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RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Baron S. A. Korff, D. C. L.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
division of international law
confidential print
Pamphlet Series of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Division of International Law
Confidential Print
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
BY
Baron S. A. Korff, D. C. L.
Professor of Political Science and History in the School of Foreign Service,
Georgetoivn University, and Sometime Professor of Russian Laiv
and History in the University of Helsingfors and
Women's University of Petrograd
WASHINGTON
PUBLISHED BY THE ENDOWMENT
1921
COKVRIGHT I92I
BY THE
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
GIBBON BROS , INC.. PRINTERS. WASHINGTON
£^ k
NOTE
A Conference on the Limitation of Armament was called on
August 11, 1921, by the Government of the United States, to
meet in Washington on November 11, 1921, the third anni-
versary of the signing of the armistice between the victorious
Allied and Associated Powers and Germany.
The representatives of the Powers originally invited to the
Conference were the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan,
for the consideration of the question of the limitation of arma-
ment, and China for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern
Questions. Later, representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands
and Portugal were invited to take part In the discussion of
questions concerning the Pacific.
The tentative program agreed upon embraces the following
subjects :
Limitation of Armament
1. Limitation of naval armament, under which shall be discussed:
(a) Basis of limitation.
(b) Extent.
{c) Fulfillment.
2. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.
3. Limitation of land armament.
Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
1. Questions relating to China.
First: Principles to be applied.
Second : Application.
Subjects :
(a) Territorial integrity.
(b) Administrative integrity.
(c) Open door — equality of commercial and industrial opportunity.
(d) Concessions, monopolies or preferential economic privileges.
(e) Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese
Eastern Railway.
(/) Preferential railroad rates.
(g) Status of existing commitments.
2. Siberia (similar headings).
3. Mandated islands (unless questions earlier settled).
Electrical communications in the Pacific.
VI NOTE
Under the heading of "Status of Existing Commitments" it is expected
that opportunity will be afforded to consider and to reach an understanding
with respect to unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of com-
mitments under which claims of rights may hereafter be asserted.
In the belief that the dissemination of information regarding
the status of armaments, the collection of official documents
throwing light upon the situation in the Pacific, and the furnish-
ing of accurate accounts of the issues involved in some of the
more important problems confronting the Conference, would
render a service to the public and perhaps even to the delegates
to the Conference, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace has undertaken the preparation and publication of a series
of pamphlets of which the present pamphlet is one.
The meeting of so many nations in conference, following upon
the close of a great war, is in itself an event of no mean import-
ance. The holding of a conference upon the limitation of arma-
ment in succession to the First Hague Peace Conference called
to consider the burden of armaments and the means for its de-
crease, with the possibility of an agreement in conference upon
some of the questions of international import in addition to
armaments, is an indication that the world is returning to "nor-
malcy" and turning to the experience of The Hague.
That the Conference may be successful In all the phases of its
program should be the desire of men and women of good-will
in all parts of the world.
James Brown Scott,
Director.
Washington, D. C,
October 31. 1921.
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. Penetration into Siberia I
II. Relations with China 7
III. Relations with Japan 20
IV. Relations with Mongolia 33
V. Present Outlook 38
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
I. Penetration into Siberia
Slow, but very steady, was the advance of Russia into Siberia.
For centuries did the Russians move onward, gradually driving
back, conquering or assimilating the Mongolian aborigines. For
a very long time Siberia seemed only a vast wilderness and a
happy hunting ground for the fur trader and trapper. Later,
and mainly on account of its great distance from European Russia,
the Siberian country was used by the czars for purposes of penal
colonization. Thus, there grew up that sad reputation, which
clung to Siberia for many generations, of a bleak land of exile,
where human suffering attained its very limit. The famous book
of George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System, helped much to
popularize these ideas, bringing home to the outside world the
worst sides of the former autocratic regime of Russia.
Yet this conception of Siberia is a very wrong one. Behind
and around the penal settlements there developed a most healthy
colonization by some of the best types of Russian Slavs. The
peasant of European Russia was attracted by the fertile soil and
agricultural resources and possibilities of Siberia and by the rela-
tive individual independence of his political and social life there;
so he willingly migrated eastward, taking possession of the fertile
land and forests he could find. But very naturally, such a pioneer
movement called forth the selection of the best type of individuals,
the most enterprising, most energetic and intellectually alert
citizens, who thus soon constituted in Siberia a very progressive
and flourishing population of settlers. Then, too, political
exiles were nearly always the pick of the Russian educated classes,
carrying away with them into the wilderness such an amount of
intellectual energy that, toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, many Siberian Provinces could boast of having the best in-
tellectually developed elements of the Russian nation. It is
important to note in this respect, that racially the Siberian set-
I RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
tiers belonged all, or nearly all, to the purely Russian stock; only
among the political exiles do we find a small percentage of Poles
and of other nationalities, sent out after the Polish insurrections
of 1831 and 1863. The Mongolian, Tartar and Finnish abori-
gines were and remained mostly nomads, of a low type of culture,
and never succeeded in Influencing the Russian colonists either
culturally or politically.
The hardships of life in Siberia quickly taught the local popu-
lation self-reliance and self-confidence, strengthening the indi-
vidual will and character, adding. In other words, just those traits
that were conspicuously lacking among the Russians In the West.
Since the Siberian territory was so unusually spacious, there
always remained sufl'iclent room for further expansion. The
local population, outside the penal colonies, could move about
freely In all directions, choosing the best location and richest land
for their farms. There was no land-lordism nor any local aris-
tocracy to hamper their movements or restrict their freehold.
The government administration for many reasons was not Inter-
fering much with their Individual life, tolerating thus the estab-
lishment and development of the fundamental principles of local
autonomy and self-government. All this naturally tended to
create a remarkably prosperous, but also individualistic and
liberty-loving type of citizen, which soon crystallized into a very
Independent class of people, thoroughly Russian in their culture
and way of thinking, yet Siberian In their self-reliance and love of
their homes and of their personal freedom.
Finally, one must mention the fabulous natural wealth and re-
sources of Siberia, superior in some respects to the American and
Canadian West of the former pioneer days. On the Siberian
plains there grows the finest wheat and barley of the world. The
virgin Siberian prairies are wonderfully suited for cattle grazing;
in some places In addition there have been started extensive cul-
tures of alfalfa. Some of the Siberian districts have vast forests,
with splendid timber, still untouched by human hand. The Altai
mountain range is well known for its mineral wealth, including
most of the precious metals, and gold is found in many of the
eastern river deposits.
PENETRATION INTO SIBERIA 3
Across the whole country there flow numerous navigable
streams, forming easy and natural ways of communication be-
tween the different parts of the Siberian Provinces. There is
unfortunately one great impediment in this respect, namely, most
of these rivers run from south to north. Consequently, for a
long time Siberia was in great need of lines of communication
going west-east, and this need forcibly and materially handicapped
the normal commercial development of the country. This urgent
necessity was ultimately met by the construction of the Great
Siberian Railway, which gave Siberia a most important outlet to
European Russia in the West and the Pacific Ocean in the East.
The significance of this new channel of communications and the
role it was bound to play can be judged by the stupendous develop-
ment of the Siberian economical resources that took place from
the very first days the cross-country railway was opened for com-
mercial trafllic.
"Siberia," or the vast Asiatic possessions of Russia, lying east
of the Ural Mountains, is really composed of two very different
parts, first, the endless plains which lie between the Urals and the
Lake Baikal, and, secondly, the Far Eastern Provinces, located
east of the Baikal. These two sections are divergent in more
ways than one; they differ topographically, economically, socially
and even politically, and are bound to constitute in the future
separate political units. The Western Provinces are, and always
will remain, overwhelmingly agricultural, wheat-growing land,
dotted here and there with magnificent timber. But in turn, they
are divided into two groups of Provinces, one northern one, the
other one southern, without much contrast between them. The
four Northern Provinces, Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yeniseisk and
Irkutsk, constitute "Siberia proper" and are at present the best
developed section, with a steady rural population of thrifty and
prosperous Russian colonists. The Southern Provinces, or
"Steppe country," Semipalatinsk, Semiretchinsk and Akmolinsk,
though possessing also tremendous natural resources, are much
less mature, mostly on account of the lack of railway communi-
cations, since the Central Siberian Railway has not enough south-
ern branches to satisfy their growing needs. All these Provinces,
4 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
in the north as well as in the south, are colonized by purely Rus-
sian stock, with very few and insignificant exceptions, and are
predominantly farmers, while the penal colonization is numeri-
cally small among them. The nomad aborigines are disappear-
ing very fast and those of them who succeed in settling down ac-
quire, without any difficulty, the Russian culture and modes of
social and political life. In most places they were permitted to
retain their local tribal organizations, and the most conspicuous
among them are the Kirgiz tribes, who stand far above the other
nomads in culture and political maturity.
The colonization of the second or eastern part of Siberia pro-
ceeded from the beginning on very different lines, first, for purely
topographical reasons, and secondly, because of the distance that
separated this section of the country from European Russia, in-
tensified by the long continuance of utter lack of communication
with the outside world. It is in these regions that we find con-
centrated the mineral wealth of Siberia and it was here in the
mine fields that the Tsar's Government settled many of the penal
and political exiles; they were to work the mines and live as far
away from Russia as possible. Very naturally these settlements
developed on quite different social and political lines from the
agricultural colonies of the Western Siberian Provinces; their
economic conditions of life were also quite distinct from the
West. The steady eastward movement of the Russians brought
them finally out to the Pacific and there they soon formed a com-
mercial fringe of settlements along that coast, of an entirely
divergent character from the rest of Siberia.
The process of colonization of Eastern Siberia reminds one
very much of the development of the American Pacific coast,
when for a long time California was separated from the Middle
West and Eastern States by the wilderness of the Rocky Moun-
tains. In many other ways, too, the American movement west-
ward developed on similar lines to those of Russia in Siberia,
except that in the United States these processes of pioneer ex-
pansion had always a much more intense and potent character
than the similar processes of Russian colonizatioin of her Eastern
Siberian frontiers. One of the more important causes that con-
stantly hampered the Russian colonization movement, as com-
PENETRATION INTO SIBERIA D
pared with America, was her inefficient autocratic form of gov-
ernment. Another reason for her lagging behind was the pres-
ence in Eastern Siberia of the penal colonies, which naturally
could not take a full share in the economic development of the
country.
Eastern Siberia is composed of four Provinces and two sepa-
rate Districts, the Transbaikal, Amur, Maritime and Yakutsk
Provinces and the Kamchatka and Sakhaline Districts. The
Transbaikal Province is rich in minerals and has a numerous
Cossack and Buriat population, racially in many cases intermixed,
as well as many of the penal settlements. The Maritime Prov-
ince, with Vladivostok as its capital, is on the contrary over-
whelmingly commercial; it is the Russian California. Yakutsk
and the vast territory of the Kamchatka Peninsula are yet very
sparsely populated, though possessing important natural re-
sources, promising mines, splendid fisheries and a huge supply of
fur-bearing animals. The Island of Sakhaline is also rich in
mines, coal and timber. The southern half of the Island was lost
to Russia, by the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which
ceded it to Japan. At present the Japanese seem to have taken
definite possession of the northern half of the Island as well.
In considering the history of Siberian colonization one comes
to the following conclusions : First, that Siberia, taken as a whole,
has an exceptionally potential economic future, on account of its
tremendous natural wealth. It is a land of great promise, mar-
velously rich, though hardly yet exploited to the limit of its possi-
bilities. Secondly, Siberia consists to two very different parts,
which are bound to constitute two distinct political units. On the
one hand, there are the Western and Southern Provinces, over-
whelmingly agricultural, with a population of thrifty peasant
farmers, an extremely individualistic, self-reliant and liberty-lov-
ing people, and in the main, with distinctly conservative leanings.
These settlers own their land and are very jealous of their free-
hold, interested in local self-government, as long as the latter
concerns their village or county, but not caring much for the out-
side world, as long as they can get a good profit from their agri-
cultural products. The cooperative movement in all its forms is
very strong among these Siberian peasants and has achieved re-
6 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
markable economic and to some extent even political results.
The Eastern or P'ar Eastern Provinces, on the other hand, possess
very different characteristics, commerce and industry visibly domi-
nating. There exists, too, in these latter Provinces a much
stronger racial intercourse with non-Russian nationalities, which
necessarily influenced the life and character of the Russian colo-
nists.
These important differences lead to a third weighty conclusion,
the different political status which these two sections of Siberia
are bound to maintain in the future Russian Commonwealth.
Whereas Western Siberia will be perfectly content with firmly
established local self-government (for instance, some form of
well developed zemstvo organization), provided economic and
financial independence from the center would be efliciently guar-
anteed, the Eastern section will demand much more and will
surely endeavor to curtail the powers of the Central Government
to a possible minimum.
The population of Siberia can be roughly divided into the fol-
lowing groups. The main body of inhabitants all over the coun-
try, constituting the vast numerical majority, are everywhere, ex-
cept in the extreme East, farmer-settlers of the peasant class of
purely Russian racial stock. Not much differing from them are
the Cossacks, settled in the Siberian Provinces by government
order and constituting autonomous, self-governing units, with a
semi-military organization of their own. The Transbaikal and
Amur Cossacks, however, are very much racially intermixed with
the local aborigines of Mongolian origin. The West-Siberian
Cossacks succeeded in preserving much better their racial purity.
Then there are the numerous penal and political colonies, many
of them thriving and thrifty. The religious dissenters among
them are exceptionally wealthy and prosperous, constituting prob-
ably the best type of the Siberian population. Canada has some
such colonies, though less numerous and less prosperous than the
Siberian nonconformists.
Scattered among all these Russian colonies live the Mongolian
nomads and aborigines, governed by their own chiefs and tribes-
men, but under the control of Russian authorities. In Western
RELATIONS WITH CHINA /
Siberia they live quite separately from the Russian population; in
the Eastern Provinces they freely intermingle. Further, there
is the commercial class in the towns and cities, a trading bourge-
oisie, an intelligentzia or numerically small educated class, pos-
sessing all the characteristic traits of the town population in gen-
eral, but very independent and self-reliant in its tastes and ideas.
Finally, in all the larger Russlansettlemcnts there istobe found and
in always increasing numbers a scatteredmassofChineseand Mon-
golians, coming intoSIberia from across the frontier, sometimes
temporarily, for commercial purposes, but only too often with the
intention of permanently establishing themselves as local citizens.
The great differences mentioned between Western and East-
ern Siberia are of modern origin, but constantly increase in poten-
tial force, as time goes on. In former days they did not influ-
ence the development of the Russian Empire, nor the policies of
its Government. The latter did not care about them, often try-
ing to frustrate or stop them, though without much success on the
whole, and their natural tendencies described above proved to be
stronger and of greater vitality than St. Petersburg ever sus-
pected. In the future they are bound to play a decisive role in
the process of shaping the fate of the Russian Commonwealth.
II. Relations With China
In the process of Siberian colonization Russia came very soon
and naturally into contact with China. In the early stages, as
long as the Russian settlers still kept west of the Baikal, relations
with China were very cordial, but rather abstract. Once in a
while we hear of a Russian religious mission going to China, or
of the appointment of a consul or agent, intended to look after
the mutual trade interests, the chief article of import from China
always having been Chinese tea. This peaceful period lasted
approximately till the middle of the nineteenth century,' when
unexpectedly the whole situation entirely altered.
'Typical for this period was the Russo-Chinese treaty of Kiakhta, signed October
21, 1727, which formed for more than a century the basis of the mutual relations
between these two countries. The text of this treaty can be found in the collection
of Sir Edw. Hertslet, Trenties, etc. het'v:een Great Britain and China: and hrt<v:ri'?i
8 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
The great change was called forth by two new and important
factors. First, Russia began to push energetically forward, in-
vading and colonizing the regions on the left bank of the Amur
River; and secondly, other European Powers started a lively com-
petition for getting control of the Chinese markets and in their
mutual rivalry betrampled the most sacred rights of sovereignty
and independence of the Middle Kingdom. Russia unfortu-
nately played no small role in this diplomatic game, which finally
led to her own undoing.
Up to the fifties, we can find many private and official attempts
on the part of Russians to penetrate into the Far-Eastern wilder-
ness, but mostly without any lasting results. There was no sys-
tem in these expeditions and all of them failed to establish any
permanent cultural influence. They could conquer, but could not
colonize nor civilize. They subdued the natives, without being
able to enlighten them. The situation changed only in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century. At that time Russia sent consecu-
tive military and diplomatic missions to China, wresting from the
latter some important privileges. Several treaties were signed,
granting Russia most valuable advantages.
Russia first signed a treaty of commerce, in order to protect
her trade along the Chinese border, but especially concerning the
Mongolian caravan routes and the recognition of freedom for
herself from all custom duties. ' The importance of this treaty
lies in the fact, that it formed the basis of the claims of Russia
during the following decades. The enumeration of privileges,
for instance, found in the agreement of 1851, was constantly re-
ferred to later on by the different Russian diplomatic agents and
representatives.
Secondly, in 1858, when the Russian penetration and coloniza-
tion along the northern banks of the Amur River had already
taken definite form, the two countries signed a new treaty of
China and Foreign Poivers, (London, 1908) vol. I; or in the official publication of
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Recueil des Trait-'s {Sbornik Traktatof)
(St. Petersburg, 1902), vol. I. An impartial and detailed history of the early Rus-
sian expansion eastward can be found in the volume of F. A. Colder, Russian Ex-
pansion on the Pacific (Cleveland, 1914).
'This is the agreement, known as the Kouldja Treaty of July 25, 1851. Cf.
IIertslet, op. cit., vol. I, p. 305 ; and Shornik, vol. I, no. 32, p. 242.
RFXATIONS WITH CHINA ' J
friendship, delineating the frontier regions and p.roclaIming Rus-
sian sovereignty to the north of that stream.' In other words,
from that day on Russia was firmly established In the F\ir Eastern
Provinces, China having lost all her juridical claims to the terri-
tories lying north of the Amur. A few weeks later the Russian
commercial privileges were restated and expanded to the whole
of China, In an agreement signed at Tientsin.^ Russia could
hence trade in any open port of China, not restricting herself as
previously to frontier places. She could send envoys to Peking,
appoint consuls In the open ports and detach vessels of war to
protect them. Special mention was also made of the Interests of
the Russian religious missions in China.
Not content with this achievement, Russia persuaded China to
sign a new agreement two years later, once more enumerating the
privileges of the Russian agents and merchants, as well as the
advantages secured for Russian trade and the extraterritorial
jurisdiction,'' somewhat extending them and interpreting the
granted privileges In Russia's favor.
These treaties with China which have been enumerated had
three important consequences for Russia. First, as was pointed
out above, they finally and juridically established the sovereignty
of Russia in the new settled Provinces north of the Amur River
and as far east as the Pacific. Russia thus reached her geogra-
phic eastern boundaries and found an outlet to the sea. Secondly,
these treaties fundamentally changed the character of the mutual
relations of the two countries. Russia was gradually becoming
much more aggressive towards China, unhesitatingly, but sel-
fishly pursuing two main objects In her new Far Eastern policy,
viz., the colonization of the Amur and Maritime Provinces and
the securing of the North China markets for the benefit of the
Russian trade.
^Treaty of Aighoun, May 16, 1858 ; cf. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 310; Sbornik, no. 33, p.
247. The demarcation of the Mongolian boundaries was agreed upon by a special
conference in 1864; cf. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 329.
2June 13, 1858; cf. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 311; Sbornik, no. 34, p. 249.
'Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860; cf. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 318; Sbornik, no.
35, p. 255. Hertslet also publishes the text of a revised convention for land trade,
signed in Peking, April 27, 1869, which is not mentioned in the Russian Sbornik;
this convention restates the privileges of the Russian trade in China and reaffirms
all the advantages granted to the Russian merchants.
10 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
In both cases she was for the time being completely successful.
The colonization and development of these new Far Eastern
Provinces were progressing by leaps and bounds. Previously,
the settlements east of the Lake Baikal were looked upon by the
Russian Government exclusively as penal colonies, among which
the political exiles played a dominant role; now, quite another
element of settlers began to move onward, exploring, colonizing
and consolidating the regions along the Amur and further north-
east. These Russian colonists soon became thoroughly con-
vinced of the tremendous economic potentialities of this country,
as well as of the wealth of its natural resources and of the ad-
vantages which they could derive from the exploitation of the
North China markets. In other words, it suddenly dawned upon
the Russians, what the opening up of the Far East might mean
for the future of Siberia and for the whole of the Russian com-
merce. The penal and political colonization of the eastern wild-
erness was thus soon transformed into a pioneer movement, which
was bound to mean a new epoch for Siberia and her Inhabitants.
In order to further consolidate the colonization of the Amur
Province, the Russian Government continued settling there groups
of Cossack families, who were expected to provide for the mili-
tary defence of the frontiersmen.
The climax of these processes of colonization was attained,
just as in the case of California, when the Russians reached the
Pacific coast and founded the city of Vladivostok. This was the
final link of the Russian Empire, connecting European Russia
through Siberia and the Far East to the Pacific coast. In order
to help the pioneers to take possession of the coast, the Russian
Government sent out warships for the further exploration of the
Eastern Pacific and for the protection of the young colonies there;
and naval commanders were duly instructed to hoist the Russian
flag in the most suitable harbors along the coast, thus establishing
and supporting the claims of sovereignty of the Russian Empire.
The offensive character of the Russian policy toward China
described above can be explained by its chief object of securing
the North China markets for the Russian merchants. It coin-
cided exactly with the aggressiveness of the Western Powers in
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 11
the South, but with this evident difference, that Russian aggres-
sion, as proved conclusively by the contents of the cited treaties,
had mainly the so-called "Land Trade" in view, and, more-
over, concerned Provinces and districts of relatively little in-
terest to China. Both Mongolia and northern Manchuria were
only sparsely populated, mostly by backward Mongolian tribes,
far distant from the center and unimportant from the political
point of view, whereas the European invasion took place in the
very heart of China, making use of her great weakness during and
after the unhappy Tai-Ping rebellion and taking advantage in the
political field by undermining the principles of Chinese sover-
eignty.
Thus can be explained the seemingly strange fact, that in some
cases Peking was quite ready to cooperate with St. Petersburg in
the development of the Northern Provinces by Russians, because,
first, the Chinese realized the advantages which could accrue to
their country from the successful opening up of these new regions,
and secondly, they hoped to find, and several times did find, sup-
port in Russia against the other Powers. In other words, the
Peking Government was at times during that period a willing
victim of Russia's Far Eastern expansion and was lending a
friendly hand to the further unfolding of the Chinese relations
with the Empire of the Czars. For the time being a certain
equilibrium was established in the mutual relations of these two
neighboring empires, Russia Intent on the consolidation of her
colonization along the Amur River, China content with the In-
creasing trade on the Russian frontier.
In 1881 a new treaty was signed by Russia and China under the
pretext of the former country returning to the latter the Province
of III, which the Russians had occupied since 1871, but securing
for Russia an Indemnity of nine million gold rubles.' This how-
ever was a blind, back of which we find important privileges once
more reaffirmed to Russia's advantage. Namely, again they
'Treaty of St. Petersburg of February 24, 1881; cf. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 340;
Sbornik, no. 36, p. 264. The history of the transactions preceding the signature of
the Treaty of 1881 is given in detail by H. Cordier, Histoire des relations de la
Chine (Paris, 1902), vol. ii, ch. ix-xii.
12 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
concerned the questions of land trade, the trade routes, consul-
ates, custom tariffs, etc., enumerated in detail in a separate un-
derstanding (called Rrglement), attached to this treaty. Thus
matters stood for fifteen years, when much more serious troubles
started for distracted China and when a new and formidable
competitor appeared in the Far East in the person of Japan.
Meanwhile, Russia, having by this time achieved a marked suc-
cess in her colonization of the newly acquired Provinces, began
to turn her attention much farther South, namely, toward Man-
churia proper and the Kingdom of Korea. Already in the eight-
ies there had arisen a certain friction concerning Korea, England
having occupied but later evacuated the Islands of Port Hamil-
ton, and Russia having increased her influence at the Court of
Seoul. Worse was to come, however, after the defeat of China
in 1895. The intention of victorious Japan was to establish per-
manently her control over Korea, which was hence entirely and
forever lost to China, and it was here, in Korea, that the first
clash came between Japan and Russia.
By the Treaty of Peace of Shimonoseki,^ China was forced to
cede to Japan the Liaotung peninsula, with the splendid fortress
of Port Arthur, and was made to pay a heavy indemnity, with no
money in her treasury to meet this obligation. And it was that
moment of hopeless weakness that the European Powers chose
to take final hold of the Chinese markets. It was to be accom-
plished by loaning China money, with which she could pay her
indemnity to Japan, and by forcing the latter to disgorge some
of her territorial acquisitions, namely, Liaotung and Port Arthur.
The first hint of this new policy came from China's most trusted
counselor, Sir Robert Hart, who informed the Peking Govern-
ment that England, for certain considerations, was willing to
float a loan which would enable China to pay the Japanese in-
demnity. Considering the straits in which the Peking Govern-
ment was laboring at the time, it was welcome news for it.
But as soon as the rumors of such an offer spread abroad, the
other Powers naturally endeavored to do the same thing. Russia,
'English translation in J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements I'/ith and
coniertiing China, Jc9J-1919 (New York, 1921), vol. i, p. 18.
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 13
backed by France, also volunteered a loan, which China, after
some hesitation, also accepted. Germany followed, and so the
ball was started rolling, enslaving China to the European Gov-
ernments by this subtle means of financial assistance. All the
loans were to be covered by the income derived from Chinese
customs, taxes on salt and the Likin tax.
Having accomplished this, the European Governments realized
that the consequent exploitation of the Chinese markets could
progress favorably only on condition of building up the necessary
lines of transportation. Thus, there started a feverish activity
for acquiring railroad concessions and using them for political
purposes as well.^
At that time there stood at the head of the Chinese Govern-
ment a careful and far-sighted statesman, who realized very well
the predicament of his poor country and that it could not do
without the support of a friendly European Power. Accord-
ingly, Li Hung-Chang chose Russia for this role; and during his
whole career of government leadership he tried to base his policy
on Russian friendship and support, bringing upon himself accu-
sations of all sorts of crimes and immorality, none of which were
ever proved. This friendly policy of Li toward Russia became
evident even during the Shimonoseki transactions. Returning to
Peking, after having signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan, he
at once started conversations with the Russian representatives
relating to concerted action in their mutual foreign policy and
promising Russia new advantages in Eastern Siberia.
His Peking conversations soon became noised abroad, creating
a great sensation. Local newspapers, the North China Herald
among others, got hold of these rumors and published, in October,
1896, an account of a supposed secret agreement, subsequently
known as the Cassini Convention, bearing the name of the Rus-
sian Minister to Peking, Count Cassini.'* As a matter of fact no
^The enumeration and details of these loan-agreements, 1894-1896, can be found
in MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i ; cf. also W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and In-
terests in China (Baltimore, 1920).
^Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., and Willoughby, op. cit.
^It is often quoted by historians and politicians, though H. Cordier in his Histoire
des relations de la Chine, has long ago pointed out the vagueness and incoherence
of t!ie newspaper text.
14 RELATIONS WITH CHINA
such convention ever existed. The Peking conversations of Li
with Cassini were only a part, and probably the least important
one, of the secret diplomatic intercourse between Russia and
China; much more momentous transactions took place in St.
Petersburg and Berlin, during the voyage of Li Hung-Chang
abroad, in the preceding winter and spring. The newspaper text,
on the whole seems to be a vague and confusing combination of
the gist of several agreements, the bank and railway concessions
and partly the alliance of May, 1896, all of them concluded in the
foregoing months of Li's travels in Europe.
He had been commissioned by his government to go to Russia
and represent China at the Tsar's coronation. In consequence,
foreseeing the necessity of an amicable understanding with
Russia, Li carefully paved his way in the political situation. He
knew that Russia was just then turning over a leaf in her Far
Eastern policy. He realized that the period of Russian coloniza-
tion was now shifting into a policy of expansion, and he cleverly
made preparations to meet Russia half way and cooperate with
her, making ceratin concessions to her and staying her impossible
demands, but all with the one main purpose in mind of finding in
Russia an ally capable of assisting him in warding off the aggres-
sion of the other Powers, whom Li, as has been said, feared much
more than his northern neighbor. As soon as Li reached St.
Petersburg, diplomatic conversations with him were at once
started by the Russian Government, pursuing three parallel ob-
jects, the securing of two concessions and a friendly alliance.
In order to appreciate the political situation of those days, we
must bear in mind the composition and policies of the govern-
ment which Li found on his arrival in St. Petersburg. At the
head of the Ministry of Finance during those days was a very
strong and exceedingly energetic statesman, S. J. Witte, who had
set his mind on the development of the Far Eastern markets of
Russia, considering them to be a most profitable opening for the
young Russian industry and a means of exploiting Siberia through
the just completed cross-country railroad. Witte thought, and
very rightly so, that the outlet to the Pacific would be a tremend-
ous stimulus for the commercial and industrial development of
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 15
Siberia and prove of no small advantage even to the Industries of
European Russia. Having these objects in view, he endeavored
to get Li Hung-Chang to agree to grant Russia two concessions,
one concerning a bank, the other relating to the construction of
a railway across Manchuria. After some bickering on both sides
these ends were attained.
Witte then started, with the help of French bankers, a Russo-
Chinese bank, with a capital of 11)4 million rubles and 5 mil-
lion taels. The president was to be a Chinese figurehead, but
the active managers were Russians, working under the direction
of Witte.' This bank was meant to carry out Witte's policy of
peaceful penetration of Northern China, exploit the Manchurian
market and establish the Russian political influence in the Far
East. But it was also meant to finance Witte's plans of railroad
construction. The Siberian main line had just reached the Baikal
Lake and now was to be continued farther, following the north-
ern bend of the Amur River. Witte had conceived the plan of
leasing from China a strip of territory across Manchuria in order
to construct the Siberian railroad in a straight line to Vladivostok
instead of building it along the northern curve of the Amur. It
shortened the railroad considerably, but at. the same time gave
the Russians a firm grip on the Manchurian market. From the
middle of Northern Manchuria Witte planned to build another
line south to Port Arthur, with a branch south-westward to
Shanhaikwan, securing for Russia in addition to the Manchurian
market, a second outlet to the Pacific.
It was an elaborate and clever program, intended to establish
an extensive system of peaceful penetration. Unfortunately,
the peaceful aims of Witte were later on overshadowed by mili-
.taristic and imperialistic designs of other Russian Ministers. It
is a very usual case, when the military elements are tempted to get
control of the foreign expansion policy of a government.
The second agreement, concerning the described plans of rail-
road construction, was finally signed on September 8, 1896, and
curiously enough in Berlin.- There is good reason to believe that
'August-September, 1896. Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i, p. 74.
'Cf. MacMurray, ibid.
16 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Witte's policy toward China was not only well known in Germany
but that much of its inspiration came Berlin. Germany
then was playing a sure game, realizing very well Russia's inter-
nal weakness; heads she won, tails Russia lost. The German
Government was not averse to seeing Russia become entangled in
the Far East. The more she was involved in the Chinese trouble,
the less she was able to participate in European questions and
support her Western ally, France. The latter country, on the
contrary, was actuated by purely financial considerations in back-
ing the Russian Far Eastern policy. The Paris bankers thought
it was a good investment for French capital, and willingly loaned
Witte the money necessary to start the Bank, and for the rail-
way construction.
The Russian Government, however, was not content to stop
there. Simultaneously with the transactions concerning the two
concessions, the Russians were conducting with Li purely political
conversations as well during the spring of 1896, and in absolute
secrecy convinced him of the necessity of signing a treaty of alli-
ance, which was directed against China's dreaded enemy, Japan. i
It is interesting to note that in Article I Japanese expansion in
Korea is also mentioned, parallel to any possible aggression on
her part in China or Russia, as a casus foederis. The other
articles describe in detail the possible military cooperation of the
two Contracting Powers in case of a war with Japan. In Article
IV is found a clear reference to the possibility of Russia building
a railway across Manchuria, but with this difference: in May,
1896, Russia stipulated such a construction only in case of war,
whereas in September of the same year China agreed that Russia
should build the line immediately in any case.
Such were the three ominous agreements signed by Russia and
China in the course of 1896. It speedily became evident, how-
ever, that Russia was even then not satisfied to remain where she
was and started a further expansion southward, trying to lay a
hand on Korea too. Russian agents appeared in numbers at
Seoul and Russian officers were appointed instructors in the
Korean army. The Korean arsenal was placed under Russian
'Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i, p. 81.
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 17
supervision and the Korean Court consulted Russian advisers,
and so forth.
China at first looked favorably on such developments, evi-
dently hoping that Russia would wrest Korea from the Japanese
and later reestablish the lost Chinese suzerainty. Japan, how-
ever, was in no way willing to forego her interests and advan-
tages in Korea. She was seemingly ready to acknowledge Rus-
sia's influence in the North, but on condition of a reciprocal
recognition of her own position in the South. This, the Russian
Government never understood, but pushed serenely southward,
thus bringing upon themselves a disastrous conflict with Japan.
It was at that time that Witte's original mistake became evi-
dent. He personally had in view exclusively a commercial policy
of peaceful penetration, using as means of expansion his Russo-
Chinese Bank and the Chinese Eastern Railway. They were
powerful agencies, no doubt, for the spreading of the Russian
control in the Far East; they soon acquired a good reputation and
helped to exploit the North China markets. But behind the com-
mercial flag there cropped up political influences, which sooner
or later were bound to thwart Witte's plans and give them a much
more militant character. Here lay the greatest possible danger
for Russia. The more she became involved in the Manchurian
enterprise, the stronger were the temptations to move farther
and farther south, toward the warm sea, but also right into the
path of a formidable rival.
Instead of heeding the growing danger, the military and na-
tionalistic elements of the Russian Government decided to take
their chances in pushing the Russian claims to the limit. They
were not satisfied with Witte's plan of acquiring another commer-
cial outlet in the Pacific, but wanted in addition to get a military
stronghold there as well. Proofs exist that the inspiration for
building a fortified port on the Gulf of Pechili came again from
Berlin. 1 The Russian Government, however, willingly adopted
the idea and secured a hold on Port Arthur and the Liaotung
peninsula, which the European Powers had forced Japan to re-
' Cf. Herman Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence (New York, 1917),
and Isaac Don Levine, Letters from ilie Kaiser to the Czar (New York, 1920).
18 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
turn to China a very short time before. This, for Japan, meant
insult added to injury. It must be said to Witte's honor, how-
ever, that he at once reahzed the terrible danger of such an
action and vigorously protested, but to no avail; the militarists
and imperialists were already in control.
In December 1897 a Russian squadron, commanded by Ad-
miral Doubassofif, occupied Port Arthur. The Russian Charge
d'Affaires informed the Chinese Government that Russia had no
Intention of infringing the sovereignty of China, but merely de-
sired to protect her from the aggression of other Powers. Rus-
sia promised to withdraw as soon as this danger disappeared.
Germany soon followed, occupying under the same pretext Klao-
chow;^ England took possession of Weihaiwel; and France
seized Kuangchowwan. Thus, instead of saving China from
outward aggression, Russia's action proved to be the first step
towards the dangerous foreign invasion of Chinese territory
which humbled China's prestige and encroached upon her rights
of sovereignty.
All of these cases of occupation took the legal form of "lease
of territory," very similar to the idea embodied in the Russian
lease of the strip of land across Manchuria for the Siberian
Railroad.^ Chinese sovereignty was nominally maintained and
respected, but the local administration was given entirely Into
the hands of the occupying foreign Powers. The convention for
the lease of Port Arthur to Russia was signed In Peking on March
27, 1898, and an additional agreement, defining the boundaries
of the leased territory, on May 7, 1898. By this understanding,
the sovereignty of China was explicitly recognized, as well as
the allegiance of the Chinese subjects, but Russia acquired all
governmental rights, being allowed to establish her own courts
of law and administration and given practically a free hand there.
A few weeks later (July 6, 1898), an agreement was signed con-
cerning the building of the southern branch of the Russian rail-
way. This was to connect the Siberian main line running through
'Germany actually s'gned the agreement with China a few days earlier than
Russia, March 6 and 27, respectively.
^Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 112 ei serj.; also WiLi-OUCnnv, Foreujyi Rights
mid Interei'.s in China, (Baltimore, 1920).
RELATIONS WITH CHINA 19
the north of Manchuria with the new outlets on the Liaotung
peninsula, Port Arthur (for military purposes) and Dalny (for
commercial use) .
The following years were full of political complications, in-
volving Russia more and more In the Far Eastern tangle. The
first crisis arose in the years 1900-1901, during and after the
Boxer uprising, when the Empress Regent of China vainly en-
deavored to get rid of the foreigners. While the fighting was
going on m and around Peking, the European Powers seemed In
friendly accord and acted In cooperation; but as soon as the up-
rising was quelled, very serious divergencies appeared and the
different Powers soon drifted away from one another, each one
intent on pursuing its own selfish policy. Russia's evident inten-
tion in that case was to assure herself an absolutely free hand in
Manchuria and thus consolidate her Influence In the Far East.
She succeeded In getting a valuable concession in Tientsin, and
occupying Newchwang and Anshanshan.
By this time, however, the Western Powers became thoroughly
alarmed at the growth of Russia's influence and consequently
began to exert considerable pressure upon her, trying to make
her release her hold on North China. It was due to that pres-
sure that Russia concluded a new agreement with China, signed
on April 8, 1902, ostensibly to reestablish Chinese authority in
Manchuria, in which she promised to withdraw the Russian
troops, leaving China to take over the protection of the railway
and of the Russian citizens.'
Further promises followed on the part of Russia, but, to the
great anxiety of the other Powers, none of these promises seemed
to have been kept. Russia was slowly consolidating her position
in North China and was not willing to withdraw. All sorts of
rumors were being spread on every side, intensifying the world's
distrust of Russia's policy and naturally magnifying her aggres-
siveness and imperialism. The diplomatic atmosphere was be-
coming steadily hotter and the political horizon darker. Even
among the Russian ofliclals there were men, who felt the storm
'Details of the cited transactions between Russia and China are given in Mac-
Murray, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 326 et seq.
20 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
coming and warned their Government, counseling moderation,
but without success.
The policy of Russia during the fateful years of 1902-1903
seemed on a declining plane. The military and nationalistic ele-
ments were definitely in control in St. Petersburg and, as usual,
absolutely blind to the growing dangers of the situation.
During all this trouble China played a very passive role. Out-
wardly her sovereignty was still respected, or at least often men-
tioned, but, as a matter of fact, her territory was simply the play-
ground for European diplomats and politicians. The Japanese
war and Russia's defeat made no material change in the posi-
tion of China. The former dominance of Russia was now re-
placed by a very friendly and close cooperation of Russia and
Japan; and the old policy of exploitation was continual with little
regard for the interests or wishes of the Chinese. Consequently,
the relations between Russia and China, from 1904 to the Great
War, show a marked absence of independence on the part of
China.
III. Relations with Japan
Russia's relations with Japan, as compared to her relations
with China, are very different in character. First, they are of
quite recent origin, and, secondly, from the very beginning they
have been exceedingly militant.
Russia came into close contact with Japan only at the time of
the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Russia was then energetically
backing the Chinese plenipotentiaries; with the active support of
the other European Powers, she was endeavoring to deprive
Japan of the fruit of her victory, by forcing her to return to
China the Liaotung peninsula and by granting China loans with
which to pay the war indemnity.
Russia took this hostile stand toward Japan because she her-
self had developed definite ambitions in the Far East. One must
remember in this respect that the nineties of last century were a
period of industrial expansion in Russia, and that among her
statesmen there were several men of the type of S. J. Witte, who
had made up their minds that the Far East could be a splendid
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 21
outlet for Siberia. Not knowing much about Japan, they had a
thorough contempt for that country, but reahzed that the Japan-
ese claims, as formulated at Shimonoseki, would forcibly impede
Russia and compete with their policy of controlling the North
China markets; hence the desire of the Russian Government to
frustrate any further Japanese advance in China.
Japan, on the other hand, flushed with her easy victory over
China, was anxious to consolidate her influence, at least in Korea,
and to some extent in Southern Manchuria. She must have felt
very keenly the humiliation inflicted upon her by the Great
Powers, who desired to limit her in the use of her victory.'
There is no doubt that, had Russia been careful in handling the
situation, an easy compromise would have been achieved. Japan
was still weak and a novice in European diplomacy, ready to ac-
cept a policy of cooperation, provided it would not hurt her
pride or damage her national interests. With a better under-
standing of these circumstances, Russia could have succeeded in
amicably delineating the mutual spheres of interest, although cer-
tainly at China's expense. She would have kept the northern
markets, permitting Japan to spread her influence southward.
Such a compromise, however, was made impossible by the increas-
ing power of the military and nationalistic elements among the
Russian Court and government circles. And it was among these
circles least of all that there could be found any desire to under-
stand the Japanese. Russia's attitude toward Japan, in conse-
quence, became extremely overbearing, irritating and exaspera-
ting, and thus from the very beginning the mutual relations of
these two countries were full of suspicion and distrust, which
created many dangerous misunderstandings. Japan had to
learn very early the clandestine ways of European secret diplo-
macy.
Russia was by no means content to spread her influence in
northern Manchuria and to exploit the North China markets.
She also wanted Korea and Southern Manchuria, endeavoring
'The treaty of peace was signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, and already,
on November 8 of the same year, Japan had to "retrocede" to China the Liaotung
peninsula with the coveted fortress of Port Arthur. Cf. MacMurray, op. cit.,
vol. 1, pp. 18, 50.
22 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
to establish herself very firmly in Seoul. This hold over China
was to be acquired, as we have seen, by means of foreign loans.
Yet, this very unfavorable setting of the opening relations
between Russia and Japan could not produce disastrous conse-
quences at once; it took some years for them to become evident.
As above stated, Japan at that moment was a newcomer in the
game, feeling still weak and isolated, and she could not well
afford vigorous protests. Therefore she outwardly subsided,
keeping her temper and biding her time. The Tokyo Govern-
ment, notwithstanding the mutual distrust, realized that some
modus Vivendi must be established with Russia and consented to
start diplomatic conversations, which very soon resulted in the
conclusion of several agreements.
First, there was signed at St. Petersburg on May 27, 1895,
a treaty of commerce and navigation, securing for the citizens of
both countries the usual privileges of equality of treatment and
freedom of trade, according to the principle of the "most-fav-
ored-nation" (Articles 1 and 14). The only exception was the
coastal trade of both countries, which was regulated by munici-
pal legislation (Article 10) . It is important to note that Article
17 of that treaty makes a special mention of abolishing hence-
forth any rights of extraterritoriality in Japan, and Article 18, of
superceding all the previous agreements then existing between
Russia and Japan.' Finally, Article 19 contains the provision
that the treaty should go into effect only four years after its con-
clusion. Such a long period does not often lapse between the
conclusion of international treaties and the date on which they go
into effect, and can be taken as another proof of how wary of one
another the signatory Powers were at the time.^ This treaty
went into effect on July 17, 1899, according to a special announce-
ment of the respective Governments, and it was not until that
date that Russia finally lost her privileges of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Japan. Thus we see how late the principle of
^There was made, however, one exception, namely for the treaty of May 7, 1875,
which was to contiue in full force. This was the treaty that settled the dispute
between Russia and Japan concerning Sakhalin and the Kuriles Islands.
-The text of this treaty can be found in the Sbornik, published by the Russian
Foreign Office, vol. I, no. 65, p. 500. A similar treaty was concluded with England
in 1^94 (Kimberley-Aoki), also abolishing extraterritoriality.
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 23
equality came into being in the mutual relations of Russia and
Japan.
Secondly, both Governments tried to adjust their policies in
Korea, where Russia was endeavoring to establish her influence.
For the time being, Japan seemed to have decided to seek the
cooperation of Russia. Accordingly, on June 16, 1896, a proto-
col was signed at St. Petersburg (Lobanoff-Yamagata) , in which
the two Powers promised to cooperate in Korea and withdraw
their armed forces. But no sooner was this act signed, than it
was violated by Russia, who started to gain control of the Korean
army and the Korean finances. This naturally aroused suspi-
cions and opposition on all sides, Japan in particular being anxious
to frustrate the Russian aims. The protests that followed made
Russia realize that she had gone too far; and the Russian Gov-
ernment made an effort to allay the Japanese distrust by beginning
new conversations, which ended in the signing of another proto-
col, this time at Tokyo, on April 25, 1898 (Nishi-Rosen), in
which both Powers agreed once more to recognize the sovereignty
and independence of Korea, while still secretly hoping to super-
cede them by their own control. Any future interference with
the Korean army or finances could take place only by common
agreement and mutual consent; Russia in particular promised not
to "obstruct the development of the commercial and industrial
relations between Japan and Korea." Such were the first steps
in this very complicated situation, when Russia and Japan com-
menced to match their forces, the latter Power still badly handi-
capped by her inferiority and isolation.
The Boxer Uprising of 1900 taught a second and much more
important lesson to Japan. The policy of the Great Powers
toward China after the rebellion, and their evident desire to
seize what they could in the disintegration of the Middle King-
dom, made Japan desire to participate in the division of spoils
on an equal footing with the other Powers. This, also, must
have forced her to realize more than ever, that she could not
achieve much while she was isolated; in other words, Tokyo must
have seen the necessity of finding some friend among the Europ-
ean Powers.
24 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
The first object, to establish her participation in the Far East-
ern policy of the Great Powers, was easier attained than the sec-
ond one, to find an ally. After the abrogation of extraterrito-
riality (in the nineties) and the cooperation of Japanese troops
during the quelling of the Boxer uprising, Japan succeeded in se-
curing a position of relative equality among the other nations.
At least, there were several occasions when Japan participated in
the common action of the Powers toward China; for instance, she
took part in the transactions concerning the "open door" policy,
championed by the United States in 1900, and in those relating
to the re-establishment of peaceful and normal conditions after
the Boxer riots, in the same year.i Yet this did not completely
satisfy her. Japan wanted more than participation; she was
intent on expansion, and this she could not achieve alone.
Thus, in 1900 Japan set out to find a friend and ally. She
carefully examined the complex situation in Europe, tested the
relative strength of the different Powers, their past history, mu-
tual relations, political conditions and modes of development.
On the whole, one must acknowledge the great success of this
task. Owing to subtle methods and the statesmanlike qualities
of her diplomatic representatives, Japan sized up the European
situation extremely well. It soon became evident that her choice
must lie between England and Russia. France did not count for
much in Far Eastern affairs, and Germany purposely declined any
direct participation, preferring to remain behind the scenes.
During the years 1900-1901 Japan cautiously felt her way,
studying the situation simultaneously in London and St. Peters-
burg. Baron Hayashi conducted conversations with Lord Lans-
downe, while the Marquis Ito had his talks v/ith Witte and
Lamsdorff; the Government at Tokyo received the reports from
both sides and had abundant and enlightening material for mak-
ing the necessary choice.
The difference in the character of the foreign policies of the
two countries were soon apparent. Whereas Russia was con-
stantly overbearing and haughty, England seemed ready to enter
into some understanding on terms of perfect equality. There
is good reason to believe that at the beginning Tokyo might
'Cf. MacMurray, op. (it., vol. i, pp. 221, 230, 278, 309.
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 25
have preferred an agreement with Russia : the two coun-
tries were near neighbors; they had the same interests in Man-
churia, In China, and on the Pacific coast; an aUiance between
them would have been the natural outcome for the whole situa-
tion, solving most difficulties. But the chance was hopelessly
spoiled by the arrogant attitude and the shortsightedness of the
Russian Government.
In 1901 the Tokyo Government finally made up their minds
in favor of England and instructed Baron Hayashi to proceed
with his conversations with Lord Lansdowne. These trans-
actions soon took a definite form, culminating in the signing
in London of the i\nglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance on Janu-
ary 30, 1902. It cannot be said that China profited by the
final choice of Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was and
proved to be a no better guarantee for the integrity of the Chin-
ese Empire than any Russo-Japanese agreement would have
been.
To appreciate in full the diplomatic situation of that epoch,
one must keep in mind the position taken by Germany. Between
England and Russia she was the tertius gaudens, carefully ab-
staining from any direct participation. She was well informed
of what was going on both in London and St. Petersburg, but
much preferred to have her hands absolutely free. Thus, in Feb-
ruary, 1902, when Komura, the Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, asked the German Ambassador if his country cared to
join the new alliance, the latter politely but firmly declined.
Least of all did Germany at that moment want to cooperate
with Great Britain.'
Having secured such a powerful ally, Japan naturally felt much
stronger. She was now quite able to withstand the Russian dip-
lomatic pressure, and effectively asserted her own claims, es-
pecially in Korea, while Russia, on her side, was absolutely blind
to the danger Involved in constantly increasing her demands and
thus proceeding headlong Into a disastrous conflict. Neither the
Russian Government, nor the Court circles and the Tsar him-
self wanted to believe that Japan could press her claims home,
and In particular that she was now starting feverishly to prepare
'Cf. Memoirs of Hayashi and Eckardtstein.
26 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
for an armed encounter. They still treated the Japanese as a
negligible quantity and chose that most dangerous moment for
launching a foolish and criminal enterprise in Korea, in the very
center of Japanese ambitions.
^. f A few unscrupulous adventurers, a former officer of the guards,
■^" Bezobrazof, an Admiral, Abaza, and some less known men took
advantage of the situation, and persuaded the Tsar of the re-
markable financial possibilities of exploiting the Korean natural
resources. They organized a private company for the purpose
of exploiting a timber and mining concession on the Yalu River
and succeeded in convincing the Tsar and several members of his
family to invest their personal capital in that concession. The
local officials in the Far East, with the Viceroy, Admiral Alex-
eiev, at their head, seeing the influence that Bezobrazof had at
Court, acquiesced instead of protesting and warning their Gov-
ernment of the imminent danger that such action created by
arousing the Japanese. Much more blame, however, falls on
the Russian Ministers, who did not object against this short-
sighted enterprise. Witte alone realized the danger and strongly
urged his Government to take immediate measures to check the
adventure of Bezobrazof, but absolutely in vain. In the Gov-
ernment there were actually Ministers who were glad to see more
trouble coming with Japan, hoping that it would divert the at-
tention of the Russian nation from the constantly growing social
dissatisfaction. For instance, Plehve, Minister of the Interior,
cynically remarked that "a little war would help the Government
very much." The war, however, proved to be neither little, nor
of any help to the autocratic Government. The Tsar himself
seemed to have had only contempt for Japan, a feeling which
was strengthened by his own conceit, as well as by the pernicious
influence of the Kaiser. Wilhelm was cleverly and strongly urg-
ing the Tsar to withstand the Japanese claims, thus leading him
toward a certain armed conflict. Germany could lose nothing
by such a policy, but could gain immensely by involving Russia in
a Far Eastern quarrel.
Neither was the Yalu adventure the only mistake of Russia;
simultaneously she tried to lease the harbor of Mosampo from
Korea intending to transform it into a naval base while her agent,
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 27
Pavlov, intrigued at the Seoul court. In order to checkmate the
Russian designs, Japan started direct negotiations in St. Peters-
burg and during the summer of 1903 made a last effort to settle
the dispute amicably, but again met in St. Petersburg with a dis-
tinct reluctance on the part of Russia to give her any decisive
answer. The Russian replies were as evasive and unsatisfac-
tory as ever.'
Witte describes this in his Memoirs'^ in a striking sentence : "We
were headed straight for war and at the same time we did nothing
to prepare ourselves for the eventuality; we acted as if we were
certain that the Japanese would endure everything without dar-
ing to attack us." This was absolutely true. Unfortunately Witte
himself has to bear a serious part of the blame for at least having
started the aggressive Russian policy, though personally he had
only "peaceful penetration" in view.
On January 13, 1904, Japan finally lost patience, and presented
her fourth proposals, which amounted to an ultimatum. She de-
clared that she was prepared to recognize Russian interests in
Manchuria, provided Russia would acknowledge the Japanese
control over Korea. But even then Russia temporized and
evaded answering the Japanese demands. On February 8, the
Japanese destroyers entered Port Arthur and fired torpedoes at
the unprepared and unprotected Russian battleships. The fol-
lowing day war was declared.
From the very beginning, the war with Japan was not popular
among the Russian people; most of them never even understood
for what their country was fighting. It did help, however, to
increase immensely the strength of the revolutionary discontent.
As defeat followed defeat, the Government was gradually forced,
in the summer of 1905, to grant half-hearted and insincere con-
cessions. This social dissatisfaction finally forced the Govern-
ment to conclude the peace which was signed on September 5,
1905, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.-' According to the Peace
Treaty, Russia returned to Japan the leased Liaotung peninsula,
iCf. Staatsarchiv, vol. 69, pp. 212, et. seq.; Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary
Politics in the Far East (N. Y., 1916), ch. xiv, p. 243.
'Sergiei Witte, Memoirs (N. Y., 1921), p. 123.
'Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i, p. 522.
28 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
including Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dalny), and ceded in ad-
dition the southern half of the Sakhalin Island (Articles 5 and 9).
Japan also received the southern branch of the Manchurian rail-
road (from Kuancheng-tzu down to Port Arthur; Article 6), as
well as the coal mines worked for the benefit of the railroad,
which proved a very important acquisition for the control of the
South Manchurian markets. All these transfers of privileges
in Manchuria were nominally to be sanctioned by China ("The
two High Contracting Powers mutually engage to obtain the con-
sent of the Government of China"), a stipulation which was
meant to safeguard the Chinese rights of sovereignty. No war
indemnity was exacted from Russia; this was probably the most
remarkable achievement of Witte at the Portsmouth Confer-
ence.
With the treaty of Portsmouth begins an entirely new epoch
in the history of Russia's position in the Far East, and in her
relations with Japan as well — an epoch very different in character
and meaning from the preceding period. Instead of the former
hostility and mutual distrust we find close cooperation and friend-
ship between these two Empires. They now amicably agreed
to define their mutual interests and spheres of influence and de-
cided to assist one another in the exploitation of China and Man-
churia; Korea was henceforth entirely given over to the full con-
trol of Japan and soon became a mere dependency.
The sudden change that came over the relations of Russia and
Japan, a change so thorough and complete that it transformed
hatred and suspicion into friendship and copartnership, can serve
as a convincing proof of how much artificiality there was in the
former relations of the two Empires and how easily could have
been established some sort of friendly jnodiis vivendi. This
time, however, the Powers went to the other extreme, evincing
a distinct desire to exclude any outside interference with what they
were doing or intending to do in North China. There could be
no question any more of an "open door" policy in Manchuria;
the door was definitely slammed.
The treaty of Portsmouth necessitated further agreements;
first, China was to express her acquiescence; secondly, Russia and
Japan themselves had to settle additional details in order to carry
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 29
out several provisions of the treaty. For instance a separate con-
vention was to be concluded for the regulation of the connecting
railway services in Manchuria, special procedure was to be
adopted concerning the option of Russian citizens in the ceded
territories and concerning their real estate and other property.
Further, Russia promised to grant Japan extensive fisheries rights
on the Pacific coast and to reestablish the former principles of
the commercial treaty with Japan (1895), which had been in
abeyance during the war. China sanctioned the transfer of
leased territories from Russia to Japan in a special treaty, signed
in Peking, December 22, 1905. It is very significant that Japan
in this respect promised to conform to the original agreements
concluded between China and Russia, "so far as circumstances
permit" (Article 2) ; this formula gave Japan practically a free
hand in Manchuria, ^ though she repeatedly promised not to im-
pair in any way Chinese sovereignty and not to act inconsistently
with the principle of equal opportunity (cf. Article 3, Treaty of
Portsmouth) .
In 1907 followed new agreements with Russia, but of two
distinct types. First, further arrangements for commercial pur-
poses were made, all of which were public; second, treaties
defining the mutual political interests were signed. To the first
type of agreements belong the Convention and Protocol, signed
in St. Petersburg on June 13, 1907, concerning the junction of
the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria, the Convention,
signed on July 28, concerning commerce and navigation, and an-
other one, signed the same day and relating to the fisheries of the
Pacific coast — the latter extremely valuable to the Japanese — and,
finally, numerous agreements, signed by Russia and China on
the one hand, and by Japan and China on the other, concerning
the local situation in Manchuria, postal communications, tele-
graph lines, exploitation of mines, new railroad construction,
etc.- This was only a natural consequence of the newly estab-
lished accord between Russia and Japan, who had to readjust
their mutual policy of exploiting Manchuria. Most of these
agreements have a purely technical character.
'MacMurray, op. fit., vol. I, p. 557 et. seq.
'Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 612-803.
30 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Quite different is the second type, which was meant to support
politically the above mentioned commercial policy of the two new
friends and allies. Two agreements belong to this group, one
made public,^ the other remaining secret even up to the present
day.^ They belong to the same period of 1907, and were meant,
to describe comprehensively the spheres of mutual interest; to
maintain the sovereignty of China'*; and to respect the status quo,
endeavoring thus to exclude any possible intrusion or advance of
any other Power in Manchuria. It was this last object that the
secret agreement of that year was intended to further confirm
and consolidate, aiming at the friendly advice of the United
States, which was earnestly trying to enforce the policy of the
"open door." Neither Russia nor Japan wanted any such inter-
ference in a sphere that they now considered their very own.
Meanwhile, the American Government insisted on the "open
door" principle. During the Taft administration. Secretary
Knox worked out a whole project of neutralization of the Man-
churian railroads and the opening up of Manchuria in general for
international trade."* This brought a prompt and decisive re-
fusal from the two allied Empires and a new agreement between
them, partly secret, signed in St. Petersburg on July 4, 1910.^
Russia and Japan once more affirmed their desire to cooperate
in Manchuria, to m.aintain the status quo and to communicate
with each other in all questions concerning such a mutual policy.
This naturally frustrated the fight for the "open door," as it was
'Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. I, p. 657.
^It is only vaguely referred to in later treaties.
^The object of recognizing China's "independence and territorial integrity"
seems only to have been a blind for the exclusion of any other Power.
Tor details see, e. g., J. F. Abbott, Japanese expansion and American Policies
(N. Y., 1916), eh. in, p. 65.
'Cf. MacMurray, op. cit., vol. i, p. 803; the alleged secret treaty of that date
was published by the New York World in a series of articles by Capt. Schreiner and
B. von Siebert, in the spring of 1921 ; the text runs as follows:
"To confirm and further develop the provisions of the Secret Treaty of June
17-30, 1907, the Russian and the Japanese governments agree to the following pro-
visions:
"Article 1. Russia and Japan recognize as the boundary of their specific spheres
of interest in Manchuria the line of demarcation as defined in the supplementary
article of the Secret Treaty of 1907.
"Art. 2. The two contracting parties agree mutually to recognize their special
interests in the areas set forth above. Each of them may also, each with'n its own
f.phere of interest, take such measures as shall be deemed necessary for the main-
tenance and protection of these interests.
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 31
meant to do, and was a strong refutation of the proposal of
Secretary Knox. Russia and Japan were asserting that nothing
really threatened the integrity of China, nor the principle of the
"open door"; that the Chinese Empire could find a much better
safeguard in their alliance than in any international compact;
and that the idea of making Manchuria a buffer state was most
distasteful to them. Finally, it is important to note that Great
Britain was at that time very much pleased with the development
of friendly relations between Russia and Japan and told them
so several times. After 1907 England began to build up friendly
relations with Russia and was in consequence very eager to help
the cooperation of Russia with her own Eastern ally and for that
reason unhesitatingly gave her support to the new Far Eastern
policy of the Government of the Tsar. During the years that
followed we see the further development of the same policy on
similar lines; the mutual commercial interests were being settled
by public agreements, concluded ad hoc, as necessity called for
determining newly arising details of daily life,i and parallel was
kept the close political cooperation, couched in terms of secret
agreements. On July 8, 1912, a third secret treaty was signed,
mentioned in the alleged secret treaty of 1916, having evidently
the same object in view, viz., the mutual assistance in the exploi-
tation of Manchuria and in the exclusion of the other Powers
from any participation in the North China trade.
This policy naturally found its climax during the Great War.
On July 3, 1916, two more agreements were signed at Petrograd,
"Art. 3. Each party undertakes to place no obstacle of any kind in the way of
the confirmation and future development of the special interests of the other party
within the boundary lines of such spheres of interest.
"Art. 4. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from all political
action within the sphere of interest of the other party in Manchuria. Furthermore,
it has been decided that Russia shall seek no privileges and concessions in the
Japanese zone, and Japan none in the Russian zone, that might be injurious to the
special interests of either party and that both Governments are to recognize the
rights acquired in their spheres of interest, as defined in Article 2 of the Public
Treaty of today's date.
"Art. 5. To ensure the working of the mutual stipulations, both parties will enter
into an open and friendly exchange of opinions on all matters concerning their
special interests in Manchuria. In case these special interests should be threatened,
the two Governments will agree on the measures that may become necessary for
common action or mutual support in order to protect these interests.
"Art. 6. The present treaty will be kept strictly secret by both Governments."
'For example, the Convention for reciprocal protection of industrial property in
China, signed in Tokyo on June 23, 1911, or the Convention of .August 14, 1911,
concerning railway connections in Manchuria.
32 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
one made public under the title of "Convention in Regard to Co-
operation in the Far East," the other, kept secret, amounted to a
treaty of alliance.^ There is no trace left of the former enmity
of these two Powers, acting now as close and old friends, ready
to stand by one another against "any third Power whatsoever"
(Article 1 of the secret treaty of 1916).
This last phrase of the treaty of 1916 very naturally aroused
the greatest concern among several foreign Powers, as it forcibly
expressed a defensive alliance of the two autocratic Empires,
whose policy could so easily develop offensive aims. For China
it meant the final loss of her Northern Provinces and a very ef-
fectively "closed door" for her northern markets. For the out-
side world it meant a compact, built up on secret agreements, that
could be dangerous on account of the undemocratic form of
government of the two contracting Powers. In view of the
tremendous significance of the enumerated Russo-Japanese trea-
ties, it would seem quite necessary that their texts should be made
public. This could be achieved the more easily at the present
day because, on account of the collapse of Russia, they all have
lost their political importance.
Of course it is not the mere fact of Russia concluding a friendly
alliance with Japan that could ever be objected to or feared by
the other Powers, but, rather, the evident aims that such an un-
derstanding had in view. Nobody could object to the establish-
ment and growth of friendship and good-will between the two Far
Eastern neighbors. On the contrary, such an agreement could
have been hailed with enthusiasm as being far better than the
former enmity. Unfortunately, however, this cordial coopera-
tion had in view not only the exploitation of the North China
markets to the detriment of Chinese sovereignty rights, but also
threatened the integrity of China and was meant to exclude all
other Powers, in particular the United States of America, and to
frustrate any attempt at establishing an "open door" policy.
'The texts of both agreements are published by MacMurray, vol. u, p. 1327-
1328. Cf. also J. Sparco, Russia as an American Problem, 1920, ch. IV.
■ RELATIONS WITH MONGOLIA 33
IV. Relations with Mongolia
During the years immediately preceding the Great War, we can
witness the inception by Russia of a new policy, this time concern-
ing Mongolia. It might seem as though, thwarted by Japan in
her aggression in Manchuria, Russia was now trying to expand
her influence in a new direction. Though possessing some de-
ceptive appearances, this movement had no great significance.
It never had the backing of the nation at large, nor did even the
Government attach much importance to it; only a very few gov-
ernment officials were interested in it, and the support was mainly
among the South Siberian tradesmen.
The Mongolian point of contact between Russia and China was
not a new one; on the contrary, as we have seen above, it was
along the endless stretch of the Mongolian frontier that Russia
came first in touch with China, several centuries ago. Yet, not-
withstanding this long space of time the contact never developed
into anything significant. This fact is easily explained if we
consider the general character of the country bordering on the
southern frontiers of Siberia. Mongolia is a very sparsely popu-
lated country, mostly desert, with but a few inhabited centers.
The Mongolian market never amounted to much, the people were
poor and trade was lagging. Only in one way do we find that
these regions had any importance for the Russian trade, namely,
this: through Mongolia several caravan routes lead into China,
connecting southern Siberia with some of the Chinese markets;
it was along these routes that Russia imported great quantities of
Chinese tea and no mean amount of Chinese silk, sending South,
in return, some very fine qualities of wool, hides, and different
drugs, used by the superstitious Mongols. But even in this latter
respect, the Mongolian caravan routes had lately lost most of
their importance, because many of the goods could be carried
much less expensively and considerably quicker by the Siberian
and Manchurian railways. In consequence, there remained only
a slight frontier trade of the local population, a fact which is quite
sufficient to demonstrate the relative lack of interest in Siberia
and Russia, as shown toward the government policy in the Mon-
golian question.
34 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
From olden days Mongolia was divided into two unequal parts,
Outer Mongolia, occupying an extensive territory, but chiefly
desert and wilderness, and Inner Mongolia in the South, smaller
in size, but more densely inhabited and interesting China very
much more, as there existed not only well developed commercial
relations with China, but also a numerous Chinese population
settled among the Mongols and exploiting the latter ruthlessly.
Trouble arose in 1910 over the question of the renewal of the
Russian-Chinese Treaty of 1881.' Russia reminded China of
the necessity of renewing this understanding, insisting, however,
on the introduction of some important changes. She had greatly
increased her trade in Turkestan, and China wanted to profit from
this trade by establishing customs there; Russia strongly objected
and continued selling Chinese tea in the Turkestan Provinces.
China held that such action was not in accord with the treaty of
1881. Russia chose this very propitious moment to ask for new
privileges on account of China's ostensible weakness. It was not
only the desire of the local Russian tradesmen to acquire some
new rights, nor was it simply the restlessness of a few Russian
officials, but mainly the wish to take advantage of the troubles
that China herself had on hand. Russia had in view, first, the
dissatisfaction developing in Northern China: and secondly, the
desire for independence from Chinese sovereignty, then existing
amxong the various Mongolian Princes. The latter resented very
much the sharp and underhand practices of the Chinese mer-
chants, especially in Inner Mongolia, and the consecutive at-
tempts of reforms on the part of China, moves which the Mon-
golians considered to be interferences with their local self-gov-
ernment. The Chinese Government, however, notwithstanding
its weakness and the various political difficulties surrounding it
from all sides, succeeded in withstanding the Russian and Mon-
golian claims for some time.
In the summer of 1911 the Mongolian Princes decided to co-
operate against China. In December, after the Chinese revolu-
tion had broken out, they proclaimed themselves independent and
elected the Khutukhtu of Urga "Emperor of Mongolia." He was
crowned with great ceremony on December 28, 1911. There is
'The treaty had been renewed twice already, in 1891 and 1901, without any
difiiculty.
RELATIONS WITH MONGOLIA 35
no doubt that Russian agents were successfully backing these pro-
ceedings, pledging Russian aid to the Mongolian Princes for es-
tablishing the independence of Outer Mongolia. In return for
this help the Mongolians promised Russia all sorts of privileges
and advantages.
Further, in 1912 the Mongolian Princes concluded a treaty of
alliance with Thibet having the same object in view, the separa-
tion from China and political independence. Meanwhile Russia
had declared that she considered the treaty of 1881 still in force,
but no longer recognized the neutral zone mentioned in this
agreement. Parallel to that, Russia signed a treaty with the
newly constituted Mongolian Government at Urga on November
3, 1912. The Russian Government promised to assist Mon-
golia in establishing and maintaining her autonomy. The Mon-
golians in return granted many new privileges to Russia, with a
definite mention in addition, that no privileges should be given to
other foreign subjects, that were not enjoyed by Russians.'
China had finally to yield, recognizing at last the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia. This was achieved by a Russo-Chinese decla-
ration, signed at Peking on November 5, 1913. Russia recog-
nized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia (Article 1),
and promised not to keep troops there, with the exception of
consular guards. China in turn recognized the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia (Article 2), agreeing not to intervene and to
refrain from further colonization. A few months later (Sep-
tember 30, 1914), Russia signed at Kiakhta with the Mongolian
Government a new agreement, acquiring a concession for the
construction of a telegraph line which Mongolia had the right to
buy from Russia after the lapse of thrity years. Upon the same
day another agreement, of more doubtful significance, concerning
railroads in Mongolia, was also signed at Kiakhta. Russia was
to advsie Mongolia as to the direction, extent and manner of
future construction of railroads (Article 2), and to cooperate If
necessary (Article 3).
Japan was carefully watching the development of events In the
Mongolian situation. She had very few commercial Interests in
'The details were enumerated in a special Protocol, annexed to the treaty; cf.
MacMurray, op. cii., vol. ii, pp. 992-996.
36 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Mongolia, consequently her concern was merely political. Seem-
ingly she attached some importance to the latter, as at Peking In
1915 she signed a special treaty "Respecting South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia." According to Article 6 of this
treaty China promised to open certain ports In Eastern Inner
Mongolia for commercial purposes, which meant the gradual
penetration of Japan Into the Mongolian markets.
This complicated situation, created by the many agreements
between Russia, China and Mongolia, as well as by the final
recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, necessitated a
readjustment of the mutual relations of these three countries. It
was achieved in 1915 by the signing at Kiakhta on June 7, of a
Tripartite agreement in regard to Outer Mongolia, by the repre-
sentatives of the Chinese Republic, the Russian Empire and the
V new Mongolian State. On January 24, 1916, a second Tripartite
agreement settled the question of Mongolian telegraph lines.
The changes that took place In Mongolia thus acquired a definite
legal form. The three participants agreed to the following
principles:
1. Outer Mongolia, though remaining autonomous, recog-
nized Chinese suzerainty.
2. Treaty power remained in China's hands, except for com-
mercial treaties which might be negotiated directly by Mongo-
lian authorities.
3. Russia and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mon-
golia, and promised to abstain from all Interference with the in-
ternal administration of the Mongols.
4. No customs duties were to exist, either on Chinese or Rus-
sian imports Into Mongolia.
5. Chinese residents were to be under Chinese jurisdiction,
Russians under Russian jurisdiction, while special mixed courts
were to be established for mixed cases, on the model of the former
Russian-Chinese mixed courts of the Russian-Chinese Railroad.
6. China promised to consult Russia on all political questions
concerning Outer Mongolia, the latter being practically under the
joint protection of Russia and China.'
'The American Journal of International Laic, 1916, vol. x, p. 798, contains an
exceilcnt article on the subject by E. T. Williams, The Relations beizveen China,
Russia and Mongolia.
RELATIONS WITH MONGOLIA
37
This state of things, however, did not last long, by reason of
the collapse of Russia and of the advance of Japan into Siberia.
In 1919 China, feeling much stronger, withdrew the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia; the Russian control naturally ceased to exist
and all the above-mentioned treaties lapsed. But an entirely new
trouble arose, as a consequence of the Russian Civil War. Sev-
eral times the Russians invaded Mongolia and used Mongolian
territory in their fight against the Moscow Bolshevik Govern-
ment, In 1920, Urga, the Mongolian capital, was captured bv
a Russian independent general and held for a short while. The
anti-Bolshevik forces tried to establish a strategic base for them-
selves in Mongolia, from which they could attack their Russian
enemies.' Later on Mongolia had to suffer for yet another rea-
son. The Bolshevik Government endeavored to secure a way
of communication with China and the outside world through
Mongolia. For that purpose, not only did their agents, with
mails and goods, use the Mongolian routes to enter China, and
spread their influence and propaganda, but their generals also
were ordered to enter Mongolia and protect these routes, ousting
if possible the anti-Bolshevik forces from their temporary
strongholds. This they accomplished in a short time, getting
practically in control of Outer Mongolia. This last summer,
the Bolshevik armies were still there and the Moscow Govern-
ment made public in August their correspondence with the Mon-
golians. The latter were supposed to have asked the Russians
not to withdraw the Bolshevik troops, as long as anti-Bolshevik
forces were in the vicinity.' Moscow gladly consented to leave
the troops there, but promised to withdraw them as soon as the
common enemy should disappear. The Mongolian authorities
are called by the Russians "The People's Revolutionary Govern-
ment of Mongolia." Moscow, however, hints that this Govern-
ment is not very firm in the saddle. Unfortunately, one cannot
be sure that this is the final episode In the Russian-Mongolian re-
lations.
^The events of those fateful years in Mongolia are described, for example, by
Perry-Ayscough and Otta Barry, fVitli the Russians in Mongolia.
'Cf. Is-vesiia, August 10 and 12, 1921.
38 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
V. Present Outlook
The events of these last years, the Russian Revolution, the
Civil War and other wars, naturally changed and warped the
whole situation in the Far East of Russia. At the present day it
is quite impossible to say what the final outcome may be.
The revolutionary developments were heralded long before the
outbreak of March, 1917, by the gradual weakening of Russia's
influence in the Far East. Absorbed as she was by the Great
War, she naturally paid much less attention to her outstanding
Provinces. Failing and degenerating autocracy was gradually
forced to abandon all its imperialistic designs and hopes, whereas
the nation as a whole never had such ambitions and was always
quite willing to let the Far Eastern Districts live their own lives
and build up their own future. This attitude was very much to
the liking of the Siberian and Far Eastern Russian population
which, as we have seen, from early days showed a constantly
growing desire for a firmly established self-government.
The local natural resources are so great, most of them being
yet untouched, the country on the whole is so little developed,
that there remains ample room for expansion without necessity
for extending political influence into foreign lands. What the
Siberian commercial interests wanted and needed was entrance
into Manchuria; in other words, the "open door," championed
by the Government of the United States. This meant that terri-
torially the Russians were content with what they had secured
by this time, viz., the left bank of the Amur River, all territories
North of it up to the Arctic Sea, and the narrow strip of land that
united Vladivostok with Irkutsk across Manchuria, along the
tracks of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In case the political in-
fluences were eliminated the Russian people could and ought to be
satisfied with this situation, which allowed them to make use of
the North China markets in a peaceful and amicable way, with-
out hurting the feelings or rights of the Chinese. And on the
whole, this was the case. The Russian people of the European
Provinces frankly did not care about the Siberian life and hap-
penings. The Siberians themselves were also quite content, with
the possible exception of some adventurous frontiersmen or some
PRESENT OUTLOOK
39
/a
quarrelsome local officials, whereas the Central Government,
handicapped by war and revolution, was obviously losing its
hold over the administration of the vast Empire.
Such a condition of domestic and foreign affairs for China,
seemed to confirm the farsighted wisdom of Li-Hung-Chang, who
always considered the friendly connection with Russia of the
greatest possible advantage to China; the latter could find there
a trustworthy friend, ready to stand by in case of a conflict with
some other great Power, and also to assist her people in develop-
ing commercially and industrially their northern market. This
time, however, the unexpected danger came from another quarter,
and was caused by the passing aw<;iy of the dying regime in Russia.
The Tsar's Government, blind to the signs of the time, and deaf
to the many warnings of the contemporaries, was going headlong
toward a national disaster. A weak and disintegrated Russia
was not only of no help to China, but, on the contrary, became
for herself a menace, creating an irresistible temptation for other
Powers to exploit her weakness and enter her territories for their
own imperialistic expansion. These last years the political situa-
tion of Russia shows very many similarities to that of China.
As to the relations of Russia to Japan since the beginning of the
Great War and up to the Revolution, we can see the same gradual
decline of Russia's interest in Far Eastern politics, as described
above. This meant that Japan, as time went on, acquired more
and more freedom of action on the Pacific coast, as well as In
the shaping of her foreign relations in general. This Russian
attitude explains for Instance, the situation and the meaning from,
he Russian point of view of the secret treaty with Japan, of July
3, 1916. The Russian nation was Indifferent to this alliance,]
caring very little for what was going on In the Far East. The
European war was taxing all the possible resources, intellectual
and physical, of the people, and the revolutionary dissatisfaction
was already powerful and threatening, distracting the Govern-
ment to the utmost. Russia's Allies meanwhile were pressing
her to enter Into closer cooperation with Japan and draw the lat-
ter more Into the European struggle. France was possibly hop-
ing for material help, in men, arms and vessels. England was
40 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
glad to see a third party taking a share in her own alliance, which
was in many ways creating her all sorts of difficulties; the partici-
pation of Russia was seemingly satisfying Japan, thus somewhat
mitigating the obligations of Great Britain. Finally, Japan found
in the secret alliance of 1916 a splendid confirmation of her most
coveted ambition and policies. It was a legal sanction to her
equality as a great Power, opening the door for her to an event-
ual participation in the final settlements of the war on absolutely
equal terms, and vouchsafing her complete freedom of action in
the Far East. The wording of the secret treaty of 1916 and in
particular the plural used in Article 4 in the description of the
guarantee "given by its Allies" seems to show that the Contract-
ing Powers had only the Teuton enemies in view, when they es-
tablished this alliance. The Entente Powers simply wanted that
Japan should cooperate more actively in the war; this was cer-
tainly the idea that the Russians had. Though this treaty was
secret, the fact of the conclusion of an alliance soon leaked out
and public opinion, as well as the Russian press, took the men-
tioned object of the alliance for granted without questioning the
possible consequences. It is only later, and especially now that
the war with Germany is over, that the aims of the Japanese
Government and the significance of the words "any third Power
whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia or Japan"
(Article 1), began to arouse a great concern among certain
nations and covernments.
The revolutionary wave that broke up the Tsar's Government
, during the first half of March, 1917, took some time before it
reached Siberia and the Far Eastern Provinces. It created great
joy, as in the rest of Russia, among the Siberian population, but
especially amidst the political exiles, who promptly received per-
mission to come back into European Russia. During the months
of April there was a considerable stream of them returning to
their homes, and eager to participate in the revolution or as they
understood it, the regeneration of Russia. This exodus left
quite a void in the Siberian communities, and deprived the latter
of a considerable portion of their educated forces. Nevertheless,
PRESENT OUTLOOK
41
sufficient enlightened elements were left to satisfy the new needs
of the awakened people, and thus there soon became evident a
strong desire among the latter to enlarge further the principles
and practice of local self-government. There never existed any
question of separation from Russia among the Siberians; all they
wanted was the establishment of a distinct, self-governing unit,
protected from the interference of the Central Government in
local affairs and especially in the financial administration.
The discussion and settlement of local affairs was to be achieved
by a Siberian Assembly, a sort of local Parliament or possiblv
even a restricted Constituent Assembly. Later on this logically
helped very much the formation of a Regional Government,
which later still proved to be the pivotal point of the Siberian
struggle against the Bolshevik Government. The latter was
gradually driving the anti-Bolshevik forces and organizations
out of European Russia. Thus, in the autumn of 1918 the mem-
bers of the temporary Ufa Government and the remnants of the
Pan-Russian Constituent Assembly had to flee Eastward from the
Bolshevik onslaught and very soon merged at Omsk with the
Siberian government organization.
In November, 1918, the Koltchak coup followed, replacing
these men by a new anti-Bolshevik Government, remaining in
power up to the autumn of 1919 and assuming the title and func-
tions of an All-Russian anti-Bolshevik Government.
Meanwhile a few Czech regiments were also valiantly fighting
their way eastward, because the Allies promised to bring them
home to their own liberated country, on condition that they as-
sist the Russians to resist the bolsheviki and possibly even estab-
lish a new front against Germany,
The Allies, especially Great Britain and France, were endeavor-
ing to persuade the Government of the United States also to par-
ticipate actively in such a policy, having in view both parallel ob-
jects, the fight against Bolshevism and the building up of a new
front against Germany, that would divert at least some of her
military resources from the Western front. Naturally the posi-
tion of Japan in this matter became most prominent; the question
of her participation had to be discussed and her going into Siberia
in some form or other decided upon.
42 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Such were the transactions between the Allied and Associated
Powers during the summer months of 1918, which finally culmi-
nated in the decision of President Wilson, taken in July, of send-
ing several regiments to Vladivostok and also agreeing to a more
active cooperation of Japan. That such participation of Japan
should be admitted is by no means strange or inexplicable; on the
contrary, it was but natural that the Japanese should be asked to
cooperate. They were the nearest neighbors and had many
interests in common, besides they were the close Allies of Russia
and England, according to the treaties of 1916 and 1920, and
relatively much less involved in the European struggle. Their
army was at home, ready for action, and there existed no danger
of any outside attack on Japan, hence she could lend a consider-
able part of her armed forces for the allied cause. Moreover,
there is very good reason to believe that at that time Japan was
absolutely impartial toward Russia, and had no idea of expansion
into Russian territory or of spreading her political or commercial
interests and influences inland from the Pacific coast. All this
meant that under certain conditions the allied cooperation, with
the inclusion of Japan, could bring forth only satisfactory results
for Siberia and ultimately for Russia. Fate, however, willed
otherwise.
According to the decision of the Allies in July, 1918, with the
few Americans, there were sent from Japan 72,000 men, who
controlled for a considerable time the railroad and towns along
the line from Vladivostok far into Western Siberia. Already
during the Koltchak regime of Omsk, there was felt a strong
Japanese influence in the Far Eastern Provinces, which constantly
tended to weaken the Siberian Government. The most con-
spicuous case was that of "general" Semenoff, firmly established
in Chita, with the assistance of Japanese support. Semenoff did
not wish to acknowledge the supremacy of Koltchak and in this
way called forth two evil consequences for the latter. First, by
hampering the rule of the Omsk Government, Semenoff was as-
sisting the processes of dismemberment of the Siberian and Far
Eastern Provinces. Secondly, he was greatly increasing the in-
fluence of Japan in the same Provinces. Indirectly Semenoff's
policy proved to be detrimental to China. Thus it happened
PRESENT OUTLOOK
43
that with Japanese connivance one important result was accom-
plished; the Far Eastern Provinces of the former Empire of the
Tsar were split into two parts, the distinct line of demarcation
existing to tiie present day. It went North-South across the
Lake Baikal; west of that line remained the Siberian Provinces,
at first with their own anti-Bolshevik Government, but subdued
later by the Moscow armies. East of the line there crystallized
the Far Eastern Republic, with headquarters at Chita, which en-
deavored to control the Russian territory toward the Pacific as
far as Vladivostok, but with only sporadic success.
The Western Siberian Provinces at present live their own lives,
hardly feeling the control of the Central Government of Mos-
cow. Nominally, the Bolsheviki still claim their sovereignty.
In the larger cities, especially in Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk, there
are very strong Bolshevik organizations playing the role of pro-
vincial or regional governments, sometimes accepting the rule
and direction of Moscow, and sometimes acting absolutely inde-
pendently. The enormous distances that separate Siberia from
Moscow help very much to foster such independence. But off
the main railroad line that runs across Siberia, and especially in
the rural districts the Bolshevik rule has no influence whatever
and really does not exist. As in days of very primitive culture,
each village, hamlet or community has its own interests, its own
life, its own organization, and has hardly anything to do with
the outside world, at times not even realizing that such a world
exists. The people live on their own produce, being everywhere
overwhelmingly agricultural. They can not, however, improve
their methods or intensify their production on account of the lack
of implements, not being able to buy new ones anywhere to re-
place the old ones now badly used up. Even the insignificant
trade with Mongolia or China has dwindled to nothing. The
horrible meaning of this to Russia becomes evident, if we con-
sider the former export of wheat and other foodstuffs from
Siberia, which were carried out in such great quantities that they
supplied the need of very many Russian towns and in addition
constituted a large part of Russia's foreign export. All foreign
44 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
exports stopped long ago, Including the supply of foodstuffs from
Siberia, which could have so easily relieved the present famine
situation.
In the Siberian towns of these Provinces we find quite a numer-
ous element of Chinese. The latter have come In only lately.
In former days there were always a few coming over the border,
but not often did they want to settle down permanently among
the Russians. This changed suddenly and entirely the moment
the Siberian Railway was opened to traffic. After 1900 the
Chinese began to come In great numbers, creating alarm among
many Siberians, who looked upon this immigration with great mis-
givings. And many of the Chinese emigrants seemed to come
with the intention of settling down permanently. Their com-
mercial efficiency, their pacific ways, their great thrift and ex-
tremely small personal needs made them formidable competitors.
Not many Russians could stand competition with them and they
looked upon this Chinese Influx as a most dangerous form of
"peaceful penetration." The danger was augmented by the ex-
ceedingly long frontier line, which could not be shut off by anv
purely physical means. A backward glance over this period dis-
closes that, while alarm was felt In certain circles, the local popu-
lation, on the whole, continued to live peacefully side-by-slde in
towns, like Irkutsk, where Chinese colonies grew to a consider-
able size. At present Immigration has ceased, partly because of
the Russian Civil War and partly on account of China's troubles
with the Mongols.
* * *
While the Civil War was raging in Siberia and European
Russia, the Far Eastern Provinces themselves were divided into
several parts.
First, there was the Chita Center, now known as the Far East-
ern Republic; secondly, came Vladivostok and the surrounding
country, mostly along the Pacific coast; thirdly, Khabarovsk and
the Districts along the banks of the Amur, with a vast, sparsely
inhabited Hinterland, stretching as far as Kamchatka; fourthly,
the Russian half of the Sakhalin Island; and fifthly, the strip of
land across Manchuria, belonging to the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way.
PRESENT OUTLOOK 45
From the times of Semenoff, the Chita Government Center
was constantly under the strong influence of the Japanese. Seme-
noff did not hold out long after the fall of Koltchak, and was him-
self driven out and replaced by a semi-Bolshevik Government,
which succeeded in establishing the Far Eastern Republic. This
Republic has decided Bolshevik leanings, and often accepted the
political guidance of Moscow, but on the whole maintained its
individuality and independence, and at times even showed a pro-
nounced tendency toward further expansion. Its object in this
respect was to get the control of Vladivostok; the regions along
the Amur interested Chita very little and could be only a "route"
or an opening further East. The Manchurian Railway was out
of their reach, neither the Japanese, nor the Chinese being will-
ing to give the line over to the Russians of any political creed
whatsoever. So the coveted opening for Chita was Vladivostok,
which would have meant a doorway to the outside world. But
Vladivostok was not so easy to get, because of the distance sepa-
rating it from Chita, and on account of quite different Japanese
interests there, and also because the Russians of the Maritime
Province were by no means ready to accept the Chita rule. How-
ever, the Far Eastern Republic did advance successfully along the
Amur and Is controlling at present this region as far as Khaba-
rovsk. It finally succeeded In ousting the Japanese, defeating
the White anti-Bolshevik generals who tried to advance from
Mongolia, and achieved a certain stability of local administration.
It lives in peace westward and has friendly relations with the
Bolshevik group in control of Irkutsk, being also in constant com-
munication with the Government of Moscow. Chita evidently
considers itself independent from the Moscow Government,
though the latter has not ceased hoping to control it eventually.
The political color of the Chita Government Is decidedly radi-
cal, though not communistic. There are a few bolsheviki in the
Government, but they do not have command of the situation at
all. Socialists of other denominations are more Influential and
the bourgeois element is not excluded.
The recent transactions between this Government and the
Japanese at Dairen have one object In view; i. e., the evacuation
of Vladivostok by the Japanese. In Chita and the Transbalkal
46 RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
Districts the Japanese are no more to be seen; most of them have
gone home of their own accord, having found the sentiment of
the local people unfriendly, but they still control the Pacific coast
from Vladivostok, on which the Chita Government laid their
eyes long ago. At present the Chita representatives are trying
to convince the Japanese of the necessity of evacuating Vladivos-
tok as well, which would give the Far Eastern Republic the chance
to occupy the Maritime Province, destroy the local anti-Bolshe-
vik Government there, and thus get rid of their last opponent in
the Far East and acquire at the same time an outlet to the sea.
The Japanese policy in the matter is not yet clear and probably
depends on entirely different factors, the European and Ameri-
can policies included.
The country north of the Amur, the District of Yakutsk and
the Kamchatka peninsula are in a somewhat different position.
The Moscow Government never was willing to lose Yakutsk and
Kamchatka on account of their tremendous, though yet quite un-
explored natural resources. The Bolsheviki always hoped to be
able to exploit these regions, by granting concessions to for-
eigners. The most conspicuous case is the grant of a huge con-
cession to Washington Vanderlip. The trouble with such con-
cessions, however, is the lack of assurance, legal and political,
that such grants will retain their value in case a change of govern-
ment occurs in Russia. The indications are that no new govern-
ment, whatever its political form or doctrine, will be willing or
able to recognize the validity of the Bolshevik grants.
The ease with which the nominal control of Moscow could still
maintain itself in Yakutsk and Kamchatka, is explained by the
great indifference of the Russian people toward these far-away
regions which hold for them no political significance whatever.
Most of the inhabited centers and hamlets are likewise living
their own lives, not caring for the outside world. Many of them
went through a stage of Bolshevik rule, instituted and dominated
by local men. Along the northern coast of the Pacific, the Japan-
ese played an important role, because of the fisheries. Japan is
very much interested in acquiring full control of the fisheries,
which have an immense economic value, by reason of the inex-
haustible supply of fish. During the Tsar's regime, Japan made
PRESENT OUTLOOK
47
an effort to secure for herself these fisheries; she tried to get them
at Portsmouth, in 1905, and acquired several privileges by the
subsequent conventions with Russia. She is now endeavoring to
establish her exclusive control over them/
48
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
means pleased with their surroundings on Russian territory and
in consequence will hardly stay there forever. The main reasons
are : first, the cold and trying climate of this country which the
Japanese cannot stand at all and which makes permanent resi-
dence impossible for them; secondly, their policy in the Far East
"STrN CIRCULAIIONULPARTAAENT
loaFTperIod 1 l2
HOAAE ySE^ ,
4 '
FORM NO. DD6
BERKELEY, CA 94720
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