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 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.
 
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 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 BY 
 
 WALTER BAGEHOT. 
 
 SEVENTH EDJIIOS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., Li? 
 
 1894
 
 {The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved-^
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 tat 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION ..... vii 
 
 No. L 
 TUB CABINET . . 1 
 
 No. II. 
 THE MONAECHY 83 
 
 No. III. 
 THE MONABCHY (continued') 67 
 
 No. IV. 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS ........ 89 
 
 No. V. 
 THE HOUSE OP COMMONS ........ 130 
 
 No. VI. 
 ON CHANGES OF MINISTRY .** 176
 
 VI CONTENTS. 
 
 No. VII. 
 ITS SUPPOSED CHECKS AND BALANCES . . . 21l 
 
 No. VIII. 
 
 THE PRE-REQUISITES OF CABINET GOVERNMENT, AND THE 
 
 PECULIAR FORM WHICH THEY HAVE ASSUMED IN ENGLAND 254 
 
 No. IX. 
 
 ITS HISTORY, AND THE EFFECTS OF THAT HISTORY. CON- 
 CLUSION * 272
 
 INTRODUCTION- 
 
 EDITION. 
 
 THERE is a great difficulty in the way of a vriter who 
 attempts to sketch a living Constitution a Constitution 
 that is in actual work and power. The difficulty is that 
 the object is in constant change. An historical writer 
 does not feel this difficulty : he deals only with the past ; 
 he can say definitely, the Constitution worked in such and 
 such a manner in the year at which he begins, and in a 
 manner in such and such respects different in the year 
 at which he ends ; he begins with a definite point of time 
 and ends with one also. But a contemporary writer who 
 tries to paint what is before him is puzzled and perplexed; 
 what he sees is changing daily. He must paint it as it 
 stood at some one time, or else he will be putting side by 
 side in his representations things which never were con- 
 temporaneous in reality. The difficulty is the greater 
 because a writer who deals with a living government
 
 Vlll INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 naturally compares it with the most important other 
 living governments, and these are changing too ; what he 
 illustrates are altered in one way, and his sources of 
 illustration are altered probably in a different way. This 
 difficulty has been constantly in my way in preparing a 
 second edition of this book. It describes the English 
 Constitution as it stood in the years 1865 and 1866. 
 Roughly speaking, it describes its working as it was in 
 the time of Lord Palrnerston ; and since that time there 
 have been many changes, some of spirit and some of 
 detail In so short a period there have rarely been more 
 changes. If I had given a sketch of the Palmerston time 
 as a sketch of the present time, it would have been in 
 many points untrue; and if I had tried to change the 
 sketch of seven years since into a sketch of the present 
 time. I should probably have blurred the picture and 
 have given something equally unlike both. 
 
 The best plan in such a case is, I think, to keep the 
 original sketch in all essentials as it was at first written, 
 and to describe shortly such changes either in the Consti- 
 tution itself, or in the Constitutions compared with it, as 
 seem material. There are in this book various ex- 
 pressions which allude to persons who were living and to 
 events which were happening when it first appeared ; 
 and I have carefully preserved these. They will serve 
 to warn the reader what time he is reading about, and to 
 prevent his mistaking the date at which the likeness
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. ix 
 
 was attempted to be taken. I proceed to speak of the 
 changes which have taken place either in the Con- 
 stitution itself or in the competing institutions which 
 illustrate it. 
 
 It is too soon as yet to attempt to estimate the effect 
 of the Reform Act of 1867. The people enfranchised 
 under it do not yet know their own power; a single 
 election, so far from teaching us how they will use that 
 power, has not been even enough to explain to them that 
 they have such power. The Reform Act of 1832 did not 
 for many years disclose its real consequences; a writer 
 in 1836, whether he approved or disapproved of them, 
 whether he thought too little of or whether he exagge- 
 rated them, would have been sure to be mistaken in 
 them. A new Constitution does not produce its full 
 effect as long as all its subjects were reared under an old 
 Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by 
 that old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes 
 to be worked by statesmen and among a people neither 
 of whom are guided by a different experience. 
 
 In one respect we are indeed particularly likely to be 
 mistaken as to the effect of the last Reform Bill. Un- 
 deniably there has lately been a great change in our. 
 politics. It is commonly said that " there is not a brick 
 of the Palmerston House standing." The change since 
 1865 is a change not in one point but in a thousand 
 points ; it is a change not of particular details but of per-
 
 X INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 vading spirit. We are now quarrelling as to the minor 
 details of an Education Act ; in Lord Palmerston's time 
 no such Act could have passed. In Lord Palmerston's 
 time Sir George Grey said that the disestablishment of 
 the Irish Church would be an "act of Revolution;" it 
 has now been disestablished by great majorities, with Sir 
 George Grey himself assenting. A new world has arisen 
 which is not as the old world ; and we naturally ascribe 
 the change to the Reform Act. But this is a complete 
 mistake. If there had been no Reform Act at all there 
 would, nevertheless, have been a great change in English 
 politics. There has been a change of the sort which, 
 above all, generates other changes a change of genera- 
 tion. Generally one generation in politics succeeds 
 another almost silently; at every moment men of all 
 ages between thirty and seventy have considerable in- 
 fluence; each year removes many old men, makes all 
 others older, brings in many new. The transition is so 
 gradual that we hardly perceive it. The board of 
 directors of the political company has a few slight 
 changes every year, and therefore the shareholders are 
 conscious of no abrupt change. But sometimes there 
 is an abrupt change. It occasionally happens that 
 several ruling directors who are about the same age 
 live on for many years, manage the company all 
 through those years, and then go off the scene almost 
 together. In that case the affairs of the company are
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 apt to alter much, for good or for evil; sometimes 
 it becomes more successful, sometimes it is ruined, but 
 it hardly ever stays as it was. Something like this 
 happened before 1865. AIL through the period between 
 1832 and 1865, the pre-'32 statesmen if I may so call 
 them Lord Derby, Lord Russell, Lord Palmerston, re- 
 tained great power. Lord Palmerston to the last retained 
 great prohibitive power. Though in some ways always 
 young, he had not a particle of sympathy with the 
 younger generation ; he brought forward no young men ; 
 he obstructed all that young men wished. In con- 
 sequence, at his death a new generation all at once 
 started into life ; the pre-'32 all at once died out. Most 
 of the new politicians were men who might well have 
 been Lord Palme rston's grandchildren. He came into 
 Parliament in 1806, they entered it after 1856. Such 
 an enormous change in the age of the workers necessarily 
 caused a great change in the kind of work attempted 
 and the way in which it was done. What we call the 
 " spirit " of politics is more surely changed by a change 
 of generation in the men than by any other change 
 whatever. Even if there had been no Reform Act, this 
 single cause would have effected grave alterations. 
 
 The mere settlement of the Reform question made a 
 great change too. If it could have been settled by any 
 other change, or even without any change, the instant 
 effect of the settlement would still have been immense. 
 
 b
 
 xii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 New questions would have appeared at once. A political 
 country is like an American forest : you have only to cut 
 down the old trees, and immediately new trees come up 
 to replace them ; the seeds were waiting in the ground, 
 and they began to grow as soon as the withdrawal of the 
 old ones brought in light and air. These new questions 
 of themselves would have made a new atmosphere, new 
 parties, new debates. 
 
 Of course I am not arguing that so important an in- 
 novation as the Reform Act of 1867 will not have very 
 great effects. It must, in all likelihood, have many great 
 ones. I am only saying that as yet we do not know what 
 those effects are; that the great evident change since 
 1865 is certainly not strictly due to it ; probably is not 
 even in a principal measure due to it ; that we have still to 
 conjecture what it will cause and what it will not cause. 
 
 The principal question arises most naturally from a 
 main doctrine of these essays. I have said that cabinet 
 government is possible in England because England was 
 a deferential country. I meant that the nominal consti- 
 tuency was not the real constituency ; that the mass of 
 the " ten-pound " householders did not really form their 
 own opinions, and did not exact of their representatives 
 an obedience to those opinions ; that they were in fact 
 guided in their judgment by the better educated classes ; 
 that they preferred representatives from those classes, and 
 gave those representatives much license. If a hundred
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Xlii 
 
 small shopkeepers had by miracle been added to any of 
 the '32 Parliaments, they would have felt outcasts there. 
 Nothing could be more unlike those Parliaments than 
 the average mass of the constituency from which they 
 were chosen. 
 
 I do not of course mean that the ten-pound house- 
 holders were great admirers of intellect or good judges of 
 refinement. We all know that, for the most part, they 
 were not so at all : very few Englishmen are. They were 
 not influenced by ideas, but by facts; not by things 
 palpable, but by things impalpable. Not to put too fine 
 a point upon it, they were influenced by rank and 
 wealth. No doubt the better sort of them believed that 
 those who were superior to them in these indisputable 
 respects were superior also in the more intangible quali- 
 ties of sense and knowledge. But the mass of the old 
 electors did not analyse very much : they liked to have 
 one of their " betters " to represent them ; if he was rich, 
 they respected him much; and if he was a lord, they 
 liked him the better. The issue put before these electors 
 was which of two rich people will you choose ? And 
 each of those rich people was put forward by great 
 parties whose notions were the notions of the rich whose 
 plans were their plans. The electors only selected one or 
 two wealthy men to carry out the schemes of one or two 
 wealthy associations. 
 
 So fully was this so, that the class to whom the great
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 body of the ten-pound householders belonged the lower" 
 middle class was above all classes the one most hardly 
 treated in the imposition of the taxes, A small shop- 
 keeper, or a clerk who just, and only just, was rich 
 enough to pay income tax, was perhaps the only severely- 
 taxed man in the country. He paid the rates, the tea, 
 sugar, tobacco, malt, and spirit taxes, as well as the in- 
 come tax, but his means were exceedingly small. Curiously 
 enough the class which in theory was omnipotent, was the 
 only class financially ill-treated. Throughout the history 
 of our former Parliaments the constituency could no 
 more have originated the policy which those Parliaments 
 selected than they could have made the solar system. 
 
 As I have endeavoured to show in this volume, the 
 deference of the old electors to their betters was the only 
 way in which our old system could be maintained. No 
 doubt countries can be imagined in which the mass of 
 the electors would be thoroughly competent to form good 
 opinions; approximations to that state happily exist. But 
 such was not the state of the minor English shopkeepers. 
 They were just competent to make a selection between 
 two sets of superior ideas ; or rather for the conceptions 
 of such people are more personal than abstract between 
 two opposing parties, each professing a creed of such 
 ideas. But they could do no more. Their own notions, 
 if they had been cross-examined upon them, would have 
 been, found always most confused and often most foolish.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XV 
 
 They were competent to decide an issue selected by the 
 higher classes, but they were incompetent to do more. 
 
 The grave question now is, How far will this peculiar 
 old system continue and how far will it be altered ? I 
 am afraid I must put aside at once the idea that it will 
 be altered entirely and altered for the better. I cannot 
 expect that the new class of voters will be at all more 
 able to form sound opinions on complex questions than 
 the old voters. There was indeed an idea a very 
 prevalent idea when the first edition of this book was 
 published that there then was an unrepresented class 
 of skilled artizans who could form superior opinions on 
 national matters, and ought to have the means of ex- 
 pressing them. We used to frame elaborate schemes to 
 give them such means. But the Keform Act of 1867 did 
 not stop at skilled labour; it enfranchised unskilled 
 labour too. And no one will contend that the ordinary 
 working man who has no special skill, and who is only 
 rated because he has a house, can judge much of intel- 
 lectual matters. The messenger in an office is not more 
 intelligent than the clerks, not better educated, but, 
 worse ; and yet the messenger is probably a very superior 
 specimen of the newly enfranchised classes. The average 
 can only earn very scanty wages by coarse labour. They 
 have no time to improve themselves, for they are labour- 
 ing the whole day through; and their early education 
 was so small that in most cases it is dubious whether
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 even if they had much time, they could use it to good 
 purpose. We have not enfranchised a class less needing 
 to be guided by their betters than the old class ; on the 
 contrary, the new class need it more than the old. The 
 real question is, Will they submit to it, will they defer 
 in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher 
 qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the 
 common accompaniments ? 
 
 There is a peculiar difficulty in answering this ques- 
 tion. Generally, the debates upon the passing of an Act 
 contain much valuable instruction as to what may be ex- 
 pected of it. But the debates on the Reform Act of 1867 
 hardly tell anything. They are taken up with techni- 
 calities as to the ratepayers and the compound house- 
 holder. Nobody in the country knew what was being 
 done. I happened at the time to visit a purely agricul- 
 tural and conservative county, and I asked the local 
 Tories, " Do you understand this Reform Bill ? Do you 
 know that your Conservative Government has brought 
 in a Bill far more Radical than any former Bill, and that 
 it is very likely to be passed ? " The answer I got 
 was, " What stuff you talk ! How can it be a Radical 
 Reform Bill ? Why, Bright opposes it 1 " There was no 
 answering that in a way which a " common jury " could 
 understand. The Bill was supported by the Times and 
 opposed by Mr. Bright; and therefore the mass of the 
 Conservatives and of common moderate people, without
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XVU 
 
 distinction of party, had no conception of the effect. 
 They said it was "London nonsense" if you tried to 
 explain it to them. The nation indeed generally looks 
 to the discussions in Parliament to enlighten it as to the 
 effect of Bills. But in this case neither party, as a party, 
 could speak out. Many, perhaps most of the intelligent 
 Conservatives, were fearful of the consequences of the 
 proposal ; but as it was made by the heads of their own 
 party, they did not like to oppose it, and the discipline 
 of party carried them with it. On the other side, many, 
 probably most of the intelligent Liberals, were in conster- 
 nation at the Bill ; they had been in the habit for years 
 of proposing Reform Bills ; they knew the points of 
 difference between each Bill, and perceived that this was 
 by far the most sweeping which had ever been proposed 
 by any Ministry. But they were almost all unwilling to 
 say so. They would have offended a large section in 
 their constituencies if they had resisted a Tory Bill 
 because it was too democratic ; the extreme partizans of 
 democracy would have said, " The enemies of the people 
 have confidence enough in the people to entrust them 
 with this power, but you, a 'Liberal,' and a professed 
 friend of the people, have not that confidence ; if that is 
 so, we will never vote for you again." Many Radical 
 members who had been asking for years for household 
 suffrage were much more surprised than pleased at the 
 near chance of obtaining it; they had asked for it as
 
 XV111 INTKODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 bargainers ask for the highest possible price, but they 
 never expected to get it. Altogether the Liberals, or at 
 least the extreme Liberals, were much like a man who 
 has been pushing hard against an opposing door, till, on 
 a sudden, the door opens, the resistance ceases, and he is 
 thrown violently forward. Persons in such an un- 
 pleasant predicament can scarcely criticise effectually, 
 and certainly the Liberals did not so criticise. We have 
 had no such previous discussions as should guide our 
 expectations from the Reform Bill, nor such as under 
 ordinary circumstances we should have had. 
 
 Nor does the experience of the last election much help 
 us. The circumstances were too exceptional In the first 
 place, Mr. Gladstone's personal popularity was such as 
 has not been seen since the time of Mr. Pitt, and such as 
 may never be seen again. Certainly it will very rarely 
 be seen. A bad speaker is said to have been asked how 
 he got on as a candidate. " Oh," he answered, " when I 
 do not know what to say, I say 'Gladstone/ and then 
 they are sure to cheer, and I have time to think." In 
 fact, that popularity acted as a guide both to consti- 
 tuencies and to members. The candidates only said they 
 would vote with Mr. Gladstone, and the constituencies 
 only chose those who said so. Even the minority could 
 only be described as anti-Gladstone, just as the majority 
 could only be described as pro-Gladstone. The remains, 
 too, of the old electoral organisation were exceedingly
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. xix 
 
 powerful ; the old voters voted as they had been told, and 
 the new voters mostly voted with them. In extremely 
 few cases was there any new and contrary organisation. 
 At the last election, the trial of the new system hardly 
 began, and, as far as it did begin, it was favoured by a 
 peculiar guidance. 
 
 In the mean time our statesmen have the greatest 
 opportunities they have had for many years, and likewise 
 the greatest duty. They have to guide the new voters in 
 the exercise of the franchise ; to guide them quietly, and 
 without saying what they are doing, but still to guide 
 them. The leading statesmen in a free country have 
 great momentary power. They settle the conversation of 
 mankind. It is they who, by a great speech or two, 
 determine what shall be said and what shall be written 
 for long after. They, in conjunction with their coun- 
 sellors, settle the programme of their party the "plat- 
 form," as the Americans call it, on which they and those 
 associated with them are to take their stand for the 
 political campaign. It is by that programme, by a com- 
 parison of the programmes of different statesmen, that 
 the world forms its judgment. The common ordinary 
 mind is quite unfit to fix for itself what political ques- 
 tion it shall attend to ; it is as much as it can do to 
 judge decently of the questions which drift down to it, 
 and are brought before it; it almost never settles its 
 topics ; it can only decide upon the issues of those topics.
 
 XX INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 And in settling what these questions shall be, statesmen 
 have now especially a great responsibility if they raise 
 questions which will excite the lower orders of mankind , 
 if they raise questions on which those orders are likely to 
 be wrong ; if they raise questions on which the interest 
 of those orders is not identical with, or is antagonistic to, 
 the whole interest of the State, they will have done the 
 greatest harm they can do. The future of this country 
 depends on the happy working of a delicate experiment, 
 and they will have done all they could to vitiate that 
 experiment. Just when it is desirable that ignorant 
 men, new to politics, should have good issues, and only 
 good issues, put before them, these statesmen will have 
 suggested bad issues. They will have suggested topics 
 which will bind the poor as a class together; topics 
 which will excite them against the rich ; topics the dis- 
 cussion of which in the only form in which that discus- 
 sion reaches their ear will be to make them think that 
 some new law can make them comfortable that it is 
 the present law which makes them uncomfortable that 
 Government has at its disposal an inexhaustible fund out 
 of which it can give to those who now want without also 
 creating elsewhere other and greater wants. If the first 
 work of the poor voters is to try to create a " poor man's 
 paradise," as poor men are apt to fancy that Paradise, 
 and as they are apt to think they can create it, the great 
 political trial now beginning will simply fail. The wide
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 gift of the elective franchise will be a great calamity to 
 the whole nation, and to those who gain it as great a 
 calamity as to any. 
 
 I do not of course mean that statesmen can choose 
 with absolute freedom what topics they will deal with 
 and what they will not. I am of course aware that they 
 choose under stringent conditions. In excited states of 
 the public mind they have scarcely a discretion at all; 
 the tendency of the public perturbation determines what 
 shall and what shall not be dealt with. But, upon the 
 other hand, in quiet times statesmen have great power ; 
 when there is no fire lighted, they can settle what fire 
 shall be lit. And as the new suffrage is happily to be 
 tried in a quiet time, the responsibility of our statesmen 
 is great because their power is great too. 
 
 And the mode in which the questions dealt with are 
 discussed is almost as important as the selection of these 
 questions. It is for our principal statesmen to lead the 
 public, and not to let the public lead them. No doubt 
 when statesmen live by public favour, as ours do, this is 
 a hard saying, and it requires to be carefully limited. I 
 do not mean that our statesmen should assume a pedantic 
 and doctrinaire tone with the English people ; if there is 
 anything which English people thoroughly detest, it is 
 that tone exactly. And they are right in detesting it ; 
 if a man cannot give guidance and communicate instruc- 
 tion formally without telling his audience " I am better
 
 XX11 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 than you ; I have studied this as you have not," then he 
 is not fit for a guide or an instructor. A statesman who 
 should show that gauchei^ie would exhibit a defect of 
 imagination, and expose an incapacity for dealing with 
 men which would be a great hindrance to him in his 
 calling. But much argument is not required to guide 
 the public, still less a formal exposition of that argument. 
 What is mostly needed is the manly utterance of clear 
 conclusions ; if a statesman gives these in a felicitous way 
 (and if with a few light and humorous illustrations, so 
 much the better), he has done his part. He will have 
 given the text, the scribes in the newspapers will write 
 the sermon. A statesman ought to show his own nature, 
 and talk in a palpable way what is to him important 
 truth. And so he will both guide and benefit the nation. 
 But if, especially at a time when great ignorance has an 
 unusual power in public affairs, he chooses to accept and 
 reiterate the decisions of that ignorance, he is only the 
 hireling of the nation, and does little save hurt it. 
 
 I shall be told that this is very obvious, and that 
 everybody knows that 2 and 2 make 4, and that there 
 is no use in inculcating it. But I answer that the lesson 
 is not observed in fact; people do not do their political 
 sums so. Of all our political dangers, the greatest I 
 conceive is that they will neglect the lesson. In plain 
 English, what I fear is that both our political parties 
 will bid for the support of the working man ; that both
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XX111 
 
 of them -will promise to do as lie likes if he will only tell 
 them what it is ; that, as he now holds the casting vote 
 in our affairs, both parties will beg and pray him to give 
 that vote to them. I can conceive of nothing more 
 corrupting or worse for a set of poor ignorant people 
 than that two combinations of well-taught and rich men 
 should constantly offer to defer to their decision, and 
 compete for the office of executing it Vox populi will 
 be Vox didboli if it is worked in that manner. 
 
 And, on the other hand, my imagination conjures up 
 a contrary danger. I can conceive that questions being 
 raised which, if continually agitated, would combine the 
 working men as a class together, the higher orders might 
 have to consider whether they would concede the measure 
 that would settle such questions, or whether they would 
 risk the effect of the working men's combination. 
 
 No doubt the question cannot be easily discussed in 
 the abstract; much must depend on the nature of the 
 measures in each particular case ; on the evil they would 
 cause if conceded ; on the attractiveness of their idea to 
 the working classes if refused. But in all cases it must 
 be remembered that a political combination of the lower 
 classes, as such and for their own objects, is an evil of 
 the first magnitude; that a permanent combination of 
 them would make them (now that so many of them have 
 the suffrage) supreme in the country; and that their 
 supremacy, in the state they now are means the su^re-
 
 Xxiv INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 macy of ignorance over instruction and of numbers over 
 knowledge. So long as they are not taught to act 
 together, there is a chance of this being averted, and 
 it can only be averted by the greatest wisdom and the 
 greatest foresight in the higher classes. They must 
 avoid, not only every evil, but every appearance of evil ; 
 while they have still the power they must remove, not 
 only every actual grievance, but, where it is possible, 
 every seeming grievance too ; they must willingly concede 
 every claim which they can safely concede, in order that 
 they may not have to concede unwillingly some claim 
 which would impair the safety of the country. 
 
 This advice, too, will be said to be obvious; but I 
 have the greatest fear that, when the time comes, it will 
 be cast aside as timid and cowardly. So strong are the 
 combative propensities of man that he would rather fight 
 a losing battle than not fight at all It is most difficult 
 to persuade people that by fighting they may strengthen 
 the enemy, yet that would be so here; since a losing 
 battle especially a long and well-fought one would 
 have thoroughly taught the lower orders to combine, and 
 would have left the higher orders face to face with an 
 irritated, organized, and superior voting power. The 
 courage which strengthens an enemy and which so loses, 
 not only the present battle, but many after battles, is a 
 heavy curse to men and nations. 
 
 In one minor respect, indeed, I think we may see
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXV 
 
 with distinctness the effect of the Reform Bill of 1867. 
 I think it has completed one change which the Act of 
 1832 began; it has completed the change which that 
 Act made in the relation of the House of Lords to the 
 House of Commons. As I have endeavoured in this book 
 to explain, the literary theory of the English Constitu- 
 tion is on this point quite wrong as usual According to 
 that theory, the two Houses are two branches of the 
 Legislature, perfectly equal and perfectly distinct. But 
 before the Act of 1832 they were not so distinct; there 
 was a very large and a very strong common element. 
 By their commanding influence in many boroughs and 
 counties the Lords nominated a considerable part of the 
 Commons ; the majority of the other part were the richer 
 gentry men in most respects like the Lords, and sympa- 
 thising with the Lords. Under the Constitution as it 
 then was the two Houses were not in their essence 
 distinct ; they were in their essence similar ; they were, 
 in the main, not Houses of contrasted origin, but Houses 
 of like origin. The predominant part of both was taken 
 from the same class from the English gentry, titled and 
 tintitled. By the Act of 1832 this was much altered. 
 The aristocracy and the gentry lost their predominance 
 in the House of Commons ; that predominance passed to 
 the middle class. The two Houses then became distinct, 
 but then they ceased to be co-equal. The Duke of 
 Wellington, in a most remarkable paper, has explained
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 what pains he took to induce the Lords to submit to 
 their new position, and to submit, time after time, their 
 will to the will of the Commons. 
 
 The Reform Act of 1867 has, I think, unmistakably 
 completed the effect which the Act of 1832 began, but 
 left unfinished. The middle class element has gained 
 greatly by the second change, and the aristocratic element 
 has lost greatly. If you examine carefully the lists of 
 members, especially of the most prominent members, of 
 either side of the House, you will not find that they are 
 in general aristocratic names. Considering the power 
 and position of the titled aristocracy, you will perhaps 
 be astonished at the small degree in which it contributes 
 to the active part of our governing assembly. The spirit 
 of our present House of Commons is plutocratic, not 
 aristocratic ; its most prominent statesmen are not men 
 of ancient descent or of great hereditary estate; they 
 are men mostly of substantial means, but they are mostly, 
 too, connected more or less closely with the new trading 
 wealth. The spirit of the two Assemblies has become far 
 more contrasted than it ever was. 
 
 The full effect of the Reform Act of 1832 was indeed 
 postponed by the cause which I mentioned just now. 
 The statesmen who worked the system which was put up 
 had themselves been educated under the system which 
 was pulled down. Strangely enough, their predominant 
 guidance lasted as long as the system which they created.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXvii 
 
 Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, Lord Derby, died or else 
 lost their influence within a year or two of 1867. The 
 complete consequences of the Act of 1832 upon the 
 House of Lords could not be seen while the Commons 
 were subject to such aristocratic guidance. Much of the 
 change which might have been expected from the Act of 
 1832 was held in suspense, and did not begin till that 
 measure had been followed by another of similar and 
 greater power. 
 
 The work which the Duke of Wellington in part 
 performed has now, therefore, to be completed also. 
 He met the half difficulty; we have to surmount the 
 whole one. We have to frame such tacit rules, to 
 establish such ruling but unenacted customs, as will 
 make the House of Lords yield to the Commons when 
 and as often as our new Constitution requires that it 
 should yield. I shall be asked, How often is that, and 
 what is the test by which you know it ? 
 
 I answer that the House of Lords must yield when- 
 ever the opinion of the Commons is also the opinion of 
 the nation, and when it is clear that the nation has made 
 up its mind. Whether or not the nation has made up its 
 mind is a question to be decided by all the circumstances 
 of the case, and in the common way in which all practical 
 questions are decided. There are some people who lay 
 down a sort of mechanical test : they say the House of 
 Lords should be at liberty to reject a measure passed by
 
 XXV111 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 the Commons once or more, and then if the Commons 
 send it up again and again, infer that the nation is 
 determined. But no important practical question in real 
 life can be uniformly settled by a fixed and formal rule 
 in this way. This rule would prove that the Lords 
 might have rejected the Reform Act of 1832. Whenever 
 the nation was both excited and determined, such a rule 
 would be an acute and dangerous political poison. It 
 would teach the House of Lords that it might shut its 
 eyes to all the facts of real life and decide simply by an 
 abstract formula. If in 1832 the Lords had so acted, 
 there would have been a revolution. Undoubtedly there 
 is a general truth in the rule. Whether a Bill has come 
 up once only, or whether it has coxie up several times, is 
 one important fact in judging whether the nation is 
 determined to have that measure enacted; it is an 
 indication, but it is only one of the indications. There 
 are others equally decisive. The unanimous voice of the 
 people may be so strong, and may be conveyed through 
 so many organs, that it may be assumed to be lasting. 
 
 Englishmen are so very miscellaneous, that that which 
 has really convinced a great and varied majority of them 
 for the present may fairly be assumed to be likely to 
 continue permanently to convince them. One sort might 
 easily fall into a temporary and erroneous fanaticism, but 
 all sorts simultaneously are very unlikely to do so. 
 
 T should venture so far as to lay down, for an approxi-
 
 INTKODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXIX 
 
 mate rule, that the House of Lords ought, on a first-class 
 subject, to be slow very slow in rejecting a Bill passed 
 even once by a large majority of the House of Commons. 
 I would not of course lay this down as an unvarying 
 rule; as I have said, I have for practical purposes no 
 belief in unvarying rules. Majorities may be either 
 genuine or fictitious, and if they are not genuine, if they 
 do not embody the opinion of the representative as well 
 as the opinion of the constituency, no one would wish to 
 have any attention paid to them. But if the opinion of 
 the nation be strong and be universal, if it be really 
 believed by members of Parliament, as well as by those 
 who send them to Parliament, in my judgment the Lords 
 should yield at once, and should not resist it. 
 
 My main reason is one which has not been much 
 urged. As a theoretical writer I can venture to say, 
 what no elected member of Parliament, Conservative or 
 Liberal, can venture to say, that I am exceedingly afraid 
 of the ignorant multitude of the new constituencies. I 
 wish to have as great and as compact a power as possible 
 to resist it. But a dissension between the Lords and 
 Commons divides that resisting power; as I have ex- 
 plained, the House of Commons still mainly represents 
 the plutocracy, the Lords represent the aristocracy. The 
 main interest of both these classes is now identical, 
 which is to prevent or to mitigate the rule of une Jucatea 
 members. But to prevent it effectually, they must not
 
 XXX INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION". 
 
 quarrel among themselves; they must not bid one 
 against the other for the aid of their common opponent. 
 And this is precisely the effect of a division between 
 Lords and Commons. The two great bodies of the 
 educated rich go to the constituencies to decide between 
 them, and the majority of the constituencies now consist 
 of the uneducated poor. This cannot be for the advan- 
 tage of any one. 
 
 In doing so besides the aristocracy forfeit their 
 natural position that by which they would gain most 
 power, and in which they would do most good. They 
 ought to be the heads of the plutocracy. In all countries 
 new wealth is ready to worship old wealth, if old wealth 
 will only let it, and I need not say that in England new 
 wealth is eager in its worship. Satirist after satirist 
 has told us how quick, how willing, how anxious are the 
 newly-made rich to associate with the ancient rich. 
 Rank probably in no country whatever has so much 
 "market" value as it has in England just now. Of 
 course there have been many countries in which certain 
 old families, whether rich or poor, were worshipped by 
 whole populations with a more intense and poetic 
 homage; but I doubt if there has ever been any in 
 which all old families and all titled families received 
 more ready observance from those who were their equals, 
 perhaps their superiors, in wealth, their equals in culture, 
 and their inferiors only in descent and rank. The
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXxi 
 
 possessors of the " material " distinctions of life, as a poli- 
 tical economist would class them, rush to worship those 
 who possess the immaterial distinctions. Nothing can be 
 more politically useful than such homage, if it be skil- 
 fully used ; no folly can be idler than to repel and reject it. 
 The worship is the more politically important because 
 it is the worship of the political superior for the political 
 inferior. At an election the non-titled are much more 
 powerful than the titled. Certain individual peers have, 
 from their great possessions, great electioneering in 
 fluence, but, as a whole, the House of Peers is not a 
 principal electioneering force. It has so many poor men 
 inside it, and so many rich men outside it, that its 
 electioneering value is impaired. Besides, it is in the 
 nature of the curious influence of rank to work much 
 more on men singly than on men collectively; it is an 
 influence which most men at least most Englishmen 
 feel very much, but of which most Englishmen are 
 somewhat ashamed. Accordingly, when any number 
 of men are collected together, each of whom worships 
 rank in his heart, the whole body will patiently hear 
 in many cases will cheer and approve some rather 
 strong speeches against rank. Each man is a little afraid 
 that his " sneaking kindness for a lord," as Mr. Gladstone 
 put it, be found out ; he is not sure how far that weakness 
 is shared by those around him. And thus Englishmen 
 easily find themselves committed to anti-aristocratic
 
 XXX11 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 sentiments which are the direct opposite of their real 
 feeling, and their collective action may be bitterly 
 hostile to rank while the secret sentiment of each 
 separately is especially favourable to rank. In 1 832 the 
 close boroughs, which were largely held by peers, and 
 were still more largely supposed to be held by them, 
 were swept away with a tumult of delight; and in 
 another similar time of great excitement, the Lords 
 themselves, if they deserve it, might pass away. The 
 democratic passions gain by fomenting a diffused excite- 
 ment, and by massing men in concourses ; the aristocratic 
 sentiments gain by calm and quiet, and act most on men 
 by themselves, in their families, and when female in- 
 fluence is not absent. The overt electioneering power 
 of the Lords does not at all equal its real social power. 
 The English plutocracy, as is often said of something yet 
 coarser, must be "humoured, not drove;" they may 
 easily be impelled against the aristocracy, though they 
 respect it very much; and as they are much stronger 
 than the aristocracy, they might, if angered, even destroy 
 it; though in order to destroy it, they must help to 
 arouse a wild excitement among the ignorant poor, 
 which, if once roused, may not be easily calmed, and 
 which may be fatal to far more than its beginners intend. 
 This is the explanation of the anomaly which puzzles 
 many clever lords. They think, if they do not say, 
 " Why are we pinned up here ? Wnv are we not in the
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXX111 
 
 Commons where we could have so much more power ? 
 Why is this nominal rank given us, at the price of 
 substantial influence? If we prefer real weight to 
 unreal prestige, why may we not have it ? " The reply 
 is, that the whole body of the Lords have an incalculably 
 greater influence over society while there is still a House 
 of Lords, than they would have if the House of Lords were 
 abolished ; and that though one or two clever young peers 
 might do better in the Commons, the old order of peers, 
 young and old, clever and not clever, is much better 
 where it is. The selfish instinct of the mass of peers 
 on this point is a keener and more exact judge of the real 
 world than the fine intelligence of one or two of them. 
 
 If the House of Peers ever goes, it will go in a storm, 
 and the storm will not leave all else as it is. It will not 
 destroy the House of Peers and leave the rich young 
 peers, with their wealth and their titles, to sit in the 
 Commons. It would probably sweep all titles before it 
 at least all legal titles and somehow or other it would 
 break up the curious system by which the estates of 
 great families all go to the eldest son. That system is a 
 very artificial one; you may make a fine argument for 
 it, but you cannot make a loud argument, an argument 
 which would reach and rule the multitude. The thing 
 looks like injustice, and in a time of popular passion it 
 would not stand. Much short of the compulsory equal 
 division of the Code Napoleon, stringent clauses might
 
 XXXIV INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 be provided to obstruct and prevent these great aggrega- 
 tions of property. Few things certainly are less likely 
 than a violent tempest like this to destroy large and 
 hereditary estates. But then, too, few things are less 
 likely than an outbreak to destroy the House of Lords' 
 my point is, that a catastrophe which levels one will not 
 spare the other. 
 
 I conceive, therefore, that the great power of the 
 House of Lords should be exercised very timidly and 
 very cautiously. For the sake of keeping the headship 
 of the plutocracy, and through that of the nation, they 
 should not offend the plutocracy ; the points upon which 
 they have to yield are mostly very minor ones, and they 
 should yield many great points rather than risk the 
 bottom of their power. They should give large donations 
 out of income, if by so doing they keep, as they would 
 keep, their capital intact. The Duke of Wellington 
 guided the House of Lords in this manner for years, and 
 nothing could prosper better for them or for the country, 
 and the Lords have only to go back to the good path in 
 which he directed them. 
 
 The events of 1870 caused much discussion upon life 
 peerages, and we have gained this great step, that 
 whereas the former leader of the Tory party in the 
 Lords Lord Lyndhurst defeated the last proposal to 
 make life peers, Lord Derby, when leader of that party, 
 desired to create them. As I have given in this book
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXV 
 
 what seemed to me good reasons for making them, I 
 need not repeat those reasons here ; I need only say how 
 the notion stands in my judgment now. 
 
 I cannot look on life peerages in the way in which 
 some of their strongest advocates regard them ; I cannot 
 think of them as a mode in which a permanent opposi- 
 tion or a contrast between the Houses of Lords and 
 Commons is to be remedied. To be effectual in that way, 
 life peerages must be very numerous. Now the House of 
 Lords will never consent to a very numerous life peerage 
 without a storm ; they must be in terror to do it, or they 
 will not do it. And if the storm blows strongly enough 
 to do so much, in all likelihood it will blow strongly 
 enough to do much more. If the revolution is powerful 
 enough and eager enough to make an immense number 
 of life peers, probably it will sweep away the hereditary 
 principle in the Upper Chamber entirely. Of course one 
 may fancy it to be otherwise; we may conceive of a 
 political storm just going to a life peerage limit, and then 
 stopping suddenly. But in politics we must not trouble 
 ourselves with exceedingly exceptional accidents; it is 
 quite difficult enough to count on and provide for the 
 regular and plain probabilities. To speak mathemati- 
 cally, we may easily miss the permanent course of the 
 political curve if we engross our minds with its cusps 
 and conjugate points. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, can I sympathise with the
 
 XXXVI 1NTKODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 objection to life peerages which some of the Radical party 
 take and feeL They think it will strengthen the Lords, 
 and so make them better able to oppose the Commons ; 
 they think, if they do not say, " The House of Lords is 
 our enemy and that of all Liberals ; happily the mass of 
 it is not intellectual; a few clever men are born there 
 which we cannot help, but we will not ' vaccinate ' it with 
 genius ; we will not put in a set of clever men for their 
 lives who may as likely as not turn against us." This 
 objection assumes that clever peers are just as likely to 
 oppose the Commons as stupid peers. But this I deny. 
 Most clever men who are in such a good place as the 
 House of Lords plainly is, will be very unwilling to lose 
 it if they can help it ; at the clear call of a great duty 
 they might lose it, but only at such a call. And it does 
 not take a clever man to see that systematic opposition 
 of the Commons is the only thing which can endanger 
 the Lords, or which will make an individual peer cease 
 to be a peer. The greater you make the sense of the 
 Lords, the more they will see that their plain interest is 
 to make friends of the plutocracy, and to be the chiefs of 
 it, and not to wish to oppose the Commons where that 
 plutocracy rules. 
 
 It is true that a completely new House of Lords, 
 mainly composed of men of ability, selected because they 
 were able, might very likely attempt to make ability the 
 predominant power in the State, and to rival, if not con-
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXV11 
 
 quer, the House of Commons, where the standard of 
 intelligence is not much above the common English 
 average. But in the present English world such a House 
 of Lords would soon lose all influence. People would 
 say, " it was too clever by half," and in an Englishman's 
 mouth that means a very severe censure. The English 
 people would think it grossly anomalous if their elected 
 assembly of rich men were thwarted by a nominated 
 assembly of talkers and writers. Sensible men of sub- 
 stantial means are what we wish to be ruled by, and a 
 peerage of genius would not compare with it in power. 
 
 It is true, too, that at present some of the cleverest 
 peers are not so ready as some others to agree with the 
 Commons. But it is not unnatural that persons of high 
 rank and of great ability should be unwilling to bend 
 to persons of lower rank, and of certainly not greater 
 ability. A few of such peers (for they are very few) 
 might say, " We had rather not have our peerage if we 
 are to buy it at the price of yielding." But a life peer 
 who had fought his way up to the peers, would never 
 think so. Young men who are born to rank may risk it, 
 not middle-aged or old men who have earned their rank. 
 A moderate number of life peers would almost always 
 counsel moderation to the Lords, and would almost 
 always be right in counselling it. 
 
 Recent discussions have also brought into curious 
 prominence another part of the Constitution. I said in
 
 XXXviii INTKODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 this book that it would very much surprise people if 
 they were only told how many things the Queen could 
 do without consulting Parliament, and it certainly has so 
 proved, for when the Queen abolished Purchase in the 
 Army by an act of prerogative (after the Lords had 
 rejected the bill for doing so), there was a great and 
 general astonishment. 
 
 But this is nothing to what the Queen can by law do 
 without consulting Parliament. Not to mention other 
 things, she could disband the army (by law she cannot 
 engage more than a certain number of men, but she is 
 not obliged to engage any men); she could dismiss all 
 the officers, from the General Comrnanding-in-Chief 
 downwards; she could dismiss all the sailors too; she 
 could sell off all our ships of war and all our naval 
 stores ; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Corn- 
 wall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She 
 could make every citizen in the United Kingdom, male 
 or female, a peer; she could make every parish in the 
 United Kingdom a " university ; " she could dismiss most 
 of the civil servants ; she could pardon all offenders. In 
 a word, the Queen could by prerogative upset all the 
 action of civil government within the government, could 
 disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could, 
 by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us 
 defenceless against foreign nations. Why do we not 
 fear that she would do this, or any approach to it ?
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXIX, 
 
 Because there are two checks one ancient and coarse, 
 the other modern and delicate. The first is the check of 
 impeachment. Any Minister who advised the Queen so 
 to use her prerogative as to endanger the safety of the 
 realm, might be impeached for high treason, and would 
 be so. Such a minister would, in our technical law, be 
 said to have levied, or aided to levy, " war against the 
 Queen." This counsel to her so to use her prerogative 
 would by the Judge be declared to be an act of violence 
 against herself, and in that peculiar but effectual way 
 the offender could be condemned and executed. Against 
 all gross excesses of the prerogative this is a sufficient 
 protection. But it would be no protection against minor 
 mistakes ; any error of judgment committed bond fide, 
 and only entailing consequences which one person might 
 say were good, and another say were bad, could not be 
 so punished. It would be possible to impeach any 
 Minister who disbanded the Queen's army, and it would 
 be done for certain. But suppose a Minister were to 
 reduce the army or the navy much below the con- 
 templated strength suppose he were only to spend upon 
 them one-third of the amount which Parliament had per- 
 mitted him to spend suppose a Minister of Lord Palmer- 
 ston's principles were suddenly and while in office con- 
 verted to the principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, 
 and were to act on those principles, he could not be im- 
 peached. The law of treason neither could nor ought to
 
 xl INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 be enforced against an act which was an error of judg- 
 ment not of intention which was in good faith intended 
 not to impair the well-being of the State, but to promote 
 and augment it. Against such misuses of the prerogative 
 our remedy is a change of Ministry. And in general this 
 works very well. Every Minister looks long before he 
 incurs that penalty, and no one incurs it wantonly. But, 
 nevertheless, there are two defects in it. The first is that 
 it may not be a remedy at all ; it may be only a punish- 
 ment. A Minister may risk his dismissal; he may do 
 some act difficult to undo, and then all which may be left 
 will be to remove and censure him. And the second is 
 that it is only one House of Parliament which has much 
 to say to this remedy, such as it is; the House of 
 Commons only can remove a Minister by a vote of 
 censure. Most of the Ministries for thirty years have 
 never possessed the confidence of the Lords, and in such 
 cases a vote of censure by the Lords could therefore have 
 but little weight; it would be simply the particular 
 expression of a general political disapproval. It would 
 be like a vote of censure on a Liberal Government by 
 the Carlton, or on a Tory Government by the Keform 
 Club. Aoid in no case has an adverse vote by the Lords 
 the same decisive effect as a vote of the Commons ; the 
 Lower House is the ruling and the choosing House, and 
 if a Government really possesses that, it thoroughly pos- 
 sesses nine-tenths of what it requires. The support of
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. xli 
 
 the Lords is an aid and a luxury ; that of the Commons 
 is a strict and indispensable necessary. 
 
 These difficulties are particularly raised by questions 
 of foreign policy. On most domestic subjects, either 
 custom or legislation has limited the use of the pre- 
 rogative. The mode of governing the country, according 
 to the existing laws, is mostly worn into a rut, and most 
 Administrations move in it because it is easier to move 
 there than anywhere else. Most political crises the 
 decisive votes, which determine the fate of Government 
 are generally either on questions of foreign policy or 
 of new laws; and the questions of foreign policy come 
 out generally in this way, that the Government has 
 already done something, and that it is for the one part of 
 the Legislature alone for the House of Commons, and 
 not for the House of Lords to say whether they have or 
 have not forfeited their place by the treaty they have 
 made. 
 
 I think every one must admit that this is not an ar- 
 rangement which seems right on the face of it. Treaties 
 are quite as important as most laws, and to require the 
 elaborate assent of representative assemblies to every 
 word of the law, and not to consult them even as to the 
 essence of the treaty, is primd facie ludicrous. In the 
 older forms of the English Constitution, this may have 
 been quite right ; the power was then really lodged in 
 the Crown, and because Parliament met very seldom,
 
 xlii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 arid for other reasons, it was then necessary that, on a 
 multitude of points, the Crown should have much more 
 power than is amply sufficient for it at present. But 
 now the real power is not in the Sovereign, it is in the 
 Prime Minister and in the Cabinet that is, in the hands 
 of a committee appointed by Parliament, and of the 
 chairman of that committee. Now, beforehand, no one 
 would have ventured to suggest that a committee of 
 Parliament on Foreign relations should be able to commit 
 the country to the greatest international obligations 
 without consulting either Parliament or the country. 
 No other select committee has any comparable power; 
 and considering how carefully we have fettered and 
 limited the powers of all other subordinate authorities, 
 our allowing so much discretionary power on matters 
 peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate to rest in 
 the sole charge of one secret committee is exceedingly 
 strange. No doubt it may be beneficial ; many seeming 
 anomalies are so, but at first sight it does not look right. 
 I confess that I should see no advantage in it if our 
 two Chambers were sufficiently homogeneous and suffi- 
 ciently harmonious. On the contrary, if those two 
 Chambers were as they ought to be, I should believe it 
 to be a great defect. If the Administration had in both 
 Houses a majority not a mechanical majority ready to 
 accept anything, but a fair and reasonable one, predis- 
 posed to think the Government right, but not ready to
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. xliii 
 
 find it to be so in the face of facts and in opposition 
 to whatever might occur; if a good Government were 
 thus placed, I should think it decidedly better that the 
 agreements of the Administration with foreign powers 
 should be submitted to Parliament. They would then 
 receive that which is best for all arrangements of 
 business, an understanding and sympathising criticism 
 but still a criticism. The majority of the Legislature 
 being well disposed to the Government, would not " find " 
 against it except it had really committed some big and 
 plain mistake. But if the Government had made such 
 a mistake, certainly the majority of the Legislature 
 would find against it. In a country fit for Parliamentary 
 institutions, the partizanship of members of the Legisla- 
 ture never comes in manifest opposition to the plain 
 interest of the nation ; if it did, the nation being (as are 
 all nations capable of Parliamentary institutions) con- 
 stantly attentive to public affairs, would inflict on them 
 the maximum Parliamentary penalty at the next election 
 and at many future elections. It would break their 
 career. No English majority dare vote for an exceedingly 
 bad treaty ; it would rather desert its own leader than 
 ensure its own ruin. And an English minority, in- 
 heriting a long experience of Parliamentary affairs, would 
 not be exceedingly ready to reject a treaty made with 
 a foreign Government. The leaders of an English 
 Opposition are very conversant with the school-boy 
 
 d
 
 xliv INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION". 
 
 maxim, " Two can play at that fun." They know that 
 the next time they are in office the same sort of sharp 
 practice may be used against them, and therefore they 
 will not use it. So strong is this predisposition, that 
 not- long since a subordinate member of the Opposition 
 declared that the " front benches " of the two sides of the 
 House that is, the leaders of the Government and the 
 leaders of the Opposition were in constant tacit league 
 to suppress the objections of independent members. 
 And what he said is often quite true. There are often 
 seeming objections which are not real objections; at 
 least, which are, in the particular cases, outweighed by 
 counter-considerations; and these "independent mem- 
 bers," having no real responsibility, not being likely to be 
 hurt themselves if they make a mistake, are sure to blurt 
 out, and to want to act upon. But the responsible heads 
 of the party who may have to decide similar things, or 
 even the same things, themselves will not permit it. 
 They refuse, out of interest as well as out of patriotism, 
 to engage the country in a permanent foreign scrape, to 
 secure for themselves and their party a momentary home 
 advantage. Accordingly, a Government which negotiated 
 a treaty would feel that its treaty would be subject 
 certainly to a scrutiny, but still to a candid and lenient 
 scrutiny; that it would go before judges, of whom the 
 majority were favourable, and among whom the most 
 influential part of the minority were in this case much
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 opposed to excessive antagonism. And this seems to be 
 the best position in which negotiators can be placed, 
 namely, that they should be sure to have to account to 
 considerate and fair persons, but not to have to account 
 to inconsiderate and unfair ones. 
 
 At present the Government which negotiates a treaty 
 can hardly be said to be accountable to any one. It is 
 sure to be subjected to vague censure. Benjamin Franklin 
 said, " I have never known a peace made, even the most 
 advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and 
 the makers condemned as injudicious or corrupt. ' Blessed 
 are the peace-makers' is, I suppose, to be understood in 
 the other world, for in this they are frequently cursed." 
 And this is very often the view taken now in England of 
 treaties. There being nothing practical in the Opposition 
 nothing likely to hamper them hereafter the leaders 
 of Opposition are nearly sure to suggest every objection. 
 The thing is done and cannot be undone, and the most 
 natural wish of the Opposition leaders is to prove that if 
 they had been in office, and it therefore had been theirs 
 to do it, they could have done it much better. On the 
 other hand, it is quite possible that there may be no real 
 criticism on a treaty at all ; or the treaty has been made 
 by the Government, and as it cannot be unmade by any 
 one, the Opposition may not think it worth while to say 
 much about it. The Government, therefore, is never 
 certain of any criticism ; on the contrary, it has a good
 
 Xlvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 chance of escaping criticism ; but if there be any criticism 
 the Government must expect it to be bitter, sharp, and 
 captious made as an irresponsible objector would make 
 it, and not as a responsible statesman, who may have 
 to deal with a difficulty if he make it, and therefore will 
 be cautious how he says anything which may make it. 
 
 This is what happens in common cases ; and in the 
 uncommon the ninety-ninth case in a hundred in 
 which the Opposition hoped to turn out the Government 
 because of the alleged badness of the treaty they have 
 made, the criticism is sure to be of the most undesirable 
 character, and to say what is most offensive to foreign 
 nations. All the practised acumen of anti-Government 
 writers and speakers is sure to be engaged in proving 
 that England has been imposed upon that, as was said 
 in one case, " The moral and the intellectual qualities 
 have been divided; that our negotiation had the moral, 
 and the negotiation on the other side the intellectual," 
 and so on. The whole pitch of party malice is then 
 expended, because there is nothing to check the party 
 VQ opposition. The treaty has been made, and though 
 it may be censured, and the party which made it ousted 
 yet the difficulty it was meant to cure is cured, and the 
 opposing party, if it takes office, will not have that 
 difficulty to deal with. 
 
 In abstract theory these defects in our present practice 
 would seem exceedingly great, but in practice they are
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. xlvii 
 
 not so. English statesmen and English parties have 
 really a great patriotism ; they can rarely be persuaded 
 even by their passions or their interest to do anything 
 contrary to the real interest of England, or anything 
 Avhich would lower England in the eyes of foreign 
 nations. And they would , seriously hurt themselves if 
 they did. But still these are the real tendencies of our 
 present practice, and these are only prevented by qualities 
 in the nation and qualities in our statesmen, which will 
 just as much exist if we change our practice. 
 
 It certainly would be in many ways advantageous to 
 change it. If we require that in some form the assent of 
 Parliament shall be given to such treaties, we should 
 have a real discussion prior to the making of such 
 treaties. We should have the reasons for the treaty 
 plainly stated, and also the reasons against it. At 
 present, as we have seen, the discussion is unreal. The 
 thing is done and cannot be altered ; and what is said 
 often ought not to be said because it is captious, and 
 what is not said ought as often to be said because it is 
 material. We should have a manlier and plainer way 
 of dealing with foreign policy, if Ministers were obliged 
 to explain clearly their foreign contracts before they 
 were valid, just as they have to explain their domestic 
 proposals before they can become laws. 
 
 The objections to this are, as far as I know, three, 
 and three only.
 
 xlviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 First. That it would not be always desirable for 
 Ministers to state clearly the motives which induced 
 them to agree to foreign compacts. " Treaties," it is 
 said, " are in one great respect different from laws, they 
 concern not only the Government which binds, the 
 nation so bound, but a third party too a foreign country 
 and the feelings of that country are to be considered 
 as well as our own. And that foreign country will, 
 probably, in the present state of the world be a despotic 
 one, where discussion is not practised, where it is not 
 understood, where the expressions of different speakers 
 are not accurately weighed, where undue offence may 
 easily be given." This objection might be easily avoided 
 by requiring that the discussion upon treaties in Parlia- 
 ment like that discussion in the American Senate should 
 be "in secret session," and that no report shoidd bo 
 published of it. But I should, for my own part, be 
 rather disposed to risk a public debate. Despotic nations 
 now cannot understand England; it is to them an 
 anomaly "chartered by Providence;" they have been 
 time out of mind puzzled by its institutions, vexed at 
 its statesmen, and angry at its newspapers. A little 
 more of such perplexity and such vexation does not seem 
 to me a great eviL And if it be meant, as it often is 
 meant, that the whole truth as to treaties cannot be 
 spoken out, I answer, that neither can the whole truth 
 as to laws. All important laws affect large "vested
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 interests ; " they touch great sources of political strength ; 
 and these great interests require to be treated as 
 delicately, and with as nice a manipulation of language, 
 as the feelings of any foreign country. A Parliamentary 
 Minister is a man trained by elaborate practice not to 
 blurt out crude things, and an English Parliament is an 
 assembly -which particularly dislikes anything gauche or 
 anything imprudent. They would still more dislike it if 
 it hurt themselves and the country as well as the speaker. 
 I am, too, disposed to deny entirely that there can be 
 any treaty for which adequate reasons cannot be given 
 to the English people, which the English people ought 
 to make. A great deal of the reticence of diplomacy had, 
 I think history shows, much better be spoken out. The 
 worst families are those in which the members never 
 really speak their minds to one another ; they maintain 
 an atmosphere of unreality, and every one always lives in 
 an atmosphere of suppressed ill-feeling. It is the same 
 with nations. The parties concerned would almost 
 always be better for hearing the substantial reasons 
 which induced the negotiators to make the treaty, and 
 the negotiators would do their work much better, for 
 half the ambiguities in treaties are caused by the nego- 
 tiators not liking the fact or not taking the pains to put 
 their own meaning distinctly before their own minds. 
 And they would be obliged to make it plain if they had 
 to defend it and argue on it before a great assembly.
 
 I INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 Secondly, it may be objected to the change suggested 
 that Parliament is not always sitting, and that if treaties 
 required its assent, it might have to be sometimes sum- 
 moned out of season, or the treaties would have to be 
 delayed. And this is as far as it goes a just objection, 
 but I do not imagine that it goes far. The great bulk of 
 treaties could wait a little without harm, and in the very- 
 few cases when urgent haste is necessary, an Autumn 
 session of Parliament could well be justified, for the 
 occasion must be of grave and critical importance. 
 
 Thirdly, it may be said that if we required the con- 
 sent of both Houses of Parliament to foreign treaties 
 before they were valid we should much augment the 
 power of the House of Lords. And this is also, I think, 
 a just objection as far as it goes. The House of Lords, 
 as it cannot turn out the Ministry for making treaties, 
 has in no case a decisive weight in foreign policy, though 
 its debates on them are often excellent ; and there is a 
 real danger at present in giving it such weight. They 
 are not under the same guidance as the House of Com- 
 mons. In the House of Commons, of necessity, the 
 Ministry has a majority, and the majority will agree to 
 the treaties the leaders have made if they fairly can. 
 They will not be anxious to disagree with them. But 
 the majority of the House of Lords may always be, and 
 has lately been generally an opposition majority, and 
 therefore the treaty may be submitted to critics exactly
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. li 
 
 pledged to opposite views. It might be like submitting 
 the design of an architect known to hold " mediaeval prin- 
 ciples " to a committee wedded to " classical principles." 
 
 Still, upon the whole, I think the augmentation of 
 the power of the Peers might be risked without real fear 
 of serious harm. Our present practice, as has been ex- 
 plained, only works because of the good sense of those 
 by whom it is worked, and the new practice would have 
 to rely on a similar good sense and practicality too. The 
 House of Lords must deal with the assent to treaties as 
 they do with the assent to laws ; they must defer to the 
 voice of the country and the authority of the Commons 
 even in cases where their own judgment might guide 
 them otherwise. In very vital treaties probably, being 
 Englishmen, they would be of the same mind as the rest 
 of Englishmen. If in such cases they showed a reluct- 
 ance to act as the people wished, they would have the 
 same lesson taught them as on vital and exciting questions 
 of domestic legislation, and the case is not so likely to 
 happen, for on these internal and organic questions the 
 interest and the feeling of the Peers is often presumably 
 opposed to that of other classes they may be anxious 
 not to relinquish the very power which other classes are 
 anxious to acquire; but in foreign policy there is no 
 similar antagonism of interest a peer and a non-peer 
 have presumably in that matter the same interest and 
 the same wishes.
 
 Ill INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 Probably, if it were considered to be desirable to give 
 to Parliament a more direct control over questions of 
 foreign policy than it possesses now, the better way 
 would be not to require a formal vote to the treaty 
 clause by clause. This would entail too much time, and 
 would lead to unnecessary changes in minor details. It 
 would be enough to let the treaty be laid upon the table 
 of both Houses, say for fourteen days, and to acquire 
 validity unless objected to by one House or other before 
 that interval had expired. 
 
 II. 
 
 This is all which I think I need say on the domestic 
 events which have changed, or suggested changes, in the 
 English Constitution since this book was written. But 
 there are also some foreign events which have illustrated 
 it, and of these I should like to say a few words. 
 
 Naturally, the most striking of these illustrative 
 changes comes from France. Since 1789 France has 
 always been trying political experiments, from which 
 others may profit much, though as yet she herself has 
 profited little. She is now trying one singularly illus- 
 trative of the English Constitution. When the first 
 edition of this book was published I had great difficulty 
 in persuading many people that it was possible for a 
 non-monarchical state, for the real chief of the practical 
 Executive the Premier as we should call him to be
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Hii 
 
 nominated and to be removable by the vote of the 
 National Assembly. The United States and its copies 
 were the only present and familial Repuolics, and in 
 the3e the system wao exactly opposite. The Executive 
 was there appointed by the people as the Legislative 
 was too. No conspicuous example of any other sort of 
 Republic then existed. But now France has given an 
 example M. Thiers is (with one exception) just the chef 
 du pouvoir executif that I endeavoured more than once 
 in this book to describe. He is appointed by and is 
 removable by the Assembly. He comes down and 
 speaks in it just as our Premier does ; he is responsible 
 for managing it just as our Premier is. No one can any 
 longer doubt the possibility of a republic in which the 
 Executive and the Legislative authorities were united 
 and fixed; no one can assert such union to be the 
 incommunicable attribute of a Constitutional Monarchy. 
 But, unfortunately, we can as yet only infer from this 
 experiment that such a constitution is possible ; we can- 
 not as yet say whether it will be bad or good. The 
 circumstances are very peculiar, and that in three ways. 
 First, the trial of a specially Parliamentary Republic, of 
 a Republic where Parliament appoints the Minister, is 
 made in a nation which has, to say the least of it, no 
 peculiar aptitude for Parliamentary Government; which 
 has possibly a peculiar inaptitude for it. In the last but 
 one of these essays I have tried to describe one of the
 
 liv INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 mental conditions of Parliamentary Government, which 
 I call " rationality," by which I do not mean reasoning 
 power, but rather the power of hearing the reasons of 
 others, of comparing them quietly with one's own reasons, 
 and then being guided by the result. But a French 
 Assembly is not easy to reason with. Every assembly is 
 divided into parties and into sections of parties, and in 
 France each party, almost every section of a party, 
 begins not to clamour but to scream, and to scream as 
 only Frenchmen can, as soon as it hears anything which 
 it particularly dislikes. With an Assembly in this 
 temper, real discussion is impossible, and Parliamentary 
 Government is impossible too, because the Parliament 
 can neither choose men nor measures. The French 
 assemblies under the Restored Monarchy seem to have 
 been quieter, probably because being elected from a 
 limited constituency they did not contain so many sec- 
 tions of opinion; they had fewer irritants and fewer 
 species of irritability. But the assemblies of the '48 
 Republic were disorderly in the extreme. I saw the last 
 myself, and can certify that steady discussion upon a 
 critical point was not possible in it. There was not an 
 audience willing to hear. The Assembly now sitting at 
 Versailles is undoubtedly also, at times, most tumultuous, 
 and a Parliamentary Government in which it governs 
 must be under a peculiar difficulty, because as a sove- 
 reign it is unstable, capricious, and unruly.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Iv 
 
 The difficulty is the greater because there is no check, 
 or little, from the French nation upon the Assembly. 
 The French, as a nation, do not care for or appreciate 
 Parliamentary Government. I have endeavoured to ex- 
 plain how difficult it is for inexperienced mankind to 
 take to such a government; how much more natural, 
 that is, how much more easy to uneducated men is 
 loyalty to a monarch. A nation which does not expect 
 good from a Parliament, cannot check or punish a Par- 
 liament. France expects, I fear, too little from her 
 Parliaments ever to get what she ought. Now that 
 the suffrage is universal, the average intellect and the 
 average culture of the constituent bodies are excessively 
 low; and even such mind and culture as there is has 
 long been enslaved to authority; the French peasant 
 cares more for standing well with his present prefet 
 than for anything else whatever ; he is far too ignorant 
 to check and watch his Parliament, and far too timid to 
 think of doing either if the executive authority nearest 
 to him did not like it. The experiment of a strictly 
 Parliamentary Republic of a Republic where the Par- 
 liament appoints the Executive is being tried in France 
 at an extreme disadvantage, because in France a Par- 
 liament is unusually likely to be bad, and unusually 
 likely also to be free enough to show its badness. 
 
 Secondly, the present polity of France is not a copy 
 of the whole effective part of the British Constitution,
 
 Ivi INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 but only a part of it By our Constitution nominally 
 the Queen, but really the Prime Minister, has the power 
 of dissolving the Assembly. But M. Thiers has no such 
 power; and therefore, under ordinary circumstances, I 
 believe, the policy would soon become unmanageable. 
 The result would be, as I have tried to explain, that the 
 Assembly would be always changing its Ministry, that 
 having no reason to fear the penalty which that change so 
 often brings in England, they would be ready to make it 
 once a month. Caprice is the characteristic vice of 
 miscellaneous assemblies, and without some check their 
 selection would be unceasingly mutable. This peculiar 
 danger of the present Constitution of France has how- 
 ever been prevented by its peculiar circumstances. The 
 Assembly have not been inclined to remove M. Thiers, 
 because in their lamentable present position they could 
 not replace M. Thiers. He has a monopoly of the 
 necessary reputation. It is the Empire the Empire 
 which he always opposed that has done him this kind- 
 ness. For twenty years no great political reputation 
 could arise in France. The Emperor governed and no 
 one member could show a capacity for government. M. 
 Rouher, though of vast real ability, was in the popular 
 jdea only the Emperor's agent; and even had it been 
 otherwise, M. Rouher, the one great man of Imperialism, 
 could not have been selected as a head of the Govern- 
 ment, at a moment of the greatest reaction against the
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ivii 
 
 Empire. Of the chiefs before the twenty years' silence, 
 of the eminent men known to be able to handle Parlia- 
 ments and to govern Parliaments, M Thiers was the only 
 one still physically able to begin again to do so. The 
 miracle is, that at seventy-four even he should still be 
 able. As no other great chief of the Parliament regime 
 existed, M. Thiers is not only the best choice, but the 
 only choice. If he were taken away, it would be most 
 difficult to make any other choice, and that difficulty 
 keeps him where he is. At every crisis the Assembly 
 feels that after M. Thiers "the deluge," and he lives upon 
 that feeling. A change of the President, though legally 
 simple, is in practice all but impossible; because all know 
 that such a change might be a change, not only of the 
 President, but of much more too : that very probably it 
 might be a change of the polity that it might bring in 
 a Monarchy or an Empire. 
 
 Lastly, by a natural consequence of the position, M. 
 Thiers does not govern as a Parliamentary Premier 
 governs. He is not, he boasts that he is not, the head of 
 a party. On the contrary, being the one person essential 
 to all parties, he selects Ministers from all parties, he 
 constructs a cabinet in which no one Minister agrees with 
 any other in anything, and with all the members of which 
 he himself frequently disagrees. The selection is quite 
 in his hand. Ordinarily a Parliamentary Premier cannot 
 choose ; he is brought in by a party ; he is maintained in
 
 Iviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 office by a party ; and that party requires that as they 
 aid him, he shall aid them ; that as they give him the 
 very best thing in the State, he shall give them the 
 next best things. But M. Thiers is under no such 
 restriction. He can choose as he likes, and does choose. 
 Neither in the selection of his Cabinet nor in the 
 management of the Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as a 
 similar person in common circumstances would have to 
 be guided. He is the exception of a moment ; he is not 
 the example of a lasting condition. 
 
 For these reasons, though we may use the present 
 Constitution of France as a useful aid to our imaginations, 
 in conceiving of a purely Parliamentary republic, of a 
 monarchy 'minus the monarch, we must not think of it 
 as much more. It is too singular in its nature and too 
 peculiar in its accidents to be a guide to anything except 
 itself. 
 
 In this essay I have made many remarks on the 
 American Constitution, in comparison with the English ; 
 and as to the American Constitution we have had a whole 
 world of experience since I first wrote. My great object 
 was to contrast the office of President as an executive 
 officer and to compare it with that of a Prime Minister ; 
 and I devoted much space to showing that in one prin- 
 cipal respect the English system is by far the best. The 
 English Premier being appointed by the selection, and 
 being removable at the pleasure, of the preponderant
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. lix 
 
 Legislative Assembly, is sure to be able to rely on that 
 assembly. If he wants legislation to aid his policy he can 
 obtain that legislation; he can carry out that policy. 
 But the American President has no similar security. He 
 is elected in one way, at one time, and Congress (no 
 matter which House) is elected in another way, at another 
 time. The two have nothing to bind them together, and 
 in matter of fact, they continually disagree. 
 
 This was written in the time of Mr. Lincoln, when 
 Congress, the President, and all the North were united as 
 one man in the war against the South. There was then 
 no patent instance of mere disunion. But between the 
 time when the essays were first written in the " Fort- 
 nightly," and their subsequent junction into a book, Mr. 
 Lincoln was assassinated, and Mr. Johnson, the Vice- 
 President, became President, and so continued for nearly 
 four years. At such a time the characteristic evils of the 
 Presidential system were shown most conspicuously. The 
 President and the Assembly, so far from being (as it is 
 essential to good government that they should be) on 
 terms of close union, were not on terms of common 
 courtesy. So far from being capable of a continuous and 
 concerted co-operation they were all the while trying 
 to thwart one another. He had one plan for the paci- 
 fication of the South and they another ; they would have 
 nothing to say to his plans, and he vetoed their plans as 
 long as the Constitution permitted, and when they were, 
 
 e
 
 IX INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 in spite of him, carried, he, as far as he could (and this 
 was very much), embarrassed them in action. The 
 quarrel in most countries would have gone beyond the 
 law, and come to blows ; even in America, the most law- 
 loving of countries, it went as far as possible within 
 the law. Mr. Johnson described the most popular branch 
 of the legislature the House of Representatives as a 
 body " hanging on the verge of government ; " and that 
 House impeached him criminally, in the hope that in 
 that way they might get rid of him civilly. Nothing 
 could be so conclusive against the American Constitution, 
 as a Constitution, as that incident. A hostile legislature 
 and a hostile executive were so tied together, that the 
 legislature tried, and tried in vain, to rid itself of the 
 executive by accusing it of illegal practices. The legis- 
 lature was so afraid of the President's legal power that 
 it unfairly accused him of acting beyond the law. And 
 the blame thus cast on the American Constitution is so 
 much praise to be given to the American political 
 character. Few nations, perhaps scarcely any nation, 
 could have borne such a trial so easily and so perfectly. 
 
 This was the most striking instance of disunion be- 
 tween the President and the Congress that has ever yet 
 occurred, and which probably will ever occur. Probably 
 for very many years the United States will have great 
 and painful reason to remember that at the moment of 
 all their history, when it was most important to them to
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ixi 
 
 collect and concentrate all the strength and wisdom of 
 their policy on the pacification of the South, that policy- 
 was divided by a strife in the last degree unseemly and 
 degrading. But it will be for a competent historian 
 hereafter to trace out this accurately and in detail ; the 
 time is yet too recent, and I cannot pretend that I know 
 enough to do so. I cannot venture myself to draw the 
 full lessons from these events ; I can only predict that 
 when they are drawn, those lessons will be most import- 
 ant and most interesting. 
 
 There is, however, one series of events which have 
 happened in America since the beginning of the civil war, 
 and since the first publication of these essays, on which 
 I should wish to say something in detail I mean the 
 financial events. These lie within the scope of my pecu- 
 liar studies, and it is comparatively easy to judge of them, 
 since whatever may be the case with refined statistical 
 reasoning, the great results of money matters speak to 
 and interest all mankind. And every incident in this 
 part of American financial history exemplifies the con- 
 trast between a Parliamentary and a Presidential Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The distinguishing quality of Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment is, that in each stage of a public transaction there is 
 a discussion; that the public assist at this discussion; that 
 it can, through Parliament, turn out an administration 
 which is not f)oing as it likes, and can put in an adminis-
 
 Ixii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 tration which will do as it likes. But the characteristic 
 of a Presidential Government is, in a multitude of cases, 
 that there is no such discussion ; that when there is a 
 discussion the fate of Government does not turn upon it, 
 and, therefore, the people do not attend to it ; that upon 
 the whole the administration itself is pretty much doing 
 as it likes, and neglecting as it likes, subject always to 
 the check that it must not too much offend the mass of 
 the nation. The nation commonly does not attend, but if 
 by gigantic blunders you make it attend, it will remember 
 it and turn you out when its time comes ; it will show 
 you that your power is short, and so on the instant 
 weaken that power; it will make your present life in 
 office unbearable and uncomfortable by the hundred 
 modes in which a free people can, without ceasing, act 
 upon the rulers which it elected yesterday, and will have 
 to reject or re-elect to-morrow. 
 
 In finance the most striking effect in America has, on 
 the first view of it, certainly been good. It has enabled 
 the Government to obtain and to keep a vast surplus of 
 revenue over expenditure. Even before the civil war it 
 did this from 1837 to 1857. Mr. Wells tells us that, 
 strange as it may seem, " There was not a single year in 
 which the unexpended balance in the National Treasury 
 derived from various sources at the end of the year, 
 was not in excess of the total expenditure of the pre- 
 ceding year; while in not a few years the unexpended
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ixiii 
 
 balance was absolutely greater than the sum of the entire 
 expenditure of the twelve months preceding." But this 
 history before the war is nothing to what has happened 
 since. The following are the surpluses of revenue over 
 expenditure since the end of the civil war : - 
 
 Surplus. 
 Tear ending June 30. 
 
 1866 ...... 5,593,000 
 
 1867 21,586,000 
 
 1868 4,242,000 
 
 1869 7,418,000 
 
 1870 18,627,000 
 
 1871 16,712,000 
 
 No one who knows anything of the working of Par- 
 liamentary Government, will for a moment imagine that 
 any Parliament would have allowed any executive to 
 keep a surplus of this magnitude. In England, after the 
 French war, the Government of that day, which had 
 brought it to a happy end, which had the glory of 
 Waterloo, which was in consequence exceedingly strong, 
 which had besides elements of strength from close 
 boroughs and Treasury influence such as certainly no 
 Government has ever had since, and such perhaps as no 
 Government ever had before that Government proposed 
 to keep a moderate surplus and to apply it to the re- 
 duction of the debt, but even this the English Parliament 
 would not endure. The administration with all its power 
 derived both from good and evil had to yield; the income 
 tax was abolished, with it went the surplus, and with the
 
 Ixiv INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 surplus all chance of any considerable reduction of the 
 debt for that time. In truth taxation is so painful that 
 in a sensitive community which has strong organs of ex- 
 pression and action, the maintenance of a great surplus is 
 excessively difficult. The opposition will always say that 
 it is unnecessary, is uncalled for, is injudicious ; the cry 
 will be echoed in every constituency ; there will be a 
 series of large meetings in the great cities ; even in the 
 smaller constituencies there will mostly be smaller meet- 
 ings ; every member of Parliament will be pressed upon 
 by those who elect him ; upon this point there will be no 
 distinction between town and country, the country gentle- 
 man and the farmer disliking high taxes as much as any 
 in the towns. To maintain a great surplus by heavy taxes 
 to pay off debt has never yet in this country been possible, 
 and to maintain a surplus of the American magnitude 
 would be plainly impossible. 
 
 Some part of the difference between England and 
 America arises undoubtedly not from political causes but 
 from economical. America is not a country sensitive to 
 taxes ; no great country has perhaps ever been so unseii- 
 sitive in this respect ; certainly she is far less sensitive 
 than England. In reality America is too rich, daily 
 industry there is too common, too skilful, and too pro- 
 ductive, for her to care much for fiscal burdens. She 
 is applying all the resources of science and skill and 
 trained labour, which have been in long ages painfully
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 acquired in old countries, to develop with great speed the 
 richest soil and the richest mines of new countries ; and 
 the result is untold wealth. Even under a Parliamentary 
 Government such a community could and would bear 
 taxation much more easily than Englishmen ever would. 
 But difference of physical character in this respect is 
 of little moment in comparison with difference of political 
 constitution. If America was under a Parliamentary 
 Government, she would soon be convinced that in main- 
 taining this great surplus and in paying this high tax- 
 ation she would be doing herself great harm. She is not 
 performing a great duty, but perpetrating a great in- 
 justice. She is injuring posterity by crippling and dis- 
 placing industry, far more than she is aiding it by re- 
 ducing the taxes it will have to pay. In the first place, 
 the maintenance of the present high taxation compels 
 the retention of many taxes which are contrary to the 
 maxims of free trade. Enormous customs duties are 
 necessary, and it would be all but impossible to impose 
 equal excise duties even if the Americans desired it. In 
 consequence, besides what the Americans pay to the 
 Government, they are paying a great deal to some of 
 their own citizens, and so are rearing a set of industries 
 which never ought to have existed, which are bad specu- 
 lations at present because other industries would have 
 paid better, and which may cause a great loss out of 
 pocket hereafter when the debt is paid off and the
 
 Ixvi INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 fostering tax withdrawn. Then probably industry will 
 return to its natural channel, the artificial trade will be 
 first depressed, then discontinued, and the fixed capital 
 employed in the trade will all be depreciated and much 
 of it be worthless. Secondly, all taxes on trade and 
 manufacture are injurious in various ways to them. You 
 cannot put on a great series of such duties without 
 cramping trade in a hundred ways and without diminish- 
 ing their productiveness exceedingly. America is now 
 working in heavy fetters, and it would probably be better 
 for her to lighten those fetters even though a generation 
 or two should have to pay rather higher taxes. Those 
 generations would really benefit, because they would be 
 so much richer that the slightly increased cost of govern- 
 ment would never be perceived. At any rate, under a 
 Parliamentary Government this doctrine would have 
 been incessantly inculcated ; a whole party would have 
 made it their business to preach it, would have made 
 incessant small motions in Parliament about it, which is 
 the way to popularise their view. And in the end I do 
 not doubt that they would have prevailed. They would 
 have had to teach a lesson both pleasant and true, and 
 such lessons are soon learned. On the whole, therefore, 
 the result of the comparison is that a Presidential Govern- 
 ment makes it much easier than the Parliamentary to 
 maintain a great surplus of income over expenditure, 
 but that it does not give the same facility for examining
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ixvii 
 
 whether it is good or not good to maintain a surplus, and, 
 therefore, that it works blindly, maintaining surpluses 
 when they do extreme harm just as much as when they 
 are very beneficial. 
 
 In this point the contrast of Presidential with Parlia- 
 mentary Government is mixed; one of the defects of 
 Parliamentary Government probably is the difficulty 
 under it of maintaining a surplus revenue to discharge 
 debt, and this defect Presidential Government escapes, 
 though at the cost of being likely to maintain that sur- 
 plus upon inexpedient occasions as well as upon expedient. 
 But in all other respects a Parliamentary Government 
 has in finance an unmixed advantage over the Presiden- 
 tial in the incessant discussion. Though in one single 
 case it produces evil as well as good, in most cases it 
 produces good only. And three of these cases are illus- 
 trated by recent American experience. 
 
 First, as Mr. Goldwin Smith no unfavourable judge 
 of anything American justly said some years since, the 
 capital error made by the United States Government 
 was the " Legal Tender Act," as it is called, by which it 
 made inconvertible paper notes issued by the Treasury 
 the sole circulating medium of the country. The tempta- 
 tion to do this was very great, because it gave at once a 
 great war fund when it was needed, and with no pain to 
 any one. If the notes of a Government supersede the 
 metallic currency medium of a country to the extent of
 
 Ixviii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 $80,000,000, this is equivalent to a recent loan of 
 $80,000,000 to the Government for all purposes within 
 the country. Whenever the precious metals are not 
 required, and for domestic purposes in such a case they 
 are not required, notes will buy what the Government 
 want, and it can buy to the extent of its issue. But, 
 like all easy expedients out of a great difficulty, it is 
 accompanied by the greatest evils; if it had not been 
 so, it would have been the regular device in such cases, 
 and the difficulty would have been no difficulty at all ; 
 there would have been a known easy way out of it. As 
 is well known, inconvertible paper issued by Government 
 is sure to be issued in great quantities, as the American 
 currency soon was ; it is sure to be depreciated as against 
 coin ; it is sure to disturb values and to derange markets ; 
 it is certain to defraud the lender ; it is certain to give 
 the borrower more than he 'ought to have. In the case 
 of America there was a further evil. Being a new 
 country, she ought in her times of financial want to 
 borrow of old countries ; but the old countries were 
 frightened by the probable issue of unlimited inconvertible 
 paper, and they would not lend a shilling. Much more 
 than the mercantile credit of America was thus lost. 
 The great commercial houses in England are the most 
 natural and most effectual conveyers of intelligence from 
 other countries to Europe. If they had been financially 
 interested in giving in a sound report as to the progress
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 of the war, a sound report we should have had. But as 
 the Northern States raised no loans in Lombard Street 
 (and could raise none because of their vicious paper 
 money), Lombard Street did not care about them, and 
 England was very imperfectly informed of the progress 
 of the civil struggle, and on the whole matter, which was 
 then new and very complex, England had to judge with- 
 out having her usual materials for judgment, and (since 
 the guidance of the " city " on political matter is very 
 quietly and' imperceptibly given) without knowing she 
 had not those materials. 
 
 Of course, this error might have been committed, and 
 perhaps would have been committed under a Parlia- 
 mentary Government. But if it had, its effects would 
 ere long have been thoroughly searched into and effect- 
 ually frustrated. The whole force of the greatest in- 
 quiring machine and the greatest discussing machine 
 which the world has ever known would have been 
 directed to this subject. In a year or two the American 
 public would have had it forced upon them in every 
 form till they must have comprehended it. But under 
 the Presidential form of Government, and owing to the 
 inferior power of generating discussion, the information 
 given to the American people has been imperfect in the 
 extreme. And in consequence, after nearly ten years of 
 painful experience, they do not now understand how much 
 they have suffered from their inconvertible currency.
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 But the mode in which the Presidential Government 
 of America managed its taxation during the Civil War, is 
 even a more striking example of its defects, Mr. Wells 
 tells us : 
 
 "In the outset all direct or internal taxation was 
 avoided, there having been apparently an apprehension 
 on the part of Congress, that inasmuch as the people had 
 never been accustomed to it, and as all machinery for 
 assessment and collection was wholly wanting, its adop- 
 tion would create discontent, and thereby interfere with 
 a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. Congress, therefore, 
 confined itself at first to the enactment of measures 
 looking to an increase of revenue from the increase of 
 indirect taxes upon imports ; and it was not until four 
 months after the actual outbreak of hostilities that a 
 direct tax of % 20,000,000 per annum was apportioned 
 among the States, and an income tax of 3 per cent, on 
 the excess of all incomes over $800 was provided for ; 
 the first being made to take effect practically eight, and 
 the second ten months after date of enactment. Such 
 laws of course took effect, and became immediately 
 operative in the loyal States only, and produced but 
 comparatively little revenue ; and although the range of 
 taxation was soon extended, the whole receipts from all 
 sources by the Government for the second year of the 
 war, from excise, income, stamp, and all other interna'
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ixxi 
 
 taxes were less than 542,000,000; and that, too, at a 
 time when the expenditures were in excess $60,000,000 
 per month, or at the rate of over $700,000,000 per annum. 
 And as showing how novel was this whole subject of 
 direct and internal taxation to the people, and how com 
 pletely the government officials were lacking in all ex- 
 perience in respect to it, the following incident may be 
 noted. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report for 
 1863, stated that, with a view of determining his re- 
 sources, he employed a very competent person, with the 
 aid of practical men, to estimate the probable amount of 
 revenue to be derived from each department of internal 
 taxation for the previous year. The estimate arrived at 
 was $85,000,000, but the actual receipts were only 
 $37,000,000." 
 
 Now, no doubt, this might have happened under a 
 Parliamentary Government. But, then, many members of 
 Parliament, the entire opposition in Parliament, would 
 have been active to unravel the matter. AH the principles 
 of finance would have been worked and propounded. 
 The light would have come from above, not from below 
 it would have come from Parliament to the nation instead 
 of from the nation to Parliament. But exactly the 
 reverse happened in America. Mr. Wells goes on to 
 eay : 
 
 " The people of the loyal States were, however, more
 
 Ixxii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 determined and in earnest in respect to this matter of 
 taxation than were their rulers; and before long the 
 popular discontent at the existing state of things was 
 openly manifest Everywhere the opinion was expressed 
 that taxation in all possible forms should immediately, 
 and to the largest extent, be made effective and impera- 
 tive ; and Congress spurred up, and rightfully relying on 
 public sentiment to sustain their action, at last took up 
 the matter resolutely and in earnest, and devised and 
 inaugurated a system of internal and direct taxation, 
 which for its universality and peculiarities has probably 
 no parallel in anything which has heretofore been recorded 
 in civil history, or is likely to be experienced hereafter. 
 The one necessity of the situation was revenue, and to 
 obtain it speedily and in large amounts through taxation 
 the only principle recognized if it can be called a prin- 
 ciple was akin to that recommended to the traditionary 
 Irishman on his visit to Donnybrook Fair, ' Wherever 
 you see a head hit it/ Wherever you find an article, a 
 product, a trade, a profession, or a source of income, tax 
 it 1 And so an edict went forth to this effect, and the 
 people cheerfully submitted. Incomes under #5,000 
 were taxed 5 per cent., with an exemption of #600 
 and house rent actually paid; these exemptions being 
 allowed on this ground, that they represented an amount 
 sufficient at the time to enable a small family to procure
 
 INTEODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. Ixxiii 
 
 the bare necessaries of life, and thus take out from the 
 operation of the law all those who were dependent upon 
 each day's earnings to supply each day's needs. Incomes 
 in excess of #5,000 and not in excess of $10,000 were 
 taxed 2| per cent, in addition ; and incomes over $10,000 
 5 per cent, additional, without any abeyance or exemp- 
 tions whatever." 
 
 Now this is all contrary to and worse than what would 
 have happened under a Parliamentary Government. The 
 delay to tax would not have occurred under it: the 
 movement by the country to get taxation would never 
 have been necessary under it. The excessive taxation 
 accordingly imposed would not have been permitted 
 under it. The last point I think I need not labour at 
 length. The evils of a bad tax are quite sure to be 
 pressed upon the ears of Parliament in season and out of 
 season; the few persons who have to pay it are thoroughly 
 certain to make themselves heard. The sort of taxation 
 tried in America, that of taxing everything, and seeing 
 what everything would yield, could not have been tried 
 under a Government delicately and quickly sensitive to 
 public opinion. 
 
 I do not apologise for dwelling at length upon these 
 points, for the subject is one of transcendent importance. 
 The practical choice of first-rate nations is between the 
 Presidential Government and the Parliamentary ; no State
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 can be first-rate which has not a Government by dis- 
 cussion, and those are the only two existing species of 
 that Government. It is between them that a nation 
 which has to choose its Government must choose. And 
 nothing therefore can be more important than to compare 
 the two, and to decide upon the testimony of experience 
 and by facts, which of them is the better. 
 
 THE POPLABS, WIMBLEDON i 
 June 20, 1872.
 
 THE 
 
 ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 No. I. 
 
 THE CABINET. 
 
 " ON all great subjects," says Mr. Mill, "much remains to 
 be said," and of none is this more true than of the English 
 Constitution. The literature which has accumulated 
 upon it is huge. But an observer who looks at the living 
 reality will wonder at the contrast to the paper descrip- 
 tion. He will see in the life much which is not in the 
 books ; and he will not find in the rough practice many 
 refinements of the literary theory. 
 
 It was natural perhaps inevitable that such an 
 undergrowth of irrelevant ideas should gather round the 
 British Constitution. Language is the tradition of 
 nations ; each generation describes what it sees, but it 
 uses words transmitted from the past. When a great 
 entity like the British Constitution has continued in 
 connected outward sameness, but hidden inner change, 
 for many ages, every generation inherits a series of inapt 
 words of maxims once true, but of which the truth is 
 
 B
 
 2 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ceasing or has ceased. As a man's family go on mutter- 
 ing in his maturity incorrect phrases derived from a just 
 observation of his early youth, so, in the full activity of 
 an historical constitution, its subjects repeat phrases true 
 in the time of their fathers, and iaculcated by those 
 fathers, but now true no longer. Or, if I may say so, an 
 ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an old man 
 who still wears with attached fondness clothes in the 
 fashion of his youth : what you see of him is the same ; 
 what you do not see is wholly altered. 
 
 There are two descriptions of the English Constitution 
 which have exercised immense influence, but which are 
 erroneous. First, it is laid down as a principle of the 
 English polity, that in it the legislative, the executive, 
 and the judicial powers are quite divided that each is 
 entrusted to a separate person or set of persons that no 
 one of these can at all interfere with the work of the 
 other. There has been much eloquence expended in ex- 
 plaining how the rough genius of the English people, 
 even in the middle ages, when it was especially rude, 
 carried into life and practice that elaborate division of 
 functions which philosophers had suggested on paper, 
 but which they had hardly hoped to see except on paper. 
 
 Secondly, it is insisted that the peculiar excellence of 
 the British Constitution lies in a balanced union of three 
 powers. It is said that the monarchical element, the 
 aristocratic element, and the democratic element, have 
 each a share in the supreme sovereignty, and that the 
 assent of all three is necessary to the action of that 
 sovereignty. Kings, lords, and commons, by this theory,
 
 THE CABINET. 3 
 
 are alleged to be not only the outward form, but the 
 inner moving essence, the vitality of the constitution. 
 A great theory, called the theory of "Checks and 
 Balances," pervades an immense part of political litera- 
 ture, and much of it is collected from or supported by 
 English experience. Monarchy, it is said, has some 
 faults, some bad tendencies, aristocracy Bothers, democracy, 
 again, others ; but England has shown that a government 
 can be constructed in which these evil tendencies exactly 
 check, balance, and destroy one another in which a 
 good whole is constructed not simply in spite of, but by 
 means of, the counteracting defects of the constituent parts. 
 Accordingly, it is believed that the principal cha- 
 racteristics of the English Constitution are inapplicable 
 in countries where the materials for a monarchy or an 
 aristocracy do not exist. That constitution is conceived 
 to be the best imaginable use of the political elements 
 which the great majority of States in modern Europe 
 inherited from the mediaeval period. It is believed that 
 out of these materials nothing better can be made than 
 the English Constitution ; but it is also believed that the 
 essential parts of the English Constitution cannot be 
 made except from these materials. Now these elements 
 are the accidents of a period and a region ; they belong 
 only to one or two centuries in human history, and to a 
 few countries. The United States could not have become 
 monarchical, even if the Constitutional Convention had 
 decreed it, even if the component States had ratified it. 
 The mystic reverence, the religious allegiance, which are 
 essential to a true monarchy, are imaginative sentiments
 
 4 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 that no legislature can manufacture in any people. These 
 semi-filial feelings in government are inherited just as 
 the true filial feelings in common life. You might as 
 well adopt a father as make a monarchy: the special 
 sentiment belonging to the one is as incapable of volun- 
 tary creation as the peculiar affection belonging to the 
 other. If the practical part of the English Constitution 
 could only be made out of a curious accumulation of 
 mediaeval materials, its interest would be half historical, 
 and its imitability very confined. 
 
 No one can approach to an understanding of the 
 English institutions, or of others, which, being the growth 
 of many centuries, exercise a wide sway over mixed 
 populations, unless he divide them into two classes. In 
 such constitutions there are two parts (not indeed separ- 
 able with microscopic accuracy, for the genius of great 
 affairs abhors nicety of division) : first, those which 
 excite and preserve the reverence of the population the 
 dignified parts, if I may so call them ; and next, the 
 efficient parts those by which it, in fact, works and 
 rules. There are two great obj ects which every consti- 
 tution must attain to be successful, which every old and 
 celebrated one must have wonderfully achieved : every 
 constitution must first gain authority, and then use 
 authority; it must first win the loyalty and confidence 
 of mankind, and then employ that homage in the work 
 of government. 
 
 There are indeed practical men who reject the dig- 
 nified parts of government. They say, we want only to 
 attain results, to do business : a constitution is a collection
 
 THE CABINET. 6 
 
 of political means for political ends, and if you admit 
 that any part of a constitution does no business, or that 
 a simpler machine would do equally well what it does, 
 you admit that this part of the constitution, however 
 dignified or awful it may be, is nevertheless in truth use- 
 less. And other reasoners, who distrust this bare philo- 
 sophy, have propounded subtle arguments to prove that 
 these dignified parts of old governments are cardinal 
 opponents of the essential apparatus, great pivots of 
 substantial utility ; and so they manufactured fallacies 
 which the plainer school have well exposed. But both 
 schools are in error. The dignified parts of government 
 are those which bring it force which attract its motive 
 power. The efficient parts only employ that power. 
 The comely parts of a government have need, for they 
 are those upon which its vital strength depends. They 
 may not do anything definite that a simpler polity would 
 not do better ; but they are the preliminaries, the need- 
 ful pre-requisites of all work. They raise the army, 
 though they do not win the battle. 
 
 Doubtless, if all subjects of the same government only 
 thought of what was useful to them, and if they all thought 
 the same thing useful, and all thought that same thing 
 could be attained in the same way, the efficient members 
 of a constitution would suffice, and no impressive adjuncts 
 would be needed. But the world in which we live is 
 organised far otherwise. 
 
 The most strange fact, though the most certain in 
 nature, is the unequal development of the human race. 
 If we look back to the early ages of mankind, such as we
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 seem in the faint distance to see them if we call up 
 the image of those dismal tribes in lake villages, or 
 on wretched beaches scarcely equal to the commonest 
 material needs, cutting down trees slowly and painfully 
 with stone tools, hardly resisting the attacks of huge, 
 fierce animals without culture, without leisure, without 
 poetry, almost without thought destitute of morality, 
 with only a sort of magic for religion; and if we compare 
 that imagined life with the actual life of Europe now, we 
 are overwhelmed at the wide contrast we can scarcely 
 conceive ourselves to be of the same race as those in the 
 far distance. There used to be a notion not so much 
 widely asserted as deeply implanted, rather pervadingly 
 latent than commonly apparent in political philosophy 
 that in a little while, perhaps ten years or so, all human 
 beings might, without extraordinary appliances, be brought 
 to the same level. But now, when we see by the painful 
 history of mankind at what point we began, by what slow 
 toil, what favourable circumstances, what accumulated 
 achievements, civilised man has become at all worthy in 
 any degree so to call himself when we realise the tedium 
 of history and the painfulness of results our perceptions 
 are sharpened as to the relative steps of our long and 
 gradual progress. We have in a great community like 
 England crowds of people scarcely more civilised than 
 the majority of two thousand years ago ; we have others, 
 even more numerous, such as the best people were a thou- 
 sand years since. The lower orders, the middle orders, are 
 still, when tried by what is the standard of the educated 
 " ten thousand," narrow-minded, unintelligent, incurious.
 
 THE CABINET. 7 
 
 It is useless to pile up abstract words. Those who doubt 
 should go out into their kitchens. Let an accomplished 
 man try what seems to him most obvious, most certain, 
 most palpable in intellectual matters, upon the housemaid 
 and the footman, and he will find that what he says seems 
 unintelligible, confused, and erroneous that his audience 
 think him mad and wild when he is speaking what is in 
 his own sphere of thought the dullest platitude of cautious 
 soberness. Great communities are like great mountains 
 they have in them the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
 strata of human progress; the characteristics of the lower 
 regions resemble the life of old times rather than the 
 present life of the higher regions. And a philosophy which 
 does not ceaselessly remember, which does not continually 
 obtrude, the palpable differences of the various parts, will 
 be a theory radically false, because it has omitted a capital 
 reality will be a theory essentially misleading, because 
 it will lead men to expect what does not exist, and not to 
 anticipate that which they will find. 
 
 Every one knows these plain facts, but by no means 
 every one has traced their political importance. When a 
 state is constituted thus, it is not true that the lower 
 classes will be wholly absorbed in the useful ; on the con- 
 trary, they do not like anything so poor. No orator ever 
 made an impression by appealing to men as to their 
 plainest physical wants, except when he could allege that 
 those wants were caused by some one's tyranny. But 
 thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing 
 to some vague dream of glory, or empire, or nationality. 
 The ruder sort of men that is, men at one stage of
 
 8 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 rudeness will sacrifice all they hope for, all they have, 
 themselves, for what is called an idea for some attraction 
 which seems to transcend reality, which aspires to elevate 
 men by an interest higher, deeper, wider than that of ordi- 
 nary life. But this order of men are uninterested in the 
 plain, palpable ends of government; they do not prize 
 them; they do not in the least comprehend how they 
 should be attained. It is very natural, therefore, that 
 the most useful parts of the structure of government 
 should by no means be those which excite the most 
 reverence. The elements which excite the most easy 
 reverence will be the theatrical elements those which 
 appeal to the senses, which claim to be embodiments of 
 the greatest human ideas, which boast in some cases of 
 far more than human origin. That which is mystic in 
 its claims ; that which is occult in its mode of action ; 
 that which is brilliant to the eye; that which is seen 
 vividly for a moment, and then is seen no more; that 
 which is hidden and unhidden ; that which is specious, 
 and yet interesting, palpable in its seeming, and yet 
 professing to be more than palpable in its results; this, 
 howsoever its form may change, or however we may 
 define it or describe it, is the sort of thing the only 
 sort which yet comes home to the mass of men. So far 
 from the dignified parts of a constitution being necessarily 
 the most useful, they are likely, according to outside pre- 
 sumption, to be the least so; for they are likely to be 
 adjusted to the lowest orders those likely to care least 
 and judge worst about what is useful. 
 
 There is another reason which, in an old constitution
 
 THE CABINET. 9 
 
 like that of England, is hardly less important. The most 
 intellectual of men are moved quite as much by the cir- 
 cumstances which they are used to as by their own will. 
 The active voluntary part of a man is very small, and if it 
 were not economised by a sleepy kind of habit, its results 
 would be null. We could not do every day out of our 
 own heads all we have to do. We should accomplish 
 nothing, for all our energies would be frittered away in 
 minor attempts at petty improvement. One man, too, 
 would go off from the known track in one direction, and 
 one in another; so that when a crisis came requiring 
 massed combination, no two men would be near enough to 
 act together. It is the dull traditional habit of mankind 
 that guides most men's actions, and is the steady frame in 
 which each new artist must set the picture that he paints. 
 And all this traditional part of human nature is, ex vi 
 termwii, most easily impressed and acted on by that which 
 is handed down. Other things being equal, yesterday's 
 institutions are by far the best for to-day ; they are the 
 most ready, the most influential, the most easy to get 
 obeyed, the most likely to retain the reverence which 
 they alone inherit, and which every other must win. 
 The most imposing institutions of mankind are the oldest; 
 and yet so changing is the world, so fluctuating are its 
 needs, so apt to lose inward force, though retaining out- 
 ward strength, are its best instruments, that we must not 
 expect the oldest institutions to be now the most efficient. 
 We must expect what is venerable to acquire influence 
 because of its inherent dignity ; but we must not expect 
 it to use that influence so well as new creations apt for the
 
 10 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 modern world, instinct with its spirit, and fitting closely 
 to its life. 
 
 The brief description of the characteristic merit of the 
 English Constitution is, that its dignified parts are very 
 complicated and somewhat imposing, very old and rather 
 venerable ; while its efficient part, at least when in great 
 and critical action, is decidedly simple and rather modern. 
 We have made, or rather stumbled on, a constitution 
 which though full of every species of incidental defect, 
 though of the worst workmanship in all out-of-the-way 
 matters of any constitution in the world yet has two 
 capital merits : it contains a simple efficient part which, 
 on occasion, and when wanted, can work more simply and 
 easily, and better, than any instrument of government 
 that has yet been tried ; and it contains likewise histori- 
 cal, complex, august, theatrical parts, which it has in- 
 herited from a long past which take the multitude 
 which guide by an insensible but an omnipotent influence 
 the associations of its subjects. Its essence is strong with 
 the strength of modern simplicity ; its exterior is august 
 with the Gothic grandeur of a more imposing age. Its 
 simple essence may, mutatis mutandis, be trans- 
 planted to many very various countries, but its august 
 outside what most men think it is is narrowly confined 
 to nations with an analogous history and similar political 
 materials. 
 
 The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be 
 described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, 
 of the executive and legislative powers. No doubt by the 
 traditional theory, as it exists in all the books, the
 
 THE CABINET. 11 
 
 goodness of our constitution consists in the entire sepa- 
 ration of the legislative and executive authorities, but in 
 truth its merit consists in their singular approximation. 
 The connecting link is the cabinet. By that new word 
 we mean a committee of the legislative body selected to 
 be the executive body. The legislature has many com- 
 mittees, but this is its greatest. It chooses for this, its 
 main committee, the men in whom it has most confidence. 
 It does not, it is true, choose them directly; but it is 
 nearly omnipotent in choosing them indirectly. A cen- 
 tury ago the Crown had a real choice of ministers, though 
 it had no longer a choice in policy. During the long 
 reign of Sir R. Walpole he was obliged not only to 
 manage parliament but to manage the palace. He was 
 obliged to take care that some court intrigue did not 
 expel him from his place. The nation then selected the 
 English policy, but the Crown chose the English ministers 
 They were not only in name, as now, but in fact, the 
 Queen's servants. Remnants, important remnants, of this 
 great prerogative still remain. The discriminating favour 
 of William IV. made Lord Melbourne head of the Whig 
 party when he was only one of several rivals. At the 
 death of Lord Palmerston it is very likely that the Queen 
 may have the opportunity of fairly choosing between two, 
 if not three statesmen. But, as a rule, the nominal prime 
 minister is chosen by the legislature, and the real prime 
 minister for most purposes the leader of the House of 
 Commons almost without exception is so. There is nearly 
 always some one man plainly selected by the voice of 
 the predominant party in the predominant house of the
 
 12 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 legislature to head that party, and consequently to rule the 
 nation. We have in England an elective first magistrate 
 as truly as the Americans have an elective first magis- 
 trate. The Queen is only at the head of the dignified 
 part of the constitution. The prime minister is at the 
 head of the efficient part. The Crown is, according to 
 the saying, the " fountain of honour ; " but the Treasury 
 is the spring of business. Nevertheless, our first magis- 
 trate differs from the American. He is not elected 
 directly by the people ; he is elected by the represen- 
 tatives of the people. He is an example of " double 
 election." The legislature chosen, in name, to make 
 laws, in fact finds its principal business in making and 
 in keeping an executive. 
 
 The leading minister so selected has to choose his 
 associates, but he only chooses among a charmed circle. 
 The position of most men in parliament forbids their 
 being invited to the cabinet; the position of a few 
 men ensures their being invited. Between the com- 
 pulsory list whom he must take, and the impossible 
 list whom he cannot take, a prime minister's inde- 
 pendent choice in the formation of a cabinet is not 
 very large ; it extends rather to the division of the 
 cabinet offices than to the choice of cabinet ministers. 
 Parliament and the nation have pretty well settled 
 who shall have the first places; but they have not 
 discriminated with the same accuracy which man shall 
 have which place. The highest patronage of a prime 
 minister is, of course, a considerable power, though it 
 La exercised under close and imperative restrictions
 
 THE CABINET. 13 
 
 though it is far less than it seems to be when stated 
 in theory, or looked at from a distance. 
 
 The cabinet, in a word, is a board of control chosen by 
 the legislature, out of persons whom it trusts and knows, 
 to rule the nation. The particular mode in which the 
 English ministers are selected ; the fiction that they are, 
 in any political sense, the Queen's servants ; the rule which 
 limits the choice of the cabinet to the members of the 
 legislature are accidents unessential to its definition 
 historical incidents separable from its nature. Its charac- 
 teristic is that it should be chosen by the legislature out 
 of persons agreeable to and trusted by the legislature. 
 Naturally these are principally its own members but 
 they need not be exclusively so. A cabinet which in- 
 cluded persons not members of the legislative assembly 
 might still perform all useful duties. Indeed the peers, 
 who constitute a large element in modern cabinets, are 
 members, now-a-days, only of a subordinate assembly. 
 The House of Lords still exercises several useful func- 
 tions ; but the ruling influence the deciding faculty 
 has passed to what, using the language of old times, we 
 still call the lower house to an assembly which, though 
 inferior as a dignified institution, is superior as an efficient 
 institution. A principal advantage of the House of Lords 
 in the present age indeed consists in its thus acting as a 
 reservoir of cabinet ministers. Unless the composition 
 of the House of Commons were improved, or unless the 
 rules requiring cabinet ministers to be members of the 
 legislature were relaxed, it would undoubtedly be difficult 
 to find, without the Lords, a sufficient supply of chief
 
 14 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ministers. But the detail of the composition of a cabinet, 
 and the precise method of its choice, are not to the pur- 
 pose now. The first and cardinal consideration is the 
 definition of a cabinet. We must not bewilder ourselves 
 with the inseparable accidents until we know the neces- 
 sary essence. A cabinet is a combining committee 
 a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legis- 
 lative part of the state to the executive part of the state. 
 In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it 
 belongs to the other. 
 
 The most curious point about the cabinet is that so 
 very little is known about it. The meetings are not only 
 secret in theory, but secret in reality. By the present 
 practice, no official minute in all ordinary cases is kept of 
 them. Even a private note is discouraged and disliked. 
 The House of Commons, even in its most inquisitive and 
 turbulent moments, would scarcely permit a note of a 
 cabinet meeting to be read. No minister who respected 
 the fundamental usages of political practice would attempt 
 to read such a note. The committee which unites the 
 law-making power to the law-executing power which, 
 by virtue of that combination, is, while it lasts and holds 
 together, the most powerful body in the state is a 
 committee wholly secret. No description of it, at once 
 graphic and authentic, has ever been given. It is said 
 to be sometimes like a rather disorderly board of direc- 
 tors, where many speak and few listen though no one 
 knows.* 
 
 * It is said that at the end of the cabinet which agreed to propose a fixed 
 duty on corn, Lord Melbourne put his back to the door and said, " Now ia
 
 THE CABINET. 15 
 
 But a cabinet, though it is a committee of the legis- 
 lative assembly, is a committee with a power which no 
 assembly would unless for historical accidents, and after 
 happy experience have been persuaded to entrust to any 
 committee. It is a committee which can dissolve the 
 assembly which appointed it ; it is a committee with a 
 suspensive veto a committee with a power of appeal. 
 Though appointed by one parliament, it can appeal if it 
 chooses to the next. Theoretically, indeed, the power to 
 dissolve parliament is entrusted to the sovereign only ; 
 and there are vestiges of doubt whether in all cases 
 a sovereign is bound to dissolve parliament when the 
 cabinet asks him to do so. But neglecting such small 
 and dubious exceptions, the cabinet which was chosen by 
 one House of Commons has an appeal to the next House 
 of Commons. The chief committee of the legislature 
 has the power of dissolving the predominant part of that 
 legislature that which at a crisis is the supreme legis- 
 lature. The English system, therefore, is not an absorp- 
 tion of the executive power by the legislative power ; it 
 is a fusion of the two. Either the cabinet legislates and 
 acts, or else it can dissolve. It is a creature, but it has 
 the power of destroying its creators. It is an executive 
 which can annihilate the legislature, as well as an execu- 
 tive which is the nominee of the legislature. It was 
 made, but it can unmake ; it was derivative in its origin, 
 but it is destructive in its action. 
 
 it to lower the price of corn or isn't it ? It is not much matter which we 
 say, but mind, we must all say the same." This is the most graphic story 
 of a cabinet I ever heard, but I cannot vouch for its truth. Lord Mel- 
 bourne's is a character about which men make stories.
 
 1(6 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 This fusion of the legislative and executive functions 
 may, to those who have not much considered it, seem 
 but a dry and small matter to be the latent essence and 
 effectual secret of the English constitution ; but we can 
 only judge of its real importance by looking at a few of 
 its principal effects, and contrasting it very shortly with 
 its great competitor, which seems likely, unless care be 
 taken, to outstrip it in the progress of the world. That 
 competitor is the Presidential system. The characteristic 
 of it is that the President is elected from the people by 
 one process, and the House of Representatives by another. 
 The independence of the legislative and executive powers 
 is the specific quality of Presidential Government, just 
 as their fusion and combination is the precise principle of 
 Cabinet Government. 
 
 First, compare the two in quiet times. The essence 
 of a civilised age is, that administration requires the con- 
 tinued aid of legislation. One principal and necessary 
 kind of legislation is taxation. The expense of civilised 
 government is continually varying. It must vary if the 
 government does its duty. The miscellaneous estimates 
 of the English Government contain an inevitable medley 
 of changing items. Education, prison discipline, art, 
 science, civil contingencies of a hundred kinds, require 
 more money one year and less another. The expense of 
 defence the naval and military estimates vary still 
 more as the danger of attack seems more or less immi- 
 nent, as the means of retarding such danger become 
 more or less costly. If the persons who have to do the 
 work are net the same as those who have to make the
 
 THE CABINET. 17 
 
 laws, there will be a controversy between the two sets of 
 persons. The tax-imposers are sure to quarrel with the 
 tax-requirers. The executive is crippled by not getting 
 the laws it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having 
 to act without responsibility: the executive becomes 
 unfit for its name, since it cannot execute what it decides 
 on ; the legislature is demoralised by liberty, by taking 
 decisions of which others (and not itself) will suffer the 
 effects. 
 
 In America so much has this difficulty been felt that 
 a semi-connection has grown up between the legislature 
 and the executive. When the Secretary of the Treasury 
 of the Federal Government wants a tax he consults 
 upon it with the Chairman of the Financial Committee 
 of Congress. He cannot go down to Congress himself 
 and propose what he wants ; he can only write a letter 
 and send it. But he tries to get a chairman of the 
 Finance Committee who likes his tax; through that 
 chairman he tries to persuade the committee to recom- 
 mend such tax ; by that committee he tries to induce the 
 house to adopt that tax. But such a chain of communi- 
 cations is liable to continual interruptions ; it may suffice 
 for a single tax on a fortunate occasion, but will scarcely 
 pass a complicated budget we do not say in a war or a 
 rebellion we are now comparing the cabinet system and 
 the presidential system in quiet times but in times of 
 financial difficulty. Two clever men never exactly agreed 
 about a budget. We have by present practice an Indian 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer talking English finance at 
 Calcutta, and an English one talking Indian finance in 
 
 c
 
 18 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 England. But the figures are never the same, and the 
 views of policy are rarely the same. One most angry 
 controversy has amused the world, and probably others 
 scarcely less interesting are hidden in the copious stores 
 of our Anglo-Indian correspondence. 
 
 But relations something like these must subsist be- 
 tween the head of a finance committee in the legislature, 
 and a finance minister in the executive.* They are sure 
 to quarrel, and the result is sure to satisfy neither. And 
 when the taxes do not yield as they were expected to 
 yield, who is responsible ? Very likely the secretary of 
 the treasury could not persuade the chairman very 
 likely the chairman could not persuade his committee 
 very likely the committee could not persuade the 
 assembly. Whom, then, can you punish whom can 
 you abolish when your taxes run short ? There is 
 nobody save the legislature, a vast miscellaneous body 
 difficult to punish, and the very persons to inflict the 
 punishment. 
 
 Nor is the financial part of administration the only 
 one which requires in a civilised age the constant support 
 and accompaniment of facilitating legislation. All ad- 
 ministration does so. In England, on a vital occasion, 
 the cabinet can compel legislation by the threat of 
 resignation, and the threat of dissolution ; but neither of 
 these can be used in a presidential state. There the 
 legislature cannot be dissolved by the executive govern- 
 
 * It is worth observing that even during the short existence of the Con- 
 federate Government these evils distinctly showed themselves. Almost the 
 last incident at the Richmond Congress was an angry financial correspon- 
 dence with Jefferson Davis.
 
 THE CABINET. 19 
 
 ment ; and it does not heed a resignation, for it has not 
 to find the successor. Accordingly, when a difference of 
 opinion arises, the legislature is forced to fight the exe- 
 cutive, and the executive is forced to fight the legislative; 
 and so very likely they contend to the conclusion of 
 their respective terms.* There is, indeed, one condition 
 of things in which this description, though still approxi- 
 mately true, is, nevertheless, not exactly true ; and that 
 is, when there is nothing to fight about. Before the 
 rebellion in America, owing to the vast distance of other 
 states, and the favourable economical condition of the 
 country, there were very few considerable objects of 
 contention ; but if that government had been tried by 
 English legislation of the last thirty years, the discordant 
 action of the two powers, whose constant co-operation is 
 essential to the best government, would have shown 
 itself much more distinctly. 
 
 Nor is this the worst. Cabinet government educates 
 the nation; the presidential does not educate it, and 
 may corrupt it. It has been said that England invented 
 the phrase, "Her Majesty's Opposition; " that it was the 
 first government which made a criticism of administra- 
 tion as much a part of the polity as administration itself. 
 This critical opposition is the consequence of cabinet 
 government. The great scene of debate, the great engine 
 of popular instruction and political controversy, is the 
 legislative assembly. A speech there by an eminent 
 
 * I leave this passage to stand as it was written, just after the 
 assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and when every one said Mr. Johnson would 
 be very hostile to the South.
 
 20 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 statesman, a party movement by a great political com- 
 bination, are the best means yet known for arousing, 
 enlivening, and teaching a people. The cabinet system 
 ensures such debates, for it makes them the means by 
 which statesmen advertise themselves for future and con- 
 firm themselves in present governments. It brings for- 
 ward men eager to speak, and gives them occasions to 
 speak. The deciding catastrophes of cabinet govern- 
 ments are critical divisions preceded by fine discussions. 
 Everything which is worth saying, everything which 
 ought to be said, most certainly will be said. Conscientious 
 men think they ought to persuade others ; selfish men 
 think they would like to obtrude themselves. The nation 
 is forced to hear two sides all the sides, perhaps, of 
 that which most concerns it. And it likes to hear it is 
 eager to know. Human nature despises long arguments 
 which come to nothing heavy speeches which precede no 
 motion abstract disquisitions which leave visible things 
 where they were. But all men heed great results, and 
 a change of government is a great result. It has a hun- 
 dred ramifications; it runs through society; it gives 
 hope to many, and it takes away hope from many. It 
 is one of those marked events which, by its magnitude 
 and its melodrama, impress men even too much. And 
 debates which have this catastrophe at the end of them 
 or may so have it are sure to be listened to, and sure 
 to sink deep into the national mind. 
 
 Travellers even in the Northern States of America, 
 the greatest and best of presidential countries, have 
 noticed that the nation was " not specially addicted to
 
 THE CABINET. 21 
 
 politics ; " that they have not a public opinion finished 
 and chastened as that of the English has been finished 
 and chastened. A great many hasty writers have charged 
 this defect on the " Yankee race," on the Anglo-American 
 character ; but English people, if they had no motive to 
 attend to politics, certainly would not attend to politics. 
 At present there is business in their attention. They 
 assist at the determining crisis ; they assist or help it. 
 Whether the government will go out or remain is deter- 
 mined by the debate, and by the division in parliament. 
 And the opinion out of doors, the secret pervading 
 disposition of society, has a great influence on that 
 division. The nation feels that its judgment is im- 
 portant, and it strives to judge. It succeeds in deciding 
 because the debates and the discussions give it the facts 
 and the arguments. But under a presidential govern- 
 ment, a nation has, except at the electing moment, no 
 influence ; it has not the ballot-box before it ; its virtue 
 is gone, and it must wait till its instant of despotism 
 again returns. It is not incited to form an opinion like 
 a nation under a cabinet government; nor is it in- 
 structed like such a nation. There are doubtless debates 
 in the legislature, but they are prologues without a play. 
 There is nothing of a catastrophe about them ; you can- 
 not turn out the government. The prize of power is 
 not in the gift of the legislature, and no one cares for the 
 egislature. The executive, the great centre of power 
 and place, sticks irremovable ; you cannot change it in 
 any event. The teaching apparatus which has educated 
 our public mind, which prepares our resolutions, which
 
 22 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 shapes our opinions, does not exist. No presidential 
 country needs to form daily, delicate opinions, or is 
 helped in forming them. 
 
 It might be thought that the discussions in the press 
 would supply the deficiencies in the constitution ; that by 
 a reading people especially, the conduct of their govern- 
 ment would be as carefully watched, that their opinions 
 about it would be as consistent, as accurate, as well con- 
 sidered, under a presidential as under a cabinet polity. 
 But the same difficulty oppresses the press which op- 
 presses the legislature. It can do nothing. It cannot 
 change the administration ; the executive was elected 
 for such and such years, and for such and such years it 
 must last. People wonder that so literary a people as 
 the Americans a people who read more than any 
 people who ever lived, who read so many newspapers 
 should have such bad newspapers. The papers are not 
 so good as the English, because they have not the same 
 motive to be good as the English papers. At a political 
 "crisis," as we say that is, when the fate of an ad- 
 ministration is unfixed, when it depends on a few votes 
 yet unsettled, upon a wavering and veering opinion 
 effective articles in great journals become of essential 
 moment. The Times has made many ministries. When, 
 as of late, there has been a long continuance of divided 
 parliaments, of governments which were without " brute 
 voting power," and which depended on intellectual 
 strength, the support of the most influential organ of 
 English opinion has been of critical moment. If a 
 Washington newspaper could have turned out Mr.
 
 THE CABINET. 23 
 
 Lincoln, there would have been good writing and fine 
 argument in the Washington newspapers. But the 
 Washington newspapers can no more remove a president 
 during his term of place than the Times can remove a 
 lord mayor during his year of office. Nobody cares for 
 a debate in Congress which comes to nothing," and no 
 one reads long articles which have no influence on events. 
 The Americans glance at the heads of news, and through 
 the paper. They do not enter upon a discussion. They 
 do not think of entering upon a discussion which would 
 be useless. 
 
 After saying that the division of the legislature and 
 the executive in presidential governments weakens the 
 legislative power, it may seem a contradiction to say 
 that it also weakens the executive power. But it is not 
 a contradiction. The division weakens the whole aggre- 
 gate force of government the entire imperial power; 
 and therefore it weakens both its halves. The executive 
 is weakened in a very plain way. In England a strong 
 cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislature in 
 all acts which facilitate its administration ; it is itself, so 
 to say, the legislature. But a president may be hampered 
 by the parliament, and is likely to be hampered. The 
 natural tendency of the members of every legislature is 
 to make themselves conspicuous. They wish to gratify 
 an ambition laudable or blamable ; they wish to promote 
 the measures they think best for the public welfare ; they 
 wish to make their will felt in great affairs. All these 
 mixed motives urge them to oppose the executive. They 
 are embodying the purposes of others if they aid; they
 
 24 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION". 
 
 are advancing their own opinions if they defeat : they are 
 first if they vanquish ; they are auxiliaries if they sup- 
 port. The weakness of the American executive used to 
 be the great theme of all critics before the Confederate 
 rebellion. Congress and committees of Congress of 
 course impeded the executive when there was no coercive 
 public sentiment to check and rule them. 
 
 But the presidential system not only gives the exe- 
 cutive power an antagonist in the legislative power, and 
 so makes it weaker ; it also enfeebles it by impairing its 
 intrinsic quality. "A cabinet is elected by a legislature ; 
 and when that legislature is composed of fit persons, that 
 mode of electing the executive is the very best. It is a 
 case of secondary election, under the only conditions in 
 which secondary election is preferable to primary. Gene- 
 rally speaking, in an electioneering country (I mean in a 
 country full of political life, and used to the manipulation 
 of popular institutions), the election of candidates to elect 
 candidates is a farce. The Electoral College of America 
 is so. It was intended that the deputies when assembled 
 should exercise a real discretion, and by independent 
 choice select the president. But the primary electors 
 take too much interest. They only elect a deputy to 
 vote for Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Breckenridge, and the deputy 
 only takes a ticket, and drops that ticket in an urn. He 
 never chooses or thinks of choosing. He is but a mes- 
 senger a transmitter; the real decision is in those who 
 choose him who chose him because they knew what he 
 would do. 
 
 It is true that the British House of Commons is sub-
 
 THE CABINET. 25 
 
 ject to the same influences. Members are mostly, per- 
 haps, elected because they will vote for a particular 
 ministry, rather than for purely legislative reasons. But 
 and here is the capital distinction the functions of 
 the House of Commons are important and continuous. 
 It does not, like the Electoral College in the United 
 States, separate when it has elected its ruler ; it watches, 
 legislates, seats and unseats ministries, from day to day. 
 Accordingly it is a real electoral body. The parliament 
 of 1857, which, more than any other parliament of late 
 years, was a parliament elected to support a particular 
 premier which was chosen, as Americans might say, 
 upon the "Palmerston ticket" before it had been in 
 existence two years, dethroned Lord Palmerston. Though 
 selected in the interest of a particular ministry, it in 
 fact destroyed that ministry. 
 
 A good parliament, too, is a capital choosing body. 
 If it is fit to make laws for a country, its majority ought 
 to represent the general average intelligence of that 
 country; its various members ought to represent the 
 various special interests, special opinions, special pre- 
 judices, to be found in that community. There ought 
 to be an advocate for every particular sect, and a vast 
 neutral body of no sect homogeneous and judicial, like 
 the nation itself. Such a body, when possible, is the 
 best selecter of executives that can be imagined. It is 
 full of political activity; it is close to political life; it 
 feels the responsibility of affairs which are brought as 
 it were to its threshold ; it has as much intelligence as 
 the society in question chances to contain. It is, what
 
 26 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Washington and Hamilton strove to create, an electoral 
 college of the picked men of the nation. 
 
 The best mode of appreciating its advantages is to 
 look at the alternative. The competing constituency is 
 the nation itself, and this is, according to theory and ex- 
 perience, in all but the rarest cases, a bad constituency. 
 Mr. Lincoln, at his second election, being elected when 
 all the Federal states had set their united hearts on one 
 single object, was voluntarily re-elected by an actually 
 choosing nation. He embodied the object in which 
 every one was absorbed. But this is almost the only 
 presidential election of which so much can be said. In 
 almost all cases the President is chosen by a machinery 
 of caucuses and combinations too complicated to be 
 perfectly known, and too familiar to require de- 
 scription. He is not the choice of the nation, he is the 
 choice of the wire-pullers. A very large constituency 
 in quiet times is the necessary, almost the legitimate, 
 subject of electioneering management: a man cannot 
 know that he does not throw his vote away except he 
 votes as part of some great organisation ; and if he votes 
 as a part, he abdicates his electoral function in favour of 
 the managers of that association. The nation, even if it 
 chose for itself, would, in some degree, be an unskilled 
 body ; but when it does not choose for itself, but only as 
 latent agitators wish, it is like a large, lazy man, with a 
 small vicious mind, it moves slowly and heavily, but 
 it moves at the bidding of a bad intention ; it " means 
 little, but it means that little ill." 
 
 And, as the nation is less able to choose than a par-
 
 THE CABINET. 27 
 
 liament, so it has worse people to choose out of. The 
 American legislators of the last century have been much 
 blamed for not permitting the ministers of the President 
 to be members of the assembly ; but, with reference to 
 the specific end which they had in view, they saw clearly 
 and decided wisely. They wished to keep "the legis- 
 lative branch absolutely distinct from the executive 
 branch ; " they believed such a separation to be essential 
 to a good constitution ; they believed such a separation 
 to exist in the English, which the wisest of them thought 
 the best constitution. And, to the effectual maintenance 
 of such a separation, the exclusion of the President's 
 ministers from the legislature is essential. If they are 
 not excluded they become the executive, they eclipse the 
 President himself. A legislative chamber is greedy and 
 covetous; it acquires as much, it concedes as little as 
 possible. The passions of its members are its rulers ; the 
 law-making faculty, the most comprehensive of the im- 
 perial faculties, is its instrument ; it will take the admin- 
 istration if it can take it. Tried by their own aims, the 
 founders of the United States were wise in excluding the 
 ministers from Congress. 
 
 But though this exclusion is essential to the pre- 
 sidential system of government, it is not for that reason 
 a small eviL It causes the degradation of public life. 
 Unless a member of the legislature be sure of something 
 more than speech, unless he is incited by the hope of 
 action, and chastened by the chance of responsibility, a 
 first-rate man will not care to take the place, and will 
 not do much if he does take it. To belong to a debating
 
 28 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 society adhering to an executive (and this is no inapt 
 description of a congress under a presidential constitu- 
 tion) is not an object to stir a noble ambition, and is a 
 position to encourage idleness. The members of a parlia- 
 ment excluded from office can never be comparable, much 
 less equal, to those of a parliament, not excluded from 
 office. The presidential government, by its nature, 
 divides political life into two halves, an executive half 
 and a legislative half; and, by so dividing it, makes 
 neither half worth a man's having worth his making it 
 a continuous career worthy to absorb, as cabinet govern- 
 ment absorbs, his whole soul. The statesmen from 
 whom a nation chooses under a presidential system are 
 much inferior to those from whom it chooses under a 
 cabinet system, while the selecting apparatus is also far 
 less discerning. 
 
 All these differences are more important at critical 
 periods, because government itself is more important. A 
 formed public opinion, a respectable, able, and disciplined 
 legislature, a well-chosen executive, a parliament and an 
 administration not thwarting each other, but co-operating 
 with each other, are of greater consequence when great 
 affairs are in progress than when small affairs are in pro- 
 gress when there is much to do than when there is little 
 to do. But in addition to this, a parliamentary or cabinet 
 constitution possesses an additional and special advantage 
 in very dangerous times. It has what we may call a re- 
 serve of power fit for and needed by extreme exigencies. 
 
 The principle of popular government is that the supreme 
 power, the determining efficacy in matters political, resides
 
 THE CABINET. 29 
 
 in the people not necessarily or commonly in the whole 
 people, in the numerical majority, but in a chosen people, 
 a picked and selected people. It is so in England ; it is 
 so in all free countries. Under a cabinet constitution at 
 a sudden emergency this people can choose a ruler for the 
 occasion. It is quite possible and even likely that he 
 would not be ruler before the occasion. The great quali- 
 ties, the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager nature 
 fit for a great crisis are not required are impediments 
 in common times. A Lord Liverpool is better in every- 
 day politics than a Chatham a Louis Philippe far better 
 than a Napoleon. By the structure of the world we often 
 want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to 
 change the helmsman to replace the pilot of the calm 
 by the pilot of the storm. In England we have had so 
 few catastrophes since our constitution attained maturity, 
 that we hardly appreciate this latent excellence. We have 
 not needed a Cavour to rule a revolution a representative 
 man above all men fit for a great occasion, and by a 
 natural legal mode brought in to rule. But even in 
 England, at what was the nearest to a great sudden crisis 
 which we have had of late years at the Crimean difficulty 
 we used this inherent power. We abolished the 
 Aberdeen cabinet, the ablest we have had, perhaps, since 
 the Reform Act a cabinet not only adapted, but 
 eminently adapted, for every sort of difficulty save the 
 one it had to meet which abounded in pacific discretion, 
 and was wanting only in the " daemonic element ; " we 
 chose a statesman, who had the sort of merit then wanted, 
 who, when he feels the steady power of England behind
 
 SO THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 him, will advance without reluctance, and will strike with- 
 out restraint. As was said at the time, " We turned out 
 the Quaker, and put in the pugilist." 
 
 But under a presidential government you can do 
 nothing of the kind. The American government calls 
 itself a government of the supreme people; but at a 
 quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most 
 needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have 
 got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out 
 perhaps by fixed instalments, which cannot be accelerated 
 or retarded you have a President chosen for a fixed 
 period, and immovable during that period: all the ar- 
 rangements are for stated times. There is no elastic 
 element, everything is rigid, specified, dated. Come what 
 may, you can quicken nothing, and can retard nothing. 
 You have bespoken your government in advance, and 
 whether it suits you or not, whether it works well or 
 works ill, whether it is what you want or not, by law 
 you must keep it. In a country of complex foreign 
 relations it would mostly happen that the first and most 
 critical year of every war would be managed by a peace 
 premier, and the first and most critical years of peace by 
 a war premier. In each case the period of transition 
 would be irrevocably governed by a man selected not for 
 what he was to introduce, but what he was to change 
 for the policy he was to abandon, not for the policy he 
 was to administer. 
 
 The whole history of the American civil war a 
 history which has thrown an intense light on the work- 
 ing of a presidential government at the time when
 
 THE CABINET. 31 
 
 government is most important is but a vast continuous 
 commentary on these reflections. It would, indeed, be 
 absurd to press against presidential government as such 
 the singular defect by which Vice-President Johnson has 
 become President by which a man elected to a sinecure 
 is fixed in what is for the moment the most important 
 administrative part in the political world. This defect, 
 though most characteristic of the expectations* of the 
 framers of the constitution and of its working, is but an 
 accident of this particular case of presidential govern- 
 ment, and no necessary ingredient in that government 
 itself. But the first election of Mr. Lincoln is liable to no 
 such objection. It was a characteristic instance of the 
 natural working of such a government upon a great 
 occasion. And what was that working? It may be 
 summed up it was government by an unknown 
 quantity. Hardly any one in America had any living 
 idea what Mr. Lincoln was like, or any definite notion 
 what he would do. The leading statesmen under the 
 system of cabinet government are not only household 
 words, but household ideas. A conception, not, perhaps, 
 in all respects a true but a most vivid conception of what 
 Mr. Gladstone is like, or what Lord Palmerston is like, 
 runs through society. We have simply no notion what 
 it would be to be left with the visible sovereignty in the 
 hands of an unknown man. The notion of employing a 
 man of unknown smallness at a crisis of unknown great- 
 
 * The framers of the constitution expected that the vice-president 
 would be elected by the Electoral College as the second wisest man in 
 the country. The vice-presidentship being a sinecure, a second-rate man 
 agreeable to the wire-pullers is always smuggled in. The chance of sue- 
 cession to the presidentship is too distant to be thought of.
 
 32 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ness is to our minds simply ludicrous. Mr. Lincoln, it is 
 true, happened to be a man, if not of eminent ability, yet of 
 eminent justness. There was an inner depth of Puritan 
 nature which came out under suffering, and was very attrac- 
 tive. But success in a lottery is no argument for lotteries. 
 What were the chances against a person of Lincoln's ante- 
 cedents, elected as he was, proving to be what he was ? 
 
 Such an incident is, however, natural to a presidential 
 government. The President is elected by processes which 
 forbid the election of known men, except at peculiar 
 conjunctures, and in moments when public opinion is 
 excited and despotic ; and consequently if a crisis comes 
 upon us soon after he is elected, inevitably we have 
 government by an unknown quantity the superin- 
 tendence of that crisis by what our great satirist would 
 have called " Statesman X." Even in quiet times, 
 government by a president is, for the several various 
 reasons which have been stated, inferior to government 
 by a cabinet ; but the difficulty of quiet times is nothing 
 as compared with the difficulty of unquiet times. The 
 comparative deficiencies of the regular, common operation 
 of a presidential government are far less than the com- 
 parative deficiencies in time of sudden trouble the want 
 of elasticity, the impossibility of a dictatorship, the 
 total absence of a revolutionary reserve. 
 
 This contrast explains why the characteristic quality 
 of cabinet governments the fusion of the executive 
 power with the legislative power is of such cardinal 
 importance. I shall proceed to show under what form 
 and with what adjuncts it exists in England.
 
 33 
 
 No. IL 
 
 THE MONARCHY. 
 
 THE use of the Queen, in a dignified capacity, is incal- 
 culable. Without her in England, the present English 
 Government would fail and pass away. Most people 
 when they read that the Queen walked on the slopes at 
 Windsor that the Prince of Wales went to the Derby 
 have imagined that too much thought and prominence 
 were given to little things. But they have been in error ; 
 and it is nice to trace how the actions of a retired widow 
 and an unemployed youth become of such importance. 
 
 The best reason why Monarchy is a strong govern- 
 ment is, that it is an intelligible government. The mass 
 of mankind understand it, and they hardly anywhere in 
 the world understand any other. It is often said that 
 men are ruled by their imaginations; but it would be 
 truer to say they are governed by the weakness of their 
 imaginations. The nature of a constitution, the action 
 of an assembly, the play of parties, the unseen formation 
 of a guiding opinion, are complex facts, difficult to know 
 and easy to mistake. But the action of a single will, 
 the fiat of a single mind, are easy ideas : anybody can 
 make them out, and no one can ever forget them. When 
 
 D
 
 34 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 you put before the mass of mankind the question, " "Will 
 you be governed by a king, or will you be governed by 
 a constitution ? " the inquiry comes out thus " Will you 
 be governed in a way you understand, or will you be 
 governed in a way you do not understand ? " The issue 
 was put to the French people ; they were asked, " Will 
 you be governed by Louis Napoleon, or will you be 
 governed by an assembly?" The French people said, 
 " We will be governed by the one man we can imagine, 
 and not by the many people we cannot imagine." 
 
 The best mode of comprehending the nature of the 
 two governments, is to look at a country in which the 
 two have within a comparatively short space of years 
 succeeded each other. 
 
 "The political condition," says Mr. Grote, "which 
 Grecian legend everywhere presents to us, is in its prin- 
 cipal features strikingly different from that which had 
 become universally prevalent among the Greeks in the 
 time of the Peloponnesian war. Historical oligarchy, 
 as well as democracy, agreed in requiring a certain 
 established system of government, comprising the three 
 elements of specialised functions, temporary functionaries, 
 and ultimate responsibility (under some forms or other) 
 to the mass of qualified citizens either a Senate or an 
 Ecclesia, or both. There were, of course, many and 
 capital distinctions between one government and another, 
 in respect to the qualification of the citizen, the attributes 
 and efficiency of the general assembly, the admissibility to 
 power, &c. ; and men might often be dissatisfied with the 
 way in which these questions were determined in their
 
 THE MONAECHY. 35 
 
 own city. But in the mind of every man, some deter- 
 mining rule or system something like what in modern 
 times is called a constitution was indispensable to any 
 government entitled to be called legitimate, or capable of 
 creating in the mind of a Greek a feeling of moral obli- 
 gation to obey it. The functionaries who exercise autho- 
 rity under it might be more or less competent or popular ; 
 but his personal feelings towards them were commonly 
 lost in his attachment or aversion to the general system. 
 If any energetic man could by audacity or craft break 
 down the constitution, and render himself permanent 
 ruler according to his own will and pleasure, even though 
 he might govern well, he could never inspire the people 
 with any sentiment of duty towards him : his sceptre 
 was illegitimate from the beginning, and even the taking 
 of his life, far from being interdicted by that moral 
 feeling which condemned the shedding of blood in other, 
 cases, was considered meritorious : he could not even be 
 mentioned in the language except by a name (rvpawog 
 despot) which branded him as an object of mingled fear 
 and dislike. 
 
 " If we carry our eyes back from historical to legen- 
 dary Greece, we find a picture the reverse of what has 
 been here sketched. We discern a government in which 
 there is little or no scheme or system, still less any idea 
 of responsibility to the governed, but in which the main- 
 spring of obedience on the part of the people consists in 
 their personal feeling and reverence towards the chief. 
 We remark, first and foremost, the King ; next, a limited 
 number of subordinate kings or chiefs ; afterwards, the
 
 36 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 mass of armed freemen, husbandmen, artisans, freebooters, 
 &c. ; lowest of all, the free labourers for hire and the 
 bought slaves. The King is not distinguished by any 
 broad, or impassable boundary from the other chiefs, to 
 each of whom the title Basileus is applicable as well as 
 to himself: his supremacy has been inherited from his 
 ancestors, and passes by inheritance, as a general rule, to 
 his eldest son, having been conferred upon the family as 
 a privilege by the favour of Zeus. In war, he is the 
 leader, foremost in personal prowess, and directing all 
 military movements ; in peace, he is the general protector 
 of the injured and oppressed ; he offers up moreover those 
 public prayers and sacrifices which are intended to obtain 
 for the whole people the favour of the gods. An ample 
 domain is assigned to him as an appurtenance of his lofty 
 position, and the produce of his fields and his cattle is 
 consecrated in part to an abundant, though rude hospi- 
 tality. Moreover he receives frequent presents, to avert 
 his enmity, to conciliate his favour, or to buy off his 
 exactions ; and when plunder is taken from the enemy, 
 a large previous share, comprising probably the most 
 alluring female captive, is reserved for him apart from 
 the general distribution. 
 
 " Such is the position of the King in the heroic times 
 of Greece the only person (if we except the herald, 
 and priests, each both special and subordinate) who is 
 then presented to us as clothed with any individual 
 authority the person by whom all the executive 
 functions, then few in number, which the society re- 
 quires, are either performed or directed. His personal
 
 THE MONARCHY. 37 
 
 ascendancy derived from divine countenance bestowed 
 both upon himself individually and upon his race, and 
 probably from accredited divine descent is the salient 
 feature in the picture : the people hearken to his voice, 
 embrace his propositions, and obey his orders : not merely 
 resistance, but even criticism upon his acts, is generally 
 exhibited in an odious point of view, and is indeed never 
 heard of except from some one or more of the subordinate 
 princes." 
 
 The characteristic of the English Monarchy is that it 
 retains the feelings by which the heroic kings governed 
 their rude age, and has added the feelings by which the 
 constitutions of later Greece ruled in more refined ages 
 We are a more mixed people than the Athenians, or pro- 
 bably than any political Greeks. We have progressed 
 more unequally. The slaves in ancient times were a 
 separate order ; not ruled by the same laws, or thoughts, 
 as other men. It was not necessary to think of them in 
 making a constitution : it was not necessary to improve 
 them in order to make a constitution possible. The 
 Greek legislator had not to combine in his polity men 
 like the labourers of Somersetshire, and men like Mr. 
 Grote. He had not to deal with a community in which 
 primitive barbarism lay as a recognised basis to acquired 
 civilisation. We have. We have no slaves to keep 
 down by special terrors and independent legislation. 
 But we have whole classes unable to comprehend the 
 idea of a constitution unable to feel the least attachment 
 to impersonal laws. Most do indeed vaguely know that 
 there are some other institutions besides the Queen, and
 
 38 THE ENGLISH CONSTITt/TION. 
 
 some rules by which she governs. But a vast number 
 like their minds to dwell more upon her than upon 
 anything else, and therefore she is inestimable. A re- 
 public has only difficult ideas in government ; a Consti- 
 tutional Monarchy has an easy idea too; it has a 
 comprehensible element for the vacant many, as well as 
 complex laws and notions for the inquiring few. 
 
 A family on the throne is an interesting idea also. 
 It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of 
 petty life. No feeling could seem more childish than the 
 enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the Prince 
 of Wales. They treated as a great political event, what, 
 looked at as a matter of pure business, was very small 
 indeed. But no feeling could be more like common 
 human nature as it is, and as it is likely to be. The 
 women one half the human race at least care fifty 
 times more for a marriage than a ministry. All but a 
 few cynics like to see a pretty novel touching for a 
 moment the dry scenes of the grave world. A princely 
 marriage is the brilliant edition of a universal fact, and, 
 as such, it rivets mankind. We smile at the Court 
 Circular; but remember how many people read the 
 Court Circular ! Its use is not in what it says, but in 
 those to whom it speaks. They say that the Americans 
 were more pleased at the Queen's letter to Mrs. Lincoln, 
 than at any act of the English Government. It was a 
 spontaneous act of intelligible feeling in the midst of 
 confused and tiresome business. Just so a royal family 
 sweetens politics by the seasonable addition of nice and 
 pretty events. It introduces irrelevant facts into the
 
 THE MONARCHY. 39 
 
 business of government, but they are facts which speak 
 to "men's bosoms" and employ their thoughts. 
 
 To state the matter shortly, Royalty is a government 
 in which the attention of the nation is concentrated on 
 one person doing interesting actions. A Republic is a 
 government in which that attention is divided between 
 many, who are all doing uninteresting actions. Ac- 
 cordingly, so long as the human heart is strong and the 
 human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it 
 appeals to diffused feeling, and Republics weak because 
 they appeal to the understanding. 
 
 Secondly. The English Monarchy strengthens our 
 government with the strength of religion. It is not easy 
 to say why it should be so. Every instructed theologian 
 would say that it was the duty of a person born under 
 a Republic as much to obey that Republic as it is the 
 duty of one born under a Monarchy to obey the monarch. 
 But the mass of the English people do not think so; they 
 agree with the oath of allegiance ; they say it is their 
 duty to obey the "Queen," and they have but hazy 
 notions as to obeying laws without a queen. In former 
 times, when our constitution was incomplete, this notion 
 of local holiness in one part was mischievous. All parts 
 were struggling, and it was necessary each should have 
 its full growth. But superstition said one should grow 
 where it would, and no other part should grow without 
 its leave. The whole cavalier party said it was their 
 duty to obey the King, whatever the king did. There 
 was to be " passive obedience " to him, and there was no 
 religious obedience due to any one else. He was the
 
 40 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 " Lord's anointed," and no one else had been anointed at 
 all. The parliament, the laws, the press were human 
 institutions ; but the Monarchy was a divine institution. 
 An undue advantage was given to a part of the con- 
 stitution, and therefore the progress of the whole was 
 stayed. 
 
 After the Revolution this mischievous sentiment was 
 much weaker. The change of the line of sovereigns was 
 at first conclusive. If there was a mystic right in any 
 one, that right was plainly in James II. ; if it was an 
 English duty to obey any one whatever he did, he was 
 the person to be so obeyed: if there was an inherent 
 inherited claim in any king, it was in the Stuart king tc 
 whom the crown had come by descent, and not in the 
 Revolution king to whom it had come by vote of Parlia- 
 ment. All through the reign of William III. there was 
 (in common speech) one king whom man had made, and 
 another king whom God had made. The king who ruled 
 had no consecrated loyalty to build upon ; although he 
 ruled in fact, according to sacred theory there was a 
 king in France who ought to rule. But it was very hard 
 for the English people, with their plain sense and slow 
 imagination, to keep up a strong sentiment of veneration 
 for a foreign adventurer. He lived under the protection 
 of a French king ; what he did was commonly stupid, 
 and what he left undone was very often wise. As soon 
 as Queen Anne began to reign there was a change of 
 feeling ; the old sacred sentiment began to cohere about 
 her. There were indeed difficulties which would have 
 baffled most people ; but an Englishman whose heart is
 
 THE MONARCHY. 41 
 
 in a matter is not easily baffled. Queen Anne had a 
 brother living and a father living, and by every rule of 
 descent, their right was better than hers. But many 
 people evaded both claims. They said James II. had 
 " run away," and so abdicated, though he only ran away 
 because he was in duresse and was frightened, and 
 though he claimed the allegiance of his subjects day by 
 day. The Pretender, it was said, was not legitimate, 
 though the birth was proved by evidence which any 
 Court of Justice would have accepted. The English 
 people were "out of" a sacred monarch, and so they 
 tried very hard to make a new one. Events, however, 
 were too strong for them. They were ready and eager 
 to take Queen Anne as the stock of a new dynasty ; 
 they were ready to ignore the claims of her father and 
 the claims of her brother, but they could not ignore the 
 fact that at the critical period she had no children. She 
 had once had thirteen, but they all died in her lifetime, 
 and it was necessary either to revert to the Stuarts or 
 to make a new king by Act of Parliament. 
 
 According to the Act of Settlement passed by the 
 Whigs, the crown was settled on the descendants of the 
 " Princess Sophia " of Hanover, a younger daughter of a 
 daughter of James I. There were before her James II., 
 his son, the descendants of a daughter of Charles I., and 
 elder children of her own mother. But the Whigs passed 
 these over because they were Catholics, and selected the 
 Princess Sophia, who, if she was anything, was a Protes- 
 tant. Certainly this selection was statesmanlike, but it 
 could not be very popular. It was quite impossible to say
 
 42 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 that it was the duty of the English people to obey the 
 House of Hanover upon any principles which do not 
 concede the right of the people to choose their rulers, and 
 which do not degrade monarchy from its solitary pinnacle 
 of majestic reverence, and make it one only among many 
 expedient institutions. If a king is a useful public func- 
 tionary who may be changed, and in whose place you may 
 make another, you cannot regard him with mystic awe and 
 wonder : and if you are bound to worship him, of course 
 you cannot change him. Accordingly, during the whole 
 reigns of George I. and George II. the sentiment of 
 religious loyalty altogether ceased to support the Crown. 
 The prerogative of the king had no strong party to 
 support it ; the Tories, who naturally would support it, 
 disliked the actual king; and the Whigs, according to 
 their creed, disliked the king's office. Until the accession 
 of George III. the most vigorous opponents of the Crown 
 were the country gentlemen, its natural friends, and the 
 representatives of quite rural districts, where loyalty is 
 mostly to be found, if anywhere. But after the accession 
 of George III. the common feeling came back to the same 
 point as in Queen Anne's time. The English were ready 
 to take the new young prince as the beginning of a sacred 
 line of sovereigns, just as they had been willing to take 
 an old lady, who was the second cousin of his great-great- 
 grandmother. So it is now. If you ask the immense 
 majority of the Queen's subjects by what right she rules, 
 they would never tell you that she rules by Parliamentary 
 right, by virtue of 6 Anne, c. 7. They will say she rules 
 by " God's Grace ; " they believe that they have a mystic
 
 THE MONARCHY. 43 
 
 obligation to obey her. When her family came to the 
 Crown it was a sort of treason to maintain the inalien- 
 able right of lineal sovereignty, for it was equivalent 
 to saying that the claim of another family was better 
 than hers : but now, in the strange course of human 
 events, that very sentiment has become her surest and 
 best support. 
 
 But it would be a great mistake to believe that at the 
 accession of George III. the instinctive sentiment of 
 hereditary loyalty at once became as useful as now. It 
 began to be powerful, but it hardly began to be useful 
 There was so much harm done by it as well as so much 
 good, that it is quite capable of being argued whether on 
 the whole it was beneficial or hurtful. Throughout the 
 greater part of his life George III. was a kind of " conse- 
 crated obstruction." Whatever he did had a sanctity 
 different from what any one else did, and it perversely 
 happened that he was commonly wrong. He had as good 
 intentions as any one need have, and he attended to the 
 business of his country, as a clerk with his bread to get 
 attends to the business of his office. But his mind was 
 small, his education limited, and he lived in a changing 
 time. Accordingly he was always resisting what ought to 
 be, and prolonging what ought not to be. He was the 
 sinister but sacred assailant of half his ministries ; and 
 when the French revolution excited the horror of the 
 world, and proved democracy to be " impious," the piety 
 of England concentrated upon him, and gave him tenfold 
 strength. The monarchy by its religious sanction now 
 confirms all our political order; in George IIL's time it
 
 44 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 confirmed little except itself. It gives now a vast strength 
 to the entire constitution, by enlisting on its behalf the 
 credulous obedience of enormous masses ; then it lived 
 aloof, absorbed all the holiness into itself, and turned over 
 all the rest of the polity to the coarse justification of bare 
 expediency. 
 
 A principal reason why the monarchy so well conse- 
 crates our whole state is to be sought in the peculiarity 
 many Americans and many utilitarians smile at. They 
 laugh at this " extra," as the Yankee called it, at the 
 solitary transcendent element. They quote Napoleon's 
 saying, " that he did not wish to be fatted in idleness," 
 when he refused to be grand elector in Sieyes' constitu- 
 tion, which was an office copied, and M. Thiers says, well 
 copied, from constitutional monarchy. But such objec- 
 tions are wholly wrong. No doubt it was absurd enough 
 in the Abbe Sieyes to propose that a new institution, 
 inheriting no reverence, and made holy by no religion, 
 should be created to fill the sort of post occupied by a 
 constitutional king in nations of monarchical history. 
 Such an institution, far from being so august as to spread 
 reverence around it, is too novel and artificial to get 
 reverence for itself; if, too, the absurdity could anyhow 
 be augmented, it was so by offering an office of inactive 
 uselessness and pretended sanctity to Napoleon, the most 
 active man in France, with the greatest genius for busi- 
 ness, only not sacred, and exclusively fit for action. But 
 the blunder of Sieyes brings the excellence of real 
 monarchy to the best light. When a monarch can bless, 
 it is best that he should not be touched. It should be
 
 THE MONARCHY. 45 
 
 evident that he does no wrong. He should not be 
 brought too closely to real measurement. He should be 
 aloof and solitary. As the functions of English royalty 
 are for the most part latent, it fulfils this condition. It 
 seems to order, but it never seems to struggle. It is 
 commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes paraded 
 like a pageant, but in neither case is it contentious. The 
 nation is divided into parties, but the crown is of no 
 party. Its apparent separation from business is that 
 which removes it both from enmities and from desecra- 
 tion, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to 
 combine the affection of conflicting parties to be a 
 visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly 
 educated as to need a symbol 
 
 Thirdly. The Queen is the head of our society. If 
 she did not exist the Prime Minister would be the first 
 person in the country. He and his wife would have to 
 receive foreign ministers, and occasionally foreign princes, 
 to give the first parties in the country ; he and she would 
 be at the head of the pageant of life ; they would repre- 
 sent England in the eyes of foreign nations ; they would 
 represent the Government of England in the eyes of the 
 English. 
 
 It is very easy to imagine a world in which this 
 change would not be a great evil. In a country where 
 people did not care for the outward show of life, where 
 the genius of the people was untheatrical, and they exclu- 
 sively regarded the substance of things, this matter would 
 be trifling. Whether Lord and Lady Derby received the 
 foreign ministers, or Lord and Lady Palmerston, would
 
 46 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 be a matter of indifference; whether they gave the 
 nicest parties would be important only to the persons at 
 those parties. A nation of unimpressible philosophers 
 would not care at all how the externals of life were 
 managed. Who is the showman is not material unless 
 you care about the show. 
 
 But of all nations in the world the English are per- 
 haps the least a nation of pure philosophers. It would 
 be a very serious matter to us to change every four or five 
 years the visible head of our world. We are not now 
 remarkable for the highest sort of ambition ; but we are 
 remarkable for having a great deal of the lower sort of 
 ambition and envy. The House of Commons is thronged 
 ! with people who get there merely for " social purposes," 
 as the phrase goes ; that is, that they and their families 
 may go to parties else impossible. Members of Parlia- 
 ment are envied by thousands merely for this frivolous 
 glory, as a thinker calls it. If the highest post in con- 
 spicuous life were thrown open to public competition, 
 this low sort of ambition and envy would be fearfully in- 
 creased. Politics would offer a prize too dazzling for 
 mankind ; clever base people would strive for it, and 
 stupid base people would envy it. Even now a dangerous 
 distinction is given by what is exclusively called public 
 life. The newspapers describe daily and incessantly a 
 certain conspicuous existence; they comment on its 
 characters, recount its details, investigate its motives, 
 anticipate its course. They give a precedent and a 
 dignity to that world which they do not give to any 
 other. The literary world, the scientific world, the philo-
 
 THE MONARCHY. 47 
 
 sophic world, not only are not comparable in dignity to 
 the political world, but in comparison are hardly worlds 
 at all. The newspaper makes no mention of them, and 
 could not mention them. As are the papers, so are the 
 readers; they, by irresistible sequence and association, 
 believe that those people who constantly figure in the 
 papers are cleverer, abler, or at any rate, somehow higher, 
 than other people. " I wrote books," we heard of a man 
 saying, " for twenty years, and I was nobody ; I got into 
 Parliament, and before I had taken my seat I had become 
 somebody." English politicians are the men who fill the 
 thoughts of the English public : they are the actors on 
 the scene, and it is hard for the admiring spectators not 
 to believe that the admired actor is greater than them- 
 selves. In this present age and country it would be very 
 dangerous to give the slightest addition to a force already 
 perilously great. If the highest social rank was to be 
 scrambled for in the House of Commons, the number 
 of social adventurers there would be incalculably more 
 numerous, and indefinitely more eager. 
 
 A very peculiar combination of causes has made this 
 characteristic one of the most prominent in English 
 society. The middle ages left all Europe with a social 
 system headed by Courts. The government was made 
 the head of all society, all intercourse, and all life ; every- 
 thing paid allegiance to the sovereign, and everything 
 ranged itself round the sovereign what was next to be 
 greatest, and what was farthest least. The idea that the 
 head of the government is the head of society is so fixed 
 in the ideas of mankind that only a few philosophers
 
 43 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 regard it as historical and accidental, though when the 
 matter is examined, that conclusion is certain and even 
 obvious. 
 
 In the first place, society as society does not naturally 
 need a head at all. Its constitution, if left to itself, is 
 not monarchical, but aristocratical. Society, in the sense 
 we are now talking of, is the union of people for amuse- 
 ment and conversation. The making of marriages goes 
 on in it, as it were, incidentally, but its common and 
 main concern is talking and pleasure. There is nothing 
 in this which needs a single supreme head ; it is a pursuit 
 in which a single person does not of necessity dominate. 
 By nature it creates an " upper ten thousand ; " a certain 
 number of persons and families possessed of equal cul- 
 ture, and equal faculties, and equal spirit, get to be on a 
 level and that level a high level. By boldness, by culti- 
 vation, by " social science " they raise themselves above 
 others ; they become the " first families," and all the rest 
 come to be below them. But they tend to be much about 
 a level among one another ; no one is recognised by all 
 or by many others as superior to them all. This is society 
 as it grew up in Greece or Italy, as it grows up now in 
 any American or colonial town. So far from the notion 
 of a " head of society " being a necessary notion, in many 
 ages it would scarcely have been an intelligible notion. 
 You could not have made Socrates understand it. He 
 would have said, "If you tell me that one of my 
 fellows is chief magistrate, and that I am bound to obey 
 him, I understand you, and you speak well; or that 
 another is a priest, and that he ought to offer sacrifices to
 
 THE MONARCHY. 49 
 
 the gods which I or any one not a priest ought not to 
 offer, again I understand and agree with you. But if you 
 tell me that there is in some citizen a hidden charm by 
 which his words become better than my words, and his 
 house better than my house, I do not follow you, and 
 should be pleased if you will explain yourself." 
 
 And even if a head of society were a natural idea, it 
 certainly would not follow that the head of the civil 
 government should be that head. Society as such has no 
 more to do with civil polity than with ecclesiastical. The 
 organisation of men and women for the purpose of amuse- 
 ment is not necessarily identical with their organisation 
 f jr political purposes, any more than with their organisa- 
 tion for religious purposes ; it has of itself no more to do 
 with the State than it has with the Church. The facul- 
 ties which fit a man to be a great ruler are not those of 
 society ; some great rulers have been unintelligible like 
 Cromwell, or brusque like Napoleon, or coarse and bar- 
 barous like Sir Robert Walpole. The light nothings of 
 the drawing-room and the grave things of office are as 
 difierent from one another as two human occupations 
 can be. There is no naturalness in uniting the two ; the 
 end of it always is, that you put a man at the head of 
 society who very likely is remarkable for social defects, 
 and is not eminent for social merits. 
 
 The best possible commentary on these remarks is 
 the "History of English Royalty." It has not been 
 sufficiently remarked that a change has taken place in 
 the structure of our society exactly analogous to the 
 change in our polity. A Republic has insinuated itself 
 
 E
 
 50 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 beneath the folds of a Monarchy. Charles II. was really 
 the head of society ; Whitehall, in his time, was the 
 centre of the best talk, the best fashion, and the most 
 curious love affairs of the age. He did not contribute 
 good morality to society, but he set an example of 
 infinite agreeableness. He concentrated around him all 
 the light part of the high world of London, and London 
 concentrated around it all the light part of the high 
 world of England. The Court was the focus where 
 everything fascinating gathered, and where everything 
 exciting centred. Whitehall was an unequalled club, 
 with female society of a very clever and sharp sort 
 superadded. All this, as we know, is now altered. 
 Buckingham Palace is as unlike a club as any place is 
 likely to be. The Court is a separate part, which stands 
 aloof from the rest of the London world, and which has 
 but slender relations 'with the more amusing part of it 
 The first two Georges were men ignorant of English, 
 and wholly unfit to guide and lead English society. 
 They both preferred one or two German ladies of bad 
 character to all else in London. George III. had no 
 social vices, but he had no social pleasures. He was a 
 family man, and a man of business, and sincerely preferred 
 a leg of mutton and turnips after a good day's work, to 
 the best fashion and the most exciting talk. In conse- 
 quence, society in London, though still in form under 
 the domination of a Court, assumed in fact its natural 
 und oligarchical structure. It, too, has become an "upper 
 ten thousand ; " it is no more monarchical in fact than 
 the society of New York. Great ladies give the tone to
 
 THE MONARCHY. 51 
 
 it with little reference to the particular Court world. 
 The peculiarly masculine world of the clubs and their 
 neighbourhood has no more to do in daily life with 
 Buckingham Palace than with the Tuileries. Formal 
 
 O 
 
 ceremonies of presentation and attendance are retained. 
 The names of leve'e and drawing-room still sustain the 
 memory of the time when the king's bed-chamber and 
 the queen's " withdrawing room " were the centres of 
 London life, but they no longer make a part of social 
 enjoyment : they are a sort of ritual in which now-a-days 
 almost every decent person can if he likes take part. 
 Even Court balls, where pleasure is at least supposed to 
 be possible, are lost in a London July. Careful observers 
 have long perceived this, but it was made palpable to 
 every one by the death of the Prince Consort. Since 
 then the Court has been always in a state of suspended 
 animation, and for a time it was quite annihilated. But 
 everything went on as usual. A few people who had no 
 daughters and little money made it an excuse to give 
 fewer parties, and if very poor, stayed in the country, 
 but upon the whole the difference was not perceptible. 
 The queen bee was taken away, but the hive went on. 
 
 Refined and original observers have of late objected 
 to English royalty that it is not splendid enough. They 
 have compared it with the French Court, which is better 
 in show, which comes to the surface everywhere so that 
 you cannot help seeing it, which is infinitely and beyond 
 question the most splendid thing in France. They have 
 said, "that in old times the English Court took too 
 much of the nation's money, and spent it ill ; but now,
 
 52 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 when it could be trusted to spend well, it does not take 
 enough of the nation's money. There are arguments for 
 not having a Court, and there are arguments for having 
 a splendid Court ; but there are no arguments for having 
 a mean Court. It is better to spend a million in dazzling 
 when you wish to dazzle, than three-quarters of a million 
 in trying to dazzle and yet not dazzling." There may be 
 something in this theory ; it may be that the Court of 
 England is not quite as gorgeous as we might wish to 
 see it. But no comparison must ever be made between 
 it and the French Court. The Emperor represents a 
 different idea from the Queen. He is not the head of 
 the State; he is the State. The theory of his govern- 
 ment is that every one in France is equal, and that the 
 Emperor embodies the principle of equality. The greater 
 you make him, the less, and therefore the more equal, 
 you make all othera He is magnified that others may 
 be dwarfed. The very contrary is the principle of 
 English royalty. As in politics it would lose its principal 
 use if it came forward into the public arena, so in society 
 if it advertised itself it would be pernicious. We have 
 voluntary show enough already in London; we do not 
 wish to have it encouraged and intensified, but quieted 
 and mitigated. Our Court is but the head of an un- 
 equal, competing, aristocratic society; its splendour would 
 not keep others down, but incite others to come on. It is 
 of use so long as it keeps others out of the first place, and 
 is guarded and retired in that place. But it would do 
 evil if it added a new example to our many examples of 
 showy wealth if it gave the sanction of its dignity to 
 the race of exoenditure.
 
 THE MONARCHY. 53 
 
 Fourthly. We have come to regard the Crown as the 
 head of our morality. The virtues of Queen Victoria and 
 the virtues of George III. have sunk deep into the 
 popular heart. We have come to believe that it is 
 natural to have a virtuous sovereign, and that the do- 
 mestic virtues are as likely to be found on thrones as 
 they are eminent when there. But a little experience 
 and less thought show that royalty cannot take credit 
 for domestic excellence. Neither George I., nor George 
 IT., nor William IV. were patterns of family merit; 
 George IV. was a model of family demerit. The plain fact 
 is, that to the disposition of all others most likely to go 
 wrong, to an excitable disposition, the place of a consti- 
 tutional king has greater temptations than almost any 
 other, and fewer suitable occupations than almost any 
 other. All the world and all the glory of it, whatever 
 is most attractive, whatever is most seductive, has always 
 been offered to the Prince of Wales of the day, and 
 always will be. It is not rational to expect the best 
 virtue where temptation is applied in the most trying 
 form at the frailest time of human life. The occupations 
 of a constitutional monarch are grave, formal, important, 
 but never exciting ; they have nothing to stir eager 
 blood, awaken high imagination, work off wild thoughts. 
 On men like George III., with a predominant taste for 
 business occupations, the routine duties of constitutional 
 royalty have doubtless a calm and chastening effect. 
 The insanity with which he struggled, and in many 
 cases struggled very successfully, during many years, 
 would probably have burst out much oftener but for the
 
 54 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 sedative effect of sedulous employment. But how few 
 princes have ever felt the anomalous impulse for real 
 work ; how uncommon is that impulse anywhere ; how 
 little are the circumstances of princes calculated to foster 
 it ; how little can it be relied on as an ordinary break- 
 water to their habitual temptations 1 Grave and careful 
 men may have domestic virtues on a constitutional 
 throne, but even these fail sometimes, and to imagine 
 that men of more eager temperaments will commonly 
 produce them, is to expect grapes from thorns and figs 
 from thistles. 
 
 Lastly, Constitutional royalty has the function which 
 I insisted on at length in my last essay, and which, 
 though it is by far the greatest, I need not now enlarge 
 upon again. It acts as a disguise. It enables our real 
 rulers to change without heedless people knowing it. 
 The masses of Englishmen are not fit for an elective 
 government ; if they knew how near they were to it, 
 they would be surprised, and almost tremble. 
 
 Of a like nature is the value of constitutional royalty 
 in times of transition. The greatest of all helps to the 
 substitution of a cabinet government for a preceding 
 absolute monarchy is the accession of a king favourable 
 to such a government, and pledged to it. Cabinet 
 government, when new, is weak in time of trouble. 
 The prime minister the chief on whom everything 
 depends, who must take responsibility if any one is to 
 take it, who must use force if any one is to use it is 
 not fixed in power. He holds his place, by the essence 
 of the government, with some uncertainty. Among a
 
 THE MONARCHY. 55 
 
 people well-accustomed to such a government, such a 
 functionary may be bold: he may rely, if not on the 
 parliament, on the nation which understands and values 
 him. But when that government has only recently been 
 introduced, it is difficult for such a minister to be as bold 
 as he ought to be. His power rests too much on human 
 reason, and too little on human instinct. The traditional 
 strength of the hereditary monarch is at these times of 
 incalculable use. It would have been impossible for 
 England to get through the first years after 1688 but 
 for the singular ability of William III. It would have 
 been impossible for Italy to have attained and kept her 
 freedom without the help of Victor Emmanuel: neither 
 the work of Cavour nor the work of Garibaldi were 
 more necessary than his. But the failure of Louis 
 Philippe to use his reserve power as constitutional 
 monarch is the most instructive proof how great that 
 reserve power is. In February, 1848, Guizot was weak 
 because his tenure of office was insecure. Louis Philippe 
 should have made that tenure certain. Parliamentary 
 reform might afterwards have been conceded to instructed 
 opinion, but nothing ought to have been conceded to the 
 mob. The Parisian populace ought to have been put 
 down, as Guizot wished. If Louis Phil ; ppe had been a 
 fit king to introduce free government, he would have 
 strengthened his ministers when they were the instru- 
 ments of order, even if he afterwards discarded them 
 when order was safe, and policy could be discussed. 
 But he was one of the cautious men who are " noted " to 
 fail in old age : though of the largest experience and of
 
 56 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 great ability, he failed and lost his crown for want of 
 petty and momentary energy, which at such a crisis a 
 plain man would have at once put forth. 
 
 Such are the principal modes in which the institution 
 of royalty by its august aspect influences mankind, and 
 in the English state of civilisation they are invaluable. 
 Of the actual business of the sovereign the real work 
 the Queen does I shall speak in my next paper.
 
 No. III. 
 THE MONARCHY (continued). 
 
 THE House of Commons has inquired into most things, 
 but has never had a committee on " the Queen." There 
 is no authentic blue-book to say what she does. Such an 
 investigation cannot take place ; but if it could, it would 
 probably save her much vexatious routine, and many toil- 
 some and unnecessary hours. 
 
 The popular theory of the English Constitution involves 
 two errors as to the sovereign. First, in its oldest form at 
 least, it considers him as an "Estate of the Realm," a 
 separate co-ordinate authority with the House of Lords 
 and the House of Commons. This and much else the 
 sovereign once was, but this he is no longer. That 
 authority could only be exercised by a monarch with a 
 legislative veto. He should be able to reject bills, if not 
 as the House of Commons rejects them, at least as the 
 House of Peers rejects them. But the Queen has no such 
 veto. She must sign her own death-warrant if the two 
 Houses unanimously send it up to her. It is a fiction of 
 the past to ascribe to her legislative power. She has long 
 ceased to have any. Secondly, the ancient theory holds 
 that the Queen is the executive. The American Consti-
 
 58 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 tution was made upon a most careful argument, and most 
 of that argument assumes the king to be the administratoi 
 of the English Constitution, and an unhereditary substi- 
 tute for him viz., a president to be peremptorily neces- 
 sary. Living across the Atlantic, and misled by accepted 
 doctrines, the acute framers of the Federal Constitution, 
 even after the keenest attention, did not perceive the Prime 
 Minister to be the principal executive of the British Con- 
 stitution, and the sovereign a cog in the mechanism. 
 There is, indeed, much excuse for the American legislators 
 in the history of that time. They took their idea of our 
 constitution from the time when they encountered it. But 
 in the so-called government of Lord North, George III. 
 was the government. Lord North was not only his 
 appointee, but his agent. The minister carried on a war 
 which he disapproved and hated, because it was a war 
 which his sovereign approved and liked. Inevitably, 
 therefore, the American Convention believed the king, 
 from whom they had suffered, to be the real executive, 
 and not the minister, from whom they had not suffered. 
 
 If we leave literary theory, and look to our actual old 
 law, it is wonderful how much the sovereign can do. A 
 few years ago the Queen very wisely attempted to make 
 life Peers, and the House of Lords very unwisely, and 
 contrary to its own best interests, refused to admit her 
 claim. They said her power had decayed into non- 
 existence; she once had it, they allowed, but it had ceased 
 by long disuse. If any one will run over the pages of 
 Comyn's " Digest," or any other such book, title " Preroga- 
 tive/' he will find the Queen has a hundred such powers
 
 THE MONARCHY. 59 
 
 which waver between reality and desuetude, and which 
 would cause a protracted and very interesting legal argu- 
 ment if she tried to exercise them. Some good lawyer 
 ought to write a careful book to say which of these powers 
 are really usable, and which are obsolete. There is no 
 authentic explicit information as to what the Queen can 
 do, any more than of what she does. 
 
 In the bare superficial theory of free institutions this 
 is undoubtedly a defect. Every power in a popular govern- 
 ment ought to be known. The whole notion of such a 
 government is that the political people the governing 
 people rules as it thinks fit. All the acts of every 
 administration are to be canvassed by it ; it is to watch 
 if such acts seem good, and in some manner or other to 
 interpose if they seem not good. But it cannot judge if 
 it is to be kept in ignorance ; it cannot interpose if it does 
 not know. A secret prerogative is an anomaly perhaps 
 the greatest of anomalies. That secrecy is, however, 
 essential to the utility of English royalty as it now is. 
 Above all things our royalty is to be reverenced, and if you 
 begin to poke about it you cannot reverence it. When 
 there is a select committee on the Queen, the charm of 
 royalty will be gone. Its mystery is its life. We must 
 not let in daylight upon magic. We must not bring 
 the Queen into the combat of politics, or she will cease 
 to be reverenced by all combatants ; she will become one 
 combatant among many. The existence of this secret 
 power is, according to abstract theory, a defect in our 
 constitutional polity, but it is a defect incident to a 
 civilisation such as ours, where august and therefore
 
 60 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 unknown powers are needed, as well as known and ser- 
 viceable powers. 
 
 If we attempt to estimate the working of this inner 
 power by the evidence of those, whether dead or living, 
 who have been brought in contact with it, we shall find a 
 singular difference. Both the courtiers of George III. 
 and the courtiers of Queen Victoria are agreed as to the 
 magnitude of the royal influence. It is with both an 
 accepted secret doctrine that the Crown does more than it 
 seems. But there is a wide discrepancy in opinion as to 
 the quality of that action. Mr. Fox did not scruple 
 to describe the hidden influence of George III. as the 
 undetected agency of " an infernal spirit." The action of 
 the Crown at that period was the dread and terror of 
 Liberal politicians. But now the best Liberal politicians 
 say, " We shall never know, but when history is written our 
 children may know, what we owe to the Queen and Prince 
 Albert." The mystery of the constitution, which used to 
 be hated by our calmest, most thoughtful, and instructed 
 statesmen, is now loved and reverenced by them. 
 
 Before we try to account for this change, there is one 
 part of the duties of the Queen which should be struck 
 out of the discussion. I mean the formal part. The 
 Queen has to assent to and sign countless formal docu- 
 ments, which contain no matter of policy, of which the 
 purport is insignificant, which any clerk could sign as 
 well. One great class of documents George III. used to 
 read before he signed them, till Lord Thurlow told him, 
 " It was nonsense his looking at them, for he could not 
 understand them." But the worst case is that of commis-
 
 THE MONARCHY. 61 
 
 sions in the army. Till an Act passed only three years 
 since the Queen used to sign all military commissions, 
 and she still signs all fresh commissions. The inevitable 
 and natural consequence is that such commissions were, 
 and to some extent still are, in arrears by thousands. 
 Men have often been known to receive their commissions 
 for the first time years after they have left the service. 
 If the Queen had been an ordinary officer she would long 
 since have complained, and long since have been relieved 
 of this slavish labour. A cynical statesman is said to 
 have defended it on the ground " that you 'may have a 
 fool for a sovereign, and then it would be desirable he 
 should have plenty of occupation in which he can do no 
 harm." But it is in truth childish to heap formal duties 
 of business upon a person who has of necessity so many 
 formal duties of society. It is a remnant of the old days 
 when George III. would know everything, however trivial 
 and assent to everything, however insignificant. These 
 labours of routine may be dismissed from the discussions. 
 It is not by them that the sovereign acquires his authority 
 either for evil or for good. 
 
 The best mode of testing what we owe to the Queen is 
 to make a vigorous effort of the imagination, and see how 
 we should get on without her. Let us strip cabinet 
 government of all its accessories, let us reduce it to its 
 two necessary constituents a representative assembly (a 
 House of Commons) and a cabinet appointed by that as- 
 sembly and examine how we should manage with them 
 only. We are so little accustomed to analyse the consti- 
 tution ; we are so used to ascribe the whole effect of the
 
 62 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 constitution to the whole constitution, that a great many 
 people will imagine it to be impossible that a nation 
 should thrive or even live with only these two simple 
 elements. But it is upon that possibility that the general 
 imitability of the English Government depends. A 
 monarch that can be truly reverenced, a House of Peers 
 that can be really respected, are historical accidents 
 nearly peculiar to this one island, and entirely peculiar to 
 Europe. A new country, if it is to be capable of a cabinet 
 government, if it is not to degrade itself to presidential 
 government, must create that cabinet out of its native 
 resources must not rely on these old world debris. 
 
 Many modes might be suggested by which a parlia- 
 ment might do in appearance what our parliament does 
 in reality, viz., appoint a premier. But I prefer to select 
 the simplest of all modes. We shall then see the bare 
 skeleton of this polity, perceive in what it differs from 
 the royal form, and be quite free from the imputation 
 of having selected an unduly charming and attractive 
 substitute. 
 
 Let us suppose the House of Commons existing alone 
 and by itself -to appoint the premier quite simply, just 
 as the shareholders of a railway choose a director. At 
 each vacancy, whether caused by death or resignation, 
 let any member or members have the right of nominating 
 a successor ; after a proper interval, such as the time now 
 commonly occupied by a ministerial crisis, ten days or a 
 fortnight, let the members present vote for the candidate 
 they prefer ; then let the Speaker count the votes, and 
 the candidate with the greatest number be premier-
 
 THE MONARCHY. 63 
 
 This mode of election would throw the whole choice into 
 the hands of party organisation, just as our present mode 
 does, except in so far as the Crown interferes with it; no 
 outsider would ever be appointed, because the immense 
 number of votes which every great party brings into 
 the field would far outnumber every casual and petty 
 minority. The premier should not be appointed for a 
 fixed time, but during good behaviour or the pleasure of 
 parliament. Mutatis mutandis, subject to the differences 
 now to be investigated, what goes on now would go on 
 then. The premier then, as now, must resign upon a 
 vote of want of confidence, but the volition of parliament 
 would then be the overt and single force in the selection 
 of a successor, whereas it is now the predominant though 
 ^atent force. 
 
 It will help the discussion very much if we divide it 
 into three parts. The whole course of a representative 
 government has three stages first, when a ministry is 
 appointed; next, during its continuance; last, when it 
 ends. Let us consider what is the exact use of the Queen 
 at each of these stages, and how our present form of 
 government differs in each, whether for good or for evil 
 from that simpler form of cabinet government which 
 might exist without her. 
 
 At the beginning of an administration there would 
 not be much difference between the royal and unroyal 
 species of cabinet governments when there were only two 
 great parties in the State, and when the greater of those 
 parties was thoroughly agreed within itself who should 
 be its parliamentary leader, and who therefore should be
 
 64 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 its premier. The sovereign must now accept that re- 
 cognised leader ; and if the choice were directly made by 
 the House of Commons, the House must also choose him ; 
 its supreme section, acting compactly and harmoniously, 
 would sway its decisions without substantial resistance, 
 and perhaps without even apparent competition. A pre- 
 dominant party, rent by no intestine demarcation, would 
 be despotic. In such a case cabinet government would 
 go on without friction whether there was a Queen or 
 whether there was no Queen. The best sovereign could 
 then achieve no good, and the worst effect no harm. 
 
 But the difficulties are far greater when the predo- 
 minant party is not agreed who should be its leader. 
 In the royal form of cabinet government the sovereign 
 then has sometimes a substantial selection; in the un- 
 royal, who would choose ? There must be a meeting at 
 " Willis's Rooms ; " there must be that sort of interior 
 despotism of the majority over the minority within the 
 party, by which Lord John Russell in 1859 was made to 
 resign his pretensions to the supreme government, and 
 to be content to serve as a subordinate to Lord Palmer- 
 ston. The tacit compression which a party anxious for 
 office would exercise over leaders who divided its strength, 
 would be used and must be used. Whether such a party 
 would always choose precisely the best man may well be 
 doubted. In a party once divided it is very difficult to 
 secure unanimity in favour of the very person whom a 
 disinterested bystander would recommend. All manner 
 of jealousies and enmities are immediately awakened, 
 and it is always difficult, often impossible, to get them
 
 THE MONARCHY. 65 
 
 to sleep again. But though such a party might not 
 select the very best leader, they have the strongest mo- 
 tives to select a very good leader. The maintenance of 
 their rule depends on it. Under a presidential consti- 
 tution the preliminary caucuses which choose the presi- 
 dent need not care as to the ultimate fitness of the 
 man they choose. They are solely concerned with his 
 attractiveness as a candidate ; they need not regard his 
 efficiency as a ruler. If they elect a man of weak judg- 
 ment, he will reign his stated term; even though he 
 show the best judgment, at the end of that term there 
 will be by constitutional destiny another election. But 
 tinder a ministerial government there is no such fixed 
 destiny. The government is a removable government, 
 its tenure depends upon its conduct. If a party in power 
 were so foolish as to choose a weak man for its head, it 
 would cease to be in power. Its judgment is its life. 
 Suppose in 1859 that the Whig party had determined 
 to set aside both Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston 
 and to choose for its head an incapable nonentity, the 
 Whig party would probably have been exiled from office 
 at the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty. The nation would 
 have deserted them, and Parliament would have deserted 
 them, too ; neither would have endured to see a secret 
 negotiation, on which depended the portentous alterna- 
 tive of war or peace, in the hands of a person who was 
 thought to be weak who had been promoted because of 
 his mediocrity whom his own friends did not respect. 
 A ministerial government, too, is carried on in the face 
 of day. Its life is in debate. A president may be a 
 
 F
 
 66 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 weak man ; yet if he keep good ministers to the end of 
 his administration, he may not be found out it may still 
 be a dubious controversy whether he is wise or foolish. 
 But a prime minister must show what he is. He must 
 meet the House of Commons in debate ; he must be able 
 to guide that assembly in the management of its business, 
 to gain its ear in every emergency, to rule it in its hours 
 of excitement. He is conspicuously submitted to a 
 searching test, and if he fails he must resign. 
 
 Nor would any party like to trust to a weak man the 
 great power which a cabinet government commits to its 
 premier. The premier, though elected by parliament 
 can dissolve parliament. Members would be naturally 
 anxious that the power which might destroy their coveted 
 dignity should be lodged in fit hands. They dare not 
 place in unfit hands a power which, besides hurting the 
 nation, might altogether ruin them. We may be sure, 
 therefore, that whenever the predominant party is 
 divided, the U7i-royal form of cabinet government would 
 secure for us a fair and able parliamentary leader that 
 it would give us a good premier, if not the very best. 
 Can it be said that the royal form does more ? 
 
 In one case I think it may. If the constitutional 
 monarch be a man of singular discernment, of unpreju- 
 diced disposition, and great political knowledge, he may 
 pick out from the ranks of the divided party its very 
 best leader, even at a time when the party, if left to 
 itself, would not nominate him. If the sovereign be able 
 to play the part of that thoroughly intelligent but 
 perfectly disinterested spectator who is so prominent in
 
 THE MONARCHY. 67 
 
 the works of certain moralists, he may be able to choose 
 better for his subjects than they would choose for them- 
 selves. But if the monarch be not so exempt from 
 prejudice, and have not this nearly miraculous discern- 
 ment, it is not likely that he will be able to make a wiser 
 choice than the choice of the party itself. He certainly 
 is not under the same motive to choose wisely. His place 
 is fixed whatever happens, but the failure of an appointing 
 party depends on the capacity of their appointee. 
 
 There is great danger, too, that the judgment of the 
 sovereign may be prejudiced. For more than forty 
 years the personal antipathies of George III. materially 
 impaired successive administrations. Almost at the 
 beginning of his career he discarded Lord Chatham: 
 almost at the end he would not permit Mr. Pitt to 
 coalesce with Mr. Fox. He always preferred mediocrity ; 
 he generally disliked high ability; he always disliked 
 great ideas. If constitutional monarchs be ordinary men 
 of restricted experience and common capacity (and we 
 have no right to suppose that by miracle they will be 
 more), the judgment of the sovereign will often be worse 
 than the judgment of the party, and he will be very 
 subject to the chronic danger of preferring a respectful 
 common-place man, such as Addington, to an inde- 
 pendent first-rate man, such as Pitt. 
 
 "We shall arrive at the same sort of mixed conclusion 
 if we examine the choice of a premier under both systems 
 in the critical case of cabinet government the case of 
 three parties. This is the case in which that species 
 of government is most sure tQ exhibit its defects, and
 
 68 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 least likely to exhibit its merits. The defining charac- 
 teristic of that government is the choice of the executive 
 ruler by the legislative assembly; but when there are 
 three parties a satisfactory choice is impossible. A really 
 good selection is a selection by a large majority which 
 trusts those it chooses, but when there are three parties 
 there is no such trust. The numerically weakest has the 
 casting vote it can determine which candidate shall be 
 chosen. But it does so under a penalty. It forfeits the 
 right of voting for its own candidate. It settles which 
 of other people's favourites shall be chosen, on condition 
 of abandoning its own favourite. A choice based on such 
 self-denial can never be a firm choice it is a choice at 
 any moment liable to be revoked. The events of 1858, 
 though not a perfect illustration of what I mean, are a 
 sufficient illustration. The Radical party, acting apart 
 from the moderate Liberal party, kept Lord Derby in 
 power. The ultra-movement party thought it expedient 
 to combine with the non-movement party. As one of 
 them coarsely but clearly put it, " We get more of our 
 way under these men than under the other men;" he 
 meant that, in his judgment, the Tories would be more 
 obedient to the Radicals than the Whigs. But it is 
 obvious that a union of opposites so marked could not 
 be durable. The Radicals bought it by choosing the 
 men whose principles were most adverse to them ; the 
 Conservatives bought it by agreeing to measures whose 
 scope was most adverse to them. After a short interval 
 the Radicals returned to their natural alliance and 
 their natural discontent with the moderate Whigs. They
 
 THE MONARCHY. 69 
 
 used their determining vote first for a government of 
 one opinion and then for a government of the contrary 
 opinion. 
 
 I am not blaming this policy. I am using it merely 
 as an illustration. I say that if we imagine this sort 
 of action greatly exaggerated and greatly prolonged 
 parliamentary government becomes impossible. If there 
 are three parties, no two of which will steadily combine 
 for mutual action, but of which the weakest gives a 
 rapidly oscillating preference to the two others, the 
 primary condition of a cabinet polity is not satisfied. 
 We have not a parliament fit to choose ; we cannot rely 
 on the selection of a sufficiently permanent executive, 
 because there is no fixity in the thoughts and feelings of 
 the choosers. 
 
 Under every species of cabinet government, whether , 
 the royal or the unroyal, this defect can be cured in one 
 way only. The moderate people of every party must 
 combine to support the government which, on the whole, 
 suits every party best. This is the mode in which Lord 
 Palmerston's administration has been lately maintained ; 
 a ministry in many ways defective, but more beneficially 
 vigorous abroad, and more beneficially active at home, 
 than the vast majority of English ministries. The mode- 
 rate Conservatives and the moderate Radicals have main- 
 tained a steady government by a sufficiently coherent 
 union with the moderate Whigs. Whether there is a 
 king or no king, this preservative self-denial is the main 
 force on which we must rely for the satisfactory con- 
 tinuance of a parliamentary government at this its
 
 70 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 period of greatest trial. Will that moderation be aided 
 or impaired by the addition of a sovereign ? Will it be 
 more effectual under the royal sort of ministerial govern- 
 ment, or will it be less effectual ? 
 
 If the sovereign has a genius for discernment, the aid 
 which he can give at such a crisis will be great. He will 
 select for his minister, and if possible maintain as his 
 minister, the statesman upon whom the moderate party 
 will ultimately fix their choice, but for whom at the 
 outset it is blindly searching ; being a man of sense, 
 experience, and tact, he will discern which is the com- 
 bination of equilibrium, which is the section with whom 
 the milder members of the other sections will at last ally 
 themselves. Amid the shifting transitions of confused 
 parties, it is probable that he will have many opportu- 
 nities of exercising a selection. It will rest with him to 
 call either on A B to form an administration, or upon 
 X Y, and either may have a chance of trial. A disturbed 
 state of parties is inconsistent with fixity, but it abounds 
 in momentary tolerance. Wanting something, but not 
 knowing with precision what, parties will accept for a brief 
 period anything, to see whether it may be that unknown 
 something to see what it will do. During the long 
 succession of weak governments which begins with the 
 resignation of the Duke of Newcastle in 1762 and ends 
 with the accession of Mr. Pitt in 1784, the vigorous will 
 of George III. was an agency of the first magnitude. 
 If at a period of complex and protracted division of 
 parties, such as are sure to occur often and last long in 
 every enduring parliamentary government, the extrinsic
 
 THE MONARCHY. 71 
 
 force of royal selection were always exercised discreetly, 
 it would be a political benefit of incalculable value. 
 
 But will it be so exercised ? A constitutional sove- 
 reign must in the common course of government be a 
 man of but common ability. I am afraid, looking to 
 the early acquired feebleness of hereditary dynasties, 
 that we must expect him to be a man of inferior ability. 
 Theory and experience both teach that the education 
 of a prince can be but a poor education, and that a 
 royal family will generally have less ability than other 
 families. What right have we then to expect the per- 
 petual entail on any family of an exquisite discretion, 
 which if it be not a sort of genius, is at least as rare as 
 genius ? 
 
 Probably in most cases the greatest wisdom of a con- 
 stitutional king would show itself in well considered in- 
 action. In the confused interval between 1857 and 1859 
 the Queen and Prince Albert were far too wise to obtrude 
 any selection of their own. If they had chosen, perhaps 
 they would not have chosen Lord Palmerston. But they 
 saw, or may be believed to have seen, that the world was 
 settling down without them, and that by interposing an 
 extrinsic agency, they would but delay the beneficial 
 crystallisation of intrinsic forces. There is, indeed, a 
 permanent reason which would make the wisest king, and 
 the king who feels most sure of his wisdom, very slow to 
 use that wisdom. The responsibility of parliament should 
 be felt by parliament. So long as parliament thinks it is 
 the sovereign's business to find a government it will be 
 sure not to find a government itself. The royal form of
 
 72 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION". 
 
 ministerial government is the worst of all forms if it 
 erect the subsidiary apparatus into the principal force, if 
 it induce the assembly which ought to perform para- 
 mount duties to expect some one else to perform, them. 
 
 It should be observed, too, in fairness to the unroyal 
 species of cabinet government, that it is exempt from one 
 of the greatest and most characteristic defects of the royal 
 species. Where there is no court there can be no evil 
 influence from a court. What these influences are every 
 one knows ; though no one, hardly the best and closest 
 observer, can say with confidence and precision how great 
 their effect is. Sir Robert Walpole, in language too 
 coarse for our modern, manners,. declared after the death 
 of Queen Caroline, that he would pay no attention to the 
 king's daughters (" those girls," as he called them), but 
 would rely exclusively on Madame de Walmoden, the 
 king's mistress. " The king," says a writer in G-eorge IV.'s 
 time, " is in our favour, and what is more to the pur- 
 pose, the Marchioness of Conyngham is so too." Every- 
 body knows to what sort of influences several Italian 
 changes of government since tike unity of Italy have 
 been attributed. These sinister agencies are likely to be 
 most effective just when everything else is. troubled, and 
 when, therefore, they are particularly dangerous. The 
 wildest and wickedest king's mistress would not plot 
 against an invulnerable administration. But very many 
 will intrigue when parliament is perplexed, when parties 
 are divided, when alternatives are many, when many evil 
 things are possible, when cabinet government must be 
 difficult.
 
 THE MONARCHY. 7$ 
 
 It is very important to see that a good administration 
 can be started without a sovereign, because some colonial 
 statesmen have doubted it. "I can conceive," it has been 
 said, " that a ministry would go on well enough without 
 a governor when it was launched, but I do not see how to 
 launch it." It has even been suggested that a colony 
 which broke away from England, and had to form its 
 own government, might not unwisely choose a governor 
 for life, and solely trusted with selected ministers, some- 
 thing like the Abbs' Sieyes's grand elector. But the intro- 
 duction of such an officer into such a colony would in fact 
 be the voluntary erection of an artificial encumbrance to 
 it. He would inevitably be a party man. The most 
 dignified post in the State must bean object of contest to 
 the great sections into which every active political com- 
 munity is divided. These parties mix in everything and 
 meddle in everything ; and they neither would nor could 
 permit the most honoured and conspicuous of all stations 
 to be filled, except at their pleasure. They know, too, 
 that the grand elector, the great chooser of ministries, 
 might be, at a sharp crisis, either a good friend or a bad 
 enemy. The strongest party would select some one who 
 would be on their side when he had to take a side, who 
 would incline to them when he did incline, who should 
 be a constant auxiliary to them and a constant impedi- 
 ment to their adversaries. It is absurd to choose by con- 
 tested party election an impartial chooser of ministers. 
 
 But it is during the continuance of a ministry, rather 
 than at its creation, that the functions of the sovereign 
 will mainly interest most persons, and that most people-
 
 74 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 will think them to be of the gravest importance. I own 
 I am myself of that opinion. I think it may be shown 
 that the post of sovereign over an intelligent and political 
 people under a constitutional monarchy is the post which 
 a wise man would choose above any other where he 
 would find the intellectual impulses best stimulated and 
 the worst intellectual impulses best controlled. 
 
 On the duties of the Queen during an administration 
 we have an invaluable fragment from her own hand. In 
 1851 Louis Napoleon had his coup d'etat; in 1852 Lord 
 John Russell had his he expelled Lord Palmerston. By 
 a most instructive breach of etiquette he read in the 
 House a royal memorandum on the duties of his rival. 
 It is as follows : " The Queen requires, first, that Lord 
 Palmerston will distinctly state what he proposes in a 
 given case, in order that the Queen may know as dis- 
 tinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction. Secondly, 
 having once given her sanction to such a measure that it 
 be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the minister. 
 Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity 
 towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the 
 exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that 
 minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes 
 between him and foreign ministers before important 
 decisions are taken based upon that intercourse ; to re- 
 ceive the foreign despatches in good time ; and to have 
 the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time 
 to make herself acquainted with their contents before 
 they must be sent off." 
 
 In addition to the control over particular ministers
 
 THE MONARCHY. 75 
 
 and especially over the foreign minister, the Queen has 
 a certain control over the Cabinet. The first minister, 
 it is understood, transmits to her authentic information 
 of all the most important decisions, together with what 
 the newspapers would do equally well, the more impor- 
 tant votes in Parliament. He is bound to take care that 
 she knows everything which there is to know as to the 
 passing politics of the nation. She has by rigid usage a 
 right to complain if she does not know of every great act 
 of her ministry, not only before it is done, but while 
 there is yet time to consider it while it is still possible 
 that it may not be done. 
 
 To state the matter shortly, the sovereign has, under 
 a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights 
 the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the 
 right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity 
 would want no others. He would find that his having 
 no others would enable him to use these with singular 
 effect. He would say to his minister: "The responsi- 
 bility of these measures is upon you. Whatever you 
 think best must be done. Whatever you think best 
 shall have my full and effectual support. But you will 
 observe that for this reason and that reason what you 
 propose to do is bad ; for this reason and that reason 
 what you do not propose is better. I do not oppose, it 
 is my duty not to oppose; but observe that I warn" 
 Supposing the king to be right, and to have what kings 
 often have, the gift of effectual expression, he could not 
 help moving his minister. He might not always turn his 
 course, but he would always trouble his mind.
 
 76 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 In the course of a long reign a sagacious king would 
 acquire an experience with which few ministers could 
 contend. The king could say : " Have you referred to 
 the transactions which happened during such and such 
 an administration, I think about fourteen years ago ? 
 They afford an instructive example of the bad results 
 which are sure to attend the policy which you propose. 
 You did not at that time take so prominent a part in 
 public life as you now do, and it is possible you do not 
 fully remember all the events. I should recommend 
 you to recur to them, and to discuss them with your older 
 colleagues who took part in them. It is unwise to recom- 
 mence a policy which so lately worked so ill" The king 
 would indeed have the advantage which a permanent 
 under-secretary has over his superior the parliamentary 
 secretary that of having shared in the proceedings of 
 the previous parliamentary secretaries. These proceed- 
 ings were part of his own life ; occupied the best of his 
 thoughts, gave him perhaps anxiety, perhaps pleasure, 
 were commenced in spite of his dissuasion, or were sanc- 
 tioned by his approval. The parliamentary secretary 
 vaguely remembers that something was done in the 
 time of some of his predecessors, when he very likely 
 did not know the least or care the least about that sort 
 of public business. He has to begin by learning pain- 
 fully and imperfectly what the permanent secretary 
 knows by clear and instant memory. No doubt a par- 
 liamentary secretary always can, and sometimes does, 
 silence his subordinate by the tacit might of his superior 
 dignity. He says : " I do not think there is much in all
 
 THE MONARCHY. 77 
 
 that. Many errors were committed at the time you refer 
 to which we need not now discuss." A pompous man 
 easily sweeps away the suggestions of those beneath him. 
 But though a minister may so deal with his subordinate, 
 he cannot so deal with his king. The social force of 
 admitted superiority by which he overturned his under- 
 secretary is now not with him but against him. He has 
 no longer to regard the deferential hints of an acknow- 
 ledged inferior, but to answer the arguments of a superior 
 to whom he has himself to be respectful. George III. in 
 fact knew the forms of public business as well or better 
 than any statesman of his time. If, in addition to his 
 capacity as a man of business and to' his industry, he had 
 possessed the higher faculties of a discerning statesman, 
 his influence would have been despotic. The old Consti- 
 tution of England undoubtedly gave a sort of power 
 to the Crown which our present Constitution does not 
 give. While a majority in parliament was principally 
 purchased by royal patronage, the king was a party to 
 the bargain either with his minister or without his 
 minister. But even under our present constitution a 
 monarch like George III., with high abilities, would 
 possess the greatest influence. It is known to all Europe 
 that in Belgium King Leopold has exercised immense 
 power by the use of such means as I have described. 
 
 It is known, too, to every one conversant with the real 
 course of the recent history of England, that Prince 
 Albert really did gain great power in precisely the same 
 way. He had the rare gifts of a constitutional monarch. 
 If his life had been prolonged twenty years, his name
 
 78 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 would have been known to Europe as that of King 
 Leopold is known. While he lived he was at a disad- 
 vantage. The statesmen who had most power in England 
 were men of far greater experience than himself. He 
 might, and no doubt did, exercise a great, if not a com- 
 manding influence over Lord Malmesbury, but he could 
 not rule Lord Palmerston. The old statesman who 
 governed England, at an age when most men are unfit to 
 govern their own families, remembered a whole generation 
 of statesmen who were dead before Prince Albert was 
 born. The two were of different ages and different 
 natures. The elaborateness of the German prince an 
 elaborateness which has been justly and happily compared 
 with that of Goethe was wholly alien to the half-Irish, 
 half-English, statesman. The somewhat boisterous cour- 
 age in minor dangers, and the obtrusive use of an always 
 effectual but not always refined, common-place, which 
 are Lord Palmerston's defects, doubtless grated on Prince 
 Albert, who had a scholar's caution and a scholar's 
 courage. The facts will be known to our children's 
 children, though not to us. Prince Albert did much, but 
 he died ere he could have made his influence felt on a 
 generation of statesmen less experienced than he was, 
 and anxious to learn from him. 
 
 It would be childish to suppose that a conference 
 between a minister and his sovereign can ever be a con- 
 ference of pure argument. " The divinity which doth 
 hedge a king " may have less sanctity than it had, but it 
 still has much sanctity. No one, or scarcely any one, can 
 argue with a cabinet minister in his own room as well as
 
 THE MONARCHY. 79 
 
 he would argue with another man in another room. He 
 cannot make his own points as well ; he cannot unmake 
 as well the points presented to him. A monarch's room 
 is worse. The best instance is Lord Chatham, the most 
 dictatorial and imperious of English statesmen, and 
 almost the first English statesman who was borne into 
 power against the wishes of the king and against the 
 wishes of the nobility the first popular minister. We 
 might have expected a proud tribune of the people to be 
 dictatorial to his sovereign to be to the king what he 
 was to all others. On the contrary, he was the slave of 
 his own imagination; there was a kind of mystic enchant- 
 ment in vicinity to the monarch which divested him of 
 his ordinary nature. " The least peep into the king's 
 closet," said Mr. Burke, " intoxicates him, and will to 
 the end of his life." A wit said that, even at the levde, 
 he bowed so low that you could see the tip of his hooked 
 nose between his legs. He was in the habit of kneeling 
 at the bedside of George III. while transacting business. 
 Now no man can argue on his knees. The same super- 
 stitious feeling which keeps him in that physical attitude 
 will keep him in a corresponding mental attitude. He 
 will not refute the bad arguments of the king as he will 
 refute another man's bad arguments. He will not state 
 his own best arguments effectively and incisively when 
 he knows that the king would not like to hear them. In 
 a nearly balanced argument the king must always have 
 the better, and in politics many most important argu- 
 ments are nearly balanced. Whenever there was much 
 to be said for the king's opinion it would have its full
 
 80 THE ENGLISH 'CONSTITUTION. 
 
 weight; whatever was said for the minister's opinion 
 would only have a lessened and enfeebled weight. 
 
 The king, too, possesses a power, according to theory, 
 for extreme use on a critical occasion, but which he can in 
 law use on any occasion. He can dissolve ; he can say to 
 his minister, in fact, if not in words, " This parliament 
 sent you here, but I will see if I cannot get another 
 parliament to send some one else here." George III. 
 well understood that it was best to take his stand at times 
 and on points when it was perhaps likely, or at any rate 
 not unlikely, the nation would support him. He always 
 made a minister that he did not like tremble at the 
 shadow of a possible successor. He had a cunning in 
 such matters like the cunning of insanity. He had con- 
 flicts with the ablest men of his time, and he was hardly 
 ever baffled. He understood how to help a feeble argu- 
 ment by a tacit threat, and how best to address it to an 
 habitual deference. 
 
 Perhaps such powers as these are what a wise man 
 would most seek to exercise and least fear to possess. 
 To wish to be a despot, "to hunger after tyranny," as the 
 Greek phrase had it, marks in our day an uncultivated 
 mind. A person who so wishes cannot have weighed 
 what Butler calls the " doubtfulness things are involved 
 in." To be sure you are right to impose your will, or to 
 wish to impose it, with violence upon others; to see 
 your own ideas vividly and fixedly, and to be tormented 
 till you can apply them in life and practice, not to like 
 to hear the opinions of others, to be unable to sit down 
 and weigh the truth they have, are but crude states o*"
 
 THE MONARCHY. 81 
 
 intellect in our present civilisation. "We know, at least, 
 that facts are many ; that progress is complicated ; that 
 burning ideas (such as young men have) are mostly false 
 and always incomplete. The notion of a far-seeing and 
 despotic statesman, who can lay down plans for ages yet 
 unborn, is a fancy generated by the pride of the human 
 intellect to which facts give no support. The plans of 
 Charlemagne died with him ; those of Richelieu were 
 mistaken; those of Napoleon gigantesque and frantic. 
 But a wise and great constitutional monarch attempts 
 no such vanities. His career is not in the air; he 
 labours in the world of sober fact ; he deals with schemes 
 which can be effected schemes which are desirable 
 schemes which are worth the cost. He says to the 
 ministry his people send to him, to ministry after minis- 
 try, " I think so and so ; do you see if there is anything 
 in it. I have put down my reasons in a certain memo- 
 randum, which I will give you. Probably it does not 
 exhaust the subject, but it will suggest materials for 
 your consideration." By years of discussion with minis- 
 try after ministry, the best plans of the wisest king 
 would certainly be adopted, and the inferior plans, the 
 impracticable plans, rooted out and rejected. He could 
 not be uselessly beyond his time, for he would have been 
 obliged to convince the representatives, the characteristic 
 men of his time. He would have the best means of 
 proving that he was right on all new and strange 
 matters, for he would have won to his side probably, 
 after years of discussion, the chosen agents of the 
 common-place world men who were where they were, 
 
 o
 
 82 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 because they had pleased the men of the existing age, 
 who will never be much disposed to new conceptions or 
 profound thoughts. A sagacious and original constitu- 
 tional monarch might go to his grave in peace if any 
 man could. He would know that his best laws were in 
 harmony with his age ; that they suited the people who 
 were to work them, the people who were to be benefited 
 by them. And he would have passed a happy life. He 
 would have passed a life in which he could always get 
 his arguments heard, in which he could always make 
 those who have the responsibility of action think of them 
 before they acted in which he could know that the 
 schemes which he had set at work in the world were not 
 the casual accidents of an individual idiosyncrasy, which 
 are mostly much wrong, but the likeliest of all things 
 to be right the ideas of one very intelligent man at 
 last accepted and acted on by the ordinary intelligent 
 many. 
 
 But can we expect such a king, or, for that is the 
 material point, can we expect a lineal series of such 
 kings ? Every one has heard the reply of the Emperor 
 Alexander to Madame de Stael, who favoured him with 
 a declamation in praise of beneficent despotism. u Yes, 
 Madame, but it is only a happy accident." He well knew 
 that the great abilities and the good intentions necessary 
 to make an efficient and good despot never were con- 
 tinuously combined in any line of rulers. He knew that 
 they were far out of reach of hereditary human nature. 
 Can it be said that the characteristic qualities of a con- 
 stitutional monarch are more within its reach ? I am
 
 THE MONARCHY. 83 
 
 afraid it cannot. We found just now that the charac- 
 teristic use of an hereditary constitutional monarch, at 
 the outset of an administration, greatly surpassed the 
 ordinary competence of hereditary faculties. I fear that 
 an impartial investigation will establish the same con- 
 clusion as to his uses during the continuance of an 
 administration. 
 
 If we look at history, we shall find that it is only 
 during the period of the present reign that in England 
 the duties of a constitutional sovereign have ever been 
 well performed. The first two Georges were ignorant 
 of English affairs, and wholly unable to guide them, 
 whether well or ill ; for many years in their time the 
 Prime Minister had, over and above the labour of 
 managing parliament, to manage the woman sometimes 
 the queen, sometimes the mistress who managed the 
 sovereign; George III. interfered unceasingly, but he 
 did harm unceasingly; George IV. and William IV. 
 gave no steady continuing guidance, and were unfit to 
 give it. On the Continent, in first-class countries, con- 
 stitutional royalty has never lasted out of one generation. 
 Louis Philippe, Victor Emmanuel, and Leopold are the 
 founders of their dynasties ; we must not reckon in con- 
 stitutional monarchy any more than in despotic monarchy 
 on the permanence in the descendants of the peculiar 
 genius which founded the race. As far as experience 
 goes, there is no reason to expect an hereditary series of 
 useful limited monarchs. 
 
 If we look to theory, there is even less reason to 
 expect it. A monarch is useful when he gives an effectual
 
 84( THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 and beneficial guidance to his ministers. But these 
 ministers are sure to be among the ablest men of their 
 time. They will have had to conduct the business of 
 parliament so as to satisfy it ; they will have to speak so 
 as to satisfy it. The two together cannot be done save 
 by a man of very great and varied ability. The exercise 
 of the two gifts is sure to teach a man much of the 
 world ; and if it did not, a parliamentary leader has to 
 pass through a magnificent training before he becomes a 
 leader. He has to gain a seat in parliament ; to gain the 
 ear of parliament ; to gain the confidence of parliament ; 
 to gain the confidence of his colleagues. No one can 
 achieve these no one, still more, can both achieve them 
 and retain them without a singular ability, nicely 
 trained in the varied detail of life. What chance has an 
 hereditary monarch such as nature forces him to be, such 
 as history shows he is, against men so educated and so 
 born ? He can but be an average man to begin with ; 
 sometimes he will be clever, but sometimes he will be 
 stupid; in the long run he will be neither clever nor 
 stupid ; he will be the simple, common man who plods 
 the plain routine of life from the cradle to the grave. 
 His education will be that of one who has never had to 
 struggle; who has always felt that he has nothing to 
 gain ; who has had the first dignity given him ; who has 
 never seen common life as in truth it is. It is idle to 
 expect an ordinary man born in the purple to have 
 greater genius than an extraordinary man born out of 
 the purple; to expect a man whose place has always 
 been fixed to have a better judgment than one who has
 
 THE MONARCHY. 85 
 
 lived by his judgment ; to expect a man whose career 
 will be the same whether he is discreet or whether he is 
 indiscreet to have the nice discretion of one who has 
 risen by his wisdom, who will fall if he ceases to be wise. 
 The characteristic advantage of a constitutional king 
 is the permanence of his place. This gives him the 
 opportunity of acquiring a consecutive knowledge of com- 
 plex transactions, but it gives only an opportunity. The 
 king must use it. There is no royal road to political 
 affairs : their detail is vast, disagreeable, complicated, and 
 miscellaneous. A king, to be the equal of his ministers 
 in discussion, must work as they work ; he must be a 
 man of business as they are men of business. Yet a con- 
 stitutional prince is the man who is most tempted to 
 pleasure, and the least forced to business. A despot 
 must feel that he is the pivot of the State. The stress 
 of his kingdom is upon him. As he is, so are his affairs. 
 He may be seduced into pleasure ; he may neglect all 
 else ; but the risk is evident. He will hurt himself; he 
 may cause a revolution. If he becomes unfit to govern, 
 some one else who is fit may conspire against him. But 
 a constitutional king need fear nothing. He may neglect 
 his duties, but he will not be injured. His place will be 
 as fixed, his income as permanent, his opportunities of 
 selfish enjoyment as full as ever. Why should he work ? 
 It is true he will lose the quiet and secret influence 
 which in the course of years industry would gain for 
 him; but an eager young man, on whom the world is 
 squandering its luxuries and its temptations, will not be 
 much attracted by the distant prospect of a moderate
 
 86 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 influence over dull matters. He may form good inten- 
 tions ; he may say, " Next year I will read these papers ; 
 I will try and ask more questions ; I will not let these 
 women talk to me so." But they will talk to him. The 
 most hopeless idleness is that most smoothed with ex- 
 cellent plans. " The Lord Treasurer," says Swift, " pro- 
 mised he will settle it to-night, and so he will say a 
 hundred nights." We may depend upon it the ministry 
 whose power will be lessened by the prince's attention 
 will not be too eager to get him to attend. 
 
 So it is if the prince come young to the throne ; but 
 the case is worse when he comes to it old or middle-aged. 
 He is then unfit to work. He will then have spent the 
 whole of youth and the first part of manhood in idleness, 
 and it is unnatural to expect him to labour. A pleasure- 
 loving lounger in middle life will not begin to work as 
 George III. worked, or as Prince Albert worked. The 
 only fit material for a constitutional king is a prince who 
 begins early to reign who in his youth is superior to 
 pleasure who in his youth is willing to labour who 
 has by nature a genius for discretion. Such kings are 
 among God's greatest gifts, but they are also among His 
 rarest. 
 
 An ordinary idle king on a constitutional throne will 
 leave no mark on his time : he will do little good and as 
 little harm; the royal form of cabinet government will 
 work in his time pretty much as the unroyal The 
 addition of a cypher will not matter though it take pre- 
 cedence of the significant figures. But corruptio optima 
 pessima. The most evil case of the royal form is far
 
 THE MONARCHY. 87 
 
 worse than the most evil case of the unroyal. It is easy 
 to imagine, upon a constitutional throne, an active and 
 meddling fool who always acts when he should not, who 
 never acts when he should, who warns his ministers 
 against their judicious measures, who encourages them in 
 their injudicious measures. It is easy to imagine that 
 such a king should be the tool of others ; that favourites 
 should guide him ; that mistresses should corrupt him ; 
 that the atmosphere of a bad court should be used to 
 degrade free government. 
 
 We have had an awful instance of the dangers of con- 
 stitutional royalty. We have had the case of a meddling 
 maniac. During great part of his life George III.'s 
 reason was half upset by every crisis. Throughout his 
 life he had an obstinacy akin to that of insanity. He 
 was an obstinate and an evil influence ; he could not be 
 turned from what was inexpedient; by the aid of his 
 station he turned truer but weaker men from what was 
 expedient. He gave an excellent moral example to his 
 contemporaries, but he is an instance of those whose 
 good dies with them, while their evil lives after them. 
 He prolonged the American war, perhaps he caused the 
 American war, so we inherit the vestiges of an American 
 hatred ; he forbad Mr. Pitt's wise plans, so we inherit an 
 Irish difficulty. He would not let us do right in time, so 
 now our attempts at right are out of time and fruitless. 
 Constitutional royalty under an active and half-insane 
 king is one of the worst of governments. There is in it 
 a secret power which is always eager, which is generally 
 obstinate, which is often wrong, which rules ministers
 
 88 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 more than they know themselves, which overpowers 
 them much more than the public believe, which is 
 irresponsible because it is inscrutable, which cannot be 
 prevented because it cannot be seen. The benefits of a 
 good monarch are almost invaluable, but the evils of 
 a bad monarch are almost irreparable. 
 
 We shall find these conclusions confirmed if we ex- 
 amine the powers and duties of an English monarch at 
 the break-up of an administration. But the power of 
 dissolution and the prerogative of creating peers, the 
 cardinal powers of that moment are too important and 
 involve too many complex matters to be sufficiently 
 treated at the very end of a paper as long as this.
 
 89 
 
 No. IV. 
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 
 
 IN my last essay I showed that it was possible for a con- 
 stitutional monarch to be, when occasion served, of first- 
 rate use both at the outset and during the continuance of 
 an administration ; but that in matter of fact it was not 
 likely that he would be useful The requisite ideas, 
 habits, and faculties, far surpass the usual competence 
 of an average man, educated in the common manner of 
 sovereigns. The same arguments are entirely applicable 
 at the close of an administration. But at that conjunc- 
 ture the two most singular prerogatives of an English 
 king the power of creating new peers and the power of 
 dissolving the Commons come into play ; and we cannot 
 duly criticise the use or misuse of these powers till we 
 know what the peers are and what the House of Com- 
 mons is. 
 
 The use of the House of Lords or, rather, of the 
 Lords, in its dignified capacity is very great. It does 
 not attract so much reverence as the Queen, but it at- 
 tracts very much. The office of an order of nobility is to 
 impose on the common people not necessarily to impose 
 on them what is untrue, yet less what is hurtful; but
 
 
 90 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 still to impose on their quiescent imaginations what 
 would not otherwise be there. The fancy of the mass 
 of men is incredibly weak ; it can see nothing without 
 a visible symbol, and there is much that it can scarcely 
 make out with a symbol. Nobility is the symbol of 
 mind. It has the marks from which the mass of men 
 always used to infer mind, and often still infer it. A 
 common clever man who goes into a country place will 
 get no reverence ; but the " old squire " will get reverence. 
 Even after he is insolvent, when every one knows that 
 his ruin is but a question of time, he will get five times 
 as much respect from the common peasantry as the 
 newly-made rich man who sits beside him. The common 
 peasantry will listen to his nonsense more submissively 
 than to the new man's sense. An old lord will get infi- 
 nite respect. His very existence is so far useful that it 
 awakens the sensation of obedience to a sort of mind in 
 the coarse, dull, contracted multitude, who could neither 
 appreciate nor perceive any other. 
 
 The order of nobility is of great use, too, not only in 
 what it creates, but in what it prevents. It prevents 
 the rule of wealth the religion of gold. This is the 
 obvious and natural idol of the Anglo-Saxon. He is 
 always trying to make money ; he reckons everything 
 in coin ; he bows down before a great heap and sneers 
 as he passes a little heap. He has a " natural instinctive 
 admiration of wealth for its own sake." And within good 
 limits the feeling is quite right. So long as we play the 
 game of industry vigorously and eagerly (and I hope we 
 shall long play it, for we must be very different from
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 91 
 
 what we are if we do anything better), we shall of neces- 
 sity respect and admire those who play successfully, and 
 a little despise those who play unsuccessfully. Whether 
 this feeling be right or wrong, it is useless to discuss ; to 
 a certain degree, it is involuntary ; it is not for mortals 
 to settle whether we will have it or not ; nature settles 
 for us that, within moderate limits, we must have it. But 
 the admiration of wealth in many countries goes far 
 beyond this ; it ceases to regard in any degree the skill 
 of acquisition; it respects wealth in the hands of the 
 inheritor just as much as in the hands of the maker ; it 
 is a simple envy and love of a heap of gold as a heap of 
 gold. From this our aristocracy preserves us. There is 
 no country where a " poor devil of a millionnaire is so ill 
 off as in England." The experiment is tried every day, 
 and every day it is proved that money alone money 
 pur et simple will not buy " London Society." Money 
 is kept down, and, so to say, cowed by the predominant 
 authority of a different power. 
 
 But it may be said that this is no gain ; that worship 
 for worship, the worship of money is as good as the 
 worship of rank. Even granting that it were so, it is a 
 great gain to society to have two idols : in the competi- 
 tion of idolatries the true worship gets a chance. But it 
 is not true that the reverence for rank at least, for here- 
 ditary rank is as base as the reverence for money. As 
 the world has gone, manner has been half -hereditary in 
 certain castes, and manner is one of the fine arts. It is 
 the style of society ; it is in the daily-spoken intercourse 
 of human beings what the art of literary expression is
 
 92 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 in their occasional written intercourse. In reverencing 
 wealth we reverence not a man, but an appendix to a 
 man ; in reverencing inherited nobility, we reverence the 
 probable possession of a great faculty the faculty of 
 bringing out what is in one. The unconscious grace of 
 life may be in the middle classes : finely-mannered per- 
 sons are born everywhere; but it ought to be in the 
 aristocracy : and a man must be born with a hitch in his 
 nerves if he has not some of it. It is a physiological 
 possession of the race, though it is sometimes wanting in 
 the individual. 
 
 There is a third idolatry from which that of rank pre- 
 ; serves us, and perhaps it is the worst of any that of 
 office. The basest deity is a subordinate employe, and 
 yet just now in civilised governments it is the commonest. 
 In France and all the best of the Continent it rules like a 
 superstition. It is to no purpose that you prove that the 
 pay of petty officials is smaller than mercantile pay ; that 
 their work is more monotonous than mercantile work; 
 that their mind is less useful and their life more tame. 
 They are still thought to be greater and better. They are 
 decor es ; they have a little red on the left breast of their 
 coat, and no argument will answer that. In England, by 
 the odd course of our society, what a theorist would desire 
 has in fact turned up. The great offices, whether per- 
 manent or parliamentary, which require mind now give 
 social prestige, and almost only those. An Under-Secretary 
 of State with 2000 a-year is a much greater man than 
 the director of a finance company with 5000, and the 
 country saves the difference. But except in a few offices
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 93 
 
 like the Treasury, which were once filled with aristocratic 
 people, and have an odour of nobility at second-hand, 
 minor place is of no social use. A big grocer despises the 
 exciseman ; and what in many countries would be thought 
 impossible, the exciseman envies the grocer. Solid wealth 
 tells where there is no artificial dignity given to petty 
 public functions. A clerk in the public service is " no- 
 body ; " and you could not make a common Englishman 
 see why he should be anybody. 
 
 But it must be owned that this turning of society into 
 a political expedient has half spoiled it. A great part of 
 the "best" English people keep their mind in a state 
 of decorous dulness. They maintain their dignity ; they 
 get obeyed; they are good and charitable to their de- 
 pendants. But they have no notion of play of mind : 
 no conception that the charm of society depends upon it. 
 They think cleverness an antic, and have a constant 
 though needless horror of being thought to have any of 
 it. So much does this stiff dignity give the tone, that 
 the few Englishmen capable of social brilliancy mostly 
 secrete it. They reserve it for persons whom they can 
 trust, and whom they know to be capable of appreciating 
 its nuances. But a good government is well worth a 
 great deal of social dulness. The dignified torpor of 
 English society is inevitable if we give precedence, not 
 to the cleverest classes, but to the oldest classes, and we 
 have seen how useful that is. 
 
 The social prestige of the aristocracy is, as every one 
 knows, immensely less than it was a hundred years or even 
 fifty years since. Two great movements the two greatest
 
 94 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 <of modern society have been unfavourable to it. The 
 1 rise of industrial wealth in countless forms has brought in 
 a competitor which has generally more mind, and which 
 would be supreme were it not for awkwardness and intel- 
 lectual gene. Every day our companies, our railways, 
 our debentures, and our shares, tend more and more to 
 multiply these surroundings of the aristocracy, and in 
 time they will hide it. And while this undergrowth has 
 I come up, the aristocracy have come down. They have 
 less means of standing out than they used to have. Their 
 power is in their theatrical exhibition, in their state. 
 But society is every day becoming less stately. As our 
 great satirist has observed, " The last Duke of St. David's 
 used to cover the north road with his carriages ; landladies 
 and waiters bowed before him. The present Duke sneaks 
 away from a railway station, smoking a cigar, in a 
 brougham." The aristocracy cannot lead the old life if 
 they would ; they are ruled by a stronger power. They 
 suffer from the tendency of all modern society to raise 
 the average, and to lower comparatively, and perhaps 
 absolutely, to lower the summit. As the picturesqueness, 
 the featureliness, of society diminishes, aristocracy loses 
 the single instrument of its peculiar power. 
 
 If we remember the great reverence which used to be 
 paid to nobility as such, we shall be surprised that the 
 House of Lords as an assembly, has always been inferior ; 
 that it was always just as now, not the first, but the second 
 of our assemblies. I am not, of course, now speaking of 
 the middle ages : I am not dealing with the embryo or the 
 infant form of our Constitution ; I am only speaking of
 
 THE HOUSE OF LOEDS. 95 
 
 its adult form. Take the times of Sir R. Walpole. He 
 was Prime Minister because he managed the House of 
 Commons ; he was turned out because he was beaten on 
 an election petition in that House ; he ruled England 
 because he ruled that House. Yet the nobility were then 
 the governing power in England. In many districts the 
 word of some lord was law. The " wicked Lord Lowther," 
 as he was called, left a name of terror in Westmoreland 
 during the- memory of men now living. A great part of 
 the borough members and a great part of the country 
 members were their nominees ; an obedient, unquestioning 
 deference was paid them. As individuals the peers were 
 the greatest people ; as a House the collected peers were 
 but the second House. 
 
 Several causes contributed to create this anomaly, but 
 the main cause was a natural one. The House of Peers 
 has never been a House where the most important peers 
 were most important. It could not be so. The qualities 
 which fit a man for marked eminence, in a deliberative 
 assembly, are not hereditary, and are not coupled with 
 great estates. In the nation, in the provinces, in his own 
 province, a Duke of Devonshire, or a Duke of Bedford, 
 was a much greater man than Lord Thurlow. They had 
 great estates, many boroughs, innumerable retainers, 
 folio wings like a court. Lord Thurlow had no boroughs, no 
 retainers ; he lived on his salary. Till the House of Lords 
 met, the dukes were not only the greatest, but immea- 
 surably the greatest. But as soon as the House met, Lord 
 Thurlow became the greatest. He could speak, and the 
 others could not speak. He could transact business in half
 
 96 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 an hour which they could not have transacted in a day, or 
 could not have transacted at all. When some foolish peer, 
 who disliked his domination, sneered at his birth, he had 
 words to meet the case : he said it was better for any one 
 to owe his place to his own exertions than to owe it to 
 descent, to being the "accident of an accident." But 
 such a House as this could not be pleasant to great 
 noblemen. They could not like to be second in their own 
 assembly (and yet that was their position from age to 
 age) to a lawyer who was of yesterday, whom everybody 
 could remember without briefs, who had talked for 
 "hire," who had "hungered after six-and-eightpence." 
 Great peers did not gain glory from the House ; on the 
 contrary, they lost glory when they were in the House. 
 They devised two expedients to get out of this difficulty : 
 / they invented proxies which enabled them to vote without 
 being present, without being offended by vigour and 
 invective, without being vexed by ridicule, without 
 leaving the rural mansion or the town palace where they 
 were demigods. And what was more effectual still, they 
 used their influence in the House of Commons instead of 
 - the House of Lords. In that indirect manner a rural 
 potentate, who half returned two county members, and 
 wholly returned two borough members, who perhaps 
 gave seats to members of the government, who possibly 
 seated the leader of the Opposition, became a much 
 greater man than by sitting on his own bench, in his own 
 House, hearing a chancellor talk. The House of Lords 
 was a second-rate force, even when the peers were a first- 
 rate force, because the greatest peers, those who had the
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 97 
 
 greatest social importance, did not care for their own 
 House, or like it, but gained great part of their political 
 power by a hidden but potent influence in the competing 
 House. 
 
 When we cease to look at the House of Lords under 
 its dignified aspect, and come to regard it under its 
 strictly useful aspect, we find the literary theory of the 
 English Constitution wholly wrong, as usual. This theory 
 says that the House of Lords is a co-ordinate estate of 
 the realm, of equal rank with the House of Commons ; 
 that it is the aristocratic branch, just as the Commons is 
 the popular branch; and that by the principle of our 
 Constitution the aristocratic branch has equal authority 
 with the popular branch. So utterly false is this doctrine 
 that it is a remarkable peculiarity, a capital excellence of 
 the British Constitution, that it contains a sort of Upper 
 House, which is not of equal authority to the Lower 
 House, yet still has some authority. 
 
 The evil of two co-equal Houses of distinct natures is 
 obvious. Each House can stop all legislation, and yet 
 some legislation may be necessary. At this moment we 
 have the best instance of this which could be conceived. 
 The Upper House of our Victorian Constitution, repre- 
 senting the rich wool-growers, has disagreed with the 
 Lower Assembly, and most business is suspended. But 
 for a most curious stratagem, the machine of government 
 would stand still. Most constitutions have committed 
 this blunder. The two most remarkable ^Republican in^ 
 stitutions in the world commit it. In both the American 
 and the Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much 
 
 H
 
 98 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ,authority as the second : it could produce the maximum 
 of impediment the dead -lock, if it liked ; if it does not 
 do so, it is owing not to the goodness of the legal consti- 
 tution, but to the discreetness of the members of the 
 Chamber. In both these constitutions, this dangerous 
 division is defended by a peculiar doctrine with which I 
 have nothing to do now. It is said that there must be in 
 a Federal Government, some institution, some authority, 
 some body possessing a veto in which the separate States 
 composing the Confederation are all equal. I confess this 
 doctrine has to me no self-evidence, and it is assumed, 
 but not proved. The State of Delaware is not equal in 
 power or influence to the State of New York, and you 
 cannot make it so by giving it an equal veto in an Upper 
 Chamber. The history of such an institution is indeed 
 most natural. A little State will like, and must like to 
 see some token, some memorial mark of its old inde- 
 pendence preserved in the Constitution by which that 
 independence is extinguished. But it is one thing for an 
 institution to be natural, and another for it to be expe- 
 dient. If indeed it be that a Federal Government compels 
 the erection of an Upper Chamber of conclusive and co- 
 ordinate authority, it is one more in addition to the many 
 other inherent defects of that kind of government. It may 
 be necessary to have the blemish, but it is a blemish just 
 as much. 
 
 There ought to be in every Constitution an available 
 authority somewhere. The sovereign power must be 
 come-at-able. And the English have made it so. The 
 House of Lords, at the passing of the Reform Act of 1832,
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 99 
 
 was as unwilling to concur with the House of Commons 
 as the Upper Chamber at Victoria to concur with the 
 Lower Chamber. But it did concur. The Crown has 
 the authority to create new peers ; and the king of the 
 day had promised the ministry of the day to create them. 
 The House of Lords did not like the precedent, and they 
 passed the Bill. The power was not used, but its existence 
 was as useful as its energy. Just as the knowledge that 
 his men can strike makes a master yield in order that 
 they may not strike, so the knowledge that their House 
 could be swamped at the will of the king at the will of 
 the people made the Lords yield to the people. 
 
 From the Reform Act the function of the House of 
 Lords has been altered in English History. Before that 
 Act it was, if not a directing Chamber, at least a Chamber 
 of Directors. The leading nobles, who had most influence 
 in the Commons, and swayed the Commons, sat there. 
 Aristocratic influence was so powerful in the House of 
 Commons, that there never was any serious breach of 
 unity. When the Houses quarrelled, it was as in the 
 great Aylesbury case, about their respective privileges, 
 and not about the national policy. The influence of the 
 nobility was then so potent, that it was not necessary to 
 exert it. The English Constitution, though then on this 
 point very different from what it now is, did not even 
 then contain the blunder of the Victorian or of the Swiss 
 Constitution. It had not two Houses of distinct origin ; 
 it had two Houses of common origin two Houses in 
 which the predominant element was the same. The 
 danger of discordance was obviated by a latent unity.
 
 100 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become 
 a revising and suspending House. It can alter Bills ; it 
 can reject Bills on which the House of Commons is not 
 yet thoroughly in earnest upon which the nation is not 
 yet determined. Their veto is a sort of hypothetical 
 veto. They say, We reject your Bill for this once or 
 these twice, or even these thrice: but if you keep on 
 sending it up, at last we won't reject it. The House has 
 ceased to be one of latent directors, and has become one 
 of temporary rejectors and palpable alterers. 
 
 It is the sole claim of the Duke of Wellington to the 
 name of a statesman, that he presided over this change. 
 He wished to guide the Lords to their true position, and 
 he did guide them. In 1846, in the crisis of the Corn- 
 Law struggle, and when it was a question whether the 
 House of Lords should resist or yield, he wrote a very 
 curious letter to the late Lord Derby : 
 
 "For many years, indeed from the year 1830, when I 
 retired from office, I have endeavoured to manage the 
 House of Lords upon the principle on which I conceive 
 that the institution exists in the Constitution of the 
 country, that of Conservatism. I have invariably objected 
 to all violent and extreme measures, which is not exactly 
 the mode of acquiring influence in a political party in 
 England, particularly one in opposition to Government. 
 I have invariably supported Government in Parliament 
 upon important occasions, and have always exercised my 
 personal influence to prevent the mischief of anything 
 like a difference or division between the two Houses, 
 of which there are some remarkable instances, to which I
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 101 
 
 I will advert here, as they will tend to show you the 
 nature of my management, and possibly, in some degree, 
 account for the extraordinary power which I have for so 
 many years exercised, without any apparent claim to it. 
 
 " Upon finding the difficulties in which the late King 
 William was involved by a promise made to create peers, 
 the number, I believe, indefinite, I determined myself, 
 and I prevailed upon others, the number very large, to 
 be absent from the House in the discussion of the last 
 atages of the Reform Bill, after the negotiations had 
 failed for the formation of a new Administration. This 
 course gave at the time great dissatisfaction to the party 
 notwithstanding that I believe it saved the existence of 
 the House of Lords at the time, and the Constitution of 
 the country. 
 
 " Subsequently, throughout the period from 1835 to 
 1841, 1 prevailed upon the House of Lords to depart from 
 many principles and systems which they as well as I had 
 adopted and voted on Irish tithes, Irish corporations, and 
 other measures, much to the vexation and annoyance of 
 many. But I recollect one particular measure, the union 
 of the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, in the 
 early stages of which I had spoken in opposition to the 
 measure, and had protested against it ; and in the last 
 stages of it I prevailed upon the House to agree to, and 
 pass it, in order to avoid the injury to the public interests 
 of a dispute between the Houses upon a question of such 
 importance. Then I supported the measures of the 
 Government, and protected the servant of the Govern- 
 ment, Captain Elliot, in China. All of which tended to
 
 102 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 weaken my influence with some of the party; others, 
 possibly a majority, might have approved of the course 
 which I took. It was at the same time well known that 
 from the commencement at least of Lord Melbourne's 
 Government, I was in constant communication with it, 
 upon all military matters, whether occurring at home or 
 abroad, at all events. But likewise upon many others. 
 
 " All this tended of course to diminish my influence 
 in the Conservative party, while it tended essentially to 
 the ease and satisfaction of the Sovereign, and to the 
 maintenance of good order. At length came the resig- 
 nation of the Government by Sir Robert Peel, in the 
 month of December last, and the Queen desiring Lord 
 John Russell to form an Administration. On the 12th 
 of December the Queen wrote to me the letter of which 
 I enclose the copy, and the copy of my answer of the 
 same date ; of which it appears that you have never seen 
 copies, although I communicated them immediately to Sir 
 Robert Peel. It was impossible for me to act otherwise 
 than is indicated in my letter to the Queen. I am the 
 servant of the Crown and people. I have been paid and 
 rewarded, and I consider myself retained ; and that I 
 can't do otherwise than serve as required, when I can do 
 so without dishonour, that is to say, as long as I have 
 health and strength to enable me to serve. But it is 
 obvious that there is, and there must be, an end of all 
 connection and counsel between party and me. I might 
 with consistency, and some may think that I ought to 
 have declined to belong to Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet on 
 the night of the 20th of December. But my opinion is,
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 103 
 
 that if I had, Sir Robert Peel's Government would not 
 
 have been framed; that we should have had and 
 
 in office next morning. 
 
 " But, at all events, it is quite obvious that when that 
 arrangement comes, which sooner or later must come, 
 there will be an end to all influence on my part over the 
 Conservative party, if I should be so indiscreet as to 
 attempt to exercise any. You will see, therefore, that 
 the stage is quite clear for you, and that you need not 
 apprehend the consequences of differing in opinion from 
 me when you will enter upon it ; as in truth I have, by 
 my letter to the Queen of the 12th of December, put an 
 end to the connection between the party and me, when 
 the party will be in opposition to her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 " My opinion is, that the great object of all is that 
 you should assume the station, and exercise the influence, 
 which I have so long exercised in the House of Lords. 
 The question is, how is that object to be attained ? By 
 guiding their opinion and decision, or by following it ? 
 You will see that I have endeavoured to guide their 
 opinion, and have succeeded upon some most remarkable 
 occasions. But it has been by a good deal of management. 
 
 "Upon the important occasion and question now 
 before the House, I propose to endeavour to induce them 
 to avoid to involve the country in the additional diffi- 
 culties of a difference of opinion, possibly a dispute be- 
 tween the Houses, on a question in the decision of which 
 it has been frequently asserted that their lordships had a 
 personal interest; which assertion, however false as
 
 104 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 
 
 affecting each of them personally, could not be denied as 
 affecting the proprietors of land in general I am aware 
 of the difficulty, but I don't despair of carrying the Bill 
 through. You must be the best judge of the course which 
 you ought to take, and of the course most likely to con- 
 ciliate the confidence of the House of Lords. My opinion 
 is, that you should advise the House to vote that which 
 would tend most to public order, and would be most 
 beneficial to the immediate interests of the country." 
 
 This is the mode in which the House of Lords came 
 to be what it now is, a chamber with (in most cases) a 
 veto of delay with (in most cases) a power of revision, 
 but with no other rights or powers. The question we 
 have to answer is, " The House of Lords being such) 
 what is the use of the Lords ? " 
 
 The common notion evidently fails, that it is a bul- 
 wark against imminent revolution. As the Duke's 
 letter in every line evinces, the wisest members, the 
 guiding members of the House, know that the House 
 must yield to the people if the people is determined. 
 The two cases that of the Reform Act and the Corn 
 Laws were decisive cases. The great majority of the 
 Lords thought Reform revolution, Free-trade confis- 
 cation, and the two together ruin. If they could ever 
 have been trusted to resist the people, they would then 
 have resisted it. But in truth it is idle to expect a 
 second chamber a chamber of notables ever to resist a 
 popular chamber, a nation's chamber, when that chamber 
 is vehement and the nation vehement too. There is no 
 strength in it for that purpose. Every class chamber,
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 105 
 
 every minority chamber, so to speak, feels weak and 
 helpless when the nation is excited. In a time of revo- 
 lution there are but two powers, the sword and the 
 people. The executive commands the sword ; the great 
 lesson which the First Napoleon taught the Parisian 
 populace the contribution he made to the theory of 
 revolutions at the 18th Brumaire is now well known. 
 Any strong soldier at the head of the army can use the 
 army. But a second chamber cannot use it. It is a 
 pacific assembly composed of timid peers, aged lawyers, 
 or, as abroad, clever litterateurs. Such a body has no 
 force to put down the nation, and if the nation will have 
 it do something it must do it. 
 
 The very nature, too, as has been seen, of the Lords 
 in the English Constitution, shows that it cannot stop 
 revolution. The constitution contains an exceptional 
 provision to prevent it stopping it. The executive, thej 
 appointee of the popular chamber and the nation, can' 
 make new peers, and so create a majority in the peers;: 
 it can say to the Lords, " Use the powers of your House ; 
 as we like, or you shall not use them at all. We will 
 find others to use them ; your virtue shall go out of you 
 if it is not used as we like, and stopped when we please." 
 An assembly under such a threat cannot arrest, and could 
 not be intended to arrest, a determined and insisting 
 executive. 
 
 In fact the House of Lords, as a House, is not a bul- 
 wark that will keep out revolution, but an index that 
 revolution is unlikely. Resting as it does upon old 
 deference, and inveterate homage, it shows that the spasm
 
 106 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 of new forces, the outbreak of new agencies, which we call 
 revolution, is for the time simply impossible. So long as 
 many old leaves linger on the November trees, you know 
 that there has been little frost and no wind; just so 
 while the House of Lords retains much power, you may 
 know that there is no desperate discontent in the country, 
 no wild agency likely to cause a great demolition. 
 
 There used to be a singular idea that two chambers 
 a revising chamber and a suggesting chamber were 
 essential to a free government. The first person who threw 
 a hard stone an effectually hitting stone against the 
 theory was one very little likely to be favourable to demo- 
 cratic influence, or to be blind to the use of aristocracy ; 
 it was the present Lord Grey. He had to look at the 
 matter practically. He was the first great colonial minister 
 of England who ever set himself to introduce representa- 
 tive institutions into all her capable colonies, and the diffi- 
 culty stared him in the face that in those colonies there 
 were hardly enough good people for one assembly, and not 
 near enough good people for two assemblies. It happened 
 and most naturally happened that a second assembly 
 was mischievous. The second assembly was either the 
 nominee of the Crown, which in such places naturally 
 allied itself with better instructed minds, or was elected 
 by people with a higher property qualification some 
 peculiarly well-judging people. Both these choosers 
 choose the best men in the colony, and put them into 
 the second assembly. But thus the popular assembly 
 was left without those best men. The popular assembly 
 was denuded of those guides and those leaders who
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 107 
 
 would have led and guided it best. Those superior men 
 were put aside to talk to one another, and perhaps 
 dispute with one another; they were a concentrated 
 instance of high but neutralised forces. They wished to 
 do good, but they could do nothing. The Lower House, 
 with all the best people in the colony extracted, did what 
 it liked. The democracy was strengthened rather than 
 weakened by the isolation of its best opponents in a 
 weak position. As soon as experience had shown this, 
 or seemed to show it, the theory that two chambers were 
 essential to a good and free government vanished away. 
 
 With a perfect Lower House it is certain that an 
 Upper House would be scarcely of any value. If we had 
 an ideal House of Commons perfectly representing the 
 nation, always moderate, never passionate, abounding in 
 men of leisure, never omitting the slow and steady forms 
 necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we 
 should not need a higher chamber. The work would be 
 done so well that we should not want any one to look 
 over or revise it. And whatever is unnecessary in govern- 
 ment is pernicious. Human life makes so much com- 
 plexity necessary that an artificial addition is sure to do 
 harm : you cannot tell where the needless bit of machinery 
 will catch and clog the hundred needful wheels ; but the 
 chances are conclusive that it will impede them some- 
 where, so nice are they and so delicate. But though 
 beside an ideal House of Commons the Lords would be 
 unnecessary, and therefore pernicious, beside the actual 
 House a revising and leisured legislature is extremely 
 useful, if not quite necessary.
 
 108 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 At present the chance majorities on minor questions 
 in the House of Commons are subject to no effectual 
 control. The nation never attends to any but the princi- 
 pal matters of policy and state. Upon these it forms that 
 rude, rough, ruling judgment which we call public 
 opinion ; but upon other things it does not think at all, 
 and it would be useless for it to think. It has not the 
 materials for forming a judgment : the detail of Bills, the 
 instrumental part of policy, the latent part of legislation, 
 are wholly out of its way. It knows nothing about 
 them, and could not find time or labour for the careful 
 investigation by which alone they can be apprehended. 
 A casual majority of the House of Commons has therefore 
 dominant power : it can legislate as it wishes. And 
 though the whole House of Commons upon great subjects 
 very fairly represents public opinion, and though its 
 judgment upon minor questions is, from some secret ex- 
 cellencies in its composition, remarkably sound and good ; 
 yet, like all similar assemblies, it is subject to the sudden 
 action of selfish combinations. There are said to be two 
 hundred " members for the railways " in the present 
 Parliament. If these two hundred choose to combine on 
 a point which the public does not care for, and which 
 they care for because it affects their purse, they are 
 absolute. A formidable sinister interest may always 
 obtain the complete command of a dominant assembly by 
 some chance and for a moment, and it is therefore of 
 great use to have a second chamber of an opposite sort, 
 differently composed, in which that interest in all likeli- 
 hood will not rule.
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 109 
 
 The most dangerous of all sinister interests is that of - 
 the executive Government, because it is the most power- 
 ful. It is perfectly possible it has happened, and will 
 happen again that the Cabinet, being very powerful in 
 the Commons, may inflict minor measures on the nation 
 which the nation did not like, but which it did not 
 understand enough to forbid. If, therefore, a tribunal 
 of revision can be found in which the executive, though 
 powerful, is less powerful, the government will be the 
 better; the retarding chamber will impede minor in- 
 stances of parliamentary tyranny, though it will not 
 prevent or much impede revolution. 
 
 Every large assembly is, moreover, a fluctuating body ; 
 it is not one house, so to say, but a set of houses ; it is 
 one set of men to-night and another to-morrow night. A 
 certain unity is doubtless preserved by the duty which 
 the executive is supposed to undertake, and does under- 
 take, of keeping a house ; a constant element is so pro- 
 vided about which all sorts of variables accumulate and 
 pass away. But even after due allowance for the full 
 weight of this protective machinery, our House of Com- 
 mons is, as all such chambers must be, subject to sudden 
 turns and bursts of feeling, because the members who 
 compose it change from time to time. The pernicious 
 result is perpetual in our legislation ; many acts of Par- 
 liament are medleys of different motives, because the 
 majority which passed one set of its clauses is different 
 from that which passed another set. 
 
 But the greatest defect of the House of Commons is 
 that it has no leisure. The life of the House is the
 
 110 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 worst of all lives a life of distracting routine. It has 
 an amount of business brought before it such as no 
 similar assembly ever has had. The British empire is a 
 miscellaneous aggregate, and each bit of the aggregate 
 brings its bit of business to the House of Commons. It is 
 India one day and Jamaica the next ; then again China, 
 and then Sleswig-Holstein. Our legislation touches on 
 all subjects, because our country contains all ingredients. 
 The mere questions which are asked of the ministers run 
 over half human affairs ; the Private Bill Acts, the mere 
 privilegia of our Government subordinate as they 
 ought to be probably give the House of Commons 
 more absolute work than the whole business, both 
 national and private, of any other assembly which has 
 ever sat. The whole scene is so encumbered with chang- 
 ing business, that it is hard to keep your head in it. 
 
 Whatever, too, may be the case hereafter, when a 
 better system has been struck out, at present the House 
 does all the work of legislation, all the detail, and all the 
 clauses itself. One of the most helpless exhibitions of 
 helpless ingenuity and wasted mind is a committee of 
 the whole House on a Bill of many clauses which eager 
 enemies are trying to spoil, and various friends are trying 
 to mend. An Act of Parliament is at least as complex 
 as a marriage settlement; and it is made much as a 
 settlement would be if it were left to the vote and settled 
 by the major part of persons concerned, including the 
 unborn children. There is an advocate for every interest, 
 and every interest clamours for every advantage. The 
 executive Government by means of its disciplined forces,
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. Ill 
 
 and the few invaluable members who sit and think, pre- 
 serves some sort of unity. But the result is very im- 
 perfect. The best test of a machine is the work it turns 
 out. Let any one who knows what legal documents 
 ought to be, read first a will he has just been making 
 and then an Act of Parliament; he will certainly say, 
 "I would have dismissed my attorney if he had done 
 my business as the legislature has done the nation's 
 business." While the House of Commons is what it is, 
 a good revising, regulating, and retarding House would 
 be a benefit of great magnitude. 
 
 But is the House of Lords such a chamber ? Does it 
 do this work ? This is almost an undiscussed question. 
 The House of Lords, for thirty years at least, has been in 
 popular discussion an accepted matter. Popular passion 
 has not crossed the path, and no vivid imagination has 
 been excited to clear the matter up. 
 
 The House of Lords has the greatest merit which such; 
 a chamber can have ; it is possible. It is incredibly diffi- 
 cult to get a revising assembly, because it is difficult to 
 find a class of respected revisers. A federal senate, a 
 second House, which represents State Unity, has this 
 advantage; it embodies a feeling at the root of society 
 a feeling which is older than complicated politics, 
 which is stronger a thousand times over than com- 
 mon political feelings the local feeling. "My shirt," 
 said the Swiss state- right patriot, " is dearer to me than 
 my coat." Every State in the American Union would 
 feel that disrespect to the Senate was disrespect to itself. 
 Accordingly, the Senate is respected ; whatever may be
 
 112 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the merits or demerits of its action, it can act ; it is real, 
 independent, and efficient. But in common governments 
 it is fatally difficult to make an unpopular entity power- 
 ful in a popular government. 
 
 It is almost the same thing to say that the House of 
 Lords is independent. It would not be powerful, it would 
 not be possible, unless it were known to be independent. 
 The Lords are in several respects more independent than 
 the Commons; their judgment may not be so good a 
 judgment, but it is emphatically their own judgment. 
 The House of Lords, as a body, is accessible to no social 
 bribe. And this, in our day, is no light matter. Many 
 members of the House of Commons, who are to be in- 
 fluenced by no other manner of corruption, are much 
 influenced by this its most insidious sort. The con- 
 ductors of the press and the writers for it are worse at 
 least the more influential who come near the temptation ; 
 for " position," as they call it, for a certain intimacy with 
 the aristocracy, some of them would do almost anything 
 and say almost anything. But the Lords are those who 
 give social bribes, and not those who take them. They 
 are above corruption because they are the corruptors. 
 They have no constituency to fear or wheedle ; they have 
 the best means of forming a disinterested and cool judg- 
 ment of any class in the country. They have, too, leisure 
 to form it. They have no occupations to distract them 
 which are worth the name. Field sports are but play- 
 things, though some Lords put an Englishman's serious- 
 ness into them. Few Englishmen can bury themselves in 
 science or literature ; and the aristocracy have less, per-
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 113 
 
 haps, of that impetus than the middle classes. Society is 
 too correct and dull to be an occupation, as in other times 
 and ages it has been. The aristocracy live in the fear 
 of the middle classes of the grocer and the merchant. 
 They dare not frame a society of enjoyment as the French 
 aristocracy once formed it. Politics are the only occupa- 
 tion a peer has worth the name. He may pursue them 
 undistractedly. The House of Lords, besides inde- 
 pendence to revise judicially and position to revise 
 effectually, has leisure to revise intellectually. 
 
 These are great merits : and, considering how difficult 
 it is to get a good second chamber, and how much with 
 our present first chamber we need a second, we may well 
 be thankful for them. But we must not permit them to 
 blind our eyes. Those merits of the Lords have faults 
 close beside them which go far to make them useless. 
 With its wealth, its place, and its leisure, the House of 
 Lords would, on the very surface of the matter, rule us 
 far more than it does if it had not secret defects which 
 hamper and weaken it. 
 
 The first of these defects is hardly to be called secret, 
 though, on the other hand, it is not well known. A severe 
 though not unfriendly critic of our institutions said that 
 "the cure for admiring the House of Lords was to go and 
 look at it " to look at it not on a great party field-day, 
 or at a time of parade, but in the ordinary transaction of 
 business. There are perhaps ten peers in the House, 
 possibly only six ; three is the quorum for transacting 
 business. A few more may dawdle in or not dawdle in : 
 those are the principal speakers, the lawyers (a few years 
 
 I
 
 114< THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ago when Lyndhust, Brougham, and Campbell were in 
 vigour, they were by far the predominant talkers) and a 
 few statesmen whom every one knows. But the mass of 
 the House is nothing. This is why orators trained in the 
 Commons detest to speak in the Lords. Lord Chatham 
 used to call it the " Tapestry." The House of Commons 
 is a scene of life if ever there was a scene of life. Every 
 member in the throng, every atom in the medley, has his 
 own objects (good or bad), his own purposes (great or 
 petty) ; his own notions, such as they are, of what is ; 
 his own notions, such as they are, of what ought to be. 
 There is a motley confluence of vigorous elements, but 
 the result is one and good. There is a " feeling of the 
 House," a " sense " of the House, and no one who knows 
 anything of it can despise it. A very shrewd man of 
 the world went so far as to say that " the House of Com- 
 mons has more sense than any one in it." But there is 
 no such " sense " in the House of Lords, because there 
 is no life. The Lower Chamber is a chamber of eager 
 politicians ; the Upper (to say the least) of not eager ones. 
 This apathy is not, indeed, as great as the outside 
 show would indicate. The committees of the Lords (as is 
 well known) do a great deal of work and do it very well. 
 And such as it is, the apathy is very natural. A House 
 composed of rich men who can vote by proxy without 
 coming will not come very much.* But after every abate- 
 ment the real indifference to their duties of most peers 
 is a great defect, and the apparent indifference is a 
 
 * In accordance with a recent resolution of the House of Lords, 
 proxies are now disused. Note to second edition.
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 115 
 
 dangerous defect. As far as politics go there is profound 
 truth in Lord Chesterfield's axiom, that " the world must 
 judge of you by what you seem, not by what you are." 
 The world knows what you seem ; it does not know 
 what you are. An assembly a revising assembly espe- 
 cially which does not assemble, which looks as if it 
 does not care how it revises, is defective in a main 
 political ingredient. It may be of use, but it will hardly 
 convince mankind that it is so. 
 
 The next defect is even more serious : it affects not 
 simply the apparent work of the House of Lords but the 
 real work. For a revising legislature, it is too uniformly 
 made up. Errors are of various kinds ; but the constitu- 
 tion of the House of Lords only guards against a single 
 error that of too quick change. The Lords leaving out 
 a few lawyers and a few outcasts are all landowners of 
 more or less wealth. They all have more or less the 
 opinions, the merits, the faults of that one class. They 
 revise legislation, as far as they do revise it, exclusively 
 according to the supposed interests, the predominant 
 feelings, the inherited opinions, of that class. Since the 
 Reform Act, this uniformity of tendency has been very 
 evident. The Lords have felt it would be harsh to 
 say hostile, but still dubious, as to the new legislation. 
 There was a spirit in it alien to their spirit, and which 
 when they could they have tried to cast out. That 
 spirit is what has been termed the " modern spirit." It 
 is not easy to concentrate its essence in a phrase; it lives 
 in our life, animates our actions, suggests our thoughts. 
 We all know what it means, though it would take an
 
 116 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 essay to limit it and define it. To this the Lords object ; 
 wherever it is concerned, they are not impartial revisers, 
 but biased revisers. 
 
 This singleness of composition would be no fault ; it 
 would be, or might be, even a merit, if the criticism of 
 the House of Lords, though a suspicious criticism, were 
 yet a criticism of great understanding. The characteristic 
 legislation of every age must have characteristic defects ; 
 it is the outcome of a character, of necessity faulty and 
 limited. It must mistake some kind of things ; it must 
 overlook some other. If we could get hold of a comple- 
 mental critic, a critic who saw what the age did not see, 
 and who saw rightly what the age mistook, we should 
 have a critic of inestimable value. But is the House of 
 Lords that critic ? Can it be said that its unfriendliness 
 to the legislation of the age is founded on a perception of 
 what the age does not see, and a rectified perception of 
 what the age does see ? The most extreme partisan, the 
 most warm admirer of the Lords, if of fair and tempered 
 mind, cannot say so. The evidence is too strong. On 
 free trade, for example, no one can doubt that the Lords 
 in opinion, in what they wished to do, and would have 
 done, if they had acted on their own minds were utterly 
 wrong. This is the clearest test of the " modern spirit." 
 It is easier here to be sure it is right than elsewhere. 
 Commerce is like war; its result is patent. Do you 
 make money or do you not make it ? There is as little 
 appeal from figures as from battle. Now no one can 
 doubt that England is a great deal better off because of 
 free trade ; that it has more money, and that its money
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 117 
 
 is diffused more as we should wish it diffused. In the 
 one case in which we can unanswerably test the modern 
 spirit, it was right, and the dubious Upper House the 
 House which would have rejected it, if possible was 
 wrong. 
 
 There is another reason. The House of Lords, being 
 
 i 
 an hereditary chamber, cannot be of more than common I 
 
 ability. It may contain it almost always has contained, 
 it almost always will contain extraordinary men. But 
 its average born law-makers cannot be extraordinary. 
 Being a set of eldest sons picked out by chance and 
 history, it cannot be very wise. It would be a standing 
 miracle if such a chamber possessed a knowledge of its 
 age superior to the other men of the age ; if it possessed 
 a superior and supplemental knowledge ; if it descried 
 what they did not discern, and saw truly that which they 
 saw, indeed, but saw untruly. 
 
 The difficulty goes deeper. The task of revising, of 
 adequately revising the legislation of this age, is not only 
 that which an aristocracy has no facility in doing, but one 
 Avhich it has a difficulty in doing. Look at the statute 
 book for 1865 the statutes at large for the year. You 
 will find, not pieces of literature, not nice and subtle 
 matters, but coarse matters, crude heaps of heavy busi- 
 ness. They deal with trade, with finance, with statute 
 law reform, with common law reform ; they deal with 
 various sorts of business, but with business always. And 
 there is no educated human being less likely to know 
 business, worse placed for knowing business than a young 
 lord. Business is really more agreeable than pleasure ; it
 
 118 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 interests the whole mind, the aggregate nature of man 
 more continuously, and more deeply. But it does not 
 look as if it did. It is difficult to convince a young man, 
 who can have the best of pleasure, that it will A young 
 lord just come into 30,000?. a year will not, as a rule, 
 care much for the law of patents, for the law of " passing 
 tolls," or the law of prisons. Like Hercules, he may 
 choose virtue, but hardly Hercules could choose business. 
 He has everything to allure him from it, and nothing to 
 allure him to it. And even if he wish to give himself to 
 business, he has indifferent means. Pleasure is near him, 
 but business is far from him. Few things are more 
 amusing than the ideas of a well-intentioned young man, 
 who is born out.of the business world, but who wishes to 
 take to business, about business. He has hardly a notion 
 in what it consists. It really is the adjustment of certain 
 particular means to equally certain particular ends. But 
 hardly any young man destitute of experience is able to 
 separate end and means. It seems to him a kind of 
 mystery ; and it is lucky if he do not think that the 
 forms are the main part, and that the end is but se- 
 condary. There are plenty of business men falsely so 
 called, who will advise him so. The subject seems a 
 kind of maze. "What would you recommend me to 
 read ? " the nice youth asks ; and it is impossible to ex- 
 plain to him that reading has nothing to do with it, that 
 he has not yet the original ideas in his mind to read 
 about; that administration is an art as painting is an 
 art; and that no book can teach the practice of either. 
 Formerly this defect in the aristocracy was hidden by
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 119 
 
 their own advantages. Being the only class at ease for 
 money and cultivated in mind they were without compe- 
 tition; and though they might not be, as a rule, and 
 extraordinary ability excepted, excellent in State busi- 
 ness, they were the best that could be had. Even in 
 old times, however, they sheltered themselves from the 
 greater pressure of coarse work. They appointed a 
 manager a Peel or a Walpole, anything but an aristo- 
 crat in manner or in nature to act for them and manage 
 for them. But now a class is coming up trained to? 
 thought, full of money, and yet trained to business. As 
 I write, two members of this class have been appointed 
 to stations considerable in themselves, and sure to lead 
 (if anything is sure in politics) to the Cabinet and 
 power. This is the class of highly-cultivated men of 
 business who, after a few years, are able to leave business 
 and begin ambition. As yet these men are few in public 
 life, because they do not know their own strength. It is 
 like Columbus and the egg once again ; a few original 
 men will show it can be done, and then a crowd of 
 common men will follow. These men know business 
 partly from tradition, and this is much. There are Uni- 
 versity families families who talk of fellowships, and who 
 invest their children's ability in Latin verses as soon as 
 they discover it ; there used to be Indian families of the 
 same sort, and probably will be again when the competi- 
 tive system has had time to foster a new breed. Just so 
 there are business families to whom all that concerns 
 money, all that concerns administration, is as familiar as 
 the air they breathe. All Americans, it has been said,
 
 120 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 know business ; it is in the air of their country. Just so 
 certain classes know business here ; and a lord can hardly 
 know it. It is as great a difficulty to learn business in a 
 palace as it is to learn agriculture in a park. 
 
 To one kind of business, indeed, this doctrine does 
 not apply. There is one kind of business in which our 
 aristocracy have still, and are likely to retain long, a 
 certain advantage. This is the business of diplomacy. 
 Napoleon, who knew men well, would never, if he could 
 help it, employ men of the Revolution in missions to the 
 old courts ; he said, " They spoke to no one, and no one 
 spoke to them ; " and so they sent home no information. 
 The reason is obvious. The old-world diplomacy of Europe 
 was largely carried on in drawing-rooms, and, to a great 
 extent, of necessity still is so. Nations touch at their 
 summits. It is always the highest class which travels 
 most, knows most of foreign nations, has the least of the 
 territorial sectarianism which calls itself patriotism, and 
 is often thought to be so. Even here, indeed, in England 
 the new trade-class is in real merit equal to the aristo- 
 cracy. Their knowledge of foreign things is as great, and 
 their contact with them often more. But, notwith- 
 standing, the new race is not as serviceable for diplomacy 
 as the old race. An ambassador is not simply an agent ; 
 he is also a spectacle. He is sent abroad for show a? 
 well as for substance ; he is to represent the Queen among 
 foreign courts and foreign sovereigns. An aristocracy is 
 in its nature better suited to such work ; it is trained to 
 the theatrical part of life ; it is fit for that if it is fit for 
 anything.
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS 121 
 
 But, with this exception, an aristocracy is necessarily 
 inferior in business to the classes nearer business ; and it 
 is not, therefore, a suitable class, if we had our choice of 
 classes, out of which to frame a chamber for revising 
 matters of business. It is indeed a singular example how 
 natural business is to the English race, that the House of 
 Lords works as well as it does. The common appearance 
 of the "whole House" is a jest a dangerous anomaly, 
 which Mr. Bright will sometimes use ; but a great deal of 
 substantial work is done in " Committees," and often very 
 well done. The great majority of the Peers do none of 
 their appointed work, and could do none of it; but a 
 minority a minority never so large and never so earnest 
 as in this age do it, and do it well. Still no one, who 
 examines the matter without prejudice, can say that the 
 work is done perfectly. In a country so rich in mind as 
 England, far more intellectual power can be, and ought 
 to be, applied to the revision of our laws. 
 
 And not only does the House of Lords do its work 
 imperfectly, but often, at least, it does it timidly. Being 
 only a section of the nation, it is afraid of the nation. 
 Having been used for years and years, on the greatest 
 matters to act contrary to its own judgment, it hardly 
 knows when to act on that judgment. The depressing 
 languor with which it damps an earnest young Peer is at 
 times ridiculous. " When the Corn Laws are gone, and 
 the rotten boroughs, why tease about Clause IX. in the 
 Bill to regulate Cotton Factories ? " is the latent thought 
 of many Peers. A word from the Leaders, from " the 
 Duke," or Lord Derby, or Lord Lyndhurst, will rouse on
 
 122 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 any matters the sleeping energies ; but most Lords are 
 feeble and forlorn. 
 
 These grave defects would have been at once lessened, 
 and in the course of years nearly effaced, if the House of 
 Lords had not resisted the proposal of Lord Palmerston's 
 first government to create peers for life. The expedient 
 was almost perfect. The difficulty of reforming an old 
 institution like the House of Lords is necessarily great ; 
 its possibility rests on continuous caste and ancient defer- 
 ence. And if you begin to agitate about it, to bawl at 
 meetings about it, that deference is gone, its peculiar 
 charm lost, its reserved sanctity gone. But, by an odd 
 fatality, there was in the recesses of the Constitution an 
 old prerogative which would have rendered agitation 
 needless which would have effected, without agitation, 
 all that agitation could have effected. Lord Palmerston 
 was now that he is dead, and his memory can be calmly 
 viewed as firm a friend to an aristocracy, as thorough an 
 aristocrat, as any in England ; yet he proposed to use that 
 power. If the House of Lords had still been under the 
 rule of the Duke of Wellington, perhaps they would have 
 acquiesced. The Duke would not indeed have reflected 
 on all the considerations which a philosophic statesman 
 would have set out before him ; but he would have been 
 brought right by one of his peculiarities. He disliked, 
 above all things, to oppose the Crown. At a great crisis, 
 at the crisis of the Corn Laws, what he considered was not 
 what other people were thinking of, the economical issue 
 under discussion, the welfare of the country hanging in 
 the balance, but the Queen's ease. He thought the Crown
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 123 
 
 so superior a part in the Constitution, that, even on vital 
 occasions, he looked solely or said he looked solely to 
 the momentary comfort of the present sovereign. He 
 never was comfortable in opposing a conspicuous act of 
 the Crown. It is very likely that, if the Duke had still 
 been the President of the House of Lords, they would have 
 permitted the Crown to prevail in its well-chosen scheme. 
 But the Duke was dead, and his authority or some of it 
 had fallen to a very different person. Lord Lyndhurst 
 had many great qualities : he had a splendid intellect 
 as great a faculty of finding truth as any one in his gene- 
 ration ; but he had no love of truth. With this great 
 faculty of finding truth, he was a believer in error in 
 what his own party now admit to be error all his life 
 through. He could have found the truth as a statesman 
 just as he found it when a judge; but he never did find 
 it. He never looked for it. He was a great partisan, and 
 he applied a capacity of argument, and a faculty of intel- 
 lectual argument rarely equalled, to support the tenets of 
 his party. The proposal to create life-peers was proposed 
 by the antagonistic party was at the moment likely to 
 injure his own party. To him this was a great opportu- 
 nity. The speech he delivered on that occasion lives 
 in the memory of those who heard it. His eyes did not 
 at that time let him read, so he repeated by memory, and 
 quite accurately, all the black-letter authorities bearing 
 on the question. So great an intellectual effort has rarely 
 been seen in an English assembly. But the result was 
 deplorable. Not by means of his black-letter authorities, 
 but by means of his recognised authority and his vivid
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 impression, he induced the House of Lords to reject the 
 proposition of the Government. Lord Lyndhurst said the 
 Crown could not now create life-peers, and so there are no 
 life-peers. The House of Lords rejected the inestimable, 
 the unprecedented opportunity of being tacitly reformed. 
 Such a chance does not come twice. The life-peers who 
 would have been then introduced would have been among 
 the first men in the country. Lord Hacaulay was to have 
 been among the first; Lord Wensleydale the most learned 
 and not the least logical of our lawyers to be the very 
 first. Thirty or forty such men, added judiciously and 
 sparingly as years went on, would have given to the House 
 of Lords the very element which, as a criticising Cham- 
 ber, it needs so much. It would have given it critics. 
 The most accomplished men in each department might 
 then, without irrelevant considerations of family and of 
 fortune, have been added to the Chamber of Review. The 
 very element which was wanted to the House of Lords 
 was, as it were, by a constitutional providence, offered to 
 the House of Lords, and they refused it. By what species 
 of effort that error can be repaired I cannot tell; but, 
 unless it is repaired, the intellectual capacity can never 
 be what it would have been, will never be what it ought 
 to be, will never be sufficient for its work. 
 
 Another reform ought to have accompanied the creation 
 of life-peers. Proxies ought to have been abolished. 
 Some time or other the slack attendance of the House of 
 Lords will destroy the House of Lords. There are occa- 
 sions in which appearances are realities, and this is one 
 of them. The House of Lords on most days looks so unlike
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 125 
 
 what it ought to be, that most people will not believe it is 
 what it ought to be. The attendance of considerate peers 
 will, for obvious reasons, be larger when it can no longer 
 be overpowered by the 'new-attendance, by the commis- 
 sioned votes of inconsiderate peers. The abolition of 
 proxies would have made the House of Lords a real 
 House ; the addition of life-peers would have made it a 
 good House. 
 
 The greater of these changes would have most mate- 
 rially aided the House of Lords in the performance of its 
 subsidiary functions. It always perhaps happens in a 
 great nation, that certain bodies of sensible men posted 
 prominently in its constitution, acquire functions, and 
 usefully exercise functions, which at the outset, no one 
 expected from them, and which do not identify them- 
 selves with their original design. This has happened to 
 the House of Lords especially. The most obvious in- 
 stance is the judicial function. This is a function which 
 no theorist would assign to a second chamber in a new 
 constitution, and which is matter of accident in ours. 
 Gradually, indeed, the unfitness of the second chamber 
 for judicial functions has made itself felt. Under our 
 present arrangements this function is not intrusted to 
 the House of Lords, but to a Committee of the House 
 of Lords. On one occasion only, the trial of O'Connell, the 
 whole House, or some few in the whole House, wished 
 to vote, and they were told they could not, or they 
 would destroy the judicial prerogative. No one, indeed, 
 would venture really to place the judicial function in 
 the chance majorities of a fluctuating assembly : it is so
 
 126 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 by a sleepy theory; it is not so in living fact. As a 
 legal question, too, it is a matter of grave doubt whether 
 there ought to be two supreme courts in this country 
 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and (what 
 is in fact though not in name) the Judicial Committee 
 of the House of Lords. Up to a very recent time, one 
 committee might decide that a man was sane as to 
 money, and the other committee might decide that he 
 was insane as to land. This absurdity has been cured ; 
 but the error from which it arose has not been cured 
 the error of having two supreme courts, to both of which 
 as time goes on, the same question is sure often enough 
 to be submitted, and each of which is sure every now 
 and then to decide it differently. I do not reckon the 
 judicial function of the House of Lords as one of its 
 true subsidiary functions, first because it does not in fact 
 exercise it, next because I wish to see it in appearance 
 deprived of it. The supreme court of the English people 
 ought to be a great conspicuous tribunal, ought to rule 
 all other courts, ought to have no competitor, ought to 
 bring our law into unity, ought not to be hidden beneath 
 the robes of a legislative assembly. 
 
 The real subsidiary functions of the House of Lords 
 are, unlike its judicial functions, very analogous to its 
 substantial nature. The first is the faculty of criticising 
 the executive. An assembly in which the mass of the 
 members have nothing to lose, where most have nothing 
 to gain, where everyone has a social position firmly fixed, 
 where no one has a constituency, where hardly any one 
 cares for the minister of the day, is the very assembly in
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 127 
 
 which to look for, from which to expect, independent cri- 
 ticism. And in matter of fact we find it. The criticism 
 of the acts of late administrations by Lord Grey has been 
 admirable. But such criticism, to have its full value, 
 should be many-sided. Every man of great ability puts 
 his own mark on his own criticism; it will be full of 
 thought and feeling, but then it is of idiosyncratic thought 
 and feeling. We want many critics of ability and know- 
 ledge in the Upper House not equal to Lord Grey, for 
 they would be hard to find but like Lord Grey. They 
 should resemble him in impartiality; they should re- 
 semble him in clearness ; they should most of all resemble 
 him in taking a supplemental view of a subject. There 
 is an actor's view of a subject, which (I speak of mature 
 and discussed action of Cabinet action) is nearly sure to 
 include everything old and new everything ascertained 
 and determinate. But there is also a bystander's view 
 which is likely to omit some one or more of these old and 
 certain elements, but also to contain some new or distant 
 matter, which the absorbed and occupied actor could not 
 see. There ought to be many life-peers in our secondary 
 chamber capable of giving us this higher criticism. I am 
 afraid we shall not soon see them, but as a first step we 
 should learn to wish for them. 
 
 The second subsidiary action of the House of Lords is 
 even more important. Taking the House of Commons, 
 not after possible but most unlikely improvements, but 
 in matter of fact and as it stands, it is overwhelmed with 
 work. The task of managing it falls upon the Cabinet, 
 and that task is very hard. Every member of the Cabinet
 
 128 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 in the Commons has to "attend the House;" to contribute 
 by his votes, if not by his voice, to the management of the 
 House. Even in so small a matter as the education de- 
 partment, Mr. Lowe, a consummate observer, spoke of the 
 desirability of finding a chief " not exposed to the pro- 
 digious labour of attending the House of Commons." It 
 is all but necessary that certain members of the Cabinet 
 should be exempt from its toil, and untouched by its ex- 
 citement. But it is also necessary that they should have 
 the power of explaining their views to the nation ; of 
 being heard as other people are heard. There are various 
 plans for so doing, which I may discuss a little in speak- 
 ing of the House of Commons. But so much is evident : 
 the House of Lords, for its own members, attains this 
 2. object; it gives them a voice, it gives them what no 
 competing plan does give them position. The leisured 
 members of the Cabinet speak in the Lords with 
 authority and power. They are not administrators with 
 a right to speech clerks (as is sometimes suggested) 
 brought down to lecture a House, but not to vote in it ; 
 but they are the equals of those they speak to; they 
 speak as they like, and reply as they choose; they 
 address the House, not with the " bated breath " of sub- 
 ordinates, but with the force and dignity of sure rank. 
 Life-peers would enable us to use this faculty of our 
 Constitution more freely and more variously. It would 
 give us a larger command of able leisure ; it would im- 
 prove the Lords as a political pulpit, for it would enlarge 
 the list of its select preachers. 
 
 The danger of the House of Commons is, perhaps,
 
 THE HOUSE OF LORDS. 129 
 
 that it will be reformed too rashly; the danger of the 
 House of Lords certainly is, that it may never be 
 reformed. Nobody asks that it should be so ; it is 
 quite safe against rough destruction, but it is not safe 
 against inward decay. It may lose its veto as the 
 Crown has lost its veto. If most of its members 
 neglect their duties, if all its members continue to 
 be of one class, and that not quite the best ; if its doors 
 are shut against genius that cannot found a family, and 
 ability which has not five thousand a year, its power 
 will be less year by year, and at last be gone, as so much 
 kingly power is gone no one knows how. Its danger 
 is not in assassination, but atrophy; not abolition, but 
 decline.
 
 130 
 
 No. T. 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.* 
 
 THE dignified aspect of the House of Commons is alto- 
 gether secondary to its efficient use. It is dignified : in 
 a government in which the most prominent parts are 
 good because they are very stately, any prominent part, 
 to be good at all, must be somewhat stately. The human 
 imagination exacts keeping in government as much as in 
 art ; it will not be at all influenced by institutions which 
 do not match with those by which it is principally in- 
 fluenced. The House of Commons needs to be impressive, 
 and impressive it is : but its use resides not in its 
 appearance, but in its reality. Its office is not to win 
 power by awing mankind, but to use power in governing 
 mankind. 
 
 The main function of the House of Commons is one 
 which we know quite well, though our common constitu- 
 tional speech does not recognise it. The House of Com- 
 mons is an electoral chamber ; it is the assembly which 
 chooses our president. Washington and his fellow- 
 
 * I reprint this chapter substantially as it was first written. It is too 
 soon, ae I have explained in the introduction, to say what changes the 
 late Reform Act will make in the House of Commons.
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 131 
 
 politicians contrived an electoral college, to be composed 
 (as was hoped) of the wisest people in the nation, which, 
 after due deliberation, was to choose for President the 
 wisest man in the nation. But that college is a sham ; it 
 has no independence and no life. No one knows, or cares 
 to know, who its members are. They never discuss, and 
 never deliberate. They were chosen to vote that Mr. 
 Lincoln be President, or that Mr. Breckenridge be Presi- 
 dent; they do so vote, and they go home. But our House 
 of Commons is a real choosing body ; it elects the people 
 it likes. And it dismisses whom it likes too. No matter 
 that a few months since it was chosen to support Lord 
 Aberdeen or Lord Palmerston ; upon a sudden occasion it 
 ousts the statesman to whom it at first adhered, and selects 
 an opposite statesman whom it at first rejected. Doubtless 
 in such cases there is a tacit reference to probable public 
 opinion ; but certainly also there is much free will in the 
 judgment of the Commons. The House only goes where 
 it thinks in the end the nation will follow ; but it takes 
 its chance of the nation following or not following; it 
 assumes the initiative, and acts upon its discretion or its 
 caprice. 
 
 When the American nation has chosen its President, 
 its virtue goes out of it, and out of the Transmissive Col- 
 lege through which it chooses. But because the House 
 of Commons has the power of dismissal in addition to 
 the power of election, its relations to the Premier are 
 incessant. They guide him and he leads them. He is 
 to them what they are to the nation. He only goes 
 where he believes they will go after him. But he has to
 
 132 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 take the lead ; lie must choose his direction, and begin 
 the journey. Nor must he flinch. A good horse likes 
 to feel the rider's bit ; and a great deliberative assembly 
 likes to fee] that it is under worthy guidance. A minister 
 who succumbs to the House, who ostentatiously seeks 
 its pleasure, who does not try to regulate it, who will 
 not boldly point out plain errors to it, seldom thrives. 
 The great leaders of Parliament have varied much, but 
 they have all had a certain firmness. A great assembly 
 is as soon spoiled by over-indulgence as a little child. 
 The whole life of English politics is the action and re- 
 action between the Ministry and the Parliament. The 
 appointees strive to guide, and the appointors surge under 
 the guidance. 
 
 The elective is now the most important function of 
 the House of Commons. It is most desirable to insist, 
 and be tedious, on this, because our tradition ignores it. 
 At the end of half the sessions of Parliament, you will 
 read in the newspapers, and you will hear even from 
 those who have looked close at the matter and should 
 know better, " Parliament has done nothing this session. 
 Some things were promised in the Queen's speech, but 
 they were only little things ; and most of them have not 
 passed." Lord Lyndhurst used for years to recount the 
 small outcomings of legislative achievement; and yet those 
 were the days of the first Whig Governments, who had 
 more to do in legislation, and did more, than any Govern- 
 ment. The true answer to such harangues as Lord 
 Lyndhurst's by a Minister should have been in the first 
 person. He should have said firmly, "Parliament has
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 133 
 
 maintained ME, and that was its greatest duty; Parlia- 
 ment has carried on what, in the language of traditional 
 respect, we call the Queen's Government ; it has main- 
 tained what wisely or unwisely it deemed the best 
 Executive of the English nation." 
 
 The second function of the House of Commons is 
 what I may call an expressive function. It is its office 
 to express the mind of the English people on all matters 
 which come before it. Whether it does so well or ill I 
 shall discuss presently. 
 
 The third function of Parliament is what I may call 
 preserving a sort of technicality even in familial 
 matters for the sake of distinctness the teaching func- 
 tion. A great and open council of considerable men 
 cannot be placed in the middle of a society without 
 altering that society. It ought to alter it for the better, 
 It ought to teach the nation what it does not know 
 How far the House of Commons can so teach, and how 
 far it does so teach, are matters for subsequent discussion. 
 
 Fourthly, the House of Commons has what may be 
 called an informing function a function which though 
 in its present form quite modern is singularly analogous 
 to a mediaeval function. In old times one office of the 
 House of Commons was to inform the Sovereign what 
 was wrong. It laid before the Crown the grievances 
 and complaints of particular interests. Since the pub- 
 lication of the Parliamentary debates a corresponding 
 office of Parliament is to lay these same grievances, 
 these same complaints, before the nation, which is 
 the present sovereign. The nation needs it quite as
 
 134 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 much as the king ever needed it. A free people is 
 indeed mostly fair, liberty practises men in a give-and- 
 take, which is the rough essence of justice. The English 
 people, possibly even above other free nations, is fair. 
 But a free nation rarely can be and the English nation 
 is not quick of apprehension. It only comprehends 
 what is familiar to it what comes into its own ex- 
 perience, what squares with its own thoughts. " I never 
 heard of such a thing in my life," the middle-class 
 Englishman says, and he thinks he so refutes an argu- 
 ment. The common disputant cannot say in reply that 
 his experience is but limited, and that the assertion may 
 be true, though he had never met with anything at all 
 like it. But a great debate in Parliament does bring 
 home something of this feeling. Any notion, any creed, 
 any feeling, any grievance which can get a decent number 
 of English members to stand up for it, is felt by almost 
 all Englishmen to be perhaps a false and pernicious 
 opinion, but at any rate possible an opinion within the 
 intellectual sphere, an opinion to be reckoned with. And 
 it is an immense achievement. Practical diplomatists say 
 that a free government is harder to deal with than a 
 despotic government ; you may be able to get the despot 
 to hear the other side ; his ministers, men of trained 
 intelligence, will be sure to know what makes against 
 them ; and they may tell him. But a free nation never 
 hears any side save its own. The newspapers only re- 
 peat the side their purchasers like : the favourable argu- 
 ments are set out, elaborated, illustrated; the adverse 
 arguments maimed, misstated, confused. The worst
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 135 
 
 judge, they say, is a deaf judge ; the most dull govern- 
 ment is a free government on matters its ruling classes 
 will not hear. I am disposed to reckon it as the second 
 function of Parliament in point of importance, that to 
 some extent it makes us hear what otherwise we should 
 not. 
 
 Lastly, there is the function of legislation, of which of 
 course it would be preposterous to deny the great impor- 
 tance, and which I only deny to be as important as the 
 executive management of the whole state, or the political 
 education given by Parliament to the whole nation. 
 There are, I allow, seasons when legislation is more im- 
 portant than either of these. The nation may be misfitted 
 with its laws, and need to change them : some particular 
 corn law may hurt all industry, and it may be worth a 
 thousand administrative blunders to get rid of it. But 
 generally the laws of a nation suit its life; special 
 adaptations of them are but subordinate ; the administra- 
 tion and conduct of that life is the matter which presses 
 most. Nevertheless, the statute-book of every great 
 nation yearly contains many important new laws, and 
 the English statute-book does so above any. An im- 
 mense mass, indeed, of the legislation is not, in the proper 
 language of jurisprudence, legislation at alL A law is a 
 general command applicable to many cases. The " special 
 acts" which crowd the statute-book and weary par- 
 liamentary committees are applicable to one case only. 
 They do not lay down rules according to which railways 
 shall be made, they enact that such a railway shall be 
 made from this place to that place, and they have no
 
 136 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 bearing upon any other transaction. But after every 
 deduction and abatement, the annual legislation of 
 Parliament is a result of singular importance ; were it 
 not so, it could not be, as it often is considered, the sole 
 result of its annual assembling. 
 
 Some persons will perhaps think that I ought to 
 enumerate a sixth function of the House of Commons 
 a financial function. But I do not consider that, upon 
 broad principle, and omitting legal technicalities, the 
 House of Commons has any special function with regard 
 to financial different from its functions with respect to 
 other legislation. It is to rule in both, and to rule in 
 both through the Cabinet. Financial legislation is of 
 necessity a yearly recurring legislation ; but frequency of 
 occurrence does not indicate a diversity of nature or 
 compel an antagonism of treatment 
 
 In truth, the principal peculiarity of the House of 
 Commons in financial affairs is nowadays not a special 
 privilege, but an exceptional disability. On common 
 subjects any member can propose anything, but not on 
 money the minister only can propose to tax the people. 
 This principle is commonly involved in medisDval meta- 
 physics as to the prerogative of the Crown, but it is as 
 useful in the nineteenth century as in the fourteenth, and 
 rests on as sure a principle. The House of Commons 
 now that it is the true sovereign, and appoints the real 
 executive has long ceased to be the checking, sparing, 
 economical body it once was. It now is more apt to 
 spend money than the minister of the day. I have heard 
 a very experienced financier say, " If you want to raise a
 
 THE HOUSE Of COMMONS. 137 
 
 certain cheer in the House of Commons make a general 
 panegyric on economy; if you want to invite a sure 
 defeat, propose a particular saving." The process is 
 simple. Every expenditure of public money has some 
 apparent public object; those who wish to spend the 
 money expatiate on that object; they say, "What is 
 50,000?. to this great country? Is this a time for 
 cheeseparing objection ? Our industry was never so 
 productive ; our resources never so immense. What is 
 50,OOOZ. in comparison with this great national interest?" 
 The members who are for the expenditure always come 
 down ; perhaps a constituent or a friend who will profit 
 by the outlay, or is keen on the object, has asked them 
 to attend ; at any rate, there is a popular vote to be 
 given, on which the newspapers always philanthropic, 
 and sometimes talked over will be sure to make en- 
 comiums. The members against the expenditure rarely 
 come down of themselves; why should they become 
 unpopular without reason? The object seems decent; 
 many of its advocates are certainly sincere: a hostile vote 
 will make enemies, and be censured by the journals. If 
 there were not some check, the " people's house " would 
 soon outrun the people's money. 
 
 That check is the responsibility of the Cabinet for the 
 national finance. If any one could propose a tax, they 
 might let the House spend it as it would, and wash their 
 hands of the matter ; but now, for whatever expenditure 
 is sanctioned even when it is sanctioned against the 
 ministry's wish the ministry must find the money. 
 Accordingly, they have the strongest motive to oppose
 
 138 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 extra outlay. They will have to pay the bill for it ; they 
 will have to impose taxation, which is always disa- 
 greeable, or suggest loans, which, under ordinary circum- 
 stances, are shameful. The ministry is (so to speak) the 
 breadwinner of the political family, and has to meet the 
 cost of philanthropy and glory, just as the head of a 
 family has to pay for the charities of his wife and the 
 toilette of his daughters. 
 
 In truth, when a Cabinet is made the sole executive, 
 it follows it must have the sole financial charge, for all 
 action costs money, all policy depends on money, and it 
 is in adjusting the relative goodness of action and policies 
 that the executive is employed. 
 
 From a consideration of these functions, it follows 
 that we are ruled by the House of Commons ; we are, 
 indeed, so used to be so ruled, that it does not seem to be 
 at all strange. But of all odd forms of government, the 
 oddest really is government by a public meeting. Here 
 are 658 persons, collected from all parts of England, 
 different in nature, different in interests, different in look, 
 and language. If we think what an empire the English 
 is, how various are its components, how incessant its 
 concerns, how immersed in history its policy ; if we think 
 what a vast information, what a nice discretion, what a 
 consistent will ought to mark the rulers of that empire, 
 we shall be surprised when we see them. We see a 
 changing body of miscellaneous persons, sometimes few, 
 sometimes many, never the same for an hour ; sometimes 
 excited, but mostly dull and half weary, impatient of 
 eloquence, catching at any joke as an alleviation. These
 
 THE EOCTSE OF COMMONS. 139 
 
 are the persons who rule the British Empire, who rule 
 England, who rule Scotland, who rule Ireland, who 
 rule a great deal of Asia, who rule a great deal of 
 Polynesia, who rule a great deal of America, and 
 scattered fragments everywhere. 
 
 Paley said many shrewd things, but he never said a 
 better thing than that it was much harder to make men 
 see a difficulty than comprehend the explanation of it. 
 The key to the difficulties of most discussed and unsettled 
 questions is commonly in their undiscussed parts : they 
 are like the background of a picture, which looks obvious, 
 easy, just what any one might have painted, but which, 
 in fact, sets the figures in their right position, chastens 
 them, and makes them what they are. Nobody will 
 understand parliament government who fancies it an 
 easy thing, a natural thing, a thing not needing ex- 
 planation. You have not a perception of the first 
 elements in this matter till you know that government 
 by a club is a standing wonder. 
 
 There has been a capital illustration lately how helpless 
 many English gentlemen are when called together on a 
 sudden. The Government, rightly or wrongly, thought 
 fit to entrust the quarter-sessions of each county with the 
 duty of combating its cattle-plague ; but the scene in 
 most "shire halls" was unsatisfactory. There was the 
 greatest difficulty in getting, not only a right decision, 
 but any decision. I saw one myself which went thus. 
 The chairman proposed a very complex resolution, in 
 which there was much which every one liked, and much 
 which every one disliked, though, of course, the favourite
 
 140 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 parts of some were the objectionable parts to others. 
 This resolution got, so to say, wedged in the meeting ; 
 everybody suggested amendments ; one amendment was 
 carried which none were satisfied with, and so the matter 
 stood over. It is a saying in England, " a big meeting 
 never does anything ; " and yet we are governed by the 
 House of Commons by " a big meeting." 
 
 It may be said that the House of Commons does not 
 rule, it only elects the rulers. But there must be some- 
 thing special about it to enable it to do that. Suppose 
 the Cabinet were elected by a London club, what con- 
 fusion there would be, what writing and answering ! 
 " Will you speak to So-and-So, and ask him to vote for 
 my man ? " would be heard on every side. How the wife 
 of A. and the wife of B. would plot to confound the wife 
 of C. Whether the club elected under the dignified 
 shadow of a queen, or without the shadow, would hardly 
 matter at all ; if the substantial choice was in them, the 
 confusion and intrigue would be there too. I propose to 
 begin this paper by asking, not why the House of Com- 
 mons governs well ? but the fundamental almost un- 
 asked question how the House of Commons comes to 
 be able to govern at all? 
 
 The House of Commons can do work which the 
 quarter-sessions or clubs cannot do, because it is an 
 organised body, while quarter-sessions and clubs are un- 
 organised. Two of the greatest orators in England 
 Lord Brougham and Lord Bolingbroke spent much 
 eloquence in attacking party government. Bolingbroke 
 probably knew what he was doing ; he was a consistent
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 141 
 
 opponent of the power of the Commons ; he wished to 
 attack them in a vital part. But Lord Brougham does 
 not know ; he proposes to amend parliamentary govern- 
 ment by striking out the very elements which make 
 parliamentary government possible. At present the ma- 
 jority of Parliament obey certain leaders; what those 
 leaders propose they support, what those leaders reject 
 they reject. An old Secretary of the Treasury used to 
 say, " This is a bad case, an indefensible case. We must 
 apply our majority to this question." That secretary 
 lived fifty years ago, before the Reform Bill, when 
 majorities were very blind, and very "applicable." Now- 
 adays, the power of leaders over their followers is strictly 
 and wisely limited : they can take their followers but a 
 little way, and that only in certain directions. Yet still 
 there are leaders and followers. On the Conservative 
 side of the House there are vestiges of the despotic leader- 
 ship even now. A cynical politician is said to have 
 watched the long row of county members, so fresh and 
 respectable- looking, and muttered, "By Jove, they are 
 the finest brute votes in Europe ! " But all satire apart, 
 the principle of Parliament is obedience to leaders. 
 Change your leader if you will, take another if you will, 
 but obey No. 1 while you serve No. 1, and obey No. 2 
 when you have gone over to No. 2. The penalty of not 
 doing so, is the penalty of impotence. It is not that you 
 will not be able to do any good, but you will not be able 
 to do anything at all. If everybody does what he thinks 
 right, there will be 657 amendments to every motion, and 
 none of them will be carried or the motion either.
 
 142 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that 
 the House of Commons is mainly and above all things an 
 elective assembly, we at once perceive that party is of its 
 essence. There never was an election without a party. 
 You cannot get a child into an asylum without a combi- 
 nation. At such places you may see " Vote for orphan 
 A." upon a placard, and "Vote for orphan B. (also an 
 idiot ! ! !) " upon a banner, and the party of each is busy 
 about its placard and banner. What is true at such 
 minor and momentary elections must be much more true 
 in a great and constant election of rulers. The House of 
 Commons lives in a state of perpetual potential choice ; 
 at any moment it can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. 
 And therefore party is inherent in it, is bone of its bone, 
 and breath of its breath. 
 
 Secondly, though the leaders of party no longer have 
 the vast patronage of the last century with which to 
 bribe, they can coerce by a threat far more potent than 
 any allurement they can dissolve. This is the secret 
 which keeps parties together. Mr. Cobden most justly 
 said, " He had never been able to discover what was the 
 proper moment, according to members of Parliament, for 
 a dissolution. He had heard them say they were ready 
 to vote for everything else, but he had never heard them 
 say they were ready to vote for that." Efficiency in an 
 assembly requires a solid mass of steady votes ; and these 
 are collected by a deferential attachment to particular 
 men, or by a belief in the principles those men represent, 
 and they are maintained by fear of those men by the 
 fear that if you vote against them, you may yourself soon 
 not have a vote at all.
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 143 
 
 Thirdly, it may seem odd to say so, just after incul- 
 cating that party organisation is the vital principle of 
 representative government, but that organisation is per- 
 manently efficient, because it is not composed of warm 
 partisans. The body is eager, but the atoms are cool. If 
 it were otherwise, parliamentary government would be- 
 come the worst of governments a sectarian government. 
 The party in power would go all the lengths their orators 
 proposed all that their formulae enjoined, as far as they 
 had ever said they would go. But the partisans of the 
 English Parliament are not of such a temper. They are 
 Whigs, or Radicals, or Tories, but they are much else too. 
 They are common Englishmen, and, as Father Newman 
 complains, " hard to be worked up to the dogmatic level." 
 They are not eager to press the tenets of their party to 
 impossible conclusions. On the contrary, the way to lead 
 them the best and acknowledged way is to affect a 
 studied and illogical moderation. You may hear men 
 say, " Without committing myself to the tenet that 3 + 2 
 make 5, though I am free to admit that the honourable 
 member for Bradford has advanced very grave arguments 
 in behalf of it, I think I may, with the permission of the 
 Committee, assume that 2 + 3 do not make 4, which will 
 be a sufficient basis for the important propositions which 
 I shall venture to submit on the present occasion." This 
 language is very suitable to the greater part of the House 
 of Commons. Most men of business love a sort of twi- 
 light. They have lived all their lives in an atmosphere 
 of probabilities and of doubt, where nothing is very clear, 
 where there are some chances for many events, where
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 there is much to be said for several courses, where never- 
 theless one course must be determinedly chosen and 
 fixedly adhered to. They like to hear arguments suited 
 to this intellectual haze. So far from caution or hesita- 
 tion in the statement of the argument striking them as 
 an indication of imbecility, it seems to them a sign of 
 practicality. They got rich themselves by transactions 
 of which they could not have stated the argumentative 
 ground and all they ask for is a distinct though moderate 
 conclusion, that they can repeat when asked ; something 
 which they feel not to be abstract argument, but abstract 
 argument diluted and dissolved in real life. " There seem 
 to me," an impatient young man once said, "to be no 
 stay in Peel's arguments." And that was why Sir Robert 
 Peel was the best leader of the Commons in our time ; we 
 like to have the rigidity taken out of an argument, and 
 the substance left. 
 
 Nor indeed, under our system of government, are the 
 leaders themselves of the House of Commons, for the most 
 part, eager to carry party conclusions too far. They 
 are in contact with reality. An Opposition, on coming 
 into power, is often like a speculative merchant whose 
 bills become due. Ministers have to make good their 
 promises, and they find a difficulty in so doing. They 
 have said the state of things is so and so, and if you 
 give us the power we will do thus and thus. But when 
 they come to handle the official documents, to converse 
 with the permanent under-secretary familiar with dis- 
 agreeable facts, and though in manner most respectful, 
 yet most imperturbable in opinion very soon doubts in-
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 145 
 
 tervene. Of course, something must be done ; the specu- 
 lative merchant cannot forget his bills ; the late Opposition 
 cannot, in office, forget those sentences which terrible 
 admirers in the country still quote. But just as the 
 merchant asks his debtor, " Could you not take a bill at 
 four months ? " so the new minister says to the permanent 
 under-secretary, " Could you not suggest a middle course ? 
 I am of course not bound by mere sentences used in de- 
 bate ; I have never been accused of letting a false ambition 
 of consistency warp my conduct ; but," etc., etc. And the 
 end always is that a middle course is devised which looks 
 as much as possible like what was suggested in opposition, 
 but which is as much as possible what patent facts facts 
 which seem to live in the office, so teasing and unceasing 
 are they prove ought to be done. 
 
 Of all modes of enforcing moderation on a party, the 
 best is to contrive that the members of that party shall 
 be intrinsically moderate, careful, and almost shrinking 
 men ; and the next best to contrive that the leaders of 
 the party, who have protested most in its behalf, shall be 
 placed in the closest contact with the actual world. Our 
 English system contains both contrivances ; it makes 
 party government permanent and possible in the sole 
 way in which it can be so, by making it mild. 
 
 But these expedients, though they sufficiently remove 
 the defects which make a common club or quarter ses- 
 sions impotent, would not enable the House of Commons 
 to govern England. A representative public meeting is 
 subject to a defect over and above those of other public 
 meetings. It may not be independent. The constitu- 
 
 L 

 
 146 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 encies may not let it alone. But if they do not, all the 
 checks which have been enumerated upon the evils of a 
 party organisation would be futile. The feeling of a 
 constituency is the feeling of a dominant party, and that 
 feeling is elicited, stimulated, sometimes even manufac- 
 tured by the local political agent. Such an opinion could 
 not be moderate; could not be subject to effectual dis- 
 cussion ; could not be in close contact with pressing facts ; 
 could not be framed under a chastening sense of near 
 responsibility; could not be formed as those form their 
 opinions who have to act upon them. Constituency 
 government is the precise opposite of parliamentary 
 government. It is the government of immoderate per- 
 sons far from the scene of action, instead of the govern- 
 ment of moderate persons close to the scene of action ; it 
 is the judgment of persons judging in the last resort and 
 without a penalty, in lieu of persons judging in fear of a 
 dissolution, and ever conscious that they are subject to 
 an appeal. 
 
 Most persons would admit these conditions of parlia- 
 mentary government when they read them, but two at 
 least of the most prominent ideas in the public mind are 
 inconsistent with them. The scheme to which the argu- 
 ments of our demagogues distinctly tend, and the scheme 
 to which the predilections of some most eminent philo- 
 sophers cleave, are both so. They would not only make 
 parliamentary government work ill, but they would pre- 
 vent its working at all ; they would not render it bad, 
 for they would make it impossible. 
 
 The first of these is the ultra-democratic theory. This
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 14-7 
 
 theory demands that every man of twenty-one years of 
 age (if not every woman too) should have an equal vote 
 in electing Parliament. Suppose that last year there were 
 twelve million adult males in England. Upon this 
 theory each man is to have one twelve-millionth share in 
 electing a Parliament ; the rich and wise are not to have, 
 by explicit law, more votes than the poor and stupid ; nor 
 are any latent contrivances to give them an influence 
 equivalent to more votes. The machinery for carrying 
 out such a plan is very easy. At each census the country 
 ought to be divided into 658 electoral districts, in each 
 of which the number of adult males should be the same ; 
 and these districts ought to be the only constituencies, 
 and elect the whole Parliament. But if the above pre- 
 requisites are needful for parliamentary government, that 
 Parliament would not work. 
 
 Such a Parliament could not be composed of moderate 
 men. The electoral districts would be, some of them, in 
 purely agricultural places, and in these the parson and 
 the squire would have almost unlimited power. They 
 would be able to drive or send to the poll an entire 
 labouring population. These districts would return an 
 unmixed squirearchy. The scattered small towns which 
 now send so many members to Parliament, would be lost 
 in the clownish mass ; their votes would send to Par- 
 liament no distinct members. The agricultural part of 
 England would choose its representatives from quarter 
 sessions exclusively. On the other hand a large part of 
 the constituencies would be town districts, and these 
 would send up persons representing the beliefs or un-
 
 14:3 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 beliefs of the lowest classes in their towns. They would, 
 perhaps, be divided between the genuine representatives 
 of the artizans not possibly of the best of the arti- 
 zans, who are a select and intellectual class, but of the 
 common order of workpeople and the merely pretended 
 members for that class whom I may call the members for 
 the public-houses. In all big towns in which there is 
 electioneering these houses are the centres of illicit cor- 
 ruption and illicit management. There are pretty good 
 records of what that corruption and management are, but 
 there is no need to describe them here. Everybody will 
 understand what sort of things I mean, and the kind of 
 unprincipled members that are returned by them. Our 
 new Parliament, therefore, would be made up of two 
 sorts of representatives from the town lowest class, and 
 one sort of representatives from the agricultural lowest 
 class. The genuine representatives of the country would 
 be men of one marked sort, and the genuine representa- 
 tives for the county men of another marked sort, but 
 very opposite : one would have the prejudices of town 
 artizans, and the other the prejudices of county magis- 
 trates. Each class would speak a language of its own ; 
 each would be unintelligible to the other ; and the only 
 thriving class would be the immoral representatives, who 
 were chosen by corrupt machination, and who would 
 probably get a good profit on the capital they laid out in 
 that corruption. If it be true that a parliamentary 
 government is possible only when the overwhelming 
 majority of the representatives are men essentially 
 moderate, of no marked varieties, free from class pre-
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 149 
 
 judices, this ultra-democratic Parliament could not 
 maintain that government, for its members would 
 be remarkable for two sorts of moral violence and one 
 sort of immoral 
 
 I do not for a moment rank the scheme of Mr. Hare 
 with the scheme of the ultra-democrats. One can hardly 
 help having a feeling of romance about it. The world 
 seems growing young when grave old lawyers and mature 
 philosophers propose a scheme promising so much. It is 
 from these classes that young men suffer commonly the 
 chilling demonstration that their fine plans are opposed 
 to rooted obstacles, that they are repetitions of other 
 plans which failed long ago, and that we must be content 
 with the very moderate results of tried machinery. But 
 Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill offer as the effect of their new 
 scheme results as large and improvements as interesting 
 as a young enthusiast, ever promised to himself in his 
 happiest mood. 
 
 I do not give any weight to the supposed impractica- 
 bility of Mr. Hare's scheme because it is new. Of course 
 it cannot be put in practice till it is old. A great change 
 of this sort happily cannot be sudden ; a free people can- 
 not be confused by new institutions which they do not 
 understand-, for they will not adopt them till they under- 
 stand them. But if Mr. Hare's plan would accomplish 
 what its friends say, or half what they say, it would be 
 worth working for, if it were not adopted till the year 
 1966. We ought incessantly to popularise the principle 
 by writing ; and, what is better than writing, small pre- 
 liminary bits of experiment. There is so much that is
 
 150 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 wearisome and detestable in all other election machineries, 
 that I well understand, and wish I could share, the sense 
 of relief with which the believers in this scheme throw 
 aside all their trammels, and look to an almost ideal 
 future when this captivating plan is carried. 
 
 Mr. Hare's scheme cannot be satisfactorily discussed in 
 the elaborate form in which he presents it. No common 
 person readily apprehends all the details in which, with 
 loving care, he has embodied it. He was so anxious to 
 prove what could be done, that he has confused most 
 people as to what it is. I have heard a man say, " He 
 never could remember it two days running." But the 
 difficulty which I feel is fundamental, and wholly inde- 
 pendent of detail. 
 
 There are two modes in which constituencies may be 
 made. First, the law may make them, as in England 
 and almost everywhere : the law -may say such and such 
 qualifications shall give a vote for constituency X ; those 
 who have that qualification shall be constituency X. 
 These are what we may call compulsory constituencies, 
 and we know all about them. Or, secondly, the law may 
 leave the electors themselves to make them. The law 
 may say all the adult males of a country shall vote, or 
 those males who can read and write, or those who have 
 50 a year, or any persons any way defined, and then 
 leave those voters to group themselves as they like. Sup- 
 pose there were 658,000 voters to elect the House of 
 Commons ; it is possible for the legislature to say, " We 
 do not care how you combine. On a given day let each 
 set of persons give notice in what group they mean to
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 151 
 
 vote ; if every voter gives notice, and every one looks to 
 make the most of his vote, each group will have just 
 1000. But the law shall not make this necessary it 
 shall take the 658 most numerous groups, no matter 
 whether they have 2000, or 1000, or 900, or 800 votes 
 the most numerous groups, whatever their number may 
 be ; and these shall be the constituencies of the nation." 
 These are voluntary constituencies, if I may so call them ; 
 the simplest kind of voluntary constituencies. Mr. Hare 
 proposes a far more complex kind; but to show the 
 merits and demerits of the voluntary principle the simplest 
 form is much the best. 
 
 The temptation to that principle is very plain. Under 
 the compulsory form of constituency the votes of the 
 minorities are thrown away. In the city of London, now, 
 there are many Tories, but all the members are Whigs ; 
 every London Tory, therefore, is by law and principle 
 misrepresented: his city sends to Parliament not the 
 member whom he wished to have, but the member he 
 wished not to have. But upon the voluntary system the 
 London Tories, who are far more than 1000 in number, 
 may combine ; they may make a constituency, and return 
 a member. In many existing constituencies the disfran- 
 chisement of minorities is hopeless and chronic. I have 
 myself had a vote for an agricultural county for twenty 
 years, and I am a Liberal ; but two Tories have always 
 been returned, and all my life will be returned. As mat- 
 ters now stand, my vote is of no use. But if I could 
 combine with 1000 other Liberals in that and other Con- 
 servative counties, we might choose a Liberal member.
 
 152 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Again, this plan gets rid of all our difficulties as to the 
 size of constituencies. It is said to be unreasonable that 
 Liverpool should return only the same number of members 
 as King's Lynn or Lyrne Regis ; but upon the voluntary 
 plan, Liverpool could come down to King's Lynn. The 
 Liberal minority in King's Lynn could communicate 
 with the Liberal minority in Liverpool, and make up 
 1000 ; and so everywhere. The numbers of popular 
 places would gain what is called their legitimate advan- 
 tage ; they would, when constituencies are voluntarily 
 made, be able to make, and be willing to make the 
 greatest number of constituencies. 
 
 Again, the admirers of a great man could make a 
 worthy constituency for him. As it is, Mr. Mill was 
 returned by the- electors of Westminster ; and they have 
 never, since they had members, done themselves so great 
 an honour. But what did the electors of Westminster 
 know of Mr. Mill ? What fraction of his mind could be 
 imagined by any percentage of their minds ? A great 
 deal of his genius most of them would not like. They 
 meant to do homage to mental ability, but it was the 
 worship of an unknown God if ever there was such a 
 thing in this world. But upon the voluntary plan, one 
 thousand out of the many thousand students of Mr. Mill's 
 book could have made an appreciating constituency for 
 him. 
 
 I could reckon other advantages, but I have to object 
 to the scheme, not to recommend it. What are the counter- 
 weights which overpower these merits ? I reply that the 
 voluntary composition of constituencies appears to me
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 153 
 
 inconsistent with the necessary pre-requisites of parlia- 
 mentary government as they have been just laid down. 
 
 Under the voluntary system, the crisis of politics is 
 not the election of the member, but the making the 
 constituency. President-making is already a trade in 
 America; and constituency-making would, under the 
 voluntary plan, be a trade here. Every party would 
 have a numerical problem to solve. The leaders would 
 say, " We have 350,000 votes, we must take care to have 
 350 members ; " and the only way to obtain them is to 
 organise. A man who wanted to compose part of a 
 Liberal constituency must not himself hunt for 1000 
 other Liberals ; if he did, after writing 10,000 letters, he 
 would probably find he was making part of a con- 
 stituency of 100, all whose votes would be thrown away, 
 the constituency being too small to be reckoned. Such 
 a Liberal must write to the great Registration Associa- 
 tion in Parliament Street; he must communicate with 
 its able managers, and they would soon use his vote for 
 him. They would say, " Sir, you are late ; Mr. Gladstone, 
 sir, is full. He got his 1000 last year. Most of the 
 gentlemen you read of in the papers are full. As soon as 
 a gentleman makes a nice speech, we get a heap of letters 
 to say, 'Make us into that gentleman's constituency.' 
 But we cannot do that. Here is our list. If you do not 
 want to throw your vote away, you must be guided by 
 us : here are three very satisfactory gentlemen (and one 
 is an Honourable) : you may vote for either of these, and 
 we will write your name down ; but if you go voting 
 wildly, you'll be thrown out altogether."
 
 154 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 The evident result of this organisation would be the 
 return of party men mainly. The member-makers would 
 i look, not for independence, but for subservience and 
 they could hardly be blamed for so doing. They are 
 agents for the Liberal party ; and, as such, they should 
 be guided by what they take to be the wishes of their 
 principal. The mass of the Liberal party wishes measure 
 A, measure B, measure C. The managers of the regis- 
 tration the skilled manipulators are busy men. They 
 would say, " Sir, here is our card ; if you want to get into 
 Parliament on our side, you must go for that card; it 
 was drawn up by Mr. Lloyd ; he used to be engaged on 
 railways, but since they passed this new voting plan, we 
 get him to attend to us ; it is a sound card ; stick to that 
 and you will be right." Upon this (in theory) voluntary 
 plan, you would get together a set of members bound 
 hard and fast with party bands and fetters, infinitely 
 tighter than any members now. 
 
 Whoever hopes anything from desultory popular action 
 if matched against systematised popular action, should con- 
 sider the way in which the American President is chosen 
 The plan was that the citizens at large should vote for 
 the statesman they liked best. But no one does anything 
 of the sort. They vote for the ticket made by "the 
 caucus," and the caucus is a sort of representative meet- 
 ing which sits voting and voting till they have cut out 
 all the known men against whom much is to be said, 
 and agreed on some unknown man against whom there 
 is nothing known, and therefore nothing to be alleged. 
 Caucuses, or their equivalent, would be far worse here in
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 155 
 
 const! tuency-making than there in President-making, 
 because on great occasions the American nation can fix 
 on some < ne great man whom it knows, but the English 
 nation could not fix on 658 great men and choose them. 
 It does not know so many, and if it did, would go wrong 
 in the difficulties of the manipulation. 
 
 But though a common voter could only be ranged in 
 an effectual constituency, and a common candidate only 
 reach a constituency by obeying the orders of the political 
 election-contrivers upon his side, certain voters and cer- 
 tain members would be quite independent of both. There 
 are organisations in this country which would soon make 
 a set of constituencies for themselves. Every chapel 
 would be an office for vote transferring before the plan 
 had been known three months. The Church would be 
 much slower in learning it and much less handy in using 
 it; but would learn. At present the Dissenters are a 
 most energetic and valuable component of the Liberal 
 party ; but under the voluntary plan they would not be 
 a component they would be a separate, independent 
 element. We now propose to group boroughs ; but then 
 they would combine chapels. There would be a. member 
 for the Baptist congregation of Tavistock, cum Totnes, 
 cum, &c., &c. 
 
 The full force of this cannot be appreciated except by 
 referring to the former proof that the mass of a Par- 
 liament ought to be men of moderate sentiments, or they 
 will elect an immoderate ministry, and enact violent 
 laws. But upon the plan suggested, the House would be 
 made up of party politicians selected by a party com-
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 mittee, chained to that committee and pledged to party 
 violence, and of characteristic, and therefore immoderate 
 representatives, for every " ism " in all England. Instead 
 of a deliberate assembly of moderate and judicious men, 
 we should have a various compound of all sorts of 
 violence. 
 
 I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have 
 not reached the worst. Bad as these members would be, 
 if they were left to themselves if, in a free Parliament, 
 they were confronted with the perils of government, close 
 responsibility might improve them and make them 
 tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A 
 voluntary constituency will nearly always be a despotic 
 constituency. Even in the best case, where a set of 
 earnest men choose a member to expound their earnest- 
 ness, they will look after him to see that he does expound 
 it. The members will be like the minister of a dissenting 
 congregation. That congregation is collected by a unity 
 of sentiment in doctrine A, and the preacher is to preach 
 doctrine A ; if he does not, he is dismissed. At present 
 the member is free because the constituency is not in 
 earnest; no constituency has an acute, accurate doctrinal 
 creed in politics. The law made the constituencies by 
 geographical divisions ; and they are not bound together 
 by close unity of belief. They have vague preferences 
 for particular doctrines; and that is all. But a voluntary 
 constituency would be a church with tenets ; it would 
 make its representative the messenger of its mandates, 
 and the delegate of its determinations. As in the case of 
 a dissenting congregation, one /rreat minister sometimes
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 157 
 
 rules it, while ninety-nine ministers in the hundred are 
 ruled by it, so here one noted man would rule his electors, 
 but the electors would rule all the others. 
 
 Thus, the members for a good voluntary constituency 
 would be hopelessly enslaved, because of its goodness; 
 but the members for a bad voluntary constituency would 
 be yet more enslaved because of its badness. The makers 
 of these constituencies would keep the despotism in their 
 own hands. In America there is a division of politicians 
 into wire-pullers and blowers; under the voluntary system 
 the member of Parliament would be the only momentary 
 mouth-piece the impotent blower; while the consti- 
 tuency-maker would be the latent wire-puller the con- 
 stant autocrat. He would write to gentlemen in Par- 
 liament, and say, " You were elected upon ' the Liberal 
 ticket ; ' and if you deviate from that ticket you cannot 
 be chosen again." And there would be no appeal for a 
 common-minded man. He is no more likely to make a 
 constituency for himself than a mole is likely to make a 
 planet. 
 
 It may indeed be said that against a septennial 
 Parliament such machinations would be powerless ; that 
 a member elected for seven years might defy the remon- 
 strances of an earnest constituency, or the imprecations 
 of the latent manipulators. But after the voluntary 
 composition of constituencies, there would soon be but 
 short-lived Parliaments. Earnest constituencies would 
 exact frequent elections; they would not like to part with 
 their virtue for a long period; it would anger them to see 
 it used contrary to their wishes, amid circumstances
 
 158 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 which at the election no one thought of. A seven years' 
 Parliament is often chosen in one political period, lasts 
 through a second, and is dissolved in a third. A con- 
 stituency collected by law and on compulsion endures 
 this change because it has no collective earnestness ; it 
 does not mind seeing the power it gave used in a manner 
 that it could not have foreseen. But a self-formed con- 
 stituency of eager opinions, a missionary constituency, so 
 to speak, would object; it would think it its bounden 
 duty to object ; and the crafty manipulators, though they 
 said nothing, in silence would object still more. The two 
 together would enjoin annual elections, and would rule 
 their members unflinchingly. 
 
 O J 
 
 The voluntary plan, therefore, when tried in this easy 
 form, is inconsistent with the extrinsic independence as 
 well as with the inherent moderation of a Parliament 
 two of the conditions which, as we have seen, are essential 
 to the bare possibility of parliamentary government. The 
 same objections, as is inevitable, adhere to that principle 
 under its more complicated forms. It is in vain to pile 
 detail on detail when the objection is one of first prin- 
 ciple. If the above reasoning be sound, compulsory 
 constituencies are necessary, voluntary constituencies 
 destructive ; the optional transferability of votes is not a 
 salutary aid, but a ruinous innovation. 
 
 I have dwelt upon the proposal of Mr. Hare and upon 
 the ultra-democratic proposal, not only because of the 
 high intellectual interest of the former and the possible 
 practical interest of the latter, but because they tend to 
 bring into relief two at least of the necessary conditions
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONi 159 
 
 of parliamentary government. But besides these neces- 
 sary qualities which are needful before a parliamentary 
 government can work at all, there are some additional 
 pre-requisites before it can work well. That a House of 
 Commons may work well it must perform, as we saw, five 
 functions well : it must elect a ministry well, legislate 
 well, teach the nation well, express the nation's will well, 
 bring matters to the nation's attention well. 
 
 Tho discussion has a difficulty of its own. What is 
 meant by " well ? " Who is to judge ? Is it to be some 
 panel of philosophers, some fancied posterity, or some 
 other outside authority ? I answer, no philosophy, no 
 posterity, no external authority, but the English nation 
 here and now. 
 
 Free government is self-government a government of 
 the people by the people. The best government of this 
 sort is that which the people think best. An imposed 
 government, a government like that of the English in 
 India, may very possibly be better ; it may represent the 
 views of a higher race than the governed race ; but it is 
 not therefore a free government. A free government is 
 that which the people subject to it voluntarily choose. 
 In a casual collection of loose people the only possible 
 free government is a democratic government. Where no 
 one knows, or cares for, or respects any one else all must 
 rank equal; no one's opinion can be more potent than 
 that of another. But, as has been : explained, a deferen- 
 tial nation has a structure of its own. Certain persons 
 are by common consent agreed to be wiser than others, 
 and their opinion is, by consent, to rank for much more
 
 160 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 than its numerical value. We may in these happy nations 
 weigh votes as well as count them, though in less favoured 
 countries we can count only. But in free nations, the 
 votes so weighed or so counted must decide. A perfect 
 free government is one which decides perfectly according 
 to those votes ; an imperfect, one which so decides imper- 
 fectly ; a bad, one which does not so decide at all. Public 
 opinion is the test of this polity ; the best opinion which 
 with its existing habits of deference, the nation will 
 accept : if the free government goes by that opinion, it is 
 a good government of its species ; if it contravenes that 
 opinion, it is a bad one. 
 
 Tried by this rule the House of Commons does its 
 appointing business welL It chooses rulers as we wish 
 rulers to be chosen. If it did not, in a speaking and 
 writing age we should soon know. I have heard a 
 great Liberal statesman say, "The time was coming 
 when we must advertise for a grievance/'* What a 
 good grievance it would be were the ministry appointed 
 and retained by the Parliament a ministry detested by 
 the nation. An anti-president government league would 
 be instantly created, and it would be more instantly 
 powerful and more instantly successful than the Anti- 
 Corn-Law League. 
 
 It has, indeed, been objected that the choosing business 
 of Parliament is done ill, because it does not choose strong 
 governments. And it is certain that when public opinion 
 does not definitely decide upon a marked policy, and when 
 in consequence parties in the Parliament are nearly even, 
 
 * This was said in 1858.
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 161 
 
 individual cupidity and changeability may make Parlia- 
 ment change its appointees too often ; may induce them 
 never enough to trust any of them ; may make it keep all 
 of them under a suspended sentence of coming dismissal. 
 But the experience of Lord Palmerston's second Govern- 
 ment proves, I think, that these fears are exaggerated. 
 When the choice of a nation is really fixed on a statesman. 
 Parliament will fix upon him too. The parties in the 
 Parliament of 1859 were as nearly divided as in any pro- 
 bable Parliament ; a great many Liberals did not much 
 like Lord Palmerston, and they would have gladly co- 
 operated in an attempt to dethrone him. Bui the same 
 influence acted on Parliament within which acted on the 
 nation without. The moderate men of both parties were 
 satisfied that Lord Palmerston's was the best government, 
 and they therefore preserved it though it was hated by 
 the immoderate on both sides. We have then found by 
 a critical instance that a government supported by what 
 I may call " the common element," by the like-minded 
 men of unlike parties, will be retained in power, though 
 parties are even, and though, as Treasury counting 
 reckons, the majority is imperceptible. If happily, by its 
 intelligence and attractiveness, a cabinet can gain a hold 
 upon the great middle part of Parliament, it will continue 
 to exist notwithstanding the hatching of small plots and 
 the machinations of mean factions. 
 
 On the whole, I think it indisputable that the selecting 
 task of Parliament is performed as well as public opinion 
 wishes it to be performed ; and if we want to improve 
 that standard, we must first improve the English nation> 
 
 M
 
 102 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 which imposes that standard. Of the substantial part of 
 its legislative task the same, too, may, I think, be said. 
 The manner of our legislation is indeed detestable, and 
 the machinery for settling that manner odious. A com- 
 mittee of the whole House, dealing, or attempting to deal 
 with the elaborate clauses of a long Bill, is a wretched 
 specimen of severe but misplaced labour. It is sure to 
 wedge some clause into the Act, such as that which the 
 judge said " seemed to have fallen by itself, perhaps, from 
 heaven, into the mind of the legislature," so little had it 
 to do with anything on either side or around it. At such 
 times government by a public meeting displays its in- 
 herent defects, and is little restrained by its necessary 
 checks. But the essence of our legislature may be sepa- 
 rated from its accidents. Subject to two considerable 
 defects I think Parliament passes laws as the nation 
 wishes to have them passed. 
 
 Thirty years ago this was not so. The nation had out- 
 grown its institutions, and was cramped by them. It was 
 a man in the clothes of a boy ; every limb wanted more 
 room, and every garment to be fresh made. " D-mn me," 
 said Lord Eldon in the dialect of his age, " if I had to 
 begin life again I would begin as an agitator." The 
 shrewd old man saw that the best life was that of a mis- 
 cellaneous objector to the old world, though he loved that 
 world, believed in it, could imagine no other. But he 
 would not say so now. There is no worse trade than agi- 
 tation at this time. A man can hardly get an audience 
 if he wishes to complain of anything. Nowadays, not 
 only does the mind and policy of Parliament (subject to
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 163 
 
 the exceptions before named) possess the common sort of 
 moderation essential to the possibility of parliamentary 
 government, but also that exact gradation, that precise 
 species of moderation, most agreeable to the nation at 
 large. Not only does the nation endure a parliamentary 
 government, which it would not do if Parliament were 
 immoderate, but it likes parliamentary government. A 
 sense of satisfaction permeates the country because most 
 of the country feels it has got the precise thing that 
 suits it. 
 
 The exceptions are two. First. That Parliament leans 
 too much to the opinions of the landed interest. The 
 Cattle Plague Act is a conspicuous instance of this defect. 
 The details of that Bill may be good or bad, and its policy 
 wise or foolisli. But the manner in which it was hurried 
 through the House savoured of despotism. The cotton 
 trade or the wine trade could not, in their maximum of 
 peril, have obtained such aid in such a manner. The 
 House of Commons would hear of no pause and would heed 
 no arguments. The greatest number of them feared for 
 their incomes. The land of England returns many mem- 
 bers annually for the counties ; these members the con- 
 stitution gave them. But what is curious is that the 
 landed interest gives no seats to other classes, but takes 
 plenty of seats from other classes. Half the boroughs in 
 England are represented by considerable landowners, and 
 when rent is in question, as in the cattle case, they think 
 more of themselves than of those who sent them. In 
 number the landed gentry in the House far surpass any 
 other class. They have, too, a more intimate connection
 
 164 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 with one another ; they were educated at the same schools 
 know one another's family name from boyhood ; form a 
 society ; are the same kind of men ; marry the same kind 
 of women. The merchants and manufacturers in Parlia- 
 ment are a motley race one educated here, another there, 
 a third not educated at all ; some are of the second gene- 
 ration of traders, who consider self-made men intruders 
 upon an hereditary place; others are self-made, and 
 regard the men of inherited wealth, which they did not 
 make and do not augment, as beings of neither mind nor 
 place, inferior to themselves because they have no brains, 
 and inferior to Lords because they have no rank. Traders 
 have no bond of union, no habits of intercourse ; their 
 wives, if they care for society, want to see not the wives 
 of other such men, but " better people," as they say the 
 wives of men certainly with land, and, if Heaven help, 
 with the titles. Men who study the structure of Parlia- 
 ment, not in abstract books, but in the concrete London 
 world, wonder not that the landed interest is very power- 
 ful, but that it is not despotic. I believe it would be 
 despotic if it were clever, or rather if its representatives 
 were so, but it has a fixed device to make them stupid. 
 The counties not only elect landowners, which is natural, 
 and perhaps wise, but also elect only landowners of their 
 own county, which is absurd. There is no free trade in 
 the agricultural mind ; each county prohibits the import 
 of able men from other counties. This is why eloquent 
 sceptics Bolingbroke and Disraeli have been so apt to 
 lead the unsceptical Tories. They will have people with 
 a great piece of land in a particular spot, and of course
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 165 
 
 these people generally cannot speak, and often cannot 
 think. And so eloquent men who laugh at the party come 
 to lead the party. The landed interest has much more 
 influence than it should have ; but it wastes that influence 
 so much that the excess is, except on singular occurrences 
 (like the cattle plague), of secondary moment. 
 
 It is almost another side of the same matter to say that 
 the structure of Parliament gives too little weight to the ' 
 growing districts of the country and too much to the 
 stationary. In old times the south of England was not 
 only the pleasantest but the greatest part of England. 
 Devonshire was a great maritime county when the foun- 
 dations of our representation were fixed ; Somersetshire 
 and Wiltshire great manufacturing counties. The harsher 
 climate of the northern counties was associated with a 
 ruder, a stern, and a sparser people. The immense pre- 
 ponderance which our Parliament gave before 1832, and 
 though pruned and mitigated, still gives to England south 
 of the Trent, then corresponded to a real preponderance 
 in wealth and mind. How opposite the present contrast 
 is we all know. And the case gets worse every day. The 
 nature of modern trade is to give to those who have much 
 and take from those who have little. Manufacture goes 
 where manufacture is, because there and there alone it 
 finds attendant and auxiliary manufacture. Every rail- 
 way takes trade from the little town to the big town 
 because it enables the customer to buy in the big town. 
 \Tear by year the North (as we may roughly call the new 
 industrial world) gets more important, and the South 
 (.^s we may call the pleasant remnant of old times) gets
 
 166 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 less important. It is a grave objection to our existing 
 parliamentary constitution that it gives much power to 
 regions of past greatness, and refuses equal power to 
 regions of present greatness. 
 
 I think (though it is not a popular notion) that by far 
 the greater part of the cry for parliamentary reform is due 
 to this inequality. The great capitalists, Mr. Bright and 
 his friends, believe they are sincere in asking for more 
 power for the working man, but, in fact, they very natu- 
 rally and very properly want more power for themselves. 
 They cannot endure they ought not to endure that a 
 rich, able manufacturer should be a less man than a small 
 stupid squire. The notions of political equality which 
 Mr. Bright puts forward are as old as political speculation, 
 and have been refuted by the first efforts of that specula- 
 tion. But for all that they are likely to last as long as 
 political society, because they are based upon indelible 
 principles in human nature. Edmund Burke called the 
 first East Indians, " Jacobins to a man," because they did 
 not feel their " present importance equal to their real 
 wealth." So long as there is an uneasy class, a class which 
 has not its just power, it will rashly clutch and blindly 
 believe the notion that all men should have the same 
 power. 
 
 I do not consider the exclusion of the working classes 
 from effectual representation a defect in this aspect of 
 our parliamentary representation. The working classes 
 contribute almost nothing to our corporate public opinion, 
 and therefore, the fact of their want of influence in Par- 
 liament does not impair the coincidence of Parliament
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 1C7 
 
 with public opinion. They are left out in the representa- 
 tion, and also in the thing represented. 
 
 Nor do I think the number of persons of aristocratic 
 descent in Parliament impairs the accordance of Par- 
 liament with public opinion. No doubt the direct de- 
 scendants and collateral relatives of noble families supply 
 members to parliament in far greater proportion than is 
 warranted by the number of such families in comparison 
 with the whole nation. But I do not believe that these 
 families have the least corporate character, or any common 
 opinions, different from others of the landed gentry. They 
 have the opinions of the propertied rank in which they 
 were born. The English aristocracy have never been a 
 caste apart, and are not a caste apart now. They would 
 keep up nothing that other landed gentlemen would not. 
 And if any landed gentlemen are to be sent to the House 
 of Commons, it is desirable that many should be men of 
 some rank. As long as we keep up a double set of insti- 
 tutions, one dignified and intended to impress the many, 
 the other efficient and intended to govern the many, we 
 should take care that the two match nicely, and hide 
 where the one begins and where the other ends. This is 
 in part effected by conceding some subordinate power to 
 the august part of our polity, but it is equally aided by 
 keeping an aristocratic element in the useful part of our 
 polity. In truth, the deferential instinct secures both. 
 Aristocracy is a power in the " constituencies." A man 
 who is an honourable or a baronet, or better yet, perhaps, 
 a real earl, though Irish, is coveted by half the electing 
 bodies ; and ccetei^is paribus, a manufacturer's son has no
 
 168 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 chance with him. The reality of the deferential feeling 
 in the community is tested by the actual election of the 
 class deferred to, where there is a large free choice be- 
 twixt it and others. 
 
 Subject therefore to the two minor, but still not in- 
 considerable, defects I have named, Parliament conforms 
 itself accurately enough, both as a chooser of executives 
 and as a legislature, to the formed opinion of the country. 
 Similarly, and subject to the same exceptions, it expresses 
 the nation's opinion in words well, when it happens that 
 words, not laws, are wanted. On foreign matters, where 
 we cannot legislate, whatever the English nation thinks, 
 or thinks it thinks, as to the critical events of the world, 
 whether in Denmark, in Italy, or America, and no matter 
 whether it thinks wisely or unwisely, that same some- 
 thing, wise or unwise, will be thoroughly well said in 
 Parliament. The lyrical function of Parliament, if I may 
 use such a phrase, is well done ; it pours out in charac- 
 teristic words the characteristic heart of the nation. And 
 it can do little more useful. Now that free government 
 is in Europe so rare and in America so distant, the 
 opinion, even the incomplete, erroneous, rapid opinion of 
 the free English people is invaluable. It may be very 
 wrong, but it is sure to be unique ; and if it is right it is 
 sure to contain matter of great magnitude, for it is only 
 a first-class matter in distant things which a free people 
 ever sees or learns. The English people must miss a 
 thousand minutiee that continental bureaucracies know 
 even too well; but if they see a cardinal truth which 
 those bureaucracies miss, that cardinal truth may greatly 
 help the world.
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 
 
 But if in these ways, and subject to these exceptions, 
 Parliament by its policy and its speech well embodies 
 and expresses public opinion, I own I think it must be 
 conceded that it is not equally successful in elevating 
 public opinion. The teaching task of Parliament is the 
 task it does worst. Probably at this moment, it is natural 
 to exaggerate this defect. The greatest teacher of all in 
 Parliament, the head-master of the nation, the great 
 elevator of the country so far as Parliament elevates it 
 must be the Prime Minister: he has an influence, an 
 authority, a facility in giving a great tone to discussion, 
 or a mean tone, which no other man has. Now Lord 
 Palmerston for many years steadily applied his mind to 
 giving, not indeed a mean tone, but a light tone, to the 
 proceedings of Parliament. One of his greatest admirers 
 has since his death told a story of which he scarcely sees, 
 or seems to see, the full effect. When Lord Palmerston 
 was first made leader of the House, his jaunty manner 
 was not at all popular, and some predicted failure. " No," 
 said an old member, " he will soon educate us down to his 
 level ; the House will soon prefer this Ha ! Ha ! style to 
 the wit of Canning and the gravity of Peel." I am afraid 
 that we must own that the prophecy was accomplished. 
 No prime minister, so popular and so influential, has 
 ever left in the public memory so little noble teaching. 
 Twenty years hence, when men inquire as to the then 
 fading memory of Palmerston, we shall be able to point 
 to no great truth which he taught, no great distinct policy 
 which he embodied, no noble words which once fascinated 
 his age, and which, in after years, men would not willingly
 
 170 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 let die. But we shall be able to say " he had a genial 
 manner, a firm, sound sense ; he had a kind of cant of 
 insincerity, but we always knew what he meant ; he had 
 the brain of a ruler in the clothes of a man of fashion." 
 Posterity will hardly understand the words of the aged 
 reminiscent, but we now feel their effect. The House of 
 Commons, since it caught its tone from such a statesman, 
 has taught the nation worse, and elevated it less, than 
 usual 
 
 I think, however, that a correct observer would decide 
 that in general, and on principle, the House of Commons 
 does not teach the public as much as it might teach it, 
 or as the public would wish to learn. I do not wish very 
 abstract, very philosophical, very hard matters to be stated 
 in Parliament. The teaching there given must be popular, 
 and to be popular it must be concrete, embodied, short. 
 The problem is to know the highest truth which the 
 people will bear, and to inculcate and preach that. 
 Certainly Lord Palmerston did not preach it. He a 
 little degraded us by preaching a doctrine just below GUI 
 own standard ; a doctrine not enough below us to repel 
 us much, but yet enough below to harm us by augment- 
 ing a worldliness which needed no addition, and by 
 diminishing a love of principle and philosophy which did 
 not want deduction. 
 
 In comparison with the debates of any other assembly, 
 it is true the debates by the English Parliament are most 
 instructive. The debates in the American Congress have 
 little teaching efficacy; it is the characteristic vice of 
 Presidential Government to deprive them of that efficacy;
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 171 
 
 in that government a debate in the legislature has little 
 effect, for it cannot turn out the executive, and the exe- 
 cutive can veto all it decides. The French Chambers* 
 are suitable appendages to an Empire which desires the 
 power of despotism without its shame ; they prevent the 
 enemies of the Empire being quite correct when they say 
 there is no free speech ; a few permitted objectors fill the 
 air with eloquence, which every one knows to be often 
 true, and always vain. The debates in an English Par- 
 liament fill a space in the world which, in these auxiliary 
 chambers, is not possible. But I think any one who 
 compares the discussions on great questions in the higher 
 part of the press, with the discussions in Parliament, will 
 feel that there is (of course amid much exaggeration and 
 vagueness) a greater vigour and a higher meaning in the 
 writing than in the speech : a vigour which the public 
 appreciate a meaning that they like to hear. 
 
 The Saturday Review said, some years since, that the 
 ability of Parliament was a " protected ability : " that 
 there was at the door a differential duty of at least 2,000?. 
 a year. Accordingly the House of Commons, represent- 
 ing only mind coupled with property, is not equal in mind 
 to a legislature chosen for mind only, and whether accom- 
 panied by wealth or not. But I do not for a moment 
 wish to see a representation of pure mind ; it would be 
 contrary to the main thesis of this essay. I maintain that 
 Parliament ought to embody the public opinion of the 
 English nation ; and, certainly, that opinion is much more 
 fixed by its property than by its mind. The " too clever 
 
 * This of course relates to the assemblies of the Empire.
 
 172 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 by half " people who live in "Bohemia," ought to have 
 no more influence in Parliament than they have in 
 England, and they can scarcely have less. Only, after 
 every great abatement and deduction, I think the country 
 would bear a little more mind; and that there is a pro- 
 fusion of opulent dulness in Parliament which might a 
 little though only a little be pruned away. 
 
 The only function of Parliament which remains to be 
 considered is the informing function, as I just now called 
 it ; the function which belongs to it, or to members of it, 
 to bring before the nation the ideas, grievances, and 
 wishes of special classes. This must not be confounded, 
 with what I have called its teaching function. In life-, 
 no doubt, the two run one into another. But so do many 
 things which it is very important in definition to separate. 
 The facts of two things being often found together is 
 rather a reason for, than an objection to, separating them, 
 in idea. Sometimes they are not found together, and! 
 then we may be puzzled if we have not trained ourselves, 
 to separate them. The teaching function brings true 
 ideas, before the nation, and is the function of its highest 
 minds. The expressive function brings only special ideas, 
 and is the function of but special minds. Each class 
 has its ideas, wants, and notions; and certain brains 
 are ingrained with them. Such sectarian conceptions 
 are not those by which a determining nation should 
 regulate its action, nor are orators, mainly animated by 
 such conceptions, safe guides in policy. But those orators 
 should be heard; those conceptions should be kept in 
 Bight. The great maxim of modern thought is not only
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 173 
 
 the toleration of everything, but the examination of 
 everything. It is by examining very bare, very dull, 
 very unpromising things, that modern science has come 
 to be what it is. There is a story of a great chemist who 
 said he owed half his fame to his habit of examining 
 after his experiments, what was going to be thrown 
 away: everybody knew the result of the experiment 
 itself, but in the refuse matter there were many little 
 facts and unknown changes, which suggested the dis- 
 coveries of a famous life to a person capable of looking 
 for them. So with the special notions of neglected 
 classes. They may contain elements of truth which, 
 though small, are the very elements which we now 
 require, because we already know all the rest. 
 
 This doctrine was well known to our ancestors. They 
 laboured to give a character to the various constituencies, 
 or to many of them. They wished that the shipping 
 trade, the wool trade, the linen trade, should each have 
 their spokesman ; that the unsectional Parliament should 
 know what each section in the nation thought before it 
 gave the national decision. This is the true reason for 
 admitting the working classes to a share in the repre- 
 sentation, at least as far as the composition of Parliament 
 is to be improved by that admission. A great many ideas, 
 a great many feelings have gathered among the town 
 artisans a peculiar intellectual life has sprung up among 
 them. They believe that they have interests which arc 
 misconceived or neglected; that they know something 
 which others do not know ; that the thoughts of Parlia- 
 ment are not as their thoughts. They ought to be allowed
 
 174i THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to try to convince Parliament ; their notions ought to be 
 stated as those of other classes are stated ; their advocates 
 should be heard as other people's advocates are heard. 
 Before the Reform Bill, there was a recognised machinery 
 for that purpose. The member for Westminster, and 
 other members, were elected by universal suffrage (or 
 what was in substance such) ; those members did, in their 
 day, state what were the grievances and ideas or were 
 thought to be the grievances and ideas of the working 
 classes. It was the single, unbending franchise introduced 
 in 1832 that has caused this difficulty, as it has others. 
 
 Until such a change is made the House of Commons 
 will be defective, just as the House of Lords was defective. 
 It will not look right. As long as the Lords do not come 
 to their own House, we may prove on paper that it is a 
 good revising chamber, but it will be difficult to make 
 the literary argument felt. Just so, as long as a great 
 class, congregated in political localities, and known to 
 have political thoughts and wishes, is without notorious 
 and palpable advocates in Parliament, we may prove on 
 paper that our representation is adequate, bub the world 
 will not believe it. There is a saying in the eighteenth 
 century, that in politics, "gross appearances are great 
 realities." It is in vain to demonstrate that the working 
 classes have no grievances ; that the middle classes have 
 done all that is possible for them, and so on with a crowd 
 of arguments which I need not repeat, for the newspapers 
 keep them in type, and we can say them by heart. But 
 so long as the " gross appearance " is that there are no 
 evident, incessant representatives to speak the wants of
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. 175 
 
 artizans, the " great reality " will be a diffused dissatis- 
 faction. Thirty years ago it was vain to prove that 
 Gatton and Old Sarum were valuable seats, and sent good 
 members. Everybody said, " Why, there are no people 
 there." Just so everybody must say now, " Our repre- 
 sentative system must be imperfect, for an immense class 
 has no members to speak for it." The only answer to 
 the cry against constituencies without inhabitants was to 
 transfer their power to constituencies with inhabitants. 
 Just so, the way to stop the complaint that artizans have 
 no members is to give them members, to create a body 
 of representatives, chosen by artizans, believing, as Mr. 
 Carlyle would say, " that artizanism is the one thing 
 needful"
 
 176 
 
 No. VL 
 
 ON CHANGES OF MINISTRY, 
 
 THERE is one error as to the English Constitution which 
 crops up periodically. Circumstances which often, though 
 irregularly, occur naturally suggests that error, and as 
 surely as they happen it revives. The relation of Parlia- 
 ment, and especially of the House of Commons, to the 
 Executive Government is the specific peculiarity of our 
 constitution, and an event which frequently happens 
 much puzzles some people as to it. 
 
 That event is a change of ministry. All our adminis- 
 trators go out together. The whole executive govern- 
 ment changes at least, all the heads of it change in a 
 body, and at every such change some speculators are sure 
 to exclaim that such a habit is foolish. They say, " No 
 doubt Mr. Gladstone and Lord Russell may have been 
 wrong about Reform ; no doubt Mr. Gladstone may have 
 been cross in the House of Commons; but why should 
 either or both of these events change all the heads of all 
 our practical departments ? What could be more absurd 
 than what happened in 1858 ? Lord Palmerston was for 
 once in his life over-buoyant ; he gave rude answers to 
 stupid inquiries ; he brought into the Cabinet a nobleman
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 177 
 
 concerned in an ugly trial about a woman; he, or his 
 Foreign Secretary, did not answer a French despatch by 
 a despatch, but told our ambassador to reply orally. And 
 because of these trifles, or at any rate these isolated un- 
 administrative mistakes, all our administration had fresh 
 heads. The Poor Law Board had a new chief, the Home 
 Department a new chief, the Public Works a new chief. 
 Surely this was absurd." Now, is this objection good or 
 bad ? Speaking generally, is it wise so to change all our 
 rulers ? 
 
 The practice produces three great evils. First, it | 
 brings in on a sudden new persons and untried persons > 
 to preside over our policy. A little while ago Lord Cran- 
 borne * had no more idea that he would now be Indian 
 Secretary than that he would be a bill broker. He had 
 never given any attention to Indian affairs ; he can get 
 them up, because he is an able educated man who can 
 get up anything. But they are not " part and parcel " of 
 his mind; not his subjects of familiar reflection, nor 
 things of which he thinks by predilection, of which he 
 cannot help thinking. But because Lord Russell and 
 Mr. Gladstone did not please the House of Commons 
 about Reform, there he is. A perfectly inexperienced 
 man, so far as Indian affairs go, rules all our Indian em- 
 pire. And if all our heads of offices change together, so 
 very frequently it must be. If twenty offices are vacant 
 at once, there are almost never twenty tried, competent, 
 clever men ready to take them. The difficulty of making 
 
 * Now Lord Salisbury, who, when this was written, was Indian 
 Secretary. Note to second edition. 
 
 N
 
 
 178 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION". 
 
 up a government is very much like the difficulty of put- 
 ting together a Chinese puzzle: the spaces do not suit 
 what you have to put into them. And the difficulty of 
 matching a ministry is more than that of fitting a puzzle, 
 because the ministers to be put in can object, though the 
 bits of a puzzle cannot. One objector can throw out the 
 combination. In 1847 Lord Grey would not join Lord 
 John Russell's projected government if Lord Palmerston 
 was to be Foreign Secretary ; Lord Palmerston would be 
 Foreign Secretary, and so the government was not 
 formed. The cases in which a single refusal prevents a 
 government are rare, and there must be many concurrent 
 circumstances to make it effectual. But the cases in 
 which refusals impair or spoil a government are very 
 common. It almost never happens that the ministry- 
 maker can put into his offices exactly whom he would 
 like ; a number of placemen are always too proud, too 
 eager, or too obstinate to go just where they should. 
 
 Again, this system not only makes new ministers 
 ignorant, but keeps present ministers indifferent. A man 
 cannot feel the same interest that he might in his work 
 if he knows that by events over which he has no control, 
 by errors in which he had no share, by metamorphoses 
 of opinion which belong to a different sequence of pheno- 
 mena, he may have to leave that work in the middle, and 
 may very likely never return to it. The new man put 
 into a fresh office ought to have the best motive to learn 
 his task thoroughly, but, in fact, in England, he has not 
 at all the best motive. The last wave of party and poli- 
 tics brought him there, the next may take him away.
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 170 
 
 Young and eager men take, even at this disadvantage, a 
 keen interest in office work, but most men, especially old 
 men, hardly do so. Many a battered minister may be 
 seen to think much more of the vicissitudes which make 
 him and unmake him, than of any office matter. 
 
 Lastly, a sudden change of ministers may easily cause ; 
 a mischievous change of policy. In many matters of' 
 business, perhaps in most, a continuity of mediocrity is 
 better than a hotch-potch of excellences. For example, 
 now that progress in the scientific arts is revolutionising 
 the instruments of war, rapid changes in our head- 
 preparers for land and sea war are most costly and most 
 hurtful. A single competent selector of new inventions 
 would probably in the course of years, after some expe- 
 rience, arrive at something tolerable ; it is in the nature 
 of steady, regular, experimenting ability to diminish, if 
 not vanquish, such difficulties. But a quick succession 
 of chiefs has no similar facility. They do not learn from 
 each other's experience ; you might as well expect the 
 new head boy at a public school to learn from the expe- 
 rience of the last head boy. The most valuable result 
 of many years is a nicely balanced mind instinctively 
 heedful of various errors ; but such a mind is the incom- 
 municable gift of individual experience, and an outgoing 
 minister can no more leave it to his successor, than an 
 elder brother can pass it on to a younger. Thus a desul- 
 tory and incalculable policy may follow from a rapidi 
 change of ministers. 
 
 These are formidable arguments, but four things may, 
 I think, be said in reply to, or mitigation of them. A
 
 ISO THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 little examination will show that this change of ministers 
 is essential to a Parliamentary government ; that some- 
 thing like it will happen in all elective governments, and 
 that worse happens under presidential government; 
 that it is not necessarily prejudicial to a good administra- 
 tion, but that, on the contrary, something like it is a 
 prerequisite of good administration; that the evident 
 evils of English administration are not the results of 
 Parliamentary government, but of grave deficiencies in 
 other parts of our political and social state ; that, in a 
 word, they result not from what we have, but from what 
 we have not. 
 
 As to the first point, those who wish to remove the 
 choice of ministers from Parliament have not adequately 
 considered what a Parliament is. A Parliament is nothing 
 less than a big meeting of more or less idle people. In 
 proportion as you give it power it will inquire into every- 
 thing, settle everything, meddle in everything. In an 
 ordinary despotism, the powers of a despot are limited 
 by his bodily capacity, and by the calls of pleasure ; he 
 is but one man ; there are but twelve hours in his day, 
 and he is not disposed to employ more than a small part 
 in dull business : he keeps the rest for the court, or the 
 harem, or for society. He is at the top of the world, and 
 all the pleasures of the world are set before him. Mostly 
 there is only a very small part of political business which 
 he cares to understand, and much of it (with the shrewd 
 sensual sense belonging to the race) he knows that he 
 will never understand. But a Parliament is composed of 
 a great number of men by no means at the top of the
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 181 
 
 world. When you establish a predominant Parliament, 
 you give over the rule of the country to a despot who 
 has unlimited time, who has unlimited vanity, who 
 has, or believes he has, unlimited comprehension, whose 
 pleasure is in action, whose life is work. There is no 
 limit to the curiosity of Parliament. Sir Robert Peel 
 once suggested that a list should be taken down of the 
 questions asked of him in a single evening ; they touched 
 more or less on fifty subjects, and there were a thousand 
 other subjects which by parity of reason might have been 
 added too. As soon as bore A ends, bore B begins. 
 Some inquire from genuine love of knowledge, or from 
 a real wish to improve what they ask about, others 
 to see their name in the papers, others to show a 
 watchful constituency that they are alert, others to 
 get on and to get a place in the government, others 
 from an accumulation of little motives they could not 
 themselves analyse, or because it is their habit to ask 
 things. And a proper reply must be given. It was said 
 that "Darby Griffith destroyed Lord Palmerston's first 
 Government," and undoubtedly the cheerful impertinence 
 with which in the conceit of victory that minister 
 answered grave men much hurt his Parliamentary power. 
 There is one thing which no one will permit to be treated 
 lightly, himself. And so there is one too which a 
 sovereign assembly will never permit to be lessened or 
 ridiculed, its own power. The minister of the day will 
 have to give an account in Parliament of all branches 
 of administration, to say why they act when they do, 
 and why they do not when they don't.
 
 182 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Nor is chance inquiry all a public department lias 
 most to fear. Fifty members of Parliament may be 
 zealous for a particular policy affecting the department, 
 and fifty others for another policy, and between them 
 they may divide its action, spoil its favourite aims, and 
 prevent its consistently working out either of their own 
 aims. The process is very simple. Every department 
 at times looks as if it was in a scrape; some apparent 
 blunder, perhaps some real blunder, catches the public 
 eye. At once the antagonist Parliamentary sections, 
 which want to act on the department, seize the oppor- 
 tunity. They make speeches, they move for documents, 
 they amass statistics. They declare "that in no other 
 country is such a policy possible as that which the 
 department is pursuing; that it is mediaeval; that it 
 costs money ; that it wastes life ; that America does the 
 contrary; that Prussia does the contrary." The news- 
 papers follow according to their nature. These bits of 
 administrative scandal amuse the public. Articles on 
 them are very easy to write, easy to read, easy to talk 
 about. They please the vanity of mankind. We think 
 as we read, " Thank God, I am not as that man ; I did 
 not send green coffee to the Crimea; / did not send 
 patent cartridge to the common guns, and common 
 cartridge to the breech loaders. / make money; that 
 miserable public functionary only wastes money." As 
 for the defence of the department, no one cares for it 
 or reads it. Naturally at first hearing it does not sound 
 true. The opposition have the unrestricted selection of 
 the point of attack, and they seldom choose a case in
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 183 
 
 which the department, upon the surface of the matter, 
 seems to be right. The case of first impression will 
 always be that something shameful has happened ; that 
 such and such men did die; that this and that gun 
 would not go off-, that this or that ship will not sail. 
 All the pretty reading is unfavourable, and all the praise 
 is very dull 
 
 Nothing is more helpless than such a department in 
 Parliament if it has no authorised official defender. The 
 wasps of the House fasten on it ; here they perceive is 
 something easy to sting, and safe, for it cannot sting in 
 return. The small grain of foundation for complaint 
 germinates, till it becomes a whole crop. At once the 
 minister of the day is appealed to ; he is at the head of 
 the administration, and he must put the errors right, if 
 such they are. The opposition leader says, " I put it to 
 the right honourable gentleman, the First Lord of the 
 Treasury. He is a man of business. I do not agree with 
 him in his choice of ends, but he is an almost perfect 
 master of methods and means. What he wishes to do he 
 does do. Now I appeal to him whether such gratuitous 
 errors, such fatuous incapacity, are to be permitted in the 
 public service. Perhaps the right honourable gentleman 
 will grant me his attention while I show from the very 
 documents of the departments," &c., &c. What is the 
 minister to do ? He never heard of this matter ; he does 
 not care about the matter. Several of the supporters of 
 the Government are interested in the opposition to the 
 department ; a grave man, supposed to be wise, mutters, 
 " This is too bad." The Secretary of the Treasury tells
 
 ISi THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 
 
 him, "The House is uneasy. A good many men are 
 shaky. A. B. said yesterday he had been dragged 
 through the dirt four nights following. Indeed I am dis- 
 posed to think myself that the department has been 
 somewhat lax. Perhaps an inquiry," &c., &c. And 
 upon that the Prime Minister rises and says, " That Her 
 Majesty's Government having given very serious and 
 grave consideration to this most important subject, are 
 not prepared to say that in so complicated a matter the 
 department has been perfectly exempt from error. He 
 does not indeed concur in all the statements which have 
 been made; it is obvious that several of the charges 
 advanced are inconsistent with one another. If A. had 
 really died from eating green coffee on the Tuesday, it is 
 plain he could not have suffered from insufficient medical 
 attendance on the following Thursday. However, on so 
 complex a subject, and one so foreign to common ex- 
 perience, he will not give a judgment. And if the 
 honourable member would be satisfied with having the 
 matter inquired into by a committee of that House, he 
 will be prepared to accede to the suggestion." 
 
 Possibly the outlying department, distrusting the 
 ministry, crams a friend But it is happy indeed if it 
 chances on a judicious friend. The persons most ready 
 to take up that sort of business are benevolent amateurs, 
 very well intentioned, very grave, very respectable, but 
 also rather dull. Their words are good, but about the 
 joints their arguments are weak. They speak very well, 
 but while they are speaking, the decorum is so great that 
 everybody goes away. Such a man is no match for a
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 185 
 
 couple of House of Commons gladiators. They pull what 
 he says to shreds. They show or say that he is wrong 
 about his facts. Then he rises in a fuss and must 
 explain : but in his hurry he mistakes, and cannot find 
 the right paper, and becomes first hot, then confused, 
 next inaudible, and so sits down. Probably he leaves 
 the House with the notion that the defence of the 
 department has broken down, and so the Times an- 
 nounces to all the world as soon as it awakes. 
 
 Some thinkers have naturally suggested that the 
 heads of departments should as such have the right of 
 speech in the House. But the system when it has been 
 tried has not answered. M. Guizot tells us from his own 
 experience that such a system is not effectual. A great 
 popular assembly has a corporate character; it has its 
 own privileges, prejudices, and notions. And one of 
 these notions is that its own members the persons it 
 sees every day whose qualities it knows, whose minds 
 it can test, are those whom it can most trust. A clerk 
 speaking from without would be an unfamiliar object. 
 He would be an outsider. He would speak under sus- 
 picion ; he would speak without dignity. Very often he 
 would speak as a victim. All the bores of the House 
 would be upon him. He would be put upon examina- 
 tion. He would have to answer interrogatories. He 
 would be put through the figures and cross-questioned in 
 detail. The whole effect of what he said would be 
 lost in qucestiunculce and hidden in a controversial 
 detritus. 
 
 Again, such a person would rarely speak with great
 
 186 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ability. He would speak as a scribe. His habits must 
 have been formed in the quiet of an office : he is used to 
 red tape, placidity, and the respect of subordinates. Such 
 a person will hardly ever be able to stand the hurly- 
 burly of a public assembly. He will lose his head he 
 will say what he should not. He will get hot and red; 
 he will feel he is a sort of culprit. After being used to 
 the flattering deference of deferential subordinates, he will 
 be pestered by fuss and confounded by invective. He 
 will hate the House as naturally as the House does not 
 like him. He will be an incompetent speaker addressing 
 a hostile audience. 
 
 And what is more, an outside administrator address- 
 ing Parliament can move Parliament only by the good- 
 ness of his arguments. He has no votes to back them 
 up with. He is sure to be at chronic war with some 
 active minority of assailants or others. The natural 
 mode in which a department is improved on great points 
 and new points is by external suggestion ; the worse foes 
 of a department are the plausible errors which the most 
 visible facts suggest, and which only half visible facts 
 confute. Both the good ideas and the bad ideas are sure 
 to find advocates first in the press and then in Parlia- 
 ment. Against these a permanent clerk would have to 
 contend by argument alone. The Minister, the head of 
 the parliamentary Government, will not care for him. The 
 Minister will say in some undress soliloquy, " These per- 
 manent ' fellows ' must look after themselves. I cannot 
 be bothered. I have only a majority of nine, and a very 
 shaky majority, too. I cannot afford to make enemies
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 187 
 
 for those whom I did not appoint. They did nothing for 
 me, and I can do nothing for them." And if the perma- 
 nent clerk come to ask his help, he will say in decorous 
 language, " I am sure that if the department can evince 
 to the satisfaction of Parliament that its past manage- 
 ment has been such as the public interests require, no 
 one will be more gratified than myself. I am not aware 
 if it will be in my power to attend in my place on Mon- 
 day ; but if I can be so fortunate, I shall listen to your 
 official statement with my very best attention." And so 
 the permanent public servant will be teased by the wits, 
 oppressed by the bores, and massacred by the innovators 
 of Parliament. 
 
 The incessant tyranny of Parliament over the public 
 offices is prevented and can only be prevented by the 
 appointment of a parliamentary head, connected by close 
 ties with the present ministry and the ruling party in! 
 Parliament. The parliamentary head is a protecting 
 machine. He and the friends he brings stand between 
 the department and the busybodies and crotchet-makers 
 of the House and the country. So long as at any moment 
 the policy of an office could be altered by chance votes in 
 either House of Parliament, there is no security for any 
 consistency. Our guns and our ships are not, perhaps, 
 very good now. But they would be much worse if any 
 thirty or forty advocates for this gun or that gun could 
 make a motion in Parliament, beat the department, and 
 get their ships or their guns adopted. The "Black 
 Breech Ordnance Company " and the " Adamantine Ship 
 Company" would soon find representatives in Parliament,
 
 188 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 if forty or fifty members would get the national custom 
 for their rubbish. But this result is now prevented by 
 the parliamentary head of the department. As soon as 
 the opposition begins the attack, he looks up his means 
 of defence. He studies the subject, compiles his argu- 
 ments, and builds little piles of statistics, which he hopes 
 will have some effect. He has his reputation at stake, 
 and he wishes to show that he is worth his present place, 
 and fit for future promotion. He is well known, perhaps 
 liked, by the House at any rate the House attends to 
 him ; he is one of the regular speakers whom they hear 
 .and heed. He is sure to be able to get himself heard, 
 land he is sure to make the best defence he can. And 
 after he has settled his speech he loiters up to the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, and says quietly, " They have got a 
 motion against me on Tuesday, you know. I hope you 
 will have your men here. A lot of fellows have crotchets, 
 and though they do not agree a bit with one another, 
 they are all against the department ; they will all vote 
 for the inquiry." And the Secretary answers, " Tuesday, 
 you say ; no (looking at a paper), I do not think it will 
 come on on Tuesday. There is Higgins on Education. 
 He is good for a long time. But anyhow it shall be all 
 right." And then he glides about and speaks a word here 
 and a word there, in consequence of which, when the anti- 
 official motion is made, a considerable array of steady, 
 grave faces sits behind the Treasury Bench nay, pos- 
 sibly a rising man who sits in outlying independence 
 below the gangway rises to defend the transaction ; the 
 department wins by thirty-three, and the management 
 of that business pursues its steady way.
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 139 
 
 This contrast is no fancy picture. The experiment of 
 conducting the administration of a public department by 
 an independent unsheltered authority has often been tried, 
 and always failed. Parliament always poked at it, till it 
 made it impossible. The most remarkable is that of the 
 Poor Law. The administration of that law is not now 
 very good, but it is not too much to say that almost the 
 whole of its goodness has been preserved by its having 
 an official and party protector in the House of Commons. 
 Without that contrivance we should have drifted back 
 into the errors of the old Poor Law, and superadded to 
 them the present meanness and incompetence in our large 
 towns. All would have been given up to local manage- 
 ment. Parliament would have interfered with the central 
 board till it made it impotent, and the local authorities 
 would have been despotic. The first administration of 
 the new Poor Law was by " Commissioners " the three 
 kings of Somerset House, as they were called. The system 
 was certainly not tried in untrustworthy hands. At the 
 crisis Mr. Chadwick, one of the most active and best 
 administrators in England, was the secretary and the 
 motive power: the principal Commissioner was Sir 
 George Lewis, perhaps the best selective administrator of 
 our time. But the House of Commons would not let the 
 Commission alone. For a long time it was defended 
 because the Whigs had made the Commission, and felt 
 bound as a party to protect it. The new law started 
 upon a certain intellectual impetus, and till that was 
 spent its administration was supported in a rickety 
 existence by an abnormal strength. But afterwards the
 
 190 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Commissioners were left to their intrinsic weakness. 
 There were members for all the localities, but there were 
 none for them. There were members for every crotchet 
 and corrupt interest, but there were none for them. The 
 rural guardians would have liked to eke out wages by 
 rates; the city guardians hated control, and hated to 
 spend money. The Commission had to be dissolved, and 
 a parliamentary head was added ; the result is not perfect, 
 but it is an amazing improvement on what would have 
 happened in the old system. The new system has not 
 worked well because the central authority has too little 
 power ; but under the previous system the central autho- 
 rity was getting to have, and by this time would have 
 had, no power at all. And if Sir George Lewis and Mr. 
 Chadwick could not maintain an outlying department 
 in the face of Parliament, how unlikely that an inferior 
 compound of discretion and activity will ever maintain it ! 
 These reasonings show why a changing parliamentary 
 head, a head changing as the ministry changes, is a 
 necessity of good Parliamentary government, and there 
 is happily a natural provision that there will be such 
 heads. Party organisation ensures it. In America, where 
 on account of the fixedly recurring presidential election, 
 and the perpetual minor elections, party organisation is 
 much more effectually organised than anywhere else, the 
 effect on the offices is tremendous. Every office is filled 
 anew at every presidential change, at least every change 
 which brings in a new party. Not only the greatest 
 posts, as in England, but the minor posts change their 
 occupants. The scale of the financial operations of the
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 191 
 
 Federal government is now so increased that most likely 
 in that department, at least, there must in future remain 
 a permanent element of great efficiency; a revenue of 
 90,000,000?. sterling cannot be collected and expended 
 with a trifling and changing staff. But till now the 
 Americans have tried to get on not only with changing 
 heads to a bureaucracy, as the English, but without any 
 stable bureaucracy at all. They have facilities for trying : 
 it which no one else has. All Americans can administer, 
 and the number of them really fit to be in succession 
 lawyers, financiers, or military managers is wonderful; 
 they need not be as afraid of a change of all their officials 
 as European countries must, for the incoming substitutes 
 are sure to be much better there than here ; and they do 
 not fear, as we English fear, that the outgoing officials 
 will be left destitute in middle life, with no hope for the 
 future and no recompense for the past, for in America 
 (whatever may be the cause of it) opportunities are 
 numberless, and a man who is ruined by being " off the 
 rails " in England soon there gets on another line. The 
 Americans will probably to some extent modify their 
 past system of total administrative cataclysms, but their 
 very existence in the only competing form of free govern- 
 ment should prepare us for and make us patient with 
 the mild transitions of Parliamentary government. 
 
 These arguments will, I think, seem conclusive to 
 almost every one ; but, at this moment, many people will 
 meet them thus : they will say, " You prove what we do 
 not deny, that this system of periodical change is a neces- 
 sary ingredient in Parliamentary government, but you
 
 192 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 have not proved what we do deny, that this change is a 
 good thing. Parliamentary government may have that 
 sffect, among others, for anything we care : we maintain 
 merely that it is a defect." In answer, I think it may 
 bo shown not, indeed, that this precise change is neces- 
 sary to a permanently perfect administration, but that 
 some analogous change, some change of the same species, 
 is so. 
 
 At this moment, in England, there is a sort of leaning 
 towards bureaucracy at least, among writers and talkers. 
 There is a seizure of partiality to it. The English people 
 do not easily change their rooted notions, but they have 
 many unrooted notions. Any great European event is 
 sure for a moment to excite a sort of twinge of conver- 
 sion to something or other. Just now, the triumph of 
 the Prussians the bureaucratic people, as is believed, 
 par excellence has excited a kind of admiration for 
 bureaucracy, which a few years since we should have 
 thought impossible. I do not presume to criticise the 
 Prussian bureaucracy of my own knowledge ; it certainly 
 is not a pleasant institution for foreigners to come across, 
 though agreeableness to travellers is but of very second- 
 rate importance. But it is quite certain that the Prussian 
 bureaucracy, though we, for a moment, half admire it at 
 a distance, does not permanently please the most intelli- 
 gent and liberal Prussians at home. What are two among 
 the principal aims of the Fortsckritt Partei the party of 
 progress as Mr. Grant Duff, the most accurate and philo- 
 sophical of our describers, delineates them ? 
 
 First, "a liberal system, conscientiously carried out
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 193 
 
 in all the details of the administration, with a view to 
 avoiding the scandals now of frequent occurrence, when 
 an obstinate or bigoted official sets at defiance the liberal 
 initiations of the government, trusting to backstairs 
 influence." 
 
 Second, "an easy method of bringing to justice guilty 
 officials, who are at present, as in France, in all conflicts 
 with simple citizens, like men armed cap-db-pie fighting 
 with undefenceless." A system against which the most 
 intelligent native liberals bring even with colour of reason 
 such grave objections, is a dangerous model for foreign 
 imitation. 
 
 The defects of bureaucracy are, indeed, well known. 
 It is a form of government which has been tried often 
 enough in the world, and it is easy to show what, human 
 nature being what it in the long run is, the defects of a 
 bureaucracy must in the long run be. 
 
 It is an inevitable defect, that bureaucrats will care 
 more for routine than for results ; or, as Burke put it, 
 " that they will think the substance of business not to 
 be much more important than the forms of it." Their 
 whole education and all the habit of their lives make 
 them do so. They are brought young into the particular 
 part of the public service to which they are attached ; 
 they are occupied for years in learning its forms after- 
 wards, for years too, in applying these forms to trifling 
 matters. They are, to use the phrase of an old writer, 
 "but the tailors of business; they cut the clothes, but 
 they do not find the body." M3n so trained must come to 
 think the routine of business not a means, but an end 
 
 o
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to imagine the elaborate machinery of which they form 
 a part, and from which they derive their dignity, to be a 
 grand and achieved result, not a working and changeable 
 instrument. But in a miscellaneous world, there is now 
 one evil and now another. The very means which best 
 helped you yesterday, may very likely be those which 
 most impede you to-morrow you may want to do a 
 different thing to-morrow, and all your accumulation of 
 means for yesterday's work is but an obstacle to the new 
 work. The Prussian military system is the theme of 
 popular wonder now, yet it sixty years pointed the moral 
 against form. We have all heard the saying that " Frederic 
 the Great lost the battle of Jena." It was the system 
 which he had established a good system for his wants 
 and his times, which, blindly adhered to, and continued 
 into a different age put to strive with new competitors 
 brought his country to ruin. The "dead and formal " 
 Prussian system was then contrasted with the " living " 
 French system the sudden outcome of the new explosive 
 democracy. The system which now exists is the product 
 of the reaction ; and the history of its predecessor is a 
 warning what its future history may be too. It is not 
 more celebrated for its day than Frederic's for his, and 
 principle teaches that a bureaucracy, elated by sudden 
 success, and marvelling at its own merit, is the most un- 
 improving and shallow of governments. 
 
 Not only does a bureaucracy thus tend to under- 
 government, in point of quality ; it tends to over-govern- 
 ment, in point of quantity. The trained official hates 
 the rude, untrained public. He thinks that they are
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTET. 195 
 
 stupid, ignorant, reckless that they cannot tell their own 
 interest that they should have the leave of the office 
 before they do anything. Protection is the natural in- 
 born creed of every official body ; free trade is an ex- 
 trinsic idea, alien to its notions, and hardly to be assimi- 
 lated with life ; and it is easy to see how an accomplished 
 critic, used to a free and active life, could thus describe 
 the official. 
 
 " Every imaginable and real social interest," says Mr. 
 Laing, "religion, education, law, police, every branch of 
 public or private business, personal liberty to move from 
 place to place, even from parish to parish within the 
 same jurisdiction; liberty to engage in any branch of 
 trade or industry, on a small or large scale, all the 
 objects, in short, in which body, mind, and capital can be 
 employed in civilised society, were gradually laid hold of 
 for the employment and support of functionaries, were 
 centralised in bureaux, were superintended, licensed, in- 
 spected, reported upon, and interfered with by a host of 
 officials scattered over the land, and maintained at the 
 public expense, yet with no conceivable utility in their 
 duties. They are not, however, gentlemen at large, en- 
 joying salary without service. They are under a semi- 
 military discipline. In Bavaria, for instance, the superior 
 civil functionary can place his inferior functionary under 
 house-arrest, for neglect of duty, or other offence against 
 civil functionary discipline. In Wurtemberg, the func- 
 tionary cannot marry without leave from his superior. 
 Voltaire says, somewhere, that, ' the art of government is 
 to make two-thirds of a nation pay all it possibly can
 
 196 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 pay for the benefit of the other third.' This is realised 
 in Germany by the functionary system. The function- 
 aries are not there for the benefit of the people, but the 
 people for the benefit of the functionaries. All this 
 machinery of functionarism, with its numerous ranks 
 and gradations in every district, filled with a staff of 
 clerks and expectants in every department looking for 
 employment, appointments, or promotions, was intended 
 to be a new support of the throne in the new social state 
 of the Continent ; a third class, in connection with the 
 people by their various official duties of interference in 
 all public or private affairs, yet attached by their in- 
 terests to the kingly power. The Beamptenstand, or 
 functionary class, was to be the equivalent to the class of 
 nobility, gentry, capitalists, and men of larger landed 
 property than the peasant-proprietors, and was to make 
 up in numbers for the want of individual weight and 
 influence. In France, at the expulsion of Louis Philippe, 
 the civil functionaries were stated to amount to 807,030 
 individuals. This civil army was more than double of 
 the military. In Germany, this class is necessarily more 
 numerous in proportion to the population, the landwehr 
 system imposing many more restrictions than the con- 
 scription on the free action of the people, and requiring 
 more officials to manage it, and the semi-feudal jurisdic- 
 tions and forms of law requiring much more writing and 
 intricate forms of procedure before the courts than the 
 Code Napoleon." 
 
 A bureaucracy is sure to think that its duty is to 
 augment official power, official business, or official mem-
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 197 
 
 bers, rather than to leave free the energies of mankind ; 
 it overdoes the quantity of government, as well as im- 
 pairs its quality. 
 
 The truth is, that a skilled bureaucracy a bureau- 
 cracy trained from early life to its special avocation is, 
 though it boasts of an appearance of science, quite incon- 
 sistent with the true principles of the art of business. 
 That art has not yet been condensed into precepts, but a 
 great many experiments have been made, and a vast 
 floating vapour of knowledge floats through society. One 
 of the most sure principles is, that success depends on a 
 due mixture of special and nonspecial minds of minds 
 which attend to the means, and of minds which attend 
 to the end. The success of the great joint-stock banks 
 of London the most remarkable . achievement of recent 
 business has been an example of the use of this mix- 
 ture. These banks are managed by a board of persons 
 mostly not trained to the business, supplemented by, and 
 annexed to, a body of specially trained officers, who have 
 been bred to banking all their lives. These mixed banks 
 have quite beaten the old banks, composed exclusively of 
 pure bankers ; it is found that the board of directors has 
 greater and more flexible knowledge more insight into 
 the wants of a commercial community knows when to 
 lend and when not to lend, better than the old bankers, 
 who had never looked at life, except out of the bank 
 windows. Just so the most successful railways in Europe 
 have been conducted not by engineers or traffic managers 
 but by capitalists ; by men of a certain business culture, 
 if of no other. These capitalists buy and use the services
 
 198 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 of skilled managers, as the unlearned attorney buys and 
 uses the services of the skilled barrister, and manage far 
 better than any of the different sorts of special men 
 under them. They combine these different specialties 
 make it clear where the realm of one ends and that of 
 the other begins, and add to it a wide knowledge of large 
 affairs, which no special man can have, and which is only 
 gained by diversified action. But this utility of leading 
 minds used to generalise, and acting upon various mate- 
 rials, is entirely dependent upon their position. They 
 must not be at the bottom they must not even be half 
 way up they must be at the top. A merchant's clerk 
 would be a child at a bank counter ; but the merchant 
 himself could, very likely, give good, clear, and useful 
 advice in a bank court. The merchant's clerk would be 
 equally at sea in a railway office, but the merchant him- 
 self could give good advice, very likely, at a board of 
 directors. The summits (if I may so say) of the various 
 kinds of business are, like the tops of mountains, much 
 more alike than the parts below the bare principles are 
 much the same ; it is only the rich variegated details of 
 the lower strata that so contrast with one another. But 
 it needs travelling to know that the summits are the 
 same. Those who live on one mountain believe that 
 their mountain is wholly unlike all others. 
 
 The application of this principle to Parliamentary 
 government is very plain; it shows at once that the 
 intrusion from without upon an office of an exterior head 
 of the office, is not an evil, but that, on the contrary, it- 
 is essential to the perfection of that office. If it is left
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 109 
 
 to itself, the office will become technical, self-absorbed, 
 self-multiplying. It will be likely to overlook the end 
 in the means ; it will fail from narrowness of mind ; it 
 will be eager in seeming to do ; it will be idle in real 
 doing. An extrinsic chief is the fit corrector of such 
 errors. He can say to the permanent chief, skilled in 
 the forms and pompous with the memories of his office, 
 " Will you, Sir, explain to me how this regulation con- 
 duces to the end in view ? According to the natural 
 view of things, the applicant should state the whole of 
 his wishes to one clerk on one paper ; you make him say 
 it to five clerks on five papers." Or, again, " Does it not 
 appear to you, Sir, that the reason of this formality is 
 extinct ? When we were building wood ships, it was 
 quite right to have such precautions against fire; but 
 now that we are building iron ships," &c., &c. If a 
 junior clerk asked these questions, he would be "pooh- 
 poohed ! " It is only the head of an office that can get 
 them answered. It is he, and he only, that brings the 
 rubbish of office to the burning glass of sense. 
 
 The immense importance of such a fresh mind is 
 greatest in a country where business changes most. A 
 dead, inactive, agricultural country may be governed by 
 an unalterable bureau for years and years, and no harm 
 come of it. If a wise man arranged the bureau rightly 
 in the beginning, it may run rightly a long time. But 
 if the country be a progressive, eager, changing one, soon 
 the bureau will either cramp improvement, or be de- 
 stroyed itself. 
 
 This conception of the use of a Parliamentary head
 
 200 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 shows how wrong is the obvious notion which regards 
 him as the principal administrator of his office. The 
 late Sir George Lewis used to be fond of explaining this 
 subject. He had every means of knowing. He was bred 
 in the permanent civil service. He was a very successful 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, a very successful Home 
 Secretary, and he died Minister for War. He used to 
 say, " It is not the business of a Cabinet Minister to work 
 his department. His business is to see that it is properly 
 worked. If he does much, he is probably doing harm. 
 The permanent staff of the office can do what he chooses 
 to do much better, or if they cannot, they ought to be 
 removed. He is only a bird of passage, and cannot com- 
 pete with those who are in the office all their lives round." 
 Sir George Lewis was a perfect Parliamentary head of 
 an office, so far as that head is to be a keen critic and 
 rational corrector of it. 
 
 But Sir George Lewis was not perfect; he was not 
 even an average good head in another respect. The use 
 of a fresh mind applied to the official mind is not only a 
 corrective use, it is also an animating use. A public 
 department is very apt to be dead to what is wanting 
 for a great occasion till the occasion is past. The vague 
 public mind will appreciate some signal duty before the 
 precise, occupied administration perceives it. The Duke 
 of Newcastle was of this use at least in the Crimean war. 
 He roused up his department, though when roused it 
 could not act. A perfect Parliamentary minister would 
 be one who should add the animating capacity of the 
 Duke of Newcastle to the accumulated sense, the de-
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 201 
 
 tective instinct, and the laissez faire habit of Sir George 
 Lewis. 
 
 As soon as we take the true view of Parliamentary 
 office we shall perceive that, fairly, frequent change in 
 the official is an advantage, not a mistake. If his 
 function is to bring a representative of outside sense and 
 outside animation in contact with the inside world, he 
 ought often to be changed. No man is a perfect repre- 
 sentative of outside sense. "There is some one," says 
 the true French saying, " who is more able than Talley- 
 rand, more able than Napoleon. C'est tout le monde." 
 That many-sided sense finds no microcosm in any single 
 individual. Still less are the critical function and the 
 animating function of a Parliamentary minister likely 
 to be perfectly exercised by one and the same man. 
 Impelling power and restraining wisdom are as opposite 
 as any two things, and are rarely found together. And 
 even if the natural mind of the Parliamentary minister 
 was perfect, long contact with the office would destroy 
 his use. Inevitably he would accept the ways of office, 
 think its thoughts, live its life. The " dyer's hand would 
 be subdued to what it works in." If the function of a 
 Parliamentary minister is to be an outsider to his office, 
 we must not choose one who, by habit, thought, and life, 
 is acclimatised to its ways. 
 
 There is every reason to expect that a Parliamentary 
 statesman will be a man of quite sufficient intelligence, 
 quite enough various knowledge, quite enough miscel- 
 laneous experience, to represent effectually general 
 sense in opposition to bureaucratic sense. Most Cabinet
 
 202 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ministers in charge of considerable departments are men 
 of superior ability; I have heard an eminent living 
 statesman of long experience say that in his time he only 
 knew one instance to the contrary. And there is the 
 best protection that it shall be so. A considerable 
 Cabinet minister has to defend his department in the 
 face of mankind ; and though distant observers and sharp 
 writers may depreciate it, this is a very difficult thing. 
 A fool, who has publicly to explain great affairs, who has 
 publicly to answer detective questions, who has publicly 
 to argue against able and quick opponents, must soon be 
 shown to be a fool. The very nature of Parliamentary 
 government answers for the discovery of substantial 
 incompetence. 
 
 At any rate, none of the competing forms of govern- 
 ment have nearly so effectual a procedure for putting 
 a good untechnical minister to correct and impel the 
 routine ones. There are but four important forms of 
 government in the present state of the world, the Par- 
 liamentary, the Presidential, the Hereditary, and the 
 Dictatorial, or Revolutionary. Of these I have shown 
 that, as now worked in America, the Presidential form 
 of government is incompatible with a skilled bureau- 
 cracy. If the whole official class change when a new 
 party goes out or comes in, a good official system is 
 impossible. Even if more officials should be permanent 
 in America than now, still, vast numbers will always be 
 changed. The whole issue is based on a single election 
 on the choice of President ; by that internecine conflict 
 all else is won or lost. The managers of the contest have
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 203 
 
 that greatest possible facility in using what I may call 
 patronage-bribery. Everybody knows that, as a fact, 
 the President can give what places he likes to what 
 persons, and when his friends tell A. B., "If we win, 
 C. D. shall be turned out of Utica Post-office, and you, 
 A. B., shall have it," A. B. believes it, and is justified in 
 doing so. But no individual member of Parliament can 
 promise place effectually. He may not be able to give 
 the places. His party may come in, but he will be 
 powerless. In the United States party intensity is 
 aggravated by concentrating an overwhelming importance 
 on a single contest, and the efficiency of promised offices 
 as a means of corruption is augmented, because the 
 victor can give what he likes to whom he likes. 
 
 Nor is this the only defect of a Presidential govern- 
 ment in reference to the choice of officers. The President 
 has the principal anomaly of a Parliamentary government 
 without having its corrective. At each change of party 
 the President distributes (as here) the principal offices to 
 his principal supporters. But he has an opportunity for 
 singular favouritism ; the minister lurks in the office ; he 
 need do nothing in public; he need not show for years 
 whether he is a fool or wise. The nation can tell what a 
 Parliamentary member is by the open test of Parliament ; 
 but no one, save from actual contact, or by rare position, 
 can tell anything certain of a Presidential minister. 
 
 The case of a minister under an hereditary form of 
 government is yet worse. The hereditary king may be 
 weak; may be under the government of women; may 
 appoint a minister from childish motives; may remove
 
 204 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 one from absurd whims. There is no security that an 
 hereditary king will be competent to choose a good chief 
 minister, and thousands of such kings have chosen 
 millions of bad ministers. 
 
 By the Dictatorial, or Revolutionary, sort of govern- 
 ment, I mean that very important sort in which the 
 sovereign the absolute sovereign is selected by in- 
 surrection. In theory, one would certainly have hoped 
 that by this time such a crude elective machinery would 
 have been reduced to a secondary part. But, in fact, the 
 greatest nation (or, perhaps, after the exploits of Bismarck, 
 I should say one of the two greatest nations of the Conti- 
 nent) vacillates between the Revolutionary and the Par- 
 liamentary, and now is governed under the Revolutionary 
 form. France elects its ruler in the streets of Paris. 
 Flatterers may suggest that the democratic empire will 
 become hereditary, but close observers know that it can- 
 not. The idea of the government is that the Emperor 
 represents the people in capacity, in judgment, in instinct. 
 But no family through generations can have sufficient, or 
 half sufficient, mind to do so. The representative despot 
 must be chosen by fighting, as Napoleon I. and Napoleon 
 III. were chosen. And such a government is likely, 
 whatever be its other defects, to have a far better and 
 abler administration than any other government. The 
 head of the government must be a man of the most con- 
 summate ability. He cannot keep his place, he can hardly 
 keep his life, unless he is. He is sure to be active, 
 because he knows that his power, and perhaps his head, 
 may be lost if he be negligent The whole frame of his
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 205 
 
 State is strained to keep down revolution. The most 
 difficult of all political problems is to be solved the 
 people are to be at once thoroughly restrained and tho- 
 roughly pleased. The executive must be like a steel shirt 
 of the Middle Ages extremely hard and extremely flexi- 
 ble. It must give way to attractive novelties which do 
 not hurt ; it must resist such as are dangerous ; it must 
 maintain old things which are good and fitting ; it must 
 alter such as cramp and give pain. The dictator dare not 1 
 appoint a bad minister if he would. I admit that such a 
 despot is a better selector of administrators than a parlia- 
 ment; that he will know how to mix fresh minds and 
 used minds better ; that he is under a stronger motive to 
 combine them well; that here is to be seen the best of 
 all choosers with the keenest motives to choose. But I 
 need not prove in England that the revolutionary selection 
 of rulers obtains administrative efficiency at a price alto- 
 gether transcending its value; that it shocks credit by 
 its catastrophes; that for intervals it does not protect 
 property or life; that it maintains an undergrowth of 
 fear through all prosperity ; that it may take years to 
 find the true capable despot ; that the interregna of the 
 incapable are full of all evil ; that the fit despot may die 
 as soon as found ; that the good administration and all 
 else hang by the thread of his life. 
 
 But if, with the exception of this terrible revolu- 
 tionary government, a Parliamentary government upon 
 principle surpasses all its competitors in administrative 
 efficiency, why is it that our English government, which 
 is beyond comparison the best of Parliamentary govern-
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 ments, is not celebrated through the world for adminis- 
 trative efficiency ? It is noted for many things, why is 
 it not noted for that ? Why, according to popular belief 
 is it rather characterised by the very contrary ? 
 
 One great reason of the diffused impression is, that 
 the English Government attempts so much. Our 
 military system is that which is most attacked. Ob- 
 jectors say we spend much more on our army than the 
 great military monarchies, and yet with an inferior result. 
 But, then, what we attempt is incalculably more difficult. 
 The continental monarchies have only to defend compact 
 European territories by the many soldiers whom they 
 force to fight; the English try to defend without any 
 compulsion only by such soldiers as they persuade to 
 serve territories far surpassing all Europe in magnitude, 
 and situated all over the habitable globe. Our Horse 
 Guards and War Office may not be at all perfect I believe 
 they are not : but if they had sufficient recruits selected 
 by force of law if they had, as in Prussia, the absolute 
 command of each man's time for a few years, and the 
 right to call him out afterwards when they liked, we 
 should be much surprised at the sudden ease and quick- 
 ness with which they did things. I have no doubt too 
 that any accomplished soldier of the Continent would 
 reject as impossible what we after a fashion effect. He 
 would not attempt to defend a vast scattered empire, 
 with many islands, a long frontier line in every continent, 
 and a very tempting bit of plunder at the centre, by mere 
 volunteer recruits, who mostly come from the worst class 
 of the people whom the Great Duke called the " scum
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 207 
 
 of the earth," who come in uncertain numbers year by 
 year who by some political accident may not come in 
 adequate numbers, or at all, in the year we need them 
 most. Our War Office attempts what foreign War Offices 
 (perhaps rightly) would not try at; their officers have 
 means of incalculable force denied to ours, though ours is 
 set to harder taska 
 
 Again, the English navy undertakes to defend a line 
 of coast and a set of dependencies far surpassing those of 
 any continental power. And the extent of our operations 
 is a singular difficulty just now. It requires us to keep 
 a large stock of ships and arms. But on the other hand, 
 there are most important reasons why we should not keep 
 much. The naval art and the military art are both in 
 a state of transition ; the last discovery of to-day is out 
 of date, and superseded by an antagonistic discovery to- 
 morrow. Any large accumulation of vessels or guns is 
 sure to contain much that will be useless, unfitting, ante- 
 diluvian, when it comes to be tried. There are two cries 
 against the Admiralty which go on side by side : one 
 says, " We have not ships enough, no ' relief ' ships, no 
 navy, to tell the truth ; " the other cry says, " We have 
 all the wrong ships, all the wrong guns, and nothing but 
 the wrong; in their foolish constructive mania the 
 Admiralty have been building when they ought to have 
 been waiting; they have heaped a curious museum of 
 exploded inventions, but they have given us nothing 
 serviceable." The two cries for opposite policies go on 
 together, and blacken our Executive together, though 
 each is a defence of the Executive against the other.
 
 AJS THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Again, the Home Department in England struggles 
 3, with difficulties of which abroad they have long got rid. 
 We love independent "local authorities," little centres 
 of outlying authority. When the metropolitan executive 
 most wishes to act, it cannot act effectually because 
 these lesser bodies hesitate, deliberate, or even disobey. 
 But local independence has no necessary connection with 
 Parliamentary government. The degree of local freedom 
 desirable in a country varies according to many circum- 
 stances, and a Parliamentary government may consist 
 with any degree of it. We certainly ought not to debit 
 Parliamentary government as a general and applicable 
 polity with the particular vices of the guardians of the 
 poor in England, though it is so debited every day. 
 
 Again, as our administration has in England this 
 peculiar difficulty, so on the other hand foreign competing 
 administrations have a peculiar advantage. Abroad a 
 man under Government is a superior being : he is higher 
 than the rest of the world ; he is envied by almost all of 
 it. This gives the Government the easy pick of the dlite 
 of the nation. All clever people are eager to be under 
 Government, and are hardly to be satisfied elsewhere. 
 But in England there is no such superiority, and the 
 English have no such feeling. We do not respect a 
 stamp-office clerk, or an exciseman's assistant. A pursy 
 grocer considers he is much above either. Our Govern- 
 ment cannot buy for minor clerks the best ability of the 
 nation in the cheap currency of pure honour, and no 
 government is rich enough to buy very much of it in 
 money. Our mercantile opportunities allure away the
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 209 
 
 most ambitious minds. The foreign bureaux are filled 
 with a selection from the ablest men of the nation, but 
 only a very few of the best men approach the English 
 offices. 
 
 But these are neither the only nor even the principal 
 reasons why our public administration is not so good 
 as, according to principle and to the unimpeded effects 
 of Parliamentary government, it should be. There are ! 
 two great causes at work, which in their consequences 
 run out into many details, but which in their funda- 
 mental nature may be briefly described. The first of 
 these causes is our ignorance. No polity can get out 
 of a nation more than there is in the nation. A free 
 government is essentially a government by persuasion; 
 and as are the people to be persuaded, and as are the 
 persuaders, so will that government be. On many parts 
 of our administration the effect of our extreme ignorance 
 is at once plain. The foreign policy of England has for 
 many years been, according to the judgment now in 
 vogue, inconsequent, fruitless, casual ; aiming at no 
 distinct pre-imagined end, based on no steadily pre-con- 
 ceived principle. I have not room to discuss with how 
 much or how little abatement this decisive censure 
 should be accepted. However, I entirely concede that 
 our recent foreign policy has been open to very grave 
 and serious blame. But would it not have been a 
 miracle if the English people, directing their own policy, 
 and being what they are, had directed a good policy ? 
 Are they not above all nations divided from the rest of 
 the world, insular both in situation and in mind, both for 
 
 P
 
 210 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 good and for evil ? Are they not out of the current of 
 common European causes and affairs ? Are they not a 
 race contemptuous of others ? Are they not a race with 
 no special education or culture as to the modern world, 
 and too often despising such culture ? Who could expect 
 such a people to comprehend the new and strange events 
 of foreign places ? So far from wondering that the 
 English Parliament has been inefficient in foreign policy, 
 I think it is wonderful, and another sign of the rude, 
 vague imagination that is at the bottom of our people, 
 that we have done so well as we have. 
 
 Again, the very conception of the English Constitu- 
 tion, as distinguished from a purely Parliamentary con- 
 stitution is, that it contains "dignified" parts parts, 
 that is, retained, not for intrinsic use, but from their 
 imaginative attraction upon an uncultured and rude 
 population. All such elements tend to diminish simple 
 efficiency. They are like the additional and solely-orna- 
 mental wheels introduced into the clocks of the Middle 
 Ages, which tell the then age of the moon or the supreme 
 constellation ; which make little men or birds come out 
 and in theatrically. All such ornamental work is a 
 source of friction and error ; it prevents the time being 
 marked accurately ; each new wheel is a new source of 
 imperfection. So if authority is given to a person, not 
 on account of his working fitness, but on account of his 
 imaginative efficiency, he will commonly impair good 
 administration. He may do something better than good 
 work of detail, but will spoil good work of detail. The 
 English aristocracy is often of this sort. It has an
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 211 
 
 influence over the people of vast value still, and of 
 infinite value formerly. But no man would select the 
 cadets of an aristocratic house as desirable adminis- 
 trators. They have peculiar disadvantages in the acqui- 
 sition of business knowledge, business training, and 
 business habits, and they have no peculiar advantages. 
 
 Our middle class, too, is very unfit to give us the 
 administrators we ought to have. I cannot now discuss 
 whether all that is said against our education is well 
 grounded; it is called by an excellent judge "preten- 
 tious, insufficient, and unsound." But I will say that it 
 does not fit men to be men of business as it ought to fit 
 them. Till lately the very simple attainments and 
 habits necessary for a banker's clerk had a scarcity- 
 value. The sort of education which fits a man for the 
 higher posts of practical life is still very rare ; there is 
 not even a good agreement as to what it is. Our public 
 officers cannot be as good as the corresponding officers of 
 some foreign nations till our business education is as 
 good as theirs.* 
 
 But strong as is our ignorance in deteriorating our 
 administration, another cause is stronger stilL There are 
 but two foreign administrations probably better than 
 ours, and both these have had something which we have 
 not had. Theirs in both cases were arranged by a man 
 of genius, after careful forethought, and upon a special 
 design. Napoleon built upon a clear stage which the 
 
 * I am happy to state that this evil is much diminishing. The im- 
 provement of school education of the middle class in the last twenty-five 
 years is marvellous.
 
 212 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTIOX. 
 
 French Eevolution bequeathed him. The originality 
 once ascribed to his edifice was indeed untrue ; Tocque- 
 ville and Lavergne have shown that he did but run up a 
 conspicuous structure in imitation of a latent one before 
 concealed by the mediaeval complexities of the old regime. 
 But what we are concerned with now is, not Napoleon's 
 originality, but his work. He undoubtedly settled the 
 administration of France upon an effective, consistent, 
 and enduring system ; the succeeding governments have 
 but worked the mechanism they inherited from him. 
 Frederick the Great did the same in the new monarchy 
 of Prussia. Both the French sj^stem and the Prussian 
 are new machines, made in civilised times to do their 
 appropriate work. 
 
 The English offices have never, since they were made, 
 been arranged with any reference to one another; or 
 rather they were never made, but grew as each could. 
 The sort of free trade which prevailed in public insti- 
 tutions in the English middle ages is very curious. Our 
 three courts of law the Queen's Bench, the Common 
 Pleas, and the Exchequer for the sake of the fees ex- 
 tended an originally contracted sphere into the entire 
 sphere of litigation. Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdic- 
 tionem, went the old saying ; or, in English, " It is the 
 mark of a good judge to augment the fees of his Court," his 
 own income, and the income of his subordinates. The cen- 
 tral administration, the Treasury, never asked any account 
 of the moneys the courts thus received ; so long as it was 
 not asked to pay anything, it was satisfied. Only last year 
 one of the many remnants of this system cropped up, to
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTKY. 213 
 
 the wondei of the public. A clerk in the Patent Office 
 stole some fees, and naturally the men of the nineteenth 
 century thought our principal finance minister, the Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer, would be, as in France, respon- 
 sible for it. But the English law was different somehow. 
 The Patent Office was under the Lord Chancellor, and the 
 Court of Chancery is one of the multitude of our insti- 
 tutions which owe their existence to free competition, 
 and so it was the Lord Chancellor's business to look after 
 the fees, which of course, as an occupied judge, he could 
 not. A certain Act of Parliament did indeed require that 
 the fees of the Patent Office should be paid into the 
 " Exchequer; " and, again, the " Chancellor of the Exche- 
 quer " was thought to be responsible in the matter, but 
 only by those who did not know. According to our 
 system the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the enemy of 
 the Exchequer ; a whole series of enactments try to pro- 
 tect it from him. Until a few months ago there was a 
 very lucrative sinecure called the " Comptrollership of the 
 Exchequer," designed to guard the Exchequer against its 
 Chancellor ; and the last holder, Lord Monteagle, used to 
 say he was the pivot of the English Constitution. I have 
 not room to explain what he meant, and it is not needful ; 
 what is to the purpose is that, by an inherited series of 
 historical complexities, a defaulting clerk in an office of 
 no litigation was not under natural authority, the finance 
 minister, but under a far-away judge who had never heard 
 of him. 
 
 The whole office of the Lord Chancellor is a heap of 
 anomalies. He is a judge, and it is contrary to obvious
 
 214 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 principle that any part of administration should be en- 
 trusted to a judge; it is of very grave moment that the 
 administration of justice should be kept clear of any sinister 
 temptations. Yet the Lord Chancellor, our chief judge, 
 sits in the Cabinet, and makes party speeches in the Lords. 
 Lord Lyndhurst was a principal Tory politician, and yet 
 he presided in the O'Connell case. Lord Westbury was 
 in chronic wrangle with the bishops, but he gave judg- 
 ment upon " Essays and Reviews." In truth, the Lord 
 Chancellor became a Cabinet Minister, because, being 
 near the person of the sovereign, he was high in court 
 precedence, and not upon a political theory wrong or 
 right. 
 
 A friend once told me that an intelligent Italian asked 
 him about the principal English officers, and that he was 
 very puzzled to explain their duties, and especially to ex- 
 plain the relation of their duties to their titles. I do not 
 remember all the cases, but I can recollect that the Italian 
 could not comprehend why the First " Lord of the Trea- 
 sury " had as a rule nothing to do with the Treasury, or 
 why the " Woods and Forests " looked after the sewerage 
 of towns. This conversation was years before the cattle 
 plague, but I should like to have heard the reasons why 
 the Privy Council Office had charge of that malady. Of 
 course one could give an historical reason, but I mean 
 an administrative reason a reason which would show, not 
 how it came to have the duty, but why in future it should 
 keep it. 
 
 dl But the unsystematic and casual arrangement of our 
 .public offices is not more striking than their difference of 
 
 af
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 215 
 
 arrangement for the one purpose they have in common. 
 They all, being under the ultimate direction of a Parlia- 
 mentary official, ought to have the best means of bringing 
 the whole of the higher concerns of the office before that offi- 
 cial When the fresh mind rules, the fresh mind requires 
 to be informed. And most business being rather alike, the 
 machinery for bringing it before the extrinsic chief ought, 
 for the most part, to be similar : at any rate, where it is 
 different, it ought to be different upon reason ; and where 
 it is similar, similar upon reason. Yet there are almost 
 no two offices which are exactly alike in the defined rela- 
 tions of the permanent official to the Parliamentary chief. 
 Let us see. The army and navy are the most similar in 
 nature, yet there is in the army a permanent outside office, 
 called the Horse Guards, to which there is nothing else 
 like. In the navy, there is a curious anomaly a Board 
 of Admiralty, also changing with every government, which 
 is to instruct the First Lord in what he does not know. 
 The relations between the First Lord and the Board have 
 not always been easily intelligible, and those between the 
 War Office and the Horse Guards are in extreme confu- 
 sion. Even now a Parliamentary paper relating to them 
 has just been presented to the House of Commons, which 
 says the fundamental and ruling document cannot be 
 traced beyond the possession of Sir George Lewis, who 
 was Secretary for War three years since ; and the confused 
 details are endless, as they must be in a chronic contention 
 of offices. At the Board of Trade there is only the hypo- 
 thesis of a Board ; it has long ceased to exist. Even the 
 President and Vice-President do not regularly meet for
 
 216 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the transaction of affairs. The patent of the latter is 
 only to transact business in the absence of the President, 
 and if the two are not intimate, and the President chooses 
 to act himself, the Vice-President sees no papers, and 
 does nothing. At the Treasury the shadow of a Board 
 exists, but its members have no power, and are the very 
 officials whom Canning said existed to make a House, to 
 keep a House, and to cheer the ministers. The India 
 Office has a fixed "Council;" but the Colonial Office, 
 which rules over our other dependencies and colonies, has 
 not, and never had, the vestige of a council. Any of these 
 varied constitutions may be right, but all of them can 
 scarcely be right. 
 
 In truth the real constitution of a permanent office to 
 be ruled by a permanent chief has been discussed only 
 once in England : that case was a peculiar and anomalous 
 one, and the decision then taken was dubious. A new 
 India Office, when the East India Company was abolished, 
 had to be made. The late Mr. James Wilson, a consum- 
 mate judge of administrative affairs, then maintained that 
 no council ought to be appointed eo nomine, but that the 
 true Council of a Cabinet minister was a certain number 
 of highly paid, much occupied, responsible secretaries, 
 whom the minister could consult either separately or 
 together, as, and when, he chose. Such secretaries, Mr. 
 Wilson maintained, must be able, for no minister will 
 sacrifice his own convenience, and endanger his own repu- 
 tation by appointing a fool to a post so near himself, and 
 where he can do much harm. A member of a Board may 
 easily be incompetent ; if some other members and the
 
 CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 217 
 
 chairmen are able, the addition of one or two stupid men 
 will not be felt ; they will receive their salaries and do 
 nothing. But a permanent under-secretaiy, charged with 
 a real control over much important business, must be 
 able, or his superior will be blamed, and there will be " a 
 scrape in Parliament." 
 
 I cannot here discuss, nor am I competent to discuss, 
 the best mode of composing public offices, and of adjust- 
 ing them to a Parliamentary head. There ought to be 
 on record skilled evidence on the subject before a person 
 without any specific experience can to any purpose think 
 about it. But I may observe that the plan which Mr. 
 Wilson suggested is that followed in the most successful 
 part of our administration, the "Ways and Means " part 
 When the Chancellor of the Exchequer prepares a 
 Budget, he requires from the responsible heads of the 
 revenue department their estimates of the public revenue 
 upon the preliminary hypothesis that no change is made, 
 but that last year's taxes will continue; if, afterwards, 
 he thinks of making an alteration, he requires a report 
 on that too. If he has to renew Exchequer bills, or 
 operate anyhow in the City, he takes the opinion, oral or 
 written, of the ablest and most responsible person at the 
 National Debt Office, and the ablest and most respon- 
 sible at the Treasury. Mr. Gladstone, by far the greatest 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer of this generation, one of the 
 very greatest of any generation, has often gone out of his 
 way to express his obligation to these responsible skilled 
 advisers. The more a man knows himself, the more 
 habituated he is to action in general, the more sure he is
 
 218 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to take and to value responsible counsel emanating from 
 ability and suggested by experience. That this principle 
 brings good fruit is certain. We have, by unequivocal 
 admission, the best budget in the world. Why should 
 not the rest of our administration be as good if we did 
 but apply the same method to it ? 
 
 I leave this to stand as it was originally written 
 since it does not profess to rest on my own knowledge, 
 and only offers a suggestion on good authority. Recent 
 experience seems, however, to show that in all great 
 administrative departments there ought to be some one 
 permanent responsible head through whom the changing 
 Parliamentary chief always acts, from whom he learns 
 everything, and to whom he communicates everything. 
 The daily work of the Exchequer is a trine compared 
 with that of the Admiralty or the Home Office, and 
 therefore a single principal head is not there so neces- 
 sary. But the preponderance of evidence at present is 
 that in all offices of very great work some one such head 
 is essential.
 
 219 
 
 No. VIL 
 
 ITS SUPPOSED CHECKS AND BALANCES. 
 
 IN a former essay I devoted an elaborate discussion to 
 the comparison of the royal and unroyal form of Par- 
 liamentary Government. I showed that at the formation 
 of a ministry, and during the continuance of a ministry, 
 a really sagacious monarch might be of rare use. I ascer- 
 tained that it was a mistake to fancy that at such times 
 a constitutional monarch had no role and no duties. But 
 I proved likewise that the temper, the disposition, and 
 the faculties then needful to fit a constitutional monarch 
 for usefulness were very rare, at least as rare as the 
 faculties of a great absolute monarch, and that a common 
 man in that place is apt to do at least as much harm as 
 good perhaps more harm. But in that essay I could 
 not discuss fully the functions of a king at the conclu- 
 sion of an administration, for then the most peculiar 
 parts of the English government the power to dissolve 
 the House of Commons, and the power to create new 
 peers come into play, and until the nature of the House 
 of Lords and the nature of the House of Commons had 
 been explained, I had no premises for an argument as to 
 the characteristic action of the king upon them. We
 
 220 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 have since considered the functions of the two houses, 
 and also the effects of changes of ministry on our ad- 
 ministrative system ; we are now, therefore, in a position 
 to discuss the functions of a king at the end of an 
 administration. 
 
 I may seem over formal in this matter, but I am 
 very formal on purpose. It appears to me that the 
 functions of our executive in dissolving the Commons 
 
 o 
 
 and augmenting the Peers are among the most impor- 
 tant, and the least appreciated, parts of our whole 
 government, and that hundreds of errors have been 
 made in copying the English Constitution from not com- 
 prehending them. 
 
 Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now under- 
 stands, that there must be a supreme authority, a con- 
 clusive power, in every state on every point somewhere. 
 The idea of government involves it when that idea 
 is properly understood. But there are two classes of 
 governments. In one the supreme determining power 
 is upon all points the same : in the other, that ultimate 
 power is different upon different points now resides in 
 one part of the Constitution and now in another. The 
 Americans thought that they were imitating the English 
 in making their Constitution upon the last principle 
 in having one ultimate authority for one sort of matter, 
 and another for another sort. But in truth the English 
 Constitution is the type of the opposite species; it has 
 only one authority for all sorts of matters. To gain a 
 living conception of the difference let us see what the 
 Americans did.
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 221 
 
 First, they altogether retained what, in part, they 
 could not help, the sovereignty of the separate states. A 
 fundamental article of the Federal Constitution says that 
 the powers not " delegated " to the central government 
 are " reserved to the States respectively." And the whole 
 recent history of the Union perhaps all its history has 
 been more determined by that enactment than by any 
 other single cause. The sovereignty of the principal 
 matters of state has rested not with the highest govern- 
 ment, but with the subordinate government. The Federal 
 government could not touch slavery the " domestic in- 
 stitution " which divided the Union into two halves, un- 
 like one another in morals, politics, and social condition, 
 and at last set them to fight. This determining political 
 fact was not in the jurisdiction of the highest government 
 in the country, where you might 'expect its highest 
 wisdom, nor in the central government, where you might 
 look for impartiality, but in local governments, where 
 petty interests were sure to be considered, and where 
 only inferior abilities were likely to be employed. The 
 capital fact was reserved for the minor jurisdictions. 
 Again, there has been only one matter comparable to 
 slavery in the United States, and that has been vitally 
 affected by the State governments also. Their ultra- 
 democracy is not a result of Federal legislation, but of 
 State legislation. The Federal Constitution deputed one 
 of the main items of its structure to the subordinate 
 governments. One of its clauses provides that the suf- 
 frages for the Federal House of Repieseritatives shall be, 
 in each State, the same as for the most numerous branch
 
 222 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 of the legislature of that State ; and as each State fixes 
 the suffrage for its own legislatures, the States altogethei 
 fix the suffrage for the Federal Lower Chamber. By 
 another clause of the Federal Constitution the States fix 
 the electoral qualification for voting at a Presidential 
 election. The primary element in a free government 
 the determination how many people shall have a share in 
 it in America depends not on the government but on 
 certain subordinate local, and sometimes, as in the South 
 now, hostile bodies. 
 
 Doubtless the framers of the Constitution had not 
 much choice in the matter. The wisest of them were 
 anxious to get as much power for the central government, 
 and to leave as little to the local governments as they 
 could. But a cry was got up that this wisdom would 
 create a tyranny and impair freedom, and with that help, 
 local jealousy triumphed easily. All Federal government 
 is, in truth, a case in which what I have called the 
 dignified elements of government do not coincide with 
 the serviceable elements. At the beginning of every 
 league the separate States are the old governments which 
 attract and keep the love and loyalty of the people ; the 
 Federal government is a useful thing, but new and un- 
 attractive. It must concede much to the State govern- 
 ments, for it is indebted to them for motive power : they 
 are the governments which the people voluntarily obey. 
 When the State governments are not thus loved, they 
 vanish as the little Italian and the little German poten- 
 tates vanished ; no federation is needed ; a single central 
 government rules all,
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 223 
 
 But the division of the sovereign authority in the 
 American Constitution is far more complex than this. 
 The part of that authority left to the Federal govern- 
 ment is itself divided and subdivided. The greatest in- 
 stance is the most obvious. The Congress rules the law, 
 but the President rules the administration. One means 
 of unity the constitution does give ; the President can 
 veto laws he does not like. But when two-thirds of both 
 houses are unanimous (as has lately happened), they can 
 overrule the President and make the laws without him ; 
 so here there are three separate repositories of the legis- 
 lative power in different cases: first, Congress and the 
 President when they agree ; next, the President when he 
 effectually exerts his power; then the requisite two-thirds 
 of Congress when they overrule the President. And the 
 President need not be over-active in carrying out a law 
 he does not approve of. He may indeed be impeached for 
 gross neglect; but between criminal non-feasance and 
 zealous activity there are infinite degrees. Mr. Johnson 
 does not carry out the Freedman's Bureau Bill as Mr. 
 Lincoln, who approved of it, would have carried it out. 
 The American Constitution has a special contrivance for 
 varying the supreme legislative authority in different 
 cases, and dividing the administrative authority from it 
 in all cases. 
 
 But the administrative power itself is not left thus 
 simple and undivided. One most important part of 
 administration is international policy, and the supreme 
 authority here is not in the President, still less in the 
 House of Representatives, but in the Senate. The Presi-
 
 224 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 dent can only make treaties, "provided two-thirds of 
 Senators present " concur. The sovereignty therefore for 
 the greatest international questions is in a different part 
 of the State altogether from any common administrative 
 or legislative question. It is put in a place by itself. 
 
 Again, the Congress declares war, but they would find 
 it very difficult, according to the recent construction of 
 their laws, to compel the President to make a peace. The 
 authors of the Constitution doubtless intended that Con- 
 gress should be able to control the American executive as 
 our Parliament controls ours. They placed the granting 
 of supplies in the House of Representatives exclusively. 
 But they forgot to look after " paper money ; " and now 
 it has been held that the President has power to emit such 
 money without consulting Congress at all. The first part 
 of the late war was so carried on by Mr. Lincoln; he 
 relied not on the grants of Congress, but on the prero- 
 gative of emission. It sounds a joke, but it is true never- 
 theless, that this power to issue greenbacks is decided to 
 belong to the President as commander-in-chief of the 
 army ; it is part of what was called the "war power." In 
 truth money was wanted in the late war, and the ad- 
 ministration got it in the readiest way ; and the nation, 
 glad not to be more taxed, wholly approved of it. But 
 the fact remains that the President has now, by precedent 
 and decision, a mighty power to continue a war without 
 the consent of Congress, and perhaps against its wish. 
 Against the united will of the American people a Presi- 
 dent would of course be impotent ; such is the genius of 
 the place and nation that he would never think of it.
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 225 
 
 But when the nation was (as of late) divided into two 
 parties, one cleaving to the President, the other to the 
 Congress, the now unquestionable power of the President 
 to issue paper-money may give him the power to continue 
 the war though Parliament (as we should speak) may 
 enjoin the war to cease. 
 
 And lastly, the whole region of the very highest ques- 
 tions is withdrawn from the ordinary authorities of the 
 State, and reserved for special authorities. The " consti- 
 tution " cannot be altered by any authorities within the 
 constitution, but only by authorities without it. Every 
 alteration of it, however urgent or however trifling, must 
 be sanctioned by a complicated proportion of States or 
 legislatures. The consequence is that the most obvious 
 evils cannot be quickly remedied ; that the most absurd 
 fictions must be framed to evade the plain sense of mis- 
 chievous clauses ; that a clumsy working and curious tech- 
 nicality mark the politics of a rough-and-ready people. 
 The practical arguments and the legal disquisitions in 
 America are often like those of trustees carrying out a 
 misdrawn will the sense of what they mean is good, but 
 it can never be worked out fully or defended simply, so 
 hampered is it by the old words of an old testament. 
 
 These instances (and others might be added) prove, as 
 history proves too, what was the principal thought of the 
 American constitution-makers. They shrank from placing 
 sovereign power anywhere. They feared that it would 
 generate tyranny; George III. had been a tyrant to 
 them, and come what might, they would not make a 
 George IIL Accredited theories said that the English 
 
 Q
 
 226 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Constitution divided the sovereign authority, and in 
 imitation the Americans split up theirs. 
 
 The result is seen now. At the critical moment of 
 their history there is no ready, deciding power. The 
 South, after a great rebellion, lies at the feet of its con- 
 querors : its conquerors have to settle what to do with 
 it.* They must decide the conditions upon which the 
 Secessionists shall again become fellow citizens, shall 
 again vote, again be represented, again perhaps govern. 
 The most difficult of problems is how to change late foes 
 into free friends. The safety of their great public debt, 
 and with that debt their future credit and their whole 
 power in future wars, may depend on their not giving too 
 much power to those who must see in the debt the cost 
 of their own subjugation, and who must have an inclina- 
 tion towards the repudiation of it, now that their own 
 debt, the cost of their defence, has been repudiated. 
 A race, too, formerly enslaved, is now at the mercy of 
 men who hate and despise it, and those who set it free 
 are bound to give it a fair chance for new life. The slave 
 was formerly protected by his chains ; he was an article 
 of value; but now he belongs to himself, no one but 
 himself has an interest in his life ; and he is at the mercy 
 of the " mean whites," whose labour he depreciates, and 
 who regard him with a loathing hatred. The greatest 
 moral duty ever set before a government, and the most 
 fearful political problem ever set before a government, 
 
 * This was written just after the close of the civil war, bat I do not 
 know that the great problem stated in it has as yet been adequately 
 solved.
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 227 
 
 are now set before the American. But there is no de- 
 cision, and no possibility of a decision. The President 
 wants one course, and has power to prevent any other ; 
 the Congress wants another course, and has power to 
 prevent any other. The splitting of sovereignty into 
 many parts amounts to there being no sovereign. 
 
 The Americans of 1787 thought they were copying 
 the English Constitution, but they were contriving a 
 contrast to it. Just as the American is the type of 
 composite governments, in which the supreme power is 
 divided between many bodies and functionaries, so the 
 English is the type of simple constitutions, in which 
 the ultimate power upon all questions is in the hands 
 of the same persons. 
 
 The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is 
 a newly-elected House of Commons. No matter whether 
 the question upon which it decides be administrative or 
 legislative ; no matter whether it concerns high matters 
 of the essential constitution or small matters of daily 
 detail ; no matter whether it be a question of making a 
 war or continuing a war ; no matter whether it be the 
 imposing a tax or the issuing a paper currency; no 
 matter whether it be a question relating to India, or 
 Ireland, or London, a new House of Commons can 
 despotically and finally resolve. 
 
 The House of Commons may, as was explained, assent 
 in minor matters to the revision of the House of Lords, 
 and submit in matters about which it cares little to the 
 suspensive veto of the House of Lords ; but when sure 
 of the popular assent, and when freshly elected, it is
 
 228 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 absolute, it can rule as it likes and decide as it likes. 
 And it can take the best security that it does not decide 
 in vain. It can insure that its decrees shall be executed, 
 for it, and it alone, appoints the executive ; it can inflict 
 the most severe of all penalties on neglect, for it can 
 remove the executive. It can choose, to effect its wishes, 
 those who wish the same ; and so its will is sure to be 
 done. A stipulated majority of both Houses of the 
 American Congress can overrule by stated enactment 
 their executive; but the popular branch of our legis- 
 lature can make and unmake ours. 
 
 The English Constitution, in a word, is framed on the 
 principle of choosing a single sovereign authority, and 
 making it good; the American, upon the principle of 
 having many sovereign authorities, and hoping that their 
 multitude may atone for their inferiority. The Americans 
 now extol their institutions, and so defraud themselves of 
 their due praise. But if they had not a genius for poli- 
 tics; if they had not a moderation in action singularly 
 curious where superficial speech is so violent ; if they had 
 not a regard for law, such as no great people have yet 
 evinced, and infinitely surpassing ours, the multiplicity 
 of authorities in the American Constitution would long 
 ago have brought it to a bad end. Sensible shareholders, 
 I have heard a shrewd attorney say, can work any deed 
 of settlement ; and so the men of Massachusetts could, I 
 believe, work any constitution.* But political philosophy 
 
 * Of conrse I am not speaking here of the South and Sonth-East, &a 
 they now are. How any free government is to exist in societies where so 
 many bad elements are so much perturbed, I cannot imagine.
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 229 
 
 must analyse political history ; it must distinguish what 
 is due to the excellence of the people, and what to the ex- 
 cellence of the laws ; it must carefully calculate the exact 
 effect of each part of the constitution, though thus it 
 may destroy many an idol of the multitude, and detect 
 the secret of utility where but few imagined it to lie. 
 
 How important singleness and unity are in political 
 action no one, I imagine, can doubt. We may distinguish 
 and define its parts ; but policy is a unit and a whole. 
 It acts by laws by administrators; it requires now 
 one, now the other; unless it can easily move both it 
 will be impeded soon; unless it has an absolute com- 
 mand of both its work will be imperfect. The interlaced 
 character of human affairs requires a single determining 
 energy ; a distinct force for each artificial compartment 
 will make but a motley patchwork, if it live long enough 
 to make anything. The excellence of the British Con- 
 stitution is that it has achieved this unity; that in it 
 the sovereign power is single, possible, and good. 
 
 The success is primarily due to the peculiar provision 
 of the English Constitution, which places the choice of 
 the executive in the " people's house ; " but it could not 
 have been thoroughly achieved except for two parts, 
 which I venture to call the " safety-valve " of the con- 
 stitution, and the " regulator." 
 
 The safety-valve is the peculiar provision of the con- 
 stitution, of which I spoke at great length in my essay 
 on the House of Lords. The head of the executive can 
 overcome the resistance of the second chamber by choos- 
 
 ing new members of that chamber; if he do not find a
 
 230 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 majority, he can make a majority. This is a jsafety-valve 
 of the truest kind. It enables the popular will the will 
 of which the executive is the exponent, the will of which 
 it is the appointee to carry out within the constitution 
 desires and conceptions which one branch of the con- 
 stitution dislikes and resists. It lets forth a dangerous 
 accumulation of inhibited power, which might sweep this 
 constitution before it, as like accumulations have often 
 swept away like constitutions. 
 
 The regulator, as I venture to call it, of our single 
 sovereignty is the power of dissolving the otherwise 
 sovereign chamber confided to the chief executive. The 
 defects of the popular branch of a legislature as a sove- 
 reign have been expounded at length in a previous essay. 
 Briefly, they may be summed up in three accusations. 
 
 First. Caprice is the commonest and most formid- 
 able vice of a choosing chamber. Wherever in our 
 colonies parliamentary government is unsuccessful, or is 
 alleged to be unsuccessful, this is the vice which first 
 impairs it. The assembly cannot be induced to main- 
 tain any administration ; it shifts its selection now from 
 one minister to another minister, and in consequence 
 there is no government at all 
 
 Secondly. The very remedy for such caprice entails 
 another evil. The only mode by which a cohesive majo- 
 rity and a lasting administration can be upheld in a 
 Parliamentary government, is party organisation; but 
 that organisation itself tends to aggravate party violence 
 and party animosity. It is, in substance, subjecting the 
 whole nation to the rule of a section of the nation,
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 
 
 selected because of its speciality. Parliamentary govern- 
 ment is, in its essence, a sectarian government, and is 
 possible only when sects are cohesive. 
 
 Thirdly. A parliament, like every other sort of sove- 
 reign, has peculiar feelings, peculiar prejudices, peculiar 
 interests ; and it may pursue these in opposition to the 
 desires, and even in opposition to the well-being of the 
 nation. It has its selfishness as well as its caprice and 
 its parties. 
 
 The mode in which the regulating wheel of our con- 
 stitution produces its effect is plain. It does not impair 
 the authority of Parliament as a species, but it impairs 
 the power of the individual Parliament. It enables a 
 particular person outside parliament to say, " You Mem- 
 bers of Parliament are not doing your duty. You are 
 gratifying caprice at the cost of the nation. You are 
 indulging party spirit at the cost of the nation. You 
 are helping yourself at the cost of the nation. I will see 
 whether the nation approves what you are doing or not ; 
 I will appeal from Parliament No. 1 to Parliament No. 2." 
 
 By far the best way to appreciate this peculiar pro- 
 vision of our constitution is to trace it in action, to see, 
 as we saw before of the other powers of English royalty, 
 how far it is dependent on the existence of an hereditary 
 king, and how far it can be exercised by a premier whom 
 Parliament elects. When we examine the nature of the 
 particular person required to exercise the power, a vivid 
 idea of that power is itself brought home to us. 
 
 First. As to the caprice of parliament in the choice 
 of a premier, who is the best person to check it ? Clearly
 
 232 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the premier himself. He is the person most interested 
 in maintaining his administration, and therefore the most 
 likely person to use efficiently and dexterously the power 
 by which it is to be maintained. The intervention of an 
 extrinsic king occasions a difficulty. A capricious Par- 
 liament may always hope that his caprice may coincide 
 with theirs. In the days when George III. assailed his 
 governments, the premier was habitually deprived of his 
 due authority. Intrigues were encouraged because it 
 was always dubious whether the king-hated minister 
 would be permitted to appeal from the intriguers, and 
 always a chance that the conspiring monarch might 
 appoint one of the conspirators to be premier in his 
 I room. The caprice of Parliament is better checked when 
 I the faculty of dissolution is intrusted to its appointee, 
 than when it is set apart in an outlying and an alien 
 authority. 
 
 But, on the contrary, the party zeal and the self- 
 seeking of Parliament are best checked by an authority 
 which has no connection with Parliament or dependence 
 upon it supposing that such authority is morally and 
 intellectually equal to the performance of the intrusted 
 function. The Prime Minister obviously being the nomi- 
 nee of a party majority is likely to share its feeling, and 
 is sure to be obliged to say that he shares it. The actual 
 contact with affairs is indeed likely to purify him from 
 many prejudices, to tame him of many fanaticisms, to 
 beat out of him many errors. The present Conservative 
 Government contains more than one member who re- 
 gards his party as intellectually benighted \ who either
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 233 
 
 never speaks their peculiar dialect, or who speaks it con- 
 descendingly, and with an " aside ; " who respects their 
 accumulated prejudices as the "potential energies" on 
 which he subsists, but who despises them while he lives 
 by them. Years ago Mr. Disraeli called Sir Robert Peel's 
 Ministry the last Conservative Ministry that had real 
 power "an organised hypocrisy," so much did the 
 ideas of its "head" differ from the sensations of its 
 "tail." Probably he now comprehends if he did not 
 always that the air of Downing Street brings certain 
 ideas to those who live there, and that the hard, compact 
 prejudices of opposition are soon melted and mitigated in 
 the great gulf stream of affairs. Lord Palmerston, too, 
 was a typical example of a leader lulling, rather than 
 arousing, assuaging rather than acerbating the minds of 
 his followers. But though the composing effect of close 
 difficulties will commonly make a premier cease to be an 
 immoderate partisan, yet a partisan to some extent he 
 must be, and a violent one he may be ; and in that case 
 he is not a good person to check the party. When the 
 leading sect (so to speak) in Parliament is doing what 
 the nation do not like, an instant appeal ought to be 
 registered and Parliament ought to be dissolved. But a 
 zealot of a premier will not appeal ; he will follow his 
 formulae ; he will believe he is doing good service when, 
 perhaps, he is but pushing to unpopular consequences the 
 narrow maxims of an inchoate theory. At such a minute 
 a constitutional king such as Leopold the First was, and 
 as Prince Albert might have been is invaluable ; he can. 
 and will prevent Parliament from hurting the nation.
 
 234* THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Again, too, on the selfishness of Parliament an ex- 
 trinsic check is clearly more efficient than an intrinsic. 
 A premier who is made by Parliament may share the 
 bad impulses of those who chose him ; or, at any rate, he 
 may have made " capital " out of them he may have 
 seemed to share them. The self-interests, the jobbing 
 propensities of the assembly are sure indeed to be of very 
 secondary interest to him. What he will care most for 
 is the permanence, is the interest whether corrupt or 
 uncorrupt of his own ministry. He will be disinclined 
 to anything coarsely unpopular. In the order of nature, 
 a new assembly must come before long, and he will be 
 indisposed to shock the feelings of the electors from 
 whom that assembly must emanate. But though the 
 interest of the minister is inconsistent with appalling 
 jobbery, he will be inclined to mitigated jobbery. He 
 will temporise; he will try to give a seemly dress to 
 unseemly matters : to do as much harm as will content 
 the assembly, and yet not so much harm as will offend 
 the nation. He will not shrink from becoming a parti- 
 ceps criminis ; he will but endeavour to dilute the crime. 
 The intervention of an extrinsic, impartial, and capable 
 authority if such can be found will undoubtedly re- 
 strain the covetousness as well as the factiousness of 
 a choosing assembly. 
 
 But can such a head be found ? In one case I think 
 it has been found. Our colonial governors are precisely 
 Dei ex machind. They are always intelligent, for they 
 have to live by a different trade ; they are nearly sure to 
 be impartial, for they come from the ends of the earth ;
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 235 
 
 they are sure not to participate in the selfish desires of 
 any colonial class or body, for long before those desires 
 can have attained fruition they will have passed to the 
 other side of the world, be busy with other faces and 
 other minds, be almost out of hearing what happens in a 
 region they have half forgotten. A colonial governor is 
 a super-parliamentary authority, animated by a wisdom 
 which is probably in quantity considerable, and is differ- 
 ent from that of the local Parliament, even if not above 
 it. But even in this case the advantage of this extrinsic 
 authority is purchased at a heavy price a price which 
 must not be made light of, because it is often worth 
 paying. A colonial governor is a ruler who has no per- 
 manent interest in the colony he governs ; who perhaps 
 had to look for it in the map when he was sent thither ; 
 who takes years before he really understands its parties 
 and its controversies ; who, though without prejudice 
 himself, is apt to be a slave to the prejudices of local 
 people near him ; who inevitably, and almost laudably, 
 governs not in the interest of the colony, which he may 
 mistake, but in his own interest, which he sees and is 
 sure of. The first desire of a colonial governor is not to 
 get into a " scrape," not to do anything which may give 
 trouble to his superiors the Colonial Office at home, 
 which may cause an untimely and dubious recall, which 
 may hurt his after career. He is sure to leave upon the 
 colony the feeling that they have a ruler who only half 
 knows them, and does not so much as half care for them. 
 We hardly appreciate this common feeling in our colo- 
 nies, because we appoint their sovereign; but we should
 
 236 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 understand it in an instant if, by a political metamor- 
 phosis, the choice were turned the other way if they 
 appointed our sovereign. We should then say at once, 
 " How is it possible a man from New Zealand can under- 
 stand England ? how is it possible that a man longing to 
 get back to the antipodes can care for England ? how can 
 we trust one who lives by the fluctuating favour of a 
 distant authority ? how can we heartily obey one who 
 is but a foreigner with the accident of an identical 
 language ? " 
 
 I dwell on the evils which impair the advantage of 
 colonial governorship because that is the most favoured 
 case of super-parliamentary royalty, and because from 
 looking at it we can bring freshly home to our minds 
 what the real difficulties of that institution are. We are 
 so familiar with it that we do not understand it. We are 
 like people who have known a man all their lives, and 
 yet are quite surprised when he displays some obvious 
 characteristic which casual observers have detected at a 
 glance. I have known a man who did not know what 
 colour his sister's eyes were, though he had seen her every 
 day for twenty years ; or rather, he did not know because 
 he had so seen her : so true is the philosophical maxim 
 that we neglect the constant element in our thoughts, 
 though it is probably the most important, and attended 
 almost only to the varying elements the differentiating 
 elements (as men now speak) though they are apt to be 
 less potent. But when we perceive by the roundabout 
 example of a colonial governor how difficult the task of a 
 constitutional king is in the exercise of the function of
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 2G7 
 
 dissolving parliament, we at once see how unlikely it is 
 that an hereditary monarch will be possessed of the 
 requisite faculties. 
 
 An hereditary king is but an ordinary person, upon an 
 average, at best ; he is nearly sure to be badly educated 
 for business ; he is very little likely to have a taste for 
 business ; he is solicited from youth by every temptation 
 to pleasure ; he probably passed the whole of his youth in 
 the vicious situation of the heir-apparent, who can do 
 nothing because he has no appointed work, and who will 
 be considered almost to outstep his function if he under- 
 take optional work. For the most part, a constitutional 
 king is a damaged common man ; not forced to business 
 by necessity as a despot often is, but yet spoiled for busi- 
 ness by most of the temptations which spoil a despot. 
 History, too, seems to show that hereditary royal families 
 gather from the repeated influence of their corrupting 
 situation some dark taint in the blood, some transmitted 
 and growing poison which hurts their judgments, darkens 
 all their sorrow, and is a cloud on half their pleasure. It 
 has been said, not truly, but with a possible approxima- 
 tion to truth, "That in 1802 every hereditary monarch 
 was insane." Is it likely that this sort of monarchs will 
 be able to catch the exact moment when, in opposition to 
 the wishes of a triumphant ministry, they ought to dis- 
 solve Parliament? To do so with efliciency they must be 
 able to perceive that the Parliament is wrong, and that 
 the nation knows it is wrong. Now to know that Parlia- 
 ment is wrong, a man must be, if not a great statesman, 
 yet a consideiable statesman a statesman of some sort.
 
 238 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 He must have great natural vigour, for no less will com- 
 prehend the hard principles of national policy. He must 
 have incessant industry, for no less will keep him abreast 
 with the involved detail to which those principles relate, 
 and the miscellaneous occasions to which they must be 
 applied. A man made common by nature, and made 
 worse by life, is not likely to have either ; he is nearly 
 sure not to be both clever and industrious. And a 
 monarch in the recesses of a palace, listening to a charmed 
 flattery unbiased by the miscellaneous world, who has 
 always been hedged in by rank, is likely to be but a poor 
 judge of public opinion. He may have an inborn tact for 
 finding it out ; but his life will never teach it him, and 
 will probably enfeeble it in him. 
 
 But there is a still worse case, a case which the life of 
 George III. which is a sort of museum of the defects 
 of a constitutional king suggests at once. The Parlia- 
 ment may be wiser than the people, and yet the king 
 may be of the same mind with the people. During the 
 last years of the American war, the Premier, Lord North, 
 upon whom the first responsibility rested, was averse to 
 continuing it, and knew it could not succeed. Parlia- 
 ment was much of the same mind; if Lord North had 
 been able to come down to Parliament with a peace in his 
 hand, Parliament would probably have rejoiced, and the 
 nation under the guidance of Parliament, though sad- 
 dened by its losses, probably would have been satisfied. 
 The opinion of that day was more like the American 
 opinion of the present day than like our present opinion. 
 It was much slower in its formation than our opinion
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 239 
 
 now, and obeyed much more easily sudden impulses from 
 the central administration. If Lord North had been 
 able to throw the undivided energy and the undistracted 
 authority of the Executive Government into the excellent 
 work of making a peace and carrying a peace, years of 
 bloodshed might have been spared, and an entail of 
 enmity cut off that has not yet run out. But there was a 
 power behind the Prime Minister; George III. was madly 
 eager to continue the war, and the nation not seeing how 
 hopeless the strife was, not comprehending the lasting 
 antipathy which their obstinacy was creating ignorant, 
 dull, and helpless was ready to go on too. Even if Lord 
 North had wished to make peace, and had persuaded Par- 
 liament accordingly, all his work would have been useless; 
 a superior power could and would have appealed from a 
 wise and pacific Parliament to a sullen and warlike nation. 
 The check which our constitution finds for the special 
 vices of our Parliament was misused to curb its wisdom. 
 The more we study the nature of Cabinet Government, 
 the more we shall shrink from exposing at a vital instant 
 its delicate machinery to a blow from a casual, incompe- 
 tent, and perhaps semi-insane outsider. The preponder- 
 ant probability is that on a great occasion the Premier 
 and Parliament will really be wiser than the king. The 
 Premier is sure to be able, and is sure to be most anxious 
 to decide well ; if he fail to decide, he loses his place, 
 though through all blunders the king keeps his ; the judg- 
 ment of the man, naturally very discerning, is sharpened 
 by a heavy penalty, from which the judgment of the man, 
 by nature much less intelligent, is exempt. Parliament,
 
 240 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 too, is for the most part a sound, careful, and practical 
 body of men. Principle shows that the power of dis- 
 missing a Government with which Parliament is satisfied, 
 and of dissolving that Parliament upon an appeal to the 
 people, is not a power which a common hereditary monarch 
 will in the long run be able beneficially to exercise. 
 
 Accordingly this power has almost, if not quite, dropped 
 out of the reality of our constitution. Nothing, perhaps, 
 would more surprise the English people than if the Queen 
 by a coup d'etat and on a sudden destroyed a ministry 
 firm in the allegiance and secure of a majority in Parlia- 
 ment. That power, indisputably, in theory, belongs to 
 her; but it has passed so far away from the minds of 
 men that it would terrify them, if she used it, like a 
 volcanic eruption from Primrose Hill. The last analogy 
 to it is not one to be coveted as a precedent. In 1835 
 William IV. dismissed an administration which, though 
 disorganised by the loss of its leader in the Commons, was 
 an existing Government, had a premier in the Lords 
 ready to go on, and a leader in the Commons willing to 
 begin. The King fancied that public opinion was leaving 
 the Whigs and going over to the Tories, and he thought 
 he should accelerate the transition by ejecting the former. 
 But the event showed that he misjudged. His perception 
 indeed was right ; the English people were wavering in 
 their allegiance to the Whigs, who had no leader that 
 touched the popular heart, none in whom Liberalism 
 could personify itself and become a passion who besides 
 were a body long used to opposition, and therefore making 
 blunders in office who were borne to power by a popular
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 241 
 
 impulse which they only half comprehended, and perhaps 
 less than half shared. But the King's policy was wrong ; 
 he impeded the reaction instead of aiding it. He forced 
 on a premature Tory Government, which was as unsuc- 
 cessful as all wise people perceived that it must be. The 
 popular distaste to the Whigs was as yet but incipient, 
 inefficient; and the intervention of the Crown was advan- 
 tageous to them, because it looked inconsistent with the 
 liberties of the people. And in so far as William IV. was 
 right in detecting an incipient change of opinion, he did 
 but detect an erroneous change. What was desirable was 
 the prolongation of Liberal rule. The commencing dis- 
 satisfaction did but relate to the personal demerits of the 
 Whig leaders, and other temporary adjuncts of free prin- 
 ciples, and not to those principles intrinsically. So that 
 the last precedent for a royal onslaught on a ministry 
 ended thus : in opposing the right principles, in aiding 
 the wrong principles, in hurting the party it was meant 
 to help. After such a warning, it is likely that our 
 monarchs will pursue the policy which a long course of 
 quiet precedent at present directs they will leave a 
 Ministry trusted by Parliament to the judgment of Par- 
 liament. 
 
 Indeed, the dangers arising from a party spirit in Par- 
 liament exceeding that of the nation, and of a selfishness 
 in Parliament contradicting the true interest of the nation, 
 are not great dangers in a country where the mind of 
 the nation is steadily political, and where its control over 
 its representatives is constant. A steady opposition to a 
 formed public opinion is hardly possible in our House 
 
 B
 
 242 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 of Commons, so incessant is the national attention to 
 politics, and so keen the fear in the mind of each mem- 
 ber that he may lose his valued seat. These dangers be- 
 long to early and scattered communities, where there are 
 no interesting political questions, where the distances are 
 great, where no vigilant opinion passes judgment on par- 
 liamentary excesses, where few care to have seats in the 
 chamber, and where many of thpse few are from their 
 characters and their antecedents better not there than 
 there. The one great vice of parliamentary government 
 in an adult political nation, is the caprice of Parliament 
 in the choice of a ministry. A nation can hardly control 
 it here ; and it is not good that, except within wide 
 limits, it should control it. The Parliamentary judgment 
 of the merits or demerits of an administration very 
 generally depends on matters which the Parliament, being 
 close at hand, distinctly sees, and which the distant nation 
 does not see. But where personality eriters, capricious- 
 ness begins. It is easy to imagine a House of Commons 
 which is discontented with all statesmen, which is con- 
 tented with none, which is made up of little parties, 
 which votes in small knots, which will adhere steadily to 
 no leader, which gives every leader a chance and a hope. 
 Such Parliaments require the imminent check of possible 
 dissolution ; but that check is (as has been shown) better 
 in the premier than in the sovereign; and by the late 
 practice of our constitution, its use is yearly ebbing from 
 the sovereign, and yearly centering in the premier. The 
 Queen can hardly now refuse a defeated minister the 
 chance of a dissolution, any more than she can dissolve
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 21-3 
 
 in the time of an undefeated one, and without his con- 
 sent. 
 
 We shall find the case much the same with the safety- 
 valve, as I have called it, of our constitution. A good, 
 capable, hereditary monarch would exercise it better than 
 a premier, but a premier could manage it well enough ; 
 and a monarch capable of doing better will be born only 
 once in a century, whereas monarchs likely to do worse 
 will be born every day. 
 
 There are two modes in which the power of our exe- 
 cutive to create Peers to nominate, that is, additional 
 members of our upper and revising chamber now acts : 
 one constant, habitual, though not adequately noticed by 
 the popular mind as it goes on ; and the other possible 
 and terrific, scarcely ever really exercised, but always by 
 its reserved magic maintaining a great and a restraining 
 influence. The Crown creates Peers, a few year by year, 
 and thus modifies continually the characteristic feeling of 
 the House of Lords. I have heard people say, who ought 
 to know, that the English peerage (the only one upon 
 which unhappily the power of new creation now acts) is 
 now more Whig than Tory. Thirty years ago the majo- 
 rity was indisputably the other way. Owing to very 
 curious circumstances English parties have not alternated 
 in power, as a good deal of speculation predicts they would, 
 and a good deal of current language assumes they have. 
 The Whig party were in office some seventy years (with 
 very small breaks) from the Death of Queen Anne to the 
 coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox; then the 
 Tories (with only such breaks), were in power for nearly
 
 244 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 fifty years, till 1832 ; and since, the Whig party has 
 always, with very trifling intervals, been predominant. 
 Consequently, each continuously-governing party has had 
 the means of modifying the Upper House to suit its views. 
 The profuse Tory creations of half a century had made the 
 House of Lords bigotedly Tory before the first Reform 
 Act, but it is wonderfully mitigated now. The Irish 
 Peers and the Scotch Peers being nominated by an 
 almost unaltered constituency, and representing the feel- 
 ings of the majority of that constituency only (no minority 
 having any voice) present an unchangeable Tory element. 
 But the element in which change is permitted has been 
 changed. Whether the English Peerage be or be not 
 predominantly now Tory, it is certainly not Tory after 
 the fashion of the Toryism of 1832. The Whig additions 
 have indeed sprung from a class commonly rather adjoin- 
 ing upon Toryism, than much inclining to Radicalism. 
 It is not from men of large wealth that a very great 
 impetus to organic change should be expected. The 
 additions to the Peers have matched nicely enough with 
 the old Peers, and therefore they have effected more easily 
 a greater and more permeating modification. The ad- 
 dition of a contrasting mass would have excited the old 
 leaven, but the delicate infusion of ingredients similar 
 in genus, though different in species, has modified the 
 new compound without irritating the old original. 
 
 This ordinary and common use of the peer-creating 
 power is always in the hands of the premier, and depends 
 for its characteristic use on being there. He, as the head 
 of the predominant party, is the proper person to modify
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 245 
 
 gradually the permanent chamber which, perhaps, was 
 at starting hostile to him ; and, at any rate, can be best 
 harmonised with the public opinion he represents by the 
 additions he makes. Hardly any contrived constitution 
 possesses a machinery for modifying its secondary house 
 so delicate, so flexible, and so constant. If the power of 
 creating life peers had been added, the mitigating in- 
 fluence of the responsible executive upon the House of 
 Lords would have been as good as such a thing can be. 
 
 The catastrophic creation of Peers for the purpose of 
 swamping the Upper House is utterly different. If an able 
 and impartial exterior king is at hand, this power is best 
 in that king. It is a power only to be used on great 
 occasions, when the object is immense, and the party 
 strife unmitigated. This is the conclusive, the swaying 
 power of the moment, and of course, therefore, it had 
 better be in the hands of a power both capable and 
 impartial, than of a premier who must in some degree be 
 a partizan. The value of a discreet, calm, wise monarch, 
 if such should happen to be reigning at the acute crisis of 
 a nation's destiny, is priceless. He may prevent years of 
 tumult, save bloodshed and civil war, lay up a store of 
 grateful fame to himself, prevent the accumulated intes- 
 tine hatred of each party to its opposite. But the question 
 comes back, Will there be such a monarch just then ? 
 What is the chance of having him just then ? What will 
 be the use of the monarch whom the accidents of inheri- 
 tance, such as we know them to be, must upon an average 
 bring us just then ? 
 
 The answer to these questions is not satisfactory, if
 
 216 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 we take it from the little experience we have had in this 
 rare matter. There have been but two cases at all ap- 
 proaching to a catastrophic creation of Peers to a creation 
 which would suddenly change the majority of the Lords 
 in English history. One was in Queen Anne's time. 
 The majority of Peers in Queen Anne's time were Whig, 
 and by profuse and quick creations Harley's Ministry 
 changed it to a Tory majority. So great was the popular 
 effect, that in the next reign one of the most contested 
 ministerial proposals was a proposal to take the power 
 of indefinite peer creation from the Crown, and to make 
 the number of Lords fixed, as that of the Commons is 
 fixed. But the sovereign had little to do with the matter. 
 Queen Anne was one of the smallest people ever set in a 
 great place. Swift bitterly and justly said " she had not 
 a store of amity by her for more than one friend at a 
 time," and just then her affection was concentrated on 
 a waiting-maid. Her waiting-maid told her to make 
 peers, and she made them. But of large thought and 
 comprehensive statesmanship she was as destitute as Mrs. 
 Masham. She supported a bad ministry by the most 
 extreme of measures, and she did it on caprice. The case 
 of William IV. is still more instructive. He was a very 
 conscientious king, but at the same time an exceedingly 
 weak king. His correspondence with Lord Grey on this 
 subject fills more than half a large volume, or rather his 
 secretary's correspondence, for he kept a very clever man 
 to write what he thought, or at least what those about 
 him thought. It is a strange instance of high-placed 
 weakness and conscientious vacillation. After endless
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 247 
 
 letters the king consents to make a reasonable number of 
 peers if required to pass the second reading of the Reform 
 Bill, but owing to desertion of the " Waverers " from the 
 Tories, the second reading is carried without it by 
 nine, and then the king refuses to make peers, or at 
 least enough peers when a vital amendment is carried by 
 Lord Lyndhurst, which would have destroyed, and was 
 meant to destroy the Bill. In consequence, there was a 
 tremendous crisis and nearly a Revolution. A more 
 striking example of well-meaning imbecility is scarcely 
 to be found in history. No one who reads it carefully 
 will doubt that the discretionary power of making peers 
 would have been far better in Lord Grey's hands than in 
 the king's. It was the uncertainty whether the king 
 would exercise it, and how far he would exercise it, that 
 mainly animated the opposition. In fact, you may place 
 power in weak hands at a revolution, but you cannot keep 
 it in weak hands. It runs out of them into strong ones. 
 An ordinary hereditary sovereign a William IV., or a 
 George IV. is unfit to exercise the peer-creating power 
 when most wanted. A half-insane king, like George III., 
 would be worse. He might use it by unaccountable im- 
 pulse when not required, and refuse to use it out of 
 sullen madness when required. 
 
 The existence of a fancied check on the premier is in 
 truth an evil, because it prevents the enforcement of a 
 real check. It would be easy to provide by law 'that 
 an extraordinary number of Peers say more than ten 
 annually should not be created except on a vote of some 
 large majority, suppose three-fourths of the Lower House.
 
 248 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 This would ensure that the premier should not use the 
 reserve force of the constitution as if it were an ordinary 
 force ; that he should not use it except when the whole 
 nation fixedly wished it; that it should be kept for a 
 revolution, not expended on administration; and it would 
 ensure that he should then have it to use. Queen Anne's 
 case and William IV.'s case prove that neither object is 
 certainly attained by entrusting this critical and extreme 
 force to the chance idiosyncrasies and habitual mediocrity 
 of an hereditary sovereign. 
 
 It may be asked why I argue at such length a 
 question in appearance so removed from practice, and in 
 one point of view so irrelevant to my subject. No one 
 proposes to remove Queen Victoria ; if any one is in a 
 safe place on earth, she is in a safe place. In these very 
 essays it has been shown that the mass of our people 
 would obey no one else, that the reverence she excites is 
 the potential energy as science now speaks out of which 
 all minor forces are made, and from which lesser functions 
 take their efficiency. But looking not to the present 
 hour, and this single country, but to the world at large 
 and coming times, no question can be more practical. 
 
 What grows upon the world is a certain matter-of- 
 factness. The test of each century, more than of the 
 century before, is the test of results. New countries are 
 arising all over the world where there are no fixed sources 
 of reverence ; which have to make them ; which have to 
 create institutions which must generate loyalty by con- 
 spicuous utility. This matter- of-factness is the growth 
 even in Europe of the two greatest and newest intellec-
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 249 
 
 tual agencies of our time. One of these is business. We 
 see so much of the material fruits of commerce, that we 
 forget its mental fruits. It begets a mind desirous of 
 things, careless of ideas, not acquainted with the niceties 
 of words. In all labour there should be profit, is its 
 motto. It is not only true that we have "left swords 
 for ledgers," but war itself is made as much by the ledger 
 as by the sword. The soldier that is, the great soldier 
 of to-day is not a romantic animal, dashing at forlorn 
 hopes, animated by frantic sentiment, full of fancies as 
 to a lady-love or a sovereign ; but a quiet, grave man, 
 busied in charts, exact in sums, master of the art of 
 tactics, occupied in trivial detail ; thinking, as the Duke 
 of Wellington was said to do, most of the shoes of his 
 soldiers ; despising all manner of eclat and eloquence ; 
 perhaps, like Count Moltke, " silent in seven languages." 
 We have reached a " climate " of opinion where figures 
 rule, where our very supporter of Divine right, as we 
 deemed him, our Count Bismarck, amputates kings right 
 and left, applies the test of results to each, and lets none 
 live who are not to do something. There has in truth 
 been a great change during the last five hundred years in 
 the predominant occupations of the ruling part of man- 
 kind ; formerly they passed their time either in exciting 
 action or inanimate repose. A feudal baron had nothing 
 between war and the chase keenly animating things 
 both and what was called "inglorious ease." Modern 
 life is scanty in excitements, but incessant in quiet action. 
 Its perpetual commerce is creating a "stock-taking" 
 habit the habit of asking each man, thing, and insti-
 
 250 THK ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 tution, "Well, what have you done since I saw you 
 last?" 
 
 Our physical science, which is becoming the dominant 
 culture of thousands, and which is beginning to permeate 
 our common literature to an extent which few watch 
 enough, quite tends the same way. The two peculiarities 
 are its homeliness and its inquisitiveness ; its value for 
 the most " stupid " facts, as one used to call them, and its 
 incessant wish for verification to be sure, by tiresome 
 seeing and hearing, that they are facts. The old excite- 
 ment of thought has half died out, or rather it is diffused 
 in quiet pleasure over a life instead of being concen- 
 trated in intense and eager spasms. An old philosopher 
 a Descartes, suppose fancied that out of primitive truths, 
 which he could by ardent excogitation know, he might 
 by pure deduction evolve the entire universe. Intense 
 self-examination, and intense reason would, he thought, 
 make out everything. The soul " itself by itself," could 
 tell all it wanted if it would be true to its sublimer 
 isolation. The greatest enjoyment possible to man was 
 that which this philosophy promises its votaries the 
 pleasure of being always right, and always reasoning 
 without ever being bound to look at anything. But our 
 most ambitious schemes of philosophy now start quite 
 differently. Mr. Darwin begins : 
 
 " When on board H.M.S. Beagle, as naturalist, I was 
 much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the 
 organic beings inhabiting South America, and in the 
 geological relations of the present to the past inhabitants 
 of that continent. These facts, as will be seen in the
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 251 
 
 latter chapters of this volume, seemed to throw some 
 light on the origin of species that mystery of mysteries, 
 as it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers. 
 On my return home, it occurred to me, in 1837, that 
 something might perhaps be made out on this question 
 by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of 
 facts which could possibly have any bearing on it. After 
 five years' work I allowed myself to speculate on the 
 subject, and drew up some short notes ; these I enlarged 
 in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions which then 
 seemed to me probable : from that period to the present 
 day I have steadily pursued the same object. I hope that 
 I may be excused for entering on these personal details, 
 as I give them to show that I have not been hasty in 
 coming to a decision." 
 
 If he hopes finally to solve his great problem, it is by 
 careful experiments in pigeon fancying, and other sorts of 
 artificial variety making. His hero is not a self-inclosed, 
 excited philosopher, but "that most skilful breeder, Sir 
 John Sebright, who used to say, with respect to pigeons, 
 that he would produce any given feathers in three years, 
 but it would take him six years to obtain a head and a 
 beak." I am not saying that the new thought is better 
 than the old ; it is no business of mine to say anything 
 about that ; I only wish to bring home to the mind, as 
 nothing but instances can bring it home, how matter-of- 
 fact, how petty, as it would at first sight look, even our 
 most ambitious science has become. 
 
 In the new communities which our emigrating habit 
 now constantly creates, this prosaic turn of mind is inten-
 
 252 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 sified. In the American mind and in the colonial mind 
 there is, as contrasted with the old English mind, a 
 literalness, a tendency to say, " The facts are so-and-so, 
 whatever may be thought or fancied about them." We 
 used before the civil war to say that the Americans wor- 
 shipped the almighty dollar ; we now know that they can 
 scatter money almost recklessly when they will But 
 what we meant was half right they worship visible 
 value: obvious, undeniable, intrusive result. And in 
 Australia and New Zealand the same turn comes upper- 
 most It grows from the struggle with the wilderness. 
 Physical difficulty is the enemy of early communities, 
 and an incessant conflict with it for generations leaves a 
 mark of reality on the mind a painful mark almost to 
 us, used to impalpable fears and the half-fanciful dangers 
 of an old and complicated society. The " new Englands " 
 of all latitudes are bare-minded (if I may so say) as com- 
 pared with the " old." 
 
 When, therefore, the new communities of the colonised 
 world have to choose a government, they must choose one 
 in which all the institutions are of an obvious evident 
 utility. We catch the Americans smiling at our Queen 
 with her secret mystery, and our Prince of Wales with his 
 happy inaction. It is impossible, in fact, to convince 
 their prosaic minds that constitutional royalty is a ra- 
 tional government, that it is suited to a new age and an 
 unbroken country that those who start afresh can start 
 with it. The princelings who run about the world with 
 excellent intentions, but an entire ignorance of business, 
 are to them a locomotive advertisement that this sort of
 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES. 253 
 
 government is European in its limitations and mediaeval 
 in its origin ; that though it has yet a great part to play 
 in the old states, it has no place or part in new states. 
 The realisme impitoydble which good critics find in a 
 most characteristic part of the literature of the nineteenth 
 century, is to be found also in its politics. An ostenta- 
 tious utility must characterise its creations. 
 
 The deepest interest, therefore, attaches to the problem 
 of this essay. If hereditary royalty had been essential to 
 parliamentary government, we might well have despaired 
 of that government. But accurate investigation shows 
 that this royalty is not essential ; that, upon an average, 
 it is not even in a high degree useful; that though a 
 king with high courage and fine discretion, a king with 
 a genius for the place, is always useful, and at rare mo- 
 ments priceless, yet that a common king, a king such as 
 birth brings, is of no use at difficult crises, while in the 
 common course of things his aid is neither likely nor 
 required he will do nothing, and he need do nothing. 
 But we happily find that a new country need not fall 
 back into the fatal division of powers incidental to a pre- 
 sidential government ; it may, if other conditions serve, 
 obtain the ready, well-placed, identical sort of sovereignty 
 which belongs to the English Constitution, under the 
 unroyal form of Parliamentary Government.
 
 254. 
 
 No. VIIL 
 
 THE PRE-REQUISITES OF CABINET GOVERNMENT, AND THE 
 PECULIAR FORM WHICH THEY HAVE ASSUMED IN 
 ENGLAND. 
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT is rare because its pre-requi sites 
 are many. It requires the co-existence of several national 
 characteristics which are not often found together in the 
 world, and which should be perceived more distinctly 
 than they often are. It is fancied that the possession of 
 a certain intelligence, and a few simple virtues, are the 
 sole requisites. The mental and moral qualities are 
 necessary, but much else is necessary also. A cabinet 
 government is the government of a committee elected by 
 the legislature, and there are therefore a double set of 
 conditions to it: first, those which are essential to all 
 elective governments as such ; and second, those which 
 are requisite to this particular elective government. 
 There are pre-requisites for the genus, and additional 
 ones for the species. 
 
 The first pre-requisite of elective government is the 
 mutual confidence of the electors. We are so accustomed 
 to submit to be ruled by elected ministers, that we are 
 apt to fancy all mankind would readily be so too. Know-
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 2oo 
 
 ledge and civilisation have at least made this progress, 
 that we instinctively, without argument, almost without 
 consciousness, allow a certain number of specified persons 
 to choose our rulers for us. It seems to us the simplest 
 thing in the world. But it is one of the gravest things. 
 
 The peculiar marks of semi-barbarous people are 
 diffused distrust and indiscriminate suspicion. People, 
 in all but the most favoured times and places, are rooted 
 to the places where they were born, think the thoughts 
 of those places, can endure no other thoughts. The next 
 parish even is suspected. Its inhabitants have different 
 usages, almost imperceptibly different, but yet different ; 
 they speak a varying accent; they use a few peculiar 
 words ; tradition says that their faith is dubious. And if 
 the next parish is a little suspected, the next county is 
 much more suspected. Here is a definite beginning of 
 new maxims, new thoughts, new ways : the immemorial 
 boundary mark begins in feeling a strange world. And 
 if the next county is dubious, a remote county is untrust- 
 worthy. "Vagrants come from thence," men know, and 
 they know nothing else. The inhabitants of the north 
 speak a dialect different from the dialect of the south : 
 they have other laws, another aristocracy, another life. 
 In ages when distant territories are blanks in the mind, 
 when neighbourhood is a sentiment, when locality is a 
 passion, concerted co-operation between remote regions is 
 impossible even on trivial matters. Neither would rely 
 enough upon the good faith, good sense, and good judg- 
 ment of the other. Neither could enough calculate on 
 the other.
 
 256 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 And if such co-operation is not to be expected in 
 trivial matters, it is not to be thought of in the most 
 vital matter of government the choice of the executive 
 ruler. To fancy that Northumberland in the thirteenth 
 century would have consented to ally itself with Somer- 
 setshire for the choice of a chief magistrate is absurd ; it 
 would scarcely have allied itself to choose a hangman. 
 Even now, if it were palpably explained, neither district 
 would like it. But no one says at a county election, 
 " The object of this present meeting is to choose our dele- 
 gate to what the Americans call the ' Electoral College/ 
 to the assembly which names our first magistrate our 
 substitute for their president. Representatives from this 
 county will meet representatives from other counties, 
 from cities and boroughs, and proceed to choose our 
 rulers." Such bald exposition would have been impos- 
 sible in old times ; it would be considered queer, eccen- 
 tric, if it were used now. Happily, the process of election 
 is so indirect and hidden, and the introduction of that 
 process was so gradual and latent, that we scarcely per- 
 ceive the immense political trust we repose in each other. 
 The best mercantile credit seems to those who give it, 
 natural, simple, obvious; they do not argue about it, 
 or think about it. The best political credit is analogous ; 
 we trust our countrymen without remembering that we 
 trust them. 
 
 A second and very rare condition of an elective 
 government is a calm national mind a tone of mind 
 sufficiently staple to bear the necessary excitement of 
 conspicuous revolutions. No barbarous, no semi-civilised
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 257 
 
 nation has ever possessed this. The mass of uneducated 
 men could not now in England be told "go to, choose 
 your rulers ; " they would go wild ; their imaginations 
 would fancy unreal dangers, and the attempt at election 
 would issue in some forcible usurpation. The incal- 
 culable advantage of august institutions in a free state 
 is, that they prevent this collapse. The excitement of 
 choosing our rulers is prevented by the apparent ex- 
 istence of an unchosen ruler. The poorer and more 
 ignorant classes those who would most feel excitement, 
 who would most be misled by excitement really believe 
 that the Queen governs. You could not explain to 
 them the recondite difference between "reigning" and 
 " governing ; " the words necessary to express it do not 
 exist in their dialect ; the ideas necessary to comprehend 
 it do not exist in their minds. The separation of principal 
 power from principal station is a refinement which they 
 could not even conceive. They fancy they are governed 
 by an hereditary queen, a queen by the grace of God, 
 when they are really governed by a cabinet and a parlia- 
 ment men like themselves, chosen by themselves. The 
 conspicuous dignity awakens the sentiment of reverence, 
 and men, often very undignified, seize the occasion to 
 govern by means of it. 
 
 Lastly. The third condition of all elective govern- 
 ment is what I may call rationality, by which I mean a 
 power involving intelligence, but yet distinct from it. 
 A whole people electing its rulers must be able to form 
 a distinct conception of distant objects. Mostly, the 
 "divinity" that surrounds a king altogether prevents 
 
 8
 
 258 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 anything like a steady conception of him. You fancy 
 that the object of your loyalty is as much elevated above 
 you by intrinsic nature as he is by extrinsic position; 
 you deify him in sentiment, as once men deified him in 
 doctrine. This illusion has been and still is of incalcu- 
 lable benefit to the human race. It prevents, indeed, 
 men from choosing their rulers ; you cannot invest with 
 that loyal illusion a man who was yesterday what you 
 are, who to-morrow may be so again, whom you chose to 
 be what he is. But though this superstition prevents 
 the election of rulers, it renders possible the existence of 
 unelected rulers. Untaught people fancy that their king,, 
 crowned with the holy crown, anointed with the oil of 
 Eheims, descended of the House of Plantagenet, is a 
 different sort of being from any one not descended of the 
 Royal House not crowned not anointed. They believe 
 that there is one man whom by mystic right they should 
 obey; and therefore they do obey him. It is only in 
 later times, when the world is wider, its experience 
 larger, and its thought colder, that the plain rule of a 
 palpably chosen ruler is even possible. 
 
 These conditions narrowly restrict elective govern- 
 ment. But the pre-requisites of a cabinet government 
 are rarer still ; it demands not only the conditions I have 
 mentioned, but the possibility likewise of a good legis- 
 lature a legislature competent to elect a sufficient 
 administration. 
 
 Now a competent legislature is very rare. Any per- 
 manent legislature at all, any constantly acting mechanism 
 for enacting and repealing laws, is, though it seems to us
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 259 
 
 so natural, quite contrary to the inveterate conceptions 
 of mankind. The great majority of nations conceive of 
 their law, either as something Divinely given, and there- 
 fore unalterable, or as a fundamental habit, inherited 
 from the past to be transmitted to the future. The Eng- 
 lish Parliament, of which the prominent functions are 
 now legislative, was not all so once. It was rather a pre- 
 servative body. The custom of the realm the aboriginal 
 transmitted law the law which was in the breast of the 
 judges, could not be altered without the consent of par- 
 liament, and therefore everybody felt sure it would not 
 be altered except in grave, peculiar, and anomalous cases. 
 The valued use of parliament was not half so much to 
 alter the law, as to prevent the laws being altered. And 
 such too was its real use. In early societies it matters 
 much more that the law should be fixed than that i 
 should be good. Any law which the people of ignorant 
 times enact is sure to involve many misconceptions, and 
 to cause many evils. Perfection in legislation is not to 
 be looked for, and is not, indeed, much wanted in a rude, 
 painful, confined life. But such an age covets fixity. 
 That men should enjoy the fruits of their labour, that 
 the law of property should be known, that the law of 
 marriage should be known, that the whole course of life 
 should be kept in a calculable track is the summum 
 bonum of early ages, the first desire of semi-civilised 
 mankind. In that age men do not want to have their 
 laws adapted, but to have their laws steady. The pas- 
 sions are so powerful, force so eager, the social bond so 
 weak, that the august spectacle of an all but unalterable
 
 260 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 law is necessary to preserve society. In the early stages 
 of human society all change is thought an evil. And 
 most change is an evil. The conditions of life are so 
 simple and so unvarying that any decent sort of rules 
 suffice, so long as men know what they are. Custom is 
 the first check on tyranny; that fixed routine of social 
 life at which modern innovations chafe, and by which 
 modern improvement is impeded, is the primitive check 
 on base power. The perception of political expediency 
 has then hardly begun; the sense of abstract justice is 
 weak and vague; and a rigid adherence to the fixed 
 mould of transmitted usage is essential to an unmarred, 
 unspoiled, unbroken life. 
 
 In such an age a legislature continuously sitting, 
 always making laws, always repealing laws, would have 
 been both an anomaly and a nuisance. But in the 
 present state of the civilised part of the world such 
 difficulties are obsolete. There is a diffused desire in 
 civilised communities for an adjusting legislation; for 
 a legislation which should adapt the inherited laws to 
 the new wants of a world which now changes every 
 day. It has ceased to be necessary to maintain bad 
 laws because it is necessary to have some laws. Civili- 
 sation is robust enough to bear the incision of legal im- 
 provements. But taking history at large, the rarity of 
 cabinets is mostly due to the greater rarity of continuous 
 legislatures. 
 
 Other conditions, however, limit even at the present 
 day the area of a cabinet government. It must be 
 possible to have not only a legislature, but to have a
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT 261 
 
 competent legislature a legislature willing to elect and 
 willing to maintain an efficient executive. And this is 
 no easy matter. It is indeed true that we need not 
 trouble ourselves to look for that elaborate and compli- 
 cated organisation which partially exists in the House of 
 Commons, and which is more fully and freely expanded 
 in plans for improving the House of Commons. We are 
 not now concerned with perfection or excellence ; we seek 
 only for simple fitness and bare competency. 
 
 The conditions of fitness are two. First, you must get 
 a good legislature; and next, you must keep it good. 
 And these are by no means so nearly connected as might 
 be thought at first sight. To keep a legislature efficient, 
 it must have a sufficient supply of substantial business. 
 If you employ the best set of men to do nearly nothing, 
 they will quarrel with each other about that nothing. 
 Where great questions end, little parties begin. And a 
 very happy community, with few new laws to make, few 
 old bad laws to repeal, and but simple foreign relations 
 to adjust, has great difficulty in employing a legislature. 
 There is nothing for it to enact, and nothing for it to 
 settle. Accordingly, there is great danger that the legis- 
 lature, being debarred from all other kind of business, 
 may take to quarrelling about its elective business ; that 
 controversies as to ministries may occupy all its time, and 
 yet that time be perniciously employed ; that a constant 
 succession of feeble administrations, unable to govern and 
 unfit to govern, may be substituted for the proper result 
 of cabinet government, a sufficient body of men long 
 enough in power to evince their sufficiency. The exact
 
 262 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 amount of non-elective business necessary for a parliament 
 which is to elect the executive cannot, of course, be for- 
 mally stated. There are no numbers and no statistics in 
 the theory of constitutions. All we can say is, that a 
 parliament with little business, which is to be as efficient 
 as a parliament with much business, must be in all other 
 respects much better. An indifferent parliament may be 
 much improved by the steadying effect of grave atfairs ; 
 but a parliament which has no such affairs must be in- 
 trinsically excellent, or it will fail utterly. 
 
 But the difficulty of keeping a good legislature, is 
 evidently secondary to the difficulty of first getting it. 
 There are two kinds of nations which can elect a good 
 parliament. The first is a nation in which the mass of 
 the people are intelligent, and in which they are comfort- 
 able. Where there is no honest poverty, where education 
 is diffused, and political intelligence is common, it is easy 
 for the mass of the people to elect a fair legislature. The 
 idea is roughly realised in the North American colonies 
 of England, and in the whole free States of the Union. 
 In these countries there is no such thing as honest 
 poverty ; physical comfort, such as the poor cannot 
 imagine here, is there easily attainable by healthy in- 
 dustry. Education is diffused much, and is fast spreading. 
 Ignorant emigrants from the Old World often prize the 
 intellectual advantages of which they are themselves 
 destitute, and are annoyed at their inferiority in a place 
 where rudimentary culture is so common. The greatest 
 difficulty of such new communities is commonly geo- 
 graphical The population is mostly scattered ; and
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 2G3 
 
 where population is sparse, discussion is difficult. But in 
 a country very large, as we reckon in Europe, a people 
 really intelligent, really educated, really comfortable, 
 would soon form a good opinion. No one can doubt that 
 the New England States, if they were a separate com- 
 munity, would have an education, a political capacity, 
 and an intelligence such as the numerical majority of no 
 people, equally numerous, has ever possessed. In a state 
 of this sort, where all the community is fit to choose a 
 sufficient legislature, it is possible, it is almost easy, to 
 create that legislature. If the New England States pos- 
 sessed a cabinet government as a separate nation, they 
 would be as renowned in the world for political sagacity 
 as they now are for diffused happiness. 
 
 The structure of these communities is indeed based on 
 the principle of equality, and it is impossible that any 
 such community can wholly satisfy the severe require- 
 ments of a political theorist. In every old community its 
 primitive and guiding assumption is at war with truth. 
 By its theory all people are entitled to the same political 
 power, and they can only be so entitled on the ground 
 that in politics they are equally wise. But at the outset 
 of an agricultural colony this postulate is as near the 
 truth as politics want. There are in such communities 
 no large properties, no great capitals, no refined classes 
 every one is comfortable and homely, and no one is at all 
 more. Equality is not artificially established in a new 
 colony ; it establishes itself. There is a story that among 
 the first settlers in Western Australia, some, who were 
 rich, took out labourers at their own expense, and also
 
 264 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 carriages to ride in. But soon they had to try if they 
 could live in the carriages. Before the masters' houses 
 were built, the labourers had gone off they were build- 
 ing houses and cultivating land for themselves, and the 
 masters were left to sit in their carriages. Whether this 
 exact thing happened I do not know, but this sort of 
 thing has happened a thousand times. There have been 
 a whole series of attempts to transplant to the colonies a 
 graduated English society. But they have always failed 
 at the first step. The rude classes at the bottom felt that 
 they were equal to or better than the delicate classes at 
 the top ; they shifted for themselves, and left the "gentle- 
 folks " to shift for themselves ; the base of the elaborate 
 pyramid spread abroad, and the apex tumbled in and 
 perished. In the early ages of an agricultural colony, 
 whether you have political democracy or not, social de- 
 mocracy you must have, for nature makes it, and not 
 you. But in time, wealth grows and inequality begins. 
 A and his children are industrious, and prosper ; B and 
 his children are idle, and fail. If manufactures on a 
 considerable scale are established and most young com- 
 munities strive even by protection to establish them 
 the tendency to inequality is intensified. The capitalist 
 becomes a unit with much, and his labourers a crowd 
 with little. After generations of education, too, there 
 arises varieties of culture there will be an upper thou- 
 sand, or ten thousand, of highly cultivated people in the 
 midst of a great nation of moderately educated people. 
 In theory it is desirable that this highest class of wealth 
 and leisure should have an influence far out of proportion
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 265 
 
 to its mere number : a perfect constitution would find for 
 it a delicate expedient to make its fine thought tell upon 
 the surrounding cruder thought. But as the world goes, 
 when the whole of the population is as instructed and as 
 intelligent as in the case I am supposing, we need not 
 care much about this. Great communities have scarcely 
 ever never save for transient moments been ruled by 
 their highest thought. And if we can get them ruled by 
 a decent capable thought, we may be well enough con- 
 tented with our work. We have done more than could 
 be expected, though not all which could be desired. At 
 any rate, an isocratic polity a polity where every one 
 votes, and where every one votes alike is, in a com- 
 munity of sound education and diffused intelligence, a 
 conceivable case of cabinet government. It satisfies the 
 essential condition! ; there is a people able to elect a 
 parliament able to choose. 
 
 But suppose the mass of the people are not able to 
 elect and this is the case with the numerical majority 
 of all but the rarest nations how is a cabinet govern- 
 ment to be then possible ? It is only possible in what I 
 may venture to call deferential nations. It has been 
 thought strange, but there are nations in which the 
 numerous unwiser part wishes to be ruled by the less 
 numerous wiser part. The numerical majority whether 
 by custom or by choice, is immaterial is ready, is eager 
 to delegate its power of choosing its ruler to a certain 
 select minority. It abdicates in favour of its elite, and 
 consents to obey whoever that dlite may confide in. It 
 acknowledges as its secondary electors as the choosers
 
 266 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 of its government an educated minority, at once com- 
 petent and unresisted ; it has a kind of loyalty to some 
 superior persons who are fit to choose a good govern- 
 ment, and whom no other class opposes. A nation in 
 such a happy state as this has obvious advantages for 
 constructing a cabinet government. It has the best 
 people to elect a legislature, and therefore it may fairly 
 be expected to choose a good legislature a legislature 
 competent to select a good administration. 
 
 England is the type of deferential countries, and the 
 manner in which it is so, and has become so, is extremely 
 curious. The middle classes the ordinary majority of 
 educated men are in the present day the despotic power 
 in England. " Public opinion," nowadays, " is the opinion 
 of the bald-headed man at the back of the omnibus." It 
 is not the opinion of the aristocratical classes as such ; or 
 of the most educated or refined classes as such; it is 
 simply the opinion of the ordinary mass of educated, 
 but still commonplace mankind. If you look at the 
 mass of the constituencies, you will see that they are 
 not very interesting people; and perhaps if you look 
 behind the scenes and see the people who manipulate 
 and work the constituencies, you will find that these are 
 yet more uninteresting. The English constitution in its 
 palpable form is this the mass of the people yield 
 obedience to a select few ; and when you see this select 
 few, you perceive that though not of the lowest class, nor 
 of an unrespectable class, they are yet of a heavy sensible 
 class the last people in the world to whom, if they were 
 drawn up in a row, an immense nation would ever give 
 an exclusive preference.
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 267 
 
 In fact, the mass of the English people yield a 
 deference rather to something else than to their rulers. 
 They defer to what we may call the theatrical show of 
 society. A. certain state passes before them; a certain 
 pomp of great men; a certain spectacle of beautiful 
 women; a wonderful scene of wealth and enjoyment is 
 displayed, and they are coerced by it. Their imagina- 
 tion is bowed down; they feel they are not equal 
 to the life which is revealed to them. Courts and aris- 
 tocracies have the great quality which rules the mul- 
 titude, though philosophers can see nothing in it 
 visibility. Courtiers can do what others cannot. A 
 common man may as well try to rival the actors on 
 the stage in their acting, as the aristocracy in their 
 acting. The higher world, as it looks from without, is 
 a stage on which the actors walk their parts much better 
 than the spectators can. This play is played in every 
 district. Every rustic feels that his house is not like my 
 lord's house; his life like my lord's life; his wife like 
 my lady. The climax of the play is the Queen : nobody 
 supposes that their house is like the court ; their life like 
 her life ; her orders like their orders. There is in England 
 a certain charmed spectacle which imposes on the many, 
 and guides their fancies as it will As a rustic on coming 
 to London finds himself in presence of a great show and 
 vast exhibition of inconceivable mechanical things, so by 
 the structure of our society, he finds himself face to face 
 with a great exhibition of political things which he could 
 not have imagined, which he could not make to which 
 lie feels in himself scarcely anything analogous.
 
 268 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Philosophers may deride this superstition, but its 
 results are inestimable. By the spectacle of this august 
 society, countless ignorant men and women are induced 
 to obey the few nominal electors the 101. borough 
 renters, and the 501. county renters who have nothing 
 imposing about them, nothing which would attract the 
 eye or fascinate the fancy. What impresses men is not 
 mind, but the result of mind. And the greatest of these 
 results is this wonderful spectacle of society, which is 
 ever new, and yet ever the same ; in which accidents pass 
 and essence remains ; in which one generation dies and 
 another succeeds, as if they were birds in a cage, or 
 animals in a menagerie ; of which it seems almost more 
 than a metaphor to treat the parts as limbs of a per- 
 petual living thing, so silently do they seem to change, 
 so wonderfully and so perfectly does the conspicuous life 
 of the new year take the place of the conspicuous life of 
 last year. The apparent rulers of the English nation are 
 like the most imposing personages of a splendid pro- 
 cession : it is by them the mob are influenced ; it is they 
 whom the spectators cheer. The real rulers are secreted 
 in second-rate carriages; no one cares for them or asks 
 about them, but they are obeyed implicitly and uncon- 
 sciously by reason of the splendour of those who eclipsed 
 and preceded them. 
 
 It is quite true that this imaginative sentiment is 
 supported by a sensation of political satisfaction. It 
 cannot be said that the mass of the English people are 
 well off. There are whole classes who have not a con- 
 ception of what the higher orders call comfort ; who have
 
 CABINET GOVERNMENT. 2G9 
 
 not the pre-requi sites of moral existence; who cannot 
 lead the life that becomes a man. But the most miserable 
 of these classes do not impute their misery to politics. 
 If a political agitator were to lecture to the peasants of 
 Dorsetshire, and try to excite political dissatisfaction, 
 it is much more likely that he would be pelted than 
 that he would succeed. Of parliament these miserable 
 creatures know scarcely anything; of the cabinet they 
 never heard. But they would say that, "for all they 
 have heard, the Queen is very good;" and rebelling 
 against the structure of society is to their minds rebelling 
 against the Queen, who rules that society, in whom all 
 its most impressive part the part that they know 
 culminates. The mass of the English people are politi- 
 cally contented as well as politically deferential. 
 
 A deferential community, even though its lowest 
 classes are not intelligent, is far more suited to a cabinet 
 government than any kind of democratic country, 
 because it is more suited to political excellence. The 
 highest classes can rule in it; and the highest classes 
 must, as such, have more political ability than the lower 
 classes. A life of labour, an incomplete education, a 
 monotonous occupation, a career in which the hands are 
 used much and the judgment is used little, cannot create 
 as much flexible thought, as much applicable intelligence, 
 as a life of leisure, a long culture, a varied experience, an 
 existence by which the judgment is incessantly exercised, 
 and by which it may be incessantly improved A country 
 of respectful poor, though far less happy than where there 
 are no poor to be respectful, is nevertheless far more fitted
 
 270 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 for the best government. You can use the best classes of 
 the respectful country ; you can only use the worst where 
 every man thinks he is as good as every other. 
 
 It is evident that no difficulty can be greater than 
 that of founding a deferential nation. Respect is tra- 
 ditional; it is given not to what is proved to be good, 
 jbut to what is known to be old. Certain classes in 
 certain nations retain by common acceptance a marked 
 political preference, because they have always possessed 
 it, and because they inherit a sort of pomp which seems 
 to make them worthy of it. But in a new colony, in a 
 community where merit may be equal, and where there 
 cannot be traditional marks of merit and fitness, it is 
 obvious that a political deference can be yielded to 
 higher culture only upon proof, first of its existence, and 
 next of its political value. But it is nearly impossible to 
 give such a proof so as to satisfy persons of less culture. 
 In a future and better age of the world it may be 
 effected ; but in this age the requisite premises scarcely 
 exist ; if the discussion be effectually open, if the debate 
 be fairly begun, it is hardly possible to obtain a rational, 
 an argumentative acquiescence in the rule of the culti- 
 vated few. As yet the few rule by their hold, not over 
 the reason of the multitude, but over their imaginations, 
 and their habits ; over their fancies as to distant things 
 they do not know at all, over their customs as to near 
 things which they know very well. 
 
 A deferential community in which the bulk of the 
 people are ignorant, is therefore in a state of what is 
 called in mechanics unstable equilibrium. If the equili-
 
 CABINET GOVEKNMEJJTT. 271 
 
 brium is once disturbed there is no tendency to return to 
 it, but rather to depart from it. A cone balanced on its 
 point is in unstable equilibrium, for if you push it ever 
 so little it will depart farther and farther from its posi- 
 tion and fall to the earth. So in communities where the 
 masses are ignorant but respectful, if you once permit 
 the ignorant class to begin to rule you may bid farewell 
 to deference for ever. Their demagogues will inculcate, 
 their newspapers will recount, that the rule of the exist- 
 ing dynasty (the people) is better than the rule of the 
 fallen dynasty (the aristocracy). A people very rarely 
 hears two sides of a subject in which it is much in- 
 terested; the popular organs take up the side which is 
 acceptable, and none but the popular organs in fact reach 
 the people. A people never hears censure of itself. No 
 one will tell it that the educated minority whom it de- 
 throned governed better or more wisely than it governs. 
 A democracy will never, save after an awful catastrophe, 
 return what has once been conceded to it, for to do so 
 would be to admit an inferiority in itself, of which, 
 except by some almost unbearable misfortune, it could 
 never be convinced.
 
 272 
 
 No. IX. 
 
 ITS HISTORY, AND THE EFFECTS OF THAT HISTORY. 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 A VOLUME might seem wanted to say anything worth 
 saying * on the History of the English Constitution, and 
 a great and new volume might still be written on it, if a 
 competent writer took it in hand. The subject has never 
 been treated by any one combining the lights of the 
 newest research and the lights of the most matured phi- 
 losophy. Since the masterly book of Hallam was 
 written, both political thought and historical knowledge 
 have gained much, and we might have a treatise apply- 
 ing our strengthened calculus to our augmented facts. I 
 do not pretend that I could write such a book, but there 
 are a few salient particulars which may be fitly brought 
 together, both because of their past interest and of their 
 present importance. 
 
 * Since the first edition of this book was published several valuable 
 works have appeared, which, on many points, throw much light on onr 
 early constitutional history, especially Mr. Stnbbs' " Select Charters and 
 other Illustrations of English Constitutional History, from the Earliest 
 Times to the Reign of Edward the First," Mr. Freeman's lecture on 
 " The Growth of the English Constitution," and the chapter on the 
 A.nglo-Saxon Constitution in his " History of the Norman Conquest : " 
 but we have not yet a great and authoritative work on the whole subject 
 such as I wished for when I wrote the passage in the text, and as it is 
 most desirable that we should have.
 
 ITS HISTORY. 273 
 
 There is a certain common polity, or germ of polity, 
 which we find in all the rude nations that have attained 
 civilisation. These nations seem to begin in what I may 
 call a consultative and tentative absolutism. The king of 
 early days, in vigorous nations, was not absolute as des- 
 pots now are; there was then no standing army to repress 
 rebellion, no organised espionage to spy out discontent, 
 no skilled bureaucracy to smooth the ruts of obedient life. 
 The early king was indeed consecrated by a religious 
 sanction ; he was essentially a man apart, a man above 
 others, divinely anointed, or even God-begotten. But in 
 nations capable of freedom this religious domination was 
 never despotic. There was indeed no legal limit; the 
 very words could not be translated into the dialect of 
 those times. The notion of law as we have it of a rule 
 imposed by human authority, capable of being altered by 
 that authority when it likes, and in fact, so altered habi- 
 tually could not be conveyed to early nations, who 
 regarded law half as an invincible prescription, and half 
 as a Divine revelation. Law "came out of the king's 
 mouth;" he gave it as Solomon gave judgment em- 
 bedded in the particular case, and upon the authority of 
 Heaven as well as his own. A Divine limit to the 
 Divine revealer was impossible, and there was no other 
 source of law. But though there was no legal limit, 
 there was a practical limit to subjection in (what may be 
 called) the pagan part of human nature, the inseparable 
 obstinacy of freemen. They never would do exactly 
 what they were told. 
 
 To early royalty, as Homer describes it in Greece and 
 
 T
 
 274 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 as we may well imagine it elsewhere, there were always 
 two adjuncts : one the " old men," the men of weight, the 
 council, the j3owXr}, of which the king asked advice, 
 from the debates in which the king tried to learn what 
 he could do and what he ought to do. Besides this there 
 was the ayopa, the purely listening assembly, as some 
 have called it, but the tentative assembly, as I think it 
 might best be called. The king came down to his as- 
 sembled people in form to announce his will, but in 
 reality, speaking in very modern words, to "feel his 
 way." He was sacred, no doubt; and popular, very 
 likely ; still he was half like a popular premier speaking 
 to a high-spirited chamber; there were limits to his 
 authority and power limits which he would discover by 
 trying whether eager cheers received his mandate, or* 
 only hollow murmurs and a thinking silence. 
 
 This polity is a good one for its era and its place, 
 but there is a fatal defect in it. The reverential associa- 
 tions upon which the government is built are transmitted 
 according to one law, and the capacity needful to work 
 the government is transmitted according to another law. 
 The popular homage clings to the line of god-descended 
 kings ; it is transmitted by inheritance. But very soon 
 that line comes to a child or an idiot, or one by some 
 defect or other incapable. Then we find everywhere the 
 truth of the old saying, that liberty thrives under weak 
 princes ; then the listening assembly begins not only to 
 murmur, but to speak ; then the grave council begins not 
 so much to suggest as to inculcate, not so much to advise 
 as to enjoin.
 
 ITS HISTORY. 275 
 
 Mr. Grote has told at length how out of these appen- 
 dages of the original kingdom the free States of Greece 
 derived their origin, and how they gradually grew the 
 oligarchical States expanding the council, and the demo- 
 cratical expanding the assembly. The history has as 
 many varieties in detail as there were Greek cities, but 
 the essence is the same everywhere. The political cha- 
 racteristic of the early Greeks, and of the early Romans, 
 too, is that out of the tentacula of a monarchy they 
 developed the organs of a republic. 
 
 English history has been in substance the same, 
 though its form is different, and its growth far slower 
 and longer. The scale was larger, and the elements more 
 various. A Greek city soon got rid of its kings, for the 
 political sacredness of the monarch would not bear the 
 daily inspection and constant criticism of an eager and 
 talking multitude. Everywhere in Greece the slave 
 population the most ignorant, and therefore the most 
 unsusceptible of intellectual influences was struck out 
 of the account. But England began as a kingdom of 
 considerable size, inhabited by distinct races, none of 
 them fit for prosaic criticism, and all subject to the 
 superstition of royalty. In early England, too, royalty 
 was much more than a superstition. A very strong 
 executive was needed to keep down a divided, an armed, 
 and an impatient country; and therefore the problem 
 of political development was delicate. A formed free 
 government in a homogeneous nation may have a strong 
 executive; but during the transition state, while the 
 republic is in course of development and the monarchy
 
 276 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 in course of decay, the executive is of necessity weak. 
 The polity is divided, and its action feeble and failing. 
 The different orders of English people have progressed, 
 too, at different rates. The change in the state of the 
 higher classes since the Middle Ages is enormous, and it 
 is all improvement ; but the lower have varied little, and 
 many argue that in some important respects they have 
 got worse, even if in others they have got better. The 
 development of the English Constitution was of necessity 
 slow, because a quick one would have destroyed the 
 executive and killed the State, and because the most 
 numerous classes, who changed very little, were not pre- 
 pared for any catastrophic change in our institutions. 
 
 I cannot presume to speak of the time before the 
 Conquest, and the exact nature even of all Anglo-Norman 
 institutions is perhaps dubious : at least, in nearly all 
 cases there have been many controversies. Political zeal, 
 whether Whig or Tory, has wanted to find a model in 
 the past ; and the whole state of society being confused, 
 the precedents altering with the caprice of men and 
 the chance of events, ingenious advocacy has had a 
 happy field. But all that I need speak of is quite plain. 
 There was a great " council " of the realm, to which the 
 king summoned the most considerable persons in Eng- 
 land, the persons he most wanted to advise him, and the 
 persons whose tempers he was most anxious to ascertain. 
 Exactly who came to it at first is obscure and unimpor- 
 tant. I need not distinguish between the "magnum 
 concilium in Parliament" and the "magnum concilium 
 out of Parliament." Gradually the principal assemblies
 
 ITS HISTORY. 277 
 
 summoned "by the English sovereign took the precise and 
 definite form of Lords and Commons, as in their outside 
 we now see them. But their real nature was very dif- 
 ferent. The Parliament of to-day is a ruling body ; ^he 
 mediaeval Parliament was, if I may so say, an expressive 
 body. Its function was to tell the executive the king 
 what the nation wished he should do ; to some extent, 
 to guide him by new wisdom, and, to a very great 
 extent, to guide him by new facts. These facts were 
 their own feelings, which were the feelings of the people, 
 because they were part and parcel of the people. From 
 thence the king learned, or had the means to learn, what 
 the nation would endure, and what it would not endure ; 
 what he might do, and what he might not do. If he 
 much mistook this, there was a rebellion. 
 
 There are, as is well known, three great periods in 
 the English Constitution. The first of these is the ante- 
 Tudor period. The English Parliament then seemed to 
 be gaining extraordinary strength and power. The title 
 to the crown was uncertain; some monarchs were im- 
 becile. Many ambitious men wanted to "take the people 
 into partnership." Certain precedents of that time were 
 cited with grave authority centuries after, when the time 
 of freedom had really arrived. But the causes of this 
 rapid growth soon produced an even more sudden de- 
 cline. Confusion fostered it, and confusion destroyed 
 it. The structure of society then was feudal ; the towns 
 were only an adjunct and a make-weight. The principal 
 popular force was an aristocratic force, acting with the 
 co-operation of the gentry and yeomanry, and resting on
 
 273 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 the loyal fealty of sworn retainers. The head of this 
 force, on whom its efficiency depended, was the high 
 nobility. But the high nobility killed itself out. The 
 great barons who adhered to the "Red Rose" or the 
 " White Rose," or who fluctuated from one to the other, 
 became poorer, fewer, and less potent every year. When 
 the great struggle ended at Bosworth, a large part of 
 the greatest combatants were gone. The restless, aspir- 
 ing, rich barons, who made the civil war, were broken 
 by it. Henry VII. attained a kingdom in which there 
 was a Parliament to advise, but scarcely a Parliament to 
 control 
 
 The consultative government of the ante-Tudor period 
 had little resemblance to some of the modern govern- 
 ments which French philosophers call by that name. 
 The French Empire, I believe, calls itself so. But its 
 assemblies are symmetrical " shams." They are elected 
 by a universal suffrage, by the ballot, and in districts 
 once marked out with an eye to equality, and still 
 retaining a look of equality. But our English parlia- 
 ments were imsymmetrical realities. They were elected 
 anyhow ; the sheriff had a considerable license in send- 
 ing writs to boroughs, that is, he could in part pick 
 its constituencies; and in each borough there was a 
 rush and scramble for the franchise, so that the 
 strongest local party got it, whether few or many. But 
 in England at that time there was a great and distinct 
 desire to know the opinion of the nation, because there 
 was a real and close necessity. The nation was wanted 
 to do something to assist the sovereign in some war, to
 
 ITS HISTORY. 279 
 
 pay some old debt, to contribute its force and aid in the 
 critical conjuncture of the time. It would not have 
 suited the ante-Tudor kings to have had a fictitious 
 assembly ; they would have lost their sole feeler, their 
 only instrument for discovering national opinion. Nor 
 could they have manufactured such an assembly if they 
 wished. The instrument in that behalf is the centralised 
 executive, and there was then no prefet by whom the 
 opinion of a rural locality could be made to order, and 
 adjusted to suit the wishes of the capital Looking at 
 the mode of election a theorist would say that these 
 parliaments were but " chance " collections of influential 
 Englishmen. There would be many corrections and 
 limitations to add to that statement if it were wanted to 
 make it accurate, but the statement itself hits exactly 
 the principal excellence of those parliaments. If not 
 " chance " collections of Englishmen, they were " unde- 
 signed" collections; no administrations made them or 
 could make them. They were bond-fide counsellors, 
 whose opinion might be wise or unwise, but was any- 
 how of paramount importance, because their co-operation 
 was wanted for what was in hand. 
 
 Legislation as a positive power was very secondary in 
 those old Parliaments. I believe no statute at all, as far 
 as we know, was passed in the reign of Richard L, and all 
 the ante-Tudor acts together would look meagre enough 
 to a modern Parliamentary agent who had to live by 
 them. But the negative action of parliament upon the 
 law was essential to its whole idea, and ran through every 
 part of its use. That the king could not change what
 
 280 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 was then the almost sacred datum of the common law, 
 without seeing whether his nation liked it or not, was an 
 essential part of the " tentative " system. The king had 
 to feel his way in this exceptional, singular act, as those 
 ages deemed original legislation, as well as in lesser acts. 
 The legislation was his at last ; he enacted after consult- 
 ing his Lords and Commons ; his was the sacred mouth 
 which gave holy firmness to the enactment ; but he only 
 dared alter the rule regulating the common life of his 
 people after consulting those people ; he would not have 
 been obeyed if he had not, by a rude age which did not 
 fear civil war as we fear it now. Many most important 
 enactments of that period (and the fact is most character- 
 istic) are declaratory acts. They do not profess to enjoin 
 by inherent authority what the law shall in future be, 
 but to state and mark what the law is ; they are declara- 
 tions of immemorial custom, not precepts of new duties. 
 Even in the " Great Charter " the notion of new enact- 
 ments was secondary, it was a great mixture of old and 
 new ; it was a sort of compact defining what was doubt- 
 ful in floating custom, and was re-enacted over and over 
 again, as boundaries are perambulated once a year, and 
 rights and claims tending to desuetude thereby made 
 patent and cleared of new obstructions. In truth, such 
 great "charters" were rather treaties between different 
 orders and factions, confirming ancient rights, or what 
 claimed to be such, than laws in our ordinary sense. They 
 were the "deeds of arrangement" of mediaeval society 
 affirmed and re-affirmed from time to time, and the prin- 
 cipal controversy was, of course, between the king and
 
 ITS HISTORY. 281 
 
 nation the king trying to see how far the nation would 
 let him go, and the nation murmuring and recalcitrating, 
 and seeing how many acts of administration they could 
 prevent, and how many of its claims they could resist. 
 
 Sir James Mackintosh says that Magna Charta " con- 
 verted the right of taxation into the shield of liberty," but 
 it did nothing of the sort. The liberty existed before, and 
 the right to be taxed was an efflorescence and instance of 
 it, not a substratum or a cause. The necessity of consult- 
 ing the great council of the realm before taxation, the 
 principle that the declaration of grievances by the Parlia- 
 ment was to precede the grant of supplies to the sovereign, 
 are but conspicuous instances of the primitive doctrine 
 of the ante-Tudor period, that the king must consult the 
 great council of the realm, before he did anything, since 
 he always wanted help. The right of self-taxation was 
 justly inserted in the "great treaty;" but it would have 
 been a dead letter, save for the armed force and aristo- 
 cratic organisation which compelled the king to make a 
 treaty; it was a result, not a basis an example, not a 
 cause. 
 
 The civil wars of many years killed out the old 
 councils (if I might so say) : that is, destroyed three parts 
 of the greater nobility, who were its most potent members, 
 tired the small nobility and the gentry, and overthrew the 
 aristocratic organisation on which all previous effectual 
 resistance to the sovereign had been based. 
 
 The second period of the British Constitution begins 
 with the accession of the House of Tudor, and goes down 
 to 1688 ; it is in substance the history of the growth,
 
 282 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 development, and gradually acquired supremacy of the 
 new great council. I have no room and no occasion to 
 narrate again the familiar history of the many steps by 
 which the slavish Parliament of Henry VIII. grew into 
 the murmuring Parliament of Queen Elizabeth, the 
 mutinous Parliament of James I., and the rebellious 
 Parliament of Charles I. The steps were many, but the 
 energy was one the growth of the English middle-class, 
 using that word in its most inclusive sense, and its ani- 
 mation under the influence of Protestantism. No one, 
 I think, can doubt that Lord Macaulay is right in saying 
 that political causes would not alone have then provoked 
 such a resistance to the sovereign unless propelled by 
 religious theory. Of course the English people went to 
 and fro from Catholicism to Protestantism, and from Pro- 
 testantism to Catholicism (not to mention that the Pro- 
 testantism was of several shades and sects), just as the 
 first Tudor kings and queens wished. But that was in 
 the pre-Puritan era. The mass of Englishmen were in 
 an undecided state, just as Hooper tells us his father was 
 "Not believing in Protestantism, yet not disinclined to 
 it." Gradually, however, a strong Evangelic spirit (as we 
 should now speak) and a still stronger anti-Papal spirit 
 entered into the middle sort of Englishmen, and added to 
 that force, fibre, and substance which they have never 
 wanted, an ideal warmth and fervour which they have 
 almost always wanted. Hence the saying that Cromwell 
 founded the English Constitution. Of course, in seeming, 
 Cromwell's work died with him; his dynasty was rejected, 
 his republic cast aside ; but the spirit which culminated
 
 ITS HISTORY. 283 
 
 in him never sank again, never ceased to be a potent, 
 though often a latent and volcanic force in the country. 
 Charles II. said that he would never go again on his 
 travels for anything or anybody ; and he well knew that 
 though the men whom he met at Worcester might be 
 dead, still the spirit which warmed them was alive and 
 young in others. 
 
 But the Cromwellian republic and the strict Puritan 
 creed were utterly hateful to most Englishmen. They 
 were, if I may venture on saying so, like the " Rouge " 
 element in France and elsewhere the sole revolutionary 
 force in the entire State, and were hated as such. That 
 force could do little of itself; indeed, its bare appearance 
 tended to frighten and alienate the moderate and dull as 
 well as the refined and reasoning classes. Alone it was 
 impotent against the solid clay of the English apathetic 
 nature. But give this fiery element a body of decent- 
 looking earth ; give it an excuse for breaking out on an 
 occasion, when the decent, the cultivated, and aristocratic 
 classes could join with it, and they would conquer by 
 means of it, and it could be disguised in their covering. 
 
 Such an excuse was found in 1688. James II., by 
 incredible and pertinacious folly, irritated not only the 
 classes which had fought against his father, but also 
 those who had fought for his father. He offended the 
 Anglican classes as well as the Puritan classes ; all the 
 Whig nobles, and half the Tory nobles, as well as the dis- 
 senting bourgeois. The rule of Parliament was estab- 
 lished by the concurrence of the usual supporters of 
 royalty with the usual opponents of it. But the result
 
 284i THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 was long weak. Our revolution has been called the 
 minimum of a revolution, because in law, at least, it only 
 changed the dynasty, but exactly on that account it was 
 the greatest shock to the common multitude, who see the 
 dynasty but see nothing else. The support of the main 
 aristocracy held together the bulk of the deferential 
 classes, but it held them together imperfectly, uneasily, 
 and unwillingly. Huge masses of crude prejudice swayed 
 hither and thither for many years. If an able Stuart 
 had with credible sincerity professed Protestantism pro- 
 bably he might have overturned the House of Hanover. 
 So strong was inbred reverence for hereditary right, that 
 until the accession of George III. the English govern- 
 ment was always subject to the unceasing attrition of a 
 competitive sovereign. 
 
 This was the result of what I insist on tediously, but 
 what is most necessary to insist on, for it is a cardinal 
 particular in the whole topic. Many of the English 
 people the higher and more educated portion had 
 come to comprehend the nature of constitutional govern- 
 ment, but the mass did not comprehend it. They looked 
 to the sovereign as the government, and to the sovereign 
 only. These were carried forward by the magic of the 
 aristocracy and principally by the influence of the great 
 Whig families with their adjuncts. Without that aid 
 reason or liberty would never have held them. 
 
 Though the rule of Parliament was definitely estab- 
 lished in 1688, yet the mode of exercising that rule has 
 since changed. At first Parliament did not know how to 
 exercise it; the organisation of parties and the appoint-
 
 ITS HISTORY. 285 
 
 ment of cabinets by parties grew up in the manner 
 Macaulay has described so well. Up to the latest period 
 the sovereign was supposed, to a most mischievous 
 extent, to interfere in the choice of the persons to be 
 Ministers. When George III. finally became insane, in 
 1810, every one believed that George IV., on assuming 
 power as Prince Kegent, would turn out Mr. Perceval's 
 government and empower Lord Grey or Lord Grenville, 
 the Whig leaders, to form another. The Tory ministry 
 was carrying on a successful war a war of existence 
 against Napoleon ; but in the people's minds, the neces- 
 sity at such an occasion for an unchanged government 
 did not outweigh the fancy that George IV. was a Whig. 
 And a Whig it is true he had been before the French 
 Revolution, when he lived an indescribable life in St. 
 James's Street with Mr. Fox. But Lord Grey and Lord 
 Grenville were rigid men, and had no immoral sort of 
 influence. What liberalism of opinion the Regent ever 
 had was frightened out of him (as of other people) by the 
 Reign of Terror. He felt, according to the saying of 
 another monarch, that "he lived by being a royalist." 
 It soon appeared that he was most anxious to retain Mr. 
 Perceval, and that he was most eager to quarrel with the 
 Whig Lords. As we all know, he kept the ministry 
 whom he found in office; but that it should have been 
 thought he could then change them, is a significant 
 example how exceedingly modern our notions of the 
 despotic action of Parliament in fact are. 
 
 By the steps of the struggle thus rudely mentioned 
 (and by others which I have no room to speak of, nor
 
 288 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 need I), the change which in the Greek cities was effected 
 both in appearance and in fact, has been effected in Eng- 
 land, though in reality only, and not in outside. Here, 
 too, the appendages of a monarchy have been converted 
 into the essence of a republic; only here, because of a 
 more numerous heterogeneous political population, it is 
 needful to keep the ancient show while we secretly inter- 
 polate the new reality. 
 
 This long and curious history has left its trace on 
 almost every part of our present political condition ; its 
 effects lie at the root of many of our most important 
 controversies; and because these effects are not rightly 
 perceived, many of these controversies are misconceived. 
 
 One of the most curious peculiarities of the English 
 people is its dislike of the executive government. We 
 are not in this respect " un vrai peuple moderne," like 
 the Americans. The Americans conceive of the executive 
 as one of their appointed agents ; when it intervenes in 
 common life, it does so, they consider, in virtue of the 
 mandate of the sovereign people, and there is no invasion 
 or dereliction of freedom in that people interfering 
 with itself. The French, the Swiss, and all nations who 
 breathe the full atmosphere of the nineteenth century, 
 think so too. The material necessities of this age require 
 a strong executive; a nation destitute of it cannot be 
 clean, or healthy, or vigorous, like a nation possessing it. 
 By definition, a nation calling itself free should have no 
 jealousy of the executive, for freedom means that the 
 nation, the political part of the nation, wields the execu- 
 tive. But our history has reversed the English feeling:
 
 ITS HISTORY. 287 
 
 our freedom is the result of centuries of resistance, more 
 or less legal, or more or less illegal, more or less audacious, 
 or more or less timid, to the executive government. We 
 have, accordingly, inherited the traditions of conflict, 
 and preserve them in the fulness of victory. We look on 
 State action, not as our own action, but as alien action ; 
 as an imposed tyranny from without, not as the consum- 
 mated result of our own organised wishes. I remember 
 at the Census of 1851 hearing a very sensible old lady 
 say that the " liberties of England were at an end ; " if 
 Government might be thus inquisitorial, if they might 
 ask who slept in your house, or what your age was, what, 
 she argued, might they not ask and what might they not 
 do? 
 
 The natural impulse of the English people is to resist 
 authority. The introduction of effectual policemen was 
 not liked ; I know people, old people I admit, who to this 
 day consider them an infringement of freedom, and an 
 imitation of the gendarmes of France. If the original 
 policemen had been started with the present helmets, the 
 result might have been dubious ; there might have been 
 a cry of military tyranny, and the inbred insubordination 
 of the English people might have prevailed over the very 
 modern love of perfect peace and order. The old notion 
 that the Government is an extrinsic agency still rules our 
 imaginations, though it is no longer true, and though in 
 calm and intellectual moments we well know it is not. 
 Nor is it merely our history which produces this effect ; 
 we might get over that ; but the results of that history 
 co-operate. Our double Government so acts : when we
 
 288 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 want to point the antipathy to the executive, we refer to 
 the jealousy of the Crown, so deeply imbedded in the very 
 substance of constitutional authority ; so many people are 
 loth to admit the Queen, in spite of law and fact, to be 
 the people's appointee and agent, that it is a good rhe- 
 torical emphasis to speak of her prerogative as something 
 wow-popular, and therefore to be distrusted. By the very 
 nature of our Government our executive cannot be liked 
 and trusted as the Swiss or the American is liked and 
 trusted. 
 
 Out of the same history and the same results proceed 
 our tolerance of those " local authorities " which so puzzle 
 many foreigners. In the struggle with the Crown these 
 local centres served as props and fulcrums. In the early 
 parliaments it was the local bodies who sent members to 
 parliament, the counties, and the boroughs ; and in that 
 way, and because of their free life, the parliament was 
 free too. If active real bodies had not sent the represen- 
 tatives, they would have been powerless. This is very 
 much the reason why our old rights of suffrage were so 
 various ; the Government let whatever people happened 
 to be the strongest in each town choose the members. 
 They applied to the electing bodies the test of " natural 
 selection;" whatever set of people were locally strong 
 enough to elect, did so. Afterwards in the civil war, 
 many of the corporations, like that of London, were im- 
 portant bases of resistance. The case of London is typical 
 and remarkable. Probably, if there is any body more 
 than another which an educated Englishman nowadays 
 regards with little favour, it is the Corporation of London,
 
 ITS IIISTORY. 289 
 
 He connects it with hereditary abuses perfectly preserved, 
 with large revenues imperfectly accounted for, with a 
 system which stops the principal city government at an 
 old archway, with the perpetuation of a hundred detest- 
 able parishes, with the maintenance of a horde of luxu- 
 rious and useless bodies. For the want of all which 
 makes Paris nice and splendid we justly reproach the 
 Corporation of London; for the existence of much of 
 what makes London mean and squalid we justly reproach 
 it too. Yet the Corporation of London was for centuries 
 a bulwark of English liberty. The conscious support of 
 the near and organised capital gave the Long Parliament 
 a vigour and vitality which they could have found no- 
 where else. Their leading patriots took refuge in the 
 City, and the nearest approach to an English " sitting in 
 permanence" is the committee at Guildhall, where all 
 members "that came were to have voices." Down to 
 George III.'s time the City was a useful centre of popular 
 judgment. Here, as elsewhere, we have built into our 
 polity pieces of the scaffolding by which it was erected. 
 
 De Tocqueville indeed used to maintain that in this 
 matter the English were not merely historically excusable 
 but likewise politically judicious. He founded what may 
 be called the culU of corporations. And it was natural, 
 that in France, where there is scarcely any power of self- 
 organisation in the people, where the prefet must be 
 asked upon every subject, and take the initiative in every 
 movement, a solitary thinker should bo repelled from the 
 exaggerations of which he knew the evil, to the contrary 
 
 u
 
 290 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 exaggeration of which he did not. But in a country like 
 England where business is in the air, where we can 
 organize a vigilance committee on every abuse and an 
 executive committee for every remedy as a matter of 
 political instruction, which was De Tocqueville's point 
 we need not care how much power is delegated to out- 
 lying bodies, and how much is kept for the central body. 
 We have had the instruction municipalities could give us : 
 we have been through all that. Now we are quite grown 
 up, and can put away childish things. 
 
 The same causes account for the innumerable anomalies 
 of our polity. I own that I do not entirely sympathise 
 with the horror of these anomalies which haunts some of 
 our best critics. It is natural that those who by special 
 and admirable culture have come to look at all things 
 upon the artistic side, should start back from these queer 
 peculiarities. But it is natural also that persons used 
 to analyse political institutions should look at these 
 anomalies with a little tenderness and a little interest. 
 They may have something to teach us. Political philo- 
 sophy is still more imperfect ; it has been framed from 
 observations taken upon regular specimens of politics and 
 States ; as to these its teaching is most valuable. But we 
 must ever remember that its data are imperfect. The 
 lessons are good where its primitive assumptions hold, 
 but may be false where those assumptions fail. A philoso- 
 phical politician regards a political anomaly as a scientific 
 physician regards a rare disease it is to him an " interest- 
 ing case." There may still be instruction here, though
 
 ITS HISTORY. 291 
 
 we have worked out the lessons of common cases. I can- 
 not, therefore, join in the full cry against anomalies ; in 
 my judgment it may quickly overrun the scent, and so 
 miss what we should be glad to find. 
 
 Subject to this saving remark, however, I not only 
 admit, but maintain, that our constitution is full of curious 
 oddities, which are impeding and mischievous, and ought 
 to be struck out. Our law very often reminds one of 
 those outskirts of cities where you cannot for a long time 
 tell how the streets come to wind about in so capricious 
 and serpent-like a manner. At last it strikes you that 
 they grew up, house by house, on the devious tracks of 
 the old green lanes ; and if you follow on to the existing 
 fields, you may often find the change half complete. Just 
 so the lines of our constitution were framed in old eras of 
 sparse population, few wants, and simple habits ; and we 
 adhere in seeming to their shape, though civilisation has 
 come with its dangers, complications, and enjoyments. 
 TLese anomalies, in a hundred instances, mark the old 
 boundaries of a constitutional struggle. The casual line 
 was traced according to the strength of deceased com- 
 batants; succeeding generations fought elsewhere; and 
 the hesitating line cf a half-drawn battle was left to 
 stand for a perpetual limit. 
 
 I do not count as an anomaly the existence of our 
 double government, with all its infinite accidents, though 
 hah the superficial peculiarities that are often complained 
 of arise out of it. The co-existence of a Queen's seeming 
 prerogative and a Downing Street's real government is
 
 292 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. 
 
 just suited to such a country as this, in such an age as 
 ours." * 
 
 * So well is our real Government concealed, that if yon tell a cabman 
 to drive to " Downing Street," he most likely will never have heard of it, 
 and will not in the least know where to take you. It is only a " disguised 
 republic " which is suited to such a being as the Englishman in such a 
 century as the nineteenth. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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