " the same." Book 4. Chap. 2. Upon this criticism by Lord Monboddo, it is to be observed, that the position of Leibnitz car- ries its own contradiction so manifestly within itself, that it affords the fairest possible mark for re- futation. Yet it is the assumption of a writer who has branded Space with the opprobrium of being " the Idol of the English Philosophers^ By this remark, I by no means intend to detract from the just and great pretensions of Mr. Leibnitz, as a Philosopher. On the contrary, I esteem the extent of his general pretensions, as forming, of itself alone, a strong argument against his view of the nature of Space, when it could not prevent his falling into such a manifest contra- diction upon the subject. But, having adverted to this inconsistency of the German Philosopher ; we shall derive ample satisfaction from observing what reasoning has SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 533 been advanced by Lord Monboddo, himself, in order to correct the error of Leibnitz. "The foundation" (says his Lordship) " of " the error, both of Dr. Clarke and Leibnitz, upon " the subject, appears to me to be this, that they " have not known or attended to the distinction " which runs through the whole ancient philoso- " phy, betwixt whdii actually exists, and what exists " only "potentially. Every thing existed in this " latter way in the Divine Mind, before creation " or production." Here then, we find, the glaring absurdity of Leibnitz, in consequence of his denial of the ac- tuaUty of Space, is attempted to be corrected by another philosopher of the same Sect, by throwing into the eyes of mankind the precious dust of the DOCTRINE OF POTENTIALITY ; which, he laments, that Clarke and Leibnitz had not known or at- tended to! Although the effect of this scholastic dust can be no other than a rational distaste at it ; I would however, finally recommend a repetition of the two decisive considerations which render the doctrine of potentiality utterly absurd, as that doctrine is taught with regard to the nature of Space, First. As I suppose no person will pretend that men and women, including their proper spi- ritual individuality, are nothing hut ideas of the Divine Mind ; it is therefore self-evident that men and women cannot exist in the Divine Mind before they are created : Hence it is absurd, and perfectly puerile, to talk of men and women as existing in the Divine Mind before they are produced ; al- 58i FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. though we may suppose ideas or forms of them to be contemplated by the Deity before he created the THINGS THEMSELVES. SECONDLY. But the mOSt important consideration is, that the possibility, CAPACITY, POTENTIALITY, or POWER, of bringing any thing into actual existence, cannot reside in any thing that does not itself already ac- tually EXIST. The Potentiality, therefore, of the existence of all future men and women, can- not reside in those men and women themselves, but must reside in, and can be predicated of, no Being except the Deity, who alone possesses this possi- bility, or potentiality, or power, or capacity ; call it by which name we please. It follows, therefore, in the simplest and most conclusive manner, that, since Space is acknow- ledged on all sides to have the capacity of receiv- mg body, this Space must be a Being actually e.vist- ingy which has this capacity as one of its inhe- rent qualities ; I say, this follows, even taking the opponents of Space upon their own ground ; for, as to the real existence of Space, as proclaimed in our direct apprehension of it, I conceive it to be so imperative, as ought to have prevented all con- troversy with regard to it. I shall conclude these collateral observations, with the following extract from the writings of Lord Monboddo ; which, when we consider the quarter from whence it comes, cannot, I think, but be peculiarly impressive. SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 535 " It may be said, that capacity of forming ideas *' is of itself sufficient to constitute a Soul or In- " tellectual Part. But there is nothing in nature " that consists of capacity merely ; for, though " there be many things that have capacities, with- " out having those things actually of which they " are capable, there is nothing exists that hath *' not something in actuality and energy ; for, if it " wanted that, it would be really nothing." — ^" An- *' tient Metaphysics." Book 4. Chap, 2. With regard to this passage ; the two propo- sitions which it contains appear to me to be in manifest contradiction of each other. The first one appears to assert that very doctrine of the Human Intellect which Mr. Harris has asserted after Aristotle, and which I consider to be plainly absurd. The other accords with the general view which Mr. Harris has taken of capacity; and with sound reason. With the former proposition, there- fore, we have nothing to do, here : but, assuredly,, one w^ould think, that, when Lord Monbodda wrote the latter, he could have had no thought that he had opposed the reality of Space upon the assumption of its being a mere potentiality or CAPACITY of receiving body. His rational and de- cisive language, in this latter proposition, is, that " /^ere 25 NOTHING in nature that consists of cx- " PACiTY MERELY ;" and he has thus, in the strong- est terms, virtually asserted that Space (since it HAS A CAPACITY,) is therefore ITSELF an ac- tual REALITY. 536 FIllST LINES OF [chap. v. 5. Distinct Argument in proof of the existence of Space void of Matter, There is yet a consideration to be suggested with regard to the foregoing subject ; which could not have been adverted to in the preceding parts of this Section, without a risk of inducing a confusion in our views of it: which consideration, while it certainly affects the strict propriety of a very usual phrase in the writings of those who assert the reali- ty of Space, at the same time presents a collateral argument of great innate force, in proof of the existence of Space void of matter. It is agreed, by both parties in the present con- troversy, that Matter is extended with three de- mensions ; and by one of the parties alone, it is denied that Space exists with dimensions beyond the limits of matter. At the same time, it is equal- ly admitted, by both sides, that an Omnipotent Being exists; who possesses a power of making more matter exist, if it should please him to will it. Upon these principles, thus assumed by consent, I apprehend it follows, in the plainest manner, that the actual reality of Space toid of matter must be admitted, even by its opponents them- selves; because I suppose these philosophers will never deny, that, where the existence of matter is possible, the existence of the Power which can produce matter must be actual. SKCT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 537 If so obvious an argument could require any illustration ; I would observe, that both parties in this controversy in the fullest manner admit, that the power of the Deity is commensurate with and pervades every particle of matter. They also admit that the Deity has created, and can annihilate matter. If therefore matter be supposed to have existed, and to be now annihilated; we, surely, cannot suppose that extent of Space which the Deity had pervaded to be annihilated alons^ with it, because this would be to contract the volume which the Deity has previously been assumed to have pervaded or filled. If this Power of the Deity continue to exist ; it must certainly occupy at least as much Space as it occupied before the annihila- tion of matter, namely, the same dimensions which the matter possessed. To suppose that the anni- hilation of the extension of any part of matter, must be attended with the annihilation of the extension of that commensurate Power which had supported that 7natter during its existence; would be the plainest absurdity. If however there be any persons who have yielded up their understanding, to the scholastic conceit that Mind is a thing which exists, but EXISTS NO WHERE ; I would here finally observe, that our judgment of the actual reality of Space does not depend upon any conception we may form upon this head ; because it is already rigor- ously shown, that Space, being universally recognised AS A CAPACITY of receiving body, must be a capacity of some Subject that had an actual existence 538 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap. v. BEFORE it received body. This may be called the PHYSICAL argument for the existence of Space, and the MAIN argument; because it concludes all par- ties. What I have suggested in the present sub- section, as an argument from the nature of Omni- potent Power, or Mind, is one which, whatever force it possesses, (and I conceive this force to be irresistible) may have to operate, in some under- standings, against a prejudice which it would be vain for reason to attempt to assail ; and it is there- fore fortunate that the main argument renders it wholly collateral and unnecessary to attack their prepossession upon this ground. If it be admitted that the extension of our own Sensations has been proved, as the result of a rigorous analysis; it may be hoped that the gross absurdity of supposing any Mind to exist no where, or to have no relation to place, must speedi- ly vanish from all philosophical investigations. And, along with this, I apprehend, it is impossible not to observe the appalling difficulties which the assumption of the inextension of the mind has con- tinually heaped upon philosophical speculation,, and which would be removed along with that chimera. From what has been adverted to in this sub- section; it would follow, that the ordinary phrase "Pure or Void Space" is unphilosophical : be- cause no part of Infinite Absolute Space can be unoccupied by the Power of the Deity. Space actually exists with Dimensions: but it can never be empty. 639 SECTION THIRD. OF THE RELATIONS OF SPACE. The manner in which Space or Extension has been treated by writers on the subject, appears in general to be indistinct and erroneous in an ex- treme degree; I mean with regard to its Modes and Relations^ apart from any consideration of its real existence. This point, therefore, requires being adverted to, before we quit the general sub- ject. According to the best authors ; proper Space, that is to say Bulk or Volume, is considered to be of the same kind with mere Linear Extension; and both these vastly different objects of thought have been confounded together under one name of Space or E.v tens ion, as being supposed to be genus and species of the same thing. ** Space (says Mr. Locke) considered barely in *' length between any two thingii, without consi- " deririg any thing else between them, is called " distance; if considered in length, breadth, and *' thickness, I think it may be called capacity. " The term extension is usually applied to it, in " what manner soever considered." *' Extension and Figure" (says Dr. Reid, in his Second Essay, Chap. 19.)**2ire circumscribed parts 540 FIRST LINES OF [chap. r. '' of space, and are the objects of geometry, a " science in which human reason has the most " ample field, and can go deeper and with more " certainty than in any other. But when we at- ** tempt to comprehend the whole of space, and *' trace it to its origin, we lose ourselves in the "■ search." The latter of these two passages furnishes an im- pressive occasion for remarking, that metaphysical writers are often supposed, by the general reader, to have expressed themselves very clearly, and perhaps luminously upon a subject, when, in point of fact, they have only darkened it by the most exceptionable statements. Dr. Reid was both a philosopher and a mathematician; and, besides these acquirements, he is with justice considered as having expressed himself very perspicuously upon subjects in general : and yet, I believe, it would be hard to find a passage, in any writer on this sub- ject, that is more pregnant with both error and confusion than the one just now quoted. In the First place ; Extension is not a circmnr scribed part of Space, because extension exists wherever Space exists. " Figure," also, is not a circumscribed part of Space ; because figure is no part of Space at all : it is nothing but a relation be- tween some two or more parts of Space. Secondly ; When Dr. Reid talks of " tracing the " whole of Space to its origin,'' he cannot, I think, be understood according to the import of his ex- pressions ; because, the supposition of tracing SECT. III.] THE HUMAN MIND. 6il Space to its origin appears to me to be out of the question. I therefore suppose he must have meant only the tracing of our idea of Space to its origin ; wliich is infinitely a different thing from what he has expressed. If any persons should incline to suppose, that the meaning of Reid may be readily apprehended, in the last case, notwithstanding its exceptiona- ble mode of expression ; I would beg to point out, that this is far from being the case. The fact is, that the expression of Dr. Reid in this instance, by mere accident, perfectly/ accords with the Berkeleian doctrine of Space and Extension; and, therefore, it might fairly be construed, from it, that Dr. Reid supposed the " origin of space to be no other than the origin of our idea of it. Besides which, we are also to recollect, that Dr. Reid was once a confirmed Berkeleian himself. The expression of Reid, there- fore, is not merely vague and illogical, but it is also dangerous, in certainly tending to mislead a reader from that view of Space which Reid himself unques- tionably entertained in his mature age, to ano- ther one which unhinges the whole fabric of human understanding. But, to resume my argument; Voluminous Space and Figure are two subjects which are so GENERicALLY different, that all the lines or figures in the universe, put together, could not be converted into a single element of Volume. In mathematical 542 FIRST LINES OF [chap. v. phraseology, indeed, it is said, that the flow of a point produces a line ; the flow of a line, a surface; and the flow of a surface, a solid. But all that the flow of a surface can do, is io part qfo. solid, in our apprehension ; which solid existed absolutely and necessarily, and w^as as complete in itself, before we conceived it to be parted off, as after- wards ; and the same may be said of surfaces, and lines. The real nature of the subject, I apprehend is, that Space, being really and necessarily existent, is the eternal and necessary cause of the infinite number and variety of Relations which exist between its own parts. But nothing can be more logically distinct, than a substantive reality and the relations between its parts; because the one altogether C7xates and supports the other. Of this, however, I sh all have to speak hereafter. If this view of the matter be admitted ; it follows that Mr. Locke has treated the subject as that of Space and its Modes, when, logically considered, it ought to have been treated only as Space and its Relations : which is a vast error in the subject. And it also appears that Dr. Reid has fallen into the same error. The thing which Dr. Reid calls " a circumscribed " part of Spaced' under the name of ^^ figure,'' can be nothing but a relation betiveen two parts of Space. It seems, indeed, to be altogether overlooked by phi- losophers, in their general discussions, ihdX no part of Space can have any figure exclusively its mvn» This point I have adverted to in a former chapter. When SECT. III.] THE HUMAN MIND. ^^ we consider a sphere or a cube, even as a mathemati- cal subject ; it is not a complete view of it, but merely a partial one that is usually taken. The real fact is, that the figure of a cube is no more the figure of that solid which we call the cube, than it is the limit or figure of that part of Space which immediately surrounds or envelops the cube. The name of /i- gurcy indeed, is loosely given, by Geometricians, to a whole bulk or solid, as well as to its mere limit or boundary. Thus a Circle, or a Sphere, with its whole contents is called " ajigure'' And it seems to be in this sense that Dr. Reid has used the word figure. But, although this phraseology may be admissible, for the sake of convenience, in mathematical dis- course ; it certainly is vastly erroneous when we are treating metaphysically of Space and its Rela- tions. Figure, in this last case, must be always distinguished from thing figured, as being its mere limit or boundary. Now, thus considered ; no solid, nor surface, has any figure but what is com- 7W07Z between it and the adjoining solid, or surface. ' The Relations of Space, therefore, form a Sub- ject altogether of a different genus from Space itself. These Relations may be said to constitute an immense Net, whose meshes enclose and divide all the infinite elementary parts of space; any portion of which, whether greater or lesser, we may conceive to be parted off, in order to form a definite subject of ratiocination : but this Net does not add at all to the magnitude of Space; and, if it 544 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap. v. were possible to conceive it away, this could not diminish the present actual extent of Space. The bearings and importance of these strictures, will appear farther in the Chapter on Necessary Connection. 545 CHAPTER VI. OF TIME. SECTION FIRST, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.— REMARKABLE REFUTA- TION OF REID'S GENERAL THEORY OF IDEAS, IN HIS PARTICULAR DOCTRINE OF DURATION. XiME is, certainly, one of the earliest, and is perhaps the most universal, of all the objects of human thought, because it is an essential compo- nent element in all our thoughts whatever. The in- vestigation of its nature, therefore, is logically in- dicated immediately after that of Space. Previously, however, to entering upon the con- sideration of Time itself, there is a point, of mate- rial importance to our forming a just estimate of the doctrine of philosophers with regard to the general nature of our ideas, which presses for at- tention, and which therefore I shall introduce at this stage of the subject. The thing to which I now allude, is a most re- Hu. Mi. 2 M 546 ' FIRST LINES OF [chap. vi. markable refutation which has been furnished by Dr. Reid, in his particular doctrine of our idea of Duration, of his own general doctrine of ihe nature of our ideas. In introducing this matter; I am unavoidably led also to notice, by the way, that the doctrine of Kant, with regard to our being essentially immersed in Space and Tmie, in which position it has al- ready appeared I fully concur, appears to have been couipletely misapprehended l)y Professor Stewart, in the account which he has given of the views of the German Metaphysician, i shall therefore commence with the last mentioned of these considerations. According to Mr. Stewart ; the doctrine of Kant is, that "The notion (or intuition) of Space^ as ** well as that of Time, is not empirical, that is, it " has not its origin in experience. On the con- " trary, both these notions are supposed, or implied, "as conditions in all our empirical perceptions : " inasmuch as we cannot perceive nor conceive an ^* external object, without representing it to our " thoughts as in space : nor can we conceive any " thing, either without or within us, without repre- " senting it to ourselves as in time J" " The notions of space and of time, however, " although they exist in us a priori, are not" (accord- ing to Kant) " innate ideas. If they are anterior " to the perceptions of our Senses, it is only in the " order of reason, and not in the order of time. SFXT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 547 " They have indeed their origin in ourselves ; but " they present themselves to the understanding ** only in consequence of occasions furnished by " our sensations ; or" (in Kant's language) " by our ** sensible modifications. Separate from these modi- " fications they could not exist ; and, without them, " they would have remained for ever latent." To this doctrine of Kant, the above account of which to the best of my recollection is corroborat- ed by every other which has come in my way, I altogether subscribe ; and I consider " Kanfs lan- guage' s\'\\h regard to it, especially in the use of the term *' sensible modijications" as being philosophi- cally just. The School of Reid itself has in the fullesj man- ner recognised our sensations as being our affections : And What (it may be asked) is an affection, but a tnodi/ication ? I think, also, that Professor Stewart has, by his own usage of it, somewhere recognised the term modification ; although I do not at this moment recollect the place. And, I may observe, that it is expressly entertained by Malebranche ; whose views, upon this part of our constitution, are unexceptionable. I do not therefore suppose that Mr. Stewart could have intended to find fault with the phrase in question. But the principal matter for our consideration, here, is the general construction which Professor Stewart has put upon the above passages. **The only important proposition" (says Mr. Stewart) " which I am able to extract from this jar- " gon is, that, as extemion and duration cannot be 548 FIRST LINES OF [chap, vi *' supposed to bear the most distant resemblance to " any sensation of which the mind is conscious, "the origin of these notions forms a manifest ex- ^' ception to the account given by Locke of the '* primary sources of our knowledge. This is pre- " cisely the ground on which Reid has made his "stand, against the scheme of Idealism; and I " leave it to my readers to judge, whether it was " not more philosophical to state, as he has done, " the fact, in simple and perspicuous terms, as a " demonstration of the imperfection of Locke's " theory, than to have reared upon it a superstruc- " ture of technical mystery, similar to what is ex- " hibited in the system of the German metaphysi- " cian."—" Phi. Essays, Essay 2. Ch. 2. Sec. 2." Now I am under the necessity to believe, that, in the above construction. Professor Stewart has given to the words of Kant, a meaning the very opposite to that which was either expressed or in- tended by him ; for I conceive it was the most -distant thing in the world from the mind of Kant, to assert that " extension and duration cannot be " supposed to bear the most distant resemblance " to any sensations of which the mind is conscious.'' On the contrary ; I would ask. Has not Professor Stewart quoted, with a peculiar mark of observation, that our ideas of space and time are said by Kant " to have their origin in ourselves, in consequence of " occasions furnished by our sensible modifications;'' and, that, ^' Separate from these modifications they " could not exist f Besides this ; I may remark, although I think it can hardly be necessary, that SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 549 in an account of the Philosophy of Kant just now by me, it is said, under the head of Sense, that " In every object of nature that presents itself to " our view, we distinguish Matter and Form. " Now as we do not create this matter, it must " consequently be given ; but this necessarily im- " plies that there is in our mind a faculty capable of " receivmg the given matter,'' I confess ; the meaning attributed to Kant, by Mr. Stewart, in this instance, has always struck me as being very surprising ; insomuch as to have led me, for a long time, to doubt my own view of it, and to refrain from offering any comment upon it. But I submit it here, for the judgment of the reader. As for the eulogium bestowed by Professor Stewart upon Dr. Reid ; I must, in the first place, remark, that " the ground upon which Reid took his ^^ stand " has been rigorously shown to be altogether fallacious and visionary ; inasmuch as our sensa- tions were shown, in their analysis, to be extended things. It was moreover, in point of fact, dark or unphilosophical in Reid to seek for the sources of our knowledge in the nature of our idea ofExTEfi- siON ; because I trust it has fully appeared that it was to be found only in an analysis of our ideas of Re- lation. But, Secondly, I am now to observe, that Dr. Reid, in his particular doctrine of our idea of Duration, has furnished one of the most remark- able self-refutations of his doctrine of our ideas in 550 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vr. general^ that was ever exhibited in the writing^s of any philosopher; — a matter of such importance to the fate of his theory, that, perhaps, 1 could hardly render any greater collateral service to the subject than by stating it here, as I now propose to do. 1 have, indeed, already pointed out this remark- able matter, in one, or more, of the evanescent tracts upon the subject of Perception which I pub- lished some years ago. And since it is of a complexion which I conceive does not admit of any controversy, I imagined the philosophical world might have looked for an acknowledgment of it. The thing in question will explain itself in the following animadversions. In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay Fifth, Chap. Third, Dr. Reid has expressed his own view of the nature of our idea of Duration, in these words. " Mr. Locke draws some conclusions from his " account of the idea of duration, which may serve " as a touchstone to discover how far it is genuine. ** One is, that if it were possible for a man awake, '* to keep only one idea in his mind without any " variation, or the succession of others, he would " have no perception of duration at all ; and the mo- ** ment he began to have this idea, would seem to " have no distance from the moment he ceased to '* have it. Now that one idea should seem to have '* no duration, and that a multiplication of that no SECT, i.j THE HUMAN MIND. 551 ''duration should seem to have duration, appears to " me as impossible as that the multiplication of " nothin^jj should produce something." This stricture of Reid, upon Locke's doctrine of our idea of duration, is so manifestly just, that it is altogether unanswerable. But let us observe what is the consequence. — Simply this, that Dr. Reid's whole account of the nature of our ideas in general is overthrown and destroyed in the most complete and remarkable manner ; like an enchanted castle, exploded on the development of a spell. This spell, in the present instance, consists in the fact, that after Dr. Reid had, with great labour and perseverance, first in his Inquiry, and afterwards in his Essays, erected his singular view of our ideas in general upon the essential principle that not one of them bears any resemblance either to Exten- sion or to Duration ; he, in an unlucky hour, in the Chapter above referred to, affirms, upon the most solid foundation, that each of our single IDEAS must have duration, or, else, that it would be impossible for any multiplication of them to afford us an idea of duration ! Whatever depth of impression this extraordinary matter is formed in itself to make, upon the mind of every person who pays the smallest attention to the subject, must however be not a little augmented upon its being here adverted to, that Professor Stewart, no less than Dr. Reid, has altogether overlooked the fatality it contains. The reader hns 552 FIRST LINES OF [chap, vi, just seen, in an extract from the writings of Mr. Stewart, that he ascribes to Kant the doctrine, that ^' extensio7i and duration cannot be supposed to " bear the most distant resemblance to any sensa- " tions of which the mind is conscious ;" and, that upon this he observes, with undissembled exul- tation, that " This is precisely the ground on which " Reid has made his stand against the scheme of Ideal- " ismJ' Can it then fail to produce the most de- cisive conviction of the visionary nature of the Ge- neral Theory of Reid; and, equally of that of the view which Professor Stewart, with all the advan- tage of mature deliberation, has taken of Reid s Theory ; to find Mr. Stewart thus eulogising it, after it had been tumbled from its foundation and broken in shivers by its author himself by a pro- cess for which we can find no simile except in the story of the dreamer with his basket of glass ? I certainly am not naturally disposed to treat the speculations of these philosophers with levity ; al- though I might, in this case, cite Dr. Reid himself, as furnishing me with a very full precedent. But when I have to remark, that the thing now stated has been placed in a situation to have been noticed, these five years past ; that even public criticism has pointed it out, as a matter which imperatively de- manded to be answered ; and yet, that candour has not been excited to acknowledge it ; I appre- hend, every one who has the advancement of general truth at heart will judge, that the matter ought not now to be treated with any lenity. I con- fess, I place it here before my contemporaries with SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 563 a confident expectation, that, operating toge- ther with what has gone before, it cannot fail to produce a decisive effect, in turning the course of philosophical opinion, in a direction entirely differ- ent from that which has been prescribed for it in this Island, during the greater part of a century. In closing the statement of this very remarkable affair ; indeed, I consider it imperative to put the question : — Will Philosophers who profess to be labouring for the advancement of general know- ledge, and for the elevation of the species, ultimate- ly decline to express an open acknowledgment of the important truth thus pointed out, and of its manifest and sweeping consequences; Or, Will they defend the matter, by denying that Dr. Reid has refuted himself ? 554 SECTION SECOND. OF THE NATURE OF TIME. ALTHOUGHTimeisacomponentelementinaUour thoughts, and we are essentially immersed therein ; it is, nevertheless, the most difficult nature to com- prehend of any that falls under our immediate cog- nizance. The celebrated answer of St. Augustin, when he was asked what Time is, forms the most natural reply to the question upon every occasion. Time has been always compared to a stream, which flows continually, without either beginning or end : but the supposed analogy fails the mo- ment we attempt to compare the two things toge- ther. A stream exists both before and after it has passed any fixed point in its course. But Time does not exist in either of these ways. And, to complete the paradox, it can be strictly demon- strated that it never exists in the present interval between the past and the future. Time is a Thing which ever has existed, but whose past existence has ceased; and, which ever must e.vist, but which existence is not yet begun : and it never possesses any present existence, except by hypothesis. That Time is of the nature of a stance, on SUB-STANCE, is what I apprehend to be altogether undeniable : because the only conception we are SECT. II.] FIRST LINES, &c. 555 able to form of substance, is that of a thing which supports accidents; and, certainly, all accidents must have Time for their support, that is for the possibi- lity of their existence. Time, therefore, instead of being comparable to a stream, may be considered as a stance of a pe- culiar nature, by which we and all other things are supported ; — which stance has neither latitude nor longitude in any direction, but is situated, in one sense, immediately under things, and is moreover endowed with this wonderful nature, that, identi- cally considered, it continually crumbles away k^sn IS ANNIHILATED, and is every moment replaced by a new stance of the very same kind, which had no existence any where the moment before. To those philosophers who have supposed Time to be nothing but a Relation; it is here to be ob- jected, that, agreeably with the nature shown to belong to Relation in the foregoing analysis, it con- sists in a distinct Partition between some two SUBSTANTIVE things, whicli latter, therefore, are necessary to its existence. What, then, (it may be asked) are the Supporters of the sup- posed Relation of Time?- — It will not be said that either energies, ox phenomena, or earths, or stars, are the supporters of Time ; because it is manifest that Time supports them, and that without it they could not exist. It is impossible to conceive Time to be dependent upon any thing, or not to be absolute : but if this dependence could be, and if Time were to fail ; then we, and all our ener- gies, should be as certainly and as immediately 556 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vi. annihilated, as if Space itself were exploded. In what sense, then, can Time be said to be deficient in the nature of Substance ? The most important logical consequence which attaches to Time, is the bearing it has upon the Subject of Relation. It is upon this account, chiefly, that I propose to enter into any farther treatment of it; and, it is to be observed that this involves some distinctions of a very subtle nature. The following considerations on the subject appear to demand our attention. It was assumed in the analysis of Relation, in concurrence with the judgment of philosophers, and it is here to be rigidly insisted upon, that all 7xal relations demand the actual co-cvistence of their two causal supporters. From this paramount maxim it manifestly follows, that the parts of Time can have no relation between them. The same, also, conse- quently holds with regard to motions, and to actions of every kind : It is impossible that their parts can support any real relation between them. Yet mankind have a strong universal and inve- terate prejudice, or belief, that the Relations of Time are as real as those of Space itself, or of any thing else whatever; and it may prove no easy matter to eradicate this prejudice. It ought, how- ever, I humbly conceive, to be attempted ; and the following suggestions are submitted with this view. It must certainly be granted, that Time past and Time future are very different things, individually SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 557 considered; but it must at the same time be ad- mitted, that there can be no partition between a thing that exists and a thing that has ceased to exists be- cause that which no longer exists can have nothing predicated of it as existing. It would be vain, in any case, to attempt to rebel against this primary canon of log-ic. At the same time it is certain that the parts of Time past no longer exist. How, then, can they possibly support any relation be- tween themselves and present or future Times ? If it be here asked ; Supposing the partitions of the parts of Time be not real, How then do we con- fidently view the parts or eras of Time, and likewise the events which successively take place in time, as being concatenated, and having the most indubi- table real divisions between them ? To this I would reply, that I conceive the divisions in question are most certainly real in one sense; but they are not of that nature which forms the essence of relations of Space; and, therefore, when they are supposed to be assimilated to the relations between things which actually co-exist, this can only be done by ajiction or hypothesis. In order to show how this may perhaps be brought about ; I would solicit the attention of the reader to what actually passes in his own mind, on many occasions whereon he is contemplating rela- tions of Time between past events. When, for ex- ample, we are reading or reflecting upon a series of historical facts ; Do we not often consider this series as being analogous to a long thread, wrought 65g FIRST LINES OF [chap. vi. with a succession of knots, of various sorts, and at various distances, continued throughout its length? And, when we would compare the distance be- tween any two of these knots, Do we not, for the moment, regard them as maintaining in one sense a co-existence, (that is a co-existence in our logical ap- prehension) although this fiction or illusion is but evanescent, and in reality we know that they never did both exist at the same time ? In like manner, when we look at the effigies of a line of ancestors, disposed round a room ; we often, by a momentary fiction of the mind, reflect on the physical and moral characters of the origi- nals, by comparing them, as we do their pictures, that is to say in one continued line of supposed co-eX' istence. It is true, the illusion is momentary, and will not bear examination : but I apprehend it is undeniable that the understanding frequently pro- ceeds in some such way. That the human mind can figure to itself a line of events, like a series of co-existent pictures which take up a line of space in our view ; is a fact which I think no person will deny : and, since the mind CAN proceed in this way; and the fact of its doing so explains a great difficulty ; I apprehend we should be bound to suppose that it does follow this fictitious course, even if we should not find it always pro- ceeding in the same manner. Along with this, also, it must be admitted, that a habit of so doing might beget in us a very different notion of the relations of Time, from that which we should have imbibed had we, from the beginning, been philosophically SECT. H.] THE HUMAN MIND. 559 aware, that since Time is every moment annihilat- ed, it is simply impossible that its parts can ever support any real relation. The real and general error in the present sub- ject, I conceive is, that, when we think of any past Times, or Events, although we think they are past, we do not however advert to the strict fact, which is that they are not only past but thty art annihilated: Or, at best, we never think of the strict LOGTCAL CONSEQUENCES of that annihila- tion ; on the contrary, we view the events in ques- tion as being past, only in the same sense that an Inn upon a road i* passed ; it being all the while in existence, although we have got beyond it. By means of such representatives, or hypothe- ses, I suppose, we in imagination create all the Relations of Time ; every one of which I conceive to hejictitious, and not real. To attempt to deny this view of the subject, would certainly be to explode the whole founda- tion of Relative Truth, and to reduce human reason and its objects to one undistinguishable chaos of unmeaning thoughts : for, the moment we affirm a real property of a thing that has no existence, (that is, has no reality itself) we utter a most gross and deplorable contradiction, amounting to nothing but absolute jargon. Upon the other hand ; I conceive we are care- fully to avoid misapprehending the nature of Time, or of the Succession of Events, by supposing that it has no reality. 560 FIKST LINES OF [chap. vi. That events do succeed each other, and that there is an interval between every tzvo of them, agreea- bly to the obvious sense or understanding of man- kind in general, is a truth which cannot for a mo- ment be questioned. The only difference, therefore, between Relations of Time and Relations of Space, consists in this, that the parts of Time, being con- tinually annihilated as soon as they have served for the STANCE of things at the moment, no longer e.vist to claim their due, that is to support one side of a rela- tion or interval between themselves and any other part of succeeding Time. It would be as illogical, therefore, to say that Time, or Succession, has had no real existence ; as it would be to affirm that a soldier never had any real existence because he has been killed in battle. As a farther illustration of the consequence of the annihilation of time ; I may observe, for example, that not only has the whole era of the ancient Greek Republics ceased to exist, but also the interval or line of distance in time between that era and the present epoch has ceased to exist. Thus, not only one of the requisite Substantives or Supports of the supposed relation of Time between ancient Greece and the present moment is annihilated, but also that very line which we call the Relation or Interval between the two Times is itself annihilated. How absurd, then, would it be to affirm any re^/ rela- tion between these two periods ? But, assuredly, it would be no less absurd to affirm that these times SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 661 have not had a real substantive absolute existence, in that order of succession w^hich we in ordinary assign to them. The nature of Time, considered together with the momentous fact of our being essentially im- mersed in it, opens a door for a host of subtilties, which, at first sight, or with the help of a warm imagination, might appear to be very formidable : but I humbly conceive they may be found all very innocent, when properly examined. As a result of the nature of Time, it may be as- serted, for example, that we never are either in pain or in pleasure ; — that we never think ; — and, in a word, that we never exist. These, indeed, are very sounding propositions ; and what is more, I fear they cannot in logical strictness be denied. But, to console us, we can assert, that ourselves and other things have existed, and that we have thought. And we have a most logical expectation that we shall do the like in future. This, I appre- hend, is all that we have to desire, in order to be certified of all the realities about which we are concerned. It may not be improper to repeat here, what I have suggested in theSeventh Section of the Chapter on Relation, namely, that when upon any occasion I speak of the existence of Time, the existence of Space, or the existence of any other Thing, I do not Hu. Mi. 2 N 5(53 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vi. use this word in its usual import or acceptation, to signify the substantive nature, or what is in ordi- nary called the essence of a thing. On the con- trary ; I consider Existence to be nothing but a Relation. Upon the present occasion, therefore, I am to observe, that, in this sense, Space andTiuis, exist with each other, that is, each of these Absolute Substatitive Natures co-operate to support a relation of congruence or compenetration between them ; — a re- lation which, indeed, is incomprehensible by our imagination, but which must be inferred as real. 2, With regard to the fact that Time is one of the two essential bases of our ideas, or, that each of our ideas measures a portion of Time ; it is so self- evident and indisputable, that it can hardly be necessary to dwell upon any illustration of it. As, however, it has happened that so eminent a philo- sopher as Locke has fallen into a hasty opinion to the contrary, and has thereby misled a large proportion of readers on the subject, it may not be altogether superfluous to advert to the matter, in order to point out the absurdity of his opinion with regard to it. In the First place, therefore, it may be observ- ed, as a fact which does not admit of question, that every one of our different sensations of Touch, Taste, Smell, Sound, and Color, takes up a portion of Time. And it is moreover to be re- SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 563 marked, that the shortest ideas of the different senses, take up different lengths of Tirae : as an exarapie of which, it may be mentioned, for a fact ascertained by actual experiment, that our most rapid sensations of ASbwwfi? measure about 160 to the Second, while those of Color or Sight are found to amount to nearly 320 in the same interval of Time. I should hardly have thought it requisite to have touched upon this point, at all, had it not been to show the fallacy of a train of reasoning which has been advanced with regard to it, in our Dictionaries of Science; and which, therefore, may be supposed to have biased the minds of a great many readers on the subject. Those writers who have imbibed the opinion of Locke, that, if we could keep only one single uniform idea in our mind for any length of time, it would appear to us to measure no time at all ; have endeavoured to support this opinion by the following argument. *' In every train of thought, the appearance of any ** one idea in the mind, occupies no more of the '* extension of time, than a mathematical point ** occupies of the extension of distance. Ten "thousand mathematical points added together " could make no part of a line, and ten thousand ** ideas made to coalesce (if that were possible) " would occupy no part of that mode of duration " which is called time." This reasoning, certainly, does ample justice to Locke's view of the subject ; and it places its ab- surdity in a very clear and conspicuous light. For, if each of our ideas occupies only a mathe- 564 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vi. matical point of timey it is self-evident that no NUMBER of them could amount to a line of time, even though they follow distinctly. Moreover, I must observe, Mathematical points in Space would be impossible, unless there were an interval of space between every two points. If, then, our ideas measure only mathematical points of time ; What is there that measures the parts of time between every two of these points ? It is certain we have some measure of the parts of time ; and it is certain that our ideas are, in some way or other, this measure : but, if each idea does not measure a part, is it not grossly absurd to suppose that any number of ideas can measure a part ? When to this is added the actual fact in experience, that each of our ideas, in many different classes of them, does sen- sibly measure a portion of time ; must it not appear that all farther reasoning upon the subject would be words wasted without any occasion. To conclude, however, I shall observe, that, if for a moment it be supposed that it is the number of our ideas, and not each idea in itself, that forms our measure of Time or Duration ; this con- sequence must inevitably follow, namely, that a man who contemplates a hundred sensations of color in the most rapid succession of the sparks of fireworks, must think the Time they occupy to be precisely as long as that which would be taken up by his hearing a hundred of the most rapid sensatiotis of sound ; whereas it is proved by experiment that the one series must take up twice the time required for the other. SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 565 It has already appeared that the judgment of Dr. Reid, with regard to the nature of our notion of Duration, is perfectly concurrent with my own : and I apprehend this to be one of the sim- plest and safest points in philosophy. 6m CHAPTER VII. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE FINITE BEINGS. SECTION FIRST. OF THE KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OUR OWN SENTIENT SUBJECT. XHE Scope of the present Chapter, in point of fact, I suppose, involves a refutation of the Scep- ticism of Hume with regard to the existence of minds. But I consider that Scepticism to have been altogether of so revolting a cast ; — to have depended so entirely upon the false and exploded hypothesis oUoose detached ideas; — and to have been so completely refuted and pointed out to ridicule by Mr. Hume himself, in his selection of the term " Impressions ; " that I should, certainly, not have deemed it worthy of being the subject of an ap- propriate speculation. The object of this Chapter, therefore, is, principally, to counteract a notion or opinion which has become very prevalent with oar best writers on the subject, with regard to the SECT. I.] FIRST LINES, &c. 567 KIND of Knowledge we have of the mind's ex- istence. In a foregoing speculation ; it was hinted, that I apprehend we cannot acquire a relative know- ledge of the existence of any Substantive Finite Being y unless we have previously had a positive or intimate knowleclo-e of some one individual of the SAME GENUS. This view of the subject, if its truth should be ultimately established, must form a very important fact in the natural history of our know- ledge. It has already been insisted upon, that Intuitive Judgment has for its great object the relations be- tween things ; of which things, absolute substantive individual beings form the primary genera, or GENUS. The nature of Relations, and the manner of our perception of them, having been considered ; it remains to investigate the manner in which we acquire the knowledge or conceptions we have of those absolute beings already mentioned, whe- ther real or supposed, which are the causes or supporters of the most primary classes of rela- tions. — From what has been advanced ; it will appear, that, strictly considered, our knowledge of absolute beings must take precedence of that of the relations which subsist between them ; and, there- fore, the former of these two subjects ought to have been treated prior to that which I am now to examine. But I conceive that a very considerable advantage will attend the order of investigation which has been here adopted. 568 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. Having mentioned ray reason for placing the present chapter out of its proper or logical order ; I proceed to the merits of the subject. According to the opinion of some of our latest and most eminent metaphysicians, " all the know- " ledge we have, either of Matter or of Mind, is " merely relative." This assumption I once subscribed to, as an accredited principle : which, also, I think, it must be granted, has a very specious appearance. But, having, in the course of the foregoing speculations, been determined, by the demonstrative nature of the Category of Relation, to have recourse to a more rigorous revise of the maxim that all our knowledge of Mind is merely relative; I have thence been led to draw a very different conclusion. If it should ultimately appear, that 1 am mis- taken in that view of the subject which will now be submitted ; One very important consequence, I think, must follow : for, in that case, it must be confessed that the knowledge we suppose ux have, of the existence of any absolute being that is not ac- tually a subject of our own consciousness, is extremely obnoxious to the cavils of Scepticism. The truth of this remark has been manifested in the doctrine of Hume. And I apprehend that the paramount maxim of reason, as it clearly operates in the fun- damental principle of all relation, must render the assumption of the mere relative knozv ledge of any absolute being undeniably absurd ; and must stamp SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 569 the character of all such beings, for nothing more real than the objects of a dream or chimera. I hardly need observe, that a knowledge of the existence of our own mind ; — that of the existence of all other human or finite minds ; — and that of the existence of the Omnipotent or Infinite Mind, — in so far as we can prove this last from arguments a posteriori; must all be involved in the conse- quences of this question. The course which I propose to adopt in the pre- sent speculation, is, to endeavour to show that all the knowledge we have of the existence of other mindsy besides our own, although it is certainly relative, is not merely relative, inasmuch as it is logically drawn from analogy, and is, in point of fact, founded upon a positive or intimate knowledge which we have of the existence of our own mind. Agreeably with this; it will be argued, that, had we not a positive or intimate knowledge of the ex- istence of our own mind, it would have been im- possible for us to have acquired a relative knowledge of the existence of any other mind : Or, in other words, it is simply impossible for us to acquire a MERE relative knowledge of the existence oiany Mind, or that of any one of the two SUPPORTERS of any Relation whatever. The investigation, I am sensible, will lead to distinctions which are not obvious ; especially, not without affording them an adequate share of atten- tion. But I entertain a sufiicient hope, that the reality of these distinctions will bear them through, in the estimation of those who will afford them a 570 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. due consideration. I also think they will present us with a view of some part of the structure of our thoughts, with regard to their objects, which will prove far from wanting in curiosity, or interest. Ih the First place; it appears proper to state, in a more particular manner than I have yet done, the doctrine here intended to be controverted. " According to the common doctrine of our best " philosophers " (says Professor Stewart, Phil. Essays, Essay 1. Chap. 1.) " it is by the evidence " of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves " exist. The proposition, however, when thus stat- " ed, is not accurately true ; for our existence is " not a direct or immediate object of consciousness, " in the strict and logical meaning of that term. " We are conscious of sensation, thought, desire, " volition ; but we are not conscious of the ex- " istence of the mind itself; nor would it be pos- " sible for us to arrive at the knowledge of it " (supposing us to be created in the full possession " of all the intellectual capacities that belong to " human nature) if no impression were ever to be " made on our external senses." I have already observed, with allusion (o the doctrine contained in this passage, that a part of it, at least, is of a very specious aspect. We never know any thing at all of the existence of our own mind, except during the existence of our thoughts or viental affections : This is certain. But the question, I apprehend, nevertheless still remains, namely, Is SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 671 this knowledge only merely relative? Is the knowledge we have of the existence of our own mind, during the existence of any sensation, pro- perly speaking " consequent upon " the sensation, in any sense which can warrant us logically to affirm that we know the existence of our mind only from knowing that of the sensation ? Or rather. Do we not know our own existence, during any sensation, ivom. an i7itimate immediate knowledge that we are the SUFFERER OR SUPPORTER of the SCUSatioU ? If it must be granted, as I confidently think it must, that, during the existence of any sensation, or thought, we have an intimate knowledge that we suffer or support that sensation, or thought ; I con- tend, it is absurd to assume that our knowledge of the e^xistence of our ow^n mind is relative at ALL. The knowledge we have of our own exist- ence, in this case, must indeed be owned to be dependent and only occasional : and, therefore, there is, certainly, a good sense in which it may be said that this knowledge is " consequent upon " a sensa- tion, or thought : but if we know our own exist- ence (as suffering beings) at the same time that we know any sensation ; and if we have this know- ledge of our own existence intimately, and not deduced in the way of inference from the existence of the sensation, but held collaterally with the knowledge of the sensation, and felt as primarily and as intimately as that of the sensation itself; it must then be regarded as a most fallacious assump- tion to affirm that the knowledge we have of the existence of our own mind is merely relative. 672 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. There are several distinct grounds, upon which it may be urged that a fallacious view of the sub- ject has been entertained by those philosophers who have assumed the mere relative knowledge of the existence of our own minds. It will be requisite, therefore, to consider the subject upon each of these grounds. First ; it is to be observed, that the writers in question, (especially those of the School of Reid,) have duly recognised the identic a Iness of the mind with its own sensations and other thoughts. This is a fundamental principle, common to both the spe- culations of that school and to my own specula- tions. But, agreeably with this principle, it is an identical proposition that so far as we knoiv any of our own sensations positively, so far we KNOW OUR MIND ITSELF POSITIVELY. I appre- hend we may challenge all the powers of human genius to deny the conclusion ; after having once granted that our sensations are only certain " STATES " of the mind itself. To grant, first, that our sensations are affections or states of the mind itself; — to say that " the mind " is the sentient being; " — and, then, to say that we have a positive knowledge of a sensation, but only a mere relative knowledge qfovR mind which we have before assumed to be one same being with that state of it which we call sensation; amounts to an absurdity so manifest, that I feel confident the pro- positions cannot both be affirmed. SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 573 It is owing to this actual identicalness of sensa- tion or thought with the thinking subject itself, that it is extremely difficult, in the case of any ONE sensation, to abstract either of the two from the other, and make it a distinct object of our contem- plation. This fact has afforded a ludicrous occa- sion, for an exquisite master of human nature, to depict the consequence which would follow if we were at any time to be wholly occupied by any one sensation. The dissolute Mariner, in the PJay, answers to his own name in the following exclamation : " Oh touch me not : — I am not Stephano, but a " cramp." From this consequence of the identicalness of our thoughts with our thinking principle, it will be found, that by far the fittest case, for the purpose of investigating the knowledge we have of the exist- ence of our own mind, is any one of those wherein we discern a Relation : Because, in order to this act, it is absolutely necessary that we contemplate some TWO Substantive Beings, or two beings regarded as Substantives; and, in the act of so doing, we have a distinct contemplation of ourselves, that is of our Intellectual Principle, as the being who views the two substantives : and, supposing these two sub- stantives to be two of our own sensations or thoughts, still, we have equally a clear and distinct view of our thinking Subject, as the being who judges BETWEEN these two sensations, or thoughts. Thus, 574 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. when I judge between a blue and a yellow, which are two of my own sensations ; I have the clearest view, and the highest possible certainty, that I my- self am A THIRD BEING, distinct from either of the sensations : and if any person were to pretend, at that moment, to tell me that I have a more intimate or immediate knowledge of each of the sensations, than I have of myself as the judge between them, I should deem his assertion not worth a serious con- sideration. . It is upon this ground, quite independent of the refutation which Mr. Hume has furnished of his own doctrine, that I formerly, in a small tract which involved the subject, had occasion to ob- serve, that the Scepticism of that Philosopher, with regard to the existence of minds, is founded upon the glaring fallacy of an assumption that ideas are to be regarded neither as having any bond of connec- tion between them.selves, nor as being connected by the view of any supporting Mind, Hence, the moment we advert to the fact that our mind is continually employed, literally speaking, as a judge and umpire between its ideas; in which judgments, therefore, it is impossible for the perverseness of any bias, to force the most hardy sceptic, to confound the Judge with the two ideas between which the judg- ment is made; all controversy concerning this point must be at an end, and we are left only to wonder at the shallowness of the assumption which once created such alarm in the minds of reflecting men. The argument now adduced is not offered as ori- ginal, although it is here somewhat developed : SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 575 for, though it forcibly struck myself, as indeed I think it might easily do any person, it is to be found, in substance, in the argument which Plato has made use of for the same purpose. Secondly ; Although I consider the foregoing argument as, of itself alone, conclusive of the fact which I here desire to establish ; it appears that much satisfactory or collateral light upon the sub- ject may be gained, from a comparison of the knowledge we have of the existence of our own mind, with that we acquire of the existence of the minds of other men. The knowledge we have of the existence of the minds of those with whom we carry on a daily in- tercourse, is, undeniably, of the very first kind of that which can be called relative. Therefore, if it should be shown that there is a difference between this knowledge and that we have of our own ex- istence; philosophers will then be compelled to admit that the latter is something more than a 7nere relative knowledge. If this position were es- tablished ; we might then with greater advantage investigate the internal evidence of the precise na- ture of the difference between the two kinds of Knowledge. With this view, therefore, I in the first place propose the following question. When we are addressing speech, to any other person; and when we in return attend to the answer of that person, that is, hear his speech and mark his action; Have we, in this case, the 576 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vn. same sort, or any thing like the same sort of evidence of the existence of his mind, that we had during our speech of the existence of our own ? For my own part, I am led so confidently to answer this question in the negative, that I think a contrary judgment will hardly be pronounced by any person of the least degree of reflection. And yet it would be necessary to answer it as confidently in the affirmative, in order to warrant the assumption that all the knowledge we have of Mind is merely relative. In assuming this last po- sition ; I am altogether borne out by that School whose doctrine I am here under the necessity to controvert. The following is the account of the matter which has been given by Dr. Reid. " A third class of natural signs comprehends " those which, though we never before had any ** notion or conception of the thing signified, do ** suggest, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natur;^ " kind of magic, and at once give us a conception, " and create a belief of it. I showed formerly, *^that our sensations suggest to us a sentient " being or mind to which they belong." Inquiry into the Human Mind. Chap. 5. Sect. 3. Here I must stop, for a moment, to deny that our sensations " suggest to us " a sentient being or mind. I have already freely granted, or intended to grant, that our sensation presents to us ihejirst occasion on which we gain a knowledge of the ex- istence of our own mind : but, to say that the sen- sation suggests this knowledge, is no other than a loose unphilosophical expression of the fact, or, SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 577 in other words, it is not strictly true : On the con- trary, it is the intimate k?ioivledge which the mind has, at the moment, that it is a sufferer, that " suggests" to it the thought that it exists. In the case of a dight sensation, such as that of ordi-^ nary color, or sound, it is to be observed, we do ?20t think of suffering, although w^e actually do suf". fer; but, in the case of a very painful ^^x\^'a\\ox\^ our knowledge of om^selves, as a sufflrEi^, will unquestionably be allowed to be as intimate as our knowledge of the sensation which we suffer. Hence, I know of no more logical assumption than the celebrated enthymeme of Descartes; ^' I think ** (i. e. I feel), therefore I exist." The object of the quotation just now given frcn^ the writings of Dr. Reid, however, is to show that he supposes no difference, between tho relative knowledge which he imagines we have of the existence of our own mind, and that of the minds of other men. If, indeed, he supposed any difference; my object would then be attained, upon his own showing ; for it is certain that we have as high a sort of relative knowledge of the exist-» ence of the minds of other men, as any knowledge that can be called merely jjei^ativj;, As for the fact that there is a difference of some sort, between the two kinds of knowledge which I have here insisted upon ; it appears to have been, the opinion of Locke, and of other eminent philo* sophers since his tim€ ; although, I must observe, Hu, Mi. 2 O 578 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. the subject is far from having been investigated Avith rigor, or indeed with any tolerable degree of precision. I shall here quote one or two passages, in order to establish this fact. It is said by Bishop Berkeley, in his " Pi^inciples " of Human Knowledge,'' page 89, that ** We com- " prehend our own existence by inward feeling or " reflection, and that of other spirits by reason." I do not quote this opinion, so far as regards our knowledge of our own existence, as being at all co-incident with that view which I entertain of the subject ; but only to show that Berkeley consi- dered our knowledge of our own existence to be in some way different from that which we have of the existence of (?///er spirits. The opinion of Locke is expressed in his Fourth Book, Chap. 3, § 21 ; wherein he says, " As to the '* Fomth sort of our knowledge, viz. of the real *' actual existence of things, we have an intuitive " knowledge of our own existence ; and a demon- " strati ve knowledge of the existence of a God : " of the existence of any thing else we have no " other but a sensitive knowledge, which extends " not beyond the objects of our senses." Farther on, in § 26, he shows that he had not included our knowledge of the existence of the minds of other men, in the above account ; and, that he held this knowledge to be in some way contra- distinguished from, and dependent upon, the intui- tive knowledge we have of our own existence. For he says, *• That there are minds or thinking beings '^ in other men as well as himself, every man has SECT. I.] THE HUMAN MIND. 570 " a reason, from their xvords and actions, to be satisy "fied." Finally; He concludes the Ninth Chapter of the same Book, in these words ; " Nothing can be ** more evident to us than our osvn existence : I " think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain ; can " any of these be more evident to me, than my own " existence ? If I doubt of all other things, that " very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, " and will not suffer me to doubt that. For if I " know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain ** perception of my own existence, as of the exist- " ence of the pain I feel ; or if 1 know I doubt, I " have as certain a perception of the existence of " the thing doubting, as of that thought which I '' call doubt." This reasoning of Locke co-incides so entirely with my own view of the subject, that perhaps I could not offer any stronger assertion of it. I hum- bly conceive it to be altogether unanswerable. But if this view of the matter be admitted, it must be altogether un philosophical to assume that we have apositiveknowledgeof our Sensations or Thoughts, and only a mere re/^^ire knowledge of Ourselves as the beings which suffer or support these thoughts. Locke, indeed, finishes his Chapter with saying, that " In every act of sensation, reasoning, or ** thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own " being; and, in this matter, come not short of the " highest degree of certainty." But, with regard to this, I must object against his judgment; and must concede to the philosophers whose opinion is 896 FIRST LINES, &c. [chap, vn, herein opposed, that there appears to me to be a great difference between that consciousness or know- ledge we have of any sensation, or thought, and that •which we have of ourselves as the supporting subject of that thought: although I insist, that in point of intimacy, we know the latter, if any thing, better or More intimately than we know the former. It is THIS difference, which, I conceive, has given rise to the supposition that the knowledge we have of the existence of our own mind is merely Hlative. But I confidently hope this latter as- sumption will have to be regarded as being pro- foundly fallacious; as it certainly is extremely dangerous, or, rather, decidedly destructive of the solidity or logical foundation of our belief in the existence of our own mind, or in that of any other being, always excepting any reason a priori. 581 SECTION SECOND. OF THE KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER FINITE MINDS. In this Section I would contrast the view which has been taken of the knowledge we have of the existence of our own thinking subject, durino: any sensation or other thought, with that we gain of the existence of the mind of any other human be- ing at any time ; and observe the vast distinction there is between the two. We never infer the existence of any other mind, except as being that Relative Subject which is usually called a cause : And, then, we draw our inference merely upon perceiving some 'phenomenon, which we suppose to be an effect. Thus we see ,a man move in a certain manner ; and so perform ac- tions in which we perceive design. We conse- quently infer the existence of a rational mind, like our own : and the foundation of this inference is merely the recollection of our having acted in a f^imilar manner, upon a similar occasion. But, I would ask, Have we, in this, or in any other such case, the same sort of evidence that there exists another rational mind performing certain actions in our view, that we have had of the existence of our own mind while we were engaged in a similar 582 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. \v'ay ? I think, no person will answer this question in the affirmative: And yet, if it be admitted that we have a different and superior evidence of our own exi^^tence in such case, from that which we have of the existence of any other person, it must be absurd any longer to assume that all the know- ledge wehaveof the existence of Mind i* *' merely RELATIVE :" for it is acknowledged, by all parties who admit the existence of minds at all, that the knowledge we have of the existence of the minds of other mm, is the highest possible kind oj mere rela- tive knowledge I hat can be imagined. It is considered by Professor Stewart, that this relative knowledge is quite equal, in the certainty of its evidence, to that o^ consciousness itself ; which last, he justly observes, has been usually looked upon as being paramount to every other authority. And, here, if the question were merely. Whe- ther, or not, we can as safely confide that another mind is the cause of any perceived action, as we can that our own mind was the cause of a similar action, in similar circumstances ? I should be ready to grant, that I think we may as safely confide. But, that the evidences, in the two cases, are of DIFFERENT KINDS; and, that we might, even, in some cases, ^e deceived with regard to one of them, but never with regard to the other ; is what I apprehend to be a truth altogether incontroverti- ble: the one being an inbred, intimate, and immediate knowledge of ourselves, as a being who acts from a motive known with equal intimacy and certainty; the other, a mere inference, founded upon nothing but SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 583 ANALOGY, (although indeed a very close and f ami- liar analogy )ih^t\^ upon a recollection that we our- selves have acted, and always would act, in asimilar way. In the case of our own mind ; we should know its existence equally well, without ever making any reference, of its actions to the actions of any other mind : but, I will venture to believe, we never could have conceived such a notion as that of the existence of any other mind, except by comparing certain perceived actions, or phenomena, which we know we have not produced, with other phe- nomena which we are convinced we have produced ; and, by inferring that the former phenomena are EFFECTS OF A CAUSE ANALOGOUS tO that which we knoxo produced the latter. Will any person, then, in this case deny that the knowledge we have of our own existence, as Sentient Beings, is antece- dent and superior; and, that which we have of the existence of other minds is consequent and infe- rior? In order to furnish an illustration of the truth of this reasoning ; I repeat the remark, that, although a series of rational actions must be referred to mindy and to reason, as its cause; yet, we might be much mistaken in referring it to any perceived being to whom we confidently ascribe it. Thus an Auto- maton exactly imitates the rational actions of a man, in a game of chess. And there can be no dispute as to the possibility that a similar piece of mechanism might be contrived, which should imi- tate a series of sounds, like those of a rational 584 FIRST LINES OF [chap. \iu speech. Now the energy exerted in such a speech, or action, must indeed be referred to the contri- vance or reason of the inventor of the machine: but, certainly, it would not be a quality of that thing in which it would appear to ixside. In this way, therefore, it is manifest, the Deity mighi actuate the Bodies of men, although they had no minds within them ; and at the same time uithout our hav^ ing any knowledge, or the least suspicion, of the real fact. But, I ask, Would it be possible to impose this deception upon us with regard to the existence oi our own minds? Surely, if any thing he certain, we are certain of this, that we know when we are the voluntary agent, in the case of any motion of our body, and when we are not so : Of this, we have the same certainty whether we be supposed to be the real efficient of our own bodily actions or not. But we can have no such certainty in any case of the actions of a body actuated by any other mind. Whence, then, comes this difference; but that we know the existence of our own mind intimately AND IMMEDIATELY, whcreas we know that of any other mind only from an ANALOGICAL INFE- RENCE drawn from the knowledge we have of our own mind ? In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, (Essay 5th, Chap. 2.) Dr. Reid has expressed him- self upon the present subject in the following terms. " Indeed the attributes of things is all that we " distinctly conceive about them. It is true, we SECT, n.l THE HUMAN MIND. 58;> *^ conceive a subject to which the attributes belong ; **but of this subject, when its attributes are set ** aside, we have but an obscure and relative con- "ception, whether it be body or mind''— " What "is it we call mind? It is a thinkin^r, intelligent, ** active being. Granting that thinking, intelli- " gence, and activity, are attributes of mind, I want " to know what the thing or being is to which these '* attributes belong? To this question I can find no " answer. The attributes of mind, and particu- " larly its operations, we know clearly, but of the ** thing itself we have only an obscure notion.'' When the opinion asserted in this passage is ap- plied to the imaginary subject called Matter ; it is a very just one: and so has fared of that subject; because, since we ourselves are shown to be pos- sessed of that quality of Extension which was all along supposed to characterise Matter, it follows, undeniably, that matter must be set down for a chimera. When, also. Dr. Reids opinion is applied to other minds, besides our own, it is at least so far just, that the notion we have of those minds is relative ; but I do not think it either *' ob- scure^' or merely relative, — because its foundation is in the intimate knowledge we have of the existence of our own mind. But farther, if Dr. Reid had asked me, concerning my own mind,— " What the thing is?"" I would have answered. It is the thing that supports my thoughts, and which I call myself And, if any man would pre- tend to tell me that my knowledge of m\ self, as THAT supporter, is Only an obscure notion, or is 586 FIRST LINES OF [chap. yji. at all more obscure than my knowledge of the thoughts which I do support ; I should revolt from such an outrage of my most internal feeling. The only kind of objection which I think Dr. Reid, or any advocate of his view of the subject, could have in contemplation, in the question con- cerning our knowledge of our own existence ; must be from supposing that an immediate, or what he means by 3. positive Knowledge of our own Sentient Subject^ ought to be like the positive knowledge we have of a sensation or thought. But against this I must urge, in the First place, that the know- ledge we h3,\e of ourselves, as a Sufferer or Sub- ject, is TOO INTIMATE, or rather TOO WHOLE, to admit of our making oursklves our proper Object, as we do a Sensation or other Thought. And, Secondly, It is obvious that every thing which we can view objectively, like a sensation, is only a QUALITY, and stands manifestly contradistin- Squished from our Substantive Being. This is freely admitted by Dr. Reid himself; and, there- fore, it would be sinking our substantive nature to the level of one of our qualities, if we could take that sort of positive view of our own Sub- ject which this writer observes we cannot do. Here I am led to remark the affectation of some philosophers, who refuse to apply the word substance to the mind; I suppose because, forsooth, it is desired to deny that there is any one point of analogy between mind and that exter- nal agent which has been all along supposed to be dead matter. But, against this affectation I SECT. 11.] THE HUMAN MIND. 587 must urge the undeniable fact, that the only con- ception we have of substance is that of a thing which SUPPORTS accidents; and it uill not be disputed that sensations and other thoughts ha\e as good a claim to the appellation of accidents, as any other qualities with which we are ac- quainted. From what has been advanced ; it becomes evi- dent by what means the mind gets to form its re- lative notions of things. In the First place, as I have already observed, it has an archetype of the thing to be conceived, in the intimate knowledge it has gained of one individual of the genus in question : Thus the mind of any man, during the time he is thinking, h2is 2a\ intimate knowledge of its own existence, as well as a positive knowledge of the existence of its sensations or other thoughts ; and it, from time to time, discerns the relations between its own thoughts and certain phenomena, — namely, its own e.vternal actions. Thus possessed of an archetype for its conceptions ; the mind is called upon to observe other and similar phenomena or actions, vvhich it cannot refer to itself as their cause ; and the con- sequence of this is, that it supplies the notion of a Correlative Subject, or Supporter of one sidf of those actions, from taking itself and its own actions as a pattern. In this way, t!ie mind, upon attending to any set of rational phenomena, not produced by itself, readily infers the existence of another 588 FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. mind, whose existence (to use the lanouag:e of Dr. Reid) it had '' never before thought oJ\'' and of which, I will venture to add, it could have had no conception. But this, 1 assert, it does only from having had a previous positive or intimate knowledge of Mind as a genus of thing existing, in the knowledge it had of its own individual ex- istence. If we for a moment contrast this view of the subject, with that which has been taken by Dr. Reid ; the result I think cannot fail to strike us very impressively. If, in the first place, we consider his assertion, that the notion of our own mind itself is ** only an obscure notion /'we may surely be permitted to ask, Of what other tJmig can we be said to have a more clear or vivid knowledge ? And here I am tp observe, that both his assertion and our present argu- ment are limited strictly to our notion or knowledge of our own mind as the sufferer or supporter of its thoughts ; and cannot at all extend to any con- mderation of what other nature we possess, besides that of A mere Supporter or Subject; in which case, I think the ground or reasoning which has been asserted on the subject by Mr. Locke, and which I have done little more than endeavour to exemplify by a collateral statement of my own sentiments with regard to it, is alto- gether solid and unanswerable. But, Secondly ; With regard to the assumption SECT. II.] THE HUMAN MIND. 689 that all our knowledge of Mind is ^^ merely re- lative ;" I must remark, it has been observed by Dr. Reid himself, that a relative knowledge of a thing is no knowledge of that thing at alL Upon this therefore I would ask (I conceive with pecu- liar effect), Was it Dr. Reid's intention to assert that we have no knowledge of our own mijjd at all? I apprehend it is impossible that his different asser- tions, when brought together, can lead to any other conclusion. But, if he had viewed the matter in this light ; I feel satisfied he would never have furnished Universal Scepticism with such a butt to shoot at. In fine; I may venture to affirm, without fear of contradiction, that (with the exception of any argument a priori) we have no knowledge, or notion, of the existence of any other mind beside our own, except from ANALOGY. And, I may venture with equal confidence to believe, no philosopher will pretend that the knowledge we have of our own existence, during any sensation or thought, is from ANALOGY. The two kinds of knowledge, therefore^ are infinitely different. The phraseology of relative knowledge is this; that we knowvinkT a thing is, from what it does. Now, we know what our own mind is, as a doer, or a sufferer, at the same time and as immediately as we know what IT DOES : but we never know what any OTHER MIND IS, or cvcn so much as whe- ther it EXISTS, except from knowing what C9Q FIRST LINES OF [chap. vii. OUR OWN mind is and what it does, and then in- ferring that certain phenomena, which we see takin^i" place around us, 7nust he the effects of some POWER analogous to that of our own mind. I stron.2:ly apprehend, that the difference between these two kinds of knowledge is not only real, but vast. And, if I have been led into repetition with regard to the distinction which has been thus insisted upon, I trust this proceeding will not be thonoht redundant, because the consequences, whicliever way we shall decide, are certainly of the very last importance to the truth or certainty of human knowledge. THE HUMAN MIKD. 501 CO NCLUSION. The foregoing Subjects having unavoidably ex- tended the Volume to its present size ; and the last Chapter forming, I conceive, the most proper one at which a pause ought to intervene, in the matter •which 1 had from the beginning intended to inves- tigate ; I have thought it expedient to postpone two or three topics, which I had fully designed to introduce in the present publication, and one of which is repeatedly mentioned in the course of it. Of this I have given notice in the preface ; at the same time intimatins; that the Subjects of the present Volume have no dependence upon the matter alluded to : and, since the whole of what was in- tended could not have been got into any conve- nient size ; I regret it the less from the nature of what has gone before, and from the consistency which I think will follow if I should be enabled to add, to the Subjects in question, some other spe- culations which I had distantly contemplated. As it is ; there is much to undergo judgment : none of which I had hazarded upon any former occasion, except a part of what forms the analysis of percep- tion. If therefore I should not be thought, by competent judges, to have succeeded in any 592 FIRST LINES OF degree in my endeavours after general truth ; I have already risked far too deeply, and the sacri- fices have been sufficiently great. In these circumstances ; I shall not attempt any recapitulation, or comment upon what has gone before, except in the instance of a very few and brief observations. The First remark which I would impress upon the recollection of my readers ; is with regard to the evidence we have, in the analysis of perception, of the Microcosmic nature of the Human Mind ; and, hence, the direct legitimate conclusion that E^vlension, or Scenic Representation, wheresoever it exists, must be an attribute of Mind. Collate^ RALLY with which conclusion, and quite indepen^ dent of it, we are also logically bound to embrace this other, namely, that, all the purposes of a supposed Material World being manifestly answered by the Scenic Representations of the Mind itself, it be- comes, upon this distinct ground alone, absurd to assume the existence of a World of Dead Mat- ter, for which no possible use can be assigned. These two distinct inferences form, I apprehend, as logi^ cal and certain a foundation, as any philosophic mind can require, whereonfto rest a full conviction, that the external unperceived cause of our extended sensations is no other than the energy, or rather the varied energies, of some spiritual agent. The effects of this last conclusion, THE HUMAN MIIS'D. ^3 upon the great foundation and sole prop of Athe- ism, have been pointed out in the beginning of the Volume, and are too manifest to require any remark in this place. The only other consideration which I would suggest for attention, is the fact of the trans- ference of the Subject of Perception, from being all along supposed a mere Physical Subject, to a branch of Demonstrative Science, strictly speak- ing ; and the consequences of this fact, from the na- ture or stability of the hiowkdge we have by it. To illustrate this ; I observe, that almost any Theory in Physics, of which we have a knowledge, is liable to be impeached by an extension of our physical knowledge : That which appears to be the 7^eal and precise fact to-day, may possibly be found to be displaced by some farther fact to- morrow. Hence all Physical Theories, in every branch of Science, are liable to suffer greater or lesser degrees of onutation. But in the case of Necessary Relations betzveen our Ideas, such as tie Subject of Perception has been shown to be in its analysis, the case becomes infinitely different : for, unless it can be shewn that there is a flaw in any of the four self- evident propositions which compose the General Laws of Vision, it is manifest that the Lazvs of Perception are as eternally immutable as the Elements of Geometry, Unless, therefore, either of the propositions themselves be found selj- Hu. Mi, 2 P 594 FIRST LINES, &c. evidently false, the matter cannot be supposed lia- ble to any of those mutations which have been, in a greater or lesser extent, the common fate of all physical knowledge. These observations are not offered at all in dis- paragement of physical science : but only to place what I apprehend to be an insuperable bar against what would otherwise be a very natural and justifiable surmise with regard to any new theory of Perception, namely, that however well it may appear, it can only have its day, and must, in the course of events, be superceded by some other, which, in its turn, must prove equally mutable. I humbly conceive, that if the Subject of Percep- tion be admitted to its place as a branch of De- monstrative Science, which I confess I have no doubt it must, it cannot then be thought liable to the prophetic forecast which 1 have here adverted to : And I am led to point this out, on account of the weight of those consequences which must depend upon our having a perfect reliance on it. I think, I may with expectation point out to every mind that is at all tinctured with science, the infinite diflference there is, between having the knowledge we possess of our own nature and expectations founded, like a mathematical theorem, upon a discernment of necessary relatmis between our ideas, and the supposition heretofore invariably entertained of its being derived from a mere fact, exhibited to our imperfect senses^ and always liable to incalculable misconception. APPENDIX. The intention of the present article, is to advert to an argu- ment which has been advanced by Dr. Reid, against the leasoii ing of Hume, with regard to the nature and place of the Ob- jects of our Perception. No proper opportunity has presented itself of noticing this discussion in the course of the foregoing Volume, without going somewhat out of the way : and yet I consider the exposition of its real merits as being requisite, or at least desirable, in order to complete the view which I deemed it necessary to take of the doctrine of Reid previously to the final statement of my own view of Perception. In the Fourteenth Chapter of his Second Essay on the Intellectual Powers ; Dr. Reid employs eight or ten pages of his work, in a very laboured, and I also think a very surprising attempt, to disprove a simple and conclusive argument of Hume against the assumption of our perceiving external objects. The anxiety which Reid manifests upon this occasion, and some particular expressions which he drops with regard to it, plainly evince that he was much afraid of the effect of the argument of Hume. And the means of defence which he has adopted against it, especially when we reflect that he was a mathema- tician and ought to have understood the nature of his own rea- soning, appear to me to furnish another striking instance of the overwhelming force of prejudice. 50(5 AFFExNDlX. In animadverting upon the opinions of Hume, in the place referred to. Dr. Reid says, " He tells us farther, that philosophy ** teaches, that the senses are unable to pro(iuce any immediate *' intercourse between the mind and the object. Here, I still ** require the reasons that philosophy gives for this ; for, to " my apprehension, 1 immeciiatcly perceive external objects, *' and this 1 conceive is the immediate intercourse here meant. " Here 1 see nothing that can be called an argument. Perhaps *' it was intended only for illustration. The argument, the only " argument follows." *' The table which we see, seems to diminish as we remove *' farther from it ; but the real table, which exists independent " of us, suifers no alteration : It was therefore nothing but its *' image which was presented to the mind. These are the ob- *' vious dictates of reason." The last passage, we are to observe, is the argument of Hume, stated by Reid : And the following is the attempt to refute it, which Dr. Reid has furnished to the world. *' To judge of the strength of this argument" (says he) ** it is necessary to attend to a distinction which is familiar to *' those who are conversant in the mathematical sciences, I " mean the distinction between real and apparent magnitude." He then proceeds to explain that — " Apparent magnitude is *' measured by the angle which an object subtends at the eye. *' Supposing two right lines drawn from the eye to the ex- *' tremities of the object, making an angle of which the ob- *'ject is the subtense, the apparent magnitude is measured by *' this angle. This apparent magnitude is an object of sight, ** and not of touch. Bishop Berkeley calls it visible mag- " nitude.'' This reasoning against the argument of Hume, is maintained by Dr. Reid. through several pages, with repeated appeals to mathematical science, and in a tone which, to those who do not understand the subject, must certainly appear to he alto- gether unanswerable ; and the ordinary reader is left only to conclude, that the argument of Hume is swept away by an irrc- APPENDIX. 597 sistible power of mathematical truth. But I will venture to believe that the argument of Reid exhibits only an extent of sophistry that is altogether unaccountable, when we consider that the author of it was in reality a mathematician. In proof of the matter; I am to observe, in the first place, that the pjiraseology in use with regard to tliis subject is extremely ambiguous ; and tliat care must be had, to make allowance for this ambiguity. This being understood ; the fol- lowing are what I humbly conceive to be the real merits of the subject. First. The real magnitude of any external object, and ivliat is CALLED its apparent or visible magnitude, are, certainly, two very different things. The Visible Sun appears to be only a few inches in diameter ; while the Sun itself is in reality between eight and nine hundred thousand miles across. Second f}/. The visible magnitude or diameter of any body, is MEASURED by an angle, agreeably with what Dr. Reid has asserted. Thirdly. But it is a most unfounded assumption to suppose, because we MEASURE any visible magnitude by an angle, {which we do in order to ascertain what relative size or propor- tion it bears to any other apparent magnitude), that therefore we PERCEIVE visible magnitude by an angle. Contrary to this; it is beyond the reach of controversy, that i:very VISIBLE MAGNITUDE which we ever perceive, is ike HEAL MAGNITUDE of a certain AFFECTiOTf the table marked out upon the bottom of the eye. Now it is self-evident, that, as the table moves farther off, the outer optic angle must lessen ; and, hence, of necessity, the INNER optic angle 'dho must lessen : because the rays of light which form both the angles in question may be compared to a pair of sheers that are partly open ; and, therefore, when one angle is made to lessen, the other of necessity lessens also. In other words ; the real magnitude of the image or picture at the bottom of the eye, will be reduced in proportion as the rays of light proceed from the external object with a smaller an-^ gle. What, then, becomes of the mathematical reasoning upon which Dr. Reid has laid so much stress, for disproving the ar- gument of Hume ? There is no philosopher who will for a moment deny, that the Sentient Principle in Man is somewhere near the INNER end of the trunk of the Optic Nerve. And it was known and expressly acknowledged by Dr. Reid, that all objects of Sight have a picture of themselves formed upon the bottom of the eycy that is upon the expansion of the Optic Nerve. These facts being here assumed ; the position of the Sen- APPENDIX. rm TiENT Principle, and the picture in the bottom of the eye, and the external object which occasions this Picture, must be that of three separate things nearly in a straight Hne ; but we must assume them as being strictly in a straight line, because it is certain that by sight the Mind can perceive only through the line of the Optic Trunk, Let these three things, therefore, be represented by the following letters, viz. or The Mind The Picture The Tahh Now, with regard to this disposition ; I would ask any per- son, How is it possible the Mind at A, should perceive the Real Table at C, when the Picture of the Table stands between them at B and forms an impenetrable curtain which must of necessity veil any object at C? Besides this conclusive argument from POSITION ; I would ask, since it is not denied by Dr. Reid that images of things are formed on the bottom of the eye. Upon what ground could he possibly overlook that the image must have been intended, by its A-U-wise Maker, for a use; and how could he doubt that this use is that of a medium 1 If any one thing in the world can be supposed to be meant as the representative of another ; I imagine it must be admitted that the picture formed in the bottom of an eye is that thing. The real truth of the matter, I trust, now stands perfectly manifest, that what is called the apparent magnitude of m table, or of any other external object, is nothing but the REAL MAGNITUDE of SO much of the Surface of the bottom of the eye as is occupied by the image or picture which the pre- sence of that external object occasions. But this reasoning, although I trust it is founded upon the most solid principles ; and its result is perfectly true in so far as to deny the possibility of our ever perceiving ANY EXTERNAL TABLE, or object; is 600 APPENDIX. yet 7iGt ultimately; true ; for \ye have a farther and a most im- portant step to go, beyond this. The ultimate truth is, that we no more perceive any picture that is f rmed in the bottom of the eye, than v.e perceive the real table, or other external object that lies at a distance with- out ihe eye. The real fact, we know, must be, although we know not by what process it happens, that some action must takfc place through the whole length of the optic trunk, subsequent to the formation of the picture at the bottom of the eye. The Picture, or Image in the Eye, therefore, is never an object of our perception : And all that we ever perceive, in Vision, is an assemblage of sensations of colors in the Mind ; — between which colors we intuitively discern certain relations 0/ con- trast and of LOCALITY or extension; and to which rela- tions we give the name of visible figures or outlines. With regard to the ultimate step just now adverted to, namely, that by which we quit the last optical fact that is known, which is the picture in the bottom of the eye, and find our- selves at once got into the regions of Consciousness; t am obliged here to remark, that Dr. Reid has animadverted upon the opinions of other philosophers vith regard to it, in a manner which evinces a strong wish, (although I think with the most unhappy result,) to show that they have proceeded illogically. In the Chapter already quoted ; He says, — " I know that " Aristotle and the Schoolmen taught, that images or species *' flow from objects, and are let in by the senses, and strike upon *' the mind ; but this has been so effectually refuted by Descar- ** tes, by Malebr£fTiche, and many others, that nobody now pre- ** tends to defend it. Reasonable men consider it as one of the *' most uniutelhgible and unmeaning points of the ancient system. *' To what cause is it owing tlhat modern Philosophers are prone *' to fall back into this hypothesis,' as if they really believed *' it? For of this proneness I co^ld give many instances bt sides *' this of Mr. Hume; and I lake the cause to be, that images in APPENDIX. 601 " the mind, and images let in by the senses, are so nearly allied, " and so strictly connected, that they must stand or fall together. ** The old system consistently maintained both : But the new *' system has rejected the doctrine of images let in by tiie senses, " holding, nevertlieUss, that there are images in the mind ; and, " having made this unnatural divorce of two doctrines which " ought not to be put asunder, that which they have retained " often leads them back involuntarily to that which they have " rejected." Now, as for the charge which Dr. Reid lays against Hume and others, for supposing that *' The Senses are the inlets through ** which images are received ;" I must observe, that, although such expressions occur, this is to be received as a very loose phraseology : for I do not beheve that any eminent writer, since the beginning of the last century, ever entertained any such con- ceit, as that of an image of an external object travelling into the MIND, through the eye, like a fish making its way through a water pipe. Besides this ; I cannot help thinking it was most unfortu- nate in Dr. Reid, to call it ** an unnatural divorce," to separate the notion of images being in the mind, from that of their being let in by the/ senses. For, when we take along with us the fact, now so fully established, that these ideas are not loose diiached images in the mind, but are the mind's own impressions or affections, it becomes the most natural and logical proceed- ing that can be, to divorce them from any supposition that they are let in tiirough the channels of the senses. Dr. Reid thought that the two doctrines " are so nearly allied, and so strictly " connected, that they must stand or fall together T — and that *' they ought not to be put asunder." The truth is, that if Ideas or Sensations he supposed to be loose detached beings, floating in the mind, ** like fish enveloped in water,'' or '* con- " tained therein like wafers in a box," as was contemplated by the author of " The Light of Nature Pursued," and indeed by Bishop Berkeley; it must then be supposed that these ideas had some way of getting into the mind, because it is admitted, on all sides, that they arc occasioned by things from without Hu, Mi. " 2 Q 602 APPENDIX. us: and, upon THIS assumption. Dr. Reid would indeed be justitied in saying tiiat the notion of images in the mind, and that of images let in hy the senses^ must stand or fall together. But the moment we recognise that grand fundamental truth which the School of Reid itfelf has from the beginning labored to bring into universal acknowledgnient, and which, also, I have humbly endeavoured to show has been in all ages recognised, even by the advocates of the Ideal Theory themselves, — a truth which indeed has completely triumphed over all the fallacies and errors of that Theory, namely, that our Sensations are nothing but affections or occasional states of the Mind itself, it becomes absurd for a moment to suppose that affections or impressions of this nature have any connection with a belief of their being let in through the channels of the senses. Page 156. For " or" read of, 387 " substantive or ideas" read or substantive ideas. 403 " of" read so. 436 line 21 " supporter" read supporters. 438 19 "to be," read to signifiy. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED This book i^ dife on tfaei|^Mi^e stamped below, or on the date fo whidi renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 7 DAY USE DURING SESSIONS Sfjn^^cR APR 2 8 1957 7 \^ Iff JUL 3 REC'D-4 PM LD 21-50m-12,'61 (C4796sl0)476 General Library University of California Berkeley U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES II III III CD2TM7flTMM