UC-NRLF eat, aoi EANING OP STOICISM book is I Roman product. In i the way of life which appe later Republic and earlier I mastery over all r ent tlf ature f Rome ' aad n , V*? 7 Romau8 of the obtains d the ff.ro.T,^ssi r oSsr'" s ' o i, c " l ""p*": pSiraS?H K^SSrttHssSa "found region" h ol^ i- if P re - c tnstian Roman *jji^juxj ue called riimcoif o c* ' of Professor Arnold^ J^oifi^^ 10 '. 8n , d &* true 1 in so THORNTON! Booksel HENRY U. BRANDENSTEIN /. A/ac* J^~ . T o^<^ >, fT^%*^* ^tt.^ / Cv^ / J lt% if N THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR TjCVN El 2 EAT TON M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. H A.7) -Vwcc^ Ja THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG. LONDON: BELL AND DALDY, FLEET STREET. 1862. M. AUEELIUS ANTONINUS. ANTONINUS was born at Rome A. D. 121, on the 26th of April. 20'*:. His father Annius Verus died while he was praetor. His mother was Domitia Calvilla also named Lucilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and de- clared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose , original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus " u> " 1 took the name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus to which was added the title of Caesar in A. D. 139 : the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped the name of Verus and took the name of Anto- ninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. Aurelius Antoninus or simply M. Antoninus, b vi M. AURELIUS The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (i. 16; vi. 30) the virtues of this ex- cellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There are extant letters between Fronto and Marcus, which show the great affection of the pupil for the master, and the master's great hopes of his in- dustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among those to whom 'he was indebted for his education. When he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most labori- ous abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhe- toric for philosophy, and he attached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, which was a useful preparation for the high place which he was designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus a distin- guished jurist. We must suppose that he learned the Roman discipline of arms, which was a neces- sary part of the education of a man who afterwards led his troops to battle against a warlike race. ANTONINUS. vii Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers and the obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he speaks of what he learned from them might seem to savour of vanity or self-praise, if we look care- lessly at the way in which he has expressed him- self ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will be mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several teachers, what they taught and what a pupil might learn from them. Be- sides, this book like the eleven other books was for his own use, and if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was written during i one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against the \ Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers might remind him of their lessons and the practical uses which he might derive from them. Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia a grandson of Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by him- self (i. 9). His favourite teacher was Q. Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher and also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are destined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about them, their companions and teachers ; and I do not know any example of a young prince having had an education which can be compared with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their acquirements and viii M. AURELIUS their character will hardly be collected again ; and as to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. Hadrian died in July A. D. 138, and was suc- ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably about A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his adoptive father the title of Caesar and was associ- ated with him in the administration of the state. The father and the adopted son lived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him. Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he as- sociated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure and unworthy of his station. Anto- ninus however bore with him, and it is said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla. The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- mand, but he did nothing, and the success that ANTONINUS. ix was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. This Parthian war ended in 165. The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the Alps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations had attempted near three hundred years before ; and the rest of the life of Antoninus with some intervals was employed in driving back the invaders. In 169 Verus sud- denly died, and Antoninus administered the state alone. In A. D. 175 Avidius Cassius a brave and skil- ful Roman commander who was at the head of the troops in Asia revolted and declared himself Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment of the family and the partizans of Cassius, and his letter to the senate in which he recommends mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, Avidius Cassius, c. 12.) Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of Cassius' revolt. We know that in A. D. 174 he was engaged in a war against the Quadi, Marco- manni and other Germanic tribes, and it is pro- bable that he went direct from the German war without returning to Rome. His wife Faustina who accompanied him into Asia died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus to the great grief of her husband, Capitolinus who has written the life x M. AURELIUS .of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- tended not to know it. Nothing is so common as such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is full of them. Anto- ninus loved his wife and he says that she was " obedient, affectionate and simple." The same scandal had been spread about Faustina's mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says in a letter to Fronto that he would rather live in exile with his wife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who would give their wives a better character than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble bio- grapher. Dion Cassius, the must malignant of historians, always reports and perhaps he believed any scandal against anybody. Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites of the age and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- tious man, though we might perhaps do so, if his book did not show that he was not. But this is only one among many instances that a ruler's ANTONINUS. xi public acts do not always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even the superstitions of his people, and though he may wish that they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by offending their pre- judices. Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph on the 23rd of December A. D. 176. In the following year Commodus was asso- ciated with his father in the empire and took the name of Augustus. This year A. D. 177 is memo- rable in ecclesiastical history. Attains and others were put to death at Lyon for their adherence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. i. with notes). The letter is from the Chris- tians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienne and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in Asia and Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It contains a very particular description of the tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that while the persecution was going on, Attains a Christian and a Roman citizen was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the amphitheatre, but the governor ordered him to be reserved with the rest who were in pri- son, until he had received instructions from the emperor. It is not clear who the " rest" were who are mentioned in the letter. Many had been tortured before the governor thought of applying to the emperor. The imperial rescript, says the xii M. AURELIUS letter, was that the Christians should be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they must be released. On this the work began again. The Christians who were Roman citizens were be- headed : the rest were exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, say nothing of the wonderful stories of the mar- tyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one sore and had lost all human form, but on being put to the rack he recovered his former appear- ance under the torture, which was thus a cure instead of a punishment. He was afterwards torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and roasted. He died at last. The letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for the ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence for one part and reject the other. We often re- ceive small evidence as proof of a thing which we believe to be within the limits of probability or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evi- dence, when the thing to which it refers, appears very improbable or impossible. But this is a false method of inquiry, though it is followed by some modern writers, who select what they like from a story and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if they do not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. A man can only act consistently by accepting all ANTONINUS. xiii this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for either. But he who rejects it may still admit that such a letter may be founded on real facts ; and he would make this admission as the most probable way of accounting for the existence of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot tell what part of his story is worthy of credit. The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people were defeated in a great battle A. D. 179. During this campaign the emperor was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on the Save in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona (Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 17th of March A. D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus was with him. His body or the ashes probably was carried to Rome, and he received the honour of deification. Those who could afford it had his statue or bust, and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or household deities. He was in a manner made a saint. His son Commodus erected to his me- mory the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft commemorate his father's victories over the Marco- manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower xiv M. AURELIUS of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue of Antoni- nus was placed on the column, but it was removed at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in its place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. The historical evidence for the times of Anto- ninus is very defective, and some of that which remains is not credible. The most curious is the story about the miracle which happened in A. D. 174 during the war with the Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and the Romans gained a great victory. All the authori- ties which speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- firm the Christian statement it is added that the emperor gave the title of Thundering to this legion ; but Dacier and others who maintain the Christian report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thun- dering or Lightning was not given to this legion because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but because there was a figure of lightning on their shields, and that this title of the legion existed in the time of Augustus. Scaliger also had observed that the legion was called Thundering (xffowa0&ttfe or xtpawofofoi) before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note of Reimarus) who enumerates all the legions of ANTONINUS. xv Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius (v. 5) when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this name being given to the legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence of the success which he obtained through their prayers; from which we may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there is mentioned under the commander of Ar- menia the Praefectura of the twelfth legion named "Thundering Melitene;" and this position in Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius concludes that Melitene was not the name of the legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. The legions did not, he says, take their name from the place where they were on duty, but from the country in which they were raised, and therefore, what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not seem probable to him. Yet Valesius on the au- thority of Apolinarius and Tertullian believed that the miracle was worked through the prayers of the Christian soldiers in the emperor's army. Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to this legion, says Valesius, and probably he pur- posely omitted it, because he knew that Melitene xvi M. AURELIUS was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where the legion was stationed in his time. The emperor, it is said, made a report of his victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for such was the practice ; but we do not know what he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Chris- tianity, that so honourable a testimony to the Christians and their religion might not be perpe- tuated. The critic has however not seen that he contradicts himself when he tells us the purport of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not find it. But there does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Anto- ninus to the Roman Senate after this memorable victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's second Apology, though it is totally unconnected with the apologies. This letter is one of the most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and it cannot be possibly founded even on the genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it were genuine, it would free the emperor from the charge of persecuting men because they were Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a man accuse another only of being a Christian and the accused confess and there is nothing else against him, he must be set free ; with this monstrous addition made by a man inconceivably ignorant, that the informer must be burnt alive. 1 1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, ANTONINUS. xvii During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce at- tack on the established religions, the address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we do not know whether they read it. The second Apology of Justinus is addressed to the Roman Senate, but there is nothing in it which shows its date. In one passage where he is speaking of the perse- cution of the Christians, Justinus says that even men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when they ordered their lives according to ethical rea- son, were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, Musonius in his own times and others; for all those who in any way labored to live according to reason and avoided wickedness were always hated ; and this was the effect of the work of daemons. Justinus himself is said to have been put to death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice to the he says, writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in which he declares that his army was saved by the prayers of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to punish with death those who ventured to accuse us." It is possible that the forged letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian had seen, for he uses the plural number "letters." A great deal has been written about this miracle of the Thundering Legion, and more than is worth reading. xviii M. A URELIUS gods; but the circumstances of his death are doubtful, and the time is uncertain. It cannot have been in the reign of Hadrian, as one autho- rity states ; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology was written in the time of M. Antoninus. The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. The evidence for it is the letter of the church of Smyrna to the churches of Philomelium and the other Christian churches, and it is preserved by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 16). But the critics do not agree about the time of Polycarp's death, differing in the two extremes to the amount of twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's martyrdom were accompanied by miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 16) has omitted, but it ap- pears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, which Usher published, and it is supposed that this version was made not long after the time of Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter states that it was transcribed by Caius from the copy of Irenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, having searched it out by the revela- tion of Polycarp, who directed me to it, &c." The story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with miraculous circumstances which some modern writers on ecclesiastical history take the liberty of omitting. 2 2 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted ANTONINUS. xix In order to form a proper notion of the con- dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan's time. When the younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those parts, and the worshipers of the old religion were falling off. The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- fice. Those who were interested in the mainte- nance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought before the governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to no other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be Christians and per- severed in their religion ought to be punished ; if for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes proved against the Christians, and he could only characterize their religion as a depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be stopped, if the people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for the emperor's directions, because he did not know what to do : He remarks that he had never been engaged in judicial inquiries about to mention the dove, which flew out of Polycarp's body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have done the same. Wake says " I am so little a friend to such miracles that I thought it better with Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bp. Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, says Middleton, he afterwards de- clares to be so well attested that we need not any further assurance of the truth of it. xx M. AURELIUS the Christians, and that accordingly he did not know what or how far to inquire and punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to inquire into a man's profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan's Rescript is extant. He approved of the governor's judgment in the matter ; but he said that no search must be made after the Christians ; if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not be punished, if he affirmed that he was not a Chris- tian and confirmed his denial by showing his re- verence to the heathen gods. He added that no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such things were of bad example. Trajan - was a mild and sensible man, and both motives of mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of the Christians as he could ; to let them live in quiet, if it were possible. Trajan's rescript is the first legislative act of the head of the Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known to us. It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed under his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan himself is not universally admitted to be an historical fact. In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- ble fpr the Roman government to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the hostility ' of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces wished to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen community, who looked on the Christians as athe- ANTONINUS. xxi ists. The Jews too who were settled all over the Roman Empire were as hostile to the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to the Pro- consul of Asia, which stands at the end of Jus- tin's first apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be troubled and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from them ; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form and no attention must be paid to popular clamours; when Christians were regularly prosecuted and convicted of any illegal act, they must be punished according to their deserts ; and false accusers also must be pun- ished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published Rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Had- rian's Rescript seem very favourable to the Chris- tians, but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no meaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor's advice. The real purpose of the Re- script is that Christians must be punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted more to the Christians than Trajan did. There is printed at the end of Justin's Apology a Re- script of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of Asia xxii M. AURELIUS (TO Koivov TYIS 'Acr/a;), and it is also in Eusebius 3 (E. H. iv. 13). The Rescript declares that the Christians, for they are meant, though the name Christians does not occur in the Rescript, were not to be disturbed, unless they were attempt- ing something against the Roman rule, and no man was to be punished simply for being a Chris- tian. But this Rescript is spurious. Any man moderately acquainted with Roman history will see at once from the style and tenor that it is a clumsy forgery. In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition be- tween the old and the ne\v belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. Melito in his apology to M. Antoninus represents the Chris- tians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the property of others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who were doing 3 In Eusebius the name at the beginning of the Rescript is that of M. Antoninus ; and so we cannot tell to which of the two emperors the forger assigned the Rescript. There are also a few verbal differences. The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that Marcus being moved by the intreaties of Melito and other heads of the church wrote an Epistle to the Commune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians to be troubled on account of their religion. Valesius supposes this to be the letter which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer to the apology of Melito of which I shall soon give the substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this letter which is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer he made to Melito. ANTONINUS. xxiii no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered anything so unjust ; and if the last order was really not from the emperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their enemies. 4 4 Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I. and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who de- nounced the Christians ; an interpretation which is entirely false. Melito calls the Christian religion " our philosophy," which began among barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire, for from that time the power of the Romans grew great and glorious. He says that the emperor has and will have as the successor to Au- gustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will protect that philosophy which grew up with the empire and began with Augustus, which philosophy the predecessors of Anto- ninus honored in addition to the other religions. He fur- ther says that the Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domitian, he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this was the origin of the false charges against the Christians. But this was corrected by the emperors who immediately pre- ceded Antoninus, who often by their Rescripts reproved those who attempted to trouble the Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many and among them to the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius when Marcus was associated with him in the empire wrote to the cities, that they must not trouble the Christians ; among others to the people of Larissa, Thessalonica, the Athenians and all the Greeks. Melito concluded thus : We are persuaded that thou who hast about these things the same mind that they had, nay rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that we ask thee. This Apology was written after A. D. 169, the year in which Verus died, for it speaks of Marcus only and his son Commodus. According to Melito's testimony, Christians had only been punished for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and xxiv M. AURELIUS We conclude from this that there were at least imperial Rescripts or Constitutions of M. Anto- ninus, which were made the foundation of these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their religion. Then come the persecu- tions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place in A. D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in Trajan's Rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if they were un- willing. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained that all the * heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe that this was a decla- ration of hostility against the Roman government, which tolerated all the various forms of supersti- tion that existed in the empire, and could not con- sistently tolerate another religion, which declared that all the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a worship of devils. If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman emperors attempted to check the persecutions began again in the time of M. Anto- ninus and were founded on his orders, which were abused as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms " that the race of the godly is now persecuted and harassed by fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing which had never happened before." But we know that all this is not true, and that Christians had been punished in Trajan's time. ANTONINUS. xxv the new religion, how they enforced their princi- ple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Chris- tians, which Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth ; how far popular clamour and riots went in this matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians, for there were many such, contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to em- bitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact is certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the hea- then populations were in open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men were put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in some parts of the world the persecution of the Christians became more violent and that it pro- ceeded from the populace in the cities ; and he adds in his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what took place in a single nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia ; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the churches of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true cause of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that both governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these disturbances. How far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceed- xxvi M. AUREL1US ings we do not know, for the historical records of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule against the Christians, for Trajan did that ; and if we admit that he would have been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it wouHl be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited authority, which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was limited by certain con- stitutional forms, by the senate, and by the prece- dents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active persecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain that he had no good opinion of the Christians, as ap- pears from his own words. 5 But he knew nothing 5 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. The rational Christians admitted no fellowship with them. " Some of these heretics," says Clemens, " show their impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), but that a man is a self-mur- derer who bears witness by his death. We also blame those who rush to death, for there are some, not of us, but only bearing the same name who give themselves up. We say of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they are publicly punished ; and they give themselves up to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire." Cave in his Primitive Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the Christians : " They did flock to the place of torment faster than droves of beasts that are driven to the shambles. They even longed to be in the arms of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in order to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not but vent his passionate desire of it : O that I might come to those wild beasts, that are prepared for me ; I heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; ANTONINUS. xxvii of them except their hostility to the Roman reli- gion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- fessions false or true of some of the Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to state all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether clear from the charge of even allowing any persecutions ; but as I seek the truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his Ethical principles from a religion of which he knew nothing. 6 There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec- tions or his Meditations, as they are generally named, is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas I would invite and encourage them speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to set upon me as they have been to others ; nay should they refuse it, I would even force them to it;" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the Christians ; but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire a man who holds to his principles even to death ; but these fanatical Christians are the Gymnosophists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 6 Dr. F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, &c. has examined this question with great good sense and fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near as our authorities enable us to reach it. xxviii M. AURELIUS (v. Mdpxos') notices a work of Antoninus in twelve books, which he names the "conduct of his own life ;" and he cites the book under several words in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but not the title of the work. There are also passages cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention of the emperor's name. The true title of the work is unknown. Xylander who published the first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo. with a Latin version) used a manuscript, which contained the twelve books, but it is not known where the manuscript is now. The only other complete manuscript which is known to exist is in the Vatican library, but it has no title and no in- scriptions of the several books : the eleventh only has the inscription Mx^xou n our minds (pavrWai) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of words^ ancTso far to apply Dialectic, but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dia- lectic, and his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He says (vin. 13), " Con- stantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul, 3 apply to it the prin- 3 The original is tTri irdffrjg Qavraviag. We have no word which expresses avraffia, for it is not only the sen- suous appearance which comes from an external object, which object is called TO aaiv rutv ovrwv cnravTwv rrjv TrpwTTjv vXrjv. (In vui. 11), Antoninus speaks of TO ovaiticte /cat vXi/cov, " the substantial and the material ;" and (vn. 10) he says that " everything material" (tvvXov) disappears in the substance of the whole (ry rtiv o\wv ovaiq). The ovcria is the generic name of that existence, which we as- sume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above it. It is the philosopher's " substance :'' it is the ultimate expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the basis, the being of a thing. " From the Divine, which is substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and every thing that is created exists." (Swedenborg.) xliv THE PHILOSOPHY Reason (orr/igj MrtSfcfj Xoyof)/* This is comform- able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original principles (#f%a/) of all things, that which acts (TO TTQIOUV) and that which is acted upon (TO 7ra<7%ov). That which is acted on is the formless matter (uXn) : that which acts is the reason (Ao'yo$) in it, God, for he is eternal and operates through all matter, and produces all things. So Anto- ninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason (xo'yos) which pervades all substance (oi, voega). Antoninus insists on this continually : God is in man, 11 and j so we must constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, \ and the soul alone has any communication with cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such are what some people have called the laws of thought, the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first prin- ciples, which need no proof and cannot be proved or de- nied. Accordingly the Germans can say " Gott ist die hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a thing con- nected with an individual being, as a man. Accordingly it is the capacity of receiving impressions (Vorstellungen, (pavraviai), and forming from them distinct ideas (Be- griffe), and perceiving differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the reader to the understanding of Antoninus, or his use of the words VOVQ and Xoyog . The Emperor's meaning must be got from his own words, and if it does not agree altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to force it into agreement, but sim- ply to find out what his meaning is, if we can. 11 Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, I. 3. 17. Ivi THE PHIL OSOPH Y the deity, for as he says (xn. 2): "With his intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- gence only which has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden within a man is life, that is the man himself. All the rest is vesture, cover- ing, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real 12 man, uses for the purposes of his present existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to respire, and so for him who is 12 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in the world and from whom the body itself lives" (quoted by Clissold, p. 456 of " The Practical Na- ture of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin," second edition, 1859 ; a book which theologians might read with profit.) This is an old doctrine of the soul, which has been often Sroclaimed, but never better expressed than by the " Auctor e Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his " Antoninus," p. 436. " The soul by which we live and have cities and nouses is invisible, but it is seen by its works ; for the whole method of life has been devised by it and ordered, and by it is held together. In like manner we must think also about the deity, who in power is most mighty , in beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue supreme: wherefore though he is invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker, (p. 382.) Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul : " Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to per- ceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, he also says : " It follows that our organized bodies are no more I ourselves, or part of ourselves than any other matter / around us." ^Compare Anton, x. 38.) OF ANTONINUS. Ivii willing to partake of it the intelligent power which holds within it all things is diffused as wide and free as the air. (vin. 54). It is by living a divinejife^ thaj^n^n^aj^oajches_to^ knowledge of the divinity. 13 It is by following the divinity wTtmn^Ja^wv or Qeds as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the deity, the supreme good, for man can never attain to perfect agreement with his internal guide (TO yytfjioviKov). " Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon (5a///wi/) wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.) There is in man, that is in the reason, the in- telligence, a superior faculty which if it is exer- cised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty (TO YiytfAoviKov), which Cicero (De Natura Deo- rum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, 13 The reader may consult Discourse V. " Of the ex- istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select Dis- courses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. 3 : " He who \J knows himself will know God ; and he who knows God will be made like to God ; and he will be made like to God, who has become worthy of God ; and he becomes worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what he speaks." I suppose that the old saying, " Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it. Iviii THE PHIL OSOPII Y " to which nothing can or ought to be superior." Antoninus often uses this term, and others which are equivalent. He names it (vn. 64) "the governing intelligence." The governing faculty is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is that which is of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine, so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of himself, when the diviner part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honour- able and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Anto- ninus on this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses, when he speaks of "the natural supremacy of reflection or conscience," of the faculty "which surveys, approves or disapproves the several affec- tions of our mind and actions of our lives." Much matter might be collected from Anto- ninus on the notion of the Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the soul of man is most intimately united to his body and together they make one animal, which we call man ; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world or the material universe, and together OF A NTONINUS. lix they form one whole. But Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on the absolute nature of the deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand. He was satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by reve- rencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure. From all that has been said it follows that the universe is administered by the Providence of God (fl-foWx), and that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the constitution and government of the Universe, but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well. (iv. 27; vi. 1; ix. 28; xu. 6, and many other passages.) Epictetus says (i. G) that we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two things, the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition. But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call evil, physical and moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- Ix THE PHIL OSOPH Y pated the Emperor's answer. We see and feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes from and is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole, (viu. 55 ; x. 6.) Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might imagine the solar system resolved into its ele- mental parts, and yet the whole would still sub- sist " ever young and perfect." All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls his bro- thers. Antoninus says (viii. 55), " Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose/' The first part of this is per- OF ANTONINUS. Ixi fectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But this is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the wrong doer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God v because of the moral disorder and suffering which are in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise, (xn. 5.) His conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which that word has Ixii THE PHIL OSOPH Y been explained, a constitution (xaTao-tttuy^ what we call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies and leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the Natural State of man, the state for which his Nature fits him ; and society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists ; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present know- ledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- ciple, may be more firmly established. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to devia- tions real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole Nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of things having a Nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for the existence of order OF ANTONINUS. Ixiii both physical and moral is proved by daily ex- perience and all past experience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is main- tained : we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we perform the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all space ; but seeing that there is a Nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal Nature has a cause which operates con- tinually, and that we are totally unable to specu- late on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that An- toninus has said. 14 The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each accord- ing to his pleasure ; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we find in the first book 14 Cleanthes says in his Hymn : " For all things good and bad to One thou forraest, So that One everlasting reason governs all." Ixiv THE PHILOSOPHY of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves through their own folly. The answer is plain enough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately to their several charac- ters. Indeed Zeus says plainly that men do attri- bute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of evil. He says, " As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the Universe." This will appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his pur- pose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the Nature of evil, as he expresses it, does not exist ; that is, evil is not a part of the constitution or nature of Things. If there were a principle of evil (af%>!) in the constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, Q27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive. One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the emperor could say (n. 11) : " To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- OF ANTONINUS. Ixv volve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. But that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the know- ledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the Universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which make us neither better nor worse. There- fore they are neither good nor evil." The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy fol- lows from his general principles. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, both a man's own nature and the nature of the Universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained, as he has explained it and as they Ixvi THE PHILOSOPHY understood it, it is " a manner of speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true." To live according to Nature is to live according to a man's whole nature, not accord- ing to a part of it, and to reverence the divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. " To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to reason." 15 (vn. 11.) That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary to nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to some part of man's nature, or it could not he done. Man is made for action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses of their nature, so man must do his. (v. 1.) Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to the nature of all things of which he is one ; and as a citizen of a political community he must direct his life and actions with reference to those among whom, and for whom, among other purposes, he lives. A man must not retire into solitude and cut himself off from his fellow men. He must be ever active to do his part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not only in blood, but still more by participating in the same intelligence and by being a portion of the same divinity. A man cannot really be in- jured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can make him bad, and he must not be angry with them nor hate them : " For we are made for co- 15 This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 321) Nuuquam aliud Natura aliud Sapientia dicit. OF ANTONINUS. Ixvii operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature ; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away."(n. 1.) Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social act to another social act, thinking of God." (vi. 7.) Again: " Love mankind. Follow God." (vn. 31.) It is the characteristic of the rational soul for a man to love his neighbour, (xi. 1.) Antoninus teaches in various passages the forgiveness of in- juries, and we know that he also practised what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that " this divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moral- ists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Chris- tianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any other single virtue." The practice of this precept is the most difficult of all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid towards following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is natural, just and useful for the conservation of society. It is useful that wrong doers should feel the natural consequences of their actions, among which is the disapprobation of society and the re- sentment of him who is wronged. But revenge in the proper sense of that word, must not be prac- tised. " The best way of avenging thyself," says the emperor, " is not to become like the wrong doer." It is plain by this that he does not mean Ixviii THE PHILOSOPHY that we should in any case practise revenge ; but he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, Be not like him who has done the wrong. Soc- rates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, xn. 17.) " When a man has done thee any wrong, imme- diately consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither wonder nor be angry." (ATI. 26.) Antoninus would not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and resentment, for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have pity instead of resentment : and so it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice to be angry and sin not ; which, as Butler well explains it, is not a recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a natural passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us into sin. In short the emperor's doctrine about wrongful acts is this : wrong doers jo not know what good and bad are : they offend out of igno- ranceVand in the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this kind of ignorance will never be ad- mitted as a legal excuse, and ought not to be ad- mitted as a full excuse in any way by society, there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a man's power to forgive without harm to society ; and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit of the sublime prayer, " Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." OF ANTONINUS. Ixix The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which teaches a man to look di- rectly to his own happiness, though a man's hap- piness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought to do. A man must live con- formably to the universal nature, which means, as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man's actions must be conformable to his true re- lations to all other human beings, both as a citizen of a political community and as a member of the whole human family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the most forcible language, that a man's words and actions, so far as they affect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their consistency with the conservation and the interests of the particular society of which he is a member, and of the whole human race. To live conform- ably to such a rule, a man must use his rational faculties in order to discern clearly the conse- quences and full effect of all his actions and of the actions of others : he must not live a life of contemplation and reflection only, though he must .often retire within himself to calm and^purify:his soul by thought, but he must mingle in the work of man and be a fellow labourer for the general good. A man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all his energies to it; of course a good object, (n. 7.) He who has not one object or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his life. (xi. 21.) Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means of " reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which is, f Ixx THE PHILOSOPHY the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he was young and has had the op- portunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a man cannot always be so wise in his youth, en- courages himself to do it when he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun. He who can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be true to them, cannot fail to live con- formably to his own interest and the universal in- terest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a thing is not good for the hive, it is not good for the bee, (vi. 54.) One passage may end this matter. "If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that ? For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence ? But if they have not deter- mined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least; and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- OF ANTONINUS. Ixxi thing else which we do as if the gods were pre- sent and lived with us but if however the gods determine about none of the things which con- cern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution (xaraTusuY]) and nature. But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me/' (vi. 44.) It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are in no order or connec- tion, a man must use the book a long time before he will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If we analyse all other things, we find how insufficient they are for human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult to explain the notion fully to himself or to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists of parts than man's intelligence does, and yet we speak of various intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the various powers which man's in- Ixxii THE PHIL OSOPH Y tellect shows by its works. In the same way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to practise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as much as man's nature is capable of. The prime principle in man's constitution is social. The next in order is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not con- formable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is freedom from error and from deception. " Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own." (vn. 55.) The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x. 11), and this had been said long before his time. It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in conformity to this disposition ; but experience shows that men's notions about justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true notion of justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. " Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the exter- nal cause ; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature." (ix. 31.) In another place (ix. 1) he says that OF ANTONINUS. Ixxiii " he who acts unjustly acts impiously/' which fol- lows of course from all that he says in various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to its consequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. But this is enough. The Stoics and Antoninus among them call some things beautiful (aXa) and some ugly (od ' OF ANTONINUS. Ixxvii of entering into life and many ways of going out of it. The ways of going out indeed are many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of himself. Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's life. There is no rule of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own hap- piness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are only seeking the gratifica- tion of some particular passion, the strongest that they have. The end of a man is, as already ex- plained, to live conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind and contentment, (in. 12 ;vni. 1, and other places.) As a means of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief virtues, each of which has its proper sphere : wisdom or the knowledge of good and evil ; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the enduring of labour and pain ; and temperance, which is moderation in all things. By thus living conformably to nature, the Stoic obtained all that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago wrote : For virtue only of all human things Takes her reward not from the hands of others. Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue. Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise man's self sufficiency ; they elevated him to the g Ixxviii A NTONINUS. rank of a deity. 17 But these were only talkers and lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter fine words, know little of human affairs, and care only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and example laboured to improve themselves and others ; and if we discover imper- fections in their teaching, we must still honour these great men who attempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the constitution of things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult enough to live as we ought to live, diffi- cult even for any man to live in such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and religion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as much as they can be persuaded to accept. 17 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on " the Excellency and Nobleness of true religion" (c. vi. ) has remarked i ui this Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. In Seneca certainly, and perhaps something of it in Epictetus ; but it is not in Antoninus. M. ANTONINUS. I. )ROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I learned] good morals and the govern- ment of my temper. 2. From the reputation and re- membrance of my father, 2 modesty and a manly character. 3. From my mother, 3 piety and beneficence, and 1 Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is no verb in this section connected with the word" from," nor in the following sections of this book ; and it is not quite certain what verb should be supplied. What I have added may express the meaning here, though there are sections which it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that he learned all these good things from the several persons whom he mentions, he means that he observed certain good qua- lities in them, or received certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better for it, or at least might have been; for it would be a mistake to understand Marcus as saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed in his kinsmen and teachers. 2 His father's name was Annius Verus. 3 His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla. 2 M. ANTONINUS. I. abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts ; and further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich. 4. From my great-grandfather, 4 not to have fre- quented public schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things a man should spend liberally. 5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights; from him too I learned endurance of labour, and to want little, and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to slander. 6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to give credit to what was said by miracle- workers and jugglers about incan- tations and the driving away of daemons and such things ; and not to breed quails [Tor fighting]], nor to give myself up passionately to such things ; and to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become intimate with philosophy ; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and Marcianus ; and to have written dialogues in my 4 Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. M. ANTONINUS. I. 3 youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline. 7. From Rusticus 5 I received the impression that my character required improvement and dis- cipline ; and from him I learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who practises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to make a display ; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to do other things of the kind ; and to write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother ; and with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and re- conciled, as soon as they have shown a readiness to be reconciled ; and to read carefully, and not to be 5 Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus valued highly, and often took his advice. (Capitol. M. Antonin. iii.) Antoninus says, TOIQ ^TTIKTIJTEIOIQ vTrofJLvrjfjLacriv, which must not be translated, " the writings of Epictetus," for Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, ravra dOrjv V7rop,vr}f Lag. (Ep. ad 4 M. ANTONINUS. I. satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book ; nor hastily to give my assent to those who talk over- much ; and I am indebted to him for being ac- quainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he communicated to me out of his own collection. 8. From Apollonius 6 I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness of purpose ; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason ; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living example that the same man can be both most resolute and yield- ing, and not peevish in giving his instruction ; and to have had before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his skill in expound- ing philosophical principles as the smallest of his merits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are esteemed favours, without being either humbled by them or letting them pass unnoticed. 9. From Sextus, 7 a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family governed in a fatherly man- ner, and the idea of living conformably to nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look care- 6 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 7 Sextus of Chseronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. M. ANTONINUS. I. 5 fully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant^ persons, and those who form opinions without considerationf : he had the power of rea- dily accommodating himself to all, so that inter- course with him was more agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly venerated by those who associated with him : and he had the faculty both of discovering and order- ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the principles necessary for life ; and he never showed anger or any other passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy display, and he possessed much knowledge without osten- tation. 1 0. From Alexander 8 the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or sole- cistic or strange-sounding expression ; but dexte- rously to introduce the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion, 8 Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a funeral oration. 6 M. ANTONINUS. I. 11. From Fronto 9 I learned to observe what envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. 1 2. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure ; nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations. 13. From Catulus, 10 not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to his usual disposition ; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 14. From my brother 11 Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus ; 12 and from him I received the idea 9 Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favour with Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus and Fronto. 10 Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 11 The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no brother. It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin. Schultz omits " brother/' and says that this Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peripatetic. 12 We know, from Tacitus (Annal. xiil, xvi. 21$ and M. ANTONINUS. L 7 of a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights amTequal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the free^p^i_^fj^e^pverned ; I learned from him alsof consistency and undeviating steadiness in my re- gard for philosophy ; and a disposition to do good, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by my friends ; and in him I observed no concealment of his opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no need to conjecture what he ! wished or did not wish, but it was quite plain. I 15. From Maximus 13 1 learned self-government, and not to be led aside by anything ; and cheer- fulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness ; and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written the lives of the two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic. 13 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' prede- cessor. The character of Maximus is that of a perfect man. (See viii. 25.) 8 M. ANTONINUS. I. and that in all that he did he never had any bad intention ; and he never showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- picious. He was accustomed to do acts of bene- ficence, and was ready to forgive, and was free from all falsehood ; and he presented the appearance of a man who could not be diverted from right rather than of a man who had been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he was de- spised by Maximus, or ever venture to think him- self a better man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.f 16. In my father 14 I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things which he had determined after due deliberation ; and no vainglory in those things which men call honours ; and a love of labour and perseverance ; and a readiness to listen to those who had any- thing to propose for the common weal ; and un- iating firmness in giving to every man accord- ing to his deserts ; and a knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action and 14 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor Antoninus Pius. M. ANTONINUS. I. 9 for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for boys ; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen ; and he released his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first present themselves ; and that his disposition was to keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be, * & ' ,:. satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery ; and to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the expenditure, and patiently to en- dure the blame which he got for such conduct ; and he was neither superstitious with respect to r $ the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the populace ; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and never any mean thoughts or action, nor love 10 M. ANTONINUS. I. of novelty. And the things which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he used without arro- gance and without excusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, he honoured those who were true philosophers, and he did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made himself agree- able without any offensive affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body's health, not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but so that, through his own attention, he very sel- dom stood in need of the physician's art or of me- dicine or external applications. He was most ready to give way without envy to those who possessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else ; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy reputation according to his deserts ; and he M. ANTONINUS. L 11 always acted conformably to the institutions of his country, without showing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of change nor un- steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and to employ himself about the same things ; and after his paroxysms of headache he came im- mediately fresh and vigorous to his usual occu- pations. His secrets were not many, but very few and very rare, and these only about public matters ; and he showed prudence and economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the con- struction of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the repu- "i tation which is got by a man's acts. He did not take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the beauty of his slaves. 15 ^ His dress V/ came from Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. 16 We know how he behaved to the toll-collector in.Tusculum who asked his pardon ; and such was all his behaviour. There 15 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is un- certain. 16 Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt. <*/* , f * 7 '* . * r * 7 4 ' 12 M. ANTONINUS. I. *ii tit ,. 11 i i l was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the sweating point ; but he examined all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of Socrates, 17 that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy ^without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus. 17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a dis- position which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something of this kind ; but, through their favour, there never was such a con- currence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my grandfather's con- 17 Xenophon, Memordb. i. 3. 15. M. ANTONINUS. L 13 cubine, and that I preserved the flower of my *) youth, and that I did not make proof of my j virility before the proper season, but even de- J ferred the time ; that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues, and such-like show ; but that it is in such a man's power to bring himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a brother, 18 who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by his respect and affection ; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was making progress in them ; that I made haste to place those who brought me up in the station of 18 The emperor had no brother, except L. Verus, his brother by adoption. 14 M. ANTONINUS. I. honour, which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some time after, because they were then still young ; that I knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus ; that I received clear and frequent impressions about living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living accord- ing to nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions ; that my body has held r out so long in such a kind of life ; that I never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was ured; and, though I was often out of humour with Rusticus, I never did anything of which I had occasion to repent ; that, though it was my mother's fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with me ; that, whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it ; and that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive anything from another; that I have such a wife, 19 so obedient, 19 See the Life of Antoninus. M. ANTONINUS. I. 15 and so affectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for my children ; and that remedies hay been shown to me by dreams. both others, and against bloodspitting and giddi- ness 20 ******* and that, when I had an in- clination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [[of histories], or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the investi- gation of appearances in the heavens ; for all these things require the help of the gods and fortune. Among the Quadi at the Granua. 21 20 This is corrupt. 21 The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia ; and Antoninus made a campaign against them. (See the Life.') Granua is probably the river Graan, which flows into the Danube. If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written this first book during the war with the Quadi. In the first edition of Antoninus, and in the older editions, the first three sections of the second book make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker placed them at the beginning of the second book. II. >r EGIN the morning by saying to thy- self, I shall meet with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by_reason of their^gnorance of what is good and evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not only] of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature ; ancMt is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn a^vay^ i%t\0u)v fyjv diavoy, which Gataker translates ' ( as if thou wast about to quit life ; " but we can- not translate i%e\9wv in that way. Other translations are not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and left it imperfect. 76 M. ANTONINUS. V. what I choose ; and I choose to do what is ac- cording to the nature of the rational and social animal. 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- perior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- thing its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best. 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee : Never has wronged a man in deed or word. And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to endure : and that the his- tory of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended : and how many beautiful things thou hast seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despised ; and how many things called honourable thou hast spurned ; and to how many M. ANTONINUS. V. 77 ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposi- tion. 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls dis- turb him who has skill and knowledge ? What soul then has skill and knowledge ? That which knows beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance and through all time by fixed periods ^revolutions] administers the universe. 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; but name is sound and echo. And the things which are much valued in life are empty and rot- ten and trifling, and C^^^JLJi^l^^Gi-k^^E one another, and little children_quarrelling, laughing^ and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth are fled Up to Olympus from the wide spread earth. What then is there which still detains thee here ? if the objects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception are dull and easily receive false impressions ; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquil- lity for thy end, whether it is extinction or re- 78 M. ANTONINUS. V. moval to another state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient ? Why, what else than to vene- rate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and se^restraint; 3 but as to everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is neither thine nor in thy power. 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two things are common both to the soul of god and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination. 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it? and what is the harm to the common weal ? 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things, but give help [to all]] according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if 3 This is the Stoic precept avk-^ov Kai a.irk\ov. The first part teaches us to be content with men and things as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of self- restraint, or the government of our passions. M. ANTONINUS. V. 70 they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent* do not imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man when he went away asked back his foster-child's top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also. When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what these things are? Yes ; but they are objects of great concern to these people Wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things ? I was once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how. But fortunate means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions. 4 4 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section can- not be discovered. Perhaps several things have been im- properly joined in one section. I have translated it nearly literally. Different translators give the section a different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they cannot understand. VI. substance of the universe is obedient and compliant ; and the reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is any- thing harmed by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason. 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty ; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in hand. 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 4. All existing things soon change, and they M. ANTONINUS. VI. 81 will either be reduced to vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed. 5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what it does, and on what material it works. 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong doer. 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one social act to another social act, thinking of god. 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes every- thing which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills. 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which ex- ternally comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and independent of this. (xi. 1, vi. 40, vni. 50.) 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of things, and a dispersion ; or it is unity and order and providence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a for- G 82 M. ANTONINUS. VI. tuitous combination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust in him who governs, (iv. 27.) 11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by continually recurring to it. 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother : return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe M. ANTONINUS. VI. 83 some sheeps' wool dyed with the blood of a shell- fish : such then are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the rea- son, and when thou art most sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- ferred to the things which are held together by a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational so far as the 84 M. ANTONINUS. VI. possessing of a number of slaves. But he who values a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except this ; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condi- tion and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself. 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already ex- tinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite du- ration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would set a high price ? It would be just as if a man should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already past out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respi- ratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst first draw it. M. ANTONINUS. VI. 85 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor as- sembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; for this is just like the act of separating and part- ing with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued ? To be received with clap- ping of hands ? No. Neither must we value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing ? This in my opinion, to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper constitution, to which end all employments lead and all arts. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be adapted to the work for which it has been made ; and both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the edu- cation and the teaching of youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too ? Then thou wilt be neither free, 86 M. ANTONINUS. VI. nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things; and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor thy own mind will make thee content with thy- self, and in harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered. 17- Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in none of these : it is something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly observed it goes hap- pily on its road. 18. How strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living at the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they have never seen nor ever will see, this they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee. 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think that it is impossible for a M. ANTONINUS. VI. 87 man : but if anything is possible for a man and conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself too. 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life : let us overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change ; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance. 22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either things without life, or things without reason, or things that have rambled and know not the way. 23. As to the animals which have no reason and generally all things and objects do thou, since 88 M. ANTONINUS. VI. thou hast reason and they have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which thou shalt do this ; for even three hours so spent are sufficient. 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the same state ; for either they were received among the same seminal prin- ciples of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the atoms. 25. Consider how many things in the same in- divisible time take place in each of us, things which concern the body and things which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into exist- ence in that which is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter each letter ? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with composure and number every letter ? Just so then in this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to ob- M. ANTONINUS. VI. 89 serve and without being disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set before thee. 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable ! And yet in a man- ner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things because they sup- pose them to be suitable to their nature and pro- fitable to them But it is not so Teach them then, and show them without being angry. 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh. 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, when thy body does not give way. 30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. S tri ve to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence 90 M. ANTONINUS. VI. the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposi- tion and social acts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his piety, and the se- renity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to un- derstand things; and how he would never let any- thing pass without having first most carefully ex- amined it and clearly understood it ; and how he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of manners and actions he was ; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist ; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants; and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the usual hour ; and his firmness and uniformity in his friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that he had when any man showed him anything better ; and how pious he was with- M. ANTONINUS. VI. 91 out superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest have as good a conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had. (i. 16.) 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these the things about thee] as thou didst look at those Qhe dreams]. 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But to the understanding those things only are indifferent, which are not the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only those which are done with reference to the present ; for as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the present indif- ferent. 33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 02 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft, never- theless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason Qthe prin- ciples] of their own -arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods. 36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little clod of the universe : all the present time is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable. All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either directly pro- ceeding or by way of consequence. And accord- ingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all. 37- He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time M. ANTONINUS. VI. 93 without end ; for all are of one kin and of one form. 38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are impli- cated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another ; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of thet active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance. /v.^T 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast : and the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly [[sincerely]. 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things which are held together by nature there is within and there abides in them the power which made them ; wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act accord- ing to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in conformity to intelligence. 41 . Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee 04 M. ANTONINUS. VI. or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference between these things [^because we do not regard these things as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding fault with god or standing in a hostile attitude to man. 42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others with- out knowing what they do ; as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are laborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the universe. But men co-operate after different fashions : and even those co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe had need even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some part of the co-operators and of those whose M. ANTONINUS. VI. 95 labors conduce to one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of. 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- bearer the earth]? And how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to the same end ? 44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that ? for what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence ? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have cer- tainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- thing else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us but if however the gods de- termine about none of the things which concern 96 M. ANTONINUS. VI. us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal : this might be suf- ficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the mid- dle kind [^neither good nor bad]. 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; for all things above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then ? 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds of men]. To that M. ANTONINUS. VI. 97 place then we must remove, where there are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many heroes of former days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, con- fident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are altogether un- known ? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men. 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those who live with thee ; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing de- lights so much as the examples of the virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them before us. 49. Art thou dissatisfied because thou weighest only so many litrae and not three hundred? Be H 98 M. ANTONINUS. VI. not dissatisfied then that thou must live only so many years and not more ; for as thou art satisfied with the amount of substance which has been as- signed to thee, so be content with the time. 50. Let us try to persuade them [[men]. But act even against their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other virtue ; and remember that thy attempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst thou desire ? Some such effort as this But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast moved are [[not] accomplished. f 51. He who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own good ; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations ; but he who has un- derstanding, considers his own acts to be his own good. 52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgments. 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- sible, be in the speaker's mind. M. ANTONINUS. VI. 99 54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee. 55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends ? 56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone out of it. 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog? 58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- cording to the reason of thy own nature : nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the universal nature. 59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what objects, and by what kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all things, and how many it has covered already. VII. HAT is badness ? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the occasion of everything which hap- s^^$% pens keep this in mind, that it is that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are filled now. There is nothing new : all things are both familiar and short- lived. 2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions [^thoughts] which correspond to them are extinguished ? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about anything, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? The things which are external to my mind have M. ANTONINUS. VII. 101 no relation at all to my mind. Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in this consists the recovery of thy life. 3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fish- ponds, labouri ngs of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings all alike]. It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and not a proud air ; to understand however that every man is worth just so much as the things are worth about which he busies himself. 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to 102 M. ANTONINUS. VII. help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society. 6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to oblivion ; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long been dead. 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of another it is possible ? 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou usest for present things. 9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one god who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, Qone] common reason in all intelligent animals, and M. ANTONINUS. VII. 103 one truth ; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason. N+bf 10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole ; and everything formal Qcausal] is very soon taken back into the universal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed in time. 11. To the rational animal the same act is ac- cording to nature and according to reason. 12. Be thou erect, or be made erect, (in. 6.) 13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have been constituted for one co-operation. And the per- ception of this will be more apparent to thee, if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [j/cfAof] of the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r~\ thou sayest that thou art a part \jAt% o J, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart ; bene- ficence does not yet delight thee for its own sake; 1 thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 14. Let there fall externally what will on the 1 I have used Gataker's conjecture KaTa\r}KTuc& instead of the common reading KaraXrjTTTiKiog : compare IT. 20 5 ix. 42. 104 M. ANTONINUS. VII. parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that what has hap- pened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so. 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good, just as if the gold, or the emerald or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color. 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself, I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself pain.f But if any one else can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, for it will never deviatef into such a judgment. The leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself. 17. Eudaemonia [Tiappiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, O imagination ? go away, I intreat thee by the M. ANTONINUS. VII. 105 gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee : only go away. 18. Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take place without change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal na- ture ? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change ? and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change ? And can any- thing else that is useful be accomplished without change ? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature ? 19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swallowed up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to every man and thing. 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now. 21. Near is thy forge tfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 106 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will die ; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fa- culty worse than it was before. 23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened together. 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed, 2 the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any longer ? 25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which thou seest, and out of their 2 This is corrupt. M. ANTONINUS. VII. 107 substance will make other things, and again other things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be ever new. 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast : but of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them. 28. Retire into thyself . The rational principle which rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures tranquillity. 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pull- 108 M. ANTONINUS. VII. ing of the strings. Confine thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal] and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a man stay there where the wrong was done. 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter into the things that are doing and the things which do them. (vii. 4.) 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with indifference towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow god. The poet says that Law rules all t And it is enough to remember that law rules all.t 3 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change. 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that which lasts a long time is tolerable ; and the mind maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself,t and the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion about it. 34. About fame : look at the minds [of those 3 The end of this section is unintelligible. M. ANTONINUS. VII. 100 who seek fame], observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon covered by those which come after. 35. From Plato : 4 the man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all time and of all sub- stance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to think that human life is anything great ? it is not possible, he said. Such a man then will think that death also is no evil Certainly not. 36. From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good and to be abused. 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not to be re- gulated and composed by itself. 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought about it. 5 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn : One man is born ; another dies. 6 4 Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 5 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 6 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 110 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for it. 42. For the good is with me, and the just. 7 43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion. 44. From Plato : 8 But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man, who is good for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man. 45. 8 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth : wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a com- mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything else, before the baseness [[of deserting his post]. 46. But, my good friend, consider whether that in. 25.) has translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are these two lines, Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 7 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses. 8 Erom the Apologia. M. ANTONINUS. VII. Ill which is noble and good is not something different from saving and being saved ; for f we must not allow that it consists in living such or such a time, at least for one who is really a man ; f and he should not be fond of life, but entrusting this to god and believing what the women say, that no man can escape his destiny, he should next inquire how he may best live the time that he has to live.9 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along with them ; and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another ; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life. 48. This is a fine saying of Plato : l That he who is discoursing about men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some higher place ; should look at them in their assemblies, armies, agricultural labours, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamen- tations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination of contraries. 9 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68. In this passage the text of Antoninus has lareov, which is perhaps right; but there seems to be something wrong in the text. It is certainly difficult to see the exact construction of parts of the section. The reading WKT'SOV for eartov does not mend the matter. 10 It is not in the extant writings of Plato. 112 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 49. Consider the past ; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should deviate from the order of the things which take place now : accordingly to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see ? 50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth, But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, Back to the heavenly realms returns. 11 This is either a dissolution of the mutual involu- tion of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. 51. With food and drinks and cunning magic arts Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death. 12 The breeze which heaven has sent We must endure, and toil without complaining. 52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but let him not be more social, nor 11 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 12 The first two lines are from the Supp. of Euri- pides, v. 1110. M. ANTONINUS. VI L 113 more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his neighbors. 63. Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear : for where we are able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds according to our constitu- tion, there no harm is to be suspected. 64. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without being well examined. 55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal na- ture through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other things have been made for the sake of rational beings, just as among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the rational for the sake of one another. The prime principle then in man's constitution i 114 M. ANTONINUS. VII. is the social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to cir- cumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appe- tites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent mo- tion claims superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own. 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to the present time ; and live according to nature the remainder which is allowed thee. 57- Love that only which happens to thee, and is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable ? 58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault with them : and now where are they? Nowhere. Why then dost thou choose to act in the same way ? and why dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign M. ANTONINUS. VII. 115 to nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved by them ? and why art thou not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things which happen to thee ? for then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest : and remember *. 1S 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig. 60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the whole body. But all these things should be observed without affectation. 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's, in respect of this that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected. 62. Constantly observe who those are whose 13 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so cor- rupt that it is impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some critics and translators have done. 11G M. ANTONINUS. VII. approbation thou wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 63. Every soul,J;he_j)hilosopher sajs x is_in volun- tarily deprived of truth ; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou_wilt be more gentle towards all. 64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the in- telligence is rational u or so far as it is sociaL Indeed in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in ima- gination : and remember this too, that we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the same as pain, such as excessive 14 The text has IXi/c^, which it has been proposed to alter to XoyiKTj, and this change is necessary. We shall then have in this section Aoyijc?/ and KOIVWIKT] associated, as we have in s. 68 XoyiKij and iroXiTiKrj, and in s. 72. M. ANTONINUS. VII. 117 drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art dis- contented about any of these things, say to thy- self, that thou art yielding to pain. 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel towards men. 15 66. How do we know if Telauges was not su- perior in character to Socrates ? for it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and disputed more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering way in the streets though as to this one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on account of men's villany, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's ignorance, nor receiving as strange any- thing that fell to his share out of the universal nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his under- standing to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh. 15 I have followed Gataker's conjecture of aVdvfyxoTroi instead of the MSS. reading oi dvOpwiroi. 118 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 6?. Nature has not so mingledt[the intelligence] with the composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one. Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of na- ture, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and obedient to god. 68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity and in a just judgment of all sur- rounding things and in a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to the thing which falls under its obser- vation ; This thou art in substance [[reality], though in men's opinion thou mayst appear to be of a different kind ; and the use shall say to that which falls under the hand : Thou art the thing M. ANTONINUS. VII. 119 that I was seeking; for tome that which presents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and in a word for the exercise of art which belongs to man or god. For everything which happens has a relationship either to god or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to work on. 69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed be- cause during so long a time they must tolerate con- tinually men such as they are and so many of them bad ; and besides this they also take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is im- possible. 72. Whatever the rational and political Asocial] faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to itself. 73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou still look for a third ' 120 M. ANTONINUS. VII. thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return ? 74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing it to others. 75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either everything that takes place comes by way of consequence [or continuity] ; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational principle. If this is remembered it will make thee more tranquil in many things, (ix. 21, vi. 44. ) 16 10 It is not easy to understand this section. It has been suggested that there is some error in 17 aXoyiora, &c. Some of the translators have made nothing of the passage, and they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which framed an order. The next question is, How are things produced now $ or in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this : It is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all change and succession have been effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and the same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and the same as man is one and the same, which he believes himsolf to M. ANTONINUS. VIL 121 be, though he also believes and cannot help believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there is change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in the universe ; and if we say that there was an order framed in the beginning and that the things which are now produced are a consequence of a previous arrangement, we speak of things as we are compelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed states of any one. thing, so there are no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any other thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or following it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our constitu- tion, but not an idea which we can suppose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. The conclusion then is certain that the present and the past, the production of present things and the supposed original order, out of which we say that present things now come, are one : and the present productive power and the so-called past ar- rangement are only different names for one thing. I sup- pose then that Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There are certainly other passages from which, I think, that we may collect that he had notions of production something like what I have expressed. We now come to the alternative : " or even the chief things principle." I do not exactly know what he means by rd fcvpiwrara, " the chief," or, " the most ex- cellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks elsewhere of inferior and superior things, and of the inferior being for the use of the superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative assumes a governing power of the universe, 122 M. ANTONINUS. VII. and that it acts by directing its power towards these chief objects, or making its special, proper, motion towards them. And here he uses the noun (op/irj)'" movement," which con- tains the same notion as the verb (wp/irjdc) " moved," which he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking of the making of the universe. If we do not ac- cept the first hypothesis, he says, we must take the con- clusion of the second, that the u chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe makes a movement are directed by no rational principle." The meaning then is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing power, which strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude that there is no rational direction of anything, if the power which first made the universe does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now produced or now exists without the action of the supreme intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature of a supreme power, whose ex- istence Antoninus always assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from these reflections must result from his rejecting the second hypothesis, and accepting the first ; whatever may be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there is no providence which governs the world, man has at least the power of governing himself according to the constitu- tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does the best that he can. If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to discover the writer's exact meaning ; for I think that he had a meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Compare ix. 28. > If I have rightly explained the emperor's meaning in this and other passages, he has touched the solution of a great question. VIII. HIS reflection also tends to the re- moval of the desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher ; but both to many others and to thy- self it is plain that thou art far from philosophy Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others], and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness any- where, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in re- 124 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. putation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he has prin- ciples from which come his affects and his acts. What principles ? Those which relate to good and bad : the belief that there is nothing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free ; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned. 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the same law with god ? 3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- clitus and Socrates ? For they were acquainted with things, and their causes forms]], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves. 4. [^Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 126 6. This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, for all things are according to the nature of the universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and at the same time remem- bering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's nature demands, do it without turning aside ; and speak as it seems to thee most just, only let it be with good temper and with modesty and with- out hypocrisy. 6. The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove to that place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away here and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution of them also remains the same. 7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well ; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this common nature every particular nature is a 126 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. part, as the nature of the leaf is a part of the na- ture of the plant; except that in the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded ; but the nature of man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its worth times, substance, cause form~], activity, and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the parts together of one thing and com- paring them with all the parts together of another. 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arrogance : thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care for them. 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something useful ; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor use- ful. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 127 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution ? What is its substance and material ? And what its causal nature Qor form] ? And what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist ? 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is according to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that which is according to each in- dividual's nature, is also more peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable. 13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dia- lectic. 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, imme- diately say to thyself : What opinions has this man about good and bad ? For if with respect to plea- sure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death, and life he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and such things ; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so. 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- 128 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. prised if the figtree produces figs, so it is to be sur- prised if the world produces such and such things of which it is productive ; and for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavorable. 16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects thy error is as consis- tent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted ac- cording to thy own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own understanding too. 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? but if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame ? the atoms [[chance]] or the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct |~that which is the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault ? for nothing should be done without a purpose. 18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are\ elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they murmur not. 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun will M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 129 say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if common sense allows this. 20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the beginning and the con- tinuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be said of a light also. 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is diseased. Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and the remembered : and all this in a nook of this part of the world ; and not even here do all agree, no not any one with him- self : and the whole earth too is a point. 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day. 23. Am I doing anything? I do it with refer- ence to the good of mankind. Does anything K 130 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived. 24. Such as bathing appears to thee oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, so is every part of life and every thing. 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then Se- cunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where are they ? for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little compound, thy- self, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere. 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 131 the movements of the senses, to form a just judg- ment of plausible appearances, and to take a sur- vey of the nature of the universe and of the things which happen in it. 27. There are three relations [[between thee and other things] : the one to the body 1 which surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee. 28. Pain is either an evil to the body then let the body say what it thinks of it or to the soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil ascends so high. 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself : now it is in my power to let no bad- ness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturbation at all ; but looking at all things I see what is their nature, and I use each according to its value. Re- member this power which thou hast from nature. 30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, 1 The text has airiov which in Antoninus means " form," " formal." Accordingly Schulze recommends either Valkenaer's emendation ayyeiov, " body," or Corae's ffwpdTwv. Compare xn. 13, x. 38. 132 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. whoever he may be, appropriately, not with any affectation : use plain discourse. 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descen- dants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- mates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, physicians and sacrificing priests the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a single man, [but of a whole race], as of the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs, The last of his race. Consider what trouble those before them have had that they might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must be the last. Again here consider the death of a whole race. 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act ; and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content ; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty But something external will stand in the way Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately But perhaps some other active power will be hindered Well, but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in place of that \vhich was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to this order of which we are speaking. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 133 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arro- gance ; and be ready to let it go. 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thy- self from the natural unity for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off yet here there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the benevolence with which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal ; and when he has been separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a part. 35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the other powers that it has,f so we have received from it this power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything which stands in its way and opposes it, and makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to 134 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purpose as it may have designed. 2 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayst expect to befall thee : but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing ? for thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this. 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus ? 3 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it ? and if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased ? and if they were pleased, would that make them immortal ? Was it not in the order of destiny that these persons too should become old women and old men and then die? 2 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the paragraph, but the meaning will appear if the second Aoyucuiy is changed into bXwv: though this change alone will not establish the grammatical completeness of the text. 3 " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true reading. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 135 What then would those do after these were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag. 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, f says the philosopher. 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance. 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security Who is this self? The reason But I am not reason Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own opinion about itself, (vn. 16.) 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [^desires] is equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure affect thee ? The senses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely [^unconditionally, or, 136 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the understanding no one is used to impede, for neither fire nor iron nor tyrant nor abuse touches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never intentionally given pain even to another. 43. Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its value. 44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself : for those who rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after time will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that sound or have this or that opinion about thee? 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 137 there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this ["change of place] sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find which is sufficient reason for this? 4 46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee. 47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou art pained because thou art not doing some parti- 4 opeyofjisvr) in this passage seems to have a passive sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12. will help to explain the meaning. 138 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. cular thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than complain ? But some insuperable obstacle is in the way? Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on thee But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well-pleased too with the things which are obstacles. 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invin- cible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and deliberately? therefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this re- fuge is unhappy. 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 139 danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a man who knows everything that happens in the world. 50. A cucumber is bitter Throw it away. There are briars in the road Turn aside from them. This is enough. Do not add, And why were such things made in the world ? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings ; but the universal nature has no external space ; now the wondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed her- self, everything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very same, so that she requires neither sub- stance from without nor wants a place into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own space, and her own matter and her own art. 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in 140 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. thy conversation without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul in- ward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By forming thy- self hourly to freedom conjoined with benevolence, simplicity and modesty. 52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. What then dost thou think of him who Qavoids or] seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who they are. 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 141 curses himself thrice every hour? wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that he does ? 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to respire it. 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness Qof one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- leased from it, as soon as he shall choose. 56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just as indifferent as his breath and his flesh. For though we are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbour's wickedness would be my harm, which god has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another. 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not ef- 142 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. fused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- ingly its rays are called Extensions [a^TlVe^ be- cause they are extended \_a7ro TTOV cgTffwta]*' But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is ex- tended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with a solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to be the out-pouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live. 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them. 5 A piece of bad etymology. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 143 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed both when it exer- cises caution and when it is employed about in- quiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object. 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and also let every other man enter into thine. IX. who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity ; for the universal nature is the nature of all things that are ; and all things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving ; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the M. ANTONINUS. IX. 145 nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good con- trary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain. And farther, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected, for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both towards these they who wish to fol- low nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain then and pleasure or death and life or honor and dis- honor, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting 146 M. ANTONINUS. IX. impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in con- tinuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a certain original movement of provi- dence, according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having con- ceived certain reasons of the things which were to be, and having determined generative powers of substances and changes and such like successions. 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. How- ever to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this pestilence ? For the destruction of the understanding is a pestilence, much more in- deed than any such corruption and change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this cor- ruption is a pestilence of animals in so far as they are animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men in so far as they are men. 3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to M. ANTONINUS. IX. 147 grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This then is consistent with the character of a re- flecting man to be neither careless nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to death by observing the ob- jects from which thou art going to be removed and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently ; and yet to remember that thy departure will be not from men who have the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance 148 M. ANTONINUS. IX. of those who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O death, lest perchance I too should forget myself. 4. He who does wrong does wrong against him- self. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to him- self, because he makes himself bad. 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he who does a certain thing. 6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- ing, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything which happensf that is enough. 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : ex- tinguish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its own power. 8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed : just as there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that have life. 9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Every- thing which is earthy turns towards the earth, M. ANTONINUS. IX. 149 everything which is liquid flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so that they require something to keep them asun- der and the application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then every- thing also which participates in the common in- telligent nature moves in like manner towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. For so much as it is superior in com- parison with all other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves ; for even in animals there are souls, and that power which brings them to- gether is seen to exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of people ; and in wars treaties and armistices. But in the 360 M. ANTONINUS. IX. things which are still superior, even though they are separated from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are separated. See then what now takes place. For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and incli- nation, and in them alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But still though men strive to avoid Qhis union], they are caught and held by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. Sooner then will one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing than a man altogether separated from other men. 10. Both man and god and the universe pro- duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other things of the same kind as reason itself. 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. And the gods too are indulgent to such persons ; and for some purposes they even help them to get M. ANTONINUS. IX. 151 health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders thee? 12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied or admired : but direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires. 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions. 14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have buried. 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it then which does judge about them? The ruling fa- culty. 1 0. Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity. 17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up. (vin. 20.) 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading prin- 152 M. ANTONINUS. IX. .ciples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of them- selves. 19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the universe too. 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it is. (vu. 29, ix. 38.) 21. Termination of activity, cessation from move- ment and opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the consider- ation of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy oM age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear ? In like manner then neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of? 22. Hasten Qto examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe and that of thy neighbor: thy own that thou mayst make it just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbor, that M. ANTONINUS. IX. 153 thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly . or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also con- sider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine. 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let every act of thine be a com- ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement. 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the re- presentation of the mansions of the dead l strikes our eyes more clearly. 25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it altogether from its material part and then contemplate it ; then determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure. 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through 1 rb rrjq "NeKvLag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schulze supposes that it may be also a reference to the Nkvia of the Odyssey (lib. xi.) 154 M. ANTONINUS. IX. not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does the things which it is constituted by nature to do. But enough [of this]. 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee anything injurious, ap- proach their souls, penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about thee. However thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value. 28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in mo- tion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content with that which is the result of its activity ; or it put itself in motion once, and every- thing else comes by way of sequence 2 in a man- ner : or indivisible elements are the origin of all things. In a word, if there is a god, all is well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also be governed by it. * The words which immediately follow rar" t-n-aKoXov- Qrjaiv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. (Compare vu. 75.) M. ANTONINUS. IX. 155 Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth too will change, and the things also which result from change will continue to change for ever, and these again for ever. For if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable. 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : it carries everything along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are en- gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. Well then, man : do what nature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee to see if any one will ob- serve it ; nor yet expect Plato's Republic : but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men's principles ? and with- out a change of principles what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves shall judge whether they discovered what the universal nature required and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate 166 M. ANTONINUS. IX. them. Simple and modest is the work of philoso- phy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. 30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together, and die. And consider too the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthu- mous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else. 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature. 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe in thy mind and by contem- M. ANTONINUS. IX. 157 plating the eternity of time and observing the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from its birth to its dissolution, and the il- limitable time before its birth as well as the equally boundless time after its dissolution. 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been spectators of its disso- lution will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with him who died pre- maturely. 34. What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honor? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time without end. What then dost thou say? That all things have been and all things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to be bound in never ceasing evil? 158 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the substance of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, only bits of hair ; and purple die, blood ; and everything else is of the same kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the same kind, changing from this to that. ^ 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then now become at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we look at these things for a hundred years or three. 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 39. Either all things proceed from one intelli- gent source and come together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole : or there are only atoms and nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why then art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou M. ANTONINUS. IX. 169 playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? 3 40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If then they have no power, why dost thou pray to them ? But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou fearest or of not desiring any of the things which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray that any of these things should not happen or happen ? for certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods have placed them in thy power. Well then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man, than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are in our power ? Begin then to pray for such things and thou wilt see. One man prays thus : How shall I be able to lie with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : How shall I not 3 There is some corruption at the end of this section. I believe that the translation expresses the emperor's mean- ing. Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has, and be tranquil. 160 M. ANTONINUS. IX. desire to lie with her ? Another prays thus, How shall I be released from this ? Another prays : How shall I not desire to be released ? Another thus, How shall I not lose my little son ? Thou thus, How shall I not be afraid to lose him. In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what comes. 41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conver- sation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as before, keeping to this main point, how the mind while participating in such movements as go on in the poor flesh shall be free from per- turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do then the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- stances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that may befal us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or with one unac- quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools of philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which thou doest it. M. ANTONItfUS. IX. 161 42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it possible then that shameless men should not be in the world ? It is not possible. Do not then require what is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men, who must of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become better disposed towards every one individually. It is use- ful to perceive this too immediately when the occa- sion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given to man as an antidote, against the stupid man mildness, and against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray ; for every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what M 1C2 M. ANTONINUS. IX. harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service ? art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own ; so also as man is formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution and he gets what is his own. X. ILT thou then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee ? Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition ? Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring any- thing either animate or inanimate for the enjoyment of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst live in harmony ? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee and will be well what- ever shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of the perfect living being, 164 M. ANTONINUS. X. the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces all things which are dissolved for the production of other like things ? Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither to find fault with them at all nor to be condemned by them ? 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by nature only : then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules then and trouble thyself about nothing else. 3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear it, or that thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If then it happens to thee in such way that thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not com- plain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember M. ANTONINUS. X. 165 however that thou art formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion to make it endurable and toler- able, by thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this. 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 6. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- pared for thee from all eternity ; and the impli- cation of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being and of that which is incident to it. (in. 11. iv. 26.) 6. Whether the universe is [a, concourse of] atoms, or nature ps a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to me out of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage ; and all natures indeed have this com- mon principle, but the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 1G6 M. ANTONINUS. X. even by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering then that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the com- mon interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now if these things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content with whatever the state may assign to him. 7. The parts of the whole, everything I mean which is naturally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish ; but let this be understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity M. ANTONINUS. X. 167 fall into evil, or have such results happened with- out her knowing it ? Both these suppositions in- deed are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term Nature [[as an efficient power] and should speak of these things [[change]] as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were hap- pening contrary to nature, particularly as the dis- solution of things is into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is either a disper- sion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that thesepartsare taken back into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the food and the air which is inspired. This then, which has received [the accretion], changes, not that which thy mo- ther brought forth. But suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that other part, which has the peculiar 168 M. ANTONINUS. X. quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said. 1 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change these names ; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a discrimi- nating attention to every several thing and freedom from negligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the things which are as- signed to thee by the common nature ; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh and above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such things. If then thou main- tainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring to be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning which appears to be consistent with the whole argument. M. ANTONINUS. X. 169 though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the following day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names : and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain islands of the Happy. 2 But if thou shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and 2 The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius,. c. 8.) In the Odyssey Proteus told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at the boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt: (Odyssey, iv. 565.) For there in sooth man's life is easiest : Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr Oceanus sends up to gladden man. It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some old legend without having any knowledge of any place which corresponds to his description. The two is- lands which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira and the adjacent island. 170 M. ANTONINUS. X. freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thus. In order however to the remembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee,if thou rememberest the gods and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man. 9. Mimi, 3 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine. fHow many things without studying nature dost thou imagine and how many dost thou neglect? 4 But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- fidence which comes from the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 3 Corae conjectured (Uffog " hatred " in place of Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all or nearly all. 4 This is corrupt. M. ANTONINUS. X. 171 of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who are able both to give it and take it away ? 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if thou examinest their principles ? 5 11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into one another, and con- stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about this part of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do against him, 5 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like the rest. 172 M. ANTONINUS. X. he never even thinks of it, being himself contented with these two things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being satisfied with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside all distracting and busy pursuits and desires nothing else than to accomplish the straight course through the law, 6 and by accomplishing the straight course to follow god. 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way content, without turning back : but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also cheerful and collected. 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it will make any difference to thee, if another does what is just and right. It will make no difference. Hast thou forgotten that those who assume 6 By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will of God. M. ANTONINUS. X. 173 arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, and hast thou forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon ^happiness] ? (vn. 17.) 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed and modest says: Give what thou wilt ; take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased with her. 15. Short is the little which remains to theeof life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state Apolitical community]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to live thus fas men do]. 16. No longer talk about the kind of man that a good man ought to be, but be such.. 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet. 174 M. ANTONINUS. X. 1 8. Look at everything that exists and observe that it is already in dissolution and in change and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when they are imperiousf and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what things ; and after a little time consider in what a condition they will be. 20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it. 21. " The earth loves the shower ;" and " the solemn aether loves:" and the universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that " this or that loves [js wont] to be produced ?" 7 7 These words are from Euripides. They are cited by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 296.) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning tpf ^iv o/i/3/oou yala. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus. It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb