M5B2o

-«:^IUBRARYQ^

\ii i

^mms/;^

<m3DNVS01^

^10SANCEI%

%a3AiNnmv^

<^ME■UNIVER%

i# "^(^AMYHan-li^ ^J5l3DNV-S01=<^

^lOSANGEl^r*

CO
30

•^AaaAiNnmv^

x^OFCAUFOR^

'^^AHvagn^'

% ^lOS;AKCU£r^
N2 ^

^HIBRARYO?.

^lUBRARYQc^

.^WtUNIVERJ/A

<i^33NVS01=v?

^lOSANCElfXA

/jajAii^iiJUJ-

■fo%

^<?AavaaiHv*'

^OFCAllFOft^

^^\\E•UNIVER% ^

•^UHDmsoi^

..T! 110?) A nv/-,

k. ^TT!

•Ti VrJ ! a ■' "7 ri w

• ic Jiw^n.'rnc.rw :. i^jf ui

-5^1UBRARYQ^ ^

53 §

>a..r.v,^^ %a3AiNni# ^^ojnvDJO^ ^

0% ^OF-C

-'c/AavailU•iv^^

•soi^-

.^10SANCEI%

iVikVi-'

^OFCAUFO;?^

^1;^

n33

5>^IUBR

O-jat-'

^\WEUNIVER%

^^DNVSOl^

eg-

r^j

% 4-
s es

FOi?^

^^EUKIVER%. ^

«5WEllNIVERr,-
c

^^.lIBRARVn

It -

* <Sf

'<»

yO.

OPINIONS AND DECREES

IN THE

MEXICAN CASES.

UAI-TIMORE: MURPHY 8i CO., PRINTKRS.

. • . • •

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in the Supreme Court of tlie

United States. December Term, 1S54 5

Decree of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in th^ case of Lyde

Goodwin. June Term, 1849 17

Opinion of Judge Martin, in the case of Lyde Goodwin. June

Term, 1849 18

Opinion of Chief Judge Dorsev, and Judge Spence, in the case
\^^^ oi Lyde Goodwin. June Tertn, 1849 19

>. Decree of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in the cases of

'!; James Williams, and John Gooding, et al. June Term, 1849. 20

-> Opinion of Judge Martin, in the cases of John Gooding, and

James Hilliums. June Term, 1849 22

?»■ Opinion of Chief Judge Dorsey, and Judge Spence, in the cases

^ of John Gooding, and James Williams, et al. June

i Term, 1849 22

Opinion of Mr. Justice Grier, in ihc Snprfirif Court of the United

^ States, in the case of Ly</e Goot/u,z/<. Dccnnber Term, 1850. 24

■^ Opinion of Mr. Justice VVuDnBURY, in the Supreme Court of the

O United States, in the ca.-e of Lyde Goodwin. December

ui Term, 18;50 27

□ Order or Decree of the Supreme Court of the United Stales, in

* the case of Lyde Goodwin. December Term, 18.'50 29

Opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson, in tlie Supreme Court of the
United States, in the cases of James Williams, and John
Gooding. December Term, 18.51 30 & 35

Orders or Decrees of the Supreme Court of the United Stales,
in the cases of .James Williams, and John Gooding. De-
cember Term, 1851 34 & 35

445^

PAGE

Opinion of Mr. Justice Grier, in the Supreme Court of the United

States, in the case of John Deacon. December Term, 1852. 36

Order or Decree of the Supreme Court of the United States, in

the case of John Deacon. December Term, 1852 38

Decrees of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District
of Maryland, in the cases of John Deacon, (1851,) and Lyde
Goodwin, James Williams, and John Gooding, (1853) 39 & 40

Opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Lyde Goodwin. December
Term, 1854 41

Order or Decree oPthe Supreme Court of the United States, in

the case of Lyde Goodwin, December Term, 1854 45

Opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the cases of James Williams, and John
Gooding, December Term, 1854 46 & 57

Opinion of Mr. Justice Daniel, in the Supreme Court of (he
United States, in the cases of James Williams, and John
Gooding, December Term, 1854 54

Orders or Decrees of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the cases of Jaffze^ Williams, and John Gooding. Decem-
ber Term, 1854 56&57

©pinions anh Slccrccs in tl)e iilejfican ^ases.

OPINION OF MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANF>Y.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1854. «

John S. Williams, Administrator of
James Williams, dec'd, appellant,
vs.

Robert M. Gibbcs and Chas. Oliver,
Ex'orsof Robert Oliver, deceased. J

And

Jno. Gooding, junior, Administrator

de bonis non of John Gooding,

deceased, appellant,

vs.

Robert M. Gibbes and Chas. Oliver,

Ex'ors of Robert Oliver, deceased.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY dissenting.

Appeals from the circuit court
of the United States for the
district of Maryland.

I dissent from the opinion in these two cases; but they are so inli-
niately conncrled with ihe case against liyde Goodwin's achninislraior,
just (l(!ci(led, that I shall be better understood by considering the three
(oL'^eihor.

W lif'ii the case of Gill (who was trustee of Goodwin under (he
insolvent laws of Maryland) against Oliver's executors was biifore lh<;
court, I did not concur in llie JudgnHiUt then given, as will \)c seen by
ihe report of the case in lllh Howard's Reports. It apjjeared to me
(umecessary at ih.ii lime to do more (ban simply ex])ress my dissent;
but iIm! course which these cases have siu((^ taken, and the derisions
now given, m.ike it my duty to stale more fully my own opinion, and
ihe grounds upon which I passed (he decrees thai are now before the
court.

'I'he history of the controversy is this: (iondwin, (Jooding, and
Williams were members of the Haltimore Mc-xican C'omi)any, which
made the contract with Mina in 1S1(>. The character of that contract
is fully stated in the lllh and I2th volmnes of Howard's Reports, and
also the ui.uukt in which it came bfforc the connnissionf-rs uuder the
treaty with Mexico, and thfir nw.ud u])oii ii.

()

The commissioners awarded (he sum mentioned in their award to
(he Mexican Company of Bahimore, as due " for arms, vessels, muni-
tions of war, goods, and money, furnished by the company to General
Mina for the service of Mexico in the years 1816 and 1817," and gave
interest to the company according to the stipulation in the contract with
Mina. I have given the words of the award, because they show that
the commissioners affirmed (he validity of this contract, and directed
the amount due by its terms to be paid to the trustees therein named,
for the benefit of the parties interested in it.

l^roceeditjgs were soon after instituted in a Maryland court of equity
against the (rustees by persons claiming an interest in the fund; and
the money by order of (he court was brought into court to be dis-
tributed among the parties entitled. Many claimants appeared, pre-
senting conflicting claims for shares in the company.

Goodwin, Gooding, and Williams all became insolvent — Goodwin
in 1817, Gooding and Williams in 1819; and their respective trustees
appeared in the Maryland court, and claimed the amount due to the
insolvent.

On the other hand, the executors of Oliver claimed these three
shares — Goodwin's under an assignment made to Oliver by Goodwin
in 1829, and the other two under assignments made to him in 1825
by George Winchester, who was tlie trustee of each of them.

The controversies which arose upon the distribution of this fund were
removed to the Maryland court of appeals, which is the highest court
of the State. And in the trial (here it was objected (hat (he con(ract
with Mina was in violation of law, and therefore fraudulent and void,
and vested no rights in the members of (he company which the law
would recognise, and consecfuently that no right of property in it could
vest in the trustee when the party became insolvent.

It may be proper to remark, that under the Maryland insolvent law,
all the property, rights and credits belonging to the insolvent at the lime
of his petition, became vested in his trustee: and he at (he same time
executes a deed to the trustee, conveying and assigning to him all his
property, rigli(s, and credi(s of every tiescription for (he benefit of his
creditors. And if the persons above named, at the times of their peti-
tions in 1817 and 1819, had any interest whatever, either legal or
equitable, vested or contingent, under this Mexican contract, it passed
to his trustee.

The court of appeals decided that (he contract with Mina was fraud-
ulent and void under our neutrality laws, and therefore vested no rigiil
in the parties which a court of justice in this country could recognise,
and, consequently, that they liad no interest or property under it which
could be transferred to or vest, in their trustees at the time of (heir in-
solvency. And upon this ground they decided against the claim of the
trustees, and directed the whole amount of the three shares to be paid
(o Oliver's executors.

The ground upon which they supported the claim of Oliver's execu-
tors to these shares is not stated fully in the opinion. It was, I pre-
sume, upon the ground that, by the terms of the award, the shares of
these three persons were received b}' the trustees named in the award,

in Irnst for these executors; and flint ihc trustee?, therefore, had no
rio-ht to withhold it from them; as neither they nor their testator had
any participation in the fraudulent contract out of which it had arisen.
And if the court was riffht in decidinsr, that neither the trustee of the
insolvent nor any one else could derive a title to this money under the
contract with Mina, perhaps the lantruaoe of the award, together with
the dociuuents referred to in it, might Justify this decision. But I ex-
press no opinion on this point, and merely suggest it in justice to the
court of appeals, in order to show that their opiiu'ons in these cases are
not necessarily inconsistent with each other, although the court may
have reasoned erroneously, and decided incorrectly.

These decisions were brought to thi« court by the trustees of the
insolvents, by writs of error imder the 2.Tih section of the act of 1789.
Motions were made in each of them to dismiss for want of jurisdiction;
and the motions were sustained by the majority of the court, and the
cases dismissed, as will appear in the reports referred to.

[differed in opinion from the court; but imdoul)tedly, when the
cases came before me at circuit, upon bills filed by the administrators,
it was my duty to conform in the inferior court to the decision of the
superior, as far as that decision applied to the case presented by these
coniplainrmts. It is true, that in my own opinion, and according to
the views of the subject I had always entertained, these bills, by the
administrators of the insolvents, could not be maintained. But I dis-
missed them, not only upon that ground, but also under the impression
that 1 was bound to do so upon the principles upon which this court
had decided them in the suits by the trustees. It appears, however,
by the opinion just delivered, that I was mistaken, and placed an
erroneous construction on the opinions formerly delivered. It seems,
therefore, to be due to myself to state not only my opinion in the former
cases, but also the interpretation I placed upon the language of this
court in deciding them. And I think it will be found that the lan-
guage of the foriuer decisions was fairly susceptible of the construction 1
[iiM upon it, althouo-h that construction has turned out to be erroneous.
1 do not mean to say that the construction which the majority of the
court puts uj)on its former decisions now, is not the true one; but that
the language u^^fd in it might lead I'vcn a careful iiHiuiriT to a ((Hitniry
conclusjot).

1 proc('(;(l, in liic first place, to speak of tlit; case of (jJili, trustee of
1 ,Vfle (ioodwiu. As I have already said, when that case was before
this ((iiiii. I ihoutrli', -111(1 siiil think, we bad jurisdiction; and proceed
now lo slale tin; tnoiinds of that o[)iniou, and how it bore on the deci-
sion of the suit by his administrator, which is now before u^

The money in disfnite was claimed under the contract w iib Mina.
And ilie aiiniiiiii eJiMiied was awarded to (he Mexican Conij)auy or
liieii |e<ra| represeutati\cs or assigns, by (lie commissioners apj)oinle(l
under the .Mexican treaty, and the act of (congress passed to cany it
into execuiif)n. The connui.ssioners were authorized to ascertain and
determine upon the vjdidily of the claims of American cilizetjs upon the
Mexican uovei nmeui, and for which this L'overnmeiit had demanded
lepaiaiidii. ( )( coiir-e it wa-' their dutv rmt ir» allow any claim for

services rendered to Mexico, or money advanced for its use, by Ameri-
can citizens in violation of their duty to their own country or in dis-
obedience to its laws. For the government would have been unmind-
ful of its own duty to the United States, if it had used its power and
influence to enforce a claim of that description, or had sanctioned it by
treaty. But the board of commissioners were necessarily the judges of
the lawfulness of the contracts, and the validity of the claims presented.
They were necessarily to determine whether they were of the descrip-
tion provided for in the treaty or not. They may have conmiitted
errors of judgment in this respect, and may have connnitted an error
of judgment in sanctioning the contract with Mina. But the law
under which they acted made them the exclusive judges on the sub-
ject. There was no appeal from their decision. And if there was no
malpractice on the part of the commissioners, and (he award was not
obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, it was final and conclusive.
It was like the judgment of any other tribunal having jurisdiction of
the subject matter, and could not be re-examined and impeached for
error of judgment in any other court which had no appellate power
over it. And they decided that the contract of Mina was valid, and
consequently it vested from its date a lawful right to the money in the
members of the Mexican Company.

The objection, therefore, in the Maryland court brought into question
the validity of an authority exercised under the United States; and as
the decision of the State court was against its validity, it was my opinion
that a writ of error did lie under the 25th section of the act of 1789.
And regarding the award as final and conclusive upon other tribunals,
there was error in the judgment of the State court which pronounced
it invalid and fraudulent. It will be observed that this error was the
foundation of the judgment of the State court. For if the court did
not look behind the award, and had regarded the contract as valid,
the right to Goodwin's interest undoubtedly passed to his trustee in
1817, long before his assignment to Oliver. I therefore thought this
court had jurisdiction, and that the judgment of the court of appeals
ought to be reversed, and this money paid to the trustee and not to
Oliver's executors.

The iTiajority of the court, however, entertained a different opinion,
and dismissed the cases upon tlie ground, as I understand the opinion,
that the construction of the treaty, or of the act of Congress, or the
validity of the authority exercised under them, did not appear to have
been drawn into question in the court of aj)peals; and that the case
appeared to liave been decided upon the efiect and operation of their
own insolvent law, and upon their own laws regulating contracts and
transfers of property and credits within the State, over which we had
no jurisdiction upon the writ of error; that these matters were exclu-
sively for the decision of the State tribunals, and their decision final
upon the subject.

Some remarks are made in the opinion in relation to grounds upon
which the State court might have decided without impeaching the
award of the commissioners; and among others the fact that Goodwin
had assigned his right to Oliver in 1829, and that the Mexican Con-

gress had previously, in 1S25, ackno\vlecla;ed its validity. There is an
error in the date, but it is ininiaterial. The acts of the Mexican Con-
gress were in 1S23 and 1S24.

Hut I did not understand these remarks as intended to affirm that
the share of Goodwin passed to Oliver by this assignment, but as sug-
gesting grounds upon which the State court miglit, whether erroneously
or not, have decided in favor of the executors. Because, as the court
held that it iiad no jurisdiction in the case, I supposed that it intended
to give no opinion upon the merits. And I presumed that it did not
intend to decide that the acknowledgment of Mexico, that Mina's con-
tract was binding upon the republic, could give any validil}^ to it in
the courts of the United States. F^or the contract of the Baltimore
Company would have been liable to the same objections if it hatl been
made originally in 1816, with the Mexican government instead of Gen-
eral Mina. And if it was void in 1817, and Goodwin then had no
interest imder it, it was equally void in 1829, when the assignment to
Oliver was made; and it is due to the court of apj^eals to say, that they
have not indicated, in any of their opinions, that the acts of the Mexi-
can congress had any influence on their judgments.
Uj)on these considerations I dismissed the bill at circuit, upon two
grounds: 1st. My own opinion is, that ilie interest of (loodwin passed
to his trustee, and consequently that the present complainant (his ad-
ministrator) can have no title. 2d. This court decided, upon a view
of the whole case, that it had no appellate power over this judgment,
and that it had been decided by the Maiyland court upon its own con-
struction of its own laws. And that point being adjudged by this
court, I did not see upon what ground 1 could, in conformity to this
opinion, revise the judgment of the Slate court and reverse its deci-
sion. It would, in substance, have been the exercise of an appellate
])0Wer at circuit over the decisions of the Stale courts, upon their o\\ n
laws, which this court had refused to exercise on writ of error; and,
for the reason lirst above staled, I now concur in aflirmini: the judg-
ment here in the case of Goodwin's administrator.

1 come now to the cases of the administrators of Gooiling and Wil-
liams, which are in many respects alike. 'I'hese wrils were also dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction, when formerl)' before the court; and in
dismissing ihem, the court said that the title of the trustees to ihe
shares of Gooding and Williams " involved only a (piesiion of Slate
law, and therefore was not die subject of revision here, and was con-
clusive of his rights, and decisive of the case." I (|uole iIm; language
of ihi; couit. The want of jurisdiction was, therefore, the only point
decided in these cases, and they were dismissed on that ground.

It is true that in these cases, as W(!ll as in that of (Joodwin's irustec,
language is used, in the opinion of the court, which would seem to
imply lliat the court was of ojiiuiou that the contract was void origi-
nally, Ijut li.id afterwards become valid by the events referred to in the
ojjinion. But 1 understood liiesc observations, as I did those, made in
Goodwin's case, merely as suggesting considerations which might have
led to the decision of the Stale court withoul impeaching the award of
the conunissioners, but not as approving or stuidioning ih-in ;is sulli-

cient Jiioiinds for (heir decree. For llie court, determined that it had
no jurisdiction, and consc(|uenlly the merits of the case were not before
it, and I presumed it did nol mean to express any opinion concerning
the correctness or incorrectness of the judgment of the State court.
Such I have understood to be the estabhshed practice of this court,
and I was not aware that this case was intended to be an exception.
The only point decided was the conclusiveness of the judgment of the
State court upon the rights of the trustees.

The court of appeals assigned two reasons for their decision, and
taking them literally, as they stand, they are inconsistent with each
other. But the opinion appears to have been hastily written, and not
sufficiently guarded in its words; and it is evident they meant to say,
that, in the opinion of the court, no interest vested in the trustee, be-
cause there was no legal or equitable interest acquired by the con-
tract that could vest anywhere, or in any person. But, if there was
a legal interest, it passed to his trustee, and by his assignment vested in
Oliver. This mode of decision upon alternative grounds is an ordinary
and familar one in courts of justice, and will often be found in the
decisions of this court.

And however the reasoning of the Slate court may be regarded, it is*
dear, that with the interest of the intestate before them and under con-
sideration, they decreed that the shares belonged to Oliver's executors.
Now it is perfectly immaterial whether the reasons assigned by the
court were right or wrong. Here is their judgment, their decree — a
decree founded altogether on State laws, as this court have said in
their former decisions, and made b}^ a court of competent jurisdiction.
ITpon what principle, tlien, can a court of the United States, either at
circuit or here, undertaice to revise it or reverse it for error? If we
had no appellate power upon the writ of error, and no right to reverse
the jiKlgmenl for errors supposed to be committed by the State court
in interpreting and administering its own laws, how can this coinl or
the circuit court exercise this revising power over the judgment in the
form it now comes before us ? It is doing in another way what it is
admitted cannot be done in the prescribed mode of proceeding by writ
of error. And I am not aware of any precedent for this exercise of
power in a coint of the United States administering State laws, when
the judgment of the highest court of the State is before them upon the
same case upon which the United States court is called on to decide.

It will be remembered that the appellate and revising power of the
i-nuris of the United Slates over the judgments of State courts stands
upon very diM'erent principles from those which, in England, govern
the relation of superior and inferior Tribunals, and they are not, there-
fore, always safe guides upon the revising and reversing power which
the courts of the United States may constitutionall}'^ exercise over the
juilgments of Slate courts.

I know it is said that the administrators of these insolvents who have
filed these bills were not parties to the former proceedings, and are not
therefore estopped by the decree of the court of appeals. And a good
deal of argument has been offered to maintain that proposition; but
that question carmot arise until other questions which stand before it

and control it are first disposed of. For this court held, upon the
former writs of error, that tliese cases were decided b\' the court of ap-
peals exclusively upon Maryland law; and, if that be the case, before
we come to the question of parties, other questions must be decided:
1st. Whether in this form of proceeding you can examine into the
validity of the groimds upon which the State court decided them, and
reverse its judgment if you suppose it committed an error in inter-
preting and administering its own laws? and, if you are authorized to
do this, then, 2dly. Did it commit an error in deciding that those
shares belonged to Oliver's executors? The reasons they may have
given for this opinion are altogether immaterial; and if these two ques-
tions are decided in the affirmative, and this court reverses the judg-
ment, upon the ground that the shares belonged to the insolvents at the
times of their death, and not to Oliver's executors, then the administra-
tors would undoubtedly have an interest, and are not estopped by the
former decree from claiming their rights. Nobody, I presume, disputes
this. But, before you come to this part of the case, you must take
jurisdiction over the judgment of the State court, and reverse it for
error. Jiccause, if that judgment stands, then the intestates had noth-
ing at (he times of their death that could pass to the administrators;
and there would have been no more propriety in making them parties,
than any other stranger who had no interest in the fund. The admin-
istrator of a vendor who has in his lifetime divested himself of all right
to property, can hardly be supposed to be a necessary party in a con-
troversy between purchasers under him when neither of the claimants
has a riijht to fall back for indenmilv on his estate. The administrators
offer no new evidence of interest in them or their intestates, but present
here tlie identical case, in all its parts, that was before the court of
appeals when it j)assed its decree.

Indeed 1 cannot comprehend how the- State court, or this c(»inl, ciin
award the fund to the administrators, if the contract was fraudulent and
void when the parties became insolvent. They both died before the
award was made; hut if, up to that tunc, the contract continued open
to examination in a court of justice, and was decided to have been
fraudulent ami a nullity when n)ade, nothing afterwards could have
given it legal existence. Nihilum ex iiiliilo oriulur is as true in law
as in philrjsophy. If void at first, it continu(Ml to be void and a mdlity
to the time of the deaths of the parlies, and their adniinislralors could
derive no lawful title from them. To say ib.ii a biial or e(|iiilal)le
interest in a fraudulent contract can (!xist in a |)arty and be transmitted
to his administrator, when used as Icjal lanirua^e, is a solecism. And
if from necessity, upon any principle of law or equity, the award related
back, it would .seem that those who punliased the interest in ilieso
shares, at their full market \'nlue at the lime, and i)aid for il, should
have tlif; b(;iiefit of the relations.

It may be .«aid, perhaps, ihat although the acta of compress of Mexico,
in 1823 and 1824, could not make valid a contract t)riginally voiil and
a mdlity by our laws, yet these acts of the Mexican leLnslalmc consii-
tuled a new and original contract which at that lime niighi lawfully be
made by our citizens, and that the rights of the parties lake dale from

that contract. But this view of the case would not obviate the legal
objections, but on the contrary it would add to them. For it still
assumes the principle that the State court had a right to examine into
the testimony, not only to determine the rights of the parties under the
award, but to impeach the award itself. And upon this theory, if they
had not found these acts of the Mexican congress in the proceedings of
the commissioners, tlie State court might have held the whole award
erroneous and a nullity, vesting no rights in any one, because it sanc-
tioned an illegal contract. As I have already said, a State court, in
iny judgment, has no such power.

The commissioners do not refer to the Mexican acts of congress, nor
allow the claims of the company upon a contract made by these laws,
T'hey award expressly upon the contract with Mina, and give interest
according to that contract. And unless their award may be impeached
for error, and their decision upon the claim re-examined and reversed
in the State court, the rights of all the claimants depend upon this con-
tract, and take date from it. According to the award of the commis-
sioners, it is this contract that gave the claimants rights — and which
must consequently govern the court in distributing the fund.

It seems to be supposed that the decision of the court of appeals de-
claring this contract to be fraudulent and void was founded upon some
local law of the State. But that is evidently a mistake. It was
founded on the breach of the neutrality laws of the United States.
They looked behind the award of the commissioners, behind an
authority exercised under the United States, and impeached its validity.

Besides, no other contract but this was under examination in the
Slate court. The court speak of no other in their opinion. The par-
ties, as appear by the proceedings, all claimed under it, and the deci-
sions of the court and the distribution of the fund were founded upon
it. Can another at)d a subsequent contract be set up here, upon which
the Slate court has passed no judgment, and has not acted, and under
which none of the parties bef'ore it claimed? I think not. And if
their decision is to be set aside for error, it must, I presume, be for
error in deciding upon the contract brought before them by the parties.
And if ihis court now reverse these decrees upon the ground that the
original contract with Mina was void, but became valid by subsequent
events, it reverses upon a new case, upon which the State court has
never decided. Moreover, it unsettles the whole proceedings in the
State court, for the interest of the claimants, in almost every instance,
depended upon the time that a lawful right to this claim vested in the
company.

And if, notwithstanding these objections, this court may look into
the judgment and reverse it for error, and they find it to have been
decided upon two principles of law, consi^ent or inconsistent with each
other, one of which is erroneous and the other sound, ought not the
judgment to be affirmed?

Now, as I have already said, the Stale court committed an error, in
my opinion, in going behind the award, and receiving testimony to
show that a contract was fraudulent and void which a tribunal of the
United Slates having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject had decided

to be lawful e^ind valid. And if this court have the power to revise
that judgment, 1 lliink it could not Ije supported on that ground.

But they put it upon another, and say, that if the original contract
is regarded as valid, then the interest of the insolvents passed to their
trustee, and, by virtue of his assignment, vested in Robert Oliver

Now, in examining the judgment of an inferior tribunal in a case of
this description, would the appellate court lay hold of the erroneous
principle to reverse the judgment? Woidd they not affirm it upon the
other allernaiive, which placed it upon lawful and tenable grounds?
1 think nobody would doubt that the judgment would be affirmed.
Ought not the same rule to be applied to the Maryland judgmeni which
this court is now revising? And is not this court bound, under the
award of the connnissioners, to regarti the original contract as valid,
when it has been so decided by a lawful tribunal of the United Slates,
having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject? If we are so bound,
and not authorized to impeach the judgment of the commissioners,
then the judgment of the Maryland comt, in the cases of Giooding and
Williams, is risht, and ought to be allirmed upon the second ground
stated in the opinion, even if we were sitting here as an appellate
tribunal.

It is true that the bill in the case of Williams's trustee was filed in
the State chancery court, wliich, by a change of the law, represents
the court where the fund was originally paid in and distributed among
the claimants; and was removed to the circuit court of the United
Slates by the appellees, who reside out of the Stale. And undoubtedly,
ihe circuit court, in that stale of the case, possessed the same power
over it, and were bound to decide it upon the same principles that
ought to have governed the Slate court in which the bill was fileil.
But there was no new evidence, no new fact, no new interest or ecpiiiy
presented. T^'hcre is a new name indeed, but no new interest or ecjuiiy
disclosed in the bill. And upon that case the court of appeals had
passed its decree. That decree was the law of the case, in the inferior
court, where this bill was filed. And the court of appeals itself could
not reverse its decree, signed and enrolletl at a former term, nor open
it merely because a new name was before them, which, according lo
its former decree, had no interest in the fimd, and conse(|ucnily ou^ht
not to have l)een made a parly in the former proceedings. And if we
ncnv reverse (his jiulgmeiit, we go further ihau ibe Mar) land court of
appeals could have gone, and exercise what is essentially an appellate
jjower over it, correcting the errors of an inferior court.

But in (iooding's case this court go siill fjuiher. The i»ill in iliis
case was fileil originally in the circuit court of llie L/niled Stales ^ et
ilie fund was never in that court, nor ihe money paid ii» iIk^ appellees
l)y iis order. If the decree is lo be opened for error, afii-r ihe fund is
(iislril)Ute(i by order of a court of compelent jurisdiction, ought il nol lo
be done in the court that pass(;d ihe decree? And ciui a circuil ctiurt
of the United Stales compel the appelltM's lo repay money which iliey
hold imder the decree of a couit of coordinate juiisdiclion, made upon
the stune ca.se, with the same evidence before iheni .' 1 ihink nol.
3

Besides, Goodinjr became insolvent again in ] 829. All the property,
rights and credits wliicli he had at that time, vested in his trustees, who
are still living. If Goodwin's interest in 1829 had become so far valid
that it could pass by his assignment to Oliver, why is not Gooding s
also lawful and vested in his trustees? Upon what principle can Good-
win's interest be capable of assignment in 1829, and Gooding's remain
fraudulent until his death ? Yet if it was capable of assignment in
1S29, the complainant is not entitled. It passed to his trustees.

And if, as the court now say, Goodwin would be estopped from im-
peaching his assignment to Oliver on the ground that the original con-
tract was illegal and fraudulent, why are not Gooding and Williams,
and their administrators, equally estopped from impeaching their assign-
ments to their repective trustee ? The assignment to the trustee for
the benefit of their creditors was equally meritorious with Goodwin's
assignment to Oliver. And if they had appeared as parties in the
Maryland court, would they have been permitted to impeach the title
of the trustee, who was then claiming it, and set up a right to the
money in themselves, upon the ground that the contract of their respec-
tive intestates was fraudulent? Certainly the principle is well estab-
lished in chancery, that a party cannot set aside a contract upon the
ground that he himself was guilty of a fraud in making it. 1 do not
cite cases to prove familiar doctrines. His administrator is in no better
condition. And yet he is allowed, in this case, to defeat the operation
of the intestate's deed to the trustee, upon the ground that the contract,
of which the trustee claims the benefit, was a fraudulent one on the
part of his intestate. And here, in a court of equity, these adminis-
trators support (heir title and recover this money against their trustees,
as well as Oliver's executors, solely upon the ground that their intestate
was guilty of a fraud in making the contract with Mina, and incapable,
therefore, of assigning it. The party defeats the operation of his own
deed, upon the ground that he himself committed a fraud. This doc-
trine cannot, I think, be maintained upon principle or authority in a
court of chancery.

We are not dealing with Mexican laws, or inquiring what a Mexi-
can tribunal or the Mexican Government would decide in relation to
this contract, but we are inquiring how it stands in a Maryland court,
and what are the legal rights under it by the laws of Maryland. And
I understand this court to place its opinion solely upon the ground that
this contract was fraudulent and void by the laws of Maryland, and
that the parties acquired no rights under it.

It may liave been good in Mexico — a valid, binding obligation.
They may have been willing to reward our citizens for a breach of
duty to their own country; but that could not cleanse it from the
offence against our own law, nor give legal rights to the administrator,
when there was no right in the intestate. The courts of the United
Stales can hardly be authorized to sanction and enforce what are called
honorary obligations of a foreign nation, when those obligations have
arisen from temptations offered to our own citizens to violate the laws
of their own country. Nor can I perceive how the opinion of the
Maryland court, declining this contract to be fraudulent and void, can

be binding and conclusive upon this court, and yet ev^ery other deci-
sion of the same court, in the same case, explaining or quahfying
this opinion, still be open to examination and reversed lor error. I
cannot, for m3'self, draw any line of distinction between the relative
conclusiveness of the opinions the State court expressed, when all of
them were equally within its jurisdiction and depended altogether upon
the laws of the State; and all upon points necessarily arising in the
case they are then deciding.

When these two cases were before the court, upon writs of error
brought by the trustees, I entertained the opinions I now express. I
then thought that the court had jurisdiction, upon the ground that the
validity of the act of the Maryland legislature of 1841 , confirming a
certain description of conveyances made before that time b\^ the trustees
of insolvent debtors, was drawn into question, as contrary to the Con-
stitution of the United States, and their decision had been in favor of
the validity of the State law. And I still think so. But at the same
lime I was of opinion, that the law in question was valid, and that
ahhough we had jurisdiction, the judgment of the Stale comt in these
two cases ought to be affirmed, and the writs of error not dismissed.
For the trustee in whom the shares vested (according to the opinion I
have expressed as to Goodwin's case) had transferred (hem to Oliver,
and the State court was tlierefore right in decreeing them to Oliver's
executors. The majority of this court thought otherwise, and dismissed
them for want of jurisdiction. And I did not state my dissent, because,
as I then understood the opinion, the dismissal finally disposed of them.

It was upon the grounds above stated that I decided these cases at
the circuit, and supposed, at the time I was deciding them, in con-
formity to the opinion of this court upon the conclusiveness of the judg-
ment of the State court. The judgment just pronounced, however,
shows that so far as the shares of Gooding and Williams are conct.'rned,
I misunderstood the opinion of the majority of this coiut. But with
all the habitual respect which I feel for the judgment of uiy l)r('tlncn,
the opinion I held at the circuit remains unchanged. And 1 have the
more confidence in it, because this court, now as heretofore, have said
that the questions in dispute depend altogether on Maryland law; and
every judge in ^Maryland who has been rallc*! upon to hear and decide
the cases of Gooding and Williams, of which I am now speaking— the
judge of the court of original chancery jurisdiction, the judges of the
court of appeals, all men of high legal altainmrnts and eminence —
have clearly and unanimously h(;ld, up(»u the same |Md(. fs now Ix-fore
us, that the executors of (Jliver were entitled to these; (wo shar(!s in
ilie Mexican Company, and decreed (hat the money should be paid (o
lliem. And no one Of lln'se judges deemed it necessary (hat (he
.idministrators shoidd be parties, or called befon; the; court — acting no
iloul)t upon the estai)lish(;d rules of chancery, that a person who has
no interest in the fund need not and ought not to be made a party;
;iiifl lii.ii ilie administrators could have no interest, as (he intestates
ilieniselves had none at the times of their re^^peciive deaths. And that
if ihev were before the comt, they could uoi he allowed (o inipearh

the deed to the trustees by alleging that their intestate had committed

a fraud in making it.

I must, therefore, adhere to the opinions I entertained when the
cases were before me at circuit, and dissent from the opinion just pro-
nounced, in tiie cases of Gooding's and VVilliams's administrators, and
concurring in that of Goodwin's administrator, for the reasons herein
before stated.

DECREES AND OPINIONS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

June Term, 1849.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUXE TERM, 1849,

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thoiiitis"]
Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, and John I
Glenn, and David M. Ferine, trustees, &c., |

vs. ^

George M. Gill, permanent trustee of Lyde Good-
win and others, appeal in the case of Thomas &.
While vs. D. Smith and others.

The appeal in this case coming on for hearinp;, and having been
fully fTiiued by the solicitors of the respective parlies, has been since
fully considered by the court; and it appearing to the court that that
part of th<' decree appealed from of the court below, which directed
any portion of the fund in controversy to be transferred or paid to the
appellee, Geo. M. Gill, as permanent trustee of Lyde Goodwin, was
erroneous, and should be reversed; and it also appearing to the court
thai said portion of said fund should be paid over and transferred to
the appellants. Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thomas Oliver,
as exfcutors of Robert Oliver, in the proceedings mentioned, together
with all accumulations of interest or dividends since accruing upon
the same:

It is thereupon, by this court, and the authority thereof, on this
Iweutv third day of .June, in the year one thousand eight hmulred and
forty-nine, adjudged, ordered, and decreed, that the said decree of the
court below, so far as the same adjudged and decreed any portion of
the fmid in controversy to be transferred or paid to the said George M.
Gill, as permanent trustee of Lyde Goodwin, be and the same is re-
versed and annulled; and this court proceeding to pass such decree in
the premises as they are of opinion should have been passed by the
court below, do further adjudgi; and decree, that all and every ))art of
such portion of said fimd, so by the com I below decreed to be trans-
ferred or paid to said George M. Ciill, as trustee aforesaid, he, by the
trustees in the prf)ceediMgs mentioned, D.ivid M . Terine and .Idm
filemi, transferred or paid over to the ;ippe||,iiiis, ( 'barb's Oliver,
Robert M. (jiiljbes, and Thomas Oliver, as executors of |{obert Oliver;
togetluM- with all and every accumulations of interest or dividends, or
investments of the sime, made or accruing in and upon such part or
portion of said bmd; iiml it is buther, by this coiut and its autlnjrily,
adjudged and d(;creed, that all other portions of the decree of the court
below, except such as is hereby reversed, be, and the same is In-reby,
ainrmed; it is fmther adjudged and decreed, that the reversal of the
decree of the court below be without costs,

Tiio ir i)ok.sl:Y;

ARA fSPLNClv

Aiul thereupon, according lo (he provisions, force, and effect of the
act of the General Assembly of Maryland of 1832, chapter 302, section
(J, the said court, of appeals here tile (he opinions of the court for and
in respect of its determination of the appeal aforesaid, the determination
of the said court of appeals being had upon oral argument on (he part
of the parties aforesaid, and which said opinions are as follows to wit:

The opinion of the honorable Robert N. Martin, one of the judges of

the said court.

Executors of Robert Oliver"^

vs.

George M. Gill, trustee of Lyde f
Goodwin. J

In my opinion the decree of the court below in (his case was correct
and ought to be affirmed.

I think that G. M. Gill is to be considered, upon the true construction
of the insolvent laws of Maryland, as duly and legally appointed the
permanent trustee of L. Goodwin, and as such trustee was competent
to institute this petition.

Those who claim the share of Lyde Goodwin in the Mexican asso-
ciation, as the representatives of Robert Oliver j rel}'- upon the deed of
G. J. Brown, of the 21st of March, 1825, and upon tiie assignment of
L. Goodwin to Robert Oliver, of the 30th of May, 1829.

In my opinion the appellants cannot make title to the share in ques-
tion through either of these deeds.

G. J. Brow^n, as the provisional trustee of L. Goodwin, was certainly
incompetent to convey this property; and it is, I think, equally clear
that L. Goodwin, by his application for the benefit of the insolvent
laws, became incapable of assigning any portion of his estate.

In my opinion there is no force in the objection that G. M. Gill, as
the trustee of L. Goodwin, cannot insist upon this claim, assuming it
to be in other respects unexceptional, upon the ground of its supposed
original turpitude as an infraction of the law of nations or (he neutrality
act of 1794.

I think that the treaty between the United States and Mexico, of the
ll^A of September, 1829,* and the act of Congress of the 12th of June,
1840, passed for the purpose of carrying into execution the stipulations
of the treaty, and the award of the commissioners under this treaty, are
to be considered as a conclusive and binding recognition of the validity
of this claim, and that it is not in this proceeding to be questioned or
disputed.

* The date of the treaty is the 11th April, 1«39.

The opinion of (he honorable Thomas B, Dorsey, chief judge, and
of llie honorable Aia Spence, judge.

June term, 1849.

Court of appeals. Appeal from the equity side of Baltimore county

court.

Oliver's executors and others "^

George M. Gill, permanent trustee of Lyde f °'
Goodwin and all. J

The majority of this court, who sat in the trial of this cause (and by
which was decreed (he reversal of the decree of the county court) at
the instance of the solicitors of (he appellees, briefly sta(e the following
as their reasons for such reversal: They are of opinion that the entire
contract, upon which the claim of the appellees is founded, is so fraught
with illegality and turpitude, as to be utterly null and void, and con-
ferring no rights or obligations upon any of the contracting parties which
can be sustained or countenanced by any comt of law or equity in this
State or of the United States; that it has no legal or moral obligadon
to support it, and that, therefore, under the insolvent laws of Mary-
land, such a claim does not pass to or vest in the trustee of an insolvent
pe(itioner. It forms no part of his property or estate, within the mean-
ing of the legislative enactments constituting our insolvent system. It
bears no analogy to tlic cases, decided in Maryland and elsewhere, of
claims not recoverable in a court of justice, which nevertheless have
been held to vest in the trustees of an insolvent or the assignees of a
bankrupt. In the case referred to, the claims as concerned those
assorting theuj, were, on their part, tainted I)y no princi])lc of illcgalilv
(»r immorality; on the contrary, were sustained b)' every ])rinoiple of
national law and national justice, and nothing was wanting to lender
them recuperaljle, but a judicial tribimal competent to lake cognizance
(liercf)f. Wholly dissimilar is the claim i)efore us. Such is its charac-
ter, that it cannot be presentetl to a court of justice but b}' a disclosmc
of its impurities; and if any thing is conclusively settled, or ought to
be so regarded, it is, (hat a claim, thus imbut-d with illegality and cor-
ru|)lion, will never be sanctioned or enforced by a coiut either df law
or e(|iiiiy.

I'lntr-rlaining this view of the case, it is unnecessaiy to examine ihc
various minor ])oinls which were raisi^l in ilic argument before us.

Nathaniel Williams, permanent trustee of James

Williams, appellant,

vs.

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thomas

Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, and others,

appellees.

Nathaniel Williams, permanent trustee of John

Gooding, appellant,

vs.

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thomas

Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, and others,

appellees,

Hannah C. Williams, administratrix of James 1
W. Williams, appellant, j

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thomas [

Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver and others, j

appellees. J

John M. Gordon, permanent trustee of John W.
Stump, appellant,
vs.
Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and Thomas ^
Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, and others,
appellees.

In the case of Thomas & White vs. Dennis Smith and others, and
on the appeal of Nathaniel Williams from the decree in said cause.

In the court of appeals for the Western Shore of Maryland,

June term, 1849.

The several appeals above meniioned of Nathaniel Williams, trustee
of James Williams; Nathaniel Williams, trustee of John Gooding; of
Hannah C. Williams, administratrix of James \V. Williams; and John
M. Gordon, permanent trustee of John W. Stump, from the decree of
the court below in this cause, Iiaving come on for hearit)g, and having
been fully argued by the counsel for the respective parties, and con-
sidered by the court, and this court being of opinion that there is no
error in the decree of the court below in awarding and decreeing to the
said appellees, Robert M. Gibbes, Charles Oliver, and Thos. (Oliver,
executors of Robert Oliver, for the shares of John Gooding and James
Williams, in certificates the sum of forty-two thousand eight hundred
and twenry-seven dollars and seventy-three and a third cents,
§42,827 7'A i-'j, and in money sixteen thousand three hundred and
twenty-one dollars and seventy-one cents (.|5l6,32] ^Vir); '""^' ''''il^ ^t'*'-
said decree of the court below ought to be affirmed as against each and
all of the above menticjned appellants.

It is thereupon, this 23(1 day of June, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, by this court and the authority

thereof, upon the said appeal of the said Nathaniel Williams, trustee
of Jaines Williams, ordered, adjudged, and decreed, tlial the said de-
cree of the court below, awarding and decreeing, as aforesaid, the share
of the said James Williams to the said Robert M. Gibbes, Charles Oli-
ver, and Thomas Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, be and the same
is hereby, in all respects, affirmed, without costs, as against the said
appellant, trustee of James Williams.

And it is thereupon, this 23d day of June, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, by this court and the
authority thereof, further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, on the appeal
of said Nathaniel Williams, trustee of John Gooding, that the said
decree of the court below awarding and decreeing to the said Robert
M. Gibbes, Charles Oliver, and Thomas Oliver, executors of Robert
Oliver as aforesaid, the share of said John Gooding, be and the same
is in all respects affirmed without costs as against said appellant Wil-
hams, as trustee of said Gooding, And it is also, on the day and year
aforesaid, and by the authority of this court, further ordered, adjudged,
and decreed, on the appeal of Hannah C. Williams, administratrix of
James W. Williams, that the said decree of the court below, awarding
and decreeing to the said Robert M. Gibbes, Charles Oliver, and
Thomas Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver as aforesaid, the share of
said James Williams, be and the same is hereby, in all respects, affirmed
without costs as against the said appellant. And it is further ordered,
adjudged, and decreed, by the authority aforesaid, on the appeal of
said John M. Gordon, permanent trustee of John W. Stump, that the
said decree of tlie comt below, awarding and decreeing as aforesaid the
share of James Williams to the said Robert M. Gibbes, Charles Oliver,
and Thomas Oliver, executors of Robert Oliver, be and the same is
hereby, in ail respects, affirmed without costs as against the said
appellant.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, by the authority
aforesaid, that the said appellees and trustees, John Glenn and David
M. Perine, pay to the said Robert M. Gil>bes, Charles Oliver, and
Thomas (Jliver, executors of Robert Oliver, the aforesaid amount in
ccriificates, and the aforesaid amount in money, decreed to ihe said
executors by the aforesaid decree of the court below, for the shares of
John (iooding and James Williams, together widi all inlrrcsl, profits,
or accmnulations ihereon, which may have arisen and been received
by lhem,lhe said Uiislees, on account of said certificaU-'S, or on account
and from any investment of any i)roceeds of the said sinn decreed to
i)e paid in money, which may have been inaiNr under iIk- order and
direction of die roinl brlow. THOS. B. l)()RSi:Y,

ARA SPHNCH,
ROJ'.CRT [V. MARTIN.

And liicrcupon, according lo llic provisions, force, form, and ellcct
of (he act of the (ieneral Assembly of Maryland of 1832, chapter 302,
section 0, the said coint of appeals iiere fde the opinions of (he coint
for and in resp(;ct of ils delcrmination of Uk- ap|i<;d .iforcsaid, the
determination of ihe said coini of aftpeals being had upon oral argu-
1

nient on the part of the parties aforesaid, and which said opinions are
as follows, to wit:

The opinion of the honorable Robert N. Martin, one of the~ judges of
the said court, in the matter of N. Williams, trustee of John Gooding.

The decree of the court below in this case, 1 think, ought to
be affirmed.

1 consider the order of Baltimore county court, passed at the Marcii
term, 1S25, authorizing the trustee to dispose of any portion of the in-
solvent's estate remaining undisposed of, &c., to be a valid order,
although not filed or recorded; and that it gave to the trustee, by its
terms, the right to sell the property in controversy.

I also think that Geo. Winchester is to be considered, upon the facts
exhibited in the record, as duly and legally appointed the permanent
trustee of .lohn Gooding, and that the sale by him of this share to
Robert Oliver was fairly and bona fide made within the meaning of the
act of Assembly of 1841, ch. 309; and that the said act, violating sales
made by trustees, notwithstanding they shall not have given bond with
security, is ^ constitutional exercise of legislative power.

Upon these grounds the decree below ought, I tfiink, to be affirmed.

Tiie opinion of the honorable Robert N. Martin, one of the judges
of the said court, in the matter of N, Williams, trustee of James
Williams.

The decree of the court below ought, I think, to be affirmed in tliis
case, for reasons assigned in the case of N. Williams, trustee of John
Gooding, against the executors of Robert Oliver.

I think that Geo. Winchester is to be considered, upon the facts
exhibited in this record, as duly and legally appointed the permanent
trustee of James Williams; that the sale by him of the shares in .con-
troversy to Robert Oliver was fairly and bona fide made within the
meaning of the act of Assembly of 1841 , ch. 309; and that that statute
being, in my opinion, neither repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States nor the constitution of the Slate of Maryland, is to [be]
regarded as a valid exercise of legislative power.

The opinion of the honorable Thomas B. Dorsey, chief judge, and
of the honorable Ara Spence, judge.

June term, 1849. — (Jourt of appeals, W. S. JVkJ.
No. 144, 145, 140, 147, 148, 149.

The solicitors for the a])pellants in the foregoing cases having, with
a view to an appeal from the decrees of affirmance by this court, re-
cjuested some expression of the grounds on which said decrees of affirm-
ance were passed, the undersigned, being two of the three judges who
sat in judgment in those cases, stale, that the grounds on which they
affirmed the judgments were — first, the reasons assigned by the majority

of this court for the reversal of the decree in No. 143, Oliver's ex'rs
and al. vs. Gill, permanent trustee of Goodwin;* and that if in this
there was error, the judgments were affirmed in No. 144, hecause
George P. Stevenson forfeited his claim by his failure to comply with
the stipulations in his contract, and because he surrendered up to his
co-associates all his interest in the Mexican Company; in Nos. 145
and 14G, because, under the proceedings based on or originating from
the insolvent petitions of John Gooding and James Williams, and the
act of Assembly applicable thereto, Robert Oliver acquired a valid title
to all (he interest of said James Williams and John Gooding in the
fund in controversy; in Nos. 147 and 14S, for the reasons assigned by
Judge Martin as the basis of his opinion in those cases; and in No. 149,
because the appellant therein hath shown no title to, or interest in. the
fund in controversy, either upon the law or facts in the case.

June 26th, 1849. THOS. B. DORSEY,

ARA SPENCE.

* See page 19.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

December Term, 1850.

George M. Gill; Trustee, &c. of Lyde Goodwin,

vs.

Robert Oliver's Executors, and Glenn & Ferine,

Trustees.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

If this court can take jurisdiction of this case under the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act, it must be under either the first or third
clause, as the second is admitted to be wholly inapplicable to it.

1. The first is, " where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and
the decision is against their validity."

2. The third is, '• where is drawn in question the construction of
any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or statute of, or commis-
sion held under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party under such clause," &c.

1. We have sought in vain through the record of this case to find
any question raised directly by the pleadings, or " by clear and neces-
sary intendment therefrom," touchingthe validity of any treaty, statute,
or authority exercised under the United States.

Both parties claim certain moneys in court as assignees of Lyde
Goodwin who was a member of the " Baltimore Mexican Company,"
and entitled to a certain proportion of the money awarded to said com-
pany as a just claim on the Mexican government. The validity of
tlie award, or the treaty under which it was made, is not called in
question by either party, as both claim under them. In order to ascer-
tain the effect of certain previous assignments made by Lyde Goodwin,
the history of the origin of his claim necessarily makes a part of the case.

The treaty and award are introduced as a part of lliis history, as
facts not disputed by either party. The money being in court, both
the treaty and the award were fimcti ojjicio, and no decision of the
rights of the claimants inter se can, in the nature of the case, involve
the validity of either.

The decision of the Court of Appeals, that the original contract with
Mina in 1816 did not create such a debt as would pass by the insol-
vent laws of Maryland, neither directly nor by implication (jucstions
the validity of any treaty, statute, or authority under the United States.

That the Baltimore Mexican Company set on foot and prepared the
means of a military expedition against the territories and dominions of
the king of Spain, a foreign prince with whom the United States were
at peace, is a fact in the history of the case not disputed, and which if
wrongly found by the court would not give us jurisdiction of the case.

'25

Tliat such conduct of the company in making their contract with
General Mina was a high misdemeanor, punishable with fine and im-
prisonment by the fifth section of the act of the oth of June, 1794,
chap. 51, cannot be disputed by any one who will read the statute;
and the conclusion drawn therefrom by the court below, that the con-
tract of the company with Mina in 1816, being founded on an illegal
transaction, was void by the law of Maryland, where it was made,
and passed no equity, right, or title whatsoever to an insolvent assignee
in 1S17, involved no question of " the validity of any treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under the United States."

The validity or binding eflect of the original contract with Mina is
neither directly nor indirectly affirmed, either in the convention with
Mexico or in the award of the commissioners under it.

The fact that the " Baltimore Mexican Company " exposed not
only their property to capture by the Spanish vessels of war, but their
own persons to fine and imprisonment by the authorities of the United
States, only enhanced the justice and equit}^ of their claims against the
new govenmient of Mexico.

The original contract with General Mina was a Maryland contract,
and its validity and construction are questions of Maryland law, which
this court is not authorized to decide in the present action.

2. We are equally at a loss to discover in this record where or how
" the construction of an}'^ clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or
statute of, or commission held under the United States," is drawn in
question in this case.

As we have already said, both parties claim money in court; and,
in order to test the value of their respective assignments from Lyde
Goodwin, introduce the history of the claim from its origin.

The treaty and award are facts in (hat history. Tiicy were before
(he court but as facts, and not for construction. If A hold land under
a patent from the United States or a Spanish grant ratified by treaty,
and his heirs, devisees, or assignees dispute as to which has (he best
title under him; this does not make a case for (he jiuisdictiou of (his
court under (he (wenty-fifih section of the .ludiciary Act. If ueiilifr
the validity nor construction of the patent or title uiuhir (he treaty is
contested, if both })arties claim under it, and (he con(est arises from
some (juestion without or dehors (he patent or (he (reaty, it is plainly
no case for our interference under (his section.

'IMiat the title originated in such a patcnl or (reaty is a fact in (he
history of the case inci(len(al (o it, but (he essential cc)n(rov«'rsy )>••-
Ivveen the pardes is widioiit and Ix-yond i(. So in (his case, both claim
the money in court. It is a fact (liat (Ik; morK^y has been paid by (Ik;
republic of Mexico, on a claim which has becMi itronounccd just and
ccjuiiabN; In' conuuissioners mider the convention of 18.'{'.). It is a fact,
also, that the origin of this claim was for arms and ammunition furn-
ished for an expedition under (ieneral Mina, for the purpose of insur-
rection against the Spanish government. It isafiict, that the IJ.iItimore
Mexican Company, or the individuals composing it, e\])ose(l (heiu-
selves to punishment under the neutiality act. It is a fact, also, (hat
afterwards, when Mexico had succeeded in es(ai>lishing her indepenil-

ence; "when her rebellion had become a successful revolution; that she
very justly and honorably made herself debtor to those who perilled their
properly and ])ersons in her service at the commencement of her
struggle. It is a fact that, though this claim was acknowledged as a
just debt by Mexico as early as 1825, payment was never obtained till
after the award of the commissioners under the convention with Mexico
in 1839, '' for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States
on the Mexican republic." It is a fact, that this claim thus recognized
by the Mexican Congress was pronounced a just debt in favor of
citizens of the United States against the republic of Mexico.

But w^iether this debt of the Mexican government, first acknow-
ledged and made tangible as such in 1825, did previously exist as an
equity, a right, or a chose in action capable of passing b}^ assignment
under the insolvent laws of Maryland in 1817, is a question not settled
in the treaty or award, nor involving any question as to the construc-
tion of either, but arising wholly from without, and entirely indepen-
dent of either the one or the other. The treaty was, that '' all claims
of citizens of the United States found to be just and equitable should
be paid." The award was, that this claim of the " Baltimore Mexi-
can Company," which had been acknowledged in 1825 as a valid
claim by Mexico, was a just debt, not a false or feigned one, and ought
to be paid. The money is awarded to be paid to Glenn and Ferine
" in trust for whom it may concern." The award does not undertake
to settle the equities or rights of the different persons claiming to be
legal or equitable assignees or transferees of the interests of the several
members of the company. That is left to the tribunals of the State
where the members of the company resided and the assignments were
made. In deciding this question, the courts of Maryland have put no
construction on the treaty or award, asserted by one party to be the
true one and denied by the other. It was before them as a fact only,
and not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money paid
into court, under the award and first acknowledged by Mexico as a debt
in 1825, existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland insolvent laws
in 1817, or whether it, for the first time, assumed the nature of a chose
in action transferable by assignment after 1825, when acknowledged
of record by Mexico, and passed by the assignment of Lyde Goodwin
to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly dehors the treaty and award,
and involving the construction of the laws of Maryland only, and not
of any treaty or statute or commission under the United States.

It is a conclusive test of the question of jurisdiction of this court in
the present case, that, if we assume jurisdiction, and proceed to consider
the merits of the case, we find it to involve no question either of validity
or construction of treaties or statutes of the United States.

But the only questions in the case will be found to be, what was
the effect of the appointment of George M, Gill in 1837 as permanent
trustee, under the insolvent laws of Maryland of 1805? Was the void
and illegal contract with Mina, made in 1816, such a chose in action
as would pass by such insolvent law in 1817? Or did it first become
an assignable claim after it was acknowledged by Mexico in 1825, and,
as a new acquisition of Lyde Goodwin after his insolvency, pass by

■-Vi'

his assignment lo Oliver? A resolution of these questions, by or
through any thing to be found on the face of the treaty or award, or
any necessary intendment or even possible inference therefrom, is
palpably impossible.

The whole case evidently turns on the construction of the laws of
Maryland, and on facts connected with the previous history of the
claim, which are not disputed, and which are incidental to the treaty
and award, but which raise no question either as to their validity or
construction.

This case is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, Mr. Justice McLEAN, Mr. Justice
WAYJNE, and Mr. Justice WOODBURY dissented.

Chief Justice TANEY stated that, in liis opinion, this court had
jurisdiction of the question upon wiiich the case was decided in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, and that their decision was erroneous,
and ought to be reversed.

Mr. Justice McLEAN concurred in opinion with the Chief Justice.

Mr. Justice WOODBURY.

I object to the form of the judgment to be entered in this case, rather
than to the results of it to the parties. By dismissing the writ of error
for want of jurisdiction, as is done here, the judgment in the Slate
court is left in full force; whereas, in my view, this court has jurisdic-
tion, and should affirm the judgment in the State court, thus leaving
it, as the other course does, in full force, but on dilFerent grounds.
The consequence to the parties, by pursuing either course, did'ers so
little, that it does not seem necessary to go into any elaborate c.\i)osilion
of the reasons for this dissent, and I shall tlicrefore content myseU" with
stating only the general grounds for it.

All that seems indispensable to give jiiiisdjction to us in this class of
cases is, that the plaintiff in error shoidd have set u]), in support of his
claim in the State court, some right or title under a treaty or doings by
authority from Congress, and that it should Ik; oxcrnded by tlw Stole
court. See the twenly-nflh s<;clioii of the act of 1 7S9 (1 Slat, at
Large, 85), and various decisions under it, including Owings v. North-
wood's Lessee. 5 Crancli, 34H, and Smiih v. Maryland, (> (./lancli,
'M\; 2 Howard, .']72. Here the appellant set u|) in his bill a ( l;iim
to money nncb-r a treaty with Mfxico, and an award under ii by <(iii)-
missioners apjjointcd by an act of Ctjugress, and the Stale court, in bis
opinion, overruled his claim. This, in my view gives jurisdiclion to
us, whether the State court decided right or wrong. See Armsiiong
i;. Athens County, 10 l^'ieis, 2S5; Milb-r ?;. Niclids, 4 Wliml, :^M .
The very object of the writ of error is lo ascrrlain wliillicr llicy did
decide right or wrong, and the jurisdiction to make this revision of iheir
opinion arises not from its error, but itsHubjecl-m.'Utrr; the latter being
a claim set iqi under some United States auiliority. Neilson v. Lagow,
7 Ilowanl, 775.

The next and only remaining inquiry for me, supposing that we
have jurisdiction, is, whether the State court formed a right conclusion
in overruling the claim set up hy the appellant. I think they did.
So far as it rested on authority under the United States, it is by no
means clear that they overruled it improperly. The claim, so far as
regards the enforcement of tlie treaty with Mexico, does not seem to
have been overruled in terms by the State court. That court did not
decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal, or in any way a nullity,
when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality.
So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the
Baltimore Mexican Company and their legal representatives had a just
claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled
at all.

It is not manifest, then, that any thing really in the treaty or in the
award, set up by Gill, the plaintiff, was actually decided against, but
only something he claimed to be there; — that when the appellants
claimed diat he, rather than others, was legally entitled to one ninth
of the sum awarded to the Baltimore Mexican Company, the State
court seems to have overruled that. But in doing this, they must still
have held the treaty itself to be valid, and the award of the commis-
sioners under it to be valid, or they could not have decreed this share
of the fund to Oliver's executors, as they appear to have done ex-
pressly by the record.

All must concede, that the State court speaks in its language against
the Mina "contract" alone as illegal, and in terms do not impugn
either the treaty or the award; and it is merely a matter of inference
or argument that either of these was assailed, or any right properly
claimed under them overruled. But it is true the court held tbat
Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were entided to the fund
furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's contract; but in
coming to that conclusion, they seem to have been governed by their
views as to their own laws and the principles of general jurisprudence.
The treaty or award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or
Oliver's executors had the better right to this share, but only that the
Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the
fund. This last the court did not question.

But who was the legal representative of Lyde Goodwin's share?
Who, by insolvencies, sales, or otherwise, had become entided to it?

That was tiie question before the court, and the one they settled;
and in deciding that they overruled the claim of Gill to be so, by
virtue of any authority in the treaty or award; and in saying that the
fund should go to Oliver's executors, as best entitled, rather than Gill,
they did it under their own State laws.

It is a general rule for the State tribunals, and not the commissioners,
to settle any conflict between different claimants; and the usage, when
disputes exist, is not for commissioners to go further than act on the
validity of the claim, and decide besides the superior rights of one of
the claimants. Frevall v. Bache et al., 14 Peters, 95; Comegys v.
Vasse, 1 Peters, 212; Sheppard v. Taylor et al., 5 Peters, 710,

It is true, that the opinion given in the State court in support of its
judgment is not entirely free from some grounds for misconception, yet
the judgment itself appears right, and, if erroneous, resting as it does
wholly on the State laws, it is not competent for us, under this writ
of error, to reverse it. We can reverse it only when wrong, and
wrong, too, for deciding improperly against some claim under a United
States law or treaty.

This, I think, it has not done. In short, the whole real truth
appears to be, that the State court considered the Mina contract in 1S17
as a violation of the neutrality act of 1794; and therefore, when LydS
Goodwin failed in the same year, and went into insolvency, that his
share in the contract, being illegal and void, could not then pass to his
creditors, or his trustee in their behalf. But when the Mexican govern-
ment, about 1S25, adopted the contract, and acknowledged its liability
to pay those entitled, the court seems to have thought that their obliga-
tion was virtually a new one. It occurred after the insolvency, and
hence seems supposed not to have passed to the creditors, any more
than did new property subsequently acquired. (See Insolvent Act of
1805, cli. 110, § 2.) Consequently, the commissioners held that the
creditors and their trustee were not entitled to its benefits. Goodwin
could and did legally assign to Oliver his new rights and new guaran-
tees, for his share from Mexico. These last though growing out of
the original Mina purchase, were not a violation of the act of 1794, —
were honorable, though not compellable, and were not deemed illegal
either by Mexico or the government of the United States, or the com-
missioners, or the State court.

Again, under the State laws doubts seemed to arise, (in deciding
on which was the proper claimant,) whether the original trustee was
not duly appointed in 1817, and could not legally assign this claim,
if it passed to him tlicn or afterwards, as he attempted to pass it to
Oliver, rather than considering it as belonging to, or vesting in. Gill,
the ajipellani, who was not appointed trustee till 1825, and then in a
manner somewhat questionable. (4 Gill dfc Johns. 892.) That, how-
ever, was likewise a point arising exclusively under the State laws, and
which we arc not authorized to decide in this writ of error.

It is for reasons like these, that, in n)y opinion, tlx; judgment in the
Stale court, so far as it related to any claim set up and supposed to i)e
overruled under any authority derived from the United States, is within
our jinisdiction; but that the State court did not improjx'ily overrule
any such claim so set up, and hence that the judgment in lln' Slate
cuiMt oii'^ht {() I)(; afllrmed.

Order.

This cause came on to i)e heard on the transcript of the record from
the Court of Appeals for the Western Shon- of Maryland, and was
argued by counsc;!. On cousidcraiion whereof, it is now \\r\r ordered,
adjudged, and decreed by this coml, that this cause be, and iIm' same
is hereby dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.
5

Tliis rnsH is rppnrtfd in II Il'iwnrfl, pnirc .'iW.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 185 1.

Nathaniel Williams, as permanent Trustee
for the Creditors of James Williams, an In-
solvent Debtor, Plaintiff in Error.

vs.

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes and
Thomas Oliver, Executors of Robert Oliver,
and John Glenn, and David M. Ferine,
Trustees.
Mr. Justice NEliSON dehvered the opinion of the Court.

This case is not distinguishable from the case decided at the last
term of Gill vs. Oliver's Executors, and which was dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.

It is reported in 11 How. 529. That case involved the right to the
share of Lyde Goodwin as a member of the " Baltimore Mexican
Company " in the fund that had been awarded to the members of that
Company by the Commissioners under the convention of 1839 with
Mexico. Gill claimed it as permanent trustee under the insolvent laws
of Maryland, the benefit of which Goodwin had obtained in 1817 on
the assignment of all his property for the use of his creditors.

The executors of Oliver claimed the right of Goodwin to this fund
under an assignment made by himself 30th May, 1829.

The money awarded by the Commissioners to this Company under
the treaty, had, by the agreement of all parties claiming an interest in
the same, been deposited in the Mechanic's Bank of Baltimore to be
distributed according to the rights of the respective parties claiming it.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided against the right of Gill,
as the permanent trustee of Goodwin, under the insolvent proceedings,
and in favor of the right of the Executors of Oliver.

The case was brought here by writ of error for review, and was
dismissed a-s we have stated for want of jinisdiction.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland had decided against the right of
Gill on the ground, that the contract made by the " Baltimore Mexican
Company" with General Mina in 1816, by which means were furn-
ished him to carry on a military expedition against the territories and
dominions of the King of Spain, a foreign Prince with whom the
United Stales were at peace, was in violation of our neutrality act of
1794, and consequently illegal, and void; and could not be the founda-
tion of any right of property, or interest existing in Goodwin in 1817,
the date of the insolvent proceedings, and hence, that no interest in
the subject-matter passed to the permanent trustees seUing up a title
under them.

After the revolutionary party in Mexico had achieved their indepen-
dence, and about the year 1825, the public authorities under the new

government recognized this claim of the Baltimore Company, as valid
and binding upon it, and as sucii it was brought before the board of
Commissioners, under the convention of 1839, and allowed.

It was not denied on the argument, and, indeed, coidd not have
been successfully, that the contract with General Mina in 1816, was
illegal and void, having been made in express violation of law: and
hence that no interest in, or right of property arising out of it, legal or
equitable, could pass, in 1817 the date of the insolvent proceedings of
Goodwin, (o the trustee for the benefit of his creditors. But, it was
urged, that the subsequent recognition, and adoption of the obligation
by the new government, had relation back, so as to confirm and legal-
ize the original transaction and thereby give operation and efTect to
the title of the trustee at the date mentioned.

And upon this ground it was insisted that the decision of the Court
below denying the right of Gill, the permanent trustee, was a decision
against a riglit derived under (he treaty, and award of the Commis-
sioners, which therefore brought the case within he 25th section of the
judiciary act.

Undoubtedly upon this aspect of the case, and assuming that there
was any well founded ground to be found in the record for maintain-
ing it, jurisdiction might have been very properly entertained: and the
question as to the efTect of the recognition of the obligation by Mexico,
and award under the treaty in pursuance thereof upon the right claimed
by the trustee under the insolvent proceedings examined and decided.
The decision below, in (his aspect of the case, must have involved the
effect and operation of the treat}'^ and award of the Commissioners
imder it.

But, a majority of the Court were of opinion tiiat no such question
existed in the case, or, was decided by (he court below: and tha( (he
only one properly arising, or that was decided, w;is \\\o one growing
out of the conUiut with General Mina of ISK), and of the elU'ct and
operation to be given to it lurder (he insolvent laws of Maryland.

'I'Ik; money awarded to the Mexican Company was a fund in court
and had been brought in by the consent of all ])arties concerned for
distribution according to their respective rights. Tlx; plainliH' in error
clain)ed the share of Goodwin under the insolvent proceedings of 1817
as trustee for the creditors through the contract with Mina — the dcfcud-
ants by virtue of an assigmneut from (ioodwin himself in 1829 after
Mexico had recojjnized and acknowledfjed thi- iLiim as valid. The
money bad been awarded (o cer(ain [)ersons " in trust for whom it
may coucern " without undertaking to settle the rights of (he several
claimants. The court in giving eflect and oiieration (o (he insolvent
laws of Maryl.'uid as to the vesting of (Im; jii(jperty and estate of (he
in.solvent, in the hands of (he (rus(ee for the benerii of the creditors,
held, that no interest or riiiht could be daiuied luidei them ihinugh
(he contract of l8Hi, i)Ut that the; right of (ioodwin (o (he finid |)asscd
by his assigmneut in 1829 to (he defendan(s.

Mr. .fustice Grier in delivering (he opinion of (he majority of the cour(,
speakiu!^ of (hfit deci<iou, observes, that in deciiliui,' the quoliou the
coiu(d of Maryland have put no construction on the treaty m awaid

asserted by one party to be the true one and denied by tlie other. It
was before them us a fact only, and not for the purpose of construction.
Whether this money paid into the court under the award, and first
acknowledged by Mexico as a debt in 1825 existed as a debt transfera-
ble by the Maryland insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it, for the first
time, assumed the nature of a chose iti aciio?i transferable by assign-
ment after 1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico and passed
by the assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a ques-
tion wholly </e/«or5 the treaty and award, and involving the construction
of the laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty or statute or com-
mission under the United States. And Mr. Justice Woodbury who
dissented on the question of jurisdiction, observes, that the claim so far
as it regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico, does not seem
to have been overruled in terms by the State Court. That court did
not decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal or in any way a nullity,
when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrahty.
So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the
Baltimore Mexican Company, and their legal representatives had a
just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not over-
ruled at all.

Again, he observes, that all must concede, that the State Court
speaks in language against the Mina contract alone, as illegal, and in
terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award ; and it is merely
a matter of inference or argument that either of these was assailed, or
any right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true, the
Court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were en-
tided to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's
contract; but in coming to that conclusion they seem to have been
governed by their own views as to their own laws and the principles of
general jurisprudence. 'I'he treaty or award contained nothing as to
the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the better right to his
share; but only that the Mexican Company and their legal representa-
tives should receive the fund. This last the court did not question.

The decision of the court below, therefore, not involving the validity
of the treaty, or award of the commissioners, or lawfulness or character
of the fund ; but, simply, the right and tide to the respective shares
claimed in it, after the fund had been paid over by the government,
and brought into court for distribution accordintr to the agreement of all
concerned, and which distribution depended upon the laws of the
State, a majority of the court taking this view of the case, held, that
there was a want of jurisdiction and dismissed the writ of error; and
that the decision whether right or wrong could not be the subject of
review under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, as it involved no
question either directly or by necessary intendment arising upon the
treaty or award or connected with the validity of either; and if this
court were right in the view thus taken of the case there can be no
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion arrived at. A different
view of the case might, of course, lead to a different conclusion.

Now, in the case before us, the plaintiff in error claims the share of
John Gooding, one of the members of the Mexican Company, as per-

manent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland, bavins^ been ap-
pointed 29ih January, 1842, Gooding having taken the benefit of
these acts, and assigned his property for (he benefit of the creditors as
early as 1819.

George Winchester had been previously appointed provisional trustee
on the 23d June, 1819, to whom all property had been assigned,
and on the 2d May, 1823, had been appointed permanent trustee, and
gave a bond for the faithful execution of his duties without surety, and
on the 2d April, 1825, sold the interest of Gooding in this share to
Robert Oliver under an order of sale made by the Baltimore County
Court having jurisdiction in the matter for (he consideration of two
thousand dollars. And in 1841 the Legislature of Maryland passed a
law confirming this sale, a doubt having been suggested as (o its va-
lidity, for want of a surety to the official bond of tlie trustee.

In this state of the case the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
the interest of Gooding in the Mexican contract did not pass under their
insolvent laws (o the plaintiff in error as permanent trustee, for the
reasons assigned in the previous case of Gill vs. Oliver's executors.
And that if it did or could have passed under these laws, it passed to
Winchester the previous trustee in connection with the confirming act
of the Legislature of 1841.

It is apparent, therefore, if the decision in the case of Gill t\s\ Oli-
ver's executors involved no question that gave to this court jurisdiction
to revise it here, as has already been decided, none exists in the case
before us; for, as it respects the question of jurisdiction, (he two staml
upon the same footing, and involved precisely the same principh^s.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error sought to distinguish this case
from the previous one, and to maintain the jurisdiction of the, argu-
ment, upon the ground, that the act of the Legislature of .Maryland of
1841 confirming the authority of Winchester, the ]jernianciit (nisler,
was in contravention of a provision of the constitution of the United
States as a '' law impairing the obligation of contracts."

But, admitting this to be so, (which we do not) still the admission
would not allcct the result. For, thn decision upon \\\o, |)rrvious
branch of the case, denied to the plaintiff any right to or interest in the
fund in question as claimed under (he insolvent |)rocecdings, as per-
manent trustee, and, hence he was deemed (lisal)led from nmintiiiiiiiig
any action founded upon that claim.

it was of no im])ortance, therefore, as it respected (Ik^ plaintill in (lie
distribution of the fund, whether it wasrightfidly or wrongfully awarded
to Oliver's executors. lie had no longer any interest in the ([iiestion.

In order to give jurisdiction to this comt to revise tln^ judgment of a
S(a(c Court under the 2.5th section of (he .ludiciary Act a (jucstion

must not only exist on (he record actually or by necessary intend nt,

as mentioned in that section and tln^ decision of the court as there
staled; but the d(,-ei.sion must he controlling in thr'. dis|)osition of (he
case, or, in the language of .some of the cases on the. .subject, " the
judgment of the Slate Court would not have been what it is, if there,
had not heen a misconstruction of some act of Congress, or a decision
against the validity of the riixht, title, jjrivilegc or exemption set np
under it.'" 3 Peters, 292, 302; or, as slated i)V Mr. Justice Slorv in

Crowell vs. Randell, (10 Peters, 392,) where he reviewed all the
cases, it must appear " from tlie facts stated by just and necessary in-
ference (hat the question was made, and that the court below must, in
order to have arrived at the judgment pronounced by it, have come to
the very decision of that question as indispensible to that judgment."
And in a recent case, (5 How. 341,) following out the doctrine of the
previous cases, " It is not enough that the record shows that the plain-
tiff in error contended and claimed that the judgment of the court im-
paired the obligation of a contract, and violated the provisions of the
constitution of the United States: and that this claim was overruled
by the court: but, it must appear by clear and necessary intendment,
that the question must have been raised, and must have been decided
in order to induce the judgment."

It is not intended, nor to be understood from these cases, that the
question thus material to the decision arrived at, must be confined ex-
clusively and specially to the construction of the treaty, act of Con-
gress, (fcc, in order to give the jurisdiction, as this would l3e too narrow
a view of it. Points may arise growing out of and connected with the
general question, and so blended with it as not to be separated, and, there-
fore, falling equally within the decision contemplated by the 25th sec-
tion. The cases of Smith vs. the State of Maryland 6 Cranch, 281,
and Martin vs. Hunter's lessee, 1 Wheat, 305, '.i55, afford illustrations
of this principle.

Now, as the decision of the question involving the right and title
of the plaintiff in error to Gooding's interest in this fund under the
insolvent proceedings was against him in the court below, and was
one, which, in our judgment, involved only a question of State law,
and, therefore, not the subject of revision here, and was conclusive
upon his rights, and decisive of the case, it follows that we have no
jurisdiction within the principle of the cases to which we have referred.
For, the determination of the court upon the validity of the act of the
Legislature of 1841 in no way controlled the judgment at which the
court arrived as respected the plaintiff. That turned upon the de-
cision as to the right of the plaintiff to the fund under the insolvent
proceedings, as permanent trustee of Gooding, and whatever might
have been the opinion of the court upon the other question, the result
of their judgment would have been the same.

For the reason, therefore, that this case falls directly within the de-
cision of Gill vs. Oliver's Executors, and is not distinguishable from it,
the case must take the same direction, and be dismissed for want of
Jurisdiction.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from
the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland for the Western Shore,
and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that this cause be, and the same
is hereby dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

This case is reported in 12 Howard, page 111,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1851.

Nathaniel Williams, as permanent"
Trustee for the Creditors of John Good-
ing, an Insolvent Debtor,
vs.

Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbes, and
Tiiomas OHver, Executors of Robert

' J

Oliver, and John Glenn and David M.

Ferine, 7^rustees.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the same principles as the case of Williams' per-
manent trustee of James Williams, already decided : and we refer to
the opinion there delivered for our decision in this case.

The case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Order.

This cause came on (o be heard on the transcript of the record from
the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland for the Western Shore,
and was argued Jjy counsel. On consideration wliereof, it is now line
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that this cause be, ;uul iIk,- .same
id hereby dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

This case is reported m Vi Ilowiird, page l:i.j.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1852.

John Deacon, Appellant,

vs.

Charles Oliver and Robert M. Gibbes,

Executors of Robert Oliver, deceased.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

Without attempting to give a history of the facts of this case, as ex-
hibited in the pleadings and proofs, or noticing all the objections of the
equity of the bill, we think there are two of its charges or allegations,
on which its whole equity rests, and which the complainant has failed
to substantiate.

1, That there were in the hands of Robert Oliver at the time the
attachment was laid, any chattels, rights, or credits of Lyde Goodwin,
"which were bound by said attachment."

2. That Robert Oliver was guilty of falsehood or fraudulent conceal-
ment of facts, in his answers to the interrogatories proposed to him as
garnishee in the attachment.

In 1816, and previous to his insolvency, Lyde Goodwin had become
a shareholder in the Baltimore Mexican Company, to the extent of one
ninth part. This company had furnished means to General Mina to
fit out a warlike expedition against MexictJ, then a dependency of
Spain. The expedition of Mina had failed, and he had perished with
it. This transaction of th^ company was illegal, and punishable as a
misdemeanor, with fine and imprisonment. The contract was there-
fore void in law, and could not be the foundation of any debt, nor
could the stock thus created be treated in law as a thing of value; and
from the uncertainty of its future prospects, its value in the market
was little better. It was merely possible that Mexico, if successful in
her struggle for independence, might, at some future day, assume the
payment of the debts contracted by Mina, and if, as it was possible, or
perhaps probable, that at some day still further in the future the pay-
ment may be obtained. Goodwin's title in this possibility or expec-
tancy, or whatever it might be called, was supposed to have passed to
Brown, his assignee, under the insolvent act. Afterwards, in 1824,
Mexico having achieved her independence, passed a decree promising
to acknowledge *' the debts that may be proven to have been con- i
traded for the service of the nation by the Generals declared bene
meritos de la patria,^^ of whom Mina was one. This renewed the
hopes of the company, that possibl}'- something might be recovered
hereafter on this pledge of the Mexican government; and Robert Oliver
was appointed the attorney on the part of the company to prosecute
their claim. Lyde Goodwin being in actual want of the means of,
subsistence, persuaded Robert Oliver to advance him the sum of twoj

thousand dollars, and take a transfer from Brown, his insolvent trustee
of this claim, as security.

In this situation of affairs, the attachment of Baring, Brothers 6c
Co. was served on Robert Oliver, as garnishee of Lyde Goodwin, in
1827. Now it is admitted that Oliver was a creditor of Lyde Goodwin,
and not a debtor. His power of attorney put him in possession of
nothing which could be attached as the property of Goodwin. The
insolvent assignment was supposed to have vested Goodwin's interest
in this expectancy, in Brown. If it did not do so, as has since been
decided, Oliver had no title to Goodwin's claim. And if it did, and
if Oliver held it merely as a security for the sum advanced by him,
the equitable assignment taken as such security, was his own; it was
but an instrument to obtain satisfaction for his debt; it conferred noth-
ing but a right in equity. Whether it was valid or invalid, absolute or
defeasible, it did not constitute him a debtor of Lyde Goodwin, or put
him in possession of any of his credits or effects, so as to subject him
to an attachment as Goodwin's garnishee. It was not till after the
death of Robert Oliver, and more than ten years after the attachment
of complainant was discontinued, that the United States made the
Convention of April, 1839, with Mexico, under which Commissioners
were appointed, before whom this claim of the Baltimore Company
was proved, and acknowledged by Mexico as a just debt. Then for
the first time, this uncertain claim or equity, assumed the form of a
credit, and an existence as a legal chose in action. But in that char-
acter it never existed in the hands of Robert Oliver. If, at the time
the attachment was served on him, the claim of Lyde Goodwin had
existed as a debt due him by a citizen of Maryland, and Oliver held an
ecjuitable transfer either absolute or defeasible, it is abundantly evident
that the proper person to be made garnishee in an attachment, would
have been the debtor, not the equitable claimant of the debt. He has
but an equity or a bare right, but whatever it is, it is his own, and his
claim is in hostility both to the plaintiff and defendant in the attach-
ment.

The whole foundation of (he complainant's equity in this bill rests
on the averment, that the interest of Lyde (ioodwin, whatever it was,
in this Mexican claim, ''was bound by (he a((achment laid in the
hands of Robert Oliver, as garnishee." The Merwin claim not hav-
ing been assigned till after tin; attachment was withdrawn, need not
be noticed. The decision of this point against the averment of the bill,
would dispose of the case.

But a-s wc think the charges made in (he bill against Roiu-rt Oliver,
of false and fraudiilenl r«»n<;ealment, have not been sustaiiieij, ii is due
to the mf;mory of one who always sustained a high rej)Ulation as a
merchant and man of honor, to notice this point.

It must be remembered (hat the purpose of the interrogatories was
to ascertain whether Oliver li.td in his lintids any rredits or e (lee Is of
Lyde Goodwiti, siil)ject to attaelmienl ; and also that Brown, the insol-
venl assignee of (ioodwin, was supposed (o have had (he title to GoojI-
win's in(erest vested in him. The legidmate inquiry was, therefore,
not whether Brown had al)use(l his trust, by sellinjjr or mortgaging (he
6

trust property for the benefit of Goodwill; or whether Oliver's claim
under the assignee was valid or not. This inquiry was wholly irrele-
vant in the investigation, under the attachment proceeding. Nor was
Oliver bound, in that investigation, to make any disclosure of the strength
or weakness of his own title, which was hostile to that of the plaintiff.
The discovery sought, was not of Oliver's equities, but of Goodwin's
assets. Oliver's answers to the interrogatories were drawn, no doubt,
by learned counsel, fully aware of the nature of the proceedings, and
the rights of the parties under them. The answers were strictly true
to the letter. The garnishee had not in his hands, " any funds, evi-
dences of debt, stocks, certificates of stock, belonging to Lyde Goodwin,
nor any acknowledgment by the Mexican government to said Lyde
Goodwin," on which the attachment could be laid. What claims or
securities he himself had as a creditor of Goodwin, the plaintiff in that
proceeding had no right to inquire, nor was Oliver bound to answer.
If he had nothing which the plaintiff could attach, it was no fraud on
plaintiff to keep his own counsel, and make no disclosure as to the
nature of his own securities.

The decree of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland,
and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here
ordered, adjudged, and decreed, by this court, that the decree of the
said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

This case is reported in 14th Howard, page 610.

DECREES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT

OF MARYLAND.

Circuit court of the U. S., April term, 1851,
Deacon

Deacon 1

vs. C

Oliver's Ex'rs. 3

This [cause] came on to be heard at this term and was argued b)'-
counsel; and thereupon, upon consideration (hereof, it is ordered, ad-
judged, and decreed, that the bill of the complainant be dismissed with
costs to be taxed by the register.

R. B. TANEY,
U. S. HEATH.

In the circuit court of the United Slates for (he district of Maryland.

Charles H. McBlair, administrator")
of Lyde Goodwin, j

vs. ^In cf|uity.

RonERT M. GiBBES and Charles Oli- (
ver, executors of Robert Oliver. J

This cause standing ready for hearing and being submitted, (he
counsel for the parties were heard, and the proceedings read and con-
sidered.

It id (hereupon, this third day of December, in the year eighteen
hundred and fifty-three, by this court adjudgetl, ordered, and decreed
limt the bill of the complainant be, and the same is hereby dismissed;
and that (he complainant pay (lie defendants (heir costs of this suit, to
be (axed by the clerk.

R. ]}. TANEY,

VVrLLTAMF. (JILES.

In the circuit court of the United Slates for the district of Maryland.

John S. Williams, administrator of")
James WiUiams, j

vs. yln equity,

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oli-
ver, executors of Robert Oliver.

This cause standing ready for hearing and being submitted, the
counsel for the parties were heard, and the proceedings read and con-
sidered.

It is thereupon, this third day of December, in the year eighteen
hundred and fifty-three, by this court adjudged, ordered, and decreed
that the bill of the complainant be, and the same is hereby dismissed;
and that the complainant pay the defendants their costs of this suit,
to be taxed by the clerk.

R. B. TANEY,
WILLIAM F. GILES.

In the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland,

John Gooding, jr., administrator of^
John Gooding, |

vs. VIn equity.

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oli-
ver, executors of Robert Oliver.

This cause standing ready for hearing and being submitted, the
counsel for the parties were heard, and the proceedings read and con-
sidered.

It is thereupon, this third day of December, in the year eighteen
hundred and fifty-three, by this court adjudged, ordered, and decreed
that the bill of the complainant be, and the same is hereby dismissed ;
and that the complainant pay the defendants their costs of this suit, to
be taxed by the clerk.

R. B. TANEY,
WILLIAM F. GILES.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1854.

Charles H. McBIair, Adminisirator of
Lyde Goodwin, deceased, appellant,
vs.

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oliver,
HxeciiiorsofRobert. Oliver, deceased.

Appeal from the circuit court
of the United States for the
district of Maryland.

Mr. Jusiice'NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Maryland.

The bill was filed by the administrator of Lyde Goodwin ag-ainstthe
executors of Robert Oliver, to recover (he proceeds of a share in an
association called the Baltimore Company, which had a claim against
the Mexican government, that was allowed under the convention of
1839, " for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States
against the Mexican republic." The claim of the company was
fotmded on a contract with General Mina, in 1816, for advances and
supplies in fitting out a military expedition against the dominions of
the King of Spain. The bill also sought to recover a commission of
five per centum, which the members of the company had agreed to
give to (ioodwin for his services as agent in soliciting the claim
against Mexico. Tlie share and commissions, as charged, amount lo
.^♦iT,:«7 15.

The executors of Oliver set up a right to retain the ftuul lor the,
benefit of the estate, under and by virtue of a jturcliasi^ ol Goodwin's
share in this company, and also of his right lo the commissions, by
their tesialor, in 18'^9. 'i'he [iiir(li;is»! :m<l transfer took place the'JOlli
May, in that year, fi^r a good and vidiiable consideration.

A (piesiion was made on the argument, whether or not the assigu-
UH-ni (if (joodwin was Muni(i<.'Uily conipri'lieusivi! to include a right to
iIk- coiiMnissious as well as (o (lie proceeds of the share. W'e are satis-
fied thai it is. The language is very broad: " .Ml my iiii(li\i(le(| niiiih
pari, right, nib.' and interest, of every kind whatever, iii ilie claiiii oii
the Governmeiii of Mexico," &.c. Atid again: " The object atid iii-
tenlion of ibis agrf.'ement is fo make a full an<l compleii- iransfer to the
said Robert Oliver, of all my right, lille and iiiiere>i aforesaid," *.V,c.
'I'he commi.ssions were dependent upon ihe allowance of ilu; claims
of (he company against Mexi<:o, and of course, an interest iniiiiiaiely
conneeled with tliem; without (be idlowaure of (he one, the other
would be valueless.

The undeislantiing of Goodwiri himself ol ibe intention and ed'ect
of the as^igumeiii accords with (his view, as derived from his deposi-
tion (aken in inbalf of (he rlaiiii« ol the foiiipany, and iisid befoie (he

hoard of commissioners; and also from liis testimony in the proceedings
before the Baltimore county court, for the distribution of the fund
among the several claimants.

This share of Lyde Goodwin in the company, and his commissions,
have heretofore been the subject of consideration in this court. Tiie
case is reported in the 1 1th How. 529. George M. Gill, the permanent
trustee of Goodwin, who had taken the benefit of the insolvent laws of
Maryland, in 1817, claimed this fund before the Baltimore county
court as part of the estate of the insolvent, against the right and tide of
the executors of Oliver, claiming under this assignment of 1829. The
Baltimore county court held that the fund passed by the insolvent as-
signment of 18J7 to Gill, the permanent trustee. The case was taken
to the court of appeals of Maryland, where the decree was reversed,
and the fund distributed to Oliver's executors, the appellate court hold-
ing that the contract of the company with General Mina was made
in violation of the neutrahty act of the United States, of 1794, and,
being thus founded upon an illegal transaction, constituted no part of
the property or estate of the insolvent within the meaning of the Mary-
land insolvent laws. Gill brought the case to this coml under the 25th
section of the Judiciary act, for the purpose of revising that decision ;
but the court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, a majority of
the judges holding that tlje only question involved in the decision be-
low was the true construction of a statute of the State, and that it
belonged to the Maryland court to interpret its own statutes. Whether
that interpretation was right or wrong, was a matter with which this
court had no concern.

Gill, the permanent trustee, having thus failed to establish a title to
the fund under the Maiyland insolvent laws, the litigation is again re-
vived respecting the fund, in behalf and for the benefit of the personal
representatives of Goodwin, on the ground that the moneys realized
upon the contract with General Mina, from the Mexican government,
is to be regarded as a subsequent acquisition of property by ihe insol-
vent, belonging to his estate, and to be dealt with accordingly.

Hence this bill filed against the executors of Oliver to recover pos-
session of the fund. The defence set up to this demand of the admin-
istrator of Goodwin, and which it is insisted is conclusive against him,
is Ihe assignment of the contract of General Mina by Goodwin himself
to Robert Oliver in 1829, which has been already referred to; that hav-
ing thus parted with all his right or claim to that contract, for a full
and valuable consideration, the proceeds thereof derived from the
recognition and fulfilment by the Mexican government belong to the
estate of Oliver, and not to that of Goodwin; and vested his executors
with the equitable right to receive the moneys, and which have been
paid accordingly under the decree of the court of appeals of Maiyland
in making a distribution of the fund.

It is urged, however, in answer to this view, that the contract with
General Mina being illegal, the sale and assignment of it from Good-
win to Oliver niusi also be illegal, and consequently that no interest
tjif-rfiii, •■(|iiil;ibl<' or l'\gal, pnss-cd to Oliver's o\rcnlnr>\

But this position is not maintainable. The transaction, out of which
the assignment to OHver arose, was uninfected with any illegaUfy.
The consideration paid was not only legal but meritorious, the relin-
quishment of a debt due from Goodwin to him. The assignment was
subsequent, collateral to, and wholly independent of, the illegal trans-
actions upon which the principal contract was foimded. Oliver was
not a party to these transactions, nor in any wa\' connected with them.

It may be admitted that even a subsequent collateral contract, if
made in aid and in furtherance of the execution of one infected with
illegality, partakes of its nature, and is equally in violation of law; but
(hat is not this case. Oliver, by the assignment, became simply owner
in the place of Goodwin, and as to any public policy or concern sup-
posed to be involved in the making; or in the fulHIment of such con-
tracts, it was a matter of entire indifference to which it belonged. The
assignee took it liable to any defence, legal or equitable, to which it
was subject in the hands of Goodwin. In consequence of the illegal-
ity the contract was invalid, and incapable of being enforced in a court
of justice. The fulfilment depended altogether upon the voluntary act
of Mina, or of those representing him.

No obligation existed, except what arose from a sense of ])onor on
the part of those deriving a benefit from the transaction out of which
it arose. Its value rested upon this ground, and this alone. The
demand was simply a debt of honor. But if the party who might set
uj) llie illegality chooses to waive it, and pay the money, he cannot
afterwards reclaim it. And, if even the money be paid to a third per-
son for the other ])arty, such thirti person cannot set up the illegality of
the contract on which the payment has been made, and withhold it for
himself. In Faikney vs. Renous, (4 Burr. 2069,) where two persons
were jointly concerned in an illegal stockjobbing business with a third,
and a loss having arisen, one of them paid the whole, and took a secu-
rity from the other for his share, the security was held to be valid as a
new contract uninfixted by the original transaction. And in Pctrie 7'."^.
llannay, (3 T. R. 418,) where one of the partners, imder similar cir-
cumstances, paid the whole at the instance of the other, he was allowed
to recover for the proportionate share. These cases are examined and
approved in Armstrong's. Tolee, (11 Wli. 258.)

In Tenant vs. Elliott, (I U. ifc l\ .3,) the defendani, a broker, ef-
fected an insurance for tin; [)laiuli(r wliich was illegal, being in viola-
tion of tbe navigation laws; but on ;i loss bappening, the underwriters
paid the money to the broker, wlio refused to |)ay it over to the insured,
setting up the illegality, upon wliicli an aciioii (or money had and
received was brouLrbl. The |»laiiili(l' recovered on ilie trroimd llial llie
imj)lied promise ot the ilelendani, arising out of llie receipt of ilii- money
for the plaintif]", was a n<:w contract, not all'ected by tbe illegality (»f
the original transaction. The. same [)rineiple wasajiplied and enforced
in the case; of J-'armr-r vs. Ru.ssell, (II). p. 2'.Hj.)

in Tlioiiq)son o. Thonq)son, (7 \'eH. 170,) \\\r\r. had been a sale (tf
die command of an Mast India sliip (o iln; defendant, and as a con-
sideration he siij)ulale(l to pay an ammiiy of J-'2'){) to (he previous
coiimiaiider so l<»ng a ; lie lioiild eoiiiimii' in cninmaiKJ of (he biji

Tliis contract of sale was illegal. Subsequently the defendant re-
linciuished the coniniand, and another person was appointed in his
place. But under the regulation adopted by the East India Company
to prevent the sale of the commands of their ships, an allowance was
made to the defendant, on his retiring, of o^''^, 540.

The bill in this case was filed for the purpose of procuring a decree
for the investment of a portion of this fund to satisfy the annuity of
0^^200, praying that the value of it might be ascertained and paid out
of the money allowed by the company.

The objection made was, that (he contract providing for the annuity
was illegal, and a court of equity therefore would not interfere.

The master of the rolls, Sir William Grant, agreed that the contract
was illegal; he admitted there was an equity against the fund, if it
could be reached by a legal agreement; but observed, "you have no
claim to this money, except through the medium of an illegal agree-
ment, which, according to the determinations, you cannot support."
" If the case," he further observed, " could have been brought to this,
that the company had paid this into the hands of a third person for the
use of the plaintitT. he might have recovered from that third person,
who could not have set up this objection as a reason for not performing
the trust;" ''but in this instance the money is paid to the party."
" There is nothing collateral in respect to which, the agreement being
out of the question, a collateral demand arises, as in the case of stock-
jobbing differences."

So, in Sharp vs. Taylor, (^2 Ph. Ch. R. 801,) the bill was filed
among other things to recover a moiety of the freight money, the whole
of which had come into the hands of one of the joint owners. The
defence set up was, that the trade in which the vessel had been en-
gaged, and in which the freight had been earned, was in violation of
the navigation laws, and illegal. But Lord Chancellor Cottenham
answered, that the plaintiff was not asking for the enforcement of an
agreement adverse to the provision of the act of Parliament, nor seek-
ing compensation and payment for an illegal voyage; that, he observed,
was disposed of when Taylor (the defendant) received the money; the
plaintiff" was seeking only his share of the realized profit.

Again, he observed, can one of two partners possess himself of the
property of the firm, and be permitted to retain it, if he can show that,
in realizing it, some provision in some act of Parliament has been
violated? The answer is, that the transaction alleged to be illegal is
completed and closed, and will not be in any manner affected by what
the court is asked to do as between the parties The difference, he
observes, between enforcing illegal contracts and asserting title to the
money which has arisen from them, is distinctly taken in Tenant vs.
Elliot, and Farmer vs. Russell, and recognised by Sir William Grant
in Thompson vs. 1'hompson.

These cases show that the assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert
Oliver, in 1829, l)eing collateral to and disconnected frou) the illegal
transaction out of which the Mina contract arose, was valid and bind-
ing upon Goodwin, and vested in Oliver all the benefits and advan-
tages, whatever they might be, derived from that contract.

The assignment from Goodwin to Oliver, though the assignment of
an illegal contract — which contract, therefore, imposed no legal obliga-
tion, and rested simply upon the honor of the parties — was not witliin
the condemnation of the Maryland insolvent laws as expounded by her
courts, as the right was not derived under, but entirely independent of
them. Those laws have no application to this assignment.

And further, that the money having been realized by his executors,
according to the purpose and object of the assignment, becomes a part
of the assets of the estate, which belong to the personal representatives.

Another ground may be briefly stated, which, in our judgment, is
equally conclusive against the complainant. The assignment of 1S29
of the Mina contract not being tainted with illegality, and therefore
obligatory upon Goodwin, if he were alive and claiming the fund
against the representatives of Oliver, having parted with all his right in
the subject to their testator, for a valuable consideration, would be
estopped from setting up any such claim, and, of course, his personal
representatives can be in no better situation.

We have not deemed it necessary to look into the case for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether Goodwin, at the time of the proceedings
in the Baltimore county court, had such notice of them as required
that he should have appeared there and asserted his right; and hence,
that the decree of that court, in the distribution of the fund, was con-
clusive upon such right. That question is unimportant, inasmuch as,
in our opinion, the executors of Oliver have, independentl}'^ of that
ground, established a complete title to the fund in controversy.

We think the decree of the court below was right, and shouiil Ik;
affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of iMaryland,
and was argued b}'^ (Jounsel. On consideration whereof, it is now
here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court, that the decree
of the said (/ircuit Court, in this cause, be, mid the same is herrby
affirmed with costs.

SUPREME COURT OF THi: UNrPE!) s'i\\'n:s.

December '1' e ii m , 18 .') 1 .

Charles H. McUlair, Ailministrator of

Lyde Goodwin, deceased, aj)p(^llant,
vs.
Robert M. Gibixjs and Charles Oliver,

Executors of Robert ( )liver, deceased. ^

Mr. Chief Jiistice TANKY.

I shall stale my opinifin in this cas<! in ihf <-aHes of (Joudiu^'s :i(l
ininistrat(n- and \VilliamH's achninistralor, mh ih<- (hrcc ca-'^r-j .nr nf.iily
connected and depend on the sauje j)riucij)les.*

•For this opinion Hcr- pnge 5.

Appeal from the cirruil court
of ihe (Inilr-d Sljilrs fur
[\\v. district of Maryland.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1854.

John Williams, Administrator of James "^

Williams, deceased, appellant, | Appeal from the circuit court

vs. y of the United States for the

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oliver,
Executors of Robert Oliver, deceased. _

district of Maryland.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Maryland.

The bill was filed in the court below to recover of the defendants
the proceeds of the share of James Willi-ams in what is called the
Baltimore Company, which had a claim against the Mexiean govern-
ment that was allowed under the convention of 1839. The claim was
similar to the one under consideration in the case of the administrator
of Lyde Goodwin against these defendants, just disposed of. The
proceeds of the share, as charged, amounts to $41,306 41.

The main grounds of defence set up in this case are:

1. The sale of this share in the company to Robert Oliver for a
valuable consideration by George Winchester, permanent trustee of
Williams, who had taken the benefit of the insolvent act of Maryland
in 1819, which was made in pursuance of an order of the court having
jurisdiction in cases of insolvency under that act. The sale took place
on the 2d April, 1825.

2. A decree of the court of appeals in Maryland at the June term,
1849, affirming a decree of the Baltimore count}^ court, which, in the
distribution of the fund arising from this claim of the Baltimore Com-
pany, assigned the proceeds of the share in question to the executors
of Oliver.

If the appellees fail to maintain their title to this fund upon one or
the other of these grounds, then the right to the share of Williams in
the Baltimore Company, for aught that appears, still belonged to him
at the time of his decease in 1836, and passed to his legal representa-
tives as a part of hi? estate; and, although originally of no legal value
on account of the illegality of the transaction out of which the contract
arose, yet, as the illegality has been waived and the money realized,
we have seen, from the principles stated in the previous case of Lyde
Goodwin, it belongs to Williams's administrator.

As it respects the first ground — the sale of the share of Williams by
the provisional trustee to Robert Oliver under the insolvent act — we
have seen, in the case of Lyde Goodwin, the court of appeals of Mary-
land held, that this contract of the Baltimore Company with General
Mina, being in violation of the neutrality act of the United States, of

1794, was so tainted with turpitude and illegality, it could not be. re-
cognised under their insolvent laws as property; and that no right to
or interest in the share passed fo the trustee. And, that this being the
construction of the statute by the highest court of the State, and which
had a right to interpret its own laws, this court felt bound by it with-
out inquiring whether that interpretation was correct or not; and, con-
sequently, as Goodwin's interest in the share did not pass to the insol-
vent trustee, it remained in Goodwin himself, and passed to the execu-
tors of Oliver by virtue of his assignment to their testator in 1829.

In this case the executors of Oliver are obliged to make title to the
share in question, under the insolvent trustee of Williams; the assign-
ment to Oliver, their testator, having been made by the trustee, and
not by Williams himself. And it is now insisted on behalf of the
executors, that the court of appeals of Maiyland in this case reversed
their opinion delivered in the case of Goodwin, and held that the in-
terest in the share did pass under the insolvent laws to the trustee, and
consequently that the proceeds of the share vested in them under his
sale and assignment to their testator in 1825.

Had this been the decision of the court of appeals in the case of the
share of i^yde Goodwin, the interest and proceeds would have passed
to Gill, the permanent trustee, instead of to the executors of Oliver.

These results, so contradictory and inconsistent, claimed too as flow-
ing from the judgments of the highest court in a State, should not be
admitted unless compelled, after the most careful and deliberate con-
sideration.

The decision in both cases was made at the same term, June, 18-19,
The one in the present case subsequent to that in the case of Goodwin.
The court in their opinion state, that the grounds upon which they
affirmed the judgment in this case were, first, for the reasons assigned
by them for their decree in the previous case of Oliver's executors
against Gill, permanent trustee of Goodwin.

The grounds for that decree are stated in tlie record, and as far as
material are as follows: '^ They are of opinion that the entire; contract
(the Mina contract) upon which the claim of the appellee (Gill, the
trustee) is founded, is so fraught widi ill(;galily :iiid lur|)itude as to be
utterly null .mkI void; conferring no rights or ol)ligatiot)s upon any of
the contracting parlies, which can be sustained or countennnced l»y any
court of law or equity in this Slate; that it has no mor.il olilii';aiiou to
supf)ort it, and that , therefore, under the insolvent laws of .Maryl-ind,
such claim does not pa.ss to or vest in the trustee of an insolveiii jnii-
(ioner. It forms no part of his properly or estate within the uieiining
of the le'jislalive ennrtuienis constituting our insolvent laws."

iNothiug can be more (•xplirit or decisive! ai,Minst the title of the in-
solvent trustee, or of those setting iq> a claim imder him, to a share in
this I'aliimore Conq)any. The court say, " it h.is no le<:;d or moral
obliL^■^lion to suppr)rt it, and timl, therefore, under the insolvent laws
of Alar} land, such a claim does not pass to or vest in the trustee of an
insolvent petitioner. It forms do p.irt of his property «>r estate, wiihin
the meaniii"- of the le'Hslaiive en.iciments con^iituiiiii; our insolvent
system." And this opinion is reallirmed, ijisisimis verbis, in giving the
7

judgment against the trustee of Williams, then before the court, and
with which we are now dealing; and yet it is gravely insisted that no
such decision was made in this case as was made in the case of Good-
win; but, on (he contrary, the court decided (hat the in(erest in the
share of Williams did pass under the insolvent laws to (he trustee;
that he became thereby invested with the title, and was competen( to
transfer it to Robert Oliver, (he testator of the defendants.

The supposed contradiction and inconsistency of the determination
of the court is founded upon the second paragraph in the opinion de-
livered. It is as follows. 2d. " Because, under (he proceedings based
on or originating from the insolvent petitions of John Gooding and
James Williams, and the act of assembly applicable thereto, Robert
Oliver acquired a valid title to all the interest of said James Williams
and John Gooding in the fund in controversy, for the reasons assigned
by Judge Martin as the basis of his opinion in those cases."

Judge Martin had dissen(ed from (he opinion of the majority of (he
court, in the case of Lyde Goodwin, being of opinion (hat the interest
in his share passed under the insolvent laws to (he (rusiee; and had
maintained the same opinion in respect to the share of Williams, in
the case (hen before the court. And it is supposed (hat (his opinion
was adop(ed by the other members, in the determination of the case.

We do not agree that (his is a proper apprehension of the judgment
given by (he two members of the court; but, on the contrary, are satis-
fied (hat the opinion delivered may well warrant a more natural and
consistent interpretation.

The true meaning will be apparent, we think, from (he following
explanation. Robert Oliver, as we have seen, had purchased the
share of Williams of the insolvent trustee, in 1825, and, consequently,
if the interest in his share passed under the insolvent laws to the trus-
tee, it had become vested in Oliver, and of course, on his death, in
the executors.

The question before the court was between the insolvent trustee and
the executors. The court, after reaffirming their opinion in (he case
of Lyde Goodwin, namely, that no in(erest in the share passed to the
trustee under the insolvent laws, and therefore (hat he was disabled
from making out a title to it, go on in substance to say, that if in error
as to (his, and the opinion of .ludge Martin should be adop(ed, namely,
that the interest did pass to the trustee, ii could make no difference in
the result, inasmuch as the executors of Oliver would then be entitled
to the proceeds, under his purchase of (he share from the trustee him-
self, in 1825. Therefore, viewing the case in either aspect, qua cun
que via data, (he insolvent trustee had failed in establishing any in-
terest in the fund.

It appears to us that this is obviously the meaning intended to be
expressed, though we admit the terms used in the expression of it fur-
nish some plausibility for the criticisms to which it has been subjected.
The two opinions, (he one in the case of Goodwin, and the other in
the case of Williams, were given at the same term, and upon the same
question; and, if (he interpretation of (he defendan(s is right, are dia-
metrically opposite to each other; and not only so, as (he first opinion

is incorporated in the second, tlie judgment rendered in the case of
Williams is founded upon two opposite constructions of the same statute,
in one and the same opinion.

We prefer the explanation we have given to this extraordinary and
absurd conclusion, as it respects the proceedings of a respectable court,
and one possessing the highest jurisdiction in the State.

The change of opinion upon a question of law, or in the construc-
tion of a statute, is no disparagement to a judge, or a court, however
eminent or experienced. The change is oftentimes a matter of com-
mendation, rather than of reproach. But the case here presented, and
upon which we are asked to turn the decision of the question, is, that
two opposite constructions of a statute have been given by the court in
the same cause, leading necessarily to opposite results, and both relied
on as grounds for the judgment rendered. We have already assigned
our reasons for disbelief in any such conclusion, and shall not again
refer to them.

It has been suggested that the statute of Maryland, of 1S41, confirm-
ing certain defective proceedings in insolvent cases, operated to confirm
the sale of the trustee to Oliver in 1S25, and that the opinion of the
court of appeals in the case of Williams is founded upon this statute.
Winchester, the permanent trustee at the time of the sale, had not
given a bond with surety, for the faithful execution of his (hity, as
required by the law ; and, under the decisions of the courts of Mary-
lantl, this omission disabled him from dealing with the estate of the
insolvent.

The act of 1841 was passed to remedy defects of this description. It
provided that all sales and transfers of properly and claims, (heretofore
made by any permanent trustee, (fcc, under the insolvent laws of the
State, shall be valid and effectual, notwithstanding such trustee shall
not have given a bond with security, (fcc ; and the 3d section provides
that the act shall not be so construed as to cure any oilier defect in (he
proceedings, than the failure to give a bond, with secmity, or the want
of any ratification by the court of any sale made by such trustee.

It is quite apparent from the provisions of the act that it was not
designed to confirm all sales previously made by (he Irusicc- under ihe
insolvent laws, and render them valid and etlectual, but sinq)ly to
confirm, so far fus respected any defect arising out of (he omission of
(be lrus(ee to give the proper secmity, and also as respecifd any omis
sion on (he part of (he court to confirm (be sale. 'llu'se (wo dtTecis
in any |)revioiis proceedings were cured by (he s(a(ul<', Imi( in all (iiImt
respects the proceedings were valid or odu^rwise independendy <>( i(.
It is im{)0ssible to mainiain that the slalu(<; looked (o any such infijr-
m.'di(y in (he (ille of (he (rustee, as (hat held by lb"- court of jq)pcals
in (he case of lijde CJoodwin, as well as in (he jirc.-ent one. And,
besides, it is inconceivable why the court slioidd have reairirmed their
opinion in (he case of Goodwin, us a ground for denying (he tide (o
the (rustee, if (hey hati in(cudcd to hold (hat it pass<'d by forcr of (be
act of 1S41. We have no belief that such was the opinion in(ended
to be expressed.

The decree of the court affirming the judgment of the court below
has been referred to as favoring the view of the decision contended for
by the appellees. This decree adjudges and decrees that the judg-
ment below awarding the share of Williams to the executors of Oliver
be affirmed, and that Glenn and Ferine, the general trustees of the
fund, pay the proceeds of the share to the said executors.

It will be remembered, that the only question before the court re-
specting this share was between the executors on the one side, and the
insolvent trustee of Williams on the other; aiid as the executors were
the apparent owners of the fimd, unless a title could be maintained by
the trustee, so far as respected the parties before the court, the former
exhibited the better title; at least the better title to take the possession
and charge of the fund in the distribution among the claimants. The
form of the decree, therefore, was very much a matter of course in the
aspect of the case as then presented.

This view will be more fully appreciated when we refer to another
branch of this case, presently to be considered. We will simply add,
in our conclusion upon this part of the case, that the opinion now ex-
pressed was the one entertained by us when the case involving this
share of Williams was formerly before the court, and which will be
found in 12 How., pp. Ill , 123.

At p. 123 we observed the counsel for the plaintiff in error sought to
distinguish this case from the previous one, (the case of Lyde Good-
win,) and to maintain the jurisdiction of the court, upon the ground
that the act of the legislature of Maryland of 1841, confirming the
authority of Winchester, the permanent trustee, was in contravention
of a provision of the Constitution of the United States, as " a law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts."

But we observed in answer, " admitting this be so, (which we do
not,) still the admission would not affect the result, for the decision
(of the court of appeals) upon a previous branch of the case denied to
the plaintiff any right to or interest in the fund in question, as claimed
under the insolvent proceedings as permanent trustee, and hence he
was deemed disabled from maintaining any action founded upon that
claim.

It was of no importance, therefore, as it respected the plaintiff, in
the distribution of the fund, whetlier it was rightfully or wrongfully
awarded to Oliver's executors. He had no longer any interest in the
question."

Our conclusion, therefore, upon this part of the case is, that accord-
ing to the law of Maryland, as expounded by the highest court of the
State, no title to or interest in the share of Williams in tlie contract of
the Baltimore Company under General Mina passed under the insol-
vent laws of that State to the insolvent trustee; and, consequently, no
interest in the same became vested in the executors of Robert Oliver
by force of the assignment from the trustee to him in 182-5.

2. The next question is as to the conclusiveness of the decree of
the Baltimore county court, making a distribution of the fund among
the several claimants, and which was atfirmed by the court of appeals,
upon the rights of the administrator of Williams to the proceeds of Ids

share in the fund. The decree in the Ballimore coiinly court was
rendered in December, 1846, and atfirnicd June lerni, 1849.

Wilhams died in 1836, and no letters of administration were taken
out upon the estate till 1852. It appears, therefore, that WiUiams had
been dead ten years when the first decree was made, and thirteen at
the date of the second; and no representative was in existence (o whom
notice of the proceedings could affect in any way ilie interest of the
estate in the fund.

Now, the principle is well settled, in respect to these proceedings in
chancery for the distribution of a common fund among the several
parties interested, either on the application of the trustee of the fund,
the executor or administrator, legatee, or next of kin, or on the appli-
cation of any party in interest, that an absent party, who had no notice
of the proceedings, and not guilty of wilful laches or unreasonable
neglect, will not be concluded by tlie decree of distribution from the
assertion of his right by bill or petition against the trustee, executor or
administrator; or, in case they have distributed the fund in pursuance
of an order of the court, against the distributees. (1 Miln and Keen,
200, David vs. Froud; 1 Russ. and M. 338, Greig vs. Somervillo; 3
Russ. 130, Gillespie V5 Alexander; 1 Keen, 391, Sawyer ?'5. I3uch-
more; 1 Ball, and 13. 436, Shine vs. Gough; Story's Eq. PI. ^ 106;
11 VVh. 304, Finley vs. Bank United States; 14 How. 52, 67, Wis-
wall vs. Sampson.

The general principle governing courts of equity, in proceedings of
this description, is more clearly stated by Sir John Leach, luasier of
the rolls in David vs. Froud, above referred to, than in any other case
that has come under our notice.

That was a case where one of the next of kin, who had no notice of
the administration suit, filed a bill against the administratrix and dis-
tributees to obtain her share of the estate. I'he bill was filed some
two years after the decree for distribution had been maile and carried
into eflfect.

The master of the rolls observed, that '< the personal j)ropcrty of an
intestate is first to be applied in payment of his debts, and then dis-
tributed amongst his next of kin. The person who takes out admin-
istration to his estate, in most cases, cannot know who are liis creditors,
and may not know who are his next of kin; and the; adminisiiaiion of
his estate may be exposed to great delay and embarrassment. A court
of equity exercises a most wholesome jurisdiclidu for (be prevention of
this delay and emi)arrassment, and for (he assistance and protection of
the administralftr. U[)on the apjtiication of any person rlaimiiiLT t') be
irit«;rest<;d, the court refi;rs it to the master, to in<|uire who are creditors
and who are next of kin, and for that purpose to cause advertisrtnenis
to be j)ui)lished in the(|uarters where creditors and next of kin are most
likely to bf; found, calling upon su<h creditors arjd next of kin to conn;
in and make, their claims before tin; masl(;r within a reasouable time
stated; and when that time is exj^red, it is considered (hat the best pos-
sible means having been taken (o ascertain the |)arties really entitled,
the administrator may reasonably iMorcr-d to distribute the estate anioiiir
tb(»se who have before (he master eslabiislied an apparent liilc. Sneji

proceedings having been taken, the court, will protect the administrator
against any future claim.

But it is obvious, he remarks, that the notice given by advertise-
ments may, and must in many cases, not reach the parlies really en-
titled. They may be abroad, and in a different part of the kingdom
from that where the advertisements are published, or from a multitude
of circumstances they may not see or hear of the advertisements, and
it would be the height of injustice that the proceedings of the court,
wisely adopted with a view to general convenience, should have the
absolute effect of conclusively transferring the property of the true
owners to one who has no right to it.

The master of the rolls further observed, that if a creditor does not
happen to discover the proceedings in the court, until after the distribu-
tion has been actually made by the order of the court amongst the par-
ties having by the master's report an apparent title, although the court
will protect the administrator, who has acted under the orders of the
court, yet, upon a bill filed by this creditor against the parties to whom
the property has been distributed, the comt will, upon proof of no wil-
ful default on the part of such creditor, and no want of reasonable dili-
gence on his part, compel the parties defendants to restore to the credi-
tor that which of right belongs to him. The master of the rolls then
applied tliis principle to the right of the next of kin, the complainant
in the bill, and observed, that it had been argued that the case is
extremely hard upon the party who is to refund, for that he has a full
right to consider the money as his own, and may have spent it; and
that it would be against the policy of the law to recall the money, which
the parly had obtained by the effect of a judgment upon a litigated
title, Bui, he observed, there is here no judgment upon a litigated
title; the party who now claims by a paramount title was absent from
the court, and all that is adjudged is, that, upon an inquiry in its nature
imperfect, parlies are found to have a prima facie claim, subject to be
defeated upon better information. The apparent title, under the mas-
ter's report, is in its nature defeasible, A party, claiming under such
circumstances, has no great reason to complain that he is called upon
to replace what he has received against his right.

In the case of Gillespie vs. Alexander, also above referred to, Lord
Eldon observed, that, all hough the language of the decree, where an
account of debt is directed, is, that those who do not come in shall be
excluded frou) the benefit of it; yet the course is to permit a creditor,
he paying costs, to prove his debt, as long as there happens to be a
residuary fund in court, or in the hands of the executor, and to pay him
out of the residue. If the creditor does not come till after the executor
has paid away the residue, he is not without remedy, though he is
barred the benefit of that decree. If he has a mind to sue the legatees,
and bring back the fund, he may do so, but he cannot affect the lega-
tees, except by suit, and he cannot affect the executor at all.

Tliese principles are decisive of this branch of the case, as they
establish, beyond all controversy, the right of the administrator to assert
the title of Williams, the intestate, to the proceeds of the share in
(piestion, notwithstanding the decree of distribution by the Baltimore

county court, Tliere has been no laches on his part, orjon the part of
those wliom he represents.

The cases above referred to relate to the rights of creditors and next
of kin, but the principle is equally applicable to all parties interested
in a common fund brought into a court of equity for distribution
amongst the several claimants.

It is worthy of observation in this connection, that the decree, how-
ever conclusive in its terms in the distribution of the fund amongst the
apparent owners then before the court, possesses no binding effect upon
the rights of the absent party whose interests have not been repre-
sented or the subject of litigation. The opinion of the court given,
and decree in pursuance thereof, applies only to interests of those
amongst whom the fund is distributed.

These observations furnish an answer to the argument on behalf of
the appellees, drawn from a reference to the terms of the decree of the
court of appeals of Maryland, in this case, by which the fund is ad-
judged to the executors of Oliver. As between all the parties then
before the court, this adjudication was doubtless proper and conclusive
upon their rights.

It is agreed in the case, that but five-eighths of the fund in contro-
versy is in the hands of the executors, the residue having been paid
over in the administration of the assets of the estate.

If this portion had been paid over by the executors in pursuance
of an order of the court in an administration suit, the defendants woidd
be protected to that extent, and the complainant compelled to proceed
against the distributees. But no such fact appears in the case.

Without saying, at this time, that an executor, in all cases, may be
compelled to account to a party making title to a portion of the estate,
after distribution among the legatees and next of kin, unless first pro-
curing an order of the court having charge of the administration, we
perceive no reason, under tlie circumstances of this case, for exoner-
ating tliem, or turning him round to a bill against the distributees.

Upon the whole, after the fullest consideration we have been able to
give to this case, we think the decree of the court below was erroneous,
and should be reversed.

^ Mr. Chief Jualic(i Taney's opinion will br found on j)ag<' r», and }
'^ Mr. Justice Danikl\s opinion on p;i^e .'5'J. \

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 1854.

court

Jolin S. Williams, Administrator of"

James Williams, deceased, appellant,

vs. y

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oliver, |

Executors of Robert Oliver, deceased. J . , ^ ...

' -^ Appeals from the circuit

And of the United States for the

John Gooding, jr., adm'r de bonis non -| ^''^'^"^^ «^ Maryland.

of Jolin Gooding, deceased, appellant, |
vs. J>

Robert M. Gibbes and Charles Oliver, j

Executors of Robert Oliver, deceased. J

Mr. Justice DANIEL dissenting.

When, at a former term, these cases were brought before this court,
in the name of Nathaniel Williams, trustee for the creditors of James
Williams, an insolvent debtor, and of the same Nathaniel Williams, as
trustee for the creditors of John Gooding, an insolvent debtor, the
court, after argument and upon full consideration, dismissed them for
the want of jurisdiction. The decision of the court, then pronounced,
commanded my entire concurrence. I still concur in that decision,
and hold the reasons on which it was founded as wholly impregnable.
Those reasons were specifically these: That the questions involved in
the cases were purel}'^ questions arising upon the construction of the
insolvent laws of Maryland; questions properly determinable, and which
had been determined by the highest tribunal of that State; and such,
therefore, as vested no jurisdiction in this court.

Such, then, being directly and explicitly the decision of this court,
as will be seen in the report of its decision in the 12th of Howard, pp.
Ill and 125, it becomes a matter for curious speculation to inquire by
what view of the facts and the law of these cases, by what process of
reasoning upon the same facts and the same law, this court have now
arrived at a conclusion diametrically opposed to that which had been
formerly reached by them. The parties in interest are essentially the
same, varied only in name; it is the same insolvent law of Maryland
which it is now as it formerly was, undertaken to interpret; and it is
the identical exposition of the identical court, formerly examined and
sanctioned here, which this tribunal now assumes the right to reject
and condemn.

Indeed, the field for discussion and criticism is now much more
narrow than was that which existed when these cases were formerly
before this court. At that time there were strenuously urged grounds

for contestation; founded upon an alleged construction of the Mexican
treaty, and of the acts of the commissioners under that treat3^ At
present, the claims of the appellants, and the impeachment by them of
the decision of the State court, and of that of the circuit court of the
United States, have been rested chiefly, if not exclusively, upon the
fact, that the personal representatives of the insolvent assignors were
not made parties to the suits brought for the distribution of the effects
of the insolvents.

It cannot be correctl}^ insisted on as a universal or necessary rule,
(hat in suits by assignees the assignors from whom they derive title
must be made parties. Cases may occur in which there may be a
propriety of joining the assignors in such suits, but, without some ap-
parent cause for such a proceeding, the rule and the practice are other-
wise. Indeed, the calling into a controversy or litigation a person
who can have no interest in such litigation, would be discountenanced
by the courts, who would dismiss him from before them at the costs of
the person who should have attempted such an irregularity. And it
would seem that if there could be a case in which such an attempt
would be irregular, it would be that in which tlie person so made a
party had not, and could not have, any interest in the controversy; in
other words, should be nn insolvent, who had transferred upon record
every possible interest he possessed in the matter in controversy. But
suppose it be admitted as the general rule, that an assignee should, in
the prosecution of an assigned interest, call in his assignor as a voucher,
or for any other purpose, how will these cases be affected by such an
admission?

The absence of the personal representatives of the insolvent assign-
ors is the only circumstance imparting a shade or semblance of differ-
ence between the attitude of these cases as formerly brought before us,
and that in which they are now presented. Of what importance,
either now or formerl}', could be the presence or absence of the per-
sonal representatives of these insolvents it might puzzle CEdipus him-
self to (iivino. The rights or interests of the representative can never
be broader tlian rue those of the person represciiled; and as the p(,'r-
sfjtis represented in these cases are admitted on all sides, and arc; shown
upon record, to have nothing, by reason of the transfer to their trusli^es
of all that they had ever possessed, or to which they had any claim —
and thai, loo, by a mode of transfer which declared the ina(le{|Mac\' of
their all Cor the liiiuidation of their debts — it followed that those who
came forward under these insolvents jure rc/iresoUalio/n's merely,
C(juld themselves be entitled to nothing by rcprcscjiialioii from (heir
princi[tals, nor claim anything in opposition to the universal and ai)su-
liite assignments to the trustees of lliosi; dehtois.

Had these personal representatives of the insolvents l»een made par-
ties to the suits for distribution, it is probable that they wr)idd have been
regarded by the court as mere, men f»f straw, used for the, purpose of
depriving the purchasers for valuabh; consiileration from the trustees
or assignees of the insolvent's interests, deemed at the time of the sale
l)y the trustees [)recarioiis and coutiiigeut, Imt wliiiji [\\<- jnogressof
events had subse(|Uentlv leiiden-d avail.ilile.

5()

But whatever may be admitted as the general rule apph'cable to suits
by an assignee; however that rule may be supposed to require that in
such suits the assignor or his representative should be a party, still we
are brought back to the true character of these cases, and of the rule
of law peculiarly applicable to them, viz: that they are controversies
depending upon the construction of the statutes of Maryland, which
regulate the administration of the effects of insolvent debtors. That,
in the construction of those statutes it has been by the supreme court
of the State decided, that in suits by the purchasers or assignees from
the statutory trustees of insolvent debtors, the personal representatives
of those insolvent debtors are not necessarily to be made parties, but
that such suits may be prosecuted and decided without participation or
interference on the part of such representatives; that in conformity
with this construction of the statute of Maryland by the supreme court
of the State, the circuit court of the United States for the district of
Maryland, and this court, in the cases herein mentioned, have concur-
rently ruled in direct opposition to the pretensions of the appellants
now advanced.

Regarding the decision just pronounced as in conflict with all that
has been heretofore ruled upon the subjects of this controversy, and as
transcending the just authority of this court to reject the construction
of the statute of Maryland proclaimed by the supreme court of that
State, I am constrained to declare my dissent from the decision of this
court, and my opinion that the decrees of the circuit court in these
cases should be affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from
the Circuit Court of the United States, for the district of Maryland,
and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here
ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court, that the decree of the
said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed
with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to
the said Circuit Court, for further proceedings to be had therein, in
conformity to the opinion of this Court.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

December Term, 185 4.

John Gooding, jr., Administrator de bonis non
of John Gooding, deceased, appellant,

vs. )>

Robert M. Gibbesand Charles Oliver, Execu-
tors of Robert Oliver, deceased.

Appeal from the cir-
cuit court of the Uni-
ted States for the dis-
trict of Maryland.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Maryland.

The case involves the same questions, and is in all respects the same
as the case of the administrator of Williams against the executors of
Oliver, just decided.*

The decree of the court below is therefore reversed, and the case
remanded to the court below.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of th^ record from
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland and
was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here
ordered, adjudged and decreed by this Court that the decree of the
said Circuit Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed
with costs, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded (o
the said Circuit Court for further proceedings to be had therein, in
conformity to the opinion of this Court.

• For the Opinions in the cnsc of tlie Administrator of Williams agninst llic Executors
of Oliver, see pajjus 4G, 5, and 54.

^OFCAllFOff^

:•# ^^Aavaani^

i 3

40FCAIIF0% ^

C5 S

^^Aiivaaii#

% 4^lOSANCElfx^ -^^^lUBRARYQr, -^lUBRARYQc

>a3AINn-3Wv

ll-\'

^OfCAUFO^/l^

?? ^

'^^Aavaaii-#'

^OJIIVJJO^

^OFCAllFO%

«AMEUNIVERy/A ^

5WEl)NIVER%

<ril33NVS01=<^

^HIBRARYQr,

ir%>^ %;.

i'g

''(^Aav

«A\^El)NIVER%. ^lOSANCEl£n>

^1^MBNiV£R% ^lOSANCElfj^

^1 I

■"^iTiiaDNvsoi^ ^a^AiNn-aftV

-j^lUBRARYOc

^. ,

^^Aavaani^

lOSANCElfXA

iiciri « nw ,-v

.t \\

'^mimwi^i^'

8RARY<?A,

es tj

4il

-^OFCAUfORfe. AOfCAUfOBto

IRTI I 6

•'(^AavaaiHv^"

"(^Aavaan-i^

.\WEUNIVERS/^ ^

^71 C5

S 3

^5jaEumvER% ^

s ^-

'UBRARYOc.

.^WEUNIVERS/A A>clOSANCtl% -cJ^lUBRARYQ^, -oj

niiiiii'iiMlilliigiiillillllllllllll in
L 006 676 589 2

.,r I irr* I. n> ■ -,

m
SO

UC SOUTHERN RFGIOPJAL LIBRARY FACILITY

AA 000 518 956

-'6

I ">■