V THE BALANCE OF POWER 1715-1789 BY ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A. STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD AUTHOR OF " BOLIXGBROKE " LOUIS XIV. AND THE ZENITH OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY," ETC PERIOD VI THE MACMILLAX COMPANY LONDON: MACMILLAN .k CO., Ltd. 1907 All rights reserved -^0- H\8T0R< Copyright, 1896, By M ACM ill an AND CO. Set up and electrotyped March, 1896. Reprinted August, 1898; November, 1900; July, 1903; January, July. 1907, NorfajooO ^rrsa J. S. CuBhing k Co. - Berwick k Smith Norwuud Mui. U.S.A. PREFACE In attempting to write the history of Europe in the eighteenth century, I have been compelled for want of space to omit to a great extent the history of the Papacy and Portugal, and to touch upon the internal history of France only so far as it reacted upon the foreign policy of Louis xv. and xvi. I have, how- ever, endeavoured to give full prominence to the for- eign policy of Dubois, Fleury, Choiseul, and Vergennes, to emphasise the full meaning of the diplomatic revo- lutions of 1 717 and 1756, and to bring out clearly the disastrous effects upon France of her entry into the war between England and the revolted American colonies. I have also devoted much attention to showing the close interdependence of Northern, Eastern, and West- ern politics, and have in consequence endeavoured to bring into clear light the first beginnings of the Eastern Question, the rise of Russia and Prussia, and the decay of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. For the valuable Appendices A, B, and C — the re- sults of very careful investigations — I am indebted to the courtesy of the Rev. A. H. Johnson ; while to Mr. H. O. Wakeman and Mr. A. N. Moberley I ven- ▼ 271931 vi Preface ture to express my thanks for their kindness in reading through the proof-sheets. It is impossible to give a complete list of the authori- ties which have either been consulted, or which should be consulted by students of this Period. Monod's BibliograpJiie dc VJiistoire de France gives a most use- ful list of the best French works, while the results of the labours of Martin, Sorel, Arneth, Carlyle, Van- dal, Jobez, Cherest, Rocquain, Sybel, Weber, Broglie, Geffroy, Baudrillard, Coxe, Taine, de Tocqueville, and Armstrong will be found easily accessible. The valuable set of Instriictiojis aiix AmbassadeiirSy and the admirable volumes in the Oncken Series, are in themselves a mine of information as interesting as they are accurate. I have in the text made frequent references to various authorities, including often mono- graphs with which the general reader may not be well acquainted. The difHculties which have presented themselves to me will be appreciated by every one who has en- deavoured to unravel the tangled skein of Continental politics during the eighteenth century ; but I trust that my attempt to sketch the condition of Europe during the period previous to the French Revolution will not prove without interest to students of modern history. A. H. Oxford, February 1896. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Europe at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century . i 11. Alberoni and Dubois, i 715-1723 25 III. The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese, i 723-1 733 . . 64 IV. The War of the Polish Succession, i 733-1 735 . . 87 V. The North and East of Europe, i 71 5-1 740 . . . 107 VI. Prussia and the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1742 128 VII. The Austrian Succession W^\r after the Peace of Breslau, 1 742-1 748 . 156 VIII. The Diplomatic Revolution, 1748-1756 .... 206 IX. The Seven Vears' War, i 756-1 763 241 X. The Fall of the Jesuits, 1759-1773 .... 280 XI. The Partition of Poland and the Treats' of Kutchuk- Kainardji 298 Xil. Europe and the War of American Independence, 1774-1783 332 XIII. Catherine ii. .\nd Joseph ii., i 783-1 789 . . • 35° XIV. France before the Revolltion, i 774-1 789 . . . 394 vii viii Conteftts APPENDICES PACK Appendix A. — The Territories of the House of Hapsburg, and their Government ......... 419 Appendix B. — Dominions of the Kings of Prussia, and their Gov- ernment after the Reforms of Frederick William i. . . . 420 Appendix C. — Constitution of the Empire in the Eighteenth Century 422 Appendix D. — Genealogies of the Russian and Swedish Royal Houses 423 Genealogy of the House of Wittelsbach, to illustrate the Bavarian Succession Question ..... 424 Appendix E. — Table of Contemporary Sovereigns .... 425 Index 427 MAPS 1. Europe in 1740 to face i^o 2. Italy in 1748 201 3. North and East Germany, 1 756-1 763 244 4. West Germany, 1 756-1 763 258 5. The North and East of Europe to face 351 6. Prussia in 1786 to face t^-jt, CHAPTER I EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY The Balance of Power — The Enlightened Governments — Commerce and the Colonies — The Growth of the Middle Class — The Causes of the European Revolution — The Settlement of 1713 and 1714 — Position of the Lead- ing European Powers in 1715 — The Empire — Austria — Prussia — Ba- varia — The Palatinate — Hanover — Saxony — Poland — Italy — Spain and Portugal — The North of Europe — The Eastern Question — Sweden and France in 1715. On the ist of September 1715 Louis xiv. died. With his death the eighteenth century may be said to begin, just as with the meeting of the States-General on May the 5th, 1789, it may be said to close. The years from 1715 to 1789 were preparatory to a period extending from 1789 to 1815, when a revolution was carried out not only in France but in other countries, and the reconstruction of the map of Europe was effected. The causes of this revolution, which has so pro- foundly influenced modern Europe, are vev}' plainly indicated in the history of the preceding years. During the period from 1715-1789 certain leading ideas were accepted which differ in many respects from those propounded during the revolutionary epoch. Of these perhaps the best known is that The Balance of the balance of power. After the Peace of West- of Power, phalia, it became recognised that a number of independent states of various sizes and resources must find a modus vive?idi, and that the security of all must be ensured. But the * Chris- tian Republic ' was an ideal of philosophers, and was ignored by Louis xrv.; it was not till 1688 that William in. headed a successful opposition to the predominance of France. The balance of power in the eighteenth century has been described PERIOD VI, I A \^ /'Z',.:i } "t i \Eiirpp'San History, 17 15-1789 as * merely a temporary immobility produced by exhaustion after long wars.' Diplomacy was corrupt, and international immorality was universal. The principles of Frederick the Great and of Catherine 11. were practised by other governments which had not the audacity to avow them. The invasion of Silesia, the partition of Poland, the attempted dismember- ments of Turkey and Sweden, and the suggested dismember- ment of Prussia, are well-known illustrations of the contempt for estabhshed rights, and the determination of powerful states to enrich themselves at the expense of their weaker neighbours. No consideration was paid to race limits or to national bounda- ries. Large portions of Italy were, at the Peace of Utrecht, taken from Spain and given to Austria ; while the Spanish /-Netherlands was handed over to the care of the distant^ House 1 of Hapsburg. Till 1789 the supremacy of dynastic interests I remained practically unquestioned, and it was not till the nine- J teenth century that the idea of nationality became generally recognised. 'They cut and pare states and kingdoms,' wrote Alberoni of the ministers of his day, 'as if they were Dutch cheeses.' And this statement accurately describes the policy pursued with a brutal consistency by all the great Powers from the Treaty of Utrecht to that of Vienna in 181 5. Nevertheless, the idea of a balance of power is founded on reason, has been a living force in European politics since the struggles of the Italian towns with each other in the Middle Ages, and exists in the minds of all European statesmen at the present day. In 171 7 Lord Stair, the English envoy, explained to the Regent that Stanhope's foreign policy was based on the principle of a balance of forces ; that it was England's object to make Austria as far as possible equal in power to France, and to prevent either country from becoming superior in strength and influence to the other. And he frankly stated that if France endeavoured to become more powerful than the Em- peror she would lose her allies. Alberoni, too, was, from the beginning of his career in Spain, firmly resolved to annul the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, as being subversive to the \ The Begimimg of the Eighteenth Century 3 balance of power, and disastrous to Spain and Italy. Though this principle was often enunciated, its mere existence could not prevent ac£s of aggression on the part of the great states ; and Europe has been described as committing suicide by allow- ing the War of the Austrian Succession and the Partition of Poland. * These iniquitous acts,' says Albert Sorel, * are the testament of old Europe, having signed which it could not but die.' Anarchic principles were abroad, morality and religion were at a low ebb, treaties were lightly broken, most European states were, at the time of the French Revolution, either ruined or worn out ; and the system of the balance of power was grossly perverted by the cynical and immoral policy of the rulers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. In 1788 the wisdom of maintain- ing within certain hmits a balance of power was appreciated by English statesmen. By their efforts Turkey and Sweden were saved from dismemberment, and Europe from a serious territorial readjustment.^ Side by side with this disregard of the rights of nationalities, it must be observed that the responsibilities of rulers within their own territories were fully grasped. The modern The En- idea of the state begins to appear. During the Qoye^n!^ ^ century, the conception that governments exist for ments. the promotion of the security and prosperity of the governed was adequately appreciated. The eighteenth century was an _ age of enlightenment ; it has been termed the _age of reason. But the idea of the sovereignty of the people was not recog- nised. It was held from England to Russia that a government, while it existed for the good of the people, must not be administered by them. The eighteenth century was the period of administrative despotism. The state was everything, the people nothing. Benevolent despots governed their countries on humanitarian principles. Though, theoretically, freedom of individual thought and action was allowed to be a good thing, in practice the principle of personal liberty was not recognised. 1 Sorel, L' Europe et la Revolution Fran^aise, vol. i. chap. i. Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century ^ vol. v. pp. 229, 230. 4 European History^ 171 5-1789 Feudalism still existed in many parts of Europe, and the poorer classes were kept in bondage. Another characteristic, the importance of which cannot be over-estimated, was the immense interest taken in commercial and colonial questions. Commerce was recog- Commerce ^ and the niscd as being the road to wealth and power, and Colonies. -^ became the policy of every European prince to increase the wealth of his country by advancing its trade. The study of political economy had definitely arisen in the seventeenth century, though it had only reached a very rudi- mentary stage — the prevalent belief being that the wealth of a nation consisted in the amount of specie which it possessed, and that the prosperity of one country was only attained at the expense of others. Consequently, each nation endeavoured to prohibit the exportation of coin, and commercial jealousy grew apace. '■ One man's gain is another's loss ' became a recog- nised principle, and the mercantile theory, as it was called, established itself firmly in Europe. During the latter half of the seventeenth century the great value of colonial trade was almost universally recognised. The unpopularity, in England, of \\\p Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 was largely due to the fact that, had they been carried out, the western basin of the Mediterranean would have become a French lake, and the English trade there and in the Levant would have been endangered. The coolness which existed after the conclusion of the Spanish Succession War between England and Peter the Great was caused in great measure by the apprehension that the appearance in the Baltic of a Russian fleet would endanger the interests of British commerce in the north. This lively appreciation — shared with England by Spain, France, and Austria — of the value of trade brought with it important results. The posses- sion of strong navies became necessary for the work of colonial expansion and the development of commerce ; and already, in the later years of the seventeenth century, the fleets of Holland, England, and France had been engaged in a brill- The Begiufting of the Eighteenth Century 5 iant rivalry, not only in European waters, but in the distant American and Indian seas. By the beginning of the eigh- teenth century Holland had dropped out of the race, but the struggle was continued between England and the navies of France and Spain. Already the contests for supremacy in America and India had begun, and it was not till the century was more than half over that it was decided that England, not France, should be supreme in India, and that the Teutonic and not the Latin element was to control the destinies and development of North America. This growth of the commer- cial and colonial interests of European states brought with it the increased importance, more particularly in -, France, in England, and in western Germany, of the Middle the middle class. The eighteenth century was the age of great civilians — the age of Walpole and of Pitt, of Alberoni and of Turgot. Wherever trade developed, the con- dition of the agricultural classes improved, and an indepen- dent, wealthy, and intelligent middle class grew up, which supplied to the various countries many admirable financiers, administrators, and soldiers. The increased interest taken in commerce tended to break down barriers between nations, and Europe became more united. Insulation was, insulation indeed, impossible when Spain had an Itahan gov- impossible, emment, England a German, Italy an Austrian, Russia every- thing but a Russian government. T^^the eighteenth century was the 3.ge of political adventur^^^ evident from a very cursory acquaintance with the histoPr of the various states. Scepticism increased, and the religious sentiment was weakened. Bossuet and Pascal were succeeded by Voltaire and Diderot ; and the influence of Catholicism steadily declined. These characteristics of the European history in the eigh- teenth century which have been briefly touched upon do not form a pleasant picture. Territorial aggrandisement was the principal object of the greater Powers, and any means were considered justifiable in order to secure their aims. Diplomacy, which had taken the place of religion ^6 European History, i^i^-iySg in the councils of Europe, was unscrupulous ; while the secret diplo7nacy of the middle of the eighteenth century marks the lowest depths arrived at in the history of the relations of Euro- pean states to each other. -' Two principal facts sum up in themselves the character of the period : — The War of the Austrian Succession, and the Partition of Poland. The one showed the amount of faith which could be put iij the solemn engagements of European Powers, the other illustrated the amount of respect which states, if weak, could expect from their stronger neighbours. When Napoleon overran and conquered the greater part of Europe, he was merely carrying out fully and successfully the policy pursued by the great European Powers before 1789. In this respect Napoleon belongs to the same category as Frederick the Great, Catherine 11., and Joseph 11., and may be classed with the despots of the eighteenth century. As the century advanced, it became evident that the over- throw of the old European system was at hand. The middle The Euro- classcs, richer and better educated than before, felt peanRevoiu- thcmselvcs to be fit for the exercise of political out in functions which the theory of benevolent despotism France. denied them. The people who provided from their own ranks the soldiers who were the instruments of the royal tyranny, were driven to desperation by feudal exaction and social privilege. On ^4ke^ other hand, monarchy had lost its dignity and leadership, .Ae nobiUty was extravagant, the Church corrupt, poHticians unblwshingly selfish. The old props of society were giving way. A catastrophe was inevitable. But from what quarter the first shock of the earthquake would make itself felt no one could say. What then were the causes of the revolution which burst out almost simultaneously in Belgium, Poland, and France, and' The Causes found the rest of Europe in a condition of weak-' of the Revo- j^^^g ^^^ collapsc ? The answer to the question' lutionary ^ ^ Epoch. may partly be found in the political condition of Europe as settled by the terms of the Treaties of Utrecht and' TJie Beginning of the Eighteenth Century 7 Nystad, partly in the struggle between England and France for colonial supremacy. While the Treaty of Utrecht introduced the principle of partition, intensified the colonial rivalry between England and France in North America, and opened an unappeasable con- troversy by assigning Belgium to Austria on conditions intoler- able to the Hapsburg House, the Treaty of Xystad (17 21) marks the definite beginning of the prodigious growth of Russia, which henceforward took advantage of the weakness of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey to advance her boundaries, and to enter into the politics of Europe. A revolution was thus being effected in north-eastern Europe of unexampled magnitude and importance. The rise of Prussia, apparent to Europe from 1740, constituted a no less startling revolution. And the union of the Bourbon Powers in the west found after 1763 that it had to reckon with a no less powerful league in the north-east of Europe. Till 1789 England and France struggled for colonial empire and for supremacv in '1 -r T . • 1-1 1 Summary. India : Austria never ceased in her endeavours to exchange the Netherlands for Bavaria, and Russia and Prussia advanced rapidly to take their place with Austria and France as leading European Powers. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, with the Barrier Treaty of 17 15, registered and sanctioned accompHshed facts, and completed the settlement of the affairs ^^ ^ , ' ^ The Settle- of Europe. Though France retained part of her ment of 1713 conquests, great care was taken to check her ^""^ ^^^'*' power of aggression. With the grouping together of states under fresh conditions new problems arose, which found their settlement in 181 5. By the Peace of Utrecht, France, though reserving Cape Breton and her share in the fisheries of the coast of Newfoundland, lost to England Acadia or Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay, and promised to dismantle Dunkirk. While she regained Lille, Aire, Bethune, and Saint- Venant, she agreed to the cession of the Spanish Netherlands to Austria, and to the establishment of a barrier 8 European History ^ 171 5-1789 on the Belgian frontier. She further undertook to restore Savoy and Nice to Victor Amadeus of Savoy, acquiesced in the arrangement by which that astute duke, reserving his rights to the Spanish Crown, received Sicily with the title of king ; recognised the royal title of Frederick William of Prussia, and his rights over Neufchatel ; and, while retaining her claims on Orange, restored Upper Guelderland to Prussia. Spain at the same time made treaties with England, Savoy, and Holland. To the former she yielded Gibraltar and Minorca, and by the Assiento agreement she granted the right of importing for thirty years into South America 4000 negroes, and of sending a ship annually to the fair of Porto Bello. With regard to Savoy and Holland the terms of the treaties arranged by France were simply repeated. It was not till the next year that peace between France and Austria was concluded at Rastadt, followed by a treaty between the Empire and France at Baden. By the Treaty of Rastadt (March 6, 17 14) France agreed that Austria should possess Naples, Sardinia, the Tuscan ports (Piombino, Porto Ercole, Porto San Stefano, Orbitello, Telamoile, and Porto ftongone in Elba) , and Milan. Further, while recognising the ninth electorate of Hanover, she secured the restoration of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne to their respective territories and rights. In September of the same year at Baden, the Empire accepted the status quo ante beilum, and the condition of things as established at the Peace of Ryswick. France retained Alsace and Strasburg, and restored the places held by her on the right bank of the Rhine. In November the Barrier Treaty (17 15) carried out the arrange- ments agreed to between the great Powers. The United Provinces handed over the Spanish Netherlands to Charles vi., and it was definitely settled that Namur, Tournai, Menin, Furnes, Warneton, Ypres, and the Fort of Knocque, were to be garrisoned by the Dutch, while Dendermonde was to be held by a mixed garrison of Dutch and Austrians. It was further laid down that no part of the Spanish Netherlands was ever to be ceded to France. TJie Begiimijig of the Eighteenth Century 9 This settlement of Utrecht, though it closed a period of wars, opened new controversies and led to fresh complications. It was impossible that a settlement of the magnitude of that carried out at Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, leading as it did to the reconstruction of the map of Europe, could be effected without leaving behind it many heart-burnings, and much irri- tation and discontent. Spain never acquiesced in the Austrian predominance in Italy, and never rested till the arrangements made at Utrecht were overthrown ; Philip, moreover, had no intention of adhering to his renunciation of the French throne, and only awaited a favourable opportunity for assert- ing his claim. The Hapsburgs regarded the conditions on which the Spanish Netherlands had been assigned to them as intolerable, and, after vain attempts to modify those con- ditions, endeavoured with great persistency to exchange Belgium for Bavaria. France, though compelled to give England a foothold in Canada, was resolved to contest her supremacy in North America, and a struggle ensued which resulted in 1763 in the loss of the French possessions on the American Continent. Nor were the Dutch satisfied with the Barrier Treaty, and they felt indignant at the position held by Austria, and at the con- duct of England. Though Europe was too exhausted in 17 15 to embark upon another general war, it was evident that the renewal of hostilities could only be averted by wise counsels and a firm attitude on the part of the leading powers. The fixed resolve of various states to get rid of the restraints im- posed and the terms laid down at Utrecht, together with the rise of the Russian monarchy made apparent by the Treaty of Nystad, tended to indicate sources of future complications in the north and east, as well as in the south and west of Europe. For nearly a generation Europe was, on the whole, tranquil ; it was not till 1733 that another general war took place; it was not till the accession of Frederick the Great to the Prussian throne that a new age in European pohtics definitely began ; it was not till the end of the century that, through the 10 European History, 171 5-1 789 destruction of the European states-system, the outbursts of the militant democracy of France threatened the liberties of Europe. The necessity of peace was perhaps more vital to Germany than to any other state in Europe. Before she had recovered from the disastrous Thirty Years' War, she had Position of the leading been exposcd to the aggressions of Louis xiv. European j^^j. ^yeakness was in great measure due to internal Powers in o 1715. The divisions, themselves the result of her constitution, "^^"^^ which had been made permanent by the Peace of Westphalia. All chance of the establishment of a united monarchy had been lost at the time of the Peace of Westphalia, and the Empire, finally dismembered, had become a nominal federation of independent princes. Germany was divided into some three hundred petty states, the rulers of each of which had the right not only to tax, to impose custom duties, to coin money and to debase the coinage, but also to make treaties, and to decide upon the form of religion to be professed within their respective dominions. Each prince was absolute master within his own state, and many of them were despots of the most despicable kind. The Empire had become a nominal federation of independent princes, and the victory in the long struggle between the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, between monarchy and aristocracy, rested with the centrifugal principle. The German kingdom was, after 1648, a republic of princes presided over by the Emperor. Germany, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had lost all national l^eling, a degradation of manners had set in, and the dominant tone in the small states was fatal to the domestic life which, previous to the Thirty Years' War, had proved the strength of the country.^ Tyrannical oppression was almost universal in these small states, many of which were hotbeds of corruption. In 17 15 Germany presented a picture of hopeless dismemberment. 'What specially enhanced the administrative and economic 1 Sec Karl Hillebrand, Lectures on German Thought, i. and ii. The Beginnijtg of the Eighteenth Century 1 1 disadvantages of such a multiplicity of states was this ' — writes Biedermann — 'that even those territories which constituted a political whole were geographically severed, and conse- quently disunited in respect of administrative and commer- cial intercourse.' At the head of the Germanic body was the Emperor, who represented the executive, and who lived at Vienna.^ His power since 1648 had become purely nominal, and though the prestige of the Imperial title still carried some weight, the Austrian instincts of the Emperors had tended to render their position in the Empire a purely ornamental one. At Ratisbon sat the Diet which wielded the legislative power. The Diet was composed of three Colleges : that of the Electors, that of the Princes, and that of the Imperial towns. The College of Electors was presided over by the Archbishop of Mainz, who, with the Archbishops of Treves and Cologne, formed the ecclesiastical elements in the College ; while the five lay Electors included the Elec- tors of Hanover, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Saxony, and either Bavaria or the Palatinate. The College of Princes consisted of 36 ecclesiastical, and 64 lay members ; and the third Col- lege consisted of the representatives of 52 Imperial Free Cities. In each of the two Upper Colleges a majority was required to agree to a resolution, but any opposition on the part of the College of Free Cities could prevent the resolution from being presented to the Emperor for his assent as a Co7ichisu7n for the Empire. In the eighteenth century delegates repre- sented the members of the three Colleges, but the knights not being represented, refused to accept the decisions of the Diet, formed themselves into separate circles, and dealt directly with the Emperor. The Diet had thus no real influence, and be- yond declaring war had no means of making its power felt. It had become merely an assembly of envoys from the states, and their action carried little weight. The Imperial Chamber, or Tribunal, sat at Wetzlar on the Lahn ; its weakness was but a sign of the weakness of the German federation. It was ^ See Appendix C. 12 Europea7t History^ 171 5-1 789 intended to decide disputes between the German sovereigns, but only very trifling cases were laid before it, and it was powerless to prevent all important matters being settled by arms. Moreover, it possessed no effective force or machinery to carry out any decision at which it might arrive. The Impe- rial administration still existed, and Germany was divided into ten circles which formed units, in the military, judicial, and financial organisation. On them, moreover, devolved the duty of carrying out the decisions of the Emperor. These circles did not correspond to any political divisions, and often the states of the same sovereign were distributed through different circles. The Imperial army was itself formed from contingents sent by the circles, but was absolutely useless and inefficient. * Not only each regiment but each company was formed of the contingent of several states, and each kept its own uniform and armament. There were states whose entire contingent consisted of two men equipped at their own expense, but also in their own fashion.' The Imperial mihtary system was a failure, and Germany was still powerless to defend itself from attacks. In addition, Germany was rent by relig- ious divisions. Each prince, since the Peace of Westphalia, was supreme in his own dominion in religion no less than in political matters ; and religious dissensions, so far from being settled in 1648, had been perpetuated, destroyed all chance of unity in Germany, and paralysed all attempts to place the Empire in a condition suitable for offence or defence. The elab- orate federative system had proved a failure. All sense of Ger- man unity was lost ; the French had taken Strasburg and Alsace ; they were about to take Lorraine. The Imperial army could not defend Germany from attack, nor could the Imperial forces put down internal disorder. The Seven Years' War exemplified the weakness of the Germanic body, the utter decay of the Holy Roman Empire, and the general confusion prevalent among all the Imperial institutions. The only chance of arriving at a better state of things lay in the rise from among the numerous German potentates of a prince who could inspire The Beginning of the Eighteenth Century 13 his countrymen with that desire for union which the ancient and decaying system had failed to supply. National unity and national policy having disappeared from Germany as a whole, the smaller princes tended for purposes of defence to group themselves round Austria or Prussia. Of the German states, Austria held the foremost place. Since the accession of Albert 11. in 1437 the Hapsburgs had held the Imperial dignity. Vienna was conse- Dk list ri 3. quently not merely the chief town of the Austrian dominions :_ it was also the capital of the Empire. Strengthened by all the eclat which belonged to the Imperial position, the Emperors of the House of Austria had used their power for the benefit of their own dominions, and for the curtailment of the rights of the Empire. They had estabhshed at Vienna an Aulic Council — a purely Austrian creation — which not un- frequently trenched upon the prerogatives of the Imperial Chamber ; but they had failed in their endeavour to crush out Protestantism, and to impose a strict despotism upon the whole of Germany. Since the Peace of Westphalia the tendency of the Emperors was more and more to neglect Imperial for purely Austrian interests. Charles vi. might have recovered Alsace and Stras- burg for the Empire during the Spanish Succession War, but his anxiety to increase his own Italian possessions, to secure Sicily as well as Naples, led him to refuse to make peace at Utrecht, with the result that Alsace and Strasburg remained in French hands till 1870. Again, in 1735 Charles, in order to gain Tuscany as compensation for the loss of Naples, gave up Lor- raine without even consulting the Empire. Always jealous of any attempt to curtail their privileges, the German princes had, during the seventeenth century, looked to France to protect them, until the reunion policy of Louis xrv., the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the devastation of the Palatinate, had forced them to rally round the Emperor. But Joseph i.'s employment of the ban of the Empire against the Electors of Cologne and Bavaria, his occupation of their territories — foreshadowing the 14 European History, 171 5-1 789 policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph 11. — and his annexations in Italy, had again roused their alarm. On Joseph's death his successor, Charles vi., was compelled to agree to the perpetual capitulation by which the powers of the Emperor were still further curtailed, and the privileges and rights of the princes still further safeguarded. In spite, however, of the perpetual capitulation, in spite of the growing influence of several of the princes, in spite of the fact that the Electors of Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony had become kings, in spite of the suspicious, if not menacing, attitude of Bavaria, Austria held a very influential position in Western Christendom. Her connection with Germany was very intimate owing to the pos- session by her rulers of the Imperial sceptre, and to the fact that, by reason of her territories in the Netherlands and in Swabia, she was regarded as the shield and defender of the Empire against France. As long, too, as there was a steady Catholic majority in the Diet, Austria's predominance in Ger- many was secure. The rulers of the House of Hapsburg indeed occupied a unique position in Europe.^ In addition to Austria proper they had acquired Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Gorz, and the Tyrol. They held Bohemia with its dependent provinces of Moravia, Silesia, and Lausitz ; and in 171 1, at the Peace of Szathmar, they finally secured Hungary, Croatia, and Transyl- vania. By the Treaty of Utrecht they had obtained a con- siderable addition to their possessions in Italy, which now included Naples, Sardinia, the Tuscan ports, and most of Lombardy — i.e. the Duchy of Mantua, and part of, the Duchy of Milan ; they had also received the Spanish Netherlands. Their territories in Swabia and the Breisgau had belonged to their house for several centuries. The history of the Haps- burgs in the second half of the seventeenth century clearly demonstrated that the true policy of Austria was, by taking advantage of the weakness of Turkey, to extend and develop in the direction of Constantinople, and to strengthen its hold 1 See Appendix A. The Begin7iing of the Eighteenth Centiuy 15 upon southern Germany. In 1715 Charles vi. was not only Emperor ; he was also King of Bohemia and Hungary, and Archduke of Austria. The government of his dominions, which contained many different nationahties — Belgians, Itahans, Ger- mans, Czechs, Magyars, and various branches of the Slav family — taxed all the resources and abilities of the ablest of the Hapsburg rulers. There was no natural centre, many of the territories were scattered and isolated, and the Austrian Nether- lands was little more than a continental colony. It was im- possible to form thus scattered populations into one centralised state : it was equally difficult to group them into a federation.^ Prussia consisted of several states almost more divided than the hereditary provinces of Charles vi. In the west, Frederick William i. possessed Cleves, IMark, and Ravensburg ; in the east Prussia, united to the Electorate in 1618 ; and in the centre the Electorate of Brandenburg, com- posed of the Kur-Mark and the Neu-Mark. To these dominions of the kings of Prussia, Farther Pomerania, Halberstadt, and Minden had been added in 1648, ^Magdeburg in 1680, and Guelders in 1713. To unite these scattered possessions was the consistent aim of Prussian monarchs during the century. Between Brandenburg and Cleves lay Hanover. Poland thrust herself between Brandenburg and Prussia, while in the north the occupation by Sweden of the greater part of Pomerania was a constant menace and source of irritation. To increase their dominions Rhinewards by securing Jiilich and Berg, to drive the Swedes from Pomerania, and to unite Brandenburg and Prussia at the expense of Poland, became the natural objects of the Prussian rulers.- Consolidation, centralisation, and expansion express the re- sults of the long reigns of Frederick WilUam i. and of his successor, the great Frederick. In this work Frederick WiUiam played a most important part, and he succeeded in founding a centralised and administrative system, which, to a great extent, lasted till the Peace of Tilsit. Prussia, in spite 1 See Appendix A. '^ See Appendix B. 1 6 European History^ 171 5-1 789 of the geographical difficulties, became gradually united, gained a strength which Austria never acquired, and, after the Seven Years' War, was recognised as the rival of Austria, and her equal in power. This extraordinary development of a small German electorate into a prominent European kingdom /was due, in the first place, to the fact that Prussia was regarded C^as the leader of the Protestant states in Germany ; in the second place, to the formation of the magnificent Prussian army ; and thirdly, to the growth of a national feeling itself inspired by Prussian victories. ' The two springs round which the new life in Germany gathered and grew up were the * ..Russian State and the Protestant religion.' Frederick the Great succeeded in arousing all that makes a nation proud of itself: heroism, a national spirit, and a love of rehgious liberty ; and consequently Prussia became in time the recognised representative of the German race. From 1715 to 1740, in anticipation of a struggle which Prince Eugene had foreseen, the relations of Prussia and Austria became more and more strained; from 1740 to 1763 the Austrian supremacy in Ger- many was definitely challenged, and on the conclusion of the Seven Years' War Prussia was recognised as the equal of Austria, and as the defender of the liberties of the German states against the encroachments of the Hapsburg House. Bavaria was ruled by a branch of the House of Wittelsbach, and its Duke had, during the Spanish Succession War, supported the French cause. In February 1714 a close aUiance had been formed between France and Bavaria, France undertaking to support the Elector in his claims on the Hapsburg possessions, and, if occasion required, on the eventual succession to the Empire. In March of the same year France forced the Emperor at the Peace of Rastadt to restore the Elector to his dominions, from which he had been expelled after the battle of Blenheim. The relations between the Hapsburgs and Bavaria had never been cordial. Even during the Thirty Years' War, when the Elector fought on the side of the Emperor, he fought mainly for his own The Begitmijig of the Eighteenth Century \y hand. For a long period his successor wavered between allegiance to the Emperor and alliance with Lx)uis xrv. At last, at the beginning of the Spanish Succession War, he definitely threw himself on the side of Louis xrv., and Bavaria remained aUied to France till success attended the policy of both Elector and King, and Charles Albert became Emperor in 1742 as Charles vii. He had always refused to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, asserting that his marriage with a niece of Charles vi. gave him, with the Elector of Saxony, a claim upon the Austrian inheritance. The Lower Palatinate, the capital of which was Heidelberg, belonged to the elder branch of the Wittelsbachs, and the Elector had received back part of his territory at The Paiati- the Treaty of Westphaha. On the extinction of the "**^- reigning branch Louis xiv. had claimed the Lower Palatinate on behalf of his daughter-in-law, the Duchess of Orleans. Event- ually, in 1702, the matter was settled by arbitration, and the Elector, John William, paid 300,000 crowns to the Duchess. On the conclusion of the Treaty of Rastadt he was compelled to give up the Upper Palatinate, which had been handed over to him in 1708, when Bavaria was put to the ban of the Empire. After Louis xiv.'s death Charles Phihp, the Elector Palatine, wavered between France and Austria. Irritated at some remonstrances which Charles vi. made in consequence of his persecutions of the Protestants in his territory, Charles Phihp drew closer to the Elector of Bavaria, and, in 1724, formed a sort of Family Compact with him, an arrangement favoured by France. In 1726, in order to secure his alliance, the Emperor guaranteed the succession to Berg and Jiilich to the Sulzbach branch, the presumptive heirs to the Lower Pa- latinate, while almost simultaneously he made similar promises to Prussia. The Emperor's duphcity so alienated the Elector that, in 1732, he refused to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanc- tion ; during the Polish Succession War he remained neutral, and on his death, in 1 743, he was succeeded by Charles Theo- dore of Sulzbach, who definitely accepted the French alliance. PERIOD VI. B 1 8 European History ^ 171 5-1789 Hanover, a Protestant state, which had at first come into prominence through its erection into an Electorate, and later through its Elector having become King of Eng- land, was closely connected with Austria, to whom it had given pledges on being raised to the electoral dignity. But though supporting Maria Theresa in the Austrian Succes- sion War, George 11. viewed the position of affairs in Germany from the point of view of a German prince, and was not averse to the coronation of Charles vii. (of Bavaria) as Emperor. On the other hand, though allied to Prussia by marriage and by religious sympathies, the relations of both George i. and George 11. with the Prussian kings were seldom friendly. It was not till the Seven Years' War that the exigencies of the political situation compelled George 11. and Frederick the Great to form a close alliance. Saxony owed much of its importance to its close connection with Poland. Augustus 11., Elector of Saxony, was also the elected King of Poland. His son, afterwards ' Augustus III., married Maria Josepha, daughter of the Emperor Joseph i., and in spite of her renunciations raised a claim on the death of Charles vi. to part of the Austrian inheritance. The connection of Saxony and Poland brought the Elector into great European prominence. For centuries Poland had maintained an anarchical government in the centre of monarchical Europe. Its constitution, though nominally monarchical, was in reality republican. Its kings were elected, and were obliged to accept a contract styled Pacta Convefita, the provisions of which they swore to observe. They presided at the National Assembly, and if they wished they could lead the army. The Senate, which was the real executive, was practically free from the control of the king, but was carefully supervised by the Diet. This body, which formerly had included the whole adult nobility, was now com- posed of 400 deputies, elected by the provincial assemblies, and given full instructions as to their line of conduct at the The Beginning of the Eighteenth Century 19 Diet. Every resolution of the Diet had to be unanimous, and, consequently, a single deputy could by his veto stop all busi- ness. When the state machinery was seriously interfered with by the exercise of the veto, or by obstruction, recourse was had to a ' Confederation,' an extraordinary assembly in which the veto was not allowed. Thus the Polish constitution with its liberiun veto^ its right of private confederation, and its Pacta Conventa, was little more than anarchy indifferently organised. The king had practically no power amid the strife of parties and the struggles of factions. During the eighteenth century Poland attracted the attention of Europe, just as Spain had been the centre of interest during the latter half of the seventeenth century. The question of the partition of the Spanish Empire had occupied the minds of the sovereigns of Christendom during Louis xiv.'s long reign ; the question of the partition of Poland was destined, even early in the eighteenth century, to be of vital interest and importance to the greater part of Europe. A kingdom in area larger than France, whose people were all soldiers, and which was placed in the centre of Europe, between Prussia, Austria, and Russia, was certain to become the centre of rivalry between these three Powers, a rivalry complicated by the interest always taken by France in Polish affairs. The Polish Succession War, the dip- lomatic struggle which raged in Poland during the years imme- diately preceding the Seven Years' War, and the history of the East of Europe, from 1764 to 1774, bring out clearly the inherent defects of the Polish constitution, and the recognition by Europe of the importance of Poland, as well as the designs of Russia upon her independence, and the inabiUty of France to carry into effect her extravagant pretensions. In Italy Austrian interests were of vast importance. The Treaty of Utrecht had temporarily destroyed French and Span- ish influence in the Peninsula. Naples, Sardinia, the Milanese, Mantua, and the Tuscan Presidencies were given to Austria. The House of Savoy, now firmly estab- hshed in Piedmont, and in possession of Sicily, was Italy's one 20 European History^ 1715-1789 hope. The House of Savoy was to Italy what the Electors of Brandenberg were to Germany. It only required time for the Milanese to be absorbed by that astute House — like an arti- choke, leaf by leaf. Northern Italy was, in 17 15, divided be- tween Savoy, Austria, Venice, and the republic of Genoa. In the centre were Modena ruled by the Estes, Tuscany ruled by the Medici, Parma and Piacenza ruled by the Farnese, the Tuscan Presidencies in the hands of Austria, the Papal domin- ions and the republic of Lucca. In the south, Austria held Naples, and Savoy held Sicily for a few years. Spain, though ousted for the moment, was only watching for an opportunity of restoring her influence in the Italian Peninsula. To the astonishment of Europe, Spain, so far from accepting defeat and allowing herself to be numbered with Portugal, Spain and Venice, and indeed Holland, showed unexpected Portugal. vitality, and prepared with renewed vigour to take her place among the leading European nations. Th^ loss of her outlying possessions in Italy, and of the Spanish Nether- lands, was in reality a gain to Spain. The expenses connected with these possessions had been enormous, and men and money were frequently wasted in defending them. The establishment of Philip V. upon the throne had been followed by many neces- sary reforms, carried out by means of foreign statesmen, who for some seventy years play an important part in the regenera- tion of Spain. French ideas and methods of administration were introduced, the obsolete policy of the Hapsburg line was thrown to the winds, the government became more centralised and better organised, obstacles to free trade between the vari- ous provinces were removed, the army was reorganised on the French model, and even the privileges of the clergy were viewed with jealousy and suspicion. Of the ministers under whose guidance Spanish regeneration was attempted, Alberoni was an Italian, Ripperda came from Holland, Patifio's family, though of Spanish origin, had long been settled in Milan, while Squillacci, the Finance Minister during the early years of Charles iii.'s reign, was an Italian. The Beginning of the Eighteenth Century 21 From 1 7 13, too, the relations between Spain and France tend towards a distinct improvement. As long as Spain held the Netherlands a constant source of friction existed. France since the days of Philip Valois has aimed at expansion on the side of Flanders, and during the latter half of the seventeenth century Louis xiv. had made consistent attempts to extend the French frontier to the Rhine and the Scheldt. From 1713 the Netherlands ceased to be a bone of contention between Spain and France, The Spanish power was rendered more compact by the loss of Flanders, one great obstacle to close and friendly relations with France was removed, and another step taken towards the estabhshment of a state of things summed up in the famous sentence, ' Henceforth there are no Pyrenees.' As soon as the dynastic rivalry between the House of Orleans, and the Spanish Bourbons ceased, Spain and France having no colonial rivalries and no jarring interests in Europe to separate, ^eiii, naturally tended to draw together and to oppose the aggressive policy of England in the colonies as well as her maritime supremacy. The years between 17 13 and 1733 are " those in which friendly relations between Spain and France are at times interrupted by the dynastic ambitions of Philip v. and the impatience of Elizabeth Farnese, but from 1733 the neces- sity of a union between Spain and France was gradually realised by French and Spanish statesmen. Between Spain and Portugal hostilities had ceased in 1713 ; and the latter country, under John v., remained at peace and under English protection for many years, during which her army, navy, and administration decayed. It was not till the accession of Joseph i. in 1750 that Portugal, owing to the abil- ity and energy of Pombal, awoke from its lethargy and entered upon one of the most flourishing periods in her history. The Treaty of Utrecht brought no tranquillity to northern Europe. There the final scene in the fall of Sweden was being enacted, and it was not till 1721 that the Peace of The North Nystad pacified the north, closed one epoch, and of Europe, opened another. \\\\X\ the death of Charles xii. the Swedish 22 European History, 171 5-1789 Government passed into the hands of an oligarchy ; the rise of Prussia rendered the question of the entire loss of the Swedish possessions in Germany a mere matter of time ; and the rise of Russia substituted for Sweden — henceforth a third-rate Power — a Slav state which has produced a succession of rulers as able as those of the Vasa dynasty, and has resources and possi- bihties of expansion and development on all sides denied to the Scandinavian kingdom. Under Peter the Great, who had become Tsar in 1682, Russia had made enormous strides in civilisation. Her domes- tic policy and institutions had been revolutionised. St. Peters- burg took the place of Moscow, western ideas and habits had been introduced, the power of the nobles curbed, and the Church and army, now trained in the European model under foreign officers, brought definitely under the control of the Tsar. The firm establishment of his despotic rule at home was coin- cident with an equally marked revolution in foreign policy. Peter saw with clearness that for the development of Russia into a commercial nation the first essential was to obtain a foot- ing upon the Baltic and Black Seas. As time went on he became no less anxious to extend the frontiers of Russia at the expense of Poland. In 1 709, at the battle of Poltava, Sweden's efforts for a cen- tury to obtain permanent mastery over the Baltic ended in fail- ure, and the work of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles x. was undone. After eleven years, mainly occupied in Charles xii.'s fruitless struggles, the Treaty of Nystad recognised the substi- tution of Russia for Sweden as the leading Power in the Baltic and the north of Europe. Against the Turks Peter the Great was not so successful. In 1696 the capture of Azov marked the entrance of Russia into The Eastern the poHtics of south-eastem Europe ; and with Question. '^^ simultaneous extension of the Russian and Austrian possessions at the expense of Turkey by the Treaty of Carlowitz, in 1699, eastern politics entered upon a new phase. The further expansion of Russia southwards was temporarily The Begin7ii7ig of the Eighteenth Century 23 checked by the capitulation of the Pnith in 1711, but hence- fonvard Russia and Turkey stand face to face. As the cen- tury proceeds, the steady decline of Turkey brings forward new questions and raises serious complications. While Russia en- deavours to establish herself on the Black Sea, Austria simulta- neously attempts to push her way down the Danube. These movements, together with the united action of the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna, during the greater part of the cen- tury, in south-eastern Europe, rouse the alarm of France. From Dubois to Vergennes French statesmen are forced to realise the significance of the new developments, and to consider the ad- visability of opposing them by vigorous action in conjunction with Turkev. or of aidinsr them bv a Russian alliance. The Treaty of Kainardji, in 1774, marks the beginning of a new period in the Eastern Question. The objects of Russia were openly avowed, and ten years later England became alive to the aims of Russian ambition, and apprehensive of the results of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Europe was hence- forward compelled to interest itself in the Eastern Question, and to endeavour to decide whether the continued presence of the Turks in Europe was a lesser evil than the aggrandisement of Russia. The history of northern, eastern, and south-eastern Europe is thus of vast importance during the eighteenth century, and the \dcissitudes of the various nations inhabiting these portions of Europe have far-reaching effects upon the balance of power. The decHne of Turkey, Poland, and Sweden — countries which had played considerable parts in the seventeenth century — gave an opportunity for the rise of younger nations with greater natural advantages, or provided with a form of govern- ment more suitable for an age which was characterised by the growth of large states and the establishment of so-called benev- olent despotisms. The rise of Russia constitutes, with that of Prussia, one of the most remarkable features of the history of northern and eastern Europe in the eighteenth century. In 1721, at the 24 European History, 17 15-1789 Peace of Nystad, she became the leading Baltic power, and a standing menace to the independence of Sweden ; with the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), ^^^ ^^^ campaign of the Pruth in 1 71 1, the Eastern Question may be said to have been opened ; with the outbreak of the Polish Succession War in 1733 the idea of a partition of Poland begins to take definite shape. _ J ^ In December 171s Charles xii. returned to Sweden and ' -^ France in ^Stockholm after an absence of sixteen years, and ^^^^' the final struggle between Sweden and the North- ern League, of which Russia was a leading member, seriously began. The year 1715 found France at peace with her neighbours, but torn by religious divisions and with her provinces perma- nently impoverished. The Treaty of Utrecht had left her with her frontiers strengthened and her position secure. She had brought the art of war to a high pitch of perfection, and her diplomatic service was the best in Europe. She had dissevered the Empire from Spain ; she had advanced her own boundaries, and still held Strasburg and Alsace. She had placed her own candidate on the Spanish throne, and she had emerged from the late war with her reputation still high and her aUiance still courted. Though probably incapable of successful colonisa- tion, and torn by internal divisions, France could boast of a unity and a concentration of resources which enabled her, till the close of the Seven Years' War, to exercise very great influ- ence in Europe, and at times to inspire alarm by her apparently successful efforts in the direction of universal empire. CHAPTER II ALBERONI AND DUBOIS 1715-1723 The Regency — The Regent Orleans — The Religious Controversy — The Re- action in Home Affairs — The Parlement oi Paris — The Struggle between the Jesuits and Jansenists — Law and the Finances — His Economic Views — The Mississippi Scheme — Close of the Reaction in Home Affairs — Dubois and French Foreign Policy — Charles vi, and Spain — Alberoni's Reforms — His Foreign Policy — George I. — Hanover — The Treaty of Westminster and The Triple Alliance — George l.'s Policy — Dubois at The Hague and in Hanover — The Northern War — The Triple AlHance — The Invasion of Sardinia — Its Justification — Triumph of Dubois — Alberoni's Difficulties — The Quadruple Alliance — Fall of Alberoni — Spain joins the Quadruple Alliance — Marriage Alliances between France and Spain — Charles XII. and his Foes — Peter the Great and the League — His Visit to Paris — The Conference of Aland — Death of Charles xii. — Revolution in Sweden — Treaties between Sweden and the Members of the League — The Treat}' of Xystad — Success of the Policy of Stanhope and Dubois — Alberoni, Goertz, and Dubois. The death of Louis xiv. was an event of importance to Europe no less than to France. Louis xv. was not expected to Hve, and in consequence the relations of The France and Spain were at once modified. Philip v. Regency, was set upon securing the French crown, and regarded Orleans with unconcealed dislike. But Spain was far from ready to take any hostile action, and Orleans was left to carry on the government of France on principles diametrically opposed to those adopted by Louis xr'. France had emerged from the Spanish Succession War exhausted but intact. The great need of the country was peace, and a change in the character of the 26 European History, 171 5-1 789 governmental system was earnestly desired. The Regency of Orleans endeavoured to satisfy the country on both these points. The nephew of Louis xiv. and first prince of the blood, PhiHp, Duke of Orleans, had been a prominent factor in French poHtics during the Spanish Succession War. He had been accused of poisoning the Dukes of Burgundy, Berry, and Brittany, and of aiming at the Spanish throne. Louis xiv. disliked him ; and though he had shown bravery and ability as a general during the late war, with the French nation he was never popular. At the beginning of 1715 Louis had signed a will making Orleans regent, but giving the real power to a Council of Regency composed of fifteen supporters of the old regime, including Maine, Toulouse, Villeroy, Voysin, Tallard, and Pontchartrain. To the Duke of Maine, son of Madame de Montespan, was given the guardianship of the Dauphin, with the charge of the Maison du Roi, or royal guards ; to Villeroy was intrusted the execution of the arrangements. The history of the attempts of Henry iv. and Louis xiii. to bind their suc- cessors might have warned Louis xiv. that his efforts would be futile. The whole country since the close of the war had impatiently desired a complete change from the ideas of the later years of Louis xiv.'s reign ; and Orleans found himself the centre of the aspirations of a generation weary of the narrowness and rigidity of a court dominated by Jesuits, and ready to make the Regency as notorious as the EngUsh restoration of 1660 by the wild excesses which marked its estabHshment. Two days after the death of Louis xiv. the Parlemenf of Paris revoked the king's will and declared Orleans Regent with full powers. Freed from the restraint which Louis had en- deavoured to impose upon his actions, Orleans at once recast the government and formed an administration on aristocratic lines. He nominated the members of the Regency Council, who were, in addition to himself, the Dukes of Bourbon and Maine, the Count of Toulouse, Chancellor d'Aguesseau, Saint- Simon, the Marshals Villeroy, Harcourt, and Bezons, and the Alberofii and Dubois 2^ Bishop of Troyes ; and following the principles ascribed to Fenelon and the late Duke of Burgundy, he appointed, with the full approval of Saint-Simon, seven Councils : Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, the Navy, Conscience, Commerce, and Home Affairs — each composed of ten persons mainly selected from the ranks of the noblesse. In other respects ^^ „ ^ . The Regent. Orleans showed himself equally willing and anxious to shake himself clear from the traditions of the late regime. He was himself remarkably intelligent ; in the liberality of his views he belonged essentially to the eighteenth centur}' ; he was interested in the new ideas, and open to new influences; he had scientific instincts, and was especially devoted to. the study of chemistry, besides being an accomplished musician and painter. He at once broke with the principles and system of the late reign : and in considering the possibility of the recall of the Prot- estants, of the suppression of the Jesuits, and of the Convoca- tion of the States-General, he showed himself at least alive to the real needs of France. But his indolence, frivolity, and vicious life, in which he had not been checked by his tutor the Abb6 Dubois, made him indifferent to reforms for their own sake, and hindered the realisation of his well-meant projects, and he left to his successors the duty of carrying out his liberal programme. In forming an estimate of the government of the Regency, the difficulties experienced by Orleans must always be borne in mind. Till 1718 he was not a free agent. His home policy was hampered by the jealousies and intrigues of the nobles, by the quarrels of the Jesuits and Jansenists, and by the obstinacy of the Park?fie?it of Paris ; while his foreign policy was vigorously attacked by all the ministers, headed by d'Huxelles and Torcy, who were supported in France by public opinion, and elsewhere by Alberoni, the Pope, and Philip v. Not the least of the difficulties which met Orleans at the outset was to be found in the hostile relations The subsisting between the Jesuits and Jansenists. confroversy The late king had left France torn by a religious in France, conflict, which was not appeased till the outbreak of the 28 Europea7i History y 171 5-1789 Revolution. From a mistaken sense of duty, Louis xiv. had endeavoured shortly before his death to force upon France absolute uniformity in religious matters. In 1709 Port Royal, the home of the Jansenists, was de- stroyed, and in 1713 the publication of the Bull Unigenitus as- tonished and alarmed all moderate men. By this Bull a hun- dred and one propositions in a work by the Jansenist Quesnel — entitled, Moral Reflections upon the New Testament — were condemned. The volume \mtten in 1671 had been ver}^ gen- erally read, and a new edition published in 1699, and dedicated to the Cardinal de Noailles, the Archbishop of Paris, was re- garded \\ith favour by Pere la Chaise, Louis' confessor, and even received praise from Clement xi. himself. But Le Tellier deter- mined to use the book as a ground for a general attack on all who were not Jesuits. The Jesuit Society had met with reverses in China, and Le Tellier hated both De Noailles and the Jan- senists. By uniting the Pope and the society closely together in a crusade against Quesnel's book, he would be satisfying his personal feelings of hate while raising the reputation of his own Order. It was only after repeated efforts that the weak and undecided Pope could be persuaded to launch the Bull Uni- genitus — which was destined to plunge France into a struggle which had hardly died out in 1789. Forty French bishops ac- cepted the Bull, while De Noailles and fourteen others refused ; and this division of opinion was reproduced in all classes of French society, lay and ecclesiastical. Louis xiv. having with difficulty compelled the Parleynentoi Paris to register the Bull, proceeded to order the suppression not only of the Moral Reflectiotis, but of all books written in its defence. But in this matter the Grafid Monarque found that his authority was by no means accepted. Neither imprisonment nor banishm_ent could restrain the fierce opposition — the first encountered since the end of the Fronde — to all his attempts to repress discussion. The Regent, with his easy-going nature and lax principles, had no hesitation in undoing his predecessor's work, and the first half of the Re- gency saw a thorough reaction. The Court was transferred Albcroni and Dicbois 29 to Paris, the Jansenist prisoners were released, the Cardinal de Noailles, leader of the opposition to the Bull Uni- The genitus, was placed at the head of the Council of Reaction. Conscience, into which the Abbe Pucelle, a well-known Jan- senist, was introduced, and Pere le Telher was driven into exile. The recall of the Huguenots was mooted, while the sup- pression of the Jesuits, and even the summoning of the States- General, was discussed in the secret councils of the Regent. The finances were taken in hand ; literature, freed from the numbing influence of the last reign, showed signs of revival ; it seemed as if an honest attempt was to be made to grapple with the difficulties of the situation as left by Louis xiv. Even the Pai'lement of Paris recovered its rights of registration and remonstrance.^ The Parle7nent of Paris, and the twelve provincial Parleinents, were law courts, and in no sense legislative or representative assemblies. They were judicial and mao^isterial ^^ *-' The bodies, High Courts of Justice, consisting of the Pariement most eminent lawyers nominated by the Crown. ° Pans. Of these the Farlemefit of Paris was the most important, its members holding their offices, which were hereditary, by pur- chase. In addition to its judicial duties the Parkme?it of Paris claimed the right to exercise two functions of a political nature — the right of remonstrating against the edicts of the king, and the power of veto upon legislation. In ordinary times a royal edict was sent to the Farleme?tt, as being the highest court of the realm for registration ; but the Farkmefif, not content with merely performing its duty, claimed the right of withholding or delaying its sanction. The French kings had never acquiesced in this claim, and at times annihilated the power of the Pariement by holding a Lit de Justice and enforc- ing registration. During the greater part of Louis xiv.'s reign the Pariement was confined entirely to its judicial functions ; but with the accession of Louis xv. it at once regained its full ^ See Aubertin, V Esprit Public an XVIII"^^ Siecle ; and Rocquain, V Esprit RevolutioJinaire avant la Revolution. 30 Europea7i History, 171 5-1789 authority. Composed for the most part of men who belonged to the richest famihes in France, the members of the Parle- ment were enabled, owing to the permanent and hereditary character of their posts, to adopt a bold attitude, to act inde- pendently of the royal power. With the growth of industry and commerce the legal profession in France was growing in importance ; and as no States-General was summoned, the Parkment was given an admirable opportunity of posing as the representative of public opinion in such questions as those connected with the Bull Unigenitus and the Jansenists. The Parkment wisely took up the popular cause, performed the use- ful function of giving expression to the general discontent, and throughout the century headed an open, direct, and serious opposition to the Crown. In 1718-20, in 1729-32, in 1752-56, in 1763-71, and in 1787-88 the Parte??iefit is found stoutly contesting the policy of Louis xv. and his advisers. Some 40,000 persons were employed in the various Courts of Judi- cature which composed the Parkmefit, and formed a popula- tion distinct from the rest of the nation. Puffed up with self-importance, and renowned for its gravity, its severity, its formality, the narrowness of its views, and its pride, the Parha- mentary society stood apart from all other classes — an isolated corporation which owed its temporary popularity to adventi- tious causes. Though at times acting as a constitutional check upon misgovernment, it was equally ready to enter upon a quarrel with the Crown on a question of etiquette ; and having successfully opposed the numerous attempts at reform in the early years of Louis xvi.'s reign, met its well-deserved fate at the hands of the revolutionists. At the outset of Orleans' government, however, no signs of opposition appeared. The nobles, the Parkme/it of Paris, The struggle the Jansenists, and the Philosophers, as yet but a T*esuits and* Small body, all had reason to support the Regency Jansenists. and to look for further and important cli^nges. Into the arms of these sections, which had been regarded during the later years of Louis' reign with suspicion, Orleans Alberoni and Dubois 31 threw himself. He had not only reversed the system of his predecessors ; he had practically recognised the right of the nation to fill a vacancy to the throne in an edict which had for its primary object the exclusion of the bastard princes. He had thus deserted the old Bourbon principle that the state was the property of the king, and had advanced a novel and a popular theory. The nation as a whole had eagerly welcomed the Regency, as marking the beginning of a new era. Orleans had become the representative of the reaction, and had by his acts expressed the national sentiment. But his well-meant attempts were not destined to meet with that success which he anticipated. The nobles, for the most part unaccustomed to administrative work, occupied themselves with intriguing against the Regent. The Parlernent showed an almost less statesmanlike spirit, allowed itself to be involved in p etty r eligious and poUtical squabbles, and made no attempt to aid Orleans in his difficult task of governing France. Nor did the religious parties show more capacity or modera- tion in their conduct. Orleans had on becoming Regent imagined that religious peace could easily be restored, and made honest attempts to adopt a policy of conciliation. Though both the Jesuits and the Pope refused to hear of any compromise, their determina- tion was shaken by the action of four Jansenist Bishops who, on March 5, 1717, appealed to a general council. These Bishops, De la Broue of Mirepoix, Soanen of Seney, Colbert of MontpeUier, and Langle of Boulogne, were supported by the Faculty of Theolog}-, and their well-drawn appeal afforded a rallying point to the widespread opposition to the Bull, and brought about negotiations between the Pope and Noailles. The consistent opposition of the Pope and Jesuits to the Regent, and their connection with the Cellamare conspiracy, weighed against Dubois' desire of a Cardinalate, and his in- fluence in favour of the Jesuits. At length Orleans, wearied with the endless discussions and interminable disputes over 32 Etiropcaii History, 171 5-1789 the Bull, ordered silence upon all parties. In 1720 a tem- porary agreement was come to, Noailles ordered the accept- ance of a certain exposition of the Bull Unigenitus, and Dubois induced the Parlement of Paris to accept it. But the four Bishops, supported by the clergy and Paris, refused to accept the Bull ; and a Council of Conscience, composed of Cardinals Dubois, Rohan, Bissy, and the future Cardinal Fleury, was unable to secure adhesion to the proposed ac- commodation. Seven Bishops forwarded to the new Pope Innocent xiii. an appeal to a general Council, with the only result that the French Government, under the influence of Dubois, threw all its influence on the side of the Pope, and numbers of Jansenists were evicted or imprisoned. In endeavouring to give religious peace to the country the Pa7-lement had supported the Regent so long as his efforts were directed against the Jesuits. But as soon as he endeavoured to relieve the lot of the Protestants, Orleans found l^mself opposed by the Jansenists no less than by the Jesuits, and by the whole force of public opinion in France. His own posi- tion was, moreover, by no means unassailable ; for, owing to the suspicions directed against him during the latter years of Louis XIV. 's reign, he was far from being popular with the nation, and was even the object of hatred to many of the nobles. In the early years of his rule, however, the difficulties in the way of carrying out his enlightened views did not appear on the surface, and so long as Philip v. did not place himself at the head of the opposition Orleans was secure. During the first half of the Regency, when the reaction in both home and foreign poHcy proceeded apace, the two men Law and the ^^'^o wcrc mainly instnmiental in carrying out the Finances. changes wcre Law and Dubois. John Law was intrusted with the reorganisation of the finances, while Dubois was allowed to reverse the foreign policy of France. For the success of the schemes of both Dubois and Law the support of the Regent was indispensable, and the triumph of their viewsi Alberoiii and Dubois 33 — in the one case a short-lived one — is seen in the second half of the Regency, when the work of the first half was undone, and the reaction came to an end. Both men agreed in exclud- ing the nobles from the control of affairs, in humiliating the Parle men f, and generally in reviving the system of absolutism. The finances were, during the early years of the Regency, intrusted to the Due de Noailles, whose first measures were the depreciation of the coinage, and the revision of the float- ing debt, by means of a Commission headed by the brothers Paris. The report of this Commission led to the appointment of a Chamber of Justice, known as the Chambre Ardente, to inquire into the conduct of the farmers of taxes. This chamber did not restore the public confidence, and was dissolved in 171 7, an edict being issued to reassure the farmers of taxes in the future. Noailles' attempts to diminish expenditure and to en- force rigid economy were equally doomed to failure. Though he reduced the floating debt and the rate of interest, and was allowed to cut down the expenses of the Na^y, he found him- self unable to touch the Court expenditure. France required twenty years of peace and retrenchment under an administra- tion Hke that of Walpole. In 1 7 18 D'Argenson was given the presidency of the Finan- cial Council, but John Law was the real manager of the finances. The year 17 18 in various ways marks the close of the reac- tion ; for it was on August 26 of that year that the Pai-lement, having opposed Law's schemes, having seized the control of the finances, and having, moreover, for several months suspended the administration of justice, was punished by Or- leans, who, supported by Dubois, D'Argenson, Saint-Simon, and Bourbon, declared his intentions to the Council of Re- gency, held a Lit de Justice, and enforced the registration of an edict forbidding the magistrates to meddle with finances or v\ith the administration. It was, too, on September 24, of the same year that the Councils of the Nobles were dissolved, and the old system of a single minister for each department was restored. In 1720 the Faf'leme?it was exiled, the Jansenists, PERIOD VI. c 34 European History ^ 171 5-1789 who had never been active supporters of the Regent, were again attacked, and the Jesuits were favoured. In thus bringing to an end the reaction of the early years of the Regency John Law played an important part. In spite of His Eco- the collapse of his famous Mississippi scheme, and nomic Views, gf the Contempt which has been poured upon the financial policy of the Regency, John Law was no mere charla- tan, nor was he indeed the master of the Government. Many of the acts attributed to him were carried out in spite of his objections. Law was a firm, if not fanatical, believer in the power of credit, and he was keenly alive to the value and use of paper money. The wealth of England and Holland was in his opinion simply the result of the good credit enjoyed by both these countries ; and he saw no reason why France, with all its natural advantages, should not, by a proper use of credit, extricate herself from her financial embarrassments. He fully comprehended that credit must rest on confidence, and thaV paper money issued without proper guarantees would fail ; but in his anxiety to increase the supply of money so as to stimu- late commerce, to lower the high rate of interest, and generally to relieve the state of a large burden of its debt, he overlooked some elementary economical truths. Law was a Socialist, that is to say, he worked to place the whole direction of finance and commerce under the direction of the state. The Government was to take in hand the management of a huge national bank and of a great commercial company. By these means the state would be able not only to extinguish the national debt, but even to dispense with taxes. Law never seems to have real- ised how impossible it was for that confidence, the existence of which was absolutely necessary for the success of his scheme, to subsist under the government of the Regency. Credit must rest on confidence, which is itself a very slow-growing plant, and which amid the extravagance and corruption of Orleans' Court could not be expected to thrive. Moreover, being under the influence of the Mississippi system. Law's views on the value of a large currency were full of errors, while his belief in Alberoni and Dubois 35 the advantages to be derived from the state acting as bankers was contrary to all experience. Ignoring agriculture and man- ufactures, he looked mainly to commerce as a source of wealth, and believed that the actual exchange of commodities was far more important than the production of wealth. Many of his theories undoubtedly contained valuable truths, but the general public seized upon those points which were fallacious and Utopian, such as the scheme for paying off the national debt and for abolishing taxes. The collapse of his projects was due not so much to the existence of fallacies in his theories as to the rotten state of the French Government and to the over- confidence of the ignorant multitude. In 1 716 Law obtained leave to estabhsh a private bank in imitation of the Bank of England ; and in spite of the restric- tions imposed, it proved ver)' successful, and secured ^j^^ the patronage of the Government. In 171 7 he Mississippi was allowed to start his famous * Compagnie de ^ *'"*' I'Occident,' better known as the ]\Iississippi Company, ^^'ith its capital of two hundred thousand shares of five hundred livres each. His object was to unite all the existing trading concerns into one vast company, and to get control of the foreign markets. For a time he was enabled to carry out his aims. In 1 7 1 7 the company secured the monopoly of commerce with Louisiana, and trade in beaver skins ^^'ith Canada. In 1 7 1 8 it undertook the tobacco monopoly and absorbed the Senegal Company, while in 1 7 1 9 it bought up the East India Company. It thus gradually monopolised nearly all the trade of France. Meanwhile Law's bank, which was quite distinct from the com- pany of the west, or the Great India Company as it was at last kno^^^l, had become the state bank, which began at once to pour forth paper money, Law thinking that wealth could be increased by increasing the currency, and not realising that paper money must be redeemable. Heedless of the teaching of experience. Law proceeded to undertake the most gigantic operations. He took up the fund- ing of the national debt, and all coining, as well as the farming 36 European History ^ 17 15-1789 of the taxes. To extend the use of paper money, an edict was issued in December 17 18 ordering that, in Paris and other towns where the bank had branches, payment in silver should be limited to 600 francs, all larger sums to be paid in gold or notes. The Company, which now monopoHsed the trade of France, in order to meet the expenses incident upon buying up all the non-trading companies, issued shares which were eagerly ab- sorbed. In July 1 718 the Company bought the control of the mint for five years, and the shares doubled in value. The Government then offered to the Company — (i) extension of its privileges for fifty years; (2) the right of farming all indi- rect taxes. In return the Company lent the Government 1500 millions at 3 per cent, to pay off the funded debt. The Gov- ernment creditors were forced to take their payment in shares at the current price (the shares being ten times their original value). Though this proved beneficial to the state it was ruin- ous to private speculators. A rage for speculation followed, and the original shareholders made enormous fortunes. In 1 719 Law was the most courted man in France. But a reac- tion soon followed the speculative craze, and in the collapse which took place in 1 7 2 1 he was ruined and forced to leave the country. Thus the reaction in home affairs had not proved successful. The Councils of the Nobles had not shown any aptitude for Close of the busincss, and in 17 18 had been dissolved; the Reaction Parle?nent of Paris had rapidly fallen into disfavour in Home ^ -' Affairs. with the Regent on account of its opposition to Law, and had been exiled to Pontoise in 1720. The Jan- * senists were again persecuted, and while Dubois was able to secure the assent of the Parlejne7it of Paris to a temporary and unsatisfactory compromise, he himself definitely supported the Jesuits. In appearance the Government at the close of Orleans' regency had returned to the principles and methods of the previous reign. The Bull Unigenitus had been registered ; Albero7ti and Dubois 37 the Farlemenf of Paris had lost its right of remonstrance. The changes effected by the Regent had been superficial. Though the liberalism of the time was concentrated in Orleans, there was no element of popular hfe in the reaction. But though the reaction may at first sight be described as a * temporary oscillation from monarchy to aristocracy/ it will be found on closer examination that, in spite of its folhes, reck- lessness, and apparent retrograde tendencies in its later years, the regency of Orleans was not without valuable results. The ancient monarchical system had been shaken, and the Regent had definitely broken with the ideas of Louis xiv.'s reign. Henceforward a spirit of unrest and inquiry pervades all ranks of French society, new doctrines are openly discussed, philos- ophy becomes popular. The eight years of Orleans' ministry had opened a new world to Frenchmen.^ But though the reaction in home affairs seemed to have come to a disastrous conclusion with the collapse of Law's schemes and the disappearance of Law himself, Dubois and the Resrent could cono^ratulate himself on the !^^.^°'"^*^" '^ ° Policy of the success of his foreign policy, which, directed by Regency, the Abbe Dubois, estabhshed a new system based upon the Triple Alliance of 1717. The son of an apothecary, Dubois was born in 1656 at Brive-la-Gaillarde, and took the tonsure at the age of thirteen, being known as the Little Abbt^. In 1672 he began to study philosophy and theology in Paris, and in 1683 was appointed to assist his friend M. de Saint- Laurent in the education of the Duke of Chartres. On the death of Saint-Laurent in 1687 he became the duke's tutor, and was with him in the campaigns of the war of the League of Augsburg. In 1698 he accom- panied Tallard to London and made the acquaintance of James Stanhope. In 1701 the Duke of Chartres, having become Duke of Orleans, appointed Dubois his secretary. During the Span- ish Succession War, the Abb^ gave ample testimony of his abil- ity and trustworthiness. Once only in 1713 were his enemies ^ See Michelet, Histoire de la Regettce. 38 Europea7i History, 17 15-1789 able to secure his temporary retirement; but in 17 14, after the deaths of the Dukes of Burgundy, Brittany, and Berry, Orleans recalled him to the Palais Royal, and in 1715, on the death of Louis xiv., his influence over his former pupil was as great as ever. Hated by Saint-Simon, and regarded with the utmost jealousy, if not detestation, by the nobles, Dubois has suffered unduly at. the hands of historians. Though deficient in character, and a far from admirable example of a Catholic priest, Dubois' influence over the Regent was not necessarily bad ; he had no hand in the death of any of the royal family, he was not bought by England. Without being possessed of any special political genius, and always ready to carry out the views of his master, Philip of Orleans, Dubois remains an emi- nent Frenchman who showed a remarkable aptitude for foreign affairs. And it is beyond question that the poHcy, the success of which he aided to assure, proved of the greatest advantage to France.^ On succeeding to the supreme power, Orleans had preserved a neutral attitude during the Jacobite rising in 17 15. But he was accused in England of having connived at James Edward's attempt, he was on bad terms with the Court of Vienna, his power was threatened at home by the faction of the Duke of Maine, and he was regarded with feelings of undisguised hostility at Madrid. The success of the Whigs impelled him to seek, in conjunction with England, efficacious means to preserve the Peace of Utrecht, to prevent its terms from being rashly and hastily revised or even modified, and thus to secure his own position at the head of the French Govern- ment in the teeth of the opposition of Philip v. and his partisans within France. In 1 7 15 there seemed every possibility of a renewal of the European struggle. The Emperor had never recognised the Charles VI. title of Philip V. to the Spanish crown, and he and Spain. \^^^ formed ambitious schemes for the further extension of his territory in Italy, which he regarded as his 1 Wiessener, Le Regent, VAbbe Dubois, et les Anglais, vol. i. chap. xiv. Alberojii and Dubois 39 own by right ; he had assigned to his son the title of Prince of the Asturias ; he had estabhshed in Vienna a Spanish Council formed of Spanish exiles; at his Court the King of Spain was known as the Duke of Anjou. Though the Treaty of Utrecht had assigned him, in addition to the Low Countries, the Milanese, the Tuscan Presidencies, with Mantua, Naples, and Sardinia, he remained dissatisfied. He was furious at the recognition of Victor Amadeus 11. of Savoy as heir to the Spanish throne in default of heirs to the House of Bourbon, and he was determined to secure Sicily by giving Victor Amadeus Sardinia in exchange. He was now involved in a war with the Turks, and it was not till two years later that he was able to direct his undivided attention to his interests in the west and south. Aiberoni's To Philip V. and his queen, the death of Louis Reforms. xrV'., followed by the quiet assumption of the Regency by Orleans, came as a staggering blow to all their hopes. French influence in Madrid, already on the wane, rapidly declined ; Giudice gave way to the energetic Alberoni. Before the end of 1 715 this ambitious son of an Italian gardener, born in 1664, was given the real authority in the state. He became indepen- dent of the departmental secretaries, and was allowed to begin valuable administrative reforms. The financial department was reorganised, large reductions made, and the revenue increased. Agriculture and manufacture were encouraged ; Spanish com- merce revived ; and most of the reforms inaugurated by Orri were continued and expanded. The army was reorganised, but the greatest attention was paid to the navy, for Alberoni was convinced that Spain should be a naval and not a military power. In his belief in the value of Spain's natural resources, the Spanish minister showed remarkable acuteness. The decline of Spain was due, in his opinion, to maladministration and mismanagement caused by the growth of an oligarchical form of government, which, by the establishment of a multi- plicity of useless councils, had well-nigh ruined the empire. With the encouragement of agriculture, the foundation of 40 Europea7i History, 171 5-1 789 vigorous colonies, and the reorganisation of the Spanish marine, Alberoni might with reason look forward to a revival which should restore his adopted country to its former prosperity. Under Alberoni's administration Spain advanced with rapid strides. The population ceased to decHne, and the successful initiation of domestic reforms attested at once the vitality of Spain as well as Alberoni's capacity for government. Not only was Alberoni intrusted with the work of internal reorganisation, he was also given the direction of foreign His Foreign affairs. But throughout his short and brilliant Policy. career his plans were continually hampered by the personal predilections of Philip and his queen, to whose will he was constantly obliged to defer, since he held office only by the royal favour. Though he recognised that friend- ship with France was impossible so long as Philip persisted in aspiring to the Regency, Alberoni, during the period im- mediately following Louis xrv.'s death, avoided all hostile demonstrations against Orleans' government, and turned his attention to resisting the imperial encroachments in Italy, and to cultivating the friendship of England. In pursuing this policy he was sure of the support of Ehzabeth Farnese, whose Italian ambitions coincided with the general wish in Spain for a restoration of the Spanish influeiice in Italy. Charles vi. had already begun to negotiate secretly for the exchange of Sardinia for Sicily, and for the eventual succession to Tuscany, Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. In resisting these encroach- ments, Alberoni was no rash breaker of the Peace of Utrecht on behalf of Elizabeth's dynastic aspirations ; he was, on the contrary, taking all justifiable means to defend and preserve the settlement of Utrecht and Rastadt from the aggressive action of the Emperor. The defence of Italy against the imperial attack was a task of enormous import to the whole of Europe not less than to Spain. The Turkish war, which for the moment occupied the attention of the Imperialists, might at any time lead to the occupation of Italy by Austrian troops, on the pre- tence that the peninsula was liable to an invasion by the Porte. Alberoni and Dubois 4 1 But until the King of Sicily and the Italian princes had decided to join with Spain in defending the nascent liberties of Italy, Alberoni felt that active Spanish inten-ention was inadvisable. Not yet supreme in Madrid, he was obliged to defer to Philip's unconquerable hostility to the Regent Orieans, though he found it impossible to encourage the hopes of the king with regard to the French crown. For success in Italy, however, an alliance with either France or England was a necessity, and, supported by Elizabeth and by Phihp, who hoped to isolate Orleans, Alberoni determined to approach England and assure himself of her friendship. In December 1 7 15 a commercial treaty was concluded between the two countries, and the English were assured of the trading privi- leges granted them at Utrecht; in 1716 the Assiento Treaty was finally concluded, the close union between France and Spain, the aim of Louis xr\, was broken, and the Queen of Spain could look forward to seeing her children in ItaHan principalities. But Alberoni's hopes of a close English aUiance were destined to be disappointed. Stanhope, indeed, agreed with the Spanish minister that the encroachments of the Emperor in Italy necessitated fresh safeguards, but he trusted by means of negotiations to check the imperial aggressiveness without having recourse to arms. As a matter of fact neither England nor Holland were willing to undertake any action or to adopt an attitude hostile either to the Emperor or to the French Regent. The Hanoverian interests of George i., and his hope of permanently securing Bremen and Verden out of the northern conflagration, rendered a breach with the Emperor well-nigh impossible, while the necessity of keeping the Pretender at a distance gave fresh force to the advances already made by Dubois, and a new importance to a secret understanding already arrived at between George i. and Orleans.^ By a treaty made with Denmark on May 17, 1715, George had received Bremen and Verden, which Frederick iv. had 1 Wiessener, Le Regent, t Abbe Dubois, et les Anglais, vol. i. chap. i. 42 European History, 17 15-1789 seized. In order to obtain the imperial sanction, negotiations were opened with Charles vi., and until these negotiations Treaty of came to a satisfactory conclusion the Hanoverian wlth^^ government was more anxious for an imperial than Denmark. a French alliance. On May 25, 1716, the Treaty of Westminster was concluded between England and the Emperor for the defence of their The Causes existing possessions and of those which might be of the Treaty acquired bv mutual consent ; and in November a of West- ^ • 1 , ^ 1 1 1 T- minster, treaty was signed between England and France May, 1716; which, with the adhesion of Holland on January the the Triple ' ■^ •' Alliance, 4th, 1717, became the celebrated Triple Alliance. Jan. 4, 1717. Various circumstances had contributed to bring about this famous treaty between England and France, which established a political system directly at variance with that pursued by Louis xiv. since 1688. The English and French Governments were both threatened by rival pretenders, and both countries, exhausted by the late war, desired a period of peace. The resumption of war would interfere with trade, and, moreover, would afford the opponents of the ruling dynasties an opportunity of raising their heads. The safety of George i.'s throne depended on the expulsion of James Edward from France, while Orleans' position could only be rendered secure by decisive measures against Philip v. The Whig ministers were as much interested in the stability of Orleans in Paris as they were in the firm estabHshment of George i. on the English throne. If Philip v. succeeded in ousting Orleans, the interests of France and Spain would be closely united, and the fears of the Whig statesmen of Queen Anne's reign reahsed. Even if Orleans succeeded unaided in holding his position against the machinations of his opponents in France, and the intrigues of the Spanish Court, it was probable that he might be driven to make an alhance with Peter the Great, the mere possibility of which was repugnant to George i., whose eyes were as usual fixed upon his northern possessions. Literary relations, which Alberoni and Dubois 43 were to lead to important results in France, had already been opened between the two countries, and the revolution in foreign policy, so far as England was concerned, was effected quietly and with little difficulty. In France, though the opposition of d'Huxelles, the President of the Council of Foreign Affairs, was outspoken, the new departure in foreign policy was accepted, though not without some murmuring. Dubois' ready and astute mind had early in 1716 conceived this plan of an alhance between England and France as the best means of thwarting Philip v. and his ministers. Dubois' The dynastic interests of Orleans were at stake. Policy. France, of all countries in Europe, needed peace, which the accession of Philip to the French throne would terminate. Though the opponents of the Regency then, and many French historical writers since, have condemned Dubois' poHcy as revolutionary and antagonistic to the true interests of France, the wily minister of the Regent might plead, not only that he was merely continuing the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, but that the circumstances of the time fully justified the EngUsh alliance, which was, in fact, maintained by his suc- cessors, the Duke of Bourbon, and Fleury. Dubois realised how important to England was the continuance of the Regent in power. The accession of Phihp to the French throne would bring on a European war, while a union between Eng- land and France would checkmate both the Spanish King and the Enghsh Pretender. All danger of a close connec- tion between Orleans and Peter the Great would be re- moved, the fears of George i. would be allayed, and the government of the Regent rendered more stable. But it was only after the exercise of a considerable amount of tact on the part of Dubois that George i., still indignant at the equivocal conduct of Orleans during the Jaco- George i.'s bite rising, could be induced to consider seriously Policy- the prospect of a French alliance. And had not northern com- plications intervened, even the skill of the French agents might have proved unavaihng to effect a durable arrangement be- 44 European History^ 171 5-1789 tween the two countries. The essence of George's foreign poHcy was friendship with Holland and Austria, and his views were in strict accordance with those of the Whig party, in whose eyes a close union with Holland, and the re- establishment of friendly relations with Austria, were essential for the safety of the Hanoverian succession. But a return to the system of the Grand Alliance was ren- dered difficult, if not impossible, owing to the discontent felt by the Court of Vienna at the Treaty of Utrecht, and the pro- posed Barrier Treaty. George i.'s attempt, on his accession to the English throne, to conciHate the Emperor, had only provoked an outburst of wrath at the conditions attached to the Austrian possession of the Low Countries, and already the possibility of an exchange of Bavaria for the distant Belgian provinces was hinted at in Vienna. The actual conclusion of the Barrier Treaty on No- vember 15, 1 715, so far from pacifying the Austrian Court, only increased its hostile attitude towards the Dutch, which was fully reciprocated by the Government of the Hague, and which au- gured ill for the renewal of the system of the Grand Alliance. Numerous incidents tended to still further intensify the ill-feel- ing between the Hague and Vienna, which, while it rendered George i.'s attempts at a renewal of friendly relations between England, Holland, and Austria for a time hopeless, offered an admirable opportunity for Chateauneuf, the French envoy at the Hague, to make a not unsuccessful effort to regain for France her influence in Europe. Louis XIV. had bequeathed to his successor a diplomatic ser- vice far superior to that of any European country, as well as traditions of foreign policy which have varied but slightly dur- ing the many vicissitudes through which France has passed Dubois at sincc his days. The names of Campredon, Ville- the Hague ncuvc, and Vergennes are sufficient to show that and in . . Hanover. the diplomatists of Louis XV. 's reign were not in- ferior to the Gremonvilles, the Barrillons, and the Harcourts of the previous century. In Chateauneuf Orleans found a Alberoni and Dubois 45 man who was capable of taking advantage of the divisions existing between the Dutch and the Austrians, and of forming a French party at the Hague. Irritated by the dilatoriness of the Dutch in acceding to his views of a Triple AUiance between England, Holland, and Austria, and suspicious of the French intrigues, George hastily concluded the Treaty of Westminster with Austria on May 25, 1 716, and on July 20, accompanied by Stanhope, he started on his journey for Hanover. Orleans had by this time recognised that no alliance with England was possible, so long as the Pre- tender could find a refuge in France. His correspondence with the English ministers having proved resultless, he decided to send Dubois, now Archbishop of Sens, and a councillor of state, to meet Stanhope at the Hague. On July 21 Dubois had his first secret meeting with the Enghsh minister, and two days later he departed for Paris, where on the 31st, he gave the Regent an account of his interview. The first step had been taken in a revolution which, like that of 1756, was to give Europe for some thirty years a new political system. On August 10 Dubois was sent to Hanover to resume his negotia- tions, which, though hopeful, had not as yet, owing to George i.'s deep-rooted suspicions of the Regent's Jacobite leanings, resulted in any definite propositions. Before his arrival, how- ever, on August 19, a complete change had been effected in the attitude of the Enghsh king, who, fearful of the consequences to Hanover of the threatened occupation of Mecklenburg by the Russians, had suddenly realised the possibiUty of an alliance between the Tsar and the Regent. The contest round the Baltic had developed in a manner little anticipated by the opponents of Charles xii. Wismar had fallen in April 1716, and the Russian troops. The struggle already the objects of suspicion to their Hanoverian ^" *^^ North, allies, had encamped in Mecklenburg. In June a convention, signed between the Tsar and Frederick iv. of Denmark, was followed by a quarrel between the contracting parties, and by the retirement of the Russian troops from the neighbourhood 46 European History, 17 15-1789 of Copenhagen to Mecklenburg. The continued presence of the Russian forces in or near Mecklenburg was disquieting to George, and extremely distasteful to Bernsdorf and the other Hanoverian ministers. A coolness sprang up between the EngHsh king and the Tsar, and the former, haunted by the prospect of a Franco-Russian understanding, saw in a French alliance the only means of combating the new danger to Hanover. The desire to secure Bremen and Verden had led to the retention of the Austrian connection ; anxiety for the safety of his German possessions now made George an eager advocate of an aUiance with France. The suspicious movements of the Russians in Denmark and Mecklenburg, the continued activity of the Jacobites in England, the possibility of a leae^ue between the The Triple & > r j o Alliance, Tsar and the Regent, directed at once agamst his Jan. 4, 1717- kingdom and his electorate, had thus, by the time of Dubois' arrival in Hanover, worked such a change in George's feelings, that he not only desired a prompt reconciliation with Orleans, but ordered Stanhope to agree to a treaty with Frange. A preUminary convention was signed at Hanover on October 9 by Stanhope and Dubois ; and on November 28, Lord Cado- gan and Dubois signed at the Hague a defensive alliance be- tween France and England, which was accepted by Holland on January 4, 171 7. The treaty consisted of eight articles. France undertook to dismantle Dunkirk, to destroy the works of Mardyck, to expel the Pretender from Avignon, and not to allow him to return to French territory. All three Powers engaged to carry out in its main features the Treaty of Utrecht, especially those articles referring to the Protestant succession in England and the separation of the crowns of France and Spain. George i. was allowed to retain the title of King of France, while Louis xv. was termed Most Christian King. Almost simultaneously with the return of George i. to Eng- land, at the end of January 171 7, the famous conspiracy of Goertz, Charles xii.'s ambassador in Holland, was discovered, Alberoni and Dubois 47 and the arrest of Gyllenborg, the Swedish envoy in London, confirmed the EngHsh king in his suspicions of the danger to his dynasty from the northern Powers, and more than ever justified the wisdom of estabhshing close relations between England and France. The alliance between England and France may be termed a dynastic one, but dynastic and national interests in both coun- tries were for the time inseparable. To the Whig ^g impor. Government the Triple AUiance meant the check- tance. mating of the Pretender and the protection of the Hanover electorate. The estabhshment of George i. on the Enghsh throne was rendered more secure, and with it the fortunes of the Whig party. To Orleans the Triple Alliance came at an opportune moment, and dealt not only a telHng blow at the schemes of his numerous enemies at home, but also upset the plans of his opponents abroad. While the individual interests of George and Orleans were furthered, their respective countries benefited in no less degree from their alliance. The Peace of Utrecht was definitely accepted, and the new order of succession in England and France was recognised. To France the aUiance brought enormous advantages. After Louis xiv.'s death she remained exhausted and isolated, and in danger, owing to the accession of the Elector of Hanover to the EngHsh throne, of being confronted by a revival of the Grand AUiance. Aided by the skill of Dubois and Chateauneuf, and by the events in the north, the Regent had succeeded in securing for France valu- able alliances, and in estabhshing a new pohtical system, which was in itself the best guarantee to Europe of the pres- ervation of peace. His success was in no small measure due to the skill of Dubois, who had, by anticipating the pohcy of Talleyrand in 1815, rescued France from a dangerous position of isolation, and given her an influential voice in the Councils of Europe. It was seen that France had found in Dubois a statesman, and the skill with which he guided French policy to the hour of his death fully justified the confidence imposed 48 European History^ 1 71 5-1 789 in him by Orleans, and explains the hostihty with which his incapable aristocratic contemporaries regarded him, and which, hke the hatred felt by Whig historians for BoUngbroke, has till the present day been perpetuated by numerous writers on the period. In his diplomatic labours he had been vigorously supported by the Regent, and that in the teeth of an out- spoken opposition of the greater part of the ministers and nobles. Though the Treaty was never popular in France, and though the maintenance of friendly relations w^th England depended entirely upon the influence and goodwill of Orleans and Dubois, and later upon that of Fleury, the Triple Alliance gave the law to Europe, and largely contributed to maintain peace for sixteen years. Relations between English and French writers became closer, and both countries, especially the former, benefited from a period of rest from foreign wars. In spite of the popular dislike of the alliance in France, Dubois' first essay in foreign politics had proved an unqualified success. At first the Emperor and the Court of Vienna were openly indignant at the conduct of England in allying with France. The Jacobites driven from France were warmly supported by the Emperor's mother, while Charles vi. himself allowed them to find a refuge in Belgium. To meet this difficulty, George i. offered, in consideration of the introduction into the Treaty of Westminster of a secret additional article, by which the Emperor bound himself not to give asylum to rebellious sub- jects, to pay to the imperial treasury the sum of 3,250,000 francs. This transaction was completed in January 1 718, and the adhesion of the Emperor to the Triple Alliance was assured at a critical moment in the history of southern Europe. To Alberoni the news of the Triple Alliance came as a surprise. Dubois had won a great diplomatic victory, and had scored a point in his struggle against the influences The Invasion ^ oo o of Sardinia of which Albcroni was the representative. But the by Spain. Spanish minister went on quietly with his work of reorganisation, and only asked for a few years of peace in order Alberoni and Dubois 49 to perfect his preparations. He brought about a reconciHation between Spain and the Pope, Clement xi., who was equally interested \\ith Philip and Elizabeth in checking the growth of the imperial power, and in opposing the Triple Alliance ; and he was giving ample proof of his real capacity for government, when an event occurred which forced his hand, drove him into war, and brought his administration to a close. The arrest of the octogenarian ]\Iolin(^s, the newly appointed inquisitor-general, a pompous old fool according to Alberoni, by the Austrians in the ^vlilanese territory at the end of May 171 7, precipitated the rupture w^hich it was the interest of the Austrians to pro- voke and that of Alberoni to avert. The insult to Spain was, however, one which Philip was unwilling to brook ; the Duke of Parma was furious, and it was due more to the pressure which he brought to bear than to Philip's indignation that the war was prematurely begun.-^ In spite of Alberoni's hatred of the Germans, and his desire to expel them from Italy, his primary interest at that time was the reorganisation of Spanish commerce and finance, and he bitterly resented this disappoint- ing interruption to his labours. At the end of July 171 7, a Spanish fleet sailed from Barcelona, anchored before Caghari on August 22, six days after Eugene's victor}^ at Belgrade, and Sardinia was subdued by the end of November. The con- quest of Sardinia by Spain has usually been itsjustifi- regarded as a breach of the Treaty of Utrecht, and nation, an act of aggression which justified the severest measures. But as a matter of fact, Spain had ample reasons for her occupation of Sardinia. It was well known that Charles vi. aimed af the acquisition of Sicily, and as early as September 1716 Stanhope had dra\^Ti up a scheme for the satisfaction of the Emperor Phihp V. and Victor Amadeus. By it the Emperor was to accept the Treaty of Utrecht, to guarantee the succession of the House of Orleans to the French throne in the case of the death of Louis xv. without heirs, and to recognise Phihp v. as King of Spain. In return he was to receive Sicily in exchange 1 See Armstrong, Elizabeth Farnese. PERIOD VI. D 50 European History, 171 5-1789 for Sardinia, while Parma and Piacenza were eventually to be set aside for Don Carlos, the son of Elizabeth Farnese. This plan had been discussed at a secret conference at Hanover between Stanhope, Sutherland, M. de Pentenriedter, one of Charles vi.'s agents, and Saint-Saphorin, the Enghsh Minister at the Court of Vienna. The terms of the Treaty of Westminster had contained allu- sions to the surrender of Sicily to the Emperor, while, in the negotiations for the Triple Alliance, its transference to Charles VI. had been openly considered. Had a sovereign and minis- ters of different temperaments to Philip and Alberoni ruled Spain, it is quite possible that the arrangements come to at the Second Treaty of Vienna in 1731 might have been anticipated in 1 71 7. As it was, Spain contemptuously declined to accept Parma and Piacenza assigned to her by Stanhope, and was only acting within her rights in taking all possible steps to prevent the Austrian seizure of Sicily, and an unwarrantable modification in the arrangements of the settlement of Utrecht. But the EngUsh Government, which was bent on securing the Hanoverian succession, was as blind to the general advantage of Europe as it was alive to its own dynastic interests. It was willing to connive at the Emperor's aggrandisement in Italy, provided it could bring about peace in southern Europe, which would enable it to deal with the dangers arising in the north. By the Treaty of Utrecht Sicily was granted to the House of Savoy, to revert to Spain in the event of failure of the line of Victor Amadeus, and as long as it remained in the hands of the Savoy line its trade was practically in the hands of the English. The northern and dynastic interests of the Whig Government, however, seem to have blinded it to the real points at issue, and on the occupation of Sardinia by Spain, England at once called upon the members of the Triple Alli- ance to resist the Spanish aggression.^ The events in the Mediterranean placed the Regent Orleans in a difficult position. By no means popular in Paris, he was aware 1 Vide Armstrong, Elizabeth Farnese. Alberoni and Dubois 51 that public opinion in France regarded Philip v. as the lawful heir to the French cro%\Ti, and would resent any interference with Spanish action, especially when directed against the House of Hapsburg. He determined to send Dubois to Dubois in London, and in October the French statesman had London, many conferences with the English ministers. The uncompromising tone adopted by Zinzendorf in Vienna and Pentenreidter in London in consequence of the victor}- of Bel- grade only tended to draw Dubois and Stanhope together, and by the end of November a joint project for the settlement of the difficulties m southern Europe was drawn up and presented to the Austrian envoy. On November 29 Dubois arrived in Paris, and having strengthened the Regent in his loyalty to the English and Dutch alliance, returned on December 31 to Lon- don, where the details of the proposed plan of pacification were discussed. While the English were inclined to favour the Austrian claims in Italy, the Regent insisted that the eventual succession to Tuscany should, in addition to that of Parma and Piacenza, be reserved for the young Don Carlos. This point being gained, Dubois and Stanhope easily settled remain^ ing difficulties, and the Emperor agreed to the proposals. Fresh difficulties, however, soon arose; a strong party in France, headed by the ^Lirshal d'Huxelles, and supported by such men as Torcy, the influential superintendent of the posts, being opposed to any understanding with Austria, while the Regent himself, in the absence of Dubois, was, as usual, unable to come to any definite resolution. Lord Stanhope therefore decided to go to Paris in July to win over the Regent to his views. It was not till August 17, after the Quadruple Alliance had been finally agreed to, that Dubois returned to Paris, hav- ing arranged a treaty which was contrary to the wishes of the Spanish party at the French Court, and which confirmed the former policy already adopted in 1716. This fresh Triumph of diplomatic success, while it added to the reputa- Dubois, 1718. tion already gained by Dubois, only intensified the hatred and increased the attacks of the French nobles headed by Maine, 52 Eiiropea7i Histo7y, 171 5-1 789 and of the ministers led by d'Huxelles, against a minister who represented both at home and abroad the principles to which they were steadily opposed. His return to France was fol- lowed by important governmental changes. The Parlement of Paris had arrogated to itself the right of interfering in the political and financial administration, and obstructed the course of justice. The whole system of Councils had proved a failure, and the Council of Foreign Affairs, presided over by d'Huxelles, had adopted a line of policy which was distinctly detrimental to the true interests of France. Encouraged by the return of Dubois triumphant in the matter of the Quadruple AUiance, Orleans, having forced his will upon the Parlement o\\ August 26, determined to regain absolute power in the government, and to carry out certain necessary changes. D'Huxelles had opposed the policy of the Triple and Quadruple Alliances. It was natural that the control of foreign affairs should pass into the hands of those who had initiated and carried out the new foreign poHcy. No confidence could be unreservedly placed in Orleans so long as d'Huxelles was at the head of foreign affairs. On September 24, with the aid of Dubois, Orleans carried out a min- isterial revolution. The Councils were suppressed, and replaced by Secretaries of State ; Dubois was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and though his foreign policy was hampered and his influence over the Regent shared by his enemy Torcy, till the latter's disgrace in October 1721 he was enabled at any rate to carry out, in conjunction with Stanhope, the terms of the Quadruple Alliance. In spite then of the attempts of Alberoni to gain over the Regent by offering him the Austrian Netherlands, and in Aiberoni's spitc of a natural inclination, encouraged by Difficulties. d'Huxcllcs and the nobles generally, to support Philip v. against the Emperor, Orleans, after much hesitation, decided in March 1718, and after a period of uncertainty again in July, to remain loyal to the Triple Alliance, and to oppose the Spanish Bourbons by force of arms. In March he did indeed make a last effort at conciliation by sending to Spain Albcroni and Dubois 53 the Marquis de Nancre, but the attempt ended in failure. Victor Amadeus had already entered into negotiations with the Emperor, who had on April 4 accepted the Anglo-French proposals, and Spain was practically isolated. Nevertheless Alberoni acted with his accustomed vigour. Finding that Victor Amadeus would not admit the Spanish forces into Sicily, the Spanish fleet was ordered to occupy the island ; in June 1 7 18 the fleets left Barcelona, and on July 5 Sicily was taken. ^ Though the seizure of Sardinia can be defended, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the attack upon Sicily was a mistake. In making it, Spain was prematurely running counter to the aims of France, England, and Austria, and thereby courting certain failure. The responsibility for the Sicilian expedition must rest to a great extent on Alberoni. He had never believed in the possibility of a close union be- tween England and France against Spain. He had convinced himself that Engli3h commercial interests would be opposed to the occupation of Sicily by Austria. Disillusion came with the united action of the members of the Triple Alliance, and the acceptance by Austria of its terms. Till his fall, however, vigour and determination characterised Spanish counsels. Though without allies, Alberoni had endeavoured to occupy his enemies at home. For some months he had attempted to reconcile Peter the Great and Charles xii., and between them and Prussia to form a league which should attack the Emperor and George i. As early as 17 14 he had appreciated the value of a Swedish alliance, and there is no doubt that in 17 18, even after the disaster of Cape Passaro, he relied much upon a Swedish- Muscovite diversion in Germany and in England. The Aland conferences had been opened in May, and there was every reason to expect that the hostihty felt by the Tsar and King of Sweden to England would be of signal advantage to Spain. He had negotiated with Ragotsky, Prince of Transylvania, and had good ground for hoping that the Turks would con- tinue the war ; he had incited Cellamare to support the anti- Orleanist party in France, and for a long time his emissaries 54 Etiropea7i History, 171 5-1 789 in Paris had intrigued against Dubois. He had stirred up the Protestants in Languedoc, the Cevennes, Poitou, and Dauphin^ to rebeUion, and had entered into communications with the discontented Bretons. The Pretender had been invited to Spain and an expedition organised against England. All Alberoni's schemes failed. The attack on Sicily led to the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance on August 2, — ^^ Stanhope's great work. By this Alliance, which Quadruple cousistcd of scvcral treaties — (i) A treaty between lance, 171 ^^ Emperor and the King of Spain, (2) a treaty between the Emperor and the King of Sicily, (3) treaties between the Emperor and the Kings of England, France, and the States-General, — the terms of the Peace of Utrecht were modified. Charles vi. exchange^ Sardinia for Sicily, and the King of Sicily received the title of King of Sardinia with the reversion to the crown of Spain. It was further arranged that Charles should renounce his claims on the Spanish monarchy and recognise Philip as the King of Spain. With regard to the succession to the Italian Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, the claims of Elizabeth Farnese were recognised. The Peace of Passarowitz had already been made (July 17 18), and Austrian troops poured into Italy, prepared to drive the Spaniards from Sicily. On August 11, the overthrow of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Byng off Cape Passaro attested the complete triumph of the Quadruple Alliance, and the suc- cess of the policy of Stanhope and Dubois. Earnest efforts had been made by the English Government to induce Spain to agree to the Quadruple Alliance. Stan- hope himself went to Spain in August, arriving at Madrid on the 1 2th, but though he offered to restore Gibraltar he was no more successful than Nancr^ had been in inducing Philip v. and Alberoni to agree to his pacific views. On August 27, he left the Spanish capital; Nancr^ followed his example on November 3, and Spain continued her struggle against the allied Powers. All hope, however, of a diversion from the north in favour Alberoni afid Dubois 55 of Spain disappeared with the death of Charles xii. in Decem- ber, followed by the overthrow of Goertz and the outbreak of hostilities between Sweden and Russia. In France France and the conspiracy of Cellamare, the existence of which ^^^^^u^ had long been known to Dubois, was suppressed Spain, in December, Cellamare being arrested, like Gyllenborg tii.- preceding year ; the rising in Brittany had failed ; and the onl v results of the discovery of the plot were that Spanish policy was discredited, the opposition of Clement xi. and the Jesuit.-, who encouraged the conspirators, to the French Government, was laid bare, the position of the Regent was strengthened, and his opposition to Spain supported even by Torcy. The Duke and Duchess of Maine, the Duke of Richelieu, the Cardi- nals Polignac and Rohan, and the Marquis of Pompadour were arrested, and either imprisoned or exiled ; four of the Breton leaders were executed, and on January 9, 17 19, after long- continued hesitation, France declared war on Spain. England, threatened by a new Jacobite invasion from the coasts of Spain, had already on December 28, 17 18, declared war. Spain could make little resistance against the combined attack. A French army crossed the frontier in March 17 19, and besieged Fuen- tarabia, while an English squadron sacked several towns and damaged the Spanish shipping. The Jacobite expedition had ended in failure, and before the close of the autumn the Austrian conquest of Sicily was assured. Alberoni had recognised that with the death of Charles xii. all hopes of success had disappeared, and he was anxious to make peace with the allies at the end of 1718. Had not the arrest of Molin^s' forced his hand, the development of the re- sources of Spain might not have been interrupted till the coun- try was ready for an attempt to restore the balance of power in the Mediterranean which, in Alberoni's opinion, had been de- stroyed by the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt. His career was now ended, but his influence on the history of Spain can- not be overestimated. Patino and the great Spanish adminis- trators worked on the lines laid down by Alberoni, and in 1 748 56 European History, 1715-1789 the establishment of Don PhiHp in Parma and Piacenza, and Don Carlos in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, is sufficient proof that his foreign policy was by no means a failure. The development of ItaHan nationahty, no less than the revival of Spain, was in no small measure due to the sagacity of the Italian statesman. The fall of Alberoni was insisted upon by the allies as the preliminary to negotiations, and in the middle of December Philip V. 1 7 19, he received orders to leave Spain. At the dismisses beginning of 1720, PhiHp, yielding to the firm atti- and joins the tudc of England and France, acceded to the terms Amance,^ of the Quadruple Alliance by the Treaty of London, 1720. though several important matters were the subject of negotiations during the whole year, and the irritation of Philip and Elizabeth was so great that a resumption of hostili- ties was regarded as possible at any moment. It was not till June 1 72 1 that matters were finally and satisfactorily arranged by a defensive alliance between Spain, England, and Fjiance. All the disputed points between Spain and Austria touching the investiture of the Italian duchies, the disputed title to the crown of Spain, and the right to confer the Golden Fleece, were to be settled at a Congress which was to meet at Ctimbrai. Fearful of a possible aUiance between Spain, England, and Austria, Dubois hastened to open negotiations with Spain with a view to sealing the present friendship between the two coun- tries by a family compact, arid in September 1721 it was openly announced that the Infanta — then five years old — would marry Louis xv., and Orleans' eldest daughter Don Luis, the heir-apparent to the Spanish throne. In January 1722, the marriage of Mademoiselle de Mont- pensier was celebrated, while the Infanta took up her residence Marriage ^^ France. This extension of French influence Alliances at Madrid caused alarm in English ministerial cir- between , _ , . . . , ^ . , ., France and cles. In endeavouring to unite with Spain, while Spain, 1721-2. preserving the English alliance, Dubois, while in a manner returning to Louis xiv.'s policy, anticipated the policy Alberoni and Dubois 57 of Fleury in 1729. In Februar}' 1723? on the attainment by Louis XV. of his majority, he became First ]Minister, and held that office till his death, when Orleans succeeded him in the post for three months. But the revival of the union between France and Spain was premature, and came to a sudden end with the deaths of Dubois in August, and Orleans in December, 1723. Though the high-handed action of Stanhope in the Mediter- ranean had checked the danger to European peace in the south from a collision between Spain and Austria, the „^ ., ^ ^ ' The North affairs in the north remained a constant source of. of Europe, anxiety to England, and an ever-increasing menace ^7^'*"^^- to the tranquilUty of Europe. There is little doubt that the policy of the ministers of Hanover had tended in the direction of the enlargement of the area of the struggle. Throughout the eighteenth century the northern Courts, owing to the rise of Russia and Prussia, and the decline of Sweden and Poland, played a very important part in European history. When George i. succeeded to the English throne in August 1714, the northern war was at its height. Russia and Prussia had just made a secret treaty (July), which was itself necessitated by the prospect of the speedy return of Charles xii. from Bender. By this treaty Russia undertook not to make peace till Prussia had secured Stettin with its dependencies up to the river Peene, together with Wolgast, Wollin, and Usedom, while Prussia engaged to aid Russia to annex the Swedish provinces i:>f Livonia, Esthonia, and Ingria. In November Charles ap- peared before Stralsund. The effect of his arrival was at once felt. His enemies drew together. Prussia made an offensive aUiance with Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, and Poland, and declared war upon Sweden. Denmark handed Bremen and Verden to George i., while Goertz, the Swedish minister, deter- mined to break up the League, and to restore Sweden to a leading position in northern Europe. Stralsund was besieged by Frederick William, and on its fall in December 1715, Charles xii. with difficulty escaped to Sweden, and it seemed likely that the war would become European, An English fleet 58 European History, 171 5-1 789 was stationed in the Baltic to protect English commerce — an ' oblique way,' says Mr. Carlyle, * for paying for Bremen and The War Verdcn ' — and the various opponents of Charles between xii. prepared for a serious struggle. In appear- Charles XII. .it c ^ \ ^ and the ^^^c the League was powerful, but no sooner was League. \^ made than it showed signs of breaking up, owing to the coolness which arose between Peter the Great and the Hanoverian ministers. In April 1716 the Duke of Mecklen- burg had married Catherine, niece of Peter, who at once inter- fered on behalf of his nephew against the Mecklenburg nobles, who were constantly at feud with their ruler, and against the Danes and Prussians, whose ravages were ruining the country. On the fall of Wismar, the last Swedish possession in Pome- rania, on April 16, the Hanoverians refused to admit Russian troops into the town, and accused Peter of carrying on secret relations with Sweden, and of wishing to occupy Mecklenburg Quarrel permanently. Charles vi.,. alarmed at the progress between of Russian influence, supported the intrigues of and Peter the Hanoverian Bernsdorf against the Russians, the Great. though Townshend and Frederick William refused to beheve in the accusations levelled against the Russian mon- arch. Frederick William approved of the presence of Russian troops in Mecklenburg on the ground that they would defend both Denmark and Prussia against a Swedish attack. He agreed to hand over Wismar to the Duke of Mecklenburg, after having razed its walls to the ground, but declined to aid the Hanoverians in expelling the Russians from Mecklenburg and with them to occupy the duchy. Having strengthened his position by a secret defensive alliance with France made in September 1716, he gave his full approval to the policy of Peter the Great, who found himself an object of suspicion not only to the Emperor but to the rest of the allies. The arrest in London of Gyllenborg, the Swedish envoy, in January 171 7, and the discovery in his papers of a plot, arranged by Goertz, for the invasion of Scotland by 12,000 Swedes on behalf of the Pretender, rendered the crisis more acute. Peter, who hoped Alberoni and Dubois 59 to secure the friendship of England, was accused by the Han- Dverians of being implicated in Gyllenborg's intrigues, and find- ing an English alliance was impossible, made his celebrated journey to France in the summer of Great's visit 1 71 7, hoping by means of French assistance to *°p*"s, 1717. force from Sweden compliance with his terms. He urged the French Government to accept Russia in place of Sweden as its northern ally, to form \\'ith Russia and Prussia a close friend- ship which should not necessarily interfere with the existing Triple Alliance between England, France, and Holland. But though Orleans, it is said, was in favour of accepting the Rus- sian overtures, Dubois saw that the stabiHty of the Triple Alli- ance would be endangered. There is httle room for doubting that Dubois' decision was the right one. The Russian Power as yet rested on no sure foundation ; its sudden rise to a prominent position was due in great measure to the collapse of the Swedish arms. An extraordinary series of circumstances had led to the arrival Df Russian troops at the Elbe, and it was unlikely that they could be maintained in Germany for any considerable period. Moreover, the future development of Russia depended upon the ability of her rulers. It would have been the height of rashness to have substituted for the Triple Alhance the distant and possibly unstable Russian Power, and France, again isolated in western Europe, would have deservedly brought upon her the hostiHty of England and Holland, aided by the forces of the Empire and probably by those of Spain. In August a simple treaty of amity was made between France, Russia, and Prussia, knowTi as the Treaty of Amster- dam.^ By this treaty France engaged to use her ^ood offices to end the northern war. But this Russia draw treaty, followed by a supplementary convention *°s«*h<''"- with Prussia in August 1718, did not prevent Peter from 1 This treaty, the first of many made between France and Russia, was followed by the establishment of regular diplomatic relations between the two countries. 6o Eiiropeaii History, 171 5-1789 negotiating directly with Sweden. Goertz, who at the time of Gyllenborg's arrest had for a short period been imprisoned in Holland, never ceased intriguing for a Russian alliance, and in May 1718 he and Gyllenborg met Bruce and Ostermann, the two Russian envoys in Losoe, one of the Aland Islands, at what is known as the Aland Conference. Goertz advocated a close alliance with Russia, the price of which was to be the provinces of Ingria, Carelia, Livonia, and Esthonia. United with Russia, Sweden could then disregard her other foes, pre- serve her German possessions, and remain the predominant Power in the Baltic. Goertz' views, admirable as they were in many respects, were not destined to be carried out. The death of Charles xii. Death of ^^ Friedrichshall on December 11, 17 18, at the Charles XII., age of thirty-six, was followed by a revolution lution in i^ Swcdcu. In January 1719 the Diet met, and Sweden. elected Ulrica Eleanora, the sister of Charles •xii., queen, and imposed upon her such stringent conditions that the despotism of the Swedish kings was transformed into a limited monarchy. All chance of the accession of the Duke of Holstein, who had married Ulrica's sister, disappeared ; Goertz, the advocate of the Holstein party, was executed ; and in 1720 Ulrica abdicated in favour of her husband, who was elected king as Frederick i*. Sweden remained in a most critical condition. She was attacked by a powerful league, while a party in the Diet, strengthened by public opinion and hoping for the aid of Prussia, were disposed to further the claims of the Holstein branch to the throne. A decided policy at home and abroad was demanded. The party in power determined to reverse the foreign policy of Charles xii. and Goertz, and to adopt a line of conduct fraught with disastrous consequences to Sweden. Upon the election of Ulrica negotiations were broken off with Russia, and steps were at once taken to conclude treaties with the various members of the League. Through the mediation of Carteret, treaties were signed in Alberoni and Dubois 6 1 November 1719 with Hanover, and in February 1720 with Prussia. By the former, Hanover, in consideration of a sum of money, was to retain Bremen and Verden ; by the latter, Prussia, having paid to Sweden two milhons of dollars, was to retain Stettin, the islands of Wollin and Usedom, and Pomerania as far as the Peene. Treaties were between also made with Poland and Denmark in Tanuarv ^^^^'^^^ ^"'^ •^ ■' the members and July 1720, the latter Power being secured in of the the possession of Sleswig, and thus Sweden was ^^^^"^• free to devote all her energies to the war against Peter the Great. But this attempt of the Swedish Government to isolate Russia and avoid further concessions failed hope- lessly. An English fleet in the Baltic proved of little value ; Peter pursued his victorious career unchecked, and in 1721 the Swedes were glad to accept the mediation of Campredon, the French ambassador, and make an inglorious peace with Russia. By the Treaty of Nystad, signed on Sep- The Treaty tember 10, 1721, Sweden relinquished to Russia °^^J^^^ . . with Russia, Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and Carelia, part of 1721. Wiborg, with the islands Ossel, Dagoe, and ]\Ioen, and all others from the boundary of Courland to Wiborg. Russia on her part paid two millions of dollars and restored Finland. With the signature of the Peace of Nystad a chapter in Euro- pean history is closed. The place of Sweden is henceforward taken by Russia and Prussia. Sweden retired from the com- manding position in Europe to which she had been raised by the House of Vasa. Henceforward, till the accession of Gus- ta\ais III., she was alternately the ally of Russia and France, and the prey to internal faction. By the Act of May 2, 1720, the Swedish monarchy had ceased to be absolute and had become elective. Weak and disunited, Sweden became the prey to factions, one of which not only supported the claims of Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the son of Hedwiga Sophia, and in 1725 the son-in-law of Peter the Great and Catherine, but also advocated a close Russian alliance. The other party supported Ulrica and her husband, 62 Europeaji History^ 1715-1709 and pressed for a French connection. Under the titles of the Hats and the Caps these two parties struggled for supremacy, the miserable years of their dissensions being characteristically styled the period of liberty. While Sweden dechned, Russia and Prussia advanced, and both Powers became important factors in the European state- system. For the moment, however, the Treaty of Nystad gave peace to the north, just as the Quadruple Alliance had secured tranquillity in the south, and the foreign policy of Stanhope and Dubois, so far as the preservation of peace was concerned, was crowned with success. The Anglo-French alliance re- mained intact, all fear of a Jacobite invasion was removed, the French Government was in no danger from the intrigues of Philip and Elizabeth Farnese, Alberoni had fallen, and Goertz had been executed. In February 1723 Louis xv. attained his legal majority, and the Regency came to an end. No change of government took place, and Dubois remained at the head of affairs till his death in August. With regard to the future, a congress was to meet and settle outstanding questions, which mainly concerned the Italian Peninsula. The years from 1715 to 1725 had seen the councils of Europe dominated by three adventurers — Alberoni, Goertz, Dubois ^^'^ Dubois. Of these three the first two worked Goertz, and definitely for the well-being of their respective countries, and their policy was dictated by national rather than by personal considerations. Both failed to carry out the work they had set themselves to do, the one through the death of Charles xii. and the inherent weakness of Sweden, the other because the dynastic interests of Elizabeth Farnese placed Spain in a false position and hampered the work of reform. With the death of Goertz Sweden retired to the posi- tion of a third-rate Power, from which she has never emerged. Alberoni's fall, on the other hand, proved only a temporary check in the regeneration of Spain ; his work was continued by his successors, and the eighteenth century saw his policy in great measure realised. Dubois stands in striking contrast to Alberoni and Dubois 63 both his contemporaries. His views were not so statesmanlike as those of Alberoni, he was not in the desperate position of Goertz, nor was he so single-minded in his views as the Spanish minister. His foreign poHcy, though beneficial to France, was dictated by personal considerations, and his domestic poHcy was selfish and opportunist. His abihty, however, was un- doubted, and he carried France with success through a dan- gerous period. But his want of high principle, his cynical contempt for religion and moraUty, and his unblushing ambi- tion, rendered the Abb^ Dubois, successful politician as he was, a far less interesting figure than Alberoni. Before the end of his career Dubois had no rival at home or abroad. Law had fled, Alberoni was in exile, Goertz was dead. All efi'orts to remedy the internal evils from which France was suffering had ceased, and the Regency closed with all the promise of its early years unfulfilled. Abroad, the Quadruple Alliance already showed signs of breaking up, and as long as the interests of Elizabeth Farnese dominated Spanish pohtics, and Charles vi. persisted in his ambitious schemes, Europe could not hope for any lengthened period of tranquillity. CHAPTER III THE INTRIGUES OF ELIZABETH FARNESE 1 723-1 733 The Period from 1723 to 1733 — The Government of the Duke of Bourbon -^ The Congress of Cambrai — The Idea of an Austro-Spanish Alliance — • Elizabeth Farnese's Reasons for allying with Austria — Charles vi.'s Reasons for allying with Spain — Ripperda's Instructions — His Career — The Dis- missal of the Infanta by Bourbon — Russian Overtures to France — Con- ferences in Vienna — The Treaty of Vienna, 1725 — The League of Hanover — The Secret Articles in the Treaty of Vienna — Prussia and the Treaty of Wiisterhausen — Parties in France — Fall of Ripperda — The Break-up of the Austro-Spanish Alliance — Danger of a General War in 1727-28 — The Treaty of Seville — England and Spain — The Second Treaty of Vienna, 1731. The years from the deaths of Dubois and Orleans to the out- break of the Pohsh Succession War (1723-33) form a troubled _. „ . ^ and complicated period, characterised by a perfect The Period ^ . ^ ' . ^ ^ from 1723 network of diplomacy. The alliance between Eng- to 1733- Xdca^ and France held good under both Bourbon and Fleury, but the existence and increasing importance of a strong opposition party at the French Court to the English connection foreshadowed complications in the future. The growing coolness between Austria and England, and between Austria and Prussia, tended to weaken the position of Charles vi., who, intent upon the pursuit of such shadows as the guarantee .of the Pragmatic Sanction and the establishment of an Ostend East India Com- pany, neglected the real interests of his country. • In France for the next three years the Duke of Bourbon held the reins of office, and continued th^ policy of Orleans The Intrigues of ElizabetJi Famese 65 and Dubois. Louis Henry, Duke of Bourbon, known as Monsieur le Due, the lineal heir of the great Cond^, had hitherto not occupied a prominent position in the xhe Govern state, being more interested in hunting than in poHt- ment of the ical matters. He had, however, stoutly opposed the Bourbon claims of the legitimes, had supported the schemes ^723-26. of Law, and had viewed with displeasure the rapid rise of Dubois. He had never shown any conspicuous ability, and was a dull man, dominated by his mistress, the intriguing Marchioness of Prie, and by the financier Paris-Duverney, who, an enemy of Law, had come prominently forward on the collapse of the latter's system. On the death of Orleans, Fleury, the astute bishop of Frejus, still in charge of Louis' education, had secured his appointment as First Minister, and remained in the background till 1726, when he himself supplanted the Duke, whose government had become intensely unpopular. The internal administration of France suffered under the ministry of Bourbon, in spite of the attempts of Paris-Duverney to force the noble class to contribute its share in the taxation of the country, and to organise a national army by a system of con- scription. Though excellent in conception, the former of those measures was abrogated in 1727, and the latter was never carried out. The re-establishment of the d?'oit de joyeiix avhiefuent, an obsolete tax, paid on the accession of a king for the confirmation of privileges by high and low alike, was very unpopular, and was never levied again. In religious matters, which since the death of Orleans had been under the direction of Fleury, Bourbon had little difficulty in making his influence felt. One severe edict (May 24, 1724) was levelled at those Protestants who still lived in France, and who had taken the opportunity of the reaction under Orleans to meet together for common worship ; and another supported, if not originated, by Fleury, was directed against the Jansenists. A fresh emigra- tion of the Protestants followed the edict, and public opinion ridiculed tlie continued attempts to force the Bull Unigenitus, in a philosophic and sceptical age, upon the French nation. PERIOD VJ. E 66 European History, 171 5-1 789 In his foreign policy Bourbon was bent on the preservation of peace, and was at first inclined to follow the lines of policy laid down by Dubois in his later years. He alone of all the Bourbon princes had in 1713 protested against Philip v.'s com- pulsory renunciations/ and to the Spanish Court the accession of the Duke to power was an event of no small significance. Philip V. and Alberoni had, by the temporary estrangement of France, paid the penalty for their impatience and rashness in 1 7 1 7 and 1 7 1 8. But before he died Dubois could boast that not only had he maintained the peace of Europe when a general war seemed imminent, but that he had taken measures to en- sure the gradual re-establishment of the Spanish influence in Italy, and had reunited the Courts of Versailles and Madrid without breaking the Anglo-French alliance. On Dubois' death the Comte de Morville, who had been appointed plenipoten- tiary at the Congress of Cambrai, took charge of foreign affairs, and remained Secretary of State till 1727. No change in the relations of France with other nations followed the accession of the Duke of Bourbon to power, and any intentions that he might have harboured for returning to a close offensive and defensive aUiance with Spain, to the detriment of the good re- lations subsisting between France and England, were cut short by the sudden abdication of Phihp v. on June 14, 1724; and later in the year the impatience of the Spanish queen again tended to postpone indefinitely any real reconciliation between France and Spain, and to unite England and France in a firm endeavour to preserve the peace of Europe. Elizabeth Far- nese's irritation at the dilatory conduct of France and Spain coincided with a growing dislike on the part of Bourbon to the Duke of Chartres, the son of Orleans, who in the event of Louis' death would succeed to the French throne. It was the dread of this contingency which led in 1725 to the dismissal of the Infanta. During the ten years from 1723 to 1733 Elizabeth Farnese * was the pivot upon which the diplomat:y of Europe turned.' ^Philippe V. et la cour de France-, par A. Baudrillard, vol. ii. 540-1. The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 6y The principal aim of her efforts was as ever the aggrandise- ment of her children, while, in spite of all renunciations and treaties, Philip showed that he remained firmly ^^ ^ ^ _ ^1 he Lon- resolved to secure, in the event of Louis xv.'s death, gress of the succession to the French Crown. On his ad- ^"^ ^^^' hesion to the Quadruple Alliance, the King of Spain had re- ceived full assurance that on the extinction of the lines of Far- nese and iSIedici, Don Carlos should succeed at Parma and Florence. It had been arranged that certain points with regard to the Italian duchies, and other questions still under dispute between Spain and Austria, should be settled at a European Congress, which, after two years spent in preliminaries, met for business at Cambrai on January 26, 1724. 'A more inane congress,' says Carlyle, ' never met in this world, and never will meet.' At the Congress the rival claims of Austria and Spain were Hstened to, and Charles vi., throwing every possible diffi- culty in the way of a satisfactory settlement of the questions awaiting solution, demanded the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction from all the assembled Powers. ' There at Cambrai, for about four years were the poor delegates busied baling out water with sieves.' While the Congress was thus sitting en- gaged in futile deHberations, an event occurred which roused the attention of Europe, and puzzled the diplomatists of every Court. Without any previous warning Philip v. had suddenly on Jan- uary 14, 1724, abdicated his throne in favour of Don Luis. Rehgious motives appear to have been the imme- Abdication diate caUse of this unexpected abdication, which, °^ Philip v. however, proved to be of short duration, as Don Luis only enjoyed his new dignity eight months, and on his death in August Philip V. reascended the Spanish throne, placing the control of foreign affairs in the hands of Grimaldo, who had been Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since Alberoni's fall. Finding that the Congress proceeded very deliberately, and being convinced that England and France had not bestirred themselves to advance her aims with regard to the Italian 68 European History ^ 171 5-1789 duchies, the Queen of Spain determined to follow Ripperda's advice, which was in agreement with her own views, and to negotiate directly with Charles vi. The idea of making an alli- The Idea of ance with Austria was no new one. Alberoni at one an Austro- period in his career had suesjested it : Philip and Spanish ^ *^^ ' j- Alliance. Elizabeth Farnese had in 1721 seriously considered it ; and during the short reign of Don Luis, Ripperda, in full accord with the old Spanish party which detested a French aUiance, had dwelt upon the advisability of bringing about friendly relations between the two Courts. In September 1724 Elizabeth was, from various reasons, ready to entertain the idea, and Francis Farnese, the Duke of Parma, threw himself eagerly into the project. To secure the eventual succession to .the duchies, and to recover Gibraltar and Minorca, were the 'definite objects of the Spanish Court. In 1724 Elizabeth was /orced to acknowledge that the French alhance of 1721 had been of little use to Spain, and that no efforts had been made by either Orleans or Bourbon to hasten the retirement of the English from Gibraltar. As long as England held Gibraltar, supported by the Spanish nobles, who urged a marriage be- tween Don Ferdinand and the new Princess of the Asturias and an Austrian Archduchess, she was ready to oppose English policy in Europe, and to hamper English trade in South Amer- ica and the West Indies. The French were equally detested at Madrid, and the old Spanish party incited the mob against France and Tesse, Elizabeth's the French envoy. It was recognised at Madrid Reasons for ^^i^it the promise of George i. to yield Gibraltar allying with ^ _ ^ ■' _ Austria. was not likely to be carried out, and this conviction was forced upon EHzabeth and Philip at the very time that the Spanish commercial classes were beginning to feel the effects of the English trading competition. Since the Regent's death, too, the ^;^econcihation with France, which had been premature and never really sincere, seemed less likely than ever to result in the recovery of Gibraltar, or in the establish- ment of Don Carlos in Italy by French aid» Grimaldo and The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 69 the other Spanish ministers had been practically superseded by John Baptiste Orendayn, formerly a clerk in the Foreign Office, and who, having received the confidence of Elizabeth, was made Secretary of State for Finance, and consulted in matters of foreign pohcy. While Elizabeth, with no fear of opposition from the Spanish ministers, was thus coming to the conclusion that the best means for the successful attain- ment of her wishes were to be found in an Austrian alliance, Charles vi. had almost decided to open negotiations with Spain. He was, as always, bent upon securing the charies vi.'s adhesion of all the great Powers to the Prasimatic ^^^f°"s for " ° allying with Sanction. But En^nd and HoUand no less than Spain. France showed no inclination to guarantee it, and he hoped to secure the Spanish support, if only he was able to satisfy the aims of Elizabeth. The Congress of Cambrai had dis- appointed his expectations. Not only was he unable to ob- tain the adhesion of the assembled Powers to the Pragmatic Sanction, but his wishes on other points had met with opposition. England and Holland had run counter to his fixed determination of establishing an Ostend East India Company. Determined to secure a share of the Indian trade, and recognising the force of Eugene's contention that the Indian Company might form the nucleus of a German fleet, he had actually founded the Company in 1722, and given it a charter in 1723, fixing the capital at one million. Between 1 71 7 and 1722 a number of experimental voyages had been made, and their success had roused the complaints of the French, Dutch, and English Companies. The Maritime Pow- ers, however, would have none of it, and their hatred of its German settlements in India was shared by the French, who at Pondicherry and Chandernagore assumed a threatening attitude. Ships were sent out, and two settlements — one at Covelong, on the south-east coast, and the other at Bankipur on the Hooghly — were founded in India, which entered into competition with the older European Companies. As Charles was equally resolved to persevere in his scheme, he- 70 Eiiropemi History, 171 5-1 789 naturally drew near to Spain, the now almost avowed enemy of England and France. In firm alliance with Spain, Charles felt that Ostend would be to the north German commerce what Trieste would be to his Mediterranean trade, and hoped to make it into a first-class naval station. The possession of a fleet would render Germany independent of the Maritime Powers, and give the Empire a commercial influence in north- ern Europe. The recognition of the Company by Spain thus became a matter of very serious importance to both England and Holland. Charles, moreover, had vast imperial schemes. He hoped to reassert the old claims on Italy, to make Italy a province of the Empire, and to use her resources for the consoli- dation of his power in Germany. For the reaUsation of these schemes Spanish friendship was absolutely necessary. It would free him from dependence on England and Holland, and it would give a considerable impetus to the growth of Catholicism in Europe, which itself might be used on behalf of a Stuart res- toration, and in favour of imperial policy in Poland and Saxony. At Vienna, it is true, the idea of an alliance with Spain met with serious opposition. Both Maria Theresa and the Empress, who wished her daughter to marry the Duke of Lorraine, were hostile to the Spanish scheme, and were supported in their dis- like of the project by Eugene, the Commander-in-chief and President of the Council of War, and Stahremberg, the Director of the Finances, while Charles vi. was aided by the advice of his Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zin- zendorf. Independent circumstances, coinciding in point of time, were thus tending to draw together the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, when two events brought matters to a head, and hastened the conclusion of an alhance. In November 1724 Ripperda arrived at Vienna, armed with elaborate instructions, and early in ?^Iarch of the following year the Infanta, Maria Anna Victoria, was sent back to Ripperda s ' ' _ instruc- Spain from France. The instructions of Ripperda, *'°"^" who had long been in favour of the establishment of close relations between Austria and Spain, were dated The hitrignes of Elizabeth Fames e yt November 22, 1724. He was ordered to keep his negotiations secret, and if he found that Charles vi. was disposed to enter- tain the idea of an alHance with Spain, he was to propose that Don Carlos should marry Maria Theresa, become king of the Romans, and on the death of Charles vi. inherit all the heredi- tary lands of the Hapsburgs, while Don Philip should marry the Archduchess Maria Anna, and after Charles vi.'s death inherit the Hapsburg possessions in Italy, the Milanese and the two Sicilies, to which should be added Tuscany and the duchies of Parma and Piacenza. Other proposals with regard to the Netherlands, Gibraltar, and IMinorca were to be made, but modifications might be allowed so long as the intermarriages were carried out. This proposed union between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid was intended by Elizabeth Farnese to have a rehgious significance. An offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded against the Turks, against the German Protestant princes, and against England. It was also to have an equally distinct effect upon commercial matters. England's maritime and mercantile interests were to be attacked, Gibraltar and Minorca captured, and the Ostend East India Company sup- ported. These instructions were drawn up while the Congress of Cambrai was sitting, and while Monteleone was negotiating at Paris with Mor\'ille against Austria. John William, Baron de Ripperda, was a Dutchman by birth, but a Spaniard by origin. He had represented his native prov- ince, Groningen, in the States-General, and during Ripperda's the Spanish Succession War had become acquainted Career, with Prince Eugene and Zinzendorf. His knowledge of com- mercial matters was keenly appreciated in Holland, and in 1 715 he was sent to Madrid as ambassador, for which post his command of several European languages well fitted him. In Spain he became a warm supporter of Alberoni's schemes,, and his knowledge of commerce was most useful to the Spanish minister. Having openly supported Alberoni's foreign policy and acted with considerable indiscretion, he was recalled, but 72 Etiropean History y 171 5-1789 before Alberoni's fall returned to Spain and became a Catholic, and offered his services to Philip v., who gave him a pension and often consulted him. During Don Luis' short reign he had come prominently forward, and for a short period played an important part in Spanish history. Though talkative and liable to be carried away by exaggerated hopes, he had many excellent qualities, and both Alberoni and Eugene recognised his merits. He had considerable organising powers ; he had a real knowledge of the commercial needs of Spain, and, like Alberoni, determined to revive her trade and encourage her manufactures. He urged upon Elizabeth Farnese the desira- bility of an alliance with Austria, and suggested the idea of double marriages.^ The first overtures, indeed, came to Spain from Austria through the mediation of the Pope, but Elizabeth, with her TheDismis- usual impetuosity, had already thrown herself sal of the eagerly into Ripperda's plans, and his visit to Bourbon. Vienna coincided with a change in the attitude of the French Government, which afforded Spain ample justifica- tion for its adoption of a new policy. The second event which was the immediate cause of the Treaty of Vienna was the dis- missal of the Infanta, Maria Anna Victoria, by the Duke of Bourbon. The object of Bourbon and Madame de Prie, with the full acquiescence of Villars, Fleury, and Morville, and the support of French public opinion, was to arrange a marriage for Louis XV. as soon as possible, for if Louis died without an heir the Orleanist House would succeed, and Bourbon's influ- ence in the Government would cease. Moreover, it was advis- able to secure a docile bride for Louis, and one who, owing her position to Bourbon, would not attempt to remove him from his office. Had it not been for the personal interest of Bour- bon, it is possible that the wishes of Catherine i., the Tsarina, who was anxious that her daughter Elizabeth should marry the French king, and that a closer alliance should be made between Russia and France, might have been seriously considered. 1 Revue cC Histoire Diplomatique, Nos. 2, 3, 4. The Intrigues of ElizabetJi Farnese 73 Peter the Great had left Russia practically isolated on his death in February 1725, and the growing hostiUty of Spain and Austria to the Triple Alliance seemed to offer „ ^ Russian an excellent opportunity for renewing negotiations Overtures with France. Catherine, inheriting Peter's policy, *° ^'■^°'=^- brought fonvard strong arguments to overcome the hesitation of Bourbon. Russian arms should aid French enterprises in any part of Europe ; a French prince, upon the next vacancy, should be placed upon the throne of Poland, which should be controlled by the united action of France and Russia. But Bourbon and Madame de Prie, fearing that the young Princess EHzabeth might develop an independence of spirit and oust them from power, refused to entertain the idea of a Russian match. Princesses of Modena and Lorraine were also discarded on account of their connection with the House of Orleans. At length they decided upon Marie Leszczynski, daughter of Stan- islas, the ex-King of Poland, who was then living at Wissen- burs:, and who had no relations with anv French faction. On September 4, 1725, the marriage took place, Bourbon hoping that a princess who owed her elevation to the house of Bour- bon-Conde would use her influence on its behalf. Bourbon's decision had important results. France found herself bound to support the claims of Stanislas in Poland, all relations with Russia were broken off, and the way was prepared for that close connection between Russia and Austria which had such an important bearing upon European history. While, however, the Duke of Bourbon was playing into the hands of Elizabeth Farnese, Ripperda's mission was meeting with unexpected success. On February 9, 1725, Prince Eu- gene, Stahremberg, and Zinzendorf, the three members of the Secret Conference, which controlled all important conferences matters in the Austrian monarchy, met together i" Vienna, to discuss Ripperdd's proposals. Prince Eugene and Count Gundakar of Stahremberg were old, cautious, and conservative in temperament. They were fully cognisant of the condition of the army and the finances, they were strong advocates of the 74 Eii7'opean History, 17 15-1789 connection with the Maritime Powers, and regarded the English alHance as the pivot of Austrian foreign poHcy. Count Louis of Zinzendorf stood in striking contrast to his two colleagues. Steeped in the scepticism and dilettantism of the century, he was hampered by no principles beyond the necessity of pleas- ing the Emperor. The three ministers, however, on this occa- sion were equally willing to consider carefully the Spanish pro- posals, and were at one with Charles vi. in recognising that Austria stood in a perilous position. They were aware of the partiality of the Maritime Powers for the Itahan scheme of Elizabeth Farnese ; they suspected that the mysterious negotia- tions of Monteleone at Paris would be followed by a com- bined Bourbon attack upon Italy. They, moreover, feared the aggression of the EngUsh and Dutch in the Netherlands, they resented the continual demands by the Maritime Powers for the abolition of the Ostend East India Company, and they were resolved not to yield to the insolent outcry of the London and Amsterdam merchants. At the same time, they agreed with the Emperor in opposing the marriage scheme, which seemed likely to result in awkward complications in the near future. They therefore, on February 11, advised Charles to negotiate for a treaty with Spain on the basis of the Quadruple Alliance, but to decline the marriage proposals, on the ground of the youth of the Archduchesses and of the engagement of Don Carlos to a French princess. After negotiations had taken place between Ripperda and Zinzendorf, the draft of a treaty was sent to Madrid on March 9. Already, however, on March I, couriers had left Paris for IMadrid, Turin, Rome, and Lon- don to announce the decision of the Duke of Bourbon to send back the Infanta to Spain. The rupture of the marriage scheme between France and Spain, the announcement of which reached Madrid in the first week of March, precipitated a crisis in the policy of Vienna, of Europe. A plausiblc pretext had been afforded ^'''^ to Spain ; the Spanish ambassador was recalled from Paris and the Spanish representatives from the Congress. The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 75 lII Austro-Spanish alliance was at once made. The Treaty of ''ienna included a sheaf of treaties, — pubUc ones signed on Lpril 30, 1725, and May i, and a secret one signed in Novem- er. By the public treaties Charles renounced his claim to 'hiUp's dominions, agreed to cede the reversion of the Italian uchies to Don Carlos, and promised to do all in his power to id in the recovery of Gibraltar. Philip, on the other hand, scognised the Ostend East India Company, and an offensive nd defensive alhance was signed. The conclusion of this unnatural alhance between the two ivals of the War of the Spanish Succession shocked the diplo- latic conscience of Europe, and was shortly after- ^^^ ^^^ ^ards followed by a demand on the part of Spain of Hanover, Dr the cession of Gibraltar. The warlike enthusi- ^^^^' sm of the Spaniards was roused, and preparations made for ostilities. Threatened by this new combination, France, Eng- md, and Prussia, taking advantage of the widespread alarm in xermany at the prospect of a revival of Charles v.'s empire, Drmed a league at Herrenhausen, which, known as the alhance if Hanover, was joined later by Sweden and Denmark, and by lolland somewhat unwillingly. The Treaty of Hanover, while iirected against the estabhshment of the Ostend East India Company, was mainly defensive, but the very formation of the Uiance tended to unite the Courts of Spain and Austria still nore closely together. Since May, Elizabeth Farnese had arranged marriages be- ween Don Ferdinand, the Prince of the Asturias, and a Portuguese princess, and between the Spanish Infanta and he Portuguese "heir-apparent. She was more than ever deter- nined to secure the two Austrian Archduchesses for her two ons, Don Carlos and Don Philip. In Vienna Zinzendorf was upported by the Marquis de Rialp, a Spaniard, who had great nfluence with the Emperor, and who was the leader of the :rowd of Spanish refugees, always favoured by Charles w. but lated by the Austrians. Prince Eugene and Stahremberg, the eaders of the German party, which regarded with deep suspi- 76 European History^ 171 5-1789 cion Rialp and the Spanish section, and which preserved a traditional regard for the English alliance, were opposed to the marriage project. But Eugene and Stahremberg had already agreed to the treaties of April 30, and the menacing attitude of England with regard to the Ostend Company weakened their opposition to the proposals of Ripperda and Zinzendorf. The Treaty of Hanover was a powerful argument in the hands of the supporters of the Spanish alliance, and in Novem- The Secret ^^^ ^^ sccret portion of the Treaty of Vienna was Articles in signed by Ripperda, Eugene, Stahremberg,* and of Vienna^ Zinzcudorf. Marriages were to be concluded be- Nov. 1725. tween the Archduchesses and Don Carlos and Don Philip, and both Powers were to act conjointly in supporting the claims of the Hapsburgs to the Imperial throne, in Polish succession questions, and in questions relating to the succes- sion to Jiilich and Berg ; while in case of a French defeat, France was to be partitioned, Spain taking Cerdagne, Rous- sillon, and Lower Navarre, and Austria Alsace and the Belgian provinces. Gibraltar and Minorca were to be speedily restored to Spain, and the Ostend East India Company was to be sup- ported. The treaties of Vienna were a great triumph for Elizabeth Farnese, and her schemes seemed likely to be suc- cessfully carried out. A diplomatic revolution had been effected, which however, unlike those of 171 7 and 1756, led to no permanent alteration in the relations of the various Powers to one another, and was followed by no European war. The news of this secret treaty, contemplating very considerable changes in the map of Europe, was received with alarm, and a general war seemed likely to ensue. All Europe was divided into two camps. On the side of Spain and Austria, Russia ranged herself in August 1726, and the alliance of Vienna was also joined by the ecclesiastical Electors, by Bavaria and the Palatinate. On the other hand, the alliance of Hanover included, besides England, France, and Prussia, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Hesse-Cassel. To the rulers of Spain, as of Austria, religious and commercial motives struggled for The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 77 precedence. The extermination of Protestantism was kept in view at Madrid as well as Vienna, and it was regarded as not improbable that France might be induced to join a system which had as its basis the extension of Catholicism. The overthrow of the House of Hanover, and the estabhshment of the Pretender upon the English throne, would be followed by the extermination of Protestantism in North Germany, and by the restoration of England to its rank among Catholic Powers. In Madrid the news of the alliance between Austria and Russia was received with enthusiasm, and it was expected that Alberoni's scheme for the restoration of the Pretender by the aid of the Russian fleet would be revived. The Duke of Liria was sent in March 1727 to St. Petersburg to make an aUiance with the Muscovite Court, and to arrange for a diver- sion against England in the interests of the Pretender and the Catholic religion. The outbreak of war seemed imminent, and of the two European leagues that of Vienna was the more united and the more powerful. Not only were the rulers of Austria, „ • • • ^ ^ ' Prussia 301ns Spain, and Russia actuated by fierce hostility to the Emperor France or England, but while both Holland and pfwaster^-^^ Sweden were lukewarm allies, Prussia in character- ^hauser^j726. istic fashion deserted the alHance of Hanover, and in October 1726 made the Treaty of Wlisterhausen with the Emperor, and in consequence Hanover lay open to an attack by the Im- perialists.^ Spain, under the direction of Ripperda, had entered upon a fresh period of commercial development and industrial activity. All she required was freedom from foreign wars and internal disturbances to enable her to stimulate colonial trade, to build a good navy, and to restore the finances of the country. While Spain held firmly to her engagements with Austria, and seemed in a fair way to advance along the path of industrial progress, the policy of the French Government Parties in was hesitating and uncertain. In France, as in France. Holland, there was always to be found a powerful Spanish party, 1 See Carlyle, History of Frederick the Great. 78 European History, 171 5-1 789 and at the very time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Hanover there was in Paris an influential section of Frenchmen who aimed at a return to the policy of Louis xrv.'s later years — a close union with Spain, the restoration of the Stuarts, and a definite anti-Protestant attitude. The Government of Bourbon was weak, divided, and incompetent, while the anti- English and war party was strong, united, and possessed of capable leaders. Bourbon's policy was a feeble continuance of that of the Regent, and, in face of the rapid expansion of English trade, seemed to far-sighted Frenchmen highly detrimental to French interests. In 1726 an English fleet under Hosier blockaded the Spanish treasure fleet at Porto Bello, while another fleet held the Baltic and overawed Russia; in February 1727 the Spaniards besieged Gibraltar, and this outbreak of hostilities between Spain and England seemed the prelude to a general European war. A variety of circumstances, however, combined to pre- serve Europe from a great struggle for some six years. Though Spain allied with Austria was in a stronger position than in the days of Alberoni, she was far from being prepared The Fall of to enter upon prolonged and costly military and Ripperda. naval operations. To her more than any other of the principal European states peace was absolutely essential. In May 1726 Ripperda was dismissed. A powerful opposi- tion had been formed against him ; the Imperial ambassador, Konigsegg, threw his influence on the side of Spanish public opinion ; and Elizabeth, on whose favour he had entirely depended, suddenly decided upon his overthrow. Though an opportunist and an adventurer, Ripperda had considerable talents. His schemes for the regeneration of Spain were in many respects admirable, and were carried out to a great extent by the famous administrators who succeeded him. That he had not a single friend in Spain is itself ample testimony of the thoroughness of those reforms which, during his short period of office, he was able to initiate. He fully recognised the folly of plunging into war, but, like Alberoni, was forced to adapt his views to suit those of the queen. EHzabeth alone TJie Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 79 desired war. The alliance of Vienna was as unpopular in Spain as the Austrian alliance was in France some thirty years later. National feeling in Spain might be gratified, but national interest would hardly be furthered by making the aggrandisement of Elizabeth's children the principal aim of Spanish policy. It was felt that Spain's true ally was France, that Ripperda had sacrificed the interests of Spain to those of the queen, while the attitude of the Emperor and the general relations between Madrid and Vienna only tended to confirm this conviction. Charles vi. discovered before Ripperda's fall that he could not hope to obtain large supplies of money from Spain, and during the siege of Gibraltar had taken no steps to xhe Break- aid his aUies. The Emperor was not in a position "p °^ ^^^ , . , , . ,. Austro- to enter upon a war ; he was mvolved m disputes Spanish with his new ally, Prussia ; while Catherine i., who ^^^-^°^«- died in May 1727, had been succeeded by Peter n., a mere child, and Russia for the time ceased to be ranked among his active supporters. Charles had never Hked the idea of the establishment of the Spaniards in Italy ; he recognised that a Spanish match was impossible ; he was opposed to the siege of Gibraltar. With the opening of 1727 peaceful counsels began to prevail in Vienna, and the Austro-Spanish alliance became sensibly weakened. The influence of Fleury and Walpole was also used to bring about a general pacification. In June 1726 Fleury had overthrown Bourbon, who had endeavoured to exile him, and though seventy-three years old, he governed France with ability till his death in 1743. Within France he endeavoured with some success to preser\'e tranquillity, and by economy and good administration to temper the despotic ?'egime and to improve the condition of the country. His foreign policy was peaceful. Till 1733 he managed, though with difficulty, to continue the Orleanist system of peace and friendship with England. After 1733 the war party proved too powerful for the pacific minister. The system of Louis xr*. was adopted. Fleury was forced 8o European History, 171 5-1789 into the Polish and Austrian Succession Wars, and before his death saw the renewal of the ancient hostility between England and France. The almost simultaneous disappearance from the political stage of Ripperda and Bourbon in 1726 had paved the way for the resumption of friendly relations between France and Spain. While Fleury, whose knowledge of the politics of Europe was considerable, and whose appreciation of the true needs of France was accurate and complete, had convinced himself that the continuance of the English alliance was the right policy, he remained honestly anxious to bring about a reconciliation with Spain. The secret mission of Montgon, in consequence of Louis xv.'s dangerous illness, like the embassy of Cellamare, bore witness not only to the existence of a power- ful opposition in France to the policy of the Government, but also to the continued determination of Phihp to secure the French succession in the event of Louis' death. France held the key of the situation, and Fleury's position as First Minister added strength to his argument in favour of peace. But though he was sufficiently strong to prevent the formation of a close alhance between France and Spain to the detriment of England, he was unable, in the teeth of a fierce opposition, to use French forces to aid the English Power against the Court of ^Madrid. Though he entered into a secret correspondence with Elizabeth, he refused to desert the Eng- lish alliance, and in May 1727 the French, Spanish, Dutch, and Imperial ministers signed preliminaries of peace at Vienna. It was agreed that the Ostend East India Company should be suspended for seven years, that the siege of Gibraltar should be raised, and that these and other matters should be referred to a general congress for a definite settlement. Elizabeth her- self was opposed to peace ; she still hoped to detach England from France, and on the death of George i. in June anticipated a successful Jacobite invasion of England. But Walpole was fully alive to the danger from the adherents of the exiled Stuarts. English policy remained unchanged, and the English and French ministers devoted all their efforts to preserve peace, The hiU'igucs of ElizabetJi Faniese 8 1 and to separate the Courts of Vienna and Madrid. But the dif- ficulties of Walpole and Fleury were enormous. In England, as in France, the national desire for war was stimulated by a power- ful party among the opposition. The negotiations between England and Spain would have failed had General War not Fleury and Konigsegg used all their influence '" ^'^^^'^ ' with Elizabeth in favour of peace, and in March 1728 Spain signed the Convention of the Pardo, accepted the Prelimina- ries of Vienna, and thus the short war between England and Spain came to an end. The alliance between Spain and Austria had been rudely shaken, and Elizabeth found herself isolated in Europe. It only required the Congress of Soissons to complete the breach between the two countries. That Congress, which opened on June 14, 1728, proved as useless as its predecessor at Cambrai. It acted with the greatest deliberation, and Patino, Ripperda's successor, took advantage of the slowness of its proceedings to hasten the Spanish preparations for war. Chauvelin, an active supporter of the anti-English and the anti-Austrian parties in France, became Keeper of the Seals, and succeeded Morville as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the autumn of 1727, and a family alliance between the Bourbons seemed to be within measurable distance. The year 1728 was a critical one in the history of Europe. But the Austro-Spanish aUiance was fast breaking down, and Fleury proved strong enough to resist the pressure of ChauveHn and his supporters. Elizabeth had now realised that the marriage schemes arranged by the secret treaty of 1725 would never be carried out, and Patifio attacked the Austrian alliance with vigour. In December 1728 Elizabeth, on receiving formal notification that the marriages could not at present take place, recognised at once that her aims in Italy could not be attained by the help of the Emperor, and with characteristic impetuosity turned to France and England to aid her in securing the Italian duchies for Don Carlos. The birth of a Dauphin removed the last obstacle to a renewal of friendly relations with France, all real causes of dispute between the PERIOD VI. F 82 European History y 171 5-1789 two countries were removed, and dynastic interests and dynas- tic jealousies no longer stood in the way of an alliance. In England Walpole was ready to consider favourably the direct application for assistance from Elizabeth, who, irritated at Fleury's slowness, had placed all her hopes upon England. Patiiio, too, was willing to accept an English alHance till Spain was thoroughly prepared to contest British encroachments in South America. To obtain the settlement of Don Carlos in Italy, and to revenge herself on Charles vi,, was the fixed resolution of Eliz- abeth in 1729. Walpole, in spite of the clamour of of Seville, the opposition, was as ready as Patiiio to cultivate *^*^' friendship between England and Spain. The great colonial questions had not as yet reached a very acute phase, and he persuaded the French minister to insist upon the intro- duction of Spanish troops into Parma and Piacenza. On November 9 the negotiations between the three Courts cul- minated in the Treaty of Seville, — joined a few days later by Holland. By this treaty the privileges granted to the Ostend East India Company in 1725 were revoked, the English trade to the Indies as well as to the Assiento were placed on their former footing, the Spaniards virtually resigned all claim to Gibraltar and Minorca, the succession of Don Carlos to the Italian duchies was guaranteed, and the occupation of Leghorn, Porto Ferrajo, Parma, and Piacenza by 6000 Spanish troops was arranged for. Elizabeth Farnese had apparently triumphed, and the succession of Don Carlos was assured. And though her satisfaction was modified by a delay of some years before the execution of the terms of the treaty, the importance of that treaty is undoubted. The unnatural Austro-Spanish alHance came to an end, and its place was taken by an arrangement far more in consonance with Spanish interests. For, though dif- ferences might arise, the relations of France and Spain were henceforward more cordial, and the saying of the Spanish ambassador in 1700 — henceforward there are no Pyrenees — seemed likely to be reaUsed. The interests of the Courts of The Intrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 83 Paris and Madrid were in many respects identical ; in the New World their claims did not clash, and both were united in hos- tility to the encroachments of England. The treaty, moreover, was a triumph of Fleury's pohcy, which since 1726 had aimed at enlarging the Anglo-French alliance by the introduction of Spain. He had now succeeded in returning to the later Orleanist policy, he had come to a better understanding with Spain, while keeping France firm to the alliance of Hanover. France again stood before Europe as the leading Bourbon Power, with Spain in due subordination. Peace had been pre- served, and the credit of averting a European war could be equally shared by him and by Walpole. But for two years it did not seem at all improbable that the Treaty of Seville would be followed by a struggle in Italy between the forces of Aus- tria and Spain. The treaty left Charles vi. isolated and furious at the conduct of Spain ; in France the anti-Hapsburg party clamoured for war ; in England the ministry was far from har- monious. Both Fleury and Walpole had difficult tasks to per- form. The former was not yet prepared for a close offensive and defensive alliance with Spain ; though resolved not to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, he was by no means anxious for war with Austria; at the same time he was jealous of England's influence at Madrid, and showed no desire to carry out the Treaty of Senile. Walpole, like Fleury, was hampered by a powerful opposition. Though prepared to fulfil, if neces- sary, his engagements with Spain, he had no sympathy with the views of Townshend, who, Hke Villars, desired an England and immediate attack on the Emperor. The English Spain. Government feared that the outbreak of a general European war would be followed by an attack on Hanover, and by the occupation of the Austrian Netherlands by the French. It desired that all miUtary operations should be confined to the bone of contention, — the Emperor's Italian dominions, — and that at all hazards no French invasion of the Austrian Nether- lands should take place. But the English opposition, led by Wyndham and Pulteney, hampered the Government by attacks 84 European History, 171 5-1789 on the close connection subsisting between England and France, and it became evident that there was a s'-rong feeling in the country that Austria, a country without colonies or a fleet, and since 1688 closely connected with Great Britain, was England's true ally, and that France and Spain, with their enor- mous colonial possessions and their weak navies, were her real foes.-^ The continued outrages of the Spanish guardacostas upon English traders and sailors in Spain and in Spanish America in 1730 and 1731, together with disputes about the boundaries of Georgia and the cutting of logwood, afforded justification for the attitude of the opposition. English trade was harassed, and not altogether unjustly, for the smuggling carried on by Englishmen had reached very considerable lengths. As long as the provisions of the Treaty of Seville remained a dead letter, the Spanish Government paid no at- tention to the EngUsh grievances. But neither EHzabeth nor Patifio were prepared to break with England. Philip, whose views were far more national than those of his wife, was always anxious for a close union with France, but Elizabeth was only intent upon carrying out her Italian projects, while Patino, like x'Xlberoni, and Ripperda, though reahsing the full import of Eng- lish trading rivalry, was as anxious as Walpole to solve the present difficulties without recourse to arms. In January 1731 the death of the Duke of Parma brought matters to a crisis. Imperial troops occupied the duchies, while Elizabeth demanded that England and France should fulfil their engagements. A European war seemed inevitable if Spanish soldiers landed in Italy. It was, however, averted by the offer of England to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. Though Fleury Treaty of was determined to give Charles no guarantee, Wal- Vienna, 1731. p^j^ j^^j ^^ ^Mc^ objection. For the sake of a direct guarantee of his family arrangement by the ^Maritime Powers, Charles agreed to withdraw his troops, and to allow Don Carlos to take possession of Parma, and to sign a treaty to that effect with England, Holland, and Spain. This settlement, known as 1 See Jobez, La France sous Louis XV. The hitrigues of Elizabeth Farnese 85 the second Treaty of Vienna, consisted of two treaties, the first made with England and Holland in March 1731, the second with Spain in July. By the former England and Holland rec- ognised the Pragmatic Sanction, while the Emperor granted George 11. formal investiture of Bremen and Verden, agreed to suspend the Ostend East India Company, and to permit 6000 Spanish troops to enter the Italian duchies. In the latter treaty no direct guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction was insisted upon. In December 1731 Don Carlos and Spanish troops, escorted by an English fleet, landed in Italy, and early in 1732 entered into quiet possession of Parma. Elizabeth had won a great triumph. Don Carlos was secure in Parma and Piacenza, and, by an ar- rangement with the Grand Duke, his succession to Tuscany had been assured. The arrangements made at Utrecht had been modified through the pertinacity of the queen, the Austrian hold on Italy had been weakened, and a Spanish dynasty intro- duced into Parma. Her success had been secured in the face of overwhelming difficulties both at home and abroad. In 17 13 Spain was weak and divided, and of little account in Europe. In 1 731 she had become a powerful nation, whose policy was independent, and whose alliance was valuable. The second Treaty of Vienna is important, not only in the history of Spain, but also in reference to the attitude and policy of the other European Powers. The establishment of a young Spanish dynasty in Italy was fraught with important consequences to Austria, as well as to Italy itself. Charles vi. had again illus- trated his willingness to retire from strong positions for the sake of phantoms, and had withdrawn his support from the Ostend Company. In 1733 the INIohammedan Government, incited by the rival European Companies, destroyed Bankipur. The shareholders endeavoured in vain to transfer the centre of their European trade to Hamburg or to Trieste, but, after a long struggle against adverse fortune, the Company became bankrupt in 1784, and was finally extinguished in 1793. In 1 731 the conclusion of the Treaty was thought to assure to Europe some years of tranquillity. The dreaded union of S6 European History, 171 5-1789 France and Spain did not appear likely to take place, for France and Spain were not on good terms. The settlement of the question of the Itahan duchies had been effected with- out the co-operation of France, whose influence was for the moment lessened, while the dreaded growth of Bourbonism, which since 1729 had been a source of alarm at Vienna no less than at London and the Hague, seemed to have received a decided check. The friendship between England and Spain and between Spain and the Emperor appeared likely to con- tinue. Colonial disputes had been peacefully adjusted, and the affairs in the Itahan Peninsula offered no opening for hostile manifestations. But the calm of 1732 was the calm which preceded a storm. CHAPTER IV THE WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION 1733-1735 Austria from 1720 to 1733 — The Views of Fleun', Walpole, and Patino — Europe in 1732 — Growth of Hostihty letween England and Spain — The Death of the Polish King, 1733 — Sardinia under Victor Amadeus I., 1715- 1730 — France makes Treaties with Sardinia and Spain — Opening of the War — France attempts to gain the Co-operation of Turkey — Fleun,' fails to grasp the Situation — Success of the Russian and Austrian Pohcy in Poland — Success of tlie French in Italy and on the Rhine — Divergent Interests of Spain and Sardinia — The Third Treaty of Vienna, 1735 — Death of Eugene — Fall of Chauvelin — Death of Patiiio — The European Importance of the War of the Polish Succession. The happiest years of Charles vi.'s reign were probably those which fell between i72o^and 1733. The Hungarians were tran- quil, and no troubles on the eastern frontier dis- Austria from turbed the Court of Vienna. His territorial gains ^720 to 1733. at the expense of tTie~TurIcrwere still intact, and Prince Eugene was at the height of his fame. Though the terms of the Bar- rier Treaty and the opposition of the Maritime Powers to the Ostend East India Company had caused a certain amount of friction, and though the treaty of 1725 had alarmed Europe, Charles had allowed his desire to secure the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction to overmaster all questions of higher pohcy. His army was weak, his treasury was empty, and in case of war Austria was in a pecuharly defenceless position. Charles had every reason to desire peace. The second Treaty of Vienna seemed to bring with it the certainty of the preservation of the European status quo for many years to come. The advantages S7 88 European History, 171 5-1 789 of peace were no less clearly appreciated by the English and Spanish ministers, while in France Fleury's pacific views were The Views of wcU known. He had no taste for adventurous Fieury, wai- schemes, and, moreover, he was engaged in a bitter pole, and ' ' ' o o Patifio. Struggle with the Parlement of Paris. France, thus ensraared at home, and without anv alhes on whom she could de- pend in the event of the outbreak of hostihties, seemed unlikely to disturb the harmony of Europe. England, fully occupied with the development of her trade and the expansion of her colonies, was governed by a minister who, in spite of the attacks and denunciations of a formidable opposition and the warhke ideas of George 11., was resolved to maintain peace, and, if pos- sible, friendly relations with France. Like Fieury and Wal- pole, Patino held pacific views ; Spain and England appeared to be on friendly terms, and the relations of both countries with France w^e outwardly satisfactory. In spite, however, of this reassuring outlook, the year 1732, though undisturbed by actual war, saw the gathering together of a storm which burst upon Europe in 1733, and was followed by a long period of conflict. In reality the political situation after the second Treaty of Vienna was, if examined closely, far from reassuring. In Europe France the existence of a powerful war party, in 1732. v/hich each year became more beUicose in its views and more popular with the nation, was a distinct menace to the peace of Europe, while Louis xv.'s determination to place Stanislas Leszczynski on the Polish throne whenever a vacancy occurred, was a warning to Europe that France was ready to return to the policy of Louis xrv. This war party, headed by Villars in the French Council, advocated union with Spain and alliance with the small German states and with Sardinia. The union with Spain would bring about the ruin of England's commerce, while the friendship of the lesser German Powers would prevent the outbreak of hostilities on the part of the Emperor. ^" These views acquired fresh importance owing to the growing irritation between Spain and the Eaiperor, and the increasing The War of the Polish Succession 89 commercial and colonial rivalry between England and France, and between England and Spain. "^ The presence of Don Carlos in Parma, and the occupation of the Duchy of Tuscany by 6000 Spanish troops, naturally gave rise to constant friction between the Courts of ]\Iadrid and Vienna. The dynastic aims of Elizabeth Farnese in Italy had by no means been entirely fulfilled, and she was watching for an opportunity to make fresh acquisitions. She and PhiHp soon realised that for the furtherance of their aggressive schemes a French alHance was eminently desirable. The French Government on its part was equally anxious to make a treaty with Spain which should unite the Bour- bons against England. The commercial and colonial rivalr}^ between France and England rendered a colhsion between the -two Powers in the not very distant future inevitable ; it became the object of both nations to secure the Spanish alliance ; and at ISIadrid Keene and Rothenburg, the rival ambassadors, engaged in a great diplomatic duel. Walpole and Patino were both bent on the presen-ation of peace, — the former in order to maintain the House of Brunswick on the EngHsh throne, the latter in order that Spain should have time to gain strength and to improve her na\7. Phihp was, as usual, inclined towards a French aUiance, while Elizabeth, who hated Fleur}-, desired with Patino to preserve friendship wath England. But as the year proceeded the Spanish Court changed its policy, and declared boldly Growth of aojainst Endand and in favour of France. For Hostility be- , . . , ° , , . . , tween Eng- this sudden change dynastic interests and na- land and tional considerations were equally responsible, spam. English ministers gave no encouragement to the extensive designs of Elizabeth Farnese, while the French Government, holding out hopes of further acquisitions in Italy, incited the queen against the Emperor. At the same time commercial disputes with England had entered an acute phase. A state of things existed in South America somewhat similar to the position of affairs in North America during the years immedi- 90 European History, 1 71 5-1789 ately preceding the Seven Years' War. In 1732 England and Spain were practically at war in the Pacific, just is in 1754, two years before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, hostilities had definitely broken out between the English and French colonists in North America. The Assiento Treaty had never been popular in Spain ; while the English right to send annually a ship to South America was the cause of a vast amount of smuggUng.-^ Additional circumstances com- bined to increase the irritation between the two countries. The English and Dutch objected to a proposed new Philippine Company. English men-of-war, often on the flimsiest pre- texts, seized guardacostas, while the Spaniards replied by capt- uring English merchantmen. In 1731 the famous Jenkins had lost his famous ear, and the only explanation given by the Spaniards was that such outrages were the work of pirates, and not of Spanish guardacostas. Spanish susceptibilities throughout these trying years received scant recognition from the English merchants, furious at the right of search claimed by the guardacostas, while the whole influence of the Enghsh press, backed up by a powerful and unscrupulous opposition, was employed to force England into a war with Spain. Had it not been for Philip's illness in August, war with Eng- land would have broken out in September 1732.^ The efforts of the English ministers to bring about a satisfactory reconcilia- tion between the Courts of Vienna and Seville never ceased, but they were now opposed by the French Government anxious to conclude a treaty with Spain, and to embroil that country The Death with Austria. In spite of aU the efforts of Patiiio, °^^!^t,,. it became clear at the beginning of 1733 that a Polish King, ° *=" ^^ Feb. 1733. European war was near at hand. In February, Augustus II., King of Poland, died ; his death gave the signal for the outbreak. France at once took the initiative. Though occupied with a religious struggle with the Parlement of Paris, though financial disorders remained unchecked, the French 1 See Armstrong, Elizabeth Farnese. The War of the Polish Succession 9 1 Government only expressed the national feeling when it de- cided, in pursuance of the traditional policy of France, to defend the independence of Poland, and to support by force of arms the candidature of Stanislas Leszczynski, the father-in-law of Louis XV. In face of the certain opposition of Russia, Austria, and the probable opposition of Prussia, the problem before the French Government was not how to get Stanislas elected, but how to maintain him on the throne when elected. Since the beginning of the century Russia and Austria had taken a deep interest in PoHsh affairs, they were prepared vigorously to resist French interference in Poland, and they could easily find means to nullify the election of a French candidate. Saxony, moreover, lent itself to the furtherance of Russian and Austrian designs, and Poland, with no clear poHcy, and the prey to internal divi- sions, was totally unable to resist the forces of the two Imperial Powers. *The Poles,' said Stanislas, 'will nominate but will not support me.' Stanislas could not hope to retain Poland unless France supported him, not only by her alliance, but also by force of arms. In spite, however, of the pacific assertions of Fleury, the French Government adopted the views of Chau- velin and Villars, and determined to place, and if possible to maintain, Louis' father-in-law on the Polish throne, and at the same time to deal a telling blow at the House of Hapsburg. Preparations were made to attack Philipsburg in the summer of 1733, while negotiations were hurried on with Spain and Sar- dinia. In the former country, the warhke aspirations of Philip carried the day against Elizabeth and Patiiio ; in the latter, to the surprise of Charles vi., Charles Emanuel, the young king of Sardinia, consented to admit the French into Italy. But the young king of Sardinia was wise in his generation. His father, Victor Amadeus, with consummate skill had placed the young kingdom of Sardinia in a fairly strong Sardinia position. By the Treaty of Utrecht, he was author- Amadeus"",*"' ised to build strong places in his states wherever 1715-30. he pleased, and with the addition of Sicily and the title of 92 Enropean History, 171 5-1789 king he might hope for the rapid development of his kingdom. The forced exchange of Sicily for Sardinia was in reality not a loss, for the latter island was close to his Italian lands, and the royal position enabled him to keep envoys at the principal Euro- pean capitals, watch his interests, and take part in the diplomacy and intrigues of the time. From 17 18 to 1730 he had devoted himself to the work of legislation and administration, and car- ried out important reforms, which a tedious quarrel with the Papacy over his undoubted right to nominate to vacant bene- fices — which was finally recognised by Benedict xiv. — did not interrupt. Financial reforms were boldly dealt with ; the exemp- tion from taxation enjoyed by the nobles was removed ; the rev- enue was augmented ; venality was checked ; agriculture and sheep-farming were encouraged. All owners of land were compelled to exhibit their titles, and the slightest irregularity resulted in the confiscation of the property. By these and similar measures feudahsm in his dominions was in great meas- ure destroyed, and Victor Amadeus succeeded in enforcing equality before the law, and that without any revolt, conspir- acy, or civil war. In many other ways the new Italian king- dom profited from the wise rule of Victor Amadeus. An Hotel des Invahdes for old soldiers was estabhshed. Pubhc archives were organised, and the study of Italian literature was encouraged. On September 30, 1730, the abdication of the king removed from the councils of Sardinia that serious and practical spirit which had been mainly instrumental in laying firmly the foundations of the rising Italian kingdom and gave a distinct impetus towards the growth of the sentiment of Italian nationality. His son and successor, Charles Emanuel i., who occupied the throne till 1773, had hitherto been regarded as frivolous and unlikely to guide his affairs with discretion. He showed, however, from the first a keen sense of the real inter- ests of his country, which he guided through a stormy period with consummate success; and after 1748 emulated his father in his desire to carry out measures for the improvement and well-being of his people. The War of the Polish Succession 93 On September i Stanislas was elected King of Poland ; on September 26 the League of Turin was concluded between France and Sardinia. Chauvelin's general policy at this mo- ment recalls that of Richelieu during the Thirty Years' War. Austria was to be driven out of Italy; the King of Sardinia was to occupy the Tvlilanese and Mantua ; Don Carlos was to have Naples, Sicily, and the Tuscan ports ; Don Philip, Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany; while France, as a reward for her assistance, should receive Savoy. But Charles Emanuel's views were not strictly identical with those of Chauvelin. Aware of the desire of the Spanish Court to become supreme France in Italy, he was opposed to the introduction of the Treaties Spaniards into northern Italy ; they should, he de- '^'*^ s^""- 1 J 1 ^ ■ • 11- diniaand clared, occupy themselves m conquermg the kmg- Spain, dom of the Two Sicilies, and the Tuscan ports. With French aid he proposed to conquer Lombardy and ^^lantua for himself. On November 7 the secret treaty of the Escurial was signed between France and Spain. It was nothing less than a solemn family compact between the two branches of the House of Bourbon. United, France and Spain were to present a firm opposition to the colonial extension and the commercial aggres- sions of Great Britain, and at the same time to act together against the Emperor. Each Power guaranteed the possessions of the other. Gibraltar was to be recovered, the exclusive privileges granted by Spain to English merchants were to be revoked, and the combined Bourbon fleets jyere to repel any attack of the English navy. The secret treaty of November 7, 1733, resembles in many points the family compact of 1721 made by Dubois. It is important as indicating the natural "tendency of the Bourbon Powers to resist not only the expansion of the trade of Eng- land, which was thrusting itself into South America, but also the rapid development of the Anglo-Saxon race in North America. The commercial interests of England had definitely clashed with those of Spain even before 1588, and with those of France since 1688. But during the Polish Succession War 94 European History , 171 5-1789 the Bourbon arms were mainly directed against the Emperor, and the open hostiUty of Spain to England was not declared to the world before 1739. To the surprise of all the combatants, England remained neutral.-^ The opposition, declaring that the Treaty of Utrecht had been too favourable to France, demanded that another Grand AUiance should be formed against the aggressions of the House of Bourbon. But France had carefully guaranteed the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands now denuded of Austrian troops, and the States-General, realising their inability to defend the Barrier towns, decided to remain neutral. With- ^ . , out the co-operation of the Dutch, Walpole reso- Opening of '■ ^ the War, lutely refused to move. Fleury had already, how- Oct. 1733. ever, been forced to take action, and on October 23 war was declared against the Emperor. But though Fleury could boast of having organised a league of Powers against the union of Austria and Russia, and though the Emperor could be attacked in Italy and on the Rhine, France had so far done nothing for Stanislas, and had been helpless to prevent 50,000 Russian troops from invading Poland. Louis' unfortu- iiate father-in-law and his French auxiliaries had already been driven from his kingdom, and had taken refuge in Danzig, while Augustus of Saxony was in October, by Russian and Saxon arms, forced upon the unwilling Poles. It was impos- sible for a French army to march through Germany ; a fleet sent to the Baltic would arouse the hostiUty of England. If France really meant to stand by her candidate, an alliance must at once be made with Prussia, Sweden, or Turkey. Of these three Powers Frederick William had the best army, he was jealous of Russia, he distrusted Charles vi. But he had already decided that the mission of the Hohenzollerns was to unite the detached portions of the Prussian monarchy by seiz- ing Polish Prussia, and he was unwilling to take any step to hinder the inevitable progress of Poland towards dismember- 1 See Heeren, Historical Treatises. Ranke, History of England, prin- cipally in the Seventeenth Century, vol, v. The War of tJie Polish Succession 95 ment, Sweden, torn by internal dissensions, was for the time incapable of offering an adequate resistance to Russian schemes, and Fleury recognised that though diplomacy might in time convert Sweden into an effective ally, the French Government could not expect efficient aid from any of the Baltic Powers. Turkey, however, remained, and Turkey, owing to prance its geographical position and its large army, its attempts to natural hostility to Russia, and its fears of the co^.op^raUon advance eastwards of Austria, had every reason to °^ Turkey, join France in protecting PoHsh independence. Russia had in 1 72 1 partially dismembered Sweden; she was preparing the downfall of Poland, and that accomplished she proposed to concentrate her attention upon the continuance of Peter the Great's policy with regard to Turkey. Whenever the Russian attack took place the Porte would find itself quite unable to withstand 200,000 disciplined Russian troops, unless it could obtain the support of one of the great European Powers. Poland and Turkey stood and fell together. At the time of the capitulation of the Pruth, Peter the Great had solemnly promised that Russia should not interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. In 1733 Turkey had every reason for apprehension and every inducement to take active measures. In the Tartar tribes, Turkey possessed an immense if somewhat undisciplined army. The prestige of France was high among these tribes, and in 1730 the Khan had assured the French ambassador Villeneuve of his readiness to aid France in placing Stanislas on the Polish throne. The neutrahty of England was bitterly resented by the Court of Vienna, and especially by Prince Eugene. He was con- vinced that the House of Austria, without the assistance of the Maritime Powers, could not resist the combination brought against it, and, in letters which were laid before George 11., he graphically described the result upon the empire and Europe of England's non-intervention. It had been for many years a fixed principle with the English parUament to maintain an equiUbrium between Austria and France, and though Walpole 96 European History, 171 5-1789 might say with truth that the succession to Poland did not affect England, it could not be denied that England was inter- ested in the fate of Italy and the aggrandisement of France. Walpole's policy at this juncture may have been consistent with the momentary advantage of Hanoverian dynasty, but it is open to the charge of being detrimental to the general interests of England and Europe. It is a tenable view that had Austria been vigorously supported by the Maritime Powers, Europe might have been spared the War of the Austrian Succession.^ The Emperor was thus left to combat the forces of France, Spain, and Sardinia in Italy and on the Rhine — a combination seemingly due to the aged and pacific French minister. In 1733 Villeneuve urged the Turks to move. But though Fleury had issued a manifesto declaring that any interference in Poland would be regarded by France as a menace to the general peace, and had secretly despatched Stanislas to Poland, the Porte refused to take action till France declared war against Austria and made a defensive league wilh Turkey. But Fleury, a prince of the Church, was, like Louis xrv., un- willing to make an alliance with the Infidel ; and the Turks, fearful of being attacked by Russia and Austria simultaneously — as indeed happened a few years later — absolutely refused to move unless France would at least engage not to make peace with Austria so long as Russia was at war with the Porte. The renegade Pacha Bonneval, then in the Turkish service, urged a close alliance between France and Turkey. Sweden would join it, while England, he said, will soon recognise that in Rus- sia she has a dangerous rival in the distant regions of Asia, for Russia, having crossed the Caucasus and the Caspian, will try and seize the trade of India and will spread all over the far east. Thus, with the adhesion of England, Holland, and Spain, a great western coalition will assure the integrity of the Sultan's dominions. 1 Ranke, History of England^ principally in the Seventeenth Century, vol. V. p. 238; Coxe, House of Aus/ria, vol. iii. p. 133 ; Heeren, Historical Treatises, p. 299. The War of the Polish Succession 97 But the colonial and Italian interests of France and Spain seemed of greater moment to those Powers than the integrity of the Turkish empire, and Fleurv but slowlv ^, ^ •' ' Fleury fails realised the immense importance to France of an to grasp the alliance with the Porte. Russia, however, quickly ^^*"^*>°°- perceived that her plans in Poland would be seriously inter- fered with by a flank attack from the south-east, and accord- ingly sent an embassy to Nadir Shah in order to foment a war between Persia and Turkey which should occupy the latter Power till the PoHsh Succession question was settled. Officers, engineers, soldiers, and ammunition were forwarded to Persia, and till 1741 Nadir Shah remained the close friend and ally of Russia. The election of Augustus iii. in October under Russian and Austrian influence was followed by the siege of The siege Danzig by Russian troops. It is round this siege, °f Danzig, which continued from October 1733 to June 1734, that the interest of the war in the north centres. Had the Turks entered Poland from the south during the siege, a general rising in favour of Stanislas would have resulted, and Danzig would have been saved. A few lines written by Fleury agreeing to the Turkish demands would have given Stanislas 200,000 soldiers. But the French minister refused to act decisively, and contented himself with an ineffectual attempt to induce Sweden to send aid to the beleaguered town. But Sweden, menaced by Denmark, refused to move. The despatch, how- ever, of a few ships and three battahons into the Baltic to succour Danzig, though unproductive of good results, led to one of the few interesting episodes in the war. The ships having retired to Copenhagen, Count Plelo, the French repre- sentative there, took command, sailed back to Danzig, and on May 21 he attacked the Russians and was killed. French troops had for the first time in modern history met the Russians in battle. At length it was decided to send the written declaration demanded by the Turks, to the effect that ' France would not make peace until assured of the safety of the Ottoman Empire.' But Fleury very characteristically. PERIOD VI. G 98 European History, 171 5-1 789 instead of sending it overland with all possible despatch, pre- ferred to send it by sea. For forty-six days the ship was tossed about in the Mediterranean, and only arrived at Constantinople on July 10. On July 2 Danzig had capitulated, and Stanislas had fled into Prussian territory.^ It is doubtful if Fleury ever really cared much for the cause of the ex-king of Poland, and during these critical months in Success of ^^ history of Poland he was busy diverting the the Russian mind of Louis XV. from the failure in Poland to and Austrian ^y t^ -y • t^ i r^\ t-- i u Policy in the i*rench successes m Italy, ihe lurks, who Poland. were occupied during the last months of 1734 in bringing the Persian war to a conclusion, proposed at the be- ginning of 1735 to enter Poland, and Sweden appeared ready to join in armed intervention. But Fleury, irritated at the slowness of the Porte, and not at all sure of its sincerity, opened direct negotiations with Russia in favour of Stanislas. France thus in 1735 refused to profit from the readiness of the Turks to attack Russia, and six months were occupied in useless negotiations. During these six months the cause of Stanislas was irrevocably lost, and the Russians carried out suc- cessfully their policy in Poland. The policy of Charles vi. was no less successful. Augustus iii. was not only firmly established on the Polish throne ; he had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and handed over Courland to Russia to be formed into a dukedom for Anne's favourite Biren, and all this had been accomplished without a single Austrian sol- dier being sent into Poland. The War of the Polish Succession, so far as the interests of France in the east of Europe were concerned, was a serious blow to French prestige ; it was at the same time a solemn warning to the rulers of Turkey. The vacillating and contra- dictory action of Pleury, accompanied by the slowness of the Turks, in the latter part of 1734, had decided the fate of Stanislas, and the ancient policy of France in the east sus- tained a defeat from which it never recovered. Henceforward ^ Vandal, Une Atnbassade Fran^aise oi Orient sous Louis XK, pp. 223-5. The War of tJie Polish Succession 99 the partition of Poland was assured, and all French efforts to prevent it useless. The irresolution and short-sightedness of the Porte likewise recoiled upon its own head, for no sooner was the Polish Succession War ended, than it became the object of an attack by the combined forces of Russia and Austria, and was forced to realise in a very unmistakable manner the close connection between the fortunes of Poland and Turkey. In the west, however, matters were reversed. There the successes of the French, Sardinians, and Spaniards at the expense of Charles vi. and the empire, indicated success of considerable changes in the balance of power in ^^e French ° _ -^ in Italy and Italy. In Italy the Austrian ruler had never been on the Rhine, popular. The Italian regiments had been disbanded, and the interests of Italy had in various ways been subordinated to those of Austria. The discontent in Lombardy and in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies augured ill for Austrian operations against Sardinia or Spain. The Emperor, too, contrary to the advice of Eugene, had moved the greater part of his troops from Tuscany and the Two Sicilies in order to place them on the Polish frontier. Hardly 12,000 Austrians remained in the Mincio. In the autumn of 1733 Charles Emanuel took Milan; and reinforced by Villars, who now bore like Turenne the title of marshal-general, and a French army, he occupied all the Milanese territory and invaded that of Mantua. In the south the Spaniards showed no less acti\dty. Under the leadership of Don Carlos they marched, in the spring of 1734, from the Tuscan coast through the Papal States to Naples, and, like Charles viii., conquered Italy 'with a piece of chalk.' Monte- mar defeated the Austrians at Bitonto on May 27, 1734; in May 1735 ^^^ Spaniards invaded Sicily, and in July of that year Don Carlos was crowned king at Palermo. The kingdom of the Two SiciHes had been conquered, and Don Carlos had founded a d}Tiasty which was to last till our own days. In the north of Italy the Spaniards were not so successful, and the opposition of the King of Sardinia proved disastrous to lOO European History ^ 171 5-1 789 their hopes. Spain wished to recover her supremacy in Italy^ and Ehzabeth Farnese hoped to appropriate Man'tua. Charles Divergent Emanuel desired Mantua for himself or for the Interests of Elector of Bavaria ; he was determined that it Spain and ^ Sardinia. should not fall into the hands of Spain. He had no wish to see the sons of Elizabeth Farnese established in Italy. He preferred the continuance of the Austrians in Lombardy to the formation of an independent Tuscan state. Not receiving satisfactory assurance on this point from Fleury, he refused to undertake the siege of Mantua, and Villars threw up his com- mand and retired, only to die in June 1734 at Turin, five days after Berwick, at the age of ninety-two. In the same month the battle of Parma was fought; the Gallo-Sardinian army under Coigny, Villars' successor, held its own, and Merci was killed ; in September, Konigsegg was defeated at Guastalla. Early in 1735 a temporary reconcilia- tion was brought about between Spain, Sardinia, and France, owing to the arrogant attitude of the English and Dutch ; a Spanish force marched northwards, and the siege of INIantua was begun. But the Spaniards had now reached the limit of their successes. At the siege of Mantua, though they were aided by the French under Noailles, who had succeeded Coigny in the command, they received no assistance from the King of Sardinia. Charles Emanuel was fully alive to the undesirability of being enclosed between two strong Bourbon Powers like France and Spain. He had already adopted the accepted policy of his House, and had made secret overtures to the Emperor behind the backs of his alHes. He refused to lend the Spaniards the artillery necessary for the siege of Mantua, and the siege artillery had to be dragged from Leghorn and Naples. All hope of the fall of Mantua was finally destroyed by the action of Fleury. who, in consequence of the general outlook, without consulting his alhes, had suddenly signed pre- liminaries of peace with the Emperor. The French campaign on the Rhine in 1733 and 1734 had been successful. Berwick, now an old man, occupied Lorraine The War of the Polish ■^nj:t'ei!^iatt.' ''.'*'. ''ib'^ J /' and the electorate of Treves, took Kehl, and besieged Pfeilips- burg, where he was killed five days before the death of Villars. Philipsburg fell in spite of the presence of Eugene, and 100,000 imperial troops. But the French won of Vienna, no further striking success in Germany, and Fleury ^735-38- was wise in coming to terms with Charles vi. The Protes- tant electors were bringing up reinforcements for the im- perial army, and fresh troops were being sent to Konigsegg in Italy; 16,000 Russians had, by order of the Tsarina Anne, marched across Germany, and joined the Austrians, while Seck- endorf, one of Eugene's lieutenants, had defeated the French at Klaussen. The fear of a diversion on the part of England and Denmark in favour of the Emperor was constantly before his eyes. He was aware that negotiations had been carried on for some time past between the Emperor and Patino, who, representing Elizabeth Farnese, had endeavoured to obtain the h^nd of Maria Theresa for Don Carlos ; Sardinia could never be trusted, and had already di\Tilged the terms of the Treaty ot ^he Escurial to the Enghsh Government. On October 5 the preliminaries of the third Treaty of Vienna, between France and the Emperor, were signed, though the definitive treaty was not concluded till November 18, 1738. Stanislas renounced his claim to Poland, and received the Duchy of Bar with the promise of Lorraine for his Hfe, as soon as the death of the Duke of Tuscany enabled that Grand Duchy to be given to the Duke of Lorraine. To Don Carlos in exchange for Tus- cany were given the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Tuscan ports and the island of Elba. He further gave up the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, which were restored to the Emperor, who also received back the Milanese, with the exception of Novara and Tortona, which were handed over to Charles Eman- uel. France engaged to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and on the death of Stanislas was to take possession of Bar and Lorraine. On the 1 2th February 1736 Maria Theresa married Francis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine, who, on the death of Gian Gas- 103 European History, 171 5-1 789 ton, Grand Duke of Tuscany, in June 1737, exchanged Lor- raine for the Grand Duchy; and on April 21, 1736, Prince Eugene died at the age of seventy-two. His moral, physical, and intellectual gifts had marked him out for many Eugene, years as the most distinguished figure in Vienna. ^'^^^' He was probably the greatest statesman of his time, and his career coincided with the most glorious period of Austrian history. With remarkable foresight he had urged Charles vi. to devote his energies to crushing the Turks, and extending the Austrian power still further down the Danube. He had no confidence in the Pragmatic Sanction, though by his skill he gained for it whatever success it met with. Though, owing to the hostility of England to the Ostend East India Company, he had been drawn into an unwilling and half-hearted support of Ripperda's schemes, he did not approve of the Spanish alliance, and firmly believed in the value of the English connection. He was convinced that Austria had erred in going to war over the Polish Succession question, foreseeing that the French and Spanish schemes in the west would be furthered ; he was, as we have seen, indignant at England's desertion of her ally. He was of opinion that Maria Theresa should have married the Bavarian prince, and that Lorraine should never have been yielded to France. Had such a marriage been carried out, Austria would have been immensely strengthened in Ger- many, and the Austrian Succession War in all probability averted.^ In Eugene, Austria lost a soldier and a statesman of the first order, and the collapse that followed his death speaks vol- umes for his wisdom and prudence. It was not till the rise of Kaunitz that the Hapsburgs again found a statesman capable of guiding the destinies of Austria. Eugene was succeeded by Bartenstein, who was a diplomatist and jurist rather than a statesman. Important changes also took place in the French Govern- ment. Chauvelin, who above all others had been mainly ^ Vide Von Arneth, Pruiz Eugen von Savoyen. The War of the Polish Snccesszofi 1 03 instrumental in inducing the French Government to enter upon the war, who, Uke d'Argenson, desired the freedom of Italy from the Germans, who opposed the Cardinal's peace pohcy, and to whose representations was due the arrangement with regard to Lorraine, was, on Chauveiin, February 20, 1737, dismissed and exiled to his ^^^^" estates through the instrumentality of Fleur}" himself, who ac- cused him of carrying on secret negotiations with Spain and England. He was succeeded by Amelot de Chaillou, who held office till June 1744. With the fall of Chauveiin the influence of the war party in France for some years declined, and it did not raise its head again till the death of the Emperor Charles VI. In Spain the news of the signature of the pre- liminaries had been received with the utmost indig- Patino, nation. Elizabeth had always hated the French ; ^^^^' she now contemplated a close alHance with England. Bitterly disappointed at her failure to bring about the marriage of Don Carlos and Maria Theresa, and at the postponement of her schemes with regard to North Italy, she declared that Spain had been duped by France. Charles Emanuel was no less indignant, and refused to accept Fleury's explanation of what he called the French perfidy. Throughout 1736 affairs in Italy had remained in a very unsettled condition. There was no har- mony between the French, Spanish, and imperial generals, and a collision leading to a fresh conflict was thought to be not at all unlikely. On May 18 Spain assented to the preliminaries of Vienna ; on November 3 Patino died. His loss was for the time being irreparable. Clear-sighted, disinterested, hard-working, and full of resource, Patino had laid Spain under a great debt. Under his ministry the country had made rapid progress. Pos- sessed of a remarkable power of mastering detail, he also held statesmanlike views of the requirements of Spain, and a clear conception of the lines on which her foreign and colonial poHcy ought to march. His influence over Elizabeth Farnese had been again and again used for the benefit of Spain. He must be classed uith Walpole and Fleury as one of the great peace 104 European History ^ 171 5-1789 ministers of the day. Like Fleury he was forced into the Polish Succession War, and hke him he brought his country out of it with her prestige heightened, and her territories increased. He was succeeded by La Quadra, afterwards Marquis of Villarias, and the government of Spain was placed almost entirely in the hands of Spaniards. The Polish Succession War was over, and Europe might hope to enjoy a period of peace. Charles vi., though his _. ^ armies had suffered defeat, had not been unsuc- The Euro- ' pean impor- cessful. His Candidate sat on the Polish throne, w"a"o° the^ ^^<^ ^^ ^^*^ received guarantees of the Pragmatic Polish Sue- Sanction from Louis xv. no less than from Augustus III. Though the empire had lost Lorraine, its Duke, the husband of Maria Theresa, had obtained Tuscany, which was now united to the Austrian possessions. Charles vi. had cer- tainly been forced to relinquish the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Tuscan ports, but he had regained Parma and Piacenza, and his dominions in Italy were consolidated. The Bourbon Powers of France and Spain had the greatest cause for con- gratulation. Fleury had, in securing the reversion of Lorraine, gained for France an acquisition of enormous value ; while Spain had not only conquered a kingdom and founded a dy- nasty in Italy, but had shown Europe that her soldiers, when well led by generals hke Montemar, had not lost their ancient courage and skill in war. Though various circumstances had caused a temporary coolness between France and Spain, the union of the French and Spanish Bourbons was patent to the world, and till the French Revolution the possibility of their domination in Europe haunted the minds of English states- men. During the war the alliance of Russia and Austria was seen to be of first-rate importance. These two Powers had success- fully carried out their policy in Poland, and the presence of Russian troops on the Rhine, for the first time in European history, revealed to startled Europe the value of the Russian alliance, and undoubtedly hastened the conclusion of peace. TJie War of the Polish Succession 105 Henceforward Poland enters upon the first stage of the period of the Partition Treaties. Owing to the dedine of Sweden, the rise of Russia and Prussia, and the aUiance between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna, the fall of Poland becomes merely a question of time. Austria has to find that her inter- ests in Poland and Silesia are as important as those in Italy, while it is henceforth a cardinal point in the policy of Prussia to neglect no means whereby her scattered dominions may be united. During the war Savoy had acted with characteristic treachery, and had secured fresh leaves of the north Italian artichoke. The war had also illustrated the growing coolness between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. Frederick WilHam had, in accordance ^\'ith his treaty obligations, sent 10,000 men to the imperial army. But he was much imtated at the course of events in Poland, throughout the peace negotiations he had been entirely ignored, and he declared that he had been de- serted by Russia and Austria. He was very suspicious of Charles m.'s poHcy in respect of the Jlilich-Berg succession, and the end of the war found his relations with the Emperor considerably strained. With the close of the seventeenth century far-sighted Aus- trian ministers had seen in the rising Brandenburg Electorate the rival of the Hapsburg state. The Polish Succession War, while justifying their apprehensions, forms a definite epoch in the history of the growth of that rivalry. Before many years were over the conflict between Prussia and Austria opened a new period in the history of Europe. The Polish Succession War thus affected in various des^rees every important European state. The union of Naples and Sicily under one king, and the growth of the power of Sardinia, rendered the war peculiarly important for Italy. The rising influence of Russia had been demonstrated, the importance of the Bourbon House fully vindicated, while the Eastern Question was rapidly becoming a factor demanding the consideration of every European cabinet. io6 European Histojy, 171 5-1 789 Thjugli the third Treaty of Vienna seemed likely to give Europe a period of peace, it was evident before 1736 had run its course that hostilities in the east were on the verge of breaking out, while in 1738 it was equally apparent that England and Spain were drifting into war. CHAPTER V THE NORTH AND EAST OF EUROPE 171 5-1740 The Eastern Question — Turkey at War with Venice and Austria — The Peace of Passarowitz — Turkey and Persia — Nadir Shah — War between Turkey and Persia — European Importance of the War — The Treaty of 1726 between Russia and Austria — Tlie Reigns of Catherine I., Pt-ter ll., and Anne Ivanovna — Causes of the Turkish War of 1736-39 — Marshal Munich — The Opening of the Turkish War, 1736 — Austria joins Russia, 1737 — The Campaign of 1739 — The Diplomacy of Villeneuve — The Politi- cal Condition of Sweden — The Diet of 1738 and the French Alliance — Austria deserts Russia — The Peace of Belgrade — Success of French Di- plomacy. The war between Turkey on the one hand and Russia and Austria on the other, which began in 1736 and continued till 1739, affords striking indications of the character The Eastern of the political forces at work in the east and north Question, of Europe. During its continuance the value of the French connection with Turkey was tested, and ample illustrations were afforded of the decadence of Sweden and the corruption of its government. The close interdependence of eastern and western Europe is clearly seen, while the prominent position of Russia and its close alliance with Austria foreshadow their union against Prussia in the Seven Years' War, and their combined action against Turkey in 1787. But above all, the war forced upon the attention of Europe the growing importance of what since the Treaty of Kainardji in 1774 became gradually known as the Eastern Question. From the close of the seven- teenth century Russia and Austria had definitely come forward 107 io8 European History, 171 5-1789 as claimants for portions of Turkish territory. The possibiHty of a partition of the SuUan's dominions was openly discussed, and the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 inaugurated that systematic dismemberment of the Turkish empire which has been consist- ently pursued down to the present day. But Austria was neither strong nor united, and Russia was not as yet a consolidated state. Peter the Great, indeed, attempted in 171 1, with insuf- ficient resources, to destroy the Ottoman power at one blow. He paid the penalty for his audacity, and the Treaty of the Truth, which alone saved him and his army from complete de- struction, relegated the Russians to their northern steppes, and averted all danger to the Turks from St. Petersburg for upwards of twenty-five years. Since the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 Turkey had been at peace in Europe. That treaty had ended a war declared by Turkey at Turkey against Venice in December 17 14 in order Venice and ^^ rccovcr the territory lost in the previous century Austria. to the Itafiau Repubhc. By the Treaty of the Truth (July 1 711) Turkey under Achmet iii. (1703-30) had humili- ated Peter the Great and regained Azov. In 1715 she was equally successful against Venice, and her armies under Ali Cumurgi, 'the dauntless Vizier,' easily conquered the Morea and expelled the Venetians from Crete. The Venetian appeal to Austria was supported by Prince Eugene, and Charles vi. early in 1716 formed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Republic. In spite of the opposition of many of the Turkish statesmen and generals, the Grand Vizier carried the day, and war was declared against Austria. But the confidence of the Grand Vizier was not justified, and the Turks failed in all their enterprises. Corfu, attacked by a Turkish fleet and army, was defended by the Austrian Schulen- berg, and in August 1716 the siege was raised. ' It was,' it is said, 'the last glorious mihtary exploit in the annals of the Republic, and it was achieved by a German soldier.' gainst Austria an army was assembled in July 1716, and marched to besiege Peterwardein. In the first encounter with TJic XortJi and East of Europe 109 the enemy's troops, under General Pfalfy, the Turks were suc- cessful. On August 13 the battle of Petenvardein was fought, and Prince Eugene won a decisive victory over the Porte. After five hours' fighting the Grand Vizier was killed, and a general rout took place. Twenty days later Eugene besieged Temesvar, \yhich, after the failure of a Turkish attempt to save it, capitulated on November 28, 1716, — its fall being followed by a rising of Ser\da in favour of the Austrians. But the princi- pal event of the war was the capture of Belgrade. Invested in June by Eugene and 80,000 men, Belgrade, with a garrison of 30,000 Turks, held out till August 18. Two days previously Eugene had totally defeated a large army which, under the new Grand Vizier Ibrahim, had attempted to save the be- leaguered city, the fall of which attracted the attention of Europe. With this splendid triumph the war closed. The Porte was anxious to treat, and England, alarmed at the ag- gressive attitude of the Spanish Court, desired to mediate a peace between Turkey and Austria. Charles w. had already determined to exchange Sardinia for Sicily, and wished to have his hands free in view of impending complications consequent on the occupation of Sar- dinia by Alberoni. In July 1718 the Peace of Pas- of Passaro- sarowitz was signed. Venice yielded the Morea, ^*^^' ^^^^' and the districts of Zarine, Ottovo, and Zubzi. All that re- mained to her of her former possessions were the Ionian Islands, while on the Albanian coast she kept Corfu and a few cities and districts enclosed in a strip of land four leagues broad and twenty in length. Austria not only completed her conquest of Hungar}' by obtaining the city and Banat of Temesvar, she also secured Belgrade, two-thirds of Servia, and portions of Wallachia and Bosnia. In Belgrade Austria held a well-nigh impregnable position on the Danube, the conquest of the greater part of Servia was a menace at once to Salonica and Constantinople, while her oc- cupation of both banks of the Save placed Bosnia at her mercy. The increase of her influence in the Roumanian lands still no European History, 17 15-1789 further strengthened her hold on the Danube, and placed her in close proximity to the Black Sea. The skilful generalship of Eugene had given Charles vi. a dominant position in eastern Europe, and afforded Austria a magnificent opportunity of extending and consolidating her conquests. Had Charles vi. foregone his western ambitions and con- tinued the war, the Austrian kingdom, freed from any fear of French intervention, would have gained an enormous advan- tage over Russia in the race to Constantinople, and might have reached the .'Egean and Black Seas. But Charles vi.'s mistake was as valuable to the Ottomans as their success at the Pruth, and the Austrian attack was not renewed for twenty years, and then under peculiarly unfavourable circumstances. An admirable opportunity to extend Austrian interests on the Danube and in the Balkan states was lost, and henceforward any Austrian advance eastwards was made in conjunction with Russia. After the Peace of Passarowitz the Turks, refusing all pro- posals to attack Russia, turned their attention to the Persian Turkey and empire, which, in consequence of misgovernment, Persia. ^y^g \^ ^ State of anarchy and the prey to the at- tacks of the Afghans. In 1 722-23 Russia and Turkey, appealed to by Shah Tahmas for aid against his rival Mahmud, had little difficulty in occupying portions of the Persian territories, for in addition to the disputed succession, the Armenians had risen against Shah Tahmas and looked to the Turks for aid. The death of Mahmud and the succession of his cousin Ashraf to all his claims was followed, in June 1724, by a Parti- tion Treaty between Turkey and Russia, according to which the Tsar was to take the provinces lying near the Caspian Sea, an.i the Turks the provinces of Georgia and Azarbijan.^ Till 1727 the cause of the Sunnite Ashraf gained ground, 1 Turkey, alarmed at the successes of the Russians, who had taken Baku, etc., had only been prevented from attacking them by Bonnac, the 1- rench envoy, who mediated a treaty. The North a7id East of Europe in and in that year the Porte, in deference to popular opinion in Constantinople, decided to recognise his claim to the Persian throne as against that of the Shiite Tahmas. This decision, however, proved ineffectual to settle the succession question, for the sudden rise of the famous Nadir Shah restored the fortunes of Tahmas, and brought about the overthrow of Ashraf in 1729, and the expulsion of the Turks in 1735. The famous adventurer was endowed with an indomitable courage and energy which carried all before it. With an unhesitatinsj belief in his own future, he possessed . ? , . , T . . r \ • , Nadir Shah. a keen msight mto the dispositions of those with whom he was brought into contact. From 1727 he had obtained a firm ascendancy over the weak Shah Tahmas, and laid the foundation of his future greatness. Whatever his personal aims at this epoch may have been, his patriotic determination to rid Persia of the foreigners, whether Afghan or Turk, to put down all rebellion, and to form Persia into a strong consolidated state, admit of no doubt. In the battles of Damaghan and Mourchakor in 1729 the Afghans, under Ashraf, were completely overthrown. In 1 730 a further defeat of Ashraf at Istaker was followed by his death in Beloochistan. The Afghan power being destroyed and Persian independence assured. Nadir, still nominally acting in behalf of Shah Tahmas, was able to turn his arms against the Turks, and to regain the lost provinces of the empire. After the capture of Herat in 1728, Nadir had sent to Constantinople an em- bassy, which proved a failure, owing to the strength of the war party in the Turkish capital. The Sultan Ahmed, though himself anxious for peace, was forced by the Janissaries to seek new opportunities for Turkish aggression in Persia, while Nadir, recognising that the hostility of the Porte was unappeasable, attacked tween Persia and defeated the aged Topal Osman at Nehavend, ^"'^ Turkey, and, having overthrown two armies under Timur and Mustapha Pacha at Azarbijan, occupied Tabriz. Ahmed, seeing the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, was preparing to ri2 Ewvpean History ^ 171 5-1789 make peace on Nadir's terms, when, in September 1730 he was forced by the discontented Janissaries to abdicate. During the first year of the reign of Mahmud i. (1730-54) some transient successes were gained by the Porte. Tabriz, during Nadir's absence at the siege of Herat, was again occu- pied by the Turks, and Shah Tahmas in 1731 agreed to a treaty which provided that, in return for a Turkish contingent against the Russians, a great portion of Azarbijan, and all the territory north of the Ara, should be handed over to the Porte. On hearing of these events Nadir was furious. He at once repudiated the treaty and deposed Shah Tahmas in 1732, replacing him by his son Abbas, an infant eight months old, and resumed the war against Turkey with the utmost vigour. In the spring of 1733 he besieged Bagdad, but in consequence of his rashness was, on July 19, defeated at Sumera by Topal Osman, who again defeated the Persians at Leitan the same year. Regarding their victories as decisive, the Turks took no necessary precautions, and in the end of the year were totally defeated at MendeH, the erallant Topal Osman be- European ^ o r Importance ing killed. The war party was still predominant in ^^' Constantinopl'e, and after a short interval the strug- gle was renewed, and became one of great European in- terest. Fleury was anxious to bring about peace between Turkey and Persia, in order to use the former as a check to the Russian designs in Poland. The Tsarina Anne was equally desirous to see the Turks occupied in Persia until the end of the Polish Succession War ; she therefore allied with Nadir Shah, yielding the Persian provinces assigned to Russia by the treaty of 1724 between Peter the Great and Ahmed iii., and supplied him with siege material. In 1734 and 1735 Nadir succeeded, after several severe battles, in expelling the Turks from Georgia. These reverses, coupled with the menacing attitude of Russia and Austria, decided the Porte, at the close of 1735, to make peace, and a treaty with Nadir was signed at Erzerum, by which Turkey yielded the provinces of Georgia The North and East of Europe 113 and Azarbijan. In the following year Nadir Shah, the restorer of Persian independence and the integrity of the empire, was elected king.^ It would have been far better for Turkey if she had made peace with Persia in 1729. Her policy since the Peace of Passarowitz had been short-sighted and suicidal. The treaty with Russia in 1724 for the partition of Persia failed entirely to avert the danger from the north, and the Persian war not only occupied her when she might have attacked Russia dur- ing the Polish Succession War, but left her weakened in face of the impending attack from the combined Russian and Aus- trian forces. The aims of Ahmed iii. and his vizier, Ibrahim Pacha, had lain in the direction of peaceful relations with the European Powers. Failing to appreciate the imminence of a Russian attack, Ibrahim contented himself with a policy of conciliation, if not of submission, to both Austria and Russia, which brought with it a series of attacks upon the French re- ligious and commercial interests in the Levant. This policy was obviously short-sighted, for Russian hostility ^^^ Treaty never slept. On August 25, 1726, was signed that 051726 treaty between Russia and Austria which gives the Russia and keynote of the eastern policy of those Powers Austria, throughout the century. By the terms of this agreement, each Power was to aid the other, in case of attack, with 30,000 men. In the event of a Turkish war all available forces were to be used. Turkey had henceforward to fear the simultaneous on- slaught of the Austrian and Russian empires, to both of which the partition of the Ottoman dominions was a matter of vital interest. But while Austria, involved in German affairs, was unable to devote her full attention to her eastern development, the Russian rulers continued to seize every opportunity of ad- vancing their territory and interests at the expense of the Porte. The treaty of 1726 with Austria was the most important event in the reign of Catherine i., who had succeeded her 1 The treaty between Nadir Shah and the Turks was finally concluded in September 1736. PERIOD VI. H i 1 4 European History, 1 7 1 5 - 1 7 89 husband, Peter the Great, upon his death on January 28, 1725. During her reign she made no attempt to check the power ot The Reigns of the ohgarchy of nobles headed by Menshikov, Catherine I., Apraksin, Tolstoi, Gohtsin, Golovkin, and Oster- and Anne mann, who composcd the Upper Secret Council, ivanovna. jj^ ^121 shc died, and Peter ii., grandson of Peter the Great, succeeded to the throne. During his short reign, in which he showed an excellent understanding though a lack of resolution, first Menshikov and then Alexis and Ivan Dolgo- ruki ruled in his name. The latter's regijne marked the tri- umph of the old Russian party who were opposed to the in- troduction of western civilisation, and regarded Moscow and not St. Petersburg as the true capital of Russia. On Peter's death on January 30, 1730, the nobles found in the absence of any male representative of the line of Peter the Great an opportunity of still further increasing their influence. After a rule of 118 years the main line of the House of Romanov had come to an end.^ Peter's eldest daughter Anne had married the Duke of Holstein and had died in 1728 leaving a son — after- wards Peter iii.; the youngest, Elizabeth, was popular with the nation and the army. But the Dolgoruki and Golitsin families determined to change the order of succession, and accordingly in 1730 proclaimed Empress Anne Ivanovna, the widowed Duchess of Courland and daughter of Ivan, the elder brother of Peter the Great. A document was drawn up which, while introducing important constitutional changes, would have placed all the power in the hands of the greater nobility. Opposed to the Golitsin and the two Dolgoruki were the Chancellor Go- lovkin and the Vice-Chancellor Ostermann, who favoured the lesser nobihty. Had she, on her arrival at Moscow, been forced to place all the powers of state in the hands of a high council composed of members of the nobility, Anne's position would have been similar to that of the ruler of Sweden, and the fate of Russia might have been that of Poland. On February 26 Anne entered Moscow, and on March 8, having secured the 1 See Appendix D. The North and East of Europe 1 1 5 support of the clergy and the army, and being, moreover, popular with the nation, she successfully carried out a coup d'etat, suppressing the council of nobles, and securing her position as absolute sovereign. All chance of the establish- ment of an ohgarchical republic was over, and the autocratic rule of the Tsars was resumed. The Dolgorukis were ruined, and Anne threw herself into the hands of German favourites of whom the Courlander Biren is the best known. Her for- eign policy, guided by Ostermann, himself the son of a West- phalian clergyman, was a continuance and expansion of that of Catherine i. While the Austrian alliance was preserved intact, friendly relations were opened with Prussia, and a treaty of commerce was made with England in 1732. By the treaties of 1726 and 1732 the foreign poHcy of Peter the Great was completely reversed, and the influence of France at St. Petersburg had received a palpable check. Fleury cared little for northern politics, and after the recall of Campredon at the end of 1726, a secretary, Magnan, acted as charge d'affaires. Gradually, however, a party headed by Marshal Munich, a distinguished German soldier, was formed at St. Petersburg opposed to the Austrian aUiance and in favour of a renewal of the French con- nection. In 1732, without the knowledge of the Russian min- ister, Munich and the Tsarina entered upon secret negotiations with France, the Tsarina demanding as the price of the Rus- sian alliance and of the maintenance of Stanislas in Poland, a free hand in rectifying the PoHsh frontier to the advantage of Russia, a recognition of Russian sovereignty over Courland,^ and the assistance of French influence in obtaining from the Turks the restoration of Azov. Fleury had thus before him the problem which throughout the century puzzled French states- men. France was again offered the choice of an alliance with 1 In 1727 Maurice de Saxe, son of Augustus n. of Saxony and Aurora de Konigsmark, was expelled by the Russians from Courland when he had been elected Duke, and the country, though under Poland, became dependent on Russia. In 1737 Biren was made Duke of Courland, Ii6 Etiropeaji History^ ^7'^S~'^7^9 Russia or the continuance of her ancient pohcy in the north and east. As might have been expected, Fleury was unable to decide between the alternative proposals. He refused to make any definite engagement. The negotiations dragged on, with the result that Russia became more firmly allied than ever to Austria, and the Polish Succession War formed an admirable illustration of the effects of the procrastinating and uncertain policy of France in the east. The Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg having succeeded in the establishment of a prince of their choice at Warsaw — Causes of the first act in the enslavement and partition of the Turkish Poland — there was nothing after the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna in 1735 to prevent them from carrying out the second portion of their poHtical schemes, an attack on the Sultan, with the ultimate intention of dis- membering his empire. Poland, the plank along which Peter the Great had hoped to march against the Turks, was now sub- missive, and its submission, combined with the difficulties of the Turks in Persia, seemed to Anne and her advisers to offer an admirable opportunity for wiping out the disgrace of the Pruth and returning to the policy of Peter the Great. In attacking Turkey, Russia could rely on the fulfilment by Austria of the terms of the Treaty of 1726. During the late war Russia, by occupying Warsaw and Danzig, and by taking upon herself the task of repressing all hostile movements in Poland, had left Austria free to combat her enemies on the Rhine and in Italy. She was therefore justified in expecting Austrian co-operation in the east, Charles vi. himself was by no means opposed to the idea of a Turkish war, and the whole train of events since 1648 tended to impel Austria to look for expansion eastwards. To recom- pense herself for her loss of power and influence in Germany in the years following the Peace of Westphalia, Austria, by the Peace of Utrecht and by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, had succeeded in securing a firm hold upon Italy. But in 1735 the House of Bourbon had obtained the kingdom of the The North mid East of Europe 1 1 7 Two Sicilies and the Tuscan ports, while the young kingdom of Sardinia had also asserted its claim to a share of northern Italy. A Turkiih war seemed to Charles vi. to afford a sure means for restoring the Austrian prestige and securing territorial compen- sation for losses in Europe and in Italy. The Peace of Passaro- witz had left Austria in a position well adapted for a further advance down the Danube ; and Russia, after the close of the PoHsh Succession War, could, in 1737, rely with confidence upon the hearty co-operation of Charles vi. Indirect assistance might be expected from Xadir Shah. That successful advent- urer had not as yet made peace with the Turks, and in 1735 he assured a Russian agent at Tiflis that he would never act against the Tsarina. Within the Turkish empire itself Russia could look for allies. Russian emissaries had, in the time of Peter the Great, been found among the Bulgarians, Servians, and Roumanians, and when in 1735 rumours of the coming war reached even the distant Montenegrins and Greeks, all the subject Christian pop- ulation of the Turkish empire were stirred with the prospect of freedom from their oppressors. Russian appeals to the patri- otic and religious aspirations of the subject races in the Balkan Peninsula continued from this time to be used as a powerful and successful lever in every attempt to dismember the Turkish empire. It was not difficult to find plausible reasons for an attack upon Turkey. The Polish troubles had merely postponed the war which had been arranged on the accession of Anne in 1 730. To the ambiguous conduct of the Porte during the Pohsh Succession War Russia had taken exception, for Turkey, outwardly a friendly Power, had sent munitions of war to the opponents of Augustus iii. The periodical invasions of the Tartars across the frontiers of the Ukraine furnished in itself a casus belli which, in default of a better reason, could always be used by the ruler of Russia. But there was a more serious dispute with regard to the unset- tled claims of Russia to Daghestan and the Kabartas provinces Ii8 Europe a7i His toy, 17 15- 1789 situated to the north of the Caucasus. During the war with Nadir Shah, Tartar troops had marched through these Cauca- sian provinces, and coUisions had taken place with the Russian forces. In 1735 Russia, freed from the PoHsh war, opposed the march of a large Tartar army through the Caucasian prov- inces to Armenia, attacked the Tartar territory, and prepared for the outbreak of hostilities. Munich was made commander-in-chief, and commands were given to Lacy, an Irishman, to Lowendal, a Swede, to Marshal two Scotsmcn, Douglas and Leslie, to Brigny, a Munich. Frenchman, and to Spiegel, a German. Negotia- tions were at once opened with Austria to secure the aid promised in 1726. Of the cosmopolitan list of Russian generals, ^Marshal Munich was the most remarkable. He was an excellent example of the eighteenth-century adventurer. Born a German, he had sensed under the Austrian, Polish, and Russian flags, and had attracted the notice of Peter the Great by his military qualities. The capture of Danzig in the Polish Succession War had added to his reputation as a good tactician and a leader of men. His boldness, amounting often to rashness, endeared him to his soldiers, who had the fullest confidence in their impetuous giant general. With a thorough belief in his own powers, he ignored all difficulties, and was determined to succeed where Peter the Great had failed, to cross the Danube and to rouse the Bulgarians, but above all to capture Azov. Azov, situated near the mouth of the Don, commanded one of the river routes which seemed to the Muscovite imagination to be the pathway of Russia to the Mediterranean. Secured by Peter the Great in 1699, Azov had been lost in 1711 ; its recapture was one of the dearest wishes of the Tsarina Anne Ivanovna. During the winter of 1735-36, Munich made all his prep- arations, and in the spring of 1736 burst suddenly upon the Crimea, leaving Lacy to besiege Azov. In May the news of the Russian invasion reached Constantinople, and war was The North and East of Europe 1 1 9 declared on May 28, the very day on which Munich stormed the Unes of Perekop, following up this success by the capture of the city itself. He then plunged rashly into The Open- the heart of the Crimea, taking the rich city of Turkish*^ Koslof on June 1 7. Lacy had already captured War, 1736. Azov, Kinburn had fallen to Leontiew, and the warlike Tartars of the Kuban had been defeated. The invasion of the Cri- mea proved costly to the Russians, for they lost by disease and privation nearly 30,000 men, and after destroying libraries and schools, pubhc buildings and monuments of antiquity, and after committing atrocious cruelties, Munich was compelled to evacuate the Crimea on August 25, 1736. In their extremity the Turks appealed to Fleury, the Dutch, and Prince Eugene as President of the Aulic Council. Austria at once offered its mediation, and, in spite of the opposition of the famous Pacha Bonneval, a French renegade of considerable astuteness, who exercised at various times great influence in the Turkish coun- cils, the offer was accepted. The retirement of the exhausted Russian army from the Crimea, and the conclusion of peace with Nadir Shah (September 1736) had placed the Porte in a more hopeful position ; but indecision prevailed in the coun- cils of the Sultan, and his advisers blindly trusted the Austrian assurances. They were soon to be undeceived. Austria joins On January 9, 1737, a secret treaty of alliance Russia, 1737. was signed between Russia and Austria confirming the engage- ments entered into in 1726. By this treaty Charles vi. agreed to join in the war against Turkey, and not to make peace with- out the knowledge of his ally. Austria continued throughout the year 1737 to profess anxiety for a pacific termination of the war, and a congress was opened at Nimirof in Polish Ukraine, and sat till November in a vain endeavour to bring about peace. The terms demanded by Russia and Austria would, if granted, have destroyed the Ottoman Empire and left Con- stantinople defenceless, and the Turks acted wisely in refusing to discuss them. This attempt at a peaceful settlement did not check the warlike operations. While Lacy ravaged the Crimea I20 Eitropeaii History ^ 1 71 5-1 789 in July, Munich in August besieged and took Ochakov, and the Austrians began a treacherous attack upon Servia, Bosnia, and Wallachia. In this campaign the Turks, headed by a new Grand Vizier, and aided by the advice of Bonneval, retook Nissa and drove the Austrians out of Bosnia. The Turks had found their best security in offering a firm resistance to their enemies, and at the close of 1736 Munich with his shattered forces had been compelled to withdraw to the Ukraine, while Seckendorf, the defeated Austrian general, was recalled and imprisoned. The resistance of the Turks astonished Europe, and cut short the numerous prophecies of the impending partition and ruin of the Ottoman Empire. With the rejection of the extravagant terms of peace, a sudden change had come over the Turks. Bonneval's advice was sought and followed, Villeneuve's council was taken. A new spirit pervaded all classes, and the Porte resolved not to enter- tain the idea of opening the Black Sea to Russian ships. In order to raise Hungary against the Emperor, the Sultan recognised the young Joseph Ragotsky as Prince of Transyl- vania and ruler of Hungary. The year 1 738 saw in some respects a repetition of the events of the jprevious year. The new Grand Vizier, Yegan Mohammed Pacha, attacked the Austrians and captured Meadia in Hungary. Though the Aus- trians, under Konigsegg, won a small success at Kornia, in July the Grand Vizier captured Semendria, and, after an attack of eighteen days, Orsova on August 15, and drove back the enemy to Belgrade. Several encounters took place during the year between the Turks and Russians, in which neither side gained any signal advantage, and Munich retired to the Ukraine in the autumn without having accomplished anything of impor- tance. Lacy indeed succeeded in again invading the Crimea, but failed in his object of capturing Kaffa, the strongest place in the peninsula. Undeterred by the failure of the campaign of 1738, Munich was strongly in favour of a continuance of the war, confident that Russia could succeed in her designs against the Ottoman The North and East of Europe 1 2 1 Empire. Anticipating the schemes of Potemkin and Catherine II., he laid before Anne an * Oriental project,' which implied the rising of the Greeks against the Turks, and The Cam- the triumphal march of the Russians to Constan- P^ign of 1739. tinople itself. On August 12, 1739, he entered Moldavia with largely increased forces, defeated a Turkish army at Khoczim on August 18, and proclaimed a descendant of the ancient rulers of the province, Prince of Moldavia. But before he was able to proceed further with his plans for the dismemberment of the Turkish empire he was checked by the news of the Aus- trian disasters and the opening of peace negotiations. Konigs- egg's failure in 1737 had been followed by his disgrace, and the appointment of Count Wallis to the command of the Aus- trian forces. But he was as unsuccessful as both of his prede- cessors. On July 2 7 the Austrian army was totally defeated at the battle of Crocyka, and the Turks followed up their victory by besieging Belgrade. At this moment negotiations of peace were resumed under the mediation of Villeneuve, the French ambassador, and re- sulted in a briUiant diplomatic triumph for France. _, _ , ^ The Diplo- In 172S Villeneuve had been despatched by Fleury macy of to Constantinople, charged to procure the re-estab- "^'^^^"^"^«- lishment of the French privileges unth regard to religion and commerce, and generally to restore French credit, which had suffered owing to the rapprocheme?it of the Turkish and Rus- sian Courts. With the opening of the Russo-Turkish war, fol- lowed by the rapid successes of Munich and Lacy, European interests in the Levant seemed likely to be affected. The Tsarina had made no secret of her intention of securing the right of navigation from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean both for ships of war and for merchantmen. The French sus- ceptibiUties were at once aroused, and Villeneuve was instructed to oppose such demands by every means in his power. The Court of Vienna refused to see that the extension of Russian influence over the Turkish empire was detrimental to the inter- ests of Austria in the east. It was not, however, till July i 737 122 Etcropean History, 171 5-1789 that the Turks, in face of the conditions of peace offered by Russia and Austria at the Congress of Nimirof, demanded the mediation of France. In spite of the fall of Chauvelin, the Court of Versailles acted with vigour, and accepted the rol^ of mediator, though it remained as determined as ever to strengthen the opposition of the Turks to the opening of the Black Sea to Russian ships. The close of 1737 found the Turks triumphant at their successes over the Austrians. Villeneuve's duty was to urge moderation and the necessity of making peace. But the Grand Vizier felt that his reputation depended upon a con- tinuance of the war, and Bonneval was equally anxious to continue the struggle. He hoped to raise Hungary against Austria, and to defeat the Emperor by means of his own subjects. The quarrel between the Grand Vizier and Bonneval made the former more willing to listen to the advice of Villeneuve, while the Court of Vienna became more and more anxious to bring the war to an end. Fleury felt no hostility to Austria, and did not regard the interests of France and Austria as irreconcilable. Charles vi., astonished at the Turkish resistance, anxious about the Pragmatic Sanction, and in want of money, was extremely desirous of peace. The campaign of 1738 had cut short all possibility of negotiation, and at the close of the year peace seemed to be indefinitely postponed. Even if Austria consented to treat, Russia might prolong the war, and Turkey, unable to force the Tsarina to conclude peace, might eventually be induced to concede to the Russian terms. What the Ottoman arms, however, could not produce was accompHshed by French diplomacy. Though the Russians might remain unaffected even by Turkish suc- cesses, the French could influence the Court of St. Petersburg by means of the Swedes. No deserts separated Sweden from Russia. The Swedes, masters of Finland, were within a few days' march from St. Petersburg, and to Sweden the fate of Poland and Turkey was a matter of considerable impor- tance. The North a7id East of Europe 123 Since the revolution of 1720 and the Peace of Nystad, Sweden had been in a state of semi-anarchy, due in great measure to her constitution. Nominally liberal ^^^ Politic 1 and anti-monarchical, the constitution in reality condition of was in favour of government by the aristocracy. ^^ The whole power was theoretically vested not in the Crown or Senate, but in the Diet, consisting of four orders — the nobles, the clergy, the citizens, and the peasants. Each order or estate sat and deliberated apart, and as a natural con- sequence, the work of legislation was rendered exceedingly difficult. The Government, however, soon lost its democratic character and became an oligarchy. During the session of the Diet the supreme executive, judicial, and legislative power was in the hands of a secret committee composed of fifty nobles, twenty-five clergy, and tw^enty-five citizens. During the parUamentary recess and on the dissolution of the Diet, the executive power was wielded by the Senate, which was itself dependent on the popular assembly. At first, however, the disastrous effects of the constitution of 1720 did not show themselves. The leader of the nobility and chancellor, Count Arvid Horn, who was distinguished as a soldier and as a statesman, governed wisely, and gave his country a period of twenty years' peace, during which the work of restoration proceeded apace. He dehberately made no attempt to keep up the French connection, but maintained peaceful relations with Russia and a friendly connection with England. Like Fleury and Walpole, the cautious Horn found himself in the course of years confronted by an opposition jealous of his powder and bent on a more vigorous foreign policy. The leader of this opposition was Count Gyllenborg, the member of a new family, and he was supported by Count Tessin and other representatives of the younger generation. Like Belleisle, Gyllenborg was vain, was anxious for war, and was determined to exchange the cautious policy of the Government for one more adventurous, and better calculated to restore Swe- den to her former position. He and his followers therefore 124 Etiropcaii History^ 17 15-1789 inveighed against Horn's peaceful attitude, declared that the disgraceful Treaty of Nystad must be v/iped out, and openly favoured a French alliance. Nicknaming their opponents the Night- Caps, or Caps, and taking themselves the title of Hats, the party headed by Gyl- lenborg, supported by French gold, definitely attacked Horn and his supporters in the Diet of 1738. This Diet marks an epoch in Swedish history. The war between Russia and Turkey was at its height. France, The Diet of alarmed at the Russian successes and fearful of the French ^^X Jricrcasc of Russian influence, was anxious Alliance. to iuducc the Tsariua to make peace. The divisions and dissensions in Sweden gave her the desired opportunity, and before many months were over her influence was paramount in Stockholm, and Russia, threatened by an attack from Sweden, consented to make peace with Turkey. Where the Ottoman arms had failed French diplomacy suc- ceeded. The Swedish nobles were poor, and venality and corruption were rampant in Sweden, where the saying that every man had his price was almost literally true. Of 700 members of the Diet only 100 refused to be bribed. Foreign ministers were not slow in finding out this weakness of the Swedish Government, and in 1738 France succeeded in prac- tically buying the votes of the majority of the Diet, in bringing about a ministerial revolution, and in placing Count Gyllenborg at the head of the administration. The author of this coup d'etat was the French ambassador, Saint-Severin, who showed consummate skill in the delicate task of bribing the Swedish deputies. He succeeded in procuring the election of Count Tessin to the office of Land-Marshal or Marshal of the Diet, among whose duties was that of presiding over the secret com- mittee ; he gained also the leader of the order of peasants, he procured the practical exclusion of the Caps from the secret committee, and a treaty was signed with France in October 1738. In return for a close alliance, and as long as Swedish foreign TJie NortJi and East of Europe 125 policy was directed from Paris, France agreed to pay an annual sum of 300,000 crowns to Sweden for the rehabilitation of her army and navy. Sweden was gained, and the influence of Russia and England had been checked. Horn retired, Gyllenborg became Chancellor, Tessin ambassador at Paris, and the Hats were supreme. At Versailles the party of action urged the necessity of hurling the Swedes against St. Petersburg, while at Stockholm the triumphant Hats sent to Constantinople proposals for a league between Sweden and Turkey. The beginning of the year 1739 found the Russian Court profoundly suspicious of the intentions of Sweden ; and the murder, by the orders of Biren, of Major Malcolm ;, ' -' ' •' Austria Sinclair, an officer in the Swedish army, on his way deserts back from Constantinople to Sweden, was at once ^"^^'^• the effect of these suspicions, and the cause of anti-Russian demonstrations in Sweden, and of Swedish preparations for war. Hoping to bring Turkey to terms before Sweden could place an army in the field, the two imperial Courts began their third campaign against the Porte. But though the audacious plan of Munich was partly successful, the Austrians failed, and the possibilities of peace were increased by the fall of the Grand Vizier and the appointment of Elviaz-Mohammed, a man of less obstinate character. The Austrian defeat at Crocyka, and the failure of the Turkish attack on Belgrade, rendered both com- batants anxious for peace, and Charles vi. consented to sepa- rate his cause from that of the Tsarina. Villeneuve's mediation was demanded, and after long negotiations the Peace of Bel- grade was agreed to by Austria and the Porte on September i. The news of the conclusion of peace with the Turks, and of the brilliant victory of Munich at Stavoretchani or Khoten, reached Vienna almost simultaneously. Charles vi. was over- whelmed with grief at having agreed to so disastrous a peace with Turkey. The second portion of Villeneuve's task was to persuade the Russians in the midst of their triumphant course to make peace. In what seemed a well-nigh hopeless 120 European History^ 171 5-1 789 task several circumstances unexpectedly aided him. The de- termination of the Swedes to attack Russia at the end of the Th p y^^^^ ^^^^ undoubted, while a plot, headed by the Belgrade, DolgOFukis and GoHtsius, for the dethronement of ept. 1739- Anne, bore witness to the existence of grave discon- tent within the empire itself The signature of peace by Austria was an additional blow to Russian hopes ; and, abandoned by her ally, isolated in Europe, and threatened by a Swedish attack, the Tsarina, on September 18, accepted the mediation of Villeneuve and the terms proposed by him. By the treaty signed by Charles vi. Austria yafced, with Belgrade and Orsova, all Servia and Bosnia taken in 1718, and the Danube and Save became the boundaries of the two empires. North of the Danube, Austria lost her holding in Wallachia, but kept the Banat of Temesvar. In the history of Austrian advance eastwards the Peace of Belgrade was a disastrous check to the policy so persistently advocated by Eugene. In her treaty with Turkey, Russia obtained few advantages. Azov was handed over to her, but its fortifications were to be destroyed ; the Russian troops were to retire from the Crimea ; Moldavia, Crocyka, Ochakov and Kinburn, with a strip of territory between the Boug and Dnieper, was given her, but no Russian ships were to be allowed on the Black Sea. Peace made between Russia and Turkey, the position of Sweden became one of extreme difficulty. Her Government had relied on the co-operation of Turkey, and now Success of ^ -' ' French found itsclf cxposcd to the vengeance of the ex- ip omacy. asperated and disappointed Muscovites. All the skill and energy of Villeneuve were required to save Sweden from the impending attack. After the expenditure of infinite tact he succeeded. On July 17, 1740, a treaty of alliance between Turkey and Sweden was signed, and Sweden was for the moment safe. By the treaty of Belgrade between Austria and Turkey, Russia had been checked in her advance to Con- stantinople ; by the treaty between Sweden and Turkey a barrier was placed in the way of Russian revenge at the expense of TJie Xorth and East of Europe 127 ^weden. The Peace of Belgrade was 'the chef-d'odiivre of ^ench diplomacy ' in the eighteenth century, and increased pi§stige of the earlier years of Louis xv. France had darkly contributed to the safety of her old ally Turkey, and that \Po\ver had shown unexpected vitality and vigour during the war. As a reward for her successful efforts, Turkey was to enjoy thirty years of peace. Recognising its debt to France, the Turkish Government consolidated and extended, by capitu- lations signed on May 28, 1740, the religious and commercial privileges hitherto accorded to Frenchmen in the east, and thus the objects for which Villeneuve had come to Constantinople in 1728 were attained. As the influence of France on the shores of the Bosphorus grew, that of Russia and Austria de- clined. France reaped a further advantage from her successful diplomacy. The close union between Russia and Austria was shaken. The Court of Vienna declared that it had been de- serted by Russia, and the Court of St. Petersburg complained of the conduct of Austria in making a separate peace. Though the Imperial Courts proclaimed the continuance of their alliance, each endeavoured to make a treaty with France. A secret treaty had already been made between Austria and France in January 1739, relative to the Jiilich-Berg succession, while between Fleury and Bartenstein a correspondence sprang up which, if Charles vi. had not died the following year, might have recon- ciled Austria and France, and anticipated the Treaty of Versailles of 1 756. In Russia too French influences tended to assert them- selves. Munich, the hero of the last war, had always been an advocate of a French connection, and he headed the French party in St. Petersburg. Prince Cantemir came as Russian envoy to Paris, and a French ambassador, La Ch^tardie, was sent to the Russian capital. Fleury had succeeded beyond his expec- tations in his role of mediator, and France occupied in 1740 a position in Europe which she was not again to hold till the wars of the French Revolution. .¥ ^ CHAPTER VI PRUSSIA AND THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION 1 740-1 742 The Accession of Frederick the Great — The Reforms of Frederick William I. — Foreign Policy of Frederick William I. — The Salzburg Protestants — The Youth of Frederick the Great — Rivalry of Austria and Prussia — Frederick the Great's Character — Frederick the Great and Louis XIV. — The Death of Charles VI. — The year 1740 a Landmark in German History — The years 1740-63 in America, India, and the West Indies — The Immediate Causes of the Invasion of Silesia — Maria Theresa and her Ministers — Fleury's Attitude — Decisive Action of Frederick the Great — The Invasion of Silesia — Molhvitz and its Results — Fleury's Policy — The French ally with Prussia and invade Germany — A Revolution in Russia places Elizabeth on the Throne — Maria Theresa in Hungary — The Treaty of Klein-Schnellendorf — The Election of Charles Albert to the Imperial Throne — Frederick's Invasion of Moravia — Carteret's Foreign Policy — The Failure of French Policy in Russia. The Peace of Abo — The Pre- liminaries of Breslau and the Treaty of Berlin. On May 31, 1740, Frederick the Great succeeded his father, Frederick WilUam i., on the Prussian throne. Born on January TheAcces- 24, 1713, he was tweuty-seven years old when he Frederick became king. Of his character httle was known, the Great. His father's despotic and brutal regi7ne had com- pelled Frederick to turn his attention to literature and music, and during the whole of his reign he delighted in the com- pany of literary men. His first acts showed a liberal spirit. The declaration of freedom of the Press, abohtion of legal torture, and religious toleration, was followed by the disband- ment of the regiment of Potsdam Guards, and by a distribution of com at low rates to the poor of certain famine-stricken districts. In the autumn his A7iti-Machiavel was published 128 TJie War of the Austrian Succession 129 anonymously. Before many months were over it was seen that Frederick was possessed of business-Hke qualities, that he was keenly interested in poHtical and military affairs, and that he intended that the government should be more centred in him- self than it had been in his father. Frederick William i. had ruled with a strong hand ; Frederick the Great intended that his power should be every whit as strong. No alteration was made in the fabric of government, which was admirably suited to a country like Prussia. Frederick William i. The Reforms had carried out many essential reforms, which re- of Frederick fleet great credit on his business-Hke qualities, his ^ '^"^ indomitable will, and his keen sense of what was to the advantage of his country. The Privy Council, which stood at the head of the Prussian administrative system, had been reorganised by Joachim Fred- erick, and further reformed by the great Elector, who made it a national advisory board, the governors of the different territo- ries having seats in it. Under Frederick William i. the Privy Council, while remaining first in dignity and importance, was found, like the EngUsh Privy Council of the seventeenth cen- tury, too large for its new duties ; and, accordingly, a small body similar to the English Cabinet was formed within it, the members of which, in close touch with the king, supervised finance, foreign affairs, and war and justice. Of these depart- ments those of finance and justice had subordinate chambers or councils throughout the country. Under the minister of finances came the general directory of finance, war, and domains (General - ober - Finanz - Kriegs - und - Domainen - Directorium), which had been formed in 1722 by the union of the war direc- tory and finance commissions, which had hitherto been treated separately, each having its own accounts, oiificers, and revenues. This general directory became at once the most important department in the state ; and with the king as president, five ministers, a number of councillors — each section of whom had special duties and responsibihties — and an elaborate code of instructions, the Prussian administrative system became at once PERIOD VI. I 130 Enrofean Hist07y^ 171 5-1 789 siaiplified an.l improved. Under it worked the Provincial Chambers for war and domains (Kriegs-und-Domainen-Kam- mern), and under them were arranged the county and town organisations. The landraths and the burgomasters were prac- tically royal officials ; the town councils had little real power ; the royal will was felt throughout the length and breadth of the land. The king's authority was equally felt in the matter of justice. Above the manorial and city courts came the provin- cial courts, and from these lay an appeal to the judicial depart- ment of the Privy Council.^ With infinite trouble Frederick WiUiam had organised a sys- tem of government pecuhar to Prussia, and dependent on the will and intelligence of a single man, which may be characterised as one of the most successful and best administered despotisms of the eighteenth century. Owing to her geographical position Prussia was forced to keep up a large army, and her govern- ment assumed a military character. Since the days of the great Elector a strong centralised state had been gradually formed by means of a military despotism, and Frederick William i. had wisely created an army which was henceforth to play so important a part in European history. The northern war of 1 718-2 1 had shown him the necessity of a powerful force capa- ble of defending Prussia against all attacks. In characteristic fashion he formed an admirable army, and before his death, while the peace establishment of England was 17,000 men, that of Prussia was 80,000 men. This large army was not only a great and increasing burden to the people, it created and en- sured the absolute power of the government. Most of the public revenues were devoted to its maintenance, and Fred- crick the Great not only found on his accession a well-drilled army but also a treasure of twenty-six millions. Frederick WiUiam i. \\\\ created a remarkable army and a new form of government, which rested, like Napoleon's government, entirely on the army, and drew from it unlimited power. To Frederick William belongs the credit of having formed 1 See Appendix B. TJie War of the Austrian Siiccession 131 an efficient administrative system, which was admirably adapted for the Prussia of his day. Out of existing materials and systems he had slowly, laboriously, and cautiously carried out a series of skilfully organised administrative reforms which enabled Prussia to bear the weight of her enormous army and to hold her own against a European coalition. Frederick William not only bequeathed to his son the most complete despotism to be found in Europe, — he left behind him the Foreign traditions of a foreign poHcy which, successfully predYricl I carried out, has placed Prussia among the leading; Wiiuam. JM European Powers. Though himself knowing little of foreign j^ politics or diplomacy, and though neither the Treaty of Wiisterhausen nor • the Polish Succession War had raised ►^ Prussia in the estimation of Europe, he had gained valuable territorial acquisitions from Sweden after the death of Charles xii., and he had struggled hard to secure the eventual succession to Berg and the seigniory of Ravenstein. Though the rising Prussian state was regarded with envy, and opposed and hampered on every possible occasion by Austria and Hanover, the latter still aspiring to a leading " position among the provinces of the empire, Frederick William remained, for the greater part of his life, imbued with a strong sense of German patriotism. It was only shortly before his death that he realised that Prussia had as yet little influence in the councils of Europe, and that Charles vi. had outwitted him in the affair of Berg. But though his diplomacy proved a failure, he had in various ways placed Prussia in a position which would enable her to make her influence felt. Not only had he formed one of the best armies in Europe, he had taken every opportunity for introducing colonists of various nations into Prussia. In 1731 a cruel persecution, xheSaizburg instituted by Archbishop Firmian of Salzburg, was Protestants, followed by the flight of thousands of Protestants from the country. Frederick William had early interested himself on behalf of the Salzburg Lutherans, whose complaints the Im- perial Diet, with characteristic callousness, treated with con- 132 European History y 171 5-1 789 tempt. His threats and appeals roused even some Catholic princes, and while the archbishop was compelled to modify his policy, some 15,000 Salzbiirgers were welcomed by the far- sighted king, and settled in the towns and agricultural districts of the former duchy of Prussia (Preussen). The Salzburg Pilgrimage has been immortaUsed by Goethe in his poem of Hermann attd Dorothea; the repeopling of Prussia by the peasants and artisans, distinguished by intelligence, thrift, and industry, is not the least of Frederick William's acts, which, like the welcome given to the Huguenots by the great Elector, has placed the present German empire under a debt of grati- tude to the father of Frederick the Great. The social and domestic relations of the great Prussian re- former are not pleasant reading. His wife, Sophia Dorothea, bore him fourteen children, of whom ten lived to The Youth of Frederick mature ycars. The eldest, Wilhelmma, whose the Great. mcmoirs give a vivid account of Frederick the Great's childhood, married the Marquess of Bayreuth ; and of her four sisters, Louisa married the Marquess of Anspach, Charlotte the Duke of Brunswick, Maria the Marquess of Schwedt, and Ulrica became Queen of Sweden and mother of Gustavus III. Frederick the Great, who was two and a half years younger than Wilhelmina, was born on January 24, 1712, his brothers being Augustus William, the father of Frederick William 11., Henry, and Augustus Ferdinand. Frederick William conceived an intense dislike of his eldest son, and on one celebrated occasion the young Frederick narrowly es- caped the fate of Alexis, son of Peter the Great. At length, after going through an apprenticeship in the Prussian civil service, Frederick was restored to favour, and in 1732 was betrothed to Princess Elizabeth of Brunswick-Bevern. He served in the Rhine campaign during the War of the PoHsh Succession, and \\atnessed the last operations of Prince Eugene, then seventy-three years old, ' an old hero gone to a shadow of himself.' It is quite possible that if Frederick had been in command on the Rhine, a successful attempt would have been TJie War of the An stria Ji Succession 133 made to relieve Philipsburg. But Eugene was rendered cautious by age ; having little confidence in his army, com- posed of contingents fi-om various states, he was unwilling to run any risks, and with the fall of Philipsburg the first campaign of the Crown Prince lost all its interest. From the end of 17 "^4 to 1740 Frederick pursued peace- • J u- ir 1 V Rivalryof ful avocations, devotmg hmiself mamly to litera- Austria ture ; while his father found himself at the end ^"'^ Prussia, of his days the dupe of Charles vi. in the Berg affair, and in 173S confronted by a coaHtion which included England, France, Holland, and Austria to prevent the seizure of the duchies of JliHch and Berg by Prussian arms. On his death Frederick William bequeathed to his successor not only the duty of avenging the double-dealing of Austria, and of defeat- ing the consistent endeavours of Hanover to oust Prussia from her leading position in north Germany, but also the task of utihsing the magnificent Prussian army for the extension and consoHdation of the territories^f the rising state. Prussia owes its greatness^ 10 Frederick William i. ; it was left to Frederick the Great to develop his father's work, to streno;then the boundaries of his kingdom, and to ^ , . , ° "^ ' Fredenck place Prussia in the first rank of European nations, the Great's This revolution in the European states-system was ^^''^'^^er. not eftected till 1 763, after Europe had experienced two mighty wars. Frederick the Great occupies a very prominent position in the history of the eighteenth century. The impor- tance of his reign is due to the revolution in international politics in which he took a prominent part, as well as to his administrative qualities, his statesmanship, his military talents, and his courage under misfortunes. His personal character presents few pleasant traits. The brutal and suspicious treat- ment of his father had soured and hardened a nature naturally gentle and high-minded, and as he grew older he became more and more hard, selfish, cynical, and sarcastic. But when he chose he could always exercise a great influence on those around him by his charm of manner, and his conversational i34 European History^ 171 5-1 789 talents ; while with his subjects, and especially with his soldiers, he was, during most of his reign, exceedingly popular. As a ruler he was essentially an opportunist, and a most successful one. Like Hyder Ali, whom he resembled in many respects, he preserved all his faculties to the very last, and died in a ripe and vigorous old age. Like George in. he was indus- trious, and capable of attending to the smallest details. UnHke George he could originate and carry out the most extensive Frederick the P^^^j^^^s. He resembled Louis XIV. in the way in Great and which he identified himself with the welfare of his country. Till within a few years of the end of his reign there is no doubt that Louis' despotism was popular and well adapted for keeping order at home, and for carrying out ambitious schemes of foreign conquest. Similarly it is certain that the Prussian system of government, tyrannical as in many respects it was, was the only one under which Frederick the Great could have guided his country safely through the storms of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. His absolutism was as complete as that of Louis, but it differed from it in many essential particulars. In both France and Prussia popular rights were practically non-existent ; in both countries the nobles and clergy were powerless to check the crown. But while the French nobility, with little or no share in the government of the country, were reduced to practical impotence by Louis xiv., the Prussian nobles, in spite of the diminution of their privileges by Fred- erick William i., remained powerful against all except their sov- ereign. Many of their privileges were preserved, they took a leading part in the administration, they held high commands in the army, and it was not until the French revolutionary epoch that the new reforming spirit effected drastic changes in the con- dition of the Prussian aristocracy. There was indeed nothing in common in the general point of view of the two monarchs. While Louis was possessed by a narrow intolerant spirit in religious matters which proved so disastrous to the internal peace of France under his successor, Frederick was in favouj The War of the Austrian Sticcession 135 of universal religious toleration. He was the first, and per- haps the most successful, of that generation of philosophic rulers who tried to carry out reforms founded on the pre- cepts of the theorists of the age, and intended to benefit the peoples whom they governed. Both kings estabhshed a bureaucratic system which broke down after they themselves had passed away. Frederick's ministers were reduced to the position of clerks, without the power of initiation, and deprived of all independence. Each department felt the effects of the increased supen'ision carried out unceasingly by the vigilant and energetic young king. While Frederick the Great was responsible for the prominent position attained by his young kingdom in the middle of the eighteenth century, he was, it has been said, also the cause of its fall at the beginning of the present century. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that without his clear-sightedness, his calm judgment, his relentless will, and the development of his mihtary talents, Prussia would never have risen to a higher position than that attained by Saxony or Bavaria. On October 20 Charles vi. died, and that event, together with the death of Frederick William, marks the beginning of a fresh period in European and colonial history. The Death of Between 1740 and 1763 questions of momentous Charles vi. importance were solved which profoundly affected the European balance of power. In the New World and in India the struggle of England against France was fought out. After the estabhshment of the maritime supremacy of the former, the loss of Canada by the latter, and the defeat of her policy in India, the rivalry between Great Britain and the Bourbons remained dor- mant until the outbreak of the contest between England and the American colonies. The question of the command of the sea, together with the further questions concerning the supremacy of the Teutonic or Latin race in North America, and the estabhsh- ment of English or French influence in India, awaited decision in 1740. They were decided in 1763 in favour of England. In Europe itself the years between 1740 and 1763 were also 136 Enropeaii History, 171 5-1 789 of supreme importance. Abundant illustrations are afforded of the leading characteristics of the eighteenth century. In Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and elsewhere the new ideas of reform, furthered by enlightened sovereigns and statesmen, were loudly proclaimed, while on the other hand the seizure of Silesia ushered in an epoch of high-handed and unblushing acts of spoliation which reached its height under Napoleon. For Germany 1740 is an important date. For with the ac- cession of Frederick the Great may be dated the starting-point The Year 0^ modcm Germany. The Thirty Years' War had 1740 a Land- igft ^ej. dismembered, humiliated, and in a condi- German tion of material, intellectual, and moral ruin. The History. feeling of nationality, almost extinct, was partially awakened by the aggressive acts of Louis xiv. But Catholic Austria, busied with her own schemes of aggrandisement, and neglectful of the interests of the Empire, was unable to offer to Germans, irrespective of creed, any hope that she would recog- nise her imperial responsibilities. The possibility of a moral and political restoration was first afforded by the rise of the Prussian state, which, if not bound up with Protestantism, at any rate secured for all liberty of religious thought. Between 1740. and 1763, owing to the rise of Prussia, 'the German national spirit was roused to new life.' The Seven Years' War showed Ger- many that in Frederick the Great she possessed a national hero, and the national enthusiasm found expression in Lessing's Minna von Barnhelm, and in Gleim's Grenadiers' Songs. It was during the Seven Years' War that the Germans began to feel themselves a nation again. From 1740 may be dated that avowed hostility between the Courts of Berlin and Vienna which continued till our own day. The early misfortunes and trials of Maria Theresa, it has been well said, form ' the opening scenes of the drama of which Sadowa was the close and Sedan the epilogue.' ^ And with the successful resistance of Prussia to Austria wa,s swept away all the hopes entertained by George 11. and his ministers of placing Hanover in the position henceforward occupied by Prussia in north Germany. 1 Karl Ilillebrand, Lectures oti German Thoii^^kt. Lecture II. TJic War of the Austrian Succession 137 While the period from 1715 to 1740 had been a period of feverish unrest, of diplomatic activity, and of preparation for the great struCTale in which Europe, America, and ^^ , , The Years India were involved, the years between 1740 and 1740-6310 176^ form one drama in three acts. From 1740 to f"J.^"'^^'. I ^ ' ' xnaia, ana 174S Frederick the Great was fully occupied with the West his two Silesian wars, and France was engaged in a double struggle. On the one hand she pursued her ancient policy of opposition to Austria, and in league with many of the lesser German princes made a definite attempt to end the rivalry of 221 years by partitioning the Hapsburg dominions; on the other hand she was compelled to defend her position in Xorth America and the West Indies, her policy in India, and her claim to equaUty with England on the sea. The Silesian question, the rivalry of France and Austria, and the colonial and commercial struggle between England and the Bourbons of France and Spain, are all fought out simultane- ously. In 1748 the combatants, exhausted, draw apart, and the years between 1748 to 1756 mark a period of peace, unrest, and intrigue preparatory to the final struggle of the Seven Years' War, which opens with France and Austria allied against Eng- land and Prussia, and which concludes in 1763 with the triumph of the latter Powers, England victorious at all points, and Prussia retaining Silesia. On Frederick the Great's accession England and Spain were at war on the Spanish Main, and though France was making warlike preparations, there were no signs of any general Euro- pean conflagration. From the first Frederick recognised the necessity of securing the friendship or neutrality of France and Russia, and negotiations were opened with both countries. In the autumn of 1740, however, two events occurred which decided Frederick to invade Silesia. On October ^^^ j^^ 20, Charles VI. suddenly died, and on the 28th of mediate . O311S6S of the the same month the Empress Anne of Russia died invasion of also. With Charles vi. the male line of the Haps- siiesia. burg House came to an end, while the death of the Empress 138 Europe a7i History, 17 15-1789 Anne left the Russian crown in the hand of a minor, the young Grand Duke Ivan. There was every reason to expect that dur- ing Ivan's long minority the Russian Government, at the head of which (after a revolutio7i de palais on November i>8, which resulted in the overthrow and exile of Biren, who had seized the regency on the death of Anne) was the German Miinich, who had been gained over by Frederick, would not interfere on behalf of the Pragmatic Sanction, and accordingly that the King of Prussia would for a time be free to devote all his atten- tion to carry out his deeply laid schemes, and to take advantage of the position of affairs at Vienna. The death of Charles vi. had thrown open to Europe the imperial crown and the Austrian possessions. Since 1718 Charles had made it the principal aim of his poHcy to obtain from all the European Powers a guar- anty that his daughter Maria Theresa should, on his death, enter into quiet possession of his hereditary estates. His efforts had been crowned with success. The Pragmatic Sanction had received the guarantee of Europe, and Maria Theresa's posi- tion seemed assured. He had also attempted, though without success, to secure for his son-in-law, Francis Stephen, now Grand Duke of Tuscany, the reversion to the imperial throne. Upon Charles' death England, Russia, Prussia, and Holland at once recognised Maria Theresa's succession to the Austrian fands, while Spain, Sardinia, Saxony, and Bavaria claimed the whole or a portion of the Hapsburg territories. Of the claim- ants the only serious one was Charles Albert of Bavaria, who, however, failed to establish his contention that the Emperor Ferdinand i. had, on his death in 1564, settled his dominions on his daughter Anna and her descendants (of whom Charles Albert was one) in the event of the failure of male heirs. But though Elizabeth Farnese might desire a kingdom in Lom- bardy for Don Philip, and the King of Sardinia look forward to securing the Milanese, neither Spain nor Sardinia were ready for hostilities, and Austria would have been secure from aggres- sion had not Prussia and France inv^aded her dominions and given the signal for a general attack upon the scattered estates of Maria Theresa. The War of the Austrian Succession 139 Maria Theresa was, on the death of Charies w., proclaimed Archduchess of Austria, Queen of Hungary, and Queen of Bohemia, and sovereign of all the various lands Maria included in the Austrian possessions. She was '^^"^^a ^ and her twenty-three years old, was strikingly handsome. Ministers, and had a charming manner which attracted all with whom she came in contact. Open-hearted and sincere, virtuous and patriotic, with a determination and energ}'' almost mas- culine, animated by an unfailing courage, deep religious prin- ciples, and a stern sense of duty, the young qugen might well expect to be treated with consideration by those European Powers which had solemnly promised to respect her rights. She at once named her husband, Francis Stephen, co-regent in all the hereditary' dominions, and confirmed the ministers, most of whom were over seventy years of age, in their posts. Of these Zinzendorf, the Chancellor and nominal Chief Min- ister, and Stahremberg, the Chief of the Finance Department, were both men .of experience. But neither they nor Count Joseph Harrach, the President of the Council of War (1738- 1764), nor Kinsky, the Bohemian Chancellor, had clear views ^Axki regard to the European situation, for, habituated to routine, they were lacking in decision and enterprise, and absolutely unfit to cope with the crisis of 1740. In Barten- stein and Herberstein, the young queen placed at first her greatest confidence. The former, an Alsatian, who by his energ}' and devotion to Austria had risen to the position of minister, had a deep distrust of Frederick the Great. * The queen,' he said, ' has no enemy to fear except the King of Pnissia.' Zinzendorf died in 1742, Stahremberg in 1745, Kinsky in i 748. While Uhlfeld became on Zinzendorf s death nominally Chancellor, Bartenstein remained from 1740 to 1753 Minister of Foreign Affairs, and had the greatest influ- ence in the Secret Conference of ministers. He was more of a jurist than a statesman, and on the rise of Kaunitz he was, with Uhlfeld, dismissed from the position of minister.^ ^ See Wolf and Zwiedineck, Oesterreich tinter Maria Theresia, Josef II, unl Leopold II., p. 27. 140 European History, 17 15-1789 The late war against Turkey had left Austria weakened and humiliated by the ignominious Treaty of Belgrade. Her army was crippled, her finances were exhausted. She required, as Eugene had declared, 200,000 men and an ample treasure ; ill 1740 she had an inexperienced queen, an army practically disbanded, and incompetent ministers. But if the internal condition of Austria was calculated to inspire anxiety, the relations of the Court of Vienna with foreign Powers were in no less critical position. Spain under a Bour- bon was tending to a close alliance with France ; Ehzabeth Farnese aimed at narrowing still further the Austrian domin- ions in Italy ; the ambition of the House of Savoy was a perpetual danger ; while in the Polish Succession War the honour of the imperial arms had not been enhanced, and England had shown no readiness to assist her ancient ally. The real and immediate danger to Austria, however, came from Prussia and France. In 1738 the latter Power had Fleury's guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in the strong- Attitude, est terms, and in exchange for her guarantee had secured Lorraine for Stanislas with reversion to France. The cession of Lorraine by Germany was the most successful act of the administration of Fleur}^, who, aware of the exhaustion of France by her late efforts, and keenly alive to the proba- bility of war with England, desired peace on the continent. No better illustration could be found of Fleury's methods than his conduct on the death of Charles vi. He was a master in the arts of duplicity and evasion, and though in January 1740 he had promised to observe his engagements made with Charles vi., on the latter's death he refused to recognise Maria Theresa, and assured the Elector of Bavaria that France would not uphold the Pragmatic Sanction against the rights of third parties, and further, that she would not prevent him from competing for the imperial crown. He undoubtedly hoped to preserve peace, but declared in casuis- tical fashion that if it was proved that any third party had better claims to the Hapsburg dominions than Maria Theresa, i) The War of the Austrian Succession 141 the French guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction fell to the ground. Fleury's equivocal attitude is explained partly by the existence at Court of a strong war party, partly by the / previous relations between France and Bavaria. In 1714 by a secret treaty the King of France had promised to support the candidature of the Elector of Bavaria to the imperial throne in the event of a vacancy. In 1727 this treaty had been renewed, and France further engaged to support the claims of the Elector to the Hapsburg inheritance. Em- boldened by this alliance, Charles Albert had, at the Diet of 1732, refused his adhesion to the Pragmatic Sanction, and in 1733 France made with him another treaty promising still more explicitly her support in case he was attacked when attempting to make good his claims. In 1 738 in order to justify and explain the French guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and the apparent desertion of Bavaria, Fleury elaborated a fine distinction between a claim and a lawful possession, and introduced a reservation about the rights of third parties. It was impossible, according to Fleury's reason- ing, for France to defend Maria Theresa if it could be proved that she was not legally entitled to her possessions. In 1 740, not feehng sure of his ground, Fleur}', after Charles vi.'s death, hesitated and equivocated. He told the Bavarian minister that the Elector could aspire to the imperial crown, as the Pragmatic Sanction contained no stipulations about the election to the Empire. Very characteristically he determined to wait the course of events before taking any decided action with regard to the hereditar}^ possessions of Charles w} Frederick the Great had, on the contrary, no scruples and felt no hesitation. He was not hampered by the existence of any opposition at his Court. He resolved to seize Decisive Silesia. Like Maria Theresa, in 1749 he invited Frederick from Podewils his chief adviser in diplomacy and the Great, foreign affnirs. and from the field-marshal Schwerin, the expres- sion of their views. They agreed on October 29 in advising 1 See Tuttle, History of Prussia, vul. i. p. 51, 142 Einvpean History, 171 5-1789 the king to open negotiations with Austria, and to offer in return for Silesia to give up all claim to Berg, and to support the Pragmatic Sanction and the candidature of the Grand Duke Francis to the imperial throne. But the death of the Empress Anne of Russia decided Frederick to act first and negotiate afterwards. If Austria refused to treat, then he would ally with Bavaria and Saxony, invoke the aid of France, support the election of Charles Albert as Emperor, and hold Russia in check by an understanding with Sweden. On December 16 the Prussian army invaded Silesia, and the War of the Austrian Succession began. It is impossible to justify Frederick's action. He himself declared that the desire to make a name was one of his The Invasion Hiotives. In cxtcnuation of the invasion it has of Silesia. been urged that the conduct of Charles vi. with regard to Jiilich and Berg had been the reverse of straightfor- ward. But the violation of the Treaty of 1728 is certainly not a justification for the seizure of Silesia. Austria and Prussia were united by a long series of treaties. They had fought together in the Polish Succession War, and Frederick William i. had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. With regard to the Prussian claims to Silesia, it cannot for a moment be asserted that Frederick's invasion had anything to do with any sup- posed claims which he might have had. Jagerndorf had been confiscated from the Elector of Brandenburg by Frederick 11. in 1623, and in 1675 Leopold i. had seized the duchies of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau. When Frederick iii. found him- self compelled to restore Schwiebus to Leopold in 1694, he formally resumed his claims upon the Silesian duchies, — which shadowy claims rested upon an agreement made in 1537 be- tween Joachim 11., Elector of Brandenburg, and the Duke of Liegnitz. Frederick William i. had never upheld these sus- pended claims ; there is no proof that they continued to sur- vive in the traditions of the House of Hohenzollern, nor is there any evidence that the question of his right to Silesia ever entered Frederick's mind. It has also been suggested that TJie War of the Austrian Succession 143 Saxony might have seized Silesia, and that, as a general Euro- pean war was certain, Frederick showed his wisdom in seizing Silesia before the other Powers moved. Whether a general European war was inevitable is open to very serious doubt, but even in that event the seizure of Silesia would not be justified. Frederick acted on his own responsibility, and his cause never called forth any real enthusiasm in England or Germany till he stood forth in the Seven Years' War to defend his new posses- sion against the combined efforts of France, Austria, and Russia. The invasion of Silesia was carried out most successfully, and by the end of January all the province, including Breslau the capital, was with the exception of Glogau, Brieg, and Xeisse in Prussian hands, and Frederick returned to Berlin. In spite of his remarkable success, he found himself in a most precarious position. Maria Theresa had refused to negotiate with him as long as a Prussian soldier remained in Silesia ; England was negotiating with Austria for the formation of a powerful coali- tion against him ; the Austrian preparations for the recovery of Silesia were prompt and extensive, and the fall of Munich in March 1741 seemed to threaten him with a Russo-Austrian alliance. At the beginning of April Neipperg, a brave pedantic soldier of the old school, led an Austrian army into the heart of Silesia, and on April 10 the battle of Mollwitz was fought and won by the Prussian infantry. This famous victory brought in its train many important results. The equivocal Moiiwitzand reputation of the Prussian soldiers was established, ^^^ Results, and it was recognised in Europe that in Prussia a new Power had arisen which could withstand and overthrow the Hapsburg veterans. Frederick had now secured Lower Silesia and Brieg, and it was evident to Enghsh statesmen that Maria Theresa's wisest policy would be to sacrifice Silesia and to make terms with Frederick. j But though defeated, INIaria Theresa refused to entertain the idea of sacrificing Silesia, and prepared to face the new situa- tion created by her defeat at Mollwitz. Spain, Bavaria, Sar- dinia, and Saxony determined to pursue their own en. Is at the 144 Ettropean History, 17 15-1789 expense of Austria, and the French Government came to a momentous decision — namely, to repudiate the Pragmatic Sanction, to actively support the candidature of Bavaria for the imperial throne, and to destroy for ever the power of the Hapsburgs. I As early as December 1740 Fleury had so far yielded to the active, noisy, and influential section who were in favour of an Fieury's attack upon Austria as to assure the brilliant, en- Poiicy. terprising, and unscrupulous leader of that section, Charles Louis Fouquet, Count of Belleisle, that France, while recognising Maria Theresa as Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, would support the Elector of Bavaria in his candidature for the imperial throne ; and at the same time informed him that Louis XV. had appointed him plenipotentiary to the German Diet in order to secure the support of that body for the furtherance of the French policy. Frederick's invasion of Silesia had been regarded at the French Court as doomed to failure, and Louis XV. had declared that the King of Prussia was mad. Various courses of action had suggested themselves to Fleury. France could carry out the treaty of 1735 and reserv^e her strength. This line of policy would have proved the best for France, then about to engage in a great struggle with England. Another course was to promote the election of Francis Stephen to the imperial throne on the understanding that Maria Theresa should give France a portion of the Low Countries or Luxemburg. A third course was to carry out the Pragmatic Sanction strictly, but in accordance with French traditions, and, in agreement with the secret treaty of 17 14 with Bavaria, to support Charles Albert's candidature for the imperial throne. Such a line of action would be difficult to pursue owing to the Elector's claim to all Maria Theresa's inheritance. The last and the worst course open to France was to break through all engagements and seize the opportunity to dismember Austria. 'I ill the battle of Mollwitz, Fleury, as has been said, had iiclined towards the third alternative, and had sent Belleisle to meet the Diet at Frankfort in order to promote the election of The Wai' of the Austrian Successiott 145 the Elector of Bavaria, The objections to this course were obvious. England's jealousy would be aroused at the interfer- ence of France in Germany ; she would be forced to support Austria warmly, and, if possible, to repeat her policy in the Spanish Succession War of forming a great alliance of all the states of Germany against France. Fleury's indecision had disastrous effects upon France, and, indeed, upon Germanv. Maria Theresa, fully convinced of his pacific intentions, refused uith scorn Frederick's attempts to treat after Mollwitz, and declined to be guided by the advice of Walpole, who urged her to accept the loss of Silesia and to unite N^ith Prussia against France; while the Prussian king, isolated in the midst of his successes, was forced to turn definitely to France. To Belleisle Frederick's victory afforded the opportunity which he had long looked for of earning out his elaborate policy. A league was to be formed, including ^^e French France, Prussia, Spain, Bavaria, Sweden, and Sax- aiiy with ony. Austria was to be dismembered, the Elector and invade of Bavaria was to become Emperor, and Germany Germany, was to be di\-ided into several equal kingdoms all incapable of resisting France. France herself, the arbiter of Europe and the protectress of German independence, was to receive the Low Countries. On April 20 he appeared in Frederick's camp, where foreign envoys had already assembled, but it was not till June 4 that Frederick agreed to sign a convention with France. The \'ictor of Mollwitz had no desire to make the Elector of Bavaria too powerful, or to set France in the place of Austria in Germany. It was not till the efforts of Enghsh mediation had completely broken down that, with a protracted war with Austria in prospect, he consented to an alliance ^vith France. On June 4 the treat}- was signed, and Frederick agreed to vote for the election of the Elector of Bavaria and to give up her claims in Jiilich and Berg. The King of France, on his part, undertook to guarantee to Frederick the possession of Lower Silesia with Breslau, to send an army into Germany to support Bavaria, and to induce Sweden to declare war on Russia in PERIOD VI. K 146 European History y 171 5-1 789 order to prevent the latter from joining Maria Theresa against Frederick. Belleisle had already, on May 28, come to an understanding — usually termed the Treaty of Nymphenburg — with Spain and Bavaria, and had promised that France would support the Elector with men and money. France did not declare war, for she simply proposed to act as the auxiliary of the Elector of Bavaria in his attempt to secure the imperial crown and a share of the Austrian possessions in Germany. In spite of Fleury's hesitation and indecision, Belleisle succeeded in his efforts, and on August 16 a French army entered Ger- many as the auxiliary of Bavaria ; and a month later another army under Maillebois advanced into Westphalia, ready to co-operate with Prussia and to hold Holland and Hanover in check. From Passau the Franco-Bavarian army marched into Upper Austria and took Linz on September 11. So far no diffi- culties had been met with. Though English feeling was enthu- siastic on behalf of Maria Theresa, and though England was on the verge of a great struggle \\dth France, neither George 11. nor Walpole showed any appreciation of the necessity of check- ing the action of France or Germany. George 11., as Elector of Hanover, was not averse to the election of Charles Albert as Emperor. Like many other German princes he was opposed to the preponderance of Hapsburgs in Germany, and, more- over, his anxiety for the safety of Hanover caused him to make, on September 7, a treaty of neutrahty with France for his electorate. Walpole, too, disliked foreign pohtics, and devoted all his energies to mediating a peace between Prussia and Austria. This dilatory conduct of England inspired Belleisle with the hope that his plans would be successfully carried out before England and Holland moved. More definite measures were taken to secure the inaction of Russia, which Power, in accordance with the treaty of 1726, proposed to send 30,000 men to aid Maria Theresa. Frederick the Great, in the treaty lately made with France, had stipulated that she should use her influence with Sweden to bring about an attack on Russia, and, on August 4, 1741, the Swedes declared war against Russia. The War of the Austrian Succession 147 The allies were now free from all danger of Russian inter- vention, and events in Russia tended still further to occupy the Court of St. Petersburg. On the fall of Biren on Novem- ber 18, 1740, Munich took the office of first minister, while Ostermann became High Admiral. The retirement of the former in March 1741 testified to the strength of the feeling at St. Petersburg in favour of Austria. But the German in- fluence was very unpopular in Russia, and a plot was organised by Lestocq, a French surgeon, which had the full ^ Revolution support of Russian national feeling, and in Decem- in Russia ber a palace revolution placed Elizabeth, daughter be^"on the*' of Peter the Great, on the throne, and marked the Throne, triumph of French influence at St. Petersburg. The young Prince Ivan was imprisoned, and Munich, Ostermann, Golov- kin, and others were exiled to Siberia ; and the accession of Elizabeth marked the resumption of the work of Peter the Great, which had been in abeyance under his immediate successors.^ A certain amount of difficulty was anticipated from the German states in consequence of the 'sullen and jealous irrita- tion ' felt towards France ever since the second Beiieisie's devastation of the Palatinate under Louis xrv. ' In Success, the minds of several of the German princes,' Frederick the Great remarked to A^alori, ' the support of France would do the Elector of Bavaria more harm than good.' Belleisle was well aware of the existence of this feeling. * The attachment to the House of Austria,' he wrote to Fleury from Germany, Ms general. It is impossible to uproot the prejudices of the country against France.' In no respect was the tact of Belleisle more signally shown than in the way in which he overcame the hostility of the German states to France. The conduct of the French troops during their march across Germany was most exemplary, while by intrigues and bribery the wily diplomatist secured the support of the Electors of Trier, Koln, .and Mainz to the French policy. Of the German ^Vandal, Louis XV. et Elisabeth de Rtissie, pp. 134-135. 148 Etiropea7i History, 17 15-1789 states, the alliance of Saxony was of immense importance for the allies. The tendency of the King of Poland and Elector of Saxony was to ally with Austria, and his minister Brlihl was jealous of the Prussian aggression. But the Saxon court had been thunderstruck at the victory of Mollwitz, and a visit of Belleisle to Dresden, combined with the influence exerted by Maurice de Saxe, and the effect produced by the march of the Franco- Bavarian army into Upper Austria, had the desired effect; and on September 19, five days after the fall of Linz, Saxony joined the allies. Similar activity was shown by the opponents of Austria in the south of Europe. Spain had, on Charles vi.'s death, made its claim a pretext for extensive preparations for an attack upon the Austrian possessions in Italy, with the object of giving Don Philip an establishment in Italy. Fleury, as usual, hesitated, proposed to Charles Eman- uel a partition of the Austrian states in Italy, and only gave Spain a half-hearted support. Though Charles Emanuel strongly objected to the increase of the Spanish power in Italy, Spanish troops were landed at Orbitello in December 1 741, and in spite of the opposition of the King of Sardinia and the Austrians, formed a junction with the Neapolitan troops, and marched towards the Po. Maria Theresa was thus threat- ened at all points, and Belleisle had succeeded almost beyond his hopes. The election of Charles Albert of Bavaria seemed assured ; Prussia and Saxony were allies of France, Spain was preparing to partition the Austrian dominions in Italy, Russia and Sweden were at war, and George 11. had made a treaty of neutrality for Hanover. Moreover, the loyalty of the Viennese was shaken, and in the autumn of 1741 Maria Theresa's position seemed hopeless. But from the end of September Maria ^^^ fortuncs began to improve. She had spent Theresa in the summcr at Pressburg, where she had been ungar . crowncd Quccn of Hungar}' on June 25. Upon the invasion of Upper Austria she had resolved to throw her- self upon the generosity of the Hungarians. On September 1 1 the Diet decreed the insurrection, and elected Francis The War of the Austrian Succession 149 Stephen as co-regent ; and on September 2 1 that memorable scene took place when the queen presented to the Hunga- rian magnates her infant son and was received with the cry, ' Moriamur pro rege nostro Maria Theresia.' The resolution of the young queen to appeal to the ^Magyars was worthy of a statesman, and did much to bridge over the hostility which had for ages existed between the Hungarians and the Austrians. Their devotion to her cause did not prevent the members of the Diet from securing valuable concessions from the helpless queen, who however found herself at the head of masses of undisciplined warriors, soon to become the terror of western Europe. While Maria Theresa was gaining from her eastern subjects those promises of support which were to prove so invaluable, signs of discord were appearing in the ranks of her enemies. Frederick the Great had been unwillingly forced into an alliance with France whom he distrusted, and it soon became apparent that his aims and those of Belleisle were by no means entirely in harmony. After taking Linz the allies should have pushed on and occupied Vienna. But Belleisle was not desirous of making Bavaria too strong, and he distrusted Frederick, The Treaty who, convinced that the capture of Vienna would slh^neiTe'n- end the war and ensure him Silesia, urged that dorf. the Austrian capital should be attacked. Belleisle, who was supported by the Elector of Bavaria in his objection to a march upon Vienna, carried his point, and the combined Franco- Bavarian-Saxon army, leaving a strong force in Linz, marched to Prague, which they besieged (November 19-26). While the combined army was committing this huge strategic blunder, Frederick had allowed himself to be detached from his alUes. He had discovered that Fleury was opposed to his possession of Glatz, the key of the Bohemian country, and almost simultaneously with this discovery came Maria Theresa's consent to a secret treaty — brought about through the efforts of the English envoy. Lord Hyndford — in accordance with 150 European History, 171 5-1 789 which Neipperg, whose army, then successfully guarding Neisse, was required for the defence of Vienna, was to be allowed to retire into Moravia, while Neisse, after a sham siege, was to be given up to Frederick, and all Silesia ceded to him. This treaty was, on October 9, agreed to at Klein-Schneliendorf by Frederick, who stipulated that it should be kept secret, otherwise he declared he would disavow it. The motives which prompted Frederick to act so treacherously towards his aUies will prob- ably never be known, while Carlyle's defence of his action will hardly be considered to be adequate. The possession of Neisse was indispensable to him, and its seizure was impossi- ble while Neipperg's army lay in front of it. The capture of Neisse enabled him to strengthen his position in Lower Silesia, recruit his exhausted troops, and to make further acquisitions. Frederick was opposed to the preponderance of the French in German politics, and he seems to have expected that the allied army would fail in its invasion of Bohemia. His treachery was soon known all over Europe, and the united forces of Neipperg and the Grand Duke Francis advanced into Bohemia and checked the successes of the allied army. Meanwhile Fred- erick had occupied the county of Glatz — a fief of the Bohe- mian crown — and on November i took possession of Neisse. Though the convention of Klein-Schnellendorf, on becoming generally known, was repudiated by Frederick, Maria Theresa had derived considerable benefit from the arrangement, which enabled her to employ her one Austrian army ; while Frederick, having gained his end and shaken himself free from his engage- ments with Austria, again turned to the allies. On November i he agreed to a treaty with Saxony and Bavaria for the dismem- berment of Austria ; he made an arrangement with Charles Albert, by which the latter, who considered himself the rightful king of Bohemia, ceded to him Glatz, the conquest of which was completed in December ; he effected the reorganisation of Silesia on the Prussian system ; and on December 27 he advanced into Moravia and seized Olmiitz. But Frederick's successes had not alarmed Maria Theresa. TJie War of the Atistrian Succession 151 Though Prague had fallen on November 29, there was a want of vigour and decision in Fleury's policy at a time when vigour and decision were required to keep the coalition T- 1 • , , J 11 T , The Election together. rredericks conduct had aroused the ofcharies deep suspicion of the French, while his futile cam- ^^^^'■^. \° *h« ^ '■ ' Imperial paign in Moravia early in i 742 owed its failure in Throne, great measure to the conduct of his French and ^^' ^''^'' Saxon allies. After the capture of Prague, Fleury had appointed the Marshal Broglie to take the command in Bohemia. The marshal was in his seventieth year, was disliked by his officers, and the object of Frederick's detestation. He had at once formed an entrenched camp at Pisek, where his force of some 16,000 men was held in check by an Austrian army. At the same time Khevenhuller had taken Linz, and was advancing on Munich, Charles Albert had been elected Emperor on January 24, 1 742, the day of the fall of Linz. It was to counteract the movements of the Austrian army in Bohemia, and to check the advance of the Hungarians upon Vienna, that Frederick proceeded to Olmiitz on January 28, and opened his second campaign. But, hampered by the attacks of the Moravian peasants, and checked by Frederick's the advance of an Austrian force asrainst De Brodie, J"^^^^°" °^ o o > Moravia, and by the conduct of the Saxons, and perhaps of 1742- the French, Frederick found himself obliged, without having fought a single battle, in April to retreat from Moravia and to give up Olmiitz. Meanwhile, though Belleisle had succeeded in securing the coronation of Charles Albert as Emperor on February 12, he could not prevent the capture of Munich the same day by Menzel's wild, irregular forces. The unfortunate Emperor was forced to seek refuge in Frankfort, where his appeal for men and money to support the imperial dignity was a curious com- mentary on Belleisle 's elaborate plans. In other directions Maria Theresa's fortunes continued to improve. Walpole's fall in February 1742 had been at once followed by the adoption of more vigorous measures. Though 152 European History, 171 5-1 789 Wilmington was nominally Prime Minister, Carteret directed the foreign policy of the Government. He was known to be in favour of active intervention on behalf of Carteret s Foreign ^laria Theresa, and his entry into office was fol- ° ^^^' lowed by a considerable increase in both the army and navy. Sixteen thousand English troops were sent into the Low Countries, the same number of Hanoverians were employed, the States-General prepared for hostilities, and it became clear that the struggle over Silesia was about to develop into a war in which wider issues would be involved. Carteret found on taking office that Vienna was safe, that Bavaria was occupied by Maria Theresa's cavalry, that the French in Bohemia were in a precarious position, and that Frederick's Moravian campaign was proving a failure. In his desire to prevent Maria Theresa's overthrow, he had the support of the king and nation ; but he proposed to reassert England's influence on the continent, to bring about peace between Aus- tria and Prussia, and to form a coalition of German Powers to secure the humiliation of France. Like George, he had no ob- jection to the election of Charles Albert ; the principal aim of his policy was to reduce France to the condition in which she was at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht. The effect of Carteret's energetic policy was also seen in Italy where the Austrians were opposed by the Spaniards, who received encour- agement from Fleury, then as ever pursuing a policy of half measures. But Fleury was unable to secure the adhesion of Charles Emanuel to a further extension of the Spanish power in the north of. Italy, and on February i, 1742, the King of Sardinia concluded a treaty with Maria Theresa, pledging him- self to aid the Austrians to defend the Milanese, Modena, Parma, and Piacenza against the Spaniards. Against the com- bined Spanish and Neapolitan army, Charles Emanuel and the Austrians proved successful, capturing Modena and Mirandola, while the Eniirlish fleet under Admiral Matthews commanded the Mediterranean. Don Carlos was compelled by the threat- ened bombardment of Naples by five Enghsh ships to sign a TJic War of the Austrian Succession 153 convention withdrawing his Xeapohtan troops from the north of Italy. All chance of establishing a kingdom of Lombardy was lost ; Ehzabeth Farnese was forced to content herself with a less ambitious programme ; Charles Emanuel had freed him- self from a very real danger to his hopes of territorial aggran- disement ; and, by the end of the year, Maria Theresa, though unable to induce the Sardinians or the English or the Pope to aid her in substituting Austrian for Spanish influence in southern Italy, was at least in secure possession of all her territories, and of Modena in addition. The improvement in the outlook for Austria was not con- fined to central and southern Europe. In Russia the Austrian prospects were improving in consequence of a grow- T^e Failure ins: coolness between the Courts of St. Petersburg °^ French ... Policy in and Versailles. Had a close Franco-Russian alii- Russia. The ance been made, it would have been impossible for Peaceof Abo. Maria Theresa to have detached Frederick from the coahtion. France had ever}' reason to use her best endeavours to presen-e her friendship with Russia. But the want of tact shown by the French Government proved disastrous to friendly relations between the two countries. The accession of Elizabeth, itself a triumph of French diplomatic skill, was a victory of the Russian as opposed to the German party ; and Alexis Bestuzhev became chief minister. The position of affairs, though favour- able to France, required skilful handhng. Russia was at war with Sweden, and Sweden had entered upon the war at the instigation of France, and in expectation of recovering some of her lost territory. On Elizabeth's accession France would have acted wisely in mediating a peace between the two countries on the basis of the status quo. A conference between Russia and Sweden was opened in 1742 at St. Petersburg, but the French Government adopted a most unfortunate and ill-advised policy. Ch^tardie backed up the Swedish claims, a treaty was concluded v^nth Denmark in March, and an attempt was made to establish a close union between Denmark and Sweden, while the French 154 European History, 17 1 5-1789 envoy at Constantinople exerted all his efforts to form an offensive alliance between Sweden and Turkey. A letter from Amelot, the French minister, to the envoy at Constantinople fell into the hands of the Russian Government, and the French intrigues stood revealed. Bestuzhev violently opposed Che- tardie, French mediation was dechned, the friendly relations between France and Russia came to an end, and Chetardie left St. Petersburg in June 1742. The peace of Abo, concluded between Russia and Sweden on August 17, 1743, gave Russia South Finland as far as the river Kiumen. Adolphus Frederick, Administrator of the Duchy of Holstein, was elected Crown Prince in preference to the Crown Prmce of Denmark. Thus Russia prevented all possibihty of a union of Sweden and Den- mark, and assumed her influence over the former country. In December 1743 Chetardie returned to St. Petersburg, only to be ordered, on June 12, 1744, to leave Russia within twenty- four hours. With his disgrace all chance of a Franco-Russian alliance disappeared for the time ; and France, deprived of Russian and Prussian support, found herself attacked by Eng- land and Austria. After Frederick's retirement from Moravia, negotiations had, by means of Lord Hyndford, been carried on between Prussia and Austria. Frederick probably realised naries of that with England and Holland about to enter the Bresiau, and ^^^j. ^^ French chanccs of success were small, and the Treaty ' of Berlin, that his bcst coursc was to make peace. Maria 1742- Theresa, however, was anxious to try again the fortunes of war, and, after some preliminary manoeuvres, the two armies, commanded respectively by Frederick and Charles of Lorraine, met at Chotusitz, or Czaslau, in Bohemia, on May 17. The Prussians gained a complete victory ; Maria Theresa consented to treat; on June 11, 1742, preliminaries for peace were signed at Bresiau ; and the definitive treaty at Berlin on July 28. By this treaty Austria yielded to Prussia the territories of Upper and Lower Silesia, with the city and county of Glatz ; the principahties of Teschen, Troppau, and Jagerndorf being, The War of tJic Austrian Succession 155 however, reserved and united to Bohemia. Frederick agreed to withdraw all Prussian troops from Bohemia within sixteen days, and to be responsible for the repayment of a loan ad- vanced by English and Dutch capitalists upon the revenues of Silesia. The Prussian king had secured the objects for which he had embarked upon war ; as the fortunes of his allies now seemed desperate, he felt justified in deserting them and providing for the safety and welfare of himself and his country. CHAPTER VII THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION WAR AFTER THE PEACE OF BRESLAU I 742-1 748 The Defection of Prussia and Saxony from the French Cause — The Retreat from Prague — The Death of Fleury — Failure of the French Attack upon Austria — Louis XV. refuses to appoint a Successor to Fleury — The Due de Richelieu — The Secret Diplomacy of Louis XV. — The Austrians secure Bavaria, June 1743 — The Battle of Dettingen, June 26, 1743 — The Project of Hanau, July 1743 — The Treaty of Worms, Sept. 13, 1743J — The Treaty of Fontainebleau, Oct. 25, 1743 — The War enters upon a 'New Phase — France declares War upon England, March 15, and upon Austria, April 4, 1744 — The War in Italy, in the Netherlands, and on the Rhine — The Causes of the Second Silesian War — The Union of Frankfort — Treaty between Prussia, France, and the Emperor — Marriage of the Russian Grand Duke Peter and the Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst — Marriage of Ulrica of Prussia to the Heir- Apparent of Sweden — The Second Silesian War — The Death of the Emperor — The Treaty of Fiissen — Isolation of Frederick the Great — The Battle of Fontenoy — The Convention of Hanover — The Election of Francis Stephen as Emperor — The Treaty of Dresden — DArgenson's Failure in Italy — The Battle of Bassignano — DArgenson's Italian Project — The Expulsion of the French and Spaniards from North Italy — Death of PhiUp v., July 9, 1746 — The French Campaign in Flanders — Fall of DArgenson — The War in 1747 — Revolution in Holland — Close of the War — The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle — Relative Position of the Great Powers in 1748 — The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle only a Truce. The Treaty of Berlin, signed July 28, 1742, was quickly followed by a treaty signed on September 7, between Saxony The Defec- ^^^ Austiia. Belleisle's schemes for the dis- tion of memberment of Austria were ruined, and the Saxony from Spanish prospects in Italy seemed likely to be the French seriously affected. The defection of Prussia and Cause. ■' Saxony from the French cause enabled Maria Theresa to reinforce the Austrian forces in Lombardy, and 156 Austrian War after the Peace of B res laic i^j left the French troops in Bohemia in a precarious position. Fleury, realising the danger, endeavoured to bring about an arrangement between Elizabeth Farnese and Charles Emanuel, and made an undignified and unsuccessful attempt to con elude peace with Austria. Maria Theresa having unwisely refused to listen to Fleury's proposals, and having published his letters, nothing remained for the French Government but to extricate the Prague garrison by means of energetic measures in Bavaria, and by an advance on the part of Maillebois from the Lower Rhine. Encouraged by Barten- stein and Stahremberg, Maria Theresa showed her usual spirit, and England determined upon a more active participation in the war. The advance by Maillebois' corps to the borders of Bohemia forced the Grand Duke Francis to raise the siege of Prague, and enabled Broglie, with eight or ten thousand men, to escape. After Maurice de Saxe captured Eger, Maillebois left Prague to its fate, and joined Broghe in Bavaria, where the Emperor, owing to the temporary success of his general, The Retreat Seckendorf, against the Austrians, had been again from Prague. enabled to occupy INIunich on October 7, and to recover all Bavaria except Scharding and Passau. The situation of Prague, defended by 18,000 men under Belleisle, seemed desperate, especially when Lobkowitz with reinforcements was sent to strengthen Festetics, who was observing the city with 12,000 men. Taking advantage of the care- lessness of Lobkowitz, Belleisle, on the night of December 16, skilfully retired from the city with all his troops, save 5000 who were left behind under Chevert. After suffering terrible hardships from the intense cold and the attacks of the enemy's light cavalry, Belleisle, who showed con- spicuous courage during this famous retreat, succeeded, after losing 1500 men, in reaching Eger on December 27. Early in February he and his troops safely crossed the Rhine, while in the meantime the firm attitude taken by Chevert had secured from Lobkowitz honourable terms, and on 158 European History, 171 5-1789 December 25 Austria regained possession of Prague, Chevert and his garrison retiring to Eger, which the French con- tinued to hold. The Austrians had thus by the end of 1742 practically recovered Bohemia, though they had been compelled to rehnquish most of their conquests in Bavaria. After this disaster to the French arms, Broglie, who had superseded Maillebois in the command, made an unsuccessful attempt to recover Passau, while the Austrians on their part failed to win any striking success. Before the campaign of 1743 opened, two events occurred which had considerable bearing on the future operations. In The Death November 1742 Frederick the Great signed a of Fieury. defensive alliance with England, it being under- stood that the advance of the Enghsh army into Germany was directed not against the Emperor but against the French. On January 29, 1743, Fieury died at the age of ninety-three, after a ministry of seventeen years. Though the principal aim of his policy was peace at home and abroad, he had with difficulty allayed for the time the ever-recurring struggle be- tween the Parkffient of Paris and the clergy ; and he left France involved in a bitter struggle on the continent, in the colonies, in India, and on the sea. By strict economy he had endeavoured to relieve France, still suffering from the disastrous financial policy of Louis xiv. and the Regent, and aided by Orry, who was controller- general from 1730 to 1745, he took in hand the work of financial reorganisation. But he failed to remove any of the most pressing evils, or the more flagrant inequalities in the system of taxation, and, by having recourse to the corvee royale — or system of forced labour by the peasants — for the im- provement of the roads, threw an additional burden on the agricultural districts, and added one more to the many grievances of which the lower orders complained. His most successful diplomatic achievements were the Treaty of Seville, the establishment of Stanislas Leszczynski Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 159 in Lorraine, with the reversion of the duchy to France, and the Treaty of Belgrade. He had placed Spain in her former position of dependence on France, and, though allied with her, Louis XV. had not supported the Court of Madrid energetically either against England, or in its Italian enterprises. Cautious and h^lf-hearted, French policy during Fleury's ministry is devoid of clearness and consistency. Militant Bourbonism was viewed by him with suspicion ; intricate negotiations were his delight ; half measures were the result of his deliberations. • He had continued the policy of Dubois and Bourbon with regard to England, and as long as he lived open hostilities did not break out between the two countries. He had even suc- ceeded where Dubois and Bourbon had failed, in bringing Spain into friendly relations with both England and France. But though he never cared for the Spanish alliance, the out- break of war between England and Spain in 1739 was the beginning of the end of a political system which had been created in 1 7 1 7 by the dynastic exigencies of the Houses of Hanover and Orleans. To the war party at the French Court the continuance of the English alliance was as distasteful as Fleury's refusal to return to the policy of Henry iv., Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. towards Austria. Even the action of France in the Polish Succession War did not satisfy them. In their opinion, when Charles vi. established the Ostend East India Company, Fleury should have encouraged Spain and the Maritime Powers to force the Emperor into active hostilities, and then have aided in his destruction. In their opinion Fleury had missed an admirable opportunity of inflicting a telling blow upon Austria in 1 734, when the French, successful in Italy, had captured Philipsburg. Contented with the reversion of Lor- raine, he had, instead of finally overthrowing the ancient foe of France, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. His conduct four years later was also bitterly criticised. According to the militant party, the Cardinal, instead of medi- ating the Peace of Belgrade, ought to have united with Spain i6o Ejiropeaii History, 17 15-1789 and Sardinia to co-operate with the Turks, and once and for all to have destroyed the Austrian power. Fleury's whole hne of policy, therefore, ran counter to the views of Villars, Chauvelin, Belleisle, and their supporters. So far from aiming at the destruction of the Hapsburg mon- archy, he had shown in 1739, and again in 1742, signs of not being averse to drawing together the French Bourbons and the Hapsburgs, and to anticipate the work of Kaunitz. But cir- cumstances proved too strong for him, and, like Walpole, his hand was forced by the war party. He must share with that party the blame of having concentrated all the attention of the French Government upon the continental struggle, when the true policy of France was to have left the Prussians and Spaniards to protect their own interests in Germany and Italy respectively, and to have devoted all her resources to a vigorous defence of the French colonies and establishments in India, North America, and the West Indies. Though he shares with other French statesmen before and after him the charge of shortsightedness, he stands personally guilty of the grave charge of having neglected the army and navy. Throughout his career he showed no appreciation of the important issues at stake between England and France in North America and India and in the Mediterranean. He never seems to have realised that a struggle between the two countries was inevitable, and that one of the first conditions of French success was a close alliance with Spain. Fleury stands convdcted of a fatal want of foresight at a most critical epoch in French history. He made no attempt to strengthen or reconstruct the fleet, he took no steps to aid in the reorgani- sation of Spain, and to encourage Spanish ministers to make their navy efiicient. Till his death he devoted all his energies to skilfully and successfully advancing the Bourbon interests on the continent. Had French colonial interests and aspira- tions been non-existent, the diplomatic skill shown by Fleury in 1729, in 1735, and in 1739, would go far to place him in the rank of great French ministers. But his subordination of Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau i^ the \'ital interests of France to the lesser important continental ambitions of the Bourbons, his bhnd trust in diplomacy to postpone indefinitely a war with England, his utter incapacity to gauge national instincts or to appreciate popular forces, resulted in the break-down of his policy, in his inability to aid Spain in the war of 1739, or to prevent the supremacy of the EngUsh fleet in the Mediterranean, and the ultimate triumph of the British in India and North America. He left France unable to give the Stuarts any efficient aid, or to provide La Bourdonnais with a strong fleet, without which French success in India was impossible. In spite of his many diplomatic successes, Fleury's foreign pohcy in the later years of his • career was totally inadequate to the needs of France. And though in 174S the French frontiers were indeed safe, the position of France in North America and in India had been shaken. The rise of Prussia, to which Fleury and his succes- sors contributed, was a doubtful compensation for losses at sea and in the colonies. Such a statesman could have few friends in his own country and no admirers abroad. Up to the outbreak of the Austrian Succession War, France benefited from his knowledge of foreign pontics, his sagacity, and his caution, but from 1740 his fall was almost generally desired. In Spain his half promises and half-hearted alliance incurred the contempt of Elizabeth Far- nese, who recognised that the so-called Family Compact of i 733 had proved as abortive as that of 172 1. He failed equally to command the respect of the English ministers or the confidence of the Sardinian king. From the outbreak of the Austrian Succession War, the pol- icv of Fleurv and Belleisle had proved disastrous to the French interests. The failure to attack Vienna was a seri- Failure of ous blunder ; it gave Maria Theresa breathing time, ^uf/k "pon and proved very disastrous to the French cause. Austria. Though France had secured the election of the Emperor, Charles vii. had no authority, and had suffered severe reverses ; the attack on Lombardy had failed ; Frederick the Great had PERIOD VI. ^ 1 62 European History, 171 5-1789 withdrawn from his aUiance with France ; Sardinia was prepar- ing to vigorously support the Austrian cause ; and, with the exception of the loss of Silesia, Maria Theresa had upheld the 1 Pragmatic Sanction and recovered her possessions. France ' had suffered a diplomatic defeat in Russia, and the Swedish war had proved unsuccessful. The death of Walpole had I thrown the conduct of foreign affairs in England upon Carteret, and under his direction an English army was about to take an j active part in the war, which had now entirely changed its character. From being, on the part of England and Austria, a war to resist an attempt to partition the Hapsburg territo- ries, it had become a war, from the English point of view, to free Germany from the French armies, and, from the Austrian point of view, to take vengeance for the unprovoked attacks of Louis XV., and to secure adequate compensation for the loss of Silesia by the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine and the Three Bishoprics. Though the outlook seemed black for France, some comfort could be derived from the lack of unanimity between the English and Austrians, from the more active poHcy of Spain after Fleury's death, and from the attitude of Charles Emanuel, who was fully determined not to continue the war without se- curing definite promises of territorial compensation from Aus- Louis XV. ^^i^- I^ ^'^y case, a capable successor to Fleury refuses to ^y^s urgently demanded. Louis xv., not recognis- appoint a . .... . . . . . ^ . , Successor mg the Critical situation in which r ranee was placed, to Fleury. declared he would take the government into his own hands, and that the Cardinal should have no successor. The results of this decision were disastrous. All unity in the administration was lost, and rival claimants contended for the chief influence over the king. The permanent ministers were the Chancellor d'Aguesseau ; the Controller-General Orry ; Amelot, minister of foreign affairs ; Maurepas, minister of ma- rine ; Count d'Argenson, minister of war. Of these the Count d'Argenson had come into office on the death of the Marquis de Breteuil on January 7, 1743, when the failure of Belleisle, Austnan War after the Peace of Breslati 163 Noailles, and Broglie rendered energetic measures necessary. Throughout his ministry, which continued till February i, 1757, he showed considerable energy, carried out many excellent reforms, and by his active co-operation not a little contributed to the \dctories of Marshal Saxe. Till the Marquis d'Argenson was, in November 1744, appointed minister of foreign affairs, the home and foreign policy of the Government was mainly directed by the Marshal de Noailles, who held no official position. Noailles, who had married one of Madame de Maintenon's nieces, aimed at once at being a financier and a soldier. He aimed at rousing Louis from his lethargy ; and to The Due de his influence, supported by that of the Duchesse de Richelieu. Chateauroux, was due the king's decision to place himself, like Louis XIV., at the head of his army. Opposed to Noailles was the Due de Richeheu, whose influence on the king proved most disastrous to the interests of France. Richelieu represented the worst type of the French noble class. A briUiant man of fashion, and the friend of Voltaire, he had in his youth seen life under the auspices of the Regent Orleans. Thoughtless, frivo- lous, and vicious, with no sense of responsibihty, and actuated by no patriotic feelings, Richeheu, in spite of his personal bravery and military instincts, was an admirable type of those nobles who, by their neglect of their duties, by their foohsh support of the so-called philosophic movement, by their general incapacity, and, above all, by their want of sympathy with the classes below them, were in a special sense answerable for the revolution which swept them away. He exercised a most pernicious influence over Louis xv., and when the temporary triumph of Noailles ended with the king's illness at Metz, he successfully encouraged the weak monarch to devote himself to a life of pleasure, and by so doing dealt a fatal blow at the stability of the royal power in France. It remains, however, true that though his popularity disappeared after his illness, and though the disgrace of Noailles in the autumn of 1 744 removed a good influence from his side, Louis continued to take in international questions a personal 164 European History, 171 5-1 789 interest, which led to curious, and, for France, unfortunate developments. From the death of Fleury began the famous secret corre- spondence of Louis XV., which was in great part answerable for the weakness of French foreign policy during the Diplomacy rest of the reign. Intelligent in many respects, the o ouis . j[^jj^g \^^^ certain ideas of his own about foreign policy. Disliking the restraining influence of his regular min- isters, he attempted to carry out his crude schemes by means of intrigue and a system of deception. Choosing confidential agents, he opened secret communications with them, and issued instructions which often ran counter to the official orders trans- mitted to them from the French Foreign Office. Till his ill- ness at Metz in 1 744, Louis reigned without a chief minister, transacting all business himself through the agency of clerks. The inconveniences of such a system are obvious, and it was unlikely that, with this recrudescence in a feeble form of Louis XIV. 's determination to be his own minister, the French arms could hope for successes against the Austrians and English in 1743 and 1744. The year 1743 witnessed three campaigns — in Bavaria, in western Germany, and in Italy. In order to save France from The invasion, to effect if possible a junction with Broglie, Austrians ^^d to prevent the Pragmatic Army from uniting Bavaria, with Prince Charles of Lorraine in Bavaria, Noailles June 1743. |g^ ^^^ army across the Rhine and advanced between the Neckar and the Maine. But the Bavarians under Secken- dorf were surprised in May by the Austrians under Charles of Lorraine, acting in conjunction with the columns of Kheven- huller and Lobkowitz ; and Broglie, refusing to give Seckendorf any assistance or to wait for reinforcements from Noailles, aban- doned Ingolstadt and Donauworth without striking a blow, and recrossed the Rhine. The Bavarian army was compelled to re- tire into Suabia, Munich was again occupied by the Austrians, the Emperor fled to Frankfort, and on June 27 Seckendorf signed the Convention of Niederschonfeld, by which hostilities Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 165 were suspended, the neutrality of the Bavarian army was agreed to, and all Bavaria except Ingolstadt was left in Austrian hands till the conclusion of a treaty. Broglie's irresolution and timid- ity had resulted in the abandonment and loss of Bavaria, and he soon afterwards fell into disfavour. In August Eger, the last relic of the French invasion of Germany in 1741, was taken by the Austrian troops. In western Germany the French arms were equally un- successful. A mixed force of English, Hanoverians, and Hessians had entered Germany from the Nether- ^^ „ ^ , ■' ^ ^ The Battle lands early in 1743, and was joined in March by ofDettingen, Neipperg, and in April by 20,000 Austrian auxilia- ^""^ ^^' ^^^^' ries under the Duke of Aremberg, the commander-in-chief in the Austrian Netherlands. These troops, known as the ' Prag- matic Army,' were commanded by Lord Stair, who had served under Marlborough. The presence of this army on the Rhine secured the election in April of an Austrian partisan to the See of Mainz. Having obtained from Holland, in May, the promise of 20,000 men, Sfeair began his march towards Bavaria, his intention being to cut BrogHe's communications with France. But Noailles frustrated this design by seizing the Hne of the Neckar ; and Stair, on attempting to march south-east and join Charles of Lorraine, found the upper waters of the Maine in the hands of the French. On June 20 George 11. took com- mand of the * Pragmatic Army,' on June 26 Noailles blocked the way to Hanau, and George was compelled to fight the battle of Dettingen. Though the news of the battle caused great enthusiasm in England and Austria, and corresponding depression in Bavaria and Prussia, no important result flowed from the French defeat. Charles of Lorraine prepared to occupy Alsace, but a French army under Coigny proved suf- ficient for the defence of that province ; while Noailles and another army guarded France against an invasion by Wade, who had succeeded Lord Stair in the command of the English army. The French, however, had been driven out of Ger- 1 66 European History y 1715-1789 many ; their ally, the Emperor, had been forced to make a treaty of neutrality with the Austrians ; while in Italy Traun had, on February 8, defeated the Spaniards at Campo Santo, Don Phihp had failed to penetrate into Piedmont ; and there seemed every probabiUty of an advance by the allies into the heart of France. While, however, matters remained in this balanced con- dition, George 11. and Carteret made a determined effort in The Pro'ect ^^^ ^° bring about a reconciliation between Maria of Hanau, Theresa and the Emperor. Known as the Project Ju y 1743- q£ Hanau, this scheme of pacification, which re- ceived the full assent of the Emperor and his representative, William of Hesse-Cassel, had much to recommend it to the German princes. Between Austria and Bavaria there were to be mutual renunciations of claims and mutual restitutions of territory. While Charles vii. retained the imperial title, he was to allow the validity of the Bohemian vote ^ in all matters relating to the Empire. Bavaria was to be erected into a kingdom, and the Emperor, in return for abandoning France, would receive from England large subsidies equal to those which he was then drawing from France, to enable him to support the imperial dignity. As a German prince, George had no objection to seeing the imperial crown in other hands than those of the Hapsburgs, and to him, as Elector of Hanover, an admirable opportunity now presented itself for supporting the rights of the princes against Austria, of bringing about the general pacification of Germany, and of uniting the Empire against France. Though this plan might appear intelligible and even statesmanlike to the inhabitants of Germany, which had suffered during the previous two hundred years from the repeated invasions of the French, there is no doubt that George, in regarding the situa- tion from a purely German point of view, incurred the charge 1 At the election of Charles vii. the Bohemian vote had been expressly excluded on the ground that Maria Theresa could not, as a woman, either vote or transfer her vote to her husband. Aiistriaii War afte7> the Peace of Breslau 167 of subordinating the interests of England to those of the Electorate of Hanover. Carteret, taking advantage of the accident which gave George 11. a position in the Empire, and ignoring the immense importance to England of the colonial and maritime issues then at stake, wished not only to return to but even to expand the policy of the Whigs in Anne's reign. Germany united was to hurl itself against France, and to com- plete the work interrupted by the Peace of Utrecht. Had this policy been carried out, George 11. would have appeared as a paramount power among the other Electors, and as one of the leading princes in Germany. But Frederick the Great had no intention of acting as the subordinate of Hanover ; Maria Theresa, in the flush of victory, was naturally reluctant to grant Charles vii. a full _^. ^ -' ° The Treaty indemnity for the past; while the Whig ministers, of worms, under Henry Pelham, who, on the death of \\'il- ^^*' ^^' ^^'*^' mington in July, had become prime minister, supported by public opinion, were distrustful of the German tendencies of George 11. and Carteret, disliked the idea of a Hanoverian army, and refused to assent to the proposed arrangement with Bavaria. All parties in England denounced the very idea of paying a subsidy to Charles w\., the avowed enemy of Maria Theresa and the hereditary friend of France. The real enmity of the English people was directed against France and Spain, and war at sea was far more popular than land operations in Germany. Carteret, already violently opposed in the cabinet, could not withstand the attacks on his policy, and the negotia- tions were broken off. In place of Carteret's proposed arrange- ments, the English cabinet determined to bring about a close alliance between Sardinia and Austria, to unite closely with Maria Theresa, and to carry on the war against France with vigour. In Italy all depended upon the action of Charles Emanuel. He was negotiating with the French and Spanish Governments, and refused to join the Austrians unless definite territorial compensation was assured him. He demanded Finale, Piacenza, and part of Pavia. English mediation was again called l6S European History y 171 5-1 789 in to adjust this difficulty, and to put pressure upon the Court of Vienna. Maria Theresa, who had bitterly resented the English attitude with regard to the cession of Silesia, was furious at this second attempt of England to force her to make unwelcome cessions to Sardinia. During the negotiations at Worms she held out firmly till Charles Emanuel threatened to accept the French proposals. Recognising most reluctantly the necessity for making the required sacrifices, Maria Theresa yielded, and on September 13 the Treaty of Worms was signed by England, Austria, Holland, Sardinia, and Saxony, all of whom agreed to uphold the Pragmatic Sanction and the balance of power in Europe. Maria Theresa ceded to Charles Emanuel the cities and part of the territories of Pavia and Piacenza, Vigevano, Anghiara, and the right of repurchasing Finale from Genoa, a right reserved by Charles vi. when he bought the marquisate from the republic. Charles Emanuel undertook, with 40,000 men, the armed defence of Maria Theresa's dominions in Italy, and the Austrian forces, numbering some 30,000, were placed under his command. He withdrew all claims on the Duchy of Milan, and by some secret articles arranged with Austria for the expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy. After Don Carlos had been driven out of the kingdom of the Two Sicihes, Sicily was to be given to Sardinia and Naples, and the Tuscan ports to Austria. In order to facilitate these arrangements, England agreed to advance the money necessary for the redemption of Finale, and to furnish subsidies during the remainder of the war. Thus the lifework of Elizabeth Farnese was endangered, and southern Italy was threatened with the restoration of the unpopular German regifne. The Treaty of Worms was at once met by the counter Treaty of Fontainebleau — a family compact between France and Spain concluded on October 25 by the express wish of of Fon- Louis XV. himself. In spite of the Treaty of 1733 tainebieau, j^q ^^^ alHancc subsistcd between the Courts of Oct. 25, 1743. Versailles and IMadrid during Fleury's lifetime. But the new League of Worms, in itself a serious blow to Austrian War after the Peace of Brcslaii i6^ France and Spain, brought the two Courts together pledged to a permanent union. Both branches of the House of Bourbon agreed to mutually guarantee their possessions present or future. France recognised the somewhat extensive claims and rights of Philip and Elizabeth Farnese to portions of Italy, and under- took to aid in the conquest of the Milanese, Parma, and Pia- cenza for Don Philip, while Gibraltar, Port Mahon, and Georgia were to be retaken from England, and the territory given to Savoy by the Treaty of Utrecht from Charles Emanuel. France agreed to declare war formally upon Sardinia and England, and this new family compact was to remain binding on both parties till by common consent they made peace with their enemies. With the Treaties of Worms and Fontainebleau the war entered upon a new phase, and the European contest assumed a more inteUigible form. England, no longer a The War mere auxihary of Austria, headed a great league ^"^^''^ "p°° against France and Spain, and it was recognised in Phase. London and at Versailles that the questions at issue involved not merely the preservation of the Pragmatic Sanction, but the supremacy of the sea, the superiority of the Latin or Teutonic element in North America, and the growth of the influence of England and France in India. Abandoning the sophisms of Fleury, France stood forth as the rival of Austria on the con- tinent, and of England on the sea and in the colonies. A fresh impulse was now given to the war, which was vigor- ously prosecuted in all directions. The national feeling was roused in France by the threatened invasion of the Austrians, and by the ancient hatred of England, while Philip v., who shortly before the Treaty of Worms had contemplated the conclusion of peace with England, was stirred up to fresh exer- tions. In October 1743 a mixed Spanish and French force, which, under Don Philip, was assembled in southern France, occupied Savoy, and attempted without success to force its way through the Alps. Louis xv., inspired by the Duchess of Chateauroux and Noailles, determined to emulate Louis xrv., and to take an active and pcrsoml share in the campaigns; I/O Etu'opeait History ^ 171 5-1 789 and the year 1744 opened with many indications of the enthu- siasm felt throughout France for the war. An invasion of England by 15,000 men from Dunkirk on behalf of the Pretender was attempted by Maurice de Saxe France de- at the beginning of 1 744, while in February the Clares War combined French and Spanish fleets, which durinof upon Eng- -^ ' ° land, March the greater part of 1743 had been blockaded in triat^Aprn V, Toulon, attacked the English fleet under Matthews, 1744- and gained the open sea. The Brest fleet ap- proached the English coast ; Kent was unguarded, and Eng- land only owed its immunity from attack to a violent storm. War was formally declared against England on March 15, and against Austria on April 4. France had definitely challenged England's naval and commercial supremacy, and Austria's claim to the leadership in Europe. Till the middle of the The War in year when Frederick the Great began the second Italy, in the Silcsian War, the principal miUtary operations took and on the placc in Italy, in Flanders, and on the Rhine. In Rhine, 1744. j^^jy great vigour was shown by both sides in the north as well as in the south. In the south Lobkowitz, the Austrian general, made an attempt to gain Naples, but was foiled by the efforts of Don Carlos aided by a Spanish army, and was defeated at Velletri. In the north, where Gages had superseded Montemar in the command of the Spanish troops, the fighting was more severe. Gages, however, failed to cut off the retreat of Lobkowitz to the Adriatic, and Don Philip, after a desperate attempt to conquer Piedmont, was forced to retreat into Dauphin^. But though the results of the year's warfare were more or less balanced in Italy, in the Netherlands and on the Rhine the French had the advantage. In May a large and formid- able army, commanded by Maurice de Saxe, though nomi- nally headed by Louis xv., who was still under the influence of Madame de Chateauroux, set out to combat the allied forces. Want of unanimity between Wade, Aremberg, anel Louis of Nassau, the commanders of the English, Austrians, and Dutcli Aiistria?i War after the Peace of Breslau 171 respectively, coupled with the withdrawal of several English regiments to defend England, the indecision of the Dutch, and the lack of ability among the generals, favoured the advance of the French army, and Courtrai, Ypres, Menin, Fumes, and other fortified places, fell easily into its hands. The whole country would have been conquered had not the Austrian in- vasion of Alsace, an event which Frederick the Great had pre- dicted, recalled the main portion of the French army under Louis XV, While the Netherlands were being invaded by the French king, Prince Charles of Lorraine, advised by that cau- tious strategist Marshal Traun, and with an army of nearly 70,000 men, had determined to conquer Alsace. Deceiving a Bavarian force under Seckendorf, and a French army under Coigni, the Austrians, by a series of skilful and rapid move- ments, which won the admiration of Frederick the Great, success- fully crossed the Rhine on the 30th of June, overran Alsace, threatened Luneville, and were only prevented from seizing Lorraine by the advance of Louis xv. himself, who had left Maurice de Saxe in the Netherlands with 45,000 men. At Metz, on August 4, Louis was seized with a dangerous illness, Madame de Chateauroux was forced to fly, and the king's re- covery was the signal for the wildest rejoicing. He received the name of Bie7i aime, and in spite of the return of Madame de Chateauroux to favour, which, however, was followed imme- diately by her death, enjoyed for a short time the greatest popularity. But before the French armies under Noailles and Coigni had effected a junction to oppose Prince Charles of Lorraine, the Austiians had been called away to defend Bohe- mia from an attack by Frederick the Great, while Noailles, who had in an attack upon the Prince shown great incompetence, was temporarily disgraced. A number of circumstances had concurred in deciding Fred- erick to again attack Austria. The continued successes of Maria Theresa during 1743 had made him anxious. The Treaty of Worms amounted in his opinion almost to a men- ace. While guaranteeing various treaties, it omitted all mention 1/2 Eiiropean History, 171 5-1789 of the Treaty of Berlin, by which he held Silesia. In December of the same year the Treaty of Vienna, between Saxony and The Causes Austria, increased his suspicions, for in that docu- of the Second T^^^it the Austrian territories had been guaranteed Silesian ^ War, 1744. without cxccption. There was no doubt that Maria Theresa's ambitious projects were developing in a manner dangerous to Prussian interests. She almost alone of all Euro- pean rulers had no wish for peace, and thirsted for further triumphs and additional compensations for her losses. Not satisfied with the reconquest of Bohemia and the occupa- tion of Bavaria, she hoped to regain Alsace and Lorraine, to incorporate Bavaria in the Austrian territories, to set aside the late imperial election, and to depose the Emperor. Fred- erick, moreover, had every reason to believe, from information from Vienna, that she was determined to reconquer Silesia. Fears for the safety of his newly acquired possessions undoubt- edly had a large share in forcing upon Frederick the necessity of making preparations for a fresh struggle, but his well-grounded uneasiness at the Austrian attitude towards the imperial consti- tution must also be taken into account. As a supporter of the Emperor Charles vii., Frederick bit- terly resented the Austrian occupation of Bavaria and Maria Theresa's treatment of the Empire as if it were an hereditary possession of the Hapsburgs. Nothing would have suited the Court of Vienna better than the inclusion of Bavaria within the Austrian territories, and the policy of Maria Theresa towards the House of Wittelsbach anticipated that of Joseph ir. in 1778 and 1785, and of Francis 11. in 1793 and 1794. A compact Austrian state in South Germany would have enormously in- creased the Hapsburg influence, and in a corresponding degree diminished that of the Hohenzollerns. To Frederick, however, the permanent occupation of Bavaria would have constituted an act of usurpation upon the rights of the princes, a deliberate attack on the imperial institutions, and a serious danger to his own kingdom of Prussia. From the beginning of 1744 Frederick the Great contem- Austrian War after the Peace of Ercslaii 173 plated the near approach of war with Austria, and with its out- break the possibility of gaining new acquisitions of territory for Prussia. On May 22 he formed, with the co-oner- ^^ „ . ■' ' '■ The Union ation of Changny, the French ambassador at Mu- of Frankfort, nich. and one of the ablest and most experienced ^^^ ^'^' diplomatists of the eighteenth century, the Union of Frankfort, which was joined by the Emperor, Charles Philip of Sulzbach, the Elector Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and by France in a secret article. The nominal objects of this league were the pacification of Germany, the restoration of Bavaria, and the recognition of the Emperor. Though not accepted by many German princes, and though its terms did not contain Frederick's real objects, the Union of Frankfort is a clear indication of the attitude henceforth adopted by Frederick with regard to German affairs, and enabled him to take up a strong position, and to gain considerable sympathy and support as a defender of the rights of the princes and ot the imperial constitution. Earlier in the year Frederick had sent Count Rothenburg on a secret mission to the Court of Versailles ; his object was to induce France to consent to a treaty with Prussia, in accordance with which Frederick, in re- turn for rescuing and restoring Charles vii., was to receive all Silesia that remained in Austrian hands, and in addition part of Bohemia. Rothenburg gained the support of the Duchess of Chateauroux, of Tencin, and of Richelieu, and in June assisted in the overthrow of Amelot, who was hostile to this scheme. After the fall of Amelot, who had been secretar}' for foreign affairs since the dismissal of Chauvelin in 1737, foreign affairs were managed, till the appointment of the Marquis d'Argenson in November, by an informal committee, which included the Count of Cha\'igny, Marshal Xoailles, and Du Teil, the chief clerk. The declaration of war against England and Austria by France in March and April was in accordance with Frederick's wishes, and was followed by the conclusion of a treaty between Prussia, France, and the Emperor, for the division of the conquests made from Austria. France was to receive several strons 174 European History, 171 5-1789 places in the Netherlands, Charles vii. Upper Austria and all Bohemia, except the circles of Koniggratz, Leitmeritz, Pardu- bitz, and Bunzlau, which, with that portion of Si- Treaty be- . ^ tween Prus- Icsia which was not yielded to Prussia by the sia, France, Treaty of BerHn, were to be handed over to Fred- and the -^ ' Emperor, erick. The arrangements with France were com- June 5. pleted by a m.ihtary convention concluded at Paris on June 5. The French king agreed to invade the Netherlands and Hanover, and to follow Prince Charles of Lorraine should he return to Austria to resist Frederick, who on his part under- took, on the conclusion of treaties by France with Russia and Sweden, to invade Bohemia in August with an immense army. A secret treaty with the Emperor on July 24 completed Fred- erick's arrangements, Charles vii. undertaking to assign the four Bohemian counties to Prussia as soon as Bohemia had been conquered and handed over to him. The failure of the Union of Frankfort to arouse any enthusiasm in Germany for the Em- peror, or to attract many members, and its subsequent decline, more than justified Frederick's policy in turning to France, where public opinion was running strongly against the Austrian cause. Besides securing the alliance of France, the King of Prussia had found means to strengthen his position in various other ways. The death of Charles Edward, Prince of East Friesland, on May 25, enabled Frederick to rapidly occupy that province in right of claims recognised by the Emperor in 1686. Emden the capital was taken, the administration of the fief was reor- ganised on a Prussian basis, and the claims of Holland and Hanover were ignored. But it was from the side of Russia Marriage of ^^at Frederick was most anxious to avert the pos- the Russian sibUity of attack. His continued distrust of Russia, Grand Duke •' Peter and SO Completely justified during the Seven Years' War, o^ Anhai"^^ had, amoug other considerations, led him to aug- Zerbst. meut his army very considerably, and to increase his war fund during the years succeeding the Peace of Breslau. A Russian invasion of Prussia in 1741 would have been disas- Anstriafi War after ihe Peace of Brest an 175 trous to Frederick's schemes, and was only prevented by the Swedish war. To avert the possibiHty of such an invasion in the future became the subject of the king's most anxious thoughts. The Russian Chancellor Bestuzhev headed an influ- ential party opposed to Prussia, and it was not till the end of the year — November 12, 1742 — that Russia acceded to the Treaty of Berlin. With infinite skill Frederick'.! diplomatic agents succeeded in assuaging the Russian hostility, and in bringing about better relations between the two countries, by securing for the heir to the Russian throne, the Grand Duke Peter of Holstein-Gottorp, a bride in the person of Sophia, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, who, on entering the Greek Church, took the name of Catherine, and became one of the most famous rulers of Russia. The betrothal took place in February 1744; the anti-Prussian influence of Bestuzhev was temporarily checked : and Frederick hoped that no danger was to be apprehended from Russia during the ensuing compaign against Austria. With Sweden Frederick had long been desirous of estabhsh- ing close relations, hoping, if occasion required, to use that countrv as a restraint upon Russia. Nesfotiations ,, . ^ o Marriage of were opened with the Court of Stockholm for a mar- uinca of riage and political alliance, and met with success. the^He1r-° In June 1 744 Frederick's sister Ulrica was married Apparent of ... . , 11/-^ r Sweden. to the heir-apparent of Sweden, and the Court of Stockholm entered cordially into friendly relations with Prussia. A friendly understanding with Sweden was all the more important since Frederick found, by the summer of 1744, that he could not hope for a Russian alliance. The French envoy Cht^tardie, who had lately returned to Russia, was ordered to leave the country in June, and Bestuzhev's influence was re- stored. France found herself unable to carry out the terms of the treaty of June 5, and the Prussian king had the techni- cal right of declining to fulfil his engagements. Realising, however, the unappeasable hostihty of Maria Theresa, and her fixed resolve to reconquer Silesia, sensible 176 European History ^ 1715-1789 of the latent jealousy of George 11. as Elector of Hanover, and, above all, profoundly convinced of the innmense impor- Summary of tance to Prussia and to Germany of recovering Frederick's Bavaria from the Hapsburg grasp, and reinstating entering the Elcctor to his position among the indepen- Second Si- ^^"^ princcs of the Empire, Frederick the Great, lesian War. in spite of the possibility of Russian opposition, and ■n spite of the inability of France to carry out the terms of her ngagement, decided to execute the treaty of June 5, and pre- pared to invade Bohemia in order to relieve France from the Dresence of Charles of Lorraine and his enormous army. He was resolved, while curbing the ambitious and revolutionary policy of Maria Theresa within the Empire, to establish his hold firmly upon the whole of Silesia, and to win a portion of Bohemia. Frederick's plan of operations was very simple. One French army was to operate in the Netherlands, and as soon as his ^^ „ attack on Bohemia had led to the retirement of The Second Siiesian Charlcs of Lorraine from Alsace, a second French ^''' army was to pun ue the retreating Austrians. On August 7 the Prussian envoy Dohna declared to the Chancellor at Vienna Frederick's intention of supporting the Emperor and the constitution of the Empire; on August 15 the Prussian army began its march upon Prague. Avoiding Dresden, so as not to rouse open hostility from that quarter, Frederick's army, in four columns, advanced through Saxony into Bohemia, and, in spite of numerous difficulties, besieged and took Prague on September 16. By the advice of Belleisle, who had recovered some of his influence and was in the Prussian camp, Frederick, against his own judgment, decided to advance southwards, con- quer the whole of Bohemia, and threaten Vienna. This deci- sion proved disastrous. Batthyani, \\ith his irregulars, cut the Prussian communications ; Augustus of Saxony carried out the Treaty of Vienna of December 1743, and sent 20,000 men to Maria Theresa's assistance ; while the return of the Austrian forces, under Charles of Lorraine and Traun, from Alsace, and Austrian War after the Peace of Bveslati 177 their junction with Batthyani at Mirotitz on October 2, placed the Prussian army in great peril. The Austrians had recrossed the Rhine on August 13, in face of the armies of Noailles and Coigny, and on September 10 had reached Donauwortb. The French had made no serious attempt, in accordance with the terms of their treaty with Frederick, to follow them and to harass their retreat. Noailles contented himself with sending reinforcements under Segur into Bavaria, and in besiegir'^ Freiburg ; while Seckendorf, aided by S^gur and troops froin Hesse and the Palatinate, busied himself with reconquering Bavaria and in restoring Charles vii. to his dominions. Fred- erick was left to his fate. Traun, placing himself between the Prussian king and Prague, outmanoeuvred the Prussians, and, with admirable strategy, forced Frederick to give up Prague, and, discomfited and discredited, to evacuate Bohemia, and to retire into Silesia. Thither the Austrians penetrated in the winter of 1744-45, after Frederick had returned to Berlin, but only to be driven out in January by Leopold of Dessau. At the close of 1 744 Frederick found himself attacked by the full force of the Hapsburg monarchy, and had learnt too late how little his French allies could be depended upon. He had deserted them in 1742 ; they deserted him in 1744. The campaign had not been disastrous to Frederick alone : though the Austrians had regained Bohemia, they had lost all Bavaria except Ingolstadt, Scharding, and Braunau, and on the 23d of October the Emperor had returned to Munich. The French had taken Freiburg ; Marshal Saxe kept possession of his conquests in the Netherlands ; the ^Marquis -.^^ j^ d'Argenson had, on November 18, become min- the Emperor, ister of foreign affairs. Still, at the beginning of ^°' ^'''^^' 1745 the Austrian fortunes looked brighter than did those of the Prussian king, who was weary of the war and ready to accept any terms which would leave him in possession of Silesia. On January 20, 1745, two months after the capture and imprisonment of his supporter Belleisle by the English, the Emperor Charles vii. died in his forty-eighth year, over- I'ERIOD VI. M 178 European History, 171 5-1789 whelmed with anxiety, disappointment, and disease. His death dealt a serious blow to French policy, and brought to an end the Union of Frankfort. Frederick the Great could no longer pose as the defender of the rights of the Emperor ; he was more exposed than ever to the hostility of Austria; while France, like Prussia, having lost that moral basis of its cause which was derived from the support given to Charles vii., could only see in a vigorous prosecution of the war any chance of an honourable peace. The effects of the death of the Emperor seemed likely to be far-reaching. In France pubUc opinion be- gan to declare against entanglements in central Europe, since experience had shown the folly of engaging in the quarrels of Germany. In England the fall of Carteret, one of the most brilliant foreign ministers of the eighteenth century, was fol- lowed by the reunion of the Whig party and by the adoption and extension of the poHcy advocated by the fallen minister. Though the Hanoverian troops were dismissed, the system of subsidising the German states was largely developed. The Governments of England and France found themselves unable to shake themselves free from political engagements, and the war continued on its former lines. The IMarquis d'Argenson, who had in November 1744 become minister of foreign affairs in France, indulged in vast schemes of foreign poHcy, and looked forward to the time when France should again have a commanding influence in Europe. He put forward Augustus - III., the Saxon King of Poland, as a candidate for the imperial throne, and at the same time an attempt was made to preserve French influence in Bavaria. The efforts of Chavigny, who „, _ was still the French ambassador at Munich, were The Treaty of Fussen, neutralised by d'Argenson's refusal to supply the April 22, 1745- (iiestitute young Elector with money, and by Maria Theresa's insight and energy. With the instinct of a states- man she at once recognised the advantages of her position, showed herself as determined to secure her husband's election to the imperial dignity as she was to regain Silesia, and resolved as a preliminary step to these ends to force upon the young Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 1 79 Elector a reconciliation. Maximilian Joseph was only eighteen years old ; his mother was a Hapsburg, and, with Seckendorf^ was in favour of peace with Austria. While he hesitated to accept the terms offered by Colleredo, the Austrian representa- tive, which amounted to a status quo ante, Maria Theresa poured her troops, under Batthyani, into BaYaria. On March 24 they crossed the Inn, droTe the French contingent out of Bavaria, and threatened Munich, while the Elector fled to Augsbuig. Deserted by the French, with his country in Austrian hands, and threatened by an advance on the part of Aremberg south- wards, he was obliged to submit. On the 2 2d of April the Treaty of Fussen was signed be- tween the young Elector and Maria Theresa. By it Bavaria was gained to the Hapsburg interest, and the Bavarian vote was secured for Francis Stephen on the ensuing imperial elec- ron. Maximilian, while recognising the Pragm:.::; S3.r.:rion, was not compelled to ally with Austria against Piussia and France, though by a secret article he engaged, in return for a subsidy equal to that granted formeriy by France to his father, to supply 12,000 troops to the Maritime Powers. The e5r:ts of the subjugation of Bavaria ir. 1 :r.e Treaty of J- _.. : -:e at once seen. The German sen: : er: ■' vays 5 : r ; lie on the score of French interference, ex : r 5 r : : 5 e'f i:: :r rings in Bavaria at the expulsion of S^gu: : . ^ ; tingent, while throughout the small states of Gerr. : :. _ : : reaction in fevour of Austria set in. At the Ha ^7 : e enthu- siasm for the continuance of the ^.-.r :: re .-t : r 'r the Elector of Saxony, yielding :o :he ;r:-.:i^:„zi ^; Ilaria Theresa's minister, allowed his ha::ri :: :r.e King of Prussia fiill play, and hastily promised to ratify the Treaty of Warsaw, to support the election of Francis Stephen, and to send troops to aid Austria in the ensuing campaign. In con- sideration of these services he was to receive Schwiebus from Austria, and further territorial compensation at the Prussian expense. On the iSth of May the Treaty of Warsaw, which had been i8o European History ^ 17 15-1789 arranged in January, was ratified. Austria and Saxony were united on a permanent basis. Both Powers agreed to partition ^ , ^. , Prussia and to reduce Frederick's kinajdom to the Isolation of ° Frederick Hmits of the ancicnt Margraviate of Brandenburg, t e reat. Maria Theresa had thus succeeded in securing the Bavarian and Saxon votes, and in isolating Frederick. The loss of the Bavarian alliance had been a serious blow to the King of Prussia ; the policy of aggression and spoliation agreed upon by Austria and Saxony constituted a grave danger. Though d'Argenson continued his hopeless attempts till the eve of the election in September to induce Augustus to become a candidate for the imperial dignity, Frederick the Great saw clearly the hopelessness of such a project, and the impossibility of gaining the adhesion of Augustus, who was himself dependent on Austria, while his ministers were, like the Electors of Koln and Mainz, in the pay of England. He was surprised when he heard of the French determination to continue the war ; he had hoped for the intervention of England in favour of a general pacification. No assistance or friendly mediation could be obtained from Russia, for the Tsarina had in April declared she would no longer be a guar- antor of the Treaty of Berlin ; while England's attempt to in- duce Austria to consider the question of peace failed utterly. Frederick was left to his own resources and to the valour of his soldiers. The fate of Silesia hung in the balance. Before the Austrian attack was made, France had won the battle of Fontenoy on May 11, and had to some extent re- ^, „ , , stored the military reputation of the French soldiers. The Battle of . Fontenoy, Maillcbois had been sent into Italy with one army ; May II, 1745. (--Q^^^j ys'i^^x a sccond defended Alsace ; while Maurice de Saxe with a third, accompanied by Louis xv., set forth to the Netherlands. In making his principal elTort in Flanders, Louis and his ministry were acting in full accord with the popular wish. In abstaining from interference in the Empire, and in profiting by the quarrel in Germany to extend her frontiers, France was pursuing, if not an honour- Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau i8l able, at least an intelligible, policy. In spite of Frederick's sarcasm that the capture of Tournay would be as useful to him as the siege of Babylon by Thamas-Chouli-Khan, Saxe, on April 30, besieged Tournay. The allied forces were under Cumberland, who was ably seconded by the Austrian Konigs- tgg, while the Dutch troops were under the Prince of Waldeck. Cumberland and Konigsegg made a desperate at- tempt to raise the siege of Tournay, and fought on May 11 the battle of Fontenoy, which, owing to the inaction of the Dutch, ended, in spite of the heroism of the English and Hanoverians, in a partial victory for Marshal Saxe. Cum- berland was compelled shortly afterwards to return to England on account of the Jacobite ri.^ing, and the French, under Lowendahl, fortunate in the withdrawal of English troops, found httle difficulty in capturing Tournay, Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde, Dendermonde, Ostend, Nieuport, and Ath.^ Frederick had been himself opposed to campaigns in the Netherlands which could not be of any senice to him in Bohemia, and had consistently advocated the winning of victories in Germany. But the news of the victor)- of Fonte- noy encouraged him to hope that possibly the Enghsh might now be induced to make peace. Fontenoy had, however, hardly been fought before the combined Austrian and Saxon armies, 75,000 strong and commanded by Prince Charles, entered Silesia. \Vith 70.000 men Frederick defeated the Prince at Hohenfriedberg on June 5, and, follow- ing the enemy into Bohemia, remained encamped veinion"of near Koniggratz for three months, hoping France Hanover, would declare war on Saxony and send Conti into the^Eiectlon Germany. He was still anxious for peace. His °^ Francis 1 J 1 ij J Stephen to resources were exhausted ; he could get no ade- the imperial quate monev srrant from the French ; while, upon J^^'o^^- ^ - ^ ? ' r Sept. 13, 1745. the retirement of Conti and his army across the Rhine shortly after Fontenoy, there was not a French soldier 1 For much of the later portion of the war in Germany see Due de Broglie, Marie Thcresr, Imperatrice. 2 vols. 1 82 Etiropemt History, 171 5-1 789 left in Germany, and Saxony had no longer to fear the pos- sibility of French intervention. On the other hand, Maria Theresa's forces dominated Frankfort, where the election of the Emperor was to be held, and the Austrian Government was well supphed with English subsidies. From his desperate position Frederick was partially relieved by George 11. England was in the throes of the Jacobite rebellion, and the English troops in Germany were required to defeat Charles Edward, who had landed in England on August 4. Fearing to leave Hanover exposed to the attacks of the Prussian king, George 11. on August 26 signed the Convention of Hanover, guaranteeing for himself and his alHes the maintenance of Frederick in Silesia, and confirming the Treaty of Berlin. But the pacific tendencies of the English king were not seconded by his alhes. The attempted media- tion on the part of England in favour of peace by Robinson, the English envoy at Vienna, begun a month previously, met with no success at the hands of Uhlfeld ; and on September 13 the Grand Duke Francis Stephen was elected Emperor as Francis i. Maria Theresa had secured one of her two great aims. It remained for her to regain Silesia. The Convention of Hanover had infuriated her against her treacherous friend England, from whose alliance she felt released, and while Briihl suggested to the Marquis de Vaulgrenant the establish- ment of friendly relations between Austria and France, Chavigny was writing on the 13th of September from Munich The End of that Chotek, the Austrian minister in that city, the Second ]^^^ g^j^ ^.q ^^ Saxon ambassador that * it was Silesian War, and the the first time the Courts of Vienna and Ver- Dresden sailles should draw together.' The opposition Dec. 25, 1745. of Louis XV. and d'Argenson, however, rendered the Austrian overtures fruitless, and the Franco-Prussian alli- ance remained intact. On the 30th of September Frederick, while retiring from Koniggratz, again defeated the Austrians at Sohr, and con- Austrian War after the Peace of Breslaii 1S3 tinued his retreat into Silesia. The Austrians, however, ignor- ing the approach of winter, to the surprise of Frederick, who had returned to Berhn, where he received a declaration that Russia would not permit any attack on the dominions of Augustus III., proposed, in conjunction with the Saxons, an invasion of Brandenburg. Hearing, through the indiscretion of Count Briihl, of this daring design of Maria Theresa against him, Frederick determined to brave the danger of a Russian onslaught and to attack Saxony. Suddenly falling on Prince Charles' army in Saxon Lusatia, he overthrew it on Novem- ber 23 in the battle of Gross Hennersdorf, and drove it into Bohemia; while, on December 15, the Prince of Dessau, hav- ing taken Leipsic, defeated a combined Austrian and Saxon army under Count Rutowski, a half-brother of Marshal Saxe, at Kesselsdorf, near Dresden ; and, three days later, Frederick entered the Saxon capital, where he charmed all by his moder- ation and affability. At this crisis Harrach, the Austrian min- ister in Dresden, who hated Frederick, made a definite offer to Vaulgrenant for a French alliance. But neither Louis xv. nor d'.\rgenson was as yet prepared to revolutionise French for- eign poHcy, and on December 2-^, i 745, the Treaty of Dresden ended the second Silesian War. The Convention of Hanover was confirmed, and the cession of Silesia was secured to Fred- crick, who agreed to recognise the new Emperor. The second Silesian War is of enormous importance in the history of Prussia, which was only saved from a serious disaster by the audacity of Frederick himself. At its close he was again recognised as sovereign of Silesia, and the influence of Prussia in Germany was secured. To France the Treaty of Dresden was an unpleasant surprise. The Prussian king had again broken with France, and Louis xv.'s policy had suffered a severe blow, more severe than the previous disasters of the year 1745, the loss of Bavaria, the Convention of Hanover, the election of Francis i. It was only in Flanders and in Italy that France could look for successes, and in the latter country a serious calamity was awaiting her in 1 746. 184 Etu'opcan History y 171 5-1789 Maria Theresa's acquiescence in the Treaty of Dresden, as unexpected as that of Louis xiv. in the Treaty of Ryswick, had ^,. been caused by the arrival of the news of the loss D Argen- -' son's Failure of Milan and the threatened loss of the Italian prov- ^ ^' inces of Austria. The year 1 745 was disastrous to the Hapsburg cause in Italy. France, closely united to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, had sent Maillebois with a French army to co-operate with the Spanish forces under Don Philip. Genoa, anxious to save Finale f^om Sardinia, had allied with Spain, and Gages iji February 1745 forced Lobkowitz to retire from Papal territory to Modena. There Lobkowitz was superseded by Schulenberg, while Gages was ordered to march to Genoa to join the combined French and Spanish armies under Maillebois and Don Philip. Elizabeth Farnese was intent on the conquest of the Milanese, but though nominally supported by the French, her aims met with no sympathy from the Marquis d'Argenson. The new French minister of foreign affairs did not approve of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, and ^u o .., r wished to break off the close connection between The Battle of Bassignano, Francc and Spain. But the impetuosity of Eliza- ept. 27, 1745. ^^^^ carried all before it. In August Schulenberg and Victor Emanuel stationed themselves at Bassignano, while the Spaniards, aided by a strong Genoese force, took Tortona, Parma, Piacenza, and Pavia before the end of September, and threatened Milan. Schulenberg, alarmed for the safety of the Milanese, left Victor Emanuel, who cared only to protect his territories, and hurried to defend the capital of Lombardy. Gages thereupon attacked the King of Sardinia, now deprived of Austrian help, won the battle of Bassignano on September 2 7, and began the conquest of Lombardy, in opposition to the wish of the French commanders, who urged the reduction of Piedmont. While Maillebois and Lasci blockaded Alessandria, Gages, having taken Casale, entered Milan on December 16, though the citadel still held out. Prince Lichtenstein, who had superseded Schulenberg, finding it necessary to remain with Victor Emanuel in Piedmont, in order to keep him true to the Austria ft War after the Peace of Breslaii 185 Austrian alliance, was unable to oppose the Spanish advance, and the campaign proved calamitous to the Hapsburgs. These disasters to the Austrian and Sardinian cause had a twofold effect. Maria Theresa recognised the necessity of making ])eace with Prussia in order to strengthen the Austrian forces i.i Italy, while Victor Emanuel, not altogether without reason, ;;ttributed his losses to the engrossing interest shown by Maria Theresa in her contest with Prussia, to the desire of the Haps- burgs to defend the Milanese, and to the insufficient number of Austrian troops in Italy. Feeling that Austria had treated him unfairly, he began to listen to d'Argenson's proposals, and con- sidered the advisability of deserting his alliance with the Haps- burgs and making peace with France. As long as Sardinia was allied with Austria and subsidised by England, she remained the great barrier to Bourbon extension in Italy. The defeat at Bassignano, and the fall of the town of Alessandria on the 12 th of October, forced upon Charles Emanuel the necessity of reconsidering his position. The traditions of Piedmontese policy demanded the maintenance of a balance between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons. In the autumn of 1745 he could no longer rely on effective Austrian assistance, and when d'Argenson opened negotiations with him in the hope of de- stroying the Austro-Sardinian alliance, Charles Emanuel felt bound to give them his consideration. D'Argenson had already carefully drawn up, to his own sat- isfaction, a ' Project for forming a republic and a lasting associ- ation of Italian Powers ' on the model of Germany, D'Argen- Switzerland, and the United Provinces, and to drive project^and back ' beyond the Alps all foreign rule in order to its Failure, estabhsh a federal bond among the sovereigns of Italian nation- ality.' This scheme for the regeneration of Italy is interesting in the history of Italian independence ; but was impracticable at that time, and was recognised as such by Charles Emanuel and his advisers. Don Carlos could not be expected to retire from Naples, nor Don Philip to resign his claims on Parma and Piacenza. There was no demand in Italy for national union. l86 EtiropeaJi History, 1715-1789 and Charles Emanuel preferred the shadowy imperial suzerainty to the risk of being exposed to French dictation. D'Argenson's earlier proposals in September that France, Spain, and Sardinia should unite to expel the Austrians, were cordially received ; but after Bassignano, the fall of the town of Alessandria, and the startling progress of the Bourbon arms, Charles Emanuel allowed the negotiations to be resumed. On December 26 Gorzegno, the Sardinian minister for foreign affairs, recognis- ing the necessity for making terms with the victorious Bourbons, signed at Turin a memorandum which set out the conditions to which France and Sardinia could agree. These merely touched upon the division of the Austrian possessions in Italy between Sardinia, Don Philip, Venice, Modena, and Genoa. Champeaux, the French agent, who had been sent to Turin to detach Charles Emanuel from the Austrian alliance and offer him the Milanese, returned to Paris with the document. Montgardino, the Sar- dinian ambassador at the French capital, declined, however, to discuss the terms of peace, and Champeaux was, on January 20, again sent to Turin to obtain a final settlement and to convert the preliminaries of peace into a definite treaty, while d'Argen- son wrote to Maillebois, telhng him that secret negotiations were on foot, and that he must simply stand on the defensive. The Spanish Government was at the same time informed of the negotiations which were proceeding. In Spain the utmost indignation prevailed, and negotiations were opened with Aus- tria ; while in France the policy of d'Argenson was subjected to the most scathing criticism. At Turin the Sardinian ministers were convinced that d'Argenson's object was not so much the freedom of Italy as the aggrandisement of France, and that in view of the establishment of Don Carlos in the south, and the probable establishment of Don Philip in the north of Italy, the expulsion of the Austrians would be a serious calamity for the rulers of Piedmont. In these views they were strengthened by events in England and Germany. The reverses of Charles Edward freed the English Government from its pressing embarrassments ; while, on the very day that Atistrian War after the Peace of Breslan 187 the preliminaries of Turin were signed, the Treaty of Dresden was being concluded. On January 4, 1 746, news of the close of the second Silesian War reached Turin; on January 13 the Sardinian Court was informed that 30,000 Austrian troops were marching to Italy. The best policy for Charles Emanuel was obviously to prolong the negotiations for a few weeks. He had insisted on a sus- pension of arms, and d'Argenson, completely overreached by the Court of Turin, signed, on Febniary 17, 1746, the famous armistice, * without making a single condition or reservation, and allowing the insertion of a special stipulation for the imme- diate raising of the siege of Alessandria.' The suspension of arms was to last till the end of February. On February 28 the younger Maillebois, appointed plenipo- tentiary at Turin, arrived at Briangon with orders to publish the armistice at Turin. But the Sardinian king was by this time master of the situation. The Austrian troops under Browne were approaching, and on March 4 the Count de Maillebois, then at Rivoli, having been hoodwinked, and his father the ^Marshal completely bewildered, the Sardinian troops, under the Baron de Leutrum, captured Asti on March 8, and a few days later the siege of Alessandria was raised, and the Span- ish besieging force, under Lasci, retired to Tortona. For a second time since the opening of the Polish Succession War, the House of Savoy had declined the French offer to make the King of Sardinia the leading Power in an independent Italy. The Spanish Court, which with difficulty had been persuaded to sign the armistice on the 8th of March, was furious, and the feeling in Paris stirred up by the fall of Asti ran ^^ ^ ° . . The Expul- strongly against d'Argenson. Louis xv., carried sion of the away by the general feeling, reversed the policy of Spaniards'* d'Argenson, sent Noailles to conciliate the Spanish from North It£llv* Court, and Maillebois was ordered to act in subor- dination to the Spanish generals. But these attempts to propi- tiate Spain failed. The ill-feehng and suspicions roused by 1 88 Europe a7i Histoiy^ 171 5-1789 d'Argenson's policy rendered united action between the French and Spanish forces impossible, and the Sardinians and Austri- ans, with few exceptions, carried all before them. The evacu- ation of Milan on March 19, and of Parma and other places by the Spaniards, was followed by the blockade of Don PhiHp and Gages in Piacenza by the Austrians. On June 14 Maillebois came to Don Philip's assistance, and the next day the battle of Piacenza was fought, the advantage being on the side of the Austrians, who were only prevented by dissensions with the Piedmontese from cutting off the retreat of the allied army. The Austrian Court gave up the negotiations with Spain into which it had entered secretly the previous year ; before the end of 1 746 the French and Spaniards were driven into France ; and, while Charles Emanuel took Finale and Savona, the Aus- trians entered Genoa in September. These disasters to the Bourbon cause were in great measure the result of Philip v.'s death, which took place on July 9. His son, by his first marriage, Ferdinand vi., replaced the capable Gages bv the incompetent Las Minas, who insisted on retreat- ing into Savoy, though the quarrels between Botta — who had succeeded Lichtenstein in the command of the Aus- Death of Philip V , trian army — and Victor Emanuel offered an excel- juiy 9, 1746. Yq^^i opportunity for retrieving the late disasters to the Bourbon cause. After the capture of Genoa the Austrians and Sardinians differed as to the future course of the campaign. The Austrian Court wished to take advantage of it? splendid position in North Italy in order to drive the Spaniards out of South Italy, and to recover the Two Sicilies ; Charles Emanuel was strongly opposed to any further aggrandisement of the Hapsburgs. The weight of English influence, however, in view of the victories of Marshal Saxe in the Low Countries, which rendered a diversion of the utmost importance, was cast in favour of an invasion of Provence and the capture of Toulon, the great French naval arsenal. The skill of Belleisle, who commanded the French army, the rising of the Genoese, the misconduct of the Marquis du Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 189 Botta, the Austrian commander-in-chief, and the recurrence of dissensions between the Austrians and Piedmontese, ruined the success of the invasion into Provence, which took place in No- vember, and the alhes in February 1747 were forced to retreat. Though the French had failed in Germany and in Italy in 1746, they could congratulate themselves on the collapse of the inva- sion of Provence, and on their successes in Flanders. In January 1 746 a proposed invasion of England or Scotland by the Due de Richelieu and 11,000 men, on behalf of Charles Edward, though it caused a certain amount of anxiety in Eng- land, had come to nothing ; but before the end of the month Marshal Saxe had invested Brussels, and on February 20 the Governor, Count Kaunitz, surrendered, and Saxe returned in triumph to Paris. The political importance of the fall of Brus- sels was great. Holland was apparently at the mercy of the French, and d'Argenson had it in his power to force the States- General either to remain neutral or to make a separate peace with France. The success of his poUcy depended upon imme- diate action before England had time to send an effective force to the aid of Holland. Instead of showing any energy, d'Argen- son, occupied in his complicated negotiations in Italy, contented himself in discussing wdth the Dutch envoy. Was- The French senaer, the bases of a sreneral peace, and the cam- ^ampaign m ' . Flanders, paign was resumed in the Netherlands. The siege 1746. of Antwerp was witnessed by Louis xv., and after the capture of the town the citadel surrendered on June 3, while Mons and Charleroi fell shortly afterwards. The serious nature of the situation was now appreciated by the Austrian Court ; while the victory of Culloden, on April 16, enabled the Enghsh to turn their attention to the Netherlands, and in view of the French successes in the Low Countries, to send an expedition to Brittany in September. An attempt to take L'Orient failed, and Marshal Saxe continued his victorious career. Commanded by the incapable Charles of Lorraine, the allied army suffered a series of disasters. Namur was lost ; and on October 1 1 Saxe won the battle of Raucoux, and the campaign ended with IQO European History, 171 5-1 789 the whole of the Austrian Netherlands, except Limburg and Luxemburg, in the hands orAustnaT) f^/^ i{ (jy ( • Though successful in theTCetKerlands, the French policy in Italy had failed ; and the relations between France and Spain had become, since the death of Philip v. in July 1746, more strained than ever. Deprived of her Bavarian ally by the Treaty of Fiissen, deserted by Prussia, and unable to hold her own against Eng- land on the sea and in the colonies, France might well recog- nise the desirability of bringing the war to a conclusion. The fall of the Marquis d'Argenson, on the nth of January 1747, removed one of the greatest obstacles to peace. The blame of the Bourbon failure in the north of Italy had been universally attributed to the minister, and his conduct dur- ing the negotiations with Charles Emanuel had justified the severest criticisms of his enemies. His Spanish policy had made him many foes, while he had been unfortunate in incur- ring the dislike of Marshal Saxe, through opposition to the lat- The Fall of ^^^'^ schemcs in the Netherlands. Saxe wished to d'Argenson. carry the war into Dutch territory, and to force o icy. {j.Q^ ^j^g Government of the Hague a special and separate peace. The appointment of the Prince of Conti to be generahssimo, though it was none of d'Argenson's doing, had still further alienated the Marshal, who united with ^ladame de Pompadour and Conti himself, and supported by the influence of Spain and Saxony, and the council of ministers, made a suc- cessful attempt to overthrow the unsuspecting statesman. It only required a memoir, drawn up by Noailles and presented to the king on December 15, 1746, to put the finishing touch to the long series of intrigues against d'Argenson. In the me- moir he was accused of having thrown himself into the arms of the Dutch, of having offended Spain, and of having humiliated France. He was charged with * ignorance, presumption, in- discretion, and gross neglect,' and the whole blame of the political situation of France was laid upon his shoulders. Frederick the Great regarded him with contempt, and having Austrian War after the Peace of Brcslau 191 made many foes and no friends, d'Argenson's ministry came to an end on January 11, 1747. The basis of his poHcy was the Prussian alHance. ' The alliance of France and Prussia,' he said, * is a system whose foundations ought to be immovable.' This conviction caused the failure of the negotiations with Austria in 1745, which, had they been successfully carried out, would have anticipated, much to the advantage of France, the revision of alliances in I 756. His plan for the regeneration and emancipation of Italy by means of the establishment of an Italian federation — admi- rable in its conception — would have, if carried out at that time, simply reduced Italy to a province of France. But while to Chauvelin the independence of the Italian peninsula was simply a means for the expulsion and consequent abasement of the Hapsburgs, to d'Argenson it was an end desirable in itself The failure of his attempt, which itself reflects honour on his memory, placed a weapon in the hands of the friends of Spain in the French Court, and paved the way for his downfall. In his relations with Spain d'Argenson represented the lack of enthusiasm felt in France for the aims of Elizabeth Farnese, while that absence of cordiality in the relations between the two countries, which he had inherited from Fleury, was con- tinued by his successor. He had acted with reference to the Treaty of Fontainebleau as Fleury had acted towards the Treaty of the Escurial, and like his predecessor he was regarded with detestation by the Spanish Court. Though his adherence to the policy of antagonism to Austria and England was intelligible, d'Argenson's general views were not such as commended themselves to men like Marshal Saxe and the majority of Frenchmen. He held that increase of territor}' would be a source of weakness to France, and desired to see Louis xv. in the position of 'arbiter and paternal pro- tector of all Europe.' As long as Prussia was confirmed in its possession of Silesia, and Austria correspondingly weakened, France ought in his opinion to be satisfied. On these grounds he was willing, in a general pacification, to restore all the French 192 European History, 171 5-1789 conquests in return for Cape Breton Island. * D'Argenson's in- contestable superiority,' writes the Due de Broglie, ' lay in an intelligence wide enough to seize on grand general ideas ; but, unfortunately, it was of little use in politics for want of other, less elevated qualities ; practical common-sense, power of gaug- ing possibilities, knowledge of men.' An honest minister, he was no statesman, and was, moreover, unable to cope with the diplomacy and intrigues of the day. His unmistakable opposition to the secret efforts of Conti to secure the Polish throne on the death of Augustus, brought on him the hostility of that prince, while his devotion to the King of Prussia arrayed against him the powerful influence of Bnihl, who recognized that the fall of d'Argenson was a necessary preliminary to an alliance between France and Saxony, which should lead to peace with Austria. After the death of Philip V. of Spain and his daughter, the Dauphiness of France, Saxony had occupied a large place in French diplomacy. The Spanish party at the French Court, headed by Noailles and Maurepas, and supported by Ferdinand vi. the King of Spain, desired that the sister of the late Dauphiness should marry the Dauphin. But the opposition of Louis xv. and d'Argenson to this scheme was successful, and it was decided that negotiations should be entered upon for the marriage of the Dauphin to the daughter of x\ugustus III. of Saxony. On January 11, 1747, the marriage was celebrated at Dres- den ; and on that day d'Argenson fell, and Saxony remained the ally of Austria. During the marriage negotiations d'Argen- son had aimed at replacing the connection between Saxony and Austria by a close understanding between Saxony and Prassia. The combined influence of Prussia and France were then to be employed in making the crown of Poland heredi- tary in the Saxon house. A blow would thus be dealt at the power of Russia and Austria, and the prestige of France in- creased in the east of Europe. This policy was opposed by Conti, who aimed at the crown of Poland on the death of Augustus in., and by Brlihl, who was Austrian War after the Peace of Brcslau 193 decidedly opposed to any idea of a Prussian alliance. The Marquis des Issarts had been appointed ambassador at Dres- den at the request of Conti, in whose intrigues at this period are to be found the first definite beginnings of the secret diplo- macy of the reign of Louis xv. D'Argenson, ignorant of the Court intrigues, ordered his envoy ' to abstain from anything which might give the least offence to the Elector of Saxony ' ; and Conti, finding his in- trigues checked by d'Argenson, threw himself vigorously into the conspiracy against the minister ; while Briihl found another powerful supporter in Maurice de Saxe, who, though chiefly interested in the proposal to make his niece Dauphiness, was opposed to d'Argenson, and ready to support the Saxon min- ister's pohcy. Having secured the assistance of Madame de Pompadour and Xoailles, Saxe decided the duel between Briihl and d'Argenson in favour of the former. D'Argenson's bold and not unstatesmanlike schemes were defeated. Saxony re- mained the ally of Russia and Austria, and an admirable oppor- tunity was lost of making Poland an hereditary monarchy, and saving it from its impending fate.-^ Thus various influences united in the same direction, and * ministers, mistress, marshals, princes, courtiers, foreign ambas- sadors, all were unanimous in accusing d'Argenson of being the one only obstacle to peace,' and in urging his downfall. His famous fiasco in Italy, his blunder in not enforcing on Holland a strict neutrality at the beginning of 1 746, his blind belief in the fidehty of the King of Prussia, his want of tact in his deaUngs with Saxe and Conti, justify, and to a great ex- tent explain, his fall. A more skilful minister, and one who was less an idealist, would not only have been aware of the coalition formed against him, but would have taken steps to defeat it. He was succeeded by the incompetent Louis Brulart de Siller}', Marquis de Puisieux ; while his brother, the Comte d'Argenson, was confirmed in his oflice as Minister of War, and 1 See Due de Broglie, Maurice de Saxe et Marquis d^ Argenson, vol. ii. PERIOD VI. N 194 Etiropean History ^ 171 5-1789 for a time the military operations continued. The proposed conference at Breda, in the autumn of 1746, had proved a fail- TheWar ^re Owing to the determination of Maria Theresa in 1747- to Continue the war till she gained compensation for the loss of Silesia and for the territories ceded to Charles Emanuel by the Treaty of Worms. In Italy the Austrians under Schulenberg failed in June to take Genoa, after a siege of two months; while the Sardinians, on July 19, engaged a French force under the Chevalier Belleisle at Exilles, on the Col d'Assietto, with the result that the Chevalier was killed, and the French retreated into Dauphin^, where Marshal Belle- isle and Las Minas, in command of the French and Spanish armies respectively, remained inactive. It was not till 1796, the year of Napoleon's first Italian campaign, that French troops again invaded Italy. In the Netherlands, where France could strike at the Sea Powers as well as at Austria, Puisieux attempted to carry out the poHcy to which d'Argenson had been opposed, and to compel the Dutch to make peace. Under Saxe and Lowen- dahl the French armies met with a series of successes. On July 2, the Duke of Cumberland was defeated by Marshal Saxe at Laufeld, and though Maestricht did not fall, Lowendahl pro- ceeded with his capture of towns, and on September 16 took the great fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom. Though the English were unsuccessful in the Netherlands, at sea the advantage was entirely on their side. Two crushing defeats completed the ruin of the French navy, and the de- struction of the French commerce. The maritime supremacy of England at the beginning of 1 748 was unquestioned. The invasion of the Netherlands in 1747 and the English suc- , . cesses at sea had two results. A popular revolution Revolution i r in Holland, in Holland broke out against the republican gov- ^'^'*^' ernment. The aristocratic party was overthrown ; WilHam rv. of Orange, a son-in-law of George 11. of England, was declared Stadtholder ; and after an interval of a few months the office was made hereditary in his family both for males and females. Austrian War after the Peace of B.cslau 195 A second result was that fresh attempts were made to bring about a general pacification. On November 10, close of the 1747, George 11., in opening Parliament, had an- ^^'■• nounced that a congress would shortly meet at Aix-la-Chapelle to consider the conditions of peace. Of the principal combatants, neither England, Spain, Hol- land, nor France had any reasons for continuing the war. The French treasury was empty, the Pretender's cause was dead, the French flag had practically disappeared from the sea, the Government had asserted that it desired no increase of territory, and there was no enthusiasm in France for the Spanish demands. In Holland, the safety of which was threatened by Marshal Saxe and his victorious troops, there was no serious opposition to the peace proposals. The revo- lution had not been followed by military successes, and the finances of the country were unable to stand the continued military expenditure. Spain, under Ferdinand vi., had already given unmistakable signs that Elizabeth Farnese's aggressive policy was no longer being pursued, and that peace would be welcome. Between England and Austria relations were becom- ing more and more strained. As in the Spanish Succession War, England had paid large subsidies to Austria, and Austria had employed that money in the maintenance of her armies in Italy. Since 17 15 it had been recognised at Vienna that the defence of the Netherlands might be left to the Maritime Powers, England's well-known jealousy of French supremacy in that quarter being considered a sufficient guarantee for their security. The burden of the war had as usual fallen mainly upon England, and the English Government was not prepared to make further sacrifices on behalf of a lukewarm ally. The Pelhams, no longer supporters of the policy initi- ated by Carteret, were ready to adopt the more pacific views formerly held by Walpole. English public opinion was satisfied with the destruction of the French marine. The certainty of the fall of Maestricht, the refusal of the Dutch to pay a share 196 European History, 171 5-1789 of the expenses connected with the transport of 30,000 Russian troops which the Tsarina had placed at the disposal of the allies, and the non-arrival of the troops themselves brought matters to a crisis, and decided the Enghsh Government to hasten the signature of the preliminaries of peace. Austria had no real desire for peace. Maria Theresa attributed to England, in no small part, her losses at the Treaties of Berlin, Worms, and Dresden, and suspected that Power of a readiness to acquiesce in further sacrifices on the part of Austria to the Sardinian king. On May 22, 1746, the Treaty of 1726 between Austria and Russia had been renewed. Opposition with the addition of certain secret articles^ Early of Maria jj^ February 1748 the Russians entered Poland, Theresa to y / t 7 Peace. and, meeting with no opposition from Augustus iii., proceeded on their march. It seemed that the arrival at the seat of war of these savage auxiliaries of Maria Theresa and her allies would counteract the efG^ct of the successes of Marshal Saxe in the Netherlands. But, in spite of these warlike appear- ances, peace was near at hand. England had made overtures of peace to the French Government, while Maria Theresa, sus- pecting treachery on the part of Sardinia and England, had already, through Count Loos, the Saxon Ambassador at Ver- sailles, approached Puisieux when she heard of the pacific intentions of England and Holland.-^ Once, after the Peace of Dresden, and a second time on the occasion of the marriage of the Saxon princess to thcDauphin, Maria ^^ attempt had been made to bring about an Theresa understanding between Austria and France, which ally w^th ° had failed owing to the firmness of d'Argenson France. ^^(j \]^q iudecision of his successor. Undeterred by the failure of these attempts, the Saxon Minister, Briihl, now for the third time threw himself into the project of effecting a diplomatic revolution which should checkmate England and Sardinia, and redound to the advantage of Austria and France. But his efforts were again doomed to failure. While Maurice 1 See Due de Broglie, La Paix d\-\ix-la-Chapelle. Aj(stj'ia?i War after the Peace of B re si an 197 de Saxe besieged jMaestricht, on which the safety of Holland entirely depended, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle met in April 1 74S. In addition to the representatives of Spain, Sar- dinia, Holland, IModena, and Genoa, Austria was represented by Kaunitz, France by the Comte de Saint-Severin and M. de Laporte du Theil, England by the capable and industrious Earl of Sandwich and by Sir Thomas Robinson. Maria Theresa desired to recover the territory which she had ceded to Sardinia by the Treaty of Worms ; she was equally anxious that France should not continue to guarantee the possession of Silesia to Prussia. Saint-Severin at first appeared to agree to her wishes ; but he suddenly changed his attitude, and closed with the English proposals. Maria Theresa was forced to recognise that without the aid of the Sardinians in Italy, or that of the Dutch or English in Flanders, she was unable to con- tinue the war. The weakness of her position rendered her acceptance of the terms agreed upon by France and England absolutely necessary. Before Austria and Spain had finally given in their adhesion to the proposals for a general pacification, the preliminaries of peace were hastily signed by the plenipotentiaries The Peace of England, France, and Holland on April 30. chapeUe" 1748, but it was not till the iSth of October that 1748. these prehminaries were converted into a definite peace. The acquisition of Silesia and Glatz by Prussia was recognised and guaranteed ; Savoy and Nice were handed over to Charles Emanuel, who, though he had to give up Finale, was confirmed in the possession of the territory in Lombardy which he had received by the Treaty of Worms ; Genoa and the Duke of Modena recovered their lost lands. France acknowledged Francis as Emperor, and George il as King of England ; she also restored the Barrier fortresses to Holland, undertook to destroy the walls on the sea-side of Dunkirk, retired from the Austrian Netherlands, and promised to exclude the Pretender from French soil. In India, Madras was restored to England, while Louisburg and Cape Breton Island were handed back to iqS European History, 171 5-1789 France. Spain acknowledged the Emperor, and confirmed to England the Assiento Treaty and the right of sending the annual ship to South America. She, however, secured for Don Philip Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla as an hereditary principality, which was to revert to Austria in the event of failure of heirs- male. With the above exceptions, the Pragmatic Sanction was formally accepted, the election of the Emperor was recognised, and all conquests made during the war were restored. With the exception of Prussia, the continental Powers saw little reason to be pleased with the results of the war. Charles Emanuel was bitterly disappointed at losing the Marquisate of Finale, and with it a direct communication between his Italian dominions and the sea. It was with the greatest reluctance that he relinquished Piacenza, which was a part of his gains at the Treaty of Worms. But he was compelled to recognise the necessity for submission, for Spain still held Savoy and Nice, and Austria regarded with open dissatisfaction his continued possession of a portion of the Milanese. Declaring that he had been grossly deceived by England, he accepted the terms offered by France and the Maritime Powers. Spain had similar feehngs of resentment towards France. But the days of PhiHp v. and Elizabeth Farnese were over, and Ferdinand vi., though furious with France, agreed to give up Savoy and Nice, and in exchange to receive the principality of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla for his half-brother, Don PhiUp. The English supremacy of the sea rendered ^ resist- ance impossible, and Ferdinand accepted the inevitable. But while Spain and Sardinia had good ground of complaint, the indignation of Maria Theresa was still more justified. The Treaties of Berlin, Dresden, and Worms had been concluded by the advice of England, and now for a fourth time England proposed to impose upon her fresh sacrifices. She resented the definite loss of Silesia, she wished to recall the cessions made to Sardinia at the Treaty of Worms, she was opposed to any further extension of the power of Charles Emanuel, and to the establishment of Don Philip in Parma. Furthermore, Austrian War after the Peace of Breslati 199 the Austrian Court was resolved to cancel the hateful Barrier Treaty. The inabihty of the Dutch to defend themselves against France, and the uselessness of the Barrier towns as an obstacle to French invasion, had been so forcibly demon- strated in the late war, that Austria, so Kaunitz declared, found herself unable to acquiesce in the restoration of the former arrangement. The real reason, however, for this declaration was to be found in Maria Theresa's conviction that Holland was a mere satellite of England, and in her fixed resolution to shake herself free from dependence on the Court of St. James'. With infinite skill Kaunitz endeavoured to break up the agreement come to by England, France, and Holland, and to gain over Saint-Severin to his views. But England and Holland, though the latter Power had prac- tically disappeared from the rank of great nations, presented a united front, and Puisieux refused to give the Austrian Court any encouragement, or to extend the guarantee granted to Prussia for Silesia to Maria Theresa's remaining possessions. With the Russians in Germany, delay in completing the pacification be- came dangerous, and the English Government, with the full sup- port of Madame de Pompadour, insisted with vigour upon the conclusion of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. After farther vain attempts to win over France, Maria Theresa, without allies, and with the possibility in view of a fresh desertion on the part of Charles Emanuel to the side of France, was forced, like Charles VI. in I 714, to accept the terms arranged by the Courts of St. James', Versailles, and the Government of the Hague. No other course was open to her. England, if '■ abandoned by Austria, could continue the war with her fleets. Austria, de- prived of the Piedmontese contingents in Italy, of the Dutch and English in Flanders, could not carry it on for a single day.' On the 1 6th of October 1748 the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed by England, France, and Holland. Spain agreed to it on October 20, Austria on the 8th and Sardinia on the 20th of November. . In spite of her territorial losses, Austria was in 1748 far 2CXD Europeaji History, 171 5-1 789 stronger than in 174 1, In the latter year it was said with some appearance of truth that ' the house of Austria had ceased to exist'; in 1748 the Hapsburgs were of greater account in Europe than the Bourbons. Hungary was more closely united to Austria than ever before, and the military resources of its eastern provinces were for the first time ap- preciated at Vienna; Bavaria and Saxony were Position of mere satellites of the Hapsburg monarchy ; the the Great Russiau alHance of 1746 was a source of strength Powers in . _ ° 1748. and safety. A distinct step had been taken in the Austria. direction of a French alliance, and the question of forming a league -of Catholic as opposed to Protestant Powers began to find favour with certain politicians both in Vienna and Paris. While the gains of Austria thus outweighed her losses, and while the war left her not only strengthened but prepared by dras- Prussia and ^^^ reforms to Carry out the work of centralisation and Italy. consolidation, and to reconsider her system of for- eign policy, the new states of Prussia, Sardinia, and Russia had made a distinct step forward. Prussia had suddenly developed into a first-rate Power, whose army was the best fighting ma- chine in Europe, whose alliance had become of immense value, and whose territorial ambitions had roused the deep-seated hostility of Austria and Russia ; Sardinia, pursuing by different methods a similar policy of centralisation and territorial expan- sion, had also come out of the war with its possessions^increased. Though d'Argenson had failed, the efforts of Elizabeth Farnese had been successful, and the Polish and Austrian Succession Wars left Italy in an improved position. Two Spanish Bourbon dvnasties had been introduced, the Sardinian territories ex- tended, and though a Hapsburg- Lorraine prince was to hold Tuscany, the decision of the Treaty of Utrecht had been reversed, and Italy was in great part freed from the German element.^ 1 For an estimate of the influence of Elizabeth Farnese upon Italy and Europe see Armstrong, Elizabeth Farnese, p. 398. Austrian War after the Peace of B res I an 201 Under the Tsarina Elizabeth, Russia was ready to advance along the lines laid down by Peter the Great, and her alliance was courted by the leading European Powers. French statesmen regarded with undisguised hos- tility the rising influence of the kingdom of the Tsars. The close alhance of 1746 between the Courts of Vienna and St. Russia. Petersburg was a great triumph for Maria Theresa, and a corresponding danger for Frederick the Great ; and the whole of Europe was affected by the growing importance of the Russian state. 202 European History, 171 5-1789 The advance of a Russian army in 1747 across Germany, and the demand of Elizabeth to take part in the pacification of Aix-la-Chapelle, were striking symptoms of the intention of the Tsarina not only to extend the influence of Russia in the East, but also to take an increasing share in the politics of western Europe. The rise of Russia and Prussia coincided with the growing weakness of France, To counteract the plans of Russia, always a difficult task for French statesmen, became doubly so after 1748. Though France emerged from the war without any territorial losses, her colonial ambitions were, owing to Fleury's neglect, threat- ened with extinction, her commerce had suffered severely, and her navy had been practically annihilated. By the influence of Madame de Pompadour the peace had been hurried on, and its conclusion was received in France with the most pro- found dissatisfaction. It was felt that, after the conquest of Belgium, France should have retained some territory, and it was realised that, after the sacrifice of 100,000 men, the French efforts had merely resulted in an enormous increase to her debt, in the acquisition of Silesia by Frederick the Great, of a principality by Don Philip, and of the imperial crown by Charles vii. for three years. In India, however, the French fortunes flourished, princi- pally owing to the ability of Dupleix, and in spite of the French Fort- ncglcct of the Government at home. The spirit "ndiVduring ^^ enterprise had received a considerable impetus the War. from Law's operations, and the French Company, originally founded by Colbert, became a formidable competitor with England for the trade of the Indies. Holland, formerly the rival of England, had become so weakened by the long wars in which she had played a part, that she took little share in the competition between the English and the French. While the headquarters of English trade were at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, or Fort William, the French had planted settlements at Surat, Masulipatam, Chandernagore, and Pondi- cherry ; they also held the Isles of France and Bourbon in the Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 203 Indian Ocean.^ Previous to the appointment of DupleLx — who since 1730 had been Governor of Chandernagore — as Gov- ernor of Pondicherry in 1741, his predecessors, Francois Martin and Dumas, had, with consummate abihty, developed the trade and extended the influence of the French Company. Dupleix was, however, not content with being the head of a schemes of successful trading corporation ; he aimed at expel- ^upieix. Hng the English and founding a great continental empire. As a means to this end, Dupleix, aided by Bussy, plunged into the vortex of native intrigues, and began to organise and drill native troops in the European fashion. On the outbreak of the war between England and France in 1744. French com- merce, owing to the inadequacy of the navy, suffered severely. But Labourdonnais, the Governor of the Mauritius, whose mili- tary skill was superior to that of Dupleix, recognised the vital importance of the possession of a fleet. Hastily collecting a number of ships, he sailed to the assistance of Dupleix on September 21, 1746, and captured Madras — the inhabitants surrendering on the understanding that the town was to be repurchased for ;j^44o,ooo. Between Labourdonnais, who, it is said, was bribed by the members of the Council of Madras, and Dupleix, who, anxious to expel the English from India, refused to accept the terms of the capitulation, a fierce dis- pute arose. Eventually, Dupleix having promised to restore Madras, Labourdonnais returned to France to justify himself. From 1748 to 1751 he was imprisoned in the Bastille, and, though acquitted of the charge brought against him, died in 1753 from the effects of the treatment which he had received. In the meantime Dupleix, who had defeated the Xawab of the Carnatic, raised the prestige of the French arms, and retained Madras, proceeded in 1747 to attempt the capture of Fort St. David. Boscawen and the English fleet saved the fortress, but failed in an attack on Pondicherry. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle led to a mutual restitution of conquests, 1 These islands, known as the Mauritius, occupy an important position between India and the Cape of Good Hope. 204 European History, 171 5-1789 but the prestige of France remained superior tc that of Eng- land in India till the recall of Dupleix in 1754 put an end to all hope of a French empire in the East. In America the French had been unable to prevent the loss of Louisburg, the capital of Cape Breton Island and the key to their possessions in Canada. The loss of Cape Breton Island laid open the St. Lawrence and Canada, and the French »,. „ u disasters at sea rendered them unable to help The French ^ in North the colonists. By the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle merica. Louisburg was exchanged for Madras, and it was decided that commissioners should define the limits of the English and French territories in North America. The course of the struggles both in India and America had ex- emphfied the disastrous results of Fleury's neglect of the navy, and had given many proofs of the mistaken policy consistently pursued by France towards her distant settle- ments and their governors during the middle portion of the eighteenth century. The maritime supremacy of Great Britain was now assured ; and though France had been successful in Flanders and held The Peace ^^^ ^^^'^ ^^ India, her growing weakness had been of Aix-ia- conspicuously exhibited at home and abroad. The Chapelle . . . ,,..,, , . , . only a efforts of her wisest ministers had failed to hide from Truce. ^j^g world the fact that good government and able administration, the characteristics of the reign of Irouis xiv., no longer were to be found in France. The Treaty of Aix-la- Chapelle, resulting as it did from the exhaustion of the various combatants, was no satisfactory pacification. It left undecided the disputes between the French and Enghsh colonists in North America; it postponed, by Article 18, the settlement of the claims of the Elector Palatine against the ]Maritime Powers and Austria. The treaty, concluded with such regrettable precipita- tion, merely put ofT the conflict between Austria and Prussia for Silesia, and the inevitable struggle between England, France, and Spain in the colonies and India, for eight years, during which Europe enjoyed a period of uneasy rest. Austrian War after the Peace of Breslau 205 Never perhaps did any war, after so many great events ^d so large a loss of blood and treasure, end in replacing the nations engaged in it so nearly in the same situation as they held at first.' The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was merely a truce. CHAPTER VIII THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION 1748-1756 The Years 1748-56 a Period of Transition — Reforms in Austria — The Aims of Maria Theresa — The Policy of Kaunitz — Growing Irritation at Vienna against England — The Question of the Election of the Archduke Joseph as King of the Romans — The Embassy of Kaunitz to France — Machaulfs Attempts at Reforms — Struggle of the Parlenient of Paris with the Court and Clergy — Louis XV. — Influence of Madame de Pompadour — Decline of the French Monarchy — Diplomatic Relations between France and Austria and between Austria and Russia — England's Relations with Rus- sia and Prussia — Likelihood of War in 1753 — England and France in America and India — The Franco-Prussian Alliance — French Policy in Eastern Europe — Position of Frederick the Great — His Relations with France — England prepares for War — The Convention of Westminster — Negotiations between France and Austria, 1755-56 — The First Treaty of Versailles, May i, 1756 — The Diplomatic Revolution, 1756. The year 1756 saw the break-up of an old system and the substitution of a new one. Austria and France laid aside the enmity of 200 years, ceased to be rivals, and formed Period of an alliance which continued till the French Revolu- ransition. ^|^^ . ^^g|■J.j^ broke off her long-standing connec- tion with the Maritime Powers, while England found an ally in Prussia. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had pleased no one. France had gained nothing from the war, England had been com- pelled to restore her conquests, Prussia was far from being satisfied with the safety of Silesia, and Austria was furious at its loss and at the conduct of England throughout the war. In addition to Silesia, Austria had suffered losses in Italy, while 206 The Diplomatic Revolution 207 the cost of the struggle had been enormous. To Maria The- resa's complaints the English minister could point to the battles of Dettingen and Fontenoy, fought on behalf of Austria with- out Austrian troops ; while, to the French complaints of Prus- sian desertion at the Treaties of Berhn and Dresden, Frederick could reply that France had at least on one occasion left him to the mercy of his foes. The diplomatic revolution was not the result of an accident, or of the injured pride of Madame de Pompadour, or of an intrigue. It was due to general causes which had been long at work. The transformation in the relations of the great European Powers, which resulted in the formation of a new balance of forces, 'though not effected till 1756, was working itself out during the eight vears succeeding the Treaty of Aix-la-Cha- pelle.° When completed, it constituted a diplomatic revolu- tion more far-reaching in its effects than the Triple Alliance of 1 71 7. and was in the main caused by the sudden rise of Prussia and the implacable hostility which existed, after Fred- erick the Great's seizure of Silesia, between the Courts of Berlin and Vienna. Maria Theresa was not inclined to accept as final the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. That treaty had left unsettled the great questions at issue between England and France in America and in India. It was merely a tr^'uce in the rivalry between Austria and Prussia; m no re- spect did it afford anv reasonable hopes of inaugurating a period of peace. Europe, till the actual consummation of the diplomatic revoludon in 1 756, ^vas divided into two groups : EncTland, Austria, Russia, and Portugal formed roughly one lea^e ; France. Prussia, Spain, Denmark, Poland, Turkey, and Sweden formed the other. Spain was, however, dunng the reicrn of Ferdinand inclined to neutrahty, and to the cultiva- tion of peaceful relations with England and Austria, while England's alliance with Russia never carried with it adhesion to the secret schemes of the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna with regard to Pnissia. With Austria and Russia, closely 208 Ejiropcaji History ^ 171 5-1 789 allied since 1 746, the all-absorbing question was the reduction of the power of the King of Prussia and the partition of his dominions; to England and France commercial and colonial rivalry was of paramount importance, and the continued dis- putes between the two nations in America and India might lead to open hostilities at any moment. The outbreak of war would test the stabihty and reahty of the existing alliances. The rise of Prussia had in itself revolutionised the European states-system, and had impressed upon ministers of every Reforms in nationality the necessity of military and other re- Austria, forms within their respective dominions. Though Austria had not only escaped annihilation, but had in a sense profited by the late war, the personal enmity between Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, intensified by the former's determination to regain Silesia, had become the central point of European politics, and led to a complete reorganisation of the Hapsburg states. The Austrian institutions were too aristo- cratic, and power tended to fall into the hands of a few great families. The weakness of the central executive system, the conflicting interests of the various provinces, the selfishness of the nobles and their excessive influence in the provincial estates, had clearly demonstrated the necessity of greater centralisation, together with the better organisation of the central government itself. Financial, judicial, and social re- forms were required. Henceforward each province paid a lump sum for the maintenance of the army, and a tax for this purpose was levied on all classes. Similar reforms were carried out in the administration of justice. During the late war the contrast between the loosely connected Hapsburg dominions and the centralised Prussian state had been very striking ; and on the conclusion of peace. Prince George of Haugwitz, the son of a Saxon general, who had already had considerable ex- perience as governt)r of what was left of Silesia, became chan- cellor, and introduced reforms which were warmly supported by Maria Theresa ; while Rudolf Chotek, the new chief of the finance department, inspired by a feeling of rivalry towards The Diplomatic Revohitioii 209 Haugwitz, entered with vigour upon his new duties. Haug- witz at once began the reorganisation of the central government, his aim being to introduce greater unity into the administra- tion, to check corruption, and to reduce the powers enjoyed by the various estates, especially those which touched upon finan- cial and military matters. The laws required codification ; the judicial power of the nobles was too great ; the influence of the clergy demanded supervision; and primary education in Aus- tria was far behind that of Prussia and France. In spite of opposition from most of the older ministers, from the nobles, and from the clergy, Haugwitz succeeded in canning out valuable reforms which led the way for those of Joseph 11. Hitherto much of the political and judicial work was under the chanceries of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary. Each chan- cery was interested in escaping from the burden of taxation, in subordinating the interests of the monarchy to those of its own country, and in checking the power of the Exchequer (Hofkammer) and that of the Emperor. During the Austrian Succession War, Kinsky, the Chief Chancellor of Bohemia, had deliberately starved the army in order to lessen the burdens of Bohemia. By an edict of May 14, 1749, justice was separated from administration, and the Austrian and Bohemian chanceries were united, and called at first Direcfoj'ium i?i internis, later ' Kaiserliche Konigliche vereinigte Hofkanzlei.' It was simply a ministry of the interior for financial and executive work, and over it was placed Haugwitz as president. Most of the judi- cial work was transferred to a High Court of Justice (Hofrath). Later on this Directorium was divided into the Exchequer (Hofkammer) and the Chancery (Hofkanzlei) for executive work. Above all was placed in 1760 a Council of State (Staats- rath) to exercise control over the Chancery, the Exchequer, the Aulic Council of War, and the High Court of Justice. It was settled that, instead of annual contributions of men and money, the proWncial estates should in the future vote a fixed sum for ten years, and that the administration of military affairs should be taken out of their hands. The poHtical powers of PERIOD VI. o 2IO European History ^ 171 5-1 789 the estates were reduced and handed over to representatives of the central authority, and local government, no longer exclu- sively in the hands of the nobles, was in many cases practically destroyed. Drastic changes were made, all in the direction of strengthening the power of the central government through- out the dominions of the Hapsburgs, of lessening the influence of the nobles, and of protecting the peasants against the oppres- sions of their masters.^ Many of Maria Theresa's reforms had thus for their object the amelioration of the lot of the peasants, and the diminution of the power of the nobles by suppressing the right to exemp- tion from taxation which many of their lands enjoyed, and by attracting them to Vienna. All these reforms tended to the centralisation of the Austrian monarchy, and the consolidation of all the powers of the state. They illustrated the ideas of hu- manity then coming into favour ; they show that Maria Theresa •was bent on unifying the monarchy, and establishing a' benevo- lent despotisQi ; they owed their introduction to the conviction that in the next struggle with Prussia greater efficiency in all departments of the state produced by the practical reconstruc- tion of all branches of the civil administration would enormously increase the chances of success. ' Haugwitz,' wrote Maria Theresa after the Chancellor's death, ' brought the government from confusion into order ' ; and there is no doubt that the central authority owed a debt of gratitude to the determination with which the reforms were carried out. No less drastic were her educational, commercial, industrial, and financial reforms, carried out with the object of increasing the revenue and reducing expenditure. In February 1 746 the nomination of the professors of the University of Vienna was placed in the hands of the Crown, — the first of a series of measures to bring all education under the control of the state. Consulates were established in the Mediterranean and Adriatic, merchant ships were built, the development of Trieste was en- couraged. Under Chotek's able supervision roads and canals 1 See Appendix A. The Diplomatic Revolution 2 1 1 were vastly improved, internal custom-houses either abolished,, or carefully restrained, and the postal system reformed. An income-tax was imposed, and a graduated poll-tax decreed. By these methods the revenues were augmented, and Austrian credit was greatly enhanced. In view of Maria Theresa's determination to recover Silesia, mihtary reforms were imperatively demanded. Conscription after the Prussian model was introduced throughout the Aus- trian dominions, except in Hungary, the Tyrol, the Milanese, and the Netherlands. The number of soldiers was increased, incompetent officers were removed, military schools were created. Certain reforms in drill were borrowed from the Prussian army, and order and economy carefully enforced. Efforts were taken to improve the general' morale of the army, and to increase the comfort of the men. The peace establishment, which was fixed at 100,000 Tnen, could be in time of war so largely increased by the irregular Hungarian troops and the reserves, that in 1753 it was estimated that the total fighting strength of Austria was 195,000. When the Seven Years' War broke out Maria Theresa was able to put into the field an admirable army, and to say with truth that the Austrian artillery was the best in Europe. Dissatisfied with the results of the late war, Maria Theresa was bent on regaining Silesia. Being one of the principal German-speaking provinces of the Austrian mon- archy, its loss, while a serious blow to the prestige of Maria of the Hapsburgs, tended to give additional weight "esa. to the Slav elements, always a source of difficulty to the Gov- ernment of Vienna. Determined to try again the chances of war, the choice of foreign allies was of the first importance. The alliance with the Maritime Powers formed the basis of the Austrian system of foreign policy, but the neutrality of England during the Pol- ish Succession War, and her dictatorial conduct throughout the Silesian Wars, had roused a strong feeling of resentment in Maria Theresa's breast. She felt that the late loss of territor}^ was due rather to the pressure of a selfish and insincere ally than to 212 European History y 171 5-1789 the victories of the French or the Prussians. On the 7th of March 1 749 she directed each of the ministers to submit, within a fortnight, a written opinion on the system of foreign policy which Austria ought henceforward to pursue. She found opinions were divided. The Emperor Francis, who cared principally for finance and chemistry, agreed with the older ministers in advising adherence to the ancient sys- tem. Austria, they pointed out, had three enemies — France, Prussia, and Turkey, and in a less degree Sardinia and Parma. To combat these she needed the assistance of the Maritime Powers and the alliance of Russia and Saxony. They further advised that Prussia should be given no excuse for renewing hostilities, and that Austria should carefully reorganise her finances and the army. Their views were combated with abihty and boldness by Kaunitz, the youngest member of the Cabinet or Conference. Anton Wengel von Kaunitz was bom in 1 7 1 1 in Vienna, and was destined for the Church. The death of his four elder The Policy brothers, however, changed the course of his life, of Kaunitz. ^cciA after a careful education for a diplomatic career at the universities of Vienna, Leipsic, and Leyden, completed by visits to England, France, Italy, and North Germany, he entered the service of Charles vi. as Aulic Councillor. During the Austrian Succession War he was successively ambassador at Rome, Turin, and Brussels, and represented Austria at the Con- gress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Though accused of frivolity'and fop- pishness, and suffering from bad health, he had already proved himself a successful diplomatist. He was, in spite of appear- ances, a sagacious thinker and a careful observer in political matters, and he proved himself to be one of the most acute statesmen of his day. His ability was unquestioned ; his re- markable energy never developed into rashness ; surrounded by jealous critics, he showed calmness, foresight, and resource. His dexterous diplomacy was the result of cool and calculating rea- son, and its strength lay in a patriotic regard for his country, which made him resent the position in which Frederick's seiz- The Diplomatic Revolution 213 ure of Silesia had left her. It was this patriotism which secured for him the full and necessar}' confidence of Maria Theresa, and forced Frederick to reahse that in him he had found his most dangerous opponent. Kaunitz was now thirty-eight years old, was about to carry out a great diplomatic revolution, and to take upon himself the direction of Austria's policy for upwards of forty years. In his famous State Paper, which in itself was twice as long as the united ' notes ' of the other ministers, he pointed out that Austria's position was materially affected by the rise of Prussia, that Prussia was the chief of the enemies of Austria, and that the latter Power would never be secure till she had recovered Silesia. Though France and the Porte could also be included in the list of Austria's enemies, Prussia's hostility was undoubted, and might declare itself any day. Austria must therefore regain Silesia without delay ; but in carrying out this policy she could not rely for support upon existing alliances. Though George 11. and Frederick were not on good terms, the King of Prussia was popular in England, and moreover the increasing interest taken in colonial and com- mercial matters rendered the English people more than ever indifferent to purely German questions. Holland, busy with internal troubles, and with her resources each year becoming more straitened, would follow England's lead ; while upon Russia, whose foreign policy depended on the caprice of the reigning despot, no reliance could be placed. The conclusions arrived at by the audacious minister were two. In the task of recovering Silesia no help could be expected from any of Austria's allies, and consequently friendship with France should be assiduously cultivated, France being the only great Power likely to aid Austria in her enterprise against Prussia. Kaunitz pointed out that the relations between France and Prussia were far from friendly, and he anticipated that Louis XV. could be easily won over to his views. Prussia was the only foe which Austria desired to attack, and the reconquest of Silesia the one object of her foreign policy. But Prussia, 214 Eii7'opea7i History, 171 5-1 789 while possessing a formidable army, had also gained consider- able prestige. The formation of a European confederacy was required to crush the power and to humble the pride of Frederick the Great, and of that confederacy France should be a leading member. The salient points in the policy of Kaunitz are therefore three : (i) the determination to recover Silesia; (2) the conviction that the English alliance was useless against Prussia in a war for the recovery of Silesia; (3) the absolute necessity of a French alliance. The views of Kaunitz were in the main correct. He cared little for the Austrian Netherlands, or for the outlying Italian provinces. Unlike Metternich, he was bent on consolidating, at the expense, if necessary, of the Milanese and of the Nether- lands, the German provinces of the Hapsburgs. In pursuance of these views he and Joseph 11. in 1778 and in 1785 attempted to include within the Austrian monarchy the Electorate of Bavaria, and to form a strong, compact German kingdom in South Germany. He wished, in a word, to restore that Austrian preponderance in Germany which had been lost at the Peace of WestphaHa, and to check those influences which were tending to make her an Eastern rather than a Western Power. The plan of a French alliance was not new. In 1726 one of Ripperda's agents had suggested that France should join the alliance of Vienna, and Fleury himself had not been unwilling to entertain the idea of cultivating friendly relations with Austria. During the later phases of the Austfian Suc- cession War Bartenstein had recognised the advisability of iletaching France from the Prussian alliance, and the policy of a definite rapprochement between the Hapsburgs and the French Bourbons had been openly discussed. Briihl in Sep- tember 1 745 had indicated to the Marquis de Vaulgrenant the advantages of an alliance between France and Austria for the punishment of the treacherous King of Prussia, and about the same time Chotek, then Austrian minister at Munich, was reported to have said to the same ambassador, that * it was quite time that the Courts of Vienna and Versailles should TJie Diplomatic Revolution 215 draw together.' And there seems Httle doubt that Maria Theresa was at that time wiUing to receive overtures from France. The French Cabinet decided to open negotiations through Vaulgrenant, but as they refused to entertain the idea of wTesting Silesia from Frederick, it is not surprising that the negotiation proved fruitless. The views of Kaunitz were at first strongly opposed by the Emperor, by Harrach, and by Uhlfeld, and as strongly sup- ported by Maria Theresa, who at once, with characteristic impetuosity, accepted a scheme which seemed to afford the best means for canning out the principal object of her thoughts — the recovery of Silesia. It was owing to her influence, coupled ^vith the growing coolness between Austria and the Maritime Powers, that the opposition to the policy of Kaunitz gradually disap- Growing peared. Ens^land had. in Maria Theresa's opinion, irritation in played her false with regard to Silesia, and further, against had forced her to make the Treaty of Aix-la- England. Chapelle. In the peculiarly sensitive state of feeling at Vienna towards England, it required little to increase the want of cordiality between the two nations. ^ Maria Theresa had deeply resented the conduct of the English Cabinet during the late war, and when, on the conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Cha- pelle, the Enghsh Parliament demurred to her demand of ;!£^ioo,ooo which she declared was due to her, she vented her irritation upon Keith, the English ambassador at Vienna. She was not satisfied with the general adhesion given by the Eng- lish Government in 1 75o__lo--the alliance of 1746 between Austria and Russia, nor did George 11. 's attempt to concihate her wound^d^elings, by proposing to support at ^j^^ Question the Diet the election of the Archduke Joseph as of the Eiec- King of the Romans, meet with any success. For Archduke two years the negotiations on this subject contin- Joseph as ued, absorbing the attention of the Electors, and af- Romans, fording France and even Russia an opportunity of ^750-52- asserting their interest in the affairs of Germany. In July and 2i6 Etiropean History, 171 5-1 789 August 1750 conferences were held in Hanover, by the authority of George 11., to consider the best means of securing the election of the Archduke. As the Electors of Mainz and Trier were devoted to the Austrian interest, and those of Bavaria, Koln, and Saxony were supposed to be influenced by England, no diffi- culty was anticipated in securing the necessary majority in the Electoral College. From Vienna itself George received little support, for Maria Theresa, while already hoping to detach France from the Prussian alliance, not only disliked the tone adopted by the English Court, but foresaw that the Electors would demand from Austria sums of money and territorial concessions. And she was justified in her apprehensions. While the Elector of Bavaria demanded a large annual subsidy, and the Elector of Koln the remission of some payments known as the Alois Romaifis, levied in the Middle Ages to defray the expenses of the Emperor's coronation journey to Rome, the Elector Palatine claimed from England and Holland ^50,000 due since the Spanish Succession War, and from Austria consid- erable territorial concessions and a large indemnity for his losses in the late war. Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine, born on the nth of December 1724, was the son of John Christian, Prince Palatine of Sulzbach, and in 1742 succeeded Charles Philip, the last Elector of the branch of Neuburg, in his titles anl estates. As he had been a French partisan during the ••vir of the Austrian Succession, his claims for compensation from the Court of Vienna naturally were received "by Maria Theresa with ill-concealed contempt. In the wearisome com- plications and negotiations which filled the years 1751 and 1752, Puisieux, the French ^Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Saint-Contest, who succeeded him in September 1751, con- tented themselves with sending Vergennes to Coblentz and Hanover to watch French interests, with advocating the execu- tion of Article 18 of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, on which the pretensions of the Elector Palatine were based, and with pro- fessing a readiness to support whatever pohcy Frederick the Great decided to adopt. After lengthy discussions at Hanover TJic Diplomatic Revolution 217 among the ambassadors of the various Courts, including Gri- maldi, the Spanish envoy to Sweden, who arrived to support Veigennes and the French poHcy, the attempt of George 11. to increase the prestige and power of his electorate failed. The King of England had found himself compelled to support the pretensions of the Elector Palatine in the face of the outspoken indignation of Maria Theresa, and an acrimonious correspond- ence took place between the Courts of Vienna and St. James'. While the question of Joseph's election was under discussion, Frederick the Great had asserted that a mere majority of Electors was insufficient to choose a king of the Romans, and the English Cabinet had taken the same view. Throughout the negotiations the English diplomatists undoubtedly showed a want of tact, the irritation felt at Vienna towards Austrian its peremptory ally became intense, and it was not irritation, till the 27th of March 1764 that the election took place. Thus George 11. 's well-meant efforts to calm the irritation of the Empress against her allies only resulted in infuriating her more than ever against the Enghsh Government. The question of the Barrier of the Netherlands had also in- creased the want of cordiality between the two Courts. The Austrian Netherlands — a continental colony of the The Barrier Hapsburgs — was always a source of difficulty. The Fortresses. closing of the Scheldt to commerce, the terms of the Barrier Treaty, and the interest of England and Holland in the defence of the country against France practically destroyed the sover- eignty of the Emperor, and justified the Austrian ministers in regarding the strengthening of the defences of the province with indifference. To ]Maria Theresa this political and com- mercial bondage to England and Holland was peculiarly exas- perating, and she only accepted in 1748 the renewal of the arrangement of 1713 with intense irritation and impatience. To England and Holland the matter was one of vital impor- tance, and in 1753 Sir Charles Hanbury Williams arrived at Vienna as special envoy. Unfortunately, like other English diplomatists of the time, he damaged his cause by his want 21 8 European History, 17 15-1789 of tact when conferring with Maria Theresa, and only strength- ened the Court of Vienna in its determination not to yield to the impatient demands of the English ministers. In 1750 Kaunitz went as Austrian Ambassador to Versailles, determined to convert the hereditary enmity of France into active friendship. His plan was to bring before basV of" the French ministers the possibihty of an alliance Kaunitz to bctwccn the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, and France, 1750. . as a means to this end to foment their suspicions of the King of Prussia. But though he remained in France till 1753, his embassy was not marked by success. On arriving at Paris he found affairs in terrible confusion. Louis xv.'s popu- larity was gone, and Madame de Pompadour was supreme. Foreign envoys paid their court to her, and the French min- isters looked to her for advancement. The extravagance of ' the court was unchecked, and the heavy and unequal taxation ruined all enterprise. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle remained intensely unpopular, and it seemed as though discontent in Paris would develop into a revolution. The Parlemoit of Paris had with difficulty been persuaded to sanction a war- tax of a * tenth,' and shortly after the conclusion of the war it found itself again the champion of the Jansenist cause against the Government, and the leader of the opposition to an attempt of Machault, the Controller-General, to impose a permanent tax of a twentieth on all classes. Machault d'Ernouville, the rival of the Comte d'Argenson, had succeeded Orry as Controller-Generfil in De- cember 1745. Formerly an intendant in Hainault, he owed his position not a little to Madame de Pompa- Machault s ^ Attempts at dour, who rccogniscd the merits of the stern and Reforms. high-principlcd magistrate. By strict economy Ma- chault made an honest attempt to improve the condition of the finances ; but, after the end of the Austrian Succession War, the edict which imposed a tax of a ' twentieth ' was received with almost universal disapprobation. Riots broke out in Brittany, the provincial Estates offered resistance, the Parlement of Paris refused to register the edict, the clergy were loud in their com- \ The Diplojuatic Revolution 219 plaints. The same forces which successfully resisted the later attempts of Turgot to cam' out reforms were able to offer to the edict an insurniountable opposition. Machault also attacked the clerg}^ directly. He wished to close many of the convents, and to check the growth of new religious establishments ; he hoped to pass a mortmain law, and to place obstacles in the way of the acquisition by the Church of legacies of land or money. He also proposed to establish free trade wnthin the length and breadth of France, in order to improve agricultijre. These admirable proposals were doomed to failure. The clergy accused him of impiety, the speculators in grain violently attacked him. Machault's programme, if carried, might have inaugurated a series of reforms which would have averted the Revolution and saved the French throne for the Bourbons. But Louis xv. was unable to withstand the outcn' raised against the minister, and in July 1754 Machault was transferred to the Ministr}' of Marine. The Parlement of Paris, unlike the king, showed no weakness in its attitude towards the clergy, who were indeed supported bv Louis himself. De Beaumont, the fanatical " , , 4 1 1 • 1 r T-w • 1 1 • T Struggle of though honest Archbishop of Pans, had issued an the Parie- order that no one should receive the Sacrament ™entofPans with the without showing a ticket of confession to prove ciergy and that he had accepted the Bull U7iigenitus, and he had further attempted to control the Paris hospitals. The Parle ?ne?it of Paris, supported by the provincial Pjrkments, strenuously opposed the Archbishop ; formally condemned, in 1752, the tickets of confession, and took severe measures against refractory priests. In 1753 the Government came to the rescue of the Archbishop, and on May 8 and 9 all the mem- bers of the Paris Parleynent were exiled, with the exception of the ' Grand Chamber.' which, however, was sent to Pontoise, and later to Soissons. Supported by the provincial Parlements, by the L'niversity of Paris, and by public opinion generally, the Parlement continued the strucrde. Its members protested against the invasion of the rights of 220 Europeaji History, 171 5-1789 the civil power by ecclesiastics and the interference by the Court in the affairs of the Parlejtient. The Paris streets were patrolled by cavalry, riots broke out in various places, seditious placards were posted on the walls. ' All orders,' wrote d'Ar- genson, ' are at once discontented. Everything is combustible. A riot may pass into a revolt, and a revolt into a complete revolution. It was expected that the Parlement would de- mand the meeting of the States-General. 'Everything,' wrote d'Argenson in March 1754, 'is preparing the way for civil war.' Louis XV., however, by the advice of Madame de Pompadour, checked the continuance of the crisis by recalling the Parlement, releasing the imprisoned magistrates, and exiling the Archbishops of Paris and Aix and the Bishops of Orleans and Troyes, be- cause they declined to reverse their policy and abandon their attacks on Jansenism. In 1756 de Beaumont reopened the struggle, which increased daily in fury. The Parlement refused a compromise obtained at the suggestion of the Government from Benedict xiv., and, supported by the public, suppressed the Papal brief. Alarmed at the pretensions of the Parlement, and furious at its conduct with regard to the Bull, the king, in December 1756, held a bed of justice, and declared he would enforce the acceptance of the Bull and would curtail the judicial powers of the Parle- 7nent in ecclesiastical cases. But the Parlement, in the absence of the States-General, was looked upon as the only ©heck upon the royal despotism, and its claim that no edict had the force of law unless it was registered by the magistrates received uni- versal acceptance. The weakness of its position lay in its dis- like of any financial reform, and its conservative attitude with regard to the preservation of antiquated privileges.^ Nevertheless the Parlement, in attacking a monarchy so unconscious of its duties and responsibilities as was that over which Louis xv. presided, occupied a strong position. Till the 1 Rocquain, L Esprit Revolutiohnaire avant la Revolution^ pp. 54-72; Aubertin, L Esprit Public ait XVIII^. Siecie, pp. 260-272; Lecky, History 0/ England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. v. pp. 325-333. TJie Diplomatic Revolution 221 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle Louis was popular. He had undoubt- edly many excellent qualities, and he could on occasion show activity and energ}' ; he was interested in questions louIs xv., of foreign policy ; he was extremely desirous of ^"^5-48- imitating and emulating Louis xiv., for whose memory he had the deepest veneration. Though he was considera- bly younger than his wife, whom the Duke of Bourbon had made Queen of France, he lived happily with her for some ten years, and had one son and six daughters. The Dauphin, who married first jMaria Theresa of Spain, and on her death ^Llria Josepha of Saxony, died in 1765. Of the daughters, Louise Elizabeth married Don Philip in 1739, and from 1748 to 1759 was known as the Duchess of Parma; none of her sisters were married. Unfortunately Louis, who had naturally an easy-going, indolent, effeminate nature, was brought up either by men like Villeroy, who inculcated the most extreme views of the divine and absolute power of kings, or like Fleury, who taught the narrowest theological dogmas. As soon as he had escaped from the domination of Bourbon, he encouraged Fleury to reproduce, as far as possible, in the Court the spirit and usages of the age of Louis xrv\ From 1735 he began to fall under the influence of the four sisters of the House of Nesle, of whom the Duchess de Chateauroux is the best known. But on her death, shortly after Louis' illness at Metz, when his popularity reached its culminating point, the star of Jeanne Poisson, who had married one Lenormand d'Etiolles, a financier, and who became in 174; Madame de , „ , ^ Influence of Pompadour, began to rise. With her appearance Madame de at the French Court all hope of any reformation of p°"^p^'^°"''- abuses, of any thorough reorganisation of the army, navy, and finances, or of any statesmanlike foreign policy, at once disap- peared. To her influence was mainly due the precipitation with which the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed, and after the end of the war ministers were appointed and dismissed in accordance with her personal wishes. Between 1748 and 1756 the French Government should have come to a clear understanding with 222 European History, 171 5-1789 England with regard to the colonial disputes ; a school of gen- erals should have been trained to take the place of Marshal Saxe, who died in 1750, and of Lowendahl, who died in 1755 ; the efforts of the Comte d'Argenson, of Rouille, and of Machault to reorganise the army and navy and to reform the finances Decline of ought to have bccu energetically supported. But the French ^^ Government, hampered by the constant inter- Monarchy, ' •' 1748-74. ference of Madame de Pompadour, was unable to carry out to any satisfactory extent this most essential pol- icy. It became evident that the king, sunk in dissipation, was unable to appreciate the responsibilities of his position, and the prospects of the Bourbon monarchy darkened with each succeeding year. The attack of Damiens on Louis xv. in January 1757, and the opening of the Seven Years' War, prevented any general outbreak ; but the discontent and sedition smouldered on, religious scepticism grew, discussions about the fundamental laws of the state increased, and the prestige of the monarchy declined rapidly. * With no firmness, no resolution, no de- cision of any kind,' the Government might well deserve the name of ' an extravagant weathercock.' But though its internal policy was vacillating and unstable, the French Government showed no signs of wishing to change the foreign policy pursued by France for well-nigh 250 years. In October 1750 the Marquis d'Hautefort was sent as ambassador to succeed Blondel, the Charge d' Affaires at Vienna, and in ^. , . i7S^ he was succeeded by the Sieur d'Aubeterre. Diplomatic '^^ . ^ Relations The rcccptiou accordcd to these envoys proved France and couclusively the dcsirc of the Austrian Govern- Austria, mcut to sccurc the alliance of France, and Keith, the English representative, at once realised the drift of the policy of the Court of Vienna. The instructions to these ambassadors show that the French Government desired to be on terms of friendship with Maria Theresa, but that as long as England, ' the natural foe ' of France, was the ally of Austria, France was compelled to find in Prussia a counter- The Diplomatic Revohition ' 223 poise to Austria. Though Kaunitz failed to detach France from Prussia, he cultivated the friendship of the king and of Madame de Pompadour, acquired some influence over the latter, and realised that France had no special feelings of hos- tility towards Austria. In 1753 he returned to Vienna, was made Chancellor of State, while Bartenstein, who could not work with him, was dismissed, and Uhlfeld retired. In 1752 the Treaty of Aranjuez, a faint reproduction of the famous Treaty of Vienna of 1725, had been made between Austria and Spain, the latter under Ferdinand vi., to guarantee each other's European possessions. To this treaty, Sardinia, Naples, and Parma acceded, so far as the Italian provinces of Austria were concerned. But the coolness between Spain and France, and the continued existence of the Anglo-Austrian connection, seemed to preclude all chance of a close alliance between Aus- tria, France, and Spain. Circumstances, however, before long aided Kaunitz, and brought about not only the Treaty of Versailles between Austria and France, but also the renewal of the Family Compact between France and Spain. The mission of Kaunitz, though devoid at the moment of any tangible result, in reality paved the way for the future aUiance between France and Austria. Like the mission of Harcourt to Spain at the close of the preceding century, it proved to be of vast international importance. In 1753 Austria's principal continental ally was Russia. Ar- ranged by Charles ^^. in 1726, the alliance between the two Courts had only been interrupted for a few years Diplomatic on the death of that Emperor. In 1744 French Relations • n • o T-. 1 • 1 • 1 -T-" between influence in St. Petersburg, which since the treaty Austria and of Belgrade had become of some importance, dis- ^"ssia. appeared with the departure of La Chetardie, and the Tsarina Elizabeth, realising the necessity of checking the ambition of Frederick the Great, \\'iningly received friendly overtures from Maria Theresa. On the 30th of May 1745 Elizabeth declared her consent to the renewal of the alliance of 1726, and on the 22d of May 1746 a treaty between the two Powers was signed 224 European History y 171 5-1 789 containing secret articles for the recovery of Silesia and for the partition of the Prussian kingdom. From the date of the sig- nature of the treaty to the death of Ehzabeth, in spite of a dispute over a religious persecution of some Servians and other Slavs by the Hungarians, Russia and Austria remained firm allies, and an article was added to the Treaty of 1746 binding both Powers, in view of French influence at Constantinople, to resist any Turkish attack. From this Russian alliance Maria Theresa hoped to derive ^o small benefit. Her hatred of the King of Prussia was, if possible, surpassed by that of Elizabeth, encouraged by her Chancellor Bestuzhev. Russia had for some time past aimed at changing the succession in Sweden, and in 1749, taking advantage of the illness of the king, a Russian army was assembled on the Finland frontier. The heir-apparent of Sweden was a brother-in-law of Frederick, who had signed, on the 29th of May 1747, a defensive alliance with Sweden, which, in 1748, had been joined by France. Prepar- ing for war, he issued a protest in May 1750 to the Russian Court. Bestuzhev, finding that England was unwilling to sup- port him, withdrew from his position ; Ehzabeth contented herself with breaking off diplomatic relations with Prussia ; and in 1753, at a Council held at Moscow, a solemn resolution was come to that Russian policy should aim at the prevention of further aggrandisement on the part of Prussia, and at co-op- eration with Austria, Saxony, and England in reducing it to its original limits. England's friendly relations with Russia and her strained relations with Prussia seemed still further to strengthen the position of Austria. A Russian, like a Swedish alliance, had to be bought, but English statesmen, partly for commercial reasons, partly in England's Order to sccurc EHzabeth's co-operation in over- Reiations awiug Frederick, and so securins; Hanover from with Russia o ' _ ^ and Prussia, all danger from Prussia, were content to pay con- siderable sums for the continuance of friendly relations with Russia. For keeping troops in readiness in time of peace Russia demanded at least ^200,000 a year, and a much larger TJie Diplomatic Revolution 225 sum in time of war. So unfriendly were the relations between England and Prussia in 1750 and the years immediately follow- ing, that there seemed little chance of a union between the two Powers. Frederick distrusted English statesmen before the Seven Years' War almost as much as he did after it. He opposed George's scheme for making the Archduke Joseph King of the Romans ; he quarrelled with England about cer- tain Prussian ships captured, while trading with France, by English men-of-war; he sent a Jacobite envoy to Paris, and for a time no English ambassador was at Berlin, and only a Prussian Secretary of Legation in London. In 1753 it seemed as though a European war would break out. In January, a Saxon clerk, Menzel, whom Frederick had bribed, sent him a copy of the secret articles , . _ ^ •' Likelihood of the Austro-Russian Treaty of 1 746, and con- of War in tinned to send copies of secret documents from ^^^^' the archives at Dresden. In Weingarten, an attach^ of the Austrian Embassy at Berlin, Frederick found another official who for gold was ready to supply him with information. The king now knew the worst. Russia and Austria had planned his destruction, and were endeavouring to secure the adhesion of Saxony. Austria was collecting forces in Bohemia, and Russian troops were moving towards Prussia. But the Rus- sian attack on Prussia was again postponed. England was unwilling to pay the subsidies demanded by the Court of St. Petersburg, Frederick showed his usual readiness to repel inva- sion, and France intimated to England that if Prussia was at- tacked she would send troops to his assistance. The fear of an invasion of Hanover might have indefinitely postponed the inevitable struggle had not the quarrels be- tween England and France in India and in Amer- Prussian ica led to the outbreak of , war between the two i^nce. countries. In 1753 Duquesne, Governor of Canada, attempted to seize the Ohio Valley, and by means of the French claims to the valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, to unite the provinces of Canada and Louisiana. In India CHve had PERIOD VI, p 226 European History, 17 1 5-1789 foiled the schemes of Dupleix, who in 1754 was recalled. In America, however, the quarrel was more serious. In 1754 Washington and the Virginian militia, after winning a decided success, were defeated, and the following year General Brad- dock, at the head of some English regular troops, was defeated and killed. Though war was not formally declared between England and France, it was obvious in 1755 that it was inevi- table. At this crisis Frederick the Great was forced to con- sider carefully his relations with France, while the Enghsh Cabinet had to decide upon the best means of defending Hanover, which lay exposed to the hostility of France and Prussia. Frederick was closely connected with France. The Treaty of 1 741 bound him to aid Louis xv. if attacked, whilejn 1753 Position of France had come to his support with a aistinct Frederick declaration that she would assist him if Ensfland the Great in " 1754-55- declared war. Though neither Power had much confidence in the sincerity of the other, though Frederick despised French statesmen, and though Madame de Pompa- dour and the Court of Versailles disliked and distrusted Fred- erick, common interests seemed to render the close alHance of France and Prussia absolutely necessary. And for a Power situated as was Prussia both geographically and financially, alHance with France seemed to be of incalculable value. France occupied an influential position in Europe. Her relations with Poland, Turkey, Sweden, and the sn^aller Ger- French man princes rendered her a valuable ally, and Policy in though Louis xv.'s secret diplomacy, combined Europe. with frcqucnt changes in the department of foreign affairs, made a firm and consistent policy impossible, the mili- tary and political position of the French nation was incontesta- bly strong. /On the conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle it was clear that in Russia a strong and successful Power had risen, while the violation of PoHsh territory by Russian troops in 1747-48 not only rendered apparent the weakness of Poland itself, but demonstrated the fixed determination of the Tsarina TJie Diplomatic Revolution 227 to make that countn' subsement to herself. y Any idea that Louis or his ministers might have of allying with Russia was prevented by the union of the Imperial Courts in the Treaty of 1746, by Louis' distaste of Russian aggressiveness, and his personal dislike of Elizabeth. In his own feeble way he was inclined to draw closer his relations with Poland, Turkey, and Sweden, realising the truth of the saying that the road from Moscow to Constantinople passed through Stockholm and War- saw. Like Bonneval, he dimly appreciated the advantage to France of a union of Poland, Turkey, and Sweden under the direction of France. But French credit had sensibly dimin- ished in the north and east, and the three countries in question were each in various degrees of decadence. It would have re- quired a statesman of superhuman energy to rouse them from their torpor, to induce them to carry out the required reforms, and to make them appreciate the imminence of the danger from Russia. Louis was not a statesman ; he was timid, he loved secrecy and circuitous courses, his health was entirely broken. He resolved to carr}- out his schemes by means of secret agents. He decided to use the senices of the Prince of Conti, the great nephew of the famous Conde, and a cousin of his own. A popular man, Conti was active and energetic, but he was the prey to an overmastering ambition, and over- fond of building castles in the air. Numerous schemes had floated through his brain. He had hoped at one time to marr}' Elizabeth of Russia, at another to be the generalissimo of the troops of some great European Power, at another to be a Cardinal. A field for his ambition was now found in Poland, where Augustus m., the king, was not expected to live long. As Poland was in size as large as France, and barred the advance of Russia into western Europe, it was obvious that she would become the centre of diplomatic activities directly a fresh European war came within sight. Austria and Russia, aided by England, were busy trying to secure the adhesion of Augustus to the Treaty of 1746, while France, realising the 228 European History, 171 5-1789 importance of the position, endeavoured at any rate to secure the neutrality of Poland.^ Louis determined, therefore, to put forward the claim of Conti to the Polish succession, hoping thereby to advance his own design with regard to a general opposition to Russia. In Poland two parties henceforward struggled for pre-eminence. The Saxon party was anxious for the Russian alliance ; and the Russian policy, which had the support of England, was to sup- port the Czartoryskis, to keep the Poles and Saxons in due sub- mission, to eventually raise a Czartoryski to the throne, using him as a Russian tool, and thus to secure the right of passage through Poland. The national party, on the other hand, was opposed to the establishment of Russian influence in Poland. To compass the triumph of the national party was the object of the French ministers, while Louis xv. went still further, and hoped and intrigued to secure the election of the Prince of Conti. As the Dauphiness was the daughter of Augustus, and as Maurice de Saxe was still alive, Louis found it necessary to keep secret the objects of his pohcy in Poland. He therefore set to work with great mystery, intending to secure Conti's election, and thus to give the coalition of Poland, Turkey, and Sweden a natural leader. To Turkey the Comte des Alleurs, one of Conti's partisans, had been sent with two sets of instruc- tions — one official, one secret. With great difficulty he restored French influence in Constantinople, and by 1750 the Turks will- ingly entered into the French plan of checking Russian influence in Poland and Sweden. To the latter country d'Havrencourt, another of Conti's agents, had been sent in 1 749, and there he remained till 1753. In 1748 France had joined Prussia in guaranteeing the defence of Sweden in case of attack, and in 1750 it seemed likely that Russia, then in occupation of Fin- land, would march on Stockholm. But the protests and prepa- rations of Frederick, combined with the interests of France in Sweden, checked Russia, while the accession of Adolphus Fred- erick at the end of 1750 to the Swedish throne, and his decla- 1 See Due de Broglie, The King's Secret. TJie Diplomatic Revolution 229 ration that he would not attempt any constitutional reforms, gave Russia an excuse for evacuating Finland. From 1752 to 1756 the chief theatres of French diplomacy were Constantinople and Warsaw. In 1752 the Comte de Broglie, the second son of the Marshal, who had taken a considerable part in the early stages of the Austrian Suc- cession War, was, through Conti's influence, appointed envoy to Poland. He carried with him, like des Alleurs, two sets of instructions. Saint-Contest, the Foreign Minister, ordered him simply to bring about a close union between Poland and Saxony, to oppose their alliance with Russia and Austria, and to support the national party in Poland ; Louis, on the other hand, instructed him, while re-establishing French influence, to for- ward Conti's candidature, and to correspond \vith Conti himself. De Broglie had a difficult task to perform, and, in spite of his total want of experience in diplomacy, seems to have shown considerable tact and skill. Like Hertzberg, de Broglie evolved a policy which, if not practicable, was at any rate ingenious. He aimed at making Poland and Saxony an im- passable barrier to Russia, and at inducing Turkey, when occa- sion required, to attack Russia by land, while Sweden and Denmark were to attack her by sea. He further looked forward to the occupation of Holland by Prussia. In the event of a continental war, France would thus only have Austria to deal with. Though his principal efforts were de- voted to securing the alHance of Poland and Saxony, and to prevent armed interference in the affairs of Poland, de Broglie made some attempts, with, however, little success, to further the candidature of Conti. By the beginning of 1755 a certain measure of success re- warded de Broglie's energy and diplomacy. A strong party hostile to the Czartoryskis had been formed among the Polish noblesse, and Augustus iii. was ready to promise to oppose the entrance of Russian troops into Poland, and give France armed assistance. He was further ready to authorise his subjects to rise en masse should the Russians invade Poland. France, 230 European History, 171 5-1 789 supported by Prussia, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey, seemed prepared, by dint of the vigorous action of de Broglie, des Alleurs, and, on his death in 1754, of Vergennes, not only to completely detach Saxony from an alliance with the two Imperial Courts, but also defend herself and her allies successfully against the hostiUty of Russia, Austria, and England. With the shadow of an inevitable conflict hanging over his country, and with full knowledge of the schemes of Austrian diplomacy of which Dresden was the centre, Position of Frederick Frederick might well hesitate before he sacrificed the Great. ^^ alliance with a Power which was as equally interested as he was in checking the growth of the Hapsburg supremacy in the Empire. The influence and prestige of the Court of Vienna were increasing, and the undoubted tendency of Austrian policy was to transform the princes of the Empire into subservient instruments of its own. It was then of the utmost importance to prevent the union of France and Austria against the House of Brandenburg. The action of England only tended to confirm his anxieties, and to force him to a decision with regard to his alliance with France. From 1 749 he had consistently endeavoured to counteract the diplomacy of Maria Theresa in the French capital, and had urged upon his representatives constant watchfulness and caution. Against his numerous foes a continuance of his close aUiance with France seemed his best chance of safety. But in France opinion was divided. Though ofificialdom, as repre- sented by Louis' ministers, continued to regard the continuance of the Prussian alliance as necessary, and had no wish to desert the ancient system of hostility to the Hapsburgs, a different spirit was apparent among many members of the Court, among financiers, diplomatists, and others. It was asserted openly that the King of Prussia had proved an unfaithful ally in the late war, that his policy was selfish, that he desired a fresh outbreak of hostiUties, that his alliance was dangerous to the interests of France. The Diplomatic Revolution 231 The appearance of Kaunitz in Paris gave force to the argu- ments of the enemies of Frederick, who found that none of his successive representatives at the French capital — , ^ . ^ His Rela- Chambrier, Lord Keith, and Knyphausen — could tions with weaken the favourable impression which the Aus- ^'■*"*^®- trian ambassador had made at the French Court. Kaunitz reigned supreme in the good graces of Madame de Pompa- dour, but though Louis xv. was gratified at the friendship of Maria Theresa, the ancient system of alliance was not over- thrown. That Louis chafed at the dictatorial tone of Fred- erick, just as Maria Theresa resented the blunt advice of the English diplomatists, is undoubted. From Berlin emanated at- tacks by French refugees upon religion and the monarchy. In France and in Prussia were a number of literary men, pension- ers of Frederick. But Louis' character, and his love of secret diplomacy, rendered a decision which involved a complete change of French policy pecuharly difficult to make, and when in 1753 Kaunitz returned to Vienna, and Hautefort was replaced by Aubeterre, there was nothing in the political situation to lead Europe to expect a reshuffling of the alliances of the great Powers. But the increasing hostility between England and France rendered Frederick's position one of extreme anxiety. France ^'as unprepared for war, and her government was conducted upon no intelligible principle. A popular outcry against the Controller-General, Machault. had resulted in his appointment to the Ministry of Marine, while Rouille, an intendant seventy years old, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs on the death of Saint-Contest. The French na\T was far inferior to that of England, and the inability of France to cope with Great Britain on the sea rendered it absolutely certain that she would endeav- our to attack England on the continent. In presence of this crisis French foreign policy wavered. If the war was confined to a struggle between England and France, and Austria and Holland remained neutral, England could only be attacked in Hanover, and only there if the Franco-Prussian alliance re- 232 European History^ 171 5-1789 mained intact. The French Government would certainly de- mand Frederick's co-operation in an invasion of Hanover, and his entry into the war would, he saw, be at once followed by a combined Austro-Russian attack on his dominions. With his usual clear-sightedness the Prussian king perceived that if France was beaten at sea he could not hope to oppose successfully the attacks of England, Hanover, Austria, Russia, and Saxony. His perplexity during the year 1755, as shown in his instructions to his ambassadors and in his conversations with the French envoy. La Touche, was only natural. In April d'Argenson, the Minis- ter of War, suggested that the Prussians should occupy Han- over. But Frederick, aware of the designs of his enemies at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Dresden, dared not weaken him- self by attacking the Electorate. Hoping to preserve neutrality in the coming war between England and France, he in July urged the French to occupy the Austrian Netherlands. In France the news of the capture of the Alcide and the Lys had caused intense excitement. The Council was itself divided, and the prey to irresolution and weakness. Questions of foreign policy were discussed in the streets, and while the majority of the ministers agreed with the majority of the nation in demanding immediate war, a small number urged that repa- ration should first be demanded from England. Though Frederick, through Knyphausen, continued to urg^ upon the distracted French ministers an immediate and over- whelming attack upon the Austrian Netherlands, he Tvas careful not to make any offer of an active alliance. His treaty made with France in 1741 would expire in June 1756, and he de- clared that on its expiry he would be ready to consider the whole question of a new alliance. The French Government, though involved in negotiations with Austria, was desirous, if possible, of obtaining some more definite declarations of policy from Frederick, and decided to send the Due de Nivernais to Berlin. But though every moment was of importance, a long and disastrous delay took place between the appointment of Nivernais and his arrival at Berlin. During that interval events The Diplomatic Revolution 233 had occurred which enabled Frederick to see that his safest poHcy was to ally with England. It had been recognised early in 1755 by English statesmen that war with France was inevitable, and that the French would attack the Austrian Netherlands and invade ^ , , England Hanover. A treaty with Hesse for a supply of prepares for 12,000 troops was concluded, and Austria was invited to renew her alliance with England. Early in 1755 the English Government had made a definite offer respecting the defence of the Austrian Netherlands. England would em- ploy Hessians, and would conclude an alliance with Russia, if Austria on her part would send an army of some 25,000 men to strengthen the garrisons in the Barrier towns. Kaunitz met this proposal in May with a poHte refusal. There was no danger, he asserted, of hostilities breaking out ; such prepara- tions as the British Government suggested might lead to the invasion which it dreaded, and should war be declared by France, the reinforcements demanded would arrive too late. Holderness, the English Secretary of State, at once recognised the meaning of Kaunitz' attitude, and the fact that the Anglo- Austrian alliance had come to an end. Austria, with no colonies and no navy, had ostensibly as little interest in the war between England and France as had Prussia. Maria Theresa's object being to reconquer Silesia, all her preparations were directed to that end, and of this Frederick was well aware. The Austrian Government was resolved to recover Silesia. It was willing on certain terms to ally with England against Prussia as well as against France, but the English ministers had no intention of attacking Prussia or of supporting the Austrian schemes in Silesia. The evasive and unsatisfactory reply of Austria to Holderness' ultimatum showed that Kaunitz was not anxious for the English alliance on the EngHsh terms, and Hanbury Williams was sent to St. Petersburg. There he was cordially received by the Chancellor, Bestuzhev, who hated Prussia, and was convinced that the true allies of Russia were England, Austria, Sweden, and Saxony. On the 30th of Sep- 234 Eiiropean History, 171 5-1789 tember a subsidy treaty was concluded, and England took into her pay 55,000 Russian troops, who, if Hanover was attacked, should at once march to its assistance. Meanwhile the Austrian Cabinet had taken a decisive step, and negotiations had been opened by England with Prussia. ^^ ^ In August the Austrian ministers had decided to The Conven- ° tionofWest- leave the Netherlands to their fate — a decision minster. which implied that the English alliance, which had existed since the revolution of 1688, was at an end. Almost simultaneously overtures had been made by England to Fred- erick, who declared that he was anxious for peace, and hoped to see the differences between France and England amicably arranged. But war was inevitable ; the news of Boscawen's capture of the Alcide and the Lys reached France in July, and by the end of 1755 some 300 French merchant ships had been seized. Frederick was unwiUing to guarantee the French colonies ; he held that the dispute between England and France was essentially a colonial one, and that his engage- ments with France applied only to Europe. He distrusted the French ministers and Madame de Pompadour, and he resented the tone of'the Court of Versailles. He had, early in 1755, urged upon France vigorous measures, but could not get any satisfactory assurances. In supporting France he would be increasing her influence in Germany ; he would also run the risk of being deserted by her in revenge for his double desertion of the French cause during the Austrian Succession IVar ; he was exposing himself to an attacl^Mrom England, Russia, and Austria. In December he saw a copy of the treaty between Russia and England. He at once came to a decision. He would have none of French half-measures and French hesi- tation. On the 1 6th of January 1756 the Convention of Westminster w^s signed, by which England and Prussia agreed not to allow foreign troops of any nation to enter or pass through Germany. England no longer wished to use Russian troops in Germany ; Frederick agreed, to the great satisfaction of George 11., to defend Hanover if attacked by French troops. The Diplomatic Revolution 235 Both Powers 'guaranteed the neiitrahty of Germany,' but by a secret article expressly excluded the Austrian Netherlands. Hitherto though English statesmen had felt no special animos- ity to Prussia, George 11., as Elector of Hanover, had always regarded Frederick William and Frederick the Great as his rivals in Germany. In the face, however, of a great struggle, the petty jealousy between the two Electors was swept away, and Prussia was recognised as England's strongest ally on the continent. By this treaty Frederick had converted one enemy, England, into an ally, had rid himself of another, Russia, had preserved the neutrality of Germany, and kept out of Germany Russian and French troops. The first step in the great diplo- matic revolution had been taken. The effect of the news of the Treaty of Westminster was immediate and stupendous. Broglie's diplomatic edifice, so carefully reared, fell to the ground like a pack of cards. All his plans were upset, the anti-Russian party became powerless, and Poland was used as a basis of operations throughout the ensuing war. In Turkey the skill of Vergennes had so arranged matters that as soon as the Russians had begun their march westwards, the Turkish army would have attacked Russia on her flank. He had roused the Tartars and sown disaffection among the Cossacks. All was ready, and Vergennes was wait- ing for the signal. But the signal never came ; and instead of France and Turkey acting together against Austria and Russia, France was found a year later in close alliance with the two Imperial Courts. At Vienna great, indignation was expressed at a treaty, which, without consultation with the Emperor, provided for the neu- trality of Germany, while at St. Petersburg Elizabeth was furious. She hated Frederick the Great, and in October 1755 the Rus- sian Council had solemnly declared that Russia would aid any Power which should attack Prussia. She had regarded the sub- sidy treaty of St. Petersburg, made with England in September 1755, as directed against Prussia, and she now felt that by the Convention of Westminster she had been balked of her prey. 236 Europea7i History, 171 5-1789 In France the news of Frederick's desertion aroused a feeling of irritation which furthered the schemes of Kaunitz. In Au- Negotiations S^^t 1 755 when the EngUsh negotiations with the between Court of Vienna had fallen to the ground, the Aus- Austria, triau Chancellor had again brought forward his old 1755-56. plan of 1749, and secured for it the support of Maria Theresa. He aimed definitely at the partition of the greater part of the Prussian state between Saxony, the Palati- nate, Sweden, and Austria. But first of all France was to be won over by the cession of Mons to herself, and by the creation of a principality in the Netherlands for Don PhiUp, Louis' son- in-law; the Polish throne was to be given to Conti, and an alliance to be made with Russia. By means of the French assistance, Austria would be enabled to reduce Prussia to the condition of a fourth-rate Power, and to recover Silesia. The scheme imphed a complete change in French foreign policy. All the traditions of France were opposed to the plan of Kaunitz. For generations France had aimed at the reduc- tion of the power of Austria, and in the contests of the last 250 years she had gained important territorial acquisitions on the side of Germany. But though the War of the Austrian Succes- sion had been fought in accordance with the traditions of the foreign policy of Louis xiv., the results of that war, so far as they had affected France, were distinctly unsatisfactory, and a widespread feeling of discontent at the failure of Louis xv.'s foreign policy pervaded all classes. Kaunitz was himself well aware of the difficulties attendant on the realisation of his aims. * A great Power was to be convinced that the whole political system which it had hitherto pursued was in direct opposition to its true interests. It was to be persuaded that what it regarded as the only means for overcoming the difficulties with England were really unsuited for the purpose, and that it was pursuing a radically false policy when it made the support of Prussia the central object of all its alHances.' To Stahremberg, then Austrian Ambassador in Paris, was intrusted, in the latter days of August 1755, the task of bringing about this revolution The Diplo7natic Revolution 237 in the classical system of French foreign policy, and of end- ing the old rivalry with Austria. On September 3 he opened negotiations with Bemis. France had much to gain by a change in her policy. In a war with England the Austrian alliance or neutrahty would be valuable, while Prussia had hitherto proved but a treacher- ous ally. In the late contest she had risked the loss of Canada in order to assist Frederick to conquer Silesia. Her efforts against Austria, her expenditure of men and money, and her exhaustion and impoverishment at the end of the war, had only resulted in the aggrandisement of a treacherous Power, which had grown into a formidable military state. For centu- ries, too, France had coveted the Austrian Netherlands. An alliance with Austria would make her supreme in that quarter, might lead to an entire or partial annexation of the Low Coun- tries, and enable her to deal a serious blow at the Maritime Powers. In reality, the interests of Austria and France were very dissimilar. France wished to attack England, Austria to attack Prussia. For France peace on the continent would be of enormous advantage; Austria, on the other hand, desired to begin a European war. The negotiations proceeded slowly, for Louis refused to believe without full and adequate proof that Frederick had a secret understanding with England or was plotting against the Cathohc religion. Austria, while matters were in this state of uncertainty, definitely proposed to unite with Spain and France for the support of the Treaty of Aix- la-Chapelle against any state that should begin war. Stahrem- berg on these terms renewed secret negotiations mth RouilM, Machault, Sechelles, and St. Florentin, as well as with Bemis. But the French ministers were suspicious of Austrian sincerity ; in a naval war with England the Austrian alliance would be of little use ; and it was practically impossible for an Austrian force to operate in Hanover. In the meantime, while the negotiations hung fire, Nivernais, who, in consequence of Bernis' suspicions of Frederick's conduct, had been appointed to succeed La Touche, at last arrived at Berlin on January 1 2, 238 Europea7i History, 171 5-1789 1756. He was instructed to find out what the king was think ing about, and to endeavour to bribe him to join an anti-Enghsh alUance. He arrived in time to receive a copy of the treaty between England and Prussia. Frederick's poUcy was un- veiled, and Kaunitz at once saw that his efforts would be crowned with success. Negotiations were resumed on the old basis between Bernis and Stahremberg. But France, though vvilHng to abandon her old alliance with Prussia, was not pre- pared to throw herself unconditionally into the arms of Austria. The negotiations advanced slowly, for France demanded that the engagements between the two countries should be recipro- cal, and that Austria should do as much against England as France would do against Prussia. Moreover, France, though prepared to recognise the recovery of Silesia by Austria, would not consent to the practical extinction of Prussia as proposed by Kaunitz. Maria Theresa on her part was unwilling to take any decided action against England until she knew what course Russia intended to adopt in consequence of the Convention of Westminster. Early in April 1756, however, Elizabeth de- clared to Esterhazy that she was prepared to attack Fred- erick that year with 80,000 men ; that she would not make peace till Maria Theresa had recovered Silesia ; and that she would agree to the proposed alliance between France and Austria. This report was indeed, as Kaunitz asserted, 'a message of comfort and encouragement ' for the anxious Austrian Court. ^^ ^ Kaunitz saw that delay would be ruinous. On The Treaty ^ of Versailles, the 19th of April a meeting of the French minis- ay I, 175 • |-gj.g |.Q consider the Austrian proposals took place. Louis XV. had been in favour of an x\ustrian alliance during a great part of his life ; Madame de Pompadour now strongly supported it. The ministers, with the exception of Machault and the Comte d'Argenson, declared their approval ; and as Kaunitz only asked for the conclusion of a general alHance, the details to be settled later, the ist of May saw the Treaty TJic Diplomatic Revolution 239 of Versailles signed. The treaty really consisted of three treaties — two public and one secret. By the first, which was an act of neutrality, Austria agreed to take no part in the hostilities between England and France, and France en- gaged not to attack the Netherlands or any Austrian posses- sion. The second was a defensive aUiance and treaty of friendship. Each Power agreed to defend the possessions of the other if attacked — the existing war between England and France being expressly excepted. By the third treaty, which included five secret articles, it was settled that Austria would aid France if attacked by any ally of England ; that the Kings of Spain and Naples, Philip of Parma, and other princes as might be agreed upon subsequently, should be invited to join the defensive alliance, and that neither Power should make any new aUiance without mutual agreement. The Treaties of West- phaha formed the basis of the new system which was now adopted. In January of the following year, Russia, by the Convention of St. Petersburg, accepted the defensive alliance between Austria and France, and on May i, 1757, a second Treaty of Versailles, in which France agreed upon the partition of Prussia, and undertook to pay Austria an annual subsidy, to place a large army in the field, and to receive in return a por- tion of the Netherlands, completed the diplomatic revolution. All traditional French policy was thus reversed. Sweden and Poland were practically given up to Russia, Turkey was neglected. The system of supporting a clientele' The Dipio- of small states for the purpose of restrainins: f"^.*'"^ Revo- ^ ^ o lution, Austria and Russia was abandoned. The French 1756. alliance ^^•ith the German Protestants came to an end. His- torians take very different views with regard to the wisdom of French policy during these years. * France,' says Henri Martin, ' committed an act of madness, of imbecile treason against herself, the like of which hardly exists in history.' The Due de Broglie takes the opposite view. ' The Austrian alliance,' he says, ^ was a condition of safety if not of existence 240 Europeaji History, 171 5-1 789 to France.' In 1756 France had probably no intention of carr}'ing out a complete revolution in her traditional policy, but simply to adapt herself to the new conditions of Europe, which had itself been revolutionised by the rise of Prussia and Russia. But the feeble Government of Louis xv. failed to see that France ought to have concentrated her strength upon the struggle in India and America and on the sea, and that in plunging into a continental war for the recovery of Si- lesia and the partition of Prussia, she was playing the game of England and Austria. The Austrian alliance proved to be disastrous to France, because that countr)' was governed by a king sunk in sloth, and contemptible for his vices ; and French poHcy, during the early stages of the Seven Years' War, was guided by incom- petent ministers. Through their incapacity and mismanage- ment, France became the cat'spaw of Russia and Austria, and her influence in Europe was ruined. The Treaty of West- minster and the Treaties of Versailles introduced a new system into Europe ; England and Prussia, the two vigorous advancing Powers, alUed together against France and Austria, aided by the young pushing Russian nation. This revolution, due in great measure to the rise of the Hohenzollern kingdom, owes no small measure of its success to the foresight, skill, and de- termination of Kaunitz. He had brought into being a powerful coalition against the small military state of Prussia, which, hav- ing restored Silesia to Austria, was to be itself partitioned. It remained to be seen how far his policy would prove successful. On the 29th of August 1756 Frederick the Great, unable to obtain satisfactory assurances from x\ustria, invaded Saxony, and thus began the Seven Years' War. CHAPTER IX THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 1756-1763 The Invasion of Saxony — The Saxon Resistance and the Battle of Lobositz— The Convention of St. Petersburg and the Second Treat}' of Versailles — Failure of France to secure the Co-operation of Spain — French Policy in Poland — The Battles of Prague, Kolin, and Gross-Jagersdorf — The Bat- tles of Rossbach and Leuthen — Pitt and Frederick the Great — The Siege of Olmiitz — Loudon raises the Siege of Olmiitz — The Battle of Zomdorf — The Defeat of Frederick at Hochkirchen — Ferdinand of Brunswick in Western Germany — Frederick the Great at the Close of 1758 — Fall of Bernis and Rise of Choiseul — Choiseul's Vigorous Policy — The Disasters of France in 1759 — The Battles of Minden and Kunersdorf — Finck's Capitulation at Maxen — Louis XV. 's Secret Diplomacy — The War in 1760 and 1761 — The Accession of Charles III. of Spain — The Family Compact of 1761 — Fall of Pitt, and War between England and Spain — Death of Ehzabeth of Russia and its Results — The Peace of Paris — The Treat)- of Hubertsburg — Results of the War. The wisdom of the step taken by Frederick the Great in opening the war is not Hkely to be questioned. There is no doubt that Austria and Russia, probably in con- The invasion junction with Saxony, intended to attack him the °^ Saxony. following year after full preparations had been made. In anticipating the onslaught of his enemies lay Frederick's one chance of safety. While this invasion of Saxony would bring upon his country all the horrors of war, delay meant absolute destruction. The justification of Frederick's attack will be found in the Russian and Austrian, no less than in the Saxon, archives. In selecting Saxony as the object of his invasion the Prussian king's motives were militar}^ and political. While desirous of crushing Austria in a single campaign, he recog- PERioD VI. 241 Q 242 Etn'0pea7i History, 171 5-1789 nised the impossibility of having a hostile Saxony in his rear. And at the same time he hoped to find and publish the Menzel documents which lay in Dresden, and so to give Europe an adequate justification of his conduct. As events turned out, Frederick would probably have acted more wisely in limiting his attack to Austria. For "to his own surprise, his intention of marching through Saxony into Bohemia and falling upon the unprepared Austrians, was frustrated by the Saxons themselves. r^ Though Augustus in. only possessed an army of 1 7,000, as compared with the 65,000 Prussians who were marching The Saxon southwards, he acted with decision and success, Resistance ^ccidi entrenched himself and his army on the hills and the i • i Battle of — the Misnian Highlands — a few miles above Lobositz. Dresden, his right and left ^\^ngs resting respec- tively upon the impregnable mountain fortresses of Pima and Konigstein. For upwards of a month the Saxons held the hilly country, and, by checking the Prussian advance into the Austrian dominions, rendered an invaluable service to the Emperor. The importance of the Saxon resistance can be fully appreciated when it is remembered that the Austrian army was far from being ready for the struggle which had so suddenly been forced upon its rulers, and that the inter\'al afforded by the Saxon resistance was utilised by the Austrian general, Browne, in remedying the many deficiencies in the army and in ^organising every branch of the ser\ice. Though the Court of Vienna disapproved of the defence of Saxon Switzerland, and suspected the fidelity of Augustus, it was compelled to take measures to relieve the Saxon army, then in great danger of being starved into surrender. Marshal Browne was ordered to march to the relief of the Saxons without delay. His carefully conceived plans, however, received a rude check. Frederick, leaving half his army to watch the Saxons, advanced into Bohemia with the other half, met Browne, and fought the indecisive battle of Lobositz. The Prussians remained in possession of the battle- field, and Browne had for the moment to renounce the idea The Seven Years' War 243 of relieving the Saxons. When on the nth of October he managed to advance within a few miles of Schandau he found that the Saxons, outmanoeuvred by the Prussians, half-starved, and badly led, were in no condition to form a junction with his troops and to fight the Pmssians. He was compelled to retreat ; and on the i6th of October the capitulation of Pirna took place. Saxony was conquered ; her king had to retire to Warsaw ; her soldiers were forced to join the Prussian army ; and the papers in the Dresden archives furnishing a justification of Frederick's invasion were published. But the Saxon resistance had saved Austria, and though the possession of Saxony was important from a mihtary point of view, Frederick gained little from the publication of his memoire raisoune, which he sent to all the European Courts. During the winter and spring his enemies left no stone unturned to compass his ruin. In September 1756 he had been condemned by the Emperor Francis as a disturber of the peace, and the Diet on the 17th of January 1757 declared war against Prussia, and put her king to the ban of the Empire. But the hostility of the Empire was no great danger to Frederick, nor any source of strength to the Emperor Francis. The Protestant states were opposed to the action of the Diet, and the imperial army was of little practical use. ^^^-^ her struggle against Prussia Austria had mainly to rely upon J? the assistance and co-operation of the Tsarina of Russia ana the King of France. Of these Powers the Tsarina Elizabeth had, for upwards of ten years, been bitterly hostile to Frederick, partly, it is said, on account of some sarcastic remarks ; while Bestuzhev. the Russian Chancellor, consistently opposed Prussia, affecting to see in it a dangerous neighbour to Russia. Supported by Woronzov and all the ministers with the ex- ception of Bestuzhev, Elizabeth, on the 21st of January 1757, by the Convention of St. Petersburg, accepted the Treaty of Versailles concluded the previous May between Austria and France, and in February made a new treaty with Austria, the latter Power agreeing to pay Russia about ^100,000 a year during the war, and both Powers undertaking not to end BURG '•^"^^-.. ^ '■■'' '•— - 11 ^P'-llSsi^ '772) •JO burg JC-vDrpsden. "••...••■ / V / *»T^ A <3 O V>; Czaslau ^ 'BOHEMIA..-., ■■ K Cracow ^^ . G AL I C I A (Austrian 1772J HUNGARY _Salzbups A U S T R / A /^' / 15 ^■o«TH&i-AST GEEJiAxy iroe-irer"""" i'l^- Co.Sc, The Seven Years War 245 the war till Frederick had yielded Silesia and Glatz, and the Prussian state was reduced to the position of Bavaria or Hesse- Cassel. Sweden, Denmark, and Saxony were to be ^^ ^ ' ' •' The Conven- induced to join the alliance by the offer of territo- tion of st. ■ 1 ,• Petersburg:, rial compensation. j^^, 21, and Secure of the aid of Russia, it only remained for the second Austria to clinch her alliance with France. On the Versailles, I St of May 1757 the second Treaty of Versailles May i, 1757. was signed by Austria and France for the partition of Prussia. As soon as Silesia was in Austrian hands, France was to obtain a portion of the Netherlands, including the ports and towns of iMons, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Furnes, the sovereignty of Beaumont and Chimay, and the fortress of Knocque, while the remainder was to be given to Don Philip of Parma, Louis' son-in-law, in exchange for Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, which were to go to Austria ; Prussia was to be conquered, and partitioned between Austria, Saxony, Sweden, the Elector Palatine, and Holland, Frederick being permitted to retain the lahds which were included in the Hohenzol- lern territory at the time of the Great Elector's accession. France agreed to pay an annual subsidy of about a million sterling so long as the war should last, and to set on foot an army of 100,000 men. She further contracted treaties with Bavaria, the Elector Palatine, and the Duke of Wlirtemberg, agreeing to pay large subsidies in return for the employment of troops against Frederick the Great. In ]\larch and Sep- tember 1757 conventions were signed between France and Sweden, in which Austria was included. By these treaties Sweden, still ruled by the aristocratic faction of the Hats, in spite of the efforts of Ulrica in 1756 to restore the royal power, engaged, in consideration for subsidies, to employ an army of 20,000 men in Pomerania against the King of Prussia. Her rival Denmark, governed by Frederick v. and his minister Count Bernsdorf, refused to join the league. The first Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1756, was conceived in a statesmanlike spirit ; the second Treaty, from the French 246 European History, 171 5-1 789 point of view, was a serious blunder. As Austria was unable to strike a blow at England, France should have concentrated all her energies upon the maritime and colonial war, and refused to take an activ^e part in the European struggle. The French, under the Due de Richelieu, had captured Minorca in May 1756, and their success in the Mediterranean should have been followed by a determined attack upon the naval power of Eng- land, whose conduct in laying a nominal blockade on all the French ports had excited the indignation of Europe. Machault, since he became Minister of Marine, had taken up the policy of Rouille, his predecessor from 1 749 to 1 754, and made strenu- ous endeavours to remedy the neglect of Maurepas, Minister of Marine from 1723 to 1749, and of Fleury ; and the seizure of Minorca bears witness to the success of his efforts. Neglect- ing, unfortunately for France, the advice of old Marshal Noailles and that of men like Machault and Comte d'Argenson, Louis XV. from the conclusion of the second Treaty of Versailles, the terms of which were unduly favourable to the Emperor, adopted a fatal line of pohcy. Satisfied with the hope of uniting to France a portion of the Austrian Netherlands, and of hamper- ing the EngHsh by the occupation of Hanover, the French king allowed himself to be dragged into a struggle for the annihilation of Prussia for the benefit of Austria, and plunged into the con- tinental war without receiving any quid pro quo from the astute Hapsburg Government. Apart from the enormous blunder of neglecting the struggle in America, Louis xv., before signing the treaty of 1757, should have entered into possession of the Austrian Netherlands. France would then have been in a posi- tion to secure compensation for her losses in the colonies, and, if necessary, to dictate terms to Austria and Prussia. In spite of the efforts of Bernis, Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 1757 to November 1758, the interests of France were subordinated to those of Austria, and French armies fought to regain Silesia for Maria Theresa. Louis xv. was not destined to add any portion of the Netherlands to his kingdom, and when at the end of the war Frederick the Great still held Silesia, and France was forced The Seveji Year's War 247 to acquiesce in her losses in North America and the West Indies and the overthrow of her influence in India, the real significance of the fatal policy adopted in 1757 was fully realised.^ In spite, however, of the unfortunate decision of the French Government to aid in the defence and extension of the Haps- burg provinces in Germany instead of making vigorous efforts to preserve the colonies of France, the treaty of 1757 need not necessarily have led to such overwhelmingly disastrous results had a close union between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid been effected, and had France, Austria, and Russia acted ener- geticallv and harmoniouslv in Germanv. The in- ro- IT-' ii' Failure of terests of Spam and France were closely connected France to and were opposed to those of England. In March ^^^"^"^^ ^h^. ^ '^ ° Co-operation 1755 Knyphausen, Frederick the Great's repre- of Spain, sentative at Paris, in answer to his master's letter ^'^^"^ ' expressing surprise that no close alliance subsisted between Ferdinand vi. and Louis xv., declared that the languid interest taken by the French Government with regard to Spain was in- conceivable. With the near approach of the Seven Years' War even the pacific Rouille, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in France from July 1754 to June 1757, saw the necessity of endeavouring to secure the Spanish alliance. Ferdinand vi. of Spain had in 1729 married Barbara, daughter of John v. of Portugal, a princess who exercised considerable influence over her husband, and who, accustomed to regard England as the ally of Portugal, was opposed to the outbreak of hostihties between the Courts of London and Madrid. Ferdinand him- self, a weak prince, influenced by his confessor Ravergo, the singer Farinelli, and the queen, was inclined to maintain peace, and, since the hasty conclusion of the prehminaries of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, had been opposed to any French alliance. In April 1754 Caravajal, who had been the first minister of Spain for twenty years, died, and though French influence was 1 For the history of the Diplomatic Revolution see Due de Broglie, V Alliance Autrichienne. 248 European History, 171 5-1 789 used to secure for the Marquis de la Ensenada the highest post in the Government, the efforts of Keene, the English ambassa- dor, succeeded in securing the appointment of General Wall, an Irishman by extraction and a friend of England, as Foreign — and practically first — Minister. Ensenada, who had en- deavoured to plunge Spain into a war with Great Britain, was exiled, and the French envoy, Duras, was replaced by Bernis, who shortly afterwards returned to France. All efforts on the part of Austria as well as of France failed to shake the deter- mination of the Spanish Court to observe a policy of neutrality during the Seven Years' War. The value of a Spanish alliance was appreciated by all the leading Powers. While Pitt seri- ously considered the advisability of offering the Spaniards Gibraltar and other concessions in return for their assistance in retaking Minorca, Maria Theresa appealed to the religious sentiments of Ferdinand and to the necessity of defending the orthodox faith against the attacks of heretics. Early in 1758 the Marquis d'Aubeterre, a diplomatist of some experience, was sent by Bernis, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, to second the appeal of Maria Theresa, to point out the dangers to the Cath- olic religion which would result from the supremacy of the King of Prussia, to play upon Wall's well-known attachment to the Stuarts, and finally to demand a close offensive and defensive aUiance, considerable subsidies, and the adhesion of Spain to a maritime league, including France, Sweden, and Denmark. In return for the accession of Spain to the Treaty of Versailles, France offered the Isle of Minorca. These efforts of Bernis throughout the year 1758 were not, however, crowned with suc- cess. The English sympathies of the queen and her influence over Ferdinand proved strong enough to maintain the neutrality of Spain, though the successes of the EngUsh in America roused the fears of the Spanish Government. Though during Ferdi- nand's reign the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of Spain had improved. Wall declared to d'Aubeterre that Spain was not in a position to advance the millions demanded, that a maritime union with Sweden and Denmark had little to recom- TJie Seven Years' War 249 mend it, and that Spain would confine herself to endeavouring to mediate a peace between France and England. Unable to secure an alliance with Spain, the success of Louis XV. 's pohcy in Europe, and that of Austria and Russia, de- pended upon the hearty union and mutual good faith of the allies. Louis xv., however, was unable to appreciate the vital necessity of eliminating all cause of suspicion and jealousy from the minds of Maria Theresa and Elizabeth of Russia, and his intrigues in Poland proved fatal to the successful p^.^^^^^ prosecution of the war in Europe. The objects of Policy in Austria, Russia, and France in the contest with Frederick the Great could only be carried out by the loyal co-operation of each of these Powers. IMutual confidence and united action were absolutely necessary for success. It was necessary that France should renounce her policy of inten-en- tion in Poland, that her agents should cease to intrigue at Warsaw against Russian influence, and that, in view of the wide issues at stake, every means should be taken to secure the confidence of the Tsarina Elizabeth. L'nfortunately, L ouis X V. never reaUsed the ^real import of the struggle in which France was engaged with England. The Treaty of Westmin- ster, followed by the disgrace of Conti, had for a time over- thro\\Ti his carefully prepared plans in Poland. But with the opening of the Seven Years' War Louis' interest in Poland revived, and he again began a series of attempts, by means of his secret diplomacy, to support the anti-Russian party at War- saw, and by so doing sacrificed the real interests of France to a futile attempt to maintain French influence in Poland. Ber- nis, bent on loyally supporting Russia and Austria in the attack on Prussia, struggled in vain to compel Broglie, who was still the French representative at Warsaw, to offer no opposition to Russia ; but, in consequence of a secret intimation from Louis, BrogUe ignored the official instructions, his house became the rendezvous of the Polish malcontents, and his opposition to the march of the Russian troops through Poland grew so violent that the Russian general, fearing an insurrection, advanced very cau- 250 European History, 171 5-1789 tiously, and thus enabled Frederick the Great to gain time for organising the defence of his kingdom. The year 1757, the most briUiant of Frederick the Great's Ufe was not only an epoch in the history of the relations be- The Battles tween France and Austria, it had momentous con- of Prague, scquences for the kingdom of Prussia. Preparations Gross'. were made by Frederick's enemies for a concerted jagersdorf. attack upon his dominions by Austrian, French, Russian, Swedish, and imperial armies. But the King of Prussia, imitating his tactics of the previous year, determined to adopt the offensive, and invade Bohemia. Browne and his troops retired before the advancing Prussians ; and at Prague accepted battle. , After a fierce engagement, in which Schwerin was killed, the main portion of the Austrian army was be- sieged in Prague. As at Pirna, Frederick's plans were again foiled by the stubborn resistance of the besieged arm.y. The approach of Daun with reinforcements decided Frederick to meet his new foe before he could approach Prague. With ordinary prudence on his own part and that of his generals, he might have defeated Daun and forced his enemies to submission. On the 1 8th of June Frederick was defeated at Kolin, prin- cipally owing to mistakes on the part of the Prussian generals which might easily have been prevented. Nearly 1.^,000 out of 32,000 Prussians were killed, the siege of Prague was raised, and Frederick was forced to retire from Bohemia. His plans were all shattered, and he learnt that he was not invincible. Before the end of the year, however, he had broken up the hostile combination formed against him, and had avenged Kolin. The immediate consequences of his defeat had been serious for Prussia. The imperial army hastened to make arrangements for a combined movement in North Germany with a French force, which, under d'Estr^es, marched against the Duke of Cumberland, won the battle of Hastenbeck, and, under the Due de Richeheu, the successor of d'Estrees, ex- tracted from the Duke of Cumberland the Convention of TJie Seven Years War 251 Klosterseven. On the 30th of June the Russians, under Apraksin, crossed the border, took Memel, and on the 30th of August defeated Lewald at Gross-Jagersdorf, while the Swedes declared war, and, using Stralsund as a base of operations, invaded Pomerania. Had it not been for Apraksin's connec- tion with the party of the Russian heir Peter, and his wife Catherine, who were opposed to the overthrow of Frederick the Great, and had it not been for the extreme caution of the victorious Daun, the battles of Gross-Jagersdorf and Kolin would have proved fatal to the Prussian cause. Apraksin re- mained on the defensive in his camp, and in spite of the ad- vice of Loudon, the excessive prudence and over-confidence of Daun and Prince Charles, threw away an opportunity of strik- ing a decisive blow at the weakened Prussian army. Though on the 1 6th of October an Austrian force entered Berlin, and though Austrian troops occupied Silesia, no combined move- ment was arranged by the allies. Apraksin, hearing that the Tsarina was seriously ill, and being, moreover, with Bestuzhev, the Russian Chancellor, a member of the party of which the Grand Duchess was a leading spirit, retired into winter quar- ters in Courland with his Cossacks ; the Enghsh Government repudiated the Convention of Klosterseven, and requested Frederick to make Ferdinand of Brunswick general of an army which Pitt was prepared to place in the field. Encouraged by these favourable circumstances Frederick advanced to meet the united French and imperial forces which, under Soubise and the Prince of Hildburghausen, were threatening Saxony. Early in 1757 two of Louis' ablest ministers, the Comte d'Argenson and ]\Iachault, had been dismissed. Both had opposed French inten-ention in Germany, and were desirous of saving the colonies. The former's experience and admin- istrative capacity would have proved valuable during the Seven Years' War. His fall was due to an attempt to bring about the dismissal of Madame de Pompadour, and thus France was served during these eventful years by a succession of incapable ministers of war and marine. 252 European History, 171 5-1789 On the 5 th of November Frederick the Great won a decisive victory at Rossbach, inflicting heavy loss on the enemy, break- ^^ „. insf up the imperial army, and forcing the French The Victory => r V J J Q of Rossbach, to rccross the Rhine Nov. 5, 1757. rpj^^ victory of Rossbach had far-reaching effects. While in England the enthusiasm for the Prussian cause showed itself in bonfires and the despatch of reinforcements, in Germany the battle was regarded as a national triumph over the French. The German people henceforward looked upon Frederick the Great as a national hero. Rossbach, like Mollwitz, revealed to Europe the strength and vigour of the young Prussian king- dom. It was, in Napoleon's opinion, the cause of the overthrow of the French Bourbons in 1792. To Frederick Rossbach was important simply as enabling him to attempt to drive the Aus- trians out of Silesia. Schweidnitz had fallen, and Charles of Lorraine, having defeated Bevern, had captured Breslau and Liegnitz. Without a decisive victory Silesia was as good as lost. With characteristic appreciation of the position of affairs Frederick resolved to stake all upon a battle. On the 5th of ^^ „ , , December, iust a month after Rossbach, the mem- The Battle of ' -' . . Leuthen, orable battle of Leuthen was fought, which was in Dec. 5, 1757. j|.gg|f sufficient to place Frederick in the rank of the greatest generals. The Prussian movements had been entirely misunderstood by Prince Charles and Daun, and the battle proved to be an admirable illustration of Frederick's ' oblique order ' of attack. In three hours the Prussian army of some 30,000 had totally defeated So, 000 Austrians. Silesia was re- covered with the exception of Schweidnitz, and the year 1 75 7 closed with a remarkable page of militar)^ history added to the annals of Germany. The opening of 1758, a year which affords excellent illus- trations of Frederick's skill in marches and manoeuvres, saw Pitt and several important modifications in the plans and thecYeat attitudes of the various combatants. Rossbach and 1758- Leuthen had indeed saved Frederick from destruc- tion, but his position was still very precarious. He could at The Seven Years War 253 anv rate count on Ensflish assistance. With unhesitating: de- cision Pitt expressed the enthusiasm of his countrymen when in April he made a new subsidy treaty with Prussia by which the Hanoverian army was taken into EngHsh pay and a treaty of alHance signed which provided for the payment of ^670,000 a year to the Prussian king. Though recognising the errors made by the French in not directing all their energies to the colonial and maritime war with England, Pitt thus resolved, while concentrating his principal efforts on the extension of England's colonial empire, to subsidise foreign troops for the defence of Hanover and the support of Frederick. America was to be won for England in Germany. Maria Theresa's hope of a neutral Hanover was destroyed, and the French hopes of wringing concessions from George 11. in the colonies in exchange for the security of Hanover were doomed to disappointment. By the end of March Ferdinand of Brunswick had cleared Germany of the French, and Hanover was safe. Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had already proved himself a capable general in the Austrian Succession War, was the brother of Charles, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenblittel from _ , ... Ferdinand of 1735 to 1780, who had married Philippa Charlotte, Brunswick sister of Frederick the Great ; while of his own ^"'^ ^""'°'- sisters, one, Elizabeth Christine, had married the Prussian king ; another, the latter's brother Augustus WiUiam ; and a third, Frederick v., King of Denmark. Charles fought for Prussia dur- ing the Seven Years' War, and on his death was succeeded by his son, Charles William Ferdjnand, who was defeated at Jena. Though England remained at peace with Russia and sent no fleet to the Baltic, there is little doubt that the English alliance, following the failure of the French at Rossbach, proved of incalculable value to the Prussian king. He had not only broken through the ring of his foes, but had destroyed all danger for the time from France and from the imperial army. Though Belleisle became, in July 1758, war minister in France, and remained in office till his death in January 1761, suc- cessful military operations were impossible owing to the in- 254 European History, 1 71 5-1 789 capacity of the French generals and the disorganisation of the armies. During 1758 Frederick had only two enemies to deal with, Austria and Russia. Elizabeth, as hostile as ever, was roused by the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, superseded Apraksin in favour of Fermor, a Russian general of English origin, who had distinguished himself in the Turkish war of 1736-39, and the Chancellor Bestuzhev in favour of Woronzov, an Austrian partisan, and the Russian army was set in motion in the depth of the winter. In January East Prussia was occupied by 31,000 men. Konigsberg, Thorn, and Elbing having been captured and Kiistrin besieged, no attack on Frederick's forces could take place before the summer, when the main Russian army was expected. Though the French and Austrian arms had failed, their diplomacy at St. Petersburg had succeeded ; the Grand Duke Peter and his wife, Catherine, ceased for a time to exercise any influence in Russian politics, a close correspondence between Louis xv. and Elizabeth was opened, and a direct alliance between France and Russia was dis- cussed. In the spring of 1758, Frederick, in opposition to the opin- ion of several of his advisers, determined again to take the of- The Siege fcusivc and attack Austria before the Russians of oimiitz. arrived. Leaving in Bohem.ia Daun, who. Prince Charles having retired, was now supreme, he retoolT Schweid- nitz and boldly advanced into Moravia, intending to take Oi- miitz and threaten Vienna. The capture of Oimiitz would at once be followed by the withdrawal of Austrian troops from Bohemia. The siege began on the 27th of May, and was con- ducted with great vigour. As time went on the situation de- veloped many points of similarity with the situation before Prague in 1757. On each occasion a powerful army was hard by threatening Frederick's communications. In 1758, however, Loudon, by his military qualities, had acquired a certain amount of influence; on July 26, 1757, ^e had been promoted to the rank of major-general, and was in a position to interfere seriously The Seven Yeai's' War 255 with Frederick's plans. Belonging to an old Scottish family, Loudon had seen service in Russia wqth Munich. Having been refused a commission by Frederick the Great, he entered the Austrian service, and proved to be, in all the qualities neces- sary for a successful general, only second to Eugene. Had he, and not Prince Charles or Daun commanded, the fortunes of Austria in the Seven Years' War might have had very different results. As it was, he remained the most for- midable enemy Frederick had ever met, and the failure of the siege of Olmiitz was due to his energy and resource. Seven weeks after the opening of the siege he captured, in spite of the bravery of the Prussian troops, an important Loudon convoy of 3000 w^agons, and compelled Frederick ^^'^^^ *J^^ on the ist of July to raise the siege. With the oimiitz. Prussian king's failure Loudon's reputation was made, and he was promoted to the rank of field-marshal-lieutenant. The rest of the year was no less remarkable in the history of the militar}' operations of the war. Frederick's retreat from Olmiitz through Bohemia into Silesia was a ^, „ ^ The Battle of masterpiece ; his defence of Brandenburg from a Zomdorf, Russian invasion illustrated his energy and resolu- "^' ^^' ^^^ tion. The Russians had occupied East Prussia and Poland, and, ravaging and murdering as they went, were threatening northern Germany. Frederick advanced to Frankfort-on-the- Oder, formed a junction with Count Dohna, and fought the battle of Zorndorf on the 25th of August. Never had so bloody a battle been seen between Teuton and Slav. No quarter was given, and with savage fury and stubborn deter- mination the struggle raged for some ten hours. The brilHant conduct of the Prussian cavalry under Zeidlitz, and the dogged courage of the Russians, are the only interesting features of :i battle which, as the day wore on, resolved itself into a hand-to-hand encounter between opposing forces in utter and hopeless confusion. Though in itself indecisive. Zorndorf proved to be a victory for the Prussians. While 11,500 Prussians were killed, the 256 European History, 171 5-1789 Russian losses amounted to 21,000 men, 100 cinnons, and 30 flags, and after a few days Fermor retired in good order into Poland, and gave up all idea of co-operating with the Swedes. Though Brandenburg was safe, a fresh attack had been ar- ranged at Vienna. Daun, assisted by the army of the Empire under the Duke of Zweibriicken, was to crush Prince Henry and retake Dresden, while another Austrian army under De- ville and Harsch was to enter Silesia and besiege Neisse. The chief efforts of the Austrians were directed against Saxony, and on the 5 th of September General Maguire seized Sonnenstein, overlooking Pirna. With extraordinary rapidity the Prussian king returned to Dresden, in time to disconcert Daun's combination and to force the Austrians to adopt defen- sive tactics. Frederick's position was a strong one ; but he threw away his advantage by advancing against Daun, who com- manded an army of twice his strength, and, with headstrong obstinacy and overweening confidence, by encamping in a position inferior to the Austrian position, and completely commanded by the Austrian army. On the 14th of October Daun, reahsing his opportunity, attacked and defeated the Prussians at Hochkirchen, but, The Defeat owing to his extraordinary cautiousness, gained no of Frederick advantages from his victory. With surprising kirchen, boMucss Frederick, by forced marches, compelled Oct. 14, 1758. Harsch to raise the sieges of Neisse and Kosel and to retire into Bohemia, and then returning with equal rapidity into Saxony, saved Dresden from all danger from Daun, and forced him to cross the frontier. Elsewhere fortune favoured the Prussian cause. Though Cleves and Hesse remained in the hands of the French, and East Prussia was within the Russian grasp, England had gained colonial successes against the French. Fermor's invasion of Brandenburg had been pre- vented, Daun had retired into Bohemia, leaving Saxony and Silesia in Frederick's hands, and a Swedish attack on Pom- erania had been repulsed. In western Germany Ferdinand of Brunswick had cleared The Seven Years' Wcir 257 Hanover, and at Krefeld, on the 23d of June, had defeated and driven across the Rhine one French army under the command of the Comte de Clermont, who had superseded Ferdinand of the Due de RicheUeu. Ruremonde and Dender- Brunswick monde were lost, Ferdinand held the Westphalian Germany^" bishoprics, and Clermont, whose defeat, in spite of '" ^758- his own incapacity, had been mainly due to the undisciplined and miserable condition in which Richelieu had left his forces, was replaced by the ]Marquis de Contades. The efforts of Madame de Pompadour were forthwith di- rected to strengthening the army of the Maine, which under her friend Soubise took Cassel, while the advanced guard under de BrogHe defeated a German contingent at Sonders- hausen on the 23d of July. To check this advance of the French, Ferdinand of Brunswick, reinforced by 12,000 English troops, abandoned his pursuit of Contades, and met the army of Soubise at Lutterberg, near Cassel. There on the 7th of October, owing to the vigour of Chevert, who had in the pre- vious war distinguished himself at Prague, Soubise won a small success, which, however, proved of little benefit to the French. In spite of the French occupation of Cassel, of the failure of the English expedition to St. Malo and Cherbourg, and not- withstanding the Russian occupation of eastern Prussia and Prussia, Frederick the Great had so far success- JL^f "f ^ ^* , ^ the close of fully resisted the attacks of his numerous foes. 1758. It was obvious at the close of 1758 that only by a close and harmonious union between Russia, Austria, and France could the overthrow of the King of Prussia be effected. In 1758 such a close union seemed impossible ; for France, defeated on the continent and at sea, with her coasts blockaded, and her communications with her colonies destroyed, and having, more- over, lost Louisburg and Fort Duquesne — the line of junction between Canada and the Mississippi being effectually cut — was powerless to give any effective aid to the Courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. The disorganisation of her admin- istration, the incapacity of her Government, and her utter PERIOD VI. R 55 WEST GEEMA>(Y 1756-1763. ^JUTLAND T'^^^^^ Copenhagen JCHLESVV HOL STEIN tiibeeko' IfambuVg -... DUCHY MECKLEN ELT or ' itANovER •: ■•. Altmark NCONl SX ...,,...•. ;••.;••••■. I UPPER \ TV ■•-. Jl ; vi^ I 5>,>„ the chief theatre of the war. Followed by two Austrian armies under Daun and Lacy, Frederick, who on hearing of Fouquet's danger had immediately bestirred himself, threw himself into the province, but after hearing of his general's surrender he turned and attempted to take Dresden. Baffled, he rushed again into Silesia, and before the Austrian armies could unite he defeated Loudon at the battle of Liegnitz on the 15th of August. The slowness, caution, and incapacity of 1 Albert Vandal, Louis XV. et Elizabeth de Rusiie. TJie Seven Years War 269 Daun and Lacy had saved Frederick from destruction. But in spite of the unwiUingness of Maria Theresa and the Aulic Council to recognise the futihty of directing mihtary opera- tions from Vienna, and the necessity of placing Loudon in the chief command, the Austrian armies, if well led, were still capable of winning victories. Though Czernitcheff recrossed the Oder, and the Austrians in Silesia were checked, Frederick remained in a very precarious position. A corps of Austrians and Russians under Lacy and Totleben raided Berhn, while the Austrian troops occupied Saxony. Frederick's return from Silesia was followed by his attack on Daun at Torgau on the 3d of November. After a fierce struggle, in which Daun was wounded, the Austrians were defeated, and having, it is said, lost 20,000 men, retired upon Dresden ; while Frederick, hav- ing regained the greater part of Saxony, though at the cost of 14,000 men, wintered at Leipsic. The last pitched battle of the war had been fought ; Saxony, with the exception of Dresden, which was still held by ]NLiguire, was left in the possession of the Prussians ; the Austrians had, owing to the genius of Frederick and the caution of Daun, merely con- quered Landshut and the country of Glatz ; and the remaining military operations were, in Carlyle's words, Mike a race be- tween spent horses.' In western Germany and in the colonies the French had gained no signal advantage. The Due de Broglie, who, aided by the Comte de Saint-Germain, had introduced reforms into the army, had indeed won a success at Corbach, and had reoccupied Hesse-Cassel, while the hereditary Prince of Brunswick had been defeated at Kloster- Campen by the Marquis de Castries ; but Ferdinand of Bruns- wick's strategy proved sufficient for the defence of Westphalia and Hanover, and by the battle of Warburg, which was won mainly by the English cavalry, he checked the French advance. In America, after some small successes, the capitulation of Mon- treal on the 8th of September completed the loss of Canada, and Louisiana alone remained to France of all her American possessions. In India Eyre Coote had defeated the French at 270 European History^ 17 15-1789 the battle of Wandewash on the 22d of January 1760, and, aftei capturing the smaller French forts, besieged Pondicherry in September. On the 26th of January 1761 Pondicherry fell, and the French dominion in India came to an end. The year 1761 was marked by the failure of renewed efforts to bring about peace, by the exhaustion of the combatants in Germany, by the fall of Pitt, and by a last attempt of Choiseul to restore the French fortunes. Finding that his efforts to bring about peace were not successful, he had resigned the direction of foreign affairs early in 1761, and became ^Minister of War and Marine. In this capacity he made strenuous efforts to improve the condition of the French fleet. All classes united to aid Choiseul in his attempts to defend the country, and new ships were ordered to be built, these efforts being an earnest of the minister's work of reorganisation from 1763 onwards. Choiseul had indeed induced Austria and Russia to consent to negotiations at Augsburg, but his wishes met with Httle support from the former Power ; the congress led to no result, and the war continued in a desultory manner. Loudon and Buturlin respectively commanded the Austrian and Russian forces in Silesia, but their quarrels enabled Frederick to hold his own till the I St of October, when Loudon, by a sudden and unex- pected movement, captured Schweidnitz, and Silesia and Glatz were occupied by Austrian and Russian armies. In eastern Pomerania Russian troops, under Rumiantsov, reduced Kolberg on the ist of December, and though they failed to take Stettin, they remained in occupation of the surrounding country. Only in western Europe was the Prussian cause successful. There Ferdinand of Brunswick successfully repulsed at Villingshausen an attempt of the incapable Soubise and the jealous de Broglie, at the head of 16,000, to advance into Westphalia and Hanover. D'Estr^es replaced de Broglie, while Conti succeeded Soubise, with little advantage to the French cause. The capture of Dominica, Belleisle, and Pondicherry were further blows to the French cause, and Choiseul realised that the complete annihila- tion of the French naval power could alone satisfy Pitt. The Seven Years War 271 Conscious that the Austrian aUiance was of httle use to France, and finding that the separate negotiations which had been opened between England and France in June were opposed by Pitt, he naturally turned to Spain, whose king, Charles in., inspired by a deep resentment of long standing against England, was burning with indignation at certain high- handed acts of the English. On the 27th of August 1758 Queen Barbara died; her in- consolable husband shut himself up, became seriously ill, and a period of governmental anarchy super\'ened. during which the possibility of making Elizabeth Famese regent was at one time discussed. The death of Ferdinand vi.. on tlie 24th of August 1759, put an end to the confusion in Spain, and his half-brother, the famous Don Carlos, king of the Two Sicihes, ascended the Spanish throne as Charles in. The new king, the ^^^^ Acces- eldest son of Elizabeth Farnese and Philip v., was sion of born in 1716, and in 1739 had married Maria of Spain, Amelia, sister of Maria Josepha, the Dauphiness, ^759- and daughter of Augustus in.. King of Poland and Saxony. Endowed with natural advantages both of mind and body, Charles in., after receiving an excellent education, had developed the qualities most necessary for a king. Imbued with the love of justice and with a sense of his royal responsibihties, he had during his reign in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies devoted himself with assiduitv to the amelioration of the lot of his sub- jects. Aided by his able minister Tanucci, brigandage was severely repressed, the privileges of the barons were curtailed, many ecclesiastical rights were abolished and others were care- fully restrained, industry and manufactures were encouraged. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle it had been provided that if Don Carlos became King of Spain, and Don Philip King of Naples, Parma and Guastalla should revert to Austria, and the greater part of the Duchy of Piacenza to the King of Sardinia. After much negotiation, it was settled that Charles iii. should be allowed to leave his kingdom of the Two Sicilies to his son Ferdinand rv., and that Don Philip should remain in his duchy, 2/2 European History, 171 5-1789 and that the claims of the King of Sardinia should be compen- sated for by a sum of money. The Austrian Court, still bent on strengthening its friendship with the Bourbons, consolidated the Austro-Spanish alliance by the marriages of the Archdukes Joseph and Leopold to the daughters of Don Phihp and Charles iii. respectively. After leaving his son Ferdinand rv. in possession of the Two Sicilies, Charles had, on his arrival in Spain, found that kingdom in a state of disorganisation, and completely unpre- pared to take part in any warlike operations. The realisation of the true position of Spain, together with the representations of Wall, then as ever opposed to war, and the influence of the Queen, checked the anti-English tendencies of Charles. ^^ ^ ., But on the death of Maria Amelia Charles chanejed The Family ° Compact of his attitude, determined to exclude the English ug- 15. 17 I- fj-om the commerce of central America, and to recover Gibraltar. He accordingly listened to the French proposals for united action against the House of Braganza, in order to withdraw the attention of the English from Germany, and to strike a blow at England's commerce with Portugal. The Marquis of Grimaldi, a Genoese by birth, and whose rise had been due to the influence of Ensenada, was sent to Paris, and on August 15, 1761, a Family Compact between Spain and France was signed, Choiseul hoping, with some plausibility, to form within the Franco- Austrian alliance a union 'of all the Bourbon Powers which should be capable of holding its own against England. This agreement, to which the Bourbon Princes of Parma and Naples were to be admitted, consisted (i) of a Family Compact which established in a general manner and on a per- manent basis the relations of the two monarchies ; and (2) of a special convention relating to the Seven Years' War, in ac- cordance with which Charles iii. engaged to declare war upon England on May i, 1762, if at that date peace was not already concluded, and France promised to hand over Minorca to the Spaniards on the day that Spain declared war. The Seven Years' War 273 Choiseul's name will ever be connected with the Family Compact. The necessity of united action on the part of the Bourbons of France and Spain against the predominance of England in America and her naval supremacy had been realised by Louis xiv. The dynastic exigencies of the Regent Orleans, followed by the timorous and short-sighted policy of Fleur)' and his successors, had relegated commercial and colonial matters to the background, with the result that the navy was neglected and star\'ed, and the ruin of the French commerce and colonies rendered certain in the event of a war with Eng- land. Choiseul recognised clearly the defects of the poHcy of his predecessors, and the value of the Spanish alliance was strikingly evidenced during the war between England and her American colonies. At first, however, no beneficial results attended the states- manlike action of Choiseul. The union of France and Spain, coming as it did when France was exhausted and Spain un- prepared, ended in fresh disasters to the former and serious losses to the latter Power.^ Pitt, suspecting with reason the existence of this treaty, was anxious for an immediate declaration of war against Spain. But a change had come over the aspect of affairs in England. George 11. had died on the 25th of October 1760, and his successor George iii. made Bute one of the Secretaries of State. Bute headed a party desirous of making peace, mainly in order to get rid of Pitt and to break up the Whig party. Find- ing his policy was not approved of by the Cabinet, y&w of Pitt Pitt resigned on the 5th of October, and thus ended '^^^ ^ar the splendid administration which raised England England to a position of first-rate importance in Europe, ^^^ Spain, and firmly established her colonial empire. Under the in- fluence of Bute, who named himself Prime Minister on the retirement of Newcastle, Parhament did not renew the annual 1 See La Diplomatie de Louis XV. et Le Facte de Famille, par Andre Soulange-Boden. PERIOD VI. S 2/4 Europea^i History, 171 5-1789 subsidy to Prussia, and though Bute found himself compelled to declare war on Spain in January 1762, and to repel the invasion of Portugal, he continued to endeavour to abandon all continental connections, and to procure peace at any price. The fall of Pitt had dealt what seemed to be a very serious blow to the fortunes of Frederick the Great, who found him- self at the end of 176 1 in a weakened and exhausted condition, exposed to the fierce hostility of the Tsarina, and deprived of the support of England. Though the efforts of the alhes to crush Frederick had so far failed in their object, Prussia at the close of 1761 seemed to all but her king in a well-nigh hopeless position. But if Frederick had only 60,000 men left, his enemies were also in an exhausted condition. The Tsarina's end was fast Death of approaching. Each day the situation in France Russi^rjan! became more serious. At Vienna the want of 5, 1762. money necessitated the discharge of some 20,000 soldiers ; while the absence of harmony among the generals, the quarrels of the ministers, the weak health of the Emperor, and the feeling of general discouragement at the failure of the last campaign, rendered Maria Theresa wilhng to consider peace proposals. It is doubtful, even if the war had dragged on its course for another year, if the exhausted coalition, in face of his extraordinary exertions, could have crushed the Prussian king. The death of the Tsarina on the 5th of January 1762, however, at once turned the scale in favour of Prussia, and Peter iii., whose admiration of Frederick was of long standing, not only on the 5th of May made peace with Fred- erick and restored all the conquered territories, but a month later made, on the 8th of June, an offensive and defensive alHance with Prussia, and ordered Czernitcheff to lead his troops against the Austrians in Silesia. Some justification for the violent change of poHcy is to be found in the fact that, though Russia seemed to be renouncing the fruits of her endurance and victories, the war from which she was gaining little was a constant drain to her in men and money. The Seven Years' War 275 The Swedes followed suit, and on the 2 2d of May made the Peace of Hamburg and withdrew from the war. Frederick's hinds were freed to attack the Austrians in Silesia, and the imperial army which was united to an Austrian contingent under Serbelloni and Stollberg in Saxony. In Silesia Daun, who resumed the command in May, attempted to defend Schweidnitz, and a lengthy series of manceuvres began. Before any engagement took place, a revolution took place at St. Petersburg. Peter's first measures on attaining the throne had been calculated to increase his popularity. The state prisons were opened, and Munich, Biren, Lestocq, and many others returned from Siberia. The Secret Chancery of the late Tsarina was abolished, and the law of Peter the Revolution Great, compelling all members of the aristocracy to in Russia. take some civil employment, was repealed. But the pefe^i°i Tsar's attempt to interfere with the property of the Accession of Church by a measure of confiscation was premature, and his endeavour to introduce into the army, and especially among the guards, a severe system of discipline, roused the discontent of the soldiers. His German propensities did not commend themselves to the Russian people, and a proposed expedition against Denmark for the conquest of Schleswig met with general disapproval. His wife Catherine headed a party which included the Orlovs and Potemkin, and a plot was formed for the overthrow of the Tsar. On the 8th of July the revolution, which was bloodless and over in two hours, took place. Peter iii., who abdicated on the 9th of July, died on July 19, and his successor, his wife Catherine, though confirm- ing the peace with Frederick, withdrew Czernitcheff and his forces. Before, however, the Russians actually retired, Fred- erick defeated the Austrian's at Burkersdorf on the 21st of July, but it was not till the 9th of October that he succeeded in taking Schweidnitz. He then returned to Saxony, where Prince Henry, whom Frederick declared was the only general who made no mistake in the war, had defeated the combined imperial and Austrian army at Freiburg — the last engagement 276 Eicropean History, 171 5-1 789 of the Seven Years' War — had taken Bamberg and Nuremberg, and forced the Diet of Ratisbon to declare its neutrality. The siege of Dresden was not attempted, and the last campaign of the Seven Years' War ended in truces with Daun and Serbelloni. English Meanwhile England was throughout 1762 winning Successes. signal succcsses against France and Spain. Mar- tinique was taken in February 1762, followed by the submission of the lesser French islands, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and the abandonment of Louisiana; on the 13th of August, Havannah, the key of the Spanish West Indian possessions, capitulated after a gallant defence, while in the East Indies, Manilla, the capital of the Philippines, was seized. In the west of Germany English interests were no less secure ; for Ferdinand of Brunswick, showing as usual his high qualities as a general, took the aggressive against d'Estr^es and Soubise, and regained Cassel. Equally successful was the English defence of its old ally Portugal against the attack of the Spanish Bourbons, who hoped to force it into hostiUties with Great Britain. Though the Portuguese lost their colony of Sacra- mento, the invasion of Portugal by the Franco-Spanish army was checked by the despatch in 1762 of 8000 English troops to Lisbon. As in 1 7 13, the exigencies of the party in power interfered with the general interests of England. Bute determined to The Peace ^ud the war, hastened on the negotiations, took of Paris. \\\.\\q account of the late successes, and on Novem- ber 3, 1 762, the preHminaries of peace were signed at Fontaine- bleau. North America passed into the hands of England ; the French retaining fishing rights round Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, at a distance of three leagues from the shore, as well as the two small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland. England restored the islands of Guadaloupe, Marie- Galante, de la Desirade, Martinique, and St. Lucia ; but kept St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica, and Grenada. Goree was restored to France (the English keeping Senegal) , and Minorca and Belleisle were exchanged ; the TJie Seven Years War 277 French evacuated their conquests in Germany, and the Enghsh army was withdrawn from the continent, both Powers agreeing to retire from the continental war. In India the French received back their factories, but they were not allowed to have any military establishments. They also undertook to restore Dunkirk to its condition before the Treaty of Aix-la- Chapelle in 1748. Spain was forced to make considerable concessions. She acknowledged the right of the English to cut logwood in Honduras Bay, provided the Enghsh destroyed their fortifications erected there. All claim to the Newfound- land fishing was renounced, and Florida was ceded to England. In return for these losses, and for the inabiUty of the French to restore Minorca, she received from France New Orleans and all Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and from England Havannah and the ports of Cuba, which had been conquered. After the preliminaries had been signed, the Philippines and Manilla, captured during the peace negotiations, were restored, the latter on the understanding that a ransom of half a million sterling, arranged by the inhabitants of Manilla to save their property from plunder, should be paid by the Spanish Govern- ment. With regard to Portugal, all conquests in the Portuguese colonies were to be restored by Spain, and the Spanish and French troops withdrawn from Portuguese territories. Though England came triumphantly out of the war, Bute's anxiety to hurry on the peace, and his carelessness when draw- ing up its provisions, proved detrimental to English interests, and deprived England of many advantages due to her briUiant and successful efforts. Though, in view of the accession of Peter in., and of the outbreak of the Spanish war, Bute may have been justified in withdrawing the English subsidies from Frederick the Great, there is no room for doubt that during the negotiations he attempted to favour Austria at the expense of the Prussian king. Bute's foreign policy was very unpopular at home, roused a deep hatred on the part of Frederick towards the Court of St. James, and left England without allies and isolated in Europe. 2/8 Europeafi History, 171 5-1 789 On the loth of February 1763 the definitive treaty between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, was signed at Paris ; The Treat ^^^ ^^ Peace of Hubcrtsburg, between Austria, of Huberts- Prussia, and Saxony, on the 15th of the same '^^^' month. By this treaty matters were restored to their position before the war. Maria Theresa renounced her pretensions to the territory ceded to Prussia after the first Silesian war ; she agreed to restore the county and town oi Glatz, and the fortresses of Wesel and Gelders, which had been held by France. By two secret articles Frederick promised to give his vote for the election of the x'\rchduke Joseph as King of the Romans, and undertook to forward the marriage of one of the Archdukes to a Princess of Modena. To Augustus III. Frederick promised to evacuate the Electorate, to restore the archives, and to renev/ the Treaty of Dresden. The political results of the Seven Years' War were consider- able. The territorial increase of the possessions and the mari- Resuits of time preponderance of England placed her in the the War. front rank of European nations, and at the head of colonising Powers. Prussia and Russia had established their claims to be considered as the equals of France, Austria, and Spain : and Germany was destined to be, till the present day, the field of a struggle between the Courts of Berlin and Vienna for the leadership in Germany. Austria, though exhausted by the war, had proved herself a worthy antagonist of -Frederick. Had Austrian generals not been hampered by the necessity of consulting the Council of War at Vienna before undertaking any serious enterprise, and had Loudon and not the incapable Charles of Lorraine or Daun commanded, the struggle between Frederick and Maria Theresa might have resulted in the res- toration of Silesia to Austria. For France and Spain the war had brought disasters. The alliance between France and Austria remained hateful to the French nation, till the Giron- dists, backed by pubhc opinion, overthrew it in 1792. To the fatal policy of which the Treaty of Versailles of 1757 is ' an illustration, and to the influence of Madame de Pompadoui The Seven Years' War 279 and the secret diplomacy of Louis xv., was due the humilia- tion of France which the efforts of Choiseul had been unable to avert. While Frederick the Great, Loudon, Wolfe, Hawke, and Montcalm had among others distinguished themselves by their achievements by land or by sea, William Pitt, and in a lesser degree Choiseul, had exhibited statesmanHke qualities for the benefit of their respective countries. To Pitt's energy, foresight, and determination, and skill in the selection of subordinates, Eng- land owed much of her success ; while owing to Choiseul's ap- preciation of the disastrous nature of the Treaty of 1757, and to his conclusion of the Family Compact, France was given, after 1763, a last opportunity of setting her house in order, and, by salutary reforms, of averting a revolutionary crisis. After the close of the Seven Years' War, the union: of the Bourbon Powers was confirmed and strengthened by the necessity not only of opposing England, but also of offering a united resist- ance to the pretensions of the Jesuit Order. CHAPTER X THE FALL OF THE JESUITS 1759-1773 Europe in the Middle of the Eighteenth Century — Catherine II. — Frederick the Great — Other Enlightened Princes — France and Spain — Charles III. and his Ministers — Enlightened Statesmen — Struensee in Denmark — Pombal in Portugal — Italian Reformers — Many of the Reforms Epheme- ral — The Jesuit Order — Attacks on the Jesuits in Portugal — The Expul- sion of the Jesuits from France — Charles III. and the Jesuits — The Papal Resistance — The Conclave of 1769. Election of Clement XIV. — The Suppression of the Jesuit Order. The Seven Years' War was an attempt on the part of Austria and Russia to destroy Prussia ; it was the turning-point in the Europe in great colonial struggle between England and France, the Middle The policy of Russia and Austria was characteristic teenth ' of the eighteenth century, and closely resembled Century. ^-j^g^j- ^f Prussia and France at the opening of the Austrian Succession War, and that of Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the partition of Poland. Solemn treaties carried no weight ; national boundaries and race limits were held to be of no importance ; the condition of the labouring classes was little considered. Jealousy and suspicion marked the deaUngs of states with each other ; corruption and venality characterised the official relations of countries ; secret di- plomacy was widespread. Adventurers were found in every Court; spies inundated each European capital. Atheism was rampant, the financial condition of every country was rotten, and self-interest was the only guiding motive. 280 The Fall of the Jesuits 281 Europe in 1763 seemed to be in a state of decadence, with no fixed religious beliefs, no sound principles. But though the idea of nationality was absent from the councils of Europe, and though the hope of sharing in a partition of a country was the only incentive potent enough to bring countries into alliance, there were' in the middle of the century some signs of better things. Europe was governed by a number of benevo- lent despots, who, either in person or by means of their minis- ters, worked for the benefit of the people over whom they ruled. While with them the omnipotence of the state was ever}'thing, it was recognised that government existed for the good of the people. Reforms were good in themselves, but all reforms were to come from the king, and no interference with his power was allowed. Many of the rulers of European countries between 1740 and 1789 were actuated by benevolent ideas, and many of their ministers proved unselfish adminis- trators. Catherine 11. and Frederick the Great 1 r 1 /- ■ 1 r X 1 1 Catherine II. were, before the reformmg days of Joseph 11., the most prominent of the enlightened despots. Both were tyran- nical, both prided themselves on their Hberal tendencies. In the early years of her reign Catherine posed as a reformer. She called an assembly in 1767, in order to secure its assist- ance in dealing with national grievances, and with the codifica- tion of the Russian law. Affected by the French liberal doctrines professed by Montesquieu and Voltaire, she at- tempted to combine despotism with a care for her subjects. She checked torture, she studied sympathetically the condi- tion of the peasants. The Church became entirely subordi- nate to the state, and the poHcy of Peter the Great and Peter III. was thus carried out. But though undoubtedly full of grand aspirations, and in the earlier years of her reign anxious to carry out beneficial reforms, she was unable to effect much. In the first place, like Joseph 11., she interfered in every department of national life, and persistently attempted to force modern civilisation upon a country backward, half Asiatic, and corrupt. It was sought, says S(^gur, ' to create at the same 282 European History, 1 71 5-1 789 time a third estate, to attract foreign commerce, to establish all kinds of manufactures, to extend agriculture, to increase paper money, to raise the exchanges, to reduce the rate of interest, to found cities, to people deserts, to cover the Black Sea with a new navy, to conquer one neighbour and circum- vent another, and finally to extend Russian influence all over Europe.' And a further cause of her failure as a reformer is to be found in her autocratic instincts, which made her impa- tient of opposition and rapidly converted her government into a cruel tyranny. She found that on the corrupt Rus- sian soil her schools, her system of justice, and her press could not flourish. The partition of Poland, and the rising of the serfs under Pougatchef, had the efl'ect of encouraging her absolutist ideas and checking her hberal tendencies. Though it has been said that '■ before the death of Catherine, the great mass of the monuments of her reign were mere ruins,' it re- mains true that Russia under her rule was established as a great European Power, and that the material and intellectual progress of the country made rapid strides. With Frederick the Great, similarly, his benevolent inten- tions were outweighed by his despotic tendencies. Like Cathe- Frederick ^iue he afl'ccted to be influenced by French ideas, the Great. ^cci^ \^q Catherine he admitted the Jesuits when they were suppressed by Clement xrv. But his ruling motive was expediency, and he had little regard for international law or for the maxims of justice. While anxious for the welfare of his people, who were for the greater part as backward in civilisation as the Russian lower orders, he maintained the authority of the nobles at the expense of the peasants and the citizens. The administration of justice was carefully re- formed, and corruption was not allowed to invade the civil service. Equality of all, whether noble or workman, before the law, was insisted upon, and in all departments he at any rate secured unity of purpose and outward harmony of action. But as he was compelled to make the army his first care, the people were practically helpless, and the governmental The Fall of the Jesuits 283 machine derived all its power from him alone. ' The basis of his Prussian majesty's conduct,' wrote Sir James Harris, ' from the time he mounted the throne to this day, seems to have been the considering mankind in general, and particularly those (/ver whom he was destined to reign, as beings created merely to be subservient to his will. . . . Proceeding on these grounds, he has all along been- guided by his own judgment alone, with- out ever consulting any of his ministers or superior officers ; not so much from the low opinion he entertains of their abihties, as from a conviction from his own feelings that, if he employed them otherwise than as simple instruments, they would in time assume a wall of their own.' ^ Though his government may have been the most efficient in Europe, it lacked organic vital- ity, and his system was certain to decline, if not to ^ , ^ "> J ' Other En- collapse, as soon as his hand was withdrawn. Other lightened princes eciaifes could be found during this period winces, in Germany and Italy, such as Maria Theresa, whose reforms are described elsewhere ; Leopold, Duke of Tuscany, the ablest of the benevolent despots, whose duchy was the best-governed state in Italy, and whose reforms were distinguished by the wisdom in which they were conceived, and the thoroughness with which they were carried out ; Ferdinand, Duke of Bruns- wick, Charles Augustus, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, and Charles Frederick of Baden ; while the careers of Joseph Emmanuel, Archbishop-Elector of Mainz, and of Clement Wenceslaus, Archbishop-Elector of Trier, showed the existence, even in the ecclesiastical states, of a tendency to promote the pros- perity of the people. The Bourbon states of France and Spain followed in like manner the movement of the century. Though France and Louis XV. cannot be numbered among the en- Spain. Hghtened despots, France was the centre of a philosophical and literary movement which influenced all civilised Europe ; and Choiseul, and after him Turgot, distinctly belonged to the band of ministers who represented the tendencies of the age in 1 Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmcsbiiry, vol. i. p. 142. 284 European History, 171 5-1789 which they Uved. In Spain, Charles iii., who bad already as Don Carlos supported Tanucci in bringing about many admira- Charies III ^^^ changes in Naples, continued with vigour the and his work of reform begun under Philip v. and Ferdi- nand VI. Fully alive to the duties of monarchy, he carried out a number of beneficent measures which conferred great benefits on Spain, and entitled Charles to be numbered among the greatest of the Spanish rulers. In spite of his strong religious instincts, many admirable ecclesiastical re- forms were initiated. The amount of land to be held in mortmain was restricted, the number of monasteries was diminished, the power of the Inquisition was regulated, and, in place of the papal jurisdiction, a national court was set up in Madrid.^ Wise measures were also taken for the develop- ment of commerce. Colonial trade was freed from vexatious restrictions, national manufactures were encouraged, and, by the ordinance of 1773, it was declared that engaging in trade was no longer to be considered as derogatory to a noble, and should not involve loss of rank or its privileges. The construc- tion of canals was entered upon, and agriculture was still further encouraged by the removal of the fatuous prohibition of en- closures, and by the planting of trees in the hitherto arid deserts of central Spain. In this meritorious work for the regeneration of Spain Charles m. was aided successively by Squillacci, d'Aranda, Campomanes, and Florida Blanca. D'Aranda, who succeeded Squillacci in 1766 as Finance Minister, was an Arragonese noble who, like Choiseul, had imbibed the philosophic and secular spirit of the times. His liberal and anti-clerical tendencies were not congenial to Charles in., and after the expulsion of the Jesuits he was sent as ambassador to Paris — his post in the Government being taken by Campomanes, one of the most enlightened Spanish statesmen of the century. Like the younger Pitt he was a student of political economy, and moreover was a leading ^ VideCoxe, TAe Bourdons in Spain; smd the JSncyc/o/xzdia Br iiannica, Art. ' Spain.' The Fall of the Jesuits 285 representative of Spanish literature. Without the sceptical tendencies of d'Aranda, he bent his attention to measures for the relief of trade, and, \vith a liberalism in advance of the times, and altogether foreign to the opinions of the king, aimed at educating the people for a share in political life. He gave valuable assistance to Florida Blanca, who, in 1774, had succeeded Grimaldi as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and who, while promoting the well-being of the Spanish people, was always careful not to wound the king's monarchical or religious susceptibilities. The subordination of the Church to the state being secured, the relations between the Government and the clergy became again harmonious. The economic reforms of Campomanes were continued after the latter's fall ; but the progress of Spain was checked by the decision of Charles iii. to support the American colonists against England. Spain required peace and good administration; the outbreak of war interrupted the work of reform ; and the death of Charles in., a few years after the conclusion of peace, still further checked the growth of prosperity. A great advance was undoubtedly made during the reign of Charles in.; but the Spanish population was sunk in sloth and superstition, the lower officials were corrupt and ignorant, no efficient machinen,^ existed to carry out the reforms, and the state took too much upon itself. In spite, however, of Charles iii.'s death in 1788 and the accession of the incapable Charles iv., many of the reforms proved permanent, and Florida Blanca remained in power till 1792. In other parts of Europe the same tendency was visible. In some cases', as in that of Sweden after the revolution of 1772, the king himself took the lead in devising measures „^ ... The for the welfare of his subjects; in other cases, en- Enlightened lightened ministers either ably seconded the efforts ^****""^°- of their masters, or actually initiated reforms themselves. Mont- gelas in Bavaria, Stadion at Mainz, Abel at Stuttgart, Struensee in Denmark, Pombal in Portugal, Tanucci, du Tillot, and 286 European History^ 171 5-1789 others in Italy and Germany, all devoted themselves in vari- ous degrees to increasing the prosperity of the states which they administered. In Denmark Struensee developed the work of Frederick v., who patronised literature and science till his death on the Struensee in 1 4th of January 1766, when he was succeeded by Denmark. j^jg gon, Christian VII., whose wife, Caroline Matilda, was a sister of George iii. Weak in body and mind, Christian speedily fell under the influence of Struensee, who, originally a physician at Altona in Holstein, became the favourite of the young queen. Count Bernsdorf and the former ministers having been removed, Struensee, in aUiance with the com- mander-in-chief, ruled Denmark from 1770 to 1772. Though ambitious, unprincipled, avaricious, insolent, and vain, Struen- see's ability was undoubted, and his attempts to modernise Denmark stamp him as one of the boldest of the autocratic reformers of the age. Honorary titles, monopolies, and the censorship of the press were abolished, and the universities, the law courts, and the municipal corporations were reformed. The lot of the peasants was hghtened, and the nobles were brought under the law. Reforms in the Church were attempted, and economies in the military service were effected. These reforms were, however, carried out hastily and without due precaution, and before long Struensee found himself ci^nfronted by the opposition of the entire Danish nation. The introduc- tion of foreign teachers, and his interference with the Church, roused general discontent, while his influence over the young queen and his attempt to arrogate to himself royal powers, alienated men of all classes. A ' Danish ' party was formed, and a conspiracy was organised by Guldberg, the former tutor of the young Prince Frederick, and by Juliana, the Queen- Dowager, which, owing to the minister's cowardice, was com- pletely successful. On April 18, 1772, Struensee was executed, and shortly afterwards Caroline Matilda was divorced. For twelve years Guldberg and Queen Juliana ruled Denmark, reversing the policy of Struensee and restoring all the former The Fall of the Jesuits 287 abuses. In 1784, taking advantage of the unpopularity of Guldberg, the Crown Prince overthrew him and Queen Juhana, obtained possession of Christian vii., and appointed Peter Andrew von Bernsdorf, nephew of the former minister, and a man of abihty and integrity, to the post of first minister. The Danish people had learnt before Guldberg's fall to regret Struensee, who, though autocratic like Pombal, had at any rate attempted to reform the relations between the peasants and the nobles, and to enforce equality before the law. " In Portugal, which, under John v. (1706-50), the slave of the Jesuits, had sunk into insignificance, Pombal, the chief minister of Joseph i. from 1750 to 1777, carried Pombai in out in a very remarkable manner a series of admira- Portugal, ble reforms, all of which illustrated the liberal tendencies of the times. But here, as in Spain, the movement of reform made little progress among the mass of the people. Sebastian Joseph de Carvalho e Mello, Marquis of Pombal, was the son of a country gentleman, who from 1739 to 1750 served in the Portuguese diplomatic service. From 1739 to 1745 he was in England, where he studied EngUsh, history, law, and finance. From 1745 to 1750 he was at Vienna, where he married, as his second wife, the daughter of Marshal Daun, and by his abilities attracted the attention of Maria Theresa and Joseph. With no army worthy of the name ; with pirates infesting her shores, and brigands her roads ; with her commerce for the most part in the hands of England, and her trade in the East well-nigh destroyed ; with an idle and licentious nobility, and a corrupt and vicious civil service, Portugal had never re- covered from the days of her dependence on Spain. Pombal's reforms in Portugal were interrupted by the earthquake of 1755, which; however, only served to illustrate his energy and determination. ' The genius of Pombal rose out of the ashes of Lisbon,' and the very prostration of Portugal enabled him to regenerate his country. His commercial policy, though protectionist, was patriotic. He wished to relieve Portugal from its dependence upon England, and, by fostering her 288 European History, 17 15-1789 industries and trade, to make her self-supporting. Like Sully he believed that agriculture was the only foundation of com- merce, and in various ways he attempted to improve the condition of agriculture in Portugal. To further private enter- prise he founded several trading companies, made a commercial treaty with Morocco, and allowed the nobles to take part in trade. In 1775 he reformed the Government of Goa and the other East Indian islands, and he introduced various important changes in the army and navy. Economies were effected in the Court and in all departments, and peculation was checked in the collection of taxes. His educational and social reforms were equally drastic. A Royal College for the better education of the nobility was established ; the University of Coimbra, which hitherto had been in the hands of the Jesuits, was re- modelled, and, in fact, refounded ; professors, who received the privileges of nobility, were established in Lisbon and in the provinces to teach Latin, Greek, rhetoric, and logic gratuitously, and a commercial school — the first technical school in Europe — was opened at Lisbon. His social reforms were no less interesting. All slaves landing in Portugal were declared free, and many privileges attached to nobility were wisely abolished. He endeavoured with success to preserve harmony between the nobility and the middle classes, and between both and the lower orders. Throughout his pubhc career, which lasted till the death of Joseph i. in 1777, Pombal showed refnarkable courage, activity, and energy. Always busy with numberless plans and reforms, his period of office may be regarded as the golden age of Portuguese industry in every branch of commerce. He possessed the entire confidence of his sovereign, the effect of a strong will upon a feeble character, and under Pombal Portugal enjoyed a strong, though despotic. Government. In Italy similar reforms were effected by Tanucci in Naples, and du Tillot in Parma. Tanucci till 1759 had served Italian with Squillacci under Don Carlos, who, though a Reformers, devotcd adherent of the Church, was firmly imbued with monarchical sentiments and fully alive to the The Fall of the Jesuits 289 responsibilities of kingship. Under him and his successor, Ferdinand iv., valuable educational, financial, and judicial reforms were carried out in Naples. The judicial powers of the nobles were abolished, the pretentions of the clergy were checked, and the rights of the Pope were reduced. Many con- vents were suppressed, titles were abolished, and the introduc- tion of Papal Bulls was regulated. He thus increased the in- fluence of the crown and advanced the well-being of the people. In 1776, eight years after the marriage of Ferdinand to Maria Caroline, daughter of Maria Theresa, the great Neapolitan min- ister fell, and the queen attempted, with the aid of incompetent advisers, to govern the kingdom. In Parma Ferdinand, the son of Don Philip, succeeded his father in 1765, and du Tillot, Marquis of Felino, and a Frenchman, was continued in office. Like Pombal and Tanucci, he encouraged education, and did much to aid the advancement of the University of Parma. In 1 7 71, two years after the marriage of Ferdinand to the Austrian Archduchess, Maria Amelia, du Tillot was dismissed. Llanos, a Spaniard, and his successor Mauprat, a Frenchman, though not continuing the work of reform, administered Parma well, and it continued to rank among the well-governed Italian states. In the Sardinian kingdom Charles Emmanuel vied with his contemporaries in his eagerness to benefit his subjects. Like Joseph II., he had a passion for equality, concentration, and uniformity in the administration. After the Treaty of Aix-la- Chapelle the army was placed on a peace footing, and the lot of the soldiers improved. Fortresses were rebuilt and strength- ened, public works were undertaken, and the provinces were brought under one regime. Pere Beccaria was recalled from Rome to assist in the foundation of a society for the study of natural science ; and the Abb^ Nollet, a distinguished phy- sician, lectured on medicine in Piedmont. In 1771 feudal rights and many ancient privileges were reclaimed.^ Similar reforms were carried out in Lombardy during Joseph 11. 's ^Hisioire de la Maison de Savoie, par Madame la Princesse Christine Trivulce. PERIOD VI. T 290 European History, 171 5-1 789 reign under the direction of Count Firmian, who supported the Universities of Milan and Pavia, and generally patronised literature and art. In spite of the admirable motives which, as a rule, prompted these efforts for the welfare of mankind, it has to be confessed Many of that the benefits conferred on the people had ReTo^rms ^^^^^^ permanent effect. In the majority of those Ephemeral, countries in which the liberal tendencies of the rulers showed themselves in measures of* reform, the same causes of failure existed. The state took too much upon itself, and left little or nothing to local enterprise ; and, moreover, the reforming impulse was, as a rule, confined to the educated classes and hardly touched the mass of the people, where corruption and ignorance reigned supreme. The methods employed, too, were often faulty, and the most enlightened measures remained inoperative for want of proper machinery to carry them out. In Russia, in Spain, and elsewhere, the most promising reforms in many cases remained mere paper schemes, and the inevitable reaction was found to be easier than progress. There was one reform upon which all the Bourbon Powers were united — a reform, too, which secured the sympathy and The Jesuit support of Maria Theresa and Joseph 11. Many Order. Qf these bcuevoleut despots had found^that their work was retarded, and their reforms checked, by the in- fluence of the Jesuits. Within a period of fifteen years, con- sequently, many of the leading European Powers agreed to unite in destroying the power of the Society to interfere with their policy. In most European states the nobles had been to a great extent deprived of their political privileges, while popular assemblies either did not exist, or had been reduced to harmlessness. It was not likely that the sovereigns of Europe would allow unquestioned the existence in their countries of a rich, powerful, disciplined body looking to the Pope as their chief, who himself considered that he, the spiritual head of Christendom, was all-powerful over temporal monarchs. The Fall of the Jesuits 291 Louis XIV. had not revoked the Edict of Nantes in order to hand France over to the Ultramontanes. His poUcy was ' no parties, no dissidents, no masters.' In Spain, similarly, from the accession of Philip v., attempts had been made to regulate and lessen the jurisdiction of the Church. A strong feeling existed in many parts of Europe about the beginning of the eighteenth century that ecclesiastical institutions should be subject to the civil power. The attacks on the Jesuits, which culminated in 1773 with their suppression, were due partly to this feeling, partly to the growth of enlightenment, partly to special causes. There is no doubt that before the Order was a hundred years old it had begun to decline. A succession of incapable generals after the death of Acquaviva had caused the development of a secular tendency among the priests ; recruits of rank and wealth were admitted, strict discipHne was relaxed, the system of free education was abandoned, and by becoming attached to courts and the nobility, the Jesuits lost their popu- larity among the middle and lower orders. Moreover, the conviction was growing that their presence was not conducive to public order or to domestic peace. It was quite evident that to the corporate interests of the Society were subordinated all other feelings, and hence, when these interests ceased to be purely rehgious and spiritual, the Jesuits found themselves the objects of hatred in most of the capitals of Europe. This lack of spirituality in no small way contributed to the views adopted by the Encyclopedists, and received a striking illus- tration in their devotion during the eighteenth century to commercial pursuits. The Jesuits had, by the middle of the century, developed into a rich, active, and important trading firm, with branch houses in many parts of the world. Possessed of enormous wealth, the Order had become the object of gen- eral envy, when, by a succession of mistakes, and by the adop- tion of a shortsighted policy, it provoked a series of attacks against which it could not prevail. The Society had been too successful. As confessors of kings, as instructors of the young, as the conquerors of empires, and 292 European History y 171 5-1789 the founders of colonies, the Jesuits thought the world belonged to them, and that their supremacy would last for ever. Victo- rious over the Jansenists, they had failed to adapt themselves to the new ideas of the eighteenth century. They believed that they were necessary to the Papacy, for were they not more papal than the Pope himself? One Pope, however, the wise and capable Benedict xiv. (1740-58), recognised the signs of his time, and attempted to reform the Papal Court as well as the Jesuits. In 1741 he issued a Bull in which he disowned the Order, as consisting of ' disobedient, contumacious, captious, and reprobate persons,' and enacted stringent regulations for their better government. In 1742 and 1744 Bulls were pub- lished with the object of checking their insubordination and bringing about reforms. Unfortunately on the death of Bene- dict in 1758 Clement xiii. was elected, a Pope who reversed the far-seeing policy of his predecessor ; and consequently the determination of the European Courts ' to bring all ecclesias- tical institutions under the control of the civil power,' found expression in a number of violent attacks on the Jesuit Order. The first blow was dealt by Pombal, and was caused by the Jesuit opposition to his policy in South America, and to his domestic reforms, together with their connection ^^xcmCks on the Jesuits, with a plot for the assassination of the king. In ortuga . 1 75 1 a long dispute between Spain and Portugal was ended by a treaty arranging the exchange of the town and district of Tuy, in Galicia, and Paraguay, for San Sacramento, a colony on the river Plate assigned to Portugal by the Treaty of Utrecht. The Jesuits, who had estabhshed in Paraguay a sort of independent republic, incited the natives to resist, and it was not till 1756 that Pombal overcame their opposition. Finding that his domestic reforms were similarly resisted by the Order, and being attacked from the pulpits at the time of the earthquake, Pombal dismissed Moreira, Joseph's confessor, on September 19, 1757, forbade any Jesuit to approach the Court without the king's permission, and published a mani- festo against the Society. Complaints were also sent to the The Fall of the Jesuits 293 Pope, and Benedict appointed Cardinal Saldanha, a friend of Pombal, to examine into the malpractices of the Order, and on the 15th of May 1758 pubhshed a decree forbidding the Portuguese Jesuits to carry on illegal trade — i.e. the purchase or sale of converted Indians — and suspending them ' from the power of confessing or preaching.' In September of the same year Joseph was attacked and wounded. After an inquiry of three months, all members of the families of Tavaro and Aviero were seized. It was asserted, though no proof was ever produced, that their papers proved the complicity of the Jesuits in a plot for the assassination of the king. The nobles were executed, and as Clement xiii. re- fused to allow Pombal to try the accused ecclesiastics, that minister, having with difficulty obtained the consent of the weak and superstitious Joseph, who only consented through terror of his life, on September i, 1759, ordered the immediate depor- tation of the Jesuits from Portugal and its dependencies, and their supersession by the bishops in the schools and universi- ties. Those in Portugal, to the number of 6000, were shipped to Civita Vecchia in September 1759, and those in the colonies were expelled. The Pope having ordered all Portuguese to leave the Papal estates, Pombal replied, in February 1761, by confiscating the property of the Jesuits in Portugal, and appeal- ing to other European Courts to suppress the Society within their dominions. At first Pombal's high-handed and cruel measures were not received by Europe with enthusiasm, but before long other countries, sharins; in the general dissatisfaction at _. ' ° ° Expulsion of the conduct of the Jesuits, adopted similar meas- the Jesuits ures. In France the growth of rehgious scepti- ^^^ cism, and the general hatred of the Jesuits, had by 1756 made considerable progress, and in attacking the Order the French Government was making a distinct concession to public opinion. Madame de Pompadour disliked them on account of their close relations with Louis, and because they refused her abso- lution. In this matter she and the Farlements were agreed iu 294 European History, 171 5-1 789 desiring their destruction. An opportunity was given the Par- lement of Paris of interfering with them by the bankruptcy of Lavalette, the Jesuit administrator of Martinique, a speculator who had become involved in mercantile undertakings, and had failed for 2,400,000 francs, involving in his own ruin several French commercial houses. Ricci, the General of the Jesuits, repudiated the debt, and was sued by the creditors. Having lost his case, he unwisely appealed to the Parlement of Paris. That body, having required the constitutions of the Jesuits to be laid before it, affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Great indignation being aroused at the character of the Jesuit constitutions, Choiseul appointed a commission to re- vise them. It was resolved that the unlimited authority of the General of the Jesuits was incompatible with the laws of France, and that a resident Vicar should be appointed. Ricci, however, refused to entertain the idea of the Society being regulated by the civil power. * Si7it ut sunt, aut non sint,^ was his famous reply. In spite of the support given to the Order by the Queen and Dauphin, Choiseul and Madame de Pompa- dour triumphed, with the aid of the judicial bodies. After various decrees had been published against them by the Parle- ment of Paris and the provincial Parle77ie7its , the Society was suppressed in France in November 1764 by royal authority. For three years they were allowed to remain as secular priests, but in May 1767 they were expelled, Clement, wlio had, in 1765, pubHshed a Bull containing a formal apology for the Order, declaring that their expulsion was a grievous injury inflicted at once upon the Church and the Holy and the See. In Spain, now almost the sole refuge of the Jesuits. Jesuits, Charles iii. was at first unwilling to pro- ceed to great lengths. Like Joseph of Portugal, he was super- stitious, and a devoted adherent of the Church. But while not imbued with the new philosophical ideas, he was deter- mined to advance the royal power and to overcome all oppo- sition to his authority, whether from nobles or from the Church. But in 1766 the Jesuits united in a revolt against a tax imposed The Fall of the Jesuits 295 by the Italian Squillacci, whom Charles felt compelled to dis- miss. Enraged at this affront to his prerogative, and convinced that they were plotting against his authority, if not against his life, Charles, with the full concurrence of his liberal-minded minister d'Aranda, drew up a decree for the suppression of the Order in Spain, Sealed despatches were sent to all the Span- ish colonies, to be opened the same day on which the decree was to take effect in Spain. On the 2d of April 1767 nearly 6000 Jesuits were deported to the Itahan coast ; but, repulsed by the Pope and Ricci, they eventually found an asylum in Corsica. Encouraged by the news from Spain, the opponents of the Jesuits in France had secured their expulsion in May, and now Choiseul and Pombal urged Charles in. to unite with them in demanding from the Pope the entire suppression of the Society. Naples and Parma had imitated France and Spain, and the Jesuits were expelled from their dominions. But Charles ni. was, as has been said, no philosophic reformer, and Papai Re- he hesitated. The Pope's action, however, decided sistance. him to throw in his lot with the other Bourbon countries. In an unwise moment Clement decided to attack the Duke of Parma, who was the nephew of Charles iii., the grandson of Louis XV., and the cousin of Ferdinand of Naples. By a de- cree, in January 1768, he pronounced the duke's rank and title forfeit, re-established in Parma the ecclesiastical jurisdic- tion, and declared war against the duke. The reply of the Bourbons was decisive. Lx)uis xv. took possession of Avignon and the county of Venaissin, the King of the Two Sicilies seized Beneventum and Ponte Corvo, Charles iii. resolved upon the abolition of the Order, and all the Bourbon Powers threatened the Pope with war. On the loth of December 1768 a joint note, demanding the abolition of the Jesuits, was presented to Clement. The feeling against the Order had now spread. Its members were expelled from Venice, Modena, and even from Bavaria, while in the Austrian dominions, still 296 European History ^ 171 5-1789 under the influence of the pious, though 'igorous, Maria Theresa, they were removed from the chairs of theology and philosophy. The Pope, now eighty-two years old, was unequal to the crisis. An attack of apoplexy, brought on by the late events, The Conclave proved fatal on February 3, 1769. On his death of 1769 arose the serious question of the election of his Election of r i • /■ i Clement succcssor. In cousequeuce 01 the gravity of the ^^^" situation, the conclave of 1769 had an unusual importance : the election of a Pope able to recognise the signs of the times, and wilhng to conciliate public opinion, might appease the storm, while no one could foresee the results of the election of a Pope who had Jesuit sympathies. During the conclave the cardinals fell into two clearly defined parties. On the one hand, the Zelanti or the Zeles, who had been all-powerful during Clement xiii.'s pontificate, aimed at securing a Pope of like opinions, one who would defend the Order against Bourbon interference and the atheistical tenden- cies of the day. To them the Papacy stood at the head of a movement opposed to the rising flood of sceptical philosophy. Each day, attacked by writers like Voltaire and the Encyclo- pedists, or by sovereigns like Frederick the Great and Cathe- rine II., the Papacy, uncertain of the fidelity of its own disciples, required, in the eyes of this party, a strong Pope who would support the Jesuits. Opposed to the Zelanti were'the Rega- listi, or supporters of the crowned heads — les cardinaux des couromies — whose aim was to secure the suppression of an arrogant and pestilent society. After lengthy negotiations among the cardinals, the influence of Bernis was successful in securing, on the i8th of May, the election of Cardinal Lorenzo Garganelli, a Franciscan of considerable abilities, and, like _^ ^ Benedict xiv., enhsfhtened and tolerant. At first The Suppres- . sion of the he showed some hesitation, and tried to avoid Jesuit r er. j^-^^jj^g ^ dccisiou, while the Jesuit hopes were raised by the fall of their enemy Choiseul. But before the determination of Grimaldi, backed by France and Portugal, The Fall of the Jesuits 297 and even by Maria Theresa, Clement was forced to yield. On the 1 6th of August 1773 ^^ issued the Bull Dominus et Redernptor, abolishing the Society of Jesuits. After this de- cisive act, which was not revoked until August 7, 18 14, when Pius VII. published the Bull SoHcitiido oi7miu77i ecclesiarium^ Clement appointed a number of cardinals to take possession of the temporalities of the Society, and imprisoned Ricci in the castle of St. Angelo, where he died in 1775. At the time of its suppression the Order had 41 provinces and 22,589 mem- bers, of whom 11,295 were priests. Avignon was restored to the Papacy, and the Jesuits found refuge in the dominions of Catherine 11. and Frederick the Great. The proscribed Order had not to wait long for revenge. In the Holy Week of 1774 Clement xrv. was taken ill; on the 22d of September he died. CHAPTER XI THE PARTITION OF POLAND AND THE TREATY OF KUTCHUK-KAINARDJI Europe after the Seven Years' War — Austria — Italy — Prussia, the Empire and Russia — Alliance between Prussia and Russia, 1764 — Poland — The Policy of Frederick the Great and Catherine II. — Polish Politics — Russian Intervention in Poland — France and Turkey — The Outbreak of War be- tween Russia and Turkey, 1768 — The Views of Frederick the Great and Kaunitz — War and Diplomacy. The Interview at Neisse — Proposals for a Partition of Poland — The Partition of Poland — The Causes of the Fall of Poland — The Non-intervention of England — The Policy of France — The Russo-Turkish War — The Treaty of Kainardji — Choiseul's Foreign Policy — The Affair of the Falkland Islands — War between England and the Bourbon Powers averted — The Suppression of the Parlement of Paris and the Provincial Parlements — The Fall of Choiseul — The Triumvirate — Gustavus III. and the Swedish Revolution — Its Effects — Attitude of France. From 1763 to 1792 western and centra] Europe were at peace. It is true that France, Spain, and Holland combated Europe after England at sea or in America during the War of the Seven American Independence, and that the Russo- Years ar. -p^j-j^jg}^ ^^j- Qf ly^s.y^ ^yas, in 1 787, followed by the Russo-Austrian attack on the Porte. But during these years the greater part of Europe enjoyed an unaccustomed period of repose. These thirty years constitute a very compli- cated period of European history. They include the last years of the eighteenth century ; they form an introduction to the new period ushered in by the French Revolution. With the widespread desire of aggrandisement, and the uni- versal longing for compactn-ess of territory, the idea of the balance of power continues to be a living force, though in a 298 The Partition of Poland 299 pen-erted form. The greed of acquisition becomes strong, and the smaller are threatened by the greater Powers with extinction. The fall of the Jesuit Order, affecting as it did the general history of Europe, was the one circumstance which, in the eighteenth century, united the Bourbon states of France. Spain, Naples, and Parma in a close alliance. The hope of partition- ing the two ancient kingdoms of Poland and Sweden proved "^ strong enough to bind closely together in a powerful league the northern states of Prussia and Russia, and with this alliance Austria and Denmark connected themselves, in order to share in the spoil. During these years Austria and Prussia occupy a leading position in Europe, while the Slav Power of Russia advances, and is universally recognised as an integral portion of the European states-system. The influence, however, of the Latin nations of Spain, France, and indeed of the Papacy, in central Europe and Italy declines, and, \nth the temporar}^ retirement of France, important developments take place in the north and e^st of Europe. In 1 763 many of these changes were already presaged. England's maritime power had definitely triumphed during the Seven Years' War. The Teutonic, and not the Latin, element was henceforward to control the destinies of the New World ; while in India, the English and not the French, were to become the dominating influence. France had not only suffered defeat in America, in India, and on the seas, but her prestige in Europe had sensibly declined, and she resigned to Prussia the mihtary leadership in Europe. Her ally Spain had also suffered, and, like France, was bent on securing revenge on the first opportunity. In spite of the failure of Maria Theresa to recover Silesia, and to ruin Prussia, Austria, with its mar\-ellous elasticity and inexhaustible resources, remained one of the most powerful^ states in Europe. Reforms in every department were pressed on, and with the impetus given to commerce and improved military and ci\-il organisation, the Court of Vienna hoped to reduce the power and territories of Frederick the Great In 300 European History^ 171 5-1789 1765, Joseph 11, , who the pre\dous year had been elected king of the Romans, became Emperor, and inherited from his father, who had never forgiven the French seizure of Lorraine, a hatred of France. His succession thus gave a new bias to Austrian poHtics, which was in harmony with the dishke felt in Vienna by the educated classes, as well as by the mihtary authorities, for the French alKance. Kaunitz, however, who still remained in power, clung to France from hatred to Prussia, and continued his efforts to unite Austria still more closely with the Bourbons. The marriages of the Archdukes Joseph and Leopold to the daughters of Don Philip and Don Carlos respectively had indicated the line of poHcy which Kaunitz continued after the Peace of Paris in the case of the Austrian Archduchesses. In 1768, Maria Caroline married Ferdinand r'. of Naples ; in 1769, ]\Iaria Amelia married Ferdi- nand of Prussia ; and the following year Marie Antoinette mar- ried the Dauphin.^ Bella gerant alii, tufelix Austria nube. Till the fall of Choiseul, the Franco-Austrian alliance showed no outward signs of weakness, and the decision of Maria Theresa to support the action of the Bourbons in the suppres- sion of the Jesuits still further strengthened the union of the Courts of Vienna and Versailles. One result of the diplomatic revolution of 1756 was to check French interference in Italy. The new Italian dynasties, the outcome of the Polish and x^ustrian Succession ^* ^' Wars, unable to secure independent support from France, fell under Austrian influence, and the Hapsburg rule, through the skill of Kaunitz, again became paramount in Italy. The Franco-Austrian alliance conferred undoubted benefits upon that country. The Seven Years' War had left Italy undis- turbed, and the tranquillity of the Peninsula, assured by the alliance between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, continued till the wars of the French Revolution. ^ Von Arneth, Geschichte von Maria Theresia, iv. p. 336, v. p. 449. The Partition of Poland 301 The Bourbon states in the west and south of Europe, bound together in one great league, and connected with Austria by marriage aUiances, were, shortly after the close of p^ussia, the the Seven Years' War, confronted by a league in Empire, and the north of Europe consisting of Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, supported by England. Frederick the Great had brought his country out of the war without loss of territory, but terribly exhausted. Prussia, however, possessed great vitality : she had established her military reputation ; she was regarded as the defender of German Protestantism, and the protector of the ancient constitution of the Empire. The Ger- manic body had indeed cause to rejoice at the success of Prus- sia. After the Peace of Hubertsburg it ' entered upon the hap- piest days of its existence.' For some thirty years, owing to the Franco-Austrian system, Germany escaped the horrors of a French invasion, while all attempts on the part of Joseph 11. to interfere with the ancient constitution of the Empire, or the rights of any of its members, were sternly and successfully re- pressed by the Prussian king. Though the Empire continued its course of gradual and unobserved decay, the Germans began to reaUse that they possessed a language and a literature. Of the other Powers engaged in the Seven Years' War, Rus- sia had given unmistakable proof of the possession of enor- mous strength. Henceforward she became an important factor in European politics. No sooner was the Treaty of Paris signed, than Europe found in the close union of Russia and Prussia a menace to the peace of eastern Europe. The defection of Peter in. from the coalition had saved Frederick, and his alli- ance with Prussia laid the foundations of a friendship between the two countries which has lasted till our own day. The death of Peter in the summer of 1762, and the accession of Catherine 11., did not interfere with this friendship, which ripened into an alliance formally concluded on April 11, 1764, and which was a necessary condition of success for the realisa- tion of the great designs then being prepared at St. Peters- burg and Berlin. Catherine 11., one of the chief founders of 302 Eiiropea7i History, 171 5-1 789 the Russian empire, had, like Maria Theresa, many of the char- acteristics of a true statesman. Though often capricious and j Alliance reckless, though at times influenced by unworthy / between favourites, thou2;h vice had great charms for her, 1 Russia and i i=> ^ > _\Prussia, 1764. and terrible crimes were imputed to her fierce wrath, the Semiramis of the North was a capable and strong-willed ruler. She believed in the national destinies of the Muscovite race ; she was alive to the advantages of her j3osition as head of the Slavonic race ; she possessed to an extraordinary degree the genius of government ; she could choose able subordinates ; she was prepared to advance along the lines laid down by Peter the Great. Like Frederick the Great Catherine was infected by the liberahsm of the eighteenth century, and under her in- fluence the Court of St. Petersburg imitated the habits of west- ern civilisation, though the nation at large was little, if at all, affected by her real desire to introduce reforms. She and Frederick the Great are the most conspicuous figures among the sovereigns of the age, and the success of their vast designs de- manded a close union. An inevitable antipathy existed between France and Prussia ; Austria was still bent on reconquering Silesia ; England, under Bute, had completely broken -with Frederick. The Prussian king, isolated in Europe, saw in a Russian alHance the best, if not the sole, means of placing his kingdom in a safe position. Neither France nor Austria was well disposed towards Russia. Austria was the natural foe of Russia, and her true policy was to support and strengthen the Polish kingdom. France had always regarded herself as the defender of Poland, and, according to Choiseul, distance alone prevented the outbreak of hostiHties between Russia and France. From the Seven Years' War Russia had emerged triumphant, and the European states, which hitherto had treated her successes with indifference, now reaHsed the signifi- cance of the rise of the powerful Slavonic nation. But the selfishness of England, the exhaustion of France, the blindness of Austria, and the isolation of Prussia were facts of which Catherine was prepared to take full advantage. She thus The Partition of Poland 303 found herself on her accession in a strong position, and able to choose the methods and allies best suited for carrjang out her- clearly defined plans. With England, Catherine's relations varied. English ships had for ages been the carriers of Russian commerce ; during the Seven Years' War the peace between the two countries had been unbroken ; the friendship of England and Russia, Chatham declared, was the comer-stone of his for- eign pohcy, and in 1766 he endeavoured, though without suc- cess, to form a close alhance with Russia and Prussia, England, however, continued to give admirals and captains to Russian fleets, and the victory of Tchesme was due to the skill of an Englishman. After that battle the Russians received no open support from the English Government, which, though it closed its eyes to the Partition of Poland, resolutely refused to aid Russia in 1772 against Sweden. It was not, however, till the time of the younger Pitt that England became an obstacle to Russian aggrandisement in Turkey. France, as the ally of Po- land and Turkey, Catherine disliked, and showed no hesitation in expressing her views with regard to Louis xv. and his minis- ters. Austria showed as yet no desire that Poland should be- come a vassal state of Russia, and viewed with hostility the pos- sibility of the mouths of the Danube coming under the control of Catherine. But she took no steps to oppose the schemes of the Russian Court, and gradually drifted into the position of a partner in the Partition of Poland. The Tsarina thus natu- rally turned to Prussia as the one continental Power with which she could form a satisfactory alliance. Frederick had no objec- tion to Russian extension in the East, while he was as anxious as Catherine to destroy Austrian influence in Poland, and he was equally ready to join in the dismemberment of Sweden. The continued anarchy in Poland, and the inability 0I Poles, by means of drastic reforms, to lead their country along the path of national progress, gave Catherine and Frederick some apparent justification for inter- vention. An elective kingship, a senate, and a diet composed of delegates from the provincial assembUes of nobles, in which 304 European History, 1715-1789 any member might, by the liherum veto, or by simply with- drawing altogether, or by obstructing progress for six weeks, impede all business, formed a constitution which was not only an anachronism, but rendered Poland a centre of turmoil in the centre of Europe. * Poland had no ambassadors at foreign courts, the land had no fortresses, no navy, no roads, no arsenals, no treasury, no fixed revenue. The army was small, undisciplined, often un- paid, so that the troops were forced to unite and to encamp before the place of assembly of the Diet, and to add an unlaw- ful weight to their lawful demands.'^ To keep Poland in a state of anarchy had been the object of Russian rulers from the days of Peter the Great, so as to The Policy of obtain a decisive voice over her destinies. The Frederick eveuts of the PoHsh Succession War and the Seven the Great and Catherine II. Years* War had practically secured the predom- inance of Russia in Poland, and shortly after her accession, Catherine, overruling the decision of the Pohsh Senate (who had given Courland to Charles, son of Augustus iii.), and the wishes of Augustus himself, replaced Biren in the government of that province. To overawe the Poles, Russian troops were moved towards Poland, and Augustus, alarmed, forced his son Charles to resign, and took refuge in Saxony, where he died on the 5th of October 1763. Though during the early years of her reign Catherine was guided by the Orlovs, the real influence in foreign affairs was wielded by Nikolai Ivanovich Panin, the Russian Chancellor, the basis of whose policy was the Prussian alliance, and the complete subordination of Poland to Russian influence." The death of Augustus in. of Poland was followed by a treaty signed on April 11, 1764, between Russia and Prussia. Besides promising mutual assistance in case of war, the con- tracting Powers agreed to place Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski '^Poland, by Field-Marshal Count von Moltke (translated), p. 74. -The leading members of the Orlov family were — Gregory, the chief of the artillery ; Alexis, the admiral; Theodore, the procurenr-general of the Senate; and Vladimir, director of the Academy of Science. The Partitio7i of Poland 305 on the Polish throne, and not to permit the abohtion of the liberum veto, nor the transformation of the elective into an hereditary monarchy. They were both determined to ward off all foreign inter-t^ ference in the affairs of Poland, and the Tsarina in placing her vassal Poniatowski on the throne, indicated her resolution to govern the Poles through him. Catherine had set out in 1763 with the intention of conquering Poland, of extending Muscovite influence over Sweden, if not of actually dismember- ing that country, and of gradually advancing to Constantinople. To carry out this policy was in her eyes the mission of the Russian rulers. By the treaty of 1764 the way was prepared for the establishment of Russian influence in Poland : in 1 769, Russia, Prussia, and Denmark' guaranteed the integrity of the existing Swedish Constitution. The ground seemed quite clear for the successful attainment of her aims in Poland and Turkey no less than in Sweden. All these countries were distracted by internal troubles and weakened by a long period of disorder. In Sweden the dominion of the Hats was shaken, and the Caps, encouraged by Russia, were ready to betray their country. Turkey was decaying rapidly, and the designs of Russia upon the Ottoman Empire seemed likely to bfe realised. In Poland the election of Poniatowski had been effected by intimidation on the part of Russia and Prussia. That kingdom was hope- lessly divided ; the Government, while ignoring the rise of Russia and Prussia, had taken no advantage of the improve- ments in warfare. The Constitution ensured the continuance of anarchy, and the relations between the upper and lower orders proved fatal to any consistent policy. The nobles upheld the feudal system, and the Polish peasantry, who were mere slaves, felt a most implacable hatred towards their masters. The family of Czartoriski, however, Poiish aimed at thorough reforms, which should change Politics, completely the system of government and bring Poland into line with other countries. They wished to abolish the liberum veto, to make the crown hereditary, and to increase its powers.^' PERIOD VI. U 3o6 European History ^ 171 5-1789 Unable to hope for assistance from France or even fronr Austria, the Czartoriskis boldly determined to use the forces o Russia for the regeneration of Poland, and having reformed anc reorganised their country, to shake off their semi-barbarous ally But the task was beyond their strength. If they had not aimec at the crown for their own family, and applied to Russia for aid their influence might possibly have benefited their unhappy country. Opposed to them were the Potockis, who aimed a limiting the power of the crown by the establishment of a per manent council of nobles. Before the election of Foniatowski the Czartoriskis, with Russian support, had overthrown the op position of their enemies, and had carried their reforms in ar Interregnum Diet. After the election of the king, who wa; the nephew of the Czartoriskis, the Confederation, or Irregulai Diet, remained sitting, the reforms were ratified, and Polanc seemed at last to have a chance of securing some real improve ments. But neither Catherine nor Frederick really cared foi reforms, and the former opened negotiations with the nationa party, which under Potocki had sworn allegiance to the king Repnin, the Russian representative in Poland, opposed Michae Czartoriski, and supported by Frederick, found a further oppor tunity of interference in the matter of the Dissidents. These were chiefly Greek and Protestant, whose religious rights hac been guaranteed since 1562 by every Polish king. During the eighteenth century, these rights had been in various ways attacked. Repnin now proposed that the Dissidents shoulc be made ehgible for all offices in the Diet and in the Senate They were to take part in the making and administration o the laws. The Diet was strongly Catholic; and in 1766, when th( question of the Dissidents was brought before it, stirred up b^ the Bishop of Cracow, and suspecting Poniatowsk Intervention and the Czartoriskis of a tendency to toleration, i in Poland. refused the claims of the Dissidents, and united witl Russia to demand the abolition of reforms. Henceforth Cathe^ Vrine and Frederick intervened in the affairs of Poland in th( The Partition of Poland 307 name of religious toleration. When the Diet refused to grant religious liberty and political equality to the Dissidents, the latter, supported by many of the patriot party who wished to leave things as they were, formed Confederations which finally combined in the Confederation of Radom, in June 1767, and received the support of Russian troops. The question whether Poland should continue free under a reformed government, or become entirely dependent on Russia, was to be decided with- out further delay. In October 1767 the king called a Diet; Warsaw was surrounded by Russian troops ; and while Cathe- rine demanded equal rights for the Dissidents, and the privilege of keeping troops in Poland, a proposal was made at Russia's instigation to delegate the powers of the Diet to certain Com- missioners. The prospect of being ruled by Commissioners under Russian influence provoked great indignation ; but Catherine seized and sent to Siberia the chief leaders of the opposition; the Diet, terrorised, yielded on the 19th of No- vember 1767; and on the 24th of February 1768 a treaty between Poland and Russia completed the subjection of the RepubHc. The constitution agreed to by Catherine provided that the monarchy should remain elective and that the libgriim veto should be continued, except in such matters as voting of supplies. The Dissidents were to be assured in their rights, and a mixed tribunal was to decide religious questions. In February 1768 Russia compelled the Diet to ratify the consti- tution. Poland, however, was not to enjoy tranquiUity for long. The nobles who were Catholic in religion were attached to in- dependence, and detested the laws of 1767 and the treaty of 1 768. In southern Poland the nobles formed the Confederation of Bar for the maintenance of their independence and religion, and this was the signal for the outbreak of serious disturbances. The peasants rose and perpetrated terrible atrocities ; the Catholics appealed to France, the Dissidents to Russia and Prussia. While the Poles massacred in the name of the Cath- olic religion, the Russians massacred in the name of tolerance. The increase of Russian influence in Poland had roused 3o8 Eiiropean History, 17 15-1789 Choiseul to the significance of the crisis. Not only were officers and money sent to support the Confederation, but diplomacy France and was employed to Stir up the enemies of Catherine. Turkey. Qf these, Turkey was the only one whose inter- ference was likely to be of much service. The Porte had always in theory opposed the introduction of a Russian army into Poland. Up to 1767, however, the Turks, perhaps owing to the bribery of influential members of the Divan by Cathe- rine, had appeared indifferent to the fate of Poland. But* by the beginning of 1768 various circumstances tended towards a rupture of the long-continued peace between Russia and Turkey. jNIustapha iii., an accomphshed, energetic prince, de- voted to his own religion, was anxious for war, and with many of his subjects had viewed the progress of the Russian arms in Poland with jealousy and alarm. Moreover, ever since 1765, Russian agents had been stirring up the Greeks, Montenegrins, and Bosnians against the Turkish rule. In July 176S Russian troops, pursuing fugitive PoUsh Confederates into Turkish ter- ritory, had burnt Balta, a town belonging to the Tartar Khan. The Sultan's position, however, remained technically weak, especially as Catherine offered a full explanation of the con- duct of the troops, and probably war would not have broken out but for the intervention of Vergennes, the French ambas- sador at Constantinople. Taking advantage of the irritation The Out- ^^^^ ^^ Turkey at the Russian intrigues in Monte- ^ break ofWar negro, he incited the Turks to demand the evacua- Russia and ^ion of Poland by Russian troops, and sent the Turkey, 1768. Baron de Tott to stir up the Khan of the Crimea to support the Sultan. The violation of the Turkish frontier and the seizure of Cracow added force to Vergennes' argu- ments, and on the 6th of October the Porte declared war upon Russia, declaring that it was simply on behalf of the liberties of the Poles that the Turks took up arms. If Russia, in her dealings with Poland, had flattered herself that she was acting as the defender of religious liberty, Turkey could at any rate assert that slie was fighting in defence of political liberty. The Partition of Poland 309 The declaration of war by Turkey took Europe by surprise, and the Austrian envoy at Constantinople, Brognard, used all possible means to preserve peace. Neither ^^ „. ^ . . The Views of Frederick nor Kaunitz looked with favour upon Frederick the outbreak of hostilities. Both were resolved ^"'^^^""i*^- not to allow their respective allies, Russia and France, to involve them in a fresh war ; both desired to maintain the tranquillity of Germany ; both felt that the peace of Europe depended on the good understanding between Prussia and Austria. ' We are Germans,' said Frederick ; ' what does it matter to us if the English and French fight for Canada and the American islands, or if PaoH gives the French plenty to do in Corsica, or if Turks and Russians seize one another by the hair?' Had these admirable sentiments been acted upon throughout the reigns of Frederick and Joseph, Germany would have been the gainer. Notwithstanding his alHance with Russia, Frederick was resolved not to allow himself^o be drawn into a war in which Prussia had no conceri^r In spite, however, of his protestations, Frederick was as anxious to secure Prussian Poland as Kaunitz was to recover Silesia or to obtain an equivalent. Already before his eyes floated the prospect of a partition of Poland. It was arranged at Vienna in January 1769 that an inter\qew between Frederick and Joseph should take place the following August, and the same month Frederick, in consideration of the succession to Anspach and Bayreuth being guaranteed him by Catherine, agreed to make common cause with Russia against Sweden and Turkey. The Prussian king was fully alive to the steady development of the terrible Russian state ; he was equally con- scious that the war between Russia and Turkey might enable him to secure a valuable accession to his kingdom ; he was deeply anxious to prevent the war from spreading and involv- ing the German Powers. The preservation of the peace of Europe could not, however, be hoped for without the co-opera- tion of Austria. If Austria adhered loyally to the French alli- ance, she could aid the Turks and the Poles ; and Frederick, 310 European History, 1715-1789 allied with Russia, would find himself again at war with France and Austria. If the latter Power, however, agreed to join with Russia in a partial partition of Turkish territories, Frederick would find himself in a dangerous isolation. Already Frederick had determined to prevent a great Euro- pean war by indemnifying Austria and Russia and Prussia in Poland. If his plan could be carried out, he would receive Polish Prussia without firing a shot ; Russia would be satisfied, and the Franco-Austrian alliance would be sensibly .weakened. In February 1769 he had written to Count Solms, the Prussian minister at St. Petersburg, a description of a project of Count Lynar for the Partition of Poland, with the expectation that Solms would use it for eliciting from Count Panin the views of the Russian Court. Panin, in the course of a conversation with the Prussian ambassador, declared that Austria should in- demnify herself for the loss of Silesia by acquisitions in the East, that Prussia should take Polish Prussia, while Russia would be satisfied with the overthrow of the Turkish empire and the for- mation of a Turkish republic with Constantinople as the capital.^ While the Prussian and Russian diplomatists were discuss- ing projects of aggrandisement, and before diplomacy could produce any decided results, Kaunitz had showed a readiness to profit from the outbreak of the Turkish War which might have provoked the envy of Frederick. In February 1769 an Austrian force, under pretence of asserting ancient IH^ungarian rights, occupied the county of Zips at the very time that Frederick was planning that system of compensations which led to the Partition of Poland. In July hostihties broke out seriously between the Russians and Turks on the Dniester. In September 1769 the Turks War and Were defeated and the Russians occupied Moldavia Diplomacy, and Wallachia, took possession of the three for- intervi'ew at* trcsses of Khotin, Azov, and Taganrog, and seized Neisse. Bucharest in November. While the campaign was proceeding, Joseph and Frederick had met at Neisse in 1 See Sorel, La Question d' Orient au XVIII'^^Siecle. The Partition of Poland 311 Silesia in August. It was most important to dfscover the views of the ' Ogre of Potsdam,' but at this famous meeting neifher potentate seems to have committed himself to any declaration of policy. The news of this interview disquieted Catherine, and she agreed to all Fre.derick's demands. In October the alliance between Russia and Prussia was extended till 1780, Catherine guaranteed the succession of Anspach and Bayreuth to Frederick, while he agreed to invade Pomerania if the Swedish Constitution was modified. Choiseul had also felt alarm at the possible results of the interview, and feared a Prusso- Austrian understanding to the detriment of the Franco- Austrian alliance. Choiseul .declared that a long war between Russia and Turkey would best suit French interests ; Kaunitz, on the other hand, wished for peace, and was ready to mediate between the belligerents, in order that Austria should gain some territorial advantages. The war in 1770 proved disastrous to the Turks. A Russian fleet, under the direction of English officers, sailed from the Baltic to the ^-Egean Sea, and though Alexis Orlov failed to bring about a revolution in Greece, the Russian admiral, aided by Elphinstone, defeated and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Tchesme on Julv 5, 1770; whfle on August i, Rumiantzov, with a small Russian force, overthrew the Turkish forces at Kagoul. It seemed as if the last hour of the Ottoman Empire had come, that its territories were about to be partitioned, and that the Russians would be firmly established on the Danube. The Sultan in alarm appealed to France for help, but Choiseul was only able to send money, 1500 men, and a few officers, among whom was Dumouriez, to aid the Confederation of Bar. England, alarmed to some extent at the Russian successes, recalled the officers who were serving in the Russian fleet, while her envoy, Murray, at Constantinople, suggested English mediation to the Porte. While Frederick the Great renewed with vigour his attempts to bring about peace between the belligerents, Austria, not content with Zips, occupied a larger extent of Polish territor}'. In August Turkey decided to 312 European History , 171 5-1789 appeal to Prussia and Austria to use their mediation to brine the war to a conclusion. The second interview between Frederick and Joseph, whicl was held at Neustadt on September 3, 1770, took place undei circumstances of extreme gravity. On this occasion Kaunitz accompanied Joseph and took a prominent part in the pro- ceedings. Frederick saw clearly that Austria was the pivot o all negotiations. If the Muscovite troops crossed the Danube, Austria would attack Russia, and a European war would be the result. Kaunitz stated that if Catherine insisted on making Poland a Russian province, or on dismembering Turkey to an) large extent, Austria would go to war. On the 1 2th of October Prince Henry arriv^ed at St. Peters- burg, and his mission proved to be an event of European im- , , portance. By the end of the year Russia had taker Proposals for ^ ■' ■' a Partition Bender, Akermann, and Braila. The Turks onl) of Poland. \^q\^ Giurgevo, on the left bank of the Danube Catherine, triumphant, declared her readiness to entertain the idea of peace. Prince Henry declares that in an interview with Catherine in January 1771 he proposed the Partition of Poland, At that moment the situation in the east of Europe was pecu- liarly threatening. The Russians had completed their con- quests of Moldavia and Wallachia ; Austria had occupied Zips and Sandecz, including in her grasp some 500 Polish villages ; and while the King of Prussia had sent troops'into Polish Prussia, the Polish Confederates had no money and small hopes of success. The Confederation relied entirely on cavalry, which numbered about 17,000, divided into five or six squad- rons, under the command of as many independent chiefs. In 1 771 Dumouriez was defeated at Landskron, and though Vio- mesnil, Dussaillans, and Choisy seized the castle of Cracow the following year, they were unable to hold it against Suvor6v, and Poland lay at the mercy of the three allies. On the 24th of December 1770, Choiseul had fallen, and France had become for the moment a cipher in European politics. It was at that very time, when Van Swieten, the The Partitio7i of Poland 313 Austrian envoy, was negotiating with Frederick at Beriin, and Prince Henry was negotiating with Catherine in St. Peters- burg, that a x)eaceful solution of the Turkish question was found in the suggestion of a partition of Poland . The idea of a partition was no new one. Maximilian 11. had suggested it in 1573, Charles x. of Sweden nearly a century later returned to it, and his successor proposed that xhe Partition the Emperor, Brandenburg, and Sweden should °^ Poland, divide the Polish territories between them. In the eighteenth century, the question of a partition was often discussed. Peter the Great seriously considered it, and Augustus 11. thought of making the crown hereditary in his own House. Prussia had long desired the possession of Polish Prussia, and Frederick the Great had himself demonstrated to his father the necessity of uniting Brandenburg and the Prussian Duchy. The advantage which Prussia would derive from such a seizure was so obvious that in 1764 it was firmly beheved, in spite of the Tsarina's denial that a partition had been agreed upon between Freder- ick and Catherine. From the time of Prince Henry's visit (October 1770-January 1771), the Tsarina began seriously to entertain the idea of taking PoHsh territor}' in heu of her Turkish conquests, and of pacifying Austria and Prussia by consenting to their seizure of portions of the doomed country. Meanwhile, Kaunitz was busily engaged in opposing the Russian designs on Turkey. The Turks themselves had hoped to secure, if not the alHance, at any rate the assistance of France. Such a project was distasteful to Austria. A united Franco- Austrian inter\'ention on behalf of Turkey implied a complete breach with Russia, and rendered impossible any indemnification for Austria at the expense of either Turkey or Poland. Events aided Austrian diplomacy. The fall of Choiseul removed all danger of French inter\^ention, and the continued successes of the Russians on the left bank of the Danube and against the Tartars of the Crimea compelled the Turks to turn to Austria. On July 6, 1771, a secret treaty was signed by the Porte with Austria, in which the latter, in consideration of a large sum of 314 Eicropean History y 171 5-1 789 money, agreed to take up arms against Russia, and to aid Tur- key to recover her lost possessions. Adopting a strong attitude, Kaunitz sent a declaration to St. Petersburg and Berlin that Austria would assume the offensive if the Russians crossed the Danube, and that she would have nothing to do with the Parti- tion of Poland. For a few months a general European war seemed inevitable. The Russians were unable to suppress the Confederates in Poland without Prussian aid, and at the same time were not desirous to hasten a partition which would enor- mously strengthen their powerful neighbour. Frederick's plans were for the moment completely upset. He had resolved on the Partition as a means of ensuring peace. If the dismemberment was to be followed by a war he would prefer to defer the Parti- tion. From this diplomatic tangle he suddenly found a means of extricating himself, when he learnt that MariaTheresa, opposed to war, was simply determined not to permit the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians. Armed with this infor- mation, Frederick resumed his intrigues. Though Maria Theresa abhorred the policy of plunder, Joseph 11. and Kaunitz listened to Frederick's advice ; and Austria, Russia, and Prussia agreed to the principle of partition on February 19, February 28, and March 5, 1772, respectively. The Partition was the result of a compromise, by which Catherine 11. relinquished her con- quests on the Danube, Austria averted a serious perii to herself, and Frederick gained his long-coveted territory. Suvor6v had defeated the Confederation; Dumouriez had retired, and his successor, Viomesnil, though he effected the capture of Cracow by French volunteers, was unable to carry out any operation of importance. On the 25th of July the definitive Treaty of Partition was finally signed, and, under threats of the con- quest of the whole country, the Diet agreed to the de- mands of the alHes. Poland accepted a constitution which perpetuated many of the old evils, and she remained for some twenty years in an anarchic condition, weakened, and awaiting her final dismemberment. By the Treaty of Partition Russia The Partition of Poland 315 secured White Russia, with all that part of Poland which lay between the Dwina, the Dnieper, and theDrusch; Austria took almost all Red Russia and GaUcia, with part of Podolia, San- domir, and Cracow ; and Prussia received PoKsh Prussia, except Danzig and Thorn, and part of Great Poland. By this partition Poland lost one-third of its territory and about one-half of its inhabitants. Of the three Powers, Prussia was the greatest gainer. Her portion, though the smallest, was the most populous, and proved of great value as a connecting link between the outlying parts of the Prussian monarchy. Weakened by her internal divisions and jealousies, Poland could offer but a feeble resistance to the Russian national movement in favour of the annexation of \Miite, ^^ „ ' The Causes Black, and Little Russia,^ or to the fixed determina- of the Fail tion of Frederick the Great to secure Polish Prussia. °^ P°iand. Whatever chance she might have had of maintaining her in- dependence by the aid of France had been lost during the Seven Years' War, when Poland became the base of operations for the Russian armies. Poland had fallen, but her fall was not entirely due to the political exigencies of the moment, or to the rapacity of her three neighbours. Her fall was in no small measure brought about by her own shortcomings. It is true that the incessant feuds of the Polish noblesse made Poland an intolerable neisrh- O bour for the three countries on which she bordered, and as long as that noblesse continued to perpetuate the medieval relations between their own order and the peasants, Poland was doomed. The Polish peasantry were still slaves. By each partition an additional number of this peasantry gained by a change of masters. '■ To the peasant, who had nothing to lose, it was a matter of indifference whether he was subject to his territorial lord or to a foreign foe.'- The key of the so-called misfortunes of Poland, and the explanation of the failure of the Poles to save their country, is to be found in the implacable 1 Rambaud, Histoire de la Russie, p. 460. "^Poland, by Field-Marshal Count von Moltke (translated), p. 75. 3i6 European History y 17 15-1789 hatred felt towards the noblesse by the great body of the people. None the less, the First Partition of Poland remains *a vast national crime,' and a striking illustration of the political temper of the times. It constitutes a great revolution in the history of Europe, and is a remarkable proof of the desire of aggrandisement, and of that tendency to round off territories, without any consideration of nationality, which is so characteristic of the eighteenth century. It is very doubtful if Russia did wisely in agreeing to the Partition. Poland, like Russia, was a Slav Power. In the Seven Years' War, Poland lay under the influence of Russia ; and, with Poniatowski on the throne, Catherine could have ruled the Poles through him, and have gradually absorbed Poland. The Partition strengthened both Prussia and Austria against Russia ; it turned the Poles into deadly enemies of the Muscovite state ; it has checked the advance of the Russians westwards ; it has put serious obstacles in the road from St. Petersburg to Constantinople. By agreeing with Prussia and Austria to divide Poland, Catherine gave away that supremacy over the Poles which was nearly equivalent to annexation. In doing so she acted contrary to the advice of her astute minister Panin, who opposed the idea of partition on the ground that it would be to Russia's advantage to make Poland a vassal state. But, supported by her favourites, the Tsarina overruled Panin's counsel, and the pohcy of partition was entered upon. The reforms instituted by Frederick the Great in his new territory go far to justify the Partition in the eyes of some German historians. He connected the Oder and the Vistula by a canal ; he encouraged the growth of cities ; he reclaimed land which has become one of the richest agricultural districts in Germany. Throughout the newly acquired territory the lot of the peasantry was ameliorated, and trade was improved. Nevertheless, the verdict of history must be given against the three Powers, who by their action definitely introduced into European politics a principle which Napoleon in later years TJie Partition of Poland 31/ put into practice, with results so serious to both Austria and Prussia. The policy which led to this dismemberment of Poland developed naturally into a system of universal con- quest, and thus the First Partition marks the beginning of the European revolution. Neither England nor France interfered to save the unhappy country. England was fully occupied with the American diffi- culty, and moreover her statesmen looked with ^. •" . . The Non- favour upon the policy of establishing a close con- intervention nection ^^ith Russia. Her commercial interests, ° "s^*"'^- threatened by the Bourbons, would, it was felt, be furthered by a good understanding between the Courts of London and St. Petersburg. English policy in India and in the colonies was not interfered with by Russia ; there was no danger of Rus- sian domination in the Mediterranean, or indeed in the Black Sea. France was still to be reckoned with in India, and Russia, like England, was not on friendly terms with the French Bourbons. Moreover, while English and French in- terests clashed in the Levant, England, in agreement with Russia, held an uncontested commercial supremacy in the' Baltic. Enghsh ministers might not approve the principle of partition, but they had neither the wish nor the power to intervene. Lord Suffolk, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, alluded to the Partition as a * curious transaction,' and con- tented himself with prophesying that the three Powers were ' sowing the seeds of future disturbances, instead of rest and tranquillity, to that part of Europe.' The continental mon- archs regarded the possible interference of England with their schemes with indifference. It was thought that England, owing to the parliamentary struggles and to the colonial troubles, was in a state of decadence. At Neisse, Frederick spoke of England with contempt, and said he would prefer to be a small German prince to being king of England. Catherine was herself convinced that a war alone would bring about internal unity in England. Kaunitz, indeed, seems to have recognised that England differed from the continental Powers, 3i8 Europea7i History^ 17 15-1789 that ' one must not be deceived by appearances,' and that it was necessary to be circumspect in deaUng with such a curious and singular government. Nor did France give any effective assistance to Poland. As long as Choiseul was in power Austria hesitated to join The Policy Prussia and Russia in the policy of partition, of France. Beyond sending, in reply to the appeal of the members of the Confederation of Bar, whose success would have resulted in the postponement of all attempts to alter the Polish Constitution, arms, m.oney, and 1500 men under Choisy de Taules and Dumouriez, Choiseul trusted to the inter- vention of the Turks, to the resistance of the Poles, and to the neutrality of Austria, to defeat the aims of Russia. Though willing to use diplomatic means to hamper Russia, Prussia, and Austria, he had no intention of involving Europe in a war for the preservation of Poland, and never seems to have realised the possibility of Russia, Prussia, and Austria acting in union. The marriage of Marie Antoinette to the Dauphin, in 1770, seemed to justify his expectations. His sudden fall, however, in December 1770, destroyed all possibiHty of active French intervention, and removed a stumbling-block in the way of Joseph 11. and Kaunitz. The Partition of Poland and the revolution in Sweden^ accomplished, the main interest of the three PoAvers was concentrated on the Turkish war. Attempts had The Russo- ^ Turkish already been made to bring about peace, but the War. Porte, recognising that the aim of the Russians was the occupation of Constantinople, refused the terms offered at a congress held at Bucharest in the spring of 1773, and the war continued. Meanwhile the Austrian Court was bent upon rectifying the terms of the Partition Treaty, and securing the line of the Sbrucz and, if possible, Bukovina. Catherine at first refused to entertain the idea of any Austrian extension, but events in the autumn of the year rendered her more ame- nable. Not only had the Russian troops suffered reverses, but 1 See page 328. The Treaty of KiUc/mk-Kamardji 319 a formidable insurrection had broken out among the Cossacks of the Don, headed by Pugachev. The movement was in part national and in part social. The introduction of foreign in- fluences in the seventeenth century, affecting even the hturgy, had been very unpopular, and Peter the Great had been com- pelled to sternly repress the discontent. The old Muscovite traditions lived on in the reign of Catherine 11., and Pugachev belonged to the party that upheld them. His real strength, however, lay with the peasants. Originally the peasant was free, but gradually he had become a serf attached to the soil, and by the end of the seventeenth century could even be sold apart from the land, though by law he was distinguished from a mere slave. When Peter in., in 1762, excused the noble class from enforced service, the peasants, remembering their ancient freedom, expected the extension of the same principle to themselves, declared that the upper orders had kept back the edict, and attributed Peter's death to their enemies the nobles. Many believed that Peter was still alive, and that Pugachev, a Cossack, was the Tsar. The Cossacks, Slavs by birth, attached to the orthodox religion, and dishking the Turk- ish war, which disturbed their ordinary avocations, were joined by numbers of fugitive serfs, and by Calmuck and Khirgis Tartars. At first Pugachev met with some successes in the Ural, and divided the property of all the nobles who fell into his hands among the serfs. Eventually the insurgents were defeated, Pugachev was captured and executed, and the inde- pendence of the Cossacks considerably curtailed.^ ^ Hampered by this rising, Catherine could not prevent Kau- nitz from placing troops along the Sbrucz, nor Frederick from rounding off his new possessions in Poland by the acquisition of fresh territory. The Turks alone of Kutchuk- failed to take advantage of the embarrassments ^^^"^'''^j^ of Russia. Though Abdul Hamid, who had succeeded Musta- pha as Sultan in 1774, was determined to carry on the war, he was even less successful than his predecessor. Rumiantsov 1 See Sorel, La Question d' Orient au XVIIP'^^ Siecle, 320 Etcropea7i History^ 171 5-1789 routed the Turkish forces in June, and in July the Grand Vizier sent plenipotentiaries to demand peace. On July 19, 1774, the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji was concluded. Russia re- stored to Turkey Georgia, Bessarabia, Wallachia, and Molda- via, and the islands of the Archipelago. She retained, however, Kinburn, Jenikale, Kertsch, and Azov, with their adjacent dis- tricts. The Tartars were brought under Russian influence, certain privileges for Christians in Turkey were demanded, better government of the Principalities was insisted upon, and a Russian embassy was to be established at Constantinople. The Treaty of Kainardji marks the definite beginning of the Eastern Question. Russia had obtained a firm footing on the north coasts of the Black Sea, the Turkish frontier being the river Boug, and she had obtained a declaration of her right of free commercial navigation in Turkish waters.^ Before the treaty was ratified, the Turks had hoped for the intervention of Prussia and Austria. But Frederick confined himself to a protest, while Joseph, satisfied with the extension of the Aus- trian portion of Podolia to the Sbrucz, and resolved upon the seizure of Bukovina, was already inclining to a Russian alliance. In September the x*\ustrian forces occupied Bukovina, and its cession was ratified by the helpless Turks by the treaty of May 8, 1775. The Treaty of Kainardji, and the First Partition of Poland, are both signal examples of the methods of the Rus- sian Government. The one was a step in the liberation of the Christian subjects of Turkey, the other a step in the enslave- ment of an ancient and brave nation. The Partition itself was not only a crime, it was a mistake. The necessity of maintaining peace between the three Imperial Courts was its excuse, the anarchy in Poland was the opportunity. But though the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and Prussia led to their alliance, the PoHsh question henceforward served as an additional cause of their mutual hostility. It did not check the struggle beween Austria and Prussia for the head- 1 See The Treaty Relations between Russia and Turkey. By T. E. Holland, D.C.L. . The Treaty of KiitcJuik-Kainardji 321 ;hip in Germany, nor has it rendered Russia less dangerous to jcrman unity. During these years France had been unable to defend either Poland or Turkey from defeat and territorial loss. Exhausted 3y the losses in the Seven Years' War, and busy choiseui's vith the work of reorganisation, with the expulsion ^°^? ^"'^ Df the Jesuits, and with the disputes between the Policy. Z!rown and the Fa?'lement of Paris, it was impossible for the government to do more than exercise diplomacy in the east ind south-east of Europe. The history of France from 1763 ;o 1770 is the history of the ministry of Choiseul. That energetic minister, after an interval of five years, had igain in 1766 assumed control of foreign affairs. He had ihvays opposed the idea of a partition of Poland, but, absorbed n his preparations for regaining naval supremacy, he neg- ected the affairs of eastern Europe ; his interference came too ate, and France in 1772 was not in a position to do more :han remonstrate. ^ Though history enumerates a number )f factions which French intrigue stirred up and supported in Poland, yet at the decisive moment we see them constantly leserted and abandoned.' ^ After the close of the Seven Years' iVar, Choiseul, bent on avenging the losses suffered by France It the hands of England, began a great work of reorganisation. England,' he declared to the king, ' is the avowed enemy of ^our power, of your state, and so she will ever remain. Her gasping commercial instincts, her arrogance, her jealousy of ^our power, ought to warn you that many years must elapse before we can make a lasting peace with such a country.' And Choiseul was right. Though wanting at times in firmness, he showed a proper appreciation of the nature of the rivalry be- :;ween PYance and England. He ardently desired the complete regeneration of France, and spared no pains to carry out his k^ast projects. He encouraged colonisation; he devoted much ittention to the Antilles, fortifying ^Martinique with great care ; tie endeavoured to restore the finances. Between 1 763 and 1 766 '^Poland, by Field-Marshal von Moltke (trans.), p. 88. PERIOD VI, X 322 Eiiropea7i History^ 171 5-1789 he introduced considerable reforms in the army, and he com- pletely reorganised the navy. With the eye of a statesman, he recognised that for a successful war with Great Britain a power- ful navy was indispensable, and that the Spanish alliance would be invaluable. He weakened England's influence in Portugal and Holland, and hoped by means of alliances with these countries to set up an effective counterpoise to the power of Great Britain. Considerable success attended his efforts. His example was followed by Grimaldi, the joint author with Choi- seul of the Family Compact of 1761, and Spain began the work of reorganising her navy and her colonial system. In 1759 ^^ French navy had been practically annihilated, only forty ships of the line remaining. In 1770 Choiseul could boast that not only were there afloat sixty-four ships of the line and fifty frig- ates, but that the efficiency of the officers and crews had greatly improved ; that the artillery of the fleet had been renewed, and that the arsenals and storehouses were filled with war mate- rial. Choiseul had never accepted the Peace of Paris as defini- tive and final, and till his fall the main object of his policy w^as, in close alliance with Spain, to prepare for the inevitable war with England. In 1766 Lorraine and Bar, on the death of Stanislas Leszczynski, became definitely a portion of France, and in 1768 the French purchased the island of Corsica from Genoa. England, however, occupied with internai commo- tions and with the colonial controversy, was not ready for war ; in spite of the efforts of Paoli, the Corsicans were over- thrown by the Comte de Vaux at the battle of Ponte Nuovo. Choiseul secured for France a valuable acquisition, and Napo- leon Bonaparte was born a French subject. In 1770 a dispute ^, ... . , between England and Spain over the Falkland The Affair of or the Falkland Islaiids brought thcsc two countrics to the verge of war. In 1766 a British force had taken pos- session of the islands, but in June 1770 a Spanish expedition appeared before Port Egmont and expelled the small English garrison. The attack on Port Egmont roused the English nation, and war seemed inevitable. The Treaty of KtitcJmk-Kainardji 323 Grimaldi, who had already on behalf of Spain negotiated the Family Compact and the Peace of Paris, had, on his return to Madrid from his embassy to the French capital, succeeded Wall as Secretary of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Marquis Jeronymo Grimaldi was a Genoese by birth, and was declared by the English envoy to have ' no very extraordinary talents nor extensive notions.' * He is,' wrote Harris in 1770, * dexterous in chicanery, and in confounding an argument.'^ In 1766 a popular rising in Madrid had been followed by the dismissal of the Finance Minister, Squillacci, an Italian ; but Grimaldi had ingratiated himself in the favour of Charles iil, was not actually unpopular, and remained in office. Though Spanish pubUc opinion relied on the Family Compact, Grimaldi was indisposed to support Choiseul against England, and, with Charles iil, was in favour of an accommodation ; while d'Aranda, the successor of Squillacci, and an admirer of Choiseul, was anxious for the outbreak of hostilities. Matters assumed a very threatening aspect, and Harris left Madrid. The fall of Choi- seul, however, destroyed all chance of aid from France, and Charles iii. agreed to restore the garrison, reserving, however, his claims to the rights of sovereignty. Naval reorganisation and a Spanish alliance had been the chief features of Choiseul's policy, and later events justified his \\isdom. The importance to France of a strong navy was proved over and over again before 1815. Spain under Charles iii. was progressing rapidly along the path of reform. With good administration, Spain was marked by her geograph- ical position, by the family connection existing between her rulers and those of France, and by her fear of England's sea power, as the most valuable ally that Choiseul could possibly have found in his proposed crusade against Great Britain. His sudden fall had been caused partly owing to the conviction of Louis XV. that France was on the verge of war with England, and partly because his tenure of office was an obstacle to the overthrow of the Paiiements by the CrowTi. ^Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury^ vol. i. p. 56. 324 European History ^ 17 15-1789 Since the Seven Years' War the power of that corporation had steadily grown. The disastrous Peace of Paris had shaken the royal authority, and the expulsion of the Jesuits Suppression from France had still further increased the preten- Parie^ment sions of the magistrates. Confident in the strength of Paris of their position, they had not hesitated to continue Provincial their attacks upon both the royal and the ecclesi- Pariements. astical authorities. The expulsion of the Jesuits, the growth of sceptical writings, the demand on the part of the Parleinent for the entire independence of the civil from the ecclesiastical power, roused the indignation of the clergy, and necessitated the interference of the Government.^ In 1766 the Council ordered the GalHcan maxims of 1682 to be observed, and endeavoured to enforce silence upon the combatants. But the attitude of the Parlemcnt towards the Crown was as aggres- sive as that adopted towards the clergy. The king's right to impose taxes without its consent was openly questioned, as was his right to hold a bed of justice, or to arrest and exile members of the Farle?}ie7it if they refused to carry out his wishes. In 1763 the Parle77ient oi Paris had protested against some edicts which had been registered by the royal consent at a bed of justice, and had received the support of the provincial Pa7-lements. Emboldened by the weak attitude of the Government, the Parle 77ie 7it oiVdiUS proceeded iii 1766 to protest against the arrest of some members of l.ie Pa7'le77ie7it of Brittany. This audacity was at once met by a declaration made by Louis in person that the legislative power sprang alone from him ; but the magistrates, undaunted, gave up none of their pretensions, and the quarrel smouldered on till a series of in- trigues overthrew their supporter, Choiseul, and left them at the mercy of the king. At the beginning of 1 770 these intrigues had developed into a formidable conspiracy against the minister. The Chancellor, Maupeou, and the Abb6 Terray, Comptroller of the Finances, had formed with the Due d'Aiguillon a secret cabal, which received valuable support from Madame du Barry. 1 Rocquain, L' esprit )-evoluiionnaire avant la Revolution, pp. 252-5. The Treaty of Ktitchiik-Kainardji 325 In April 1770 d'Aiguillon, accused of grave abuses in his government of Brittany, was, by his own and the king's wish, tried before the Parlement of Paris. After an interval of two months Louis declared him exonerated from every charge, but the Parlement added that until he was formally acquitted he was not to exercise any of the functions of the peerage. Furious at this fresh act of insubordination, Louis carried away the registers of the Parle me7it ; while the magistrates on their part refused to perform their duties, and the administration of justice was suspended. On December 7 Maupeou, the Chan- cellor, denounced the conduct of the Parle77ient as seditious. On December 24 Choiseul (who had steadily refused to pay any court to Madame du Barry) fell, his place being given to d'Aiguillon, the supporter of the Jesuits and the enemy of the Parle7nent. On January 20, 1771, the Pa7'le77ie7it of Paris was suppressed, its fall being shortly afterwards followed by that of the provincial Pa7'let7te7its and of the Coi/r des Aides, while the Chatelet was reorganised and made subservient to the Crown. The energetic action of the Government was crowned with success.^ All talk about revolution ceased, while Voltaire, hating the opposition of the Parle77ie7it to toleration and reform, gave a vigorous support to the Government, and found himself at one with the priests. \\\ spite of the success which attended this coup d'etat, the royal authority, though unquestioned as long as Louis xv. lived, was unpopular and contemptible. ' The policy of Louis xv. towards his Parliaments,' Mr. Lecky writes, ' was of a kind which bevond all others discredits and weakens governments. Either resistance or concession, if consistently carried out and skilfully conducted, might have succeeded j but a policy of alternate resistance and concession, of bold acts of authority repeatedly and ignorainiously reversed, could have no other effect than to uproot all feeling of reverence for the Crown. '^ 1 The Parlement of Paris had many enemies, including not only the priests, but also men like Voltaire, who resented the judicial murder of Galas in 1762, and other cruel and intolerant acts. 2 Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. v. chap. xx. 326 European History^ 1715-17S9 Choiseul's fall in December had as momentous results on the course of events beyond the borders of France as it had The FaU of ^^ internal politics. Occupied with vast schemes, Choiseui. ^g^ \^q. Nicholas Fouquet, underrated the influence of his enemies, and paid little heed to their intrigues. For upwards of a year before his fall his position had been under- mined by Terray and Maupeou, no less than by Madame du Barry. While Choiseui desired to secure, by a policy of con- ciliation, peace within France and to embark upon an advent- urous foreign policy, his opponents, caring little for the honour of France abroad, were resolved on the suppression of the Parlemetit of Paris. In consequence of their representations, Louis XV. suddenly reaUsed that the dispute between England and Spain over the Falkland Islands was, in consequence of the existence of the Family Compact, likely to involve France in war. Choiseui fell, like d'Argenson, the victim of a series of intrigues and of the incapacity of Louis xv. to appreciate the value of an able minister. The policy of Choiseui was based upon considerations for the welfare of France. His alliance with Spain was statesmanlike ; his endeavours to lessen the influence of Austria in French pohtics requires no defence. It is doubt- ful if France under any circumstances would have acted wisely in interfering energetically in the East of Europe.^ A memoir on the true poHcy of France, presented by him in February 1 763 to Louis XV., is marked by keen pohtical insight and a thorough knowledge of European politics. In it he appreciates the Aus- trian connection at its real value, and though he sees that the union of France and Austria ensures tranquillity in Italy, he is careful to point out that Spain is the true ally of France, and that if France loses the Spanish alliance she will be isolated in Europe. His attitude with regard to the expulsion of the Jesuits and the annexation of Corsica, and the dignity with which, when exiled, he retired to Chanteloup, confirms the view that in Choiseui France had a minister not unworthy of her best 1 Sorel, La Question d' Orient an XVI 11"^^ Steele. The Treaty of KutcJmk-Kahiardji 327 traditions. His fall affected not only the foreign and home poHcy of France, it excited deep interest in Vienna and Berlin. At the same time it must be remembered that Louis xv., whose knowledge of foreign politics was considerable, was probably acting in the best interests of France in removing a minister who was bent on immediate war with England. It was also in the interests of the Crown and nation that the Parlements — obstacles to all real reform — should be abolished. Choiseul's friendly relations with the Parle7nent of Paris ren- ' dered his fall a necessary prehminar}^ to any energetic move- ment against the rebeUious and reactionary corporation of lawyers. The Government was carried on by d'Aiguillon, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Terray, and INIaupeou, and numer- ous judicial reforms were made. Six new Tribunals xhe Trium- called Conseils Superieurs were instituted at Arras, virate. Blois, Chalons-sur-Marne, Clermont, Lyons, and Poitiers, and a central court of justice was set up in Paris, composed of seventy-five nominees of the Crown. This Assembly was known as the Pa7'le7nent Maupeou, or the ' Great Council,' and justice was administered gratuitously. In spite of its magnitude the revolution excited no serious opposi- tion. jMalesherbes, the President of the Cotir des Aides, pro- tested, as did several members of the provincial Parle7ne7its, but the discontent was mainly confined to some pamphlets and a few witty sayings. To these feeble protests Louis xv. paid little attention. To all appearance the royal power had won a signal victory ; the Chancellor was confident ^nd triumphant, and the only organ of Hberty by which the nation could make itself heard was destroyed. From 1 77 1 to 1774 the French Government was carried on by the Triumvirate. While Maupeou and Terray mismanaged internal affairs, the latter's desperate remedies to improve the state of the finances only increasing the general dislocation, d'Aiguillon was called upon to deal with important events abroad. Though French agents remained in Poland, he made 328 European History, 171 5-1789 no attempt to avert the partition of that kingdom which took place in 1773. With regard to Sweden, however, he was more successful. Towards that country he continued Choiseul's pohcy of giving encouragement to Gustavus in., who on the 19th of August 1772, aided by the subsidies, and encouraged by the support of the French Government, carried out one of the most audacious and successful revolutions of the eighteenth century. On February 12, 1771, Adolphus Frederick, King of Sweden, had died, and with the accession of his son, Gustavus in., it was Gustavus III. evident that a critical period in Swedish history and the ^^^^ been reached. Since the death of Charles xii. Swedish Revolution. Sweden had been the prey to aristocratic anarchy, and after the disastrous peace of Abo, Russian influence had steadily increased among the governing faction. In 1766, after some thirty years of government by the Hats, the party of the Caps came into power, and, in order to counteract the influence of France, drew near to Russia, and arranged a marriage between the Crown Prince, Gu5ta\ais, and Sophia Magdalena, a Danish princess. Though the economical policy of the Caps was in many respects commendable, their foreign policy was disastrous. Instead of observing a careful neutrahty, they, under the leadership of Ostermann, the Russian ambassa- dor, threw themselves on the side of Russia, ignoring the fact that the Tsarina's policy implied the ultimate destruction of Swedish independence. The elections of 1769 resulted in the defeat of the Caps, and though the Crown Prince, supported by the French ambassa- dor, endeavoured, but in vain, to carry out necessary reforms in the Constitution, the success of the Hats or French party en- couraged Gustavus to visit Paris, and to discuss with Choiseul the political situation in Sweden. Gustavus arrived in Paris on February 4, 1771, and on his father's death Louis xv. under- took to pay large subsidies to Sweden annually, and sent Ver- gennes, the leading French diplomatist, to Stockholm. On June 6, 1 771, Gustavus arrived at his capital. The overthrow TJie Treaty of Kutchuk-Kamardji ^2g of the anarchical constitution of Sweden was absolutely neces- sary if the countr}- was not to become the prey of Russia. Gustavus, already an adept in the arts of dissimulation, con- scious of the possession of great powers, and animated by a patriotic ambition to save his country, realised that the postpone- ment of a revolution would destroy all hopes of securing the independence of his country. In an interview with Frederick the Great on his way from Paris, he had discovered that Russia, Prussia, and Denmark were leagued together to uphold the existing Swedish constitution. The Partition of Poland was already agreed upon, and Cath- erine's success against the Turks was assured. Unless a revo- lution had been speedily effected, Sweden would undoubtedly have shared the fate of Poland, and would have been gradually dismembered. From that fate the determination of Gustavus saved her. Supported by the democracy, he engaged in a successful struggle with the priMileged orders, and the coup d^eiat of August 19 proved an inestimable benefit to Sweden. A new constitution was drawn up, in which the king was given ex- traordinary prerogatives. Many of the abuses hitherto rampant in Sweden were abolished, and an attempt was made to intro- duce justice and order into the kingdom. It would probably have been better for Sweden if Gustavus had established a des- potism, instead of attempting to govern constitutionally a peo- ple as yet unable to appreciate the meaning of constitutional Hberties.^ Very striking were the immediate consequences of the Swedish revolution. Owing to the coup d'etat of Gustavus 111., Sweden had suddenly emerged from the compara- The Effects tive obscmitv in which she had remained since the °^ ^^,^. . Swedish death of Charles xn. The plans of Russia, Prussia, Revolution, and Denmark had received a rude shock, and a general Euro- pean war seemed imminent. Catherine 11., who had hoped to form a ' Grand Northern Alliance ' of all the states dependent upon Russia, prepared for hostilities against Sweden, and 1 See Geffroy, Gustave III. et la Cotir de France. 330 European History^ 1715-1789 Denmark hastily armed. No war, however, took place ; the immunity of Sweden from attack, and the preservation of tran- quillity in the north, being as much due to the influence of the Courts of Berlin and St. James as the difficulties in which Cath- erine found herself involved in Turkey. Frederick the Great had already succeeded, by means of the Partition of Poland, in averting a war between Russia and Austria ; he now exerted all his influence to preserve peace between Russia and Sweden, fearing for his gains from Poland if a general European war broke out. His efforts to prevent an outbreak in the north were vigorously seconded by the English Government, which determined to maintain the balance of power in the Baltic, refused to co-operate with Russia, and, anticipating the views of Canning, discountenanced any interference in the domestic affairs of Sweden, and adopted a pohcy of neutrality and non- interv^ention. The hostile preparations of Catherine, however, continued, and an attack by the joint forces of Russia, Prussia, and Den- Attitude of mark upon Sweden was expected in the spring. France. jj^ ^|^g autumu of 1 772 Gustavus had, by his war- like attitude, induced the Danish Court to disarm, but matters at the close of the year assumed so threatening an aspect that France decided to aid Sweden by diplomacy, and with money and men. At Paris the news of the Swedish RevoJution had been received with enthusiasm, and Gustavus in., v/ho during his short visit had made himself extremely popular, found that even the degraded French Government, to some of the mem- bers of which the traditions of a brihiant foreign policy still appealed, was ready to enter upon a European war on his behalf. Till the death of Louis xv. French foreign policy, guided by d'Aiguillon, regained some of its former prestige by its advocacy of the Swedish cause. United with Spain, and having sent Durrand, an experienced diplomatist, to St. Peters- burg, the French Government warned the Courts of Vienna and Copenhagen of its intention to support Sweden, and en- deavoured to secure England's co-operation in maintaining the TJie Treaty of Ktitchiik-Kainai'dji 331 balance of power in the Baltic. But the English Government refused to allow a French fleet either to enter the Baltic or to act in the Mediterranean on behalf of Turkey. The fear, how- ' ever, of a European war passed away, owing to the unexpected . obstinacy of the Turks, who in 1773 gained a brilHant victory I over the Russians. Catherine, unable to deal adequately with ' the northern complications so long as she had the Turkish war , on her hands, listened to the pacific views of her Chancellor, Panin. Contenting herself with the Treaty of Tsarkoe-Selo, by which the Grand Duke Paul exchanged with the King of Den- mark his Holstein possessions for Oldenburg and Delmanhorst, and with a fresh secret alliance with Denmark signed on August 12, 1774, Catherine decided to wait for a favourable oppor- tunity for carrying out that policy towards Sweden on which ' she had set her heart. To some extent the French Govern- : ment had atoned for its apathy with regard to Poland by the readiness with which it was prepared to defend the action of ! Gustavus. The influence of Vergennes at Stockholm became I paramount. D'Aiguillon, in addition to large subsidies, nego- tiated a loan to enable Sweden to reorganise and strengthen j its army ; and the enhanced prestige of France in the north stands out in relief against the dark background of Louis xv.'s declining years. On May 10, 1774, Louis xv. died, leaving to his successor the task of rescuing the country from the financial and. administrative chaos which was the result of his long reign, and the duty of adopting a foreign policy which should restore to France her position among the great European Powers. CHAPTER XII EUROPE AND THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE I 774-1 783 After the Partition of Poland — Outbreak of the American War — Vergennes — His Policy in 1774 — The American War — The American Declaration of Independence — Vergennes' Views — The Value of French Assistance to the Colonists — The Effect of the Capitulation of Saratoga — England and France at War, 1778 — European Politics in 1778 — The Bavarian Succes- sion Question — The Decline of the House of Wittelsbach — The War of the Bavarian Succession — Mediation of France and Russia — The Treaty ofTeschen — The Armed Neutrality of the North— England's Position in 1780 — Events in 1781 — Attempts at Peace — Rodney's Victory, and the Defence of Gibraltar — Peace Negotiations — The Treaty of Versailles — Results of the American War upon Western Europe and upon Russia and Austria. The Partition of Poland, followed by the Treaty of Kainardji, forced upon Europe the recognition of the growing^influence of Russia in Europe. The rise of this new Power After the _ ^ ^ Partition of fouud Austria and Prussia mutually distrustful, the Poland. Bourbon kingdoms weak, and England occupied with her own affairs at home and in the colonies. During the ten years succeeding the Partition of Poland, the strained rela- tions between Prussia and Austria, the outbreak of the Ameri- can war, and Joseph 11. 's attempt to seize Bavaria, afforded Catherine ii. admirable opportunities for establishing Russia as a great European state. Europe remained in a state of tension, aggravated by the uneasy activity of Joseph 11., the ambition of Catherine, and the disHke felt by Frederick the Grent for Eng- land. In April 1775 the first blood in the American struggle 332 - Ew'ope and the War of American Independence 333 was shed at Lexington, and the following year the seizure of Bukovina by Austria almost produced a war with Russia, while at the same time Frederick the Great was endeav- ^ ,. , , Outbreak of curing to excite fresh troubles in Poland, in order the Ameri- to make a second partition necessary, and French agents were busy in the East attempting to induce the Turks to enter upon fresh hostilities with Russia. The Declaration of American Independence on July 4, 1776, led to an alliance between France and the revolted colonists, which deeply affected the course of events in central Europe, and was productive of several unexpected developments. Ever since the Peace of Paris Choiseul had ardently desired to obtain from England reparation for the losses which France had sus- tained ; it was left to Vergennes to carry out his aims, and to inflict a series of severe blows on the maritime and colonial power of Great Britain. On May 10, 1774, Louis xv. had died, leaving the monarchy weakened in reputation abroad, and suf- fering terribly from financial embarrassments. In the balance of power in the east of Europe France had httle weight, while in the west court intrigues had lessened her influence, and so far rendered the Family Compact with Spain of little practical value. No sooner had Louis x^^. ascended the Vergennes. throne than Vergennes, who was then in Sweden, was nominated the successor of d'Aiguillon at the Foreign Office. Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, descended from an ancient Burgundian family, was born on the 28th of Decem- ber 1 719, at Dijon. An ancestor, Philibert Gravier, an avocat in the Parleineni of Dijon, had married, in 1652, Rose Perrault, who brought with her the property of Vergennes, which lay near Autun. After studying law, the young Vergennes had, under the super\'ision of his uncle, Chavigny, seen something of diplo- matic life in Portugal, and in Germany, during the Austrian Succession War. After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle the young diplomatist was appointed French representative at the Court of the Elector of Trier, and during the years 1750, 1751, and 1752 took an active part in supporting the claims of the Elector 534 European History, 17 15-1789 Palatine for compensation from England and Austria. In 1754, on the death of Des Alleurs, he was sent to Constantinople, and till the diplomatic revolution of 1756 exerted himself with suc- cess to organise an attack of the Turkish forces upon the Rus- sians whenever the latter marched westwards. The united ac- tion of France, Austria, and Russia in the Seven Years' War upset all his preparations, and it was not till 1768 that an opportunity was given him of inciting the Turks to declare war against Rus- sia. He had crowned his diplomatic services to France by his action at Stockholm, during and after the coup d'etat of Gusta- vus III. Russian influence received a severe blow, and the appointment of Vergennes to the Foreign Office was a wise recognition of his admirable services and undoubted abilities. Though not a statesman, Vergennes was an experienced diplo- matist, possessed of a considerable knowledge of European politics. Throughout his career he showed great sagacity and acuteness in furthering the interests of France. He never allowed his patriotism to lead him into attempting what was impracticable, and during his ministry France recovered much of the prestige which she lost during the Seven Years' War. His pohcy was a continuance and expansion of that of Choiseul. To avenge the losses sustained by France at the hands of Eng- land, and to slacken the ties which bound France to Austria, were objects worthy of a French Foreign Minister, and entirely consonant with the views of the French nation. On his accession to office France, in spite of the efforts of Choiseul, held the position of a second-rate Power. The Peace His Policy of Paris, followed by the First Partition of Poland in 1774. ^j-j(^ 1^^ Treaty of Kainardji, had demonstrated the weakness of France, and the failure of her diplomacy. In Poland her influence was destroyed, at Constantinople her credit had declined. Before, however, Louis xvi. had been on the throne many years, circumstances enabled Vergennes to place France again in a leading position in Europe, to deal a severe blow at England's maritime supremacy, and to still further weaken the unpopular Austrian connection. The out- Ein'ope and the War of American Independence 335 break of the war between the American colonies and the mother country afforded France the opportunity, long desired by Choiseul, of avenging the losses incurred during The Ameri- the Seven Years' War. The apathy, divisions, and ^^" ^^'■• exhaustion of the Americans during the early phases of the war had weakened their resistance, and it became evident that without foreign assistance the success of the revolution would be seriously endangered. It was obvious to the American leaders that no French aUiance was possible unless accom- panied by a complete severance from Great Britain; and, taking advantage of the indignation roused among the colonists by England's action in hiring German mercenaries, Congress voted, on July 4, 1776, the Declaration of Inde- pendence. The importance of this step cannot be carf D^"r'a- overestimated. /The political unitv of the Ens^lish tion of inde- ^ — ....'' pendence. race was for the first time in its history broken up ; the rise of a new nation was proclaimed to the world ; an independent foreign policy was rendered possible ; and Con- gress determined to seek a French alliance. Before Silas Deane, the American representative, had arrived in Paris, in July 1776, Vergennes, probably influenced by Choiseul, had written a memorial on American affairs.) In the vergennes' document the importance of maintaining a close Views, alliance between the different branches of the House of Bour- bon, and of opposing on all occasions the interests of Great Britain, was clearly demonstrated, and especial stress was laid upon the necessity of aiding the Americans in their struggle for independence. The defeat and submission of the colo- nists would, Vergennes declared, be followed by disastrous con- sequences for the French and Spanish possessions in the West Indies. If, however, the Americans won by their own exertions, they would be themselves disposed to conquer the French and Spanish West Indies, so as to provide fresh outlets for their productions. Hence it was of supreme importance that France should at once lay the colonists under a debt of gratitude, and at the same time avenge upon England ' the evils which since 33^ Europea7i History , 171 5-1 789 1 the commencement of the century she has inflicted upon her neighbours and rivals.' He ended by urging that the intentions of the French Government should be kept secret, and that while the Americans should be prevented from making peace by ' secret favours and vague hopes,' the English Ministry should be dexterously tranquillised ' as to the intentions of F^^^hA^°^ France and Spain.' ^ Thus, though England was sistanceto at pcacc with both France and Spain, the insur- nists.° °' gents were to be aided with money and military stores, and the Bourbon forces were to be rapidly strengthened with a view to open hostilities with England. In spite of the pacific views of Maurepas, Malesherbes, and Turgot, who realised the pressing necessity of peace for France, and notwithstanding the risks which an absolute monarchy ran in supporting rebels against their lawful king, Vergennes' policy prevailed ; a large sum of money was secretly furnished to the Americans ; Grimaldi, the Spanish minister, was induced to send a similar amount, and, till the end of the war, the colonists were aided by loans and supplies of military material. What- ever may be thought of Vergennes' underhand methods, there is no doubt that, between 1774 and 1778, the French assistance proved invaluable, while the Bourbons in Spain and Tuscany, no less than Frederick the Great, Joseph 11., and the Dutch, aided and encouraged in various degrees the American resist- ance to England. ' Every nation in Europe,' wrote Franklin and Deane, the American commissioners at Paris, Svishes to see Britain humbled, having all in their turn been offended by her insolence, which in prosperity she is apt to discover on all occasions.' Vergennes' views on the situation, and on the true policy of France, were supported by the majority of French- men, who were inspired either by resentment for former defeats at the hands of England, or, like Voltaire and Rousseau, by feelings of sympathy for religious and political liberty. In spite of the incongruity of a despotic government supporting 1 See Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century^ vols. iv. and V. Eiijvpe and the War of Aincricaji Independence 337 the rise of a great republic in the West fv^unded upon rebelHon, the French enthusiasm for the colonists was sincere, and showed : itself in the eagerness with which multitudes of soldiers crossed •the Atlantic to reinforce the armies of the insurgents. It only required the disastrous capitulation of Saratoga, on October 17, 1777, to convince the French the^Capftuia- ministejrs that England's greatness was over, and tio" o^ Sara- to decide them to openly join the colonists. On February 6, 1778, treaties, in which the Americans engaged to j make no peace with England unless their independence was j recognised, were signed in Paris. Even Vergennes had hesi- ; tated to take this decisive action till he was assured that a ! reconciliation between Endand and her colonists r. , , . ^ England and was impossible. He was well aware of the miser- France at I able state of the French finances, while many of ^^' ^^"^ ' his colleagues dreaded war and were inclined to follow the w^se policy indicated by Turgot. But the overwhelming disas- ter of Saratoga carried all before it, and Vergennes seized the opportunity of still further humiliating Great Britain. In March 1778 England and France were at war, and the isolation of Great Britain seemed complete. The German Powers were hostile, Frederick the Great being an avowed enemy, and while Spain was preparing to aid France, the attitude of Russia and Holland was doubtful. The capitulation of Saratoga had rendered the success of the revolution a certainty. During the remaining months of 1778, however, England's chances of success seemed more hopeful, and both Washington and Vergennes recognised with apprehension the possibility of the failure of the revolution. Before the end of the year nearly all the French possessions in India had been lost ; the inde- cisive battle of Ushant was fought on July 2 7 ; while, in the West Indies, the gains and losses of the English and French were fairly equalised. But with the beginning of 1779 the prospects of the colonial cause gradually improved. In April Spain signed a convention with France, while in June she declared war against England and besieged Gibraltar. PERIOD VI. y 33^ European History, 17 15-1789 While aiding the ^^ merican colonists, Vergennes was careful to exert all his influence in favour of the preservation of the Euro ean peace of Europe. It was equally England's in- Poiitics in tercst to securc if possible the aUiance of Russia, ^^^ ■ and, as in the Seven Years' War, to involve France in continental complications. In 1778 there seemed every reason to expect the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The relations between Russia and Turkey had become so strained that on the 27th of February Sir James Harris, the Enghsh ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote that ' war between the Russian Court and the Porte appears inevitable.' The naval and military preparations of the Turks proceeded on a consid- erable scale, and it was believed in England that France, in order to draw off the attention of Russia from the politics of western Europe, was inducing the Turks to violate the Treaty of Kainardji. Nikolai Ivanovich, Count Panin, who still pre- sided over the Russian Foreign Office, was unwilling to take any step which might endanger the close alliance between Russia and Prussia. He still hoped to carry into effect his northern system which, uniting Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, should counteract the effects of the Family Compact. In 1778 Catherine, still irritated with the Austrian Govern- ment, which had hampered her in the late peace negotiations with the Turks, was approached by the English Government through the medium of Sir James Harris, and invited to make an offensive and defensive alliance. ' But the opposition of Panin, influenced by Frederick the Great, who was still furious at the conduct of Bute, prevented any close rapprochejuejit between England and Russia ; and Catherine declared her inabihty to join England against France, unless the English Government bound itself to support her against the Turks. * Turkey,' she declared, ' was her national enemy as France was ours. ... A war between Russia and Turkey was almost certain, and she would find herself thus with two enemies upon her hands, and no corresponding advantage accruing to her from her Enghsh alhance, which would be a dead letter with Europe and the War of American Independence 339 respect to the Xorthern Powers, who were never hkely to be at war with Russia.' ^ While England, without an ally in the world, was at war with France, and engaged in a desperate attempt to reduce the American colonists to submission, while Russia was occupied in preparing for a fresh struggle against Turkey, while Spain was about to join France in giving aid to the Americans, cen- tral Europe seemed hkely to be involved in a great contest over the question of the Bavarian Succession. On the 30th of December 1777, Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, died, and the younger branch of the House of Wittelsbach became extinct.- Austrian troops The occupied Bavaria. Frederick the Great prepared succession to contest the Hapsburg claims; and it was not Question, till the Peace of Teschen. in May 1779, that a serious danger to the peace of Europe was removed. The death of the Elector, and the subsequent events, re- vealed to Europe the feeble condition of the House of Wit- telsbach. During the Thirty Years' War the Bava- The Decline rian Duke had played a very important part ; Ho^us^e of and till the close of the Spanish Succession War Witteisbach. Bavaria, from various causes, was regarded as one of the most powerful of the secondary states in the Empire. From the Treaty of Utrecht, however, Bavaria ceased to be looked upon as the principal supporter of the Catholics in Germany. In spite of its close connection with France, and in spite of the election of the Elector Charles Albert to the imperial throne in 1742, Bavaria, after his death in 1745, continued to decUne in the consideration of Europe. With the conclusion of the Franco- Austrian alliance of 1756, the French Government had no longer any reason to support Bavaria against Austria, while the Elector himself had not the ability and enterprise requisite to elevate his country into the position which it held in the estimation of Europe during the seventeenth century. 1 Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i. p. 193, note. - See Appendix D. 340 Europeafi History, 171 5-1789 The decadence of Bavaria was a serious matter far Germany, and especially so at a time when the Lorraine policy of the House of Hapsburg, under Joseph 11., was beginning to make itself felt in consistent efforts at consolidation and concentra- tion. Such a policy could not be adopted without meeting with opposition from France and Prussia. The former hoped to regain her ancient influence at the Courts of the smaller German princes, the latter was jealous of any interference with the ministers or constitution of the Empire. Eastern and central Europe was thus in a state of tension, while western Europe was on the verge of becoming deeply ^.. ,., , involved in the great contest in America and in The War of ° the Bavarian attempts to dcstroy England's maritime supremacy. Succession, j^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ moment that Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, died (December 30, 1777), and his heir, Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine, who represented the elder branch of the Wittelsbach House, signed a treaty on January 3, 1778, recognising the Austrian claims. Kaunitz at once took advantage of the fact of France being occupied in the American struggle ; Austrian troops occupied Bavaria ; and Frederick the Great was face to face with a state of things most prejudicial to his interests. He therefore turned to Charles Augustus, the Duke of Zweibriicken, or Deux-Ponts, head of the Birkenfeld branch and heir to the childless Charfes Theo- dore. Before the Austrians could legally take possession of Bavaria, the ratification of Charles Augustus to the convention of January 3, 1778, was necessary. That ratification the Duke was not prepared to give, and in May 1778 protested at the Diet against the convention, and invoked the aid of France and Prussia. Frederick, thereupon, undertook to defend the Duke's claims ; he and Joseph 11. entered into a long correspondence in which the latter set forth his claims, and Prussian and Aus- trian armies marched into Bohemia. War seemed inevitable, and likely to spread over the north of Europe. In the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, no less than in the Bavarian Succession question, Gustavus iii. had an Etirope and the War of Americaji hidependence 341 interest. Against Russia Turkey was his natural ally, while, as Duke of Pomerania, he had a voice in German affairs. Had war broken out in the east and centre of Europe, Sweden would have seized the opportunity of attacking Denmark. No war, however, took place. The Partition of Poland was so recent an event that Catherine feared the reopening of the question might result from the outbreak of hostilities. She therefore contented herself with profiting by the French diplomatic efforts, which, at the instigation of Frederick the Great, who wished to keep Russia unhampered by Eastern troubles, had been employed in 1777 to avert a Russo-Turkish war, and con- tinued to gradually extend Russian influence over the Crimea by means of intrigues. Like Frederick the Great, she was anxious to preserve the peace of Europe, and watched with some anxiety the development of the ambitious, though by no means unstatesmanlike, design of Joseph 11. to strengthen Austria by the incorporatior/of Bavaria. In the summer of 1778 two Prussian armies, one under Frederick himself and the other under Prince Henry, were set in motion, the king's intention being to march on Vienna by way of Bohemia and Moravia. But he found the Austrians ready to meet him. One army of 15,000 men, commanded by Joseph 11., who was supported by Lacy and Haddik, opposed the advance of Frederick to Glatz ; while 50,000 men under Loudon were detached to watch Prince Henry and prevent his junction with the king. Loudon's movements were masterly and successful ; and though no serious action was fought, Frederick lost, mainly through want of forage and food, and the autumnal rains, more than 20,000 men. Both the Prussian and Austrian armies were probably inade- quate for an extended campaign, and hostiHties closed in the spring of 1779 by the Treaty of Teschen. The principal cause of this unexpected result was Maria Theresa's repugnance to war. Aware that Austria was ill prepared for the resumption of the struggle against Prussia, that the mass of the people were impoverished and heavily taxed, and that the Hungarians 342 Etiropeaji History^ 17 15-1789 were discontented at Joseph's unconstitutional attempt to em- ploy the Hungarian cavalry, she attempted to gain over Freder- ick by negotiations, and sent Thugut, an Austrian diplomatist, secretly to Frederick on two separate occasions, offering to assure him the succession of Anspach and Baireuth if he would consent to the incorporation of Bavaria with Austria. Fred- erick and his minister, Hertzberg, refused to entertain such propositions, while Joseph, on hearing of his mother's action, was furious. Maria Theresa, supported by Kaunitz, was, how- ever, resolved on peace, and appealed to France and Russia to use their mediation. Joseph 11., at the same time, demanded from France 24,000 men, basing his demand on the terms of the treaty of 1756. But Vergennes replied that the posses- „ J- .• " r sions of Austria were not threatened, and that the Mediation of ' France and present trouble was caused by unheard-of claims on the part of the Emperor. Joseph then secretly proposed an exchange of the Low Countries for Bavaria. But Vergennes, realising the importance of not repeating the blun- ders of the Seven Years' War, steadily refused to be drawn into any European war, and declared that he would only interfere to preserve peace. Maria Theresa had been equally unsuc- cessful in her negotiations with Russia. In the spring of 1778 she had written to Catherine asking her to use her influence to induce Frederick the Great to withdraw from his 'position. But Catherine, closely aUied with Prussia, showed no desire to aid Maria Theresa, and the Austrian Court found its proposals declined by Prussia, France, and Russia. Eventually, Russia and France having agreed to mediate between the contending Powers, Catherine moved a force of 30,000 Russians to the frontier of Galicia, and, determined to support Prussia, notified to Austria that she had appointed Prince Repnin to mediate, and to prevent, if necessary by force of arms, the absorption of Bavaria by the Hapsburgs. Vergennes, braving the wrath of Marie Antoinette and the Austrian party, declined to sup- port the proposed exchange of Bavaria and the Netherlands, and insisted on the maintenance of the Treaty of Westphalia, Europe mid tJic JVar of Ame^'icaji hidependeiice 343 The prudent and moderate policy of the French minister and the resokite attitude of Catherine, proved successful, and con- iferences were held at Teschen between Prussia and The Treaty I Austria, and under the joint mediation of Russia of Teschen. and France. On the 13th of ]May 1779 peace was signed. Austria paid off the claims of Saxony, restored the lands seized from Bavaria, annulled the renunciation of Charles Theodore, and withdrew its opposition to the reunion of Anspach and Baireuth to the Electorate of Brandenburg on the extinction of the reigning House. On the other hand, Charles Theodore ceded to Austria the 'quarter of the Inn,' — that is, the country between the Danube, the Inn, and the Salza, comprising about 200 miles of territory, and inhabited by some 60,000 people. The War of the Bavarian Succession and the Peace of Teschen have a distinct importance both in throwing light upon the political condition of Europe, and in affording indica- tions of future developments. Had France not been engaged in assisting the American colonists and in combating England, the temptation to seize the opportunity of strengthening her north-eastern frontier would have proved irresistibly strong. The policy pursued by France is as creditable to the foresight and resolution of Vergennes as it is to Louis xvi.'s wisdom in supporting his minister against the party of Marie Antoinette. The Peace of Teschen afforded Russia that opportunity of in- terfering in the affairs of Germany which had been refused to her in 1748. Russia was admitted as a guarantor of the great Westphalian settlement ; the growth of her influence in Europe was recognised, and future events tended to increase her pre- ponderance. Sir James Harris had no hesitation in declaring that Russia had become a leading Power in Europe, and that the concerns of Europe were the concerns of Russia.^ To Austria the conduct of Vergennes came as a surprise. In Vienna the treaty of 1756 was as unpopular as in Paris, and Joseph II. himself disliked it. Though Maria Theresa and Kaunitz were disinclined to take any step which should in any 1 Diaries, and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i. p. 253. 344 European History, 171 5-1 789 way weaken the connection with the Bourbons, the attitude of France plainly indicated that the Court of Versailles would afford Austria no assistance in any schemes of aggrandisement The ties which bound the two Courts became sensibly weakened, and Austrian policy began to incline towards a rapprochetneni with England and Russia.^ To Prussia and the lesser German provinces the Treaty of Teschen was eminently satisfactory. Though the war had cost Frederick ^4,350,000, in addition to the loss of men, the Prus- sian intervention had been successful. Austrian aggrandisement had been checked, and the reputation of Frederick as the de- fender of the rights and liberties of the Empire was consider- ably enhanced. By the union of Bavaria and the Palatinate a new and more powerful House of Bavaria was established, which, in spite of the persistent efforts of Joseph 11. and some of his successors, has remained independent of Austria. Joseph II. 's scheme had been foiled, and the imperial laws and consti- tution had been protected by Frederick the Great. The wisdom of the policy of Vergennes during the Bavarian complications was undoubted. At St. Petersburg, Sir James Harris had established a personal and political friendship with Potemkin, the rival of Panin, and, on the 22nd of July 1779, had a private interview with the Tsarina, the result of which was seen in an order that each member of the Coujicil should Th Arm d ^^pctrately give his opinion on the affairs of Great Neutrality of Britain to Catherine.- Instead, however, of mak- ing an alHance, Catherine, though never really hostile to England, placed herself at the head of the armed neutrality of the North, formed in consequence of England's claim to search neutral vessels for contraband of war. In Feb- ruary 1780 the Tsarina issued a manifesto which laid down the principle that a blockade, to be effectual, must be real ; that neutral ships may sail from port to port, and along the coasts of belligerents ; and that all goods, except contraband of war, 1 Paganel, Histoire de Joseph IT., p. 326. ^Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i. p. 255. { Europe and the War of Avierican Independe7tce 345 belonging to the belligerent Powers shall be free from seizure in neutral vessels. Russia immediately received support from Sweden and Denmark, the king of the former country having already, in December 177C, protested against the high-handed manner in which England exercised her right of search. In July and August 1 780, Sweden and Denmark respectively united with Russia ; Prussia and Austria joined the alliance in May and October 1781, Portugal in July 1782, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies in February i783.\Though no war resulted from the armed neutraHty, the chances of an expansion of hostilities were very much increased. England found herself opposed by northern Europe ; the preponderance of Russia in European affairs was greatly enhanced ; the Prussian party, headed by Panin at the Court of St. Petersburg, had won its last triumph ; and all chance of an Anglo-Russian p^sj^j^jj ^j alliance had for the moment disappeared. On England in December 20, 1780, England was compelled, by ^^ °" the constant infractions of treaty stipulations, to declare war against Holland, which did not join the armed neutrality of the North till January 1781, and thus found arrayed against her almost the whole of Europe. ' The aspect of affairs at the close of 1780.' writes Mr. Lecky, 'might indeed well have appalled an English statesman. Perfectly isolated in the world, England was confronted by the united arms of France, Spain, Holland, and America ; while the Northern League threatened her, if not with another war, at least with the annihilation of her most powerful weapon of offence. At the same time, in Hindostan, Hyder AU was desolating the Carnatic and menacing Madras ; and in Ireland the connection was strained to its utmost Hmit.' ^ In 1 781 a French attack on Jersey was repulsed; and in April Gibraltar, which had already been besieged since July 1780, was reheved. The capture of St. Eustatius Events in by Rodney and Vaughan, on February 3, proved ^781. a terrible disaster for the Dutch, and was followed by the loss of Negapatam and other settlements on the Coromandel Coast, 1 Lecky, History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. iv. p. 163. 34^ European History, 171 5-1789 as well as by those in Sumatra. At sea, while a drawn battle was fought between the English and Dutch on the Dogger Danl^, suc- cess attended the efforts of the French and Spanish fleets. De Grasse estabhshed the naval ascendency of the French in the West Indies, and, after capturing Tobago, landed a strong force of soldiers in America. The Spaniards were no less successful ; they not only reconquered West Florida, in May, but, together with a French contingent, landed a force in Minorca, while a combined French and Spanish fleet was for some weeks supreme in the Eng- lish Channel. It was only the energy of Warren Hastings, and the skill and courage of Sir Eyre Coote, who overthrew Hyder in the battle of Porto Novo, on July i, 1781, that prevented the temporary extinction of the English power in the Carnatic. The continuance of the war gave an increased importance to a Russian aUiance, and while the Dutch appealed to Cathe- Attempts at ^^"^^ on the grouud that Great Britain had broken Peace. ^yith Holland solely on account of the armed neu- trality, the English Government offered to hand over ^Minorca as the price of a convention. Catherine, however, refused the appeals of both England and Holland, declaring to Sir James Harris that ' nothing could be stronger than her friendship for England,' and that she would 'be most happy to contribute to obtain for Great Britain a just and honourable peace.' ^ Both Russia and Austria had already attempted to mediate between the belligerent Powers, but it was not till after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, due in great part to the landing of French troops by De Grasse at the Chesapeake, on October 19, 1 781, that proposals for peace were definitely entertained. Hostilities, however, continued through a o^reat The Victory ' ' & & of Rodney, part of 1 782. Roducy's great victory ou April 1 2, April 12, 1782; jyS2 near DoiTnmca7~oveFlhe French fleet, was and the ' ' ' ' Defence of followed by the famous defence of Gibraltar, in September, by Sir George Elliot. Though the siege continued till February 17 S3, Gibraltar was never again ^ Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury , vol. i. pp. 401, 402, Europe ajid the War of American Independence 34/ in any danger from the French or Spaniards. Spain had long been desirous of retiring from the war, which she had entered mainly in order to recover Gibraltar. The hope of doing so had now vanished, and, with bankruptcy imminent, the Span- ish Court, which had always disliked the idea of American independence, was ready to open negotiations. R odney 's victory had destroyed the French hopes of the capture of Jamaica ; France, like Spain, was rapidly drifting towards bankruptcy ; Maurepas and Necker w'ere Peace Nego- extremely desirous of peace ; and Vergennes, tiations. though determined to obtain terms satisfactory to France and her American allies, was weary of the war, disillusioned with the Americans, and anxious to have his hands free to deal with the Eastern Question, which he foresaw was being skilfully reopened by the Tsarina and her ministers. He was resolved not to support the desire of the colonists to conquer Canada,; he was equally willing, provided the independence of America was recognised, to take all possitje steps to prevent the com- plete ahenation of England. • Thoi]gh*»his views met with Httle response from George iiia who was opposed. ta^OXli' recognition of American independence, public feehng in England declared itself in favour of peacCj'^nd recognised the necessity of ac- quiescing in the loss of the revolted States. The fall of the North Ministry cleared the way for peace negotiations, which were at once taken in hand by Rockingham, through the medium of his two Secretaries of State, Fox and Shelburne, in the spring of 1782. On the death of Rockingham, on July i, Shelburne became Prime Minister, and found the task of car- rying on the peace negotiations simplified through the victory of Rodney and the defence of Gibraltar. On November 30, 1782, the prehminaries between England and the United States were signed, those between England and France and Spain on January 20, 1783; while a truce between England and Holland ended the hostihties between those Powers. The Peace of Versailles, which included treaties between England and the United States, France, Spain, and Holland, and which 348 European History y 171 5-1 789 confirmed the preliminaries, was signed in September 1783. England ceded to France St. Lucia and Tobago, Senegal and n.,- T, t Goree, and restored the French establishments at The Peace of ' Versailles. Surat and in Orissa and Bengal, Pondicherry, to- sept. 1783. gether with Calicut, and the fort of Mah^ ; she received back, however, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat, while Spain retained West Florida, and received East Florida and Minorca. England secured the right to cut logwood in Honduras Bay, and re- covered Providence and the Bahama Isles. The negotia- tions between England and America revealed considerable differences of opinion between Vergennes and his alKes. Neither he nor Florida Blanca wished to secure the complete ascendency of the United States ; the latter indeed detested the idea of American independence. The war had been to a The Results great extent non-European, but its effects were felt oftheAmeri- Qver the wholc civilised world. Western Europe upon West- had no reason to look back on the American war ern Europe ^yj^j^ satisfaction. England came out of the struggle with her prestige diminished, and her empire cut short. She had seen the northern Powers form the armed neutrality to contest her right to the sovereignty of the sea ; hostile fleets had twice sailed supreme in the English Channel. It was gen- erally beheved in Europe that England's decadence had set in. The war had dealt an almost fatal blow at the declining power of Holland. The half-hearted conduct of WiUiam v. during the struggle, and the disasters which befell the Dutch, had excited the so-called '■ patriot ' party to oppose the Stadt- holder, and a period of internal turmoil only made more appar- ent the weakness of the Government of the Hague. Spain, which had entered the war in order to regain Gibraltar, had indeed acquired Minorca and Florida. But, as Florida Blanca had anticipated, the example of America was soon after fol- lowed by the Spanish colonies. For, France the effects of the struggle proved still more disastrous. Though she could boast of having revenged herself upon England, and though, in 1783, Etirope and tJic War of American Independence 349 she appeared to have secured a complete preponderance in Europe, she had in reahty suffered far more than her ancient rival. Financial ruin and bankruptcy were rendered inevitable, and revolution was brought within measurable distance. The American war had been genuinely popular in France, and the people were becoming inoculated with republican and revolu- tionary ideas. The predictions of Turgot and Gustavus iii. were amply fulfilled. The former had warned Louis xvi. that bankruptcy must result from war ; the latter reahsed clearly the inconsistency and risk involved in an absolute monarch supporting rebels. ' Such an example ' (as that of the Ameri- can colonies) , he wrote, ' will find only too many imitators in an age when it is the fashion to overthrow every bulwark of authority.' ^ But if the War of American Independence had such disas- trous results upon the countries of western Europe which en- gaged in it, far different were the indirect effects upon Russia and Austria. The death of Maria Theresa, on the 29th of November 1780, had freed Joseph 11. from the restraining in- fluence of the great Empress-Queen, and Catherine 11., now wearv of the Prussian alliance and secure from all and upon interference by France or England, was preparing Russia and for the annexation of the Crimea. In May 1 780 the Tsarina and Joseph 11. had met at Mohilev, and Vergennes' alarm at the growing power and schemes of Russia was fully justified. He had hastened on the Peace of Versailles, and had been careful not to make harsh demands on England, in order to secure for France the co-operation of Great Britain in opposing the policy of Russia in eastern Europe. 1 Nisbet Bain, Gustavus III. and his Contemporaries, vol. i. 209. CHAPTER XIII CATHERINE II. AND JOSEPH IL 1783-1789 The Russo-Austrian Alliance — The Reforms of Joseph II. — Maria Theresa's Reforms — Joseph's Administrative Reforms — Commercial Reforms — Judicial Reforms — Religious Reforms — Criticism of these Reforms — Reforms in the Austrian Netherlands followed by an Insurrection, 1787 — The Aims of Joseph II, 's Foreign Pohcy — Austrian Influence in Italy — Treatv between Joseph II, and Catherine II., 1781 — The Fall of Panin, and the End of the Alliance between Russia and Prussia — Schemes for the Partition of Turkey — The Annexation of the Crimea, 1784 — The Attitude of England and France — The Treaty of Constantinople, 1784 — Condi- tion of Holland : Aggressions of Joseph II. in the Netherlands — The Treaty of Fontainebleau, 1785 — Alliance between France and Holland, 1785 — The Designs of Joseph II. on Bavaria, 1785 — Frederick the Great and the League of Princes — Death of Frederick the Great, 1786 — Frederick William ll. and Holland — Death of Vergennes, 1787 — Treaty of Com- merce between England and France, 1786 — Vergennes is succeeded by Montmorin — The Triple Alliance of 1788 — The Journey of Catherine II. and Joseph Ii. to the Crimea, 1787 — War between Russia and Turkey — Joseph II. declares War with Turkey — The Capture of Ochakov — Sweden declares War with Russia — The Danes attack Sweden — The Intervention of the Triple Alliance — Revolution in Sweden — The Continuance of the Russo-Turkish War — Revolutionary Movements in the Austrian Nether- lands — The Foreign Policy of Prussia in 1789 — Death of Joseph II. — How far his Reign a Failure ? — Hostile Attitude of Prussia — Hertzberg's Schemes — The Convention of Reichenbach — Leopold II. and the Re-establishment of the Imperial Authority — The Peace of Sistova — The Treaties of Verela and Jassy — Europe on the Verge of the Wars of the French Revolution. The meeting of the Emperor and the Tsarina at Mohilev was followed by a visit of the former to St. Petersburg and the establishment of friendly relations between the Austrian and Russian Courts. The efforts of Frederick the Great, who 350 NORTH & EAST OF EUROPE IN 1780 J^stad ' '^Abo 40 THE |60 FIRST PARTITION ! OF I POLAND [ 1772 1 To Russia , ! ,, Prussia ! I ,, Austria ^Sosco^ "^ ^Q. ^ lA :x d 50 '•\-Brzesc r " ^ :Bar Ij ?^-45 Seyastupc lardp. fenegrg,. ■i VTo/iii, i^ CK S E\JL 40 25 l<,n„u,. w-ich 30 PERIOD VI. ■T nWi T^trr rl' "t'TTin^ w- A Co..£3 iTiT Catherine 11. mid Joseph IL 35 1 sent his nephew, Prince Henry, to St. Petersburg to preser\-e his alHance with Catherine, were of no avail, and the Tsarina testified her regard for the Emperor by usins: her ^, , ° . ° The Austro- influence to ensure the election of the Archduke Russian Maximilian as coadjutor of Munster. On Xovem- •^^^^"'^"=- ber 29, 17S0, shortly after Joseph's return to Vienna, Maria Theresa died, and the Emperor was free to carry out on an extended scale his reforming schemes and his ambitious projects.^ The character of the sovereign who now attempted to introduce sweeping reforms into the Austrian dominions is a curious study. With abilities above those of xhe Reforms the average European ruler, and imbued with a °^ Joseph 11. passion for ideal justice, Joseph 11. is by far the most interest- ing of the enlightened reformers of the centur}'. Previous to .his mother's death his energies had .been confined to Impe- rial matters, and he had attempted to reform the Imperial Chamber, which sat at Wetzlar, and the Aulic Council, which met in Vienna. His want of success in this endeavour, followed by his failure to annex Bavaria, had disgusted him with the Imperial institutions; and after 1780 he confined his reforming energies to the Hapsburg states. His policy, both domestic and foreign, was often statesmanlike in con- ception, but marred by a recklessness and impatience which characterised his whole career. He undertook tasks beyond human strength, and ' his history is therefore only the long and sorrowful story of a prince animated by the best inten- tions,' who failed in much that he attempted. He was per- meated with the ideas of the century, and fascinated with the prospect of carrying out large, comprehensive, and beneficent projects for the good of his subjects. His scheme of domestic policy was 'no less than to consolidate all his dominions into one homogeneous whole ; to abolish all privileges and exclu- sive rights ; to obliterate the boundaries of nations, and sub- stitute for them a mere administrative division of his whole 1 Paganel, Histoire de Joseph II., p. 332. 352 European History, 171 5-1789 Empire ; to merge all nationalities, and establish a uniform code of justice ; to raise the mass of the community to legal equality with their former masters ; to constitute a uniform level of democratic simplicity under his own absolute sway.' ^ These drastic changes, which amounted to a revolution, Joseph resolved to carry out with the utmost haste, and to * alter the administrative government, education, rehgious constitution, legislation, and legal procedure of his states,' without any regard for the prejudices and traditions of the people for whose benefit these changes were to be made. ^Wlnie with Frederick the Great the practical statesman was ( always uppermost, with Joseph poHtical considerations were \siit)ordinated to a desire to carry out the new ideas of the century. Generous, conscientious, and well-meaning, there was nothing profound in the Emperor's character. His ambitions were often admirable, but he entirely failed in his estimate of the limits of his powers. His desire to emu- late and excel Frederick the Great animated him all his life, and coloured much of his policy. Into his mind, which hcked a sound educational training, ideas borrowed hastily from French philosophers had sunk. ' Since I mounted the throne,' he wrote in 1781, 'I have made philosophy the legis- lator of my Empire.' Influenced by the ideas of the century, and his desire, in imitation of Frederick the Great, to form a well-organized central state, Joseph attempted within five years to check the influence of all foreign Powers, includ- ing that of the Roman Church, on the internal affairs of Austria, and to abolish all old institutions and usages in the assemblage of dominions which constituted his kingdom. Administrative, judicial, economic, and rehgious reforms were set on foot simultaneously. History, tradition, race, counted for nothing. Anticipating the spirit in which the French National x\ssembly acted, the Emperor, in the interests of unity, desired to make a clean sweep of all obstacles which impeded the realisation of his aims. But unlike the French ^ Herman Merivale, Historical Studies, p. 12. Catherine II. and Joseph II. 353 Revolutionists, he had to exercise his policy in a state com- posed of the most diverse and heterogeneous elements in Europe. His d^^^^ns were only held together by the personal tie^^BI^Breignty, and by the influence of the Church. ^ f^^ai^ ^solved.' writes von Sybel, 'that Austria should gain well-rounded, and, if possible, extended frontiers on every side, and thus come forth from the centre of Europe as the first of European Powers. He was therefore in a state of continual aggression against his privileged orders, his peo- ple, and his neighbours.' ^ In Galicia and Lombardy Joseph was regarded as a con- queror attempting to impose his rule on an unwilling people ; in fl^ungary he was opposed by the dominant nobility; in the Netherlands his influence was checked by the independent tone of a number of self-governing commonwealths ; in Bohemia and Moravia he was regarded as a foreigner ; in the Tyrol his power was modified by the existence of a free though loyal peasantry. The work of reform had already been taken in hand by his energetic mother. Maria Theresa had swept away a mass of antiquated customs, and had destroyed the privi- . leges of the Provincial Diets. They could no longer Theresa's impose indirect taxation, the control of the admin- ^*'^°''"^^- istration of the provinces was placed in the hands of lieuten- ants and intendants sent from Vienna, and thus their functions were confined to voting the taxes demanded by the Govern- ment, and which were paid into the Imperial Exchequer at Vienna. A body of magistrates, whose headquarters were also at Vienna, had taken the place of the old local , . . Joseph s Courts of Justice. This policy had received the Admmistra- full support of Joseph, who was equally bent on *'^^^^^°'""^s. destroying the privileges of the towns and placing them under Imperial bailiffs. - In spite of the difficulties in his path, Joseph boldly attempted 1 Heinrich von Sybel, History of the French Revolution, vol. i. p. i86 (trans.). ^ See Appendix A. PEiaOD VI. z 354 European History, 171 5-1 789 to form out of these discordant elements a united Empire. He abolished serfdom in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Hun- gary, putting the peasants into possession of the lands which they cultivated on the payment of a fair rent. He destroyed whatever remained of the rights of the Diets, and introduced further reforms into the laws of land tenure. The Austrian dominions were formed into one single state, composed of the thirteen districts of Galicia, Bohemia, Moravia, Lower i\ustria, Austria Proper (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola), the Tyrol, the Austrian possessions in Suabia, Transylvania, Hungary, Croatia, Lombardy, the Austrian Netherlands ; lastly, the counties of Gorz and Gradisca, with Trieste. These were subdivided into circles, over each of which was placed a governor (Kreishaupt- mann) . All these different nationalities were to be merged into one people, and the German language ^ was established and was alone recognised throughout his dominions. The Diets were no longer convoked, and the privileges of the royal towns were Commercial supprcsscd. Joscph was no Icss activc in his efforts Reforms. ^q improvc the trade of the country and to enrich the state. Two commissions were appointed for the revision of taxation, and the exemptions of the nobles and the clergy were destroyed. His attempts to open the Scheldt to the Aus- trian trade are well known. Roads were made and improved ; and, with the assistance of Zinzendorf, the late governor of Trieste, Austrian commerce received a great stimulus. The ports of the Adriatic coast, especially that of Fiume, were im- proved ; treaties of friendship were made with the Emperor of Morocco, with Turkey, and with Russia. The Austrian trade in the Levant was extended. Factories were established in China and the Indies, and manufactories were built in Vienna. In August 1784 a strict system of protection was estabhshed, and which, carried on in a manner worthy of Napoleon, proved very disastrous to the welfare of Austrian trade. 1 5 INDEX Abbas, Shah, 112. Abel of Mainz, 283. Abdul Hamid, 319. Abo, Treaty of, 154. Adelaide, Madame, 397. Adolphus Frederick of Sweden, 154, 228, 328, 384, Ahmed ill., 108, 111-113. Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 197-205, „ 215, 216, 218, 226, 237, 277, 289,333. Aland, Conference of, 53. Alberoni, 28 ; rise of, 39 ; foreign pol- icy, 40, 41, 48-63, 71, 84, 109. Alcide, capture of the, 232, 234. Amelot, 103, 154, 173, 402. American Independence, Declaration of, 333. 335- War, the, 335, etc., 405, 410; the effects of on France, 349. Anne Ivanovna, 98, 112, 114, 115, 121, 124, 138. Anti-Machiavel, the, 128. Apraksin, 251, 254. Aremberg, Duke of, 165. Armed Neutrality of the North, the, 344, 345. 365- Armenians, they appeal to Turkey, no; treatment of by Russia, 364. d'Artois, Count, 412. Ashraf, no, in. Assiento, the, 41, 90, 198. Aubeterre, 231, 248. Augustus II. of Saxony and Poland, 94. III. of Saxony and Poland, 97, 98, 117, 178, 180, 192, 227, 2^, 278, 304. Aulic Council, 269, 351. Azov, 108, 118. Balta, 308. Bankipur, 69. Bar, Confederation of, 307, 311, 314. Barbara of Portugal, Queen, 271. Barrier Treaty, the, 7-9, 44, 217, 368, 390. Barry, Madame du, 324, 325, Bartenstein, 102, 127, 139, 214, 234. Bassignano, battle of, 184. Batthyani, 176, 179. Bavaria, 9, 13, 17, 100, 370-372, 376, 379; Charles Albert of, 138, 141, 142, 144, 146, 150 {^see Charles VII.) ; Alaximilian Joseph of, 339, 340. Bavarian War of Succession, 339-343. Beaumont, Archbishop de, 219, 220. Belgrade, Treaty of, 125, 126, 140, 159, 382; siege of, 112. Belleisle, Marshal, 157, 160-162, 176, 188, 253, 259. Benedict XIV., 92, 220, 292, 296. Berlin, Treaty of, 154, 156, 174, 175, 180, 196. Bernis, 240, 249, 252, 263, 404. Bernsdorf (Hanoverian Minister), 46; (Danish Minister), 245, 286; Peter Andrew, 287. Berwick, Marshal, 100. Bestuzhev, 153, 175, 224, 233, 243,251, 254- Biren, 98, 115, 138, 275. Bitonto, battle of, 99. Blondel, 222. Bolingbroke, 48. Bonneval, Pacha, 96, 119, 120, 227. Boscawen, 203, 234, 262. Botta, Marquis de, 188. Bourbon, Due de, 26, 64-66, 72, 73, 78-80, 221. Braddock, General, 226, 259. Bremen, 41. Breslau, Preliminaries of, 154, 156. Breteuil, 267. Brienne, Lomenie de, 404, 414, 415. Brittany, rising in, 54, 415. Broglie, Comte de, 229, 249, 257, 263, 265, 269, 270; Marquis de, 151, 158, 163-165. 427 428 Etiropeaji History, 171 5-1789 Browne, Marshal, 187, 242. Bruhl, 192, 193. Brunswick, t'erdinand of, 251, 253, 257, 276. Bukovina, 318, 320. Burkersdorf, battle of, 275. Bute, Lord, 273, 277, 302, 338. Buturlin, 270. Calonne, 412, 413, 416. Cambrai, Congress of, 66, 67, 69, 71. Campo Santo, battle of, 166. Campomanes, 284, 285. Campredon, 115. Canada, 9, 262. Canning, 330. Carlos, Don, 50, 51, 67, 68, 71, 81, 82, 84, 85, 89, 99-101, 103, 168, 170, 271 {see Charles 111.). Carlowitz, Treaty of, 22, 24, 108. Caroline, Matilda of Denmark, 286. of Naples, 360. Carteret, 152, 162, 166, 167, 178, 195. Catherine I., 72, 73, 79, 113, 114. II., 175, 266, 275, 281, 296, 297 301-307, 309, 312, 313-316, 317, 319, 33^^332, 338, 341-344. 346, 349-371, 377. 380, 381. 383. 392, 393. 407- Cellamare, 31, 53, 55, 80. Charles ill. of Spain, 271, 272, 284, 285, 294, 295, 323. IV. ol Spain, 285. VI. of Austria, 48, 49, 63, 79, 83, 85, 87, 91, 94, 104, 105, 109, 114, 122, 125, 126, 133, 135, 137, 138, 199, 212, 223, 364, 382. VII. (Emperor), 161, 166, 167, 172-174, 177, 178, 202. X. of Sweden, 313. XII, of Sweden, 45, 53, 57-60, 62, 131- Theodore, Elector Palatme, 216 ; of Zweibriicken, 340, 343, 371. Philip of Xeuburg, 216. • Edward, 170, 182, 186, 189, 195. Emanuel of Sardinia, 91-93, 99- loi. 103, 138, 148, 152, 153, 157, 162, 167, 168, 185-190, 194, 197, 272, 289. of Saxony (son of Augustus III.), 304. Chateauneuf, 44, 47. Chateauroux, Duchesse de, 163, 169, 170, 173. Chauvelin, 81, 91, 93, 102, 103, Chavigny, 173, 178, 333. Chevert, 157, 158, 257. Choiseul, Due de, 260-264, 267-270, 272, 279, 283, 284, 294, 311-313, 321-328, 333-335. 395-397. Choisy de Taules, 312. Chotek, 208, 210, 214. Chotusitz, battle of, 154. Clement xi., 49, 55 ; XIII., 292, 293, 295 ; XIV., 282, 296, 297. Clermont, Comte de, 257. Chve, 225, 262. Coalition Government, the, 365. Cobenzl, 391. Coburg, 382. Coigny, 100, 171, 177. Colbert, 202. Colleredo, 179. Commercial Treaty of 1786, 376. Coynpte Rendu, Necker's, 405. Conclave, the, of 1769, 296. Constantinople, idea of Russian occu- pation of, 363 ; Treaty of, 366. Contades, 263. Conti, 180, 181, 190, 193, 227-229, 249, 270. Contrats Social, the, 408, 409. Cornwallis, Lord, 346. Corsica, 309. Corvee, the, 400, 404, 414. Courland, 115, 251, 304. Crimea, annexation of, 361, 364, 365. Crocyka, battle of, 121, 125. Czartoriskis, the, 305. Czernitcheff, 274. Damiens, 222. D'Aiguillon, Due, 262, 324, 325, 327, 330. 331. 397- Danubian Principalities, the, 363, 365. D'Aranda, 284, 285, 295, 323. D'Argenson, Comte, 162, 193, 218, 232, 238, 246, 251. Marquis, 103, 163, 173, 182, 185- 193, 200, 326. Daun, 251, 256, 265, 266, 269, 275, 278, 287. Dauphin, the (son of Louis XV.), 192. Dauphiny, 415-417. Deane, Silas, 335. De la Clue, 262. Denmark, war with Sweden (1788), 383. 384- D'Eon, Chevalier, 264. D'Estrees, 250, 270, 276. Des Alleurs, 228, 334. Dettingen, battle of, 165. Diamond necklace, the, 413. Dohna, Counts, 255. Diderot, 407. Index 429 Dresden, Treaty of, 183, 187, 196, 278. Dubois, 23, 28-63. Dumouriez, 312, 314, 318. Dunkirk, 7. Dupleix, 202, 203, 226, 259. Du Tillot, 288. Eastern Question, the, 22, 107, 320, 347, 361, etc.; 366, 381, etc. Economists, the, 399. Edict of Nantes, 402. Eg)-pt, idea of French occupation of, 363- Elliot, Sir George, 346. Elizabeth Farnese, 49, 62, 66-86, 89, 100, 103, 138, 140, 153, 157, 161, 168, 169, 1S4, 271. Elizabeth of Russia, 114, 153, 201, 223, 224, 227, 235, 238, 243, 249, 260, 263, 266, 267, 274 ; death of, 274. Empire, the, after 1763, 301. Encyclopedists, the, 291, 407. Ensenada, de la, 248, 272. Elscurial, Treaty of, 93, loi, 172. Eugene, Prince, 49, 69, 71. 73, 95, 102, 109, 119, 132, 133, 140, 364. Eyre Coote, 269, 346. Falkland Islands, affair of, 322, 326. Family Compact of 1761, the, 272, 279, 322,' 323, 333. Farinelli, 247. Fermor, 254, 256, 263. Ferdinand iv. of the Two Sicilies, 271, 289. of Parma, 289. VL, 188, 198, 223, 247, 248, 271, 284. Finck, 266, 268. Firmian, Archbishop, 131. Count, 290. Finland, 390. Fleury, 57, 65, 72, 79-82, 88, 89, 91, 94, 96, 104, 115, 116, 119, 127, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 159-161, 169, 204, 214, 273. Joly de, 410, 412. Florida Blanca, 284, 285, 348. Foksany. battle of, 385. Fontainebleau, Treat)' of, 169, 184, 191, 369- Fontenoy, battle of, 180. Fouquet, 268 ; Nicholas, 326. Fox, C. J., 347 ; foreign policy of, 365. Francis L, election as Emperor, 182, 183, 243, 246, 313. Franklin, 336. Frederick \. of Sweden, 60, 61. V. of Denmark, 245. the Great, 2, 6, 9, 128, 129 ; youth