RARY RSirY OF DIEGO J HE 396 S25 M3 n'l'im'Jlini '"' "LIFORNIA SAHJ niEGO 3 1822 01291 5203 ^ ,^ A^ ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Great Lakes -St. Lawrence Ship Channel BY ROY S. MacELWEE ■Author of "Ports and Terminal Facilities" ALFRED H. RITTER specialist in Transportation and Port Development NEW YORK THE RONALD PRESS COMPANY 1921 Copyright, 1921, by The Ronald Press Company All Rights Reserved NATIONAL OAriTAl PRtSt, INC., WAIMINOTON, D. (3 FOREWORD In this analysis of the economic aspects of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Ship Channel, the authors have endeavored to present conservatively the more important local and national advantages to be gained from opening the Great Lakes to ocean traffic. Prior to making this investigation, they, like many others, had formed an immature judgment that ocean vessels on this route could not compete with existing routes serving the Northwest. A study of the factors affecting the costs and advantages of the various available routes and methods of transportation has served to dispel the impressions derived largely from reports submitted many years ago when the conditions and costs of transportation, as well as the needs of the vast territory served by the Great Lakes, were very different from what they are at the present time. The authors desire to give credit for valuable information regarding various phases of the proposition, contained in public utterances and in special papers by Herbert Hoover, Julius H. Barnes, William C. Redfield, George F. Roberts, Senator Irvine L. Lenroot, Senator Chas. E. Townsend, Congressman A. P. Nelson, and many others whose names appear in this report and in the record of hearings before the International Joint Commission. Roy S. MacElv^ee, Alfred H. Ritter. January 3, 192L TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter. Page. I. Scope of the investigation 7 II. Relation of transportation to the economic life of the nation. . 12 III. The transportation shortage 16 IV. The remedy for the defects in our transportation system 31 V. The handicap of inadequate terminal facilities 35 VI. Character of water transportation needed for the commerce of the Northwest 54 VII. Cost of transportation between upper lake ports and Liverpool. 65 VIII. The areas commercially tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway 81 IX. Production of the tributary area 113 X. Brief history of improvements for navigation on the Great Lakes 1 50 XI. Benefits from navigation improvements on the Great Lakes. . . 157 XII. Comparison of navigation facilities on the Great Lakes with those of ocean ports 162 XIII. Character of navigation to be provided on the St. Lawrence River 166 XIV. Comparison of the St. Lawrence with other ocean routes 173 XV. Navigation conditions on the St. Lawrence route 177 XVI. Depths required for the accommodation of vessels engaged in maritime trade 195 XVII. Types and sizes of vessels which carry the world's commerce . . . 205 XVIII. Study of vessels passing through the Panama Canal between July 1, 1919, and June 30, 1920 224 XIX. Will ocean vessels seek inland ports? 234 XX. The problem of return loads 237 XXI. The commerce of the Great Lakes 242 XXII. Volume of commerce affected by the Great Lakes-St. Law- rence waterway 248 XXIII. The grain movement 253 XXIV. Other commodity movements 268 XXV. Shipbuilding on the Great Lakes 282 XXVI. Water Power 284 XXVII. Conclusions 287 Chapter I SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION Study of the engineering features of the proposed improvement is in progress by engineers representing the United States and Canada. Much information relative to the physical conditions is already available as a result of previous surveys, but a new in- vestigation of the commercial and economic features is necessary in view of the magnitude of the agricultural, mineral and indus- trial development in the areas to be served by the waterway and the marked changes in transportation costs and conditions during recent years. The law and the official reference. — The river and harbor act approved March 2, 1919, contains the following item: Sec. 9. That the International Joint Commission created by the treaty between the United States and Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington January 11, 1909, under the provisions of article 9 of said treaty, is requested to investigate what further improvement of the Saint Lawrence River between Montreal and Lake Ontario is necessary to make the same navigable for ocean- going vessels, together with the estimated cost thereof, and report to the Government of the Dominion of Canada and to the Congress of the United States, with its recommendations for cooperation by the United States with the Dominion of Canada in the improvement of said river. To formulate definite conclusions upon the questions specified in the law necessarily involves extensive study and investigation of the physical, commercial, transportation, industrial, and other economic conditions affecting or affected by the proposed im- provement. In the letter of reference from the Secretary of State, the matters requiring investigation are definitely stated, as follows : Department of State, Washington, D. C, January 21, 1920. International Joint Commission, IVashington, D. C. Gentlemen. — I have the honor to inform you that the Governments of the United States of America and of the Dominion of Canada, under the provision of article 9 of the treaty of the 11th of Januar-. 1909, between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, herewith refer certain questions, as set forth below, "involving the beneficial use of the waters of the St. Lawrence River, between Montreal and Lake Ontario, in 7 8 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE the interests oi b6th countries, and in g-eneral the rights, obHgations, or interests of either in r'clation to the other, or to the inhabitants of the other along their common frontier." It is desired that the said questions be made the basis of an investigation to be carried out by the International Joint Commission, to the end that th'C said commission may submit a report to the two countries covering the subject matter of this reference, together with such conclusions and recommendations as may be considered pertinent in the premises. Question I. — What furth'er improvement in the St. Lawrence River, between Montreal and Lake Ontario, is necessary to make the same navigable for deep draft vessels of either the lake or ocean going type? What draft of water is recommended and what is the estimated cost? In answering this question the commission is requ'csted to consider : (o) Navigation interests alone, whether by the construction of locks and dams in the river; by side canals with the necessary locks; or by a combination of the two. (h) The combination of navigation and power interests to obtain the greatest beneficial use of the waters of tbe river. Question //.—Which of the schemes submitted by the Government or other engineers is preferred, and why? Question III. — Under what general method of procedure and in what general order shall the various physical and administrative features of the improvement be carried out? Question IV. — Upon what basis shall the capital cost of the completed improvement be apportioned to each country? Question V. — Upon what basis shall the costs of operation and mainte- nance be apportioned to each country ? Question VI. — What m^ethod of control is recommended for the opera- tion of the improved waterway to secure its most beneficial use? Question I'll. — Will regulating Lake Ontario increase the low-wat'er flow in the St. Lawrence ship channel below Montreal? And if so, to what extent and at what additional cost? Question VIII. — To what extent will the improvement develop the resources, commerce, and industry of each country? Question IX. — What traffic, both incoming and outgoing, in kind and quantity, is likely to be carried upon the proposed route both at its incep- tion and in the future, consideration to be given not only to present conditions but to probable changes therein resulting from the d'cvelopmcnt of industrial activities due to availability of large (luantities of hydraulic power ? Pending the receipt of plans, estimates, and other engine'ering data necessary for the final consideration of this reference, the commission is requested to hold such public hearings as may be consid'ered necessary or advisable in order to obtain all information bearing directly or indirectly on the physical, commercial, and economic feasibility nf tlic project as k whole. To facilitate the preparation of the desired report each Government will, from its official engineering persoiniel, appoint an engineer with full authority to confer with a similar officer of the other Government for the purpose: First, of ac(|uiring, each in his own country, such data as may be found nt-cessary to supplement the existing engineering data and GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL \f surveys; and, second, of preparing complete outline plans for and estimates of the cost of the proposed improvement, including the value of all property, easements, damages, and rights connected therewith. These plans and estimates are to be submitted to the commission as soon as practicable, but not later than one year from the date of appointment, and the com- mission is request'cd to forward to the two Governments its linal report, with recommendation not later than three months tbereafter. A copy of the instructions furnished these engin^eers is attached hereto. I am, g'entlemen, Your obedient servant, Robert Lansing. Instructions to the engineers. — The instructions to the en- {.jineers were as follows: You are hereby designated to take charge of the survey of the St. Law- rence River, Montreal to Lake Ontario, for the purpose of preparing plans and estimates for its further improvement to make the same navigable for deep-draft vessels of either the lake or ocean-going type, and to obtain the greatest beneficial use from these waters. The surveys, plans, and estimates are to be submitted to the International Joint Commission within twelve months, and are to assist the commission in answering the questions of a reference to the matter under the provisions of article 9 of the treaty of the 11th of January, 1909, between the United States and Great Britain. (A copy of the letter of reference is inclosed for your information.) It is desired to expedite the completion of the duty confided to you by utilizing all available surveys and other reliable information, whether derived from public or from private sources. That a proper basis of pro- cedure may be agreed upon in the first instance and the field work and the preparation of plans and estimates promptly and efficiently carried on thereafter, you are requested to confer fully and freely with (name of individual to be inserted), who has been designated to take charge of corresponding duties on behalf of the (name of country to be in- serted), to arrange for the division of the field work, and for cooperation in the preparation of the desired plans and estimates. While it is clear that the field work necessary to complete existing information may prop- erly and advantageously be divided, cooperation and unity in the prepa- ration of plans and estimates seem preferable. It will be noted that the reference to the joint commission contemplates four different general schemes or methods of improvements, as follows : (a) By means of locks and navigation dams in the river. {h) By means of locks and side canals, (r) By a combination of the two preceding methods. {d) By means of locks and power dams. The plans and estimates should definitely cover these four general schemes or methods of improvement, but other variations of them may be considered, and, if deemed desirable, also presented to the commission. The channels to be considered are to be of 25 and 30 feet depth at low water, and the plans and estimates should be prepared correspondingly. A choice between them will, under the terms of the reference, be made by the commission. 10 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE As detailed plans can not be prepared within the time limit of one year fixed for this work, it is desired that merely outline plans and lump- sum estimates, based upon experience from similar work, such as the enlargement of the Welland Canal and the power development at Niagara Falls, should be submitted. The general schemes should be furnished to the commission showing : First, the best for navigation alone ; and, second, for the most efficient utilization of the waters of the St. Lawrence for navigation and power, together with the approximate costs thereof. As the handling and disposal of ice is a fundamental difficulty on the St. Lawrence River, the arrangements regarded as being necessary for this purpose should be discussed as well as those recommended for ice disposal during the construction period and thereafter. Regulation of the levels of Lake Ontario so as to equalize the discharge of the St. Law^rence may be desirable in the interest of navigation, of ice disposal, and of power development. If the plans include any pro- visions for such regulation, an explanation should be furnished to make clear just what is proposed. Finally, you are requested to keep the International Joint Commission fully advised of your progress and to maintain close and sympathetic touch with it so as to insure complete coordination. The engineers appointed to conduct the surveys are Coh \V. P. Wooten, Corps of Engineers, for the United States, and Air. W. A. Bowden, for the Dominion of Canada. Upon the submis- sion of the report of these officers the Commission will be in possession of complete and reliable data regarding the physical features of the improvement, concerning which much informa- tion is already available as a result of previous surveys, both by the United States and by the Dominion of Canada. New investigation of commerce and transportation essential. — The questions relating to commerce and trans])ortation. however, require a new and independent study, in the light of the conditions now existing affecting the foreign and domestic commerce of the country. So rapid has been the industrial and commercial ex- pansion of the United States, and so pronounced have been the changes in transportation and terminal conditions and costs during recent years, that the studies made and conclusions reached twenty years or more ago, respecting the merits of a deep waterway connecting the Great Lakes with the seaboard, are inapplicable to the problems now confronting our great Northwest. In view of the above, extended discussion of the engineering features of the improvement will be omitted from this report, and only such brief reference included as appears necessary to a clear under- standing of the facilities available and required for the use of commerce and navigation. The problem which the International Joint Commission is now GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 11 asked to solve is one of the most important projects of waterway improvement ever proposed in the interests of the pubhc. At the many hearings held by the Commission throughout the country, a vast amount of information has been submitted, setting forth the advantages to be derived from a deep waterway connecting the Great Lakes with the Atlantic seaboard. As affecting the advisability of undertaking the improvement, the information for each locality must be coordinated into the general study, and the missing elements must be supplied from reliable sources, in order that the final results may give a clear picture of the problem, portraying the advantages in their true proportions. An attempt has been made in this report to coordinate the information pre- sented at the hearings, and to present as fully as space will permit the vital facts affecting the advisability of the United States undertaking the proposed improvement in cooperation with the Dominion of Canada. Chapter II RELATION OF TRANSPORTATION TO THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE NATION The future of America will be determined by the efforts made to extend her commercial relations with other countries. Eco- nomical transportation between areas of production and foreign markets is one of the requisites of successful foreign trade, and improvements increasing the economy of overseas business are national in character and contribute directly to the welfare of every citizen of the land. The surplus producing areas of the United States are in the heart of the continent at distances of 800 to 1,500 miles from the seaboard. The cost of transportation by rail has now reached the point where a thousand-mile haul across the country, with attendant expense of transfers, com- pletely wipes out the margin of profit on many commodities entering largely into our foreign commercial relations, and serves to lim.it the markets for many others. The provision of econom- ical transportation for our surplus production is a national duty. In order to clearly appreciate the importance of efficient and economical transportation in shaping the destiny of the nation, we must first realize that the progress of industry and commerce has now reached the era in its development when nations can no longer live alone. The developments in the physical means of transportation during the last century have so extended the limits of commercial intercourse that the interchange of prodticts around the world is now as freely accomplished as was the local trade of a limited territory when this country was founded. The wonderful recent development of manufacturing throughout the world rests upon transportation. Our factories no longer fabri- cate only the raw materials produced at their doors, but they locate where some one great essential is available, drawing the remain- ing essentials from all quarters of the globe and distributing the finished products to every land. Raw jjroducts are freriuently imported many thousand miles from distant lands, and the fin- ished manufactures returned inr consumption to the very coun- tries where the raw material originated. Crude rubber from r>razil and long staj)lc cotton from h'gypt find their wav to our factories, where they are manufactured into tires, and thence dnring 1919 were exported to 88 different countries or provinces throughout the world The same situation applies to many other manufactured articles. While adequate transj^ortation of our domestic commerce is of 12 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 13 vital importance to the people, it is of the utmost importance that efficient and economical transportation be available from source to destination for products entering into our foreign trade. No nation ever became great that did not seek foreign inter- course. The Phoenicians became great through seeking trade in the Mediterranean Sea ; the Portuguese by exploring the coast of Africa; Venice by opening up trade routes to the East; Spain by her discoveries made in the quest of commerce ; and Great Britain by her indefatigable zeal in extending her trade to the four corners of the world. The future of America will be determined by the efforts made to extend her commercial rela- tions with other countries. Economical transportation between the areas of production and manufacture and the foreign markets is one of the requisites of successful foreign trade, and the greater the efficiency attained the greater will be our ability to meet competition in the markets of the world. Any improve- ment that will contribute to the economy of overseas business is national in character. The benefits in such cases are never con- fined to geographical limits of the improvement. Both directly and indirectly they contribute to the welfare of every citizen of the land. During the last few years the world has been begging for our products and was willing to pay any price to obtain them. During this period the economic laws governing trade between nations were cast aside. No price was too great to pay for the supplies urgently demanded for the successfvil prosecution of war, nor for the food required to meet the necessities of lands where production had been brought to a standstill. During this period our manufacturers were enabled to extend their trade into many new fields, and a large business was developed in South America and elsewhere for manufactured articles which were formerly obtained almost exclusively from Great Britain and Germany. In return, we purchased large quantities of raw ma- terials from these lands, and through this helpful intercourse have developed a trade of vast proportions which we must exer- cise every rightful means to retain. It is needless to say that we shall meet keen competition in this endeavor. Having in mind the fact that our labor, while the most efficient in the world, is more costly than the labor of many of our competitors, and accepting as fundamental to our institutions the just and generous treatment of those who contribute their daily efforts to our indus- try, it behooves us to seek such other means as are attainable to 14 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE place our goods in foreign markets as cheaply as our competitors. We have it within our power by suitable tariff legislation to prevent the dumping of foreign manufactures upon our shores at prices with which our factories can not compete, but care" must be taken lest we impose additional costs upon materials required for use in American industries. The real problem confronting us is the maintenance and extension of our export business. Many things can be done to help accomplish this pur- pose, but the most important in its bearing upon our ability to meet competition is economical transportation. The sixteen States which are united in the movement for a deep waterway connecting the Great Lakes with the ocean pro- duce 75 per cent of the wheat, 65 per cent of the corn. 100 per cent of the flax, 85 per cent of the iron, 39 per cent of the copper, 74 per cent of the zinc, and 46 per cent of the lead produced in the entire country. The shores of these lakes are lined with industries producing in great volume a multitude of manufactured articles entering prominently into our foreign trade. This great and productive territory is situated in the heart of the continent at distances of 800 to 1,500 miles from the seaboard, and in order that its commerce can be placed upon the vessel by which it is taken to foreign ports, it must first proceed to tidewater by routes which have grown to be excessively costly and unreliable. Herein lies a handicap to successful foreign business that is shared by few, if any other, nations of the globe, and it can not be too strongly impressed upon those responsible for our national policies that this condition must be alleviated or the foreign trade of the United States will be permanently im- paired. The cost of transportation by rail has now reached the point where a thousand-mile haul across the country, with the attendant expense of transfers and delays at the terminals, com- pletely wipes out the margin of profit on many commodities entering largely into our foreign commercial relations, and it serves tO' limit the markets for many others. Consider England, with her short hauls to seaboard from important manufacturing districts, and consider Argentina and Australia with their short distances to ship side from surplus grain producing areas. Our competitors in foreign trade are already alive to the necessity of reducing costs in order to sujiplant us in the markets which we have so recently gained. It will be only a short time when this competition will once again be upon the same basis of keen rivalry that existed prior to the war. Our duty is to meet this competition GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SIIl'P CHANNEL 15 by every means which American skill can devise. Superior quality of goods, improved machinery, quantity production, cheap power and economical transportation are some of the means which must be employed. Of these means the latter two will be greatly ad- vanced by the opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels and by the incidental development of the vast waterpower of the St. Lawrence. Thus will be provided a transportation route suit- able in character and capacity for the economical shipment of the raw and manufactured products of the great Northwest, and fof the importation of the products of other lands direct to this im- portant consuming area. On the banks of this waterway new industries will be estabHshed where all the raw materials of manufacture can be assembled at lowest cost, and where a never- failing source of power will turn the wheels. Since the dawn of our country's history, no greater opportunity has been pre- sented for the establishment of industry under such favorable conditions with respect to economical production and distribution. In the following quotation from a recent speech. President- elect Harding set forth succinctly and truly the importance of commercial progress to the life of the nation: Here is a vast continent, so favored by God and so blessed by His infinite bounty that the discoverer, a Spaniard, stood only at the gateway and marveled, without ever dreaming of the reality. Ours are millions of broad acres, eager to respond to man's cultivating touch ; we have an empire in millions more which are awaiting reclamation ; we have not half revealed the mines nor measured our waterpower. We are unmatched in genius and unexcelled in industry. We are progressive in education, we are free in religion and mean to stay free, and mean ever to be free in press and speech. We have more than the beginning of an adequate transport system. We are awakened to the possibilities of inland water- ways and tardily alert to the imperative need of a merchant marine to widen commerce, world influence, and national safety. . . . We have ships now ; we have the commercial foundations ; our future lies in policies and practices. We must buy as well as sell, to be sure, but we need the expanding trade policy, its efficient agents in salesmen and credits, and the simple, practical understanding that commerce is the life-blood of material existence, that the barterers of commerce are the ambassadors of developing civilization, that the paths of trade are the avenues of exchanging ideas in art and education, and no nation in the world ever has been or ever will be eminent in influence until it establishes its eminence in commerce. Chapter III v^: THE TRANSPORTATION SHORTAGE The railroad facilities are inadequate to meet the transporta- tion requirements of the country during periods of business ac- tivity. There is a shortage of about 700,000 freight cars, and the rail mileage in the eastern district where the congestion has been the greatest shows a continual decrease since 1915. There has been an almost complete cessation of the construction of classi- fication yards, freight houses and stations, and all terminal facilities other than those required to repair and maintain the motive power and equipment. The inability of the railroads to handle the traffic expeditiously has resulted in enormous losses and has discouraged production. Inadequacy of railroads to meet the requirements of commerce. — It has been estimated that the lack of adequate transportation facilities in the United States results in a daily loss of $100,- 000,000. While this figure seems large, careful reflection of the far-reaching effects of inadequate transportation upon the prices of commodities will show that it is within reason. Inadequate transportation has resulted not only in a direct loss to the pro- ducer and manufacturer on practically all business, but it has likewise resulted in an increase of cost to the consumer on all purchases, and this affects every article required for the daily sustenance of our population. Every embargo by the Govern- ment on the shipment of given commodities in given localities has resulted in an increase in price of that commodity, and has enabled those in control of the supply to exact usurious charges from the public. The failure of the car supply has resulted in the creation of a hazard on all business. This hazard is assumed by the wholesaler or middleman and is added to the price of the goods. The inability to provide an even flow of commodi- ties at all times results in the creation of monopolistic conditions in local trade which have to be paid for by the consumer. The increase in the cost of living in this country was due as much to the failure of transportation as to increase in cost of produc- tion. A glance at the statistics will show that the railroad facilities of the United States are hopelessly deficient, and that the cost of supplying equipment to care for the peak loads during crop moving periods will be greater than can be met from any sources now available. In 1916 a committee of experts, after an elaborate investiga- tion, reported that, if traffic should continue to increase during 16 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL L (he succeeding ten years at the same rate as it had during tlie preceding twenty, the railroads would be obliged to spend $1,500.- 000,000 a year, or $15,000,000,000 in all. to enable them to keep up with it. (Testimony of Alfred P. Thorn, General Counsel Association of American Railway Executives, before the New- lands Committee.) At the instance of a group of New York bankers, another investigation was recently made by a committee of eminent engineers, who reported that at present prices it would take at least $18,000,000,000 to put the railroads into condition to handle the traffic of the country with reasonable promptness and efficiency. In October, 1914, the late James J. Hill made the following statement : "To imagine the amouht needed can be secured when there is such a poverty of capital as there will be for ten, twenty, possibly more years to come, is absurd." The normal growth of traffic in the United States is susceptible of reasonably accurate determination, and a comparison of the number of freight cars constructed each year with the normal yearly increase of traffic will show the increase or decrease in carrying capacity. The failure of the railroad facilities to meet the expanding requirements of traffic is clearly shown by the deficiency in the construction of new cars, as well as by the almost complete cessation of construction of new lines and extensions of old lines. Since 1916 there has been an unprecedented volume of traffic accompanied by acute car shortages, but the roads have purchased but little new equipment and the situation is daily becoming more serious. The railroads are unable to handle the normal traffic, and no adequate preparation is being made lo meet the greater demands which the normal growth of traffic will entail. The records show that the ton miles of freight car- ried increased from 186,463,109,510 in 1905 to 301.398.752,108 in 1913, which was the year of heaviest freight traffic in the ten- vear period between 1905 and 1915. During this period of ten vears the number of freight cars increased from 1,731,409 to 2,356,338, an increase of 36 per cent, indicating that the increase in the number of freight cars was only 59 per cent of the increase in traffic. Between 1915 and 1918 the freight traffic increased 45 per cent, while the number of freight cars in service increased only 1.6 per cent. The comparisons indicated by the above figures, however, are somewhat modified by the increase in freight-car capacity. The normal traffic for each year from 1904 to 1926. and the actual traffic between 1904 and 1918 are shown by the following table: 18 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Freight traffic in ton-miles. {a) Actual Normal 1904 174,522,000,000 186,105,000,000 1905 186,463,000,000 194,735,000,000 1906 215,878,000,000 203,690,000,000 1907 236,601,000,000 212,990,000,000 1908 218,382,000,000 222,635,000,000 1909 218,803,000,000 232,640,000,000 1910 255,017,000,000 243, 02(1,000, 000 1911 253,784.000,000 253,784,000,000 1912 ■ 264,081,000,000 264,945,000,000 1913 301,399,000,000 276,515,000,000 1914 288,320,000,000 288,510,000,000 1915 *276,830,000,000 300,950,000,000 1916 *343,099,937,805 313,840,000,000 1916(cal.) *365, 771, 824,741 320,455,000,000 1917 *397,935,177,017 334,100,000,000 1918 *401, 946,000,000 348,245,000,000 1919 ^ **402,000.000,000 362,890,000,000 1920 **410,000,000,000 378,075,000,000 1921 **418,000,000,000 393,815,000,000 1922 **427,000,000,000 410,125,000,000 1923 427,030,000,000 1924 444,540,000,000 1925 462,700,000,000 1926 481.515,000,000 * Classes I and II. ** Estimated. (a) From data contained in The Railway Age. In order to determine the number of cars that will be necessary to handle the estimated normal traffic for any given future year, it is necessary to consider the normal rate of increase in car capacity and the average ton-miles per ton capacity per year. The figures for recent years are as follows : Freight car mileage and average load. (a) Revenue car-miles per car per day Tons per loaded car Revenue ton-miles per car per day Average capacity of car Ratio, average load to capacity per cent Ton-miles per ton capacity per year 1905 16.3 17.0 16.5 14.6 15.0 16.5 16.0 16.1 16.2 17.2 16.1 15.2 17.8 18.5 18.8 17.6 15.2 18.1 18.9 19.7 19.6 19.3 19.8 19.7 20.2 21.1 21.1 21.2 22.4 22.8 24.8 26.6 27.9 298 321 325 286 290 327 315 326 363 340 328 399 422 466 469 425 30.7 32 1 33.7 34.8 35.3 35.9 36.9 37.5 38.3 39.1 39.8 40.6 41.0 41.5 41.9(est.) 42. 2 (est.) 59.0 59.0 58.5 56.3 54.7 55.2 53.4 53.9 55.1 54.0 53.2 55.1 55.6 59.8 63.5 65.1 3,500 1906 1907 3,650 3 520 1908 1909 3,010 3 000 1910 1911 3.320 3,120 1912 3,180 1913 3,460 1914 3,180 1915 3.000 1916 3,690 1916 (cal.) 3 760 1917 4.130 1918 4,090 1919 (nine months). . 3.670 1913 to 1916 include Class I and II roads only. 1918 and 1919 include Class I roads only. («) From data contained in The Raihcay Age. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 19 It will be seen that during the first nine months of 1919 the traffic was handled at the rate of 3,670 ton-miles per ton of capacity per year, corresponding closely with the figure for 1906. The ton-miles per ton of capacity per year have been in excess of 3.500 whenever there has been a car shortage, and below this figure whenever there has been an ample supply of cars. The present total capacity of all roads in the United States is estimated at 101,100,000 tons, which under normal conditions would be suffi- cient to handle an annual traffic of 354,000,000,000 ton-miles. The actual traffic, however, has now reached 400,000,000,000 ton-miles, indicating that a car capacity of 114,200,000 tons, or about 13,100,000 tons more than is now available, would be re- quired on the basis of 3,500 ton-miles per ton of capacity per year. The average capacity of cars being 50 tons, about 262,000 cars would be required to make up the present shortage. This does not take into account, however, the increases in traffic or surplus required at times of unusually heavy traffic movements, nor for retirement of wornout cars. The total needs during the next three years are summarized by the Raihvay Age as follows : Cars To make up the present shortage 262,000 To provide an adequate surplus . 100,000 To take care of increases in traffic 126,000 To make up for deferred retirement 49,500 To care for normal retirement 174,900 Total cars needed in three years 712,400 Annual requirements 237,500 Assuming that present prices will continue, the 712,000 cars needed in the next three years will involve an expenditure of approximately $2,000,000,000. The stagnation in railroad development is further indicated by the decrease in the mileage of new lines constructed. During 1919 a total of 685.98 miles of new railway lines were completed and placed in service in the United States. This establishes a new low record since the Civil War, the lowest previous record being 722 miles constructed in 1918. A study of the figures for 1919 shows that the greatest mileage was constructed in the States of California, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas. Among the States in which there was no new construction are New Hamp- shire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island. Connecticut, New York, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, 20 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Missouri, and Montana. The following table shows the miles of new line completed in the United States since 1893 : Miles of New Line Completed in the United Stales Since 1893 1894 1,760 1895 1,420 1896 1,692 1897 2,109 1898 3,265 1899 4,569 1900 4,894 1901 5,368 1902 6,026 1903 5,652 1904 3,832 1905 4,388 1906 5,623 1907 5,212 1908 3,214 1909 3,748 1910 4,122 1911 3,066 1912 2,997 1913 3,071 1914 1,532 1915 933 1916 1,098 1917 979 1918 721 1919 686 As great as has been the reduction in new mileage constructed during the last few years, the situation becomes even more serious when an examination is made of the miles of line abandoned during the same period. Thus a total of 689 miles of line are reported as abandoned in 1919, exceeding by three miles the total track constructed during that year. Operation has been discontinued on nearly 1,000 more miles of line than have been built during the last three years. During the three years from 1917 to 1919, inclusive, operation was abandoned on 3,319 miles of line, and in the same period only 2,386 miles of extensions, branches, and other new lines were completed and placed in service. The mileage in the eastern district, where the congestion has been the greatest, shows a continual decrease since 1915, as will be seen from the following-: Total mile- age owned Eastern Southern Western (Single district district district track) Miles Miles Miles Miles Dec. 31, 1917 253,626.13 61,120.98 51,405.65 141,009.50 Dec. 31, 1916 2.S4,045.83 61,141.56 51,572.71 141,331.56 June 30, 1916 2.S4,250.62 61,243.19 51.620.39 141,387.04 June 30, 1915 253,788.64 61,361.34 51,373.03 141,054.27 There has also been an almost complete cessation of the con- struction of classification yards, freight houses and stations, and of terminal facilities other than those required to repair and luaintain the motive power and equipment. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 21 To meet the needs for adequate motive power a large number of locomotives are also urgently necessary. A great many loco- motives have been continued in service during the war that prob- ably would have been retired under normal conditions. The loco- motive building program must be expanded to provide 13,177 modern locomotives in three years, and 12,000 obsolete locomo- tives should be retired from service. The program for the next three years for freight service, including the power necessary to meet present needs and for increase of traffic as well as for nor- mal and deferred retirements, aggregates 452,490,000 pounds of tractive power, or a total of 7,542 units of 60,000 pounds of average tractive effort. The cost of this equipment will be ap- proximately $618,444,000, making a yearly average of 2,514 freight locomotives costing $206,000,000. As clearly as these figures show the steadily decreasing effi- ciency of our railroads, they fail to depict the real dangers of the situation. During the last year billions of dollars were lost because of the failure of transportation. In May, 1920, due largely to the strike of railway switchmen, it was reported that railway cars, loaded and unloaded, were piled up by thousands in yards from Chicago to Buffalo, New York, Pittsburgh, Cleve- land, and almost every railroad center reported congestion. Cali- fornia complained that the big citrus crop was piled high in warehouses and that the fruit and vegetable crop of the Imperial Valley was seriously affected by the shortage of refrigerator cars which had gone East and failed to return. Many coal mines in Ohio and Pennsylvania were obliged to close. Manufac- turers throughout the great industrial region extending from Chicago to Buffalo were unable to get raw material or coal. Mr. Edward D. McDougal, of the Armour Grain Company, said, "The situation was bad enough before the strike. Now things are at a standstill. It's cars we need. We have not even moved the old crop from the farms. How are we going to take care of the new crop?" On May 15, 1920. the Department of Agriculture issued the following statement : Failure of the railroads to move grain in proportion to the supplies in the country and the demand, has created a situation that is without precedent in the United States. During the last week the mark'ets were entirely under this influence, and steadily advancing prices and new price records on thie crop were the results. At a meeting of representatives of the grain exchanges, bankers, and farmers' organization in Chicago on the 7th to discuss the resumption of 22 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE trading in wheat futures, a Minneapolis banker told of the S'eriousness of the situation as follows : "You can't have country and terminal elevators full of old grain and move the new crop. In the Northwest, where dealers would normally be liquidating borrowed money, about $150,000,000 is tied up by lack of cars. . . ." The representative of a Nebraska farmers' organization said : "Th'C car shortage is the more serious part of the problem. Fifty per cent of the cars are not fit to ship grain in, and cars are in the East which should be in the West and Southwest. From 10 to 20 per cent of the old crop is still on the farms, unable to move. The new crop is coming on. What about the next crop? It tends to discourage the planting of larg'C acreages." Exporters were after wheat all the week. On the 7th they bid on a basis of $3.25 at Gulf ports. It was intimated that $3.20 would be paid, track New York, if wheat could be secured. Owing largely to the difficulties of securing deliveries of grain at eastern ports during the spring of 1920, British buyers bid for wheat delivered at Gulf ports. It is a matter of record that the car supply was insufficient to move the grain which the farmers desired to ship during the spring and summer of 1920, when there was an ample demand for grain for export shipment and when prices were such as to yield the farmer a fair return for his labor. By reason of the inability of the railroads to move the crop, the farmer, who should have received $3 or more per bushel in July, was later caught in the general slump of commodity prices and forced to decide between the alternative of selling at a loss, or of holding his crop in the perhaps futile prospect of later obtaining a remunerative price. As a result of this condition we have witnessed the collapse of some of the banking institutions which have financed the 1920 wheat crop, ^rhe farmer is blained for wanting tti hold his crop in order to avoid an actual loss, while the real fault must be laid at the doors of the inade([uate transportation system of the country which made it impracticable for the farmer to market his crop at the time when the foreign demand was such as to guarantee him a reasonable profit. In January, 1918, there were 418 vessels held in New York Harbor becau.se of lack of fuel and cargoes, due to car shortage. In the fall of 1917 the great Northwest suffered for lack of 6,000,- 000 tons of coal, and to supply the urgent deficiency it was neces- sary to use 50 per cent of the freight cars of 47 railroads for many weeks and later to utilize them to make up an iron ore shortage. This shifting of the car supply to meet supernormal GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL . 23 needs caused by deficient transportation facilities has resulted in complete disruption of the railroad systems of the country. Some communities suffer for food, others for fuel, still others for the raw materials of manufacture, while the important industries of the country are unable to make the prompt deliveries which are essential to maintenance of trade. These conditions are not temporary. They are the result of constantly diminishing trans- portation capacity as compared with constantly increasing trans- portation requirements. The tendency was foreseen many years ago and the warning given by Mr. James J. Hill. The trouble is not alone with the shortage of cars, but is to be found also in the inadequacy of terminals, as a result of which cars can not be unloaded promptly. At New York goods are frequently held in cars for two to six weeks or more before they can be unloaded, thus depriving the country of the use of these needed transportation facilities. A railroad car is like a vessel, in that it is serving the people as a transportation agency only when in motion. Vessels held in port on account of poor facilities, and cars used for storage purposes, are not performing their proper functions. The Government recently found it necessary to insist upon the unloading of grain which was held in cars at Galveston, while other grain could not move to market because no cars were available. Specific instances of losses due to the failure of transportation. — While the losses sustained by reason of inadequate transporta- tion facilities are well known to the people of our country, it seems desirable to present a few specific instances which are fairly representative of the usual conditions. Attention is invited to the following extracts from the address of Mr. Watson S. Moore, second vice-president of the U. S. Grain Corporation, made before the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Congress at Detroit, Michigan, on July 23, 1920 : The first half of Maj^ 1920, bakery after bakery in New York City advised they would have to shut down unless given flour. The Grain Corporation supplied the temporary needs of bakeries out of its export stocks in storage New York Citj' awaiting transportation. On pressure from the Traffic Division of the Grain Corporation, railroads gave special attention to moving flour for relief of th'sse bakers. The Grain Corporation, of course, was not in position to secure this car supply, except as it added its supplication to that of other shippers, to the railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission to grant the reli'ef asked for. The country did not always understand that the position of the Grain Corporation in this particular was advisory only. For instance, one grain dealer in the West, who was facing bankruptcy, 24 . ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE due to th'C lack of cars to ship out his grain, went into one of the Grain Corporation offices and at the point of a pistol demanded that the Vice- President secure the cars. The man was almost crazed with his trouble. The Vice-President was, as is common with the officials of the Grain Corpora- tion, strong in persuasive powers and of steady nerve and not afraid to die, was able to get hold of the pistol and quiet the man, and on presenting the matter to the railroad officials relief was secured and the life of the Vice- President saved. The shipper sent a bunch of roses to the Vice President for the service, but the flowers were returned, the Vice President fearing they were originally intend'ed to adorn his remains. Ocean ship agents, seaboard, repeatedly inquired: "Where is your grain?" Answer: Chicago, Minneapolis, or Buffalo, etc. Agents asked, "Why, what's the trouble?" Answer, "No cars." At Lake port, no trouble about transportation to Eastern end of Lakes. Trouble only at loading and unloading ports, account no cars. Demurrage was paid as high as $6,000 a day on ocean vessels, one ship collecting $27,000. If it had not been for the unusual consideration shown shippers bj^ repre- sentatives of foreign governments in allowing substitution of other grains and commodities, I am informed on good authority that a large number of grain exporters would have been ruined by the unusual, extraordinary and long delays of grain shipments from the West during the last eight months, due to no cars. Now that the grain shipping and export business is going back into the liands of private traders, there will have to be an improvement in the rail service. Otherwise the grain merchants will not be able to meet their ocean freight engagements, and they will pay very dearly if they default on any of these engagements. Consequently, caution will have to be exercised and this will be reflected in lower prices to producer. The following data will give you an idea of the difficulties we have had in moving our wheat all-rail to seaboard and by canal from Buffalo; also experiences we have had in moving some wheat from Buffalo to Mon- treal by lake steamer, indicating the relief which might be given to shippers; also the pressure which might be taken off the rail lines and the canal, by the building of a deep waterway from the lakes to the sea. On January 9, Grain Corporation ordered something over 1,000.000 bushels of wheat shipped by rail from Minneapolis to Philadelphia and New York. Up to .'\pril 9, only 299,0(X) bushels had been moved. The balance we had to divert to Duluth for lake shipment, and it took four months to move this wheat by rail from Minneapolis to Duluth, only 150 miles, which should be moved within four days, and when it did get to Duluth, it was carried prom])t]y 1.000 miles by water in four days. On January 9, 1920, Grain Corporation ordered 365,000 bushels shipped by rail from Manitowoc, Wis., to New York. Not a carload of this was moved by rail and we had to move it by lake to Erie. On January 9, 1920, Grain Corporation ordered about 100,000 bushels from Chicago to Philadelijhja by rail. Up to April 9, only about 65,000 bushels of this had been moved — no cars — and we liad to forward the balance by lake. No delay. On May 26, 1920, the Army Inland Canal Service, operating governnient boats on the Erie Canal, agreed \n furnish canal boats for 100,000 bushels. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 25 Up to July 13, only one boat capable of carrying about 18,000 bushels, had been furnished on this order. On June 18, arrangements were made to move about 600,000 bushels of wheat from Buffalo to Montreal by lake boat down the St. Lawrence river. Up to June 30, about 484,000 bushels had been moved this way. With the close, of navigation last fall, Grain Corporation had at Buffalo, approximately 14,0T>^,000 bushels of wheat. In spite of all the .efforts we could exert with the Railroad Administration while it was in existence and with th- individual railroads since March 1, 1920, and with the canal people, it has taken to pVesent date, July 21, to get this 15,000,000 bushels moved from Buffalo to the ^se^oard. All of this grain was intended for export and was so situated that it might have been forwarded by vessel direct from the Western lake ports by ocean steamer overseas, had the deep waterway to the sea been in existence. This would have been a very decided relief to the inland transportation facilities at a time when they were sorely pressed to meet the urgent needs of our domestic commerce and other foreign commerce. Forty-eight million bushels of wheat was still in elevators and on farms in Kansas alone on the 15th of May, within a month of the new crop (which amount was half the estimated new crop for this State), on account of no cars. Grain priority had to be divided with coal. Coal must be moved to the northwest during the season of navigation, or that section of the country will freeze. There is a large number of people in that, country who are unable to get to Palm Beach in the winter. The coal operators now claim that the present coal shortage is due in a considerable measure to the failure of some roads to obey the priority order. With priority given to grain and to coal — Then the automobile industry is checked. Answer, no cars ; and Detroit says "Ouch I" The woolen mills must be shut down — no cars. Now the steel industry is threatened with a shut-down — no cars ; with twenty blast furnaces idle in the main steel-producing district — no cars ; with a million and a half tons of steel products piled up and the country crying for it, which would take 28,300 cars to move — no cars. Three hundred miles of pipe bought from a Pittsburgh concern, intended for Mexico, delivery of which would aid the Shipping Board in obtaining much-needed oil for their ships ; but no cars. The car shortage resulting in the delayed movement of the 1919 wheat crop from the farms and also from the country and terminal elevators to the mills the past eight months was largely responsible for a $2 to $3 increase per barrel in the price of flour since January 1. No cars. During six months of this period, when the car shortage was most acute, the consumption of flour in this country was about 61,000,000 barrels,, which, at $2.50 per barrel, amounts to $152,500,000, which is over the first estimate of the cost of the improvement of your proposed waterway. To decrease the cost of living in New England and in the congested centers of population in the East, and also if this section of the country IS to maintain its position as a manfacturing center, the great food-produc- ing area of the West must be brought closer. 26 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE The East and the West are getting economically farther and farther apart, owing to the advance— the necessary advance— of railroad freight rates. The same thing is true of the product of eastern manufacturers in relation to the western market for their surplus output. The only relief for this situation is the further extension and the development of the water routes. It is estimated 160,000,000 bushels of wheat will be carried over from the 1919 crop to the 1920 crop. This is about 100,000,000 bushels above the normal carry-over. There were plenty of hungry people who needed this wheat the past year, but had to go without because it did not get to market. No cars. In addition to the loss in quantity and quality through normal deteriora- tion, and from improper warehousing and vermin, it takes at least three cents per bushel, per month, at the present price, to carry wheat. Twelve months at 36 cents on the carry-over of 100,000,000 bushels is $36,000,000. which could take care of the interest on the cost of j-our waterway improvement for four or fi\'e years. This is on wheat alone. At the Toledo hearing- on June 10, 1920, evidence was sub- mitted showing- the extent to which the congestion upon the trunk Hues has hampered the export business of that city and surrounding localities. A few statements from the record will be introduced. Statement of Mr. F. O. Paddock, representing the Toledo Produce Exchange I shipped a cargo of corn to Erie, Pa., by the New York Central lines, and it was sixty days in transit, and the corn was red hot when it got to destination. Last year we shipped something like 475,000 bushels of wheat for export and it was delayed at New York and Philadelphia anywhere from two to five weeks, notwithstanding the fact that it was subject to stealage and leakage owing to the fact that there were no facilities to take care of it and unload it and get it into vessels. It has been m\- understanding that there wore at that time 200,000 loaded cars congested at New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore alone. . . . The matter of interest on drafts alone where wheat was not handled amounted to thousands upon thousands of dollars, due entirely to the congestion. . . . We had four cars of hot corn on the sample tables today, and it is bringing from 15 to 20 cents per bushel less than it would have brought if cars could have l>ecn obtained to ship it at the time the elevator people were ready to ship. ************ The farmer is anxious and willing to sell. I have known of a dozen farmers within a radius of 50 miles of Toledo who within sixty days liavc hauled their corn to market to the elevators, but the elevators have been filled and they could not take it and they had to haul it back. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHAXXEL 27 Statement of Mr. C. S. Latchaiv, Secretary of the Fanners' Grain Dealers' Association of Ohio WIkii we have no adequate transportation facilities, when our grain has got to remain in our bins and be destroyed by vermin and weevils for the reason that we can not get it on the market, there is no incentive for farmers to try to increase production. We have one house within 35 miles of here that has probably 3,000 or 4,000 bushels of corn heating right this minute, sour corn, out of condition, corn that was all right when it was put into the house and which we have not been able to move. I do not know of any commodity that is as sensitive to transportation as grain or live stock. A fluctuation of 10, IS, or 20 cents a day is possible when such conditions arise that the grain can not be taken care of. 1 do not believe that there is a large elevator in the State but what has not from one to fifteen hundred unpaid claims on grain losses in transit. Statement of Mr. L. H. Baughman, Traffic Manager of the Toledo Scale Company I have a record here in this report of a certain car which we loaded on March 29. I take March 29 because that was just before our labor troubles and just after our heavy snowstorms. This car contained six shipments. The heaviest shipment in the package was 11 tons on a measurement basis of twenty-four boxes. That shipment was 54 days from the time it left Toledo until it was loaded aboard the boat in New York. The average for the car for the shipments from the time they left Toledo until they were loaded on the boat was about sixty-five days. The shipments were destined for Holland, Australia, Spain, the Philippine Islands, the Argen- tine Republic and Brazil. A car left Toledo on March 31 via the New York Central. It contained but two shipments, one for Spain and one for Norway. Up to the date of the hearing, June 10, this shipment had not cleared from New York. Statement of Mr. H. C. IVildesen, Export Manager Champion Spark Plug Company Incidentally, those people in the other countries suffer a great deal of inconvenience and pecuniary loss and sometimes real hardship while they are waiting interminable weeks and weeks and sometimes months for the necessities which they have a perfect right to believe should reach them a long time before they ever get them in hand ; and' it is because of the extraordinary delays in transportation and shipping due to being compelled to depend upon New York or some other Atlantic seaport. Order No. 3989 was shipped from here on March 29. It arrived at New York on May 8 and left New York May 19. Therefore it was just a little less than two months from the time we delivered it to the railroad before it actually got on its way on the steamer. Our order No. 3720 left here March 30. It reached New York May 2 and did not get out of New York until June 2. So that shipment took from March 30, the time we delivered it to the railroad here, until June 2 before it actually got on its way across the water. 28 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Our order No. 5117 left here on March 29, arrived at New York May 2 and left New York on May 15. It got a streamer within a reasonable time. Our order No. 4651 left h'cre on the 24th of Alarch, arrived in New York on the 26th of April, left New York on the second of May. Our order No. 3468 left here March 19, arrived at New York April 21, and is still there. Our order No. 3966 left here March 20, arrived in New York April 22 and did not get out of New York until June 4. You can see how much good it has done us to spend money and time trying to make prompt deliveries. Statement of Mr. Mark X. Mcnnell, representing the Menncll Milling Company, Fostoria, Ohio Our own business has suffered to this extent, that on January 1 we entered the year 1920 with 100 per cent capacity of our plant sold, much of it being for export, but up to June 1 we have only enjoyed ten per cent operation. We have had ninety per cent shutdown by reason of no empty cars or inability to secure permits for exports, the permits being denied because of congestion at seaboard. Our own company had forty-six carloads of flour shipped in November on the ten days' free storage bill of lading, and the profit on a barrel of flour, if liberal, would be 25 or 30 cents a barrel on export business. The flour never cleared until charges approximating $7,000 accumulated for storage and demurrage at seaboard. . . . On the $7,000 we figured that about $6,000 was a pure loss. The American exporter in order to compete, for example, at Liverpool with exporters at Australia, Argentina and the Balkan States must sell on the prevailing terms which are known as C. I. F. terms, which means cost, insurance and freight; which means a price named for delivery at Liverpool. To compute a delivered price at Liverpool a factor in the price is of course the inland freight, the ocean freight and the insurance. These are determinable factors, but if a car shipment is to be held at the American seaboard longer than the ten days' free time allowed, those im- ports are all subject to storage and demurrage, which accumulate at an alarmingly rapid rate, and which must be studied by the seller, that is the shipper. He has named a delivered price at Liverpool, so he must absorb all tho.se charges. He must name a delivered price because that is the standard world term for selling and he must compete with his world competitors. . Statement of Mr. Frank M. Hurst, representing the American Crayon Co., of Sandusky, Ohio. At present we have a warehouse full of export merchandise, meaning by export all goods traveling by water from the Port of New York to South American points and European points. The warehouse there is full of paints and crayons for school trade. Some of them have been lying there since last September. . . . We have some cars that moved March 29 that have not been delivered in New York City today. (June 10, 1920.) I ran into the same experience as Mr. Mennell stated at Balitmore on the car storage, paying $500 to $800 on a car of crayons for storage there, wii)ing out all tlie profit. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 29 Additional statements of the effects of the car shortage, at the Marquette, Michigan, hearing on May 10, 1920, as follows: Statement of Mr. F. S. St. Peter, of Menominee, Mieli. We are very frequently delayed in obtaining the raw material needed for our business. We have bought and paid for cars of coffee in New York and then waited thirty days until they were lightered out of some storage warehouse and put on the cars, and then have had them en route for a couple of weeks more. . . . Let me say that at the present time we feel that the exceedingly high cost of sugar is due largely to the absolute lack of ability upon the part of the New York peopk to handle the raw sugar into New York and the refined sugar out. ... I have been told that the beet seed, which I think come from Russia, were forwarded last fall. That seed has been in New York City since the first of the year. They are compelled to pay heavy storage and insurance charges upon it. That beet seed has not yet been delivered to them. . . . Again, last fall they were compelled to pay $357 per thousand for bags when they had bought them at $150. They are imported from Calcutta and were held up at New York so long that they had to buy burlap bags which must be filLed immediately and they could not wait until some other time to fill their bags and had to buy at a cost to themselves of $200,000 more. Statement of Mr. Geo. IV. Roivell, Publicity Manager, Lloyd Manufacturing Co., Menominee, Mich. We are at the present time manufacturing 600 baby carriages a day, and I might say that our transportation facilities to the places of consump- tion, the largest of which are in the Eastern States, have been so poor that we have today 6,000 baby carriages stored in a factory which we built last summer at a cost of $150,000 because we could not get enough cars to ship the carriages East. . . . Our money is tied up in these manufactured articles and we are unable to use the new factory in which to broaden out in our industry. . . . We ship about eight carloads of baby carriages every day, but we have been limited to one and two cars and a good many days to none at all. A few extracts from the record of the hearing at Duluth on June 3-4, 1920, will be given. Statement of Mr. Mitchel F. Jamar, Representing F. A. Patrick & Company, of Duluth, Minn. I bought wool in Boston last February, and I practically had the plant shut down because it took over two and one-half months to get the wool to the mills. Statement of Mr. O. P. B. Jacobson, Member Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission During the trying days of 1916-17, when our transporation was as badly demoralized as it ever has been and the country was crying for cars ; when the East was clamoring for flour and wheat and the West was full of both, we had cars in plenty. At the very time that the prayers 30 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL for relief were most persistent I saw in the terminal yards of the Lehigh \'alley and New York Central Systems thousands of cars loaded with grain awaiting shipment abroad. Upon further investigation as to why this grain was not being unloaded, it was learned that hundreds of those cars had not been moved for many weeks, and in some instances not for months. This was an astounding revelation, in view of the prevailing distress all over the country for the lack of box cars for transporting food and other commodities. But it could not be helped. There was no place that the grain could have been put The few elevators in New York Harbor were full and had been for months. Ocean bottoms were not to be had and the result was that the grain remained in the cars. The terminal yards were filled with loading cars and the congestion began. It spread back into the interior until the yards at Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and other places were crowded. Still farther west the congestion spread until it reached Chicago, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and then everything was tied up. Statement of Mr. Chas. F. McDonald, Secretary and Treasurer of the Duluth Board of Trade This car congestion, too, is a very serious matter to the growers of the Northwest. The demands of the business in the East are to keep cars down there and hold them down there, so that the Northwest has been short of its cars and has been unable to market its grain. Grain has remained in the elevators in the West for months and months with large amounts of money tied up in its handling. In fact, I think that 1 am abso- lutely correct in saying that the volume of money that has been tied up in the handling of the grain crop of the Northwest and the financing' of it this past jear has been two or three times what it would be in any normal year. It has been impossible to get a release of that volume of money through inability to get cars to bring the grain to market. More- over, it has had a disastrous effect upon the consumer, because with this volume of grain tied up in these elevators in the country he has had to depend upon the lesser volume that was flowing and obtainable, and that has resulted in a revision in price. Chapter IV THE REMEDY FOR THE DEFECTS IN OUR TRANS- PORTATION SYSTEM Increasing the number of freight cars would not remedy the transportation deficiencies. It would not relieve the congestion at the gateways and terminals, but would tend still further to ag- gravate the difficulties. The most effective solution of the present problems attending the movement of peak loads, is the opening of new routes to relieve the existing routes and gateways of the surplus traffic. Products must be transported promptly during the periods of most acute demand in the world's markets, but the railroads can not afford to provide the excess equipment and the excess facilities at terminals to meet the heavy traffic burdens during crop moving periods. There is a flexibility of operation in water transportation that is not shared by railroads. Vessels can be allocated to ports and routes to meet the exigencies of trade conditions, and the oceans provide the right of way for an unlim- ited commerce. Ships afford the cheapest transportation in the world. The opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels would provide a dependable outlet for the products of our chief sur- plus producing areas, and would decrease by fully 50 per cent the average rail haul to and from shipside. It would constitute an effective regulator of rail rates and traffic. Car shortage not the only trouble. — While it appears from the statements of railroad authorities that there is a great shortage of cars, it seems clear that the inability of our railroads to handle the traffic is due not only to an insufficient number of cars, but also to the inability under existing operating conditions of obtaining the fullest use of the cars now available. If the total annual freight car capacity were equivalent to the total annual traffic, the transportation shortage would not be entirely relieved. The greatest need is for the expeditious movement of commodi- ties in their proper season. The traffic is not distributed evenly throughout the year, but on the contrary is very much greater at certain times than at others. For instance, with the move- ment of the western crops in July, the depletion of the car supply on western lines begins, lasting for six to eight months, during which the eastern lines are congested. Increasing the number of cars without increasing the lines and improving the terminals results in blocking the traffic. The traffic on lines converging to the export temiinals of the Atlantic Coast has passed the saturation point, and the addition of the normal in- crease of business during the next few years will heavily over- 31 32 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE load these lines. The provision of new cars will not relieve the congestion at the gateways and terminals, but may tend to still further aggravate the difficulties. There is only one effective solution of the difficulties attending the movement of the peak loads, and that is the opening of new routes to relieve the existing routes of the surplus traffic. The average mileage per days of all the cars in the United States is less than 20 miles. In the central western territory it is 27.5 miles. Proceeding eastward it becomes 26.8 miles in the Pocahontas district, 19.9 miles in the Allegheny district, and 17.2 miles in the New England district. Some lines have an efficiency of more than twice that of the lines entering the con- gested territory adjacent to the eastern seaboard. Car efficiency is greatly impaired by the congestion incident to the continual eft"ort of the shippers of the country to jam a vast amoimt of freight through gateways and terminals which can not handle it. This results in the use of cars for storage purposes, which should be used for the movement of traffic. The present system of shipping freight from all parts of the United States through a few ports on the, Atlantic Coast not only blocks the freight move- ment, but is economically unsound for other reasons. The ship- ment of a car of freight for a distance of 1,000 miles by rail, when it could have reached a suitable port with a journey of 500 miles, decreases by 50 per cent the efficiency of that car as a transportation unit. In 1918 the freight carried on Class 1 roads in the eastern dis- trict amounted to 1,317.961.397 tons, of which 614,638,737 tons originated on those lines and 703,322,660 tons were received from other lines. The figures are as follows : Revenue Freight, Class I Roads, 1918. Total, all districts Eastern district Southern district Western district Roads operated by R. R. Admin- istration Roads not operated by R. R. Ad- ministration Tons 2.269,861,326 36.006.919 Tons 1.314,179.513 3.781.884 Tons 341,294.735 Tons 614,387.078 . 32.225 035 Total 2.305.868.245 1.263.265,890 1.317.961.397 614.638,737 341.294,7.35 216.081.819 646 612 113 Less freight originating on road . . . 432.545.334 Total freight received from other lines 1,042.602.355 703.322,660 125.212.916 214.066 779 The above data show clearly the preponderance of freight now moving into the eastern district. This movement not only causes the great congestion which serves to block the entire GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 33 transportation system of the country, but it results in an excessive proportion of one-way trat^c, since about 50 per cent of the cars returning from the Atlantic seaboard are empty. It is said that commerce follows the lines of least resistance, but in actual practice it follows the lines which have been laid down by habit. The people of the United States now ship in a haphazard manner without due regard to the conditions exist- ing on traffic lines and at the terminals, and hence serious losses constantly occur due to inability to get the goods on board vessel promptly. This situation has been recognized by Government authorities and steps are being taken to encourage shipment by way of the most logical routes. Increased utilization of waterways imperative. — A conserva- tive view of the existing transportation situation seems to justify the belief that the best our railroads can do with the expenditure of all procurable funds is to meet the normal requirements of traffic. They can not afTord to provide the excess equipment and the excess facilities at terminals to meet the heavy traffic burdens during the crop moving periods. The overhead charges on this excess equipment will not justify its purchase solely to meet the requirements of periods of heavy traffic, and yet it is at such periods that the interest of the people of the United States in adequate transportation is the greatest. We must get our crops to market at the period of most acute demand in the markets of the world. If, by reason of inadequate facilities, the crops can not be moved promptly, great losses are certain to result. The evidence before the Commission fully sustains this assertion. There is a flexibility of operation in water transportation that is not shared by the railroads. \'essels can be allocated to ports and routes to meet the exigencies of trade conditions. The oceans provide the right of way for an unlimited com- merce, but railroads can not handle more than their proper capacity, and an attempt to do so results in blocking them com- pletely. We need a greater utilization of waterways, and a com- mensurate improvement of our terminal facilities. Particu- larly do we need abundant accommodations for ships, which provide the cheapest transportation in the world. The report of the Committee on Interoceanic Canals, rendered about 1902, contained the following statement : The commercial world demands ship transportation for commerce wher- ever it can be had. Railroads that, unfortunately, sometimes supersed^e interior canal lines can not successfully compete with ship canals or supply their place in transporting commerce. They can neither transport tlTe 34 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL quantities of freight that canals can carry nor at as Httle cost, and they necessarily involve the br'eaking of bulk on the coast and reshipment, if the cargces arc destined for an additional sea voyage. The influence of the St. Lawrence waterway in relieving the transportation shortage. — For all of the export traffic from the Lake States and the Northwest, and much of the domestic traffic destined for the eastern seaboard, the St. Lawrence River will furnish a direct route with an average saving of 800 to 1,500 miles of rail haul, and the elimination of the excessive cost of transfers involved at Atlantic ports. Irrespective of the actual saving in cost to the shipper, which will be very large, the sub.-titution of short rail hauls to the Great Lakes in place of k)ng rail hauls to the Atlantic seaboard will result in a vast improvement in the general transportation conditions of the country. Every car utilized in carrying freight to lake ports would be able to make from two to five times as many trips per year as it can make to Atlantic ports. This would be more than equivalent to a large increase in the number of cars, because it would relieve congestion instead of increasing it. The exten- sion of the seaboard to the heart of the country is the real solution of the transportation problems now confronting the people of the country. The construction of the Panama Canal bestowed the benefits of deep water transportation upon the people of the Pacific Coast, extending inland as far as the Rockies, the Gulf Coast extending northward as far as St. Louis, and the Atlantic Coast extending westward as far as Indiana, leaving the northerly interior of the country at a greater disadvantage than ever before. It is the interior of every country of large size that is most difficult to develop because of the handicap imposed by the transportation disadvantages. We look to these great western plains, however, for our food production and for the surplus which our commercial interests demand that we should lia\c to sell in foreign markets. The people of this great ter- ritory in return have the right to demand that we provide them with the facilities of transportation which will enable them to carry out these worthy purposes. It requires no gift of prophecy to foresee that unless more efficient and economical transportation is ])rovided. the time will shortly come when we can no longer compete with other nations in the grain markets of the world. Therefore it is 7vitli prayerful hope that one turns to the project of the proposed St. Lawrenee ship channel as affording the most available solution of the problem of providing economical trans- portation for this great region. Chapter V THE HANDICAP OF INADEQUATE TERMINAL FACILITIES A large part of the cost of transporting goods to and from seaboard is terminal rather than line cost. The expense involved between the arrival of a car at New York and the placing of goods on the ship frequently amounts to as much as the cost of the haul from points as far west as Chicago. Because of these excessive terminal costs, foreign trade is seriously handicapped. The terminals at Atlantic ports were originally constructed in the interests of the railroads, and are not properly designed, equipped or connected to secure economy. On the Great Lakes, terminals can be constructed which will avoid the costly errors made at Atlantic ports, and will afford the facility of movement which is alike necessary in the interests of the shipper and of the vessel. While prompt and economical transfers are impor- tant where goods must be transshipped, the avoidance of trans- fers is more important. The Great Lakes route will eliminate transfers on a vast amount of business and will reduce the num- ber and cost of transfers on an equal or greater amount. The saving of terminal costs and of losses resulting from delays in delivery of goods will amount to several hundred million dollars annually. Inadequate terminals responsible for deficient transportation. — In the preceding discussion the conclusion was reached that the difficulty of securing maximum efficiency in our railroad transportation system is due to the impracticability under exist- ing conditions of obtaining a quick turn-around and proper dis- tribution of cars, rather than upon the acknowledged car short- age. The same difficulty of securing rapid turn-around is found in the operation of vessels at our principal ports. Much of the fault for the present inefficiency of both rail and water lines of trans- portation may clearly be placed upon the lack of adequate facili- ties at the terminals, and a large share of the cost of transporta- tion is terminal cost rather than line cost. The authors concur fully with the views expressed by Mr. Chas. Whiting Baker at the hearing before the International Joint Commission at New York on October 20, 1920, on this phase of the subject. Mr. Baker called attention to the fact that while the costs of rail transportation have been decreasing for a great many years, due to improvement in type and capacity of the rolling stock, the expenses at the terminals have gone on increasing. A vast amount of work must be undertaken at the ports of this coun- 35 36 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE try to secure greater economy in all services connected with a transfer of freight between land and water carriers. A greater service than the reduction of transfer costs, however, will be rendered by the entire elimination of such costs wherever prac- ticable. The necessity of making transfers from one form of transportation to another involves not one, but many items of expense, depending upon the particular conditions affecting the shipment. These costs are not sut^ciently uniform to be definitely stated, but it may be said in general terms that the cost of getting freight from car to vessel at our Atlantic ports frequently equals or exceeds the cost of the rail haul from points as far distant as Chicago, or more than $10 per ton. Problems of Atlantic ports. — Terminal development in the past has been largely haphazard, due to the fact that in the early stages of port development the terminal facilities were provided by each railroad system for the accommodation of its own busi- ness and without regard to the business of other carriers.* In some ports we therefore find several isolated terminal develop- ments which can not now be economically coordinated and inter- connected. Due to the lack of any original, comprehensive plan, the task of introducing the most economical conditions becomes exceedingly great. Frontages on deep water which should have been reserved for public transportation uses have been monopo- lized by private interests, and it is now impracticable in some localities to provide a system of belt line communication serv- ing all wharves and affording connection with all rail lines. While it is known that the terminal charges are by far the greatest drag on commerce, it is little realized to what extent these charges have come to rest upon the domestic an I foreign commerce of the United States, increasing the cost of living at home and limiting the markets for American products abroad. The point of diminishing returns is soon reached with an increase in the size of terminals; that is, beyond a certain size terminal costs increase rapidly, with a further increase in the size of the terminal. It is therefore the natural conclusion, unfortunately borne out by fact, that the greatest terminal in the United States, New York, is the most expensive and the charges there rest most heavily upon commerce. Character of terminal charges. — Terminal charges are borne directly by three groups of persons. ( 1 ) There are the terminal *See MacElwee, "Ports and Terminal Facilities," McGraw-Hill, 1918. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL ?i7 charges that fall to the expense of operation of the railroad company; (2) there are the expenses that fall to the steam- ship company; and (3) there are the expenses that fall to the shipper himself, the merchant handling the goods. Ultimately, the consumer pays it all if the goods are of such nature that ihe price can be increased without destroying the market, but in the case of grain and some other products prominent in our export trade and on which the prices are fixed abroad, the pro- ducer must stand these costs. As a general knowledge at least of these costs is desirable in order to appreciate the savings their elimination will effect, some data on these costs will be l)resented. While the information given is based principally upon conditions at the port of New York, it is not with the purpose of making this great port the target for special criti- cism, since many of the items are ec^ually applicable to other Atlantic ports, nor can we pass to these details without paying tribute to the splendid achievements of Dock Commissioner Hulbert in securin*^- approval of i)roiects of great magnitude in the interests of the port. Lighterage. — The lighterage cost at the port of New York is one of the most insidious drags upon the commerce of the United States. .Much useful information concerning the lighterage service at New York is conta'ned in the record of the New York Harbor case before the Interstate Commerce Commission. In this case the Committee on \\'ays and Means to Prosecute the Case of Alleged Railroad Rate and Service Discrimination at the Port of New York, complained that the transportation of commodities to and from Manhattan and Brooklyn involves an expensive lighterage and floatage service not performed on trafific to and from points in the northern part of the State of New Jersey; that in view of the more favorable location of the latter points the rates' between points in the West and Jersey City, Hoboken, Newark. Paterson. and other cities in northern New Jersey should be lower than the rates to and from Man- hattan and Brooklyn ; and that the defendants' policy of em- bracing all of these points in the same zone, and their consequent failure to recognize in the rate structure the cost of the lighterage and floating service, subjects the people and the communities of northern New Jersey to undue prejudice and disadvantage, and operates to the undue preference and advantage of Manhattan and Brooklyn. The Commission held that the rates attacked are not shown to be unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. Its report 38 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE fully confirms the statements elsewhere made regarding the ex- istence for many years of congestion and excessive terminal expense at New York, but it shows that the granting of lower rates to New Jersey points because of this excessive cost would not remedy the situation. The rates to north Atlantic ports were many years ago adjusted on a differential basis, by agree- ment among the railroads, and as a result of these differentials certain definite traffic relations and conditions have been devel- oped. To disturb these dift'erentials might result in an un- usual and unfair advantage to the favored ports, and hence the greatest caution must be exercised in any readjustment of rates. A few quotations from the report of the Commission will serve to make the situation clearer. Extracts from Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the N'ezv York Harbor Case It is maintained by some experts on harbor development that no port is to be regarded as ideal unless its facilities are so arrang^ed as to provide for the direct and economical interchange of freight between the rail carriers and the boat lines S'crving it. There should be spacious piers on the water front adjacent to the terminus of the rail lines; the railroad tracks should extend onto the piers; and freight should be transferred directly between the cars and the vessel. If this principle is sound, the very statem'ent of it constitutes a serious indictment of the prevailing conditions at the port of New York, since the terminals of nearly all the trunk lines at that port are on th-e New Jersey shore, while most of the ocean lines have their piers either on Manhattan Island or at South Brookbti, distant from 1 mile to 4 miles from the rail terminus. To a specialist in port development it is "a sur- prising fact that not a single steamship pier on Manhattan Island has a railroad track on it connected to a trunk line railroad, or even to a switch- ing railroad by which the trunk line might be reached." With a few exceptions there are no facilities on the New Jersey shore for the accommodation of large vessels, which are accordingly obliged to find pier space elsewhere in the harbor. In the absence of bridges or freight tunnels connecting the N-ew Jersey shore with Manhattan and Brooklyn, the problem of providing facilities for the transfer of freight between the cars and the vessels is solved by the use of lighters and car floats, which arc also employed in transferring freight between the railroad terminals and the piers iti other parts of the harbor. The conditions under which freight is transported from one side of the harbor to the other at New York are without an exact parallel anywhere in this country. As long as the railroads perform the expensive lighterage and floatage service without imposing an additional charge therefor, the freight rates offer no inducement to the steamship companies to seek pier space on the New Jersey shore rather than in Manliattan or Brooklyn ; and the maintenance of a common rate to and from both sides of the port tends GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 39 to increase rather than to diminish the congestion of freight on the shores of Manhattan and Brooklyn. If the freight rates to and from the New- Jersey shore were lower, ocean shipping would be attracted to the New Jersey side of the harbor and more industries would be induced to locate there. It is estimated that *10,00O,0(K) tons of freight annually would be affected by a change in the rates here in issue, and that of the total tonnage coming to the New Jersey shore from the West, from 85 to 90 per cent is carried in lighters or on car floats to the east side of the harbor. If it be true that an expensive and unnecessary lighterage service is performed on such an enormous tonnage, it is obvious that the present method of handling freight at the port involves a huge economic loss which is, in a sense, an unjustifiable burden upon the people of the whole country. There are 91 steamship lines engaged in the foreign trade sailing from Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Staten Island. Only nine sail from the New Jersey side of the harbor, and three of these, the North German Lloyd and two of the Hamburg-American lines, have suspended their sailings because of the war. In addition to the lines engaged in the trans- Atlantic service there are 15 lines plying between New York Harbor and points on Long Island Sound, ail of them sailing from the New York side of the harbor. Even prior to the enormous increase in the volume of export traffic which the trunk lines have recently been called upon to carry to the seaboard the congestion of freight at the terminals, on the piers, and in the streets of the city presented a problem which taxed the ingenuity of the carriers and the city authorities. The present dock commissioner describes the situation as follows: The necessity for dispatching the business within very limited periods of high congestion morning and evening, combined with the cramped conditions under which freight is handled over the piers and through the bulkhead sheds, has produced a condition which places a most serious burden upon the shippers of the city. West street and the marginal way are at times crowded with trucks to a point where it is impossible to reach the freight stations without intolerable and expensive delays. Testimony which appears entirely reliable has been taken by a number of commis- sions which have investigated the subject to the effect that several hours' delay in waiting for a chance to receive or deliver freight is no uncommon occurrence, and that the actual cost to the New York shipper of getting freight to and from the water-side stations is frequently equal to or in excess of rail service as far west as Buffalo. The rates published by the carriers operating over the ocean-and-rail routes, which carry a large tonnage between New York Harbor and points in the West, are the same from Jersey City and Hoboken as from New York, although all of the vessels engaged in this traffic sail from the Manhattan side, and an additional lighterage service must be performed therefore on traffic moving to or from points in New Jersey. The competition between carriers which resulted ultimately in the adoption of the so-called port differentials began soon after the middle of *The correct figure is nearer 100,000,000 tons. 40 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ihc last ctntury. The New York Central and its connections opened the iirst through route from New York to Chicago in 1852, and through rates were first published in 1857. At that time the New York Central was the only carrier reaching New York Harbor with its own rails, but the Baltimore & Ohio participated to a certain extent in the New York traffic by means of a boat line from Baltimore. The Erie Railroad leached Jersey City in 1862, the Pennsylvania in 1866 or 1867, and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western in 1869. The lines of the Pennsyl- vania system were extended to Chicago in 1858. thos-e of the Erie several years later, and the Baltimore & Ohio reached Chicago for the first time in 1874. The establishment of through routes by these carriers between New York and Chicago marked the beginning of a period of intense rivalry between them which is without a parallel in the history of American transportation. Grain, which is said to have constituted IZ per cent of the total tonnage carried by the trunk lines to the principal Atlantic ports in 1881, was the traffic most desired by each of the carriers. The principal terminals of the New York Central, the Lackawanna, and the Erie were at the port of New York, those of the Pennsylvania at Philadelphia, and those of the Baltimore & Ohio at Baltimore ; and each carrier exerted every possible efifort to have the export traffic move through the port in which it was primarily interested. Thus, it came about that the competition between carriers became in turn a competition between ports. That the rivalry is as yet unabated is abundantly attested by the evidence of record in the proceeding now before us. The rate war resulting from the struggle between the trunk lines for supremacy was so severe as to make it apparent that its continuance would bankrupt all of the carriers, and steps were soon taken toward the establishment of a rate adjustment that would be satisfactory to all concerned. In 1877 a written agreement wa*; signed by the New York Central, the Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore & Ohio, the preamble of which stated that its object was — to avoid all future misunderstandings in respect to the geograpliical ad- vantages or disadvantages of the cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, as afifected by rail and ocean transportation, and with a view to effecting an equalization of the aggregate cost of rail and ocean trans- pr.rtation between all competitive points in the West and Southwest and all domestic or foreign ports reached through the above cities. The agree- ment provided that export rates to Boston should be no higher than those to New York; that the rates to Philadelphia should be 2 cents lower than those to New York; and that the rates to Baltimore should be 3 cents lower than to New York. .\ difference of one-fourth cent per bushel seems almost negligible, but it must be remembered that the movement of grain is determined by very slight differences in rates; and the Philadelphia dealers remind us that one- fourth cent per bushel amounts to $300 on a cargo of 200,000 bushels. .approximately 40 per cent of the grain exported through the port of New York is handled in lighters or barges from the terminals of the rail lines to the vessels, floating elevators being employed to load the cargo from lighter to vessel. This method of "indirect" loading, which is made necessarv because of the failure of some of the trunk lines to provide GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 41 faciliti'cs for the difcct transfer of grain from elevator to vessel, involves an additional cost to the shipper of 0.4 of 1 cent per busiiel, th^e charge for indirect loading being 0.9 of 1 cent per bushel. Several of the trunk lines insist that connecting carriers permit them to d'cduct before prorating joint rates the sum of 3 cents per 100 pounds for the lighterage and floatage service when they perform it. Shipments consigned from points in the West to Manhattan or Brooklyn and moving, for example, over the New York C'entral's route through Wee- hawken, would be carried across the harbor by the floating equipment of that carrier. Before prorating the New York Central deducts 3 cents per 100 pounds, which it credits to itself for the terminal service. The shipper pays no extra charge for the service, the cost .of performing it being absorbed by the carriers out of the New York rate. The practice of the Pennsylvania Railroad in this respect differs from that of some of the other lines. That carrier deducts 3 cents per 100 pounds before prorating on all traffic moving between points in the West and points on its lines in the New York rate group, whether it performs the lighterage service or not. On shipments to Newark, N. J., for example, where no lighterage is necessary, the terminal deduction is made as well as on shipments to Brooklyn. Reference has already been made to the fact that a large part of the lighterage and floatage of freight across New York Harbor is performed by private terminal companies, acting in that capacity as agents for the trunk lines. These companies, whose terminals are on the Brooklyn shore, not only transport freight with their own floating equipment be- tween their own terminals and those of the railroads, but they collect freight charges and remit them to the rail carriers, and they assume all responsibility for loss and damage to the freight while it is in their possession. On all traffic originating at or consigned to points west of the western termini of the eastern trunk lines except grain the auxiliary terminal companies are paid 4.4 cents per 100 pounds for the lighterage or floatage service which they perform. On traffic originating at or consigned to points east of the western termini the allowance is 3.2 cents. Prior to our supplemental decision in The Five Per Cent Case. 32 I. C. C, 325, the amounts paid to the terminal companies were 4.2 cents and 3 cents. respectively^ On grain the allowance is uniformly 3.2 cents per 100 pounds. These allowances are in no instances paid by the shipper, the carriers uniformly absorbing them out of the New York rate. The complainants' contention that the methods of handling both domestic and export traffic at the port of New York must be thoroughly revised if the maximum of efficiency is to be attained is abundantly established by the evidence of record. Adequate freight tunnels under the North River, which apparently could be constructed at a cost small in comparison with Ihe resulting benefits, would make it possible to handle a large portion of Manhattan's freight traffic without the use of lighters or car floats. A large part of the valuable water front on the New Jersey shore, now used almost wholly for the transfer of freight between the rails and the floating equipment, could be released for other and more suitable pur- pores; the congestion on the west side of Manhattan Island caused by 42 ECON'OMIC ASPECTS OF THE the assembling of countless vehicles at the crowded piers to receive and discharge freight would be considerably relieved ; and th'e pier stations on the Manhattan shore, now taxed to capacity, could be devoted in part to other uses. Although it has been plainly suggested by certain parties in the present proceeding that a finding in favor of the complainants would induce the carriers to unite their efiforts toward bettering terminal conditions at the port, it is clear that the authority to regulate rates was not delegated to the Commission for any such purpose. The methods of handling freight at the port can be revised and improved without specially adjusting the freight rates with that end in view, and the remarkable growth and progress of the port can best be continued by treating it as an organic whole. The above quotations from the report of the Interstate Com- merce Coinmission show that in general the Hghterage and float- age costs are absorbed in the rate. They are not paid directly by the shipper, but are. nevertheless, indirectly paid by him, since they are included in the rate. Moreover, these charges are paid on some traffic entering the New York district whether lighter- age or floatage is actually required or not. The charge of about 3 cents per hundred pounds deducted by the road performing this service may at one time have represented its true cost, but this is no longer the case, and as stated by Commissioner Woolley, the cost had risen to $35 a car or more at the beginning of the war. It is estimated that the present cost is about $60 a car, which is equivalent to about $2.00 a ton, or 10 cents a hundred pounds. It seems clear that in the past the necessity of making the rate to New York sufficient to cover the lighterage and floatage costs has been fully recognized, and that in observing the established differentials, this practice has resulted in maintaining unneces- sarily high rates to the other north Atlantic j)orts. The rate relationship is purely artificial and arbitrary, and is not based on the cost of service at the present time. If ii were so based, the rates to Baltimore would be from 5 to 10 cents less per 100 pounds than to New York. The situation is an unfortunate one, and the only prospect of a remedy seems to lie in the creation of new outlets for ocean traffic. The St. Lawrence waterway would exercise a powerful influence in bringing about the econo- mies so sorely needed at Atlantic ports. Competition in trans- portation in just as effective as it is in industry. Such compe- tition would be aft'orded by the deeper St. Lawrence waterway, and the influence of this waterway would be seen not only in the development of a vast traffic on its own channel. l)ut in the GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 43 reduction of charges for handling traffic through all Atlantic ports, and on all competing rail and water routes. The history of transportation proves that this result would be inevitable. Stevedoring costs. — The cost of loading and unloading both cars and vessels has increased with leaps and bounds during the last few years. Available data indicate a wide variation in these costs, but it may be said in general terms that the cost of loading or unloading a ton of general package freight now amounts to $1.00, as compared with 25 cents at the time the construction of the present barge canal across the State of New York was recom- mended. In connection with the operation of the Government barges on the Mississippi River, the cost of loading and unloading at St. Louis was found to be about $1 per ton. At our principal Atlantic ports it is greater, as will be seen from the following: Results of Stevedoring Study Made at the Port of Xezc York by the U. S. Shipping Board Loading, 1913; 33 vessels, 8 of which were coastwise; all loaded with gen- eral merchandise T J- nf>aiiy at Philadelphia. Bombay, Calcutta Cargoes per Calcutta or Bombay ton . . . Bale Cargo China Clay Chalk Colombo Cargo General Cargoes (per ton weight or measurement) . . . Iron (pig) Lath Ore Steel or Iron Scrap Skins (wet), per ton of 2240 lbs. C. or B. cargo Ammunition and-or explo- sives Dynamite (50% extra) Automobiles Discharging Sulphur $ 1 . 00 per ton ST. 56 per ton Skins, if wet, quoted above, if 1.20 " " dry on Bombay or Calcutta .98 " " cargo basis. .98 " " Wool: • .75 " " Compressed 1.80 " " Not Compressed 60 " bale 1.10 '• " From River Plata Ports 1.15 " " Maize and-or Linseed-In bags 1 . 50 " " overside 1 . 10 per ton .75 ■' " Maize and or Linseed-In bags 2.50 " " on dock (same rate plus labor for trucking and piling) 1.10 " •' ' Loading Billets, bars and pig iron . . . . Beams (structural steel) Barrel and -or drums of oil, or other barrel cargoes: Full cargoes at Refinery, Iron Plates $1 80 per ton $3.35 per ton Locomotives and -or Ma- chinery or other hea\;>' 1.35 " " lifts, including crane hire measurement. when loaded at Pier "G" 1 51 per ton and -or Eddystone, on 2.85 " " the entire shipment 4. SO " "' Lumber 1 -'50 Meats 1 10 " •• Oilcake 1.10 " " GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 45 From dock, .23 per bbl From dock and lighters .27 per bbl Part cargoes. .29 per bbl. . . . (Out of City) .30 per bbl Barbed wire Case oil: Full cargoes From lighters Coil wire Car material Carbon black Cotton Flour and other bagged cargo. General cargo (weight or measurement) Hay Ingots ron — Scrap Loading 1.15 per ton Oats 7.50 per 1000 bu. Oats (filling into and stow- 1 35 " " ing in bags and feeders). .19. 00 per 1000 1 .-15 " " bu. e.\tra. 1.50 I' " Oats (full cargo-bagged) . . 24.00 per 1000 1 63 '■ " bushels Pipe 1.55 per ton .04 "case Rails-under 40 ft. long and .05 " " rail equipment 1.55 " " 1.31 " ton Rails — over 40 ft. long and 1.31 " " rail equipment 2.00 " " measurement. Staves 1 . SO " " 1.31 per ton Tobacco 1.50 " " measurement. Wheat and -or all heav>- 1 . 50 per ton grains 5 . 50 per 1000 1 . 10 per ton bushels Filling and stowing in bags 1.10 '■ " and feeders 16.50 per 1000 1 .60 " " bu. extra 1.51 " " Other commodities by spe- 2.45 " " cial arrangements. Other terminal costs. — There are many charges assessed against a vessel in connection with its port operations, such as pilotage, towage, dockage, etc., which it will be unnecessary to consider at length in this report. They are important, however, as aft'ecting the earning ability of the vessel, and some of them at least would be smaller at Lake ports than at Atlantic ports. The wharfage and handling charges on freight from points out- side of local territory are usually absorbed in the rail rate for the line haul. The following table shows some of the more important charges : Port and Terminal Charges at Principal North Atlantic Ports Pilotage Towage Dockage Boston Vessels over 2,000 tons Sea to dock, $25 per At railroad piers, no net ,$5 per foot draft. tug. charge. or an average of $120 Docking and undock- At public piers, no for a vessel drawing ing, $20 per tug. charge. 24.. At private piers, $15 per day. New York Vessels of 21' draft or Sea to dock, $15 per Few vessels devoted to over, $4.88 per foot hour per tug. Dock- foreign commerce inward and $3.56 ing and undocking dock at railroad outward. $12.50 per hour per piers. At private tug. Two tugs usu- piers, where tramps ally required. and outside lines dock, $75 to $500 per day per ship. Philadelphia $120 for 24' draft. At railroad piers, no charge. At publi« and private piers, le per net registered ton per day. Baltimore $5 per foot draft, or $120 per tug for 5,000 At railroad piers, no $120for vessel of 24' gr. ton vessel from charge. At public draft. sea to dock (usually and private piers. from quarantine). about $15 per day. Do:;king and un- docking, included in towage charge. 46 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Wharfage Lighterage Floatage Boston. New York. Philadelphia . Baltimore . At railroad and private piers: Local traffic, through trafiSc held in storage or trans- ferred from one ter- minal to another, 40 to 50 cents per ton. At public piers : Same as above; 10 cents a ton is paid to the State and ab- sorbed in rail rate. Where assessed, a- mounts to about IS , cents to 20 cents per ton. Some compa- nies make a higher charge unless the company is to have a large revenue from storage. None — See Storage. At public piers, a charge per day vary- ing with the com- modity. Overseas 55 lines use no lighters. Coast- wise lines operate their own lighters. Rent of lighter S30 per day, plus labor, engineer and towing. Railroad freight for ex- port s entitled to free lighterage, the cost being absorbed in the rate. The charge on local freight is 3 cents per hundred pounds. Free on traffic paying a line haul of $1.40 per ton, and freight is delivered without additional charge alongside vessels in Philadelphia harbor by lighter, car float, team or otherwise. Traffic paying less than SI. 40 per ton must pay 3c per 100 lbs. lighterage. Free on traffic paying a line haul of $1.40 per ton; includes lighterage or float- age upon all freight to alongside vessels • or piers. On traffic paying less than SI. 40 a ton there is a charge of 2c per 100 lbs. for light- erage. Not extensively used. Charge, about $7 per car. Free for shipment of 6 cars or more. $9 for each car less than 6, indicating a charge of $9 per car ab- sorbed in the rate. See Lighterage. See Lighterage. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 47 Elevating Switching Storage Boston . New York. Philadelphia. Baltimore . Export grain 9 10 cent per bushel, including storage and insur- ance for 20 days and delivery direct to vessels. 1 /8 cent per bushel for storage for each 10 days after free period. Receiving, weighing and discharging, ~i cent per bushel. Transportation to elevator, ■ ;s cent per bushel. Trimming, $3 per M. bushels. Floating elevators transfer grain from railroad elevators to vessels. Receiving, weighing, storing from cars, in- cluding storage for 20 days, and deliv- ery to vessel ?n population of ahc.ut 35,000,000 tons, and based on probable traffic of industries of over 18,000.000 tons. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL . 63 From the above quotations from the report of General Wother- spoon it will be seen that the industries of the State of New York alone within a reasonable time will provide a tonnage in excess of the capacity of the Barge Canal which is placed at 20,000,000 tons per annum, or 10,000,000 tons in each direction. The value of the Barge Canal as a transportation route is fully recognized, and it is confidently believed that it will before many years carry a traffic which will tax its maximum capacity, 'i'his traffic will consist of some through commerce from Lake ports to New York, and vice versa, but it will consist in greater volume of local traffic. It will carry a reasonable proportion of high-class freight, but this high-class freight will be largely confined to the products of industry located on or near its banks and to articles to be consumed by the population in the immediately tributary area. There is no reason to believe that the traffic on this canal will dififer materially from that on other waterways of similar characteristics throughout the world. The manufac- tured products of the Great Lakes destined for foreign countries will not undergo the cost and risk of damage involved in transfer from lake vessel to barge at Bufifalo. They will continue to go as heretofore directly from point of manufacture to the ocean carrier, and in case the ocean carrier is able to penetrate into the Lakes great saving of cost and great facility in the conduct of business will result.. The belief that the Barge Canal is unsuited to the transportation requirements of the Great Lakes region is shared by Hon. Frederick C. Stevens, formerly Super- intendent of Public Works of the State of New York, who submitted the following recommendations in his annual report for 1907: The last ten years have seen not one but S'cv^ral revolutions in the transportation problem. In 1880, it was bdieved a no-toll canal would restore to New York her commercial supremacy. This restoration hardly outlived the accomplishment of the fact. In 1893, a 9-foot canal, it was thought, would serve as a restorer. In 1903, a 1,000-ton barge canal with locks 28 feet wide, it was thought, would suffice. Two years later the demand had so grown as to require and justify a 4S-foot lock. The canals of Ohio have been abandoned as inadequate. The Illinois- Mississippi Canal only just completed, after 15 years of construction work, is found to be practically obsolete though this structure has locks 35 feet wide and 170 feet in length. Fifteen years ago this project was thought to be ambitious but already the boats which may be operated on this canal with profit are too large to pass through the locks. . . . The inevitable conclusion to my mind, as, I believe, it will be to the mind of every fair minded man who makes a careful study of this project and eliminates all consideration of locality, is that your honorable body 64 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE should without delay memorialize Congress to join with New York in making that portion of the Barge Canal route from the Hudson River by way of the Mohawk River, Oneida Lake and Oswego River, a ship canal of the type contemplated in the governmental surveys of 1900, and that this memorializing of Congress should be followed by such pressure from those interests within our State as may not tie ignored, to the end that the plans suggested may be accomplished. The construction of a deep waterway to the Hudson River is not now under consideration, luit some of the groundless ob- jections urged against the St. Lawrence route apply with real force to an artificial waterway for ships across the State of New York. Such a waterway would involve several times the amount of restricted navigation which will exist upon the im- proved St. Lawrence, and its capacity would be entirely inade- quate to meet the future requirements of commerce. In conclusion, it should be definitely asserted that the Barge Canal does not provide the character of water transportation needed for the commerce of the Northwest, and will not be used to any great extent for through traffic of a general nature to and from the ports of the Great Lakes. The improvement of the natural outlet to the sea by way of the St. Lazvrence RiT'cr is the only solution of the problem of pro- viding adequate transportation faeilities for the vast territory tributary to the Great Lakes. Chapter VII COST OF TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN UPPER LAKE PORTS AND LIVERPOOL Studies made by the United States Shipping Board of the cost of operating freight vessels of standard type have been used as a basis for determining the additional cost of operating such vessels to the ports of the Great Lakes. With due allowance for the additional time consumed in the trip from Liverpool to Lake ports as compared with the trip to Atlantic ports, and with in- surance and certain other items increased to meet the new con- ditions, it is found that rates far below those now existing be- tween the Great Lakes and Europe could be made and afford the vessel a satisfactory revenue on her operations. In general, it may be anticipated that vessels will be able to make the same rates to Lake Erie points as to north Atlantic coast points, and the same rates to Lake Michigan and Lake Superior as to Gulf ports. On account of the difference in the efficiency of vessels and terminals, and the widely varying charges against both vessel and cargo at dift'erent ports, or even parts of the same port, it is realized that determination of actual costs in a selected case will not necessarily furnish a reliable guide for estimating the cost of transportation by other carriers of similar type and capacity. A knowledge of costs, however, is essential to intelligent rate making, although with this information in hand, assumptions are still necessary. Dr. Emory R. Johnson states that "The difficulty of fixing freight rates that correspond with costs — after the expenses or costs of service for vessels of dift'erent types have been ascertained with a fair degree of accuracy for the various trades — is not especially great when the rates apply to a full cargo consisting of one to three or four commodities offered and carried in known and definite quantities or tonnages. The complications of tate making, however, are intricate when different rates are to be made for each of numerous commodities, and are to apply to any quantity that may be offered. The rela- tive costs of service for transporting dift'erent articles of dif- ferent weights, densities, perishability, strength, and fragility, value, etc., are hardly determinable with close accuracy. . . . How far the costs of services, when determinable, should be con- trolling in making ocean-freight rates is a question the answer to which will depend upon the policy of rate making or rate regulation that may be adopted. In most instances, other facts 65 C6 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE hliould be considered along with costs in deciding what freight charges shall be imposed or permitted, but it will seldom happen that rates yielding less than cost are justifiable. In all cases those responsible for making or approving ocean rates will prefer to act wnth a knowledge of the fixed and current expenses to be met from the revenues secured from the rates in question.'' In order to make intelligent comparisons of the cost of ship- ment on two or more competing routes, it is necessary to separate the cost into its several factors. Investigation by the Shipping Board of operating costs of three standard vessel types. — In connection with the operation of the large number of vessels under the control of the United States Shipping Board, it became necessary to secure information relative to the costs of operating the several stand- ard types of vessels on different routes. A report was therefore prepared in collaboration with commercial shij) owners and operators for the purpose of developing an index of the relative desirability of dilTerent cargo ships. Each of the charges was set up after a careful investigation of actual ])erformance costs with the view both to showing a true comparison between the same item of expense for the ships and to presenting the different costs for each ship in the proportion one to the other, that is met with under commercial operating conditions. For each type of ship the cost was drawn on a high basis of war-time value and prices, and on a lower basis of estimated peace-time condi- tions. The determination of normal peace-time conditions, how- ever, presents a problem which is still difficult of solution. Some reduction in certain of the assigned fixed charges is no d<»ubt warranted, but operating costs have not as yet fallen appreciably, and for the latter items the results obtained are no doubt reason- ably applicable at the preseiU time. Hence, the actual costs of operation designated as "high" costs will be used in analyzing the results of the investigation, and the study will be confined to three standard steel, coal-burning \essels operated between New' York and Liverpool, which would be suitable for use on the ])ro])ose(l deep waterway, as follows: GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 67 5,650 D. W. T. Steel ship 7,500 D. W. T. Steel ship 8,800 D. W. T. Steel ship Length over all Molded breadth. . . • Molded depth Load draft Gross tonnage Net tonnage Indicated horsepower Designed speed knots Net operating days Number of men, officers and crew. Assumed sea speed, knots Days in port. New York and Liverpool Turnarounds per annum Fuel consumption: Per day at sea Per day in port Maximum cargo capacity, (long tons) Outbound Inbound ' Potential cargo capacity per an- num, long tons Cargo— ton knots per annum 389'0" 43'9" 28'0" 23'0" 3,820 3,029 2,100 11.0 325 40 9.6 10 and 10 7.0 40.0 4.5 4,741 4,741 66,374 202,639,800 401'0" 54'0" 32'0" 24'0" 4,860 3,600 2,500 11.5 330 45 10.2 10 and 10 7.35 48.0 10.0 6,365 6,365 427'0" 54'0" 29'9" 24'2" 5,898 4,450 2,500 10.5 330 48 9.5 lOH and 101^ 6.904 48.0 10.0 7,604 7,604 93,566 I 104,996 303,246,0001 320,250,000 Before proceeding with a study of the cost figures, a brief explanation of the bases of computation appears necessary. Capital ro.s-fjr.— Interest on the investment is taken at 5 per cent. Depreciation. — The hfe of a steel ship is assumed to be 30 years, and therefore a flat charge of 3 1-3 per cent per annum will liquidate this item. Opinion as to the proper charge for depreciation is varied. A study of the policy of operating com- panies indicates that it is a custom to vary the sum set aside each year with the profits earned during the year, and that no fixed allowance is made. To enable comparisons to be made, it is necessary to adopt a uniform rate to cover depreciation, and the rate assigned is considered a fair and normal charge. Creiv. — The crew costs are based upon the following rates of pay : 68 ECONOMIC ASl'l-XTS OF THE Deck crew Pay per month Engine room {Cont'd) Pay per i Master $250 Third Assistant . . . 120 Chief officer 150 Deck Engineer. . . . 85 Second officer . . . . l.?5 Oilers 80 Third officer 120 Storekeepers 80 Carpenter 90 Firemen 75 Boatswain 85 Coal passers 65 Able seaman 75 Steward's department: Ordinary seaman . 55 Chief steward 120 Deck boys 40 Chief cook 100 Engine room: Second cook and Chief Engineer. . . 185 baker 90 First Assistant . . . 150 Cook's mate 60 Second Assistant . 135 Messmen 60 Subsistence. — The cost per man per day i.s taken at 86 cents. Repairs and maintenance. — This figure is taken as 4 per cent of the contract price of the ships. In this item is included an annual dry docking charge of 50 cents per gross ton and painting costs of $700 to $1,000. It has been assumed that the total money spent per year on upkeep will be the same on whatever route the ship is operating. Similarly, for the purpose of com- parison between ships, the increased repairs necessary as the sliip becomes older and approaches her periods of resurvey or the variations commercially met with in this item, due to change in policy of owners, urgency of the repairs, or difference in care in handling the ships, have not been considered. All the ships are taken as "new." Insurance on hull and uiachincry. — Insurance on hull and machinery is usually taken out under annual policies and the rates vary according to the following conditions : 1. The type and classification of the steamer, horseixnver. trad- ing limits, and the nature of cargoes likely to be carried. 2. The character and experience of the owners. 3. Whether the steamers are running in a regular line or are simply tramps. The rates taken on hull and machinery are regular commercial quotations, and conform to the current American Hull Insur- ance Association's form of policy. Speed. — The assumed standard average sea speed taken for each ship is somewhat less than the designed speed, the deduction being about 5 per cent in the case of the larger steel ships. Fuel consumption. — The fuel consumption of the ships was checked by performance of tyi)ical ships under actual service conditions. The fuel consumption in port includes that re(iuire(l to get up steam when going to sea. Fuel reserve for trans- Atlantic routes is taken as 22^4 per cent of requirements. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 69 Fuel costs. — The fuel costs are based upon a charge of $8.50 per ton of coal trimmed in bunkers at both New York and Liverpool. Net operating days. — This item represents the maximum number of operating days possible in a year after deducting the days lost on account of bad weather and time allowed for dry docking and overhauling, which has been set at 30 days in the case of each of the ships. The delays lost on account of bad weather are as follows : 5,650 D. W. T. steel vessel. 7,500 D. W. T. steel vessel. 8,800 D. W. T. steel vessel. New York-Liverpool Route. 10 5 5 Turnarounds per annum. — This figure represents the number of round trips which can be expected per year. It is modified by a variation in speed, days in port, etc. Net cargo-carrying capacity. — This is the deadweight tonnage less the weight of fuel, feed water, spare gear, crew and effects, fresh water, sanitary salt water, provisions, galley and steward's stores, and bilgewater. The amount of cargo possible for various routes will depend mainly on bunkering requirements. Pilotage and harbor charges. — The charges were taken from the 1917 edition of Dues and Port Charges of the World, re- vised according to recent experience in respect to New York dock charges. The item covers compulsory pilotage, wharfage, custom fees, tonnage, clearance, dunnage, petties, etc. New York-Liverpool Route (round trip approximately 6,100 nautical miles) Basis of Costs and Expenses [assuming full cargoes.) 5,650 D.W.T. steel ship 7,500 D.W.T. steel ship 8,800 D.W.T. steel ship Cost per annum Per cargo ton Cost per annum Per cargo ton Cost per ^num Per cargo ton Fuel $ 68,432 43,260 12,556 99,579 49,780 6,780 28,441 4,800 $1.03 0.65 0.19 1.50 0.75 0.10 0.43 0.07 $ 87,156 47,340 14,439 127,500 63,730 9.000 34,545 4,800 $0.93 0.51 0.16 1.36 0.68 0.10 0.37 0.05 $ 87,991 49,680 15,067 139,330 69,940 10,500 37,903 4,800 $0.84 0.47 Subsistence, officers and crew Interest and depreciation , . . Repairs, maintenance, and 0.14 1.33 0.67 Stores and supplies Pilotage, harbor charges, etc. 0.10 0.36 0.05 Total, exclusive of insur- 313,628 54,134 155,792 4.72 0.82 2.35 388,510 65,230 219,508 4.15 0.70 2.35 415,211 70,224 246,740 3.96 Insurance on hull and ma- 0.67 Insurance on cargo carried . . 2.35 Total annual expenditures 523,554 7.89 673,248 7.20 732,175 6.98 70 ECOXOMIC .\SPECTS OF THE Changes in Government cost figures required to meet present conditions in commercial shipping. — Some nioditication of the resuhs shown by the above figures is necessary to make them comparable with costs in merchant shipping. The item of "In- surance on cargo carried" should be eliminated, this being an expense chargeable to the shipper and not to the carrier. The value of the 5,650-ton vessel was based on a cost of $211 per deadweight ton, the 7,500-ton vessel on a cost of $202 per dead- weight ton, and the 8,800-ton vessel on a cost of $190 per deadweight ton. These are the high prices pertaining to the period immediately following the war. At the present time we are passing through a period of readjustment in costs of vessel construction, and there is a wide variation in prices quoted by various ship builders, but there is a distinct recent downward tendency made necessary by the loss of Government contracts, the possibility of enforced idleness, and the realization that we must again compete with foreign ship yards. The following table furnished by the United States Shipping Board gives some interesting information on vessel costs : Approximate Average Price of Steel Cargo Vessels. Year United States per deadweight ton Great Britain per deadweight ton 1910 1914 $45.00 59.00 90.00 118.00 135.00 193.00 $26.00 37.00 1915 1916 1917 77.00 114 00 115.00 1918 1X)7.00 ilie figurgs for 1910 are based on contracts for ordinary tram[) cargo vessels and are estimated average prices in both countries. Information furnished by ship yards regarding the present cost of constructing the standard 8.800-ton vessel indicates that a fair figure will be $140 per deadweight ton, making the total cost of this vessel $1,232,000. From this figure the cost of the 7,500-ton vessel may be placed at $150 and the 5,650-ton vessel at $160 per deadweight ton. Some estimates are much lower than these figures, but it is deemed advisable for the purposes of this study to adopt figures that may be regarded as fair averages. The revised figures are as follows: GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 71 New York- Liver pool Route {round trip approximately 6,100 nautical miles). Showing Distribution of Costs for Commercial Vessels, 1920. 5,650 D.W.T. Steel ship 7,500 D.W.T. Steel ship 8,800 D.W.T. Steel ship Cost per annum Cost per annum Cost per annum Fixed charges: Interest on investment at 5 per cent $45,200 30,133 54,134 $56,250 37,500 65,230 $61,600 Depreciation at 5yi per cent.. . . Insurance on hull and machinery 41,067 70,224 Total fixed charges $129,467 $158,980 $172,881 Operating costs: Fuel Pay of officers and crew Subsistence. 68,432 43,260 12,556 38,770 6,780 28,441 4,800 87,156 47,340 14,439 48,130 9,000 34,545 4,800 87,991 49,680 15,067 Repairs, Jiiaintenance and over- hauling 52,929 Stores and supplies Pilotage, harbor charges, ^tc. . . . Husbandrv 10,500 37,903 4,800 Total operating costs $203,039 $245,410 $258,870 Total annual cost 332,506 399 625 1,024 5.01 404,390 482 744 1,226 4.32 431,751 (325 and 330 days) Operating costs per operating day (325 and 330 days) Total cost per operating day Cost per cargo ton 524 784 1,308 4.11 In the work of the Great Lakes Department of the Division of Operations of the Shipping Board, the daily costs of opera- tion of ships of the type built for ocean traffic has been roughly estimated to be about $800. This figure includes such items as crew wages, crew subsistence, port charges, fuel, water, re- pairs, deck* and engine supplies, overhead and maintenance, etc., but does not include depreciation, interest or loading and dis- charging costs. Some private operators 'consider this figure too high. A prominent firm in Boston reports that their figures show that the expense of wages, provisions and upkeep, includ- ing insurance on hull on steamers of 7,000 tons capacity, amounts to about $16,000 per month or $500 per day. As noted before, there appears to be no uniformity in costs, particularly under existing conditions, but it may be accepted that private com- 72 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE panics are able to operate their vessels more economically than the Government. The S. S. Mariners Harbor, 3.535 deadweight tons, made two voyages, one after the other, in June and July, 1918, running from New York to Porto Rico and back. Each voyage took a days for completion. First voyage, average daily expense exclusive of de- preciation and interest S855 . 34 Second voyage, as above 678 . 20 General average for the two voyages 766 .77 Depreciation and interest charges $287.67 per day. The above figures illustrate the diiTterence that may exist in operating the same vessel over the same route. The S. S. Mincola, 3,954 deadweight tons, made a trip in July and August, 1918, from Philadelphia to Cuba and back to New York, consuming 37 days on the trip. Her expenses averaged per day, exclusive of depreciation and interest, $1,080.36. ( Depreciation and interest %?)?>?).77 per day. ) The S. S. Sacramento, 7,462 deadweight tons, made a trip from San Francisco to the west coast of South America and np to Wilmington, North Carolina, in April and May, 1918, on which trip the average daily expenses came to $1,159.05. (De- preciation and interest $614.06 per day.) The S. S. Anaeortes, 7,478 deadweight tons, made a trip from Seattle to the west coast of St)Uth America and up to lialtimorc in September and October, 1918, averaging per day $1,317.75. (Depreciation and interest $587.75 per day.) Effect of Stay in Port, — Vessels are earning only when mov- ing, and all unnecessary time lost in port, from whatever cause, reduces the annual cargo capacity and increases the cost per cargo ton. For the three standard vessels particularly studied, the increased cost per cargo ton for each day's delay in port is a'> follows: &ents. 5,6.S() I). \V. T. vessel 12 7,.S0() D. W. T. vessoi 10 8,800 I ). \V. T. vessel 9 Similailv, there is a corresponding saving for each day by which the stay in jiort is shortened, in the case of the 8,800-t()n vessel having a cargo capacitv of 7,600 tons, each day in j'jort is worth about $760. 'i'ime in port is non-j)roductivc time. ;uid should be reduced to the mininuun. i*"or this vessel the time GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIT CHANNEL 7?) allowed at each terminus is 10^ days. If this time were reduced to 8 days at New York and 7 days at Liverpool, there would be a saving of 6 days per trip or $4,560. Instead of making seven round trips per year of 47 days each, the vessel could then make eight round trips per year of 41 days, increasing her potential annual cargo from 104,996 long tons to 121.600 long tons. Comparison of Operating Costs of Ocean Vessels on the Pro- posed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Route with North Atlantic Routes. — It may be admitted that vessels constructed solely for service on the lakes are not suitable for ocean navigation, at least without strengthening and other expensive alterations. Dur- ing the war. many lake vessels, of the package and bulk type, were requisitioned by the Governments of Canada and the United States, and were placed on ocean routes after necessary altera- tion, but this method was solely to meet an existing emergency, and the questions of adaptability and economy could not be given weight. The question of the inadaptability of present lake vessels for ocean service, however, is unimportant. The vessels which will carry the commerce of the Great Lakes to foreign markets are the vessels of average size now engaged in ocean service. The important port of Chicago alone is quite capable of furnishing commerce of the general character necessary to afford profitable cargoes. With a depth of 25 feet through the St. Lawrence River, the standard steel vessel of 8,800 tons and under could operate successfully on this route, taking on grain or other heavy cargo at upper lake ports, and completing the load with manufactured articles at Lake Erie ports. Other advantageous methods of operation wnll readily suggest them- selves to practical shipping men. The distance from Duluth to Liverpool is 3,936 nautical miles, as compared with 3,050 to 3,105 nautical miles from New York to Liverpool. Accepting the approximate figure used by the Shipping Board of 3,050 nautical miles, gives a difference of 886 miles, or 1,772 miles per round trip. The 8,800-ton steamer has a designed speed of lO^A knots, and her cruising speed has been assumed as about 9^ knots in the cost statements of the Shipping Board. Her total time per turnaround between New York and Liverpool is 47 days, of which 21 days are spent in port and 26 days on the sea. The additional distance of 1,772 miles would require about 7^^ days if the navigation were all in open waters. The improved route from Montreal to Lake 74 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Superior, however, will involve a maximum of 100 statute miles of improved river channel and 50 statute miles of canal naviga- tion, the former requiring 10 hours and the latter not exceeding 16 hours, including delays incident to lockage. If these stretches were open water the time required for their passage would be about 13.4 hours, showing a delay of 12.6 hours each way due to restricted channel, or 1 day on the round trip, making a total of 8y2 days more required for the lake trip, or say 56 days per turnaround, with time in port similar to the New York-i.iverpool route. On this basis four trips would require 224 days. The average length of the navigation season at St. Marys Falls Canal, the controlling point west of the St. Lawrence, is 220 days. But no time in port has to be taken into consideration on the initial voyage of the season, as the vessel would be practically loaded and ready to sail upon the opening of navigation ; hence, four round trips per season are easily possible, even with the exces- sive time in port stated for the New York-Liverpool route. If the initial trip be made from Liverpool or from the terminus of some other winter route, the vessel will be able to make four trips to lake ports and be out of the St. Lawrence before the close of the navigation season. This arrangement would have the advantage of completing the season's work with the vessel in open waters, where she could be placed on other routes during the winter to the total limit of 330 days' operation. The total time required for the four trips with Liverpool as the terminus in all cases, 224 days, would leave 106 days surplus, which would be more than sufficient for two round trips from Liverpool to a chosen Atlantic port. Thus, the vessel would have 6 round trips per year, as compared with 7 round trips on the New York- Liverpool route. The total mileage per year would be 43,688, as compared with 42,700 on the New York route, a difference of 988 miles, and certain of the costs affected by this increase such as fuel and supplies, must be increased accordingly. It is also deemed advisable to allow 25 per cent additional for insurance. The estimate gives the following results : GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 75 Statement Showing Transportation Costs Liverpool-Duluth Route (4 trips per year, round trip approximately 7,872 nautical miles). Liverpool-New York Route (2 trips per year, round trip approximately 6,100 nautical miles). 5,650 D.W.T. 7,500 D.W.T. Steel ship Steel ship 8,800 D.W.T. Steel ship Fixed charges Operating costs Total annual cost Total cost per operating day Cost properly chargeable to two New York trips Cost properly chargeable to four Duluth trips Cost per cargo ton. New York trips Cost per cargo ton, Duluth trips . . $143,010.00 205,661.00 348,671.00 1,073.00 95,000.00 253,671.00 5.01 6.69 ^175,287. 00 248,729.00 424,016.00 1,284.00 115,540.00 308,476.00 4.32 6.06 $190,437.00 262,353.00 452,790.00 1,372.00 123,358.00 329,432.00 4.11 5.42 In the above statement all costs of every kind, additional to those heretofore determined as pertaining to the New York- Liverpool route, have been charged against the Liverpool-Diiluth route. The statements of the Shipping Board do not cover general and administrative expense, such as maintenance of main office, traffic agencies, etc., and some distribution of such expense against the vessel seems proper, inasmuch as this expense must be borne out of the freight receipts. This item would affect both routes similarly, however, so its inclusion is not neces- sary to afford reasonable comparisons of the cost of transporta- tion by the two routes provided the ships are operated through- out the year in both cases. Moreover, it is a charge varying with the business policies of the transportation companies rather than with the characteristics of the route. In fixing rates, this item would need consideration, as well as the item of profits. To apply the figures given above, it is desirable to consider a typical trip. With a 25-foot channel through the Welland Canal and St. Lawrence River, and without enlargement of the present connecting channels of the upper lakes, the standard 8,800-ton vessel could take on 150,000 bushels of grain at Duluth, proceed as far as Lake Erie, and take on 3,000 tons of general cargo, after which she would draw about 24 feet. The grain would w-eigh about 4,500 tons, making a total cargo of 7,500 tons. If a rate on general cargo of $30 per ton be taken, the 76 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE gross revenue from such freight would be $90,000. At 40 cents per bushel, the revenue from the grain would amount to $60,000, or a total of $150,000. or $20.00^ per ton actually carried. The cargo ton cost has been found to be $5.42, based on full car- goes both ways. The gross revenue from one eastbound trip such as assumed above would be nearly four times the amount required to meet expenses, and if the westward trip were made in ballast, the receipts for the round trip would still be prac- tically double the costs. It is fair to assume one-third return cargoes, however, consisting largely of high-class freight. West- bound rates are very much lower at the present time than east- l)ound rates, as steamship companies plan to at least cover all costs on the eastbound trip, owing to the existing uncertainty of obtaining cargo abroad. Recent consignments indicate an average of about $18 per ton on such westbound freight, and on 2,500 tons this rate would afford a revenue of $45,000. mak- ing the gross receipts for the round trip $195,000. On the basis of a full cargo eastward, consisting of 4.500 tons of grain and 3,000 tons of general cargo, and one-tliird cargo westward, consisting of general cargo, 10,000 tons would be carried on the round trip, at a cost of $8.13 per ton. Assigning rates far below those now existing the ])roposition might appear as follows : 150,000 bushels of grain at 20 cents $30,000 3,000 tons general cargo at $25 75,000 2,000 tons general cargo at $ 15 37,500 $142,500 The results show cargo ton receipts of $14.25 per ton or $6.00 per ton in excess of actual vessel costs. With substantial allowance for administrative expenses, there would still be a large surplus apjilicable to profits. The figures show that cargo can be carried between lake ports and Liverpool, and other foreign ports, at rates which will be reasonable and will permit successful compctiti(Mi with Atlantic coast ports. Reducing all cargo to grain for purposes of com- parison, it is found that the actual cost per liushel. assuming full cargoes, on the New York-TJverpool route for the 8.800-ton vessel is 12.5 cents, and on the Duluth-Liverpool route 16.4 cents, a difference of 3.9 cents. If this grain could be taken fn^ni Duluth to New York and there placed ui:)on the ocean carrier for less than 3.9 cents per bushel, the New York route would lia\(' the advantage so far as grain is concerned. P.ut this GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL // can not be done. The cost of getting grain to the Atlantic sea- board ranges between 15 and 20 cents. If actual costs conie down on existing routes, they will likewise be reduced on the Lake route below the figures given. It is on general cargo that the greatest savings will result because of the higher rail rate and the higher costs of handling such cargo. With the recent increase in rail rates, the average ton-mile rate is now about 1.25 cent. This represents a charge of $11.40 per ton from Chicago to New York, and $5.52 per ton from Buffalo to New York. As a matter of fact, rates from Chicago to New York on freight of the character referred to are from $12.60 to $30.00 and more per ton. The first case involves one or more transfers at New York, costing at a low estimate $2.00 per ton in addition to charges absorbed in the rate, or a total of $13.40; while the latter involves two transfers, one at Buffalo at about $1.20 per ton, and one at New York at $2.00 per ton, plus the lake haul from Chicago to Buffalo, costing about $2.35 per ton, or a total of $11.07. The addi- tional cost of the Liverpool-Duluth all-water route over the Liverpool-New York route being $1.31 per cargo ton, it appears that the possible saving involved by the use of the latter route amounts to $9.76 per ton on general cargo, and from 6 to 12 cents per bushel on grain, or $2.00 to $4.00 per ton. These savings, or the smaller savings attainable from carrying less than full cargoes, are so substantial as to indicate that a deep water- way penetrating the Great Lakes will be not only desirable, but indispensable to the future prosperity of the Northwest. There is another factor that should not be overlooked. The vessel expenses on both routes have been based on a stay in port at each end of 10^^ days, or 21 days for the round trip. With cargoes consisting of 50 per cent of grain and with properly designed terminals and efficient machinery for handling other cargo, the time in port should easily be reduced to 6 days. This is entirely feasible at Lake ports where there are now in use the most efficient machinery for handling bulk cargo to be found in the world, and where modern terminals for general freight can be established which will not be rendered ineffective by such congestion as exists at our chief Atlantic port. The saving of 4^ days in port on this side and a similar saving at Liverpool would enable the vessel to increase her earning capacity and place the Lake route on an equal footing with the New York route^as regards the time consumed per trip. /8 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE The following gives an estimate for a 5,500 deadweight ton package freighter, on th(^ route from Chicago to Liverp(iol, and includes in the fixed charges the items of bond interest, sinking fund, interest on working capital and interest on cai)itc[l stock. The results show the rate that should l)e charged per ton to insure a modest j^rofit, instead of the cost per ton. The calculation shows that a ship owner can carry freight at the price per ton stated and earn out of that freight a moderate profit on his investment, after paying bond interest and setting aside ])roper amount for depreciation and a sinking fund for the growth of his business. Voyage Calculation — Package Freight 5,500 D. W. ton freighter — Chicago to Liverpool and return voyage 7,900 miles— 54 days turnaround — value of ship $825,000.00. Lay-up 30 days per j'ear. Fixed Charges (including proportion lay-up time). Insurance 6 per cent $7,960.00 Port Dues and Pilotage 4,500 . 00 Bond Interest Jo Value 6 per cent 4,000.00 Depreciation 5 per cent on Value 6,650.00 Sinking Fund 9 per cent on Value 12,100.00 Int. on Capital Stock yo Value, 7 per cent 4,165.00 Int. on Working Capital 300.00 Operation Expense: Maintenance at 85c per D. W. ton per mo 7,500.00 Loss and damage 600 . 00 Fuel oil at $10.00-775 tons 7,750.00 Water 150.00 Crew Wages and Subsistence: Deckcrew 9 $2,575.00 Engine 13 3,180.00 Stewards 9 1,380.00 Subsistence 31 at 90c per day per man 1,640.00 $39,675.00 16,000.00 8,775.00 Stores: Deck $675 . 00 Engine 770.00 Stewards 562 . 00 2,007.00 Cargo handling 5,750.00 $72,207.00 Rate per ton cargo carried — cargo return li^'ht $15 .60 Rate per ton cargo carried — cargo return ; 2 '"^f' 10.92 Rate per ton cargo carried — cargo return full load 8.46 Itinerary Deadweight List Chicago ' 8 days Cargo 4,600 En Route Liverpool 19 days Bunkers 775 Liverpool 8 days Water 100 En Route Chicago 1-9 days Stores 25 Total 54 da)S • GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 79 Insurance rates. — At the hearing held by the International Joint Commission at New York on October 19, 1920, testimony was presented showing that the insurance rates on cargo prevailing from spring until October are 27^ cents per $100, as compared with 25 cents from New York. On October 16, the rate on the St. Lawrence advances from 27^ to 31 cents, and on November 1 to 42 cents. There is therefore a difference of only 2^^ cents in the rate during the greater part of the navigation period. This difference is so small as to be negligible when compared with the savings in freight charges and terminal costs which will be afforded by the improved waterway. The insurance rate on shipments by way of the St. Lawrence River has been reduced from time to time as better channel facilities and aids to navi- gation were provided. The opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels would considerably augment the importance of the St. Lawrence River and lead to still further measures for the safety and benefit of navigation which would unquestionably be re- flected in the insurance and freight rates. Transportation Costs — Lake Vessels. — The cost of operating a bulk lake freighter of 10,000 tons cargo capacity is stated to be about $425 a day, while the cost of operating the large-sized lake package freighter, having a capacity of about 5,000 tons, is about $600 per day, both figures being exclusive of interest, de- preciation, and insurance. An estimate of the present cost of the package freighter made by a prominent ship-building company on the lakes is $150 per ton, or a total of $750,000. The large bulk freighter will cost about $110 per deadweight ton, or $1,100,- 000. The following gives a comparison of the cost of operatin\( the S. S. Anacortes with a daily operating cost of $1,317.75, as compared with a lake vessel requiring transshipment of cargo. The comparison contemplates a through voyage by the Anacortes between Cleveland and any selected foreign port : Cost of operating Anacortes, Cleveland to Montreal (5 days).. . . $6,588.75 Cost of operating lake freighter, Cleveland to Montreal 2,125 00 Cost of discharging cargo into shed at Montreal at 60c per ton . . 4,200.00 Charges for rent of wharf shed at $15,000 a year, assuming that cargo can be loaded in 5 days 208 . 3,S Cost of reloading cargo into ocean steamer at 85c per ton 5,950.00 Total $12,483 . 2,3, Excess cost of transshipment plan $5,894 . 58 Modifying the above to provide for 3 days between Cleveland and Montreal, which is nearer the correct time, the savin? would 80 grp:at lakes-st. lawrence ship channel be $7,680.08. These figures confirm the statement already made in these pages that on account of the high cost of handHng pack- age freight, transfers must be avoided whenever possible, and any route involving such transfers should be rejected. The cost of operating the A)iacortcs appears large as compared with the lake vessel, and the average ocean freight vessel of similar ton- nage could be expected to do better. It is clear that lake vessels aflford some economies over ocean vessels, but the length of their haul is such a small proportion of the whole trip that these economies are more than oft'set by even one transfer. This statement applies particularly to package freight. It is possible that full cargoes of grain might be economically transferred from lake vessels to ocean vessels at some suitable point on the lower St. Lawrence, but a lower rate on grain will be possible when shipped in conjunction with high class manufactured goods than when shipped in full cargoes, and this fact should render transshipment inadvisable in the avprage case. The transfer of package freight is out of the question. Shippers will use the route and method which eliminate this hazard, irrespecti\-e of the savings in freight costs. The study shozcs that the additional cost of operating ocean vessels to Lake ports as compared ivith Atlantic ports is oidy a fraction of what may be saved through the elimination of rail hauls and transfer charges. Chapter VIII THE AREAS COMMERCIALLY TRIBUTARY TO THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY The area tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway will differ with the origin of the imports and the destination of the exports. The area which will benefit directly from the pro- posed route for commerce with the United Kingdom and western Europe, including the Baltic Sea, has a population of about 41,000,000, while the area tributary for commerce with Mediter- ranean ports has a population of about 36,000,000. An area having a population of about 30,000,000 will benefit by water communication with South America, while 20,000,000 people will benefit from the opportunities for direct ocean trade with the West Indies and Central America. A territory having a popu- lation of 21,000,000 will likewise derive advantage from the opportunities of coastwise vessel service to and from the ocean ports of the United States. A study of rates and distances shows clearly the important savings and advantages to be afforded by the opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels. On some com- modities the saving will amount to as much as $10 per ton as compared with the cost by way of existing routes. The Tributary Area for Commerce with the United Kingdom and Western Europe Estimated on the basis of Distance. — In considering the extent and character of the commerce that would naturally seek an outlet by way of the deepened St. Lawrence, it is necessary first to determine the geographical limits of territory which may be regarded as commercially tributary to the waterway. These limits are approximately fixed by the relative costs of trans- portation by all available routes. It may be readily understood that this area will difl:"er for overseas commerce as compared with purelv domestic commerce. In the case of commerce going abroad, the use of the ocean carrier is essential and the sooner the traffic can be placed upon that carrier the better. For foreign commerce therefore the railroad is at a disadvantage with a deep water route comnuniicating with the ocean. In cases where the deep w^aterway will actually avoid a transfer, its utilization is clearly economical. The excessive terminal costs at some of the Atlantic ports and the unfavorable railroad grades through the Alleghanies will have the effect of extending the commercially tributary area of the St. Lawrence route consider- ably more than half the distance across the intervening territory. 81 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE In this phase of the study, however, terminal costs have been disregarded, and an efifort made to ascertain the tributary area on the basis of the transportation movement alone. Distances in statute miles from Lake ports to Liverpool. All water via Barge Rail and water via Canal New York All water via St. Lawrence 1 Lakes Canal and n„„.,„ Hudson River 0"^" Total Rail Ocean Total Duluth.... 4,546 988 496 3.578 5,062 1,391 3,578 4.969 Chicago . . . 4,453 895 496 3,578 4,969 912 3,578 4.490 Detroit 3,819 261 496 3,578 4.335 693 3,578 4,271 Toledo 3,812 254 496 3,578 4.328 705 3,578 4,283 Cleveland.. 3,735 176 496 3,578 4.250 584 3.578 4,162 Buffalo 3.597 496 3,578 4,074 442 3,578 4,020 The above shows that the St. Lawrence route is 477 miles shorter than the route via the Barge Canal, and 423 to 471 miles shorter than via rail routes to New York, except in the case of Chicago, where the difference is but Z7 miles. CVith a practicable navigation for ocean-going vessels extending into the Great Lakes, the proposition arising for determination is whether the use of this direct and .shorter route will afford economies as compared w'ith existing longer routes requiring one or more transfers of cargo. It can not be seriously con- tended that the St. Lawrence route will not be more economical than any route involving a rail haul from Lake ports to the At- lantic Ocean. Lake Erie ports are practically upon an equal footing with Atlantic ports so far as distance is concerned, and with the opening of deep water navigation on the St. Lawrence the haul from these ports across the country to Atlantic ports would be an unjustifiable expense, increasing the time and intro- ducing uncertainties of delivery, and would involve the use of cars which could better be employed elsewhere. As explained in another part of this report, the Barge Canal is not adapted for the economical transportation of the commerce interested in the improvement of the St. Lawrence River and is at an even greater disadvantage than the rail routes so far as distance is concerned. Dn the basis of distance and irrespective of the cheaper trans- portation afforded by vessels as compared with railroads, all ports located on the shores of the Great Lakes should find it advantageous to utilize the proposed waterway. When consid- eration is given to the lower cost of water transportation as com- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 83 pared with rail, the advantages of this route will be found to extend to practically all destinations to which it affords direct access, the most important of which will be considered later in this report. Distances in statute miles from Ohio River points to Liverpool, via Atlantic Coast ports, and via Lake Erie ports* Distal ice, statute miles ' Rail Water Total Pittsburgh to Liverpool, Via — New York 444 353 334 135 124 147 757 666 593 668 263 211 871 780 703 731 377 325 3,578 3,743 3,907 3,735 3,679 3,640 3,578 3,743 3,907 3,768 3,735 3,812 3,578 3,743 3,907 3,768 3,735 3,812 4,022 Philadelphia Baltimore Cleveland Ashtabula Erie 4,096 4,241 3,870 3,803 3,787 Cincinnati to Liverpool, Via — New York 4,335 Philadelphia Baltimore Norfolk Cleveland 4,409 4,500 4,436 3,998 Toledo Louisville to Liverpool, Via — New York 4,023 4,449 Philadelphia 4,523 Baltimore Norfolk 4,610 4,499 Cleveland 4,112 Toledo 4,137 * Rail distances are taken from the Official Table of Distances, issued by the War Department, covering the shortest usually traveled routes; ocean distances from the Table of Distances between Ports, issued by the Navy Department, using in all cases the shortest route; Lake distances from the United States Lake Survey Bulletin. These figures show a decided advantage in distance in favor of the Lake route to and from Ohio River points, irrespective of the important advantages of avoiding the congestion at and around Atlantic ports, avoiding the passage over the AUeghanies, and reducing the rail haul by several hundred miles. For com- merce to and from the United Kingdom and western Europe, the tributary area extends as far as Connellsville, Pa., 56 miles south- east of Pittsburgh, and includes the entire Pittsburgh manufac- turing district. From Connellsville the line proceeds approxi- mately to Charleston, W. Va., which is 329 miles from Cleveland 84 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE and 428 miles from Baltimore, the nearest Atlantic coast port, including a large area of the West Virginia coal fields. From Charleston, W. Va., the line extends approximately to Nashville, Tenn., as will be seen from the following: Distance, statute miles Rail Water Total Nashville to Liverpool, Via — New York 998 Philadelphia 907 Baltimore 810 Norfolk 801 Charleston, S. C 598 Savannah 583 Mobile 485 New Orleans 626 Cleveland 563 Chicago 444 3,578 3,743 3,907 3,768 4,076 4,161 5,233 5,312 3,735 4,453 4,576 4,650 4,717 4,569 4,674 4,744 5,718 5,938 4,298 4,897 These figures show that the shortest route from Nashville, Tenn., to Liverpool is by way of Cleveland or Toledo, and the shortest rail haul is by way of Chicago. The water haul from Chicago to Liverpool is 859 miles less than from New Orleans and 1,043 miles less than from Galveston ; while the tcaier haul to Liverpool from Cleveland is 1,577 miles less thati from Nezv Or- leans, and L761 miles less than from Galveston. These impor- tant advantages indicate that the area tributary to the Great Lakes route will extend considerably more than half the distance between the Lakes and the Gulf, so far as traffic to the United Kingdom and western Europe is concerned. For meats, grain and other commodities subject to deterioration in warm climates, the Lake route is particularly desirable. From Nashville the line would proceed below the southern boundary of Missouri and include all of that State and also all of Kansas, Colorado. Iowa, and all States north. Traffic origi- nating directly on the Mississippi River below St. Louis nu'ght be considered as tributary to New Orleans, but with the opening of the Illinois waterway, which has been definitely adopted. Mis- sissippi River traffic originating above the mouth of the ( )hio River will be equally tributary to Chicago. Careful studv is necessarv in fixinfj the western and south- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 85 western limits of the area tributary to the Great Lakes. On ac- count of the long water haul from the Pacific Coast to Liverpool, it is obvious that the western limit of this area extends beyond the point of equal rail distance between Lake and Pacific ports, and the advantages of Galveston over Pacific coast points are not to be ignored. The following are the distances from Denver: Distance, statute miles Denver to Liverpool, V^ia San Francisco Los Angeles Galveston Chicago Cleveland 10,400 10,018 6,619 5,471 5,114 * Via Panama Canal. The above figures show clearly the great advantages of the Lake route for commerce to and from Denver and other points in Colorado, including the important iron and lead districts. From the southwestern corner of Colorado the line proceeds approximately to Salt Lake City, as will be seen from the following : Distance, statute miles Rail Water Total Salt Lake City to Liverpool, Via — San Francisco Chicago Cleveland 823 1,530 1,887 9,024* 4,453 3,735 9,847 5,983 5,622 * Via Panama Canal. While the route by way of the Great Lakes is approximately 4.000 miles shorter than by way of the Pacific Coast, it involves a much longer rail haul, the cost of which must be given con- sideration in deciding whether the Lake route is really the more economical. 86 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE The average rail rate in the United States is now in the neigh- borhood of 1.25 cent per ton mile. On first class freight, rates for distances of 500 to 2,000 miles range between 3 and 4y2 cents per ton mile. As will be later shown, the average freight vessel engaged in onr foreign trade has a net tonnage of 2,414, a deadweight tonnage of 5,000 to 6,000 tons, and a loaded draft of about 21 feet. The cost of transportation by a vessel of this size may be placed at 1.3 mills per ton mile, based upon the ex- perience of the Shipping Board, and assuming full loads. In practice, however, vessels rarely carry full loads in both directions, and a more reasonable figure for the conditions actually prevail- ing at the present time would be 2 mills per ton mile, or one-sixth the cost of rail carriage, although the ratio in some instances may be as great as 1 to 10. On the basis of 1 to 6, the above figures may be reduced to an all-water basis, as follows: Distance reduced to all water cost basis Salt Lake City to Liverpool: Via— statute miles. San Francisco 13,962 Chicago 13,733 Cleveland 15,157 The figures for Chicago and Cleveland include 100 miles added to cover the distance lost through 10 hours' delay in passing through the restricted sections of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway. It seems clear that Salt Lake City marks one limit of the area tributary to the Great Lakes, and in all jirobability no great movement from this remote section can be expected by rail for export unless the transcontinental railroads find it profit- able to make low rates to Chicago. It is believed that these railroads will welcome the opening of the deep waterway in view of the opportunity it will aflford to establish a combined rail and water route to Canadian, North Atlantic and European ports, in competition with the existing routes by way of the Panama Canal. From Salt Lake City the line extends approximately to Boi.se, Idaho. The distances to Liverpool from this point are as follows: Distance statute mil-^s Rail Water Total Boise to Liverpool, Via — PortK'ind. . . 506 1,662 9.772 4.540 10.278 Dululh 6,208 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 87 Reducing the above distances to tlieir all-water ef|uivalents,' the following results are shown : Boise to Liveroool, V'ia- Portland Duluth Distance reduced to all water cost basis statute miles 12,808 14,638 The distance via Duluth includes 120 miles, representing 12 hours" time lost in passing through the St. Marys, St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, and other restricted sections of the waterway. These figures indicate that there would not be any pronounced movement from Boise to the Great Lakes for export to the United Kingdom and western Europe. This locality falls within competitive territory, however, and should derive advantage from the competition certain to 'exist between the transcontinental roads and the coastwise vessels. The route to the Lakes has the advantage of a better grade. From Helena, Mont., the dis- tances are more favorable to the Great Lakes route : Distance, statute miles Rail Water Total Helena to Liverpool, Via — Portland 761 1,136 9,772 4,546 10,533 Duluth - 5,682 The following are the distances reduced to an all-water cost basis : Statute miles Portland 14,338 Duluth . 12.618 Based on distances and the relative average costs of rail and ocean transportation, the area tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence deep waterway may be estimated to extend to the westerly boundary of Montana, and all points east of 112 degrees west longitude and north of Salt Lake City are clearly within the territory which will receive direct benefits from the improvement in connection with traffic to and from the United Kingdom and western Europe. The lines can not be definitely fixed, because there will be a wide area of competitive territory. 88 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE aiul much will depend upon the rates which the interested rail- roads are disposed to make and which may receive the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Moreover, the com- parative, cost of rail and ocean transportation varies within rather wide limits, and the adoption of a different ratio from that herein assumed would change the results. It should be pointed out that the outlet for the products of Montana is now eastward, and that the imports likewise come form the east with the exception of fresh fruits, canned fruits, vegetables, and a few other items, of which the total volume is very small. Aloreover, the wheat and flour which constitute the most important items of export are injuriously affected by passage through warm climates, and the Lake route is much to be pre- ferred to the Panama Canal route for these and similar products. Much of the Montana w^heat is now shipped through Baltimore, Md. Wheat from southern Idaho likewise goes to the Atlantic Coast, but the wheat of northern Idaho goes to the Pacific because of the cheaper rate. The existing movement of traffic- therefore sustains the placing of the westerly limit of the area tributary to ihe Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway at a line drawn from F)oise, Idaho, to the northwesterly corner of the State of Montana. The territory embraced in the above discussion is indicated on the accompanying map. Estimated on the basis of rates. — An estimate of the tributary area on the basis of distance is believed to be of more permanent ajjplicability than an estimate based on rates, since rates are fre- (juently changed to meet altered transportation conditions. Rail- road rates are more stable than ocean rates, which are changed according to the demand for carriers. No reliance can there- fore be placed upon the maintenance of a given rate by vessel, and the ex])ense of the ocean haul may properly be assumed on the basis of the cost of oj^erating a vessel of suitable type and capacity o\er the particular route under consideration. In general terms it may be said that the cost of operating a given vessel over one route as compared with another is ])r(i- portional to the time required for the two joiu'neys, although some variation in cost due to insurance, port charges, etc.. may be involved. The passage through restricted channels aftects the cost to the extent that it increases the time of transit. In passing from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Duluth, it is estimated that the restricted sections of the waterway will cause a vessel to consume 12.6 hours luore time than she would consume for the same distance in open water. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 89 With an allowance of 25 per cent additional for insurance, and other factors increased in proportion to the time consumed in making the trip, it has been estimated that the cost per cargo ton from Liverpool to Duluth as compared with the cost from Liver- pool to New York, would be as follows for standard steel vessels of suitable size and type : 5,650 D.W.T. steel ship cost per cargo ton 7,500 D.W.T. steel ship cost per cargo ton 8,800 D.W.T. steel ship cost per cargo ton Liverpool to New York .... Liverpool to Duluth $5.01 6.69 $4.32 6.06 $4.11 5.42 These figures assume full cargoes both ways. If the return trip were in ballast, the cost per ton would be doubled. With one-third return cargoes, the cost on the Duluth route would be $10.03, $9.09, and $8.13, respectively, and on the New York trip $7.51, $6.48, and $6.16, respectively, for the vessels con- sidered, making a theoretical difference in favor of the New York route of $2.52, $2.61, and $1.97, respectively, per cargo ton. New York would also have an advantage over Lake Erie ports of $1.50 to $2.00 per ton, so far as the actual cost of the water haul is concerned. This advantage, however, is entirely elimi- nated by the cost of the transfer and incidental charges at New York or other Atlantic ports. The promptness with which ship- ments can be dispatched will have a controlling influence upon the routing of traffic from competitive territory. The following shows 1920 rates from Atlantic and Gulf ports lo the United Kingdom, in cents per hundred pounds : Nev Commodity Boston y , Phila- delphia Balti- more Norfolk Savan- nah Mobile New Orleans Galves- ton Agricultural implements. Clothing. . . . Grain Meat Shoes Steel 100 100 100 100 100 107H 11. S~ 115 100 100 100 100 100 107^ ll.S 115 40 40 40 40 40 47J^ 60 60 100 100 100 100 100 107M 115 115 100 100 100 100 100 107 ig 115 115 49 49 49 49 49 56V^ 64 64 115 115 60 115 115 64 It will be observed that vessels make the same rate to the United Kingdom from all North Atlantic ports, although the distance from Baltimore to Liverpool is 535 statute miles farther 90 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE than from Boston. Baltimore is 172 miles farther from Liver- pool than Cleveland, which is more than sufficient to offset the 10 hours' time lost in restricted channels below Lake Erie. In practice, it would not be at all surprising to find vessels making the same rates to Lake Erie ports as to North Atlantic ports. Attention is invited to the rate of $1.15 per hundred pounds on agricultural implements, clothing, meat and shoes from New Orleans and Galveston to United Kingdom, as compared with $1.00 from North Atlantic ports, an increase of only 15 cents a hundred for an additional voyage of 1,800 to 2,000 miles. If cargo can be carried from Galveston to Liverpool, a distance of 5.496 statute miles, for $1.15 per hundred pounds, there is every reason to believe that it can be carried from Duluth or Chicago to Liverpool for the same rate, since the saving of approximately 1.000 miles in distance will more than offset the slight physical disadvantages of the Lake route. The time actually required for the trip, not counting time in port, would be several days greater from Gulf ports than from Lake ports, and the cost would therefore be heavier. This rate amounts to an increase of $3.00 a ton over the New York rate, which is in keeping with the difference in the estimated cost per cargo ton. It is there- fore considered entirely reasonable to expect that rates to the United Kingdom and Europe would be approximately the same from Duluth and Chicago as from Gulf ports. To the ocean rates must be added the cost of the rail haul where involved. The new rates, effective August 26, 1920, are as follows: Rail rates from Chicago to specificed North Atlantic Ports, effective Aug. 26, 1920 {in cents per 100 lbs.) New York Philadelphia Baltimore Agricultural implements CL 63 61 60 Clothing CL 1571/^ 155».i I54I2 Grain CL, domestic 41i/^ 39^ 38»/i Grain CL, export 33 32 31 J^ Meat, fresh, CL 96^ 94^ 93^ Steel (from Gary, I nd.) 63 61 60 The total rates in cents per 100 pounds from Chicago to Liver- pool, by rail and ocean, were recently as follows: New York Philadelphia Baltimore Agricultural implements 163 161 160 Clothing 257>i 255J.^ 254',2 Grain 73 72 711^ Meat 196 V-i 194»^ 193 \l Steel (from Gary) 112 110 109 I GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 91 These rates show costs per ton from Chicago to Liverpool via New York of $32.60 on agricultural implements, $51.50 on cloth- ing, $14.60 on grain, and $39.30 on meats. Vessel operators can afford to make a very low rate on grain from Duluth or Chicago, and get their profits from the general package freight above men- tioned, which originates on the Lakes in very great volume. With a total cost for operating and maintaining the vessel $8 to $10 per cargo ton. contemplating full loads eastward and one-third loads westward, there is a very wide margin for profit on all traffic to and from ports of the Great Lakes. The rate on grain from u]jper Lake ports to New York, by lake and rail is approxi- mately 18/ 2 cents per biishel, or 31.8 cents per hundred pounds, including elevator charges at Buffalo. The lake rate to Buffalo is about 4 cents per bushel, and if the St. Lawrence were open to lake and ocean vessels the rate for carrying grain as far as Montreal would be about 7 cents per bushel, based on present costs. It would therefore be entirely feasible to get the gram as far as Montreal, a distance of 3,207 statute miles from Liver- pool, at a saving of 8 to 12 cents per bushel, as compared with the cost of getting it to New York, 3,578 statute miles from Liver- pool. Since the cost of transferring grain to ocean carrier at Montreal would not exceed 1 cent per bushel, there is clearly an opportunity for a net saving of 6 to 10 cents per bushel, utilizing the lake ^ essel as far as Montreal. As shown elsewhere in this report, however, the greatest economies will result from shipping direct in ocean vessels carrying well balanced cargoes consisting of proper proportions of grain and high-class freight. It is this combination of bulk and package freight that permits the lowest rates on the bulk cargo. Comparing the present rail and ocean rates from Chicago to the Lniited Kingdom with the ocean rates from Gulf ports, which are assumed to be equivalent to the probable Lake rate, it will be seen that a very great saving will be effected by the proposed waterway. On agricultural implements a saving of 45 cents a hundred is indicated, on meat 75 cents a hundred, and on clothing probably $1.00 a hundred. Grain is carried from Gulf ports for 60 cents a hundred, while the rate through New York from Chicago is T^ cents a hundred, indicating a possible saving of 13 cents a hundred, with a rate from Chicago and Duluth similar to that from Gulf ports. Steel from Gary to the LTnited Kingdom via New York takes a rate of $1.12 a hundred. It can be shipped from Gulf ports for 64 cents a hundred, and 92 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE a similar rate would probably be feasible by vessel direct from Gary : Taking up the Ohio River points, we find the following : Rail rates on coal to specified ports on Lake Erie and the Atlantic Coast, effective Aug. 26, 1920 From To Rate per ton New River District Toledo $2 . 86 New River District Newport News 2.80 Kanawha and Big Sandy District Toledo 2 . 66 Kanawha and Big Sandy District Newport News 2 .90 Pittsburgh A shtabula 1 . 86 Pittsburgh Cleveland 1 . 86 It is believed that Lake Erie ports would be able to attract export coal, particularly in view of the great congestion in this traffic moving to the Atlantic coast. During the summer of 1920, the movement of coal through Norfolk and Baltimore was com- pletely blocked. At Norfolk prices as high as $18 to $20 a ton were offered for coal for export. If the St. Lawrence had been open to ocean vessels, Lake Erie ports would have relieved the situation. Rail rates on manufactured iron and steel from Pittsburgh, Pa., to specified ports, effective Aug. 26, 1920 Cetits per 100 Ihs. A shtabula 23 Cleveland 24 New York 38 Philadelphia 36 Baltimore 35 Adding the ocean rate to United Kingdom points, the total rate from Pittsburgh is 87 cents per 100 pounds, or $17.40 per short ton. lliere is no doubt that Lake Erie ports can expect to obtain a share of this traffic. The rate from Cleveland or Ashtabula to the United Kingdom should be in the neighborhood of 50 of 55 cents a hundred pounds, making a total charge from Pittsburgh of 75 to 80 cents. Since it has been determined that rates may be made from Lake Michigan and Lake Superior to the United Kingdom and western Euroi)e. which will conijjare favorably with the rates to those points from the Gulf ports, the study of the area between the Lakes and the Gulf resolves itself largely into a study of rail rates to the two outlets. The rates to Atlantic ports are included for comparison. 1 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 93 Rail rales from St. Louis, Mo., effective Aug. 26, 1920. {In cents per 100 lbs.) To New To New To *To York Orleans Galveston Chicago Agricultural implements CL for export. 733^ 52 52 28^ Clothing CL for export 148 136^ 1363^ 88 Meat CL for export 1033/2 5534 553^ 2834 Shoes CL for export 15734 1363^ 1363^ 88 Grain CL for export 4334 2334 373^ 16 * Domestic rates. These rates show a pronounced advantage in shipping via Chicago, amounting to 23^ cents on agricuUural implements, 483/2 cents on clothin,g, 27 cents on fresh meat, 48^ cents on shoes, and 7^^ cents on grain as compared with New Orleans, and 21 j^ cents as compared with Galveston. The rates to Chicago are of course domestic rates, and some reduction could be expected to place these on an export basis. With the opening of the St. Lawrence this route is clearly indicated as the most economical for shipment from St. Louis. Shipments through Atlantic Coast ports in comparison would be unduly expensive. The claim made by proponents of the new route that its influence would extend as far as Oklahoma has foundation. The rates on grain from Boise, Idaho, in cents per 100 lbs., are as follows : Boise to Portland 48 Boise to Seattle S7}4 Boise to Chicago 74J--2 From Helena, the following rates, in cents per 100 lbs., are quoted : To Portland To DululJi Grain 423^ 503^ The above rates on grain show a difiference in favor of Port- land of 26y2 cents from Boise, and SjA cents from Helena. At the assumed lake rate of 60 cents per 100 lbs., from Duluth or Chicago, corresponding to the rate from Gulf ports, the total rate to Liverpool would be as follows : Rates on grain to Liverpool from Boise and Helena. (In cents per 100 lbs.) Boise to Liverpool, via Chicago 1343^ Helena to Liverpool, via Duluth 11034 There is quite a large movement of grain from Portland, Seattle and San Francisco to the United Kingdom and to North 94 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Atlantic ports by way of the Panama Canal. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, 120 vessels loaded with grain and flour passed through the Canal, of which twenty-nine were destined for points in the United Kingdom and Europe, and ninety-one for Atlantic ports of the United States. The rate on grain from Portland, Seattle and San Francisco to New York. Boston and Philadelphia by vessel is $1,563/2 per 100 lbs. This rate was furnished by the Shipping Board under date of September 20, 1920. Shipping Board charter rates on grain were $20 a ton for full cargoes from San Francisco, Portland, Puget Sound to the United Kingdom or continent, Bordeaux to Hamburg.* The rates vary, however, according to the demand for carriers. The following statistics published by the Department of Agriculture show that in 1913 the area tributary to Atlantic ports for grain shipments extended as far westward as Blackfoot, Idaho. Approximate transportation costs from Blackfoot, Idaho, to Liverpool, England (1913), per bushel of zvheat I'm Pacific Cents Via Atlantic Cents By rail to Seattle or By rail to New York 39 . 2 Tacoma 24 Ocean freight to Liverpool. 21 New York to Liverpool. . . 5.6 Total 45 Total 44 . 8 In order that Pacific ports can com])ete on this business, the vessel rate is adjusted so that the total rate to Liverpool is approximately the same as via Atlantic ports. x*\s noted above, however, the grain movement is largely eastward from Montana and southern Idaho. In further support of the statement that the influence of the St. Lawrence route will extend as far as the western boundary of Montana, attention is invited to the letter of the Traffic Manager of the Anaconda Copper Companv, dated December 4. 1920: ./ANACONDA COPPER MIXING COMPANY Traffic Department, 42 Broadway Nkw York, December 4. 1920. International Joint Commission, Washington, D. C, and Ottawa, Canada. To the Honorable Members of the Commission: Snpplemcnting the statement made by me in Helena, Montana, at a previous hearing before your Body, I beg to advise that we are now moving *Lower rates have since been c|uoted. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 95 copper and zinc to New York, via Seattle, Washington and tlie Panama Canal, a distance of sonre 7,800 miles, at a very material saving in freight rates. The rates are as follows : Per ton Butte to New York, all rail, 2,500 miles $22 .00 Lake and rail 20 . 93 1 ^ Rail rate, Butte to Puget Sound, 800 miles 7 .87}^ The rate, Seattle to New York, is somewhat of an uncertain factor, depending entirely upon the available bottoms. A rate of 40c per cwt. has prevailed in the past, with reductions recently. I should sa}' the rate would vary from $5 to $8 A route from Duluth, such as the proposed ocean way via the Welland Canal and St. Lawrence River, would afford us a much more attractive rate than across the Rocky Mountains, the Cascades and through the Panama Canal. The distance from Butte to Lake Superior is but little! greater by rail than to Puget Sound, with the mountain ranges eliminated,! and the water distance from Lake Superior points to New York is lessl than 40 per cent of the distance via Panama Canal to reach New York\ and other North Atlantic Coast points, while for overseas trading the \ saving in distance and cost would be pronounced. From the above it will be seen that the present saving via the Seattle ' and Panama route amounts to some $6.00 or more per ton. This would be increased via Lake Superior points and the St. Lawrence. When this , saving is applied to our monthly production of 13,000 tons of copper and 4,500 tons of zinc in normal times, it will give some conception of what such a sea-way to the heart of the American continent would mean in transportation economies to our industry alone, and when applied to all of the varied production of that vast section its benefit to the Nation / becomes almost incalculable. Verv truly vours, (Sgd.) E. H. L.-vxG f 96 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 97 The Tributary Area for Commerce With Mediterranean Ports The comparative distances to Mediterranean ports will be seen from the following- statement of distances to Gibraltar : Pittsburgh to Gibraltar, Via — New York Philadelphia Baltimore Cleveland Ash abula Erie Cincinnati to Gibraltar, Via — New York Philadelphia Baltimore Norfolk Cleveland Toledo Louisville to Gibraltar, Via — New York Philadelphia Baltimore Norfolk Cleveland Toledo Distance, statute miles Rail Water Total 444 3,693 4,137 353 3,858 4,211 334 4,019 4,353 135 4,199 4,334 124 4,142 4,266 147 4,104 4,251 757 3,693 4,450 666 3,858 4,524 593 4,019 4,612 668 3,880 4,548 263 4,199 4,462 211 4,276 4,487 871 3,693 4,564 780 3,858 4,638 703 4,019 4,722 731 3,880 4,611 377 4,199 4,576 325 4,276 4,609 The above shows that New York is the shortest route from Ohio River points to the Mediterranean, but that it involves the greatest rail distance, which is the thing to be avoided. The distance from Cincinnati to Gibraltar by way of New York is 12 miles less than by way of Cleveland, but the rail haul is 494 miles greater, involving an average additional cost of over $6.00 per ton for the haul alone. To partially offset this dif- ference, the lake route involves 500 miles of additional naviga- tion, and a loss of 10 hours due to passage through the Welland Canal and upper St. Lawrence River. The loss of time is equivalent to 100 miles of navigation, making the equivalent of 600 miles additional distance. At 2 mills per cargo ton mile, the actual cost of transporting a ton over this additional distance by ocean carrier would be $1.20, indicating a possible saving averaging $4.80 a ton by using the Lake route. 98 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Comparing existing rail rates frum Pittsbtirgh to New York on steel of 38 cents a hundred pounds or $7.60 a ton, with the existing rate to Cleveland of 24 cents a hundred pounds or $4.80 a ton, shows a saving of $2.80 a ton on the rail haul. At 2 mills per ton mile the additional water haul and time of vessel involves a cost of $1.20, making a difference uf SI. 60 per ton in favor of shipping steel via Lake Erie. On high class package freight the saving would be greater. Proceeding westward, the difference in favor of the Lake route continues, and it will therefore be unnecessary to work out the costs for each point. The following table of distances may, however, be of interest : Distances to Gibraltar by Water. Statute miles Clevsland 4,199 Chicago 4,917 Duluth 5,010 New Orleans ■ 5,289 Galveston 5,473 San Francisco 8,775 Portland, Oreg 9,523 The figures show that the area tributary to the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence waterway for Mediterranean trade will not extend quite so far in every direction from the Great Lakes as the area for the Baltic, United Kingdom and western Europe trade. The distance to Gibraltar from lake ports is 464 miles farther than to Liverpool, while the distance from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore to Gibraltar is only 115 miles farther than to Liverpool. New Orleans and Galveston are 23 miles nearer Gibraltar than to Liverpool, while San Francisco and Portland are 249 miles nearer Gibraltar than to Liverpool. These differences mean little on voyages of the length considered, but theoretically they limit the tributary area for Mediterranean i)orts as compared with United Kingdom ports by a distance ranging from 50 miles throughout the eastern part of the country to 120 miles in the western portion of the country. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 99 > ,— 1 < s c n o < VO ^ PO a ^ u o ^ H <• « iJ ^ t3 < CL. kJ o H m 1 t/) to H M cs < eu H-1 ^ ^H < < « K < f- H h— t" ;s n M (t1 i; H g <; S g < o u 100 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE The Area Tributary for Traffic with the West Indies, Central and South America, and the Orient The probable commerce between the Northwest and the West Indies, Central and South America, includes the importation of raw sugar from Cuba, bananas and other tropical fruits from Jamaica and Central America, chiefly Honduras, asphalt from Trinidad, coffee and rubber from Brazil, nitrate of soda from Chili, sisal, ixtle and possibly oil from Mexico, hard woods from Panama and Central America, flaxseed and hides from x\rgen- tine, and many other items. The exports to these places will consist in general of iron and. steel, agricultural implements and machinery, automobiles and vehicles, clothing and other manufactured goods, flour, corn and oats to Mexico and Cuba and in lesser quantities to other countries, cement, chemicals, etc. Some of the more important of these commodity move- ments will be analyzed later in this report, and the present consideration will be confined to a study of the cost of trans- porting commerce between these countries and the Great Lakes, as compared with existing routes via Gulf and Atlantic ports. The distances in statute miles are as follows : Via New York Via Galveston Via St. Law- rence direct Rail Water Total Rail Water Total Total Havana to Cleveland .... 584 1,366 1,950 1,412 886 2,298 3,375 Havana to Chicago 912 1,366 2,278 1,148 886 2,034 4,093 Havana to Duluth 1,391 1,366 2,757 1,485 886 2.371 4,186 Tampico to Chicago 912 2,338 3,250 1,148 545 1,693 5,047 Tampico to Duluth 1,391 2,338 3,729 1,485 545 2.030 5,140 Panama to Chicago 912 2,n?, 3,235 1,148 1.769 2.917 4,934 Rio de Janeiro to Toledo. 705 5,493 6,198 1,301 6,173 7,474 6,773 Rio de Janeiro to Chicago. 912 5,493 6,405 1,148 6,173 7,321 7,414 Rio de Janeiro to Duluth. 1.391 5,493 6,884 1,485 6,173 7,658 7,507 Buenos Aires to Duluth . . 1,391 6,761 8,151 1,485 7,490 8,975 8,775 Buenos Aires to Chicago. . 912 6,761 7,673 1,148 7,490 8,638 8.682 Buenos Aires to Cleveland 584 6,761 7,345 1,412 7,490 8,902 7,964 Pernambuco to Cleveland 584 4,258 4,842 1,412 4,987 6.399 5,461 GREAT LAKES-ST.' LAWRENCE SHiTP CHANNEL 101 Via New Orleans - Rail Water Total Rio de Janeiro to Toledo 1,046 912 1,098 912 5,965 7.011 Buenos Aires to Chicago Pernambuco to Cleveland 7,233 4,731 1,650 8,145 5,829 Panama to Chicago 2,562 These figures show that the distance from points on the east coast of South America to Duluth and Lake Erie ports by way of the St. Lawrence is less than by way of Gulf ports. The distance from similar points to New York is less than to Lake ports, but the difference is by no means sufficient to overcome the cost of transfer at New York and the cost of the rail haul. For instance, taking Pernambuco as a basing point, rubber can be shipped di- rect to Cleveland by way of the St. Lawrence, a total distance of 5,461 statute miles, for much less cost than it can be shipped 4.258 miles by water to New York, and there stand the cost of a transfer and a rail haul of 584 miles to Cleveland. Similarly, cofifee could be shipped from Rio de Janeiro direct to Toledo, a distance of 6,773 miles, at a substantial saving as compared with the cost of shipping this commodity 5,493 miles to New York, with a transfer and further haul of 705 miles by rail to destination. The transfer and rail haul will together cost as much as the entire trip between Rio de Janeiro and Toledo by water. 102 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE w tj < OS u H s < < 05 CO W (-1 ul P W o HC/i o H W (- 05 u H S ■a" s III o 05 U < 05 U) o SB IK H GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 103 There is no question that raw sugar can be shipped from Havana to Duluth direct by water at less cost than it can be shipped via either Atlantic or Gulf ports. The long- rail haul to Duluth is an item of such heavy expense as to make direct water shipments to this place advantageous from practically all parts of the world. The most unfavorable points for such shipments to Duluth are apparently Mexican ports, but even here the long rail haul more than overcomes the advantages of distance possessed by the Gulf ports. Frdm Tampico to Duluth is 5,140 miles by way of the St. Lawrence, while the distance via Galves- ton is only 2,030 miles. But the latter route involves a rail haul of 1,485 miles with an average rail charge for this distance of about $15 a ton. This item and the cost of transfer are suf- ficient to pay the entire cost of the shipment by water. The rail haul alone is equivalent in cost to a water haul of 5,000 to 9,000 miles. The same conditions apply to manufactured goods and other freight shipped from the Great Lakes. The following are the rail rates effective August 26, 1920, be- tween New Orleans and specified Lake ports : Rates from New Orleans in cents per 100 lbs. Chicago Toledo Duluth Bananas, CL 883^ .... .... Burlap, CL 42 Sisal, CL 51K Coffee : 60 72 77^ Sugar 60 60 74^ These figures show costs per ton on colTee, of $12 to Chicago, $14.40 to Toledo, and $15.50 to Duluth, for the rail haul from New Orleans alone, and to this must be added the cost of the water haul from Brazil to New Orleans. The total distance by water from Rio de Janeiro to Toledo is 6,773 miles, and from Rio de Janeiro to New Orleans 5,965 miles, a difference of 808 miles in favor of New Orleans. But the route to Toledo via New Orleans involves a rail haul of 1,046 miles and a transfer. The proportion is so plainly in favor of the lake route as to require no further discussion. The saving may be expected to amount to fully $10 a ton. From Havana to Duluth the existing route by way of New York involves a water haul of 1,366 miles and a rail haul of 1,391 miles, while the distance via the St. Lawrence is 4,186 miles. The diflFerence in the water haul, 2,820 miles, is to be compared with a rail haul of 1,391 and the added cost of a 104 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 105 transfer. On sugar to Duluth there is clearly an opportunity for a saving of $5 a ton, as compared with either the New York, New Orleans or Galveston routes. The tributary area for commerce between the Lakes and the West Indies and Central America, however, will not extend very far in a southerly direction from the Lakes, except as aflfected by the normal processes of accumulation and distribution. We could scarcely expect iron from Colorado to reach Mexico by way of the Great Lakes, nor could we expect shoes or other manufactured goods from St. Louis to seek those markets by way of the Lake route. If the goods are of such nature that they are ready for movement to final destination, they would naturally go by rail to the Gulf rather than by rail to the Lakes, as a transfer would be involved in either case and the difference in rail distances in favor of Lake ports would be offset by the greater water distance by this route. The area tributary to the waterway for trade with the West Indies and Central America will therefore be confined rather closely to the Lakes themselves, with an extension of the area westward penetrating the States situated at the greatest distances from the Gulf of Mexico. The westerly limit of this area will be fixed by the competition of the Pacific routes. The distances from Pacific ports to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Havana, and some of the other points considered, however, are considerably greater than from Lake ports by way of the St. Lawrence, as will be seen from the following: Statute miles San Francisco to Rio de Janeiro 8,794 Seattle to Rio de Janeiro 9,720 San Francisco to Havana 4,941 San Francisco to Pernambuco 7,560 San Francisco to Buenos Aires 10,062 San Francisco to Tampico 5,496 Seattle to Tampico 6,422 It may be conceded that Pacific Coast ports have alvantages on nearly all trafific which requires a transfer from rail to vessel, bound to and from Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The advantages are reversed for trade with the west coast of South America, however. Yokohama. Sydney. . . . Honolulu . . Callao Guayaquil. Valparaiso . Montreal San Francisco Seattle Stat, miles Stat, miles Stat, miles 12,534 5,223 4,900 12,525 7,766 9,083 2,408 2,774 5,238 4,591 5,517 4,601 4,047 4,973 6,701 5,919 6,845 106 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Duluth is 1,339 miles by water from Montreal and 1,808 miles by rail from Seattle, while Chicago is 1,246 miles by water from Montreal and 2,279 miles by rail from San Francisco. The through distances from Lake ports to points on the west coast of South America are as follows : Via Pacific ports Rail Water Total Via St. Lawrence All water Chicago to Callao. . . . Chicago to Guayaquil Chicago to Valparaiso Duluth to Callao .... Duluth to Guayaquil. Duluth to Valparaiso. 2,279 2,279 2,279 1,808 1,808 1,808 4,591 4,047 5,919 5,517 4,973 6,845 6,870 6,326 8,198 7,325 6,781 8,653 6,484 5,847 7,947 6,577 5,940 8,040 The distances from points east of Duluth and Chicago are more favorable to the Lake route. It will be seen that direct sailings between Lake ports and South America should be more economical than shipments through Pacific ports, with the long rail haul and transfer involved. The same is true to a less extent of shipments through Gulf ports. It is believed that the route through Pacific ports to the Orient will be found to be the more economical for practically all of the territory west of the Great Lakes. In the past, the rate on steel from Pittsburgh to Yokohama, for instance, has been the same whether shipped through New York or San Francisco, but the vessel operating from San Francisco or other Pacific port was compelled to adjust its rate in connection with the transcon- tinental rate, so as not to exceed the combined rail and water rate via New York. This traffic has been conducted on rather a slender margin, and it is claimed that the recent increase of rail rates makes it impracticable for the vessels operating from Pacific ports to the Orient to make a profit. Since 45 per cent of the cars going west are empty, it is economically imjiortant that this traffic be preserved, and it may be expected that more favor- able rates will be made on the commodities ordinarily moving through these ports. Under these circumstances, the area tribu- tary to the St. Lawrence waterway for commerce with Hawaii. Japan, China, Australia and the Philippines will probably not extend far from the shores of the Great Lakes. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 107 The Area Tributary for Coastwise Traffic The utilization of the St. Lawrence waterway for coastwise traffic between lake and ocean ports involves the substitution of a water haul for a rail haul, the former being of greater length than the latter. In this case the problem involves only the comparative cost of the two methods, the time of transit, including delays at ports, being a factor of cost. In case of a movement from or to a point not directly reached by the water carrier, the cost of the land haul and transfer must be added to the cost of the water haul. So far as the territory between Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the Atlantic Coast is concerned, it is obvious that the tributary area will not extend very far from the shore line for goods which ordinarily move directly to destination. It should be noted, however, that many com- modities do not move directly from point of origin to point of destination, but are first dispatched to points of accumulation or primary markets. Every important rail and water point is to a greater or less extent a point of accumulation. The agricultural products of Illinois, Indiana and Ohio go first to Chicago, Toledo, Cleveland, and other points. For all products moving to points of accumulation, this additional haul is involved regardless of the method by which the larger transportation movement is made. Products from central Illinois may move to Chicago as their primary market, and may then proceed in carload lots to New York, from which point they may be carried in smaller lots to points some distance inland for consumption. To fix with reasonable accuracy the limits of the area tributary for such traffic would involve careful study of the extent and character of the business of every port involved, which is beyond the scope of this report. The discussion will therefore be restricted to movements from points of accumulation or direct shipment only. Rail distances in statute miles From To Boston To New York To New Orleans Duluth 1,513 1,391 1,391 Chicago 1,034 912 912 Detroit 750 693 1,106 Toledo 795 705 1,046 Cleveland . , 682 584 1,098 San Francisco 3,313 3,191 2,482 Seattle 3.258 3,136 2,935 108 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Water distances in statute miles From To Boston To New York To New Orleans Duluth 2,775 3,019 4,869 Chicago 2,682 2,926 4,776 Detroit 2,048 2,292 4,142 Toledo 2,041 2,285 4,135 Cleveland 1,964 2,208 4,058 San Francisco 6,270 6,059 5,297 Seattle 7,196 6,954 6,223 The above shows that the rail distance between San Francisco and New York is 3,191 miles and the water distance by way of the Panama Canal is 6,059 miles, the former being 53 per cent of the latter. The tolls on vessels passing through the canal have averaged about 50 cents per ton of cargo, but the railroads have been unable to compete with the water route. Rates by rail have been as much as 200 to 300 per cent of the water rates, and the rail traffic has been largely confined to high-class goods on which the saving of interest on capital invested justifies the use of the quicker but more expensive route. The distance from Seattle to New York by rail is 3,136 miles, while the distance by water is 6,954 miles, the rail distance being 45 per cent of water distance. Large quantities of grain and flour are carried from Seattle. Tacoma and Portland to New York, and also to the United Kingdom, Scandinavian and Mediterranean ports. During the fiscal year ending June 30. 1920. a total of 120 vessels carried grain eastward through the Panama Canal. In the past, goods have been carried from the Pacific Coast to New York by vessel and sent long distances inland for less cost than the same goods could be sent direct by rail from the Pacific Coast. Document No. 22 of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors of the House of Representatives, U. S. (63d Congress. 3d Session), explains the disadvantages under which the Trans-Mississippi territory was placed because of the cheaper transportation afforded competing points included in the territory tributary to the water route between the Pacific and the Atlantic, and calls attention to the need of water communication with the interior of the country to ofifset these disadvantages. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway will extend the benefits of cheap transportation to the territory which has been placed at a serious disadvantage, as a result of the influence of the Panama Canal. From Chicago to New York is a distance of 912 miles by rail and 2,926 miles by water, the former being 31. per cent of the latter. There can be no reasonable doubt that high- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 109 class freight can be carried between these points by water at less cost than by rail. The present rail rate on fresh meat from Chicago to New York is 93y^ cents per hundred pounds, or $18.70 a ton. It is carried from New York to Liverpool, a distance of 3.578 statute miles, for $1.00 per hundred pounds, or $20.00 per ton, and the vessels make handsome profits at this rate. It could be carried by the St. Lawrence to New- York for 75 cents a hundred pounds and afford the vessel a large profit on the business. This would be at the rate of over 5 mills per ton mile, or more than double the actual cost to the vessel, counting a return load of one-third. From Duluth to Boston is a distance of 1,513 miles by rail and 2,775 miles by water, the former being 54 per cent of the latter. From Cleveland to Boston the distances are 682 miles by rail and 1,964 miles by water. The rail haul is about 35 per cent of that by water. Wool, hides, salt, copper, iron, steel, etc., could be carried to Boston and vicinity by water at a large saving as compared with the rail rates. The relation of the rail to the water haul between Duluth and Boston is more favorable for the use of the waterway than is the relation of rail to water haul on the Panama Canal route between the Pacific and the Atlantic. One factor that must not be overlooked is that the large packers, steel companies and other corporations can and no doubt will operate their own vessels, at an actual cost to them of about 2 mills per ton mile. This is equivalent to a cost of $5.84 a ton between Chicago and New York, $5.36 between Chicago and Boston, $6.03 between Duluth and New York, $5.55 between Duluth and Boston, $4.41 between Cleveland and New York, and $3.92 between Cleveland and Boston. Existing rail rates are from 3 to 5 times these figures, so that there is ample margin for savings or profits. The movement of lumber from the Pacific Coast to the Lakes is new business which will be entirely feasible, as will be the movement of sulphur from Sabine. Tex., and phosphate from Florida. These commodities can not afford the costs of rail haul for the distances involved, and there is accordingly no great movement of them to the lakes at the present time. They can come by water in full cargoes, however, at a cost which will make a large movement possible. Sulphur is now shipped from Sabine in the vessels of the producing company to all parts of the world, and, as will be shown in another chapter analyzing 1 10 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE the extent and character of the traffic movements, a large tonnage of sulphur will be shipped from Sabine by vessel into the Lakes. These bulk commodities are either shipped in vessels belonging to the shipper or in vessels chartered for the purpose, at a cost much lower than rates by regular carriers. Hence, a comparison of rates is not appHcable to this class of business, which includes large shipments from the Lakes as well as into them. As previously stated in this report, the cost of transportation on a vessel of the size adapted for use on the proposed St. Lawrence waterway is about one-sixth the average rate of rail transportation, assuming average load conditions. This is a comparison of average cost with an average rate, the latter in- cluding profits, if any. At the assumed average rail rate of 1.25 cent per ton mile, however, the profits would be very small. Comparing actual water rates with actual rail rates, we find the following: Rate per ton Rate per ton Chicago to New York, 912 statute miles, mile, cents Agricultural implements $12 . 60 1.38 Steel 12.60 1.38 Clothing 31.50 3.45 Meat 19.30 2.11 Grain 6.60 0.72 New York to Liverpool, 3,578 statute miles. Agricultural implements $20.00 0.56 Steel 9.80 0.27 Clothing 20.00 0.56 Meat 20.00 0.56 Grain 8.00 0.22 New Orleans to Liverpool, 5,312 statute miles. Agricultural implements $23.00 0.45 Steel 12.80 0.24 Clothing 23.00 0.45 Meat 23.00 0.45 Grain 12.00 0.22 Seattle to Liverpool, 9,950 statute miles. Charter rates $20.00 0.20 Seattle to New York, 6,954 statute miles. Copper 8.00 0.11 The above shows the relationship of rail and water rates, with the railroads barely existing, and the ocean carriers making large profits. Moreover, some of the ocean rates are based on making the costs of the round trip on the outward voyage. On the basis of existing rates alone, the water route may expect to compete successfully with rail routes for distances 3 to 12 times as great as the latter.* As heretofore stated, actual costs ♦Since the above was prepared, ocean rates have been greatly reduced, and the comparison is more favorable to water transportation. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 11 112 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL are considered more important than rates, as indicating the limits within which competition may extend. From a study of the distances by rail and water, it may be concluded that all points on the Great Lakes may ship by vessel to North Atlantic ports at less cost than by rail, and that points on Lake Superior and Lake Michigan will particularly benefit by the water route. The hauls from points west of these lakes to the Atlantic coast are so long as to justify a transfer to ocean vessel at Duluth, Milwaukee or Chicago, both in the interests of economy and for the betterment of transportation conditions. New England is the farthest by rail from the Great Lakes district, but is the nearest by water, and will benefit greatly by her advantage in coastwise shipping. General Conclusions The areas indicated on the accompanying maps as tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway include the principal points of accumulation and distribution, but they do not mark the limits to which the influence of the waterway would extend either for exports or imports. To determine with accuracy these limits, every commodity movement would have to be studied individually, and the tributary area of every port would similarly have to be treated by itself. The boundaries are given in straight lines for convenience in estimating population and production ; the actual boundaries would be irregular and would depend upon the railroad communications at every point. With respect to imports particularly, the areas indicated on the maps can not be considered as limiting the distribution of the products. For instance, Toledo is located within the area deemed economical for the importation of green coffee from Brazil, but roasted coffee distributed from Toledo will by no means be limited to the territory shown on the map. The same principle will apply to practically all imports. Chicago may receive large consignments of freight from South and Central America, which freight may be economically distributed either in original or refined condition to points outside of the limits shown. The distribution of the refined product is limited only by the enterprise of the manu- facturer in creating a demand for his product. Chapter IX PRODUCTION OF THE TRIBUTARY AREA The statistics of production of the sixteen States particularly interested in the opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels show that in these States is produced the larger proportion of our surplus raw materials. This area now produces 75 per cent of the wheat, 65 per cent of the corn, 100 per cent of the flax, 85 per cent of the iron, 39 per cent of the copper, 74 per cent of the zinc, and 46 per cent of the lead produced in the entire country. Within this area are also located the centers of some of our most important manufacturing industries. The increase in manufac- turing at the principal cities of the Great Lakes has been greater than at the principal manufacturing centers of the Atlantic coast, and the conditions with respect to economical procurement of materials are such that with adequate transportation facilities there will be a more pronounced development in the future. Production estimated on basis of population. — The entire pro- duction of the United States is estimated to have a value of over $70,000,000,000 annually. The population of the country on January 1, 1920, is announced by the Census Bureau at 105,683,108, showing- a per capita production valued at over $650. The population of the States embraced within the area considered tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway for com- merce with the United Kingdom and western Europe amounts to 36,027,144, as follows: Population, 1920 Illinois 6,485,098 Michigan 3,667,222 Wisconsin 2,631,839 Minnesota 2,386,371 Ohio 5,759,368 Indiana 2,930,544 Iowa 2,403,630 North Dakota 645,730 South Dakota 635,839 Montana 547,593 Idaho 431,826 Wyoming 194,402 Colorado 939,376 Nebraska 1,295,502 Missouri 3,403,547 Kansas 1,769,257 36,027,144 In addition to the alx)ve, there are twenty-two counties in Pennsylvania and thirty-two counties in New York which may be considered properly tributary to this route. The population 113 114 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE of these counties in 1917 was placed at 5,583,850, making a total of over 41,000,000 people who will be benefited by the proposed improvement, exclusive of a portion of the population of the States of West Virginia, Kentucky and Utah. On the basis of population, the production of this area has an annual value of over $26,000,000,000. Statistics of production by States.' — There is outlined below the industrial development, which is well indicated by the statistics of manufactures, mineral output, and agricultural products. The year 1914 has been selected, as that is the latest one for which statistics of manufactures are available. The figures for agriculture do not include all farm products, but they show the staple and important crops raised in this region. Statistics for all farm products are not available for any year later than 1909, and it has, therefore, been deemed best to use the 1914 figures for important crops rather than complete figures for a year when values were so much less. There is some slight duplication between the statistics of mineral ])roduction and the statistics of manufactures. There is also much duplication in the statistics showing the value of manufactured products, as the finished product of one industry is the raw material for another. Thus the product of blast furnaces and rolling mills is used as raw material by many industries. The material used by one industry may have been reworked several times in its passage from the blast furnace to the plant where it is finally worked into a commodity for sale to the ultimate consumer. The industries which manufacture foodstuffs are almost the only ones that use ])rimary raw materials. Other industries have for their raw materials the finished products of other establishments. In the automobile industry, for example, the value of products was $632,831,474. included in which is the cost of raw materials amounting to $356,207,930. These raw materials include iron and steel, leather, glass, wire rods, lumber, canvas, and practically everything else that goes into an automobile. If it is borne in mind that the production statistics do not indicate goods ready for the use of the ultimate consumer, the figures will not be misleading. 'Production l)y States, largely from a study by L. S. Schmeckebier, Ph.D., some time Chief of the Division of Research, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, now National Research Council. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 115 Illinois In manufactures Illinois, with a total product valued at $2,247,322,819, ranked third among the States, being outranked by New York and Pennsylvania. It is the leading State in the slaughtering and meat packing, agricultural implement, and zinc smelting and refining industries. The products of the slaughtering and meat packing industry were valued at $489,230,324, or 21.8 per cent of all products of the State and 29.2 per cent of that of this industry in all States. The agricul- tural implement industry ranked fifth among those of the States, with products valued at $65,337,663, or 2.9 per cent of the value of all manufactures produced in the State and 39.8 per cent of the value of all goods of this class produced throughout the country. The zinc smelting and refining industry produced goods valued at $18,421,039 or 0.8 per cent of the total value of the manu- factures of the State and 34.4 per cent of the output of this industry in all States. Illinois was third in value of steelworks, rolling-mill, and blast-furnace products, the production being valued at $90,856,649, or 7.4 per cent of the total production of the United States. Industries to the number of 121 reported products valued at more than one million dollars each. Impor- tant industries in addition to those mentioned above include foundry and machine-shop products, $141,328,624; printing and publishing, $112,833,427; men's clothing, $89,144,448; railroad cars, $61,315,638; flour-mill and grist-mill products, $49,493,224; and electrical apparatus, machinery, and supplies, $45,667,456. The total mineral output of the State was valued at $117,- 116,370, the leading products being coal, $64,693,529, and petroleum, $25,426,179. Corn is the staple crop of Illinois, which competes with Iowa for first place in quantity produced. The value of the corn crop in 1914 was $183,021,000, or more than three times that of any other crop. The next leading crops and their value were oats, $55,436,000; wheat, $46,712,000; and hay, $27,533,000. Value of products, Illinois, 1914 Manufactures $2,247,322,819 Mineral products 117,168,370 Principal crops 31Q,656.000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 154,456,000 Total = $2,828,603,189 116 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Michigan The manufacture of automobiles was the main industry of Michigan, the products being valued at $398,289,022, or 36.7 per cent of that of all manufactures of the State and 62.9 per cent of the value of the products of the automobile industry in all States. Statistics for 75 industries are given in the Census re- ports, the total output being valued at $1,086,162,432. Foundry and machine-shop products held second place with a value of $64,576,497, followed by lumber and timber products, $58,523,- 217; furniture and refrigerators, $33,857,041; flour and grist-mill products, $27,381,474; and leather, $25,503,573. Twenty indus- tries produced goods valued at more than $10,000,000 each. Under the heading "All other industries"' are included 14 which had a product in excess of $1,000,000 each, but which are not shown in the • statistics in order not to disclose individual operations. The mineral production of the State was valued at $57,743,555, the principal mineral products being copper and iron ore. Alich- igan was third among the States in the production of copper ore, with an output valued at $21,857,759, or 14.3 per cent of the total for the United States, and second in the production of iron ore, with an output valued at $18,722,358, or 26 per cent of the total for the country'. The principal crops of Michigan for which farm values are available and their value in 1914 were corn, $42,210,999; hay. $36,132,000; and oats, $22,838,000. This State was second in the production of beet sugar, the factory value of the sugar pro- duced being $11,023,058; figures for the farm value of this crop are not available. Value of products, Michigan, 1914 Manufactures $1,086,162,432 Mineral products 57,743,555 Principal crops 139,899,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 95,654,000 Total $1,379,458,987 Wisconsin The manufactures of Wisconsin, valued at $695,172,002. are made mostly from the products of the farm and the forest. The butter, cheese, and condensed-milk industry heads the list, with a value of $72,858,592. or 10.5 per cent of the total of all indus- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 117 tries of the State and 20 per cent of the total for this industry for all States. Foundry and machine-shop products come second, with a value of $60,698,391. The next seven industries all use as their main material farm or forest products. They are. in order of importance, lumber and timber products, $55,362,511; leather, $42,204,202 ; malt liquors, $40,884,284 ; slaughtering and meat packing, $34,697,955; paper and wood pulp, $31,205,395; flour-mill and grist-mill products, $28,697,413; furniture and refrigerators, $22,586,531. Altogether separate statistics are given for 69 industries, each of which reported products valued at more than $250,000. The lumber industry showed a consid- erable decrease from 1909 to 1914, and is likely to show further decline owing to the depletion of the forests. The malt liquor industry will be eliminated in the future as far as intoxicants are concerned, but it is likely that considerable non-intoxicating malt beverages will continue to be manufactured and that the remaining plants will be converted into other industrial uses. The mineral output of the State is not important, the products being valued at only $11,140,365. Zinc was the most important mineral produced, the yield being valued at $3,173,526. The importance of the dairying industry in Wisconsin is shown by the high value of the milch cows on farms, estimated at $96.- 747,000 on January 1, 1915, or 8.2 per cent of the value for the entire United States. The principal crops and their values in 1914 were corn, $45,410,000; hay, $41,497,000; and oats, $26,703,000. Value of products, Wisconsin, 1914 Manufactures $695,172,002 Mineral products 11,140,365 Principal crops 152,321,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 161,395,000 Total $1,020,028,367 Minnesota The manufactures of Minnesota had a value of $493,354,136, and were mainly dependent upon the farm and the forest for their raw materials. Flour and grist-mill products to the value of $148,243,708 constituted 30 per cent of the total manufac- tures of the State. Minnesota is the leading State in this in- dustry; its output was 16.9 per cent of the total for the United States and was almost twice as great as that of the next highest 118 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE State. Other important industries and the value of their prod- ucts were slaughtering and meat packing, $47,710,059; lumber and timber products, $44,674,948 ; butter and cheese, $33,746,396 ; foundry and machine-shop products, $21,405,023. Its proximity to the producing centers for flaxseed within its own borders and in North Dakota and Montana place it in the lead in the manu- facture of linseed oil, the output of which had a value of $12,356,906, or 27.5 per cent of the total for the United States. The mineral production of the State was valued at $45,680,- 865, the greater part of which was iron ore valued at $40,628,771. The value of the shipments from Minnesota was 56.6 per cent of the value of the ore shipped from all mines in the United States. The great iron ore resources of the State are not reflected in its manufactures, as the ore is shipped to Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana mills for smelting. Corn, wheat and oats were the principal crops with value of $47,320,000 .for corn, $43,834,000 for wheat, and $34,048,000 for oats. Value of products, Minnesota, 1914 Manufactures $493,354, 136 Mineral products 45,680,865 Principal crops 180,432,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 117,333,000 Total $836,800,001 Ohio Ohio is essentially a manufacturing State, ranking fourth with products valued at $1,782,808,279, or 7.4 per cent of the total of the United States. Almost every industry is represented within its borders, the census returns giving statistics of 101 industries, each of which reported products valued at more than $1,000,000. It was first among the States in manufactures of rubber goods other than belting, hose, boots, and shoes, with a total output valued at $109,658,605, or 49 per cent of the total value of this classification in the United States and 6.2 per cent of the value of AX products of the State. It ranked second among the States in products of steel work, rolling mills, and blast furnaces, the output being valued at $277,716,759, or 22 per cent of the total for the United States and 15.6 per cent of the value of all products of the State. It ranked fourth among the States in value of mineral output, the products being valued at $101,661,384, or 4.8 per cent of the total for the United States. The princip.nl mineral products GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 119 were clay products valued at $37,166,768, coal valued at $21,- 250,642, natural gas valued at $14,667,790, and petroleum valued at $13,372,729. The principal crop of Ohio was corn, with a value of $87,- 056,000, or twice that of the next most valuable agricultural product. Other important crops and their values were hay, $42,585,000 ; wheat, $38,365,000 ; and oats, $22,646,000. Wool is also an important product in this State, which ranked third, with a production of 6,645,120 pounds of scoured wool. Value of products, Ohio, 1914 Manufactures $1,782,808,279 Mineral products 101,661,384 Principal crops 207,337,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 138,799,000 Total $2,230,605,663 Indiana Indiana ranked eighth among the States in manufactures, the value of the output being $730,795,021. Sixty-three industries each produced goods vakied at more than $1,000,000 each, 29 of these having an output valued at more than $5,000,000. As in Ohio, the largest production was that of steel works and rolling mills, valued at $58,882,522, or 8.1 per cent of the total production of the State and 6.4 per cent of the production of the United States for this industry. Statistics for blast furnaces are not shown separately as the figures would reveal the operations of individual plants. It is evident that the iron and steel industry is of greater importance than is indicated by the sta- tistics. Other important industries and the value of the products are slaughtering and meat packing, $51,065,774; foundry and machine shop products, $48,879,894 ; flour and grist-mill products, $37,488,223, and automobiles, $29,389,088. The mineral products were valued at $42,864,267. Coal valued at $18,290,928 was the leading mineral product, the value of coal being more than twice as great as that of any other mineral. Corn, wheat, and hay were the principal agricultural products in 1914, the values of the crops being as follows : Corn, $94,- 724,000 ; wheat, $44,536,000 ; and hay, $24,872,000. Value of products, Indiana, 1914 Manufactures $730,795,021 Mineral products 42,864,267 Principal crops 189,553,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 108,860,000 Total $1,072,072,288 120 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Iowa Iowa is primarily an agricultural Slate, although the value of its manufactures amounted to $310,749,974. The leading industry was slaughtering and meat packing, with products valued at $74,289,387, or 23.9 per cent of the total for the State. Other important products and their values were butter, cheese, and condensed milk, $27,605,968; foundry and machine-shop products, $16,606,080; printing and publishing, $15,934,486; and flour-mill and grist-mill products, $14,336,576. The Census reports give separate statistics for 44 industries each of whose products were valued at more than $500,000; eight of these produced goods to the value of more than $5,000,000 each. The mineral production amounted in value to $25,287,115, the principal products and their value being coal, $13,364,070. and clay products, $6,401,745. Corn is the great crop of Iowa, which competes with Illinois for first place in quantity produced. The value in 1914 was $214,183,000, or more than three times that of any other crop. Oats and hay followed corn with values of $67,650,000 for oats and $41,117,000 for hay. Value of products, Iowa, 1914 Manufactures $310,749,974 Mineral products 13,364,070 Principal crops 351,450,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 282,015,000 Total $957,579,044 North Dakota North Dakota is essentially an agricultural State, the value of its manufactures being only 25 per cent of the value of the wheat crop in 1914. The manufactures were valued at $21,- 147,431. As is to be expected, Hour-mill and grist-mill products to the value of $12,029,905 contributed 56.9 per cent of the total value of all products for the State. No other industry had an output valued at more than $2,500,000. The factory products were destined mainly for local consumption. The mineral ])roduction was not important, the total value being only $l,0r)3.540. Coal to the value of $771,379 formed the largest item in the mineral i)roduction. Wheat is the staple crop in North Uakota, which competes with Kansas for first place in the amount produced. In 1914 it GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 121 held second place with a value of $82,408,000 or more than three times that of any other cereal. The other leading agricultural products and their values were oats, $24,014,000, and barley, $12,724,000. Value of products, North Dakota, 1914 Manufactures $ 21,147,431 Mineral products 1,063,540 Principal crops 144,383,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 48,089,000 Total $214,682,971 South Dakota South Dakota, Hke its northern neighbor, is predominantly agricultural. Its total output of manufactured products was \alued at only $24,138,566, while its corn crop had a value of $39,000,000. The principal industry was the manufacture of flour, the value of flour-mill and grist-mill products being $5,556,996, or 23 per cent of the total for all industries in the State. Butter making is the second industry, with a value of $2,920,342, or 12.1 per cent of the total for all products. It is Hkely that few of the factory products find markets at any great distance from the place of production. The gold deposits of the Black Hills yield the only mineral output of importance. The value of the gold production was $7,333,508 out of a total mineral output of $7,861,601. In 1914 corn was the most valuable crop with value of $39,- 000,000. Next in order of value came wheat, $29,672,000 ; oats, $16,783,000; and barley, $9,775,000. Value of products. South Dakota, 1914 Manufactures $24,138,566 Mineral products 7,861,601 Principal crops 106,488,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 81,157,000 Total $219,645,167 Montana With the exception of copper and lead products, beet sugar, and cement, the manufactured products of Montana are consumed mostly within the State. Unfortunately separate figures can not be given fcrr the four industries mentioned, as they would dis- close the operation of individual establishments. The total value of the products of Montana amounted to $84,446,136, but the 122 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE class "Other industries" is credited with $54,199,438, or 64.2 per cent of the total, because some important industries are car- ried on by less than three establishments and it is necessary to combine the reports in order not to disclose individual operations. Of the industries reported separately the leading one is the man- ufacture of lumber and timber products, which had a value of $6,720,881, or 8 per cent of the total of all manufactures of the State. The mineral production was valued at $54,244,889. The lead- ing items were copper, $31,019,542; silver, $6,645,102; and zinc, $5,690,608. The State ranked second in output of copper and zinc and third in output of silver. The field crops of Montana were less important than those of any State in the region, with the exception of Wyoming, wheat being the leading crop with a value of $16,704,000. The only other crops having a value of more than $5,000,000 were hay, valued at $15,225,000, and oats, valued at $7,234,000. Wool, however, is an important product, this State holding first place in 1914, with a production of 11,165,490 pounds of scoured wool. Value of products, Montana, 1914 Manufactures $84,446,136 Mineral products 54,244,899 Principal crops 47,893,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 69,558,000 Total $256,142,035 Wyoming Manufactures were of little importance in Wyoming, the total value of products in 1914 being only $11,223,415. Cattle and sheep raising furnished the i)rincipal sources of wealth, but the cattle raising industry is not reflected in the statistics of manu- factures, as the slaughtering and packing were carried on in the centers of this industry in the States farther east. The mineral products were valued at $12,417,752, the principal item being coal valued at $10,033,747. In value of field crop Wyoming is the least important State in the region. Only four crops had a value of over one million dollars in 1914; namely, hay, $8,625,000; oats, $3,780,000; wheat, $2,038,000; and potatoes, $1,134,000. Sheep raising, however, is ail important industry, Wyoming ranking seconcf in 1914 in amount of wool produced, with an output of 9,397,080 pounds of scoured wool. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 123 Value of products, Wyoming, 1914 Manufactures $11,223,415 Mineral products 12,417,752 Principal crops 16,352,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 58,552,000 Total $98,545,167 Colorado Beet-sugar factories formed the most important group of industries in Colorado, the value of their output reaching $17,- 635,556, or 12.9 per cent of the value of all manufactures, which amounted to $136,839,321. Other leading industries and the value of their products were slaughtering and meat packing, $12,726,127; the flour-mill and grist-mill products. $7,535,633; and printing and publishing, $7,027,420. The value of the mineral output amounted to $52,161,660, the leading products and their value being gold, $19,883,105; coal, $13,60l,718; zinc, $4,935,523; and silver, $4,864,224. Hay to the value of $17,227,000 and wheat to the value of $9,842,000 were the principal crops for which values are avail- able. Colorado was the leading State in the amount of beet sugar produced, but figures on the farm value of the crop are not available. The factory value of the sugar produced at the beet sugar factories amounted to $J 7,635,556. Value of products, Colorado, 1914 Manufactures v$136,839,321 Mineral products 52,161,660 Principal crops 46,111,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 67,857,000 Total $302,968,981 Nebraska The value of manufactures of Nebraska amounted to $221,- 615,848 in 1914, but agricukure furnishes the economic founda- tion of the State, 54 per cent of the total manufactures being furnished by the meat-packing and flour-milling industries. Slaughtering and meat packing was the leading industry with products valued at $104,503,333, or 47.2 per cent of the total of all manufactures of the State. Other important products and their values were flour-mill and grist-mill products, $15,022,126; butter. $11,082,123; printing and publishing, $7,835,653; and 124 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE foundry and machine-shop products. $5,110,961. The census returns give separate statistics for 32 industries, each of which reported products valued at more than $1,000,000 for each one. The mineral output of Nebraska is not important, amounting to only $1,166,787. Corn, wheat, and oats were the leading crops of this State with values of $92,194,000 for corn; $64,710,000 for wheat; and $27,840,000 for oats. Value of products, Nebraska, 1914 Alanufactures $221,615,848 Mineral products 1,166,787 Principal crops 184,744,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 165,362,000 Total $572,888,635 Missouri Missouri is a State of diversified industries, 51 separate in- dustry groups with a total production valued at $637,952,128 being shown in the reports of the Census of Manufactures. The leading industries and the value of their products were slaugh- tering and meat packing, $92.060,499 ; boots and shoes, $52,- 522,006 ; flour-mill and grist-mill products, $38,686,308 ; tobacco manufactures, $33,380,843; printing and publishing, $33,173,414; malt liquors, $31,801,404; and foundry and machine-shop prod- ucts, $22,270,635. The total luineral output (^f the State was valued at $48,- 597,593. the leading products and their values being lead, $15,023,736; zinc, $10,811,388; and coal, $6,802,325. It ranked first among the States in the production of lead and zinc, sup- plying 35.8 per cent of the lead output of the country, and 26.8 l)cr cent of the zinc smelted in the United States. The leading agricultural product of Missouri was corn, which in 1914 had a value of $107,712,000, or more than twice that of any other crop. The other crops with values of more than $3,000,000 were wheat, $42,466,000 ; hay $24,752.000 ; and oats, $11,352,000. Value of products, Missouri, 1914 Manufactures $637,952,128 Mineral products 48,597,593 Principal crops 190,645,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1. 1915 181,902,000 Total $1,059,096,721 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 125 Kansas While the value of the manufactures of Kansas amounted to $323,234,194, agriculture was the leading industry and furnished the greater part of the material worked up l)y manufacturing establishments, the combined value of the products of flour-mill, grist-mill, slaughtering, and meat-packing industries being 69.5 per cent of the total for the State. Slaughtering and meat packing was the leading industry, the value of the products amounting to $151,647,123, or 46.9 per cent of the total for'all industries. Other important industries and the value of their products are the manufacture of flour, $72,894,736 ; butter, cheese, and condensed milk, $10,219,813; petroleum refining, $8,922,718; and foundry and machine-shop products, $7,027,145. The value of the mineral output amounted to $25,866,351. The leading products and their value were coal, $11,238,253; natural gas, $3,340,025 ; and petroleum, $2,433,074. Wheat is the most valuable of the crops of Kansas, which alternates with North Dakota for the lead in the production of this staple. In 1914 the total value of the wheat crop was $168,340,000, while the value of the corn crop reached $68,- 182,000. These two crops form the backbone of the prosperity of the State, the only other leading crops of high value being oats, to the value of $24,763,000, and hay, to the value of $18,441,000. Value of products, Kansas, 1914 Manufactures $323,234,194 Mineral products 2,S,866,351 Principal crops 287,672,000 Live stock on farms, Jan. 1, 1915 149,615,000 Total $786,387,545 Idaho Idaho is a large producer of raw materials, which are divided into the following items : Tons Products of agriculture 1,404,239 Products of animals 267,410 Products of mines 1,323,923 Products of forests 2,415,393 Products of manufactories 148,854 Miscellaneous 212,548 The area of the State is 83,888 square miles, and the population approximates 440,000 people. One of the principal reasons for 126 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE the small population is lack of transportation, while another reason is the unfavorable location with respect to markets. The products of the State, however, are conceded to be of the finest quality. The soil is not cultivated to its full degree of intensity, and these lands can not and will not be developed until such time as a market for the products may be found. The State is surrounded by a number of other States having a surplus pro- duction, and hence is at a great disadvantage. It has vast potash deposits, which, how^ever, are of low grade and can not be profitably developed until cheaper transportation is provided. The soil is well adapted to the production of fruit and potatoes, and large quantities of these products would be forwarded to foreign markets and to the Atlantic seaboard if transportation by water from Duluth were available. Among other products of importance in this State are grain, lumber, live stock and wool. Its most valuable crop is wheat. Increase in value of manufactures at principal cities on the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard, between 1899 and 1914. Value of all manufactures Atlantic Coast: 1899 1914 New York 1,172,870,000 2,292,831,693 Philadelphia 519,982,000 784,499,633 Boston 167,149,000 284,802,479 Baltimore 135,108,000 215,171,530 Newark 112,728,000 210,601,047 2,107,837.000 3,787,906,382 Increase at fiv? principal manufacturing cities on Atlantic Coast, 79 per cent. Chica)?,o. . 797,897,000 1,483,498,416 Detroit 88,366,000 400,347,912 Cleveland 139,356,000 352,418,052 Buffalo 105,627,000 247.515,476 Milwaukee 110,854,000 223,555,142 1,242,100,000 2,707,334,998 Increase at five principal manufacturing cities on Great Lakes, 118 per cent. The figures of the 1919 census of manufactures are not yet available, but it is clear that there is an increasing tendency to develop manufacturing industries in the regions of the GrSat Lakes, in close proximity to the raw materials of production and to the center of population. The sole disadvantage of this location appears to be the excessive cost of transportation to foreign destinations, and this handicap would be entirely removed bv the construction of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 127 128 ECOXOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Production centers, — It is important to note that the center of production of many of the most important commodities entering into our export trade Hes within the area tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. The map on page 127 and the following list of production centers are taken from an article by Mr. Horace C. Gardner, in Mechanical Engineering. Sep- tember, 1920: Production Centers 1 Center of population Indiana 2 Farm acreage .' . Central Missouri 3 Farm values S. E. Iowa 4 Wheat S. E. Nebraska 5 Com Illinois 6 Oats S. E. Iowa 7 Potatoes S. E. Wisconsin 8 Wool Wyoming 9 Tobacco N. E. Kentucky 1 1 Beet sugar Western Colorado 12 Horses N. W. Missouri 13 Sheep Northern Colorado 14 Milch cows Illinois 15 Other cattle Western Kansas ■ 16 Butter Northern Illinois 1 7 Swine S. W. Illinois 18 Iron ore N. E. Minnesota 19 Pig iron production Eastern Ohio 20 Bituminous coal reserves S. E. Wyoming 21 Bituminous coal production Panhandle of W. Va. 23 Manufacture — Primary horse power used in Eastern Ohio 24 Persons engaged in manufacture S. W. Pennsylvania 25 Manufacture — Value added bv N. W. Pennsylvania 26 Cheese S. E. Wisconsin 28 Shoes Near Rochester, N. Y. 29 Eggs N. E. Iowa 30 Men's clothing Near Chicago 31 Slaughtering and meat packing N. E. Iowa 32 Automobiles Near Detroit, Mich. 33 Rubber goods Near Akron, Ohio The following graphs show clearly the magnitude of the in- dustries of the region tributary to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 129 Distribution, by Principal Articles, of tin Valuation of Manufactures Reported by Principal Cities According to Census of Manufactures for 1914. PlTTSBl^RGH Millions of dollars Per cent of Value 50 100 total Iron and steel . . Foundry Slaughtering. . . Printing Cars Bread Liquor* Other 80,454,000 27,778,000 17,947,000 10,825,000 9,707,000 9,363,000 5,200,000 85,420,000 32.6 11.2 7.3 4.4 3.9 3.8 2.1 34.7 — Milwaukee Millions of dollars Per cent of Value 50 100 total Liquors Leather goods . . Clothing Boots and shoes. Foundry Printing Iron and steel . . Confectionery . . Bread 32,435,755 22,893,306 14,568,873 11,665,824 9,902,102 6,279;488 5,645,308 4,943,459 4,571,0*? 3,994,646 2,848,626 2,396,501 101,410,197 ^ 14.5 10.2 6.5 5.2 4.4 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 Electric Mach. . Lumber Furniture Other 1.8 1.3 1.1 43 4 Cincinnati Articles Millions of dollars Per cent of Value 50 100 total Slaughtering. . . Foundry Clothing Boots and shoes Printing Liquors Leather goods . . Bread Copper work . . . Paints Tobacco Furniture Lumber Coffee and spices Other 23,245.000 21,122,000 17,672,000 15,329,000 13,378,000 10,353,000 6,974,000 6,386,000 5,550,000 4,517,000 4,121,000 3,514,000 3,246,000 2,286,000 73,038,000 11.1 10.0 8.4 7.3 6.4 4.9 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.1 34.3 130 ECONOMIC -ASPECTS OF THE MlNNEAPOUIS Millions of dollars • Per cent of total Value 50 100 Flour mills Printing Liquors Iron work Clothing Bread 88.935,924 7,429,729 6,302,975 5.766,029 5,737,265 4,917.245 4.549,448 4,460,655 3.780,260 2.037.634 1.652.565 1,610.903 1,390,310 1,315.274 46.875,576 ■ 47.4 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.6 Cars 2.4 Lumber Foundry Coffee and spices Furniture Confectionery . . Cooperage Medicines Other 2.4 2.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 7 7 24.9 Kansas City Articles Millions of dollars Per cent of total ValiK- .lO 100 133.826,.338 5,552.901 83.8 3.5 m 3.158.499 m 2.0 2,458.961 ■ 1.5 I1,70:{,169 "■■ 9 2 Slaughtering Hour mills. . Foundry. . . . Cnrs Other HOCHESTEH Articles Millions of dollars Viilii. Per cent of total Clothing 20.822,858 ■■■^^ 14.8 |{ts and shoes. 13,519.755 ■■■ 9.6 Foundry 6,586.267 ^ 4.7 Printing 4,588.923 ^ 3.3 Flour mills 4,351.542 ■ 3.1 Liquors 4,279.456 ■ 3.0 Furniture 3.458.985 ■ 2.5 2,718,449 2,458.936 J 1 9 ICIertric mach. . 1.7 Lumber 2,193..^60 1.6 ("onfectionery . . 1,897, .348 13 1,268,484 72.552.192 0.9 Other 51.6 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 131 Indianapolis Articles Millions of dollars Value Per cent of t1 total Slaughtering. . Automobiles. . . Foundry Flour mills. . . . Printing Clothing Furniture Bread Lumber Druggists prep Liquors Cars Confectionery . Carriages Other 37,780,039 12,693,097 8,752,318 7,971,329 6,423,546 4,2.59,730 3,442,741 3,227,511 3,137,300 2,9.55,829 2,764,610 1,741.028 1,542,784 1,400,402 39,428,373 Akbon Articles Millions of dollars Per cent of Value 50 100 total Rubber goods . . Other Toledo Millions of dollars Per cent Articles of total Value 50 100 Foundry 6,544,602 warn 5.7 Coffeeandspices. 5,889,320 ■■ 5.1 Flour mills 5,815,388 ■■ 5.1 Clothing 3,355,488 2.9 Electric mach . . 3,229,882 2.8 Printing 2,797,092 2.4 Liquors 2,474,913 2.1 Bread 2,307,211 2.0 Copper work . . . 2,029,356 1.8 Lumber 1,480,636 1.3 1,201,929 873,570 1 1.0 Iron work 0.8 Confectionery . . 777,552 1 0.7 Furniture Other 734,231 75,538,256 1 0.6 65.7 132 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE YOUNGSTOWN Articles Millions of dollars Value Per cent of total Iron and steel Foundry Lumber Printing Bread Other 48,796,464 3,077.945 1,010,128 791,777 619,886 37,815,072 53.0 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 41.0 DaYTOiN Articles Millions of dollars Per cent of Value 25 50 total Foundry Slaughtering. . . Tobacco Bread 5,595,634 4,830,647 2.055,431 2,012,777 1,899,216 1,107,527 863,497 824,823 ■ 1 I 7.9 6.8 2.9 8 Lumber Printing 2.7 1.6 1.2 Furniture 1.2 Other 72.9 Chicago Hundreds of millions of dollars Per cent Articles of total Value 12 3 4 Slaughtering. . . Clothing Printing 410.709,000 109,089,000 97,507,000 27 7 .7 4 6.6 Cars 67,619,000 ^1^1^^^ 4.6 Bread 42,122,000 ^^^ 2.8 Liquors 28.933,000 MB 1.9 Lumber 28,711,000 ^■B 1.9 Iron and steel . . 27,002,000 ■H 1.8 PainU 22,811,000 IB 1.6 Leather goods. . 21,126,000 ■i 1.4 Confectionery . . 20,349.000 ^ 1.4 Electric mach . . 17.568,000 ■1 1.2 Metal work 13,236,000 434.166.000 ■ 111^ 1.0 31.6 Other GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWKEXCE SHIP CHANNEL 133 Detroit Articles If undreds of millions of dollars Value Automobiles. . . Slaughtering . . Foundry Tobacco Brass work. . . . Medicines Printing liquors Bread Stoves Lumber Copper work . . Clothing Other 171,231.962 20,077,148 17.185,368 17,044,106 14,629,751 13.691,495 11,149,376 9.409,722 7,488,821 5,921,410 5.566,510 4,369.116 3,770.564 98,813,563 St. Lons Hundreds of millions of dollars Per cent Articles of total Value 1 2 Slaughtering . . . 36,506,1.52 j^g^^ 10.1 Boots and shoes. 31,048,946 ^■■■B 8.6 Liquors 26,829,474 ^■■H 7.4 Printing 16,604,879 1^^ 4.6 Clothing 15,626,033 ^m 4.3 Coffee and spices 11.171,901 ^B 3.3 Bread 9.453,646 ^^ 2.6 2.4 Foundry 8,806,184 Mi Flour mills 8,093,910 ■■■ 2.2 7,478,760 ^gi 2.1 1.6 Chemicals 6,471.081 ■i Medicines 6,048,497 ^ 1 7 Furniture 5,621,890 ^ 1.6 Paints 5,002 918 1^ 1.4 1.3 Confectionery. . 4,668.334 m Druggists prep, . 3,275,247 m 0.9 Brass products.. 2,936,923 m 0.8 Iron work 2,721,358 m 0.8 2,235,117 2,112,814 147,785.935 ■ 0.6 0.6 Lumber Other » 134 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Cleveland Articles Millions of dollars Value 100 Per cent of total Iron and steel . . Foundry Clothing Automobiles. . . . Slaughtering. . Printing Electric mach . . Paints 50.029.151 34.959.583 28.811,322 27,116,595 23.210.323 12.150,628 11.357.538 10,092.979 6,907,608 6,528,168 6,035.669 4.957.868 4,946.892 3.864.955 121.128,793 U.2 9.9 51^^^ 8.2 7.7 6.6 3.4 3.3 2.9 Bread Liquors Iron work Cars 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.4 Confectionery . . Copper work . . . 1.4 1.1 Other 34.4 Buffalo Millions of dollars Per cent of total Value 50 100 Flour mills j 22,185.983 13.0 Slaughtering. . . 29,398.200 11.6 Liquors 16,036.439 ■■■■ 6.5 Foundry 11.375.640 ■■■ 4.6 Printing 7.170,610 ■■ 2.9 Bread 6.514,477 ■ 2.6 5.507.262 3.830.576 ■ 2.2 Leather goods . . 1.6 Lumber 3,944.209 1.6 Furniture 3,728.066 1.5 Clothing 3.517.308 1.4 Bra.ss work 3,399.130 1,4 Medicines 3.160,665 1.3 Iron work 2,681.649 11 Confectionery . . 1,875.503 0.3 Automobiles. . . . 1.764.212 0,7 Copper work . . . 1,450.401 0.6 Boxes 1.486,341 1.499.457 6 Boots and shoes. 0.6 Other 106.902.448 43.2 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 135 Distribution by States of the Value of Manufactures, 1914. (Prepared by the Ports Facilities Commission, U. S. Shipping Board. Flour and Grist Mill Products 136 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ^1 ^ w / 1- LINOIS ^ i^ 7, 6 ao J-03 ..^^ ® Glass Manufactures GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 137 AUTOMORILES 138 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Agricultural Implements GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 139 Iron and Steel (Steel works and rolling mills only) 140 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Si AUGHTERING ASD MeAT PACKING GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 141 NEW YOR« ^'^a 26-2.309 #>9t' ^^ / ■"x^^ ^ •^^ .f / ^>— - ■ — ^ ^«?>. o<> / \ * \ • ^^o"' / 1 »o \ 1 \ / 19'^ » \ <» \ >^V / \ S». ^''^'N. / ■J o ^ ^^Ir- -^ ___^ 25>^ ^**'^>^ 60% ^ Butter, Cheese and ^Condensed Milk 142 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE l(_L|N Ois fl7,S09.2ff6 >Av;<33 <-'Seti 41- .-1 w ^*r 'oj'o" V' ?«.' •^.ar" Leather Products GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 143 Rubber Goods 144 ECONO>riC ASPECTS OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 145 146 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE < o 1^ « t GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 147 8 6(N 5^ 1 _ 0) 1- o 1 5 ^ t XO CD u o CO 1 in i) o o o o o o 9 2 1 TO r-^ t/i O u I— 1 t/3 D •^g u V." O o — — °° ^- ^H 148 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE P PQ 0-, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 149 2 00 P-> « M U o o '^ Chapter X BRIEF HISTORY OF IMPROVEMENTS FOR NAVIGA- TION ON THE GREAT LAKES Progressive improvements by the United States have resulted in providing depths in the channels and harbors of the Great Lakes suitable for vessels drawing up to 21 feet. The project depths of the principal lake harbors are 20 and 21 feet at low water, but in a number of cases greater depths are provided in * the entrance channels. During the last 24 years the depths in the principal harbors have been increased several feet. The St. Marys Falls Canal provides a depth of 24.5 feet. The Welland Canal now has a depth of 14 feet, but is being enlarged to pro- vide an initial depth of 25 feet and an ultimate depth of 30 feet at extreme low water. The lateral canals of the St. Law- rence River now have a depth of 14 feet. Original conditions. — Prior to the initiation of improvements for the benefit of navigation on the Great Lakes, through traffic was restricted by physical conditions to Lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan. Communication with Lake Superior was rendered impracticable by the Falls of Saint Marys River, having a drop of about 20 feet, and communication between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario was blocked by the Falls of the Niagara. Prior to 1832, Detroit was the western terminus of most of the Lake traffic, except that of fur traders and military posts. It is said that the Black Hawk War which broke out in that year was one means of diffusing knowledge of Illinois and Wisconsin through- out the East and helped to accelerate the settlement of the country on the west shore of Lake Michigan, which was followed by an extension of traffic to Lake Michigan. St. Marys River. — Originally St. Marys River, connecting Lakes Huron and Superior, was obstructed by St. Marys Falls and by a number of shoals upon which the least depths were from 5 to 17 feet at mean low water. Navigation past the Falls was impracticable except for downbound canoes and log rafts. A small canal was built on the Canadian side by the Northwest Fur Company in 1797-8, and provided a depth of about 2 feet. This canal was destroyed in 1814. Thereafter until 1855 the movement of freight to and from Lake Superior was by boat to Sault Ste. Marie, where cargoes were unloaded, taken across the portage one mile long, and reloaded on boats. In 1855 the State of Michigan completed a canal with a double lift 150 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 151 lock, providing a channel for vessels having a draft of 11.5 feet at mean stage of water, thus establishing the first through navi- gation route to Lake Superior. This canal was taken over by the United States in 1881, and in 1888 the original locks were destroyed in making the excavation for the present Poe Lock, which is 800 feet long, 100 feet wide, and has a depth of 22 feet on the sills. This lock was completed in 1896. The Weitzel Lock, built in the years 1870 to 1881, is 515 feet long, 80 feet wide in the chamber, narrowing to 60 feet at the gates, and has a depth of 17 feet of water on the sills. The Davis or Third lock opened in 1914, and the Sabin or Fo'urth lock opened in 1919, are 1,300 feet long, 80 feet wide, and have 24.5 feet on the sills. The existing project for the improvement of the St. Marys River provides for a depth of 21 feet at low water, over a minimum width of 300 feet for one-way traffic and of 600 feet for two-way traffic throughout the river. The project depth of the South Canal is 24^^ feet, and of the North Canal 25 feet. At the present time the dredged areas afford a least width of 300 feet, increasing at angles and other critical places up to 1,000 feet. In addition to the improvements provided by the United States at St. Marys Falls, the Dominion of Canada between the years 1888 and 1895 constructed a canal lyi miles long, 150 feet wide, with a lock 900 feet long and 60 feet wide, having a depth of 18 feet 3 inches on the sills at lowest known water level. St. Clair River, Mich. — The St. Clair River connects Lake Huron and Lake St. Clair, and has a total fall of 5.8 feet in its length of 40 miles. With the exception of the delta section which begins about 33 miles below the head of the river, the width averages about 2,000 feet. It discharges into Lake St. Clair through seven mouths, the one known as the South Channel being used for deep-draft vessels, while several other channels are used for small craft. The least depths above the mouths of the river were suitable for vessels plying these waters during the early period of lake navigation. The existing project pro- vides for channels 20. 21, and 22 feet deep at low water through various sections. Lake St. Clair, Mich. — Lake St. Clair is the smallest of the Great Lakes, being about 503 square miles in area, and is shallow throughout. On the sailing course it is 18 miles wide. Originally the channels through the Lake were obstructed by a shoal at the entrance to the Detroit River and by bars at the several mouths 152 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE of the St. Clair River. According to a report of conditions in 1846, lighters were used at the latter point to relieve boats of some of their freight, thus enabling them to pass with greater safety over the shallow places The existing project provides for a ship canal known as St. Clair Flats Canal, consisting of two dredged cuts each 300 feet wide and 20 feet deep, extending from deep water in St. Clair River, a distance of 17,460 feet, into Lake St. Clair ; and for a channel 800 feet wide and 20 feet deep through the shoal at the entrance to the Detroit River, known as Grosse Pointe Channel. Detroit River. — The Detroit River connects Lakes St. Clair and Erie and is 28 miles long. The total fall is about 3 feet, most of which occurs in the length of about 5 miles in the lower por- tion of the river. The width of the river varies from ]/> mile to about 3 miles. In its original condition the river was navigable throughout its entire length, but the shoals at Limekiln Crossing, about 8 miles above Detroit River Lighthouse, limited the usable depth to \2y2 to 15 feet at Lake Erie stage over a bottom of solid rock. The existing project provides for a channel known as Amherstburg Channel, at least 600 feet wide, with a depth of 22 feet north of its junction with the Livingstone Channel, and of 21 feet south of said junction ; and for a second channel known as Livingstone Channel, with a least depth of 22 feet and a least width of 800 feet from deep water in Lake Erie to Bar Point, and a least width of 300 feet thence to its junction with the Amherstburg Channel. The project also provides for a channel 22 feet deep and 800 feet wide abreast of Fighting Island, and for removing the shoal at the head of Grosse Isle. The Amherstburg Channel is for upbound traffic and the Living- stone Channel is for downbound traffic. The Welland Canal. — To overcome the barrier to traffic formed by Niagara Falls the Dominion of Canada constructed the Wel- land Canal, extending from Port Colborne on Lake Erie to Port Dalhousie on Lake Ontario. The canal is 26-v:| miles long and has a total descent of 326^)4 feet, overcome by twenty-five lift locks each 270 feet long, with an available length of 255 feet, a width of 45 feet, and a depth of about 14 feet on the sills. Tn order to provide accommodation for larger vessels, opera- tions were begun in 1913 for the construction of a new ship canal between Lakes Erie and Ontario. The line of the pro- posed canal follows the course of the present canal froiri Port Colborne to Allanburg, about half way across the peninsula; GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 153 thence an entirely new channel will be provided and the canal will enter Lake Ontario at Port Weller about 3 miles east of the terminus of the present canal. The total length of the new line is 25 miles, and the difference in elevation between the two lakes, about 325}^ feet, will be overcome by seven lift locks, each having a lift of 46 J/2 feet. The locks will be 800 feet in length by 80 feet in width in the clear, with 30 feet of water over the miter sills at extreme low stages in the Lakes. The width of the canal at the bottom will be 200 feet, and for the present the canal reaches will be excavated to a depth of 25 feet only, but all structures will be sunk to a 30-foot depth so that the canal can be deepened at any future time by the simple process of dredging out the reaches. The proposed depths are at extreme low water in Lake Erie, 568 feet above sea level, while the datum plane of improvements by the United States on Lake Erie is referred to low water datum 570.8 feet above sea level. The cost of the new Welland Canal was originally estimated at $50,000,000, but this estimate will no doubt have to be increased. The St. Lawrence River. — From the head of the St. Lawrence River to Montreal is a total distance of 182 statute miles, and from the latter point to the Strait of Belle Isle at the mouth of the St. Lawrence a distance of 1,003 miles, making the total length of the St. Lawrence River 1,185 miles. Between Lake Ontario and Garlop Island, a distance of 68 miles, there is a chan- nel 30 feet or more in depth, with a minimum width of 500 feet. At Galop Island the uppermost rapids are encountered, which have been overcome by the Galop Canal, constructed by the Dominion of Canada. This canal is 7 1-3 miles long, with a bottom width of 80 feet, a surface width of 144 feet, and a depth of 14 feet on the sills. It has two lift locks, one of which is 800 feet long by 50 feet wide and the other 303 feet long by 45 feet wide. A guard lock at the head of the canal is 270 feet long by 45 feet wide, and the total lockage is 151/2 feet. Below this canal is a stretch of 4^/2 miles of navigable river ex- tending to the head of the Rapide Plat Canal. This canal is 3 2-3 miles long, 80 feet wide at bottom and 152 feet wide at the surface, with 14 feet of water on the sills. It has two locks each 270 feet long by 45 feet wide. It was constructed to enable vessels ascending the river to pass the rapids ; descending vessels run the rapids safely. From the foot of the Rapide Plat Canal to the head of Farran's Point Canal, there is a navigable stretch of 9^/2 miles. The Farran's Point Canal is 1% miles 154 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE long, 90 feet wide at bottom and 154 feet wide at the surface, with 14 feet of water on the miter sills of the new lock, which has a length of 800 feet and a width of 50 feet. The total lockage is 3^ feet, and descending vessels run the rapids with ease and safety. The new lock enables vessels ascending the river to avoid Farran's Point rapids, passing a full tow at one lockage. The Farran's Point, Rapide Plat, and Galop Canals are collectively known as the Williamsburg Canals. From the foot of Farran's Point Canal to the head of the Cornwall Canal there is a distance of five miles of navigable river. The Cornwall Canal is 11 miles long, 90 feet wide at bottom and 54 feet wide at the water surface. It has one guard gate and six locks 270 feet long by 45 feet wide, with a total lockage of 48 feet. The Cornwall Canal extends past the Long Sault Rapids, from the town of Cornwall to Dickinson's Landing. Below the Cornwall Canal there is a stretch of 31 miles of navigable water through Lake St. Francis to the head of the Soulanges Canal. The Soulanges Canal is 14 miles long. 100 feet wide at bottom and 164 feet wide at the surface, with 15 feet of water on the sills. It has one guard lock and four lift locks 280 feet long by 45 feet wide, overcoming a total rise or lockage of 84 feet. This canal extends from Cascades Point to Coteau Landing, overcoming the Cascades Rapids, Cedar Rapids and Coteau Rapids. From the foot of the Soulanges Canal there is a navigable stretch of 16 miles in Lake St. Louis and the St. Lawrence River to the head of the Lachine Canal. The latter canal is 8^/^ miles long, with an average width of 150 feet. There are five locks 270 feet long by 45 feet wide, at two of which the depth on the sills is 18 feet, and on the other three there is a depth of 14 feet. The total rise or lockage is 45 feet. The canal consists of one channel with two distinct systems of locks, the old and the enlarged, and there are two lock entrances at each end. The canal overcomes the St. Louis Rapids and extends from the town of Lachine to the city of Montreal. From Montreal to Father Point a 30-foot channel has been practically completed, with a width of 450 feet in the straight portions and of 600 to 750 feet in the bends between Montreal and Quebec, and of 1,000 feet everywhere below Quebec. The deepening of this channel to 35 feet was begun in 1909. By means of these channel improvements Montreal has been placed at the head of ocean navigation on the St. Lawrence River. Lake Harbors. — .As the depths of the connecting channels GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 155 of the Great Lakes place definite limits upon the drafts to which vessels may load, the improvement of the lake harbors has neces- sarily maintained close relationship to the facilities available in these channels. The project depths of the principal lake harbors are 20 and 21 feet at low water, but in a number of Project depths in feet at Lake Ports, 1896 and 1920 1896 1920 Reference Reference Project above mean Project ibove mean Incrctisc depth tide at New York depth tide at w York Lake Superior Duluth-Superior, Minn. and Wis 16 ■601.2 30 at entr^ce 24 in outer harbor 2601.6 3.6-13.6 20-22 inside Grand Marais, Minn.. . . 16 '601.2 16 2601.6 0.0 Ashland, Wis. 17 '601.2 20 2601.6 2.6 Ontonagon, Mich 12 '601.2 17 at bar 15 in harbor =601.6 2.6-4.6 Marquette, Mich. 15 '601.2 21 2601.6 5.6 Grand Marais, Mich. . . . 15H '601.2 18-20 2601.6 2.1 - 4.1 Lakes Michigan and Huron Cheboygan, Mich 18 3581.28 \?,y, 2579.6 2.18 Charlevoix, Mich 12 3581.28 15 2579.6 4.68 Frankfort, Mich 12 3581.28 13 2579.6 7.68 Manistee, Mich 15 3581.28 20 2579.6 6.68 Ludington, Mich.. . . 13 3581.28 18 2579.6 5.68 Muskegon, Mich 14 3581.28 20 2579.6 7.68 South Haven, Mich 12 3581.28 17-19 2579.6 6.68-8.68 St. Joseph, Mich 16 3581.28 18 2579.6 3.68 Milwaukee, Wis 18 '580.34 19 2579.6 1.74 Racine, Wis 16 '580.34 19 2579.6 3.74 Menominee, Wis. and Mich 16 14-18 '580.34 '580.34 18 19 2579.6 2579.6 2.74 Sheboygan, Wis 1.74-5.74 Manitowoc, Wis 14-18 '580.34 18 2579.6 0.74-4.74 Kenosha, Wis 15 14 '580.34 '580.34 19 18 2579.6 2579.6 4.74 Kewaunee, Wis 4.74 Manistique, Mich 12 '580.34 18 2579.6 6.74 Two Rivers, Wis 12 '580.34 14 2579.6 2.74 Waukegan, 111 12 '580 . 34 18 2579.6 6.74 Chicago, 111 16 16 '■580.6 6580.6 21 21 2579.6 2579.6 6.00 Calumet, 111 6.00 '.Duluth city datum. 2,Low water datum adopted 1916. 3(Mean lake level, 1860-1875. ' Four feet below high water, 1838. ' One foot above Chicago city datum. cases greater depths are provided in the entrance channels, in order to afford safer navigation in rough weather and to provide for the lowering of level due to winds. Ordinary fluctuations of water surface at Buffalo due to winds are about 2 feet, while extreme fluctuations are about 7 feet above and 5 feet below normal level. Changes at the westerly end of Lake Erie and 156 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL in the Detroit River have been as much as 6 feet within eight hours, but such violent changes are rare. The accompanying tables show the changes in the project depths of lake harbors and channels since 1896. and the increase of depths indicated by a comparison of the reference planes. During this period, however, lake levels have been lowered as a result of artificial diversions of water, and the actual increases of depth at the various local- ities are modified to the extent of the lowering at each point. Project d-^pths in feet at Lake Ports, 1896 and 1930 1896 1920 Project depth Reference above mean tide at New York Project depth Reference above mean tide at New York Increase Lake Erie Cleveland, Ohio 16 17 17 20 17 15-18 18 17 18 19 ■572.8 ■572.8 ■572. 8 '572.8 ■572.8 '572.8 '572.8 '572.8 '572.8 ■572.8 19-23 21 19 19 19 18 20 20 20 21-23 2570.8 2570.8 2570.8 2570.8 =570.8 ■570.8 2570.8 2570.8 2570.8 2570.8 5.00-9.00 Toledo, Ohio Sandusky, Ohio 6.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 Fairport, Ohio Lorain, Ohio (Black River) . Conneaut, Ohio Erie, Pa Buffalo. N. Y 2.00-5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00H5.00 Lake Ontario Oswego, N. Y Charlotte, N. Y IS 16 15 16 3244.21 3244.21 '244.21 3244.21 16 20 153-^ ISJi 2244.5 =244 . 5 2244 . 5 2244.5 0.7 3.7 Little Sodus Bay, N. Y Great Sodus Bay. N. Y 0.2 0.0 St. Lawrence River Ogdensburg, N. Y 16.5 *245. 33 19 2243 . 7 4.13 Connecting Channels St. Marys River, above locks.. St. Marys Falls Canal St. Marys River, below locks . St. Clair River (foot of Lake 21 21 20 21 20 21 601.2 601.1 583 . 8 581.17 575.44 572.58 21 25 21 22 20 22 '■601.2 601.1 580.6 579.6 573.8 570.8 0.00 4.00 («) (•) Lake St. Clair (•) Detroit River (mouth) (•) ' Mean lake level 1860-1875. 2 Low water datum. 3 Zero of Oswego gauge. * Zero of Ogdensburg gauge. » Vidal Shoal. * Sloping surface. Increase can be determined only by comparing data for specific points. Average increase about 2 feet. Chapter XI BENEFITS FROM NAVIGATION IMPROVEMENTS ON THE GREAT LAKES The reduction in freight rates on the Great Lakes, due to im- provements by the United States, is equivalent to a saving of about $130,000,000 per annum on the present lake commerce. An increase in depth to 25 feet in the channels of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence would afford an estimated saving of $31,- 300,000 per annum, based on the benefits to purely lake navigation. Irrespective of the improvement of the St. Lawrence, the bene- fits from the improvement of navigation on the Great Lakes are so vast and so closely related to the prosperity of our industries and our foreign trade that these improvements must go on. It is only a matter of time when the connecting channels of the Great Lakes will be deepened to accommodate vessels of 25 or 30 feet draft, since the economies thereby afforded will eventually justify the outlay. If the betterment of conditions on the Lakes should be hastened by the construction of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, it will be because the returns clearly warrant the investment. Reduction in freight rates. — The improvement of the lake connecting channels has permitted a great increase in the draft of vessels, resulting in the use of vessels of greater tonnage, the carrying capacity of the largest lake freight steamers having increased from 4,000 tons in 1893 to over 15,000 tons at the present time. The reduction in freight rates from 2.3 mills in 1887 to 0.6 mill per ton-mile in 1914 is attributed chiefly to these improvements. This reduction is equivalent to a saving of about $130,000,000 per annum on the present lake commerce. Due to conditions brought about by the war, there was an in- crease in the average freight charge per ton-mile to 1.21 mills in 1917, reducing to 1.19 mdls in 1918, and 1.05 mills in 1919. During the period from 1887 to the present time, the commerce passing through St. Marys Falls Canals increased from less than 6,000,000 tons to more than 90,000,000 tons per annum. Increase in size and capacity of vessels. — Every increase in the depth of channels and harbors has been promptly utilized to its full capacity by navigation. Tlie Deep Waterways Commission in 1896 reported that the largest vessels in use on the Great Lakes had lengths of 426 to 438 feet, breadths of 45.5 to 48.27 feet, and capacities of 6,300 to 6,800 tons on a draft of 19 feet, or less than one-half the capacity of the largest lake freighters 157 158 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE at the present time. The boats constituting the existing lake fleet of about 700 large vessels now load to drafts of 19 to 21 feet. About 58 per cent of these vessels are capable of loading to drafts in excess of 20 feet, 48 per cent to 21 feet or more, 23 per cent to 23 feet or more, and 12 per cent to 24 feet or more. The provision of the necessary channel facilities permitting the use of these large vessels has resulted in great economy. The bulk freighter of the lakes now carries each year about 80 per cent of the nation's production of iron ore, more than 20 per cent of the combined wheat crops of the United States and Canada, and about 5 per cent of the coal production of the United States. It has been estimated that each tenth of a foot of draft on the Great Lakes corresponds to freight earnings of $44.57 per trip of a modern bulk freighter. With 25 trips per season, the loss due to a reduction of one-tenth foot of depth, and the gain due to an equal increase of depth, amounts to $590,000 annually, and the corresponding gain for the smaller vessels using the present Welland Canal and upper St. Lawrence River amounts to $70,000 annually. At this rate, one foot increase in depth represents a gain of $5,900,000 to general lake navigation, and $700,000 to navigation on the Welland Canal and St. Lawrence River, based entirely upon the volume of the existing movement through those channels. Value of a 25-foot channel to existing lake navigation. — P>ased upon the above figures, the annual saving to be eflfected by an increase in the depth of lake channels from 21 to 25 feet would be $23,600,000 for general lake navigation, and the proposed increase of the Welland Canal and St. Lawrence River channels from 14 to 25 feet would represent an annual saving of $7,700,000, or a total saving of $31,300,000, which is equal to the interest at 5 per cent on $626,000,000. With such evidence before us of the economies resulting from the provision of deeper channels on the Great Lakes, we can not share the \iew occasionally expressed that the limits of depth and vessel capacity on the Great Lakes have been reached. The history of improvements of both the connecting channels and harbors of the Great Lakes shows a progressive increase in project dimensions, and there is no reason to believe that this normal growth has come to a definite termination. The savings to be effected by the further improvement of the channels through Detroit River, St. Clair River and St. Marys GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 159 River, will more than compensate for the cost of the necessary improvements. Moreover, the savings effected in the cost of transporting such essential products as iron ore, coal and grain have a far greater economic significance than the immediate cash returns. The cost of iron ore and coal to our important indus- tries directly affects the cost of a multitude of finished manu- factured products upon which our trade with the world depends, and this is also true of other raw materials obtainable in the territory tributary to the Great Lakes. There is no factor of greater importance to commercial and industrial prosperity than the opportunity to secure an abundance of raw material at low cost. Our estimate of benefits must not be restricted to the immediate returns ; we must grasp the broader significance which decreased cost of production means to our world trade. The navigation facilities of the Great Lakes have exercised a powerful influence in the upbuilding of commercial and in- dustrial America. They have permitted the iron ore of Lake Superior to be brought to the furnaces of the Lake Erie and Pittsburgh districts at a saving of over $100,000,000 annually, as compared with the cost of shipping this material by rail, and they have permitted the return of vast quantities of coal to the upper lakes at a saving of $25,000,000 to $50,000,000 annually. They have permitted the wheat from the Northwest to obtain economical transportation for a portion of its journey to the markets of the world. The task is not completed, however. There can be no such thing as a pause in economic progress. To cease to advance is to fall behind other nations of the world who are assiduously seeking every avenue of trade. Fresh economies must be sought to lower the cost of production and to maintain our commercial supremacy, and it is inevitable that we shall proceed with the improvement of our Great Lakes channels and harbors for the development of greater economy and efficiency. Irrespective of the improvement of the St. Lawrence River, the work of deepening these channels and harbors will go on, and the objection made by opponents of the St. Lawrence improvement that it will make necessary the expenditure of large sums for the deepening of the harbors and channels of the lakes, has no merit. If such improvements should be hastened by the construction of the St. Lawrence waterway, it will be because the benefits clearly justify the outlay. With a continuation of the normal rate of progress in the improvement of these channels which has prevailed in the 160 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE past, it may be contidently expected that they will be able to accommodate ocean carriers of average capacity by the time the St. Lawrence improvement is completed. All of the lake harbors will not become ports of the first class. There will be the same competition between ports on this route as elsewhere. A few ports advantageously situated with respect to areas of production and distribution, possessing adequate terminals and connections, and the enterprise to attract and develop traffic, will take the lead in commerce. At these few ports only will deep channels be essential. Regulation of lake levels will provide increased depth at small cost. — Deepening the channels by dredging is not the only way to increase the depths. The Great Lakes constitute a series of enormous natural reservoirs connected by waterways of restricted capacity. Every change in the elevation of one lake afl:"ects the elevation of the lakes below, and every change in the cross section of the connecting waterways likewise afifects the elevations of the lakes above and below it. By providing outlets of limited capacity, nature has established an efficient regulator of lake levels. In connection with the improvement of the St. Marys Falls Canal, controlling works have been found necessary, and with these works the level of Lake Superior can be regulated within a maximum range of 2.5 feet and ordinarily within a range of 1.5 feet, or between elevations of 602.1 and 603.6 feet above mean tide at New York, thus permitting an increase of as much as 2 feet in the depths of the channels and harbors of this lake. With a view to better maintaining the normal level of Lake Erie, the International Waterways Commission in 1913 rec- ommended the construction of compensating works consisting of a submerged weir in the Niagara River, with a guard lock at Tonawanda River and one at the entrance to Welland River. The effect of this weir would be to raise the level of Lake Erie 0.39 foot. Lake St. Clair 0.23 foot, and Lake Huron 0.09 foot at mean stage. The estimated cost was $3,500,000. A j^lan for regulating the levels of Lake Erie, Lake St. Clair and Lake Huron by controlling the discharge was presented by the Board of Engineers on Deep Waterways in 1900, and provided for the regulation of Lake Erie between the levels 574.2 and 574.8 feet. The datum plane of the existing navigation projects on Lake Erie being 570.8 feet, this improvement would result in providing an increase of 3 to 4 feet, and would enable vessels GREAT LAKES-3T. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 161 of 24 to 25 feet draft to use the improved harbors on these lakes. The increase of depth in the connecting channels would obviously be less, but would amount to a substantial improve- ment of navigation conditions. The instructions to the engineers require consideration of the advisability of constructing works for the regulation of the level of Lake Ontario, and it is entirely practicable in connection with the improvement of the St. Lawrence River to provide the necessary regulating works to afford a substantial increase in the depth of all harbors on this lake. By the adoption of plans as above suggested for controlling the levels of the Great Lakes, it is entirely feasible to secure increased facilities of navigation, affording economies in transportation amounting to many millions of dollars a year, and decreasing b)- many millions the cost of the ultimate development of these channels. Li connection with such regulation of levels, it is of course essenf'al to consider not only their influence upon navigation, but also their effect upon other public and [)rivate improvements, including water- power development. Chapter XII COMPARISON OF NAVIGATION FACILITIES ON THE GREAT LAKES WITH THOSE OF THE OCEAN PORTS The project depths of channels on the Great Lakes are referred to a plane of low water which is 2 feet below mean lake level. The low water season on the Lakes is during the winter, while the high water season is during the summer; hence it is not unusual for vessels to load to drafts equal to or greater than the project dimensions of the channels. While the vessels on the Great Lakes utilize every foot of available depth through the connect- ing channels, only a small percentage of vessels visiting our ocean ports require the full depths provided in the main channels of the inner harbors. At the entrances to exposed ocean harbors an excess depth is required to allow for the "send" of the vessel in rough water. These facts must be kept in mind in considering the depths required for the accommodation of vessels on the Great Lakes as compared with those existing at our ocean ports. A channel 25 feet deep at the project datum plane through the con- necting channels of the Great Lakes will permit the passage of vessels drawing 1 to 3 feet more than would ordinarily attempt to enter an ocean port having a similar depth at mean low water. Capacity of channels of the Great Lakes. — From the brief description given of the project depths at the variotis harbors and throtigh the several connecting channels of the Great Lakes, it will be seen that provision has been made for channels 20 to 21 feet deep inside the entrances of important harbors, with greater depths in the approach cliannels at several ports, and that the connecting channels between Lake Erie and the upper lakes have likewise been improved to 20 and 21 feet, with greater depths in several of the imjwrtant channels and throtigh the St. Marys Falls Canal. These depths are all referred to a plane of low water, which is 2 feet below the plane of mean lake level, 1860-1875. formerly used as the reference plane of many of the Great Lakes projects. Because of this fact, the vessels of the Great Lakes are frequently able to load to greater drafts than the stated project depths of the channels, and it is not uncommon for vessels drawing 21 feet or more to pass througli these channels. Vessel oi)erators are kept informed of the depth that can be carried through the connecting channels, and the vessels are loaded to the greatest capacity which the facilities existing at the moment will permit. The high water season on the Great Lakes is during the summer, while the low water season is during the winter ^\•hen navigation is closed, so that in 162 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 163 general there is available during the season of navigation greater (leptli in the harbors and channels of the Great Lakes than might be apparent from a statement of the approved project depths. As already stated in this report, the project for thejiew Welland Canal provides for a preliminary depth of 25 feet at extreme low water in Lake Erie, 568 feet above sea level. This plane is 2.8 feet below low water datum, which is the reference plane of adopted projects for improvement on Lake Erie, and it is 4.8 feet below the plane of mean lake level, indicating that vessels drawing more than 25 feet will be able to pass through this canal. The instructions to the engineers in connection with the improve- ment of the St. Lawrence River require consideration of channels 25 and 30 feet deep at low^ water. These depths at the stage specified will be sufficient to pass vessels drawing as much as the stated depth of the waterway during the greater part of the customary navigation season. Ample depth required at exposed entrances. — The projects for improvement of our harbors along the Atlantic coast are referred to a plane of mean low water, and there are many limes when the actual depths available to navigation are less than those stated in the authorized project. A great deal has been said, and some testimony appears in the record of the hearings before the International Joint Commission, regarding the necessity for ample depth below the keel. It is well known that vessels at full speed draw more water than when navigating at low speed, and this fact must be given due weight in deciding upon the most suitable channel depths to be provided. At ocean entrances where the channels are exposed to severe wave action, it is also essential that ample depth below the keel be provided to prevent pounding of the vessel on the bottom. At Boston the authorized project provides for a depth of 40 feet from the sea to President Roads, with 45 feet through rock, this channel being exposed to heavy seas. The depth reduces to 35 feet from Broad Sound to the Navy Yard, and other channels have depths of 27, 25 and 23 feet. There is thus a diiTerence of 10 feet between the exposed outer channel and the deepest channel inside. These conditions, however, are not applicable to the connecting channels of the Great Lakes, which are protected from the violent wave action found at ocean entrances. In actual practice, vessels passing through the Detroit River, St. Clair River and St. Marys Falls Canal have loaded drafts in excess of the customary drafts of vessels entering many of our 164 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE seaboard harbors which now enjoy a successful foreign trade. As will be shown later in this report, these lake channels now accommodate vessels having drafts equal to that of the average vessel engaged in foreign trade at our Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific ports, as w^ell as those in use on many of the important trade routes of the world. The passage through the connecting chan- nels of the Great Lakes is no more difficult than is the navigation of the long entrance channels of some of our ocean ports, such as Wilmington, N. C., Jacksonville, Fla., Mobile, Ala., Houston and Beaumont, Tex., and Portland, Oreg. For the same reasons that the channels of ocean harbors must provide a reasonable margin of depth below the keel, a similar margin of safety is needed at the entrance to harbors of the Great Lakes. From the table of project depths at lake ports, it will be seen that a depth of 30 feet has been provided at the en- trance to Duluth-Superior Harbor, with 24 feet at the outer har- bor, and that at Cleveland and Bufifalo depths of 23 feet are author- ized at the entrances. At ocean ports greater depths than those specified in the authorized projects are of course available at high tide, but vessels bound to an ocean port can not load so as to take advantage of this increase, as unfavorable weather conditions or delays from other causes might render it imprac- ticable to reach the entrance at the proper stage of tide. The maximum drafts of vessels using our ocean ports are usually a foot or more less than the depth available at mean low water. The point to be emphasized is that a depth of 21 feet at the project datum plane through the connecting channels of the Great Lakes, will permit the passage of vessels drawing one to three feet more than would ordinarily attempt to enter an Atlantic coast harbor having a similar depth at mean low water. In the statistical report of commerce passing through the canals at Sault Ste. Marie during the season of 1919. it is stated that "conditions at the wharves and in the channels of the Great Lakes system limit the draft of vessels to about 21 feet" ; that is, vessels using these channels draw as much and in some cases more than the stated depths of the channels. At the exposed entrances of Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific coast harbors, a de])th of 23 to 25 feet is necessary for the safe navigation of vessels of similar draft. Speed of vessels in restricted channels of the Great Lakes. — 'Ihe shoal portions of the through channels of the Great Lakes are not of great length, and the diminution of speed required for their safe navigation is very small. Vessels normally having GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 165 a speed of 12 miles an hour reduce their speed to 8 to 10 miles per hour when passing through these channels. At the hearing held at Sault Ste. Alarie. Mich., on May 10, 1920, Mr. L. C. Sabin, General Superintendent of the St. Marys Falls Canal, testified that in taking the actual passage of four steamers at random in the St. Marys River, he found that the average time for three trips each going upstream from Sailors' Encamp- ment to the Canal, 22.08 miles, amounted to a total of 2 hours and 23 minutes, including all delays, showing a speed of 8.8 miles per hour. Downstream for a distance of 22.49 miles it takes 2.53 hours, an average of 8.9 miles per hour. Allowing 20 min- utes for supplies, the running time is 10 miles per hour. Mr. Sabin stated that between 8 and 10 miles per hour may be ex- pected in channels of this kind, of which about three-fourths are improved, and that such channels are properly considered re- stricted because they have been dredged out and are very narrow. (See pp. 662-663 of the record.) Chatter XIII CHARACTER OF NAVIGATION TO BE PROVIDED ON THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER The effect on the earnings of a vessel due to passage through restricted channels is due almost entirely to the greater time re- quired to make the journey. The passage through the canals and dredged channels between Montreal and Duluth under the pro- posed project for the deep waterway will involve a total delay of about 12.6 hours as compared with the navigation of an equal distance in open waters. This loss of time will lessen the earning ability of the vessel to practically the same extent as an increase of 120 miles in the length of her voyage. Such an increase in dis- tance in a voyage of between 3,000 and 5,000 miles is of no conse- quence. Vessels now make the same rates from Europe to all north Atlantic ports of the United States and to Montreal, not- withstanding differences in distance of over 500 miles. Where the restricted channel constitutes only a small portion of a long route, the history of navigation shows that there is no perceptible disadvantage to commerce. The extensive use of important re- stricted waterways such as the Manchester Canal, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the Kiel Canal, the Amsterdam Canal, and others, fully sustains this assertion. Navigation on the St. Lawrence will not be excessively restricted. — The instructions to the engineers require considera- tion of channels 25 and 30 feet deep at low water in the St. Law- rence River between Lake Ontario and Montreal. The im- provement by the United States at Ogdensburg on the St. Lawrence River is based upon a plane of low water, corre- sponding to a Lake Ontario stage of 244.5 feet above mean sea level. The St. Lawrence River has a discharge of 241,000 cubic feet per second at mean stage of Lake Ontario, which is 246.18 feet above mean sea level. The provision of a channel 25 feet deep at low water in the St. Lawrence River will ordi- narily afford sufficient depth for the passage of vessels loaded to 25 or 26 feet, and will compare favorably with the capacity of an ocean harbor having an exposed entrance channel of 28 to 30 feet. Contrary to the views of some opponents of this improvement, whose views are given in the record, the navigation of the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Lake Ontario will involve but little of the restricted naviga- tion usually characteristic of canals. In fact, the naviga- tion above Montreal will in some respects be superior to that now existing in portion-- of the channel between Montreal and 166 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 167 Quebec, and it can scarcely be claimed that the navigation of the St. Lawrence River up to Montreal is impracticable for ocean vessels. Montreal is a successful ocean port, with a rapidly increasing commerce. In the year 1919 a larger quantity of wheat was shipped to Europe from Montreal by way of the St. Lawrence River than from any port in the United States except New York. The navigation of the St. Lawrence River below Montreal must therefore be considered as thoroughly practicable. From Montreal to Lake Ontario, which is the stretch of river now under consideration, is a distance of 182 miles, and in this stretch there are a number of falls and rapids at present sur- mounted by lateral canals having a depth of 14 feet and a total length of about 46 miles. Under present conditions, there is also some open river navigation that might be regarded as re- stricted, but with the improvements proposed this section of the river will consist of long pools created by dams extending across the stream, and affording full speed navigation for vessels ex- cept at the six or seven locks and possibly in a canal section about 20 miles long between Lake St. Francis and Montreal, in- volving a total delay of not exceeding 5 hours. The other artifi- cial canals to be passed to reach the head of the Lakes are the Welland Canal, 25 miles long, the St. Clair Flats Canal, 3.5 miles long, and the St. Marys Falls Canal. 1.6 miles long. In all, 14 lockages will be required to reach Duluth, and 13 lockages to reach Chicago. The total length of canals at the present time is 76.1 miles which, as just stated, will be reduced by the proposed improvement of the St. Lawrence River. In addition, there are now 74 miles of improved river channel where a reduction in speed of 1 to 3 miles per hour only is necessary. The total time lost in the entire trip between Duluth and Liverpool will not exceed 13 hours, and may be less. The following table shows the lengths of restricted channel and the probable time required for the trip: 168 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE j: s« c .A 0. •* c 1 o s 2 SEg « oc r^ oc c c fo r, C o 0. y c K ■c TT — T! (^ >c « 8 0( • o i -tS E •^ "^ •Cl, Q « ■* c o . S " ^•^ »^ E 3 d c •C vC 1 f^. B< a V- _ o j2 HJ3 .2-5! c ^ ». OS a> U g- -c IT- c -" 01 .^ " \r. 6 '-l^S 1l n '-'. f C C 10 d 5 s a •^"S CA 1-^ B C V J^ IW p •» 8 .2 E t^-\ 'q C fo 1^ (ui2 f* r 4 >■ « i^ r^ ^ >o c r- rM K p i — _ 0( OF 0. p<- ■*' It .0 r*" "■ "■ oc a •^J <\ be "^ z. ••S'lfeS ^ '^i ^ g r. ) 1^ ^ , ^ '^ r^ r* K-2 c c a'E^i ■" V 0. 55 C S It C > « S ■/ -. c 5 C » C ■- c J C s o> «E Q r. 5 « c i t- n ', r 4 e ^ \ ; r-; i ) >< \ » C D 01 3 l>I c Q 5 b 2 i 'a C ; : <. 9 ; c c ■■ 1 : S CT" c ' 1 "^ 3 J 1 (5 - ; t » 1 c c > : « > : 3 8 t 5 'il : '1 ■ 1 u y 5 J 5 * — a C ' '- t c c '- u c- i U ^ 3 Q ^ 3 D fl nJ * ; rt ti z 3 S"!* ^ { i ^ _ ; J J U 3 -(^ .p - i I ; ■ xc a 3 : I ^ c : 00 c^ K ~ 2 C 3 fc ts tJ: if. 3 1 ■5- tt ^ »' - o « ^ c 7 ft •a w « pj; O « GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 169 Effect of restricted channels on vessel costs and rates. — The effect on the earnings of the vessel due to passage through re- stricted channels is due almost entirely to the greater time required to make the journey. The same effect upon the earnings of the vessel would be produced if this additional time were lost in ocean travel, and a loss of 12 hours time in passing through the restricted portions of the St. Lawrence route lessens the earning ability of the vessel to practically the same extent as an increase of 120 miles in the length of her voyage. We know that such an increase on a voyage of between 3.000 and 5,000 miles is of no importance. Vessels make the same rate from ■ Europe to all North Atlantic ports, although Baltimore is 550 miles farther from Liverpool than Boston and requires 48 hours additional time. It is surprising to know that men supposed to be informed on shipping can contend that the small loss of time to be occasioned in passing through the restricted sections of the St. Lawrence River will have a controlling influence on the utilization of this route. Where the restricted channel con- stitutes only a small portion of a long route, as in the present case, the history of navigation shows that there is no perceptible disadvantage to commerce. A few instances will be cited. The Manchester Canal. — In 1880 the City of Manchester found its industrial prosperity in danger of extinction due to the ex- cessive costs of shipping through Liverpool, which involved a transfer from vessel to car and a 45-mile haul by rail. Engi- neers said that a ship canal to Manchester was impracticable, and traffic men said that no vessel would ever use it. The condi- tions were somewhat similar to those now confronting the St. Lawrence project. Manchester was obliged to fight the oppo- sition of the Liverpool interests, but she kept doggedly on and in 1894 the canal was completed at a cost of more than $100,- 000,000. A port was developed with modern econoinical termi- nals, and the upper end of the canal was broadened into a basin lined with mile after mile of warehouses. Manchester's trade came back, her prosperity returned, and she is once again one of the chief centers of industrial activity of the world. The benefits gained by avoiding trans-shipment at Liverpool are shown by Mr. Wm. E. Curtis in a letter from Manchester pub- lished in the Chicago Record-Herald on October 20. 1908: Before the canal was built all the cotton consunred in the Manchester district, which is the largest manufacturing district in the world, had to be unloaded from the ocean steamers at Liverpool, hauled tbrough that 170 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE city on carts to a railway station, carried to Manchester by rail, unloaded from the cars into warehouses and then hauled to the factories by wagons at a total expense of 14 shillings, 8 pence per ton — about $3.66 in our money. Of this the dock charge was 3 shillings, the cost of handling 1 shilling 3 pence, cartage to railway 1 shilling 3 pence, freight to Manchester 7 shillings 2 pence, cartage to factories 2 shillings — which equals 14 shillings 8 pence. In the saving of this high charge of $3.66 per ton rested the justification for the construction of the Manchester Canal, which involves 35.5 miles of restricted navigation. The total rise from the water level at Liverpool to Manchester is 60 feet, which is overcome by five sets of locks. The canal passes through a populous section and is crossed by eight bridges and viaducts. It is worthy of note that the same rates apply to Manchester as to Liverpool. The Suez Canal. — The Suez Canal was opened for the passage of vessels November 17, 1869. It has a length of 87 nautical miles or about 102 statute miles, and a present depth of about 36 feet 1 inch, with a bottom width of 137 feet. The total cost to 1912 was approximately $127,000,000. It is a sea-level canal, and about two-thirds of its length is through shallow lakes. It should be noted that the construction through shallow lakes art'ords no advantage to navigation over a land cut of suitable cross section. It has been found that channels constructed through wide shallow lakes are difficult to maintain and are more difticult to follow than land cuts. The total length of restricted navigation through this canal may, therefore, be placed at 100 miles. The net tonnage of the Suez Canal has increased l-rogressively from 436,609 tons in 1870 t(T over 20.000.000 tons in 1913, and the tendency is still upward, although the traffic was impaired during the War. The earnings and profits of the (anal ('onipany are very large. The Panama Canal. — The Panama Canal was ofticially opened on August 16. 1914. Its length is 40^ j miles from shore to shore, and about 50 miles between deep water at its two ex- tremes. It has a nn'nimum depth of 41 feet and a ininimum width of 300 feet, the average bottom width being 649 feet. The summit level is 85 feet above sea level, this rise being over- come by locks. The total cost of its construction is placed at $400,000,000. and the yearly cost of its operation is estimated at $3,500,000. The traffic has grown from 4.969.790 cargo tons in 1915 to over 8.000,000 cargo tons in 1920. The distance from New "S'ork to San Franci-co by way of the Magellan Strait is GREAT LAKi:S-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 171 15,126 Statute miles, while the distance by way of the Panama Canal is 6.059 statute miles, a saving of over 9,000 miles. The distance from Liverpool to San Francisco via Magellan Strait is 15.548 miles, as compared with 9,024 miles via the Panama Canal, a saving of over 6,500 miles. There is an extensive coast- wise movement through this canal between Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States, involving distances of over 6,000 miles. The Kiel Canal. — The Kiel Canal, also known as the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and the North Sea-Baltic Canal, was opened in 1895. The length of the canal is 61 miles, the terminus in the Baltic Sea being at the harbor of Kiel. This canal has been deepened and provided with locks larger than those of the Panama Canal, in order to accommodate the largest battleships. The Helder or Holland Canal. — This canal extends from Amsterdam to Helder, a distance of 51 miles, and avoids the shoals of the Zuyder Zee. It has been described as "the chief cause of the prosperity of Amsterdam." The Amsterdam Canal. — With the development of the shipping industry, the dimensions of the Helder Canal became inadequate, and to maintain the commercial position of Amsterdam the con- struction of a new and larger canal was undertaken. This canal, known as the Amsterdam Canal, has a length of iSjA miles. Its effect upon the commerce of Amsterdam was instantaneous. For twenty years the tonnage statistics of shipping at that port had shown almost a complete stagnation, but in six years after the opening of the new canal the tonnage had doubled. The Amsterdam and Manchester Canals were each constructed to serve the needs of a single port, and their potential economic value must be regarded as very much less than that of the Panama Canal, Suez Canal, and the proposed St. Lawrence waterway, which connect large bodies of water and afford communica- tion with- a large number of ports. In our own country, we have some instances of artificial waterways leading up to single ports. Among these may be mentioned the Houston Ship Chan- nel, extending 50 miles in a northwesterly direction across Gal- veston Bay through the San Jacinto River and Buffalo Bayou. This waterway is 25 feet deep at mean low tide, 150 feet wide on bottom across Galveston Bay and 100 feet wide on bottom in the river section. It has exercised an important influence upon the development of commerce of Houston, Tex., and not- withstanding the 50 miles of restricted navigation, vessels make the same rate to Houston as to Galveston. A similar situation 172 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL is found at Sabine. Beaumont, and Orange, Tex. At this lo- cality, the entering vessel first passes through Sabine Pass, 7 miles long, and thence through Port Arthur Canal, a further distance of 7 miles to Port Arthur. From this point to Beaumont by way of the Sabine-Neches Canal is a further distance of 35 miles, making a total distance of 49 miles from the sea. of which more than 40 miles are restricted navigation. Notwithstanding this supposed handicap, the commerce of Beaumont has grown from 157,797 tons in 1914 to over a million tons at the present time. Vessels make the same rate to Beaumont as to Port Arthur. From this information, it will be seen that while the loss of time involved in passing through restricted channels of 50 to 100 miles in length increases the cost of the boat's operation in proportion to the additional time required, the increased cost is not sufficient to affect steamship rates. The rate on grain from Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco to all north Atlantic ports of the United States is the same, although the ditference in distance may amount to nearly 1.000 miles, and in time to 80 to 100 hours. The additional time consumed is about eight times that lost on account of restricted navigation in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence route, but the loss in earning power is not sufficient to affect the rate. Many examples could be cited -bowing similar rate conditions. Chapter XIV COMPARISON OF THE ST. LAWRENCE WITH OTHER OCEAN ROUTES The European analogies afford abundant encouragement for the expectation of a commensurate utilization of the St. Law- rence ship channel. From London to Genoa by water is 2,500 statute miles, while the distance by rail is about the same as from Chicago to New York. The water distance is about 2^ times the rail distance and yet it is not customary to ship from London to Genoa by rail, but by water. From London to Con- stantinople by rail is 2,176 statute miles, while the water distance is about 3,800 statute miles. Regardless of the saving by rail of 1,600 to 1,700 miles, the main freight traffic is by water through Gibraltar and not by rail. Other European analogies show similar conditions. The St. Lawrence ship channel will afford greater opportunities than the Manchester or Kiel Canals. It will give access to 2,700 miles of coast dotted with rich and productive industrial cities offering unusual inducement to vessels in the way of well balanced cargoes. European distances. — Charts for full-powered steam vessels prepared by the Hydrographic Office, United States Navy, show some extremely interesting figures. Montreal and New York are almost exactly the same distance from Gibraltar, and the distance from New York to London is a little farther than from New York to Gibraltar. The point is this : It is about as near by water from the lake ports to Montreal as it is by rail to New Yofk. but once in Montreal it is no farther by water to Gibraltar than it is from New York to Gibraltar and to all the ports of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. All of southern Europe, North Africa, the Near East, South Russia, and India, are just as close to the Great Lakes ports by the all-water route as by the rail-and- water route via New York. When one considers the North Sea and Baltic Sea ports, all of the rich area of northwestern and northern Europe and Russia, the advantage is distinctly in favor of the St. Lawrence route by several hundred miles. Therefore, if port expenses and dis- patch are equal, once the St. Lawrence is opened, the Great Lakes ports Avould have an advantage over New York in time and distance to all northern Europe and the British Isles, and an equal chance to southern Europe, north Africa, the Near East, and India. But, considering the enormous cost of getting goods through the congested port of New York and the possi- 173 174 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE bilities of building absolutely modern ports on the Great Lakes, the potential advantages to lake-coast shippers through the St. Lawrence are so enormous that there is simply no room for argument. Europe affords another anology. Viewing Montreal, New York, London, and Gibraltar as four points from which radi- ate steamship lines, we find some very interesting compari- sons. \\'e may argue this way : before the war, before Eu- rope got all cracked up, it was the usual thing to ship goods from London to Genoa, or from London to the Baltic ports by water and not by rail. We find the steaming distance from London to Gibraltar is 1,351 nautical miles, thence 860 nautical miles to (Jenoa, a total of 2,211 nautical miles, or about 2,500 land miles. The distance from New York to Montreal is 1,460 nautical miles, plus 1,082 nautical miles to Chicago, or 2,542 nautical miles or about 3,000 land miles. In this particular case the distance from New York to Chicago would be about 500 land miles farther than from London to Genoa. From London to Genoa by rail, that is, from Calais by rail, would be about the same distance as from Chicago to New York by rail. The water distance is about 2^ to 3 times the rail distance, and yet it is not customary to ship from London to Genoa by rail, but by water. From London to Constantinople by rail is 2,176 land miles, and from London to Gibraltar and thence to Constantinople by water is 3,175 nautical miles, or about 3,800 statute miles. Regardless of a saving by rail of 1,600 to 1,700 miles, ^the main freight traffic is by water around through Gibraltar and not by rail. Whether you take Hamburg, or Havre, or Antwerp or London as the starting point, our European analogies will indi- cate that rather than ship overland by rail all of these points ship to the Mediterranean, even twice as far, by water. If Europe ships out and around by water, rather than across by rail, why not through the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence? Better than Manchester. — The confined chaiincl and locks of the St. Lawrence and the new Welland Canal will not exceed fifty miles. Wide river navigation, when the channels are well lighted, offers no particular obstacle to ocean vessels. Bearing in mind this fifty miles of restricted waterway, wc find that 5,000,000 tons of shipping every year are willing to pass by Liverpool and go up 35^ miles of canal and through five sets of canal locks in order to reach the one city of Manchester. By entering the Great Lakes a vessel could reach numerous Man- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 175 cliesters and have a choice of any one of them. It is fair to assume that with adequate port facilities, at least 5,000.000 tons could be induced to work through fifty miles of canal and locks to enter the Great Lakes to reach a far bigger prize than that at the end of the Manchester Ship Canal. More useful than Kiel. — The best illustration for our argu- ment is the Kiel Canal. The Kiel Canal is 61 miles long. It is used, not to reach an otherwise inaccessible place, but only to save distance, and only a few hundred miles out of 1,400 at that. The Baltic was not opened to ocean navigation by the Kiel Canal. Since the dawn of history the Baltic was opened to navigation around Jutland through the Skagerack and Kattegat. For in- stance, the port of Riga from London is 988 miles through the Kiel Canal and 1,400 miles through the Skagerack. a saving of 412 miles. In normal times most vessels prefer to go through the 61 miles of the Kiel Canal and pay the dues rather than take the longer trip around Jutland, in order to save only 400 miles of steaming. If vessels going from London and other channels and north seaports to Baltic ports will pass through 61 miles of canal in order to save 400 miles in distance, would they not be willing to pass through 50 miles of canal that is the only avenue of entry and will give access to 2,700 miles of coast dotted with rich and productive industrial cities? Petrograd is just about as far from London as Duluth or Chicago is from Montreal. The reply then to our second query, "Will ocean ships enter the Great Lakes?" must be very strongly in the affirmative. According to all that other ship canals of the world can show us this would be the case. 176 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL J«Tt fM O vO — \C "^ O '^1 w '^ "". 1^ rO O ■* "O •>i< c»5 lO oo !-0 vO ■^ I'l O ro a\ 00 r^ iri r^ O —1 -"f ^^^ ri< CN r^ CN r^ ::> — 22 *£» 5 -^ ■; fvi fv) 00 r^ O' O O 00 iE^Ooo^^^<~ou^r^■^C^ o ^ o o :: r^ j: -f.T7:a^ mo 3^-^, -t ao — " '^1 " O^ ' • i rr "^1 ^ O lO -f <^- C o 50° w ^ '\ '//////,'//"i). % (North Arldntic Ocean L ambert Hro/ecTion) m o Chapter XV NAVIGATION CONDITIONS ON THE ST. LAWRENCE ROUTE The length of the navigation season on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Ship Channel will be about 215 days, but it will be possible to extend this season by the use of ice breakers. The Barge Canal has no advantage over the St. Lawrence River in respect to the length of the navigation season. The St. Law- rence below Quebec seldom, if ever, freezes completely over. The harbors and bays of the Gulf and lower St. Lawrence freeze early in December, but the Gulf itself does not freeze over so as to prevent navigation by vessels properly equipped to withstand ice. Cabot Strait is never frozen completely over, and sealing steamers use the strait throughout the winter. Experience on the Baltic indicates that by the use of powerful ice breakers and the maintenance of an international ice patrol and an ice signal system, it would be possible to extend greatly the period of navi- gation by modern steamers between the upper St. Lawrence and the open sea. Observations by the Hydrographic Office of the U. S. Navy and the U. S. Weather Bureau show that the areas of greatest fog frequency are southeast of Newfoundland where the cold Arctic waters come in contact with the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. The amount of fog encountered on routes between North Atlantic ports and Europe is very much greater than is encountered on the routes between the St. Lawrence River and similar points. Length of navigation season. — Xavigation on the Great Lakes usually opens about the latter part of April and closes in De- cember, making an average of eight months each year. Many of the car ferries, however, operate the entire year. The num- ber of days the St. Marys Falls Canals were opened, 1891 to 1909. was 219 to 264 days a year. The data available at the time of the report of the United States Deep Waterways Commission indicated a navigation sea- son of 235 days at Montreal, 216 days at Lachine, 253 days at Lake St. Francis, 220 days at Cornwall, 224 days at Farran Point, 247 days at Buffalo, and 237 days at Welland. It was stated, however, that the records were incomplete and general dedtic-tions were not warranted. With the records of more than twenty subsequent years now available, however, the results do not differ greatly, as will !)e seen from tiie following table giving the latest information. 177 178 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Table showing length of navigation season it selected points along route of proposed deep waterway. Locality Average date of Average date of opening of closing of navigation ' navigation Average length of navigation season Days Duluth, Minn | April 22 December 15 St. Marys Falls Canal ... April 26 December 6 Straits of Mackinac ^ April 12 [ December 15 St. Clair River March 31 I December 19 Detroit River March 30 \ December 18 Cleveland, Ohio Alarch 26 December 22 Buffalo, N. Y ; April 9 December 12 Welland Canal April 17 December 10 Oswego, X. Y j April 5 December 13 Lachine Canal i April 30 December 1 Montreal April 24 November 25 237 224 247 263 263 271 248 237 252 215 215 From the above it will be seen that the latest average date of the opening of navigation is April 30 at the Lachine Canal, and the earliest average date of closing is November 25 at Montreal. The date of closing of navigation at Montreal is the average date of the last sailing to sea. \\'ith the St. Lawrence canalized, some increase in the navigation season might be expected in the upper part of the river as compared with the present small lateral canals, and a navigation season averaging 215 days, cor- responding to the average time between the first and last sailing at Montreal, is conservative. The average time of actual closing of navigation at Montreal is stated by the Hydrographic Office of the United States Navy to be about the middle of December. Navigation opened on the 23rd of April. 1912. and closed on the 3rd of January, 1913. Below Montreal ice-breaking steamers have been in operation, by means of which the channel has been opened about two weeks earlier than formerly. In the report on the survey of the proposed Georgian Bay Canal, traversing a more northerly route and less commodious water- ways,, it was estimated that the navigation season for that canal would average 210 days. The length of the navigation season of the St. Lawrence River as compared with that of general lake navigation is of im- portance in determining the value of the proposed deep water- way. So far as the average dates afifect this question, it will be seen that a vessel which might leave Duluth on, say, April 24, could pass through .^t. Marys Falls Canal on April 26, and GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 179 would have an unobstructed course until she reached the Lachine Canal, which would be open on April 30. Average dates are of little value, however, in considering the conditions that might be encountered on a through trip. Apparently, eastbound vessels would in general be able to proceed from Lake Superior points at the opening of navigation without delay, and from Lake Michigan points with but little delay. \'essels loaded with grain now winter in Buffalo Harbor, thus greatly increasing the avail- able grain storage facilities of that port beyond the capacity of its elevators, and enabling ex-lake shipments to be made two to three weeks earlier than would be the case if these vessels were to load at Duluth upon the opening of navigation. The worst part of the entire route, from the standpoint of navigation season, appears to be the section of the St. Lawrence River between Lake St. Francis and Montreal. With the river improved, as pro- posed, however, the navigation season on the St. Lawrence might be lengthened so that there would be little practical difference between the average season on this river and at St. Marys Falls Canals. Even under present conditions, the difference is so small as to exercise no important effect upon the general utility of the proposed deep waterway. Table showing the dates of the opening and closing of Canadian Canals for the sea'^ons 1916, 1Q17 and 1918. Lachine Soulanges Cornwall ( Farran's Point Williamsburg -j Rapide Plat . , Galops Welland Sault Ste. Marie 1916 Opened Closed Opened Closed Opened Closed Apr. 26 Dec. 15 Apr. 25 Dec. 15 Apr. 30 Apr. 26 Dec. 15 Apr. 25 Dec. 15 May 1 Apr. 24 Dec. 14 Apr. 17 Dec. 12 Apr. 24 Apr. 24 Dec. 16 Apr. 17 Dec. 10 Apr. 26 Apr. 24 Dec. 16 Apr. 17 Dec. 10 Apr. 24 Apr. 24 Dec. 16 Apr. 17 Dec. 10 Apr. 24 Apr. 22 Dec. 16 Apr. 18 Dec. 8 Apr. 2.^ Apr. 18 Dec. 19 Apr. 25 Dec. 16 Apr. 2.3 Dec. 17 Dec. 17 Dec. 17 Dec. 16 Dec. 16 Dec. 16 Dec. 20 Dec. 17 The Erie Canal between 1891 and 1909 opened usually the first week in May and closed early in December. The average length of season between 1891 and^l905 was 216 days. The .season does not differ materially from that of the St. Lawrence River, and neither the Erie nor Oswego barge canal route would afford any appreciable advantages over the St. Lawrence route in this respect. The dates given for the opening and closing of na\igation at Montreal take into consideration the conditions in tlie channels 180 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE lielow that point. XuLwithstanding- the tact that the navigation (if the lower St. Lawrence is known to be commercially tea.sible and vessels operate regularly between Montreal and the United Kingdom, the statement has been made that this route is bc^et by many dangers and difficulties, and that the cost of insurance on vessels and cargoes using it would be prohibitive. It there- fore appears to be advisable to examine into the facts. St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Quebec. — The dis- tance between Montreal and Quebec is 159 miles, of which about 88 miles is naturally deep water. The remainder has been dredged to provide a depth of 30 feet at extreme low water of 1897 from IMontreal to tide water at Batiscan, and 30 feet at extreme low tide thence to Quebec, the minimum width being 450 feet in the straight portions and from 550 to 750 feet at the bends. The St. Lawrence River Pilot, issued by the Hydro- graphic Office of the United States Navy, contains the following information relative to navigation on this section of the river: The weather on the St. Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal is remarkably favorable for navigation. Fogs are most unfrequent and of short duration. Smoke rarely affects day navigation. Snowstorms do not last over 24 hours. . . . Vessels drawing 28 feet can now navigate the St. Lawrence up to Montreal. The ship channel between Quebec and Montreal is marked with range lights and lightbuoys to facilitate navigation both by day and night for all vessels. The best time to leave Quebec when ascending the river in a steamer with a speed of 15 knots is at the top of high water, as the flood stream is then carri'cd as far as it goes. . . . Above Batiscan the current is always down, and between that and Lake St. Peter the effect of the tide is an increase or decrease in th'e rate of the downward current. The rate of the current varies throughout ; its general a\\;rage is 2'/.' miles an hour. It is greatest at Richelieu Rapids, at Caps a la Roche, and at St. Marys Rapid, in Montreal Harbor. No reliable rates have been obtained, but in some parts of the river it is about 1 mile an hour, in Lake St. Peter about ^^ mile an hour, and in St. Marys Rapid about 6 to 7 miles an hour. It is usually greater in spring tlian at other times of the year. St. Lawrence River below Quebec. — The stretch of river just below Quebec is divided into three channels, known as the South, Middle and North Channels. The South Channel is generally used for navigation. It is buoyed, has excellent anchorage, and the rate of flow is moderate in every part except for a few miles in the Traverse, at the upper end of which is a lighthouse and at the lower end a light-vessel. The Traverse mav be consid- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 181 ered the crucial point on the lower St. Lawrence, as the tidal streams here attain their greatest strength. In South Traverse the rate of ebb is 7 to 8 knots, and that of the flood 6 to 7>^ knots. The new 35- foot channel, which is in progress of con- struction, will utilize the North Channel. Below the Traverse there are no navigation difficulties due to restricted channel or excessiA^e currents. The river widens out and is in fact an estuary of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The Gulf of St. Lawrence. — The Gulf of St. Lawrence is an irregularly shaped inland sea, inclosed on its northern and south- western sides by Canadian territory, and on its eastern side by Newfoundland. It has an area of 101.562 square miles. Cabot Strait, its principal entrance, is 55 miles wide and lies between Cape Breton Island and Newfoundland. Belleisle Strait, by which it communicates with the Atlantic at its northeastern end, is about 10 miles wide. It is also connected with the ocean by the Gut of Canso. about ^ mile wide.. which separates Nova .Scotia from Cape Breton Island. The rate of the current in the Gulf seldom exceeds 1 mile an hour. Ice. — The St. Lawrence below Quebec seldom, if ever, freezes completely over. The harbors and bays in the lower part of the river begin to freeze early in December, and there is heavy ice at the mouth of the river toward the end of that month, lasting until about the middle of April, but during the season leads can be found wh^n the wind drives the ice to either side of the river. As a rule, navigation at Quebec is suspended from the 26th of November to the 27th of April. During the spring and autumn the navigation of the Gulf of St. Lawrence is rendered difficult by ice. and general navigation is suspended during the winter. In spring, generally until May, and sometimes early in June, parts of the Gulf are usually covered with drift ice, and if imprepared for it vessels may sufifer from it, but serious acci- dents from this cause do not frequently occur, as the ice is then generally more or less in a melting condition from the efifect of the sun and warmer winds. In autumn, accidents from ice seldom happen, except when winter commences unusually early or when vessels have lingered imprudently. Cabot Strait is never frozen completely over, but vessels not specially built to encounter ice can not navigate it safely between January and April. Seahng steamers use the strait throughout the winter. Ice from the Gulf is generally met with in Cabot .Strait earlv in January. At this time it is thin, but it increases gradually 182 ECONf)MIC ASPECTS OF THE to as much as 4 feet in thickness ; occasionally small bergs are seen, but a large berg is seldom visible. Ice may flow through until May or the beginning of June. Nearly every year between the middle of April and the middle of May, the ice forms a blockade between St. Paul Island and Cape Ray, known as the Bridge. In the Gulf the harbors and bays begin to freeze in December, and are usually closed to navigation at about the end of that month. Even in the southern part of the Gulf, navigation is not considered safe, on an average, after the tirst week in De- cember or before the 15th of April. The Gut of Canso and Northumberland Strait are rarely closed by ice after the 25th of April. At Belleisle Strait, the most northerly entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, thin sheet ice makes its appearance between the 15th and 25th of December, and at about the beginning of the year ice 3 to 10 feet in thickness passes between the coast of Labrador and Belle Isle, and drifts into the strait. Icebergs, which are liberated from the northerly regions during the sum- mer, do not begin to arrive in any great number until April. The greater number of the bergs enter between Belle Isle and Labrador, and pass slowly through the strait, frequently ground- ing and breaking up. No bergs drawing more than .^0 fathoms of water can reach the westerly end of the strait without break- ing up. Heavy drift ice also enters the strait with easterly winds during the latter part of May. The first steamers enter the strait between the 7th of June and 25th of July, and the last pass outward between the 11th and the 26th of November. On account of the varying conditions at the several entrances into the Gulf of St. Lawrence at different seasons, definite routes have been laid down for westbound and eastbound vessels. The routes for full-powered steamers between England and North America are as follows : Westbound. — From the 11th of April to the I5th of May and 15th of November to the 14th of February, inclusive: Steer on the Great Circle course to cross meridian of 50 degrees VV. in latitude 46 degrees N., whence steer to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. From 16th of May to the opening of the Belleisle Strait route: Steer Great Circle course to Cape Race, thence to the St. Lawrence. From the opening of Belleisle Strait to the 14th of November, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 183 inclusive : Steer on a course 10 miles north of the Great Circle track until approaching Belle Isle. Eastbound. — From the 11th of April to 15th of May and 15th of November to 14th of February, inclusive : Steer to latitude 45 degrees 30 minutes N., longitude 50 degrees W., and thence steer bv Great Circle. M W «> il ; 1 General enveloping lines of j ice. 1904-1913. ?a? .... i ... — - .... .... i 1 " ^ 4 "^ \ ^ i 4 \ \ ; r^ '*v^ I7i 7 ' , :' .^ y' u ^' i V \ '•. v^ i / U4 LV'<^ > \ ■^ % '^'5i *5i> ^^ \ ^ H Y ^i. ••> ^ \ \ \ M- X s \ 1 1 1 K^■ \^\ Tr \\ ^^ I. ^L i f / / r ^ \ ''■■ V ^ xJ .... f- .... - ..|.._ -- 1 1 / / .... _/ \ ! ^ \ N-. 1/ Li^^ f\ \ \ V Mw *fa Ki>i ^ \ \ •-=-?« _^ ^ / 1 i -4. .^ 1 j -- -' '" 1 M i i : 1 " ; M -^ 4C 1| From the 16th of May to the opening of the Belleisle Strait route : Steer to Cape Race, and thence Great Circle. From the opening of Belleisle Strait route to 14th of Novem- ber, inclusive : Steer from Belle Isle on a course 10 miles south of the Great Circle track. Ice movements in the North Atlantic Ocean. — .\11 ocean routes 184 ECONOMIC ASl'tCTS CF THE have some dangers. The Hydrographic Office states that "ves- sels crossing the Atlantic Ocean between Europe and the ports of the United States and British America are liable to encounter icebergs or extensive fields of compact ice. which are carried southward from the Arctic resrion bv the ocean currents. It is in the vicinity of the great bank of Newfoundland that these masses of ice appear in the greatest numbers and drift farthest southward." The accompanying charts show the areas in which icebergs and field ice have been reported by mariners in tlic years 1904 to 1913, in the months of April. May, and June, when they occur in the greatest number. Another chart is presented show- (;reat lakes-st. lawrence ship channel 185 ing the general limits in which icebergs and field ice have been encountered during the same months. The locality in which ice of all kinds is most apt to be found during the months of April, May. and June, lies between latitude 42 and 45 degrees, and longitude 47 and 52 degrees west of Greenwich. Here the Gulf Stream and the Labrador current meet, and the movement of the ice is influenced sometimes by the one and sometimes by the other of these currents. This area is well to the south of the entrance to Belleisle Strait and the St. Lawrence River, but envelops the steamer tracks to the North Atlantic ports of the United States. 186 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE In April, May, and June, icebergs have been seen as far south as latitude 37 degrees 50 minutes N., and as far east as longi- tude 38 degrees W. Exceptional drifts have occurred almost down to latitude 30 degrees north, and between longitude 10 and 7b degrees west, in these months as well as during other seasons of the year. Between Newfoundland and the 40th parallel, floating ice may be met in any month, but not often from August to December. For more complete information relative to ice and its movement in the .\orth Atlantic Ocean, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 187 reference is made to Reprint No. 2 of December 1, 1917, en- titled "North Atlantic Ice Movements," published by the Hydro- graphic Otifice, U. S. Navy. In brief, the information given therein shows that while ice conditions at Belleisle Strait and the Gulf of St. Lawrence at certain periods of the year are such as to require careful navigation, the shipping lanes between North Atlantic ports and Europe are by no means immune from these dangers, and on both of these routes the navigator" must exercise caution and keep a sharp lookout west of the 40th degree of longitude. The ice problem in the Baltic Sea. — The interference of ice with navigation in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Finds a close parallel in the Baltic Sea. The navigation season in the Baltic as a rule extends from April to December. On account of the many fresh waters emptying into this sea its sa- linity is only about 1 per cent, and consequently it freezes at about 30 degrees Fahrenheit. Ice often begins to form first at the bottom, and it is frequently brought up in fishermen's nets at depths of 10 to 15 fathoms while the surface is still clear. The Gulf of Bothnia, the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, areas in the vicinity of the Finnish Islands and the Aland Islands, and portions of the Gulf of Riga freeze over so as to prevent all navigation for a period of 4 to 6 months. Along the Swedish shore the water freezes usually as far as Stockholm, but the winter temperatures on this shore are milder than on the Russian coast. Southward of the Gulf of Riga, the Baltic rarely, if ever, freezes. While the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland is usually completely frozen over by the end of January, the Gulf of Riga rarely freezes over, but usually ice makes out from the shores from 1^^ to 2 miles. Fixed ice very rarely occurs at the ports of Libau and Windau, and then only in severe winters and for a very short time. For navigational purposes these ports may be considered as ice free. All ports in the Gulf of Finland are blocked by ice from about the first of January until the first of April. However, ice breakers have little difticulty in keeping channels to open water from ports with which it may be particularly desirable to have communication. Ice in the Gulf of Finland varies in thickness from 9 inches to 3 feet. Even through the latter the heavy ice breakers go at a speed of 6 to 8 knots. These ice breakers not only keep open the channels of the Baltic Sea itself, but also the channels of the important rivers flowing into 188 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE the sea. The Hydrographic Office of the United States Navy makes the following statement: The conditions of winter navigation in the Baltic are now being modified by the gradual introduction of ice breakers. They may be said to be of two kinds : Those designed for the purpose of keeping a port open by constantly passing up and down the channel to be frozen, and those for the navigation of waters lightly froz-en over. They are very strongly built vessels with a spoon bow, and break the ice partly by impact and partly by crushing it under this bow. and have l)roved to be verj' efficient. The ice breakers have proved that they are of enormous value to the shipping of the ports of Swinemiinde and Stettin. The mails between Stockholm and Hango in Finland are. during winter, 1)1 )W carried on by one of these vessels. In addition to the effective work of ice breakers in keeping Open the channels to Baltic ports, a system of ice signals has been devised in order to give the mariner the earliest possible information as to the state and condition of the ice. Ice signals are not shown from light vessels or ice signal stations until navi- gation is closed for sailing vessels. These ice signals have been established not only in the main passage between the North Sea and the Baltic, but also along the Swedish. German, and Russian coasts. The results accomplished in keeping open the ports of the Baltic Sea and the channels of the rivers emptying into this sea are capable of duplication in the St. Laurence River. The im- portance of the commerce zvhich -will ntiljce the St. Lawrence amply justifies the maintetiance of ati international ice patrol and an ice signal system, which would greatly extend the period of nai'igation by modern steamers beticecn the upper St. Law- rence and the open sea. Fogs. — Fogs occur in the gulf and river during the open or navigable season, and sometimes last several days. They are most frequent during the early part of the summer and seldom fail to accompany an easterly wind, though they are rare during westerly winds. Westerly winds become more frequent toward summer, and southwesterly winds prevail in summer in all parts of the gulf and river. It is unusual for a very heavy gale to occur between May and October, although fresh to strong breezes are common. In view of the statements made by opponents of the St. Lawrence River improvement regarding the prevalence of fog on this route, a study has been made of the most reliable data on this subject to determine the relative frequency of fog (;keat lakes-st. lawrence shii" channel 189 on a route extending from the St. Lawrence River to Europe, as compared with the existing routes from north Atlantic ports to Europe. The area of greatest fog frequency in the north Atlantic Ocean is southeast of Newfoundland where the warm waters of the Gulf Stream meet the cold Arctic waters. The heavy fogs from this source extend southward and envelop the steamer tracks from north Atlantic ports to Europe. From this center of greatest fog frequency, the fog diminishes in all directions, although in some months there is another area of great fog frequency directly east of Boston and New York. The follow- ing is a description of the average conditions during each month of the year as shown by charts recording the results of observa- tions made by the Hydrographic Ofifice of the Navy Department and the Weather Bureau of the Department of Agriculture : Fog Frequency in the North Atlantic Ocean Jamiarx. — St. Lawrence closed by ice, and free from fog. Ten per cent fog is found from Atlantic ports to the meeting of the Gulf Stream and Arctic current southeast of Newfound- land, where there is 30 to 35 per cent fog. Beyond this area the percentage of days with fog diminishes to about 5 per cent. Fcbruarx. — St. Lawrence closed by ice, and free from fog. Area of greatest fog southeast of Newfoundland, 30 to 35 per cent. Routes from Atlantic ports are south of this area and fog is not of great importance. March. — St. Lawrence closed and 'no fog shown. No icebergs near Belle Isle, but a number shown southeast of Newfoundland. Immediatelv southeast of Newfoundland is an area of 40 to 45 per cent fog. but this does not extend to the steamship lanes be- tween the United States and Europe. The routes from Atlantic ports to Europe are in 10 to 20 per cent fog for about 1,000 miles, after which there is little or no fog until the British Isles are approached. April. — Mouth of St. Lawrence and Belleisle Strait are indi- cated as free from fog. Extensive areas of fog are shown south- east of Newfoundland with 20 to 35 per cent on the steamship lanes between ports of the United States and Europe and 40 to 45 -per cent between these lanes and Newfoundland. Beyond these areas the fog frequency decreases to 10 and 5 per cent. May. — No- fog is shown at the mouth of the St. Lawrence or in Belleisle Strait. East and southeast of Newfoundland is an area of 40 to 45 per cent days with fog, diminishing in all 190 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE directions therefrom. The steamer route to Europe from Bos- ton passes through another area of 40 to 45 per cent fog and is in 20 to 30 per cent fog for a distance of about 1,000 miles. New York and Philadelphia are in an area of 30 per cent fog. June. — The amount of fog at the mouth of the St. Lawrence and in Belleisle Strait is not shown. The greatest frequency is found in an area of 60 to 65 per cent fog east and southeast of Newfoundland, reducing in all directions therefrom. Thirty per cent is shown in the Gulf of St. Lawrence just west of Newfoundland, with probably 20 per cent at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. Ofif Boston and New York is an area of 40 to 45 per cent, and the 30 per cent area extends as far south as Norfolk. No icebergs are shown in or near Belleisle Strait, but a large number of them are indicated close to the steamer track between Atlantic ports and Europe. The routes from Boston and New York are in 30 per cent fog or more for about 1,200 miles, after which they enter areas of diminished fog frequency. Jitly. — The conditions during July are worthy of careful ob- servation. Fog areas of 10 to 50 per cent envelop the entire north Atlantic coast and Gulf of St. Lawrence. The mouth of the St. Lawrence is in an area of 10 to 20 per cent fog. Belleisle Strait is between the curves of 40 and 50 per cent. Portland, Me., is in a 50 per cent area. Boston 45 per cent. New York 35 per cent, Philadelphia 30 per cent, and the 10 per cent line is between Baltimore and Norfolk. The area of greatest fog frequency, amounting to 50 to 55 per cent, extends southeastward from Newfoundland, and is of wide area, including all of New- foundland except its northerly extremity and extending south- eastward along the Atlantic Coast nearly to Boston. Belleisle Strait is in practically the same relative position to this area as Boston. On the St. Lati'vcncc route to Europe the 20 per cent curyc is passed about 600 miles off Belle Jsle, hut the routes from North .Itlantic ports have from 1,200 to 1,500 miles in areas of 20 per cent or greater fog frequency. No icebergs are shown in Belleisle Strait, nor in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but some are shown in and near the routes to Atlantic ports. August.- — The mouth of the St. Lawrence is in an area of 10 per cent days with fog. Belleisle Strait shows 20 per cent. The greatest per cent of fog is found in a very small area o\ 40 to 45 per cent southeast of Newfoundland. Outside Belie Isle the 20 per cent area extends for about 500 miles, after wliich the 10 per cent area extends for a distance of 800 to 1.000 miles, de- pending upon the route. Beyond this the 5 per cent area is entered. An examination of the map shows that the routes from Atlantic coast ports have no advantage over the St. Law- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL " 191 rence route as respects fog. From Boston to the United King- dom the route passes tirst through the 20 per cent area, after which it enters a 30 to 35 per cent area, beyond which it is in 20 and 10 per cent areas for double the distance which the St. Lawrence-Liverpool route passes through such areas. The New York route is not much better. For ports of Norway and Sweden and the Baltic Sea, the St. Lawrence route is vastly superior having only about 1,000 miles of 10 to 20 per cent fog. as com- pared with about 2,000 miles of 10 to 35 per cent fog from New York or Boston. September. — In this month we find the mouth of the St. Law- rence in 10 per cent fog, Belleisle Strait in 20 per cent fog. and the area north of Belleisle Strait in 10 per cent fog. The 20 per cent area passes southeastward from Belleisle in a wide circle, inclosing the routes from north Atlantic ports, which also pass through a wide area of 30 to 35 per cent fog southeast of New- foundland. Within the latter area numerous icebergs are indi- cated extending well into the shipping lanes. East of Boston is another 30 to 35 per cent area. The St. Lawrence route is clearly more favorable this month, both as regards fog and ice- bergs. On the route to Liverpool it comprises about 300 miles of 20 per cent fog, 300 miles of 10 per cent fog. 600 miles of 5 per cent fog, and the balance practically clear. The Boston route to Liverpool comprises about 600 miles of 30 to 35 per cent fog. 300 miles of 20 per cent, 1,000 miles of 10 per cent, about 100 miles of 5 per cent, and the balance clear. October. — The mouth of the St. Lawrence is in 10 per cent fog. Belleisle Strait is in 20 per cent fog. The area southeast of Newfoundland is still the worst spot, with 30 to 35 per cent fog and with icebergs well within the shipping lanes. Icebergs are also shown in Belleisle Strait. The routes from Boston and New York to the United Kingdom are practically all in areas of fog prevalence ranging from 10 to 20 per cent, with small areas of 5 and 30 to 35 per cent. November. — The mouth of the St. Lawrence is in 5 per cent fog, and Belleisle Strait in 10 per cent fog. The worst area of fog is southeast of Newfoundland extending as in previous months well across the shipping routes from north Atlantic ports to Europe. The conditions along the Atlantic coast are very much better than in preceding months, but the fog increases as the Newfoundland banks are approached until the 30 to 35 per cent area is entered. In this area icebergs are noted, as also in the vicinity of Belle Isle. December. — Navigation in the St. Lawrence is generally closed by ice, and there is very little fog. The area of greatest fog 192 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE is southeast of Newfoundland, inclosing the shipping route from Atlantic ports to Europe. Numerous icebergs are noted in this vicinity. From the above description, it nnll be sccu that the normal route from Belle Isle to the United Kingdom and Europe is not nearly so beset by fog as the customary lanes to North Atlantic ports. In the early part of the navigation season when Belleisle Strait can not be used, vessels must proceed south of Newfound- land, but it will be observed that the fog conditions in the North Atlantic are not nearly so bad as they become later in the season, and at this later period the Belleisle Strait is available. The maps prepared by the Hydrographic Office show clearly that the routes to and from Boston and New York involve a much greater distance through areas of fog frequency than does the St. Law- rence route, and that icebergs are frequently encountered in the former routes. As affording a basis for comparison of the fog frequency of the St. Lawrence route to Europe with other important ocean routes, a study has likewise been made of fog conditions in the Pacific Ocean as follows: Fog Frequency in the North Pacific Ocean January. — The Asiatic coast within the area visited by vessels is practically free from fog, but the San Francisco- Yokohama route for about 1.800 miles passes through area of 15 to 20 per cent days with fog. The Columbia River-Yokohama route is about one-half in this area. February. — The fog areas are not greatly different from January but the 10 per cent area is seen to be moving westward and extends more than half way across the P^acitic. The area southwest of San Francisco is in 10 to 15 per cent fog for about 800 miles. MarcJi. — The area of 15 to 20 per cent days with fog extends 2,000 miles along the route from San Francisco to Yokohama, and slightly less along the route from Puget Sound and Columbia River to ^'ok()hama. Beyond this there is 10 and 5 per cent fog for a further distance of about 1.500 miles. The area of 15 per cent fog extends along the American coast to Cape San Lucas. April. — The percentage of days with fog is 15 to 20 n\ mid- ocean and alf>ng the American coast from San Francisco to Cape San Lucas. The San Francisco-Yokohama route is prac- tically all in areas of 10 to 15 per cent fog. m c m c ^ c • r GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 193 May. — An area of 20 to 25 per cent days with fog is within a curved Hne extending from 40 degrees N. 148 degrees E. to 52 degrees N. 179 degrees W. and includes the Great Circle route from San Francisco and points north to Yokohama, for distances ranging from 800 to 1,500 miles. All of the routes specified above are almost wholly within this 15 per cent area, while the routes between San Francisco and United States ports south to Honolulu and Australia are partially in 15 per cent fog. June. — The North Pacific routes are practically all in areas of fog prevalence. There is a wide area of 40 to 50 per cent days with fog between the western Aleutian Islands and Kamchatka. The area of 30 per cent or greater fog covers the Yokohama routes for 2,000 miles and the 20 per cent area for about 2.000 miles more. There is 30 per cent fog along the American coast between San Francisco and Cape San Lucas. July. — The fog shows considerable increase this month. There is an area of about 1.000 miles of 55 to 60 per cent days with fog along the routes to Yokohama, outside of which there is 35 to 45 per cent fog for fully 1,000 miles, and 25 per cent fog for a further distance of 1,000 miles or more. The routes from Puget Sound and Columbia River to Yokohama are entirely in areas of 25 per cent or more fog until within about 500 miles of Japan. August. — An area of 40 per cent fog includes over 1,000 miles of the Great Circle routes between San Francisco and points north and Yokohama. Of the remainder of these routes the greater distance is in the 30 per cent area and a small distance in the 20 per cent area. The 30 per cent area also extends along the Pacific coast from Vancouver to Cape San Lucas. Outside of this area vessels north of San Francisco must pass through the 20 and 10 per cent areas. September. — The Great Circle route between San Francisco and Yokohama passes for about 1.500 miles through an area of 40 to 45 per cent days with fog, and the remainder is in the 30 and- 20 per cent area. Practically the entire distance of 4,536 nautical miles is in area of 20 to 45 per cent fog prevalence, 40 per cent fog extends along the Pacific coast from Vancouver to and in- cluding San Francisco. Thirty per cent fog extends outside this area from the head of Vancouver Island to Lower California, while 20 per cent fog is encountered outside of this area. The entire expanse of the Pacific north of the 34 degree parallel is subject to 20 per cent or more fog, except for the central portion where the curve extends uj) nearly to the 40 degree of N. latitude. October. — This month shows a decided change in the areas of fog prevalence. The San Francisco- Yokohama route extends 194 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL over 1.200 miles through 10 to 15 per cent days with fog, with about 1.000 miles through 10 to 30 per cent areas off the Xorth American coast. November. — In this month the Asiatic side is practically free from fog, but the North American coast has a small area of 20 per cent fog close to shore with 10 per cent area along the San Francisco-Yokohama route for about 1,800 miles. December. — There is 15 per cent fog along the American coast from Vancouver to Cape San Lucas, and the 10 per cent curve is about 1,000 miles from San Francisco. Beyond this point the percentage is low. Compared with the route from the St. Lawrence to Europe, the Northern Pacific routes involve a much greater distance in areas of great fog frequency during the larger part of the navi- gation season. The Hydrographic Office states that 'Tnvestiga- tions have shown that the strandings on the Gulf and River of St. Lawrence and the approaches, including the coast of New- foundland, are not owing to the dangers of the route, but to the want of care and attention to navigation." The farther a vessel proceeds from the fog area southeast of Newfoundland in any direction, the less the fog becomes and it extends but a short distance up the St. Lawrence. As stated above, fogs are rarely encountered above Quebec. Chatter X\'I DEPTHS REQUIRED FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN MARITIME TRADE The depths to be provided in the St. Lawrence waterway must be adequate for the accommodation of the class of vessels which now carry the world's commerce. At some of our chief ocean ports depths in excess of those needed for freight vessels have been provided in order to accommodate the great liners and the larger naval vessels. There are many foreign ports with depths between 20 and 30 feet which now conduct an important inter- national trade. Vessels entering the ports of the Great Lakes will not have to compete with vessels plying to At,lantic ports. They will have to compete, however, with a transportation movement by rail between points in the Northwest and Atlantic ports, plus the cost of transfer to vessel at such ports, plus the heavy but indefinite charges due to delays at those ports, plus the steamship rate to destination. The average size freight vessel will be better adapted to the conditions to be met in developing the trade of Lake ports. The large vessels require a longer time for their turnaround in the port and can therefore make fewer trips during the year. They can be accommodated at only a few harbors in the world and are consequently unsuitable for developing trade routes. Their economy is dependent upon the availability of full cargoes, and their operation is usually con- fined to two important terminal ports. Opponents of the St. Lawrence River improvement have con- tended that great depths are essential for the accommodation of ocean vessels. It may be admitted that great depths are advanta- geotis, but it must be clearly affirmed that they are not necessary to the development of an important trade under the conditions which will govern the economies of transportation on the Great Lakes. The reasons which have led to the continued demand for greater depth at our seaports are not applicable to the pro- posed seaports of the Great Lakes. Conditions at American Seaports. — At New York the depths must be sufficient to accommodate the largest vessels because this harbor is the terminus of many of the great liners and it must be entered by the largest war vessels desiring to proceed to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The ability of this port to provide full cargoes for the largest freighters and to absorb large quanti- ties of imports makes the use of these great vessels economical, but it must not be supposed that all our Atlantic ports provide sufficient business to give profitable employment for this class of vessels. Boston, for example, is a port of call and is rarely 195 196 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE able to provide a full cargo for one of these large freighters, and there is no port between Norfolk and New Orleans that can provide full cargoes for such vessels regularly. There is no such full utilization of the available depths as is found on the Great Lakes, and the reason for this is that depths have been provided at our important ports to take care of the occasional large vessel. There may be some local advantage in this where there are a number of ports competing for the same business, as the port having the greatest depth is in a favorable position to control the larger share of the trade. But these conditions do not afifect the question of the most advantageous depth to be provided on the S^ Lawrence waterway. The depths of this waterway will control the facilities of all the ports of the Great Lakes, and it will control the size of the vessels to be used at these ports. It will serve as an effectual check upon the inclina- tions of individual ports to obtain excessive depths, and will avoul the all too frequent expenditures made at our seacoast harbors for the purpose of giving one port an advantage over another, or of removing alleged disadvantages between competing ports. In fixing the depth of the St. Lawrence waterway for navi- gation of ocean vessels, the study should eliminate the fast pas- senger liners, the largest combination liners, the large freighters built for the transportation of particular commodities not com- mon to the proposed route, and the deep draft Navy vessels, all of which enter conspicuously into the vessel statistics of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific ports. The influence which these special types of vessels have exerted in fixing the authorized depths at our various ports will be seen from the following table. The depths given refer to mean low water on the Atlantic coast, mean low Gulf on the Gulf coast, and mean lower low water on the Pacific coast. Authorized depths of Main Channels at Unittd States Ports, 1920 Port Depth (Feet) Portland, Me Entrance and lower harbor 35 Anchorage and inner harbor 30 Boston, Mass Outer entrance 40 Sea to Navy Yard 35 New York, N. Y Entrince 40 Inner channels 30 and 40 Philadelphia, Pa Delaware River to the sea 35 Baltimore, Md Baltimore to sea 35 Norfolk, Va Entrance and Southern Branch.. .40 Other channels 12 ani 17 Leith 26 11 Liverpool 55 30 London 14 to 30 Manchester, Canal 28 Plymouth 30 Southampton 35 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 199 Other Foreign Ports Depth at High Depth at Low Water (Feet) Water (Feet) Aden, Arabia 30 Alexan Iria, Egypt 35 Amsterdam, Holland ii (canal) Antwerp, Belgium 30 Archangel, Russia ^ 23 Auckland, N. Z 31 Bangkok, Siam 14 Barcelona, Spain 24 to 32 22 at berths Bordeaux, France 20 to 25 Bremen, Germany, entrance 22 18 Bremerhaven, Germany 30 22 Brest, France 36 23 Bruges, Belgium 26'3" Buenos Ayres, Argentine, entrance 24 to 30 Cadiz, Spain 35 or more Calais, France 14' 11" Calcutta, India 24 to 30 Cherbourg, France 17 Callas, Peru, entrance 25 21 Constantinople, Turkey 22.3 at wharves Copenhagen, Denmark 29.8 (in free port) Danzig 23 Dunkirk, France 29 23 Emden c>2 23 Fiume, entrance 100 to 120 Fiume quays 24 to 26 Genoa, Italy, entrance 52 to 69 ' TT t /^ f 40 at new basins Hamburg, Germany \ Hamburg- American line Havana, Cuba, entrance 35 Havre, France 44 15 to 23^ Hong Kong, China 35 to 40 Leghorn, Italy (One of the chief Mediterranean ports) 22 to 28 Kiel 23 Libau, Russia 24 (in commercial harbor) Melbourne, Auttralia 24 to 28 Montevideo,Uruguay, in outer roads 30 in inner harbor 24 Odessa, Rusi-ia 30 maximum Oporto, Portugal 18 Ostend, Belgium 32 to 35 17 Pernambuco, Brazil .24 21 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil ii (neap tide) Riga..." 22 Petrograd, Russia 21 (basin) Rouen 18 10 Shanghai, China. 28 20 Singapore, S. S Up to 45 Stettin 25 21 Stockholm, Sweoen 23 Venice 27 200 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Large capacity is practicable on small draft. — Tht- capacity of the average cargo vessel has been increased by giving additional length and beam rather than additional draft. Within reasonable limits this would appear to be the solution of the problem of providing greater capacity for the general freight vessel that must be able to enter a multitude of ports. That it is entirely feasible to construct an ocean carrier with a cargo capacity of 7,000 tons on a draft of 20 feet, is shown by the following com- munication from the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd. : Mr. H. I. Harriman, 6 State :5tr-?et,, Boston, Massachusetts. Aly dear Mr. riarriman : Referring to the questions you asked me regarding the design of an ocean-going vessel to ply on the Great Lakes with a cargo capacity of 7,000 tona, It IS perfectly feasibk to design a boat of 8,000 tons deadweight on a draft oi 20 feet, making a speed of about eleven knots. Her breadth would be about 60 feet, and length somewhere around 400 feet. I should imagine it would not cost over five or ten per cent more for a vessel of this type than it would for an ordinary open carrier. You will note by these dimensions that the ship is very broad and quite shallow; therefore, the scantlings would have to be a little heavier than for a boat of the same capacity used for purely ocean purposes. Very truly yours, (Signed) S. W. Wakem.'lN, General Manager. Influence of new trade routes on vessel design. — While it would be too much to expect that vessels of special type would be constructed for the use of a single port, it is entirely reason- able to anticipate that vessels adapted particularly to the re- quirements of an important trade route serving a number of ])orts and an area of great productivity, w'ould l)e built. This has already been demonstrated by the construction of the bulk car- rier on the Great Lakes. It is a very small step in naval archi- tecture to design an ocean-going vessel capable of carrying 10.000 to 15,000 tons on a draft of 25 feet. Mr. Adam W. Kirkaldy. the English authority, in his book on "British Shipping," thus describes the effect of the opening of the Suez Canal on the vessel tonnage then existing: A new ocean route was opened to the world by the piercing of a great natural barrier for shipping. In order to utilize this new route, and make the most of it, a new type of ship was required. That the opening of the Suez Canal was a death blow to the sailing ship was fairly generally realized, because the Red Sea is not navigable by sail, but it was also even GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 201 more decisively and immediately the death blow to the existing type of steamer. Steamship owners, engaged in the Eastern trades, in order to tak'e full^ advantage of the canal, must scrap their existing fleets and build steamers of a special type. Would they do this, could they do it ? TlTey had many thousands of tons of steamships operating, why not continue to run these obsolescents and gradually renew their fleets with the new type as time went on? But there was the possibility that the foreigner with no tonnage in existence might enter the trade with the requisite type of steamship, and had he done so, to recover the lost ground would have severely tried the resources of British owners. Our premier shipping company in the Eastern trade had something like 100,000 tons of steamers rendered unsuitable. Without unnecessary hesitation this fleet was replaced by ships of the required tj'pe, fitted with the new marine engine. It was a hazardous step to take, but although it required time to justify the action of the management, the consequent reductions in rates of freight and passage money, which averaged somewhere between 50 and 75 per cent of those previously charged, eventually and completely justified the policy. Nor was this the only British shipping company that adopted up-to-date methods, the result being that throughout the history of the canal the British flag has been easily first among the shipping making use of this great highway to the East. It is then fairly conceivable that in addition to the steamers that may navigate the Great Lakes, just as they are, the com- merce of that enormous region will be of such a volume that new types of vessels, probably of the Diesel system, will be built especially for this trade. Deep draft vessels not essential for the St. Lawrence water- way. — The conditions afifecting the St. Lawrence route are en- tirely different from those governing channel depths at Atlantic ports. The existing lake harbors are now effectually bottled up. There are no deep lake harbors now served by other deep water routes, with which the new route will have to compete. Vessels entering the ports of the Great Lakes will not have to compete with vessels plying to Atlantic ports. They will have to com- pete, however, with a transportation movement by rail between points in the Northwest and Atlantic ports, plus the cost of trans- fer to vessel at such ports, plus the heavy but indefinite charges due to delays at those ports, plus the damages and loss occa- sioned by rehandling, plus the steamship rate to destination. Since the rail and terminal charges involved in putting a ton of merchandise from Chicago on board ship at New York exceed the reasonable cost of shipping by an average sized vessel from Chicago to Europe, it matters little whether the ocean rate from New York to Europe be less than from Chicago. The vessel -. trading at lake ports will be competing chiefly with the railroads. 202 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE The costs and rates involved are analyzed in another portion of this report. Where there is a real demand for transportation, as in the present instance, the navigation facilities available will determine the character of vessels to be used, and the only requisite is that these facilities should be ample for the accommodation of a large number of vessels customarily engaged in similar traffic. In opening up a new route for world trade there are some de- cided advantages in the use of average sized vessels. It may be conceded that the general export and import business will de- velop gradually, and that in the early stages of this development it will be easier to find full cargoes for vessels of this class than for those of great size. The largest types of ocean freighters operate generally between two important terminal harbors hav- ing great depth. To provide sufficient cargo for such vessels, these terminal harbors will in all cases be found to be long established ports whose business has gradually developed to its present proportions. While these vessels afiford the greatest economy when they can be provided with full cargoes, they are not adapted for service on routes where such full cargoes can not be provided, nor where cargo must be picked up at a number of ports. They are only economical when they can be operated regularly with full loads, and it seems certain that in the early years of the development of ocean-going commerce on the Great Lakes the smaller vessel will better meet the requirements. The large freighters require a longer time for their turnaround in the port, and they can consequently make fewer trips per year. A few days' delay in port awaiting sufficient cargo to provide a full load would completely ofifset the greater economies of this type of vessel. It must also be borne in mind that suit- able terminal facilities for the accommodation of ocean vessels will have to be built at lake ports, and with a view to avoiding excessive initial expense these facilities should be so planned that they can be expanded from time to time as the development of commerce proceeds. If these facilities were planned for the accommodation of the largest vessels in the world, the initial expenditure and the related fixed charges would be vastly greater than if they were planned for the accommodation of vessels of moderate size. The number of large vessels used would, in any event, be a small proportion of the total, as they are at long es- tablished ports, and the additional expenditure for terminal facilities and dredging of harbors for their especial accommoda- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 203 tion would not be warranted, at least until there has been a de- velopment of commerce sufficient to guarantee profitable operat- ing conditions. The Great Lakes will have a large trade with Baltic, Mediterranean, and South American ports, and the vessels now used on these routes are all of the smaller type. In de- veloping trade with the world's markets, the use of vessels which can enter a large number of ports and operate on all of the world's routes is desirable. Where great depths are required. — The facts above adduced should not be interpreted as indicating that large vessels, when employed under favorable operating conditions, are not more economical than small vessels, nor that deep channels are not essential in some cases. A study of conditions rendering great depth indispensable will show clearly that the St. Lawrence River does not fall in this category. Two instances where great depths are essential are the Suez Canal and Panama Canal. These canals constitute connecting links between oceans, and to render the maximum service and to secure the greatest revenue they must be able to accommodate all vessels operating between all points affected in competition with open sea routes. The Great Lakes have no such competition, as no other ship channel or route can reach theuL The project depth of the Suez Canal is 11 meters, or 36 feet, 1 inch ; while the depth of the Panama Canal is 41 feet. An important consideration in fixing the depth of the latter canal was the desirability of being able to pass the largest war vessels. The reports of the Panama Canal Commis- sion show that the average draft of vessels using the canal is about 21 feet. Chapter X\'II TYPES AND SIZES OF VESSELS WHICH CARRY THE WORLD'S COMMERCE Examination of the records of entrances and clearances at our important ports shows that vessels engaged in foreign trade during 1918 had an average net tonnage of 2,414. A freight vessel of this tonnage would have a loaded draft averaging about 21.5 feet. Vessels in the coastwise trade during the same year had an average net tonnage of 1,341, and a draft of about 18 feet. The statistics likewise show that there has been no increase in the average net tonnage of vessels used in the foreign trade with the United States during the last ten years. While there has been a pronounced increase in the size of the larger types of vessels, the number of vessels of this class in use is too small to exert any pronounced effect upon the averages. Out of 14,513 steamships listed in Lloyd's Register for 1918-19, 81.45 per cent have drafts of 25 feet or less, and 99.32 per cent have drafts of 30 feet or less. At New York, where the largest vessels in the world call and where vessels customarily load deeper than at any other port of the United States, 96 per cent of the vessels paying pilot fees during the first six months of 1914 drew 30 feet of water or less. Out of 30,939 vessels which passed through the Suez Canal during the last eight years, only 3.3 per cent had drafts of 27 feet or more. Classes of vessels using American ports. — It may be freely admitted that the commensurate utilization of a waterway from the Great Lakes to the seaboard is dependent upon the provision of channel dimensions suitable for the accommodation of the vessels ordinarily engaged in the world's commerce. It is not essential that the waterway should admit vessels of the largest class, which are limited to a very few routes and a very few ports. These largest vessels are the great ocean greyhounds for passengers and mail, and the combination passenger and freight liners owned by the regular steamship lines, such as the Cunard, White Star, and formerly the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American ^ine. On account of the limitations imposed by their great draft, they can only run on fixed routes and can not alter their movements to suit trafific needs. Their revenue from passenger and mail service, however, enables them to carry a small amount of high class express freight at low rates, and instances have been recorded in the past where they carried grain free in order to obtain the ballast. It is unlikely that such conditions will ever occur again, but it may be re- marked that abnormally cheap transportation on the small fraction of the total movement thus carried exerts little or no influence on the crop movement as a whole. In the United 205 206 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE States these large combination liners in normal times are con- fined principally to the port of New York. Deep draft freight vessels are increasing in numbers, but as in the case of the large combination liners they are built for specific purposes or for specific routes. A large proportion of deep draft freight vessels constructed in recent years have been tankers, and at a number of harbors there is now an insistent demand for increased depth to accommodate these vessels. Drafts of vessels using United States seaports. — The Govern- ment statistics give very little data regarding -drafts of vessels using the improved channels of the United States. The following information is given relative to drafts of vessels at Portland, Me.; New York, N. Y. ; Charleston, S. C. ; and Mobile, Ala. : Portland, Me. Steamers entering and clearing, 1918 Foreign, draft from 30 to 34 feet Foreign, draft from 25 to 29 feet Foreign, draft from 20 to 24 feet Foreign, draft from 15 to 19 feet Coastwise, draft from 25 to 29 feet Coastwise, draft from 20 to 24 feet 238 Coastwise, draft from 15 to 19 feet 146 Coastwise, draft from 10 to 14 feet 79 Coastwi.sc, draft under 10 feet 1,003 New York, N. Y. Deep draft vessels, 1918 1,619 Outward Inward Draft Vessels Trips Vessels Trips 43 feet draft and under 44 1 1 1 "3 2 7 8 13 15 25 54 91 172 273 338 1 1 .... 42 feet draft and under 43 6 2 ■"s 5 14 19 32 23 56 54 77 121 235 401 469 .... 1 .... 3 4 7 31 49 99 185 200 41 feet draft and under 42 40 feet draft and under 41 39 feet draft and under 40 7 38 feet draft and under 39 37 feet draft and under 38 3 35 feet draft and under 36 2 34 feet draft and under 35 3 33 feet draft and under 34 10 12 31 feet draft and under 32 40 30 feet draft and under 31 74 29 feet draft and under 30 144 28 feet draft and under 29 296 27 feet draft and under 28 284 Total 1,520 875 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SUIT CHANNEL 207 Charleston, S. C. Steamers entering and clearing, 1918 Draft Foreign trade Coastwise American Foreign crade 25 to 29 feet 4 16 12 1 22 48 36 3 25 20 to 24 feet 38 15 to 19 feet 395 10 to 14 feet.. . 6 Under 10 feet Total a 109 464 Mobile, Ala. Steamers entering and clearing, 1918 Up Less than 13 feet 92 13 to 14 feet ' 30 14 to 15 feet 68 15 to 16 feet 38 16 to 17 feet 20 17 to 18 feet 4 18 to 19 feet 8 20 to 21 feet 3 21 to 22 feet 3 22 to 23 feet 8 23 to 24 feet ^ 2 24 to 25 feet 2 25 to 26 feet 10 26 to 27 feet 4 Over 27 feet Total 293 Down 53 38 34 34 19 22 22 12 10 4 6 12 3 1 290 The large number of deep draft vessels calling at Portland, Me., is due to its tise by the Ctmard liners and the White Star steamers Megantic, Laurentic, Northland, Southland, Irishman. Georgic, Arabic, etc., all of which draw 30 feet or more. Port- land is used as a winter port by the Grand Trunk Railway, and large quantities of grain are shipped through it during the season of closed navigation on the Great Lakes. It will be noted that the statistics given above for New York incltide only deep draft vessels. While the figures show a large number of these, they are really only a small proportion of the whole. Considerable information regarding the entrances and clear- ances at the various ports is available, but uniform information is not given for all localities. At some localities it is possible to 208 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE separate the tonnage in the foreign trade from that in the domestic trade, but in other cases this distinction is not made. In some cases the figures for steam vessels are separated from those for sailing vessels and other craft, but in this respect also there is no fixed practice. It is recognized that there is no uniform relationship between draft and tonnage, and no rule can be applied to determine the draft of a vessel from a mere statement of her tonnage, but the average of a large number of vessels in general use at the present time gives a reasonable basis for determining average drafts of vessels engaged in ocean traffic. Such averages have been determined by the Shipping Board from a study of vessels in actual use at the present time, and the following table shows the results of that study for vessels of specified gross tonnage. As the entrances and clear- ances of vessels at our various ports are reported in net tonnage, a column has been added to show the average draft of freight vessels on net tonnage basis in order that the table may be utilized to indicate the average draft of such vessels using Amer- ican seaports. Tonnage Average draft Net Gross feet 10,000 and over 9,333 to 10.000 15,000 and over 14,000 to 14,999 13,000 to 13,999 12,000 to 12,999 11,000 to 11,999 10,000 to 10,999 9,000 to 9,999 8,000 to 8,999 7,000 to 7,999 6,000 to 6,999 5,000 to 5.999 4,000 to 4,999 3,000 to 3,999 2,000 to 2,999 1,000 to 1,999 34.1 30.8 8,666 to 9,333 31.6 8,000 to 8,666 29.7 7,333 to 6,666 to 6,000 to 8,000 7,333 6,666 29.4 28.3 29.2 5,333 to 6,000 28.5 4,666 to 5,333 27.5 4,000 to 4,666 27.0 3,300 to 4,000 25.4 2,666 to 3,33^ . . . 24.3 2,000 to 2,666 22.6 1,333 to 2,000 20.1 666 to 1,333 17.2 An examination has been made of the records of entrances and clearances at our jjrincipal Atlantic and Gulf ports with a view to obtaining a definite idea of the size of vessels which are actually carrying the commerce. The vessels used in foreign trade are generally larger than those employed in coastwise trade, as will be seen from the FoUowint; tabiC : GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 209 Number and Tonnage of Steam Vessels Entered and Cleared at Selected Ports During the Year 1918 Number of entrances and clearances Net tonnage Average net tonnage per vessel Average loaded draft (approx.) Boston, Mass Philadelphia. Pa Baltimore, Md Norfolk, Va. (all classes of vessels) Savannah,Ga.(all classes of vessels) Jacksonville, Fla Tampa, Fla New Orleans, La Galveston, Tex Sabine Pass, Tex Beaumont, Tex 1,208 2,073 1,105 385 2,282,594 5,593,520 2,618,605 1,143,605 1,889 2,698 2.369 2,970 Feet 20 23 21 24 7,716 7,411,474 960 15 2,195 5,270 5,511,332 9,268,738 2,511 1,757 22 19 192 756 2,005 384,8*^0 1,745,305 2,691,656 2,005 2,308 1,345 20 5 21 18 2,482 775,982 313 1,518 3,096,072 2,039 20.5 1,035 508 345 534 " 76 1,962,107 1,307,946 1,114,198 1,354,036 183,875 1,896 2,575 3,229 2,536 2,416 20 22 24 22 21.5 83 184,383 2,221 21 Foreign trade only Foreign trade only Foreign ves?els only American vessels in foreign tia.^e Coastwise only Foreign trnde only Coastwise only Foreign trade only Coastwise Foreign and coast- wise Foreign and coast- wise Foreign and coast- wise Foreign trade only Coastwise only Foreign trade Coastwise only Foreign trade largely Coastwise only The above table includes only steamers except at Norfolk and Savannah where they are not classified. The available statistics for the port of New York do not give the information required for the purposes in view. From the table given we find that at the ports specified vessels engaged in foreign trade during 1918 numbered 8,614, having a net tonnage of 20,794,716, or an average net tonnage per vessel of 2,414. A vessel of this net tonnage would have a gross tonnage of about 3,500, and a loaded draft averaging about 21.5 feet, \essels in the coastwise trade at these ports (steamers only except at Norfolk and Savannah) numbered 14,867, having a net tonnage of 21,271,882, or an average net tonnage per vessel of 1,341. Such a vessel would have a gross tonnage of about 2,000 and a draft of about 18 feet. The ports considered are among the largest in the country and it therefore seems desirable to compare the results shown with the figures for the entire country. The following tables show the number, net tonnage and approximate drafts of vessels entering and clearing in the foreign trade for the fiscal years 1910 to 1919, inclusive: 210 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Entrances and Clearances in the Foreign Trade Atlantic Coast Fiscal year Number of vessels en- tered and cleared Net tonnage Average net tonnage per vessel Average loaded draft feet (approx.) 1910 20,255 20,270 20,660 21,651 20,573 21,841 25,747 24,969 20,198 19,451 21,562 43,297,873 45,109,850 47,375,679 50,152,197 51,893,150 44,971,298 51,227,560 49,058,553 38,258,602 41,899,303 46,324,406 2,137 2,225 2,293 2,316 2,522 2,057 1,989 1,965 1,894 2,154 2,148 20 5 1911 21 1912 1913 21.0 21 1914 21 5 1915 '20 5 1916 1917 20.0 20 1918 19 5 1919 20.5 10 year average. . . . 20.5 Gulf Coast Fiscal year Number of vessels en- tered and cleared Net tonnage Average net tonnage per vessel Average loaded draft feet (approx.) 1910 6,925 7,228 7,870 9,051 9,555 9,996 9,198 9,902 9,429 10,491,690 11,224,753 12,542,154 14,762,264 15,832,584 14,778,772 13,892,802 14,561,577 13,663,094 14,464,062 13,621,375 1,515 1,553 1,594 1,631 1,657 1,643 1,510 1,470 1,449 1,458 1,546 18 5 1911 1912 1913 18.5 18.5 19 1914 1915 1916 19.0 19.0 18.5 1917 1918 18.0 18 1919 10 year average. . . . 9,921 8,807 18.0 18 5 Pacific Coast Fiscal year Number of vessels en- tered and cleared Net tonnage Average net tonnage per vessel Average loaded draft feet (approx.) 1910 7,435 8,201 10,061 11,347 10,555 10,215 12,755 12,763 12,732 12,311 10,837 7,637,185 8,421,133 9,444,972 10,490,948 11,840,585 10,598,451 11,420,471 10,864,577 10,918,886 9,096,266 10,073,347 1,027 1 17 1911 1,027 ' 17 1912 938 924 1,122 1,037 895 851 857 739 929 16 5 1913 16 5 1914 17 1915 17.0 1916 16 1917 16 1918 16 1919 15.5 1 year average .... 16.5 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 211 These tables disclose a most remarkable situation. It has been generally accepted that the vessels employed in ocean traffic are constantly becoming of greater size and draft. If the maximum vessels only are considered, this is no doubt true, but the figures show clearly that there has been no increase in the average size of vessels employed in our foreign trade during the last ten years. This fact is more definitely shown by the following graph. The increase in average size of vessels on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts during 1918 is probably due to the transfer to these coasts of the larger vessels pertaining to the Pacific coast fleet, for war purposes, which would also account for the decrease in size of vessels on the Pacific Coast during that period. Average Net Tonnage of Vessels in the Foreign Trade Atlantic Cm« Gul r CMSt PAclfic COASt. Tendencies in vessel dimensions. — -In substantiation of the re- sults obtained by the above study, attention is invited to the fol- lowing data prepared by the Port Facilities Commission of the Shipping Board. 212 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Percentage which the number of steam and sail vessels, of specified classes of tonnage (500 tons and over), represented of the total vessels of all classes built, by quinquennial periods, from 1959 to 1918. Gross tonnage 1889 to 1893 1894 to 1898 1899 to 1903 1904 to 1908 1909 to 1913 1914 to 1918 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 and over to 14,999 to 13,999 to 12,999 to 11,999 to 10,999 to 9,999 to 8,999 to 7,999 to 6,999 to 5,999 0.3 2.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.2 0.7 1.9 3.0 5.7 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.5 1.8 5.7 5.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.2 3.4 6.2 8.3 0.7 0.1 '6'3 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.4 4.8 6.1 19.8 Gross tonnage 4,000 to 4,999 Steam 3,000 to 3,999 Steam Sailing 2,000 to 2,999 Steam Sailing 1,000 to 1,999 Steam Sailing 500 to 999 Ste^m Sailinc 1859 to 1863 13.5 10.9 59.5 16.1 1864 to 1868 2.0 1.2 12.8 13.8 ,47.9 21.3 1869 to 1873 1874 to 1878 1879 to 1883 2.8 1.2 28.0 9.1 42.5 15.2 2.7 2.0 21.8 24.2 27.7 21.6 3.1 0.1 13.2 2.3 42.9 8.2 22.7 7.6 1884 1889 1894 1899 1904 1908 to to to to to to 1888 1893 1898 1903 1908 1913 1914 21.0 5.0 28.4 14.3 21.3 5.0 10.5 0.9 22.0 5.3 22.3 10.6 17.4 4.6 18.0 1.4 18.1 1.7 19.3 3.7 14.3 5.4 17.0 0.9 12.1 3.2 18.5 i.i 12.5 5.5 15.6 0.3 11.6 0.4 21.8 1.0 14.6 3.7 15.7 11.9 0.9 9.2 0.2 20.6 0.7 15.9 2.3 10.1 14.5 0.4 17.3 2.3 9.2 2.0 During the five-year period from 1914 to 1918, inclusive, there were constructed twenty vessels of 15,000 gross tons and over, _and forty-six vessels between 10,000 and 15,000 tons, or a total of sixty-six vessels of 10,000 gross tons and over ; while during the same period there were also constructed 2,796 vessels of 500 tons or more and less than 10,000 tons. The figures already given show that an astonishingly large number of the smaller steamers are used in the foreign trade, and that the large vessels are so few as to exercise no pronounced effect upon the averages. The following data regarding the ten largest vessels built during quinquennial periods from 1889 to 1918 show clearly the steady increase in the size of the large combination ])assenger and freight liners. Observation of the tendency toward increase of dimen- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 213 sions in these large vessels has no doubt contributed largely to the widespread misconception of the size of the average cargo carrier. Name, Gross Tonnage and Dimensions of the Ten Largest Vessels {Combination Freight and Passenger) Built during Quin- quennial Periods 1889 to 1918. 1914-1918 Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length Width Deep load draft Bismarck Leviathan Britannic Statendam Justicia Belgic DuiHo William O'Swald. . Cap. Polonio Tirpitz Average per ship 56,000 54,282 48,158 32,500 32,234 24,547 22,000 20,000 19,500 19.300 912.0 907.6 852.5 740.0 740.5 670.4 601.4 587.8 636.0 588.0 100.0 100.3 94.0 86.4 86.4 78.4 75.9 72.0 72.2 75.0 41.3 41.3 34.0 34.0 34,0 36.3 35.0 34.0 33.0 32,852 723.6 84.1 35.6 1909-1913 Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length Width Deep load draft Imperator. . . r Olympic Columbus France Alsatian Ceramic Franconia Laconia Empress of Asia . . . Empress of Russia . Average per ship 51,969 46,359 35,000 23,666 18,481 18,441 18,150 18,099 16,909 16,810 882.9 852.5 750.0 692.2 571,4 655.1 600.3 600.6 570.1 570.2 98.3 92.5 80.0 75.6 72.4 69.4 71.3 71.3 68.2 68.2 37.0 34.7 36.0 34.0 35.0 34.8 29.6 29.6 29.0 29.0 26.388 674.5 76.7 32,8 214 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE 1904-1908 Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length Width Deep load draft \ Mauretania George Washington Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Adriatic Rotterdam Baltic Amerika (America) ...... Minnesota Caronia Carmania y Average per ship 30,704 25,570 24,581 24,541 24,149 23,876 22,622 20,718 19,687 19,524 762.2 699.1 677.5 709.2 650.5 709.2 669.0 622.0 650.0 650.4 88.0 78.2 77.3 75.5 77.4 75.6 74.3 73.5 72.0 72.2 36.3 34.0 36.0 37.3 33.0 37.3 33.0 38.0 33.3 33.3 23,597 679.9 76.4 35.1 1899-1903 Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length I Width Deej) load draft Cedric Celtic Northland Victoria Luise Kronprins Wilhelm . Patricia Saxonia Ivernia Carpathia Orotic Average per ship . 21,040 20,904 17,905 16,703 14,908 14,466 14,297 14,278 13,603 13,518 16,162 680.9 680.9 561.6 660.9 637.3 560.3 580.0 582.0 540.0 582.0 606,6 75.3 75.3 60.2 67.3 66.3 62.3 64.2 64.9 64.5 60.3 66.1 36.9 36.5 30 30.5 30.0 32.2 31.11 32.0 31.4 32 1 32.4 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 1894-1898 215 Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length Width Deep load draft Cumric Pennsylvania. . . Pretoria Graf Wladersee . Scandinavian . . Burdegala St. Louis St. Paul Bremen Bulgaria 13,370 13,333 13,234 13,193 12,099 12,009 11,639 11,639 11,540 11,440 585,5 559.4 561.0 561.2 550.3 581 535 535 550 501 64 3 62 2 62 2 62 2 59 3 63 7 63 63 60 2 62 2 62 2 31,0 32.2 32.2 32.2 30 31.0 29.5 29.5 28.5 30.0 Average per ship. 12,350 552.2 30.6 1889-1893 (and prior) Name of vessel Gross tonnage Length Width Deep load draft Campania. . . . New York. . . . Philadelphia . . Teutonic La Touraine . . Ophir Himalaya .... La Bretagne. . Alphonso XIL Bovec 12,884 10,798 10,186 9,984 8,429 6,942 6,929 6,756 6,748 6,583 Average per ship | . . 8 624 601.0 517.0 527.6 565.8 520.2 465.0 465.6 495.4 463.5 470.0 509.1 65.2 63.6 63.2 57.8 56.0 53.4 52.2 51.8 51.7 53.1 56.8 29.0 30.4 30.4 29.4 27.0 27.5 28.0 26.5 27.0 27.0 28.2 While the number of large vessels of great draft has increased, the average draft of freight vessels of equal tonnage has appar- ently decreased. For instance, an average vessel of recent design of 8,000 gross tons has less draft than a vessel of similar tonnage constructed twenty years ago. These facts will be evident from an examination of the following tables prepared by the Shipping Board : 216 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Deep Load Draft of Steam Vessels (5000 Gross Tons and Over) Built During Each Quinquennial Period 1889 to 1918. Gross tonnage 1889 1894 1899 1904 1909 to to to to to 1893 1898 1903 1908 1913 1914 to 1918 15,000 and over 33.0 34.1 32.8 35.3 14,000 to 14,999 32.2 31.5 31.1 30.5 28.8 13,000 to 13,999 32.2 32.0 32.7 29.9 32.3 12,000 to 12,999 29 31.0 31.2 31.5 27.9 29.3 11,000 to 11,999 29.3 31.8 27.6 ^ 30.1 28.4 10,000 to 10,999 30 4 28.2 30.9 27.2 27.6 28.0 9,000 to 9,999 30.0 29.2 29.0 28.7 8,000 to 8,999 29.9 29.2 28.1 28.0 28.4 7,000 to 7,999 27.6 27.6 27.6 27.5 27.4 6,000 to 6,999 26.8 26.9 26.7 27.2 27.0 5,000 to 5,999 26 3 25.8 25.6 25.5 25.3 25.3 Deep Load Draft of Steam and Sail Vessels {Under 5,000 gross tons) built During each Quinquennial Period 1859 to 1918. Gross tonnage 1859 1864 1869 to to to 1863 1868 1873 1874 to 1878 1879 to 1883 1884 to 1888 1889 to 1893 1894| 1899 to to 1898 J 1903 1904 1909 1914 to to to 1908 1913 1918 4,000 t.. 4,999 Steam 3.000 tu 3,999 Steam Sailing 2,000 ts 2,999 Steam Sailing 1,000 to 1,999 Steam Sailing 500 to 999 Steam Sailing 15.1 .... 22.8 14.8 17.7 21.6 18.8 21.5 15.9 14.7 18.8 18.8 20.4 14.9 17.6 25.8 24.5 22.8 21.8 18.0 21.2 14.8 18.3 25.0 24.0 21.6 22.1 18.3 20.7 14.3 18.4 24.4 23.8 23.0 21.1 22.1 17.9 20.1 14.4 17.5 25.0 22.7 23.4 20.3 21.4 16.9 20.4 13.9 12.8 25.0 22.8 23.1 19.9 21.8 17.3 21.0 13.7 16.5 24.3 22.5 23.4 19.8 21.9 16.6 14.0 13.5 16.0 24.1 21.9 22.6 19.4 22.5 16.8 11.8 13.2 10.5 23.7 22.5 19.5 22.4 16.5 18.8 13.4 15.4 In order to get a clearer idea of the relative sizes and dead- weight capacities of cargo carriers, we append the following tables : Deadweight carrying capacity Length of keel Beam Load draft Speed loaded 1,000 tons. 3,000 tons. 2,500 tons. 3,000 tons. 4,000 tons . 4,500 tons. 5,600 tons. 8,200 tons. 8,800 tons. 10,000 tons. 14,000 tons. Ft. 185 227 250 250 304 334 350 400 423 450 500 In Ft. In. 29 38 35 43 46 4cS 49 54 54 59 64 Ft. 13 17 18 20 20 21 21 24 24 28 28 In. Knots 10 10 10 10 10 10 W?. 10 10 1 11 2 10 5 10 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHAXNEI, 217 The above ships are slow-speed carriers, and if higher speeds are desired, this simply adds to the increased weight of machinery and fuel and reduces the deadweight cargo. For instance, the 5,200-ton ship when increased in speed to 11 knots carries about 4,800 tons and at 12 knots carries 4,400 tons. The slow speed vessel has been found to be the more economical for cargo purposes. The following table shows the maximum drafts, loaded and light, of the standard vessels constructed by the Shipping Board, the figures being derived from actual measurements of vessels constructed at dififerent points under the same plans : Dead- weight tonnage Draft Type Loaded Light Mean Forward Aft Steel: Cargo Troop-cargo Tanker Cargo Cargo 12,000 11,800 10,500 9,600 8,800 7,500 7,500 5,075 4,300 4,000 3,500 4,700 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,500 3,500 Ft. In. 30 6 28 VA 25 734 27 .. 24 2 24 5H 26 22 IIM 24 4H 24 2 21 1 24 9 23 5 26 .. 24 2 23 11 23 3 Ft. In. 9 3M 9 214 18 3 7 lOH 11 AH 9 5 12 1 8 9}^ 16 7 9 11 7 6M 11 3 11 2 13 4H 12 31^ 10 7 11 IV2 Ft. In. 17 '.'. 4 6 8 8 6 6 12 1 5 6 11 5M 6 6 5 9^ 5 6 7 11 8 10 8 7 6 6 8 11 Ft. In. 19 6 11 3 14 1 Cargo Tanker 12 4 12 1 Cargo 11 9 Cargo passenger. . Cargo (Lake) .... Cargo (Lake) .... Wood: Dougherty Bailin 21 8>2 13 4 9 4 18 16 5 Peninsula Ferris 17 11 16 Ferris- Mod Hough 14 8 13 4 The table shows that ocean-going cargo vessels as large as the standard 8,800-ton vessel would be able to load to maximum draft on a waterway 25 feet deep at low water, and that such a waterway would more than meet the requirements for getting out to the ocean newly constructed vessels of all the standard classes. The very important question therefore arises — what propor- tion of the world's cargo tonnage will be excluded from the Great Lakes because of the limitations of channels, provided that it is otherwise economical to send ocean ships to Great Lake ports? 218 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Given a controlling- depth throughout the lakes and in the principal harbors as at present constituted of 21 feet at low water and given 25 feet as limiting below Detroit River, with all important Ontario and Erie ports requiring a compara- tively small amount of dredging to give depths of 25 feet, and assuming that progressive improvement for the coming genera- tion will bring all depths to 30 feet — the lock-sill limits of the present projects — what proportion of the ocean tonnage will be admitted at each stage of progress? Studies made by the Shipping Board of the drafts of vessels show the following results : Average Deep Load Draft, by Quinquennial Periods of Vessels (500 Gross Tons and Over) Built 1859 to 1918, and Now in Use.* Jict. . TSRIOS of Vessels IBep Draft. DSEP LOAD DRAFT 5 10 15 20 25 Prsv. Period 1859-1663 Ho Peet Per Cant Ho ?eet For Cent 1924-1928' - 24.6 .8 3.4 9.5 62,9 1919-1923 - 23.8 .8 3.5 8.7 57.6 ^^^_ 1914-1918 1343 23.0 1.3 6.0 7.9 52.3 1909-1913 1120 21.7 .2 .9 6.6 43.7 ^ 1904-1908 1062 21.5 1899-1903 978 22.2 1.1 5.2 7.1 47.0 ^^ 1894-1893 636 21.1 .5 2.4 6.0 39.7 1889-1393 635 20.6 .8 4.0 5.5 36.4 1384-1833 216 19.8 1.2 6.5 4.7 31.1 1879-1883 212 18.6 .2 1.1 3.6 23.2 ^^^^^* 1874-1878 76 18.4 .4 2.2 3,3 1869-1873 17 18.0 1.2 7.1 2.9 19.2 18&4-1868 7 16.8 1.7 11.3 1.7 11.3 1869-1863 2 15.1 - - - - ' -A ^Prepared by the U. S. Shipping Board, Port Facilities Commission. The table includes only vessels for which information was obtainable, and the figures in column "Number of Vessels" do not represent all vessels now in service. The above shows that the average deep load draft of vessels of 500 gross tons and over is 23 feet. In connection with the above, the following tables are of peculiar interest: GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 219 ^ \ ! n 1 ! O "^ O 1 o = 1 Q - ( C3 6- 1 il "«^^c.«^.,^^^«o g 2i| S -!m'k>.o* 8 1^ '^' ': "^ ■■". ". •-. '% "". "-. "^ °=. =. '=. ^1 ""'°^.^- ^1 ..g;Sg:?;S:?:?:g:S:g > '^, ^; ^; '^ '^l '^, ^; ^; 'i ■' m Soooooooo oo 4 rfl^torJrHOO>»r-*fl>n if. E5J LI.H, a ^iS 220 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Average Deep Load Draft, by Classes of Tonnage, of Steam and Sail Vessels Built 1859 to 1918, and Now in Use.* Attention is invited to the fact that while there are only 155 vessels of 10,000 gross tons or over, there are 3,574 steam vessels of 2,000 to 6,000 gross tons. The average deep load drafts of the latter class of vessels range from 20.1 to 25.4 feet. These are the vessels which carry the world's commerce, and which will continue to do so for many years to come. As pointed out above, the largest vessels are the passenger liners, and the combination freight and passenger vessels. Neither of these classes is essential for economical transportation of the commerce that may be expected to develop upon the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes dee}) waterway. In a recent address, Major Gen. W . M. Black, U.S.A., Retired, formerly Chief of Engineers, and more recently Consulting En- gineer of the Shipping Board, made the following statement : Out of 14.513 steamships listed in Lloyd's Register for 1918-1919. 81.45 per cent have drafts of 25 feet or less, and 99.32 per cent draw 30 feet or less, leaving a percentage of 0.68 of vessels of over 30 feet draft. This l)repond'erance of vessels of less than 30 feet draft is illustrated by the fact that in the first six months of 1914, out of 4.476 ships which paid pilot fees at the port of New York, 4.402. or 96 per cent, drew 30 feet of water or less. Since increased cargo capacity means an increase of earning capacity, tlTere must be a good reason for this limitation in size. There is, and it *Prej)ared by the U. S. Shipping Board, Port Facilities Commission. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 221 is one independ'ent of the difliculty of obtaining full cargoes for the large carriers. It lies in the fact that few harbors in the world have depth suffici'ent to accommodate such ships as the Leviathan. It may surprise you to learn that during the war the Leviathan made one trip to Liverpool. By taking advantage of the tide she made her entry into the port, but had to be there for about a month before there was sufficient channel depth to enable her to get away. Sizes of German commercial vessels. — The following gives data relative to the sizes of vessels used on four different routes from Hamburg prior to the war. Vessel No. 3 in each case is the typical vessel for the route in question. On the Hamburg- Calcutta route the typical vessel has a loaded draft of 25 feet ; oil the Hamburg-West Coast ( Pacitic route) 25 feet; on the Hamburg-Mediterranean service 21 feet ; and on the Baltic and North Sea service 16 feet. * Dimensions, Tonnage and Draft of German-owned Cargo Boats Running on the Hamburg- Calcutta Service. Gross tonnage Net tonnage Length (feet) Breadth moulded (feet) Mean loaded draft (feet) Vessel No. 1 Vessel No. 2 Vessel No. 3 (typical) Vessel No. 4 Vessel No. 5 Vessel No. 6 Vessel No. 7 4,110 4,115 5,625 7,170 7,170 8,900 8,900 2,550 2,550 3,480 4,445 4,445 5,515 5,515 384.5 384.5 423.0 456.0 456.0 508.5 308.5 48.0 48.0 53.0 57.5 57.5 61.0 61.0 23.0 23.0 25.0 25.8 25.8 27.5 27.5 *^ Dimensions , Tonnage and Draft of German-owned Cargo Boats Running on the Hamburg-West Coast (Pacific) Service. Gross Net Length tonnage tonnage (feet) 3,630 2,250 384.0 3,630 2,250 384.0 4,970 3,080 423.2 6,380 3,950 456.0 6,380 3,950 456.0 7,780 4,830 484.2 7,780 4,830 484.2 Breadth moulded (feet) Mean loaded draft (feet) Vessel No. 1 Vessel No. 2 Vessel No. 3 (typical) Vessel No. 4 Vessel No. 5 Vessel No. 6 Vessel No. 7 48.5 48.5 53.2 56.5 56.5 61.0 61.0 23.0 23.0 25.0 27.0 27.0 28.8 28 8 222 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE *Dimensions, Tonnage and Draft oj German-owned Cargo Boats Running on the Hamburg- Mediterranean Service. Gross Net tonnage tonnage 1,580 963 1,580 963 2,130 1,300 2,695 1,640 2,695 1,640 Length (feet) Breadth moulded (feet) Mean loaded draft (feet) Vessel No. 1 Vessel No. 2 Vessel No. 3 (typical) Vessel No. 4 Vessel No. 5 255.5 255.5 288.0 311.5 311.5 34.75 34.75 38.5 43.25 43.25 19.25 19.25 21.0 21.5 21.5 * Dimensions , Tonttage and Draft of German-owned Cargo Boats Running on Baltic and North Sea Service. Gross Net tonnage tonnage 875 525 875 525 1,180 709 1,490 895 1,490 895 1,800 1,080 1,800 1,080 Length (feet) Breadth moulded (feet) Mean loaded draft (feet) Vessel No. 1 Vessel No. 2 Vessel No. 3 (typical). Vessel No. 4 Vessel No. 5 Vessel No. 6 Vessel No. 7 215.0 214.5 236.5 255.0 255.0 270.5 270.5 32.0 32.0 35.0 37.75 37.75 40.0 40.0 14.5 14.5 16.0 17.2 17.2 18.5 18.5 * Condensed from the Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, January 2, 1918. Two of these routes are several thousand miles longer than the Duluth-Liverpool route and involve passage through either the Panama or Suez Canal, the latter having about 100 miles of restricted navigation. These vessels have been operated success- fully vmder conditions no more favoral^le than those which will govern the St. Lawrence route, and should set at rest any fears that might have been entertained regarding the economic ])racticability of the proposed navigation. Drafts of vessels using the Suez Canal. — The following data furnished the authors by tiie Suez Maritime Canal Company show that during the last eight years, 30,939 vessels have passed through the Suez Canal, of which 1.002 vessels have had drafts of 27 feet or more, or about 3.3 per cent of the total. It is clear that the average draft is \ery much less than 25 feet, and is probably nearer 21 feet. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SIIII Year 29-30//. 28-29//. 21-28 ft. 1919 7 24 85 1918 5 16 43 1917 1 12 24 1916 3 10 45 1915 6 28 83 1914 49 147 1913 .... 233 1912 .... 181 Maximum draft of water allowed: 30 feet. P CHANNEL 22 U?ider 27 //. Total ships 3,870 3,986 2,458 2,522 2,316 2,353 3,052 3,110 3,591 3,708 4,606 4,802 4,852 5,085 5,192 5,373 Chapter XVIII STUDY OF VESSELS PASSING THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL BETWEEN JULY 1, 1919, AND JUNE 30, 1920 The Panama Canal has a depth of 41 feet, but the average draft of vessels passing through it is only about 21 feet. During the year ending June 30, 1920, 120 vessels carried grain from Pacific coast points through the Panama Canal, of which 73 had drafts under 25 feet and none had drafts in excess of 28 feet. During the same period 160 vessels carried cargoes through the canal consisting largely or entirely of lumber, ties, etc., and of these only 5 drew 25 feet or more. The number of vessels carrying nitrates was 123, of which 77 drew less than 25 feet; while one drew over 30 feet. Of 118 vessels carrying general cargo through the Canal from the United Kingdom and Europe, 36 drew 25 feet or more and none drew as much as 30 feet. The figures show that a depth of 25 feet in the St. Lawrence waterway would accommodate a large proportion of the vessels using the Panama Canal; while a depth of 30 feet would accom- modate practically all of them. While data relative to drafts of vessels are not generally kept at the ports of the United States, accurate measurements are' kept of all vessels passing through the Panama Canal. Since this canal has a depth of 41 feet and is utilized by vessels proceeding from and to all points of the world, a study of the drafts of vessels passing through the canal with various kinds of cargo should give a true picture of the vessels engaged in the freight traffic of the world. The Panama Canal Record states that during the six months from July to December, 1919, the average length of the 1,152 commercial ships making the transit of the canal was 342 feet, the average beam was 48 feet, and the average draft in salt water was 21 feet. 224 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 225 Drafts of Vessels carrying grain and flour through the Panama Canal, July 1, 1919, to June 30, 1920. Draft Draft feet From To feet From To. and ins. and ins. 23.4 Seattle Europe 23.6 Astoria New York 20.9 Portland New York 22.2 San Francisco Norfolk 19 7 San Francisco Europe 24.0 Tacoma Newport News 22.1 Portland New York 25.5 San Francisco Newport News 26.1 Seattle New York 24.0 San Francisco United Kingdom 26.0 Vallejo Newport News 23.8 Portland New York 23.0 Tacoma New York' 24.0 San Francisco United Kingdom 20 Melbourne Christiania 22.6 San Francisco London 23 4 Portland New York 24 1 Portland New York 23.4 Portland New York 21.9 San Francisco United Kingdom 24.3 Tacoma New York 26 Astoria New York 19.6 San Francisco England 21.6 Port Custer Falmouth 24.0 Portland New York 26.0 Tacoma New York 22.0 San Francisco Ipswich 19.0 San Francisco Queenstown 24 San Francisco Christiania 25.7 Tacoma Newport News 24 6 Seattle Norfolk 23.6 San Francisco Gibraltar 24.7 Portland Newport News 23 Portland Gibraltar 26.0 San Fr.mcisco Newport Nsws 22 San Francisco Sharpness 25 S San Francisco Copenhagen 24.6 Portland Gibraltar 21.0 San Francisco Ipswich 25 San Francisco Norfolk 24.1 Portland New York 22.0 San Francisco Falmouth 21.9 San Francisco Queenstown 23.4 Portland New York 26.1 Seattle Norfolk 26.0 San Francisco Norfolk 22.0 San Francisco New York 23.0 Tacoma New York 24 3 Portland New York 23.6 Los Angeles New York 24 6 Portland New York 24.2 Tacoma New York 23.10 Portland New York 19.8 San Franciscb New York 26.0 Seattle New York 23.0 Portland New York 23.1 Tacomi New York 26.6 San Francisco New York 25. 6 Adelaide Falmouth 24.0 Portland New York 22.0 San Francisco United Kingdom 25.0 Tacoma New York 26.0 Tacoma New York 23.6 Seattle New York 27.0 Valparaiso Ipswich 25.0 Seattle New York 23.6 Seattle New York 23.0 San Francisco Leith 25.0 Tacoma New Yoik 25.1 San Francisco New York 20 Portland New York 25.7 Portland New York 24.6 Tacoma New York 26.0 Seattle New York 22.0 San Francisco New York 24.0 Tacoma New York 23.6 Tacoma New York 26.0 Seattle New York 23.0 San Francisco New York 27.0 Portland New York 26.0 Seattle New York 27.0 Tacoma New York 27.0 Astoria New York 25.0 Seattle New York 26.0 San Francisco New York 25.0 Portland New York 25.3 San Francisco New York 23.5 Seattle New York 24.6 Portland New York 24.5 San Francisco New Yoik 23.6 Seattle New York 24.0 Tacoma New York 25.0 San Francisco United Kingdom 26.6 Portand New Uork 25.0 San Francisco New York 24.6 Everett New York 26.6 Portland New York 27.0 Tacoma New York 20.11 Portland New York 24.0 Portland New York 26.6 Portland New York 27.5 Tacoma New York 21.6 San Francisco New York 26.0 San Francisco New York 23.0 Portland New York 25* Seattle New York 22.0 Seattle New York 21.0 Seattle New York 23.6 Astoria New York 24.0 Tacoma New York 25.6 San Francisco Alexandria 23.6 Portland New York 20.0 Valpariaso Ipswich 27.0 Portland New York 23.0 Tacoma New York 27.0 Tacoma New York 25.6 San Francisco New York 25.6 Seattle New York 26.5 San Francisco Alexandria 22.0 Seattle New York 25.0 Portland Glasgow 226 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE 120 vessels carried grain from Pacific coast points. The drafts of these vessels were as follows : Feet No. of vessels 27-28 8 26-27 19 25-26 20 24-25 23 23-24 24 22-23 11 21-22 6 20-21 5 19-20 4 120 Of these vessels, twenty-seven were destined for points in the United Kingdom and Europe. The drafts of these vessels were as follows : Feet No. of vessels 27 1 26-27 25-26 4 24-25 4 23-24 4 22-23 5 21 22 4 20-21 2 19-20 3 Vessels Carrying Lumber Through the Panama Canal from the Pacific to the Atlantic, July 1, 1919, to June 30, 1920. 160 vessels carried cargoes consisting largely or entirely of lumber, ties, etc. Of these only 5 drew 25 feet or over. The following shows the number of vessels of each foot of draft : Feet No. of vessels 29-30 " 1 28-29 1 27-28 26-27 1 25-26 2 24-25 13 23-24 15 22-23 48 21-22 27 20-21 14 19-20 9 18-19 10 17-18 3 16-17 8 15-16 5 14-15 3 160 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 227 A study of the destinations of these vessels shows thai 114 were bound for points in the United Kingdom and Europe, and that only one of these vessels drew 25 feet or more. This vessel carried a cargo of 9,100 tons of redwood and flour from Seattle to Amsterdam, and drew 28.6 feet. Of the remaining vessels, fifteen were bound for points in Cuba and the greatest draft was 23.6 feet, while twenty-eight vessels were bound for Atlantic coast points. Several vessels were bound for Cristobal for orders. From the figures given it will be seen that with a 25-foot depth in the St. Lawrence River all of these vessels carrying lumber through the canal, with the exception of about five could have proceeded into the Great Lakes. The destination of vessels carrying nitrates through the Canal to Atlantic and Gulf ports, and the drafts of vessels employed in this trade were as follows: Vessels carrying nitrates from South America to Atlantic and Gulf ports, between July 1, 1919, and Jmie 30, 1920. Boston New York Philadelphia Baltimore Norfolk Wilmington feet feet feet feet feet feet and inches and inches and inches and inches and inches and inches 24.0 24.6 23.0 25.9 18.0 22.6 23.1 2.^.0 23.0 29.0 20.6 24.8 23.0 26.0 23.0 26.0 24.2 25.0 22.6 25.0 24.0 29.0 24.0 22.0 19.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 23.0 24.0 24.0 27.6 27.2 23.6 23 6 24.0 26.6 20.0 25.0 21.6 19.6 22.0 23.6 22.7 27.0 20.0 2.13 28.0 21.0 21.0 24.6 24.6 19.6 22.6 21.0 24.0 22.6 22.6 .... "rf ■ ■ 29.0 23.2 .... 228 ECONOMIC ASPFXTS OF THE Charleston Savannah Mobile New Orleans Other ports feet feet feet feet feet and inches and inches and inches and inches and inches 25.5 24.6 23.0 20.6 23.0 22.10 25.6 26.6 23.5 16.6 20.0 22.1 29.0 27.0 26.6 24.4 23.0 26.8 26.6 26.0. 21.0 23.0 28.7 28.6 26.6 25.0 22.3 24.2 28.0 29.0 24.8 28.0 20.0 27.0 23.6 20.0 29.2 28.3 21.6 29.7 20.2 29.6 24.6 27.8 20.0 24.6 22.5 29.6 23.6 23.6 24.0 26.3 21.0 20.8 26.6 31.6 22.6 25.0 28.0 26.0 26.6 27.4 28.0 To summarize the above, one hundred and twenty-three vessels carried nitrates from South American ports to Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States. The drafts of these vessels were as follows : Feet No. of vessels 31-32 1 30-31 29-30 9 28-29 8 27-28 7 26-27 13 25-26 8 24-25 19 23-24 19 22-23 14 21-22 8 20-21 12 19-20 3 18-19 1 17-18 » 16-17 • 1 123 These figures show that the deepest draft vessels carr\ini.j nitrates were those supplying the large fertilizer factories at and near Charleston and Savannah. Nitrate of soda is a heavy bulk commodity, for which vessels of deep draft can advantageously be used when the depths available permit. It is noticeable, how- ever, that the use of ves.sels drawing up to 31.6 feet at Charleston did not make the use of smaller vessels unprofitable. At Boston and Mobile all vessels delivering nitrates drew under 25 feet. At GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 229 New York. Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans only two ves- sels drew over 25 feet ; and at Philadelphia only one vessel drew over 25 feet. From this it will be seen that nearly all vessels carrying nitrates to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Mobile, and New Orleans could proceed into the Great Lakes if a 25-foot channel were available. Vessels carrying general cargo from United Kingdom and European ports through'the Panama Canal, betioeen July 1, 1919, and June 30, 1920. Draft Draft Cfeet) From To (feet) Draft To and ins. and ins. 25.0 Plymouth Wellington 24.2 Liverpool Valparaiso 22.0 London San Francisco 16.3 Copenhagen San Francisco 26.6 Liverpool San Francisco 15.6 Genoa Valparaiso 25.0 Liverpool Coronel 27.7 London Auckland 28.0 London Auckland 22.6 Liverpool Chili 25.0 London Auckland 17.6 Genoa Valparaiso 25.2 Liverpool W. Coast 23.9 Glasgow Callao 25.6 Liverpool Littleton 15.1 Rotterdam Guayaquil 26.0 Liverpool Littleton 22.4 Liverpool Valparaiso 23.0 Liverpool Peru and Chile 22.0 London Coronel 23.0 Liverpool Coronel 23.6 Glasgow San Francisco 18.0 Gothenberg Balboa 20.9 London Seattle 22.0 Liverpool Valparaiso 21.0 Christiania Callao 15.10 Liverpool Vancouver 19.6 Amsterdam Talcahuano 14.3 Genoa Valparaiso 16.0 London W. Coast 20.0 Liverpool Coronel 22.9 Liverpool Coronel 26.0 London San Francisco 18.0 Liverpool Los Angeles 16.0 Gothenberg San Francisco 27.6 Manchester Adelaide 28.0 Manchester Sydney 25.6 Liverpool Dunedin 24.4 Liverpool Coronel 19.0 Genoa Valparaiso 27.6 Middlesboro bydney 20.6 Liverpool Valparaiso 21.3 Liverpool Guayaquil 16.0 Bordeaux Valparaiso 19.0 Amsterdam Valparaiso 27.4 London Wellington 25.0 London Valparaiso 15.6 Bordeaux Noumea 26.0 Manchester Sydney 20.0 Liverpool Valparaiso 29.3 Glasgow Wellington 20.6 Liverpool Vancouver 29.9 London Wellington 20.0 Liverpool Guayaquil 28.3 London New Zealand 26.8 London Sydney 22.0 Liverpool Los Angeles 20.11 Genoa Guayaquil 22.8 Liverpool Coronel 23.6 Liverpool Coronel 25.0 Avonmouth Wellington 17.6 Christiania San Francisco 20.6 Genoa Valparaiso 19.0 Gothenberg Valparaiso 16.0 Gothenberg San Francisco 20.0 Liverpool Valparaiso 16.0 Rotterdam Valparaifo 19.2 Genoa V^alparaiso 17.0 Gothenberg Valparaiso 20.6 Liverpool San Francisco 16.0 Christiania San Francisco 17.6 Havre Talcahuano 21.9 Liverpool Coronel 27.0 London Auckland 27.3 London Auckland 15.6 Amsterdam Callao 28.6 Avonmouth Wellington 24.0 Liverpool Coronel 24.6 Liverpool Coronel 15.0 Hamburg Talcahuano 23.1 Liverpool Coronel 23.0 Liverpool Coronel 16.0 Genoa Valparaiso 24.0 Liverpool Coronel 26.0 Copenhagen San Francisco 25.0 London Sydney 19.4 Genoa Valparaiso 21.7 Gothenberg San Francisco 16.6 Amsterdam Valparaiso 25.8 Liverpool Coronel 20.6 London Champerico 27.0 London New Zealand 29.0 London Auckland 23.7 London Valdivia 23.1 Glasgow Vancouver 19.0 London Valparaiso 19.3 Christiania Corral 26.1 Liverpool Auckland 25.0 London Adelaide 16.5 Bordeaux Guayaquil 15.0 London Champerico 16.6 Amsterdam Valparaiso 22.9 Glasgow Corral 15.0 Genoa Valparaiso 18.0 Glasgow Valparaiso 25.0 Southhampton Auckland 28.6 Avonmouth Auckland 13.6 Leith San Francisco 21.6 Hull Brisbane 29.0 Glasgow Yokohama 23.0 Liverpool Coronel 21.7 Antwerp San Francisco 23.6 Liverpool Valparaiso 22.0 London Talcahuano 13.0 London Guatamala 22.0 Liverpool Valparaiso 29.5 Liverpool Wellington 20.6 Glasgow San Francisco 15.0 Hamburg Talcahuano 23.0 Liverpool Coronel 24.0 Liverpool Coronel 25.0 London Sydney 230 ECONOMIC .\SPECTS OF THE The figures show a total of 118 vessels carrying general cargo from points in the United Kingdom and Europe to points on the west coast of North and South x\merica, and to Australia, New- Zealand, Japan, and elsewhere. The following is the distribu- tion according to draft: Draft No. of vessels Feet 29-30 5 28-29 5 27-28 7 26-27 7 25-26 12 24-25 5 23-24 II 22-23 11 21-22 6 20-21 12 19-20 8 18-19 3 17-18 4 16-17. . . 11 15-16 8 14-15 1 13-14 2 118 The above shows that 36 vessels drew 25 feet or more and 82 vessels less than 25 feet. None drew as much as 30 feet. The vessels carrying general cargo from the points named to Pacific coast ports of the United States w^ere as follows : San Francisco draft feet and inches Los A ngeles draft feet and inches Vancouver draft feet a nd inches Seattle draft feet and inches 26.6 20.6 22.0 23.1 20.9 26.0 17.6 18.0 20.6 26.0 16.3 15.10 23.6 16.0 22.0 16.0 21.7 16.0 21. V 20. ■ 13.6 These figures show that with the exception of three vessels which went to San Francisco, all vessels from Europe and the United Kingdom to Pacific ports of the United States could utilize a 25-fo()t channel into the Great Lakes. This of cour.se refers to vessels listed as carrying general cargo, which is the class of vessel which would I)e needed for use on the St. Lawrence River. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 231 I'essels carrying general cargo through the Panama Canal, destined for Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States, between July 1, 1919 and June 30, 1920. Draft Draft (feet) From To (feet) From To, and ins. and ins. 19.6 San Francisco New York 24 Valparaiso New York 25.0 Yokohama New York 22.6 Singapore New York 22.0 Singapore New York 19.0 Shanghai New York 21.0 Valparaiso New York 24.0 Talcahuano New YorK 21.0 Eureka New York 24.6 Kobe New York 22.6 Valparaiso New York 24.6 Valparaiso New York 24.6 Hongkong New York 26.0 Wellington Baltimore 20.0 San Francisco New York 25.4 Singapore New York 19.0 San Francisco New York 25.3 Valparaiso New York 23.6 Kobe New York 19.0 Kobe New York 26.9 Singapore New York 22.0 Port Pirie Boston 24.0 Hongkong New York 26.0 Singapore New York 22.0 Melbourne New York 19.0 San Francisco Baltimore 23.6 Kobe Camden, N. J. 24.0 Singapore New Orleans 25.0 Manila New York 26.6 Sydney New York 19.7 Kobe New York 20.8 Guayacan New York 27.0 Dalny, China New York 23.0 Kobe New York 17.1 Valparaiso New York 23.0 Valparaiso New York 19.7 Guayacan New York 25.0 Talcahuano New York 23.8 Shanghai New York 20.6 Taku New York 24.8 Talcahuano New York 25.6 Auckland New York 24.0 Balboa New York 21,0 Eten New York 25.6 Valparaiso New York 22.2. Yokohama. New York 21.0 Lyttleton New York 20.9 Hongkong New York 26.6 Singapore New York 24.0 Valparaiso New York 24.0 Kobe New York 23.9 Noumea New York 19.0 San Francisco Baltimore 18.0 Auckland New York 22.6 Adelaide Baltimore 25.2 Valparaiso New York 21.5 Arica New York 24.6 Hongkong New York 16.6 San Francisco Baltimore 28.0 Singapore New York 17.6 Gatico, Chili New York 24.0 Manila New York 26.0 Singapore New York 22.1 Hongkong New York 24.6 Singapore New Orleans 29.0 Valparaiso New York 24.6 Shanghai New York 24.1 W. Coast, S.A. New York 26.0 Shanghai New York 19.7 San Francisco Baltimore 23.6 Shanghai New York 24.0 Shanghai New York 25.3 Valparaiso New York 20.6 Cahncay New York 17.0 San Francisco Baltimore 26.0 Shanghai New York 24.0 Hongkong New York The figures given show that 77 vessels loaded with general cargo passed through the canal destined for Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States. The following is the distribution according to draft: Draft Feet No. of vessels 29 1 28 1 27 1 26-27 8 25-26 9 24-25 18 23-24 7 22-23 8 21-22 5 20-21 5 19-20 9 18-19 1 17-18 3 16-17 1 77 232 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE From these figures it will be seen that 20 of these vessels drew 25 feet or more, while 57 vessels drew less than 25 feet. None drew as much as 30 feet. In addition to the above, 166 vessels with g^eral cargo passed through the canal to Cristobal. Only one of these vessels drew 25 feet, the majority drawing from 15 to 20 feet. These vessels brought general cargo from west coast points to Cristobal for transfer to vessels operating between that point and the East. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 233 „ ^^^O•■^^00v000>O0^•*00•^O"^ ro -* rO o H ^^f*5'*vO'Ot^'^'^tNCVJtNCNC O o O ro O >o c o 03 lO > ^— H v-H CN ^-H •/^ o o rt O t/j ■^(NcoOrO'^CN'-^fN'-^'-''* o 00 LO ■^ Tj< ■^ -t O o z • i o CN ^■rttNiro<^'<*T}o w l-H Ih ct3 IJ > : : : « C 3 O 73 Q OOONOOt^OiOTj<'rjrM— hOOv'- 1 .—1 r^rOCNCNCNCNCSCNCSCNrMCN^H ^^ CoOOOOOOOOOO o^ i o cfl O M O0\00t^^i0'^ror-1»HOO>00^5 ■ H 4J o rr 3 O. r^ <^ 1 c^ ) CN cs r. ) c^ ) r^ r- «- ■^ TO ?; S "^ 0) 5 "^ _^ ■*^ U) ^ O M :3 rt M ,— . 73 O &C O ° O fe o o ^ ^ .t^ "S . O O C -03 . i? o -^ ^ O ^ 4J !< I- S t^ cj <-• (/) Cj (D C +J J-H > O rH ^ O O TO V. C ^ 2 cd ^^ ^ c Hi3 fcO C D* a; a Chapter XIX WILL OCEAN VESSELS SEEK INLAND PORTS? Vessels will proceed as far inland as physically practicable, and the farther inland they can penetrate the greater is the resulting economy. Hence it will be found that important ports have gen- erally been developed at the head of ocean navigation. The Amazon River is navigated by ocean vessels to Manaos, 900 miles above the mouth, and by lighter draft ocean vessels to Iquitos, 2,200 miles above the mouth. The outbound cargo is limited almost entirely to rubber, while the inbound cargo con- sists principally of supplies for the rubber gatherers. The St. Lawrence River provides a noteworthy instance of the principle that ocean vessels will proceed as far into the interior as the navigation conditions will permit. The extension of navigation beyond Montreal to the important industrial and shipping centers of the Great Lakes can not fail to. attract the ocean carrier. Since it has been contended that import and export business will always be confined to the seacoast, it seems advisable to con- sider whether ocean vessels would seek the ports of the Great Lakes if a deep waterway were provided. It is a recognized rule of transportation that where there is a productive interior. ships will proceed as far inland as physically practicable, and the farther inland they can penetrate the greater is the resulting economy, and the more extensive is the area benefited. Hence, ports are generally developed at the head of ocean navigation. A few examples are shown by the following table : River Place Distance from ocean. Statute miles Scheldt Antwerp 60 Nieuwe Mass Thames Gironde Rotterdam London Bordeau.x 18 50 55 Elbe Hamburg 70 Mobile Mobile 40 BufTalo Bayou Delaware Patapsco Mississippi Houston Philadelphia Baltimore New Orleans Portland 50 101 190 100 Willamette 113 Yangtse Hankau Manaos 615 Amazon 900 St. Lawrence Montreal 1,003 Amazon Iquitos 2,200 234 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 235 Similarly, railroads seek the shortest route to deep water. An addition of five hundred miles to a rail haul results in a heavy tax upon transportation, but a similar addition to an ocean voyage is of no great consequence. There is no material difference in the rates between the United Kingdom and the several North Atlantic ports, although the distance to Baltimore is 550 miles greater than to Boston. X'essels make the same rate to Man- chester as to Liverpool, the same rate to Houston as to Galveston, and the same rate to Beaumont as to Port Arthur, although in each case the additional navigation is entirely in restricted channels. Hankau and Manaos are comparatively unimi)ortant com- mercially, and the country tributary to the latter place is sparsely settled. From Manaos to Iquitos, Peru, about 1,300 miles, there are no towns of importance. Below Manaos the river in places is only 38 yards wide from bank to bank, which, with a swift current, makes navigation by large vessels difticult and dan- gerous. Nevertheless, it appears from the following report on the Amazon River traffic made before the war by Capt. A. G. Winterhalter, U. S. Navy, that Manaos is a regular port of call for a number of steamship lines and that small ocean vessels go to Iquitos. Steamers drawing 14 feet can navigate the .Amazon for 2,700 miles above its mouth, or to Borja, 400 miles beyond Iquitos, Peru. The principal difficulty is due to the shifting bars, the strong currents, 3 to 5 knots, and the immense quantity of driftwood which comes down when the river is rising. Pilots are necessary and are regularly emplo}~ed by companies operating river stieamers. Manaos, about 900 miles from the mouth of the river, is the most important town above Para, and has both ocean and river trade. There is about 40 feet difference between high and low water at this point. From Manaos to Iquitos, Peru, about 1,300 miles, there are no towns of importance. The difference between high and low water is about 18 feet at Iquitos. The following regular lines of steamers are engaged in the commerce of the Amazon : Amazon Steam i\'a7'igattou Co. — Twenty-nine steamers, of 9,184 aggregate tonnage, ply between Para and points on the .\mazon and tributaries. Booth's Line. — Thirteen steamers, from 1,100 to 2,000 tons each. Itineraries of these vessels include the following ports: Manaos, Liverpool, Havre, Lisbon, Madeira, New York, Maranhao, Ceara, and Barbados. Smaller vessels of this line go to Iquitos. Sailings every 10 days from Manaos for Europe ; every 20 days for New York. Red Cross Line. — Xine steamers; aggregate tonnage, 9,467. This line 2J6 CHEAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL has same itiiTcrary as Booth Line, dates of saiHngs alternating with those of latter lin'e. Lloyd Brazilian Line. — Seven vessels, of 1,999 tons each, plying between Manaos and Rio Janeiro, and touching at intermediate points. Liqure Brasiliana (Italian). — Two steamers, plying between Manaos and Genoa, touching at Para and Mediterranean port's. A. Bcrncaud & Co. — Twelve steamers, of 150 to 300 tons each, navigat- ing the Amazon, Madeira. Negro, Purus, and other tributaries. The population of Manaos is only about 50.000, and its exports consist of rubber and its imports of supplies for the rubber gath- erers, all of which could be handled on light draft boats and transshipped at Para. But the small ocean vessel has ascended 900 miles of difficult river navigation to get the business. Having this instance in mind, it is unreasonable to believe that the rich and populous industrial and shipping centers of Duluth. Mil- waukee. Chicago. Detroit, Cleveland, and Toledo will fail to at- tract the ocean carrier. The idea that imports must be restricted to the coast line is untenable ; that they are largely so restricted at the present time is due solely to physical obstacles. In considering the question of whether vessels will proceed into the Great Lakes, we need no other analogy than that of the St. Lawrence River itself. Montreal at the head of ocean navigation has developed into the most important commercial city of Canada, and only the physical obstacles to navigation prevent the further penetration of ocean vessels beyond this port into the Great Lakes. In winter when the St. Lawrence is not navigable, vessels proceed to St. John, which is the farthest point inland that can be reached. Numerous other examples could be cited showing the tendency of ocean vessels to proceed as far inland as the navigation condi- tions will permit. The advantage of developing ports as near as practicable to the center of population of the country seems evident. The area within economical distribution of such a cen- tral port will be far greater than froiu any port on the seacoast. In a recent paper the Albany Chamber of Commerce makes the following truthful observation: "It should be the policy of the United States to foster trade and to ex- t-c-nd ocean routes as far inland as practicable." Chapter XX THE PROBLEM OF RETURN LOADS While full loads both inward and outward are desirable in order to afford the most profitable operating conditions for ves- sels, they are rarely obtainable in practice. Our exports to Europe during recent years have been about seven times our im- ports. At Newport News in 1918 the exports were nearly seventy times the imports, while at Los Angeles the exports were nearly twenty times the imports. At Portland, Oregon, the exports in 1919 were forty times the imports. The situation, however, is even less favorable than these figures indicate, inasmuch as in some instances the exports are chiefly destined to a different con- tinent than that from which the imports are received. The cotton from Galveston goes to the United Kingdom, while her chief imports come from Mexico. To secure cargoes, vessels can not always maintain regular service between such ports, but must operate on triangular routes or make their movements conform to the requirements of business. The conditions on the Great Lakes are favorable for operations of this kind, and a more equal distribution of imports and exports at ports on the Great Lakes may be anticipated than is now the case at the majority of our ocean ports. One-way traffic not uncommon. — It has been asserted that ships must have return cargoes and that ships saiHng through the St. Lawrence would not be able to obtain such cargoes. Both of these assertions may be challenged. It is of course highly desirable that ships should have return cargoes because the cargo ton cost is thereby reduced, providing there are no conditions involved to offset this result. The assertion that "ships must have return cargoes," however, is not borne out by the actual condi- tions on many trade routes and at many ports. For instance, the ore carrier of the Great Lakes often returns light in preference to taking" on a cargo of coal at Lake Erie ports, the reason being that the freight rate on ore is a little more than twice as much as the rate on coal and the vessel is able to show a larger net return on her season's operations by saving the time required for the loading and unloading of the coal. Time spent in port is unproductive time, and in many cases vessels find it more profitable to operate with a one-way haul of paying freight than a two-way haul involving considerable detention in port in tak- ing on a cargo of less profitable freight. These conditions, of course, are confined chiefly to comparatively short routes where the time in port is a large proportion of the total. Nevertheless, we find from the records of vessels passing through the Panaina 237 23ii ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Canal during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, that vessels carrying nitrates between Taltal, Iquique, Valparaiso, Antofa- gasta, and other points on the west coast to Atlantic and Gulf ports of the United States generally carried full cargoes eastward with little or no cargo westward. These conditions are found wherever there are large quantities of natural resources in terri- tories of small population and restricted consumption. Relation of import and export cargoes. — It is a mistake to believe that the trade of the United States with the various coun- tries of the world is so well balanced that there is a uniform move- ment in both directions. During the calendar year 1919 our total imports amounted to $3,904,-364,9.32, and our total exports to $7,920,425,990 or more than double the value of the imports. It must not be assumed, however, that the average load of vessels in our import trade was one-half their load in the export trade, because the imports and exports were not evenly distributed. Considering for instance our trade with Euroi)e, it is found that our imports amounted to $750,528,389, wliile our exports to Europe amounted to $^,187,666,363, or nearly seven times the value of the imports. \'essels engaged in the trade with Europe averaged about one-seventh load inward as compared with the load outward. Our imports from South America during the last ten years have been practically double our exports. Many vessels carrying full loads to Europe return practically empty, and many \essels bringing full loads from South America do likewise. Breadstuffs constitute our most important exports, while sugar takes first rank among our imports. The first goes largely to Europe, while the second comes largely from Cuba. Our exports io Europe comprise large quantities of coal and iron and steel, l>ro\iding the heavy tonnage required for full loads, but our imports from Euroj:)e consist largely of manufactured goods of small tonnage as compared with their value. Our ten most im- portant imports consist of sugar, wool, silk, India rubber, chemi- cals, hides and skins, coffee, copper, vegetable oils, and fibers. Of these only chemicals and vegetable oils are received in any great quantity from Europe. Our large imports from South America and Asia do not solve the problem of return loads for vessels trading with Europe. The sulphur from Louisiana and 1>xas mines is carried to Europe in full cargoes, but the vessels return empty, as do most of the vessels carrying coal from Nor- folk and Newport News. It might be facetiously inquired — What is the return cargo of the tanker ? GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE Sllll' CHANNEL 239 Comparison of imports and exports at ports of the United States. — In evidence of the lack of equilibrium in tlie tonnage of inbound and outbound cargoes of vessels engaged in foreign commerce with the United States, the following statistics of the commerce of certain of our principal ports are of interest: v» Imports, tons Exports, tons 1918 1919 1918 1919 Portland, Me New York, N. Y Fernandina, Fla Mobile, Ala Galveston, Tex Newport News, Va Norfolk, Va Sabine Pass, Tex Los Angeles, Calif Portland, Oreg 257,849 6,155,083 3,981 200,403 277,410 5,250 517,588 348,388 11,716 22,252 133,357 4,490 193,647 124,767 10.497 382,585 590,330 28,365 14,260 914,575 12,252,614 155,862 557,824 2,100,815 3,646,094 8,585,305 2,655,490 220,891 230,311 1,183,968 315,761 1,016,548 1,582,467 2,854,122 5,633,200 2,213,673 341,591 579,148 It will be seen that in a number of cases the exports were many times the imports. The situation is really more unfavor- able than these figures indicate, for the reason that in several cases the imports were made up of articles not obtainable in the countries to which the exports were destined, and vice versa. At Galveston, in 1919, the exports were about twelve times the imports. Similar conditions exist at Norfolk and Newport News. At the latter place, in 1918, the exports were nearly 70 times the imports, while at Los Angeles the exports were nearly 20 times the imports. At Portland, Oreg., the exports in 1919 were 40 times the imports. These are all successful ports, not- withstanding the lack of imports. Analyzing the traffic at Galveston in 1918, it is found that mineral oil constituted 215,405 tons of the total of 277.410 tons of imports, while grain and cottton comprised 1,702,995 tons of the total exports of 2.100,815 tons. The grain and cotton went largely to the United Kingdom, but the oil came from Mexico, so that in exchange for 1,702.995 tons of grain and cotton there was a possible return movement from the United King- dom of 62,005 tons of miscellaneous freight. Let us suppose that the grain which was exported from Galveston, amounting to 1,471.759 tons, had been sent from Duluth, requiring say 200 240 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ship loads. To equal the performance at Galveston, only 310 tons of imports would have to be brought back on each trip. It is true that the vessel, after discharging the grain at Liverpool, may not have returned directly to Galveston, but perhaps found a better cargo for some other port. Thus a vessel sailing from a South Atlantic port to Liverpool might proceed to Norfolk for bunker coal and thence by the usual route to destination where she might find one-third of a load for New York or Boston, but none for her original port. She would therefore be operating on a triangular route, with a full cargo on the first trip, one- third cargo on the second trip, and none on the third trip. The conditions on the Great Lakes are exceedingly favorable for operations of this kind, as there are a number of large cities all situated directly upon the through route and requiring no diversion to reach any desired destination. A vessel taking grain from Duluth to Liverpool could bring back general mer- chandise for Quebec, Montreal, Oswego, Rochester, Buffalo, Erie. Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, and Duluth, without material alteration of her course. So far as imports are concerned, the great city of Chicago already serves a wider area than any South Atlantic port, although these imports now proceed through Atlantic ports before being distributed from Chicago. Compared with many ports of the United States which now have a suc- cessful maritime trade, the important cities of the Great Lakes have far greater opportunities. Import business will be devel- oped at these ports in proportion to consumption in the territory tributary to them, just as similar business has been developed at other ports of the world accessible to ocean vessels and having economical communication with the interior. These lake cities now take millions of tons of imports annually, which are brought by rail from the seaboard, and it is worthy of note that some of the chief tonnage producing ituports of the United States arc destined largely for the industries of this region. Chicago is the rail center of the United States as well as the second city in population. As a distributing center for imports it has the transportation facilities for serving a wide area. We would be blind to the truth if we were to deny the clearly evident opportunities that these cities have for developing an miport traffic, comparable to the consuming ability of the important territory now served by them. *rhe maintenance of shipping service at any port is dependent upon the availability of profit- able cargoes. The ideal conditions are found where there is both GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 241 bulk and package freight for the loading of outbound vessels, manufacturing industries requiring large quantities of imported raw materials, and a large population consuming the food prod- ucts and manufactures of other lands. All of these conditions now exist at the principal cities of the Great Lakes. We would anticipate a more equal distribuiton of imports and exports at ports on the Great Lakes than is now the case at the majority of our ocean ports. Chapter XXI THE COMMERCE OF THE GREAT LAKES. The commerce carried on the Great Lakes is sometimes meas- ured by the traffic of the St. Marys Falls Canal. In 1916 the traffic through this canal amounte'd to only 68 per cent of the total, which in that year was approximately 133,388,000 tons. Of this total, approximately 100,000,000 tons consisted of iron ore and coal, and over 10,000.000 tons consisted of grain. Part of the iron ore and coal and practically all of the grain are interested in reaching the seaboard, but the general freight traffic now carried on the Lakes is purely local and interlake freight not destined to seaboard. The enormous volume of high-class freight destined to the seaboard now goes entirely by rail and will con- tinue to do so until the Great Lakes are opened to ocean vessels. This freight is of the kind on which the transfer costs are the greatest. The present rail routes to seaboard from the important industrial centers of the Great Lakes require one transfer at heavy cost in order to place the goods on board the vessel bound for foreign or coastwise destinations. The movement from the same points by way of the Barge Canal requires two or more transfers, while the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Ship Channel will eliminate all transfers on this business. Volume of present water-borne commerce.— Some of the are:u- ments against the proposed deep route by way of the St. Law- rence River have been based on a consideration of the present commerce of the Great Lakes, and it has been correctly stated that the greater portion of this commerce consists of iron ore and coal. Before proceeding wMth a study of the commerce that may be expected to utilize the new route, it seems desirable to present data showing the actual commerce carried on the Great Lakes. The following shows the commerce passing through the .St. Marys Falls Canals between 1910 and 1919: Commerce Through the St. Marys Falls Canals. Year Iron ore (tons) Coal (tons) Grain* (tons) Other com- modities (tons) Total commerce (tons) Number of vessels 1910 41.603.634 30.731.235 46.303.423 48.109.353 31.413.765 45.213.604 63,452.107 61.374.090 60.551,296 46,922.792 13.513.727 15,332,876 14.931,594 18.662.938 14,487,221 13,357,058 16,123,119 18,298,853 17,981,610 13,874.951 4,166,859 4,471,402 7,588,200 9,632,792 6,949,385 9,861,462 9,647,125 7,764.689 5.200,077 5,467,413 3,078,998 2,941,703 3,649,459 3,313,261 2,519,563 2,858,180 2,665,868 1,839,594 1,947,344 1.970,386 62,363,218 53,477,216 72,472,676 79,718.344 55,369,934 71,290,304 91,888.219 89,277.226 85,680,327 68,235,542 877 1911 765 1912 853 1913 852 1914 813 1915 806 1916 863 1917 780 1918 749 1919 733 * Includes flour. 242 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 243 It will be seen that the maximum tonnage was reached in 1916, when a total of 91,888,219 tons was transported through the canals. This represents only the commerce entering and leaving })oints on Lake Superior, however. There is no complete record of the total commerce of the Great Lakes. The Corps of Engi- neers. U. S. Army, which is in charge of the improvements on the Great Lakes, publishes annually a record of the commerce of the ports at which improvements are carried on by the Govern- ment, but these records include only the important ports, num- bering in all about 83 localities, while there are approximately 300 minor lake ports not included in the records. The following shows the commerce of the principal ports only during the calendar year 1916: Commerce of the Great Lakes in 1916, exclusive of car ferries Port Iron ore (tons) Coal (tons) Grain (tons"! All other (tons) Total (tons) Port Arthur, Canada . . . Grand Mrrais, Minn Agate Bay, Minn Duluth-Superior, Minn. and Wis I'ort Wing, Wis Ashland, Wis t Keweenaw Waterway, Mich Marquette Bay, Mich.. . . Marquette, Mich Ontonagon, Mich Grand Marais, Mich Manistique, Mich Menominee, Mich, and Wis Ocento, Wis Green Bay, Wis Fox River, Wi.~ Sturgeon Bay Canal Escanaba, Mich Algoma, Wis Kewaunee, Wis Two Rivers, Wis Manitowoc, Wis Sheboygan, Wis ■ ■ • ■ Port Washington, Wis — Milwaukee, Wis Racine, Wis Kenosha, Wis Waukegan, 111 Chicago, 111 Calumet. Til Indiana Harbor, Ind. . . . Gary, Ind Michigan Citv, Ind St. Joseph, Mich South Haven, Mich Saugatuck, Mich Holland, Mich Grand Haven, Mich Grand River, Mich Muskegon, Mic^ White Lake, Mich Ludington. Mich Manistee, Mich Portage Lake. Mich Arcadia, Mich Frankfort, Mich 12,024,1.S.S 38, .347,953 33,930 3, 263, .346 1,060,309 6„S60 .457,444 269,899 7,745,835 793,214 2,718,185 325 309,440 9,585,237 735,081 1,415,327 356,326' 2,381 143,920 776.416 88,7.39 104,170 3.600 1,100 21,391 397,039 635,413 13,786 4,590,384 198,176 21,614 170,751 471,774 1,181,262 416,208 316 1,457 120 125 55.568 187 < ,.532 23,780 103 1.323 556 5,774 153 275 204.779 564 206 411,778 421,301 41 40,636' 4,106 15,683 1,854,723 1,463 316,871 615,311 24,749 21,379 2,434 1,280 22,071 89,105 5,292 81,832 77,278 495,906 8,296 8,330 2,561 37,941 47,471 1,771 1,-591.918 68,921 106,3.30 26.893 1,555,829 960,337 834,076 8,694 122,106 34,732 9,008 36,712 173.410 49,495 127,455 7.063 201,455 83.091 1,779 4,422 1,855 4.431* 12,349,278 49,787,913* 1.463* 10,076,703 2,064,568* 3,288,095 1,438,014 2,434 1,280 24.452 2.33,025 5,292 858,435 167,549 630,416 7,457,444 11,999 10,753 24,508 440,754 683,037 15,832 6,656,980 267,661 127,944 197,850 2.439,381 10,308,735 2,043.498 2,718,185 8,694 122,106 35,048 10,465 36,832 173,535 49,495 127,496 7,063 297,053 83,091 1,779 4,422 1,855 * Grain included under St. Marys Falls Canals. t 1,431,025 tons local. 244 ECONOMIC ASPKCTS OF THE Port Iron ore (tons) Coal (tons) Grain (tons) All other (tons) Total (tons) Charlevoix, Mich Petoskey, Mich 92,244 2.400 150 64,855 1,056 2,204 11,021 52,551 6,857 3,205.014 13.221 419,909 138,128 3,773 69,350 3,253 1,025,371 9,110 835,132 9.025 574.295 181.126 711 111.916 1,458.752 247,328 102,863 49.559 655.645 988 1.974.328 349,149 1.2 71,040 50,000 129,387 159.649 1.056 2.204 22,195 77,455 6,857 3,213,635 87,054 555,474 138 828 Pentwater. Mich Mackinac. Mich 11.174 24,904 Cheboygan, Mich Rogers City, Mich Calcite, Mich 8,621 73,623 135.565 700 15,206 48,440 7,693 5.000 Alpena, Mich 210 Thunder Bay, Mich Saginaw River, Mich Harbor Beach, Mich. . 18,979 117,790 10 946 Black River Mich Clinton River, Mich Rouge River, Mich 385,179 1.415.550 Monroe, Mich 9.110 10.335,530 10 52S Toledo, Ohio 2,030,538 7,441,222 1,500 2,812,407 1.203,815 28,638 Port Clinton, O Sandusky, O. . . 3.120 3,389.822 2 869 066 Huron, O 1,484,125 Vermilion, 71 1 Lorain, O 5,167.825 11,937,252 2,890,385 12,838,919 10,738,942 1,697,513 3,668,105 3,142,419 515,574 5.322,353 2,340,866 2,104,379 8,947,846 16,577,240 3,828.711 18,264 135 38,817 175,424 Fairport, 0. . . Ashtabula, O Conneaut, O 13 129 367 Erie, Pa 137.582 4,595,119 988 Dunkirk, N. Y Buffalo, N. Y Tonawanda, N. Y 7.698,385 631,461 630,519 2,871.370 5,988.629 18.532,712 980,610 Black Rock Canal, N. Y.. Niagara River. N. Y Charlotte. N. Y 6,944 "i, 11 2,352' 190,889 129,563 527.892 472,646 266 1.908,769 50.000 1 241 739 Great Sodus Bay, N. Y.. 190 889 Little Sodus Bay, N. Y.... 22.374 2,062 509,940 129,570 Oswego. N. Y 550,266 Cape Vincent. N. Y .56,1 02 9,647.125 534.822 3.000.000 2.062 1 038 682 St. Marys Falls Canals, for grain only to and 9,647,125 St. Lawrence Canals to and from Montreal (1917) t 1,951,021 905,301 3 391,144 Canadian ports on Geor- gian Bay 3.000.000 Total receipts and shipments Commerce of Great Lakes 140,968.868 70,484,434 57,846,083 28,923.042 20,723.267 10,361,633 24,208.035 12,104.018 243.746.253 121.873.127 t Traffic for 1916 not available. These figures show a total of 243,746,253 tons received and shipped at the principal lake ports, including the greater part of the Canadian conmierce. To ascertain the actual commerce, it is necessary to divide the total receipts and shipments hy 2, inasmuch as each ton of commerce is reported as a shipment in one port and as a receipt in another. Ihis shows that the com- merce of the principal lake ports in 1916 amounted to 121.873,- 127 tons. The Census of 'iransportation hy Water in 1916, issued hy the Dei)artment of Commerce, places the total freight carried in American vessels on the Great Lakes at 125,385,545 tons. The report of the Census Bureau was compiled from GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 245 vessel statements and therefore includes the traffic of the minor lake ports as well as the principal lake ports, but it nevertheless fails to show the total commerce because it is limited to Amer- ican vessels. During the year 1916. 94 per cent of the freight passing through the St. Marys Falls Canals was carried in Anier- * ican vessels, while 6 per cent was carried in Canadian vessels. Assuming that a similar ratio prevailed on other portions of the Great Lakes system, the total commerce for the year 1916 was approximately 133,388,000 tons. The commerce passing through the St. Marys Falls Canals has frequently been referred to as representing the traffic of the Great Lakes, while in reality it constituted in 1916 only 68 per cent of the total. During the war there was a marked falling off in the propor- tion of general package and miscellaneous freight carried on the Great Lakes, as compared with iron ore and coal, but some im- provement in this respect is already noticed in the traffic returns, while there has been a decline in the amount of iron ore and coal. The amount of package freight passing through the canal, however, is less than during the few years immediately preceding the war. Commerce interested in reaching the seaboard. — Some of the interests opposed to the construction of the Great Lakes-St. Law- rence waterway have stated that the present commerce of the Great Lakes consists of approximately 60,000,000 tons of iron ore shipped from such ports as Duluth, Ashland, Marquette and Escanaba to Lake Erie ports for consumption by steel furnaces in the Lake Erie district, approximately 30,000,000 tons of coal shipped west and northwest, and that these two commodities constitute nine-tenths of the total freight on the Lakes. It is contended by these interests that not more than 5 per cent of the total freight of the Great Lakes is interested in ocean trans- portation. When the construction of the New York State Barge Canal was under consideration, studies were made and statistics presented to show that there would be a very large volume of commerce seeking transportation between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard. At the Buffalo hearing on June 14, 1920, some of the arguments of those opposing the St. Lawrence waterway were directed to the purpose of showing that there is no such commerce. With reference to the question of iron and steel, it is fitting to quote from the report of the Committee on Canals of the State of New York submitted in 1899. on which was largely based the 246 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE expenditure of approximately $180,000,000 made by the State .in connection with the enlargement of the Erie Canal : It is not alone, however, the export grain trade which r^equires the enlargement of the Erie Canal. The chief argument for its construction eighty years ago was to have a cheap transportation route for grain and lumber, and this has continued to be its most important function down to the present time. But the changes which are now taking place in the iron trade give reason to belie\'« that if an adequate waterway can be secured between Lake Erie and the Hudson River the centre of th'c iron industry can be brought within the State of New York. This has hitherto been within the State of Pennsylvania on account of its own resources in ores, coal and limestone. But the discovery within a comparatively recent period of almost inexhaustible beds of iron ore in the upper lake region, combined with clTeap water transportation on the lakes, has led to the abandonment of its own ore and the substitution of those from the lakes. These ores can be laid down at any point on a water route between Buffalo and New York at less cost than they can be laid down in Pittsburgh. . . . Between Pittsburgh and tidewater the finished product must be transported a distance of 350 miles over a range of mountains, whereas from either Buffalo or New York, or any intermediate point on the water route, the enormous market for steel and iron in Xeiv York and AVtc England, as well as abroad, can be supplied at greatly reduced charges for transporta- tion. We believe that a suitable enlarg^ement of the Erie Canal at the present time is justified by the prospect of its use in connection witli manufacture of steel and iron and shipbuilding, fully as much as its original construction was justified by the prospect of transporting bread- stuffs. Indeed it is not too much to expect that, with a canal which can carry manufactured steel from Conneaut to New York for 50 cents a tmi. and distribute this from New York to points on the New England coast without breaking bulk, the vast steel and allied interest; centering at Pittsburgh, which support a population greater than that of Chicago, will seek an outlet for their products by rail to Conneaut and thence by Erie Canal, rather than across the AMeghanics to Philadelphia. Thu.s it will be seen that one of the objects sought by the enlargement of the Erie Canal was the diversion of iron ore from its present destination at Lake Erie ports to New York and New England, and also the diversion of manufactured iron and .steel of the Pittsburgh district from its outlet at Philadelphia to similar destinations by way of the canal. The assumption that neither iron nor coal is concerned about cheaper transportation to the ocean fails to consider the changes in industrial conditions which, as pointed out by the Committee on Canals, may readily follow the opening of a really adequate tran.sportaticm roiUc. It shotild be emphasized that economies of transportation determine largely the routes and destinations of traffic, and while neither iron ore nor coal now moves via lake routes to seaboard, the creation of new conditions permitting the eouKimiral assembling of the raw GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 247 materials of manufacture at points other than those at which this industry is chiefly concentrated, would undoubtedly result in new industrial development. The influence of transportation in fixing the points of most advantageous manufacture are too well known to require detailed explanation here, but it may be confidently asserted that the development of the vast waterpower of the St. Lawrence River on the shores of a waterway available for the procurement of raw materials which are so abundantly found in the regions of the Great Lakes, and for the shipment of finished products to all points of the world without transfer, presents an opportunity for the successful development of trade and industry which will not be ignored. A similar thought was clearly in the minds of the Committee on Canals of the State of New York when it made the following statement : The problem of transmission of power has been so far solved as to permit the lighting of Buffalo and the operation of its street car system at a distance of 22 miles from the power house. It is probable that in less than ten years the transmission of power, at kast as far as Rochester, will be commercially practicable. These advantages, if properly utilized, will make Western New York the centre of such a manufacturing district as the world has never seen. The lakes give cheap transportation to the West, and it only needs a suitable water route to the Hudson in order to give cheap transportation eastward, which will enable these inanufactured products to compete in every market in the world. The assiimpUon that the bulk traffic of the Great Lakes is not interested in reaching seaboard is incorrect. Evidence shozvs tlwt large quantities of iron ore and pig iron will be carried from the lakes to points along the Atlantic Coast. The assumption that the present package freight carried on the Great Lakes is interested in the Great Lakes-St. Lazvrence water- wav is likezvise incorrect. This is largely local and interlake traf- fic not destined to seaboard. The general package freight consti- tuting the vast movement betiveen the Northivesiern States and the seaboard, both for foreign and domestic destinations, nozi' goes .entirely by rail, and will continue to do so until a ivater route ade- quate for ocean vessels is provided. Chapter XXII VOLUME OF COMMERCE AFFECTED BY THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY The total traffic originating on Class I railroads of the United States in 1918 amounted to 2,526,531,780 tons, or 24 tons per capita, and on this basis the total freight of the territory affected by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway amounts to nearly 1,000,000,000 tons annually. The greater proportion is purely internal business not interested in reaching the seaboard, but practically all the foreign commerce is vitally interested as well as the domestic commerce which now goes to and from points on or near the seaboard. On a basis of population, 28,000,000 tons of exports and 12,000,000 tons of imports originate in the area tributary to the Great Lakes. The rail traffic in and out of Chicago alone amounts to nearly 200,000,000 tons without duplication. In 1918 six of the principal eastern trunk lines carried 561,883,194 tons. The traffic moving to and from points on or near the Atlantic seaboard is estimated at about 250,- 000,000 tons, and it is from this tonnage that the coastwise traffic of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Ship Channel must be drawn. In view of the important savings in freight charges and terminal costs which the waterway will afford, it is believed that a com- merce of not less than 20,000,000 tons per annum may be reason- ably expected within five years after its opening, with continued growth thereafter. Total traffic estimated on basis of population. — It has already been shown that the population of the area tributary to the Great Lakes on January 1, 1920, was over 40.000.000. "Applying the ratio of 18 tons per capita of freight originating in the United States, as adopted by General W. W. Wotherspoon in estiinating the possible tonnage of the Barge Canal, the total freight origi- nating in this area may be placed at 700.000.000 tons. The statis- tics of the Interstate Commerce Commission show that the total traffic originating on Class 1 railroads of the United States in 1918 amounted to 2,526,531.780 tons, or 24 tons per capita, and on this basis the total freight of the territory interested in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway amounts to nearly 1,000.- 000,000 tons annually. This figure represents the luaximum freiglit movement from which the inbound and outbound traffic of the St. Lawrence must be drawn. While the greater propor- tion of purely domestic tonnage is not interested in this move- ment, practically all of the foreign commerce is vitally inter- ested, the exception being the commerce with Canada now largely carried by rail. 248 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 249 Volume of foreign trade affected. — No precise figures of the total volume of the foreign commerce of the United States have ever been prepared, but statistics of traffic through our principal ports contained in the annual report of the Chief of Engineers, and statistics of the total value of our foreign commerce prepared by the Bureau of Foreign and Dojnestic Commerce, permit us to make rather a close estimate of this tonnage. The foreign commerce utilizing the improved channels at our principal ports in 1919 was 71,274,770 tons, valued at $7,943,073,134. The average value of the imports was $118 per ton, and of the ex- ports $107 per ton. The statistics of the Department of Com- merce show that during the same year our total imports were valued at $3,904,364,932, and our exports at $7,920,425,990. Ap- plying the ton values of foreign traffic on our principal channels gives a total of 33,000,000 tons of imports and 74,000,000 tons of exports, or a grand total of 107,000,000 tons, or practically 1 ton per capita. The per ton values given do not take into con- sideration, however, the rail commerce with Canada which in- cludes among other things about 15.000,000 tons of coal annually. The value of this traffic is included in the total figures of the Department of Commerce, but its deduction from the total would not materially alter the results. The territory tributary to the Great Lakes is the most im- portant producing section of the United States, and an estimate of the total exports in this region based on population will be extremely conservative. Our imports are quite equally dis- tributed throughout the country, and an estimate of the consump- tion of imports in this territory based on population will be fair. Such an estimate shows that the total foreign commerce inter- ested in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway amounts in round numbers to 40,000,000 tons, consisting of about 28,000,000 tons of exports and 12,000,000 tons of imports. The tonnages of the principal items will be considered later in this report. Volume of domestic trade affected. — Under this head is in- cluded the traffic between points on or near the Atlantic Coast and points immediately adjacent to the Great Lakes, and also a large area extending westward from the lakes. Certain traffic from the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Coast will also be affected. Much of the east and west bound traffic touches the lakes at Chicago, and the greater portion of the traffic is bound either to or from the Atlantic Coast. The following statement of the inbound and outbound freight at Chicago, prepared by 250 ECOXOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Mr. George E. Hooker, U. S. Trade Commissioner, shows the magnitude of the traffic at this point : Amount of Freight, by Rail and by Ji'atcr, hito and Out of Chicago. (Prepared by U. S. Trade Commissioner George E. Hooker.) Freight traffic All rail Oct. 1. 1918, to Sept. 30, 1919 Lake» 1918 Lake-rail 1918 Rail-lake, 1918 Grand total Inbound: Destined for Chicago Tons 81.549,900 53,915,050 Tons 8,797,641 Tons Tons Tons 90,347,541 ■ Passing through Chicago. . . . 590,664 54,505,714 135,464,950 50,656,054 53,915.050 8,797,641 171,960 590,664 144,853.255 Outbound: Originating in Chicago 50,828.014 Passing through Chicago .... 2,018.810 55.933,860 Total outbound 104,571,104 240,036,054 171,960 8.969.601 590.664 2.018,810 2.018,810 106 761 874 Total, in and out 251,615.129 This shows a grand total of 251,615,129 tons, but the through traffic of 53,915.050 tons is included in both the inbound and the outbound tonnage. Deducting this sum gives a total of 197.- 700,079 tons without duplication. The total freight on all eastern roads in 1918 was 1.317.961.397 tons. The tonnage of the principal trunk lines operating between lake ports and the Atlantic seaboard in 1918 was as follows : Railroad Total revenue freight Freight origi- nating on road Freight re- ceived from other roads Pennsvlvania Tons Tons Tons 2.U,738,170 137,017,684 97.720.486 New York Central Baltimore and Ohio Erie 121,044,996 ' 40,582,106 94,152,556 61,768,315 44,323,996 20,054,126 37,250,739 21,118,537 30,372,737 18,779,780 80,462,890 32,384,241 24,269,870 Lehigh Valley 16,132,202 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western 11,592,957 Total 561,883,194 299,320,548 262,562,646 While other roads contributed to the freight traffic between the j)oints under consideration, the figures given are sufficient GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWKEN'CE SHIP CIIA.\N1:l 251 to indicate the volume of the movement between the Northwest and the Atlantic seaboard, and to make it clear that the possi- bilities of coastwise traffic are very great. It is well known that the domestic movement to and from the seaboard is very much larger than the foreign movement, the ratio being roughly esti- mated as ten to one. On this basis the domestic traffic between the seacoast and the territory interested in coastwise trade via the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway is about 250,000,000 tons. In 1916, General Wotherspoon estimated the traffic that might be considered as potential traffic of the Barge Canal, at 175,000,000 tons. The following is quoted from his report: The traffic of the New York-Buffalo liives is largely potential canal tonnage, in that it moves between points served by the all-water route provided by tfe Hudson River and the canal. The traffic of the Chicago-Buffalo lines is also a potentiality to be considered because a large percentage of their total traffic moves to and from a territory east of Buffalo served by the canal. The same is trur of the Chicago-New York lines. The New England rail tonnage is a very important factor, inasmuch as a big portion of the total moves to and from areas served bj^ the canal and its western connections. Sonve part of the total tonnage of all these lines, therefore, is potential canal business The aggregate of all lines was : Tons New York-Buffalo lines 106,000,000 Chicago-New York and lines west from Buffalo. . 15,000,000 New England lines 5-4,000,000 175,000,000 Adding to these figures the commerce moving to and from all ports south of New York, including the Gulf of Mexico, the total domestic traffic from which the coastwise business of the St. Lawrence route will be drawn is fully 250,000,000 tons, as given above. The evidence presented to the International Joint Commission shows that many large and important industries are prepared to utilize the water route for domestic traffic. The Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers shows that the coast- wise traffic of Atlantic ports in 1919 amounted to over 30,000,000 tons, without duplication, or 63,000,000 tons counting both re- ceipts and shipments. The extension of the Atlantic coastwise routes into the Great Lakes will greatly increase this traffic and make it economically feasible to carry a large tonnage of low- priced coinmodities on which the transportation charges by rail 252 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL are prohibitive. Some of these are discussed in the analysis of ^commodity movements. It is bclici'ed that the foreign ami domestic commerce of the 7vatc)'zvay unthin five years after its opening should amount to not less than 20,000,000 tons per annum, with continued growth in the future. Chapter XXIII THE GRAIN MOVEMENT The chief surplus grain producing countries of the world are the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, India, Russia, and the Balkan States. The chief countries of deficient produc- tion, which constitute the important grain markets of the world are the United Kingdom and the countries of western Europe. Liverpool is the chief grain market of the world, and the price at this point determines not only the price which the producer in America and other countries receives for his exports, but generally speaking it determines the price received for all the grain produced. To keep the grain at home the American con- sumer must pay as much as the foreign buyers, less the cost of transportation and incidental charges. A saving in transportation of 8 to 10 cents per bushel, which is clearly attainable by the use of the St. Lawrence Ship Channel, will be reflected in sub- stantial degree on the total production of grain within the area which is so situated as to take advantage of the facilities afforded by the waterway. It is estimated that 3,664,000,000 bushels of American grain, and 440,000,000 bushels of Canadian grain will be thus affected, and that the annual saving on this grain will be ap- proximately equal to the full cost of the improvements required in the interests of navigation. There is no commodity more sensitive to changes in market, financial and transportation conditions than grain, and this apphes particularly to wheat. During the calendar year 1919 our ex- ports of agricultural products were valued at 55 per cent of the total of all exports, and during the last ten years they have amounted to 46 per cent of the total. It is essential that we shall have a surplus agricultural production for export in the future, and it is doubly essential that we should take the measures found necessary to encourage agricultural production. In considering the future of the grain industry of the United States, it is desirable to understand the relation of the produc- tion of this country to the world's requirements. During the period from 1909 to 1913, the average annual production of cereals in the world was 377,108,000 tons, and in 1918-1919 the average was 254,116,000 tons. The decrease in 12 producing countries in Europe amounted to 20,193,000 tons, while there was a loss of 119,519,000 tons in the closed countries of Europe. The increase in North American production amounted to 12,711,000 tons. The European consumption of wheat and rye has de- creased from 58,800,000 tons annually in the period 1909-1913 to 43,500,000 tons in 1919. Western Europe furnishes the world 2. S3 254 F.CONOMIC ASPFXTS OF THE market for cereals. The decline in the consumption of wheat and r>'e in the last few years is due largely to the necessity of utilizing substitutes. The following tables prepared by the De- partment of Agriculture show the average production of cereals for the two periods 1909-1913 and 1918-1919, and the net im- ]K)rts of wheat and rye into the imjiorting coimtries of Europe: yet Imports of Wheat and Rye for Certain Countries (Tons of 2,000 pounds.) Countries 1909-1913 1 1918 Change 1919 Change Belgium Tons 1,659,000 409,000 1,200,000 1,307,000 1,537,000 983,000 295.000 95,000 132,000 320,000 587,000 6,499,000 Tons Per cl. Tons 118,000 11,000 2,581,000 619,000 2,848,000 421,000 288,000 57,000 373,000 123,000 346,000 5,399,000 Per ct. - 92.9 Denmark - 97.3 France. . . 2 166 000 -i-xn =; + 115 1 Germany - 52.6 Italy 2,448,000 87,000 160,000 +59.3 -91.1 -45.8 + 85.3 Netherlands Norwa}' - 57.2 - 2 4 Portugal - 40.0 Spain 177,000 111,000 235,000 5,397,000 +34.1 -65.3 -60.0 -17.0 + 182 6 Sweden - 61.6 Switzerland United Kingdom. - 41.1 - 16.9 Total .. 15,022,000* 10,781,000 - 6.7 13,184,000 - 12.2 * Omitting Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Portugal, for purposes of comparison with the figures for 1918, the total is 11,552,000. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 255 vO o o oo o o c - o o o o o c -*_ o o q_o_o^o^o^o^ o__ t/3 w cS 03 ^2 ro r^r^""'-''"i-~'"os'" irT CD t- V S On On NO ■-^ ■•-< <^ t^ — lONro OnOoooO'-ii^ '— < CN f^ ro r^ 00 NO__t-~_NO_^ to -^OnnO r-.ooiO-tirN]to to '— * O On' i~--' no' oo' ^ '^' t^ On -H to CN NO ^ ON i^ 1^ •.— 1 ro »-i to 00 ^ t^ r^ ro o c o o o o o3 w^ c o oo o o o. c c o o o__o_ o_^ J^ g no'i-'no'-^'-^'iO* oT T c 00 to ^^^ •.-H --h ro to 00 ^ ro to '-' to C>] nO 00 o3 o~. no' to' to' -f t^ On' CnJ »— I to tn 03 O o o o o o o 000 0000 c oJ r^ o o o o o o 000 0000 N '"' o o o__o__o_o o_o_,o__ 0000 c On o3 g On' to ■rt' 00 •'-1 oo' O O -* 00 NO t~~ to CM oo'to'ro' NO -* t^ r^ to E 13 1 ro Cn] Ol -rt ^ On 10 On 1/- 00 On O ON to' to' "^'o' no' 00 -* r-l -^'-Ton' CN_-* 00__On On__ o ro ^ NO ro 10 r^ H On ooo ooo oo oooo (U On 0, o__o_o_o_o_o q 1 00 S io"on On t^ t^ O t^ O O -^ — 1 <>1 to b-l 00 O NO 00 On O to Td CN) 03 On CM i-Ni c-1 NO NO ro rt^' fO -^ 1^ On 4-> 03 O O O O O O 0000000000 C rC tri O O O O O O oooooooooc c & O^ o_o__o_o__o__o ~ lo'ON'frrCM'O 00 o_^ o_ o_ o__ o_^ o__ o_^ o_^ o_ ON'-^'rt^'NO'-^'l^-'o NO NO NO c nC o__ oi 1 O t^ r-i ro to 00 00 ^ r-__ ^_^ po 00^ m^ I— ro'"-H^CN't^ to Cn to cot^oi tOT- NO t. n 'u c J 'C C d ■J ^ "t^ 3 C _ ; ^ G ■ (U r oS 1 ^ 3 o3 n3 . 1- • V C 3 2 G (J s ■ S i c t ■ c ) :^ ! ■ c ; 4> C a X • 5 •'S 03 1] ; c ■^ c 03 3 "^ I, < 0: c < c 2 1 0: t- - < ■I < _o' " 3 :: 0. ) 3.C 3fr 3E c ) J: ) -1- J C 3 ^ 3 ^ 3 256 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 257 A general idea of the impurts and exports of wheat by continents may be obtained from the map on page 256 prepared by the De- partment of Agriculture. The quantities of grain produced in the United States and the amounts exported between 1900 and 1918 are shown in the following tables : Production of Grain in the United States and amounts exported, 1900 to 1918 (a). Wheat Production Exported Bushels Bushels 1900 522,230,000 215,990,073 1901 748,460,000 234,772,516 1902 670,063,000 202,905,598 1903 . 637,822,000 120,727,613 1904 552,400,000 44,112,910 1905 . 692,979,000 97,609,007 1906 735,261,000 146,700,425 1907 634,087,000 163,043,669 1908 664,602,000 114,268,468 1909 683,379,000 87,364,318 1910 635,121,000 69,311,760 1911 621,338,000 79,689,404 1912 730,267,000 142,879,596 1913 763,380,000 145,590,349 1914 891,017,000 **332,464,975 1915 *1,025,801,000 243,117,026 1916 636,318,000 203,573,928 1917 636,655,000 132,579,533 1918 917,100,000 287,438,087 * Greatest production in the history of the country. ** Greatest amount exported in the history of the country, and the greatest amount ever exported by any country in the world. (a) Production by calendar years. Exports by fiscal years, beginning July 1 . Oats Production Exported Bushels Bushels 1900 809,126,000 42,268,931 1901 736,809,000 13,277,612 1902 987,843,000 8,381,805 1903 784,094,000 1,960,740 1904 894,596,000 8,394,692 1905 953,216,000 48,434,541 1906 964,905,000 6,386,334 1907 754,443,000 2,518,855 1908 807,156,000 2,333,817 1909 1,007,143,000 2,548,726 1910 1,186,341,000 3,845,850 1911 922,298,000 2,677,749 1912 1,418,337,000 36,455,474 1913 1,121,768,000 2,748,743 1914 1,141,060,000 100,609,272 1915 1,549,030,000 98,960,481 1916 1,251,837,000 95,105,698 1917 *1, 592, 740,000 **125, 134,579 1918 1,538,359,000 * Greatest production in the history of the country. Greatest amount exported in the history of the country. ** 258 l-XONOMIC ASPECTS dp THE Bur ley Production Exported Btishels Bushels 1900 58,926,000 6,293,207 1901 109,933,000 8,714,268 1902 134,954,000 8,429,141 1903 131,861,000 10,881,627 1904 139,749.000 10,661,655 1905 136,551,000 17,729,360 1906 178,916,000 8,238,842 1907 153,597,000 4,349,078 1908 166,756,000 6,580,393 1909 173,344,000 4,311,566 1910 173,832,000 9,399,346 1911 160,240,000 1,585,242 1912 223,824,000 17,536,703 1913 1 78,189,000 6,644,747 1914 194,953,000 26,754,522 1915 228,851,000 **27,473,160 1916 182,309,000 16,381,077 1917 211,759,000 26,408,978 1918 *256,375,000 20,457,781 * Greatest production in the history of the country. ** Greatest amount exported in the history of the country. Corn Production Exported Bushels Bushels 1900 2,105,103,000 181,405,473 1901 1,522,520,000 28,028,688 1902 1,523,648,000 76,639,261 1903 3,244,177,000 58,222,061 1904 2,467,481,000 90,293,483 1905 2,707,994,000 119,893,833 1906 2,927,416,000 86,368,228 1907 2,592.320,000 55,063,860 1908 2,668,651,000 37,665,040 1909 2,552,190,000 38,128,498 1910 2,886,260,000 65,614,522 1911 2,531,488,000 41,797,291 1912 3,124,746,000 50,780,143 1913 2.446,988,000 10,725,819 1914 2,672,804,000 50,668,303 1915 2,994,793,000 39,896,928 1916 2,566,927,000 66,753,294 1917 *3,065,233,000 49,073,263 1918 2,582,814,000 23,020,846 * Greatest production in the history of the country. Greatest amount exported, 2J 3, 123,4 12 bushels in 1899. CREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 259 Rye Production Exported Bushels Bushels 1900 23,996,000 2,345,512 1901 30,345,000 2,712,077 1902 33,631,000 5,445,273 1903 29,363,000 784,068 1904 27,242,000 29,749 1905 28,486,000 1,387,826 1906 33,375,000 769,717 1907 31,566.000 2,444,588 1908 31,851,000 1,295,701 1909 29,520,000 242,262 1910 34,897,000 40,123 1911 33,119,000 31,384 1912 35,664,000 1,854,738 1913 41,381,000 2,272,492 1914 42,779,000 13,026,778 1915 54,050,000 15,250,151 1916 48,862,000 13,703,499 1917 62,933,000 17,130,226 1918 *89,103,000 ♦*34,980,573 * Greatest production in the history of the country. ** Greatest amount exported in the history of the country. The following averages are based on official figures of the United States Department of Agriculture and the official returns of the Census Bureau. The population given is the average for the period : Production of wheat in the United States compared with population. Period Average produc- tion per year, bushels Average population Bushels per capita 1849 1859 1866-1870 100,486,000 173,105,000 240,024,000 339,391,000 437,547,000 526,497,000 665,417,000 777,734,000 23,000,000 31,000,000 37,000,000 45,000,000 57,000,000 70,000,000 84,000,000 *98,000,000 4.36 5.58 6.49 1871-1880 7.54 1881-1890 7.67 1891-1900 1901-1910 1911-1918 7.52 7.92 7.93 * Based on estimated population of 105,000,000 in 1918. It will be seen that the amount of grain exported varies widely. The conditions brought about by the war resulted in a very great increase in the exportation of oats, rye and barley, and it is impracticable at this time to make an estimate of our future exports of these grains. In the year 1916 over 10,000,000 tons 260 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE of American and Canadian grain were shipped on the Great Lakes alone, and during that year 10,152,025 tons were carried on the Chicago-New York rail Hne, making a total of about 20,000,000 tons of grain which annually goes to the Atlantic seaboard, either for foreign shipment or domestic consumption. Practically all of the wheat, oats and rye is produced in the territory tributary to the Great Lakes. The corn belt extends farther southward than the wheat belt, and while export corn does not now utilize the Great Lakes route to any great extent, it may be expected to do so when it is possible to load vessels at lake ports, proceeding directly to foreign destinations. The principal corn producing States are Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota and Missouri, all of which are wnthin the territory which will find it advantageous to use the through water route by way of the St. Lawrence River. The New York Produce Exchange reports the following re- ceipts of flour and grain : Receipts of Flour and Grain at Western Lake and River Ports. Bushels 1913-14 984,767,000 1914-15 1,094,817,000 1915-16 1,266,558,500 1916-17 1,032,559,000 1917-18 942,505,000 1918-19 1,199,714,000 Receipts of Flour and Grain at Six Atlantic Seaboard Ports. Bushels 1914 446,910,921 1915 550,357,466 1916 640,126,787 1917 486,631,771 1918 435,187,493 1919 446,538,219 Receipts of Flour and Grain at Gulf Ports {New Orleans and Galveston). Bushels 1914 96,638,154 1915 93,132,832 1916 76.991,413 1917 76,020,425 1918 85,424,857 1919 68,885,393 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 261 The following shows the receipts of grain at the principal eastern ports during the last six years. Port 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 Bushels Bushels Bushels Bushels Bushels Bushels Portland ' . . . . 8,912,063 15,088.291 34.341,893 11,000,000 23,800,000 32,800.000 Montreal 99,709,493 68,444,323 108,190,586 57,934,559 106,286,481 88,567,589 Boston 26,182,60.S 28,132,085 42,788,468 28,020,330 28,723,722 27,858,616 New York .... 159,264,869 225,886,601 233,012,099 186,217,593 118,745,017 142,647,539 Philadelphia. . . 49,009.621 70,765,806 73,610,091 65,051,227 52,569,863 75,922,899 Baltimore 68,909,106 106,124,331 143,444,462 96,831,477 62,857,556 68,776,938 Newport News' 3.865,335 62.627.238 52.005.699 32,676,019 24.423.379 24,071.447 ' Exports. The figures show that the total movement of fiour and grain to the principal ports of the Atlantic and Gulf averages about 580.000.000 bushels annually, and to Atlantic ports alone about 500,000,000 bushels annually. In 1916, the movement to Atlantic ports amounted to 687,393,298 bushels, or about 20,000,000 tons. The annual exports of flour and grain from the United States during the last five years have averaged 424,000,000 bushels. It is apparent tliat the existing movement of grain to Atlantic ports and Montreal exceeds the entire eastbound capacity of the Barge Canal, and if the canal afforded economies sii-jjicicnt to attract the grain to that route, it ivonld he unable to handle the traffic. Since General Wotherspoon has estimated that the industries of the area immediately tributary to the canal will provide all the tonnage it can carry, it is not seen hozv the cancration, would earn substantial dividends on the cost of such Great Lake carriers. For the 48-hour ex- tension of its voyage, an additional earning of two cents per bushel would yield an even higher net ratio, so that there is a i)otential saving on this route that may well run as high as ten cents per bushel. .\ rate of from six to eight cents per bushel for water carriage from Chicago or Duluth and Fort William to Montreal would on the present rail structure extend the arc of delivery costs as far south as Oklahoma and as far west as the Rocky Mountains. In the sixteen States whose farm price level would inevitably be improved by a reduction of the transportation cost to the Kuropean markets, there is grown 3,664 million bushels of grain. If such a reduction of ten cents in the transportation cost could be fully reflected to the farm price in this area, there would be an improvement in the farm [)osition of $366.0()n,(X)() in a single year. The same improvement in farm price position in respect to western Canada's production of 440 million bushels, would be a gain to farmers of Canada of $44,000,000. If we cal- y GREAT LAKES-3T. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 263 culate that the full measure of saving will not be reflected to the farm,\ but that the farm position will be improved by five cents per bushel, we ^ y make a saving in the American farm income of $183,000,000 and in they Canadian farm income of $22,(X)0,000, all on a single year's crop. Geography of wheat prices. — In 1918 the Department of Agriculture made a study of the prices of wheat throughout the United States, which is interesting as supporting the statements made above relative to the effects of transportation upon the price of wheat, irrespective of whether it is exported or consumed at home. The investigation of the Department of Agriculture was based upon data for the five years ending 1914, when the farm price in New York was approximately $1.00 per bushel. The minimum price paid wheat growers occurs within the areas of surplus production in central Montana and eastern Idaho. With a long rail haul and lower ocean freight rate eastward, and a short rail hatil but higher ocean freight rate westward, this territory is most disadvantageously situated as to foreign and domestic wheat markets. Radiating from this region, prices graduate upward in every direction until the maximum toward the coast is reached. Prices likewise increase in areas of deficient production, the highest price at the time of the study by the Department of Agriculture being $1.15 in certain portions of the southeastern States. The lowest prices are in the surplus pro- ducing areas farthest from European markets, or in those most unfavorably placed in the channels of distribution. The territory west of the Mississij^pi, embracing the surplus wheat areas, produces some 550 out of the total 800 million bushels, or about 69 per cent, though it has but 38 per cent of the farm lands and 20 per cent of the total population. The west north central States constitute the great surplus wheat area, growing 51.8 per cent of the national wheat, or 416 out of 800 million bushels, with only 12 per cent of the national population and 17 per cent of the land area. North Dakota with 160 bushels per capita, and Kansas with 58 bushels per capita, contribute about 60 per cent of the wheat grown in the seven States of this section, which supplies not only the greater part of the domestic defi- ciencies east of the Rockies, but also most of the export wheat. Deducting the Pacific wheat which normally enters into a distinct trade westward, this division furnishes nearly 80 per cent of the gross surplus of the United States. The national wheat surplus, that is the exports, constituted during recent years from 11 to 37 per cent of the production. The Department of Agricul- 264 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE ture states "it is the price received for this surplus which broadly stated tends to regulate the farm prices of the entire crop." The accompanying map from the report of the Department of Agriculture shows the gradual elevation in the farm prices of wheat toward the seaboard, with other changes due to transporta- tion and production conditions. In this progression, a prepon- derant factor is cost of transportation, other items of distributive expense being usually in fractions of one cent per bushel. There is a definite proportion between prices prevailing at the different markets, domestic and foreign, which is measured largely by the diflference in freight charges. From the accompanying map it will be seen that wnth wheat at $1.00 per bushel in New York, the price in Montana was 70 cents and as low as 65 cents in eastern Idaho, while in the areas of greatest surplus production the average price w^as 80 cents. Effect on F.\rm Prices of Whe.\t of Nearness to ok Remoteness from Gr.^in Markets Figures represent farm prices of wheat. The territory from which each market or group of markets receives most of its wheat is outlined on the map by an etched border. Fann prices per busbeL Average of 1910-1914 to show nonnal geograpbic variation. c GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 265 Since the investigation by the Department of AgricuUure, there has been a large increase in the transportation costs. The price differences on July 1, 1918, are shown by the following table : Wheat Prices at Imported Markets, Jtily 1, 1918. Government Prices Wheat prices established by presidential proclamation of February 21, 1918, and the prices established July 1, 1918, due to new freight rates, are shown below for important terminals: Terminal New price, July 1, 1918 Old price Increase New York Philadelphia . . . Baltimore Newport News, Chicago New Orleans . . Galveston St. Louis Duluth Minneapolis. . . Kansas City . . . Omaha San Francisco . Portland Seattle $2.39M 2.39 2.38M 2.38M 2.26 2.28 2.28 2.24 2.223/2 2.211^ 2.18 2.18 2.20 2.20 2.20 J2.28 2.27 2.27 2.17 2.15 2.15 2.10 2.05 2.05 $0.11M 0.12 O.llM 0.11% 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05M 0.041^ 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.15 The prices are those at which the Grain Corporation was prepared to buy wheat at the above markets, for No. 1 northern spring. No. 1 hard winter. No. 1 red winter. No. 1 durum. No. 1 hard white, in store in some public elevators approved for storage. 266 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE i'.2 rt 1 v j.[/3 Of-'* aom fs lO O) 00 — — © 22§ 22S p S = £5 ~4 rN CM r^i tN (N tN r^(NfN (N(Nr^ CS (NM OUK rt O O Haj ^•2 :?::s:::?: 5 :^:j^^ :j:^:s ::f::s;:f^ :^^::?; ©""Of^ t^'*© •*^t^ (N0>10 (NtN Mr»>0 lii r>)00 f*^ r** r^ •* r^ W5 ^ ^ **1 feig :^;s?:;5^ ;?^ :?;;s^;?! :s^;s5:^ :s5:;^:s^ ;?j;s^;s? .5 ft «) ^1^ OOirt — o vOf»5 0> ro f^ 1^ — OOrf T(o fS \Orr,o ■ "! O >0 — 00 ■<1' •t rt t- '*» tN tS tN %0 x Tf^t^ ■i-iOC ■>!' 0>>010 a CS fN « fS (N— ■ s u C CNtN tN tN (NCN CN rMritish West Africa. Brazil, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad. The total amount now consumed in the area economically tributary to the f ireat Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway is aj)proxiniately 55,000 tons. Sugar. — Sugar constitutes the most iiuportant item in the import trade of the Uniterl States. The total quantity of cane GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 273 sugar imported in 1919 amounted to 7,019,690,475 lbs., or 3,509,- 845 tons. Of this total, 6,686,141,983 lbs. came from Cuba. It is estimated by the Detroit Board of Commerce that 41 per cent, or 1,439,000 tons, was used in the States tributary to the Great Lakes. Based on a uniform per capita consumption, the amount that it would apparently be economical to import by way of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway would be about 25 per cent, or 877,000 tons. In the case of sugar, however, there are other considerations than the amount which is now consumed in this territory. The evidence contained in the record of hear- ings before the International Joint Commission shows that the refining of beet sugar is now an important industry of the upper Lake States, and that these refineries are at present able to operate only two or three months each year. Because of the short operating season, the overhead expense is tremendous. Every beet sugar factory, however, is capable without any changes in its machinery to refine cane sugars, and the interests now identified with the refining of beet sugar are looking forward to the opportunity of importing Cuban raw sugars directly by water, thus enabling them to run their plants at least ten months in the year and placing their industry upon a sound economic basis. In a case of this kind the quantity of imports would not be restricted to the consumption of the area immediately tributary to the waterway, and the total importations could reasonably be expected to equal the capacity of the refineries. Having this fact in mind, the total importation by way of the St. Lawrence may easily reach 1,000,000 tons a year. The return cargoes would consist of corn, oats, cement, iron and steel, coal and manufactured articles. Fruits and nuts. In 1919 we imported approximately 544,- 000,000 lbs. of nuts, or 272,000 tons. The weight of fruits imported is not given in the statistics, but was apparently about 1,500,000 tons. There were 36,993,095 bunches of bananas alone. There are very large shipments of bananas from Gulf ports and Atlantic ports to the Great Lakes districts. About 75 carloads of bananas are used in the State of Michigan each week, or 3,900 cars per year. Importers at Detroit say that the opening of the St. Lawrence waterway will enable them to import these bananas directly from Cuba and Central America, and that by reason of the ability to obtain them economically the consump- tion would be increased at least 100 per cent. Ships bringing tropical fruits are equipped with refrigeration, and if these 274 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE vessels could proceed directly to Lake ports a great saving of cost would result. The present consumption is sufficient to take care of full cargo shipments to the important Lake cities. Ref- erence is particularly made to the testimony of Mr, F. S. Keiser, Traffic Manager of the Duluth Commercial Club, relative to the magnitude of the movement of tropical fruits to Lake ports, page 2665 of the record, in which it is stated that bananas run through Cairo from New Orleans in train lots of thirty cars each, possibly an average of three to five trains every twenty-four hours the year round. The total tonnage of fruits and nuts now shipped into the area to which they could be economically supplied by way of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, is approxi- mately 500,000 tons. Rubber. The total amount of unmanufactured rubber im- ported in 1919 amounted to 576,708,524 lbs., or 288,354 tons. Of this total, 267,295,344 lbs. came from Straits Settlements, 57,- 432,831 lbs. from other British East Indies, 61,260,330 lbs. from Dutch East Indies, 60,159,954 lbs. from England (reshipped), 58,845,384 lbs. from Brazil, with lesser quantities from other countries. This rubber was received largely at the port of New York, the total for this port being about 380,000,000 lbs. Fully 50 per cent of the total imports, or approximately 144,000 tons, goes to the rubber manufacturing industries at Detroit, Chicago and Akron, where 70 per cent of the automobile tires of the country are produced. This is equivalent to about 60 ship loads of the average vessels used in the South American and East Indian trade. In the past great difficulty has been experienced in obtaining the prompt shipment of rubber from the Atlantic seaboard to the factories on the Great Lakes, and it is certain that a large part, if not all, of the crude rubber used on the Lakes would be received by way of the St. Lawrence, since the rate to Cleveland or Detroit would be little if any more than the rate to New York, while the cost of the rail haul and transfer would be saved. The total saving on this commodity would amount to approximately $10 a ton, or a total of about $1,400,000 annually. This estimate is based entirely upon present consumption, which will be largely exceeded in the future. Fertilizer materials, — One of the important needs of the great territory interested in the improvement of the St. Lawrence is an abundance of cheap fertilizer. The fertilizer industry is now centered chiefly along the south Atlantic coast at a distance of a thousanrl miles or more from the chief agricultural center of GREAT LAKES-ST. LAVVREiVCE SHIP CHANNEL 275 the country. The total amount of nitrate of soda imported in 1919 was 407,459 tons, which was less than one-fourth the amount imported in 1918. Practically all of this nitrate comes from Chile, and as shown elsewhere in this report most of the vessels which carr\- it have a draft of less than 25 feet. The potash has heretofore come principally from Germany, but this trade was practically extinguished by the war. Other fertilizer materials imported in 1919 amounted to 264,000 tons, making a total of approximately 670.000 tons of fertilizer imported. The amount of phosphate rock used annually ranges between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 tons. This comes largely from Florida, the production of this State being about 1,500,000 tons annually. The phosphate of Florida is shipped in vessels of the size and draft suitable for the navigation of the St. Lawrence waterway. At the Toledo hearing on June 10, 1920, it was brought out that the cost of fertilizer is now prohibitive throughout much of the Northwest. Having in mind the feasibility of establishing factories for the manufacture of calcium cyanamid or lime nitrogen at points on the Great Lakes to be served by the electrical power of the St. Lawrence, and the opportunity of obtaining other raw materials ill full cargoes by water, it is regarded as certain that the manu- facture of fertilizer would develop into an industry of consider- able importance. Lumber. — At the present time lumber is shipped from the Pacific Coast through the Panama Canal to the Atlantic seaboard, and frequently is forwarded inland by rail as far as I'ittsburgh. Bufifalo and Erie. As pointed out by Mr. John A. Russell, vice-president of the Detroit Board of Commerce, it would be more economical to bring lumber through the St. Lawrence to Detroit, as the average water haul from New York to Detroit would be less than the rail rate to the points named. The same argument applies to lumber from the Southern States and to the tropical hardwoods of Central America. The situation with respect to lumber for use in the important furniture industries of Michigan is quite similar to that of the paper mills, in that the native supplies of raw material which originally influenced the establishment of the plants have been largely exhausted. The opening of the St. Lawrence would permit lumber vessels, which ordinarily do not draw over 20 feet, to proceed to any port on the Great Lakes. It would place on a firmer basis all the industries now consuming lumber and would at the same time open the doors for the exportation of certain varieties of 276 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE low-grade lumber of the lake regions which is unsuitable for use in the industries of this region. Hides. — In 1919 we imported 744,836,035 lbs. of hides, or 372,418 tons, principally from South America, India and South Africa. Hides from Argentina come mostly via European ports, whither they are sent as distressed cargo. Hides from Australia come chiefly by way of Vancouver and the Canadian Pacific Railway. The State of Michigan alone imports between 1,000.000 and 2,000,000 skins annually, weighing 8 to 20 pounds each, while the States of Illinois, Ohio and Wisconsin also use large numbers. It costs 83 cents a hundred pounds to bring hides from Glasgow to Montreal or New York. The handling charge in New York is 2 cents a skin. It costs 43 cents a hundred pounds to bring hides from the seaboard to the lakes by rail. Hides can be brought from Glasgow to lake ports through the proposed waterway at not exceeding $1 a hundred, or $20 a ton, making a saving of about 33 cents a hundred, or $6.60 a ton. On Australian hides, the freight from \'ancouver alone is $2.79 a hundred, or over $55 a ton, which is sufficient to pay the entire cost by water direct to lake ports. The total imports of hides into the region of the Great Lakes may be placed at approximately 100,000 tons annually, on which a saving of $660,- 000 in freight charges may be expected. Other inbound freight. — Among the other articles which are used in large quantities upon the Great Lakes and which will use the proposed waterway are the following, the figures given being the amounts imported into the country in 1919: Asphaltvim from 'JVinidad, Venezuela, and other countries. 94,329 tons Chicle, shellac and other gums, largely from British Hon- duras, Colombia, Mexico, India, British East Indies, New Zealand 80,995,969 lbs. Extracts for tanning, largely from Argentina and Paraguay. 150,600,000 lbs. Sago and tapioca, largely from Dutch East Indies and British Straits Settlements 99,274,913 lbs. Fibers and textile grasses, largely from Mexico 327,279 tons Flaxseed, largely from Argentina 14,036,184 bu. Other seeds for planting, approximately 50,000,000 lbs. Spices, largely from the East Indies, China, and Jamaica. . 56,441,836 lbs. Vegetable oils, approximately " 900,000,000 lbs. Granite from New England 500,000 tons Outbound Iron and steel. — Tlu' total production of iron ore in the United States in 1916 amounted to 77,870,553 long tons, valued at $181,- 902,277, of which 62,932,500 long tons, or 70,484,434 short tons. GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 277 equal to 80 per cent of the entire production of the country, was moved on the Great Lakes. The total ore of the country was smelted into 39,126,324 long tons of pig iron, valued at $663,- 478.118. In 1914, the latest year for which statistics of manu- factures are available, the value of iron and steel manufactures amounted to $1,365,380,206, and the present annual value is fully double this amount. Exports of iron and steel, including certain classes of machineri^, amounted to $1,241,960,102 in 1917. and $968,520,154 in 1919. The statistics show that the greater part of the steel manufactures of the United States are concen- trated in portions of the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, IlUnois and Indiana, within the territory tributary to the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence waterway. A number of plants engaged in the manufacture of refined iron and steel articles are located in New England, and large quantities of pig iron are now shipped by rail to these localities. All of the pig iron for use at points in the vicinity of the Atlantic Coast could be brought by vessel from the Great Lakes at a considerable saving. Moreover, there are a number of important steel plants along the Atlantic Coast which now consume considerable quantities of iron ore. One company has large iron ore holdings in Cuba, but requires the Lake ore for use in connection with the Cuban ore. As much as 3,000.000 tons of Lake ore is now carried by rail annually to the Atlantic Coast. The opening of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway for ocean vessels will give iron and steel industries a choice of two desirable expedients: first, they can locate upon the Atlantic Coast and bring ore by vessel directly to their plants, at a large saving in the present cost of transporting ore or of obtaining pig iron by rail ; second, they can locate directly upon the Great Lakes, where they can obtain their ore from Lake Superior mines, limestone from Lake Huron, and their coal by short haul from neighboring bituminous districts. With the opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels, there will be a movement of not less than 5,000,000 tons of iron ore per annum to the Atlantic Coast, and the shipment of pig iron and manufactured iron and steel, both for export and domestic use, should speedily develop to considerable proportions. This view is supported by the analysis made by the Committee on Canals of the State of New^ York when considering the traffic that would move between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard. Exports of iron and steel manufactures in 1918 through Atlantic Coast ports, between 278 ECOXOMIC ASPECTS OF THE Porlland, Me., and Norfolk, \'a., over channels improved by the Government, amounted to 4,065.795 tons, of which fully 50 per cent originated in the area which winild hnd it economical to use the Great Lakes route. Agricultural implements. — The value of agricultural imple- ments manufactured in the United States in 1914 aniounted to $164,087,000. Illinois took first rank with $65,338,000. Wisconsin second rank with $20,119,000. and Ohio third rank with $17,485.- 000; while Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Iowa were among the other States where this industry is chiefly centered. There is an increasing demand for American agricultural implements abroad, and the value of such exports in 1919 amounted to $41,195,494. The market for these implements is well distributed throughout the entire world, and in 1919 the exports went to 88 countries. The transfer of machinery of all kinds is expensive and involves risk of breakage. Direct shipment from Lake ports would reduce this risk and alford a large saving in trans- portation costs. Automobiles and vehicles. — The statistics show that the auto- mobile industry is largely concentrated upon the Great Lakes, the value of products of this industry tor th? State of Michigan exceeding that of the entire balance of the countr\-. American automobiles are increasing in popularity abroad, and there is every reason to contemplate an expanding market in the future. They now go to all parts of the world, and the total exportation is much greater than the official figures show, because there ha'^ been a tendency on the part of the American manufacturers to supplv certain foreign markets from Canadian factories, and this is also true of automobile tires. The reason for shipping from Canada rather than the United States is due to the im- practicability of getting prompt shipment through Atlantic jiorts. and with the opening of the St. Lawrence to ocean vessels ship- ments would be made directly from the American jilants. More important, however, than the foreign trade is the do- mestic trade along the Atlantic Coast. The delay in deliveries of automobiles by rail during the last few years has been most exasperating to manufacturers, and as a result automobiles have been driven thousands of miles in order to effect delivery. One of the most important automobile industries of the country is now contemplating the erection of a mnnber of warehouses on tJie .Atlantic Coast, particularly to enable more expeditious de- liveries to be made in that territorv. 'I'hc large cost of these ware- GREAT LAKIiS-ST. LAW KEKCE Sliil' CIIANMiL 279 houses would be rendered unnecessary if the way were opened for coastwise dehvery by vessel. Coal. — From a study of the present movement of coal, it might be assumed that this commodity is not interested in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. It must be remembered, how- ever, that coal is a commodity which is frequently used to buy other business, and it is due to her enormous coal reserves that Great Britain has been able to extend profitable trade to all parts of the world. This commodity is extensively used to provide cargoes to many countries which are unable to absorb a sufficient amount of manufactures to balance their exports of raw materials. A study of the statistics shows that we now export large quantities of coal to Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and other countries of South and Central America and the West Indies, as well as to Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries. Where full cargoes are brought in from these coun- tries, coal will help to make up the return cargo. While the Great Lakes district consumes large quantities of raw materials from Cuba, Mexico and South America, the exports to those regions, while important, would be of smaller volume. By reason of the short haul from the coal fields to Lake Erie and Lake Michigan, however, coal will be extensively used for bottom cargo to make up the deficiency. New England now uses large quantities of coal for industrial purposes, which coal has in the past been a serious burden to the rail lines serving that territory, and much difficulty has been experienced in obtaining the requisite supply. Upon completion of the St. Lawrence waterway, a route will be provided by which this coal can be shipped by vessel to New England ports. The return cargoes from New England will consist of hardware, manufactured goods of all kinds, and large quantities of granite which is now extensively used in building operations of the Lake cities and is brought by rail from the New England district. The total movement of granite into the Great Lakes region will amount to not less than 500,000 tons annually, while the outbound movement of coal to foreign and domestic destinations will reach a total of fully 5,000,000 tons. Salt. — Large quantities of salt are used in connection with the fishing industries of the New England coast. In the past this commodity has been brought in chiefly from England, Spain, and the British West Indies. The State of Michigan ranks first in the production of salt in the L^nited States, with a total 280 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE of 2,250,939 tons in 1917, and it is reasonably certain that salt will constitute one of the items of coastwise traffic between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic Coast. Copper. — The total production of copper in the United States from domestic ores amounted to 1,927,850,548 lbs. in 1916. Of this total, 273,692,525 lbs. came from Michigan, 352,928.373 lbs. from Montana, 240,275,222 lbs. from Utah, and 8,624,081 lbs. from Colorado, making a total for these four States of 875,- 520,201 lbs., or 46 per cent of the total production of the country. Of this production, practically all the copper of Michigan and Montana, and part of that of Colorado and Utah, would use the Great Lakes route. The Anaconda Copper Company, which has a monthly production of 13,000 tons, now ships large quan- tities to the Atlantic Coast by way of the Panama Canal, and is prepared to avail itself of the cheaper transportation afforded by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. Copper would con- stitute one of the important commodities in the coastwise trade between the Great Lakes and New England ports. Our total exports of copper in 1919 amounted to 516,627,775 lbs., or 258,000 tons, which was less than half the exports in 1917. The exports for 1920 are unofficially estimated at 611,000,000 lbs. Of the total average annual exports, 200,000,000 lbs., or 100,000 tons, would be shipped by way of the St. Lawrence River, while an equal or greater amount would use this route to reach do- mestic markets along the Atlantic seaboard. While our country is blessed with large resources of copper, the situation with respect to this material is analogous in some respects to the situation in regard to grain, in that the chief sources of production are situated in the interior of the country, involving long and expensive hauls to the seaboard. As in the case of grain, our copper comes into competition with countries which can produce more cheaply than we, and it is important that we seek every means of reducing the cost of placing this product on the market. It is reported that copper from the fields of the Congo Basin can be placed in London at a cost of 7 cents a pound. The provision of a more economical outlet for our copi)cr is of national rather than local interest. Meat and dairy products. — The total value of products of the slaughtering and meat packing industries in 1914 amounted to $1,651,965,000. of which Illinois produced $485,362,000. Other States in the territory tributary to the Great Lakes which showed a large jiroduction include Kansas, Missouri, Iowa. Ohio, Indiana, GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 281 Minnesota and Wisconsin. In the manufacture of butter Wis- consin took first rank, with Minnesota second and Iowa third; while in the manufacture of cheese Wisconsin took first rank, with New York second and Michigan third. IlHnois, Wisconsin and Michigan ranked second, third and fourth, respectively, in the manufacture of condensed milk and milk products other than butter and cheese. The total exports of meat and dairy products in 1919 exceeded 4,000.000,000 pounds, or 2,000,000 tons, and of this total, 1,500,000 tons came from the territory tributary to the Great Lakes. In the shipment of all commodities requiring refrigeration in transit, there is a great advantage and saving in making direct shipment from point of origin to destination. In the past, large losses have resulted from deterioration of products of this kind in transit. Including the coastwise movement to the Atlantic seaboard, the total outbound shipments of meat and dairy products by way of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence ship channel will amount to 1,000,000 tons annually. There can be no doubt that the waterway will be used for these shipments, because it will afford a substantial saving over present routes, and such saving is necessary to permit our exporters to success- fully meet the competition of Argentina, Australia, and other meat producing countries. Other outbound freight. — Included among the many articles which will contribute to the make-up of general merchandise shipped abroad and to Atlantic Coast points, are linseed oil, rubber goods, leather, furniture, paper, live stock, and countless manufactured articles which are produced in great abundance at the many important industrial cities of this region. Chapter XXV SHIPBUILDING ON THE GREAT LAKES. A depth of 25 feet in the St. Lawrence waterway will be sufficient for the passage without cargo of the larger types of commercial vessels. The low cost of the raw materials required for steel manufacture, and other factors affecting production costs, justify the belief that the conditions on the Great Lakes are peculiarly favorable for successful competition in the ship- building trade of the world, and the benefits to be afforded this industry by the proposed improvement of the St. Lawrence River may easily amount to millions of dollars annually. The possibilities of shipbuilding on the Great Lakes have always been recognized, but the same physical obstacles which have limited traffic to the confines of the lakes themselves, have likewise limited commercial shipbuilding. As a result of the war, however, construction of large vessels on the Great Lakes has taken on new importance. Prior to 1917, the Great Lakes could boast of only four ships of 8,000 tons gross register. In 1917 alone, 14 bulk freighters were constructed, with a gross tonnage of 98,615 and a carrying capacity of 147,000 tons. Many lake vessels were taken by the L'nited States and Canadian Gov- ernments for ocean service, and delivered by way of the St. Lawrence River. Vessels more than 261 feet in length were cut into two parts for passage through the W'elland Canal and St. Lawrence River. The majority of vessels taken over by the United States were package freighters, although a number of bulk freighters were taken. During the year 1918, there were thirteen yards on the Great Lakes engaged in constructing vessels for the United Stales Government, and the dimensions of the vessels built were gen- erally the maximum that could be passed through the present W'elland Canal. The Great Lakes Engineering Works built and delivered 34 vessels, the majority of which were originally ordered by private firms, but subsequently requisitioned by the United States. Thirty of these vessels have tine machinery amidships with two large hatches forward and two aft, and are typical of the smaller type of ocean-going general cargo vessels. The last four have their machinery aft. with a depth of 27^/^ feet (not draft), and were originally designed as colliers for use on the Atlantic Coast. One of these steamers, the Craicl Keys, is worthy of special reference, inasmuch as this vessel was completely 282 CiKEAT LAKES-ST. LAWKE.XCE SHIP CHANNEL 283 built and delivered in 29 working days. For this achievement the Great Lakes Engineering Works was officially awarded the world record by the United States Shipping Board. The Amer- ican Shipbuilding Company has delivered 94 ships of the standard ocean-going type, and other yards have constructed standard vessels for salt-water use. The yards of the Great Lakes are well equipped for the con- struction of vessels of all types, but their contracts have been largely limited to vessels which can be passed through the canals. A few larger ones have been constructed and sent through in sections. The depth now proposed for the St. Lawrence water- way is sufficient for the passage, without cargo, of the larger type of commercial vessels, and if the locks be given sufficient width and length to accommodate such vessels the activities of the ship yards of the Great Lakes can and will be extended to include the construction of large ocean-going freight and pas- senger vessels. Consideration of the factors of cost justifies the belief that the conditions on the Great Lakes are peculiarly favorable for successful competition in the shipbuilding trade of the world. The business is one which will assume great magnitude in the future, and the benefits to be afforded by the advancement of this industry on the Great Lakes may easily amount to millions of dollars annually. Chapter XXVI WATER POWER. It is estimated that the improvement of the St. Lawrence River will develop 4,000,000 H. P., which will be worth about $15 per H. P., or $60,000,000, and will save from 25,000,000 to 50,000,000 tons of coal annually. To haul this coal from the mine to the factory would require one trip of 500,000 to 1,000,000 cars. The products of factories of the United States in 1914 were worth in excess of $1,000 per primary H. P. used in such indus- tries. If the power of the St. Lawrence were all used for manu- facturing, the value of the raw materials, based on averages for the country, would be $2,600,000,000, and of the finished products $4,400,000,000. At a value of $200 per ton, the products would amount to 22,000,000 tons annually, while the raw materials would equal or exceed this tonnage. While all the power will not be devoted to manufacturing, a large amount of it will be. The industries which will be established to utilize this power will in themselves create an enormous tonnage for movement on the waterway. The opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels is required in the interest of the commerce of the United States, and the cost is fully justified for this purpose. The fact that the improve- ment will incidentally harness and make available for mankind a water power of great magnitude, however, can not be ignored, particularly as this water power will not only afford a revenue sufficient to pay the entire cost, but will make possible a vast industrial development which will add materially to the future commerce of the new ocean route. As the subject will be thor- oughly considered in the report of the engineers, it will be re- ferred to only briefly in this report. The question of waterpower development is of paramount importance to both the United States and Canada. In consider- ing the future requirements of industry, insufficient considera- tion has been given to our power resources, and it is here that a shortage is to be feared rather than in the supply of raw materials of manufacture. The lack of a sufficient power re- serve was especially manifest during the war, when the combined facilities of hydroelectric, steam, and mechanical water power proved inadequate to meet production necessities in some of the more important industrial districts. In fact, the situation became so serious that it was not only necessary to curtail power to pro- ducers of nonessentials, Init to adopt strict measures for the conservation of power at establishments engaged upon important 284 GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 285 Government work. While it is generally possible to augment the output of raw materials within a reasonable space of time, in order to meet increased requirements of manufacture, it is not feasible to materially increase the supply of power without the long delay required for the construction and equipment of new plants. It is understood that but little was accomplished during the war toward increasing the power supply, owing to the impracticability of establishing the plant and machinery re- quired, and that had the war continued much longer the country would have been face to face with a power shortage so serious as to materially afifect the war program. As a measure of future protection, as well as to provide for the growing needs of indus- try, the important power resources of the country should be de- veloped to the point where they may be quickly brought into use when required. It is estimated that from 6 to 15 tons of coal are required for the development of one horsepower year, the former figure being for the most efficient plants, while the latter figure repre- sents more nearly the average. The present annual production of coal in the United States is more than 500,000,000 tons, and of this it is estimated that about 350,000,000 tons are consumed in the production of steam power. Our deposits of anthracite and bituminous coal are gradually being exhausted, and while the latter will last for many years to come, the eventual exhaustion of the supply is inevitable, and it is none too soon to adopt measures for its conservation. It is estimated that the improvement of the St. Lawrence River will develop 4,000,000 horsepower, of which approximately 2,000,- 000 horsepower will be in the international section. The value of this power at the switchboard will be at least $15 a horse- power, or $60,000,000 a year, and it will save from 25 to 50 million tons of coal annually, valued at $100,000,000 to $200.- 000,000. To haul this coal from the mine to the factory would require one trip of 500,000 to 1,000,000 cars. In 1914, there was 22,547,574 primary horsepower used in manufacturing in the United States, and the value of the products was $24,246,434,724, or more than $1,000 per horsepower. Based on the figures of the 1914 census, the horsepower of the St. Lawrence would afford employment to about 1,500,000 people. If the power were all used for manufacturing, the value of the raw materials would be $2,600,000,000, and of the finished products $4,400,000,000. At a value of $200 a ton, the products would give a total com- 286 i;reat lakes-st. lawkence ship channel nierce amounting to 22,000,000 tons annually, while the raw ma- terials would equal or exceed this tonnage. While all of this power will not be devoted to manufacturing, it is certain that much of it will be, and that this development will create a com- merce of large proportions. The combination of cheap power, cheap transportation of raw products, and a direct ocean route to the world's markets, will not fail to attract the enterprising American and Canadian manufacturer seeking an opportunity to improve his position in commerce. The paper and metallurgical industries will be among those which will recognize the peculiar advantages of the situation. CONCLUSIONS. The study of the economic aspects of the Great I.akes-St. Lawrence waterway leads to the following conclusions : 1. A channel 25 feet deep at low water in the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Lake Ontario will enable the greater proportion of vessels engaged in foreign trade, and prac- tically all vessels engaged in general coastwise trade, to enter the Great Lakes. The figures show that the ocean freight vessel of average tonnage has a loaded draft of about 21 feet. 2. At our principal ocean ports, scarcely 1 per cent of the vessels utilize the full available depth, while vessels on the Great Lakes customarily take advantage of every foot. A channel 25 feet deep at low water into the Great Lakes could be used by nearly all vessels now calling at the 30-foot harbors of the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts. 3. The study of vessels passing through the Panama Canal discloses the fact that the vessels operating on this route between the important ports of the world have an average draft of 21 feet. The greater proportion of them could have delivered their cargoes to lake ports on a 25-foot channel, and nearly all of them on a 30-foot channel. Only 3.3 per cent of the vessels pass- ing through the Suez Canal since 1912 have had drafts as great as 27 feet. At New York, which is used by the largest vessels in the world, only 4 per cent drew 30 feet or more during the first six months of 1914. 4. A channel 30 feet deep will accommodate 99 per cent of the vessels customarily engaged in world trade. 5. Vessels of moderate size and draft are now in use on all the world trade routes and are the most suitable for use in devel- oping the maritime trade of the Great Lakes. Most of them can be accommodated on a depth of 25 feet, and all of them on a depth of 30 feet. 6. Every increase of navigation facilities on the Great Lakes has brought benefits amounting to many times its cost, and if the opening of these waters to ocean vessels should lead to further expenditures for channels and terminal facilities, the outlay must be regarded as a high-grade investment which will return abundant dividends to the public. 7. The assumption that the restricted sections of the St. Law- rence route will involve delays which will render the use of ocean vessels unprofitable is not supported by a study of the navigation conditions on this and other routes, nor by the prac- tices with reference to vessel rates. 287 288 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE 8. The rapid rise of the port of Montreal to a position second only to New York in the exportation of grain from the American continent is alone abundant proof that the navigation of the St. Lawrence under conditions similar to those now prevailing between Montreal and the Atlantic Ocean, presents no difficulties of sufficient importance to prevent the full realization of the purposes for which the extension of this navigation is desired. 9. The European analogies show that the St. Lawrence water- way gives prospect of greater usefulness than many foreign deep- water routes which are in successful use at the present time. 10. It is a recognized rule of transportation that where there is a productive interior, ships will proceed as far inland as physi- cally practicable, and there are many precedents to show that ocean vessels will enter the Great Lakes. Moreover, there will be a large amount of incoming and outgoing freight in full cargoes, for which vessels will be chartered or owned by the com- panies interested. 11. A wrong impression exists regarding return loads at our ocean ports. At a number of successful ports the exports are many times the imports. At Galveston the ratio is about 12 to 1 ; at Los Angeles 20 to 1 ; at Portland, Oreg., 40 to 1 ; and at New- port News 70 to 1. Moreover, in some cases the imports do not proceed in any quantity from the countries to which the exports are destined. The consuming ability of the territory tributary to the Great Lakes, and the importance of the manufacturing industries which now import large quantities of raw materials from abroad, insure a greater proportion of return cargo than is obtainable at many of our successful ocean ports. 12. In the great interior section of the L^nited States contiguous to the Great Lakes is centered a large share of the surplus agri- cultural and mineral production of the country, and the manu- factured goods of this area go to every country in the world. It is essential to the future prosperity of the nation that means be provided for placing these surplus products in foreign markets at low cost. The present rail haul of 1,000 to 1,500 miles, with the attendant cost and delay of transfer at Atlantic ports, is an unwarrantable handicap again,st our foreign trade, and seri- ously limits our ability to meet competition abroad. The opening of the Great Lakes to ocean vessels will remove the handicap. 13. The railroads of the country are inadequate ti> handle the traffic, whenever there is any traffic to handle. During the ])eriods of business depression they do fairly well, but they are unable to carry the freight during the crop moving periods and at times when commodities are in demand. The transportation shortage is resi^onsible for the loss of billions of dollars annually. GREAT I.AKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 289 More cars mean more congestion. The real need is more routes, more outlets, and better terminals. The Great Lakes-St. Law- rence waterway will have an important effect in relieving the transportation congestion, and will more than save its cost every year by eliminating losses due to inability of the railroads to move the traffic. 14. The cost of getting freight through the terminals of the Atlantic Coast frequently equals the cost of the rail haul from points as far west as Chicago. The extent to which these terminal charges burden the commerce of the United States is not generally appreciated. More and better terminal facilities must be pro- vided, but of greater importance to commerce will be the open- ing of a deep water route to the heart of the country which will eliminate a large proportion of the transfers. 15. Estimates formerly made regarding the cost of barge navigation have not been sustained by actual experience. The traffic on the Barge Canal is not unlike that on other shallow waterways, and consists chiefly of low-priced products. Its capacity is no more than will be required for transporting the local traffic originating on its banks. Instead of avoiding a trans- fer, it introduces an additional transfer, which renders it unsuit- able as an outlet for the general commerce of the Great Lakes region. 16. Study of the cost of transportation by ocean vessels shows that the additional cost of running to upper lake ports, as com- pared with Atlantic ports, is only a fraction of the amount which will be saved by elimination of rail hauls and transfers. 17. Comparison of distances and costs of transportation from all parts of the world to the areas tributary to the Great Lakes, both by existing routes and by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway, shows that the latter route will eft"ect important sav- ings, amounting to as much as $10 a ton on some commodities. The territory tributary for commerce with the United Kingdom and western Europe has a population of about 41.000,000, and the area tributary for commerce with South ^A-merica a popula- tion of about 30,000,000. The area tributary for coastwise traffic is smaller, but includes all of 'the important manufacturing dis- tricts adjacent to the Great Lakes, and this statement is also applicable to the area tributary for traffic with Central .\merica and the West Indies. 18. The statistics show that the centers of production of many of the most important tonnage producing commodities are within the territory tributary to the Great Lakes. In this territory are produced 75 per cent of the wheat, 65 per cent of the corn, 290 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE 100 per cent of the flax, 85 per cent of the iron. 40 per cent of the copper, 74 per cent of the zinc, and 46 per cent of the lead. The important manufacturing industries of this territory include agricultural implements, automobiles and accessories, rubber manufactures, meat packing, iron and steel, paper, furniture, and many others. 19. The present commerce of the Great Lakes furnishes no basis for estimating the commerce of the Great Lakes-St. Law- rence waterway. The package freight, which has been referred to as being the only part interested in reaching tidewater, con- sists largely of local and interlake freight which is not uiterested in reaching the seaboard. Practically all of the grain and some iron ore, pig iron and coal will use the deep waterway. The general freight interested in the waterway is the enormous ton- nage which now moves entirely by rail between the Great Lakes region and the Atlantic seaboard. The total volume of this move- ment is now about 250,000,000 tons annually. 20. Tlie saving on grain will amount to from 8 to 10 cents a bushel, and this saving will afl:'ect not only the grain which actually moves for export, but practically all that produced within the area tributary to the Great Lakes. This saving will amount annually to approximately the entire cost of the improvement required to admit ocean vessels into the Lakes. In view of the importance of having available at all times a route which will enable the producers of the great Northwest to market their products expeditiously and economically at the moment of greatest demand, the opening of this deep water route is regarded as of national importance and fully justified for this purpose alone. 21. The principal commodities which will be brought into the Lakes over the deep waterway will be pulpwood, wood-pulp, sulphur, china clay, cofifee, cocoa, sugar, fruits and nuts, rubber, fertilizer materials, lumber, hides, canned goods, asphaltum, gums, tanning extracts, sago and tapioca, fibers and textile grasses, flaxseed, seed for planting, spices, vegetable oils, granite and hardware. The principal commodities which will be shipped outward will be grain, iron ore, iron and steel, coal, agricultural implements, automobiles and vehicles, salt, copper, meat and dairy products, and the countless manufactures of the industrial centers of the Great Lakes. Within a short period after comple- tion of the deep waterway, the commerce should amount to ap- proximately 20,000,000 tons, with continued growth in the future. 22. The Great Lakes are regarded as a most advantageous location for shipbuilding, due to the availability of an abundance of iron ore and other essentials of steel manufacture. The pro- GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE SHIP CHANNEL 291 posed enlargement of the channels affording access to the Great Lakes will permit the shipyards on the Lakes to construct vessels of all sizes and types, except the very few express liners, and will be of great value to this industry. 23. The waterpower development will not only afford a revenue which will maintain the improvement and amortize the full cost within a reasonable period, but it will be the direct means of creat- ing a vast industrial development which in itself will provide a large traffic on the waterway consisting of the raw materials so abundantly provided by nature in the region of the Great Lakes, and of the finished products which will be transported direct by ocean vessel to foreign and domestic markets. 24. No greater opportunity for the successful development of commerce has ever been offered to mankind. The advantages can not be regarded as of local importance only. They combine to afford more favorable opportunity for expanding our trade with the world, and hence must be regarded as of interest to every citizen of the land. It seems clear that the time has come when we can no longer safely delay the opening of the Great Lakes to the commerce of the world. It has been forcibly stated by Senator Lenroot, and we now repeat in his language : The Wfest demands the St. Lawrence outlet to the sea, and because its demands are so just, so necessary for the future, not alone for the West, but of the entire nation, no opposition from any source shall prevail against it, and this great project which is more important to the prosperity of this country than the Panama Canal, shall in a few years be an accomplished fact. Upon the broad bosom of our Great Lakes, and in the harbors of our great cities, there shall fly the flags of every nation from the mastheads of ships coming from every part of the world, but with the upbuilding of our merchant marine there shall always be one flag more numerous than any other, the flag of the United States of America. UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIbHAHY i-auili AA 001 118 642 6