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DEVELOPMENT AND 
 DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
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DEVELOPMENT AND 
 DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 BY 
 
 VERNON F. STORR, M.A. 
 
 n 
 
 FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 LECTURER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN CAMBRIDCF. UNIVERSITY 
 
 EXAMINING CHAPLAIN TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTLRBURY 
 
 METHUEN & CO. 
 
 36 ESSEX STREET W.C. 
 
 LONDON 
 
&LZ 
 
 First Publishediin igo6 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The present volume contains the first set 
 of lectures given before the University of 
 Cambridge, under the terms of the lectureship 
 established in 1904 through the generosity of 
 Dr. Stanton, Ely Professor of Divinity. It 
 may be well to reprint in full from The Cam- 
 bridge University Reporter of 23rd February, 
 1904, the letter in which Dr. Stanton communi- 
 cated his offer to the Vice-Chancellor of the 
 University : — 
 
 11 The Senate last June accepted the proposal 
 of the Special Board for Divinity to add to Part 
 II. of the Theological Tripos a new Section 
 on the Philosophy of Religion and Christian 
 Ethics, the first examination in which is to be 
 held in June 1906. We may hope that some 
 students will begin to prepare for this examina- 
 tion after the present Academic Year, and the 
 
 question of providing for any who may do so, 
 
 (v) 
 
 492300 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 the advice and teaching which they will re- 
 quire, must soon be taken into consideration. 
 
 I think that some of the existing staff of 
 Divinity teachers in the University may be 
 able and glad to give assistance in certain of 
 the subjects included in the Schedule. But it 
 is also very desirable that courses of lectures 
 should be given from time to time by some 
 one who is an expert in philosophy, in a way 
 that those who have been much occupied with 
 Theology, Biblical Criticism, and Church His- 
 tory can rarely succeed in being, and who has 
 also given special attention to the subject of 
 its relation to religious belief. ... I believe 
 that such lectures would prove attractive to 
 others besides students for the new section of 
 the Theological Tripos." 
 
 This offer the Senate gratefully accepted, 
 and the lectureship was officially entitled a 
 
 II Lectureship in the Philosophy of Religion ". 
 Under the terms of the benefaction the lecturer 
 is required to deliver a minimum of twelve 
 lectures in each academic year. The lectures 
 here printed were given in the Michaelmas 
 term of 1904 and the Lent term of 1905 and 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 were open to the general public. They were 
 thirteen in number, and are reproduced sub- 
 stantially as they were spoken. 
 
 I cannot claim the merit of any special origin- 
 ality for the contents of this volume, though 
 I have tried to assimilate and make my own 
 what I have learned from other writers. Yet 
 I venture to hope that the book may serve 
 a useful purpose, in that it brings together a 
 number of ideas connected with the Argument 
 from Design and the conception of Develop- 
 ment which possess a true organic unity, and 
 represent a mental outlook shared by many 
 at the present time. Where I have directly 
 borrowed a thought or suggestion from another 
 I have endeavoured to acknowledge my debt 
 in the footnotes. But I should like to say here 
 that the books which have most helped to shape 
 my own thinking upon the subjects on which 
 I have written are, Professor Campbell Fraser's 
 Gififord Lectures, The Philosophy of Theism ; 
 Professor Ward's Gififord Lectures, Naturalism 
 and Agnosticism ; and Dr. Martineau's Study 
 of Religion. A life-long debt also I owe to 
 my uncle, Mr. Reginald Fanshawe, formerly 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 Fellow of New College, and I am glad to 
 take this opportunity of expressing my grati- 
 tude for all that he has done for me in the 
 way of moulding and stimulating my mental 
 development. Though, with the exception of 
 a suggestion or two for the introductory lecture, 
 the present course was written without advice 
 from him or from any one, yet I feel that 
 the interchange of ideas which we have had 
 together during the past few years, as occasion 
 has offered itself, has helped not a little to de- 
 termine my present outlook, both theological 
 and philosophical. This is not a kind of debt 
 which can be repaid. The only form of re- 
 payment possible is to follow the leading so 
 generously given, and, while striving to grow 
 oneself into a clearer vision and larger under- 
 standing of the truth, to share with others 
 thoughts which have proved themselves so 
 pregnant with life for one's own mind. 
 
 V. F. S. 
 
 Bramshott, 1906 
 
PAGE 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 18 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 i. Scope of the Philosophy of Religion 
 
 2. Theology and the Philosophy of Religion 
 
 3. Importance of Idea of Development 
 
 4. Importance of Idea of Purpose 
 
 5. Scope of the present volume . 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN * 
 
 1. Paley and the Notion of Contrivance 22 
 
 2. A Teleology of Special Instances 28 
 
 3. Fixity and Special Creation of Species 33 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 DARWIN AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL 
 SELECTION 
 
 1 . The Theory of Natural Selection 41 
 
 2. Its Relation to Argument from Design 48 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 
 
 1. Analysis of Idea of Progress ....... 54 
 
 2. Failure of Natural Selection to Explain Progress ... 58 
 
 3. Theories to Explain Progress 70 
 
 4. Progress and Design ........ 81 
 
 (ix) 
 
x CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 
 
 PAGE 
 
 i. The Problem of Origin 88 
 
 2. A First Cause 95 
 
 3. The Problem of Direction 98 
 
 4. Human Will a Directing Agency . . . . . . 102 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 TELEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 
 
 1. The Organism not Passive no 
 
 2. Theory of Sexual Selection 115 
 
 3. Spiritual Factors Everywhere Operative . . . .118 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 RESTATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 
 
 1. Need of Restatement 123 
 
 2. The Appeal of the Whole 127 
 
 3. The Analogy of Self-Consciousness 131 
 
 4. The Meaning of Immanence ....... 134 
 
 5. Partial or Universal Design . 138 
 
 6. Conception of Value in Design 147 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 
 
 1. Characteristics of Living Matter . . . . . . 153 
 
 2. The Unity of Organisms . 164 
 
 3. Mechanical Explanation of Organisms 168 
 
 4. Abstract Character of Physical Science 176 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN— DIFFICULTIES 
 AND OBJECTIONS 
 
 1. Kant's View of Organisms 187 
 
 2. The Argument from Analogy *9° 
 
 3. Weaknesses of Teleological Argument . . . . . 197 
 
 4. The Nature of God . 205 
 
CONTENTS xl 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 PAGE 
 
 i. Growth of Idea of Development 210 
 
 2. Development and Change 216 
 
 3. The End Gives the Meaning of Development . . . 221 
 
 4. Origin and Validity 229 
 
 5. The Scientific and Philosophical Problems .... 235 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 1. Newman's Theory of Development 244 
 
 2. Tests of Development : — 
 
 (a) Preservation of Type 255 
 
 (b) Chronic Vigour 260 
 
 (c) Assimilative Power 263 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 
 
 1. Moral Trust 268 
 
 2. Causality and Will 270 
 
 3. Moral Will 279, 
 
 4. Will not Capricious 282 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
 AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 r T*HE speculative activity of the present time 
 -*- is characterised, one may affirm with cer- 
 tainty, by one prominent feature — its general 
 recognition of the unity of knowledge, and of 
 the close correlation and interdependence which 
 exist between the various departments of in- 
 quiry. Special branches of study still retain 
 their speciality, but it grows more and more 
 difficult to draw hard and fast lines of demarca- 
 tion round the subject-matter of each. What 
 we may designate as borderland problems hold 
 an increasingly important place, whether in 
 natural science, ethics, or psychology. Truth is 
 seen to be organic and concrete, and, for its ap- 
 prehension, men recognise that an organic atti- 
 
2 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 tude of mind is necessary. Such an attitude of 
 mind was that of the late Dr. Hort, whose 
 Hulsean lectures, The Way, the Truth, the 
 Life — lectures given, let us remember, at the 
 very same period when the theologian was also 
 examining in the Natural Sciences Tripos — will, 
 assuredly, for many a long year to come, con- 
 tinue to deliver their profound and striking 
 message. No one understood more clearly than 
 Dr. Hort that truth enters the mind of man by 
 many avenues, and that the ripest thought and 
 the clearest illumination come only to those who 
 seek to see truth in its many-sidedness, and to 
 grow into its fulness. 
 
 It was some such recognition as this of 
 the organic nature of truth which doubtless 
 prompted Professor Stanton to make his most 
 generous offer, from which has resulted the 
 foundation of the present lectureship. And 
 that the University of Cambridge should have 
 selected a member of the sister University of 
 Oxford to be her first lecturer in the Philosophy 
 of Religion is, surely, proof that, corresponding 
 to the recognition of the interdependence of all 
 branches of knowledge, is the practical feeling 
 that all seekers for truth belong to one brother- 
 hood, and that the search is best promoted by 
 
INTRODUCTORY 3 
 
 throwing open to competition teachers' posts, 
 which, in earlier years, might have been re- 
 garded as closed to any others than members 
 of the society in which the vacancy occurred. 
 The justification for attributing to the founder 
 of this lectureship a certain intention is to be 
 found in the notice in The University Reporter 
 of 23rd February, 1904, which embodies Pro- 
 fessor Stanton's letter, offering to endow this 
 post. The reason given in that letter for the 
 foundation of the lectureship is, that a new 
 section, dealing with the Philosophy of Religion 
 and Christian Ethics, has just been added to the 
 Theological Tripos. Further, one of the regula- 
 tions attached to the tenure of this office is, 
 that the lecturer shall submit in advance a state- 
 ment of the proposed subject of his lectures, both 
 to the special Board for Divinity, and to the 
 special Board for Moral Science. May not this 
 be taken as conclusive evidence that in Cam- 
 bridge the view obtains that the problems of 
 ethics, theology, philosophy are all vitally 
 interconnected, and that, in some sense, the 
 Philosophy of Religion may be regarded as 
 mediating between these three? This, at any 
 rate, is how the present lecturer interprets for 
 himself the terms of his commission, that he is 
 
4 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 required to lecture on those subjects which lie 
 on the confines of science, philosophy, theology, 
 those borderland problems of which mention 
 has just been made. 
 
 To define with any exactness the scope of a 
 Philosophy of Religion is not easy, nor will any 
 attempt at such definition be made here. But 
 I may, perhaps, be allowed to offer a few in- 
 troductory remarks upon the point, before 
 proceeding to characterise more precisely the 
 subject-matter of this volume. The supreme 
 function of the Philosophy of Religion is, from 
 one point of view, the same as that of all philo- 
 sophy, to discover the ultimate unity or ground 
 of all being and knowledge. But she is, per- 
 haps, more particularly concerned with the in- 
 vestigation of the three following problems. Can 
 personality be predicated of that ultimate unity ? 
 What is the relation in which this unity stands 
 to man ? What importance and significance are 
 to be attached to the verdicts of the common 
 religious consciousness ? For purposes of analy- 
 sis and exposition we speak of these as three 
 problems, but they are really one. They all 
 merge in the great inquiry, whether God is a 
 Personal Being. That, after all, is the supreme 
 question to which we seek an answer. As 
 
INTRODUCTORY 5 
 
 ethical beings, we wish to discover whether the 
 moral laws, which ethics conceives as abstract 
 and impersonal, can be interpreted as the ex- 
 pression of a Divine will and character ; whether 
 the strange, spiritual significance of the beauty 
 of the natural world of form and colour — the 
 " fancy from a flower-bell," the "sunset touch" 
 — is only illusion, born of irrational associa- 
 tion, or whether it is a real witness to a personal 
 existence, greater than ourselves ; whether our 
 deepest hopes and aspirations, the out-reaching 
 of our spirits after a Father of all spirits, in 
 prayer, and resolve, and consecration of self, are 
 vain and fruitless, or whether there is a God 
 who hears, and answers, and regards. Just be- 
 cause religion is the movement of man's whole 
 personality towards that final unity which we 
 call God, and which faith interprets as a person, 
 the conception of personality remains the central 
 conception in a Philosophy of Religion. The 
 religious life of man demands that he shall be 
 able to enter into conscious relationship with a 
 personal God. The history of religious develop- 
 ment has been, on the whole, that of a progress 
 towards God, interpreted as a personal Being, 
 while the noblest form of known religion dis- 
 tinctly characterises God as possessed of a per- 
 
6 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 sonality which has true and abiding points of 
 affinity with our own. The religious conscious- 
 ness seems to grasp God by methods more direct 
 than those which are available for philosophic 
 reason. Religion lays hold by immediate intui- 
 tion, as it were, of the supreme object of her faith. 
 Prayer affords an open avenue of approach ; the 
 feelings of awe and reverence place her at once 
 in the heart of the Divine presence. It is for the 
 Philosophy of Religion to justify, if she can, these 
 direct verdicts of the common consciousness. 
 As life precedes philosophy, so religion precedes 
 that further reflection upon herself which we 
 call the Philosophy of Religion. If this justifica- 
 tion can be achieved, if God can be made real 
 to reason and reflection, there will result, surely, 
 for the individual, what we may call a larger 
 intuition, or immediate apprehension of God, as 
 certain, as direct, as the other, but more strong 
 to withstand the disintegrating effects of criticism. 
 The temper of the steel will have been tested, 
 the dross will have been burnt away from the 
 true metal. What we are urging is this, that, 
 just as the simple, religious consciousness never 
 lays hold of God by a movement of reason or re- 
 flection alone, so, after reflection has been brought 
 to bear upon the contents of the religious con- 
 
INTRODUCTORY * 7 
 
 sciousness, reason will find herself transfigured 
 into something larger than what we usually mean 
 by the word. She will be an organic reason, a 
 reason expressive of the whole rich content of 
 human nature. 
 
 To arrive, however, at this mature and 
 reasoned conviction of the existence and per- 
 sonality of God, is to have achieved the supreme 
 synthesis of thought. It is to put the coping- 
 stone upon the building. The goal is only to 
 be won, if it is to be won at all, after many 
 efforts and much labour have been devoted to 
 the solution of subordinate problems. And the 
 Philosophy of Religion is called on to investigate 
 these subordinate problems. Her inquiry here 
 becomes one with that of general philosophy, 
 which receives at the hands of the special sci- 
 ences the conclusions which they have reached, 
 and revises and correlates them in the light 
 of her conviction, that there is a final unity 
 somewhere to be found. Like philosophy, the 
 Philosophy of Religion will show a spirit of re- 
 ceptiveness, patience, humility ; but, in all her 
 inquiries, she will be constantly reminding her- 
 self that it is religion in which she is primarily 
 interested, and that religion is something very 
 old and universal among men. The remem- 
 
8 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 brance of this fact, while it need not create a 
 bias or prejudice in her mind, will certainly affect 
 the spirit and temper of her inquiry. There is 
 no such thing as complete impartiality of mind. 
 All speculation rests on a basis of some pre- 
 suppositions. Every investigator brings with 
 him, to his work of search, his own complex 
 personality. An absolutely impartial mind 
 would be an empty mind. 
 
 One other introductory topic, upon which a 
 few words must be said, is the relation of theo- 
 logy to the Philosophy of Religion. 
 
 The situation here may be summed up by 
 saying that, in matters theological, the move- 
 ment of reason must be free and unfettered. 
 We can no longer adopt the mediaeval dictum, 
 that philosophy is the handmaid of theology. 
 Theology, if she would lay claim to the title 
 of scientific, must herself adopt the method of 
 reason, which is the method of free inquiry. 1 
 The principle of authority cannot be, for a 
 reasoning being, an ultimate principle. In so 
 far as the dogmatic utterances of any theological 
 system represent the summed up reflection of 
 the thoughtful minds of the past, the Philosophy 
 
 1 See Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy, chap, xiii., pp. 
 352-4. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 9 
 
 of Religion will treat them with the utmost rever- 
 ence ; but she will hold herself free to criticise 
 them, and, if need be, to restate them. If they 
 were born of critical reflection, reflection may 
 still ask them for their credentials. The Philo- 
 sophy of Religion is not worthy of the name of 
 philosophy unless she preserves her right of 
 free inquiry at the bar of reason. Even a 
 religion which claims to be a revealed religion 
 must appear before this tribunal ; for she has to 
 prove that the mysteries, which she holds in 
 her hands, are God-given, and she can make 
 good her position only by the appeal to reason. 
 
 It is, I think, worth while to insist upon this 
 point, for there is still to-day much use made, in 
 what can only be called an irrational manner, of 
 this principle of authority in religion ; while a 
 very interesting psychological study is presented 
 by some theologians who seem to have effected, 
 in their own minds at any rate, an adjustment 
 or compromise between the principle of reason 
 and the principle of authority. A careful analy- 
 sis, for example, of what one may call the logic 
 of such a volume of essays as Lux Mundi, would, 
 not improbably, reveal grave incompatibilities of 
 thought and method. 
 
 This, however, is by the way. What I would 
 
io DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 venture to urge is, that, in an age which has 
 been touched by the spirit of criticism, and, 
 above all, by the spirit of historical inquiry, 
 any appeal to the principle of authority, as such, 
 and as an independent principle, cannot possibly 
 be justified. There is a wealth of meaning in 
 a saying of the late August Sabatier, which 
 occurs in the preface to his volume (posthumously 
 published, and recently translated into English), 
 The Religions of Authority and the Religion of 
 the Spirit} He writes, " The history of a dogma 
 is its inevitable criticism ". Every dogma, that 
 is, received shape under definite, historical con- 
 ditions, and the formulation of the truth was 
 affected under pressure from those conditions. 
 The organism took some colour from its envi- 
 ronment. To understand the dogma, therefore, 
 you must study it in the light of the historical 
 circumstances under which it arose. From the 
 origin of the dogma you pass on, naturally, to 
 study its subsequent history. You begin to 
 criticise it, from the point of view of its suitable- 
 ness to the needs, both intellectual and practical, 
 of a later time. You ask, whether the dogma 
 is the expression of a truth, which is a truth for 
 
 1 Theological Translation Library, Williams & Norgate. 
 
INTRODUCTORY n 
 
 us, here and now, or whether lapse of time has 
 revealed it as belonging to the things which 
 pass away. Or, if the truth, which the dogma 
 embodies, proves itself to be possessed of a 
 present vitality, you inquire if there may not 
 still be need for restating that truth in language 
 more suitable to the advancing thought of the 
 age. May we not have to disentangle, in the 
 dogma, the local and temporary elements from 
 those which are essential and eternal ? A task, 
 such as this, is a paramount duty for an age 
 which is characterised by the spirit of historical 
 inquiry ; but, in undertaking the task, you part 
 company with the principle of authority, as an 
 independent principle. A little farther on, in 
 the introduction to the same volume, Sabatier 
 asks this question : " What is the education of 
 mankind, if not the passage from faith in author- 
 ity to personal conviction, and to the sustained 
 practice of the intellectual duty to consent to no 
 idea, except by virtue of its recognised truth, to 
 accept no fact until its reality has been, in one 
 way or another, established ? " 
 
 Passing now to the more immediate subject 
 of this volume, we proceed to indicate its scope 
 and intention, and to say something as to the 
 reasons which make the subject a fruitful field 
 
12 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of inquiry at the present time. The two ideas 
 of Purpose and Development are closely con- 
 nected in the thought of this generation. The 
 question which we are all asking is, What is the 
 meaning, and what are the essential implications 
 of the idea of development or growth ? Will 
 development prove, on analysis, to be a teleo- 
 logical conception, or can we interpret it without 
 any reference to the idea of purpose? The 
 sovereign principle which rules our minds to- 
 day in every department of inquiry is that of 
 development or evolution ; and, if we would 
 understand the mind of the century in which 
 we live, we must make some attempt to interpret 
 the principle. Fully to interpret it will be im- 
 possible. To no age is it given to understand 
 completely the ideas which govern it. Just as 
 you cannot appreciate the height of a mountain 
 if you stand at its immediate base, so you cannot 
 see the full significance of an idea, such as that 
 of development, until a considerable period of 
 time has elapsed, during which the idea has had 
 opportunity to reveal itself in its richness and 
 complexity. Even now we do not understand 
 adequately the significance of the principle of 
 nationality, though that principle has been at 
 work in human societies since the dissolution of 
 
INTRODUCTORY 13 
 
 the Roman Empire. We are all feeling our way 
 towards a comprehension of this conception of 
 development, which is proving itself to be so 
 profound, and so charged with meaning. And 
 there is all the more reason for this attempt at 
 analysis and interpretation when we remember 
 how recklessly the word " evolution" is used. 
 Many seem to think that the mere utterance of 
 the term brings with it a lucid explanation of all 
 difficulties. Many forget, too, that evolution 
 may mean very different things when applied 
 to different subjects or fields of inquiry. In 
 investigating, then, such a problem as the 
 meaning of development, we are turning the 
 eye of critical reflection inward upon the dom- 
 inant movement of our own thought. We are 
 seeking to understand ourselves more clearly, 
 so to grasp the essential spirit of our own age 
 that we may the better help to mould the de- 
 velopment of the ages which are to follow. 
 
 Again, theological questions are to-day exer- 
 cising a peculiar fascination over a growing 
 number of students. Why is this? Is it not 
 because this conception of development is being 
 applied in the sphere of theology? Theology 
 has at times stood apart from the movements of 
 thought around her, and she has always done so 
 
14 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 with loss to herself. But even the most secluded 
 mountain lake sometimes feels the full fury of 
 the gale, and to-day theology stands exposed to 
 all the winds which blow from the four quarters 
 of the heaven. Men are seeing that the law of 
 development operates in theology as elsewhere, 
 and on all sides they are setting themselves to 
 investigate the history and conditions of this 
 evolution. They bring into play their powers 
 of regressive historic sympathy, and endeavour 
 to disengage the germinal principles of Christi- 
 anity from the accretions, or the natural develop- 
 ments, of later times. They retrace, critically, 
 the whole movement of the river from mouth to 
 source, and back again from source to mouth, 
 and the task is one of the profoundest interest. 
 It cannot, therefore, be amiss, in the face of such 
 speculative activity upon these most vital of all 
 problems, to ask ourselves what the idea of 
 development really means. 
 
 If, on the other hand, we think of the idea of 
 purpose, there are not wanting good reasons 
 for an investigation of this conception. First 
 and foremost stands the fact of our own pur- 
 posive activity as rational beings. Whatever 
 doubt there may be about the applicability of 
 the conception of purpose to the operations of 
 
INTRODUCTORY 15 
 
 the natural world, there can be none whatever 
 about its applicability to ourselves. We do 
 habitually act with purpose. We set up before 
 ourselves ends, and contrive means to reach 
 them. And it is inevitable that we should ask 
 whether the principle of final causation is not to 
 have some place in our interpretation of the 
 world around us, whether we may not use our 
 own human nature as a key to unlock the riddle 
 of the universe. The historical importance of 
 the argument from design is sufficient justifi- 
 cation for making an attempt once more to 
 examine its validity. By a kind of native in- 
 stinct man has always seen, and will continue 
 to see, evidences of the work of a designing 
 mind in the natural world. He refuses to 
 acquiesce in a view of the universe which 
 makes him a lonely being in the midst of a 
 world of matter, which shows no trace of spiritual 
 kinship with his own nature. His interest lies 
 in proving, if he can do so, that the purposive- 
 ness which he finds in himself is linked on to 
 a larger purposiveness, running through the 
 whole scheme of existence. 
 
 As an additional reason for investigating at 
 the present time the conception of purpose, we 
 may mention the recent appearance of a move- 
 
16 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 ment in philosophy, known as personal idealism. 
 The supporters of this movement contend that, 
 if we would rise to a true interpretation of real- 
 ity, we must start from the practical activities of 
 human nature, the will, the striving after the 
 realisation of ends, the whole conative move- 
 ment of the personality. They maintain that 
 the idealistic philosophy of the past has been 
 too abstract, both in method and results, and 
 that its conclusions stand in need of revision. 
 Such revision they are attempting to carry out, 
 on the basis of a psychology which finds in 
 will and purpose the keynote of human nature. 
 Upon the success of the attempt it is too early, 
 as yet, to pass judgment, for the results of the 
 movement are not sufficiently matured. But of 
 its importance there can be no doubt. Any 
 speculative endeavour to emphasise the element 
 of will, and to interpret ultimate reality in teleo- 
 logical terms, must command attention, because 
 of its appeal to some of the convictions which lie 
 deepest in our spiritual nature. 
 
 Once more, whatever view we may ultimately 
 take of the Christian religion, we are face to face 
 with this fact, that the highest known form of 
 religion, the form which seems to be possessed 
 of the vitality necessary to make it a conquering, 
 
INTRODUCTORY 17 
 
 missionary creed, is one which conceives of the 
 world as the stage upon which a great, historic 
 purpose is being slowly consummated. Christi- 
 anity (and we may include under the term the 
 earlier beliefs of the Old Testament, which belong 
 to the same line of spiritual ancestry) was the 
 first religion to possess a philosophy of history. 
 And the dominant conception of that philosophy 
 is this, that through time and in the seeming 
 maze of human history a divine, eternal purpose 
 is being gradually worked out. The Philosophy 
 of Religion has to investigate the demand of 
 Christianity to be regarded as a true explana- 
 tion of the world-process. In particular, she is 
 confronted with a unique, historic figure who 
 claims, not only to fulfil the past, but to control 
 the future ; in whom, as in a focus- point, many 
 convergent lines of evolution seem to meet, and 
 from whom radiate out new forces of develop- 
 ment. The Christ of history raises the teleo- 
 logical problem in an acute form. 
 
 We have already suggested that one of the 
 most pressing problems for our thought to-day 
 is how we are to interpret development. Is the 
 conception to be construed teleologically ? Do 
 the two ideas of purpose and evolution ultimately 
 involve each other ? This problem is raised in 
 
18 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 a special manner by the conflict between evolu- 
 tionary science and teleology, over the argument 
 from design. Have modern biological theories 
 of evolution succeeded in destroying the argu- 
 ment, based, as it is, upon the existence of 
 exquisite adaptations in the organic world ? 
 Has Darwin given the final quietus to Paley's 
 contention in the Natural Theology ? This is 
 a question which is full of interest at the present 
 time, and it raises clearly, at a particular point, 
 the important issue as to the compatibility or 
 incompatibility of the two conceptions of purpose 
 and development. It forms one of the problems 
 with which the Philosophy of Religion has to 
 deal. Historically, the argument from design 
 has played a significant part in the determina- 
 tion of the wider problem of the existence and 
 character of God. Since it has fallen somewhat 
 into disrepute to-day, there is all the more need 
 to examine it carefully, in order that we may 
 decide whether the argument is worthless, or 
 whether it only requires to be restated to recover 
 its apologetic value for the theist. 
 
 The title of this volume, Development and 
 Divine Purpose, covers so wide a field that it 
 is obvious that in the space at our disposal no 
 exhaustive treatment of the subject is possible. 
 
INTRODUCTORY 19 
 
 Any attempt in that direction would involve a 
 complete philosophy. The field of inquiry is, 
 therefore, narrowed to the following dimensions. 
 We begin by discussing certain aspects of the 
 argument from design, with especial reference 
 to Darwinism, and modern biological theories of 
 evolution ; and an attempt is made to restate 
 the argument in terms more suitable to the 
 conditions of modern thought and knowledge. 
 The nature of organisms is then investigated, 
 with a view to discovering what are the peculiar 
 characteristics which mark off living from inor- 
 ganic matter, and how far physical science can 
 claim success in her endeavour to interpret 
 organisms in mechanical terms. The conclud- 
 ing section of the volume deals with the ideas 
 of development and purpose in their larger 
 meaning ; and, in particular, with the problem 
 of what canons are necessary for interpreting a 
 development, and in what ways we may test 
 a development in order to decide whether it 
 has remained true to, or has departed from, its 
 essential principle. Throughout the whole in- 
 quiry we keep in mind the necessity of deter- 
 mining whether the idea of development is to 
 be construed teleologically. Such a method of 
 dealing with the subject before us appears more 
 
20 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 satisfactory than to attempt, at the outset, a 
 formal definition of growth or development. 
 Definition is one of the last stages arrived at 
 in the process of thought, and definitions are 
 never complete or satisfactory accounts of the 
 subject-matter defined. The richer the object 
 of the definition the more difficult it becomes to 
 define it. Some of its wealth of meaning must 
 be lost in the endeavour to fix it in a precise 
 terminology. Further, part of the process of 
 development now going on in the world con- 
 sists in a development of our ideas. There is 
 a development of the idea of development ; and, 
 until that development is completed, no fully 
 adequate definition of the conception is possible. 
 It is with the idea of development as with the 
 idea of life. Our difficulty is, that we can never 
 arrest the growth of the living organism which 
 we are examining. While we are examining it, 
 it has moved another step in its evolution. Its 
 present we never succeed in analysing, but only 
 its past. Its " is " is eternally becoming a " was ". 
 You can arrest its growth only by killing it, and 
 then it is not life, but death, which you are inves- 
 tigating. We are, that is, gradually feeling our 
 way towards a complete analysis of the sover- 
 eign idea which at present masters us, but which 
 we hope one day, in our turn, to master. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 
 
 PA LEY and Darwin are the two great names 
 round which our discussion of the con- 
 ception of design will mainly centre ; and our 
 problem will be to decide whether, and, if so, to 
 what extent, Darwin has succeeded in destroy- 
 ing Paley's teleological argument. Paley is, by 
 common consent, regarded as the chief exponent 
 of the older teleology. He best states for us 
 the popular view on final causation as it existed 
 before the time of Darwin, and as it still exists 
 in the minds of those who do not realise what a 
 change in outlook was effected by the publication 
 of the Origin of Species. It is the fashion to-day 
 to decry Paley. The gulf which separates the 
 modern mind from his mind is enormous, and 
 we shall find reason to conclude that his method 
 of stating the argument from design is, in the 
 light of present knowledge, indefensible. At 
 
 the same time, there is a vigour and force about 
 
 (21) 
 
22 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 his writings, there is a power of presenting an 
 argument, which is very striking. Nor do his 
 conclusions lack an essential core of soundness. 
 His argument, certainly, needs to be restated, 
 but it is by no means the case that it is worthless. 
 
 We may single out three chief features as 
 characteristic of Paley's teleology : — 
 
 i. The first is contained in this short quota- 
 tion from the Natural Theology : " Contrivance 
 must have had a contriver, design a designer". 
 The question is, What did Paley mean by " con- 
 trivance " ? He meant a whole of parts, whose 
 parts were so mutually co-ordinated and adjusted 
 that our minds at once feel that such an intri- 
 cate arrangement could not have come about 
 by chance. We look at any contrivance — an 
 engine or a telescope among the works of men, 
 an eye or the webbed foot of a duck among 
 the works of Nature — and we are compelled to 
 say that the several parts of these contrivances 
 are " put together for a purpose " ; and we pass 
 on, by a natural transition of thought, to infer 
 that in each one of these cases there was an 
 artificer or designer who formed the contriv- 
 ance for the very purpose which we find that 
 it serves. Arrangement, disposition of parts, 
 subserviency of means to ends, whether in 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 23 
 
 Nature or among the products of human ac- 
 tivity, imply the presence of intelligence. 
 
 It may be well briefly to dissect this argu- 
 ment and note its further implications. We 
 discover in it, first of all, Paley's canon of 
 finality, the criterion, that is, by which he de- 
 cides when it is legitimate to invoke to our 
 aid the principle of final causation, when it 
 becomes necessary for us to speak of an end 
 and of means leading up to that end. Janet, 
 in Final Causes, defines an end as "a foreseen 
 effect which could not have taken place with- 
 out this foresight " ; something, in other words, 
 to which many prior movements lead, the pre- 
 determined goal of a number of antecedent 
 stages. The emphasis is on the word "pre- 
 determined/' and for Paley predetermination is 
 the criterion of finality. There would seem, 
 then, to be two cases, where we judge an ex- 
 planation in terms of final causes necessary : 
 (a) where in a given whole we cannot explain 
 the mutual co-ordination and adjustment of the 
 parts without supposing that the whole is, in 
 some sense, present as a controlling factor ; 
 where the power, that is, which brought about 
 the adjustment did so having in view the re- 
 sult actually achieved. The result is raised to 
 
24 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 the dignity of an end because we regard it as 
 in some fashion foreseen. (y8) The second case 
 is that of a development, in which the present 
 appears to be influenced causally by the future, 
 where we cannot satisfactorily explain to our- 
 selves the process of growth without conceiving 
 that the future phenomenon in some way con- 
 trols the whole development, and is thus, as it 
 were, a cause of itself. Let us take, for ex- 
 ample, the instance of the acorn developing 
 into the oak. Here you have an accurate 
 co-ordination of an inconceivable number of 
 molecular movements, each traversing its own 
 peculiar path and yet adjusted all the while 
 to the necessities of the general plan. Such a 
 phenomenon would seem too precise and com- 
 plicated to be explicable in any other way than 
 by the hypothesis of some purposive control 
 present from the first throughout the whole 
 evolution. Paley, then, insists that a result be- 
 comes an end, and must be so judged by us, 
 just because of the complexity of the conditions 
 necessary to bring it about. 1 Nor is any fault 
 to be found with this canon or criterion. What 
 impresses us when we look out either upon the 
 
 1 See Janet, Final Causes, bk. i., chaps, i. and ii., and 
 Paley's Natural Theology, chaps, i. and ii. 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 25 
 
 world as a whole or upon any of the marvellous 
 contrivances and adaptations in living Nature is 
 just this co-ordination of parts and movements 
 to produce a complex result. Adaptation is an 
 aspect of the larger phenomenon of order, and 
 it is the orderly character of the universe which 
 calls for an adequate explanation. 
 
 The nature of Paley's inference is the next 
 point which attracts our notice. He argues 
 from contrivance to the existence of a design- 
 ing mind. End implies intention. From the 
 facts of the natural world, from the adaptations 
 of organic Nature, Paley passes to God, and 
 insists that God must have designed these con- 
 trivances to fulfil the particular purposes which 
 they do fulfil. He allows, of course, for the 
 action of what are called secondary causes or 
 the operation of natural forces. But he is care- 
 ful to point out that a cause and a law of Nature 
 are not synonymous terms. Cause, in the last 
 resort, implies power or efficiency, while law 
 does not. A law of Nature is simply the state- 
 ment of an observed uniformity. You have to 
 pass behind law to explain it. Paley passes 
 behind it, and behind all secondary causes, to 
 God, as the great originator and designer. One 
 hesitates to criticise Paley's conception of God as 
 
26 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 anthropomorphic, because any conception which 
 we can form of Him must be that. Yet it is 
 not unfair, I think, to say that Paley does not 
 appear to appreciate the grave metaphysical 
 difficulties which surround his inference. 1 He 
 interprets the Divine activity too much in terms 
 of the activity of a human workman designing 
 a machine. What ground have we for saying 
 that God works in the manner in which we 
 work ? How can we determine the relation 
 in which He stands to His material? Does 
 He first create a raw material and then work 
 it up into shape or does He give it form at the 
 same moment in which He calls it into being? 
 Does He stand outside His material or does 
 He in some fashion dwell within it? Can we 
 legitimately speak of foresight or prevision in 
 a Being for whom everything may exist in a 
 timeless present, an eternal now ? These ques- 
 tionings come pouring into our minds so soon 
 as we begin to think about the problem of the 
 mode of God's activity. They hardly seem to 
 disturb, they certainly do not agitate, the mind 
 of Paley. Yet we must not be unjust towards 
 him. He was not a metaphysician. He wrote 
 
 1 See, however, Natural Theology, chap, iii., end, and 
 chap, v., beginning. 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 27 
 
 as a typical English theologian of his day, who 
 accepting God's existence, almost as an axiom, 
 interpreted His Being in the language current 
 at the time. We may almost say that he was 
 not interested in the problems which are of 
 supreme importance to a generation which has 
 studied Kant's trenchant criticism of the teleo- 
 logical argument, and which has, under pressure 
 from many quarters, grown to think of God as 
 immanent in all His works. We, to-day, if 
 called on to deal with this problem, should prob- 
 ably endeavour to picture the Divine activity in 
 other terms, more after the fashion described 
 in chapter vii. of this volume, which attempts to 
 restate the argument from design. Yet, when 
 we have raised all our objections, if we are 
 prepared to admit that there is a Divine activity, 
 intention will still be the term by which we shall 
 be compelled to characterise it. For this, at 
 least, is true, that we must apply to God the 
 highest categories which we possess. God's ac- 
 tivity cannot be less rational or purposive than 
 our own, and intention is a plain feature of human 
 scheming. God's designing may greatly tran- 
 scend human designing, but there must exist 
 real points of affinity between our intelligent 
 adaptation of means to ends and the purposive 
 
28 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 activity of God. It is not Paley's broad con- 
 clusion that there is design and intention with 
 which we quarrel, but his somewhat crude 
 method of stating his argument. 
 
 2. The second great characteristic of Paley's 
 teleology is that it is a teleology of special in- 
 stances. " I take my stand in human anatomy," 
 he writes, and he urges that the eye will prove 
 his point without the ear, and the ear without 
 the eye. 1 Any single contrivance in Nature, 
 sufficiently complex (Paley, however, does not 
 say how much complexity he demands), will 
 satisfy the conditions of the argument ; and the 
 Natural Theology consists almost entirely of an 
 examination of individual instances of highly 
 complex structures, the eye, the ear, the swim- 
 ming bladder of fishes, the arrangements in the 
 floral world for effecting fertilisation, and the 
 distribution of seed. We quote, once more, his 
 own words : " So it is with the evidences of a 
 Divine agency. The proof is not a conclusion 
 which lies at the end of a chain of reasoning, of 
 which chain each instance of contrivance is only 
 a link, and of which if one link fails the whole 
 falls ; but it is an argument separately supplied 
 
 1 Natural Theology -, chap. vi. 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 29 
 
 by every separate example. An error in stating 
 an example affects only that example. The 
 argument is cumulative in the fullest sense of 
 the term." 1 
 
 Our teleology to-day is not one of special 
 instances. Darwin's statement of the theory 
 of natural selection has made it more difficult 
 for us to appeal to single examples of contriv- 
 ance and adaptation as proof of design, because, 
 however marvellous any contrivance may be, it 
 is always open to the Darwinian to assert that 
 this intricacy of structure has been reached only 
 as the last stage of a long succession of adapta- 
 tions in the past, each of which has added some- 
 thing towards the perfecting of the contrivance, 
 while the whole progressive development has 
 been carried on by the interaction of laws 
 whose operations show no trace of design. It 
 will be our task to discuss the Darwinian posi- 
 tion in the succeeding chapters. It might be 
 unwise to allow that the special instance can 
 never be used as proof of design. But it re- 
 mains true that we to-day lay emphasis less 
 upon the single adaptation than upon the 
 general and wider movement of evolution as 
 
 1 Natural Theology », chap. vi. 
 
30 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 a whole. It is in this that we see marks of 
 purpose. We insist upon " the glory of the sum 
 of things ". What we are saying may perhaps 
 be stated in a slightly different manner. The 
 particular criticism of Paley's reasoning which, 
 in the light of the theory of natural selection, 
 we should be inclined to offer, is to ask whether 
 we can defend an anticipatory teleology. Paley 
 argues that things were made beforehand, as it 
 were, for certain definite purposes, each organ 
 and structure for the particular purpose which 
 it serves, and that God had in mind these pur- 
 poses before He made the organ. There is 
 antecedent design. Things were intended for 
 the uses which they serve. But Darwin has 
 suggested an alternative explanation of the facts, 
 which, while it in no way destroys teleology al- 
 together, certainly makes it more difficult to 
 insist upon an anticipatory teleology, conceived 
 as Paley conceives it. Darwin himself was of 
 opinion that the discovery of the principle of 
 natural selection had dealt the death-blow to 
 teleology as an argument based upon special 
 adaptations. We find in the Autobiography 1 
 the following statement : " The old argument 
 
 1 See Charles Darwin by his son Francis Darwin, chap, 
 iii. 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 31 
 
 from design in Nature, as given by Paley, which 
 formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now 
 that the law of natural selection has been dis- 
 covered. We can no longer argue that, for 
 instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell 
 must have been made by an intelligent being, 
 like the hinge of a door by man. There seems 
 to be no more design in the variability of organic 
 beings, and in the action of natural selection, 
 than in the course which the wind blows." 
 
 The full bearing of this will not be clear 
 until we have investigated the theory of natural 
 selection, but the point is raised here by way of 
 suggestion, because it is certainly a feature of 
 Paley's teleology that it is anticipatory in its 
 scope ; and because it opens up for considera- 
 tion a very serious problem which we shall 
 endeavour to discuss later. Paley, as we have 
 said, never states what degree of complexity he 
 requires in a contrivance in order to render 
 legitimate his appeal to the principle of design. 
 It would, perhaps, have been impossible for him 
 to do so. The problem would resemble the 
 logical difficulty of determining the number of 
 grains necessary to make a heap of corn. Yet 
 we are confronted with this difficulty. If we 
 come to the conclusion that purpose is operative 
 
32 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in the universe, is it operative everywhere ? Is 
 there such a thing as chance? Paley himself 
 admits that chance, which he defines as "the 
 operation of causes without design," might pro- 
 duce a wart, or a wen, or a mole, but nothing 
 so complex as the eye. Darwin found himself 
 involved in great difficulties over this question. 
 In a letter to Asa Gray, the American botanist, 
 in i860, he writes: "I am inclined to look at 
 everything as resulting from designed laws, with 
 the details, whether good or bad, left to the 
 working out of what we may call chance.' ' 
 Chance, here, would mean the undesigned in- 
 teraction of these laws. The laws would be 
 continually crossing each other in their opera- 
 tion, and at the points of intersection there 
 would be a constant alteration of the conditions 
 of equilibrium, from which changes would result, 
 but the changes could not be called designed. 
 Asa Gray believed in a directed stream of varia- 
 tion among organic forms. Darwin writes to 
 him i 1 "I have been lately corresponding with 
 Lyell, who, I think, adopts your idea of the 
 stream of variation having been led or designed. 
 I have asked him, whether he believes the shape 
 
 1 Charles Darwin, chap, xiv., p. 249. 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 33 
 
 of my nose was designed. If he does, I have 
 nothing more to say. If not, seeing what 
 fanciers have done by selection of individual 
 differences in the nasal bones of pigeons, I must 
 think that it is illogical to suppose that the 
 variations which natural selection preserves for 
 the good of any being have been designed." 
 The problem then, which we shall have later 
 to discuss, is this — If there is design anywhere, 
 is there design everywhere? If design is only 
 partial in its scope, can we divide off the pur- 
 posive from the non-purposive operations of 
 Nature? Can a final philosophy admit of this 
 distinction being made? 
 
 3. The third feature in Paley's teleology is 
 the basis upon which the whole of his argument 
 rests, his belief in the fixity and special creation 
 of species. This may be called the cardinal 
 article of Paley's creed, and it explains the par- 
 ticular form which his presentation of the design 
 argument took. We deal with it last of all, be- 
 cause it forms a convenient bridge of transition 
 to Darwin and the theory of natural selection. 
 Paley, in common with the great majority of 
 his contemporaries, believed that at some point 
 in the past (he would allow you to put it as far 
 back as you will) complex organisms, an original 
 3 
 
34 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 pair, perhaps, to represent each species, were 
 suddenly introduced by God's creative hand 
 into ready-made conditions ; while between each 
 species God fixed immovable barriers. Now 
 this belief in the immutability and special crea- 
 tion of species explains much of Paley's reason- 
 ing. If species were thus suddenly introduced 
 into the world, a complex organism into com- 
 plex conditions, then their presence indubitably 
 affords evidence of design. Only designing 
 mind could thus adjust, at a stroke, the two 
 factors of living form and environment. The 
 problem remains the same even if we admit, as 
 the obvious facts of Nature compel us to admit, 
 that organisms reproduce their kind by natural 
 law. Paley never contended that every living 
 creature was made directly by God. He dis- 
 cusses the hypothetical case of a watch, produc- 
 ing in the course of its movements another 
 watch like itself ; but he rightly argues that such 
 a case of reproduction of kind gives you no ex- 
 planation of the constitution and mechanism of 
 either watch. You have still to ask how the 
 original form came into being, and the only 
 answer which Paley could give to that question 
 was, that God launched it into existence by a 
 special creative act of Divine power. At the 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 35 
 
 time no other answer was possible, for in Paley's 
 day the belief in the immutability of species was 
 almost universally shared by theologians and 
 men of science. There were indeed foreshadow- 
 ings of an evolutionary theory, but they were 
 not numerous. Buffon by 1761 had come to 
 believe in some degree in the mutability of 
 species, though he still held to fixity of type 
 among the larger animals. Erasmus Darwin 
 in England was expressing strong evolutionist 
 ideas. There were signs of the profound changes 
 which were to come over the face of science. 
 But Paley lived too early to be affected by 
 them. Indeed, more than half a century after 
 his death, the antagonism aroused by the pub- 
 lication of the Origin shows how deeply rooted 
 was the belief in special creation and fixity of 
 species. Paley, therefore, was supported in his 
 views both by science and theology, and in our 
 estimate of him we must take this fact into 
 account. We must not forget that theology is 
 not alone to blame for the doctrine of special 
 creation. So long as science believed in the 
 immutability of species, theology, passing on 
 into a region which lay beyond the scope of 
 science, was compelled to construe this im- 
 mutability as resulting from an original special 
 
36 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 creation. Science has not always been fair to 
 theology in this matter. No doubt theologians 
 have at times tried foolishly to defend the doc- 
 trine of special creation against evolutionary 
 science, using as their weapon the Biblical 
 narratives in the book of Genesis. In so far 
 as they have done this, they have committed 
 two mistakes. They are putting the Bible to a 
 use for which it was never intended. The Bible 
 is the teacher of religious and not of scientific 
 truth. They are also misinterpreting the very 
 chapters in Genesis upon which they rely. For 
 there is nothing in those chapters to justify the 
 belief in special creation. The late Aubrey 
 Moore pointed out in his essay, Darwinism and 
 the Christian Faith, how the influence of Milton, 
 which has been great upon the whole range of 
 what we may call popular Protestant theology, 
 is largely responsible for the dissemination of 
 this belief. In book vii. of Paradise Lost 
 Milton gives us a graphic description of the 
 process of creation, in which he pictures the 
 various species of animals coming into being 
 suddenly at the command of the Divine will. 
 It happened also, as the same writer shows, that 
 the first scientific attempt to define and fix the 
 meaning of species coincided in point of time 
 
PALEY AND THE ARGUMENT 37 
 
 with Milton's poem. 1 John Ray, a younger 
 contemporary of Milton, was the author of the 
 doctrine of the fixity of species. Science took 
 up the conception, which was accepted by such 
 scientific leaders as Linnaeus and Cuvier, and 
 became the orthodox creed in biology until it 
 was displaced by the rival conception of evolu- 
 tion or transformation of species. 1 1 is impossible 
 for us to-day to believe in the fixity of species 
 or in special creation, and the fact that we cannot 
 do so destroys Paley's teleological argument in 
 the form in which he presented it. From this 
 point we pass to a consideration of the work of 
 Darwin. 
 
 1 Science and the Faith, pp. 179, 180. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 DARWIN AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL 
 SELECTION 
 
 TN discussing the theory of evolution in its 
 -*- narrower meaning, as a theory dealing with 
 the history and development of organisms, we 
 must carefully distinguish between the fact of 
 evolution and the method or methods of evolu- 
 tion. On the question of method there is room 
 for difference of opinion, but as to the fact there 
 can be little or no doubt that the theory of 
 evolution must be accepted as the best hypoth- 
 esis which science has been able to frame to 
 cover the known results reached by the investi- 
 gations of the morphologist, embryologist and 
 palaeontologist, and by inquiry into the geo- 
 graphical distribution of plants and animals. We 
 are compelled by scientific evidence to believe 
 that all organisms have arisen by progressive 
 modification from a common stock. Even if 
 we do not hold with Darwin that "all animals 
 
 (38) 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 39 
 
 are descended from at most only four or five 
 progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser 
 number," we must give our assent to Wallace's 
 statement that " every species has come into 
 existence coincident both in space and time, 
 with a pre-existing and closely allied species ". 
 The practical agreement of scientific men upon 
 the point leaves us no alternative but to accept 
 their opinion. Now the fact of evolution is 
 destructive of Paley's argument, in the form in 
 which he stated it. His appeal to special in- 
 stances is largely, if not entirely, destroyed. 
 For, according to the evolutionary theory, every 
 structure is what it is only because a million 
 other structures have been before it, each gra- 
 dually growing more and more perfect, more 
 adapted, that is, to the conditions under which 
 the owner of the structure has to live. Paley 
 points in triumph to the eye, with it myriad co- 
 ordinations, and its marvellous pre-adaptation in 
 the darkness of the womb for the future environ- 
 ment of light in which it will find itself, and 
 argues that God alone could have designed such 
 a structure. The evolutionist, in reply, produces 
 a long series of eyes, beginning with the simple 
 pigment-spot, sensitive to light and shade, and 
 gradually growing more and more complex ; 
 
4 o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 and urges that his complex eye is only the 
 latest development in a historic succession of 
 eyes ; and that it has grown to be what it is 
 because it is the inheritor of the cumulative, 
 ancestral improvements of the organ in the 
 past. Darwin himself writes — and his words 
 have weight, as being the words of one, whose 
 range of observation was extensive — " I have 
 been astonished how rarely an organ can be 
 named towards which no transitional grade is 
 known to lead V 
 
 But, it may be objected, has this destroyed 
 Paley's argument from design? Is there less 
 evidence of design because a structure has come 
 slowly into being? If a cathedral takes twenty 
 years to build, do we therefore infer that there 
 was no architect? Are there not still present 
 in organic structures all the marks of plan and 
 purpose? In order adequately to discuss this 
 objection we must come to closer quarters with 
 the Darwinian theory. The sting of Darwin's 
 attack on Paley does not lie solely, or even 
 chiefly, in the fact that structures and adapta- 
 tions have arisen slowly, but rather in the 
 method which Darwin suggested as an ex- 
 
 1 Origin of Species ; sixth edition, p. 146. 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 41 
 
 planation of the evolutionary process. We 
 pass, therefore, to consider the method of 
 evolution, known as natural selection. Darwin 
 himself believed that other factors, besides 
 natural selection, were operative in the process 
 of organic development ; but the theory of 
 natural selection, though it does not exhaust, 
 still remains the central feature of Darwinism. 
 A brief exposition of the theory is necessary, 
 because, as the history of its first reception 
 shows, it lends itself easily to misconstruction ; 
 and the misunderstandings of it which charac- 
 terised its original appearance have not alto- 
 gether disappeared. 
 
 The theory reposes upon a basis of three facts, 
 of whose existence there is no question, (a) The 
 fact of variability in organic forms. No child 
 exactly resembles its parents. No two blades 
 of grass, no two leaves, are precisely similar 
 in all points. Nature is a home of infinite 
 diversity, a realm of individuality. Organisms 
 are everywhere plastic, and tend to display varia- 
 tions, (b) The fact of inheritance, by which 
 ancestral characteristics are more or less faith- 
 fully reproduced in offspring. Inheritance and 
 variability are complementary factors. They 
 represent the conservative and liberal tendencies 
 
42 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in Nature's political system, (c) The fact of a 
 tendency on the part of organisms to increase 
 so rapidly that they outrun the limits of the 
 food supply ; from which results what is called 
 the struggle for existence, a competition so 
 severe, that a very slight advantage possessed 
 by an organism over its neighbours may just 
 make the difference in the all-important matter 
 of survival or destruction in the race of life. 
 Natural selection is a short-hand formula for 
 expressing this group of facts, for saying that, 
 owing to the struggle which goes on among 
 living forms, those organisms, which have varied 
 in a direction favourable to life-preservation, will 
 tend to survive, and leave an equally or better 
 adapted progeny, while those which have varied 
 in an unfavourable direction will probably per- 
 ish because they are unable to adapt themselves 
 to their surroundings. What an organism has 
 to do, if it would survive, is to accommodate 
 itself to its environment. Organisms, as we 
 have seen, are plastic or variable. Now among 
 the variations which occur among living forms 
 some must be in the direction of adapting their 
 owners better to their environment, others must 
 tend in the reverse direction. If the variation 
 is favourable, it brings its owner into greater 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 43 
 
 harmony with his conditions of life. He will 
 accordingly benefit in the struggle for existence, 
 and will survive, and, through the influence of 
 heredity, will tend to hand on his favourable 
 variation to his progeny. The progeny will 
 tend to possess these variations in a more per- 
 fect form than their parents, for inheritance 
 acts cumulatively. Organisms whose variations 
 are not favourable will be crushed out in the 
 struggle. So keen is the competition that al- 
 most any variation may turn the scale between 
 life and death. The nature of the environment 
 determines whether a variation shall be reckoned 
 favourable or not. Strength is not necessarily 
 the criterion of advantage. Sometimes a keener 
 scent may preserve a form, or greater swiftness 
 or cunning, or the power to resist sudden changes 
 of temperature, or the adoption of nocturnal 
 habits, or protective colouring. Darwin's own 
 words are: "This preservation of favourable 
 individual differences and variations, and the 
 destruction of those which are injurious, I have 
 called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the 
 Fittest V And he adds: "It may metaphor- 
 ically be said that Natural Selection is daily and 
 
 1 Origin of Species, p. 58. 
 
44 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 hourly scrutinising throughout the world the 
 slightest variations ; rejecting those that are 
 bad ; preserving and adding up all that are 
 good ; silently and insensibly working, when- 
 ever and wherever opportunity offers, at the 
 improvement of each organic being, in relation 
 to its organic and inorganic conditions of life". 1 
 This process goes on unendingly, for, not only 
 do organisms vary, but the environment itself 
 is constantly changing. If the environment did 
 not change, one would hope in time to see a 
 perfect adjustment effected between the or- 
 ganism and its surroundings. But, since the 
 environment itself is subject to modification, 
 there has to be a perpetually fresh process of 
 adaptation on the part of the organism. Some 
 organisms (and among them what we may 
 reckon our oldest forms of life) seem to have 
 effected a more or less complete adjustment, for 
 they survive on almost unchanged ; but, viewed 
 broadly, the process is one of perpetual inter- 
 action between the two factors, resulting in 
 constant alterations. 
 
 The phrase " natural selection " needs perhaps 
 a word of explanation. In the quotation given 
 
 1 Origin of Species \ pp. 60, 61. 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 45 
 
 above Darwin uses the word u metaphorically " 
 of the agency of natural selection. The word 
 "select" is a word expressive of our own in- 
 telligent choice, but for Darwin the term was 
 only a metaphor, as applied to Nature's working, 
 and included nothing which could be in any 
 way called intelligent activity. The source 
 from which he derived the expression was his 
 observation of the results achieved by the arti- 
 ficial selection practised by breeders and animal 
 fanciers. It had long been known that strains 
 could be improved by careful selection of ani- 
 mals for breeding purposes. Special qualities 
 in a stock which a farmer or a fancier wished to 
 perpetuate or improve could be so secured, if 
 care was taken to breed only from those animals 
 which possessed the quality in question. Darwin, 
 observing this fact, and seeing the extraordinary 
 results achieved by this artificial selection, set 
 about to discover whether there was not some 
 cause at work in Nature, which might account 
 for the obvious fact of progressive differentiation 
 among organisms. He claimed to have found 
 such a cause, and he called it Natural Selection, 
 the unintelligent selection practised by Nature. 
 
 Now, for the believer in final causes the crux 
 of the situation lies just here, in the way in 
 
46 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 which Darwin conceived of the relation between 
 the two factors of organism and environment. 
 A defender of the argument from design would 
 naturally incline to adopt one of two hypotheses 
 to explain the adjustment and accommodation 
 which exist between organisms and their sur- 
 roundings. He would either, with Paley, invoke 
 the aid of an external regulator, God, who adapts 
 the organism to its environment ; or he would 
 call in the aid of some internal, regulative force, 
 working within the organism, which brings it 
 into harmony with its conditions of life. But 
 Darwin dispenses with both these alternatives. 
 He offers to explain, by a self-acting, mechanical 
 process, the adaptation of organism to environ- 
 ment, without any hypothesis of external ac- 
 commodation or internal control. Owing to 
 the plasticity and variability of organisms the 
 adjustment is, not of the environment to the 
 organism, but of the organism to the environ- 
 ment. But (and here lies the central point of 
 the Darwinian theory) organisms vary without 
 any purpose, and it is a mere chance whether 
 the variations of any organism fit in with the 
 environment. The two factors are viewed as 
 standing in a purely external relation to each 
 other. It is as if you had a set of marbles on 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 47 
 
 a tray, and then tilted the tray. The marbles 
 would roll about and collide until a new equi- 
 librium was effected. In like manner do the 
 changes in organism and environment collide, 
 until an equilibrium, more or less stable, is 
 reached. One should, perhaps, qualify the 
 phrase just used " purely external relation"; 
 for the relation of the two factors of organism 
 and environment depends upon the general 
 conditions of evolution, and the relation might, 
 in a deeper view, be regarded as intrinsic. The 
 point is, that adaptations are viewed as resulting 
 from the interaction of organisms and surround- 
 ings, in accordance with fixed conditions ; and 
 that this interaction is interpreted in mechanical 
 terms, in the way in which the physicist would 
 describe the interaction of two particles of matter. 
 Whether any two things which interact can 
 ultimately be interpreted in terms of mechanism 
 is a problem for later discussion. 
 
 We may state the Darwinian position in two 
 other ways. We may call it, first, a theory of 
 accidental variations. Accidental does not, it is 
 clear, mean causeless. Nothing happens with- 
 out a cause. But it means indefinite, undesigned. 
 The variations which occur in organisms are 
 accidental, in the sense that there is nothing to 
 
48 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 determine them in one direction rather than 
 another. They form the rude, unsorted, pro- 
 miscuous material from which the selection is 
 to take place. As regards the selective agency 
 in Nature they are accidental ; that is, as far as 
 natural selection is concerned, it matters not 
 whether an organism varies in one direction 
 rather than in another. And it is for natural 
 selection immaterial what the causes of varia- 
 tions are. In other words, organisms try random 
 experiments in variation. As Huxley put it, 
 it is a method of advance by " trial and error, 
 worked by unintelligent agents". The same 
 writer uses a graphic simile to describe the 
 method. The older teleology, he says, regarded 
 each adaptation as a rifle bullet fired direct at 
 a mark, whereas Darwin has shown that adap- 
 tations are like grape-shot, of which, while many 
 fall wide of the mark, some hit it. " For the 
 teleologist an organism exists, because it was 
 made for the conditions in which it is found : 
 for the Darwinian an organism exists, because, 
 out of many of its kind, it is the only one which 
 has been able to persist in the conditions in 
 which it is found." 1 Limits, certainly, there 
 
 1 Darwiniana : Essay entitled " Criticisms on the Origin 
 of Species ". 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 49 
 
 are to variability, those, for instance, imposed 
 by the physical constitution of each organism. 
 But within these limits variations are indefinite. 
 
 Or we may describe the theory in another 
 way, by saying that it denies the existence of 
 any causal relation between the environment and 
 the requirements of an organism. If organisms 
 have to live in an environment, one would natu- 
 rally imagine that they would somehow be ad- 
 justed beforehand to it. And, since environment 
 does cause changes in organisms (light and heat, 
 for example, affect them), one would be inclined 
 to think that it would cause such modifica- 
 tions as would better adapt them to their 
 conditions of life. But this is denied by the 
 theory. The changes caused by the environ- 
 ment in the organism are indefinite, and not 
 necessarily in the direction of better adapting 
 the plant or animal to its surroundings. There 
 are as many chances in favour of the environ- 
 ment causing a harmful variation as there are 
 in favour of its causing a beneficial one. 
 
 We have already quoted a sentence from 
 the Autobiography showing how Darwin was of 
 opinion that his theory had destroyed teleology ; 
 and, if one faces fairly the Darwinian explana- 
 tion of the adaptations which confront us in 
 
 4 
 
50 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Nature, one must admit that the statement of 
 the argument from design has to be profoundly 
 modified. Any adaptation, however complex or 
 exquisite, has arisen through a gradual process 
 of perfecting, in which each generation becomes 
 the heir of the fortunate variations of its prede- 
 cessors which have been preserved by heredity. 
 The advance is due to the accumulation through 
 inheritance of accidental variations, which at the 
 time of their occurrence were not guided by 
 any reference to the needs of the animal. The 
 adaptation arose with the growth of the varia- 
 tions themselves. There was no future refer- 
 ence to the requirements of the organism. Thus 
 the seeming prevision, which in the womb fits 
 the eye for an environment which is yet to 
 be, is explained away, and the adaptation is 
 accounted for by the influence of heredity, 
 which preserves each stage already reached 
 and heightens its utility. Darwin's own words 
 about the eye in the Origin of Species may well 
 be quoted : " Reason tells me that, if numerous 
 gradations from a simple and imperfect eye to 
 one complex and perfect can be shown to exist, 
 each grade being useful to its possessor, as is 
 certainly the case ; if, further, the eye ever 
 varies, and the variations be inherited, as is 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 51 
 
 likewise certainly the case ; and if such varia- 
 tions should be useful to any animal under 
 changing conditions of life, then the difficulty 
 of believing that a perfect and complex eye 
 could be formed by natural selection, though 
 insuperable by our imagination, should not be 
 considered as subversive of the theory V 
 
 The theory of natural selection, then, seems 
 to place the believer in the presence of design 
 in the organic world face to face with the follow- 
 ing three positions, (a) The existing order of 
 the world, with its series of graded modifications, 
 its intricacies of structure, its exquisite adapta- 
 tions, is the relic of a mass of changes which 
 were effected in earlier ages without any design 
 or purpose. The forms that exist — rari nantes 
 in gurgite vasto — are merely the happy survivors 
 of a host of other forms, whose variations did 
 not enable them to compete successfully in the 
 struggle for existence. We who look on are 
 the victims of a great illusion. Seeming order 
 and plan are really the result of chance inter- 
 actions through innumerable ages, of happy hits 
 effected between the variations of organisms and 
 the variations of environment. Plan and pur- 
 
 1 P. 134. 
 
52 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 pose have vanished and the changes of plants 
 and animals are like the meaningless dance of 
 thistledown in an autumn breeze. (6) No adap- 
 tation, however marvellous, can be taken singly 
 and treated in isolation. For every structure is 
 what it is only because innumerable others have 
 been before it, each gradually growing more 
 adapted to its surrounding conditions, each re- 
 presenting one more stage towards Nature's goal 
 (if Nature can be said to have a goal) of com- 
 plete adaptation of organism to environment. 
 (c) It would appear difficult to speak at all 
 of ends in Nature. Everything is becoming, 
 nothing is. Not product, but process, is the 
 word which characterises Nature. Organisms 
 appear and then vanish to make room for 
 others. The river of life streams on endlessly 
 and the value of each drop of water is just 
 the value of its individual contribution to the 
 total volume of the river. The survival of the 
 fittest is but the temporary finding of a new 
 equilibrium. Tennyson's hope, so beautifully 
 expressed in In Memoriam : — 
 
 That nothing walks with aimless feet, 
 That not one life shall be destroyed, 
 Or cast as rubbish to the void, 
 
 When God hath made the pile complete ; 
 
THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 53 
 
 That not a worm is cloven in vain ; 
 
 That not a moth with vain desire 
 
 Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire, 
 Or but subserves another's gain ; 
 
 that hope is illusory, unless, indeed, we can find 
 reason for believing that Darwinism is not a 
 complete account of the facts which it proposes 
 to interpret, and that the mechanical explanation 
 of Nature's processes has to be supplemented 
 by other explanations, in which conceptions of 
 value and significance play their part, and in 
 which more consideration shall be given to the 
 fact that Nature is an orderly and systematic 
 whole. A deeper inquiry is needed before we 
 can abandon our teleological convictions. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF PRO- 
 GRESS 
 
 l~N our criticism of the Darwinian theory we 
 -*- shall deal with the three following ques- 
 tions : (a) What are the implications of the 
 conception of Progress ? (6) What are the im- 
 plications of the conception of Order ? (c) Are 
 there not involved in the theory factors possessed 
 of a character essentially teleological ? The last 
 question is, to some extent, bound up with the 
 two former ones, but we shall endeavour to pre- 
 serve the distinctness of the three discussions. 
 The present chapter deals with the implications 
 of the conception of Progress. 
 
 Progress is a fact. As we trace out the story 
 of the world's development we cannot fail to 
 admit that there has been progress and advance, 
 though not, indeed, everywhere, nor along a 
 single line. Development includes retrogression. 
 
 (54) 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 55 
 
 There are many back currents and side arms to 
 the stream of evolution. In the world of organic 
 life there are degenerate forms, such as parasites ; 
 in human history the march of civilisation has 
 often been arrested. But within the total move- 
 ment we do trace out a definite path of progress. 
 The world of inorganic matter has been succeeded 
 by the world of life. Within the world of life 
 itself, the world with which we are chiefly con- 
 cerned in our criticism of Darwinism, there has 
 been movement upward from very simple single- 
 celled organisms to man ; there has been the 
 gradual emergence of a series of living forms, 
 structurally more complex, and in the case of 
 man, with his self-conscious reason and morality, 
 ethically higher. And though it may be harder 
 to discover a clear path of progress in human 
 history, where movements appear often retro- 
 grade or cyclic, still it can hardly be denied that 
 civilised man does represent an advance upon 
 his savage ancestors. The fact of progress is, 
 then, plain, and it calls for an explanation. Now 
 the very conception of progress is essentially 
 teleological, involving, that is, the idea of an 
 end or goal. You have a series of living forms, 
 for example, and you say that the series shows 
 marks of progress, that there has been advance. 
 
56 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 You are judging the series by a standard or 
 criterion which is none other than the highest 
 stage reached by the series in its evolution. 
 You take this highest stage and you compare 
 the lower stages with it, and appraise them 
 accordingly. The series is read by you as a 
 series moving towards an end, and in the light 
 of that end you judge the various members of 
 the series. The development is, for your 
 thought, not a mere sequence of changes, but 
 a sequence of changes interpreted in the light 
 of an end. You are judging teleologically. If 
 the evolutionist, then, speaks of the vertebrates 
 as being higher than the invertebrates, or of the 
 many-celled animals as being higher than the 
 single-celled animals, he is using as his standard of 
 judgment the criterion of complexity of structure, 
 and he takes the most complex organism in the 
 series as the end or goal towards which the 
 whole development of the series has been tend- 
 ing. He has in his mind some standard of value 
 by which he judges of each member of the series. 
 The words "higher" and "lower" have no 
 meaning, except in reference to some standard. 
 Not infrequently the word " higher " carries with 
 it an ethical significance. Of two moral acts, or 
 two motives, we call one higher than the other. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 57 
 
 It is worth more, of more value, when judged 
 by the ethical standard. This ethical meaning 
 should be kept carefully distinct from other 
 meanings of the word. In fact, whenever we 
 use the word "higher," we should make clear 
 to ourselves what is the particular criterion or 
 standard which we have in mind. Complexity 
 of structure is one criterion by which we judge 
 of the evolution of organisms ; but we might also 
 attempt to place organisms in a serial order, 
 according to the degree of reason or self-con- 
 sciousness which we deem them to possess. The 
 interesting thing about man is, that, while he is 
 structurally the most complex form, he is also 
 the most rational and the most ethical, if indeed 
 he is not the only ethical form. The physical 
 and spiritual developments have taken place 
 together, as two sides of a single process, and in 
 judging of the process we take our criterion now 
 from the one side and now from the other. But 
 whatever our criterion may be, it is necessary, 
 if we would give any adequate meaning to the 
 word "development" or "evolution," that we 
 should have a criterion ; and, in all cases, we 
 derive our criterion from some term or stage in 
 the development which we cannot help inter- 
 preting as the end towards which the develop- 
 
58 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 ment is moving. Progress has no meaning, 
 unless it is construed teleologically. 
 
 Bearing in mind, then, the fact that we are 
 concerned to criticise the theory of natural 
 selection, and confining our attention, accord- 
 ingly, to the world of organic forms, we proceed 
 to ask whether natural selection can account for 
 the progress which we observe as we trace out 
 the evolutionary history of organisms. The 
 contention of this chapter is that natural selec- 
 tion offers no final explanation of the fact of 
 progress ; or, rather, that it can only explain 
 progress by making certain assumptions, into 
 the nature of which the believer in final causes 
 must very carefully inquire. If we take as our 
 standard complexity of structure, then we shall 
 say that progress has been brought about by 
 the cumulative inheritance of favourable varia- 
 tions which were in the direction of greater 
 structural complexity. Each generation pro- 
 gressed, because it inherited in a cumulative 
 form, and itself added something to, the varia- 
 tions of earlier generations which were in the 
 direction of advance. If there had been no 
 variations tending in the direction of progress, 
 progress, obviously, would not have occurred. 
 Natural selection, in other words, is not a theory 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 59 
 
 of origins, as Darwin readily admitted. It takes 
 variability among organisms as one of the data 
 from which it starts, just as it takes the fact of 
 inheritance or of the tendency to a rapid in- 
 crease in number. If you remove any one of 
 the three great foundation-stones of the theory 
 the whole theory collapses. Thus, without 
 variability natural selection would have no ma- 
 terial upon which to work. There would be 
 nothing to select. If we remove the fact of 
 inheritance there could be no possibility of pro- 
 gress or of the production of so-called specific 
 and generic kinds. If, finally, there were no 
 struggle for existence there would be no prce- 
 mium set upon advantageous variations, but 
 each creature would have room to vary indefi- 
 nitely, and would pay no penalty for harmful 
 variations, provided they were not themselves 
 of a nature to lead to death. The essentials of 
 the whole theory, therefore, lie in its presup- 
 positions, and the most important of these for 
 the teleologist is the fact of variability. There 
 could, then, be no progress, if among the varia- 
 tions which occur were not some leading in the 
 direction of progress. But to admit this is to 
 send us back behind natural selection to the 
 fundamental molecular processes which take 
 
60 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 place within the living substance of an organism. 
 We still await an answer to the question, why 
 the variations of living matter have been of such 
 a nature as to produce the world of ordered 
 progress which meets our eye. 
 
 Natural selection is a theory professing to 
 explain adaptations. It forms no part of the 
 theory that adaptations should be progressive. 
 If need arose, if climatic changes, for example, 
 required it, there is no reason, so far as natural 
 selection is concerned, why the whole earth 
 should not become populated solely with toad- 
 stools and mussels. Natural selection deals 
 with the variations which occur, of whatever 
 kind they may be. In the case of parasites 
 there has been for the most part degeneration, 
 not advance, parasites, in many instances, having 
 lost their locomotive organs and having adopted 
 a stationary life, feeding on the bodies of their 
 hosts. Yet parasites, equally with more pro- 
 gressive organisms, have survived, because they 
 have adapted themselves to their surroundings. 
 In his essay, Criticisms on the Origin of Species, 
 Huxley makes this point clear. He writes : 
 " So far from any gradual progress towards 
 perfection forming any necessary part of the 
 Darwinian creed, it appears to us that it is per- 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 61 
 
 fectly consistent with indefinite persistence in 
 one state or with a gradual retrogression. Sup- 
 pose, for example, a return of the glacial period 
 and a spread of polar climatal conditions over 
 the whole globe. The operation of natural 
 selection under these circumstances would tend, 
 on the whole, to the weeding-out of the higher 
 organisms and the cherishing of the lower forms 
 of life." 1 
 
 For the explanation, then, of progress we are 
 thrown back upon the fact of variability, and the 
 problem that confronts us is this : Does the fact 
 that variations in the direction of progress have 
 occurred give us any ground for believing that 
 there has been somewhere at work a principle of 
 design or purpose? Does not the believer in 
 final causes find in the fact of progress a secure 
 anchorage? A discussion of this question in- 
 volves a discussion of the problem of variability 
 among organisms. What we have to determine 
 is the range and extent of variation and the 
 causes of it ; and, in particular, the problem, 
 whether we can believe in a directed stream of 
 variation, or whether we must hold that all 
 variation is accidental and indefinite in the 
 
 1 Darwiniana, vol. ii., pp. 90, 91. 
 
62 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 sense above described. We have to confess 
 at once that no satisfactory solution of this 
 problem is at present possible. Biological in- 
 vestigation has, as yet, reached but few assured 
 results. The causes of variation have not been 
 determined with any certainty. The field is 
 one on which biologists are busily engaged in 
 working at the present time, so that conclusions 
 can be regarded only as tentative. But it is 
 possible (and for the purpose of this volume it 
 is all that is required) to indicate certain lines 
 upon which any discussion of the problem must 
 move. 
 
 The problem is primarily one which turns 
 upon the observation of facts. It should be 
 possible, by observation and experiment, to de- 
 termine statistically the actual range of variation, 
 and inquiry is being more and more directed 
 along this channel. But the problem is also 
 one of theory and hypothesis, of tentative en- 
 deavours to supply some explanation of the 
 method of evolution, and it is in this light that 
 we propose immediately to consider it. 
 
 Natural science makes it her ideal to explain 
 everything in terms of mechanism. Biology is 
 reduced to the level of physics. The biologist, 
 therefore, sets about his task resolved to dispense, 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 63 
 
 if he can, with all principles of explanation which 
 are not mechanical. He would at once rule out 
 of court any reference to the principle of design 
 or intelligent control, for the use of such a 
 principle contradicts the ideal of his science. 
 How then is he to deal with the question of the 
 range of variability? He must assume, at the 
 outset, that variations are indefinite, that there is 
 nothing to determine them in any one direction 
 more than in any other. The opposite assump- 
 tion would leave him confronted with a factor 
 which could not be brought within the compass 
 of his mechanical theory. By assuming an 
 indefinite variability as the material upon which 
 natural selection works, the biologist is able to 
 attribute to chance the adaptations which occur 
 among organisms. For, however striking an 
 adaptation may be, however apparently indica- 
 tive of design, you can always make a show of 
 explaining its occurrence, if you assume that it 
 is only one out of an indefinite number of other 
 possibilities which might have occurred. It is 
 always possible to maintain, without self-con- 
 tradiction, that if you tossed the letters of the 
 alphabet often enough, the combination of them 
 into a lyric poem might take place. The general 
 assumption which underlies any investigation of 
 
64 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 statistical laws is, that, while the range of varia- 
 tion is indefinite, yet departures from the mean 
 at either end of the scale will neutralise each 
 other. In the same way it is suggested that 
 Darwin assumed that variability was indefinite, 
 that in the struggle for existence unfavourable 
 variations would be eliminated, and that whatever 
 results might be achieved would be due solely 
 to the influence of natural selection. 1 From this 
 point of view, and if we grant for the moment 
 the validity of this criticism, indefinite variability 
 is a hypothesis made in the interests of a theory. 
 Whether it is also a fact is a question which 
 awaits our consideration. It is worth while to 
 dwell upon the point just raised because there 
 is such a thing as the manipulation, conscious 
 or unconscious, of facts in the interest of a specu- 
 lative position. There is also, in some quarters, 
 a tendency to assume that physical science 
 must be right in her explanations, and that the 
 principles with which she investigates are the 
 final principles which must govern all inquiry. 
 
 1 See " Darwinism and Design " in Mr. F. C. S. Schiller's 
 volume of essays Humanism, where this point is fully worked 
 out. I am indebted to Mr. Schiller for some suggestions 
 made by him in a correspondence between us a few years 
 ago. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 65 
 
 It is often forgotten that science attempts to 
 interpret the world only from a certain point of 
 view ; and this method of abstraction, while 
 abundantly justified as a means of simplifying 
 any given problem and of facilitating inquiry, 
 may create a bias or prejudice which is the 
 negation of the true scientific temper. Science 
 is right in framing any hypothesis she chooses 
 and interpreting facts from any point of view. 
 The psychologist, for example, may assume that 
 the will is not free, for the purposes of his inquiry, 
 because he desires to eliminate any variable or 
 incalculable factor which may render impossible 
 the treatment of his subject-matter as a strict 
 science. The older political economy regarded 
 man purely as a wealth-loving animal, and left 
 out of account the fact that he is also a social and 
 moral being, and that these additional charac- 
 teristics of his nature must react upon his desire 
 for wealth. 1 Her procedure was enormously 
 simplified by this hypothesis, but the results 
 reached by the science are highly abstract and 
 cannot be regarded as a complete explanation 
 of the facts in question. 
 
 One has no desire to be unfair to Darwinism, 
 
 1 Mr. Schiller's illustration, op. cit. t pp. 146, 147. 
 5 
 
66 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 but it may not be amiss to call attention to three 
 other examples which illustrate the hypothetical 
 character of the theory, more particularly, per- 
 haps, in its later and neo-Darwinian develop- 
 ments. It is extraordinary how, by the exercise 
 of a little ingenuity, the theory can be made to 
 fit all the facts, (a) Take, first, the question, 
 whether variations are always slight or infinitesi- 
 mal, and whether advance has been made by 
 the accumulation of these minute changes ; 
 whether the maxim is true that Nature works 
 always gradually and does nothing by a leap or 
 jump. It seems at first sight impossible that 
 such a complex structure as the eye could have 
 arisen by slow stages from so rudimentary a 
 condition as that of a mere pigment spot, sensi- 
 tive to light and shade. Darwin, however, 
 writes : " Although the belief that an organ so 
 perfect as the eye could have been formed by 
 natural selection is enough to stagger any one, 
 yet in the case of any organ, if we know of 
 a long series of gradations in complexity, each 
 good for its possessor, then, under changing con- 
 ditions of life, there is no logical impossibility 
 in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of 
 perfection through natural selection." 1 
 
 1 Origin of Species, p. 154. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 67 
 
 There is no /^^/impossibility. True, but 
 may not the hypothesis that every structure 
 has arisen by slow modification from simpler 
 structures have blinded inquirers to the facts 
 of variability ? For to-day we find biologists 
 asserting, as indeed Huxley asserted in 1864, 
 that variations need not always be slight or 
 infinitesimal, but that large or " discontinuous " 
 variations do constantly occur. 1 (b) Take, again, 
 the question of the utility of an organ or varia- 
 tion. That every variation must be of use to 
 its possessor, if it is to be preserved by natural 
 selection, is an essential article of the Darwinian 
 creed. And so you find biologists exercising 
 their brains to discover the uses to which struc- 
 tures may be put, and two inquirers sometimes 
 arrive at different conclusions. Curiously enough, 
 it is just the characters which are most constant 
 and specific, that is, which most surely charac- 
 terise species, such as minute markings on a 
 shell, which seem to have no conceivable utility. 
 If you assume as a preliminary starting-point 
 that every variation must be useful, you have 
 an endless field for speculation in the discovery 
 of uses. But may not your hypothesis possibly 
 be blinding you to the fact that not all characters 
 
 1 See Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation. 
 
68 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 possess selection- value, but that non -adaptive 
 characters may also be preserved? And may 
 you not thus be tending unduly to limit the 
 possible causes and methods of evolution by 
 giving natural selection, with its canon of utility, 
 the control of the whole process ? Here, again, 
 we find investigators who question the truth of 
 this initial assumption. The principles of the 
 theory were enunciated and were found applic- 
 able to many of the facts. Then the assumption 
 was made that they were the only principles, 
 and, speculatively, Darwinians could show much 
 logical probability on their side. But it is at 
 least possible that they were thereby hindered 
 from an impartial examination of all the facts. 
 Only now, after a lapse of many years, is a full 
 inquiry into the whole problem of variability 
 being undertaken, and also into that of heredity, 
 with a view to determining whether, after all, 
 non-adaptive characters may not be preserved, 
 whether, that is, the canon of utility exhausts 
 the nature of an organism as regards its indi- 
 vidual qualities and structures. 1 (c) Finally, 
 
 1 See Bateson, op. cit^ p. 79 : " While the only test of utility 
 is the success of the organism, even this does not indicate the 
 utility of one part of the economy, but rather the net fitness 
 of the whole ". 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 69 
 
 take the vexed question, whether acquired char- 
 acters can be inherited. Weismann, a neo- 
 Darwinian of the extreme school, has constructed 
 a theory of heredity which even his most ardent 
 defenders must admit to be highly speculative in 
 character. It is unnecessary here to enter into 
 the details of the theory, except to say this, that 
 it turns upon the making of a sharp distinction 
 between the germ-plasm, or race substance of 
 heredity, and the body-plasm or cells, of which 
 the body is composed. What affects the latter, 
 says Weismann, cannot affect the former. Char- 
 acters acquired by the individual organism in its 
 lifetime cannot therefore be transmitted to a 
 subsequent generation. If you produce an ex- 
 ample of what seems to be an acquired character, 
 Weismann meets you by asserting that the char- 
 acter has been latent all along in the germ-plasm, 
 and has only been awaiting the appropriate 
 condition and stimulus to call it out. Every 
 apparently acquired character can always be 
 treated as a congenital or race character which 
 has been lying latent in the complex germ-plasm. 
 The evidence for the inheritance of acquired 
 characters is, certainly, very slight, and the task 
 of determining in any case whether a given 
 character is a genuinely acquired character is 
 
70 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 extraordinarily difficult, and this gives stability 
 to Weismann's position. Yet one cannot but 
 feel that there is danger lest a speculative theory 
 of heredity may prejudice investigators in their 
 inquiry into the facts. 
 
 We have seen that natural selection is no 
 theory of origins but takes variability in organ- 
 isms for granted. We have also seen that, if 
 we would explain progress, we must endeavour 
 to determine why it is that variations in the 
 direction of progress have occurred. We are 
 driven back upon the hidden molecular processes 
 which occur in the living substance of organisms. 
 We have to investigate the facts of variability. 
 We wish to discover if there is any ground for 
 asserting that the stream of variation is directed ; 
 if the facts of variability will admit of the appli- 
 cation of the teleological principle in some form 
 or other. Let us repeat, once more, that no 
 adequate treatment of this question is at present 
 possible. Scientific opinion is still in an un- 
 settled condition. Only in comparatively recent 
 years has the problem of variability been care- 
 fully investigated, and conclusions are necessarily 
 tentative. All that we can do is to sketch out, 
 so far as our knowledge permits, some of the 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 71 
 
 main lines upon which investigation is proceed- 
 ing, and to indicate the nature of the problems 
 involved. Speaking broadly, we may say that 
 there are three main views to be considered. 
 (a) There are the views of those who maintain 
 that variations are directed by some special 
 regulative power or principle in the organism. 
 (6) There are the views of those who consider 
 that the two factors of organism and environ- 
 ment are accidentally related to each other, and 
 that there is no causal connection between the 
 influence of the environment and the require- 
 ments of an organism, (c) Lastly, there are 
 those who believe that there is some predeter- 
 mined relation between the two factors, so that, 
 in some way, the environment can influence the 
 organism to vary in directions which adapt it 
 better to its surroundings. We will take these 
 views in turn. 
 
 (a) That variations are directed by some 
 inner principle of control in the organism is a 
 view which has been adopted, and is still main- 
 tained by some inquirers, though the nature of 
 the controlling power is variously described. 
 In Germany, for example, a view of this kind 
 has found favour with Von Baer and Von 
 Hartmann, and in America with Dr. Cope. 
 
72 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Von Hartmann asserts that, along with the 
 mechanical forces at work in each organism, is 
 operating some non-mechanical power whose 
 action is as continuous as theirs. Von Baer 
 thought that this power acted intermittently, 
 presumably just at those points where striking 
 favourable variations occurred, which gave a lift, 
 as it were, to the whole development. Von Hart- 
 mann makes the assumption of the existence of 
 this non-mechanical power on two grounds ; first, 
 because it is only an unlimited and indefinite 
 variability, which will explain adaptation by 
 selection ; secondly, because, as a matter of fact, 
 variation takes place in fixed directions. The 
 former is an assertion based on the logical re- 
 quirements of a theory ; the latter is, in the 
 opinion of its author, supported by observed 
 facts. 
 
 The most effective criticism of this position 
 is to ask what evidence there is of the existence 
 of this regulative principle of control. The 
 answer is, that there is none. Its existence is 
 purely hypothetical. The assumption is also 
 open to certain grave objections. How, for 
 instance, can we ever hope to form any concep- 
 tion of the working of this regulative factor? 
 It is a purely unknown quantity, from handling 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 73 
 
 which science not unnaturally shrinks. For to 
 accept the belief in the existence of any such 
 non-mechanical principle is to abandon the ideal 
 of natural science which is to press to its furthest 
 limit the mechanical principle of explanation. 
 The gradual bringing of new regions under the 
 dominance of mechanical modes of explanation 
 remains one of the greatest triumphs of modern 
 scientific inquiry. Every day the links are 
 being multiplied which connect the organic with 
 the inorganic world, and the fount of the scientific 
 man's inspiration is the hope that one day the 
 phenomena of life will prove amenable to me- 
 chanical explanation. We can, then, see clearly 
 why men of science are unwilling to admit the 
 existence of such a factor, and, in particular, 
 why the believer in the universal efficiency of 
 natural selection is so unwilling. For what is 
 called in question is the strictly mechanical 
 character of natural selection and its presupposi- 
 tions. As Weismann well says in his Studies 
 in the Theory of Descent : '* It is certainly the 
 absence of a theoretical definition of variability 
 which always leaves open the door for smuggling 
 in a teleological power. A mechanical explana- 
 tion of variability must form the basis of this 
 side of natural selection." 
 
74 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Bateson in his volume, Materials for the 
 Study of Variation, denies that all change is 
 slight and infinitesimal, and produces much 
 evidence to show that variations may be large 
 or "discontinous," in a word, that Nature does 
 work by leaps. But he does not conclude from 
 this fact that there must be some inner, non- 
 mechanical, regulative force, which is operative 
 just at those points where a large and useful 
 variation suddenly emerges. On the contrary, 
 he suggests that the definiteness and discontinuity 
 of the variations is determined mechanically ; for 
 example, " that the patterns into which the tissues 
 of animals are divided represent positions in 
 which the forces that effect the division are in 
 equilibrium." 1 He suggests, further, that there 
 may be f< an analogy between the discontinuity 
 of some substantive variations (such as those 
 occurring in the colours of flowers) and that of 
 chemical discontinuity. " 2 We are not, therefore, 
 to assume the existence of unknown forces until 
 it has been demonstrated that known forces are 
 insufficient to explain the facts. On the other 
 hand, the hypothesis of some non-mechanical 
 and regulative power reminds us that we are 
 
 ^.70. 2 P. 71. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 75 
 
 entirely ignorant of the relation in which physical 
 and spiritual factors stand to each other. What 
 we do know is this, that in man the physical and 
 mental series are in close correlation, and the 
 idea of development would suggest that there 
 has been an evolution of the spiritual factor 
 proceeding parallel to the evolution of the phys- 
 ical all down the scale. There may therefore 
 (may we not say there must ?) be at work some 
 spiritual factor. Life has not been successfully 
 interpreted in terms of mechanism, and, as we 
 shall see later, a merely mechanical explanation 
 even of inorganic matter is impossible. But to 
 assert this is something very different from 
 isolating out this spiritual factor and treating it 
 as a detached quantity or force ; which is really 
 equivalent to reducing it to the mechanical level. 
 The operations of any spiritual factor cannot be 
 treated as if they were similar in kind to the 
 operations of mechanical forces. 
 
 {b) We have already discussed the second 
 view, the view of those who, relying on the 
 all-sufficiency of natural selection as the sole 
 method of evolution, maintain that organism 
 and environment are accidentally related, and 
 that there is no causal connection between the 
 action of the surroundings and useful changes 
 
76 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in the organism. And we have suggested that 
 it is possible that the hypothesis of indefinite 
 variability was made in the interests of a theory. 
 At the same time it is but fair to quote the words 
 of a biologist like Wallace, in chapter iii. of 
 Darwinism, which deals with " Variability of 
 Species in a State of Nature ". Wallace is con- 
 cerned to show that the range of variation among 
 organic forms, which actually does occur, is enor- 
 mous, and may practically be called unlimited. 
 
 11 Variation, in abundant or typical species, is 
 always present in ample amount ; it exists in all 
 parts and organs ; these vary for the most part 
 independently, so that any required combination 
 of variations can be secured ; . . . consequently 
 the right or favourable variations are so fre- 
 quently present that the unerring power of 
 natural selection never wants materials to work 
 upon." Wallace, that is, absolutely denies the 
 statement that there is some agency which de- 
 termines variation in the right direction. While 
 admitting that the environment may cause varia- 
 tions in organisms, he denies that it necessarily 
 causes useful or adaptive ones. 
 
 (c) We have to deal, thirdly, with the view 
 that there is some causal relation between the 
 influence of the environment and useful changes 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 77 
 
 in the organism. Here it is necessary to sub- 
 divide the opinions of members of this school. 
 (1) There are those who maintain that the 
 environment exercises a direct influence on the 
 organism, causing it to form definite variations, 
 which are always in the direction of better adap- 
 tation to itself. They are chiefly botanists, who 
 hold this opinion. We may take Professor 
 George Henslow as a typical champion of this 
 contention ; and what we have to say upon the 
 point is derived from his book, The Origin of 
 Plant-Structures by Self -Adaptation to the En- 
 vironment. We must notice the latter half of 
 the title of the volume. He writes that the 
 differences in structure among plants " are due 
 to the responsive power of protoplasm, which, 
 under the influences of the external forces of the 
 environment, builds up just those tissues which 
 are best fitted to be in harmony with the en- 
 vironment in question". 1 Henslow denies ab- 
 solutely the cardinal tenet of the Darwinian. 
 Variations in Nature, as opposed to those in 
 cultivated forms, are never indefinite but always 
 definite. His book is an attack upon the theory 
 of natural selection. He wishes to discover if 
 
 1 P. 14. 
 
7$ DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 natural selection supplies any aid in originating 
 species. He settles that it is not needed because 
 the environment " itself induces a plant to form 
 definite and not indefinite variations in Nature " ; 
 and these " definite variations are always in the 
 direction of adaptation to the environment it- 
 self". 1 He claims to have proved his contention 
 by experiment and observation. He instances 
 desert plants, among others, and says that if 
 you place a plant in a desert it immediately be- 
 gins to change, and change in the direction of 
 adaptation to its conditions of life. It grows 
 fleshy, producing tissues which can hold water 
 and are bad conductors of heat. Its leaves 
 often change to spines, the change effecting a 
 useful economy of vital power. The view of 
 the believer in natural selection is that the plant 
 varies indefinitely, either from certain internal 
 causes or from the indefinite irritating action of 
 the environment upon it. Among the indefinite 
 variations which occur are some which are in 
 the direction of adaptation to environment, and 
 these, being useful, are preserved by natural 
 selection. Henslow's view is that the environ- 
 ment calls out these very adaptations. The 
 
 1 Op. cit. } preface, p. 8. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 79 
 
 environment excites the variability latent in the 
 plant and turns it into particular channels. 
 There is implied a close correlation and causal 
 connection between the two factors. (2) The 
 other school maintains that the action of the 
 environment is indirect and takes place through 
 the inherited effects of use and disuse by which 
 organs and structures are either improved or 
 atrophied. This was Lamarck's view in the 
 Philosophie Zoologique : " Environment can effect 
 no direct changes whatever upon the organisa- 
 ation of animals, but change is brought about 
 only through the reaction of the organism to 
 the stimulation of the environment ". Darwin 
 and Herbert Spencer were both stout supporters 
 of this opinion. Darwin takes the case of an 
 organism finding itself in altered conditions of 
 life, a wild duck, for example, confined in cap- 
 tivity. It flies, he tells us, less, and walks more, 
 than the wild duck, and its limb bones have 
 become diminished and increased in a corre- 
 sponding manner in comparison with those of 
 the wild duck. Use and disuse have gradually 
 brought about these structural modifications. 
 The modifications have been inherited, and thus 
 large changes have been slowly effected. At 
 the present time such a view is confronted with 
 
80 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 a grave difficulty, the difficulty arising from the 
 uncertainty whether acquired characters can be 
 transmitted by heredity to subsequent genera- 
 tions. 
 
 We shall do well to remind ourselves at this 
 point that Darwin's own judgment upon all these 
 questions was extraordinarily broad and balanced. 
 He took a large and comprehensive view of the 
 vexed problem of the factors of evolution. He 
 never asserted that natural selection was the 
 sole operative principle. As to the question of 
 the causes of variability in organisms, he saw 
 plainly the complexity of the problem, and the 
 probability that many co-operating causes were 
 at work. Later inquirers have, as a rule, taken 
 up one element in Darwin's system and have 
 emphasised that to the exclusion of other ele- 
 ments, with detriment to the cause of truth 
 which they have at heart. A recurrence, there- 
 fore, to Darwin's own writings is an absolute 
 essential for all who would understand what 
 evolution in biology means. His was the 
 master light, the white light of a sane and liberal 
 reason. That light has passed through the 
 prism of lesser minds, has been broken up into 
 its constituent rays, one or other of which we 
 are often asked to accept, as if it were the full 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 81 
 
 splendour. This, perhaps, always happens in 
 the case of an original and creative mind. It 
 certainly was so with Kant. Later develop- 
 ments of philosophy consist largely in taking up 
 and applying certain elements in his comprehen- 
 sive thought to the exclusion of other elements. 
 At the same time it is given to no one to say 
 the last word upon any subject. Biology has 
 made great advance since Darwin's day, particu- 
 larly as regards the problem of the range and 
 causes of variability. 
 
 We have, in conclusion, to ask what is the 
 attitude of the believer in final causes towards 
 these various biological theories, and more 
 generally towards the broad and undoubted fact 
 of progress. With the first, the theory of some 
 non-mechanical regulative factor, he is obvi- 
 ously in sympathy, though we have seen reason 
 to reject the theory. With the second he is 
 not in sympathy. Instinctively he feels that an 
 orderly and progressive system cannot have 
 arisen out of the accidental interaction of the 
 two variables, organism and environment ; and 
 he demands more evidence that variation is as 
 indefinite as it is assumed to be. Even if he 
 were forced to admit that natural selection is 
 
 the sole factor in organic evolution he would 
 6 
 
82 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 fall back, as we shall see in the succeeding 
 chapter, upon the contention that some applica- 
 tion of the principle of design is necessary, if 
 you would explain the original constitution of 
 matter from which the whole orderly evolution 
 has proceeded. The third view, which main- 
 tains that the environment is in causal relation 
 to useful or adaptive changes in the organism, 
 clearly appeals to him, for the chance interaction 
 of the two factors has vanished, and there is 
 substituted for it something in the nature of 
 a correlation or pre-established harmony, which 
 is more in accord with the striking appearance 
 of design afforded by the world of living forms. 
 Turning our attention, then, to the broad fact 
 of progress, we seem compelled to interpret it 
 in teleological terms. The very idea of pro- 
 gress, as we have said, involves the conception 
 of an end. Progress is change determined to- 
 wards an end. This at least is the way in which 
 we are compelled to read the meaning of the 
 word. It is true, indeed, that this does not 
 prove that the progressive development of the 
 world is designed, but it renders it natural for us 
 to ask whether we may not apply to the move- 
 ment of the universe a conception which cer- 
 tainly applies to human activity and of which 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 83 
 
 the movement of the universe will admit. To 
 the conception of a static order, which our 
 fathers possessed, we have to add that of an 
 orderly development or evolution, whose march 
 is measured not by decades or centuries but by 
 thousands of years, whose scale is so gigantic 
 that our imaginations are overpowered as we 
 reflect upon it. A panorama, vaster than that 
 dreamed of by any other age, has opened out 
 before us, and we realise in a unique manner 
 the marvels of the universe by which we are 
 surrounded. The whole conception of a pro- 
 gressive development seems to render more 
 apparent those indications of plan and purpose 
 which by a kind of native intuition man has 
 seen, and always will see, in the construction of 
 the world. How native and natural this teleo- 
 logical attitude is to man may be illustrated 
 from the writings of Darwin or any advocate of 
 natural selection. They wish to do away with 
 any reference to design or purpose, yet they 
 are compelled to use teleological language. 
 Utility is the key-note of the theory. Only 
 those changes are preserved which are useful. 
 Useful for what ? The very conception implies 
 a reference to an end. Nature is everywhere 
 treated by them as a system of means and ends, 
 
84 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 and they are always asking what purpose a 
 variation serves. They best prosecute their 
 anti-teleological crusade by donning the armour 
 of the teleologist. It is impossible for us to rid 
 our minds of the conception of purpose or de- 
 sign. But not only do we see progress, not 
 only do we see, especially in the organic world, 
 adaptations subtle and exquisite, but we are 
 confronted by this fact, that the process of evo- 
 lution has been crowned by the advent of man 
 and seems to have been directed towards the 
 production of man. In the presence of man we 
 seem to read the meaning of the age-long striv- 
 ing of the past. As we shall see later, the end 
 in any development is the explanation of the 
 beginning, not the beginning of the end. No 
 development can be adequately interpreted un- 
 less the process is read in the light of the goal 
 toward which it moves. When we survey the 
 whole evolutionary movement, and observe its 
 culmination in man, it becomes natural for us 
 to regard all the earlier stages as prophetic of 
 the goal finally attained. They win a richer 
 and fuller meaning when read in relation to 
 ourselves. We are not arguing that the colour 
 of the rose was made with the sole purpose of 
 delighting the eye of man, or the taste of the 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PROGRESS 85 
 
 grape to gratify his palate. To say this would 
 be to parallel Paley's naive argument that 
 poisonous snakes exist in Africa for the purpose 
 of warning off intending settlers. 1 All we con- 
 tend is, that, viewed broadly, the whole process 
 of evolution seems to have been directed towards 
 the production of man. Nor are we denying 
 that ends other, and possibly higher, than man's 
 welfare may be served by these adaptations. 
 But even if there are higher ends this does not 
 alter the fact that natural processes, with their 
 myriad adjustments, find a culmination in man. 
 The greater does not exclude the less. Be- 
 cause a road which passes through one town 
 ultimately reaches another, we cannot argue that 
 the maker of the road did not intend to reach 
 the nearer town. Our conviction is not shaken 
 if we are told that we are making man the 
 measure of the universe. Further, when we go 
 on to consider the nature of man, his moral and 
 spiritual worth, those of us, at any rate, who 
 believe that materialism is an impossible creed, 
 and who are convinced that the universe must 
 ultimately be explained in terms of mind or 
 spirit, will all the more feel the force of the 
 
 1 Natural Theology \ chap. xxvi. 
 
86 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 argument just stated. Our general outlook 
 to-day is no whit less teleological, nay, it is more 
 teleological, than it was before. There is such 
 a thing, as has been said, as a miracle of un- 
 belief. Is it easier to believe that this orderly 
 and progressive development is the result of the 
 working of blind, unconscious power, or of the 
 fortuitous clash of atoms "ruining along the 
 illimitable inane," rather than the slow accom- 
 plishment of a great Divine plan, the expression 
 of a mind, infinitely vaster than, yet genuinely 
 akin to, our human reason ? 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF 
 ORDER 
 
 IN considering the fact of progress we have 
 already touched upon the problem of order, 
 for progress is part of order. But order is the 
 wider conception, and order may express itself 
 in manifold ways. We go on, therefore, to in- 
 vestigate the implications of the conception of 
 order from a somewhat broader point of view. 
 Let us first note that evolution is not a self- 
 explanatory term. Evolution is a word which 
 is merely descriptive. 1 1 describes a phenomenal 
 process. To narrate the history of any develop- 
 ment, to set it forth in the sequence of its suc- 
 cessive movements, is not to explain it. The 
 demands of my reason are in no way satisfied 
 when you tell me that it is by gradual stages 
 that the acorn has grown into the oak, or that 
 the planetary system has resulted from the slow 
 cooling down of a nebulous and gaseous mass. 
 
 m 
 
88 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 I still want to know how there ever came to be 
 an acorn at all, or why the gaseous mass took 
 the particular path of development which it has 
 taken. Just as the essentials of the theory of 
 natural selection lie in its presuppositions, so the 
 conception of evolution as a whole sends us back 
 to the original conditions which govern and 
 underlie the total movement. In other words, 
 we ask two fundamental questions. What is the 
 origin of the whole process of evolution, what 
 the source from which it springs? Why has 
 the process been directed and determined along 
 the particular lines which we see it follow? 
 There is a problem of origin, and a problem of 
 direction. 
 
 (a) With regard to the former problem, we 
 must admit frankly at the outset that it is a 
 problem which we cannot completely solve, for 
 the very good reason that we were not present 
 in the grey dawn of being to see what actually 
 did take place. But there are certain aspects 
 of the problem which we can discuss, with some 
 fair hope of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. 
 The universe is an orderly universe. No one 
 can deny that. It is a system whose life goes 
 on under fixed conditions. Nature is a home 
 of law, and the laws of Nature are the expres- 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 89 
 
 sion of the observed uniformities of Nature's 
 working. The fount of inspiration for the man 
 of science is the conviction that Nature is no- 
 where chaotic, but that she will gradually yield 
 up her secret to the inquiring mind which seeks 
 and finds in Nature the orderliness which charac- 
 terises reason in its operations. And as investi- 
 gation proceeds, the validity of this conviction 
 grows more and more apparent. But we ask 
 how this system came to be, and what is the 
 origin of the orderliness of Nature. A law can- 
 not explain itself; it is a bare statement of ob- 
 served fact. Now science, if she is true science, 
 does not concern herself with this question of 
 origins. 1 1 is a problem for metaphysics ; it is 
 a very important problem for the Philosophy of 
 Religion. Science assumes that Nature has al- 
 ways been orderly, has always been a system. 
 Let us take, for example, such a statement as 
 this of Huxley : " The whole world, living and 
 not living, is the result of the mutual inter- 
 action, according to definite laws, of the powers 
 possessed by the molecules, of which the primi- 
 tive nebulosity of the universe was composed". 1 
 We have here a plain confession, that Nature 
 
 1 Darwiniana> Essay on " The Genealogy of Animals ". 
 
9 o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 must be assumed to be a system from the very 
 first. The assumption postulates the existence 
 of molecules possessed of certain powers, and 
 endowed with a fixed constitution, which interact 
 according to definite laws ; or, to use a phrase 
 of Lotze, the existence of " a series of primary 
 relations between the elements of the universe ". 
 If things interact in definite ways, there must be 
 some underlying basis for the interaction. Some 
 ground must exist for the co-ordinated necessities 
 of the world. What science therefore assumes 
 is the existence of certain prearranged activities, 
 or elements, in a related whole. And the ultimate 
 problem is, how to interpret this whole, this 
 unity of multiplicity, which science finds intelli- 
 gible and amenable to treatment by human rea- 
 son, so far as she has succeeded in investigating 
 it. Science, as we have already said, does not 
 attempt to explain the original order which she 
 assumes. She treats it as a fact, which has 
 existed from all time. She is right to do so, 
 only she must recognise that her assumption is 
 itself open to criticism, and that reason will 
 still endeavour to penetrate behind her as- 
 sumption, or rather to analyse it, with a view 
 to discovering if it is an ultimate assumption, or 
 whether it may not itself depend on a further 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 91 
 
 assumption, and be capable of a different inter- 
 pretation. 
 
 We may neglect the pseudo-science, which 
 endeavours to derive the primitive order of the 
 universe from an earlier state of chaos, if for no 
 other reason, at least for this, that chaos is un- 
 thinkable. Whatever it is about which we are 
 thinking, we are compelled to treat it as orderly, 
 as a system of relations. Mind cannot lay hold, , 
 so to speak, of anything which is not orderly. 
 If there were such a thing as sheer indefiniteness, 
 as " infinite motion and mixture in infinitely 
 various ways/' 1 it would be nothing for our rea- 
 son. Reason would be brought up suddenly 
 before it, as a climber before an absolutely 
 smooth wall of rock. The climber cannot climb 
 the rock unless he can find a groove or niche 
 to give him foothold. Chaos, then, is unthink- 
 able. Even if we assume it to be the origin of 
 everything, we have still to ask how out of 
 chaos order can come. What was there in the 
 primitive chaos which led it at one time to 
 become orderly? If you say that there was 
 some element there which ultimately led to 
 chaos becoming cosmos, then it is no longer 
 
 1 Lotze, Microco$mus % Eng. Trans., bk. iv., chap. ii. 
 
92 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 chaos. It is so far orderly. Nor, if you assert 
 that this universe is only one out of an infinite 
 number of other possible universes which might 
 have been, are you nearer to any rational solu- 
 tion of the problem. For these other hypothet- 
 ical universes could not have co-existed along 
 with this actual one ; and the point is, why this 
 actual one came into being. Whatever originally 
 existed, no matter how complex and manifold, or 
 how simple its original relations might be, must 
 have been actual, and so must have excluded other 
 possibilities from co-existing. 1 Again, every ele- 
 ment in your original chaos was not chaotic ; 
 but each must have had a definite character, 
 and must therefore have been orderly. A mere 
 possibility is nothing. Only an actual something 
 can have existence. However far you go in 
 your analysis of ultimate conditions you find 
 yourself confronted with orderliness. To postu- 
 late chaos as the fons et origo of the order that 
 exists is to use language which has no meaning. 
 How, then, are we to explain the fact that, 
 however far back we may push our inquiry, 
 Nature always reveals herself as a system ? An 
 explanation is needed, for our minds cannot be 
 
 1 MicrocosmuSy bk. iv., chap. ii. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 93 
 
 satisfied with the fact as an ultimate datum. 
 Can we find any other explanation than this, 
 that the system of Nature is the expression of 
 an intelligence or mind ? Let us consider these 
 points. Nature is intelligible. Our minds can 
 progressively understand her, and we find our- 
 selves at home in the universe. If Nature pos- 
 sesses the quality of intelligibility, must she not 
 herself be the expression of an intelligence? 
 How are we to explain the harmony which 
 exists between our minds and Nature, except on 
 the hypothesis that Nature emanates from mind? 
 Regard Nature as a development, and take note 
 of the end towards which the development has 
 moved. The movement has resulted in the pro- 
 duction of personalities, spiritual beings endowed 
 with reason, and possessed of moral worth and 
 significance. Can such beings reasonably be 
 regarded as incidental products of the interaction 
 of mechanical forces ? Is it thinkable that 
 blind, unconscious force should result in the 
 production of conscious beings who can turn 
 round and view and interpret the process by 
 which they came into existence ? Can consci- 
 ousness be a by-product of material conditions ? 
 Surely the significance of the end must contain 
 the key for the solution of the whole problem. 
 
94 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Mind which emerges in the course of the evolu- 
 tion must have been present at the beginning 
 of it. Once more, analysis of our own conscious 
 existence reveals ourselves as centres of experi- 
 ences which we call our own. Each one of us 
 is a system of such experiences, which are ren- 
 dered orderly and systematic just because they 
 are all the experiences of a self. And our 
 rational development consists in this, that we 
 try more and more to group and arrange our 
 experiences, and to render them orderly and 
 intelligible to ourselves. The life of the self is 
 a perpetual movement toward fuller and com- 
 pleter unification and systematisation. We re- 
 tain our identity through a continually expanding 
 series of changes. Mind is a unifying activity. 
 Now the contention of an idealistic philosophy 
 is, that the only meaning of system, whether in 
 Nature or in man, is to be found in mind. We 
 know of no other unifying principle except mind. 
 Matter in itself is nothing, has no existence, ex- 
 cept in so far as it exists for, and is interpreted 
 by, mind. Your atom is a mental hypothesis. 
 The interacting molecules with which science 
 starts are all mental constructions, even though 
 they may at the same time be real, in the sense 
 of not being merely ideas. We are not denying 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 95 
 
 that matter has a real existence ; but we must 
 maintain that, apart from a mind to which it is 
 related, and by which it is grasped, matter is 
 nothing. A self-existent matter is unthinkable 
 and meaningless. Can we then, we ask once 
 more, rest satisfied with any explanation of 
 order, other than that which regards it as the 
 expression of an intelligence? 
 
 The problem of the origin of the orderly 
 evolution of the universe is often stated in the 
 following terms. Men, recognising that every 
 event must have a cause, follow in imagination 
 the steps of the evolution backwards, and ask 
 whether there must not have been a First 
 Cause. Can we think an infinite regress, or 
 attach any intelligible meaning to such a con- 
 ception? Must we not come to a halt some- 
 where, and find a starting-point for the whole 
 development? The doctrine of creation, as 
 popularly held, undoubtedly includes the belief 
 that the universe began to be at a certain point 
 in time, and that, before that point, the matter 
 of which it is composed did not exist. But, 
 though we who live in the time-process must 
 think of the present development of the universe 
 as beginning at a definite moment, there is no 
 reason why we should not regard creation as an 
 
96 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 unending and unbeginning process, and think of 
 God as eternally creating a succession of uni- 
 verses. Provided we postulate a cause adequate 
 to produce an infinite phenomenal succession, 
 we may believe in the existence of an infinite 
 regress. Let us, however, assume that there 
 was a starting-point of the whole movement. 
 What we have to make clear is that we cannot, 
 in that case, speak in strict language of a First 
 Cause. First implies first in a series. Now, 
 whatever God is, He cannot be first in any 
 series. He cannot be any term at all in the 
 series, but must stand, as it were, outside the 
 series. If we call God a First Cause we are 
 really degrading Him from His position of being 
 the ground or underlying basis of the whole 
 series, and are making Him a stage only in the 
 series. We should use another form of expres- 
 sion in order to describe His relation to the 
 historic process of development. Metaphysics 
 might call God by the somewhat ugly name of 
 the " world-ground," or the underlying "signi- 
 ficant idea " which gives unity to the whole, or 
 the " supreme spiritual principle". The Philo- 
 sophy of Religion rises higher, and describes 
 Him as the great Personal Existence, upon 
 whom depends, and from whom emanates, the 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 97 
 
 whole temporal evolution. The difficulty con- 
 nected with the expression " First Cause " raises 
 ultimately the problem of the manner in which 
 God stands related to the universe, a problem 
 which is for us insoluble. But though the 
 problem is finally insoluble, yet of the attempts 
 which we make to solve it some can be seen to 
 be less adequate than others. For example, 
 we must not, as we shall see more fully later, 
 think of God as an external designer, a mode 
 of expression which appears to imply that God 
 stands outside a material which is foreign to 
 Him, and works it up into shape. In God we 
 seem to demand a simultaneity of purpose and 
 execution. To call Him a designer is a some- 
 what crude form of expression. Nor is our 
 religious consciousness satisfied by speaking of 
 God as an immanent idea. The difficulty of 
 thinking of God as apart from or outside matter 
 is sometimes said to be avoided by thinking of 
 God and matter as somehow one, and blended 
 into a unity. Matter is regarded as somehow 
 mixed with mind, the two being constituents of 
 a something which is both of them, and which 
 expresses itself in the evolution of the universe. 
 But what alone satisfies our religious conscious- 
 ness is some conception of God which shall 
 7 
 
98 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 make Him that upon which the evolution of 
 the world depends ; that which alone has self- 
 existence ; which has spontaneity of action ; 
 that which has moral worth and possesses an 
 intelligence really akin to our own. The only 
 satisfactory expression which can cover all these 
 conditions is the word Person. It is for the 
 Philosophy of Religion to vindicate its right to 
 use the word " Person " of God. 
 
 (6) We go on to consider the problem of 
 direction, the question why the development of 
 this planet has resulted in the serial order which 
 we observe, in which there has been a succession 
 of organic forms culminating in the appearance 
 of man. Let us revert to that phrase of Huxley 
 already quoted : " The whole world, living and 
 not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, 
 according to definite laws, of the powers pos- 
 sessed by the molecules, of which the primitive 
 nebulosity of the universe was composed ". 
 
 We are thinking of molecules interacting. 
 The universe is regarded as a system of inter- 
 connected molecules and the problem of its 
 evolution is a problem in molecular physics. 
 Fixing our attention upon one point in the 
 development which may serve as typical of the 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 99 
 
 whole, the growth, let us say, of an acorn into 
 an oak, what we want to know is why the acorn 
 develops into an oak. Why does it not turn 
 into an elm or a fir-tree? If we say that the 
 acorn has inherited certain tendencies from its 
 ancestor oak, which compel it to grow oakwards 
 rather than in any other direction, we are simply 
 restating the fact and have explained nothing. 
 The problem is, why the myriad molecules 
 which compose the acorn move along the paths, 
 each molecule along its own appropriate path, 
 which lead to the formation of an oak-tree in 
 our garden. In other words, What is it which 
 directs molecular motion? It would be an ex- 
 traordinary phenomenon for our thought to 
 puzzle over, if there were only one acorn in the 
 whole world growing into an oak. We should 
 have here just that intricate adjustment of parts 
 to form a whole, that co-ordination of move- 
 ments toward the production of a result, which 
 we could not help raising to the dignity of an 
 end, and treating as in some way foreseen ; but 
 the marvel is rendered all the more extraordinary 
 when we think of successive generations of oaks, 
 when we reflect what heredity and the repetition 
 of the phenomenon imply. Here molecular 
 motion is determined in a definite direction, not 
 
ioo DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 once but many times. We ask with all the 
 more urgency how an acorn can gradually put 
 on a structure which looks as if it had been de- 
 signed. This is a fundamental question for a 
 philosophy which would interpret a development 
 or indeed any change whatever. Wherever we 
 are dealing with any physical change, the motion 
 of any single particle of matter, we ask what it 
 is which makes that particle move in the direc- 
 tion in which it does move. One cannot ask a 
 more fundamental question. Indeed, so funda- 
 mental is it that we are obliged to confess that 
 we cannot answer it. We have to admit that 
 we do not know what controls molecular motion. 
 On the other hand, a little reflection shows us 
 that certain explanations of the difficulty which 
 are offered us are no explanations at all. We 
 are sometimes told, for example, that force de- 
 termines molecular motion. This would seem 
 to be the view of Huxley when he writes that 
 the universe has resulted from the interaction of 
 the powers possessed by the original molecules. 
 But is this a satisfactory explanation ? A force 
 acting on a molecule would certainly move it, 
 but the point is, why the molecule moves in 
 a particular direction. The force must itself 
 have been determined in a particular way if it 
 
THE CONCEPTION 0^6fcSfiR # 101 
 
 could cause the molecule to move in one direc- 
 tion rather than in another. As Croll brings 
 out very clearly in The Basis of Evolution, 
 motion is one thing, the determination of motion 
 is another. The illustration which he gives is 
 as follows : Let A and B be two particles at a 
 distance from each other, A being to the east 
 of B. Let them move toward each other under 
 the force of mutual attraction. B will move 
 eastward and A westward. The motion of each 
 particle is due to attraction, but not the deter- 
 mination of the motion. A moves west, because 
 B happens to be to the west of it, and the direc- 
 tion of A's motion is due to whatever causes 
 they were which placed B on the west of A. 
 " The direction taken by moving particles is 
 due to pre-arrangement of those particles in 
 regard to time and space. A difference in pre- 
 arrangement would necessarily produce a corre- 
 sponding difference in the direction taken by the 
 particles." 1 
 
 Force, therefore, can never be the explanation 
 of plan or order. Order results from the deter- 
 mination or directing of force. Now in the 
 organic world, not to speak of the inorganic, 
 
 1 Croll, The Basis of Evolution, p. 20. 
 
m DEVELOPxMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 there is everywhere definite plan. Things de- 
 velop, as we say, according to type. But no 
 one can say what it is which makes the mole- 
 cules of a growing organism take severally their 
 appropriate directions, so that there results a 
 structure which presents the appearance of 
 having been designed after a definite pattern. 
 We must not allow ourselves to be deceived 
 by such high-sounding phrases as " formative 
 forces " or " forces of building and construction ". 
 Science knows nothing whatever about the ulti- 
 mate causes of the determination of force and 
 motion. All that science can do, even if she is 
 aware of the difference between the cause of 
 motion and the cause of the determination of 
 motion, is to assume a certain definite, original 
 constitution of matter, a certain precise arrange- 
 ment of all the primitive particles in relation to 
 each other from which has developed the whole 
 order of the universe. And this assumption 
 itself needs explanation. We still seek for the 
 cause of the original arrangement. 
 
 An analysis of our own inner experience may, 
 I think, give us a clue to the solution of the 
 difficulty. That analysis reveals the existence 
 in each of us of a power of will, a power of 
 determining our line of action. Whatever diffi- 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 103 
 
 culties there may be in the way of proving that 
 the will is free (and strict proof is impossible), 
 our conviction upon the matter is certain. We 
 appear to possess this power of choice and 
 self-determination. Consciousness testifies to it. 
 Morality demands it, for you cannot satisfactorily 
 explain the existence of the " ought" in ethics 
 without assuming the responsibility, and there- 
 fore the freedom, of the agent. And ultimately 
 our conception of force or efficiency is derived 
 from our own power of will, from our sense of 
 exercising effort, and from the experience of 
 pressure or resistance with which we meet 
 when we come into contact with material ob- 
 jects. In this way, our own natures supply us 
 with the key for the interpretation of the world 
 around us. And we do from our power of will 
 receive a real suggestion as to the meaning of 
 determination. It becomes natural for us to 
 refer the determining agency in Nature to the 
 power of a Divine will, even though we cannot 
 see far enough into the mystery of existence to 
 justify completely to reason the conclusion which 
 we frame. 
 
 We may, perhaps, be permitted here to make 
 a momentary digression, which, however, is not 
 without direct bearing upon the problem under 
 
104 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 consideration. The difficulty connected with the 
 freedom of the will turns ultimately upon the 
 nature of causation. The causes which we 
 know in the physical universe, and with which 
 science deals, are all of them also effects of 
 conditions antecedent to them ; and reading 
 backwards the process of physical causation we 
 find ourselves confronted with an infinite re- 
 gress, an endless chain of cause and effect. If 
 the will is free, it would seem that we have here 
 a cause which cannot be regarded as an effect 
 of anything antecedent (except in so far as man's 
 freedom is ultimately derived from God) ; a 
 cause which does not stand as a link in a chain, 
 but is really spontaneous in its operation. Yet, 
 if we assert this, we at once plunge ourselves 
 into grave difficulties. If I am absolutely free 
 at any minute to choose between two alterna- 
 tives, if there is nothing to bias me in either 
 direction, and my choice is completely indifferent, 
 then my action cannot be called moral. For 
 that action alone can have moral judgment 
 passed upon it which is the outcome of char- 
 acter, which is action expressive of the nature 
 and constitution of the self. On the other hand, 
 if we say that a man's choice is the expression 
 of his character, then his choice would seem to 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF ORDER 105 
 
 be qualified and determined by his inner states 
 at the moment when he makes the choice. 
 These inner states must be held to depend on 
 earlier states, and so the cause (the choice) is 
 reduced to an effect of antecedent conditions. 
 We may once more follow Croll, 1 and put the 
 matter in this way. I chose A half an hour 
 ago, but now, when the same two alternatives 
 are presented to me, I choose B. Why has my 
 choice changed ? If there has been a change in 
 the antecedents, that is, in the inner states which 
 determine my choice, then my altered choice 
 depends on this earlier change of antecedents, 
 and must be represented as an effect of prior 
 conditions. If 1 maintain that there has been 
 no change in my inner states, but that I choose 
 freely, and with complete indifference, then a 
 change has been brought about without a cause, 
 and we seem to be contradicting the truth that 
 for every event there must be a cause adequate 
 to produce it. The event in this case is the 
 alteration of my choice, and of this there seems 
 to be no explanation. Yet the fact remains, 
 that we are convinced we are free, and have the 
 power of spontaneous self-determination. The 
 
 1 The Basis of Evolution, chap. viii. 
 
106 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 final problem, then, is this — are there causes in 
 operation which are not themselves effects of 
 earlier causes? Our reason requires us to be- 
 lieve in the existence of, at least, one such cause, 
 God, the eternally self-existent Being whose 
 activity, seen in the operations of the physical 
 universe, flows from His own nature, and is the 
 free expression of it. We cannot pass behind 
 God, or treat Him as effect. Our own causality 
 it may be difficult to explain as a free causality. 1 
 That it is free we are convinced, yet directly 
 we try to explain it, we find ourselves interpret- 
 ing it in terms of cause and effect, that is, as a 
 series in which each stage depends on something 
 earlier. Will therefore is the only finally opera- 
 tive and determining power, of which we are 
 aware. 
 
 1 For a fuller discussion of the difficulty and for a sug- 
 gested solution of it, see bk. iv., chap, iv., "The Problem 
 of Moral Freedom," in Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 TELEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 
 
 I" N concluding our investigation of Darwinism, 
 -*- we pass on to consider whether there are 
 not teleological factors in the Darwinian theory 
 which compel us to modify our conception of 
 the nature of that theory. The last two chapters 
 have dealt with the problem, whether the pre- 
 suppositions of Darwinism, or indeed of any in- 
 terpretation of the universe in terms of physical 
 science, do not ultimately involve a teleological 
 explanation. Our present task is to decide 
 whether there are not actually operative in the 
 evolutionary process, as it goes on to-day, factors 
 which wear a teleological colour. Here, once 
 more, we must insist upon the distinction be- 
 tween Darwinism as its author himself gave it 
 to the world, and the narrower theory of natural 
 selection which forms only a part of the Dar- 
 winian scheme. Darwin admitted the existence 
 
 (107) 
 
108 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of factors other than natural selection as operative 
 in the work of evolution. The neo- Darwinians 
 elevate natural selection to the dignity of being 
 the sole cause governing organic development. 
 The theory of natural selection, as we have seen, 
 professes to explain adaptations, without any 
 reference to a principle of purpose or design. 
 Organism and environment are treated by it 
 as two factors which are externally related to 
 each other, and which interact mechanically. 
 The theory is true to the standpoint of physical 
 science, which is engaged ultimately in deter- 
 mining the quantitative relations of things. The 
 conceptions with which science deals are those 
 of energy, spatial distribution of matter, interac- 
 tion between particles of matter. All forms of 
 energy are reducible by physical science to 
 modes of motion, and all problems finally re- 
 solve themselves for her into problems of mole- 
 cular physics. She investigates a universe 
 which is construed in terms of molecular motion, 
 a cold, grey world, in which ideas of worth or 
 value and even ideas of qualitative distinction 
 have no place. The sensation of red, for ex- 
 ample, as experienced by us is qualitatively 
 distinct from that of green, but the explanation 
 of the fact which science offers is in terms of 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 109 
 
 the difference in length of the waves of light. 
 This is an explanation which does not touch the 
 qualitative aspect of the sensations, but merely 
 states the material conditions under which the 
 sensations may arise. Obviously, the explana- 
 tion is incomplete. It is an abstract or partial 
 account of the fact in question, which disregards 
 the quality of the sensation experienced. All 
 the explanations of physical science are abstract. 
 Let us suppose, for instance, that what you 
 want to explain is a man. The science of 
 number will call him one, or will say that he has 
 two hands and two feet. So far as the ex- 
 planation goes it is true, but it does not tell you 
 much about the man. Physics will describe the 
 man- for you in terms of interacting molecules. 
 The man is for the physicist a system of inter- 
 acting particles of matter. You know more 
 about the man now, but physics has not described 
 your friend. There can be no love or friend- 
 ship between you and a system of molecules. 
 Biology tells you that the man is alive, an or- 
 ganism which grows and assimilates food. You 
 are learning still more about him and he is 
 becoming more concrete. Again you mount 
 higher, and psychology reminds you that he is 
 a conscious and self-conscious being, possessed 
 
no DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of a mind which is not any system of mole- 
 cules, which is non-spatial and in which there 
 are no movements either molar or molecular. 
 Ethics, finally, tells you that he can distin- 
 guish between right and wrong, knows what 
 duty is, has ideals, is a being of spiritual worth. 
 Is it not clear that, in order fully to explain the 
 man, you need in addition to the lower explana- 
 tions of mathematics and physics the higher 
 explanations of the other sciences ? The lower 
 explanations may be true, but they are abstract 
 and regard the man only from a certain point of 
 view. Bearing this in mind, let us come back to 
 the theory of natural selection, and ask whether, 
 by viewing the two factors of organism and 
 environment as externally related to each other, 
 the upholders of the theory are not leaving out 
 of account certain elements which very materi- 
 ally affect our judgment upon the question of the 
 teleological character of the process of evolution. 
 Is it fair to treat a living organism as inter- 
 acting mechanically with its environment, as a 
 passive factor in the process ? What does being 
 alive mean, except that the living creature is 
 essentially active, with needs which it seeks to 
 gratify, with an instinct of self-preservation 
 which impels it to strive against its surround- 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION in 
 
 ings? An organism is sentient, has appetites, 
 has will-power, learns by experience to choose 
 and to avoid ; in a word, is not a straw drifting 
 with every current, but a swimmer who can, in 
 part, at any rate, direct his course. All these 
 characteristics belong to living organisms, and 
 all are teleological in nature. 1 It is difficult to 
 maintain that these activities of an organism 
 have nothing to do with determining the direc- 
 tion which its development shall take. Even 
 if they cannot call into being a variation, can 
 they not influence a variation when it occurs, 
 either helping to foster it, or to suppress it? 
 Do they not provide natural selection with some 
 of the materials with which it deals? We 
 cannot leave out of account, in our interpreta- 
 tion of the evolutionary process, the non-material 
 factors which are operative in the world of life. 
 Lamarck was strongly of opinion that the effort 
 or striving of the organism after a certain end 
 influenced its growth toward the more ready 
 attainment of that end. It was the felt need or 
 want, together with the movement initiated and 
 continued by this need, which resulted in the 
 production of a new part or organ. There 
 
 1 See Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i., chap, 
 x., where this point is insisted on. 
 
ii2 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 would be a greater flow of blood to the part 
 concerned, from which would follow growth and 
 increase in size. Thus the neck of the giraffe 
 has attained its present dimensions because the 
 animal continued to stretch it in its efforts to 
 reach the topmost twigs. Any advance, won 
 in this way, would be preserved through the 
 influence of heredity, and hence continuous mo- 
 dification is rendered possible. The organism 
 reacts to the stimuli which play upon it from 
 its surroundings. Lamarck's theory, therefore, 
 turns upon the effects of use and disuse of organs. 
 Increased use leads to increased efficiency, while 
 disuse leads to atrophy. Organs which are 
 constantly used for a certain purpose gradually 
 undergo a structural improvement which better 
 fits them for performing the action in question, 
 and through the inheritance of the improvement 
 thus reached there follows continual advance 
 towards more perfect adaptation. Habit created 
 form through the effects of use and disuse and 
 the influence of heredity, — this was Lamarck's 
 belief; and it was in this way, he maintained, 
 that we were to explain the adaptation of organic 
 structures to function. Darwin, as we have 
 seen, also believed in the inherited effects of use 
 and disuse, certainly to some extent, and perhaps, 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION ir 3 
 
 increasingly, as he more and more came to study 
 the fact of variability and its causes. He was 
 ready, that is, to believe that in this way there 
 was some causal relation between the environ- 
 ment and useful variations. But if we admit 
 the existence of this Lamarckian factor, we are 
 admitting an activity on the part of organisms 
 which involves sentiencyand often, probably, con- 
 sciousness. Mind is at work as a factor of the 
 evolutionary process. Difficulties undoubtedly 
 there are in the way of our acceptance of 
 Lamarck's theory. For example, there is the 
 difficulty about the inheritance of acquired char- 
 acters. There is the difficulty of making the 
 theory cover the case of organisms, such as 
 plants, in which, so far as we are able to judge, 
 there is no conscious striving or volition. The 
 theory would seem to refer only to the higher 
 animals, who can direct their efforts with intelli- 
 gence. Finally, there are many tissues and 
 organs even among the higher animals, such as 
 the shells of Crustacea or tortoises, which cannot 
 have been used in Lamarck's sense, so as to 
 increase the flow of blood to them. 1 Yet even 
 
 1 See Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin, vol. i., chap, 
 vii., p. 256, for a criticism of Lamarck. 
 
 8 
 
ii4 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 if we admit these limitations to the application 
 of the theory, there remains surely the fact of 
 sentiency. Wherever you have animal life one 
 would think that there must be some form of 
 sentiency, the presence of desires and appetites 
 and needs, however dimly discerned, and that 
 these must determine in part the reaction of the 
 organism to its environment. In so far as they 
 are operative, the organism cannot be treated as 
 interacting mechanically with its surroundings. 
 We cannot put out of view altogether the nature 
 of the organism. The answer of the supporter 
 of natural selection is, that so soon as organ- 
 isms become sentient, selection will have refer- 
 ence to this fact of sentiency. What will happen 
 is this : states which bring an organism into 
 harmony with its conditions of life will produce 
 pleasure, states of an opposite nature will produce 
 pain. Animals which found pleasure in what 
 was harmful to life would not survive. Eventu- 
 ally, therefore, states of sentiency as pleasurable 
 or painful will correspond with what is good or 
 bad for species in the struggle for existence. 1 
 Natural selection still remains the sole controlling 
 factor. But this answer tends to slur over facts 
 
 1 Romanes, Darwin and after Darwin, vol. i., chap, x., 
 p. 416. 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 115 
 
 which for the teleologist are of the utmost im- 
 portance. What he is concerned to emphasise 
 is the fact that the organism is not passive and 
 cannot be treated as such. An animal having 
 once experienced a pleasure will probably seek 
 to experience it again. It will be led on to 
 search for pleasure, it will feel an interest in 
 seeking to widen the area of its experiences. 
 The mental factor will be operative in the de- 
 velopment of its life. 1 It may still be under the 
 rule of natural selection, but in our total estimate 
 of the character and meaning of its development, 
 we shall have to take into account the presence 
 of this mental factor, which can only be called 
 teleological. 
 
 Reference must also be made to the theory 
 of sexual selection enunciated by Darwin to 
 account for certain phenomena in organic life 
 which he considered could not be explained by 
 the theory of natural selection. Of this latter 
 theory utility is the keynote. To be preserved, 
 an organ or structure or variation must be use- 
 ful to its possessor in the struggle for exist- 
 ence. But in Darwin's opinion there were 
 certain organic facts to which the conception 
 
 1 Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i., chap, x., 
 pp. 294-9. 
 
n6 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of utility could not satisfactorily be applied 
 and for which natural selection was, therefore, 
 powerless to account. The facts in question 
 are those connected with the phenomenon of 
 the beautiful in animal life. The colours of 
 the peacock's tail, for example, would seem to 
 be of no use to the bird in the struggle for life, 
 and yet they have been preserved even though 
 the tail, owing to its size, is a drain upon the 
 general economy of the system. The same dif- 
 ficulty would seem to hold good of the gorgeous 
 plumage of all birds, the utility of which it is 
 hard to discover. To meet this difficulty Darwin 
 suggested the theory that the higher animals, 
 and especially birds, possess some degree of 
 aesthetic taste and are determined in some of 
 their actions by this sense of beauty. Darwin's 
 contention would appear to be supported by 
 a considerable range of fact. Birds, for ex- 
 ample, often adorn and decorate their nests 
 with coloured feathers and other bright objects. 
 Romanes instances the very remarkable case of 
 the Baya bird of Asia, " which, after having 
 completed its bottle-shaped and chambered nest, 
 studs it over with small lumps of clay, upon 
 which the cock bird sticks fireflies, apparently 
 for the sole purpose of securing a brilliantly 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 117 
 
 decorative effect". 1 Again, in mating, birds 
 and other animals exercise a preferential choice, 
 which is apparently directed towards securing 
 the most attractive member of the opposite sex. 
 Only in some such way, said Darwin, can you 
 explain the extraordinary brilliancy of plumage 
 which characterises many male birds in the 
 pairing season, and which recalls the action of 
 the human suitor in donning his best attire 
 when going to visit the lady whose hand he 
 hopes to win. If a strikingly coloured male 
 bird is chosen, then the young of that bird will 
 tend to inherit his superior beauty, and so a 
 continuous advance would be made in the matter 
 of colouring. And what applies to colour ap- 
 plies also to song and to other decorative varia- 
 tions. It is the aesthetic taste of the animals 
 themselves which is thus made responsible for 
 the development of organic beauty. Detailed 
 criticism of the theory must be left to biologists. 
 Suffice it here to say that, though Wallace is an 
 uncompromising opponent of the theory, main- 
 taining that natural selection can explain all the 
 facts, Darwin's last words to science were these : 
 " After having carefully weighed the various ar- 
 
 1 Darwin and after Darwin, vol. i., chap, x., p. 381. 
 
u8 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 guments which have been advanced against the 
 principle of sexual selection I remain firmly con- 
 vinced of its truth V For the purposes of the 
 present chapter the point is, that if you admit 
 sexual selection as a factor in evolution you are 
 admitting the operation of intelligence or mind. 
 
 We have, lastly, to consider the applicability 
 of natural selection to explain the development 
 of certain human faculties. Wallace, who is a 
 stout defender of the all-sufficiency of natural 
 selection in the sub-human sphere, denies, in 
 the last chapter of Darwinism, that it can ex- 
 plain the emergence and evolution of certain 
 distinctively human faculties. The faculties in 
 question are those which he calls the mathe- 
 matical, musical and artistic, and to these he 
 adds the power of forming abstract conceptions 
 and the peculiar faculty of wit or humour. Wal- 
 lace is asking the question, whether, if natural 
 selection can explain the development of body, 
 it can also explain the development of mind. 
 He denies that it is competent to do so in the 
 case of the faculties just mentioned, because 
 the possession of these faculties can have been 
 of no use to man in the struggle for existence. 
 
 1 Quoted by Romanes in Darwin and after Darwin, 
 vol. i., p. 400. 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 119 
 
 Their great development in civilised as opposed 
 to uncivilised races must be due to the operation 
 of special causes. According to the Darwinian 
 theory, while useful variations are preserved, 
 no creature can be improved beyond the stage 
 which is necessary for its present welfare ; while 
 the struggle for existence is a struggle of life 
 and death, natural selection resulting in the 
 survival of the fittest and the elimination of 
 the unfit. Wallace proceeds to argue that the 
 possession of the above faculties has had noth- 
 ing to do with the preservation of one tribe of 
 uncivilised men in their warfare with another 
 tribe. Further, under the operation of natural 
 selection, a mean of variation is maintained, de- 
 partures from which are not great, so that there 
 is "a general level of development ". But in 
 the case of these special faculties enormous 
 difference of capacity is seen. Only a gifted 
 few are musical or mathematical. Other causes 
 must therefore be at work. There is in man 
 something which cannot be derived from an 
 animal ancestry, " something which we may 
 best refer to as being of a spiritual essence 
 or nature, capable of progressive development 
 under favourable conditions V 
 
 1 Darwinism, chap, xv., p. 474. 
 
120 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Now, as we take a general survey of the 
 process of evolution and note the emergence of 
 mind in human beings, who are plainly con- 
 nected on the physical side with a long line of 
 animal ancestors, the belief is borne in upon us 
 that mind too has been the subject of a gradual 
 and continuous development, and that the mental 
 factor has been operative all down the scale of 
 life. Wherever, that is, you have life, there you 
 have also some form of mind, however lowly 
 and rudimentary. The evolution of the physical 
 series has gone on, concomitantly with the evolu- 
 tion of the spiritual series ; each series developing 
 under its own laws and by its own appropriate 
 methods. Everywhere the spiritual factor has 
 been an operative factor, and the whole process 
 of evolution wears a teleological colour. To 
 interpret it in terms of molecular physics, as a 
 series of mechanical changes, is to do inadequate 
 justice to the facts. 
 
 In conclusion, we call attention to two points. 
 Science often assures us that you can assume 
 the existence of intelligent activity only in the 
 case of the higher animals. Romanes, for 
 example, in criticising Lamarck's views, asserts 
 that in most invertebrates and all plants there is 
 no conscious striving or discriminating volition. 
 
FACTORS IN EVOLUTION 121 
 
 Such an assertion appears to be a little hazard- 
 ous. It is difficult to prove a negative. One 
 must admit that when we attempt to interpret 
 the mental conditions of the lower form of life 
 we are, by the necessities of the case, compelled 
 to construe them in terms of our own mental 
 activity, for we have experience of no other. 
 And, where we fail to detect the marks which 
 characterise intelligent and volitional action as 
 we know it, it is natural to conclude that no 
 mental factor is present. But the idea of con- 
 tinuity in development, which we press to the 
 extreme in the case of the physical series, 
 suggests very forcibly that the spiritual series 
 falls under the same conception. If spiritual or 
 mental agency can be seen to be progressively 
 operative in the more advanced stages of evolu- 
 tion, is it unreasonable to maintain, though it 
 cannot be proved, that the same agency is 
 operative wherever life is found? 
 
 The other point, which it is worth while to 
 mention, is this, that the admission of a con- 
 tinuous and gradual development of mind is one 
 which can be accepted by theology with no 
 detriment to the essential tenets of theism or 
 Christianity. In some quarters it is thought 
 that such an admission is tantamount to banishing 
 
122 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 from the field all Divine activity. Theologians 
 have often pointed in triumph to the failure of 
 science to bridge the gulf between the inorganic 
 and the organic, or between the unconscious and 
 the conscious. They have argued that the exist- 
 ence of gaps in our interpretation of the process 
 of evolution is proof that special interpositions 
 of Divine activity occurred at the points where 
 the gaps exist. The foolishness of such a pro- 
 cedure is obvious, for if one day the gulfs should 
 be bridged, the theologians are instantly defeated 
 in their contention. An activity is no less Divine 
 because it is continuous. Indeed, a God who, 
 if we may so describe Him, lives in gaps, is not 
 a God who commends Himself to our modern 
 minds. Creation may be continuous as well 
 as occasional. Intermittency of operation is no 
 proof of specially Divine power. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 RESTATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM 
 DESIGN 
 
 ALL truths require from time to time to be 
 restated and reinterpreted in order that 
 they may be brought more into harmony with 
 the advance of knowledge, and the argument 
 from design affords no exception to this general 
 rule. Our outlook upon the world has been 
 profoundly modified by the conception of de- 
 velopment. It cannot but be that so sovereign 
 an idea as that of evolution should exercise a 
 powerful influence upon all our speculation. 
 Two changes in particular have come over our 
 attitude towards Nature. We regard her, in 
 the first place, no longer as a system of finished 
 products, ready-made and complete, but rather 
 as a process or series of stages, each of which 
 leads up to some other stage. The common 
 distinction between means and ends, which we 
 habitually make, appears at first sight no longer 
 
 (123) 
 
124 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 valid. Every end becomes a means toward 
 the realisation of some ulterior end. We seem 
 unable to rest in any one stage of Nature's pro- 
 cess, and characterise that as the end towards 
 the production of which Nature was striving. 
 All adjustments are relative, and the most intri- 
 cate of Paley's contrivances is but a half-way 
 house to an adaptation yet more complete ; and 
 when that is reached it will, in its turn, give 
 place to something better still, something, that 
 is, which more perfectly fits its possessor to ad- 
 just his life to his changing surroundings. Can 
 we then speak of the existence of ends at all, 
 or argue to a designing cause of the adaptations 
 which we find in Nature ? If we could discover 
 the one ultimate end, the great final purpose, 
 served by the whole development, then perhaps 
 we might legitimately use teleological language. 
 For we should in that case have discovered 
 something to which we could attribute inde- 
 pendent worth and significance, and we might 
 not unreasonably regard all the earlier stages of 
 the development as means to that end, and as 
 leading up to its production. But can we claim 
 that we have discovered this final end? Is it 
 not but the merest fragment of the gigantic pro- 
 cess which unfolds itself before our gaze? In 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 125 
 
 the second place, when we consider organic 
 adaptations (and it was from the realm of life 
 that the older design argument drew most of its 
 illustrations), we find that it becomes increasingly 
 difficult to treat organisms as adapted to their 
 environment by some external designer. Living 
 things and their surroundings are no more to be 
 regarded as two independent factors or series 
 which have to be brought into relation with each 
 other by an external power ; we view them, 
 rather, as correlated and interdependent exist- 
 ences, whose interaction is governed by the 
 fixed conditions under which the whole march 
 of development proceeds. There is one great 
 process of which organism and environment 
 form two sides. Thus the eye cannot, after the 
 fashion of the older teleologist, be treated as 
 a structure made specially for the purpose of 
 seeing, but must be regarded as something 
 which has gradually arisen by a slow process 
 of modification from earlier and more imperfect 
 structures, through the interaction of the forces 
 of the environment and the forces of the living 
 creature. We ask of any structure or adapta- 
 tion how it came to be. We are driven back, 
 that is, upon the general conditions under which 
 the evolutionary process goes on, and our search 
 
126 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 for design is directed to these general conditions. 
 If we can satisfy ourselves that these need some 
 teleological explanation then we may go on to 
 discuss the problem whether there is design in 
 the subsequent stages of the process. Before 
 we can use the speech of the teleologist we 
 must learn to use the glasses of the evolutionist. 1 
 We are then face to face with a new situation. 
 Paley's external designer, conceived on the 
 model of a human workman, has vanished, and 
 so has his appeal to individual structures as 
 finished products. Nature's method of produc- 
 ing an adaptation does not, at first sight, seem 
 to require any reference to an intelligent pur- 
 posive cause ; while it appears to be doubtful if 
 we can call any stage in the process of develop- 
 ment an end, in view of the fact that all ends 
 are means to something beyond them. 
 
 The problem, therefore, which awaits us is to 
 determine in what way we are to restate the 
 argument from design. Let us, first of all, give 
 due weight to the fact that, despite all attacks 
 and all criticism, the common consciousness still 
 regards the total movement of Nature as pur- 
 
 1 See A New Natural Theology, by J. Morris, chap, ii., 
 " The Argument of Design," to which I am indebted for 
 some suggestions. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 127 
 
 posive. Our attitude is no whit less teleological 
 than it was before. When we try to put our 
 argument into words we may have to alter our 
 presentation of it, but the attitude is still there, 
 and we may confidently assert will always be. 
 It is an attitude, not only natural, but even 
 necessary, to beings whose activities are them- 
 selves full of purpose, and whose only key for 
 unlocking the riddle of the universe is to be 
 found in their own constitution. The teleo- 
 logical idea is an ultimate category of thought, 
 or, at any rate, represents what must always 
 remain an ultimate attitude for the majority of 
 men. We cannot look out upon the natural 
 world and not see in it marks of purpose. It is 
 too orderly, too much a home of relationships 
 and adjustments. In particular, the growth of 
 organic structures and the nature of living forms 
 are such that we are compelled to say of them 
 that they look as if they had been designed. 
 Nor must we despise the common conscious- 
 ness. True it is that universal consent is not 
 necessarily a test of truth : you have to pass 
 behind the consent in order to find out the 
 grounds upon which it is based. But the pres- 
 ence of it should at least caution us to move 
 warily before we abandon as utterly worthless 
 
128 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 an argument so old and time-honoured as the 
 argument from design. When stated in strictly 
 logical form the teleological argument may not 
 be able to bear the weight of the conclusions 
 which are drawn from the premisses. But may 
 we not treat it as analogous in some degree to 
 the argument for God's existence which is drawn 
 from the beauty and spiritual significance of the 
 world ? There is, for many minds, through their 
 appreciation of the beauty of nature, an intuition, 
 as it were, of the Divine presence. May we not 
 argue, in the same way, that the order and seem- 
 ing purpose of the natural world constitute an 
 almost irresistible appeal to us to see in them a 
 witness to the operation of the Divine mind? 
 We receive a general impression which is, at 
 any rate, in part, confirmed by the judgments of 
 reason, of a world shot through with purpose ; 
 an impression powerful enough to overcome the 
 opposite impression, which certainly might arise 
 if we confined our attention to the apparent 
 maladjustments in the natural order. There 
 are such maladjustments, and they have to be 
 reckoned with, but they do not destroy the force 
 of the total impression which Nature leaves upon 
 our minds. And this impression remains, even 
 though we may not be able to detect the whole 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 129 
 
 significance of all, or any, of the adaptations 
 which meet our eye. The complete meaning 
 of a picture or a machine is often hidden from 
 us, yet we are satisfied that there is purpose in 
 them. 1 This appeal of the whole comes home 
 to the modern mind with especial power, just 
 because we have learned to think of the world 
 as the scene of a great process which is slowly 
 moving towards its consummation. An out- 
 look and temper of mind have been called into 
 being which reinforce the teleological contention. 
 Modern literature, for example In Memoriam, 
 shows distinct traces of the psychological effect 
 which has been produced by a recognition of 
 the vastness and orderly continuity of the world's 
 development. Order and progress, then, in their 
 broader aspects, are the marks in Nature upon 
 which the teleologist to-day places special em- 
 phasis. In addition, he gives great prominence 
 to the thought of the end which the evolutionary 
 process has reached. Man, as the crown of the 
 world's development, engages his attention. We 
 distinguish three divisions in the natural world : 
 the inorganic, the organic, and the spiritual, or 
 that realm of moral, intellectual, and religious 
 
 1 See Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, p. 99. 
 9 
 
130 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 activity and endowment which is the peculiar 
 mark of man. Of these three divisions the two 
 lower prepare the way for the third and are 
 its indispensable conditions ; while within the 
 highest division you find personalities, moral 
 and spiritual beings, who appear to possess a 
 unique worth and value, and who form a social 
 kingdom of personalities which seems to be a 
 worthy end and goal for the long striving of the 
 past. Man, if this view of his existence is ten- 
 able, is no accident in a world which is a theatre 
 for the play of blind forces, but represents the 
 purpose towards the realisation of which all the 
 earlier stages of evolution were tending. We 
 are reverting to our original question, whether 
 Nature is everywhere process and nowhere final 
 product, and suggest, that in the creation of 
 human personalities we can not unreasonably 
 discern the goal of the world's development, and 
 so can speak of that development as purposive. 
 We are not asserting that man, as he is, is com- 
 plete product, for man too is still in the making. 
 But whatever further developments there may 
 be in the future, they will take, we seem natur- 
 ally compelled to believe, the direction of the 
 perfecting of human personality and social re- 
 lationships. Mankind will never be persuaded 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 131 
 
 that personality is a mere temporary by-product 
 of racial living forces. The race is an abstrac- 
 tion. The most concrete and real thing which 
 we know is a person, and our personal worth 
 yields neither to the claims of the Absolute nor 
 of protoplasm. If personality is to have any 
 meaning for us, we are not, and never can be, 
 God, nor can God be we ; while to offer us the 
 shadowy abstraction of the race, as a substitute 
 for the individual who feels and knows and 
 hopes, is to void life of all that most makes it 
 worth living. 
 
 Restatement of the design argument moves 
 also in another direction. It is, of course, im- 
 possible for us to understand the nature and 
 method of the Divine activity. We are ignor- 
 ant of the relation in which God stands to the 
 material upon which He works. But we have 
 already seen, and shall again see more fully, 
 reason to reject that conception of God which 
 regards Him as an external designer working 
 upon a material outside Himself. Neither the 
 analogy of a machine nor of a work of art satisfies 
 us in our interpretation of the relation of Nature 
 to God. The idea of development, when viewed 
 in its religious bearing, seems to require us to 
 conceive of God as not only continuously work- 
 
132 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 ing, but as immanent in His works. Nature 
 developing is God in operation. He does not 
 so much work on a material as in and through 
 it. Thus we think of Nature as a great organ- 
 ism, alive, developing by the inherent power of 
 life within it ; not as being simply equivalent to 
 God, for that would involve us in pantheism, 
 but as being the visible expression of an in- 
 dwelling Divine life, which yet remains unex- 
 hausted by the operations of natural forces. 
 The question is, whether we can find any valid 
 experience of our own which will enable us to 
 give a real meaning and content to such a con- 
 ception. Any attempt to describe the Divine 
 activity must remain utterly inadequate, a seeing 
 through a glass darkly, but it may be possible 
 to find an illustration more satisfactory than that 
 of the machine or work of art. Now, as Illing- 
 worth suggests, 1 an analysis of our own personal 
 and self-conscious existence may provide us with 
 the illustration of which we are in search. Such 
 analysis reveals the presence of spirit, immanent 
 in and controlling matter, impressing itself upon 
 the material world, using that world for its own 
 higher ends, making matter a vehicle for the 
 
 1 Divine Immanence, pp. 65-73. I wish here to acknow- 
 ledge my debt to the teaching of this volume. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 133 
 
 expression of itself. The life of a person is a 
 continuous life, an organic development, which 
 can be described only as a system of means and 
 ends. Inherently purposive, its growth consists 
 in becoming so increasingly. The stronger and 
 richer the personality the wider is the range of 
 its purposive activities, and the more complete 
 the organisation of its experience, while the more 
 manifest becomes the subordination of minor 
 ends to the great ends which give meaning to 
 the whole development. Have we not here the 
 analogy for which we are seeking? Are we 
 not taking our loftiest conception, that of person- 
 ality, and applying it to God ? ' Conceive of 
 God as spirit, immanent in and yet transcending 
 matter ; purposive in all His activities, where 
 we are only partially so ; continuous in His 
 operation ; using the world of matter as the 
 instrument by which He achieves His great 
 designs ; regulating every single movement of 
 the material universe, the fall of the oak-leaf 
 no less than the fiery rush of the sun ; and you 
 have a conception which satisfies, and which 
 alone satisfies, the demands of our intelligence 
 as it sets out to explain the world. It is true 
 
 1 For objections to speaking of God as a Person, see 
 Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics •, bk. iv., chap. iii. 
 
134 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 that, in using language like this, we are trying 
 to sound depths which no human plummet can 
 fathom. We talk of spirit, and we have not 
 explored more than the fringe of the conception ; 
 of personality, and we cannot define the full 
 meaning of the term. But we know that our 
 own spiritual activities are full of purpose, and 
 that for us matter subserves spiritual ends, and 
 so we take the highest conception which we 
 possess and apply it to God. Our hands reach 
 out in the darkness, and something tells us that 
 there is an answering touch. 
 
 One or two problems arise here in connection 
 with what has just been said, and it is necessary 
 to deal with them. 
 
 (a) The first is concerned with the meaning 
 of the word "immanent". What do we mean 
 when we speak of God as immanent in Nature ? 
 The primary implication of the term is, I sup- 
 pose, that we conceive of God as dwelling within 
 His works in opposition to a God who dwells 
 outside them. Whatever God is, we feel that 
 He must be spirit. God must be mind, intelli- 
 gence, will, and when we speak of Him as 
 immanent we seem to imply that His spirit 
 dwells in and operates through matter. But can 
 spirit be in matter ? Are we not applying a 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 135 
 
 spatial metaphor and thinking of God almost as 
 extended spirit occupying space ? One box can 
 be within another box because both occupy space, 
 but spirit and mind are non-spatial. Our ignor- 
 ance of the relation of mind to matter should 
 make us cautious in using the word " immanent " 
 of the connection between God and the material 
 world. But the word may also serve to em- 
 phasise God's perpetual causal activity. God 
 cannot worthily be thought of as a Being who 
 once made the world and then withdrew from 
 it, leaving it to itself. Creation must be continu- 
 ous. God is not remote, but must be conceived 
 as near at hand. The whole universe, with all 
 its movements, is at each moment sustained by 
 God. This is probably the fundamental truth 
 which we try to express by the word " imma- 
 nence ". The spatial idea comes in to baffle us, 
 but what we wish to emphasise is the continuous 
 causal activity. Illingworth, 1 dealing with this 
 problem of the relation of God to the universe, 
 succinctly puts the question in this way. Is the 
 universe to be thought of as God's body or God's 
 work? If we answer that we must think of it 
 as His body, we are confronted by two diffi- 
 
 1 Divine Immanence, p. 72. 
 
136 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 culties. We are using an illustration which we 
 have borrowed from our own personal existence, 
 but which throws no real light upon the situation, 
 because we are ignorant, in our own case, of the 
 relation which exists between our spirits and our 
 bodies. The two elements, spirit and bodily 
 organism, are given to us as a concrete whole of 
 experience. Subsequent reflection analyses this 
 experience into these two contrasted elements, 
 but remains powerless to render any account of 
 their mode of connection. 1 We must, then, make 
 it perfectly clear to ourselves, that, in speaking of 
 the universe as God's body, we are offering no 
 explanation of the problem, but are merely re- 
 stating it. The second objection to this mode 
 of expression is, that the term " body " is inade- 
 quate to describe the relation in which God 
 stands to human personalities. A body is an 
 instrument, without independence of its own. 
 But finite spirits must possess a relative inde- 
 pendence, or they would not be spirits. Spirit 
 implies independence and the power of self- 
 determination. And any theory of Divine 
 immanence must cover the relation of the Divine 
 spirit to human personality. If, on the other 
 
 1 See Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics, bk. iv., chap. ii. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 137 
 
 hand, we speak of the universe as God's work, 
 even though we find ourselves face to face with 
 all the difficulties which cluster round the idea 
 of creation, we may, perhaps, regard our descrip- 
 tion as more satisfactory. For a man's work is 
 the expression of his mind and character, is the 
 utterance of his personality ; and, when we assert 
 that we read a spiritual meaning in the world of 
 material things, what we wish to emphasise is, 
 that they are the expression of an intelligence 
 which is revealing itself, through them, to our 
 intelligence. The phrase " God's work " also 
 brings into prominence the thought of the 
 Divine causality, which, as we have seen, under- 
 lies the conception of immanence. There is, 
 however, an important difference between the 
 work of God and the works of men. A human 
 being makes a thing and, when he has made it, 
 he has done with it. It stands apart from its 
 maker as a finished product. But God's causal 
 operation is to be thought of as continuous. He 
 makes and sustains, by the same act, the whole 
 frame of the material universe. Finally, in 
 speaking of the universe as God's work, we are 
 using a form of expression which does more 
 justice to the fact of our own spiritual independ- 
 ence. We should then maintain that God was 
 
I3S DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 causally operative everywhere, except at those 
 points in our own lives where He has given us 
 a measure of relative, causal independence. As 
 spiritual beings we are still His work, for we 
 owe our existence to Him, but, in making us 
 free, He has permitted His own causal activity 
 to be traversed by our own. The transcendence 
 of God is a truth, which must be guarded equally 
 with that of His immanence. If we would not 
 lapse into pantheism, we must maintain that God 
 is not exhausted by His works, that they are not 
 a complete expression of His being, but that He 
 possesses, if we may so put it, a reserve of power. 
 He is, then, greater than His works, for He is 
 the originating and sustaining cause of them. 
 Transcendence emphasises also the thought, that 
 God is a spiritual Being, who is to be construed 
 in terms of mind and will. When we have said 
 all, however, we have to confess that the relation 
 of God to the universe is a problem beyond our 
 comprehension. All illustrations or analogies 
 which we may use supply us with but dim 
 adumbrations of the real truth. 
 
 (d) A second problem, upon which it is neces- 
 sary to say something, is the problem to which 
 we have already referred, of the existence of 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 139 
 
 design in every part and corner of the universe. 
 Is every detail in the structure of existence de- 
 signed ? Was the shape of Darwin's nose de- 
 signed ? This question I am inclined to answer 
 in the affirmative, though with certain qualifica- 
 tions. But before giving reasons for this asser- 
 tion, I would ask my readers to bear in mind the 
 fact that we have not yet examined the validity 
 of the conception of design as applied to God. 
 That examination is made later. 1 In the present 
 chapter the word " design" is used of God's 
 activity, without critical investigation of its ap- 
 plicability. 
 
 Now we have already seen that our minds 
 cannot think chaos, and so cannot postulate 
 chaos, or sheer indefiniteness, as the origin from 
 which our orderly universe has developed. 
 Whatever was there in the beginning was 
 orderly ; matter was possessed, from the first, 
 of a definite constitution. We have to assume 
 the existence of a system of primary relations 
 and to think of the ground of the universe as 
 a unity of multiplicity, a whole made up of 
 related elements, each of which is what it is, 
 only because of its relation to, and place in, the 
 
 1 In chapter ix. 
 
140 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 whole. Lotze l makes a shrewd remark to the 
 effect that people, in labouring to prove that 
 there is design in the universe, seem to assume, 
 that what is irrational and without purpose has 
 a better reason to exist ultimately than what 
 is rational and purposive. He asks why, since 
 we are compelled to recognise in reality some- 
 thing final and absolute, we should not suppose 
 that ultimate reality to possess " these predicates 
 of harmony, inner agreement and adjustment of 
 means to ends". So far as the legitimacy of 
 the assumption is involved we have as much 
 right to assume the one as we have to assume 
 the other. 
 
 But, if the original conditions were not chaotic, 
 then everything which, in the course of develop- 
 ment, emerges as a result of these conditions, 
 must have been predetermined. If we had 
 knowledge enough we could foresee the course 
 which the evolution of the physical universe 
 would take, or, conversely, could trace back any 
 event to the initial conditions out of which it 
 has sprung. This original unity of relation- 
 ships, which science treats as an eternally exist- 
 ing fact, we have seen reason to interpret in 
 
 1 Philosophy of Religion , English trans., edited by F. C. 
 Conybeare, chap, i., sec. n. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 141 
 
 terms of intelligence. Does it not, therefore, 
 follow, that, for that ultimate mind, each stage 
 and every detail of the evolution must be part 
 of the plan, must have its appointed place in the 
 whole scheme, must be, as we say in our human 
 language, " designed". There are, however, 
 difficulties in this contention. For example, as 
 Lotze points out, 1 the word "accidental" has 
 a real meaning in the case of purposive human 
 action. I set out to execute some plan and 
 devise means in order to effect it. Those 
 means issue in results, over and above what are 
 wanted for the carrying out of the end in ques- 
 tion. I take, let us suppose, the necessary steps 
 to dig up a bed in my garden. In achieving 
 my end I have also produced a change in the 
 structure of the spade with which I dug. The 
 spade is more worn, by friction, than it was. By 
 bringing up to the surface soil that was before 
 below it, I have also caused certain alterations 
 in the chemical constitution of the soil, and these 
 changes involve an infinite series of other 
 changes, which are so complex that I cannot 
 follow them out. Much, therefore, has happened 
 by the way, which formed no part of my original 
 
 1 Philosophy of Religion , chap, i., sec. 8. 
 
142 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 plan, and these side-happenings may fairly be 
 called accidental, though, of course, not cause- 
 less. Similarly, in the case of a law of Nature, 
 much may occur, which, " though not opposed 
 to the law," can hardly be called a direct result 
 of it. "An accident comes to pass in the con- 
 nected course of events, but is due to some 
 circumstances which have nothing to do either 
 with the purpose or law in question/' 1 
 
 May not God, therefore, have purposed a 
 general end for realisation, and have established 
 certain fixed conditions under which the end is 
 to be reached, but have left a host of details un- 
 designed, details which occur accidentally, as the 
 general tendency is being consummated? Let 
 us assume, for example, that He designed the 
 succession of organic forms, which we see, in its 
 broad outline. Did He design each spot on the 
 tiger's skin, or each mark on the shell of the 
 snail ? We cannot answer the question, for we 
 do not know the nature of the Divine intelli- 
 gence, or the relation in which God stands to the 
 material upon which He works. But it is natural 
 to suggest, that, the more perfect the intelligence 
 may be, the less room will there be for anything 
 
 1 Philosophy of Religion, chap, i., sec. 8. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 143 
 
 unforeseen. An infinite mind would be aware, 
 surely, of the full results of every action, and for 
 it there would be no meaning in the word " acci- 
 dental ". Its complete insight would take account 
 of every possible contingency. A parallel pro- 
 blem occurs in all the text-books on ethics under 
 the head of the distinction between motive and 
 intention. The man, who acts, frames before- 
 hand, in idea, an end which he wishes to reach, 
 and his motive (what moves him to act) is this 
 end, as foreseen and anticipated. His intention, 
 we are told, is something wider, and includes all 
 the foreseen consequences of the act, both those, 
 for the sake of which, and those, in spite of which, 
 he does the act. The cook who wishes to poison 
 her mistress, and who puts poison in the soup of 
 which the family, as a whole, is to partake, knows 
 that she will probably kill others in addition to 
 her selected victim. But it is not her motive 
 to kill these others ; her motive is to kill her 
 mistress. This distinction, however, between 
 motive and intention, is not ultimately valid. 
 For in any given set of circumstances, there 
 must be one, and only one completely right 
 thing to do. The good must^ be individual and 
 unique, and, for a being who possessed intelli- 
 gence enough to foresee the total consequences 
 
144 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 which would flow from his action, would include 
 both motive and intention. There cannot, ulti- 
 mately, be any conflict between motive and in- 
 tention, for the motive is the one complete end 
 of action, with which, as being good or bad, 
 the individual identifies himself in order to 
 reach it. 
 
 The chief difficulties in the view, which we 
 have adopted of Gods intelligent activity as 
 covering all details, are those which arise when 
 we face the moral problem of the existence of 
 pain and imperfection. The small-pox germ 
 seems to alight indiscriminately on good and 
 bad alike. The stray bullet from the Maxim 
 gun kills, in an instant, the man on whom the 
 hope of the army depends. In all the realms of 
 life there are born organisms which are dwarfed 
 or distorted and untrue to type. Nature appears 
 to fail of her purpose. If life is an end in itself, 
 and worth preserving, then there are many ad- 
 justments which are harmful to life. We are 
 confronted with the old problem of reconciling 
 the omnipotence with the benevolence of God. 
 The existing conditions of the universe seem to 
 constitute a sore impeachment upon either His 
 power or His goodness. But, it is to be noted, 
 that we are here introducing considerations of 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 145 
 
 a moral kind, and, consequently, the whole ques- 
 tion demands a wider treatment. Many have 
 thought that the problem of pain is rendered 
 easier of solution if you do not regard every 
 detail of the world as designed, but admit the 
 existence of a contingent element. God, on this 
 view, would be working out a general plan, under 
 fixed conditions. In the realisation of that plan 
 many things might happen by the way which 
 were no part of the plan, though they were in- 
 cluded within the scope of the general conditions, 
 such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, or 
 the unequal incidence of disease. Can our moral 
 sense maintain that God designs all these things, 
 and deliberately causes the cancer and the pestil- 
 ence ? Certainly we cannot hold that moral evil 
 is designed, though the possibility of it must have 
 been allowed for by God. Nor can a strict 
 doctrine of predetermination hold, I think, of 
 those regions in which man's free will is opera- 
 tive. But the solution of the problem is beyond 
 us, whatever view we elect to take of the diffi- 
 culty. 
 
 On the other hand, if we leave out of account 
 
 the moral aspect of the question our difficulties 
 
 are greatly lessened. They arise from our 
 
 inability, as finite beings, to conceive of an in- 
 
 10 
 
146 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 telligence which is possessed of the complete 
 insight which we, confessedly, lack. Meanwhile, 
 let us fix our attention upon our experience of 
 ourselves as conscious, intelligent beings. Is it 
 not our ideal to make every single act and detail 
 of our lives the deliberate expression of our pur- 
 posive activity? We do not succeed in this. 
 We cannot always live at the high levels of 
 intense spiritual concentration, and not every- 
 thing that we do is the expression of our total 
 personality. Yet, even with these limitations, 
 life does more and more take shape as an 
 ordered and systematic whole. If we were not 
 so limited, we should increasingly throw our 
 whole being into every single act which we 
 perform, and every detail would glow with full 
 spiritual purpose. Is it inconceivable that God 
 may be so able to act, and that, for Him, the 
 meaning of the whole may be expressed, at each 
 moment, in every part of it ? Must we not, in- 
 deed, think of His mind as grasping completely 
 the entire scheme of reality in its immense 
 complexity ; seeing each detail in its clear re- 
 lation to the whole ; and meaning that each 
 detail shall express a definite purpose and shall 
 contribute its quota to the purpose of the total 
 scheme ? 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 147 
 
 (c) The last point upon which I would touch, 
 is the significance of the conception of worth 
 or value in the argument from design. The 
 importance of the conception, in this connection, 
 is abundantly clear. An element in the teleo- 
 logical idea is found, on analysis, to be a recogni- 
 tion that the end reached is one which it was 
 worth while to reach, either as being complete 
 in itself, or as a means to some ulterior end. If 
 we take human action as that which affords us 
 our best illustration of what teleological activity 
 means, we find that a purposive act, on the part 
 of a human being, includes the following ele- 
 ments : l (a) the reaching of a result after 
 deliberation and the adoption of the appropriate 
 means ; (6) the foreseeing of the result by the 
 actor, so that it is raised from a mere result to 
 the dignity of an end ; (c) the recognition that 
 there is value or worth in the result. The thing 
 was worth doing, and the knowledge that it was 
 so was an important contributing factor of the 
 process which brought it about. The concep- 
 tion of end always involves the idea of worth or 
 value. Judgments of value form an integral 
 part of our experience. Now, as we look out 
 
 1 See Hobhouse, The Theory of Knowledge, p. 582. 
 
148 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 upon the world, we certainly judge some things 
 in it to have worth or value, and that for them- 
 selves, independently of the fact that they may 
 also have value, as being means to further ends. 
 A person has such worth, and a moral act. 
 Beauty, again, would seem to be an end in itself, 
 and also life. For, as we shall see, 1 it is one of 
 the characteristics of organisms, that we judge 
 them to be self-contained wholes whose life is 
 complete in itself at every phase and moment of 
 it. Wherever you have life there you seem to 
 have a series of continuous affirmations, on the 
 part of the living creature, that its life is complete 
 at each moment. At each stage of its being it 
 comes before you as a self-contained system 
 whose existence is, if we may so put it, worth 
 while. A living organism can never be treated 
 as a mere means to something else. Extending 
 this conception to the universe as a whole, it is 
 open to us to think of it as a great organism 
 unfolding itself to fuller and fuller life, each 
 step in whose development is an end in itself. 
 Browning has magnificently expressed this point 
 of view in Paracelsus : — 
 
 1 The Theory of Knowledge, chap. viii. 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 149 
 
 I knew, I felt . . . what God is, what we are, 
 What life is — how God tastes an infinite joy 
 In infinite ways — one everlasting bliss, 
 From whom all being emanates, all power 
 Proceeds ; in whom is life for evermore, 
 Yet whom existence in its lowest form 
 Includes ; where dwells enjoyment, there is he. 
 
 And then the poet goes on to illustrate from 
 Nature's life the joy of God : — 
 
 Afar the ocean sleeps ; white fishing gulls 
 Flit where the strand is purple with its tribe 
 Of nested limpets : savage creatures seek 
 Their loves in wood and plain — and God renews 
 His ancient rapture. Thus he dwells in all, 
 From life's minute beginnings, up at last 
 To man — the consummation of this scheme 
 Of being. 
 
 This is the poet's vision, but it is not given to 
 us all to see it. When he says, M Where dwells 
 enjoyment, there is he," we at once ask how the 
 vision is to be reconciled with the fact of pain. 
 Discords make a harmony. If God hears the 
 harmony, are we left to hear only the discords ? 
 Once again, the problem of pain and moral evil 
 baffles us, and it can never be more than an act 
 of faith which makes us interpret the world as 
 the movement of a great life, which, at every 
 moment, is complete in itself and good. But 
 
150 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 we have good reason for referring to this view 
 of ultimate reality, born, I will not say, of an 
 optimism which has never faced, but of an 
 optimism which puts aside, the darker facts of 
 existence, and forgets the shadow in the joy of 
 the sunlight, because it calls on us to modify 
 that conception of evolution which would make 
 each step in development simply a means to a 
 remoter end. The distinction between means 
 and ends breaks down when we apply it to the 
 life of an organism, or of a moral personality. 
 It is the end of the living creature at each 
 moment to maintain itself, just as it is the end 
 of a human being to make his every action the 
 expression of his complete individuality. We 
 must, therefore, when we ask if there is design 
 in the whole or the parts, keep in mind the 
 judgments of value, which form so large a por- 
 tion of our mental furniture. The validity of 
 these judgments becomes more apparent just in 
 proportion as we mount the scale of being, and 
 they receive their completest justification when 
 they are applied to man. And, because we find 
 indications of value in the later stages of the 
 evolution, it is natural that we should also re- 
 gard all the lower forms of existence as possessed 
 of an inherent worth. The qualities which char- 
 
THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN 151 
 
 acterise reality at one point must, we think, 
 characterise it throughout, though, for our un- 
 derstanding, they may be more apparent in the 
 higher grades of being. We might then state 
 Darwin's question about the designed character 
 of his nose in another form. We might ask 
 whether there are not degrees of worth in the 
 total scheme of existence ; whether some parts 
 of reality do not more completely express the 
 true nature of reality than other parts. The 
 conception of worth would apply to the whole 
 of existence and the infinite mind would grasp 
 every detail, however minute, in its relation to 
 the total system, but at some points in that total 
 system the meaning of the whole would flash 
 out with intenser brilliance ; just as our own 
 action, in a moral crisis, is a truer revelation of 
 ourselves as spiritual beings than our action in 
 eating our breakfast or dressing for dinner. 
 The conception of degrees of reality x and de- 
 grees of value throws much light upon some of 
 the teleological problems which we have been 
 discussing. 
 
 1 See Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics ; bk. ii., chap. iii. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 
 
 IN the present chapter we shall investigate 
 the nature of organisms and discuss by 
 what categories of thought we may best inter- 
 pret them. Such an inquiry is clearly part of 
 the more general problem dealt with by this 
 volume. The meaning of development is to be 
 found only if we include in our purview the 
 world of life, while the nature of an organism 
 has, as a matter of history, been one of the most 
 fruitful fields of research for those interested in 
 the study of final causes. The two conceptions 
 of purpose and development seem to meet in 
 the interpretation of the nature of living things. 
 Our subject naturally falls into three divisions. 
 We shall begin by examining the differences 
 which appear to mark off the living from the 
 non-living world. Next, we shall examine the 
 claim of physical science to extend mechanical 
 
 (152) 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 153 
 
 principles of explanation so as to include organ- 
 isms. Lastly, we shall consider some of the 
 special problems which organisms raise for the 
 teleologist. 
 
 That there are essential differences between 
 the organic and the inorganic is the verdict of 
 the profoundest thought as well as of ordinary- 
 experience. It would not be difficult for any 
 one to enumerate some few points in which a 
 living being differs from a stone or a machine ; 
 yet, to grasp the full significance of these differ- 
 ences, or to explain in any way the mystery of 
 life, is beyond the power of the acutest observer. 
 Life, so far, at any rate, has steadily refused to 
 yield up her secret. Four main characteristics 
 appear to mark off organisms from inorganic 
 substances — the power of movement ; the power 
 of assimilating food ; the capacity for growth, 
 under which we may include reproduction of 
 kind ; and the nature of their unity. We will 
 deal shortly with each of these in turn. 
 
 (a) Organisms, both plants and animals, pos- 
 sess the power of self-movement. The organic 
 world can originate, the inorganic world can 
 only transmit, change. This spontaneity of 
 movement is not, however, altogether independ- 
 ent of external influences. In the great majority 
 
154 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of cases, perhaps in all, it is conditioned by- 
 physical forces which act directly or indirectly 
 upon the organism. But, even where it is so 
 conditioned, there would seem to be in the 
 organism a peculiar power of response to ex- 
 ternal stimulation, which cannot be explained 
 solely in terms of the interaction of physical 
 forces. There are many movements on the 
 part of organisms which cannot be traced to 
 the influence of any direct external stimulus. 
 The most minute investigation has failed to 
 reveal the presence of such stimulus. These 
 movements are probably due to internal changes 
 in the organism by which potential energy is 
 liberated, 1 protoplasm being a highly unstable 
 compound. Only in this way, for example, can 
 we explain the movements of the amoeba, which, 
 indeed, derives its name from the changes which 
 characterise its life and lead to perpetual altera- 
 tions of its form. Again, if we mount higher 
 up the scale of life, and fix our attention upon 
 organisms which possess a central nervous sys- 
 tem, we find it increasingly impossible to explain 
 all the movements of such organisms as reflex. 
 
 1 Biology calls such movements "automatic," in contrast 
 with those which are due to the presence of some external 
 stimulus, 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 155 
 
 " There may be a discharge of the energy ac- 
 cumulated in the central ganglia without any 
 excitation whatever of an afferent nerve/' 1 
 
 Indirectly such spontaneous movement is con- 
 ditioned by external stimuli, for the continuance 
 of life depends upon the taking in of supplies of 
 food, and this intake alters the equilibrium of 
 the forces in the body and involves perpetual 
 readjustment. But, even so, no law of equiva- 
 lence between external stimulus and internal 
 change can be established. The movement 
 of an inorganic body is in proportion to the 
 force impressed, but, when a stimulus is applied 
 to living matter, the energy produced is often 
 entirely out of proportion to the stimulus. The 
 whole transaction proceeds on a plane higher 
 than that with which physical science is familiar. 
 For the organism appears to have its own pe- 
 culiar manner of reacting to external stimuli 
 when such are present. It "reacts as an indi- 
 vidual, not as a substance ". Its response is 
 organic, and not merely physical. In other 
 words it responds as a living being, and into 
 all its reactions its individuality enters. We 
 might illustrate this point in many ways, but 
 
 1 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology », English trans., chap, 
 vii., sec. 3. 
 
156 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 it will be enough if we refer to the power, pos- 
 sessed by all organisms, even by the single cell, 
 of selecting and rejecting food. 1 Let us take, 
 for example, the epithelial cells, which line the 
 intestinal wall. Each of these cells is a complex 
 organism which assimilates food by sending out 
 protoplasmic processes, grasping the particles of 
 fat, but infallibly rejecting poisons. Or take 
 the case of the amoeba, Vampyrella Spirogyrce. 
 This is a minute red-tinged cell, apparently 
 structureless, which will feed only upon one kind 
 of algae and refuses all others. Of Colpodella 
 pugnax one observer writes : " The behaviour 
 of these monads, in their search after food 
 and in their method of absorbing it, is so 
 remarkable, that one can hardly avoid the 
 conclusion that the acts are those of conscious 
 beings". 2 What these instances serve to show 
 is this, that, while the presence of food stimu- 
 lates the cells to movement, it evokes a res- 
 ponse of an order so highly complicated that 
 it cannot be explained in mechanical terms 
 alone. 
 
 1 The following illustrations are taken from the chapter 
 entitled " Vitalism and Mechanism " in Bunge's Textbook of 
 Physiological and Pathological Chemistry. 
 
 2 Cienkowski, quoted by Bunge. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 157 
 
 (6) The power of assimilating food, to which 
 we have just referred, may, perhaps, be regarded 
 as the most fundamental organic process, for, 
 without the presence of a constant supply of 
 food, life would quickly come to an end. There 
 is, however, nothing whatever in the inorganic 
 world parallel to this power possessed by organ- 
 isms, by which plants build up the inorganic 
 elements in the air and the earth into organic 
 tissue, and animals convert into new and appro- 
 priate forms the organic substances which they 
 assimilate. We witness here the phenomenon 
 of an organism building itself up by means of 
 a material which it in part creates, and giving 
 new expression to the energy which it takes in 
 with the food it eats. Upon this power of 
 assimilation depends the possibility of the growth 
 or development of the organism. And growth 
 implies, not only increase in bulk, but also the 
 emergence of qualitative differences. On the 
 occurrence of any chemical change in the organ- 
 ism there are brought into play new forces which 
 were not before operative. 1 
 
 Increase is the key-note of growth, but the 
 increase is not to be interpreted merely as the 
 
 1 See Lotze, Microcosmus, bk. i., chap. iv. 
 
158 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 addition of units to an already existing bulk or 
 mass, but as a qualitative increase which gives 
 the organism an intensified individuality. Every 
 organism, therefore, must be thought of as a self- 
 maintaining whole, which uses what it assimilates 
 for its own purposes of the nurture and repair 
 of the body, and which grows according to type. 
 Professor Ward has recently 1 emphasised the 
 importance of this characteristic of self-mainte- 
 nance. In the inorganic world there exists, as he 
 points out, a constant tendency towards physical 
 quiescence and equilibrium. Energy, while the 
 total amount of it remains the same, is continu- 
 ally passing into forms which are no longer 
 available for work, and science bids us look 
 forward to a day when the clock of the solar 
 system will have run down and stopped, and 
 this planet will have lost all its heat, and become 
 a stone-cold mass revolving in a dark heaven. 
 But in the organic realm the very reverse of this 
 obtains. There you have organisms constantly 
 engaged in storing up energy which shall be 
 available for future use, growing in complexity 
 and differentiation of structure and manifesting 
 an increasing activity. They wage war against 
 
 1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i., chap, x., p. 285. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 159 
 
 the destructive forces of their environment, re- 
 pair their bodily waste, fight against disintegra- 
 tion, and in every way seek to counteract the 
 tendency which prevails in the inorganic world. 
 They are, in other words, organised systems, 
 whose organisation is maintained and per- 
 petuated through change ; whereas organised 
 systems in the inorganic sphere are always 
 undergoing disintegration of their organisation. 
 There would seem, therefore, to be some vital 
 energy or power of a stable and constant char- 
 acter, which controls and directs the molecular 
 changes going on within the body of the 
 organism, and which enables it to maintain itself. 
 While energy itself, as Ward says, 1 is direction- 
 less, " life consists in guidance and control of 
 known forms of energy, molar and molecular ". 
 And, when life ceases, there is no energy, equi- 
 valent in amount, to take its place. 2 The life of 
 the organism is not, however, entirely inde- 
 pendent of the system of physical forces. On 
 the contrary, it is everywhere conditioned by 
 them, and they operate within its material or- 
 ganisation. Thus, for example, food could not 
 be assimilated unless heat and moisture were 
 
 1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i., chap, x., p. 290. 
 
160 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 present in the body, and when energy is stored 
 up by such assimilation the law of the con- 
 servation of energy operates. But over and 
 above this working of the physical forces there 
 would seem to be present another factor, some- 
 thing which is not on the level of a physical force 
 at all, something which in older days used to be 
 called a vital force, but which we should not, 
 I think, so name to-day. How we are to con- 
 ceive of this something, and what picture of its 
 operation we can form in our minds, is just the 
 problem that still awaits solution. 
 
 (c) Under the head of growth we may include 
 reproduction of kind, for the life of the parent 
 organism is extended, as it were, in the life of 
 its offspring. The new organism is formed by 
 the growth of a portion of the parent organism, 
 which in due course acquires an individual and 
 independent existence. The inorganic world 
 can show nothing which resembles the power 
 of reproduction ; nor has any attempt to derive 
 life from the inorganic ever succeeded. It is 
 an accepted principle of biology to-day that all 
 life comes only from already existing life. We 
 need not, however, jump to the conclusion that 
 there was not once a time when the organic was 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 161 
 
 derived from the inorganic. The life, which we 
 know to-day, even in its lowliest form, is a life 
 which has been exposed to centuries of change. 
 A long process of adaptation to environment 
 has been going on which must have altered the 
 character and quality of living activities. Life 
 was, possibly, a simpler thing originally, and it 
 may have arisen from the inorganic without any 
 special interposition of Divine creative activity. 
 If we are impressed by the grandeur of the 
 conception of absolute continuity in development, 
 we may prefer to lean towards the belief that 
 there has been, in fact, no break between the 
 two series. And this belief will be strengthened 
 by deeper reflection upon the nature of the 
 Divine activity, so far as finite human reason 
 can form any conception of the operations of 
 God. We cannot, however, now reproduce the 
 conditions under which the transition from the 
 inorganic to the organic took place. 
 
 If the inorganic world contains nothing which 
 is strictly parallel to reproduction of kind, neither 
 can it show anything which is comparable to 
 growth in its larger meaning. We are some- 
 times told, that, in the formation of a crystal, we 
 have a process which resembles the growth of 
 
 the living organism, and it may be well briefly 
 ii 
 
162 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 to examine the validity of the statement. The 
 organisation of a crystal is very complex, and 
 we are told that each crystal possesses a marked 
 individuality of its own which distinguishes it 
 from every other crystal, just as every living 
 organism is a unique individual. The differ- 
 ence between the crystal and the organism is, 
 we are asked to believe, not one of kind, but one 
 of degree. The organisation of the latter is 
 more delicate and complex, but both are to 
 be explained on the same terms and by the same 
 principles. But can this contention be made 
 good in face of the striking dissimilarities be- 
 tween the two which confront us? A crystal 
 increases in size by a process of accretion of 
 new material from without. If the conditions 
 which facilitate this quantitative increase are 
 removed the crystal no longer increases in bulk, 
 but, the moment they are restored again, the 
 process of enlargement commences anew. But 
 the organism grows by a process of taking food 
 within and assimilating it, and the assimilation 
 changes the character of the material which is 
 absorbed. A crystal can be broken up into 
 fragments and can be restored by a repetition 
 of the process which originated it, but an organ- 
 ism cannot be so restored. Only to a limited 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 163 
 
 extent can organisms repair their own damages, 
 and the more complex and highly developed the 
 organism the less is the power of repair which 
 it possesses. From a dissected portion of a 
 water-hydra a new water-hydra will spring into 
 being, and a lizard can repair its lost tail, but a 
 dog's leg will not grow again, nor the hand of a 
 man. Once more, while there is an organisation 
 both of inorganic and of living matter, the 
 living organism, as we have said, appears to 
 possess some principle of control which pre- 
 serves its organisation in face of the disruptive 
 influences of the environment, but such principle 
 is wanting in inorganic matter. The crystal, in 
 other words, is a resultant or aggregate, but the 
 living organism is a self-producing whole. We 
 do not regard it simply as acted on by things 
 outside it, and as reacting mechanically to ex- 
 ternal forces, but we view it as organising itself, 
 and so reacting as a self-conserving system. 
 The phenomenon being unique, we have no 
 language adequate to explain it. The difference 
 between the crystal and the organism is one 
 which we can appreciate rather than describe. 
 We find ourselves at a new point of view when 
 we set out to interpret organic life. The prin- 
 ciples of mechanical explanation fail us. They 
 
1 64 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 only partially explain the nature of organisms. 
 We need categories which are richer and fuller. 1 
 
 (d) The unity of the organism is the last 
 characteristic which demands our attention. 
 What do we mean when we speak of every 
 living thing as a unity ? A machine possesses 
 a unity of its own ; it is one machine, made for, 
 and serving, one end. A stone, also, is a unity. 
 How do the stone and the machine differ, as 
 regards their oneness, from an organism? In 
 attempting to answer this question we note two 
 features as characteristic of the unity of an 
 organism. The first we have already alluded 
 to in speaking of the power which an organism 
 has of preserving its individuality through a 
 succession of changes. Every living thing is 
 a self-organising system. It adapts itself to 
 altering circumstances, it reacts upon its en- 
 vironment, and through differences keeps, its 
 identity. But, secondly, in an organism the 
 relation of the parts to each other and to the 
 whole is something peculiarly close and intimate. 
 A machine is a whole of parts, but you can 
 
 x For a fuller discussion of the differences between a 
 crystal and an organism, see A New Natural Theology by 
 J. Morris, chap, v., sec. i. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 165 
 
 detach a bolt or a wheel, and they remain bolt 
 and wheel, though it is true, that, for the time 
 being, their function is gone. But if you detach 
 a hand from the body it dies. In a living being, 
 again, the parts are outgrowths of the whole, 
 and yet, in their turn, minister to the life of 
 the whole. The leaves of a tree, to use Kant's 
 illustration, 1 are products of the vital activity 
 of the tree, yet help to nourish the tree, and, 
 by repeated stripping of the leaves, you kill the 
 tree. We cannot think of the parts of any 
 organism independently of the whole, while the 
 whole, again, is just the whole of the parts, a 
 unity, which is expressed in and through the 
 differences. The whole may be said to be in 
 each part, just as each part is in the whole ; 
 and all the parts have to be conceived as adapt- 
 ing themselves one to another and to their 
 surroundings, so as to form a self-conserving 
 system. In a machine, on the contrary, we 
 tend rather to think of the parts, as standing 
 in an external relation to each other, which has 
 been imposed upon them from without by the 
 maker of the machine. Any alteration in the 
 machine is made from outside, whereas changes 
 
 3 Critique of Judgment, trans, by J. H. Bernard, part ii., 
 sec. 64. 
 
1 66 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in an organism take place by a process of internal 
 transformation in which the life of the whole 
 organism is involved ; though the occasion of 
 the transformation may be the presence of some 
 stimulus derived from without, from the material 
 world which surrounds the organism. 
 
 Certain qualifying considerations must, how- 
 ever, be noticed ; for the unity of organisms 
 appears to be a matter of degree. In the first 
 place, a relative independence must be allowed 
 to certain groups of cells in the body. Broadly 
 stated, it is true, that, if " one member suffer all 
 the members suffer with it," yet damage to a 
 finger-nail or to the hair of one's head, does not 
 necessarily affect vitally the life of the whole 
 organism, and the hair of the head may be cut 
 off and still retain for long periods its charac- 
 teristic qualities. Secondly, it is difficult, in the 
 case of some organisms, to determine what you 
 mean by their individuality. For example, in 
 what are known as colonies, or colonial forms, 
 you have various cells, which, though aggregated 
 together, really lead an almost independent life 
 and perform independent functions. In Siphono- 
 phora, for instance, one of the Hydromedusce, 
 there is a common stem from which grow out 
 various cells, a digestive cell, a cell for attack, 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 167 
 
 one for defence, a reproductive cell, which last, 
 in course of time, becomes detached and gives 
 rise to a new compound or colonial form. 
 
 Is the individuality here to be attributed to 
 the whole colony or to the single cell ? What, 
 again, of the individuality of the water-hydra, 
 each fragment of which when artificially dissev- 
 ered will reproduce a new and complete organism, 
 and which gives birth to another specimen by 
 the simple process of putting out a bud which 
 ultimately separates itself from the parental 
 body ? Morphologically regarded, the cell is 
 the unit, and multicellular organisms are treated 
 by science as aggregates of such units. Aggre- 
 gates they are, it is true, but they are also more, 
 at least in the case of the more highly developed 
 organisms. The conception of an aggregate is 
 inadequate to do justice to the unity and in- 
 dividuality of a dog or a human being, even 
 when regarded only from the standpoint of their 
 bodily existence. More plainly inadequate is 
 the conception when the factor of mind and 
 self-consciousness is taken into consideration. 
 The self-consciousness of man represents the 
 highest type of unity and individuality of which 
 we have any experience. If we analyse our 
 personality, we find that we are conscious of 
 
168 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 ourselves as maintaining our identity through 
 difference and change. We change and yet 
 know ourselves to be the same. There is that 
 intrinsic relation of whole and parts which we 
 found to be characteristic of organic life. We 
 take our own nature, I suppose, and use it as 
 the key to explain the world outside us. We 
 are aware of our own individuality and find in 
 ourselves this intrinsic relation of whole and 
 part. It confronts us in organisms, and is char- 
 acteristic even of the single cell, for living things 
 refuse to be explained mechanically. But we 
 are puzzled by finding that the unity and in- 
 dividuality of organisms are not everywhere 
 equally apparent. In Natures scheme the in- 
 dividual comes gradually, and the higher you 
 mount up the scale of life the more marked does 
 the individuality of organisms become, whether 
 you apply a physical or a mental criterion. 
 
 We pass on now to consider the attempt which 
 science makes to explain organisms mechanically. 
 Her ideal is to reduce the organic to the level 
 of the inorganic, to make biology a matter of 
 chemistry and physics. The organism is treated 
 as being only a specially complicated case of 
 mechanism which is to be interpreted in terms 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 169 
 
 of physical causation by the use of the categories 
 of efficient cause and reciprocity. Physical 
 science abstracts from the point of view of life ; 
 it levels down and claims that what explains the 
 lower or inorganic is competent to explain also 
 the higher or organic. The unity of the organ- 
 ism, as we have seen, science treats as a case of 
 aggregation. The living thing is conceived as 
 an aggregate. Its parts are regarded as stand- 
 ing in an external relation to each other, and as 
 forming a group of independent units which 
 happen to be combined in a whole. Life, for 
 the physicist, differs from the inorganic, not in 
 virtue of the presence of any particular or special 
 force, but solely because of a peculiar mode of 
 connection between the parts of the organism. 1 
 The connection is more intricate and complex 
 than in a machine. But the whole life of the 
 organism is under the control of the same 
 general laws which operate in the inorganic 
 sphere, and these laws are held to be sufficient 
 to explain all which seems most characteristic 
 of living things. If we could understand com- 
 pletely the connection of parts in an organism 
 we should see that mechanical principles would 
 
 1 See Lotze, Microcosmus, bk. i., chap. iii. 
 
i;o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 explain its life. We fall back on the view that 
 special categories are needed only because the 
 great complexity of organic existence baffles our 
 attempts at mechanical interpretation. Growth, 
 again, it is urged, might be mechanically ex- 
 plained if we knew the original arrangements of 
 the particles of the germ from which the organ- 
 ism develops. 1 If we could see these in their 
 interconnection we should then understand how 
 all the interactions with external influences from 
 which growth results were controlled by this 
 original constitution of the germ. No special 
 force or power need be invoked, but the whole 
 process would be explicable in terms of the 
 known forces in combination with an original 
 arrangement of material particles. The sub- 
 stances which the growing organism takes into 
 its system retain their own properties and 
 forces. What happens is, that these forces are 
 brought into connection with the existing forces 
 of the bodily system of the organism, and fresh 
 interactions and combinations result. The body 
 grows in bulk and acquires new powers of act- 
 ing upon the external world. Nothing more is 
 needed to explain the growth of the organism 
 
 1 Cf. Lotze, Microcosmus, bk i., chap, iii., § 3, from which 
 I have borrowed this mechanical explanation of growth. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 171 
 
 if you assume that the original particles of the 
 germ are associated together strongly enough to 
 resist disintegration, and to allow of the self- 
 conservation of the growing being. Repair of 
 injuries may be explained on similar lines, so 
 physical science urges, and also reproduction of 
 kind. In all cases the problem is simply one of 
 understanding the connection between the parts 
 of the organism. 1 The central point of the whole 
 mechanical method of explanation is to be found 
 in the thought of each organism being only a 
 very specially complicated machine, whose inter- 
 connections are closer and more subtle than any 
 with which we meet in the inorganic realm. 
 
 Now the demand that life shall be treated 
 mechanically is strengthened in two ways. In 
 the first place, science has already made no 
 small advance along the road of mechanical 
 explanation. She has shown that physical and 
 chemical methods of interpretation do hold, at 
 least in part, in regard to many vital phenomena, 
 
 1 The repair of an injury involves an elaborate division 
 of labour between the cells engaged in the work of repair. 
 It is difficult to picture any mechanical explanation of the 
 fact that thousands of cells each contribute their own share 
 of labour in harmonious co-operation. We cannot help 
 asking how they are directed. 
 
172 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 and every day she is bringing more and more 
 of the field of life under the control of these 
 methods. Life cannot be treated as something 
 which stands altogether apart from the laws 
 which operate in the inorganic sphere. The 
 maintenance, as opposed to the origin of life, 
 seems, as Lotze says, to be given over to the 
 control of physical and mechanical forces. And, 
 in the second place, the position of science is 
 reinforced by the criticism which she can direct 
 against views which stand in opposition to her 
 own. One such opposing view, now generally 
 abandoned, is that maintained by the upholders 
 of the theory of vitalism. These postulate the 
 existence of some special vital force or peculiar 
 power working in an organism, whose presence 
 accounts for all the unique characteristics pos- 
 sessed by living things. But of such a theory 
 we are compelled to ask what proof there is of 
 the existence of such a force. Supposing it to 
 exist, how are we to conceive of its action ? It 
 is an unknown quantity of which we can form 
 an idea only in proportion as we interpret it in 
 terms of known forces, and then it loses its 
 special features. A vital force, as something 
 which rises above the physical nature and limita- 
 tions of the organism, is a hypothesis which we 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 173 
 
 cannot accept. Science not unnaturally shrinks 
 from handling unknown quantities. Hoffding 1 
 gives as a reason why the theory of vital force 
 so long held its ground the fact that men 
 thought of the organism as an absolute unity 
 rather than as a complex whole. Organisms, 
 for example, responded to external stimuli in a 
 manner which seemed to stand in no exact rela- 
 tion to the stimuli. Why, for instance, should 
 light make a plant turn to it ? Why should the 
 response of the organism be, as is so often the 
 case, of the nature of adaptation to environment ? 
 To account for this peculiarity, men invoked the 
 aid of a peculiar force, whereas the true explana- 
 tion would seem to lie in regarding the organism 
 as a very complex, organised whole. Stimuli 
 received at one point of the organism would be 
 transmitted to another, and would in this way 
 pass through the whole system, and the effects 
 produced by the stimuli would vary according to 
 the nature of the forces in the various parts of 
 the organism. Thus the final result might be 
 something very different from what was taken 
 into the organism at the first. Organic response 
 to external stimuli must, therefore, be richer and 
 
 1 Outlines of Psychology, chap, ii., p. 34. 
 
174 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 more varied than inorganic response, just because 
 organisms are richer in content and possess a 
 greater amount of stored-up energy ready to be 
 liberated. It is, says Hoffding, " by an analysis 
 of the individual factors in the vital process" 
 that the new view has arisen, which regards the 
 organism as a complicated machine to be ex- 
 plained on mechanical principles. Opponents 
 of this mechanical type of explanation sometimes 
 adopt another line of argument. They insist 
 that the growth of an organism can only be 
 accounted for if you allow that the idea of the 
 whole was, in some way, present as a controlling 
 factor throughout the whole development. In a 
 mechanical structure the whole arises out of and 
 as a result of the combination of the parts ; but 
 in the case of a living being we seem obliged to 
 think of the whole as in some sense preceding 
 the formation of the parts and regulating their 
 development. We tend, as Lotze puts it, 1 to 
 think that "the form of the whole is already 
 present in the developing body as an animating 
 and regulating power even before the whole sum 
 of parts, by which its outline is one day to be 
 filled, are yet in existence or in their right places". 
 
 1 Microeosmus, bk. i., chap, iii., pp. 63, 64. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 175 
 
 We are compelled, that is, to fall back upon the 
 idea of predetermination, which we have treated 
 as a canon of finality. But if we adopt this theory 
 of the immanent or indwelling idea of the whole, 
 and invest that idea with active powers of con- 
 trol, we are not really nearer any satisfactory 
 explanation of the problem. All we do is to 
 emphasise our refusal to acquiesce in the me- 
 chanical theory. Just as in the case of the 
 theory of vital force, so here, we can form no 
 conception of the mode of operation of this idea 
 or of its relation to the physical forces in the 
 organism. The idea, certainly, cannot be inde- 
 pendent of such forces, and there are plain limits 
 to its power. The existence of organic mal- 
 formations and of departures from type are 
 enough to prove this. The growth of the 
 organism can be arrested or interrupted by the 
 use of physical force, and the existing arrange- 
 ment of its parts can be broken up. The idea 
 can only act in connection with the physical 
 forces of the body, and, if you insist upon its 
 presence, you must reduce it to the level of a 
 physical force. The conception of a regulative 
 idea, out of all connection with the physical sys- 
 tem of the body, floating above it, as it were, and 
 interfering from time to time to modify or set 
 
176 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 right a development which is being carried on 
 by these mechanical forces is a conception which 
 we cannot admit. 1 If, urges the upholder of the 
 mechanical view, we could only understand fully 
 the systematic connection of the parts of an or- 
 ganism and the interaction of all its forces, 
 then we should see that there was no necessity 
 to fall back upon either of these additional 
 hypotheses. 
 
 What, then, are we to say by way of final 
 criticism about this attempt to press mechanical 
 principles of explanation to cover the facts of 
 life ? We need not fear it because of the limita- 
 tions which are inherent in it, and which any 
 fair-minded man of science would readily allow 
 to be there. Let us assume that science has 
 achieved her ideal, that life can be shown to be 
 amenable, in all her details, to physical treat- 
 ment, may be created even out of the inorganic. 
 Are we, thereby, reduced to regarding the world 
 as a blindly working machine, soulless and dead ? 
 Far from it ; for, in the first place, the mechan- 
 ical explanation of life gives us no theory of the 
 origin of the world. Science can only assume, 
 as an eternally existing fact, an original con- 
 
 1 Lotze, Microcosmus, bk. L, chap, iii., pp. 63-7. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 177 
 
 stitution of matter or certain primal relations 
 between the original elements of which matter 
 is composed. But with such an assumption our 
 minds cannot rest satisfied ; it itself needs to be 
 explained. What is this unity of differences 
 which is postulated as the fount of all being? 
 What is the bond which holds the elements in 
 relation ? Why do they form a whole or system 
 at all ? We are driven, by a deeper analysis, 
 to interpret that ultimate arrangement in terms 
 of mind. Mechanism cannot explain it, and, if 
 so, neither can it explain the development which 
 has issued from it. In fact, mechanism explains 
 nothing, but itself everywhere needs explanation. 
 If there was an ideal significance in the original 
 constitution of the world, there is an ideal signifi- 
 cance in every stage of its evolution. Through- 
 out the whole realm of physical Nature there 
 may operate one system of laws, but these laws 
 are differently applied in different departments, 
 and yield varying results, which cannot all be in- 
 terpreted on the same terms. Reality, in its 
 different grades, calls for the use of different 
 categories. Thus, while science seeks to inter- 
 pret life and its processes in mechanical terms, 
 her explanations can never do full justice to the 
 
 facts. For the facts not only exist, but have 
 12 
 
178 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 meaning or significance, and may be regarded 
 from the point of view of their ideal worth. 
 Nothing can alter the fact that we do find 
 a fuller meaning in an organism than in a 
 stone ; and the more highly developed the or- 
 ganism is the richer is its significance for our 
 thought. The richest categories of interpretation 
 are claimed by the richest existences ; those of 
 man, as a moral personality, and of God, who 
 gives to the universe whatever significance any 
 part of it may possess. Science does not con- 
 cern herself with the problem of worth or value. 
 She is interested in tracing out the connection 
 between events. She singles out, for example, 
 the movement of an organism in response to an 
 external stimulus, and looks at that as a suc- 
 cession of happenings, a series of molecular 
 movements. So much energy enters the system 
 of the organism, a disturbance is set up, and so 
 much energy is liberated and flows out again 
 into the surrounding world. This is the account 
 which science gives of the phenomenon. But 
 the movement in question may also be regarded 
 from other points of view, as displaying purpose 
 or intelligence on the part of the organism, or as 
 belonging to a being whose unity is such that 
 we are compelled to regard its very existence 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 179 
 
 as significant, and all its activities as consequently 
 sharing in that significance. Every event, in a 
 word, can be both explained and interpreted. 
 We can look for its meaning as well as its 
 genesis, and the two inquiries are independent. 
 The significance of autumn colouring for my 
 mind and aesthetic appreciation is not one whit 
 reduced if you tell me that the colour is due 
 to chemical processes of decomposition in the 
 leaves. That may be the mechanism through 
 which the change in coloration is effected, but 
 the beauty is there all the same, and makes its 
 distinct appeal to my mind. The ideal value 
 of a thing is not destroyed by showing the 
 steps through which it has come about. And 
 there can never, I think, come a time when we 
 shall cease to regard the organic as something 
 altogether richer and more significant than the 
 inorganic, with a more marked unity, with pur- 
 posive activities, and a promise, at each stage 
 of its being, of future growth. Far more prob- 
 able is it that we shall come to regard the 
 inorganic as itself organic, and that life, and not 
 matter, will be our ultimate category. For, 
 after all, if mechanism can maintain life, and if 
 once the organic arose from the inorganic, the 
 inorganic must have in it the potency of life, 
 
180 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 and, in interpreting it, we must give to it that 
 which has issued from it. Finally, when the 
 evolution of life reaches the stage at which 
 consciousness and self-consciousness appear, is 
 it not clear that these mental qualities cannot 
 be explained in terms of mechanism? What 
 meaning is there in saying that consciousness 
 is a product of the chemical activity of the 
 brain-cells ; or, in the old phrase, that the brain 
 secretes thought as the liver secretes bile ; or 
 that the mind is the organ of the body ? These 
 are all expressions which are applicable only to 
 the physical series ; they cannot be used to 
 explain the connection between the physical 
 series and a series which is entirely different in 
 kind. The attempt to make mind a product of 
 mechanical forces is confessedly hopeless. In 
 addition, while science is building up her world 
 of mechanical forces, it is mind, all the while, 
 which is doing the construction. The matter 
 of science is matter interpreted by mind, which 
 has meaning only for mind, and which ultimately 
 has existence only for mind. 
 
 An interesting problem arises here whether 
 science, by adopting this ideal, and this mechan- 
 ical method of explanation, may not be blinding 
 herself to some of the facts of organic life ; 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 181 
 
 whether, in short, the attempt to reduce biology 
 to the level of chemistry and physics may not 
 be putting scientific inquirers on the wrong track 
 in the pursuit of their investigations. For a 
 study of this problem the reader is referred to 
 G. Sandeman's Problems of Biology, which con- 
 tains a very thoughtful critique of modern bio- 
 logical method. The fundamental problem of 
 biology, in its investigation into the nature of 
 organisms, is the same as the problem of philo- 
 sophy, how, namely, to interpret the unity and 
 individuality of the organism. The organism 
 plainly is a unity, and preserves its oneness 
 through manifold changes. Problems of hered- 
 ity ultimately turn on the endeavour to dis- 
 cover what it is which enables the new germ 
 to grow true to type and to develop into a 
 single self-contained life, which, more or less 
 faithfully, reproduces the character of the parent 
 lives. As Mr. Sandeman points out, 1 the theory 
 of vitalism was an attempt to explain the unity 
 of organisms. Doctrines of type involve the 
 same problem, and it is the unity of organisms 
 which has led to the calling in of some principle 
 of design. The teleological problem, as applied 
 
 1 F. 196. 
 
182 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 to organisms, is just the problem of what to 
 make of their individuality. Yet all modern 
 biological theories set out by treating the organ- 
 ism as something which is to be analysed into 
 component parts, as an aggregate of externally 
 related elements. Nor does there appear to be 
 any limit to the range of possible subdivision. 
 We find, for example, theories of heredity, which 
 postulate in the germ a definite, material particle 
 as the basis of each single quality or character- 
 istic which emerges in the course of the organ- 
 ism's development. The germ is thus conceived 
 as a highly particulate substance, each particle 
 being the carrier or vehicle of some separate 
 characteristic. In other words, science, con- 
 fronted with the unity and individuality of an 
 organism, adopts a point of view which seems 
 to deny the existence of the very thing which 
 she set out to explain. Biology should find 
 some other conception of organic unity than 
 that of an aggregate of independent parts if she 
 is to solve the problem before her. 1 For organic 
 differences cannot be treated in their isolation. 
 They are intrinsically related to each other and 
 to the whole to which they belong. The more 
 
 1 See Problems of Biology, chap. v. 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 183 
 
 you break up the oneness of the organism the 
 more difficult will you find it to explain how it 
 is that the parts are combined into a whole so 
 unique and individual. 
 
 The difficulty which both science and philo- 
 sophy find in explaining the unity of an organism 
 serves to remind us that, in any department of 
 inquiry, our thought is never adequate to the 
 concreteness of the facts which we set out to 
 interpret. Our experience of the fact comes 
 first, our reflection on it comes later. Man lives 
 before he philosophises, and in his thinking he 
 can never do justice to the fulness of his ex- 
 perience, for thought is always in arrear of the 
 facts of life. But it is the task of philosophy to 
 bring to bear upon the facts the richest and 
 most adequate conceptions which she can find, 
 even though she can never hope successfully to 
 mirror the concreteness of reality. Science, on 
 the other hand, confessedly pursues an abstract 
 method. She regards any fact from the parti- 
 cular point of view of the science in question and 
 neglects all other aspects of fact. If knowledge 
 is to advance it is absolutely necessary that 
 science should adopt this attitude, for only so 
 can she make clear to herself the exact nature 
 of the problem which she is investigating. But 
 
1 84 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 it is an attitude which has its dangers, for it 
 may blind men to the fact that what they are 
 investigating may have other meanings and a 
 different significance. Let us take once more, 
 as examples, the two instances to which we have 
 already referred. It is possible to be so in- 
 terested in the physiological processes which 
 underlie our aesthetic appreciation as to forget 
 that men have everywhere found a moral and 
 religious significance in the beauty of the natural 
 world. We may be so absorbed in analysing 
 the mechanism of Nature as to disregard alto- 
 gether her aesthetic appeal. But Nature, if she 
 " labours as a machine," also, at the same time, 
 and in virtue of the same laws, " sleeps as a 
 picture " ; l and the one aspect of her is as true 
 as the other. Or let us take this very problem 
 of the individuality of an organism. 1 1 is possible 
 so to dissect the organism as to forget that it is 
 alive ; so to analyse it into component parts as 
 to lose sight of its unity ; so to treat it as a tem- 
 porary meeting-point of racial forces of heredity 
 as to make the species or type everything and 
 the individual nothing. And the danger is, that 
 this attitude may become so engrained that the 
 
 1 Mozley, University Sermons, Sermon on " Nature ". 
 
ORGANISM AND MECHANISM 185 
 
 mind may become warped or biased and may 
 tend to treat, as void of any real importance for 
 a final interpretation of experience, those higher 
 characteristics which emerge in the course of 
 development. Any one, for example, who de- 
 votes his whole energies to an investigation of 
 the material factors of heredity must find it more 
 difficult to admit the immortality of a human 
 being. Regarded as a mere living thing the 
 individual does appear to be only a temporary 
 phenomenon. While he perishes the race en- 
 dures. Yet I believe it to be profoundly true 
 that there is nothing in the world, no atom, no 
 amoeba, and a fortiori no man, which has not 
 an eternal significance and value peculiarly its 
 own. This is not the place in which to attempt 
 to prove the validity of this conception of signi- 
 ficant individuality. The justification for any 
 such reasoned conviction is to be found, ulti- 
 mately, in the thought of God, in whom we, and 
 all things, live and move and have our being. 
 Such a final metaphysic would endeavour to 
 show that no existence, whether of molecule or 
 man, has any possibility of being such, or has 
 any meaning, apart from God ; and that, if He 
 is the ground and basis of all that exists, then 
 for Him, if not for us, every detail of the world 
 
186 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 must glow with significant individuality. All 
 that I would suggest here is, that in the obvious 
 significance which any single organism has for 
 us, and in the more clear significance of our own 
 personality, we have a plain hint that individu- 
 ality, rather than type or kind or species or any 
 other generalisation, is the word which best 
 characterises the concreteness of reality. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN— DIFFICUL- 
 TIES AND OBJECTIONS 
 
 THE discussion in the preceding chapter has 
 made clear some of the reasons which 
 compel us to interpret organisms in teleological 
 terms. It remains, therefore, merely to sum- 
 marise those reasons before we pass on to 
 consider other questions. Kant, with his usual 
 profundity of thought, analysed the nature of 
 living organisms, and no one, I think, has im- 
 proved upon his analysis. 1 He singled out 
 three characteristics of living things which ap- 
 peared to demand a teleological explanation. 
 
 (a) The form of an organism seems to be 
 such that we are unable to explain it in terms 
 of mere natural law, that is, from the mechanical 
 point of view of physical science. In an organ- 
 ism we are bound to think of the whole as being 
 somehow prior to the parts. The organism is 
 
 1 Critique of Judgment, part ii., sees. 64-69. 
 
 (187) 
 
1 88 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 at once cause and effect of itself. " Nature, 
 considered as mere mechanism, can produce 
 its forms in a thousand different ways without 
 stumbling upon the unity " which an organism 
 shows. 1 Nothing accidental or purposeless 
 occurs in an organism, but everything is ar- 
 ranged in due accordance with the idea of the 
 whole ; and we, therefore, call in a causality, 
 working by ends, to explain the phenomenon. 
 Kant, however, was careful to add that, if we 
 could see further into Nature, we might be able 
 to discover a reason for the form of organisms 
 without being obliged to recur to a principle of 
 design ; though Nature, taken as a whole, can 
 ultimately give no explanation of her existence 
 or her unity, but requires us to pass behind her 
 to an intelligence or principle of reason. 
 
 (6) Viewed in its growth an organism calls 
 for a teleological explanation. A tree changes 
 the inorganic substances which it assimilates 
 into its own peculiar substance and imparts to 
 them a special quality. The tree " develops 
 itself by aid of a material, which, as compounded, 
 is its own product ". And, when it extends its 
 
 1 Critique of Judgment, part ii., sec. 6i. 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 189 
 
 life in the seed, it M generates another tree ac- 
 cording to a known natural law. But the tree 
 produced is of the same genus ; and so it pro- 
 duces itself generically. On the one hand, as 
 effect it is continually self-produced ; on the 
 other hand, as cause it continually produces 
 itself, and so perpetuates itself generically." 1 
 Translating this into the language of molecular 
 physics we see that the problem is, how to ex- 
 plain the determination of each of the myriad 
 molecules to its right place in the structure of 
 the tree, so that the whole preserves its unity 
 and peculiar character. The tree, and the seed 
 from which another tree springs, both seem to 
 grow according to a predetermined plan, and 
 reach out, as it were, to the realisation of an 
 end. 
 
 (c) Finally, in an organism all the parts are 
 reciprocally means and ends for each other. 
 The leaves are products of the tree, but in turn 
 minister to its life. The maintenance of any 
 one part depends on the maintenance of the 
 other parts. The whole organisation and con- 
 stitution of a living thing appears to be purposive. 
 
 1 Critique of Judgment ', part ii., sec. 64. 
 
190 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Now we interpret organisms teleologically 
 because we find in them features which resemble 
 elements in our own purposive activity. We 
 argue from analogy ; and it is worth while to 
 digress for a moment in order to see how this 
 analogical reasoning works out. Argument 
 from analogy is argument from resemblances — 
 that is the simplest account to give of the pro- 
 cedure. We argue, or infer, that if A resembles 
 B in some respects, it will do so in others. It 
 is a form of inference, but only of probable 
 inference, and the probability varies greatly in 
 different cases. We have to take into account 
 (i) the number of the resemblances, (2) their 
 nature or character, (3) the presence and number 
 of the dissimilarities. If A resembles B in 
 fifteen important points the probability is that 
 it will also resemble it in the sixteenth point, 
 which is the new instance under consideration. 
 But if A resembles B in five points and differs 
 from it in ten the force of the analogy is obvi- 
 ously diminished, and that in proportion to the 
 importance or unimportance of the dissimilarities. 
 One resemblance in an important point, in some- 
 thing, that is, from which flow many other con- 
 sequences, may be enough to give your argument 
 a high degree of probability. 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 191 
 
 Let us now apply this analogical reasoning to 
 the case of organisms. 1 We start from our own 
 purposive activity. Here we are on familiar 
 ground. We know that we do set before our- 
 selves ends and consciously adopt means in 
 order to reach them. From ourselves we pass 
 to other men. It is foreign to our present in- 
 tention to inquire in what way we become aware 
 of the existence of intelligent human beings 
 other than ourselves. 2 But, when we see a 
 machine or a building, we unhesitatingly affirm 
 that it was constructed by an intelligence like 
 our own ; because we are able to show that 
 there is a striking resemblance in many import- 
 ant points between the structure in question and 
 other structures which we have ourselves de- 
 signed. In particular we emphasise this salient 
 characteristic, that there are present a number 
 of co-operating circumstances which combine to 
 form one result, and we feel that this co-ordina- 
 tion of factors cannot have been due to chance. 
 Some intelligence must have foreseen and ar- 
 ranged the combination. Bricks and bolts and 
 
 1 See Janet, Final Causes, chap, iii., where this argument 
 from analogy is worked out fully. 
 
 2 For some remarks on this point see Taylor's Elements of 
 Metaphysics, bk. iii., chap. ii. 
 
i 9 2 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 wheels do not come together of themselves. 
 Passing on lower down the scale we reach the 
 activities of animals, which seem to display the 
 same co-ordination of means to achieve ends. 
 But here we have to distinguish between activi- 
 ties which are conscious and those which are 
 sub-conscious or instinctive. Both equally in- 
 volve action for ends and the selection of means 
 to reach those ends, but in instinct we are con- 
 fronted with a form of activity which we cannot 
 explain. The following would seem to be the 
 chief characteristics of instinctive activity. 1 
 
 It is sub-conscious. It lacks individuality, 
 for instincts are activities representative of a 
 group of allied animals, which, as regards these 
 activities, all act in the same way. The activities 
 are congenital and hereditary, the newly born 
 organism possessing them ready made at birth. 
 In instinct many sub-tendencies are co-ordinated 
 to reach the given end. Instinct is more com- 
 plicated than simple reflex action and hence 
 has been defined as " compound reflex action ". 
 Throughout the whole process, so far as we can 
 judge, the activity never reaches the level of 
 conscious intelligence. Finally, we come to the 
 
 1 See Lloyd Morgan, Habit and Instinct, chap. i. 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 193 
 
 internal functions of organisms and to the growth 
 and formation of their various organs ; where, 
 again, we find ourselves in presence of processes 
 of extraordinary complexity, involving the same 
 combination of means to produce the given 
 result. It is this combination and co-ordination 
 which is the phenomenon in each case to be 
 explained. This is the essential point of re- 
 semblance between the various instances upon 
 which our analogical reasoning turns. And to 
 explain satisfactorily such complex adjustment 
 and adaptation we seem obliged to invoke the 
 aid of some teleological principle. 
 
 But it is at this point that our difficulties begin. 
 As we descend the scale of Nature it becomes 
 increasingly hard to define the character of the 
 designing activity whose presence we feel com- 
 pelled to assert. We move farther away at each 
 step from the operation of the only principle of 
 design with which we are familiar, that, namely, 
 which is found in our own foreseeing and intelli- 
 gent activity. What account can we give of the 
 work of instinct ? Or how are we to interpret 
 growth ? As we watch the development of an 
 organism we feel that some mysterious designer 
 is close at hand. We can almost see him at his 
 task. Yet who is he ? He does not appear to 
 13 
 
194 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 stand outside his products, but seems rather to 
 dwell within them, so that product and designer 
 are one. How are we to describe the purpose 
 whose gradual realisation we are witnessing? 
 If we take refuge in the thought of God, and 
 treat all the operations of Nature as modes of 
 the Divine activity, we are at once confronted 
 by the question, whether we can conceive of 
 God as designing. Must not God's activity, of 
 whatever kind it be, be something higher than 
 what we mean when we speak of design ? The 
 remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an 
 examination of these difficulties, for which we 
 must attempt to find some solution. 
 
 Now, looking at the whole matter broadly, 
 we may say that there are two ways in which 
 we may conceive of design in Nature and in- 
 terpret the activity of that first principle upon 
 which both Nature and man depend. We may 
 maintain, with Paley, that wherever there are 
 ends in Nature there God is operative as an 
 intelligence which acts consciously for these ends 
 and devises the means to reach them. Or we 
 may regard Nature as unconsciously working for 
 ends, and interpret her activity in terms of blind 
 tendency rather than of designing intelligence. 
 
 Taking the latter hypothesis first, we must 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 195 
 
 ask why such a theory was ever adopted. The 
 answer, I suppose, is, that the difficulties in the 
 way of thinking of God as a designer led men 
 to try to frame a counter-theory which should 
 be more free from objections and so easier of 
 acceptance. To regard Nature as an organism, 
 or great living whole, realising its end sponta- 
 neously, and not dependent on any external, 
 supra-mundane cause, brings to some minds a 
 satisfaction which they cannot find in the rival 
 hypothesis of a designing God. We may note, 
 in passing, that there are many variations of the 
 theory which refuses to interpret Nature's causal- 
 ity in terms of conscious mind. It is unnecessary 
 to discuss them here. The point about them 
 all, whether they speak of instinct or unconscious 
 reason or immanent idea, is, that they agree in 
 characterising the operation of Nature, or of the 
 first principle, upon which Nature depends, in a 
 manner which precludes the ascription to it of 
 anything really analogous to what we mean by 
 intelligent activity. Nature is to be regarded 
 as a self-contained and self-developing system, 
 working unconsciously after the fashion in which 
 we conceive instinct as working. But the ob- 
 jections to such a view are no less serious than 
 the objections to calling God a designer. To 
 
1 96 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 reduce the first principle and ground of all reality 
 to unconscious reason fails to satisfy the demands 
 of my intelligence. My own reason is not an 
 unconscious reason. I act for ends, with full 
 knowledge of what I am doing. How did I, 
 a product of Nature, arrive at a stage of being 
 which represents a higher level than that of the 
 first principle ? Can you derive self-conscious- 
 ness and intelligence from Nature if they were 
 not somehow already present in Nature ? "He 
 that made the eye, shall he not see ? " As an 
 intelligent being I demand in the source from 
 which the universe has been derived some 
 quality which can fairly be called intelligence. 
 Again, are we not, if we adopt this theory, 
 explaining the obscure by the more obscure? 
 Instinct, or unconscious reason, is something of 
 whose nature we are completely ignorant. Why 
 offer this as our final explanation of the world- 
 process? We are only making the darkness 
 more intense. We should remember Kant's 
 dictum, that it is illegitimate to substitute for a 
 causality with which we are familiar one which 
 is unfamiliar and inexplicable. Finally, as Janet 
 points out, 1 why should we refuse to refer the 
 
 1 Final Causes, bk. ii., chap, iii., pp. 358, 359. 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 197 
 
 unconscious activities of Nature to a conscious 
 and intelligent source ? Why are we to regard 
 these activities as self-existent and ultimate ? 
 If spontaneous now in their operation they may 
 yet owe their existence to the original causal 
 activity of the Divine will and mind ; or, as we 
 may with perhaps more reason maintain, they 
 may be the expressions of a continually operative 
 Divine causality, the witnesses of a God im- 
 manent in all His works. We cannot rest in a 
 theory which is so paralysing to the higher in- 
 tincts of our personality. 
 
 Can we, on the other hand, speak of God as 
 a designer ? Can we overcome the weaknesses 
 which are inherent in the teleological argument ? 
 Criticisms of the argument from design usually 
 centre round this objection, that design is an 
 unworthy conception to be applied to God. It 
 is deemed unworthy on the following grounds : — 
 
 (a) The argument gives you only an architect 
 and not a creator of the world. When man 
 designs he works upon a material which he did 
 not create, but which he finds ready to hand ; 
 and it is urged that the argument from final 
 causes cannot establish more than this in the 
 case of God. All it can show is, that, upon a 
 
198 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 given matter, intelligence imposes order and ar- 
 rangement. The objection, so far as it goes, 
 is certainly valid. The argument from design 
 cannot establish the existence of a creator. But 
 the problem of creation is, surely, an independent 
 problem which calls for a separate inquiry. The 
 teleologist is not concerned with the question of 
 creation. His task is to vindicate the existence 
 of an intelligence which works through Nature 
 to realise ends. He finds in Nature order, 
 adaptations, adjustments, and argues that these 
 things can have their origin only in a mind and 
 will which called them into being and acts with 
 intelligent purpose. The apparent design is no 
 less if you assume that matter eternally existed. 
 Whether it did so exist or no is a problem of a 
 different order. The core of the teleological 
 argument, the passage, that is, from certain 
 features in the natural scheme to a mind in and 
 behind the scheme, remains sound. It involves 
 a confusion of the issue to drag in the question 
 of creation. 
 
 (6) A similar line of defence helps us to dis- 
 pose of the second objection, that the argument 
 from design does not enable us to prove the 
 existence of a God who is perfectly wise and 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 199 
 
 good, but only of a God who is very wise and 
 good. We survey only a limited field ; we 
 cannot, therefore, argue to a God who is able 
 to produce more than the amount of order and 
 adaptation which we actually observe. But this 
 is a criticism which, though it is undoubtedly 
 true, does not touch the heart of the teleologist's 
 contention. He is concerned, not with existences 
 which lie beyond the range of his experience, 
 but with the adaptations which confront him 
 day by day in the natural world. He is asking 
 what explanation he can find of these ; and he 
 maintains that the only explanation lies in the 
 assumption of an intelligent God who produced 
 these adaptations, and who, through them, is 
 realising certain ends. However far we go in 
 our exploration of Nature, everywhere we find 
 it to be a home of order and adaptation ; and 
 so the conviction, which, as a practical postulate, 
 underlies all the work of scientific investigation, 
 is borne in upon us, that the universe, in all its 
 parts, displays the same features. We see 
 enough of Nature to make us argue to the 
 existence of a Divine mind, whose operations 
 are so vast and wonderful that we readily predi- 
 cate of that mind the attribute of perfection, 
 even though we may not be logically justified 
 
20o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in so doing. 1 The fact that the whole range of 
 existence is not open to our inspection does not 
 destroy the evidences of design which meet us 
 in the more limited regions which we can ob- 
 serve. The problem of the absolute perfection 
 of God involves other considerations than those 
 which affect the teleologist. In particular, it in- 
 volves the very important consideration, whether 
 a finite mind can form any positive conception 
 at all of what absolute perfection is. We must 
 not criticise the argument from design for failing 
 to establish a conclusion, which, when the argu- 
 ment is rightly stated, it never sets out to 
 establish. 
 
 (c) Again, why should we attribute to God a 
 conception, like that of design, which implies an 
 effort to bring about the proper adjustment of 
 the conditions, and involves a lengthy process 
 of attaining an end through a succession of 
 means ? Cannot God be thought of as creating 
 at one moment the matter and the adaptation ? 
 Is it not an unworthy conception of the Divine 
 activity, thus to regard it, as working up into 
 shape a refractory material ? This is, probably, 
 
 1 See Martineau, Study of Religion, vol. i., bk. ii., chap, 
 i., sec. i. 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 201 
 
 the criticism which is, more than any other, 
 directed against the argument from design, and 
 it possesses this validity, that it warns us against 
 applying to God the idea of design in the precise 
 form in which it is applied to human activity. 
 In God we may reasonably postulate a unity of 
 purpose and execution, in which design in the 
 lower sense is transcended and taken up into a 
 higher mode of activity, whereby it is made, not 
 less than design, but more. But, until man 
 becomes God, he cannot hope to make clear to 
 himself the precise nature of God's manner of 
 operation, though he may do more justice to its 
 real character, by substituting for the calculating 
 activity of the designer the thought of an activity 
 which works by free, spontaneous impulse, and 
 which is not compelled to think out beforehand 
 each detail of the scheme, or laboriously co- 
 ordinate means to reach a remote end. But 
 for us, who look out upon the adaptations in 
 Nature and who live under the conditions of 
 the time-process, the Divine activity must ap- 
 pear as the activity of an intelligence which 
 reaches an end through a succession of appro- 
 priate means. We cannot free ourselves from 
 the time-process, and so are compelled to break 
 up the unity and immediacy of the creative act 
 
202 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 into the stages of an activity which is construed 
 in terms of time. But I am unable to see that 
 the core of the argument is rendered unsound. 
 The essence of the conception of design is to be 
 found in the thought that intelligence is present, 
 and it still remains true that order, adaptation, 
 arrangement, can be explained only if you postu- 
 late intelligence behind them. That intelligence 
 may act in ways unlike those which characterise 
 the operations of a human mind without ceasing 
 to be intelligence. And it is difficult to see how 
 the Divine mind could reveal itself, as such, to 
 mans mind, unless it were through a develop- 
 ment which involved the use of means to achieve 
 ends. 
 
 (d) Once more, we are told, that it is deroga- 
 tory to the Divine dignity to think of God as de- 
 signing, because this implies that God wishes to 
 reach certain ends, and so is not self-sufficient. 
 He needs something for His own further self- 
 satisfaction. But such a criticism is equally ap- 
 plicable to any theory which attempts to deal 
 with the relation of God to the universe. Why 
 should God create at all, or call into being a 
 human race? The difficulty is no greater for 
 those who speak of God as designing than for 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 203 
 
 those who prefer to use other language about 
 Him. Nor can it fairly be maintained that ac- 
 tivity for certain ends implies the presence of a 
 defect in the agent. A poet may create in his 
 own mind a poem. If he puts it upon paper has 
 he thereby proved himself defective in any sense 
 in which he was not defective before ? The crea- 
 tive activity of God need imply no limitation 
 upon His self-sufficiency. He may be thought 
 of as moving continually towards the realisation 
 of ends, and yet as being complete in Himself 
 all the while, and as viewing the whole temporal 
 process as one single act. Any limitations upon 
 God, which the act of creating a universe may 
 involve, are self-imposed limitations, which are, 
 therefore, really evidences of all the greater 
 power. Not a few of our difficulties in this con- 
 nection arise because creation is thought of as 
 beginning at a certain point in time. The idea 
 of creation, as an endless process, and of the 
 universe as the continuous self-expression and 
 self- revelation of God, will be found on deeper 
 reflection to be a more satisfactory conception. 1 
 
 1 The whole problem of creation, and of what we mean 
 when we use the word, demands a separate treatment. See 
 Lotze's Philosophy of Religion, chap. iii. All we are con- 
 cerned here to show is, that the difficulties are not peculiar 
 to the argument from design. 
 
204 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 (e) The last criticism with which we propose 
 to deal is, that the argument from design enables 
 you to conclude only to the existence of God as 
 standing in an external relation to the world, a 
 conception which cannot satisfy the necessities 
 of our thought. It is certainly true that the 
 popular mind does picture God as a great ex- 
 ternal designer, who, with infinite skill and 
 wisdom, arranges the exquisite adaptations which 
 abound in Nature ; and it is also true that such 
 a thought of God, when we begin to reflect upon 
 it, is found to be one in which we cannot rest. 
 All the old difficulties about the existence of 
 matter at once confront us. Does God find 
 matter already existing to His hand ? Or does 
 He first create it in an unorganised condition 
 and then impose order upon it ? Whatever God 
 is He must be thought of as the immanent reason 
 and indwelling principle of life of the universe, 1 
 and the whole temporal process must be re- 
 garded as you would regard an organism whose 
 development is from within and self-contained. 
 We cannot apply to God the conception of 
 design in the form in which we apply it to a 
 
 1 See J. Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 
 P- 139- 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 205 
 
 human workman. But none the less do the 
 adaptations of the natural world inevitably sug- 
 gest to us intelligence as their cause, and, as we 
 have already said, when we speak of design 
 what we mean, primarily, is intelligence. The 
 question of the immanence or transcendence of 
 God is a problem of a different order. In re- 
 jecting the conception of God as a designer we 
 must be careful to insist that we still think 
 of the operative cause as intelligent and pur- 
 posive. 
 
 The refusal to attribute design to God is 
 sometimes part of a larger refusal to allow that 
 any quality or characteristic which has meaning 
 among men can be predicated of the infinite. 
 We are bidden to remember how little of the 
 mystery of existence we can explain. Both in 
 time and space the universe appears to be with- 
 out limit, and our minds are dwarfed by it. Can 
 we hope, it is urged, to comprehend in any way 
 the nature of God, the non-phenomenal cause 
 from which flows all this unending succession of 
 phenomena? Is not God a name merely for 
 the great unknown and impenetrable back- 
 ground lying out there beyond us, inaccessible 
 to our finite reason ? But such a conception of 
 
206 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 the infinite inevitably leads to scepticism, and 
 destroys any hope which we may have of 
 rendering our experience orderly and intelli- 
 gible. This agnostic creed is impossible as a 
 final creed, and can be shown to rest on no 
 sound logical basis. Is it conceivable that mind, 
 which is the organ we have for knowing God, 
 cuts us off from that knowledge just because it 
 is our own mind ? Let us suppose God to exist 
 and to have given us our minds. Is it a tenable 
 theory, that the faculty of knowledge which He 
 has given us is the one barrier which prevents 
 us from knowing Him? And how, if, in virtue 
 of your finitude, you can say nothing whatever 
 about Him, can you even say that He exists? 
 You are, in saying that He exists, predicating 
 something of Him. You have established 
 communications between yourself and the un- 
 knowable, and, to that extent at any rate, the 
 unknowable has changed its character and has 
 become the unknown, or the only partially 
 known. But if God is partially known there is 
 reasonable hope that we may progressively 
 come to know more of Him. The unknowable 
 can never be the goal of human thought. The 
 unknown is that goal, but, then, the unknown 
 can more and more reveal to us its secrets, and 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 207 
 
 so becomes the known. To set up the infinite 
 as equivalent to the impenetrable reality which 
 fades into mystery the moment that we try to 
 compass it, is to misuse the word. The infinite 
 has another meaning, in which it becomes, not 
 a mystery of darkness, but a mystery of light. 
 Let us grant, by all means, that we cannot make 
 completely clear to ourselves the nature of the 
 Divine activity ; yet we may still assert that it 
 must have true affinities with what is highest 
 and best in our own activity. Our wonder will 
 be heightened, but our minds will not be para- 
 lysed. We take our stand upon our own per- 
 sonality. We are ourselves causally active ; we 
 act with intelligence to reach ends ; and we 
 know ourselves to be free and responsible. 
 We find here something which may serve as a 
 type of the Divine causality. In passing from 
 ourselves to God undoubtedly we exercise faith. 
 There is an act of moral trust, that the causality, 
 which underlies the movement of the universe, 
 is not altogether alien from what is highest in 
 our own being. Reason cannot, perhaps, com- 
 pletely justify the step which we take, but, then, 
 man is more than reason. The movement of 
 his personality is one and undivided, and truth 
 enters by other avenues than those of the in- 
 
208 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 tellect alone. The charge of anthropomorphism, 
 which is often levelled against the theist, has, 
 indeed, some justification in it, if the theist attri- 
 butes to God a human body, or the feelings 
 which depend upon some bodily organ, or if he 
 insists that mind exists in God in the precise 
 form in which it exists in ourselves. But there 
 is an anthropomorphism of a nobler type, which 
 maintains that there exist in God qualities which 
 really correspond to the qualities of will and 
 intelligence and goodness which are found in 
 men. All that the teleologist is concerned to 
 contend for is this, that what we call design in 
 man has in God a real counterpart, inasmuch as 
 the results achieved both by God and man are 
 achieved through the operation of conscious 
 intelligence, though the mode of the Divine 
 activity may be very different from the mode 
 of the human. The first rude attempt of an 
 amateur to paint a picture belongs to the same 
 order of existence as the supreme genius of a 
 Raphael. In the same way, as regards the 
 presence of intelligence, the mind of man and 
 the mind of God are akin. The argument from 
 design possesses enormous value, as being an 
 attempt to unfold the nature of a belief which 
 lies beyond logical demonstration ; a belief of 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS 209 
 
 which men find themselves possessed when 
 they awake to consciousness of the meaning of 
 their own existence ; the belief in an ultimate 
 intelligence, to which they give the name of 
 God. 
 
 14 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA OF DEVELOP- 
 MENT 
 
 EVOLUTION or Development 1 is the 
 key-word which unlocks the mind of the 
 present age. But the word is a purely descrip- 
 tive one, a formal term indicating a process of 
 becoming. To describe the history of anything, 
 the movement by which it has come to be what 
 it is, is not to explain it. We may be able to 
 show in detail the successive stages through 
 which the acorn passes in its development into 
 an oak, to trace them in their completeness, to 
 observe how one modification melts by almost 
 imperceptible change into another, but in doing 
 this we have not explained or interpreted the 
 
 1 The two terms may be taken as identical in meaning. 
 If there is any shade of difference between them we might 
 perhaps say that evolution directs our thought rather to the 
 source, development to the goal, of the process which is 
 under investigation. 
 
 (2IO) 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 211 
 
 growth of the tree. We are no nearer to the 
 solution of the problem how or why all this 
 happens. The causes of the development have 
 not been discovered, nor its meaning and signifi- 
 cance for our thought determined. So far we 
 are moving only on the surface of things, and 
 have not penetrated into their hidden depths. 
 Our task has been one of simple description. 
 As used by science the word evolution refers 
 either to the life-history of organic forms or to 
 the wider history of the universe as a whole. 
 But the term is also applied to any subject- 
 matter which can be shown to have a history, 
 such as sculpture, religion, the constitution of a 
 state ; and, when so applied, it emphasises the fact 
 that all presents have grown out of a past and 
 are unfolding into a future, and that, if we would 
 understand what we are investigating, we must, 
 as a preliminary condition of our inquiry, adopt 
 the genetic or historical method. The spirit of 
 the age is pre-eminently historical ; and, because 
 it is that, it is also critical. A critical age is one 
 which has learned to compare its present with 
 its past. It neither acquiesces complacently in 
 existing conditions nor regards them as final and 
 permanently fixed. But it seeks to know how 
 things have come to be what they are, and to- 
 
212 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 wards what they are tending. It will ask, for 
 example, whether the doctrinal statements of 
 theology, which were accepted by an earlier 
 generation, may not contain an admixture of 
 elements which are local and accidental, and 
 which the present age may have to discard ; 
 or, in the case of a political revolution, it will 
 endeavour to discover the signs of earlier unrest 
 which were prophetic of the final upheaval, and 
 to determine the essential bearing of the revolu- 
 tion upon the future life of the state or nation. 
 An age whose spirit is historical is one which 
 has reflected upon the antecedents out of which 
 it has sprung. It is aware of its ancestry and 
 so of itself. It faces towards both the past and 
 the future and knows itself as mediating between 
 them. 
 
 It would be outside our present purpose to 
 trace with any fulness of treatment the process 
 of development by which the spirit of our own 
 age has itself become possessed of the charac- 
 teristics which I have described ; but one, who 
 will take the trouble to study that process, will 
 see how the Romantic movement, which began 
 in Germany in the eighteenth century, as some- 
 thing essentially introspective and subjective in 
 method, took a new lease of life and became 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 213 
 
 more sober and less fanciful when it turned to 
 the study of history. Past history was regarded 
 no more as a matter for the chronicler or the 
 antiquarian alone, but men began to realise that 
 the past was still alive, and that its life could be 
 recovered by a sympathetic insight. We find 
 arising a genuine interest in the past, of which, 
 among our own writers, the romances of Scott 
 may be taken as an example. This was the 
 age in which the true study of history began, in 
 which the modern historical method was born. 
 The sense of the continuity of human life im- 
 pressed itself upon men's minds, and they began 
 to understand how every age was vitally linked 
 with and obeyed its predecessors, and how even 
 reaction was a form of obedience. The past 
 therefore must be investigated if the present 
 would be rendered intelligible. Laws, customs, 
 institutions, religion, art, all must be carefully 
 examined in the light of their historical evolu- 
 tion, for the secret of their present meaning was 
 to be found in the past from which they had 
 sprung. Research into the past gradually grew 
 scientific in scope and scholarly in method. 
 Already the conception of development was 
 dominating men's thought, and, having taken 
 root there, it became marvellously reinforced by 
 
214 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 the further application of the idea in biology 
 and geology. To England belongs the honour 
 of having produced the men who worked the 
 transformation in the field of natural science ; 
 Lyell, in geology, with his substitution for ca- 
 tastrophe of the conception of slow-working, 
 uniform, natural processes ; and, in biology, 
 Darwin, with his doctrine of descent in place 
 of that of special creation. Thus hand in hand 
 with the historic interest shown in the past 
 went investigation by careful and patient re- 
 search of the facts of Nature in the present, 
 leading to the growth of the modern scientific 
 temper and the inductive method. And the 
 broad result of this change of attitude both in 
 science and history is, that to-day we find our- 
 selves mastered by this sovereign conception 
 of development, whose richness and complexity 
 seem to be inexhaustible. We have no chance, 
 then, to understand the age in which we find 
 ourselves unless we are prepared to adopt the 
 historical attitude and to think things in terms 
 of growth and evolution. 
 
 But there is one important caution to be 
 borne in mind at the outset. Because develop- 
 ment is only a formal term, descriptive of a 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 215 
 
 process, its inner meaning is not necessarily the 
 same in the various spheres in which the con- 
 ception is applied. The dynamic factors of one 
 development may be entirely inadequate to ex- 
 plain another. The factors, which explain in- 
 organic evolution (if indeed you can use the 
 word evolution of inorganic changes) do not 
 explain evolution in the animal world. Even 
 if you allow that natural selection is a sufficient 
 explanation of the development of the various 
 species of plants and animals, it by no means 
 follows that human history can be interpreted 
 by the use of that one principle. The differ- 
 ences between the two spheres are obvious on 
 a moment's reflection. In the animal world you 
 have a struggle for existence, a ruthless and 
 endless competition, in which the unfit go to 
 the wall and perish. But when man appears 
 upon the scene, though there is certainly struggle 
 and competition, yet they are traversed by the 
 law of love and sympathy. Morality emerges 
 and transforms by its presence the whole pro- 
 cess of development. Huxley insisted upon this 
 in his Romanes lecture, Evolution and Ethics, 
 where he pointed out that man climbed to the 
 top of the wall by the ladder of animal cunning 
 and ferocity, and, when he found himself there, 
 
216 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 proceeded to disown the instrument by which 
 he had achieved his ascent. We must remem- 
 ber, then, that the great world-process is made 
 up of subordinate processes of development, 
 each of which has to be explained by the cata- 
 gories and methods appropriate to it. At the 
 same time, it should be possible to arrive at 
 some general principles and canons for interpret- 
 ing the idea of development in its broader and 
 more formal aspect, which shall be universally 
 applicable wherever any evolutionary process 
 is under investigation. We are concerned here 
 with the attempt to discover a few such prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 (a) The question which we naturally first ask 
 ourselves, is this : What is the difference be- 
 tween development and change? Develop- 
 ment includes change, as is obvious. But what 
 further conceptions does it include which are not 
 involved in the simpler idea of change ? Per- 
 haps we shall best make clear to ourselves the 
 difference between the two ideas by the use of 
 a simple illustration. Imagine a ball travelling 
 along a groove which is bounded at either end 
 by a block, and imagine, further, that when the 
 ball reaches one end of the groove it at once 
 travels back to the other end, and so goes on 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 217 
 
 indefinitely, always traversing and retraversing 
 the same path. There we have a series or 
 succession of changes. At each moment the 
 ball is altering its position, and we, in watching 
 it, are receiving a succession of varying impres- 
 sions. But we do not think of applying the 
 word development to that series of changes ; 
 for we regard them merely as recurrent phases 
 of movement, in which the fiftieth journey of 
 the ball tells us nothing more than the first had 
 told us. On the other hand, when we watch 
 the changes which happen to the seed as it 
 undergoes its life-history and becomes the plant, 
 there we unhesitatingly speak of the seed as 
 developing. Why is this ? Is it not because 
 we view each change in relation to the end or 
 goal which is to be the final outcome of all the 
 changes ? The idea of end or purpose at once 
 comes in to give meaning to the successive 
 changes which we witness, and our minds unify 
 the whole series of modifications and regard 
 them as a continuous series having relation to 
 an end, which is ultimately to be attained through 
 their succession. In the case of the seed we 
 know, of course, that other seeds have become 
 plants, and so we predict an end for this par- 
 ticular development with assurance. And we 
 
218 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 can, to some extent, formally, at any rate, define 
 what the end of the development is to be. The 
 seed, we say, is developing towards the end of 
 growing true to type, or of being perfect of its 
 kind, or of becoming a self-maintaining whole, 
 which shall then, when its own cycle of life is 
 complete, perpetuate itself in another similar 
 organism. Sometimes we cannot foresee what 
 the goal of the development is to be, or cannot 
 see it in its completeness. We cannot, for 
 instance, form any adequate conception of the 
 goal, towards which we believe that human 
 society is moving ; or, if an entirely unknown 
 seed was discovered, we could not describe in 
 any detail what the form of the mature plant 
 would be. Yet, in these cases, too, we should 
 regard the changes which occurred as move- 
 ments towards an end, and as involving ulti- 
 mately some conception of purpose, because we 
 should see, almost so soon as the development 
 began, that the changes were not merely quanti- 
 tative changes in bulk, but qualitative changes, 
 by which the organism took on new character- 
 istics and became richer in content. We should 
 observe that " increasing series of results " which 
 Lotze mentions as one of the chief features of 
 growth. Nor should we be content to regard 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 219 
 
 the changes as due merely to the influence of 
 external conditions upon the organism, but we 
 should attribute to the organism a power of 
 spontaneous development, and view it, as in 
 some measure a self-maintaining whole, reacting 
 in its own appropriate manner to the influences 
 of the environment. Development, then, differs 
 from change in that it is change determined 
 towards an end, and we seem compelled to 
 interpret it in teleological terms. If we re- 
 move all thought of any goal to be reached by 
 the developing organism, development appears 
 to have no meaning for our minds. Is it true, 
 however, that development always shows move- 
 ment towards greater complexity and greater 
 richness of content ? Are there not changes in 
 the life of organisms which result in simplifica- 
 tions of structure, so that the forms become, as 
 we say, degenerate ? Does not history show 
 epochs of retrogression and decline? Diffi- 
 culties such as these are really questions of 
 definition. The large process of evolution cer- 
 tainly includes movements in both directions, to- 
 wards greater complexity and greater simplicity, 
 and development is nowhere always unilinear. 
 We may refuse to apply the term development 
 to such retrograde movements if we insist upon 
 
220 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 making increase in complexity the main charac- 
 teristic of development. Yet, even in a process 
 of degeneration there still remain the reference 
 to an end, and the realisation in the degenerate 
 conditions of tendencies which in the more 
 complete state were unrealised, and this would 
 seem to bring the process within the general 
 conception of development. It remains true, 
 however, that our criterion of development is 
 usually taken from those instances of it which 
 reveal a gradual unfolding of what is more 
 complex and more full of meaning. Increase 
 of significance, and movement towards an end, 
 these two characteristics are the essential ele- 
 ments in our conception. The movement to- 
 wards greater fulness is, however, accompanied 
 by some measure of loss. What is vital in the 
 past is taken up and re -embodied in the new 
 stage upon which the development enters ; what 
 is not vital and essential is left behind. The 
 snake casts its slough, the butterfly emerges 
 from the chrysalis, the man outgrows the ideas 
 of childhood, the earlier formulations of a truth 
 may be imperfect, and the truth may have to 
 be re-expressed. Yet, in all these cases, what 
 is discarded is not of intrinsic importance. It 
 is but the temporary expression of the living 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 221 
 
 principle which is ever forcing its way to fuller 
 manifestation of itself, which, as it nears the 
 goal of the process, ever more and more reveals 
 its true nature in all its concreteness. We may- 
 apply to a development the thought which under- 
 lies the song sung by Ariel in The Tempest : — 
 
 Full fathom five thy father lies ; 
 
 Of his bones are coral made ; 
 Those are pearls that were his eyes : 
 
 Nothing of him that doth fade, 
 But doth suffer a sea-change 
 Into something rich and strange. 
 
 Change determined towards an end, which re- 
 veals the immanent purpose and meaning of the 
 whole movement, is the first thought, which our 
 analysis of the idea of development brings to 
 light. 
 
 (d) From this point the transition is both 
 natural and easy to the second canon for in- 
 terpreting development, the canon, that it is in 
 the end and not in the beginning of the process 
 that the true explanation of the development 
 lies. The oak unfolds the nature and meaning 
 of the acorn. You cannot understand the signi- 
 ficance of the seed except by reference to the 
 mature plant into which it grows. A movement 
 
222 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 in history must exhaust itself and reach its final 
 stage if you are to appreciate all that it implies. 
 There is more in the end than there was in 
 the beginning ; or, as we should perhaps rather 
 say, what we describe as being potential and 
 implicit in the germ becomes explicit as the 
 development proceeds. Thus each stage in a 
 development is prophetic and anticipatory of 
 the succeeding stage. Its outlook is towards 
 the future ; it is pregnant with issues that are 
 yet to be. 
 
 Such an interpretation of development seems 
 sufficiently obvious. Yet there are not wanting 
 thinkers who reverse this method of reasoning, 
 and maintain that it is the beginning of a de- 
 velopment which gives you the true canon for 
 interpreting the whole. Analyse the beginning, 
 we are told, discover the elements and factors 
 there present, and we shall have all that we 
 need for understanding the movement. The 
 apparent greater fulness of the later stages is, 
 it is argued, something which may be neglected, 
 as contributing nothing which is of any import- 
 ance to the general meaning of the process. 
 This is the attitude adopted by the materialist, 
 who, starting with matter as the only reality, 
 and then finding himself confronted by the fact 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 223 
 
 of mind, treats consciousness as a mere by- 
 product of material factors, which may be 
 neglected in the final construction of his cold, 
 dead, soulless universe. It is the attitude of 
 the revolutionary reformer, who would sweep 
 away at one stroke all the complex products of 
 a long social development, would wipe clean the 
 slate, and rebuild society on the ruins of its dead 
 past. In theology the same phenomenon is 
 witnessed. You hear men crying out for the 
 abolition of all dogma, and urging a return to 
 the simple ethical teaching of the founder of 
 Christianity, on the ground that the technical 
 definitions of the theologian are simply so much 
 meaningless accretion, like the weeds which 
 gather about the sides of the unused boat. But 
 such an attitude seems to be a negation of what 
 development implies, and empties the whole 
 conception of its meaning. 
 
 Dr. E. Caird in his Evolution of Religion l 
 well illustrates the procedure of these rival 
 schools of thought. He instances religion, and 
 the method of defining it. As we survey the 
 field of religious phenomena we find religion 
 existing in various degrees of development. 
 
 Volume i., second lecture. 
 
224 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 At the lower end of the scale is the savage 
 with his crude superstition ; at the upper end 
 is Christianity ; while midway between the two 
 are innumerable forms of belief and worship, 
 existing in every degree of development. The 
 history of religion has been, in part at any rate, 
 the history of progress from the lower to the 
 higher types. When we ask, how, in the face 
 of this varied subject-matter, we are to define 
 religion, we meet with two answers. On the 
 one hand, we are told, that, since religion has 
 developed, we must seek for our definition of 
 its true nature in the highest known form of it, 
 for it is in the supreme type that the meaning 
 of the whole evolution lies. On the other hand, 
 we are bidden, if we would do justice in our 
 definition to all the existing forms of religion, 
 to seek out the common element in all the 
 forms, that something which is characteristic of 
 the dim gropings of the savage as well as of the 
 reasonable faith of the Christian. This common 
 element, present in all stages of the develop- 
 ment, is the key to the meaning of the whole. 
 But, if we adopt this latter view, we are con- 
 fronted with two difficulties. First, we are 
 neglecting the specific qualities of the highest 
 form of religion. Christianity is clearly some- 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 225 
 
 thing far nobler and higher than the superstition 
 of the savage. Its glory lies just in the fact 
 that it has outgrown those lower and earlier 
 forms ; and to define it in terms of that lower 
 element, which is common to it and the lower 
 forms, is surely to do it scant justice. To sub- 
 stitute for a belief in the Fatherhood of God the 
 belief in dependence on some higher power or 
 powers, vaguely conceived, or regarded as cruel 
 and capricious, is plainly to be unfair to Christi- 
 anity. Secondly, we are neglecting the essential 
 fact, that the lower forms of religion have de- 
 veloped, and so must themselves be regarded 
 as capable and prophetic of higher achievements 
 in the future. To insist on the common element 
 in all religions, as expressing the essential mean- 
 ing of religion, is to forget that religion is, by 
 its very nature, a progressive thing, which must 
 be judged and interpreted in the light of its 
 possibilities and its capacity for further growth. 
 At the same time, it would hardly be right to 
 define savage religions in terms of Christianity, 
 for, obviously, they are Christian only by a very 
 liberal interpretation of their possibilities of de- 
 velopment. The truth is, as Dr. Caird points 
 out, that, though the meaning of a development 
 
 is to be found in the end reached by the de* 
 15 
 
226 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 velopment, yet, for the full interpretation of it, 
 you must read the process both backwards and 
 forwards. Light is thrown upon the movement 
 from both ends of the scale. And, if a definition 
 of religion is possible, we must seek for such 
 definition, in terms of some principle or con- 
 ception, which is itself capable of progressive 
 enrichment as it is applied to the successive 
 stages of the development. We might, for 
 example, adopt some such provisional definition 
 of religion as the following : " Religion is mans 
 appropriation of God's revelation of Himself". 
 This is not, of course, offered as being in any 
 way an exact or adequate definition (to find a 
 definition of religion is no easy task), but rather 
 as an attempt to discover some illustration of 
 the principle for which we are contending. 
 Here we have a conception which acquires a 
 growing meaning when it is applied to the 
 higher types of religion. The savage appro- 
 priates God's revelation in meagre fashion. He 
 enters into some kind of relationship and com- 
 munion with a power which he conceives as 
 superior to himself. The Christian does the 
 same, but his appropriation is richer and com- 
 pleter, and he believes that, as his experience 
 widens, it may become yet more complete. To 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 227 
 
 define, however, is not the important thing. 
 Definitions are always inadequate to the com- 
 plexity and concreteness of their object. Least 
 of all are definitions satisfactory when you are 
 dealing with something which develops and 
 alters as it grows. For at every moment the 
 growing thing leaves its past behind it and 
 emerges into fuller existence. You can never 
 arrest its movement. If you seize upon any 
 single stage of its history, and try to define it in 
 terms of that stage, you find, when you have 
 finished your task, that the object of your defini- 
 tion has become something other than it was. 
 It is the same, yet it is different ; it has, in its 
 growth, transcended its earlier condition and 
 passed beyond it, and your definition is not 
 adequate to its present content. But though 
 to define may be relatively unimportant, what 
 is important, is to remember that the earlier 
 stages of a development do not provide us with 
 material which will enable us to interpret the 
 whole movement. It is to the end that we 
 must look, to the final stage, which makes ex- 
 plicit the meaning of the earlier stages. For 
 from the end light is reflected back upon the 
 beginning. The beginning takes on a new 
 glory, and we see it full of the possibilities 
 
228 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 which later growths have made actual. We 
 recall, in this connection, Browning's lines in 
 Paracelsus. The poet is speaking of the human 
 faculties of power, love, knowledge, and says : — 
 
 Hints and previsions of which faculties, 
 
 Are strewn confusedly everywhere about 
 
 The inferior natures, and all lead up higher, 
 
 All shape out dimly the superior race, 
 
 The heir of hopes too fair to turn out false, 
 
 And man appears at last. So far the seal 
 
 Is put on life ; one stage of being complete, 
 
 One scheme wound up : and from the grand result 
 
 A supplementary reflux of light, 
 
 Illustrates all the inferior grades, explains 
 
 Each back step in the circle. Not alone 
 
 For their possessor dawn those qualities, 
 
 But the new glory mixes with the heaven 
 
 And earth ; man, once descried, imprints for ever 
 
 His presence on all lifeless things : the winds 
 
 Are henceforth voices, wailing or a shout, 
 
 A querulous mutter, or a quick, gay laugh, 
 
 Never a senseless gust now man is born. 
 
 The herded pines commune, and have deep thoughts. 
 
 Here we have expressed one side of the truth, 
 that, in the light of the present, the whole past 
 receives new meaning. And a little later in the 
 same poem we see the other side of the truth, 
 that the present itself is to be interpreted as 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 229 
 
 full of possibilities which the future will make 
 actual : — 
 
 All tended to mankind, 
 And, man produced, all has its end thus far : 
 But in completed man begins anew 
 A tendency to God. Prognostics told 
 Man's near approach ; so in man's self arise 
 August anticipations, symbols, types, 
 Of a dim splendour ever on before 
 In that eternal circle run by life. 
 
 (c) The third canon > for interpreting the idea 
 of development is, that the value or significance 
 of a thing is independent of its origin or of the 
 method by which it came to be. We have 
 already referred to this canon, but its importance 
 is such that no excuse is needed for mentioning 
 it once more. Origin is no test of validity. 
 The worth of my personality is not now affected 
 by the fact that once I existed as a microscopic, 
 unconscious cell. The present value for my 
 thought and emotion of a moral act is not one 
 whit diminished, even though you could prove 
 (which I should hesitate to allow) that the sense 
 
 1 This canon may perhaps be regarded as identical with 
 our second canon. The second canon certainly includes it 
 by implication ; yet, for purposes of exposition, it may be 
 treated as a distinct principle. 
 
230 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 of duty has slowly arisen out of impulses which 
 once had no moral colour. Social institutions 
 do not lose their significance because we are 
 able to trace the development of society from 
 the primitive horde. A lowly beginning can- 
 not discredit a noble ending. We must insist 
 strongly upon this, because the idea of evolution 
 is so often used, as we have seen, to depreciate 
 much that we think of value and importance. 
 Religion, for example, is in many quarters 
 belittled by tracing its origin to dreams or 
 ghost-worship. We are asked to believe, that, 
 because it arose (if it did so arise) out of these 
 crude beginnings, therefore it is to-day no more 
 significant for us than it was for our primitive 
 ancestors, and that all the added content which 
 it has received in the course of its development 
 has made no clearer for our thought the meaning 
 of its essential principle. A good instance of 
 this method of treatment is to be found in some 
 evolutionary theories about remorse. Remorse 
 is one of the most striking of ethical phenomena. 
 It is charged with deep, moral significance, and 
 is a powerful agency in the making of character. 
 Now we are told, that, if we would appraise this 
 emotion at its true worth, we must go back to 
 the very early days of society, when man lived 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 231 
 
 less as an individual than as a member of a 
 tribe. The most important fact about man then 
 was his tribal consciousness. He thought of 
 himself almost exclusively as a member of the 
 society to which he belonged, and his actions 
 were directed to the good of the tribe. In 
 course of time the sense of his own individuality 
 developed, and there arose the inevitable con- 
 flict between a self-seeking impulse and one 
 which had as its end the welfare of his society. 
 In a moment of temptation he chose the former, 
 but, no sooner had he done so, than the stronger 
 and more enduring social impulse reasserted 
 itself and issued in the disquiet of remorse. 
 All further yieldings produced the same results, 
 and man's life became a battlefield where the 
 fight was between the more permanent social 
 tendencies within him and the weaker, though 
 temporarily dominant, individualistic impulses. 1 
 Now an analysis of remorse to-day reveals the 
 presence of many other ingredients besides that 
 of a conflict between a tribal and a self-regarding 
 factor. Thoughts of a violated moral order, to 
 which homage is due, fill the mind. The sense 
 of sin, with its further reference to the will of a 
 
 1 See W. K. Clifford's Lectures and Essays, " The Scien- 
 tific Basis of Morals," pp. 290-3. 
 
232 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Holy God, casts its dark shadow on the scene. 
 The quality of the emotion is profoundly changed. 
 Are these new elements, which have arisen in 
 the course of man's ethical development, to be 
 disregarded ? Can we treat remorse merely as 
 the presence of a stronger tendency reasserting 
 itself after a temporary defeat by a weaker one ? 
 Is strength a moral quality at all ? If so, then 
 you might equally maintain, that remorse is to 
 be found in the case of a great sculptor con- 
 demned to manual labour in the fields when his 
 whole soul is afire with the yearning to create. 
 The artistic tendency in him is the strongest 
 thing in his nature. It will be perpetually rising 
 up in him and striving to assert itself. But can 
 you fairly compare his emotions, the uneasiness 
 and irritation which he experiences, with the 
 anguish of the writer of Psalm li., when he cries 
 out : " Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned, 
 and done this evil in Thy sight " ? Would you 
 regard the sublime prophecies of Amos and 
 Isaiah as void of meaning, because the earliest 
 form of Hebrew prophecy had kinship with the 
 frenzy of the dervish ; or treat the masterpieces 
 of Pheidias and Praxiteles as less a true expres- 
 sion of the soul of the sculptor, and the possi- 
 bilities of his art, than the rude archaic creations 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 233 
 
 which marked the first attempt of the Greek 
 genius to embody ideas in wood and stone? 
 Surely, in our estimate of any development, we 
 must take account of the qualitative differences 
 which reveal themselves as the development 
 proceeds. They are real, and they cannot be 
 discredited by showing that once they did not 
 exist. Potentially and ideally they did exist, 
 and it is the ideal meaning of a development 
 which is its true meaning. Our judgments of 
 value are not affected because we happen to 
 look at things from a genetic and historical point 
 of view. 
 
 Nor must we allow ourselves to be deceived 
 by the fact that in a development the transition 
 from one stage to another may be effected by 
 very gradual steps. The distinction between 
 A and B does not cease to exist because A is 
 connected with B by a series of intermediate 
 stages, C D E F, which make a complete bridge 
 of transition between the two. However minute 
 the gradations may be between two points in a 
 series, yet, if we compare the two points, we 
 shall see that they differ, and the importance of 
 the differences between them is not affected by 
 the fact that they have been brought about 
 
234 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 gradually. We have only to pass over a suffi- 
 cient number of intermediate links in the chain 
 to be aware that differences have emerged, and 
 that a new significance has been given to the 
 movement. The idea of evolution has certainly 
 tended to obliterate the hard and fast lines of 
 distinction which we were once accustomed to 
 draw in our mapping out of the world's history ; 
 and the result for some minds has been that 
 they have grown confused, and have failed to 
 see that the significance of the final result of any 
 process is not reduced because that result has 
 been brought about gradually. We may men- 
 tion here, in passing, that the maxim natura 
 nihil facit per saltum is by no means necessarily 
 of universal application. We have already seen 
 that there is a growing belief among biologists 
 that all organic changes have not been brought 
 about through the preservation and accumula- 
 tion of minute variations. Just as there may 
 have been epochs in the past when protoplasm 
 was more unstable than it is at present and so 
 was capable of great and sudden modifications ; 
 just as the uniformitarian hypothesis in geology 
 may need to be supplemented by the catas- 
 trophic ; so everywhere, when we are discussing 
 a development, we must allow for the possibility 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 235 
 
 of changes being both rapid and large. Cer- 
 tainly, in the sphere of human history, enormous 
 modifications of the course of development have 
 been brought about suddenly by the action of 
 vigorous, creative personalities. But whether 
 the observed changes be rapid or slow nothing 
 can alter the truth of our main contention, that 
 validity is not affected by origin. 
 
 It is the recognition of this principle which 
 may be said to mark one of the differences 
 between philosophic inquiry and the inquiry of 
 science or history. The special sciences in- 
 vestigate each their own region of fact, frame 
 and verify their explanatory hypotheses ; and, 
 if the science is one which admits of the appli- 
 cation to its subject-matter of this conception 
 of development, the science will endeavour to 
 present its facts in a serial order, and to discover 
 the law of their evolution. The historian in 
 like manner, though with less success, because 
 of the greater complexity of the subject which 
 he is investigating, adopts the genetic method, 
 and traces out the development of institutions, 
 polities, forms of government, and of the ideas 
 which they embody, thus seeking to give order 
 and unity to the tangled mass of fact which 
 confronts him. But philosophy is primarily 
 
236 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 interested in an inquiry of a different kind. 
 She does not, in the first instance, ask how 
 things have come to be, but rather, given any 
 fact, what is its meaning and significance. How 
 is it related to the great system of all things ? 
 What is its place and importance in the final 
 unity of reality ? What is its ideal significance ? 
 She takes from science and history the results 
 of their several inquiries, but she does not rest 
 in them. She wants to know whether there is 
 not more in the facts than either the man of 
 science or the historian realise. She asks, 
 whether in the very methods by which they have 
 arrived at their conclusions, there are not con- 
 cealed certain assumptions or presuppositions, 
 which, when they are made plain, give a new 
 and richer meaning to the facts under investiga- 
 tion. Let us take, as an example of the difference 
 in attitude between science and philosophy, the 
 development of morality. Ethics, as a historical 
 science, is concerned to trace out the origin 
 and growth of moral ideas and sentiments, to 
 show how our complex ethical conceptions of 
 to-day have arisen out of conceptions which 
 were once simpler, and which deepened and 
 grew more full of content as society advanced 
 in civilisation. And then, pursuing her inquiry 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 237 
 
 beyond the frontiers of humanity, she goes on 
 to discover the germs of ethical ideas in the 
 animal kingdom, with which man has blood- 
 relationship, and tries to find there, or even in 
 the sub-animal world, the presence of tendencies 
 or forces which foreshadow the morality of 
 human society ; thus laying the foundation of 
 the moral in the non-moral, and deriving the 
 ethical from the unethical. She hands up her 
 results to philosophy and is met by the retort, 
 that it is impossible so to derive morality from 
 the non-moral, that no bridge can span the 
 chasm between the two. But then, there is the 
 plain evidence that human life is derived from 
 an animal ancestry, and there is the growing 
 conviction that there are no gaps at all in the 
 story of the world's development, but only in- 
 numerable transitions, by which you pass from 
 simple to complex, from lower to higher, in 
 physical and spiritual spheres alike. The philo- 
 sopher would even be ready, for the sake of 
 argument, to meet the ardent evolutionist, and 
 admit the existence of a hypothetical series of 
 anthropoid ancestors of man, each of whom grew 
 gradually more and more aware of the meaning 
 of morality, of duty, and obligation, and the 
 ethically higher ; and yet he would still maintain 
 
238 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 that there was no passage from the non-moral 
 to the moral. For, at whatever moment in 
 the historical development there dawned in any 
 mind the first conception of an end that ought 
 to be, and a law that ought to be obeyed, there, 
 says the philosopher, you have an absolutely 
 new phenomenon, unlike anything which had 
 gone before it. And it can be explained only 
 by its own appropriate categories. Before the 
 emergence of this new kind you had a tendency 
 towards an end ; now you have a recognition of 
 an end that ought to be pursued, and there is no 
 common measure between a tendency and an 
 11 ought ". There is a logical gap, a gap for 
 interpretation and for philosophy, which in- 
 quires into the meaning of things, and this gap 
 remains even though you make your historical 
 record as complete and continuous as you will. 
 Or, once again, let us suppose that it is the 
 evolution of the mind which is under investiga- 
 tion. We are interested, let us say, in compara- 
 tive psychology and are trying to trace out how 
 mind has arisen in the race, how it develops in 
 the human infant, and how in lower degrees it 
 exists in the animals. We wish to set forth in 
 due order the whole ascending series of mental 
 phenomena, crowned by the self-consciousness 
 
THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT 239 
 
 of man. Philosophy accepts the results of our 
 investigation but makes a similar statement, that 
 for self-conscious mind no origin can be found, 
 because between self-consciousness and what is 
 not self-conscious there is an impassable gulf. 
 The two are distinct in kind, and each has a 
 distinct significance. For thought there is no 
 transition between the two, even though, as a 
 matter of historical sequence, finite self-conscious 
 beings may have appeared upon the earth at a 
 definite point of time. Philosophy is concerned 
 with estimating the place of mind in the total 
 world-scheme, and her inquiry is not a historical 
 but a logical or metaphysical inquiry. Mind, 
 for her, is the prius of all being. Things exist 
 only for thought, and you cannot therefore 
 derive from the phenomenal order that which 
 is the very condition and presupposition of there 
 being a phenomenal order at all. As we have 
 already said, when science constructs her story 
 of the universe, she is apt to forget that all her 
 hypotheses, all her tabulation, the whole fabric 
 of her activity, is the work of mind. Now you 
 cannot trace the origin of mind from the pheno- 
 menal conditions which mind herself constructs. 
 Before there was any human consciousness at 
 all there was an orderly world, and that world 
 
240 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 must have been thought by an eternal mind. 
 The world-process cannot be made to yield 
 mind as a product, unless mind was present 
 there all the while ; not, of course, your finite 
 mind and mine, but an eternal mind in which 
 we all share, and which is the great presupposi- 
 tion of all existence. The problem of philo- 
 sophy, then, differs essentially from the problems 
 of science or history ; and so unfamiliar to the 
 common mind is the philosophic problem and 
 method, that philosophy is often held to be a 
 foolish and fanciful pursuit. But a little reflec- 
 tion will disabuse the mind of that prejudice. 
 The philosopher is certainly a star-gazer, for he 
 desires to find the central sun whose influence 
 governs all the movements of the spheres. But, 
 while he gazes on the stars, his feet are firm on 
 earth. They are just facts, hard, concrete facts, 
 in which he is interested ; only, behind the fact 
 he sees the meaning of the fact, its worth, its 
 ideal importance ; behind the historical and 
 temporal processes of becoming he sees the 
 eternal significance of that which changes not 
 and can never become. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 XT TE have endeavoured to indicate in outline 
 * * what general attitude we should adopt 
 in examining any development, whether of the 
 world-process as a whole, or in any smaller 
 department of change. But we shall not have 
 completed our investigation until we have come 
 to a decision upon a very important point. We 
 have to reach, if we can, some criterion or 
 standard for testing the worth and appropriate- 
 ness of the successive stages in a development. 
 Upon what grounds do we regard some of these 
 stages as a departure from what we conceive to 
 be the true line of evolution, and others as con- 
 tributing to the essential meaning of the process ? 
 This is clearly an important question, and one 
 which calls for an answer. 
 
 Now, in order that we may understand the 
 nature of the problem before us we must draw 
 16 (241) 
 
242 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 a distinction between developments in Nature 
 and developments in history. With the emer- 
 gence of man upon the stage of the world there 
 came into operation new factors ; or, if some of 
 these factors may have existed in a more rudi- 
 mentary form in the sub-human sphere, in man 
 they received, at any rate, new significance and 
 force. The factors, to which reference is made, 
 are freedom and morality, or the presence of 
 ideals consciously recognised and followed. In 
 human history the process of development is in 
 part qualified by the intervention of man's ac- 
 tivity ; and this activity, if it is to be rightly 
 interpreted, must be, at least to some extent, 
 construed in terms of freedom. Man can, in 
 some measure, freely and genuinely determine 
 the line which the development of his religion, 
 his institutions, his political life shall take. He 
 can choose his course of action. He certainly 
 possesses the consciousness that he is free. He 
 regards his actions as his own, and himself as 
 responsible for them ; and, if he is deceived, 
 then it becomes difficult to give any satisfactory 
 explanation of how this universal illusion arose. 
 What follows from this belief in human freedom, 
 and in the existence of ideals which a man feels 
 that he ought to — not must — pursue ? Surely 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 243 
 
 the conclusion, that not all which has occurred 
 in past human history is either right or neces- 
 sary. There has been development, and, on 
 the whole, viewed broadly, it may have been 
 in the right direction ; but there may also have 
 been much in it which ought not to have been. 
 The development may have been distorted and 
 warped. Instead of advance there may have 
 been retrogression, which might have been 
 avoided ; and the development need not, in all 
 its stages, have been necessary or true. The 
 moment you pass away from the region where 
 tendency operates, where movement is to be 
 construed in terms of a driving force from be- 
 hind, and find yourself in a world where there 
 is free choice and a deliberate selection of ideals, 
 then any development becomes at once a subject 
 for criticism ; and it is open to any one to main- 
 tain that certain stages in it are a departure 
 from the true nature and meaning of the evolu- 
 tion. There are those to-day who would regard 
 the world-process, in all its stages, as the neces- 
 sary unfolding of some great, immanent purpose, 
 and each step in the development as an essential 
 moment in the life of God, so that whatever has 
 been, or is, could not have been otherwise. 
 But such a theory appears to involve the nega- 
 
244 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 tion of what we mean by human personality. 
 History is more than a logical or necessitated 
 movement. It is a sphere where great issues 
 are freely determined by the clash and collision 
 of human wills. On the theory, which we are 
 combating, what account are you to give of 
 moral evil ? Is such evil a necessary mode of 
 the Divine existence? Are the crimes that 
 stain the page of history merely the discords, 
 which, when taken together, make up the uni- 
 versal harmony ? That a great purpose is being 
 worked out through the ages, and that the 
 movement of the world is tending towards a 
 goal, we must all believe ; but we cannot exalt 
 God's control of the process at the expense of 
 human initiative, or do violence to the moral 
 condemnation which we instinctively pass upon 
 much that has happened in earlier times, or 
 that is happening now. 
 
 It will be instructive, at this point, to refer to 
 Newman's Development of Christian Doctrine. 
 We shall not discuss it from the standpoint of 
 theology, but from that of philosophy. A theo- 
 logical treatment of the work would carry us 
 into regions lying entirely outside the scope of 
 these lectures. Newman was, perhaps, the first 
 to introduce the idea of development, as a formal 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 245 
 
 principle, into English theology ; and he was 
 also the first to suggest any criterion for testing 
 the character of a development. His book is, 
 of course, a personal apology for his abandon- 
 ment of Anglicanism and adoption of Romanism. 
 It is an attempt to justify a step in the develop- 
 ment of his own life to which he was driven by 
 a mixture of many motives ; but the interest of 
 the volume extends far beyond the personal 
 element in it. It is the first attempt to construe, 
 critically and analytically, the conception of 
 development as applied to theology. In the 
 Church of Rome Newman found a historical 
 continuity which he failed to find in any other 
 Church. This at once appealed to him, for he 
 was looking for a Church which should be at 
 once united and linked to primitive times. Yet, 
 how could he justify the changes in doctrine and 
 practice which seemed to separate the Roman 
 Church from the undivided Church of primitive 
 ages ? Continuity the Roman Church possessed. 
 Could it be said faithfully to reproduce the tem- 
 per and teaching of the early Church ? Newman 
 answered that question by suggesting that there 
 was such a thing as development in doctrine. 
 There is development in Nature. The bird is 
 very different from the egg out of which it has 
 
246 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 come, yet it is one and the same life, which has 
 developed without undergoing any breach of 
 continuity. May there not be a similar evolution 
 in theology by which great transformations of 
 doctrine and practice may be achieved without 
 any loss of identity in the Church which exhibits 
 all these changes? It was through the applica- 
 tion of the idea of development that Newman 
 solved the problem which he had set himself, or 
 which had been set for him by the current of 
 events on which his life was sailing. But, if we 
 examine Newman's treatment of the conception, 
 not from the standpoint of a Protestant theology, 
 but simply in the light of what, in other regions 
 of history, a development means, we shall find 
 ourselves compelled to criticise it somewhat 
 severely. The central criticism which we pass 
 upon it is, that the doctrinal development, which 
 he describes, is not a free, historical develop- 
 ment. It is one which proceeds under the control 
 of an authority which decides between the modi- 
 fications which occur, and determines which may 
 be accepted and which are to be rejected. These 
 are his own words : " This is the doctrine of 
 the infallibility of the Church ; for by infallibility 
 I , suppose is meant the power of deciding whether 
 this, that, and a third, and any number of theo- 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 247 
 
 logical or ethical statements are true". 1 The 
 development unfolds under the eye of an au- 
 thority, conceived as infallible, a theory which 
 clearly removes this particular development out 
 of reach of the ordinary forces which regulate 
 any other development in history. The develop- 
 ment takes place in history, but it is not a 
 historical development. Newman's theory fails 
 to do justice to the essential nature of historical 
 development. As Dr. Fairbairn puts it, 2 he 
 attempts to treat a historical development as if 
 it were a logical one, in which the later stages 
 were necessarily implicit in the earlier, and un- 
 folded themselves in due sequence by a rigor- 
 ously determined movement. History is called 
 in to give support to a theory of development 
 which is conceived independently of a true study 
 of history. So soon as we begin to investigate 
 the complete, historical movement of Christian- 
 ity, we find that it is impossible to rule out as 
 "corruptions" all developments which have 
 taken other lines than those followed by the 
 Roman development. The word "corruption" 
 was for Newman the opposite of development. 
 
 1 Development of Christian Doctrine, ninth edition, chap, 
 ii., 2, sect. 4. 
 
 2 Christ in Modern Theology, div. i., chap, i., sect. 2. 
 
248 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 He defines it as " the breaking up of life pre- 
 paratory to its termination," 1 or as " a develop- 
 ment in that very stage in which it ceases to 
 illustrate, and begins to disturb, the acquisitions 
 gained in its previous history ". 2 " This resolu- 
 tion of a body into its component parts is the 
 stage before its dissolution ; it begins when life 
 has reached its perfection, and it is the sequel, 
 or rather the continuation of that process to- 
 wards perfection, being at the same time the 
 reversal and undoing of what went before." 3 
 The non- Roman developments show no sign 
 of tending to decay and self-destruction. Many 
 of them are full of vitality and pregnant with 
 great possibilities for the future. Is it conceiv- 
 able that they contribute nothing to the essential 
 meaning of Christianity ? 
 
 Newman failed to realise with sufficient clear- 
 ness the fact, that Christianity was introduced 
 into a world which was already rich with exist- 
 ing civilisations, systems of thought and belief, 
 long-continued habitudes and customs. It made 
 no attempt to blot out all this work of previous 
 
 1 Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 17. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 199. 
 
 3 Ibid u pp. 170, 171. 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 249 
 
 centuries, but came rather as a new germinating 
 principle, which was to operate among these 
 already existing forces. This was the rich en- 
 vironment in which the new seed was planted ; 
 and, like any organism, whether plant or animal, 
 the seed must take some colour from its sur- 
 roundings. Christianity proved its power, as 
 time went on, by showing itself capable of 
 assimilating from the various environments, in 
 which it found itself, whatever vital nutriment 
 they had to give. But the result was, that the 
 evolution of the religion was not everywhere 
 uniform or the same. Indeed, one cannot see 
 how it could have been so. If it was to be, as we 
 believe, the one, universal religion, its develop- 
 ment must exhibit variations corresponding 
 to the differences of national life and thought 
 and temper. Only in a uniform environ- 
 ment can you expect any measure of uniform 
 development. If you take a garden plant and 
 put it in a desert it will change its character. 
 Again, the richer the content of the germ, the 
 greater are its possibilities of varying. New- 
 man, then, we may say, did not make enough 
 allowance for the influence of the environment 
 upon the organism of Christianity in deter- 
 mining its lines of growth. Nor does he 
 
2SO DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 seem to have seen that his own theory of an 
 infallible authority, sitting as arbiter over the 
 development of doctrine, was itself a develop- 
 ment. We may well ask with Dr. Fairbairn 
 how that, which is itself an exhibition of the 
 law of development, can be used as the final 
 criterion of what development means. 1 
 
 We need not, however, dwell longer upon 
 the fallacious character of Newman's theory. 
 Our object in referring to the theory was not 
 primarily to criticise it, but rather to gather 
 from it some suggestions for the discovery of 
 criteria or canons with which to test a develop- 
 ment. That we need these canons is clear, 
 unless we are prepared to allow that every stage 
 in any historical development is a strictly neces- 
 sary and essential part of the evolution. Now 
 Newman suggests seven principles for testing 
 a development and for distinguishing between a 
 development and a corruption. They are as 
 follows : — 
 
 i. Preservation of type, " suggested by the 
 analogy of physical growth," in which the 
 " adult animal has the same make as it had on 
 
 1 Christ in Modern Theology, p. 33. See the whole of 
 chap. i. 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 251 
 
 its birth," x the limbs of the man being larger 
 than, yet the same as, those of the infant. 
 u Unity of type becomes so much the surer 
 guarantee of the healthiness and soundness of 
 developments when it is persistently preserved 
 in spite of their number or importance." 
 
 » 1 
 
 2. Continuity of principles. — In national life, 
 for example, if there is an abandonment of the 
 great principles which characterise the national 
 existence, such as love of freedom or justice, 
 there you have a sign of corruption ; but if they 
 are preserved then you may be sure that the 
 development is a true one. 
 
 3. Power of assimilation, that is, a power on 
 the part of the developing organism, be it idea, 
 or plant, or body of doctrines, to grow, by in- 
 corporating into itself material from outside, and 
 by using what is so absorbed to promote its 
 own more healthy development. 
 
 4. Logical sequence. — M There is a certain 
 continuous advance and determinate path which 
 belong to the history of a doctrine, policy or 
 
 1 Development of Christian Doctrine, pp. 171, 172. 
 ».#*£, p. 178. 
 
252 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 institution, and which impresses upon the com- 
 mon sense of mankind that what it ultimately 
 becomes is the issue of what it was at first." l 
 An analysis, therefore, of the later stages of a 
 true development will reveal that they are the 
 natural outcome of the earlier stages. This 
 would equally apply to the later stages of a 
 corruption. The final degeneration of a char- 
 acter would be seen to be the natural fruit of 
 seeds of evil which had effected lodgment in 
 the life in earlier days. 
 
 5. Anticipation of its future, where, on ana- 
 lysis, one can discern in the early stages of a 
 development hints of what is found later. " In- 
 stances of a development which is to come, 
 though vague and isolated, may occur from the 
 very first, though a lapse of time be necessary 
 to bring them to perfection." 
 
 » 2 
 
 6. Conservative action upon its past, — In a 
 development you have " a tendency conservative 
 of what has gone before it," whereas, in a cor- 
 ruption, what was gained in the past is dissipated 
 and lost. " A true development, then, may be 
 
 1 Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 195. 
 
 */W£, p. 195. 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 253 
 
 described as one which is conservative of the 
 course of antecedent developments, being really 
 those antecedents and something besides them ; 
 it is an addition which illustrates, not obscures, 
 corroborates, not corrects, the body of thought 
 from which it proceeds ; and this is its charac- 
 teristic as contrasted with a corruption." 1 
 
 7. Chronic vigour, — "While a corruption is 
 distinguished from decay by its energetic action, 
 it is distinguished from a development by its 
 transitory character." 2 Corruption cannot be 
 long-lived, and so duration may be taken to be 
 a test of a true development ; not a duration, 
 however, of mere immobility, but one in which 
 the life remains vigorous and progressive. 
 
 Such are the tests which Newman would 
 apply to a historical development, whether of 
 idea, institution, or body of doctrines (and 
 Christianity is all of these), in order to decide 
 if it be a true or a false development. They 
 are certainly very suggestive, and they lose 
 none of their suggestiveness even though, in 
 other hands, an application of them to the same 
 
 1 Development of Christian Doctrine, p. 200. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 205. 
 
254 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 subject-matter might yield very different results. 
 To some extent the seven tests overlap, and 
 they can be simplified and reduced in number. 
 For example, preservation of type, continuity 
 of principles, and logical sequence, seem to 
 amount to very much the same thing. You 
 wish to prove, let us say, that the later stages 
 in a development are the true and natural out- 
 come of the earlier. If you decide that they are, 
 you can express your conclusion by saying that 
 the original type has been preserved through 
 all the changes ; or that the original principles 
 have remained continuously operative ; or that 
 the sequence of stages has followed the natural 
 order, which you would have anticipated had 
 you analysed what was in the germ. I should 
 feel inclined, therefore, to reduce the tests to 
 three in number. 
 
 i. Preservation of type. 2. Assimilative 
 power, involving adaptability of the organism 
 to its environment. 3. Chronic vigour, or 
 vitality. The remaining tests appear to have 
 less the nature of tests than the others. " Con- 
 servative action upon the past" simply states 
 the fact, that, wherever you have growth, there 
 you have a constant process of taking up from 
 the past whatever it has to yield that is vital, 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 255 
 
 and of re-absorbing it in a new form in the 
 present. Progress consists in continuous re- 
 vision of antecedent stages. A living organism 
 is always transcending its earlier states of being. 
 ' ' Anticipation of its future " applies equally to 
 a corruption. The observer, who looked back 
 in the completed process, whether of develop- 
 ment or the reverse, would be able to detect in 
 the initial stages the germs of what emerged 
 later in fuller manifestation. 
 
 Let us now take these three tests and discuss 
 them, and, so far as we can, try to illustrate them 
 by concrete instances. 1. We will begin with 
 preservation of type, as being, not only the 
 most obvious, but also the surest criterion ; 
 though, of course, in applying this test one 
 must first determine, in any case, what one 
 considers the type to be. Let us take, as our 
 concrete examples, the development of the 
 English nation, and the development of the 
 body of Christian doctrine which deals with 
 the Person of Christ. 
 
 A nation grows and develops. It may, in 
 a very real sense, be regarded as an organism 
 which maintains its identity through a series of 
 changes. What, then, constitutes the identity 
 of a nation ? Is the English nation the same 
 
256 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 nation that it was before the Norman conquest ? 
 Has it remained true to its national character ? 
 Is its type preserved ? We have chosen for 
 investigation a comparatively simple case, be- 
 cause the history of England has been largely 
 free from those episodes of catastrophe and 
 revolution which, in other nations, have so often 
 rudely interrupted their orderly development. 
 Though we have expanded overseas yet the 
 central home of the nation remains geographic- 
 ally the same. The evolution of our language 
 has gone on by a process of gradual and natural 
 change. If we adopt Aristotle's criterion in 
 the Politics? that a state remains the same if 
 its government remains the same, then we can 
 point, since the days when constitutional gov- 
 ernment was first established, to an orderly 
 development along the lines of such govern- 
 ment. English kings, indeed, there have been, 
 who tried to impose their sole will upon the 
 nation, but, broadly speaking, it remains true, 
 that government of the people by the people 
 has been the mark of English political theory 
 from the very first. There may be signs to- 
 day that the system of party government is 
 
 1 III., 3, 6, iro\iT€Vfia &i<TTiv vf iroAircia. 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 257 
 
 giving place to government by groups, and that 
 the Cabinet is more and more usurping the con- 
 trol which in theory belongs to the representative 
 assembly ; but these are not departures from the 
 type sufficient to make us deny that, viewed 
 politically, our development has been true to 
 the original and essential principle. If we turn, 
 lastly, to the region of ideas and sentiments, 
 can we say that England has departed from the 
 ideals and characteristics which were hers origin- 
 ally ? Do we still value liberty and justice? 
 Have we the same marked capacity for admin- 
 istration, the same sense of order and control ? 
 Are we characterised by that same activity, due, 
 perhaps, to the mixture of blood that flows in 
 our veins, which, while it made our ancestors 
 great discoverers and navigators, has made us 
 great colonists ? Any one, I think, who applies 
 to the development of our English nationality 
 the test of fidelity to type would have to admit 
 that the development is a true one, and that 
 there has been a natural continuity of idea, 
 sentiment, and institution, which marks out our 
 growth as healthy and vigorous. We read the 
 beginning of the process in the light of the 
 end, and we see that the two are in natural 
 
 correlation. 
 17 
 
258 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 You have, again, a clear example of develop- 
 ment in the case of the doctrinal interpretation 
 of the Person of Christ. The Christology be- 
 comes more explicitly formulated, and is fixed 
 finally in certain definite creeds. This interpre- 
 tation of the Person of the Founder of Christi- 
 anity claims to be the natural development of 
 the statements about Christ made in the Apos- 
 tolic epistles, while they, in turn, claim to be 
 the fair and natural outcome of the impression 
 made by Christ upon the minds of the first 
 disciples, as portrayed in the Gospel records. 
 Is this a true development? That is the great 
 question at issue to-day between the upholders 
 of the humanitarian view of Christ's Person and 
 the upholders of the orthodox view, who decline 
 to interpret Him in terms of manhood alone, 
 however ideally conceived. The one school of 
 thought urges, that the apostolic construction, 
 which ultimately issued in the definitions of the 
 creeds, is the natural development of what Christ 
 said about Himself, and of the total impression 
 which He made upon the minds of His con- 
 temporaries. The other school contends that 
 Christ was a man, and that subsequent genera- 
 tions idealised His character and attributes, and 
 ultimately deified Him. Which of the two rival 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 259 
 
 parties is right? To decide the dispute it is 
 necessary to recur to the germinal source of 
 the development, to the original records of the 
 Person, work, and claims of the Founder of the 
 religion. This record has to be analysed. Its 
 authenticity must be established. The previous 
 training and the religious and intellectual outlook 
 of the writers of the record have to be investi- 
 gated, and then the later developments must be 
 read in the light of the conclusions so reached. 
 Here, of course, we fail to find agreement as to 
 the nature of the original germ. The two sets 
 of disputants differ in their views as to what 
 constitutes the type. But it is the type which 
 is by both parties conceived as the criterion of 
 the later evolution. And where, as in this in- 
 stance, the germ is a creative Personality (and 
 Christ was that, whatever view you take of 
 Him) the need for recurrence to the germ is 
 all the more apparent. Preservation of type is 
 characteristic of life. The seed of the poppy 
 develops into a poppy, the acorn grows into 
 an oak. Yet type, we must remember, is no 
 narrowly delimited conception, for every organ- 
 ism varies somewhat from every other organism. 
 There is a marked individuality about every 
 living thing. Type can only stand for a mean, 
 
26o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 round which variation occurs, and departures 
 from this mean are departures from type. To 
 what extent an organism may depart from the 
 mean, and yet remain true to type, is an inter- 
 esting problem. In botanical classifications you 
 often find that what one botanist regards as a 
 new variety another will classify under a variety 
 already known and recognised. We cannot, 
 therefore, either in the field of science or history, 
 treat type as anything rigorously fixed, though 
 our task becomes easier when we are dealing 
 with the development of a definite institution, 
 a Church, for example, with defined canons and 
 constitution ; or with the evolution of a special 
 system of ideas, which may be treated as form- 
 ing a whole, as in the case of a religion founded 
 by a single person. 
 
 2. Chronic vigour is certainly a characteristic, 
 and, therefore, may be taken as a test of a true 
 development. It is a feature of the life of any 
 organism, which, under normal circumstances, 
 continues vigorous until its appointed cycle is 
 run. Life involves incessant activity, continu- 
 ous movement, continuous creation of what is 
 new. Chronic vigour includes more than mere 
 duration ; it means growth, the putting out of 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 261 
 
 new powers, and the adoption of new forms, as 
 expressions of the underlying principle. But 
 Newman was undoubtedly right in insisting 
 upon duration as one note of a true develop- 
 ment. About a corruption or perversion of 
 type there is often abundant vigour, but it lasts 
 only for a time. The spurious vitality rapidly 
 exhausts itself, and decay sets in. Now the 
 vitality of Christianity is very remarkable. The 
 religion has undergone a fair testing on the field 
 of history. It has been long enough present 
 among other competitors to allow of its claims 
 to be the one true and final religion to be 
 thoroughly weighed and examined ; and, after 
 many processes of sifting, it has emerged 
 stronger than ever, and possessed of a vitality 
 which seems to promise for it a future of bound- 
 less growth. And, while it has endured, it has 
 continued to express itself in new forms. Its 
 history shows that " increasing series of results " 
 which is characteristic of growth. The principle 
 of nationality, again, with the sentiment which 
 corresponds to it, is proving itself extraordinarily 
 vital. Perhaps someday it may be transcended. 
 The poet's dream of "the parliament of man, 
 the federation of the world," may possibly be 
 realised. But, at present, there is no sign that 
 
262 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 the principle of nationality is exhausted. Rather 
 does it seem to grow intenser and more alive, 
 and so becomes a more dominant factor in the 
 development of human history. On the other 
 hand, let us take Judaism as an example. Once 
 vital and progressive, it is this no longer, and 
 we can trace in part the causes of its decay. 
 When, after the exile, the ritual and ceremonial 
 element in the religion was developed at the 
 expense of ■ the moral element, then its pro- 
 gressive powers were arrested. The casing or 
 shell grew so thick that the organism under- 
 neath it was crushed. It was starved to death. 
 And we can see how this development of cere- 
 monial was a departure from the true type of 
 the religion whose real strength lay in its 
 ethical monotheism. The ceremonial element 
 in Judaism was not the revealed element but was 
 part of the natural inheritance of all Semite 
 peoples, and, as such, was a mere instrument for 
 giving expression to the essential ideas which 
 formed the kernel of the religion. If Judaism 
 lives on to-day it does so only as a survival, left 
 behind on the strand w r hile the stream flows on 
 in new channels. Its duration is not accom- 
 panied by vitality. 
 
 3. Lastly, let us consider adaptability or as- 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 263 
 
 similative power. We treat them together, for 
 the one involves the other. Between organism 
 and environment there is constant interchange. 
 The environment stimulates the organism, which 
 in its turn reacts upon the environment, by 
 adapting itself to its surroundings. Life every- 
 where shows this perpetual readjustment be- 
 tween the two factors. Every organism grows 
 by assimilating nutriment from its environment 
 which it converts into its own substance. Here 
 the creative power, as we may call it, resides 
 within the organism. It proves itself stronger 
 than the forces which surround it and play upon 
 it, or, if it fails to do this, it dies. But the en- 
 vironment also is active, and exercises a forma- 
 tive influence upon the organism, modifying its 
 development in various directions. The impulse 
 to development, however, lies within the living 
 creature, whose spontaneous activity is the real 
 cause of growth. Can we not find here a test 
 which we may apply to any development ; the 
 test of the ability of the organism not only to 
 resist the disintegrating influence of its sur- 
 roundings but to use these forces of the environ- 
 ment as ministers to its own progressive life? 
 We have been drawing our illustrations from 
 Christianity ; let us, once more, take that religion 
 
264 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 as our example. Is not one of the striking 
 features about the religion this, that it has 
 proved itself capable of maintaining its own 
 essential life amid the most varied surround- 
 ings? It was no empty world, as we have 
 already said, into which it came, but a world full 
 of cultures and creeds and civilisations. The 
 Christian germ could not but take some colour 
 from this complex environment. In some 
 epochs of its history the religion may have 
 shown an over-adaptability; it may have yielded 
 too much to the influences of its surroundings, 
 and so departed from its essential principles. 
 But, on the whole, its development has been 
 marked by the triumph of the essential principles 
 over the environment. It has taken from the 
 surroundings what they had to give that was 
 vital ; from Rome its order and organisation ; 
 from Greece its free, intellectual inquiry, and 
 such of its culture as was not purely pagan ; 
 from the Teuton his sense of individual liberty ; 
 but it has digested what it has received and has 
 made these new acquisitions subservient to its 
 own inner and progressive life. In particular, 
 the conception of Christ as the creative fount of 
 life, which is the root conception of the religion, 
 has maintained its supremacy untouched. The 
 
THE TESTS OF DEVELOPMENT 265 
 
 religion has proved its adaptability to the needs 
 of man in all possible conditions of life, under 
 all climates, and amid all social systems ; yet its 
 plasticity is no sign of weakness, but rather of 
 inherent strength. It carries still, unimpaired 
 within itself, its principle of life, its sovereign 
 idea, a definite belief about the Person of its 
 Founder. 
 
 Such are some of the suggestions conveyed 
 by this conception of development which we 
 have been considering in the last two chapters. 
 We have attempted to indicate in outline what 
 our general attitude should be in interpreting the 
 idea ; and we have endeavoured to show the 
 need which exists for arriving at some criteria for 
 testing the worth of any development. Fuller 
 study of the conception is necessary for all of 
 us if we would hope to understand the mind of 
 our own age. The more we study it the richer 
 will the idea be found to be. It is a mine from 
 which we may dig " ore that is not for the mart 
 of commerce," but which is of the utmost value 
 for the nobler purposes of interchange of thought. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 
 
 THE conception of development is, as we 
 have seen, distinctly teleological ,in char- 
 acter. The world-process seems to be the 
 expression of a great purpose, which gradually 
 unfolds itself more and more, and of which the 
 complete meaning is not yet plain. About the 
 history of man and the evolution of Nature 
 there is an element of unfulfilled prophecy. 
 The drama of development awaits its crowning 
 act. We have seen, further, that a teleological 
 outlook is natural to man. He is so conscious 
 of purpose in his own activities and aspirations 
 that he cannot but find evidences of purpose in 
 the world outside him. He refuses to believe 
 that his is the only purposive existence in an 
 otherwise purposeless world. He cannot, by 
 the acceptance of such a creed, void his own 
 being of the meaning which it appears to pos- 
 
 (266) 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 267 
 
 sess, and so he reads into the outward order of 
 the universe a purpose truly analogous to that 
 which he finds in himself; or, as we may rather 
 maintain, when he begins to inquire into the 
 constitution and meaning of the outward order, 
 he seems to find in it that spiritual affinity with 
 his own being which enables him to treat it as 
 a true, if temporary, home, in which he may 
 grow to maturity, and which he hopes more 
 and more fully to explore. His native and in- 
 stinctive teleology is sufficiently reinforced by 
 the critical and reflective work of his intelligence 
 to enable him to rise to the rational conviction 
 that the development of the world, in all its 
 parts and stages, is the expression of a divine 
 plan, which is being slowly consummated 
 throughout the centuries. 
 
 We have, in this concluding chapter, to seek 
 for further justification for this attitude which 
 man adopts. Let us insist, once more, that it 
 is an attitude rather than an argument. We 
 must admit that the argument from design can- 
 not logically prove the existence of an intelligent 
 God who acts for ends. Our reasoning cannot 
 be thrown into a form which will satisfy the 
 requirements of strict logic. The superstructure 
 is greater than the particular foundation will 
 
268 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 bear. But the same criticism is, perhaps, valid 
 of any argument which endeavours to demon- 
 strate the existence and character of God. No 
 finite mind can completely mirror the infinite. 
 All our reasonings about God are attempts to 
 unfold the meaning of a belief or an idea, of 
 which we already find ourselves possessed when 
 thought awakes to consciousness of itself; and 
 the belief or idea is greater than the partial 
 interpretations of it. But our failure does not 
 render our reasonings utterly untrustworthy. 
 They may be sound, so far as they go ; and, 
 because they cannot travel the whole distance, 
 they are not therefore to be discredited for that 
 portion of the journey which they can accomplish. 
 Faith, trust, conviction, play no small part in 
 any attempt which we may make to construe to 
 ourselves the meaning of the wonderful universe 
 which surrounds us. This is true, not only of 
 the attempt to interpret the universe religiously, 
 but also of the attempt to interpret it scientific- 
 ally. Without a trust that Nature is an orderly 
 system, and that the skies will not tumble in upon 
 his head to crush nim, the man of science could 
 not proceed one step in his investigation of the 
 mysteries of life and matter. Our ordinary life 
 of the home and the market-place reposes on a 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 269 
 
 basis of faith. Equally does the life of scientific 
 or philosophic investigation so repose. There 
 is no system of thought devised by man which 
 can completely explain the nature and meaning 
 of reality. Somewhere, sooner or later, we are 
 brought to a standstill and are bound to confess 
 that, for the moment at any rate, reasoning can 
 go no farther. Yet we must live and act, nay, 
 we must try to present to ourselves intellectually 
 the meaning of the world as a system of com- 
 pletely articulated thought. We are convinced 
 that it is such a rational system, and where we 
 cannot know we trust. Unless we are content 
 to be simply sceptical (and an attitude of utter 
 scepticism is self-contradictory, and so impossible 
 for men, either as practical or speculative beings), 
 we must, and habitually do, adopt, in the last 
 resort, beliefs which reason can never completely 
 justify. They do not contradict reason, but 
 reason cannot explicate in its own terms all 
 their content. Such is our attitude in the case 
 of the argument from design, an argument 
 which carries with it great weight, and which 
 is strengthened when taken in connection with 
 other arguments for God's existence. Behind 
 the terms of logical inference, in which the 
 argument is cast, lies the larger conviction, and 
 
2;o DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 this will always remain operative despite any 
 explanations which science may give of adapta- 
 tions in Nature. For we cannot observe adap- 
 tations without wondering at them, without 
 seeing in them a significance, without regarding 
 them as expressive of a purpose. 
 
 But our conviction that the world-process is 
 purposive, and therefore ultimately the expres- 
 sion of mind, rests upon a deeper foundation, 
 which is discovered when we analyse what we 
 mean by causality. That nothing can happen, 
 that is, that no event or change can come into 
 being without an appropriate and adequate 
 cause for the same, is, of all truths, the one 
 perhaps most firmly held by man. Our pro- 
 gressive interpretation of the changing universe 
 around us is just an attempt to discover causes. 
 The whole work of science is to investigate 
 causes, and so to reduce to order the sequences 
 of phenomena in the world outside us. 1 The 
 orderly sequences which science discovers she 
 calls "laws of Nature," meaning by "law" an 
 observed uniformity of behaviour. A law of 
 
 1 See, however, for a theory of science as " descriptive," 
 Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism ; also Taylor's Ele- 
 ments of Metaphysics, p. 174. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 271 
 
 Nature is nothing more than a statement of the 
 way in which certain happenings or events oc- 
 cur, have occurred in the past, and will, under sim- 
 ilar conditions, occur in the future. Sequence, 
 therefore, seems so far to be the key-note 
 of physical causation. Yet, clearly, sequence is 
 not enough. There is more in cause than the 
 idea of sequence ; indeed, analysis reveals that 
 sequence is the least important element in our 
 conception of causality, and one which, in our 
 final interpretation, we may have to discard 
 altogether. We need, in addition, the idea of 
 productive power. A cause, as we say, does 
 something. In the language of science, a 
 causal action involves an expenditure of force 
 or energy. Power is a more important element 
 than sequence in our conception of cause. We 
 must note, in passing, that the idea of law con- 
 tains no conception of efficiency. It is some- 
 times thought that the discovery of a law of 
 Nature provides us with a complete explanation 
 of the series of phenomena grouped under the 
 law. But a moment's reflection shows us that 
 the discovery of a law tells us nothing at all in 
 way of explanation of any series of changes. 
 What has been made plain to us is merely the 
 order in which the changes in question happen. 
 
272 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 Why they so happen still remains to be dis- 
 covered. The source of power is still concealed. 
 That there is power is something which we 
 cannot doubt. Force or energy is a conception 
 underlying all the investigations of physical 
 science, which has gone far in the direction of 
 treating all energy in terms of quantitative 
 measurement. We know (unless, indeed, recent 
 discoveries about the nature of matter may 
 compel us to modify our views) that the amount 
 of energy in the world is a fixed and constant 
 quantity, and that, though the forms of energy 
 may change, the total amount remains the same, 
 loss of energy under one form being compen- 
 sated for by the appearance of precisely the same 
 amount of energy under another form. 1 Redis- 
 tribution of energy, therefore, is the formula which 
 expresses the nature of the changes occurring 
 in the physical universe. But it is not a formula 
 which in any way satisfies our demand for a 
 
 1 Since the whole range of the universe is not open to our 
 investigation, we cannot assert positively that the doctrine 
 of the conservation of energy is true of all physical reality. 
 At the same time, the truth of the doctrine has been so 
 widely established by physical science, that it may be ac- 
 cepted as a truth, which obtains for any closed material 
 system. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 273 
 
 causal explanation. All that science succeeds 
 in doing is to trace back any event to the ante- 
 cedent conditions from which it has arisen. But 
 these antecedent conditions have themselves to 
 be referred to other antecedent conditions, and 
 those again to others, and thus we find ourselves 
 confronted with an infinite or endless regress, 
 and with the task of tracing out the course of a 
 stream which has no determinate source. Now 
 such a conception as this of an infinite regress 
 cannot satisfy the demand of my intelligence 
 for an explanation of events. An infinite re- 
 gress interpreted solely in physical terms is 
 ultimately unthinkable, and endless redistribu- 
 tions of energy throw no light upon the great 
 problem of the source of energy. Our minds 
 persist in asking of what nature is the produc- 
 tive power which is at work in the universe. 
 
 Let us observe that we could not ask such a 
 question at all unless we had already had ex- 
 perience of power. If you could imagine a 
 being endowed solely with the sense of sight 
 and without any capacity for initiating action, 
 for such a being the word power would, I sup- 
 pose, have no meaning. All that such a being 
 would be aware of would be a sequence of 
 
 changes, and causation would be for it, what 
 
 18 
 
274 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 some sensationalist thinkers have unsuccessfully 
 tried to make it, a mere matter of phenomenal 
 succession. From whence, then, do we derive 
 our conception of power ? In the first place, 
 from the sensations of pressure and resistance 
 which we experience as our bodies come into 
 contact with the material world. We become 
 aware, in this way, of the existence of objects 
 outside us which can act upon our own bodies 
 and with which we are brought into physical 
 contact. But, secondly, a far more important 
 and deeper source of the conception of power 
 is to be found in our own volition. The root 
 element in the whole causal idea is to be sought 
 in our knowledge of ourselves as willing, or 
 volitional, agents. We do things ; we exert 
 effort ; we attend to certain incidents in the 
 changing scene around us, and can compel a 
 flagging consciousness to arouse itself and ob- 
 serve what is happening. We act for ends, and 
 deliberately seek out the means to reach them. 
 Our causal activity is purposive. And we pos- 
 sess the consciousness that we are doing these 
 things freely, that we are, in a word, creative, 
 or self-determining, centres of power. We are 
 not mere channels through which flow tides of 
 energy which we cannot control, but we possess 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 275 
 
 a real initiative, a true causal agency. If we 
 are told that we are deceived, and that what 
 we seem ourselves to do is being done in us, 
 and through us, by another agency, we decline 
 to believe it. Our awareness of ourselves as 
 free causal agents is an ultimate fact of spiritual 
 experience, and we refuse to hold ourselves 
 the victims of an illusion which affects all that 
 gives most meaning to our own personality. 
 Further, we are moral beings for whom the 
 word " ought " has a vital significance, and we 
 know that "ought" involves "can," that free- 
 dom is the correlative of duty, and that we 
 praise and blame ourselves and others for ac- 
 tions for which we hold the agents responsible. 
 To take away freedom is to take away morality, 
 or, at least, to rob it of more than half its glory. 
 It is as a moral being who accounts himself 
 responsible for his actions that man becomes 
 most deeply aware of the meaning of power 
 and causality. The innermost significance of 
 the conception of cause is derived from the 
 central shrine of human personality. From 
 that centre we investigate outwards, and, when 
 we find in the world around us all the signs of 
 change and productive power, even though the 
 actual power be hidden from us, we can do 
 
276 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 nothing else to satisfy our craving for an ex- 
 planation of such change than interpret it in 
 terms of a causality like our own, in terms, that 
 is, of a Divine Will. Our primitive ancestors, 
 in that phase of religion known as animism, 
 referred the changes which they saw around 
 them, the movement of the leaf, the dancing of 
 the stream, the upspringing of the herb, to the 
 activity of spirits of woodland and water and 
 meadow. For them (so natural was this mode 
 of interpretation) the whole world was peopled 
 with spiritual powers, with beings who, by their 
 creative activity, caused all the changing pheno- 
 mena of Nature, and man saw everywhere his 
 own image reflected back from the world around 
 him. Our advance in knowledge has been in 
 the direction of referring natural changes to 
 will, conceived as one, rather than as many ; 
 but it is still a will, interpreted in terms of our 
 own will, which thought posits as the ultimate 
 cause of the changes in the material world. 
 We have not, that is, left the path trodden by 
 those early feet, only the path has carried us 
 into sight of a new prospect. And, however 
 far the path may still go, however long may be 
 the story of human thought, it is impossible 
 that man can ever interpret God except in 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 277 
 
 terms of free, creative will. Will, equally with 
 intelligence, is the element upon which we must 
 insist as being part of the essential nature of 
 God. There is a danger that philosophical 
 speculation may construe God's being in terms 
 of thought alone and may forget to emphasise 
 the quality of will. But a God, so conceived, 
 is not a God whom man can either love or 
 worship. Indeed, can we, we may ask, form 
 any intelligible conception of an existence which 
 consists of pure thought alone ? Of pure thought 
 we have no experience whatever. Our own 
 thought is always combined with will, and, we 
 may add, with feeling also. If there is any- 
 where a purely thinking being we can form no 
 idea of his mode of existence. Intelligence and 
 will, however, whether in ourselves or God, are 
 not to be treated as two distinct faculties. The 
 days of a facultative or departmental psychology 
 are numbered. Personality is an indivisible 
 unity, in which you can indeed distinguish ele- 
 ments, as opposed to faculties, but whose activity 
 involves, at each moment, the whole richness of 
 the nature. 
 
 Here, then, in the thought of creative will, our 
 minds find that final interpretation for which 
 they are looking. Here lies the only possible 
 
278 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 solution of the great causal problem. For what 
 we wish to discover is a true cause, a cause, that 
 is, which cannot be treated as a mere effect of 
 anything antecedent to it, but which contains 
 within itself the spontaneity and productive 
 energy from which flows freely the river of 
 universal change. We ourselves, if the verdict 
 of our self-knowledge and experience can be 
 trusted, are, in our limited degree, such creative 
 causes. Physically regarded we are effects of 
 antecedent conditions; regarded spiritually we 
 may in part be so, but there does come a 
 point in our analysis of moral personality where 
 we are obliged to stop in our regress and to 
 confess that we cannot be entirely interpreted 
 in terms of antecedent conditions, but have the 
 power of true self-determination and can origin- 
 ate change. Such freedom, of course, we owe 
 to God, but, in creating us, He made us free. 
 He caused us to be causes of our own acti- 
 vities, limiting His own power thereby (for 
 no less a consequence follows from our ad- 
 mission of human freedom), but thereby also 
 rendering possible the existence of a kingdom 
 of moral personalities, whose wills were their 
 own, in order that they might make them 
 His. 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 279 
 
 Two points, in conclusion, invite our further 
 consideration. 
 
 (a) The first is, that, in our own experience, 
 the deepest significance of will is to be found in 
 connection with moral action. The stupendous 
 importance of will and free causality is best 
 revealed by the peculiarly ethical factors of 
 remorse, responsibility, the emotions of shame 
 and reverence, the consciousness that we might 
 have done otherwise than we have done. And, 
 when we regard man as a moral being, we at 
 once think of his life as purposive. The con- 
 ception of purpose, which is dominant when you 
 consider man as an intelligent agent acting for 
 ends, is even more prominent when you think 
 of him as a moral being acting for moral ends 
 and striving to realise moral ideals. This, I 
 suppose, would be admitted by any one. But 
 if we admit it, then, it appears to me, when we 
 transfer the conception of will to God's causal 
 activity, it is difficult not to interpret that activity 
 in terms of moral purpose. The inference, I 
 admit, is not logically valid ; but it is important 
 to remember that it is not bare will devoid of 
 all richer significance which we carry over 
 naturally and attribute to God. Bare will has 
 no meaning. A will must will something, must 
 
280 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 seek some end, must invest itself with other 
 attributes besides that of mere efficiency. And, 
 as we cannot think of our own volitional activity 
 except in terms of ends which ultimately ! take 
 a moral colouring, so we cannot think of God 
 except as purposing moral ends. It might be 
 retorted that God may will an immoral end, just 
 as a man, in virtue of his freedom, can, and does, 
 will to do evil. From the point of view of our 
 present argument that is a fair retort ; but, even 
 so, the objector has granted what we are pri- 
 marily contending for, namely, the existence of 
 a will with a content and characteristics, seeking 
 positive ends which it conceives as worth pur- 
 suing. What we must banish from our minds 
 is the thought of bare, indeterminate will. 
 Whether the Divine will is more appropriately 
 to be thought of as seeking evil ends rather 
 than good ones is another question, to which, 
 I imagine, there is not likely to be given any 
 
 1 Man's ends take a moral colouring " ultimately," that is, 
 if life is viewed as a whole. It is possible, of course, to 
 take a single activity of man, a single act, and say that it has 
 no moral colour, e.g., if I knock the head off a poppy when 
 on a walk, you could hardly read a moral purpose into the 
 act, but if I spent the whole afternoon in so doing you would 
 rightly charge me with waste of time, 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 281 
 
 other answer than that the Divine purpose must 
 include what we mean by morality. For, if 
 God is thought of as seeking evil, as saying 
 deliberately, like Milton's Satan, " evil be thou 
 my good," then we are confronted by the fact 
 of morality, and man's recognition that his 
 highest good consists in the pursuit of moral 
 ends. How can man condemn himself, as he 
 does, for pursuing evil ends if God pursues 
 them ? On such a theory man's moral life be- 
 comes meaningless. Whatever our character- 
 isation of ultimate reality may be, it must be 
 consonant with our appreciation of moral good- 
 ness and our pursuit of ethical ideas. Because, 
 then, moral purpose is ultimately connected with 
 human free causality, and because such free 
 causality finds its chief significance in the moral 
 sphere, it becomes natural for man to think of 
 the Divine causality as moral. And, the greater 
 the importance which man attaches to the moral 
 aspect of life, the more readily will he see in 
 God's causal activity the expression of a moral 
 purpose. His conviction that the universe is 
 a home of order, and that he can trust it, will 
 ripen into a conviction that it is a home of moral 
 order. The basis of his trust will be moral. 
 He will feel that it is a moral will which is 
 
282 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 guiding its destinies ; in other words, that in 
 and behind its changing processes lives a per- 
 sonal and moral being. 
 
 (d) The second point to consider is this. Is 
 there any necessary contradiction between the 
 scientific account of causation in the physical 
 universe, and the religious account of it which 
 refers all natural changes to the creative activity 
 of a personal will ? Are the laws of Nature to 
 be regarded as modes of a Divine volition ? 1 
 Is there anything foolish or contradictory in so 
 construing them? That any difficulty at all 
 should be felt upon this point is due, I believe, 
 to the prevalence of an imperfect conception of 
 what will is. Just as we are often taught that 
 creation must mean creation out of nothing, and 
 forget that any change whatever is really created 
 change and involves the emergence of something 
 which was not there before, so we have come 
 to think of will as capricious, arbitrary, indeter- 
 minate activity. Will is regarded as consisting 
 of what Martineau describes as " detached spurts 
 of power," not a steady, continuous, activity, but 
 
 1 For a full discussion of this problem see Fraser's Philo- 
 sophy of Theism , second series of lectures, lecture ii., "Causa- 
 tion Theistically Interpreted ". 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 283 
 
 an intermittent one, fitful in its operation, and 
 owning many intervals of quiescence. Of this 
 nature, certainly, is much of our own volitional 
 activity. We pursue ends for a while and then 
 weary of the pursuit. Intervals of sleep inter- 
 rupt our conscious activity. We find it difficult 
 to concentrate our attention for any length of 
 time on a given point. We do not succeed in 
 rounding off all our energies in the prosecution 
 of some few, great dominant purposes which 
 shall give unity and connection to our life. We 
 will, but we have to will to will. Our freedom 
 is a possession of which we only become aware 
 if we try to enjoy it, and we do not make the 
 continuous attempt. And so we come to think 
 of will as necessarily connected with intermittent 
 and somewhat capricious activity. Then, when 
 science shows us a world in which activities are 
 always uniform, where strict order reigns, and 
 where " nothing is that errs from law," we begin 
 to wonder if, after all, the conception of will 
 can be applied to such activities, whether will 
 is not something too volatile and wayward to 
 be a satisfactory explanation of movements so 
 orderly in their procession and so strictly deter- 
 mined in their relation to the past. But, surely, 
 if there existed a perfect will, a will "without 
 
284 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 variation or shadow that is cast by turning," the 
 activities of that will would be continuous and 
 orderly. Unvarying law, that is, unvarying 
 sequence among phenomena, would be the con- 
 sistent and natural expression of such a perfect 
 will, and the iron necessities of Nature, which 
 now seem to be at the opposite pole from all 
 that we mean by freedom, would be the com- 
 plete expression of the highest freedom. In 
 this way the laws of the material universe may 
 be construed as the expression of the unchang- 
 ing purposes of God. Where is the contradic- 
 tion between this theistic view and the view 
 of physical science ? There is none. Science 
 gives you her view of natural causation without 
 regard to the spiritual significance of the same. 
 The theist adds on to the scientific view other 
 elements, which he derives from a consideration 
 of man's place in the universe as a moral per- 
 sonality. He admits all the facts which science 
 adduces, only he looks at them in a new light. 
 He admits the explanation which science has 
 to offer as to the mechanism by which physical 
 changes come to be, but he urges that these ex- 
 planations are not self-explanatory, and need, in 
 their turn, another explanation, which he finds 
 in the postulate of a Divine will which works 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 285 
 
 through the mechanism of Nature to reach 
 moral ends. The only quarrel which the theist 
 has with the man of science arises, if the latter 
 offers his partial and abstract explanations as 
 complete explanations. He, speaking in the 
 name both of philosophy and religion, reminds 
 the physicist that a higher synthesis is possible, 
 and one which shall do justice to those spiritual 
 factors of experience, which the man of science 
 is bound to leave on one side if he would carry 
 his investigations to a successful issue. Science, 
 then, shows us the orderly sequences of pheno- 
 mena, and construes all physical changes in 
 terms of the redistribution of energy. It re- 
 mains for a deeper inquiry to interpret the facts 
 in another manner, and, by an act of faith, if 
 you will, only not a faith divorced from reason, 
 to rise to the conviction that 
 
 The whole round earth is every way 
 Bound by gold chains about the feet of God. 
 
 The lower causality of Nature is interpreted by 
 the higher causality of man. The beginning is 
 once more explained in the light of the end. 
 
 If, now, we can climb to the height of a true 
 theistic faith, we then turn back and retraverse 
 our road ; but we carry with us the illumination 
 
286 DEVELOPMENT AND DIVINE PURPOSE 
 
 which shone for us on the supreme summit of 
 vision ; and we see, in all the successive stages 
 of Nature's evolution, the self-revelation (I see 
 no reason why we should be ashamed of the 
 word) of a Personal God and the gradual un- 
 folding of the spiritual meaning of the universe. 
 From matter to life, from life to consciousness, 
 from consciousness to self-consciousness and 
 morality, and the emergence of beings who 
 know themselves as persons and call God a 
 Father — these are the stages through which 
 God has been gradually revealing to men His 
 own nature and His eternal purposes. And we 
 wait for the completion of the revelation. For 
 man is only in the making. His powers of 
 thought and action are not yet fully ripe. He 
 has much more yet of God to know. Each 
 generation of men, as it arrives upon the scene, 
 looks through the archway of its experience and 
 sees beyond it, gleaming, 
 
 That untravelled world, whose margin fades 
 For ever and for ever, as we move. 
 
 The vision would be intolerable, and would 
 mock us, if it were not that we are so constituted 
 that, where knowledge fails, there conviction 
 steps in to steady and inspire us. Thus we go 
 
THE CONCEPTION OF PURPOSE 287 
 
 through life, assured that the power behind 
 phenomena, whose ceaseless activity has pro- 
 duced our own moral being, cannot be less than 
 moral, and so can be eternally trusted. " In 
 Him " — it is the theist's reasoned conviction — 
 11 we live, and move, and have our being/' 
 
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12 
 
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36 
 
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Fiction 
 
 37 
 
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 A DOUBLE KNOT 
 
38 
 
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 Levett-Yeats (S. K.). THE TRAITOR'S 
 
 WAY. 
 Linton (E. Lynn). THE TRUE HIS- 
 TORY OF JOSHUA DAVIDSON. 
 Lyall (Edna). DERRICK VAUGHAN. 
 Malet (Lucas). THE CARISSIMA. 
 A COUNSEL OF PERFECTION. 
 Mann (Mrs. M. E.). MRS. PETER 
 
 HOWARD. 
 A LOST ESTATE. 
 THE CEDAR STAR. 
 ONE ANOTHER'S BURDENS. 
 Marchmont (A. W.). MISER HOAD- 
 
 LEY'S SECRET. 
 A MOMENT'S ERROR. 
 Marryat (Captain). PETER SIMPLE. 
 JACOB FAITHFUL. 
 Marsh (Richard). THE TWICKENHAM 
 
 PEERAGE. 
 THE GODDESS. 
 THE JOSS. 
 A METAMORPHOSIS. 
 
 Mason (A. E. W.). CLEMENTINA. 
 
 Mathers (Helen). HONEY. 
 
 GRIFF OF GRIFFITHSCOURT. 
 
 SAM'S SWEETHEART 
 
 Meade (Mrs. L. T.). DRIFT. 
 
 Mitford (Bertram). THE SIGN OF THE 
 
 SPIDER. 
 Montresor (F. F.). THE ALIEN. 
 Moore(Arthur). THE GAY DECEIVERS. 
 Morrison (Arthur). THE HOLE IN 
 
 THE WALL. 
 Nesbit(E.). THE RED HOUSE. 
 Norris(W. E.). HIS GRACE. 
 GILES INGILBY. 
 THE CREDIT OF THE COUNTY. 
 LORD LEONARD. 
 MATTHEW AUSTIN. 
 CLARISSA FURIOSA. 
 Oliphant (Mrs.). THE LADY'S WALK. 
 SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. 
 THE PRODIGALS. 
 Oppenheim (E. Phillips). MASTE 
 
 MEN. 
 Parker (Gilbert). THE POMP OF 
 
 LAVILETTES. 
 WHEN VALMOND CAME TO PON 1 
 THE TRAIL OF THE SWORD. 
 Pemberton (Max). THE FOOTS! 
 
 OF A THRONE. 
 I CROWN THEE KING. 
 Phillpotts (Eden). THE HUMAN 1 
 CHILDREN OF THE MIST. 
 «Q.» THE WHITE WOLF. 
 Ridge (W. Pett). A SON OF THE STATE. 
 LOST PROPERTY. 
 GEORGE AND THE GENERAL. 
 Russell (W. Clark). A MARRIAGE AT 
 
 SEA. 
 ABANDONED. 
 
 MY DANISH SWEETHEART. 
 HIS ISLAND PRINCESS. 
 Sergeant (Adeline). THE MASTER OF 
 
 BEECHWOOD. 
 BARBARA'S MONEY. 
 THE YELLOW DIAMOND. 
 THE LOVE THAT OVERCAME. 
 Surtees (R. S.). HANDLEY CROSS. 
 
 Illustrated. 
 MR. SPONGE'S SPORTING TOUR. 
 
 Illustrated. 
 ASK MAMMA. Illustrated. 
 Valentine (Major E. S.). VELDT AND 
 
 LAAGER. 
 Walford (Mrs. L. B.). MR. SMITH. 
 COUSINS. 
 
 THE BABY'S GRANDMOTHER. 
 Wallace (General Lew). BEN-HUR. 
 THE FAIR GOD. 
 
 Watson (H. B. Marriot). THE ADVEN- 
 TURERS. 
 Weekes (A. B.). PRISONERS OF WAR. 
 Wells (H.G.). THE STOLEN BACILLUS. 
 White (Percy). A PASSIONATE 
 
 PILGRIM. 
 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY