REESE LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Deceived FEB- . -10- 1-894 > l8 9 - 
 
 I 
 
 *A 
 
 Accessions No&ttTTY.... Class No. >/ 
 
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES 
 
 TO THK- 
 
 BOOK 
 
 oiozmiRcrs 
 
 TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS 
 
 -BY- 
 
 FRANK SMALLEY, A. M.; PH. D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE 
 IN THE 
 
 SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY. 
 
 SYRACUSE, N. Y. 
 
 T. W. DTJBSTON, 
 1892. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Preface 3 
 
 Introduction 5 
 
 I. The Tusculan Disputations .r 5 
 
 II. Argument of Book V 7 
 
 III. A Brief View of Greek and Roman Ethical Philosophy 11 
 
 (a) Socrates 11 
 
 (b) The Cynics, (Antisthenes and Diogenes) 12 
 
 (c) The Cyrenaics, (Aristippus and Theodorus) 13 
 
 (d) Plato 15 
 
 (e) The Academies 18 
 
 (1) The Old Academy, (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, etc.) 18 
 
 (2) The Middle Academy, (Arcesilaus and Carneades) 18 
 
 (3) The New Academy, (Philo and Antiochus) 19 
 
 (f) Aristotle 20 
 
 (g) The Peripatetics, (Theophrastus, Aristo, Callipho, etc.) 21 
 
 (h) The Stoics, (Zeno, Aristo of Chios, Diogenes of Babylon, 
 
 Panaetius, etc.) 22 
 
 (i) The Epicureans, (Epicurus, Metrodorus, etc.) 28 
 
 (j) Relations of Epicureanism to Stoicism 33 
 
 (k) The Eclectics, (Cicero) 34 
 
 Notes on the text. . 36 
 
PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 The Introduction and annotations here presented are advance 
 sheets. They are printed now because needed for immediate use. 
 The plan is to extend the latter to other portions of the text, and 
 briefly to extend and adapt the former to the same. Some Latin 
 text of the Disputations, as Teubner's or Harper's, will be used in 
 the class. 
 
 No scholar can feel any degree of confidence or any assurance of 
 competence to present a commentary on this composition of Cicero 
 without first devoting much thoughtful study to the great German 
 editors, whose works have done so much to furnish a correct text 
 and a clear exposition of the sometimes obscure passages, elucidat- 
 ing the author's thought. Reference is made especially to the works 
 of Wolf, Moser and Kiihner. Use has been constantly made of the 
 edition of Heine, and especially of Tischer's (Sorof) last (eighth), on 
 whose text the notes are based. Independent additions have been 
 made where it was deemed that the interest of a clear exposition 
 demanded; especially is this true of comments of a biographical and 
 philosophical character. 
 
 A few grammatical references have been inserted. The design in 
 reading this Latin should not be so much the study of the language 
 as of the thought ; and the student should have little need of gram- 
 matical instruction, but be able to give his attention almost exclu- 
 sively to the style, the elevated tone, the general line of thought and 
 the philosophical questions discussed. As a necessary preparation 
 for understanding the philosophy, the introduction has been pre- 
 pared ; for, the reader who has not previously devoted some atten- 
 tion to ancient philosophy, would, when introduced thus, "/ medias 
 res" be quite incapable of comprehending the author. He must 
 first fix in mind the ethical teachings of this philosophy, the discus- 
 sion of which constitutes the substance of the work, and with which 
 the author assumes that his reader has a reasonable familiarity. Such 
 
preparation, moreover, is especially important in this case; first, be- 
 cause this book is the last of a series, the writer naturally assuming 
 that the books have been perused in order; second, because the 
 work, as a whole, followed in time of composition other philosophical 
 writings of the author to which it stands related, as the practical to 
 the theoretical. In the five books De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum 
 he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the high- 
 est good and of evil ; the Tusculanae Dispulationes followed, in which 
 he showed what things are necessary to the greatest happiness in life. 
 
 If we were to specify narrowly the knowledge most indispensable 
 to the student at the outset, it would be this: the ethical views of 
 Aristotle, of the Old Academy, of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, 
 of Carneades of the Middle Academy, of Antiochus of the New 
 Academy, and of Cicero himself. See INTRODUCTION; (and for 
 Cicero), III. THE ECLECTICS. 
 
 The helps made use of in preparing the commentary are suffi- 
 ciently indicated above. In the philosophical introduction the 
 more important works consulted are as follows : History of Philo- 
 sophy, Dr. F. Ueberweg, translated by Morris, vol. i ; A Sketch of 
 Ancient Philosophy, J. B. Mayor; A Brief History of Greek Philo- 
 sophy, Burt ; Christianity and Greek Philosophy, Cocker ; A Short 
 History of Greek Philosophy, Marshall; Lives and Opinions of 
 Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius, translated by Yonge; 
 Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Zeller, translated by Reichel. 
 
 FRANK SMALLEY. 
 SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, 
 September, 1892. 
 
(UNIVERSITY 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. 
 
 Cicero tells us in the first book that the five books of the Tusculan 
 Disputations are the record of the five days discussion of philo- 
 sophic questions at his Tusculan villa (whence the name), each book 
 representing the discussion of a day. The questions considered have 
 a practical application to life, and the treatise is a contribution to 
 moral philosophy. It was begun in the year 45 B. C. and finished 
 the following year. The form of each book is that of a dialogue 
 not as in his other works, between equals but one of his pupils or 
 friends suggests a thesis and briefly attempts to maintain it, after 
 which Cicero, having refuted his views, proceeds almost without 
 interruption to discuss the topic at length. The popular method of 
 presentation, the easy flow of thought, and above all the elevated 
 and noble moral tone combine to delight the reader. However it 
 must be admitted that there is a weakness in his arguments and a 
 lack of keenness in his logic compared with the dialectic of Plato 
 which is his model. " The Tusculan Disputations is a work of des- 
 pair. When Cicero wrote them, Italy was given over to Caesar and 
 the host of tribunes and centurions who had conquered license in 
 his train. Everything but good conscience seemed lost beyond 
 recovery; and Cicero strove to convince himself, in convincing the 
 young yet uncorrupted by the world, that to keep a good conscience 
 through everything is enough, and more than enough; that to know 
 this is our main concern; and that glory and success and all exter- 
 nals are so secondary that the inquiry as to whether they add any- 
 thing more or less to virtue only serves curiosity, if, indeed, it does 
 not lower courage. Even the style is affected by the reckless earn- 
 estness of the writer, and becomes more animated and pathetic, and 
 at the same time less pure." The above quotation from Simcox 
 states the circumstances under which the work was composed and 
 partially sets forth the object the author had in view. More specif- 
 
ically, it may be stated that the great object was to assure himself 
 and his readers that amidst all the evils of life (I use the expression 
 in its popular sense) there is one secure refuge namely, virtue, and 
 that virtue insures happiness under all circumstances. Man has thus 
 in his own power all that is necessary for happiness. 
 
 The first book speaks of the proper attitude toward death, holding 
 that it is not an evil, and is to be looked upon with indifference if 
 not actually regarded as a blessing ; the second book teaches us that 
 bodily pain, although an evil, can be overcome by the exercise of 
 reason and self-control ; the third book refutes the proposition that 
 the wise man is subject to grief or sorrow. Cicero says: " Your 
 question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have 
 the appearance of evil, that is not dishonorable ; or at least anything 
 else would seem so small an evil, that by his wisdom he would so 
 overmatch it, as to make it wholly disappear." The fourth book has 
 reference to other emotions or passions of the mind, the thesis being 
 thus stated: "Non omni animi perturbations sapiens potest vacare" 
 This is refuted on the Stoic principle that no man can be called 
 virtuous who has not gotten rid of all emotions or passions, or the 
 beliefs which give rise to these irrational impulses. " But certainly 
 the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all per- 
 turbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or 
 necessary in them." The fifth book maintains that virtue in itself 
 is sufficient to insure a happy life, which is related to the thesis of 
 the preceding books as the universal to the particular, the contain- 
 ing to the contained. It is a comprehensive statement of a general 
 proposition involving all the questions that were proposed, discussed 
 and settled in harmony with it in the preceding books. This book 
 is justly regarded as the most pleasing and attractive of the five. 
 
II. ARGUMENT OF BOOK V. 
 
 The first four chapters are introductory. Reference is made to 
 the opinion of Brutus that virtue is sufficient of itself to insure a 
 happy life a truth of the highest importance, but one which the 
 infirmity of human nature leads him sometimes to distrust, until, by 
 reflection on the power of virtue, he corrects his judgment, (i). Philo- 
 sophy here must be our guide; whereupon he breaks into an enthu- 
 siastic panegyric of philosophy, which is praised as of the utmost 
 service to men, but which is even maligned by some who do not 
 realize its value and antiquity, (2). A brief summary of the earliest 
 philosophy, especially of the wise men of antiquity, follows extend- 
 ing down to Pythagoras who invented the term philosopeer, whom 
 he (Pythagoras) compared to the spectators at the Grecian games, 
 thus earnestly contemplating nature, (3). Philosophy before the 
 time of Socrates was mostly natural philosophy. Socrates applied 
 it to life and morals. Many sects followed. The Socratic method 
 will be pursued, (4) The Auditor says that virtue does not seem to 
 him sufficient to insure a happy life, and maintains that thesis by 
 declaring that, while virtue may exist under torture and on the rack, 
 happiness cannot, (5). Reference is made by M. (Magister?) to the 
 conclusions of the preceding books which quite seem to settle the 
 question ; for if virtue has fortune in her power, and is beyond the 
 reach of fear and anxiety, desire and vain joy, it must insure happi- 
 ness, (6). A. is convinced of his error; notwithstanding, M. pro- 
 ceeds, saying that, while mathematicians prove a point and then 
 leave it, philosophers are accustomed to discuss such points separ- 
 ately; and this is a very important point, for philosophy promises to 
 make man forever happy, (7). The inconsistency of the Academics, 
 especially of Antiochus, is pointed out, who holds that virtue of 
 itself can make happy but not perfectly happy; that things are esti- 
 mated from there predominant constituent; and that there are three 
 classes of evils, and that one can be happy even under evil, (8). The 
 Peripatetics (Theophrastus) reason consistently, but from wrong 
 
8 
 
 premises. They hold to three kinds of goods (and corresponding 
 evils) and that evil may befall a good man, destroying happiness. 
 Epicurus is blamed for commending temperance and at the same 
 time making pleasure the chief good, and for defying fortune while 
 regarding pain as the sole or greatest evil, (9). Happiness must be 
 absolute enjoyment of good without any evil ; so virtue, as indis- 
 pensable to happiness, must be the only good. Otherwise the evils 
 corresponding to goods as pain, poverty, etc., might befall the good 
 or wise man, and if regarded as evils be inconsistent with happiness. 
 Aristotle and the Academics cannot be permitted to say that a wise 
 man is always happy and at the same time hold their view of evils, 
 nor can Epicurus with his view of pain, (10). Cicero had endeavored 
 to show in the fourth book de Finibus, that the difference between 
 the Stoics and the Peripatetics on this subject is one of words only, 
 and justifies his inconsistency on the ground of adherence to the 
 Academy. The question here is, admitting that virtue is the only 
 good, is it alone sufficient for a happy life, (n). And this doctrine 
 is due to Plato and before him to Socrates. Plato in the speech of 
 Pericles says that the happy man is unaffected by externals, has con- 
 trol of his passions, and is entirely dependent on himself, (12). 
 Beginning with nature it is shown that every creature (plant or 
 animal) is designed to reach its perfect development, the animal in 
 a higher sphere than the plant, and man, endowed with reason, in 
 the highest sphere that of reason which is identical with virtue ; 
 and, as whatever lacks nothing is happy, virtue in man implies hap- 
 piness. Brutus, Aristotle and the Old Academy believe this, (13). 
 But Cicero holds more, namely, that it implies complete happiness. 
 Those who make three classes of goods must be in doubt, as being 
 dependent on unreliable goods. The happy man must be free from 
 all apprehension of the loss of that which makes happy, and of all 
 fear. Courage that admits any fear is not true courage. Add to 
 courage self-control, and what can be wanting to happiness ? (14). 
 The wise man regards grief and fear as arising from imagined evils, 
 and pleasure and desire from imagined goods and all opposed to 
 reason. He is happy because unaffected by them. The true good 
 produces joy, and is honorable, (i. e. morally good). The honorable 
 alone is good, so that honesty (moral goodness) alone makes a 
 happy life. These cannot be goods of which one may have an 
 
abundance, as of wealth, honors, etc., and yet be unhappy. Take 
 away the morally good (honestum) and you take away happi- 
 ness. The honorable is again defined as the only good; if not such, 
 many other things are entitled to be called goods, (15). Nothing 
 external can be called a good in the true sense. The Stoics give the 
 designation preferred to some of the so-called goods of others, but 
 do not, as others do, regard them as essential to happiness, or to the 
 greatest happiness. An argument from Socrates is introduced which 
 is based on the harmony of a man's life with his mental disposition. 
 If his disposition is morally good his life will be the same and there- 
 fore happy. Then follows a resume of arguments witli the con- 
 clusion that a happy life is consequent on virtue, (16). A com- 
 parison between a happy antf an unhappy life is made and leads to 
 the result that only the happy life can have a praiseworthy char- 
 acter, and must therefore be virtuous. Finally the conclusion is 
 reached by a comparison of vice with virtue, that as the former ren- 
 ders life miserable, the latter must render it happy, (17). The reality 
 of the Stoic's proof is again briefly summarized, (18); and for the 
 confirmation of the same a number of examples of virtuous and of 
 wicked statesmen are presented, (19, 20, 21, 22, 23-); also several 
 philosophers are mentioned, and finally the activity and the happi- 
 ness of the wise man is pictured in detail, (-23, 24, 25). Then fol- 
 lows a refutation of the objections which seem to have some force 
 against the Stoic view that virtue is able to produce a happy life, 
 and since the view that pain is an evil is the strongest argument that 
 threatens the proof of that proposition, Cicero reminds us that even 
 Epicurus asserts that he can be happy in spite of the most intense 
 sufferings, and a number of facts and illustrations to the same affect 
 are cited, (26, 27, 28, 29-). Cicero takes advantage of his agnosticism 
 to show a spirit of fair dealing with all views and to show that, how- 
 ever they differ, virtue is still able to insure a happy life. Various 
 opinions of the good are enumerated and some of them discussed. 
 He comes back again to the question of pain, and, in connection 
 with it, of death; pain cannot destroy happiness for the Peripatetics 
 or even the Epicureans, (-29, 30, 31). Poverty twin of pain is 
 next discussed and Epicurus commended. He shows how easily 
 poverty is endured by others as well as by the Stoics, (32, 34, 35). 
 And amid these illustrations are set forth the practical directions of 
 
 F 
 
10 
 
 Epicurus concerning the striving for pleasure, (33). Obscurity also 
 and unpopularity cannot prevent a wise man from being happy, (36); 
 nor can banishment, (37). The same is true of all griefs and anxie- 
 ties, of blindness, and deafness, which afflictions are not to be con- 
 sidered in comparison with the many pleasures of life which are at 
 the command of the wise man. But let all these misfortunes meet 
 in one person, together with acute bodily pain, still he may escape 
 by a voluntary death, (38, 39, 40). If those philosophers who hold 
 the honorable and laudable as of no value can maintain that the wise 
 man is always happy, what must be the case with philosophers who 
 derive from Socrates and Plato ? All come so near together on this 
 question that Cicero expresses his gratification that it is thus satis- 
 factorily solved, and he closes with the remark that he can best alle- 
 viate his own afflictions by devoting his leisure to philosophical study 
 and composition, (41). 
 
 For a less detailed analysis, see Klotz's Argumentum in the Teub- 
 ner text or in Harper's. 
 
III. A BRIEF VIEW OF GREEK AND ROMAN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The earliest philosophy was a natural philosophy. It concerned 
 itself with the problem of nature and the universe, and the individual 
 was lost sight of in the study of the universal. It was not until the 
 Sophists appeared that thought was directed to man instead of 
 nature, and philosophy became subjective. The Sophists were not 
 philosophers in the highest sense. They were rhetoricians and gram- 
 marians and teachers of youth, the professors of the " higher educa- 
 tion," and of u practical " philosophy. However, they did speculate 
 on the nature of human volition and thought, and thus prepared the 
 way for a profounder study of man, for ethics and a better dialectic. 
 There was need of a great genius to rescue philosophy from the 
 chaos into which it had fallen by the study of nature and the per- 
 versions of the Sophists, to take up and extend the principle of sub- 
 jectivism introduced by the latter, and to consider man in his uni- 
 versal as well as his individual nature; to maintain the certainty of 
 moral distinctions, and establish a scientific method for detecting 
 error and determining truth; in a word, to recognize, through the 
 laws of thinking and moral willing, the relation of man to the objec- 
 tive world. Such a genius appeared in Socrates, and although he 
 wrote no treatise, and did not profess to teach, but simply to stimu- 
 late thought by means of keen questioning, he marks an era in 
 philosophy. 
 
 (a) ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF SOCRATES. 
 
 SOCRATES was the father of moral philosophy. It is true there 
 had been some ethical speculations by the natural philosophers, par- 
 ticularly by Anaxagoras, by Democritus, and by the Sophists, but it 
 was left for Socrates to investigate the law of conduct. He did not 
 build up a system of ethics, his efforts being limited to testing men 
 and leading them to rigorous self-examination. " The fundamental 
 
 conception of Socrates was the inseparable union of 
 
 theoretical insight with practical moral excellence." And so virtue 
 is knowledge, and vice is ignorance. No man willingly sins, but 
 only as the result of ignorance, for every man desires happiness and 
 the only road to happiness is through virtue, while knowledge 
 (scientific knowledge, wisdom) is the sole condition to virtue. " To 
 
12 
 
 do wrong wittingly is better than to do right ignorantly. Character 
 and deliberate choice, consequently, were not regarded by Socrates 
 as elements of virtue." Virtue is the necessary result of knowledge, 
 If a man is virtuous he is realizing what is best and truest in himself, 
 he is fulfilling what is best and truest without himself; he "has come 
 to a knowledge evidencing itself in works expressive of the law that 
 is in him, as he is in it." " Therefore the law of virtuous growth is 
 expressed in the maxim 'know thyself; that is, realize thyself; by 
 obedience and self-control come to your full stature." Virtue can 
 be taught, because knowledge can be acquired, and further, because 
 of this unity of virtue and knowledge the virtues are one, having a 
 common essence in wisdom. Thus temperance, friendship, courage, 
 justice and piety are only different expressions of wisdom. The 
 Good is the highest object of knowledge. It is a condition like the 
 gods to have no wants, and the less one wants the nearer he comes 
 to this ideal. External goods confer no advantage. Socrates re- 
 garded physical speculation as unprofitable and even impious, but 
 pious conduct was the just due of Deity, because of his care for men 
 and his manifested wisdom. He believed in an omnipotent and 
 invisible Supreme Being who rules the universe. 
 
 The greatest of the disciples of Socrates was Plato. There were, 
 however, several others termed the Lesser Socratics, who founded 
 schools, each mainly characterized by some particular feature of the 
 Sbcratic teachings. Of these, two treated chiefly of ethical questions, 
 namely, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic Schools. 
 
 (b) THE CYNICS. SEE IX. 26, NOTE. 
 
 ANTISTHENES, the founder of the Cynic school, had been a pupil 
 of Gorgias the Sophist, before coming to Socrates. It is a question 
 whether the name of the school was derived from a gymnasium 
 The Cynosarges where Antistheries taught, or from xvwxoz, dog- 
 gish, from their churlish manners. The Cynics were the ascetics of 
 philosophy, and they magnified the Socratic principle of self-control 
 and superiority to appetite. Virtue is the only good, vice the only 
 evil. Everything else is indifferent. "Virtue is wisdom and the 
 wise man is always perfectly happy because he is self-sufficient and 
 has no wants, no ties and no weaknesses." The Cynic aimed at 
 liberty through self-denial. He did not however despise all pleas- 
 
13 
 
 ures as Anthisthenes shows in these remarks, "when I wish a treat I 
 do not go and buy it at great cost in the market place; I find iny 
 storehouse of pleasures in the soul;" and, "follow the pleasures that 
 come after pains, not those which bring pains in their train." He 
 sought to train body and mind so as to attain independence, and so 
 that the very refusal of pleasure would be itself a pleasure. Virtue 
 was declared to be teachable and when once acquired could never 
 be lost. Believing civilization corrupt he sought to return to a state 
 of nature, to become a citizen of the world in distinction from exist- 
 ing society. His ideal is then expressed in the words, liberty, free- 
 speech and independence. This resulted in boorishness, indecency, 
 shabbiness of dress, insolence, and ostentatious asceticism. Hegel 
 truly says, " The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in 
 which is true freedom." The most famous of the Cynics was Dio- 
 genes of Sinope. He is described as "conceited, scurrilous, witty, a 
 caricature of Socrates, sleeping in porticoes, coarsely and scantily 
 clad, living on the rudest fare, drinking water from the palm of his 
 hand, violating all rules of decency, railing at whatever and whom- 
 ever he whimsically conceived a dislike to ; an admired, privileged 
 * Dog' indeed." All this excess came from the exaggeration of prin- 
 ciples in themselves good, the superiority of man to his environment, 
 simplicity of life, frankness and sincerity in speech. 
 Stoicism with its mental culture was indebted to cynicism. 
 
 (c) THE CYRENAICS. 
 
 ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic School. Although of 
 a luxurious city and possessed of wealth and fond of good living, he 
 was attracted by Socrates and became his disciple. His means and 
 social condition naturally affected his views. The Socratic doctrine 
 of self-control was capable of interpretations that might lead to very 
 diverse results in the practical conduct of life. Antisthenes and the 
 Cynics, as we have seen, interpreted and applied it in practice with 
 the result of taking pleasure in the very denial of pleasure and in a 
 severely ascetic mode of life. And to some extent they had the 
 example of Socrates to plead in favor of their practice. On the 
 other hand Socrates did sometimes go to great lengths in convivial 
 indulgence, never, however, losing self-control. Pleasure and self- 
 control, with the emphasis on the first, was the fundamental ethical 
 
14 
 
 principle of Aristippus. " The Socratic element in the doctrine of 
 Aristippus appears in the principle of self-determination directed by 
 knowledge, and in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired 
 through knowledge and culture." 
 
 The Cyrenaics first gave prominence to a phrase much used later, 
 namely, the end of existence, meaning by it that which is good in and 
 for itself, and not as a means to anything else, and in fact, " sums up 
 the good in existence." With them the end oi life is pleasure; hence 
 the term Hedonism (from -fjdovr], pleasure) often applied to the school. 
 The pleasure meant is the pleasure of each moment, with little regard 
 for the past or the future, the present only being in our power. 
 Virtue, the good, and pleasure are identical. The wise man is 
 therefore the man who enjoys pleasure but keeps it under his con- 
 trol; but wisdom intellectual culture is essential to this enjoy- 
 ment. The sage is subject to grief and fear. He is not always 
 happy. All pleasures as such are good and equally desirable, 
 whether arising from a good or bad cause or source. " Duration 
 and degree determines their worth." Pleasure is defined as a gentle 
 motion, " a tranquil activity of the being, like the gently heaving sea, 
 midway between violent motion which was pain and absolute calm 
 which was insensibility." It was not mere absence of pain, but 
 something positive. 
 
 The criterion of truth for each man is his feeling of the moment. 
 There is therefore no common criterion of good or truth. Although 
 we may use the same words the thing indicated will vary with each 
 man. This is like the teaching of the Sophist Protagoras. 
 
 Aristippus is said to have been much at the courts of the Dionysii 
 the elder and the younger, at Syracuse, and to have met Plato at 
 both. Arete, the daughter of Aristippus, was among his prominent 
 disciples, and her son, the younger Aristippus, was of great service to 
 the school by giving it systematic form. Modification of the doc- 
 trines came through the discovery of their incompatibility. For 
 what consistency is there in holding that the pleasure of the moment 
 is the highest good, and at the same time that the wise man controls 
 pleasure and is not controlled by it ? Too much scope is thus given 
 to external circumstances, too little to wisdom. Nearly a century 
 after Aristippus, therefore, Theodorus, the Atheist, substituted for 
 the passing pleasure, which he held to be indifferent,*" a calm and 
 
cheerful frame of mind." See I. XLIII. 102; V. XL. 117. Euhem- 
 erus, the Rationalist, taught that " belief in the existence of gods, 
 began with the veneration of distinguished men." Hegesias, con- 
 vinced that there is more pain than pleasure in life, held that the 
 highest good is to avoid trouble; "he despaired of positive happiness 
 and considered life to be intrinsically valueless," which comes near 
 to the conclusions of the Cynics. I. XXXIV. 83. 
 
 (d) PLATO. 
 
 PLATO. The Platonic Ethics are so related to his Theory of 
 Ideas that a brief statement of that theory is necessary. Aristotle 
 states that Plato's mind was influenced, first, by the Heraclitean 
 doctrine of the constant flux*br flow of things in the Universe and 
 the conclusion from this that there can be no absolute knowledge; 
 and second, by Socrates' perpetually searching for definition, and, in 
 his ethical inquiries, always seeking for universals. Plato accepted 
 the view that there must be conceptions that are ever invariable and 
 he reasoned that these could not belong to the objects of sense, be- 
 cause these are constantly changing, but to another kind of existence. 
 Thus he conceives "of universals as forms or ideas of real existences." 
 Any concrete object, for example, as a book, affords us a passing 
 sensation merely, but we may rise by abstraction to the contempla- 
 tion of the ideal of book which is a universal. [It was with reference 
 to this doctrine that Antisthenes remarked, "O Plato, I see horses, 
 but no horseness." Whereupon Plato replied that it was because 
 he had no eye for it.] "If we approach the Ideal from below, from 
 the concrete particulars, it takes the form of the class, the common 
 name, the definition, the concept, the Idea; but this is an incomplete 
 view of it. The Ideal exists apart from, and prior to, all concrete 
 embodiment. It is the eternal archetype of which the sensible 
 objects are the copies. It is because the soul in its pre-existent 
 state is already familiar with this archetype, that it is capable of 
 being reminded of it when it sees its shadow in the phenomenal 
 existences which make up the world of sense." The highest of all 
 the Ideas is the Idea of the Good which he identifies with God, the 
 first great Cause, the Supreme Intelligence. Further, he says, "The 
 soul is that which most partakes of the Divine." It is by virtue of 
 this that we are capable of knowledge. This participation in the 
 
i6 
 
 divine Idea is the connection between the divine and the human 
 reason and provides man with the primordial laws of thought and 
 reason. But these Ideas are regarded by Plato as the archetypes, 
 as " the eternal patterns to which the artificer of the world looks in 
 framing the world." Phenomenal objects participate in Ideas, and 
 thus in some sense picture the world of reason. Ideas are noumenal 
 entities corresponding to types or classes of phenomenal existencies. 
 The idea of the Beautiful, for example, Plato terms the Beautiful 
 per se, in distinction from beautiful objects, and says it is not simply 
 a conception, but exists as a substance of and by itself; and all 
 beautiful objects participate in it. 
 
 But all of Plato's philosophy has an ethical character and a prac- 
 tical purpose as might be expected of a disciple of Socrates. This is 
 seen in his conception of the Idea of the Good as the highest of all, 
 instead of the Idea of Being; but the former may be thought quite 
 as universal as the latter, since every truly existent object is neces- 
 sarily good. He views perfect Wisdom as identical with perfect 
 Goodness, which is God, and makes the highest good for man the 
 summum bonum the supreme end of life, consist in the greatest 
 possible likeness to God. And this likeness "is affected by that 
 yearning after the ideal which we know by the name of Love." God 
 is thus the absolutely good and the cause and end of all knowledge. 
 " The possession of the good is happiness. Happiness depends on 
 culture and justice or on the possession of moral beauty and good- 
 ness." In the Philebus Plato speaks of the Good as including 
 measure, beauty, and symmetry as well as "mind," "pleasure," and 
 " causality." 
 
 Virtue is the fitness of the soul for its proper duties. Justice is 
 the universal virtue, and " perfect virtue arises when wisdom, cour- 
 age and temperance, (the other three cardinal virtues), are bound 
 together by justice." In the Republic he states " that the best and 
 justest man is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most 
 royal master of himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is 
 also the most miserable and that "this is he who is the greatest tyrant 
 of himself and of his state." 
 
 It may be well to insert here a few words on the nature of the soul. 
 
 The soul is conceived by Plato to be threefold, the immortal, divine, 
 rational part having its seat in the head, is united to the mortal part 
 
consisting of two portions, the courageous, which is located in the 
 heart, and the appetitive (desire), whose location is in the lower part 
 of the trunk. 
 
 The indulgence of desires brings neither virtue nor happiness. 
 They must be restrained to secure such a result. Pleasure results 
 from the preservation of an inward harmony, pain from the lack of 
 harmony. 
 
 The following additional statements of Plato's views are from Dio- 
 genes Laertius : "There are three classes of goods, viz. those of the 
 mind, those of the body, and those that are wholly external. The 
 four cardinal principles may be named as of the first class, health and 
 strength of the second, friends and wealth of the third." "A per- 
 fectly happy man is one whose happiness consists of wisdom in 
 counsel, a good condition of the sensations and health of body, 
 good fortune, good reputation and riches." " There are evils cor- 
 responding to the goods and a third class which are neutral or in- 
 different." " On the subject of good and evil, these were his senti- 
 ments : that the end was to become like God; and that virtue was 
 sufficient of herself for happiness, but nevertheless required the 
 advantages of the body as instruments to work with; such as health, 
 strength, the integrity of the senses, and things of that kind; and 
 also external advantages, such as riches, and noble birth, and glory. 
 Still that the wise man would be not the less happy, even if desti- 
 tute of these auxiliary circumstances; for he would enjoy the consti- 
 tution of his country, and would marry, and would not transgress 
 the established laws, and that he would legislate for his country, as 
 well as he could under existing circumstances, unless he saw affairs 
 in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of the excessive 
 
 factiousness of the people And he was the first person 
 
 who defined the notion of the honorable, as that which borders on 
 the praiseworthy, and the logical, and the useful, and the becoming, 
 and the expedient, all which things are combined with that which is 
 suitable to, and in accordance with, nature." 
 
 (e) THE ACADEMIES. 
 
 These are distinguished as the Old, Middle, and New or Reformed 
 Academies, embracing five schools, viz: the Old, the first school; 
 the Middle, the second and third schools; and the New, the fourth 
 
i8 
 
 and fifth schools. This is the distinction made by the later writers. 
 Cicero recognized only the Old and the New Academy, the latter 
 corresponding to what is here termed the Middle Academy, but 
 including Philo. Antiochus himself claimed to be a true representa- 
 tive of the Old Academy. Zeller knows the school of Arcesilaus 
 and Carneades as the New Academy. And thus Cicero may be 
 classed, in so far as he accepts the doctrine of the Academy, as 
 belonging either to the Middle, or to the New Academy. 
 
 (i) The Old Academy. See X. 30, Note. 
 
 Speusippus, Plato's nephew, was his uncle's successor at the head 
 of the Academy. He was followed by Xenocrates, he by Polemo, 
 and he by Crates. Other names are Heraclides of Pontus, Hermo- 
 dorus and Grantor, to whose writings Cicero is indebted in his Con- 
 solatio and his Tusculan Disputations. Without treating of the 
 special characteristics of individual views, it may be stated that in 
 general the ethical theory of the Old Academy does not depart 
 widely from that of Plato. While virtue is held to be the highest 
 good it requires the addition of external goods to make life agree- 
 able, that is, to produce a happy life. "Follow nature" was a pre- 
 cept of Xenocrates, Speusippus and Polemo, was the practice of the 
 Cynics, and was adopted as a Stoic maxim but was not uniformly 
 interpreted. 
 
 (2) The Middle Academy. 
 
 This was sceptical and is discussed by Zeller under the head of 
 the Sceptics. The leading minds were Arcesilaus and Carneades, 
 founders respectively of the second and third Academic schools. In 
 respect to cognition they held that knowledge is not attainable and 
 that probability is the utmost advance that can be made in the 
 direction of knowledge. They professed to follow the example of 
 Socrates, but complained that he approached too near to dogmatism 
 when he said that he knew that he knew nothing. Carneades held 
 that probability is of several degrees. "The lowest degree of 
 probability arises when a notion produces by itself an impression 
 of truth, without being taken in connection with other notions. The 
 next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by the 
 agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and 
 
19 
 
 highest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results 
 in producing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a 
 notion is called probable; in the second probable and undisputed; 
 in the third, probable, undisputed and tested." His ethical views 
 were tinctured by his scepticism. To understand his position one 
 should first note carefully the Stoic views which he combats. He 
 could not " allow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions 
 respecting the nature and aim of moral action; and in this point he 
 attacked the Stoics with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency 
 in calling the choice of what is natural the highest business of 
 morality, and yet not allowing to that which is according to nature 
 a place among goods, was so trenchantly exposed by him that Anti- 
 pater is said to have been brought to admit that not the objects to 
 which choice is directed, but the actual choice itself is a good." 
 
 "The real meaning of Carneades can only be that virtue consists 
 in an activity directed towards the possession of what is according 
 to nature, and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be separated 
 from accordance with nature. For the same reason, virtue supplies 
 all that is requisite for happiness." 
 
 (3) The New Academy. 
 
 This was an eclectic school and notes a return to dogmatism. 
 Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, his pupil, to both of 
 whom Cicero had listened, were the founders respectively of the 
 fourth and fifth schools. Both revert to Plato and hold that truth 
 is attainable. Antiochus endeavored to show that the principal 
 doctrines of the Stoics are to be found in Plato and that there is 
 essential agreement between these and Aristotle as well. 
 
 Ethics. " Starting with the Stoic prima naturae, but enlarging 
 their scope so as to take in not only all that belongs to self-preserva- 
 tion, but the rudiments of virtue and knowledge also, and defining 
 the Summum Bonum as a life in accordance with the perfect nature 
 of man, Antiochus includes under this, not only the perfection of 
 reason, but all bodily and external good. Virtue in itself suffices for 
 happiness, as the Stoics said, but not for the highest happiness; here 
 we must borrow a little from the Peripatetics; though they err in 
 allowing too much weight to external goods, as the Stoics err in the 
 opposite direction." 
 
2O 
 (f) ARISTOTLE. SEE X. 30, NOTE. 
 
 Our purpose requires only a brief settlement of Aristotle's ethical 
 views. He rejects Plato's idea of the absolute Good the cause of 
 all existence and all knowledge and says, "If there is any one good, 
 universal and generic, or transcendental and absolute, it obviously 
 never can be realized nor possessed by man ; whereas something of 
 this latter kind is what we are inquiring after." What he seeks to 
 know is what is good for man. Now the chief good is identical with 
 " the final and perfect end of all action." The peculiar work or end 
 of man is rational activity, because man is a rational creature, and 
 such activity is in harmony with his nature. 
 
 Virtue is not exactly knowledge or science as Socrates taught, it 
 is rather an art and is to be attained by exercise. So man attains 
 good not through knowledge, but through exercise and habit. Aris- 
 totle means by habit a fixed and definite power or tendency of the 
 soul, a natural instinct, not simply a mode of action. Men realize 
 the good through nature, reason and habit ; for we must practice 
 moral acts in order to be virtuous as the musician practices music in 
 order to become skilled. 
 
 The end of the activity of man, which is his highest good, the 
 realization of the soul's peculiar excellence, is happiness, which 
 depends on the continuous virtuous and rational activity of the soul. 
 "Happiness is a perfect practical activity in a perfect life." But 
 complete happiness cannot result from virtue alone ; it requires be- 
 sides the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, as health, 
 strength, etc., external goods, as wealth, friends, etc.; and pleasures 
 as well. Vice, however, is sufficient to cause unhappiness even if 
 bodily and external goods are present in the highest degree. 
 
 Pleasure is the blossom and natural culmination of activity. To 
 determine the moral quality of pleasure the perfect man must be 
 the standard. That is true pleasure which is pleasure to him. All 
 virtues are either intellectual, resulting chiefly from instruction, or 
 ethical resulting from habit. The former refers to the reason rightly 
 developing its own activities, and consists of reason, science, art and 
 practical intelligence. The ethical virtues refer to the subjection 
 of the lower functions to reason, and are courage, temperance, 
 liberality and magnificence, high-mindedness and love of honor, 
 
21 
 
 mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship and justice. " Jus- 
 tice is the most perfect virtue because it is the perfect exercise of 
 all virtue." The function of the reason in connection with the 
 desires is to determine the mean, i. <?., the right proportion. For 
 example, courage is a mean between fearing and daring, temperance 
 between pleasures and pains, etc. 
 
 We may now give Aristotle's definition of virtue: "Virtue is habit 
 characterized by deliberate choice, in the mean relative to ourselves, 
 which is fixed or determined by reason and as the prudent man 
 would determine it." He defines " deliberative choice" as " calcu- 
 lating choice exercised in regard to things contingent and within 
 our power to do;" and prudence involved in the expression "the 
 prudent man," as "moral irfsight and tendency to right action that 
 are begotten of experience in acting justly, temperately," etc. 
 
 (g) THE PERIPATETICS. 
 
 Some of the most eminent followers of Aristotle were Theophras- 
 tus of Lesbus, Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus the Musician, and 
 Dicotarchus. We may name also as later Peripatetics Aristo, Hiero- 
 nymus, Critolaus, Diodorus, Callipho. See notes ix. 24 and 25. 
 Theophrastus was, for the most part, faithful to the teachings of his 
 master, giving his theories, however, a naturalistic interpretation. 
 In ethics he taught that external goods are essential to perfect 
 happiness and to the cultivation of virtue. The Stoics often re- 
 proached him with approving the poetic maxim, vitam regit fortuna 
 non sapientia; See ix. 25; but he probably applied this only to 
 man's external life. He thought that virtue is worthy to be sought 
 on its own account, and that in its absence external goods are 
 valueless; also that one is permitted and even required to deviate 
 slightly from the rules of morals, when such deviation results in 
 securing a great good to a friend or warding off from him a great 
 evil. For the views Aristoxenus see i. x. 20 ; of Dic&archus I. x. 21 ; 
 xxxi. 77. 
 
 (h) THE STOICS. See XII. 34. 
 
 The founder of the school was Zeno of Citium. He was succeeded 
 by Cleanthes and he by Chrysippus, who is regarded as the second 
 founder of the school. Other Stoics were Aristo of Chios, Diogenes 
 the Babylonian, Antipater of Tarsus, Panaetius of Rhodes, who was 
 
22 
 
 .the principal teacher of the doctrines at Rome, Posidonius of Rhodes, 
 a teacher of Cicero, Seneca the younger, and the Emperor Marcus 
 Aurelius. The Stoics introduced little if anything that was new 
 into philosophy, their Logic being a modification of that of Aristotle, 
 their Physics Heraclitean and their Ethics the Cynic Ethics 
 elevated. They regarded themselves as followers of Socrates. 
 
 In presenting the chief ethical views of the school it will be best 
 to quote from Zeller even at the expense of space. " The enquiry 
 into the destiny and end of man turns with the Stoics, as it did with 
 all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about the funda- 
 mental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary to 
 make up the highest good or happiness. Happiness, they consider, 
 can only be sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking more 
 explicitly, the primary impulse of every being is towards self-pres- 
 ervation and self-gratification. It follows that every being pursues 
 those things which are most suited to its nature, and that such 
 things only have for it a value. Hence the highest good the end- 
 in-chief, or happiness can only be found in what is conformable to 
 nature. Nothing can be conformable to nature for any individual 
 thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of the universe, or with 
 the universal reason of the world ; nor, in the case of a conscious 
 and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a recognition of this 
 general law in short, from rational intelligence. In every enquiry 
 into what is conformable to nature, all turns upon agreement with 
 the essential constitution of the being, and this essential constitution 
 consists, in the case of a man, simply in reason.". . . . 
 
 " In every case the meaning is that the life of the individual approxi- 
 mates to or falls short of the goal of happiness, exactly in proportion as 
 it approaches to or departs from the universal law of the world and 
 the particular rational nature of man. In a word, a rational life, an 
 agreement with the general course of the world, constitutes virtue. 
 The principle of the Stoic morality might therefore be briefly ex- 
 pressed in the sentence: Only virtue is good, and happiness consists 
 
 exclusively in virtue." "A view of life is here presented to us in 
 
 which happiness coincides with virtue, the good and the useful with 
 duty and reason. There is neither any good independently of 
 virtue, nor is there in virtue and for virtue any evil. 
 
 The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction 
 
23 
 
 sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, 
 between various kinds and degrees of good ; nor would they allow 
 bodily advantages and external circumstances to be included among 
 good things, together with mental and moral qualities. A certain 
 difference between goods they did not indeed deny, and various 
 kinds are mentioned by them in their formal division of goods. But 
 these differences amount, in the end, to no more than this, that 
 whilst some goods are good and useful in themselves, others are 
 only subsidiary to them. The existence of several equally primary 
 goods appears to the Stoics to be at variance with the conception of 
 the good. That only is a good, according to their view, which has 
 an unconditional value. That which has a value only in comparison 
 with something else, or as leading to something else, does not de- 
 serve to be called a good. The difference between what is good 
 and what is not good is not only a difference of degree, but also one 
 of kind ; and what is not a goodfler se can never be a good under 
 any circumstances. The same remarks apply to evil. That which 
 is not in itself an evil can never become so from its relation to 
 something else. Hence only that which is absolutely good, or 
 virtue, can be considered a good ; and only that which is absolutely 
 bad, or vice, can be considered an evil. All other things, however 
 great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of things 
 neither good nor evil, but indifferent. Neither health, nor riches, 
 nor honor, nor even life itself, is a good ; and just as little are the 
 opposite states poverty, sickness, disgrace and death evils. Both 
 are in themselves indifferent, a material which may either be em- 
 ployed for good or else for evil. 
 
 The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked 
 by the Stoics for including among goods external things which are 
 dependent on chance. For how can that be a good under any 
 circumstances, which bears no relation to man's moral nature, and 
 is even frequently obtained at the cost of morality ? If virtue ren- 
 ders a man happy, it must render him perfectly happy in himself, 
 since no one can be happy who is not happy altogether. Were any- 
 thing which is not in man's power allowed to influence his happi- 
 ness, it would detract from the absolute worth of virtue, and man 
 would never be able to attain to that imperturbable serenity of 
 mind without which no happiness is conceivable. 
 
24 
 
 Least of all can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as 
 it was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He 
 who places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue ; he who 
 considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good 
 and the peculiar value of virtue ; he appeals to feelings, rather than 
 to actions ; he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is 
 unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoy- 
 ments of the lower animals. Pleasure must never be the object of 
 pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably in- 
 volved in virtue. That it no doubt is.". ..." The only point on which 
 the Stoics are not unanimous is whether every pleasure is contrary 
 to nature, as the stern Cleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, 
 or whether there is such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. 
 Virtue, on the other hand, needs no extraneous additions, but con- 
 tains in itself all the conditions of happiness." " And so uncondi- 
 tional is this self- sufficiency of virtue, that the happiness which it 
 affords is not increased by length of time. Rational self-control is 
 here recognized as the only good; thereby man makes himself 
 independent of all external circumstances, absolutely free, and in- 
 wardly satisfied. 
 
 The happiness of the virtuous man and this is a very marked 
 feature in Stoicism is thus more negative than positive. It consists 
 in independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment 
 which moral conduct brings with it." 
 
 The cardinal virtues are four in number, viz.: practical wisdom, 
 courage, temperance and justice, and represent the principal aspects 
 of the one honestum or decorum. Man must overcome his emotions 
 or passions {perturbationes) in order to be virtuous. " The Peripa- 
 tetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with nature, 
 was flatly denied by the Stoics." Emotions are impulses that over- 
 step natural limits, "disturbances of mental health." Hence a 
 Stoic demands their entire suppression, and only then can virtue 
 exist. The principal emotions are pleasure and pain, hope and 
 fear. The first two are false beliefs of present good or evil, the last 
 false beliefs of future good or evil. 
 
 " The teaching of Plato and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be 
 regulated, but not uprooted, was attacked in the most vigorous 
 manner by these philosophers. A moderate evil, they say, always 
 
25 
 
 remains an evil. What is faulty and opposed to reason, ought never 
 to be tolerated not even in the smallest degree." The wise man 
 must have no emotion. "Pain he may feel, but, not regarding it 
 as an evil, he will suffer no affliction, and know no fear. He may 
 be slandered and ill-treated, but he cannot be injured or degraded. 
 Being untouched by honor and dishonor he has no vanity. To 
 anger he never yields, nor needs this irrational impulse, not even 
 for valor and the championship of right. But he also feels no pity, 
 and exercises no indulgence." 
 
 "Virtue contains in itself two elements one practical the other 
 speculative. At the root, and as a condition of all rational conduct, 
 lies, according to the Stoics, jight knowledge. On this point they 
 are at one with the well-known Socratic doctrine, and with the 
 teachings of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural virtue, or virtue 
 acquired only by exercise they reject altogether. After the manner 
 of Socrates, they define virtue as knowledge, vice as ignorance, and 
 insist on the necessity of learning virtue. Even the avowed enemy 
 of all speculative inquiry, Aristo of Chios, was on this point at one 
 with the rest of the school. 
 
 However closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is 
 based on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, 
 they are not content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge 
 above practical activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we 
 have seen already, knowledge with them was only a means towards 
 rational conduct." 
 
 " From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one 
 thoroughgoing moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction 
 between the virtuous and the vicious ; and that within each of 
 these classes there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses 
 virtue possesses it whole and entire ; he who lacks it lacks it alto- 
 gether ; and whether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter 
 
 of no moment." " The whole of mankind are thus divided by the 
 
 Stoics into two classes those who are wise and those who are fool- 
 ish ; and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclu- 
 sive, each one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, 
 among the foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible. The wise 
 man is absolutely free from faults and mistakes : all that he does is 
 right ; in him all virtues center ; he has a right opinion on every 
 
26 
 
 subject and never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely an 
 opinion. The bad man, on the contrary, can do nothing aright ; he 
 has every kind of vice ; he has no right knowledge, and is altogether 
 rude, violent, cruel and ungrateful.". . . ."The wise man only is free, 
 because he only uses his will to control himself ; he only is beauti- 
 ful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive ; he only is rich 
 and happy, because goods of the soul are the most valuable, true 
 riches consisting in being independent of wants. Nay more, he is 
 absolutely rich, since he who has a right view of everything has 
 everything in his intellectual treasury, and he who makes the right 
 use of everything bears to everything the relation of owner. The 
 wise only know how to obey, and they also only know how to gov- 
 ern ; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots ; they only are 
 orators, poets and prophets ; and since their view of the Gods and 
 their worship of the Gods is the true one, only amongst them can 
 true piety be found they are the only priests and friends of heaven ; 
 all foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane and enemies 
 of the Gods. Only the wise man is capable of feeling gratitude, 
 love and friendship, he only is capable of receiving a benefit, noth- 
 ing being of use or advantage to the foolish man. To sum up, the 
 wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from passion and 
 want, absolutely happy ; as the Stoics conclusively assert, he in no 
 way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, since time, the only point 
 in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment happiness at all. 
 On the other hand, the foolish man is altogether foolish, unhappy 
 and perverse ; or, in the expressive language of the Stoics, every 
 foolish man is a madman, he being a madman who has no 
 knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely affects him," 
 
 While the Stoics did not agree with Aristotle that anything is to 
 be added to virtue to constitute happiness or the highest good, they 
 did make a distinction respecting goods. All things are good, bad 
 or indifferent. The bad are the opposite of the virtues, as folly, 
 intemperance, cowardice, injustice ; all others are indifferent. 
 Among these last some are to be preferred as having comparative 
 value, and were termed producta or praeposita, viz., such as the 
 primary objects of our natural instincts (prima naturae), as health, 
 position, wealth ; their opposites being reiecta. A similar distinc- 
 
27 
 
 tion is made between actions. As life belongs to the class of things 
 indifferent suicide is permissible as a means of terminating it. 
 
 " Thus the Stoics worked out on ideal and absolute lines the 
 thought of righteousness as the chief and only good. Across this 
 ideal picture were continually being drawn by opponents without or 
 inquirers within clouds of difficulty drawn from real experience. 
 'What,' it was asked, ' of progress in goodness? Is this a middle 
 state between good and evil ; or if a middle state between good and 
 evil be a contradiction in terms, how may we characterize it ?' Here 
 the wiser teachers had to be content to answer that it tended 
 towards good, was good in possibility, would be absolutely good 
 when the full attainment cam.e, and the straining after right had 
 been swallowed up in the perfect calm of settled virtue. 
 
 4 How also of the wise man tormented by pain, or in hunger and 
 poverty and rags, is his perfectness of wisdom and goodness really 
 sufficient to make him happy ?' Here, again, the answer had to be 
 hesitating and provisional, through no fault of the Stoics. In this 
 world, while we are still under the strange dominion of time and 
 circumstance, the ideal can never wholly fit the real. There must 
 still be difficulty and incompleteness here, only to be solved and 
 perfected 'when iniquity shall have an end.' Our eyes may fail 
 with looking upward yet the upward look is well; and the jibes upon 
 the Stoic * king in rags' that Horace and others were so fond of, do 
 not affect the question. It may have been, and probably often was, 
 the case that Stoic teachers were apt to transfer to themselves per- 
 sonally the ideal attributes which they justly assigned to the ideal 
 man in whom wisdom was perfected. The doctrine gave much 
 scope for cant and mental pride and hypocrisy, as every ideal doc- 
 trine does, including the Christian." Marshall. 
 
 " The doctrine, of course, like every doctrine worth anything, was 
 pushed to extravagant lengths, and thrust into inappropriate quar- 
 ters, by foolish doctrinaires. As that the wise man is the only 
 orator, critic, poet, physician, nay, cobbler if you please ; that the 
 wise man knows all that is to be known, and can do everything that 
 is worth doing, and so on. The school was often too academic, too 
 abstract, too fond of hearing itself talk. This, alas ! is what most 
 schools are, and most schoolmasters." Id. 
 
28 
 
 (i) THE EPICUREANS. SEE IX. 26, NOTE. 
 
 EPICURUS who gave his name to the school of his founding came 
 from Samos to Athens at an early age, and his school dates from 
 about the year 306 B. C. He freely criticised other philosophers, 
 among them Aristotle, and even Democritus, many of whose views 
 he borrowed. He was greatly beloved by his disciples, and his 
 word was law to them. The Epicurean school continued to the 
 fourth century after Christ, outliving most other systems. Among 
 his scholars may be named Metrodorus and Hermarchus who suc- 
 ceeded Epicurus as the head of the school. Other Epicureans were 
 Apollodorus, Zeno of Sidon, Phaedrus contemporary with Cicero, and 
 Philodemus; and at Rome, Lucretius, Cassias the conspirator, Atticus 
 and others. While Epicurus, in the main, accepts the teaching of 
 Democritus in Physics, in his Ethics, which is the feature of greatest 
 importance for him, he follows Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, as 
 Zeno followed Antisthenes. He turns away therefore from Plato 
 and Aristotle and goes back to Socrates and the Socratic school. 
 
 Ethics. "The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus is 
 pleasure ; the only unconditional evil is pain. No proof of this 
 proposition seemed to him to be necessary ; it rests on a conviction 
 supplied by nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our 
 doing and not doing. If proof, however, were required, he appealed 
 to the fact that all living beings from the first moment of their 
 existence pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and that consequently 
 pleasure is a natural good, and the normal condition of every being. 
 Hence follows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with 
 all the philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the 
 object of life. 
 
 At the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean 
 system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure 
 nor pain is a simple thing. There are many varieties and degrees 
 of pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has 
 to be secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in 
 which pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at 
 the cost of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the 
 various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully weighed, and in con- 
 sideration of the advantages and disadvantages which they confer, 
 
29 
 
 would under circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, 
 and the evil as a good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it 
 would entail a greater corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if 
 it holds out the prospect of greater pleasure. He also agrees with 
 Plato in holding that every positive pleasure presupposes a want, 
 /. e., a pain which it proposes to remove ; and hence he concludes 
 that the real aim and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining 
 freedom from pain, and that the good is nothing else but emancipa- 
 tion from evil. By a Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom 
 from pain, but a gentle motion of the soul or positive pleasure was 
 proposed as the object of life ; and hence happiness was not made 
 to depend on man's general state of mind, but on the sum total of 
 his actual enjoyments. Buf Epicurus, advancing beyond this posi- 
 tion, recognized both the positive and the negative side of pleasures, 
 both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion. Both aspects of 
 pleasure, however, do not stand on the same footing in his system. 
 On the contrary, the essential and immediate cause of happiness is 
 repose of mind. Positive pleasure is only an indirect cause of 
 repose of mind in that it removes the pain of unsatisfied craving. 
 This mental repose, however, depends essentially on the character 
 of a man's mind, just as conversely positive pleasure in systems so 
 materialistic must depend on sensuous attractions. It was consist- 
 ent, therefore, on the part of Aristippus to consider bodily gratifi- 
 cation the highest pleasure ; and conversely Epicurus was no less 
 consistent in subordinating it to gratification of mind. 
 
 In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we 
 do not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor indeed sensual enjoy- 
 ments at all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and the free- 
 dom of the soul from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, 
 neither the lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the 
 joys of the table, make life happy, but a sober judgment, investigat- 
 ing the motives for action and for inaction, and dispelling those 
 greatest enemies of our peace, prejudices. The root from which it 
 springs, and, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. It is in- 
 telligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without 
 being ever too early or too late. Our indispensable wants are sim- 
 ple, little being necessary to insure freedom from pain ; other things 
 only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not in- 
 
30 
 
 creased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. The little we need 
 may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our 
 happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting 
 what she gives in thinking what we desire. He who lives according 
 to nature is never poor ; the wise man living on bread and water 
 has no reason to envy Zeus ; chance has little hold on him ; with 
 him judgment is everything, and if that be right, he need trouble 
 himself but little about external mishaps. Not even bodily pain 
 appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud the wise 
 man's happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic's 
 insensibility to pain, still he is of opinion that the wise man may be 
 happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent, ex- 
 claiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! [Cf. xxvi. 73]. A 
 touch of forced sentiment may be discerned in the last expression, 
 and a trace of self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the 
 beautiful language of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. 
 Nevertheless, the principle involved is based in the spirit of the 
 Epicurean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the 
 founder. The main thing according to Epicurus, is not the state of 
 the body, but the state of the mind ; bodily pleasure being of short 
 duration, and having much about it to unsettle ; mental enjoyments 
 only being pure and incorruptible. For the same reasons mental 
 sufferings are more severe than those of the body, since the body 
 only suffers from present ills, whilst the soul feels those past and 
 those to come. In a life of limited duration the pleasures of the 
 flesh never attain their consummation. Mind only, by consoling us 
 for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life 
 complete in itself, and not standing in need of unlimited duration. 
 
 At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their princi- 
 ples, could not deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and 
 likewise the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus 
 nor his favorile pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this admis- 
 sion ; Epicurus declaring that he could form no conception of the 
 good apart from enjoyments of the senses ; Metrodorus asserting 
 that everything good has reference to the belly. For all that the 
 Epicureans did not feel themselves driven to give up the pre-emi- 
 nence which they claimed for goods of the soul over those of the 
 body." Zeller. 
 
3 1 
 
 Virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness 
 from virtue. Virtue should not be sought for its own sake. 
 
 " Virtue has only a conditional value as a means to happiness; 
 or, as it is otherwise expressed, virtue taken by itself does not render 
 a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exercise of virtue. 
 This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in the conscious- 
 ness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the freedom from 
 disquiet, fear and dangers, which follows as a consequence from 
 virtue. 
 
 Wisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating 
 us from the fear of the Gods and of death, by making us independ- 
 ent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear 
 pain as something subordinate and passing, and by pointing the 
 way to a more cheerful and natural life. Self-control aids in that 
 it points out the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and pain, 
 so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment and the minimum of 
 suffering ; valor in that it enables us to overcome fear and pain ; 
 justice in that it makes life possible without the fear of Gods and 
 men, which ever haunts the transgressor. To the Epicurean virtue 
 is never an end in itself, but only a means to an end lying beyond 
 a happy life but withal a means so certain and necessary that 
 virtue can neither be conceived without happiness nor happiness 
 without virtue. However unnecessary it may seem, still Epicurus 
 would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not ac- 
 cording to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not 
 simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in 
 what is good. 
 
 The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his 
 wise man as the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only 
 does he attribute to him a control over pain, in nothing inferior to 
 the Stoic insensibility of feeling, but he endeavors himself to de- 
 scribe the wise man's life as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. 
 Albeit not free from emotions, and in particular susceptible to the 
 higher feelings of the soul such as compassion, the wise man finds 
 his philosophic activity in no wise thereby impaired. Without de- 
 spising enjoyment, he is altogether master of his desires, and knows 
 how to restrain them by intelligence, so that they never exercise a 
 harmful influence on life. 
 
3* 
 
 He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction ; he alone 
 knows how to do the right thing in the right way ; he alone, as 
 Metrodorus observes, knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is 
 so far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his 
 pupils that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as 
 Gods among men ; so little can destiny influence him, that he calls 
 him happy under all circumstances. Happiness may, indeed, de- 
 pend on certain external conditions ; it may even be allowed that 
 the disposition to happiness is not found in every nature nor in 
 every person ; but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor can 
 time affect its duration." Id. 
 
 The wise man may resort to suicide if necessary, but such cases 
 of necessity are of very rare occurrence. Epicurus did not favor the 
 Stoic view of suicide. He laid great stress on friendship, which, 
 however, was based on motives of utility. He even calls it the 
 highest of earthly goods. " The Epicurean friendship is hardly less 
 celebrated than the Pythagorean." 
 
 " In spite of much that may offend in the doctrines of Epicurus 
 there is much at least in the man which is sympathetic and attrac- 
 tive. What one observes, however, when we compare such a phil- 
 osophy with that of Plato or Aristotle, is first a total loss of con- 
 structive imagination. The parts of the ' philosophy,' if we are so 
 to call it, of Epicurus hang badly together, and neither the Canonics 
 nor the Physics show any real faculty of serious thinking at all. The 
 Ethics has a wider scope and a more real relation to experience if 
 not to reason. But it can never satisfy the deeper apprehension of 
 mankind." Marshall. 
 
 (j) RELATIONS OF EPICUREANISM TO STOICISM. 
 
 "The arena of the warmest dispute between the two schools is ethics. 
 Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than appears 
 at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than that 
 between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of 
 virtue ; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically oppo- 
 site. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same 
 end the happiness of mankind but the conditions of happiness 
 are also laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno 
 virtue, according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good ; 
 
33 
 
 but the former in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal 
 from the senses or insensibility ; the latter in seeking pleasure in 
 repose of mind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. 
 Man can only find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when 
 by means of knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest 
 with itself, and also to an independence of external attractions and 
 misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the 
 common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this 
 idea under the same form that of the ideal wise man for the most 
 part with the same features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we 
 have seen, superior to pain and want ; he enjoys an excellence 
 which cannot be lost ; and he Jives among men a very God in intel- 
 ligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into details, the 
 difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and 
 the Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate 
 happiness from virtue, nor the Epicureans separate virtue from 
 happiness." 
 
 " The point of difference between the two schools is their view of 
 the conditions under which certainty of consciousness is attained. 
 The Stoics have to attain it by the entire subordination of the indi- 
 vidual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are 
 of opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is 
 restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of 
 happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence 
 on others and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make 
 virtue, the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest 
 good. By the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived 
 as of a purely negative character, as being freedom from pain, and 
 is referred to the whole of human life. Hence it is always made to 
 depend on the moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, 
 and the state of the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable 
 with intelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the 
 Epicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the 
 Stoics the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those 
 who are altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect 
 inward harmony." Zeller. 
 
34 
 
 (k) THE ECLECTICS. 
 
 " When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable ele- 
 ments in all the great systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical 
 convictions could not but lead either to the construction of new 
 
 systems or to Eclecticism Eclecticism would naturally find 
 
 acceptance with those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as 
 such, but rather a general theoretical preparation for practical life 
 and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, and for 
 whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosoph- 
 ical thought were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the phil- 
 osophy of the Romans was almost universally eclectic, even in the 
 case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of the Hel- 
 lenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero." 
 
 " M. Tullius Cicero (Jan. 3d, 106 Dec. ;th, 43 B. C.,) pursued 
 his philosophical studies especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his 
 youth he heard first, Phaedrus the Epicurean and Philo the Aca- 
 demic, and was also instructed by Diodotus, the Stoic (who was 
 afterwards, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house. Tusc. V. 39). 
 He afterward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the 
 Epicurean, and lastly (at Rhodes) Posidonius the Stoic. In his 
 latter years Cicero turned his attention again to philosophy, espe- 
 cially during the last three years of his life. Tusc. V. 2 
 
 Cicero defines the morally good (honestum) as that which is intrinsi- 
 cally praiseworthy, in accordance with the etymology of the word, 
 which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek x/6v. The most 
 important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue 
 is alone sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer 
 this question, with the Stoics in the affirmative, though the recollec- 
 tion of his own weakness and of the general frailty of mankind often 
 fills him with doubts ; but then he reproaches himself for judging 
 of the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy. 
 Cicero is not altogether disinclined to the distinction made by 
 Antiochus of Askalon between the vita beata^ which is made sure 
 under all circumstances by virtue, and the vita beatissima, to which 
 external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and 
 logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (Tusc. V. 13) rejects 
 it ; but he contents himself with the thought that all which is not 
 
35 
 
 virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good or not, is at all 
 events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing conse- 
 quence in comparison with it. From this point of view the differ- 
 ence between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, 
 to a mere difference of words, which Carneades had already declared 
 it to be. Cicero is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, 
 that virtue requires the reduction of the TtdOy (translated by Cicero 
 perturbationes] to their right proportions ; he demands with the 
 Stoics, that the sage should be without nddy." Ueb, 
 
 In defining Cicero's ethical views we may quote further from 
 Zeller. "The happiness of the virtuous man and this is a very 
 marked feature in Stoicism is thus more negative than positive. 
 It consists in independence and peace of mind rather than in the 
 enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it. In mental disquie- 
 tude says Cicero, speaking as a Stoic consists misery ; in com- 
 posure, happiness. How can he be deficient in happiness, he in- 
 quires, whom courage preserves from care and fear, and self-control 
 guards from passionate pleasure and desire ? How can he fail to be 
 absolutely happy who is in no way dependent on fortune, but sim- 
 ply and solely on himself?" 
 
NOTES. 
 
 1. i. Quintus hie dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum 
 disputationum : See INTRODUCTION, I. Brute. M. Junius Brutus, 
 one of the assassins of Julius Caesar. Quintilian says that Brutus 
 was more distinguished as a philosopher than as an orator. And 
 Cicero tells us in De Finibus, that Brutus had sent him (t. e., dedi- 
 cated to him) a treatise De Virtute. See ex eo libra, below. Like 
 Cicero he was an eclectic, but was a disciple of the Old Academy 
 save in ethics, in which he-agreed, for the most part, with the Stoics. 
 Cf. VHI. 21, putat, and note. 
 
 Quern ad me accuratissime scripsisti,=^m accuratissime 
 scriptum ad me misisti. Exact meaning of accuratissime ? ex multis 
 sermonibus tuis, from many of your conversations, tormenta, 
 strokes, blows, quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur : Cf. 
 VII. 19. Cave emm putes ullam a philosophia vocem emissam clariorem 
 ullumve esse philosophies promissum uberius aut mams. 
 
 2. ea causa ut conlocarent : the ut clause is in apposition 
 
 with ea causa and more fully defines the motive. It is a purpose 
 clause, qui primi : As a matter of fact Socrates was the first to 
 apply philosophy to life, virtus, that is, the conception or idea of 
 
 virtue, subiecta sub casus : Cf. X. 29, neque ulla alia huic 
 
 verbo subiecta notio, where dat. follows the participle. 
 
 Sin autem videantur, (freely), if virtue does not rise superior 
 
 to fortune and is incapable of always maintaining itself, I fear that we 
 shall lose confidence in the power of virtue to conduct us to happiness, and 
 resort to prayer for that condition. 
 
 Videantur belongs, of course, to the tarn clause (videatur) as 
 well as to the quam clause. Cf. 4. ilia. . . .omnia. . . t subter se habet^ 
 etc. 
 
 Abbreviations: Grammars, A. Allen & Greenough; H. Harkness; R. Roby; 
 Z. Zumpt. 
 
 T. Tischer (Sorof); D. Doederlein, Latin Synonymes; Ueb. Ueberweg; Zr. 
 Zeller. 
 
 Cf. compare; s. v. sub verbo; sc. or scil. scilicet, namely. 
 
3. huic sententiae : as above, praesidii ad beate vivendum 
 
 in virtute satis est. extimescere : note the meaning of the word. 
 Cf. with vereor. See D. Congruentis, sharing in, sympathizing with. 
 implicatos, involved in, affected by. 
 
 4. Castigo, / correct, existimo=*W/V<?. avunculus tuus: 
 Cato Uticensis, the Stoic and the suicide. Brutus' mother, Servilia, 
 was the half sister, and his wife Porcia, the daughter of Cato. de- 
 spiciens, contemnit : Despicimus infra nos posita, ut vulgi opinio- 
 nes ; contemnimus, magna, metuenda, ut pericula, mortem. Lamb. 
 Despicere, not to value; contemnere, not to fear. D. 
 
 venientia metu maerore praesentia: Figure ? A. 344 /, 
 
 (2); H. 562. 
 
 II. 5. Culpae vitiorum peccatorumque : culpa, guilt as 
 
 the state of a responsible agent, however light the offense; vitium, 
 either a censurable action or quality or a natural defect; peccatum, 
 strictly an indiscreet transgression of the laws of nature and reason, 
 but often having a broader meaning. We may render, fault, offenses, 
 transgressions, his gravissimis casibus : Cicero, a sincere pat- 
 riot, was tossed about in the conflict of the selfish, ambitious pas- 
 sions of his time, in the civil war, and was practically forced out of 
 public life. The death of his daughter intensified his sorrow, in 
 eundem portum : Cicero listened to philosophical lectures by 
 Phaedrus, the Epicurean, and by Philo, of the New Academy, as 
 early as 89 B. C. when only 17 years of age. In 79 B. C. he studied 
 philosophy at Athens. Diodotus, the Stoic, resided many years in 
 Cicero's house. Cf. XXXIX. 113. sine te : A. 310. a; H. 507. 3. 
 Note 7. tu dissipates homines, etc. The steps from barbarism 
 to civilization are noted. The social instinct, under the guidance of 
 philosophy and science (which were identical), leads to the con- 
 struction of dwelling places (domiciliis), to regard for the marriage 
 relation (coniugiis), to written language and oratory (litter arum et 
 vocurn], to civil (leguni) and moral (morum) laws, and to training 
 (disciplinae). peccanti immortalitati, an eternity of transgression. 
 Seneca says that one day of learning is worth the longest life of 
 ignorance, largita. . . .CS : Cf. dare. See Lex. s. v. 
 
 6. tantum abest ut ut: A. 332. d; H. 502. 3. proinde 
 
 ac merita, as much as it has deserved, parricidio : because of 
 
39 
 
 parentcm (parent, source of existence), before, percipere, sc. earn 
 =philosophiam ; to appreciate. 
 
 III. 7. Quam rem, /. e. philosophiam. Cicero is speaking of 
 the invention of the term <pdo00(pia (p/rilosophia) to denote sapientia, 
 the original Latin term, initiorum, first principles, hoc pulcher- 
 rimum nomen : sapere means to taste, then to have good taste, dis- 
 cernment, that is to be wise; whence sapientia. adsequebatur, ac- 
 quired, illos septem : Bias, Chilo, Cleobulus, Pittacus, Periander, 
 Solon, Thales. Excepting Thales these men were deemed wise 
 statesmen rather than philosophers. Saeculis, generations. Ly- 
 curgum : the Spartan legislator ; flourished about 825 B. C. He 
 is said to have met Homer in Chios, or at least to have met with 
 the Homeric poems which he introduced into Sparta. Homerus 
 probably antedated Lycurgus. habitos CSSC, were regarded. 
 
 8. Atlas: son of Titan lapetus, and brother of Prometheus, 
 condemned to bear the heavens on head and hands. Prometheus: 
 chained by Jove to Mt. Caucasus as a punishment. Cepheus : 
 king of Ethiopia, together with his wife Cassiopeia, and daughter 
 Andromeda, and her husband Perseus, were placed among the stars 
 (stellatus ; See Lex.). Read the story in the Mythology or Clas. 
 Diet. The student should read Ovid's version and Kingsley's 
 
 Andromeda, caelestium, heavenly bodies, divina COgnitio 
 
 traduxisset : i. e. their wisdom (sapientia] has been symbolically 
 expressed by the ancients in the myth of their transformation, in 
 rerum contemplatione studia ponebant : were devoting them- 
 selves to the study of the universe. Almost the entire sum of knowl- 
 edge of the ancients is comprehended in this expression. It in- 
 cludes philosophy, science and theology. Lucretius entitles his 
 work De Rerum Natura, following his master Epicurus and other 
 philosophical writers among the Greeks who wrote Ilept 0uffea)C, 
 on Nature, of which the Latin is but a translation. Pythagorae : 
 Pythagoras, born on the island of Samos about 580 B. C., migrated 
 to Lower Italy and settled at Croton, 529 B. C., founded a religi- 
 ous brotherhood with a politico-philosophical character and is 
 thought to have perished in the revolution it provoked. He left no 
 writings, for the Golden Sayings seventy-one maxims in hexameter 
 although attributed to him, are not genuine. 
 
40 
 
 He is supposed to have travelled a great deal in his earlier life. 
 Among other views he held the doctrine of the transmigration of 
 souls (metempsychosis], and that number is the principle of the uni- 
 verse and of moral life. Heraclides: born 380 B. C. at Heracles 
 in Pontus, surnamed Ponticus. He went to Athens and became a 
 disciple of Plato and of Aristotle. Phliuntem: Phlius was the chief 
 town of Phliasia in the northeastern part of the Peloponnesus. 
 eumque: observe the change from the relative to the demonstrative 
 in the same sentence. Cf. I. XLIV. 106, Neque te for neque qiiam. 
 arte: ars primarily signifies skill in combining, (cf. arma and artus], 
 and then handicraft, profession, art. Philosophum: Pythagoras 
 is thus given the credit of coining this modest term lover of wis- 
 dom. He said that the name 0o<f>6z, wise, used by the older sages, 
 
 belongs only to deity, quid: interresset, what difference there 
 
 is. 
 
 9. mercatum eum, that festival assemblage. Mayor says, the 
 
 Olympic games. Ace. instead of dat. with similem. maximo 
 
 apparatu, the most splendid representation. Abl. accompaniment, 
 celebritate, numerous concourse; manner, lit peterent: etc. com- 
 parative clause of manner; subordinate in ind. discourse, quaestu 
 et lucro: the terms are similar the former signifying the steady 
 gains of a regular occupation ; the latter, gains earned and deserved. 
 
 visendi perspicerent: Cf. I. XIX. 44 ; visere, perspiciendisque. 
 
 The former is the intensive from videre, the latter passes over to the 
 idea of mental vision, contemplation, mercatus: gen. ex alia 
 vita: The doctrine of the transmigration of souls, intuerenter, 
 contemplate, spectare, to behold, as a theatrical representation, id 
 CSt enim, for that is the meaning of. liberalissimum, the most 
 noble occupation; predicate for both spectare and praestare. omni- 
 bus studiis=0*#/ifatf aliis studiis. in vita praestare: as the 
 
 Greeks viewed it ; the Romans were intensely practical. 
 
 IV. 10. rerum: /. e. philosophic doctrines, in Italiam: to 
 Croton. quae magna dicta CSt: Graecia Magna or Major was a 
 name given, not to Southern Italy, but to districts there settled and 
 inhabited by Greeks. Even Cumae and Neapolis were included. 
 How the designation originated is unknown, privatim et publice 
 
 institutis et artibus: Chiasmus, for privatim belongs to 
 
 artibus (disciplina), publice to institutis. ab antiqua philosophia : 
 
from Thales, Pythagoras, etc. Socratem; of Athens, 469-399 
 B. C. It would be difficult to overestimate his influence on 
 philosophy. Archelaum : of Athens or Miletus. Flourished 
 about 450 B. C. Said to have made an advance on his teacher, 
 Anaxagoras, in moral speculation. Was surnamed Physicus. Anax- 
 agorae: Anaxagoras, 500 428 B. C. was a native of Clazomenae, 
 but removed to Athens and gave philosophy a home in that city. 
 He was the friend and teacher of Pericles and Euripides, and 
 Socrates listened to his teaching. He assumed two principles a 
 material principle, a medley of an infinite number of " seeds" of 
 things, and a spiritual principle an independent intelligence oper- 
 ating on matter. Later philosophers termed his material elements 
 or " seeds", homoeomeria, i. e. particles of like kind with them- 
 selves and with the whole that is made up of them, thus differing 
 from the atoms of Democritus which give rise to the different quali- 
 ties of their compounds by the mode of composition, numeri: Cf. 
 I. X. 20 ; XVII. 38, nisi quid erat numeris aut descriptionibus expli- 
 candum. et before CUncta caelestia, and generally. The Pytha- 
 goreans speculated about the "five" planets and the fixed stars, and 
 the Sophists included astronomy in their teachings. Socrates. . . . 
 primus: etc. /. e. Socrates was the first moral philosopher, the first 
 to direct his attention inward, to study man, to make practical 
 application of the Delphic inscription "know thyself". See INTRO- 
 DUCTION, e caelo; /. <?., out of the sphere of the phenomena of 
 nature. 
 
 ii. Platonis: 429 348 B. C. The foremost philosopher of 
 antiquity, disciple of Socrates and founder of the Academy. See 
 INTRODUCTION, memoria et litteris, by the recorded reminiscences. 
 Fig.? consecrata, immortalized. See Lex. s. v. II. C. genera, sects 
 or schools. There may be mentioned the Cyrenaics, (Aristippus of 
 Gyrene, founder); the Cynics, (Antisthenes, founder); the Megarians, 
 (Euclides, of Megara, founder). These were called the Lesser 
 Socratics. Then the Academy, (Plato,) and the later Academies, 
 (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Carneades, Antiochus); the Peripatetics, 
 (Aristotle, Theophrastus, etc.); the Stoics, (Zcno, Cleanthes, Chry- 
 
 sippus). See INTRODUCTION, id: sc. genus, ut tegeremus 
 
 etc. A. 332. f; H. 501. III. et quaereremus; A. 208.^. 2. 
 
 See IV. VII. 16. Carneades: of Gyrene 214 1296. C. found- 
 
42 
 
 er of the second school of the Middle Academy at Athens, indus- 
 triously combated the Stoic doctrines, especially their Theology. 
 His polemics against Stoic dogmatism was mainly negative, in har- 
 mony with the view that opinion is the utmost certainty in knowl- 
 edge attainable. Carneades was one of the three Athenian embas- 
 sadors that came to Rome in 155 B. C. See INTRODUCTION, in 
 Tusculano: at Cicero's Tusculan villa, fecimus . . . .lit disputa- 
 remus: the circumlocution adds emphasis. A. 332. e; H. 498. II. 
 Note 2. eodem in loco: /. e. in the so-called Academy, a prome- 
 nade in Cicero's Tusculan Villa made to resemble the Academy at 
 Athens Plato's school. Cf. II. III. 9, in Academiam descendimus. 
 est propositum de quo disputaremus: Cf. I. IV. 7, Ponere 
 iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans dispu- 
 tabam. 
 
 V. 12. videtur: the sense is that of censeo. The personal con- 
 struction is more common, as I. IV. 9, Malum mihi videtur esse 
 mors. A. 330. bj H. 534, 1. Note I. (I). Bruto Meo: with reference 
 to his treatise De Virtute. Cf. V. I. i. See also INTRODUCTION 
 for the Stoic view of virtue, quod mihi dixi videri, of which I 
 have expressed an opinion, nempe*. in a question asking for a more 
 precise statement; with negas we may render, do you mean to deny? 
 Lex. s. v. II. i. quidni or quid ni : used with the subjunctive 
 in a rhetorical question. R. 1614. cur non expects an answer. 
 Nam etiam, etc. He denies that all who live uprightly are happy; 
 for a person could not be happy under torments however upright 
 and courageous. 
 
 13. CCUleum, rack. adspirat, /. e. accedere temptat. The 
 Stoics distinguished between things in our power and things not in 
 our power. Among the former are the affections, desires, opinions, 
 etc., among the latter wealth, rank, etc. But we can train ourselves 
 to regard the latter as unimportant, and, to that extent, they are in 
 our power. The grand duty of life is to enthrone reason by which 
 to control every impulse and every disturbing cause. By reason 
 we must arrive at a condition of perfect indifference to pleasure and 
 pain, hope and fear. The wise man has attained this ideal and is 
 perfectly happy; but the wise man is the virtuous man the terms 
 are synonymous. Hence the reasoning of M. in the text, who 
 maintains that virtue is sufficient for a happy life. Haec etiam in 
 
43 
 
 eculeum quo vita non aspirat vita; Simcox criticises the 
 
 author's style in this expression as being affected by a reckless 
 earnestness. He says: 
 
 " The discussion whether vita beata will mount the rack with the philosopher 
 is a model of the careless personification which misses being picturesque and suc- 
 ceeds in being illogical ; and it is one of the praises of Latin literature that it gen- 
 erally abstains from this slovenly sort of personification, and only personifies to 
 make a direct and vivid appeal to the imagination." 
 
 si quid es facturus; /. e., if you are to convince me or to effect 
 anything in opposition to my views. tamquam^^V^/. nihil va- 
 lent in aqua, do not keep their strength when mixed with water. 
 velut, as for instance; stating an example under a general proposi- 
 tion, chorus virtutum : so Horace, chorus vatum scriptorum, etc. 
 
 14. hoc; viz. possitne etc. nudum, unobscured. noli vereri, 
 have no fear. Si enim nulla virtus prudentia vacat; Chrysippus, 
 the Stoic, held that the primitive virtues are prudence, manly cour- 
 age, justice and temperance. Allophanes thought that there is but 
 a single virtue, viz. prudence. The Stoics, generally, held that the 
 " virtues reciprocally follow one another and that he who has one 
 has all." Diog. Laert. Life of Zeno. In III. XVII, " What answer 
 will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue 
 sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure 
 you a happy one?" M. Atilio (Regulo): the hero of one of the 
 most celebrated stories in Roman History. See Clas. Diet. Q. 
 Caepione; Q. Servilius Caepio, defeated on the Rhone (105 B. C.) 
 by the Cimbri, cast into prison either for misconduct in this war or 
 for sacrilege. M. Aquilio; Consul 101 B. C., defeated in 88 B. C. 
 and imprisoned by Mithradates, who slew him by pouring molten 
 gold down his throat, ipsa prudentia: repeated for the sake of 
 clearness. 
 
 VI. 15. For the reasoning in this Chapter see philosophical 
 note in paragraph 13. 
 
 Atqui introduces a fresh step in the reasoning, profligata, 
 almost settled, motus turbulent!: etc. the emotions or passions 
 grief (or pain), desire (or hope), fear, pleasure. They were termed 
 by the Stoics " perturbations," and occasion error in thought. The 
 virtuous man must have right judgment and right intention, vitae 
 beatae; Gen. ignominiam; through the nota censoria. See Diet. 
 
44 
 
 Antiq. The power of the censors was very great, infamiam, loss 
 of political rights. The in/amis was expelled from his tribe and lost 
 his vote and right to hold office. non....sed; this expression is 
 not quite equivalent to non modo....sed etiam. The emphasis is 
 here put on the latter expression, viz. potentibus populis. quod. . . . 
 
 potentibus populis contigit, servitutem; is there an allusion 
 
 to the supremacy of Caesar in these words ? contigit, here of an 
 unfortunate occurrence like accidit. 
 
 1 6. aegritudine : sickness of both body and mind, but in philo- 
 sophical language usually of the former, eliditur; as a ship dashed 
 to pieces on the beach: shattered, quo (que). . . .eo: correlatives. 
 laetitia ; exsultans ; gestiens : laetitia denotes joy as a calm and 
 cheerful expression ; exsultans denotes an extravagant outbreak of 
 joy ; gestiens, denotes a passionate uncontrollable expression of joy 
 
 and triumph, metus aegritudines libidines laetitiae; 
 
 these are the four kinds {genera) of perturbations noted in paragraph 
 13, and again referred to in note on VI. 15. The metus (fear), and 
 aegritudo, (grief, pain), arise from an opinion of evil impending 
 (fear) or present (pain). The laetitia or voluptas gestiens (pleasure), 
 arises from an opinion of present good, libido or cupiditas (desire, 
 hope), from an opinion of future good. The virtuous man must get 
 rid of all such beliefs and reach a state entirely emotionless and 
 without perturbation of any kind, languidis liquefaciunt volup- 
 tatibus, weakened by enervating pleasures. 
 
 17. ex quo=ut ex eo. Cf. ex hoc, I. XII. 28. Note another 
 statement, in varied terms, of the four passions as above ; timor, 
 angor, concupiscat, voluptate. See also first sentence of next chapter. 
 idemque si, etc., the characteristic clause is discontinued ; anacolu- 
 thon. 
 
 VII. A. admits both propositions (alterum alterum; the 
 
 one.... the other), viz. that they who are subject to no "perturba- 
 tions" are happy, and that the ideal wise man, who is included in this 
 class, is happy. quitl=<?m non, a dependent question : R. 1768. im- 
 potenti, uncontrollable, integrum non CSt, is not open for discussion. 
 effectum est: here used with an infinitive, but often with a consec- 
 utive clause. 
 
 18. ad earn rem: /". e. which they wish to demonstrate, modo, 
 only, scriptum est: as in a text book, in earn; take with conveniunt. 
 
45 
 
 Quodni ita esset si esset; a double condition, the tense of 
 
 the latter being subject to the law of sequence, si esset quaesitum 
 satisne, if the question under discussion were whether, etc. hones- 
 tum; "The Greeks declare that the beautiful (ro xahov) is good ; 
 Cicero declared that the honorable (honestum] [morally good] alone 
 is good. Where, therefore, the Greeks had spoken of ro xodov, and 
 we should speak of moral good, Cicero speaks of honestum, and 
 founds precisely similar arguments on it. This conception implies, 
 besides self-regarding rectitude the praise of others and the rewards 
 of glory, and hence is eminently suited to the public spirited men 
 for whom he wrote. To it is opposed the base (turpe), that disgrace- 
 ful evil which all good men would avoid." Cruttwell. Cf. de Officiis, 
 sive honestum solum bonum eft, ut Stoicis placet, etc., whether honestum 
 is the only good as the Stoics hold, etc. Also the following from the 
 Acad. "Zeno placed everything which could have any effect in pro- 
 ducing a happy life in virtue alone, and reckoned nothing else a 
 good at all, and called that honorable (honestum) which was single in 
 its nature and the sole and only good (bonum)." 
 
 The reasoning in nihil bonum sit bonum, is, that virtue is 
 
 sufficient for a happy life because there is nothing good which is not 
 at the same time honorable (morally good), and that the contrary is 
 quite as true, viz. that nothing is good which is not honorable be- 
 cause virtue is sufficient for a happy life. The fuller process is seen 
 in the next note. See also VIII. 21, Ego enim, etc. ante docuisse: 
 /. e., in the various passages of his philosophical books as the fol- 
 lowing from the de Fin. 
 
 "The conclusions of the Stoics are arrived at as follows : 'Everything which is 
 
 good is praiseworthy ; but everything which is praiseworthy is honorable'; and 
 
 so the result is that whatever is good is also honorable (honestum). In the next 
 place I ask, who can boast of a life which is miserable; or avoid boasting of one 
 which is happy ? Therefore men boast only of a life which is happy. From which 
 the consequence follows that a happy life deserves to be boasted of; but this cannot 
 properly be predicated of any life which is not an honorable one. From which it 
 follows that a happy life must be an honorable one. . . .And that man of lofty and 
 excellent spirit that magnanimous and truly brave man who considers all human 
 accidents beneath his notice ought to confide in himself, and in his own life both 
 past and to come and to form a favorable judgment of himself, laying down as a 
 principle, that no evil can happen to a wise man. From which again the same 
 result follows, that the sole good is that which is honorable ; and that to live 
 happily is to live honorably, that is, virtuously." 
 
46 
 
 The virtuous life implies honor which is identical with the highest 
 good; a life of honor (thus defined, which is subject to no distrac- 
 tions) must be a happy life. The converse of which is equally true. 
 
 19. Propiis et suis, peculiar and strictly their own. clarior- 
 
 em, more noble i. e, than that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Cf. I. 
 i . nihil est enim omnium .... quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur. 
 paruisset; representing fut. perf. time, ut esset. . . .armatus: A. 
 
 287 e ; H. 495, II. 
 
 20. videro; with the force of the future. Z. 5 1 1. tantisper, mean- 
 while. Nam Xerxes; etc. Contrasted with the happiness and con- 
 tentment effected by virtue. This story is related of other Persian 
 kings also, praemiis, advantages. The force of the preposition 
 in the compound praemium is felt here, qai invenisset: the ante- 
 cedent is often omitted especially when indefinite, hoc firmius 
 crederemus: viz. that virtue of itself, unaided by pleasures, suffices 
 for happiness. 
 
 VIII. 21. habeo p. q. requiram, I want a little information. 
 eorum: The Stoics. Supply Us; Plural because both propositions are 
 
 contained in alterum esse. ut quem ad modum, foil. See VII. 
 
 1 8, cui satis, etc. Sic; scil. sequdtur. sic is correlative with quern ad 
 modum, ut introducing the result clause. Brutus. See I. i. Aristo; 
 Aristus, of Ascalon, an Academic philosopher of Athens, brother of 
 Antiochus, at one time teacher and friend of Brutus and Cicero. 
 Antiocho; Antiochus of Ascalon, a disciple of Philo, from whom he 
 differed, attempted to combine the Stoic and Peripatetic systems 
 with the Academic. He placed the goods and virtues of the body 
 along with those of the soul, among the perfect goods and virtues. 
 putat; sc. vitam beatam virtute confici. Brutus held against the Stoics 
 that external goods, and consequently evils, may exist and still vir- 
 tue be sufficient for a happy life. The Stoics denied that if any one 
 is in actual evil he could be happy ; and so they restricted the terms 
 goods and evils closely. 
 
 22. quid cuique consentaneum, etc. how these views are har- 
 monized. alio loco ; sc. dicam. saepe ; In 79 B. C. he spent six 
 months at Athens studying philosophy (under Antiochus), and 
 rhetoric, nuper; from July, 51, for a year, he was proconsul of 
 of Cilicia, and was honored by the title of Imperator for his conduct 
 in a campaign against the robber tribes of Mount Amanus. He 
 
47 
 
 stopped at Athens on his return, B. C. 50. videbatur : the personal 
 construction of the passive of video is the usual one ; but in the next 
 clause we have sapientem. . . .posse, a new subject being introduced. 
 ulla COrporis aut fortunae mala : Ct. infra, 23, tria genera 
 malorum, and XXX., 85, Tria genera bonorum maxima animi, secun- 
 da corporis, externa (i. e. fortunae) tertia, ut Peripatetici nee multo vet- 
 eres Academici secus. The bona have their corresponding mala. The 
 question that Cicero raises in the text is whether evils other than 
 those of the mind are really evils. The Stoics held that external 
 good and evil are matters of indifference, and apparent evils are 
 often blessings, neque tamen beatissimam : Antiochus, like the 
 Peripatetics, adds external goods to virtue, in order to produce the 
 greatest happiness, deinde ex maiore parte : etc., that things 
 generally get their names from that which predominates in their 
 composition, genere, non numero, by quality (or character), not 
 by quantity, clauderet : from claudeo. Cf. claudico. 
 
 23. Nam et qui : etc, It may be conceded that in some cases 
 it is true that things are known from their predominant elements, 
 but the principle is inapplicable to happiness, et, quod, and, as to 
 what. Z. 626, 627 ; A. 333. a\ H. 516. 2 N. valeat : characteristic, 
 tria genera malorum : See note above, qui : the antecedent 
 is huic. urgeatur, oppressed, cum vero tria beatissimam : 
 Cicero wishes to convict Antiochus of inconsistency (non constan- 
 tissime), and reasons from A.'s point of view. A. holds that goods 
 (bona) of body (corporis) and estate (fortunae) must be added to 
 virtus to produce the highest happiness, although virtus alone can 
 produce a less degree of happiness. Cicero reasons that, if that be 
 true, the presence of virtus accompanied not by the other two classes 
 of blessings, but by their opposites, or evils, must be fatal to any 
 degree of happiness, to say nothing (non modo) of the highest degree. 
 
 IX. 24. Hoc; See last note. Theophrastus; 371 287 B. C. 
 Born in Lesbos, lived at Athens ; pupil of Plato, then of Aristotle 
 whom he succeeded as the head of the Peripatetic School; somewhat 
 independent in his views. He devoted himself especially to inves- 
 tigations in natural science, and was the founder of the science of 
 Botany, as Aristotle was of that of Zoology. He advocated Aris- 
 totle's view that external goods are a necessary concomitant of vir- 
 tue, and an essential to happiness. Cic. says of him that "he stripped 
 
48 
 
 virtue of its beauty and made it powerless by denying that to live 
 happily depended solely on it," Acad j again, " And this point 
 [whether happiness is wholly in the power of a wise man, or wheth- 
 er it can be undermined or taken from him by adversity], is the 
 especial subject of the book of Theophrastus, on a Happy Life ; in 
 which a great deal is attributed to fortune ; and if that theory is 
 correct, then wisdom cannot make life happy." de Fin. Susti- 
 nere non potuit, could not heartily maintain (advocate), although a 
 Peripatetic, desiring to be consistent. Compare the views of An- 
 tiochus, as given in the preceding chapter, with those of Theophras- 
 tus, in the preceding note. Nam cum statuisset sentiret; 
 unlike Antiochus, he could hardly predicate any happiness under 
 such circumstances. Consequentia .... prima, conclusions .... 
 premises. elegaLntissimus=sufaitisstmus y most precise. T. primum; 
 the corresponding sentence is vexatur idem, in the following para- 
 graph (25). in CO libro, in respect to that book, rotam, wheel of 
 torture. The bracketed words, found in some Mss. are supposed to 
 be an ancient gloss. 
 
 25. Cui concesserim; equivalent to a condition, dolores 
 
 corporis naufragia fortunae; two of the three classes of evils. 
 
 huic succensere; the answer implied is no, because he is consist- 
 ent ; Antiochus is not consistent. Callisthene: In his book on 
 Callisthenes. The latter was his friend and fellow-pupil under the 
 instruction of Aristotle. He was also a fellow-pupil and historian 
 of Alexander the Great. He, however, refused to pay that monarch 
 homage as to a divinity, and was by him thrown into prison, where 
 he died in 328 B. C. at the age of 32. He was a relative of Aris- 
 totle. Vitam regit fortuna non sapientia : Theophrastus de- 
 parted somewhat from Aristotle's ethical teachings. Aristotle (See 
 INTRODUCTION) held that the highest happiness consists in activity 
 of the reason, /. e. in philosophy ; that somewhat of external pros- 
 perity, although very little, is needed for the putting forth of that 
 activity which constitutes happiness ; that virtue is habit character- 
 ized by deliberate choice which is determined by reason, and as the 
 prudent man would determine it. Thus stress is laid on reason and 
 wisdom as the condition of a happy life. Theophrastus seems to 
 have made less of the transcendence of reason, and to have assigned 
 much weight to fortune as an element of happiness. 
 
49 
 
 The verse (Iambic Trimeter) is probably from Ennius' Penthesilca. 
 languidius, with less spirit, in COrpore, depending on the body. 
 
 26. Epicurum : 342-268 B. C. Founder of the Epicurean 
 school at Athens, which flourished there for more than 200 years, 
 and much longer in other cities. Epicurus was born in the Attic 
 deme of Gargettus, but his early life was passed at Samos. It was 
 not until 304 B. C. that he came to Athens, where he gave his lec- 
 tures in " the Garden" surrounded by his friends. His death oc- 
 curred in 268 B. C. after very great sufferings, through which and 
 to the last he maintained a calm mind and a serene spirit. In his 
 Ethics he taught that happiness is the highest good happiness 
 found in pleasure not the pjeasure of the moment, (although Cicero 
 often inclines so to interpret it), but the enduring condition of pleas- 
 ure. In its essence this pleasure is freedom from pain, the great- 
 est of evils. But pleasure of mind is a greater good than the nega- 
 tive pleasure of freedom from bodily pains. Virtue contributes to 
 this higher pleasure by regulating the appetites and passions and 
 banishing fear. Virtue is, therefore, desirable, not for its own sake, 
 but for the pleasure it thus secures. " Virtue can be as little sepa- 
 rated from happiness as happiness from virtue." Zr. Wisdom is 
 the cardinal virtue, enabling us to calculate the probable conse- 
 quences of our actions in regard to pleasure or pain. If the judg- 
 ment be right a man need trouble himself but little about external 
 mishaps. Antisthenes : b. 444 B. C. Founder of the Cynic and 
 indirectly of the Stoic schools, pupil and friend of Socrates, carried 
 to the extreme the ascetic views of his master. See INTRODUCTION. 
 Antisthenes held that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and can be 
 taught, and, after acquisition, cannot be lost ; that the wise man is 
 superior by reason of his self-sufficiency while the masses are fools 
 and slaves. In conduct, their views had for their result shabbiness 
 of dress, mendicancy, indecency of manner of life, etc. Antisthenes 
 "wore no garment except a cloak," ** renounced all diet except the 
 simplest. ... was stern and bitter in his language." Diogenes, his 
 
 disciple, was a greater extremist than his teacher, fortunam 
 
 sapienti : that fortune has very slight influence on the wise man. 
 
 isne : /. <?. Epicurus, cum dolorem sed solum malum 
 
 dixerit : Cicero, to be just, should, perhaps, include in dolorem, pain 
 of soul as well as of body. Their summum bonum was the " freedom 
 
50 
 
 of the body from pain and the soul from confusion." Still they held 
 bodily pleasure to be the foundation of all other pleasures. 
 
 27. Metrodorus: d. 277 B. C. Disciple of Epicurus, and who 
 sensualized his philosophy. He says, " All good is concerned with 
 eating." See XXXVII. 109, note. Occupavi : / have anticipated. 
 adspirare : See Lex. s. v. B. Aristo : of Chios, a Stoic and dis- 
 ciple of Zeno ; flourished about 260 B. C. Zeno : a native of 
 Cittium in Cyprus. Founder of the Stoic school. He was greatly 
 honored by the Athenians. See INTRODUCTION, spe : that it will 
 thus continue, isto . . . . bono : i. e. firma corporis affectio, etc. 
 iam, instantly. 
 
 X. 28. istorum hominum ; Epicureans ; contemptuous, ve- 
 lut : belongs to the illustration following, and not to the single sen- 
 tence. 
 
 29. cumulata, full, perfect, si mala ilia ducimus: The 
 Stoics do not regard these as evils, and Cicero here holds the same 
 view. They regarded as indifferent those things that are "neither 
 beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, 
 strength, riches, good reputation, nobility of birth, and their contra- 
 ries, death, disease, labor, disgrace, weakness, poverty, and bad 
 reputation, baseness of birth and the like." Diog. Laert. Life of 
 Zeno. The bad are the vices the opposite of the virtues ; folly, 
 intemperance, cowardice and injustice, in his tot et tantis : malis 
 is purposely omitted because of the distinction pointed out in the 
 last note, praestare, to be responsible for the doctrine. 
 
 30. communibus magistris ; as Aristus and Antiochus. See 
 VIII. 21, and note. Aristotle; See INTRODUCTION. Aristotle 
 was born B. C. 384, at Stageira in Thrace. He was for many years 
 a disciple of Plato, but afterward the head of an independent school. 
 He developed opposition especially to Plato's theory of Ideas. For 
 eight years prior to the founding of his school the Lyceum he 
 was at the court of Philip, king of Macedonia, as the tutor of his 
 son afterward Alexander the Great. From his habit of walking 
 up and down the shady avenues while conversing with his pupils on 
 the problems of philosophy, his school received the name Peripatet- 
 ic. He died in 322 B. C. See an interesting article in the Century 
 magazine for July, 1892, on the discovery at Eretria of what the 
 author and discoverer, Charles Waldstein, supposes to be the tomb 
 
of Aristotle. Aristotle's writings are numerous, both scientific and 
 philosophic. He is regarded as the originator of Logic, Grammar, 
 Rhetoric in its scientific aspect, Literary Criticism, Natural History, 
 Physiology and Psychology. He first treated of the History of 
 Philosophy, and of the forms of government existing at that time. 
 His was one of the greatest intellects the world has known. Speu- 
 sippo: See INTRODUCTION. Speusippus, the son of Plato's sister, 
 succeeded his uncle as the head of the Academy and was himself 
 succeeded by Xenocrates 396-314, B. C. and he in turn by Polemo, 
 d. 273 B. C. titulus hie ; sc. sapientis. inducant animum, let 
 them determine. So mo gen sie sich entschliessen. T. se neque 
 
 fortunae ducant in bonis ; a succinct statement of Stoic 
 
 doctrine, neque (nee) -que : This combination occurs only 
 
 occasionally. Z. 338. The -que, from its nature (Z. 333), has here 
 an adversative force, sibi ; This word is necessary for limiting the 
 omnia, and with \\.=omnia sua, all so far as it is of interest to them. 
 
 31. Nunc, now, however; under these circumstances, quae 
 
 viri and quae volgus are contrasted, qua gloria.=cuius 
 
 ret gloria j i. e. sapientis. si dis placet, please the gods, or, with 
 God's help. Ironically used, si ipse SC audiret, // he would be 
 consistent. Quam hoc suave est ; Cf. II. VII. 17, (Epicurus] 
 affirmat enim quo dam loco " si uratur sapiens, si crucietur," expectas 
 fortassedumdicat; " patietur, perferet, non succumbet /' magna me- 
 hercule laus et eo ipso, per quern iuravi, Hercule digna ; sed Epicuro, 
 homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis ; in Phalaridis tauro si erit, 
 dicet ; " Quam suave est! quam hoc non euro!" Suave etiam ? an 
 parum est, si non amarum ? ex perpetuitate atque constantia, 
 from the continuity and consistency of their teachings. 
 
 XI. 32. quartum de Finibus : Thus Quintilian, in T. Livii 
 primo ; IX. 2.37. The allusion is to Chapter XX. In the fourth 
 book de Finibus, the New Academy assails Zeno and the Stoics. In 
 Chap. XX. occurs this passage : 
 
 "Nor did he (Zeno) think those things deserving of being valued less which he him- 
 self denied to be goods than they who did consider them as goods. What, then, 
 did he wish to effect by having altered these names ? At least he would have 
 taken something from their weight and would have valued them at rather less than 
 the Peripatetics, in order to appear to think in some respects differently from them, 
 and not merely to speak so." etc. 
 
52 
 
 hoc : object of ostendere, and has the nihil '. . . .inter esse clause as 
 appositive. verborum novitatem : See note above. Quod si, 
 etc. If they differ only in words, agreeing in fact, and if Zeno can 
 consistently hold, etc., then the Peripatetics can consistently hold 
 the same. 
 
 33. tabellis obsignatis, from sealed writings, i. e., in strictest 
 form. Cf. ex syngrapha agere. nos : /. e., of the Middle Academy to 
 whose sceptical doctrine, that certainty is unattainable, Cicero sub- 
 scribed. He boasts of the freedom of his school (soli sumus liberi), 
 whereby he can advocate any doctrine he may fancy at the time (in 
 diem). He cares nothing for inconsistencies. See INTRODUCTION ; 
 The Middle Academy, de COnstantia : in the preceding Chapter 
 respecting Epicurus, verumne : the adj. is the predicate with 
 sit, whose subject is the clause, bonum esse s. q. h. esset. quod ho- 
 nestum esset; thus excluding so-called external goods. Historical 
 tense because of time past, /". e. of Zeno, (placuerit). Read si ita 
 esset for ni ita esset ; if this view (of Zeno) be correct j if we 
 admit it. totum hoc beate vivere ; object of poneret. si ita 
 esset ... .poneret: The tense is imperfect through the influence 
 of the preceding honestum esset. This sentence has been variously 
 emended. The reading ni for si, num. for turn, with ponerent for 
 
 poneret, is one emendation. Another reads si poneretur, inserting 
 
 volui before ut, etc. Heine thinks that volui is implied in poneret 
 which he changes to ponentur. If we read si ita esset. . . .poneret, the 
 meaning is : Conceding his view, whether then he makes the happy 
 life entirely dependent on virtue, as a matter of fact. If we read ni 
 ita esset. . . .poneret, it would mean : If his view be incorrect, and 
 there are other goods besides the honestum, whether then he will rest 
 happiness entirely on virtue. That is consistent with what follows, 
 for that was the position of Brutus. See below, turn ut, etc., is 
 dependent on verum, true / /. e., whether it is true then that, etc., and 
 poneret expresses result after verum sit. 
 
 34. viderit ; probably a fut. pf. R. 1585. For the opinion of 
 Brutus, see VIII. 21. beatissimus ; Cf. VIII., 22, 23. 
 
 XII. advena ; Zeno was a native of Cittium in Cyprus, origin- 
 ally a colony from Phoenicia. Cicero speaks of Zeno as a Poenulus, 
 Phoenician, verborum opifex; Cf. de Fin. III. II. 5, "Zeno too, 
 their chief, was not so much a discoverer of new things as of new 
 
53 
 
 words." See note in XI. 32, and INTRODUCTION, insinuasse se : 
 Cicero also uses the verb without the reflexive in the same sense. 
 a Platonis auctoritate : "Their (the Stoic's) doctrines con- 
 tained little that was new, seeking rather to give a practical applica- 
 tion to the dogmas which they took ready made from previous sys- 
 tems." In Ethics they largely followed the Old Academy as well as 
 Socrates and the Cynics, velut ; Cf. V. 13, note, in Gorgia : in 
 Plato's dialogue entitled Gorgias. Archelaum : King of Mace- 
 donia (413-399 B. C.), and son of Perdiccas II. He obtained the 
 throne by slaying his half-brother. A patron of art and literature, 
 his place was adorned with splendid paintings of Zeuxis, and men of 
 eminence, as Euripides, were entertained by him. 
 
 35. Haud SCio: not so*definite in its negative answer as nescio. 
 an tu, etc. A. 211. b ; H. 353. 2. N. 4. quam sit doctus, quam 
 vir bonus : Socrates aimed to establish an objective rule of practi- 
 cal life. This standard he saw in knowledge with which he identified 
 virtue, in CO : that is, in this condition of knowledge and virtue. 
 iniustus : justice with Socrates was a crowning virtue. So also 
 with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. 
 
 36. in Epitaphio : the funeral oration of Pericles over the 
 Athenians, at the close of the first year of the Peloponnesian war ; 
 in Plato's Menexenus. See Timayenis, History of Greece, Vol. I., p. 
 283. apta : depending upon, (in this sense, only in Cic.) Used both 
 with ex as here and without it as in XIV. 40, rudentibus apta fortuna. 
 See Lex. s. apo. B. SUSpensa, depend, rest on. In this sense very 
 rare. Cf. with apta ex in last note, and pendere ex in this sentence. 
 praecepto : /. e., in se ipso omnem spent reponet sui. Cf. X. 30, 
 omniaque sibi in sese esse posita. "The wise man [of the Stoics] is he 
 who, being perfect in his knowledge of the laws of the universe, 
 above all passion, and completely governed by reason, is perfectly 
 self-contained and self-satisfied." 
 
 XIII. The argument of the Chapter is this : Everything in na- 
 ture is destined to the complete development of its kind. All im- 
 plicitly follow the law of nature. Each has its peculiar excellencies 
 which abide with it. Man's superior gift is his spiritual nature, soul 
 and mind, the perfect development of which constitutes virtue ; 
 wherein man reaches the perfection .of his kind, which must be 
 synonymous with happiness. 
 
54 
 
 37- hieme : temporal, fundat, produces abundantly, quantum 
 sit : Subj. by attraction. 
 
 38. Take etiam with facilius. Observe the variety of distribu- 
 tive terms, alias. . ..alias, quasdam. . . .quasdam, (Chiasmus also); 
 par tint. . . .partim, alias, quasdam, non nullas. praecipui : Gen. par- 
 titive, etsi, although j corrective. See Lex. s. v. II. habent 
 aliquem comparationem, that admit of comparison, decerptus 
 ex mente divina : A Stoic tenet. Plato had borrowed this doc- 
 trine from Pythagoras. Cf. Cat. M. XXI. 78. 
 
 39. absoluta ratio : The Stoics enthroned reason, and sought 
 to bring every impulse under its control, quod est idem virtus : 
 "He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtu- 
 ous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly 
 vicious." et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto, etc. So far they 
 agree, but Cicero and the Stoics hold that this (virtus) suffices for 
 vita beatissima, the others that other goods must suppliment virtus 
 to bring about this result. The Stoics say, that if anything not in 
 man's power were allowed to influence his happiness, it would 
 detract from the absolute worth of virtue. 
 
 40. tripertito : Cf. VIII. 23, note, and X. 29. 30, and notes. 
 XIV. istorum : of those goods, non sane, not very; softens the 
 
 negation ; sane non would strengthen it. rudentibus apta ; Cf. 
 XII. 36, apta and note. A knot in a rope was all that intervened 
 between safety and possible destruction. 
 
 41. volumus, we hold / implying that the opinion is open for 
 discussion, saeptum atque munitum, constitute together a sin- 
 gle member of the series. Why ? A. 208. b. i and 2 ; H. 554. I. 6. 
 parvo metu praeditus ; praeditus is used with qualities both good 
 and bad more commonly the former, parva metuit ; T. has 
 parvo metu est. alia .... nisi, else than. See Lex. s. ahus I. B. Say 
 the Stoics, " bravery is fearless obedience to the law of reason, both 
 in boldness and endurance." Zr. procul in the sense of liber ^ as 
 frequently in Livy. 
 
 42. Qui autem, further how. securitatem, freedom from 
 care, aegritudinis, anxiety, grief. Cf. VI. 16, note, celsus et 
 erectus, noble and elevated, omnia sibi; See X. 30, note, tali 
 animo ; characteristic. civitas universa ; as Lacedaemon or 
 Sparta, (Lacedaemonif). fortitudinem, temperantia : two of the 
 
55 
 
 four virtues which most Stoics held, the others being prudence 
 and justice. See V. 14, note, commotionum, emotions or passions. 
 aegritudine, metu, libidine, insolent! alacritate ; Cf. VI. 15, 
 and note on motus turbulenti ; also XV. 43 ; XVI. 48, sine metu, etc. 
 alacritate, ecstacy, rapture. Cf. XV. 43, laetitia gestiens. 
 
 XV. 43: quod aegritudo, etc. pain and fear are classed as 
 fancied evils, pleasure and desire as imagined goods, in each case 
 the one a present evil or good, the other a future. We must get rid 
 of such beliefs and arrive at a state of indifference to them, is the 
 
 Stoic teaching. See VI. 16, note, in bonorum errore=/Vz 
 
 bonis opinatis. The author varies the expression. We have follow- 
 ing the famous chain argument of the Stoics. Atque etiam omne 
 bonum, etc. See VII. \%~ante docuisse, note, praedicandum, 
 extolled. . , 
 
 44. quibus abundantem: A. 248. c. 2; H. 421. II. licet 
 esse : for licet with inf. with subject ace. See A. 331. /. N. 3 ; H. 
 
 538- 
 
 45. iniustus, etc. Note the enumeration of the vices, the oppo- 
 site of the highest virtues, and cf. note on fortitudinem, etc. in XIV. 
 42. atque nullo : the atque has a climacteric effect, and in fact. 
 See Lex. s. v. I. B. b. videamus ne : Cf. I. XXXIV. 83, and R. 
 1656. sola is not to be taken with quae, but with the predicate, 
 beatum beata vita for sake of variety, quid) how. Etenim, etc. 
 Cf. XV. 43. 
 
 XVI. 46. minima, of slight value, color suavis, a fine complexion. 
 Anticlea ; a slip for Euryclea, the nurse of Ulysses. Anticlea 
 was his mother. Ulixi : Cf. I. XLI. 98; also A. 43. a j H. 68. 
 Lenitudo, etc. A catalectic trochaic tetrameter or septenarius, 
 from the Niptra of Pacuvius, imitated from Sophocles. The death 
 of Ulysses was the subject, gravitate, dignity, moral earnestness. 
 
 aut gravius aut grandius : paronomasia. Cf. Salvus sanus, 
 
 XXI. 62. 
 
 47. At enim : the enim introduces a reason for the objection 
 implied in at. The reply, partly concessive, frequently has et quidem, 
 or quidem as here. R. 1623. praecipua : The Stoics regarded 
 everything that was not positively good or evil (virtue or vice) as 
 indifferent (media). But among things indifferent there are, on 
 comparison, necessarily preferences. Some, such as health, wealth, 
 
56 
 
 talent, rank, were regarded as having comparative value, and were 
 classed as praecipua, producta, praeposita j their opposites were 
 termed reiecta, remota, reiectanea. The media, indifferentia, as a spe- 
 cial class, became thus limited to those things which could not in- 
 fluence choice, hi autem : the Peripatetics. Socratica ilia con- 
 clusione I only the first part of the conclusion is from Socrates. 
 The second part, Adfectus autem, etc., Cicero, or his Greek author- 
 ity, has added. 
 
 48. etenim: A. 156. d; H. 554. V. 2. alacritate=/Kw/i*// 
 alacritate, XIV. 42. See note. Refert autem omnia ad beate 
 vivendum : not in the sense of making happiness the end to be 
 attained, but of regarding it as the concomitant of virtue. The 
 vita laudabilis is the vita honestavita beata j and in the vita honesta 
 resides virtus, the summum bonum. 
 
 XVII. 49. 'E.tatqui. See Lex. s. v. E. in aliqua vita, in 
 some kinds of life, gloriandum ; gloriari with a direct object (ex- 
 cept cognate ace.) is rare and post-clas. The gerundive is thus 
 used here. See also next paragraph, beata vita glorianda est. 
 
 Epaminondas ; The famous Theban statesman and general. 
 Died 362 B. C. He was the hero of Leuctra and Mantinea, and in 
 his life, both public and private, characterized by the utmost integ- 
 rity, he practised the lessons of philosophy of which he was an ar- 
 dent student. Consiliis, etc. Pausanias gives the epigram in full. 
 est attonsa ; Greek Ixelparo. Africanus : A. Maior, (234-183 
 B. C.). A sole, etc. The distich is from Ennius and is quoted by 
 Seneca, Ep. XVIIL 5, where two more verses are given : " Si fas 
 endo plagas caelestum ascender e cuiquam est, Mi soli caeli maxima porta 
 patet. The meter is the elegiac, supra ; instead of this another 
 writer quotes ad usque. Maeotis: Gen., for Maeotidis. The s does 
 not make "position." Lake Maeotis, now the Sea of Azov, aequipe- 
 rari : sc. me. 
 
 51. libra ilia Critolai ; Critolaus, a Peripatetic philosopher, 
 was one of the three Athenian embassadors to Rome in 155 B. C. 
 For the allusion in libra compare the following from de Fin. V. 
 XXX. 91, where Piso is setting forth the Peripatetic doctrines in 
 opposition to the Stoic ; " I will venture to call goods whatever is 
 in accordance with nature .... and I will place that noble quality, 
 virtue (virtutis amplitudinem), in the other pan of the balance, so to 
 
57 
 
 speak. Believe me that pan will outweigh (deprimet) earth and 
 
 seas, animi bona corporis et externa ; See XXX. 85, and 
 
 X. 22, ullo corporis aut fortunae mala, and note, tantum propen- 
 dere, press down, so heavily, illam lancem ; /. e. containing the 
 bona animi. deprimat, weigh down^ i. e. force up the scale con- 
 taining bona corporis et externa. Critolaus had probably first used 
 this figure. 
 
 XVIII. Xenocratem : See X. 30. exaggerantem=<?^/<7/&#- 
 
 tem. Cf. XXX. 85 ; also see XIII. 39, note. 
 
 52. formido, etc. sc. cadit. formido, dread, overpowering the 
 understanding ; timiditas, fearful-ness as an habitual quality ; 
 ignavia, a blamable inaptitude for any noble action ; metus, fear t 
 as from reflection. See D. s. vereri / Cf. also pavor, consternation, 
 a being disheartened. ergo : sc. in eum etiam cadit. Atrei : 
 Atreus, king of Mycenae, was the son of Pelops and father of Aga- 
 memnon and Menelaus. Proinde : a dissyllable here. The verse 
 is an iambic trimeter from Accius, and is probably from the Atreus 
 quae, and these qualities. 
 
 53. ut nihil (ace.) paeniteat : sc. sapientem. A. 221. cj H. 
 408. Ill; Z. 442. Cf. XXVIII. 8 1, quod paenitere possit. omnia 
 profluenter : sc. se habebunt. absolute=/*r/ii&. igitur : A. 
 156. k; H. 554. IV. 3 ; Z. 357. 
 
 XIX. From this point to Chapter XXIV. are given illustrations 
 to show that vice is productive of misery, virtue of happiness. 
 
 54. C. Laelii : Caius Laelius Sapiens, the intimate friend of the 
 younger Africanus, was consul in B. C. 140. cum repulsa : In 141 
 B. C. he was defeated for the office. This sentence might have 
 ended with quattuor Cinnae consulatibus to give the author's meaning. 
 But after the parenthesis he changes the form, sed tamen, etc. 
 An anacoluthon. malles te, . . .consulem : double ace. with esse 
 omitted, as often. 
 
 Cinnam : L. Cornelius Ciima was an adherent of the party of 
 Marius and consul in the years 87, 86, 85 and 84 B. C. In his first 
 consulship he sought to recall Marius from exile, but failed and fled 
 to escape the vengeance of his colleague Cn. Octavius and the Sen- 
 ate, and was deposed. But he collected an army and, with Marius, 
 laid siege to Rome. The capture of the city was followed by mur- 
 
58 
 
 ders and proscriptions. Catulus, the noble colleague of Harms in 
 the battle against the Cimbri, was one of the victims whose death 
 the latter demanded, as related in this chapter (56). Cinna was 
 assassinated by his soldiers in 84 B. C. 
 
 55. video cui committam : Cicero's friend was doubtless in 
 political sympathy with him. colleg'ae sui : emphasized by posi- 
 tion before the proper name. Cn. Octavii ; He was one of the 
 first victims. His head was cut off and suspended from the Rostra. 
 P. Crassi ; surnamed Dives. Father of the triumvir ; took his own 
 life. L. Caesaris ; L. Julius Caesar Strabo, consul in 90 B. C., 
 censor in 89 with Crassus as his colleague ; great uncle of M. Anto- 
 nius, the triumvir. M. Antonii ; the orator, grandfather of the tri- 
 umvir; consul in 99 B. C. His head was suspended from the Rostra. 
 C. Caesaris : surnamed Strabo Vopiscus, was a brother of the L. 
 Caesar mentioned above. He was famous as an orator and is one 
 of the speakers in Cicero's de Oratore. Specimen, ideal. Cf. I. XIV. 
 32, specimen naturae, liceret, it was lawful, sermonis errore; 
 Cicero shows that the term, licere, may be used of what is legally 
 right or permitted, although morally wrong. 
 
 56. cum communicavit ; After defeating the Teutoni and 
 
 Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae in his fourth consulship, Marius joined 
 the proconsul Q. Lutatius Catulus, and they jointly gained a great 
 victory over the Cimbri at Campi Raudii, near Vercellae. This was 
 in 101 B. C., in the 5th consulship of Marius. Moriatur; See 
 note on Cinnam, (54). He is said to have suffocated himself with 
 
 the fumes of charcoal, sex consulatus ; 107 and 104-100 B. 
 
 C. He was a seventh time consul in 86 B. C., but died on the 
 eighteenth day after entering on his office, obruere, dim or destroy 
 the glory of. 
 
 XX. 57. Dionysius ; the Elder, b. 430 B. C. He became sole 
 general in 405 and began his reign of tyranny, which continued until 
 his death in 367. in victu temperantiam : and yet his death is 
 said to have been caused by excessive feasting, veritatem, the 
 true state of the case, omnia SC posse, that he had unlimited power. 
 Elliptical. 
 
 58. alius alio modo ; He was born in a private station. Plotius 
 says he was a mule-driver, Diodorus Siculus, that he was a clerk. 
 aequalium familiaritatibus, familiar intercourse with his contem- 
 
59 
 
 poraries. consuetudine propinquorum, intimate association with 
 his kinsmen, credebat yfofcw habebat. The direct object is ex- 
 pressed, ex familiis locupletium, from the family-servants of the 
 rich, servos ; attracted into the relative clause, quibus ; etc. 
 He had manumitted them and termed them "new citizens." ton- 
 dere : used absolutely, artificio, employment; abl. manner, ton- 
 Striculae j Other authors mention female barbers ; for example, 
 Plaut. True. II. 4. 51. ferrum, a razor. 
 
 59. duas uxores : after the death of his first wife he married 
 the two here named at about the same time, possibly the same day. 
 civem suam ; sister of Dion, who was in high favor with Dionysius, 
 and for a time, later, supplanted, as tyrant, the younger Dionysius, 
 his nephew. Locrensem ; the Locris of which Doris was a native 
 was situated in the south-eastern part of the country of the Bruttii. 
 Her son, the younger Dionysius, made himself tyrant of the place 
 when he was expelled from Syracuse. Cubiculari lecto : probably 
 the edifice or pavilion in which his bed stood, cubiculari is from 
 cubicularis instead of cubicularius, the usual form, coniunxisset 
 =coniungendo effects set. 
 
 60. pila ludere : Playing ball was a favorite sport and exercise 
 with both Greeks and Romans. The Emperor Augustus used to 
 play, and men getting along in years would play for the purpose of 
 warding off old age. Every complete gymnasium had a room de- 
 voted to this exercise, and special teachers gave instruction in ball- 
 playing. Foot-ball was a favorite game at Sparta. The base-ball 
 of these days was unknown then. See Diet. Antiq. s. pila. poneret, 
 laid aside, impotentium, incapable of self-control. Cf. impotenti, 
 VII. 17. 
 
 6 1 . illdicavit, declared his judgment. 
 
 XXI. Damocles ; Horace alludes to the story in Od. III., I. 
 copias, riches, opes, power, pulcherrimo textili stragulo: 
 The conjunction between the adjectives is omitted because the 
 textili stragulo express a single idea, ministrare : the proper word 
 for waiting or serving at table. 
 
 62. QfortSsuffimenta; effect for cause. deftuebatlt=sensim 
 ddabebantur. Cf. Liv. II. 20, moribundus (de equo) ad terram 
 defluxit. satisne: The-ne=nonne. A. 210. d. aliqui : the adj. 
 form here properly used, integrum erat ut, etc. A. 332 ; H, 
 
6o 
 
 501.2; Z. 623. Cf. VII. iTttntegrum non est. Salvus sanus : 
 
 paronomasia. 
 
 XXII. 63. in Pythagoriis duobis illis: Damon and Phintias. 
 See de Fin. II. XXIV. 79. where Cicero also alludes to the friend- 
 ship of Orestes and Pylades. adscriberer : Force of the imperf. 
 
 subjunc.? miserum, afflicting, docto, educated. Musicorum 
 
 perstlldiosum : On account of the parenthesis the sentence is in- 
 complete, musicorum is neuter. Cf. I. XXIV. 57, si geometrica 
 dedicisset. poetam etiam tragicum : He is said to have con- 
 tended repeatedly at Athens for the prize of tragedy, but obtained 
 only second and third prizes until just before his death, when he 
 won the first prize at the Lenaea, an Attic festival of Dionysus' or 
 
 Bacchus, with a play entitled "The Ransom of Hector." in hoc 
 
 genere : poets, neminem: A. 202. /. 2 ; H. 457. i. cum Aqui- 
 nio : A bad poet, also mentioned by Catullus 14. 18. omni cultu 
 et victll humano, of all refinement and social intercourse with men. 
 
 XXIII. 64. Archytae : Archytas of Tarentum, (fl. B. C. 400- 
 365 ?) was a Pythagorean and a friend of Plato who was probably 
 indebted to him for some of his views. He was distinguished as a 
 general and a statesman. Like all Pythagoreans he gave much at- 
 tention to mathematics and became eminent as a mathematician. 
 His wooden flying dove was the wonder of the ancients, humilem 
 homunculum ; Archimedes (287-212 B. C.) was of humble origin 
 and poor. Sil. Ital. XIV. 342, says 
 
 Vir fuit Isthmiacis decus immortale colonis, 
 Ingenio facile ante omnes telluris alumnos, 
 Nudus opum, sed cui caelum terraeque pater ent. 
 
 He aided materially in defending Syracuse by his engines, but 
 was slain by a Roman soldier at the taking of the city. He was the 
 first to ascertain the ratio of the radius to the circumference and of 
 the cylinder to the sphere, and that a body dipped in water loses as 
 much weight as that of the water displaced. He invented the pulley, 
 the endless screw, an orrery, showing the motions of the heavenly 
 bodies, etc. Some of his writings are still extant, a pulvere et 
 radio ; The mathematicians used to strew a table with sand (pulvis) 
 and in this draw their figures with a rod (radius). Cf. de Nat. Deo- 
 rum, II. 18.48, nunquam eruditum ilium pulverem attigistis, you have 
 
6i 
 
 never taught mathematics, ego quaestor : In 75 B. C. under the 
 
 praetor of Lilybaeum, Sex. Paducaeus. spheram cum cylin- 
 
 dro ; Archimedes first discovered the relation which the cubic con- 
 tents of the sphere bears to those of the cylinder. 
 
 65. ad portas Achradinas; Achradina was one of the five parts 
 or towns of which Syracuse consisted, and occupied the high ground 
 of the peninsula north of Ortygia. Other readings are Agragianas 
 and Agragentinas, meaning the "Agragentine" gate at Syracuse in 
 the direction of Agrigentum. animum adverH==afiwadfctfr//. In 
 the classical period these words are usually contracted to animad- 
 verti. erant autem ; the autem is transitional, now. 
 
 66. ad adversam basim, to the front of the pedestal, exesis, 
 effaced. Graeciae= Magnae Graeciae. unius acutissimi ; Ob- 
 serve how the superlative is strengthened by unius. See also unus 
 suavissimus in this same paragraph, homine Arpinati ; Cicero 
 was born at Arpinum in Latium. cum humanitate, with liberal 
 culture, actionemque, and their employments, cum oblectatione 
 sollertiae, with the pleasure that comes from a consciousness of skill. 
 in caede e, t iniuriis ; Zeugma. For alebatur supply versabatur. 
 
 67. eius ; /. e., of the mind, igitur ; Note the position of igitur. 
 existere, proceeds, arises. 
 
 XXIV. 68. moventia, motives. The quasi softens the unusual 
 expression ; moventia, springs of action, intellegentiamque, and 
 understanding, nobis ; Dat. A. 232. a ; H. 388. fingatur, con- 
 ceived of, imaged, tardis enim mentibus : Dat. Cf. XXXV. 100, 
 huic vitae. Cicero uses this verb (as if comitem esse) with the dat. in 
 only three instances, triplex ille animi fetus ; Physics, ethics, 
 dialectics ; /. e. a knowledge of all branches of philosophy, unus 
 . . . .alter. . . .tertius : more common in Cic. than/n'wjw, secundus, 
 tertius. Cf. I. XVII. 40, una, altera. 
 
 69. cum his. . . .curis ; i. e. the problems of philosophy, and the 
 pleasure experienced in their investigation, ut, for example, per- 
 spexerit, viderit : time future to that expressed in adfici necesse 
 est, which is future in sense, eius ipsius ; /. e. totius mundi. Sep- 
 tem alia ; the five planets and the sun and moon, rata, fixed, 
 unalterable. SUStineantur ; change of tense from perfect to pres- 
 ent ; a common usage, qua gravitate ; depends on delata. It is 
 better to omit the in and connect the qua with gravitate. 
 
62 
 
 XXV. 7- 1 paragraphs 70 and 71 the pleasures of the study 
 of moral philosophy are set forth, praecepta, enjoined, ilia COg- 
 nitio : See I. XXII. 52. compleatur : Bentley emends completur. 
 The subjunctive must be explained as result ; the indicative would 
 state it as a fact simply, illius aeternitatis imitandi : The imi- 
 tandi may possibly stand for imitandae, which would make the con- 
 struction regular. Cf. A. 298.^- H. 542. I. Note i. Tischer reads 
 aeternitatem. illius : sc. mentis, in brevitate vitae conlocatam, 
 confined to this short life. Conlocatam refers back to cogitatio, while 
 the thinking mind is in fact the subject of putat. ex aliis aptas, 
 depending upon (arising front] others. The expression is Ciceronian. 
 See Lex. s. v. I. B. quibus refers to rerum; fluentibus to the 
 constant changes in things. 
 
 71. intuens means attentive contemplation, SUSpiciens implies 
 here respect. c\teriQr*==trrestria. genera partesque : pars, 
 not species stands opposed to genus. Cf. III. XI. 24. extremum 
 in bonis=summum bonum. ultiTnum=summum. Cf. de Fin. I. 
 IV. n, " quid sequatur natura, ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid 
 fugiat ut extremum malorum" 
 
 72. tertia : /. e. Logic. The gender is due to the concluding 
 words of the sentence, genera dispertit : See note on genera 
 partesque, 71. perfecta concludit : states the conclusion syllogis- 
 tically. ratio, art. Transeat, etc. A Stoic view and opposed to 
 the Epicurean. Epicurus and Metrodorus thought it folly to take 
 part in public life, contineri prudentia, firmly established through 
 his prudence, iustitia : Abl. in suam domum: Not the home 
 but the locality is designated. Hence the preposition, tarn var- 
 iisque ; the -que is necessary because tarn variis expresses a single 
 idea, paene, I may say. cultu atque victu : Cf. XXII. 63, note. 
 Fortuna ipsa cedat : Cf. Parad. V. I. 34, cut quidem (sapienti} 
 etiam, quae vim habere maximam dicitur, fortunam ipsa cedit. bea- 
 
 XXVI. 73. in viola, of one bedded on violets, in rosa : Cf. 
 Hor. Od. I. 5, i. an Epicuro, etc. The antithesis to this clause 
 might have been ceteris pJiilosophis idem dicere non licebit? But Cicero 
 takes up the matter afresh in 75, sed cum is dicat etc. ut habet SC 
 res : /. e. when one considers only the matter itself, dolore de- 
 finiat, etc. The pleasure that with Epicurus is the chief good is 
 
63 
 
 " freedom of the body from pain and the soul from confusion." 
 honesta turpia : asyndeton in opposition. Z. 782. R. 2204 (b). 
 Cf. A. 208. b; H. 636. I. i ; also I. XXVI. 64, supera in/era, etc. 
 aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur : Epicurus reduces 
 all knowledge to touch ; for he holds that the senses are the only 
 source of knowledge, and these give us a true perception of that 
 which comes into contact with them. Lucretius teaches that the 
 sense of taste is agreeable when it is acted on by smooth atoms and 
 disagreeable when the atoms are rough, huic . . . . ferarum : The 
 expression is abbreviated as in I. I. 2, ilia. . . .sunt conferendd. obli- 
 
 visci sui, to forget his own chief tenet. 
 
 74. ilia: such as the Stoics provide, recordatione prae- 
 
 teritorum voluptatium : Cf. XXXI. 88. 
 
 " While the Cyrenaics maintained that bodily pleasures and pains were the keen- 
 est, Epicurus claimed these characteristics for the pleasures of the mind, which 
 intensified the present feeling by anticipations of the future and recollections of the 
 past. And thus the wise man might be happy even on the rack." Marshall, Hist 
 Gk. Phil. 
 
 " Listen. . . .to the words of Epicurus when dying ; and observe how inconsistent 
 is his conduct with his language. ' Epicurus to Hermarchus greeting : I write this 
 letter', he says, ' while passing a happy day, which is also the last day of my life. 
 And the pains of. ... and bowels are so intense that nothing can be added to them 
 which can make them greater.' Here is a man miserable if pain is the greatest 
 possible evil. It cannot possibly be denied. However, let us see how he proceeds. 
 * But still I have to balance this a joy in my mind, which I derive from the recol- 
 lection of my philosophical principles and discoveries, But do you. . . .protect the 
 children of Metrodorus.' After reading this I do not consider the death of Epami- 
 nondas or Leonidas preferable to his. . . .The deaths of generals are glorious, but 
 philosophers usually die in their beds. But still Epicurus says when dying, ' I 
 have a joy to counterbalance these pains.' I recognize in these words, O Epicurus, 
 the sentiments of a philosopher, but still you forgot what you ought to have said. 
 For, in the first place, if those things be true, in the recollection of which you say 
 you rejoice, that is to say, if your writings and discoveries are true, then you can 
 not rejoice, For you have no pleasure here which you can refer to the body. But 
 you have constantly asserted that no one ever feels joy or pain except with refer- 
 ence to his body. ' I rejoice,' says he, ' in the past.' In what that is past ? If 
 you mean such past things as refer to the body then I see that you are counterbal- 
 ancing your agonies with your reason, and not with your recollection of pleasures 
 which you have felt in the body. But if you are referring to your mind, then your 
 denial of there being any joy of the mind which cannot be referred to some pleas- 
 ure of the body, must be false. Why, then, do you recommend the children of 
 Metrodorus to Hermarchus ? In that admirable exercise of duty, in that excellent 
 
6 4 
 
 display of your good faith, (for that is how I look upon it), what is there that you 
 refer to the body ? de Fin. II. xxx. 
 
 Some texts have voluptatum. Arpinati nostro : sz.fundo. Arpi- 
 num the birthplace of Cicero lies in a mountainous district near 
 the junction of the Fibrenus and Liris. mala praesentia prae- 
 teritae voluptates; chiasmus. 
 
 75. iis qui existimant ; /. e. the Stoics and many adherents 
 
 of the New Academy. The sentiment semper beatum esse sapientem 
 is consistent, not with the view of Epicurus, but with that of the 
 Stoics, that virtue is alone sufficient for a happy life, balbutire : 
 for they held that happiness, although found only in virtue, is in- 
 creased by external goods. Cf. VIII. 23, and IX. 24, and notes. 
 in Phalaridis taurum ; Cf. II. VII. 17, in Phalaridis tauro si erit, 
 dicet j Quam suave est, quam hoc no n euro ! The sense of the last 
 two sentences is this : Epicurus is inconsistent in saying that happi- 
 ness can exist with pain, for he holds pain to be the sole evil ; he en- 
 croaches on the ground of the Stoics who hold pain to be indifferent ; 
 while the Peripatetics and the adherents of the Old Academy (see 
 last note, balbutire^) are as inconsistent as Epicurus, for, as external 
 goods are essential to happiness, pain must destroy it. Let them, 
 then, allow, as do the Stoics, that happiness consists in virtue alone ! 
 
 XXVII. 76. tria genera bonorum : See VIII. 23. laqueis, 
 subtleties. See XVI. 47, note, sint sane ilia, etc. Cicero will 
 concede more than the Stoics, viz. that external and corporal goods 
 are actual goods in proper subordination to those of the mind (ilia 
 divina]. sumenda, taken for use. The term is a technical term of 
 the Stoics, its opposite being reiidenda. [ut] ; if the ut be permit- 
 ted to stand, there is an anacoluthon, the author intending to close 
 his sentence with a result clause, as beatus aut potius beatissimus di- 
 cendus sit, or something like this. Dolorem vero, etc. A suggested 
 objection which he meets in the next paragraph (77). Is: dolor. 
 huic. . . .sententiae : scil. sapientem beatissimum esse. contra 
 mortem, etc. See in INTRODUCTION I, the subjects of the five 
 books, wherein Cicero has labored to prove that death, pain, grief 
 and other mental perturbations are not evils. In this book we have 
 the final proposition which naturally follows, viz. that virtue is of 
 itself sufficient for a happy life, and the sole criterion of the wise 
 
65 
 
 man. ardentCS faces : So in II. XXV. 61, cumque quasi faces ei 
 dolor is admoverentur. 
 
 77. Pueri Spartiatae laniati;Cf. II. XIV. 34, Spartae 
 
 vero pueri ad aram [of Diana Orthia\ sic verberibus accipiuntur, ut 
 multus e visceribus sanguis exeat, non nunquam etiam, ut, cum ibi essem, 
 audiebam, ad necem- quorum non modo nemo exclamavit, umquam, sed ne 
 ingemuit quidem. Quid ergo ? hoc pueri possunt, viri non poterunt ? 
 et mos valebit, ratio non valebit ? Cf. II. XX. 46. prius ; with the 
 sense of potius. barbaria ; sc terra, qui sapientes habentur; 
 called by the Greeks -fo^oao^taru.^ the Brahmins. Caucasi : the 
 name is given to the extension of the Caucasus even to India, /. e. 
 the Hindoo Coosh or the Hirnalaya Mts. 
 
 78. Mulieres vero : answers to the primum ei of the preceding 
 sentence. So in I. XIII. $Q,primumj and Maximum vero (XIV. 31). 
 The custom referred to is said to exist still despite the efforts of the 
 English authorities and the missionaries, ilia victa : as though 
 there were but two. An indication of careless composition, um- 
 bris, dreamy lives, privatatis erroribus, with their own perversely 
 erroneous views, ibim aut aspidem, etc. The same animals were 
 not reverenced alike in all parts of Egypt. The crocodile might be 
 killed with impunity in some parts. The ibis and the cat were held 
 sacred everywhere. 
 
 79. montivagOS ; found only here in prose. The whole pas- 
 sage is poetical, vulnera excipiant ; accipiant would imply, " wil- 
 lingly" receive, ambitiosi laudis studiosi : Nom. The latter 
 
 phrase is our " ambitious", the former means eagerness for honor- 
 able public station. 
 
 XXVIII. 80. illuc unde deflexit : viz. to the subject suggest- 
 ed in the question with which chapter XXVI. begins ; whether a 
 wise man can be happy in the midst of pain, etc, nec=^ non, and 
 the non negatives consistet and resistet. consistet, will it stop short; 
 opposed to prosecuta as is resistet below, ut ante dixi : See V. 13. 
 
 foedius deformius ; The foedus offends the natural feelings, 
 
 causing aversion ; the defcrmis offends the finer sensations, causing 
 dislike opposed \.n formosus ; turpis offends the moral feelings. D. 
 
 8r. quod poenitere possit ; Cf. XVIII. 53. The quod\* nom., 
 and expresses an indefinite object of emotion. R. 1329. Cf. A. 221. c. 
 where the quod is expressly given as an ace., and with this agrees 
 
 9 
 
66 
 
 Tischer. H. 410. IV. nihil invitum, splendide omnia : 
 
 observe the Chiasmus. The emphasis is thus strengthened, nihil 
 . . . . admirari, to be disturbed by nothing; by this, meaning anything 
 that could disturb the sage's serenity. The reader will recall the 
 Nil admirari of Horace. Epist. I. 6. i. 
 
 82. senserint=/W/V^z;m/. congruere vivere: subject of 
 
 esse. Note the Chiasmus, vita beata (sit): Nom. quo modo 
 nunc est, as the matter now stands ; i. e. according to our conclu- 
 sions to this point. 
 
 XXIX. impetrarim libentur ut : Anacoluthon. We should 
 have, following the ut, a purpose clause like id me doceas, quern ad 
 modum, etc., but, as often, for clearness' sake, after a long interven- 
 ing clause, Cicero begins anew, id velim audire. nulla vincula, 
 etc. refers to Cicero's adherence to the teachings of the Middle or 
 New Academy. See XI. 33, note, and 83 below. He dislikes the 
 Stoic dogmatism, paulo ante: XXVI. 75. his : *'. e. Peripateticis 
 et veteribus Academids. contra istam sententiam : /. e. their 
 fundamental teaching, that the wise man is always beatus but not 
 always beatissimus. conclusa : sc. sunt. 
 
 83. habetur in omnes partes, considers the views of all. ut 
 
 iudicari ; i.e. can be judged solely on its merits, no great 
 
 name giving it credence, hoc velle ut . . .virtus satis habeat ; 
 Brachylogy for ut a nobis demonstretur virtutem .... habere. de 
 finibus ; sc. bonorum et malorum. See XXX. 84. quod quidem ; 
 
 The relative refers to the clause, virtus satis praesidii, which is 
 
 repeated in the illud below. Carneadem : See IV. n, note. 
 See INTRODUCTION. sed is; sc. id egit, as implied in what 
 follows. Ut contra Stoicos, as (i. e. since), it was against the Stoics. 
 He vehemently opposed the dogmatism of the Stoics, and held that 
 probability is the utmost that can be attained. See INTRODUCTION. 
 quod quidem exarserat is really parenthetic, posiverunt: 
 an archaic form. 
 
 84. ut possit ; depends on quaeramus. quasi decretum ; 
 
 The word decretum as a philosophical term in the sense of dogma, 
 was new to the Romans ; hence the quasi. Cf. Acad. II. IX. 29, 
 Quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum sentitis enim iam hoc me 
 
 dicer e^ etc. 
 
 XXX. Hieronymus ; Of Rhodes, about 300-260 B. C., was a 
 
disciple of Aristotle, and is classed as a Peripatetic, although Cicero 
 says of him, de Fin. V. V. 14, "I do not know why I should call 
 him a Peripateiic, for he defined the highest good to be freedom 
 from pain." naturae primis bonis ; Cicero in de Fin. V. VII. 18, 
 says, 
 
 "Some people consider the first desire to be a desire of pleasure, and the first 
 thing which men seek to ward off to be pain, others think that the first thing 
 wished for is freedom from pain, and the first thing shunned, pain ; and from these 
 men others proceed, who call the first goods natural ones ; among which they 
 reckon the safety and integrity of all one's parts, good health, the senses unimpaired, 
 freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and other things of the same sort, the images 
 or which are the first things in the mind, like the sparks and the seeds of the 
 virtues." 
 
 85. tria genera bonorifm : See VIII. 22, note; also IX. 25, 
 note. Dinomachus et Callipho : Of these philosophers little is 
 known. Cicero condemns their theory in de Off. III. XXIII. 119, 
 as follows ; "who supposed that they could reconcile the antagonis- 
 tic views of the Stoics and the Epicureans, by uniting the honorable 
 (virtue) with pleasure, like uniting man with beast." indolentiam, 
 freedom from pain. Diodorus : of Tyre, a disciple of Critolaus, 
 about, 1 10 B.C. Aristonis: See XVIII. 27, note. He differed 
 from Zeno in considering all the indifferent (d8td<popa) as equally 
 indifferent. Cf. XVI. 47, note. Pyrrhonis ; about 320 B. C. 
 A native of Elis and founder of the Sceptical or Pyrrhonian School 
 of Philosophy. He was probably influenced by the views of Democ- 
 ritus. He left no writings, but his pupil Timon of Phlius wrote vol- 
 uminously. ''When the Academy became sceptical there was no 
 room for an independent Pyrrhonist school, but it revived. . . .when 
 the Academy became identified with an eclectic dogmatism under 
 Antiochus." Pyrrho held that the wise man cares nothing for the 
 indifferent (ddtdyopa), Herilli: Herillus of Carthage, a disciple of 
 Zeno, hence a Stoic. He held, however, that knowledge (scientia) 
 is the highest good, evanuerunt ; Cic. in de Off. I. II. 6, says : 
 Atistonis, Pyrrhonis, Herilli tarn pridem eocplosa sententia est. Later 
 these views, permeated by a new principle, were revived with much 
 greater energy in the Christian Church, obtinere, maintain. Cf. 
 I. XII. 26. explicata, (adj.) clear. Cf. Cic. Plane. 2. 5, causa fad- 
 Us atque explicata. praeter Theophrastum^^^ Theophrasto, 
 the more common method of expression in prose. For the views of 
 
68 
 
 T. see IX. 24. 25, notes, licet : /. e. as their principles permit them 
 to do. exaggerent : See XVIII. 51, and note, ex conlatione, 
 in comparison (with virtue]. COnterere : as if to tread under foot. 
 In contrast with ad caelum extulerunt. quamquam . . . . sint : A. 
 311. a\ H. 515. III. N. I. i. 
 
 XXXI. 86. propendere: See Lex. s. v. II. A. Cf. XVIII. 51. 
 
 87. horum: Peripatetics and Academics. Virtue, with these, 
 is the "greater part," the absolute essential to a happy life, taurum : 
 
 See XXVI. 75. Aristotele, etc. See X. 30, note, minis 
 
 COrmpta : Zeugma ; the corrupta goes properly with blandintentis , 
 but we need some such word as territa for minis, minis aut blan- 
 dimentis : Bentley's emendation for minimis blandimentis. com- 
 plectitur : as in I. III. 5, orator em (=eloquentiam) complexi sumus. 
 longe et retro ponenda. This is the ms. reading. Some editors 
 omit the et, others change it to ei, the retro ponenda=postponenda. 
 habere SC angustius, are in greater straits, i. e. hampered, be- 
 cause virtue is not with them so essential to a happy life, desertum 
 ilium Carneadem: His views respecting the chief good, XXX. 84. 
 were not adopted by the later Academics. Antiochus, e. g. starts 
 with the Stoic/rwHfl naturae, but defining the highest good as life in 
 accordance with man's perfect nature, he includes in it bodily and 
 external goods as well as perfection of reason, and while virtue is 
 deemed sufficient for happiness, it does not suffice for the highest 
 happiness. For this other goods are necessary. We must not allow 
 too much weight to external goods, neither can we ignore them alto- 
 gether, nemo est enim eorum quin bonorum : There are 
 several different readings here, as nemo est enim qui eorum bonorum; 
 nemo est enim quin eorum bonorum ; nemo est enim quin veronim bono- 
 rum ; nemo est enim eorum qui bonorum. With our reading the nemo 
 eorum refers to those mentioned in the preceding sentence, ani- 
 
 mum esse iudicem ; The thought here and in the following is, 
 
 that, whatever maybe thought by the different schools of the relative 
 importance of the three classes of goods, goods of the mind, of the 
 body and external goods, all agree that the mind is the judge ; and 
 so all schools approximate the Stoic view that goods of the mind 
 (virtues) are the sole goods all others being indifferent ; for the 
 mind will interpret and soften bodily and external evils even for the 
 
6 9 
 
 Epicurean whose standard of happiness is pleasure, so that he can 
 be happy in pain, ea, quae bona malaque; /. e. corporis externaque. 
 
 88. quis: Who of these just named, voluptarium : Cf. II. 
 VII. 1 8, Epicurus, homo, ut scis voluptarius. enim diem quo mo- 
 ritur beatum appellat : See XXVI. 74, note, memoria et re- 
 COrdatione : reminisd denotes an act of the mind as momentary, 
 like in memoriam revocare; whereas recordari denotes it as of some 
 duration, like revocata in memoriam contemplari. D. confutat : 
 note the primary meaning of this word, ita sentit, lit . . . . putet : 
 Pleonasm. Z. 749, 750; so XXXIII. 95, sic. . . .praecipit, ut.... 
 putet. sensum exstinctum, consciousness is destroyed. Death is 
 annihilation, a dispersion of the atoms constituting the soul, certa, 
 fixed tenets, consolatur ; itsed with objects personal and imper- 
 sonal; in the latter case as here =&*/. 
 
 89. isti grandiloqui : the Stoics. Cicero was not in perfect 
 harmony with their ethics. Cf. XXXII. 90, nostrates philosophi. 
 paupertatem : considered here as an evil dreaded by the many, 
 regarded with indifference by the philosopher. Hence Neque tamen, 
 
 etc. Neque quisquam philosophorum ; [The wise man] 
 
 " like Epicurus can live on bread and water and at the same time 
 think himself as happy as Zeus." Zr. 
 
 XXXII. de tenui victu : Cf. III. XX. 49, tenuem victum antefert 
 copioso. Cicero criticises his view as inconsistent, omnia philosopho 
 digna, sed cum voluptate pugnantia. quae res: /. <?. amort, ambitioni, 
 etc. 
 
 90. Scythes Anacharsis : The importance of the adj. gives it 
 first place. Cf. Collegae sui consulis, Cn. Octavii, XIX. 55. Anacharsis 
 was brother of a Scythian king and came to Athens about 594 B. C. 
 He made the acquaintance of Solon. The Greeks admired his intelli- 
 gence and wisdom and the simplicity of his life. His brother slew 
 him on his return home, nostrates philosophi : In distinction 
 from foreigners like Anacharsis ; with special reference to the 
 Epicureans, facere : See Lex. s. v. II. E. Illius epistola: there 
 are several letters extant bearing his name, all of which are regarded 
 as spurious. Scythicum tegimen : Cf. Justin. II. 2, (Scythae) 
 pellibus ferinis aut murinis utuntur. quietum, contented, at ease. 
 quibus es delectatus : Greek o?c Ivrpixpare. 
 
 91. Xenocrates : See X. 30, note, talenta : the word means 
 
70 
 
 "the balance" and "the thing weighed." It was the highest measure 
 of weight among the Greeks, and came to designate a sum of money 
 consisting of coins equal to it in weight and value. The Attic talent 
 is usually meant. The reference is to silver, gold being rarely 
 issued. The talentum contains 6,000 drachmae. The drachma be- 
 fore the time of Solon contained 6.03 grains=i s. i d. After Solon 
 it retained the same value as a weight, but as a coin it sunk to 4.366 
 grs.=about 8d. The talentum, therefore, was worth about ^"200, 
 and was not a coin. The largest coin was of the value of ten 
 drachmae. Athenis praesertim : Athens, after the war with 
 Philip, was poor in comparison with the Greek cities in Italy and 
 Asia Minor, tantum ; evidently restrictive here. See Lex. s. v. 
 II. B. minas ; the mina (100 drachmae) was 1-60 of the talentum, 
 3, 6s. 8d. 
 
 92. Diogenes; 412-393 B.C. pupil of Antisthenes. He was 
 captured by pirates and sold as a slave to a gentleman of Corinth, 
 who freed him. His interview with Alexander the Great, was at 
 Corinth, and the latter is said to have admired him so greatly as to 
 have said, " If I were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes." 
 See INTRODUCTION, ut Cynicus ; /. e. as was natural, he being a 
 Cynic, eum and eius as well as illi and ille refer to regem Persa- 
 rum, the reflexive sufficiently distinguishing the speaker. 
 
 XXXIII. 93. diviserit ; "Desires of the ist class aim at the 
 removal of pain ; those of the 2d at the diveisification of pleasure; 
 and those of the 3d at the gratification of vanity, ambition, and 
 empty conceits generally." Cicero in de Fin. II. IX. criticises, with 
 some severity, this classification, paene nihilo ; Abl. price. 
 neque necessitatem modo sed ne naturam quidem attinge- 
 rent, and have to do neither with necessity nor nature, i. e. are neither 
 necessary nor natural. nequeet non, and a second non is implied 
 in this combination. A. 149. Vy H. 552. II. Observe the changes 
 of tense in this paragraph the writer at one time thinking of the 
 existing philosophy, and at another, taking the standpoint of its 
 author. 
 
 94. eaeque voluptates : /'. e. of the first and second classes. 
 
 extenuatur, are disparaged, quarum genera copiam : the 
 
 meaning of the author is not entirely clear. Some editors omit non 
 before contemnunt\ but this clause stands in opposition to the words 
 
funditus eiiciendas putavit, which applies to the third class of pleas- 
 ures, and so seems to require the negative in contrast. Taking 
 copiam in the sense of facidtatem we may understand the sense to 
 be that the Epicureans disparage individual pleasures of the first 
 and second classes, (/. e. think them not worthy of much effort) 
 while not rejecting the classes ; but they seek them when they may 
 be easily obtained and are harmless, (v. non obsit, infra.) See IN- 
 TRODUCTION. THE EPICUREANS, non genere aut loco aut or- 
 dine, not by family, or rank, or station, figura properly denotes 
 shape in its mathematical relation, whereas forma is the aesthetical 
 conception of the same. See D. s. Figura. The tropical meaning 
 quality or nature is best here. 
 
 95. optandam [et] expetendam ; better optandam expeten- 
 damque. Both words signify a wish, the latter, in addition, the 
 effort, through other?, to realize one's wish, compensatione : the 
 tropical use of this noun is confined to Cicero, voluptatemfugiat; 
 " He would have pleasure foresworn if it would entail a greater 
 corresponding pain." tamen ; rarely found at the end of a sen- 
 tence. 
 
 96. tam diu, dum ; with tam diu the correlative is often quam 
 diu, sometimes dum or quam alone, or even quoad, sentiret, iun- 
 geretur ; Bentley and others emend sentiat, iungetur; but it is not 
 uncommon to find a change in the tenses of the subjunctives de- 
 pendent on a present indicative [here praecipii\ which may be con- 
 sidered historical, memoria ; the abl. without cum is common 
 with the participles iunctus and coniunctus / not so with the verbs. 
 With the statements in paragraphs 95 and 96 compare the following: 
 
 " He [Epicurus] admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and 
 therefore a good thing, and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before 
 deciding in favor of a given pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its conse- 
 quences, and that we then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of 
 pleasure or pain in the result." Ueb. 
 
 " Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The more powerful 
 sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily but mental ; for while the 
 former are confined to the moment, the latter are connected with the past and fu- 
 ture, through memory and hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment." 
 Id. See INTRODUCTION, See also XXVI. 74, note. 
 
 XXXIV. 97. advictum: 
 
72 
 
 " Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, moderation, the accustom- 
 ing of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and intemperate 
 enjoyments, or, at most only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be 
 preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished." Ueb. 
 
 desideriis condiri. Cf. the proverb " fabas indulcet fames," 
 
 hunger sweetens beans or "appetite is the best sauce." Darius: Co- 
 domannus (?), last king of Persia, 336-331 B. C. was conquered by 
 Alexander the Great. The same story is related of Artaxerxes. 
 See in Plutarch's Lives, Artaxerxes. PtolemaeilS. Ptolemaeus I., 
 Soter (?) son of Lagus, reigned 323-285 B. C. He accompanied 
 Alexander the Great. Later he attacked Jerusalem on the Sabbath 
 day and thus made himself master of the city, cibarius. . . .panis. 
 Cf. Isid. Orig. XX. 2, Pants cibarius est, qui ad cibum servis datur, nee 
 delicatus; called by Celsus hordeaceus. contentius; from contendere. 
 
 opsonare . . . famem; Cf. de Fin. II. XXVIII. 90, Socratem 
 
 audio dicentem cibi condimentum esse famem, 
 
 98. philitiis ; or pheiditiis, the Spartan name for the Syssitia or 
 daily public meals of the Spartans and Cretans. The meals were 
 confined to men and youth, who were obliged to attend them. The 
 guests were divided into messes of about fifteen members each. The 
 principal dish was meat cooked in blood with a seasoning of salt and 
 vinegar (called black broth [v. infra] ), with barley bread and wine. 
 Temperance was strictly enforced. These meals served the purpose 
 of uniting the citizens closely by ties of union and intimacy, strength- 
 ening the feeling of nationally. At sparta the messes were formed 
 into corresponding military divisions, and fought more bravely than 
 would mere chance comrades. See Diet. Antiq. s. Syssitia. Diony- 
 sius ; the Elder. Quae tandem ; sc. condimenta. ad Euro t am, 
 along the Eurotas. Bentley's emendation for the ms. reading, ab 
 Eurota. ex bestiis ; for ex bestiarum more, a case of abbreviated 
 comparison, ut quicquid obiectum est ; for ut aliquid obiectum 
 est, quicquid est. 
 
 99. a Xenophonte : in the Cyropaedia. Cf. de Fin. II. XXVIII. 
 92. COpia facili, by the facility with which they are obtained. Cf. 
 copiam, XXXIII. 94. siccitatem, firmness (of body)', freedom from 
 gross humors. See Lex. s. v. B. 3. 
 
 100. turn intelleges ; is connected in thought with Adde 
 
 adde, as well as with confer. 
 
73 
 
 XXXV. Timotheum ; Son of Conon, and a distinguished Athe- 
 nian general; appointed to a public command in 378 B. C. Died 
 in exile, epistola Platonis ; among Piato's writings are included 
 thirteen letters, which are universally regarded as spurious. The 
 seventh and eighth were perhaps written by Plato's disciples. The 
 former is the most famous of them (here termed praeclara] and 
 relates to the assassination of Dion (353 B. C.), between whom and 
 the younger Dionysius he had tried to effect a reconciliation, his 
 third visit to Syracuse (about 360 B. C.) having been fruitlessly 
 made with that object. Cf. XX. 59, civem suam, note. Hst.... 
 
 epistola ad propinquos: note the omission of scripta. Quo 
 
 cum venissem: referenced to his first visit to Syracuse, about 
 389 B. C. when he incurred the displeasure of the elder Dionysius, 
 and is said to have been sold by him into slavery, ferebatur: See 
 Lex. s. fero, II. 7. Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum : 
 These were in Greece proverbial for luxury. The word Sybarite, 
 derived from Sybaris, a Greek town in Italy, has come into our lan- 
 guage as a synonym of luxury and voluptousness. Syracusiarumque; 
 There are three adjective forms from Syracusae, viz : Syracusanus, 
 Syracosius (Greek) and Syracusius. The latter, used here, is rare 
 and is found but twice in Cicero. The second is a collateral form 
 of the third, and is poetic, bis in die ; A. 256. a; H. 429. I. 
 comitantur huic vitae. Cf. XXIV. 68, note. 
 
 1 01. temperari, to be organized. Cf. I. X. 21, temper atione. Sar- 
 danapalli according to Ctesias and Diodorus Siculus, Sardana- 
 pallus was the last King of the Assyrian (Syrtae=Assyriae) empire 
 and destroyed himself in 876 B. C. 
 
 The story as told by Ctesias is that he was effeminate and licentious and after 
 suffering a siege of two years collected all his treasures and his wives on an immense 
 pyre and perished with them in the flames. Rawlinson thinks that the Sardana- 
 pallus of Ctesias represents both Asshur-dani-pal, and Asshur-emit-ilin (according 
 to him the Saracus of Abydenus), in whose time Assyria fell into the hands of the 
 Medes. On the accession of the former, 667 B. C. , the empire was at the height of 
 its glory and magnitude. His buildings were without rival for size and splendor ; 
 his palaces were richly adorned with the precious metals and sculpture, and Assyr- 
 ian culture reached its culminating point. The libraries at Nineveh were the finest 
 that had ever existed, and learned men were attracted to the court. Many valua- 
 ble cuneiform inscriptions belong to this reign. It is also said of Saracus that he 
 burned himself in his palace on the revolt of Nabopolassar, father of the Nebuchad- 
 rezzar of the Scriptures. 
 
 10 
 
74 
 
 Haec babeo ; Cic. quotes but two of the six verses of which the 
 inscription consists. Strabo gives it entire, iacent ; are lost. 
 
 102. cur=cui ret, to which corresponds the reply in the datives 
 sigm's, tdbulis, ludis. ubi=gua in re. paupertas ; corresponds to 
 tenues homines, men of slender means. See below, putlgit aliquid : 
 conscience troubles them, because most of these works of art found 
 in Roman houses and villas were forcibly or secretly taken from 
 Greek cities and temples. 
 
 XXXVI. 103. popularis offensio, unpopularity. In 106 the 
 same is expressed in the words, offensam populi voluntatemj opposed 
 to gratia popularis or aura popularis, or, as below, commendatio in 
 vulgus. Cf. Hor. Arbitrio popularis aurae. vide ne; a modest 
 form of expression. Cf. I. XXXIV. 83. Z. 534. leviculus, somewhat 
 vain. Found only here in this sense. Quid hoc levius : Pliny 
 the younger, Epist. IX. 23, takes a diiferent view of the case ; De- 
 mosthenes iure laetatus est, quod ilium anus Attica ita noscitavit j 
 Our6$ <TTI Ayfjioadevrfi. apad alios; See Lex. s. apud. B. 2. d. 
 non multum ipse secum; elsewhere Cicero speaks much more 
 considerately and justly of Demosthenes, e. g. Or. VII. 23, hoc nee 
 gravior exstitit quisquam nee callidior nee temperantior . 
 
 104. Democritus; A Greek philosopher born at Abdera in 
 Thrace about 460 B. C., the founder, with Leucippus, of the 
 Atomic theory of Greek philosophy. Although he traveled a great 
 deal, it is not certain that he was ever at Athens. However Vale- 
 rius Maximus writes : [Democritus] Athenis compluribus annis mora- 
 tus .... ignotus illi urbi vixit, quod ipse in quodam volumine testatur. 
 
 a gloria afuisse, indifferent to fame. An tibicines, etc. Cf. I. 
 
 XIV. 31, Ergo arbor es seret . . . .vir magnus ... .non seret ? mill to 
 arte maiore; A. 344.^. and b. note; H. 561. III. aliquid esse; 
 aliquid in this use= aliquid magnum. See Lex. s. v. II. C. i. Cf. I. 
 XX. 45. ambitiones, canvassing for office. How does ambitus 
 differ from ambitio ? ante quam poenitere coepit ; Cicero re- 
 flects bitterly on his own experience. 
 
 105. est; often used alone to introduce quotations=.fm^z# 
 est. Heraclitum ; Heraclitus, of Ephesus about 535-475 B. C., 
 called " the Obscure. " He held that the ultimate principle of all 
 existence is fire, and that all things are in a constant flux or flow. 
 
75 
 
 Plato and especially the Stoics were indebted to Heraclitus. Frag- 
 ments of his great work "On Nature" have come down to us. 
 Hermodoro: Hermodorus is said to have gone to Rome after his 
 expulsion, and to have assisted the decemvirs in drawing up the 
 laws of the Twelve Tables, 451 B. C. unus; adds emphasis. Cf. 
 unus quisque and unus with superlatives, excel lat, sit; A. 266; H. 
 483. exsuperantiam; occurs only here in Cicero. Aristides; 
 " the Just" fl. 490-471 B. C., was the political opponent of The- 
 mistocles. He was ostracized but recalled, and died very poor but 
 highly honored. Graecorum quam nostra; sc. exempla. con- 
 trahunt, have dealings, intercourse; a business term but used beyond 
 the sphere of business, iis litteris; in same construction as otio 
 litterato. 
 
 XXXVII. 106. credo : ironical as in XXXV. 102. paulo 
 ante dictus est: At XXXVI. 103. abesse patria; Cicero usually 
 repeats the preposition. He uses abesse to designate his banishment 
 from Rome, bonis: A. 220. b, i, and 252. note; H. 410. III. 
 
 107. parum multa; Cf. I. XLV. iog,parumdiu. rerum natu- 
 ram ; /. e. the reality. Xenocrates ; See X. 30, note. He ac- 
 companied Plato to Syracuse, and was sent on repeated embassies 
 to Philip of Macedonia. He was a native of Chalcedon. Grantor; 
 of Soli in Cilicia, an Academic philosopher and disciple of Xeno- 
 crates about 300 B. C. His most celebrated work was "On Grief," 
 of which Cicero made much use in his Consolatio. Cf. I. XLVIII. 
 115. Arcesilas : A native of Pitane in Aeolis, and founder of the 
 second or Middle Academy. Fl. 250 B. C. A disciple of Theo- 
 phrastus, Polemo and Grantor. Lacydes : A native of Cyrene and 
 successor of Arcesilas as president of the Academy at Athens. Died 
 215 B. C. Aristoteles; See X. 30, note. Theophrastus ; See 
 IX. 24, note. Zeno ; See IX. 27, note. Cleanthes : A disciple 
 and the successor of Zeno 263 B. C., born at Assos in Troas. His 
 Hymn to Zeus is still extant. It is given in full in Ueberweg, and 
 the translation in Peter's "Specimens of Ancient Poets," and in 
 Cocker's " Christianity and Greek Philosophy." Chrysippus : One 
 of the greatest of the Stoics, born at Soli in Cilicia in 280 B. C.; a 
 disciple of Cleanthes, and the first to put Stoicism on a sound ration- 
 al basis. He is called the second founder of the school, and it was 
 said that " without Chrysippus the Stoa had not existed." Anti- 
 
7 6 
 
 pater : Another Stoic, born at Tarsus, and fl. 144 B. C. Carne- 
 ades: See IV. n, note. Panaetius : A Stoic, native of Rhodes, 
 disciple of Antipater, at Rome the friend of Laelius and the younger 
 Scipio Africanus. Died at Athens about in B. C. Clitomachus: 
 A Carthaginian, disciple of Carmades at Athens, and his successor 
 as the head of the Middle Academy, B. C. 129. Philo : of Larissa, 
 a disciple of Clitomachus. He settled in Rome B. C. 88, and Cicero 
 listened to his lectures. Antiochus : See VIII. 22, note. Posi- 
 donius: A Stoic, from Apamea in Syria, B. C. 135, studied under 
 Panaetius at Athens. He traveled widely and then settled in 
 Rhodes, where Cicero attended his lectures. Afterwards he came 
 
 to Rome. At enim sine ignominia adficere sapientem ; 
 
 This reading of the best mss. is plainly incomplete. Various read- 
 ings have been proposed. Other mss. have non before sine and the 
 word poterit is found in a few. The word ignominia may have oc- 
 curred twice in the original and an early copyist failed by oversight 
 to repeat it, the error being perpetuated. Hence Orelli's emenda- 
 tion, ' At enim sine ignominia' Ignominia poterit afficere sapientem? 
 May not the reading possibly be, At enim non sine ignominia afficere 
 poterit sapientem, where exsilium is supplied from above as subject of 
 potent? Heine suggests that the omission might be supplied thus: 
 ' At emm sine ignominia \horum exilium fuit.' ' An poterit quicquam 
 ignominid\ afficere sapientem' Tischer reads, ''At enim sine ignominia' 
 An potest exsilium ignominia adficere sapientem ? At enim : the 
 enim introduces a reason for the objection implied in at. non 
 Oportet : What kind of obligation denoted by oportet? See D. s. 
 Necesse est. 
 
 108. queant : denotes ability as the consequence of complete 
 qualification. D. s. Posse. Cf. Barbari. . . .ferro decertare acer- 
 rime possunt) aegrotare viriliter non queunt; and infra, XLI. 118, quas 
 ferre nequeas. Patria est, etc. From the Teucer, a tragedy of 
 Pacuvius. What is the story of Teucer, son of Telamon ? Cf. Hor. 
 Od. I. 7, vs. 21-32. Cf. also Pub. Syr. patria tua est ubicumquevixeris 
 bene. The sentence became a proverb with the Greeks and Romans. 
 Mundanum : a word coined by Cicero, and occurring as an adjec- 
 tive in late Latin. The apothegm here stated is frequently quoted, 
 and is sometimes attributed to other philosophers. T. Albucius : 
 A careful student of Greek literature ; satirized by Lucilius. He 
 
77 
 
 was praetor in Sardinia in 105 B. C.; was afterwards condemned for 
 extortion. He retired to Athens and pursued the study of philoso- 
 phy. An adherent of the Epicurean school. Epicuri legibus : 
 Epicurus taught that the " wise man" should not entangle himself 
 in the affairs of state. 
 
 109. in patria: See IX. 26, note. Metrodorus : A native of 
 Lampsacus (some say of Athens), a distinguished disciple of Epicu- 
 rus. Metrodorus made happiness consist in having a well-consti- 
 tuted body; a good digestion was his test of happiness. See IX. 
 27, note. Plato, Polemo : natives of Athens. Xenocrates, 
 Arcesilas : strangers who had moved to Athens. Damaratus : 
 the Doric form for Demaratus; a noble of Corinth, who, when Cyp- 
 selus overthrew his clan, 657*8. C., fled to Etruria and settled at 
 Tarquinii. tyrannum Cypselum : reigned from 658 to 628 B. C. 
 For the origin of his name see Clas. Diet. 
 
 XXXVIII. no. sollicitudines : has reference to fiiture evils, 
 aegritudines to present ills. How does the latter word differ in 
 meaning from aegrotatio ? traductis animis : The Epicureans 
 taught that every being naturally seeks to acquire happiness which 
 is synonymous with pleasure, that virtue is the only sure path to 
 happiness, and that the wise man possesses virtue and is, therefore, 
 always happy. Yet, virtue is not the chief good, but pleasure, and 
 the former is chosen for the sake of the latter, in pluribus bonis 
 esse, abounds in good things, ut sapiens semper beatus sit : 
 after speaking at length of blindness and deafness in the following 
 paragraphs, Cicero resumes the thread of thought here broken off in 
 paragraph 1 19. 
 
 in. aspectu : aspectus differs from conspectus, as the active from 
 the passive. D. non versari in, are not concerned with ; i. e. not 
 the eyes but the mind receives pleasure in the sight of a pleasing 
 object, while with the senses of taste, smell, touch and hearing the 
 organs of sense are the seat of pleasure, in OClilis tale nihil fit : 
 a change is here made to the direct discourse, animus accipit 
 quae videmus : Cf. I. XX. 46, animum et videre et audire. But 
 with the Epicureans all sensation is reduced to touch it is produced 
 by the impact upon the various organs of sense, of infinitely small, 
 film-like emanations from bodies, non ferme=/^# fere, not easily. 
 
7 8 
 
 adhibet OCUlos advocates, avails himself of (needs) the aid of the 
 eyes. 
 
 112. Antipatri: Antipater is said to have been a disciple of 
 Aristippus, the founder or the Cyrenaic school. Not the Antipater 
 mentioned in paragraph 107. See notes, est quidem : Editors 
 now write est id quidem, as required by the Latin idiom. When 
 an opposition between two predicates occurs, quidem is never added 
 to the verb or adjective unless the subject in the form of a pronoun 
 is repeated, obscenius : A. 93, a ; H. 444. I. Appium : Appius 
 Claudius Caecus was of a proud aristocratic family. When censor 
 (312 B. C.) he built the Appian aqueduct and commenced the famous 
 Appian way. He was consul in 307 and in 296. In 280 he was 
 carried into the Senate house, and in an eloquent speech persuaded 
 the senate to reject the terms of peace proposed by Pyrrhus and 
 brought by Cineas. Cf. Cat. M. 6. 16 and n. 37. C. Drusi : This 
 Drusus, distinguished as a jurist and an orator, was a brother of M. 
 Livius Drusus who was the ablest of the Roman demagogues and 
 patron of the Italians. Pueris nobis : In what year was Cicero 
 born? When die? Cn. Aufidius : Was quaestor in 1196. C., 
 tribunus plebis in 114, and praetor in 108. Cf. de Fin. V. XIX. 54, 
 Equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetoris, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe 
 audiebam, quum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret. 
 
 Graecam historiam : "Of his Graeca historia we possess no 
 
 fragments; but there is no doubt it treated of the history of Rome." 
 Teuffel. 
 
 XXXIX. 113. Diodotus : A teacher of Cicero, especially in 
 dialectics; died in the year 59 B. C. at Cicero's house, and left the 
 latter a property worth about a hundred thousand sesterces, (nearly 
 $50,000). Learned Greeks enjoyed the literary society of distin- 
 guished Romans, and became members of Roman families for that 
 purpose, often instructing the children although in no need of such 
 means of support, domui : the locative form of domus in the fourth 
 declension. A. 70. g. quod credibile vix esset : There is an 
 ellipsis of the condition, if I had not myself witnessed it. cum .... 
 
 versaretur et cum uteretur, cumque legerentur 
 
 turn tuebatur : A. 326, b ; H. 521. 2. 2). Note i. Pythag- 
 
 oreorum more : The Greeks gave considerable attention to 
 music, while with the Romans there was little if any native develop- 
 
79 
 
 ment of it. The early Romans knew nothing of stringed instru- 
 ments, the short and slender Latian flute with four holes being their 
 sole musical instrument. The Greeks had a number of instruments. 
 Pythagoras studied music scientifically and discovered the numerical 
 relations of the octave, the fifth and the fourth. The Pythagorean 
 school continued the investigations. Aristoxenus (see I. X. 20), a 
 pupil of Aristotle and a Pythagorean, was the greatest authority on 
 music among the ancients. It may be added that the mathematician 
 Euclid and the astronomer Ptolemaeus wrote on music, legeren- 
 tur=recitarentur. munus tuebatur, attended to the duties of a 
 teacher. Cf.i. XLV. 109, virtutis functus est munere. Asclepiadem: 
 Asdepiades of Phlius, 300 B. C. friend and disciple of Menedemus 
 of Eretria, who founded the Eretrian school. The teachings of this 
 school are little known but are said to resemble those of the Megar- 
 ian school. The latter united the views of the Eleatics with the 
 ethical and dialectical principles of Socrates. Cf. Acad. II. XLII. 
 129, A Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriad appellati, 
 quorum omne bonum in mente positum ac mentis acie, qua verum cerne- 
 retur. puero ut uno esset comitatior: The allusion is to the 
 custom of the wealthy being escorted by friends and clients. As- 
 clepiades, although without such attendance, says in jest that his 
 blindness has added another to his attendants, namely a boy to lead 
 
 him about, ut esset comitatior : A result clause. Cicero 
 
 frequently employs comitatus in a passive sense, si liceat: sc. para- 
 sitari or mendicare. Many Greek scholars at Rome stood in the 
 relation of parasites to wealthy Romans. Cicero would not degrade 
 them. 
 
 114. luminibus amissis : This is doubtful. The tradition is 
 that he deprived himself of sight in order that he might the better 
 concentrate his thoughts on philosophic study, scilicet : concess- 
 ive, bona mala: See XXVI. 73, note. R. 2204. magna parva: 
 not in the sense of size, aspectu OCUlorum, the sense or power of 
 sight. Cf, I. XXX. 73, aspectum omnino amitterent ; and XXXVIII. 
 III. oculorum is a subjec. gen. ille. . . . peregrinabatur : sc. animo. 
 His knowledge was extensive ; no Greek before Aristotle was as 
 learned ; and he left works on physics, ethics, astronomy, mathe- 
 matics, art, and literature, of which scanty fragments remain. The 
 lively and attractive style of his writings is praised. Homerum 
 
8o 
 
 caecum fuisse ; The tradition that Homer was blind in his old 
 age may have arisen from the fancy that the blind singer in the 
 Odyssey was a prototype of Homer, and because the author of the 
 hymn to the Delian Apollo, (supposed by the ancients to be Homer), 
 represented him as blind. picturam ; Lucian calls Homer 
 ^O.&pufTOS TCOV fpa<f>sa)v, the best of painters. 
 
 115. Anaxagoras ; See IV. 10. Anaxagoras died in quasi ban- 
 ishment at Lampsacus. He gave philosophy a home at Athens, and 
 is above all distinguished as the first philosopher to introduce a 
 spiritual element beside the material a sort of dualism. Cf. I. 
 XLIII. 104. Tiresiam ; The blind soothsayer of Thebes. His 
 blindness is variously accounted for. He possessed the gift of proph- 
 ecy, and figures in the wars of the Seven against Thebes and the 
 Epigoni. Polyphemum : Cicero seems to be in error in referring 
 this story to Homer as it does not occur there. There were different 
 conceptions of the Cyclopes, (round-eyed ones) among the ancients. 
 Hesiod makes them the sons of Uranus and Gaea, and three in 
 number, with a single eye in the forehead. They later forged Jove's 
 thunderbolts. Homer represents them as living a pastoral life, and 
 a later age placed them in Sicily and identified them with the Cy- 
 clopes of Hesiod. Polyphemus appears in Homer as suffering the 
 deprivation of his eye by the cunning device of Odysseus. A later 
 legend made him the lover of the nymph Galatea, and the poets 
 Philoxenus and Theocritus have made the story famous. Propertius 
 says, "quin etiam, Polypheme, fera Galatea sub Aetna ad tua rorantes 
 carmina flexit equos." It was a third variety of Cyclopes that built 
 the Cyclopean walls at Mycenae, Tiryns, Argos, etc. colloquentem 
 facit eiusque laudare fortunas : Observe the two constructions 
 after facit, in the sense of representing. Z. 618. Note; A. 292. e; 
 H. 535. I. 4, and see Lex. s. v. B. 4 (7-). fortunas ; For other in- 
 stances of the use of the plural for the sing, of this word, see Lex. 
 s. for tuna, 2. B. fin. 
 
 XL. 116. surdaster : a form of the diminutive, of rare occur- 
 rence. This word occurs only here. Cf. oleaster, parasitaster , pi- 
 naster, and our poetaster. See Roby, vol. I. 889. M. Crassus : 
 surnamed Dives, the triumvir. He was a shrewd speculator, and 
 had the reputation of being avaricious, male audiebat: The word 
 
8i 
 
 audire has here the sense " to be named, or styled somehow" (as Greek 
 dxouw). Thus male audtre=to be in ill repute, to hear evil of one's 
 self =xaxa)<; dxoueev. Cicero plays upon words ; for being a little 
 deaf (surdaster), male audiebat would be true of Crassus in two senses. 
 See Lex. s. audio II. D. Epicure! : This word is found in all mss. 
 Wolf rejects it. It may be simply one of Cicero's thrusts at the 
 school whose teachings he opposes. Cf. I. III. 5, 6. omnesque 
 
 [id] Surdi : id is omitted in some mss. If it stands, it makes 
 
 with surdi an anacoluthon. A better reading is item in place of fd, 
 and remove the brackets from surdi. legendis his : his=cantibus, 
 i. e. the words or verses. 
 
 117. paulo ante ; At ^XXXVIII. in. secum loqui : See 
 XXXVI. 103. captus sit=privatus sit. See Lex. s. capio I. B. 
 i. e. primum ; correlative to sin forte, quid est....quod 
 laboremus ; A. 320; H. 503. I. Note 2, portus enim praesto 
 est ; Cf. I. XXX. 74. In the Stoic ethics life is regarded as among 
 things indifferent, suicide is permitted as a rational means of termi- 
 nating it, but only by the sage, ibidem ; at the time when suffer- 
 ing most. This word is omitted by some editors, and Bentley omits 
 as a silly gloss quoniam mors ibidem est, and T. brackets the words. 
 Others insert quidem after quoniam. nihil sentiendi ; Cf. I. XLIII. 
 102, de nihil sentiendo. Theodorus : of Cyrene, designated as the 
 Atheist, a disciple of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. 
 See INTRODUCTION. He went to Athens and later to Alexandria, 
 finally returning to Cyrene. While in the service of Ptolemy, king 
 of the Macedonian dynasty in Egypt, he was sent as an embassy to 
 Lysimachus, king of Thrace, who threatened to crucify him on 
 account of his freedom of speech. Cf. I. XLIII. 102. vero ; iron- 
 ical. Cantharidis vim ; the cantharis was used by the ancients 
 as a poison. It is a question whether it was the same insect that 
 is now known by that name the Spanish fly which is bruised and 
 used as a vesicatory. Cic. says, C. Carbo, accusante L. Crasso, Can- 
 tharidas sumpsisse dicitur. Ad. Fam. IX. 21.3. 
 
 1 1 8. Paulus ; L, Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus (230-160 B.C.) 
 was one of the most upright of the Roman nobles. In his second 
 consulship, 168 B. C., he defeated (on June 2d) at Pydna, the last 
 king of Macedonia, Perses. The triumph of Paulus was celebrated 
 
82 
 
 Nov. 3oth, 167, and before the triumphal car walked the captive 
 king and his children. Persi J Perses was cast into a dungeon after 
 the triumph of Paulus, but was released at the intercession of the 
 latter and permitted to end his days in an honorable captivity at 
 Alba. Perses is declined as an a or e stem, but Sallust and Tacitus 
 write the gen. Persi, and Cicero and Livy have the same form for 
 the dative. In this passage some editors have Persae, and Roby I. 
 482, remarks, " The name of the Macedonian king Perseus had an e 
 stem used in Cicero, and an eu stem used in Livy. Other writers 
 generally follow Livy." 
 
 XLI. obtinetur, is observed; not obtinet because this verb is 
 never neuter in Cicero. See Lex. aut bibat and abeat : The 
 Greek has y nWe ^ oxide, either drink or depart, and the German sauf 
 oder lauf. inquit: indefinite subject, violentiam vinolentorum : 
 A play upon words. Cf. III. XXVII. 64, Pueros vero matres.... 
 castigare . . . . solent, nee verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus. Haec 
 eadem : See XXXVIII. no, and II. VI. 15. Hieronymus : of 
 Rhodes, a Peripatetic. See XXX. 84. He held that the highest 
 good consists in freedom from pain, cf. II. VI. 15 ; while Aristotle 
 taught that complete happiness results from the rational and virtuous 
 activity of the soul, together with the presence of certain external 
 goods. See IX. 25, note. 
 
 119. ut virtus per se ipsa nihil valeat : What was the Epi- 
 curean view of the relation of virtue to pleasure ? profectis : from 
 proficiscor. Dat. Quorum alii: The Peripatetics and the Academ- 
 ics. See XVI. 47 ; XXVI. 75 and notes, alii autem : The Stoics. 
 See VIII. 22 ; X. 29, note. 
 
 120. honorarius arbiter : i.e. chosen by the parties and not 
 by the praetor. For the functions, etc. of the arbiter see Morey's 
 Outlines of Roman Law, pg. 390. Carneades : See XXIX. 83, 
 note. commoda=praeaj>ua. See XVI. 47, note, causam esse 
 discrepandi: Cf. XXVI. 75, note, hunc locum, this point; i.e. 
 respecting the summum bonum, and that a wise man lives happily. 
 ceterarum disciplinarum : Of other schools than those just men- 
 tioned, which in re if not in verbis agreed with one another. VOCC= 
 sententia. 
 
 121. eundum : To the city from his Tusculan villa, ubi, 
 wherein hoiv. cuicuimodi : Roby I. 382; A. 105, . Note;H. 
 
83 
 
 187. 4- Note, alteros quinque: He had already written and dedi- 
 cated to Brutus the five books De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. 
 lacessiti : Cic. may refer to Brutus' work, De Virtute, which was 
 dedicated to him. See I. i. profuturi simus dixerim : Ob- 
 serve the change of number. It is not probable that Cicero intended 
 to include Brutus in the plural verb any more than in the nostris 
 following. 
 
 Without doubt Cicero alleviated very materially his personal sor- 
 rows and his political anxieties by the congenial diversion of philo- 
 sophical study and composition. 
 
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