FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD -MARSHAL Sir Willwm Robertson .1 GIFT OF Larry Lai phi in FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Ohr. (nihrr ■ Jrrni n ' 'infilj.t/ir-/ //■iA.tii /v/ riti . Iinriirrui rVrlilirr ril f'cl-Irn ; . Irjif) FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL BY FIELD-MARSHAL Sir WILLIAM ROBERTSON Bart. G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O. Hon. LL.D. Cambridge, Hon. D.C.L. Oxford ILLUSTRATED BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 1921 « « c t « • • •«••• • Printed in Great Britain. De&tcate& ^. TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER ^ TO WHOSE AFFECTIONATE AND INSPIRING TEACHINGS ^ IN EARLY LIFE IS ATTRIBUTABLE SUCH MERIT, Ij =C IF ANY, AS MAY ATTACH TO MY CAREER. CD ' 5 3'15688 &o PREFACE The only justification for publishing this book is that it describes the climbing of a soldier from the bottom to the top of the military ladder, and even in this feat there is nothing remarkable beyond the fact that it happens to be the first of its kind in the annals of the British Army. Energy and determination are usually essential to advancement in any vocation, and are at the disposal of every one possessing a good constitution. Given the exercise of these qualities and the same help from real friends as I enjoyed — friends who had nothing to gain and perhaps something to lose by showing friendship — any man can equal what I have accomplished. Still, the story here given may not be wholly without interest, especially to those who have their lives in front of them, and in the hope that it will prove to be so I have decided to let it go forth. Doubtless it has many defects, both in substance and style, which would have been less apparent if its preparation had been in more practised hands, and for these imperfections I ask lenient treatment. In writing the chapters dealing with my service in the ranks and as a Subaltern Officer I have had to depend chiefly upon memory, which has become blurred and unreliable owing to the lapse of time and the crowded events of the last few years. Consequently it has not been possible to make this part of the book as complete as, to my mind, it deserves to be, for the period in question was in some ways the most fascinating and happy of all. For instance, I derived greater satisfaction from being pro- moted Lance-Corporal in 1878 — the first rung of the ladder — than I did from being created a Baronet forty years later ; vii viii FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL and, as Lieutenant, I felt prouder to be in command at the railhead of a Frontier Expeditionary Force in India of less than 10,000 men than, as General, to be Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the greatest conflict the world has ever known, when the number of our troops ran into several millions. In building up the chapters referring to the Great War, I was embarrassed by having not too little but too much material. The difficulty here was to make a suitable selection, and to include just so much about my share of the war as seemed appropriately to fall within the scope of the book. In particular I tried to avoid enlarging upon old controversies connected with the supreme direction of the war, and which occur to a greater or less extent in all wars. I felt that a discussion of them would merely bore the ordinary reader, who is content to know that the war was in fact won ; while it would be of little use to any one unless the points in dispute were thoroughly examined in the light of complete evidence, and this would require a book for itself as well as access to official documents which are not at my disposal. I have therefore made, as a rule, no more reference to these matters than was required to enable me to illustrate the work of the Imperial General Staff, of which I was Chief for about half the period of the war — four other officers filling that post at different times during the remaining half — and to emphasise the achieve- ments, though very inadequately, of the regimental officers and men of the Imperial Forces who won the war for us, and with whom I have had the honour to be associated for nearly forty-four years. W. R. ROBERTSON, Field-Marshal. PAGE CONTENTS CHAPTER I Recruit at Aldershot . , . . ■ EnUstment in i6th Lancers— The " Old Soldier " in the 'Seventies — Barrack-room hfe — Rations — Pay — Kit and equipment— Uniform— Drills— Treatment of sick— Breaking out of barracks — Sundays — First Christmas Day — Night guards — MiUtary offences and punishments — Guard-room — Articles of War — Muster parade — Punishment drill— Musketry course— Dismissed drills— Day guards— I allow a deserter to escape and so commit my first " crime "—Imprisoned in guard-room — My second " crime " — Promoted Lance-Corporal — Backward state of training — Field-days — Reasons for defect- ive training — Lord Wolseley. Sir Evelyn Wood, and other rising Generals effect great reforms — Successes in competitions at skill-at-arms. CHAPTER H Non-commissioned Officer . . . • • ^9 Promoted Corporal— Stationed at Brighton— My third and last " crime "—Special duty at Chatham— Rejoin regiment and go to York — Promoted Lance-Sergeant — Special duties while at York — Musketry course at Hythe — Promoted Sergeant — SignalUng course at Aldershot— Regiment goes to Dundalk — State of Ireland— Appointed Assistant Instructor of Signalling — Lieutenant Dugdale— Success of signallers announced in regimental orders— Assistant Instructor of Musketry and Military Reconnaissance — Escort prisoners to Limerick Gaol — Regiment goes to Dublin — Promoted Troop Sergeant-Major — Suicide of predecessor — Influence of Troop Sergeant-Ma jor-- Consider possibility of obtaining commission — Difficulties in the way of this — Regimental officer's expenses — Decline Com- manding Officer's offer of a commission — Accept the same offer made by his successor — Vexatious delays retard commission — Pass examination for commission — Regiment goes to Aldershot — Gazetted Second Lieutenant in 3rd Dragoon Guards— Leave the 1 6th Lancers. ix PAGE 34 X FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL CHAPTER III Subaltern in India . Join Cavalry Depot at Canterbury — Officer's course of musketry at Hythe — Leave England for India — Life on board a troopship — Join 3rd Dragoon Guards — Camp of exercise at Meerut — Pass Lower Standard Examination in Hindustani — Life at Muttra — Acting Adjutant and Station Staff Officer — Beer-tasting committees— Regiment attends Muridki Camp of exercise en route to Rawal Pindi— Ludicrous spectacle presented by native followers — State of training in India and reforms effected by General Luck — Visit of Prince Albert Victor to Muridki — Pass Higher Standard Examination in Hindustani — Successes at Rawal Pindi District Assault-at-Arms — On detach- ment at Murree — Pass examination in Persian — In charge of Government Grass Farm at Rawal Pindi — In charge of regi- mental signallers— Acting Station Staff Officer and Secretary of Assault-at-Arms Committee — Pass examinations in Punjabi and Pushtu— Black Mountain Expedition— Miranzai Expedi- tion — Some amusing incidents in connection with the latter Posted to Army Headquarters, Simla. CHAPTER IV In the Intelligence Branch, Simla . . -50 Indian InteUigence Branch reorganised by General Sir H. Brackenbury — Curious division of duties at Army Head- quarters — Comparison with system at home — Society favourites thought to have best chance of Staff employment- Colonels Elles and Mason — First permanent Staff appointment — Countries dealt with by North-West Frontier Section in which I am employed — Situation in Afghanistan — Kafiristan— Intricate frontier questions to be settled — Proceed on leave to England— Death of my mother— Frontier matters still dis- turbed on return to India — Question of Russian advance on India via the Pamirs — Ordered to reconnoitre route leading to Pamirs— Srinagar— Bridges in Kashmir— Gilgit—Rakapushi Mountain — Hunza — Meet Townshend and Fowler — Yasin Darkot Pass— The Pamirs— Return to India via the Indus, Chilas, and Abbottabad — Pass examination in Gurkhali. CHAPTER V On the Intelligence Staff ok the Chitral Relief Force 66 Punitive expedition sent into Waziristan— In temporary charge of Frontier Section— Events leading up to the siege of CONTENTS xi PAGE Chitral Fort — Umra Khan of Jandol implicated — Despatch of Chitral Relief Force from India and a detachment from Gilgit — Appointed to Headquarters Staff of the ReUef Force — Sir Robert Low — Colonel Bindon Blood — Captain Nixon — Nature of country to be traversed — Capture of the Malakand Pass — Action at Khar — Passage of Swat river — Effective action of cavalry — Reconnaissances to Panjkora river and towards Umra Khan's headquarters— Fine fighting of Guides Infantry — Reconnaissance up the Panjkora — Meet Roddy Owen — Ad- vance on Miankilai and flight of Umra Khan — Siege of Chitral is raised — Reconnaissance down the Panjkora — Treacherously attacked by my two guides — Severely wounded — Sent back to India — Mentioned in Despatches and awarded D.S.O. — Pro- moted Captain — Preparation for Staff College Entrance Examination — Nominated for entrance — Leave for England — Some reflections on service in India. CHAPTER VI Student at the Staff College . . . .81 Colonel Hildyard — His views on the education of officers — Nature of the Staff College Course — Colonel Henderson — Lord Roberts' appreciation of him — First year's work at the college — Go to France to learn the language — Second year's work — Visit to battlefields of 1870 war — Visit the Meuse Valley and Belgian Ardennes — Umpire at army manoeuvres — Sir H. Brackenbury — Inspection of Staff College by Lord Wolseley — Value of Staff College training. CHAPTER VII On the Intelligence Staff, War Office . .91 Posted to the Intelligence Division, War Office — Sir John Ardagh — Status of the Division — Its duties — Mr. Stanhope's memorandum regarding miUtary policy — Hartington Com- mission recommends appointment of a Chief of the Staff — Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman dissents — Recommendation not carried out — Effect of this in South African War — Colonial Defence Committee — Work in the Russian Section — Appointed Staff Captain in the Colonial Section — Captain Altham — Description of Colonial Empire — Work in the Colonial Section — Effect of our general unreadiness for war in regard to the South African situation — War declared against the South African Republics — Forecast of cost of war — Sir George White sent to command in Natal — Altham goes with him and I take charge of the Colonial Section — Early developments in the war — Dependence on the Press for information — Reverses at Storm- berg, Magersfontein, and Colenso — BuUer suggests abandon- ment of attempt to reUeve Ladysmith — Am consulted by a Cabinet Minister as to what should be done — Recommend xii FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL appointment of Commander-in-Chief as distinct from the Com- mander in Natal — Defence Committee of Cabinet appoint Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff — Proceed to South Africa to join the Staff of Lord Roberts. CHAPTER VIII On the Headquarters Staff in the South African War . . . . . . .104 Situation on arrival at Cape Town — Formation of mounted infantry — Lord Roberts' plan of operations and measures taken to preserve secrecy — Composition of InteUigence Staff at Headquarters — Arrival of Headquarters at Modder liver — Lord Roberts' care for his troops — Mystifying Cronje as to the proposed line of advance — General situation at this time — Buller asks for reinforcements — Lord Roberts adheres to his plan — Cavalry Division crosses Free State frontier and relieves Kimberley — Pursuit of Cronje — Battle of Paardeberg — Con- fusion caused by bad system of command — Investment of Cronje — Cronje surrenders and is brought into camp — He is sent to St. Helena — Grierson joins Headquarters — His efforts to improve defective methods of staff work— Lord Roberts' instructions in regard to battle of Poplar Grove — Imperfect arrangements for the battle enable Boer forces to make good their retreat — Advance continued to Bloemfontein — Summary of events to date — Standard of staff work and tactics inferior to strategy — Strategy never so good again — Some reasons for this — Henderson's health breaks down and he returns to England — He commences to write the Official History of the War — His death in Egypt in 1903 — The soldier's difficulties in writing official histories — The advance from Bloemfontein to Kronstad and thence to Pretoria — Boer guerilla warfare — Lord Roberts' plan — Hardships of march and fine spirit of the men — Action of Diamond Hill — The advance to Middelburg — The De Wet hunts — Recalled to the War Office — Reach rank of Major^Promotcd Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel for services in the war. CHAPTER IX Head of the Foreign Intelligence Section, War Office 127 Resume work in Intelligence Division — Lord Roberts returns to England and becomes Commander-in-Chief — Visit defended ports — Intelligence and mobilisation combined under the charge of Sir W. Nicholson — Am made head of the Foreign Section of InteUigence — Promoted Colonel, 1904 — Selection of military attach6.s — Preparations for war hampered by lack of a policy — Our International position — Defence of India — Examination of it and Lord Kitchener's objections to our calculations — Esher Committee — Reorganisation of War Office and forma- CONTENTS xiii PAGE tion of General Staff — Post of Commander-in-Chief abolished — Sir N. Lyttelton becomes first Chief of the General Staff — Committee of Imperial Defence established — War preparations now become more feasible — Bogy of Russian attack on India disappears and contingency of war with Germany begins to take its place — Agreements with France, Russia, and Japan — Expeditionary Force formed — Grierson and Huguet largely instrumental in this— Lord Roberts resigns from Committee of Imperial Defence — First attempt to give a mihtary lecture — Visits between 1902 and 1906 to Northern Africa, Canada, America, the Balkans, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and other European countries — Leave War Office on expiration of appointment — Placed on half -pay, 1907. CHAPTER X Brigadier-General, General Staff, Aldershot , .152 Translate German regulations regarding heavy artillery — Assistant Quartermaster-General, Aldershot, 1907 — Become Chief of General Staff there six months later — Smith-Dorrien — Officers on the Aldershot Staff — Comparison of soldier's Ufe in 1907 with that in 1877 — Similar comparison in regard to train- ing — Smith-Dorrien's methods — Weakness of units — Innova- tions in organisation and improvements in training — System of obtaining ground for manoeuvres — False teaching of manoeuvres — Smith-Dorrien's practical views — Staff tours — Visits of King Edward— Visits of King George and Queen Mary — Aeroplanes — Balloons — The Caterpillar — -Ordered to take up post of Commandant, Staff College. CHAPTER XI Commandant of the Staff College . . .169 History of College— Students and staff — Promoted Major- General — Subjects of study — Nature of staff tours — System of classifying the students — Defects in instruction — Points on which special emphasis was laid — Importance of considering defensive as well as offensive warfare — Warning given to students about war with Germany — Naval War College — Admirals Jackson and Colville — Visits to the Loire and Amiens battlefields of 1870 war — My first speech in French — General Picquart — With the King's suite on army manoeuvres — Adventures with Oxley while motoring— Trinity College — ■ Created Knight of the Victorian Order — Leave the Staff College to become Director of Mihtary Training. xiv FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL CHAPTER XH PACE Director of Military Training . . . .186 Duties — Unsatisfactory responsibility for training — Arrange- ments for command at home in time of war — "Staff" cannot " command " — Question of invasion — Invasion ruled out as impracticable and replaced by theory of raids — Reversion to invasion theory — Question mainly one for the Admiralty — Constant discussions finally settled in August 1914 — Pohcy as to invasion during the Great War — Economy exercised to the detriment of training — " Curragh incident " and its effect on Army officers — " Joe " Maude — Collapse of the proposed coercion of Ulster and resignation of the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General — Sir Charles Douglas — Army manceuvres arranged for 1914 — War with Germany declared — Am appointed Quartermaster-General of the British Expeditionary Force. CHAPTER XHI Quartermaster-General, British Expeditionary Force 197 Organisation and duties of G.H.Q. — System of supply and maintenance — The I.G.C. — His duties are curtailed — The " Directors " — My Staff — Arrive at Paris with the Commander- in-Chief — Stay at the Hotel Crillon— Visit J off re at Vitry-le- Fran9ois — Reach G.H.Q. at Le Cateau — Concentration of the Force — Various situations to be thought out — Discuss change of base with I.G.C. — Commander-in-Chief's conference before battle of Mons — The retreat from Mons — Replacement of clothing and equipment lost in the retreat — Confusion caused by change of base — Control of railways in French hands — Difficulty of knowing where troops were — Plight of refugees — WiUing spirit shown by all ranks to help each other — Despatch riders — G.H.Q. move successively to St. Quentin, Noyon, Compi^gne, Dammartin, Lagny, Melun — The move from Dam- martin to Lagny — Force becomes part of Paris garrison under Gallieni — Battle of the Marne — BrutaUties of German troops — G.H.Q. at Coulommiers and F6re-en-Tardenois— Want of heavy artillery on the Aisne — Move round to Flanders —First battle of Ypres — State of trenches — Cross the Channel with Lord Roberts — His death at St. Omer — Succeed Murray as Chief of the General Staff at G.H.Q. CHAPTER XIV Chief of the General Staff, British Expeditionary Force . . . . • • .219 Duties— Arrangements for training — Reorganisation of the General Staff — My principal assistants— Signal communica- CONTENTS XV PAGE tions — Flying Corps — Life at G.H.Q. — Relations with units at the front — Liaison officers — Situation on West Front at beginning of 1915 — Position of British Commander-in-Chief — Results of unreadiness for war — Uncertainty as to reinforce- ments and war material — Neuve Chapelle — Second battle of Ypres — Withdrawal from part of the Sahent — Festubert — Loos — Alhes short of war material — Joffre's first conference of Allied Representatives — My views on the general situation and conduct of the war — Decide to send them to the C.I.G.S. at the War Office — He forwards them to the Cabinet — Lord Kitchener asks me to become C.I.G.S. — I send him my views as to the status and duties of the General Staff — He cannot agree with some of them and proposes to resign — Meet him at Calais and discuss his objections — They are satisfactorily removed — I leave G.H.Q. for the War Ofl&ce. CHAPTER XV Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 19 16 . . 246 General situation in all theatres — Reorganisation of the General Staff — Position of C.I.G.S. — Relations with Joffre, Cadorna, and Alexeieff — War Council and War Cabinet — Relations between Ministers and their professional advisers — Proposed war policy approved by Cabinet — Send instructions to Commanders-in-Chief — Steps to improve training and organisation of troops at home and abroad — Home Defence — India and India Office responsible for Mesopotamia — Need for comprehensive plan for utilising man-power — Cabinet Com- mittee set up to deal with the question — Lord Kitchener and compulsory service — Many people objected to it — Problem of providing officers — Production of tanks — Evacuation of GaUipoli — Operations in Mesopotamia — Campaign is handed over to the War Office — Fall of Kut-el-Amara — Appointment of Maude as Commander-in-Chief— His successes — Operations in Egypt and Macedonia — Disadvantages of employing armies of mixed nationalities — East Africa — Smuts and Van Dewenter — Operations on the West Front — Verdun and the Somme — Situation at the end of the year — Ministers' dissatisfaction — ■ Tendency to try new methods and plans — Joffre superseded by Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French armies — His plan for 1917 rejected by Governments in favour of Nivelle's plan — My relations with Joffre — Change of Government — My relations with Lord Kitchener — The part he played in the war. CHAPTER XVI Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 191 7-18 . 291 AUied Conference at Rome — Method of conducting these conferences — Admiral Bacon — Dover patrol — Relations with Admiralty Staff — Admirals Jackson, Jellicoe, and Wemyss — Re- organisation of Admiralty Staff — Lord Fisher — Visit to Italian xvi FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL PAGE Front — General Staff views on man-power — Difficulty of providing drafts — Question many times raised during 19 17 — Young soldier battalions — Events on Russian Front — Palestine Campaign — Operations on West Front — Nivelle replaced by Petain — ^Foch becomes Chief of French General Staff — My relations with him — Messines — Passchendaele — Cambrai — Defeat of Italians — Alternative plans suggested during the year — Evils attending unnecessary changes of plan — Difficulty of keeping strategical direction of war on right lines — Con- sideration by General Staff of plans for 191 8 — Conclusions reached — Anxiety regarding man-power and shipping — Generals Pershing and Bliss — Question of unity of command — Various proposals made in 191 5 — Calais agreement of February 191 7 — Consideration by miUtary authorities in summer of 191 7 — Rapallo Conference establishes a Supreme War Council — A poUtical not a miUtary body — The technical advisers of the Council become executive officers — Am unable to accept the Government's arrangement for giving effect to this decision — This leads to my removal from the War Office — Measures taken after the German offensive in March 1918 — My in- debtedness to many friends whilst C.I.G.S. CHAPTER XVU Commander-in-Chief, Great Britain . . . 342 Appointed Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Command — Excessive number of men retained in United Kingdom — Re- organisation of the Eastern Command Staff — Become Com- mander-in-Chief, Great Britain — Reorganisation of Head- quarters Staff — Organisation of commands — Inspections — Good work of hospitals — ■ Defence schemes — Anti-aircraft defences — Air warfare of the future — Science should be given a more prominent place in our war preparations — Visits to the Grand Fleet — Co-operation of American Navy — Admiral Sims — Discontent on demobihsation — Industrial unrest — Chair- man of Committee on Officers' Pay — King reviews young soldier battaUons in Hyde Park — Appointed to command the British Army of the Rhine. CHAPTER XVIII Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine . 357 Composition of Headquarters Staff — Distribution of Alhed troops — The British zone — The Military Governor — Adminis- tration of the occupied territory — Meaning of martial law — Policy as to industrial questions — Strength of Army — Its reorganisation — Preparations for the advance into unoccupied territory — Visit of the King and Queen of the Belgians — Visits of the Duke of Connaught, Marshal Focli, Marshal J off re, General Pershing, and other distinguished officers — Visit of the CONTENTS xvii PAGE Army Council — Interchange of visits with Allied Generals — Peace celebrations at Paris, Brussels, and London — ^Deer- stalking in Scotland — Sir Michael Culme-Seymour — Lord Charles Beresford — Changes made in system of administration and reduction of Army on ratification of peace — Farewells previous to leaving for England — Promoted Field-Marshal. CHAPTER XIX Some Final Reflections ..... 380 Characteristics of British soldier^Unpopularity of the army as compared with the navy — Study of military history by statesmen — Results of its neglect. DATES OF PROMOTION . . . . .387 FOREIGN HONOURS RECEIVED DURING THE GREAT WAR . . . . . .388 INDEX . . . . . . .389 i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Portrait of Author At the Army Manoeuvres, 1 9 1 3 . Lord Roberts at the Staff College Gentlemen Cadets making a Cask-bridge Marshal Joffre . Inspection of Gentlemen Cadets Lord Kitchener. Allied Conference at the Qua! d'Orsay Visit to the Italian Front Marshal Foch . Inspection of Italian troops Canadian Officers General Allen, American army . General Michel, Belgian army . General Mangin, French army . General Gouraud, French army . At Laeken Palace Map illustrating journey to Pamirs, 1894, and Chitral Ex 1895 ..... Frontispiece FACING I'AGK 166 176 186 266 288 292 296 312 344 358 366 368 370 376 pedition, 80 XIX CHAPTER I RECRUIT AT ALDERSHOT Enlistment in i6th Lancers — The " Old Soldier " in the 'Seventies — Barrack-room life — Rations — Pay — Kit and equipment — Uniform — Drills— Treatment of sick — Breaking out of barracks — Sundays — First Christmas Day — Night guards — Military offences and punishments — Guard-room — Articles of War — Muster parade — Punishment drill— Musketry course — Dismissed drills — -Day guards — I allow a deserter to escape and so commit my first " crime " — Imprisoned in guard-room — My second " crime " — Promoted Lance- Corporal — Backward state of training — Field-days— Reasons for defective training — Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, and other rising Generals effect great reforms — Successes in competitions at skill-at-arms. I WAS seventeen and three-quarters years old when, having decided to seek my fortune in the army, I took the " Queen's Shilling " from a recruiting sergeant in the city of Worcester on the 13th of November 1877. The minimum age for en- Ustment was eighteen, but as I was tall for my years the sergeant said that the deficient three months would involve no difficulty, and he promptly wrote me down as eighteen years and two months — so as to be on the safe side — and that has been the basis of my official age ever since. For some reason that has now escaped my memory I was detained at Worcester for four days, receiving in the mean- time two shillings and a halfpenny per diem for board and lodgings. The odd halfpenny strikes one as being a queer item, but it had no doubt been arrived at by Her Majesty's Treasury after careful calculation of the cost actually incurred. The recruiting sergeant, a kindly disposed in- dividual, took possession of the whole sum, giving me in return excellent, if homely, accommodation and food at his own house. The regiment I selected to join, the i6th (Queen's) I B 2 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Lancers, was stationed in the West Cavalry Barracks, Aldershot, and on arrival there, on a wet and dreary November evening, the first people I met were the " orderly officer " and the regimental sergeant-major, both of whom showed a sympathetic interest in me. I was at once posted as No. 1514 to " G " Troop, the officer saying to me as I went off, " Give your watch to the sergeant-major of your troop, my lad," and, as I wrote home a few days later, I did so, " for it is unsafe to leave it lying about, and there is nowhere you can carry it with safety." The regiment was commanded at the time by Colonel Whigham, who had originally served in the infantry. The adjutant. Lieutenant " Jimmy " Babington, was a fine horse- man, a strict discipUnarian, and universally regarded as an ideal cavalry officer. He was more than that, as is shown by his selection in 1914, when nearly 60 years of age, to command one of the Kitchener Divisions. This he took out to France the following year, and from then onwards was continuously in command of the division or an army corps, in France or in Italy, until the end of the war, a task which proved to be beyond the physical powers of many a younger man in the hard and incessant fighting on the West Front. " G " Troop was commanded by Captain Henry Graham, one of the most kind-hearted men under whom it has been my lot to serve. His subaltern. Lieutenant " Freddy " Blair, was somewhat of a terror to aU shirkers and wrong- doers in the troop, but I have no recollection of having been on his black Hst ; and I am sure that neither of us then thought that forty-one years later I would be Commander- in-Chief of the Eastern Command and he would be my military secretary. But so it turned out. The hfe of a recruit in 1877 was a very different matter from what it is now. The system introduced in 1871-72 by Mr. Cardwell — one of the greatest War Ministers the country has ever had — under which men enlisted for twelve years' regular service, had not yet had time to get into full swing. Regiments were, therefore, still composed mainly of old soldiers who, although very admirable comrades in some respects and with a commendable code of honour of their own, were in many cases — not in all — addicted to rough ENLISTMENT 3 behaviour, heavy drinking, and hard swearing. They could not well be blamed for this. Year in and year out they went through the same routine, were treated like machines — of an inferior kind — and having little prospect of finding decent employment on the expiration of their twenty-one years' engagement, they lived only for the present, the single bright spot in their existence being the receipt of a few shillings — perhaps not more than one — on the weekly pay-day. These rugged veterans exacted full deference from the recruit, who was assigned the worst bed in the room, given the smallest amount of food and the least palatable, had to " lend " them articles of kit which they had lost or sold, " fag " for them in a variety of ways, and, finally, was expected to share with them at the regimental canteen such cash as he might have in the purchase of beer sold at 3d, a quart. It so happened that I joined the regiment on pay-day, and accordingly the greater number of my newly-found companions spent the evening at the canteen — then a mere drinking saloon — or at public-houses in the town. On return to quarters, if not before, old quarrels were revived or new ones were started, and some of them had to be settled by an appeal to fists. One of these encounters took place on and near the bed in which I was vainly trying to sleep, and which was itself of an unattractive and uncom- fortable nature. Argument and turmoil continued far into the night, and I began to wonder whether I had made a wise decision after all. I continued to wonder for several nights afterwards, and would lie awake for hours meditating whether to see the matter through, or get out of bed, put on my plain clothes (which I still had), and " desert." For- tunately for me another occupant of the room removed the temptation these clothes afforded, for, having none of his own, he one night appropriated mine, went off in them, and never came back. Shortly before the period of which I write it had been the custom for a married soldier and his wife, with such children as they possessed, to hve in one corner of the barrack-room, screened off with blankets, and in return for this accommodation and a share of the rations the wife kept 4 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the room clean, washed and mended the m.en's under- clothing, and attended to the preparation of their meals. This custom was not without its good points, as the women exercised a steadying influence over the men, while the latter seldom if ever forgot that a woman was in the room, and any one who did forget was promptly brought to order by the others. Still, it could not be wholly without its undesirable side, and the transfer of all women to " married quarters " was a distinct change for the better. The barrack-room arrangements for sleeping and eating could not be classed as luxurious. The brown bed-blankets were seldom or ever washed ; clean sheets were issued once a month ; and clean straw for the mattresses once every three months. Besides the beds, the only other furniture consisted of four benches and two deal tables. The men polished their boots on the former, and the latter were used for cleaning the remaining articles of kit as well as for dining- tables. Tablecloths there were none, and plates and basins (paid for by the men) were the only crockery, the basin being used in turn as a coffee-cup, tea-cup, beer-mug, soup-plate, shaving-mug, and receptacle for pipe-clay with which to clean gloves and belts. The food provided free consisted of one pound of bread and three-quarters of a pound of meat, and nothing more of any kind. Groceries, vegetables, and all other require- ments were paid for by the men, who had a daily deduction of 3|d. made from their pay of is. 2d. for that purpose. The regulation meals were coffee and bread for breakfast ; meat and potatoes for dinner, with soup or pudding once or twice a week ; tea and bread for tea. If a man wished to have supper or something besides dry bread for breakfast and tea he had to purchase it from the barrack hawkers or canteen. Putting the cost of this at 4^d. a day, he thus had to expend a total of eightpence a day on his food, besides which he was subjected to a further daily charge of a penny for washing. This left him fivepence a day or about three shillings a week, and even this was not all clear pocket-money, for after the first free issue he had to keep up the whole of his underclothing as well as many articles of uniform, and also supply himself with cleaning KIT AND UNIFORM 5 materials, such as polishing paste for brasses, oil for steel equipment, and soft-soap for saddlery. A beneficent regulation, recognising these drains on the unfortunate man's pay, laid down that in no case should he receive less than a penny a day ! In my regiment the custom was never to give less than a shilling a week, but even this sum did not go far to supplement the allowance of food, to say nothing of beer and tobacco. The Govern- ment now provides ample food, practically all clothing, and the amount of pay actually received is live or six times greater than it used to be. The " kit " with which I was issued free of cost consisted of a valise, stable-bag, hold-all (containing knife, fork, spoon, razor and comb, shaving, hair, lace, button, clothes and boot brushes), three baggage straps, tin of oil, tin of blacking, tin of brass paste, cloak, cape, lance-cap and plume, two forage caps, tunic, jacket, overalls (trousers), pantaloons, canvas ducks, jack-boots and spurs, Wellington boots and spurs, ankle-boots, braces, three shirts, three pairs of socks, two pairs of pants, two towels, and a piece of soap. Finally, I was given a lance, sword, pistol, cartridge-case, cap-case, and numerous belts — an amount of armament that completely staggered me. Uniform was of a very unpractical kind, especially the undress part of it. This comprised skin-tight overalls, an equally tight " shell-jacket " cut off short above the hips, and a forage cap of about the size of a breakfast saucer, and kept in its place immediately above the right ear by a narrow chin-strap worn under the lower hp (never under the chin in the cavalry, except on mounted parades). There were no " British-warms " or woollen " jumpers " as to-day, and cloaks were not allowed to be worn when off duty without a regimental order to that effect. This order was never given except when the weather was very inclement. Later on the forage cap became a " free issue," and was thoroughly disUked by everybody because of its ugly shape and abnormally large size as compared with the regimental pattern. The first occasion on which it was worn by the regiment was at an inspection by the Duke of Cambridge at York in 6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL 1881, when an unofficial hint was sent round the barrack- rooms beforehand that it was to be put well on the top of the head, and generally made to appear as hideous as possible. Every one did his best, or rather his worst, to comply with the hint, and when the Duke — never in too good a temper early in the day — came on parade, the sight of the dis- figured regiment nearly gave him a fit. It was alleged that he went back to the Horse Guards and wrote a furious letter to the War Office condemning the cap, but it remained the regulation article for some years afterwards, although the original pattern was still allowed to be worn off parade, and at the expense of the owner. The cavalry recruit was kept hard at work, riding- drill, stables, foot-drill, gymnastics, and school following each other in bewildering fashion from six in the morning till six in the evening, without any appreciable interval for rest. Riding-school was the terror of most recruits, few of whom had ever before been across a horse. For some weeks no saddle was allowed, no stirrups for some months, and the chief aim of the instructor, or " rough-rider," was not to give his pupil confidence but as many falls as possible. The " rough-rider " deserved his name, for he was as rough with a young horse as with a young recruit. He seldom possessed a decent pair of hands, and his system of training a horse was of the break-down rather than the break-in type. These unintelligent methods have long since passed into oblivion. Gymnastics, or physical exercises, were conducted on much the same hnes. Every recruit was expected to do the same thing in an equally proficient way, no allowance being made for differences in age, build, or general physical capacity. A robust constitution was required in winter to with- stand the cold and draughty stables and the biting winds which swept across the barrack square during foot-drill, where the shivering recruit would struggle to grasp the explanations of drill gabbled out by his instructor, and painfully endeavour to master the mysteries of the " goose- step " and the art of drawing swords " by numbers." I succumbed twice during my first winter, once being in TREATMENT OF SICK 7 hospital for two months with rheumatic fever brought on by exposure. When a man " reported sick " he was marched at about nine o'clock in the morning to the medical inspection room of his regiment, and after waiting about in all weathers for an indefinite time was seen by a medical officer. If con- sidered a case for admission he was given an aperient, whether he wanted it or not, in the shape of half-a-pint of vile-tasting liquid known as " black-strap." He was next marched off to hospital, which might be anything up to a mile or more away, and there he was interviewed by another doctor before being " admitted " to hospital. Next he was told off to a ward, where he might hope to arrive about mid- day, after having been on the move for some three or four hours. In the afternoon he would put on his hospital clothing, give his own into store, and lie down to await the visit of the medical officer in charge of the ward on the following morning. He was then again examined, treat- ment was prescribed, and if all went weU he received it during the afternoon, or some thirty hours after he first set out from his barrack-room. Accidents and other special cases would be dealt with more or less immediately, but ordinary medical cases dawdled on in the manner I have described, greatly to the discomfort of the patient and sometimes at the risk of his life. There was no nursing service, at any rate in the hospitals I had the misfortune to visit. Nursing and dressing were the duty of the " orderly " of the ward, and this individual was apt to regulate the amount of attention he gave to his patients by the amount of tips they gave to him. Permission to be out of barracks after " watch-setting " — ^half-past nine at night — was sparingly granted, and all- night passes were practically never given. The " roll " was called at watch-setting, when every man not on leave had to answer his name, and to make sure that none went out afterwards one and sometimes two " check " roll-calls were made by the orderly sergeant-major at uncertain hours during the night. Each orderly-sergeant handed in at watch-setting a statement showing the number of men 8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL sleeping in each of his troop rooms, and equipped with this the orderly sergeant-major, accompanied by the corporal of the guard, visited the rooms and counted the sleeping occupants. It was a favourite device of absentees, before going out, to fold up their bed as in day-time, so that the visiting sergeant-major might perhaps not notice their absence ; while others would try to deceive him by leaving a made-up dummy in their beds. " Breaking-out of barracks " was the crime, and twenty-eight days' confine- ment to barracks was usually the punishment, for this form of absence. To " break out " of barracks was a simple matter at Aldershot, for although the gates at the end of them were kept locked after watch-setting, and had high walls on either side, an unenclosed public road ran along the front which was accessible to everybody. This was not the case with all barracks, most of them being surrounded by high walls, topped with broken glass. When we were at Brighton, where the walls were of this kind, an amusing incident occurred in connection with a man who was trying to get back again after successfully breaking out. Not being able to scale the walls, he hit on the idea of returning in an officer's brougham, which was being brought back to barracks by a friendly coachman after depositing the officer and his wife at their house in the town. Unfor- tunately the military police sergeant looked inside the brougham before allowing it to leave the barrack gate, and the offender accordingly found himself in a worse predicament at orderly room next morning than if he had walked into barracks and surrendered. Of all days of the week Sunday was the most hated^a sad confession to make, but none the less true. After morning stables there was a general rush, often with little or no time for breakfast, to turn out in " full dress " for " divine service " — attendance at which was compulsory. On return to barracks there was another scramble preparatory to the commanding officer's inspection of stables, horses, saddlery, and barrack-rooms. From early morning till half-past one in the afternoon there was more work to be done, more grumbhng and swearing, and more fault-finding DIVINE SERVICE 9 than on any other day, all of which could have been avoided had the inspections been carried out on a week-day. The reason they were made on Sunday was certainly not because there was no time for them on other days. The real reason probably was that Sunday was the most convenient day for the officers, as it left them greater leisure to follow their social and sporting pursuits during the week. It was only natural that the men should resent being hustled about and made to do unnecessary work on the one day of the week observed by everybody else in the country as a day of rest. Divine service was not held for aU denominations at the same time, but at hours suitable to local facilities. It might be at any time between eight o'clock and noon, and therefore it was not uncommon for men, on moving to a new station, to ask to change their religion if by so doing they would attend church or chapel at such an hour as would enable them to escape from the detested inspections. Many amusing stories are told about these changes, one being of a man who asked his sergeant-major to enter him in the books as belonging to the " Plymouth Brethren." He was promptly told that no such religion was ofhcially recognised, and that he would be put down as a Roman Catholic ! On Christmas Day, 1877, I was detailed for my first military " duty," that of stable-guard or looking after the troop-horses out of stable-hours. The custom was to employ the most recently joined recruits on this particular day, so that the old soldiers might be free to make the most of their Christmas dinner, which was provided by the officer com- manding the troop, and included a variety of eatables never seen on any other day, as well as a liberal supply of beer. The casks containing the beer were brought some time before to the barrack-room where the dinner was to be held, and were there placed under charge of a man who could be depended upon to see that they were not broached before the appointed hour. Had this happened — as it sometimes did — rather awkward incidents might have occurred when the officers visited the room just previous to the dinner to wish the men a merry Christmas and to receive similar wishes in return. If any individual did, by some means or 10 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL other, contrive to start his festivities too early, efforts were made to keep him in the background until the officers had left. It was the practice to see that all members of the troop who were absent on duty should be specially well- cared for, and in my case the dinner brought to the stable consisted of a huge plateful of miscellaneous food — beef, goose, ham, vegetables, plum - pudding, blanc- mange — plus a basin of beer, a packet of tobacco, and a new clay pipe ! At night the horses were looked after by a " night guard," which paraded about five or six o'clock in the evening and came off duty at reveille on the following morning. It was mainly composed of recruits and other men who were required to attend training or do other work during the day-time. The chief duties of a " sentry " of the night guard were to perambulate outside the stables, tie up any horse that might get loose (some of the old troop-horses were extraordinarily clever at slipping their head collars and finding their way to the corn-bin), see that the doors were kept closed, and, in the phraseology of the " orders," " call the corporal of the guard in the event of fire or other unusual occurrence." The sentry was armed with either a sword or a carbine (no ammunition), though what assistance he was supposed to derive therefrom in the performance of his duties no one ever understood. The nights were sometimes intensely cold and always interminably long, although the two hours " on " sentry were followed by four hours "off," and to the tired recruit the bales of forage offered tempting resting-places. That way lay danger if not disaster, for once he succumbed to the temptation to sit down it was a hundred to one that he would fall asleep, and if he did he might wake up to find himself confronted by an officer or non-commissioned officer going the " rounds," with the result that he would be made prisoner and tried by court-martial. The punish- ment for this crime was invariably two months' imprison- ment, and although young soldiers must be made to realise their responsibihties when on sentry, a little more considera- tion in dealing with tired lads not yet out of their teens THE GUARD-ROOM ii would not have been misplaced. I have known more than one lad ruined for life because of undue severity of punish- ment for a first offence. Forty years ago every offence, however trivial, was classed as a " crime," and the " prisoner " was interned in the " guard-room." The latter, in the case of the cavalry barracks at Aldershot, was about fifteen feet square, indif- ferently ventilated, and with the most primitive arrange- ments for sanitation. No means of lighting it after dark were either provided or permitted. Rimning along one of its sides was a sloping wooden stage, measuring about six feet from top to bottom, which served as a bed for all the occupants, sometimes a dozen or more in number ; at the top was a wooden shelf, slightly raised above the level of the stage, which acted as pillow ; and no blankets (except in very cold weather) or mattresses were allowed, except for prisoners who had been interned for more than seven days. Until then their only covering, besides their ordinary clothes — which were never taken off — consisted of their cloaks, and they had to endure as best they could the sore hips and shoulders caused by lying on the hard boards. I shall describe presently how I once came to be incarcerated in this horrible place for a period of three weeks, and will only say here that I was exceedingly glad when the first seven days were completed. A prisoner charged with committing an offence was kept in the guard- room until he could be brought before the commanding officer, no other officer in the regiment having power to dispose of his case, and if he were remanded for a court-martial, as he not infrequently was, he might be interned for several days before his trial took place. In the meantime he would have for company all classes of prisoners thrust into the room at any hour of the day or night, some for drunkenness, some for desertion, some for insubordination, and some for no offence at all which merited confinement. This was not a healthy atmosphere in which to bring up young soldiers, to many of whom the shady side of life was as yet unknown, and, as will be shown later, a more sensible and humane system was eventually adopted. It should not be forgotten that these harsh and 12 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL short-sighted methods were more or less common to the age, and were not confined to the army. The " Articles of War," based on the " Mutiny Act," constituted the law which then governed the soldier. The Articles contained a list of all military offences, with their punishments, and were read out to the men once a month after " muster parade." Originally — they dated back a long time — they were of excessive severity, inflicting death or loss of limb for almost every crime. They were not much more lenient in my early days from what I can remember of them, the termination of most of them being to the effect that " any soldier committing this offence shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer death or such less punishment as may be awarded." In 1879 the Articles of War and the Mutiny Act were consolidated in the " Army Discipline and Regulations Act." This was repealed in 1881 and re-enacted with some amendments in the present Army Act, which is brought into operation annually by another Act of Parliament. " Muster parade," I may explain, was held on the last day of each month, and was the only parade at which every officer and man had to be present. The paymaster was the important person, as he had to satisfy himself that every one for whom he had issued pay was actually serving in the regiment. It appears to have been a relic of the days when commanding officers received a lump sum of money for a given number of men, and could not be trusted to have that number in the regiment, A man sentenced to undergo imprisonment, even if for some such short period as forty-eight hours, had his hair closely cropped off, and was thus made to look like a convict for several weeks after his discharge. " Confinement to barracks " included " punishment drill " for four separate hours each day except Sunday, and this again seemed to have been designed to destroy any shred of self-respect the unfortunate defaulter might possess. The " drill " con- sisted in being turned and twisted about on the barrack square, in quick time and with only a few short pauses during the hour, the men carrying their full kit, strapped on their shoulders, besides the lance and sword — a total weight A TRAINED SOLDIER 13 of some 40 or 50 lbs. The drill could be made, and fre- quently was, according to the fancy of the sergeant in charge, extremely exasperating and fatiguing, and in order to escape from such degrading drudgery men would sometimes deliberately commit a second and more serious offence so as to be sent to prison. In the cavalry it was not feasible, as in the infantry, to spare the men for four hours a day from their other duties, and as a rule the punishment took the form of one hour's drill and one or two of emplojnnent on " fatigue duties." In August 1878 — or about nine months after joining — I was " dismissed " recruit-drill, this being the length of time usually taken to become classified as a trained cavalry soldier. The recruit training included a " course " of musketry of about three weeks' duration, most of the time being devoted to the deadly dull exercise known as " bob and joe " — the bringing of the carbine from the " ready " to the " present " and vice versa. Forty rounds of ball ammunition, no more and no less, regardless of require- ments, were allowed for each and every recruit to make himself a proficient shot. The result was that not one in twenty was proficient, or anything like it. I remember that I carried off the prize for the best shot of my batch, the prize being three shillings ! As a trained soldier I now became available for " day- guard," which furnished the full-dress sentry on the barrack gate and was responsible for the safe custody of the prisoners in the guard-room. It was composed of a corporal, a trumpeter, and five men, and was paraded for inspection by the regimental sergeant-major. The parade of this guard was one of the chief events of the day, for from amongst the five men the sergeant-major selected the two whom he thought to be the smartest and best turned out to act as " orderlies " to the commanding officer and adjutant. To be thus selected was the ambition of the whole five, for while the three had turn about to spend the next twenty- four hours on sentry on the barrack gate, the chosen two passed their night in bed and had little to do during the day. I was lucky enough to be selected at my first two attempts, though I was not equally fortunate on all other occasions. 14 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Being considered, I suppose, to be a promising and trustworthy lad, I was detailed in the summer of 1878, in company with another man and a corporal, to form the " escort " for bringing back from London a notorious deserter who had been arrested there by the civil police. He had been a burglar by profession before becoming a soldier, and notwithstanding the size of the escort he managed, with the assistance of some of his friends who appeared on the scene, and favoured by darkness, to make his escape while we were passing through the purlieus adjacent to Waterloo station. Crestfallen, we returned to Aldershot minus our prisoner. The corporal was at once placed " in arrest," whilst I and my companion were con- signed to the guard-room, there to await trial by court- martial, and in all probability to be sentenced to not less than six months' imprisonment. At the end of three weeks the General commanding the Cavalry Brigade exercised, as I thought and still think, a sensible discretion by releasing us. Had he brought us to trial, the chances are that I would have followed in the steps of many another soldier of those days and have become a hardened offender against military law, a disgrace to myself, and a burden to the country. This was my first " crime," and the second followed a week or two later. It consisted in allowing a led horse to break loose at exercise, and for this I was duly " repri- manded " by the commanding officer (Whigham) and warned that stern punishment would be meted out the next time I misbehaved. My future prospects were there- fore beginning to appear somewhat gloomy, but thanks to the good sense of Graham, my troop commander, neither of the two offences were allowed to count seriously against me. He realised that such neglect as there might have been was attributable to nothing worse than youthful inexperience, and early in 1879 he took advantage of the temporary absence of the colonel to recommend me to the acting commanding officer for promotion to lance-corporal, thus obtaining for me the first step towards the rank of Field- Marshal. MiUtary training lagged far behind, notwithstanding the many lessons furnished by the Franco-German War of 1870, PIPE-CLAY 15 and was still mainly based on the system inherited from the Peninsula and Crimean campaigns. Pipe-clay, antiquated and useless forms of drill, blind obedience to orders, ramrod- Hke rigidity on parade, and similar time-honoured practices were the chief quahfications by which a regiment was judged. Very few officers had any ambition beyond regimental promotion. " Squadron leader " was a name and not a reality, for beyond commanding it on parade this officer had no responsibility or duty of any kind connected with the squadron as such. In all other respects each of the two troops which then formed a squadron was a separate and independent unit, the troop commander being subordinate only to the regimental commanding officer. Once a week or so the latter held his " field-day," when the regiment as a whole attended parade and spent the greater part of two or three hours in carrying out a series of comphcated drill-book movements : equally good results could have been secured in half the time, and with half the expenditure of horse-flesh and strong language. For the remainder of the week training, as understood in those days, was the preserve of the adjutant, whose parades were attended only by those officers who were junior to him in rank, and by a comparatively small proportion of the men. For the drill of recruits on foot the adjutant was also responsible, and in riding drill the ridingmaster was supreme. Troop officers had no responsibility for either one or the other. As already mentioned, Lancer regiments carried sword, lance, and a muzzle-loading horse-pistol, and about half-a- dozen men in each troop, known as scouts or skirmishers, had a carbine as well. They had a very sketchy knowledge of the use of this weapon and, like every one else, but a "hazy idea of either scouting or skirmishing. Later, carbines were issued to all men, and the horse-pistols were with- drawn ; but for some years musketry was universally hated and deemed to be a degradation and a bore. In no case could it have been made of much value, since the annual allowance of ammunition was fixed at forty rounds a man, and thirty rounds of these were fired at distances between 500 and 800 yards. i6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Manoeuvres as practised in more recent years were practically unknown, though there was a legend amongst the old soldiers that they had taken place at Cannock Chase some years before I joined. The nearest approach to them was the " field-day " held, perhaps half-a-dozen times during the year, by the Generals in command of the larger stations, or by the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge. The first one I attended was held on the ground at the back of the Staff College, the whole of the Aldershot garrison — about a division — taking part in it. I remember that towards the end of the battle — a field-day always entailed a " battle " — my squadron was ordered to charge a battalion of the opposing infantry. Down came our lances to the " engage," the " charge " was sounded, and off we went at full speed, regardless of everything except the desire to make a brave show worthy of our regimental predecessors who had delivered the immortal charge at Aliwal some thirty odd years before. The enemy received us in square, with fixed bayonets, front rank kneeling and rear rank standing, the orthodox method of dealing with a cavalry charge. Finding our opponents too strong — or for some other reason — the order was given, " troops right-about wheel," and so near were we that, in wheeling, the outer flank was carried on to the infantry and one of the horses received a bayonet in his chest. Being too seriously injured to live he was shot, but in other respects we were congratu- lated on having accompHshed a fine performance. No doubt it was magnificent, but it was not the way to fight against men armed with rifles. These defective methods of training in general were due in a large measure to the system of voluntary enUstment, under which recruits were received in driblets throughout the year, and, more especially perhaps, to the fact that the four different arms were kept severely apart from each other. Cavalry training was the business of the Inspector- General of Cavalry at the Horse Guards, the local General having little or no say in the matter. Artillery were mainly stationed at Woolwich and engineer units at Chatham, each having, like the cavalry, its own special Generals and staffs and its special representatives at the Horse Guards. Com- THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE 17 bined training of the different arms, without which it is nonsense to expect intelligent co-operation in war, was therefore impossible. There may have been, and probably were, other obstacles in the way of improvement, but one would think that most of them could have been surmounted, given more impetus from the top. It was not forthcoming, and for this the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief from 1856 to 1895 (thirty-nine years), must be held accountable. He was a good friend of the soldier and extremely popular with all ranks in the army, but he was extraordinarily conservative in his ideas on the training and education of both officers and men. He seems to have beUeved, quite honestly, that the army as he had found it, created by such a master of war as the Duke of Welhngton, must be the best for all time, and he had not realised the changes which had since taken place in the armies of Europe. I have been told that he once took the chair at a lecture given to officers of the Aldershot garrison on the subject of foreign cavalry, when he proved to be a veritable Balaam in commending the lecturer to the audience. " Why should we want to know anything about foreign cavalry ? " he asked. " We have better cavalry of our own. I fear, gentlemen, that the army is in danger of becoming a mere debating society." Many of the younger generation of officers were fully ahve to the fact that better organisation, education, and training were necessary, the most notable amongst them being Lord Wolseley, the best-read soldier of his time. From 1882 onwards he was the moving spirit in the path of progress, and thanks to his energy and initiative, and to the support he received from Sir Evelyn Wood and other keen-sighted soldiers, apathy and idleness began to go out of fashion, and hard work became the rule ; study was no longer considered to be " bad form," but a duty and an essential step to advancement ; hunting on six days of the week was no longer admitted to be the only training required by a cavalry leader ; and in general the profes- sional quahfications of our regimental officers began to reach a much higher standard. I shall refer to this matter again, i8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL when describing my experiences at Aldershot some thirty years later. Before leaving the subject of training, I may mention that once a year the non-commissioned officers and men of each troop had to compete between themselves for classifica- tion in the use of the sword and lance, the troop- winners then fighting off for the regimental prize. When first introduced, rather crude notions prevailed as to how the competition should be carried out, and it was the custom to place the two adversaries at opposite ends of the riding- school, give the order to attack, and then leave them to charge down on each other at full speed much in the same way as the picture-books represent the tournaments of centuries ago. With the single-stick used as a sword not much damage could be done ; but with a stout ash pole nine feet in length representing the lance the case was different. For the rider and his horse to be ridden down or rolled over was a common occurrence, and it was seldom that one or more of the competitors was not carried off to hospital, especially if the competition happened to follow pay-day. This rough business had its value as it taught the men how to defend themselves ; and incidentally it afforded a certain class of individual an opportunity for paying off old scores against any non-commissioned officer against whom he had a grudge. To him it was a matter of indifference what the umpire's decision might be, provided he " got one in " against the object of his resentment. When I became sergeant, and subsequently troop sergeant-major, I had occasionally to deal with attacks of this kind, but being careful at all times to keep fit in wind and limb by constant practice with foils and single-sticks, and by taking regular running exercise, I was capable of giving back quite as good as I received. My most successful year was, I think, 1886, when I was lucky enough to secure all the first prizes in the troop— sword, lance, and shooting— but pride had its usual faU (hterally) when, as troop-winner, I fought for the regimental prize and, with my horse, was bundled head over heels by a better man. CHAPTER II NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER Promoted Corporal — Stationed at Brighton — My third and last " crime " — Special duty at Chatham — Rejoin regiment and go to York — Promoted Lance-Sergeant — Special duties while at York — Musketry course at Hythe — Promoted Sergeant — Signalling course at Alder- shot — Regiment goes to Dundalk — State of Ireland — Appointed Assistant Instructor of Signalling — Lieutenant Dugdale — Success of signallers announced in regimental orders — Assistant Instructor of Musketry and Military Reconnaissance — Escort prisoners to Limerick Gaol — Regiment goes to Dublin — Promoted Troop Sergeant-Major — Suicide of predecessor — Influence of Troop Sergeant-Major — Consider possibihty of obtaining commission — Difficulties in the way of this — Regimental officer's expenses — Decline Commanding Of&cer's offer of a commission — Accept the same offer made by his successor — Vexatious delays retard com- mission—Pass examination for commission — Regiment goes to Aldershot — Gazetted Second Lieutenant in 3rd Dragoon Guards^ Leave the i6th Lancers. In April 1879, or about a year and a half after en- listing, I was promoted full corporal. This was, for the time, almost unprecedented rapidity of advancement in the cavalry, and it entailed my transfer to another troop under other superiors having other ways. Shortly afterwards the regiment was ordered to Brighton — a four days' march — and I was selected to go on ahead in charge of the billeting party to arrange for the accommodation of the men and horses of the troop at the various halting-places. It was in this way that I gained my first experience in those duties of Quartermaster- General which were to devolve upon me in the Great War. Whilst at Brighton I committed my third and last " crime." I had been detailed with two men to act as escort to Major-General Newdigate, under whose command some Volunteer battalions were having a field-day, or 19 20 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL " sham-fight " as the phrase went, on Brighton Downs, The day was observed as a hoHday in the neighbourhood, and the hohday-makers, with the best of intentions, insisted upon offering more free drinks to my two men than were good for them. As I failed to keep a sufficiently sharp eye on them one of the two yielded to the temptation, and on the way home parted company with his horse, which galloped riderless back to barracks where it was seen arriving by the regimental sergeant-major. The man himself was picked up in the street helplessly drunk, and I, the responsible party, was placed " in arrest." (I may remind the reader that I was still in my teens.) I had a very unpleasant interview with the commanding officer, Whigham, next morning at orderly room. Looking at the record of my two previous crimes as given in the " defaulters' book," he fiercely remarked, " First you allow a man to escape ; then you allow a horse to escape ; now vou allow both a man and a horse to break loose. You are ' severely reprimanded,' and if you ever come before me again I will reduce you to the ranks." I knew that his bark was sometimes worse than his bite, but I also felt that he might be as good as his word, and that it behoved me to be more strict in future in supervising the men under my control. This was well rubbed into me later by the sergeant- major, a non-commissioned officer of the best type and for whose advice I always had the greatest respect. A few years later the troop defaulters' book containing a list of my offences was either lost or wilfully destroyed. No one was able to discover what had become of it. The offences, not being of a serious nature, had not been recorded in the regimental defaulters' book, or an5rwhere else except in the missing book, and therefore I was necessarily given, as were all other men similarly situated, a clean sheet in the new book. It remained without an entry throughout my future service in the ranks. Apparently my latest dereliction of duty was not deemed to be very heinous, for a few months after it occurred I was one of two non-commissioned officers in the regiment recommended to go through a twelve months' course at the riding establishment at Canterbury, in order to qualify SIR EVELYN WOOD 21 for the post of ridingmaster. The final decision rested, of course, with the commanding officer, and he selected the other man, I was not sorry, as I had neither the desire nor natural ability to become an expert in equitation. A more congenial post was given me in the summer of 1879, when I was ordered one day, on return to barracks from a long morning's drill on the Downs, to parade in " marching order " by three o'clock to proceed to Chatham in charge of three men detailed as mounted orderlies at the headquarters of the Chatham district. It was already past noon, but by the appointed hour my detachment was on parade, and we pushed on as quickly as our tired horses would permit, passing through Lewes and Uckfield, and reaching our first halting-place, Maresfield, about half-past seven in the evening. The only available accommodation was a small farmstead occupied by an irascible old lady who flatly refused to have anything to do with us, and conse- quently I had to ride on for another two miles to a police station and obtain the requisite authority compelling her to take us in. This brought her to her senses, and by the time we had groomed our horses and made them comfortable for the night, about ten o'clock, she had prepared for us an excellent supper to which we did full justice, having had no food since our meagre breakfast at seven o'clock in the morning. Next day we made Tonbridge, where we were fortimate in at once securing good billets, gooseberry pudding being a higiily-appreciated feature of the menu. The local members of the Kent Yeomanry showed us welcome hos- pitality in the evening. The following day we reached Chatham, wet to the skin, and were attached to a company of the army service corps for quarters and rations. It was at Chatham, while holding this, my first independent command, that I made the acquaintance of the late Sir Evelyn Wood. The views I held about my mission are shown in a letter I wrote home : Taking all things into consideration it is good to have been selected for this work, as I am in sole charge and no one will interfere with me so long as the men turn out clean and smart 22 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL when on duty and keep steady. I need hardly say that we were all picked out as likely to be a credit to the regiment to which we belong. I hope we shall be, as my Captain told me when starting that he would keep up a correspondence with the General Com- manding (Sir Evelyn Wood, now in Africa with the French Empress) and will hear how I get on, and that if all goes correct he will, on my return, do his best for me. He was a sensible officer this captain — I forget his name — to impress upon me, a young lad, the importance of keeping up the good name of the regiment, and I may add that on completion of the duty, about eight months later, the commanding officer received from the Chatham head- quarters an official letter which was highly complimentary to myself and my men. The regiment had meantime moved from Brighton to Woolwich, and the circumstances in which I rejoined it from Chatham will best be described by quoting from another letter : Cock Hotel, Ware, Hertfordshire, Sunday, 2o.2.'8i. Last Wednesday about six p.m. I was sent for by the Brigade Major, and told to have myself and men ready by nine a.m. next morning to rejoin the regiment. That was all I could get to know. Next morning we left Chatham and covered the twenty- six miles to Woolwich in about four hours, finding out on arrival there that next day we would commence our journey to York, there to remain until further orders. On the first day we passed through Greenwich, Blackheath and Lewisham, over London Bridge, through the city, Islington, Shoreditch and on to Edmonton, eighteen miles. Yesterday we arrived at Ware, sixteen miles, where we halted for Sunday. The following shows ; from here to York : Monday Royston. Tuesday Huntingdon. Wednesday . Peterborough Thursday Bourne. Friday Grantham. Saturday ) Newark. Sunday ( r w ^ ^ v^ » T w^ i» • Monday Retford. Tuesday Doncaster. Wednesday . Pontefract. Thursday York. PROMOTED SERGEANT 23 I remember that the winter was exceptionally severe, and that we had to lead our horses for a great part of the way, owing to the frozen and slippery state of the snow- covered ground. Soon after arrival at York I was promoted lance-sergeant (or provisional sergeant), thus becoming a member of the sergeants' mess and terminating my barrack-room life with the men. As sergeant, my horse, saddlery, and accoutrements were cleaned by a batman, who received six shillings a month from government for the additional work, as well as certain indulgences granted by his master. This was a welcome change, for there was no harder animal in the world to groom than a troop horse in winter, when, no part of him being clipped, his hair would be inches in length, and in spite of rubbing would remain wet from mud or perspira- tion for hours, and until he was dry the rubbing had to be continued. In winter, too, many men would be absent on furlough, which meant that two and sometimes three horses fell to the lot of each man present at stables. After being employed for some weeks on mounted duty at the headquarters of the York district, I was placed in charge of the regimental remounts — about forty in number — and so occupied another semi-independent position. My selection for these different posts was probably due to the credit earned at Chatham. The following August I was sent to the school of musketry at Hythe to qualify as assistant instructor of musketry. The curriculum was then about as unpractical and weari- some as it could well be, the greater part of the time — two months — being devoted to acquiring efficiency in repeating, parrot-like, the instructions laid down in the drill book. Little or no attention was paid to the art of shooting in the field, and the total amount of ball ammunition expended was restricted to the orthodox forty rounds per man. It was not till some years later, under such commandants as Ian Hamilton and Monro, that a more intelligent system, better suited to modern requirements, was introduced, and Hythe began to be a really useful institution. Both in going and returning I travelled between Hull 24 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL and London by boat, making the journey at each end by rail. This may not seem a very expeditious route, nor was it. For instance, when returning from Hythe I had to spend a day in London waiting for a boat ; another two days were taken by the sea passage ; and as I arrived at Hull late on a Sunday I had to stay the night there before being able to get a train for York. To the financial mind, however, the itinerary was correct, for the travelling ex- penditure incurred was some pence, and perhaps even some shillings, less than it would have been had I travelled all the way by rail. January 1882 saw me promoted full sergeant, by far the youngest of that rank in the regiment, both in age and service, and this led to my transfer to another troop, " B," commanded by Major Garrett. He was a general favourite with his men, and I have pleasant recollections of my time under his command. In June I was deputed to go through a course of in- struction at the school of signalling at Aldershot. It was considerably more advanced in its methods than the Hythe establishment, but was nevertheless not as up-to-date as it should have been. Whilst I was at Aldershot the regiment moved from York to Ireland, headquarters and three troops going to Dundalk, and the remaining five troops to four other stations, of which Belfast was one. On completion of the signalling course I was ordered to join at Dundalk. Ireland was at this period, as at many other times in her history, suffering from the effects of being a political shuttle- cock, and the military were frequently called out to assist the police in the suppression of disorder. Evictions for non-payment of rent were the most common source of trouble, and some of them would be attended by thousands of sympathisers from the countryside, necessitating, in the opinion of the authorities, the presence of a considerable military force. I have known as much as a brigade of all arms employed on this duty, the evicted tenant being an old woman occupying a dilapidated hovel, and the unpaid rent amounting to a few shillings ! Having passed the examination at the signalling school, LIEUTENANT DUGDALE 25 obtaining 282 marks out of a possible 300, I was made assistant instructor of the regimental signallers, whose standard was then very low. The annual inspection took place about two months later, and consequently there was not sufficient time to make much improvement. The regiment was reported as being only " fair," and it occupied 44th place in the army " order of merit." The inspecting officer was pleased, however, to classify the assistant instructor, myself, as " very good." The commanding officer, now Schwabe in place of Whigham, was bent on achieving much better results, and he gave Lieutenant Dugdale, the " instructor," and myself a free hand to do as we liked on the understanding that the necessary improvement should be made. In this we suc- ceeded at the next annual inspection, when the regiment took 12th place in the army and 3rd place in Ireland. In 1884 we did still better, the regiment being first in Ireland and missing first in the army only by a decimal. I felt very proud of myself when the following appeared in regimental orders : Sir Thomas Steele, General Commanding the Forces in Ireland, has been pleased to express his intention of bringing at the first opportunity to the notice of H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, that the i6th Lancers have turned out the best squad of signallers in Ireland. The Commanding Of&cer wishes to express his sincere thanks to Lieutenant Dugdale, Sergeant Robertson, and the signallers for their exertion which has brought so much credit to the regiment. During our connection with signalling I formed a close friendship with Dugdale, which lasted until his death. I stiU have the case of pipes he gave me as a memento of our combined success ; the handful of cigars he gave me at the same time was consumed that evening in the sergeants' mess. He was a splendid athlete, handsome, generous to a fault, and beloved by all who knew him. His death from a virulent attack of influenza some years ago, with that of his wife from the same cause on the following day, came as a great shock to their numerous friends. He was married subsequent to our signaUing days, and it so happened that one of his daughters was the wife of one 26 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL of my pupils at the Staff College some twenty-five years later. Besides the signalhng duty I officiated as sergeant- instructor of musketry. This appointment, as well as that of instructor (always an officer), was aboHshed in 1883, the Adjutant- General of the day, Sir Garnet Wolseley, quite rightly holding troop officers responsible for the training of their men in this branch of their work as in all others, but as musketry was still to a great extent a sealed book to most cavalry officers I continued to exercise, under the adjutant, a general supervision over the musketry arrange- ments, to train the recruits, and to prepare the annual musketry returns. A third duty, which feU to me in the winter months, was that of assistant-instructor in sketching, map-reading, and other things coming under the heading of recon- naissance. Like most non-commissioned officers of the time I knew practically nothing about these subjects, but by reading such few books as existed — nearly all of which made very intricate what was really quite simple — I learnt a certain amount which I passed on to the half- dozen members of the class. Eventually I picked up a good deal of useful knowledge which proved to be helpful later in hfe when employed on intelligence work in the field, but it was a slow and laborious business. Fortunately I was a fairly good draughtsman. For much of what I learnt I was indebted to Captain Lord St. Vincent, a keen and capable officer, who had recently come to us from the 7th Hussars. He met his death in Egypt during the fighting of the 'eighties. Having these specialist duties to carry out I was " excused " — as the phrase went — the ordinary troop and regimental duties of a sergeant, and on the whole had an interesting and pleasant time, for, as I wrote, " I have nothing else to do such as stables, guards, etc., have all Sunday to myself, and get up and go to bed when I like ! " Whilst at Dundalk I was given an opportunity of showing whether I had profited from my previous failures to look properly after men committed to my charge. I was ordered to conduct eleven men from the Belfast district ESCORT DUTY 27 / to Limerick gaol, where they were to undergo varying terms of imprisonment, some being of considerable length. My friend the regimental sergeant-major warned me that some of the prisoners were hardened criminals who might try to get away, and he reminded me of the deserter who had made his escape in London. The eleven prisoners were taken over at different railway stations en route to Limerick, and as I received them I handcuffed them and the four men of the escort together in one long string. This was not by any means a comfortable manner in which to make a railway journey extending over twelve hours, and some of the men begged that the handcuffs might be taken off, if only for a few minutes, so that they might rest their cramped and aching arms, I remained obdurate both to their entreaties and threats, and in due course they were safely delivered over to the prison authorities. Ruthless as this treatment may seem, it was the only way in which I could make sure of carrying out my mission, and after having accompUshed it I proceeded to a sergeants' mess in the Limerick barracks, and there took part in a dance until reveille sounded the following morning. Having thus completed what I thought to be a very creditable trip, I returned to Dundalk and reported that the eleven prisoners had been duly lodged in gaol. The journey was not, however, an unqualified success, for I managed to lose the key of one pair of the handcuffs — a matter which entailed, to the annoyance of the commanding officer, a lengthy correspondence between the regiment and the ordnance office. It terminated by my being ordered to pay threepence to defray the loss of the key. How much money had meanwhile been expended on stamps and stationery I cannot say. At the end of February 1885 the regiment was suddenly ordered to move to Dublin (Island Bridge barracks) in relief of the 5th Lancers despatched to the Sudan, No sooner had we arrived there than we were confined to barracks and aU leave was cancelled, owing to the demonstrations which were being held in Phoenix Park in sympathy with Mr. O'Brien, M.P., who had just been suspended in the House of Commons. 28 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL A month later I was promoted troop sergeant-major of " E " troop. My predecessor had been a medical student before joining the army, and as he was well educated his prospects would have been good had he not been addicted to periodical spells of hard drinking. He had been promoted in the hope that his increased responsibihties might help to keep him straight, and he had promised to abstain from drink, but before many months had elapsed the troop accounts, for which he was answerable to his troop officer, were found to balance on the wrong side and he was accordingly ordered to revert to the rank of sergeant and to hand over his duties to me. I was directed to go to his quarters to discuss matters, and I there found him to be quite drunk and incapable of explaining anything. When his condition became known to higher authority he was placed " in arrest " pending investigation by the commanding officer. Next day a troop sergeant-major went to escort him to the orderly room, and finding his door locked he came for me. We returned together, and on breaking open the door discovered that the poor fellow had shot hunself a few minutes before. Apparently he had felt unable at the last moment to face the ruin and disgrace which confronted him, and a round of service ammunition and a carbine had done the rest. For several days I was kept busy in un- ravelling the tangle into which the accounts had been allowed to fall, but beyond neglect and carelessness there was nothing seriously wrong with them, the actual deficiency in money amounting only to thirty-five pounds. For this miserable sum drink had claimed its victim, whose life, but for the one weakness, might have been so different. " Paddy " Malone, the commander of my new troop, was a splendid specimen of manhood both in build and character, standing a good six feet six inches in height and made in proportion. Wyndham Quinn and Dugdale were the two subalterns, and from all three I experienced nothing but kindness during the three years I was their troop sergeant- major. A troop sergeant-major occupies a position which enables him to exert, for good or for evil, great influence over his men. It is said that the non-commissioned officer is the TROOP SERGEANT-MAJOR 29 backbone of the army, but it is equally true that he can do much harm unless he is strictly impartial and identifies himself with the interests of his men. Although the " old soldier " as I knew him eight years before was rapidly dis- appearing, a certain number still remained who, with some of the younger ones, required firm and tactful handling. In not a few cases the worst characters were the best work- men — that is, the best grooms and best riders — when money was scarce ; when it was plentiful they would fall under the spell of drink, and this would lead to absence, insubor- dination, and other military offences. Try as one might these men proved very hard to reform, and while I gained many gratifying successes I also had some failures in my efforts to make them see the folly of their ways. The fault lay not nearly so much with the men — ^who were good fellows at heart — as with the authorities who neglected to provide them with congenial means of recreation, to place greater trust in their self-respect, and generally to call forth the better part of their nature. With the intro- duction of comfortable regimental institutes ; the substi- tution, except when a really serious dereliction of duty had been committed, of "minor offences" for "crimes"; the abolition of the practice of imprisoning all offenders in the guard-room no matter how trivial the offence ; greater hberahty in the granting of leave ; and the adoption all round of more intelligent and sympathetic methods, a marked improvement in the behaviour of the men quickly followed, and their outlook on life automatically became quite different. For some years before going to Dublin I had cherished the hope of obtaining a commission, but at first there seemed no more chance of this hope being reaHsed than of obtaining the moon. Apart from ridingmasters and quartermasters it was very seldom that any one was promoted from the ranks — not more than four or five a year on an average — and moreover the initial step lay with the commanding officer, a strong backing from whom was a sine qua non. Whigham was not friendly disposed towards me, and he happened to be, I think, one of those who held the view that promotion from the ranks was not to the benefit of 30 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL either the man or the State. During his regime, therefore, nothing was or could be done. The idea of trying for a commission had originated with Leshe Melville, the rector of my native village. Both he and his wife had taken a kindly interest in me from early boyhood, and the lady, who had several relatives in the army, was particularly keen that I should make a name for myself. Some officers of the regiment, Dugdale more than any, gave me similar encouragement, and when Whigham was succeeded by Schwabe, and I had come to the front a Httle as a result of the special duties I had been carrying out, my prospects seemed brighter. Setting to work more systematically and with greater confidence, I commenced to study for a " first class certificate of education," this qualification being necessary before I could be recommended for a commission. The certificate was duly secured in the autumn of 1883, and I then turned to the professional side, reading all the books on tactics, strategy, and past campaigns that I could lay hands on. They were few in number, as the regimental library did not cater for this kind of study — or for any other for that matter — and I could not afford to purchase many books. The deficiency had to be made up by reading very carefully those that were available. The ordinary drill books I knew from A to Z. But there was another and much greater obstacle to be considered, about which I could not make up my mind for a long time. I had no private means, and without some £300 a year in addition to army pay it was impossible to live as an officer in a cavalry regiment at home. The infantry was less expensive, but I could not entertain the idea of leaving my old arm, the cavalry. The money difficulty did not arise in the case of the so-called " ranker " who sought a commission through the ranks because he could not, owing to lack of brains or industry, obtain one through Sandhurst or the mihtia. Such rankers as these usually possessed ample money, and, being backed by private influence, would be given their commission, if at all, a year or two after enlistment, and were then able to resume the social status which they had ON TAKING A COMMISSION 31 temporarily laid down. The true ranker, having no influence behind him, had to toil for several years before receiving a commission, and even then the chances were that he would, owing to the want of private means, be miserable in himself and a nuisance to his brother officers. All officers were, quite rightly, expected to live up to the standard of their regimental mess, and to bear a due share of the expenses — at some stations a very heavy item — incurred by the entertainment of mess guests, balls, race- meetings, and so forth. Considerable contributions had also to be made towards the upkeep of the regimental band, which was maintained only to a very limited extent from pubhc funds. An absurd amount of costly uniform had to be purchased and constantly renewed, while chargers had to be paid for out of the officers' pockets, and had to be of first-class quality. A subaltern's pay was about ;£i20 per annum. Ten years or more might elapse before Captain's rank was attained, and then the pay was less than £200 per annum. It had hitherto been possible, as well as convenient, to find room in each regiment for at least one ranker by appoint- ing him adjutant, a post which he could hold for an in- definite time. This brought him useful pecuniary benefit, and by entrusting to him much of the elementary training of the men the other officers were able to enjoy increased faciUties for leave. But this system was rapidly passing away. Troop and squadron officers were now being made really responsible for the training and administration of their commands ; a higher degree of efficiency was being demanded ; and the post of adjutant, now limited to five years, was no longer regarded as the perquisite of the ranker, but was being eagerly sought after by all young officers who aspired to rise in their profession. It will be understood that in these circumstances the ranker was not as welcome to the officers of a regiment as before, and as the financial obstacle seemed insurmountable I decided that I must give up all idea of realising my ambition, and I did. The matter did not rest there for long, as one day in 1884 Schwabe expressed the wish that I should take a 32 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL commission as soon as possible. Not having previously mentioned the subject to me, his generous offer came as a complete surprise, and I again went over all the old ground, wondering whether I dare accept the offer or not. Event- ually, and with a sad heart, I reluctantly dechned it, and I believe that Schwabe was as sorry as myself. He told me I was acting foolishly, and probably he was right. Soon afterwards he was succeeded in the command of the regiment by Colonel Maillard. Sticking to my studies in the hope that something might yet turn up to justify going back on the decision to which I had come, I became more and more devoted to a military life and the old ambition soon reasserted itself. WTien, therefore, in 1886, Maillard made the same proposal as his predecessor had done, and appeared equally desirous that I should not refuse it, I determined to put aside my fears and take the risk of failure owing to lack of funds. He allayed my anxiety in this respect by promising to get me posted to a regiment in India if possible, where the pay would be higher and the expenses much lower than in England. Thus the die was cast. Before he could recommend me for a commission, how- ever, I had the mortification of having to undergo a further educational examination, the standard of the first class certificate having been raised since I took it three years earlier. A few weeks' study overcame this stumbling-block, and in April 1887 the recommendation was at last sent on its way to the Horse Guards. The reply came back in August that the outfit allowance of £150 granted to rankers on promotion could not be given me during the current financial year, as the Treasury allotment for that purpose had already been promised. I was given the choice of taking a commission without the allowance, and as I could not afford to do that the only alternative was to wait for still another year. These vexatious delays terminated early in February 1888 when I appeared before a board of officers of the 4th Dragoon Guards at the Royal Barracks, Dublin, to be examined in the subjects qualifying for promotion to Lieu- tenant. The examination was very simple and was passed GAZETTED SECOND LIEUTENANT 33 almost as a matter of course, for it would have been an unforgivable breach of etiquette for officers of one regiment to plough a candidate sent up by another. In March my squadron was ordered to the Curragh, and a few weeks later the whole regiment moved to Aldershot, where I had joined it as a recruit about ten and a half years before. On the 27th of June I was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in the 3rd Dragoon Guards, then serving in India. It was with real regret, not unmixed with anxiety as to what the future had in store for me, that I parted company with my comrades of the sergeants' mess, where I had spent many pleasant hours. Maillard, who had always shown the most kindly interest in my welfare, presented me with a sword ; Dugdale insisted upon fitting me out with saddlery ; the members of the sergeants' mess gave me a silver-mounted dressing-case; and from many others in the regiment, officers and men, I received expressions of goodwill. The i6th Lancers had become a home to me, and I am proud to think that I once had the honour of serving in so distin- guished a regiment. D CHAPTER III SUBALTERN IN INDIA Join Cavalry Depot at Canterbury — Officers' course of musketry at Hythe — Leave England for India — Life on board a troopship — Join 3rd Dragoon Guards — Camp of exercise at Meerut — Pass Lower Standard Examination in Hindustani — Life at Muttra — Acting Adjutant and Station Staff Officer — Beer-tasting committees — Regiment attends Muridki camp of exercise en route to Rawal Pindi— Ludicrous spectacle presented by native followers — State of training in India and reforms effected by General Luck — Visit of Prince Albert Victor to Muridki — Pass Higher Standard Examination in Hindustani — Successes at Rawal Pindi District Assault-at-Arms — On detachment at Murree — Pass examination in Persian — In charge of Government Grass Farm at Rawal Pindi — In charge of Regi- mental Signallers — Acting Station Staff Officer and Secretary of Assault-at-Arms Committee — Pass examinations in Punjabi and Pushtu — Black Mountain Expedition — Miranzai Expedition — Some amusing incidents in connection with the latter — Posted to Army Headquarters, Simla. Being unable to join my new regiment in India mitil the " trooping season " of the following autumn I was posted to the depot at Canterbury, where the depots of all cavalry regiments serving abroad were then located. These consisted almost entirely of recruits, and as their training was mainly in the hands of the depot staff the of&cers had little to do except enjoy themselves. I therefore took advantage of the opportunity to attend an officers' course of musketry at Hythe in order to qualify as " Instructor," as my sergeant's certificate qualified me as " assistant instructor " only. The chief novelty of the course was the maxim gun, then in its experimental stage. After completing the course I went on two months' leave, and having bid good-bye to my mother — which proved to be our final parting — I sailed from Portsmouth in the Indian troopship " Euphrates " on the 2ist November, and reached Bombay about a month later. 34 TROOPSHIPS 35 These troopships have long since been replaced by trans- ports hired from the merchant service, and no one was sorry for their supersession. They had a speed of only eight or nine knots ; were manned by naval personnel who thoroughly disliked the work and made no secret of it in their dealings with the soldiers ; and the accommodation was indifferent and disagreeable. The men were closely packed together on the lower deck, with a small space on the upper deck for use during the day. The majority of the junior oflftcers' cabins were on or below the water-line, and consequently were more or less in permanent darkness and without fresh air. The children of the officers were located in one large cabin, known as the dove-cot, any berths not occupied by them or their nurses being assigned to the wives of the most junior officers, whether they themselves owned any of the infants or not. The noise which sometimes prevailed in this amalgamated nursery, especially in rough weather, can be better imagined than described. The wives and children of the men had quarters in the fore-part of the ship, and twice each night after ii p.m. these were visited by the military officer of the watch in order to ascertain that the sentry on the door was fulfilling his duty of permitting no man to enter. I suppose the visits had been found necessary, but the perambulation by subaltern officers through a maze of cots containing sleeping women and girls could hardly be commended from the standpoint of refinement, and this was particularly the case when the sea was rough or the weather hot. In passing through the Suez Canal our vessel ran into one of the banks — not an uncommon proceeding on the part of a troopship — and there we remained for about twelve hours before we could be got off. On arrival at Bombay we were besieged by the usual crowd of natives who wished to be employed as personal servants, this being the first trap into which the new-comer is apt to fall, unless he has been duly warned of it beforehand. Not a few of these gentry, more especially those who can speak English, make a practice of meeting transports and inducing officers arriving in India for the first time to engage them ; and after a few days they disappear, having meanwhile fleeced 36 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL their newly-found and innocent " Sahib " of as many rupees as his trustful nature and ignorance of the country will allow. From Bombay I proceeded to Muttra, the permanent station of my regiment, and thence to Meerut, where the regiment itself was attending a camp of exercise, or training camp, under the command of General Sir George Greaves. I received a most friendly welcome from all members of the officers' mess, which at once dispelled the anxiety I had felt as to the nature of the reception that would be accorded me, and I quickly settled down to my new life and surroundings. Returning to Muttra on conclusion of the training, I began my first experience of an Indian summer, which is there both long and hot, and the greater part of the day, from about ten in the morning till six in the evening, must necessarily be spent indoors. By retiring early to bed and leading an abstemious life I avoided the rather common and injurious habit of sleeping during the day, and utilised the time in learning Hindustani. My munshi, or teacher, a man of a stout and lethargic type, was quite content with what- ever progress his pupils made, or did not make, provided he regularly received his monthly pay of ten rupees. To keep awake when teaching after his mid- day meal was entirely beyond his powers, and he could not understand why I should wish to work while other Sahibs either took their lessons in the evening or not at aU. By degrees I caused him to see that this was not my method of doing business, and within three months the " lower standard " examination was successfully negotiated, and a commencement made in preparing for examination by the " higher standard." There was excellent sport in the vicinity of Muttra, including an unlimited supply of pig, and as there were no other troops in the station we were able to arrange both shooting and pig-sticking so as to derive full advantage from the abundant facilities available. Of work there was very little : the weather was too hot to admit of much being done, and, as at all cantonments in the Indian plains, a large proportion of the men were sent to a hill-station for six months or so during the summer. The adjutant falling ill, I was detailed to act for him, and for several weeks this kept me more fully employed than would MUTTRA 37 otherwise have been the case, and incidentally it gave me a chance to show what I could do. The adjutant also officiated as station staff officer and cantonment magistrate, and from carrying out these duties I learned something of the native customs of the country. The troop and squadron officers with whom I was directly associated, and in fact all the officers, were particularly pleasant and helpful, and on the whole I felt, and still feel, that I was fortunate in having been posted to the regiment. Walter, an ex-infantry officer, was the captain of my troop. Some thirty years later I unveiled the memorial erected in his village after the Great War. On it, as in so many other cases, was the name of his only son and child. The non-commissioned officers and men of the regiment were of a good class and well-behaved. Drunkenness was the principal cause of the little misconduct there was, and this not infrequently had its origin in the practice which then prevailed in India of " tasting " the beer supplied to the canteen. Once a week three or four non-commissioned officers and men were detailed, in accordance with the regulations, to taste each cask of beer received, before it was issued for consumption. Sometimes there were a good many casks to be tasted, and therefore it was an easy matter for the tasters to find by the time they had finished that they had tasted too often — more especially so as the weather was hot and the tasting took place, as a rule, before break- fast. This pernicious custom has, I beheve, been discon- tinued. In November 1889 the regiment left Muttra by road for Muridki, near Lahore, where it was to attend a camp of exercise with twelve other cavalry regiments and some batteries of horse artillery, and afterwards proceed to its new station at Rawal Pindi. The march to Muridki occu- pied over five weeks, and thence to Rawal Pindi nearly three weeks, and it thus afforded a good opportunity for seeing the country. Starting at about six o'clock in the morning, the day's march of ten to fifteen miles would be finished by ten o'clock at the latest ; breakfast and stables took another three hours or so, after which there was usually plenty of rough shooting to be obtained quite ;MrjG86 38 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL near the halting-place. All officers were accompanied, as was the custom in those days, not only by a dozen to a score servants each — bearers, khansamahs, syces, sweepers, dhobis, bhistis, grass-cutters — but also by two or three generations of their servants' families and their belongings. For the conveyance of these " followers " each officer provided at least one and more often two or three bullock wagons, on and around which were piled and hung every imaginable kind of household effects, while on the top of all were perched the women, children, and grand-parents. A more ludicrous spectacle or unwieldy crowd could not be seen. At Kumaul, on the way to Muridki, the students of the native college challenged us at cricket. They wore the customary Indian dress, and as they plaj^ed with naked feet, and the ground was as hard as ffint, they had rather a poor time against our fast bowling, and did well to make as many as thirty-five runs. At several places I noticed that the young Indians were very keen on this game, and they were not over particular about the conditions under which they played it. At Lahore, for instance, I watched a school match in which the ball used was made of wood, and the pitch lay across no fewer than three distinct furrows ! At Ludhiana we crossed the Sutlej by a ferry-train and then entered the Punjab, or country of " five rivers " — the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum — all bemg tribu- taries of the Indus. The passage of the Beas in fiat- bottomed boats took two days, and the Ravi, just be3^ond Lahore, was crossed by a bridge of boats. The camp at Muridki was under the command of Major- General Luck, who had recently been appointed Inspector- General of Cavalry. He was considered by some officers of the old school to be more of a drill-sergeant than a cavalry commander, in that he required regimental officers to know far more about their men and horses and the details ot drill than was either reasonable or necessary. To my mind he only asked of officers what it was their duty to give : he expected them to know their work and be able to instinct their men, and this is what many officers in India and elsewhere did not then know and could not do. He imparted MANCEUVRES 39 a much-needed impetus to cavalry training before he left India to become Inspector-General at home. Much useful elementary training, of a character hitherto unknown in India, was carried out during the first three weeks at Muridki, and subsequently the troops were divided into two opposing forces, placed fifty miles apart, and exercised in the role of independent cavalry. The scheme was apparently designed to afford mstruction in long- distance reconnaissance duties and then finish with a great cavalry fight, which in those days was considered to be the orthodox prelude to the clash of the main armies. The operations, m general, were conducted on practical hnes : we bivouacked each night as and where we could, under active service conditions, and lived mainly on the country through which we passed. There were some exciting, though not very edifpng, encounters between the opposing patrols, and these were the matters of chief interest to junior officers such as myself. In one case a hostile party consisting of an officer and six men rode right round the rear of the force to which my regiment belonged before being observed, or at any rate stopped. I was sent with half a troop in pursuit when the party was at last seen, and rather proudly returned with all the horses, five of the men, and the officer's sword. He and one of his men escaped by jumping into a river and swimming across to the other side, and thus he no doubt took back to his General the information he had been sent out to obtain. Possibly he might have been less successful had we been able to use ball-ammunition instead of blank while he was in the water. This reminds me that the rough ground and dense clouds of black dust, in which we were usually enveloped when working in compact bodies, led to three men being killed and several others injured before the manoeuvres terminated. On the concluding day of the operations the Commander- in-Chief, Lord Roberts, and a large number of staff officers and ladies from Simla and Calcutta were present at the spot where it was expected that the great fight would occur, but the opposing commanders either decided not to fight at that particular place or time, or they failed to locate each other's main body, with the result that the fight did 40 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL not come off ! The big - wigs were exceedingly wroth, according to camp gossip, at what they classed as the manifest incompetency of the commanders, but the fault probably lay as much with the big-wigs themselves — the framers of the scheme — as with those who carried it out. Exactly who was to blame I cannot say, because it was not yet the custom for junior regimental officers to be told what was supposed to be happening, or what the scheme of operations was. All I know for certain is that my regiment, and I think most of the others, walked straight into its camp, from where it had started a few days before, without having seen a sign of the enemy, and was very pleased to get there at an earlier hour than had been anticipated. Prince Albert Victor, elder brother of His Majesty, was present during the final stages of the training, and the pro- ceedings were brought to an end on the 28th January with a review of all the troops and a charge in line on a front of nearly two miles. We in the ranks could see practically nothing for dust, and I doubt if the spectators saw much more. Other events which figured on the programme during the Prince's stay were a " darbar," attended by numerous Indian chiefs in full war attire, a smoking concert, and various competitions in skill-at-arms. A feature of the concert was an exhibition of sword-play by some " sowars " (native cavalrymen), which looked particularly fine as seen by the light of the huge camp-fire around which we sat. The Prince presented a silver cup for the best score made at tent-pegging, and being in good form at the time I was a strong regimental favourite. I struck the first peg fair in the middle, but, as sometimes happens, it split, and as I failed to carry it away I became, according to the rules, ineligible to take any further part in the competition. There was some keen rivalry shown amongst the native regiments in the " lance-exercise " competition, and I must confess that, although one of the judges, I was hopeful that the prize would go to the i8th Bengal Lancers, whose scarlet tunics reminded me of my old regiment the i6th Lancers. Sentiment had, however, to be kept in check, and another fine regiment, I forget whicli, carried off the prize by the narrow margin of five points out of a possible two hundred. TRAVELLING EXPENSES 41 Whilst at Muridki I passed the examination in the higher standard of Hindustani, the language used being known as Hindi and the character Sanskrit, while for the lower standard the language is known as Urdu and the character is Persian. I had been examined in the higher standard three months before at Meerut, and felt fairly certain that I had been successful, but it turned out that the President of the Examining Board was not qualified to act as such and the proceedings were therefore annulled. According to the Indian Army Regulations (there are, or were, some twenty or thirty volumes of them) candidates, if successful, received their travelling expenses, and as the appointment of the wrong President was no fault of mine I claimed these expenses. The financial reply was that I could not have them as I had not, in fact, " passed," and my answer to this was that not only had I incurred the expenses because some one else had blundered, but that, for the same reason, I was now compelled to go through a further course of preparation, with its attendant cost. The correspondence continued to see-saw in this manner for several weeks, and at last my commanding officer became so infuriated with the sight of it that I gave up the contest. On the 30th January 1890 the regiment left Muridki for Rawal Pindi, amongst the notable places passed through being Gujrat, where was fought the final battle in the Sikh war. Here, in my walk round, I came across a batch of school-boys squatted on the ground and poring over a small- scale map of Europe, which was being explained to them by their master. Like many people before them, they were surprised and puzzled most of all at the very small space occupied by England. The 500 miles' march from Muttra to the Jhelum had lain over a dead-fiat plain, but after crossing this river we entered the foot-hills of the Himalayas, whose snowy summits had already been visible many marches earlier. One afternoon I went some distance into these hills so as to get a better view of the sunset, and, forgetting that there was practically no twilight, remained gazing too long, with the result that darkness caught me in a labyrinth of rocks and ravines through which I had to crawl and scramble in 42 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the direction where I hoped the camp might be. After some hours' anxiety lest I would have to wait for daylight I fortunately saw the camp-fires and so found my way back. Between Jhelum and Rawal Pindi — I forget exactly where — I visited the spot on which Alexander the Great is supposed to have erected, in 326 B.C., the monument to his favourite charger, Bucephalus. We reached Rawal Pindi, the Aldershot of northern India, on the 17th February, and shortly afterwards the annual district assault-at-arms took place. At this meeting I was more fortunate than at Muridki, winning the tent- pegging quite easily. The following year I took the first prizes in swordsmanship and fencmg, and fought in the final for the chief prize — that for the best officer-at-arms — but being fairly and squarely unhorsed by an officer of the nth Bengal Lancers I failed to win it. Another officer of this regiment against whom I fought was Lieutenant (now General Sir William) Birdwood. The chief prize fell to me a year later, as did two other prizes. These achievements, such as they were, were mainly due to keeping myself physically fit — not an easy thing to do in the plains of India unless one is blessed with a strong constitution, and is careful to safeguard it by temperate habits and suitable exercise. I claim no credit for pursuing these habits, because I had not the wherewithal to do otherwise. Water was the only drink I could afford, while for smoking I had to be content with a fixed amount of tobacco and cheroots at two shillings a hundred. It was not altogether agreeable to be seen drinking water at mess when others were drinking champagne, or to defer smoking till leaving the mess because pipes were not allowed, but it had to be done. After being at Rawal Pindi for a few weeks I was sent with a detachment to spend the hot season at the hill- station of Murree, where we were joined by a similar detach- ment of the Queen's Bays, the combined strength being about 300 men. I was appointed acting-adjutant for the whole and was of course responsible for the training and discipline of my own men. These duties occupied the greater part of the day, but by avoiding most of the social FARMING 43 engagements common to hill-stations in India, I was able to give some three or four hours daily to the study of a third language — Persian . My teacher, a native of Persia, was an exasperating but none the less attractive person, who had evidently led a scapegrace kind of life and possibly for that reason had taken refuge in India. At one time he would be most regular in his attendance and very smartly dressed. At other times he was quite the reverse, and for days did not put in an appearance. I induced him to mend his ways, and as he was a well-educated and capable instructor, the higher standard was successfully passed before I returned to Rawal Pindi in the autumn. Immediately afterwards I was appointed by the General in command. Sir William Elles, to supervise the govern- ment grass farm, of about eleven thousand acres, then being started for the purpose of supplying the horses of the station with hay in place of the " dhub " grass which, according to the Indian custom, had hitherto been brought in daily by an army of " grass-cutters." This appointment proved to be a tiresome affair, as the native contractors were continually advancing plausible reasons why I should excuse their breaches of agreement, and as they had complete control over practically all the available coolie labour I was some- times in the predicament of having to choose between accepting inferior work and getting no work at all. Besides looking after my farm I was placed in charge of the regimental signallers, the commanding officer telling me at the time that a very unsatisfactory report on them had been received from army headquarters, and that there must be a great improvement. He added that he would allow me a free hand as to their training, while I in my turn must undertake to make them more efficient. I promised to do this, subject to there being no mistake with respect to the free hand, and thanks to the loyal co-operation of my men the regiment gained first place in the order of merit at the next annual inspection. Some time afterwards I was offered the appointment of assistant inspector of signalling in India, but I declined it as some- thing more promising was then in sight 44 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Another appointment which occasionally devolved upon me, in the absence of the permanent holder, was that of station staff officer, in which capacity I served under Sir Power Palmer and Sir George Luck, who respectively held temporary command of the Rawal Pindi district. For two years I was also secretary of the district assault-at-arms committee. My hands were therefore fairly full, but by a proper adjustment of work I was able to take a share of regimental duties, as well as find sufficient leisure to qualify in two more languages, Punjabi and Pushtu, thus making five in all. Pushtu resembles Persian in many ways, but the colloquial is difficult. I failed in it at my first attempt, partly because I had the misfortune to miss the train which was to take me to Peshawar for the examination, and had to travel all night in the guard's van of a luggage train in order to present myself at the appointed hour ; and chiefly because the wild man, a Mohmand, whom the examiners produced to converse with me, launched out into a long dissertation about the Christian belief in the Trinity. Not understanding in the least what he was talking about I made all kinds of wild and incorrect guesses in the endeavour to keep up the conversation, with the result that I was hopelessly ploughed. Six months' further study, plus a new munshi, enabled me to pass with flying colours. In 1920 this munshi, Ziaud-Din by name, sent his son to call on me when the latter, a youth of about twenty years of age, came to London to study law. The pecuniary rewards given by the Indian Government for passing examinations in these languages was little more than sufficient to pay expenses, but this little was not to be despised for it helped to keep my head, financially, above water. Having established some reputation as a hnguist, I was able to make a contract with my munshis to pay a fixed sum on passing instead of the customary monthly wage irrespective of passing. When studying Punjabi my only spare time was before 8 a.m. and after 5 p.m., and in order that the munshi might be on the spot when required I lodged him in the compound with the other natives of my household, and told him that he might call me as early as he liked for our first lesson. Determined to earn his ACTIVE SERVICE 45 money in as short a time as possible he appeared every morning by my bedside with maddening regularity at a very early hour, quietly but persistently calling out, " Sahib, Sahib," until I awoke. He reaped his reward within a few weeks, for as Punjabi has much in common with Hindi it was easy to master for examination purposes. He has apparently not yet forgotten his old pupil, as three years ago I received the following from him : Pandit Dhanpat Rai (of Rahon), Officers' Punjabi Munshi, sends his most respectful salaams for Christmas Day and his best wishes for a happy new j^ear. Present address : Sadar Bazar, Peshawar (India). A knowledge of oriental languages did not at the time appear to be of much professional use as the regiment was shortly due to go to South Africa, and indeed very few officers in British regiments serving in India took the trouble to study them, with the exception of Hindustani. I had the impression, however, that they might prove useful, and so it turned out, for it was largely owing to my knowledge of them that I was later appointed to the staff. Before this happened I gained my initial experience of active service. Early in 1891 a punitive expedition under Sir Wilham Elles was sent against certain of the Black Mountain tribes, who had continued to give trouble ever since the fruitless expedition of 1888, and whilst this expedi- tion was in progress some 16,000 Miranzai tribesmen raided the frontier near Kohat, doing considerable damage and get- tmg within two or three miles of that place. To deal with them a mixed brigade of mfantry and artillery was ordered to be withdrawn from the Black Mountain and despatched to Kohat as quickly as possible. Sir William Lockhart to be in command. On the 7th April I was suddenly deputed to go to Hassan Abdal, the railhead of the Black Mountain force, and make the necessary arrangements for railing the Kohat force to Kushalgarh, which was the selected base of the new operations and, at the time, the railway terminus in that direction. The transport animals, mainly mules, and their native drivers gave me a good deal of trouble, especially those 46 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL that had to be entrained during the night, but, to quote from a letter I wrote home, " a knowledge of the vernacular ex- pedites matters considerably, more particularly when rubbed in with a stout stick, a weapon I always carry." The wives of certain officers were also the cause of some trouble, and in their case neither the vernacular nor the stick could be emplo3^ed. Not having seen their husbands for some weeks, and not knowing when they might have another opportunity of seeing them, they came up by rail from Rawal Pindi to meet them when passing through Hassan Abdal. There were no buildings suitable for Europeans except the small wayside station and a three-roomed dak bungalow, and therefore these ladies monopolised practically all the accommodation available. They might more appropriately have stayed at home, but soldiering in India thirty years ago was conducted in an easy-going fashion in more ways than one. Amongst the officers who passed through Hassan Abdal was Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, who was then serving with his regiment in India. I had not met him before, and when he came to ask me for a railway warrant I remarked that he was looking rather dirty and ragged after his Black Mountam experiences. His good-humoured reply greatly helped to dispel the confusion into which I fell when he gave me his name. The Prince was universally regarded as a good officer, and was very popular with all ranks. The brigade was despatched sufficiently quickly to reach Kohat before further damage was done there, and I was gratified to receive a telegram from Sir William Lockhart expressing his satisfaction at the rapidity and smoothness with which the railway movement had been carried out. Being eager to see active service I telegraphed to head- quarters at Rawal Pindi saying that I proposed going to Kushalgarh with the last train-load of troops, so as to ensure that everything was in order at that place. This was approved, but just as the train was due to start a second message arrived cancelhng the first and teUing me to go back to Rawal Pindi. This I put into my pocket and, quite improperly, ignored, hoping that once I got to Kushalgarh I would be allowed to accompany the force to Kohat and KUSHALGARH 47 thence into the Miranzai country. The plot did not work out successfully, for three days later I was again directed and in more peremptory terms, to return. On arrival at Rawal Pindi, however, I was met by a staff officer who told me that I was to go back to Kushalgarh at once by the train in which I had just travelled, and take up the duties of Base Commandant. As I had had little or nothing to eat for the last two or three days — nothing being obtainable at Kushalgarh — I repUed that I must first lay in a stock of supplies and would then proceed by a later train. He was not inclined to consent but did so at last, and during the day my orders were again changed, and I was told that I need not go back. Two days afterwards it was discovered that matters at Kushalgarh had got into a muddle, and I was then bundled off at a few hours' notice with direct instructions from the General to put them right. I accordingly started, having but a very vague idea of what was required of me in my new capacity. The important thing seemed to be to hurry up to the front all men, animals, and material arriving at the base, and send back to Rawal Pindi with equal despatch everything arriving from the front. By adhering to this rough rule I managed to give satisfaction to the authorities both at the front and the rear. " Kushalgarh " signifies the " happy mountain," but a more abominable place in which to live cannot be imagined. Situated on the banks of the Indus — which was crossed at the time by a bridge of boats — ^it is notoriously hot in summer, and is devoid of everything save rocks and sand. My only shelter was a small Indian tent, and at times the heat was almost unbearable. It would have been entirely so had I not always been able to procure a cool drink by anchoring a hamper of lemonade and soda water in the river, then in flood from the melting snows of the Hima- layas and icy cold a few feet below the surface. Once, for a period of two days, we had a plague of locusts ; on the table, in the bed, in clothing, in cooking utensils, every- where were the locusts. They were so thick on the ground that one morning they actually stopped a train. There was a sUght ascent to the station, and the crushing of the locusts made the rails so slippery that the train had to 48 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL be brought in by a section at a time, a party of men being detailed to throw sand on the Hne and sweep away the pests in front of the engine. A terrific storm of wind followed, and this effectively cleared them off, but it also levelled all our tents and carried away my only suit of pyjamas ! Wishing to escape from the heat and to establish more favourable conditions under which to work, I told the native station-master that I proposed to use the ladies' waiting- room as an office during the daytime, as no ladies ever came to the station at that season, and there were none within fifty miles of it, but he suggested that I should first obtain the permission of the superintendent of the line. I therefore sent a brief telegram to the latter, who was well-known to me, and he at once gave his consent. Some months later, when the accounts of the expedition were being audited, I received a letter from the Adjutant-General at Simla asking for an explanation as to why I had sent an official telegram on what was evidently a private matter, namely, an apphca- tion to use a ladies' waiting-room ! I explained the circum- stances, very clearly I thought, but failed to satisfy him, and was directed not to repeat the irregularity in future, and meanwhile to defray the cost of the telegram amounting to eight annas. This was not the only financial trouble into which I fell in connection with this expedition. On the breaking-up of the base I returned the camp equipment and other stores to the government arsenal at Lahore, and on their arrival it was alleged that many articles were missing, the value of which amounted to twenty thousand rupees. I was so informed in the usual Babu phraseology, and requested " kindly to remit same." The sum was so far in excess of my abiHty to pay that it struck me as being exceedingly comic, and after a lengthy correspondence, in which I main- tained that the missing articles had been returned, the charge was " written off " and I was exonerated. I may add here that I did not receive the medal for either of the expeditions referred to above, as I had not crossed the Hne of demarcation which qualified for it. Early in 1892 the Intelligence Branch at army head- THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 49 quarters was about to be strengthened by an increased number of officers. The intention was to take these officers partly from native and partly from British regiments, and after they had served a period of probation as " attaches " to select from amongst them for permanent employment such as it was considered desirable to retain. It was necessary, of course, that they should possess the linguistic attainments required by the nature of the work they had to do, and as I had five languages to my credit I was one of those chosen from British regiments, and was ordered to proceed to Simla forthwith. CHAPTER IV IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, SIMLA Indian Intelligence Branch reorganised by General Sir H. Brackenbury — Curious division of duties at Army Headquarters — Comparison with system at home — Society favourites thought to have best chance of Staff employment — Colonels EUes and Mason — First permanent Staff appointment — Countries dealt with by North-West Frontier Section, in which I am employed— Situation in Afghanistan — Kafiristan — Intricate frontier questions to be settled — Proceed on leave to England — Death of my mother — Frontier matters still disturbed on return to India — Question of Russian advance on India via the Pamirs — Ordered to reconnoitre route leading to Pamirs — Srinagar^Bridges in Kashmir — Gilgit — Rakapushi Moun- tain — Hunza — Meet Townshend and Fowler — Yasin — Darkot Pass — The Pamirs — Return to India via the Indus, Chilas, and Abbotta- bad — Pass examination in GurkhaU. The decision to reorganise the Intelligence Branch was due to the initiative of General Sir Henry Brackenbury, the MiUtary Member of the Viceroy's Council. This General had previously been Director of MiUtary IntelHgence at the War Office, and he was quick to perceive that the Simla Branch required much overhauling if it was to cope efficiently with the military situation then prevaiUng on the North- West Frontier and in Central Asia. At the time the In- telligence and Mobilisation Branches were both subdivisions of the department of the Quartermaster-General, who was responsible for deaHng with military operations and questions of military policy in general. He was therefore charged, in addition to his usual duties of supply, transport, and barracks, with what we now know as the duties of the General Staff, except that the Adjutant-General was re- sponsible for training, and from this it followed that he occupied the position of Chief Staff Officer of the Commander- in-Chief. It is significant of the illogical manner in which we 50 THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH 51 then conducted our Imperial military affairs that quite another system obtained at home. There the Adjutant- General was the Chief Staff Officer of the Commander-in- Chief, and had under him the Intelligence and MobiUsation Branches as well as training, while the Quartermaster-General was concerned only with the duties which properly belonged to him. Again, when the War Office was reorganised in 1904 the Commander-in-Chief was abohshed on the ground that no one man could carry out the duties which had hitherto devolved upon him, and these were accordingly divided up between a number of army councillors, each of whom was made responsible for his department to the Secretary of State for War. In India, on the other hand, and at about the same period, it was the Mihtary Member — roughly the equivalent of the War Secretary at home — who was for all practical purposes abohshed, since he was made the sub- ordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, and the latter became the supreme head of all military business in the country. Conditions in India differ considerably from those at home, and a Commander-in-Chief is undoubtedly necessary there, but the difference is not so great as to justify having an entirely different military system in other respects, and it is satisfactory to know that within recent years the two headquarters have been brought more into hne. Apart from the faulty organisation of headquarters as a whole, the InteUigence Branch had suffered because of the inadequacy — and perhaps of the inferior quahty — of its per- sonnel. Although much had been done by the Commander- in-Chief, Lord Roberts, to ensure that priority for staff employment should be governed by professional capacity, favouritism and social influence were not yet deemed by the outsider to be extinct. It was alleged that staff officers were still too often selected from amongst those who were hkely to be successful performers in amateur theatricals, or be useful in some other way at the various entertainments provided for the amusement of Simla society. I was frequently asked on first arrival at this smart hill-station what my special accomphshment was — acting, singing, or whistling — and what my contribution to the amenities of the season was to be. It was taken for granted that I could 52 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL do something of this nature, and do it well, and my interro- gators were surprised to learn that I could contribute nothing. Fortunately, this missing element in my equipment was a recommendation in the eyes of my new chief. Colonel (now General Sir) Edmund Elles, half-brother of the General under whom I had served at Rawal Pindi. He expected his subordinates to keep themselves physically and mentally fit by taking a share in all outdoor games and recreations, but he also demanded a full day's work. To his sound and able guidance I attribute much of the success, such as it is, which attended my subsequent career, and from both him and his wife, a lady of gentle and kind disposition, I received many proofs of sincere friendship. Some twenty years later, when I was commandant of the Staff College, their son was one of the students, and in the Great War he won distinction as commander of the Tank Corps. I was equally happy in my immediate chief, Lieutenant- Colonel Mason of the Royal Engineers, who was in charge of the North- West Frontier section to which I was posted. He was a man of sterhng character, an acknowledged expert on all questions relating to the frontier, and quite fearless in the expression of the mihtary opinions which he was called upon to lay before his superiors. Of a retiring nature, he was slow to confide in new acquaintances, but I gained his confidence fairly soon, and he taught me much about the life, customs, and attitude of the heterogeneous tribes of the North- West Frontier, which I could have learned so well from no one else. It was due to him and to Elles that, within a few weeks of my arrival at Simla, Lord Roberts approved of my temporary appointment being made per- manent for the usual period of five years, and in this way I received my first employment on the staff. Mason's death from an attack of enteric fever two years later was a great loss to the army. My section dealt with the whole of the independent and semi-independent territories, including Afghanistan, Kash- mir, and Baluchistan, whicli extend for some 2000 miles along the North- West Frontier from Tibet on the riglit to the Arabian Sea on the left. Of Kashmir and Baluchistan, both AFGHANISTAN 53 within the border of Indian administration, there is nothing special to say, while as to the trans-frontier tribes all that need be said is that trouble with one or another was constantly breaking out or threatening to do so. We knew really very httle about their territory, and could not well obtain much information as the border-line was closed to us except when opened by a punitive expedition. Afghanistan was of importance as being a " buffer " between India and Russian territory. The agreement with the Amir, Abdul Rahman, was that in return for an annual subsidy and other advantages he would have no foreign relations with any Power except the Government of India. The agreement was modified later, and exactly what the arrangement now is I do not know. The country had been torn with war and dissensions before Abdul Rahman assumed the rulership in 1880, and in 1892, when I went to Simla, he had not yet everywhere established order, although he had, by drastic methods, gone far in that direction. Afghanistan is one of the most difficult countries in the world to govern, for the inhabitants, about five millions in number, are not of the same stock and lineage, and do not possess the same pohtical interests and tribal affinities. The only bond of union among them is that of religion, and even this is neither strong nor durable, owing to the division of the people into the two great hostile sects of the faith of Muhammad, Shiahs and Sunnis. The latter are now far more numerous than the former. The two principal Afghan tribes, properly so-called, are the Duranis and Ghilzais, the former being found chiefly in the Kandahar and Farah Provinces and the Ghilzais in the Kabul Province. The Ghilzais are said to be the descendants of " Ghalzoe," i.e. the " son of a thief," whose birth took place within three months of the marriage of his parents. In the northern provinces the inhabitants are for the most part alien to the Afghan, being Turkomans in Turkistan and of Persian origin in Herat. The army, of which the Amir was proud, was about 130,000 strong, of whom 100,000 were regulars and 30,000 militia. It comprised the three arms, cavalr}^ artillery, and infantry. Considered as a theatre of war, Afghanistan is a water- 54 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAT less, treeless, foodless, roadless, mountainous country, and has been described as Spain once was — a country in which a large army will starve and a small one will be murdered. The chief mountain range, the Hindu Kush, has a general elevation of between 12,000 and 18,000 feet, and is every- where precipitous and arid. A more desolate and inhospi- table region cannot be imagined. The routes leading through the country between the Russian and Indian frontiers we used to classify in three groups : Pamirs line, Kabul line, and Kandahar line. I will refer to the Pamirs line later, merely saying here that the distance from the Russian frontier to Peshawar is about 600 miles. By the Kabul line there are several alternative routes as far as the capital, the distance from the Oxus to Peshawar being about 450 miles. By Herat and Kandahar the distance to Quetta is 650 miles. These distances, coupled with what has been said about the country, will serve to show the enormous difficulties to be overcome in conducting military operations on an}' of the three lines. The Amir's policy was to permit no kind of interference with his internal affairs, and although he received subsidies and supplies of arms from us he would make few or no concessions in return, and all projects, such as railways and telegraphs, proposed for the better defence of the country he viewed with distrust. He maintained the same attitude towards foreign visitors, and beyond the few employees he had at Kabul, no European was allowed to set foot in the country except in the rare event of a " mission," and the members of it would always be closely watched. Lord Curzon was the only person during my four years at Simla who entered Afghanistan as a guest, under the auspices of the Amir. He once gave me an amusing description of the attire he wore when meeting the Amir for the first time. It included a military frock-coat, cocked hat, boots of the Household Cavalry type, fierce-looking brass spurs, and an elaborate presentation sword lent by Sir William Lockhart. Lord Curzon was quite right, for this kind of display counts for much in the eyes of the Eastern chief, who remains quite unmoved by the sight of a top-hat, morning coat, and white spats. BOUNDARY QUESTIONS 55 At the time I joined the IntelUgence Branch many compHcated problems were constantly coming up for examination. Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom more will be said in the next chapter, was aggressively active on the borders of Kafiristan and elsewhere ; other semi-independent tribes were fractious, and threatened to indulge in one of their periodical outbreaks ; the Afghan-Persian boundary was in dispute ; while Russia was systematically pushing forward her outposts on the Pamirs and disturbing the peace of mind of the Amir, who feared that he might be deprived of territory which he asserted belonged to him. Kafiristan, it may be explained, was the name given by the Muhammadans to the country lying between the province of Kabul and Chitral, the inhabitants of which were pagans and were therefore regarded by the Muhammadans as infidels, or " kafirs." These kafirs have no connection with the Kafir of South Africa. They were finally subdued by Abdul Rahman about 1895, and compelled to accept the religion of Islam. Following the Afghan Boundary Commission of 1884-88, an agreement had been reached with Russia in respect of the Russo-Afghan boundary from Badakhshan to Persia, but that separating the two countries in the vicinity of the Pamirs remained unsettled for several years afterwards. The trouble arose partly from the fact that in an agreement of 1872 the Oxus had been laid down as the boundary, and however clear this definition may have appeared to those who drafted the agreement, it proved to be far from clear when an attempt was made to put it into practice. The reason of this was that not one of the various streams in the Pamir region which go to form the Oxus is locally known by that name, while more than one of them can, at a pinch, be claimed as the main river according to the aims of the parties interested. The incident furnishes, amongst others I could quote, rather a striking example of the danger which attaches to the drafting of frontier agreements when dependent, as in this case, upon old and imperfect small scale maps and in the absence of complete topographical data. When I went to Simla there was no good information 56 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL available as regards much of the vast area for which the Frontier Section was responsible. We had to rely largely upon the reports of travellers, and these seldom gave the kind of intelligence that was needed, much of it was many years old, while some of the travellers were themselves more renowned for their powers of graphic description than for the accuracy of their statements. By initiating new and extended reconnaissances, and introducing a better method of recording and compiling the information received, our stock of intelligence gradually improved both in quantity and quality. One compilation, The Gazetteer and Military Report on Afghanistan, occupied the greater part of my time for more than a year, the five volumes of which it was comprised aggregating some three thousand pages. It was a stupendous task, and I was glad when it was finished, but the knowledge I gained of the country was some compensation for the drudgery involved. In January 1893, having been over four years in India, I took six months' leave to England as I wished to qualify for promotion to Captain, which in those days entailed going through what was known as a " garrison class," or special course of military education. I was also anxious to see my mother, who I knew to be in failing health, but on arrival at Malta was met by a telegram conveying the news of her death. To that extent the trip to England was a bitter failure. When I returned to Simla in July 1893 affairs in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier generally were still in a very unsettled state, and in particular the activities of Russia on the Pamirs were feared — quite need- lessly — to constitute a threat on India, in the future if not at the present. It is incomprehensible why those who held this view never seemed to appreciate the tremendous topographical difficulties to be overcome. Another question constantly to the fore was whether, assuming the Pamir line of advance to be feasible for any- thing worth calling a military force, we ought to prepare for it by adopting what was known as a forward policy — that is, to push out our outposts and establish good communications between India and the furthest limit possible — or whether we should deliberately refrain from doing these things, so as THE KASHMIR VALLEY 57 to place on the potential enemy the disadvantage of sur- mounting the defensive barrier provided by nature. There was much to be said on both sides, and much was said, and the compromise eventually arrived at was probably the wisest solution. In June 1894 I was deputed to reconnoitre various routes in the vicinity of the Pamirs, in order to obtain certain information of which we were specially in need. Leaving the railway at Rawal Pindi I travelled for about 150 miles in a " tonga," or covered two-wheeled vehicle, drawn by two ponies changed at various distances en route, and not infrequently suffering from abominably sore shoulders. For the first forty miles the road climbed up the Murree hills, whence it descended to the Jhelum valley and then followed that river through gorges and defiles to Baramula at the entrance of the main valley of Kashmir, and within a few miles of the point where the Jhelum leaves the Wular Lake. From here I crossed the lake and ascended the river to Srinagar in a kind of miniature houseboat, which was roofed in with matting and had a crew consisting of a man, his wife, and a baby. The lake is liable to sudden and dangerous storms, which have caused many a boat to be swamped and wrecked, but my trip was free from any such adventure. The only disagreeable feature of the twenty-four hours' voyage was that the baby — only a few feet away from me — continued to howl for the greater part of the night. The Kashmir valley, some 20 miles wide and nearly 100 miles in length, is justly renowned for its scenery. It is enclosed by high, wooded, snow-covered mountains and intersected by numerous streams and lakes, which with a profusion of fruit-trees of every species and wild flowers of every hue, constitute a picture which cannot well be surpassed in natural beauty. Srinagar, the " city of the sun," is closely cut up with canals, and is sometimes styled the Venice of the east. The impression I formed was that its delights are more imaginary than real. Its jumbled medley of houses, mainly constructed of timber and built out of the water, were mostly in a ramshackle and ruinous condition, with broken doors or no doors at all, and 58 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL windows stopped up with boards, paper, or rags ; the lanes between them were narrow, dirty, and ill-paved ; and the smells encountered were not savoury. On this fringe of civihsation I completed my transport and supply arrangements. Besides the food and equipment required for the use of myself and followers, corn had to be carried for the riding and transport animals, little or none bemg procurable between the Kashmir valley and Gilgit, a distance of 228 miles. The road connecting Srinagar with Gilgit was good as roads go in this part of the world, and on the third day's march I crossed the Tragbal Pass, 11,950 feet in height. It was covered with a thick carpet of flowers, chiefly primulas and orchids, of every colour, and afforded a most magnificent view. Behind, thousands of feet below, was the broad expanse of the Wular Lake and the Kashmir valley, backed by the snow-crested range of the Pir Panjal ; and in front, some 50 miles away, could be seen the snowy domes of Nanga Parbat, 26,620 feet in altitude, towering above the mountain ranges on either hand and forming a landmark visible for hundreds of miles. From the Tragbal the road descended to and crossed the Kishan- ganga, and then a long and severe climb led to the Burzil Pass, 13,650 feet high. This pass is easy in summer, but is practically closed for the remainder of the year, and possesses a bad reputation for severe snowstorms at seasons when they are not usually expected. It forms the line of demarcation between the forest-clad mountains of the south and the bare and arid region of the Hindu Kush to the north. Some 40 miles farther on I reached Astor, famous for its abundance of ibex, markhor, and orial, and claiming to be the birthplace of polo or at any rate the land of its earliest adoption. The game is played in a rough-and-ready manner, and any number of players up to about a score a side take part in it. From Astor the road followed the river of that name down a deep valley enclosed by high and precipitous mountains to Ramghat, a ghastly place surrounded on all sides by lofty rocks and crags, and in summer-time as hot BRIDGES 59 as a fm-nace. As Knight says in his book Where Three Empires Meet, " A man might almost as well pass his life in a stoke-hole as in this infernal oven." The river rushes with terrific force and deafening noise through a deep gorge 150 feet wide, over which the road is carried by the fine suspension bridge which shortly before my visit had replaced the " jhula " or rope-bridge common to the country. The " jhula " is made of three ropes of twisted twigs, and is stretched across the river in the form of a triangle, two parallel ropes acting as hand-rails and the central or lower one as a footway. The three sets of ropes are tied together by similar ropes at every few feet, and the whole is bound to baulks anchored to high rocks or cliffs on either side, and as far as possible on the same level. In order to keep the side ropes apart cross-sticks are inserted at varying distances, and over these one has to step — a performance which calls for a certain amount of acrobatic skill, as the side ropes are in places as much as 3 feet above the foot- rope. There is a tremendous sag in the middle, and when there is a strong wind and the span is large — some are as much as 300 feet in length — the bridge is apt to swing dizzily about in a manner decidedly trying to the nerves of any one not accustomed to this mode of traffic. Perhaps the worst feature of the " jhula " is that one never knows whether it may be trusted to carry the weight put upon it, as the twigs of which it is made quickly dry and perish, and the ropes may then any day suddenly break. Where something more substantial than a " jhula " is required, a bridge on the cantilever principle is constructed. It consists of timbers projecting one over another from the opposite banks, their shore ends being weighted down with masonry or rocks. In the absence of a bridge of any kind the natives cross on a " shinaz," or inflated hide of the ox or goat. Striding across this and passing each leg through a loop hanging down Uke a stirrup leather, the rider lays his chest upon the hide and plunges into the current, paddling with arms and legs as in the act of swimming. Much skill and dexterity are required in the management of these httle floats to prevent a capsize. The passage of rivers is also made on rafts of inflated skins supporting a framework 6o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL of light sticks or bamboos. When the shore is left these rafts go dancing wildly down stream, while the boatmen, armed with long poles, frantically strive to propel them across to the opposite bank before being swept past the desired landing-place. About a quarter of a mile below Ramghat the Astor joins the Indus. The road to Gilgit followed the left bank of the latter for about fourteen miles, then crossed to the right bank by another fine suspension bridge, and than along the muddy, boiling Gilgit river to the Gilgit Agency. Here I acquired from our officers, about half-a-dozen in number, much useful information respecting the countries to be traversed before reaching my destination, and while supplies were being replenished and other arrangements completed for the onward march to the Pamirs I made a trip to Hunza, some 60 miles up the valley of that name. I covered this distance in two days each way. The road up the Hunza valley— since greatly improved — crossed several glacier torrents and bad " paris." " Pari " means a cliff, but the word is used to signify a chff road strutted or bracketed to the face of a precipice, seldom more than a foot or two wide, and often of very shaky and sketchy construction. The country is noted for the number and size of its glaciers, the Nagar river having its source in one of the greatest known. A few miles east of the road is the giant Rakapushi mountain, which rises sheer 19,000 feet above the level of the valley, its height above sea-level being 25,550 feet. There are several other summits to be seen which exceed 24,000 feet. Fruit-trees abound, especially the apricot, mulberry, apple, and walnut, and so prolific are the crops that the people live to a great extent upon them, as also do the animals and fowls. To cope with the discomforts which attend a journey through the hot valleys in this part of the world the traveller needs to be young, and able to sleep soundly after the day's work is finished. Flies, of the most tenacious kind, are a perfect pest to him ; usually he is afflicted by an insatiable thirst which continues well into the night ; the cockroach goes to bed with him and climbs up the inside of his pyjamas THE FRINGES OF THE EMPIRE 6i to make the acquaintance of the caterpillar just fallen on his nose from the roof of the tent ; the mosquito searches out the most palatable parts of his ankles ; the jungle dog enters the tent to ascertain whether anything edible has been left on the ground ; and at last the native servant appears to announce that morning is here and breakfast ready. Having done such justice to the meal as he can, got into riding kit, and donned his blue spectacles as a protection against the sun's rays reflected from the bare and burning rocks, the traveller mounts an animal called a pony, and the march is resumed. But the discomforts, such as they are, sit lightly on the young and strong ; there is much to see of enthralling interest in these wonderful outlying regions of the Empire ; and such is the influence of the British "raj " that one feels that one is not only a man, but, in the eyes of the natives, a sort of king. The people of Hunza and Nagar, known as Kanjutis, were for centuries professional brigands and slave-dealers. So great was the terror inspired by them that whole districts, formerly well - cultivated and populated, were totally abandoned by their inhabitants. Secure in their mountain strongholds, and having ready access to the passes leading north to the Yarkand valley, the Kanjutis were able to waylay and pillage with impunity the rich caravans travel- ling by the great trade route between India and Turkestan, and to raid the territory of their neighbours as and when they wished. This wholesale brigandage and raiding, as well as the slave-dealing scourge, were effectively put a stop to by the introduction of British administrative control which followed Colonel Durand's brilliant little Hunza- Nagar campaign in the winter of 189 1. On leaving Gilgit for the Pamirs my party consisted of an orderly provided by the 5th Ghurkas, who had accom- panied me from India, a Path an and two servants, eight other " followers " of various nationalities, a native guide, a dozen mules and ponies, and about a score sheep to supply us with meat. The guide claimed to be the " Raja " of one of the districts through which we were to pass, but unluckily for him some one else not only claimed that title but exercised it. I was afraid that this difference of opinion 62 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL might be the cause of trouble, but it was not, my guide probably being regarded by the man in possession as so weak a pretender as not to be worth removing. From Gilgit to Gupis, 70 miles, the road continued up the right bank of the Gilgit river, the valley seldom being wider than to give room for the roaring torrent 70 to 100 yards across and in places running like a mill-race. The mountain-tops rise high and steep on both sides, and when there is heavy rain or the snow is melting it is necessary to maintain a sharp look-out for the huge avalanches which come tumbUng down. I was often kept awake at night by the terrific noise, resembling the sound of heavy gun-fire, caused by these masses of rock, weighing many tons, plunging down from thousands of feet into the river below. At Gupis I found a small detachment of Kashmir Imperial Service troops, one of the many posts then scattered along the route between Astor and Chitral, each commanded by a British subaltern or captain. The work done at this period by these young and enterprising officers in consolidating British influence was of great value, and has perhaps never been adequately appreciated. Amongst those whom I met, two — Captain Townshend and Lieutenant Fowler — were destined to play a prominent part the following year in the operations in Chitral, and again in the Great War. Townshend was in command during the siege of Chitral and also at Kut-el-Amara, and Fowler was treacherously made prisoner on his way to Chitral. He was lucky not to have been murdered by some fanatic or other before Umra Khan released him, a month after his capture, and sent him in to the headquarters of the Relief Force. In the Great War he was Director of the " signal service " on the West Front. A little above Gupis I crossed the Gilgit river by a rickety wire suspension bridge and entered the valley of Yasin. It was here that the intrepid traveller Hayward was murdered in 1870. The object was apparently plunder, as he was believed to be in possession of a considerable amount of gold as well as many valuable presents. The story is that, finding himself threatened, he sat up in his tent all night with his loaded rifle on the table before DARKOT PASS 63 him, and in the early morning, being overcome with fatigue, he dozed off and was immediately pounced upon b}'^ his crafty enemies who had been closely watching him throughout the night. He asked permission to go outside and ascend a low mound in order to take a last look at the rising sun, and after this had been granted he was brutally done to death. For the benefit of those who have not travelled in this part of the world, I may explain that passes of 13,000 feet and over are closed by snow for some five months or more every year, according to their altitude ; when the snow begins to melt, and for some weeks afterwards, the streams running down from them, and which may have to be crossed many times, are roaring torrents, and, as a rule, unfordable ; this means, in practice, that the routes may be actually open only for two or three months in the year — that is, after the streams go down and before the passes again become blocked with snow ; and, finally, all passes of 15,000 feet and over have on them perpetual snov,-, and this must be crossed before the sun has risen sufficiently high to make it too soft to traverse. Above Yasin, 7300 feet in altitude, the valley is for the most part hemmed in by precipitous mountains thousands of feet high ; the debris of many landsHps had to be crossed ; and the ever-recurring ascents and descents made progress slow and laborious. At 20 miles from Yasin the climb up to the Darkot Pass began ; bare rock took the place of earth ; and at 14,000 feet the first glacier was reached. Having crossed this, the track struck the edge of the snow- field, which led up to and over the pass. It was then mid- day, and as the hot July sun had made the snow so soft and yielding as to be impassable for either men or animals, there was nothing to do but to halt for the night and resume the journey early next morning when the snow would again be frozen hard. I spent most of the afternoon in gazing upon the stupen- dous mountains which rose before me on all sides, and in which culminate the three great water-partings of Central Asia — the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas, and the mountains of Chinese Turkestan. From this region the melting snows 64 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL descend eastwards to the Yarkand river and Gobi desert ; westwards to the Oxus and the Aral Sea ; and southwards to the Indus and Indian Ocean. As far as the eye could reach, gigantic peaks, clothed in perpetual snow, soared proudly up into the blue heavens at heights of 25,000 feet and more above sea-level, and this incomparable array of mountain majesty was rendered the more impressive by the apparent total absence of Ufe of any kind, and by the great stillness which everywhere prevailed. No house, tree, bird, animal, or man was visible, the overpowering solitude being broken only by the distant thunder of an occasional avalanche, when a grey smoke would ascend to the sky showing where the mass of fallen snow had subsided. I remained absorbed and appalled by the magnitude of Nature's works, feeUng but a very small atom in the Universe, until a cold shiver told me that the sun had disappeared behind the mountain-tops overlooking my camp, and that the temperature, according to its nightly custom, was rapidly falling below freezing-point. Wrapped up in all the rugs and blankets I possessed, and fortified by a hot meal, I lay down for a few hours' rest, but it was some time before the sensations of the afternoon allowed me to fall asleep. The march was resumed at 2 a.m., the going then being quite hard and the snow sparkhng in the Ught of a per- fectly clear moon like a vast field of diamonds. The top of the pass, 15,200 feet, was reached after four hours' stiff cUmbing. From this point the pass runs either north- west over a glacier to the Baroghil Pass, 12,460 feet, or north-east over the surface of another glacier to the Shawitakh Pass, 12,560 feet. I followed the former, reaching the farther edge of the snowfield just as the heat of the new sun was causing it again to become soft and impassable. I halted for the night on the left bank of the Yarkhun river, which has its source in the adjacent glaciers and eventually joins the Kabul river near Jalalabad under the name of the Kunar. The following day I forded this icy-cold stream on the back of a yak, my bare feet and legs receiving the coldest bath they have ever had. THE END OF THE JOURNEY 65 I was now on the outskirts of the Pamirs — the Roof of the World. " Pamir " signifies a more or less level valley of considerable width, and as the lowest of them is 12,000 feet above sea-level, the climate is severe ; in a few favoured spots only is there much grass ; trees there are none, and even bushes are scarce ; strong, biting winds are common, and on the whole the Pamirs cannot be recom- mended as a cheerful or comfortable country in which to live. On completion of my work I returned by the Shawitakh track, and early in August left Gilgit for India, my orders being to follow the Indus from Ramghat to Chilas, occupied by us the year before, and thence proceed by Khagan to Abbottabad. The Indus part of the road was then only in course of construction, and there were many difficult stone- shoots and swift, dangerous torrents to be negotiated in the 53 miles to Chilas. Thence to Khagan there was little that could be dignified by the name of a road, and the track which served as one was in places as bad as it could be. The greatest height crossed was at the Babusar Pass, 13,585 feet. At Abbottabad the little party which had shared my wanderings broke up. All the members of it had consist- ently served me well since we left Srinagar three months before, and a word of gratitude is also due to my intelligent and sure-footed riding mules, who had carried me over many perilous mountain sides with far greater safety than if I had attempted to traverse them on foot. The Gurkha, the only soldier of the party, and a good type of his sturdy race, was a well-educated man, and during our long marches it had been my custom to converse with him in Gurkhali, his native tongue. In this way I acquired a sufficient knowledge of it to enable me, before leaving Abbottabad, to pass the prescribed examination and so bring up the number of oriental languages in which I had qualified to a total of six. CHAPTER V ON THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF THE CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE Punitive expedition sent into Waziristan— In temporary charge of Frontier Section Events leading up to the siege of Chitral Fort — Umra Khan of Jandol — Despatch of Chitral ReUef Force from India and a detachment from Gilgit— Appointed to Headquarters Staff of the Rehef Force Sir Robert Low — Colonel Bindon Blood — Captain jvjixon Nature of country to be traversed — capture of the Mala- kand Pass — Action at Khar — Passage of Swat river — Effective action of cavalry — Reconnaissances to Panjkora river and towards Umra Khan's headquarters— Fine fighting of Guides Infantry- Reconnaissance up the Panjkora — Meet Roddy Owen— Advance on Miankilai and flight of Umra Khan — Siege of Chitral is raised — Reconnaissance down the Panjkora — Treacherously attacked by my two guides — Severely wounded — Sent back to India — Mentioned in Despatches and awarded D.S.O. — Promoted Captain — Prepara- tion for Staff College Entrance Examination — Nominated for entrance Leave for England — Some reflections on service in India. Towards the end of 1894 a brigade of all arms was despatched to the borders of the Mahsiid Waziri country, and, as had happened more than once before in our deaUngs with this truculent tribe, the camp of the brigade was attacked one morning at dawn while the troops were still asleep in their tents. We suffered a considerable number of casualties, as well as loss of prestige, and it was therefore decided to employ a larger force under the command of General Sir WilUam Lockhart. Mason joined his staff as head of the Intelligence, and Lockhart afterwards applied for me to join it also, but this was not sanctioned as I was required to take charge of the North- West Frontier Section pending Mason's absence. I was naturally disappointed at losing this promising opportunity of seeing active service, but my chance and a better one — was to come shortly on another part of the frontier, in Chitral. Chitral, one of the mountainous states bordering India 66 THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 67 on the north, is about the size of Wales and has a population of upwards of a hundred thousand. Both the state and the capital are called by the same name, the capital being some 60 miles on the Indian side of the main watershed of the Hindu Kush. For some years past we had aimed at exerting our influence in the state, more especially over its external relations, as it was important that we should watch the northern passes to which it gives access, and be informed of what was taking place there. In 1892 the Mehtar, or chief, died, and, as is customary in these frontier states, a scramble at once began for the Mehtarship. The old Mehtar left behind him seventeen sons born of his four legitimate wives, and of these Afzul- ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk were supposed to have the strongest claims to the succession. Afzul-ul-Mulk, happen- ing to be at Chitral at the time, while Nizam-ul-Mulk was in Yasin, 150 miles off, at once seized all the arms and money in the fort, murdered such of his brothers as he could put his hands on who were likely to give him trouble, and then started off to deal with Nizam-ul-Mulk. The latter deemed discretion the better part of valour and fled for refuge to our Agency at Gilgit, leaving" Afzul- ul-Mulk in possession. But although the brothers had been disposed of, the new Mehtar had still to reckon with an uncle, Sher Afzul by name, who, in the years gone by, had unsuccessfully tried to oust the old Mehtar and had since been an exile in Afghanistan. This individual, thinking that his chances were now more promising, suddenly appeared in front of Chitral fort, accompanied by a body of horsemen picked up en route, and Afzul-ul-Mulk, on going to the gate to ascer- tain what all the noise was about, was shot down, and expired immediately afterwards. Sher Afzul then became Mehtar, but his reign was of even more brief duration, for as soon as Nizam-ul-Mulk heard of these events he set out from Gilgit to wrest the throne from him. He was joined by many adherents on the way, and before he reached Chitral fort Sher x\fzul threw up the sponge and fled back to Afghan territory as rapidly as he had appeared. 68 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Nizam-ul-Mulk professed himself to be a faithful ally of the British Government, and by his request a British officer, Captain (now Sir) Frank Younghusband, the well-known explorer, was deputed to reside in the country as our Political Agent. Affairs then settled down, and it was hoped that there would be no further trouble, but on the 1st January 1895 Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead while out hawking by a partisan of his brother Amir-ul-Mulk, who for the previous two years had been living with Umra Khan, the ruler of the neighbouring state of Jandol. This restless and ambitious chief had recently extended his authority over the Khanate of Dir and a considerable part of Swat, both of which marched with his own territory ; and thinking that his opportunity had arrived for still further extending his dominions he invaded Chitral, osten- sibly with the object of supporting his friend Amir-ul-Mulk, but with the real intention of annexing the country. There was, in fact, reason to beheve that he was not wholly dis- connected with the murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk. He soon obtained a footing in the southern districts, and was after- wards joined by the persevering Sher Afzul, who again turned up from Afghanistan. The two chiefs apparently made an agreement to combine forces in expelhng the British officers, and then decide who should be the ruler. Collecting some 10,000 men they advanced on Chitral itself, where, after some sharp skirmishing on the 3rd of March, the native troops forming the escort of Surgeon- Major (later Sir) G. Robertson were shut up within the walls of the fort, and nothing more was heard of them for several weeks. Surgeon-Major Robertson was our PoUtical Agent at Gilgit, and had gone to Chitral at the end of January to report on the situation. The besieged garrison consisted of 100 men of the 14th Sikhs, 300 men of the Kashmir Infantry, and about 150 followers and others, the whole being under the command of Captain Townshend. If every one were put on half rations there were sufficient supplies of food to last till about the end of April, and the ammunition amounted to 300 rounds per rifle. A few days later a British post of about 50 men was THE CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE 69 captured at Reshun, between Chitral and Mastuj, and before the end of March the garrison of Mastuj, consisting of 300 men, was besieged. These stirring events kept me fairly busy in the Frontier Section, but having learned much about the country and its inhabitants during my visit to the neighbourhood in the previous year, I was able to deal with them far more easily than would have been the case had this local know- ledge not been acquired. When it became known in India that British troops had been attacked by Umra Khan and Sher Afzul, and were besieged by them, there was nothing to be done but to take immediate steps for their relief. The Government of India therefore decided : {a) The ist Indian Division, about 15,000 strong, to mobilise at Peshawar, move from a southerly direction through Swat and Dir, and fall on the rear of Umra Khan. This force, designated the " Chitral Relief Force." to be based on Nowshera (near Peshawar), and be under the command of Major-General (afterwards Sir) Robert Low. (b) A column of 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers (a regular Indian native battaUon), and two guns of a Kashmir moun- tain battery, to move at the same time from the Gilgit vicinity, where they then were, and, passing through Mastuj , endeavour to reach Chitral from the north. Colonel Kelly to command. From the southern frontier to Chitral the distance was 190 miles, and from Gilgit to Chitral 220 miles. The number of pack animals required to feed and maintain the " Chitral Rehef Force " amounted to nearly 30,000. As explained in the preceding chapter, the duties con- nected with the management of field operations, which in these days belong to the General Staff, were performed at the time of which I write by the Intelligence and Mobilisa- tion Branches of the Quartermaster-General's department. Upon them, therefore, devolved the task of working out the plan of operations, and in the case of the Intelligence Branch this fell upon my section. When it was finished, Sir George White, who had succeeded Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief, appointed me to the Intelligence Staff of the Force, of which the head was Captain (now General 70 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Sir) John Nixon, i8th Bengal Lancers. The Chief of the Staff was Brigadier-General (now Sir) Bindon Blood, and from both these officers I received much friendly help during the campaign which went far to improve my crude know- ledge of staff duties in the field. Topographical information of the line of advance was vague, and almost entirely derived from native sources. Before entering Swat, the first independent country to be traversed, a range of rugged hills varying between 3000 and 6000 feet in height had to be crossed, and although these had confronted us for years at only a few miles from our boundary no one knew what their difficulties really were, or what the country on the other side of them was like. It was known, however, that at least four mountain ranges — of which the altitude of one varied between 10,000 and 20,000 feet — and three large rivers, the Swat, Panjkora, and Kunar, as well as many smaller streams, had to be crossed ; that the route could nowhere be called a road ; that the intervening country was a hotbed of fanaticism ; and that the tribes would almost certainly oppose our advance, whatever their subsequent attitude might be. While the force was concentrating at Mardan at the end of March the intelligence officers were directed to obtain as much information as possible regarding the three passes giving access to the Swat valley — the Mora, Shakot, and Malakand — so as to enable the Commander to make his plan. By skilful dispositions and the dissemination of false intelligence he endeavoured to mislead the enemy as to which of the three passes, about seven miles apart, would be selected for attack, and he communicated the true objective to only the more senior commanders and staff officers. I was not let into the secret, and on the afternoon of the 2nd April the Brigadier of the ist Brigade, which I had been ordered to accompany, instructed me to be prepared to show the way next morning for the attack on the Shakot, opposite to which the brigade had just arrived. I had a shrewd suspicion that I was being intentionally misinformed, and deemed it wise to be prepared not only for going direct to the Shakot but also for making a flank CAPTURE OF THE MALAKAND PASS 71 march across country to the Malakand, which I thought would be the real point of attack. I laid my plans accord- ingly, and next morning when the brigade was about to move off, and I was ordered to conduct it to the Malakand and not to the Shakot, I greatly enjoyed seeing the look of surprise on the Brigadier's face at the readiness with which his order was carried out. The enemy's strength at the Malakand was about 12,000 men, but probably not more than half that number had firearms, and of these only a comparatively small proportion were rifles, the remainder being old muzzle-loaders which, in some cases, were almost as dangerous to the owner as to his adversary. The unarmed men were employed in carrying away the killed and wounded, and in hurling down boulders upon the assaulting columns. The position itself, running along the crest for nearly two miles, was exceptionally strong, and was defended on either flank and down the forward spurs by a number of " sangars," or stone breast-works. The dispositions for the attack were : 2nd Brigade in advance, two battalions turning the right flank while the two others delivered a frontal attack ; ist Brigade in support ; 3rd Brigade in reserve ; three mountain batteries of artillery to co-operate with the infantry. As the fight progressed the battalions of the ist Brigade were pushed up level with those of the 2nd, and just before the crest was reached the whole line paused for a few minutes to take breath. All being ready, the bugles sounded the advance, and, with a great shout, Highlanders, Riflemen, Sikhs, Dogras, Guides, Bedfordshires, Scottish Borderers, leaped forward and carried the position at the point of the bayonet, pursuing the enemy down the further side of the hill as far as the village of the Khar. The enemy's total loss was estimated at about 1500 men, while ours amounted to seventy killed and wounded. Some of the enemy displayed the most reckless bravery, individual swordsmen and standard-bearers charging madly forward, and seeming to bear a charmed life until at last a bullet found its mark. Sometimes a dozen or more would start off on their wild career simultaneously, the last man 72 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL left alive, undaunted by the fate of his comrades, holding on till he also fell, perhaps within a few yards of our line. I remember one leader in particular who, sword in hand, urged on his men from the roof of a hut. Standing out very clearly against the sky-line he drew upon himself a tremen- dous fusillade, but although evidently hit several times it was long before he was struck down never to rise again. The so-called road leading up the pass was abominably bad even for pack animals, and many of the troops did not receive their supplies till next morning. The Brigade Staff came off no better, and we lay down to sleep supperless. Unknown to me till daylight appeared, there were several of the enemy's dead within a few feet of the spot where I happened to lie — a proof of the haste with which he had fled, as his custom is to carry his dead away. Next day the ist Brigade took the lead, and after descending from the pass was assailed near Khar by several thousand tribesmen streaming past its right flank from the Shakot and Mora Passes. We had a stiff little fight, which was brought to a successful conclusion by the charge of a squadron of the Guides cavalry. Coming round the end of a spur, the squadron suddenly discovered between one and two thousand of the enemy in the open, and without a moment's hesitation it galloped into them, driving them back helter-skelter into the hills. Next morning there was no sign of an enemy anywhere. Supplies again failed to arrive till late in the evening, although another road up the Malakand had been found. On this occasion the Brigadier thought that better arrange- ments for dinner ought to have been made by our cook — a native — and he was accordingly called to account for his neglect. The result was most unfortunate, for during the night he decamped across the frontier, and next morning we found ourselves without a cook of any kind. What happened afterwards I cannot say, as the same day I was transferred to the 2nd Brigade, which was now ordered to resume the lead. Three days later the Swat river, half a mile or more in width, was forced. It was unbridgcd, but fordable in certain places. The enemy, reinforced by a contingent sent by CAVALRY ACTION 73 Umra Khan, had so disposed his 5000 men as effectively to command the ford where it was expected the passage would be attempted. Seeing this, the Brigadier— Waterfield —ordered the nth Bengal Lancers, a regiment with a deservedly fine reputation, the equally fine regiment of Guides cavalry, and the 15th Sikhs to cross by a ford higher up. After what had happened at Khar, the prospect of the dreaded cavalry falling upon their flank and rear was too much for the defenders, who at once evacuated their position and their retirement quickly became a demoralised flight, the cavalry pursuing them for several miles. The terrifying effect produced by the cavalry in the actions at Khar and the Swat was quite extraordinary and the news of it spread through the country-side for many miles. Unaccustomed for the most part to horses, and having exaggerated notions as to the power of mounted troops, the enemy never really recovered his morale, and the stubborn resistance he offered at the Malakand was not again encountered. After the passage of the Swat I was sent on with the Guides cavalry to reconnoitre the route leading over the Laram Range by the Katgola Pass, and thence to Sado on the Panjkora river. This was the greatest obstacle we had yet met, though it was fordable by all arms on the day of my arrival. Two days later, when the 2nd Brigade had come up, I was directed to proceed with the cavalry to reconnoitre the Jandol valley towards Umra Khan's headquarters near Miankilai. We were warmly sniped from the neighbouring hills, and as there was evidence to show that large numbers of the tribesmen were collecting near Miankilai, we returned to Sado after completing a recon- naissance of about eight miles and obtaining the required information regarding the enemy's movements and the practicability of the route. In the morning we had forded the Panjkora fairly easily, but when we returned in the evening it had risen considerably, the current had become very swift, and several horses were lost in recrossing. Next morning it had become quite unfordable and equally impracticable for swimming, and no further progress was possible pending the construction of a bridge or the discovery of another ford. As the latter could not be found, the former 74 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL had to be taken in hand. A rough footbridge was completed on the i2th, and the Guides infantry were sent across to hold the bridgehead, but during the night the river again rose, washing the bridge away and leaving the Guides cut off from the remainder of the force. A suspension bridge was then commenced, and took four days to complete. Meanwhile, on the 13th, the Guides went beyond the bridgehead in order to burn certain villages which had been harbouring " snipers " engaged in firing on our working parties, and when about to return the battalion was attacked by some 5000 tribesmen who had collected together on hearing of its isolated position. For some time the situation appeared critical, the enemy coming on in the most deter- mined way, but the Guides splendidly upheld their reputa- tion, and, moving as steadily as if on parade, slowly fought their way back to their entrenchments and there came under the shelter of the guns and troops posted on the left bank of the river. Unfortunately the battalion lost its gallant commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, A small reinforcement was sent across on rafts, as it was expected that the enemy would renew the attack during the night. It later transpired that this was his intention, but the discharge of some star shells by a mountain battery so alarmed him that he drew off, and no further molestation was attempted. While waiting for the bridge to be completed I was sent with a squadron of the nth Bengal Lancers and half a battahon of the Buffs to reconnoitre the left bank of the Panjkora up to Robat, being accompanied by that fine soldier and splendid horseman Roddy Owen. When hostilities iirst broke out Roddy was stationed at Quetta, and hke many other officers he at once applied for employ- ment. As this was not given he asked for and obtained ten days' leave, and of this he took advantage to join the Relief Force as a newspaper correspondent. When his leave expired the Simla authorities issued instructions directing him to return to India, but Roddy contrived on one plea or another to stay where he was, and at last Simla gave up the contest. He remained with the Force till the conclusion of the campaign, and afterwards made a journey CHITRAL RELIEVED 75 from Chitral to the Pamirs. This was not a bad performance on the basis of ten days' leave, and was typical of Roddy's methods of getting his own way. On the 17th the cavalry and 3rd Brigade, now in front, crossed the Panjkora, dispersed a miscellaneous gathering of the enemy in the Jandol valley, and on arrival at Miankilai learnt that Umra Khan had thrown his hand in and fled to Afghanistan. A day or two later the unlucky Sher Afzul, with 1500 followers, was captured by our ally the Khan of Dir. He was subsequently sent to India. Pushing on from Miankilai, the advanced troops crossed the Janbatai Pass (7400 feet high) on the 19th, and arrived at Dir on the 21st, where news was received that the siege of Chitral had been raised three days before. This was the natural corollary of the successful advance of the Relief Force, and the main object of the campaign had thus been achieved within about a month of the date on which the order for mobilisation was given. From the first the enemy had been out-matched by our superior armament and organisation, but we had, apart from him, many diffi- culties to contend against, and the commander and his troops well deserved the high praise officially bestowed upon them. The Gilgit detachment, which reached Chitral on the 20th April, had also achieved a great triumph. Composed entirely of native troops, with the exception of a handful of British officers, it had marched 220 miles through the highest mountain system in the world, when the country was inflamed with news of the rebellion, and at a season when the weather was still severe and the passes deep in snow, one of those traversed being 12,400 high. Finally, neither the efforts of the Rehef Force, nor those of the Gilgit detachment, could have availed but for the gallantry and cheerful endurance displayed by the invested garrison in holding out for forty-seven days until help arrived. In this case, again, all the troops were natives except a few British officers, and the siege will always rank as one of the finest episodes in the annals of the Indian Army. As to its intrepid commander. Captain Townshend, I imagine that he learnt many things which proved useful 76 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL to him twenty years later in the still more famous siege of Kut-el-Amara. Chitral being relieved and the enemy having dispersed, nothing remained for the Relief Force to do except to send on from Dir sufficient troops to consolidate order in the country, and open up permanent means of communication with India. The route followed by them presented extra- ordinary difficulties, especially at the Lowarai Pass (10,450 feet high and covered with snow), and required extensive improvements before transport animals could use it. While this final movement was taking place I was ordered to report on the practicability of the road leading from Dir down the Panjkora to Robat, the place to which I had already made a reconnaissance up the same river from Sado. A company of the 4th Gurkhas was given me as escort, and the Khan of Dir provided two guides, who were said to be specially trustworthy men, one of them being known as the " Kazi." For the first two marches they were everything that could be desired, and most helpful both as to their knowledge of the country and in obtaining local supplies of food, but later they were not so satisfactory. I was suffering from dysentery at the time, and on the third day's march gave my sword to the " Kazi " to carry as I was unable to bear its weight round my waist. Being mounted, I gradually forged ahead of the escort, and was followed by the two guides only. Suddenly, and to my utter amazement, I was twice fired at from behind, and could not imagine what had happened. Looking round I saw the " Kazi " rising from his knee, and in the act of throwing aside the smoking 12-bore breech-loader which he had been carrying since we left Dir, preparatory to achieving with his sword — or rather my sword — what he had failed to accomplish with his gun, for although he could not have been more than ten yards away when he fired he had missed me with both barrels. He was yelling with the fury of a madman, and I realised that he had become " ghazi " — a religious fanatic — not an uncommon occurrence on the frontier. The goat-track on the steep hillside along which I was riding would not permit me to move to the right or left, or to turn the pony round so as AWARDED THE " D.S.O." 77 to face my man, and the only alternative was to dismount. In doing this I stumbled and fell, the result being that I was in a half-sitting position when the " Kazi " arrived at close quarters and proceeded to slash wildly at me. As there was neither time nor opportunity to draw my revolver while this vigorous sword practice was taking place, I could only scramble to my feet and floor the fellow with my fist. Just as I did this I observed that the other so-called guide, kneeling on one knee a few yards away, was waiting his opportunity to fire the moment he could do so without hitting his companion. Whilst my attention was distracted in this way the " Kazi " jumped up and the pair of them made off. Pulling out the revolver at last, I brought down the " Kazi " as he was in the act of flying up the hillside, and then I remembered no more till the Gurkhas arrived, they having hastened to the spot on hearing the sound of firing. They picked up the " Kazi," who had been hard hit but not killed, and a native hospital orderly did his best temporarily to patch up my wounds, which were later officially classed as " severe " but were not really serious. We then commenced the return march to Dir, where the " Kazi," who turned out to be an adherent of Umra Khan, in whose service he had previously been, was tried by court-martial and sentenced to be shot and his body burnt. The sentence was carried out by a sergeant and six men of a Highland battahon — I forget which. I thought at the time, and still think, that however indifferent a marksman the " Kazi " may have been, he could not possibly have missed me with both barrels at so short a range but for the direct intervention of Providence. On becoming fit to travel I was sent back to India, and my connection with the Chitral Relief Force terminated. A " mention in despatches " and the award of the Distinguished Service Order, then a rather rare decoration, tended to alleviate, but did not entirely dispel, the morti- fication I felt at not having put up a more finished fight and accounted for both my assailants. I was chaffed a good deal at the time for having been cut about with my own sword, and for not acting up to the standard displayed at the Rawal Pindi assault-at-arms. I deserved to be chaffed. 78 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL While serving with the Relief Force I became Captain in the ordinary course of regimental promotion, and was unusually lucky in reaching that rank in less than seven years after being commissioned. After resuming duty in the Intelligence Branch at the end of the summer of 1895 I began to realise, as a result of a talk with my friend Mason, the necessity of graduating at the Staff College, for without that qualification my future professional advancement was doubtful. About thirty officers were admitted to the college annually, three-fourths of this number by open competition and the remainder, conditional on qualifying at the entrance examination, by selection. The examination was not very difficult, but it embraced many subjects — mathematics, military engineering, military topography, tactics, military history, strategy, military geography, military administra- tion, military law, and a knowledge of two foreign languages, of which one must be either French or German. As a rule competition was very keen, and therefore prospective candidates usually spent several weeks and even months at one of the cramming establishments in London which specialised in this branch of military education. As there were no such establishments in India, officers stationed in that country invariably took leave to England so as to obtain the help they needed. I could not get leave, nor could I afford to throw up my staff appointment in order to return home, and consequently there was nothing for it but to do without expert assistance. I decided to take Hindustani, which I knew fairly well, as one of the two languages ; knowing nothing of German I selected French as the second, and, knowing very little of it, I enlisted the aid of a Frenchwoman who happened to be employed at Simla. My wife also took a hand in this subject, and in addition showed exemplary patience in hearing me recite the propositions of Euclid. For mathe- matics in general I procured the help of a local schoolmaster ; and, lastly, I received many useful hints from Lieutenant (now Major-General) Holman, who was also on the head- quarters staff and was himself working for the examination preparatory to going home to complete his studies. For RETURN TO ENGLAND 79 the rest I had to rely on my own resources, and they were rather a broken reed, for such meagre knowledge as I then possessed about some of the subjects was entirely self- acquired. Ten months were available in which to prepare for the examination, and I was oppressed with the thought that I had but the one chance of getting into the college, because by the time the next examination came round I would be over the regulation age for admission. It will be understood from all this that the period of preparation was neither easy nor devoid of anxiety, but by rising regularly every morning between four and five o'clock, in winter as in summer, I was able to get through a large amount of spade work, crude and ill-directed though it might be, before going to office for the day. Progress was naturally both slow and doubtful, for having no one to guide me I approached my tasks by the most roundabout way, and when completed there was often no certainty that the results were correct. In due course the fateful examination, lasting ten days, arrived, and perseverance then had its reward. I qualified in all subjects, and as I just missed securing one of the competitive vacancies Sir George White came to the rescue and recommended me for one of the vacancies to be filled by selection. Lord Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief at home, approved, and in December 1896 I started with my wife and five months' old child for England. The voyage was very unpleasant, rough weather prevailing almost continuously. The nurse was the worst sailor of the party, next to myself, and succumbed as soon as we started, and in our cabin ! Fortunately the man-servant of the officer occupying the adjoining cabin was an obliging person, and undertook to look after the child during my wife's absence at meals. He had once been a prize-fighter ! My eight years' experience in India prompts me to say that a certain amount of service in this great dependency is an essential part of the education of every young officer. It broadens his views ; brings him into contact with the native troops of the Indian army, by the side of whom he may sooner or later be called upon to fight ; and affords him opportunities for seeing training conducted under more 8o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL practical conditions than usually prevail in England. On the other hand, if it is unduly prolonged physical energy may deteriorate, with a corresponding loss in military capacity, and there will also be a tendency to become antiquated and stereotyped in method, owing to the difficulty of keeping pace with the development of military ideas in Europe. Modem means of communication have helped to diminish these dangers, but they have not entirely removed them and never can, and everything possible should therefore be done by those in authority to ensure that the army in India maintains close touch with the army at home. In principle this is now generally recognised, but in practice the recognition is not so apparent, and not a few obstruct- ive prejudices and old-fashioned notions must be uprooted before the two armies can be brought into that intimate relationship which Imperial efficiency demands. MAP ILLUSTRATING JOURNEY TO AND CHITRAL EXPEDITIO Scale 1 lnch = 45 Miles. ^O 40 30 20 10 9 I ! I I [ I I I I r I I I ] I I ] I I I I I [ [ I I SO z±= Russian Sphere of Influence British Do .Do Under direct administration of Government of Indie AMIRS 1894 1895. .i^ f-^vt --rt-il>J too IB CHAPTER VI STUDENT AT TPIE STAFF COLLEGE Colonel Hildyard — His views on the education of officers — Nature of the Staff College course — Colonel Henderson — Lord Roberts' apprecia- tion of him — First year's work at the college — Go to France to learn the language — Second year's work — Visit to battlefields of 1870 war — Visit the Meuse Valley and Belgian Ardennes — Umpire at army manoeuvres — Sir H. Brackenbury — Inspection of Staff College by Lord Wolseley — Value of Staff College training. I JOINED the Staff College in January 1897 and was, I believe, the first officer promoted from the ranks to enter it as a student, though others have done so since. The Commandant was Colonel (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir) H. Hildyard, Colonel (now Lieutenant-General Sir) H. Miles succeeding him in 1898. Up to 1893, when Hildyard assumed command, too much importance seems to have been attached to the mere accumulation of know- ledge and to preparation for written examinations, and the capacity of the students on leaving the college was estimated mainly by the number of marks gained in these examinations. Everybody knows that the best performer on paper is not always — one might say is not usually — the most proficient in the field, and as Hildyard held strong views on the impossibility of producing or discovering the best officers by means of written examinations alone he gave the curriculum a more practical character. In order to test their powers of application the students were constantly employed in the study of concrete questions regarding organisation and administration, and in solving strategical and tactical problems both in quarters and out of doors. Hildyard proposed the entire abolition of written examina- tions by outside examiners, and although this was not sanctioned the examinations were restricted to the first 81 G 82 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL year. Since then the students have been classified at the end of the second year according to the quality of their work throughout the course, and to the opinion formed by the Instructional Staff as to the likelihood of their becoming capable leaders and staff officers. There were five military instructors or " professors," as they were then called — one for strategy and tactics, one for artillery and fortifications, one for administrative duties, and two for topography, as well as two for languages — French and German. Topography was the subject which the students Hked least, and undoubtedly a good deal of time and temper were expended in making intricate " scales " which would never be required on service, in learning to draw the conventional signs for trees, churches, public- houses, and other topographical features, according to scale, and in chasing five-feet contours round the undulations of ground near the college, none of which were more than a hundred feet above the general level. This seeming waste of effort was not without excuse, for some officers had but a hazy notion of how to make or read a map, and were not much surer of themselves in regard to the working of the magnetic compass. All this has been changed by having a better system of military education from the beginning, and the cadets at Sandhurst and Woolwich are now as proficient as were many of the students at the Staff College twenty-five years ago. The professor of strategy and tactics was Lieutenant- Colonel G. F. Henderson, the author of Stonewall Jackson, Spicheren, and other military books and essays. " Hender," as he was familiarly known to us, was a past-master in his work, and his lovable and unselfish companionship was of itself a moral and professional education of hfe-long benefit. He was devoted to his pupils and, as Hildyard wrote of him some years later, " There was no paper, however crude, wherein he did not notice points for encouragement towards renewed effort ; so there was no paper, however complete, to which his practical and well-thought-out remarks did not add value. To him it was a labour of love, and each memoir, good or indifferent, received the same measure of attention from him." LIEUT.-COLONEL G. F. HENDERSON 83 About the time I joined the college Henderson first became the intimate friend of Lord Roberts, who tells us that he " formed a very high opinion of his abihties " and, like many others, " succumbed to the spell of his fascinating personality." The characteristically warm-hearted memoir which the Field-Marshal wrote in after years as a fore- word to the posthumous publication of Henderson's Science of War, is perhaps the best appreciation extant. It is much too long to reproduce here, but I may quote the following : The affectionate tributes to Henderson's memory by his many friends are a testimony to his pure and stainless character. Blessed with a cheerful temperament, he brightened the lives of all with whom he was associated, and his letters display a spirit of playful tenderness towards those whom he loved, which is most attractive. Generous and thoughtful for others, he took no thought for himself, and only valued money for what it might have enabled him to do for those who needed his help. The influence of such a man must bear good fruit, and the more widely his writings are read, and the more closely his teachings are followed, the more successful will be our would-be commanders, and the better it will be for England when again she is forced to go to war. That the prophecy contained in the last sentence was well fulfilled, the reader will, I think, agree when I say that amongst the students who passed through Henderson's hands between 1892 and 1899 were Haig, Allenby, and scores of others whose names became household words in the Great War ; and all these officers would, I am sure, readily admit that such successes as attended their leader- ship were largely due to the sound instruction and mspiring counsel which they received from their old tutor some twenty years or so before. Of the different causes which are alleged to have given us the victory over Germany, not one should be assigned a more prominent place than the influence and teaching of Henderson at the Staff College. Having passed into the college without the help of a crammer I was anxious as to how my work there would compare with that of the other officers, and so I told the 84 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL commandant at the first interview I had with him after joining. His encouraging reply was that the lack of this form of education need not necessarily be a handicap, as " We do not want any cramming here ; we want officers to absorb, not to cram " ; and except in a few insignificant details, which I soon made good, I never felt at a dis- advantage because of being differently equipped at the start from my contemporaries. The first year's work was mainly of an elementary nature, and for the most part — though not entirely — was interesting and practical, and it formed a useful foundation for the more advanced studies of the second year. It was compulsory to " pass " in either French or German, and on the advice of our excellent French professor, M. Deshumbert, whom we all adored, I spent the summer vacation of two months with a family in France, French being the language I had selected. On crossing over to France I left Newhaven at midnight, intending to embark on the boat going to Caen, where it was due to arrive about eight o'clock next morning. To my surprise I woke at four o'clock to find that the boat had already reached port, and then discovered that I had carelessly gone aboard the boat for Dieppe, which left Newhaven at the same hour as the one for Caen, where my bicycle and luggage, having been registered in London, had of course gone. It was a great tax on my limited knowledge of French to explain to the ticket-collector why, having a ticket for Caen, I had come to Dieppe. I afterwards spent some ten hours in travelling across country by a very indifferent railway route, changing trains no fewer than six times, to the port where my belongings had gone and which was quite near to my destination— the small provincial town of Vire. I learnt more French that day than at any time during my two months in the country, as the " Pasteur " with whom I stayed and studied did not put in an appear- ance until dejeuner, and even then was apt to be drowsy except when roused by an objectionable habit of coughing. Another thing I remember about the visit is that there was no bath in the house, and it was only after diligent search THE BATTLEFIELDS OF 1870 85 in the town that one was at last procured from a shop which dealt in antiques ! At the end of the year I " passed " in French, missing the " interpretership " by six marks out of the six hundred and twenty required to qualify. For this I had to wait till the following year. All the other examinations were successfully negotiated, as indeed they ought to be, for they were not difficult. Of the examiners who came to the college on this occasion was an officer who had un- successfully competed at the entrance examination the previous year — an incident which caused us much amuse- ment, seeing that we, who had succeeded in securing vacancies, were being examined by one who had failed to do so. He appreciated the humorous side of the matter as much as we did, and I should add that no one doubted his competence to examine us in the particular subject for which the War Office had appointed him. Early the following summer the senior division — as the officers in their second year are called — made the customary visit to the principal battlefields of the 1870 war — Woerth, Spicheren, Vionville, and Gravelotte — under the guidance of Henderson. These visits enabled us to picture on the gi'ound itself the operations which took place, and to grasp the lessons they taught far better than could be done by merely reading about them. When visiting the battlefield of Woerth we stayed at Niederbronn, a small spa prettily situated in the Vosges. It was much frequented by the Germans in summer, and by German officers from Bitche and other neighbouring places. The hotel proprietor, now dead, was a French Alsatian. He told us much about the French retreat from Woerth, which passed through Niederbronn, and was far from being in love with his new masters, or they with him. It was perhaps deemed pohtic that his daughter should marry a German, but the arrangement has since been badly upset by the reversion of Niederbronn to the French, and madame gave me the impression that she was painfully aware of the fact when I went there two years ago. In company with Captain (now Lieut.-General Sir) G. Barrow of the Indian Cavalry I left England some days in 86 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL advance, in order to see certain places of interest before join- ing the main party at Metz. We first went to Waterloo and Ligny, and afterwards spent a few days in the Belgian Ardennes and Meuse valley, which was already recognised as a probable line of operations in the event of war between Germany and France. The forts d'arret at Liege and Namur — twelve at the former and nine at the latter — had been constructed some years before with the object of blocking, or at any rate of temporarily checking, an advance by this line. One night we stayed at Marche, a small Belgian town south of Huy, where we experienced some difficulty in finding accommodation, and the hotel where we eventually found quarters could only produce one room. What was still more inconvenient, the room contained but one bed, which the landlady wished Barrow and myself to share, and she apparently thought we were making an unnecessary fuss about a very small matter when we insisted upon having a bed each. To add to our troubles during this day, or rather to Barrow's, he lost his only pipe, which in the case of any one but him would have meant the loss of temper also. In September I was detailed with other officers of the senior division for employment on the umpire staff at the army manoeuvres, which took place in the vicinity of Salisbury Plain. The opposing forces consisted of an army corps each, respectively commanded by the Duke of Connaught and Sir Redvers Buller, this being the first time for twenty-six years that manoeuvres had been held. At the end of the first day I was sent for by Sir Henry Brackenbury, who was chief umpire of one side, and with whom I had become acquainted when at Simla, He told me that he was dissatisfied with the way in which the umpire duties were being performed, as he was unable to obtain from the cavalry the early and complete reports regarding the operations which he required ; and he directed me to leave the cavalry regiment to which I was then attached and under- take the duty of procuring for him the information he wanted. How I got it he said he did not care, but that he " must have it, and have it in time." There was no reason why SIR HENRY BRACKENBURY By he should not, for it was simply a question of organisation, and of putting more Ufe and activity into certain individuals on the umpire staff, who were incHned to look upon the manoeuvres as a kind of glorified picnic in which they could share as much or as little as they desired. I introduced the necessary organisation, took effective, albeit somewhat disagreeable, steps to " get a move on " amongst the in- dividuals mentioned, and it then became quite easy to meet Brackenbury's wishes. I thought no more of the matter until he sent for me on the night the manoeuvres terminated, when, taking my arm, he walked me up and down between the rows of tents for about half an hour, making in the course of our conversation some complimentary remarks about the assistance I had given him, and finished by saying that if at any time I stood in need of help he would gladly give it. Some years later I did need it, and he was then as good as his word. Like most men in high positions he had his detractors, and was thought by some people to be harsh and overbearing. It is true, I think, that he did not suffer fools gladly, but he always struck me as being genuinely kind-hearted, and he was rightly regarded as one of the most capable and progressive soldiers of his time. About the middle of December, Lord Wolseley made his usual annual inspection of the college, saying a few en- couraging words to each officer in turn, and expressing his appreciation of their work as reported to him by the com- mandant. This was the last parade for those of us who belonged to the senior division, and we afterwards dis- persed to the four quarters of the globe, pleased to feel, or rather hoping, that we had gained the coveted letters P.S.C. (passed Staff College) — a matter that would not be known to us for certain tiU a few weeks later. But we had also a feeling of regret, for we had invariably received the utmost consideration and assistance from the commandant and his staff, while the students with whom we had been associated were, as always, some of the best fellows in the service. We had been worked hard, but plenty of time was allowed for recreation, and, like all Staff College graduates. 88 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL had many happy as well as amusing recollections of cricket, hockey, and especially of the drag. In bidding good-bye to each other none of us imagined that in less than a year we would again be working together, and putting into practice on the South African veld the lessons we had learned from " Render " and the other professors at Camberley. Rightly or wrongly, we felt ourselves capable of competing with whatever task the future might have in store for us ; and the same self-confidence would not have been lacking had we known that in less than sixteen years some of us would be among the chief actors in the greatest drama the world has ever seen — the Great War. This good opinion of ourselves should not be classed as conceit, for no soldier possessing an atom of sense, or having the remotest conception of the difficulties and uncertainties which attend the conduct of war, will dare to boast, even to himself, of what he thinks he can do. It was merely an illustration of the saying that " knowledge is power," and showed that the training received by the Staff College officer gives him a measure of self-rehance which he probably did not possess before, and which, if appropriately used, should be of great value to him in the future. The Staff College does not aspire to make wise men out of fools, or to achieve any other impossibihties, and, like other educational institutions, it has had its failures. It can, however, and does, make good men better, broaden their views, strengthen their powers of reasoning, improve their judgment, and in general lay the foundations of a useful military career. Further, the benefits of the course are by no means confined to the lectures the students are given, or to the instructional exercises in which they take part, for in addition there is a smartening friction with other brains, and officers are enabled to rub shoulders with others of their own standing with whom they may have to work later in hfe. Haig, AUenby, Murray, Milne, Capper, Haking, Barrow, Forestier-Walker, and others who filled important posts in the Great War were amongst my con- temporaries, and this personal acquaintance was very useful to me, as no doubt it was to them, when I was Chief of the General Staff in France in 1915, and still more so when VALUE OF STAFF COLLEGE 89 Chief of the Imperial General Staff from the end of 1915 to the beginning of 1918. Again, at the college are to be found representatives of practically every branch of the British and Indian armies and the forces of the Overseas Dominions. There are few parts of the Empire that have not been visited at one time or another by some member of the staff or by one of the students, and the interchange of the various experiences acquired is most valuable. Another advantage of the course is that the students are taught the same basic principles of strategy and tactics, and are accustomed to employ the same methods of adminis- tration. It is necessary in any business that the men responsible for its administration should abide by the same rules, foUow the same procedure, and be fully ac- quainted with the best means for ensuring smoothness and despatch ; and nowhere is the necessity greater than in the business of war, where friction, delay, and mis- apprehension are fraught with so many possibilities of mischief. It is only by the estabhshment of a sound system with which all officers are thoroughly famiUar that these rocks can be avoided. As an illustration of the benefit conferred by a common school of training, I may mention that from the time Maude took over the chief command in Mesopotamia to the day of his death, and although all communication between us was conducted by telegraph, the local situation being difficult, precarious, and changing, not a single misunderstanding occurred between him as Commander-in-Chief and myself as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, nor did we ever fear that one would occur. The same good results were obtained in similar circum- stances in my dealings with Milne in Macedonia, Allenby in Egypt, and Monro in India, and I believe these officers were as satisfied at their end of the wire as I was at mine. In the case of Haig the exchange of views and the transmission of the War Cabinet's instructions were comparatively easy, since we could meet at frequent intervals and discuss matters verbally ; but here, also, the work of both of us was facih- tated by our Staff College training, and, as with all the other 90 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL commanders I have mentioned, there was never, so far as I know, any material difference of opinion between us in regard to the main principles to be observed in order to win the war. That the mutual agreement and excellent comradeship established between Staff College graduates during the twenty years previous to 1914 were of inestimable value to the Empire throughout the Great War is, in my humble belief, beyond contradiction. Lest I should be misunderstood I hasten to add that no one more fully recognises than myself that there are many good and even brilliant soldiers who are not Staff College graduates. They deserve, indeed, the greater credit for what they have achieved, because of the drawbacks against which they have had to contend. I know that they have felt the weight of these drawbacks, for they have told me so, and regretted that they had not enjoyed the benefit of two years' study at the college, and the equally beneficial exchange of ideas with men who, like themselves, meant to rise in their profession. I would therefore warn all young officers who wish to make their mark and serve their country well, that they may one day incur a consider- able handicap if they fail to take advantage of the assistance which is afforded by the Staff College course. CHAPTER VII ON THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF, WAR OFFICE Posted to the Intelligence Division, War Office— Sir John Ardagh — Status of the Division — Its duties — Mr. Stanhope's memorandum regard- ing military policy — Hartington Commission recommends appoint- ment of a Chief of the Staff — Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman dissents — Recommendation not carried out — Effect of this in South African War — Colonial Defence Committees — Work in the Russian Section — Appointed Staff Captain in the Colonial Section — Captain Altham — Description of Colonial Empire — Work in the Colonial Section — Effect of our general unreadiness for war in regard to the South African situation — War declared against the South African RepubUcs — Forecast of cost of war — Sir George White sent to command in Natal — Altham goes with him and I take charge of the Colonial Section — Early developments in the war — Dependence on the Press for information — Reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso— Buller suggests abandonment of attempt to relieve Ladysmith — Am consulted by a Cabinet Minister as to what should be done — Recommend appointment of Commander-in-Chief as distinct from the Commander in Natal — Defence Committee of Cabinet appoint Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff — Proceed to South Africa to join the staff of Lord Roberts. On leaving the Staff College officers usually return to regi- mental duty tor at least a year before being employed on the staff, so that they may again be brought into touch with troops, but occasionally the rule is not observed. It was not in my case, for in order to meet the temporary want of an officer with staff experience in India I was sent direct to the IntelHgence Branch of the War Office, then located at 29 Queen Anne's Gate, and presided over by Major-General Sir John Ardagh. When first formed in 1873 it was a branch of the Quarter- master-General's department ; later it was placed under the Adjutant-General ; and was, when I joined it, more or less under the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. It had a staff of about sixteen officers and, with the " Mobilisation 91 92 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Section " of three or four officers, was the only semblance of a General Staff then in existence. The Mobihsation Section had originally been under the Director of Military Intelligence, was afterwards absorbed by the Adjutant- General's department, and then, Uke the Intelligence Branch, came under the Commander-in-Chief. Thus it will be seen that the two branches had been constantly tossed over from one high official to another, apparently in accordance with the predominant view or personality of the moment. The Intelligence Branch was responsible for the collection and collation of military information regarding foreign countries, but it was not the recognised duty of the branch, or of any other, scientifically to study the information so collected and make it the basis of our own requirements. This basis had been fixed in a memorandum by Mr. Stanhope of the ist June 1888, and it still held the field. According to it our army requirements had for their object the support of the civil power in the United Kingdom, the provision of men for the garrison of India and our fortresses and coahng stations at home and abroad, and, in addition, the ability to mobilise for home defence two army corps of regular troops, one army corps of regulars and militia combined, and the auxiliary forces not allotted to these three corps. Subject to these considerations, and their financial obhgations, a further aim was to be able to send abroad, in case of necessity, two complete army corps, but, said the memorandum, " It will be distinctly understood that the probabihty of the employment of an army corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the miUtary authorities to organise efficiently for the defence of this country." To Mr. Stanhope's instruction regarding the " improbable prob- ability " of the employment of even one army corps in any European war may therefore fairly be attributed the fact that our mobihsation arrangements dealt principally with home defence, and that broad military plans essential for the defence of the Empire as a whole received no adequate treatment in the War Office of that period. Two years after the date of Mr. Stanhope's memorandum, a majority of the Hartington Commission recommended the SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN 93 creation of a new War Office department under a " Chief of the Staff," who was to devote himself entirely to collecting information, to thinking out great miUtary problems, and to advising the Secretary of State for War on matters of " general military policy." Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, one of the Commissioners and Secretary of State for War from 1892 to 1895, dissented from the recommendation, and expressed the view that the new department was " unnecessary," and that although it existed in continental countries " those countries differ fundamentally from Great Britain " in that they were " concerned in watching the mihtary conditions of their neighbours, in detecting points of weakness and strength, and in planning possible opera- tions in possible wars against them. But in this country there is in truth no room for a ' general mihtary poHcy ' in this larger and more ambitious sense of the phrase. We have no designs against our European neighbours." It seems to have been overlooked, or was too inconvenient to be admitted, that these same neighbours might have designs agamst us, at any rate in the future even if they had none then, and that the security of the Empire demanded that the Government should be furnished with considered mihtary opinions on which to frame their plans of defence. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was at a loss to know where the new department " could find an adequate field in the circumstances of this country," and was " afraid that while there would be no use for the proposed office there might be in it some danger to our best interests. All that is in fact required for our purposes can be amply obtained by an adequately-equipped Intelligence Branch which, under the direction of the Adjutant-General, could collect all necessary information, and place it at the disposal, not of one officer or department alone, but of all the miUtary heads, whose duty it would be to advise the Minister." The above references to the Hartington Commission are not made for the purpose of condemning Sir Henry Campbell- Bannerman, but rather to illustrate the views then held by prominent pubhc men in regard to preparation for war. To do the Hartington Commissioners justice I should add that all of them, except Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 94 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL agreed with the recommendation mentioned, but, on the other hand, the opinions he expressed must have been shared by many persons in both political parties, for, although there was a change of Government in 1895, nothing was done to introduce the system recommended until the necessity for it was forced upon us by the costly experience of the South African war. The consequences of this delay were set forth in the " Report of the War Ofhce (Reconstitution) Committee, 1904," where it was stated that " if the recom- mendations of the majority of the Hartington Commission had not been ignored, the country would have been saved the loss of many thousands of lives and of many millions of pounds subsequently sacrificed in the war." There was, moreover, no superior authority specially charged with the co-ordination of the different State depart- ments concerned in war preparations, and in this connection it was stated in the evidence given before the Hartington Commission that " no combined plan of operations for the defence of the Empire in any given contingency has ever been worked out or decided upon by the two departments " {i.e., War Office and Admiralty). The nearest approach to a superior authority of the kind required were the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and the Colonial Defence Committee. But the former, to the best of my knowledge, seldom met except when an emergency had already arisen ; it had no permanent nucleus and therefore had little or no continuity of policy or action ; and for these and other reasons it could not, and did not, properly consider the many complex military problems calling for solution. The Colonial Defence Committee, having a succession of very capable secretaries, including the present Lord Syden- ham, performed an extraordinary amount of valuable work — of which we reaped the benefit in the Great War — but its activities were mainly confined to the colonies, and, being composed of subordinate officials, it had no power to decide the questions with which it dealt. It could only make " recommendations," which were afterwards submitted for the approval of the departmental ministers concerned, and, as might be expected, this was not always given, while at best it took days, weeks, or even months to obtain. SIR EDWARD ALTHAM - 95 The danger incurred by all this appalling want of foresight was the more serious because the other Great Powers were busily engaged in improving their General Staff machinery, various parts of Africa and China were in process of annexa- tion or exploitation, several international boundaries and treaties affecting our mihtary interests were in dispute, and our foreign diplomatic relations were in more than one case the reverse of cordial. Hence, while we may wish that the South African war had never been fought, we cannot be too thankful that its exposure of our defects compelled the adoption in 1904 (see page 136) of those reforms in our mihtary system which, if they had not been made when they were, would have greatly aggravated the disadvantages under which we entered upon the war with Germany in 1914. It is perhaps not too much to say that the Empire was saved from disaster by the small community of Boer farmers who, a few years before, had fought against us. On joining the Intelligence Branch I was posted to the section deahng with Asia and Russia in Europe. My Simla experience made me feel at home with Asiatic affairs, but I was strange to European Russia and ignorant of its language, for although before leaving the Staff College I had passed the French interpretership examination and made fair progress in German, Russian was a sealed book to me and still is. Captain (now Brigadier-General) Waters, the head of the section, was an accomplished Russian linguist, and being personally acquainted with the country he took charge of it himself, consigning to me the care of the non-Russian part of Asia. After being employed in this manner for three months my " temporary " appointment to the staff was made permanent, and I was posted as Staff Captain in the Colonial Section, my immediate chief in this case being Captain (now Lieutenant-General Sir) E. Altham. From him I learnt much about the resources, administration, and defence of the different parts of the Empire of which I knew little or nothing before and which was valuable to me in after years. In many respects I was his debtor, but his handwriting was amongst the worst ever seen, except my own, and I frequently had to summon his confidential clerk to decipher 96 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the hieroglyphics which in the course of business he inflicted upon me. Our Colonial Empire comprised some forty distinct and independent governments, and in addition to these organised states there were a number of dependencies under the dominion of the Sovereign which had no formed administrations, as well as large territories controlled by certain British Companies, and the protectorates, such as Somaliland and British East Africa, under the supervision of the Foreign Office. All military questions concerning these possessions found their way into my section, their number being exceeded only by the variety of their character. They included the training, equipment, administration, organisation, and emxployment of the local forces so far as these matters were referred for the advice or decision of the Home Government, and as the forces were still in a rudi- mentary stage such references were far more common than they now are. Complicated questions regarding the armament and garrisons of coaling stations cropped up almost daily, besides a host of others relating to what was then termed Colonial Defence and is now known as Imperial Defence. One of these was the control of submarine cables in time of war, practical measures for which were then being worked out and have since proved to be of great value. The protectorates, though few in number, absorbed a great deal of our time, as they were invariably the scene of disturbances of some kind or other. Between 1896 and 1899 there must have been a dozen or more small wars in these territories, such as the Uganda mutiny and Sierra Leone rebellion, and not being equipped with personnel to deal with them the Foreign Office had constantly to ask the Intelligence Branch, as representing the War Office, for advice or information. This was not always easy to give, because so little was known about either the countries themselves, the quality and characteristics of the troops we had raised in them, or the power for mischief possessed by the hostile tribes. The heaviest part of the work lay in South Africa, where trouble with the Transvaal had been brewing for some two years past and was daily becoming more acute. Every SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 97 Saturday the Cape mail brought us a budget of correspond- ence, ofificial and private, which had to be sifted, studied, and distributed ; it was known that war-hke stores were gradually being accumulated both by the Transvaal and Free State, and it was our duty to watch these as closely as conditions would allow ; special reconnaissances of main routes and strategical localities had to be initiated ; hand- books and summaries of the information obtained had to be prepared with a view to active operations ; the Cabinet had to be supplied with memoranda bearing on the military situation ; and many other matters, far too numerous to specify, called for urgent attention. Fortunately, Altham had a good knowledge of the country and was a quick worker, and while I struggled with the remainder of the Empire for which we were responsible, he dealt with the important and pressing business of South Africa. Consider- ing the amount to be got through he achieved marvels, and this was recognised by the Royal Commission on the South African war, who pronounced the information contained in the hand-books, as well as in a " valuable " series of memoranda, to be in many respects remarkably accurate. As everybody knows, the war lasted much longer and required far more troops than had been expected. Of the reasons for this I may mention two : the first was Mr. Stanhope's dictum that the " primary " duty of the military authorities was home defence ; the second, largely the corollary of the first, was the weakness of our military position as compared with the Boers when hostilities com- menced. Throughout the long negotiations with the two Republics this disadvantage was keenly felt both by the local authorities and the War Office, but it was difficult, if not impossible, to remedy it, since to send out reinforcements and to make other necessary preparations might have destroyed all hopes of obtaining that peaceful solution which the Government desired. The position was therefore still dangerously weak when hostilities broke out on the nth October, and in consequence we were penalised with the greatest of all handicaps in war — a bad start. I recall the disadvantages which prevailed at the beginning, because they, more than anything else, were H 98 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL answerable for the prolonged duration of the war. I am aware that certain people claimed in later years to have appreciated the situation correctly, and to have forecast more or less accurately the number of troops that would be required ; but I am afraid that these claims must be regarded as instances of being wise after the event. At any rate all the estimates which came to my notice at the War Office before the war, and a great many came, proved to be, with one exception, very much on the wrong side. I am reminded of another forecast which proved to be inaccurate. At one of the many Cabinet discussions of the South African question some one apparently suggested that it would be a wise precaution to work out the probable cost involved in the event of war, and it fell to me to make the arithmetical calculation. Being furnished with the figures representing the estimated number of troops required and the time they would take in carrying out their task, I had merely to apply these and other data to the cost of previous British campaigns in somewhat similar countries, making of course due allowance for any difference there might be in the conditions. The answer to my sum was recorded on half a sheet of foolscap, and if it found its way to the Cabinet, as I suppose it did, I am sure it received a cordial welcome. What it was I shall not say — though I remem-ber the figure well — and I would wager that no one would guess it in a dozen attempts, though it was perhaps as accurate as the estimate of the cost of any other war has ever been. When General Sir George White was deputed in September 1899 to assume command of the troops in Natal, then being reinforced by certain units from India, Altham went with him as head of the Intelligence and I was placed in charge of the Colonial section. Another officer was appointed to fill the post I vacated, but he had not been with me more than a fortnight before he was ordered to join his battalion, which was proceeding to South Africa, and no sooner had he been followed by a new man than a further change was made for the same reason. No fewer than five different officers were given to me in this way before the end of the year, and it was under these CIVILIAN PROPOSALS 99 conditions that, over and above the normal work of the section, I had to grapple with a multitude of questions for the proper treatment of which at least half a dozen General Staff Officers were required. Consequently I could but try, with the help of my ever-changing assistant, to deal with the more important matters, so far as an average sixteen- hour day would permit, and leave the remainder to look after themselves. The rapidity with which the Boers proceeded after the outbreak of war to besiege first one place and then another, and to carry their offensive into adjacent British possessions, gave rise to much consternation amongst those whose private or commercial interests were affected. This brought to the War Office a flood of proposals from all classes of people, according to which, it was claimed, the situation could be at once retrieved and the aims of the enemy completely frustrated. All found their way to my table for examination and report, and as many of them were produced or backed by influential persons, a great deal more labour had to be devoted to answering them than they deserved. Practically all of them suffered from the defect common to other amateur prescriptions, in that while they clearly and often quite cleverly showed what it was desirable to do — a comparatively easy task — they failed to be so convincing as to how this could be done — which is never easy, especially to those responsible for doing it. The burden of responsibility makes an important difference in war, as it does in all other business calling for important decisions, and for this reason advice unaccompanied by a proper share of responsibility for execution should always be accepted with caution. My task in dealing with these proposals was made the harder because Sir John Ardagh, owing to indisposition, was not always present to back up my replies, but on the other hand I was invariably well supported by both Lord Wolseley and the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne. Inventions with which utterly to destroy the enemy without loss to ourselves, and false reports of various devices on his part for destroying us, also arrived in large numbers, and these again, being sometimes forwarded by prominent public men, or having in them some particle of good, had 100 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL to be examined and answered to the satisfaction of the authorities to whose notice they had been brought. Another task which occupied much of my time was the preparation of a daily summary of events for the Queen, the Cabinet, and various departmental heads, showing the dispositions of the troops and the reinforcements in course of transit. Information as to these dispositions was difficult to obtain, as it always is when the military situation is unfavourable, for the local authorities themselves may not have it, and such as they have may be doubtful or unpalatable, and therefore they sometimes hesitate to forward it until it has been confirmed. Again, when informa- tion reached the War Office from the front it had to pass through rigidly prescribed channels, as in time of peace, and was often hours and sometimes days before it arrived at my table in Queen Anne's Gate, on the opposite side of St. James's Park. The Intelligence Branch was treated as a separate, and not very important, part of the War Office organisation. The consequence was that I had to rely for my data largely upon the reports of war correspondents, which would often appear in the Press before the same informa- tion reached me officially, and sometimes the newspapers alone supplied the particular intelligence I wanted. As might be expected, the reports were not always rehable, but they served to furnish useful indications regarding events at the front, and by carefully following them day by day, and exercising due discretion as to the credibility of individual correspondents — which I was soon able to appraise — the summary proved to be remarkably correct. As it was the only document of its kind produced, the demand for it soon rose from half a dozen copies to five times that number. The accuracy of the summary, prepared in the manner described, is an illustration of the useful intelligence which can be gleaned by an enemy from a close study of his adversary's press, and it shows that the censor- ship of military news has greater justification than some people imagine. December 1899 found Mafeking, Kimberley, and Lady- smith still besieged and parts of Cape Colony in rebellion. SIR REDVERS BULLER loi and the climax was reached in the second week of the month, popularly known as " black week," in which occurred the three reverses of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso. Then followed the despatch of Sir Redvers Buller's historic telegram on the evening of the 15th December, in which he expressed the view that he " ought to let Ladysmith go, occupy good positions for the defence of South Natal, and let time help us." The first I knew about this telegram was at three o'clock the following afternoon, Saturday, when a member of the Government brought it in his pocket to the Intelligence Branch intending to discuss it with Sir John Ardagh before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet met at five o'clock that evening to consider what should be done. As Sir John was ill in bed I was summoned, the telegram was read over to me, and I was asked to advise. What puzzled the minister was that there should be any such great obstacle to the reHef of Ladysmith as that implied by Buller's proposal to abandon the attempt. In his view the advantages of position seemed to be with us, seeing that Buller's force outside and White's force inside were together numerically superior to the Boer force in the middle ; we were the nutcrackers and the Boers were the nut, and he could not understand why they should not be promptly and completely crushed. The " nut- crackers " theory offers tempting results and has always been attractive to the layman, as well as to not a few professionals, but it happens to be one of those many operations of war which in theory seem so simple and in practice are so hard. Its successful application demands not only considerable superiority, either in numbers or morale, but also perfect timing, good intercommunication, and great determination on the part of the exterior forces and their commanders, and these are the very essentials which, in the given circumstances, are the most difficult to ensure. I did my best to explain to the minister why this was so, but I could see that he was not altogether convinced, and when I told him that as the besieged force had only sixty days' supplies when first shut up some six weeks earlier, it could not hold out long after the end of the year unless the ordinary scale of rations had meanwhile 102 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL been reduced, he ruefully observed that the prospect of the country having a happy new year was not very bright. I could not deny this, nor could I help remarking that the principal cause of all the trouble was the bad start we had made. Buller felt this as much as any one, and on the 20th of November had written : " Ever since I have been here, we have been like the man who, with a long day's work before him, overslept himself and so was late for every- thing all day." We had, in fact, as Lord Wolseley had said in the preceding September, " committed one of the greatest blunders in war, namely, we have given the enemy the initiative." Having made this mistake, we were now com- pelled to dance to the enemy's tune, and, amongst other things, transfer to Natal a large part of the field force originally destined to advance into the Free State from Cape Colony. As it could serve no useful purpose to dwell upon reflec- tions of this kind, I proceeded to adopt a more encouraging tone by saying that, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory outlook, there was as yet no sufficient ground for accepting Buller's suggestion to " let Ladysmith go," for it would probably be found that the garrison could hold out for a considerably longer time than that estimated on the ration basis, while its surrender must clearly have a serious military and political effect. Turning to the general situation I pointed out that our troops were dispersed in small bodies over a vast area and were acting upon no coherent or com- prehensive plan, and consequently there had been a great lack of unified effort between them. Obviously, the most pressing need was a change in the High Command, since it was impossible for Buller properly to direct operations on a front extending for some 600 miles from Natal to Kimberley, to say nothing of the operations, in progress or contemplated, on the west and north sides of the enemy countries, and in addition exercise personal command over the Ladysmith Relief Force. The remedy was either to direct Buller to hand over the Natal Command to another officer, so that he might give his undivided attention to the opera- tions as a whole, or to limit his sphere to Natal and replace him by another officer in the supreme command. The LORD ROBERTS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 103 minister seemed to appreciate this argument, and after further conversation he started off for the Cabinet meeting, with the determination — greatly to his credit — of seeing the South African business through at all costs. The minister was Mr. Balfour. What took place at the meeting is unknown to me, but the decision of the Government was to reject the proposed abandonment of Ladysmith, to provide large reinforce- ments, and to appoint Lord Roberts Commander-in-Chief of all troops in South Africa, Lord Kitchener to be his Chief of the Staff. So ended a somewhat memorable day in the annals of the British Empire. On the following Monday Henderson, my old tutor at the Staff College, came to tell me that he was joining the headquarters staff of Lord Roberts as Director of Intelli- gence. We spent some time together considering alternative plans of campaign, and he then rejoiced my heart by saying that he intended to ask for me to go out as his assistant. Hearing no more about the matter before Lord Roberts and his staff left England on the following Saturday I sorrow- fully concluded that Henderson's proposal had not been sanctioned. I had not expected that it would be, for I was the only officer at the War Office who had the situation at his fingers' ends, and could not hope that Ardagh would allow me to go away. However, on the 27th of December I was telegraphed for by Lord Roberts from Gibraltar, where he had stopped to pick up Lord Kitchener coming from Egypt, and as the order had gone forth that he was to be given everything and everybody he asked for I was duly liberated. Three days later I embarked at South- ampton on the transport Aurania, heartily glad to escape from the depressing and uncongenial atmosphere common to official life in London in time of war. CHAPTER VIII ON THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR Situation on arrival at Cape Town — Formation of mounted infantry — Lord Roberts' plan of operations and measures taken to preserve secrecy — Composition of Intelligence Staff at Headquarters — Arrival of Headquarters at Modder river — Lord Roberts' care for his troops — Mystifying Cronje as to the proposed line of advance — General situation at this time — Buller asks for reinforcements — Lord Roberts adheres to his plan — Cavalry division crosses Free State frontier and reheves Kimberley — Pursuit of Cronje — Battle of Paardeberg^Confusion caused by bad system of command — Investment of Cronje — Cronje surrenders and is brought into camp — He is sent to St. Helena — Grierson joins Headquarters — His efiorts to improve defective methods of staff work — Lord Roberts' instructions in regard to battle of Poplar Grove— Imperfect arrange- ments for the battle enable Boer forces to make good their retreat — Advance continued to Bloemfontein — Summary of events to date — Standard of staff work and tactics inferior to strategy — Strategy never so good again — Some reasons lor this — Henderson's health breaks down and he returns to England — He commences to write the Official History of the War — His death in Egypt in 1903 — The soldier's difficulties in writing official histories — The advance from Bloemfontein to Kroonstad and thence to Pretoria — Boer guerilla warfare — Lord Roberts' plan — Hardships of march and fine spirit of the men — Action of Diamond Hill — The advance to Middelburg — The De Wet hunts — Recalled to the War Office — Reach rank of Major — Promoted Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel for services in the war. On arrival at Cape Town on the 20th of January I found Lord Roberts and the headquarters staff engaged in making systematic preparations for the advance into the Free State, and for giving the troops greater mobihty than they had hitherto possessed. This entailed a drastic change in the normal organisation of the transport service, as well as the provision of additional bodies of mounted men. The latter were obtained partly by raising or expanding local corps, and partly by forming mounted infantry bat- talions composed of companies drawn from line battalions. 104 MOUNTED INFANTRY 105 In this way eight additional mounted infantry battahons were made up, and as an example of the conditions under which some of them were formed I may mention that the infantry battaUon on board the ship which conveyed me was met on reaching port by a staff officer with orders to despatch one company that evening to De Aar, where it would find horses and saddlery and thereupon would become a mounted infantry company. Three weeks later this same company, with others equally untrained, was sent forward to meet the enemy, and as something went wrong with the orders the first day's march did not begin till seven o'clock in the evening. Many of the men crossed a horse that day for the first time in their fives, and in the darkness of the night the horses often stumbled, many of the riders fell, and when camp was reached at daylight next morning a considerable number were absent, having been left lying on the ground while their mounts went on with the column. Later in the war the mounted infantry performed excellent work, but at first they could not manoeuvre under fire, and by their bad riding galled both their horses and themselves. The need for more mounted troops was obvious enough, but a mounted infantryman who can neither ride nor properly look after his horse is not of much fighting value, and he is decidedly expensive in the matter of horseflesh. No more unfortunate animal ever lived than the horse of the mounted infantryman during the early period of the march from the Modder to Pretoria. Lord Roberts' plan was to concentrate as large a force as possible in the vicinity of Lord Methuen's camp on the Modder near Magersfontein, pass round Cronje's left flank, then wheel north and get astride his communications with Kimberley, and after the relief of that place operate in the direction of Bloemfontein, so as to render the Boer positions south of the Orange river untenable. Lord Roberts was convinced, moreover, that by threatening Bloemfontein he would oblige the enemy to relax his hold on Natal, and would thereby effect the relief of Ladysmith. The success of the plan depended upon keeping the enemy in doubt as to the proposed line of advance, and this io6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL was furthered by making demonstrations as if the intention were to force a passage at Norval's Pont, some 150 miles by rail east of Magersfontein, and by various other devices calculated to mislead. As the Boers had recently captured in Natal certain intelligence papers disclosing the original plan of campaign, which contemplated an advance into the Free State by Norval's Pont, they were the more easily imposed upon and induced to believe that this route would be the one followed. The real plan was at first made known to no one, I believe, except to Lord Kitchener, Sir William Nicholson (the military secretary), Henderson, and a few officers charged with making the necessary railway arrangements. It was not disclosed either to Kelly-Kenny or French (who commanded the troops waiting to be transferred from the Norval's Pont locahty to the Modder) until the 29th of January, the day on which the transfer began. Other troops were meanwhile pushed up the western hne, but the Boers apparently thought that this merely indicated a renewed but local attack on Magers- fontein. Henderson, always an ardent advocate for mystifying and misleading the enemy, was especially active, and revelled in the deceits he practised. He sent out fictitious telegrams to commanders in clear, and then on one excuse or another countermanded them in cipher ; circulated false orders implying a concentration of troops at Colesberg, in the Norval's Pont direction; gave "confidential" tips to people eager for news whom he knew would at once divulge them ; and in numerous ways fostered the belief that never again would our troops hurl themselves against the carefully prepared Boer entrenchments at Magersfontein, and that Kimberley could and must look after itself pending a direct advance on Bloemfontein by the Norval's Pont route. One of his tools was a London newspaper corre- spondent to whom he gave a particularly " confidential " piece of information, with strict injunctions to keep it to himself. As Henderson hoped, it quickly appeared in the London Press, and was brought to our notice by the War Office as a serious indiscretion on the part of some of the staff ! A few days later, when the advance was begun in LORD ROBERTS 107 a direction quite different from that which had been told him, the correspondent became so irate and was so lacking in a sense of humour that he formally complained to Lord Roberts of the " unfair and dishonest treatment " he had received. On the whole it is probable that no military plan was ever kept better concealed from either friend or foe, and certainly the Boers did not discover it until too late to rectify their error. In addition to Henderson, the Intelligence staff at headquarters consisted of four officers, including myself, designated Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals, though we had nothing whatever to do with the Adjutant- General's department. We were a happy party, and, having all been pupils of Henderson at the Staff College, looked forward with keen interest to the appHcation in practice of the lessons and principles he had taught us in theory a few years before. The discussions we had with him in the small mess we formed, and which he joined, regarding the problems to be solved were a valuable education for aU of us, but he nevertheless kept from us almost as much as from the Boers the secret of the selected line of advance. By degrees, however, our suspicions were aroused, and when headquarters was suddenly ordered to entrain at Cape Town for the front we were not surprised to learn that our destina- tion was Lord Methuen's camp on the Modder. On reaching this camp on the 8th of February the Com- mander-in-Chief immediately proceeded to visit the troops, and by his cheery smile and friendly recognition did much to revive the spirits of those who were feeling disheartened owing to previous failures and disappointments. Lord Roberts possessed an attractive personahty, took infinite pains to secure the confidence and esteem of his troops, and to show them that their interests were also his — as they undoubtedly were. It is to be regretted that his example is not more frequently followed by other leaders, since the neglect of it greatly reduces the fighting value of the troops and cannot be made good by any other qualities of leadership, with the sole exception, perhaps, of an unbroken string of victories, and this rarely falls to the lot of the commander of whom regimental officers and io8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL men know and see little, and for whom they consequently care less. Good relations between commanders and the rank and file are like all other forms of friendship — if they are to be maintained and bear fruit they must be nourished. Soldiers are human beings — rather more human than other people — and they will never respond whole-heartedly to the commander who treats them as mere automata to be used for his own purpose according to order, and without any thought being given to them as ordinary men. On the other hand, they will always be ready to offer the last ounce of their strength in extricating from any difficulty into which he may have fallen the General in whom they have con- fidence as a personal friend. Our men are exceedingly accurate judges of an officer's worth and character, and whilst they intensely dislike the officer who does not enter into their feelings and treats them as if they had none, they have unbounded admiration for the one who treats them kindly as well as justly. The matter is one which calls for special attention in these modern days, when armies are very large and spread over vast areas, and when senior commanders can no longer live in or near to the camps and bivouacs of their troops, but must usually have their headquarters many miles distant from them. For several other reasons a com- mander's opportunities , of being seen by his men, and of becoming personally known to them, are much fewer than formerly, and therefore there is the more need that he should make additional efforts to meet these new conditions, for the human factor remains unchanged and the men are as sensitive as ever to the human touch. The daily arrival of troops near Magersfontein ought to have shown to Cronje the extreme danger of his position, but he still clung fast to the belief that it signi- fied no more than a direct attack, and that we could not operate except in the immediate proximity to a railway. It was desirable to confirm him in these false impressions if our object of passing round his left flank was to be achieved, and Intelligence officers and agents were therefore kept busy reconnoitring the country in front of his position ; GENERAL FRENCH 109 information regarding water, camping-places, etc., alongside the railway was sought from every one likely to acquaint him with our enquiries ; telegrams in cipher, easy to decipher, were allowed to fall into his hands ; and all the other usual means of deception were practised. Lastly, as it was important that we should be informed early and accurately of his movements when eventually he found his flank turned, we induced certain Dutch-speaking men to join his commandos, with a promise of substantial pecuniary reward if they brought us the information we required. The situation at the time was one of great anxiety. The siege of Kimberley had hitherto been a kind of passive investment, but on the 7th of February the Boers opened fire with the " Long Tom " (six-inch gun) which they had brought round from Ladysmith, and this so alarmed the inhabitants that two days later Kekewich, the commander of the besieged force, felt obhged to report to Lord Roberts that the danger of surrender was imminent. Other dis- quieting news was received from Buller as to his inability to reheve Ladysmith, and on the gth of February he reported that in his opinion " the fate of Ladysmith is only a question of days unless I am very considerably reinforced." All this constituted a heavy load, and Lord Roberts carried it bravely and correctly. He could not possibly send reinforcements to Buller in Natal without abandoning the plan he had so carefully considered and elaborated for an advance into the Free State, and in which he beheved to lie the greatest prospects of success. Moreover, its abandonment would entail endless confusion and delay. He therefore stuck to it ; gave orders for the troops to cross the Free State frontier on the nth of February ; and instructed General French, commanding the cavalry division, which led the way, to reheve Kimberley "at all costs." By skilful manoeuvre and the display of com- mendable audacity, French was able to report on the evening of the 15th that his mission had been accomphshed in con- formity with Lord Roberts' instructions. Cronje having meanwhile obstinately refused to budge from his trenches, our next task was to reap the fruits of no FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the opportunity created by the cavalry, which had not only relieved Kimberley but had interposed between the investing force now retreating north of that place and the commandos at Magersfontein to the south, and had thus severed Cronje's communications with the Transvaal, to which he, a Trans- vaaler, attached great importance. Cronje has been much criticised for his inaction, and it is right that he should be held responsible for the conse- quences of it, but on the other hand it is only fair to take into account the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time. It was a fact that the British troops had not previously operated at any great distance from a railway, and Cronje probably thought, and quite correctly, that to do so on this occasion would be a very difficult undertaking. February is the hottest month of the South African summer ; water was alarmingly scarce ; no rain had fallen for weeks past and the sandy plains offered but little food for the country-bred animals and stiU less for the EngUsh horses ; the Modder and the Riet were formidable obstacles, passable only at widely separated drifts ; and finally, to march round the flank of a mobile enemy knowing every inch of the terrain, while we knew little or nothing about it, was to incur such risks as not a few commanders would hesitate to accept. These and similar considerations could not fail to have a great influence on Cronje's decision, and he does not deserve to be dismissed merely as a stupid and sullen old Boer in the summary and superior fashion adopted by some of his critics ; and to do this is to belittle what un- doubtedly was a bold conception on the part of Lord Roberts, and an arduous performance on the part of his troops. Hearing of the rehef of Kimberley and of the movement of other British columns round his left flank, Cronje at last realised his perilous position, and about ten o'clock on the night of the 15th he commenced to retreat up the right bank of the Modder so as to regain his communica- tions with Bloemfontein. When our headquarters reached Jacobsdal early the following morning reports and rumours indicating the direction of his retirement began to come in, but they were so vague and contradictory that it was difficult to draw any reUable inference from them. This CRONJE MOVES iii may seem strange in these more modern days, seeing that Cronje was moving between French's cavalry at Kimberley and Kelly-Kenny's Division at Klip Drift on the Modder, the distance between these two detachments being only about 15 miles ; but it should be remembered that com- munications in the field had not then reached their present state of perfection, and that there were no aeroplanes to spy out the country and rapidly bring back the information which we now expect to get as a matter of routine. It was my special business to collect and study the intelligence received concerning the Boer movements, and although I knew that Cronje had three courses open to him, it was' as yet impossible to say which of the three he would choose. He might retreat either by the west or the east side of Kimberley and unite with the force just driven back by French, or he might try to escape to the eastward and make for Bloemfontein. Strategically, either of the two first would have been the safest, but, as so often happens in war, the least likely route — the third — was selected. I think it was Moltke who once warned his students that when an enemy seems to have three courses open to him, the chances are that he will find a fourth and adopt it. By mid-day on the i6th all doubts were dispelled by the arrival at headquarters of one of the men whom we had previously introduced into the commandos at Magers- fontein. His account of Cronje's movements was evidently reliable, and being corroborated by the information we had received from other sources, it became possible to form a definite opinion upon which the Commander-in-Chief could safely determine his future action. The informant received the promised reward and something in addition. French was immediately ordered back from Kimberley to head off Cronje at Koodoos Drift ; the 6th and 9th Divisions were told to retard and harass the retreating commandos ; and other troops were hastened up from the rear. Owing to defective communications French did not receive his in- structions till ten o'clock that night, but his squadrons were set in motion before dawn next morning, and at about eleven o'clock, having covered 26 miles since leaving Kimberley, his horse batteries came into action against the 112 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL main body of Cronje's convoy, hampered by women, children, and dismounted men, just as it was beginning to descend to Vendutie Drift in order to gain the Bloemfontein road on the left bank. Throughout the day French effectively frustrated all the enemy's attempts to cross the river, and his retreat having thus been arrested, Cronje's surrender became a question of time. Headquarters remained at Jacobsdal during the 17th and i8th, and on the 19th moved to Paardeberg Drift, the scene of the battle of Paardeberg of the previous day. We found considerable disappointment prevailing because the battle had not ended in the defeat and capture of Cronje's force, and one of the reasons given for this was the faulty manner in which the chief command had been exercised. Kelly- Kenny was the senior officer present and therefore ought to have commanded, but Lord Roberts had thought fit to appoint Lord Kitchener to give orders in his name, which amounted to placing him over Kelly-Kenny's head. Lord Kitchener had no time to make arrangements with either Kelly-Kenny or Colville, respectively commanding the 6th and 9th Divisions as to the way in which he would communicate his orders, and, except for his aides-de-camp and one other staff officer, he possessed no machinery for such communication. The two divisional commanders were therefore frequently at a loss to know during the course of the battle what was required of them, and owing to lack of effective control over the force as a whole there was no adequate co-operation between the different parts of it. Throughout the war it was rather a favourite custom of Lord Roberts to use Lord Kitchener as a sort of second- in-command rather than as a Chief of Staff, and to depute him to take command of operations at a distance which he himself could not superintend. But an itinerant com- mander cannot have the same grasp of local conditions as the commander on the spot, and if the latter is not competent to command his troops in action he ought to be replaced by some one who is, and not be superseded just as the fighting begins. Further, if the Chief of Staff is con- stantly away from headquarters for days or even weeks at a time — as Lord Kitchener was — it is farcical to call CRONJE'S SURRENDER 113 him by that name, or to imagine that the duties of the staff can be properly carried out. During the investment of Cronje we were sometimes very short of food, for, in addition to the difficulties ex- perienced in bringing up the supply columns, De Wet had a few days before swooped down upon one of our convoys at Waterval Drift and captured about 180 wagon loads of supplies as well as some 500 slaughter oxen. On the first night of our arrival at Paardeberg our mess was without food of any kind until Lord Roberts, hearing of our pUght, and with his characteristic kindness, sent us the remains of a leg of mutton, which was apparently all that his own mess possessed. In the darkness I clumsily allowed my share of it to fall to the ground, but my hunger was much too keen to allow me to be " put off " by the sand and other disagreeable and unknown things with which, when I retrieved it, and resumed my meal, I found the bone to be covered. We had no bread, and for several days were on half rations of biscuits, while we were not much better off for water. The Modder was certainly close at hand, but as dead animals from the enemy's laager higher up stream were constantly to be seen, and smelt, floating down, or caught up by the branches overhanging its banks, this means of quenching one's thirst was not pleasant. We found plenty to do while at Paardeberg, as numerous deserters drifted in from the laager and had to be ex- amined ; we had to watch the commandos hovering about in the vicinity with the intention of lending Cronje a hand to break out ; and there were many reports to be investi- gated of Boer reinforcements being sent from Cape Colony and Ladysmith. An interesting occupation was to arrive at an estimate regarding the strength of the force Cronje had with him, the best calculation we could make being 5000 men and 8 guns. The number actually amounted, when the surrender took place, to 3919 fighting men and 5 guns, to which of course should be added the deserters who had meanwhile given themselves up or had escaped through our hues. The Boers hoisted the white flag soon after sunrise on the 27th, and about seven o'clock Cronje was brought in to I 114 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL headquarters, where he was met by Lord Roberts and congratulated on the gallant defence he had made. The rugged features of the old Boer leader showed signs of the anxious times through which he had passed, but he carried himself bravely and hke a man. Whatever mistakes his indecision had caused him to commit earlier in the operations, he had at any rate displayed a fine determination in com- pelling his despondent followers to hold out against superior forces for ten days in an impossible position, and he was entitled to receive, and did receive, the respectful sympathy of us all. Early in the afternoon he left with his wife for Cape Town en route to St. Helena. We had a welcome addition to the headquarters staff about this time in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Grierson, who arrived hot-footed from Berlin, where he had been employed as military attache. He had his first meal at our frugal and impoverished mess, and like all newcomers to the country was suffering from an inordinate thirst which, quite unknown to him but fully realised by us, was slaked only at the expense of our last " sparklet " and small stock of whisky. It had been intended to place him in charge of the foreign military attaches accompanying headquarters, but this not being to his liking he so arranged matters as to become Assistant Adjutant-General, with the special duty of dealing with the movements and distribution of the troops — a duty which hitherto had been mainly performed by the Commander-in-Chief through the medium of his aides-de-camp and other officers of his personal staff. Grierson, having for long made a close study of the methods of the German General Staff, was alive to the value of clear and definite orders, and at once set about introducing systematic arrangements for their issue. But his task was difficult and he made little headway, as many orders still continued to be sent out by the Commander-in-Chief direct or through his personal staff, and sometimes without the knowledge of the real staff and the administrative services. Grierson received more than one hint to go easy with his new-fangled ideas, and on one occasion at least he was told that he need issue no orders as the Commander-in-Chief would issue them himself. The battle of Paardeberg had POPLAR GROVE 115 already shown the disadvantages incurred by the absence of clearly expressed operation orders, and a further proof of this was furnished at the next action fought— Poplar Grove, on the 7th of March. Following the surrender of Cronje, De Wet had collected several commandos astride the Modder facing our camp at Osfontein, their maximum strength being estimated at 14,000 men. We had more than twice that number and about five times as many guns. The situation of De Wet was in some respects not unhke that of Cronje on the day before the battle of Paardeberg, and the intention of Lord Roberts was to turn it to much the same account. The mounted troops under French were to make a detour of 17 miles round and out of reach of the enemy's left flank, and so cut off his retreat to Bloemfontein ; when these troops had been planted completely in rear of the enemy's line, Kelly-Kenny's division was to attack his left and drive him north towards the Modder ; the 7th Division was to threaten the centre, and the gth Division the right. To make the plan a success it was necessary, first and foremost, to ensure that French should be sufficiently near to his destination before the Boers either knew of the turning movement or were alarmed by the advance of Kelly-Kenny against their left. In other words, accurate timing and perfect co-ordination were the predominant factors. On the afternoon of the 6th Lord Roberts assembled the Commanding Generals at headquarters and gave to each a copy of the instructions he had himself prepared. These contained a very clear description of his general plan, but nothing about the time at which the different ■ divisions were to start. This was verbally discussed afterwards, and apparently French left the conference under the impression that he was to start at 3 a.m., whereas Kelly-Kenny, who was to follow him for part of the way, understood that French would start at 2 A.M. In addition to this misunder- standing other difficulties arose owing to the absence of good staff arrangements, and, to cut a long story short, the movement of Kelly-Kenny's division next morning was entirely blocked for some time by the cavalry, and the cavalry itself was not able to move nearly so fast as had ii6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL been expected. The result was that long before French had time to reach their rear the Boers perceived that an enveloping movement was in progress and promptly began to fall back eastward, thus escaping, with practically no loss, from the toils within which it had been hoped to entrap them. The method adopted by Lord Roberts for conveying his intentions to his Generals is one that is often necessary, as it helps to preserve secrecy and enables a Commander-in- Chief to explain his plans in greater detail than is possible in the crystallised paragraphs of operation orders ; but it should never be made, as it was at Poplar Grove, a substitute for those orders. Had Lord Roberts' instructions been afterwards translated into concrete operation orders, and march-tables been worked out by the staff, definite hours of starting for each division would have been laid down in writing and all misunderstanding prevented or removed. The failure at Poplar Grove was the more unfortunate because the Boers were then in a very despondent frame of mind. Cronje's force had been captured a few days before, Kimberley and Ladysmith had been set free, and if, as Lord Roberts intended, De Wet had been forced into the bed of the Modder, and there surrounded, the effect of this further disaster might have gone far to end the war. Whether better staff work and the issue of proper operation orders would have made success certain at Poplar Grove and so shortened the war by perhaps as much as two years, may be a debatable point, but there can be no question that success could not be expected unless these conditions were fulfilled. After the action headquarters moved to Poplar Grove and remained th.ere till the loth. The army then again advanced, the left column, under French and including Kelly-Kenny's division, fighting a sharp engagement on the Driefontein ridge, of which we had a good view from Dricfontein Farm. The severe punishment which the Boers received caused them to beat a hurried retreat, and they fell back that night in disorder towards Bloemfontein. On the nth we reached Assvogel Kop, Venter's Vallei OCCUPATION OF BLOEMFONTEIN 117 on the 12th, and next morning the Mayor of Bloemfontein and three of the leading citizens came out and ceremoniously surrendered the town. Shortly afterwards it was entered by the Commander-in-Chief and the headquarters staff, and the Union Jack was hoisted on the President's house. The troops bivouacked for the most part outside the town, as Lord Roberts was anxious that the inhabitants, whom it was hoped would soon become British subjects, should be put to as little inconvenience and discomfort as possible. Thanks to sound strategy and to the fortitude and gallantry of the troops, the thirty days' operations which terminated with the occupation of Bloemfontein had changed the whole aspect of the war. For the great results achieved the principal credit must of course be accorded to the Commander-in-Chief, since upon him rested the responsi- bility for the consequences of the strategical decision he took, whether they proved to be good or bad, and more- over the success was largely due to the implicit confidence which the troops placed in him. To what extent, if any, Henderson's counsels contributed to the strategy adopted I am not in a position to say, and he was far too modest a man to talk about it. But one cannot help being struck by the fact that, after he had left headquarters, the operations were unproductive of similar marked successes, and that there was a strong tendency to attach too much importance to the occupation of towns and too little to the decisive defeat of the enemy's forces, by which alone complete victory could be secured. If the standard of staff work and tactics in the march from the Modder to Bloemfontein had equalled that of strategy the results might have been even greater than they were ; but the nature and value of staff duties were not yet properly appreciated, while tactics suffered from a desire on the part of the High Command to avoid casualties. The reluctance to fight what were termed costly battles tended to hamper the subordinate commanders, who, not unnaturally, felt that their capacity would be judged mainly by the number of casualties incurred. This feeling was apt to cause them to hesitate when they should have displayed determination and boldness, and in the long run the poHcy was liable to ii8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL defeat its own end, since half-hearted and indecisive fighting was likely to make the war-aggregate of casualties greater than if the struggle were relentlessly fought out from the first and without so much regard to immediate losses. On the 17th, while headquarters was still at Jacobsdal, Henderson's health, which for some time past had been indifferent, completely broke down. He had been careless of himself, and so immersed in his work that he had neglected to fit himself out with the ordinary campaigning require- ments, he carried no food for use in emergency, and as far as I remember he did not possess even a water-bottle. Added to this, the heat on the 17th was intense, the only water we had was particularly bad and had a most offensive smell, and the whole of the transport lagged far behind. We of the staff did our best out of our scanty store to provide for his needs, and I begged him to rest quietly on my camp- bed, but he was not to be persuaded. Most of the day he worked hard, dressed in pyjamas, studying the important events which were happening, discussing with the Com- mander-in-Chief the action to be taken, and generally doing the duty of a Chief of the General Staff, the real Chief of Staff, Lord Kitchener, being away at the front with Kelly- Kenny's division. The following day he became so ill that he had to be sent back to Cape Town. We parted from him with sorrow, and he of course was grievously disappointed to relinquish his work which had begun with such remark- able success. He was succeeded as Director of Intelligence • by Lieutenant - Colonel (now Major- General Sir) Colin Mackenzie, a contemporary of mine at the Staff College. From Cape Town Henderson was sent back to England, and owing to continued ill-health took no further part in the war. Later, he was appointed to write the official history of it, which he commenced with an account of the political events leading up to hostilities and a description of the military resources available on both sides. His idea was that without full knowledge of these conditions the reader would not be able properly to understand many of the earlier military decisions and dispositions which were to a great extent necessarily based upon them. At the end of 1902 his health again gave way and he was ordered to OFFICIAL HISTORIES 119 Egypt, where he died in March of the following year, leaving behind him a gap in the British army which has not yet been filled, and a memory which is held in sincere affection by all who had the privilege to know him. The Government subsequently decided that it was un- desirable to publish in the history of the war any discussion of the questions which had been at issue between them and the two Republics before the outbreak of hostilities, or that had been the subject of controversy at home, and therefore that portion of it which Henderson had compiled was entirely recast. In connection with this decision I may observe that for a soldier to write an official history of military operations, which shall be acceptable to the Government departments concerned, is invariably a ticklish task. On the one hand, it may be impossible for him to make clear the reasons for the military action taken unless he first describes the political conditions and instructions which, to a greater or less degree, governed that action ; while, on the other hand, a cold, comprehensive review of the proceedings which led up to those conditions and instructions does' not, in the light of after events, always afford very pleasant reading to those who took part in them. I remember one rather striking instance, amongst others within my experience, of an officer getting into trouble on this account. He was compiling, under my orders, the official report on certain military operations which had been preceded and were attended by particularly complicated questions of international policy, and knowing that undue reference to these questions would be resented, I gave him directions to leave them severely alone except in so far as it was absolutely essential to mention them, and even then he was to take his facts from the Blue books — already available to the public — and rigidly to exclude any political information of a secret or confidential nature that we might have in our archives. I trusted that by this means all objections would be obviated, and I know that '.le officer set about his work with the intention of crea'.ng none, and that he confined his political researches to the Blue books. But when his report was submitted to the departmental 120 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL authorities in \Vhitehall for approval, before being printed off, some of its political paragraphs were considerably modified or expunged altogether, and a curt letter from the objecting department invited us to mind our own business in future. Before continuing the advance beyond Bloemfontein it was necessary to refit and reorganise the army, and we had also to cope with a serious outbreak of typhoid — an epidemic which in those days was accepted as almost unpreventable in time of war. The medical services were not organised adequately to deal with the ever-increasing number of sick ; there was great difficulty in providing suitable accommoda- tion for the patients ; eight wagon loads of medical comforts had been lost at Waterval Drift ; and the result of all this was that many of our fever-stricken men died whose lives might have been saved had better treatment and properly equipped accommodation been available. The efficiency of the medical arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded has since been improved a thousand-fold, as shown by the marvellous work done in the Great War, and in this respect as in many others the South African war was of inestimable benefit to us. The system of guerilla warfare adopted by the Boers after the occupation of Bloemfontein, and continued throughout the war, made Intelligence duties much more difficult than before. The enemy's plan now was to act aggressively against different points on our line of communication, and to pick up elsewhere an}^ helpless or unwary detachment which promised to be an easy prey, and as the bodies he employed were widely dispersed, moved swiftly, were subject to variable combinations, and were favoured by the nature of the country, it was impossible to place or number them for more than a few hours at a time. We derived much information from the mail-bags seized at various places, for the Boers wrote very freely to each other, but as a rule it came to hand too late to be of much use except for general purposes, and we had to rely mainly upon our Intelligence Scouts. These scouts, working under the direction of Cap- tain (now General Sir) G. F. Milne, would track the com- mandos from place to place, and sometimes lie out watching ADVANCE ON PRETORIA i2i them for several days and nights in succession, bringing or sending back most valuable intelligence. Most of them were recruited from South Africa, some being white and some coloured, while some of them came from other parts of the world. One of the latter was Mr. F. R. Burnham, the famous American scout. He was a great acquisition, and carried out many hazardous enterprises with skill and success. The army being at last more or less reorganised and re- equipped, we set out for Pretoria on the 3rd May. The general plan was to advance on a front extending from Ladysmith to Kimberley, BuUer on the right with about 45,000 men. Hunter and Methuen on the left with 10,000, the columns in the centre directly under Lord Roberts being about 43,000 strong. Brandfort was occupied the same day with the loss of about half a dozen men ; the passage of the Vet river was forced two days later ; the Zand river, the next obstacle, was crossed on the loth, with the loss of about a hundred men ; and on the following day Kroonstad was abandoned and President Steyn went off to Lindley, proclaiming that place to be the new capital and seat of government of the Free State. From that time onwards organised co-operation between the two Republics ceased, the Free Staters apparently thinking that as they had borne the brunt of the British attack for nearly three months it was for the Transvaalers and not for them to defend the Transvaal. British headquarters entered Kroon- stad on the 1 2th May and remained there for ten days, so as to allow the railway in rear to be repaired and the army to be pulled together once more. I have already mentioned that Grierson held the appoint- ment of Assistant Adjutant-General, but as a matter of fact he was charged with duties belonging to the department of the Quartermaster-General, a curious feature in the organisation of the headquarters staff being that it contained no officer designated by the name of that department. It was Grierson's business to allot accommodation for the troops, and in order to improve upon the defective arrangements made at Bloemfontein for the disposal of the sick he allocated the church and other public buildings in Kroonstad for the 122 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL purpose, telling the Landrost to provide so many hundred mattresses by four o'clock in the afternoon. The Landrost raised many objections, and said that there was nothing like that number in the shops, upon which Grierson observed, in rather forcible language, that he was not thinking merely of what the shops could produce, that there must be a large number of mattresses in the town, and that the full number demanded must be forthcoming by the hour named. The Landrost went off to Lord Roberts to complain of having been harshly treated and threatened with punishment if he did not comply with the order, and Grierson was then sent for to give his side of the story. He admitted that in his conversation with the Landrost he had freely drawn upon all the languages with which he was acquainted, including Scotch and Hindustani, so as to ensure prompt comphance with his order, and that he had done so because he felt that the comfort of the sick should have priority over everything and everybody. He was quietly requested to treat the inhabitants with more sympathy and consideration in future, and, of course, he received the admonition with becoming respect. He gained his object, however, and in telling us of the incident that night at dinner he finished up by saying, " I got my beds, the men are now on them, and that, after all, is the only thing that matters." Somebody present at dinner reminded us of the old story told of a similar incident that occurred in the Peninsula war, of which the sequel was rather different. General Craufurd, the commander of the famous Light Division, once directed the head man of a Spanish town to collect certain supplies for the troops, at a given time and place, otherwise he would be shot. The Spaniard complained to the Duke of WeUington of the General's high-handed conduct, and said that he could not possibly carry out the order. " Do you mean to tell me," the Duke asked, " that General Craufurd threatened to shoot you ? " "He did," replied the Spaniard, thinking the Duke was taking his part. The answer he got was : " Well, if I were in your place I would produce the supplies somehow, for, believe me. General Craufurd is a man of his word and will shoot you if you don't." HARDSHIPS ON THE ADVANCE 123 We left Kroonstad on the 22nd May, entered the Trans- vaal five days later, and Johannesburg fell on the 30th May. Next day it was formally handed over to us, our infantry marched through the main square, and the Dutch flags were hauled down from the government buildings and replaced by the Union Jack. A similar ceremony took place at Pretoria on the 5th June, and the Transvaal Govern- ment thus became vagabond hke that of the sister Republic. The three hundred miles march from Bloemfontein to Pretoria had been dull and irksome to a degree, and I suppose that no military operations were ever more lacking in interest and variety. Throughout the march the Boers, greatly inferior to us in numbers, would hold the river lines and other defensible positions, covering a wide front ; our mounted troops were then sent round one or other of their flanks with the object of enveloping them ; and when this movement had proceeded up to a certain point the Boers would withdraw out of harm's way to take up a similar position farther to the rear. But although no action worth calling a battle was fought, the march itself was attended by many hardships. Day after day our troops plodded silently on over the apparently endless prairies ; sometimes the sun was blazing hot, at others there was a bitterly cold wind against which no clothing seemed proof ; food was scanty, and shelterless bivouacs formed the only resting-places at night. In fact the march was unrelieved by any redeeming feature except hope, and our splendid infantry deserve the highest credit for the way in which they doggedly stuck to their monotonous daily toil until the fall of Pretoria, the second Boer capital, gave them their reward and brought the pacification of the country definitely within sight. The Boers were now more than ever convinced that their one and only chance of salvation lay in striking the slender Une of communications which trailed away for hundreds of miles in rear of our exhausted troops, De Wet became particularly active, capturing considerable numbers of prisoners, and burning and destroying large and invaluable quantities of food and stores. Refusing to be disturbed by these raids, vexatious and inconvenient though they were, 124 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the Commander-in-Chief set in motion all the troops he could collect to attack the enemy, some 6000 strong, who had taken up a position astride the railway about fifteen miles east of Pretoria. After some desultory fighting on the nth and 12th of June the Boers disappeared during the night, part of them under De la Rey circling round to the western Transvaal, and the remainder under Botha retiring eastward. This engagement, known as the battle of Diamond Hill, cost us less than 180 casualties, of whom 20 were killed. Before the advance could be resumed it was again necessary to refit the army, and make good the wear and tear amongst the men, animals, and material caused by the long march from Bloemfontein. This took about six weeks, and on the 23rd of July, when the troops again moved forward, the Boers at once evacuated Balmoral, which had been Botha's headquarters since the action at Diamond Hill, and two days later they retired through Middelburg, eighty miles east of Pretoria. On the night of the 25th of July, the date of our occupa- tion of Balmoral, there was a terrible storm of wind and rain — the worst of the many bad storms we had encountered. The troops suffered severely from exposure in their bivouacs, and next morning the adjacent hill-sides were covered with dead and dying transport animals. In many places whole teams of dead oxen and mules lay heaped together. Much of this loss was due to neglect on somebody's part to order the transport columns to march earlier in the day. The order was not given till the afternoon, and consequently the columns were caught in the hills by the storm and darkness long before they had finished their march, the tracks became slippery and impassable, confusion reigned ever3rwhere, a great part of the columns were out all night, and the animals perished by hundreds. It was pitiable to see these fine beasts in their death-throes being shot by the veterinary surgeons, who went about amongst them and mercifully put out of their agony those which had no chance of recovery. After the occupation of Middelburg the forward move- ment was again suspended, and soon afterwards a great part RETURN TO ENGLAND 125 of the troops in the Transvaal were turned on to pursue De Wet, who had crossed the Vaal from the Free State on the 6th of August. Nine columns composed of about 30,000 men were engaged in this the first of the De Wet hunts, Lord Kitchener being in command of the combined operations. De Wet ov/ed his escape on this occasion, as on many subsequent ones, to misunderstandings on the part of his pursuers, and in the circumstances it was practically impossible to pre- vent misunderstanding. Intercommunication between the different British columns was bad, and therefore they did not always know what each other had done or would do ; the enemy could always get the best possible information, whereas we could seldom depend upon what we obtained ; and such information as we got and sent to the columns often arrived too late to be of use. At headquarters we were usually able to trace De Wet's movements. The diihculty was to inform the columns within useful time. Headquarters stayed at Pretoria throughout the remain- ing period of Lord Roberts' command, only a small portion of it accompanying him v/hen the advance eastward was resumed on August the 26th. I was one of those left behind, and saw no more of the operations. Early in October I was ordered back for duty at the War Office, and a month later took up the same appointment of Staff Captain in the Colonial Section as I had held a year before. Meanwhile I had reached the rank of Major in the ordinary course of regimental promotion. For my services in the war I was given a " mention in despatches," but only in the class then known as " also ran," and when the promotions and other rewards were published my name did not appear in the list. I had hoped that it would, but whatever chance of this there might have been was destroyed by my having incurred the displeasure of Lord Roberts, owing to a misunderstanding that arose in regard to certain instructions which I had issued to an officer just before I left South Africa. As this officer was on the spot when the mistake came to light and could give his version of it to headquarters, whilst I was in England and had no opportunity of giving mine either to Lord 126 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Roberts or any one else, the blame for it rested with me. The matter was later put right by some of my friends, and in a Supplementary Gazette published in November 1901 I was promoted Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel. As the brevet took effect from the date of the first Gazette, November 1900, I lost nothing by the delay. CHAPTER IX HEAD OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SECTION, WAR OFFICE Resume work in Intelligence Division — Lord Roberts returns to England and becomes Commander-in-Chief — Visit defended ports — Intelli- gence and mobilisation combined under the charge of Sir W. Nicholson — Am made head of the Foreign Section of Intelhgence — Promoted Colonel 1904 — Selection of MiUtary Attaches — Preparations for war hampered by lack of a poUcy — Our international position — Defence of India — Examination of it and Lord Kitchener's objections to our calculations — Esher Committee — Reorganisation of War Office and formation of General Staff — Post of Commander-in-Chief abohshed — Sir N. Lyttelton becomes first Chief of the General Staff — Com- mittee of Imperial Defence established— War preparations now become more feasible — Bogy of Russian attack on India disappears and contingency of war with Germany begins to take its place — Agreements made with France, Russia, and Japan — Expeditionary Force formed — Grierson and Huguet largely instrumental in this — Lord Roberts resigns from Committee of Imperial Defence — First attempt to give a military lecture — Visits between 1 902-1 906 to Northern Africa, Canada, America, the Balkans, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and other European countries — Leave War Office on expiration of appointment — Placed on half-pay, 1907. Lord Roberts returned to England at the end of 1900 and became Commander-in-Chief in place of Lord Wolseley, whose departure from the War Office was greatly regretted by all who had served under him. He had given many years of faithful service to the State, and the ungenerous criticisms levelled against him in Parliament, concerning his share of the defects exposed by the South African war, made a very unpleasant impression upon those who were aware of the numerous obstructions to military efficiency, in high as well as in low places, with which he had for so long to contend, not only when Commander-in-Chief but before he held that appointment. It is doubtful if, in face of these obstructions, any other man of the time could have done 127 128 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL half as much for the education and training of the British Army as was achieved by this eminent soldier. The war had shown the necessity for having a more efficient military organisation, both for foreign service and home defence, and following upon the appointment of Mr. Brodrick (now Earl of Midleton) as War Secretary various measures for improving the training, equipment, and organ- isation of the forces were carried out. The basis of them was, in addition to an adequate provision for home defence, the ability to send three army corps abroad. The un- necessarily large garrisons of defended ports v/ere also brought under revision. These, consisting mainly of volunteers, had in many cases been recruited more in accordance v/ith the local supply of men than with the needs of local defence, and they included an excessive number of garrison artillery, this branch being more popular than the infantry. It was therefore decided to bring the numbers into line with actual requirements, and for this purpose a War Office committee was appointed to visit the ports, twenty-six in number, and, in consultation with the local authorities, settle the garrison of each on the spot. I was made a member of the committee and so derived much useful knowledge of coast defence matters, which stood me in good stead in after years and more particularly when I was in command of the forces in Great Britain. The work of the committee extended over a period of about five months. Several other useful reforms were made, both in the commands and at the War Office, but I shall mention only the one which directly concerned myself — the amalgama- tion of the Mobihsation and Intelligence Divisions under the control of Sir William Nicholson, whose title of Director of Mihtary Intelligence was altered to Director-General of Mobihsation and Intelligence, and his functions were corre- spondingly enlarged. The Intelligence Division was subdivided into three sections, of which the first, or Imperial, Section (practically the old Colonial Section under another name) was made responsible for the preparation of plans of operations for the military defence of the Empire, and for the collection THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 129 of information relating to its military geography and resources, the United Kingdom and India being excluded in each case. The second, or Foreign, Section was made responsible for collecting information regarding the military resources, geography, and armed forces of all foreign countries, conducting correspondence with military attaches, and examining foreign journals and literature. The third, or Special, Section dealt with censorship, preparation of maps, maintenance of libraries, and ofhce routine in general. Each of the three sections was placed under an Assistant Quartermaster-General, and divided into a number of sub- sections each headed by a Deputy Assistant Quartermaster- General. In this way the officers of the Intelligence Division once more took their designation from the Quartermaster- General's department, although they had no more connection with that department than they had had with the Adjutant- General's department, the designation by which they had been known for some years previously, Altham was appointed head of the Imperial Section ; Trotter, who had been Assistant Adjutant-General of the old Intelligence Division, remained with the Special Section ; and to my surprise Nicholson selected me for the Foreign Section. Thus at one bound I went from Staff Captain to Assistant Quartermaster- General, and from being the junior of two officers in the Colonial Section I became the chief of a section having a staff of nine officers. This advancement came at a most opportune moment, for about the same time my promotion to Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel was announced, and according to the regulations of the period the appoint- ment of Assistant Quartermaster- General automatically carried with it promotion to Colonel at the end of three years in the brevet rank just mentioned. As the brevet dated from the 29th November 1900, it followed that if I continued to hold the new post till the 29th November 1903, I would then become Colonel. This happened, and from being one of the oldest Lieutenants in the army in 1895 I became in less than nine years one of the youngest Colonels. The new appointment had the further advantage of extending my studies to countries with which I had not K 130 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL previously been officially connected. At Simla experience had been gained in the affairs of India and the adjoining states ; in the Colonial Section I had learnt something about the remaining British possessions oversea ; the Foreign Section, embracing all foreign countries, completed the circuit of the globe, and gave me a valuable insight into international questions of great importance. On taking over the new duties I found that, chiefly owing to an inadequate staff, imperfect organisation, and the lack of clear direction, there was not, with one exception, which shall be nameless, a single up-to-date statement giving a comprehensive and considered estimate of the military resources of any foreign country. One reason for this was that there was as yet no General Staff, and the Intelligence Division, which strove to do the work of a General Staff, had been starved. The few officers employed in it had worked hard and done their best, but the system and circum- stances were all against them. There were in the Foreign Section some small non- confidential hand-books, largely compiled from newspapers and other unofficial publications, which related to the strength and organisation of most of the foreign armies. These, though good enough in their way as an elementary basis to work upon, did not contain, and did not pretend to contain, anything of much value in regard to strategical questions, strong places, or the general military resources of the countries to which they referred. There were also various memoranda which dealt with certain operations that we might have to undertake in the event of war, but these, again, though useful for the specific purpose they were intended to serve, did not give a complete survey of the enemy's resources as a whole, or anything like it. After ascertaining how matters stood I discussed them with Nicholson and we agreed that we must make the best tentative arrangements we could, and try to reach a higher standard later on. The first essential was to obtain more complete information than we then had, and to do this more funds were required for intelligence work, as well as a better method of appointing military attaches. More funds were provided, thanks to the ready co-operation of MILITARY ATTACHES 131 the Foreign Office ; more proficient military attaches were not, in all cases. These officers were for the most part underpaid, and were all paid at the same rate, irrespective of the particular capital to which they were accredited. That Paris life was infinitely more expensive than life at Peking, and that the amount of information procurable by a military attache was largely governed by the amount of money he could spend in entertaining those from whom he might hope to procure it, were facts which left the Treasury mind unmoved. The result was that these important posts were often given to officers who were rich, in preference to officers who were not, though the latter might be professionally much better quahfied to fill them. Other influences were brought to bear on the selection of mihtary attaches (which did not rest solely or even mainly with the War Office), and it was not uncommon for an officer to be chosen because he was a society favourite, or had an attractive wife, or a friend in the Foreign Office, or for some equally insufficient reason. I have known officers to be selected who, besides being unsuitable on military grounds, had no knowledge of the language of the country to which they were sent, or of any other except their own. I remember a military attache at one of the European capitals who, regarded by the other attaches as a favourable target for their practical jokes, sent us a map, under every precaution of secrecy in the way of seahng-wax, red-tape, and extra envelopes, showing the peace distribution of the armed forces of a certain country, which he stated had been confidentially given to him by a friendly colleague. In- credible as it may seem, the price of the map and the name of its continental publisher were printed at the bottom, the sender either not having observed this or being too ignorant of European languages to be able to read it ! In the case of more than one military attache the lack of a reasonable knowledge of the language of the country was responsible for many ludicrous as well as alarming reports being sent to us, and it was no doubt equally answerable for our not receiving much information that ought to have been sent. I tried 132 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL to ensure that only properly qualified officers should be selected, but the exterior influences mentioned sometimes proved to be too strong for me. Another improvement needed was to give my subordin- ates greater facilities for visiting the countries with which they had to deal, so that they might acquire a personal knowledge of them and not be entirely dependent, as some of them were, upon what they read or were told. The time and money expended upon these visits, which I sanctioned as frequently as possible, were more than justified. I was fortunate in having some very hard-working and capable assistants during the five years I was in charge of the Foreign Section. They included Lawrence of the 17th Lancers; Macbean, Forestier- Walker, Crowe, Fasson, Milne, and Thwaites of the artillery; Edmonds and Williams of the engineers ; Romer, Malcolm, and Lynden Bell of the infantry ; Holman and Black of the Indian army. Nearly all held high positions in the Great War. Milne commanded the British army in Macedonia from May 1916 onwards, and Lawrence became Chief of the General Staff on the West Front in January 1918. Since it is not possible, and should never be necessary to try, to prepare at one and the same time for half-a-dozen different wars, soldiers charged with the duty of preparation aim at making ready for the greatest and the most probable war in which their army may become engaged. I set out with this purpose in view, and was immediately confronted with the difficulty of deciding what particular war ought to be regarded as the most probable, as this depended upon the policy of the Government, and upon that question I was not in possession of any definite pronouncement. I therefore took steps to obtain one, beginning with the examination of some old papers which dealt with our military obligations under various treaties and agreements, and I found thaf whilst the necessity for fulfilling some of these obligations was unlikely ever to arise, others were of great importance and in the near future might possibly make heavy demands upon us. I prepared a memorandum in which I reviewed the whole of them from a military standpoint, taking each one separately, and after discussing the responsibilities they THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION 133 involved I asked for instructions as to whether it was desired that the army should be prepared to carry them out. My object was twofold : first, to take steps for pro- curing the information required for those operations which, in pursuance of the policy of the Government, might one day have to be undertaken ; and, secondly, to avoid waste of time over those which in all probability would never be undertaken. After being approved by my military superiors, the memorandum proceeded on its way to the ministers con- cerned, and I hoped to receive such a reply from them as would enable me to direct the work of my officers into the most profitable channels. One ministerial minute was, to the best of my memory, something like this : " I do not know what benefit you expect to derive from meditations of this kind. At any rate, I can contribute nothing useful. The policy to be adopted in the contingency you mention must necessarily be decided by the Government of the day, when the time comes, and it cannot be decided now." I quite realised that a definite decision could not then be reached in respect of a situation which might not arise for several years, if ever, since the attendant circumstances might change in the meantime ; but I had hoped, neverthe- less, that my cherished memorandum would elicit somewhat better guidance than was furnished by the minute just quoted, and that I would not have to continue to rely entirely on my own judgment as to the preparations that should be made. I became wiser as I grew older. Our international position was not altogether satisfactory at this period, and there were outstanding questions with more than one of the Great Powers which might any day give rise to trouble. For example, France was feeling sore over the Fashoda incident ; her colonial party were, we thought, unduly aggressive ; and, in general, it had become the fashion for the two nations to look upon each other as possible future enemies. There was never any good reason why they should have drifted into this regrettable frame of mind, but Germany may have been answerable for it to some extent. Russia, as for years past, was considered to be another country with whom we might come into conflict. 134 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL and it was a common argument that her proceedings in the Middle East and Central Asia could best be countered by our forming an alliance with Germany. I had not been a year in my new post, however, before I became convinced, and stated so officially, that instead of regarding Germany as a suitable ally we ought to look upon her as our most formidable rival, and that the con- tingency of war with her ought to set the standard of our military requirements. Either because of the disbelief that such a war would ever come, or because of the idea that if it came we would not fight it out on the Continent, this opinion was not yet shared by those responsible for laying down policy, and they decided that the defence of India as against Russia should be the first problem examined. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, having passed most of his life in India, was also inclined to give that country priority of treatment, and for several months I was kept busy in preparing for the Defence Committee of the Cabinet a series of papers on the subject. Thanks to my four years' apprenticeship in the Intelligence Branch at Simla, and to the knowledge of the North-West Frontier which I had acquired on the spot, I was fairly well acquainted with the conditions which govern military operations in this part of the world, but some of the questions propounded were nevertheless beyond my power to answer. I remember once being asked to prepare a statement showing the monthly progress likely to be made by the opposing forces, during the first six months of war, in the event of a Russian advance on India through Afghanistan. The situation in all wars is apt to develop in a totally un- expected manner, and this particular problem was beset with numerous uncertainties peculiarly its own : for instance, the attitude of the Afghans, who were constantly fighting amongst themselves and about whom the only sure thing was that they would pillage and murder both belligerents indiscriminately whenever occasion offered ; the feasibility of our collect- ing within given periods of time hundreds of thousands of camels for transport purposes, for which no reliable arrange- ments had been made or could be made, and which depended partly upon the season of the year ; and the rate at which DEFENCE OF INDIA 135 roads and railways could be constructed across the 500 miles of mountainous country lying between the Russian and British frontiers. These and similar calculations could be nothing more than mere guess-work, different people making different guesses, and this was especially so as regards railways, because no survey for them had ever been made except for the stretch between Quetta and Kandahar at the end of the last Afghan war, and even it had since been lost ! How- ever, assisted by Holman, who was in charge of the Indian sub-section, I produced the required statement, with maps, showing what the dispositions of the British and Russian armies might be at the end of each month, and, in order that there should be no misapprehension about it, I added that it was practically worthless, and for the reasons once given by Moltke, who had said : " It is a delusion to imagine that a plan of campaign can be laid down far ahead and fulfilled with exactitude. The colhsion with the enemy creates a new situation in accordance with its result. Some things intended will have become impracticable ; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to form a correct estimate of the circumstances, decide for the best for the moment, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly." When our calculations were communicated to India they did not at all meet with the approval of Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, who was then pressing the home authorities to sanction certain reforms in the Indian army, including considerable additions to its strength. In order to show how utterly wrong the calculations were, he caused a " war game " to be played at Simla illustrating the danger to which India would be exposed if attacked by Russia, and he sent the " proceedings " of it to the India Office. It is always wise when studying problems of this kind to take, within reason, the circumstances least favourable to oneself, and as there were many important matters con- nected with the Indian army which then urgently needed improvement Lord Kitchener may be excused for making his own case appear as bad as he possibly could. But he 136 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL " protested " a little too much in his war game. He assumed, amongst other things, that Russia would be able to transfer large numbers of troops from Europe to Central Asia, and collect there hundreds of thousands of camels and other transport animals, ready to jump across the Oxus — a formidable river — and enter Afghanistan, almost if not quite before we knew anything about what she was doing. The result of this invaluable start and other exaggerations was that, in the imaginary advance which followed, the Russian troops bounded from one success to another with the most astonishing rapidity, and to the complete over- throw of the existing arrangements for Indian defence. The arrival of the " proceedings " created some excite- ment in WTiitehall, where they were apparently regarded as affording infallible proof of what Russia could actually do, and undeniable evidence that we had been terribly out in the calculations we had made. They found their way to me for examination, and I had to explain that a war game was by no means the same thing as war, and that some of the assumptions made in the game were quite un- tenable. A lengthy correspondence with India ensued, and officers were sent home to prove that the Indian calcula- tions were right and ours were wrong. They failed to carry their point, but the game probably went a long way towards fulfilling Lord Kitchener's real purpose, which was to obtain early sanction for the reforms he was advocating. In 1903 the Esher Committee, consisting of Lord Eshcr, Sir John (afterwards Lord) Fisher, and Sir George Clarke (now Lord Sydenham), was appointed to advise the Govern- ment as to the reorganisation of the War Office. It recom- mended that the old constitution should be replaced by an Army Council on lines similar to the Board of Admiralty, the post of Commander-in-Chief being abolished, and, most important of all, that a General Staff should be created. This system was introduced in February 1904. Lord Roberts left the War Office, becoming a member of the new Com- mittee of Imperial Defence, and the heads of the principal departments were superseded by other officers, as the new measures were held to require the services of new men. THE ESHER COMMITTEE 137 That may have been so, but the scant courtesy with which the changes were made was the cause of much adverse comment, and not without reason, as it showed but Httle consideration for the feehngs of the officers who were suddenly removed from their posts, after having served their country with distinction for a long period of years. Nicholson was one of those to go, much to his surprise, for he had been frequently consulted by the committee with respect to the most suitable organisation to be estab- Ushed, and he apparently had hoped to become the first Chief of the newly-formed General Staff. He was quite stunned by his abrupt and unexpected dismissal, and although he became Quartermaster-General a year or two later, and subsequently Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he was never quite the same man again. He seemed to have been robbed of some of his old military zeal ; and being hurt at the treatment he had received, his habit of appearing some- what cynical in manner — though in reality a kind-hearted man — became rather more pronounced than before. The General Staff was organised in three directorates — Military operations. Staff duties, and Military training — and the post of Chief of the General Staff was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir Neville Lyttelton. The Mihtary operations directorate was practically the existing Intelli- gence Division under another name, the head of it being my old friend Grierson, and his three immediate subordinates were styled Assistant Directors. The Foreign Section of the directorate, of which I remained in charge, was expanded from four to eight subdivisions, the number of officers in it being increased from nine to twenty. The Committee of Imperial Defence, also constituted on the recommendation of the Esher Committee, absorbed the functions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and of the Colonial Defence Committee. These measures, together with the long-overdue formation of a General Staff, went far to remedy the hopeless methods by which matters concerning the defence of the Empire had pre- viously been conducted. For the first time naval and military questions now began to be seriously investigated, and the activities of the different State departments to 138 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL be intelligently co-ordinated. Appreciable progress in the preparation for war became possible, and plans of opera- tions for use in case of need were worked out between my section and the Imperial Section presided over by Altham, who was later succeeded by Callwell. Taking as a pattern the valuable report we had on one country — which I have previously mentioned as being the only one of its kind in our possession — the military resources of every country in the world in which our troops might conceivably be employed were surveyed, and by the end of 1906 reasoned conclusions thereon had been reached. In the nature of things this survey could only be provisional in the first instance, but it constituted a systematic beginning which could be and was subsequently developed and improved as facilities permitted. We were also able, being at last organised as a General Staff, to furnish the Foreign Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence with considered military advice in regard to several international questions which had to be dealt with at this time. Amongst them our relations with France took a prominent place, for besides the Fashoda sore there were disputes connected with Morocco, Egypt, Siam, Madagascar, New Hebrides, various Colonial boundaries in West and Central Africa, and the fishing rights off Newfoundland, the latter wrangle dating back to the time of the old French ascendancy in North America. Owing to the clear vision of King Edward, who paid his first official visit to Paris in May 1903, to the efforts of the two Foreign Ministers, Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcasse, and to the goodwill shown by the two nations in general, these causes of friction were satisfactorily removed by the Anglo- French Agreement of 1904, and this, under stress of events, quickly developed into the " Entente " which was destined to prove so valuable to both countries ten years later. The Entente with France led to a reconsideration of our long and dangerous rivalry with Russia, the chief bones of contention in this case being Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet, The negotiations were very prolonged — India and the India Office as well as the Foreign Office taking part in them — and they were still going on when I left the War THE GERMAN MENACE 139 Office at the beginning of 1907. In August of that year, however, an agreement was signed, for which Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey deserves great credit, and the triple entente, as confronting the triple alliance, was thus brought into being. Another important question upon which the General Staff was asked to advise was the renewal and amendment of the Anglo- Japanese treaty signed in 1902. It had been concluded for a term of five years, but in 1905, while the Russo-Japanese war was still in progress, it was replaced by a new treaty of wider scope and covering a period of ten years. A special advantage derived from these and similar investigations was that the bogy of a Russian attack on India, over which so much labour had been wasted in 1901 and 1902, was relegated to the background ; and more time and thought could be devoted to the real enemy, Germany, who, in the eyes of aU but the wilfully blind, was pursuing a policy that was bound to bring her, sooner or later, into conflict with us. It is strange that so many people should have refused to accept this view. I remember that as late as 1912 a Cabinet Minister once said to me, in reply to my remark that war with Germany was inevitable : " No, General, I would not say inevitable, but conceivable." His way of stating the case may have been more technically correct than mine, for no war can, strictly speaking, be classed as inevitable till it has begun, but mine seemed to me the simpler and safer basis to work upon, and it did not prove to be inaccurate. Grierson was as convinced as myself that the only policy consistent with the interests of the Empire was an active alliance wdth France and Belgium, and although no such alliance was made arrangements were unofficially put in train for ensuring mutual military assistance in case of war. I had some capital officers in my German and French sections whose business it was to work out the details, and as a matter of interest I may add that our prophecy at the time was that the Great War would come in 1915, the year in which, according to what has since trans- pired, the enemy apparently intended that it should come. 140 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL In combination with Colonel Huguet, the French mihtary attache in London, Grierson did more than any other officer of his time to establish good relations between the French and British armies, and it is true to say that the success which attended the despatch of the Expedi- tionary Force in 1914 was due first and foremost to his initiative and foresight when Director of Mihtary Operations in 1904-1906. During 1905 we visited in company portions of the Franco-Belgian frontier on which much of the fighting in 1914 took place, and the forecast he then made of the course of events proved to be in many respects singularly accurate, though I confess that neither of us foresaw the four years' struggle against entrenched positions extending from the North Sea to Switzerland. Grierson was a great favourite with all officers in the directorate, and indeed was one of the most popular men in the army, particularly so with the rank and file. He had an unrivalled knowledge of all foreign armies, more especially of the German army, and his sudden death from heart failure, when travelling by train through France on the i8th of August 1914 as Commander of the Second Army Corps, was one of the tragedies of the war. The Expeditionary Force was formed after Mr. (now Lord) Haldane became Secretary of State for War in 1905. At the same time the militia was converted into the Special Reserve, with the duty of providing drafts for the regular battahons at the front ; and the volunteers became the Territorial Force of fourteen divisions for home defence. This organisation was a great improvement on the old one, but it nevertheless suffered from serious defects. The Expeditionary Force was obviously not strong enough to intervene effectively in a Franco-German war — judging from the extensive preparations for war then being made by Germany ; the Special Reserve could not be kept up to strength and never was ; while, owing to inadequate training and other reasons, a considerable portion of the Territorial Force could not be made efficient, and by the terms of its engagement it was not available for service outside the United Kingdom. The fact was, as so often before in our history, that the THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 141 strength and organisation of our army were not determined by the requirements of our Uabihties, but by what our existing methods of recruiting could produce within the financial Hmits imposed by such annual estimates as it was politically expedient to lay before parliament. On the other hand, the measures taken to ensure the efficiency of the Expeditionary Force — such as it was — and to admit of its rapid despatch oversea were far in advance of anything previously attempted, while all the world knows that in the Great War the Territorial Force covered itself with glory in many a hard-fought battle, and provided an invaluable first reinforcement to the regular army in France and elsewhere. For these results — at the most critical period of the war — Lord Haldane is entitled to more gratitude than is usually accorded to him. It will be remembered that in 1905 Lord Roberts resigned his seat on the Committee of Imperial Defence, as he was anxious to warn his countrymen of the danger in which they stood, and felt that he could not appropriately do this while a member of the committee. It so happened that I was present at the meeting at which he announced his decision and gave his reasons for it. In the discussion which ensued the veteran Field-Marshal was of course hopelessly outclassed by the professional debaters on the committee, his manner of expression being characterised rather by blunt honesty than dialectical skill, but he remained impervious to all arguments and in a plain and simple way stuck to his guns, being convinced that his first duty was to his country, which he believed — and rightly so — to be living in a fool's paradise. He has sometimes been taunted for not speaking out and getting more done when Commander-in-Chief, but I doubt if he himself fully reaUsed the position until 1905. Having once reahsed it, nothing could turn him away from the object he had in view. England owes much to Lord Roberts, and the loss of many lives and much suffering might have been averted had his advice been accepted and acted upon by those responsible — soldiers as well as civihans — for the welfare of the Empire. It was whilst serving as Assistant Director of Military 142 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Operations that I acquired my initial experience as a military lecturer, the occasion being when I addressed the Royal Mihtary Society at Dublin in 1905. At the time there was rather a mania for lectures on the part of the authorities, and those who had to make the local arrange- ments were often at a loss to find any one who had some- thing useful to say, and was capable of saying it. This was perhaps the reason why Lord Grenfell, then commanding in Ireland, asked me to give a lecture on the North- West Frontier of India, and although I knew a good deal about that country I was terrified at the prospect of having to stand up and talk about it before an audience of some two or three hundred officers. I was even more scared when the moment arrived to begin, but by degrees my shaking limbs were brought under control and I managed to tell the story, previously committed to memory, without entirely losing my wits. In fact the performance was a mild success, judging from what Lord Grenfell was good enough to tell me, and afterwards I received several requests to speak at other mihtary centres. I complied with as many as my duties would permit, as they gave me an opportunity of mixing with officers employed with troops, and incidentally the experience proved helpful when I later became Commandant of the Staff College. As so often happens in the army, this form of imparting instruction was carried to excess, and officers and men became rather "fed up " with it both as regards quantity and quality. There is no more determined passive-resister in the world than Tommy, when compulsorily present at a lecture or a sermon which is not to his hking. He simply refuses to listen, and is invariably seized with an infectious cough which rapidly spreads throughout the audience or congregation, to the utter discomfiture of the speaker. A similar craze for lectures broke out after the Great War — the idea, a perfectly good one, being to enlarge the scope of the soldier's education and so fit him for work when he left the army. Many lecturers, supposed to be experts in their particular fine, were sent out for this pur- pose to the Rhine when I commanded there in 1919-20, and while some of them gave interesting and useful instruction, ON LEAVE 143 others did not, and in the aggregate they were too numerous. I had to ask the War Office to limit the number, and also to exercise more discretion in the selection of subjects, I explained that, for example, the proposed lectures on " Pond life " and " The anatomy of the rabbit " would scarcely appeal to those men who had already Uved in the mud of Flanders for about four years, or to those who, hating rabbits at all times, had been consistently given them as rations on two or three days of the week while serving at home. I utilised most of my annual leave between 1902 and 1906 in travelUng abroad, making journeys to Northern Africa, Canada, the United States, and various countries in Europe, including France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, and the Balkan Peninsula. On one occasion when visiting the environs of Metz I barely escaped being locked up as a spy. The German authorities were suspicious of all foreigners, and an order had been issued, of which I was ignorant, which forbade the latter being in the vicinity of the Metz forts without a special permit signed by the garrison commander. I was not at all desirous of obtaining information regarding the forts, as they were already sufficiently known to me. I was merely re-studying the battle of Gravelotte, and, when near St. Privat, a detective in plain clothes appeared on the scene and enquired in French whether I was a French officer. I gave him rather an abrupt reply in English, thinking he was one of the many so-called guides who frequent the battlefield, and he then, speaking in good Enghsh, told me who he was and demanded my passport. As I could not produce it, having left it at the hotel at Metz, he took me by the arm and said he must detain me in the village police station, pending investiga- tion. I was careful to be civil to him, and when I expressed regret at having broken the rules, and informed him that I was an English colonel, he immediately apologised and we parted on good terms. British officers travelUng abroad sometimes make the mistake of being too off-hand in their dealings with foreign officials, with the result that they may be put to consider- 144 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL able inconvenience and even be kept under arrest, in un- pleasant and unsanitary conditions, while a lengthy corre- spondence is conducted between the governments concerned before they are released. More than one such instance came to my knowledge when I was at the War Office. After parting company with the detective, my wife, who was with me, and I cycled our hardest back to our hotel and, suspecting that further enquiries would be instituted, packed our boxes and started off for Niederbronn, whence I wished to visit the battlefield of Woerth. I was the more anxious to get away from Metz because my passport showed that I was Assistant Director of Military Operations, and had this become known there is little doubt after what had passed that I would have been detained. One of the sights at Metz which attracts the attention of all visitors is a figure at the main entrance to the cathedral, which bears a striking hkeness of the ex-Kaiser. Some years ago the figure of the prophet Daniel, draped in Eastern costume, was about to be placed there, and according to the local story the order went forth for the prophet to be given the ex-Kaiser's features. After the town was occupied by the French at the end of 1918 handcuffs were placed on the figure, and on them was hung a card inscribed in large letters, " Sic transit gloria mundi ! " They were still there when I visited Metz in June 1919. I made several journeys to the Belgian Ardennes, Namur, Liege, and the Meuse vaUey between these two towns. They were of special interest because of the possibihty of Germany \aolating Belgian neutrality in the event of her going to war with France, and it had become quite evident, from her railway extensions alone, that she meant to enter Belgium. Before her intentions became so obvious, opinions varied a good deal as to what she would do, as there was much to be said both for and against the operation ; but on balance it always seemed to me, and so I officially stated, that it would be attempted, notwithstanding the elaborate Liege and Namur defences which had been constructed at great cost in order to close this Une of advance. When visiting the Peninsula battlefields I first pro- ceeded from Lisbon to the famous lines of Torres Vedras, THE PENINSULA BATTLEFIELDS 145 which proved to be a harder nut than Massena could crack when he stumbled up against them in following WeUington after the battle of Busaco. The passage of the Douro at Oporto, the next place I visited, would in these days be regarded as a minor operation, the French casualties being estimated at five hundred killed and wounded, while the British were only slightly over a hundred. But it was nevertheless a fine performance. The river at Oporto is some three hundred yards wide, the current is rapid and the banks are precipitous and rocky, and to attempt to cross such an obstacle in presence of the enemy, and without a bridging train, was an extremely perilous and daring undertaking. Had Soult and his staff taken reason- able precautions the attempt ought not to have succeeded. There is a good club at Oporto, estabhshed many years ago by the EngUsh colony engaged in the port wine trade, and as the hotels are of a poor and unsanitary type I was glad to accept the privilege of its hospitality. The club was used by Soult and his staff before they were so suddenly expelled from the town, and their signatures are to be seen in the visitors' book. On the same page are the names of Wellington and his staff, who it will be remembered ate the dinner that had been prepared for Soult and his officers. The plateau of Busaco affords a magnificent view of the surrounding country, and on it now stands a large and comfortable hotel, originally intended, I believe, as a palace for the King of Portugal. Tennis, golf, and other games are played on the ground where the battle was fought on the 27th of September 1810. The battle ought to have taken place on the 25th of the month, before the allies were in position. Ney asked permission to attack on that day, but Massena, hke other French generals of his time, under- rated Wellington, and after keeping Ney's messenger waiting several hours he replied that all action should be deferred until he arrived at the front. He leisurely appeared about noon on the following day, and then fixed the battle for the 27th of September. By that time the allies had completed their arrangements for defence, and after in- flicting some 4500 casualties on the French and losing about 1500 men themselves they were able to withdraw L 146 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL unmolested, " according to plan " as we would say in these days, to the lines of Torres Vedras. For the journey to Canada and the United States I could not spare more than about two months, and therefore it was not possible to see much of these two wonderful countries. The voyage from Liverpool was made under most comfort- able conditions, thanks to the kindness of the officials of the Allan Line. From Quebec the steamer proceeded to Montreal, where I spent a few days, and then went on to Ottawa. From there I continued the journey to Sault Ste Marie, which was the farthest point west I had time to go. The amount of shipping which passes through the Sault Ste Marie, or " Soo," canals can be judged from the fact that although the passage is closed for some months in winter, the annual amount of tonnage fifteen years ago was more than twice that which passed through the Suez Canal. Since then the amount has become much greater. Wheat, timber, iron ore, and other minerals are the principal cargoes. From the Soo I descended Lake Huron to Detroit, and thence went to Toronto, the Niagara frontier, and Buffalo. Although I saw but little of Canada, what I did see came to me as a great surprise. The large towns, with their fine thoroughfares and magnificent buildings, have an air of business and grandeur of which most people in England have little or no conception, and the rate and scale at which the Dominion has been developed must be seen to be correctly appreciated. I venture to say that a personal visit to our Overseas Dominions is an essential part of the education of all high officials at home whose duties are in any way connected with them, for without some such knowledge gained on the spot their work will probably be not only valueless but may be exceedingly mischievous. From Buffalo I went to the Adirondacks, an in- teresting country with a delightful summer climate, and there, at Lake Placid, I struck my first " dr}^ " town in the States. For some reason or other no one seemed to pay much attention to the embargo, and at the hotel where I stayed there was no difficulty in obtaining such wines as A VISIT TO AMERICA 147 I required. The following day, after a stage-coach drive of about forty miles, I arrived at another town where the sale of alcohol was prohibited, and there my experience was different. Remembering my good fortune of the day before, I asked the waitress at dinner to bring me a whisky and soda, and she reminded me that it was a " dry " town. Ignoring her answer I rather brusquely repeated the request, to which she rephed that I could have nothing to drink there, and asked who I was " trying to get at." Having acquired a particularly bad thirst during the hot and dusty drive I interviewed the manager, but for a long time he, too, was obdurate. Finally he relented, took me to his wife's bedroom, and told me to wait there and see what happened. Shortly afterwards a waiter brought in a bottle of whisky, soda water, and a box of cigars, and told me that, by the orders of the " boss," I was to take what 1 wanted, be quick about it, and then clear out. I carried out all his instructions. Every one has at different times discovered how small a place the world is, and a rather curious instance of this occurred during my drive through the Adirondacks. A fellow-passenger, an American, told me in the course of conversation that a few months before he had given to the British Consul at Batum an account of what he had seen of the Russian troops in Central Asia, through which he had recently travelled. I remembered having received this information at the War Office, for at the time we were in doubt regarding certain matters which the report very opportunely cleared up. I did not tell this to my companion as it was not desirable he should know where I was employed, but it struck me as being a remarkable coincidence that while traveUing by stage-coach in America I should meet the unknown author of the information received from Central Asia. The visit to the Balkans in the autumn of 1906 was perhaps the most instructive and interesting of all my journeys, for I had already made a close study of the literature regarding this comphcated part of the world and required some local knowledge in order to complete it. The visit was rendered the more pleasant and useful by the 148 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL assistance and hospitality I received from our official representatives at each place where I stayed — with one exception. Journeying from Calais I first went to Berhn and then to Vienna, staying a few days at each place, and afterwards continued the journey to Bucharest, or the " Paris of the East." Here I was the guest of the British Minister, Sir Con>Tigham Greene, who kindly arranged with the authorities for me to see some Rumanian troops, barracks, hospitals, and other military estabhshments. From Bucharest I crossed the Danube at Rutschuk, and then proceeded via Plevna to Sofia, where different branches of the Bulgarian army were paraded for inspection. I was much impressed with the physique of the men and their smartness at drill, and came to the conclusion that the military education of both officers and men was of a higher standard than most people imagined. Less than forty years before the Bulgars were still in slavery to Turkey, and the progress the country had since made was pheno- menal. Sofia, from being a collection of mud-hovels, had become a modern town with many fine and substantial buildings, education had advanced rapidly, pubhc works had been instituted on a large scale, and the country in general had become one of the most efficient of all the Balkan States. From Sofia I went via Adrianople to Constantinople, which from being amongst the most progressive, had be- come, under Turkish rule, the dirtiest and most retrograde capital in Europe. At the time of my visit the streets were still scavenged by tens of thousands of repulsive- looking dogs, who Uved together in batches of a dozen or so, each batch on its own pitch, and if a strange dog ven- tured to intrude he was immediately attacked by the rightful owners. These unfortunate animals were subse- quently deported wholesale to an island in the Sea of Marmora, and in true Turkish fashion were there left to die of hunger and thirst. The streets of Constantinople were mostly unpaved and badly lighted, the installation of electric light was forbidden except — for a consideration — in a few favoured cases, and the same remark appUes to telephones, of which there were then but few. Indeed CONSTANTINOPLE 149 everything possible seemed to be done to prevent the intro- duction of modern improvements, the object apparently being to keep Europeans out of the town. I attended, as most tourists do, the ceremony of the Salamlik, and there noticed that I was being closely followed by a detective — as all foreigners were on these occasions. The Sultan was insane on the subject of espionage. He insisted upon being kept fully informed of the movements of strangers, and all classes, in order to curry favour with him, played up to his idiosyncrasy. The result was that over and above an army of professional spies there was a host of unpaid amateurs who were constantly on the look- out for some plot, real or imaginary, which they could report. The only way in which one could move about, or indeed do anything with reasonable convenience, was by a hberal employment of bribes. At this period, too, all power, civil and mihtary, was centred in the hands of the Sultan, and he was chief spiritual ruler as well. He was therefore emperor and pope rolled into one. I noticed that the German Embassy presented a parti- cularly clean and prosperous appearance. The employees were smartly dressed, the grounds and buildings were well kept, and in general it was by far the most prosperous- looking of all the embassies, not excluding our own. Germany was then forging ahead in Turkey, and was careful to impress the Eastern mind with her power and prosperity, while we, who had once been predominant, were fast falling behind and, like GalUo, cared for none of these things. After making a trip to the Black Sea through the Bos- phorus, which somewhat resembles a winding river of three-quarters of a mile or less in width, I was glad to get away from Constantinople and its abominable smells, hideous noises, dirty streets, and official obstructions. Salonika by rail, via Dede Agach, was my next halting-place, and from there I made several journeys into that ethnological museum known as Macedonia. The mountainous nature of the interior has always made the country difficult to conquer, and the various invaders were never able to absorb the people whom they found in it ; the large towns and sea- 150 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ports attracted men of all races for purposes of business ; and in these and other ways it came about that for centuries the country was a sort of dumping-ground for many different nations. Again, in addition to the Turks, there were four Christian sects in the country, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Rumanians, each with its own special propaganda and aiming at making as many converts as possible. No corner of the world presented such a conflict of ambitions and interests, and it is not to be wondered at that the Macedonian question seemed for so long to be insoluble. From Salonika I went north through Uskub to Nish, and thence to Belgrade and Buda-Pesth, spending a few days at each place before returning to England. A good deal has happened in the Balkans since 1906, and it is not unlikely that much more will happen before a definite settlement is made of that " Eastern question " which has been in existence ever since Turkish rule was established in Europe some 470 years ago. According to the regulations of the time, the tenure of my appointment as head of the Foreign Section should have expired in October 1905, but for certain reasons it was extended to the end of January 1907. My rapid promotion to the substantive rank of Colonel in November 1903, though fortunate in some respects, had the disadvan- tage of involving my removal from the regimental list, and therefore when I left the War Office I was placed on " half- pay." This term might be supposed to have some con- nection with full-pay, but in fact it has none at all. For example, the usual full-pay of a major-general was then ;^i5oo a year, whereas the emoluments of an officer of that rank while on half-pay were only ;^5oo a year. A similar anomaly, not to say hardship, obtained in the case of officers of other ranks. Another disadvantage of being on the half- pay list was that as there was no certainty whether or when fresh employment would be given, no settled plans for the future could be made. In my case the prospect was brighter, as I was authoritatively informed before leaving the War Office that I would shortly be appointed Chief Staff Officer in one of the home commands. This was the kind of appointment I most desired to have, and I accordingly HALF-PAY 151 entered upon my period of enforced idleness with compara- tively little anxiety. This system of half-pay, which renders an officer useless to his profession and country when in the prime of life, and at a time when his experience and accelerated promotion would seem to demand that his services should be fully utilised, is not one which strikes the ordinary man as being in the best interest of the State. I have always thought that there should be no insuperable difficulty in devising a more profitable system, given a less bureaucratic Treasury and more logical methods in the promotion of officers whose retention in the army is considered to be desirable. CHAPTER X BRIGADIER-GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF, ALDERSHOT Translate German regulations regarding heavy artillery — Assistant Quartermaster-General, Aldershot, 1907 — Become Chief of General Staff there six months later— Smith-Dorrien — Officers on the Aider- shot Staff — Comparison of soldier's Ufe in 1907 with that in 1877 — Similar comparison in regard to training — Smith-Dorrien's methods — Weakness of units — Innovations in organisation and improve- ments in training — System of obtaining ground for manoeuvres — False teaching of manoeuvres — Smith-Dorrien's practical views — Staff tours — Visits of King Edward— Visits of King George and Queen Mary — Aeroplanes — Balloons — The Caterpillar — Ordered to take up post of Commandant, Staff College. In order to fill up the time and improve my knowledge of German I midertook while on half-pay to translate for the War Office certain German and Austrian military publica- tions, and with the assistance of my wife — a good German hnguist — the results were, I hope, fairly good, notwithstand- ing the many technical terms to be unravelled. Amongst these publications were the German official " Regulations for the employment of heavy artillery in the field," from which it was manifest that heavy artillery would play a prominent part in Germany's next war in Europe, This was not the only information of the kind which came to our notice, but we made no effort worth mentioning to provide ourselves with similar artillery, or with the means for producing either it or its ammunition when required, and there was the same indifference with regard to machine- guns. Years before 1914 Germany was known to be paying special attention to machine-gun organisation, and to have raised a considerable number of well-trained machine-gun units, whereas we began the war with no such units, and our battalions had but two machine-guns each. As the date of my promised re-employment approached, 152 ALDERSHOT AGAIN i53 I was disappointed one day to receive a letter from the War Office telling me that I would not be given the post which I had been led to believe a few weeks before would fall to me. Fortunately Sir William Nicholson, who was then Quartermaster-General, offered me the post of Assistant Quartermaster-General at Aldershot, and advised me not to refuse it as something better might come along shortly. I took his advice, although the post was no better than the one I had already held for more than five years, while from a financial standpoint it was inferior to it. On the other hand, it afforded a means of learning the duties of a branch of the staff in which I had hitherto not been employed, and this experience later proved very useful, especially when I was Quartermaster-General of the army sent to France in 1914. I took up my new duties in May 1907. There were then about thirty thousand troops in the Aldershot command, the principal formations being the ist and 2nd Divisions under Major-Generals Grierson and Stephenson respectively, and the ist Cavalry Brigade. Sir John French was in chief command. Sir Archibald Murray was his Chief of the General Staff, and the Major-General in charge of Administration, my immediate chief, was at first Major-General Heath and later Major-General (now Sir) H. Lawson, both being helpful and considerate masters. In December 1907 Sir John French was succeeded by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and at the same time Murray went to the War Office as Director of Military Training. Sir William Nicholson, who had recently become Chief of the Imperial General Staff, gave me the vacancy left by Murray — a far better post than the one I had expected to receive earlier in the year, and in fact it was the best of its kind. Once more, therefore, fortune had favoured me, and the advancement was the more gratifying because it occurred at Aldershot where, on a miserable November night thirty years before, I had entered the cavaky barracks as a recruit — a lonely and, for all practical purposes, a seemingly friendless lad. I would often, when passing in that direc- tion as Chief of the General Staff, gaze at the old barrack- room where I first hved, and at its neighbour the guard- room of evil memory, and wonder how it had come about 154 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL that I was now a General Officer and the right-hand man of the Commander-in-Chief. Murray left everything connected with General Staff work in good order, and it was easy to take over from him the threads of peace training. My two assistants on the General Staff were Major Kerr of the Gordon Highlanders and Captain Nicholl of the Bedfordshire Regiment, both hard-working and capable officers. " Freddie " Kerr was a born soldier, possessed of sound mihtary instinct, and popular with all who knew him. The army suffered a great loss when he was killed near Ypres in 1914. Colonel " Freddie " Wing, the staff officer for artillery duties, was a splendid horseman, keen and active, and in character as fine a type of man as could be met. He was killed at the battle of Loos in October 19 15 when in command of a division. Brigadier-General " Peter " Buston was the Chief Engineer, and Major McMahon was in charge of the musketry. Colonel Kerr Montgomery and Colonel Alec Godley were respectively the senior General Staff Officers of the ist and 2nd Divisions. Godley was later employed with the New Zealand Forces, being succeeded by Colonel De Lisle, and both of them commanded army corps during the Great War. The ad- ministrative services came under the charge of Major- General Robb when Lawson succeeded Stephenson in the command of the 2nd Division, while Kerr was succeeded on the General Staff by Lieut. -Col. (now Major-Gen. Sir) W. Campbell. On the personal staff of the Commander-in-Chief were Major Clive Wigram, assistant mihtary secretary, and now assistant personal secretary to His Majesty, and Captain Way, the aide-de-camp. Captain Arthur Wood, a son of Sir Evelyn, and Lieutenant Boscawen, a son of Lord Falmouth, were also aides-de-camp at different times. Boscawen, a charming boy and a most promising officer, won the D.S.O. and rose to the rank of Major in the Great War, meeting his death in the summer of 19 18. This com- pletes the list of staff officers with whom I was most fre- quently brought into contact. I always thought we were a happy family, and I hope the others were of the same opinion. A SOLDIER'S LIFE 155 Having had the opportunity of seeing both sides of life in the army during the thirty years that had elapsed since I first went to Aldershot in 1877, it may be of interest to the reader if I compare some of the conditions under which a soldier then lived and worked with those which prevailed when I joined the Aldershot staff in 1907. In my early days the soldier when off parade had the choice of three places in which to pass his time — the barrack- room, the library (a fusty, ill-kept place without a book or a newspaper worth reading) , and the canteen, where besides bread and cheese little could be bought except beer. Inside the barracks these were the only facihties afforded for his recreation and self-improvement ; outside the barracks, in Aldershot, the " Soldier's Home," maintained by kind- hearted benefactors, was almost his only alternative to women and beer-shops, both of the lowest type ; and beyond an occasional cricket match he was not encouraged to play any outdoor game. In not a few regiments his officers saw little or nothing of him except when on parade or at stables ; they showed no interest in his personal concerns, and sometimes did not even know his name, although he might have been under their command for weeks. It was realised by some inspecting officers that this state of affairs was not what it should be, from the professional standpoint alone, and I have heard the most absurd replies given when troop officers have been asked to tell them a man's name, or what length of service he had. The great thing was to give an answer of some sort and give it quickly, whether it might be the right one or not. By 1907 all this had been changed. Officers were now expected to know all about their men, to look after their minds as well as their bodies, and generally to identify themselves in peace with those upon whom they would have to depend in war. To this new demand they readily responded — as British officers always will once they know what is required of them — and much keenness and rivalry were displayed by regiments in making physical exercises more interesting, and in organising cross-country races and other useful forms of sport such as football, hockey, and boxing. By Smith-Dorrien's directions a number of first- 156 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL class recreation grounds were later provided sufficient to meet all requirements. A vast improvement was also noticeable in regard to the men's food, though it varied a good deal in different units. Formerly the rations had not only been inadequate and, for want of proper supervision, often of inferior quality, but there had been much waste and some corruption in their disposal, while the cooks were selected without reference to their culinary knowledge and were sometimes notoriously the dirtiest men in the regiment. Better rations were now supplied, economical use was made of them, and the cooks were taught their trade and made to understand that cleanhness is the first requisite of a good cook-house. Again, in the old days the men dined in the same room where they lived and slept, and ate their meals off the same table on which they pipeclayed their accoutrements, the table itself being rarely cleaned more than once a day, and then perhaps only with the broom used for sweeping the floor. These objectionable customs had largely disappeared. Separate dining-rooms, wherever possible, were now allotted, the supply of crockery was improved, tablecloths were provided, and the meals were served up in a more palatable and decent form. With the estabhshment of what are called regimental institutes the soldier also had at his disposal various rooms — corporals' room, concert-room, writing-room, coffee-room, all reasonably furnished— where he could spend a comfortable hour when off duty, and with no temptation to get dmnk. The methods of giving instruction in riding, foot- drill, musketry, and other elementary forms of training had been improved out of all recognition since 1877, and the whole system of training in its more advanced stages had been clianged for the better. Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, and other military reformers had insisted on going far beyond the antiquated instructions contained in the " drill books " of the period, and before the South African war the preparation of training manuals was taken in hand. That campaign delayed their completion, but on its termina- tion the excellent book known as " Combined Training " was issued. It was followed, when the General Staff was formed GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN i57 in 1904, by the publication of " Field Service Regulations" and "Training Manuals" for each arm. These covered the entire field of individual and tactical training, and it is universally admitted that the principles they enunciated well stood the test to which they were put in the Great War. To sum up, the soldier was no longer treated, as he used to be, as a being without intelligence and without the remotest chance of ever developing any, down whose throat it was the business of the non-commissioned officer to force as much parrot-like drill as possible but never to attempt to draw anything out. " Why did you do that ? " the unfortunate man would be asked when accused of making a slip, and when he explained that he had done it because he thought it was the proper thing to do in the circum- stances, the reply would be : " You have no right to think, do as you are told, and don't think again." This stupid attitude was going out of fashion. A man was taught to use his wits and act with initiative and responsibility, individual instruction was superseding squad drill, and a clear distinction was drawn between drill pure and simple and field training. It must not be thought that perfection had been reached in any of these matters. Much remained to be done, and Smith-Dorrien was the man to do it. Full of energy him- self, he expected every one in his command to be equally zealous and to take his profession seriously. He held strongly that the utmost should be done for the welfare of the men and their families, and that they should be trusted not to abuse the increased privileges granted to them. In carrying out these objects he was well supported by Grierson, Stephenson, Lawson, and his other immediate subordinates, and the aim of all was to try and bring out what was best in the men and not everlastingly be thinking of the worst. We had learned many useful lessons in the South African war, both as to what to do and what not to do, more especially as to the use of ground, and we also had some surprises in the Russo-Japanese war. But there was still much difference of opinion as to the extent to which these lessons ought to modify previously -accepted methods. British officers, like other mortals, are not infallible, and their 158 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ideas are apt either to move too slowly and in strictly defined grooves, or to fly off to the opposite extreme. It was for the senior commanders and General Staff to steer a correct course between excessive regard for regularity and rule on the one hand, and the desire to throw all previous experience to the winds on the other — to see, in short, that methods of training kept pace with changing conditions but did not madly overrun them. Having shared in much fighting in past wars Smith-Dorrien was well qualified to judge of the probable characteristics of future wars, and the importance he attached, when commanding at Alder- shot, to the right use of ground, the effect of rifle and machine-gun fire, and the necessity for carefully training section and other subordinate leaders proved, in the light of the Great War, that his appreciation was singularly accurate. " Modern war," ran one of his training instructions, " demands that individual intelligence should be on a high plane. Battlefields now cover such extensive areas that control by officers is very difficult, consequently non-com- missioned officers and even private soldiers very often find themselves left to their own resources : and it is only by being accustomed in peace training to use their common sense and intelligence that they are likely to be equal to their duties in war." Another instruction laid down that " troops should be continually practised in improvising existing cover in every possible piece of ground gained which it is important to hold. Officers and non-commissioned officers should be trained to sight and trace trenches after dark as well as by day. Artillery, too, is very dependent on the hours of darkness in getting into position, and although it may as a rule be possible to select positions during the day, it must frequently happen that the actual digging of gun-pits and moving guns into them must take place at night." Smith-Dorrien was particularly insistent during field training that individual officers and men should not unnecessarily expose themselves to view or fire, and would sometimes emphasise this in very downright terms. The admonition was not without good reason, and it was not forgotten by those to whom it was addressed. TRAINING 159 Work was fairly strenuous all the year round, the normal stages of field training being squadron, battery, and company in March and April ; regimental and battalion in May and June ; brigade, divisional, and command from July to the middle of September ; individual training throughout the winter. As at all other stations, training suffered from the two defects inherent to our army system — weakness of the battalions and inequality in the proficiency of the men under instruction, whose army service varied between one day and about twenty years. This complication was due to recruits dribbling in at all periods of the year — the result of voluntary enlistment as compared with universal service, which enables the whole of the recruits for one year to be received on the same day, and to be put through a systematic and progressive course of training. These disadvantages were specially felt in regard to the training of the officers, for as battalions always con- tained a large percentage of recruits who had not completed their drill in barracks, and who therefore were not available for training in the field, the officers had no opportunity of commanding their units at full strength, and in some ways this destroyed the whole value of the training. To get over the difficulty two units would be put into one, but this brought in men who were strangers to the commander, and who regarded the work as a bore and of no benefit to themselves. Another expedient was to give the officers theoretical schemes to work out, the troops being imaginary ; but this again was a poor substitute for the real thing, for only few instructors are capable of making it useful to the instructed, and also it was unpopular. Training was, in fact, largely a case of trying to make bricks without straw, and there was much truth in what a distinguished General once said to me : " Never forget, Robertson, that we have two armies — the War Office army and the Aldershot army. The first is always up to strength, and is organised, reorganised, and disorganised almost daily. The second is never up to strength, knows nothing whatever about the first, and remains unaffected by any of these organising activities. i6o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL It just cleans its rifle and falls in on parade." The army of no other European country laboured under the same disadvantages as we did, and it is to their undying credit that our ofhcers stuck to their work in such discouraging circumstances, and in the Great War proved themselves to be such fine commanders. Of the other training problems which engaged attention at Aldershot it may be added that the cavalry were issued with a new-pattern sword, the old custom of cutting and hacking at one's opponent giving place to the more lightning- like thrust. Definite efforts were made for the first time to provide the troops with travelling-kitchens {i.e. vehicles in which the food can be cooked whilst on the move and so be ready whenever wanted) ; and mechanical transport was worked out on a practical basis, thus solving some of the difficulties attaching to the supply of food and ammunition in the field. In the summer of 1909 the ist Division was mobilised as an experiment, the necessary additional men, horses, vehicles, etc., being taken from other units at Aldershot and elsewhere. This was the first time any one had ever seen a British division at war strength, and it was the last till August 1914. The experience gained was valu- able, and upon it were based many of the decisions for the movement and handling of large formations which were successfully practised in the Great War. One of the most important innovations of all was the organisation of " communication companies." It can be understood that in the employment of large forces spread over wide areas a multitude of messages, orders, and instructions regarding fighting, feeding, moving, and many other matters have to be conveyed between commanders, staff, and troops, and that unless they are conveyed accurately and promptly serious consequences may ensue. Heretofore the arrangements for this service had been of the most sketchy and unsatisfactory kind. For use amongst themselves and with their brigade headquarters, the regiments, battalions, and batteries had each had their quota of " signallers," equipped with flags, lamps, heliographs, and other appliances for visual signalling, as well as a varying number of mounted orderlies and cyclists ; between COMMUNICATION COMPANIES i6i brigades and divisions were telegraph companies working with cables conveyed on waggons, these units belonging to divisions ; and behind them were similar telegraph com- panies working with cable-waggons and the ordinary land lines of telegraph, these belonging to other formations or directly under army headquarters. This system was both unreliable and uneconomical, and was replaced first by " communication companies " and then by a " signal ser- vice " embracing all the different elements. A number of despatch riders and other necessary personnel and material were added to them, the whole being placed under one general control and without unduly interfering with details. The Russo-Japanese war had exemplified the importance of good means of communication, and before I went to Aldershot a temporary organisation for the purpose had been started. When Murray became Director of Military Training he placed it, with the approval of the Secretary of State for War, on a permanent basis, and its development rapidly followed. I shall show in a later chapter how exceedingly well it answered in the Great War. The foregoing account of training must not be understood to imply that Aldershot alone was identified with laying the foundations of the original " Expeditionary Force." That was not the case. I have already referred to the training manuals published by the General Staff at the War Office, and upon these the training in general was based. We frequently received other forms of assistance from the Training Directorate and the individual officers serving in it. The object of both staffs was to work closely and helpfully together, and this I think was achieved. If it was not it was not the fault of the War Office staff. Moreover, the Southern, Irish, and other commands played their part in training-duties, although it was on a much smaller scale, Aldershot being the largest military station in the United Kingdom, and the only one where a reasonable number of troops and a fair amount of suitable training-ground were available throughout the year. It also contained many military establishments not to be found elsewhere, such as the signalling school, army gymnastic school, school of cookery, aeroplane and balloon M i62 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL factories and schools, and a large mechanical transport depot. As the Aldershot area was much too restricted in size, as well as too familiar, for the advanced training of the higher formations, and as we had no legal powers by which ground elsewhere could be acquired, reliance had to be placed on the good-will of landowners and tenants. As a rule these met us in a most generous spirit, though there were some notable and tiresome exceptions. I remember one large landowner who declined to allow us the use of some " common " land which came under his control as lord of the manor, although he was a prominent member of the National Service League ! Another wealthy proprietor once refused, in spite of many entreaties, to grant the use of quite a small, though to us a very important, area which happened to be in the centre of a tract of country already conceded to us by other owners, and without which the contemplated operations would to a great extent become unreal. A similar difficulty threatened on another occasion, but was overcome by the patriotism and good sense of the owner. Smith-Dorrien had decided that the operations should include the crossing of the Thames by a division during darkness, and there was only one locality available where an improvised bridge could be constructed and the passage made so as to lit suitably into the project as a whole. The ground on one side of the river had been obtained, but the owner of the fields on the opposite bank at first met our request with a blank refusal, and the position seemed hopeless. He had good reason for refusing, for he had recently received in connection with another matter very shabby and exasperat- ing treatment at the hands of the superior military authorities. After a lengthy correspondence I succeeded in gaining a personal interview with him, when he proved to be quite amenable, and gave his full consent for us to do as we wished. The system of obtaining ground for manoeuvres only from those who were sufficiently patriotic to lend it was fundamentally bad and pleased nobody. Separate arrange- ments had to be made with all the owners, tenants, and MANOEUVRES 163 sub - tenants concerned, and these would amount to some hundreds in number, and when, after months of correspondence and many personal interviews, consent had at last been obtained, it was always liable to be withdrawn or curtailed at the last moment. Further, some owners and tenants objected to being asked to do that which others were known to have refused to do, and they frequently told me that the only satisfactory system was for the Govern- ment to exercise legal powers, take what they wanted from all and sundry alike, and not trade upon the patriotism of those who did not hke to refuse. It was really part and parcel of the old question of voluntary versus national service. In later years legal powers were taken, to the satisfaction of everybody worth counting. The benefit troops derive from manoeuvres depends almost entirely upon the way in which they are conducted. They are by no means the same thing as war, and cannot be made so because of the absence of bullets. Up to a point they can be rendered exceedingly valuable, but un- less properly conducted they may be not only useless but highly mischievous because of the, false teaching they give. At the period of which I write they were often accompanied by a considerable element of " eye-wash," and measures were not always taken to ensure that opposing com- manders would be compelled to come to their decisions in an atmosphere resembling as far as possible the fog of war which prevails on the battlefield. For example, it was not uncommon for the supervising General to command one of the opposing sides himself, and, after issuing the orders to his own troops, cross over to the enemy's position and from there observe, and afterwards criticise, the action of both forces. Having himself set the problem, and knowing all that was happening on both sides during its solution, he obviously could not derive much instruction from it, or make an impartial criticism of the action of his opponent. It was, in short, the custom for manoeuvres to take the form of a series of " field-days " rather than of continuous operations in face of an enemy, and between the movements of each day there would be a close time when neither side i64 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL need anticipate danger from the other. Conducted in this manner the so-called manoeuvres did not give a true picture of what occurs in war, or anything like it, and might more appropriately have been called battle-drill ; and as we were expected by our seniors to believe that they were a close approximation to the real thing, whereas they were nothing of the kind, they belonged to that class which, as I have explained, is more dangerous than useful. Thorough elementary instruction must of course be given before troops proceed to training of an advanced nature, and military commanders, like other people, must learn to walk before they attempt to run, but they will never become expert runners if their training is always restricted to walking. Once when acting as director of some manoeuvres, a year or two after leaving Aldershot, I was asked by a senior officer of the umpire staff at what time the troops might have their dinners. It was then about 2 p.m. on a Thursday. I replied that they could have them when- ever they chose. " But," said he, " won't you sound ' stand-fast ' or something, so that both sides can dine at the same time and without the risk of being interfered with by each other ? " He gave me up as a hopeless lunatic, I think, when I answered : " ' Stand-fast ' will be sounded on Saturday afternoon when the operations are due to finish. Meanwhile everybody, umpires included, should make their own arrangements for eating, as on active service." The chief reason why manoeuvres were not more prac- tical was that those who supervised them dare not give the opposing commanders a sufficiently free hand for fear the operations might get out of control. Granted the necessary imagination, there need have been no difficulty in preparing such schemes as would permit commanders to go all-out in their own way, and still compel them to keep within the limits imposed by conditions attaching to peace- training — such as time, money, and ground. Smith-Dorrien determined that his manoeuvres should, as far as possible, be carried out as in war ; and as an example of this I may mention an incident which occurred in the STAFF TOURS 165 first manoeuvres he held in September 1908, on the Downs near Winchester. At the end of the first day's operations the cavalry brigade of one side went comfortably into bivouac, taking little or no precautions for security during the night, and being unaware that within a mile or two was the bivouac of one of the enemy's infantry brigades. Later on a battalion of this brigade discovered the presence of the cavalry, and at dawn next morning surrounded and took the whole of them prisoners. An umpire came to headquarters to ask for a decision as to what should be done, and was promptly told by the Commander-in-Chief that the cavalry must be placed out of action until the operations terminated. The lesson thus driven home was not likely to be forgotten, and outweighed the disadvantage of depriving the captured brigade of an additional day's training. " Staff tours," which were much in favour with the War Office authorities when I was at Aldershot, are also fraught with danger unless properly managed. A " staff tour," I may explain for the benefit of the layman, is a form of training intended to give senior commanders and their staffs theoretical instruction in working out on the ground problems of strategy, tactics, marches, and the administration of an army in the field. No troops are employed, but the directing staff decide, according to the orders given and other measures taken by the officers under instruction, what the imaginary troops would accomplish. One tour held whilst I was at Aldershot had rather a significant ending. Instructions had been issued shortly before by the War Office defining the action required in the event of invasion, and Smith-Dorrien decided to adopt them as the basis of his staff tour scheme, thinking that the officers would thereby derive useful practice in an operation which presumably they might one day be called upon to carry out in reality. During the tour certain defects were exposed which seemed to merit the attention of the authorities, and these were duly brought to notice when, according to custom, the proceedings were forwarded to the War Office. Smith-Dorrien received little i66 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL thanks for his pains, and was told that his scheme had been based on conditions which were not hkely to arise ; that if exercises of this particular kind became known diplomatic compHcations might ensue ; and that for the future they should be left alone. Whether invasion was a possible contingency or not was a matter upon which opinions had for long been divided, but as instructions for meeting it had been authoritatively issued, Smith-Dorrien was doing no more than his duty in giving his officers an opportunity of studying it. King Edward paid his usual annual visit to Aldershot in May 1907, and also in 1908 and 1909. His custom was to arrive at 11.30 a.m. and leave about 4 o'clock the same day. As he did not ride, and as it was necessary that he should see as many of the troops as possible, the " scheme " had to be so arranged as to bring the troops near to places where his motor could be taken, and whence he could observe the operations. It was not an easy matter to achieve this and at the same time ensure that the various movements were properly connected and did not develop into unreal situations. One year the operations terminated with an infantry assault on the enemy's position, on the crest of which His Majesty had just arrived. Two battalions of the Guards made the assault at this point, and shortly afterwards, the " cease fire " having sounded, Grierson, the commander of the attacking side, arrived breathless near where the King stood. " Well, General," asked the King, " did you succeed in defeating the enemy ? " " Sir," said Grierson, with his usual diplomacy, " I threw into the assault all the troops at my disposal, including Your Majesty's Guards, and if they could not take the position no troops in Europe could ! " " Very good, very good," answered the King, with a broad smile on his face. The last time King Edward saw the Aldershot troops at work was in 1909 at Emperor's Hill on the Chobham Ridges. In May the following year preparations were well advanced for another visit, but his death occurred a few days before the date on which he was due to arrive. King George visited Aldershot several times when Prince of Wales, and has since regularly paid visits lasting for a ON a S X <; c . - K ^ S •* z H w o V U 'J (3 S fc 5 K o a w *. o B Q W [=1 X H KING GEORGE 167 week or ten days. In his practical way His Majesty made it quite clear to everybody that he wished to see the troops at their ordinary everyday work, and would have no change made in the normal training programme. He abhorred everything of the nature of a " set-piece," was quick to detect the intention to foist one upon him as the genuine article, and would roundly condemn any attempt to do, or to allow to be done, anything that would be impracticable in war. His visits were the more valuable to us because on return to London he would be instrumental in compeUing the War Office to settle tiresome questions regarding which we had perhaps carried on a fruitless correspondence for months past. With the same object in view His Majesty usually asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to be present during at least a part of his visit. Once when Sir Wilham Nicholson was attending in this capacity the King led us a long morning ride in the hot sun, and as Nicholson neither liked nor was accustomed to horse-exercise he returned to the Royal Pavilion feehng rather stiff and sore, both in mind and body. During luncheon he had to submit to a certain amount of chaff on the subject, the King humorously condoHng with him on the sufferings of the morning. Nicholson, who was fond of quoting scripture, replied, " Thank you. Sir, but I trust that I bear my trials with appropriate patience, for I know that whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth." His Majesty was invariably accompanied by the Queen, and both of them would be employed for the greater part of the day in seeing the troops at work, visiting the various mihtary estabhshments, enquiring into matters concerning the welfare of the soldiers and their families, and in inform- ing themselves generally of the conditions of Aldershot hfe. Their Majesties always gave us the impression that they thoroughly enjoyed being amongst the troops, while we were delighted to welcome them and to render their visits pleasant. The aeroplane, still in its infancy, was a feature of special interest at Aldershot during this period, the renowned Cody being amongst the bravest and most persevering of the pioneers engaged on this perilous work, as it then was. i68 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Under every disadvantage as regards money and material, he laboured for months and even years on Laffan's Plain, assisted by his son, to construct a machine that would consent to leave the ground, remain a reasonable time in the air, and then return to earth without smashing itself to pieces. Eventually he succeeded in accomplishing, for the times in which he Uved, some remarkable flights, but later he met the same fate as many other aviators of those early days. The country owes much to Cody. Kites and dirigible balloons were also still in the element- ary stage, and like all other aeronautical duties were under the supervision of Colonel (now Major-General Sir) J. Capper. The tank was not yet in being, but its prototype, the " caterpillar," was, and was thought to have a great future as a tractor for dragging heavy guns and vehicles across broken ground. Universal sympathy was extended to the drivers, who, in consequence of the caterpillar's violent up-and-down motions, experienced aU the sensations of acute sea-sickness, and looked it. In June 1910, while engaged on a staff tour in Leicester- shire, I received a letter from Sir WiUiam Nicholson offering me the post of Commandant of the Staff College. This unexpected offer, though flattering to me personally and possessing many attractive possibilities, had the drawback common to other army appointments in that the post was greatly underpaid. However, I determined not to be baulked of a promising opening on that account, but to have a try at filling what was one of the most important positions which an officer of my standing could in peace time be called upon to hold. At the end of July I bade farewell to Aldershot, where I had made many friends and had learned much of the practical side of my profession from the officers with whom I had been associated. CHAPTER XI COMMANDANT OF THE STAFF COLLEGE History of college — Students and stafi — Promoted Major-General — Subjects of study — Nature of staff tours — System of classifying the students — Defects in instruction — Points on which special emphasis was laid — Importance of considering defensive as well as offensive warfare — Warning given to students about war with Germany — Naval War College — Admirals Jackson and Colville — Visits to the Loire and Amiens battlefields of 1870 war — My first speech in French — General Picquart — With the King's suite in army manoeuvres — Adventures with Oxley while motoring — Trinity College — Created Knight of the Victorian Order — Leave the Staff College to become Director of MiUtary Training. While at Aldershot I had been nominated to act as Chief of the General Staff to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was to command one of the opposing sides at the army manoeuvres to be held in September, but my transfer to Camberley necessarily entailed the appointment of another officer, and as the Staff College was closed during August and Sep- tember for the summer vacation I utihsed these two months in thinking over my new duties and deciding how best to carry them out. This was not a matter to be settled without careful consideration, for there is no position in the army where greater influence for good or for evil can be exerted over the rising generation of officers than that of Command- ant of the Staff College. The history of the college dates back to 1799, when an institution for educating officers for staff employment was estabhshed at High Wycombe, the superintendent being, for some reason unknown to me, a retired French officer, by name General Jarry. In 1802 this institution was given the designation of " Senior Department of the Royal MiUtary College," and a Junior Department for educating cadets was added to it. Eleven years later the Senior 169 170 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Department was moved to Farnham and in 182 1 to Sand- hurst, and there the two branches continued to be known as the " Royal Mihtary College." In 1862 the present Staff College was built, but both colleges remained under the same Governor until 1870, when the Staff College was separated from the Royal Military College for purposes of instruction, though it continued to be under it for adminis- tration. This s^^stem was most inconvenient, and while I was Commandant I induced the War Ofhce to separate the two colleges for all purposes and so allow each to look after itself. The number of students in the early days was very small and, as I have said in a previous chapter, amounted in 1897 to about sixty. Shortly before I became Commandant this number had grown to a hundred and twenty, and the instructional staff to fifteen. There was no adjutant or other administrative officer at the college, and many petty and tiresome details had therefore to be dealt with by me, whereas my whole time ought to have been devoted to instruction. Up to about thirty years before there had been an adjutant, and the story was that he had been abolished on the recommendation of the Commandant, who, having a large family, was desirous of appropriating the adjoining quarters occupied by the adjutant, also a married man. The War Office approved my proposal to revert to the appointment of an adjutant, and I avoided the difficulty as to quarters by asking for a bachelor so that he might live in the college with the other of&cers. I was fortunate in securing for the post a very excellent officer — Captain Brewis of the Warwickshire Regiment — who was invaluable to me and a great favourite with staff and students alike. To the deep regret of all who knew him, " Bobbie " Brewis was killed in the Great War. The object of the Staff College being to train officers not only for staff work but also for the duties of command, the name is rather a misnomer, and I have always thought that " War School " would be more appropriate. I tried to get this designation adopted, but without effect. I tried, too, to get the pay of the Commandant increased, but for a long time failed in this also. I set to work rather subtly. THE STAFF COLLEGE 171 so I thought, a few weeks after I had been promoted Major- General in 1912. I pointed out to the authorities that I was still being shown in the Army List as a Brigadier- General of the General Staff, whereas I was in fact a Major- General, and that I could not understand why I should be given a title inferior to that conferred upon me by the King. They were at first puzzled to know what to do, as Major-General of the General Staff was not a recognised appointment, but eventually the higher title was accorded me, and having extracted this concession I then claimed to be paid at a rate consistent with the title. This was refused, no good reasons being given, but when Sir John French became Chief of the Imperial General Staff he saw the justice of the case and a higher scale of pa}^ was sanctioned — the same day that I ceased to be Commandant ! I have already referred to the improvement made in the curriculum after Hildyard became Commandant in 1893, and when he left in 1897 the course was more exclusively practical than at any other college in Europe. Before and after the South African war his system was continued by Miles, and other useful reforms were later introduced by the present Lord Rawlinson, especially in the substi- tution of work on the ground for the less practical form of work on paper. Summarised, the main subjects were as follows : Military history and geography, strategy, and tactics, with special reference to modem campaigns, though older ones were also studied. Principles of Imperial Defence, defence of frontiers, plans of concentration, naval strategy and bases, defended ports, food- supplies of United Kingdom, British and foreign submarine cables, staff duties at home and in the field, organisation of the British and principal foreign armies, landings on an enemj'-'s coast, oversea expeditions in general. System of transport and supply, economic geography, com- mercial law. Medical and ordnance services as affecting commanders and staff officers. Staff tours, as time and funds permitted. There were many other subjects, but the above will suffice to show the variety of the work done. 172 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Speaking generally, the first year was devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, and the second to its application. The solving of problems dealing with tactical situations, billeting, camping, and other duties which lend themselves to this method of treatment, was a special feature of the second year's work, as also was the guiding of troops (imaginary) across roadless and unknown country by night. Staff tours, whose nature has already been explained, usually lasted three or four days, and I tried to conduct them in such a way as would test the students' tempers and physical powers as well as their knowledge. Information about the (imaginary) enemy would be given out at all hours of the day and night and emanate from all sources — newspapers, secret agents, prisoners, inhabitants, and aero- planes — some of the news being rehable, some doubtful, some contradictory, and it was for the students to sift and piece together the different items, thus obtaining approxi- mately the same amount of information as they might be expected to get in war before they could regulate the action of their troops. This meant that they occasionally had no opportunity of going to bed at night, or only for a short time, notwithstanding that they had been hard at work during the day, and had another similar day in pros- pect. They took it all in good part, and it served to bring home to them that staff employment in war is not, as some people think, all beer and skittles. One staff tour was held annually in the Welsh mountains, so as to represent Indian frontier warfare, and on it the inexperienced students discovered what it means to make long mountain cHmbs on foot, and learnt how to protect camps at night in savage countries, capture passes crowned with sangars, arrange for the movement of long strings of pack animals following narrow tracks, and finally how to withdraw a force, sniped by hostile tribesmen from the adjacent hillsides, down the nalas to the frontier — at Bangor or Criccieth. The benefit students derive from the Staff College course naturally depends upon the quahty of the instruction, and good instructors, or directing staff as they are called, are not too easily come by. As a rule they are well up in the COMMANDANT OF STAFF COLLEGE 173 subjects with which they have to deal, or soon become so after joining the college, and there is no question as to their keenness to do their best for those under their charge. Not all, however, possess the gift of imparting in an interesting and intelligible manner the knowledge they have been at such pains to acquire ; some have a tendency to ride a particular theory to death ; and others to attach so much importance to regulations as to convey the idea that a knowledge of them is in itself a proof of military proficiency. In order to keep myself acquainted with the kind of instruction given, and to correct what I thought to be wrong, I used to visit the lecture rooms at uncertain hours, and once caused some anxiety to the lecturer as well as amusement to the students, though I did not know this at the time. The lecturer had apparently intended to restrict the lecture to about twenty minutes, the orthodox duration being about fifty, and as I arrived on the scene just as he was coming to an end he proceeded to repeat the whole story again, so I discovered afterwards, the students loyally playing up to him by showing rapt attention in listening to what they had already heard only a few minutes before. I had, as all Commandants have had, some good in- structors and some who were not so good, but on the whole I was very well served and especially by the two senior assistants — Perceval of the Gunners and Johnny Gough of the Rifle Brigade — who were respectively in charge of the two divisions into which the students were formed. Gough had a high reputation as a brilliant and accomplished soldier, and it was a heavy loss to the army when, as Chief of the General Staff of the ist Army, he was mortally wounded by a stray bullet in Flanders in February 19 15, when going to visit his battalion in the trenches. He came of a renowned fighting family, and was the brother of Hubert Gough, who rose in the Great War from Brigadier to the command of the 5th Army, which fought so gallantly against overwhelming odds when the Germans made their great, but unsuccessful, bid for victory in March igi8. Amongst the other officers employed on the directing staff were Furse, Barrow, Ross and Ballard (contemporaries of mine when a student), Howell (a rising soldier, killed in 174 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the Great War), Foster and Hull (since dead), Stewart (who had distinguished himself in Kelly's march from Gilgit to Chitral), Harper, Hoskins, Davidson, and Percival. At the end of each term — there were three terms in the year — the directing staff of each of the two divisions met in conference to discuss the work done by the students and to classify them according to the ability they had shown. This classification underwent considerable alteration during the first year of the course, as the progress made by some of the officers was much greater than that made by others ; but in the second year it remained fairly constant, and by the end of that year it was perhaps as good an estimate of the students' capacity as could be made. There was no danger of favouritism, for if any one of the staff showed an undue leaning towards a student the others could be relied upon to see that impartiality was maintained. As pre- viously mentioned, this method of deciding upon the students' qualifications was adopted while Hildyard was Commandant, in preference to the system hitherto in vogue by which they were placed in order of merit mainly accord- ing to the number of marks gained in paper examinations at the end of the course. It answered well, and this I think is proved by the fact that of the i8o officers who graduated during m}^ regime very few failed in the Great War to come up to the expectation formed of them, and fewer still exceeded it. The students are liable to be sent away from the college for misconduct, or if they show themselves unlikely to become proficient staff officers or commanders. It fell to my lot to dismiss two only. One was a young man from the Overseas Dominions who, both by ordinary education and natural abiUty, ought not to have been sent to the college, for he could never hope to be equal to a position of responsibility. The other was a clever and gallant officer who foolishly persisted in refusing to grow a moustache, thus contravening the King's Regulations of the time, which directed that the upper lip should not be shaved. Many of the young men of the period were in the habit of shaving, and as strict orders had been issued by the War Office forbidding the METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 175 practice, and telling General Officers to put a stop to it, the offender was duly warned by the directing staff of his division. As this had no effect he was brought before me, and when I asked him why he continued to break the regulations he rephed that they merely forbade shaving, and that he did not shave, but only made use of the scissors to cut off such few hairs as would grow, and which looked very ugly when allowed to grow. No one would be so idiotic as to think that an officer is any better for wearing a moustache than he is for shaving or clipping it off, and the regulation has since been aboHshed, but staff officers are expected to set an example of obeying the King's Regulations, and I had no alternative but to report the matter. The officer was ordered to leave the college, and I am sorry to add that he was killed in the Great War. On taking over command of the college the flaw in instruction which struck me most was one which is not uncommonly seen in other educational establishments — that is, the aptitude to dwell too much upon the theoretical aspect of a problem and the neglect to reahse the difficulties which beset its solution in practice. Details, so-called, were thought to be petty and beneath the notice of the big-minded man, and yet they are the very things which nine hundred and ninety times out of a thousand make just the difference in war between success and failure. What- ever may be the case in peace time there are few or no small things in war, though some are of greater importance than others, and those who, like myself, attended the meetings of the War Cabinet for more than two years during the Great War will bear out this statement. Another objectionable habit I noticed was the craving to employ high-sounding phrases such as " pivot of manoeuvre," " interior lines," " offensive-defensive," and so on, all of which were right enough in their way, on paper, but in actual war do not greatly assist the ordinary commander in the thing that really matters, the defeat of the enemy. There is only one road to victory, given a capable opponent, and that is the road of hard fighting, of which there is usually a great deal. I was very insistent on this point, and in the solution of problems, whether on paper or on the ground. 176 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL I would always lead the student up to it and from it judge whether his solution was or was not sound. War, I would impress upon him, is largely a contest between the brains and grit of the opposing commanders, in which each en- deavours to outwit, outlast, and beat the other. In the course of my final address to the students who left the college at the end of 1912 I said : It will further assist you to keep on the right lines if at all times you remember to study with the definite aim of obtaining guidance for future use in war, and not merely for the sake of amassing a store of information. Not one of us could compare perhaps with certain military historians who might be mentioned, as far as mere knowledge of past wars is concerned, and yet we do not admit that they would prove to be our best commanders. Why ? Simply because they do not study military history, we think, in the way that we do or ought to do, namely with the object of making actual use in war of the knowledge acquired. If we conduct our investigations from this standpoint we shall not be likely to waste time in fascinating, but valueless, hair- splitting dialectics ; we will not make too frequent use of stereo- typed phrases which may mean one of several things or even nothing at all ; we shall not burden our minds with too many historical parallels ; and will not be so apt to form conclusions which, however attractive they may appear on paper, have little or no connection with the rough and bloody work of masses of men trying to kill each other. The question of giving more instruction in duties con- nected with a retreat also called for attention. The training regulations dwelt with great persistence on the importance of the offensive, and the idea of fighting on the defensive was thought to be so obnoxious to the minds of the authorities that, for some time past, it had been deemed politic to leave defensive training severely alone. There was the greater inchnation to leave it alone because of the impossibility of reproducing in peace some of the conditions — and the most important of them — which attach to a retreat in war. Still it was necessary to do a^' that could be done, for however valuable offensive action may be, and undoubtedly is, there could be no certainty that a defensive policy would not one day be imposed upon us, and for that contingency we ought to be prepared. I therefore made it O < m < '< -ji. c z o C MEASURES FOR RETREAT 177 an almost invariable practice at all staff tours and other exercises on the ground to create a situation that entailed taking measures for retreat, and the following extract from the final address referred to above bears on the same subject : Of all forms of making war the one that demands most careful study is that of fighting a superior and well-trained force. Every soldier feels, and ought to feel, a great aversion from retiring from before the enemy without a trial of strength, and yet if the enemy is found to be superior (I do not refer merely to numbers), and is concentrated, there may be nothing for it but to fall back and await a better opportunity, as many a good general has had to do in the past. For example, Moore to Corunna ; Wellington in 1810 and again in 1812 ; Napoleon to Leipzig in 1813 and to Paris in 1814 ; and Jackson and Lee in the American Civil War. The great difficulty attaching to operations of this nature is to reconcile two conflicting aims — the husbanding of one's own forces and the infliction of loss upon the enemy — and it can only be overcome if the commander possesses sound judgment and a powerful iron will ; if the staff are accurate in their calculations and untiring in their efforts ; and if the troops possess great mobility, high morale, confidence in their leaders, and good fighting capacity in general. Remember, too, that the larger the force the more difficult does the operation become. Our regula- tions justly lay stress on the value of the offensive ; but if this teaching alone is given, think what may be the effect on the troops when they are ordered to retire instead of to go forward — that is, to abandon that method of making war by which alone, according to the training they have previously received, decisive victory can be achieved. Think, too, of the disintegration and demoralisation which nearly always accompany retrograde move- ments, even when an army has not been previously defeated. It seems to me that there is practically no chance of successfully carrying out this operation in war unless we thoroughly study and practice it beforehand during peace. If we have this practice, the operation will then not come as a surprise to the troops in war ; they will understand better what they are expected to do ; and they will recognise it as being a form of war which may have to be adopted by any army, and can be adopted, not only without failure, but with a certain measure, ultimately, of success. You will do well to study the methods of Wellington in the Peninsula, and the teaching furnished by the American Civil war on this important subject. I have reason to believe that this advice, published in N 178 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the Army Review by the order of the Secretary of State for War, Lord Haldane, caused other and more senior officers to give increased attention to defensive fighting, and thereby was indirectly of some help to them in the historic retreat from Mons. Emphasis was also laid, day in and day out, on the importance of the staff cultivating close and friendly relations with the regimental officers, and of preventing the erection of the barrier which at one period separated the two with such pernicious effect. This advice, too, I believe, bore fruit in the Great War, as did also the injunction not to be content with merely giving orders, but, by watching and helping before matters had time to go wrong, ensure that they were carried out as the commander desired. Another warning persistently rubbed in was the prob- ability of war with Germany, and the responsibilities it would cast upon Staff College officers in particular. In this connection, and at the risk of being accused of imduly blow- ing my own trumpet, I shall quote from the final address I made to the students who left at the end of 191 1 : So far as one can judge from the present state of the world, you may any day find yourselves taking part in a war than which there has been no greater for the last hundred years or so, and it may be upon you to whom I am now speaking that to a great extent will depend how we emerge from that war. We are too apt to go on day by day discussing the probability and conse- quences of certain wars, without ever really recognising our own individual responsibility, and remember that officers who have been through the Staff College have the greater responsibility. You do not come here for the sake of passing examinations at the end of the first year, and of obtaining a P.S.C. at the end of the second. You come here in order that you may leave the college better and more efficient members of the military com- munity. You should endeavour to increase the knowledge you have acquired, disseminate it amongst others, and, as I have often told you, direct your studies and peace preparations in general to a special and definite end — that of fighting the most probable and most formidable adversary for the time being. Finally, remember that when the day for fighting comes, the qualifications demanded of you, whether on the staff or in command, will include, in addition to a good theoretical know- ledge of your professional duties, the possession of a quick eye, SIR HENRY JACKSON 179 a good digestion, an untiring activity, a determination to close with your enemy, and a firm resolution not to take counsel of your fears. It was well understood between me and the students who " the most probable and most formidable adversary " was. We had often discussed him, and there was no need to mention him by name. That was seldom done, as the hint had long since been received from London that we were not in any way to meddle with questions which might, if they became known, give offence to a friendly (!) Power, and possibly lead to " diplomatic complications." " Mum " was the word, therefore, in regard to all work — and there was a great deal — which was designed to assist the students in studying the conflict which threatened us, and which we had in fact to meet within less than three years of the time when the above words were spoken. Shortly before I became Commandant the Admiralty had established a War College at Portsmouth, with the object of giving instruction to naval officers somewhat similar to that given at the Staff College. The course was, however, much shorter, and in other respects was not regarded as being of quite the same importance, but I should imagine that it did a great deal of good, and it undoubtedly helped to bring the two services closer together. Two or three naval officers attended the Staff College for a few months as students, and military officers were sent to the Naval College ; the students of both colleges, with their instructors, occasionally took part in combined naval and military exercises, in which there was a useful exchange of ideas ; and in many ways the officers of the two colleges were able to learn much from and about each other. Amongst the naval friends I had the good fortune to make in this way was Sir Henry Jackson, then Commandant of the Naval College. He very kindly arranged for me to spend a week at sea with the ist Battle Squadron, com- manded by Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. The work of the squadron was full of interest for me, especially the " battle practice," and I was most hospitably treated by the Admiral and the officers of his fine flagship the Collingwood. i8o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Besides making the usual trips to the more classical battlefields of 1870-71 — Spicheren, Woerth, and Gravelotte — I revived the custom which had lapsed in recent years of taking the students to the battlefields near Amiens, Orleans, and Le Mans. I did so because these battles had a special value of their own, as they were fought by partially-trained and hastily-raised French troops, and I always felt that one day we ourselves might have to fight with the same kind of troops, as indeed we had to do in the Great War. I think I am justified in saying that the discussions which ensued and the knowledge that was acquired during these visits were of benefit to the students when employed with the troops of which our New Armies were composed. During one of the visits to Orleans, the headquarters of a French army corps, I had an interesting conversation with the corps commander, who, as a young man, had fought in the French cavalry during the war. He had been present at the famous cavalry charge at Morsbronn, and then went with the remains of MacMahon's army to Sedan, where he took part in the cavalry charge which preceded the invest- ment of that place, his regiment being one of the few to break through the German lines before the French forces were entirely surrounded. He was then sent south to the Loire, being present at the various battles near Orleans, and he was therefore able to give much information in regard to them. One day he invited me to bring my fifty odd students after dinner to meet some of his officers at the military club. We were given a most cordial reception, and after the national anthem had been played by a large band outside the club, which was brilliantly illuminated, we were con- ducted inside. We entered a room profusely decorated with flowers and flags, and sat down to enjoy dessert, \\dne, coffee, and smokes. To my surprise our host got on his feet towards the end of the evening, and made a very eulogistic speech respecting the British army, and its past and present relations with the French army. One of his staff then read the English translation of the speech, which had evidently been prepared with much care, and it then remained for me to reply. SPEECH-MAKING i8i Having been taken unawares, and being at all times incapable of making a public speech on the spur of the moment, I felt that the only thing to do was to put on a bold front and try to score by replying in French. I knew that my vocabulary was very limited, and that my French pronunciation was execrably bad, but there seemed nothing for it but to do or die. After talking for the space of some ten minutes, and having tried the effect of a few jokes — which apparently were not understood and certainly did not amuse — the proceedings became distinctly fiat, and as a total collapse seemed to be imminent I made a last despairing effort not to be beaten. I apologised for my ignorance of the French language, regretted I could not say half what I wished to say, and added that, being unable to speak further, I would call on my officers to sing a ditty commonly heard at similar reunions in England. I then proposed the health of the corps commander and asked the officers to sing " For he's a jolly good fellow." They responded with even more than the usual amount of noise and discord, and all that the French officers could grasp of the performance was a repetition of the same words. Next morning I bought the local newspaper in order to see what kind of account was given of the entertainment. The corps commander's speech, a very good one, was reported verbatim. Mine was not. I did not expect that it would be. But the reporter credited me with a far better speech than the one I had actually deUvered, and added that, at the end of it, I called upon my officers to sing the well-known Enghsh song of which the chorus was, " For thou art a very good man ! " On another occasion, in 1913, we were invited by General Picquart to meet the officers of the army corps at Amiens. Not to be again caught napping I took the precaution to ask Maurice — one of my staff and an excellent French scholar — to prepare a speech for me beforehand. It was well that I did so, for I had to reply to a most flattering welcome, and can claim (thanks to Maurice) to have come out of the ordeal with flying colours. I had a long talk with the General before we parted. He was a native of Strasburg, and as a boy of about ten years of age was in the city when the Germans besieged it in 1870. He de- i82 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL scribed to me, with some emotion, how his family had lost all their property and treasures, and he evidently looked forward to the day of reckoning, and hoped that when it arrived we would be on his side. A few months afterwards he was thrown from his horse and killed. So as not to lose all touch with the practical side of soldiering I used to attend the annual divisional and brigade trainings as far as college duties would allow. One year I was asked to prepare a scheme for the inter-divisional manoeuvres of two of the commands in England, and to draft it in such a way as to test the leadership of two brigadiers who were shortly to be considered by the Selection Board for promotion to Major-General. I therefore so arranged matters that at the commencement of the opera- tions the two officers found themselves opposing each other, each being in command of a detachment which was unlikely to be reinforced for a period of at least twelve hours, and I left them as free a hand as possible in dealing with the situation thus created, so that they might show what they could do. How they emerged from the test it was no part of my business as chief umpire to say, and I do not pretend to know what opinion was formed of them by the two General Officers under whom they were serving, and who exercised chief supervision over the operations ; but I do know that they were not promoted when their turn came, and yet both of them rose to positions of high command in the Great War. Manoeuvres afford the best means in time of peace for testing the capacity of an officer to command troops in war, but they are not always a reliable guide of a commander's merit ; they are very different from the real thing. In 1912 I was ordered to accompany the King during the army manoeuvres in Cambridgeshire, and wishing to make myself acquainted with the country over which they were to take place, I motored through it a few days previous to the commencement of operations, being accompanied by Colonel Oxley, who was then on the directing staff of the college. One morning a powerful car suddenly emerged at full speed from a blind corner at some cross-roads we were passing, striking our lighter car — an open one — full broad- MOTOR ACCIDENTS 183 side and turning it completely round and upside down. Oxley, I, and the chauffeur were shot clean out of it, for- tunately landing on a patch of grass, for a distance, as we afterwards ascertained, of twelve yards. On picking our- selves up we were surprised to find that we were quite unhurt beyond a few bruises, and I still held in my hands the map and magnifying glass I had been using at the moment the collision occurred. The car was practically a wreck. Oxley was wont to be a Jonah in his motor drives. Two or three days later his car was again struck by one coming from a side road, though he once more escaped with a shaking ; and one day, when motoring with me along the foot of the South Downs, there was further trouble. We met a ramshackle country cart being driven by a boy, in which were two large casks probably containing pigwash or some such mixture. As the road was narrow we slowed down almost to a halt, the boy directing his cart off the road and up the rather steep hill-side so as to pass us. This brought the full load of the cart to bear on the wheel next to us, and just as we were passing the axle gave way and the boy and the contents of his casks were flung into our car. Oxley was fairly well drenched, but, to his intense relief, it transpired that the casks held nothing worse than drinking water, and the total damage done, over and above the broken axle, was hmited to barking the boy's shins. We gave him 2s. 6d. as compensation, and then proceeded on our journey. During the manoeuvres the King and his suite were accommodated in Trinity College, everything possible being done by the college officials to render the visit pleasant to all of us. At the end of the manoeuvres the usual conference, or " pow-wow," was held in the hall of the college, some of the Fellows attending to hear how the soldiers acquitted themselves in the talking line. The time of day, immediately after luncheon, was not conducive to alert attention, and for the first hour or so the proceedings dragged on in a dull and dreary manner, with little or no prospect of ever coming to an end. This depressing circumstance, plus the lunch, was too much for some of the audience, and the Master in i84 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL particular had to struggle very hard to prevent his nodding head from coming into contact with the table at which he sat at the top of the hall. The following year the manoeuvres were held in Northamptonshire. I was again attached to the King's suite, all of whom were the guests of Lord Spencer at Althorp. The party numbered about twenty, and included the Queen, the Duke of Connaught, and Prince Arthur of Connaught. Lord Spencer was a deUghtful host, surpassed in kindness, if at all, only by his daughter Lady Delia, who acted as hostess. By his invitation I went to Althorp a few days before the manoeuvres commenced so as to talk over and arrange certain matters with him previous to Their Majesties' arrival, and I have the most pleasant recollection of the hospitality received. On the day the manoeuvres terminated I was informed by CHve Wigram, one of the equerries, that the King wished to see me. I found His Majesty with the Queen, Lord Spencer, and a few members of the suite in the famous picture gallery, and was then told by the King that in return for the services I had rendered during the last few years he proposed to make me a Knight Commander of the Victorian Order. I was more than surprised, somewhat nervous, and quite ignorant as to what I was expected to do, but Wigram came to the rescue, drew the sword he was wearing, lianded it to the King, and told me to kneel down. Having duly knighted me the King put out his hand, and not knowing what else to do I shook it, rising to my feet at the same time. I ought to have kissed it, of course, as a sign of homage, but the King was probably quite as pleased to see me shake it. The incident brought a broad smile over the faces of the onlookers, and I beat as hasty a retreat as I respectfully could. I have always felt far more gratified with the honour thus simply and spontaneously conferred upon me as a mark of His Majesty's personal esteem, than with any of the rewards since received on the recommenda- tion of ministers or my military superiors. In the summer of 19 13 I was told by Sir John French that he wished me to go to the War Office as Director of Military Training. This was much against my inchnation. LEAVING THE STAFF COLLEGE 185 as I have always disliked life in London, more especially official life, and I was anxious to be given active command of troops. However, the Field-Marshal was good enough to make his request more palatable by promising me the command of the ist Division at Aldershot when it became vacant in the summer of the following year. The night before leaving the Staff College, in October 1913, I was entertained by the staff and students at dinner, and I am not ashamed to say that in the short farewell speech I made to them my heart was fairly in my mouth. Black sheep are to be found in nearly ever}^ flock, but there are an unusual small proportion of them at the Staff College. Both staff and students are of the most attractive character, hard workers, lovable companions whether at work or play, and really good fellows in every sense of the word. I grieve to think that over one hundred and fifty of the officers who had graduated at Camberley met their death in the Great War. The next time I dined with a party of Staff College officers was at Cologne in 1919, when in command of the Army of the Rhine. Dillon, my private secretary, collected all the P.S.C. officers then serving under my orders (I am afraid one was unintentionally left out), and we spent a pleasant evening together at my house overlooking the river, discussing the old Camberley days and the great events which had since taken place. CHAPTER XII DIRECTOR OF MILITARY TRAINING Duties — Unsatisfactory responsibility for training — Arrangements for command at home in time of war — " Staff " cannot " command " — Question of invasion — Invasion ruled out as impracticable and replaced by theory of raids — Reversion to invasion theory — Question mainly one for the Admiralty — Constant discussions finally settled in August 1914 — PoUcy as to invasion during the Great War — Economy exercised to the detriment of training — " Curragh incident " and its effect on army officers — " Joe " Maude — Collapse of the proposed coercion of Ulster and resignation of the Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General — Sir Charles Douglas — Army manoeuvres arranged for 191 4 — War with Germany declared — Am appointed Quartermaster-General of the Expeditionary Force. I JOINED the staff at the War Office for the third time on the 9th October 1913. As Director of MiUtar}^ Training I was responsible to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the training of all troops at home, for the education of officers (including the Cadets at Woolwich and Sandhurst and the Officers Training Corps), and for questions connected with home defence. The directorate was in good working order, thanks to the efforts of Murray while in charge of it from September 1907 to June 1912, excellent training manuals had been prepared, and I had little to do except ensure that the appUcation of the principles they contained kept pace with changing conditions. There was, however, an objectionable flaw in the chain of responsibihty for training, in that all training instructions were prepared under the orders of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, while the troops were inspected, not by him; or his staff, but by a separate body of Inspectors located at the Horse Guards under an Inspector-General, the latter reporting the results of the inspections to the Army Council. 186 < o z 5 < < < > O (X, O C/5 H a c < U z W J H Z K o DIRECTOR OF MILITARY TRAINING 187 The position therefore was that while the General Staff drafted the training instructions they had no opportunity — except by arranging occasionally to accompany the Inspector- General — of seeing and hearing for themselves how they worked in practice ; and on the other hand the Inspector- General's Staff had this opportunity but were without the authority to change the instructions if found to be unsuitable. The system had been introduced by the Esher Committee ten years before, the idea of having a separate inspecting branch having probably been taken from the large con- tinental armies, in which it was necessary to have Inspectors constantly moving about between one command and another so as to ensure uniformity. With our comparatively small army there was not nearly the same necessity for them, as uniformity could have been safeguarded, and at far less expense, by inspections carried out by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and his subordinates, and, moreover, the latter would have had the benefit of mahitaining closer touch with the troops for whose training they were primarily responsible. Even if a separate inspecting staff were required it should have been placed under the orders of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as in foreign armies, and not made, as it was, independent of him. This illogical system, which might have proved very mischievous had not the General Staff and Inspecting Staff been careful to work closely together, came to an end when a Commander-in-Chief of all troops in the United Kingdom was appointed in December 1915, as the Inspecting Staff was then made part of his headquarters and its independent status thus disappeared. Both he and the Inspecting Staff were abolished early in 1920. The arrangements for the supreme command at home in time of war were also not as satisfactory as could be desired. The scheme for home defence contemplated the employment of a large number of troops ; these were located in peace time in seven different commands, and thus served under the orders of seven different Com- manders - in - Chief ; and when required for home defence duties they would differ materially in composition and i88 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL efficiency according to the conditions of the moment. In these circumstances, and on the accepted assumption that the greatest danger of an overseas attack would be in the earUest stage of the war, the exercise of supreme command was bound to be difficult and complicated, and therefore it was desirable that this duty should be definitely assigned to an officer selected during peace, so that he might, subject to the instructions of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, draw up his plan and make himself acquainted beforehand with the many details which would affect its execution. No such officer was, however, in existence, nor was it intended to have one in war. As I have just said, the Director of Military Training was responsible in peace that suitable measures were taken for home defence, and although some additional senior commanders were to be appointed in war, the supreme control of all military operations in the United Kingdom was to be exercised by the War Office, that is, by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This was not a sound arrangement, and it showed a strange forgetfulness of the elementary principles of military organisation. A staff officer cannot command troops and is not meant to do so ; while in any war which would render us liable to invasion it was practically certain that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would have far too much to engage his attention in other parts of the world, and in the raising and training of additional troops, to admit of his being able to carry direct responsibility for the security of the home front, nor ought he to be troubled with every petty hostile raid by sea or air that might be attempted. Had we been subjected in the Great War to any serious attack from oversea the truth of these remarks might have been established in a rather unpleasant manner. As it was, the system proved to be defective both as regards efficiency of defence and economy of personnel, and, like that of training, had to be remedied by the appointment of a Commander-in- Chief in 1915 — the only way in which it could be remedied. Whatever may be said for or against the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the home forces in time of peace, there is no doubt that one is required when we have a great war on our hands. I shall refer to this question again in the HOME DEFENCE 189 chapter dealing with my experiences as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. For years before I became Director of Military Training there had been a constant difference of official opinion as to the necessity of maintaining a home defence force. As mentioned in Chapter VII., it had been decided in 1888 that the provision of this force was the " primary duty" of the military authorities, and, notwithstanding the differences of opinion, this policy may be said to have held good till 1905, when it was replaced by one of an entirely opposite character, the Prime Minister, Mr, Balfour, then laying down that " the serious invasion of these islands is not a possibility that we need consider." A distinction was drawn at about the same time between invasion and raids, the feasibility of the latter being admitted, and the question then arose : W'Tien is a raid not a raid ? The answer eventually given was that an attack by a force not exceeding 10,000 men should be classed as a raid : if by more than that number the attack became invasion and therefore could be ruled out as impracticable. Later it was discovered that two separate raids of 10,000 men each might be attempted simultaneously, so as to give one of them a better chance of succeeding; it was also admitted that raids on a smaller scale — from 500 to 2000 men each — against any one of several possible, though less important, objectives might be attempted ; and, finally, it was agreed that, as a raid would be a matter of, say, forty- eight hours only, and might be made without any warning, there would not be time to transfer troops from one vulner- able point in order to repel an attack on another. Provision had accordingly to be made to meet these conclusions, and the general result of accepting the policy as to raids and rejecting that of invasion was to add complications to a problem which was already loaded with complexity, and to make little if any reduction in the total number of troops required to give security. The doctrine of no-invasion was replaced in 1909 by the original policy, Mr. Asquith, who was then Prime Minister, announcing in the House of Commons that it was " the business of the War Office to see that we have in aU circum- igo FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL stances a properly organised and properly equipped force capable of dealing effectively with a possible invading force of seventy thousand men." This figure held the field when I became Director of Military Training, and I had not been long in the post before the eternal question was again brought forward for consideration. In the many discussions which followed at the meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, the " blue-water school," or anti-invasionists, would at one time be on top, at another it was the " bolt from the blue " party, or pro- invasionists, who scored. Exactly which came out best depended chiefly upon the comparative debating skill of the representative spokesmen, and words continued to obscure and confuse the main issue until the question was definitely settled by the breaking out of war in August 1914. This diversity of views was not conducive either to economy or to a good system of military organisation, and, as the responsible staff officer for home defence, I would often have been far more anxious than I was had there been no Territorial Force. Invasion or no invasion, this Force was, at any rate, a substantial miUtary asset to have to fall back upon, and the services it rendered in many parts of the world during the Great War were a proof that there was more value in the volunteer movement than many people supposed. To my mind, the possibility of invasion was essentially a question to be answered by the Admiralty, granted that the enemy, as in the case of Germany, had ample troops at his disposal, good communications between his garrison towns and ports of embarkation, and was prepared to risk losing his sea-communications in return for the prospective advantages to be gained once a landing was effected. More than a century had elapsed since our fleet had fought a really formidable enemy ; many new inventions had meanwhile been introduced ; naval operations are notoriously liable to the uncertainties of war ; and it was for the Admiralty to say whether, having regard to these considerations and to the strength of the enemy's fleet, they could undertake to prevent a landing. I always repUed, therefore, to those who argued against the practicability of invasion that it RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NAVY 191 was for the Admiralty to give a reasonable — not necessarily an absolute — guarantee, which would be acceptable to the Government, that they could in all circumstances prevent a hostile landing ; that if no such assurance could be given, we ought to be prepared to deal with a landing by military means ; and that, irrespective of the feasibility of the operation, it was conceivable that, owing to the mere threat of attack on our coast-towns, the Government might, in the event of war with Germany, be compelled by public opinion to retain at home a considerable number of troops urgently needed on the continent. It was, in fact, to meet this threat rather than to meet actual invasion or raids that suitable preparations for home defence were required. During the time that I was Director of Mihtary Training I do not remember that the Admiralty ever saw their way definitely to give the guarantee — and their hesitation was easy to understand — but there were those in high places who continued to argue that the navy alone afforded sufficient security, and who scoffed at the idea that Germany might seek to spring a surprise upon us by secretly preparing and despatching a raiding or invading force without a previous declaration of war. " Why," it was asked, " should it be contemplated for a moment that a civilised country like Germany will be guilty of such atrocious conduct as to make a deliberate attack upon a nation with whom she is stiU at peace ? No, a bolt from the blue, or invasion of any kind, is a preposterous theory, and even assuming it were attempted it could never succeed." I have listened to the reiteration of these and similar arguments for hours at a time, but they do not seem to have been quite so much to the fore when war came along in 1914. Only four of our six regular divisions were at first allowed to proceed to France ; for a great part of the war the standard of 70,000 possible invaders was not only retained but increased ; and a considerable number of troops were for long kept back in this country. It was not until the war was nearly three years old that the reinforcement of the divisions abroad was allowed to take unquestioned precedence over the estimated requirements for the home front, and I have yet to learn that this policy 192 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL was ever really opposed by those who, with great courage and still greater eloquence, had been so eager before the war to pour ridicule upon those who advocated the adoption of reasonable home defence measures. The truth is, that however bravely one may talk in time of peace, when brought up in war against the grim proposition of an enemy having at his disposal millions of soldiers, an undefeated fleet, and abundant transports, wdthin a few hours steaming of our coast, no government dare rely, or would be allowed to do so by public opinion, solely upon the navy for the security of England — the nerve-centre of the whole Empire. To revert to the question of training, I may recall the fact that reduction of expenditure on army services was constantly being pressed in the years immediately before the Great War ; " estimates " had to be cut down to their lowest limit ; and there was, for practical purposes, but little additional preparation for the conflict so soon to burst upon us. I am reminded of one particular instance of this. It had been suggested to me that, in view of the experiences of the Russo-Japanese war, we ought to train the infantry in throwing hand-grenades, or bombs as we now call them. For this purpose I asked for the troops to be supplied with dummy-bombs, costing about twopence each, and also with a certain number of live grenades for purposes of demon- stration. Sanction was obtained for a small number of the twopenny bombs, at a total cost of perhaps not more than thirty or forty pounds, while as regards the live grenades it was decided that they were too dangerous as well as too expensive to be issued. (They certainly did cost a great deal — I believe nearly £i each.) The decision was toned down by giving permission for battalions to send a few selected men to see live grenades thrown by expert sappers ! I should think that some scores of millions were thrown by our men in the Great War, costing about sixpence apiece. The War Minister of the day was not to be blamed for the scarcity of funds. His business was, as it always is, to show a saving on the estimates of the preceding year. Our policy was a policy of peace, and war on a great scale on the continent was hardly allowed in the picture at all so far as the army was concerned. The accepted plan was THE CURRAGH INCIDENT 193 that, in certain eventualities, we should send oversea an Ex- peditionary Force of one cavalry and six infantry divisions, that the Territorial Force would be employed for home defence, and that the Special Reserve would supply the Expeditionary Force with drafts. Beyond these limits the GeiTnan danger was disregarded, and the people as a whole cared little or nothing for the army so long as there was a strong navy, and, uninformed by their leaders, they were not encouraged to care anything for it. They were more concerned with internal politics, social reforms, and the enjoyment of agreeable week-ends. In March 19 14 occurred the unfortunate " Curragh incident," which arose, it will be remembered, in con- nection with the proposal to use troops for the coercion of Ulster, then busy arming and drilling with the intention of opposing the introduction of Home Rule. The members of the Government responsible for the proposal appear to have given no thought to its practical side as a military question, and were completely taken aback when certain officers at the Curragh, whose regiments were to be employed, sent in their resignations and declined to serve. Soldiers cannot be treated as if they had neither souls nor consciences, and to expect them to undertake a duty which may lead to shooting down those with whose ideals and religion they are in sympathy is to expect a great deal. While the crisis lasted I was besieged by excited officers in the War Office and from elsewhere asking my advice as to what they should do, for they were determined, they said, to stand by their comrades who had declined to obey an order which they considered to be both unjust and illegal. I had no hesitation in telling them to go away, make their minds easy, and get on with their work, as I felt sure that in the long run any intention there might be of employing troops against the Ulster men would be abandoned. One of the officers who came to see me was " Joe " Maude, the head of the training branch of my directorate, and afterwards the commander of the forces in Mesopotamia in the Great War. I had brought him only a short time before from the Curragh, where he had been on the General Staff and had made many friends amongst the officers o 194 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL implicated. He told me that he felt it to be his duty to resign his commission, as they had done, and it was with some difficulty that I persuaded him to take my advice and sit tight. I had no knowledge, nor had any other director in the General Staff I think, of the proposal to use troops in the manner mentioned until it had been more or less decided to use them, and when officially informed of it my first question was : " Which directorate will be responsible for making the necessary arrangements and issuing the orders ? " The responsibility for operations outside the United Kingdom rested with the Director of Military Operations ; that for operations inside, but only as against oversea attack, rested with me — the Director of Military Training ; and the Adjutant-General dealt with the use of troops in aid of the civil power. The case of Ulster did not fall within any one of these three spheres, and not wishing to have anything to do with it each of us argued that it was not his business. In the end it was settled that if troops had to be employed the duty would come under the heading of home defence, and the arrangements to be made would accordingly fall upon me. I then asked a few further questions : " Are we supposed to be going to war with Ulster ; that is, will the troops be on ' active service ' ? If we are not going to war what are we going to do, as the case is obviously not one of suppressing civil disorder because there is no disorder at present ? If we are going to war, is mobilisation to be ordered, and what ammunition, supplies, and transport are the troops to take ? What instructions are to be given to the General in command regarding the nature and object of his mission ? " Coupled with the Curragh resignations, these questions brought matters to a head, for there was no answer to some of them, and when the light had thus been turned on the affair became one of heated discussions, alleged misunder- standings, impatient explanations, and a general running to and fro between the different offices and departments in Whitehall. In the course of two or three days the whole proposal deservedly came to an inglorious end, and we were exceedingly glad to hear the last of it and be allowed to SIR CHARLES DOUGLAS 195 get on with more sensible work. The Secretary of State for War, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General resigned their appointments, and Mr. Asquith took charge of the War Office in addition to his duties of Prime Minister. The new Chief of the Imperial General Staff was Sir Charles Douglas, a very conscientious officer who would insist upon working more hours a day than his state of health justified, and it was largely due to this habit that he died a few weeks after the Great War broke out. He had quite a unique knowledge of the details of all army matters, and although he had the reputation of being somewhat abrupt and overbearing in manner I always found him to be a very considerate chief as weU as a good friend. For the manoeuvres of 1914 I had, subject to his approval, selected an area in the west of England, and together we spent several days going over the ground and considering how my suggested scheme of operations would work out. It involved the passage of the Severn by a force retiring before an enemy of superior strength, and Douglas was at first rather afraid that the operations might get out of control and end in a fiasco, but later he accepted the scheme. As I have already said, manoeuvre schemes in the past had usually led up to and finished with a pitched battle, into which both sides threw themselves headlong and hoped for the best. Douglas agreed with me that a change was desir- able, and that as our army might one day find itself being driven back in war by a superior force it would be well to give it some practice beforehand. The manoeuvres were due to take place in September, but before then we were en- gaged in the real thing in France, and were being driven back by overwhelming masses of Germans. The study of the manoeuvres we had planned was most helpful to me during the first few weeks of the war, when I was hard put to it to keep the troops supplied with what they needed. As the Director of MiHtary Training became, in war, Chief General Staff Ofticer of the home defence force, there seemed to be no chance when war broke out of my going to France. At the last moment, however, Grierson, who had been origmally nominated Chief of the General 196 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Staff of the Expeditionary Force, was given the command of the Second Army Corps, and Murray, originally intended to be Quartermaster-General of the Force, was selected to succeed him. The appointment of Quartermaster- General thus became vacant and Douglas was good enough to give it to me. Within forty-eight hours I once again left the War Office, and joined the headquarters of the Expeditionary Force then mobilising at the Metropole Hotel in North- umberland Avenue, CHAPTER XIII QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL, BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Organisation and duties of G.H.Q. — System of supply and maintenance — The I.G.C. — His duties are curtailed — The " Directors " — My Staff — Arrive at Paris with the Commander-in-Chief — Stay at the Hotel Crillon — Visit JofEre at Vitry-le-Fran9ois — Reach G.H.Q. at Le Cateau — Concentration of the Force — Various situations to be thought out — Discuss change of base with I.G.C. — Commander-in- Chief's conference before battle of Mons — The retreat from Mons — Replacement of clothing and equipment lost in the retreat — -Con- fusion caused by change of base — Control of railways in French hands — Difficulty of knowing where troops were — PUght of refugees — WilHng spirit shown by all ranks to help each other — Despatch riders — G.H.Q. move successively to St. Quentin, Noyon, Com- pi^gne, Dammartin, Lagny, Melun — The move from Dammartin to Lagny — Force becomes part of Paris garrison under Galheni — Battle of the Marne — Brutalities of German troops — G.H.Q. at Coulommiers and Fere-en-Tardenois — Want of heavy artillery on the Aisne — Move round to Flanders — First battle of Ypres — State of trenches — Cross the Channel with Lord Roberts — His death at St. Omer — Succeed Murray as Chief of the General Staff at G.H.Q. The staff of an army, according to the British system, is composed of three branches — General Staff, Adjutant- General's Staff, and Quartermaster- General's Staff. The General Staff deals with training, operations, intelligence, and general military pohcy ; the Adjutant-General with recruiting, mobihsation, disciphne, medical services, and the chaplains' department ; the Quartermaster-General with supplies and transport, and the issue of all military stores. Stated in a simpler form, the Adjutant-General recruits the men with which to fight, tends to their spiritual needs, tries them by court-martial when accused of breaking the regulations, takes care of them when sick or wounded, and buries them when they die. The Quartermaster-General clothes, arms, feeds, and houses them, and supplies them with all they need with which to fight, viz. horses, motors, 197 198 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL lorries, bicycles, ammunition, guns, entrenching-tools, barbed wire, bombs, and a thousand other things. He also moves them, according to the direction of the General Staff, by rail and sea. The staffs of the Adjutant-General and Quarter- master-General thus put and maintain the army in the field ready for use by the General Staff, who arrange, according to the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, all matters connected with the actual fighting. The welfare of the army and the success attending the operations largely depend upon the way in which the three branches work together and upon the personality of the Chief of the General Staff, who is the recognised head of the whole staff and the principal confidant and adviser of the Commander-in-Chief. The staff of the Expeditionary Force were fortunate in this respect, for Murray was a help- ful colleague to do business with, and possessed a thorough knowledge of staff duties in general. The same may be said of the Adjutant -General, Sir Nevil Macready, \^ith whom I worked from the commencement of the war until a few months before he became Commissioner of the Metro- politan Police in the summer of 1918, The system by which the immense volume of food, ammunition, clothing and other war material is conveyed to the troops may now be explained, and for the information of the non-military reader I may first observe that an " army " consists of two or more army corps ; an " army corps " of two or more divisions ; a " division " of three or four infantry and artillery brigades respectively and certain other troops ; a " brigade " of infantry of three or four battalions, and a " brigade " of artillery of three or four batteries. When an expeditionary force is sent abroad, " bases " are established at selected oversea ports, and there large depots of food, stores, men, animals, etc., are formed, and from these the supplies are sent up by rail to a " regulating station." From this place trains, each carrying the right proportion of each kind of article required, are despatched to " railheads," i.e. the stations nearest to the front-hne troops to which it is feasible to work the railway. Each railhead may serve one or more army corps according to SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE 199 circumstances, and at it the supplies are loaded on convoys of motor lorries called " supply columns." Each column then conveys the supplies of its division or other formation to which it belongs to previously selected rendezvous called " refilling points," where they are met at an appointed hour by horsed wagons of the " regimental train." These, having been loaded with their proper quota of supplies, carry them to the units to which they belong. The distances traversed by the supply columns may be as much as forty miles between railhead and refilling point, and the horsed wagons may cover six or seven miles each way. Ammuni- tion and other stores are distributed from railheads in much the same manner as food, the ammunition convoy being known as the " ammunition park." This explanation is very crude, but it will suffice to give a rough idea of the system in force at the commencement of the Great War. It will be understood that, owing to the movement of the troops or to interference by the enemy, changes of railheads and refilling points may have to be made at very short notice. These changes, unless properly and promptly notified, may dislocate the entire proceedings, and, in the case of a retreat, cause roads to become blocked with trans- port and so jeopardise the safety of the whole army. The arrangements for carrying out this delicate system were, according to the regulations, mainly vested in a General Officer known as the " Inspector-General of Com- munications," or I.G.C., who occupied a position second in importance only to that of the Commander-in-Chief himself. His headquarters were at the base, distant perhaps a hundred miles or more from the front line, or at some place between the two. By the nature of his duties he was something hke the managing directors of Harrods' Stores and Carter Paterson rolled into one, it being his business to see that ample stocks of food and war material were maintained at the bases, and thence conveyed, in the manner just described, in sufficient quantity and to such places at the front as directed by the Quartermaster-General in furtherance of the Commander-in-Chief's plans. It will thus be seen that the Quartermaster-General was not responsible for the actual performance of the duties enumerated at the beginning of 200 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL this chapter, and only in a hmited degree for prescribing the method of their execution. He was answerable for seeing that they were not left undone rather than for doing them. Before the war I was convinced that the system would not work in practice. Telegraphic communication between the front and the I.G.C., upon the efficiency of which every- thing hinged, was liable to be interrupted or blocked ; and in any case notification by him or to him regarding alteration of railheads or refilling points, consequent on a change in the tactical situation, was bound to be slow and uncertain. It followed from this that orders issued by the I.G.C. on these matters might well become impossible of execution hours before they left his office. They did so from the day fighting began, and with the approval of the Commander-in- Chief I swept away the regulations, and so far as the dis- tribution of food and ammunition was concerned the respon- sibility of the I.G.C. was made to end at the railheads, to be selected by me, the onward transport then becoming a matter for my staff and not for his. Later, his duties at the front were further restricted, and it was recognised that, instead of retaining the almost complete freedom of action assigned to him by the regulations, he must be guided by the instructions of the Quartermaster-General. This officer is the mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief for purposes of supply, and is much better placed for knowing his wishes than an I.G.C. can possibly be. Major-General Robb, who first held the post, and his successor, Major-General Maxwell, at once fell in with these views, and the change of system worked quite smoothly. As the army grew in strength, more decentralisation and elasticity had to be introduced, and it is not unhkely that the I.G.C. may disappear altogether from future regulations. If he does I shall think that we have gone too far in the opposite direction, and burdened General Headquarters, whose chief business is fighting, with work that can be done more suitably and economically by an organisation in rear. To complete this account of the method of supplying an army in the field I should add that under the Adjutant- General, Quartermaster- General, and I.G.C, respectively, SIR JOHN COWANS 201 according to the duties to be performed, are the " Directors " of the different administrative services— ^.g. medical, veter- inary, remounts, supply, transport, ordnance— who with their assistant directors, deputy assistant directors, and other officers are responsible for actually issuing to the troops what they require. These officers are not uncommonly regarded by the general public as belonging to the staff, but this is not the case. Their duties and status are quite different. The staff, properly so-called, are the assistants of the Commander-in-Chief, they may take action in his name, and they are the medium through which he communicates his orders ; the administrative officers are responsible, each in his own sphere, for making such administrative arrange- ments as will enable these orders to be carried out. The officers at first employed on the Quartermaster- General's staff were : Colonel Dawkins, Assistant Quarter- master-General, with Major Jebb of the Bedfordshire Regiment and Captain Percival of the army service corps as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster - Generals. Captain Woodroffe of the horse artillery was my aide-de-camp. I can never be too grateful to these four officers for the assistance they rendered, especially in the retreat from Mons, when the supply of the army was a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Day and night they toiled hke slaves with never a thought for their own comfort or interest. I was also greatly assisted at this period, and in fact during the whole time I was Quartermaster- General, by Sir John Cowans, under whose direction the initial arrangements for the maintenance of the army were made by the Quartermaster- General's department of the War Office. As soon as the troops began to cross the Channel I sent Dawkins off to France, with Jebb and Percival to help him, to arrange for the reception of the troops at the front and generally to get the department into working order. I remained behind in England with the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff, as it was necessary to keep in close touch with them and be ready to advise upon matters under my charge. We left London on the afternoon of the 14th August, crossed the Channel from Dover on H.M.'s Cruiser Sentinel, 202 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL and reached Boulogne about 5.30 p.m. The streets seemed to be full of British soldiers waiting to be sent to the front, and a very cordial welcome was extended to them by our French allies. After visiting some of the rest camps, where we found the troops cheery and full of enthusiasm, we left at 7.20 P.M. for Amiens, the headquarters of our line of com- munication, and there spent the night. Next morning we proceeded to Paris, which was reached shortly after noon. The Commander-in-Chief and some of the staff stayed at the British Embassy, whilst I and some others put up at the Hotel Crillon, where the manager, M. Decquis, placed the best rooms at our disposal, and gave us what I have always thought to be the best dinner I ever had. He produced an equally good English breakfast at five o'clock next morning, and when I asked him on leaving for the bill he replied that he would send it to me at Berlin, and that for the present he would accept nothing, feeling only too pleased to have been of service to us. I went to Berlin after the war, but I have not yet received the bill. The incident was a standing joke between us on the many occasions I stayed at the Crillon when called to Paris on duty during the war, and I must add that M. Decquis never relaxed his efforts to make these visits as comfortable as the first one was. We left Paris by motor early on Sunday morning, i6th August, to see General Joffre at his headquarters at Vitry- le-Francois. He was in excellent spirits and with much pride showed us a German standard which had been captured a day or two before in some small engagement on the southern flank. After we had taken lunch with him and his staff, and business had been concluded, we proceeded to Rheims, passed the night there, and next day joined our own head- quarters at Le Cateau, the offices of which were located in a large school in the centre of the town. I and the four officers of my staff were billeted in a small house close by, the owner being a kind-hearted old lady who occupied the adjoining house. Woodroffe quickly got our small mess into working order, and saw that nothing was lacking in the way of either food or drink. Our soldier- cook — still a dark horse — played up well, and was assisted THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 203 by the woman cook of our landlady, though by what means they were able to understand each other's language was a mystery. This difficulty once led to a rather noisy altercation, which called for the intervention of Woodroffe. Hearing heated arguments taking place in the kitchen, in the most extraordinary mixture of French and English, he proceeded there to enquire what was the matter, and found the two cooks engaged in a tug of war at opposite sides of a frying- pan of potatoes which were to be cooked for breakfast. It transpired that the kitchen fire had refused to burn properly, and that the French cook was trying to explain to ours that she had a good fire next door and would take the potatoes there to cook, while our man was under the impression that she wished to appropriate them for herself, and he was determined not to let them go at any price. Woodroffe restored peace, and we got our potatoes by the required time. About a week later, when the German troops were nearing the town, I was able to repay the hospitality of our landlady by sending her off in a motor in the direction of Paris, as she had no other means of getting away. On passing through Le Cateau in 19 19 I found that both her houses had been destroyed — like many others in the town. The British Expeditionary Force, composed of six divisions and a cavalry division, had a total strength of, roughly, 160,000 men, 60,000 horses, 490 guns, and 7000 vehicles. That part of it sent out in the first instance numbered only about 100,000 men, and consisted of a cavalry division and two army corps each of two divisions. Of the remaining two divisions one did not begin to arrive till after the battle of Mons had been fought, and the other, for reasons unknown to me, did not reach us for several days later. Had there been less delay in our coming to a decision to join France more time would, of course, have been available for the whole six to arrive, and had they been present at the battle the course of the war might have been different. The Force, as at first sent out, completed its concentra- tion just south of Maubeuge on the 20th August, and on 204 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the following day commenced to move forward. On the 22nd it reached positions in the vicinity of Mons, its right being in touch with the left of the 5th French army near Thuin, south-west of Charleroi. It is interesting to recall that Mons was occupied by a detachment of Welhngton's army at the beginning of Napoleon's last campaign about a hundred years earlier. Whilst G.H.Q. remained at Le Cateau I devoted all my spare time to visiting the areas through which the troops were moving. Some fifty per cent of the infantry was composed of reservists just called up, and as most of them were not in hard condition the blazing August sun and long stretches of white dusty roads made marching and the carrying of some 60 lbs. of kit and equipment a heavy burden. All the more reason, therefore, why the Quarter- master-General's staff should be active, and personally see to it that there was no shortage of food or water, that the billets and bivouacs were as good as could be found, and that the transport conveying the requirements of the troops should reach its destination in good time. It was my purpose to ensure that this was done. I had also to think out the different situations which my department might have to meet during the next few days. The strength and direction of the enemy's main advance had not yet been clearly disclosed, but the view held at French G.H.Q., as late as the 22nd August, was that the Germans were not sufficiently strong to secure them- selves against a determined attack in the Ardennes — for which General Joffre had made preparations — and at the same time launch a great attack against the Allied left. On the contrary, it was deemed possible for the British army and 5th French army to envelop the German right, and it was in pursuance of this plan that the British army marched to Mons. But there was no certainty that the French view would prove to be right. The enemy was well known to have an intense craving for enveloping methods, and there were rumours that he had larger forces north of the Meuse than the French seemed to think, and if, instead of our enveloping his right, he should succeed in envelop- ing our left our line of communication would be seriously " BE PREPARED " 205 endangered, and we might in consequence be compelled to abandon our sea-bases at Havre and Boulogne and establish others further to the south. Moreover, I knew before leaving England that Lord Kitchener was of opinion that we were concentrating too far forward, and events since then tended to show that he was right. Be these things as they might it was my business to be prepared for the worst that might happen as well as for the best. He is merely a fool who, holding a high position in war, refuses to contemplate anything but success. " J'ai r habitude," said Napoleon, " de penser trois ou quatre mois d'avance a ce que je dois faire, et je calcule sur le pire." Confidence is an essential element in war, and in public should always be seen on the faces of all leaders and staff officers, while any who are not endowed with a reasonable sense of humour should make room for others who are. But confidence and cheeriness do not mean that one should be cocksure of everything going as one would wish, especially at the beginning of a war when the unexpected is so apt to be the rule. It was necessary that the Quarter- master-General's staff should examine the situation from every point of view, and introduce such elasticity into the supply arrangements as would promptly afford the Com- mander-in-Chief the greatest possible choice of action. In short, it should be prepared to meet any and every reasonable contingency, for no matter how skilful the plans of the Commander-in-Chief might be, they would almost certainly fail in execution if the troops were not properly fed and quartered, and kept supplied with ammunition. Assuming that the Allies' plan of operations proved successful, these demands could be met with comparative ease ; but on the other hand it might be very difficult to meet them if, in spite of the confidence which prevailed, we were opposed by very superior numbers and compelled to fall back from the positions taken up. I therefore decided to summon the I.G.C., Major-General Robb, to G.H.Q. and discuss possible developments with him, as it was essential that there should be a clear under- standing between us as to what it might become necessary to do. He arrived on the 22nd August— the day before the 2o6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL battle of Mons — and before he left we had settled the main principles upon which we would act in the event of the sea- bases having to be replaced by others. On return to his headquarters at Amiens he made such preliminary arrange- ments as he could for effecting the change. There are not many other instances in military history I imagine, if any, of measures having been taken before the first battle of a campaign to change the base of an army which has been deliberately selected after long and careful consideration. It was fortunate that they were taken on this occasion, for within a week the German advance had progressed to such a point that the Commander-in-Chief gave me orders to change the bases to St. Nazaire, with an advanced base at Le Mans. Amiens, the advanced base, had then already been evacuated by us, and the Germans occupied it on the 31st August. This change of base to the Loire, at a very critical period, was a striking example of the value of sea-power, and of itself was a suihcient return for the money we had expended in maintaining our naval supremacy. At 5 A.M. on Sunday the 23rd August the Commander- in-Chief, accompanied by the heads of his staff, met the commanders of the I. and II. Corps and Cavalry Division at Sars-la-Bruyere, a few miles south of Mons, to explain the situation. From information received from French G.H.Q. he imderstood that little more than one, or at the most two, of the enemy's army corps, with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of our positions, and he was aware of no out-flanking movement by the enemy. There were, as a matter of fact, four army corps and three cavalry divisions, or about 160,000 combatants, within striking distance of the British army of less than half that fighting strength, and at 10.30 a.m. our first battle in the Great War opened in earnest. The subsequent retreat from Mons, which terminated south of the Mame on the 3rd September, will for all time be regarded as one of the finest performances of the British army. Hopelessly outnumbered from the start, and fight- ing on a length of front far exceeding their powers to hold, there was no way by which our troops could avoid THE RETREAT FROM MONS 207 retreat, and by all the rules of war they ought to have suffered not only defeat but annihilation. They would admit neither, rules of war notwithstanding. Composed of the finest British personnel, well-trained, excellent shots, and led by that incomparable commander the British regimental officer, they time and again turned on the pursuing enemy and made him pay a heavy price for his boastful claim to invincibility. Bruised, battered, and sometimes beaten to their knees, they were never beaten in spirit, and even in the darkest hour it never seemed to cross their minds that they were or could be beaten. They knew they were being forced back by an enemy far stronger numerically than themselves ; they were sometimes hungry, often thirsty, and many were too tired to keep awake even when marching ; but they continued to fight grimly on with a determination which has never been surpassed and never will be. Officers and men of the regular army, as we knew them in those days, were seen at their best, and it is an unforgettable privilege to have been associated with them. By the time the vicinity of Le Cateau was reached the 4th Division (the fifth in number to be despatched from home) began to come up and suppUed a welcome reinforce- ment, but it was far from being sufficient effectively to arrest the onward march of the enemy's masses. Since the war ended we have been asked to believe that the Allies owe their victory to the foresight and energy of some poUtical leader or other, to the employment of certain mechanical contrivances, to the enormous output of munitions, to unity of command, to the rottenness of autocratic government, and so on, according to the taste or interest of those who expressed or inspired these state- ments. Perhaps the statements were not meant to be taken literally, for no man of sense would attribute our victory to any one cause, especially as all classes combined so loyally to secure it. Still, they were rather frequently made, and therefore it is well to remind ourselves occasionally of the endurance and heroism displayed by the fighting men, notably in the retreat from Mons, in the three battles of Ypres, on the Somme, and in the desperate struggles of 1918. I sometimes think that the French set us an 2o8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL example in this respect, for they invariably award chief credit for success to their armies alone, and are careful not to detract from it by the advancement of other claims. It is significant of their point of view that at the official dinner at the Elysee on the day of the victory march through Paris in 1919, to which I had the honour of being invited, some ten or twelve non-commissioned officers and men were included among the hundred and twenty guests present. In the retreat a large amount of clothing (caps, jackets, great-coats, etc.), and equipment (shovels, rifles, vahses, wagons, guns, machine-guns, etc.), were either lost, captured, or thrown away because they could not be carried, and it was my duty to see that they were immediately replaced. The ordnance regulations were of the most stringent red-tape description, and before stores were allowed to be issued commanding officers had to render, sometimes in triplicate, elaborate " army forms " setting out their demands and giving full reasons for them. It was absurd to suppose that this procedure could be adhered to when the troops were constantly at close grips with a pursuing enemy ; when the wretched forms, with all other army stationery, had, perhaps, been left behind or thrown away ; and when the commanding officers, killed, wounded, taken prisoner, or for some other reason could not readily be found. There was no authority at all, to the best of my memory, for the free issue of clothing to officers. They were expected to get it, I imagine, as in peace, from Savile Row or other places inhabited by the military tailors of London. The senior ordnance officer at G.H.Q. was at first terribly perplexed to know what to do, for, owing to the strict financial control exercised over the smallest details, and which had its origin in the Treasury, his professional capacity was mainly estimated by the way in which he kept his accounts, and produced innumerable " vouchers " for the action he took. He must often have thought me most irrational and unsympathetic, for I would listen to nothing about his regulations so long as officers and men were going about bareheaded for want of a cap, or had their backs exposed to drenching rain for lack of a coat. I insisted that THE SEA-BASES 209 the missing articles must be replaced at once, whatever the regulations might or might not be, and said that the entire responsibility would be mine if he got into trouble. The officer in question, Colonel (now Major-General Sir Charles) Mathew, played up well, and the army owed him much for the efforts he made to replenish it with the thousand and one things included in the term " ordnance stores " of which it was short. The matter was further complicated because the sea- bases, from which the different articles had to be obtained, were, as already stated, in process of being moved from Havre and Boulogne to St. Nazaire. Even when the move had been completed, many days, and in some cases weeks, elapsed before the required articles became available. In the hurry and confusion attending evacuation of the original bases, the ships had been loaded on no system except that of getting out of the place as rapidly as possible, the Germans then being at Amiens and their advance parties pushed forward in the direction of Rouen. Different kinds of stores were inextricably mixed ; machine-guns were on one ship and their tripods on another, while the articles wanted first were, as often as not, at the bottom of the ship, below sacks of oats and bales of hay, and therefore were the last that could be got out. Moreover, the estabhshment of a new base, even at a good port, is a matter which demands con- siderable time and previous preparation, and in many respects St. Nazaire happened to be particularly inconvenient and deficient of the facilities required. Another factor which mihtated against the prompt supply of food and stores was that we did not control the railways we used, and could not expect to do so. Trains were allotted to us daily by the French authorities, they were necessarily restricted in number, and the time and place of their arrival were very uncertain, as in the circum- stances they were bound to be. The trouble was aggravated when they could no longer pass through Amiens and had to proceed to the front via Paris, for besides the exodus of people from that city which was then taking place, Joffre was transferring masses of troops from his right to his left, and for these and other reasons there was a widespread p 210 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL congestion and dislocation of all railway traffic. I found that the only sure way of getting trains up by the time they were wanted was to send the indefatigable Percival down to Paris by motor, and for him to board the train and compel the station-master to send it forward. Many a time he did this, and was instrumental in producing food for the troops which but for his efforts they would not have received. The distribution of supplies after they reached railheads was another difficulty, as the ever-changing situation and frequent interruption of communication made it impossible to know where particular units might be at any given time. I could only guess as to the place where they might be, send their food to it, and a further supply to other probable places, in the hope that if the first consignment did not reach them the second would. The expedient was also adopted of dumping supplies — ffitches of bacon, sides of beef, cheese, boxes of biscuits — alongside the roads so that the troops might help themselves as they passed. Much of the food thus deposited had to be left where it was put, either because it was not found in the darkness, or from want of time to use it or of means to carry it away, but on the whole the object of ensuring that plenty of food should be obtainable when and where wanted was fairly well achieved. Compliance with routine regulations, and the extra expense incurred by issuing double or treble the normal allowance of rations, were not considerations to be taken into account. Distribution was further hampered by the endless stream of refugees fleeing before the advancing enemy, and it was not until steps had been taken to shepherd them into batches, under proper supervision, that either troops or transport could move along the roads with some semblance of regu- larity. The flight of these fugitives was a strange mixture of tragedy and comedy. All the men were old or very young ; the children, some laughing, some crying, went by in droves ; and tired mothers, carrying their infants on their backs, crawled along the hot and dusty roads with fear and despair depicted on their terror-stricken faces. Two, three, and even four generations of a family could sometimes be seen making their way together to the DESPATCH RIDERS 211 rear, some on foot, others riding in farm-carts, donkey- carts, ox-wagons, on bicycles, in perambulators, according to age and circumstances, whilst the household effects and farm stock with which they were accompanied were of the most varied description. Cows, sheep, goats, pigs, fowls, geese, ducks, cats, and dogs, carried or driven, were amongst the number, and vehicles of every kind, frorh a wagon to a wheelbarrow, were brought into use and laden with every imaginable article from beds to bird-cages. As if to intensify the distress and misery of the scene, the distant sky was black with smoke rising in dense clouds from the burning villages which had been set on fire either deliberately or by the enemy's shells, these same villages having been but a few hours before and for many years previously the homes of those who were now fleeing from them, knowing and caring not where, so long as they were safe from the Hun. Having said so much about the difficulties to be over- come, I ought to add that my duties, like those of all other senior officers, were greatly lightened by the splendid manner in which all ranks, forgetful of self, were animated by the sole desire to help each other. In numberless ways the retreat brought out, and in quarters where least expected, the best qualities of man, and showed how much good there is even in what appear to be the most forbidding and un- responsive natures. I have already mentioned the assistance rendered by the members of my staff, and I was equally indebted to the administrative officers who worked with me, especially to Colonels Gilpin, King, and Ford, and Major Crof ton- Atkins of the army service corps, who superintended the transport and food arrangements. The despatch riders, too, per- formed invaluable service in carrying messages to and from the troops and the various supply and ammunition columns. The work of a despatch rider at the time was very different from what it was after trench warfare set in. Headquarters of brigades and divisions were constantly moving from one place to another, and the despatch rider had to find them — in a strange country and perhaps at night — as best he could. As often as not he would arrive near the place 212 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL where he had hoped or guessed they would be, only to discover that it was occupied by the enemy. Most of our despatch riders were boys under twenty years of age who had joined on the outbreak of war, many of them from the universities, and the manner in which they carried out their duties in the face of great hardships and dangers confirmed me in the opinion that the Enghsh boy has no superior. I am prepared to go further and say that he has no equal. During the retreat G.H.Q. moved successively to St. Quentin, Noyon, Compiegne, Dammartin, Lagny, and Melun. Dammartin is only fifteen miles from Paris, and on our arrival there the Force became for the time being a part of the Paris garrison commanded by General Gallieni. This was not a pleasant duty to contemplate — the defence of the French capital — and had an ominous look about it. Luckily it did not last long. As can be imagined our personal feeding arrangements were rather sketchy and uncertain during the hurry of the retreat, but at Dammartin we hoped for better things and were looking forward to the enjoyment of a roast leg of mutton for dinner. Suddenly, however, the order was given to move to Lagny, and as it was then seven o'clock we had to go off without any dinner at all, the leg of mutton, just ready for eating, being packed up in a newspaper and taken away on the floor of a motor lorry. It was none the worse next day, except for being cold. On this occasion Dawkins and I travelled together, and as we were inside the Paris perimeter and the night was dark, we had rather an exciting journey. German officers, disguised as Enghsh staff officers, were reported to be going about in motors within the lines, and the French Territorial troops on picquet, of whom we encountered several, were menacingly inquisitive as to who we were, addressing their enquiries over the sights of their rifles or at the point of the bayonet. At last we reached Lagny, about midnight, and as it was impossible to secure a billet at that hour we tried to persuade the proprietor of a small cafe to make us an omelette by way of dinner, preparatory to passing the night in the car. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 213 Whilst discussing the omelette, which there seemed little prospect of our getting, a woman entered the cafe and offered us the use of two rooms in her house close by, and after- wards gave us supper. Next morning she cooked us an excellent breakfast, and I later discovered that in order to accommodate us she and her husband had sat up all night. This is the sort of kindness that really counts, and on the first opportunity I intend to revisit Lagny and, if I can find them, once more thank my host and hostess for their hospitality. At Melun we were equally well treated, the owner of the house at which we stayed placing everything he had at our disposal. The advance from the Marne to the Aisne, immediately after a retreat of 170 miles before a numerically superior enemy flushed with success, is no less a glorious page in the history of the British army than that of the retreat itself. The battle of the Marne, as it is called, or Joffre's great counter-stroke which changed the whole course of the campaign, commenced on the 6th of September and con- tinued, so far as we were concerned, till the loth of September. G.H.Q. meanwhile moved first to Coulommiers and then to Fere-en-Tardenois. In passing through the country from which the Germans had just been expelled, it was interesting to compare the behaviour of their troops in retreat — the severest test which war can bring — with that of our own men in similar circum- stances, and there is no doubt that our type of discipline, based chiefly upon good relations between officers and men, stood the test far better than the boasted iron discipline of the German army. Everywhere was wanton and wicked destruction — shops gutted, fields and streets Httered with empty wine-bottles, household goods deliberately destroyed, and filthy deeds committed too abominable to mention. Some of the troops, perhaps many, had behaved well, accord- ing to what we heard, but others were accused of the most brutal acts. How thankful England should be that she was spared from the unspeakable miseries and horrors of invasion ! Shortly after our arrival on the Aisne the enemy brought up more heavy artillery from Maubeuge, which had just fallen, and the period of trench warfare destined to last for 214 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL nearly four years set in. With it arose demands for heavy artillery on our side, more gun ammunition, more machine- guns, bombs, barbed wire, and other artillery and enguieer- ing stores, none of which could be even approximately met, so defective had been our war preparations. When first sent out, the Expeditionary Force had, as already mentioned, only two machine-guns per battahon or about a hundred and fifty in all, while of the 490 pieces of artillery twenty- four only were of " medium " type, the remainder being the ordinary " light " field-guns or field-howitzers. There was no " heavy " artillery. These twenty-four medium guns were supplemented on the Aisne by sixteen 6-inch howitzers of an inferior kind, and some rather old guns of 4.7-inch calibre. How utterly insufficient these numbers were, can be under- stood when I say that on Armistice Day we had in France alone well over 40,000 machine-guns and close on 6500 guns and howitzers, of which over 2200 were of medium and heavy calibre. As regards artillery ammunition, no one, either before the war or in the early part of it, dreamt that the demand would reach the colossal figure it eventually did reach. At any rate no adequate provision was made by the responsible authorities to meet it, and to the best of my memory we began the war with a reserve of considerably less than a million rounds, whereas at one time during the war we had in France alone a reserve of twenty million rounds, to say nothing of other theatres and the enormous stocks in England. It was the same story with respect to the special requirements of trench warfare, although the Russo-Japanese war had furnished much valuable guidance in the matter. Hand grenades, for instance, or bombs, were practically non- existent before the war, and at first had to be improvised by filling jam-tins and similar receptacles with the necessary explosives. The number of bombs expended during the war must have run into scores of millions, and a reserve of five or six millions at the front was quite an ordinary number. To cope with the ever-increasing duties of my department sanction was given while we were on the Aisne for an addi- tional Assistant Quartermaster-General and one Deputy FROM THE AISNE TO FLANDERS 215 Assistant Quartermaster-General. The former appointment was filled by Colonel Lynden Bell, and the latter by my aide-de-camp, Woodroffe, his place being taken by Captain Lucas, another Horse Gunner. On the 3rd of October the British army commenced to move round to Flanders so as to frustrate the enemy's attempt to reach the Channel ports. The cavalry went by road and the divisions by rail, the arrangements for the journey devolving on the staff of the Quartermaster-General. It was desired, as in all such cases, to detram as near to the enemy as possible so as to avoid unnecessary marching, and sufficiently far away from him that the operation could be completed without interruption. His cavalry was appar- ently being pushed well forward in the direction of the ports, and as only vague information was forthcoming as to what was behind it, the detraining stations had to be decided upon, in consultation with the General Staff, whilst the transfer was taking place. For example, one division was at first sent to Boulogne, and afterwards ordered to detrain much farther east. It will be understood that this uncertainty not only caused inconvenience and discom- fort to the troops, but rendered future arrangements for their supply difficult to make. As the war went on and experience was gained, the transfer of masses of men from one part of the line to another became a comparatively easy matter, but seeing that the transfer from the Aisne to Flanders was the first to be undertaken, and that the enemy was not stationary but on the move, the troops may be credited with having accomplished a fairly good performance. G.H.Q. reached Abbeville on the 8th of October and shortly afterwards moved to St. Omer, where they remained for many months. About this time the 7th Division and some of the other troops which had been sent to assist the Belgians in saving Antwerp were absorbed in the Expedi- tionary Force, having previously been controlled by the authorities in London. It took us some days properly to get hold of these contingents, find out where they were, who they were, and what they had got with them. They had been hurriedly put together in the first instance, both 2i6 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Admiralty and War Office taking a hand, and as they had had a trying time since disembarkation many confused matters connected with them had to be adjusted. For example, some of the mechanical transport drivers had been engaged by the Admiralty at a much higher rate of pay than that given to those engaged by the War Office, and obviously we could not pay different rates to different men for doing the same army work. I think we settled the question by giving the Admiralty men the choice between voluntarily joining the army and going home. On another occasion I was asked to sanction the payment of £1700 which had been expended by a naval officer in mounting certain guns on railway trucks. On asking for further details regarding the ownership of the trucks and the origin of the guns, I was told that the trucks had been " taken " and the guns " found." Hard fighting commenced as soon as we arrived in Flanders, and it became a near thing which side would win ; but despite the shortage of artillery, machine-guns, ammunition, and reinforcements, and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy, who poured in corps after corps at Ypres, hoping to finish off our attenuated army once and for all, the matchless pluck of the British soldier won the day. As a theatre of war Flanders has always had an evil reputation, and it never deserved it more than in the winter of 1914-15. The desperate fighting of the first battle of Ypres had barely been concluded when the troops were called upon to face the most atrocious weather, long periods of continuous rain alternating with gales of wind, snow and frost, and although every measure that could be suggested was taken to compete with these conditions, it was impossible to keep the water-logged trenches either dry or in a reason- able state of repair. The men often had to stand waist- high in bitterly cold water ; the communications between the first-line trenches and the rear were as bad as they could be ; and the sufferings endured were almost, if not quite, without parallel. Life in the trenches came all the harder because the troops were new to the work, many being fresh from the tropics, and some twenty thousand LORD ROBERTS'S DEATH 217 men were invalided during the winter on account of " trench feet " alone. To make matters worse, the Germans had the advantage of higher, drier, and generally much more favourable ground, from which they looked down into our miserable, muddy hnes, and were able to bombard them, with their superior artillery, in a manner that would have broken the hearts of any ordinary troops. To this treatment we could give no adequate reply owing to the lack of heavy artillery and of ammunition for such guns as we had. I remember that at one time I had, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, to issue orders restricting the expenditure to two rounds per gun a day, so depleted were our stocks and precarious our prospects of replenishing them. I claim to have as good a knowledge as any one of the British soldier, but to this day it is a marvel to me how he continued to hold on during that first terrible winter in Flanders. By the end of 19 14 the Expeditionary Force had reached a strength of five cavalry divisions and eleven infantry divisions, of which two in each case were Anglo-Indian. In addition a considerable number of Territorial battaUons and Yeomanry regiments had been sent out from home. The New Armies were in course of formation and training, and were not yet ready to be put in the field. Early in November the Commander-in-Chief sent me to England to represent to the War Office the urgency of the ammunition position, and to press for an increased supply. On return to France Lord Roberts crossed the Channel on the same boat as myself, and we had a long conversation on the war and our neglect to prepare for it. Notwith- standing his great age, his clear mihtary instinct was as prominent as ever, but it occurred to me that for a man of his years he was trjdng himself too highly in attempt- ing the journey, and this unfortunately proved to be the case. He arrived at St. Omer on the nth November, was suddenly taken ill on the 13th, and died at 8 p.m. on the following day. Previous to the despatch of his body to England a short, simple service was held at the Mairie on the 17th, at which I had the mournful honour of being one of the pall-bearers. Contingents of British, Indian, and 2i8 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL French troops, and many foreign officers attended to do homage to the veteran Field-Marshal, and as the body left the Mairie on its homeward journey, the day being gloomy and dispiriting, the sun burst forth and threw a brilliant rainbow over the town, thus making a fitting termination to one of the most impressive ceremonies I have ever witnessed. In January 1915 the Commander-in-Chief asked me to become Chief of the General Staff in place of Murray, who was about to return to England. The offer was a tempting one, as it meant an increase of pay as well as of position, but I did not wish to accept it. I had become interested in my work, I knew that the Commander-in-Chief had previously asked for another officer to succeed Murray, which was sufficient proof that I was not his first choice, and although he had appeared quite satisfied with me as Quartermaster- General, there was no certainty that either of us would be equally happy if I became his Chief of the General Staff. I therefore asked to be allowed to stay where I was, and after further discussion a final decision was, by my request, deferred for a day or two. In the end I realised that it was my duty to put personal considerations aside, and on the 25th of January I took up the new post, being succeeded as Quartermaster-General by Major-General Maxwell. I was extremely sorry to separate from my old staff, who had served me so loyally during a time of stress and anxiety, and I would pay a special tribute to my friend Dawkins, now dead. He had a high sense of duty, not a crooked element in his character, great capacity for work, and was beloved by all of us. " The Deputy," as he was familiarly called, had a bad habit of sitting up late at night to work or read the newspapers, of which neither my reproof nor the chaff of the other officers could cure him. In honour of the season, and to the amusement of the mess, I gave him permission on Christmas night to sit up for an hour later than he usually did ! CHAPTER XIV CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Duties — Arrangements for training — Reorganisation of the General Staff — My principal assistants — Signal communications — Flying Corps — Life at G.H.Q.— Relations with units at the front — Liaison officers — Situation on West Front at beginning of 1915 — Position of British Commander-in-Chief — Results of unreadiness for war — Uncertainty as to reinforcements and war material — Neuve Chapelle — Second battle of Ypres — Withdrawal from part of the saUent — Festubert — Loos — Allies short of war material — Jofire's first con- ference of Alhed Representatives — My views on the general situation and conduct of the war — Decide to send them to the C.I.G.S. at the War Office — He forwards them to the Cabinet — Lord Kitchener asks me to become C.I.G.S. — I send him my views as to the status and duties of the General Staff — He cannot agree with some of them and proposes to resign — Meet him at Calais and discuss his objections — They are satisfactorily removed — I leave G.H.Q. for the War Office. In my nev/ capacity I became, according to official phraseo- logy, the Commander-in-Chief's " responsible adviser on all matters affecting military operations, through whom he exercises his functions of command, and by whom all orders issued by him will be signed." The regulations further laid down that the General Staff duties comprised the study of proposed operations ; framing, issue, and despatch of opera- tion orders ; plans for movements to the points of con- centration ; measures of security ; inter-communication ; reconnaissances ; provision and distribution of maps ; and the supply of information to the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General regarding the situation and the probable requirements of the troops. There was much more than this to be done, and as a first step I obtained the Commander-in-Chief's consent to make certain changes in the personnel and organisation of the General Staff itself. Of the two branches into which it 219 220 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL was divided, Operations and Intelligence, the former was inclined to regard the latter as its own particular hand- maid — which was wrong — and it also included a small sub- section known as " O (6)," which had been designed mainly to conduct telegraphic correspondence with formations at^the front. In this way the whole of the work had a tendency to filter through the Operations branch to the sub-chief, from him to the Chief of the General Staff, and then to the Commander-in-Chief. Bottle-necks are notorious for making nothing and obstructing everything, and this one was the more objectionable because of the increasing amount of work to be done. The Expeditionary Force upon which the existing system had been based was already double its original strength, many more divisions would shortly arrive, and therefore it was necessary that greater decentralisation of staff work should be initiated. Moreover, units, large and small, were coming out from home indifferently trained in their common military duties, and knowing next to nothing about the conditions attaching to trench warfare. The war of trenches had brought up new problems for which our accepted methods of instruction made little provision, and the New Armies, as well as the drafts, were still being trained on much the same lines as the old regular army had been. It was essential to set up machinery for giving these new arrivals the requisite addi- tional training before they went into the trenches, the machinery to include schools of instruction manned by officers and non-commissioned officers who were speciaHsts in their business ; to make similar arrangements for the training of drafts at the bases ; bring formations at the front in closer relation with these drafts and cause them to take a greater interest in them ; and inaugurate systematic instruction for regimental officers and non-commissioned officers, whose professional standard had fallen to a low level owing to the number of casualties we had suffered. Lastly, special means had to be provided for dealing with questions regarding new units such as mining com- panies, new inventions such as trench-mortars, and a host of others relating to new methods of making war in general and trench war in particular. SIR FREDERICK MAURICE 221 I decided to form three separate branches, Operations, IntelHgence, and General Staff duties {i.e. training and all other duties not included in the two first-named branches). In the Operations branch was one officer charged solely with keeping the artillery ammunition account, and with advising me how we could best use the smaU amounts then being received. Every single round had to be jealously guarded, for consignments of ammunition did not then come out as later in the war by hundreds of tons at a time in special ships and barges, but in driblets of thirty or forty rounds, much in the same way as if despatched by parcel post. The head of each branch was made responsible to me per- sonally, aU three being expected to keep in touch with each other and not to shut themselves up in water-tight com- partments. Colonel (now Major-General) E. Perceval took charge, as sub-chief of the General Staff, of Staff duties, and acted for me in my temporary absence ; Colonel (now Major-General Sir) F. Maurice became head of the Operations branch, and Colonel (now Lieutenant-General Sir) G. Macdonogh remained as head of the Intelligence. Perceval, as mentioned in a previous chapter, had served under me at the Staff College, and his professional knowledge and untiring energy were as valuable to me in France as they had been at Camberley. He was given command of a division in July 1915, being succeeded as sub-chief by Colonel (now Major-General Sir) R. Whigham, another of my Staff College assistants. Maurice, who had also been with me at the Staff College, was, hke his father the late Sir Frederick Maurice, possessed of quite exceptional talents. He was particularly well read in military histor}^ had a thorough grasp of the principles of strategy and tactics, and, what was more to the point, held sound views regarding their practical application. He could express himself temperately and clearly both verbally and on paper, and he devoted every spare minute of the day and night to thinking out how best to beat the formidable enemy in front of us. There was, I may remind the reader, a great deal of thinking of this nature to be done at the time, for not much daylight was yet visible. 222 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Most of the junior officers in the three branches had been trained under me at the Staff College, and were as capable and loyal a body of assistants as any man could wish to have. They included, at different times, Radcliffe, Bartholomew, Montgomery, and Tandy (artillery), Hutchison (cavalry), Elles and Cox (engineers), Deedes (infantry), and Wigram (Indian army). Being a believer in having small messes on service, the only member's of the one I formed were the sub-chief, Maurice, and my two aides-de-camp — Lucas and Montagu Stopford, the son of Lionel Stopford, one of my contem- poraries when a student at the Staff College. My pre- decessor had lived with the Commander-in-Chief and had no separate mess of his own, and although this arrangement had its advantages it also had its drawbacks. The General Staff office and the principal General Staff officers were always liable to be located some distance away from the quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and it seemed best that I should be near them. Moreover, it is just as well that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of his Staff should occasionally have a close time of their own, for, unless they possess more angeUc tempers than ordinary mortals can hope to have, the constant mental strain to which they are subjected by the stress of war may cause them to get on each other's nerves. If that happens there will be trouble, and the effect of it may be felt by the whole army. Outside the General Staff, and omitting my two helpful colleagues the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, the senior officers upon whom I had chiefly to rely for assistance were Du Cane the Artillery Adviser, Fowke the Engineer-in-Chief, and Fowler the Director of the Signal Service. The nature and amount of guns and ammunition we required, the best use to make of such material as we had and hoped to have in the future, and the most suitable system of artillery organisation in general, were all questions regarding which much difference of opinion still existed at the beginning of 1915, and it was largely owing to Du Cane's judgment and foresight that the right course was steered and the foundations of our artillery supremacy were cor- THE SIGNAL SERVICE 223 rectly laid. He was afterwards employed in the Ministry of Munitions for the greater part of igi6 ; he then com- manded an army corps on the West Front for about one and a half years, and was the senior British mihtary repre- sentative at the headquarters of the allied armies from April to November 1918. Fowke had to deal with and advise on matters con- nected with trench warfare, the supply of engineering material, and new methods of solving the most difficult problems with which the Royal Engineers had ever been confronted. He became Adjutant-General in France in February 1916, and continued to hold that post until the end of the war. Fowler was in charge of the Signal Service from the first day of the war until the last, and superintended its expansion from a strength of about 1600 in 1914 to one of over 70,000 in 1918. I had first met him twenty j^ears before when travelling through Kashmir ; he had served on my staff at the Staff College ; and in pre-war days we had often taken part together in staff tours designed to afford instruction in the working of signal communications with an army in the field. During the retreat from Mons he had accom- plished marvels in keeping up connection between G.H.Q. and the troops, and he was indispensable to me whilst I was Chief of the General Staff in 1915. In Chapter X. I have described the original formation of " Communication Companies." These had later become the " Signal Service" ; and for the benefit of those who are unacquainted with the duties of this service I may say that upon the efficiency with which they are performed the power of a commander to handle his troops greatly depends. Just as in a human body the nerves convey the information obtained by the senses to the brain, and the orders from the brain to the muscles, so the signal communications of an army convey the information obtained from all sources to the commander, and orders from the commander to his troops. Loss of efficiency or sluggishness of the nerves ' results in partial paralysis of the body, and a corresponding paralysis of the army results from the failure of its signal communications. 224 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL The maintenance of communication on the West Front, particularly in the forward area, was very difficult owing to the heavy shell-fire, mud, and exposure which were experienced, and as no one means could be relied on many alternative methods had to be provided. Telegraph and telephone by wire and cables, wireless telegraphy, telegraphy through the ground (power buzzer), visual signalling with electric lamps, helios and flags, carrier pigeons, messenger dogs, message-carrying rockets, firework signals, motor- cyclist despatch riders, mounted orderhes, cyclists, and finally runners were all employed in turn according to circumstances. The telephone cables, being too vulnerable overground, had sometimes to be buried to a depth of six or eight feet to protect them from shell fire, a task which entailed the digging of hundreds of miles of trenches. During 1917 some 80,000 miles of telephone wire were buried in this way. Further to the rear, out of range of the enemy's artillery, the telegraph and telephone were used much in the same way as we are accustomed to in civil hfe. The number of messages dealt with on the different systems was astonishing, and in the great battles of 1917 and 1918 they amounted to tens of thousands in a day. The Royal Flying Corps, as the Royal Air Force was called in 1915, was under the command of Major-General (now Lieutenant-General Sir) David Henderson, who had been Director-General of Military Aeronautics before the war, and may be termed the father of the corps. The detachment on the West Front was commanded by Brigadier- General (now Air-Marshal Sir) Hugh Trenchard, of whose excellent work I had many proofs when serving with him. At the time the corps was still very much in its infancy and below the requisite strength, but it had considerably improved as compared with its condition in August 19 14. The development and unrivalled efficiency it eventually attained are amongst the greatest achievements of the war. The country owes much to the Flying Corps, and especially to the men, or rather boys for the most part, who flew and fought the machines with such marvellous courage and skill. The pity of it is that so many of these gallant lads lost their lives. I always maintained that they were taken too young, G.H.Q. 225 and the answer given me was that the younger ones were always the most daring. No doubt this was so, but this same daring was sometimes little less than recklessness, and led to loss of life which would have been avoided by men a year or two older. The Military Secretary, working directly under the Commander-in-Chief, and dealing with all appointments, promotions, and rewards, was another officer with whom I had much to do, as all nominations for employment on the General Staff throughout the Force were made by me before submission for the Chief's approval. Colonel " Billy " (now Major-General Sir William) Lambton held the post and filled it, so I thought, exceedingly well. He was a pleasant and practical officer to do business with, and his numerous friends were extremely sorry when, as a divisional com- mander later in the war, he had the misfortune to be seriously injured by his horse coming down with him. I should like to correct the idea, prevalent at one time if not now, that life at G.H.Q. was one of ease and indolence. It was very strenuous, and as a general rule the staff were kept hard at work, either in their offices or at the front, from early morning till ten o'clock or later at night. It should be remembered, too, that they carried great responsi- bilities. Officers who have done splendidly with troops at the front, or have shown high ability in administration, may still fail, and have been known to fail, to bear the heavier burdens resting upon them when employed at G.H.Q. To be of any real use there a General Staff ofhcer must not be content with carrying on according to estabUshed routine, he must initiate ; he has to decide tangled questions which come before him because they have proved to be too much for the commanders and staffs at the front ; being at the top of the military structure, there is no one upon whom he can lean ; and he is oppressed with the thought that a slip on his part may set going a series of actions involv- ing perhaps the loss of thousands of lives. Earher in the war I had known staff officers to be so run down by constant work and worry as to faint away at their oface tables, and this at a time when high spirits, confidence, and energy were especially needed. Good work Q 226 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL calls for good physical and mental health, and I insisted upon my staff taking exercise at least once during the day, preferably on horseback, and going off to bed, whenever possible, by ten o'clock at night. In my own mess we seldom missed going for a ride at 6.30 a.m., returning for breakfast at 8 a.m., and with this invigorating recreation in hand we were able to commence the day's work on cheerful terms with ourselves and everybody else. I followed the same rule afterwards when at the War Office, as did the other principal members of my staff (with one exception), regularly joining the " Liver Brigade " in the Row for about an hour every morning, and sometimes taking a second ride in the afternoon. Another matter upon which I laid stress was that staff officers at G.H.Q. should carefully maintain friendly rela- tions with the troops and headquarters, small as well as large, at the front. By this means only is it possible to learn what the feeling of an army really is, where the shoe pinches, and how it can be eased. A sympathetic listening to the numerous worries that daily beset subordinate commanders, a friendly chat with them about their personal duties and interests, the passing on of news about affairs on other fronts and in other theatres, all help to establish that spirit of comradeship and mutual confidence without which the wheels of the military machine will never go round smoothly and efficiently. I used to visit some headquarters or troops practically every day, attending to office work in the evening, and the other officers of my staff were expected to do the same, as far as their other duties would permit. Being less important personages than myself, they were able to pick up informa- tion which was not vouchsafed to me, and it was for the common good that they should tell me, as they did, anything useful that came to their notice. To supplement their rather restricted opportunities a certain number of " liaison officers " were employed as a more permanent link between G.H.Q. and the front. Each morning before leaving they would visit the staff offices and prime themselves with what the army or army corps with which they were connected should know, would bring back in the evening all the information gained that G.H.Q. should I915 227 have, and at both ends would clear up, if they could, any points about which there might be misapprehension. Similar but more extensive arrangements were made for keeping up connection with the headquarters of the French and Belgian armies, each of the three Allies having a " mihtary mission " permanently located at the headquarters of the other two. The French Mission at our G.H.Q. comprised a considerable number of officers, as there were daily many questions in regard to civil administration, the use of railways, etc., which had to be dealt with, quite apart from those affecting the fighting. I shall not attempt to describe in detail the operations which took place on the British front in 19 15. That has been done in the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief, and, moreover, this book is not meant to be a history of the war. My observations will be of a general nature, and as the operations have not escaped criticism I would in the first place remind the reader that they should be judged not merely by what we may have failed to achieve, but also by what we prevented the enemy from achieving. The problem confronting the Commander - in - Chief throughout 1915 was one of extreme difficulty. The enemy was within a short distance of the Channel ports, the loss of which v/ould be very serious to us, if not fatal, and at any moment he could close down his Russian operations sufficiently to allow of reinforcements being sent to the West Front while we were still weak in men, practically without heavy artillery, and woefully short of artillery ammimition of all kinds. The necessity for safeguarding the Channel ports, together with our lack of men and munitions, indicated that the policy most favourable to us would be to defer offensive operations until we possessed a well-trained and well-equipped army adequate to our needs. This, however, would be to take a narrow view of the situation, as it would leave out of account the effect a defensive attitude might have upon our Allies, to say nothing of its destructive influence upon the morale of our own troops. It must also be remembered that the Commander-in- Chief was not in all respects master in his own house. Theoretically he was an independent commander and 228 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL responsible only to his own Government, but his instructions laid down— quite rightly— that " the special motive of the Force under your command is to support, and co-operate with, the French army against our common enemies," and obviously he could not so co-operate and at the same time retain complete independence of action. The enemy was in possession of a large and valuable part of French territory ; Russia, suffering from a series of defeats, was crying out for pressure to be relieved by energetic action on the West Front ; certain prospective alHes were sitting on the fence, wondering on which side to descend or whether to come down at all ; and if General Joffre thought that this situation could best be met by an early offensive his British colleague could hardly do otherwise than support him to the best of his power. For these and a score of other reasons a defensive pohcy was not practicable, and yet it is true that our armies were not in a condition to fight with any good prospect of obtaining decisive results. Having before her our experiences of 1915 and 1916, and not forgetting perhaps the lessons she herself had learned in the Civil War, America seems to have decided, when she joined the Allies in 1917, not to commit her troops to battle until they were fully ready and of sufficient strength to be more or less self-supporting : in the end, and in consequence of the enemy's action, she was obliged to forgo this decision and hurry to the assistance of the British and French armies as best she could. The inexorable fact is that, when opposed by a capable adversary, the unprepared nation is invariably compelled by force of circumstances to put its troops into battle piecemeal and before they have been properly trained to fight, with the result that losses are incurred out of all proportion to the progress made in winning the war, while the lives thus sacrificed are usually amongst the best which the nation possesses. To what cause history will attribute our unreadiness I shall not attempt to prophesy, but when I think of the terrible events of 1914 and 1915 ; of the privations and mental strain suffered by the men of our attenuated battalions through being kept in the front line for weeks at a stretch owing to the lack of reinforcements ; of men being shot down NEUVE CHAPELLE 229 like rabbits when trying to pass through the enemy's wire entanglements which had not previously been demolished because of the shortage of artillery ; and of the heavy loss of life in the hastily-raised and inexperienced divisions of the New Armies, I wonder what are the feelings of those who, occupying high positions in the years before the war, made no serious effort to provide such an army as the inevitable struggle with Germany would demand, and dehberately held up to scorn those who, putting patriotism before self-interest, strove to warn the country of the peril in which it stood. As a corollary of our unreadiness the Commander-in- Chief was further hampered by the uncertainty which prevailed throughout the greater part of 19 15 regarding the reinforcements, guns, and ammunition which he might hope to receive within a given period of time. No one could possibly say long beforehand when particular divisions of the New Armies would be ready to take the field, or whether contracts for war material would or would not be fulfilled by the agreed date, while both men and material, originally ear-marked for France, were liable to be diverted at the last moment, and were diverted, to other theatres of war. It is not my purpose, for the moment, to question this dissemina- tion of resources. I merely wish to point out how difficult it was to utilise to the best advantage such resources as became available for the West Front, owing to the absence of any reliable basis upon which a definite and comprehensive plan of campaign could be constructed. Neuve Chapelle, the first battle in 1915, was fought on the loth, nth, and 12th March. We lost some 2500 killed and over 8000 wounded, while the enemy left thousands of dead on the field and removed, according to our intelligence reports, at least 12,000 wounded by train. Judged by more recent standards this battle would be classified as quite a minor engagement, but its importance should not be estimated merely by the numbers engaged, the duration of the fighting, or the results immediately achieved. It helped to nourish the offensive spirit of the troops, who had endured months of heart-breaking sub- mission to the enemy's will under the most trying climatic 230 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL conditions ; it created a corresponding feeling of disquiet and disappointment in the German ranks ; it afforded many encouraging proofs that, given an adequate supply of guns and ammunition, the enemy's lines need not be regarded as impregnable ; and, finally, the elaborate arrangements made for the employment of artillery fire, which were intro- duced on this occasion for the first time, furnished useful guidance for both the British and French armies in the greater attacks undertaken at a later period of the war. The second battle of Ypres, commencing at 5 p.m. on the 22nd of April and ending on the 24th of May, is prominent as being the first action in which asphyxiating gas was used. The brunt of the attack fell on a French division which was holding the line Steenstraat-Langemarck on the extreme left of our Second Army, where the ist Canadian Division was posted. Within an hour the position had to be abandoned, the smoke and fumes of the gas hid everything from view, the ground was covered with men in a dying or comatose condition, and in the panic and confusion which prevailed it was impossible for any one to realise at first what had actually happened. Owing to the retirement of the French division — for which the division could not be blamed, as no troops would have held their ground against this unexpected form of attack — the left flank of the Canadian Division became completely exposed, and had it been driven in the whole of the British troops in the salient would have been threatened with disaster. This danger was averted by the splendid gallantry of the Canadians, and by the prompt despatch of reserves from other divisions in the vicinity. The necessity for rapidly pushing troops forward to check the enemy's advance, and to close the gap between our left and the French right, inevitably led to the mixing of units ; this in its turn made the exercise of efficient command impossible ; and although large reinforcements were moved up and various other measures taken to meet eventualities, the situation was critical during the next few days. The ground gained by the enemy placed our troops in the salient in a very awkward position, and as there seemed little prospect of recapturing the original line the FESTUBERT 231 Commander-in-Chief decided on the ist of May to withdraw them to a safer Hne in rear which had already been fixed upon. To withdraw a force at grips with a winning enemy must always be a difficult and delicate task, and in this particular case the conditions were specially unfavourable. The enemy had all the advantages of ground, he made violent attacks on the nights of the 2nd and 3rd of May while the rearward movement was going on, some of his front line trenches were less than 100 yards distant from ours, the sur- face of the sodden fields had been so broken by artillery fire as to be nearly impassable, the maintenance of refiable com- munication was impossible, and our troops were absolutely worn out so far as British troops ever can be. In spite of all this, and of much more, the retirement was effected by the morning of the 4th of May with scarcely any loss, and during that day the enemy shelled the trenches we had abandoned, being quite unaware that our men were no longer in them. General Plumer succeeded General Smith-Dorrien in the command of the Second Army while the above events were taking place, and it is doubtful if any commander was ever before suddenly called upon to handle so difficult a situation. While the Second Army was still engaged in the battle of Ypres, the First Army made an attack on the enemy's trenches opposite the southern part of our line, this operation, usually spoken of as the battle of Festubert, being part of a joint attack made by the French and British armies on the front extending from near Armentieres to Arras. The role of the British was to hold the enemy on their front, and draw towards themselves hostile reinforcements which might otherwise be sent to oppose the main attack made by the French troops under General Foch, the chief objective of the latter being the Vimy Ridge. The battle commenced on the 9th of May and was continued on the loth, it was resumed on the i6th, and terminated, so far as we were concerned, on the 25th. The French continued fighting in their attempts to take the Vimy Ridge until the 13th of July. We experienced the usual trouble with the enemy's machine-gun posts, with which we did not yet know how to deal, and we again felt the want of more artillery and 232 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ammunition. In fact, our co-operation ceased on the date mentioned because of the want of ammunition. The results of the battle were somewhat disappointing, the losses of both British and French being considerable and no im- mediate material advantage was gained. In consequence of the French losses, which were some of the heaviest in the war, Foch became rather unpopular in certain circles in France, by whom he was regarded, quite unjustly, as a leader who was careless of the lives of his men. The battle of Loos, the first occasion on which we used gas, began on the 25th of September and continued until the 15th of October. It, also, was carried out in combination with an attack by the French armies under General Foch on our right, a third and more powerful attack being simul- taneously made by the French armies under General Joffre in Champagne. The enemy's position at Loos was of exceptional strength and, as was the case everywhere else, there were few or no weak spots in the formidable defences upon which he had spent the greater part of a year in constructing ; the ground in front of the position was very open to view, and in other ways unfavourable to us as regards both the preparation and execution of the attack ; while we were further handicapped by bad weather inter- fering with observation of fire and aerial reconnaissance. Very satisfactory progress was made at the beginning of the battle but it could not be exploited, one reason for this being, amongst others, that the French on our right were unable to make any substantial headway in their efforts to gain complete possession of the Vimy Ridge. We were after- wards subjected to a series of severe counter-attacks, the battle swaying to and fro for several days, particularly in the neighbourhood of the renowned Hohenzollern Redoubt. The French attack in Champagne also, though successful at first, did not fulfil expectations, but taking the results of these autumn operations as a whole there is no doubt that they caused the enemy genuine anxiety, and I sometimes think that he might have suffered a real set-back had the large number of men and guns then in the Dardanelles been on the West Front. Speaking of this period, Falkenhayn admits that " a serious crisis arose, which almost led to the SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT 233 withdrawal of the whole 3rd German Army on the Cham- pagne Front " ; while Ludendorff, in referring to the " power- ful offensive near Loos and in Champagne," says that " the troops which had been transferred from the East [i.e. the Russian Front) arrived just in time to support the defenders of the West Front, who were holding out so gallantly, and avert a serious defeat." Our captures at Loos included over 3000 prisoners and 26 field-guns, and many thousands of the enemy's dead were seen lying on the ground in front of our lines. We also lost heavily, including three Divisional Commanders, Capper of the 7th Division, Wing of the 12th Division, and Thesiger of the 9th Division. No troops in the world could have fought with greater gallantry than ours did, but gallantry is not of itself enough to cope with the destructive effect of modern armament ; and the lack of adequate training and military experience in general from which the new divisions suffered, and the need for increased artillery sup- port, very quickly made themselves felt. More troops, more training, more aeroplanes, more guns, more ammunition, were required before decisive results could be achieved. With the exception of France, our Allies were no better off than ourselves, and some of them were worse. Before the war they were supposed to have, thanks to their system of universal service, large numbers of men available for mobilisation and on paper they had them, but when put to the test it was found that insufficient provision had been made for rifles, clothing, heavy artillery, ammunition, vehicles, and all the other things required. Russia had millions of men on her books, but could only put a com- paratively small proportion of them in the field, and she was not always sure as to what amount of equipment she had. Some which she thought she had proved to be not forthcoming when wanted, while in one instance at least stores were " found " of whose existence no one seems to have been previously aware. Italy, also, had more men of military age than she could equip, and, hke Russia, lacked both aeroplanes and heavy artillery. Belgium had naturally lost much of what she had at the beginning of the war, and Serbia had lost practically all. The two countries with the 234 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL greatest surplus of men, Russia and Italy, were badly situated for making good their deficiencies by new produc- tion, as the former was difficult of access, the latter wanted coal, and both needed raw material. In December 1915 Joffre assembled representatives of all the Allied armies at his headquarters at Chantilly, so as to ascertain the men and material they then had and hoped to have by the spring of 1916, and to try to arrive at some conclusions with respect to mutual assistance. The meeting, like those which followed it, was handicapped by the absence of a suitable representative from Russia. In all other cases the Allies were represented either by their Commander-in- Chief or his Chief of the Staff, but owing to distance and other causes Russia was always represented either by an ofiicer permanently attached to Joffre's headquarters, or by another officer not then fiUing a high position in the Russian army, and neither of these could speak with the requisite knowledge or authority. The meeting had some good results, but each representative not unnaturally argued that his own front was the most important and had perhaps been authori- tatively instructed to say so, and as everybody was short of nearly everything promises of assistance were rather reluctantly given and were usually conditional. Joffre's task at this period was difficult, for the war had not yet proceeded far enough to admit of his being acknow- ledged as supreme commander of all the Allied armies. Even the smallest countries were quick to resent outside interference with their status as independent nations. This can be understood if we remember that the question was not merely one of directing the armies in the field but also of organising and equipping them, and this affected the commercial, industrial, and financial interests of the whole nation. Any suggestion at this time of introducing the same system of centralised command as that which the prospect of stark defeat compelled the Alhes to adopt in 1918 would have been peremptorily turned down as too im- possible for any self-respecting country to entertain. Joffre had therefore to make the best of a bad job, and I am in- clined to think that he did all that he or any one else could then have done to unify the efforts of the different armies. SECONDARY FRONTS 235 G.H.Q. in France were of course concerned only with matters on that front, and had nothing to do with the conduct of the war in general, either strategical or adminis- trative. That was the business of the authorities in London, but it was the subject of a good deal of conversation with ministers and other ofBcials who from time to time visited G.H.Q. The views of the General Staff were unanimous and simple. They were that the West Front was the main front, whether we liked it or not ; that the main decision must consequently be sought on that front ; and that every man, gun, and round of ammunition should be sent to it, except such as were absolutely required elsewhere for the defence of interests vital to the Empire. All our visitors did not agree, and perhaps suspected us of undue partiality to the front on which we were employed, but at least two of them, Mr. Asquith and Lord Kitchener, were as convinced as we were that so long as we won in the west temporary set-backs in other parts of the world would right themselves. Lord Kitchener once told me in connection with the enemy's activities in Persia and Afghanistan, that he did not care what happened there or in India if only we beat the German armies in Europe. For one reason or another, however, we had become committed before the end of 1915 to operations in no less than three secondary theatres, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli, and Macedonia ; a fourth campaign was about to begin in East Africa ; a fifth had to be contemplated against the Turks east of the Suez Canal, and the western border of Egypt was also unsettled. In the aggregate these liabilities seemed Ukely, before finished with, to make such demands upon men, material, and shipping as might seriously jeopardise success in the main theatre, and this was the more probable because Russia had just been so crippled as to render her future assistance a very doubtful quantity. As far as an outsider like myself could judge, these secondary operations formed no part of any general Entente plan embracing the war as a whole ; the importance of making proper prepara- tions to carry them out, and of carefully considering the extent to which they might develop, had been obscured by the desire to present the public with an easy and dramatic 236 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL success ; and it was forgotten that any success of real advantage to us must equally be to the disadvantage of the enemy, who therefore might be expected to try his hardest to prevent it from being gained. The whole situation being so full of peril, I felt it to be my duty to do what I could to bring about somewhat more efficient methods in the supreme direction of the war. Strictly speaking I had no right to interfere, but departure from official etiquette was a small matter in comparison with the danger in which the country seemed to stand, and there- fore I decided to embody my views in a memorandum and send them unofficially to Murray, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to be disposed of as he thought fit. The memo- randum, which strongly advocated better co-ordination of the Entente plans, was eventually circulated to the Cabinet, and to that extent it served its purpose. A short time afterwards, when I happened to be at home. Lord Kitchener told me that I was wanted to take up the duties of Chief of the Imperial General Staff, For some weeks past I had suspected that this suggestion would be made, as I had received hints from influential quarters that I would be more useful in London than in France, and I had always opposed the change. It was distasteful to me to supersede Murray, who was an old friend and had taken up the appointment as recently as the 26th of September, Moreover, he was rapidly making the necessary improvements in the General Staff machiner}^ and I was not vain enough to suppose that I could do any better than he was doing, if as well. A minor reason for wishing to remain in France was that the open-air life and spirit of comradeship and cheerfulness which always prevailed at the front, no matter how bad the weather or how aggressive the enemy, were far more attractive than the gloomy despond- ency of London and the thankless work of Whitehall. Still another reason was that I could not help being influenced by the prevailing gossip that Lord Kitchener centrahsed all authority in his own hands, and would not allow the General Staff at the War Office to take that part in the strategical direction of operations which it ought to take. My acquaint- ance with him at the time was very sliglit, for although we LORD KITCHENER 237 had served together in South Africa I was then only a junior officer and we saw practically nothing of each other. I therefore asked him to leave me in France, but to this he would not listen, and from the long conversation we had the same evening at York House it became evident that I ought to comply with his wishes. In the course of our talk he referred quite frankly to the unenviable reputation he had acquired, and asked me not to believe it for it was not true, and he assured me that I might rest satisfied that no action of his would endanger our working smoothly together. I was much impressed by his outspoken manner, and felt that I was in the presence of a man whose character was totally different from what I had been led to suppose ; but I still thought it would be best for both of us, and for the country, if before finally deciding we came to a definite understanding, in writing, on the particular points regarding which I was in doubt. To this he agreed, and as soon as I returned to France I sent him a memorandum containing my proposals, one of them being that all operation orders issued to Commanders- in-Chief to give effect to the military policy of the Govern- ment should be sent by me, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and not, as hitherto, be issued in the name of the Army Council and over the signature of the Secretary of the Council — a civilian. This and certain other proposals did not meet with his approval, and in the letter which he wrote me by return of post he said that it would be impossible for him to retain the responsibility of Secretary of State for War without full executive power, and with his functions cur- tailed to the feeding and clothing of the army (the Ministry of Munitions having recently taken over the other services of maintenance) ; but that although he could not remain Secretary of State for War if my suggestions were accepted by the Government — as he thought they would be — he might still continue to be a member of the War Council, and " in that case you may rely on me to always do my best to support you in carrying out the difficult task you will have before you." This example of patriotism and subordination of self was the more striking as coming from a man of his standing 238 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL in the Empire and with his record of service, and I had not a moment's hesitation as to the right thing to do. His letter reached me at St. Omer about seven o'clock in the evening, and as I knew that he was passing through Calais at eleven o'clock the same night on his way to Paris, I got into my motor after dinner and went to Calais to meet him. He greeted me very cordially, albeit a little sadly, I thought, and with an air of disappointment. I came at once to the point and said that whatever happened I could not hear of his leaving the War Office, since there was no one who could fill the position which he held in the country, and I begged him to discuss with me the paragraphs in the memorandum to which he objected. As his train was due to start almost immediately for Paris he asked me to go with him. I jumped in, and we sat up talking till two o'clock next morning, the conversation being resumed after we had breakfasted in Paris. I had two special reasons for wishing to aboUsh the existing system of issuing operation orders, and to vest this duty, unhampered, in the hands of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. At the time the Army Council consisted of four military and four civil members (later increased by three additional miUtary members, or eleven in all), besides the Secretary of State for War, and all these members had the right, if they chose to exercise it, to be consulted before any important orders were issued in the name of the Council. This would have entailed interminable delay, and as all the members had more than enough to do in their own depart- ments without becoming entangled in the work of the General Staff, they were, in practice, not consulted, except in so far as their respective departments were concerned — a custom which must necessarily prevail under any system. Therefore while they shared the responsibihty for the operation orders issued, they knew, in fact, little or nothing about them, and this was neither fair to them nor to the General Staff. My second objection to this sham system was that it prevented the General Staff at the War Office from being recognised as the Great General Staff of our armies at the front, and in my opinion this recognition was essential. At the front the issue of operation orders was, as in all armies C.I.G.S. 239 of the world, the business of the General Staff and of no one else, and my proposal brought the procedure at the War Office into conformity with this practice, and caused the pretended control of operations by the Army Council to disappear. It did not, as some people imagined, involve any diminution in the authority of the Secretary of State for War. It merely assigned a particular duty to the head of one department of the War Office instead of assigning it to the Army Council as a whole, made the position of the General Staff clear, and brought that Staff into more direct relations with the Cabinet. When I had explained the proposal in this way to Lord Kitchener, and cleared up the other points with which he was not at first in agreement, the offending paragraphs of the memorandum — written in a hurry and not very happily worded in all respects — were amended in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and I returned to G.H.Q. at St. Omer. A few days later I left for England, and on the 23rd of December took up the new post. The memorandum, as amended, was as follows : General Headquarters, British Army in the Field in France, 5th December 1915. Dear Lord Kitchener — You were kind enough yesterday to express your willingness to receive some observations of mine regarding the conduct of the war, with special reference to the status and duties of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. For a long time past I have given careful and anxious con- sideration to this question. Both the history of past wars and our experience in the present war show that certain conditions are normally essential to the successful conduct of military operations, though there have, it is true, been isolated instances of commanders of genius who have triumphed in the absence of these conditions. These conditions are : (I.) There should be a supreme directing authority whose function is to formulate policy, decide on the theatres in which military operations are to be conducted, and determine the relative importance of these theatres. This authority must also exercise a general supervision over the conduct of the war, and must select the men who are to execute the policy on which it has decided. Its constitution must be 240 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL such that it is able to come to quick decisions, and therefore as regards the conduct of the war it must be absolute. The War Council^ should be capable of performing the functions of this supreme authority, provided it is relieved of responsibility to the Cabinet as a whole as regards the conduct of military operations, and that it has real executive power and is not merely an advisory committee. The War Council will frequently find itself in a position similar to that of a commander in the field — that is, it will have to come to a decision when the situation is obscure, when information is deficient, and when the wishes and the powers of our Allies are uncertain. Whatever these diffi- culties may be, if and when a decision is required it must be made. If it is deferred success cannot be expected; the com- mander concerned will have a grossly unfair burden placed upon him ; and in fact the absence of a decision may be little less than criminal because of the loss of life which may be entailed. (II.) In order that the War Council may be able to come to timely decisions on the questions with which it has to deal, it is essential that it should receive all advice on matters concerning military operations through one authoritative channel only. With us that channel must be the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It is his function, so far as regards military operations, to present to the War Council his reasoned opinion as to the military effect of the policy which they pro- pose, and as to the means of putting this approved policy into execution. The War Council are then free to accept or reject the reasoned advice so offered. Advice regarding military operations emanating from members of the Cabinet, or of the War Council in their indi- vidual capacity, or from any other individual, should be sifted, examined, and presented, if necessary with reasoned conclusions, to the War Council by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff before it is accepted by the War Council. (III.) All orders for the military operations required to put into execution the policy approved by the War Council should be issued and signed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, under the authority of the Secretary of State for War, not under that of the Army Council. Similarly, all communications from General Officers Commanding regarding military operations should be addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In fact, the same procedure is required in London as obtains in the field — the War Council being in the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the 1 The constitution of this War Council, or War Committee, is described on p. 253. MEMORANDUM TO LORD KITCHENER 241 whole of the Imperial Land Forces, and, with the War Office Staff, constituting the Great General Headquarters of the Empire. (IV.) The adoption of this system by which communica- tions regarding military operations are issued and received by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff will greatly expedite the despatch of business, and will help to preserve greater secrecy than now prevails. Instances have occurred in the war of the contents of the most important documents becoming public property within a few days. Than this nothing could be more harmful to the conduct of the war. It would be for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to give orders as to the reproduction and dis- tribution of these communications, and he would of course be responsible for seeing that the Secretary of State for War and the War Council receive at all times full information of all that they should know. (V.) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff must be free to devote his entire time to the duties above indicated, and have sufficient leisure to think quietly out the many difficult problems which are continually arising, and also to keep him- self thoroughly fit in mind and body. He must therefore be relieved as far as possible of War Office routine duties. To do this the Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff should become a Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff with authority to represent, as and when necessary, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in all Army Council business. (VI.) The number of General Officers Commanding with which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should deal should not exceed the number which experience shows to be possible — about half-a-dozen. For this it is necessary that a General Officer Commanding- in-Chief should be appointed to the Command of the Home Forces or those in Great Britain, as may be deemed best, his position being exactly similar to, say, that of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in France, except that the present system of administration need not be disturbed. He would also be responsible for Home Defence, the troops for this purpose being allocated, of course, under instructions issued by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as in all other cases — vide para (III.). I need not go more fully into my reasons for the above pro- posals, as I am sure they will be obvious to you. It is of para- mount importance in war that there should be a definite plan of operations, and that that plan should be carried out with prompt- R 242 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ness and decision. It is impossible that this should be so if the War Council is itself compelled to listen to conflicting advice, and to decide between the merits of rival experts. It is equally impossible that this should be so if the War Council has to submit its plan for the conduct of the war to the approval of the whole Cabinet. The War Council is now conducting military opera- tions in a number of separate theatres of war, and has control of large reserves which may be thrown into one theatre or another. France has no reserves left, therefore the decision as to the future conduct of the war by the Western AlHes rests in great measure with the War Council. It is vital then that it should possess the machinery both to come to timely decisions and to have its decisions executed. My proposals seem to necessitate some modifications of the Orders in Council which lay down the constitution of the Army Council and the duties of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. If that is so those Orders should be amended for the period of the war. They were never intended, I suppose, to meet a situation such as now exists, and they certainly do not meet it. I hope you will not think that I have any desire to make a bargain for myself, but I feel strongly that I cannot serve the War Council and my King and country as Chief of the Imperial General Staff unless the above conditions are fulfilled. It is my conviction that the system by which the war has been conducted hitherto has been such as to make victory very difficult indeed, if not impossible. Having no faith in it I could not do justice to it, and therefore if my proposals cannot be accepted you would be better advised to select an officer who sees in the exist- ing system a possible means of bringing this war to a successful conclusion. I hope, however, that the proposals may not be considered unacceptable, and that they will be adopted whoever may fill the post of Chief of the Imperial Staff. If the appointment were offered to me, I should have to make a few alterations in the General Staff organisation at the War Office, and would wish to replace two or three officers by officers from this country. I need not trouble you with these alterations except to say that: The Directorate of Home Defence and part of the Training Directorate would be handed over to the staff of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces, as his staff. The remaining part of the Training Directorate would be placed in the Staff Duties Directorate. One of these two Directors could be abolished. The D.M.O. Branch would be divided into the two Direc- torates of " Operations " and " Intelligence." " OUR BARGAIN " 243 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff would then have to deal with Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Director of Operations, and Director of Intelligence. The Director of Staff Duties would be under the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff. I enclose a duplicate copy of this letter, which I hope you will send to the Prime Minister should it ever be contemplated to offer me the appointment of Chief of the Imperial General Staff. — Believe me, yours sincerely, W. R. Robertson. On the 27th of January 1916 the new method of issuing operation orders was authorised in the following Order in Council : The Chief of the Imperial General Staff shall, in addition to performing such other duties as may from time to time be assigned to him under the Order in Council, dated the loth August 1914, be responsible for issuing the orders of the Govern- ment in regard to Military Operations. During the time we worked together Lord Kitchener would sometimes refer to the memorandum as " our bargain," and would ask his personal staff whether he was carr3dng his part of it out, thus showing a genuine desire to make everything go smoothly. For myself I never had occasion to give it another thought, and I shall always regret that the unfounded gossip to which I have alluded caused me to misjudge him, even though temporarily, and so add to the cares and anxieties he was then carrying, alone and unaided save by those loyal friends who really knew and appreciated him. I shall say more on this point in the next chapter. To assist me in forming a proper general headquarters in London I took home Whigham as my deputy and Maurice as Director of Operations. The faithful Lucas accompanied me as a matter of course. I was sorry to have to move these officers from France, for besides condemning them to uncongenial work in London it meant placing them, in comparison with their contemporaries at the front, at a distinct disadvantage with regard to their prospects of advancement. But like the good fellows they are they made no wry faces, and expressed their willingness to go wherever 244 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL I thought they could best help me and be of most use to the State. My eldest son Brian, who had come to France as my second aide-de-camp in May, six months after passing into the Royal Engineers from the Royal Military Academy, I left behind with his corps. He was afterwards employed as aide-de-camp to Sir Douglas Haig, and then on the General Staff of the XI. Corps, where he won the good opinion of his corps commander, Haking. He then served to the end of hostilities as an infantry brigade-major under Brigadier- General James. I am proud to feel that his services in the war were considered sufficiently meritorious to justify the award first of the Military Cross and later of the Dis- tinguished Service Order, a decoration which I myself had been awarded some twenty-five years before. I also left my chauffeur, Reginald Settle, in France. Educated at a public school previous to joining his father's business, he volunteered early in the war and had driven my Rolls Royce since the autumn of 19 14. He was devoted to his car — ^which he would allow no one else to touch — and also to myself ; and he wished to accompany me home so as to continue driving me to the end of the war. This duty, as it would be in London, was not however quite suitable to a young man of his attainments and upbringing, and therefore I decided to leave him behind. He was a clean-living, attractive boy, and his death at the front a few weeks later, after receiving a commission, was a heavy blow to his parents. His only brother died in a French hospital at Mayence shortly after the armistice. Settle was succeeded by Corporal Carthews, another good driver and loyal servant, who remained with me until his death from a sudden attack of influenza in 1918. Whilst at G.H.Q. in France I always found the French General Staff most friendly and helpful, and think that the relations between the two staffs could hardly have been better. This was largely due to the French Chief of the General Staff, General Pelle, with whom it was always easy and pleasant to work. On the day of my departure from France I received the following letter from General Joffre : Marshal JoFFRE conversing with some ^-rench officers at Cologne, 1919. LETTER FROM JOFFRE 245 22 dec. 1915. MoN CHER General — Je suis tres louche des sentiments que vous m'exprimez au moment ou vous quittez la France pour prendre les fonctions de Chef d'fitat-Major Imperial au War Office. J'ai ete tres heureux de votre nomination a ce poste, parce que je suis certain que vous y emploierez au benefice de la cause commune les hautes qualites dont vous avez fait preuve comme Chef d'fitat-Major des Troupes Britanniques en France. La cordialite de nos relations anterieures m'est un sur garant que I'accord sera toujours de plus en plus intime entre nos armees alliees et nul mieux que vous n'etait qualifie pour assurer en Angleterre la coordination de nos efforts. Agreez, mon cher General, I'assurance de mes sentiments les plus devoues. J. JOFFRE. {Trandation. I highly appreciate the sentiments that you have been good enough to convey to me at the time when you are leaving France to take up the duties of Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the War Office. Your nomination to this post gives me great pleasure, for I feel sure that you will display in it to the benefit of the common cause the same high qualities as those of which you have given proof while Chief of the General Staff with the British Army in France. The cordiaHty of our relations in the past is a safe guarantee that the mutual understanding between our two armies will become still closer, and no one is better quahfied than yourself to ensure in England the co-ordination of our efforts. Pray accept, my dear General, the assurance of my sincere respect. J. JOFFRE.] CHAPTER XV CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF, I916 General situation in all theatres — Reorganisation of the General Staff — Position of C.I.G.S. — Relations with Joffre, Cadorna, and Alexeiefi — War Council and War Cabinet — Relations between Ministers and their professional advisers — Proposed war poUcy approved by Cabinet — Send instructions to Commanders-in-Chief — Steps to improve training and organisation of troops at home and abroad — Home Defence— India and India Of&ce responsible for Mesopotamia — Need for comprehensive plan for utiUsing man-power — Cabinet Committee set up to deal with the question — Lord Kitchener and Compulsory Service — Many people objected to it — Problem of pro- viding officers — Production of tanks — Evacuation of Galhpoh — Operations in Mesopotamia — Campaign is handed over to the War Of&ce — Fall of Kut-el-Amara — Appointment of Maude as Com- mander-in-Chief — His successes — Operations in Egypt and Mace- donia — Disadvantages of employing armies of mixed nationalities — East Africa — Smuts and Van Dewenter — Operations on the West Front — Situation at the end of the year — Ministers' dissatisfaction — Tendency to try new methods and plans — Joffre superseded by Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French armies — His plan for 1917 rejected by Governments in favour of Nivelle's plan — My relations with Joffre — Change of Government — My relations with Lord Kitchener — The part he played in the war. I TOOK up the post of C.I.G.S. (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) with a profound sense of anxiety, as I realised that the amount of work to be done was enormous and without precedent, and that many things would be expected of me with which I had had no previous dealings, for I had not only to organise the armies and superintend their strategi- cal employment in accordance with the policy of the Govern- ment, but also to make myself acquainted with numerous matters, great and small, which affected almost every branch of the life of the nation. Moreover, it was impressed upon me by several public men and others, especially after the death of Lord Kitchener, that the country looked to me to show the way to victory, and the feeling of this 246 THE GENERAL SITUATION 247 responsibility never left me for an instant. A heavier burden could hardly have rested on the shoulders of any man, and I could only hope that I might be given the strength and wisdom to carry it fearlessly and efficiently. I am thankful to remember that, notwithstanding many disappointments, I never once felt or expressed, privately or officially, any doubt as to our ability to win, provided the Government, supported by the people, put into the war what war has always required — adequate men, material, and moral resolution, — and put them in at the right time and in the right place. Though not so immediately critical as in the spring of 1918, the general military situation at the end of 1915 was darker and more complicated than at any period of the war. Russia had suffered crushing defeats at the hand of Mackensen, losing heavily in men, territory, and morale, and whether she would be able to recover from them suffi- ciently to be of effective assistance to the Allies in the future was at least doubtful. The ItaUan armies seemed unable to make material progress in expelling the Austrians from their positions beyond the Isonzo. On the West Front no tangible results could as yet be shown in return for the great expenditure of life incurred. Servia had been over- run, the remnants of her army driven out of the country, and the Anglo-French forces sent out too late to help her were now opposed by strong hostile forces in front, had an uncertain neutral on their flanks, and were left with no better objective than the passive defence of Salonika. The Dardanelles operations had been partially abandoned as a failure, Anzac and Suvla having already been evacuated, and the remaining troops were clinging to Cape Helles pending a decision as to whether they were to remain there or come away. On the western frontier of Egypt the Senussi tribesmen had established themselves within striking distance of the Nile valley ; in the Sudan there were signs of trouble with the Sultan of Darfur, who had been approached by Turkish agents ; and on the east the Turks were in possession of the Sinai Peninsula, and were being promised German support in an attack on Egypt from that side, thus endangering the most vital of our 248 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Imperial communications — the Suez Canal. In Mesopotamia an Anglo-Indian force under Major-General Townshend, inadequate in strength and imperfectly organised, had retreated from Ctesiphon after the abortive attempt to capture Baghdad, and since the beginning of December had been besieged by a considerable Turkish army at Kut- el-Amara. Thus the " one bright spot on the military horizon," as Baghdad was thought to be by certain people only a few weeks before, had receded so far into space as to be wholly invisible. In East Africa we were unable to defend our territory, and British prestige was at its lowest ebb. As regards our own share in bringing about this state of affairs it is no exaggeration to say that every mistake we had made in our wars with France more than a hundred years before had been repeated. We had committed our- selves to expeditions, on a vast scale and in remote theatres, which were strategically unsound, had never been properly thought out, and in the Dardanelles alone had already cost us considerably over 100,000 casualties. The false direction thus given to our strategy imperilled the chances of ultimate success, and at the best was bound to hang like a millstone round our necks for the remainder of the war — as it did. It is one of the first principles of war that all available resources should be concentrated at the " decisive " point — that is, at the place where the main decision of the war is to be fought out. There may be a difference of opinion as to where that point should be, but there should never be more than one such point at a time, and once the selection is made, no departure from the principle just mentioned is admissible except {a) when it becomes necessary to detach troops for the protection of interests vital to oneself, for example the Suez Canal ; or {b) when by detaching them the enemy will be compelled as a counter-measure to send a still larger detachment in order to protect interests which are vital to him. This principle, as old as the hills, had been inexcusably violated in 1914-15, and however much we might afterwards try to mitigate the evils resulting therefrom they could never be entirely removed. But there was another side to the picture. In spite CHANGES AT THE WAR OFFICE 249 of losses and unfulfilled expectations the people of the Empire remained solid in their determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion, cost what it might, and so long as this spirit continued there was no reason for despair in the minds of their leaders and servants. That it would continue no one had the right to doubt, and whenever the outlook was black and the prospects of victory seemed remote, or even threatened to disappear altogether, renewed hope and strength could always be derived from a justifiable belief in the steadfastness of the British race. This belief was many times confirmed in 1916 and 1917 by letters which I received from private persons and public bodies expressing confidence in the General Staff and showing a firm resolution to win. Much encouragement was also given by individual public men who promised to support the General Staff to the full extent of their power in the measures recommended for prosecuting the war. The first thing required of me was to give the General Staff at the War Office an organisation similar to that at G.H.Q. in France, though on a more extensive scale, and then hope that, as a result of its increased usefulness, the Government would accord to it that position in the direction of the war which a General Staff at Great Headquarters is intended to fill. The reforms commenced with the room assigned for my own use in the War Office, the first and only day spent in it being quite the most exasperating day of my life. The telephone, which I have always detested, rang incessantly, and a constant stream of people of both sexes and all grades — girl typists, wives of officers, members of parliament, boy-scout messengers, general officers — entered the room, one after another, unannounced, either to see me on some trivial matter or some one else whose room they thought it was. To attempt to work under such maddening conditions was worse than useless. Lucas realised the position as well as I did, and by nine o'clock next morning he had taken possession of another room for me, from which all telephone apparatus was expelled, and access to which could only be gained through an anteroom where he or my private 250 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL secretary kept constant guard so that I might be left in peace. I have described in the preceding chapter the new system sanctioned by which the CT.G.S., instead of the Army Council as a whole, became responsible for the issue of operation orders, and, as bearing upon this, I may now explain the change made in his status vis-d-vis the other military members of the Council. When the Council was first formed in 1904 the military members were given precedence amongst themselves according to their appoint- ments, the C.I.G.S. being First MiUtary Member, the Adjutant- General second, and so on. This system had been altered during the war, precedence being taken according to seniority of rank, and on arrival at the War Office I occupied the third place. I represented to Lord Kitchener that while I did not care two straws personally what place was allotted to me, I was in fact chief military adviser to the Government, and that in other respects the system was illogical and ought to be replaced by the original one. He did not agree, taking the view that one member was as necessary to the constitution of the Council as another, and there- fore that each was entitled, subject to seniority of rank, to be recognised as the First Member. I objected that this could not work in practice, since, for example, it was for the C.I.G.S. to lay down, in conformity with the policy of the Government, where troops were to be sent, and it then became the duty of the Quartermaster-General to send their food there. It was not for the Quartermaster-General to lay down the place where food would be sent, and then for the C.I.G.S. to send troops there to eat it. This rough and exaggerated illustration of conducting the Council's business had effect, and as he dishked going back on the system but recently set up, he naively settled the matter by promoting me " temporary " General. As this was a higher rank than that held by any other Councillor it automatically made me First Member. With respect to the distribution of duties as between the different members of the General Staff I separated the Operations and Intelligence Directorate into two, as I had done in France, Maurice taking charge of the Operations, SIR CHARLES CALLWELL 251 and Callwell retaining the Intelligence. I was lucky to find Callwell in the department, as he was most helpful in making me acquainted with the situation in the various theatres of war, and with numerous other current questions about which I naturally knew little or nothing. He had joined the General Staff from the retired list at the beginning of the war, having previously had many years' experience in it, and I shudder to think what I would have done during the first few harassing weeks of my time as C.I.G.S. had I not had the benefit of his assistance. Later on he was succeeded by Macdonogh, whom I thought it best to bring back from G.H.Q. in France so as to utilise the knowledge he had acquired of that all-important front as chief of the Intelligence since 1914. Whigham, my deputy, had charge of all General Staff work not included in Operations and Intelligence, and acted for me at Army Council meetings, as on all other occasions, when I could not be present. Brigadier-General Bird was Director of Staff Duties and Brigadier-General Cockerill Deputy Director of Intelligence, and amongst the numerous other officers employed were Kirke, Bartholomew, Ellington, Earl Percy (now Duke of Northumberland), and Butler (a New Army officer and son of the late Master of. Trinity College, Cambridge) in the Operations branch, and Buckley, French, Kell, and Cox in the Intelligence. The method of dealing with the receipt and despatch of official letters and telegrams connected with the employ- ment of the field armies was next taken in hand. According to the existing procedure — the old peace procedure and quite unsuitable for war — all communications arriving at the War Office were received and distributed, some of them first being printed, by the civil staff of the Secretary's department. They poured in by hundreds daily and referred to every imaginable subject, from a demand for more socks to the dispositions of whole armies. The depart- ment did its work manfully, and so far as concerned the socks and the multitude of other things required by the troops the system was probably a good one, but for the direction of military operations in face of the enemy it was impossible. Communications on this subject must reach 252 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL the General Staff without a moment's delay, pass through as few hands as possible, and be distributed to such persons as the trained officers of the General Staff can alone decide. With the concurrence of the Secretary, Sir Reginald Brade, the system was so modified as to secure these results, and I formed a small section within the General Staff itself for deaUng with the receipt and disposal of all telegrams and other important communications of a General Staff nature. These and other measures made the General Staff a live organisation, caused it to be recognised as the Great General Staff of the armies in the field, and enabled it to furnish the Government with considered advice on important military questions, so that whether the advice were accepted or not ministers would be made aware of the probable military effect of their decisions. For the purpose of keeping each other informed on matters with which we were mutually concerned, I had officers at the headquarters of Joffre, Cadorna, and Alexeieff respectively, and they had their representatives with me in London. Brigadier-Generals Yarde-Buller, Clive and Delme-Radcliffe, and other officers were employed on this duty in France and Italy. Mainly as a result of their good work and friendly relations with the French and Italian staffs, there was always a complete under- standing with those two countries. With Russia it was not equally satisfactory, although the representatives at both ends did their best to make it so. There were several reasons for this. Alexeieff and I were strangers to each other and so were our staffs ; I could not meet him, as I frequently could Joffre and Cadorna, and discuss matters personally ; he was inclined to press for more British divisions being sent to the eastern theatres, includ- ing co-operation with his forces in Armenia, which was at variance with my views ; and he never seemed able to appreciate the tax imposed by long-distance operations on our already overstrained naval and shipping resources. Twice during 1916 I sent Callwell to explain these and similar questions to him, and to some extent he was success- ful in clearing up points of difference, while my permanent representatives also achieved something in the same direc- THE WAR CABINET 253 tion, but the understanding was never as complete and stable as with France and Italy. It could not possibly be so, for although Alexeieff sincerely desired to work in close accord with the British General Staff, and to the best of my know- ledge with all the Entente armies, he had, over and above the disadvantages just indicated, to contend with a very difficult situation in his own country, which daily became worse until it ended in the revolution of 19 17. The machinery employed by the Government for the supreme conduct of naval and military operations consisted, at the commencement of the war, of the Cabinet of some twenty odd members, aided by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and with the Admiralty and War Office acting as its executive agents. Later, the Committee of Imperial Defence gave place to a War Council composed of certain selected ministers, with the Prime Minister as Chairman ; this, in its turn, afterwards became known as the Dardanelles Committee ; and, finally, the latter was replaced by a War Committee. The last-named was in existence when I be- came C.I.G.S., and, as I had said to Lord Kitchener in my letter of the 5th December (reproduced in the preceding chapter), it was not well adapted to ensure decisions being promptly reached, for, notwithstanding some delegation of its powers to the War Committee, the Cabinet still seemed to be regarded as the supreme authority to whom the more im- portant questions should be referred before action was taken. When Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916 the old-time Cabinet and its War Com- mittee both disappeared, and, following much the same principles as I had suggested in my letter to Lord Kit- chener, a War Cabinet of six or seven members assumed unrestricted control over the war-business of the nation. From a military standpoint — and leaving out of account the constitutional aspect of the question, about which I express no opinion — the change was welcome, if only for the reason that six men could be trusted to give a de- cision in less time than a score would ; but my experience leads me to add that the War Cabinet did not by any means provide a complete remedy for the evils from which its predecessor had suffered. Most of its members were 254 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ministers without portfolios, and having httle if any first- hand knowledge of the questions with which they had to deal they were necessarily dependent upon those ministers who had it. Consequently the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Foreign Secretary, none of whom were members of the War Cabinet, usually had to attend once a day when meetings were held, while other ministers, such as the Secretary of State for India, the Shipping Controller, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of the Air, and the Minister of Munitions, had also frequently to be summoned. The result was that the total number present was often not much less, and was sometimes more, than under the old system, and it is difficult to see how this could have been prevented, for whether the heads of the various State departments do or do not permanently belong to the body charged with the supreme direction of a war, they must be called in when important questions concerning their departments are being considered. The fact is that in a great war such as that of 1914-18 the ramifications of the numerous problems which arise are so widespread that the rapid despatch of business must always be exceedingly difficult to achieve. In 1916, and throughout 1914-18 for that matter, there was much pubUc criticism of the way in which the Govern- ment was conducting the war, and it was difficult to keep clear of the poHtical controversies which arose, though I persistently strove to give them a wide berth. To me it was of no interest how the Government was composed so long as the army got what it wanted, and was not asked to undertake unsound and impracticable operations. This seemed the proper attitude for a soldier to take up, though perhaps it was unwise of me to disclose it as openly as I did. Since the end of the last century the professional careers of senior officers of the army have passed by degrees entirely into the hands of ministers, and, however necessary this system may be, the consequence of it is that, if an officer holding a high position shows that he has no political leanings one way or tlie other, he may find himself without friends in any political party and be suspected by all. It goes without saying that professional advisers should THE PROFESSIONAL ADVISER 255 try their hardest to meet the wishes of ministers, but the doctrine is easier stated than practised. In war, especially in a long war, things do not proceed on simple and smooth lines, but bristle with knots and thorns to an extent quite unknown to those who have not experienced them. Profes- sional advisers are the servants of the Government, and there would be an end of parUamentary government if they were able to override Government policy. On the other hand, the time may come when a policy is proposed which they feel convinced will, if pursued, have disastrous results, and they then have to choose between acquiescing in it, thereby jeopardising the interests of the nation, and sajdng in unmistakable terms that they can be no party to it. More than once when confronted with this dilemma I felt it my duty to adopt the second alternative. In peace time differences of opinion may be allowed to go by the board without great harm being done, as it may be possible to adjust them at a more convenient season. In war the case is different — chickens remorselessly and rapidly come home to roost, errors can seldom be rectified (the enemy will see to that), and men's lives are at stake. A minister once tried in the course of conversation to persuade me that the duty of a professional adviser begins and ends with giving his advice, and that after it has been given and ministers have considered it the orders of the Government should be carried out without further question or remonstrance. I was unable to agree with him as to the chief professional adviser, holding that he had a duty to the country as well as to ministers, and I said so, though I admitted that only special circumstances would justify the conclusion that duty to ministers conflicted with duty to country and must accordingly take second place. It was upon such principles as these that I endeavoured to regulate my attitude. Whether they were right or wrong the reader must judge for himself, but I have no doubt whatever in my own mind that to their cumulative effect may be attributed my removal from the post of C.I.G.S. in February 1918, and therefore from the standpoint of personal advantage they were obviously wrong. Having now cleared the ground by this short account 256 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL of the military situation at the end of 1915, the reorganisation of the General Staff, the arrangements for keeping connected up with the Great General Staffs of the Allies, the methods by which the Government conducted its war-business, and the relations as between the Government and its professional advisers, I will proceed to describe the nature of the work with which the General Staff had to deal. Sundays excepted, I attended the meeting of the War Committee— later the War Cabinet — almost every day, in order to elucidate or justify our written recommendations as to the mihtary poUcy to be followed, give an account of and explain the events of the last twenty-four hours in the different theatres of war, and do what I could to prophesy the events of the next twenty-four. It was not easy to do any of these things, because the reasons which prompted a given recommendation or expression of opinion might be of a technical nature or be the result of a lifelong study of the art of war, and it was not always possible to substantiate them off-hand in the course of a discussion in which a dozen or more ingenious debaters were taking part. I sometimes envied my naval colleague, who, although he had similar duties to perform, escaped much of the ex- amination and criticism which fell to my lot. Amateurs who do not hesitate to lay down the law on questions of mihtary strategy and tactics proceed more warily with respect to naval operations. They have many opportunities for picking up a smattering of military knowledge, whereas their acquaintance with naval matters may be hmited to an occasional trip to the seaside or a bad attack of sea-sickness when crossing the Channel. The sailors do not, as a rule, give them much assistance to become more proficient, the phraseology they use being so strange and technical that the amateur, finding himself to be out of his depth, is only too glad to pass on to the discussion of other subjects in which his ignorance may not be so apparent. The first question to which I had to ask for a clear and stable answer from the Government on becoming C.I.G.S. was what policy they wished to pursue in each and all of the theatres of war where British troops were emplo^^ed, as upon this depended the action to be taken not only by the DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS 257 General Staff but by all other branches of the War Office. Murray had shortly before submitted a memorandum on the subject, but for some reason unknown to me no decision had been reached. His views being in general agreement with my own, I summed up his main recommendations and sent them to the Cabinet for approval on the same day as I took up office. I at once received as complete an answer as circumstances permitted, and the hearts of the General Staff were particularly gladdened by the acceptance of the recommendation that, from the British point of view, France and Flanders should be regarded as the main theatre of operations. So long as this policy was adhered to in practice all would be well. The next step was to ensure that the Commanders-in- Chief understood what they were expected to do, and having obtained an authoritative pronouncement as to policy I was able to tell them. I could not discover that they had any precise and up-to-date directions of the kind required. They had received various telegrams and other communications from time to time, and may have been given verbal directions, but something more was needed to enable them to look ahead, make their plans, and give effect to the wishes of the Government in the manner intended. They required to be furnished with concrete " Instructions " (" Directives " in French) explaining in concise and definite language, over the signature of the Secretary of State for War on behalf of the Government, the exact nature of their mission, and then leaving them to decide as to the method of its execution. It may be mentioned, too, that besides their obvious use to Commanders-in-Chief, these instructions have another value. The mere act of putting them into writing for future guidance and record tends to lay bare any defects and incon- sistencies there may be in the policy which they represent, and had they been drafted, as they should have been, in all cases in 1914-15 some of the projects then undertaken might have been consigned to obHvion before they became reaUy dangerous. Even if they were not abandoned, there would at any rate be no question as to where responsibiUty rested, for once a commander receives his instructions it is his own s 258 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL fault if, without remonstrance, he attempts to carry them out when of opinion that they are impracticable. I next gave attention to the training and organisation of the troops, both at home and abroad. Egypt, the base for all operations in the Mediterranean, was in a state of chaos, and the British and Colonial divisions transferred there from the Galhpoli Peninsula, together with large reinforcements of partially-trained personnel from Austraha and New Zealand, and other partially-trained drafts for Gallipoh and Salonika, constituted an unwieldy accumula- tion of some 300,000 men. These had either never yet been organised as fighting forces, or their organisation, such as it was, required drastic overhauUng before proper value could be derived from them in the field. The sorting out of this medley of troops and the vast jumble of stores, transport, and equipment collected for their use, was a herculean task for the local mihtary authorities, and will be further referred to later. At home, again, there were hundreds of thousands of men who, for the most part, were without proper organisation either for the field or for purposes of training, and in addition there was a large number of divisions which as yet were only half-trained and half-equipped. Moreover, the number, com- position, and distribution of the home defence troops bore httle relation to the actual situation ; the general plan of defence was fundamentally faulty ; and with some com- mendable exceptions the defences themselves were insufficient and often of unsuitable t^^es. For all this no one in particular was to blame. On the contrary the War Office, commanders, and troops had worked their hardest and best under most adverse conditions. It was the natural outcome of having to create large armies at short notice, without the assistance of a previously- prepared plan, and of being frequently obliged to send troops abroad in small packets and on no method save that of meeting an urgent need in one of the many theatres in which we were fighting. It fell to Lord French, Commander- in-Chief in the United Kingdom, to straighten out the tangle at home. As I have stated elsewhere, there were previous to his appointment on the 19th December 1915, seven MESOPOTAMIA 259 Commanders-in-Chief at home, each of whom was directly under the War Office, thus making with the Commanders- in-Chief in France, Salonika, Egypt and Gallipoli, a total of eleven commanders with whom the C.I.G.S. had to deal. No man could possibly deal with such a number, and I was glad that the Government approved of my recommendation to unite all troops at home under one commander. The organisation of the troops in Mesopotamia and the arrangements for the maintenance of the long and precarious line of communication in that country were notoriously bad, but with this theatre the General Staff was not directly concerned as the operations were conducted by the Govern- ment of India under instructions issued by the India Office. x\s I wish to avoid saying anything which might revive the controversial question of responsibility for the mismanage- ment of the early part of this campaign, I wiU merely remark that a sound system of command is a requisite condition of success, and that no worse system could have been devised than that of dividing the control of the miUtary forces of the Empire between two separate departments (India Office and War Office) and two separate army head- quarters (Simla and London). British officers can do most things, but no human being could have made this vicious system work efficiently, and it is no reflection on either the India authorities or the India Office to say that it was bound to lead to serious trouble, if not to disaster, as unfortun- ately it did. For some time I hesitated to put my finger into the Mesopotamian pie, but as matters seemed to be going from bad to worse I was at last compelled to point out to the War Committee the impossibility of continuing the existing arrangement, and I recommended, with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, that both operative and administrative control should be taken over by the War Office and be dealt with by it as in the case of aU other campaigns. After some discussion the recommendation was accepted and the change took effect in the month of February 1916. As an illustra- tion of the disadvantages incurred by different campaigns being conducted by different State departments, I may say that, previous to this change, neither the Imperial General 26o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Staff nor the Army Council were entitled to communicate direct with the military authorities in India. All correspond- ence of importance had to pass through the India Ofhce — the department responsible to the Home Government. Another, and perhaps the most complicated, problem awaiting solution was that of man-power. In July 19 15 the National Registration Act had been passed, and in accord- ance with it every person in Great Britain — Ireland being excluded — between the ages of 16 and 65 years had been registered. This was a useful and necessary preliminary to any legislation for universal service, but it was no more than that. Later, the " Derby Scheme " had been introduced so as to give the voluntary system of recruiting its last chance, its distinctive features being that men " attested " their willingness to join the army when wanted, and they then entered a so-called reserve where they remained undisturbed in their civil employment until called up. This produced good results at first but soon began to dwindle away, and by the end of 1915 it was quite clear, notwithstanding the wonders hitherto achieved under Lord Kitchener's inspiration, that the voluntary system was fast breaking down and must be replaced by compulsory measures. To the procuring of these I forthwith directed my energies. No plan for substituting such measures had as yet been thoroughly considered, and the hard fact that the entire manhood of the nation would have to be utilised in the prosecution of the war, either in the fighting services or on other work of an essential kind, and utilised in an appropriate way, was, so far as my knowledge goes, still insufficiently recognised by any one in the Government with the possible exception of Lord Kitchener. I shall show presently that, for practical purposes, it never was recognised until the enemy made his last throw for victorj^ in March 1918, and then the recognition was perilously near to being too late. It was, perhaps, not surprising that, as late as December 1915, the important question of man-power had not yet been dealt with in a comprehensive manner. For several months after the outbreak of hostilities the belief had prevailed that the war would soon be over, and in the MAN-POWER 261 meantime shoals of men had come forward, voluntarily, as quickly as they could be handled. Even when this belief began to weaken, it was supposed that the only problem was the provision of an additional number of men for the army alone. " Business as usual " was still far from being dead, and when it was suggested that certain trades unconnected with the war might be discontinued, the reply was that an " awful outcry " would be raised. Moreover, ministers had, as a result of our general unpreparedness, been overwhelmed with other work, and some of them did not even know how many divisions had already been formed, let alone how many we might eventually want. I had several informal conversations with ministers, including Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, during my first few days in London, and their common complaint against the soldiers was that they could get from them no definite and reliable opinion. It was evident to me that, whatever had been the case before, they were now more than anxious to have the advice of the General Staff as to what was to be done, and I made up my mind that on this score they should have no further ground for dissatisfaction. Besides three cavalry divisions we had on the army books a total of seventy British infantry divisions, thirty- five being in France, others in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Macedonia, and the remainder in different stages of formation at home. It was essential that the latter, except such as were required for home defence, should be completed with personnel and sent to the front as soon as possible, and that men should also be provided to meet the great expansion contemplated in heavy artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, mechanical transport, railways, tunnelling companies, and numerous other units outside the divisions. In addition, there must be sufficient reserves to make good the wastage caused by sickness and battle, and finally, after making provision to meet all these demands, it would be necessary to consider whether any further divisions should be raised, and if so, how many. It was the business of the General Staff to advise on these matters from the standpoint of miUtary policy, and it then rested with the Adjutant-General, after a decision 262 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL had been reached, to obtain the number of men authorised. How many men could be spared for the army was of course for the Government and not for the War Office to say, as men were also needed for the navy, shipbuilding, food- production, munitions, industries, and many other services connected with the war. On the 27th December, four days after I became C.I.G.S., the General Staff views on man- power were laid before the Cabinet, and shortly after- wards the whole question was investigated by a " Cabinet Committee on the co-ordination of military and financial effort." At the back of my mind I had the intention of obtaining at least two million men in addition to the two and a half milhons recruited since August 1914. How many more might be required later could not yet be foreseen. The investigation was particularly exhaustive respecting the actual needs of the army, and the effect which these needs, if met, might have on trade and consequently on finance. If trade were crippled then money would become short, in which case we might be unable either to maintain the existing divisions or to continue giving subsidies to our Allies, and there were those who feared that bankruptcy was already in sight. Trade and finance lay outside the War Office sphere and were dealt with in the evidence supplied by the Board of Trade and Treasury, but I cannot help remarking that the views held by experts on the relation of finance to war seem to call for revision. Before 1914 it was frequently said, and on high authority sometimes, that future wars would be of short duration, if not entirely prevented, because of the financial strain and the general dislocation of com- merce which they would entail. This prophecy was not borne out by the Great War, though I would hesitate to guess what may yet be the outcome of the colossal expen- diture incurred in it. I am so profoundly ignorant of financial strategy and tactics — never having had the wherewithal to indulge in them — that I cannot even understand why pubHc servants Uke myself should pay income tax on their salaries months before the same tax is collected from the business community. It would have assisted the other departments, as some " MILITARY SERVICE ACT " 263 of them said, if a specific estimate of the number of divisions required to win the war could have been made by the War Office, but no such calculation was feasible, and the posi- tion I took up before the committee was that, owing to the world-wide character of the war, it was impossible to say how many men would eventually be required. In other words, I argued that we could not hope to win through on any basis of limited Habihty, and that the only limit we were justified in accepting was the last available man. From this position I never budged, and perhaps was some- times thought to be obstinate and unreasonable, but the situation was much too grave to permit of watering down considered opinions in the vain endeavour to make things easier. To have shown any such weakness would have been tantamount to a betrayal of the trust reposed in me by virtue of the office I held. The committee gave me a very patient hearing, as they did all other War Office representatives, but the first results, the passing of the " Military Service Act " on the 27th of January 1916, were disappointing, as the Act rendered liable to mihtary service only those men who were unmarried or widowers having no dependent children. The inadequate scope of this half-baked measure, and the ease with which its provisions enabled military obliga- tions to be evaded, were apparent from the first, and after further investigation by the committee the Bill was ex- tended, in May 1916, to include married men and widowers with dependent children. The amended Bill still excluded Ireland, and in other respects was not as comprehensive and as free from hampering conditions as could have been desired, but it was a great step in advance, for it ensured a more reliable flow of recruits from Great Britain ; it established the principle, if it did not wholly enforce it, of national service until the end of the war ; and, thanks to it, close upon 1,200,000 men were obtained during 1916 out of the two millions I had set out to get. When at the commencement of the enquiry I tried to convince Lord Kitchener that we must resort to all-round compulsory service he was not inclined to agree with me. This was only natural, as he had been marvellously success- 264 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL ful in obtaining volunteers for the New Armies he had formed, and he hoped to finish the war without applying compulsion, especially as regards married men. Moreover, in his dealings with the representatives of Labour he had apparently promised, either by word or implication, not to apply it until it became absolutely necessary, if they would co-operate with him, as I believe they invariably did, in obtaining men under the Derby Scheme, and he was anxious not to appear guilty of a breach of faith. But the chief reason which induced him to hold back was, I believe, the desire to conserve suihcient reserves to deal the finishing blow in the war when the psychological moment arrived. " Don't try to hurry things so," he would say when I was urging my view of the case. " What we should aim at is to have the largest army in Europe when the terms of peace are being discussed, and that will not be in 1916 but in 1917." Eventually he agreed with me that, owing to the increased demands by new services (tanks, aeroplanes, heavy guns, etc.), to the gradual decline of the voluntary sj^stem, and to the time it would take to start a new system and train the men produced by it, the intro- duction of compulsory measures could no longer be delayed, and thenceforward he whole-heartedly supported them. He has been blamed for not introducing them in 1914, and no doubt if this had been done our man-power resources could have been tapped by scientific and equitable methods, and much discontent and disturbance of industry would have been avoided. We would not, for instance, have depleted the country of skilled engineers by placing them in the trenches, from which they had later to be withdrawn for employment in ship - building yards and munition- shops. But these were matters for the Government and not merely for the Secretary of State for War, who was concerned only with the army. Moreover, the necessary registration and legislation would have taken a considerable time to carry out and there was not an hour to lose, and much opposition might have been encountered had an attempt been made to introduce compulsion before the voluntary system was seen to be inadequate. In confirmation of this I may say that when the Cabinet COMPULSORY SERVICE 265 enquiry was being held there were, to my personal know- ledge — and quite irrespective of the opinions that may or may not have been held by members of the Cabinet, regard- ing which I shall say nothing — far more prominent public men outside the Cabinet who doubted the wisdom of in- troducing compulsion than is generally supposed. Some of these maintained, amongst other objections, that the addi- tional men procurable would not be worth the public dis- content the change would create, and would be more than outweighed by the additional troops required for the pre- servation of internal order ; while as to Ireland, it was said that the attempt to apply compulsion would inevitably produce a rebellion. As we now know these forebodings proved to be without foundation, though it should be added that as the Bill was not made applicable to Ireland the fancied danger of rebellion there was not incurred. Personally, I doubt if any such danger really existed, and as is well known the rebellion, so-called, which occurred in Easter week did not represent any considerable element in Irish life as a whole, and was condemned by the greater part of Ireland as indignantly as by England. As there was at the time no Commander-in-Chief of the usual status in the country, the task of restoring order was confided by the Government to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell, who had recently returned from Egypt, and I sent Lieutenant- Colonel Hutchison with him as his Chief of the General Staff. Maxwell had a difficult and distasteful duty to perform, as all soldiers have when called upon to use force against their fellow-subjects, and I am sure that he honestly tried to carry it out in accordance with the letter and spirit of his instructions. In Dublin, where the rebellion started, severe street fighting lasted for several days, about 100 soldiers and 180 civilians being killed. There were also outbreaks in Galway, Wexford, and Drogheda, but these were less serious, and the National Volunteers, composed of Irishmen, helped to suppress them. To revert to the question of man-power. It was fre- quently suggested to me during 1916 that the country was still imperfectly informed of the dimensions of the struggle in which we were engaged, and that it longed to have the 266 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL facts of the case plainly put before it. To speak in public, however, did not properly lie within my province, and I never spoke without obtaining the consent of the Secretary of State for War, and until convinced that it was my duty to speak. On those occasions when I felt it necessary to speak I was, with one exception, Hstened to with earnest attention, and no will deny that the country invariably showed the greatest readiness to comply with the ever- increasing demands made upon it. The exception was at a meeting held at Woolwich Arsenal, which I had been requested to attend by the Ministry of Munitions. I had no sooner entered the room than I found that I was not wanted. I told the men that I had come at some inconvenience to myself and purely as a matter of duty, and that if they did not wish to hear me I would go away. Their leaders appealed to them to keep order, and as it had no effect I walked off the platform and returned to London. I discovered afterwards, to my astonishment, that some labour question was in dispute at the time betv/een the men and the Ministry of Munitions, and that they had gone to the meeting to hear what the minister who accompanied me had to say, and for that purpose alone. Naturally, therefore, they did not wish to waste time in listening to me. Connected with man-power was the question of providing a sufficient number of officers to keep pace with the ex- pansion of the army and to make good wastage. The casualties amongst officers had amounted in 1914 to about 5700, and in 1915 to about 23,260, and it was expected that the number would be much larger in 19 16, as several more divisions were to be put in the field. As early as the winter of 1914-15 G.H.Q. in France received complaints from regimental commanders that many of the officers sent from England were quite untrained, and instead of being a help were an actual danger to the men they had to lead. This was due to the fact that they had received their commis- sions straight from civil life before undergoing any military training. At the time a considerable number of men from the ranks were being recommended for commissions, and in order to give them some little instruction in the duties 3i < Z ►J < < O z a S M Z w O o z U Z CADET BATTALIONS 267 of an officer before appointing them to commissions the Commander-in-Chief ordered a Cadet School to be formed at Bailleul, the Artists Rifles — which had belonged to the Officers' Training Corps in peace time — being used for the purpose. The results were satisfactory, and in the spring of 1915 the school was transferred to near St. Omer and enlarged to deal with about 100 cadets at a time. The demand for officers was at first so heavy that only six weeks could be allotted to each class, but this was later extended to a course of three months, and it included ex- perience in the fighting line. Instruction was given in all branches of training required by a platoon commander. When I became C.I.G.S. the only sources, apart from the Cadet School in France, from which officers with some previous training were obtainable, were Sandhurst, Woolwich, the Honourable Artillery Company, the Inns of Court and Artists Rifles contingents of the Officers' Training Corps, and the Officers' Training Corps of the universities. The staffs of these Training Corps had not the necessary know- ledge to train officers up to the required standard, and, moreover, as the demand had quite outstripped the supply, commissions were still being given to men coming direct from civil life. I therefore obtained Lord Kitchener's consent to organise at home a number of cadet battalions similar to the one which had given such good results in France, and in the month of February I brought Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchison to the War Office to superintend their organisa- tion and training, he having been charged with the same duty when I was in France. Twelve cadet battalions were formed, each consisting of about 500 cadets ; the course was one of three months, and the cadets had to pass an examination before receiving their commissions. Each battalion had a permanent training establishment of about 30 officers and from 80 to 100 other ranks, most of whom had had experience in the field. The casualties amongst officers in all theatres rose from 23,260 in 1915 to 41,610 in 1916, and to 51,960 in 1917. (It will be understood that these are gross, not nett, figures, and include the wounded and sick who returned to duty after recovery.) To meet this increased wastage the number of 268 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL cadet battalions had to be enlarged, and included cavalry, artillery, engineers, and army service corps, as well as infantry. The battalions were commanded by some of our best officers, full of energy and enthusiasm, and they answered their purpose so well that not only were the losses at the front made good but at the beginning of 1918 there was a reserve of about 10,000 officers at home. It was fortunate that we had this reserve to fall back upon in the critical months of April and May of that year. In all, more than 84,000 officers were supplied by the battalions during the war. The General Staff had also to deal with the shortage of junior officers fit for employment on the staff. To meet this need in France we had started a staff school at St. Omer in 1915, and early in 1916 I formed one at Cambridge university under Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hare. The school was expanded in 1917, and a side to teach more senior staff officers was added to it. Another new organisation introduced in 1916 was the Tank Corps, which in the earlier stages of its existence was recruited from selected officers and men transferred from other units, and was designated the " Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps." The official trial of the first tank, known as " Mother," took place in Hatfield Park early in February, Mr, Balfour (First Lord of the Admiralty), Mr. M'Kenna, Lord Kitchener, myself, and several other officials being present. Opinion was by no means unanimous that the machine would prove suitable for employment in battle, and it was in fact much inferior to the type evolved later ; but before we left the ground Lord Kitchener agreed to my proposal that a hundred should be ordered at once. In the following September about fifty tanks took part in the battle of the Somme. As in the case of all new inventions, the best value was not derived from the tank until the troops learnt how to use it, the chief difficulty being to obtain effective co-operation between the three arms — tanks, artillery, and infantry, and for this time and experience were required. The War Office has been accused of obstructing the pro- vision of tanks, and perhaps those who made the accusation EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI 269 did not quite realise all the difficulties which attend the starting of a new service and a new means of making war, and that these were accentuated in the case of the Tank Corps because of the shortage of men and steel. To divert men from the other arms and services — who were incessantly clamouring for personnel either to make good wastage or for purposes of expansion — so as to provide men to make and man tanks, of whose utility many officers, at the front as at home, were still unconvinced, was not a decision to be lightly taken : while as regards steel it was laid down, not by the War Office but by the authorities responsible for assessing the order of " priority," that the building of tanks should not be permitted to interfere with the output of guns, ammunition, aeroplanes, mechanical transport, and locomotives. Having made this explanation I should add that the great reputation eventually won, and deserved, by the tank as a formidable and indispensable fighting machine, is the more creditable to those who, in the face of adverse circumstances, were concerned in its production. On a previous page I have said that the evacuation of Helles in the Gallipoli Peninsula was still under considera- tion at the end of 1915. Since September the Government had been undecided what course to pursue in regard to the Dardanelles, and early in October I had been summoned from France to advise. I recommended cutting our losses, and said that although evacuation must necessarily be attended with difficulty and risk it ought nevertheless to be a feasible operation provided that careful arrangements were made, especially with respect to secrecy. Later, General Sir Charles Monro was sent out to command and to advise, and he was followed by Lord Kitchener, who was to give a final decision. Eventually, in the third week of December, Anzac and Suvla were evacuated, but the question as to whether Helles, at the toe of the peninsula, should or should not be retained still remained to be settled. The open confession of failure involved by complete evacuation was unpalatable to ministers, and some of them thought that we should lose prestige in the eyes of the eastern world, and so make further trouble for ourselves there ; some of the soldiers thought that Egypt would be 270 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL seriously threatened by the Hberation of the Turkish troops hitherto contained in the peninsula ; the sailors, for reasons not very convincing, were mainly in favour of continued occupation; while the withdrawal and re-embarkation of a force of 40,000 men, 150 guns, 4500 horses, and a vast quantity of stores was undoubtedly beset with enormous risks. Much more so than the withdrawal from Anzac and Suvla, for the hostile forces would be relatively stronger, surprise would be improbable, and bad weather would be more likely. It was impossible to say what our losses might not be, for apart from the uncertainty of what the enemy might do or omit to do, much depended upon the extent to which weather interfered with the operation. Some of the officers on the spot thought we might lose as much as thirty per cent of the force. But, after all, the main question was what useful purpose would be served by keeping a detachment at Helles, now that the troops had been withdrawn from Anzac and Suvla ? Clearly there was none, and to continue hanging on to the place merely because we were afraid to leave it, was not only a waste of men but would be a constant source of anxiety. On the 28th of December, five days after becoming C.I.G.S., I placed before the War Committee a memo- randum drafted for me by Callwell, who was acquainted with my views, advocating the immediate and total evacua- tion of the peninsula. Lord Kitchener supported the recommendation, evacuation was approved, the necessary orders were despatched the same day, and by the 8th of January the operation had been completed, the only casualties being one man hit by a spent bullet and three men accidentally injured while embarking. Nearly all the guns were brought away, but some 500 animals had to be left behind. To extricate about 40,000 men in face of greatly superior forces, almost without a single mishap, was a per- formance which redounds to the credit of all soldiers and sailors who took part in it. Maude, with the headquarters of his division, the 13th, was one of the last to leave. This division had previously taken part in the withdrawal from Suvla and was afterwards sent to relieve a tired division at KUT-EL-AMARA 271 Helles. Much of the credit for the retirement therefore belongs to it and its fine commander. Having got rid of this commitment, my next desire was to send as many divisions as could be spared from Egypt, where the Gallipoli troops had been disembarked, to join the armies on the West Front, and to send back to the same front certain reinforcements which had been directed to proceed thence to Egypt just before I became C.I.G.S. Orders to this effect were issued, and within a short time the divisions were on their way to France. Kut-el-Amara, in Mesopotamia, was a more difficult problem than Helles, for in this case we could not with- draw. We must first fight, and fight hard, and the adminis- trative arrangements in this theatre were so defective that it was almost impossible to m.ake a satisfactory plan for the fighting and at the same time be reasonably certain of relieving the garrison before it was starved into surrender. Exactly what could be done depended almost entirely upon the output of the line of communication, and this was doubtful in the extreme. The line was of great length — some 500 miles along the river — imperfectly organised in itself and at the base, and the amount of river transport was not nearly sufficient to convey the available troops to the front, supply them when there with food and ammunition, and maintain them in reasonable comfort and health. This lamentable shortage of river-craft ham- pered, in fact, the whole operation, and at the best must take a considerable time to remedy. It has been said with much truth that a line of com- munication is the main artery along which flows the life- blood of the army in front, and that if any congestion or rupture occurs the whole military body becomes sick and may even die. Before any attempt had been made to advance as far as Baghdad every precaution should have been taken to establish a line of communication which would be not only good but very good. Our own history had fur- nished dozens of examples in proof of this — one being Lord Kitchener's advance to Khartoum — but they do not seem to have been remembered. Three attempts were made to relieve Kut-el-Amara. 272 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL respectively beginning on the 4th of January, the 8th of March, and the 6th of April, and all failed, although one at least might perhaps have succeeded had everything gone smoothly and as expected. This seldom happens in war, and it did not happen at Kut-el-Amara, and in the last week of April the garrison of 2970 British and 6000 native troops, including followers, was compelled to surrender, after gallantly holding out under the most trying conditions for nearly five months. Thus was exacted the inevitable penalty for allowing operations to develop without any settled policy ; without making proper preparations and providing sufficient means to attain the object in view ; and without taking sufficiently into account what the enemy might do in order to frustrate that object. The original purpose of the campaign had been the seizure of the Persian Gulf water-way up to the point where navigation for ocean-going vessels ceases, and the protection of the Karun oil-fields. Incidentally, the operation would exercise a useful effect on the tribes around the Gulf, and as no large force was required and the troops themselves were to some extent not suitable for employment in Europe, the campaign as at first intended may be regarded as justi- fiable. But to enlarge its scope by attempting to capture and permanently occupy Baghdad was, at the time the attempt was made, not within the limits of our means, and I happen to know that Lord Kitchener dissented from it, laying special emphasis on the disadvantages of the long and imperfect line of communication. (As previously men- tioned, the campaign was being conducted at this period under the auspices of the India Office and not of the War Office, and therefore Lord Kitchener may have thought that he could do no more than express his disapproval of the decision.) As in the case of the final evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula, it was thought that the fall of Kut-el-Amara would create serious disquiet, if nothing worse, in the Muhammadan countries adjacent to India ; but happily, as with Gallipoh, it did nothing of the kind, and the prophecy I heard made that our eastern empire would be shaken to its foundations remained unfulfilled. I think we need to correct our ideas ORIENTAL PRESTIGE 273 a little on the matter of prestige, as we call it. Prestige, no doubt, carries much weight in eastern countries, but in war it is apt to become a bogy, and to scare away the timid from doing what is clearly the right thing to do, or, what may prove to be worse, frighten them into a dissipation of strength in the vain endeavour to be safe everywhere at the same time. Years ago, when means of communica- tion were few and slow, and education had not spread to its present dimensions, the eastern people knew little about the might of the British Empire and unimpaired prestige may then have been a necessity, but at the present day they are fairly shrewd judges of a situation, and may be trusted to appreciate a temporary set-back at something like its proper value. This does not mean that the question can be entirely neglected. Orientals are as susceptible as other nations to the enemy's wiles and propaganda. In the early part of 1916 enemy agents were overrunning Persia and Trans- Caspia, and were also to be found in Afghanistan and at other places on the borders of India, spreading abroad the most ludicrous stories concerning the war and the imminent downfall of the British Empire, and backing up their statements with a plentiful distribution of promises and hard cash. To counteract these mischievous proceed- ings no effective steps had been taken, and the enemy was having things entirely his own way. The remedy did not lie, as was sometimes suggested, in sending packets of troops, varying from battalions to brigades, to " show the flag " or to support some professedly loyal chief, and without thinking of what it might ultimately cost to keep the same flag flying. The General Staff had to resist more than one suggestion of this kind whilst I was C.I.G.S., and it was not an easy task, for they usually emanated from the " man on the spot," who is too frequently thought to be the most com- petent judge, whereas his outlook is often narrow and his advice by no means always the best to follow. What was needed was to despatch to the centres of intrigue and disaffection a few Englishmen of the right type to give our version of the state of affairs, furnish them with money T 274 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL to pay handsomely for intelligence and other services rendered, and provide them with just sufficient escort to ensure their personal safety. On the advice of the General Staff measures of this kind were initiated, and in a short time matters assumed a different aspect. Of course, the best way of thwarting the enemy's designs and of making our position permanently secure was to give the Turks in Mesopotamia a sound beating, and arrangements for this were put in train. Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake commanded in this theatre between January and August 1916, and was then succeeded by Maude, who had gone to Mesopotamia with his division from Egypt early in the year and had subse- quently been in command of an army corps. When the question of a successor to Sir Percy was being considered by the Government, I had no hesitation in recommending that Maude should be given the appointment, and although no exception was taken to him no particular desire was shown to select him, one reason for this probably being that the officers whose names were mentioned as alternatives were much better known to the ministers with whom the decision rested. Maude was, in fact, almost entirely un- known to them at the time, and therefore it was the more gratifying to me that in the end Mr. Asquith accepted my recommendation. I was quite ready to accept responsibility for it. I knew that Maude possessed a high standard of honour, a quaUfication without which, and historical exceptions not- withstanding, no man is fit to hold an important command. I also knew that he was careful of the interests of his men, held sound views on tactical and strategical questions, recognised the value of good organisation, and in every way seemed to be the ideal man to clear up the Mesopotamian muddle and give the Turks a thrashing into the bargain. How well he justified his selection is one of the most brilhant chapters in the history of the Great War. Wisely devoting his energies first to the improvement of the abominable line of communication and the training and organisation of his troops, he patiently laboured and waited until his pre- parations were sufficiently good to justify an advance, and MAUDE IN MESOPOTAMIA 275 when all was ready he struck with such skill and vigour that in less than three months the enemy was completely defeated. Kut-el-Amara was recaptured in February 1917 with more than 2000 prisoners, and on the nth of March Maude entered Baghdad at the heels of the flying Turks and chased them north along the line of the German railway. Some months later we received many reports indicating the concentration of large hostile forces about Mosul, but they were probably circulated for the express purpose of inducing us to send reinforcements from other theatres, and whatever truth there may have been in them (there was little or none) they did not seriously disturb the minds of the General Staff. Having at last established a reasonably good line of communication, and enjoying the assistance of Monro (Commander-in-Chief in India since October 1916) and the Indian authorities in general, we felt that we could safely leave the rest to Maude. His death from cholera on the i8th of November 1917 was a great loss to the Empire and to all those many comrades by whom he was both admired and beloved. Before the Great War he had served with distinction in Egypt, South Africa, Canada, and at home, and he left behind him a name for devotion to duty and uprightness of character that will endure for all time in the annals of the British army. Murray in Egypt, like Maude in Mesopotamia, had much spade work to do in connection with the organisation, equipment, and training of his troops before he could dispose of the Turks lying east of the Suez Canal. One wonders why these essential matters had been permitted to get into such an unsatisfactory state, and in all theatres except France, for every soldier possessing a rudimentary know- ledge of his profession is aware of their importance. The reason was that whereas our pre-war preparations for offen- sive action had been based on a scale not exceeding the employment of some half-dozen divisions, we had, in addition to sharing on the West Front in the greatest con- flict the world has ever known, become engaged in five other campaigns, all of which were of considerable magnitude. These commitments would have taxed the resources and ingenuity of the most perfectly prepared nation, and in 276 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL our case they were bound to lead to confusion, and, if nothing worse, be unproductive of useful results for a long time to come. Murray's task was the harder because the normal organi- sation of the divisions which had returned from Gallipoli had been dislocated when they were sent there. A variety of personnel, animals, vehicles, etc., not required in Galli- poH were then left behind in Egypt and these had of necessity been meanwhile sent to the western frontier of the country or elsewhere, and were still absent, hundreds of miles away, when the divisions returned to Egypt. They had to be collected or replaced before the divisions could be recon- structed. A further disadvantage was that at first Murray was not sole master in Egypt. When he was sent there at the end of 1915, on being succeeded by me as C.I.G.S., it was decided that he should command only the troops operating in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, and that the remainder should continue under the orders of Maxwell, who had previously commanded the whole. On hearing of this decision when I went to the War Office I represented to Lord Kitchener that it was impracticable, but he was anxious to retain Maxwell because of his unique experience in Egyptian matters, and as he would agree neither to put Murray under Maxwell nor Maxwell under Murray two kings of Brent- ford were set up. Both Generals tried their hardest to make the system work, but within a few weeks both were forced to say that it was an impossible one and ought to be discontinued. In March, Maxwell returned to England and Murray assumed command of all the troops. The operations in Egypt, as in other theatres, were also hampered by the lack of war material, and Murray was usually worse off in this respect than other Commanders-in- Chief, for as the output was still much below the sum of our requirements he frequently had to go short in order that the more pressing needs of other fronts might be satisfied. In spite of these adverse conditions, and of having to build a broad-gauge railway as he advanced, and lay down a great pipe-line, with pumping stations, to bring fresh water from Egypt for his troops, he drove the Turks out of the MACEDONIA 277 Sinai Peninsula before the end of the year and thus put a stop to further hostile designs in this quarter. He also effectually cleared the Senussi out of the oases of the western deserts of Egypt. Of the campaign in Macedonia there is little to be said, except that for about three years it absorbed a large Entente force which contributed nothing material to the winning of the war, beyond detaining two or three German divisions of inferior quality, and a number of Bulgarian divisions who would probably have objected to serve outside the Balkan Peninsula. This is a hard statement to make, remembering the privations and sickness our troops experi- enced and the fine work they performed in the offensive of September 1918, but the fact remains that the Bulgars were defeated on the West Front and not in Macedonia. They had been at war since 1912, were exhausted, and realised that their side was beaten before the offensive began. Practically the only good point about the campaign was that it enabled the Entente to use Serb and Greek troops whom it might have been difficult to employ elsewhere. The total Entente force in Macedonia was usually much stronger than the enemy, numbering at one time about 650,000 men as against some 450,000 Germans and Bulgars, and the bad strategy which caused this situation had the result of creating frequent discussions as to what could be done to improve matters. Scarcely a month passed in which some fresh plan was not proposed by one or other of the countries interested — Russia, France, Serbia, Greece, Italy, and ourselves. At one time it would be a question of increasing the force either for offensive or defensive purposes ; at another of reducing it so as to discontinue the waste of troops who were doing nothing and could do nothing, and were badly needed elsewhere ; at another of coming away altogether. No one policy held the field for more than a few weeks, and this is not to be wondered at, seeing there was no hope of achieving anything decisive by such offensive operations as were feasible, while on the other hand there were reasons why the force could neither be withdrawn nor reduced. As might be expected, the enemy exploited the position 278 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL to his own advantage, and frequently spread false reports of his intention to make a preponderating attack and drive the Allies into the sea. What was worse, the reports sometimes had the desired effect of inducing the AUied Governments to reinforce this front at the expense of the West Front, and so use up shipping which could have been more profitably employed in other ways, and at the same time that shipping became an additional target for submarine attack. Nothing pleased the enemy more than to see the Allies add to the number of their troops in this theatre, which he facetiously described as the "entente internment camp." I remember that considerable excite- ment once prevailed because Falkenhayn, who had recently ceased to be the Chief of the German General Staff, was reported to have arrived in Macedonia, and although the British General Staff discredited the rumour some of the Allies insisted that it was true. Later, the Falkenhayn turned out to be a major having a somewhat similar name who was the German mihtary attache in Greece. The Macedonian campaign was the more difficult to conduct because of the mixture of nationalities in the Allied forces, for although General Sarrail was theoretically in supreme command of the whole, no important measure could be taken without reference to the Governments concerned. The entire campaign, in fact, was complicated and tiresome, and more conferences were held, either at London or in France, in regard to it than to any other military question. Even when it did not figure in the agenda it invariably obtruded itself before the conference dispersed, and it is no exaggeration to say that at one period it made more demands on the time and temper of ministers and their naval and military advisers than all the other campaigns put together. Fortunately for the General Staff we had a very level-headed General, Milne, in command of the British contingent, upon whom we could always rely to give a sound opinion and make the best use of the troops he had. Milne was an old comrade of mine, having served with me on Lord Roberts' staff in South Africa, and under me in the Intelligence Division at the War Office when in charge of the Balkans section. GENERAL SMUTS 279 Throughout the war, ministers never seemed able to understand, what educated soldiers well know, that the employment of troops of different armies in the same operation is attended with many difficulties and complica- tions, and that the aggregate fighting value of the force is thereby reduced to a corresponding degree. Mihtary salads of this kind are sometimes justifiable and may be unavoidable, but it must be remembered that the mere counting of heads may give quite a wrong impression of the capabilities of the force, and that the appointment of an Allied Commander- in-Chief does not entirely remove the disadvantages in- curred, though in some respects it may perhaps mitigate them. The enemy acted more wisely than we did, either from choice or necessity, and kept his different nationalities on separate fronts where they could most conveniently be placed and maintained. Thus, there were Germans on the West Front, Austrians on the Italian Front, Germans and Austrians on different sections of the Russian Front, Bulgars in Macedonia, and Turks in Asia. From this principle he seldom departed, except for the purpose of temporarily stiffening a wobbhng ally, or of providing for a special operation the requisite reinforcements which could not be found in any other manner. In East Africa the campaign had commenced with the despatch of an expeditionary force from India to Mombasa in August 1914, and at the end of 1915 the position was such that the Government decided, just before I became C.I.G.S., to send out reinforcements, the bulk of which were to be provided by South Africa. Sir Horace Smith- Dorrien was appointed to the chief command, but in consequence of temporary ill-health he was unable to proceed beyond Cape Town, and his place was taken by General Smuts. The latter was succeeded at the end of 19 16 by General Van Dewenter. The campaign, though comparatively a minor one, was attended by great hardships, owing to the nature and cUmate of the country, the absence of roads, and the distances to be covered, while on the other hand the German commander, Von Lettow, displayed commendable skill in the way he 28o FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL employed his troops — mainly native levies — and sustained their morale under what must have seemed to them rather disheartening conditions. Although the enemy was given no rest, first by Smuts and then by Van Dewenter, the operations dragged on for a long time, and in the circum- stances this could not be avoided. It was a matter of patience and perseverance both on the part of commanders and troops, and in the end they had their reward. The enemy's elusive tactics were gradually worn threadbare, his troops were broken up into detachments without cohesion, and the last of them were driven from East Africa into Portuguese territory in December 1917. In an earlier chapter I have mentioned that a Staff College training is a great help in war to officers employed on the staff or in command of troops, in that it enables them to understand each other's methods and generally to work together easily and efficiently. This advantage is the more valuable when intercommunication is limited to the tele- graph, and, again, if the officers concerned are not personally known to each other. Before the Great War Generals Smuts and Van Dewenter were known to me only by name, and as they were not only not Staff College graduates but did not belong to the British army, I wish to say that from first to last I found no difficulty whatever in working with them. Their telegrams were models of lucidity and conveyed just the information and advice that the General Staff required to have, and I trust that the two Generals felt equally satisfied at their end of the wire. If they did not I owe them a further debt of gratitude, for they invariably interpreted the instructions it was my duty to send them in the way in which they were intended to be understood. On the West Front the most conspicuous events during 1916 were the battles of Verdim and the Somme. The attack on Verdun was a desperate bid to cripple the French armies beyond hope of recovery, and lasted from the 21st of February to the 1st of July, the opening day of the battle of the Somme, which in its turn did not end till the 17th of November. The Somme was the first occasion on which our resources in men, guns, and ammunition enabled us to start an offensive with a reasonable chance of success. They were not entirely as THE SOMME 281 good as could have been desired, but they were infinitely superior to anything we had enjoyed before. Coupled with the heavy punishment meted out by the French at Verdun, who firmly and patiently fought on while we completed our preparations, the Somme battle marked a definite stage on the road to victory. The final overthrow of the enemy was henceforward no longer in doubt, provided the Allies resolutely kept up the pressure at the decisive point and resisted the temptation to embark on side issues. In support of this opinion I shall quote Ludendorff's account of the condition of the German armies at the time. He says, " The strain during this year (1916) had proved too great. The endurance of the troops had been weakened by long spells of defence under the powerful enemy artillery fire and their own losses. We were completely exhausted on the Western Front. . . . We now urgently needed a rest. The army had been fought to a standstill and was utterly worn out." (The italics are mine.) But the far-reaching effects of the year's fighting on this front were not in all cases appreciated by ministers, some of whom asserted that the battle of the Somme had been a ghastly failure, and persisted in measuring the amount of our success by the kilometres of ground gained, with little or no regard to the moral ascendancy our troops had established. Moreover, although there was plenty of evidence that the enemy had suffered heavily, both in men and morale, the Allies had themselves sustained great losses, and millions of German troops were yet in the field. On the Eastern Front Brusiloff's celebrated advance had resulted in the capture of half a million prisoners and an enormous amount of war material, but the Russians had also lost heavily, and throughout their ranks the sinister influence of German pro- paganda continued to spread with demorahsing effect. The Rumanians, who had joined the Allies on 28th August, had been thrown back from Transylvania and through Wallachia, and three whole Russian armies had been sent south to save the situation. Finally, the enemy was care- ful to play on the fears and nerves of those who, unac- quainted with the practical side of war in general and with the conditions of the Great War in particular, were apt to 282 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL give more attention to his cunningly-devised communiques than to the importance of strict adherence to sound strategical principles. In face of these circumstances it was uphill work trying to convince some of those with whom I was brought into contact that, given perseverance in the right direction, victory was assured. Such a statement would be received with an impatient shrug of the shoulders as if to say, " We have heard the same story scores of times before, and are still as far from winning the war as ever we were." As might be expected, this dissatisfaction, or disappointment, was the most pronounced when the fighting was severe, and it would be argued that, as the attacker was more exposed to loss in crossing the open than the defender was in his dug-out, the right policy for us was to assume a defensive role and leave the enemy to do the attacking. The whole problem appeared to be, so it was said, purely one of mathematics. To this I would demur, pointing out that although the attacker might at first be the heavier loser he might hope to make a good bag later, and that there were other things to be taken into account besides figures. Armies like boxers, I would observe, could not possibly win battles, and certainly not wars, if they restricted their efforts to self-defence and never led off to damage their opponents ; the preliminary step to victory was, as always, the wearing-down of the enemy's power of resistance, and this was not to be achieved without loss. Fresh ground would then be taken up by my questioners, who would suggest that as Russia had many millions of men at her disposal while we were short of them, she and not we ought to undertake the wearing-down business. We could provide her with the armament she needed, of which we would require less, and incidentally the plan would solve our man-power difficulties, leaving a greater number of men available for employment in those industries which it was essential for financial and other reasons to maintain. To this I replied that perhaps Russia might not make such good use of the armament as would our own troops, and that in any case it would be wise to equip the latter with what they still wanted before giving too much away. To THE WILL TO WIN 283 some extent this advice prevailed, but not so far as could have been wished, and much of the armament as well as other war material sent to Russia was put to indifferent use, or not used at all, while some of it, falling into the enemy's hands, was eventually used against us on the West Front. Discussions of this nature were bound to arise, for we had suffered unprecedented losses, and it was the duty of ministers to consider every means of reducing them in future. The case was much more serious when, from the end of 1916 onwards, a desire was evinced to adopt not only new tactics but new strategy — strategy that would find a " way round " to victory in place of courting heavy losses in trying to achieve what was held to be impossible, the defeat of the enemy on the West Front. There, it was said, the existing stalemate would continue, and we ought to show greater "imagination" in our plans. We were too wooden in our ideas and too heavy-footed in our movements. " Why go on battering our heads against a brick wall ? Why not follow the example of Germany which has been so successful in Servia, Russia, and Rumania, and give first a punch here and then a punch there ? " I was once asked, while the speaker, suiting the action to the word, struck out right and left with his clenched fists against the imaginary foe, I could only reply that the conditions were not the same, and that although war was certainly not an exact science, and had no fixed code of rules, there was in it one good working principle — the concentration of superior force at the decisive point — which could never be disregarded without great risk, and which, if whole-heartedly applied, would generally bring success. The persistence with which views such as the above were pressed forward caused me much anxiety, but consolation could always be had from the knowledge that the same thing had happened in past wars and that in spite of it we had won in the end. That valuable book Ordeal by Battle contains some pertinent remarks on this subject, which I extracted, kept on my table, and frequently read. I hope that the author, Mr. F. S. Oliver, will not object to my reproducing them here. They are as follows : 284 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL As we read and re-read British history we cannot but be impressed with the fact that our leading statesmen, misled by the very brilliancy of their intellectual endowments, have always been prone to two errors of policy which the simpler mind of the soldier instinctively avoids. They have ever been too ready to conclude prematurely that a certain line of obstacles is so formidable that it cannot be forced ; and they have also ever been too ready to accept the notion that there must surely be some ingenious far way round, by which they may succeed in circumventing the infinite. The defect of brilliant brains is not necessarily a want of courage — daring there has usually been in plenty — but they are apt to lack fortitude. They are apt to abandon the assault upon positions which are not really invulnerable, and to go off, chasing after attractive butterflies, until they fall into quagmires. Dis- persion of effort has always been the besetting sin of British statesmen and the curse of British policy. There is no clearer example of this than the case of William Pitt the Younger, who went on picking up sugar islands all over the world when he ought to have been giving his whole strength to beating Napoleon. Very few obstacles are really insurmountable, and it is usually the shortest and the safest course to stick to what has been already begun. Especially is this the case when your resources in trained soldiers and munitions of war are painfully restricted. At the one point, where you have decided to attack, the motto is push hard ; and at all others, where you may be compelled to defend yourselves, the motto is hold fast. The peril of British war councils in the past has always been (and may be still is) the tendency of ingenious argument to get the better of sound judgement. In the very opposite of this lies safety. We find the true type of high policy, as well as of successful campaigning, in the cool and patient inflexibility of Wellington, holding fast by one main idea, forcing his way over one obstacle after another which had been pronounced invincible — through walled cities, into the deep valleys of the Pyrenees, across the Bidassoa — till from the crests of the Great Rhune and the Little his soldiers looked down at last upon the plains of France. Further reference to the different plans proposed for 1917 will be made in the next chapter, but mention should be made here of the plan for the West Front drawn up in November 1916 at a conference of the Allied Commanders-in- Chief held at Chantilly under the presidency of General Joffre, and at which I was present. The exhausted condition of PLANS FOR 1917 285 the German armies was not then as well known to us as it has since become, but we knew sufficient about it to realise the wisdom of taking full advantage of the successes gained in the Verdun and Somme campaigns, first by continuing to exert pressure on the Somme front, so far as the winter season would permit, and secondly by preparing to attack the enemy early in 1917, with all the resources that could be made available, before he had had time to recover from his difficulties. The conference decided upon a plan of this nature, but it was not carried out, as General Nivelle, who shortly afterwards replaced General Joffre in the command of the French armies, substituted another plan, and, as will be explained in the next chapter, this change had the effect of postponing the date of the opening of the combined offensive. Whilst at the War Office, as well as before that time, I had been on the most friendly terms with General Joffre, and happening to be in Paris shortly after he vacated his command I called one evening at his house. What passed between us I shall not repeat, but it will be no breach of confidence to say that such references as were made to his replacement showed him to be a great patriot, actuated by the sole desire to serve his country faithfully, though he naturally felt disappointed in being deprived of the oppor- tunity of leading to victory the armies he loved so well, and with whom he had stood up against the onslaught of 19 14 and afterwards held the enemy at bay for two years while our armies were being prepared to come to his aid. One end of his room was packed with floral tributes sent by his admiring countrymen, and he told me of many other testimonies of affection and confidence which he had received from those who appreciated the value of his services. I have never seen a more pathetic picture than this fine old soldier, who had hitherto been the most prominent figure in the Allied armies and was now prevented from reaping the success which his stout heart and indomit- able will had made possible. France produced many capable Generals in the Great War, but it would be hard to think of one better qualified than General Joffre, if as well, to be at the head of her troops during the early stages of it, especially 286 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL in August 1914 when a repetition of the failure of 1870 was deemed sufficiently imminent to justify the removal of the seat of government from Paris to Bordeaux. I can speak with some personal knowledge on this point, for I saw Joffre on two or three critical occasions in August and September of 1914, one of them being at two o'clock in the morning after he had made a long motor drive. This is an hour when a man's courage and judgment are not at their best, and for myself I have always regarded with suspicion pessimistic telegrams sent from the front after II P.M. But although the situation was as bad as it could be — hence Joffre's journey — he was as calm and imperturbable as ever, and one felt him to be a real tower of strength against which weaker natures might confidently lean for support. When his original plan for meeting the enemy in 1914 had collapsed he carried on his shoulders a burden which would have broken down an ordinary man, but he never wavered in his determination to return to the attack. The opportunity for this came at the Mame in the first week of September, and he seized it with such prompti- tude and success as will always place him in the front rank of great commanders. When making one of my periodical visits to Paris in 1917 I invited Joffre, then a Marechal, to dine with me at the Hotel Crillon and meet a few British officers with whom he was acquainted. We had a most enjoyable evening, the Marechal evidently being very gratified at the attention shown him, and he told me a good deal about his anxieties and intentions during the early part of the war. Whilst we were at dinner it became known outside that Pere Joffre was at the hotel, and on leaving he received a tremendous ovation from the crowd which had assembled in the Place de la Concorde. Like most other senior French generals Joffre absolutely refused to converse in any language except his own, but he was quick to grasp the sense of what was said to him, no matter how quaint the words or vile the pronunciation. Once when having dejeuner together at his headquarters we were discussing a new plan which had been suggested for winning the war, and for the moment I could think of LORD KITCHENER'S DEATH 287 no more apt remark to make about it than that if it were attempted we would find ourselves in the soup. Not knowing how to render the phrase in idiomatic French, I gave it to him literally as, " nous nous trouverons dans le consomme." He immediately tumbled to the meaning, and immensely enjoyed my lion-hearted effort not to be defeated. In December 1916 Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister in place of Mr. Asquith, Lord Derby succeeding the former as Secretary of State for War. All public men are liable to be either over-praised or over-blamed, and whether Mr. Asquith was or was not an exception to the rule is no business of mine. I may say, however, that my experi- ence of him as Prime Minister — which extended over more than half the duration of the war, and the most difficult part of it — was that he showed a much more sympathetic recognition of the difficulties with which our commanders and troops in the field were faced than did some of his colleagues ; and he was always ready to give an impartial hearing to the views of the General Staff, whether able to accept them or not. Lord Kitchener's tragic death in June 1916 was an irreparable loss to the Empire and to the Entente. He was easily the most outstanding personality at the Allied conferences, and was listened to with more deference than was vouchsafed to any one else during the two and a half years that I attended these meetings. At the War Office and in Downing Street I found him to be a staunch supporter of the General vStaff, and his aptitude for detecting essentials enabled him to give us much con- structive assistance. I did not realise how valuable his help was until deprived of it, when, in addition to carrying my own load, I had to shoulder as best I could part of the load which he had hitherto borne. Without quite knowing why sometimes, he had a wonderful knack in being right in the things that really mattered. For some months before his death it was common talk that his relations with certain members of the Government were the reverse of happy, and that intrigues were afoot to get him removed from the Cabinet. What amount of 288 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL truth there was in this gossip I do not pretend to know, but I had not been a week in the War Office before I was warned by a friend that " they " hoped I would " down K." He did not say who " they " were, and my reply was that I was not concerned with " downing " anybody, and certainly not Lord Kitchener. Like some other great men Lord Kitchener was exacting, and had no use whatever for those who raised petty diffi- culties at a time when prompt action was required ; while as to his alleged habit of over-centralisation all I can say is that it was never displayed during the six months I had the privilege of working with him, and that he was as ready to listen to the advice of his departmental heads as were any of the other seven Secretaries of State under whom I have worked. Nor did he disclose any sign of that ruthless and domineering disposition attributed to him by those who wished to injure his good name. On the contrary, he was a kind and delightful chief to serve, once his ways were understood ; and I know that he many times stood up against opposition in high quarters so as to protect officers who were threatened with unfair treatment. As an instance of this, his last words to me were, when I said good-bye to him on the eve of his departure to Russia : " Remember what I have told you about and mind you look after him," The officer in question was then being subjected to a persecution which Lord Kitchener thought to be undeserved. Of all ministers and soldiers, so far as my knowledge goes, Lord Kitchener alone was convinced from the first that the war would be one of prolonged attrition. Ever looking further forward than his contemporaries, he always maintained in his talks with me that 1917 would be the decisive year, and this conception might have proved re- markably correct had not the clock been put back twelve months by the Russian revolution, which he, no more than all others at the time, could foresee would occur. Indeed, it might have proved accurate notwithstanding the revolu- tion had not the Chantilly plan for the West Front in 1917 been rejected. There were officers who, holding high posts in London ^3 u z a X CI - z - a 35 z ^ P3 Q (B Z o o u < z o c z VISIT OF THE ARMY COUNCIL 369 The Army Council, represented by the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Winston Churchill), the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Adjutant-General, arrived at Cologne on the 17th of August and left on the 20th of that month. They were shown as many of the troops as time would permit them to see, including a review of the 6th Army Corps, the women-workers, clubs, and regimental institutes, and on the last day they descended the Rhine from Remagen, 15 miles above Bonn, to Cologne, accompanied by the naval flotilla and two squadrons of the air force. The reverberations of the naval salute in the defiles of the Rhine when the party went on board, the sheets of white foam thrown up by the rapidly-moving motor launches, the humming of the aeroplanes in the cloudless sky, and the wonderful colouring of the surrounding country characteristic of the Rhine valley, constituted an impressive spectacle not easily to be forgotten. After their return to England the Council sent me the following telegram : Please convey to all ranks Rhine army the thanks of the Army Council for their message of August 21. The Council have greatly valued the opportunities of personal touch with the troops afforded them by their visit, of which they retain the pleasantest memories. The Council were deeply impressed with the soldierly bearing and the fine spirit shown by the troops under your Command, who worthily uphold the best traditions of the British army. In returning the visits of the AUied Generals I was always shown great courtesy and hospitahty, the guards of honour with which I was received usually being drawn up in the principal square of the town and consisting of at least a battalion of infantry, cavalry also being included if available. The general arrangements and the turn-out of the troops were a proof that the ceremony was not merely a matter of form, but that pains had been taken to make it a genuine mark of respect to the representative of the British army. One of the first of these visits was paid to General Mangin at Mayence on the 2nd of June, when, by the King's command, I presented him with the K.C.B. The General 2B 370 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL lived in the palace of the Duke of Hesse, which was frequently occupied by Napoleon during his campaigns beyond the Rhine, and the room in which he slept is still retained in much the same order as when he used it. I was told that when Marshal Foch was staying here with General Mangin he was invited to sleep in the bed. His reply was, " Thank you, but I am too small." The following morning I reached Metz, where, after visit- ing the battlefield of Verdun during the day, I dined with the garrison commander, General Maud'huy, who occupied the same house as that in which the German commandant had lived, and to which I used to go to report my arrival when at Metz before the war. General Maud'huy is a native of Metz, and as a boy of about ten years of age was living in the town at the time of the 1870 war. He told me that some years later, when he had become an officer of the French army, the German authorities at Metz refused to give him permission to go there to attend his mother's funeral. On the 20th of July I paid another visit to General Mangin, who met me at Bingen and accompanied me in the train to Mayence, where the arrival platform and waiting-room were profusely decorated with flags and flowers. Outside the station a fine-looking French battalion formed the guard of honour, a squadron of African cavalry escorted us through the town to the palace, and there we were received by a battalion of African infantry. In the evening there was a dinner-party, a dance, and a torchhght tattoo, which, as seen from the palace windows overlooking the Rhine, presented a remarkably briUiant spectacle. The following day I went to Strasburg as the guest of General Gouraud, who, after dejeuner, made a very compli- mentary speech about the British army, for which I was quite unprepared and therefore experienced some difficulty in giving, in French, a suitable reply to it. I spent the evening at the house of M. Millerand, then Governor of Alsace and now President of the French Repubhc, who had invited about thirty people to dinner. In the course of our conversation, which was very interesting to me, he recalled the fact that we had first met on the West Front in 1915 when he was Minister of War z S c U < o O < a O '-■^ b -^ < PEACE CELEBRATIONS 371 On the 23rd I arrived at Kaiserslautern, and after dejeuner went with General Fayolle for a four hours' motor drive through the beautiful country of the Vosges. He was a charming host and, like the other French generals, did all in his power to render the visit agreeable. On the 31st of July I went to Aix-la-Chapelle to present about thirty decorations to certain Belgian ofhcers and men. A battalion of Belgian infantry and a squadron of cavalry, as well as a detachment of French troops, were formed up in the square in front of the Rathaus, and after the presentation was over I met a number of Belgian and French officers at the General's house. By the invitation of M. Clemenceau I attended the peace celebration held at Paris on the 14th of July, the British contingent consisting of 1000 men from the Rhine and about half that number from England. Paris was seen at its best, which is saying a good deal, for there is no city in the world so well adapted for a public display or that so well understands how to make it attractive, and all classes seemed to combine to give the proceedings an air of genuine rejoicing. In the evening a dinner was given by M. Poincare at the filysee to about 120 officers, to which I had the honour of being invited. Madame Poincare was the only lady present, I was also invited to attend the Belgian peace celebration at Brussels on the 22nd of July, but was prevented by duty from going. At the British peace celebration in London on the 19th of July I was not present, as I was not asked to attend. In September I took a few days' leave for deer-stalking at Langwell, the Scottish home of the Duke and Duchess of Portland, where I had received some lessons in the art of stalking from the Duke himself during two brief visits in 1918. Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour and Lord Charles .Beresford were of the party, as they had been the year before and on many previous occasions. Sir Michael, I believe, had not once missed for over twenty years. These two fine old sailors were splendid company, and amused us greatly by the downright way in which they expressed their opinions about things naval and otherwise. I remember 372 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL that Lord Fisher had just written one of his characteristic letters to The Times — its subject has escaped my memory — and the editor telegraphed to Lord Charles asking for his views upon it. On the Thursday evening Lord Charles told us that he would devote Sunday to the preparation of his reply, and would write something pretty hot. " Don't make a fool of yourself, Charlie," advised Sir Michael in his characteristically blunt manner. But man proposes and God disposes. When I left Langwell on the following morn- ing Lord Charles seemed to be in his usual health and was certainly in excellent spirits, much good-humoured chaff taking place between him and Sir Michael during breakfast about a new suit of clothes he was wearing. On the Saturday evening, having retired early to his room, he was seized with a sudden illness and within a few minutes was dead. The contribution to The Times was therefore never written. Sir Michael, over 80 years of age, was a marvel of vitality and energy. He would walk all day over the moors killing his one or two stags, sometimes three, and when not out stalking would take his place on the tennis-court or the golf links little inferior to men years younger than himself. Some months later his health broke down, and when I was next at Langwell, in October 1920, we received the news of his death. Langwell is situated on the east coast of Scotland, 43 miles south of John o' Groat's house. It stands on high ground flanked north and south by the deep and wooded gorges of the Berriedale and Langwell rivers re- spectively. These streams unite in the Httle village of Berriedale at the foot of the hill, the combined stream then flowing for some two hundred yards through a defile, the sides of which are nearly 300 feet high, before dis- charging its waters into the North Sea. Amid this grand highland scenery, and at the point of confluence of the two streams, is the memorial recently erected by the Duke in honour of the officers and men of his Caithness estates who served in the Great War. It is one of the most impressive and best-designed war memorials I have seen. The Duke is not only an excellent all-round sportsman himself, but does everything he can to ensure that his HONORARY DEGREES 373 guests have good sport and plenty of it Whenever I go to Langwell, or think of the pleasant days I have spent there, I find it difficult not to break the tenth command- ment. In November I went to Cambridge to receive the honorary degree of LL.D., which that university was kind enough to confer upon me and other officers of the fighting services in recognition of our work during the war. The ceremony of giving the degrees was presided over by Mr. Balfour, and was of a rather more elaborate kind than usual as he was installed Chancellor of the university on the same day. The undergraduates, of whom a large number were present, surprised me by the mildness of their behaviour during and after the proceedings, as I had always understood that it was their custom on these occasions to behave in anything but a mild manner. They rode on the roofs and bonnets of the motor-cars conveying the new " Doctors " to the college where the official luncheon was to take place ; the heels of some of them found their way through the glass of the car windows ; and they insisted, with rare good humour, on carrying us on their shoulders into the college grounds when we left the cars. This, however, was the sum of their attentions, and it gave us as much amusement as it seemed to give them. I had been informed earUer in the year that the university of Oxford was desirous of showing me a similar kindness by the granting of an honorary degree as D.C.L., but I could not leave my command at the time the ceremony took place. The invitation was renewed in 1920, and I was then able to be present. M. Paderewski and M. Venizelos were amongst those who received degrees on this occasion. Soon after the peace treaty had been signed instructions were received from the War Office to proceed with the reduction of the Rhine army. At first it was the intention to retain six divisions, and two of the ten divisions then on the Rhine were ordered to England on 31st July. Many different instructions were subsequently received, and in the end it was decided to retain only about 15,000 men as the permanent garrison, with an independent division of about the same strength for temporary service in East Prussia and 374 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Silesia pending the taking of the plebiscite after the peace treaty had been ratified. Demobilisation, and consequent reorganisation, accordingly continued for the greater part of 1919, and as the treaty was not ratified until the loth of January 1920 it was then found that the independent division could not after all be employed in the manner intended, as the majority of the men were due for de- mobihsation before the end of March and some of them at a much earher date. The division was therefore ordered to be demobilised forthwith, and the battalions for the plebiscite area were sent out from home. By the end of February demobihsation had been completed and the Rhine garrison had been nearly reduced to its assigned strength. The ratification of peace caused another modification of our arrangements, as by the terms of the treaty the civil administration of the occupied territory passed out of the hands of the military authorities and was vested in a civilian body styled the " Rhineland High Commission," composed of representatives of France, Belgium, America, and Great Britain. I beheve that this system of setting up a civiHan body as the supreme authority during the mihtary occupa- tion of a conquered country is without precedent, and there was a chance that it might lead to difficulty in application. For example, the civil administration, which had hitherto been supervised by the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, reverted to the German authorities, subject to certain saving clauses with respect to the AUied troops and to the " ordinances " that might be issued by the Rhineland High Commission. The German authorities were thus left responsible for the maintenance of order, but not being allowed to retain any troops in the occupied territory they had only the poHce to rely upon, and they were of indifferent quahty. If and when the poUce required assistance the German authorities had to apply to the Commission, and the latter had then to instruct the Commander-in-Chief of the AlUed forces to direct the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerned to furnish the requisite troops, or, if the Commission deemed it desirable, they could declare a " state of siege," or martial law as we would call it, upon which the military authorities SIR HAROLD STUART 375 would resume complete control. In either case, therefore, these authorities would suddenly be required to deal with a situation with which they might have previously had no connection, and about which they might know little or nothing. The use of military forces to assist the civil power is a difficult task in one's own country ; the use of AlHed troops to assist German police, in the circumstances just described, was likely to be even more complicated. The necessity for giving this assistance did not, I am glad to say, arise during my period of command, but had it arisen I have no doubt that a way out of the difficulties would have been found, as they were fully recognised by the Commission. My relations with the Commission were particularly cordial, a result which I feel was mainly due to the good offices of the British representative, Sir Harold Stuart. America, I may add, had as yet no legal status on the Commission, for not having ratified the peace treaty she did not come under its terms, and therefore while the French, British, and Belgian areas were administered under the new system, in the American area the old system was continued, the American General remaining the supreme authority. Like the practical man he was, the General solved the difficulty by issuing to the inhabitants of his area the same orders as were issued by the Commission to the other areas. Another rather quaint feature was that the Commission, called into being by the ratification of peace, had its headquarters at Coblence in the area of the Americans who were stiU at war ! Consequent on the reduction of the army and the change in the system of civil administration I was ordered to hand over my command to a more junior officer, Lieutenant- General Morland, on the 3rd of March. Previous to leaving, my wife and I had the honour of being invited to stay with the King and Queen of the Belgians at their palace at Laeken. Thanks to the kind reception accorded to us by Their Majesties, the visit was most enjoyable and interesting. General Degoutte came from Mayence to Cologne to bid me good-bye, and General Michel and his wife came over 376 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL from Aix-la-Chapelle for the same purpose. Colonel Biddle, the popular American liaison officer attached to my head- quarters, with Mrs. Biddle, General and Mrs. Allen, and other Americans, entertained us at dinner at Cologne on the 25th of February, and on the 27th we were similarly entertained at Coblence by the Rhineland High Commission, M. Tirard, the French representative on the Commission, being the chief host. The dinner was followed by a ball, at which General Degoutte and other French Generals from Mayence and General Allen and many American officers and their wives were present. Next day Sir Harold Stuart took me for a motor drive through the American area on the right bank of the Rhine, and in the course of it Gore-Browne made an excellent snapshot of us while standing near the stone at Ems which marks the spot of the historic meeting between Benedetti and King William of Prussia just previous to the Franco- German War of 1870. On return to Coblence I was received, for the last time, by an American guard of honour, and after luncheon parted company with General Alien and my other American friends. There were more farewell gatherings at Cologne during my few remaining days on the Rhine. They included a dinner with some forty-five members of the headquarters staff, with whom I spent one of the most gratifying evenings of my life, notwithstanding the thought that I was separating from some of the best fellows in the world. The series was brought to an end on the night of the 3rd of March, when, having previously attended the opera with the Hutchisons, I left for Calais at 11 p.m. by the special train which I had used throughout my period of command. Although I had caused it to be known that I did not wish for any one to see me off from the station, a number of officers and their wives assembled on the platform, which was covered with the red carpet used by the ex-Kaiser on his visits to Cologne, the Inniskilling Dragoons sent their band, and the loth Middlesex formed a guard of honour, the commanding officer — Dillon, my old private secretary — irregularly, but affectionately, taking command of it. It was a bad wrench parting with so many good friends, and 2 . 5 K a. < = < i z I '^ H < g < % RETURN HOME 377 the train carried me away with a sharp pain in my heart and the tune of " Auld Lang Syne " ringing in my ears. Hutchison and Gore-Brown accompanied me to Calais, and there I was received by General Gibb, commanding the British troops in France, his staff, and a guard of honour formed by the Labour BattaHon of the King's Liverpool Regiment — a fine body of old soldiers wearing, for the most part, several medal ribbons. I felt that this was probably my last parade in an active capacity, which now extended over a period of more than forty-two years, and, as can be imagined, each ^hand-shake, each good-bye, became harder than its predecessor. I was glad when the boat cast off, and the sound of " Auld Lang S3nie " had died away. The two people I last recognised were the faithful " Hutch," who had walked on alone to the end of the quay so as to give me a final salute as I stood on the bridge, and my German attendant on the special train, who waved a table napkin from the saloon window, his regrets at my departure — though probably quite sincere in themselves — possibly being mixed with fears that the future might have in store for him a less pleasant life than when his only duty was to see to the creature comforts of the English General commanding at Cologne. The anti-climax of these events was experienced when, on a dark and dismal night, I arrived at Victoria Station. Here there was no guard of honour, no official greeting of any kind, and having secured a broken-down taxi I drove off to my residence in Eccleston Square, and thereupon joined the long list of unemployed offtcers on half-pay. Dobson, my soldier-groom and a typical artillery driver, accompanied me home, having been almost continuously with me for thirteen years. I owe a great deal to him for the way in which he looked after my horses and saddlery during that period. Robinson, my soldier-valet in the war and belonging to the K.R.R.C, had been demobilised shortly after the Armistice. He also rendered me much good service, and, besides seeing to my personal affairs when serving on the West Front, was very helpful in the frequent journeys I made between England and the continent when C.LG.S. I was fortunate to have had two such good men with me. 378 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Before leaving Cologne I sent a short letter of adieu to Marshal Foch, to which he replied thus : 26.3.20. MoN CHER General — Vous avez ete tres aimable de penser a moi en quittant Cologne et moi j'ai ete tres malheureux de ne pas vous y trouver quand je m'y suis rendu. Les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous sommes connus et pratiques, depuis le debut de la grande guerre, nous avaient permis une mesure exacte et complete de nous-memes. Nous avions souvent travaille ensemble dans des journees critiques, nous avions joints tons nos efforts pour sortir des crises. Et de cette union aussi franche et aussi droite que possible nous avions bien tire des solutions heureuses pour nos armees. Nous n'avions pas perdu tout notre temps. De ces souvenirs, dont je suis fier, je vous reste particulierement attache, soyez-en bien convaincu. J'ai toujours presents a I'esprit, votre conscience, votre experience, votre activite, avec une parfaite droiture dans les relations. Aujourd'hui le commandement de Cologne ne pouvait tant exiger, et c'est pour cela que j'espere bientot vous voir dans un de vos grands commandements devenu plus important. En tout cas, mon cher General, je souhaite que les circonstances de la carriere me permettent de vous retrouver souvent, ce sera la toujours, pour moi, une grande satisfaction. Recevez une fois de plus I'assurance de mes bien attaches sentiments. F. Foch. [Translation. It was most kind of you to think of me when leaving Cologne, and I was very disappointed not to find you there at the time of my visit. The conditions under which we became acquainted and have worked together since the commencement of the Great War have enabled us to get to know each other very intimately. We have worked together in critical times, and have combined our efforts in overcoming the crises as they arose. From this concord, as frank as it was straightforward, we have been able to reach decisions of the best advantage to our armies. We have made good use of our time, and you may rest assured that these memories, of which I am proud, make me particularly attached to you. I always have in mind the perception, experience, activity and perfect honesty which you showed during our relationship. The Cologne command does not now call for the same qualifica- tions as before, and for that reason I hope you may soon be given a command of greater importance. In any case, my dear General, I trust that circumstances will permit of my frequently PROMOTED FIELD-MARSHAL 379 meeting you, which will always be a great pleasure. Pray receive once more the assurance of my closest regard. F. FocH.] I had reason to believe when I left the Rhine that I should be appointed to command the forces in Ireland, but the Government decided otherwise. Ireland was not altogether a bed of roses, viewed from the standpoint of the Commander-in-Chief, and such disappointment as I felt at remaining unemployed was further mitigated on the 29th of March, when, on the recommendation of Mr. Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, His Majesty promoted me Field-Marshal. CHAPTER XIX SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS Characteristics of British soldier — Unpopularity of the army as compared with the navy — Study of mihtary history by statesmen — Results of its neglect. Having now brought to an end the story of my mihtary career, it is with a feehng of regret that I take leave of the British soldier, with whom I served for so many years, in all grades, in different countries, in peace and in war. He may not possess to the same extent the elan and logical mind of his French comrade in arms ; he may not be such an adept at expedients or at first fight with such vehemence as his American kinsman ; he is apt to be rather a slow starter and casual in things military ; but once he reahses that he is up against a tough proposition and decides to take off his coat, there is no Hmit to his staying power as there is none to the initiative and daring of which he is capable, and the tougher the proposition the firmer becomes his resolution to overcome it. His world-wide reputation for stubborn resistance is well deserved, for in ill fortune as in good it is seldom that a British regiment has failed to hold together. This indestructible cohesion, the most valuable quality that an armed body of men can possess, is not to be attributed merely to hereditary causes. It is largely based on reciprocal confidence and respect, and can only be secured when the men in the ranks have implicit faith in the abihty and justice of their officers, and when the officers have the same belief in the valour and disciphne of their men. It is gratifying to know that, notwithstanding the levelling tendencies of the age in which we live, and the fact that our armies were mainly composed of personnel taken straight from civil life, these mutually good relations were as readily 380 THE BRITISH SOLDIER 381 and spontaneously forthcoming in the Great War as when they proved their worth in the days of Marlborough and Wellington. As I have remarked in an earlier chapter, the British soldier has no use for those who, showing no personal interest in him, would push him about as a pawn on a chessboard, and, like other sane mortals, he is not prepared to be killed " by order." But win his esteem, make him proud of himself and his regiment, remind him of his home, and he will flinch at nothing, " Why on earth do you want bands ? " once demanded a staff officer of a General who was then serving on the West Front and had suggested that the regimental bands — left behind in England — should be sent out. " Why on earth do you ask such a d d silly question ? " inquired the General in reply. " But since you ask I will tell you. I want my men occasionally to hear ' It's a long, long way to Tipperary ' and their other favourite music-hall songs, and on Sundays to hear the church hymns they were accustomed to hear when they were boys at home." The bands were sent out, eventually. There is an old proverb that one volunteer is worth three pressed men, but without being in any way unmindful of the hundreds of thousands of our race who joined the fighting forces of their own free will, many of whom were living in remote parts of far distant continents, it may still be said that the truth of the proverb received little, if any, support from the evidence to be derived from the Great War. The conscripts, so called, were not less ready to accept the sacrifice by which victory is achieved than were those who entered the armies as volunteers, just as those who were soldiers only for the war were no less resolved to conquer than were the men who belonged to the regular forces. It was sometimes alleged during the Great War, and after it, that appropriate use was not made of the officers of non- regular units, and that regular officers not endowed with half their intellectual ability were given appointments in preference to them. Not improbably this statement was bom of the opinion, rather commonly held, that the best brains of the nation gravitate more generally to the learned professions or to commerce than to the fighting services. I 382 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL question if this opinion is substantiated by the history of our Empire, and as regards the early period of the war it should be remembered that an officer who has served in the army for only a few weeks is not likely to be so competent, or to command the same confidence from those above and below him, as one whose service may run into several years. In the army as in civil life efficiency and success depend upon systematic training. Later in the war, when the non-regular officers had ac- quired much the same experience at the front as many of their regular comrades, there was, perhaps, more justification for the complaint, but here again it should be remembered that, as in all cases of improvisation, waste of valuable material is bound to occur when large armies have to be created at short notice, and cannot be entirely prevented. One can only hope that, in the nation's interest, every effort will be made to minimise it. Subject to these remarks, I cannot think that any responsible General would make the slightest difference in the treatment of either officers or men, whether belonging to the new army or to the old, and I am sure that all regular officers admired the keenness with which the non- regulars shouldered their new duties, and rapidly learnt to appreciate the importance of discipline. Unfortunately for the British soldier, whether regular or non-regular, the army is not popular in the sense that the navy is. The latter usually enjoys full public support, the army seldom does except in war, and consequently it labours under considerable disadvantages in its efforts to prepare for war, and from this it has followed that our wars have so often been a case of " muddling through." In the Great War nearly every household in the country had at least one of its members in the army ; every one having a shred of justification, or even none at all, hurried to put on khaki ; and one hoped that at last the army had made good in the eyes of the people. In fact the height of success seemed to have been attained, for the people and the army had become one and the same thing, and the brick wall that used to separate them seemed to have been effectively broken down. But no sooner was the war over than the dislike to military uniform reasserted itself, every one who could promptly EDUCATED LEADERS 383 discarded it, the officers at the War Office setting the example, and the army quickly drifted back to the position it had held before the war. This disappointing result was perhaps not surprising, and it need not be a cause of anxiety, since it was only natural that there should be a reaction after the long years of war through which we had passed. The resolution sho^vn by all classes at home during these years, and the deeds of the men who fought at Ypres, on the Somme, at Passchendaele and Gallipoli, more than prove that, if correctly informed by its parliamentary representa- tives, the country may safely be trusted to answer the call of duty, in the future as in the past. To think otherwise would be a libel on the living and an insult to the dead. A matter of more immediate importance is that the nation should realise the necessity for having educated leaders — trained statesmen — to conduct its war business, if and when war should again come along. This is a direction in which much-needed preparation can be made without the expen- diture of cash, and it may be the means of saving tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of money. In all trades and professions the man who aims at taking the lead knows that he must first learn the business he purposes to follow : that he must be systematically trained in it. Only in the business of war — the most difficult of all — is no special training or study demanded from those charged with, and paid for, its management. This is the more to be regretted because, as the Empire is scattered all over the globe, occupies about a quarter of the world's surface, and exceeds in population one-quarter of the human race, the problems which confront British statesmen are far more numerous and intricate than those which have to be dealt with by the statesmen of other countries. Long after August 1914 ministers could be seen groping uncertainly forward in the discharge of their duties, having no good knowledge of the principles or methods which should guide them ; the numerous questions which daily arose came too frequently as a surprise, whereas they ought to have been foreseen ; and the ability to deal with them on sound lines had too often to be acquired by experience — the most costly of all schools. 384 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Years before the close of the last century thinking men urged that those intending to follow a political career should prepare themselves for it by a careful study of military history — that is, of the defence of empires — but although some of the universities took steps to provide facilities for this study, it continued to be shunned in favour of more popular subjects, such as social reform, which were, and still are, deemed to have greater value for the Cabinet aspirant. Far be it from me to suggest that embryo statesmen should study military history with a view to becoming generals and admirals. As a great military writer has truly said : " War is, above all, a practical art, and the application of theory to practice is not to be taught at any university, or to be learned by those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in the ranks." This being so, the statesman should never attempt to frame a plan of campaign for himself — that way lies disaster, as was proved in the Great War ; he should never try unduly to influence the professional, whose function it is to frame the plan, to go back on his considered judgment ; once he has approved of a plan he should not interfere with its execution, or limit the number of troops to be employed ; and, in general, he should recognise the line beyond which his interference in the domain of the naval and military leader becomes an impediment rather than an aid to success. But although the statesman is not required to handle fleets and armies, and, from lack of practical experience and acquaintance with details, should never attempt to handle them, he ought to have a correct knowledge of the way in which the use or misuse of those instruments may affect the welfare of the State, and he is required to have the same kind of knowledge with respect to finance, shipping, industry, food, and all the many other component parts of the nation's strength. Here, again, he should not attempt to become either a bank manager, a ship-builder, a cotton- spinner, or even a farmer, but he ought to be able to appreciate the values, relative and collective, of the re- sources with which these experts deal, and to recognise the point where, in the nation's interests, his control should intervene and where it should be withheld. THE DUTIES OF STATESMEN 385 It is much too commonly supposed that war is a matter solely for armies and navies, and that a statesman's duties are concerned almost entirely with those services. This is as wide apart as the poles from being the truth. War draws into its vortex every element of the national life, nothing escapes it, and upon the statesman devolves the responsibility, once war is declared, for combining the whole diplomatic, poHtical, financial, industrial, naval, and mili- tary powers of the nation for the defeat of the enemy. It seems impossible that he can properly carry out this task unless previously fortified with a good knowledge of the business of war, and there is little doubt that if political and mihtary history had been more carefully studied by British statesmen in the years before the Great War, the evils attending constant changes from one military plan to another would have been better understood by them ; there would have been less repetition of the mistakes made in the Napoleonic wars of dissipating our forces in secondary and unsound enterprises ; our commercial, industrial, and man-power resources would have been more intelHgently co- ordinated and brought into requisition at an earlier date ; income-tax would probably now be at a lower rate than six shillings in the pound ; and, most important of all, fewer wooden crosses might be seen on the battlefields of France and elsewhere. Again, a knowledge of military history is as indispensable to the statesman in peace as it is in war. At the present moment, for example, there is an outcry for greater economy, and the fighting services, being of an unproductive character, are rightly regarded as being amongst the first where reduc- tion of expenditure should begin. An essential preliminary, however, to this step is the adoption of a sound and stable policy based on established principles of war, and on a com- prehensive survey of the whole question of Imperial Defence. If our military edifice is built on this foundation, it will be both safe and economical ; if it is erected on the shifting sands of opportunism and political expediency, it will be neither economical nor able to weather the storms to which it may be exposed. These observations on the duties of the statesman may 2C 386 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL seem to imply that he alone made mistakes in the Great War, and that the soldier and sailor were convicted of none. I can assure the reader that this is far from being my opinion, so far as the soldier is concerned. He frequently omitted to practise the things that he had been so careful to learn before the war ; he was taught a great deal that he had not before known ; and he was compelled to realise that the principles he had been at such pains to lay down required much amend- ment in their application. My desire is not to draw an unfavourable comparison as between the statesman and the fighting man, but to emphasise the increased importance of the statesman's duties, and the necessity of their being undertaken only by men who have been educated to carry them out. I have seen the Government machine at work at close quarters for many years during peace, and for a longer period than any other British General during war, and the conclusion to which I have come is that the conduct of modem war is so complex that, in the Cabinet as elsewhere, the days of the amateur are over. It is for this reason, and at the risk of appearing to trespass beyond my legitimate sphere, that I venture to suggest that all those who aspire to exercise ministerial control over the future destinies of the Empire should make military history the subject of much more sj^stematic study than has hitherto been the custom. By this means only, so it seems to me, can they hope efficiently to dis- charge the duties devolving upon them in peace, and use- fully to assist in guiding their country through the ordeal of war. DATES OF PROMOTION ^/?f*.6f* -r. Enlisted Lance-Corporal Corporal Lance-Sergeant Sergeant Troop Sergeant-Major Second-Lieutenant Lieutenant Captain . Major Lieutenant-Colonel Colonel . Major-General . Lieutenant-General General . Field-Marshal . November 1877. February 1879. April 1879. May 1881. January 1882. March 1885. June 1888. March 1891. April 1895. March 1900. November 1900. November 1903. December iqio,-^^^^ October 1915. June 1916. March 1920. P£C f9ff? 387 FOREIGN HONOURS RECEIVED DURING THE GREAT WAR American — Distinguished Service Medal. Belgian— L' Or dre de la Couronne (Grand Cordon), and Croix de Guerre. Chinese— Order of Chia Ho (Excellent Crop) ist Class. French — Legion d'Honneur (Grand Officier), and Croix de Guerre avec Palme. Italian— Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus (Grand Cross), and Order of the Crown of Italy (Grand Cross). Japanese — Order of the Rising Sun (Grand Cordon). Russian — Order of St. Alexander Nevsky, with Swords. Servian— Order of the White Eagle, ist Class, with Swords. The Russian Order was one of the last of its class bestowed on a foreign officer by the late Czar. The American medal was presented by General Pershing, and the Legion of Honour was received from the hands of General Joffre. The French Army Order, or citation, regarding the award of the Croix de Guerre was as follows : " Officier General du plus grand merite et des plus distingues. Apres avoir rempli en France, sous les ordres du Marechal French, differents postes de haute confiance dans lesquels il a deploye les qualites de bravoure, d'energie et d'endurance, qui I'ont rendu legendaire dans les Armees Brittaniques, s'est vu confier par son Gouvemement le poste de Chef d'Etat Major Imperial qu'il a rempli pendant la plus grande partie de la Guerre et ou il s'est particulierement distingue." 388 INDEX Abbeville, 215 Abbottabad, 65 Acheson, Commander, 358 Adirondacks, 146 Admiralty, relations with the General Staff, 294 ; reorganisation of, 295 Adrianople, 148 Advisers, naval and military, 254, 255, 318, 319 Afghanistan, description of, 53 ; boundary questions, 55 Africa, Northern, visit to, 143 Afzul-ul-Mulk, 67 Aircraft, 167, 168, 349, 350, 351 Aisne, the, 213, 214 Aix-la-Chapelle, 371 Albert Victor, Prince, 40 Aldershot, stationed at, 2, 24, 33, 153 Alexandretta, proposed operations from, against the Turks, 314, 315 Alexeiefi, Gen., 252, 306 Allen, Gen., 367, 376 AUenby, Field-Marshal Viscount, 83, 88, 89. 306 Altham, Lt.-Gen. Sir E., 95, 97, 98, 129, 138 America, entry into Great War, 326 ; shipping for troops, 324, 326 Amiens, visit of Staff College stu- dents to, 181 ; advanced base in Great War, 202, 206, 209 Amir Abdul Rahman, 53 Ammunition, shortage of, in Great War, 214, 217, 221, 227, 232, 233 Antwerp, British troops sent to, 215 Aosta, Duke of, 297 Ardagh, Maj.-Gen. Sir J., 91, 99, loi Army, British, general conditions of soldier's life in 1877, 3 et seq. ; in 1907, 155. 156, 157 Army Headquarters in India and Great Britain, comparison of systems, 50, 51 Army policy in 1888, 92, 93, 94 ; in 1901, 128 ; in 1914. 192, 193 Army Staff system in the field, 197, 198 Articles of War, 12 Artillery, heavy, 152, 214, 217, 227 Ashmore, Maj.-Gen., 349 Asquith, Mr., 189. 195, 235, 253, 261, 274, 287, 305 Asser, Lt.-Gen. Sir J., 357 Astor, 58 Babington, Lt.-Gen. Sir J., 2 Babusar Pass, 65 Bacon, Admiral, 293, 294 Baghdad, capture of, 275 Balfour, Mr., 103, 189, 268, 373 Balkans, visit to, 147 et seq. Ballard, Brig. -Gen., 173 Baramula, 57 Baroghil Pass, 64 Barrow, Lt.-Gen. Sir G., 85, 88, 173 Barry, Col. Stanley, 345 Bartholomew, Col., 222, 251 Bases, Overseas, 198 Battlefields, 1870 war, 85, 180 Battye, Lt.-Col., 74 Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet, Earl, 352 Beauchamp, Earl, 354 Belgians, King of the, 366, 375 Belgium, probable infringement of neutraUty by Germany, 144 Belgrade, 150 Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles, 371. 372 Berlin, 148 Biddle, Col., 376 Bird, Brig. -Gen., 251 Birdwood, Gen. Sir W., 42 Black, Col., 132 389 390 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Black Mountain Expedition, 1891, 45 Blair, Col., 2 Bliss, Gen., 326, 329, 3^7 Bloemfontein, 117 Blood, Lt.-Gen. Sir B., 70 Boer War, see South African War Boriani, Col., 296 Boscawen, Maj., 154 Boselli, M., 292 Bosphorus, 149 Boulogne, base at, 202, 205, 209 Bovey, Capt., 345 Braekenbury, Gen. Sir H., 50, 86, 87 Brade, Sir R., 252 Braithwaite, Lt.-Gen. Sir W., 365 Brewis, Capt., 170 Briand, M., 291 Brighton, stationed at, 19 British Expeditionary Force, 140, 203 Brooke, Mr. C, 339 Bucephalus, monument to, 42 Bucharest, 148 Buckley, Col., 251 Buda Pesth, 150 Bulgarian troops, inspection of, 148 BuUer, Gen. Sir Redvers, 86, loi, 102, 109 Burnham, Mr., American Scout, 121 Burzil Pass, 58 Busaco, battlefield of, 145 Buston, Brig.-Gen., 154 Butler, Capt., 251 Cadet battalions in Great War, 267 Cadorna, Gen., 252, 296, 297, 312, 314, 332 Callwell, Maj. -Gen. Sir C, 138, 251, 252, 270 Cambrai, battle of, 312 Cambridge, Duke of, 5, 6, 17 Cambridge University, honorary degree, 373 Campbell, Maj. -Gen. Sir W., 154 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 93 Canada, vi.sit to, 146 Canadian Division, the, 230 Canterbury, Cavalry Depot, 34 Caporetto, battle of, 312, 313 Capper, Maj. -Gen. Sir J., 168 Capper, Maj. -Gen. Sir T.. 88, 233 Card well, Mr., 2 Carthews, Pte., 244 Castelnau, Gen. dc, 310 Champagne, attack in, 232, 233 Chantilly, conferences at, 234, 284, 285, 307. 325. 327 Chatham, stationed at, 21 Chichester, Maj. -Gen. Sir E., 358 Chief of General Staff, at Aldershot, 153 et seq. ; in France, 218 et seq. Chief of Imperial General Staff, 236 et seq., 246 et seq. Chilas, 65 Chitral, 66, 67 Chitral Relief Force, 66 et seq. Christian, Prince, of Schleswig- Holstein, 46 Church Army, 362 Churchill, Mr. Winston, 353, 369, 379 Clemenceau, M., 292, 332, 371 Clive, Brig.-Gen. S., 252, 361 Coast defence, see Home defence Cockerill, Brig.-Gen., 251 Cody, Col., 167, 168 Colonial Defence Committee, 94, 137 Colonial Section, employed in, 95 et seq. Cohdlle, Vice-Admiral Hon. Sir S., 179 Commissions, grant of, to rankers, 29 et seq. Committee of Imperial Defence, see Imperial defence Compiegne, 212 Compulsory service, see Man-power Conferences, Allied, 292 ; at Rome, 292 ; at Calais, 307 ; at Rapallo, 327, 328 ; at Ver.sailles, 330 et seq. Connaught, Duke of, 86, 184, 366 Constantinople, 148 Coulommiers, 213 Cowans, Gen. Sir J., 201 Cox, Col., 222, 251 Craufurd, Gen., 122 Crimes while in ranks, 14, 19 Crofton- Atkins, Maj., 211 Cronje, 105, log, no, in, 113 Crowe, Col., 132 Culme - Seymour, Admiral Sir Michael, 371, 372 Curragh incident, the, 193 Curzon, Earl, 54 Dallas, Maj. -Gen., 345 Dammartin, 212 Dardanelles Committee, 253 Dardanelles operations, see Gallipoli Peninsula Darkot Pass, 63, 64 Davidson, Maj. -Gen. Sir J., 174 INDEX 391 Dawkins, Col., 201, 212, 218 De Burgh, Capt., 345 Decquis, M., 202 Deedes, Col., 222 Deer-stalking in Scotland, 371 Defence Commit^^ee of Cabinet, 94, loi, 134 Degoutte, Gen., 368, 375 De Lisle, Lt.-Gen. Sir H., 154 Delme-Radcliffe, Brig.-Gen. Sir C, 252, 296 Demobilisation difficulties in 1919, 353. 363 Derby, Earl of, 287, 333, 334, 335 Deshumbert, M., 84 Despatch riders in the Great War, 211, 212 Detroit, 146 De Wet, 115, 125 Diamond Hill, battle of, 124 IXllon, Lt.-Col., 185, 357, 376 Dir, 68, 75, 76 Directors, administrative, 201 Dobson, Driver, 377 Dominions Overseas, Ministers of, 338 Douglas, Gen. Sir C, 195, 196 Douro, passage of, 145 Dragoon Guards, 3rd, service in, 36 et seq. Drill, defective methods of, 6, 15 DubUn, stationed at, 27 Du Cane, Lt.-Gen. Sir J., 222 Dugdale, Capt., 2.5, 28 Dundalk, stationed at, 24, 33 East Africa, campaign in 1914-17, 279, 280 Eastern Command, Commander-in- Chief of, 342, 343, 344 Eddow^es, Lt.-Col., 345 Edmonds, Col., 132 Egypt, operations in, 258, 275, 276, 306 EUes, Lt.-Gen. Sir E., 52 EUes, Col. Sir H., 52, 222 EUes, Lt.-Gen. Sir W., 43, 45 ElUngton, Col., 251 Esher Committee, 1903-4, 94, 136 Evans, Capt., 294 Executive Committee of Supreme War Council, see Supreme War Council Falkenhayn, Gen. von, 232, 233, 323 Fasson, Col., 132 Fay, Sir S., 338 Fayolle, Marshal, 368, 371 Fere-en-Tardenois, 213 Fergusson, Lt.-Gen. Sir C, 361 Festubert, battle of, 231, 232 Fielding, Maj.-Gen., 345 Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord, 136, 295, 296 Flying Corps, Royal, 224, 225 Foch, Marshal, 231, 232, 309, 310, 311, 312. 325, 330, 332, 333. 358. 366, 367, 370, 378 Ford, Maj.-Gen., 211 Forestier- Walker, Maj.-Gen., 88, 132 Forster, Lord, 338 Foster, Col., 174 Fowke, Lt.-Gen. Sir G., 222, 223, 340 Fowler, Maj.-Gen. Sir J., 62, 222, 223 France, our relations with, before the Great War, 133, 138, 140 French, Col., 251 French, Field-Marshal Earl, 109, III, 115, 153, 184, 258, 332, 345 French language, study of, 84, 95 Freyer, Col. Sir P., 347 Fuller, Brig.-Gen., 358 Furse, Lt.-Gen. Sir W., 173 Gallipoli Peninsula, operations in, 247, 248, 269, 270 Garrett, Maj., 24 Gas, use of, in war, 230, 351 Gaza, battle of, 306 General Staff, formation of, 136; reorganisation of, in France, 191 5, 219, 220, 221 ; at War Office in 191 6, 249 et seq. George, Mr. Lloyd, 253, 287, 318, 331 Germany, our relations with, before the Great War, 134, 139 G.H.Q. in France, 225, 226, 227 Gilgit, 58, 60, 65 Gilpin, Col., 211 Godley, Lt.-Gen. Sir A., 154, 365 Gore-Browne, Lt.-Col., 357, 376, 377 Gough, Lt.-Gen. Sir H., 173 Gough, Brig.-Gen. J., 173 Gouraud, Gen., 368, 370 Graduated battaUons, 305, 363 Graham, Capt., 2, 14 Granet, Sir G., 338 Great Britain, Commander-in-Chief, 345 ei seq. 392 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Greaves, Gen. Sir G., 36 Greene, Sir Conyngham, 148 Grenfell, Field-Marshal Lord, 142 Grey, Lord, 139 Grierson, Lt.-Gen. Sir J., 114, lar, 122, 137, 140, 153, 195 Guard Room at Aldershot, 1 1 Gujrat, 41 Gupis, 62 Haig, Field-Marshal Earl, 83, 88, 89, 244. 307, 330, 332, 334 Haking, Lt.-Gen. Sir R., 88, 244 Haldane, Lt.-Gen. Sir J., 365 Haldane, Lord, 140, 141, 178 Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, 23 Hand-grenades or bombs, 192 Harper, Lt.-Gen. Sir G., 174 Harris, Sir C, 338 Hartington Commission, 92, 93, 94 Hassan Abdal, 45, 46 Havre, base at, 205, 209 Hay ward, Mr., murder of. 62 Heath, Maj.-Gen. Sir C, 153 Henderson, Mr. A., 297 Henderson, Lt.-Gen. Sir D., 224 Henderson, Col. G., 82, 83, 103, 106, 107, 117, 118, 119 Hildyard, Lt.-Gen. Sir H., 81, 82, 171. 174 Himalayas, 41, 63 Hindu Kush, 54, 58, 63 Holman, Maj.-Gen., 78, 132, 135 Home defence, 92, 128, 165, 166, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 258, 343. 347. 348, 349, 352 Home forces, see Home defence Hoskins, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 174 Hospitals, military, good work of, 346, 347 Howell, Capt., 173 Huguet, Col., 140 Hull, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 174 Hunza, 60, 61 Huron, lake, 146 Hutchison, Col., 222, 265, 267, 358, 376, 377 Hythe, School of Musketry, 23, 34 Imperial defence, 94, 95, 96, 129, 136, 137. 253. 385 Imperiali, Marquis, 297 India, defence of, 54, 56, 134, 135, 136, 139 India, service in, 34 et seq. ; value of, to officers, 79, 80 Indus, river, 47, 60, 64 Inspector-General, duties of, 186, 187 Inspector-General of Communica- tions, 199, 200, 205 IntelUgence derived from enemy's press, 100 Intelligence Branch, India, organi- sation of and employment in, 50 et seq. InteUigence Branch, War Office, organisation of and employment in, 91 et seq., 129 et seq. Invasion of Great Britain, see Home defence Ireland, situation in, 24 ; rebellion of 1916, 265 Italy, King of, 297 Jackson, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir H., 179, 294 Jacob, Lt.-Gen. Sir C, 365 Jacobsdal, no James, Brig. -Gen., 244 Janbatai Pass, 75 Jandol valley, 73 Japan, our relations with, before the Great War, 139 Jebb, Col., 201 Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount, 294, 297 Jerusalem, capture of, 306 Jhelum, 41, 57 Jhula, or rope-bridge, 59 Joffre, Marshal, 202, 232, 234, 244, 245, 252, 284, 285, 286, 325, 332, 368 Johannesburg, 123 Jones, Brig.-Gen., 345 Kafiristan, 55 Kaiserslautern, 371 Kanjutis, 61 Kashmir, 57 e/ seq. Katgola Pass, 73 Kekewich, Maj.-Gen., 109 Kell, Col. Sir V., 251 Kelly, Col., 69 Kelly-Kenny, Maj.-Gen., 106, in, 112, 115 Kennedy, Maj.-Gen., 361 Kerr, Major F., 154 Khagan, 65 Khar, action of, 72 Kimberley, siege of, 109, no King, Col., 211 INDEX 393 King Edward, visit to Paris, 138; visits to Aldershot, 166 King George, visits to Aldershot, 1 67 ; at army manoeuvres, 182, 183, 184 Kirke, Col., 251 Kishanganga, river, 58 Kitchener, Field-Marshal Earl, 103, 112, 135, 136, 235, 2^6 etseq., 250, 263, 264, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 276, 287 et seq., 305, 306 Kohat, 45, 46 Kunar, river, 64, 70 Kurnaul, 38 Kushalgarh, 45 et seq. Kut-el-Amara, siege of, see Meso- potamia Ladysmith, siege of, loi, 102 Lagny, 212 Lahore, 38 Lake, Lt.-Gen. Sir P., 274 Lambton, Maj.-Gen. Sir W., 225 Lancers, i6th, enlisted in, i Languages, oriental, 36, 41, 43, 44, 45. 49. 65 Lansdowne, Marquis of, 99, 139 Lawrence, Gen. Sir H., 132 Lawson, Lt.-Gen. Sir H., 153, 154 Leave Club, Cologne, 362 Le Cateau, 202, 203, 204, 207 Lectures, miUtary, 142, 143 Le Mans, 206 Liaison officers, 226 Liggett, Gen., 366, 367 Lincoln, visit to, 342 Lockhart, Gen. Sir W., 45, 46, 54, 66 Locusts, plague of, 47, 48 Loos, battle of, 232, 233 Low, Maj.-Gen. Sir R., 69 Lowarai Pass, 76 Lucas, Lt.-Col., 215, 222, 243, 296, 339. 345 Luck, Maj.-Gen. Sir R., 38, 44 Ludendorfi, Gen. von, 233, 281, 320. 323 Ludhiana, 38 Lyautey, Marshal, 291 Lynden-Bell, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 132, 215 L5rttelton, Gen. Sir N., 137 Macbean, Col., 132 McCracken, Lt.-Gen. Sir F., 345 Macdonogh, Lt.-Gen. SirG., 221, 251 Macedonia, visits to, 149 ; cam- paign in, 277, 278, 279, 323 Machine guns, 34, 152, 214 McKenna, Mr., 261, 268 Mackenzie, Maj.-Gen. Sir C, n8 McMahon, Major, 154 Macready, Gen. Sir N., 198 Mahsud Waziri, campaign in 1894, 66 Maillard, Lt.-Col., 32, 33 Malakand Pass, battle of, 70, 71, 72 Malcolm, Maj.-Gen. H., 132 Malone, Maj., 28 Mangln, Gen., 368, 369, 370 Manoeuvres at Aldershot, 162, 163 ; conduct of, 163, 164, 182 Manoeuvres, army, 1898, 86 ; 191 2 and 1913, 182, 183, 184 ; prepara- tion for, in 191 4, 195 Man-power question in Great War, 260 et seq., 297 et seq., 343 Mardan, 70 Marne, battle of the, 213 Martial Law, meaning of, 360, 361 Mason, Lt.-Col., 52, 66, 78 Mastuj, 69 Mathew, Maj.-Gen. Sir C, 209 Maude, Lt.-Gen. Sir S., 89, 193, 270, 274. 275 Maud'huy, Gen., 370 Maurice, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., 221, 243, 250 Maxwell, Gen. Sir J., 265, 276, 345 Maxwell, Lt.-Gen. Sir R., 200, 218 Mayence, 370 Meerut, 36 Melun, 212 Melville, Mr. Leslie, 30 Mesopotamia, campaign in, 248, 259, 271, 272, 274, 275, 305, 307 Messines Ridge, battle of, 311, 312 Metz, visits to, 86, 143, 144, 370 Meuse valley defences, 86, 144 Miankilai, 73, 75 Michel, Gen., 367, 375 Midleton, Earl of, 128 Miles, Lt.-Gen. Sir H., 81, 171 Military attaches, 131 Military Governor on Rhine, 359, 362 MiUtary history, value of, to minis- ters, 383 et seq. MiUtary situation at end of 191 5, 235, 247 et seq. ; 1916, 281 et seq. ; 1917, 320 et seq. Military Training, Director of, 186 et seq. Millerand, M., 370 394 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Milne, Gen. Sir G., 88, 89, 120, 132, 278, 292 Ministers, onerous duties of, in war, 385 Miranzai expedition in 1891, 45 ei seq. Monro, Gen. Sir C, 23, 89, 269, 275, 317. 338 Mons, retreat from, 206 et seq. Montgomery, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 358 Montgomery, Col. H., 222 Montgomery, Maj.-Gen. K., 154 Montreal, 146 Mora Pass, 70 Morland, Lt.-Gen. Sir T., 365, 375 Mounted Infantry in South African War, 105 Muridki, camp of exercise, 37 ei seq. Murray, Gen. Sir A., 88, 153, 154, 186, 196, 198, 218, 236, 257, 275, 276, 306, 345 Murray, Col. Sir M., 366 Murree, 42, 57 Musketry, training in, 13, 15 Muster parades, 12 Muttra, stationed at, 36, 37 Nagar, 60 Nanga Par bat, 58 Naval flotilla on the Rhine, 358, 359 Neuve Chapelle, battle of, 229, 230 New Armies, 180, 217, 29S Newman, Lt.-Col., 357 Niagara frontier, 146 NichoU, Col., 154 Nicholson, Field-Marshal Lord, 106, 128, 137, 153, 167, 168 Niederbronn, 85 Nivelle, Gen., 285, 307, 308, 309, 325. 327, 332 Nixon, Gen. Sir J., 70 Nizam-ul-Mulk, 67, 68 Non-commissioned officers, influence of, 28 Northumberland, Duke of, 251 North-west frontier of India, ^1 et seq. Nowshera, 69 Noyon, 212 Officers, proficiency and training of, 16, 17 ; provision of, 266, 267, 268 Officers' Training Corps, 186 Oliver. Mr., 283 Operations, military, official ac- counts of, 119 Oporto, 145 Ordnance, Army, regulations of, 208 Orleans, 180 Ottawa, 146 Owen, Major Roddy, 74 Oxford University, honorary degree, 373 Oxley, Col., 182, 183 Paardeberg, battle of, 112 Paderewski, M., 373 Painleve, M., 292, 309 Palestine, operations in, 306, 315, 316, 317, 318, 331, 334 Palmer, Gen. Sir P., 44 Pamirs, 57 et seq. Panjkora, river, 70, 73, 75, 76 Paris, 202, 212 Passchendaele, battle of, 312 Pay, officers', 150, 354, 355 Peace celebrations in 191 9, 208, 371 Peek, Capt., 345, 357 Pelle, Gen., 244 Peninsula battlefields, 144, 145 Perceval, Maj.-Gen., 173, 221 Percival, Col., 174, 201, 210 Percy, Earl, 251 Pershing, Gen., 326, 366 Peshawar, 44, 69 Petain, Marshal, 308, 309, 330, 368 Philhps. Lt., 358 Picquart, Gen., 181 Pir Panjal, 58 Pirrie, Lord, 339, 340 Placid, Lake, 146 Plans, alternative, 313 e/ seq. Plevna, 148 Plumer, Field-Marshal Lord, 169, 231. 335. 336, 358 Poincare, M., 371 Policy, as affecting war prepara- tions, 132, 133 Poplar Grove, battle of, 115, 116 Portland, Duke of, 371, 372 Pretoria, occupation of, 123 Pulteney, Lt.-Gen. Sir W., 345 Punishment, military, system of, 11, 12, 13 Quartermaster - General, in Great War, 197 et seq. ; duties of, in the field, 197, 198 Quebec, 146 Radchife, Maj.-Gen. Sir P., 222 Rakapushi, 60 INDEX 395 Ramghat, 58, 65 | Rankers, promotion of, 30, 31 I Rapallo Conference, 328, 332 1 Rawal Pindi, stationed at, 41 ct seq. | Rawlinson, Gen. Lord, 171 Recruit's life in the army in 1877, 2 et seq. Reshun, 69 Rheims, 202 Rhine, Command of British Army of the, 356 et seq. Rhineland High Commission, 374, 375. 376 Ribot, M., 292 Robat, 76 Robb, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., 154, 200, 344 Roberts, Field-Marshal Earl, 39, 51, 52, 69, 83, 103, 105, 107, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116. 117, 122, 125. 126, 127, 134, 136, 141, 217 Robertson, Capt. B., 244, 296 Robertson, Sir G., 68 Robinson, Rifleman, 377 Rodd, Sir R., 313 Rome, 291, 313 Romer, Maj.-Gen., 132, 345 Rosebery, Lord, 295, 296 Ross, Col., 173 Rumania, visit to, 148 ; entry into v/ar, 281 Russia, our relations with, before the Great War, 133, 134, 138 ; Lord Kitchener's mission to, 305, 306 ; inter-Allied mission to, 306 Sado, 73, 76 St. Nazaire, base at, 206, 209 St. Omer, 215, 217 St. Quentin, 212 St. Vincent, Capt. Lord, 26 Salonika, visit to, 149 ; see also Macedonia Sarrail, Gen., 278, 292 Sars-le-Bruyere, conference at, be- fore battle of Mons, 206 Sault Ste. Marie canals, visit to, 146 Schwabe, Lt.-Col., 25, 30, 31, 32 Science, its value in war, 351 Sclater, Gen. Sir H., 345 Sentries, duties of, 10 Settle, R., 244 Seymour, Lt.-Col., 357 Shakot Pass, 70 Shawitakh Pass, 64, 65 Sher Afzul, 67, 68, 75 Shinaz, or skin raft, 59 Shipping, importance of, in Great War, 324, 326, 327 Sick, treatment of, in army, 7 Signal communications, 160, 161, 223, 224 Signallers, regimental, 25, 43 Sillem, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 358 Simla, stationed at, 50 et seq. Sims, Admiral, 351 Sinai Peninsula, operations in, 275, 276 Sldll-at-arms, 18, 40, 42 Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H., 153, 157, 158, 162, 164, 165, 231, 279 Smuts, Lt.-Gen., 279, 280 Snow, Lt.-Gen. Sir T., 345 Sofia, 148 Soldier, British, in the 'seventies, 2 ; relations with his officers, 107, 108, 380; characteristics of, 380 Somme, battle of, 280, 281, 285, 307 Sonnino, Baron, 292 South African War, preparations for, 96 et seq. ; advance from the Modder to Bloemfontein, 109 et seq.; strategy and tactics, 117, 118; advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, 121 etseq.; subsequent operations, 123 Speeches in public, 266 Spencer, Earl, 184 Srinagar, 57, 65 Staff, first appointment to, 52 Staff College, preparation for en- trance, 78 ; student at, 81 et seq. ; value of course, 88, 89, 90 ; com- mandant of, 169 et seq. ; history of, 169, 170 ; advice given to students, 176, 177, 178 Staff officers, duties of, at G.H.Q., 225, 226 ; relations with troops, 226 Staff school, 268 Staff tours, 165, 172 Stanhope, Mr., 92, 97 Stephenson, Maj.-Gen., 153 Stewart, Col. C, 174 Steyn, President, 121 Stopford, Maj.-Gen. Sir L., 222 Stopford, Capt., 222 Strasburg, 370 Strikes, industrial, on the Rhine, 362 Stuart, Sir H., 375, 376 Summary Courts, 361 Supply, system of, in war, 198, 199, 200, 201 396 FROM PRIVATE TO FIELD-MARSHAL Supreme War Council, 234, 313. 327 et seq. Swat, 68, 70, 72, 73 Sydenham, Col. Lord, 94, 136 Tagart, Maj.-Gen. Sir H., 345 Tandy, Col., 222 Tanks, 168, 268, 269 Territorial Force, 140, 190 Thesiger, Maj.-Gen., 233 Thomas, M., 291 Thwaites, Maj.-Gen. Sir W., 132 Tirard, M., 376 Toronto, 146 Torres Vedras, lines of, 144 Townshend, Maj.-Gen. Sir C, 62, 68, 75, 248 Tragbal Pass, 58 Training, military, in the 'seventies, 14 e< seq. ; in India, 38, 39; at Alder shot before the Great War, 156, 157, 158, 159; during the war, 220 Trenchard, Air-Marshal Sir H., 224 Trinity College, Cambridge, 183 Tritton, Sir W., 342 Troopships, life on board, 35 Trotter, Col., 129 Udine, 296, 313 Ulster, proposed coercion of, in 191 4, 193. 194. 195 Umra Khan, 55, 68, 69, 73, 75 United States, visit to, 146, 147 Unity of command, see Supreme War Council Van Dewenter, Gen., 279, 280 Venizelos, M., 373 Verdun, battle of, 280, 281, 370 Versailles Conference, 315, ^^oetseq. Vienna, 148 Vimy Ridge, 231, 232 Voluntary enlistment, disadvan- tages of, 16, 159 Volunteers, 19, 128, 140 Walter, Capt., 37 War Cabinet, 253, 254, 256 War Committee, 253 War, the Great, unreadiness for, 192, 193, 228, 229 War, supreme conduct of, 235 et seq., 253, 282, 283, 284, 3135^ seq. ; pre- paration for, includes systematic training of ministers, 383 et seq. Waterfield, Brig. -Gen., 73 Waters, Col., 95 Way, Capt., 154 Wester Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord, 294 West Front, importance of, 232, 235, 311, 323, 324, 325 Weygand, Gen., 296, 328, 367 Whigham, Lt.-Col., 2, 20, 25, 29, 30 Whigham, Maj.-Gen. Sir R., 221, 243 White, Field-Marshal Sir G., 69, 79, 98 Wigram, Lt.-Col. Clive, 154, 184 Wigram, Col. K., 222 Williams, Maj.-Gen. Sir B., 132 Wing, Maj.-Gen., 154, 233 Wolseley, Field-Marshal Viscount, 17. 79. 87, 99, 102, 127 Wood, Field-Marshal Sir E., 17, 21 Wood, Capt., 154 Woodroffe, Col., 201, .02, 203, 215 Woollcombe, Lt.-Gen. Sir C, 345 Worcester, visit to, 354 Wular Lake, 57 Wyndham Quinn, Col., 28 Yarde-Buller, Brig. --Gen., 252 Yarkand, river, 61, 64 Yarkhun, river, 64 Yasin, 62, 63 Y.M.C.A., 362 York, stationed at, 23 Young Soldier battalions, 305, 355, 362 Younghusband, Sir F., 68 Ypres, battles of, 216, 230, 231, 312 THE END Piinlci/ in Great Britain !>y K. & R. Ci.ark, Limiteii, Edinburgh. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. MAR 2 9 1986 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1933 Field Marshal Wm. Robertson Dies in London Chief of Iniiierial General StafiF in World War Rose From Private Soldier Visited America Twice Wrote in Memoirs of Differ- ences With Lloyd George By The United Press LONDON, Feb. 12.— Field Marshal Sir William Robert Robertson, one of Britain's greatest soldiers, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff dur- ing the World War, died of a heart at- tack during the night at his home here. He was found lifeless in bed early this morning. He was seventy- three years old. From Private to Field Marshal Sir William was the only man in the history of the British army to rise from private to the rank of field marshal, one of the rare examples of the Napo- leonic maxim that "every soldier car- ries a field marshal's baton in his knap- sack." Sir William was beloved of the rank and file of the army, which nick- named him "Wullie." Unaided by wealth or social position, he was a hard --headed, iron-jawed Scotsman who climbed to the top by sheer force of character and ability. No man ever had a more spectacular rise in the British army than Sir Wil- lianf* not excepting even the ill-fated Sir Hector MacDonald, one of the most famous officers ever to come out of the ranks. He was born in Welbourne, Lincolnshire, in September, 1859, the son of Thomas C. Robertson. A poor '^oy, without influence of any sort, he received an elementary educattpn at a small private school and then, serving as a hall boy In the employ of an Eng- lish nobleman, he had a row with the butler, cast aside his livery and took the "Queen's shilling"— the shilling bonus given recruits — enlisting in the army when he was eighteen years old. Never did he make a secret of his humble origin, not even In later years when he had succeeded Lord Kltchen.?r as the empire's chief military adviser. Once, at a dinner given in his honor, he said to an elderly peeress: "You do not remember me, my lady, but when you were a girl, I had the pleasure of being present at a dinner Succeeded Kitchener Associated Press photo Field Marshal Sir William Robertson the later months of 1917 It became harder for him In view of the disap- pointing results of the Allied offensives there to convince the War Cabinet that the diversion of troops to Palestlm or the Balkans or the Austro-Italian frontier endangered the prospects of victory on the Western front. He held that th . plan of having a supreme war c ^ncil composed of military reprc- .sentatives of tlie Allies, such as was introduced toward the end of the year, was unworkable. In February, 1918, therefore, he re- signed — just a month before the sue cess that attended the great Germai offensive added weight to his warning,'i He received the eastern command ii* England and three months la^er sue ceeded Lord French as commander-in chief in Great Britain. In the fina distribution of war honors, he wa given a baronetcy and a grant of 10,00i pounds. From April, 1919. to Marcl% 1920, he commanded the British troops on the Rhine and after relinquishing that post when the force was reduced he was promoted to field marshal. Criticised Lloyd George His memoirs "From Private to Flela Marshal," published in 1921, touched uron his differences with Prime Min- ister Llovd George which had led to his removal from the War Office. He asserted that the credit for the first Idea of a united command over the 3 1158 006 7 8262 mmjA •noT!;T:|.8duioo sjjii^^ ^rosoTi JO S'\di -inoo 9q^ :^sni^g^ 9] jotiJi s;^a:^9q n^nije^ FACILITY AA 000 690 161 -OJd oi lEaddB Jiaqi aiBJ^snni s"^*- -oB^— isaiiv Haaan qnvih