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 THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR 
 
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 M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 
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THE THOUGHTS OF 
 
 THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS 
 
 ANTONINUS. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG. 
 
 LONDON: 
 BELL AND DALDY, FLEET STREET. 
 
 1862. 
 
M. AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 ANTONINUS was born at Rome 
 A. D. 121, on the 26th of April. 20'*:. 
 His father Annius Verus died 
 while he was praetor. His mother 
 was Domitia Calvilla also named 
 Lucilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married 
 Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius 
 Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. 
 When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and de- 
 clared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus 
 Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the 
 son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose , 
 
 original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus " u> " 1 
 took the name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus to 
 which was added the title of Caesar in A. D. 139 : 
 the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, 
 and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. 
 When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped 
 the name of Verus and took the name of Anto- 
 ninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. 
 Aurelius Antoninus or simply M. Antoninus, 
 b 
 
vi M. AURELIUS 
 
 The youth was most carefully brought up. He 
 thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- 
 fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, 
 good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly 
 everything good. He had the happy fortune to 
 witness the example of his uncle and adoptive 
 father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in 
 his work (i. 16; vi. 30) the virtues of this ex- 
 cellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young 
 Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied 
 rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius 
 Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There 
 are extant letters between Fronto and Marcus, 
 which show the great affection of the pupil for 
 the master, and the master's great hopes of his in- 
 dustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto 
 (i. 11) among those to whom 'he was indebted for 
 his education. 
 
 When he was eleven years old, he assumed the 
 dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, 
 became a hard student, and lived a most labori- 
 ous abstemious life, even so far as to injure his 
 health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhe- 
 toric for philosophy, and he attached himself to 
 the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect 
 the study of law, which was a useful preparation 
 for the high place which he was designed to fill. 
 His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus a distin- 
 guished jurist. We must suppose that he learned 
 the Roman discipline of arms, which was a neces- 
 sary part of the education of a man who afterwards 
 led his troops to battle against a warlike race. 
 
ANTONINUS. vii 
 
 Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
 names of his teachers and the obligations which 
 he owed to each of them. The way in which he 
 speaks of what he learned from them might seem 
 to savour of vanity or self-praise, if we look care- 
 lessly at the way in which he has expressed him- 
 self ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will 
 be mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate 
 the merits of his several teachers, what they taught 
 and what a pupil might learn from them. Be- 
 sides, this book like the eleven other books was 
 for his own use, and if we may trust the note at 
 the end of the first book, it was written during i 
 one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against the \ 
 Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of the 
 virtues of his illustrious teachers might remind 
 him of their lessons and the practical uses which 
 he might derive from them. 
 
 Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus 
 of Chaeroneia a grandson of Plutarch. What he 
 learned from this excellent man is told by him- 
 self (i. 9). His favourite teacher was Q. Junius 
 Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher and also a man of 
 practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus 
 was the adviser of Antoninus after he became 
 emperor. Young men who are destined for high 
 places are not often fortunate in those who are 
 about them, their companions and teachers ; and 
 I do not know any example of a young prince 
 having had an education which can be compared 
 with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of 
 teachers distinguished by their acquirements and 
 
viii M. AURELIUS 
 
 their character will hardly be collected again ; 
 and as to the pupil, we have not had one like 
 him since. 
 
 Hadrian died in July A. D. 138, and was suc- 
 ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- 
 ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, 
 probably about A.D. 146, for he had a daughter 
 born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his 
 adoptive father the title of Caesar and was associ- 
 ated with him in the administration of the state. 
 The father and the adopted son lived together 
 in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus 
 was a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved 
 and esteemed him. 
 
 Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The 
 Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take 
 the sole administration of the empire, but he as- 
 sociated with himself the other adopted son of 
 Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally 
 called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time 
 had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man 
 of pleasure and unworthy of his station. Anto- 
 ninus however bore with him, and it is said that 
 Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague 
 the respect due to his character. A virtuous 
 emperor and a loose partner lived together in 
 peace, and their alliance was strengthened by 
 Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter 
 Lucilla. 
 
 The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by 
 a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
 mand, but he did nothing, and the success that 
 
ANTONINUS. ix 
 
 was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on 
 the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. 
 This Parthian war ended in 165. 
 
 The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
 rude people beyond the Alps from the borders 
 of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. 
 These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as 
 the Germanic nations had attempted near three 
 hundred years before ; and the rest of the life of 
 Antoninus with some intervals was employed in 
 driving back the invaders. In 169 Verus sud- 
 denly died, and Antoninus administered the state 
 alone. 
 
 In A. D. 175 Avidius Cassius a brave and skil- 
 ful Roman commander who was at the head of 
 the troops in Asia revolted and declared himself 
 Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some 
 of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an end. 
 Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment 
 of the family and the partizans of Cassius, and 
 his letter to the senate in which he recommends 
 mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, Avidius Cassius, 
 c. 12.) 
 
 Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of 
 Cassius' revolt. We know that in A. D. 174 he 
 was engaged in a war against the Quadi, Marco- 
 manni and other Germanic tribes, and it is pro- 
 bable that he went direct from the German war 
 without returning to Rome. His wife Faustina 
 who accompanied him into Asia died suddenly at 
 the foot of the Taurus to the great grief of her 
 husband, Capitolinus who has written the life 
 
x M. AURELIUS 
 
 .of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the 
 empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband 
 and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 
 says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- 
 tended not to know it. Nothing is so common 
 as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
 history of imperial Rome is full of them. Anto- 
 ninus loved his wife and he says that she was 
 " obedient, affectionate and simple." The same 
 scandal had been spread about Faustina's mother, 
 the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was 
 perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius 
 says in a letter to Fronto that he would rather 
 live in exile with his wife than in his palace at 
 Rome without her. There are not many men 
 who would give their wives a better character 
 than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in 
 the time of Diocletian. He may have intended 
 to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble bio- 
 grapher. Dion Cassius, the must malignant of 
 historians, always reports and perhaps he believed 
 any scandal against anybody. 
 
 Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and 
 Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens 
 he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. 
 It was the practice of the emperor to conform to 
 the established rites of the age and to perform 
 religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We 
 cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- 
 tious man, though we might perhaps do so, if his 
 book did not show that he was not. But this 
 is only one among many instances that a ruler's 
 
ANTONINUS. xi 
 
 public acts do not always prove his real opinions. 
 A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even 
 the superstitions of his people, and though he 
 may wish that they were wiser, he will know that 
 he cannot make them so by offending their pre- 
 judices. 
 
 Antoninus and his son Commodus entered 
 Rome in triumph on the 23rd of December A. D. 
 176. In the following year Commodus was asso- 
 ciated with his father in the empire and took the 
 name of Augustus. This year A. D. 177 is memo- 
 rable in ecclesiastical history. Attains and others 
 were put to death at Lyon for their adherence 
 to the Christian religion. The evidence of this 
 persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius 
 (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, 
 vol. i. with notes). The letter is from the Chris- 
 tians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienne 
 and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in Asia 
 and Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly 
 entire. It contains a very particular description of 
 the tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, 
 and it states that while the persecution was going 
 on, Attains a Christian and a Roman citizen was 
 loudly demanded by the populace and brought 
 into the amphitheatre, but the governor ordered 
 him to be reserved with the rest who were in pri- 
 son, until he had received instructions from the 
 emperor. It is not clear who the " rest" were who 
 are mentioned in the letter. Many had been 
 tortured before the governor thought of applying 
 to the emperor. The imperial rescript, says the 
 
xii M. AURELIUS 
 
 letter, was that the Christians should be punished, 
 but if they would deny their faith, they must be 
 released. On this the work began again. The 
 Christians who were Roman citizens were be- 
 headed : the rest were exposed to the wild beasts 
 in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers on 
 ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, 
 say nothing of the wonderful stories of the mar- 
 tyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was 
 burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one 
 sore and had lost all human form, but on being 
 put to the rack he recovered his former appear- 
 ance under the torture, which was thus a cure 
 instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
 torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
 roasted. He died at last. 
 
 The letter is one piece of evidence. The 
 writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name 
 of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for 
 the ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances 
 of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence 
 for one part and reject the other. We often re- 
 ceive small evidence as proof of a thing which we 
 believe to be within the limits of probability or 
 possibility, and we reject exactly the same evi- 
 dence, when the thing to which it refers, appears 
 very improbable or impossible. But this is a false 
 method of inquiry, though it is followed by some 
 modern writers, who select what they like from a 
 story and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if 
 they do not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. 
 A man can only act consistently by accepting all 
 
ANTONINUS. xiii 
 
 this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame 
 him for either. But he who rejects it may still 
 admit that such a letter may be founded on real 
 facts ; and he would make this admission as the 
 most probable way of accounting for the existence 
 of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the 
 writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot 
 tell what part of his story is worthy of credit. 
 
 The war on the northern frontier appears to 
 have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- 
 ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor 
 again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The 
 Germanic people were defeated in a great battle 
 A. D. 179. During this campaign the emperor 
 was seized with some contagious malady, of which 
 he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on 
 the Save in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona 
 (Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 
 17th of March A. D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of 
 his age. His son Commodus was with him. His 
 body or the ashes probably was carried to Rome, 
 and he received the honour of deification. Those 
 who could afford it had his statue or bust, and 
 when Capitolinus wrote, many people still had 
 statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or 
 household deities. He was in a manner made a 
 saint. His son Commodus erected to his me- 
 mory the Antonine column which is now in the 
 Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi 
 which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft 
 commemorate his father's victories over the Marco- 
 manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower 
 
xiv M. AURELIUS 
 
 of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and 
 discomfited their enemies. The statue of Antoni- 
 nus was placed on the column, but it was removed 
 at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. 
 Paul was put in its place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 
 
 The historical evidence for the times of Anto- 
 ninus is very defective, and some of that which 
 remains is not credible. The most curious is the 
 story about the miracle which happened in A. D. 
 174 during the war with the Quadi. The Roman 
 army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a 
 sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it 
 discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and the 
 Romans gained a great victory. All the authori- 
 ties which speak of the battle speak also of the 
 miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their 
 gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the 
 Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- 
 firm the Christian statement it is added that the 
 emperor gave the title of Thundering to this legion ; 
 but Dacier and others who maintain the Christian 
 report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thun- 
 dering or Lightning was not given to this legion 
 because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but 
 because there was a figure of lightning on their 
 shields, and that this title of the legion existed in 
 the time of Augustus. 
 
 Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
 called Thundering (xffowa0&ttfe or xtpawofofoi) 
 before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this 
 from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note 
 of Reimarus) who enumerates all the legions of 
 
ANTONINUS. xv 
 
 Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- 
 ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of 
 Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius 
 (v. 5) when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- 
 narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this 
 name being given to the legion Melitene by the 
 emperor in consequence of the success which he 
 obtained through their prayers; from which we 
 may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. 
 Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- 
 rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the 
 Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia 
 in the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes 
 that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum 
 there is mentioned under the commander of Ar- 
 menia the Praefectura of the twelfth legion named 
 "Thundering Melitene;" and this position in 
 Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its 
 position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius 
 concludes that Melitene was not the name of the 
 legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. 
 The legions did not, he says, take their name from 
 the place where they were on duty, but from the 
 country in which they were raised, and therefore, 
 what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not 
 seem probable to him. Yet Valesius on the au- 
 thority of Apolinarius and Tertullian believed that 
 the miracle was worked through the prayers of 
 the Christian soldiers in the emperor's army. 
 Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to 
 this legion, says Valesius, and probably he pur- 
 posely omitted it, because he knew that Melitene 
 
xvi M. AURELIUS 
 
 was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where 
 the legion was stationed in his time. 
 
 The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
 victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for 
 such was the practice ; but we do not know what 
 he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier 
 assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely 
 destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Chris- 
 tianity, that so honourable a testimony to the 
 Christians and their religion might not be perpe- 
 tuated. The critic has however not seen that he 
 contradicts himself when he tells us the purport 
 of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, 
 and even Eusebius could not find it. But there 
 does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Anto- 
 ninus to the Roman Senate after this memorable 
 victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's 
 second Apology, though it is totally unconnected 
 with the apologies. This letter is one of the most 
 stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and it 
 cannot be possibly founded even on the genuine 
 report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it were 
 genuine, it would free the emperor from the charge 
 of persecuting men because they were Christians, 
 for he says in this false letter that if a man accuse 
 another only of being a Christian and the accused 
 confess and there is nothing else against him, he 
 must be set free ; with this monstrous addition 
 made by a man inconceivably ignorant, that the 
 informer must be burnt alive. 1 
 
 1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the 
 Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, 
 
ANTONINUS. xvii 
 
 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- 
 cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology of 
 Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of 
 Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce at- 
 tack on the established religions, the address of 
 Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the 
 Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of 
 Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that 
 of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is 
 addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted 
 sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we do not 
 know whether they read it. The second Apology 
 of Justinus is addressed to the Roman Senate, 
 but there is nothing in it which shows its date. 
 In one passage where he is speaking of the perse- 
 cution of the Christians, Justinus says that even 
 men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when 
 they ordered their lives according to ethical rea- 
 son, were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, 
 Musonius in his own times and others; for all 
 those who in any way labored to live according to 
 reason and avoided wickedness were always hated ; 
 and this was the effect of the work of daemons. 
 
 Justinus himself is said to have been put to death 
 at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice to the 
 
 he says, writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in 
 which he declares that his army was saved by the prayers 
 of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to punish with 
 death those who ventured to accuse us." It is possible 
 that the forged letter which is now extant may be one of 
 those which Tertullian had seen, for he uses the plural 
 number "letters." A great deal has been written about 
 this miracle of the Thundering Legion, and more than is 
 worth reading. 
 
xviii M. A URELIUS 
 
 gods; but the circumstances of his death are 
 doubtful, and the time is uncertain. It cannot 
 have been in the reign of Hadrian, as one autho- 
 rity states ; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, 
 if the second Apology was written in the time of 
 M. Antoninus. 
 
 The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at 
 Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. 
 The evidence for it is the letter of the church 
 of Smyrna to the churches of Philomelium and 
 the other Christian churches, and it is preserved 
 by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 16). But the critics do 
 not agree about the time of Polycarp's death, 
 differing in the two extremes to the amount of 
 twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's 
 martyrdom were accompanied by miracles, one of 
 which Eusebius (iv. 16) has omitted, but it ap- 
 pears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, 
 which Usher published, and it is supposed that 
 this version was made not long after the time of 
 Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter 
 states that it was transcribed by Caius from the 
 copy of Irenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then 
 transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which 
 I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above 
 mentioned, having searched it out by the revela- 
 tion of Polycarp, who directed me to it, &c." The 
 story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with 
 miraculous circumstances which some modern 
 writers on ecclesiastical history take the liberty of 
 omitting. 2 
 
 2 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miraculous 
 Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted 
 
ANTONINUS. xix 
 
 In order to form a proper notion of the con- 
 dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus 
 we must go back to Trajan's time. When the 
 younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
 Christians were numerous in those parts, and the 
 worshipers of the old religion were falling off. 
 The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, 
 and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- 
 fice. Those who were interested in the mainte- 
 nance of the old religion thus found that their 
 profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes 
 and of all ages were brought before the governor, 
 who did not know what to do with them. He 
 could come to no other conclusion than this, 
 that those who confessed to be Christians and per- 
 severed in their religion ought to be punished ; 
 if for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. 
 He found no crimes proved against the Christians, 
 and he could only characterize their religion as 
 a depraved and extravagant superstition, which 
 might be stopped, if the people were allowed the 
 opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a 
 letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked 
 for the emperor's directions, because he did not 
 know what to do : He remarks that he had 
 never been engaged in judicial inquiries about 
 
 to mention the dove, which flew out of Polycarp's body, 
 and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have done the same. 
 Wake says " I am so little a friend to such miracles that 
 I thought it better with Eusebius to omit that circumstance 
 than to mention it from Bp. Usher's Manuscript," which 
 manuscript however, says Middleton, he afterwards de- 
 clares to be so well attested that we need not any further 
 assurance of the truth of it. 
 
xx M. AURELIUS 
 
 the Christians, and that accordingly he did not 
 know what or how far to inquire and punish. 
 This proves that it was not a new thing to inquire 
 into a man's profession of Christianity and to 
 punish him for it. Trajan's Rescript is extant. 
 He approved of the governor's judgment in the 
 matter ; but he said that no search must be made 
 after the Christians ; if a man was charged with 
 the new religion and convicted, he must not be 
 punished, if he affirmed that he was not a Chris- 
 tian and confirmed his denial by showing his re- 
 verence to the heathen gods. He added that no 
 notice must be taken of anonymous informations, 
 for such things were of bad example. Trajan 
 - was a mild and sensible man, and both motives of 
 mercy and policy probably also induced him to take 
 as little notice of the Christians as he could ; to 
 let them live in quiet, if it were possible. Trajan's 
 rescript is the first legislative act of the head of 
 the Roman state with reference to Christianity, 
 which is known to us. It does not appear that 
 the Christians were further disturbed under his 
 reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the order 
 of Trajan himself is not universally admitted to 
 be an historical fact. 
 
 In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- 
 ble fpr the Roman government to overlook the 
 great increase of the Christians and the hostility 
 ' of the common sort to them. If the governors 
 in the provinces wished to let them alone, they 
 could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen 
 community, who looked on the Christians as athe- 
 
ANTONINUS. xxi 
 
 ists. The Jews too who were settled all over the 
 Roman Empire were as hostile to the Christians 
 as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian 
 begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly 
 what the popular feeling towards the Christians 
 then was. A rescript of Hadrian to the Pro- 
 consul of Asia, which stands at the end of Jus- 
 tin's first apology, instructs the governor that 
 innocent people must not be troubled and false 
 accusers must not be allowed to extort money 
 from them ; the charges against the Christians 
 must be made in due form and no attention must 
 be paid to popular clamours; when Christians 
 were regularly prosecuted and convicted of any 
 illegal act, they must be punished according to 
 their deserts ; and false accusers also must be pun- 
 ished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published 
 Rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Had- 
 rian's Rescript seem very favourable to the Chris- 
 tians, but if we understand it in this sense, that 
 they were only to be punished like other people 
 for illegal acts, it would have had no meaning, for 
 that could have been done without asking the 
 emperor's advice. The real purpose of the Re- 
 script is that Christians must be punished if they 
 persisted in their belief, and would not prove their 
 renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen 
 religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we have 
 no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted 
 more to the Christians than Trajan did. There 
 is printed at the end of Justin's Apology a Re- 
 script of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of Asia 
 
xxii M. AURELIUS 
 
 (TO Koivov TYIS 'Acr/a;), and it is also in Eusebius 3 
 (E. H. iv. 13). The Rescript declares that 
 the Christians, for they are meant, though the 
 name Christians does not occur in the Rescript, 
 were not to be disturbed, unless they were attempt- 
 ing something against the Roman rule, and no 
 man was to be punished simply for being a Chris- 
 tian. But this Rescript is spurious. Any man 
 moderately acquainted with Roman history will 
 see at once from the style and tenor that it is a 
 clumsy forgery. 
 
 In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition be- 
 tween the old and the ne\v belief was still stronger, 
 and the adherents of the heathen religion urged 
 those in authority to a more regular resistance to 
 the invasions of the Christian faith. Melito in 
 his apology to M. Antoninus represents the Chris- 
 tians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial 
 orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who 
 were greedy after the property of others, used these 
 orders as a means of robbing those who were doing 
 
 3 In Eusebius the name at the beginning of the Rescript 
 is that of M. Antoninus ; and so we cannot tell to which 
 of the two emperors the forger assigned the Rescript. 
 There are also a few verbal differences. 
 
 The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that 
 Marcus being moved by the intreaties of Melito and other 
 heads of the church wrote an Epistle to the Commune of 
 Asia in which he forbade the Christians to be troubled on 
 account of their religion. Valesius supposes this to be the 
 letter which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be 
 the answer to the apology of Melito of which I shall soon 
 give the substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this 
 letter which is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer 
 he made to Melito. 
 
ANTONINUS. xxiii 
 
 no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have 
 ordered anything so unjust ; and if the last order 
 was really not from the emperor, the Christians 
 entreat him not to give them up to their enemies. 4 
 
 4 Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I. 
 and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is 
 not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as 
 to affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who de- 
 nounced the Christians ; an interpretation which is entirely 
 false. Melito calls the Christian religion " our philosophy," 
 which began among barbarians (the Jews), and flourished 
 among the Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to 
 the great advantage of the empire, for from that time 
 the power of the Romans grew great and glorious. He says 
 that the emperor has and will have as the successor to Au- 
 gustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will protect 
 that philosophy which grew up with the empire and began 
 with Augustus, which philosophy the predecessors of Anto- 
 ninus honored in addition to the other religions. He fur- 
 ther says that the Christian religion had suffered no harm 
 since the time of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed 
 all honor and respect that any man could desire. Nero and 
 Domitian, he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious 
 men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this was the 
 origin of the false charges against the Christians. But 
 this was corrected by the emperors who immediately pre- 
 ceded Antoninus, who often by their Rescripts reproved 
 those who attempted to trouble the Christians. Hadrian, 
 Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many and among them 
 to the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius when Marcus 
 was associated with him in the empire wrote to the cities, 
 that they must not trouble the Christians ; among others 
 to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians and all 
 the Greeks. Melito concluded thus : We are persuaded that 
 thou who hast about these things the same mind that they 
 had, nay rather one much more humane and philosophical, 
 wilt do all that we ask thee. This Apology was written 
 after A. D. 169, the year in which Verus died, for it speaks 
 of Marcus only and his son Commodus. According to 
 Melito's testimony, Christians had only been punished 
 for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and 
 
xxiv M. AURELIUS 
 
 We conclude from this that there were at least 
 imperial Rescripts or Constitutions of M. Anto- 
 ninus, which were made the foundation of these 
 persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was 
 now a crime and punished, unless the accused 
 denied their religion. Then come the persecu- 
 tions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place 
 in A. D. 167, ten years before the persecution of 
 Lyon. The governors of the provinces under M. 
 Antoninus might have found enough even in 
 Trajan's Rescript to warrant them in punishing 
 Christians, and the fanaticism of the people would 
 drive them to persecution, even if they were un- 
 willing. But besides the fact of the Christians 
 rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not 
 forget that they plainly maintained that all the 
 * heathen religions were false. The Christians thus 
 declared war against the heathen rites, and it is 
 hardly necessary to observe that this was a decla- 
 ration of hostility against the Roman government, 
 which tolerated all the various forms of supersti- 
 tion that existed in the empire, and could not con- 
 sistently tolerate another religion, which declared 
 that all the rest were false and all the splendid 
 ceremonies of the empire only a worship of devils. 
 If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should 
 know how the Roman emperors attempted to check 
 
 the persecutions began again in the time of M. Anto- 
 ninus and were founded on his orders, which were abused 
 as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms " that the 
 race of the godly is now persecuted and harassed by fresh 
 imperial orders in Asia, a thing which had never happened 
 before." But we know that all this is not true, and that 
 Christians had been punished in Trajan's time. 
 
ANTONINUS. xxv 
 
 the new religion, how they enforced their princi- 
 ple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Chris- 
 tians, which Justin in his Apology affirms that they 
 did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth ; 
 how far popular clamour and riots went in this 
 matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant 
 Christians, for there were many such, contributed 
 to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to em- 
 bitter the quarrel between the Roman government 
 and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical 
 histories are manifestly falsified, and what truth 
 they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact is 
 certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the hea- 
 then populations were in open hostility to the 
 Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men 
 were put to death because they were Christians. 
 Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book remarks 
 that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, 
 in some parts of the world the persecution of the 
 Christians became more violent and that it pro- 
 ceeded from the populace in the cities ; and he 
 adds in his usual style of exaggeration, that we 
 may infer from what took place in a single 
 nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the 
 habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to 
 is Gallia ; and he then proceeds to give the letter 
 of the churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It 
 is probable that he has assigned the true cause of 
 the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, 
 and that both governors and emperor had a great 
 deal of trouble with these disturbances. How 
 far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceed- 
 
xxvi M. AUREL1US 
 
 ings we do not know, for the historical records of 
 his reign are very defective. He did not make 
 the rule against the Christians, for Trajan did 
 that ; and if we admit that he would have been 
 willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot 
 affirm that it was in his power, for it wouHl be a 
 great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the 
 unlimited authority, which some modern sovereigns 
 have had. His power was limited by certain con- 
 stitutional forms, by the senate, and by the prece- 
 dents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that 
 such a man was an active persecutor, for there is 
 no evidence that he was, though it is certain that 
 he had no good opinion of the Christians, as ap- 
 pears from his own words. 5 But he knew nothing 
 
 5 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such 
 fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) 
 mentions. The rational Christians admitted no fellowship 
 with them. " Some of these heretics," says Clemens, 
 " show their impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, 
 saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is 
 true testimony (martyrdom), but that a man is a self-mur- 
 derer who bears witness by his death. We also blame those 
 who rush to death, for there are some, not of us, but only 
 bearing the same name who give themselves up. We say 
 of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they 
 are publicly punished ; and they give themselves up to a 
 death which avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists 
 give themselves up foolishly to fire." Cave in his Primitive 
 Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the Christians : " They did 
 flock to the place of torment faster than droves of beasts 
 that are driven to the shambles. They even longed to be 
 in the arms of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his 
 journey to Rome in order to his execution, yet by the way 
 as he went could not but vent his passionate desire of it : 
 O that I might come to those wild beasts, that are prepared 
 for me ; I heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; 
 
ANTONINUS. xxvii 
 
 of them except their hostility to the Roman reli- 
 gion, and he probably thought that they were 
 dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- 
 fessions false or true of some of the Apologists. 
 So much I have said, because it would be unfair 
 not to state all that can be urged against a man 
 whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages 
 venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. 
 If I admitted the genuineness of some documents, 
 he would be altogether clear from the charge of 
 even allowing any persecutions ; but as I seek the 
 truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him 
 to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it 
 is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any 
 of his Ethical principles from a religion of which 
 he knew nothing. 6 
 
 There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec- 
 tions or his Meditations, as they are generally 
 named, is a genuine work. In the first book he 
 speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; 
 and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas 
 
 I would invite and encourage them speedily to devour me, 
 and not be afraid to set upon me as they have been to 
 others ; nay should they refuse it, I would even force them 
 to it;" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. 
 Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the 
 Christians ; but I think that he mistook the matter. We 
 admire a man who holds to his principles even to death ; 
 but these fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists 
 whom Clemens treats with disdain. 
 
 6 Dr. F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum 
 und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 
 &c. has examined this question with great good sense and 
 fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near as 
 our authorities enable us to reach it. 
 
xxviii M. AURELIUS 
 
 (v. Mdpxos') notices a work of Antoninus in twelve 
 books, which he names the "conduct of his own 
 life ;" and he cites the book under several words 
 in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but 
 not the title of the work. There are also passages 
 cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention 
 of the emperor's name. The true title of the 
 work is unknown. Xylander who published the 
 first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo. 
 with a Latin version) used a manuscript, which 
 contained the twelve books, but it is not known 
 where the manuscript is now. The only other 
 complete manuscript which is known to exist is in 
 the Vatican library, but it has no title and no in- 
 scriptions of the several books : the eleventh only 
 has the inscription Mx^xou <zuro)tfa,TOfo$ marked 
 with an asterisk. The other Vatican manuscripts 
 and the three Florentine contain only excerpts from 
 the emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts 
 nearly agree with that which Xylander prefixed to 
 his edition, Mdpxou 'Avruvlvou Ai/TOXfa.TOfo$ ruv tig 
 EXUTOV @i@hta i0. This title has been used by all 
 subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether An- 
 toninus divided his work into books or somebody 
 else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of the 
 first and second books are genuine, he may have 
 made the division himself. 
 
 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
 thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose ; and 
 since they were intended for his own use, it is no 
 improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy 
 behind him written with his own hand ; for it is 
 
ANTONINUS. xxix 
 
 not likely that so diligent a man would use the 
 labour of a transcriber for such a purpose, and 
 expose his most secret thoughts to any other eye. 
 He may have also intended the book for his son 
 Commodus, who however had no taste for his 
 father's philosophy. Some careful hand preserved 
 the precious volume; and a work by Antoninus is 
 mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 
 
 Many critics have labored on the text of Anto- 
 ninus. The most complete edition is that by 
 Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition 
 of Gataker was superintended by George Stan- 
 hope, 1697, 4to. There is also an edition of 
 1704. Gataker made and suggested many good 
 corrections, and he also made a new Latin version, 
 which is not a very good specimen of Latin, but 
 it generally expresses the sense of the original and 
 often better than some of the more recent trans- 
 lations. He added in the margin opposite to each 
 paragraph references to the other parallel passages ; 
 and he wrote a commentary, one of the most com- 
 plete that has been written on any ancient author. 
 This commentary contains the editor's exposition 
 of the more difficult passages, and quotations from 
 all the Greek and Roman writers for the illustra- 
 tion of the text. It is a wonderful monument of 
 learning and labour, and certainly no Englishman 
 has yet done anything like it. At the end of his 
 preface the editor says that he wrote it at Rother- 
 hithe near London in a severe winter, when he 
 was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651, 
 a time when Milton, Selden and other great men 
 
xxx M. A URELIUS 
 
 of the Commonwealth time were living ; and the 
 great French scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with 
 whom Gataker corresponded and received help 
 from him for his edition of Antoninus. The 
 Greek text has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, 
 Leipzig, 1802, 8vo. ; and by the learned Greek 
 Adamantius Corais, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text 
 of Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 
 
 There are English, French, Italian and Spanish 
 translations of M. Antoninus, and there may be 
 others. I have not seen all the English transla- 
 tions. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo. 
 a most coarse and vulgar copy of the original. 
 The latest French translation by Alexis Pierron 
 in the collection of Charpentier is better than 
 Dacier's, which has been honoured with an Italian 
 version (Udine, 1772). There is an Italian ver- 
 sion (1675) which I have not seen. It is by a 
 cardinal. " A man illustrious in the church, the 
 Cardinal Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of 
 Pope Urban VIII, occupied the last years of his 
 life in translating into his native language the 
 thoughts of the Roman emperor, in order to 
 diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and vivi- 
 fying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his 
 soul, to make it, as he says in his energetic style, 
 redder than his purple at the sight of the virtues 
 of this Gentile" (Pierron, Preface). I have made 
 this translation at intervals after having used the 
 book for many years. It is made from the Greek, 
 but I have not always followed one text. I have 
 occasionally compared other versions. I made 
 
ANTONINUS. xxxi 
 
 this translation for my own use, because I found 
 that it was worth the labour. It may be useful 
 to others also and at last I have determined to print 
 it, though, as the original is both very difficult to 
 understand and still more difficult to translate, it 
 is not possible that I have always avoided error. 
 But I believe that I have not often missed the 
 meaning, and those who will take the trouble to 
 compare the translation with the original should 
 not hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do 
 not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
 meaning, though at first sight they may not appear 
 to do so ; and when I differ from the translators, 
 I think that in some places they are wrong, and in 
 other places I am sure that they are. I have 
 placed a f in some passages, which indicates cor- 
 ruption in the text or great uncertainty in the 
 meaning. I could have made the language more 
 easy and flowing, but I have preferred a somewhat 
 ruder style as being better suited to express the 
 character of the original ; and sometimes the ob- 
 scurity which may appear in the version is a fair 
 copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should 
 ever revise this version, I would gladly make use 
 of any corrections which may be suggested. I 
 have added an index of some of the Greek terms 
 with the corresponding English. If I have not 
 given the best words for the Greek, I have done 
 the best that I could; and in the text I have 
 always given the same translation of the same word. 
 The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that 
 I have observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on 
 
xxxii M. AURELIUS 
 
 the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not 
 a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be 
 converted at a time when Christianity was grossly 
 corrupted. But he was a really religious man, 
 and he concludes his commentary with a prayer 
 to the Deity which no Christian could improve. 
 From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of 
 about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy 
 formed the characters of some of the best and 
 greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and we 
 hear no more of it till the revival of letters in 
 Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very inac- 
 curate and incomplete manuscripts of Epictetus' 
 Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and 
 dedicated to his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici 
 in whose collection he had found the book. Poli- 
 ziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition 
 of the Enchiridion, A. D. 1531 (apud And. Cra- 
 tandrum). Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion 
 to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, 
 and useful in the difficulties by which he was sur- 
 rounded. 
 
 Epictelus and Antoninus have had readers ever 
 since they were first printed. The little book of 
 Antoninus has been the companion of some great 
 men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus 
 Antoninus were the two books which were used 
 when he was a young man by Captain John 
 Smith, and he could not have found two writers 
 better fitted to form the character of a soldier 
 and a man. Smith is almost unknown and for- 
 gotten in England his native country, but not in 
 
ANTONINUS. xxxiii 
 
 America where he saved the young colony of Vir- 
 ginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his 
 deeds in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of 
 his character. For a man's greatness lies not in 
 wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet 
 in his intellectual capacity, which is often asso- 
 ciated with the meanest moral character, the most 
 abject servility to those in high places and arro- 
 gance to the poor and lowly ; but ajman's true 
 greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest 
 purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of him- 
 self and everything else, on frequent self-exami- 
 nation, and a steady obedience to the rule which 
 he knows to be right, without IrouBTing himself, 
 as~tfie emperor says he should not, about what 
 others may think or say, or whether they do or do 
 not do that which he thinks and says and does. 
 
THE 
 PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 
 
 T has been said that the Stoic philo- 
 sophy first showed its real value 
 when it passed from Greece to Rome. 
 The doctrines of Zeno and his suc- 
 cessors were well suited to the gravity and practical 
 good sense of the Romans ; and even in the Re- 
 publican period we have an example of a man, M. 
 Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and 
 died consistently with the opinions which he pro- 
 fessed. He was a man, says Cicero, who embraced 
 the Stoic philosophy from conviction ; not for the 
 purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in 
 order to make his life conformable to its precepts. 
 In the wretched times from the death of Augustus 
 to the murder of Domitian ,there was nothing but 
 the Stoic philosophy which could console and sup- 
 port the followers of the old religion under im- 
 perial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. 
 There were even then noble minds that could dare 
 and endure, sustained by a good conscience and an 
 
PHILOSOPH Y OF ANTONINUS, xxxv 
 
 elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence. 
 Such were Paetus Thrasea, Helvidius Priscus, 
 Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus, 1 and the poets Per- 
 sius and Juvenal, whose energetic language and 
 manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now 
 as they might have been to their contemporaries. 
 Persius died under Nero's bloody reign, but 
 Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant 
 Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, 
 Trajan and Hadrian. His best precepts are de- 
 rived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced 
 in his finest verses by the unrivalled vigor of the 
 Latin language. 
 
 The two best expounders of the later Stoical 
 philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman em- 
 peror. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought 
 to Rome, we know not how, but he was there the 
 slave and afterwards the freed man of an unworthy 
 master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freed- 
 man and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have 
 been a hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he 
 was still a slave, but he can hardly have been a 
 teacher before he was made free. He was one of 
 the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished 
 from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, 
 and he may have died there. Like other great 
 
 1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in 
 a sense a Stoic and he has said many good things in a very 
 fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius (xn. 2) on Se- 
 neca, or rather a statement of what some people thought 
 of his philosophy, and it is not favorable. His writings 
 and his life must be taken together, and I have nothing 
 more to say of him here. 
 
xxxvi THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to 
 his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of 
 Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books 
 of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four 
 remain and some fragments. We have also from 
 Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of 
 the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valu- 
 able commentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, 
 who lived in the time of the emperor Justinian.* 
 
 Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he 
 gratefully commemorates his obligations to his 
 teachers, says that he was made acquainted by 
 Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, 
 whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41 ; 
 xi. 33. 30). Indeed the doctrines of Epictetus 
 and Antoninus are tke same, and Epictetus is the 
 best authority for the explanation of the philoso- 
 phical language of Antoninus and the exposition 
 of his opinions. But the method of the two phi- 
 losophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed 
 himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse and 
 in a familiar and simple manner. Antoninus wrote 
 down his reflections for his own use only, in short 
 unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure. 
 
 The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, 
 Physic ($U<TIKQV\ Ethic (yQutov), and Logic (toyucov). 
 This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made 
 by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect 
 
 5 There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with 
 the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeuser, 6 vols. 
 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of 
 Epictetus by Mrs. Carter. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xxxvii 
 
 and by Chrysippus ; but these philosophers placed 
 the three divisions in the following order, Logic, 
 Physic, Ethic. It appears however that this di- 
 vision was made before Zeno's time and acknow- 
 ledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post. i. 5). 
 Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in 
 the narrower sense of that word. 
 
 Cleanthes,a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, 
 and made six: Dialectic and Rhetoric, com prised in 
 Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; Physic and Theology. 
 This division was merely for practical use, for all 
 Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics 
 Logic or Dialectic does not occupy the same place 
 as in Plato : it is considered only as an instrument 
 which is to be used for the other divisions of Phi- 
 losophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic doc- 
 trines and of their modifications would require a 
 volume. My object is to explain only the opinions 
 of Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from 
 his book. 
 
 According to the subdivision of Cleanthes 
 Physic and Theology go together, or the study of 
 the nature of Things, and the study of the nature 
 of the Deity, so far as man can understand the 
 Deity, and of his government of the universe. 
 This division or subdivision is not formally adopted 
 by Antoninus, for as already observed, there is no 
 method in his book ; but it is virtually contained 
 in it. 
 
 Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or 
 the study of the principles of morals and the study 
 of the constitution of civil society ; and undoubt- 
 d 
 
xxxviii THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 edly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two 
 parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic, for 
 though the two are intimately connected, they are 
 also very distinct, and many questions can only be 
 properly discussed by carefully observing the dis- 
 tinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. 
 His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical 
 application to his own conduct in life as a man 
 and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his 
 doctrines about man's nature, the Universal Nature, 
 and the relation of every man to everything else. 
 It is therefore intimately and inseparably connected 
 with Physic or the nature of Things and with 
 Theology or the Nature of the Deity. He advises 
 us to examine well_all the impressionsj>n our minds 
 (pavrWai) and to form a right judgment of them, 
 to make just conclusions, and to inquire into the 
 meanings of words^ ancTso far to apply Dialectic, 
 but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dia- 
 lectic, and his philosophy is in substance purely 
 moral and practical. He says (vin. 13), " Con- 
 stantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of 
 every impression on the soul, 3 apply to it the prin- 
 
 3 The original is tTri irdffrjg Qavraviag. We have no 
 word which expresses <f>avraffia, for it is not only the sen- 
 suous appearance which comes from an external object, 
 which object is called TO <fta.vTa.Gr6v, but it is also the 
 thought or feeling or opinion which is produced even 
 when there is no corresponding external object before us. 
 Accordingly everything which moves the soul is Qa 
 and produces a 0avra<ria. 
 
 In this extract Antoninus says 0v(rioXoyav, 
 dLa.\tKTiKtue<r9ai. I have translated iraQoXoyiiv by using 
 the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xxxix 
 
 ciples of Physic, of Moral and of Dialectic :" 
 which is only another way of telling us to examine 
 the impression in every possible way. In another 
 passage (in. 11) he says, " To the aids which 
 have been mentioned let this one still be added : 
 make for thyself a definition or description of the 
 object (TO (pavravTov) which is presented to thee, 
 so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in 
 its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, 
 and tell thyself its proper name, and the names 
 of the things of which it has been compounded, 
 and into which it will be resolved." Such an ex- 
 amination implies a use of Dialectic, which An- 
 toninus accordingly employed as a means towards 
 establishing his Physical, Theological and Ethical 
 principles. 
 
 There are several expositions of the Physical, 
 Theological, and Ethical principles, which are 
 contained in the work of Antoninus ; and more 
 expositions than I have read. Ritter (Geschichte 
 der Philosophic, iv. 241) after explaining the 
 doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and in- 
 sufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to 
 a short essay, in which the work is done better. 4 
 There is also an essay on the Philosophical Prin- 
 ciples of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, 
 placed at the end of his German translation of 
 Antoninus (Schleswig, 1799). With the assistance 
 of these two useful essays and his own diligent 
 
 4 De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commenta- 
 riis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lip- 
 siae, 1826. 
 
xl THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 study a man may form a sufficient notion of the 
 principles of Antoninus ; but he will find it more 
 difficult to expound them to others. Besides the 
 want of arrangement in the original and of con- 
 nection among the numerous paragraphs, the cor- 
 ruption of the text, the obscurity of the language 
 and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion 
 in the writer's own ideas, besides all this there 
 is occasionally an apparent contradiction in the 
 emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were some- 
 times unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his 
 mind. A man who leads a life of tranquillity and 
 reflection, who is not disturbed at home and 
 meddles not with the affairs of the world, may 
 keep his mind at ease and his thoughts in one even 
 course. But such a man has not been tried. All 
 his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue 
 might turn out to be idle words, if he were once 
 exposed to the rude realities of human existence. 
 Fine thoughts and moral dissertations from men 
 who have not worked and suffered may be 
 read, but they will be forgotten. No religion, no 
 Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the 
 teacher has not lived the " life of an apostle," and 
 been ready to die " the death of a martyr." " Not 
 in passivity (the passive affects) but in activity lie 
 the evil and the good of the rational social animal, 
 just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, 
 but in activity" (ix. 1 6). The emperor Antoninus 
 was a practical moralist. From his youth he fol- 
 lowed a laborious discipline, and though his high sta- 
 tion placed him above all want or the fear of it, he 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xli 
 
 lived as frugally and temperately as the poorest 
 philosopher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems 
 that he always had the little that he wanted ; and 
 he was content with it, as he had been with his 
 servile station. But Antoninus after his accession 
 to the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the 
 administration of an empire which extended from 
 the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold 
 mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa ; 
 and we may imagine, though we cannot know it 
 by experience, what must be the trials, the troubles, 
 the anxiety and the sorrows of him who has the 
 world's business on his hands with the wish to do 
 the best that he can, and the certain knowledge 
 that he can do very little of the good which he 
 wishes. 
 
 In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, ge- 
 neral corruption and with the weight of so un- 
 wieldy an empire upon him, we may easily compre- 
 hend that Antoninus often had need of all his for- 
 titude to support him. The best and the bravest 
 men have moments of doubt and of weakness, 
 but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise 
 again from their depression by recurring to first 
 principles, as Antoninus does. The emperor says 
 that life is smoke, a vapour, and St. James in his 
 Epistle is of the same mind ; that the world is 
 full of envious, jealous, malignant people, and a 
 man might be well content to get out of it. He 
 has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to 
 which he holds most firmly. There are only a 
 few passages of this kind, but they are evidence of 
 
xlii THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 -j. the struggles which even the noblest of the SOL. 
 of men had to maintain against the hard realities 
 of his daily life. A poor remark it is which I 
 have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging 
 way, that the emperor's reflections show that he 
 had need of consolation and comfort in life, and 
 even to prepare him to meet his death. True that 
 he did need comfort and support, and we see how 
 he found it. He constantly recurs to his funda- 
 mental principle that the universe is wiselyordered, 
 that jivery man is a part of it and must conform 
 toTthat order which He cannot change, that what- 
 ever the Deity has done is good, that all mankind 
 are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish 
 them and try to make them better, even those who 
 would do him harm. This is his conclusion (u. 
 17) : " What then is that which is able to conduct 
 a man ? One thing and only one, Philosophy. 
 But this consists in keeping the divinity within a 
 man free from violence and unharmed, superior to 
 pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a pur- 
 pose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling 
 the need of another man's doing or not doing any- 
 thing ; and besides, accepting all that happens 
 and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, 
 wherever it is, from whence he himself came ; 
 and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind 
 as being nothing else than a dissolution of the 
 V elements, of which every living being is compound- 
 ed. But if there is no harm to the elements 
 themselves in each continually changing into ano- 
 ther, why should a man have any apprehension 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xliii 
 
 about the change and dissolution of all the ele- 
 ments Qhimself ] ? for it is according to nature ; 
 and nothing is evil that is according to nature." 
 
 The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of 
 the Nature of the Universe, of its government, 
 and of the relation of man's nature to both. He 
 names the universe (jj TUV oXuv ovala,, vi. I), 5 "the 
 universal substance," and he adds that " reason," 
 (hoyo$) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) 
 uses the terms " universal nature" or " nature of 
 the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe 
 "the one and all, which we name Cosmus or Order" 
 (noo-fAQs). If he ever seems to use these general 
 terms as significant of the All, of all that man can 
 in any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- 
 casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Ma- 
 terial things (t/toj, i/Tufcov), and Cause, Origin, 
 
 5 As to the word ovffia, the reader may see the Index. 
 I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; Anto- 
 ninus has (v. 24), T; avfnraffa oixria, "the universal sub- 
 stance.'' He says (xn. 30), " there is one common 1 ' sub- 
 stance (ovtn'a), distributed among countless bodies ; and 
 (iv. 40). In Stobaeus (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this 
 definition, ovffiav ds <f>aaiv rutv ovrwv cnravTwv rrjv TrpwTTjv 
 vXrjv. (In vui. 11), Antoninus speaks of TO ovaiticte /cat 
 vXi/cov, " the substantial and the material ;" and (vn. 10) 
 he says that " everything material" (tvvXov) disappears 
 in the substance of the whole (ry rtiv o\wv ovaiq). The 
 ovcria is the generic name of that existence, which we as- 
 sume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no 
 existence which can be coordinated with it and none above 
 it. It is the philosopher's " substance :'' it is the ultimate 
 expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the 
 basis, the being of a thing. " From the Divine, which is 
 substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and 
 every thing that is created exists." (Swedenborg.) 
 
xliv THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Reason (orr/igj MrtSfcfj Xoyof)/* This is comform- 
 able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original 
 principles (#f%a/) of all things, that which acts 
 (TO TTQIOUV) and that which is acted upon (TO 
 7ra<7%ov). That which is acted on is the formless 
 matter (uXn) : that which acts is the reason (Ao'yo$) 
 in it, God, for he is eternal and operates through 
 all matter, and produces all things. So Anto- 
 ninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason (xo'yos) which 
 pervades all substance (o<n'a), and through all 
 time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers 
 the universe (TO nav). God is eternal, and Mat- 
 ter is eternal. It is God who gives to matter its 
 
 6 I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, 
 that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The 
 " one and all," and the like, and " the whole," imply 
 limitation. " One" is limited ; " all" is limited ; the 
 " whole" is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find 
 words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. 
 The addition of " absolute" or any other such word does 
 not mend the matter. Even God is used by most people, 
 often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is im- 
 plied, and yet at the same time words are added which are 
 intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when 
 he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that 
 God has no name like a man ; and Justin says the same 
 (Apol. ii. 6). We can conceive the existence of a thing, 
 or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without 
 an adequate notion of it, " adequate" meaning coextensive 
 and coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited 
 space derived from the dimensions of what we call a mate- 
 rial thing, though of space absolute, if I may use the term, 
 we have no notion at all ; and of infinite space the notion 
 is the same, no notion at all ; and yet we conceive it in a 
 sense, though I know not how, and we believe that^pace 
 isjnnnite, and we cannot conceive it to belinite. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xlv 
 
 form, but he is not said to have created matter. 
 According to this view, which is as old as Anax- 
 agoras, God and matter exist independently, but 
 God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the 
 expression of the fact of the existence both of 
 matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex 
 themselves with the insoluble question of the origin 
 and nature of matter. 7 Antoninus also assumes a 
 beginning of things, as we now know them ; but 
 his language is sometimes very obscure. I have 
 endeavoured to explain the meaning of one diffi- 
 cult passage, (vn. 75, and the note.) 
 
 Matter consists of elemental parts (o"roix,ua) 
 of which all material objects are made. But 
 nothing is permanent in form. The nature of 
 the universe, according to Antoninus' expression 
 (iv. 30), "loves nothing so much as to change 
 the things which are, and to make new things 
 like them. For everything that exists is in a man- 
 ner the seed of. that which will be. But thou 
 
 7 The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. 
 We derive the notion of space from matter and form. But 
 we have no adequate conception either of matter or of 
 space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintel- 
 ligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other 
 name they may express the power which makes itself 
 known by its acts. Anaxagoras laid down the distinction 
 between intelligence (vovg) and matter, and he said that 
 intelligence impressed motion on matter and so separated 
 the elements of matter and gave them order ; but he pro- 
 bably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a 
 foundation of his philosophical teaching. 
 
 The common Greek word which we translate " matter" 
 is vXrj. It is the stuff that things are made of. 
 
xlvi THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the 
 earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar 
 notion." All things then are in a constant flux 
 and change : some things are dissolved into the 
 elements, others come in their places ; and so the 
 " whole universe continues ever young and per- 
 fect." (xn. 23.) 
 
 Antoninus has some obscure expressions about 
 what he calls " seminal principles" ((rTrspfjuxrixot 
 Xoyo*). He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms 
 (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal princi- 
 ples" are not material atoms which wander about 
 at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In 
 one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living princi- 
 ples, souls (iJ/L^aj) after the dissolution of their 
 bodies being received into the "seminal princi- 
 ple of the universe." Schultz thinks that by 
 u seminal principles Antoninus means the rela- 
 tions of the various elemental principles, which 
 relations are determined by the deity and by 
 which alone the production of organized beings 
 is possible." This may be the meaning, but if it 
 is, nothing of any value can be derived from it. 8 
 Antoninus often uses the word " Nature " (npv<Ti<;\ 
 and we must attempt to fix its meaning. The 
 
 8 Justin (Apol. ii. 8) has the expression Kara (n 
 \6yov /Ltcpof, where he is speaking of the Stoics. The 
 early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, 
 and their writings show that the contest was begun be- 
 tween the Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. 
 Even in the second Epistle of St. Peter (n. 1 , v. 4) we find a 
 Stoic expression, iVa ia rourwv y^vrjcrOe 9dag KOLVWVOI 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xlvii 
 
 simple etymological sense of Qu<n<; is " production," 
 the birth of what we call Things. The Romans 
 used Natura, which also means " birth " originally. 
 But neither the Greeks nor the Romans stuck 
 to this simple meaning, nor do we. Antoninus 
 says (x. 6) : " Whether the universe is a con- 
 course of] atoms or Nature ps a system], let this 
 first be established that I am a part of the whole 
 which is governed by nature." Here it might 
 seem as if nature were personified and viewed as 
 an active, efficient power, as something which, if 
 not independent of the Deity, acts by a power 
 which is given to it by the Deity. Such, if I un- 
 derstand the expression right, is the way in which 
 the word Nature is often used now, though it is 
 plain that many writers use the word without 
 fixing any exact meaning to it. It is the same 
 with the expression Laws of Nature, which some 
 writers may use in an intelligible sense, but others 
 as clearly use in no definite sense at all. There 
 is no meaning in this word Nature, except that 
 which Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, 
 " The only distinct meaning of that word Natural 
 is Stated, Fixed or Settled ; since what is natural 
 as much requires and presupposes an intelligent 
 agent to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually 
 or at stated times, as what is supernatural or mi- 
 raculous does to effect it at once/' This is Plato's 
 meaning (De Leg. iv.), when he says, that God 
 holds the beginning and end and middle of all 
 that exists, and proceeds straight on his course, 
 making his circuit according to nature (that is, 
 
xlviii THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 by a fixed order) ; and he is continually accom- 
 panied by justice who punishes those who deviate 
 from the divine law, that is, from the order or 
 course which God observes. 
 
 When we look at the motions of the planets, the 
 action of what we call gravitation, the elemental 
 combination of unorganized bodies and their reso- 
 lution, the production of plants and of living 
 bodies, their generation, growth, and their disso- 
 lution, which we call their death, we observe a 
 regular sequence of phaenomena, which within 
 the limits of experience present and past, so far 
 as we know the past, is fixed and invariable. But 
 if this is not so, if the order and sequence of 
 phaenomena, as known to us, are subject to change 
 in the course of an infinite progression, and such 
 change is conceivable, we have not discovered, 
 nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order 
 and sequence of phaenomena, in which sequence 
 there may be involved according to its very nature, 
 that is, according to its fixed order, some varia- 
 tion of what we now call the Order or Nature of 
 Things. It is also conceivable that such changes 
 have taken place, changes in the order of things, 
 as we are compelled by the imperfection of lan- 
 guage to call them, but which are no changes ; 
 and further it is certain, that our knowledge of 
 the true sequence of all actual phaenomena, as for 
 instance, the phaenomena of generation, growth, 
 and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect. 
 
 We do not fare much better when we speak of 
 Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. xlix 
 
 For the practical purposes of life we may use the 
 terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may 
 fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at 
 least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the 
 case is different when we speak of causes and 
 effects as of Things. All that we know is phae- 
 nomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances 
 which follow one another in a regular order, as 
 we conceive it, so that if some one phaenomenon 
 should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
 must either be an interruption of the series, or 
 that something else will appear after the phae- 
 nomenon which has failed to appear, and will 
 occupy the vacant place ; and so the series in its 
 progression may be modified or totally changed. 
 Cause and effect then mean nothing in the se- 
 quence of natural phaenomena beyond what I have 
 said ; and the real cause, or the transcendant cause, 
 as some would call it, of each successive phaenome- 
 non is in that which is the cause of all things 
 which are, which have been, and which will be 
 for ever. Thus the word Creation may have a 
 real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can 
 conceive a first, in the present order of natural 
 phaenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation 
 of all things at a certain time, followed by a 
 quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment 
 of all sequences of Phaenomena to the Laws of 
 Nature, or to any other words that people may 
 use, is absolutely absurd.^ 
 
 9 Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; 
 but time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of 
 
1 THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 Now, though there is great difficulty in under- 
 standing all the passages of Antoninus, in which 
 he speaks of Nature, of the changes of things and 
 of the economy of the universe, I am convinced 
 that his sense of Nature and Natural is the same 
 as that which I have stated ; and as he was a man 
 who knew how to use words in a clear way and 
 with strict consistency, we ought to assume, even 
 if his meaning in some passages is doubtful, that 
 his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed 
 belief in the all-pervading, ever present, and ever 
 acti^ejmergy of God. (iv. 40 ; x. 1 ; vi. 40 ; and 
 other passages.) 
 
 There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
 understand, and it might be said that he did not 
 fully comprehend all that he wrote ; which would 
 however be in no way remarkable, for it happens 
 now that a man may write what neither he nor 
 anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us 
 (xu. 10) to look at things and see what they are, 
 resolving them into the material (itai), the causal 
 ), and the relation (ava<po%d\ or the purpose, 
 
 thought, except in a very imperfect way. Time and space 
 must not in any way be thought of, when we think of the 
 Deity. Swedenborg says, " The natural man may believe 
 that he would have no thought, if the ideas of time, of 
 space, and of things material were taken away ; for upon 
 those is founded all the thought that man has. But let 
 him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in 
 proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what 
 is material; and that they are not limited and are ex- 
 tended, in proportion as they do not partake of those 
 things ; since the mind is so far elevated above the things 
 corporeal and worldly.' 7 (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 1 69.) 
 
OF ANTONINUS. li 
 
 by which he seems to mean something in the 
 nature of what we call effect, or end. The word 
 cause (atria) is the difficulty. There is the same 
 word in the Sanscrit (hetu) ; and the subtle phi- 
 losophers of India and of Greece, and the less 
 subtle philosophers of modern times have all used 
 this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague way. 
 Yet the confusion sometimes may be in the in- 
 evitable ambiguity of language rather than in the 
 mind of the writer, for I cannot think that some 
 of the wisest of men did not know what they 
 intended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), 
 " that everything that exists is in a manner the 
 seed of that which will be," he might be supposed 
 to say what some of the Indian philosophers have 
 said, and thus a profound truth might be converted 
 into a gross absurdity. But he says, " in a man- 
 ner," and in a manner he said true ; and in 
 another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he 
 said false. When Plato said, " Nothing ever is, 
 but is always becoming" (asl yiyvErai), he de- 
 livered a text, out of which we may derive some- 
 thing ; for he destroys by it not all practical, but 
 all speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
 whole series of things, as they appear to us, must 
 be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and 
 we conceive or suppose intervals between one state 
 of things and another state of things, so that there 
 is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, 
 and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. 
 But there is nothing of the kind in the Nature of 
 Things. It is an everlasting continuity, (iv. 45 ; 
 
lii THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 vn. 75.) When Antoninus speaks of generation 
 (x. 26), he speaks of one cause (arn'a) acting, 
 and then another cause taking up the work, which 
 the former left in a certain state and so on ; and 
 we might perhaps conceive that he had some 
 notion like what has been called u the self-evolving 
 power of nature ;" a fine phrase indeed, the full 
 import of which I believe that the writer of it 
 did not see, and thus he laid himself open to the 
 imputation of being a follower of one of the Hindu 
 sects, which makes all things come by evolution 
 out of nature or matter, or out of something which 
 takes the place of deity, but is not deity. I would 
 have all men think as they please or as they can, 
 and I only claim the same freedom, which I give. 
 When a man writes anything, we may fairly try 
 to find out all that his words must mean, even if 
 the result is that they mean what he did not mean ; 
 and if we find this contradiction, it is not our 
 fault, but his misfortune. Now Antoninus is per- 
 haps somewhat in this condition in what he says 
 {x. 26), though he speaks at the end of the para- 
 graph of the power which acts, unseen by the 
 eyes, but still no less clearly. But whether in 
 this passage (x. 26) he means that the power is 
 conceived to be in the different successive causes 
 (rnaj), or in something else, nobody can tell. 
 From other passages however I do collect that his 
 notion of the phaenomena of the universe is what 
 I have stated. The deity works unseen, if we 
 may use such language, and perhaps I may, as 
 Job did, or he who wrote the book of Job. " In 
 
OF ANTONINUS. liii 
 
 him we live and move and are," said St. Paul to 
 the Athenians, and to show his hearers that this 
 was no new doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. 
 One of these poets was the Stoic Cleanthes whose 
 noble hymn to Zeus or God is an elevated ex- 
 pression of devotion and philosophy. It deprives 
 Nature of her power and puts her under the im- 
 mediate government of the deity. 
 
 " Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
 Obeys and willing follows where thou leadest. 
 Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
 Nor in the aethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
 Save what the wicked do through their own folly." 
 
 Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a 
 divine power and government was founded on his 
 perception of the order of the universe. Like 
 Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3), he says that though 
 we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we 
 know that they exist because we see their works. 
 
 " To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the 
 gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they 
 exist and so worshipest them ? I answer, in the 
 first place, that they may be seen even with the 
 eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen 
 my own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then 
 with respect to the gods, from what I constantly 
 experience of their power, from this I compre- 
 hend that they exist and I venerate them." 
 (xn. 28. Comp. Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9 ; St. Paul's 
 Epistle to the Romans, 1. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's 
 Apology for Raimond de Sebonde, n. c. 12.) This 
 is a very old argument which has always had 
 e 
 
liv THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 great weight with most people and has appeared 
 sufficient. It does not acquire the least additional 
 strength by being developed in a learned treatise. 
 It is as intelligible in its simple enunciation as it 
 can be made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing 
 with him who rejects it : and if it is worked out 
 into innumerable particulars, the value of the 
 evidence runs the risk of being buried under a 
 mass of words. 
 
 Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power 
 or an intellectual power, or that he has such a 
 power, in whatever way he conceives that he has 
 it for I wish simply to state a fact from this 
 power which he has in himself, he is led, as An- 
 toninus says, to believe that there is a greater 
 power, which as the old Stoics tell us, pervades 
 the whole universe as the intellect 10 (youg) pervades 
 
 10 I have always translated the word vov t " intelli- 
 gence" or " intellect." It appears to be the word used by 
 the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of 
 " intelligence" as opposed to the notion of " matter." I 
 have always translated the word X6yo by " reason," and 
 Xoyico by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes 
 "reasonable," as I have translated votpoc by the word 
 " intellectual." Every man who has thought and has 
 read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of 
 i finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly 
 I words express these notions, and how carelessly the words 
 ' are often used. The various senses of the word X6yo are 
 enough to perplex any man. Our translators of the New 
 Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 \6yog 
 by " the word," as the Germans translated it by " das 
 Wort ;" but in their theological writings they sometimes 
 retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a 
 term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to our word 
 Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths, which we 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Iv 
 
 man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, i. 14; and 
 Voltaire a Mad e . Necker, vol. LXVII. p. 278.) 
 
 God exists then, but what do we know of his 
 Nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of man is 
 an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like 
 animals, but we have reason, intelligence as the 
 gods. Animals have life (-^wi), and what we 
 call instincts or natural principles of action : but 
 the rational animal man alone has a rational, in- 
 telligent soul (-v}/y%*j Aoy*fc>i, voega). Antoninus 
 insists on this continually : God is in man, 11 and j 
 so we must constantly attend to the divinity 
 within us, for it is only in this way that we can 
 have any knowledge of the nature of God. The 
 human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, \ 
 and the soul alone has any communication with 
 
 cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such 
 are what some people have called the laws of thought, the 
 conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first prin- 
 ciples, which need no proof and cannot be proved or de- 
 nied. Accordingly the Germans can say " Gott ist die 
 hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans 
 have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our 
 word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not as 
 a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a thing con- 
 nected with an individual being, as a man. Accordingly 
 it is the capacity of receiving impressions (Vorstellungen, 
 (pavraviai), and forming from them distinct ideas (Be- 
 griffe), and perceiving differences. I do not think that 
 these remarks will help the reader to the understanding 
 of Antoninus, or his use of the words VOVQ and Xoyog . 
 The Emperor's meaning must be got from his own words, 
 and if it does not agree altogether with modern notions, 
 it is not our business to force it into agreement, but sim- 
 ply to find out what his meaning is, if we can. 
 11 Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, I. 3. 17. 
 
Ivi THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 the deity, for as he says (xn. 2): "With his 
 intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- 
 gence only which has flowed and been derived 
 from himself into these bodies." In fact he says 
 that which is hidden within a man is life, that is 
 the man himself. All the rest is vesture, cover- 
 ing, organs, instrument, which the living man, the 
 real 12 man, uses for the purposes of his present 
 existence. The air is universally diffused for him 
 who is able to respire, and so for him who is 
 
 12 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As 
 to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall 
 live after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, 
 who lives in the body, that is, the interior man, who by 
 the body acts in the world and from whom the body itself 
 lives" (quoted by Clissold, p. 456 of " The Practical Na- 
 ture of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 
 in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin," second edition, 
 1859 ; a book which theologians might read with profit.) 
 This is an old doctrine of the soul, which has been often 
 
 Sroclaimed, but never better expressed than by the " Auctor 
 e Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his " Antoninus," 
 p. 436. " The soul by which we live and have cities and 
 nouses is invisible, but it is seen by its works ; for the 
 whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, 
 and by it is held together. In like manner we must think 
 also about the deity, who in power is most mighty , in beauty 
 most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: 
 wherefore though he is invisible to human nature, he is 
 seen by his very works." Other passages to the same 
 purpose are quoted by Gataker, (p. 382.) Bishop Butler 
 has the same as to the soul : " Upon the whole then our 
 organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, 
 which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to per- 
 ceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, he also 
 says : " It follows that our organized bodies are no more 
 
 I ourselves, or part of ourselves than any other matter 
 
 / around us." ^Compare Anton, x. 38.) 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ivii 
 
 willing to partake of it the intelligent power which 
 holds within it all things is diffused as wide and 
 free as the air. (vin. 54). It is by living a 
 divinejife^ thaj^n^n^aj^oajches_to^ knowledge 
 of the divinity. 13 It is by following the divinity 
 wTtmn^Ja^wv or Qeds as Antoninus calls it, that 
 man comes nearest to the deity, the supreme good, 
 for man can never attain to perfect agreement 
 with his internal guide (TO yytfjioviKov). " Live with 
 the gods. And he does live with the gods who 
 constantly shows to them that his own soul is 
 satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and 
 that it does all the daemon (5a///wi/) wishes, which 
 Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian 
 and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon 
 is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.) 
 There is in man, that is in the reason, the in- 
 telligence, a superior faculty which if it is exer- 
 cised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty 
 (TO YiytfAoviKov), which Cicero (De Natura Deo- 
 rum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, 
 
 13 The reader may consult Discourse V. " Of the ex- 
 istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select Dis- 
 courses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the 
 striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. 3 : " He who \J 
 knows himself will know God ; and he who knows God 
 will be made like to God ; and he will be made like to God, 
 who has become worthy of God ; and he becomes worthy 
 of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks 
 the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and 
 does what he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, 
 " Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and 
 others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which 
 is generally given to it. 
 
Iviii THE PHIL OSOPII Y 
 
 " to which nothing can or ought to be superior." 
 Antoninus often uses this term, and others which 
 are equivalent. He names it (vn. 64) "the 
 governing intelligence." The governing faculty 
 is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must 
 reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity 
 within him. As we must reverence that which 
 is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence 
 that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is 
 that which is of like kind with that which is 
 supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus 
 says, the soul of man can only know the divine, 
 so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) 
 Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of 
 himself, when the diviner part within him has 
 been overpowered and yields to the less honour- 
 able and to the perishable part, the body, and its 
 gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Anto- 
 ninus on this matter, however his expressions may 
 vary, are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses, 
 when he speaks of "the natural supremacy of 
 reflection or conscience," of the faculty "which 
 surveys, approves or disapproves the several affec- 
 tions of our mind and actions of our lives." 
 
 Much matter might be collected from Anto- 
 ninus on the notion of the Universe being one 
 animated Being. But all that he says amounts 
 to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the 
 soul of man is most intimately united to his body 
 and together they make one animal, which we 
 call man ; so the Deity is most intimately united 
 to the world or the material universe, and together 
 
OF A NTONINUS. lix 
 
 they form one whole. But Antoninus did not 
 view God and the material universe as the same, 
 any more than he viewed the body and soul of 
 man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on 
 the absolute nature of the deity. It was not his 
 fashion to waste his time on what man cannot 
 understand. He was satisfied that God exists, 
 that he governs all things, that man can only have 
 an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he 
 must attain this imperfect knowledge by reve- 
 rencing the divinity which is within him, and 
 keeping it pure. 
 
 From all that has been said it follows that the 
 universe is administered by the Providence of God 
 (fl-foWx), and that all things are wisely ordered. 
 There are passages in which Antoninus expresses 
 doubts, or states different possible theories of the 
 constitution and government of the Universe, but 
 he always recurs to his fundamental principle, 
 that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must 
 also admit that he orders all things wisely and 
 well. (iv. 27; vi. 1; ix. 28; xu. 6, and many 
 other passages.) Epictetus says (i. G) that we 
 can discern the providence which rules the world, 
 if we possess two things, the power of seeing all 
 that happens with respect to each thing, and a 
 grateful disposition. 
 
 But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the 
 world so full of what we call evil, physical and 
 moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in 
 the world, we use the expression which I have 
 used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- 
 
Ix THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 pated the Emperor's answer. We see and feel 
 and know imperfectly very few things in the few 
 years that we live, and all the knowledge and all 
 the experience of all the human race is positive 
 ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now 
 as our reason teaches us that everything is in some 
 way related to and connected with every other 
 thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe 
 of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes 
 from and is governed by an intelligent being, it 
 is impossible to conceive anything in it which 
 tends to the evil or destruction of the whole, 
 (viu. 55 ; x. 6.) Everything is in constant 
 mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might 
 imagine the solar system resolved into its ele- 
 mental parts, and yet the whole would still sub- 
 sist " ever young and perfect." 
 
 All things, all forms, are dissolved and new 
 forms appear. All living things undergo the 
 change which we call death. If we call death an 
 evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings 
 also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for 
 he suffers both in and by his body and by his 
 intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, 
 and perhaps the largest part of human suffering 
 comes to man from those whom he calls his bro- 
 thers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), " Generally, 
 wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and 
 particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no 
 harm to another. It is only harmful to him who 
 has it in his power to be released from it, as soon 
 as he shall choose/' The first part of this is per- 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixi 
 
 fectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole 
 can sustain no evil or harm. The second part 
 must be explained by the Stoic principle that 
 there is no evil in anything which is not in our 
 power. What wrong we suffer from another is 
 his evil, not ours. But this is an admission that 
 there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does 
 evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there 
 is evil in the wrong doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) 
 gives many excellent precepts with respect to 
 wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. 
 He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and 
 his lessons may be just as useful to him who 
 denies the being and the government of God as 
 to him who believes in both. There is no direct 
 answer in Antoninus to the objections which may 
 be made to the existence and providence of God v 
 because of the moral disorder and suffering which 
 are in the world, except this answer which he 
 makes in reply to the supposition that even the 
 best men may be extinguished by death. He 
 says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought 
 to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
 ordered it otherwise, (xn. 5.) His conviction of 
 the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- 
 ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed by 
 any apparent irregularities in the order of things. 
 That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who 
 would conclude from them against the being and 
 government of God conclude too hastily. We all 
 admit that there is an order in the material world, 
 a Nature, in the sense in which that word has 
 
Ixii THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 been explained, a constitution (xaTao-tttuy^ what 
 we call a system, a relation of parts to one another 
 and a fitness of the whole for something. So in 
 the constitution of plants and of animals there is 
 an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the 
 order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the 
 end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, 
 the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before 
 it has passed through all its changes and done all 
 its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed 
 order, for some to perish early and for others to 
 do all their uses and leave successors to take their 
 place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual 
 and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and 
 on the whole man performs these uses, dies and 
 leaves other men in his place. So society exists, 
 and a social state is manifestly the Natural State 
 of man, the state for which his Nature fits him ; 
 and society amidst innumerable irregularities and 
 disorders still subsists ; and perhaps we may say 
 that the history of the past and our present know- 
 ledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders 
 will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- 
 ciple, may be more firmly established. As order 
 then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to devia- 
 tions real or apparent, must be admitted to exist 
 in the whole Nature of things, that which we call 
 disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not in any 
 way alter the fact of the general constitution of 
 things having a Nature or fixed order. Nobody 
 will conclude from the existence of disorder that 
 order is not the rule, for the existence of order 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixiii 
 
 both physical and moral is proved by daily ex- 
 perience and all past experience. We cannot 
 conceive how the order of the universe is main- 
 tained : we cannot even conceive how our own 
 life from day to day is continued, nor how we 
 perform the simplest movements of the body, nor 
 how we grow and think and act, though we know 
 many of the conditions which are necessary for 
 all these functions. Knowing nothing then of 
 the unseen power which acts in ourselves except 
 by what is done, we know nothing of the power 
 which acts through what we call all time and all 
 space ; but seeing that there is a Nature or fixed 
 order in all things known to us, it is conformable 
 to the nature of our minds to believe that this 
 universal Nature has a cause which operates con- 
 tinually, and that we are totally unable to specu- 
 late on the reason of any of those disorders or 
 evils which we perceive. This I believe is the 
 answer which may be collected from all that An- 
 toninus has said. 14 
 
 The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles 
 tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, 
 one filled with good things, and the other with 
 bad, and that he gives to men out of each accord- 
 ing to his pleasure ; and so we must be content, 
 for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the 
 Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile 
 this doctrine with what we find in the first book 
 
 14 Cleanthes says in his Hymn : 
 " For all things good and bad to One thou forraest, 
 So that One everlasting reason governs all." 
 
Ixiv THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, 
 Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they 
 bring it on themselves through their own folly. 
 The answer is plain enough even to the Greek 
 commentator. The poets make both Achilles and 
 Zeus speak appropriately to their several charac- 
 ters. Indeed Zeus says plainly that men do attri- 
 bute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it 
 falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. 
 
 Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short 
 work of the question of evil. He says, " As a 
 mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, 
 so neither does the nature of evil exist in the 
 Universe." This will appear obscure enough to 
 those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but 
 he always knows what he is talking about. We 
 do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though 
 we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus 
 assumes, has not ordered all things so that his pur- 
 pose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what 
 we call evil, the Nature of evil, as he expresses it, 
 does not exist ; that is, evil is not a part of the 
 constitution or nature of Things. If there were a 
 principle of evil (af%>!) in the constitution of 
 things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius 
 argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, 
 Q27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text 
 of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive. 
 
 One passage more will conclude this matter. It 
 contains all that the emperor could say (n. 11) : 
 " To go from among men, if there are gods, is not 
 a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixv 
 
 volve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not 
 exist, or if they have no concern about human 
 affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid 
 of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth 
 they do exist, and they do care for human 
 things, and they have put all the means in man's 
 power to enable him not to fall into real evils. 
 And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, 
 they would have provided for this also, that it 
 should be altogether in a man's power not to fall 
 into it. But that which does not make a man 
 worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But 
 neither through ignorance, nor having the know- 
 ledge, but not the power to guard against or correct 
 these things, is it possible that the nature of the 
 Universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible 
 that it has made so great a mistake, either through 
 want of power or want of skill, that good and evil 
 should happen indiscriminately to the good and 
 the bad. But death certainly and life, honour and 
 dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things 
 equally happen to good and bad men, being things 
 which make us neither better nor worse. There- 
 fore they are neither good nor evil." 
 
 The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy fol- 
 lows from his general principles. The end of all 
 his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, 
 both a man's own nature and the nature of the 
 Universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the 
 Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of 
 living according to Nature, and he says that when 
 it is explained, as he has explained it and as they 
 
Ixvi THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 understood it, it is " a manner of speaking not loose 
 and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly 
 just and true." To live according to Nature is to 
 live according to a man's whole nature, not accord- 
 ing to a part of it, and to reverence the divinity 
 within him as the governor of all his actions. " To 
 the rational animal the same act is according to 
 nature and according to reason." 15 (vn. 11.) That 
 which is done contrary to reason is also an act 
 contrary to nature, to the whole nature, though it 
 is certainly conformable to some part of man's 
 nature, or it could not he done. Man is made for 
 action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants 
 and animals do the uses of their nature, so man 
 must do his. (v. 1.) 
 
 Man must also live conformably to the universal 
 nature, conformably to the nature of all things of 
 which he is one ; and as a citizen of a political 
 community he must direct his life and actions with 
 reference to those among whom, and for whom, 
 among other purposes, he lives. A man must not 
 retire into solitude and cut himself off from his 
 fellow men. He must be ever active to do his 
 part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not 
 only in blood, but still more by participating in 
 the same intelligence and by being a portion of 
 the same divinity. A man cannot really be in- 
 jured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can 
 make him bad, and he must not be angry with 
 them nor hate them : " For we are made for co- 
 
 15 This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321) 
 Nuuquam aliud Natura aliud Sapientia dicit. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixvii 
 
 operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
 the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act 
 against one another then is contrary to nature ; 
 and it is acting against one another to be vexed 
 and to turn away."(n. 1.) 
 
 Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing 
 and rest in it, in passing from one social act to 
 another social act, thinking of God." (vi. 7.) 
 Again: " Love mankind. Follow God." (vn. 31.) 
 It is the characteristic of the rational soul for a 
 man to love his neighbour, (xi. 1.) Antoninus 
 teaches in various passages the forgiveness of in- 
 juries, and we know that he also practised what 
 he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that " this 
 divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our 
 enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moral- 
 ists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Chris- 
 tianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it 
 than on any other single virtue." The practice of 
 this precept is the most difficult of all virtues. 
 Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid 
 towards following it. When we are injured, we 
 feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is 
 natural, just and useful for the conservation of 
 society. It is useful that wrong doers should feel 
 the natural consequences of their actions, among 
 which is the disapprobation of society and the re- 
 sentment of him who is wronged. But revenge 
 in the proper sense of that word, must not be prac- 
 tised. " The best way of avenging thyself," says 
 the emperor, " is not to become like the wrong 
 doer." It is plain by this that he does not mean 
 
Ixviii THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 that we should in any case practise revenge ; but 
 he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, 
 Be not like him who has done the wrong. Soc- 
 rates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other 
 words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xn. 17.) 
 " When a man has done thee any wrong, imme- 
 diately consider with what opinion about good or 
 evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast 
 seen this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither 
 wonder nor be angry." (ATI. 26.) Antoninus 
 would not deny that wrong naturally produces the 
 feeling of anger and resentment, for this is implied 
 in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of 
 the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then 
 you will have pity instead of resentment : and so 
 it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice to be 
 angry and sin not ; which, as Butler well explains 
 it, is not a recommendation to be angry, which 
 nobody needs, for anger is a natural passion, but 
 it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us 
 into sin. In short the emperor's doctrine about 
 wrongful acts is this : wrong doers jo not know 
 what good and bad are : they offend out of igno- 
 ranceVand in the sense of the Stoics this is true. 
 Though this kind of ignorance will never be ad- 
 mitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to be ad- 
 mitted as a full excuse in any way by society, 
 there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a 
 man's power to forgive without harm to society ; 
 and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies 
 know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit 
 of the sublime prayer, " Father, forgive them, for 
 they know not what they do." 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixix 
 
 The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, 
 narrow system, which teaches a man to look di- 
 rectly to his own happiness, though a man's hap- 
 piness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by 
 living as he ought to do. A man must live con- 
 formably to the universal nature, which means, as 
 the emperor explains it in many passages, that a 
 man's actions must be conformable to his true re- 
 lations to all other human beings, both as a citizen 
 of a political community and as a member of the 
 whole human family. This implies, and he often 
 expresses it in the most forcible language, that a 
 man's words and actions, so far as they affect others, 
 must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their 
 consistency with the conservation and the interests 
 of the particular society of which he is a member, 
 and of the whole human race. To live conform- 
 ably to such a rule, a man must use his rational 
 faculties in order to discern clearly the conse- 
 quences and full effect of all his actions and of 
 the actions of others : he must not live a life of 
 contemplation and reflection only, though he must 
 .often retire within himself to calm and^purify:his 
 soul by thought, but he must mingle in the work 
 of man and be a fellow labourer for the general good. 
 
 A man should have an object or purpose in life, 
 that he may direct all his energies to it; of course 
 a good object, (n. 7.) He who has not one object 
 or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life. (xi. 21.) Bacon has a remark to 
 the same effect, on the best means of " reducing of 
 the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which is, 
 f 
 
Ixx THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the electing and propounding unto a man's self 
 good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be 
 in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." 
 He is a happy man who has been wise enough to 
 do this when he was young and has had the op- 
 portunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a 
 man cannot always be so wise in his youth, en- 
 courages himself to do it when he can, and not to 
 let life slip away before he has begun. He who 
 can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of 
 life, and be true to them, cannot fail to live con- 
 formably to his own interest and the universal in- 
 terest, for in the nature of things they are one. If 
 a thing is not good for the hive, it is not good for 
 the bee, (vi. 54.) 
 
 One passage may end this matter. "If the gods 
 have determined about me and about the things 
 which must happen to me, they have determined 
 well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity 
 without forethought ; and as to doing me harm, 
 why should they have any desire towards that ? 
 For what advantage would result to them from 
 this or to the whole, which is the special object of 
 their providence ? But if they have not deter- 
 mined about me individually, they have certainly 
 determined about the whole at least; and the 
 things which happen by way of sequence in this 
 general arrangement I ought to accept with 
 pleasure and to be content with them. But if 
 they determine about nothing which it is wicked 
 to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither 
 sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixxi 
 
 thing else which we do as if the gods were pre- 
 sent and lived with us but if however the gods 
 determine about none of the things which con- 
 cern us, I am able to determine about myself, and 
 I can inquire about that which is useful ; and that 
 is useful to every man which is conformable to his 
 own constitution (xaraTusuY]) and nature. But 
 my nature is rational and social ; and my city and 
 country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but 
 so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things 
 then which are useful to these cities are alone 
 useful to me/' (vi. 44.) 
 
 It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to 
 state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in 
 which a man may profitably use his understanding 
 towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. 
 The passages to this purpose are in all parts of 
 his book, but as they are in no order or connec- 
 tion, a man must use the book a long time before 
 he will find out all that is in it. A few words may 
 be added here. If we analyse all other things, 
 we find how insufficient they are for human life, 
 and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue 
 alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. 
 The notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague 
 or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult 
 to explain the notion fully to himself or to expound 
 it to others in such a way as to prevent cavilling. 
 Virtue is a whole, and no more consists of parts 
 than man's intelligence does, and yet we speak of 
 various intellectual faculties as a convenient way 
 of expressing the various powers which man's in- 
 
Ixxii THE PHIL OSOPH Y 
 
 tellect shows by its works. In the same way we 
 may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in 
 a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what 
 particular virtues we ought to practise in order to 
 the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as 
 much as man's nature is capable of. 
 
 The prime principle in man's constitution is 
 social. The next in order is not to yield to the 
 persuasions of the body, when they are not con- 
 formable to the rational principle, which must 
 govern. The third is freedom from error and 
 from deception. " Let then the ruling principle 
 holding fast to these things go straight on and it 
 has what is its own." (vn. 55.) The emperor 
 selects justice as the virtue which is the basis of 
 all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long 
 before his time. 
 
 It is true that all people have some notion of 
 what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
 mind, and some notion about acting in conformity 
 to this disposition ; but experience shows that 
 men's notions about justice are as confused as their 
 actions are inconsistent with the true notion of 
 justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear 
 enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. 
 " Let there be freedom from perturbations with 
 respect to the things which come from the exter- 
 nal cause ; and let there be justice in the things 
 done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let 
 there be movement and action terminating in this, 
 in social acts, for this is according to thy nature." 
 (ix. 31.) In another place (ix. 1) he says that 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixxiii 
 
 " he who acts unjustly acts impiously/' which fol- 
 lows of course from all that he says in various 
 places. He insists on the practice of truth as a 
 virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt 
 it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens 
 the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as 
 great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, 
 viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, 
 and viewed with respect to its consequences. He 
 couples the notion of justice with action. A man 
 must not pride himself on having some fine notion 
 of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his 
 justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. 
 But this is enough. 
 
 The Stoics and Antoninus among them call 
 some things beautiful (aXa) and some ugly 
 (od<rxpa,\ and as they are beautiful so they are 
 good, and as they are ugly so they are evil or bad. 
 (n. 1.) All these things good and evil are in our 
 power, absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would 
 say ; in a manner only, as those who would not 
 depart altogether from common sense would say ; 
 practically they are to a great degree in the power 
 of some persons and in some circumstances, but in 
 a small degree only in other persons and in other 
 circumstances. The Stoics maintain man's free 
 will as to the things which are in his power ; for 
 as to the things which are out of his power, 
 free will terminating in action is of course excluded 
 by the very terms of the expression. I hardly 
 know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion 
 of the free will of man, nor is the question worth 
 
Ixxiv THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the inquiry. What he does mean and does say is 
 intelligible. All the things which are not in our 
 power (oiTrqoaif era) are indifferent : they are 
 neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life, 
 health, wealth, power, disease, poverty and death. 
 Life and death are all men's portion. Health, 
 wealth, power, disease and poverty happen to men 
 indifferently to the good and to the bad ; to those 
 who live according to nature and to those who do 
 not. " Life," says the emperor, " is a warfare and 
 a stranger's sojourn, and after fame is oblivion." 
 (n. 17.) After speaking of those men who have 
 disturbed the world and then died, and of the 
 death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and De- 
 mocritus who was destroyed by lice, and of Soc- 
 rates whom Other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he 
 says : " What means all this ? Thou hast embarked, 
 thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to 
 shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is 
 no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state 
 without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by 
 pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel 
 which is as much inferior as that which serves it 
 is superior : for the one is intelligence and deity ; 
 the other is earth and corruption." (in. 3.) It is 
 not death that a man should fear, but he should 
 fear never beginning to live according to nature, 
 (xn. 1.) Every man should live in such a way 
 as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself 
 about nothing else. He should live such a life 
 that he shall always be ready for death, and shall 
 depart content when the summons comes. For 
 
OF ANTONINUS. Ixxv 
 
 what is death ? "A cessation of the impressions 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
 strings which move the appetites and of the dis- 
 cursive movements of the thoughts, and of the 
 service to the flesh." (vi. 28.) Death is such as 
 generation is, a mystery of nature, (iv. 5.) In 
 another passage, the exact meaning of which is 
 perhaps doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child 
 which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at 
 death leaves its envelope. As the child is born or 
 comes into life by leaving the womb, so the soul 
 may on leaving the body pass into another existence 
 which is perfect. I am not sure if this is the 
 emperor's meaning. Butler compares it with a 
 passage in Strabo about the Brahmins' notion of 
 death being the birth into real life and a happy 
 life to those who have philosophized ; and he 
 thinks that Antoninus may allude to this opinion. 16 
 Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere 
 clearly expressed. His doctrine of the nature 
 of the soul of necessity implies that it does \J 
 not perish absolutely, for a portion of the di- 
 vinity cannot perish. The opinion is at least as 
 old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides ; 
 what comes from earth goes back to earth, and 
 what comes from heaven, the divinity, returns to 
 
 16 Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expres- 
 sion of his own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others 
 employed to embellish his writings, I know not. After 
 speaking of the child being prepared in the womb to live 
 this life, he adds, " Sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia 
 patet in senectutem, in alium naturae sumimur partum. 
 Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum status." 
 
..... '<' . . , . ,../,._ * 
 
 I Hi 
 
 v.~6CO*~ 4, fc^v A^A *TH^ U ^Ai*~.^ fff^ ^J~lu Afcr , // -J-sZLjL, if ' 
 
 ,,,. , 
 
 ] 
 
 him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in 
 Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing 
 after death so as to be conscious of his sameness 
 with that soul which occupied his vessel of clay. 
 He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and 
 finally to have rested in this, that God or the gods 
 will do whatever is best and consistent with the 
 university of things. 
 
 Nor I think does he speak conclusively on 
 another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics prac- 
 tised, the anticipating the regular course of nature 
 by a man's own act. The reader will find some 
 passages in which this is touched on, and he may 
 make of them what he can. But there are pas- 
 sages in which the emperor encourages himself to 
 wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity ; 
 and certainly it is consistent with all his best teach- 
 ing that a man should bear all that falls to his lot 
 and do useful acts as long as he lives. He should 
 not therefore abridge the time of his usefulness by 
 his own act. Whether he contemplates any pos- 
 sible cases in which a man should die by his own 
 hand, I cannot tell, and the matter is not worth 
 a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not lead 
 to any certain result as to his opinion on this point. 
 I do not think that Antoninus, who never men- 
 tions Seneca, though he must have known all 
 about him, would have agreed with Seneca when 
 he gives as a reason for suicide, that the eternal 
 law, whatever he means, has made nothing better 
 for us than this, that it has given us only one way 
 
f 
 
 -t, JLt.c ,-,./. . I,, ^ ** fa. *(.-** ^ie.6 "^ fa 
 
 * cSnsiriXt. / -Yy> ' 
 
 OF ANTONINUS. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 of entering into life and many ways of going out 
 of it. The ways of going out indeed are many, 
 and that is a good reason for a man taking care of 
 himself. 
 
 Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's 
 life. There is no rule of life contained in the 
 precept that a man should pursue his own hap- 
 piness. Many men think that they are seeking 
 happiness when they are only seeking the gratifica- 
 tion of some particular passion, the strongest that 
 they have. The end of a man is, as already ex- 
 plained, to live conformably to nature, and he will 
 thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind and 
 contentment, (in. 12 ;vni. 1, and other places.) As 
 a means of living conformably to nature he must 
 study the four chief virtues, each of which has its 
 proper sphere : wisdom or the knowledge of good 
 and evil ; justice, or the giving to every man his 
 due; fortitude, or the enduring of labour and 
 pain ; and temperance, which is moderation in all 
 things. By thus living conformably to nature, the 
 Stoic obtained all that he wished or expected. 
 His reward was in his virtuous life, and he was 
 satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago 
 wrote : 
 
 For virtue only of all human things 
 
 Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
 
 Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue. 
 
 Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves 
 in very arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise 
 man's self sufficiency ; they elevated him to the 
 g 
 
Ixxviii A NTONINUS. 
 
 rank of a deity. 17 But these were only talkers 
 and lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter 
 fine words, know little of human affairs, and care 
 only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus 
 both by precept and example laboured to improve 
 themselves and others ; and if we discover imper- 
 fections in their teaching, we must still honour 
 these great men who attempted to show that there 
 is in man's nature and in the constitution of things 
 sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is 
 difficult enough to live as we ought to live, diffi- 
 cult even for any man to live in such a way as to 
 satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate 
 degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing 
 his own conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought 
 to the same opinions in morals and religion, it is 
 at least worth while to give them good reasons for 
 as much as they can be persuaded to accept. 
 
 17 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on " the Excellency 
 and Nobleness of true religion" (c. vi. ) has remarked i ui this 
 Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. In 
 Seneca certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus ; 
 but it is not in Antoninus. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. 
 
 I. 
 
 )ROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I 
 learned] good morals and the govern- 
 ment of my temper. 
 
 2. From the reputation and re- 
 membrance of my father, 2 modesty and a manly 
 character. 
 
 3. From my mother, 3 piety and beneficence, and 
 
 1 Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is 
 no verb in this section connected with the word" from," nor 
 in the following sections of this book ; and it is not quite 
 certain what verb should be supplied. What I have added 
 may express the meaning here, though there are sections 
 which it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that he 
 learned all these good things from the several persons whom 
 he mentions, he means that he observed certain good qua- 
 lities in them, or received certain benefits from them, and 
 it is implied that he was the better for it, or at least might 
 have been; for it would be a mistake to understand Marcus 
 as saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed 
 in his kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 2 His father's name was Annius Verus. 
 
 3 His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla. 
 
2 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from 
 evil thoughts ; and further, simplicity in my way 
 of living, far removed from the habits of the 
 rich. 
 
 4. From my great-grandfather, 4 not to have fre- 
 quented public schools, and to have had good 
 teachers at home, and to know that on such things 
 a man should spend liberally. 
 
 5. From my governor, to be neither of the green 
 nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus, 
 nor a partizan either of the Parmularius or the 
 Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too 
 I learned endurance of labour, and to want little, 
 and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle 
 with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to 
 listen to slander. 
 
 6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about 
 trifling things, and not to give credit to what was 
 said by miracle- workers and jugglers about incan- 
 tations and the driving away of daemons and such 
 things ; and not to breed quails [Tor fighting]], nor 
 to give myself up passionately to such things ; and 
 to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become 
 intimate with philosophy ; and to have been a 
 hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and 
 Marcianus ; and to have written dialogues in my 
 
 4 Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 3 
 
 youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, 
 and whatever else of the kind belongs to the 
 Grecian discipline. 
 
 7. From Rusticus 5 I received the impression 
 that my character required improvement and dis- 
 cipline ; and from him I learned not to be led astray 
 to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative 
 matters, nor to delivering little hortatory orations, 
 nor to showing myself off as a man who practises 
 much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order 
 to make a display ; and to abstain from rhetoric, 
 and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about 
 in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other 
 things of the kind ; and to write my letters with 
 simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote 
 from Sinuessa to my mother ; and with respect to 
 those who have offended me by words, or done me 
 wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and re- 
 conciled, as soon as they have shown a readiness to 
 be reconciled ; and to read carefully, and not to be 
 
 5 Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom 
 Antoninus valued highly, and often took his advice. 
 (Capitol. M. Antonin. iii.) 
 
 Antoninus says, TOIQ ^TTIKTIJTEIOIQ vTrofJLvrjfjLacriv, which 
 must not be translated, " the writings of Epictetus," for 
 Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has 
 preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, ravra 
 dOrjv V7rop,vr}f 
 Lag. (Ep. ad 
 
4 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book ; 
 nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk over- 
 much ; and I am indebted to him for being ac- 
 quainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which 
 he communicated to me out of his own collection. 
 
 8. From Apollonius 6 I learned freedom of will 
 and undeviating steadiness of purpose ; and to look 
 to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to 
 reason ; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, 
 on the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long 
 illness ; and to see clearly in a living example that 
 the same man can be both most resolute and yield- 
 ing, and not peevish in giving his instruction ; 
 and to have had before my eyes a man who clearly 
 considered his experience and his skill in expound- 
 ing philosophical principles as the smallest of his 
 merits; and from him I learned how to receive 
 from friends what are esteemed favours, without 
 being either humbled by them or letting them pass 
 unnoticed. 
 
 9. From Sextus, 7 a benevolent disposition, and 
 the example of a family governed in a fatherly man- 
 ner, and the idea of living conformably to nature; 
 and gravity without affectation, and to look care- 
 
 6 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of 
 Pius to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 
 
 7 Sextus of Chseronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or 
 nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 5 
 
 fully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate 
 ignorant^ persons, and those who form opinions 
 without considerationf : he had the power of rea- 
 dily accommodating himself to all, so that inter- 
 course with him was more agreeable than any 
 flattery; and at the same time he was most highly 
 venerated by those who associated with him : and 
 he had the faculty both of discovering and order- 
 ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the 
 principles necessary for life ; and he never showed 
 anger or any other passion, but was entirely free 
 from passion, and also most affectionate; and he 
 could express approbation without noisy display, 
 and he possessed much knowledge without osten- 
 tation. 
 
 1 0. From Alexander 8 the grammarian, to refrain 
 from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful way 
 to chide those who uttered any barbarous or sole- 
 cistic or strange-sounding expression ; but dexte- 
 rously to introduce the very expression which ought 
 to have been used, and in the way of answer or 
 giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about 
 the thing itself, not about the word, or by some 
 other fit suggestion, 
 
 8 Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. 
 He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician 
 Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a funeral 
 oration. 
 
6 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 11. From Fronto 9 I learned to observe what envy, 
 and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and 
 that generally those among us who are called 
 Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. 
 
 1 2. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently 
 nor without necessity to say to any one, or to write 
 in a letter, that I have no leisure ; nor continually 
 to excuse the neglect of duties required by our 
 relation to those with whom we live, by alleging 
 urgent occupations. 
 
 13. From Catulus, 10 not to be indifferent when 
 a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault 
 without reason, but to try to restore him to his 
 usual disposition ; and to be ready to speak well 
 of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
 Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 
 
 14. From my brother 11 Severus, to love my kin, 
 and to love truth, and to love justice; and through 
 him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, 
 Dion, Brutus ; 12 and from him I received the idea 
 
 9 Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favour 
 with Marcus. There are extant various letters between 
 Marcus and Fronto. 
 
 10 Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
 11 The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus 
 had no brother. It has been supposed that he may mean 
 some cousin. Schultz omits " brother/' and says that this 
 Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. 
 
 12 We know, from Tacitus (Annal. xiil, xvi. 21$ and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. L 7 
 
 of a polity in which there is the same law for all, 
 a polity administered with regard to equal rights 
 amTequal freedom of speech, and the idea of a 
 kingly government which respects most of all the 
 free^p^i_^fj^e^pverned ; I learned from him alsof 
 consistency and undeviating steadiness in my re- 
 gard for philosophy ; and a disposition to do good, 
 and to give to others readily, and to cherish good 
 hopes, and to believe that I am loved by my friends ; 
 and in him I observed no concealment of his opinions 
 with respect to those whom he condemned, and 
 that his friends had no need to conjecture what he ! 
 wished or did not wish, but it was quite plain. I 
 
 15. From Maximus 13 1 learned self-government, 
 and not to be led aside by anything ; and cheer- 
 fulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness ; 
 and a just admixture in the moral character of 
 sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set 
 before me without complaining. I observed that 
 everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, 
 
 other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch 
 has written the lives of the two Catos, and of Dion and 
 Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to Cato of Utica, 
 who was a Stoic. 
 
 13 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was 
 highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' prede- 
 cessor. The character of Maximus is that of a perfect 
 man. (See viii. 25.) 
 
8 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 and that in all that he did he never had any bad 
 intention ; and he never showed amazement and 
 surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put 
 off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, 
 nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, 
 on the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- 
 picious. He was accustomed to do acts of bene- 
 ficence, and was ready to forgive, and was free from 
 all falsehood ; and he presented the appearance of 
 a man who could not be diverted from right rather 
 than of a man who had been improved. I observed, 
 too, that no man could ever think that he was de- 
 spised by Maximus, or ever venture to think him- 
 self a better man. He had also the art of being 
 humorous in an agreeable way.f 
 
 16. In my father 14 I observed mildness of 
 temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things 
 which he had determined after due deliberation ; 
 and no vainglory in those things which men call 
 honours ; and a love of labour and perseverance ; 
 and a readiness to listen to those who had any- 
 thing to propose for the common weal ; and un- 
 
 iating firmness in giving to every man accord- 
 ing to his deserts ; and a knowledge derived from 
 experience of the occasions for vigorous action and 
 
 14 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the 
 Emperor Antoninus Pius. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 9 
 
 for remission. And I observed that he had overcome 
 all passion for boys ; and he considered himself no 
 more than any other citizen ; and he released his 
 friends from all obligation to sup with him or to 
 attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and 
 those who had failed to accompany him, by reason 
 of any urgent circumstances, always found him the 
 same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry 
 in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, 
 and that he never stopped his investigation through 
 being satisfied with appearances which first present 
 themselves ; and that his disposition was to keep 
 his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor 
 
 yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be, 
 * & ' ,:. 
 
 satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to 
 foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the 
 smallest without display; and to check immediately 
 popular applause and all flattery ; and to be ever 
 watchful over the things which were necessary for 
 the administration of the empire, and to be a good 
 manager of the expenditure, and patiently to en- 
 dure the blame which he got for such conduct ; 
 and he was neither superstitious with respect to 
 
 r $ 
 
 the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by 
 trying to please them, or by flattering the populace ; 
 but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, 
 and never any mean thoughts or action, nor love 
 
10 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 of novelty. And the things which conduce in any 
 way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune 
 gives an abundant supply, he used without arro- 
 gance and without excusing himself; so that when 
 he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, 
 and when he had them not, he did not want them. 
 No one could ever say of him that he was either a 
 sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; 
 but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, 
 perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and 
 other men's affairs. Besides this, he honoured 
 those who were true philosophers, and he did not 
 reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, 
 nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also 
 easy in conversation, and he made himself agree- 
 able without any offensive affectation. He took a 
 reasonable care of his body's health, not as one who 
 was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to 
 personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, 
 but so that, through his own attention, he very sel- 
 dom stood in need of the physician's art or of me- 
 dicine or external applications. He was most ready 
 to give way without envy to those who possessed 
 any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or 
 knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything 
 else ; and he gave them his help, that each might 
 enjoy reputation according to his deserts ; and he 
 
M. ANTONINUS. L 11 
 
 always acted conformably to the institutions of his 
 country, without showing any affectation of doing 
 so. Further, he was not fond of change nor un- 
 steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and 
 to employ himself about the same things ; and 
 after his paroxysms of headache he came im- 
 mediately fresh and vigorous to his usual occu- 
 pations. His secrets were not many, but very few 
 and very rare, and these only about public matters ; 
 and he showed prudence and economy in the 
 exhibition of the public spectacles and the con- 
 struction of public buildings, his donations to the 
 people, and in such things, for he was a man who 
 looked to what ought to be done, not to the repu- "i 
 tation which is got by a man's acts. He did not 
 take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not 
 fond of building houses, nor curious about what he 
 ate, nor about the texture and colour of his clothes, 
 nor about the beauty of his slaves. 15 ^ His dress V/ 
 came from Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from 
 Lanuvium generally. 16 We know how he behaved 
 to the toll-collector in.Tusculum who asked his 
 pardon ; and such was all his behaviour. There 
 
 15 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is un- 
 certain. 
 
 16 Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and 
 there Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This 
 also is corrupt. <*/* , f * 7 '* . * r * 7 4 ' 
 
12 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 *ii tit ,. 11 i i l 
 
 was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor 
 violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to 
 the sweating point ; but he examined all things 
 severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- 
 out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and 
 consistently. And that might be applied to him 
 which is recorded of Socrates, 17 that he was able 
 both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things 
 which many are too weak to abstain from, and 
 cannot enjoy ^without excess. But to be strong 
 enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the 
 other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and 
 invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of 
 Maximus. 
 
 17. To the gods I am indebted for having good 
 grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
 teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and 
 friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe 
 it to the gods that I was not hurried into any 
 offence against any of them, though I had a dis- 
 position which, if opportunity had offered, might 
 have led me to do something of this kind ; but, 
 through their favour, there never was such a con- 
 currence of circumstances as put me to the trial. 
 Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was 
 not longer brought up with my grandfather's con- 
 
 17 Xenophon, Memordb. i. 3. 15. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. L 13 
 
 cubine, and that I preserved the flower of my *) 
 youth, and that I did not make proof of my j 
 virility before the proper season, but even de- J 
 ferred the time ; that I was subjected to a ruler 
 and a father who was able to take away all pride 
 from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that 
 it is possible for a man to live in a palace without 
 wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or 
 torches and statues, and such-like show ; but that 
 it is in such a man's power to bring himself very 
 near to the fashion of a private person, without 
 being for this reason either meaner in thought, or 
 more remiss in action, with respect to the things 
 which must be done for the public interest in a 
 manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for 
 giving me such a brother, 18 who was able by his 
 moral character to rouse me to vigilance over 
 myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by 
 his respect and affection ; that my children have 
 not been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did 
 not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and 
 the other studies, in which I should perhaps have 
 been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was 
 making progress in them ; that I made haste to 
 place those who brought me up in the station of 
 
 18 The emperor had no brother, except L. Verus, his 
 brother by adoption. 
 
14 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 honour, which they seemed to desire, without 
 putting them off with hope of my doing it some 
 time after, because they were then still young ; 
 that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus ; 
 that I received clear and frequent impressions 
 about living according to nature, and what kind 
 of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the 
 gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations, 
 nothing hindered me from forthwith living accord- 
 ing to nature, though I still fall short of it through 
 my own fault, and through not observing the 
 admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, 
 their direct instructions ; that my body has held 
 r out so long in such a kind of life ; that I never 
 touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, 
 after having fallen into amatory passions, I was 
 ured; and, though I was often out of humour 
 with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I 
 had occasion to repent ; that, though it was my 
 mother's fate to die young, she spent the last 
 years of her life with me ; that, whenever I wished 
 to help any man in his need, or on any other 
 occasion, I was never told that I had not the 
 means of doing it ; and that to myself the same 
 necessity never happened, to receive anything from 
 another; that I have such a wife, 19 so obedient, 
 
 19 See the Life of Antoninus. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 15 
 
 and so affectionate, and so simple; that I had 
 abundance of good masters for my children ; and 
 that remedies hay been shown to me by dreams. 
 both others, and against bloodspitting and giddi- 
 ness 20 ******* and that, when I had an in- 
 clination to philosophy, I did not fall into the 
 hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste my 
 time on writers [[of histories], or in the resolution 
 of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the investi- 
 gation of appearances in the heavens ; for all these 
 things require the help of the gods and fortune. 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua. 21 
 
 20 This is corrupt. 
 
 21 The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and 
 Moravia ; and Antoninus made a campaign against them. 
 (See the Life.') Granua is probably the river Graan, 
 which flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written 
 this first book during the war with the Quadi. In the first 
 edition of Antoninus, and in the older editions, the first 
 three sections of the second book make the conclusion of 
 the first book. Gataker placed them at the beginning 
 of the second book. 
 
II. 
 
 >r EGIN the morning by saying to thy- 
 self, I shall meet with the busybody, 
 the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, 
 envious, unsocial. All these things 
 happen to them by_reason of their^gnorance of 
 what is good and evil. But I who have seen the 
 nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of 
 the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him 
 who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not only] 
 of the same blood or seed, but that it participates 
 in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion 
 of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of 
 them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor 
 can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
 For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
 hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and 
 lower teeth. To act against one another then is 
 contrary to nature ; ancMt is acting against one 
 another to be vexed and to turn a^vay^ <r &*&** " t ^ 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 17 
 
 2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh 
 and breath, and the ruling part. Throw away thy 
 books ; no longer distract thyself : it is not allowed ; 
 but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh : 
 it is blood and bones and a net-work, a contexture 
 of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, 
 what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always the 
 same, but every moment sent out and again sucked 
 in. The third then is the ruling part : consider 
 thus: Thou art an old man; no longer let this be 
 a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a 
 puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either 
 dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from 
 the future. 
 
 3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. 
 That which is from fortune is not separated from 
 nature or without an interweaving and involution 
 with the things which are ordered by providence. 
 From thence all things flow ; and there is besides 
 necessity, and that which is for the advantage of 
 the whole universe, of which thou art a part. 
 But that is good for every part of nature which 
 the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to 
 maintain this nature. Now the universe is pre- 
 served, as by the changes of the elements so by the 
 changes of things compounded. Let these prin- 
 ciples be enough for thee, let them always be 
 
< /- 
 
 /fcvr <; .,., ,^': *, x cuz tr-f^f (^ ^^ 
 
 18 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after 
 books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but 
 cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to 
 the gods. 
 
 4. Remember how long thou hast been putting 
 off these things, and how often thou hast received 
 an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use 
 it. Thou must now at last perceive of what uni- 
 verse thou art a part, and of what administrator of 
 the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that a 
 limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost 
 not use for clearing away the clouds from thy 
 N A/- mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never 
 
 5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman 
 and a man, to do what thou hast in hand with 
 perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, 
 and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself 
 relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
 give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy 
 life as if it were the last, laying aside all careless- 
 ness and passionate aversion from the commands 
 of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and dis- 
 content with the portion -which has been given to 
 thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the 
 which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life 
 which flows in quiet, and is like the existence of 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 19 
 
 the gods ; for the gods on their part will require 
 nothing more from him who observes these 
 things. 
 
 6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my 
 soul ; but thou wilt no longer have the opportunity 
 of honouring thyself. Every man's life is suf- 
 ficient.f But thine is nearly finished, though thy 
 soul reverences not itself, but places thy felicity in 
 the souls of others. 
 
 7. Do the things external which fall upon thee 
 distract thee ? Give thyself time to learn something 
 new and good, and cease to be whirled around. 
 But then thou must also avoid being carried about 
 the other way. For those too are triflers who have 
 wearied themselves in life by their activity, and yet 
 have no object to which to direct every movement, 
 and, in a word, all their thoughts. 
 
 8. Through not observing what is in the mind 
 of another a man has seldom been seen to be un-^ 
 happy; but those who do not observe the move- 
 ments of their own minds must of necessity be 
 unhappy. 
 
 9. This thou must always bear in mind, what 
 is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, 
 and how this is related to that, and what kind of 
 a part it is of what kind of a whole ; and that 
 there is no one who hinders thee from always 
 
20 M. ANTONINUS. 1 L 
 
 doing and saying the things which are according 
 to the nature of which thou art a part. 
 
 10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts 
 such a comparison as one would make in accord- 
 ance with the common notions of mankind says, 
 like a true philosopher, that the offences which are 
 committed through desire are more blameable than 
 those which are committed through anger. For he 
 who is excited by anger seems to turn away from 
 reason with a certain pain and unconscious con- 
 traction ; but he who offends through desire, being 
 overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner 
 more intemperate and more womanish in his 
 offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of 
 philosophy, he said that the offence which is com- 
 mitted with pleasure is more blameable than that 
 which is committed with pain ; and on the whole 
 the one is more like a person who has been first 
 wronged and through pain is compelled to be 
 angry ; but the other is moved by his own impulse 
 to do wrong, being carried towards doing something 
 by desire. 
 
 11. Since it is possible that thou mayest depart 
 from life this very moment, regulate every act and 
 thought accordingly. But to go away from among 
 men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid 
 of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil ; but 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 21 
 
 if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no 
 concern about human affairs, what is it to me to 
 live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of pro- 
 vidence ? But in truth they do exist, and they do 
 care for human things, and they have put all the 
 means in man's power to enable him not to fall 
 into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was 
 anything evil, they would have provided for this 
 also, that it should be altogether in a man's power 
 not to fall into it. Now that which does not make 
 a man worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? 
 But neither through ignorance, nor having the 
 knowledge, but not the power to guard against or 
 correct these things, is it possible that the nature 
 of the universe has overlooked them ; nor is it 
 possible that it has made so great a mistake, either 
 through want of power or want of skill, that good 
 and evil should happen indiscriminately to the 
 good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, 
 honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these 
 things equally happen to good men and bad, being 
 things which make us neither better nor worse. 
 Therefore they are neither good nor evil. 
 
 12. How quickly all things disappear, in the 
 universe the bodies themselves, but in time the 
 remembrance of them ; what is the nature of all 
 sensible things, and particularly those which attract 
 
22 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are 
 noised abroad by vapoury fame ; how worthless, 
 and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and 
 dead they are all this it is the part of the intel- 
 lectual faculty to observe. To observe too who 
 these are whose opinions and voices give reputa- 
 tion ; what death is, and the fact that, if a man 
 looks at it in itself, and by the abstractive power of 
 reflection resolves into their parts all the things 
 which present themselves to the imagination in it, 
 he will then consider it to be nothing else than an 
 operation of nature ; and if any one is afraid of an 
 operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, 
 is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a 
 thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. 
 To observe too how man comes near to the deity, 
 and by what part of him, and when this part of 
 man is so disposed .t 
 
 13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who 
 traverses everything in a round, and pries into the 
 things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and 
 seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his 
 neighbours, without perceiving that it is sufficient 
 ' to attend to the daemon within him, and to reve- 
 
 ^ s i ncere ty- And reverence of the daemon 
 consists in keeping it pure from passion and 
 thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 23 
 
 comes from gods and men. For the things from 
 the gods merit veneration for their excellence ; 
 and the things from men should be dear to us by 
 reason of kinship ; and sometimes even, in a man- 
 ner, they move our pity by reason of men's igno- 
 rance of good and bad ; this defect being not less 
 than that which deprives us of the power of dis- 
 tinguishing things that are white and black. 
 
 14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three 
 thousand years, and as many times ten thousand 
 years, still remember that no man loses any other 
 life than this which he now lives, nor lives any 
 other than this which he now loses. The longest and 
 shortest are thus brought to the same. For the 
 present is the same to all, though that which is 
 past is not the same ; and so that which is lost 
 appears to be a mere moment. For a man cannot 
 lose either the past or the future : for what a man 
 has not, how can any one take this from him ? 
 These two things then thou must bear in mind ; 
 the one, that all things from eternity are of like 
 forms and come round in a circle, and that it 
 makes no difference whether a man shall see the 
 same things during a hundred years or two hundred, 
 or an infinite time ; and the second, that the 
 longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just 
 the same. For the present is the only thing of 
 
24 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this 
 is the only thing which he has, and that a man 
 cannot lose a thing if he has it not. 
 
 15. Remember that^all is opinion. For what 
 was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : and 
 manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man 
 receives what may be got out of it as far as it is 
 true. 
 
 1 6. The soul of man does violence to itself, first 
 of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, 
 a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to 
 bejvgxgdjit anything which happens is a separati on 
 of ourselves from nature, in some part of which the 
 natures of all other things are contained. In the 
 next place, the soul does violence to itself when it 
 turns away from any man, or even moves towards 
 him with the intention of injuring, such as are the 
 souls of those who are angry. In the third place, 
 the soul does violence to itself when it is over- 
 powered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when 
 it plays a part, and does or says anything in- 
 sincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows 
 any act of its own and any movement to be with- 
 out an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and 
 without considering what it is, it being right that 
 even the smallest things be done with reference to 
 an end ; and the end of rational animals is to fol- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 25 
 
 low the reason/and the law of the most ancient 
 city and polity. 
 
 17. Of human life the time is a point, and the 
 substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and 
 the composition of the whole body subject to 
 putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune 
 hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of 
 judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything 
 which belongs to the body is a stream, and what 
 belongs to the soul is a dream and vapour, and life 
 is a* warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after- 
 fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able 
 to conduct a man ? One thing and only one, phi- 
 losophy. But this consists in keeping the daemon 
 within a man free from violence and unharmed, 
 superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing 
 without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypo- 
 crisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing 
 or not doing anything ; and besides, accepting all 
 that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming 
 from thence, wherever^ it is, from whence he him- 
 self came ; and, finally, waiting for death with a 
 cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dis- 
 solution of the elements of which every living being 
 is compounded. But if there is no harm to the 
 elements themselves in each continually changing 
 into another, why should a man have any appre- 
 
26 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 hension about the change and dissolution of all the 
 elements ? For it is according to nature, and no- 
 thing is evil which is according to nature. 
 This in Carnuntum. 1 
 
 1 Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south 
 side of the Danube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona 
 (Vienna). Orosius (vii. 15.) and Eutropius (viii. 13.) say 
 that Antoninus remained three years at Carnuntum during 
 his war with the Marcomanni. 
 
Oi/rwt w. WnL 
 
 III. 
 
 rE ought to consider not only that 
 our life is daily wasting away and 
 a smaller part of it is left, but an- 
 other thing also must be taken into 
 the account, that if a man should live longer, 
 it is quite uncertain whether the understanding 
 will still continue sufficient for the comprehension 
 of things, and retain the power of contemplation 
 which strives to acquire the knowledge of the 
 divine and the human. For if he shall begin to 
 fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition *md 
 imagination and appetite, and whatever else there 
 is of the kind, will not fail; but the power of i* 
 m^Jdn^ji^o^ourselves, and fillingjrp the measure /^ 
 of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, 5 
 and considering whether a man should now 
 depart from life, and whatever else of the kind 
 absolutely requires a disciplined reason, all this 
 is already extinguished. We must make haste 
 
28 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 then, not only because we are daily nearer to death, 
 but also because the conception of things and the 
 understanding of them cease first. 
 
 2. We ought to observe also that even the 
 things which follow after the things which are 
 produced according to nature contain something 
 pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread 
 is baked some parts are split at the surface, and 
 these parts which thus open, and have a certain 
 fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, 
 are beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way 
 excite a desire for eating. And again, figs, 
 when they are quite ripe, gape open ; and in 
 the ripe olives the very circumstance of their 
 being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty 
 to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down, 
 and the lion's eyebrows, and the foam which flows 
 from the mouth of wild boars, and many other 
 things though they are far from being beauti- 
 ful, if a man should examine them severally, still, 
 because they are consequent upon the things which 
 are formed by nature, help to adorn them, and 
 they please the mind ; so that if a man should 
 have a feeling and deeper insight with respect to 
 the things which are produced in the universe, 
 there is hardly one of those which follow by way 
 of consequence which will not seem to him to be 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 29 
 
 in a manner disposed so as to give pleasure. And 
 so he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild 
 beasts with no less pleasure than those which 
 painters and sculptors show by imitation ; and in 
 an old woman and an old man he will be able to | 
 see a certain maturity and comeliness ; and the at- 
 tractive loveliness of young persons, he will be able 
 to look on with chaste eyes ; and many such things 
 will present themselves, not pleasing to every 
 man, but to him only who has become truly 
 familiar with nature and her works. 
 
 3. Hippocrates after curing many diseases him- 
 self fell sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold the 
 deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. 
 Alexander, and Pompeius, and Gains Caesar, after 
 so often completely destroying whole cities, and in 
 battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of 
 cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last de- 
 parted from life. Heraclitus, after so many 
 speculations on the conflagration of the universe, 
 was filled with water internally and died smeared 
 all over with mud. And lice destroyed De- 
 mocritus ; and other lice killed Socrates. What 
 means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast 
 made the voyage, thou art come to shore ; get out. 
 If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, 
 not even there. But if to a state without sen- 
 
SO M. ANTONINUS II L 
 
 sation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and 
 pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is 
 as much inferior as that which serves it is superior :f 
 for the one is intelligence and deity ; the other is 
 earth and corruption. 
 
 4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in 
 thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer 
 thy thoughts to some object of common utility. 
 ^For thou losest the opportunity of doing something 
 else w h en thou hast such thoughts as these, What 
 is such a person doing, and why, and what is he 
 saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he 
 contriving, and whatever else of the kind makes 
 us wander away from the observation of our own 
 ruling power. We ought then to check in the 
 series of our thoughts everything that is without a 
 purpose and useless, but most of all the overcurious 
 feeling and the malignant ; and a man should use 
 himself to think of those things only about which 
 if one should suddenly ask, What hast thou now in 
 thy thoughts ? with perfect openness thou mightest 
 immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy 
 words it should be plain that everything in thee is 
 simple and benevolent, and such as befits a social 
 animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about 
 pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, or any rivalry 
 or envy and suspicion, or anything else for which 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 31 
 
 thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say that thou 
 hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is such 
 as no longer to delay being among the number of^ 
 the best, is like a priest and minister of the godsj^ 
 using too the ftleity]] which is planted within him J 
 which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure,! 
 unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, I 
 feeling no wrong, afighter in the noblest fight, one I 
 who cannot be overpowered by any passion, dyed 
 deep with justice, accepting with all his soul every- 
 thing which happens and is assigned to him as his 
 portion; and not often, nor yet without great 
 necessity and for the general interest, imagining 
 what another says, or does, or thinks. For it is 
 only what belongs to himself that he makes the 
 matter for his activity ; and he constantly thinks 
 of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum 
 total of things, and he makes his own acts fair, and 
 he is persuaded that his own portion is good. 
 For the lot which is assigned to each man is carried 
 along with him and carries him along with it.f 
 And he remembers also that every rational animal 
 is his kinsman, and that to care for all men is 
 according to man's nature ; and a man should hold 
 on to the opinion not of all, but of those only who 
 confessedly live according to nature. But as to 
 those who live not so, he always bears in mind 
 
32 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 what kind of men they are both at home and from 
 home, both by night and by day, and what they 
 are, and with what men they live an impure life. 
 Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise 
 which comes from such men, since they are not 
 even satisfied with themselves. 
 
 6. Labour not unwillingly, nor without regard 
 to the common ^nterest, nor without due_consider- 
 ation, nor with distraction ; nor let studied orna- 
 ment set off thy thoughts, and be not either a 
 man of many words, or busy about too many things. 
 And further, let the deity which is in thee be 
 the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe 
 age, and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, 
 and a ruler, who has taken his post like a man 
 waiting for the signal which summons him from 
 life, and ready to go, having need neither of oath 
 nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful also, and 
 seek not external help nor the tranquillity which 
 others give- Ajnaiijfchgn must stajcid_erect, not 
 be kept erect by others. 
 
 6. If thou findest in human life anything better 
 than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in 
 a word, anything better than thy own mind's self- 
 satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to 
 do according to right reason, and in the condition 
 that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; 
 
M. AJVTONINUS. IIL 33 
 
 *fcj{l.V<*v<X- _ irv^CU^ I 1 "" f*"*k nnP^v 
 
 if, I say, thou seest anything better than this, turn 
 to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou 
 hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears 
 to be better than the deity which is_planted in 
 thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appe- 
 tites, and carefully examines all the impressions, 
 and, as Socrates said, has detached itself from the 
 persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself to 
 the gods, and cares for mankind ; if thou findest 
 everything else smaller and of less value than this, 
 give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once 
 diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer with- 
 out distraction be able to give the preference to 
 that good thing which is thy proper possession and 
 thy own ; for it is not right that anything of any 
 other kind, such as praise from the many, or 
 power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come 
 into competition with that which is rationally and 
 politically good. All these things, even though 
 they may seem to adapt themselves to the better 
 things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all 
 at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, 
 simply and freely choose the better, and hold to 
 it But that which is useful is the better. Well 
 then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep 
 to it ; but if it is only useful to thee as an animal, 
 say so, and maintain thy judgment without arro- 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 gance : only take care that thou makest the in- 
 quiry by a sure method. 
 
 7. Never value anything as profitable to thy- 
 self which shall compel thee to break thy promise, 
 to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to suspect, 
 to curse, to act_the hypocrite, to desire anything 
 which needs walls and curtains : for he who has 
 preferred to everything else his own intelligence, and 
 the daemon [within him] and the worship of its ex- 
 cellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, will 
 not need either solitude or much company ; and, 
 what is chief of all, he will live without either 
 pursuing or flying from Qife] ; but whether for a 
 longer or a shorter time he shall have the soul in- 
 closed in the body, he cares not at all : for even 
 if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily 
 as if he were going to do anything else which 
 can be done with decency and order ; taking care 
 of this only all through life, that his thoughts 
 turn not away from anything which belongs to an 
 intelligent animal and a member of a civil com- 
 munity. 
 
 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 
 purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor im- 
 purity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life 
 incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may 
 say of an actor who leaves the stage before ending 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 35 
 
 and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him 
 nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound 
 [to other things], nor yet detached Qfrom other 
 things], nothing worthy of blame, nothing which 
 seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. 
 On this faculty it entirely depends whether there 
 shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion incon- 
 sistent with nature and the constitution of the ra- 
 tional animal. And this faculty promises freedom 
 from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men, 
 and obedience to the gods. 
 
 10. Throwing away then all things, hold to 
 these only which are few; and besides bear in 
 mind that every man lives only this present time, 
 which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest 
 of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short 
 then is the time which every man lives, and small 
 the nook of the earth where he lives ; and short 
 too the longest posthumous fame, and even this 
 only continued by a succession of poor human 
 beings, who will very soon die, and who know not 
 even themselves, much less him who died long 
 ago. 
 
 11. To the aids which have been mentioned let 
 this one still be added : Make for thyself a defi- 
 nition or description of the thing which is presented 
 
36 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing 
 it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete 
 entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the 
 names of the things of which it has been com- 
 pounded, and into which it will be resolved. For 
 nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to 
 be able to examine methodically and truly every 
 object which is presented to thee in life, and always 
 to look at things so as to see at the same time what 
 kind of universe this is, and what kind of use 
 everything performs in it, and what value every- 
 thing has with reference to the whole, and what 
 with reference to man, who is a citizen of the 
 highest city, of which all other cities are like fa- 
 milies ; what each thing is, and of what it is com- 
 posed, and how long it is the nature of this thing 
 to endure which now makes an impression on me, 
 and what virtue I have need of with respect to it, 
 such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, sim- 
 plicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on 
 every occasion a man should say : this comes 
 from god ; and this is according to the apportion- 
 ment f and spinning of the thread of destiny, and 
 such-like coincidence and chance; and this is from 
 one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, 
 one who knows not however what is according to 
 his nature. But I know ; for this reason I behave 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 37 
 
 towards him according to the natural law of fel- 
 lowship with benevolence and justice. At the 
 same time however in things indifferent I attempt 
 to ascertain the value of each. 
 
 12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, 
 following right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, 
 without allowing anything else to distract thee," ^TTf^ 
 
 i . i . i i / i ^St*w*<Aii3 <*<- * 5. 
 
 but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou'<x*f,r.< 
 
 , TV"-^- 5 -; , r~~r* . ,. , yZt& 
 
 / . shouldest be bound to give it back immediately ; 
 
 if thou boldest to this, expecting nothing, fearing 
 nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity ac- 
 cording to nature, and with heroic truth inevery 
 word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt 
 h<7v/ilive happy. And there is no man who is able to 
 prevent this. 
 
 13. As physicians have always their instruments 
 and knives ready for cases which suddenly require 
 their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the 
 understanding of things divine and human, and 
 for doing everything, even the smallest, with a re- 
 collection of the bond which unites the divine and 
 human to one another. For neither wilt thou do 
 anything well which pertains to man without at 
 the same time having a reference to things divine ; 
 nor the contrary. 
 
 1 4. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither 
 wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor the acts of 
 
38 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selec- 
 tions from books which thou wast reserving for thy 
 old age. Hasten then to the end which thou hast 
 before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come 
 to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, 
 while it is in thy power. 
 
 15. They know not how many things are sig- 
 nified by the words stealing, sowing, buying, 
 keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done ; for 
 this is not done by the eyes, but by another kind 
 of vision. 
 
 1 6. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body belong 
 sensations, to the soul appetites, to the intelligence 
 principles. To receive the impressions of forms by 
 means of appearances belongs even to animals ; to 
 be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to 
 wild beasts and to men who have made themselves 
 into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to 
 have the intelligence that guides to the things which 
 appear suitable belongs also to those who do not 
 believe in the gods, and who betray their country, 
 and do their impure deeds when they have shut 
 the doors. If then everything else is common to 
 all that I have mentioned, there remains that which 
 is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and 
 content with what happens, and with the thread 
 which is spun for him ; amj^otjo defile the divi- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 39 
 
 nity which is planted in his breast, nor disturb it 
 by a crowd of images, but to preserve it tranquil, 
 following it obediently as a god, neither saying any- 
 thing contrary to the truth, nor doing anything 
 contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to be- 
 lieve that he lives a simple, modest, and contented 
 life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does 
 he deviate from the way which leads to the end 
 of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tran- 
 quil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion 
 perfectly reconciled to his lot. 
 
IV. 
 
 ^ HAT which rules within, when it is 
 according to nature, is so affected 
 with respect to the events which 
 happen, that it always easily adapts 
 itself to that which is possible and is presented to 
 it. For it requires no definite material, but it 
 moves towards its purpose, under certain conditions 
 however ; and it makes a material for itself out of 
 that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what 
 falls into it, by which a small light would have 
 been extinguished : but when the fire is strong, it 
 soon appropriates to itself the matter which is 
 heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by 
 means of this very material. 
 
 2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor 
 otherwise than according to the perfect principles 
 of art. 
 
 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 41 
 
 the country, sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou 
 too art wont to desire such things very much. 
 But this is altogether a mark of the most common 
 sort of men, for it is in thy power whenever thou 
 shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere 
 either with more quiet or more freedom from 
 trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, 
 particularly when he has within him such thoughts 
 that by looking into them he is immediately in per- 
 fect tranquillity ; and I affirm that tranquillity is 
 nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. 
 Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and 
 renew thyself ; and let thy principles be brief and 
 fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to 
 them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul com- 
 pletely, and to send thee back free from all dis- 
 content with the things to which thou returnest. 
 For with what art thou discontented ? With the 
 badness of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclu- 
 sion, that rational animals exist for one another, and 
 that to endure is a part of justice, and that men do 
 wrong_inyoluntarily ; and consider how many al- 
 ready, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and 
 fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to 
 ashes ; and be quiet at last. But perhaps thou art 
 dissatisfied with that which is assigned to thee out 
 of the universe. Recall to thy recollection this 
 
42 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 alternative; either there is providence or atoms 
 [[fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or remember 
 the arguments by which it has been proved that 
 the world is a kind of political community [[and 
 be quiet at last]. But perhaps corporeal things 
 will still fasten upon thee. Consider then further 
 that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether 
 moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn 
 itself apart and discovered its own power, and think 
 also of all that thou hast heard and assented to 
 about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at last]: 
 But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame 
 will torment thee See how soon everything is 
 forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on 
 each side of [the present], and the emptiness of 
 applause, and the changeableness and want of 
 judgment in those who pretend to give praise, and 
 the narrowness of the space within which it is cir- 
 cumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole 
 earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this 
 thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what 
 kind of people are they who will praise thee. 
 
 This then remains : Remember to retire into 
 this little territory of thy own, and above all do 
 not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look 
 at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, 
 as a mortal. But among the things readiest to 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 43 
 
 thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be 
 these, which are two. One is that things do not 
 touch the soul, for they are external and remain 
 immovable; but our perturbations come only from 
 the opinion which is within. The other is that 
 all these things which thou seest change immedi- 
 ately and will no longer be ; and constantly bear 
 in mind how many of these changes thou hast al- 
 ready witnessed. The universe is transformation : 
 life is opinion. 
 
 4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason 
 also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is 
 common : if this is so, common also is the reason 
 which commands us what to do, and what not to 
 do ; if this is so, there is a common law also ; if 
 this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we 
 are members of some political community ; if this 
 is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of 
 what other common political community will any 
 one say that the whole human race are members ? 
 And from thence, from this common political com- 
 munity comes also our very intellectual faculty 
 and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law ; 
 or whence do they come ? For as my earthly part 
 is a portion given to me from certain earth, and 
 that which is watery from another element, and 
 that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar 
 
44 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 source (for nothing comes out of that which is 
 nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), 
 so also the intellectual part comes from some 
 source. 
 
 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of 
 nature ; a composition out of the same elements, 
 and a decomposition into the same; and altogether 
 not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, 
 for it is conformable to [the nature of] a reason- 
 able animal, and not contrary tojhe^reason of_our 
 constitution. 
 
 6. It is natural that these things should be done 
 by such persons, it is a matter of necessity ; and 
 if a man will not have it so, he will not allow the 
 fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this 
 in mind, that within a very short time both thou 
 and he will be dead; and soon not even your 
 names will be left behind. 
 
 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is 
 taken away the complaint, " I have been harmed." 
 Take away the complaint, " I have been harmed," 
 and the harm is taken away. 
 
 8. That which does not make a man worse than 
 he was, also does not make his life worse, nor does 
 it harm him either from without or from within. 
 
 9. The nature of that which is [universally] 
 useful has been compelled to do this. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 45 
 
 10. Consider that everything which happens, 
 happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, thou 
 wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with respect to 
 the continuity of the series of things, but with re- 
 spect to what is just, and as if it were done by one 
 who assigns to each thing its value. Observe then 
 as thou hast begun ; and whatever thou doest, do 
 it in conjunction with this, the being good, and 
 in the sense in which a man is properly under- 
 stood to be good. Keep to this in every action. 
 
 1 1 . Do not have such an opinion of things as he 
 has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee 
 to have, but look at them as they are in truth. 
 
 12. A man should always have these two rules 
 in readiness; the one, to do only whatever the 
 reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may 
 suggest for the use of men ; the other, to change 
 thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who sets 
 thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But 
 this change of opinion must proceed only from a 
 certain persuasion, as of what is just or of com- 
 mon advantage, and the like, not because it appears 
 pleasant or brings reputation. 
 
 13. Hast thou reason? I have. Why then 
 dost not thou use it? For if this does its own work, 
 what else dost thou wish ? 
 
 14. Thou existest as a part. Thou shalt dis- 
 
46 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 appear in that which produced thee ; but rather 
 thou shalt be received back into its seminal prin- 
 ciple by transmutation. 
 
 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
 altar : one falls before, another falls after ; but it 
 makes no difference. 
 
 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to 
 those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, 
 if thou wilt return to thy principles and the wor- 
 ship of reason. 
 
 17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten 
 thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While 
 thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good. 
 
 18. How much trouble he avoids who does not 
 look to see what his neighbour says or does or 
 thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it 
 may be just and pure ; or as Agathon f says, look 
 not round at the depraved morals of others, but run 
 straight along the line without deviating from it. 
 
 19. He who has a vehement desire for posthu- 
 mous fame does not consider that every one of 
 those who remember him will himself also die very 
 soon ; then again also they who have succeeded them, 
 until the whole remembrance shall have been ex- 
 tinguished as it is transmitted through men who 
 foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that 
 those who will remember are even immortal, and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 47 
 
 that the remembrance will be immortal, what then 
 is this to thee ? And I say not what is it to the dead, 
 but what is it to the living. What is praise, ex- 
 ceptf indeed so far as it hasf a certain utility ? For 
 thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, 
 clinging to something else * * * f. 
 
 20. Everything which is in any way beautiful 
 is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not 
 having praise as part of itself. Neither worse 
 then nor better is a thing made by being praised. 
 I affirm this also of the things which are called 
 beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material 
 things and works of art. That which is really 
 beautiful has no need of anything; not more than 
 law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence 
 or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful 
 because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed ? 
 Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it 
 was, if it is not praised? or gold, ivory, purple, 
 a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub ? 
 
 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the^air 
 contain them from eternity ? But how does the 
 earth contain the bodies of those who have been 
 buried from time so remote ? For as here the mu- 
 tation of these bodies after a certain continuance, 
 whatever it may be, and their dissolution make 
 room for other dead bodies; so the souls which are 
 
48 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 removed into the air after subsistjngjprjsome time 
 are transmuted, and diffused, and assume a fiery 
 nature by being received into the seminal intelli- 
 gence of the universe, and in this way mateToom 
 for the fresh souls which come to dwell there. 
 And this is the answer which a marPmightT give 
 on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But 
 we must not only think of the number of bodies 
 which are thus buried, but also of the number of 
 animals which are daily eaten by us and the other 
 animals. For what a number is consumed, and 
 thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who 
 feed on them ? And nevertheless this earth receives 
 them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] 
 into blood, and the transformations into the aerial 
 or the fiery element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in this 
 matter ? The division into that which is material 
 and that which is the cause of form [the formal]], 
 (vii. 29.) 
 
 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every 
 movement have respect to justice, and on the oc- 
 casion of every impression maintain the faculty of 
 comprehension [or understanding]. 
 
 23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is 
 harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for 
 me is too early nor too late, which is in due time 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 49 
 
 for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy ^ 
 seasons bring, O Nature : from thee are all things, ( 
 in thee are all things, to thee all things return. ( 
 The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not , 
 thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 
 
 24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the 
 philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. But con- 
 sider if it would not be better to say, Do what is 
 necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal 
 which is naturally social requires, and as it requires. 
 For this brings not only the tranquillity which 
 comes from doing well, but also that which comes 
 from doing few things. For the greatest part of 
 what we say and do being unnecessary, if a man 
 takes this away, he will have more leisure and less 
 uneasiness. Accordingly on every occasion a man 
 should ask himself, Is this one of the unnecessary 
 things ? Now a man should take away not only 
 unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts,! 
 for thus superfluous acts will not follow after. 
 
 25. Try how the life of the good man suits 
 thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his por- 
 tion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own 
 just acts and benevolent disposition. 
 
 26. Hast thou seen those things ? Look also at 
 these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself all 
 simplicity. Does any one do wrong ? It is to him- 
 
60 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 self that he does the wrong. Has anything hap- 
 pened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe from 
 the beginning everything which happens has been 
 apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, 
 thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit the pre- 
 sent by the aid of reason and justice. Be sober in 
 thy relaxation. 
 
 27. Either it is a well arranged universe 1 or a 
 chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But 
 can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder 
 in the All? And this too when all things are so 
 separated and diffused and sympathetic. 
 
 28. A black character, a womanish character, 
 a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, 
 
 ' 
 
 stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyran- 
 nical. 
 
 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does 
 not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger 
 who does not know what is going on in it. He is 
 a runaway, who flies from social reason ; he is 
 blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding ; 
 he is poor, who has need of another, and has not 
 from himself all things which are useful for life. 
 He is an abscess on the universe who withdraws 
 
 1 Antoninus here uses the word Kofffiog both in the sense 
 of the Universe and of Order 5 and it is difficult to express 
 his meaning. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. TV. 51 
 
 and separates himself from the reason of our com- 
 mon nature through being displeased with the 
 things which happen, for the same nature produces 
 this, and has produced thee too: he is apiece rent 
 asunder from the state, who tears his own soul 
 from that of reasonable animals, which is one. 
 
 30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
 and the other without a book : here is another 
 half naked : Bread I have not, he says, and I 
 abide by reason And I do not get the means of 
 living out of my learning,f and I abide Qby my 
 reason]. 
 
 31. Love the art, poor as it maybe, which thou 
 hast learned, and be content with it; and pass 
 through the rest of life like one who has intrusted 
 to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, 
 
 .~b L 
 
 making thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of 
 any man. 
 
 32. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- w 
 pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
 marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, war- 
 ring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, 
 flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, 
 wishing for some to die, grumbling about the 
 present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring con- 
 sulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of 
 these people no longer exists at all. Again, re- 
 
62 ^f. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 move to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the 
 same. Their life too is gone. In like manner 
 view also the other epochs of time and of whole 
 nations, and see how many after great efforts soon 
 fell and were resolved into the elements. But 
 chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou hast 
 thyself known distracting themselves about idle 
 things, neglecting to do what was in accordance 
 with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly 
 to this and to be content with it. And herein it 
 is necessary to remember that the attention given 
 to everything has its proper value and proportion. 
 For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou ap- 
 pliest thyself to smaller matters no further than 
 is fit. 
 
 33. The words which were formerly familiar 
 are now antiquated : so also the names of those 
 who were famed of old, are now in a manner an- 
 tiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, 
 and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then 
 Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. 
 For all things soon pass away and become a mere 
 tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. 
 And I say this of those who have shone in a won- 
 drous way. For the rest, as soon as they have 
 breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no 
 mail speaks of them. And, to conclude the mat- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 53 
 
 ter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A 
 mere nothing. What then is that about which we 
 ought to employ our serious pains? This one 
 thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words ^ 
 which never lie, and a disposition which gladly 
 accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as 
 flowing from a principle and source of the same 
 kind. 
 
 34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho one of 
 the fates], allowing her to spin thy threadf into 
 whatever things she pleases. 
 
 35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
 which remembers and that which is remembered. 
 
 36. Observe constantly that all things take place 
 by change, and accustom thyself to consider that 
 the nature of the Universe loves nothing so much 
 as to change the things which are and to make 
 new things like them. For everything that exists 
 is in a manner the seed of that which will be. 
 But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast 
 into the earth or into a womb : but this is a very 
 vulgar notion. 
 
 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet 
 simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without 
 suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor 
 kindly^disposedto wards all ; nor dost thou yet 
 place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
54 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those 
 of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, and 
 what kind they pursue. 
 
 39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the 
 ruling principle of another ; nor yet in any turn- 
 ing and mutation of thy corporeal covering. 
 Where is it then ? It is in that part of thee in 
 which subsists the power of forming opinions about 
 evils. Let this power then not form such] opinions, 
 and all is well. And if that which is nearest to 
 it, the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter 
 and rottenness, nevertheless let the part which 
 forms opinions about these things be quiet, that 
 
 i is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good 
 
 I which can happen equally to the bad man and the 
 
 I good. For that which happens equally to him 
 
 who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives 
 
 according to nature, is neither according to nature 
 
 nor contrary to nature. 
 
 40. Constantly regard the universe as one 
 living^ being, having one substance and one soul_; 
 and observe how all things have reference to one 
 perception, the perception of this one living being; 
 ja.nd_ho\vj*ll thingsjictjwi th one movement ; and^ 
 how all thjngs are the co-operating_cause^of^ all 
 things which_exjst; observe too the continuous 
 spinning of the jhreajjmd^tbe jeontexture of^he 
 web. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 55 
 
 41 . Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, au 
 as Epictetus used to say. 
 
 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
 and no good for things to subsist in consequence 
 of change. 
 
 43. Time is like a river made up of the events 
 which happen, and a violent stream ; for as soon 
 as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and 
 another comes in its place, and this will be carried 
 away too. 
 
 44. Everything which happens is as familiar 
 and well known as the rose in spring and the 
 fruit in summer ; for such is disease, and death, 
 and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else 
 delights fools or vexes them. 
 
 45. In the series of things those which follow 
 are always aptly fitted to those which have gone 
 before ; for this series is not like a mere enumera- 
 tion of disjointed things, which has only a neces- 
 sary sequence, but it is a rational connection : and 
 as all existing things are arranged together har- 
 moniously, so the things which come into existence 
 exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonder- 
 ful relationship, (vi. 38. vii. 9.) 
 
 46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, 
 that the death of earth is to become water, and 
 the death of water is to become air, and the death 
 
5G M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think 
 too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and 
 that men quarrel with that with which they are 
 most constantly in communion, the reason which 
 governs the universe ; and the things which they 
 daily meet with seem to them strange : and con- 
 sider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were 
 asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak ; 
 and thatf we ought not, like children who learn 
 from their parents, simply to act and speak as we 
 have been taught, f 
 
 47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to- 
 morrow or certainly on the day after to-morrow, 
 thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the 
 third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in 
 the highest degree mean-spirited, for how small 
 is the difference ? so think it no great thing to 
 die after as many years as thou canst name rather 
 than to-morrow. 
 
 48. Think continually how many physicians are 
 dead after often contracting their eyebrows over 
 the sick ; and how many astrologers after predict- 
 ing with great pretensions the deaths of others ; 
 and how many philosophers after endless discourses 
 on death or immortality ; how many heroes after 
 killing thousands; and how many tyrants who 
 have used their power over men's lives with ter- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 57 
 
 rible insolence as if they were immortal ; and how 
 many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice 
 and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others innu- 
 merable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou 
 hast known, one after another. One man after 
 burying another has been laid out dead, and another 
 buries him; and all this in a short time. To con- 
 clude, always observe how ephemeral and worth- 
 less human things are, and what was yesterday a 
 little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. 
 Pass Jthen through this little space of time con- 
 fqrmably to nature, and end thy journey in con- 
 tent, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, blesj^ 
 ing jiature^who producejdljt^ and thanking the 
 tree on ^yhich it grew. 
 
 49. Be like the promontory against which the 
 waves continually break, but it stands firm and 
 tames the fury of the water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I, because this has happened to 
 me Not so, but Happy am I, though this has 
 happened to me, because I continue free from 
 pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing 
 the future. For such a thing as this might have 
 happened to every man ; but every man would not 
 have continued free from pain on such an occasion. 
 Why then is that rather a misfortune than this a 
 good fortune ? And dost thou in all cases call that 
 
68 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 a man's misfortune, which is not a deviation from 
 man's nature ? And does a thing seem to thee to 
 be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not 
 contrary to the will of man's nature ? Well, thou 
 knowest the will of nature. Will then this which 
 has happened prevent thee from being just, mag- 
 nanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against in- 
 consjderate opinions and falsehood ; will it prevent 
 thee from having modesty, freedom, and everything 
 else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains 
 all that is its own ? Remember too on every oc- 
 casion which leads thee to vexation to apply this 
 principle : that this is not a misfortune, but that 
 to bear it nobly^i^oodjbrtime. 
 
 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards 
 contempt of death, to pass in review those who 
 have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then 
 have they gained than those who have died early? 
 Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at 
 last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or 
 any one else like them, who have carried out many 
 to be buried and then were carried out themselves. 
 Altogether the interval is small [between birth 
 and death] ; and consider with how much trouble, 
 and in company with what sort of people and in 
 what a feeble body this interval is laboriously 
 passed. Do not then consider life a thing of any 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 50 
 
 value.f For look to the immensity of time behind 
 thee, and to the time which is before thee, another 
 boundless space. In this infinity then what is the 
 difference between him who lives three days and 
 him who lives three generations ? 2 
 
 51. Always run to the short way ; and the short 
 way is the natural : accordingly say and do every- 
 thing in conformity with the soundest reason. 
 For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,f and 
 warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious display. 
 
 2 An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the 
 war of Troy among the third generation, like old Parr 
 with his hundred and fifty two years, and some others in 
 modern times who have beaten Parr by twenty or thirty 
 years ; and yet they died at last. The word is rpiyeprjviov 
 in Antoninus. Nestor is named rpiyepwv by some writers ; 
 but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's Veprjvioc; 
 
 ITTTTOTa 
 
V. 
 
 ?N the morning when thou risest un- 
 willingly, let this thought be pre- 
 sent I am rising to the work of a 
 hmnanjbeing. Why then am I dis- 
 satisfied if I am going to do the things for which 
 I exist and for which I was brought into the world? 
 Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bed- 
 clothes and keep myself warm ? But this is more 
 pleasant Dost thou exist then to take thy 
 pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion ? 
 Dost thou not see the littlej)lants, the littlejrirds, 
 the ants, the spiders, the bees working together 
 to put in order their several parts of the universe ? 
 And art thou unwilling to do the work of a human 
 being, and dost thou not make haste to do that 
 which is according to thy nature ? But it is ne- 
 cessary to take rest also It is necessary : however 
 nature has fixed bounds to this too : she has fixed 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 61 
 
 bounds both to eating and drinking, and yet thou 
 goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is suffi- 
 cient ; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stop- 
 pest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest 
 not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love 
 thy nature and her will. But those who love 
 their several arts exhaust themselves in working 
 at them, unwashed and without food ; but thou 
 valuest thy own nature less than the turner values 
 the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or 
 the lover of money values his money, or the vain- 
 glorious man his little glory. And such men, 
 when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose 
 neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect 
 the things which they care for. But are the acts 
 which concern society more vile in thy eyes and 
 less worthy of thy labour ? 
 
 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
 every impression which is troublesome or unsuit- 
 able, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. 
 
 3. Judge every word and deed which is accord- 
 ing to nature to be fit for thee; and be not diverted 
 by the blame which follows from any people nor 
 by their words, but if a thing is good to be done 
 or said, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For 
 those persons have their peculiar leading principle 
 and follow their peculiar movement ; which things 
 
62 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 do not thou regard, but go straight on, following 
 thy own nature and the common nature ; and the 
 wayjrf both is one. 
 
 4. I go through the things which happen ac- 
 cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, 
 breathing out my breath into that element out of 
 which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that 
 earth out of which my father collected the seed, 
 and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; 
 out of which during so many years I have been 
 supplied with food and drink ; which bears me 
 when I tread on it and abuse it for so many pur- 
 
 5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharp- 
 ness of thy wits Be it so : but there are many 
 other things of which thou canst not say, I am not 
 formed for them by nature. Show those qualities 
 then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, 
 gravity, endurance of labour, aversion to pleasure, 
 contentment with thy portion and with few things, 
 benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, 
 freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou 
 not see how many qualities thou art immediately 
 able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of na- 
 tural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still 
 remainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou 
 compelled through being defectively furnished by 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 63 
 
 nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, 
 and to find fault with thy poor body, and to 
 try to please men, and to make great display, 
 and to be so restless in thy mind ? No by the 
 gods: but thou mightest have been delivered 
 from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou 
 canst be charged with being rather slow and dull 
 of comprehension, thou must exert thyself about 
 this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure 
 in thy dulness. 
 
 6. One man, when he has done a service to 
 another, is ready to set it down to his account as 
 a favour conferred. Another is not ready to do 
 this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the 
 man as his debtor, and he knows what he has 
 done. A third in a manner does not even know 
 what he has done, but he is like a vine which has 
 produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after 
 it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse 
 when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the 
 game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man 
 when he has done a good act, does not call out for 
 others to come and see, but he goes on to another 
 act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
 in season Must a man then be one of these, who 
 in a manner act thus without observing it ? Yes 
 But this very thing is necessary, the observation 
 
C4 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 of what a man is doing : for, it may be said, it is 
 characteristic of the social animal to perceive that 
 he is working in a social manner, and indeed to 
 wish that his social partner also should perceive it 
 It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not 
 rightly understand what is now said : and for this 
 reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I 
 spoke before, for even they are misled by a 
 certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to 
 understand the meaning of what is said, do not 
 fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social 
 act. 
 
 7. A prayer of the Athenians : Rain, rain, O 
 dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
 Athenians and on the plains. In truth we ought 
 not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this sim- 
 ple and noble fashion. 
 
 8. Just as we must understand when it is said, 
 That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse- 
 exercise, or bathing in cold water or going with- 
 out shoes ; so we must understand it when it is 
 said, That the nature of the universe prescribed to 
 this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything 
 else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed 
 means something like this : he prescribed this for 
 this man as a thing adapted to procure health ; 
 and in the second case it means, That which 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 65 
 
 happens 1 to [[or, suits] every man is fixed in a man- 
 ner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what 
 we mean when we say that things are suitable to 
 us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls 
 or the pyramids, that they are suitable, when they 
 fit them to one another in some kind of connection. 
 For there is altogether one fitness [[or, harmony]. 
 And as the universe is made up out of all bodies 
 to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing 
 causes necessity [[destiny] is made up to be such 
 a cause as it is. And even those who are com* 
 pletely ignorant understand what I mean, for they 
 say, It [[necessity, destiny] brought this to such a 
 person. This then was brought and this was pre- 
 scribed to him. Let us then receive these things, 
 as well as those which Aesculapius prescribes. 
 Many as a matter of course even among his pre- 
 scriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in 
 the hope of health. Let the perfecting and ac- 
 complishment of the things which the common 
 nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be 
 of the same kind as thy health. And so accept 
 everything which happens, even if it seem dis- 
 agreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of 
 the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of 
 
 1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 Zeus [the universe]. For he would not have 
 brought on any man what he has brought, if it 
 were not useful for the whole. Neither does the 
 nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause any- 
 thing which is not suitable to that which is directed 
 by it. For two reasons then it is right to be con- 
 tent with that which happens to thee ; the one, 
 because it was done for thee and prescribed for 
 thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, ori- 
 ginally from the most ancient causes spun with 
 thy destiny ; and the other, because even that 
 which comes severally to every man is to the power 
 which administers tEe universe a cause of felicity 
 and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. 
 For the integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou 
 cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction 
 and the continuity either of the parts or of the 
 causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy 
 power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in a man- 
 ner triest to put anything out of the way. 
 
 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dis- 
 satisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing every- 
 thing according to right principles ; but when thou 
 hast failed, return back again, and be content if 
 the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
 with man's nature, and love this jo which thou re- 
 turnest ; and do not return to philosophy as if she 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 67 
 
 were a master, but act like those who have sore 
 eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as 
 another applies a plaister, or drenching with water. 
 For thus thou wilt not fail tof obey reason, and 
 thou wilt repose in it. And remember that phi- 
 
 1 f 
 
 losophjM-equires only the things jvhich thy nature 
 requires ; but thou wouldst have something else 
 which is not according to nature It may be ob- 
 jected, Why what is more agreeable than this 
 Q which I am doing] ? But is not this the very 
 reason why pleasure deceives us ? And consider if 
 magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, aequanimity, 
 piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more 
 agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest 
 of the security and the happy course of all things 
 which depend on the faculty of understanding and 
 knowledge ? 
 
 10. Things are in such a kind of envelopement 
 that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few 
 nor those common philosophers, altogether unin- 
 telligible ; nay even to the Stoics themselves they 
 seem difficult to understand. And all our assent 
 is changeable ; for where is the man who never 
 changes ? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects 
 themselves, and consider how short-lived they are 
 and worthless, and that they may be in the pos- 
 session of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber. 
 
68 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 Then turn to the morals of those who live with 
 thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
 most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
 being hardly able to endure himself. In such 
 darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux 
 both of substance and of time, and of motion and 
 of things moved, what there is worth being highly 
 prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can- 
 not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's 
 duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the 
 natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the 
 delay, but to rest in these principles only : the one, 
 that nothing will happen to me which is not con- 
 formable to the nature of the universe ; and the 
 other, that it is in my power never to act contrary 
 to my god and daemon : for there is no man who 
 will compel me to this. 
 
 1 1 . About what am I now employing my own 
 soul ? On every occasion I must ask myself this 
 question, and inquire, what have I now in this 
 part of me which they call the ruling principle ? 
 and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of 
 a young man, or of a feeblejwoman, or of a tyrant, 
 or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 
 
 12. What kind of things those are which ap- 
 pear good to the many, we may learn from this. 
 For if any man should conceive certain things as 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 69 
 
 being really good, such as prudence, temperance, 
 justice, fortitude, he would not after having first 
 conceived these endure to listen to anythingf 
 which should not be in harmony with what is 
 really good.f But if a man has first conceived as 
 good the things which appear to the many to be 
 good, he will listen and readily receive as very 
 applicable that which was said by the comic writer. 
 fThus even the many perceive the difference. t 
 For were it not so, this saying would not offend 
 and would not be rejected pn the first case], while 
 we receive it when it is said of wealth, and of the 
 means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly 
 and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value 
 and think those things to be good, to which after 
 their first conception in the mind the words of the 
 comic writer might be aptly applied that he who 
 has them, through pure abundance has not a place 
 to ease himself in. 
 
 13. I am composed of the formal and the ma- 
 terial ; and neither of them will perish into non- 
 existence, as neither of them came into existence 
 out of non-existence. Every partjofjne thenjwill 
 be_reduced by^ change^ intojsome part of the uni- 
 verse, and tha^againjyill changejnto another j^art 
 of the universe andjo on for ever. And by con- 
 sequence of such a change I too exist; and those 
 
70 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 who begot me, and so on for ever in the other di- 
 rection. For nothing hinders us from saying so, 
 even if the universe is administered according to 
 definite periods [of revolution]. 
 
 14. Reason and the reasoning art ^philosophy] 
 are powers which are sufficient for themselves and 
 for their own works. They move then from a 
 first principle which is their own, and they make 
 their way to the end which is proposed to them ; 
 and this is the reason why such acts are named 
 Catortho'seis or right acts, which word signifies 
 that they proceed by the right road. 
 
 15. None of these things ought to be called a 
 man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
 They are not required of a man, nor does man's 
 nature promise them, nor are they the means of 
 man's nature attaining its end. Neither then 
 does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet 
 that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, 
 and that which aids towards this end is that 
 which is good. Besides, if any of these things did 
 belong to man, it would not be right for a man to 
 despise them and to set himself against them ; nor 
 would a man be worthy of praise who showed that 
 he did not want these things, nor would he who 
 stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed 
 these things were good. But now the more of 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 71 
 
 these things a man deprives himself of, or of other 
 things like them, or even when he is deprived of 
 any of them, themore patiently he endures^ the/ 
 loss, just in the same degree he is ajbetter man. 
 
 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also 
 will be the character of thy mind ; for the soul_ is 
 dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a contin- 
 uous series of such thoughts as these : for instance, 
 that where a man can live, there he can also live 
 well. But he must live in a palace ; well then, 
 he can also live well in a palace. And again, 
 consider that for whatever purpose each thing has 
 been constituted, for this it has been constituted, 
 and towards this it is carried ; and its end is in 
 that towards which it is carried ; and where the 
 end is, there also is the advantage and the good of 
 each thing. Now the good for the reasonable 
 animal is society ; for that we are made for society 
 has been shown above. Is it not plain that the 
 inferior exist for the sake of the superior ? but the 
 things which have life are superior to those which 
 have not life, and of those which have life the 
 superior are those which have reason. 
 
 17. To seek what is impossible is madness: 
 and it is impossible that the bad should not do 
 something of this kind. 
 
 18. Nothing happens to any man which he is 
 
72 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 not formed by nature to bear. The same things 
 happen to another, and either because he does not 
 see that they have happened or because he would 
 show a great spirit he is firm and remains un- 
 harmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and 
 conceit should be stronger than wisdom. 
 
 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not 
 in the least degree ; nor have they admission to 
 the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul : but 
 the soul turns and moves itself alone, and what- 
 ever judgments it may think proper to make, such 
 it makes for itself the things which present them- 
 selves to it. 
 
 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to 
 me, so far as I must do good to men and endure 
 them. But so far as some men make themselves 
 obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me 
 one of the things which are indifferent, no less 
 than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is 
 true that these may impede my action, but they 
 are no impediments to my affects and disposition, 
 which have the power of acting conditionally and 
 changing : for the mind converts and changes- 
 every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and so 
 that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance 
 to an act ; and that which is an obstacle on the 
 road helps us on this road. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 73 
 
 2 1 . Reverence that which is bestin thejuniyerse ; 
 and this is that which makes use of all things and 
 directs all things. And in like manner also re- it 
 verence that which is best in thyself; and this is 
 
 . of the same kind as that. For in thyself also, 
 that which makes use of everything else, is this, 
 and thy life is directed by this. 
 
 22. That which does no harm to the state, does 
 no harm to the citizen. In the case of every ap- 
 pearance of harm apply this rule : if the state is 
 not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if 
 the state is harmed, thou must not be angry with 
 him who does harm to the state. Show him 
 where his error is.f 
 
 23. Often think of the rapidity with which 
 things pass by and disappear, both the things 
 which are and the things which are produced. 
 For substance is like a river in a continual flow, 
 and the activities of things are in constant change, 
 and the causes work in infinite varieties ; and there 
 is hardly anything which stands still. And con- 
 sider this which is near to thee, this boundless 
 abyss of the past and of the future in which all 
 things disappear. How then is he not a fool who 
 is puffed up with such things or plagued about 
 them and makes himself miserable ? for they vex 
 him only for a time, and a short time. 
 
74 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 24. Think of the universal substance, of which 
 thou hast a very small portion ; and of universal 
 time, of which a short and indivisible interval has 
 been assigned to thee ; and of that which is fixed 
 by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. 
 
 25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look 
 to it. He has his own disposition, his own activity. 
 I now have what the universal nature wills me to 
 have ; and I do what my nature now wills me 
 to do. 
 
 2G. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
 governs be undisturbed by the movements in the 
 flesh whether of pleasure or of pain ; and let it 
 not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself 
 and limit those affects to their parts. But when 
 these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that 
 other sympathy that naturally exists in a body 
 which is all one, then thou must not strive to re- 
 sist the sensation, for it is natural ; but let not the 
 ruling part of itself add to the sensation the opinion 
 that it is either good or bad. 
 
 27. Lrve_with the gods. And he does live with 
 the gods who^ constantly shows to them that his 
 own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to 
 him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, 
 which Zeus hath given to every man for his 
 guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And 
 this is every man's understanding and reason. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 75 
 
 28. Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits 
 stink? art thou angry with him whose mouth 
 smells foul ? What good will this anger do thee ? 
 He has such a mouth, he has such arm-pits : it is 
 necessary that such an emanation must come from 
 such things But the man has reason, it will be 
 said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover 
 wherein he offends I wish thee well of thy dis- 
 covery. Well then, and thou hast reason : by thy 
 rational faculty stir up his rational faculty ; show 
 him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, 
 thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
 Qt Neither tragic actor nor whore.-)-] 2 
 
 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
 gone out, * * so it is in thy power to live here. 
 But if men do not permit thee, then get away out 
 of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. 
 The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost 
 thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long 
 as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, 
 am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing 
 
 2 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also 
 something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of S. 29, 
 where he says u> i%t\0u)v fyjv diavoy, which Gataker 
 translates ' ( as if thou wast about to quit life ; " but we can- 
 not translate i%e\9wv in that way. Other translations are 
 not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally 
 and left it imperfect. 
 
76 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 what I choose ; and I choose to do what is ac- 
 cording to the nature of the rational and social 
 animal. 
 
 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
 Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
 the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- 
 perior to one another. Thou seest how it has 
 subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- 
 thing its proper portion, and has brought together 
 into concord with one another the things which 
 are the best. 
 
 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
 gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to 
 those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, 
 kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast 
 hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this 
 may be said of thee : 
 
 Never has wronged a man in deed or word. 
 
 And call to recollection both how many things 
 thou hast passed through, and how many things 
 thou hast been able to endure : and that the his- 
 tory of thy life is now complete and thy service is 
 ended : and how many beautiful things thou hast 
 seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou 
 hast despised ; and how many things called 
 honourable thou hast spurned ; and to how many 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 77 
 
 ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposi- 
 tion. 
 
 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls dis- 
 turb him who has skill and knowledge ? What 
 soul then has skill and knowledge ? That which 
 knows beginning and end, and knows the reason 
 which pervades all substance and through all time 
 by fixed periods ^revolutions] administers the 
 universe. 
 
 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a 
 skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; 
 but name is sound and echo. And the things 
 which are much valued in life are empty and rot- 
 ten and trifling, and C^^^JLJi^l^^Gi-k^^E one 
 another, and little children_quarrelling, laughing^ 
 and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and 
 modesty and justice and truth are fled 
 
 Up to Olympus from the wide spread earth. 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee here ? 
 if the objects of sense are easily changed and never 
 stand still, and the organs of perception are dull 
 and easily receive false impressions ; and the poor 
 soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have 
 good repute amidst such a world as this is an empty 
 thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquil- 
 lity for thy end, whether it is extinction or re- 
 
78 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 moval to another state? And until that time comes, 
 what is sufficient ? Why, what else than to vene- 
 rate the gods and bless them, and to do good to 
 men, and to practise tolerance and se^restraint; 3 
 but as to everything which is beyond the limits of 
 the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this 
 is neither thine nor in thy power. 
 
 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow 
 of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, 
 and think and act in the right way. These two 
 things are common both to the soul of god and to 
 the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational 
 being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold 
 good to consist in the disposition to justice and 
 the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find 
 its termination. 
 
 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an 
 effect of my own badness, and the common weal is 
 not injured, why am I troubled about it? and 
 what is the harm to the common weal ? 
 
 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by 
 the appearance of things, but give help [to all]] 
 according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if 
 
 3 This is the Stoic precept avk-^ov Kai a.irk\ov. The 
 first part teaches us to be content with men and things as 
 they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of self- 
 restraint, or the government of our passions. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 70 
 
 they should have sustained loss in matters which 
 are indifferent* do not imagine this to be a damage. 
 For it is a bad habit. But as the old man when 
 he went away asked back his foster-child's top, 
 remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this 
 case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast 
 thou forgotten, man, what these things are? Yes ; 
 but they are objects of great concern to these 
 people Wilt thou too then be made a fool for 
 these things ? I was once a fortunate man, but 
 I lost it, I know not how. But fortunate means 
 that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: 
 and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, 
 good emotions, good actions. 4 
 
 4 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words 
 may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section can- 
 not be discovered. Perhaps several things have been im- 
 properly joined in one section. I have translated it nearly 
 literally. Different translators give the section a different 
 turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they cannot 
 understand. 
 
VI. 
 
 substance of the universe is 
 obedient and compliant ; and the 
 reason which governs it has in itself 
 no cause for doing evil, for it has no 
 malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is any- 
 thing harmed by it. But all things are made and 
 perfected according to this reason. 
 
 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether 
 thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty ; 
 and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with 
 sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and 
 whether dying or doing something else. For it is 
 one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : 
 it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what 
 we have in hand. 
 
 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar 
 quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 
 
 4. All existing things soon change, and they 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 81 
 
 will either be reduced to vapour, if indeed all 
 substance is one, or they will be dispersed. 
 
 5. The reason which governs knows what its 
 own disposition is, and what it does, and on what 
 material it works. 
 
 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to 
 become like the wrong doer. 
 
 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, 
 in passing from one social act to another social 
 act, thinking of god. 
 
 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses 
 and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as 
 it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes every- 
 thing which happens appear to itself to be such as 
 it wills. 
 
 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe 
 every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it 
 is not in conformity to any other nature that each 
 thing is accomplished, either a nature which ex- 
 ternally comprehends this, or a nature which is 
 comprehended within this nature, or a nature 
 external and independent of this. (xi. 1, vi. 40, 
 vni. 50.) 
 
 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a 
 mutual involution of things, and a dispersion ; or 
 it is unity and order and providence. If then it 
 is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a for- 
 
 G 
 
82 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 tuitous combination of things and such a disorder? 
 and why do I care about anything else than how I 
 shall at last become earth? and why am I disturbed, 
 for the dispersion of my elements will happen 
 whatever I do. But if the other supposition is 
 true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust in him 
 who governs, (iv. 27.) 
 
 11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- 
 cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly 
 return to thyself and do not continue out of tune 
 longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wilt 
 have more mastery over the harmony by continually 
 recurring to it. 
 
 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother 
 at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy 
 step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- 
 turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy 
 now be to thee step-mother and mother : return 
 to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through 
 whom what thou meetest with in the court appears 
 to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in 
 the court. 
 
 13. When we have meat before us and such 
 eatables, we receive the impression, that this is 
 the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body 
 of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian 
 is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 83 
 
 some sheeps' wool dyed with the blood of a shell- 
 fish : such then are these impressions, and they 
 reach the things themselves and penetrate them, 
 and so we see what kind of things they are. Just 
 in the same way ought we to act all through life, 
 and where there are things which appear most 
 worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them 
 bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them 
 of all the words by which they are exalted. For 
 outward show is a wonderful perverter of the rea- 
 son, and when thou art most sure that thou art 
 employed about things worth thy pains, it is then 
 that it cheats thee most. Consider then what 
 Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 
 
 14. Most of the things which the multitude 
 admire are referred to objects of the most general 
 kind, those which are held together by cohesion 
 or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- 
 trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired 
 by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- 
 ferred to the things which are held together by a 
 living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are 
 admired by men who are still more instructed are 
 the things which are held together by a rational 
 soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so 
 far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in 
 some other way, or simply rational so far as the 
 
84 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 possessing of a number of slaves. But he who 
 values a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted 
 for political life, regards nothing else except this ; 
 and above all things he keeps his soul in a condi- 
 tion and in an activity conformable to reason and 
 social life, and he co-operates to this end with those 
 who are of the same kind as himself. 
 
 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, 
 and others are hurrying out of it; and of that 
 which is coming into existence part is already ex- 
 tinguished. Motions and changes are continually 
 renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted 
 course of time is always renewing the infinite du- 
 ration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on 
 which there is no abiding, what is there of the 
 things which hurry by on which a man would set 
 a high price ? It would be just as if a man should 
 fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, 
 but it has already past out of sight. Something 
 of this kind is the very life of every man, like the 
 exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the 
 air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the 
 air and to have given it back, which we do every 
 moment, just the same is it with the whole respi- 
 ratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth 
 yesterday and the day before, to give it back to 
 the element from which thou didst first draw it. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 85 
 
 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
 thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- 
 cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of 
 impressions by the appearances of things, nor being 
 moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor as- 
 sembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; 
 for this is just like the act of separating and part- 
 ing with the useless part of our food. What then 
 is worth being valued ? To be received with clap- 
 ping of hands ? No. Neither must we value the 
 clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes 
 from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose 
 then that thou hast given up this worthless thing 
 called fame, what remains that is worth valuing ? 
 This in my opinion, to move thyself and to restrain 
 thyself in conformity to thy proper constitution, to 
 which end all employments lead and all arts. For 
 every art aims at this, that the thing which has 
 been made should be adapted to the work for which 
 it has been made ; and both the vine-planter who 
 looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he 
 who trains the dog, seek this end. But the edu- 
 cation and the teaching of youth aim at something. 
 In this then is the value of the education and the 
 teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek 
 anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many 
 other things too ? Then thou wilt be neither free, 
 
86 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without 
 passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, 
 jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away 
 those things, and plot against those who have that 
 which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must 
 be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants 
 any of these things; and besides, he must often find 
 fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor 
 thy own mind will make thee content with thy- 
 self, and in harmony with society, and in agreement 
 with the gods, that is, praising all that they give 
 and have ordered. 
 
 17- Above, below, all around are the movements 
 of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in 
 none of these : it is something more divine, and 
 advancing by a way hardly observed it goes hap- 
 pily on its road. 
 
 18. How strangely men act. They will not 
 praise those who are living at the same time and 
 living with themselves; but to be themselves 
 praised by posterity, by those whom they have 
 never seen nor ever will see, this they set much 
 value on. But this is very much the same as if 
 thou shouldst be grieved because those who have 
 lived before thee did not praise thee. 
 
 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by 
 thyself, do not think that it is impossible for a 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 87 
 
 man : but if anything is possible for a man and 
 conformable to his nature, think that this can be 
 attained by thyself too. 
 
 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a 
 man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing 
 against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we 
 neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we 
 offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a 
 treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
 against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet 
 with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. 
 Something like this let thy behaviour be in all the 
 other parts of life : let us overlook many things in 
 those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
 For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the 
 way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 
 
 21. If any man is able to convince me and show 
 me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly 
 change ; for I seek the truth by which no man 
 was ever injured. But he is injured who abides 
 in his error and ignorance. 
 
 22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; 
 for they are either things without life, or things 
 without reason, or things that have rambled and 
 know not the way. 
 
 23. As to the animals which have no reason and 
 generally all things and objects do thou, since 
 
88 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 thou hast reason and they have none, make use 
 of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But 
 towards human beings, as they have reason, behave 
 in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the 
 gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length 
 of time in which thou shalt do this ; for even three 
 hours so spent are sufficient. 
 
 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
 by death were brought to the same state ; for either 
 they were received among the same seminal prin- 
 ciples of the universe, or they were alike dispersed 
 among the atoms. 
 
 25. Consider how many things in the same in- 
 divisible time take place in each of us, things which 
 concern the body and things which concern the 
 soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many more 
 things, or rather all things which come into exist- 
 ence in that which is the one and all, which we 
 call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 
 
 26. If any man should propose to thee the 
 question, how the name Antoninus is written, 
 wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
 each letter ? What then if they grow angry, wilt 
 thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with 
 composure and number every letter ? Just so then 
 in this life also remember that every duty is made 
 up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to ob- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 89 
 
 serve and without being disturbed or showing 
 anger towards those who are angry with thee to 
 go on thy way and finish that which is set before 
 thee. 
 
 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
 after the things which appear to them to be suitable 
 to their nature and profitable ! And yet in a man- 
 ner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou 
 art vexed because they do wrong. For they are 
 certainly moved towards things because they sup- 
 pose them to be suitable to their nature and pro- 
 fitable to them But it is not so Teach them 
 then, and show them without being angry. 
 
 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings 
 which move the appetites, and of the discursive 
 movements of the thoughts, and of the service to 
 the flesh. 
 
 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give 
 way in this life, when thy body does not give way. 
 
 30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
 Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for 
 such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, 
 good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of 
 justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, 
 strenuous in all proper acts. S tri ve to continue to be 
 such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence 
 
90 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is 
 only one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposi- 
 tion and social acts. Do everything as a disciple 
 of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every 
 act which was conformable to reason, and his 
 evenness in all things, and his piety, and the se- 
 renity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and 
 his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to un- 
 derstand things; and how he would never let any- 
 thing pass without having first most carefully ex- 
 amined it and clearly understood it ; and how he 
 bore with those who blamed him unjustly without 
 blaming them in return ; how he did nothing in a 
 hurry ; and how he listened not to calumnies, and 
 how exact an examiner of manners and actions he 
 was ; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, 
 nor suspicious, nor a sophist ; and with how little 
 he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, 
 servants; and how laborious and patient; and 
 how he was able on account of his sparing diet to 
 hold out to the evening, not even requiring 
 to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the 
 usual hour ; and his firmness and uniformity in 
 his friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of 
 speech in those who opposed his opinions ; and 
 the pleasure that he had when any man showed 
 him anything better ; and how pious he was with- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 91 
 
 out superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest 
 have as good a conscience, when thy last hour 
 comes, as he had. (i. 16.) 
 
 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself 
 back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from sleep 
 and hast perceived that they were only dreams 
 which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours 
 look at these the things about thee] as thou didst 
 look at those Qhe dreams]. 
 
 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now 
 to this little body all things are indifferent, for it 
 is not able to perceive differences. But to the 
 understanding those things only are indifferent, 
 which are not the works of its own activity. But 
 whatever things are the works of its own activity, 
 all these are in its power. And of these however 
 only those which are done with reference to the 
 present ; for as to the future and the past activities 
 of the mind, even these are for the present indif- 
 ferent. 
 
 33. Neither the labor which the hand does 
 nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long 
 as the foot does the foot's work and the hand the 
 hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his 
 labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the 
 things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary 
 to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 
 
02 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by 
 robbers, patricides, tyrants. 
 
 35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen 
 accommodate themselves up to a certain point to 
 those who are not skilled in their craft, never- 
 theless they cling to the reason [the principles] of 
 their art and do not endure to depart from it? 
 Is it not strange if the architect and the physician 
 shall have more respect to the reason Qthe prin- 
 ciples] of their own -arts than man to his own 
 reason, which is common to him and the gods. 
 
 36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : 
 all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little 
 clod of the universe : all the present time is a point 
 in eternity. All things are little, changeable, 
 perishable. All things come from thence, from 
 that universal ruling power either directly pro- 
 ceeding or by way of consequence. And accord- 
 ingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is 
 poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as 
 mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. 
 Do not then imagine that they are of another kind 
 from that which thou dost venerate, but form a 
 just opinion of the source of all. 
 
 37- He who has seen present things has seen 
 all, both everything which has taken place from 
 all eternity and everything which will be for time 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 93 
 
 without end ; for all are of one kin and of one 
 form. 
 
 38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
 things in the universe and their relation to one 
 another. For in a manner all things are impli- 
 cated with one another, and all in this way are 
 friendly to one another ; for one thing comes in 
 order after another, and this is by virtue of thet 
 active movement and mutual conspiration and the 
 unity of the substance. /v.^T 
 
 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy 
 lot has been cast : and the men among whom thou 
 hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly 
 [[sincerely]. 
 
 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that 
 for which it has been made, is well, and yet he who 
 made it is not there. But in the things which 
 are held together by nature there is within and 
 there abides in them the power which made them ; 
 wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, 
 and to think, that, if thou dost live and act accord- 
 ing to its will, everything in thee is in conformity 
 to intelligence. And thus also in the universe 
 the things which belong to it are in conformity to 
 intelligence. 
 
 41 . Whatever of the things which are not within 
 thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee 
 
04 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad 
 thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, 
 thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those 
 who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or 
 those who are suspected of being likely to be the 
 cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because 
 we make a difference between these things [^because 
 we do not regard these things as indifferent]. 
 But if we judge only those things which are in 
 our power to be good or bad, there remains no 
 reason either for finding fault with god or standing 
 in a hostile attitude to man. 
 
 42. We are all working together to one end, 
 some with knowledge and design, and others with- 
 out knowing what they do ; as men also when 
 they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, 
 who says that they are laborers and co-operators in 
 the things which take place in the universe. But 
 men co-operate after different fashions : and even 
 those co-operate abundantly, who find fault with 
 what happens and those who try to oppose it and to 
 hinder it ; for the universe had need even of such 
 men as these. It remains then for thee to understand 
 among what kind of workmen thou placest thyself; 
 for he who rules all things will certainly make a 
 right use of thee, and he will receive thee among 
 some part of the co-operators and of those whose 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 95 
 
 labors conduce to one end. But be not thou such 
 a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, 
 which Chrysippus speaks of. 
 
 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of 
 the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- 
 bearer the earth]? And how is it with respect 
 to each of the stars, are they not different and yet 
 they work together to the same end ? 
 
 44. If the gods have determined about me and 
 about the things which must happen to me, they 
 have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
 imagine a deity without forethought; and as to 
 doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that ? for what advantage would result to 
 them from this or to the whole, which is the special 
 object of their providence ? But if they have not 
 determined about me individually, they have cer- 
 tainly determined about the whole at least, and 
 the things which happen by way of sequence in 
 this general arrangement I ought to accept with 
 pleasure and to be content with them. But if 
 they determine about nothing which it is wicked 
 to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither 
 sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- 
 thing else which we do as if the gods were present 
 and lived with us but if however the gods de- 
 termine about none of the things which concern 
 
96 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can 
 inquire about that which is useful ; and that is 
 useful to every man which is conformable to his 
 own constitution and nature. But my nature is 
 rational and social ; and my city and country, so 
 far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I 
 am a man, it is the world. The things then which 
 are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. 
 
 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for 
 the interest of the universal : this might be suf- 
 ficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as 
 a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever 
 is profitable to any man is profitable also to other 
 men. But let the word profitable be taken here 
 in the common sense as said of things of the mid- 
 dle kind [^neither good nor bad]. 
 
 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
 and such places, that the continual sight of the 
 same things and the uniformity make the spectacle 
 wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; for all 
 things above, below, are the same and from the 
 same. How long then ? 
 
 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and 
 of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, 
 so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion 
 and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy 
 thoughts to the other kinds of men]. To that 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 97 
 
 place then we must remove, where there are so 
 many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, 
 Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many heroes 
 of former days, and so many generals after them, 
 and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, 
 Archimedes, and other men of acute natural 
 talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, con- 
 fident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral 
 life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. 
 As to all these consider that they have long been 
 in the dust. What harm then is this to them; 
 and what to those whose names are altogether un- 
 known ? One thing here is worth a great deal, to 
 pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent 
 disposition even to liars and unjust men. 
 
 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think 
 of the virtues of those who live with thee ; for 
 instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of 
 another, and the liberality of a third, and some 
 other good quality of a fourth. For nothing de- 
 lights so much as the examples of the virtues, when 
 they are exhibited in the morals of those who live 
 with us and present themselves in abundance, as 
 far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them 
 before us. 
 
 49. Art thou dissatisfied because thou weighest 
 only so many litrae and not three hundred? Be 
 
 H 
 
98 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 not dissatisfied then that thou must live only so 
 many years and not more ; for as thou art satisfied 
 with the amount of substance which has been as- 
 signed to thee, so be content with the time. 
 
 50. Let us try to persuade them [[men]. But 
 act even against their will, when the principles of 
 justice lead that way. If however any man by 
 using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to 
 contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time 
 employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some 
 other virtue ; and remember that thy attempt was 
 with a reservation [conditionally], that thou didst 
 not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst 
 thou desire ? Some such effort as this But thou 
 attainest thy object, if the things to which thou 
 wast moved are [[not] accomplished. f 
 
 51. He who loves fame considers another man's 
 activity to be his own good ; and he who loves 
 pleasure, his own sensations ; but he who has un- 
 derstanding, considers his own acts to be his own 
 good. 
 
 52. It is in our power to have no opinion about 
 a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for 
 things themselves have no natural power to form 
 our judgments. 
 
 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to 
 what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- 
 sible, be in the speaker's mind. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 99 
 
 54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
 neither is it good for the bee. 
 
 55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick 
 the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or 
 how could the helmsman secure the safety of those 
 in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom 
 he attends ? 
 
 56. How many together with whom I came 
 into the world are already gone out of it. 
 
 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and 
 to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear; and 
 to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why 
 then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a false 
 opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced 
 or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad 
 dog? 
 
 58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- 
 cording to the reason of thy own nature : nothing 
 will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the 
 universal nature. 
 
 59. What kind of people are those whom men 
 wish to please, and for what objects, and by what 
 kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all things, 
 and how many it has covered already. 
 
VII. 
 
 HAT is badness ? It is that which 
 thou hast often seen. And on the 
 occasion of everything which hap- 
 s^^$% pens keep this in mind, that it is 
 that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up 
 and down thou wilt find the same things, with 
 which the old histories are filled, those of the 
 middle ages and those of our own day; with which 
 cities and houses are filled now. There is nothing 
 new : all things are both familiar and short- 
 lived. 
 
 2. How can our principles become dead, unless 
 the impressions [^thoughts] which correspond to 
 them are extinguished ? But it is in thy power 
 continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. 
 I can have that opinion about anything, which I 
 ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? 
 The things which are external to my mind have 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 101 
 
 no relation at all to my mind. Let this be the 
 state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To 
 recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things 
 again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in this 
 consists the recovery of thy life. 
 
 3. The idle business of show, plays on the 
 stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, 
 a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fish- 
 ponds, labouri ngs of ants and burden-carrying, 
 runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets 
 pulled by strings all alike]. It is thy duty then 
 in the midst of such things to show good humor 
 and not a proud air ; to understand however that 
 every man is worth just so much as the things are 
 worth about which he busies himself. 
 
 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
 said, and in every movement thou must observe 
 what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see 
 immediately to what end it refers, but in the 
 other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 
 
 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or 
 not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as an 
 instrument given by the universal nature. But if 
 it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the 
 work and give way to him who is able to do it 
 better, unless there be some reason why I ought 
 not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to 
 
102 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 help me the man who with the aid of my ruling 
 principle can do what is now fit and useful for the 
 general good. For whatsoever either by myself or 
 with another I can do, ought to be directed to this 
 only, to that which is useful and well suited to 
 society. 
 
 6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
 have been given up to oblivion ; and how many who 
 have celebrated the fame of others have long been 
 dead. 
 
 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy 
 business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault 
 on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst 
 not mount up on the battlements alone, but with 
 the help of another it is possible ? 
 
 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou 
 wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having 
 with thee the same reason which now thou usest 
 for present things. 
 
 9. All things are implicated with one another, 
 and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything 
 unconnected with any other thing. For things 
 have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form 
 the same universe [order]. For there is one 
 universe made up of all things, and one god who 
 pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, 
 Qone] common reason in all intelligent animals, and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 103 
 
 one truth ; if indeed there is also one perfection 
 for all animals which are of the same stock and 
 participate in the same reason. N+bf 
 
 10. Everything material soon disappears in the 
 substance of the whole ; and everything formal 
 Qcausal] is very soon taken back into the universal 
 reason; and the memory of everything is very 
 soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 11. To the rational animal the same act is ac- 
 cording to nature and according to reason. 
 
 12. Be thou erect, or be made erect, (in. 6.) 
 
 13. Just as it is with the members in those 
 bodies which are united in one, so it is with rational 
 beings which exist separate, for they have been 
 constituted for one co-operation. And the per- 
 ception of this will be more apparent to thee, if thou 
 often sayest to thyself that I am a member [j/cfAof] 
 of the system of rational beings. But if [using 
 the letter r~\ thou sayest that thou art a part \jAt% o J, 
 thou dost not yet love men from thy heart ; bene- 
 ficence does not yet delight thee for its own sake; 1 
 thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, 
 and not yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 14. Let there fall externally what will on the 
 
 1 I have used Gataker's conjecture KaTa\r}KTuc& instead 
 of the common reading KaraXrjTTTiKiog : compare IT. 20 5 
 ix. 42. 
 
104 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For 
 those parts which have felt will complain, if they 
 choose. But I, unless I think that what has hap- 
 pened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in 
 my power not to think so. 
 
 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be 
 good, just as if the gold, or the emerald or the 
 purple were always saying this, Whatever any one 
 does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color. 
 
 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself, 
 I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself 
 pain.f But if any one else can frighten or pain 
 it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not 
 by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let 
 the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer 
 nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the 
 soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, 
 which has completely the power of forming an 
 opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, for 
 it will never deviatef into such a judgment. The 
 leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it 
 makes a want for itself; and therefore it is both 
 free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it does 
 not disturb and impede itself. 
 
 17. Eudaemonia [Tiappiness] is a good daemon, 
 or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, 
 O imagination ? go away, I intreat thee by the 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 105 
 
 gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. 
 But thou art come according to thy old fashion. 
 I am not angry with thee : only go away. 
 
 18. Is any man afraid of change? Why what 
 can take place without change? What then is 
 more pleasing or more suitable to the universal na- 
 ture ? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood 
 undergoes a change ? and canst thou be nourished, 
 unless the food undergoes a change ? And can any- 
 thing else that is useful be accomplished without 
 change ? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also 
 to change is just the same, and equally necessary for 
 the universal nature ? 
 
 19. Through the universal substance as through 
 a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by 
 their nature united with and co-operating with the 
 whole, as the parts of our body with one another. 
 How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, 
 how many an Epictetus has time already swallowed 
 up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with 
 reference to every man and thing. 
 
 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
 do something which the constitution of man does 
 not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, 
 or what it does not allow now. 
 
 21. Near is thy forge tfulness of all things; 
 and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 
 
106 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
 who do wrong. And this happens, if when 
 they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are 
 kinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance 
 and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
 die ; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done 
 thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fa- 
 culty worse than it was before. 
 
 23. The universal nature out of the universal 
 substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, 
 and when it has broken this up, it uses the material 
 for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; 
 and each of these things subsists for a very short 
 time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be 
 broken up, just as there was none in its being 
 fastened together. 
 
 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; 
 when it is often assumed, 2 the result is that all 
 comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely 
 extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at 
 all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it 
 is contrary to reason. For if even the perception 
 of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there 
 for living any longer ? 
 
 25. Nature which governs the whole will soon 
 change all things which thou seest, and out of their 
 
 2 This is corrupt. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 107 
 
 substance will make other things, and again other 
 things from the substance of them, in order that 
 the world may be ever new. 
 
 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, 
 immediately consider with what opinion about good 
 or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast 
 seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither 
 wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself 
 thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or 
 another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty 
 then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think 
 such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more 
 readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 
 
 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not 
 as of what thou hast : but of the things which 
 thou hast select the best, and then reflect how 
 eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst 
 them not. At the same time however take care 
 that thou dost not through being so pleased with 
 them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to 
 be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have 
 them. 
 
 28. Retire into thyself . The rational principle 
 which rules has this nature, that it is content with 
 itself when it does what is just, and so secures 
 tranquillity. 
 
 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pull- 
 
108 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 ing of the strings. Confine thyself to the present. 
 Understand well what happens either to thee or 
 to another. Divide and distribute every object 
 into the causal [formal] and the material. Think 
 of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by 
 a man stay there where the wrong was done. 
 
 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let 
 thy understanding enter into the things that are 
 doing and the things which do them. (vii. 4.) 
 
 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty 
 and with indifference towards the things which 
 lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. 
 Follow god. The poet says that Law rules all t 
 And it is enough to remember that law rules 
 
 all.t 3 
 
 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or 
 a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either 
 extinction or change. 
 
 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable 
 carries us off; but that which lasts a long time 
 is tolerable ; and the mind maintains its own 
 tranquillity by retiring into itself,t and the ruling 
 faculty is not made worse. But the parts which 
 are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give 
 their opinion about it. 
 
 34. About fame : look at the minds [of those 
 
 3 The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 100 
 
 who seek fame], observe what they are, and what 
 kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things 
 they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of 
 sand piled on one another hide the former sands, 
 so in life the events which go before are soon 
 covered by those which come after. 
 
 35. From Plato : 4 the man who has an elevated 
 mind and takes a view of all time and of all sub- 
 stance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to 
 think that human life is anything great ? it is not 
 possible, he said. Such a man then will think that 
 death also is no evil Certainly not. 
 
 36. From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good 
 and to be abused. 
 
 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be 
 obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the 
 mind commands, and for the mind not to be re- 
 gulated and composed by itself. 
 
 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
 For they care nought about it. 5 
 
 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of 
 
 corn : 
 One man is born ; another dies. 6 
 
 4 Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 
 
 5 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 
 
 6 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 
 
110 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 42. For the good is with me, and the just. 7 
 
 43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent 
 emotion. 
 
 44. From Plato : 8 But I would make this man 
 a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest 
 not well, if thou thinkest that a man, who is good 
 for anything at all ought to compute the hazard 
 of life or death, and should not rather look to this 
 only in all that he does, whether he is doing what 
 is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a 
 bad man. 
 
 45. 8 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth : 
 wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the 
 best place for him, or has been placed by a com- 
 mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and 
 to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the 
 reckoning, either death or anything else, before the 
 baseness [[of deserting his post]. 
 
 46. But, my good friend, consider whether that 
 
 in. 25.) has translated six lines from Euripides, and among 
 them are these two lines, 
 
 Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 
 
 7 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses. 
 
 8 Erom the Apologia. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. Ill 
 
 which is noble and good is not something different 
 from saving and being saved ; for f we must not 
 allow that it consists in living such or such a time, 
 at least for one who is really a man ; f and he 
 should not be fond of life, but entrusting this to 
 god and believing what the women say, that no 
 man can escape his destiny, he should next inquire 
 how he may best live the time that he has to 
 live.9 
 
 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as 
 if thou wert going along with them ; and constantly 
 consider the changes of the elements into one 
 another ; for such thoughts purge away the filth of 
 the terrene life. 
 
 48. This is a fine saying of Plato : l That he who 
 is discoursing about men should look also at earthly 
 things as if he viewed them from some higher 
 place ; should look at them in their assemblies, 
 armies, agricultural labours, marriages, treaties, 
 births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert 
 places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamen- 
 tations, markets, a mixture of all things and an 
 orderly combination of contraries. 
 
 9 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68. In this passage the text of 
 Antoninus has lareov, which is perhaps right; but there 
 seems to be something wrong in the text. It is certainly 
 difficult to see the exact construction of parts of the section. 
 The reading WKT'SOV for eartov does not mend the matter. 
 
 10 It is not in the extant writings of Plato. 
 
112 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 49. Consider the past ; such great changes of 
 political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also 
 the things which will be. For they will certainly 
 be of like form, and it is not possible that they 
 should deviate from the order of the things which 
 take place now : accordingly to have contemplated 
 human life for forty years is the same as to have 
 contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what 
 more wilt thou see ? 
 
 50. That which has grown from the earth to 
 
 the earth, 
 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns. 11 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual involu- 
 tion of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the 
 unsentient elements. 
 
 51. With food and drinks and cunning magic 
 
 arts 
 
 Turning the channel's course to 'scape from 
 death. 12 
 
 The breeze which heaven has sent 
 We must endure, and toil without complaining. 
 
 52. Another may be more expert in casting his 
 opponent; but let him not be more social, nor 
 
 11 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 12 The first two lines are from the Supp. of Euri- 
 pides, v. 1110. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI L 113 
 
 more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all 
 that happens, nor more considerate with respect to 
 the faults of his neighbors. 
 
 63. Where any work can be done conformably 
 to the reason which is common to gods and men, 
 there we have nothing to fear : for where we are 
 able to get profit by means of the activity which is 
 successful and proceeds according to our constitu- 
 tion, there no harm is to be suspected. 
 
 64. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
 power piously to acquiesce in thy present condition, 
 and to behave justly to those who are about thee, 
 and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, 
 that nothing shall steal into them without being 
 well examined. 
 
 55. Do not look around thee to discover other 
 men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, 
 to what nature leads thee, both the universal na- 
 ture through the things which happen to thee, and 
 thy own nature through the acts which must be 
 done by thee. But every being ought to do that 
 which is according to its constitution; and all 
 other things have been made for the sake of rational 
 beings, just as among irrational things the inferior 
 for the sake of the superior, but the rational for 
 the sake of one another. 
 
 The prime principle then in man's constitution 
 i 
 
114 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 is the social. And the second is not to yield to 
 the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar 
 office of the rational and intelligent motion to cir- 
 cumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered 
 either by the motion of the senses or of the appe- 
 tites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent mo- 
 tion claims superiority and does not permit itself 
 to be overpowered by the others. And with good 
 reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of them. 
 The third thing in the rational constitution is 
 freedom from error and from deception. Let then 
 the ruling principle holding fast to these things go 
 straight on, and it has what is its own. 
 
 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
 completed thy life up to the present time ; and live 
 according to nature the remainder which is allowed 
 thee. 
 
 57- Love that only which happens to thee, and 
 is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what 
 is more suitable ? 
 
 58. In everything which happens keep before 
 thy eyes those to whom the same things happened, 
 and how they were vexed, and treated them as 
 strange things, and found fault with them : and 
 now where are they? Nowhere. Why then dost 
 thou choose to act in the same way ? and why dost 
 thou not leave these agitations which are foreign 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 115 
 
 to nature, to those who cause them and those who 
 are moved by them ? and why art thou not altogether 
 intent upon the right way of making use of the 
 things which happen to thee ? for then thou wilt 
 use them well, and they will be a material for thee 
 [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve 
 to be a good man in every act which thou doest : 
 and remember *. 1S 
 
 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
 good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever 
 dig. 
 
 60. The body ought to be compact, and to show 
 no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For 
 what the mind shows in the face by maintaining 
 in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, 
 that ought to be required also in the whole body. 
 But all these things should be observed without 
 affectation. 
 
 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's 
 art than the dancer's, in respect of this that it 
 should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which 
 are sudden and unexpected. 
 
 62. Constantly observe who those are whose 
 
 13 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so cor- 
 rupt that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to 
 it. It is better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some 
 critics and translators have done. 
 
11G M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 approbation thou wishest to have, and what ruling 
 principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither 
 blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou 
 want their approbation, if thou lookest to the 
 sources of their opinions and appetites. 
 
 63. Every soul,J;he_j)hilosopher sajs x is_in volun- 
 tarily deprived of truth ; consequently in the same 
 way it is deprived of justice and temperance and 
 benevolence and everything of the kind. It is 
 most necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for 
 thus thou_wilt be more gentle towards all. 
 
 64. In every pain let this thought be present, 
 that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make 
 the governing intelligence worse, for it does not 
 damage the intelligence either so far as the in- 
 telligence is rational u or so far as it is sociaL 
 Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark of 
 Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable 
 nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has 
 its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in ima- 
 gination : and remember this too, that we do not 
 perceive that many things which are disagreeable 
 to us are the same as pain, such as excessive 
 
 14 The text has IXi/c^, which it has been proposed to alter 
 to XoyiKTj, and this change is necessary. We shall then 
 have in this section Aoyijc?/ and KOIVWIKT] associated, as we 
 have in s. 68 XoyiKij and iroXiTiKrj, and in s. 72. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 117 
 
 drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and 
 the having no appetite. When then thou art dis- 
 contented about any of these things, say to thy- 
 self, that thou art yielding to pain. 
 
 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, 
 as they feel towards men. 15 
 
 66. How do we know if Telauges was not su- 
 perior in character to Socrates ? for it is not enough 
 that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed 
 more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the 
 night in the cold with more endurance, and that 
 when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he 
 considered it more noble to refuse, and that he 
 walked in a swaggering way in the streets though 
 as to this one may have great doubts if it was true. 
 But we ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it 
 was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to 
 be content with being just towards men and pious 
 towards the gods, neither idly vexed on account of 
 men's villany, nor yet making himself a slave to 
 any man's ignorance, nor receiving as strange any- 
 thing that fell to his share out of the universal nor 
 enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his under- 
 standing to sympathize with the affects of the 
 miserable flesh. 
 
 15 I have followed Gataker's conjecture of aVdvfyxoTroi 
 instead of the MSS. reading oi dvOpwiroi. 
 
118 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 6?. Nature has not so mingledt[the intelligence] 
 with the composition of the body, as not to have 
 allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself 
 and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that 
 is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a divine 
 man and to be recognized as such by no one. 
 Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, 
 that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy 
 life. And because thou hast despaired of becoming 
 a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of na- 
 ture, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being 
 both free and modest and social and obedient to god. 
 
 68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- 
 pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even 
 if all the world cry out against thee as much as 
 they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces 
 the members of this kneaded matter which has 
 grown around thee. For what hinders the mind 
 in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in 
 tranquillity and in a just judgment of all sur- 
 rounding things and in a ready use of the objects 
 which are presented to it, so that the judgment 
 may say to the thing which falls under its obser- 
 vation ; This thou art in substance [[reality], 
 though in men's opinion thou mayst appear to be 
 of a different kind ; and the use shall say to that 
 which falls under the hand : Thou art the thing 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 119 
 
 that I was seeking; for tome that which presents 
 itself is always a material for virtue both rational 
 and political, and in a word for the exercise of art 
 which belongs to man or god. For everything 
 which happens has a relationship either to god or 
 man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but 
 usual and apt matter to work on. 
 
 69. The perfection of moral character consists 
 in this, in passing every day as the last, and in 
 being neither violently excited nor torpid nor 
 playing the hypocrite. 
 
 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed be- 
 cause during so long a time they must tolerate con- 
 tinually men such as they are and so many of them 
 bad ; and besides this they also take care of them in 
 all ways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon, 
 art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this too 
 when thou art one of them ? 
 
 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly 
 from his own badness, which is indeed possible, but 
 to fly from other men's badness, which is im- 
 possible. 
 
 72. Whatever the rational and political Asocial] 
 faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it 
 properly judges to be inferior to itself. 
 
 73. When thou hast done a good act and another 
 has received it, why dost thou still look for a third ' 
 
120 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the 
 reputation of having done a good act or to obtain 
 a return ? 
 
 74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. 
 But it is useful to act according to nature. Do not 
 then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing 
 it to others. 
 
 75. The nature of the All moved to make the 
 universe. But now either everything that takes 
 place comes by way of consequence [or continuity] ; 
 or even the chief things towards which the ruling 
 power of the universe directs its own movement 
 are governed by no rational principle. If this is 
 remembered it will make thee more tranquil in 
 many things, (ix. 21, vi. 44. ) 16 
 
 10 It is not easy to understand this section. It has been 
 suggested that there is some error in 17 aXoyiora, &c. Some 
 of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and they 
 have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition 
 is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A 
 beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which 
 framed an order. The next question is, How are things 
 produced now $ or in other words, by what power do forms 
 appear in continuous succession ? The answer, according 
 to Antoninus, may be this : It is by virtue of the original 
 constitution of things that all change and succession have 
 been effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a 
 sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and the 
 same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and the same 
 as man is one and the same, which he believes himsolf to 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIL 121 
 
 be, though he also believes and cannot help believing that 
 both in his body and in his thoughts there is change and 
 succession. There is no real discontinuity then in the 
 universe ; and if we say that there was an order framed in 
 the beginning and that the things which are now produced 
 are a consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of 
 things as we are compelled to view them, as forming a series 
 or succession ; just as we speak of the changes in our own 
 bodies and the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there 
 are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between 
 any two supposed states of any one. thing, so there are 
 no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what 
 we call one thing and any other thing which we speak 
 of as immediately preceding or following it. What we call 
 time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession of 
 things or events, an idea which is a part of our constitu- 
 tion, but not an idea which we can suppose to belong to an 
 infinite intelligence and power. The conclusion then is 
 certain that the present and the past, the production of 
 present things and the supposed original order, out of 
 which we say that present things now come, are one : and 
 the present productive power and the so-called past ar- 
 rangement are only different names for one thing. I sup- 
 pose then that Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes 
 talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed 
 by his words. There are certainly other passages from 
 which, I think, that we may collect that he had notions of 
 production something like what I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternative : " or even the chief 
 
 things principle." I do not exactly know what 
 
 he means by rd fcvpiwrara, " the chief," or, " the most ex- 
 cellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of 
 inferior and superior things, and of the inferior being for 
 the use of the superior, and of rational beings being the 
 highest, he may here mean rational beings. He also in 
 this alternative assumes a governing power of the universe, 
 
122 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 and that it acts by directing its power towards these chief 
 objects, or making its special, proper, motion towards them. 
 And here he uses the noun (op/irj)'" movement," which con- 
 tains the same notion as the verb (wp/irjdc) " moved," which 
 he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was 
 speaking of the making of the universe. If we do not ac- 
 cept the first hypothesis, he says, we must take the con- 
 clusion of the second, that the u chief things towards which 
 the ruling power of the universe makes a movement are 
 directed by no rational principle." The meaning then is, 
 if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing 
 power, which strives to give effect to its efforts, we must 
 conclude that there is no rational direction of anything, if 
 the power which first made the universe does not in some 
 way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything 
 is now produced or now exists without the action of the 
 supreme intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes 
 an effort to act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be 
 reconciled with the nature of a supreme power, whose ex- 
 istence Antoninus always assumes. The tranquillity that 
 a man may gain from these reflections must result from his 
 rejecting the second hypothesis, and accepting the first ; 
 whatever may be the exact sense in which the emperor 
 understood the first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there is 
 no providence which governs the world, man has at least 
 the power of governing himself according to the constitu- 
 tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does 
 the best that he can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor 
 to discover the writer's exact meaning ; for I think that he 
 had a meaning, though people may not agree what it was. 
 (Compare ix. 28. > If I have rightly explained the emperor's 
 meaning in this and other passages, he has touched the 
 solution of a great question. 
 
VIII. 
 
 HIS reflection also tends to the re- 
 moval of the desire of empty fame, 
 that it is no longer in thy power to 
 have lived the whole of thy life, or 
 at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a 
 philosopher ; but both to many others and to thy- 
 self it is plain that thou art far from philosophy 
 Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is 
 no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a 
 philosopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. 
 If then thou hast truly seen where the matter 
 lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem 
 [to others], and be content if thou shalt live the 
 rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. 
 Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else 
 distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many 
 wanderings without having found happiness any- 
 where, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in re- 
 
124 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 putation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where 
 is it then ? In doing what man's nature requires. 
 How then shall a man do this ? If he has prin- 
 ciples from which come his affects and his acts. 
 What principles ? Those which relate to good and 
 bad : the belief that there is nothing good for 
 man, which does not make him just, temperate, 
 manly, free ; and that there is nothing bad, which 
 does not do the contrary to what has been 
 mentioned. 
 
 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, 
 How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent 
 of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. 
 What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is 
 the work of an intelligent living being, and a 
 social being, and one who is under the same law 
 with god ? 
 
 3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what 
 are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- 
 clitus and Socrates ? For they were acquainted 
 with things, and their causes forms]], and their 
 matter, and the ruling principles of these men 
 were the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. 
 But as to the others, how many things had they 
 to care for, and to how many things were they 
 slaves. 
 
 4. [^Consider] that men will do the same things 
 nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 126 
 
 6. This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, 
 for all things are according to the nature of the 
 universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody 
 and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In 
 the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy 
 business look at it, and at the same time remem- 
 bering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what 
 man's nature demands, do it without turning aside ; 
 and speak as it seems to thee most just, only let it 
 be with good temper and with modesty and with- 
 out hypocrisy. 
 
 6. The nature of the universal has this work to 
 do, to remove to that place the things which are in 
 this, to change them, to take them away here and 
 to carry them there. All things are change, yet 
 we need not fear anything new. All things are 
 familiar [to us] ; but the distribution of them also 
 remains the same. 
 
 7. Every nature is contented with itself when 
 it goes on its way well ; and a rational nature goes 
 on its way well, when in its thoughts it assents to 
 nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its 
 movements to social acts only, and when it confines 
 its desires and aversions to the things which are in 
 its power, and when it is satisfied with everything 
 that is assigned to it by the common nature. For 
 of this common nature every particular nature is a 
 
126 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 part, as the nature of the leaf is a part of the na- 
 ture of the plant; except that in the plant the 
 nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not 
 perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded ; 
 but the nature of man is part of a nature which is 
 not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and 
 just, since it gives to everything in equal portions 
 and according to its worth times, substance, cause 
 form~], activity, and incident. But examine, not 
 to discover that any one thing compared with any 
 other single thing is equal in all respects, but by 
 taking all the parts together of one thing and com- 
 paring them with all the parts together of another. 
 
 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. 
 But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check 
 arrogance : thou hast leisure to be superior to 
 pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior 
 to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and 
 ungrateful people, nay even to care for them. 
 
 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding 
 fault with the court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 
 
 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for 
 having neglected something useful ; but that which 
 is good must be something useful, and the perfect 
 good man should look after it. But no such man 
 would ever repent of having refused any sensual 
 pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor use- 
 ful. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 127 
 
 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
 constitution ? What is its substance and material ? 
 And what its causal nature Qor form] ? And what 
 is it doing in the world? And how long does it 
 subsist ? 
 
 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, 
 remember that it is according to thy constitution 
 and according to human nature to perform social 
 acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational 
 animals. But that which is according to each in- 
 dividual's nature, is also more peculiarly its own, 
 and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also 
 more agreeable. 
 
 13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the 
 occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to 
 it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dia- 
 lectic. 
 
 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, imme- 
 diately say to thyself : What opinions has this man 
 about good and bad ? For if with respect to plea- 
 sure and pain and the causes of each, and with 
 respect to fame and ignominy, death, and life he 
 has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing 
 wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and 
 such things ; and I shall bear in mind that he is 
 compelled to do so. 
 
 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- 
 
128 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 prised if the figtree produces figs, so it is to be sur- 
 prised if the world produces such and such things 
 of which it is productive ; and for the physician 
 and the helmsman it is a shame to be surprised, if 
 a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavorable. 
 
 16. Remember that to change thy opinion and 
 to follow him who corrects thy error is as consis- 
 tent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. 
 For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted ac- 
 cording to thy own movement and judgment, and 
 indeed according to thy own understanding too. 
 
 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou 
 do it ? but if it is in the power of another, whom 
 dost thou blame ? the atoms [[chance]] or the gods? 
 Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. 
 For if thou canst, correct |~that which is the cause] ; 
 but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the 
 thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this, 
 of what use is it to thee to find fault ? for nothing 
 should be done without a purpose. 
 
 18. That which has died falls not out of the 
 universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
 and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are\ 
 elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
 these too change, and they murmur not. 
 
 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a 
 vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun will 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 129 
 
 say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods 
 will say the same. For what purpose then art thou ? 
 to enjoy pleasure ? See if common sense allows this. 
 
 20. Nature has had regard in everything no less 
 to the end than to the beginning and the con- 
 tinuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. 
 What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or 
 harm for it to come down, or even to have fallen? 
 and what good is it to the bubble while it holds 
 together, or what harm when it is burst? The 
 same may be said of a light also. 
 
 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what 
 kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown old, 
 what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is 
 diseased. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, 
 and the rememberer and the remembered : and all 
 this in a nook of this part of the world ; and not 
 even here do all agree, no not any one with him- 
 self : and the whole earth too is a point. 
 
 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, 
 whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 
 rather to become good to-morrow than to be good 
 to-day. 
 
 23. Am I doing anything? I do it with refer- 
 ence to the good of mankind. Does anything 
 
 K 
 
130 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the 
 gods, and the source of all things, from which all 
 that happens is derived. 
 
 24. Such as bathing appears to thee oil, sweat, 
 dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, so is every 
 part of life and every thing. 
 
 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla 
 died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then Se- 
 cunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and 
 then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina 
 die, and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. 
 Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. 
 And those sharp-witted men, either seers or men 
 inflated with pride, where are they ? for instance 
 the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the 
 Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like 
 them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed 
 have not been remembered even for a short time, 
 and others have become the heroes of fables, and 
 again others have disappeared even from fables. 
 Remember this then, that this little compound, thy- 
 self, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath 
 must be extinguished, or be removed and placed 
 elsewhere. 
 
 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper 
 works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a 
 man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 131 
 
 the movements of the senses, to form a just judg- 
 ment of plausible appearances, and to take a sur- 
 vey of the nature of the universe and of the things 
 which happen in it. 
 
 27. There are three relations [[between thee 
 and other things] : the one to the body 1 which 
 surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause 
 from which all things come to all ; and the third 
 to those who live with thee. 
 
 28. Pain is either an evil to the body then let 
 the body say what it thinks of it or to the soul ; 
 but it is in the power of the soul to maintain 
 its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think 
 that pain is an evil. For every judgment and 
 movement and desire and aversion is within, and 
 no evil ascends so high. 
 
 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying 
 to thyself : now it is in my power to let no bad- 
 ness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturbation 
 at all ; but looking at all things I see what is their 
 nature, and I use each according to its value. Re- 
 member this power which thou hast from nature. 
 
 30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, 
 
 1 The text has airiov which in Antoninus means " form," 
 " formal." Accordingly Schulze recommends either 
 Valkenaer's emendation ayyeiov, " body," or Corae's 
 ffwpdTwv. Compare xn. 13, x. 38. 
 
132 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 whoever he may be, appropriately, not with any 
 affectation : use plain discourse. 
 
 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descen- 
 dants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- 
 mates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, physicians and 
 sacrificing priests the whole court is dead. Then 
 turn to the rest, not considering the death of a 
 single man, [but of a whole race], as of the 
 Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs, 
 The last of his race. Consider what trouble those 
 before them have had that they might leave a 
 successor; and then, that of necessity some one 
 must be the last. Again here consider the death 
 of a whole race. 
 
 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every 
 single act ; and if every act does its duty, as far 
 as is possible, be content ; and no one is able to 
 hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty 
 But something external will stand in the way 
 Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly 
 and soberly and considerately But perhaps some 
 other active power will be hindered Well, but by 
 acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content 
 to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, 
 another opportunity of action is immediately put 
 before thee in place of that \vhich was hindered, 
 and one which will adapt itself to this order of 
 which we are speaking. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 133 
 
 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arro- 
 gance ; and be ready to let it go. 
 
 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, 
 or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of 
 the body, such does a man make himself, as far as 
 he can, who is not content with what happens, 
 and separates himself from others, or does anything 
 unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thy- 
 self from the natural unity for thou wast made 
 by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself 
 off yet here there is this beautiful provision, that 
 it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has 
 allowed this to no other part, after it has been 
 separated and cut asunder, to come together again. 
 But consider the benevolence with which he has 
 distinguished man, for he has put it in his power 
 not to be separated at all from the universal ; and 
 when he has been separated, he has allowed him 
 to return and to be united and to resume his place 
 as a part. 
 
 35. As the nature of the universal has given to 
 every rational being all the other powers that it 
 has,f so we have received from it this power also. 
 For as the universal nature converts and fixes in 
 its predestined place everything which stands in 
 its way and opposes it, and makes such things a 
 part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to 
 
134 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 make every hindrance its own material, and to use 
 it for such purpose as it may have designed. 2 
 
 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the 
 whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once 
 embrace all the various troubles which thou mayst 
 expect to befall thee : but on every occasion ask 
 thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable 
 and past bearing ? for thou wilt be ashamed to 
 confess. In the next place remember that neither 
 the future nor the past pains thee, but only the 
 present. But this is reduced to a very little, if 
 thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, 
 if it is unable to hold out against even this. 
 
 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the 
 tomb of Verus ? 3 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by 
 the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridiculous. 
 Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead 
 be conscious of it ? and if the dead were conscious, 
 would they be pleased ? and if they were pleased, 
 would that make them immortal ? Was it not 
 in the order of destiny that these persons too should 
 become old women and old men and then die? 
 
 2 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, 
 but the meaning will appear if the second Aoyucuiy is 
 changed into bXwv: though this change alone will not 
 establish the grammatical completeness of the text. 
 
 3 " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the 
 true reading. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 135 
 
 What then would those do after these were dead? 
 All this is foul smell and blood in a bag. 
 
 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
 wisely, f says the philosopher. 
 
 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I 
 see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see 
 a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and 
 that is temperance. 
 
 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that 
 which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself 
 standest in perfect security Who is this self? 
 The reason But I am not reason Be it so. 
 Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But 
 if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own 
 opinion about itself, (vn. 16.) 
 
 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is 
 an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the 
 movements [^desires] is equally an evil to the 
 animal nature. And something else also is equally 
 an impediment and an evil to the constitution of 
 plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the 
 intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. 
 Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain 
 or sensuous pleasure affect thee ? The senses will 
 look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in 
 thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou wast 
 making this effort absolutely [^unconditionally, or, 
 
136 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is 
 an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. 
 But if thou takest [into consideration] the usual 
 course of things, thou hast not yet been injured 
 nor even impeded. The things however which are 
 proper to the understanding no one is used to 
 impede, for neither fire nor iron nor tyrant nor 
 abuse touches it in any way. When it has been 
 made a sphere, it continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 
 
 42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, 
 for I have never intentionally given pain even to 
 another. 
 
 43. Different things delight different people. 
 But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
 sound without turning away either from any man 
 or from any of the things which happen to men, 
 but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes 
 and using everything according to its value. 
 
 44. See that thou secure this present time to 
 thyself : for those who rather pursue posthumous 
 fame do not consider that the men of after time 
 will be exactly such as these whom they cannot 
 bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it 
 in any way to thee if these men of after time utter 
 this or that sound or have this or that opinion about 
 thee? 
 
 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 137 
 
 there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, 
 content, if it can feel and act conformably to its 
 proper constitution. Is this ["change of place] 
 sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy 
 and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, 
 shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find 
 which is sufficient reason for this? 4 
 
 46. Nothing can happen to any man which is 
 not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not 
 according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine 
 which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor 
 to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then 
 there happens to each thing both what is usual 
 and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For 
 the common nature brings nothing which may not 
 be borne by thee. 
 
 47. If thou art pained by any external thing, 
 it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own 
 judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe 
 out this judgment now. But if anything in thy 
 own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee 
 from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou 
 art pained because thou art not doing some parti- 
 
 4 opeyofjisvr) in this passage seems to have a passive 
 sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and 
 some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12. will 
 help to explain the meaning. 
 
138 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 cular thing which seems to thee to be right, why 
 dost thou not rather act than complain ? But 
 some insuperable obstacle is in the way? Do 
 not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
 done depends not on thee But it is not worth 
 while to live, if this cannot be done Take thy 
 departure then from life contentedly, just as he 
 dies who is in full activity, and well-pleased too 
 with the things which are obstacles. 
 
 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invin- 
 cible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, 
 if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, 
 even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then 
 will it be when it forms a judgment about anything 
 aided by reason and deliberately? therefore the 
 mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for 
 man has nothing more secure to which he can fly 
 for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. 
 He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; 
 but he who has seen it and does not fly to this re- 
 fuge is unhappy. 
 
 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the 
 first appearances report. Suppose that it has been 
 reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of 
 thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast 
 been injured, that has not been reported. I see 
 that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 139 
 
 danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by 
 the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from 
 within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or 
 rather add something, like a man who knows 
 everything that happens in the world. 
 
 50. A cucumber is bitter Throw it away. 
 There are briars in the road Turn aside from 
 them. This is enough. Do not add, And why 
 were such things made in the world ? For thou 
 wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with 
 nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter 
 and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because 
 thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings 
 from the things which they make. And yet they 
 have places into which they can throw these 
 shavings and cuttings ; but the universal nature 
 has no external space ; now the wondrous part of 
 her art is that though she has circumscribed her- 
 self, everything within her which appears to decay 
 and to grow old and to be useless she changes into 
 herself, and again makes other new things from 
 these very same, so that she requires neither sub- 
 stance from without nor wants a place into which 
 she may cast that which decays. She is content 
 then with her own space, and her own matter and 
 her own art. 
 
 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in 
 
140 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 thy conversation without method, nor wandering 
 in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul in- 
 ward contention nor external effusion, nor in life 
 be so busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, 
 curse thee. What then can these things do to 
 prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, 
 just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a 
 limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never 
 ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should 
 cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse 
 them and wash them out, and will not be at all 
 polluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual 
 fountain [and not a mere well] ? By forming thy- 
 self hourly to freedom conjoined with benevolence, 
 simplicity and modesty. 
 
 52. He who does not know what the world is, 
 does not know where he is. And he who does 
 not know for what purpose the world exists, does 
 not know who he is, nor what the world is. But 
 he who has failed in any one of these things could 
 not even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
 What then dost thou think of him who Qavoids 
 or] seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men 
 who know not either where they are or who they 
 are. 
 
 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 141 
 
 curses himself thrice every hour? wouldst thou 
 wish to please a man who does not please himself? 
 Does a man please himself who repents of nearly 
 everything that he does ? 
 
 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in 
 concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let 
 thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the 
 intelligence which embraces all things. For the 
 intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and 
 pervades all things for him who is willing to draw 
 it to him than the aerial power for him who is able 
 to respire it. 
 
 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all 
 to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness 
 Qof one man] does no harm to another. It is only 
 harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- 
 leased from it, as soon as he shall choose. 
 
 56. To my own free will the free will of my 
 neighbour is just as indifferent as his breath and 
 his flesh. For though we are made especially for 
 the sake of one another, still the ruling power of 
 each of us has its own office, for otherwise my 
 neighbour's wickedness would be my harm, which 
 god has not willed in order that my unhappiness 
 may not depend on another. 
 
 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in 
 all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not ef- 
 
142 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 fused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- 
 ingly its rays are called Extensions [a^TlVe^ be- 
 cause they are extended \_a7ro TTOV cgTffwta]*' 
 But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, 
 if he looks at the sun's light passing through a 
 narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is ex- 
 tended in a right line, and as it were is divided 
 when it meets with a solid body which stands in 
 the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there 
 the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall 
 off. Such then ought to be the out-pouring and 
 diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no 
 way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should 
 make no violent or impetuous collision with the 
 obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, 
 but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. 
 For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, 
 if it does not admit it. 
 
 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of 
 sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if 
 thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel 
 any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind 
 of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living 
 being and thou wilt not cease to live. 
 
 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
 Teach them then or bear with them. 
 
 5 A piece of bad etymology. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 143 
 
 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way 
 the mind. The mind indeed both when it exer- 
 cises caution and when it is employed about in- 
 quiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to 
 its object. 
 
 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and 
 also let every other man enter into thine. 
 
IX. 
 
 who acts unjustly acts impiously. 
 For since the universal nature has 
 made rational animals for the sake 
 of one another to help one another 
 according to their deserts, but in no way to injure 
 one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly 
 guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. 
 And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same 
 divinity ; for the universal nature is the nature of 
 all things that are ; and all things that are have a 
 relation to all things that come into existence. 
 And further, this universal nature is named truth 
 and is the prime cause of all things that are true. 
 He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety 
 inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving ; and he 
 also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at 
 variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch 
 as he disturbs the order by fighting against the 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 145 
 
 nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who 
 is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, 
 for he had received powers from nature through the 
 neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish 
 falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues 
 pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil is guilty 
 of impiety. For of necessity such a man must 
 often find fault with the universal nature, alleging 
 that it assigns things to the bad and the good con- 
 trary to their deserts, because frequently the bad 
 are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the 
 things which procure pleasure, but the good have 
 pain for their share and the things which cause 
 pain. And farther, he who is afraid of pain will 
 sometimes also be afraid of some of the things 
 which will happen in the world, and even this is 
 impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not 
 abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. 
 Now with respect to the things towards which the 
 universal nature is equally affected, for it would 
 not have made both, unless it was equally affected 
 towards both towards these they who wish to fol- 
 low nature should be of the same mind with it, 
 and equally affected. With respect to pain then 
 and pleasure or death and life or honor and dis- 
 honor, which the universal nature employs equally, 
 whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting 
 
146 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 impiously. And I say that the universal nature 
 employs them equally, instead of saying that they 
 happen alike to those who are produced in con- 
 tinuous series and to those who come after them 
 by virtue of a certain original movement of provi- 
 dence, according to which it moved from a certain 
 beginning to this ordering of things, having con- 
 ceived certain reasons of the things which were to 
 be, and having determined generative powers of 
 substances and changes and such like successions. 
 
 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart 
 from mankind without having had any taste of 
 lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. How- 
 ever to breathe out one's life when a man has had 
 enough of these things is the next best voyage, as 
 the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with 
 vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to 
 fly from this pestilence ? For the destruction of 
 the understanding is a pestilence, much more in- 
 deed than any such corruption and change of this 
 atmosphere which surrounds us. For this cor- 
 ruption is a pestilence of animals in so far as they 
 are animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men 
 in so far as they are men. 
 
 3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
 with it, since this too is one of those things which 
 nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 147 
 
 grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, 
 and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and 
 to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, 
 and all the other natural operations which the 
 seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. 
 This then is consistent with the character of a re- 
 flecting man to be neither careless nor impatient 
 nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to 
 wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As 
 thou now waitest for the time when the child shall 
 come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the 
 time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. 
 But if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort 
 which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made 
 best reconciled to death by observing the ob- 
 jects from which thou art going to be removed and 
 the morals of those with whom thy soul will no 
 longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be 
 offended with men, but it is thy duty to care for 
 them and to bear with them gently ; and yet to 
 remember that thy departure will be not from men 
 who have the same principles as thyself. For this 
 is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw 
 us the contrary way and attach us to life, to be 
 permitted to live with those who have the same 
 principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how 
 great is the trouble arising from the discordance 
 
148 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 of those who live together, so that thou mayst say, 
 Come quick, O death, lest perchance I too should 
 forget myself. 
 
 4. He who does wrong does wrong against him- 
 self. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to him- 
 self, because he makes himself bad. 
 
 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a 
 certain thing; not only he who does a certain 
 thing. 
 
 6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- 
 ing, and thy present conduct directed to social 
 good, and thy present disposition of contentment 
 with everything which happensf that is enough. 
 
 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : ex- 
 tinguish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its 
 own power. 
 
 8. Among the animals which have not reason 
 one life is distributed; but among reasonable 
 animals one intelligent soul is distributed : just as 
 there is one earth of all things which are of an 
 earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe 
 one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision 
 and all that have life. 
 
 9. All things which participate in anything 
 which is common to them all move towards that 
 which is of the same kind with themselves. Every- 
 thing which is earthy turns towards the earth, 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 149 
 
 everything which is liquid flows together, and 
 everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, 
 so that they require something to keep them asun- 
 der and the application of force. Fire indeed 
 moves upwards on account of the elemental fire, 
 but it is so ready to be kindled together with all 
 the fire which is here, that even every substance 
 which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, because 
 there is less mingled with it of that which is a 
 hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then every- 
 thing also which participates in the common in- 
 telligent nature moves in like manner towards that 
 which is of the same kind with itself, or moves 
 even more. For so much as it is superior in com- 
 parison with all other things, in the same degree 
 also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused 
 with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among 
 animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, 
 and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, 
 and in a manner, loves ; for even in animals there 
 are souls, and that power which brings them to- 
 gether is seen to exert itself in the superior degree, 
 and in such a way as never has been observed 
 in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in 
 rational animals there are political communities and 
 friendships, and families and meetings of people ; 
 and in wars treaties and armistices. But in the 
 
360 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 things which are still superior, even though they 
 are separated from one another, unity in a manner 
 exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the 
 higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even 
 in things which are separated. See then what 
 now takes place. For only intelligent animals 
 have now forgotten this mutual desire and incli- 
 nation, and in them alone the property of flowing 
 together is not seen. But still though men strive 
 to avoid Qhis union], they are caught and held by 
 it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and 
 thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. 
 Sooner then will one find anything earthy which 
 comes in contact with no earthy thing than a 
 man altogether separated from other men. 
 
 10. Both man and god and the universe pro- 
 duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces 
 it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms 
 to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason 
 produces fruit both for all and for itself, and there 
 are produced from it other things of the same kind 
 as reason itself. 
 
 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those 
 who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember 
 that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. 
 And the gods too are indulgent to such persons ; 
 and for some purposes they even help them to get 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 151 
 
 health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. 
 And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders 
 thee? 
 
 12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet 
 as one who would be pitied or admired : but direct 
 thy will to one thing only, to put thyself in motion 
 and to check thyself, as the social reason requires. 
 
 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
 rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
 outside, but within and in my opinions. 
 
 14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- 
 perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless in 
 the matter. Everything now is just as it was in 
 the time of those whom we have buried. 
 
 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by 
 themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, 
 nor expressing any judgment. What is it then 
 which does judge about them? The ruling fa- 
 culty. 
 
 1 0. Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil 
 and the good of the rational social animal, just as 
 his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in 
 activity. 
 
 17. For the stone which has been thrown up 
 it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good to 
 have been carried up. (vin. 20.) 
 
 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading prin- 
 
152 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 .ciples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid 
 of, and what kind of judges they are of them- 
 selves. 
 
 19. All things are changing: and thou thyself 
 art in continuous mutation and in a manner in 
 continuous destruction, and the universe too. 
 
 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's 
 wrongful act there where it is. (vu. 29, ix. 38.) 
 
 21. Termination of activity, cessation from move- 
 ment and opinion, and in a sense their death, is 
 no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consider- 
 ation of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, 
 thy manhood, thy oM age, for in these also every 
 change was a death. Is this anything to fear? 
 Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy 
 grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, 
 then to thy life under thy father; and as thou 
 findest many other differences and changes and 
 terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear ? 
 In like manner then neither are the termination and 
 cessation and change of thy whole life a thing to 
 be afraid of? 
 
 22. Hasten Qto examine] thy own ruling faculty 
 and that of the universe and that of thy neighbor: 
 thy own that thou mayst make it just : and that 
 of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what 
 thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbor, that 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 153 
 
 thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly . 
 or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also con- 
 sider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine. 
 
 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a 
 social system, so let every act of thine be a com- 
 ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine 
 then has no reference either immediately or 
 remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life 
 and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the 
 nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular 
 assembly a man acting by himself stands apart from 
 the general agreement. 
 
 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, 
 and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such 
 is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the re- 
 presentation of the mansions of the dead l strikes 
 our eyes more clearly. 
 
 25. Examine into the quality of the form of an 
 object, and detach it altogether from its material 
 part and then contemplate it ; then determine the 
 time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar 
 form is naturally made to endure. 
 
 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through 
 
 1 rb rrjq "NeKvLag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a 
 dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schulze 
 supposes that it may be also a reference to the Nkvia of 
 the Odyssey (lib. xi.) 
 
154 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when 
 it does the things which it is constituted by nature 
 to do. But enough [of this]. 
 
 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or 
 when men say about thee anything injurious, ap- 
 proach their souls, penetrate within, and see what 
 kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that 
 there is no reason to take any trouble that these 
 men may have this or that opinion about thee. 
 However thou must be well disposed towards 
 them, for by nature they are friends. And the 
 gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by signs, 
 towards the attainment of those things on which 
 they set a value. 
 
 28. The periodic movements of the universe are 
 the same, up and down from age to age. And 
 either the universal intelligence puts itself in mo- 
 tion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be 
 thou content with that which is the result of its 
 activity ; or it put itself in motion once, and every- 
 thing else comes by way of sequence 2 in a man- 
 ner : or indivisible elements are the origin of all 
 things. In a word, if there is a god, all is well ; 
 and if chance rules, do not thou also be governed 
 by it. 
 
 * The words which immediately follow rar" t-n-aKoXov- 
 Qrjaiv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. 
 (Compare vu. 75.) 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 155 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth 
 too will change, and the things also which result 
 from change will continue to change for ever, and 
 these again for ever. For if a man reflects on the 
 changes and transformations which follow one 
 another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he 
 will despise everything which is perishable. 
 
 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : 
 it carries everything along with it. But how 
 worthless are all these poor people who are en- 
 gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, 
 are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. 
 Well then, man : do what nature now requires. 
 Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and 
 do not look about thee to see if any one will ob- 
 serve it ; nor yet expect Plato's Republic : but be 
 content if the smallest thing goes on well, and 
 consider such an event to be no small matter. 
 For who can change men's principles ? and with- 
 out a change of principles what else is there than 
 the slavery of men who groan while they pretend 
 to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexander and 
 Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They 
 themselves shall judge whether they discovered 
 what the universal nature required and trained 
 themselves accordingly. But if they acted like 
 tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate 
 
166 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 them. Simple and modest is the work of philoso- 
 phy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. 
 
 30. Look down from above on the countless 
 herds of men and their countless solemnities, and 
 the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms, 
 and the differences among those who are born, who 
 live together, and die. And consider too the life lived 
 by others in olden time, and the life of those who 
 will live after thee, and the life now lived among 
 barbarous nations, and how many know not even 
 thy name, and how many will soon forget it, and 
 how they who perhaps now are praising thee will 
 very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthu- 
 mous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor 
 anything else. 
 
 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations 
 with respect to the things which come from the 
 external cause; and let there be justice in the 
 things done by virtue of the internal cause, that 
 is, let there be movement and action terminating 
 in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy 
 nature. 
 
 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
 useless things among those which disturb thee, for 
 they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt 
 then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending 
 the whole universe in thy mind and by contem- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 157 
 
 plating the eternity of time and observing the rapid 
 change of every several thing, how short is the 
 time from its birth to its dissolution, and the il- 
 limitable time before its birth as well as the equally 
 boundless time after its dissolution. 
 
 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, 
 and those who have been spectators of its disso- 
 lution will very soon perish too. And he who 
 dies at the extremest old age will be brought 
 into the same condition with him who died pre- 
 maturely. 
 
 34. What are these men's leading principles, and 
 about what kind of things are they busy, and for 
 what kind of reasons do they love and honor? 
 Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. 
 When they think that they do harm by their 
 blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 
 
 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the 
 universal nature delights in change, and in 
 obedience to her all things are now done well, and 
 from eternity have been done in like form, and 
 will be such to time without end. What then dost 
 thou say? That all things have been and all things 
 always will be bad, and that no power has ever been 
 found in so many gods to rectify these things, but 
 the world has been condemned to be bound in 
 never ceasing evil? 
 
158 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the 
 substance of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : 
 or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; 
 and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, 
 only bits of hair ; and purple die, blood ; and 
 everything else is of the same kind. And that 
 which is of the nature of breath is also another 
 thing of the same kind, changing from this to 
 that. 
 
 ^ 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- 
 ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? 
 What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? 
 Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it 
 the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there 
 is nothing. Towards the gods then now become at 
 last more simple and better. It is the same 
 whether we look at these things for a hundred 
 years or three. 
 
 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is 
 his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 39. Either all things proceed from one intelli- 
 gent source and come together as in one body, and 
 the part ought not to find fault with what is done 
 for the benefit of the whole : or there are only 
 atoms and nothing else than mixture and dispersion. 
 Why then art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling 
 faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 169 
 
 playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, 
 dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? 3 
 
 40. Either the gods have no power or they 
 have power. If then they have no power, why 
 dost thou pray to them ? But if they have power, 
 why dost thou not pray for them to give thee the 
 faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou 
 fearest or of not desiring any of the things which 
 thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, 
 rather than pray that any of these things should 
 not happen or happen ? for certainly if they can 
 co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these 
 purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods 
 have placed them in thy power. Well then, is it 
 not better to use what is in thy power like a free 
 man, than to desire in a slavish and abject way 
 what is not in thy power? And who has told thee 
 that the gods do not aid us even in the things 
 which are in our power ? Begin then to pray for 
 such things and thou wilt see. One man prays 
 thus : How shall I be able to lie with that 
 woman ? Do thou pray thus : How shall I not 
 
 3 There is some corruption at the end of this section. I 
 believe that the translation expresses the emperor's mean- 
 ing. Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a 
 man must not be disturbed. He must use the power that 
 he has, and be tranquil. 
 
160 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 desire to lie with her ? Another prays thus, How 
 shall I be released from this ? Another prays : 
 How shall I not desire to be released ? Another 
 thus, How shall I not lose my little son ? Thou 
 thus, How shall I not be afraid to lose him. In 
 fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what 
 comes. 
 
 41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conver- 
 sation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says 
 he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited 
 me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of 
 things as before, keeping to this main point, how 
 the mind while participating in such movements 
 as go on in the poor flesh shall be free from per- 
 turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did 
 I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of 
 putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
 something great, but my life went on well and 
 happily. Do then the same that he did both in 
 sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
 stances; for never to desert philosophy in any 
 events that may befal us, nor to hold trifling talk 
 either with an ignorant man or with one unac- 
 quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools 
 of philosophy; but to be intent only on that which 
 thou art now doing and on the instrument by 
 which thou doest it. 
 
M. ANTONItfUS. IX. 161 
 
 42. When thou art offended with any man's 
 shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it 
 possible then that shameless men should not be in 
 the world ? It is not possible. Do not then require 
 what is impossible. For this man also is one of 
 those shameless men, who must of necessity be in 
 the world. Let the same considerations be present 
 to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the 
 faithless man, and of every man who does wrong 
 in any way. For at the same time that thou dost 
 remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind 
 of men should not exist, thou wilt become better 
 disposed towards every one individually. It is use- 
 ful to perceive this too immediately when the occa- 
 sion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to 
 oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given 
 to man as an antidote, against the stupid man 
 mildness, and against another kind of man some 
 other power. And in all cases it is possible for 
 thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone 
 astray ; for every man who errs misses his object 
 and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou 
 been injured? For thou wilt find that no one 
 among those against whom thou art irritated has 
 done anything by which thy mind could be made 
 worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful 
 has its foundation only in the mind. And what 
 M 
 
1C2 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 harm is done or what is there strange, if the man 
 who has not been instructed does the acts of an 
 uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst 
 not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not 
 expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou 
 hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose 
 that it was likely that he would commit this error, 
 and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he 
 has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a 
 man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For 
 the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst 
 trust that a man who had such a disposition would 
 keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness 
 thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such 
 way as to have received from thy very act all the 
 profit. For what more dost thou want when thou 
 hast done a man a service ? art thou not content 
 that thou hast done something conformable to thy 
 nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? 
 just as if the eye demanded a recompense for 
 seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these 
 members are formed for a particular purpose, and 
 by working according to their several constitutions 
 obtain what is their own ; so also as man is formed 
 by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done 
 anything benevolent or in any other way conducive 
 to the common interest, he has acted conformably 
 to his constitution and he gets what is his own. 
 
X. 
 
 ILT thou then, my soul, never be 
 good and simple and one and naked, 
 more manifest than the body which 
 surrounds thee ? Wilt thou never 
 enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition ? 
 Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any 
 kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring any- 
 thing either animate or inanimate for the enjoyment 
 of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time wherein thou 
 shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant 
 climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst 
 live in harmony ? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy 
 present condition, and pleased with all that is about 
 thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast 
 everything and that it comes from the gods, that 
 everything is well for thee and will be well what- 
 ever shall please them, and whatever they shall 
 give for the conservation of the perfect living being, 
 
164 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 the good and just and beautiful, which generates 
 and holds together all things, and contains and 
 embraces all things which are dissolved for the 
 production of other like things ? Wilt thou never 
 be such that thou shalt so dwell in community 
 with gods and men as neither to find fault with 
 them at all nor to be condemned by them ? 
 
 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as 
 thou art governed by nature only : then do it and 
 accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living 
 being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou 
 must observe what thy nature requires so far as 
 thou art a living being. And all this thou 
 mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou 
 art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by 
 it. But the rational animal is consequently also 
 a political [social] animal. Use these rules then 
 and trouble thyself about nothing else. 
 
 3. Everything which happens either happens in 
 such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear 
 it, or that thou art not formed by nature to bear 
 it. If then it happens to thee in such way that 
 thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not com- 
 plain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to 
 bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou 
 art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will 
 perish after it has consumed thee. Remember 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 165 
 
 however that thou art formed by nature to bear 
 everything, with respect to which it depends on 
 thy own opinion to make it endurable and toler- 
 able, by thinking that it is either thy interest or 
 thy duty to do this. 
 
 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
 and show him his error. But if thou art not able, 
 blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 
 
 6. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
 pared for thee from all eternity ; and the impli- 
 cation of causes was from eternity spinning the 
 thread of thy being and of that which is incident 
 to it. (in. 11. iv. 26.) 
 
 6. Whether the universe is [a, concourse of] 
 atoms, or nature ps a system], let this first be 
 established, that I am a part of the whole which 
 is governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner 
 intimately related to the parts which are of the 
 same kind with myself. For remembering this, 
 inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented 
 with none of the things which are assigned to me 
 out of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the 
 part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For 
 the whole contains nothing which is not for its 
 advantage ; and all natures indeed have this com- 
 mon principle, but the nature of the universe has 
 this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 
 
1G6 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 even by any external cause to generate anything 
 harmful to itself. By remembering then that I 
 am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with 
 everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am 
 in a manner intimately related to the parts which 
 are of the same kind with myself, I shall do 
 nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself 
 to the things which are of the same kind with 
 myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the com- 
 mon interest, and divert them from the contrary. 
 Now if these things are done so, life must flow on 
 happily, just as thou mayst observe that the life 
 of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of 
 action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, 
 and is content with whatever the state may assign 
 to him. 
 
 7. The parts of the whole, everything I mean 
 which is naturally comprehended in the universe, 
 must of necessity perish ; but let this be understood 
 in this sense, that they must undergo change. 
 But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity 
 for the parts, the whole would not continue to 
 exist in a good condition, the parts being subject 
 to change and constituted so as to perish in various 
 ways. For whether did nature herself design to 
 do evil to the things which are parts of herself, 
 and to make them subject to evil and of necessity 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 167 
 
 fall into evil, or have such results happened with- 
 out her knowing it ? Both these suppositions in- 
 deed are incredible. But if a man should even 
 drop the term Nature [[as an efficient power] and 
 should speak of these things [[change]] as natural, 
 even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the 
 same time that the parts of the whole are in their 
 nature subject to change, and at the same time to 
 be surprised or vexed as if something were hap- 
 pening contrary to nature, particularly as the dis- 
 solution of things is into those things of which each 
 thing is composed. For there is either a disper- 
 sion of the elements out of which everything has 
 been compounded, or a change from the solid to 
 the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that 
 thesepartsare taken back into the universal reason, 
 whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire 
 or renewed by eternal changes. And do not 
 imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to 
 thee from the time of generation. For all this 
 received its accretion only yesterday and the day 
 before, as one may say, from the food and the air 
 which is inspired. This then, which has received 
 [the accretion], changes, not that which thy mo- 
 ther brought forth. But suppose that this [which 
 thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very 
 much with that other part, which has the peculiar 
 
168 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the 
 way of objection to what is said. 1 
 
 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, 
 modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and 
 magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change 
 these names ; and if thou shouldst lose them, 
 quickly return to them. And remember that the 
 term Rational was intended to signify a discrimi- 
 nating attention to every several thing and freedom 
 from negligence; and that Equanimity is the 
 voluntary acceptance of the things which are as- 
 signed to thee by the common nature ; and that 
 Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
 above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the 
 flesh and above that poor thing called fame, and 
 death, and all such things. If then thou main- 
 tainest thyself in the possession of these names, 
 without desiring to be called by these names by 
 others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter 
 on another life. For to continue to be such as thou 
 hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and 
 defiled in such a life, is the character of a very 
 stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like 
 those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 
 
 1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The 
 meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning 
 which appears to be consistent with the whole argument. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 169 
 
 though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat 
 to be kept to the following day, though they will 
 be exposed in the same state to the same claws 
 and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession 
 of these few names : and if thou art able to abide 
 in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain 
 islands of the Happy. 2 But if thou shalt perceive 
 that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain 
 thy hold, go courageously into some nook where 
 thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once 
 from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and 
 
 2 The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae 
 are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They 
 were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as 
 we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. 
 Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors 
 who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in 
 them and rest from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius,. c. 8.) 
 In the Odyssey Proteus told Menelaus that he should not 
 die in Argos, but be removed to a place at the boundary 
 of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt: (Odyssey, iv. 
 565.) 
 
 For there in sooth man's life is easiest : 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man. 
 
 It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows 
 some old legend without having any knowledge of any 
 place which corresponds to his description. The two is- 
 lands which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira and the 
 adjacent island. 
 
170 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laudable] 
 thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus. 
 In order however to the remembrance of these 
 names, it will greatly help thee,if thou rememberest 
 the gods and that they wish not to be flattered, 
 but wish all reasonable beings to be made like 
 themselves; and if thou rememberest that what 
 does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that 
 what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that 
 what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that 
 what does the work of a man is a man. 
 
 9. Mimi, 3 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery 
 will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine. 
 fHow many things without studying nature dost 
 thou imagine and how many dost thou neglect? 4 
 But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do 
 everything, that at the same time the power of 
 dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the 
 contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- 
 fidence which comes from the knowledge of each 
 several thing is maintained without showing it, 
 but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy 
 simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
 
 3 Corae conjectured (Uffog " hatred " in place of Mimi, 
 Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all or 
 nearly all. 
 
 4 This is corrupt. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 171 
 
 of every several thing, both what it is in substance, 
 and what place it has in the universe, and how 
 long it is formed to exist and of what things it is 
 compounded, and to whom it can belong, and 
 who are able both to give it and take it away ? 
 
 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, 
 and another when he has caught a poor hare, and 
 another when he has taken a little fish in a net, 
 and another when he has taken wild boars, and 
 another when he has taken bears, and another 
 when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these 
 robbers, if thou examinest their principles ? 5 
 
 11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
 how all things change into one another, and con- 
 stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about this 
 part of philosophy]. For nothing is so much 
 adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man 
 has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, 
 no one knows how soon, go away from among men 
 and leave everything here, he gives himself up 
 entirely to just doing in all his actions, and in 
 everything else that happens he resigns himself 
 to the universal nature. But as to what any man 
 shall say or think about him or do against him, 
 
 5 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. 
 He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, 
 as he says, like the rest. 
 
172 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 he never even thinks of it, being himself contented 
 with these two things, with acting justly in what 
 he now does, and being satisfied with what is now 
 assigned to him ; and he lays aside all distracting 
 and busy pursuits and desires nothing else than to 
 accomplish the straight course through the law, 6 
 and by accomplishing the straight course to 
 follow god. 
 
 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, 
 since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to 
 be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way 
 content, without turning back : but if thou dost 
 not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. 
 But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- 
 ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping 
 to that which appears to be just. For it is best 
 to reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy 
 failure be in attempting this. He who follows 
 reason in all things is both tranquil and active at 
 the same time, and also cheerful and collected. 
 
 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
 from sleep, whether it will make any difference to 
 thee, if another does what is just and right. It 
 will make no difference. 
 
 Hast thou forgotten that those who assume 
 
 6 By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the 
 will of God. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 173 
 
 arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame 
 on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, 
 and hast thou forgotten what they do, and what 
 they avoid and what they pursue, and how they 
 steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, 
 but with their most valuable part, by means of 
 which there is produced, when a man chooses, 
 fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon 
 ^happiness] ? (vn. 17.) 
 
 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
 nature, the man who is instructed and modest says: 
 Give what thou wilt ; take back what thou wilt. 
 And he says this not proudly, but obediently and 
 well pleased with her. 
 
 15. Short is the little which remains to theeof 
 life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no 
 difference whether a man lives there or here, if he 
 lives everywhere in the world as in a state Apolitical 
 community]. Let men see, let them know a real 
 man who lives according to nature. If they cannot 
 endure him, let them kill him. For that is better 
 than to live thus fas men do]. 
 
 16. No longer talk about the kind of man that 
 a good man ought to be, but be such.. 
 
 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
 and the whole of substance, and consider that all 
 individual things as to substance are a grain of a 
 fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet. 
 
174 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 1 8. Look at everything that exists and observe 
 that it is already in dissolution and in change and 
 as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- 
 thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 
 
 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
 ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and 
 so forth. Then what kind of men they are when 
 they are imperiousf and arrogant, or angry and 
 scolding from their elevated place. But a short 
 time ago to how many they were slaves and for 
 what things ; and after a little time consider in 
 what a condition they will be. 
 
 20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
 the universal nature brings to each. And it is 
 for its good at the time when nature brings it. 
 
 21. " The earth loves the shower ;" and " the 
 solemn aether loves:" and the universe loves to 
 make whatever is about to be. I say then to the 
 universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not 
 this too said, that " this or that loves [js wont] to 
 be produced ?" 7 
 
 7 These words are from Euripides. They are cited by 
 Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 296.) and 
 Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning tpf ^iv 
 o/i/3/oou yala. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings 
 of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb <fn\el } " loves/' 
 which has also the sense of" is wont," " uses," and the like. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 175 
 
 22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
 accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, 
 and this was thy own will ; or thou art dying and 
 hast discharged thy duty. But besides these 
 things there is nothing. Be of good cheer then. 
 
 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this 
 piece of land is like any other ; and that all things 
 here are the same with things on the top of a 
 mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou 
 choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what Plato 
 says, Making the walls of the city like a shepherd's 
 fold on a mountain. QThe three last words are 
 omitted. They are unintelligible.] 8 
 
 24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of 
 what nature am I now making it ? and for what 
 purpose am I now using it ? is it void of under- 
 standing ? is it loosed and rent asunder from social 
 life ? is it melted into and mixed with the poor 
 flesh so as to move together with it ? 
 
 25. He who flies from his master is a runaway ; 
 but the law is master, and he who breaks the law 
 is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or 
 
 He finds in thecommon language of mankind a philosophical 
 truth, and most great truths are expressed in thecommon 
 language of life 5 some understand them, but most people 
 express them without knowing how much they mean. 
 8 Plato, Theaet. 174D.E. 
 
176 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 angry or afraid, f is dissatisfied because something 
 has been or is or shall be of the things which are 
 appointed by him who rules all things, and he is 
 Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He 
 then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a run- 
 away. 9 
 
 2G. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
 away, and then another cause takes it, and labors 
 on it and makes a child. What a thing from such 
 a material ! Again, the child passes food down 
 through the throat, and then another cause takes 
 it and makes perception and motion, and in fine 
 life and strength and other things ; how many and 
 how strange ! Observe then the things which are 
 produced in such a hidden way, and see the power 
 just as we see the power which carries things 
 downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but 
 still no less plainly. 
 
 27. Constantly consider how all things such as 
 they now are, in time past also were ; and consider 
 that they will be the same again. And place be- 
 fore thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the 
 same form, whatever thou hast learned from thy 
 experience or from older history ; for example the 
 
 9 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of vofiog, 
 law, assignment, that which assigns (vtfiti) to every man 
 his portion. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 177 
 
 whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of 
 Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, 
 Alexander, Croesus ; for all those were such dramas 
 as we see now, only with different actors. 
 
 28. Imagine every man who is grieved at any- 
 thing or discontented to be like a pig which is 
 sacrificed and kicks and screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in 
 silence laments the bonds in which we are held. 
 And consider that only to the rational animal is it 
 given to follow voluntarily what happens ; but 
 simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 
 
 29. Severally on the occasion of everything that 
 thou doest pause and ask thyself, if death is a 
 dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this. 
 
 30. When thou art offended at any man's 
 fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what 
 like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, 
 in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, 
 or reputation and the like. For by attending to 
 this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this 
 consideration also is added, that the man is com- 
 pelled : for what else could he do ? or, if thou art 
 able, take away from him the compulsion. 
 
 31. When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic,f 
 think of either Eutyches or Hymen, and when 
 thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or 
 
178 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron 
 think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast seen 
 Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when 
 thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other 
 Caesar, and in the case of every one do in like 
 manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind, 
 j Where then are those men ? Nowhere, or nobody 
 knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt 
 look at human things as smoke and nothing at all; 
 especially if thou reflectest at the same time that 
 what has once changed will never exist again in 
 the infinite duration of time. But thou, in what 
 a brief space of time is thy existence ? And why 
 art thou not content to pass through this short 
 time in an orderly way ? What matter and oppor- 
 tunity [Tor thy activity^ art thou avoiding ? For 
 what else are all these things, except exercises for 
 the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by 
 examination into their nature the things which 
 happen in life ? Persevere then until thou shalt 
 have made these things thy own, as the stomach 
 which is strengthened makes all things its own, as 
 the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of 
 everything that is thrown into it. 
 
 32. Let it not be in any man's power to say 
 truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou 
 art not good ; but let him be a liar whoever shall 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 179 
 
 think anything of this kind about thee ; and this 
 is altogether in thy power. For who is he that 
 shall hinder thee from being good and simple? 
 Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless 
 thou shalt be such. For neither does reason allow 
 Qhee to live], if thou art not such. 
 
 33. What is that which as to this material [[our 
 life] can be done or said in the way most con- 
 formable to reason ? For whatever this may be, it 
 is in thy power to do it or to say it ; and do not 
 make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt 
 not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a con- 
 dition, that, what luxury is to those who enjoy 
 pleasure, such shall be to thee in the matter which 
 is subjected and presented to thee the doing of the 
 things which are conformable to man's constitution ; 
 for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment every- 
 thing which it is in his power to do according to 
 his own nature. And it is in his power every- 
 where. Now it is not given to a cylinder to move 
 everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor 
 fire, nor to anything else which is governed by 
 nature or an irrational soul, for the things which 
 check them and stand in the way are many. But 
 intelligence and reason are able to go through 
 everything that opposes them, and in such manner 
 as they are formed by nature and as they choose. 
 
180 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 Place before thy eyes this facility with which the 
 reason will be carried through all things, as fire 
 upwards, as a stone downwards, as a cylinder down 
 an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further. 
 For all other obstacles either affect the body only 
 which is a dead thing ; or, except through opinion 
 and the yielding of the reason itself, they do not 
 crush nor do any harm of any kind ; for if they 
 did, he who felt it would immediately become bad. 
 Now in the case of all things which have a cer- 
 tain constitution, whatever harm may happen to 
 any of them, that which is so affected becomes 
 consequently worse ; but in the like case, a man 
 becomes both better, if one may say so, and more 
 worthy of praise by making a right use of these ac- 
 cidents. And finally remember that nothing harms 
 him who is really a citizen, which does not harm the 
 state ; nor yet does anything harm the state, which 
 does not harm law Border] ; and of these things 
 which are called misfortunes not one harms law. 
 What then does not harm law does not harm either 
 state or citizen. 
 
 34. To him who is penetrated by true principles 
 even the briefest precept is sufficient, and any 
 common precept, to remind him that he should be 
 free from grief and fear. For example 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 181 
 
 Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground 
 So is the race of men. 10 
 
 Leaves also are thy children ; and leaves too are 
 they who cry out as if they were worthy of credit 
 and bestow their praise, or on the contrary curse, 
 or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves in like 
 manner are those who shall receive and transmit a 
 man's fame to after times. For all such things 
 as these " are produced in the season of spring," as 
 the poet says; then the wind casts them down; 
 then the forest produces other leaves in their places. 
 But a brief existence is common to all things, and 
 yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as if they 
 would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt 
 close thy eyes ; and him who has attended thee to 
 thy grave another soon will lament. 
 
 35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
 things and not to say, I wish for green things; 
 for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And 
 the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready 
 to perceive all that can be heard and smelled. 
 And the healthy stomach ought to be with respect 
 to all food just as the mill with respect to all 
 things which it is formed to grind. And accord- 
 ingly the healthy understanding ought to be pre- 
 pared for everything which happens; but that 
 
 10 Homer, II. vi. 146. 
 
182 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 which says, Let my dear children live, and let all 
 men praise whatever I may do, is an eye which 
 seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft 
 things. 
 
 36* There is no man so fortunate that there 
 shall not be by him when he is dying some who 
 are pleased with what is going to happen. 11 Sup- 
 pose that he was a good and wise man, will there 
 not be at last some one to say of him, Let us at 
 last breathe freely being relieved from this school- 
 master. It is true that he was harsh to none of 
 us, but I perceived that he tacitly condemns us. 
 This is what is said of a good man. But in our 
 own case how many other things are there for which 
 there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou 
 wilt consider this then when thou art dying, and 
 thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting 
 thus : I am going away from such a life, in which 
 even my associates in behalf of whom I have stri- 
 ven so much, prayed, and cared, themselves wish 
 me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little 
 advantage by it. Why then should a man cling 
 to a longer stay here ? Do not however for this 
 reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but 
 preserving thy own character, and continuing 
 
 11 He says KCNCOV, but as he affirms in other places that 
 death is no evil, he must mean what others may call an 
 evil, and he means only " what is going to happen," 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 183 
 
 friendly and benevolent and kind, and on the 
 other hand not as if thou wast torn away ; but as 
 when a man dies a quiet death, the soul is easily 
 separated from the body, such also ought thy de- 
 parture from men to be, for nature united thee to 
 them and associated thee. But does she now dis- 
 solve the union? Well, I am separated as from 
 kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but with- 
 out compulsion ; for this too is one of the things 
 according to nature. 
 
 37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the 
 occasion of anything being done by any person to 
 inquire with thyself, For what object is this man 
 doing this ? but begin with thyself, and examine 
 thyself first. 
 
 38. Remember that this which pulls the strings 
 is the thing which is hidden within : this is the 
 power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may 
 so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never 
 include the vessel which surrounds thee and these 
 instruments which are attached about it. For they 
 are like to an axe, differing only in this that they 
 grow to the body. For indeed there is no more 
 use in these parts without the cause which moves 
 and checks them, than in the weaver's shuttle, and 
 the writer's pen and the driver's whip. 12 
 
 12 See " The Philosophy of Antoninus." 
 
XI. 
 
 are the properties of the 
 rational soul : it sees itself, analyses 
 itself, and makes itself such as it 
 chooses ; the fruit which it bears it- 
 self enjoys for the fruits of plants and that in 
 animals which corresponds to fruits others enjoy 
 it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life may 
 be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in 
 such like things, where the whole action is 
 incomplete, if anything cuts it short ; but in every 
 part and wherever it may be stopped, it makes 
 what has been set before it full and complete, so 
 that it can say, I have what is my own. And 
 further it traverses the whole universe, and the 
 surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it 
 extends itself into the infinity of time and embraces 
 and comprehends the periodical renovation of all 
 things, and it comprehends that those who come 
 after us will see nothing new, nor have those before 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 185 
 
 us seen anything more, but in a manner he who 
 is forty years old, if he has any understanding at 
 all, has seen by virtue of the uniformity that pre- 
 vails all things which have been and all that will 
 be. This too is a property of the rational soul, 
 love of one's neighbor, and truth and modesty, and 
 to value *nothing more than itself, which is also 
 the property of Law. 1 Thus then right reason 
 differs not at all from the reason of justice. 
 
 2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song 
 and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt dis- 
 tribute the melody of the voice into its several 
 sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art 
 mastered by this ; for thou wilt be prevented by 
 shame from confessing it : and in the matter of 
 dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou 
 wilt do the same ; and the like also in the matter 
 of the pancratium. In all things then, except 
 virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
 thyself to their several parts, and by this division 
 to come to value them little : and apply this rule 
 also to thy whole life. 
 
 3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any 
 moment it must be separated from the body, and 
 ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or 
 continue to exist; but so that this readiness 
 
 1 Law is the order by which all things are governed. 
 
:o Ifam , 
 
 186 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere 
 obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately 
 and with dignity and in a way to persuade an- 
 other, without tragic show. 
 
 4. Have I done something for the general in- 
 terest ? Well then I have had my reward. Let 
 this always be present to thy mind, and never stop 
 doing good]. 
 
 5. What is thy art ? to be good. And how is 
 this accomplished well except by general principles, 
 some about the nature of the universe, and others 
 about the proper constitution of man ? 
 
 6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage 
 as means of reminding men of the things which 
 happen to them, and that it is according to nature 
 for things to happen so, and that, if thou art de- 
 lighted with what is shown on the stage, thou 
 shouldst not be troubled with that which takes 
 place on the larger stage. For thou seest that 
 these things must be accomplished thus, and that 
 even they bear them who cry out 2 " O Cithaeron." 
 And indeed some things are said well by the 
 dramatic writers, of which kind is the following 
 especially : 
 
 Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
 This has its reason too. 3 
 
 3 Sdphocles, Oedipus Rex. 
 5 See vii, 41. 38. 40. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 187 
 
 And again 
 
 We must not chafe and fret at that which happens. 
 
 And 
 
 Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear* 
 
 And other things of the same kind. 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, 
 which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and 
 by its very plainness of speaking was useful in 
 reminding men to beware of insolence; and for 
 this purpose too Diogenes used to take from these 
 writers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy which came next, 
 observe what it was, and again, for what object 
 the new comedy was introduced, which gradually 
 sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some 
 good things are said by these writers too, every- 
 body knows : but the whole plan of such poetry 
 and dramaturgy, to what end does it look ! 
 
 7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
 another condition of life so well suited for philo- 
 sophizing as this in which thou now happenest 
 to be. 
 
 8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
 must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree 
 also. So too a man when he is separated from 
 another man has fallen off from the whole social 
 
188 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it 
 off, but a man by his own act separates himself 
 from his neighbor when he hates him and turns 
 away from him, and he does not know that he 
 has at the same time cut himself off from the 
 whole social system. Yet he has this privilege 
 certainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is 
 in our power to grow again to that which is near 
 to us and again to become a part which helps to 
 make up the whole. However if it often happens, 
 this kind of separation, it makes it difficult for 
 that which detaches itself to be brought to unity 
 and to be restored to its former condition. Finally, 
 the branch, which from the first grew together 
 with the tree and has continued to have one life 
 with it, is not like that which after being cut off 
 is then ingrafted, but it is something like what 
 the gardeners mean when they say that it grows 
 with the rest of the tree, butf that it has not the 
 same mind with it. 
 
 9. As those who try to stand in thy way when 
 thou art proceeding according to right reason, 
 will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper 
 action, so neither let them drive thee from thy 
 benevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy 
 guard equally in both matters, not only in the 
 matter of steady judgment and action, but also in 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 189 
 
 the matter of gentleness towards those who try to 
 hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this also 
 is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to 
 be diverted from thy course of action and to give 
 way through fear ; for both are equally deserters 
 from their post, the man who does it through fear, 
 and the man who is alienated from him who is by 
 nature a kinsman and a friend. 
 
 10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, 
 for the arts imitate the natures of things. But if 
 this is so, that nature which is the most perfect 
 and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot 
 fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the 
 inferior things for the sake of the superior ; there- 
 fore the universal nature does so too. And indeed 
 hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the 
 other virtues have their foundation: for justice 
 will not be observed, if we either care for middle 
 things [^things indifferent], or are easily deceived 
 and careless and changeable, (v. 16. 30; vn. 
 65.) 
 
 11. If the things do not come to thee, the pur- 
 suits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still 
 in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy 
 judgment about them be at rest, and they will re- 
 main quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pur- 
 suing or avoiding. 
 
^~.. 
 M'X -/. XI 
 
 190 
 
 f. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 12. The spherical form of the soul maintains $ 
 figure, when it is neither extended towards any 
 object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor 
 sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which 
 it sees the truth, the truth of all things and the 
 truth that is in itself, (viu. 41. 45, xir. 3.) 
 
 13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
 him look to that himself. But I will look to this, 
 that I be not discovered doing or saying anything 
 deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me ? 
 Let him look to it. But I will be mild and be- 
 nevolent towards every man and even to him, 
 ready to show him his mistake, not reproachfully, 
 nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but 
 nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless 
 indeed he only assumed it. For the interior 
 Qparts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be 
 seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything 
 nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if 
 thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own 
 nature and art satisfied with that which at this 
 moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, 
 since thou art a human being placed at thy post 
 t to endure whatever is for the common advantage ? 
 
 14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
 another ; and men wish to raise themselves above 
 one another and crouch before one another. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 191 
 
 15. How unsound and insincere is lie who says, 
 I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way. 
 What art thou doing, man ? There is no occasion 
 to give this notice. It will soon show itself by 
 acts. The voice ought to be plainly written on 
 the forehead. Such as a man's character is,f he im- 
 mediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is 
 beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of 
 lovers. The man who is honest and good ought 
 to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that 
 the bystander as soon as he comes near him must 
 smell whether he choose or not. But the affecta- 
 tion of simplicity is like a crooked stick. 4 No- 
 thing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship 
 Qfalse friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The 
 good and simple and benevolent show all these 
 things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking, flu** ^ 
 
 16. As to living in the best way, this power is 
 in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are 
 indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks 
 on each of these things separately and all together, 
 and if it remembers that not one of them pro- 
 
 4 Instead of tr/cdX/jj; Saumaise reads (nca^rj. There is 
 a Greek proverb, (TKapfibv v\ov oudtiror 6p06v : " You 
 cannot make a crooked stick straight." 
 
 The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of 
 the sheep and the wolves. 
 
192 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 duces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to 
 us ; but these things remain immoveable, and it is 
 we ourselves who produce the judgments about 
 them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, 
 it being in our power not to write them, and it be- 
 ing in our power, if perchance these judgments 
 have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, 
 to wipe them out ; and if we remember also that 
 such attention will only be for a short time, and 
 then life will be at an end. Besides what trouble 
 is there at all in doing this ? For if these things 
 are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they 
 will be easy to thee : but if contrary to nature, 
 seek what is comformable to thy own nature, and 
 strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation ; 
 for every man is allowed to seek his own good. 
 
 17. Consider whence each thing is come, and 
 of what it consists,f and into what it changes, and 
 what kind of a thing it will be when it has changed, 
 and that it will sustain no harm. 
 
 18. If any have offended against thee, consider 
 first] : What is my relation to men, and that we 
 are made for one another ; and in another respect, 
 I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the 
 flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the 
 matter from first principles, from this : If all 
 things are not mere atoms, it is nature which 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 193 
 
 orders all things : if this is so, the inferior things 
 exist for the sake of the superior and these for 
 the sake of one another, (n. 1; ix. 39; v. 16; 
 in. 4.) 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are 
 at table, in bed, and so forth : and particularly^ 
 under what compulsions in respect of opinions 
 they are ; and as to their acts, consider with what 
 pride they do what they do. (vin. 14; ix. 34.) 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, 
 we ought not to be displeased ; but if they do not 
 right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily 
 and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly 
 deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly de- 
 prived of the power of behaving to each man ac- 
 cording to his deserts. Accordingly men are 
 pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, 
 and greedy, and in a word wrongdoers to their 
 neighbors, (vn. 62, 63 ; n. 1 ; vii. 26; vin. 29.) 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest many 
 things wrong, and that thou art a man like others ; 
 and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, 
 still thou hast the disposition to commit them, 
 though either through cowardice, or concern about 
 reputation or some such mean motive, thou dost 
 abstain from such faults, (i. 17.) 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even under- 
 
194 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 stand whether men are doing wrong or not, for 
 many things are done with a certain reference to 
 J circumstances. And in short, a man must learn 
 a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judg- 
 ment on another man's acts. (ix. 38 ; iv. 51.) 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or 
 grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and after 
 a short time we are all laid out dead. (vu. 58 ; 
 iv. 48.) 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men's acts which dis- 
 turb us, for those acts have their foundation in 
 men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions 
 which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, 
 and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an 
 act as if it were something grievous, and thy 
 anger is gone. How then shalt thou take away 
 these opinions ? By reflecting that no wrongful 
 act of another brings shame on thee : for unless 
 that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must 
 of necessity do many things wrong and become a 
 robber and everything else. (v. 25 ; vu. 1G.) 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is 
 brought on us by the anger and vexation caused 
 by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which 
 we are angry and vexed, (iv. 39. 49 ; vu. 24.) 
 
 Ninth, consider that benevolence is invincible, 
 if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and 
 acting a part. For what will the most violent 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 195 
 
 man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a bene- 
 volent disposition towards him, and if, as opportu- 
 nity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly 
 correctest his errors at the very time when he is 
 trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child : 
 we are constituted by nature for something else : I 
 shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring 
 thyself, my child. And show him with gentle 
 tact and by general principles that this is so, and 
 that even bees do not do as he does, nor any ani- 
 mals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. 
 And thou must do this neither with any double 
 meaning nor in the way of reproach, but affection- 
 ately and without any rancour in thy soul ; and 
 not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any 
 bystander may admire, but either when he is alone, 
 and if others are present * *. 5 
 
 Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst 
 received them as a gift from the Muses, and begin 
 at last to be a man, so long as thou livest. But 
 thou must equally avoid flattering men and being 
 vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to 
 harm. And let this truth be present to thee in 
 the excitement of anger, that to be moved by 
 passion is not manly, but that mildness and gen- 
 tleness, as they are more agreeable to human na- 
 ture, so also are they more manly; and he who 
 
 5 It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 
 
196 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves 
 and courage, and not the man who is subject to 
 fits of passion and discontent. For in the same 
 degree in which a man's mind is nearer to freedom 
 from all passion, in the same degree also is it 
 nearer to strength : and as the sense of pain is a 
 characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For 
 he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, 
 both are wounded and both submit. But if thou 
 wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader 
 of the Muses QApollo], and it is this that to 
 expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for 
 he who expects this desires an impossibility. But 
 to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect 
 them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and 
 tyrannical. 
 
 19. There are four principal aberrations of the 
 superior faculty against which thou shouldst be 
 constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast de- 
 tected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say 
 on each occasion thus : this thought is not neces- 
 sary : this tends to destroy social union : this 
 which thou art going to say comes not from the 
 real thoughts ; for thou shouldst consider it among 
 the most absurd of things for a man not to speak 
 from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when 
 thou shalt reproachf thyself for anything, for 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 197 
 
 this is an evidence of the diviner part within thee 
 being overpowered and yielding to the less honor- 
 able and to the perishable part, the body, and to 
 its gross pleasures, (iv. 24; n. 16.) 
 
 20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts 
 which are mingled in thee, though by nature they 
 have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the 
 disposition of the universe they are overpowered 
 here in the compound mass Qthe body]. And also 
 the whole of the earthy part in thee and the watery, 
 though their tendency is downward, still are raised 
 up and occupy a position which is not their natural 
 one. In this manner then the elemental parts 
 obey the universal, for when they have been fixed 
 in any place perforce they remain there until 
 again the universal shall sound the signal for dis- 
 solution. Is it not then strange that thy intelli- 
 gent part only should be disobedient and discon- 
 tented with its own place ? And yet no force is 
 imposed on it, but only those things which are 
 conformable to its nature : still it does not submit, 
 but is carried in the opposite direction. For 
 the movement towards injustice and intem- 
 perance and to anger and grief and fear is 
 nothing else than the act of one who deviates from 
 nature. And also when the ruling faculty is dis- 
 contented with anything that happens, then too it 
 
198 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 deserts its post : for it is constituted for piety and 
 reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. 
 For these qualities also are comprehended under 
 the generic term of contentment with the constitu- 
 tion of things, and indeed they are prior 6 to acts of 
 justice. 
 
 21. He who has not one and always the same 
 object in life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life. But what I have said is not 
 enough, unless this also is added, what this object 
 ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion 
 
 6 The word irpevfivrtpa, which is here translated 
 " prior, "may also mean " superior : " but Antoninus seems 
 to say that piety and reverence of the gods precede all 
 virtues, and that other virtues are derived from them, even 
 justice, which in another passage (xi. 10) he makes the 
 foundation of all virtues. The ancient notion of justice is 
 that of giving to every one his due. It is not a legal defi- 
 nition, as some have supposed, but a moral rule which law 
 cannot in all cases enforce. Besides law has its own rules, 
 which are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral ; but 
 it enforces them all simply because they are general rules, 
 and if it did not or could not enforce them, so far Law 
 would not be Law. Justice, or the doing what is just, im- 
 plies a universal rule and obedience to it ; and as we all 
 live under universal Law, which commands both our body 
 and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, that 
 is the law of the whole constitution of man, we must en- 
 deavour to discover what this supreme Law is. It is the 
 will of the power that rules all. By acting in obedience 
 to this will, we do justice, and by consequence everything 
 else that we ought to do. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XL 199 
 
 about all the things which in some way or other 
 are considered by the majority to be good, but only 
 about some certain things, that is, things which 
 concern the common interest ; so also ought we to 
 propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a 
 common kind Asocial] and political. For he who 
 directs all his own efforts to this object, will make 
 all his acts alike, and thus will always be the 
 same. 
 
 22. Think of the country mouse and of the 
 town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of 
 the town mouse. 7 
 
 23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
 many by the name of Lamiae, bugbears to frighten 
 children. 
 
 24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spec- 
 tacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, 
 but themselves sat down anywhere. 
 
 25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas 8 for 
 not going to him, saying, It is because I would not 
 perish by the worst of all ends, that is, I would 
 not receive a favor and then be unable to return 
 it. 
 
 7 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (n. 6), and 
 by others since, but not better. 
 
 8 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other 
 writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who 
 invited Socrates to Macedonia. 
 
200 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] 9 there 
 was this precept, constantly to think of some one 
 of the men of former times who practised virtue. 
 
 27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
 look to the heavens that we may be reminded of 
 those bodies which continually do the same things 
 and in the same manner perform their work, and 
 also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For 
 there is no veil over a star. 
 
 28. Consider what a man Socrates was when 
 he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had 
 taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates 
 said to his friends who were ashamed of him and 
 drew back from him when they saw him dressed 
 thus. 
 
 29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou 
 be able to lay down rules for others before thou 
 shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. 
 Much more is this so in life. 
 
 30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for 
 
 thee. 
 
 31. And my heart laughed within. (Od. 
 
 ix. 413.) 
 
 32. And virtue they will curse speaking harsh 
 
 words. (Hesiod, Works and Days, 184.) 
 
 33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman's 
 
 4 Gataker suggested 'E-rriKovptiuv for 'E^eo-iW. 
 
M, ANTONINUS. XL 201 
 
 act : such is he who looks for his child when it is 
 no longer allowed. (Epictetus, in. 24.) 
 
 34. When a man kisses his child, said Epicte- 
 tus, he should whisper to himself, " To-morrow 
 perchance thou wilt die" But those are words of 
 bad omen " No word is a word of bad omen," said 
 Epictetus," which expresses any work of nature; or 
 if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak of 
 the ears of corn being reaped." (Epictetus, in. 
 24.) 
 
 35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried 
 grape, all are changes, not into nothing, but into 
 something which exists not yet. (Epictetus, in. 24.) 
 
 36. No man can rob us of our free will. 
 (Epictetus, in. 22.) 
 
 37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover 
 an artQor rules] with respect to giving his assent; 
 and in respect to his movements he must be care- 
 ful that they be made with regard to circumstances, 
 that they be consistent with social interests, that 
 they have regard to the value of the object ; and 
 as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep 
 away from it ; and as to avoidance, Qa version] he 
 should not show it with respect to any of the 
 things which are not in our power. 
 
 38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any 
 common matter, but about being mad or not. 
 
202 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 39. Socrates used to say, What do you want ? 
 Souls of rational men or irrational ? Souls of ra- 
 tional men Of what rational men? Sound or 
 unsound? Sound Why then do you not seek 
 for them ? Because we have them Why then 
 do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
XII. 
 
 I LL those things at which thou wish- 
 est to arrive by a circuitous road, 
 thou canst have now, if thou dost 
 not refuse them to thyself. And 
 this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the 
 past, and trust the future to providence, and direct 
 the present only conformably to piety and justice. 
 Conformably to piety, that thou mayst be content 
 with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature 
 designed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably 
 to justice, that thou mayst always speak the truth 
 freely and without disguise, and do the things 
 which are agreeable to law and according to the 
 worth of each. And let neither another man's 
 wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor 
 yet the sensations of the poor flesh which has grown 
 about thee ; for the passive part will look to this. 
 If then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt 
 be near to thy departure, neglecting everything 
 
204 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 else thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and 
 the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid 
 not because thou must some time cease to live, but 
 if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live ac- 
 cording to nature then thou wilt be a man worthy 
 of the universe which has produced thee, and thou 
 wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and 
 to wonder at things which happen daily as if they 
 were something unexpected, and to be dependent 
 on this or that. 
 
 2. God sees the minds (ruling principles) of all 
 men bared of the material vesture and rind and 
 impurities. With his intellectual part alone he 
 touches the intelligence only which has flowed and 
 been derived from himself into these bodies. And 
 if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt rid 
 thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards 
 not the poor flesh which envelopes him, surely will 
 not trouble himself by looking after raiment and 
 dwelling and fame and such like externals and 
 show. 
 
 3. The things are three of which thou art com- 
 posed, body, breath Qife], intelligence. Of these 
 the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to 
 take care of them ; but the third alone is properly 
 thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thy- 
 self, that is, from thy understanding, whatever 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 205 
 
 others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or 
 said thyself, and whatever future things trouble 
 thee because they may happen, and whatever in 
 the body which envelopes thee or in the breath, 
 [life] which is by nature associated with the body, 
 is attached to thee independent of thy will, and 
 whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls 
 round, so that the intellectual power exempt from 
 the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, 
 doing what is just and accepting what happens 
 and saying the truth : if thou wilt separate, I say, 
 from this ruling faculty the things which are at- 
 tached to it by the impressions of sense, and the 
 things of time to come and of time that is past, 
 and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere, 
 
 All round, and in its joyous rest reposing 5 l 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really 
 thy life, that is, the present then thou wilt be 
 able to pass that portion of life which remains for 
 thee up to the time of thy death, free from per- 
 turbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon 
 [to the god that is within thee]. (n. 13. 17; m- 
 5, 6; xi. 12.) 
 
 4. I have often wondered how it is that every 
 
 1 The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It 
 has been restored by Peyron thus : 
 
206 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 man loves himself more than all the rest of men, 
 but yet sets less value on his own opinion of him- 
 self than on the opinion of others. If then a god 
 or a wise teacher should present himself to a man 
 and bid him to think of nothing and to design 
 nothing which he would not express as soon as he 
 conceived it, he could not endure it even for a 
 single day. So much more respect have we to 
 what our neighbors shall think of us than to what 
 we shall think of ourselves. 
 
 6. How can it be that the gods after having 
 arranged all things well and benevolently for 
 mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some 
 men and very good men, and men who, as we may 
 say, have had most communion with the divinity, 
 and through pious acts and religious observances 
 have been most intimate with the divinity, when 
 they have once died should never exist again, but 
 should be completely extinguished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to 
 have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. 
 For if it were just, it would also be possible ; and 
 if it were according to nature, nature would have 
 had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is 
 not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
 been so : for thou seest even of thyself that in 
 this inquiry thou art disputing with the deity; 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XIL 207 
 
 and we should not thus dispute with the gods, 
 unless they were most excellent and most just ; 
 but if this is so, they would not have allowed any- 
 thing in the ordering of the universe to be neg- 
 lected unjustly and irrationally. 
 
 6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou 
 despairest of accomplishing. For even the left 
 hand, which is ineffectual for all other things for 
 want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously 
 than the right hand ; for it has been practised in 
 this. 
 
 7. Consider in what condition both in body and 
 soul a man should be when he is overtaken by 
 death ; and consider the shortness of life, the 
 boundless abyss of time past and future, the 
 feebleness of all matter. 
 
 8. Contemplate the formative principles [Torms] 
 of things bare of their coverings ; the purposes of 
 actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, and 
 death, and fame ; who is to himself the cause of his 
 uneasiness ; how no man is hindered by another ; 
 that everything is opinion. 
 
 9. In the application of thy principles thou must 
 be like the pancratiast, not like the gladiator ; for 
 the gladiator lets fall the sword which he uses and 
 is killed ; but the other always has his hand, and 
 needs to do nothing else than use it. 
 
208 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 10. See what things are in themselves, dividing 
 them into matter, form and purpose. 
 
 1 1 . What a power man has to do nothing except 
 what god will approve, and to accept all that god 
 may give him. 
 
 12. With respect to that which happens con- 
 formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
 gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily 
 or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing 
 wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
 should blame nobody, (n. 11, 12, 13; vn. G2 ; 
 
 VIII. 17.) 
 
 13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is 
 who is surprised at anything which happens in life. 
 
 14. Either there is a fatal necessity and in- 
 vincible order, or a kind providence, or a confusion 
 without a purpose and without a director. If then 
 there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou re- 
 sist ? But if there is a providence which allows 
 itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the 
 help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion 
 without a governor, be content that in such a 
 tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling in- 
 telligence. And even if the tempest carry thee 
 away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the breath, 
 everything else ; for the intelligence at least it will 
 not carry away. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 209 
 
 15. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
 losing its splendor until it is extinguished; and 
 shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
 temperance be extinguished [^before thy death] ? 
 
 1 6. When a man has presented the appearance 
 of having done wrong, Qsay,] How then do I know 
 if this is a wrongful act ? And even if he has done 
 wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned 
 himself? and so this is like tearing his own face. 
 Consider that he, who would not have the bad 
 man do wrong, is like the man who would not 
 have the figtree to bear juice in the figs and in- 
 fants to cry and the horse to neigh, and whatever 
 else must of necessity be. For what must a man 
 do who has such a character? If then thou art 
 irritable,t cure this man's disposition. 2 
 
 17. If it is not right, do not do it : if it is not 
 true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be. ] 3 
 
 18. In everything always observe what the thing 
 is which produces for thee an appearance, and re- 
 solve it by dividing it into the formal, the material, 
 the purpose, and the time within which it must 
 end. 
 
 2 The interpreters translate ycp-yog by the words " acer, 
 validusque," and (l skilful." But in Epictetus yopyoj; means 
 " vehement," " prone to anger," " irritable." 
 
 3 There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
 P 
 
210 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee 
 something better and more divine than the things 
 which cause the various affects, and as it were pull 
 thee by the strings. What is there now in my 
 mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything 
 of the kind? (v. 11.) 
 
 20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor with- 
 out a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to 
 nothing else than to a social end. 
 
 21. Consider that before long thou wilt be no- 
 body and nowhere, nor will any of the things ex- 
 ist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are 
 now living. For all things are formed by nature 
 to change and be turned and to perish in order 
 that other things in continuous succession may 
 exist. 
 
 22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
 opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when 
 thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, 
 who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find 
 calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. 
 
 23. Any one activity whatever it may be, when 
 it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil be- 
 cause it has ceased ; nor he who has done this act, 
 does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act 
 has ceased. In like manner then the whole which 
 consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it cease 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 211 
 
 at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason 
 that it has ceased ; nor he who has terminated this 
 series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. 
 But the proper time and the limit nature fixes, 
 sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of man, 
 but always the universal nature, by the change of 
 whose parts the whole universe continues ever 
 young and perfect. And everything which is 
 useful to the universal is always good and in season. 
 Therefore the termination of life for every man is 
 no evil, because neither is it shameful, since it is 
 both independent of the will and not opposed to 
 the general interest, but it is good, since it is 
 seasonable and profitable to and congruent with 
 the universal. For thus too he is moved by the 
 deity who is moved in the same manner with the 
 deity and towards the same things in his mind. 
 
 24. These three principles thou must have in 
 readiness. In the things which thou doest do 
 nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than 
 as justice herself would act ; but with respect to 
 what may happen to thee from without, consider 
 that it happens either by chance or according to 
 providence, and thou must neither blame chance 
 nor accuse providence. Second, consider what 
 every being is from the seed to the time of its 
 receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to 
 
212 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 the giving back of the same, and of what things every 
 being is compounded and into what things it is re- 
 solved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised 
 up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human 
 things, and observe the variety of them how great 
 it is, and at the same time also shouldst see at a 
 glance how great is the number of beings who 
 dwell all around in the air and the aether, consider 
 that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou 
 wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and 
 shortness of duration. Are these things to be 
 proud of? 
 
 25. Cast away opinion : thou art saved. Who 
 then hinders thee from casting it away? 
 
 26. When thou art troubled about anything, 
 thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
 according to the universal nature ; and forgotten 
 this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; 
 and further thou hast forgotten this, that every- 
 thing which happens, always happened so and will 
 happen so, and now happens so everywhere ; for- 
 gotten this too, how close is the kinship between 
 a man and the whole human race, for it is a com- 
 munity, not of a little blood or seed, but of intel- 
 ligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that 
 every man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of 
 the deity; and forgotten this, that nothing is a man's 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 213 
 
 own, but that his child and his body and his very 
 soul came from the deity; forgotten this, that every- 
 thing is opinion ; and lastly thou hast forgotten 
 that every man lives the present time only, and 
 loses only this. 
 
 27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those 
 who have complained greatly about anything, those 
 who have been most conspicuous by the greatest 
 fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any 
 kind : then think where are they all now ? Smoke 
 and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let 
 there be present to thy mind also everything of 
 this sort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the 
 country, and Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and 
 Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae and 
 Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; and in fine 
 think of the eager pursuit of anything conjoined 
 with pride ; and how worthless everything is after 
 which men violently strain ; and how much more 
 philosophical it is for a man in the opportunities 
 presented to him to show himself just, temperate, 
 obedient to the gods, and to do this with all sim- 
 plicity : for the pride which is proud of its want 
 of pride is the most intolerable of all. 
 
 28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
 the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they 
 exist and so worshipest them, I answer, in the 
 
214 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 first place, they may be seen even with the eyes ; 4 
 in the second place neither have I seen even my 
 own soul and yet I honor it. Thus then with 
 respect to the gods, from what I constantly expe- 
 rience of their power, from this I comprehend that 
 they exist and I venerate them. 
 
 29. The safety of life is this, to examine every- 
 thing all through, what it is itself, what is its ma- 
 terial, what its formal part ; with all thy soul to 
 
 4 " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this 
 may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe 
 is a god (iv. 23), and that the celestial bodies are gods 
 (vm. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know 
 that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because 
 we see what they do ; as we know that man has intellect- 
 ual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other 
 way do we know it. This passage then will agree with 
 the passage in the Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and 
 with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which Jesus 
 Christ is named " the image of the invisible god 5" and 
 with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. v. 9). 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learn- 
 ing, and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin 
 which is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. v. 20) : 
 " God by creating the universe [or world, mundum], being 
 himself invisible, has presented himself to our eyes con- 
 spicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes 
 Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. 8) : " Quocunque te flexeris, ibi 
 ilium videbis occurrentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus 
 suum ipse implet." Compare also Cicero, De Senectute 
 (c. 22), and Xenophon's Cyropaedia (vui. 7.) I think that 
 my interpretation of Antoninus is right. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 215 
 
 do justice and to say the truth. What remains 
 except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to 
 another so as not to leave even the smallest inter- 
 vals between ? 
 
 30. There is one light of the sun, though it is 
 distributed over walls, mountains, and other things 
 infinite. There is one common substance, though 
 it is distributed among countless bodies which have 
 their several qualities. There is one soul, though 
 it is distributed among infinite natures and indi- 
 vidual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There 
 is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. 
 Now in the things which have been mentioned all 
 the other parts, such as those which are air and 
 substance, are without sensation and have no fel- 
 lowship : and yet even these parts the intelligent 
 principle holds together and the gravitation towards 
 the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends 
 to that which is of the same kin, and combines 
 with it, and the feeling for communion is not in- 
 terrupted. 
 
 31. What dost thou wish ? to continue to exist ? 
 Well, dost thou wish to have sensation? movement? 
 growth ? and then again to cease to grow ? to use 
 thy speech ? to think ? What is there of all these 
 things which seems to thee worth desiring ? But 
 if it is easy to set little value on all these things, 
 
21G M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 turn to that which remains, which is to follow 
 reason and god. But it is inconsistent with 
 honoring reason and god to be troubled because by 
 death a man will be deprived of the other things. 
 
 32. How small a part of the boundless and un- 
 fathomable time is assigned to every man ? for it 
 is very soon swallowed up in the eternal. And 
 how small a part of the whole substance ? and 
 how small a part of the universal soul ? and on 
 what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest ? 
 Reflecting on all this consider nothing to be great, 
 except to act as thy nature leads thee, and to en- 
 dure that which the common nature brings. 
 
 33. How does the ruling faculty make use of 
 itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, 
 whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is 
 only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 34. This reflection is most adapted to move us 
 to contempt of death, that even those who think 
 pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have 
 despised it. 
 
 35. The man to whom that only is good which 
 comes in due season, and to whom it is the same 
 thing whether he has done more or fewer acts 
 conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes 
 no difference whether he contemplates the world 
 for a longer or a shorter time for this man neither 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 217 
 
 is death a terrible thing, (in. 7 ; vi. 23 ; x. 20 ; 
 xn. 23.) 
 
 36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great 
 state Qhe world] : what difference does it make 
 to thee whether for five years [[or three] ? for that 
 which is conformable to the laws is just for all. 
 Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet 
 an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, v . 
 but nature who brought thee into it ? the same as 
 if a praetor who has employed an actor dismisses 
 him from the stage " But I have not finished the 
 five acts, but only three of them" Thou sayest 
 well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; 
 for what shall be a complete drama is determined 
 by him who was once the cause of its composition, 
 and now of its dissolution : but thou art the cause 
 of neither. Dejmrt then satisfied, for Jie also who 
 releases thee is satisfied. 
 
tonto t* fa 
 
INDEX. 
 
 r 
 
INDEX. 
 
 (indifferentia, Cicero); things indifferent, nei- 
 ther good nor bad 5 the same as fikffa. 
 
 alaxpoG, (turpis, Cic.), ugly ; morally ugly. 
 
 curia, cause. 
 
 airi&deG, ainov, TO, the formal principle, the cause. 
 
 avatyopd, reference, relation to a purpose. 
 
 aTroppoia, efflux. 
 
 curpoaipsTa, ra, the things which are not in our will or 
 power. 
 
 apxrj, a first principle. 
 
 drofioi, (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms. 
 
 avrapKtia, est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 
 abundat (Cicero) ; contentment. 
 
 avrapKTiQ, sufficient in itself; contented. 
 
 yiyi>6/ii>a, ra, things which are produced, come into 
 existence. 
 
 daifidjv, god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 
 Q, disposition, affection of the mind. 
 iz, division of things into their parts, dissection, 
 resolution, analysis. 
 
 SiaXtKriKrj, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi 
 (Cic.) 
 
 didXvffig , dissolution, the opposite of avyicpiaiQ. 
 
 didvoia, understanding; sometimes, the mind generally, 
 
 the whole intellectual power. 
 6y/zara, (decreta, Cic.), principles. 
 
222 INDEX. 
 
 a, temperance, self-restraint. 
 tldog, in divisione forraae sunt, quas Graeci tidrj vocant ; 
 
 nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic.) 
 
 But tldoe is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less ex- 
 
 actly and as a general term, like genus. Index Epict. 
 
 ed. Schweigh. *Q ds ye ai TrpiUJrai ovffiai TTOOQ TO. aXXa 
 
 faovfftv, OVTW KO.I TO elfioc; irpoQ TO ytvog t\ei' vrroKtiTai 
 
 yap TO eio r<$ ytvei. (Aristot. Cat. c. 5). 
 tifiapfjLBvrj, (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny, neces- 
 
 sity. 
 fcK/eXitraf, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from 
 
 things 5 the opposite of 6pieig . 
 tfjL-^vxdj rd, things which have life. 
 kvtpytia, action, activity. 
 tvvoia, Ivvoiai, notio, notiones (Cic.), or " notitiae remm 5" 
 
 notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci turn 
 
 tvvoiav, turn TrpoXrjifsiv, Cic.) 
 kTriOTpoQri, attention to an object. 
 
 'ia, animi tranquillitas, (Cic.) 
 
 icov, TO, the ruling faculty 5 principatus, (Cicero.) 
 0wp??/iara, percepta (Cic.), things perceived, general prin- 
 
 ciples. 
 
 KaXog, beautiful. 
 KaTaXTjipig, comprehension; cognitio, perceptio, compre- 
 
 hensio (Cicero). 
 KaTaffKtvr), constitution. 
 KdTopOwatiQj KaTop9wfiaTa ; recta, recte facta (Cicero); 
 
 right acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right 
 
 or straight road. 
 Ko<7/>io, order, world, universe. 
 Koapog, o o\o, the universe, that which is the One and 
 
 the All, (vi. 25.) 
 
 a, ra, the things which have reason. 
 og, rational. 
 X6yo, reason. 
 
 Xoyoc <77T|0/iarifcoc, seminal principle. 
 /ntffot, ra, things indifferent, viewed with respect to virtue. 
 voepog, intellectual. 
 
INDEX. 223 
 
 g, law. 
 
 j intelligence. 
 
 g, arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Anto- 
 
 ninus the same as TVQOQ ; but it also means " opinion." 
 oiKovofjiia (dispositiOjOrdo, Cic.), has sometimes the peculiar 
 
 sense of artifice, or doing something with an apparent 
 
 purpose different from the real purpose. 
 oXov, TO, the universe, the whole. 
 OVTCI, ra, things which exist ; existence, being. 
 ope&c, desire of a thing, which is opposed to tKK\iai, 
 
 aversion. 
 bppfj, movement towards an object, appetite; appetitio, 
 
 naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cicero). 
 ovffia, substance, (vi. 49.) Modern writers sometimes 
 
 incorrectly translate it " essentia." It is often used) by 
 
 Epictetus in the same sense as v\rj. Aristotle (Cat. 
 
 c. 5) defines obffia, and it is properly translated " sub- 
 
 stantia " (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2) : 
 
 r) oifffia av^rdrdj ovaa r(f fiijdtv dvat Trpo avTijg ykvog 
 
 r)v TO 
 
 7rapaicov\T]9iKrj ^vva^ig, r/, the power which enables us to 
 
 observe and understand. 
 TTfTo-ic, passivity, opposed to ivtpyeia. 
 TrtpHJTdffEiQ, circumstances, the things which surround 
 
 us ; troubles, difficulties. 
 jj, 77, destiny. 
 g, purpose, free will. 
 TrpoaipsTa, TU, things which are within our will or power. 
 TrpoaiptTiKov, TO, free will. 
 7rp60<ri, a purpose, proposition. 
 TTpoi/oia, (providentia, Cic.), providence. 
 GKOTTOQ, object, purpose. 
 (troixaov, element. 
 (Ti/y/caraOetric, (assensio, approbatio, Cic.), assent ; (tuy/ca- 
 
 ra0e<r (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1 ). 
 ovyKpiaiQ, the act of combining elements out of which a 
 
 body is produced, combination. 
 v\rj, matter, material. 
 
224 INDEX. 
 
 t>Xi/c6v, ro, the material principle. 
 
 vTreZaipeffiQ, exception, reservation 5 /u0' vire 
 conditionally. 
 
 vTroOtffiQ, material to work on ; thing to employ the rea- 
 son on ; proposition, thing assumed as matter for argu- 
 ment and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum duo 
 sunt genera ; alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. 
 Definitum est, quod vTroOtmv Graeci, nos causam : infi- 
 nitum, quod 9'iaiv illi appellant, nos propositum possumus 
 nominare. Cic. See Aristot. AnaL Post. i. c. 2). 
 
 uTroX^iJ/ic, opinion. 
 
 viroffTctffig, basis, substance, being (x. 5). Epictetus has 
 
 TL TO VTTOffTariKOV Kdl QVGI&OIQ. 
 
 vQiffTaaQai, to subsist, to be. 
 
 QavTaaiat, (visus, Cic.); appearances, thoughts, impres- 
 sions, (visa animi, Gellius, xix. 1) : QavTaala iari 
 
 vTaajJia, seems to be used by Antoninus in the same 
 sense as tyavTaoia. Epictetus uses only Qavraaia. 
 vTaaTov, that which produces a (pavraffia : Qavracrrbv 
 TO TreTTOLTjicog TJJV QavTaaiav aiaOtjTov. 
 
 nature. 
 
 , r} T&V o\o>i/, the nature of the universe. 
 *1> soul, life, living principle. 
 
 ifoj, voepd y a rational soul, an intelligent soul. 
 
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