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 THE GENIUS OF NAVAL WARFARE
 
 THE GENIUS 
 
 OF 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE 
 
 I 
 
 STRATEGY 
 
 SECOND EDITION OF 
 
 A STUDY OF NAVAL STRATEGY 
 
 BY 
 
 RENE DAVELUY 
 
 COMMANDER, FRENCH NAVY 
 Translated by PHILIP R. ALGER, Professor, U. S. Navy 
 
 Annapolis, Md. 
 The United States Naval Institute 
 
 1910
 
 BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.
 
 103 
 
 FOREWORD. 
 
 When, some ten years ago, I decided to give to the pubHc a 
 popular presentation of naval questions, I had formed a plan all 
 the more extensive from the fact that it still existed only in my 
 imagination. I proposed to divide my work into three distinct 
 parts : Strategy, Tactics, Organisation. These three parts were 
 to form a whole under the title: The Genius of Naval Warfare. 
 
 It did not take long for me to perceive that I had undertaken a 
 task beyond my strength, and that a very long time would elapse 
 before I should be capable of realizing my program ; moreover, the 
 title I had chosen seemed to me to be pretentious, although it 
 exactly expressed my idea. I therefore renounced the composi- 
 tion of a complete work and limited my pretensions to bringing out 
 separate studies, without connecting them by a general title. 
 
 Under these conditions A Study of Naval Combat was published 
 in 1902, followed by A Study of Nazfal Strategy in 1905. These 
 two works were the first two parts of my original design. As for 
 the third part, it was sacrificed to the publication of The Struggle 
 for Command of the Sea; and since then I have not had time to 
 bring it out. 
 
 A new edition of the two studies that have already appeared 
 having become necessary, I decided to take up again my first 
 project, inclusive of its general title, which I hope will be more 
 readily pardoned for the ten years that have passed. 
 
 I therefore offer to-day to the criticism of my comrades Volume 
 I of The Genius of Naval Warfare: Strategy, which is merely 
 a revision of A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 It is very rare for authors not to have something to add to their 
 works, and I have not escaped the common law. I have therefore 
 seized the opportunity to reconstruct or develop some chapters. 
 In others I have merely made trifling corrections ; but my readers 
 will thank me for having abbreviated. 
 
 Volume II, Tactics, is about to appear and will be the new 
 edition of A Study of Naz'o.l Combat. 
 
 Finally, I hope very soon to complete Organisation, which will 
 form Volume III of The Genius of Naval Warfare. 
 
 R. Daveluy. 
 Contre-Torpilleur Faiicon, 
 
 La Tude, Crete, July, 1909.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction I 
 
 FIRST PART. 
 The Principles of Naval Strategy. 
 
 I. General Considerations 7 
 
 II. Aim and Means of War lo 
 
 III. The Principal Objective 22 
 
 IV. Concentrations 26 
 
 V. Interior Lines 33 
 
 VI. The Policy of Guarantees 36 
 
 VII. Alliances 40 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 
 The Elements of Naval Strategy. 
 
 I. Offensive and Defensive 45 
 
 II. Geography 51 
 
 III. Secrecy of Operations 57 
 
 IV. Information and Communications 59 
 
 V. Bases of Operations 68 
 
 VI. The Radius of Action 73 
 
 VII. Speed 79 
 
 VIII. Homogeneity 84 
 
 THIRD PART. 
 
 Operations. 
 
 I. The Attack and Defense of Coasts 89 
 
 II. The Conquest of Over-Seas Territory 142 
 
 III. Commerce Destroying IQI 
 
 IV. Blockades 219 
 
 V. Passages by Main Force 229 
 
 FOURTH PART. 
 The Auxiliaries of Str.\tegy. 
 
 I. The Plan of Campaign 237 
 
 II. Public Opinion 241 
 
 III. Preparation 244 
 
 IV. The Doctrine 248 
 
 V. Grand Maneuvers 257 
 
 VI. The War Game 260
 
 Table of Contents. viii 
 
 FIFTH PART. 
 
 Examples. 
 
 I. The War of American Independence 263 
 
 II. Napoleon's Naval Strategy 274 
 
 III. The American Civil War 283 
 
 IV. The War between Chile and Peru 286 
 
 V. The Spanish-American War 289 
 
 Conclusion of Volume 1 295
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The study of history leads us to the somewhat disconcerting 
 conclusion that, though many people have made war, very few 
 have understood it. The same faults, the same errors, reproduce 
 themselves with almost mathematical regularity. 
 
 Upon reflection, there is nothing unnatural in this. It is with 
 the military profession as with other professions : the ideas neces- 
 sary to apply its letter are easily acquired, but it is not given to 
 everyone to grasp its spirit. It is not sufficient to be a doctor 
 to diagnosticate, to play an instrument to be a musician, to cover 
 canvasses with colors to be a painter. 
 
 Likewise there will never be but a small number of men having 
 a clear comprehension of the afifairs of war ; the rest, however, 
 though they cannot set the seal of personality upon their opera- 
 tions, will nevertheless avoid many mistakes by studying the 
 conditions of war and by letting themselves be guided by the laws 
 that govern it. 
 
 For a long time people fought without other rule than to follow 
 the impulse of the moment. But instinct is our worst adviser : 
 all of life is passed in avoiding the snares that it sets for us. It is 
 always spying on us, seeking to entice us into the wrong road. 
 
 Let a vessel run upon reefs, and instinct urges us to leap into 
 the sea, when the most prudent course is to remain on board. 
 
 Let a torpedo explode ahead of a ship which is going through 
 a passage, and the first impulse, that which instinct guides, is to 
 put the helm over so as not to pass over the place of the ex- 
 plosion, when it is there, on the contrary, that there is the least 
 chance of being struck by another torpedo. 
 
 When reverses have beaten down courage and darkened coun- 
 sel, there appear those desperate resolutions that posterity looks 
 upon with contempt : it is instinct which stifles the voice of duty 
 and retakes control.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Instinct, then, must not be our guide ; we must learn warfare. 
 
 The study of mihtary questions is relatively recent; it is sub- 
 sequent to standing armies and dates only from the period when 
 the first military schools were founded. 
 
 The different methods of teaching that have been put in prac- 
 tice can be reduced to three. The first, which is called the 
 rational method, claims to be founded upon logic and good sense ; 
 the second makes of war an exact science ; the third looks to his- 
 tory for guidance. 
 
 Which to choose? 
 
 All the conceptions whose weakness and falsity have been 
 revealed by the event were considered reasonable by their authors. 
 Most frequently they had been submitted to the deliberations of 
 a council and studied under their different aspects ; their execu- 
 tion was prepared with careful foresight. Nevertheless a flash 
 of genius sufficed to make them go to pieces, and it is the means 
 employed by the adversary that at first sight seem to us to be 
 irrational ; only in the light of events do they appear to us as 
 they truly were. 
 
 This is because the system of deductions, which forms the basis 
 of the rational method, leads us despite ourselves in a way marked 
 out in advance, without showing us the obstacles with which it 
 is sown. 
 
 As for the scientific method, that is always held in honor 
 during the long periods of peace. War tends to take on a con- 
 ventional character when for a long time we have ceased to have 
 examples before our eyes. It is no longer seen as it is, but as 
 we conceive it, that is, freed from reflex actions and independent 
 of all the elements which at every moment change its aspect. 
 It presents itself then under the form of a succession of particu- 
 lar facts each of which constitutes a special problem. To solve 
 these problems we are led to give fixed values to factors essen- 
 tially variable ; and we do this with so much the more assurance 
 as the enemy is not on hand to bring matters back to reality ; 
 he becomes a term in an equation. That is why the mathematical 
 method ends in solutions that are mathematically false. We shall 
 have several occasions to show this. 
 
 War gives birth to too many unexpected things to conform to 
 the rigidity of a formula and to be contained in the narrow frame- 
 work of an exact science. Actualities must be present in our
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 minds at every instant in order to show us things under their 
 true aspect, and not under that which we shall be tempted to 
 attribute to them. 
 
 History alone can give us this exact understanding. 
 
 History is the experience of nations. Men are transient, and 
 they draw from the heritage of the past materials to supplement 
 their incomplete ideas. 
 
 In spite of their genius, the great captains have not thought 
 that they could neglect the lessons of the past. We have seen 
 the general of brigade Bonaparte profiting by the leisure forced 
 upon him by the distrust of the Committee of Public Safety in 
 1795 to devote himself to the study of the campaigns of the 
 great Frederick. Later, become Emperor, he said : " Knowledge 
 of the high parts of war can only be acquired by experience and 
 by the study of history and of the battles of great captains." 
 
 If the masters have judged it necessary to turn to history for 
 enlightenment, what right have we to pretend to free ourselves 
 from it and to undertake to invent war ? 
 
 It was through the historic method, adopted in Prussia at the 
 fall of the first Empire, that the Prussians beat us in 1870; and 
 it is only since that fatal date that the French army has remem- 
 bered that it was commanded, sixty years before, by the man 
 who incarnated the genius of war. So it is that every nation 
 has to pass through a period of reverses before discovering the 
 true basis of military education. 
 
 In spite of these examples, the system that consists of seeking 
 in previous struggles for guidance in future ones is little honored 
 in the French navy. Yet the navy, too, has had its Jena and its 
 Sedan: demoralized by the battle of the 13th Prairial, it under- 
 went a first disaster at Aboukir, and was definitely destroyed at 
 Trafalgar. Unhappily, it did not learn the lessons that defeat 
 should have taught because Trafalgar did not reach the nation's 
 heart. The country, deprived for several years of its over-sea com- 
 merce, had found new outlets in the territorial expansion of the 
 Empire. At the same period a new era of conquests began. The 
 cannon shots which resounded over the Danube's shores drowned 
 the dying groans of the navy. Ulm and Austerlitz were the flowers 
 that the army cast upon the navy's tomb. 
 
 Then the Empire crumbled away. All was forgotten, and,
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 with the Restoration, began a long period of peace which has 
 not since been troubled except by minor operations. 
 
 Little by little, material and armament changed. Steam, giving 
 freedom of movement to the ship, introduced a new factor, and, 
 since the modern navy no longer had any relation to the navy 
 of sailing ships, it seemed necessary to wipe out the past and 
 begin over again on a new basis. Truth to tell, for a long time 
 no advance was made beyond fixing upon an order of battle, and 
 attention was given rather to methods of navigation than to meth- 
 ods of fighting. There were then but two navies worthy of the 
 name. The policy of the Second Empire made them our allies, 
 and the eventuality of a naval war was so remote that it seemed 
 useless to consider it. 
 
 After our disasters of 1870, the view was accepted in France 
 that a navy w-ould be useless in a conflict with Germany. The 
 foundation upon which this theory rested was the fact that our 
 enemy had reduced us to impotence without the aid of his fleet, 
 while our fleet had not been of the least use to us. Without 
 here discussing the fallacy of such an opinion, we may declare 
 that those who advocated eflfacing the navy were short-sighted 
 politicians. The life of nations, like that of men, is full of vicis- 
 situdes ; they have their days of trial which, if they are tenacious, 
 help them to rise. But the Franco-German War is only an epi- 
 sode in our history, and France was given a role little accordant 
 w'ith her past when she was made to neglect her navy and sub- 
 ordinate everything to a revenge from which we draw^ back 
 more and more. Events were soon to demonstrate this, and to-day 
 we are bearing the consequences of so narrow a policy. 
 
 The state of neglect in which the navy was left during the 
 years that followed the war could not but have an evil influence 
 on the minds of the officers. Losing sight of the prospect of a 
 naval war, their education took a wholly peaceful turn. It seemed 
 then that France had only kept her ships for appearance sake — 
 like those princes to whom the revolutions of Europe have left 
 but a nominal sovereignty, and who try to conserve the illusion 
 of power by surrounding themselves with guards of honor. Many 
 officers still can recall the time when our Mediterranean Squadron 
 cruised majestically along the shores without other care than 
 precision and regularity of movement ; that was the time w^hen
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 target practice was considered a wearisome burden to be gotten 
 over with as quickly as possible. 
 
 As cruising could not fully occupy the activity of officers, the 
 education of the naval school became more and more scientific ; 
 more and more the officer tended to become an engineer, elec- 
 trician, mechanician, and forgot to be a military man. 
 
 Such was the situation when Germany and Italy built up for 
 themselves a navy whose importance ceased to be negligible. 
 Those who had admitted that a fleet was unnecessary in a war 
 with Germany alone were less willing to allow that the Mediter- 
 ranean ought to be abandoned to the united forces of the Triple 
 Alliance. At the same time England, faithful to her traditions, 
 took advantage of our helplessness on the seas to increase her 
 colonial domain, and since for our part we had sought in coloniza- 
 tion a compensation for our territorial losses, the points of contact 
 of the two countries multiplied, and with them the occasions of 
 conflict. 
 
 But while the English, consistent with themselves, increased 
 their fleet and multiplied their advanced bases progressively with 
 the development of their colonial power, we limited ourselves 
 to annexing territories without concerning ourselves about having 
 a navy to defend them. The danger of so rash a policy soon made 
 itself seen. 
 
 In short, this concatenation of circumstances drew attention 
 to the affairs of war ; and then became manifest the effect of a 
 scientific education which had not been tempered by the study 
 of history. War was studied by mathematics, and certain works 
 cannot be read without recalling that phrase of von der Goltz 
 which characterizes a period already old : " The tactical and 
 strategical writings of this period have for the most part an odd 
 resemblance to a course in geometry." Which proves that often 
 innovators do but republish old ideas, and that in attacking tra- 
 ditions they only revive them. 
 
 Here we must do justice on that theory which consists of 
 denying all the teachings of the past under the pretence that times 
 have changed. 
 
 If respect for traditions consists in clinging to the letter of 
 institutions or to the materiality of facts, let us cast it off without 
 hesitation, for manners change and methods differ. But if we 
 neglect the letter to see only the spirit that inspires it, if we
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 seek in events the causes that brought them forth, the past 
 supphes us with an inexhaustible mine of teachings. So far as 
 war is more particularly considered, who does not see the im- 
 portant part that the moral state of men plays in it? But men 
 have not changed. Who could deny that arms have been but 
 the instruments of the thought of a leader, and that this thought 
 still remains true? 
 
 Such are the arguments that have determined our method. It 
 alone can make us seize the spirit of ivar and bring out the laws 
 that govern it.
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL STRATEGY. 
 
 I. 
 
 General Considerations. 
 
 In the beginning-, war was the conflict of two peoples who 
 rushed against each other and fought until one of the two reduced 
 the other to slavery or drove them out of their territory. 
 
 When the conquering races had taken possession of the soil, 
 they grouped themselves about common interests and formed 
 nations. Then frontiers came into existence. War was no longer 
 waged in quest of new territories but for self-preservation and 
 advancement. Regular troops took the place of armed mobs, 
 thus diminishing the number of combatants and increasing their 
 worth. Each people has its neighbors ; this contact engenders 
 conflicts ; the weaker combine to crush the stronger ; the fields 
 of operations become more numerous. Then strategy appears 
 upon the scene. 
 
 In face of the impossibility of fighting everywhere at once, 
 some men, more talented than the rest in the afifairs of war, 
 supply the place of numbers by activity ; they oppose successively 
 to each adversary almost the entire body of their forces, contenting 
 themselves with putting obstacles in the path of the others ; thus 
 they beat their enemies in detail and overwhelm them with 
 numbers. 
 
 Next the ambition of the conquerors increases with their suc- 
 cess ; they conceive still higher aims and wish to strike quicker 
 and harder. They then attack their enemies at the very heart of 
 their power and finish the war at a single blow. Such were the 
 Napoleonic wars. 
 
 The different elements of strategy have thus come into exist- 
 ence under the impulsion of the various needs of the moment : 
 they were not developed methodically. For the art of war is 
 not the fruit of the experience of centuries, it was brought forth 
 by the genius of a few men who were unwilling to subordinate 
 their designs to the weakness of their means. And thus it may 
 be said that the characteristic of strategy is to get the best of
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 it with feeble resources, or at the least to obtain the greatest 
 return from such resources/ 
 
 If now w-e seek in the operations of fleets an analog-y with 
 what took place on land, we shall have difficulty in finding it. 
 This is because there is no naval warfare in the exclusive sense of 
 the word. People make war: the army and the navy are its 
 instruments ; they ought to lend mutual support to one another 
 in attaining a common object. Many wars have been seen on 
 land not necessitating naval intervention ; but it would be vain 
 to seek for a single naval war which has not necessitated, to a 
 greater or less extent, the intervention of the army.* 
 
 This diflference proceeds from the environment of each element : 
 the army destroys the forces of the enemy and occupies his terri- 
 tory ; the navy can only prepare the way for the army, since it 
 operates upon ground common to all. The operations in which 
 it acts for its own account, although important, do not lead directly 
 to the objects of the war. A maritime power all of whose naval 
 forces had been destroyed would probably give up the fight, with- 
 out waiting for an invasion of its own soil or of its colonies ; but 
 it will only yield in face of the impossibility of defending itself, 
 which involves the co-operation of the army. 
 
 In order that an exclusively naval action may. put her existence 
 in peril, it has been necessary that one nation, England, should 
 accumulate upon the sea gigantic interests whose loss would be 
 a fatal blow to her. She is an exception therefore to the common 
 law, without, however, being sheltered from combined military 
 and naval operations, which might reduce her in a not less effi- 
 cacious manner. 
 
 The navy has played a more or less preponderant part, accord- 
 ing to circumstances ; but it has often followed the general trend 
 
 ^Let us note in passing that the war of 1870, by forcing the continental 
 nations to arm all their citizens, will result in bringing war back to its 
 primitive form ; and it seems as though future struggles would resemble 
 the encounters of ancient peoples. Strategy will then lose the artistic 
 character that it had when armies were less numerous and more mobile. 
 
 ' At first sight the wars of American Independence and of the Empire 
 might appear exclusively naval. Nevertheless, in the former, the land 
 operations, in the West Indies and in America, had a considerable in- 
 fluence upon events, and in the latter the movements of fleets were inti- 
 mately connected with the project of the invasion of England.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 of warfare and thus has not been able to operate in its own 
 sphere. Under Louis XIII and during the minority of Louis 
 XIV, in a period when war is merely a succession of sieges, the 
 fleet lends its support to the army in the investment of maritime 
 places : Sourdis blockades Fontarabia and Tarragona ; the cam- 
 paigns of Breze on the coasts of Catalonia and Italy have for 
 their object to support the army ; later the battles of StromboH, 
 Agosta and Palermo are the consequence of the occupation of 
 Sicily. 
 
 In the wars with England the navy played the principal part, 
 and she it was that gave direction to the operations. The vast 
 field that spread before her could give rise to many combinations ; 
 yet, until the Empire, strategy seems to have chiefly had in view 
 to equalize the forces as much as possible on each field of battle, 
 by recommending to chiefs of squadrons the avoidance of fighting 
 when they found themselves for the moment in a state of inferior- 
 ity. Besides this concern, we see many projects of invasion 
 whose unsuccess shows a defective preparation or an error of 
 principle. Nowhere appear unity of control and concentration 
 of efforts. 
 
 The absence of strategical manoeuvers may be attributed to 
 the fact that, in the navy, our great seamen had no part in the 
 conception of the plans of campaign ; their genius found its em- 
 ployment only upon the fields of battle, and they were often 
 compelled to carry out the plans of people having no knowledge 
 of naval matters.' The only one who escaped from this rule, by 
 paying no attention to the orders that he had received, was 
 Suffren ; and it cannot be denied that, in a narrow theater, he 
 showed himself a fine strategist. In land warfare, on the con- 
 trary, the great leaders have been chiefs of the State, and they 
 have had the power to conceive and to execute. Thus, when 
 Napoleon takes charge of naval operations, they assume a char- 
 acter of absolute resemblance to the principles that he applied 
 on land. 
 
 ^ It is well known that Tourville was obliged to demonstrate to the 
 Minister that his instructions were impossible to execute.
 
 II. 
 
 The Aim and Means of War. 
 
 Wars break out for the most various and often the most trivial 
 causes ; but the political considerations which determine them 
 should not have any influence upon military action.* The latter 
 has but one aim — to reduce the adversary to a state of impotence. 
 This end attained, the settlement of the conflict will always be 
 easy. 
 
 To reduce the enemy to impotency, it is necessary to disarm 
 him ; that is, to destroy the constituted forces that are the guar- 
 antee of his power. Undoubtedly many wars have ended before 
 all the enemy's means of defense were destroyed, but prior vic- 
 tories have shown him the impossibility of continuing the struggle 
 with success, and have induced him to lay down his arms. 
 
 The necessity of attacking the adversary's constituted forces 
 leads directly to battle. 
 
 The potency of battle is beyond discussion : it makes itself 
 manifest by results. The history of conquests is but a long recital 
 of battles, and whether we consider Napoleon or Frederick, Nel- 
 son or Sufifren, we always find in all their acts anxiety to meet 
 the enemy. Thus the question which arises is not whether fighting 
 is justifiable, but whether it is possible to do without it. 
 
 Let us first observe that a country's naval forces are designed 
 to protect all the interests that either closely or remotely concern 
 maritime affairs. By attacking these forces we directly menace 
 all the interests that they protect ; and if, in a given region, we 
 succeed in destroying them, all the operations that proceed from 
 naval warfare become easy, since there is nothing to oppose them. 
 Moreover the building at great expense of engines of destruction 
 with the intention of using them as little as possible- is repugnant 
 to common sense. 
 
 The real error of many naval writers is that they see in naval 
 warfare only particular cases. Some claim that the purpose of 
 the navy is to insure the safety of the coast and to attack the 
 
 * Policy has sometimes directed operations without any attention to the 
 military art. This error of principle has always had doleful consequences.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 enemy's coasts ; others tell us that its role is to destroy commerce ; 
 still others wish to use it to assure the success of an invasion. 
 Very well, then ! destroy the enemy and you will secure all these > / 
 results at once : the protection of the coast will be assured and ' 
 you will be able to conclude successfully whatever operation the 
 circumstances demand. 
 
 Fighting issues, therefore, from the very nature of war and 
 from the means prepared to make war with. Any system which 
 tends to relegate it to the second place, instead of making it the 
 end and aim of war, can only be regarded as an expedient. 
 
 Nevertheless, the idea of fighting did not at once impress 
 itself upon the minds of the first seamen as being the very founda- 
 tion of naval warfare. In the beginning the interests that trav- 
 ersed the seas were inconsiderable and no one thought of attack- 
 ing them ; ships were only a means of transporting troops to the 
 hostile shores, where they pillaged and burned towns and villages. 
 Battles were merely a consequence of these expeditions ; but 
 they were not sought, since the ships were not specially armed 
 with a view to fighting one another. 
 
 With colonization maritime commerce developed and it soon 
 became important enough for its capture to seriously injure those 
 who carried it on, and at the same time to enrich its captors. 
 Naval operations then took on another character. Spain, then 
 at the height of her power, was the first to undergo the test of 
 this new kind of warfare during the eighteen years that her 
 struggle with England lasted ; but, as usually happens, the new 
 problem that arose did not immediately receive its true solution. 
 The English at first attacked commerce directly. Spain, taken 
 unawares, suffered important losses through the capture of her 
 American galleons, which periodically returned to Europe in 
 company ; but having in her ports naval forces immensely supe- 
 rior to those of England, she had only to equip war fleets stronger 
 than those of the enemy to compel him to abandon the field. Then 
 it was that the true conception of naval war germinated in the 
 minds of a few English seamen, such as Monson and Raleigh: i, 
 they perceived that the best way to reach commerce was not! [ 
 to attack it directly, but first to destroy the forces that defended! \ 
 it. These celebrated seamen felt, though still vaguely, that, 
 though the fabric constituted by the maritime greatness of a 
 nation rests upon its commercial traffic and on the prosperity of
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 its colonies, this fabric is sustained only by military forces, and 
 is undermined by attacking those forces.' 
 
 This truth was brought more clearly into relief in the following 
 century by the fifty years of war that England sustained against 
 Holland, a struggle whose sole object was to decide to which 
 of the two nations the commercial monopoly of the world should 
 belong. 
 
 At the end of this truly heroic period, England had reached a 
 definite comprehension of the influence of battle, and thereafter 
 she made it the principal objective of her military combinations. 
 
 The importance of battle did not reveal itself to the same de- 
 gree to other maritime nations. Spain, especially, for centuries 
 carried on war on the sea without the least comprehension of it, 
 without her experience, dearly bought by an uninterrupted series 
 of reverses, succeeding in tearing away the veil that darkened 
 the sight of her statesmen and her seamen. France had some 
 glimpses of the truth ; but, in a general way, she was more ready 
 to seek her special object than encounter with the military forces 
 of the enemy. 
 
 This difference in the lines of conduct of the three great mari- 
 time nations had tangible results : Spain, with an immense material 
 afloat, fails in all her enterprises ; at war with England, she en- 
 riches her with her spoils ; in a struggle with France, she gives 
 her her finest victories and writes for her .the most glorious pages 
 of her naval history ; allied with us, she compromises us and 
 brings failure to enterprises that offer the greatest chance of 
 success ; finally she disappears from the concert of maritime na- 
 tions because, during four centuries, she can almost be said not 
 to have registered a single victory ; and the reason why she has 
 I always been beaten is because, not recognizing the necessity of 
 ■battle, she was never ready to confront it. 
 
 France, with Tourville, with Duquesne, and with Suffren, in- 
 termittently gets hold of the true concept of war, and then her 
 navy shines with brilliant lustre ; but as soon as she falls back 
 into the old ways her naval power disappears. An energetic 
 nation, she labors in times of peace to build for herself a colonial 
 domain which she regularly loses in times of war because she 
 is unwilling to employ the true means of defending it. 
 
 ' See Colomb, Naval Warfare, Chapter I.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 England, on the contrary, has done nothing but expand. Poor, 
 she has taken away from the rich their colonies ; rich herself, 
 she has been able to keep them and to grow greater : to-day she 
 reigns over the seas. 
 
 If, after having set forth what the influence of fighting has 
 been upon the greatness of maritime powers, we seek the effects 
 which its refusal has had upon the details of operations, we see 
 that it has given birth to useless, absurd, or incomprehensible 
 combinations. 
 
 All seamen, in reading history, are struck by the fact that, 
 during the war of American Independence, the French always 
 received the attack to leeward, excepting in the East Indies, 
 where Sufifren was in command. It may well be supposed that 
 it was not chance alone that gave the English the constant ad- 
 vantage of the windw^ard position. The cause is that, despite a 
 marked superiority in a majority of encounters, we never sought 
 battle : we always submitted to it. The explanation of this sin- 
 gular conduct is given us by this phrase of Ramatuelle :" " The 
 French Navy," said he, " has always preferred the glory of secur- 
 ing or preserving a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps but 
 certainly less substantial, of capturing a few ships ; and, in this, 
 it has come nearer to the true aim of war." 
 
 This reasoning is a mere sophism ; when the conquest of a 
 territory can only be made by sea, its possession is not definitely 
 assured until the hostile fleet has been reduced to a state of 
 harmlessness. 
 
 We shall see to what paradoxical operations the application of 
 an erroneous doctrine can lead. 
 
 The promenade that the great combined fleet made along the 
 shores of England, in 1779, deserves only passing mention, be- 
 cause it has not been clearly shown whether d'Orvilliers was 
 unable or unwilling to meet the English fleet, inferior by nearly 
 half to that of the Allies. We can, however, draw the conclusion 
 that this immense armament, which entailed a great expenditure 
 of time and money, remained unproductive for the sole reason 
 that it did not receive the sanction of battle. 
 
 But, two years afterwards, this same fleet, under the command 
 
 'M. de Ramatuelle was a lieutenant during the war of American Inde- 
 pendence; under the Consulate he published a book on naval tactics. 
 
 13
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 of a Spanish admiral, has the good fortune to corner, in the bay 
 of Torbay, Derby's squadron, that has but thirty ships to oppose 
 to fifty. The AlHed fleet disdains the combat and withdraws 
 into its ports. What benefit resulted from this cruise? History 
 does not tell us. In revenge, if we do not see what the combined 
 fleet gained, what it lost is only too apparent. Derby's squadron 
 was the sole force that the English could oppose to the Allies in 
 the Channel. That squadron destroyed, England's existence was 
 imperilled ; but it was necessary to fight ! ! ! ' 
 
 Here is something stranger. Twice this extraordinary occur- 
 rence took place : two hostile squadrons clinging to the flanks of 
 a single island and landing a part of their artillery to entrust to 
 the disembarked troops the task of deciding to whom the island 
 shall belong. 
 
 On December 13, 1778, d'Estaing learned at Martinique that 
 Admiral Barrington was attacking St. Lucia. On the 14th he 
 makes sail with twelve ships, and on the 15th arrives off the 
 island only to learn that the English are in possession.' He 
 anchors then in the bay of Choc and disembarks his troops, while 
 Barrington, who had only seven ships, moors head and stern in 
 the bay of Cul-de-sac, ready to receive an attack. 
 
 On January 11, 1782, the Count de Grasse anchors at St. 
 Christophers in the bay of Salines with twenty-six ships. The 
 Marquis de Bouille is at once landed and, with his customary 
 ardor, he soon had the English garrison shut up in the fortified 
 position of Brimstone Hill. As soon as Admiral Hood, who was 
 at the Barbadoes, learned of our movements, he made sail with 
 twenty-two ships to carry assistance to the island. De Grasse 
 goes to meet him and manoeuvers so well that on the 25th Hood 
 takes the anchorage that we quitted the evening before. De Grasse 
 did not dare to attack him there and satisfied himself by firing a 
 few shells at him from long range ; then he anchored again and 
 disembarked the artillery of the Cato to support the troops on 
 shore. Admiral Hood could thus withdraw without being dis- 
 turbed after he had ascertained that he could not get reinforce- 
 ments into the garrison. 
 
 ' We shall take up this lamentable episode with more detail in the dis- 
 cussion of the war of American Independence. 
 
 *The garrison still held out; it j'ielded after the departure of the 
 squadron. 
 
 14
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In these two attacks the error committed is manifest. Each 
 time the French fleet had numerical superiority over the enemy 
 and neglected to profit by it. What were the consequences ? 
 
 At St. Lucia, the troops were repelled, the expedition failed, and 
 a month later Byron came to reinforce the English squadron. 
 D'Estaing thus lost the advantage of numbers and he could then 
 reflect upon the letter that Sufifren had written to him on that 
 occasion, in which he said: "Let us destroy this squadron (the 
 English squadron) ; the troops, lacking everything, in a bad coun- 
 try, will certainly have to surrender ; let Byron come afterwards 
 and he will be welcome." 
 
 At St. Christophers, the invasion succeeded ; but three months 
 afterwards de Grasse was beaten at Dominica by the very same 
 English fleet that he had neglected, and that had been reinforced 
 by fifteen ships brought from England by Rodney. The French 
 admiral had forgotten that in war an opportunity lost does not 
 recur again ; when one has the means of fighting the enemy to 
 advantage and does not profit by it, later one finds him again 
 on another field of battle under less favorable conditions. 
 
 After these useless or absurd operations, we shall see two others 
 that from the same cause are incomprehensible. They took place 
 during the war of the Revolution. 
 
 On September 23, 1796, Admiral Don Juan de Langara left 
 Cadiz with nineteen ships. After having cleared the Strait of 
 Gibraltar he met, on October i, at daybreak, seven English vessels 
 under the command of Rear-Admiral Mann, and allowed them to 
 escape. The Spaniards put into Carthagena where there were 
 seven ships of the line. Don Juan de Langara thus found himself 
 in command of twenty-six ships. 
 
 The Spanish fleet cruised in the waters between the coast of 
 Spain and Corsica. Towards the end of October it got word 
 of the English Squadron, then anchored in the bay of St, Florent. 
 This squadron was completing the embarkation of the men and 
 material of the corps of occupation (of Corsica). Since the de- 
 parture of Rear-Admiral Mann, whom the Spaniards had un- 
 successfully chased, Sir John Jervis' squadron was reduced to 
 fifteen ships. Admiral Don Juan de Langara had a very great 
 superiority over the English. Instead of profiting by this situa- 
 tion to attack them, he separated himself from them. We may 
 well ask why this admiral did not attempt to destroy, with his 
 
 IS
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 twenty-six ships, the fifteen ships, encumbered with troops and 
 munitions, of his adversary. 
 
 " If the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish fleet had decided 
 to fight the English in the bay of St. Florent, he would have had 
 the good fortune to surprise them, in disorder, in a roadstead 
 that was not protected on the landward side ...."" 
 
 The Spanish fleet withdrew to Toulon and let Jervis escape ; '" 
 four months afterwards the latter met the same fleet, then com- 
 manded by Don Jose de Cordova, ofif St. Vincent, but the cir- 
 cumstances were no longer the same. Instead of their surprising 
 the enemy, it was the Spaniards who were surprised, divided 
 in two parts ; and they expiated, on February 14th, the error 
 committed in the preceding month of October. 
 
 On March 25, 1799, Bruix, taking advantage of the absence 
 of the English fleet that blockaded Brest, puts to sea with twenty- 
 five ships. He very skilfully deceives the English as to his desti- 
 nation, and, while Lord Bridport went in search of him along the 
 Irish coast, he steers for Cadiz. 
 
 Lord Keith was cruising off that port with fifteen ships, watch- 
 ing a Spanish fleet of seventeen ships that was there. On May 
 4th Bruix appears ofif Cadiz. The weather being unfavorable, 
 he abandons the plan of joining the Spaniards and enters the 
 Mediterranean without endeavoring to fight the English. This 
 was a first error. Lord Keith's squadron formed the most im- 
 portant part of the English forces stationed in that region. This 
 squadron put out of action, the sixteen English vessels which 
 were distributed at Minorca, Palermo, Naples, Malta and Alex- 
 andria would be wholly powerless to prevent the junction of the 
 allied fleets ; and before the Admiralty would have time to send 
 a new fleet to the Mediterranean irreparable events could occur. 
 
 Yet Bruix proceeds to Toulon where he anchors on May 14th. 
 
 Jervis was then at Gibraltar, where he was detained by ill health. 
 The entry of a French fleet into the Mediterranean made him 
 fear an attack upon Minorca, which was only defended by four 
 ships under Duckworth ; he therefore at once recalled Lord Keith. 
 
 Mazarredo, who commanded the Spanish fleet at Cadiz, took 
 
 " Chevalier, History of the Frencli Navy under the First Republic. 
 " There were then at Toulon twelve French ships that would have been 
 able to join the Spanish fleet. 
 
 16
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 advantage of the departure of the EngHsh blockading force to 
 leave port on May 14th ; on the 20th he entered Carthagena. 
 
 Bruix leaves Toulon on May 26th, convoys some vessels laden 
 with wheat to Genoa, and anchors at Vado on June 4th. He 
 sets out again on the 8th to make junction with the Spaniards 
 at Carthagena. During this passage, the French fleet passed 
 within a short distance of the English fleet, then composed of 
 twenty ships (through the meeting of Keith and Duckworth), 
 which was endeavoring to intercept it. Bruix then had only 
 twenty-two ships, and a meeting with the English no longer 
 ofifered him the same chances of success as before. But it was 
 written that fortune should favor the French to the end without 
 their dreaming of taking advantage of it. Bruix arrived without 
 hindrance at Carthagena, and set forth again on June 25th, at the 
 head of forty ships. Once more he found himself in the vicinity 
 of Lord Keith, who had returned to Mahon and had but twenty 
 ships to oppose him with." He preferred to ignore him and 
 kept on his course to Brest where the combined fleet anchored 
 on August 8th, after having put in at Cadiz. 
 
 Thus this long cruise of three and a half months served for 
 nothing more than to bring the Spanish fleet into the Channel. 
 Was that of any use? As soon as they arrived the Allies were 
 blockaded by Lord Bridport, reinforced by ships which had there- 
 tofore been engaged in watching the Spanish squadron at Cadiz. 
 Nothing then was altered, except that the English had but one 
 point to keep watch over instead of two. 
 
 Nevertheless, the movements of Bruix had not been useless; 
 Lord Bridport's fleet had remained immobilized on the Irish coast, 
 the blockade of Brest and that of Cadiz had been raised, and all 
 the English forces in the Mediterranean had found themselves 
 compromised, and, with them the possession of Minorca. The 
 orders and counter-orders of Jervis, the detachment that he sent 
 to Nelson at the moment when he himself feared being over- 
 whelmed by numbers, everything shows his apprehensions. To 
 take advantage of this situation, it was necessary to make an 
 encounter with the enemy the principal objective, otherwise the 
 
 " A reinforcement of five ships really arrived at Minorca on July 7th, 
 that is at the moment when the Allies had already gone out of the Med- 
 iterranean. It is then that Lord Keith started in pursuit of them with 
 thirty-one ships. 
 
 17
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 English must sooner or later be reinforced and the fruits of the 
 campaign were lost. That is what happened. 
 
 If Bruix had profited by the two chances that he had to carry 
 off an easy victory, his cruise would appear to us one of the 
 best-conceived strategic operations. As it was carried out, we 
 cannot comprehend it at all. During three months everything 
 was in confusion; all the plans of the Admiralty were upset; 
 then, little by little, everything settled back into the same position, 
 or an equivalent one. And so it will be every time that no event 
 happens to break the equilibrium of forces. 
 
 If the French navy had always sought battle, as the English 
 did, it would have seen brighter days ; not recognizing the effi- 
 cacy of fighting, it got itself beaten because it engaged in the 
 contest with defective instruments that were not prepared to 
 brave it. 
 
 Because of not having perceived the necessity of attacking the 
 military forces of the adversary there was undertaken, under 
 the Revolution and Empire, that long series of expeditions which 
 almost all failed miserably because their only chance of success 
 lay in avoiding the enemy.^" Certainly it is possible to pass un- 
 perceived across a sea which is guarded, but to do so cannot be 
 made a condition of success. War is not a game of hazard, and 
 even though chance does play a part, the destinies of the country 
 cannot be trusted to it. The miscarriage of all our enterprises 
 at this epoch proves that force is the sole logical base of all 
 military conceptions ; it proves likewise that an encounter is 
 with difficulty avoided when the enemy has decided to bring it 
 about. The best thing to do, therefore, is to prepare for it. 
 
 The only exceptions to this rule result from special conditions 
 or from temporary circumstances that we shall consider later on. 
 
 A nation which fears to stand up against an adversary superior 
 in numbers will always have a tendency to be sparing of its 
 material. It will allow itself to be easily led astray by a delusive 
 vision, and then it is that those specious theories appear which 
 pretend that a nation can be subjugated by raising the cost of 
 insurance. 
 
 " Anyone who reads attentively the history of Ganteaume's cruise in 
 the Mediterranean (1801) will see that it was fear of meeting the enemy 
 that made the expedition fail. 
 
 18
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 Those who imag-ine that war can be made in this way without 
 encountering the enemy have allowed themselves to be led away 
 by the attraction of more or less ingenious combinations, but they 
 never take account of the fact that the enemy has forces, and 
 that he will make use of them precisely for the purpose of de- 
 molishing all these speculations in which he is taken no account of. 
 
 To justify their system, they argue from our reverses and 
 draw the conclusion that battle is ineffective. Why, say they, 
 recommence a policy that has brought our worst disasters upon 
 us ? This reasoning will convince nobody. 
 
 In the operations of war, all previsions are founded upon suc- 
 cess. There is not, and there could not be, a plan of campaign 
 which in advance discounts defeat. It is quite natural, therefore, 
 that, each time when we have been beaten at sea, our naval power 
 should have undergone the consequences. This result, on the 
 contrary, only confirms the greatness of the moral and material 
 effects of battle ; for if, at Trafalgar and Aboukir, fortune, aided 
 by the genius of a leader and the valor of his men, had declared 
 in our favor and had given us a triumph as complete as that 
 which the English obtained, the situation would have been re- 
 versed. It is not the system of war in itself, therefore, that can 
 be incriminated : defeat alone is guilty. 
 
 And why were we defeated? 
 
 When we were inferior in numbers, the explanation is already 
 found, although the English have demonstrated to us that one 
 can conquer without superiority of numbers, and we shall make 
 an explanation on the subject further on; but at Trafalgar we 
 were superior in numbers, on other occasions there was equality, 
 and none the less we were crushed. Is this reason for giving 
 up in despair? Surely not, for the causes of this impotence are 
 not endemic: they can be remedied. Just now we have been 
 able to see that, disposing of the same means as our adversaries 
 in the American war, we used them in quite a different manner, 
 and it is to that that we must attribute the sterility of our efforts. 
 Under the Revolution it was the disorganization of our navy, 
 both as regards material and personnel, that made our ships in- 
 capable of facing an encounter, no matter what the conditions. 
 
 Let us have good officers, good crews, good ships ; let us know 
 how to fight; and, in our turn, not only will we be victors, but 
 we will gather from victory the same fruits as the English. 
 
 19
 
 1 
 
 1^" 
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 > As for indecisive battles, evidently they are unfruitful : when 
 two adversaries, disposing of identical means and knowing how 
 to use them, both expend the same amount of energy, they hold 
 themselves in check and between them the balance rests even. 
 There is then a disposition to seek another combination which may 
 break the equilibrium ; but this is not a reason for believing that 
 fighting is not still the best solution, and that any other would 
 not be a worse one." That one who first shall have sought to 
 escape from it, to pursue another objective, will be forced to 
 come back to it after having been well beaten. That is precisely 
 the spectacle oflfered us by the Dutch wars. The French navy 
 obeyed a sentiment of the same kind after the wars in which it 
 tried commerce destroying; disillusion with an impotent method 
 and return to the direct attack were signalized by an outburst of 
 ship building. 
 
 Against fighting, then, there is but a single plausible objection: 
 inferiority of number. This is serious. 
 
 Number, on condition that at the same time it represents force, 
 is the principal lever of war, but it is not the only one. What was 
 the Electorate of Brandenburg in comparison with the German 
 Empire? What did the English navy amount to in comparison 
 with that of Spain, under Elizabeth? None the less Prussia has 
 absorbed the Empire, and none the less the English navy beat the 
 Spanish navy. 
 
 Number, therefore, is not the ultima ratio of war. On the sea, 
 it carries with it many burdens that reduce its absolute value ; 
 the nation which has the most powerful navy is also the one which 
 has the most interests to safeguard, and which, therefore, has not 
 the power to set in motion its forces to the same extent as its ad- 
 versary. As a matter of fact, the English navy has never had, on 
 the field of battle, a manifest numerical superiority. Setting aside 
 the battle of La Hogue, which was the result of a political aberra- 
 tion, the forces have been sensibly equal in the majority of en- 
 counters. There have been some occasions where the dispropor- 
 tion of forces, without being so excessive as at La Hogue, was 
 nevertheless evident ; but the balance inclined in our favor as often 
 as in favor of the English. 
 
 " It is already quite a good deal to hold one's position and not to allow 
 one's self to be overrun.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 It is possible, then, to have effective forces less numerous than 
 those of the enemy, and yet not be driven to disproportionate com- 
 bats ; but yet it is certain that, below a certain limit, no amount 
 of skill can supply the want of numbers ; and then disaster is un- 
 avoidable. It does not result from this that attack on the enemy's 
 forces is not a necessity from which there is no escape, whether 
 we will or no ; " at the most we can conclude from it that France 
 must choose between the following two solutions: either to give^ 
 up the idea of being a naval power, or to take upon herself the 
 burdens necessary in order to carry on war to advantage. 
 
 It is the more important to be convinced of the necessity of battle 
 because this conviction has a direct effect upon the nature of mili- 
 tary preparations. Unless a preponderant role is ascribed to 
 battle, we shall be led, as we have been, to give to the naval forces 
 a heterogeneous composition, corresponding to diverse conceptions. 
 We may then find it impossible to face an encounter, not because 
 we lack means absolutely, but because the means are not suited to 
 the end. 
 
 " Otherwise there would be no advantage in being the stronger, since 
 strength would be of no use. We shall see, moreover, further on, that 
 there is not a single sort of maritime operation, not even commerce de- 
 stroying, that does not lead to the direct attack upon the military forces 
 of the enemy.
 
 III. 
 
 The Principal Objective. 
 
 From the fact that battle is the principal means of warfare it is 
 not necessary to conclude that we should always throw ourselves 
 blindly upon the enemy. It is evident that nothing is ever gained 
 by the useless sacrifice of ships, and when one is sure to be van- 
 quished it is better to try to avoid the contest. In such a case, be- 
 tween two evils, the least is to be chosen. Therefore, when it is 
 stated that before all else battle should be sought, it must be under- 
 stood by this that the strategic effort ought to aim at bringing upon 
 the field of battle the greatest force possible. We are now to ex- 
 amine into the methods that can be employed to attain this object. 
 
 At first sight it seems wholly natural to oppose to each fraction 
 of the hostile forces a fraction of one's own. Many wars have 
 been conducted without any other strategic rule. 
 
 This is a simple method when one possesses superiority of num- 
 bers. It may even be alleged that powers whose riches are de- 
 pendent upon the sea are obliged to adopt this strategy, because 
 they cannot abandon to the enterprises of the enemy any one of 
 their interests without exposing themselves to serious loss. They 
 must, therefore, ever3'where oppose to the enemy forces at least 
 ecjual to his in order to prevent him from doing harm. 
 
 With equality of forces, the system becomes less efficacious; 
 in such a case the war would take on the character of a succession 
 of separate combats, and, unless one's adversary were badly or- 
 ganized, it would be rash to assume to have the advantage every- 
 where. What was gained at one point might well be lost at 
 another. 
 
 Finally, in a struggle with an enemy of manifest superiority, 
 and one who is not completely disorganized (as our navy was 
 under the Revolution and the Empire), there is every chance of 
 being beaten. 
 
 Yet, if it is no longer possible to confront the enemy from the 
 moment that we are numerically inferior to him, we must suppress 
 the most glorious pages of our history, we must cease to admire 
 
 22
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 those men who have refused to yield to numbers and have been 
 victors. What, then, was their secret? It consisted in discerning 
 at what point it was necessary to strike in order to make the 
 adversary's whole power crumble at a single blow, and in neglect- 
 ing the rest of his forces, so as to be the stronger at the principal 
 point. And thus the partial successes that the enemy could secure 
 became fruitless. That is why military strategy teaches to attack 
 the principal army first. 
 
 It is the same upon the sea. 
 
 The characteristic of naval war between two nations having 
 colonies is that it extends over an immense area. The points of 
 contact between the belligerents are numerous, and they occur 
 particularly in regions where the two parties have common inter- 
 ests. But the influence that the attack or abandonment of these 
 interests can exercise upon the final result is not the same every- 
 where. Nations, like men, have a heart and members. If it is 
 possible to strike at the heart, it is useless and even hurtful to 
 expend one's energy in cutting off legs and arms. It is the heart, 
 therefore, that must be aimed at. 
 
 Nevertheless there is a reluctance to attack the principal center 
 of resistance of the enemy. It is often thought preferable to 
 pursue several objectives at the same time, because of unwilling- 
 ness to abandon anything; thus one's forces are employed in dis- 
 connected attacks and a decisive result is nowhere obtained be- 
 cause nowhere is a sufficient effort made. Sometimes one is led 
 astray by the temptation of any easy prey, and then successes are 
 won which are equivalent to defeats.'^ 
 
 As the enemy always accumulates his chief means of defense 
 in the region where he is most vulnerable, there is usually hesita- 
 tion to attack him there, and a solution is sought which is appar- 
 ently more simple. This is to draw back for a better leap ; for 
 an eccentric operation that leaves untouched the enemy's principal 
 
 " It is easy to show that a victory is not always worth winning. When 
 the Spanish government made Admiral Camara start for the Philippines 
 with the last naval reserves it made an impotent effort. The crux of the 
 situation was in Cuba ; it was there only that it was important to be the 
 victor; every ship drawn away from that field of battle compromised the 
 issue of the war, even if it won successes. This was finally recognized, 
 and Admiral Camara was recalled from Suez; but it would have been 
 much better to have reflected before starting him off in a wrong direction. 
 
 23
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 forces does not take from him the abihty to retrieve the situation, 
 and there is always risk of losing what has been gained. On the 
 contrary, when the resistance at the decisive point has been over- 
 come, the detachments that are operating elsewhere find them- 
 selves wholly compromised, and the source of their supplies is 
 dried up. Moreover, the weakness of these detachments prevents 
 their being dangerous, and their dispersion prevents them from be- 
 coming a serious menace by getting together. 
 
 This is above all true in naval wars where the communications 
 are often cut and where the distances from one point to another 
 are considerable. 
 
 The main fleet of the enemy, therefore, constitutes the principal 
 objective. This objective is generally easy to determine. Yet 
 there may be a doubt about it when the enemy has very numerous 
 forces at his disposition. In this case it is a question of judgment, 
 but it should not be lost sight of that the importance of a naval 
 force does not depend solely upon the region in which it operates, 
 as we shall see when discussing the influence of geography. 
 
 24
 
 IV. 
 
 Concentrations 
 
 When the principal army of the enemy has been determined, 
 all the resources of strategy should be employed to attack it under 
 favorable conditions. How is this to be done? Is it necessary 
 to concentrate in advance all one's forces face to face with the 
 objective one has in view? 
 
 We shall try to demonstrate that concentrations at the begin- 
 ning of the war^" are only advantageous for one who is the 
 stronger both upon land and on the sea. 
 
 Two cases may arise : the two sides are of about equal force, 
 or one of the two has a marked superiority over the other. 
 
 In the first case, a general concentration on one side will pro- 
 voke a similar operation on the other. This is inadequate, for a 
 struggle with equal arms affords no serious chance of annihilating 
 the enemy, unless one is engaged with a disorganized adversary; 
 he may be vanquished but he is not reduced to helplessness. But 
 it is not enough to be the victor; it is further necessary that the 
 enemy be so much punished that it becomes possible to benefit 
 
 " The word concentration evokes the idea of a grouping of forces ; we 
 believe, in fact, that war cannot be waged without grouping ships in squad- 
 rons or fleets. This necessity is denied by certain persons who, having 
 noticed that our naval disasters have been caused by the defeat of our 
 squadrons, have thence deduced with inexorable logic that removing the 
 cause will be all sufficient to suppress the effect. " If there no longer are 
 any squadrons, it is clear that they cannot be destroyed." 
 
 It is almost beneath one's dignity to refute such absurdities; yet it is 
 necessary to do so, since the public, ignorant of the aff'airs of war, accepts 
 in good faith everything that tends to furnish it with a method, as simple 
 as it is infallible, of conquering the enemy. 
 
 It may well be wondered at that the idea of preventing defeats by doing 
 away with armies did not sooner germinate in the minds of the famous 
 military leaders of the past, and that ever since wars began there has 
 been such an obstinate determination to collect troops together in armies. 
 It is above all to be regretted that we did not employ this new procedure 
 in 1870, and thus avoid the surrender of Metz and Sedan. 
 
 Perhaps it is because nothing else can be done. In fact, the war-ship, 
 
 25
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 by his defeat. This stands out very clearly from all the wars 
 in which a situation of this kind has occurred. In examining 
 them, we shall likewise see what the causes are that have led the 
 belligerents to meet upon a single battle field. 
 
 The most remarkable examples of general concentrations are 
 furnished to us by the English-Dutch wars. What strikes us at 
 the very first, in these wars, is the confined area of the theater 
 of operations. Except for a few filibustering expeditions to far- 
 off colonies, which, moreover, had no connection with the conduct 
 of the war, the fleets of the two countries, collected in two enor- 
 mous masses, invariably meet in that narrow strip of sea which 
 separates England from Holland. This peculiarity is easily ex- 
 plained. From the numerical point of view the forces were about 
 equal ; yet the importance of their commerce was a cause of in- 
 feriority in the Dutch, while England found in the extent of her 
 territory military resources that were lacking to her rivals. On 
 the other hand, though the maritime interests of both countries 
 are wide-spread, all those of Holland and the greater part of those 
 of England converge, in the form of merchant ships, upon the 
 North Sea. Concentration is necessary for Holland, for if she 
 diverts a part of her fleets to protect her commerce, she exposes 
 her frontier ; while by massing all her ships in the North Sea she 
 covers at once her territory and the point of convergence of her 
 convoys. England is obliged to act in the same way in order not 
 to find herself in a state of inferiority in this same region ; she like- 
 
 which is the tool with which war is made on the sea, exercises a threat 
 wherever it goes. In order to escape from the damages of every sort 
 that it can cause, it must be suppressed. Another ship will therefore be 
 opposed to it, and to be more certain of having the advantage, two will 
 be opposed, if possible. The first ship will then have to withdraw (unless 
 it is destroyed) until it can return with a reinforcement; in order not to 
 be beaten, the side to which it belongs will have to lessen the dispersion 
 of its forces so as to increase their resistance, and the other side will have 
 to do the same. Thus, little by little, the anxiety to be the stronger 
 leads each side to diminish the number of its objectives and to concen- 
 trate its forces in a few regions where there are vital interests to be safe- 
 guarded. If one cannot thus be the stronger, at least one is as little 
 weak as possible. 
 
 The composition of naval forces in divisions, squadrons and fleets re- 
 sults therefore from the fact that war is an act of force; and those who 
 pretend that war can be made without grouping one's forces not only 
 commit an error but state an absurdity. 
 
 26 
 
 I
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 wise has to cover the mouth of the Thames and to protect 
 Chatham, which at this period is her great war port." 
 
 Concentration, therefore, was forced upon hoth sides. This 
 necessity did not make itself clear at the first ; the solution of war 
 problems is much more the fruit of experience than the result of 
 reasoned calculations. Thus, during the first war, other systems 
 were tried, such as the direct protection of commerce and the 
 attack upon that of the enemy ; but the danger of this line of ac- 
 tion quickly revealed itself, and from the beginning of the second 
 war the concentrations are complete. 
 
 The war that Holland had to sustain against the united forces 
 of France and England presents the same character: the same 
 causes produce the same effects. 
 
 What were the results of these tremendous gatherings? Us- 
 ually the victory is in doubt, each side claims for itself the award : 
 which indicates that there was no great profit from the encounter. 
 There were some battles that resulted in a marked advantage for 
 one side, but the vanquished one retained sufficient strength to 
 prevent being annihilated, and the victor was only able to profit 
 momentarily by his victory. Both sides would be obliged to re- 
 enter port to make repairs ; the one that came out again first would 
 capture a few convoys, make some landings of no particular im- 
 portance; then he would be forced to cease his depredations on 
 account of the reappearance of the enemy. 
 
 With equal forces, therefore, the chances of subduing the enemy 
 are not sufficient; victories then merely give satisfaction to one's 
 vanity, and they cost too dear to make it possible to derive benefit 
 from them. In such a case concentration is not advantageous. 
 When circumstances make of it a necessity (as in the Dutch wars) , 
 an attempt must be made to break the balance of forces by a rapid 
 mobilization, in such a manner as to oppose the junction of the 
 hostile squadrons, and to overwhelm one of them. This first suc- 
 cess can then become the point of departure for others of more 
 importance.'* 
 
 Twice the English, following this plan, placed themselves bc- 
 
 " Occurrences showed that this port was not then safely protected from 
 a sudden attack. 
 
 "This is precisely what the Japanese did at the beginning of their war 
 with Russia, when they ignored the Russian division at Vladivostok to 
 concentrate their efforts against the Port Arthur squadron. 
 
 27
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 tween the fleets of Holland and of Zealand, in the wars already 
 cited, but the manoeuver failed for reasons that do not concern 
 us here. On the other hand, this method of procedure brought 
 about the victory of Beachy Head. At this period fleets only went 
 to sea during the season of good weather. Counting upon a respite 
 until the end of the winter, the English and Dutch had not yet 
 accomplished their concentration. A part of the Dutch ships had 
 not assembled ; Shovel was guarding the Irish coast and Killigrew 
 was delaying at Gibraltar. It was then that Tourville attacked 
 with seventy ships the fleet of Torrington, which formed the prin- 
 cipal force of the enemy, and beat it. 
 
 The era of concentrations did not close with the campaign of 
 1688, but the subsequent attempts made by the French either did 
 not result in an encounter or were failures. We shall only refer 
 to them, therefore, to bring out the fact that the threat of them 
 kept all the enemy's forces in the vicinity of the English coasts. 
 After 1689, moreover, they occurred under unfavorable conditions, 
 since we were already the inferior in numbers. In fact, it is evi- 
 dent that a concentration on the part of the w^eaker, effected at 
 the beginning of a war, provokes a sirhilar movement from the 
 enemy, who, being threatened only at a single point, has no reason 
 to divide his forces. Under these conditions, the issue can only be 
 disastrous to the one who, as a foregone conclusion, puts himself 
 in a state of inferiority. On the field of battle, the energy of the 
 combatants, the skill of the leaders, may furnish, as at La Hogue, 
 matter for a brilliant page of history, but they cannot obviate the 
 consequences of an unequal struggle. 
 
 In order that an initial concentration may be advantageous, one 
 must be at the same time the stronger on land and on sea (which 
 rarely happens in maritime wars). In fact, naval power being 
 a function of maritime wealth, a nation which brings all its forces 
 together at the same point abandons its commerce and its colonial 
 domain to the enterprises of the enemy. To scorn the damage 
 that it risks incurring from this fact, a country must have the 
 means of terminating the war at a single blow by invading the 
 enemy's territory. But this requires superiority on land and sea. 
 If the superiority exists only on the sea, a concentration will not 
 bring about that of the adversary, who will have, on the contrary, 
 every inducement to divide his forces to attack the points left 
 without defense. It may be said, therefore, that the concentration 
 
 28
 
 A Study of Nav/xl Strategy. 
 
 of the weaker determines that of the stronger, but that the opposite 
 is not true. Actually, from the moment that France gave up the 
 concentrations which she practiced up to Quiberon, the theater 
 of operations is seen to enlarge more and more in proportion with 
 the growth of England's colonial power. The latter, not being 
 able to attempt anything against our territory, and solicited on 
 all sides by her multiple interests, more and more divides her 
 forces when she is no longer threatened with invasion ; at the 
 end of the reign of Louis XIV, the war extends to the Mediter- 
 ranean ; under Louis XV, it involves the colonies which, till then, 
 had been visited only by flying squadrons or by expeditions under- 
 taken by private interests ; finally, under Louis XVI, fighting is 
 going on at once in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the 
 West Indies, in the East Indies, and on the coasts of America. 
 It is very nearly the same during the wars of the Revolution and 
 Empire. It can be observed, moreover, that it was always the 
 distribution of our forces that regulated the apportionment of 
 the English forces, because there came a time when maritime 
 wealth formed the principal element of our rival's prosperity and 
 was so closely bound up with his existence that he was obliged to 
 provide protection ever^^where before thinking of seizing anything. 
 Thus it is the weaker who chooses the field of battle, when he does 
 not adopt a passive attitude. Wherever he is, he constitutes a 
 menace and draws the enemy to him, and the latter is compelled 
 to have forces everywhere where he has them. 
 
 Furthermore, the nation which is the more powerful on the 
 sea will always seek to take preventive measures ; it will station 
 forces in regions where it has numerous interests to protect, with- 
 out waiting for them to be attacked ; the weaker, on the contrary, 
 finds advantage in neglecting a part of these forces which do not 
 tlireaten him, in order to concentrate all his efforts against others. 
 
 Since initial concentrations give no result, it should not be laid 
 down as a principle never to divide one's forces, for that is the 
 only way to oblige the enemy to divide his. Colomb remarks " 
 that the English were never so free from anxiety as when our 
 squadrons were brought together, because they then had but a 
 single force to keep watch over. 
 
 '^ Naval Warfare. 
 
 29
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 But the dividing up of forces ought to be done with discern- 
 ment. To compel the enemy to divide, each separate fraction must 
 by its strength and its position constitute a threat, and the different 
 fractions must not be so close together as to enable a single force 
 to look after them."* 
 
 Centers of action are thus established, similar to those that 
 were formed in our naval wars ; and it is then only that it can 
 be hoped to bring about an unexpected concentration. If the 
 sliips that operate in one or several of these centers succeed in 
 suddenly disappearing, and are lost in the immensity of the seas, 
 thev will be able to appear unexpectedly at another place where 
 they will furnish to the forces already there the addition needed 
 to give superiority. 
 
 Such is the principle of concentration ; but the application is 
 by no means so simple a matter. Success depends greatly on the 
 distance from the point of departure to the point of arrival, and 
 on the uncertainty that prevails regarding the destination of the 
 ships whose trace has been lost. If the latter have but a single 
 possible objective and only a short distance to traverse to reach it, 
 the enemy will immediately rush in their pursuit, and will be 
 able to arrive before their presence has produced any effect. On 
 the contrary, if the enemy is obliged to choose between several 
 possibilities, he may start upon a false scent, as Colpoys, Nelson 
 and Bridport did, or may remain where he is in fear of an offen- 
 sive return. 
 
 ^° For example, it would be an error to divide our Mediterranean squad- 
 ron into two parts, distributed between Toulon and Bizerta. In so narrow 
 a sea, the enemy can hold the two forces in check without himself divid- 
 ing, and, since they can do nothing before making a junction, their initial 
 separation compromises them uselessly by exposing them to the chance 
 of being beaten in detail. If, instead of two centers, one's forces are 
 distributed between three or four, the consequences are still graver: the 
 enemy, by remaining concenrrated, has such great chances of interfering 
 with a junction that he can afford to oppose to all these detachments only 
 one central force inferior to their sum. 
 
 It is also an error to station a division of the Northern squadron at 
 Brest and another at Cherbourg. By itself each is too weak to be dan- 
 gerous ; all that results therefore is the anxiety of bringing them together, 
 which is always a risky operation. 
 
 30 
 
 I
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 We have already seen a concentration of this sort in the case 
 of Bruix's cruise in the Mediterranean ; we shall see a still more 
 striking example of it in Napoleon's great strategic operation. 
 From these trials it stands forth clearly that the number and 
 amplitude of the combinations to which displacements of forces 
 give rise depend upon the importance and dispersion of the 
 adversary's maritime interests. The weaker side will here find, 
 therefore, if not compensation, at least an attenuation of his 
 numerical inferiority. 
 
 The conditions of navigation under sail were a hindrance to a 
 system of operations requiring a certain concordance of move- 
 ments ; great elasticity had to be given to plans in order to allow 
 for difficulties and delays which the strength and direction of 
 the wind might create. The regularity of movement of steam 
 vessels, in conjunction with the precision of navigation, should 
 partly do away with these obstacles. But we find others of a 
 different sort: rightly or wrongly, modern navies have in different 
 regions ships of different types whose union would form a hetero- 
 geneous assemblage, and they are also encumbered with a whole 
 class of ships whose small radius of action is not adapted to any 
 strategic conception. These causes do not permit giving to opera- 
 tions the development they might have. Nevertheless, advantage 
 can be derived from concentrations in some well-defined cases, 
 and particularly by providing for co-operation between our foreign 
 stations. 
 
 The preceding considerations can only be applied to nations that 
 have world-wide maritime interests, which multiplies points of 
 contact with the enemy and in time of peace causes a certain 
 scattering of naval forces. But, when the conflict is localized in 
 a narrow theater, either by reason of its very nature or on account 
 of the feeble forces of the belligerents, there is no occasion to go 
 far afield with complicated combinations ; it is then always best to 
 concentrate in order to offer the maximum resistance. This solu- 
 tion may not be very good, but it will certainly be the least bad. 
 It frequently happens so, in military question, that one is obliged to 
 be content with the lesser ill. 
 
 If, at the beginning of the late war, the Russians, in pursuit 
 of I know not what deep laid schemes, had not divided their forces 
 
 31
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 between Port Arthur and Vladivostok, they would have been in 
 a better position to assume the offensive in the month of May. 
 
 On the other hand, the Japanese, concentrating their forces in 
 the Yellow Sea and ignoring the Vladivostok division, were good 
 strategists. 
 
 32
 
 V. 
 
 Interior Lines. 
 
 The available means are not always sufficient for an attack 
 upon the main army of the enemy. When the disproportion of 
 forces is too great, this must be renounced. It then becomes neces- 
 sary to seek to beat him in detail. The method which seems most 
 attractive is that which utilizes interior lines. " Interior lines of 
 operation are those that an army constitutes for itself when facing 
 a hostile army having several lines of operations, and to which 
 is given a direction such that the different corps can be brought 
 together and their movements co-ordinated with a view to com- 
 mon action before the enemy can oppose to them a greater 
 force." ^ 
 
 In the navy, operations by interior lines present themselves in 
 a much more simple form ; we operate by interior lines when we 
 place the whole of our forces between two hostile squadrons in 
 order to beat them one at a time. This is called the method " of 
 interior lines " because the position chosen places the central body 
 at a less distance from each hostile fraction than that which sep- 
 t^es them one from the other. 
 
 We have seen that on two occasions the English established 
 their entire fleet off the Texel to prevent the junction of the 
 squadrons of Holland and Zealand in 1788. In the same manner 
 the English squadron stood on and off before Ouissant to inter- 
 cept Tourville bringing the Mediterranean contingent into the 
 Channel. When Jervis wished to prevent Bruix from reaching 
 Carthagena, where the Spanish fleet was, he stationed Keith at 
 Cape St. Sebastian. These three examples show us three different 
 applications of interior lines, and we shall have occasion to cite 
 others, for they are frequently made use of. 
 
 The employment of interior lines affords a convenient means 
 of making up for inferiority of number ; yet the advantages that 
 can be derived from it are not always positive ; they depend 
 greatly on the ratio between the central body and the sum of 
 
 " Jomini. 
 
 3 33
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the two others. When this ratio is near unity, one should always 
 seek to utilize interior lines. If the operation succeeds, a decisive 
 victory is won in the first encounter, thanks to the disproportion 
 of forces, and the chance is good of not being too much used up 
 to enter upon a second battle. If the operation fails, and the 
 enemy manages to concentrate, nothing is compromised. 
 
 When the two squadrons against which one is acting are of 
 unequal force, preference should be given to engaging first the 
 stronger, because, if the enemy, after a defeat, seeks to avoid 
 a second encounter, the means at his disposition are no longer 
 of importance. 
 
 The most favorable circumstances for the utilization of interior 
 lines occur at the beginning of the war, under the conditions that 
 we have already considered apropos of concentrations, that is 
 when the forces of the two opponents are sensibly equal. 
 
 In the case where the central body is but slightly superior to 
 each of the other two, it finds itself in a situation which it may 
 be necessary to accept, but which should never be sought. If the 
 hostile forces succeed in joining each other, it finds itself in a 
 desperate situation. But the eventuality of a junction is one of 
 those that must always be reckoned with, since interior lines offer 
 a good chance, rather than the certainty, of interfering with i 
 all the geometrical combinations that can be made to prevent it 
 go to pieces in the presence of mobile forces free to choose what- 
 ever route pleases them. The uncertainty that results from this 
 often leads to the blockading of one of the forces in a port and 
 opposing the entry of the other force. This manner of acting 
 ofifered advantages in the days of sailing ships, because the wind 
 that favored access to the port at the same time prevented the 
 exit of the ships that were within it. To-day this obstacle has 
 disappeared ; and the blockading squadron would scarcely have 
 begun its fight with the enemy coming from without when it 
 would become necessary to meet the one that it was holding in 
 confinement. The best that can happen will be to encounter one 
 of the hostile divisions before the other can come to succor it ; 
 which can only happen through the aid of a conjunction of lucky 
 chances. The operation will then have fully succeeded ; but what 
 will be its result? The disproportion of forces will not be suffi- 
 cient for the first victory not to have been dearly bought, and 
 it will be found impossible to dare a second encounter. Thereupon 
 
 34
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the division of the hostile forces which did not fight will remain 
 mistress of the sea." 
 
 To sum up, it seems that, when the body which acts by interior 
 lines has not a force equal to that of the other two combined, 
 the advice of von der Goltz can be accepted : he says on this sub- 
 ject: " It is a mistake to speak in a general way of the advan- 
 tages of interior lines, for the general situation of the one who 
 is upon the interior line is almost always very critical. . . . All 
 that can be said is that this situation would be still more critical 
 if, for any reason, freedom of movement to and fro between the 
 different hostile groups was lost." 
 
 There are cases in which one finds himself on interior lines 
 by force of circumstances, and without having sought that posi- 
 tion. The greatest fault that can then be committed is to divide 
 one's forces to oppose a detachment to each of the enemy's de- 
 tachments ; yet this is a frequent error, so natural is the sentiment 
 that urges us to face in all directions at once. In the second 
 Dutch war, the English had detached Rupert with some twenty 
 ships to await along the southern coast of England the Duke of 
 Beaufort's squadron, which was to make a junction with the 
 Dutch. The danger incurred by the English fleet owing to 
 Rupert's departure was perceived too late ; and when the latter 
 rejoined Monk, the Four-Days' battle had been going on for two 
 days. In 1805, Cornwallis was ofif Brest watching Ganteaume, 
 and had just been reinforced by a part of Nelson's squadron and 
 by that of Calder, when he learned that Villeneuve was on the 
 Spanish coast. He then separated his forces in two and sent 
 Calder to the south, which Napoleon characterized by saying it 
 was the height of imbecility .^^ 
 
 We have seen that the Japanese were very careful not to commit 
 this error before the attack of P'ebruary 8th. 
 
 ^This is what would result if our Mediterranean squadron placed itself 
 at Bizerta to prevent the junction of the English Mediterranean squadron 
 that is stationed at Malta and the Channel squadron that would come by 
 way of Gibraltar. After a first action, the English would remain in com- 
 mand of the sea. 
 
 ^ There are still other examples of interior lines, but they do not bear 
 upon the subject we are considering. 
 
 35
 
 VI. 
 
 The I'or.iCY of Guarantees. 
 
 We have already said that it is always necessary to endeavor 
 to attack the principal hostile army, and we have discussed the 
 different methods that have been employed to come upon the field 
 of battle in superior force. But the method last referred to, that 
 of interior lines, is only good under special circumstances that may 
 very well be absent ; and the first one needs to be favored by geo- 
 graphical conditions. In short, it is not always possible to bring 
 the main effort to bear at the most sensible point." 
 
 Recourse is then had to what an officer of high rank has hap- 
 pily called " the policy of guarantees " : this consists of seizing 
 securities, the possession of which does enough harm to the enemy 
 to induce him, in the impossibility of recovering them, to give 
 up the struggle. From the day when the Americans got a foot- 
 hold in Cuba, the Spaniards, bereft of a navy, despaired of being 
 able to drive them out and began to negotiate for peace. 
 
 The policy of guarantees is particularly suitable to naval war- 
 fare because the coveted points are generally colonies, to attack 
 which requires the aid of the fleet. The impulse to practice it 
 is irresistible when engaged in a contest with a colonial power: 
 it appears that the required effort will thus be lessened, which 
 is not always true, as we shall see in connection with the war 
 of American Independence. It was one of the characteristics of our 
 numerous wars with England, and it must be recognized that it 
 was a forced condition of the respective situations of the two op- 
 posing countries : England, unable to land troops in France with- 
 
 '* Thus it is not easy to see how, in the Spanish-American War, the 
 Americans could have recruited and carried across the Atlantic a sufficient 
 army to penetrate to the heart of Spain : the effort would have been out of 
 proportion to the risks to be run and the result to be gained. On her 
 side, Spain no longer had soldiers available for attempting the same opera- 
 tion ; her army was insufficient and the state of her finances did not per- 
 mit of any more large expenditures. It would have been useless therefore 
 for either of the belligerents to carry the war to the immediate neighbor- 
 hood of the enemy's coasts with a view to preparing the way for an 
 army of invasion. 
 
 36
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 out affording us upon land the favorable field of battle which we 
 did not find at sea, was drawn by the lure of our colonies ; the 
 squadrons that she kept on the coasts of Europe had no other pur- 
 pose but to guarantee her against invasion. The instant that 
 danger disappeared, in consequence of our defeats, she carried the 
 whole effort of the war to the colonies ; and, in the impossibility 
 of doing anything else, we were obliged to follow her example. 
 
 Two conditions are necessary in order that the policy of guar- 
 antees may lead to the end proposed. 
 
 The first is that suitable dispositions be taken to prevent the 
 enemy from doing on his side what we are doing on ours : in 
 carrying out the line of conduct adopted, we must be able to 
 attack the enemy's places without immobilizing our squadrons 
 to defend our own. Naval forces can only provide colonies with 
 indirect protection by hastening in pursuit of the hostile ships in 
 order to fight them ; they thus deprive the adversary of his means 
 of transport and open the way to the offensive. While the squad- 
 rons seek the enemy afloat, the colonies are abandoned provision- 
 ally to their own resources; they ought, therefore, to have a 
 sufficient strength of resistance to be safe from a sudden raid."' 
 If the precaution has not been taken to garrison them strongly, 
 an exchange of guarantees is all that results. That is what hap- 
 pened during the war of American Independence: we took from 
 the English Dominica, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, St. Christo- 
 phers, Trincomalee and Florida, while the English took from us 
 St. Pierre and Miquelon, St. Lucia, St. Eustatius, St. Martin and 
 Pondicherry. Hostilities might thus have been indefinitely pro- 
 longed. If France, which (for the first time perhaps) had her 
 whole army available, had increased her garrisons (which England 
 at this time could not do to the same extent), and if above all she 
 had begun by subordinating every other enterprise to the destruc- 
 tion of the enemy's fleet, the presence of which always renders any 
 new conquest precarious, the result would have been different.^ 
 
 The second condition imposed by the policy of guarantees is 
 a judicious choice of the securities which it is proposed to seize. 
 
 " It is important, moreover, to note that it is the garrison of the col- 
 onies that is drawn upon to attack hostile colonies, when sea communica- 
 tion is free. 
 
 ^' The almost complete abandonment of the colonies during the peace 
 interfered with all the operations. From the beginning of the war, con- 
 
 37
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy.' 
 
 An error of appreciation in the value of the guarantee may 
 lead to a result diametrically opposed to the one sought, and play 
 the game of the adversary against whom we exhaust ourselves 
 in fruitless struggles. 
 
 It was this error that made the war between France and China 
 drag out so : faithful to her naval traditions, France, not wishing 
 to involve herself deeply, sought to secure possession of a guar- 
 antee which she had no intention of retaining, but by means of 
 which she expected to bring pressure to bear upon the Celestial 
 Empire. She resolved, therefore, to occupy Keelung and Tamsui. 
 Let us observe at the very beginning that these two places form 
 but an insignificant part of Formosa, and that the size of that 
 island furnished the enemy with means of resistance out of all 
 proportion with the small number of troops that it was desired 
 to devote to the expedition. When it is only meant to make an 
 eiifort limited in advance, a country whose local resources are 
 a constant support to the enemy must not be attacked. That was 
 a first error. 
 
 The second consisted in the geographic position of the guaran- 
 tee, which was much too far removed from the center of affairs 
 to have an influence upon the issue of the war. Admiral Courbet, 
 as is well known, went to Formosa unwillingly ; in his despatches 
 he maintained that it was needful to strike closer to the head, 
 and he proposed the blockade of rice and the taking of Port 
 Arthur. A partial adoption of his views sufficed to bring the 
 Chinese to submit; but the efiforts fruitlessly expended at For- 
 mosa did not permit our being exacting, and the self-esteem of 
 the Son of Heaven had scarcely at all to suffer from the condi- 
 tions of the peace. 
 
 To sum up, the policy of guarantees requires great certainty 
 of judgment and means properly related to the end. As it is 
 usuallv adopted to avoid too great sacrifices, this latter considera- 
 
 voys had to be formed, which, Hke all passive forces, can escape the enemy 
 only on condition of not meeting him, because, the force of escort being 
 usually known, it is easy to oppose to it superior forces ; the ships allotted 
 to the conduct of convoys diminished by just so much our squadrons. See, 
 in this connection, the battle of Cape Finisterre (May 3, I747), and that 
 of M. de I'Etenduere (October 14, 1747)- 
 
 38
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 tion is of importance, because the tendency is to provide too 
 slenderly."' In itself it does not constitute a moral expedient ; 
 often it even amounts to causing more fright than harm. It is 
 necessary, therefore, to estimate correctly the moral force of 
 the adversary. 
 
 This system will be employed only in case nothing else can 
 be done, and then without too great faith in its absolute efificacy. 
 It must not be lost sight of, however, that, if the adversary 
 possesses naval forces, the policy of guarantees presents, in a 
 narrow field, the same characteristics as naval operations which 
 threaten directly the vital interests of the belligerents. It has an 
 absolute advantage only in case the position of the guarantee 
 permits collecting there forces superior to those of the enemy, 
 which can happen when the desired possessions are at once far 
 separated from the center of the enemy's power and near the 
 great bases of operations at one's own disposal.^' 
 
 On the other hand it can be made use of advantageously as 
 a means of compelling the enemy to fight in a determined zone 
 where he is inferior in forces ; when the mission of ships is to 
 protect a region, threatening a single point is sufficient to make 
 them hasten there. Most battles have no other cause, and it is 
 for this reason that almost all have taken place near the coast line. 
 
 "^ It was the anxiety to limit expense which gave rise to the method of 
 taking half measures, the fatal consequences of which are borne in mind 
 by all who took part in the Tonkin and Dahomey campaigns, and the first 
 Madagascar expedition. Much more was expended, a little at a time, 
 than would have been necessary to end those wars at a single blow. 
 
 ^ This was the case for the Americans in their last war : Cuba was 
 near their coasts and too far from Spain for her to be able to bring all 
 her forces into the theater of operations. When the war was declared, 
 comparisons between the effective forces of the two countries were made 
 by all writers; not one took account of the geographic situation. 
 
 39
 
 VII. 
 
 Alliances. 
 
 Maritime alliances usually have not had the fortunate results 
 expected from them. The everlasting recriminations that the 
 allies are not sparing of between themselves stand out most 
 cons])icuously from them. 
 
 In 1666, the Dutch complain of being deserted by the French ; 
 and, considering the slowness with which the Duke of Beau- 
 fort moved, the reproach appears well founded. Some years later, 
 the French find themselves allied with the English in two con- 
 secutive campaigns, and the latter make such accusations against 
 the Count d'Estrees that Louis XIV orders an investigation. In 
 1676 the Dutch do not appear to have been satisfied with the 
 help of the Spaniards when they were united against Duquesne. 
 
 At Beachy Head, France was avenged for the attacks which 
 the English had made upon her: the Dutch loudly accused Tor- 
 rington of having let them be crushed by Tourville's van.'"' 
 
 All these reproaches were ill founded: it frequently happens 
 in a battle that one part of the line has to endure more than 
 another part, but that does not show that there is any defection ; 
 the enemy alone is guilty ; when allies distrust one another, they 
 cry treason the moment that fortune abandons them. 
 
 During the whole reign of Louis XIV, the Dutch continued to 
 make common cause with the English ; but it seems that at this 
 time there was complete harmony. 
 
 Then came the French-Spanish alliances. At the battle of 
 Toulon, de Court extricates the Spaniards by a skilful manoeuver, 
 and, for his thanks, Admiral Navarro, who behaved in a shameful 
 manner, complains bitterly of him.'" 
 
 During the American war, the two allied governments have 
 great difficulty in agreeing. Each draws the cover to its own 
 side and wishes the alliance to serve only its own interests. Then 
 
 ^ It was apropos of this that it was written : " In this battle, victory was 
 for the French, glory for the Dutch and shame for the English." 
 ^He was made Due de la Victoire, while de Court fell into disgrace. 
 
 40
 
 A Study of Naval Stkategy, 
 
 a middle course is adopted, and war is waged, sometimes in tiie 
 north for the account of France, sometimes in the south to the 
 profit of Spain. The result is what might be expected : nothing. 
 The combined fleets are no more than disorderly mobs. I refrain 
 from mentioning the conflicts for precedence, 
 
 Holland is also our ally in this war: she keeps ofif by herself. 
 
 Under the Empire, there could be no question of Spain's dis- 
 cussing with Napoleon on a footing of equality. Her navy had 
 to content itself with being purely and simply in tow of ours ; 
 but it was only a burden upon us. Villeneuve does not get over 
 having Spanish ships in his squadron. 
 
 In short, naval alliances would have displayed their impotence 
 more than anything else if the battle of Navarino had not come 
 to demonstrate that emulation sometimes prevails over prejudices. 
 
 In the beginning, the only object of alliances was to carry 
 on war cheaply ; each party stipulated the number of ships he 
 would furnish, and the responsibility of doing more was left 
 to the other, if he judged it opportune. Great care was taken to 
 do nothing in the way of drawing the chestnuts out of the fire. 
 
 The treaty likewise mentioned the claims of each party, and 
 it was promised not to make peace except in common, after 
 having won success. Naturally, as soon as fortune became un- 
 favorable, all promises were forgotten, and each treated as best 
 he could. 
 
 This way of regulating the efifort of each ally was evidently 
 a permanent cause of misfortune, since there was no plan of 
 putting new life into the war, while the designation of the ob- 
 jects to be sought gave a wholly wrong direction to the operations : 
 it was never possible to make Spain comprehend that the keys 
 to the citadel of Gibraltar were to be found in London. 
 
 As the character of warfare has changed, so, too, has the 
 character of alliances : henceforth each will pledge all his forces 
 without restrictions and without bargaining. But the elaboration 
 of the plan of campaign may give rise to serious difficulties. 
 
 There are almost always, in a war, a certain number of dis- 
 agreeable operations which yield more trouble than honor. Such 
 as these nobody cares for. Moreover, each nation sees things 
 from its own particular point of view, in a special perspective ; 
 and agreement is hard to establish. 
 
 This first difficulty overcome, the question of the supreme com- 
 
 4 41
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 mand forms a new source of friction. If it is possible, without 
 compromising the issue of the war, to make each ally act on a 
 separate battle field, this solution will always be preferable. 
 
 Failing this, it will be necessary to form special units of the 
 forces of each nationality, and to leave them under the command 
 of their own chiefs. The error will thus be avoided which we fell 
 into when we intermingled the Spanish ships and our own.'' 
 
 It will remain true none the less that an allied fleet will always 
 be less redoubtable than a fleet of the same force composed of 
 elements of a single nationality. The Commander-in-Chief will 
 not be able to handle the different units in his own way ; each 
 navy has a manner of manoeuvering peculiar to itself ; it has its 
 own ideas and traditions. The question of signals will be equally 
 difficult to settle. Thus there are several causes of inferiority 
 for which superior number is the only compensation. If the 
 enemy is not of almost equal force, this will be much ; otherwise 
 it will be insufficient. 
 
 Since we may hope in the future not to find ourselves alone 
 facing the naval enemy, let us wish that everything may be done 
 a long time in advance to remove all the obstacles that have so 
 often impeded the progress of allied navies, and that, when the 
 time of struggle comes, there may survive no other sentiment than 
 that of emulation, which, on the field of battle, accomplishes great 
 things. 
 
 '^ It is true that this was done with the object of preventing their playing 
 the part of Cleopatra's galleys at the battle of Actium.
 
 SECOND PART 
 
 THE ELEMENTS OF NAVAL STRATEGY
 
 1. 
 
 Offensive and Defensive. 
 
 After having passed in review the methods that strategy has at 
 its disposal, we have to consider what the elements are that 
 strengthen or weaken its action. These elements are of a very 
 variable nature, and first among them are found the offensive 
 and the defensive. 
 
 The offensive, it is said, is the weapon of the strong; the de- 
 fensive, that of the weak. This is true on land : armies, in propor- 
 tion as they separate themselves from their bases to penetrate into 
 the hostile country, distribute along the route a part of their forces 
 to keep guard over the safety of their communications. It is 
 natural, consequently, that the weaker side should prefer to remain 
 in its own territory in order to have the whole of its forces avail- 
 able. Its numerical inferiority is further compensated by the 
 defensive works that it will have been wise enough to accumulate 
 in the path of invasion. With the aid of these obstacles, it will 
 arrest the enemy's progress long enough to ascertain the situation 
 and to mass its troops at the desired point with the help of its 
 interior network of railroads. 
 
 This system of operations is justifiable if it leads to battle. 
 If the contest turns to the advantage of the weaker, he destroys 
 the cohesion of his adversary ; demoralizes him, takes from him 
 prisoners, who are pledges. He can thus restore the balance 
 of numbers and in his turn assume the offensive. 
 
 The naval defensive is quite a different affair. A fleet can 
 scarcely, at the present time, make up for its numerical inferiority 
 by supporting itself with fixed defenses. It only secures the assist' 
 ance of coast batteries in the interior of roadsteads or in the chan- 
 nels that give access to them ; but roadsteads and channels are not 
 fields of battle that can be highly regarded in a naval war. More- 
 over, defense in this sense falls within the scope of tactics, and it 
 is not apparent how strategy can force the enemy to accept combat 
 under such conditions.'' 
 
 ^^ Fixed defences have often furnished material assistance to fleets of 
 sailing ships. When these ships found themselves compelled to fight near 
 
 •^5
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 On the sea the defensive is rather a question of words than one 
 of fact. This is the consequence of the rather peculiar character 
 of naval forces. 
 
 The army to which we were alluding has to assure the safety of 
 its territory and to impose upon the enemy the law of the stronger ; 
 it has attained its double object when it has invaded the territory 
 of its adversary, taking from him thus every means of continuing 
 the contest. 
 
 The navy, for its part, cannot take possession of the land ; it has 
 been created to guard maritime interests, whether those that pass 
 to and fro over the seas or those that have gathered in ports. 
 When a war breaks out, the role of the navy becomes very com- 
 plex. It always retains the mission of protecting wealth that is 
 afloat, a mission so much the more imperative as this wealth forms 
 a greater part of the national capital ; but besides this, it must keep 
 guard over the seas to prevent every attempt at invasion of the 
 home country or her colonies. This latter is the defensive part of 
 its task. But not all of it : the struggle having been entered upon, 
 it is necessary to strive to get the upper hand, and this leads to 
 attacking in the adversary's country the interests that one protects 
 in his own. This is the offensive side. The navy thus has very 
 diverse problems to solve ; it is pulled about by multiple necessities. 
 Not being able to make headway everywhere at once, it is obliged to 
 choose between the protection of its own interests and the attack 
 upon those of its adversary, and, according as it has more to lose 
 or to gain, it adopts the defensive or the offensive. Considering 
 things from this very broad point of view, it may be concluded that 
 it is the weaker power which attacks and the stronger which de- 
 fends itself, since naval power is proportional to the magnitude of 
 maritime interests. This is just what happened in our struggles 
 with England : she only assumed the offensive against our colonies, 
 
 a coast, they anchored near the shore or ran themselves aground, and dis- 
 embarked a part of their artillery to defend the two ends of the line. A 
 squadron thus supported was considered to hold a very strong position, and 
 the enemy rarely risked attacking it (see the maneuver of Harrington and 
 of Parker at St. Lucia, and that of Linois at Algeciras). Suffren did not 
 share this opinion. Considering the short range of artillery at that time, 
 it is probable that the effect of such improvised batteries was of a purely 
 moral order. At Aboukir, as is well known, Brueys supported the head of 
 his line with a battery of two mortars and four 12-pounder guns, whose 
 shot did not reach the English ships that doubled the line. 
 
 46
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 which were all she coveted, after she had defended herself 
 victoriously.^ 
 
 But when we inquire how this theoretical defensive has been 
 put into effect, we learn that it has led directly to the offensive 
 against the hostile squadrons, the sole means of taking away from 
 the adversary the possibility of doing harm. This sort of defen- 
 sive is, therefore, of political rather than military order. 
 
 Of what then does consist the defensive properly so called, that 
 which furnishes to those who practise it a compensation for their 
 numerical inferiority ? 
 
 Does it consist of shutting oneself up in harbors, according to a 
 system that has had numerous partisans in recent years ? 
 
 Such a method of procedure has no connection with any defen- 
 sive system — it leads simply to inaction. It is only justifiable if 
 it procures advantages for those who make use of it. But what 
 are those advantages ? 
 
 The force that immobilizes itself inside of a harbor is inevitably 
 blockaded ; if the relative situations of blockader and blockaded are 
 examined, it is easy to see that the former has all the advantage. 
 He secures freedom of the seas behind him : according to the 
 English saying, he carries the frontier of his country to the shores 
 of the enemy, and, within this frontier, security is absolute. 
 Therefore, the blockader reaps a positive reward. 
 
 The blockaded does no harm to the enemy, and he does not pre- 
 vent the latter from doing harm ; he assures his own existence 
 without safeguarding the interests which he is charged to defend. 
 It is true that he immobilizes forces equal or superior to his own, 
 but what is the good of that when he derives no benefit from it? 
 Therefore, he secures from his inaction only a negative result. 
 Moreover, many will think that it is better not to build the costly 
 and complicated machines called warships, if they are not to be 
 utilized. 
 
 ^ This characteristic of our naval wars is very marked : in the war of the 
 League of Augsburg, the attacks upon our colonies only become serious 
 after the battle of La Hogue; under Louis XV, the taking of Canada and 
 of our East Indian possessions follow the disaster of Quiberon ; under 
 the Revolution and Empire, the loss of our last colonies is subsequent to 
 Trafalgar. 
 
 We do not speak of the war of the Spanish Succession, because that was 
 one of those in which politics constantly directed operations, and in which 
 the movements of fleets were subordinated to those of armies. 
 
 47
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Doubtless there are circumstances under which a naval force is 
 obliged to shut itself up in port to escape from certain destruction ; 
 but then it obeys an imperious necessity. In such a case we can- 
 not consider that it has gained the advantages that it should prop- 
 erly derive from a true defensive system. Those who advocate 
 withdrawal within harbors forget thrt it was forced upon us 
 despite ourselves from 1793 to 1814 and that it never led to any- 
 thing advantageous except for the enemy ; England was anxious 
 only when one of our squadrons became active again bv getting 
 out." 
 
 Does the defensive consist in the act of devoting oneself ex- 
 clusively to protecting the coast? Without at present discussing 
 the amount of money and the naval forces that would be necessary 
 to assure directly the defense of the coast, it may be perceived that 
 colonial nations would get only losses from a policy which made 
 that the sole objective of naval warfare. Its immediate conse- 
 quence would be the abandonment of the high seas to the enemy's 
 enterprises and the stoppage of all maritime commerce. Moreover, 
 admitting the colonies to be strongly enough garrisoned to resist 
 attack (which would require a deployment of forces comporting 
 ill with a defensive system), communications with the mother 
 country would be interrupted and far distant possessions left to 
 their own resources. A situation of this sort could not last long 
 without bringing about disturbances in the economic life of the 
 mother country. But what would put an end to it? The enemy 
 would suffer no damage either in his constituted forces or in his 
 interests; the war would not be a serious burden for him, and he 
 would have every advantage in prolonging it. Moreover, one can- 
 not enter upon a contest wthout possessing any means of putting 
 an end to it by the injury done to one's adversary. Protection of 
 the coast does not furnish this means. 
 
 Finally a third defensive system can be envisaged consisting of 
 awaiting the enemy at home in order to utilize all one's resources 
 of whatever nature. If the two belligerents are separated from one 
 another by a wade extent of sea, this kind of defensive is advan- 
 tageous for the weaker side. It can bring to bear the totality of its 
 
 "What advantage did the Russians gain by shutting themselves up in 
 Port Arthur? That of delaying the moment when they were obliged to 
 destroy their own ships ; but the Japanese availed themselves of it to land 
 in Manchuria. 
 
 48
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 means of action, while its adversary in going to attack it must 
 deprive himself of all his ships of small radius of action. 
 
 Unfortunately, these favorable circumstances never occur in 
 practice. It may happen that two nations separated by wide 
 stretches of sea make war upon one another, but between them are 
 found disputed interests whose possession usually is the object of 
 the strife. Thenceforth, one is no longer free to adopt a defensive 
 attitude ; it is necessary to carry the war wherever the enemy 
 carries it ; for to defend oneself is not to let oneself be beaten with- 
 out doing anything. 
 
 The Spanish-American war affords us an example of this kind. 
 If Spain had not possessed Cuba and Porto Rico in the neighbor- 
 hood of the American coast, there would not have been any con- 
 flict.^ When it broke forth, the Spaniards would have had all the 
 more advantage in awaiting the enemy at home, because the 
 American Navy was burdened with coast-defense ships that could 
 not cross the Atlantic ; but they were not free to choose their 
 theater of operations, nor to adopt the kind of warfare that suited 
 them. The force of events led them to the other side of the 
 Atlantic. Thus it was the weaker side that had to deprive itself 
 of a part of its forces."*" 
 
 When the two adversaries have common sea frontiers, the weaker 
 no longer has an interest in waiting near his own coast for the 
 enemy, since he no longer can prevent almost the whole of the 
 hostile forces from coming to fight him there. AVe shall even see, 
 by studying operations in detail, that taking station along the 
 coast, far from compensating for a numerical inferiority, only 
 aggravates it. 
 
 In short, the naval defensive, under whatever form it presents 
 itself, offers only disadvantages ; one may be obliged to submit to 
 it, but should never seek it. On the one hand as on the other, we 
 are led to assume the offensive, that is, to seek the enemy to fight 
 him. But the two sides do not carry out this purpose in the same 
 way. 
 
 The stronger will always rush to meet the dififerent squadrons 
 of the adversary to destroy them as soon as possible, before they 
 
 " Just as our difficulties with China began after the taking of Cochin 
 China and were kept up by the occupation of Tonkin. 
 
 ** Which proves that one ought not to have several kinds of fighting 
 ships, since it is not known what sort of war one will be obliged to enter 
 upon. 
 
 49
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 have had time to do harm. The weaker will seek first to make the 
 adversary lose touch with him in order to rearrange his forces and 
 create an unexpected situation ; then he will seek to draw his ad- 
 versary onto a favorable field of battle where his weaker units can 
 be brought into action. So long as this contest lasts, and so long 
 as a decisive battle has not inclined the balance one way or the 
 the other, both sides will abandon the aspirations that brought on 
 the struggle ; for it is upon the field of battle that their fate will be 
 decided. 
 
 Who will be the victor? The most active, the most skilful, the 
 most tenacious, the one who has the material best suited to the 
 needs of the war. 
 
 The ofifensive will secure decisive results particularly at the 
 beginning of the war. If, by impetuosity of attack, the projects 
 of the adversary are anticipated, a fixed direction is given to the 
 operations ; a menace is created which upsets all the enemy's pre- 
 visions, which paralyzes him so long as he does not succeed in 
 disentangling himself by a victory. But the single fact of having 
 placed him in an unexpected situation puts him in a state of in- 
 feriority and prevents him from recovering when, on the contrary, 
 his adversary has himself been able to use his forces to the best 
 advantage. 
 
 The characteristic of the offensive is to impose the attack, in- 
 stead of submitting to it : it has manifested itself in history by the 
 fact that almost all victories have been won on the enemy's coast. 
 
 50
 
 II. 
 
 Geography. 
 
 Geographical conditions have weighed upon opciations in all 
 wars, and, unhappily, they have not been favorable to France. 
 
 It is often said that our country, placed astride of two seas, 
 occupies a privileged position. This assertion is correct as far as 
 our economic development is concerned : France has owed to her 
 coast of Provence the predominance she has long exercised in the 
 Mediterranean as well as her African domain, while her ocean 
 shores furnish her with outlets for trade with the two Americas. 
 This cause of prosperity becomes a source of weakness during 
 war: it determines the splitting up of our naval forces into two 
 great bodies, far removed one from the other, and which are 
 unable to unite without passing under the Caudine Forks of 
 Gibraltar." 
 
 So long as England had no permanent fleet in the Mediter- 
 ranean, France was obliged to go to fight her in the Atlantic and 
 the Channel. Every war, therefore, began by the despatch of the 
 forces of Toulon to the north, and geographic conditions con- 
 stantly interfered with this movement ; the distance caused delays 
 or gave the enemy an easy means of opposing the junction. 
 
 When the Toulon detachment was slow to arrive, operations 
 had to be begun without it, if circumstances demanded. Thus it 
 was that the Dutch had to fight the Four Days' Battle before the 
 arrival of the Duke of Beaufort, and that Tourville began the 
 battle of La Hogue before he had been reinforced by d'Estrees. 
 
 To oppose the junction of our forces, the English proceeded in 
 two different ways : either, profiting by the temporary weak- 
 ness of our Brest squadron, they took station off Ouessant to await 
 the detachment from Toulon ; or they sent superior forces to 
 Gibraltar to intercept it on the way.''* 
 
 "The nation which, from the geographic point of view, enjoyed the same 
 advantages as France, without suffering from the inconveniences, was 
 Spain. This was the origin of her greatness. 
 
 ^This second solution is open to criticism: England would have found 
 
 SI
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Tourville succeeded once in taking eighteen ships into Brest in 
 sight of the EngHsh fleet, and Chateau-Renault, the following year, 
 escaped Killigrew, Avho pursued him after his exit from the 
 strait." 
 
 The danger that these two admirals incurred shows the diffi- 
 culties of the enterprise, and proves that the operation is of those 
 that logically ought not to be attempted. In fact, Tourville and 
 Chateau-Renault were the only ones who succeeded and all the 
 other attempts failed ; among them that of M. de la Clue, which 
 brought on the disaster of Lagos and had its after-effect at 
 Quiberon. 
 
 It must be recognized that the method employed, under Louis 
 XIV and Louis XV, was not of a nature to lessen the disadvan- 
 tages of an unfavorable geographical situation. The vessels that 
 were sent from Toulon to the north approached the center of 
 English power and ran into danger. It would have been more 
 reasonable to perform the opposite maneuver, and to bring about 
 the junction as far as possible from the principal hostile fleet. 
 This would have required the Brest squadron (the stronger) to 
 start for the south at the period when that of Toulon was accus- 
 tomed to set forth (that is, a little before the beginning of the com- 
 paign, in March or April). It would have passed the straits, 
 joined the Toulon ships, and at once gone north again. The worst 
 that could have happened would have been the English fleet's fol- 
 lowing it ; but it is better to flee from danger than to go to meet it. 
 
 During the war that Louis XIV and Charles II sustained 
 against Holland, in 1672, the junction of the French and English 
 squadrons was accomplished in accordance with these principles. 
 The bulk of the English forces was at Chatham with the Duke of 
 York ; d'Estrees' thirty ships armed at Brest. The point of con- 
 centration was fixed at Saint Helens. Ruyter, who commanded 
 the Dutch, planned to separate the allies by stationing himself in 
 the Strait of Dover. As soon as the Duke of York learned that the 
 
 more advantage in leaving at Gibraltar only frigates to watch the passage, 
 and in concentrating all her forces in the north ; she w^ould thus have been 
 more favorably situated whatever happened. 
 
 *' During the war of the Spanish Succession, the English even placed all 
 of their forces at Cape St. Vincent to oppose the contrary operation, the 
 passage of the Count of Toulouse from the north to the south. 
 
 52
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Dutch squadron was directing its course from the Texel towards 
 the strait, he hastened to leave the Thames, leaving behind the ves- 
 sels that had not completed arming, and succeeded thus in getting 
 ahead of Ruyter. The junction was then accomplished without 
 hindrance at the designated place ; then the allied fleet, returning 
 to the east, took on the way the ships that had remained in the 
 Thames. The situation would have been entirely different if the 
 Duke of York had remained where he was, waiting for the French 
 contingent.*" 
 
 During the war of American Independence, each time that the 
 combined fleet cruised in the Channel, the junction was previously 
 accomplished in Spain, sometimes at Ferrol, sometimes at Cadiz, 
 that is to say, far from the enemy's coasts. It is probable that the 
 French government, in adopting this line of conduct, obeyed con- 
 siderations of a political rather than a strategical order. Whatever 
 the causes were, the result was none the less favorable to the 
 concentration. 
 
 The Mediterranean, through the construction of the Suez Canal, 
 came to cut the route of commerce between England, on the one 
 hand, and India and the Far East on the other. Geography would 
 then have turned to our side if, by his foresight, our rival had not 
 known how to reserve to himself the possession of Malta and 
 Gibraltar. 
 
 The Mediterranean, in fact, was never a favorable field of battle 
 to the English fleets until the day when they could make use of the 
 .ports of Italy, Sardinia and Sicily. Until then, they were too far 
 separated from their base to maintain themselves there perma- 
 nently ; and though England could keep Gibraltar, which is self- 
 defensive, she twice lost Minorca. 
 
 In the Anglo-Dutch wars, geography was still favorable to Eng- 
 land. All the shores of Holland were watched by a part of those 
 of England, and not a Dutch merchant ship could reach port with- 
 out traversing the theater of operations. On the other hand, the 
 greater part of the English coast was completely outside of the 
 zone of action of the fleets, and ships could take refuge there while 
 awaiting a favorable opportunity to enter the Thames. The result 
 was that Holland had to interdict all transit while hostilities lasted, 
 
 ^This maneuver is not mentioned in naval histories; it appears in the 
 report of the Count d'Estrees. 
 
 53
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 and little by little she ruined herself without having had a marked 
 inferiority at sea. 
 
 It seems useless to point out the preponderant part that geog- 
 raphy played in the Spanish-American conflict. It is sufficient to 
 look at a map to become aware of it. 
 
 In the Russo-Japanese war, geography was doubly against the 
 Russians : ist, their forces were at the two extremities of the earth 
 when the war broke out ; 2d. in the theater of operations, Japan 
 occupied, in relation to Russia's two bases (Port Arthur and 
 Vladivostok), a central position that was favorable to her. This 
 situation enabled the Japanese always to have numerical superior- 
 ity on the battlefield. 
 
 When geography is in one's favor, advantage must be taken of it, 
 but too much must not be made of it. There is, in fact, a tendency 
 to be led astray by the advantages that a geographic position can 
 eventually procure, and thus to come to attribute more importance 
 to this position than to the hostile forces. In a conception of this 
 sort there is a vicious circle. The objective is always the enemy 
 afloat; geographic positions, therefore, have no value in them- 
 selves ; they have value only in so far as they favor the action of 
 naval forces against the enemy. 
 
 To fix our ideas, let us take for example the Strait of Dover, 
 truly the most perfect type of the geographic position. We have, 
 then, stationed at Dunkirk, a powerful flotilla with the avowed 
 object of commanding the passage. But what part can this flotilla 
 play ? It will perhaps be less brilliant than one would be tempted 
 to believe. 
 
 The operations will have a different character, according as the 
 English coast is hostile or neutral. 
 
 In the former case, our flotilla which is based upon Dunkirk 
 and Calais will find itself opposed to a hostile fleet based upon 
 Dover and the mouth of the Thames ; and as numbers will not be 
 on our side, it is not very apparent what we could undertake*\vith 
 success. If our torpedo-boats remain cautious and avoid engaging, 
 they will in effect leave the enemy master of the strait. It seems 
 preferable, therefore, to employ them in another region, and they 
 are out of place in the Strait of Dover. It would only be worth 
 while for them to appear there when they had a chance of driving 
 off the hostile flotilla. 
 
 In the second case, that is if the English coast is neutral, nothing 
 
 54
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 will prevent France from commanding the passage, and this time 
 at least it might be thought that the presence of a flotilla at Dun- 
 kirk was justifiable. But it is not at all so. If the flotilla in- 
 cludes a considerable number of submarines, it will doubtless be a 
 sufficient menace to take away from the enemy the desire of risk- 
 ing himself in the strait ; but that does not constitute a positive 
 result. The enemy will be embarrassed in his movements, but he 
 will not suffer any diminution of strength. On the other hand, we 
 shall have immobilized a numerous flotilla with no resulting gain. 
 It cannot be too often repeated that naval forces are made to play 
 an active part. To condemn them to stand stock still, waiting for 
 events that may never happen, is equivalent to giving the enemy a 
 force equal to the one thus withdrawn from the theater of opera- 
 tions. The day when a hostile fleet is seen appearing in the At- 
 lantic, after having passed to the westward of England, it will be 
 recognized that the position of the Strait of Dover has not an abso- 
 lute value. 
 
 None the less geographical positions have an indisputable strate- 
 gic importance that has been clearly brought out in the Russo- 
 Japanese war ; and yet the Japanese never thought of permanently 
 immobilizing forces in Pescadores Channel and the Korean Strait," 
 nor in the Straits of Tsugar and la Perouse, since these forces 
 would have been wanting in the Yellow Sea. They profited by the 
 advantages that certain of these positions procured under deter- 
 mined circumstances ; but they did not seek to make them yield 
 more than they could give. 
 
 " The preceding considerations do not apply to straits alone ; they 
 are true for whole regions. It is evident, for example, that the 
 Channel would be an excellent field of action for our flotillas, which 
 are composed in greater part of units of small size. But we must 
 not let ourselves be so attracted by this advantage as to assign the 
 Channel in advance to our torpedo-boats as a theater of opera- 
 tions ; for so long as the enemy did not present himself there they 
 would have nothing to do there. 
 
 " Some torpedo-boats had Takechiki for base, but they were few in num- 
 ber and could not, on account of their small size, take part iil the opera- 
 tions in the Yellow Sea. Their presence in the Korean Strait, moreover, 
 seems to be attributable much less to anxiety to guard the passage (which 
 they were incapable of doing) than to the purpose of aiding the passage of 
 transports through the channel. 
 
 55
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In the same order of ideas, the pubhc ought to become con- 
 vinced that our squadrons are by no means intended to operate in 
 one region rather than in another, in spite of the official designa- 
 tions that seem to assign them specially to the guard of fixed re- 
 gions. They have been created, at great expense, to destroy the 
 enemy, whatever be the place where he is to be found. If he does 
 not come to them, they must go to him. Besides, where there is 
 no enemy our interests are not threatened, and we do not have 
 to protect them. 
 
 56
 
 III. 
 
 Secrecy of Operations. 
 
 If there had never been anything unforeseen in the composition 
 and movements of forces, the brilHant combinations that we admire 
 would have been reduced to nothingness, and the great leaders 
 would have been deprived of one of their most powerful means of 
 action. 
 
 There do not seem, however, to have been many mysteries in 
 naval wars ; and although previsions were often found faulty as a 
 consequence of fortuitous circumstances, we generally knew the 
 English armaments, and the English knew ours. Doubtless it did 
 not enter into the manners of the time to conceal from officers 
 their destination, so that the enemy was informed, not only of the 
 preparations that were made, but also of their object. It is per- 
 haps for this reason that, on all seas, the forces always tended to 
 reach a state of balance so far as the means at the disposal of each 
 side allowed. 
 
 Napoleon, on the contrary, always took care to envelop his naval 
 operations in uncertainty. It is known that the secret of the expe- 
 dition to Egypt was well kept, and that it resulted in the success 
 of his landing. Further on we shall see in what manner the 
 Emperor turned aside the attention of the English government in 
 his great strategic undertaking. The efficacy of the dispositions 
 adopted is proven, since Missiessy was not followed to the 
 Antilles and Nelson lost a month before hastening in pursuit of 
 Villeneuve. 
 
 It is almost impossible to conceal the warlike preparations that 
 go on in ports ; the enemy will even often have enough perspicacity 
 not to accept without reservation all the rumors which circulate 
 in respect to them, nor to take seriously all the preparations that 
 seem to confirm them. Nevertheless, he will not be able to scorn 
 them and to neglect to take account of them; for his not taking 
 the measures called for by the avowed projects of the enemy would 
 suffice to render their accomplishment possible. 
 
 Secrecy of operations gives birth to doubt ; and there is no 
 worse counsellor for those who have the responsibility of directing 
 
 57
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the movements of fleets than doubt. It often leads to the adop- 
 tion of a mistaken course and to an ill-advised division of forces. 
 We have already seen examples of this, and the Americans have 
 quite recently furnished a new proof of it: when the Spanish 
 squadron left the Cape de Verde Islands, uncertainty as to its 
 objective led the Navy Department to divide its forces into two 
 groups, neither of which, theoretically, had a marked superiority 
 over the Spanish cruisers. A junction was only effected after it 
 was learned in what region the enemy was to be found. 
 
 One's projects, therefore, must never be made known, even 
 those which seem to be a necessity ; it is astonishing to see, in read- 
 ing history, how much the enemy is disposed always to believe in 
 the most complicated solution when he is obliged to divine the 
 objective of an armament. 
 
 With the means of communication now available, it seems diffi- 
 cult to deceive the enemy long as to one's movements. Neverthe- 
 less, the Japanese, by means of a strict censorship, succeeded in 
 keeping their adversaries in almost absolute ignorance of their 
 movements. It would be premature, therefore, to consider that, on 
 account of the development of telegraphy — with or without wires 
 — secrecy of operations must be renounced. 
 
 S8
 
 IV. 
 Information and Communications. 
 
 The object of the service of information is to penetrate the de- 
 signs of the enemy in spite of the precautions that he takes to con- 
 ceal them. A thorough knowledge of the adversary in itself fur- 
 nishes precious indications ; history shows what his aspirations 
 are, and the means that he has employed in previous wars to realize 
 them. By combining these data with the economic situation of the 
 country and the ideas that are current there, we bring together a 
 certain number of presumptions which give an impression as to 
 the trend that he will give to operations. 
 
 War declared, it is above all important to know the number, 
 composition and movements of the adverse forces. 
 
 To this end all governments maintain agents, who keep them 
 informed regarding the warlike preparations of the ports and the 
 rumors that circulate ; but all these informations should only be 
 tentatively accepted, since those who furnish them are often not to 
 be depended upon and rarely have an exact understanding of the 
 business. In any event, as agents are actuated by an interested 
 motive, they are much more concerned to furnish information than 
 to see that it is exact, and, to earn their pay, they have a tendency 
 always to exaggerate. 
 
 Searching. — When the hostile squadrons put to sea, their des- 
 tination can be known and their projects opposed only by getting 
 touch of them. The service of information then devolves upon 
 fast vessels ; in its modern form it is known under the name of 
 " searching." 
 
 Seaching consists of finding the enemy without other datum 
 than his point of departure. The inventors of the process advocate, 
 for the solution of this problem, the use of so-called strategical 
 curves. On paper, these curves give rise to amusing recreations ; 
 carried into the field of action, executed by real ships, they give 
 nothing, because, in order to use them, it is necessary to base 
 the strategic problems upon false or conventional data." So that 
 
 " The difference assumed between the speed of the chaser and that of the 
 chased is too great; the points of departure are nearer together than they 
 
 S9
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 it may well be asked whether strategical curves were brought 
 forth by anxiety to find the enemy, or whether they were not ap- 
 plied to that purpose in order to find a use for them. However 
 this may be, whenever it has become a question of practice, one 
 has inevitably been led to sweeping with a line of cruisers the 
 segments of the sea in which it is supposed that the enemy ought 
 to be found. 
 
 For a number of years the application of the principle of search- 
 ing furnished the theme of all our exercises, without giving very 
 conclusive results. As we contented ourselves with seeking to 
 discover the enemy, without bringing in the data that, in time of 
 war, will limit the uncertainty as to his position, and without tak- 
 ing account of the reaction of the development of cruisers upon the 
 force of the line of battle, everybody said that our squadrons 
 hadn't enough cruisers. And it could not be otherwise, for we 
 aimed at giving an absolute solution to a problem which, in itself, 
 does not admit of one, except in special cases. 
 
 Moreover, the importance attributed to this scouting cavalry led 
 to the supposition that the enemy w^oukl use the same means, and 
 that before being able to reach the main body of his forces, to 
 ascertain their number and position, it would be necessary to drive 
 back the opposing forces. It is then no longer a light cavalry that 
 should precede squadrons, but a heavy cavalry, armored cruisers ; 
 the light ships are no longer good for anything but connecting the 
 scouting line with the command by an uninterrupted service of 
 expresses. 
 
 It would only be advantageous to endow our squadrons with a 
 cloud of cruisers, if the consequence of so doing was not to dimin- 
 ish correspondingly the line of battle. Certainly lines of cruisers 
 will furnish means of getting information as to the force of the 
 enemy in time to escape in case of being inferior ; this inferiority, 
 however, must not be due to an exaggerated development of 
 auxiliary ships. But, in certain maneuvers, the total tonnage of 
 these latter reached 50 per cent of the tonnage of all the armored 
 ships, and, now that cruisers of 12,500 tons and more have come 
 into service, the total displacement of our so-called light vessels 
 approaches that of the armored ships. 
 
 would be in reality in order to permit solving the problem during the 
 period of daylight; finally the enemy is prohibited from changing course, 
 which seems rather too much. 
 
 60
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Whither does this tend? — since, in fact, such a diminution of 
 our effective fighting- ships can only be admitted on condition that 
 the elements that weaken them are indispensable. But the design 
 of ships devoted to searching is open to criticism as well as search- 
 ing itself. 
 
 The object of the vessels that attend the squadrons is not to 
 fight ; it is to furnish information. The combats that they may 
 have to sustain in the accomplishment of their mission are only 
 accidents ; if they are stronger than the enemy, they drive him 
 back; if they are weaker, they withdraw. But it is the idea of 
 making our cruisers fight that has determined the increase of their 
 displacement, with the solicitude always to do better than other 
 nations. The cruiser must thus inevitably approximate more 
 and more to the battleship ; which is contrary to reason. Actually 
 our new cruisers are as large as our armored cruisers and their 
 speed is but little greater. It is no doubt difficult to allow that 
 we should have a type of light vessel inferior to that of the 
 enemy ; but, on the other hand, the theory of lines of cruisers 
 does not rest on any experimental datum, and nothing proves that, 
 in reality, things will happen according to prediction. It may 
 very well be, on the contrary, that from the beginning of a war, 
 the whole system will crumble, since it has not received the sanc- 
 tion of experience. 
 
 Henceforth, in fact, we may expect many disappointments in this 
 quarter. In the exercises of our squadrons, the problem has never 
 been attacked very closely ; the greater part of the themes are con- 
 ceived with a view to assuring a successful conclusion, so as not to 
 risk expending fuel for nothing. In spite of that, the conclusions 
 that can be drawn from our maneuvers are scarcely consoling : the 
 first part of the program, that which consists of discovering the 
 enemy, succeeds sometimes, thanks to rigorous conventions which 
 war will refuse to admit; in revenge, the maintenance of contact 
 and the service of information have always functioned pretty badly. 
 These results are of a nature to awaken our suspicions as to the 
 efficacy of scouting lines. 
 
 The services that are demanded of them, moreover, are not 
 obligatory to the same degree upon both sides. The stronger, 
 after having assured itself of numerical superiority, can think of 
 increasing the number of auxiliaries accompanying squadrons 
 in order to enhance its chances of meeting the enemy. The 
 
 6i
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 weaker, on the contrary, will never have any trouble in provoking 
 an encounter ; but, in order to risk one, will try to bring about its 
 reinforcement with other units ; and, to assemble them, it has 
 nothing to gain by extending the area it covers ; it will concentrate, 
 on the contrary, so as to occupy the least space possible." 
 
 The number and kind of vessels intended to maintain the service 
 of information and communications ought not to be fixed in an 
 abstract fashion; the way in which the development of auxiliary 
 ships may react upon the general conditions of the war should be 
 taken into account." Give to a chief of squadron the task of seek- 
 ing another squadron in the midst of the seas, as a needle is looked 
 for in a truss of hay. This admiral, seeing only his immediate 
 objective, will find that he is always lacking in light vessels ; 
 double, triple their number, and he will not complain of it. Sup- 
 pose now that this same chief of squadron commands in time of 
 war, and that upon the result of his encounter with the enemy 
 depend the destinies of the country. At this critical moment his 
 solicitude will not be for light vessels, but for fighting ships. It is 
 those that he will insistently demand. And, if he could be left 
 free to dispose as he saw fit of the tonnage represented by the 
 whole of the so-called light vessels, there are nine chances out of 
 ten that he would change the greater part of them into solid battle- 
 ships, because there is never too much force to insure victory. 
 This admiral will without doubt consider that, before thinking of 
 meeting the enemy, it is first necessary to be able to contend with 
 him, and that there is no instance of adversaries not having ended 
 by meeting.'^ 
 
 **!£, during the maneuvers of 1901, Squadron B had not deployed its 
 cruisers, it would have had a better chance of slipping through. 
 
 " " If my heart were opened," wrote Nelson when he was searching for 
 Brueys' squadron, " there would be found written on it ' more frigates.' " 
 Without doubt he was right. But if the Admiralty had replaced ships by 
 frigates, there could have been read in Nelson's heart " more fighting 
 ships." 
 
 "Let us inquire what have really been the determining causes of naval 
 battles. They can be arranged in two classes. The first comprises all 
 actions where the adversaries have deliberately gone to meet one another to 
 decide to which the empire of the sea shall belong. In this category 
 belong the battles known under the following names : Lowestoft, the Four 
 Days' Battle, North Foreland, Solebay, Schoneveldt, Beachy Head, Malaga, 
 Ouessant.* The second category comprises battles that were the conse- 
 
 * This is the French name for Keppel's action off Brest in 1778.— P. R. A. 
 
 62 
 
 «
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 He will, therefore, keep only the indispensable number of 
 scouts, and these, representing but a small part of the tonnage of 
 the whole squadron, will not materially diminish his strength. In 
 a word, he will adopt the solution that will give him the best 
 return." 
 
 We are thus led to consider how information was obtained at 
 the period when the seas were not raked with cruisers. 
 
 At the very start we are struck by the quantity of news fur- 
 nished by neutral vessels " and by prizes taken from the enemy. 
 
 quence of operations undertaken by one of the belligerents and which the 
 other attempted to obstruct : Stromboli, Agosta and Palermo are con- 
 nected with the French occupation of Sicily ; Bantry was the result of a 
 landing in Ireland ; La Hogue of a threat to invade England ; Mahon of 
 the siege of that city ; Quiberon is merely a repetition of La Hogue. 
 
 Almost all the encounters of the war of American Independence in the 
 West Indies and on the American coast had their origin in land operations; 
 the same is true of part of Suffren's battles ; finally Trafalgar is the last 
 act of the attempt to land in England. 
 
 Steam does not alter the character of encounters ; Lissa, the Yalu and 
 Santiago have a certain likeness to Bantry. 
 
 As for accidental meetings, they are in a very small minority, and should 
 be put down to the account of the profit and loss of war. 
 
 "The increase of the size and armament of cruisers will lead to their 
 being regarded as ships of the line. Thus we shall have poor fighting ships 
 that we shall not even be sure of bringing into action, for they may very 
 well be at a great distance from the main body at the moment of encounter- 
 ing the enemy. 
 
 ^''Examples. — -A neutral vessel informs the Spaniards of the departure of 
 Derby with a convoy for Gibraltar (1781) ; Derby himself is advised by a 
 neutral of the capture by La Motte-Picquet of the convoy from St. Eustatius 
 and detaches eight ships to try to retake it (1781). Madeira fishermen in- 
 form Suffren of the passage of Johnstone; the latter was steering for the 
 Cape of Good Hope when he learned from a neutral of the preparations 
 that made his expedition useless (1781). A merchant ship informs Suff- 
 ren of the whereabouts of the East Indian English squadron (1782). 
 Lord Howe meets neutrals, who inform him of Villaret-Joyeuse's position 
 (1794). During the voyage of the expedition to Egypt, a brig meets 
 Nelson's squadron at sea and carries the news to Toulon, whence two 
 despatch vessels are hastened to Brueys (1798). On June 22, the English 
 speak a vessel that had passed through the midst of Brueys' fleet (1798). 
 Brid'port learns from several merchant ships that Brueys' fleet, set out 
 from Brest, is proceeding to the southwest (1799). A Ragusan vessel 
 informs Villeneuve that Nelson is to the southward of Sardinia (1805). 
 The latter learns, in his turn, that Villeneuve was south of Cape Gata on 
 March 7, etc. 
 
 63
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The squadron that gets news communicates it, if it is necessary, 
 to other squadrons and to the seat of government. The latter, for 
 its part, sends to the squadrons all the information that is of a 
 nature, to interest them. Thus there is established between the 
 squadrons and the shore, and between the squadrons themselves, 
 a permanent exchange of communications by means of light ves- 
 sels.'^ All the news that reaches the chiefs of squadrons only fur- 
 nishes them with indications from which they judge what is prob- 
 able. Then they send scouts in fixed directions to see if their 
 conclusions are well-founded. 
 
 This system of communications was not created outright, as 
 ours is. It was the result of the experience of centuries, and 
 nothing proves that the needs to which it responded are not as 
 exacting to-day as they used to be. It is not practised during 
 maneuvers and exercises because the very statement of the theme 
 takes its place ; but in time of war it is very possible that we shall 
 be obliged to re-establish it suddenly. We shall then find our- 
 selves stripped of light vessels because, on the one hand, the prac- 
 tice of searching has given the auxiliary divisions a composition 
 not at all suited to this kind of service, and, on the other hand, 
 there is no sign of a provision of scouts distributed in all ports for 
 the use of the central government. In the old navy, the despatch- 
 boats were little vessels (frigates, corvettes, brigs), whose small 
 cost permitted an increase of number without diminishing too 
 
 *^ Examples. — D'Estaing sends the Flore to the Spanish coast to keep the 
 minister informed regarding his position (1778). The frigate Concorde 
 learns at Martinique the news of the declaration of war (1778). The 
 corvette Diligente carries to France the news of the taking of Grenada 
 and the battle of July 6 (1779). De Ternay sends a vessel to France to ask 
 for reinforcements (1780). De Grasse asks Barras to send him despatch 
 vessels with Rochambeau's despatches (1781). The i^/ne carries to Mauritius 
 and the Cape the plans of the government (1781). The Consolante goes to 
 the Cape to give Suffren the order to return to Mauritius (1781). Suffren 
 sends a ship to France to announce the battle of Praya (1781). The 
 Argus goes to Europe to carry the news of the departure of the Count 
 d'Orves (1781). Hotham is warned by an express from Genoa of the 
 sortie of Admiral Martin (1795). The Cuneux, sent by Nelson to Europe, 
 meets Villeneuve's fleet (1805). The Arethuse meets two French divisions 
 at sea; she sends a despatch boat to Cornwallis, a corvette to Ferrol and' 
 to Cadiz to warn the English fleets (1805). Admiral Duckworth sends a 
 frigate to England to carry information to the Admiralty as to the 
 strength and course of a French squadron he has met (1805). 
 
 64
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 much the effective force of ships of the Hne. These vessels were 
 distributed in all the ports so as to be always sure of being able to 
 send one of them from a region not watched by the enemy ; if the 
 news to be communicated was very important, two or three were 
 sent at the same time from different places. The messengers 
 coming from the squadrons, for their part, took care not to make 
 the land in quarters where the enemy was cruising, and they 
 entered by preference commercial ports. 
 
 If the modern navy has to undertake the same service, it will 
 have only big cruisers to do it with ; it would need a swarm of 
 scouts of 900 to 1000 tons, which will have the advantage of being 
 numerous without costing much, and under very many circum- 
 stances simple torpedo-boat destroyers will suffice for this task by 
 virtue of their great speed. 
 
 If, moreover, we refer back to the three last naval wars — the 
 Chinese-Japanese, the Spanish-American and the Russo-Japanese 
 wars — we find no evidence that they could have furnished occa- 
 sion for the employment of searching. In the first, the Japanese 
 had no need whatever to play with search rakes in order to obtain 
 knowledge of the enemy's force and position. In the second, scout- 
 ing lines would have proved themselves manifestly powerless to 
 discover in the midst of the Atlantic the Spanish division, set out 
 from the Cape de Verde Islands with an unknown destination. 
 Had the Americans transformed their entire fleet into scouts, to 
 the extent of having not one fighting ship to oppose to Admiral 
 Cervera, their search rake would have covered an insignificant 
 part of the surface of the sea. It must be admitted that there are 
 occasions, on land as well as on the sea, when, to know where the 
 enemy is, it is necessary to wait for him to show himself, which 
 usually is not long delayed. Above all, it is necessary to avoid 
 losing precious time and dispersing without any gain at all no less 
 precious ships, for the pleasure of doing kinematics. Finally, in 
 the third war, we know very well the use that was made or could 
 have been made of light vessels ; but it surely was not in the con- 
 ventional shape that we have created. 
 
 Is this to say that it will never be necessary to have recourse to 
 scouting lines ? Not at all ; but, instead of using them regularly, 
 as we now do, they will only be used in special cases, and during 
 short intervals of tim.e, when operations are undertaken in very 
 narrow seas such as make them perfectly efficient. But it will not 
 
 65
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 be necessary to depend upon vessels specially built for this service ; 
 it will be enoiig-h to collect for the occasion all the light vessels 
 available in the region and to suspend, while the operations last, 
 communications with the shore and between squadrons. 
 
 As to encounter between cruisers thrown out ahead by each side 
 — as to this encounter the contingency of which has given us 
 armored cruisers — it has not yet taken place, despite three suc- 
 cessive wars. From which we may be permitted without pre- 
 sumption to infer that a general conclusion has been lightly drawn 
 from what will never be anything but an exceptional case. 
 
 It may be asked what influence the nets of telegraph wires 
 that cover the earth will have upon the service of information. 
 Judging from the Spanish-American war, the advantages of in- 
 stantaneous communications have been tempered by some draw- 
 backs. Cruisers have derived an evident benefit from them by 
 going to the end of a cable, instead of traversing great dis- 
 tances ; on the other hand, the American government was over- 
 whelmed with the most contradictory news. 
 
 In any event, the cutting of cables must be anticipated and its 
 consequences prepared for. 
 
 Scouting. — It is not considered sufficient to send out cruisers 
 ahead of squadrons to discover the enemy ; it is also pro- 
 posed that naval forces should have in their immediate vicinity a 
 screen of sentinels to preserve them from any surprise. At first, 
 scouting in cross was tried, which is still the regulation method; 
 then it was agreed that polygonal scouting was preferable, which 
 assures an equal protection in all directions if the fighting body is 
 allowed to fall back to the rear of the center of figure in relation to 
 the direction of advance. 
 
 Without wishing to undervalue the merits of tactical scouting, 
 even were it hexagonal, it may be said that it derives from an 
 idea that is more seductive than practical. 
 
 Supposing the main force to be 12 miles from the furthest 
 scout (which is a maximum) and a velocity of approach of 24 
 knots (which is a minimum speed of 12 knots), the safety interval 
 is increased by half an hour. 
 
 Five or six scouts cannot be immobilized for this scant benefit. 
 It would be dangerous to substitute battle-ships for them ; they 
 might not have time to concentrate, if they were surprised by an 
 enemy breaking through at full speed. Only convoys remain, 
 
 66
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 therefore, to which to apply close scouting, and their ships do not 
 possess sufficient means of communication to perform this service. 
 
 Usually, it will be known when the enemy is near and there is a 
 chance of meeting him. Then a more sustained watchfulness 
 will take the place of scouting. 
 
 Chasing. — Since cruisers entered into the composition of squad- 
 rons, problems of chasing have developed so that, with searching, 
 they seem to be the embodiment of naval war. Here we have a 
 new proof of the exaggerated importance attributed to the acces- 
 sory in derogation of the principal. 
 
 Certainly chasing will render real service ; but it will perhaps 
 not be in the form that is given to it. Much ingenuity has been 
 exercised to find in it an excuse for solving triangles ; in order 
 to give it this trigonometrical form, it has been necessary to 
 attribute absolute values to unknown quantities, such as the 
 course, the speed and sometimes even the position of the chased. 
 These precautions being still insufficient, there has been added, 
 for the chased, the obligation of conforming to strict rules which 
 it is his most elementary duty not to follow. 
 
 The day when these peaceful distractions are changed to opera- 
 tions of war, sines and cosines will be obliged to give way to clear- 
 sightedness and resolution. Would it not be better to develop 
 these qualities in times of peace, instead of substituting geometrical 
 constructions for them ? 
 
 When a conflict shall have brutally brought us to the true con- 
 cept of naval war, there will be good cause for astonishment that 
 we have been able thus to substitute fictions for reality. 
 
 The different methods studied for the solution of problems of 
 chasing find their application in the stationing of scouts among 
 themselves or with respect to the squadron ; all the data are then 
 known and furnish an exact point of departure. But strategy 
 is not concerned with this, nor even is tactics ; these methods 
 are simply useful in cruising, just as the determination of the 
 position is ; they ought, therefore, to form part of the general 
 instruction of young officers. 
 
 67
 
 V. 
 Bases of Operations. 
 
 It is useless to define a base of operations : the necessity is self- 
 evident of having sheltered places in which to prepare forces 
 before they are sent out to fight, to repair and resupply them after 
 battle. But the number, position and utilization of these bases give 
 rise to differences of opinion. 
 
 The first condition that advanced bases ought to fulfil is to suf- 
 fice to themselves, that is not to require the assistance of mobile 
 forces. If bases of operations are made to protect ships, ships 
 cannot have the protection of bases of operations for their objec- 
 tive. The English have always regarded them in this light, and 
 events have proved that they are right : the Admiralty was never 
 solicitous about the attacks upon Gibraltar after that place had 
 once been put in a state of defense ; they abandoned the garrison 
 to itself, contenting themselves with revictualing it from time to 
 time. The Russians adopted exactly the opposite solution at Port 
 Arthur; and what it cost them to sacrifice the armament of their 
 fleet to the defense of Port Arthur is well known. 
 
 The more advanced bases a country puts at the disposition of its 
 fleets, the greater the development that strategy can attain. There- 
 fore, there would be advantage in multiplying them, if the financial 
 sacrifices that they necessitate (as much for their creation as for 
 the normal functioning of their services) did not diminish corres- 
 pondingly the power of the active forces for which they are 
 created. Their number is, therefore, limited.*' 
 
 There is general agreement in locating bases only in positions 
 that have a strategic value, but there is more difficulty in arriving 
 at a common understanding as to what constitutes the strategic 
 value of a given point. Certain minds readily allow themselves to 
 be attracted by the facilities that some places offer for the establish- 
 ment of a great naval arsenal, and they are inclined to believe that 
 this fact alone gives to such ports strategical importance. Then it 
 
 ** Still there must be some. It is not easy to see how the ships on our 
 foreign stations can carry on war so long as they do not have, on each 
 station, at least one port where they can find safety. 
 
 68
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 is desired to transform the lake of Berre into a second Bizerta ; and 
 radicals even go so far as to wish to utilize the sea of Bou-Grara. 
 The sole advantage of these two lakes resides in the enclosed 
 sheet of water, " which would suffice to give shelter to all the 
 fleets of the world." This phrase, which we have all heard applied 
 to Brest, Rio de Janeiro, Bizerta and Diego-Suarez, has the gift of 
 producing a profound impression on the public. 
 
 The excessive dimensions of a roadstead are, nevertheless, an 
 inconvenience rather than an advantage, and it is absolutely useless 
 to be able to shelter a thousand ships in a place where the necessi- 
 ties of war will never bring more than fifty. If the roadstead of 
 Brest were less vast, the inner defense would have been easier to 
 organize, and the need of a breakwater would not have been felt 
 at all; it is the extent of the lake of Bizerta similarly that has 
 necessitated the construction of a small harbor inside the big one. 
 The importance of these roadsteads, therefore, consists much less in 
 the extent of their liquid surface than in the distance that separates 
 them from the sea, a distance which places their establishments 
 out of reach of shot. 
 
 The strategical value of advanced bases really depends only 
 upon their geographic position. 
 
 The utilization of bases of operations is a complex problem that 
 presents itself in a different light in each region, according to the 
 conditions peculiar to each of them. It will be sufficient for us to 
 seek out the part that some of them have played in the past, and 
 that which they can have in the future, to show that the services 
 they render are not all of the same order. 
 
 Brest and Cherbourg threaten directly the shores of England, 
 and Toulon was built to command the Mediterranean. It seems, 
 therefore, that the first two ports would serve as points of concen- 
 tration for forces intended to operate in the Channel, and that 
 the squadrons that are to act in the Mediterranean would be drawn 
 from Toulon. Yet we have seen that the immense fleet which, 
 under Villeneuve's orders, imperiled English supremacy in the 
 Channel, was drawn entirely from Toulon, Cadiz and Ferrol, while 
 the Brest squadron played no part in it. On the other hand, when 
 Bruix found himself in the Mediterranean at the head of forces 
 double those of the English, it was Brest that had furnished the 
 greater part of his force. Later, the First Consul, wishing to send 
 help to Egypt, had the forces destined for this expedition set out 
 from Brest (Ganteaume's cruise). 
 
 69
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 These anomalies are easily explained. The menace constituted 
 by the presence of naval forces in Brest was too evident for the 
 English not to take acount of it by stationing- in their neighborhood 
 equal or superior forces ; and the proximity of her coast gave her 
 every facility in this respect, for, if Brest commands the English 
 coast, Portsmouth commands the French coast. To secure supe- 
 riority, therefore, it was necessary to draw from out-of-the-way 
 regions supplementary forces, which, from their remoteness, might 
 have other objectives and consequently not inspire the same appre- 
 hensions in the enemy. 
 
 Toulon was not, like Brest, paralyzed by a hostile port, and 
 would perhaps have sufficed to the Mediterranean forces with its 
 own resources if our rivals had not had the foresight to secure 
 provisional advanced bases that compensated, in a certain measure, 
 for the distance of their great military ports. 
 
 So long as a battle does not intervene, the absolute benefit of 
 bases that command a coast or a region is acquired only by the 
 stronger side which in advance concentrates there the forces that 
 it judges necessary. But it is only after a victory that, on one side 
 as well as on the other, the strategical importance of such bases 
 makes itself specially felt. The victor, master of the sea, establishes 
 himself there permanently and finds, in the resources that they af- 
 ford, means of resupplying his squadrons without separating him- 
 self from his field of action. The importance of a point must, there- 
 fore, not be deduced from the number of ships that are there at the 
 beginning of hostilities, but from the forces that the progress of 
 operations may bring there ; for, soon or late, the interest of the 
 war will concentrate itself in regions that may be called centers of 
 attraction. 
 
 Rochefort and Lorient. — The advantages of these ports during 
 our naval wars arose from a double cause : the importance of Brest, 
 where the principal armaments took place, drew from them the 
 attention of the English ; at the same time their distance from the 
 enemy's coasts made their surveillance more difficult. That is why 
 it was always endeavored to make the reliefs destined for the 
 colonies and, in general, small expeditions intended to operate in 
 the Atlantic start from these ports. It is to be observed that the 
 divisions of Missiessy, of Allemand and of Savary, which were 
 almost the only ones able to go and come without hindrance, had 
 Rochefort for base. And their success must be attributed to the 
 difficulty the enemy had in watching that port. 
 
 70
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Secondary bases, therefore, advantageously supplement the prin- 
 cipal bases, without taking away from the latter their importance, 
 and without making them lose anything of their own proper value. 
 
 The suppression of secondary bases simplifies the task of the 
 enemy by permitting him to watch with a single force the different 
 fractions that are not called upon to act together. 
 
 However, it is evident that from the moment that our military 
 ports of the second class have become unequal to receiving existing 
 squadrons, whose units are of not less than 12,500 tons displace- 
 ment, they cease to constitute bases and no longer render any 
 service. This, unhappily, is the case with Rochefort and Lorient. 
 
 Gibraltar has not always had the importance that is now given 
 to it. Its true efficaciousness only dates from the wars of the Revo- 
 lution, that is from the period when the English maintained per- 
 manent squadrons in the Mediterranean. Even then the rock was 
 only a post for news, coupled with a rather poor anchorage ; ships 
 did not even find water there, but had to go to Tetuan or Lagos for 
 it. The immense works undertaken in later years have been neces- 
 sary to make Gibraltar a real base of operations. 
 
 Before 1793 the Mediterranean only formed part of the theater 
 of war intermittently, and, in the interludes, the fortress was some- 
 times a heavy burden ; it no longer rendered any service, and it 
 was none the less necessary to revictual it by passing through the 
 Spanish forces stationed at Cadiz. 
 
 Malta is, for the English, the key of the Mediterranean. The 
 entrance to this sea is closed by Gibraltar, but we are already inside. 
 Without Malta, Egypt and Cyprus are in danger, the mouth of 
 the Suez Canal is at our mercy; and, if an action were to take 
 place east of Bizerta, we would be able to bring to it all our forces, 
 while the English, if they had only Gibraltar, would be deprived 
 of their torpedo-boats. 
 
 Bizerta. — The creation of Bizerta was necessary for France on 
 several accounts. 
 
 First of all, a look at the chart will make it unnecessary to dwell 
 upon the advantage that could be derived from this arsenal after 
 a victory in the Mediterranean. 
 
 In the second place, the need of Bizerta arises from the great 
 extent of coast that we possess in Africa. From Cape Bon to 
 Nemours our shores border upon the route between Gibraltar and 
 Malta; war must, therefore, inevitably lead us into these regions. 
 
 71
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 We had no means of revictualing there because all the ports of 
 Algeria are directly on the coast; Bizerta fills this want. 
 
 Finally, the possession of but one arsenal in so vast a sea as the 
 Mediterranean placed our forces in a difficult position ; since, as 
 one of our admirals said, it is almost impossible to imagine strate- 
 gical operations when there is only a single base at one's dis- 
 position. ^ 
 
 * * 
 
 There are three kinds of bases of operations : 
 
 1st. Arsenals, which are ports of construction, arming and 
 repair. 
 
 2d. Advanced bases, where ships find fuel and supplies and 
 where they can make slight repairs. 
 
 3d. Stations for torpedo-boats. 
 
 Whichever they may be, these different bases are too intimately 
 connected with the utilization of our active forces not to be ren- 
 dered inviolable, and this condition will be the easier to fulfill if 
 they are at the end of long narrow passages. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is not needful to consider the situation of Cher- 
 bourg desperate. That port is directly on the coast, it is true ; but 
 in consequence of this it has been defended. It is customary to 
 consider that the enemy can easily bombard it. But will the three 
 hundred heavy guns of the water batteries remain silent? Will 
 not the torpedo-boats and submarines issue forth ? 
 
 The protection of torpedo-boat stations cannot be developed to 
 the same extent as that of the fleet's grand bases. Their best 
 defense will consist of placing them in ports extending well into 
 the land, difficult of access and inaccessible to vessels of greater 
 draft than torpedo-boats. Boom defenses, defended by light 
 artillery, will suffice to preserve them from the enemy's enterprises. 
 
 It has rarely happened that ships have dared to attack directly 
 the defenses of a naval arsenal. Still, in the sixteenth century, 
 the English succeeded in reaching a Spanish fleet inside the road- 
 stead of Cadiz, and the Dutch, in the following century, burned 
 some disarmed English ships at Chatham. The only conclusion 
 that can be drawn from these isolated facts is that the defense of 
 the places named was insufficient ; for no attempt has ever been 
 made to pass through the narrow entrance of Brest. If the im- 
 prudence is committed of stationing ships in bases before they are 
 supplied with sufficient means of defense, the bases become points 
 of weakness. 
 
 72
 
 VI. 
 The Radius of Action. 
 
 If circles are drawn with the bases of operations as centers and 
 half the steaming distance of the ships as radius, the sectors of 
 sea contained in the circles will represent the maximum field of 
 action of the mobile forces starting from each port. 
 
 When the radius of action is very small, these various sectors 
 will cover but an insignificant part of the surface of the sea ; they 
 are isolated from each other and even may not touch the territorial 
 waters of the enemy. There is no strategy then ; the ships are 
 riveted to their base by a chain which fetters their movements, 
 and, outside of their zone, the sea is free ; the war does not reach 
 it. If the enemy, better equipped, has given his ships a sufficient 
 radius of action, he has full leisure to assemble his forces and to 
 attack a single sector, sure of having nothing to fear from the 
 others. Thus the side which has the least mobility is inevitably 
 condemned to inferiority on the field of battle, even if it has abso- 
 lute superiority. 
 
 Now let the radius of action be increased. The sectors will 
 extend to the neighboring bases, and immediately the situation is 
 bettered. A squadron, starting from one base, can end at another, 
 or separated squadrons can unite. The number of combinations 
 increases and also the possibility of surprises. The enemy is no 
 longer so free from anxiety; if he makes a given force his objec- 
 tive, he is in danger of being taken in the rear and, to protect him- 
 self, he divides his forces. 
 
 Finally, if we assume a very great radius of action, strategy 
 attains its full development ; the enemy is everywhere accessible 
 and all the movements of forces that the circumstances demand 
 can be put into efifect. 
 
 The first supposition that we have made is not an imaginary 
 one. It corresponds still to-day to a reality as far as a part of our 
 naval forces are concerned. 
 
 We have coast-defense vessels which cannot go from Toulon to 
 Brest, even at moderate speed, without renewing their coal supply. 
 If the interest of the war is transferred far from their base, we
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 shall have to do without their aid. But, it will be said, they have 
 been put there to remain there. There are necessities from which 
 there is no escape ; did not Admiral Nebogatof 's coast-defense 
 ships, whicli were built for the Baltic, go to the shores of Japan 
 to be sunk? 
 
 Let us now inquire what the situation of our foreign posses- 
 sions is. Actually, the ships stationed in them can find support 
 only in their single base. Unless they shut themselves up in it 
 (in which case they are of no use) they will be destroyed sooner or 
 later. The enemy, knowing their number and isolation, will op- 
 pose to them superior forces and will always succeed in meeting 
 them, because they will only be able to move in a restricted zone 
 and because, for this reason, their objectives will be limited; the 
 enemy will know, besides, that through unavoidable necessity these 
 ships must return to their point of departure, and he will await 
 them in its vicinity. 
 
 If these same ships had a sufficient radius of action to be able, 
 from their central station, easily to reach the neighboring stations 
 and to go, for example, from Dakar to Martinique and to Diego- 
 Suarez, or from Diego-Suarez to Saigon and to Dakar, the mili- 
 tary value of our foreign stations would cease to be a negligible 
 quantity. The forces of two or three stations could unite at a 
 single one, find themselves thus momentarily superior to the hos- 
 tile forces and crush them. Instead of shutting themselves up in 
 a trap, which amounts to moral defeat, they could assume the 
 offensive and play the only part that becomes fighting ships : wage 
 w^ar. It will doubtless be pointed out that hundreds and thousands 
 of miles will have to be covered in pursuit of an uncertain result ; 
 but war is not a child's game and nothing is won without cost. 
 It is possible that fruitless raids will be made ; yet perseverance 
 has always been compensated, and a good victory quickly effaces 
 the memory of past trials. Calculate from the chart the number 
 of leagues traversed by Nelson before coming up to Brueys at 
 Aboukir and Villeneuve at Trafalgar, and take account of the 
 effort he must have made to reach the enemy ; and if Nelson had 
 survived his last victory, perhaps he would have felt that he had 
 not bought it too dearly by paying for it seven months of pursuit. 
 
 The small importance that for a long time has been attached to 
 the radius of action was the consequence of the transformation of 
 naval material. The appearance of steam completely changed the 
 
 74
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 strategical conditions of naval warfare; and, while giving the ship 
 freedom of movement, imprisoned it in a narrow circle. Military 
 operations were then seen under a new aspect, and in the presence 
 of the facts, the value of the distance that could be traversed was 
 lost sight of little by little. Thus for a long time no advantage 
 was taken of improvements in the economy of engines ; the old 
 ways were followed, because mental conceptions are always be- 
 hind material progress. It is only in these latter years that more 
 correct ideas have led to increasing the radius of action of our 
 ships, but the error committed brought us a fleet of coast-defense 
 vessels that are unsuitable for carrying on war. Yet there were 
 numerous examples of enterprises that had to be interrupted or 
 failed on account of the necessity of returning to port.°" 
 
 As to the advantages secured by a greater radius of action than 
 the enemy's, they were particularly evident during the wars of 
 the Revolution and Empire. At this period, the English had to a 
 considerable degree increased the independence of their squadrons 
 by introducing the use of iron water tanks on board ship and bet- 
 tering the health of the crews by measures of cleanliness unknown 
 till then. At the same time, the constant training given to the sail- 
 ors had. diminished the damages that so often obliged ships to re- 
 turn to port ; so that Nelson could say that his ships were less tried 
 by bad weather in a year than ours were in a day. It was due to 
 these improvements and this training that the English were able 
 to- keep up a continuous blockade of our coasts, which had never 
 before been attempted, and to make those gigantic raids which 
 would have been impossible in the previous wars."^ They thus 
 secured an absolute advantage. But to-day the elements of the 
 radius of action are altered : they no longer depend on the sanitary 
 
 ^ One of those which best bring clearly out the consequences that dis- 
 regard of this strategic factor may entail is the campaign that the combined 
 fleets of France and Spain made on the coast of England, during the sum- 
 mer of 1779, under d'Orvillier's command, and which failed miserably 
 because the ships could remain at sea no longer. 
 
 " The radius of action of sailing ships was not as great as is thought, 
 even though it was independent of a motor. In going to the East Indies, 
 the English put in at Brazil, at the Cape of Good Hope (or at St. Helena 
 before the seizure of the Cape) and in the Portuguese possessions in the 
 Indian Ocean. To-day the Powerful can go from England to Mauritius 
 without coaling. Squadrons of steamers, therefore, can cover a greater 
 distance than could the old fleets of sailing ships to which an " infinite " 
 radius of action is often ascribed. 
 
 75
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 condition on board ship, but on the quantity of coal that can be 
 burned ; they thus have a direct effect upon displacements, which 
 constantly increase, and an indirect effect upon the number of units, 
 which diminishes proportionally as displacement increases. Still, 
 it can be said that the radius of action, facilitating the utilization 
 of all available forces, compensates to a certain degree for the 
 reduction of numbers that its development entails. 
 
 The limit that the development of the radius of action ought to 
 attain is quite dilificult to determine precisely. Some officers think 
 that it is fixed by the distance that separates the different bases of 
 operations. War, however, does not consist of going from one 
 point to another by the shortest road. It is necessary to go wher- 
 ever the enemy is, to expend coal in goings and comings, in a word 
 to use that continuity of action that characterizes successful enter- 
 prises. It must not be necessary to stop to take coal at the moment 
 when the objective is reached. The radius of action ought not to 
 be calculated too nicely; it can only be deduced from the general 
 lines of the plan of campaign that it is proposed to adopt. 
 
 The influence of the radius of action on the progression of dis- 
 placements has developed in the French Navy a current opinion 
 opposed to expansion of the steaming distance. Fuel being a 
 renewable element, it has been thought that it could be taken on 
 board in smaller quantity on condition of more often filling the 
 empty bunkers. It is not the same thing, however, to traverse a 
 given distance at one stretch and in several successive ones. In 
 the latter case, there results a great loss of time, and perhaps also 
 the necessity of going out of one's way. 
 
 In naval operations, the steammg distance represents the factor 
 " movement." Movement is the soul of strategy, that which gives 
 it life. Without the faculty of moving about, all is arranged in ad- 
 vance, events follow their natural course, the stronger is the vic- 
 tor, the weaker is vanquished. With the aid of movements of 
 forces, on the contrary, the parts may be reversed ; the material 
 afloat is made to give the maximum return, it is multiplied. 
 Whether the field of battle be accepted or imposed, it is first of all 
 important to bring the greatest possible number of ships there: 
 movement. Finally, the most direct benefit that victory procures 
 is to permit abandoning an adversary reduced to impotency in 
 order to go to another field : movement. 
 
 A tactical unit, however powerful, will never render any but 
 feeble services if it is not capable of moving about freely. The 
 
 76
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 enemy will be satisfied to keep out of its way. Without going back 
 to coast-defense vessels, regard mobile defenses : if our squadrons 
 were sure of having always with them a swarm of torpedo-boats, 
 their force would be sensibly increased ; but this certitude is lack- 
 ing because those boats have very little endurance, are frequently 
 incapacitated by bad weather, and finally because it cannot be fore- 
 seen where and when the enemy will be encountered."^ If some 
 day we are astonished at the small results obtained from torpedo- 
 boats, w^e shall have to attribute it in great part to their want of 
 mobility. This shows that tactics and strategy are indissolubly 
 connected : one is good for nothing without the other. 
 
 A naval force, devoid of radius of action, is exclusively defen- 
 sive. It may thwart the enemy's plans, but it will never en- 
 danger him. It contributes nothing, therefore, towards the ends 
 of the war ; it has a negative efficiency. It may be redoubtable, 
 but its power is fettered : it is a lion enclosed in a cage. Interdict- 
 ing access to such or such a point does not better one's situation ; 
 what is needed is to prevent the enemy from being safe wherever 
 he may be. The defensive is passive ; the oflfensive is active. But 
 the latter is inconceivable without movement. 
 
 Evidently nations that build ships without steaming endurance 
 have good hopes of being able to make use of them ; they suppose 
 that war will take a form appropriate to their employment. They 
 thus prepare for themselves many disappointments, for, with this 
 plan, it is necessary to reckon with the enemy, who will always 
 find means of being superior in force and in number if he has only 
 passive forces to fear. War does not divide itself up into a series 
 of particular cases ; it comprises onlv one general case which is to 
 go wherever there is need of being. 
 
 After the example that Spain, the United States and Russia 
 have just given us, mobility cannot be thought lightly of. Neither 
 of these three nations was capable of making the whole of its 
 forces take part in operations, because part of them was incapable 
 of changing its place. 
 
 * ' * 
 
 Fuel is not the only constituent of the radius of action. That is 
 what is generally referred to; but there is another factor which 
 cannot be neglected : that is the supply of munitions. 
 
 " Sea-going qualities have a place among the factors of the radius of 
 action of torpedo-boats. 
 
 71
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 A naval force whose coal bunkers are full while its ammunition 
 rooms are empty is none the less powerless." 
 
 In estimates of a ship's radius of action, the supply of ammuni- 
 tion is the necessary condition, and the quantity of coal is the 
 sufficient condition, because the object of the second factor is to 
 enhance the first. 
 
 "When the Japanese squadron abandoned the battlefield of the Yalu, in 
 want of ammunition, it lacked radius of action. It was the same with the 
 American division that fought the battle of Cavite: the destruction of the 
 Spanish fleet was succeeded by a long period of inaction occasioned by lack 
 of shell. If the Spaniards had had other forces in the Philippines, the 
 Americans would have been obliged to leave the islands. 
 
 78
 
 Speed. 
 
 The advantages secured by speed, in the old navy, stand out 
 clearly in the following report of Suffren, in which he asks that 
 our ships be copper-bottomed so as to be able to cope with those 
 of the English : 
 
 " Since the English have coppered a number of their ships and 
 continue to do so with such activity that they will all be copper- 
 sheathed in a short time, the operation of sheathing ours ought not 
 to be regarded merely as advantageous ; it is an absolute necessity. 
 Otherwise, when they are the stronger, they will be sure of coming 
 up with us, and when they are the weaker, avoiding us 
 
 " In Admiral Rodney's reports may be seen with what confi- 
 dence he sends three ships into the Mediterranean, with what 
 temerity he has them cruise off Port Royal, where we had twenty- 
 five. But for the sheathed ships, in view of the approach of night 
 and bad weather, Langara might have escaped; if the Prothcc 
 had been sheathed, she would not have been taken. These re- 
 flections, which a seaman cannot avoid making, have deeply af- 
 fected me, seeing escape the escort of the convoy just taken by the 
 combined fleet. If the Zclc had been sheathed, she would have 
 come up with the Ramillies and attacked her. In a previous 
 cruise, I would have taken five privateers that I had chased, and a 
 very rich convoy going from London to Lisbon, which I missed 
 because of having chased for sixteen hours a privateer, which 
 separated me twenty-five leagues from the cruising ground that I 
 had established from Cape La Roque to the Scilly Islands. Finally, 
 the boldness with which Commodore Johnstone cruises with a 
 fifty-gun ship and some frigates, encompassed by fifty ships of 
 war, is a very strong proof of what I have just stated." 
 
 All these considerations are still true. The advantages of speed 
 can be summed up as follows : 
 
 Inferiority of speed in relation to the enemy compromises all 
 operations ; it renders the offensive almost impossible, without 
 profiting the defensive. 
 
 79
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Superiority of speed diminishes the dead time that separates 
 conception from execution ; it favors surprises. 
 
 The influence of speed manifests itself Hkewise in that it gives 
 to the commander greater freedom of mind and of movement, 
 on account of diminution of the danger that results from the 
 neighborhood of a superior force. 
 
 Every' effort will, therefore, be made to be faster than the 
 enemy, but just here comes in the difficulty. No one power pos- 
 sesses the secret of building ships faster than those of its neighbor ; 
 and, for this reason, among the great maritime nations, the speeds 
 of each class of ships are sensibly equal. If a navy aims at supe- 
 riority, its lead lasts but a short time and affects only so limited a 
 number of ships that it is not worth being concerned about." 
 
 Moreover, supernatural virtues must not be ascribed to speed. 
 Its admirers draw up for us an attractive list of its qualities: 
 " If we are faster than the enemy, we can force him to fight when 
 and where we wish." Things do not come to pass so simply. 
 Doubtless it is possible to draw the enemy to oneself by occupying 
 a region where he has interests to safeguard ; but when he is there 
 the encounter will take place when and where it can, and not when 
 and where one would like it to be. Speed will certainly be useful ; 
 but what good purpose will it have served if, in order to arrive 
 first upon the battlefield, we have had to throw overboard part of 
 the artillery to increase our headway. Yet this is the result ar- 
 rived at by seeking superiority of speed at any cost. To be con- 
 vinced of it, it is sufficient to compare the armaments of two ships 
 of the same displacement and of different speeds. 
 
 There is nothing left to do then but to escape, and the natural 
 conclusion is that it would have been better not to come. Flight is 
 not a solution ; it is an avoidance. 
 
 When speed is at the service of weakness, it merely facilitates 
 desertion. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian cruis- 
 ers furnished us, on three different occasions, with valuable indica- 
 tions : let us take care not to forget them. 
 
 It will not be easy even to play the part of the Wandering Jew 
 on the sea. We are preparing lor ourselves a terrible awakening 
 
 "According to official figures, the English destroyers are faster than 
 ours; but accidents have shown that their excess of speed was only ob- 
 tained by the sacrifice of qualities essential in vessels ; it would, therefore, 
 be an embarrassment rather than an advantage. 
 
 80 <
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 when we figure that a superiority of two or three knots will permit 
 escaping. It may be supposed that a ship which constantly keeps 
 all fires lighted and all boilers under pressure will be able to 
 escape every attack, thanks to her speed, if she has nothing else to 
 do but take to her heels as soon as smoke is seen on the horizon. 
 But all this is pure theory. In practice no warship is capable of 
 keeping, through the whole duration of a cruise, her boilers at 17 
 atmospheres' pressure ; and before taking flight it is needful first 
 to recognize with whom one has to deal. Thus it will be necessary 
 to let oneself be approached, and when it is decided to run away, 
 the situation will already be critical. To escape from it, the ship 
 will have to undergo one of those tests that are so often inter- 
 rupted by breakdowns during official trials. Mere statistics will 
 show the danger of trusting to speed under these excessive 
 conditions. 
 
 Doubtless the chaser may also suffer the same injuries, but for 
 him they will not have the same consequences ; they will not 
 entail his loss. The situation is not the same, therefore. 
 
 If, instead of considering the case of a single ship, we take that 
 of a group of vessels, we arrive at still more pessimistic conclu- 
 sions. Homogeneity of speed is most difficult to obtain ; ships 
 have a speed depending upon their age, the cleanness of their 
 hulls, the amount of scale in their boilers, etc. At the present 
 time, when the speed of battle-ships closely presses that of cruisers, 
 a squadron of battle-ships has units faster than the poor sailers of 
 a division of cruisers. Thenceforth, the latter can no longer es- 
 cape without abandoning to the enemy some of its ships ; the lag- 
 gards will be quickly caught by the fast battle-ships ; and to succor 
 them it will be necessary to make a stand. 
 
 All this proves that the advantages of speed are much more 
 sensible for the stronger side, which derives an absolute benefit 
 from it, than for the weaker side, which will make use of it, but 
 which only has an interest in seeking after it if not thereby 
 weakened. But, until a new invention permits getting greater 
 power on a less weight, speed will only be increased by increasing 
 the power of the engines and the number of boilers to the detri- 
 ment of armament. In this way we fall again into the error com- 
 mitted at the time when battery power was increased by making 
 monster guns, and the protection of ships by giving them armor 
 of greater thickness. In the first case, the armament was reduced 
 
 81
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to one or two big guns; in the second, the armor sheltered but a 
 slender battery. 
 
 The result, therefore, is that the weakest navy is reduced to not 
 letting itself be left behind, and to seeking preferably endurance, 
 which, with theoretically equal speeds, gives in fact superiority. 
 This necessity is all the more imperative because speed is so ex- 
 cessively costly; not only will a fast ship be less armed on an 
 equal displacement, but she will likewise cost more, since battle- 
 ships cost about 2200 francs a ton, while light vessels without any 
 protection come to about 3000 francs a ton. Speed, therefore, 
 weakens in two ways : it diminishes the armament of ships as well 
 as their number. Nevertheless, to-day, one can no longer discuss 
 speed under its different aspects without being accused of the 
 crime of lack of patriotism. By dint of exalting it, we have come 
 to deify it. It is no longer considered in its relationship to other 
 elements ; it is made a thing apart, intangible, which has value in 
 itself. Let us not fear, on the contrary, to cry aloud (at the risk 
 of being regarded as retrogressives) that speed is not a force, but 
 a means of giving value to force, and that one has no right to 
 sacrifice a single sfun to it. That is the truth. 
 
 The speed corresponding to the most rapid pace that can be kept 
 up indefinitely is called the " strategical speed." We seamen have 
 no concern with those trial speeds that are reached by forcing a 
 ship over the measured base like a race horse in the home stretch. 
 Such feats require an expenditure of energy and a supplementary 
 personnel that cannot be furnished in regular service. What we 
 need is to keep up without failure a sustained rate oi speed, that 
 is to have engines that are not liable to break down. 
 
 High speed demands the presence in engine and fire rooms of 
 the whole force of mechanicians. It is, therefore, only a tactical jl 
 element that permits, at a given moment, giving a leap forward 
 when in contact with the enemy.'" 
 
 °° On war-ships, where the weight and space allotted to the machinery are 
 limited', high speeds have been attained by means of an expedient; thanks 
 to very elastic boilers that can burn up to 200 kilograms of coal per square 
 meter of grate surface, there is obtained by forced draft an overproduction 
 of steam that is used in giving an excessive number of revolutions to the 
 engines. For cruising speed it is necessary to reduce the power of the 
 engines to the normal. When this result is attained, the weight per horse- 
 power is almost as great as on merchant steamers. 
 
 82
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Radius of action, together with speed, gives the ship mobility. 
 But the relative importance of these two factors is not the same. 
 Speed is a prodigal that spends without counting and quickly uses 
 up its resources. Radius of action is distinguished by perse- 
 verance and tenacity. One is a brilliant quality ; the other a solid 
 quality. 
 
 However weak a naval force may be, there will never be any 
 difficulty about utilizing it, if it has mobility ; it will always be pos- 
 sible to find for it a field of action where it will not be confronted 
 with the cruel necessity of yielding with honor. 
 
 83
 
 VIII. 
 Homogeneity. 
 
 The object of homogeneity is to secure the maximum return 
 from speed and radius of action.^" It is the factor that above all 
 others gives economy of forces. Lack of homogeneousness in a 
 fleet constitutes a useless squandering of force and money. It is 
 evident, in fact, that the speed of a squadron is regulated by that 
 of the slowest ship and that the extent of operations is limited by 
 the resources of the ship which has the least of them." It may be 
 necessary, therefore, on account of a single ship, not to utilize the 
 qualities of a whole body of ships. 
 
 Since heterogeneousness is a source of weakness, the weakest 
 navy ought logically to strive with the most tenacity for similarity 
 of types. 
 
 Unhappily, France has never done so. Never has she taken 
 pains to give her squadrons a reasonable composition. Matters 
 have even gone so far that it seems as if there had sometimes been 
 an endeavor to compose a mixture of unlike ships so that there 
 might be some for every taste. It was doubtless thought that the 
 superior qualities of some would compensate the deficiencies of 
 others, and that all lumped together would have an average value. 
 
 Some attempts have been made to follow a more reasonable 
 course ; they were partly abandoned and moreover were but im- 
 
 °' We are here speaking only of strategical homegeneity ; further on we 
 shall consider the character of tactical homogeneity. 
 
 " Extract from one of d'Estaing's cruising reports : " The Langnedoc 
 and the Cesar are the fastest. The Tonnanl is the third sailer of the squad- 
 ron ; after that vessel come the Hector and the Zele. The Protecteur, 
 Faniasque and Sagittaire are what is called three companion ships. The 
 Marscillais and the Provenge sail fairly; as for the Guerrier and the Vail- 
 
 lant, they are the two worst sailers of the squadron You may get 
 
 an idea of the slowness to which we are condemned by the Guerrier and the 
 Vaillant from the fact that of all the merchant ships that have joined us 
 none have separated from the squadron except when they wished. These 
 two ships labor and risk theirs spars, keeping always under full sail, while 
 we roll and the sea devours us, because it is constantly necessary to shorten 
 sail to wait for them." 
 
 84
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 perfectly carried out. How reach a logical solution when, in our 
 navy, each unit has its special character? It is enough to cite the 
 Redoiitahlc, Devastation and Coiirbet to show that ships can have 
 very different capabilities in spite of a certain similarity of lines. 
 Our latest squadron itself is not homogeneous as regards 
 armaments. 
 
 One would like to know the role intended to be assigned to a 
 division such as our Far-Eastern squadron was quite recently 
 (Bayard, Vaiiban, Isly, Pascal, Eclaireur). These ships embar- 
 rassed each other, without being able to mutually support one 
 another. It would have been at least logical to give to the less 
 armed ships the greatest speed ; yet the Kersaint, which replaced 
 the Eclaireur, was built for i6 knots, while the Pascal steams 19, 
 
 At all periods the English have cared more than we for homo- 
 geneity. It is known witn what care the squadrons that had the 
 mission, always delicate, of revictualing Gibraltar in the presence 
 of the enemy were composed. The cohesion that was the advan- 
 tage of homogeneity was not unconnected with the success of this 
 operation. In our times, the English fleet has this same char- 
 acteristic that is so wholly wanting to ours, because in England 
 ships are built in groups and improvements are introduced in a 
 whole group. 
 
 It would be vain to seek in the past for instances of lack of 
 homogeneousness procuring advantage, while its disadvantages 
 are revealed to us on every page of history. What fatality then 
 weighs upon the French Navy that it persists in not seeing this? 
 
 Beyond doubt, a great effort was made to try — without, how- 
 ever, succeeding — to have at least one homogeneous squadron of 
 battle-ships ; but this laudable intention did not extend to armored 
 cruisers, which continue to be samples. The Lcon-Gamhetta, 
 Ernest-Renan and Waldeck-Rousseaii have different batteries. 
 
 There is no situation, in naval warfare, where lack of homo- 
 geneity is a greater handicap than in the case of a naval force 
 obliged to take to flight. At the end of a short time the ships are 
 trailed out in the order of their speed and fall successively into the 
 enemy's ranks."* A uniform speed, however small, would compel 
 making a stand and the battle would have a less unfavorable 
 aspect. 
 
 ■^ This was the cause of the Quiberon disaster and the origin of the loss 
 of de la Clue's ships. 
 
 8S
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Homogeneousness of squadrons has not the same value as 
 that of the ships of each squadron by itself. 
 
 There is no advantage in having several squadrons of the same 
 characteristics. Naval material is always being improved upon, 
 and, if it were wished to have all our squadrons similar, we would 
 be distanced by rival navies, or would be deprived of the assistance 
 of ships already old, but not destitute ot military value. The 
 different fractions of our forces will have to fulfil different duties 
 that do not require them all to have the same qualities to the same 
 degree ; if they have to unite, they will not all have the same road 
 to follow. It will be sufficient, therefore, to give the hardest task 
 to the squadron that has the most means. 
 
 In any one squadron, it is the homogeneity of the fighting line 
 alone that is important. The light vessels that spread in all direc- 
 tions will frequently be employed singly. On the different services 
 that are given them, they will have to display all their qualities, 
 and the more these qualities are developed the better ; but the older 
 vessels, and consequently less well equipped, will not be the less 
 useful in default of others ; they will render services of less value, 
 but still valuable. Moreover, the employment of light vessels is of so 
 various a nature that it even requires sometimes different types."" 
 The relative homogeneity given them will, therefore, result from 
 considerations of economy rather than of strategy, because variety 
 is a source of expense. 
 
 " Scouts of small draft may be needed, and others of great radius of 
 action. 
 
 86
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 OPERATIONS
 
 I. 
 
 The Attack and Defense of Coasts. 
 
 In our time coast defense has assumed such a preponderance in 
 the thoughts of the naval world that it seems, by itself alone, to 
 embody naval war. According to some, we have built a navy at 
 great expense only to secure " the inviolability of our shores " — 
 such is the consecrated expression. Others, seeking to discover 
 the unknown of future struggles in the naval operations of the 
 last century, have observed that they almost all took place along 
 the coast and were summed up in attacks upon fortified works, 
 combined with landings ; thence they have concluded that naval 
 warfare in the course of its evolution has taken a new form, of 
 which the type is furnished by the American Civil War, and the 
 Crimean expedition. 
 
 Before imposing this system of warfare upon France, with all 
 the consequences that it entails in respect to material, the causes 
 which gave birth to it should first have been determined ; it would 
 then have been found that, during the American Civil War, the 
 Confederates had an improvised navy, absolutely unfit for carry- 
 ing on a war, and that, during the Crimean expedition, the Rus- 
 sians sunk their ships. In both cases, therefore, the aggressor 
 found himself, at the very outset, in a position as advantageous as 
 if he had previously destroyed the offensive forces of the adver- 
 sary, and these examples do not furnish us with any indication as 
 to the influence that naval forces will exercise upon the protection 
 of the coast. 
 
 The public always looks with favor upon coast defense ; without 
 responsibility for the conduct of war, it sees above all the evils that 
 war engenders, and is frightened at the idea of suffering its con- 
 sequences. The ready-made opinions of those facile writers who 
 flatter the instinct of self-preservation innate in man are, there- 
 fore, freely accepted. Under this influence, each village, each city, 
 each region craves its share of protection ; the spectre of the 
 Augusta ravaging our shores in 1870 is evoked, and batteries, 
 torpedo-boats, coast-defense ships and even squadrons are 
 demanded.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Whither do such exaggerations lead? For. after all, the 
 always-cited Augusta captured but two steamers and a navy-yard 
 auxiliary ; and we have not built two hundred torpedo-boats and 
 spent hundreds of millions on battleships in order to arm ourselves 
 against such a danger as that. It will be impossible to carry on 
 war if all our resources are devoted to repelling imaginary 
 dangers. 
 
 War, we cannot too often repeat, can have no other object than 
 imposing upon the enemy the law of the stronger. We have no 
 right, therefore, to regard the defense of the coast as an inde- 
 pendent question, which leads to becoming absorbed in the acces- 
 sory to the detriment of the principal. It can only be taken into 
 account, in the employment of our resources, from the point of 
 view of its relations with the public wealth that nourishes the 
 war. The share that goes to it ought to represent only an insur- 
 ance premium proportional to the capital guaranteed. If the pre- 
 mium is greater than the insured capital, it is an absurdity. 
 
 The first thing to do, therefore, is to take account of the danger 
 incurred from expeditions against the coast and the chances of 
 their taking place. We shall then try to determine if it be not 
 possible to secure an efficient protection of the coast without im- 
 peding the offensive action that alone can bring the enemy to 
 terms. 
 
 It is curious that those who profess to see in attack upon our 
 shores the supreme calamity have confined themselves to recording 
 facts without weighing their import. Yet the study of causes and 
 efifects is the best basis of estimation that we have : we will begin 
 with it. 
 
 attacks against the coast in the reign of LOUIS XIII.™ 
 
 In 1627, France has no navy. The enemy can insult our shores 
 without fear of being taken in the rear ; if he attempts a landing, 
 the sea gives him a line of retreat and secure communications, 
 
 England takes advantage of this to endeavor to get a foothold 
 
 "" For the attacks that took place upon the Atlantic coast during the 
 period comprising the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV, we have fol- 
 lowed fhe account of Mr. Georges Toudouze, who has published an excel- 
 lent work, with full references, upon the organization of the defense of the 
 coasts in the seventeenth century. We quote verbatim such passages as are 
 of special interest. 
 
 90
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 in the midst of the rebellious Protestant communities, and to 
 acquire a base of operations with a view to reconquering the an- 
 cient kingdom of Aquitaine. 
 
 On July 20, Buckingham appears before the island of Re with 
 120 ships carrying 8000 soldiers. 
 
 On the 26th, the landing is completed ; the 27th, the little French 
 garrison, forced to retreat, shuts itself up in the citadel of Saint 
 Martin, where it is immediately besieged. The siege lasted five 
 months. 
 
 In spite of a reinforcement of 4000 men, Buckingham could not 
 overcome the heroic resistance of Toiras ; and, on November 27, 
 he re-embarked, taking back to England only 2000 men. 
 
 The failure was complete. 
 
 ATTACKS AGAINST THE COAST IN THE REIGN OF LOUIS XIV. 
 
 War breaks out, in 1672, between Holland on one side and 
 France and England on the other. 
 
 The first two years pass in conflicts of squadrons against squad- 
 rons ; they are signalized by the battles of Southwood, Walcheren 
 and the Texel ; but in 1674, Holland, having made peace with 
 England, takes advantage of the transfer of all our forces from 
 the Atlantic to the Mediterranean to attempt systematically to 
 ravage our sea coast. 
 
 Tromp, with a fleet of 36 ships and 34 transports, carrying 8000 
 men, first cruises off the Normandy coast, seeking a landing place ; 
 but he found the shore so well guarded everywhere that he dared 
 not risk his troops. 
 
 At the end of June, the Dutch fleet appears at the entrance of 
 the Iroise ; a storm drives it out to sea. It then proceeded to 
 Belle-Isle where it anchored on June 27. 
 
 Count Horn, who commanded the troops, summoned the place 
 to surrender. The governor of the island having refused to yield, 
 the Dutch general did not dare to force a landing and employed a 
 classic method. 
 
 During the night fifty men were put on shore at the little village 
 of Locmaria, and set fire to the houses. Thanks to this diversion, 
 which attracted the defenders of the island, the troops were able 
 to land in the harbor of Grand-Sable without opposition. 
 
 The garrison of the island took refuge in the citadel, expecting 
 
 91
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to support a siege ; after a fruitless assault, the Dutch were con- 
 tent to ravage the island, and on July 4 they got under way and 
 steered for Noirmoutiers. 
 
 The hostile fleet remained off this island three weeks, while the 
 disembarked forces levied contributions upon the inhabitants, de- 
 stroyed the fortifications and laid hands on private properties. 
 After having loaded his ships wath the spoils, Tromp got under 
 way and proceeded to make a peaceful demonstration in the 
 Straits of Oleron ; then he finally left the Atlantic and went to 
 join the Spaniards in the Mediterranean. 
 
 " Nobody in France at all understood this strange expedition 
 which journeyed along the coast and whose greatest exploit was 
 the pillage of Noirmoutiers." " 
 
 Our shores were troubled no further until the Peace of Nime- 
 guen : the fleets of both sides operate in the Mediterranean, where 
 they have neither the time nor the means of doing harm of a 
 purely material nature. 
 
 We come now to the war of the League of Augsburg. 
 
 The first four years pass without attacks upon the coast : it is 
 the period when our naval power is at its apogee and enables us 
 to hold in check the united forces of England and Holland. Three 
 years in succession, Tourville paralyzes the efforts of the allied 
 fleets, and even inflicts defeat upon them at Beachy Head. But, 
 in 1692, he is beaten at La Hogue, and with the following year the 
 enemy reappears off our coasts."^ 
 
 Louis XI\^, in fact, yielding to Pontchartrain's solicitations, 
 renounces the struggle of fleets in the Atlantic and sends Tour- 
 ville into the Mediterranean."^ The following year this admiral 
 goes again to the Levant, where his squadron remains until the 
 
 " Georges Toudouze, La Defence des cotes de Dunkerque a Bayonnc au 
 dix-septicme siecle. 
 
 " The battle of La Hogue was fought at the end of May. The allies, 
 therefore, had time to profit by their victory, campaigns not ending until 
 the autumn; in fact they had planned a combined attack upon Saint Malo, 
 but the season slipped uway before the naval and military authorities were 
 able to agree upon the plan of operations (see Colomb, Naval Warfare). 
 
 *^ He set sail from Brest, on May 26, with seventy-one ships, almost the 
 entire naval force of France. It was during this voyage that he met, off 
 Lagos, a convoy of four hundred sail escorted by twenty-six ships, part of 
 which he captured. 
 
 92
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 end of the war very nearly without occupation." The Atlantic, 
 therefore, remains undefended. 
 
 It was Saint Malo that sustained the first onset. 
 
 On November 27, a fleet composed of '' twelve ships, twelve 
 bomb-ketches, twelve brigantines and several gunboats," under 
 the orders of Captain Benbow, arrayed itself in the roadstead. 
 
 For five days the town was bombarded. Although the defenses 
 were far from complete, the inhabitants, seconded by the troops, 
 put a good face on the matter and replied energetically. 
 
 It was on this occasion that the English made trial of those 
 infernal machines * that they were to make frequent use of in this 
 war and that never yielded anything but disappointments. The 
 Vesuve was blown up, but destroyed only her own crew. 
 
 The enemy reckoned upon destroying a nest of privateers when 
 he appeared of? Saint Malo; he only succeeded in breaking win- 
 dows and slates. " It is no joke, says a contemporary account, 
 to say that with the exception of a soldier who disappeared 
 from the Bidouane tower where he was on sentry duty, and of the 
 poor devil of a gunner before mentioned, our only loss was an 
 unfortunate cat killed in a gutter." °* 
 
 After this exploit, the fleet went to its home ports to winter. 
 
 In order to restore their prestige, the allies prepared, for the 
 next campaign, an attack upon Brest. The plan consisted of 
 landing a small army on the peninsulas of Kelern in order to 
 destroy all the defenses on the south side of the narrow entrance 
 and so to permit the ships to go through the passes and reach the 
 arsenal. 
 
 On June 17, 1694, the Dutch-English fleet, commanded by Lord 
 Berkeley, entered the Iroise and moored at the entrance of the 
 passage, between Bertheaume and Camaret. It was composed of 
 22 English ships, 19 Dutch, 12 bomb-ketches and a great number 
 of transports.*' General Tollemache was in command of the land- 
 ing force of troops, 6000 in number. 
 
 " He left Brest on April 24. 
 
 * " Machines " or " infernals " were fire ships arranged to explode. — 
 P. R. A. 
 
 ^ Quoted by Georges Toudouze. 
 
 °* Colomb, Naval Warfare. We have given preference to the figures of 
 English historians as regards the composition of squadrons and the number 
 of troops ; on the contrary, we have adopted the French version of the 
 
 93
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 That very evening- a frigate went to reconnoiter the beach at 
 Trez-Roiiz, on the Camaret side, where the landing was to take 
 place ; but scarcely had she approached the shore when the fire of 
 the batteries forced her to withdraw. It was a disappointment : 
 Lord Berkeley was not expecting any resistance and, since the 
 French were on their guard, the situation took on quite another 
 aspect. 
 
 In a council of war, the admiral was in favor of giving up the 
 expedition ; but General Tollemache's opinion prevailed, and the 
 landing was agreed upon for the following day. 
 
 In the night, Vauban, who commanded the defense, sent rein- 
 forcements onto the peninsulas of Kelern ; everyone got ready to 
 receive the enemy. 
 
 On the 1 8th, as soon as the fog lifted, seven frigates got under 
 way, with Rear-Admiral Carmarthen in command, to protect the 
 landing. 
 
 " Carmarthen made preparations to direct his whole fire against 
 the fort (of Camaret) ; but scarcely had the seven frigates cleared 
 the reef that terminates Convent Point when the entire circuit of 
 the shore burst into flame, and a terrific fire, from batteries whose 
 existence was unknown to the allies, was poured upon the seven 
 ships. For a moment they were thrown into a disorder and con- 
 fusion that only the impetuous valor of Carmarthen saved from 
 being fatal to them. While he established order in the action so 
 brusquely begun, and recovered his men from their surprise, 
 Berkele}- made a last effort to induce Tollemache to withdraw 
 from his enterprise in view of such a superiority of the defense. 
 But the lieutenant-general would pay no heed and took the leader- 
 ship of a hundred boats containing the first troops of the landing 
 force. 
 
 " Very gallantly, meanwhile, three frigates brought their broad- 
 sides to bear at half-range from the batteries of Convent Point ; 
 three others attacked the little fort of Camaret, and the seventh 
 stood for the beach of Trez-Rouz to be ready for the arrival of 
 the boats. The latter, in their turn, entered the circle of fire 
 formed by the French batteries, which sunk a number of them ; 
 the rest, nevertheless, put ashore under the most frightful fire 
 
 results of each operation, because the enemy never made an exact return 
 of the damages he did. 
 
 94
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 from artillery and small arms that can be imagined, and the troops, 
 already harassed, began to land among the breakers. But, taken 
 from one side by a battery, shot at from the front by marines and 
 coast-defense militia sheltered behind breastworks overlooking the 
 beach, the Dutch-English deployed in a disorderly manner on the 
 wet sands and their decimated lines wavered. Too numerous to be 
 all sheltered behind an enormous rock that occupies the center of 
 the beach, they were not sufficiently numerous to attempt to as- 
 sault intrenchments ; the murderous fire that they endured delayed 
 the arrival of other boats, already hindered by the ebb tide, while 
 the supporting frigates with great difficulty made head against 
 the French batteries 
 
 " In this critical situation, a very visible hesitation showed itself 
 in the ranks of the disembarked soldiers : seizing with the greatest 
 good fortune upon this instant of indecision, MM. de • Benoise 
 and de la Cousse rushed sword in hand onto the beach and, at the 
 head of a hundred men from the volunteer companies, ran straight 
 at the 1 200 or 1300 Dutch-English drawn up along the sands. 
 Following at once this bold example, 1600 to 1800 coast-defense 
 militia, who were occupying the ridges bordering the beach and 
 many of whom were armed only with sticks and scythes with 
 handles reversed, rushed in a body upon the enemy with savage 
 cries. A furious but brief hand-to-hand conflict ensued. At the 
 very beginning Tollemache fell, mortally wounded ; he was im- 
 mediately borne to his boat, which escaped under oars and sail, 
 as did also all the boats that had not yet been beached. It was the 
 beginning of a complete rout ; the disembarked troops wished to 
 flee, but the falling tide had left their boats aground and the over- 
 loaded craft remained stranded. The supporting frigate gave way 
 in her turn and stood ofif, three-quarters dismantled and powerless 
 to help. On the beach, in spite of a very fine resistance, 800 sol- 
 diers lay dead, and the 400 to 500 survivors laid down their arms 
 to a squadron of Du Plessis-Praslin's regiment, arrived post-haste 
 to save these unfortunates to whom the coast-guards, drunk with 
 fury, refused any quarter. 
 
 " In a few moments all was over and shouts of victory rang 
 about the circuit of the bay, while the batteries, still keeping up a 
 rapid fire, hailed projectiles upon the retreating boats and the 
 frigates already so harassed. The Monck, Carmarthen's ship, 
 after having in vain sought to force the Camaret entrance, her 
 
 95
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 yards carried away, her sails in tatters, her hull pierced with shot 
 holes, had to call for a tow. The two frigates that had attacked 
 the little fort of Camaret retreated in their turn, after having 
 knocked down the bell of the chapel of Notre Dame of Roc- 
 Amadour, situated on the jetty, beside the fort, and on the walls 
 of which the marks of their shot are still to be seen. But of the 
 three ships that struggled painfully with the batteries of Convent 
 Point, only two could regain the fleet. The third, a Dutch 34-gun 
 ship named the Wesep, was too near the shore ; she touched bot- 
 tom on the shoal known under the name of Corejou, could not 
 lighten herself and remained stranded wath 12 feet of water in 
 her hold, under a terrible fire: she finally surrendered to M. de 
 La Gondiniere, whose musketeers were shooting the crew from the 
 top of the neighboring cliff; forty dead were found on her and 60 
 prisoners. Just prior to this, a boat loaded with infantry had been 
 sunk outright in the middle of the bay by a shell from the battery 
 of two mortars established on Convent Point. 
 
 " Little by little, the remnants of the expedition rejoined the 
 main body of the squadron,, over which reigned profound dis- 
 couragement; the losses, in fact, were out of all proportion with 
 the duration of the fight. On the beach of Trez-Rouz, 800 men 
 had perished ; 500 were prisoners ; 400 to 500 soldiers and sailors 
 had been killed on the ships and in the boats ; 2 vessels and 48 
 boats were lost. It was a veritable disaster, and English his- 
 torians have vainly sought to conceal its full extent. Tollemache, 
 enraged at having been beaten by peasants, wished to attempt 
 savage reprisals ; he demanded that Berkeley force the entrance of 
 the harbor at any cost and destroy the town of Camaret with hot 
 shot from the entire squadron, to avenge upon the inhabitants his 
 bloody repulse. This proposal on the part of the lieutenant-general 
 was rejected by the members of the council of war, who were 
 little anxious to engage in a new action ; and Berkeley, whose too 
 well-founded apprehensions had been justified by the event, or- 
 dered sail made. The allied squadron, lifting anchor, started back 
 for England, but its misfortunes were not over ; in doubling Oues- 
 sant, it had to abandon to sink in those waters two ships that had 
 suffered much in the battle of the i8th, and it was then assailed 
 for five days by a violent storm from the southeast. It only 
 reached Portsmouth at the end of the month, much crippled." " 
 
 " Georges Toudouze. 
 
 96
 
 A Studv of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Made ridiculous at Saint Malo, beaten at Camaret, the allies 
 sought a revenge that could repay them without making them run 
 any risk. 
 
 They fixed their choice upon Dieppe, a town almost without 
 defense. 
 
 In the middle of July, the town was bombarded. The houses, 
 built of wood, were soon set on fire by the action of shells ; two- 
 thirds of the town was consumed by the flames. The inhabitants, 
 moreover, did nothing to arrest the conflagration. 
 
 After this easy success, the Dutch-English went to Havre to 
 recommence the same operation. But there arrangements had 
 been made to combat the fire, which was the only serious danger 
 from such bombardments. The damage done was unimportant ; 
 moreover, the place made a good defense : twice the batteries 
 forced the hostile fleet to change its anchorage and blew up a 
 bomb-ketch. 
 
 After having remained five days before Havre, the allies pro- 
 ceeded to Dunkirk : " but there they had to deal with a veritable 
 stronghold and they were awaited resolutely ; the forts were well 
 armed and supplied, and Jean Bart in person had accepted the 
 command of six long-boats and eleven chaloupes intended to give a 
 warm reception to bomb-ketches that came near the harbor. 
 
 " The enemy appeared on September 20, and the advance guard 
 of frigates that came to sound the roadstead gave way under the 
 fire from the Risban and the citadel. The 22d, thirty-six ships, 
 frigates and fire-ships came to attack the forts at the head of the 
 jetties, but the guns of these forts blew up the two infernal 
 machines brought by the fleet, before they were able to secure 
 them to the framework of the jetty ; and after this check the 
 enemy withdrew out of range of the artillery. 
 
 " They only got up anchor on the 26th, to throw some bombs, 
 without result, into Calais ; from Calais they went to cruise oflf 
 Cherbourg and finally returned to England." ^ 
 
 The campaign of 1694 was over, According to custom, the 
 fleets took up their winter quarters and only rearmed in the spring. 
 
 In 1695, the objective of the allies has not changed: they wish 
 at any cost to utterly destroy the haunts where our privateers took 
 refuge. The towns of Saint Malo and Dunkirk, therefore, will 
 sustain their principal attack. But, doubtless attributing their 
 
 ** Georges Toudouze. 
 
 97
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 repulses in the preceding year to the insufficiency of their means, 
 they increase their forces. It is a fleet of seventy ships that comes 
 to anchor off Saint Malo on July 14. 
 
 The 15th, the enemy endeavored, without any success, to de- 
 stroy the Conche fort; they fired 1500 to 1600 shells, only 900 of 
 which fell in the town, and the appraisement that was made on the 
 following 30th of July gives as the sum total of damages 103,532 
 francs, and as the number of victims 20 to 25 persons, besides four 
 soldiers of the Oleron regiment. As for the allies, their losses, 
 which can scarcely be estimated accurately, must have been great, 
 for the English historian Smollet says that the English bomb ves- 
 sels suffered more harm than they caused. What is certain is that 
 one of them ran aground at Cesambre and another was burned 
 and then abandoned by her crew ; besides which three double 
 chaloupes were sunk.°° 
 
 The enemy perceived that they were uselessly expending their 
 time and money, and on the 17th they withdrew. But while the 
 main body of the fleet proceeded to England, a newly arrived 
 detachment delayed to throw 500 shells into Granville, " without 
 doing much damage, although the English boasted of having left 
 that town in flames." ™ 
 
 After having revictualed, the allies appear before Dunkirk in 
 August. 
 
 It is probable that the commanders of the f^eet understood very 
 well that they would be no more successful than at Saint Malo, but 
 their governments still had a right to preserve their illusions ; 
 since, judging by the English accounts, the admirals, not daring 
 to avow their repulses themselves, aided to deceive them by exag- 
 gerating the results. If what they said had been true, it would not 
 have been necessary to attack the same places after such short 
 intervals. 
 
 This time, the number of bomb-ketches had been increased to 
 twenty." It was all to no efifect, or rather it had this effect — 
 never again did the English attack Dunkirk. 
 
 "^ Georges Toudouze. "" Georges Toudouze. 
 
 " At this epoch, bomb-ketches, invented by the French engineer Petit- 
 Renau, played the principal part in bombardments. The movable sight not 
 existing (it did not appear till the middle of the 19th century), gun fire 
 was very uncertain, and the ketches, owing to their small size, offered a tar- 
 get very difficult to hit. Advantage was taken of this to bring them as near 
 
 9<S
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 " Finding themselves in this sorry plight, being obliged either 
 to endure the fire of the batteries or to risk being lost on the 
 Brack shoal, the enemy preferred, according to Clement's phrase, 
 ' to wipe avv^ay their grief upon Calais,' which they did, however, 
 to a very moderate degree, since, although they did some damage, 
 they could not, in spite of all their efforts, burn or destroy the 
 wooden pier that sheltered Calais on the side of the sea." " 
 
 In 1696 the allies become more cautious ; in May they bombard 
 Calais in a spiritless way, make a demonstration before Brest, and 
 come to anchor in Quiberon bay. 
 
 Landings were made on the two small islands of Houat and 
 Hoedic, as well as at Groix ; these islands, in view of their unim- 
 portance, were absolutely without defenses. 
 
 " The English historians have represented these islands as of 
 great extent, populous, with large towns and innumerable villages ; 
 they say that twenty villages were burned on Hoedic, where there 
 were scarcely that many cottages, and declare that six hundred 
 cattle were taken away or killed on that island, which could not 
 have fed half as many ; as for the town of Houat, it has never 
 existed except in the imagination of historians eager to conceal 
 the insignificance of these expeditions : thus Father Frangois- 
 Marie Galen, who was an eye-witness, continually heaps sarcasms 
 upon them in this connection." " 
 
 After these exploits, Admiral Rooke, who commanded the allied 
 fleet, attempted a landing at Belle-Isle with 8000 men. 
 
 But there there was an energetic governor and a garrison, small 
 it is true, but which sufficed for the population to gather around ; 
 in a word there was an organized defense. Thus, when the troops 
 wished to land, they were so badly received that they did not 
 insist. The memory of Camaret seems to be still present in the 
 minds of the allies, for the fleet remains eleven days before Belle- 
 Isle without daring to do anything. During this time, a detach- 
 ment goes to throw a few shells at Sables-d'Olonne and into Saint 
 Martin-de-Re, in order not to return to England without anything 
 to tell of. 
 
 Peace was signed in the following year. 
 
 as possible to the shore, whence they launched shells against the town, 
 while the ships kept at the extreme range of the batteries. This explains 
 why the latter suffered so little in this class of operations. 
 '' Georges Toudouze. " Georges Toudouze. 
 
 99
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Thus for three successive years the English immobiHzed enor- 
 mous forces to bombard our whole coast, and all these armaments 
 served only to reduce to ashes one small town. The English 
 historian Burchett recognized that when everything was taken 
 into account the result was disproportionate to the expense. 
 
 The enemies recognized the fruitlessness of bombardments, 
 and, during the war of the Spanish Succession, we shall see them 
 give up ploughing our fields with shot and devote themselves 
 exclusively to landings. Eut they will act with such circumspec- 
 tion that their troops will only once succeed in setting foot upon 
 French soil. 
 
 As in the latter years of the preceding war, France abandoned 
 the Atlantic. She made over part of her western forces to priva- 
 teers to prey upon commerce ; the rest were sent to Toulon or 
 employed in protecting convoys. 
 
 The English took advantage of this to attempt to surprise 
 Cadiz with 14,000 men, which was unsuccessful, and to destroy 
 at Vigo the Spanish galleons and Chateau-Renault's ships which 
 were convoying them. 
 
 In 1703, the same fleet made a useless cruise along our coasts. 
 Yet it had put to sea with magnificent projects : nothing less was 
 proposed than to destroy all the defenses that protected the straits, 
 then to ruin Rochefort and to end by a landing at Brest. 
 
 Admiral Rooke, who commanded the fleet, brought with him a 
 landing force of 7000 men ; he had even had the foresight to have 
 vessels laden with stones made ready to obstruct the passes. 
 
 But it is far from conception to execution: the start is made 
 with fine resolutions ; then, on arriving at the spot, it is perceived 
 ■ — though rather late — that to land a handful of men in a country 
 like France is very dangerous ; then prudence is seen to be the 
 better part of valor. 
 
 As a matter of fact. Sir George Rooke first steered towards the 
 shores of Saintonge, and then all at once went to the north. It 
 has been said that he received notice of the presence of a French 
 squadron of twenty-six ships, and that he wished first to get rid of 
 them ; but this squadron did not exist.'* At the beginning of June 
 the hostile fleet anchored off Belle-Isle. 
 
 '* It is probable that it was a convoy of merchant ships escorted by a few 
 war vessels.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 PTad the English admiral come there bacause there was nothing 
 else to do, or did he really intend to make a landing? The fact is 
 that he remained a fortnight off Le Palais without doing any- 
 thing. On the other hand, the active preparations going on on 
 shore showed clearly that, if the enemy landed, they would find a 
 warm reception. In 1696, Rooke had had a taste of what the 
 governor could do, and perhaps this memory had something to do 
 with the resolution to withdraw that he arrived at.'° 
 
 Dissatisfaction with oneself often leads to the venting of one's 
 rage upon inoffensive people. The English, before returning to 
 England, sought an expiatory victim and fixed upon the island of 
 Groix, which this same Admiral Rooke had twice devastated in 
 1696. 
 
 " This island, which vv^as without troops and without fortifica- 
 tions, would certainly have seen repeated the disaster from which 
 it suffered in 1696 but for the parish priest, who saved it. ' Thanks 
 to a strategem conceived by the priest, the English believed that 
 they were confronted by a considerable number of regular troops, 
 and so did not land. The priest made the women and girls put on 
 red caps and ordered them to stand in line with all the men on 
 the highest part of the island, which slopes down towards the sea. 
 The population, mounted upon horses, asses, cows and oxen, so 
 deluded the English admiral that he did not dare to go any 
 further . . . . ' The priest received from minister Pontchartrain 
 some most curious letters, in which the latter presented him with 
 a draft for 500 livres on the bishop of Agen, for the services he 
 had rendered, and named him commandant of the militia and 
 coast-guards, in case of the absence of officers." " 
 
 After 1704, the English government's attention is drawn to- 
 wards the south. The same fleet that operated in Spain in 1702, 
 and in France in 1703, escorts as far as Lisbon an army corps 
 intended to support the claims of the Archduke Charles ; then it 
 takes Gibraltar by surprise and is kept in the Mediterranean by the 
 squadron of the Count of Toulouse, with which it has an encounter 
 at Malaga. After the disarming of our ships, it takes part in the 
 
 " " When the hostile fleet appeared before Belle-Isle, the governor, 
 Herve de la Ferriere (the same as in 1696) was hunting on the mainland. 
 A vessel was sent to look for him and brought him back through the 
 fleet." — Georges Toudouze. 
 
 ™ Cabart-Danneville (report to the Senate) and Georges Toudouze.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 military operations before Barcelona ; then it winters at Lisbon 
 and in English ports. 
 
 The following- year (1706) the appearance of the Count of 
 Toulouse before Barcelona draws the allies into the Mediter- 
 ranean ; they force our squadron to retire to Toulon. 
 
 Thus, for three years, our shores enjoy complete tranquillity. 
 But in 1707 the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene besiege 
 Toulon by land, and Shovel, who commanded the hostile naval 
 forces, thinks the moment favorable to disembarrass himself of our 
 ships, which, in spite of their disarmament, are a permanent 
 menace. 
 
 It was only an alarm. The hostile army having raised the siege 
 at the end of ten days, the fleet lost all hope of penetrating into the 
 harbor, and it withdrew after having emptied its magazines to no 
 effect. 
 
 The following year a hostile fleet reappeared in the north. 
 
 Admiral Byng anchors, on August 20, 1708, off Vaast-la- 
 Hougue, with sixty ships. 
 
 As soon as the presence of the hostile fleet was signaled, the 
 Marshal of Matignon hastened with three regiments to the assist- 
 ance of the little garrison of the place. 
 
 On the 23d an attempt at landing fails ; the boats do not even 
 reach the beach. 
 
 The fleet then gets under way and goes to show itself before 
 Cherbourg ; then, suddenly, it comes back to its former anchorage. 
 But the defense has not fallen into the snare, and from all direc- 
 tions troops flow in. 
 
 On the 28th the boats once more approach the shore, and, as 
 on the first occasion, they have to regain their ships without hav- 
 ing been able to disembark the troops. 
 
 The enemy doubtless hesitated to go away baffled, since, for a 
 month, they remained on the Cotentin coast, and it was not until 
 the end of September that they definitely withdrew. 
 
 This repulse took from the English for the remainder of the 
 war the desire of attacking anew our western shores ; they thought 
 they would be more fortunate on our Mediterranean coast, which, 
 not having as yet felt such invasions, might be less prepared to 
 repel them. 
 
 Actually, 700 men were easily able to land in the neighborhood 
 
 Jl
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 of Cettc, on July 19, 1710; the following day they took possession 
 of the town, while the ships exchanged broadsides with the forts. 
 
 The object of the English was to offer help to the Protestant 
 peasants of the Cevennes, who were then in full revolt, and to 
 carry aid to them in the shape of men and money by taking the 
 town of Cette as a base of operations ; but the English government 
 must have been very ill-informed as to the importance of these 
 risings to expect to maintain itself in French territory with such a 
 ridiculous force. 
 
 On the 2 1st, the town and bridge of Agde were taken ; then the 
 enemy stopped, not daring to adventure further. On the 27th, 
 the heads of column of the French troops were signaled at Meze. 
 Threatened with being cut off, General Seissan requested the 
 English admiral to send armed boats into the lagoon of Thau to 
 prevent the French from fording it ; " but, at the same time, infor- 
 mation was received that considerable forces were marching on 
 Agde. Retreat was necessary. The English withdrew upon 
 Cette ; hard-pressed, they could only pass through the town to 
 gain their boats, and they only embarked at the sacrifice of their 
 rear-guard. 
 
 This attack was the last of the war, which v>'as ended on April 
 II, 1713, by the treaty of Utrecht. 
 
 ATTACKS AGAINST THE COAST IN THE REIGN OF LOUIS XV. 
 
 During the naval wars of the reign of Louis XV, attacks upon 
 the coast continue, but they take on a new character. 
 
 Objectives remain the same ; methods are different. The Eng- 
 lish systematically refrain from bombardments ; they endeavor to 
 take our maritime towns from the rear by landing bodies of troops 
 numbering as much as 14,000 men ; but, taught by experience, they 
 avoid, as far as possible, forcible landings, and, in order to find 
 undefended beaches, they are obliged to disembark far from their 
 objectives ; whenever the defense does not lose its head, this sepa- 
 ration is fatal to them. 
 
 The war of the Austrian Succession was marked by but a single 
 attack upon the coasts. After the battle of Toulon, which deter- 
 
 '' The towns of Cette and Agde are separated by a long dyke which is 
 washed on one side by the sea and on the other by the lagoon of Thau. 
 Meze is on the edge of the lagoon near its middle. 
 
 103
 
 A Studv of Naval Strategy. 
 
 mined the official declaration of war," France prepared an expedi- 
 tion to attempt once a.qain the restoration of the Stuarts. The 
 active surveillance of the English squadrons ruined these projects, 
 and the French squadron that had been armed was broken up : a 
 part went into the Mediterranean, other ships went to Lorient and 
 Rochefort. 
 
 But the English government still had causes for anxiety ; 
 Charles-Edward, son of the Pretender, had landed in the north 
 of Scotland and had raised the country. For nearly two years he 
 held in check the troops launched in his pursuit. 
 
 So long as this heroic frolic lasted, the enemy's squadrons 
 cruised off our coast, from Dunkirk to Rochefort, to intercept any 
 aid sent to the prince. When Charles-Edward, having no more 
 soldiers, was reduced to wandering as a fugitive in the Scottish 
 mountains, the British government breathed again ; and then only 
 did it think of attempting to surprise Lorient in order to ruin the 
 establishments of the East Indian Company. 
 
 Admiral Lestock anchored on October i, 1746, in the bay of 
 Pouldu with 16 ships, 8 frigates and 2 bomb-vessels ; he escorted 
 a convoy carrying 5800 troops commanded by General Sinclair. 
 
 A landing was effected the same day ; on the 2d, the English 
 seized Guidel and Plimur, and established their camp between the 
 two places. Thence General Sinclair sent to summon the town to 
 surrender. 
 
 The inhabitants were not high-spirited : although Lorient had 
 walls armed with cannon, it could not be considered a stronghold. 
 The authorities signed a truce and entered upon deliberations as 
 to the course that should be taken. 
 
 While the people of Lorient discussed the matter, the English 
 general conferred with his admiral ; for, if the French did not 
 think their situation a good one, the English found theirs worse : 
 at any moment they might be cut off from their ships. 
 
 At the end of several days the inhabitants, intimidated by a few 
 cannon shot, decided to surrender ; a flag of truce left the town to 
 agree upon the terms of capitulation. But precisely at this mo- 
 ment, the English had reached the conclusion to retire; and they 
 had struck their camp so hastily that they left behind four cannon, 
 a mortar and a quantity of stores. Sinclair had received notice of 
 
 '* Hostilities had already begun, according to the English. 
 
 104
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the assembling of troops, and, not knowing whether he would 
 have to deal with a company of loo men or an army of 20,cxx) 
 soldiers, he had preferred to retreat. Actually, thirteen battalions 
 and fourteen squadrons were advancing under the orders of MM. 
 de Saint-Pern and de Coetlogon, but they were still several days' 
 march away." 
 
 On Oct. 9, the fleet got under way. Lestock, not daring to re- 
 turn immediately to England, cruised for a fortnight off the coast, 
 made a landing at Houat and at Hoedic, and finally went away on 
 October 23. 
 
 Was it the failure of this expedition that kept the English away 
 from our coasts during the rest of the war ? It would seem so, for 
 the few ships that we had kept armed could not have interfered 
 with them. 
 
 The Seven Years War began with a setback for the enemy : 
 France seized Minorca before the English had had time to send 
 forces into the Mediterranean. 
 
 The loss of Minorca was deeply felt in England and public 
 opinion loudly demanded reprisals. The occasion was favorable : 
 after a first effort crowned with success, the French navy seemed 
 for three years to be non-existent ; it was then directed by Berryer, 
 who had set his heart on ruining it. 
 
 England had a fine chance and took advantage of it. 
 
 A fleet composed of seventeen ships of the line, under the 
 orders of Admiral Hawke, set sail from Portsmouth on September 
 7, 1757 ; it escorted a convoy carrying 10,000 men. On the 20th it 
 was made out by the lookouts on the island of Re beating to wind- 
 ward to approach the land ; on the 22d it anchored in the Basque 
 Roads. There was no doubt but that it had designs against 
 our Rochefort arsenal. 
 
 On the day following, the island of Aix, which was defended by 
 only 16 cannon and had a garrison of only 250 men, fell into the 
 hands of the enemy. The English made as if to land at Chatelail- 
 lon, where there were a few hundred coast-guards ; they were 
 prevented, it is said, by the state of the sea. They likewise made a 
 demonstration before Fouras, where Lieutenant-General de Lan- 
 geron had gone ; on September 30 they retired, abandoning the 
 island of Aix. 
 
 '° These troops had been detached from the army of Marshal Saxe. 
 
 105
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 During all this time the most extreme confusion continued to 
 reign at Rochefort, where there was much more thought of seek- 
 ing safety than of putting up a defense. Here again there was as 
 much fear on one side as on the other ; M. de Langeron, with a few 
 companies of regulars and coast-guards, saved the situation by his 
 energetic attitude. 
 
 The following year Admiral Hawke reappeared off the island 
 of Aix ; but this time the land was not his objective. He brought 
 with him only seven ships and three frigates, and had in view 
 only the destruction of an important convoy bound for the colonies. 
 We shall, therefore, merely mention this operation, which does 
 not belong to the class of attacks on the coast f° but, some time 
 after, the invasions recommence, and it is again Saint Malo that 
 attracts the English. 
 
 An immense effort was made : a hundred transports carried 
 16,000 men under the orders of the Duke of Marlborough. 
 
 On June 5, 1758, the fleet, commanded by Lord Howe, anchored 
 in Cancale bay. A landing was effected without difficulty, and 
 Marlborough, after establishing an intrenched camp to protect 
 his embarkation in case of a reverse, began to march towards 
 Saint Malo. On the way he delayed to ravage the country, and 
 when he arrived under the walls of the place the Marquis de la 
 Chatre had had time to shut himself up in it with 2000 men and to 
 put it in a state of defense. 
 
 Unable to penetrate into the town, and not anxious to make an 
 assault, the English burned all the vessels that were in the harbor 
 of Saint-Servan. Meanwhile the Duke d'Aiguillon, governor of 
 the province, directed a movement of all the troops of Brittany 
 towards the coast, and he had already collected several thousand 
 men at Dinan, where he had gone in person. 
 
 Fearing to be cut off from his line of retreat, Marlborough 
 decided to raise the siege ; the forces at the disposition of the 
 Duke d'Aiguillon were not yet sufficient to disturb him, and he 
 was able to re-embark without loss on June 11. The fleet got 
 under way on the 17th and returned to England. 
 
 *" The enterprise did not fail completely : the vessels, which had been 
 obliged to lighten themselves in order to ascend the river, lost a great part 
 of their stores, and the departure of the convoy was delayed. It consisted 
 of five ships, some frigates and forty transports. 
 
 106
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 What was the purpose of the English in going to Saint Malo ? 
 
 A thousand horses and twenty-five pieces of artillery were not 
 joined with the infantry in order to burn eight vessels, most of 
 which were only boats. 
 
 A week's expedition does not require the mobilizing of 16,000 
 men and the chartering of a hundred merchant ships. 
 
 They intended, therefore, to take the place, and it is not easy 
 to see why they neither tried to open a breach nor to make an 
 assault ; or rather it must be supposed that they perceived then 
 that they had put themselves in a false position. 
 
 Marlborough's conduct was no doubt severely judged in Eng- 
 land, for he was replaced by General Bligh ; and, at the end of 
 July, the fleet proceeded to Cherbourg, carrying with it only 6000 
 men for landing. 
 
 In this sad affair of Cherbourg, there are occurrences so extra- 
 ordinary that it is interesting to give a detailed account of it. 
 
 " At the end of July, 1758, it is learned that several divisions 
 of the English fleet are 18 leagues ofif and that there are some 
 ships beating to windward along the coast off Cherbourg. 
 
 " On August 5, the English fleet makes all sail to double Cape 
 la Hague. The commandant of Cherbourg, Baron de Coppley, 
 is informed of this at 9 o'clock in the evening of the same day. 
 
 " On August 6, the English fleet directs its course for the road- 
 stead. M. de Coppley informs Count Raymond, major-general, 
 commanding the troops of Cotintin under the orders of Lieuten- 
 ant-General d'Harcourt, who is living at Caen. 
 
 " The same day there are assembled at Caen, the Orion regi- 
 ment, the Clark regiment, 1200 armed citizens, 20 bombardiers, 
 ^2 citizen cannoniers, 6 battalions of coast-guards and the Langue- 
 doc regiment of dragoons. 
 
 " This made up an effective force of more than 6500 men. And, 
 let us add, the Guyenne regiment and two battalions of militia 
 who are at La Hogue receive orders to remain there, for some 
 unknown reason. 
 
 " On August 7, the English fire some shell which, however, do 
 no harm. 
 
 " Some of the coast batteries begin to fire : the Tourlaville battery 
 shatters the quarter of a frigate and kills or wounds forty-five 
 men, among others almost all the officers of the ship. 
 
 " Ten shots were all that were fired. 
 
 107
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 " The commandant of Cherbourg orders the firing to cease. It 
 is impossible to find a plausible explanation of this strange fact ; 
 moreover, this is only the first of many errors committed by the 
 commandant. General Baron Raymond perhaps wished to await 
 the English in Sainte Anne's Bay, where formidable preparations 
 had been made to drive them back into the sea. There happened 
 what always will happen, namely that the English carefully re- 
 frained from landing where their reception had been so well pre- 
 pared for, and went to Urville Bay, which had been judged im- 
 practicable. The landing was effected with much good fortune and 
 skill under the eyes of our troops, who, restrained by the ships' 
 artillery, offered no resistance. The landing force had a strength 
 of about 5000 men. General Raymond then gives orders to re- 
 treat ; the English form and occupy the dominant positions. 
 
 " ' Thus,' says the eye-witness from whom we take this account, 
 ' thus astonishingly was carried out an invasion for which we had 
 been preparing two months with all sorts of fortifications in the 
 places most susceptible of attack.' 
 
 " It certainly is not the first time (nor will it be the last) that 
 fortifications have caused the loss of wits of a leader ill prepared 
 to make use of them. 
 
 " And it must not be supposed that the available troops were 
 not well-disposed to fight. 
 
 " ' The troops, the citizens, even the residents of the country,' 
 says our author, 'had no fear of an attack on the part of the Eng- 
 lish. On the contrary, they wished that there might be some 
 attempts against our coast, satisfied that they would be repented 
 of.' 
 
 " Not till half an hour after noon on August 8 does General 
 Raymond leave Cherbourg and go on horseback to reconnoiter the 
 enemy ; but he does not go even as far as the advance guards of 
 the French troops, and he re-enters the city, leaving for all the 
 troops the strange order to go to rejoin him at Mount Epinguet, 
 10 kilometers from Cherbourg. In the evening the English en- 
 tered the city, which no longer had any soldiers. August 9, the 
 fleet lands 1800 more men, and the English occupy Mount Roule, 
 which we have abandoned. August 10, they send a patrol of 
 cavalry to reconnoiter upon the road to Valognes. It gets a hot 
 reception from a small French troop and beats a retreat. 
 
 " That day there arrive in the French camp Lieutenant-Generals 
 
 108
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Harcourt, Count Coetlogon and Roth, as well as a battalion from 
 Avranches. August 12, there come likewise to the French camp 
 the Escav cavalry regiment, two battalions from Poitou and 
 four battalions of coast-guards from Caen. August 13, come two 
 battalions of the Saint-Kamans regiment and the Bourbon- Prince 
 cavalry regiment. August 14, the Marshal of Luxemburg 
 arrives. 
 
 " The English occupy their time in pillaging the inhabitants, 
 ransoming the city, destroying the jetties, smashing or carrying 
 off the abandoned cannon, sinking or burning the vessels in the 
 harbor, etc. They are not disturbed by any incident during the 
 whole time that they are carrying on the execution of the countr}\ 
 On August 16 they re-embark. On the 17th, at 3 in the after- 
 noon, the generals and French troops re-enter Cherbourg." " 
 
 Emboldened by this success, the causes of which they do not 
 seem to have discerned, the English wish to redeem their failure 
 before Saint Malo in June ; but this time they are to learn that 
 nothing but lack of energy on the part of the defenders can permit 
 such incursions. 
 
 Their fleet appeared abreast Cape Frehel on September 3 ; on 
 the 4th it anchored off the island of Agot ; the 5th the troops dis- 
 embark in the harbor of Saint-Briac, without meeting any 
 resistance. 
 
 If General Bligh's choice of a landing place on the side of the 
 left bank of the Ranee was to enable him to disembark unhindered, 
 his calculation was correct ; but this advantage was largely bal- 
 anced by the difficulty of having to cross the Ranee to reach Saint 
 Malo. Moreover, the entrance to the river was defended by a 
 line of frigates and privateers ; it would have been necessary to 
 penetrate into the interior of the country to turn it. Bligh did not 
 dare to venture so far, and to justify his enterprise he began to 
 ravage the country. 
 
 As soon as he had learned of the presence of the English, the 
 Duke d'Aiguillon had gone to establish himself at Lamballe, direct- 
 ing the convergence of all the troops of the region on that point. 
 
 Bligh then decided to beat a retreat, and proceeded towards 
 Saint-Cast, where his ships had gone to await him ; but he was 
 
 " Des Operations mariti}nes conire Ics cotes et des dcbarquements, by 
 M. D. B. G. 
 
 109
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 still far ofif and he had to traverse Arguenon. For two days the 
 EngHsh were harried by our troops ; finally they stopped on the 
 plateau of Matignon to concentrate. 
 
 " In this position, they were impregnable ; but they would have 
 to descend from it, whether to procure food or to re-embark. It 
 was this moment that the Duke d'Aiguillon waited for. He had 
 divided his little army into three bodies ; himself, with the central 
 one, was to follow the English step by step, and the two others 
 were to skirt the edge of the sea and attack them in flank when- 
 ever they should re-embark. A re-embarkation is always a diffi- 
 cult operation, because there is a moment when one-half the troops 
 is aboard and the other on shore, and the latter need a great deal 
 of coolness and courage to stand their ground. On this occasion 
 there was still another difficulty : the road descending from Matig- 
 non to the sea was a steep and sandy slope ; it had to be traversed 
 under pressure from all the French forces. On the morning of the 
 loth, General Bligh began his movement ; Admiral Howe's boats 
 were on the shore and the frigates with broadsides bearing. When 
 nearly half the English troops had embarked, the French attacked 
 as arranged, on three sides at once. At first the English stood 
 firm : but quite a large number of them, frightened, having thrown 
 themselves into the w^ater to reach the boats, two of the latter 
 overloaded, went to the bottom ; those in others, to avoid a similar 
 mishap, then slashed with their sabers the hands of the unfortu- 
 nates who were clinging to the sides. At this spectacle, the troops 
 still on the shore, thinking themselves deserted, uttered cries of 
 distress and broke ranks. The disorder was at its height. The 
 frigates, which had not yet opened for fear of hitting their own 
 army corps, began to fire wildly into the confused melee of friends 
 and enemies. The Duke d'Aiguillon then had the presence of 
 mind to withdraw his soldiers and force the English alone, in a 
 mass, onto the beach. The frigates perceived this and ceased 
 firing, and the unhappy English soldiers, victims of their grape 
 and cannister, had no other recourse than to surrender, to the 
 number of 3500.*" The same evening the fleet got under way." ^^ 
 
 ** This number is exaggerated. The Chevalier de Mirabeau, who was on 
 the spot, wrote to his brother : " A thousand to twelve hundred killed, 
 seven to eight hundred prisoners." See Lacour-Gayet, La Marine miii- 
 taire de la France sous le regne de Louis XV. 
 
 *^ Henri Riviere. La Marine frangaise sous Ic rcgne de Louis XV.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Meanwhile the Duke de Choiseul had come into power. An 
 ardent patriot, he asked himself if the policy of abstention was 
 suitable for France and if the navy ought to attend impotently 
 upon the ruin of our colonies and the outrage of our shores. Then 
 it was that he conceived the project of an invasion of England 
 which, striking to the enemy's heart, should lay him low with a 
 single blow. Unfortunately the navy no longer had enough ships 
 to successfully conduct such an enterprise, and this attempt led to 
 the loss of our squadrons at Lagos and Quiberon. But the threat 
 of an invasion has always had the quality of disquieting Eng- 
 land ; and jthis time, as in 1745, she suspended her operations in 
 order to watch over the preparation that were being made in 
 France. 
 
 When all danger was averted, she thought once more of appear- 
 ing off our shores. But experience had shown her the danger of 
 invasions of the mainland, and she turns her attention to Belle- 
 Isle, which for the fourth time in less than a century saw the 
 enemy. 
 
 On April 7, 1761, the fleet of Admiral Keppel, of twenty-five 
 ships, appeared ; it escorted a convoy of 100 transports carrying 
 10,000 men. 
 
 We have seen that Tromp succeeded in landing at Belle-Isle by 
 means of a diversion ; Rooke failed to make a landing by force in 
 1696, and in 1703 did not dare even to attempt it. So Keppel will 
 first be repulsed in a direct attack, and then by using the scheme 
 of a false attack will succeed thus in getting a foothold on the 
 island. 
 
 On the 8th the boats of the squadron disembark troops at Point 
 Andro. The governor, M. de Sainte-Croix, receives them in such 
 fashion that they hastily regain their ships, leaving 400 men 
 behind. 
 
 This repulse seems to discourage Keppel ; for a fortnight he 
 does nothing. Perhaps he was waiting for the six ships that 
 brought him a reinforcement of 2400 men. As soon as he had 
 received them, the 22d, he bombards Le Palais with his ships, 
 while the boats go to land 4000 men in the harbor of Locmaria." 
 M. de Sainte-Croix arrived too late to oppose the landing; he had 
 
 " Probably at daylight.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to shut himself up in the town. After an energetic resistance, he 
 capitulated on June 7." 
 
 Soon after the preliminaries of peace were opened, and Mahon 
 was exchanged for Belle-Isle. It even seems that the taking of 
 this island was for no other object than to use it as an exchange ; 
 for the English could only keep it by immobilizing a squadron to 
 guard the channel that separates it from the mainland, and if 
 hostilities had continued, it would have been a burden upon them. 
 
 attacks upon the coast in the reign of LOUIS XVI. 
 
 During the five years that the war of American Independence 
 lasted, our shores were absolutely unmolested. That is because 
 we had a navy that kept the sea and did not allow the English to 
 devote themselves to games whose fruits were often bitter. 
 
 It is fair to say that operations in America did not leave Eng- 
 land sufficient resources to undertake expeditions that sometimes 
 required 16,000 men ; but she could have recommenced, if she had 
 thought it profitable, such a series of bombardments as distin- 
 guished the war of the League of Augsburg. For it is worthy of 
 note that our squadrons never, from 1778 to 1783, sought to pro- 
 tect directly our coasts; they passed, on several occasions, whole 
 months on the coasts of Spain and in the Mediterranean, abandon- 
 ing thus the entire Atlantic coast and Channel to the enemy's 
 enterprises ; but the mere existence of these fleets was a sufficient 
 menace to England to make her more anxious to watch them than 
 to attack the coast. 
 
 attacks upon the coast DURING THE REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. 
 
 With the wars of the Revolution and Empire we enter upon the 
 darkest period of our naval history. The bad state of material, 
 the incapacity of commanders and the lack of discipline of crews 
 made our forces so distinctly inferior that we seem to have sent 
 our squadrons out only to deliver them over to the enemy. Yet 
 during twenty years of war we count only five expeditions 
 against our coasts.** First comes the capture of Toulon ; but an 
 affair of this sort should not be counted, since the city was handed 
 
 "'For the capture of Belle-Isle see: Lacour-Gayet, La Marine militaire 
 de la France sous le regne de Louis XV. 
 ^ We do not refer to unimportant surprises. 
 
 112
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 over by its own inhabitants, whose treason is a unique occurrence 
 in history. The place, moreover, was soon retaken ; though the 
 Enghsh occupation had a direct influence on naval operations by 
 causing us to lose an entire squadron. 
 
 In 1794 Corsica was occupied by the English, thanks to Paoli's 
 assistance, and evacuated in 1796. 
 
 In 1795 and 1800 two fruitless landings took place in Quiberon 
 Bay. 
 
 The first has an aspect peculiar to itself : its object was to 
 establish a body of emigrants on the shores of Brittany, and it is 
 doubtful if England would have attempted this venture with her 
 own troops, since the only justification for it was the hope of 
 raising the whole of Brittany. 
 
 A French squadron of twelve ships, commanded by Villaret- 
 Joyeuse, was then in the neighborhood of Belle-Isle. 
 
 The English squadron under Lord Bridport met it on June 22 
 off Groix and forced it to take refuge in Lorient, after having 
 taken from it three ships. The convoy, composed of fifty trans- 
 ports and escorted by three ships under Commodore Warren, then 
 proceeded to anchor in the bay of Quiberon, and the landing was 
 effected without difficulty on the beach of Carnac on June 25. 
 
 The land defense was in the hands of an energetic leader ; so 
 events follow their natural course. 
 
 The emigrants, reinforced by several thousand Chouans, ad- 
 vance a few leagues into the interior ; Hoche assembles his 
 troops. 
 
 On July 16 there is a battle : the emigrants, beaten, take refuge 
 on the peninsula of Quiberon. 
 
 On July 21 Hoche takes possession of Fort Penthievre and 
 penetrates into the peninsula; the emigrants flee towards the 
 beach and are obliged to yield. Bad weather then comes on to 
 further complicate the situation : the boats cannot come close in 
 and so pick up very few people. 
 
 On September 1 1 a convoy of eighty sail entered Quiberon Bay 
 and anchored between Houat and Hoedic: it brought the Count 
 d'Artois. 
 
 The situation in Brittany appearing desperate, the Prince is 
 conducted to the island of Yeu, where he remains till November 
 7, without daring to set foot in France ; on this date the English 
 fleet departs and returns to its own ports. 
 
 113
 
 A Study of N.wal Strategy. 
 
 The attempt of 1800 scarcely took definite shape. 
 
 Sir Edward Pellew anchors on June 2 in Quiberon Bay with 
 7 ships, 5 frigates, i corvette and 5 large transports ; 5000 sol- 
 diers, commanded by General Maitland, were on board. 
 
 The English occupy the islands of Houat and Hoedic and make 
 them their base of operations. From June to September they turn 
 aside upon Quiberon and Port-Navallo ; but they do not dare to 
 advance into the interior. In September the convoy sets sail for 
 the Mediterranean ; the expeditionary corps has to take part in the 
 expedition to Egypt. 
 
 For nine years England refrains from attacking pur shores ; but 
 in 1809 she hopes to be able to seize Antwerp while the whole 
 French Army is still in Austria. In the hands of the French, this 
 port took on a considerable development; the shipyards there 
 were busily occupied, and the English feared lest this arsenal 
 should become a dangerous base of operations against Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The Antwerp expedition was perhaps the most important at- 
 tempt every made to land by force in a hostile country. " The 
 expeditionary fleet comprised 39 ships, 25 frigates, 31 corvettes, 5 
 bomb vessels, 23 gunboats, 59 small vessels and 82 armed launches. 
 The number of transports was from 400 to 500, carrying 50,000 
 men, several thousand horses, artillery, ammunition, material and 
 supplies. The fleet was placed under the orders of Sir John 
 Strachan ; Lord Chatham, the elder brother of the celebrated 
 minister, was commander-in-chief of the land and sea forces. 
 
 The fleet appeared off the mouths of the Scheldt on July 29, 
 1809 ; on the 31st 15,000 men were put on shore on the island of 
 Walcheren : it was important to secure possession of Flushing 
 before marching on Antwerp. Middleburg, the capital of the 
 island, was easily occupied ; then Flushing was invested by land 
 and sea. After a three-day bombardment, the place capitulated on 
 August 16. 
 
 A fortnight had already elapsed. 
 
 There remained nothing more to do but to transfer the 40,000 
 men to the mainland and march upon Antwerp, but Lord Chatham 
 could not make up his mind to do it : it seems that the hazards of 
 all such enterprises only become apparent on the spot. 
 
 The troops re-embarked; the expedition returned to England, 
 leaving a garrison of 12,000 men in Flushing. 
 
 114
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In the month of December the island of Walchercn itself was 
 abandoned. 
 
 This venture cost England the small sum of 625,000,000 francs ; 
 she lost in it 4000 men, and 10,000 others returned sick. 
 
 The coast of France was decidedly too well guarded : there- 
 after, to give her army a part in operations against France, Eng- 
 land will land them in a friendly country. 
 
 To sum up, during the wars of the Revolution and Empire, 
 attacks against the coasts were never systematic ; the enemy only 
 took advantage of opportunities that seemed to him favorable, 
 such as the treason of the Toulonese, Paoli's insurrection in 
 Corsica, the royalist disturbances in Brittany, or, finally, the 
 Austrian campaign ; he preferred to devote himself more par- 
 ticularly, when he had secured command of the sea, to the con- 
 quest of our colonies, which did not present the same elements of 
 resistance. 
 
 * * 
 
 All these details are not without use ; what actually happened 
 alone can give us knowledge of the enemy's aspirations, furnish 
 us with an exact idea of the dangers that France has incurred, 
 and reveal to us the best methods of attack and defense. 
 
 For two centuries England has essayed against our coasts every- 
 thing that the passions of war can suggest to an unscrupulous 
 people. We have a right, therefore, to assume that a nation which 
 wished to recommence the same system of war would be naturally 
 led to employ the same methods. 
 
 From another point of view, it is striking to see the same names 
 always reappearing ; it is observed that the enemy, after having 
 failed on the mainland, is irresistibly drawn to islands, or rather 
 to a particular one : Belle-Isle ; " and from this aggregate of facts 
 we can draw very precise conclusions. 
 
 It would have been possible to find other examples elsewhere 
 than in our history ; but they would not have offered the same 
 interest, because the situation appears in a different light in each 
 country, according to its military organization, the development 
 of its means of communication and the geographic conditions. 
 
 We shall now examine the question of the attack and defense of 
 coasts under three successive aspects. 
 
 *^ Let us hope that this indication will not be lost sight of. 
 
 115
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 We shall first seek to ascertain the degree of resistance offered 
 by coasts left to themselves ; then we shall study the effect exer- 
 cised by naval forces upon their protection, setting aside their 
 own means of defense ; and last we shall deduce the method by 
 which the action of shore defenses ought to be combined with 
 that of mobile defenses in order to secure the best system of 
 protection. 
 
 We have been able to note that the enterprises directed against 
 our shores consisted at first almost exclusively of landings (1627- 
 1694) ; then came the era of bombardments, which lasted scarcely 
 three years (1694-1696) and was followed by a renewal of land- 
 ings. They retain this last form. 
 
 Landings."* — In two centuries our shores had to endure more 
 than twenty invasions. Each of these expeditions required a 
 considerable display of military forces ; the number of troops 
 varied from 5000 to 11,000 men (it was even greater on some 
 occasions), necessitating a great many transports. 
 
 What was the result of these immense armaments ? Whenever 
 the enemies find a resolute man facing them, they suffer a repulse 
 or even a veritable disaster. Usually they re-embark without 
 even attempting to contend with our troops ; an inconceivable in- 
 capacity on the part of the authorities is necessary in order that 
 they may accomplish some depredations without being molested. 
 
 The English (aside from the Antwerp expedition) seem never 
 to have thought of seizing a foothold on the mainland: in all 
 cases, save one (Cherbourg, 1758), they fail to accomplish the 
 object of the expedition and content themselves with pillaging 
 villages, trampling crops under foot and carrying off a slender 
 booty. What is such a gain in comparison with the risks run and 
 the expenses incurred by each expedition? Yet France, engaged 
 in continental wars, could only oppose raw levies to England's 
 regulars ! 
 
 The sterility of all these attempts arises less from faulty organi- 
 zation or poor leadership than from the very nature of the opera- 
 tion. 
 
 An enemy who disembarks in a territory having such vast re- 
 
 ** In this chapter we treat only of such landings on the coast as imply 
 the possession by the enemy of limited forces. In another chapter we 
 shall speak of expeditions whose object is the conquest of territories. 
 
 116
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 sources as those of France finds himself from the beginning in a 
 difficult situation. The aim of the expedition is usually one of the 
 centers of activity of our navy : Brest, Saint Malo, Lorient, Roche- 
 fort. These towns are more or less fortified, and landing under 
 the guns of the place is an almost impossible operation: it has 
 never been attempted. To put on shore and assemble in safety 
 small army corps comprising infantry, artillery and sometimes 
 even cavalry, there is needed a landing place devoid of all means 
 of defense. The further the disembarkation from the objective 
 point, the easier will such a place be found. 
 
 When the troops are on shore, an intrenched camp is established 
 to protect the reembarkation in case of repulse. 
 
 All this takes valuable time which the defense takes advantage 
 of to throw forces into the place and organize resistance. Thence- 
 forth the object of the expedition is spoiled: from the moment 
 that the assailant has failed to eflfect a surprise, he must renounce 
 the hope of entering the town without striking a blow ; he cannot 
 undertake a siege, for he will be obliged to raise it after a few 
 days to make head against troops coming from the interior. 
 
 As soon as the small army penetrates into the country, it is 
 exposed to an encounter during its march with hostile forces 
 whose numbers it is ignorant of : it marches towards the unknown. 
 Each day that elapses, each stage of the journey that separates it 
 from its landing place, renders its situation more critical ; it does 
 not know that its line of retreat may not suddenly find itself 
 threatened. 
 
 These ideas weigh upon the mind of the commander and in- 
 fluence his decisions ; evidence of the anxieties to which they 
 give rise are found in all such enterprises, and some have had no 
 other cause of failure. 
 
 Fearful of being cut oflf from the sea, growing weaker in pro- 
 portion as he advances on account of the necessity of guarding his 
 lines of communication, the enemy only marches with extreme 
 caution. As soon as he learns of the gathering of troops, he 
 regains his boats as quickly as possible, fortunate if he is not 
 obliged to sacrifice his rear guard. On his return home, the poor 
 villages that have been pillaged are transformed into great towns, 
 and honor is safe. But if the result obtained is compared with 
 the expeditionary expenses, the balance is uneven. 
 
 When the enemy, thanks to the foolishness of incapable leaders, 
 
 "7
 
 A Study or Naval Strategy. 
 
 enters a town, as in the case of Cherbourg, he does not even 
 think of maintaining himself there. He knows that at the end of 
 a short time he will be attacked and he has not the necessary 
 means at his disposal to put himself in a state of defense. 
 
 Looking at past events from a present standpoint, with exact 
 knowledge of local resources, taking into account the improvised 
 defense, we are tempted to judge severely the precipitate reso- 
 lutions adopted by certain English generals : but let us not forget 
 that if the latter sometimes beat a retreat before imaginary perils, 
 those perils would have become real at the end of a few days ; and 
 by persisting they would have had the same fortune as Tolle- 
 mache and Bligh. Even then France offered too much resistance 
 for a handful of men to be able to put her in danger. 
 
 To-day an attempt at landing would have still fewer chances of 
 success than in former times : the maritime towns are better de- 
 fended ; our military organization is out of all comparison with 
 what it used to be ; the tailroads enable great bodies of troops to 
 be poured into a single place in a few hours ; the commanders of 
 sections are no longer merely gentlemen, usually very brave, but 
 little versed in the art of war ; finally, our soldiers are greatly 
 superior, in number and in value, to peasants armed with scythes, 
 to militia and coast-guards. 
 
 The enemy who should attempt a landing, even with great 
 forces, would be rushing upon certain failure,*' especially if 
 France were not engaged in a continental war and had the free 
 disposal of her army. 
 
 In this latter case, far from fearing such operations, we ought 
 earnestly to wish for them : the undiscerning terror inspired in 
 many people by the contemplation of 40,000 English landing on 
 Cotentin is hard to explain. After all, the principal, almost the 
 sole solicitude, in wartime, is to find a favorable field of battle 
 where the enemy can be crushed by numbers. The English, by 
 landing on our territory, offer us on land lists that we vainly seek 
 at sea, and yet we tremble at the idea ! And some talk of con- 
 quering the whole United Kingdom with 150,000 men. Tf we 
 hope to be able to be victors on English soil with limited forces. 
 
 " Naturally we assume that we shall oppose the enemy and not be con- 
 tent to escape from him. We are here studying operations of war ; it is 
 evident we cannot prevent the enemy from attaining his object if we per- 
 mit him to do so. 
 
 118
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 we shall be very much more so on our own soil with unlimited 
 forces. 
 
 There is no occasion, therefore, to be afraid of a landing on the 
 mainland ; but we shall make some qualifications respecting the 
 islands that border upon our shores. 
 
 The situation then is no longer the same : resistance is limited 
 to the local resources, and the enemy may have quite an exact 
 knowledge concerning them ; the assailant is no longer pursued by 
 the nightmare of an attack from the rear ; finally, the fleet is 
 always near at hand and furnishes a more efficient protection to 
 troops which operate near the shore.^ 
 
 Nevertheless, save for one exception, none of our islands have 
 remained in the enemy's hands. 
 
 The reason of this is as follows : 
 
 It is always difficult to cflfect a landing by force. The ships have 
 not boats enough to throw on shore the whole expeditionary force 
 with a single movement. The portion which sets out first is 
 reached by the enemy's fire even before it has put foot ashore ; 
 when it lands it has to assemble and form for battle : there is a 
 critical time during which the defense has all the advantages on 
 its side in spite of the weakness of it? available forces. The 
 operation is not impossible, but it is always dangerous. It is 
 evident, too, that on an island of small extent, where the landing 
 places are few in number, an active watch can usually prevent a 
 surprise. This circumstance has several times saved our islands. 
 Yet landings have been made on them, and they will be made still 
 more easily with fast vessels that can facilitate diversions ; it 
 must not be forgotten either that, with calm weather, infantry can 
 land anywhere and so take in reverse the fortifications con- 
 structed by the defense in the vicinity of beaches to locate its artil- 
 lery and shelter its sharpshooters. 
 
 If a landing has been effected in this manner, there remains for 
 the garrison nothing to do but to shut itself up in a fort and stand 
 a siege. 
 
 The island will not yet be taken : if resistance is prolonged, the 
 
 ^ In operations against coasts, the fleet never goes away until the affair 
 is over. It is only in the conquest of territory over seas, which is ac- 
 complished with force sufficient to subjugate a whole country, that ships 
 can abandon troops to their fate, and they only do so when the army 
 advances into the interior. 
 
 119
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 enemy will tire of immobilizing troops and ships, the need of which 
 elsewhere will make itself felt, and will withdraw. 
 
 Sometimes, moreover, the only object of the attack is to produce 
 a moral effect by the ravages accomplished, without any idea of 
 conquest. Groix, Houat, Hoedic, Noirmoutiers, have thus seen 
 their soil violated by hordes that passed over them without 
 stopping. 
 
 It is not enough to take islands : it is necessary to retain them. 
 But ours are so near the mainland that they cannot be left in 
 charge of a mere garrison without risking their loss ; therefore 
 they have to be guarded by naval forces. And then it is seen that 
 the consequences of such an obligation are that the land depends 
 upon the fleet for support, whereas the possession of the islands 
 is only really advantageous if the ships can be supported by them. 
 Of course squadrons will be enabled to anchor there, just as they 
 might in a great many other places on our coast which are not 
 defended ; but they will never find there anything but alien and 
 unsafe roadsteads."^ 
 
 These considerations are not sufficient to justify leaving our 
 sea-coast islands without defense; quite to the contrary, they 
 should be given sufficient power of resistance for the enemy to say 
 to himself that the effort required to seize them would be out of 
 proportion to the advantages that he would derive from them. 
 
 But when one of our islands is invaded and its garrison be- 
 sieged, all that will not prevent its finally succumbing if the navy 
 does not intervene in time to put a stop to it. 
 
 Colonies may be likened to our coast islands in the sense that 
 they also have but limited resources, but their distance from the 
 mother country places them in a still more unfavorable situation. 
 If the enemy commands the sea, they will fall into his hands when- 
 ever he is able to assemble forces sufficient to overcome all re- 
 sistance: it is only a question of time and means. Once taken, 
 they will never more be recaptured, smce the communications will 
 be cut. 
 
 Evidently, they can be safeguarded by making sufficient sacri- 
 fices to put them out of reach of any attack, but such sacrifices 
 have a limit. 
 
 " It will be observed that Corsica was evacuated the moment the English 
 fleet was recalled into the Atlantic; the English frequently sojourn at 
 Houat and Hoedic, but they abandon them whenever their ships go away.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Here again the intervention of the navy is necessary ; we shall 
 see further on what its nature must be. 
 
 Bombardments. — There can be no question here of bombard- 
 ing undefended towns. It is evident that the material damages 
 will depend solely upon the number of shell that the enemy ex- 
 pends in useless slaughter."^ It may be observed, nevertheless, 
 that it is not customary to throw the burden of war on defenseless 
 centers for the reason that, such centers being unimportant, 
 their destruction is of no interest as regards the settlement of 
 the conflict. War is not made, especially naval war, to trouble 
 the repose of peaceable citizens ; a more lucrative result is sought, 
 and, even were this result only moral effect, it can only be at- 
 tained by attacking an important center, which is always pro- 
 vided with defenses. It was unpardonable negligence to have 
 left Dieppe, where in the 17th century privateers fitted out, ex- 
 posed to bombardment, without furnishing it with means of 
 defending itself. 
 
 Bombardments have generally been occasioned by the fits of 
 rage of a nation that wished to avenge the losses inflicted upon 
 its commerce by privateers. Thus we have seen the English fall 
 furiously upon Dunkirk, Dieppe and Saint Malo ; thus France 
 vainly tried, for two centuries, to burn the nest of Barbary cor- 
 sairs at Algiers. 
 
 Sometimes the result has been insignificant ; most often it has 
 been nil. 
 
 Will it be otherwise nowadays? 
 
 Certain writers seems to take a malign pleasure in terrifying 
 the sea-coast population by exalting the destructive power of 
 modern explosives. Let us come to an understanding about this. 
 When ships appear before a port, before sending into the town 
 those great-capacity shell that are to reduce it to ashes, they must 
 first engage in a regular contest with the shore batteries ; they will 
 turn all their fire upon the latter, for there is no example of ships 
 receiving cannon shot and not turning against those who send 
 them. Not until after the defensive works have been silenced can 
 
 °^Yet the entire contents of the magazines of a squadron of ordinary 
 composition would not suffice to destroy a city. See on this subject an 
 extract from the Memorial de I'Artillerie de Marine appearing under the 
 title : Des Operations maritime contre les cotes et des debarquements, by 
 M. D. B. G. 
 
 121
 
 A Study of Naval Strategv. 
 
 the task of destruction be undertaken — provided there remain 
 shell in the magazines. 
 
 We will seek, therefore, in the most recent wars for indications 
 as to the efficacy of a contest of ships against coast batteries. 
 
 During the war between China and Japan, the Japanese ships 
 contended in a spiritless manner and at long range with the works 
 at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei. The Japanese had, nevertheless, 
 in both cases, a deep interest in destroying the sea-front defenses, 
 because they were seeking to get into the interior of the harbors 
 to second the operations of their army. 
 
 They secured no result. 
 
 The Americans were no more fortunate : at Matanzas, Cabanas, 
 San Juan and Santiago, the coast batteries endured, almost with- 
 out replying, the fire of the ships and were none the worse for it. 
 
 It is probable that if the Japanese and Americans had really 
 wished to destroy the works, they would have succeeded, because 
 the armament of the shore batteries was composed only of old- 
 fashioned guns and their gunners fired as badly as the enemy 
 could desire ; but in that case it would have been necessary to 
 engage seriously and to enter upon a combat at point-blank dis- 
 tance ; ■" but, if the expression may be pardoned, the game was not 
 worth the candle. The Japanese, as well as the Americans, had 
 need of their ships and their ammunition ; they did not at all favor 
 exposing the former and using up the latter for a problematic 
 result. Their prudence would have been still greater if the bat- 
 teries had been armed with modern guns and served by real 
 artillerymen. 
 
 The Americans certainly cannot be accused of having shown 
 excessive sensitiveness during their last war. Yet it has not been 
 sufficiently remarked that Secretary of the Navy Long enjoined 
 upon Admiral Sampson, who had charge of the blockade of 
 
 ^ Shore batteries offer only a very small target ; and to dismantle them 
 it is necessary to hit each separate piece. In order to avoid receiving hard 
 knocks, the ships are led to oppose to each battery a crushing superiority 
 of fire in order to prevent it from firing, and to fight at short range. But 
 when they have affair with the works of an important place, whose lines 
 of fire cross, the contest becomes dangerous, and the attack prefers to get 
 around the difficulty by taking the batteries from the rear by means of a 
 landing. That is how the Federals usually acted in the American Civil 
 War, the Japanese at Wei-hai-wei and Port x\rthur, and the Americans 
 at Santiago.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Cuba, never to engage coast batteries armed with heavy guns, 
 and only to attack others for the purpose of getting at vessels 
 that they were protecting." If we may judge from one of the 
 American admiral's letters, he would not have been sorry to 
 give voice to his guns to break the monotony of the blockade ; 
 but his government thought, with good reason, that there were 
 only hard knocks to receive, and no benefits to gain, from a contest 
 with even badly served and poorly armed batteries ; and that it is 
 useless to squander valuable ammunition so long as there remains 
 hope of using it against the enemy afloat. This calculation was 
 rigorously exact : after the destruction of Cervera's squadron, 
 peace had to be made. 
 
 By a singular contradiction, while the American authorities 
 adopted so wise a measure, the sea-coast population of the United 
 States was obsessed with the idea that the Spanish squadron might 
 appear off their shores. Yet what harm could the entire contents 
 of the magazines of four cruisers do to the fortunes of the United 
 States ? 
 
 Finally, the part played by bombardments in the Russo-Japanese 
 war is still more insignificant than in previous v/ars. Admiral 
 Togo had better to do than to expend his ammunition against the 
 batteries of Port Arthur, and he contented himself with an ex- 
 change of a few shots at long range. 
 
 It seems that the point of view adopted by the American and 
 Japanese governments will likewise force itself upon every naval 
 power solicitous of obtaining the best return from its forces. 
 Ships will not be risked against batteries before the hostile fleet 
 has been completely destroyed ; and when this result has been 
 attained it will be preferred to take the forts from the rear, by 
 landing troops, rather than to attack them with ships from the 
 front. This consideration affords us a just measure of the dan- 
 gers run by sea-coast towns ; and we are seized with pity when we 
 learn from Cervera's correspondence that this admiral, placed at 
 the head of his country's principal naval force, saw no better use 
 to make of it than devoting it to the defense of the Canaries, 
 while his minister leaned rather to Porto Rico. 
 
 At the present time bombardments are good only to intimidate 
 half-civilized peoples. A great moral effect can then be discounted 
 
 "'Why then was the useless bombardment of Porto Rico ordered? Do 
 we not see there again a yielding to public opinion? 
 
 123
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 with a small material result ; but this method will only be employed 
 against nations that have no navy, because it will often be the 
 only way of reaching them. Moreover, every one knows that the 
 ammunition supply of modern artillery is excessively costly, and 
 yet scanty : squandering ammunition in operations that do not 
 advance at all the settlement of the conflict will, therefore, be 
 avoided. 
 
 We would certainly have less apprehension of bombardments 
 if, instead of always reckoning up the harm that an enemy could 
 do us by attacking our coasts, we turned the problem around. 
 We would then ask ourselves what one of our naval forces could 
 do if it were given the mission of " insulting " the enemy's shores. 
 Whoever was charged with this thankless task would not fail to 
 represent the danger of such an operation and the small benefit 
 that it ^ould procure. These considerations would bring the im- 
 portance of bombardments down to its true value. 
 
 Let us, therefore, provide our great naval centers with coast 
 batteries ; let us keep light vessels out of the docks by booms 
 protected by rapid-fire guns ; let us even plant lines of torpedoes 
 at the harbor entrances : then if the enemy appears he will know 
 what the cost will be. 
 
 The Influence of Naval Forces on Coast Defense. — In all 
 that precedes we have supposed the coast to be left to take care of 
 itself. We will now inquire how naval forces can contribute to 
 the protection of a coast without land defenses. 
 
 The influence of naval forces is very clearly shown by the his- 
 tory already set forth : it can be summed up in two words : 
 
 So long as the squadrons keep the sea, so long as they show 
 themselves, the coast enjoys absolute tranquillity. 
 
 As soon as the squadrons disappear, whether because they have 
 been destroyed, or because they operate in another, far-distant 
 region, the coast is attacked. 
 
 In the colonies this characteristic has been less clearly defined, 
 because the intermingling of English and French possessions 
 permitted landing troops on the islands unexpectedly ; but it sub- 
 sists in a general way.** 
 
 The mere fact that " war is being carried on " is, therefore, 
 
 ^ See in the Second Part, in the paragraph on " The Offensive and the 
 Defensive," the character of our naval wars. 
 
 124
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 sufficient to create a powerful enough diversion to turn aside the 
 enemy's attention from the coast, because he is urged seaward by 
 more powerful interests ; but since the introduction of steam this 
 guarantee has seemed insufficient, and it has been demanded of 
 the navy to devote itself more directly to securing the safety of 
 the coasts. From this period date the creation of a special mate- 
 rial and the birth of new conceptions as to the employment of 
 naval forces. 
 
 If we may judge from the nature and distribution of part of 
 our ships, from the majority of naval writings and from the 
 themes of our grand maneuvers, protection of the coast can be 
 assured at the present time : 
 
 1st. By torpedo-boats. 
 
 2d. By coast-defense vessels, either distributed singly in the 
 ports, or grouped in divisions. 
 
 3d. By squadrons assigned to the protection of a fixed stretch 
 of coast. 
 
 We will examine successively each of these systems, which may 
 be employed together or separately, and deduce from this ex- 
 amination their efficiency. 
 
 Protection of the Coast by Torpedo-Boats. — It is easy to 
 prove that, with the speed of modern vessels and the rapidity of 
 fire of their guns, a squadron can appear by day oflf a port, empty 
 its magazines and put to sea again without havmg anything to 
 fear from the torpedo-boats of the local defense.** 
 
 Protection of a port by torpedo-boats is more difficult to realize 
 than is supposed. Durin.<^ the grand maneuvers cruising grounds 
 are established in the approaches to the central station of the 
 mobile defenses : but this is a solution that can only be used for a 
 few days : it will become impracticable as soon as hostilities have 
 a duration of several months ; in our opinion, it is a bad utilization 
 of the torpedo-boats. ^ Little by little this continued effort will use 
 up the boats, and when there is need of them they will not be 
 available. Even disregarding the unfitness of coast-defense tor- 
 pedo-boats to keep the sea continuously, it is not reasonable to put 
 mobile forces on permanent guard duty in anticipation of an event 
 that may never happen ; on the one hand, attention ends by tir- 
 ing and they let themselves be surprised ; on the other, the return 
 
 " The Japanese squadron furnished proof of this for ten successive 
 months. 
 
 125
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 is too insignificant. When the presence of the enemy is signaled, 
 all the torpedo-boats should be sent out and go to seek the enemy. 
 While waiting, the boats should be kept in practice and exercised 
 without undue strain in order to have them all in readiness. 
 
 But it is probable that the enemy will surround his intentions 
 with a cloud of doubt, and that his appearance will be unexpected ; 
 he will thus have a very good chance of not meeting torpedo- 
 boats on his route. 
 
 However, to conform to the established rules, we will suppose 
 that there are always torpedo-boats at sea, and even that, by a 
 happy chance, they are all outside on the night that precedes the 
 attack. 
 
 Their scouting zone will necessarily be quite close to the point 
 to be defended ; for, as they increase their distance from it, the 
 space to be covered increases rapidly and quickly becomes so 
 extended that the guard is ineflficient. In all probability the 
 torpedo-boats will not be more than lo miles off shore : to make 
 every allowance, let us put it at 20 miles. 
 
 It will be sufficient, therefore, for the enemy to appear before 
 the port less than two hours after sunrise in order to preserve 
 himself from a night attack." 
 
 Two hours later he will have emptied his magazines and will 
 put to sea again. 
 
 His speed will perhaps then be reduced on account of injuries 
 to his ships ; but he will be careful not to depart before stationing 
 his destroyers on guard so as to prevent the torpedo-boats from 
 coming out at least until night-fall. If the latter succeed in then 
 escaping, the enemy will have had such a start that he will long 
 have been out of reach. 
 
 This is not all. 
 
 Operations against the coast, of the kind that we are consider- 
 ing, are never of an urgent nature, since it is sure that the land 
 will not move away. Therefore, favorable conditions will be 
 waited for: if it is known that the torpedo-boats come out regu- 
 larly at night, an attempt will first be made to cut them off from 
 their refuge by means of light vesseb : the destruction of all of 
 them doubtless will not be attained to, but those that escape will 
 become more cautious and will no longer dare to separate them- 
 
 ■" This will even be an excess of precaution, since the torpedo-boats al- 
 ways return to their port at daylight so as not to be caught at sea. 
 
 126
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 selves from the immediate vicinity of the entrances ; this accom- 
 plished, there will be chosen for the attack preferably short nights, 
 of full moon, and finally weather ill suited to small boats. 
 
 It will only be necessary for part of these conditions to exist in 
 order to remove all apprehensions on the part of the battleships. 
 
 There would be danger for them from torpedo-boats that, set- 
 ting out from ports very far off, and therefore not under watch, 
 might come to wait for them on their return passage ; but our 
 mobile-defense torpedo-boats have neither endurance nor radius 
 of action enough to undertake raids of this sort. 
 
 As a matter of fact, in the numerous exercises of coast attack 
 that have been carried on in recent years, torpedo-boats have 
 played but a small part. 
 
 I am not at all seeking here to depreciate the value of torpedo- 
 boats ; I believe, on the contrary, that, if employed judiciously, 
 they can to a certain extent make up for the inferiority of our 
 squadrons: I am merely finding fault with the defensive part to 
 which they have been condemned. In order that they may do 
 justice to the torpedo, the enemy ought not know their number, 
 their customs, or where they are to be found : on the contrary, 
 they should attack without premeditated plan, which amounts to 
 having offensive torpedo-boats capable of going to look for the 
 enemy wherever he may be."* 
 
 Under the pressure of public opinion we have built two hundred 
 coast-defense torpedo-boats, and we have distributed them from 
 Dunkirk to Villefranche, from Oran to Bizerta, seeking thus to 
 assign to each place a part proportional to its importance, so as to 
 content everybody. Even this does not suffice ; for, once entered 
 upon this way, there is no reason to stop ; thus we have read news- 
 paper articles demanding torpedo-boats as far as in Bou-Grara 
 sea. 
 
 The consequences of this singular strategy will not be long in 
 making themselves felt. 
 
 The war will not have the same intensity everywhere : it will be 
 localized in certain regions, because the number of squadrons is 
 
 "* The movements of sea-going torpedo-boats ought to be combined with 
 those of squadrons, because, as soon as a torpedo-boat puts to sea, it needs 
 to be supported in day time by a force that prevents its being captured 
 by the hostile cavalry, that is by cruisers. 
 
 127
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 limited and the enemy is not interested in attacking the coast at 
 all points at once — if he even attacks it at all. 
 
 Admitting that torpedo-boats have in the direct protection of 
 the coast an efficiency which we do not deny to them, it will only 
 be those in the immediate vicinity of the point attacked that can 
 be utilized. All the rest will remain inactive and will be mere 
 spectators of the events that occur far from them: when the war 
 is over, the greater number of them will not have fired a single 
 torpedo. 
 
 And then the same men who, during peace, were the first to 
 preach the distribution of our torpedo-boats, influenced by un- 
 reasoning fear, will cast stones at us and accuse us of not having 
 known how to make use of our forces 
 
 And this time they will be right ; for our first duty is to utilize 
 our vessels. 
 
 Protection of Sea-Coast Towns by Coast-Defense Vessels 
 AND Armored Gunboats. — The French Navy has the good for- 
 tune to possess an important number of coast-defense vessels and 
 armored gunboats. It has been proposed to utilize them by mak- 
 ing them assist in the defense of places. This proposition has 
 even had a beginning of execution, since we find the Fusee, 
 Mitraille and Phlegeton at Bizerta, the Styx and Acheron at 
 Saigon ; but yesterday the Flamme was at Dunkirk, and it is pre- 
 tended that in time of war nothing better than that could be done. 
 
 These vessels have only one or two heavy guns ; they are, there- 
 fore, only floating gun carriages of enormous cost, expensive to 
 maintain, and of much greater vulnerability than a sea-coast 
 cannon, since it is only necessary to damage the vessel to put out 
 of action the gun it carries. 
 
 If all the guns that defend a great maritime place are enumer- 
 ated, it will at once be seen that the battery of a coast-defense 
 vessel will be but an insignificant addition to the defense and will 
 not compel the enemy to modify sensibly the composition of his 
 forces. It is, therefore, the mobility of this floating gun carriage 
 that is counted upon to justify the presence of a naval unit in the 
 midst of shore batteries. 
 
 The advantages given by ability to move about are not evident 
 in the actual case. If the coast-defense vessel wishes to go out 
 from the narrows, it separates itself from the land defenses and 
 concentrates upon itself alone the fire of all the ships ; therefore, 
 
 128 
 
 i
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy 
 
 it cannot venture out to sea without exposing itself to being 
 wrecked, and its propeller serves to take it into port rather than 
 for anything else. 
 
 The assignment of coast-defense vessels or armored gunboats 
 to the protection of harbors amounts to turning naval funds over 
 to the war department. The land defense does not get from this 
 lavishness a benefit proportional to the millions such vessels rep- 
 resent; with the same sum it could have obtained much more im- 
 portant results. On the other hand, the navy's loss is a total one : 
 its offensive strength is diminished by an equivalent quantity.** 
 
 Since these vessels will bring to the defense of places only a 
 trifling aid, let us inquire what better disposition can be made of 
 them. 
 
 Concentrate them in a single body. Place this body in the 
 neighborhood of a strait frequented by the enemy, since their 
 lack of radius of action and of nautical qualities does not permit 
 giving them an extended field of action. We will thus have at our 
 disposition a very considerable force. The enemy must hold it in 
 check by opposing to it an equal or superior force ; and we shall 
 thus have immobilized a certain number of vessels and so will not 
 find them confronting us on another field of battle or before our 
 ports. The situation will not even then be brilliant, but it will be 
 better than it was. This concentration will contribute more 
 efficiently to the protection of the shore than would distribution in 
 several ports. 
 
 If, in place of this squadron of limited steaming capacity, we 
 had offensive ships capable of being utilized under all circum- 
 stances, we would immediately perceive a series of new combina- 
 tions made possible by this additional force. We could thus more 
 easily drive the enemy from our coasts. Moreover, we would have 
 increased our ofifensive power without at all diminishing our 
 defensive power. 
 
 It was reserved for America, the inventor of the coast-defense 
 vessel, to be the first to make proof of its inefficiency. 
 
 The needs of the war with Spain revealed to the United States 
 that it is dangerous to construct a special material adapted for a 
 
 °* Evidently the commander of the section will not reason in this way. 
 Each one, in his sphere, sees only the immediate interests of which he has 
 charge, and as regards the defensive one always thinks himself not suffi- 
 ciently safe : but that is not the question. 
 
 129
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 particular form of war, because operations cannot at will be given 
 a fixed character. Actually, America only succeeded in having 
 superiority over the Spanish by taking a number of monitors away 
 from their original application in order to reinforce her squadron. 
 Then it was perceived that they were troublesome and might 
 become dangerous. Their unfitness to meet the conditions of war 
 was such that Mahan wrote in regard to them: 
 
 " In the recent hostilities we had 26,000 tons tied up in monitors 
 of comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic and Pacific. 
 From the beginning to the end, I venture to say that there was 
 not an hour when we would not willingly have exchanged them 
 all six for two battleships of moderate displacement." '"" 
 
 To-day we no longer need to fear seeing our fleet increased by 
 new samples of this sort; but doubts subsist as to the best use 
 that can be made of those we have. Whatever there may be at- 
 tempted to get from them, we may boldly assert that their distri- 
 bution among several ports is the method by which they will 
 yield the least return. 
 
 We also have a lesson to take to heart from the presence of 
 these bastards in the list of our war ships. It is clear that we only 
 undertook the construction of our coast-defense vessels in imita- 
 tion of America and Germany, and that not until after having 
 built them did we inquire what use could be made of them. Is the 
 French Navy so ignorant of the needs of war as to be reduced 
 to seeking direction from her younger sisters ? If our neighbors 
 make an error, that is not a reason for imitating them. It is neces- 
 sary to know what one is doing and why one does it; without 
 that one is exposed to entering upon a war without having the 
 means of waging it. 
 
 Defense of the Coast by Ships Grouped in Divisions. — This 
 system, which we find advocated in Les Guerres navales de de- 
 main, is the most perfect application of the fatal method of doing 
 things piecemeal. We refer to it, although it is already a thing 
 of the past, to show clearly to what aberrations absence of a 
 sound doctrine can lead. This is the use made of it by the author : 
 
 He stations at Toulon, Marseilles, Cette, Bizerta, Bone, Philip- 
 peville, Algiers and Oran, divisions composed of battleships and 
 
 "°It is known that the coast-defense vessels had to be towed in order 
 to go to Porto Rico and that their replenishment was a constant source of 
 anxiety. 
 
 130
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 cruisers ; "" and that accomplished, the author thinks he has as- 
 sured France's preponderance in the Mediterranean. 
 
 If we go back to the period when this original plan was con- 
 ceived, we observe with pain that its materials were furnished, as 
 far as armored ships are concerned, by all the naval forces of 
 France except three new battleships and three station ships. 
 
 Let us now note the consequences of this plan. 
 
 England cannot imagine a distribution of forces that would be 
 more favorable for herself : this scattering of our forces is such as 
 would result from a battle lost, followed by a rout. No one of 
 these divisions is a source of annoyance to a squadron that re- 
 mains concentrated ; not one has sufficient strength to constitute 
 by itself alone a serious danger. The English squadron, there- 
 fore, is mistress of the Mediterranean. That is something ; it is 
 even all that is asked. Nevertheless, it cannot quit its field of 
 action, for, if it went away, English interests would be com- 
 promised. 
 
 Not finding himself confronted by any immediate adversary, 
 the enemy would seek to utilize this inactive force, and, as has 
 happened whenever a condition of this sort has existed, he will be 
 drawn towards the coasts. We will then suppose (though it is 
 far from incontestable) that the disposition of our forces has an 
 absolute efficiency and forbids any attack upon the cities where 
 our divisions are."" The enemy, moreover, has something better 
 to do than empty his magazines upon our shores. 
 
 He finds himself opposed to a very extended line of defense. 
 Naturally he will not divide his forces to attack everywhere at 
 
 "^ At Toulon : Trident, Ocean, d'Estrees. 
 
 At Marseilles : Richelieu, Friedland, Colbert, Dupetit-Thouars, Papin, 
 
 Linois. 
 At Cette : Acheron, Mitraille, Fusee (3 guns in all). 
 At Bizerta : Courbei, Redoutable, Devastation, Sfax, Forbin, Davout. 
 At Bone : Terrible, Dragonne. 
 
 At Algiers: Baudin, Formidable, Troudc, Bombe, Dague. 
 At Oran : Caiman, Milan. 
 ^"^ It is very difficult, from the tactical point of view, to combine the 
 action of ships with that of batteries ; in practice, the first will be led to 
 move in line close to the port with broadsides bearing; and, as they have 
 only been placed there to make up for an insufficient land defense, they 
 will support the principal effort and receive the fire of a double or triple 
 force without being able to profit by the advantages given by mobility. 
 
 131
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 once ; lie will take the weak points. Well, at one of the extremi- 
 ties lies Tunis. It constitutes a guarantee worth taking and even 
 keeping ; and it does not dispose of the same means of resistance 
 as France, or even Algeria. 
 
 A day will be enough to take 12,000 men at Malta and land 
 them safely on one of the numerous deserted beaches that are 
 available to the invader, or even at a port like Sousse. The sole 
 precaution needed will consist of paralyzing the divisions at 
 Bizerta and Bone by means of detachments of superior force. 
 
 When the enemy has put foot on the soil of Tunis, perhaps then 
 it will be recognized that the best means of saving our colony is 
 to cut off his retreat by destroying his squadron. Then the re- 
 union of all our scattered forces will be thought of — that is, we 
 will end where we should have begun ; but the concentration will 
 present insurmountable difficulties, the enemy holding interior 
 lines ; and it will suffice for one or two divisions to be crushed in 
 detail for all hope of fighting him to advantage to be lost. 
 
 Thus this initial dislocation, whose object is to protect the 
 coast, will attract the enemy there for the very reason that, not 
 being solicited in another direction, he will have nothing better 
 to do. 
 
 Protection of the Coast by Squadrons. — ^We come now to 
 the favorite theme of grand maneuvers : the assignment of squad- 
 rons to the guard of a fixed stretch of coast. Enough experiments 
 of this kind have been made to enable us to draw precise con- 
 clusions from them. 
 
 This is what takes place : 
 
 As soon as hostilities are declared — I mean from the very be- 
 ginning of the maneuvers — the defense squadron gets under way 
 and promenades along the coast like a sentinel along a wall. The 
 enemy, who comes from seaward, has it watched by his scouts, 
 and, when it reaches one of the extremities of its zone of surveil- 
 lance, attacks the other. His presence is at once signaled to the 
 defense, which turns about — and arrives too late. 
 
 It arrives too late because it has a great extent of coast to 
 guard, and it cannot be everywhere at once. 
 
 The day after, the enemy appears at another point ; and this 
 game of hide-and-seek lasts as long as the maneuvers last. 
 
 Sometimes the defense, tired of playing this part of dupe, 
 divides its forces ; it commits then a serious error that only the 
 
 132
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 make-believe of the maneuvers excuses ; for, if the enemy has 
 remained concentrated, each fraction is endangered. 
 
 In an exercise of this kind the coast-defense squadron will 
 never succeed, and never can succeed. The navy must not be 
 asked to perform the impossible. 
 
 The result would perhaps be completely different if the data of 
 the problem were more general. 
 
 Instead of making it the objective to prevent the enemy from 
 approaching the coast, the aim should be limited to destroying 
 him if he appears. 
 
 The coast-defense squadron would then maneuver in another 
 fashion. 
 
 As soon as it learned of the enemy's approach, it would put to 
 sea and having taken position on his line of retreat would wait 
 for the attack to define itself. 
 
 Warned at once by scouts left in the ports, it would endeavor to 
 cut the enemy off and bring him to a stand between itself and the 
 coast. 
 
 If the enemy waits to bombard a port, he contributes to his own 
 defeat ; the time that he loses gives the defense time to come up 
 and force him to an encounter that his expenditure of ammunition 
 and his injuries would make disastrous. But, to succeed, the 
 defense needs, just as m.uch as the attack, speed and steaming 
 radius ; while it is always assumed — I know not why — that on the 
 defensive side these two factors can be sacrificed. 
 
 It is unnecessary to conceal the fact that this discussion has 
 only a platonic interest. It is always supposed, in the grand 
 maneuvers, that the defense is stronger than the attack: it is a 
 quite conventional supposition. On the one hand, the enemy, if 
 he knows he will meet superior forces, will take rare not to come 
 to throw himself into the wolf's jaws ; on the other hand, when 
 one is the superior, the idea will not occur to him to immobilize 
 his ships to await an enemy whose every interest is not to come. 
 On each side, therefore, there will be agreement to adopt another 
 solution. 
 
 The reality — the sad reality — is that a squadron assigned to the 
 protection of a fixed extent of coast and constituted, as is gener- 
 ally supposed, of ships few in number, ill armed, and having but 
 little speed and a small radius of action, is condemned in advance 
 to inferiority, and consequently to destruction. It, therefore, de- 
 
 133
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 fends nothing. The attack, in truth, may adopt two procedures : 
 either it will make two parts of its forces, of which one will act 
 against the shore, while the other will combat the coast-defense 
 vessels ; or better, it will remain concentrated and will first get 
 rid of the ships ; after which it will turn against the land. In the 
 first case the attack on the coast accompanies the destruction of 
 the floating defense ; in the second, it follows it ; in neither case is 
 it prevented. 
 
 How is the unfortunate coast-defense squadron to escape from 
 the fate that threatens it? Its separation from its base of opera- 
 tions will be waited for, to crush it; and as armored ships, 
 even coast-defense vessels, cannot enter the majority of commer- 
 cial ports, their want of speed will force them passively to receive 
 attack. 
 
 There remains the resource of shutting themselves up in a port. 
 This is not a solution : the navy has not expended hundreds of 
 millions in building ships to shut them up in the strong-box of a 
 naval arsenal ; it requires dividends from them. Moreover, public ^ 
 
 opinion would at once force our squadrons to sea when the enemy, 
 by a feint, has made an appearance that masks his real strength. 
 Our squadrons will be uselessly sacrificed. 
 
 The Unfitness of Ships to Give Direct Protection. — It 
 will doubtless be judged that ships give proof of singular in- 
 effectiveness. Fortunately nothing of the sort is true. 
 
 It is not the ships that are inefifective : it is the proposed method 
 of using them that is defective. 
 
 It is proposed to condemn them to give direct protection by 
 placing them between the coast and the enemy. We find our- 
 selves then faced with a new application of the defensive that is 
 worth no more tlian the rest. One kind of vessel only would be 
 fit to make it effective : that is the submarine. And this for two 
 reasons : first, because it is invulnerable ; second, because it can- 
 not be combatted with elements of the same nature. But con- 
 siderations that we shall presently examine into will show us that 
 only a moderate use of submarines is necessary for the protection 
 of the coast. 
 
 The defensive upon the sea is the exact opposite of the defen- 
 sive on land. 
 
 The army is concentrated within the frontiers to await the 
 enemy ; the navy is obliged to crumble its forces outside the sea 
 
 134
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 frontiers. The defensive on land occupies, so to speak, the center 
 of a circle whose circumference the naval defensive would occupy. 
 One acts by interior lines ; the other by exterior lines. 
 
 This comparison reveals to us the dangers and difficulties of 
 direct protection. 
 
 The disposition along the coast lets the enemy know with almost 
 perfect accuracy the number and composition of the forces he 
 will find in each center of defense ; there is, therefore, no longer 
 anything unexpected for him. Free to keep off, he will only 
 attack when he has brought together destroyers and ships in suffi- 
 cient numbers to have an overwhelming superiority .^°' 
 
 In a word, to have superiority, it would be necessary every- 
 where to offer resistance with forces at least equal to those that 
 the enemy can collect at a single point: which is impossible. A 
 squadron taking with it twenty destroyers will have enough ele- 
 ments to provide against our two hundred coast-defense torpedo- 
 boats, since it will only have to do with one single mobile defense 
 at a time. 
 
 In practice, only limited means are available in each region. If 
 they are scattered, the protection is very weak and becomes in- 
 effective ; if they are concentrated, the greater part of the terri- 
 tory is exposed and the protection is unreal. It is turning in a 
 vicious circle. 
 
 The complete organization of direct protection for the coasts of 
 France and her colonies would require, to be efficacious, expendi- 
 tures that are in contradiction of the defensive idea. The English 
 naval budget would not be enough for it. That is why submarines 
 should only be used for coast defense to a moderate extent ; so 
 long as we have hopes of letting them loose against the enemy, 
 we ought to employ them without any thought of the defensive. 
 
 Direct protection can only be practised by elements whose value 
 does not depend, to the same degree as that of ships, upon num- 
 bers, and whose moderate cost does not task too heavily our 
 budget : such elements are constituted by iixed defenses. 
 
 "' It has been concluded from this situation that England, in spite of her 
 formidable navy, will never succeed in effectively protecting her coasts. 
 There is no reason to suppose that she will adopt a procedure so mani- 
 festly ineffective as that of dividing her squadrons : that would be con- 
 trary to all her traditions. It would be imprudent to found hopes upon 
 an error that, in a French-English duel, we alone have wished to commit. 
 
 135
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Protection of the Coast by the Offensive. — As far as 
 naval forces are concerned, they can only furnish the coast with 
 indirect protection by turning- aside the enemy's attention, that is 
 by taking the offensive.^** This method has succeeded in the past ; 
 there is no reason why it should not do so in the future. 
 
 And, by reflecting upon the matter, it will be seen that this 
 system of protection must be efficacious. In order that it should 
 be otherwise, the enemy must seek to deceive the vigilance of the 
 forces that are watching him, to make a dash at the coast. What 
 will then be his situation? 
 
 If a landing is contemplated, the ships and the troops they carry 
 are bound together ; so long as the expeditionary corps operates 
 on shore, the ships are obliged to remain in its neighborhood to 
 support it, furnish it with reinforcements, watch over the safety 
 of the transports, and in case of need protect the re-embarkation. 
 What sort of a squadron is it then that will expose itself to attack 
 under such unfavorable conditions ? Yet it is this with which it is 
 threatened. It is engaged in an operation of uncertain duration ; 
 it, therefore, risks giving the enemy time to come up, even from a 
 great distance, and to surprise its ships in an undefended anchor- 
 age, stripped of part of their forces ; or to be met on their return 
 voyage, encumbered with troops and embarrassed by a convoy. 
 During the grand maneuvers, this chance can be taken, because 
 then the duration of the operation can be abridged at pleasure, 
 and above all because there is certainty of not being destroyed; 
 but in time of war, it will not be attempted without a great deal of 
 reflection. 
 
 If a bombardment is contemplated, the aggressor finds himself 
 in a position none the better. 
 
 The operation in itself can be rapidly carried out, and it may be 
 hoped to finish it without hindrance. But afterwards ? It will be 
 necessary to turn back with magazines empty, with ships dam- 
 
 ^"^ What constitutes the defensive strength of a fortified place is that the 
 garrison is sheltered behind breastworks or in forts. If it was attempted 
 to defend a city by stationing the garrison outside the walls, so as to in- 
 terpose between the enemy and the point to be defended, nothing at all 
 would be protected, since it would suffice to assemble a force more nu- 
 merous than the garrison to drive the latter away. To pretend to defend 
 the coast by interposing ships between the coast and the enemy is equiva- 
 lent to defending a place by making its garrison go out into the open 
 country. 
 
 136
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 aged ; here again it would be madness to contemplate an en- 
 counter. In both cases, a very powerful motive would be neces- 
 sary to justify risking one's squadrons in such a venture ; but there 
 is no such motive : attacking the coast does not lead directly to the 
 ends of war. 
 
 Fleets, like armies, are the only instruments that have hitherto 
 been able to decide the disputes that divide nations. From the 
 day when ships ceased to play the part of a bridge by which to 
 cross arms of the sea, and became deadly weapons, the whole in- 
 terest of war became fixed upon them ; they became a menace that 
 can only be escaped by destroying them. That is why they attract 
 to themselves the hostile forces. The struggle between elements 
 afloat is, therefore, a necessity from the first. So long as this i » i i 
 quarrel is not settled, the coast will remain in peace, and we have U * 
 no right to compromise the issue by detaching a part of our fleet 
 to stand guard over our shore ; all the ships ought to participate 
 in the operations. It will always be time to bring them down to 
 the coast afterwards if fortune betrays us ; but it Is to be feared 
 that they will then be unable to raise our prestige and that our 
 loss will be irremediable. 
 
 It is a grave error to believe that the offensive has not a direct 
 and immediate effect upon the defensive, to imagine that one can 
 with impunity disregard what is going on on the sea to use all his 
 exertions on shore. This error has led to looking upon naval 
 warfare as merely a succession of disconnected operations, to 
 devoting part of one's forces to offense and part to defense, with- 
 out its being perceived that in this way the former is endangered 
 without the latter being made safe. As if the best way of de- | 
 fending oneself has not always been to attack. ' 
 
 This policy has given us what may be called the fleet of " the 
 public folly " : eighteen coast-defense vessels and two hundred 
 mobile-defense torpedo-boats that are tied to the shore by lack of 
 steaming radius and sea-going qualities. It must be confessed 
 that so large a share has been given the defensive that any offen- 
 sive becomes impossible. 
 
 There are not, therefore — or rather there ought not to be — two 
 distinct fleets, one fleet for attack and another fleet for defense. 
 There is but one of them, whose objective is the enemy afloat, and 
 which puts in action all the resources of strategy to beat him. 
 without looking back to see what is happening to the coast. 
 
 cA^-- 
 
 137 
 
 -f
 
 i\. Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 To continue the comparison between land and sea operations, 
 we will say that on the sea the offensive contributes to the pro- 
 tection of the coasts to the same degree that the offensive on land 
 contributes to the protection of the frontiers. As soon as the 
 army penetrates into the hostile territory, it secures efficiently the 
 protection of its own territory, and renders useless all the defenses 
 of fortified places ; the latter no longer have to guard themselves 
 except against surprise attacks. 
 
 The foregoing is what we wrote in the first edition of this 
 study, before the Russo-Japanese war. To-day, after a recent 
 experience, we have nothing to change in it. The offensive 
 played the same preventive part during this war as in the past ; 
 and it could not be otherwise, for the influence of naval forces 
 derives from the very nature of war. 
 
 Indirect Protection. — Indirect protection is, therefore, the 
 only kind that is suitable to sea forces ; it is also the only logical 
 kind, because it leaves to the navy its freedom of action in carry- 
 ing on the war. It forms neither a barrier nor an obstacle, and 
 for that reason its efficiency is not clearly apparent unless pains 
 are taken to disengage it from the teachings of history. It 
 does not oppose the enemy's undertakings : it threatens to inter- 
 rupt them or to make him pay dearly for them. It inspires a fear 
 like that of the policeman, who does not prevent robberies, but 
 arrests the robbers. Just as civil society has found no better means 
 of guaranteeing property than by inspiring a salutary fear in 
 those who wish to assail it, so military society can only guarantee 
 itself against certain eventualities by making the enemy run risks 
 greater than the damages he can cause. 
 
 This solution is not absolute — who can flatter himself to have 
 given such to any problem of warfare? — but any other would be 
 less good. 
 
 Evidently, the anxiety to find a favorable field of battle may 
 force us to abandon completely certam regions. An Augusta may 
 profit by it to appear on our coast, but that will no more compro- 
 mise the issue of the war than a cavalry raid compromises the 
 issue of a campaign. It may even happen that a more important 
 force will come to threaten us, though this is much less probable, 
 since, when the enemy is kept on the alert, he has neither desire 
 nor leisure to attack the coast. But, against such incursions, the 
 coasts will not be stripped bare ; they will have, to defend them, 
 
 138
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 batteries, booms, lines of torpedoes and, if tbe war is exclusively 
 naval, the whole French Army. With similar means France has 
 for two centuries repulsed — not unsuccessfully — attacks more dan- 
 gerous than those with which a maritime nation can threaten us ; 
 for at that epoch the defense of most of our sea-coast towns was 
 only in embryo, and our army was always occupied elsewhere. 
 
 And if these means did not suffice, if a few houses were de- 
 stroyed, some villages burned, some harvests trodden under foot, 
 it would not be necessary to cry abomination of desolation : war is 
 not made without receiving blows, the whole thing is to give more 
 of them than one receives, and above all to strike home. Well, if 
 we strip a part of our coast to carry the theater ol war onto a 
 distant field, it is because usually — not to say always — we antici- 
 pate elsewhere a superiority that will assure us victory. The 
 enemy, in taking advantage of the momentary freedom of the sea 
 to attack our shores, therefore plays our game ; in exchange for 
 material damages, he renounces a decisive result or gets himself 
 beaten. What do bombardments and invasions amount to then? 
 The dead are replaced, the losses are made up ; one thing alone is 
 irreparable : the ruin of the fatherland. 
 
 And we will conclude : the best way to protect the coast is still 
 to combine the direct action of fixed defenses with the indirect 
 action of squadrons. 
 
 Protection at a Distance. — When possession of a territory 
 is of capital importance, either temporarily or with a view to the 
 future, and this territory is not in condition to defend itself, it 
 becomes necessary to protect it with ships. In truth cases of this 
 sort are extremely rare : it is generally better to restrict oneself 
 to bringing the adversary to an agreement rather than to expend 
 one's forces in piecemeal attacks. When the time of settlement 
 arrives, demands are limited only by the degree of helplessness to 
 which the enemy is reduced. But after all the event can happen, 
 and the best example of it is certainly the defense of Gibraltar by 
 the English. Let us see how they went to work to preserve their 
 new conquest, without suffering the dangers of direct protection. 
 
 The Spaniards, having committed the error of leaving a garri- 
 son of only 150 men in Gibraltar, Admiral Rooke had seized it by 
 surprise. The English government recognized the importance of 
 the position and resolved to retain it at any cost. But to put the 
 place in a state of defense required extensive works and in the 
 
 139
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 interval until they were executed, although the rock could he put 
 out of reach of a surprise, the fleet alone could preserve it from a 
 prolonged attack. 
 
 The English squadron, commanded hy Leake, took Lisbon for a 
 base of operations. It is probable that this port was only chosen in 
 the absence of a nearer one ; but events proved that in spite of its 
 distance, or rather on account of it, the protection was effective.'"'' 
 
 In fact, so long as Leake's forces were not pur out of action, 
 the capture of Gibraltar by sea was impossible. The garrison, 
 knowing that it would receive assistance in the course of time, 
 would hold out until the fleet arrived ; and the latter, finding the 
 besiegers engaged in combined operations, could inflict defeat 
 upon them, even if inferior in numbers. It was necessary to 
 station oflf Lisbon a covering squadron at least equal in force to 
 that of Leake, which required a deployment of forces that France 
 was incapable of accomplishing ; or to destroy the English squad- 
 ron first and then attack Gibraltar. But how could ships inside 
 an inaccessible roadstead be reached? 
 
 The English fleet, established at Lisbon, therefore really pro- 
 tected Gibraltar ; it did not accomplish indirect protection, but 
 protection at a distance.'"* 
 
 The French government did not appreciate this situation. 
 Relying upon the absence of Leake's fleet, it paid no attention to it 
 and sent Squadron Commander de Pointis to Gibraltar to aid 
 with his ships the land operations directed by Marshal Tesse. 
 
 Did Pointis comprehend the danger he was going to run? 
 It may be doubted, since he accepted the mission. Things are 
 often not seen in their true light until after arrival on the spot. 
 However this may be, when he reached Gibraltar he perceived the 
 difficulties of his task and wrote of them to Paris. At the same 
 time he withdrew to Cadiz, leaving his light vessels off the place 
 to blockade it. This light squadron was captured by Leake, who 
 had hastened from Lisbon on news of its appearance ; then the 
 
 "^ Colomb. Naval Warfare. 
 
 ^"*A naval force compelled by circumstances to take station off a port 
 which it cannot use as a base is, o priori, in a delicate position; it is never 
 complete, on account of the need to revictual its ships and to maintain 
 distant lookout vessels. The position taken by the English squadron had 
 the curious result of making the attack defend itself and the defense 
 attack. 
 
 140
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 English fleet, after having supplied the rock, returned to its post 
 of observation. 
 
 The blindness of the French government having forced Pointis 
 to lend more effective co-operation to the troops, the latter in- 
 vested Gibraltar by sea and was surprised by Leake, who arrived 
 from Lisbon for the third time. Eight of his ships were then off 
 to leeward ; the five that remained widi him were captured. 
 
 This result might have been foreseen. We may well ask 
 through what blindness the Versailles Cabinet assumed to under- 
 take an operation of long duration in the presence of a naval 
 force specially intended to oppose it. If the English squadron 
 could have been destroyed, the besieged would perhaps have sur- 
 rendered, because, seeing no longer any possibility of being aided, 
 they would have judged it useless to prolong a hopeless struggle ; 
 but the assurance that the fleet would appear gave them strength 
 to resist until all means of resistance were exhausted. 
 
 And, since v/e are speaking of Gibraltar, let us observe that the 
 English have never believed, either on that occasion or on any 
 other, that a bombardment could reduce the place, because they 
 knew that the batteries would defend themselves and would end 
 by having the best of it. These expectations have been realized. 
 
 141
 
 [The following chapter was translated by Commander H. S. Knapp, U. S. N.] 
 
 11. 
 
 The Conquest of Territory over Seas. 
 
 Should a nation having a .strong navy wish to undertake opera- 
 tions of war on land, it must confine its aspirations to attempts 
 upon the coast of the adversary if its army is numerically weak. 
 Not having at disposal means sufficient for an invasion of the 
 enemy's territory, it is only by accident that it can take possession 
 of an island or of a position on the coast, the occupation of which 
 will always remain precarious. 
 
 On the other hand, a nation having a strong military organiza- 
 tion, but whose navy has been sacrificed to the army, will always be 
 tempted to seek upon land a field of battle that it does not find on 
 the sea. It will disdain those desultory operations that attack only 
 the material interests of populations on the littoral, and will be pos- 
 sessed by the idea of throwing great masses of men into the 
 enemy's territory in order to make use of its army. 
 
 For this reason it is the English who have given examples of 
 operations against the coast : wliile it is France that holds the 
 stage as soon as the question is one of attempting an invasion. 
 
 The history of the Franco-English duel affords the most re- 
 markable example of the efforts made by a countr\- to compensate 
 for its maritime inferiority by a land struggle. We purpose re- 
 viewing the different phases of this long drama. 
 
 The Landing in Ireland (1689). — The accession of William 
 III to the English throne marks the beginning of the series of 
 maritime wars that was not to end until 1815, 126 years after. 
 
 James II, dethroned by his son-in-law, had taken refuge at 
 the court of Louis XIV and had sought his sujjport. The new 
 king of England himself furnished the pretext for an intervention 
 by entering the League of Augsburg. 
 
 Attention was first directed to Ireland. Tyrconnel had suc- 
 ceeded in maintaining that island under the authority of the 
 Stuarts, with the exception of L'lster. It was. therefore, decided 
 that James II should betake himself to Ireland, and that he should 
 be followed by a small army, about which to organize the poorly 
 disciplined Irish troops. 
 
 142
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 The king left Saint Germain February 28, 1689. " I wish," said 
 Louis XIV on leaving him, " never to see you again." A division 
 composed of some 10 ships under the orders of Gabaret, Squadron 
 Commander, had been fitted out at Brest with the utmost secrecy. 
 James II embarked with 400 French officers and 1200 Anglo- 
 Irishmen; he took with him a good quantity of arms and muni- 
 tions. Gabaret arrived at Kinsale March 22. After having dis- 
 embarked the troops and material he left Captain Duquesne-Mon- 
 nier on the spot with three frigates, and returned to Brest without 
 having encountered a single enemy vessel. Such happy luck 
 need occasion no surprise. War had only just been declared ; 
 nothing about the projects of Louis XIV had leaked out; finally 
 it was the custom in those days not to commission ships until 
 spring. By sailing at the beginning of March one was almost 
 certain to find the sea entirely free, which happened in this case. 
 
 In the meantime the fleet was put in commission at Brest under ' 
 the command of Chateau-Renault. It was composed of 24 ships, 
 2 frigates, and 6 fireships. On May 6 it sailed, escorting a convoy 
 that carried 7000 men. 
 
 The attention of the English government had been attracted by 
 the landing of James II in Ireland and the fitting out of the ships 
 at Brest. It hastily fitted out a squadron commanded by Admiral 
 Herbert, the same who had taken over William of Orange from 
 Holland to England. Herbert took station on lookout off Ushant, 
 where he learned of the departure of the French and laid his 
 course for the Irish coast. 
 
 Chateau-Renault had orders to disembark his troops at Kin- 
 sale or Galway ; but, on March 9, near Cape Clear, he had infor- 
 mation of the English squadron. The nearness of the enemy and 
 the direction of the wind forced him to abandon his plan ; he im- 
 mediately resolved to take his convoy into Bantry Bay, where he 
 anchored March 10 at 11 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 The light vessels began embarking the troops in order to trans- 
 port them to the head of the bay close to the land. About four 
 in the afternoon the scouts signalled 2'] sails which were tacking 
 in to approach the land. 
 
 Chateau-Renault judging that the enemy would not arrive at 
 the entrance of the bay before 24 hours, kept up the operations 
 of disembarkation throughout the night. The next day he got 
 
 143
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 under way at dawn and left the bay; but in order to cover his 
 transports, he did not stand far off shore. The action began 
 about II o'clock; it was rather confused, but finally the advan- 
 tage rested with the French. Chateau-Renault gave up the pursuit 
 of the enemy in order not to separate himself from his convoy, and 
 took his squadron back to Bantry. After having picked up his 
 frigates and fireships he endeavored to overtake the English ; but 
 as they had taken refuge at Spithead to repair their damages he 
 steered for Brest, where he arrived March i8, after an absence of 
 II days. 
 
 Without drawing premature conclusions from this single expe- 
 dition, we shall note that it was favored by special conditions. 
 
 Ireland was an allied country ; the disembarkation could thus be 
 effected within an inclosed anchorage and upon any part of the 
 coast; the population, instead of forcibly resisting the descent of 
 the troops, favored it to the extent of its power. Had it been 
 necessary for Chateau-Renault to undertake the disembarkation 
 in a hostile country he would have been forced to do it on an unin- 
 habited beach, which would have required a much longer time ; 
 nor would he have been able to modify his plans at the last 
 moment by selecting Bantry in place of Kinsale, because it is not 
 a matter of indifference to arrive at one point rather than another 
 when gaining a foothold on territory occupied by the enemy. 
 Despite this array of favorable circumstances, despite the great 
 extent of coast of which the expedition could make use, our squad- 
 ron narrowly escaped meeting the English at sea ; and it is easy to 
 imagine what would have happened. 
 
 What became of the little army landed in March ? 
 
 Upon the arrival of James II Ireland arose, and the principal 
 towns of Ulster quickly fell into the power of the Jacobites. The 
 Protestants shut themselves up in Londonderry and Enniskillen 
 until the situation in England should permit William to succor 
 them. James II laid siege to Londonderry, but the place was well 
 defended, and after three months the siege had to be raised (July 
 28). A month later Schomberg landed with several thousand 
 men, relieved Enniskillen, and pushed James II back to the borders 
 of Ulster and Leinster. 
 
 Thus the war dragged on, the ex-king fearing to give battle, 
 Schomberg afraid to venture into the insurgent region, 
 
 144
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 . The Second Landing in Ireland (1690). — In November the 
 English ParHament voted appropriations in order to push the war 
 with vigor, and WilHam manifested his intention of going to Ire- 
 land at the beginning of the campaign. Upon the urgent request 
 of James II, Louis XIV had decided to send fresh reinforcements 
 on condition that he should receive an equal number of Irishmen in 
 exchange for his regular troops. In March, 1690, Lieutenant- 
 General d'Amfreville left Brest with 27 vessels, escorting a con- 
 voy carrying 6000 to 7000 troops under the orders of the Duke de 
 Lauzun, and also a great quantity of arms and munitions. 
 
 In consequence of circumstances that would take too long in 
 telling, not only had the Dutch fleet not yet arrived in England, 
 but the English ships themselves were not in commission. D'Am- 
 freville, therefore, encountered no opposition ; he landed his troops 
 at Cork on March 23, embarked the Irishmen in exchange, and re- 
 turned to Brest. 
 
 After the arrival of Chateau-Renault, who brought the Eastern 
 Squadron from Toulon, Tourville sailed from Brest with 70 ships 
 to dispute the command of the channel with the English and the 
 Dutch. At Beachy Head he encountered the enemy's fleet com- 
 manded by Herbert, and defeated it ; but the very next day James 
 II was crushed at the Boyne. 
 
 William III had reached Ireland the day of Tourville's sailing 
 for Brest. He at once put himself at the head of his troops and, 
 with 40,000 men, attacked James II, who had less than 30,000 men. 
 Abandoning his army, James II fled precipitately to Kinsale, 
 where he found 10 French frigates.'" He embarked at once and 
 had himself taken to Brest, and from there he went to Versailles to 
 ask for a new army. But Louis XIV, indignant at his conduct, re- 
 fused him any aid and ordered Tourville to send ships to Ireland 
 to repatriate the troops. 
 
 After the defeat at the Boyne, the Duke de Lauzun had retreated 
 to Galway while a simple French captain, Boisselot, shut himself 
 up in Limerick with a handful of resolute men and arrested the 
 victorious march of William. Lauzun was thus able to await the 
 French ships without anxiety ; these arrived at the end of August 
 
 "^ It had been decided that, if Tourville should be the victor, he would 
 send twenty-five frigates to sweep St. George's Channel and intercept the 
 reinforcements crossing to Ireland; the frigates at Kinsale were a part of 
 this detachment. 
 
 145
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 and took the troops back to Brest. Scarcely had the French troops 
 left when Kinsale was taken. 
 
 At this time the alHed fleet had taken refuge in the Thames, 
 where Herbert had caused the removal of the buoys marking the 
 entrance to the Thames in order to stop the pursuit by the French 
 squadron. The victory of Beachy Head thus had a direct influence 
 upon the security of sea communications ; and it is beyond question 
 that the small French army would have been forced to capitulate 
 if Tourville had been beaten. 
 
 Attempt to Invade England (1692). — During the campaign 
 of 1691 the fleet remained on the defensive. Tourville made his 
 three months' sortie in the Channel, which has remained celebrated 
 under the name of the " deep-sea-cruise," during which time he 
 held a superior enenn' in check without permitting the least 
 damage to himself. But in 1692 there came a reversion to the idea 
 of invasion. This time it was desired to land in England itself in 
 order to finish the w-ar at a single blow. James H repaired to 
 Havre and la Hogue, where 30,000 men and 500 transports were 
 assembled. The army was commanded by Marshal de Bellefonds, 
 and Tourville had the duty of covering the passage with the fleet. 
 
 The disadvantages of the geographical situation of France, 
 which have been pointed out in a preceding chapter, then made 
 themselves felt. The Toulon detachment, being hindered by the 
 weather, was not able to arrive at the date fixed. Tourville, whose 
 departure had already been delayed nearly a month by reason of 
 strained finances, sailed on May 2y with only 44 ships. Mishaps 
 always have disastrous consequences. Troops are assembled, 
 transports are ready to sail, there is nothing to delay departure 
 except awaiting the arrival of the escort ; but every day that passes 
 represents an added expenditure and increases the enervation 
 caused by delay. It results, then, that patience is lost ; and, in 
 order that all these preparations shall not have been made in vain, 
 some hazardous venture is attempted. This is what happened. 
 
 The delay in commissioning the fleet had left to the Dutch tim.e 
 to effect their junction with the English ; and when the French 
 fleet had doubled Cape la Hogue it found itself in the presence of 
 99 enemy ships. Tourville was defeated despite a magnificent 
 resistance. The expedition was abandoned. 
 
 We shall not recall here the melancholy incidents that followed 
 the battle of la Hogue and brought about the loss of 15 ships. 
 
 146
 
 A Study of Nav^al Strategy. 
 
 Suffice to say that the result of this battle illustrates well that a 
 fleet that has been defeated, but not destroyed, is completely negli- 
 gible for a long time, and that the demoralization that attends lost 
 battles permits the victor to undertake with impunity the most 
 hardy enterprises without running any risk. 
 
 The war with England lasted until 1712, with a short interval 
 of peace from 1698 to 1702; but the miscarriage of this attempt at 
 invasion took away from Louis XIV all idea of undertaking an 
 operation of this sort again. It required 30 years of peace to 
 weaken the bad impression that it had left, and to bring minds back 
 toward a disembarkation. 
 
 Second Attempt to Invade England (1744). — England had 
 been at war with Spain since 1739. The vexations of every kind 
 to which the English had subjected our maritime commerce made 
 it plain that France, in spite of her efforts, would not long be able 
 to avoid taking a part in the struggle. A final affront made the 
 government emerge from its attitude of reserve which, if pro- 
 longed, would have wrought injury to the national prestige. The 
 Spanish fleet, pursued by the English, had sought refuge at Tou- 
 lon ; and the English ships treated our coast as enemy country 
 under pretext of watching the Spanish squadron. 
 
 Fitting out was immediately begun at Brest and Toulon, and it 
 was resolved to throw an army corps into England, taking advan- 
 tage of the fact that the war with Spain had withdrawn a great 
 part of the English ships from their own coast. 
 
 While transports were being quietly dispatched to Dunkirk, 
 Calais, and Boulogne, 15,000 old soldiers were concentrated at 
 Lille and Valenciennes. The Pretender, Charles Edward, was to 
 accompany the troops, which were put under the command of 
 Marshal de Saxe. 
 
 It was a small number for the conquest of England — 15,000 
 men ; but at this time George II was waging war in Germany, 
 whither he had sent his best troops, and there were remaining in 
 England not more than 10,000 men. The discontent that was 
 readily taken for a desire for the restoration was also counted 
 upon, and it was believed that the landing of the Pretender would 
 be sufficient to make the country rise. It was a constant mistake 
 of the Versailles cabinet to speculate upon a revolution in England. 
 The exiled princes, living in retirement, were surrounded by a 
 court of refugees who passed their time in commenting upon and 
 
 147
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 in exaggerating events; and, in their haste to return to a state of 
 affairs that should restore them to place and dignity, they took 
 their wishes for realities. On the other hand, the emissaries kept 
 in England by the court to keep it informed of opinion exag- 
 gerated the slightest incidents in order to justify the subsidies they 
 received ; and these different causes brought it about that the situ- 
 ation was viewed in a false light in France. As a result it was 
 ever believed that the landing of a number of regiments on Brit- 
 ish soil would be sufficient to replace the Stuarts upon the throne 
 of their fathers. 
 
 The squadron that had been fitted out at Brest comprised then 
 25 ships under de Roquefeuil as commander-in-chief ; its duty was 
 to cover the passage. 
 
 Count de Roquefeuil got under way on February 14, 1744. His 
 object was to make a reconnaissance of the English coast, and, 
 after assuring himself that no English fleet was in the Channel, 
 to regain the Strait of Dover and escort the convoy. 
 
 Bad weather kept the French squadron off shore and it was not 
 until the end of the month that it appeared off the Isle of Wight. 
 Count de Roquefeuil ascertained that there was no naval force in 
 the roadstead of Saint Helens ; from this he concluded, a little 
 prematurely, that the English had not yet fitted out their ships. 
 He detached several ships under command of Baraith to inform 
 Charles Edward and Marshal de Saxe that the passage was clear 
 and that they could cross the Strait under the protection of the es- 
 cort that he had sent them. He himself anchored on the evening 
 of the 226. at Dungeness to cover the passage. The next day his 
 astonishment was extreme to see 34 enemy ships tacking in to 
 reach him. This is what had happened. Upon his sailing from 
 Brest, Roquefeuil had been sighted first by the Phoenix, which was 
 cruising in the vicinity of Ushant ; and then, on February 3, by the 
 escort of a convoy coming from Jamaica. The Admiralty, thus 
 warned, had hastened the fitting out of the fleet ; and Admiral Nor- 
 ris quickly found himself in the Downs at the head of 49 sail, of 
 which 21 were of more than 60 guns, and 11 of more than 44. 
 
 Thwarted by the tide, the English squadron had to anchor six 
 miles away from our ships. Roquefeuil took advantage of the 
 circumstances to get under way. Favored by the fog, he had al- 
 ready succeeded in escaping from the pursuit of the enemy, when 
 
 148
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 a storm dispersed his squadron and sent it back in disorder to 
 Brest. The same storm prevented the convoy from setting- out; 
 the Pretender, Maurice de Saxe and ii battahons had already 
 embarked. 
 
 When the bad weather was over the EngHsh forces were guard- 
 ing the passage; the expedition was abandoned. 
 
 The French government had evidently reckoned upon being able 
 to surprise the English because of the war with Spain ; but the 
 situation was too tense to permit of the vigilance of our enemies 
 not being fully aroused. 
 
 Landing of Prince Charles Edward in Scotland (1745), 
 Followed by a Third Attempt to Land in England. — Charles 
 Edward had not given up the hope of reconquering the crown of 
 his ancestors, and he displayed an energy at this time that would, 
 no doubt, have assured the success of his grandfather 60 years 
 earlier. Left to his own resources he repaired to Nantes, and sailed 
 from there with one ship and one frigate lent him by an Irish 
 privateer.^** He landed in Scotland June 4, 1745, with a number of 
 followers, some arms and 4000 louis, entered Edinburgh, beat the 
 English at Prestonpans, and penetrated to within 30 leagues of 
 London. The situation became critical for the English ; the king 
 was still in Germany and the Council of Regents was at its wit's 
 end. The French government deemed the occasion a favorable one 
 to intervene ; 10,000 men were assembled in the vicinity of the 
 Strait of Dover, and the Duke of Richelieu was selected to com- 
 mand. But action had been too slow ; when the troops were ready 
 to embark, at the end of December, two English squadrons were 
 watching the Strait. After vainly waiting some time for bad 
 weather to sweep away the English ships, the troops went back to 
 their respective garrisons. The expedition was abandoned. 
 
 For a second time (and it will not be the last) we note the im- 
 possibility of making an expedition wait that has required lengthy 
 preparations. When all is ready it is necessary to set out or give 
 up the operation. But, as the coast is generally watched and as a 
 storm alone can clear it, the departure depends upon a combina- 
 tion of circumstances that rarely comes to pass. 
 
 ^"' These two ships, the Dcntelle and the Elizabeth, belonged to the king 
 and had been lent to the Irishman Walsh to use in privateering. 
 
 149
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 First Conquest of Minorca (1756). — As always happens 
 after a fruitless attempt, the war ended without further thought 
 of invading English territory; but the idea was to be taken up on 
 a grander scale during the Seven Years' War. 
 
 The war was declared May 15, 1756; as a matter of fact it had 
 been going on for several years. In Canada there had been fight- 
 ing ever since the death of a French officer, Jumonville, assassi- 
 nated by the English in contempt of the law of nations. Pitt had 
 caused to be seized in the ports 300 French merchant ships ; and, 
 while Parliament had declared the captures irregular, the English 
 government none the less refused to give them up. To all these 
 annoyances it was desired to make an energetic reply, and while 
 Lieutenant-General Macnemara sailed from Brest for Canada 
 with a squadron, an expedition was fitted out at Toulon with the 
 object of seizing the island of Minorca, which had been left in the 
 hands of the British by the Treaty of Utrecht. That power was 
 only keeping at the time two ships and three frigates in the Medi- 
 terranean, stationed usually at Mahon. 
 
 Lieutenant-General de la Galissonniere sailed from Toulon April 
 9, 1756, with 12 ships, 4 frigates and 6 gunboats. He first went 
 to Hyeres Roads where he joined the convoy of 14,000 men under 
 the command of Duke de Richelieu. On the i8th the fleet 
 anchored before the little town of Ciudadella, where the landing 
 took place with no attempt at opposition on the part of the enemy ; 
 by the 24th the artillery and all the material was on shore. The 
 ships of war then went to sea to establish the blockade of the 
 island, the French already being masters of the whole territory 
 except Fort St. Philip, which commands the city of Mahon and in 
 which the English garrison of 3000 men had taken refuge. 
 
 In the meantime England had taken alarm at the preparations 
 going on at Toulon, and though their object w^as concealed it 
 seemed probable that the expedition was aimed at Minorca. The 
 Admiralty immediately prepared a squadron for the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 Admiral Bing left Spithead April 6 (three days before the de- 
 parture of the French fleet from Toulon) with ii ships and 4000 
 troops. Upon arriving at Gibraltar May 2, he learned of the land- 
 ing of the French from the English ships that had fled from Mahon 
 at our approach. He left May 8, having then 13 ships, and arrived 
 in sight of Minorca and of the French squadron on the 19th, 
 
 150
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Defeated by la Galissonniere the following- day, Admiral Bing 
 abandoned the relief of Minorca and sailed away for Gibraltar. 
 Nevertheless he had not lost a single ship; for there, as at Bantry, 
 the anxiety of the French not to abandon the expeditionary corps 
 forbade them to fight to a finish. This timidity might have cost us 
 dearly if contentions had not arisen in the English squadron to 
 paralyze its movements ; as a matter of fact, Bing found at Gibral- 
 tar on June 19 five ships that had just arrived from England to rein- 
 force him, and with which he might have taken the offensive again. 
 
 Fort St. Philip capitulated June 30. The troops then began to 
 embark, and, on July 8, the fleet set out for Toulon where it 
 arrived the i6th, only a garrison remaining at Minorca. 
 
 As is known, Bing was relieved of his command, brought to 
 trial before a court-martial, and was shot on the poop of his own 
 ship. 
 
 War had been declared three days before the battle of Mahon. 
 
 It is curious to note that the English, who were constantly 
 masters of the sea, made no attempt to retake Minorca throughout 
 the entire course of the war. To our mind, the English govern- 
 ment held, in this particular, the just estimate of the situation. 
 The means were certainly not lacking to our enemy of landing in 
 security at the Balearics a body of troops capable of wresting the 
 island from the garrison in occupation ; but, during the whole of 
 the operation, which might have lasted several months if the 
 French had sustained the siege in Fort St. Philip, the Balearics 
 would have become the center of attraction for the navies of the 
 two countries. The English ships, however, would not have found 
 a favorable field of operations on those coasts ; at that time, as we 
 have already said, Gibraltar did not yet constitute a solid point of 
 support, and England was more concerned then to keep the Rock 
 than to utilize it. As a result an expedition against Minorca could 
 have no other bases than the home ports, which were far away, 
 while France had in the neighborhood one of her principal arse- 
 nals. A position so advantageous offered to the remnants of our 
 navy that had taken refuge at Toulon such opportunities of thwart- 
 ing all attempts against Mahon that England preferred not to risk 
 them. Her government doubtless thought that being victorious in 
 the end would suffice to constrain the vanquished to give up what 
 he had taken, and that is the very tiling that happened ; at the con- 
 clusion of peace Minorca was exchanged for Belle-Isle. 
 
 151
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Fourth Attempt to Land in England (1759). — The battle 
 of Mahon marked the end of our successes during- this calamitous 
 war. The navy had fallen into unworthy hands which set them- 
 selves to destroy it with as much ardor as, and more hatred than, 
 the enemy. The ships remaining to us were laid up, their crews 
 disbanded. Finding- no enemy to fight, the English squadrons 
 ravaged our coasts and took possession of our colonies ; and it 
 seemed as if the navy of Colbert was about to perish, suffocated 
 by shame, when affairs fell into the hands of the Duke de Choi- 
 seul. His patriotism could not put up with such humiliations ; 
 but, in his desire to raise the prestige of France by a bold stroke, 
 he only cast her into the depths, for there were no longer at dis- 
 posal means sufficient for his purpose. As ever, our inability to 
 wage war on the sea led us to shift the war to the land, and it was 
 thus that attention was centered on a scheme of invasion. Choi- 
 seul, at the instigation of Marshal Belle-Isle, proposed at first to 
 throw 50,000 men on to English soil by sending them over from 
 Boulogne and Ambleteuse in flatboats. A beginning was even 
 made on this plan ; the construction of a flotilla was begun and 
 the coast was armed with some hundred heavy guns designed to 
 protect the points of assemblage. But this project was soon aban- 
 doned and a new one was adopted, due, it is said, to Captain Bigot 
 de Morogues.'™ 
 
 The descent was to be made at two different places ; to this end 
 two armies of 20.000 men each were assembled, the first in Brit- 
 tany under the Duke d'Aiguillon, the second in Flanders under 
 Chevert. At the same time a general concentration of all squad- 
 rons at Brest was to unite 35 or 40 ships. This fleet was first to 
 join the convoy from Morbihan (Brittany), and, passing to the 
 westward of Ireland, was to detach several frigates with the 
 transports before the Gulf of the Clyde ; then it was to turn the 
 northern end of Scotland and pick up Chevert's army at Ostend 
 and escort it to the English coast, where it was to land at Breath- 
 water, some leagues from London. This very complicated plan 
 had the peculiarity of taking no more account of the enemy than 
 if it had concerned a simple ocean promenade. The participa- 
 tion of the English squadron was, however, acknowledged by 
 providing that, in case it should show signs of interfering, the 
 
 "* Author of a treatise on naval tactics. 
 
 152
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 war fleet would remain in the Channel to paralyze its movements, 
 while the two convoys should cross the sea under escort of a few 
 frigates. To complete these dispositions a small division was to 
 be sent out from Havre to throw a landing force into Ireland with 
 the object of creating a diversion. 
 
 If the division of the expedition into three parts, composed 
 of the two landing corps on the wings and of the escort in the 
 center, had only for its object to force the enemy to divide his 
 forces in such a way that the Brest squadron would find before 
 it a number of ships small enough to be fought successfully — if 
 such was the object of this peculiar distribution of force — it might 
 be justified as a preliminary operation. But if it was expected 
 that the passage could be made without fighting, the question 
 arises : What object was there in concentrating the troops in a 
 port at a distance from that in which the ships were to concen- 
 trate ? This added one difficulty more to those already presented 
 by such a hazardous operation. 
 
 The first act of this whole scheme was to get the Toulon squad- 
 ron out of the Mediterranean and into the ocean. De la Clue, its 
 chief, was watched by Boscawen off Toulon. The latter, having 
 occasion to repair three of his ships that had been badly damaged 
 in a hot skirmish in the outer roadstead of Toulon, returned to 
 Gibraltar leaving some frigates before the port. The French 
 admiral profited by his absence to sail, on August 5, 1759, with 12 
 ships and three frigates; on the evening of August 17 he was at 
 the entrance of the Strait. The same date the English squadron, 
 consisting of 16 ships and nine frigates, got under way at 10 
 o'clock at night, and on the morning of the i8th Boscawen 
 sighted the enemy, who had passed through the Strait, and imme- 
 diately started in pursuit. De la Clue, finding himself discovered, 
 decided to go on past Cadiz, which port he had intended to enter ; 
 but, sailing without lights in order not to betray his whereabouts. 
 he became separated from five ships and three frigates, which 
 pursued their course to Cadiz and anchored there in ignorance of 
 his new dispositions. The remainder of the squadron was over- 
 taken by the English squadron the next day, and had to abandon 
 the Centaure. The following night two ships steered a false 
 course and thereby succeeded in reaching Rochefort; the others 
 were destroyed in the roadstead of Lagos. 
 
 153
 
 A Study of N.wal Strategy. 
 
 There is a temptation to throw all the responsibility upon the 
 actors of the drama when passing these painful events in review. 
 Whv did not the admiral signal a new rendezvous to his squadron 
 when he decided not to put into Cadiz ? Why did the rear guard 
 lose track of the ships in the van? Upon reflection it must be 
 recognized that the cause of all the evil lay in the very conditions 
 under which this unfortunate squadron labored. For a naval 
 force there is no more ungrateful situation than the one that puts 
 it under the necessity of avoiding, at all hazards, coming into con- 
 tact with the enemy. The least incident destroys all calculations, 
 forces sudden and unexpected modifications of orders, and puts 
 the ships under sailing conditions that are abnormal. Why, then, 
 be astonished that mistakes result that do not occur at ordinary 
 limes? The disaster resulting from this separation is not to be 
 imputed to de la Clue but to the false position in which circum- 
 stances had placed him. On the other hand it is difficult to ex- 
 plain what he was going to do at Cadiz, in the immediate vicinity 
 of a superior force. If the French had had the good fortune to 
 pass through the Strait without being discovered, which was not 
 impossible since they went through the Strait at night, the stop at 
 Cadiz would have revealed their passage and have made them lose 
 the benefit of their lead. 
 
 The number of ships at our disposition in European waters was 
 reduced to 21 by the disaster at Lagos, and the plan of the cam- 
 paign was modified. Five ships, detached from the Brest squad- 
 ron, were to escort the convoy from Brittany, while the 16 others 
 should occupy the attention of the English forces. But, at the last 
 moment. Marshal de Conflans, who commanded the squadron, in- 
 sisted that his force should not be divided, and it was decided that 
 he himself should go to Morbihan for the convoy. 
 
 The English, who were attentively following all the preparations 
 for the expedition, had 25 ships before Ushant under Admiral 
 Hawke, while Commodore Duff cruised in the vicinity of Belle- 
 Isle with four ships and three frigates in order to watch the move- 
 ments of the transports. The season became well advanced with 
 the squadron still at Brest. Finally, at the end of October, a storm 
 forced the English squadron to retire upon Torbay and left the 
 approaches to Brest free. Marshal de Conflans sailed at ii o'clock 
 on the morning of November 14 and set his course for Belle-Isle. 
 Whv had he waited so long? It is impossible that the storm could 
 
 154
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 have lasted 15 clays. At all events, Admiral Hawke left Torbay 
 the same day, and learning- from his scouts of the sortie of the 
 French, he sought them at Morbihan without hesitation. On the 
 20th he made junction with Commodore Duff, and he came upon 
 the French squadron at the moment when it was entering the 
 passes of Ouiberon Bay. The result of that unfortunate battle is 
 well known. The expedition was abandoned. 
 
 Expedition of Thurot to Ireland (1760). — Meanwhile Cap- 
 tain Thurot, who was charged with the diversion in Ireland, had 
 set out from Dunkirk on October 6 with a flotilla of six privateers 
 carrying- 1400 troops."" Happily escaping the English cruisers that 
 were watching the northern expeditionary corps, he appeared off 
 Aberdeen and threw Scotland into a state of alarm. Overtaken 
 by tempestuous weather he lost two ships and laid by for several 
 months in Norway and the Fairoe Islands. Finally it was not un- 
 til February 21, 1760, that he landed at Carrickfergus. He had no 
 trouble in seizing the castle, which had a garrison of only 200 men. 
 But having learned that the expedition had been given up in con- 
 sequence of the battle of Quiberon, he judged that he would not be 
 able to do anything solely on his own resources ; and, three days 
 after his arrival, he set out again for France. Moreover, discord 
 reigned in the little squadron between the land and the sea officers, 
 and between Thurot and his captains. Shortly after sailing two 
 ships separated ; the other three were pursued and attacked by 
 English frigates, and were captured near the Isle of Man. 
 
 After the failure of this attempt at invasion, France had to con- 
 fess herself beaten. 
 
 Fifth Attempt to Land in England (1779). — When France 
 ranged herself on the side of the English colonies in America that 
 had revolted against their mother country, the circumstances were 
 particularly favorable for attempting a descent upon England. 
 The war, which had been going on several years on land in Amer- 
 ica, absorbed all the regular troops of the United Kingdom, while 
 on the sea our alliance with Spain gave us a considerable superior- 
 ity. Preparations were, therefore, made for an invasion on the 
 following bases : ^" 
 
 "° He had left Havre the moment that city was bombarded. 
 "' We pass by in silence an abortive attempt against the Channel Islands 
 undertaken with insufficient means. 
 
 155
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The two allied navies, after effecting- junction, were to crush the 
 English forces in the Channel and then conduct across a convoy of 
 40,000 men. 
 
 We shall see how an operation appearing- to present the greatest 
 chances of success may come to naught by the one fact of faulty 
 preparation. 
 
 Lieutenant-General d'Orvilliers left Brest on June 3, 1779, with 
 30 ships and 10 frigates, and sailed for the Spanish coast. But 
 the Spanish ships were not ready ; for a month d'Orvilliers cruised 
 in the vicinity of Cizarga waiting for them. On July 2 eight ships 
 and two frigates came out from Corunna under command of 
 Lieutenant-General Don Antonio Darce and joined the French 
 fleet. It was not until 20 days later that Lieutenant-General Don 
 Luis de Cordova arrived from Cadiz with the rest of the Spanish 
 fleet — 28 ships, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes and 8 fireships. 
 
 Some days passed, during which the two admirals were occupied 
 with the organization of the fleet. One important question, that 
 of signals, had been entirely neglected during the negotiations con- 
 cerning the assembling of the two squadrons. " I was greatly sur- 
 prised, my Lord," wrote Lieutenant-General d'Orvilliers to the 
 Minister, " to find that the signals for the fleet had not been printed 
 in Spain, and that M. Mazzaredo (chief of staff of the Spanish 
 fleet) had been obliged to copy them by hand after his departure 
 from Cadiz. I can assure you that it has never before happened 
 that two fleets, making junction at sea, have been reduced to the 
 improvisation of an entire code of signals . . . ." On the 28th 
 and 29th the ships that had been detached to Ferrol and Corunna 
 rejoined the flag of the commander-in-chief. On July 30 the com- 
 bined fleet, in strength 66 ships of the line, of which 36 were 
 Spanish, and 14 frigates of the two nations, stood away to the 
 North.^'^ 
 
 More than two months had passed and the ships had already 
 consumed a large part of their stores ; but d'Orvilliers counted 
 upon transports loaded with provisions being sent to him by the 
 ^Minister, who knew the situation of the fleet. The fleet was en- 
 cumbered with sick, many ships had sailed without doctors, and 
 medicines were wanting. 
 
 '"Chevalier. Histoire de la marine francaise pendant la guerre de I'ln- 
 dependence americaine. 
 
 156
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 On August 7 the combined fleet sighted Ushant. D'Orvilliers 
 found there neither provisions nor the pilots for whom he had 
 asked, but in spite of this he entered the Channel. On August i6 
 he received orders that modified the plans of the government ; the 
 landing, instead of taking place in the neighborhood of Ports- 
 mouth, was to be made at Falmouth. The moment was poorly 
 chosen to change all the plans. The Minister took no account of 
 the objections that his instructions gave rise to : Falmouth had an 
 anchorage insufficient to hold the fleet and it did not offer secure 
 shelter. D'Orvilliers attempted to point this out, but it was too 
 late to discuss the matter. An easterly gale blew the fleet out of 
 the Channel and solved the question. As soon as the weather mod- 
 erated the provisions were equally divided between the ships, and 
 the subsistence of the fleet was thus assured until September 20. 
 
 On August 25 the English fleet was signalled. It comprised 35 
 ships and was sighted near the Scilly Isles, having also been driven 
 to leeward by the easterly winds. A real admiral (veritable 
 homme de git err e) would have lost no time in undertaking its 
 pursuit at once ; d'Orvilliers preferred to call a council of war, 
 and it is easy to imagine how long a time was needed to gather on 
 board the admiral's ship the flag officers from a fleet of 80 sail. 
 The council decided that the fleet should abandon its cruise on 
 September 8 at the latest, in view of the sanitary conditions and 
 of the shortness of provisions ; and that, in the meantime, it should 
 go to meet the enemy. But the enemy had not delayed for the end 
 of the deliberations to make his escape ; on September 2 he entered 
 Portsmouth. The combined fleet continued to cruise for several 
 days, then steered for Ushant, and anchored at Brest on September 
 14. 
 
 The expedition was abandoned. 
 
 This unfortunate cruise brought no honor to the allied govern- 
 ments, when consideration is given to the want of co-ordination 
 shown in fitting out the squadrons, the failure to establish any 
 understanding for sailing in company, the deficiencies in water 
 and provisions, the lack of surgeons and medicines, the defective 
 hygiene, and the unconcern manifested about victualling the fleet 
 when it had pvit to sea. Not by showing such incapacity as this 
 can it be hoped to give a fatal blow to an enemy who is determined 
 to defend himself. The expedition was thus doomed to failure at 
 the outset. D'Orvilliers fell under the ban of disfavor ; but the 
 
 157
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Minister of ^Marine, M. de Sartines, deserved to have followed 
 him into retirement, for he was the true culprit. 
 
 Though the war was to go on for several years, during which 
 our superiority in the Channel became only the more marked, yet 
 the idea of conquering England was completely given up. 
 
 It is a curious fact that, up to the time of the Empire, our 
 schemes for descent were prepared with the least energy when 
 our navy was the strongest. From this it may be concluded that 
 the passage of an army offered such hazards that it was preferable 
 to keep to measures exclusively maritime so long as the hope 
 remained of being victorious on the sea ; and that the army was 
 only permitted to take a part when there were no other means 
 to employ. But if there is hesitation about entrusting the desti- 
 nies of troops to the hazard of a crossing when it is possible to 
 conquer the command of the sea beforehand, then it must be ad- 
 mitted that disaster is inevitably courted if the same operation 
 is ventured across a sea occupied by the enemy. 
 
 Second Conquest of Minorca (1781-1782). — The manifold 
 necessities that pressed upon the English navy had forced the 
 Admiralty to strip the Mediterranean almost completely, and the 
 allies found the occasion a propitious one for retaking Minorca. 
 On June 23, 1781, Guichen took to Cadiz from Brest 18 ships 
 w^hich were placed under the orders of Don Luis de Cordova. 
 They were joined there by a ship and a frigate from Toulon, and 
 the combined fleet, 50 ships strong and carrying a landing force 
 of 14,000 men, weighed from Cadiz on July 22. The fleet landed 
 the troops at Minorca and then left the Mediterranean for the 
 North. The Due de Crillon, who commanded the expeditionary 
 corps, easily took possession of the island, but the citadel did not 
 surrender until February 4, 1782. 
 
 The Expedition of Hoche to Ireland (1796-1797). — We 
 now come to the wars of the Revolution, during which the spirit 
 of enterprise characterizing this epoch led inevitably to ideas of 
 invasion. There w^as no preoccupation then about the means ; it 
 was willingly believed that hardihood of conception and enthu- 
 siasm in execution would make up for everything. 
 
 The leaven was ever at work in Ireland. A widespread asso- 
 Tciation had been formed in the island to shake off the yoke of 
 the English, and upon the outbreak of war a delegation of the 
 principal leaders had come to Paris to implore the aid of France. 
 
 158
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The difficulties of every kind in the midst of which our country 
 was then struggHng had prevented the Convention from acceding 
 to this request; but in 1796, new emissaries having come to give 
 assurances that the appearance of the French would occasion a 
 general uprising in Ireland, the Directory believed the moment 
 favorable for action. 
 
 Hoche was appointed to the command of the expedition; Villa- 
 ret-Joyeuse, who was at the head of the Brest squadron, was to 
 command the naval forces and remain under the orders of the 
 General. 
 
 The troops that had been engaged in the pacification of the 
 Vendee were sent to Brest, and orders were given at that port 
 to fit out all ships that were sea-worthy. Our naval material was 
 at that time in a deplorable state; storehouses were empty, and 
 for many years the ships had not been kept in condition. The 
 personnel left quite as much to be desired ; the attempt to get 
 together the number of seamen necessary to form the crews of 
 the ships had not succeeded, and those who were present had no 
 professional instruction. 
 
 The danger of undertaking an expedition under such faulty 
 conditions did not escape the attention of the officers; Villaret- 
 Joyeuse particularly did not cease to represent to Minister Tru- 
 guet the rashness of such an expedition. At the same time the 
 lack of funds impeded the fitting out of the ships. Hoche went 
 to Brest to hasten the preparations; he found that nothing was 
 going on in a way to accord with his own impatience, and he 
 openly accused the admiral of being ill-affected. The Directory 
 ended by displacing Villaret, and Morard de Galle was named in 
 his stead. 
 
 Surely Villaret should not be reproached for having lifted the 
 voice of reason and for having advised against an enterprise in 
 which his own honor was engaged as well as that of France, but, 
 granted that the government had decided upon the crossing, it 
 was good policy not to leave Villaret to have a part in an opera- 
 tion of which he disapproved. Unfortunately, Morard de Galle 
 was no more confident. He did not accept the command given 
 him without a protest; but this done he lent to Hoche the most 
 devoted assistance. 
 
 Thanks to the efforts of Hoche, and to the activity of Bruix, 
 
 159
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 who was chief of staff of the squadron, the expedition was ready 
 to set out in the early days of December. 
 
 The original plan of Truguet consisted in concentrating at 
 Brest all the French and Spanish naval forces ; but, as the neces- 
 sity existed of dispatching reinforcements to India, he thought of 
 having the squadron leave Brest with only a part of the expedi- 
 tionary corps, and of dispatching eight ships to India after the 
 landing of the troops. As it was difficult to foresee at what time 
 it would be possible to send reinforcements, this advance guard 
 would be exposed to the danger of succumbing before aid could 
 arrive. Therefore a more simple idea was reverted to, which, as 
 the season was advancing, was satisfied by sending to Brest the 
 division of Rear-Admiral Richery,"* which had come from New- 
 foundland and anchored in Aix roadstead November 5. 
 
 On December 15 the squadron weighed from Brest ; it was 
 composed of 17 ships, 14 frigates, 6 corvettes, 6 storeships and 20 
 transports. It carried 17,210 infantry, iioo cavalry and 1200 
 artillerymen. Hoche and Morard de Galle were on board the 
 frigate Fraternite. The squadron of Admiral Colpoys had been 
 driven off by a violent easterly wind. 
 
 On the evening of the 15th the fleet anchored in Bertheaume 
 Bay to await two ships that were behindhand ; it finally sailed on 
 the afternoon of the i6th, steering for Sein Race. At 5 o'clock, 
 owing to the wind, the admiral made signal to go through the 
 Iroise Channel ; but the signal was poorly understood because the 
 ships were unaccustomed to sailing in squadron and the crews 
 were improvised. To add to the confusion, an English ship cruis- 
 ing in the Iroise, the Indefatigable, ran near the French ships, 
 firing rockets and guns and burning signals. In short, the greater 
 part of the fleet passed through Sein Race, while the other ships 
 kept on with the admiral, and the Seduisant was lost on Grand- 
 Trevennec. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th eight ships, seven frigates, and one 
 transport were together; they placed themselves under the orders 
 of Rear-Admiral Bouvet, whose flag flew on the Immortalite. 
 The Admiral then opened his instructions which directed him in 
 case of separation to proceed to Cape Mizzen Head and cruise 
 there for five days. On the 19th the division was joined by Rear- 
 
 "^ Only two ships of this division were able to take part in the expedition. 
 
 160
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Admirals Richery and Nielly with seven ships, two frigates, and 
 a number of transports. Only one ship, three frigates, two cor- 
 vettes and one transport were missing; unfortunately the two 
 chiefs of the expedition were on board one of the missing frigates. 
 
 On the 2 1st the fleet was at the entrance to Bantry Bay in bad 
 weather with snow falling. Rear-Admiral Bouvet, mistrusting the 
 inexperience of his crews, feared to remain underway ; he anchored 
 near Bear Island, allowing each ship to act at discretion. In his 
 vicinity seven ships, six frigates, and one transport anchored ; 
 the rest lay to, and the fleet was once more divided. 
 
 On the 24th the wind fell. A council of war was called on 
 board the Immortalite under the presidency of General Grouchy, 
 in which it was decided to land the 6000 troops available. The 
 ships got underway to get nearer the land ; but the weather became 
 so bad on the 25th that many ships had to go to sea to avoid being 
 cast ashore, and among them the Immortalite. 
 
 During the afternoon of the 26th the wind began to go down. 
 On the morning of the 27th, Division-Commander Bedout, to 
 whom the command descended by reason of the absence of Ad- 
 miral Bouvet, called a council of war on board the Indomptable. 
 The matter of landing was debated, but it was decided to be im- 
 possible, the 4000 men remaining having neither artillery, muni- 
 tions, provisions, nor money. The division sailed on its return to 
 France and anchored at Brest on January 12 without having seen 
 the enemy. Several ships that had been separated from the others 
 on the 2ist and 25th were already there. They were the Pluton, 
 the Pegase, the Resolue, and the Immortalite, the last named 
 carrying the flag of Admiral Bouvet. 
 
 The Tourville and the Foiigueux, which had been unable to 
 anchor under Great Bear Island, had remained at sea laid to ; the 
 former arrived at Bantry Bay, December 30, and the latter Decem- 
 ber 31. The Redoubtable, which had left the anchorage on the 
 night of December 22, also arrived on the 30th. On January i 
 the Nestor arrived ; she had been in company with the Fraternite 
 until December 20, but had lost her on the night of December 
 20-21 during a squall. Again the question of a landing came up. 
 About 4000 men could be put ashore ; but there was a rumor that 
 the English had got 13,000 men together in camp since the appear- 
 ance of the French ; it was known further that a part of the expe- 
 ditionary corps had sailed for Brest ; finally the ships began to feel 
 
 161
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the need of provisions, and they could not delay their return much 
 longer. It appeared imprudent to abandon a handful of men to 
 their own resources under the circumstances, and the idea of land- 
 ing was abandoned. The ships sailed for Brest on the 5th of 
 January and arrived on the 13th, with the exception of the 
 Surveillante which was in such bad condition that it had been 
 necessary to sink her in Bantry Bay. 
 
 The Trajan and the Charente, after having gone to the mouth of 
 the Shannon (one of the assigned rendezvous), anchored on 
 December 28 in Kilkadia Bay, where the Trajan furnished some 
 provisions to the Charante, which was short; after which both 
 ships returned to Brest. 
 
 What, then, had become of the Fraternite, which carried the two 
 chiefs of the expedition? On December 21, the frigate found 
 herself alone after having had in company for some time the 
 Cocarde, the Romaine, and the Nestor. On the 24th she was 
 chased by an enemy ship and only escaped by jettisoning a part 
 of her artillery. Going on then toward the Irish coast she met 
 at sea the Revolution and the Scevola. The latter was in a 
 sinking state and the Revolution took off her crew and passengers. 
 From these ships the Admiral had news of the expeditionary corps 
 up to December 22. He then decided, the General agreeing, to 
 return to France with the Revolution, whose condition might 
 become critical at any moment. The two ships anchored at Aix 
 Island on January 13 ; already for several days the men had been 
 on reduced rations. 
 
 Such was the end of this unfortunate expedition. Of the forty- 
 five vessels comprising it, twelve were lost. The Seduisant had 
 gone ashore on Grand-Trevennec upon leaving Brest; the Scevola 
 had foundered at sea ; the Surveillante had sunk in Bantry Bay ; 
 the Impatiente had gone upon the rocks near Cape Clear ; the 
 Tortne, the Atalante and four transports had been captured by the 
 enemy ; finally the Droits-de-l' Homme, chased by two vessels of 
 the enemy, had been lost in Audierne Bay, carrying with her to 
 destruction the English frigate Amazone. 
 
 At first sight it seems as if the enemy had had only a secondary 
 part in the defeat of this attempt. The striking thing about it is 
 the deplorable state of the ships, which were unable to stand the 
 slightest wind ; and the insufficiency of provisions, which weighed 
 upon every decision. But, though hasty and insufficient prepara- 
 
 162
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 tion inevitably tended to failure, it is no less true that the necessit)' 
 under which our ships labored of being unable to face the presence 
 of the enemy had consequences even more serious. That it was 
 that caused the modification of orders and provoked the initial 
 separation of the expeditionary corps ; that prevented the vessels 
 arriving successively at Bantry from awaiting the laggards ; that 
 forced a multiplication of rendezvous and that led ships off in 
 false directions. 
 
 None the less the English squadrons were unequal to their task. 
 How was it that the French could successively present themselves 
 on the Irish coast without drawing the English squadrons thither? 
 Here is something that appears beyond belief, and is so in fact, 
 The expedition had to fear the squadron of Colpoys, which was 
 cruising off Ushant, and that of Bridport, called the Channel 
 Squadron, which was anchored at Spithead. Colpoys, as soon as 
 he knew that the French had come out, went at once in search, 
 and ran across the division of Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, which 
 was on its way from Toulon to Brest. This diversion led him 
 ofif as far as Groix Island, where he abandoned the chase, return- 
 ing afterwards to Plymouth. As for the Channel Squadron, 
 though advised on the 20th of December it did not sail until the 
 8th of January, and one is quite at a loss to find the reasons that 
 condemned it to inactivity. Nothing less than these two unlooked- 
 for circumstances could have served to keep the expedition from 
 total destruction. 
 
 Preparation for a Landing in England (1797). — Hoche had 
 returned furious, but with unabated enthusiasm. Attributing to 
 the elements and to disaffection what was only the consequence 
 of an error in principle and of the disorganization of the navy, he 
 pressed the Directory to make ready a new expedition. After 
 the signature of the Leoben preliminaries, the government appar- 
 ently entered into his views, but with a desire this time to get 
 together a force ample to try conclusions with the English. To 
 this end the order was given to fit out all the available ships at 
 Lorient and Rochefort and send them to join the Brest squadron, 
 which was ready. At the same time the co-operation of Spain and 
 Holland was obtained. The former was to send its squadron from 
 Cadiz to Brest as soon as it found a chance to get out, and the 
 latter was to attempt a diversion by throwing into England a corps 
 of 13,000 men. This project was not followed up in France; it 
 
 163
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 was the time of the Lille conferences that ended in nothing. 
 Holland alone made a beginning in its execution. From the begin- 
 ning of July, 1797, 13,500 men were embarked in her fleet, which 
 consisted of fifteen ships, ten frigates, and twenty-seven transports. 
 For more than two months this expeditionary corps waited for a 
 favorable opportunity to set out ; at the end of that time the ships 
 had run out of provisions and the troops had to be landed. 
 
 The treaty of Campo-Formio, by establishing peace on the 
 continent, left to France the free use of her army, and she wished 
 to profit thereby by turning it against England, which alone re- 
 fused to make peace. General Bonaparte took the place of Hoche 
 (who died in September) at the head of the Army of England, 
 and under his impulse the first preparations went rapidly forward. 
 
 " Vice-Admiral Pleville Le Peley recalled to the service the 
 sailors who had been discharged with so little reflection some 
 months before. The government took back the frigates, corvettes, 
 and other vessels that it had loaned to commercial uses, paying 
 heavy indemnities therefor. It was necessary to get together new 
 crews, and it was then that the extent of the error committed in 
 disbanding them was realized. The sailors of the maritime inscrip- 
 tion hid themselves and only a small number of them were found. 
 The government had no money, and the expedition to England 
 required a great deal. The Conseils voted a loan to meet this 
 expenditure on the proposal of the Directory. The court of 
 Madrid was besought from Paris to assemble at Cadiz as many 
 ships, frigates, and light vessels as possible. This squadron, pro- 
 vided with three months' stores and carrying a landing corps of 
 15,000 men, was to.be ready to go to sea at the end of April."* 
 If not blockaded by superior force it was to sail at that time for a 
 destination to be arranged by the two governments in concert. 
 The Directory also asked that the vessels stationed at Ferrol, — 
 ships, frigates, and corvettes, — might be sent to Brest with provi- 
 sions and stores for three months, and with full crews. The Dutch 
 Republic had pledged itself to take a part in the expedition to 
 England. It gave the Texel fleet, some troops and the transports 
 necessary to embark them. General Andreossi and Engineer For- 
 fait were commissioned to ask from the Dutch government 200 
 flat boats of good sailing qualities and 200 fishing or other boats 
 
 1798. 
 
 164
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 able each to carry from 80 to 100 men. They were charged to see, 
 besides, that the gunboats and the launches and other armed boats 
 were fitted out and sent to Dunkirk. It was the intention at Paris 
 to have at Boulogne 50 launches, 400 or 500 fishing boats, 100 
 horse boats, and 25 vessels of 100 tons. Calais was to shelter 400 
 vessels, and the small ports Etaples and Ambleteuse 50 fishing 
 boats each. General Caflfarelli was ordered to put the coast 
 batteries in good condition, and to augment their number should 
 that prove necessary, in order to ensure the security of the ports 
 designated to receive the vessels of the expedition. Engineer 
 officers inspected the coast of England between Folkstone and Rye 
 from the decks of privateers." 
 
 " At the beginning of February, 1798, General Bonaparte 
 visited the coasts of the Ocean, the Channel and the North Sea. 
 
 j> lie 
 
 It was in consequence of this inspection that the commander of 
 the Army of England was convinced that the expedition could 
 not take place during the course of that year, and that he sub- 
 mitted to the Directory the plan for the expedition to Egypt, which 
 was accepted. 
 
 The Expedition to Egypt (1798). — The preparations were at 
 once pushed with feverish activity. At Toulon fifteen ships and 
 thirteen frigates were fitted out, and transports were assembled at 
 Marseilles, Ajaccio, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia. Brueys, who had 
 known General Bonaparte in Italy, was made a vice-admiral and 
 put at the head of the fleet. 
 
 The commander-in-chief arrived at Toulon May 9, 1798; on 
 the 19th the fleet set sail after a delay of several days due to con- 
 trary winds. Joined by the transports from Marseilles it steered 
 with the wind aft for Ajaccio, then for Genoa, to pick up the 
 convoys assembled in those ports. As contrary winds prevented 
 it from going to Civita Vecchia, the convoy from that place did not 
 join until later."' On June 10, Bonaparte captured Malta. On 
 July I the fleet appeared before Alexandria. Brueys anchored to 
 the westward of the city, facing the Marabout Tower, and the 
 landing began that same evening. The next day the city was 
 captured. The convoy and light vessels profited by entering the 
 port immediately, while the squadron proceeded to Aboukir. 
 
 "° Chevalier. Histoire de la marine frangaise sous la Revolution. 
 "• Before Malta. 
 
 165
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Thus did Bonaparte, giiided by his star, succeed in transport- 
 ing 33,000 men and 800 horses across a sea occupied by the ememy. 
 Was that the end of it all? The outcome will teach us the 
 answer. But first it is interesting" to know the train of circum- 
 stances by which this fleet of four hundred sails had been able to 
 cross undiscovered. 
 
 " When the first news reached England of the preparations that 
 we were making at Toulon, the government saw in these measures 
 only a stratagem to draw Lord Jervis into the Mediterranean. 
 Should he withdraw. Admiral Mazzaredo"^ would get to sea. 
 Consequently there was no desire in London to deviate from the 
 line of conduct being followed at the moment. The British navy 
 was closely blockading the Spaniards in Cadiz and the Dutch in 
 the Texel. Considerable forces were watching Brest and the 
 Channel coast. The danger of an invasion, the thing regarded 
 wiith most fear by the English nation, seemed to be provided 
 against by these measures. Nevertheless the reports of English 
 agents in Italy gave such a formidable aspect to the preparations of 
 the French that the British government deemed it necessary to 
 have information of what was going on at Toulon. By direction 
 of the Admiralty Lord Jervis sent a detachment of three ships 
 and four frigates into the Mediterranean. This division, com- 
 manded by Admiral Nelson, was about 25 leagues south of 
 Hyeres Islands on May 19, 1798, when it was struck by a violent 
 gale from the northwest. The Vanguard, seventy-four, flagship 
 of the Admiral, lost all her masts. The enemy's ships, flying before 
 the wind, steered for the coast of Sardinia. On nearing land the 
 Vanguard narrowly escaped being lost, but Admiral Nelson 
 finally reached the anchorage of St. Pierre Island on May 22. On 
 the 27th the Vanguard had rigged jury masts and repaired her 
 worst injuries, and Admiral Nelson again went to sea. Arriving 
 May 31 off Toulon, he was informed of the departure of the 
 French squadron, but could obtain no information of the route 
 it had taken. On June 5 he was joined by the brig Mutine carry- 
 ing urgent dispatches. The English government, which had not 
 paid any great attention to our preparations up to then, was begin- 
 ning to get alarmed. They were asking in London if the concen- 
 tration of troops and ships made at different points of the Mediter- 
 
 ^" Who was blockaded at Cadiz. 
 
 166 
 
 I 
 
 I
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 ranean did not have England as their objective. The Admiralty 
 with considerable effort fitted out new ships and sent them to 
 Lord Jervis, who received at the same time an order to raise 
 to fourteen ships the squadron detached into the Mediterranean, 
 . . , , Lord Jervis, in the instructions that he sent to Nelson by the 
 Mutine, seemed to think that we might wish to attack Naples or 
 Sicily. Perhaps, he added, we might have in mind directing upon 
 some point of the Spanish coast an army with which we could 
 march against Portugal. Finally, examining a last hypothesis 
 that was of especial interest to England, Lord St. Vincent asked 
 himself if our real object were not to pass the Strait of Gibraltar 
 and throw troops into Ireland 
 
 " On June 7 Admiral Nelson effected his junction with the 
 eleven ships that Admiral Jervis had sent him, ten seventy-fours 
 and one fifty." "' 
 
 It was then that the exasperating pursuit began whose end 
 was at Aboukir. The English squadron doubled Cape Corso June 
 12; it was at Naples, June 19, where Nelson learned that the 
 French fleet had been sighted on the Sardinian coast, the rumor 
 being that it was on its way to Malta. On the 20th the English 
 squadron passed through the Strait of Messina ; on the 22d Nelson 
 learned from a merchantman who had passed through the midst of 
 our fleet that it was then to the eastward of Malta steering south- 
 east. 
 
 Convinced that Egypt was our objective, Nelson hastened in 
 that direction. On the 28th of June he was off Alexandria, com- 
 municated with the shore and learned that the French had not 
 appeared. Uncertain what to think, he decided to return to Sicily, 
 little suspecting that the next day he would pass within a short 
 distance of our fleet as he worked to windward. The English 
 squadron anchored at Syracuse, July 19, for water and provisions. 
 Nelson could no longer doubt the destination of the French expe- 
 dition and he again set his course for Egypt. On the ist of 
 August the Zealous, which was scouting ahead of the fleet, sig- 
 nalled that ships were at anchor to the eastward of Alexandria. 
 That night our squadron was annihilated. 
 
 Two questions now arise : 
 
 Why was it that the Egyptian expedition alone, of all those made 
 
 "* Chevalier. Histoire de la marine frangaise sons la Revolution. 
 
 167
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 with important bodies of troops, was able without hindrance to 
 cross a sea occupied by the enemy ? 
 
 Should we consider that the object of the expedition was at- 
 tained by the fact that the troops took possession of Egypt? 
 
 When Brueys left Toulon the Mediterranean had been, since 
 December, 1796, abandoned by the English ships, which were 
 drawn into the ocean by the preparations for a descent upon 
 England; neither the Admiral nor the General suspected the ar- 
 rival of Nelson in the vicinity of Toulon at the very moment of 
 their setting out. The several movements necessary to pick up 
 the convoys were thus made by the fleet in perfect ease of mind — 
 without the haste that breeds disorder. The convoy sailed by 
 easy stages and was able to remain concentrated, thanks to this 
 lack of haste. To be sure, this was not the determining cause of 
 the success of the passage, but paradoxical as it may appear it was 
 one of its elements, because with the conviction that the sea was 
 free, there was no necessity of making the sort of decision so 
 often attended by grievous results.^'" 
 
 The thing that did favor the French, even more than the damage 
 to the Vanguard, was the place chosen for the landing. So 
 improbable was it that neither the English Admiralty, nor Jervis, 
 nor Nelson suspected it at first. We were not at war with Turkey 
 and it was not apparent that the occupation of Egypt would have 
 great weight upon the issue of the war. Attention had not been 
 called in this direction ; consequently, the fleet having had the 
 good luck to get away without being followed up, the search 
 made in quest of it was bound to go amiss, and the fleet had 
 against it only the chance of an accidental meeting at sea."" 
 
 None of the expeditions of which we have spoken hitherto found 
 themselves under like conditions. Some were able, thanks to a 
 gale of wind, to leave port without being observed ; but the enemy 
 always knew on what coasts to find them again. 
 
 And of this expedition it is likewise to be noted that the very 
 
 "' Brueys was not informed of the presence of the English in the Medi- 
 terranean until the second part of the passage, by an express dispatched 
 from Toulon. 
 
 "° This meeting just missed taking place on June 22, near Cape Passaro; 
 the English squadron sighted and had in plain view two sails that were 
 afterwards known to have been a part of the French fleet 
 
 168
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 reason that contributed to the success of the passage took away 
 its efficacy from the enterprise, since the possession of Egy^pt by 
 France did not imperil the fate of England. 
 
 As for the second question that has been raised, it may be said 
 that, if it had been possible to sign a treaty of peace with England 
 at Cairo, the success would have been complete, and the destruction 
 of Brueys' squadron would have been only of secondary import- 
 ance. But, since the expedition to Egypt was only a diversion, the 
 importance of which, moreover, is not evident, since the naval 
 war went on, we must put on the balance sheet of this undertaking 
 the influence of the loss of our squadron upon maritime operations, 
 the capture of vessels that attempted afterwards to establish com- 
 munications with Egypt,'^ and the fruitless attempts to re victual 
 the expeditionary corps, like that of Ganteaume. The army, cut 
 off from the sea and abandoned to its own resources, grew weaker 
 and weaker and finally was forced to capitulate. The genius of 
 Napoleon was able to put off the inevitable day of reckoning ; but 
 that day was bound to come sooner or later, and come it did. 
 From every point of view the expedition to Egypt had conse- 
 quences that were calamitous ; and if this is not apparent at first 
 sight, it is because our attention is diverted by the brilliancy of 
 Bonaparte's victories that have left behind them so luminous a 
 wake. As for the passage itself, its success can not make us forget 
 the dangers to which the army commanded by our greatest captain 
 was exposed, nor reconcile us to such a hazardous operation. 
 
 Expedition of General Humbert to Ireland (1798). — The 
 great invasion of England had been postponed; events on the 
 continent were soon to cause the Directory to abandon it. The 
 
 ^^ The expedition to Egypt caused the loss of the following vessels of 
 war: 
 
 Brueys' squadron: Orient, Franklin, Tonnant, Aquilon, Spartiate, Con- 
 querant, Peuple-Souverain, Guerrier, Heureux, Mercure, Timoleon, Ar- 
 temise, Serieuse. 
 
 After Aboukir : Genereux, Guillaume-Tell, Sensible, Anemone, Alceste, 
 Junon, Courageux, Alerte, Ville-de-Marseille, Entreprenant, Redoubtable, 
 Capricieuse, Independant, J eune- Alexandrine, Justice, Egypiienne, Re- 
 generee, Causse, Dunois, Montenotte. 
 
 To this long list must be added all the ships that were not taken, and 
 that could not take part in the operations, being devoted exclusively to 
 transport service between Toulon and Alexandria. 
 
 169
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Directory then reverted to the idea of stirring up Ireland to revolt 
 by grouping the inhabitants about some thousands of French 
 soldiers. 
 
 The advance guard of this small expedition left Aix '" August 6, 
 1798; it comprised 1200 men under the command of General 
 Humbert. The division formed of the three frigates Concorde, 
 Franchise, and Medee, was under the orders of Division-Com- 
 mander Savary. He arrived on the coast of Ireland without hav- 
 ing encountered any vessels of the enemy, and on the 21st he 
 landed his troops at Killala, immediately returning to France. 
 He entered the Gironde September 5 with the same good fortune. 
 
 At first General Humbert had some successes ; then later, when 
 the English had assembled troops, he was overwhelmed by weight 
 of numbers and was forced to surrender on September 8. 
 
 On the 7th the brig Anacreon left Dunkirk carrying two Irish 
 officers and forty-five men. Delayed by contrary winds, the vessel 
 anchored near Great Aran Island, where news of General Hum- 
 bert's surrender was received. The Irishmen deemed it useless 
 to land and the brig brought the detachment back to France. 
 
 While General Humbert was sailing toward Ireland the Brest 
 Division, carrying the major part of the contingent (3000 men), 
 vainly tried to get away. It was composed of one ship, the 
 Hoche, and eight frigates under Division-Commander Bompard. 
 As early as July 21 it entered the Iroise but the appearance of the 
 enemy forced it to go back to port. A second attempt, made 
 August 19, was still less fortunate ; the ships came back into the 
 Goulet pursued by the enemy's shot. Finally, on September 16, 
 it was able to get to sea ; but from the moment of leaving it was 
 followed by enemy frigates which never left it until October 4. 
 On the loth it was in contact with Commodore Warren's division 
 composed of three eighty-gun ships and five frigates, and on the 
 nth it was obliged to accept battle. The Hoche and three frigates 
 were captured. The Immortalite and Resolue succeeded in escap- 
 
 '"Many historians have it that Savary's division set out from Brest. I 
 have found in the unpublished papers of Admiral Martin, which are kept 
 in the Rochefort Library, the sea journal of Commandant Papin, flag- 
 captain of Division Commander Savary, from which is proved that the 
 division was fitted out at Brest and went to Rochefort to embark the 
 troops. 
 
 170
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 ing and anchored on the i8th in the Bay of Donegal, where they 
 learned the fate of Humbert's column. General Menage gave 
 up the landing and the frigates sailed the same evening. During 
 the passage homeward the Resolue was taken by the Melampus, 
 and the Immortalite by the Fishguard. 
 
 The Loire and the Semillante steered for Galway; on the 15th 
 they were chased, and they separated. The Loire after several 
 brilliant engagements, surrendered to the ships Anson and Kan- 
 garoo; the Semillante, more lucky, succeeded in escaping and 
 arrived at Lorient October 26. 
 
 The Romaine anchored on the 13th on the Irish coast several 
 miles away from the Immortalite and the Resolue; not succeeding 
 in getting information she returned to Brest on the 21st. 
 , The French government, uneasy about the situation of the 
 division of Bompard, decided to send back Division-Commander 
 Savary ^ with fresh troops. He left the Isle of Aix on October 
 12, with four frigates, and by good fortune reached Killala, where 
 he learned of the disaster that had overtaken Bompard. He sailed 
 at once on his return to France without landing his troops. 
 Chased by two English ships, his vessels scattered. The Venus 
 entered the Charente November 6, and the Concorde on the 9th ; 
 the Franchise anchored ofif Saint-Martin-de-Re on the 6th, after 
 throwing her guns overboard; finally the Medee reached Basque 
 Roads on the 7th under similar conditions. 
 
 It is hard to find an operation more badly conceived. Making 
 the doubtful admission that 4000 or 5000 men were sufficient to 
 maintain themselves in Ireland, the best way to drive them to sur- 
 render was certainly to send them out in small parties. It was 
 actually too presumptuous by far to suppose that General Humbert 
 would be able to maintain himself in that country with a thousand 
 men ; and, as the landing place of reinforcements could not be in- 
 dicated in advance because of the presence of enemy forces along 
 the coasts, the reinforcements risked being separated from the 
 advance guard. Further the greatest difficulty was to land them ; 
 and circumstances so favorable as those encountered by the Savary 
 division are not met more than once. 
 
 ^°^This second expedition was little to the liking of Commander Savary; 
 he wrote several letters asking to he relieved from the doubtful honor of 
 passing a second time across the English cruising ground. 
 
 171
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Preparations for an Invasion of England: The Boulogne 
 Camp. — To end this history there remains only the mention of 
 Napoleon's preparations to invade England. 
 
 From the rupture of the peace of Amiens the First Consul had 
 dwelt upon this idea, and he gave to his plan proportions as vast 
 as his genius. At Boulogne he formed a camp of 150,000 men. 
 10,000 horses, and 400 guns. Here is something far removed from 
 the timidity of the Monarchy ; this time it is to be a duel to the 
 death, and if this great army succeeds in setting foot on English 
 soil, England's day has come. But in order to carry over such a 
 mass of troops means of transport were required, and the First 
 Consul busied himself without loss of time to create them. 
 
 Three kinds of vessels were built : 
 
 ist. Armed launches carrying four pieces of large caliber. They 
 were brig-rigged, had a crew of 24 men, and could carry a com- 
 pany of infantry of 100 men with their munitions. 
 
 2d. Armed boats especially intended to carry artillery. For- 
 ward they had a 24-pounder, and aft a field piece ; amidships there 
 were stalls for two horses. These boats had crews of only six 
 men and could carry a company of infantry and several artillery- 
 men. 
 
 3d. Pinnaces of about 20 meters length, provided with sixty 
 oars to be manned by soldiers ; they carried only a small howitzer 
 and a 4-pounder. 
 
 Thus fitted out the army could land in spite of opposition, thanks 
 to the guns of the launches, and immediately afterwards give 
 battle ; but in order to carry on the campaign there would be need 
 of its cavalry and its trains. To this end a commission bought all 
 the coasters and fishing boats along the coast from St. Malo to 
 the Texel. 
 
 When, after three years' efforts, the Emperor had succeeded 
 in realizing the prodigious task of assembling two thousand three 
 hundred vessels, the only thing remaining was to ensure the liberty 
 of the sea to his immense flotilla. In a later chapter we shall see 
 the different combinations that the Emperor had designed to sweep 
 the Strait, and the causes that made them come to naught. 
 
 This attempt at invasion, the grandest of all in its conception, 
 was also the last. ^ 
 
 * * 
 
 If we desire to draw conclusions from this array of facts, whose 
 
 172
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 results are often contradictory, it is necessary at the outset to 
 distinguish between important expeditions, requiring the assem- 
 blage of a great number of vessels, and those which only involve 
 the transportation of a few thousand men. 
 
 Conditions Necessary for the Transportation over Sea of 
 AN Army Corps. — In the former case recourse is necessary to 
 packets and merchant ships, and consequently an encounter with 
 the enemy, however feeble he may be, becomes fatal to the 
 expedition. All these auxiliary ships are unprovided with the 
 necessary means for sailing in squadron. They are officered by 
 men who are strangers to maneuvers and tO' signals. In the old 
 days, also, the convoy was nothing but a mob following pell-mell 
 after its escort. Now the transports are placed in one or two 
 columns, with ships of war introduced among them charged with 
 the duty of guiding them. Naturally the speed is low because, 
 when great numbers of troops are to be transported, it is neces- 
 sary to utilize the last reserves of commercial ports. 
 
 If the enemy runs across this procession, which covers a great 
 extent of sea, the situation at once becomes critical. At the first 
 shells that fall about them the transports, destitute of every 
 means of protection, have no resource save flight. Threatened by 
 the danger of sinking and without succor, crews and passengers 
 become demoralized ; disorder ensues and soon the convoy is 
 dispersed in every direction. What can the escort do? It seeks 
 to concentrate and interpose between the enemy and the convoy ; 
 but it can neither keep the shells from reaching the convoy nor 
 keep the light vessels from rushing in pursuit of it. Moreover the 
 ships of war are themselves encumbered with troops in order to 
 keep down the nimiber of auxiliaries, and they find themselves in 
 the most unfavorable condition for battle. In every way the 
 expedition becomes broken up. So true is this that the instructions 
 given to our squadron commanders under circumstances of this 
 kind prescribed that they should always carefully avoid the enemy ; 
 and when they have had the bad fortune to be met at sea the result 
 has always been lamentable. The Spaniards are perhaps the only 
 ones who have essayed (in the sixteenth century) to form an 
 assemblage of ships formidable enough to force the passage of a 
 convoy in the face of the enemy, and the world knows what 
 happened to the Invincible Armada. 
 
 173
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Thus, in order to cross the sea with great bodies of troops, 
 there is only a choice between the three following solutions : 
 
 1st. To take advantage of the fact that the sea is free, whether 
 temporarily or absolutely. 
 
 2d. To destroy or paralyse the enemy at the outset, and then to 
 cross. 
 
 3d. To seek to make the crossing by surprise. 
 
 First Case. — The sea is free. The success of the crossing can 
 then only be thwarted by bad weather. As for the landing, it can 
 always be effected if the region has a large extent of coast ; as for 
 the rest, everything will depend upon the relation of the means 
 put in operation to the elements of the enemy's resistance. The 
 two expeditions to Minorca were carried on imder these conditions, 
 and both were crowned with success. 
 
 Nevertheless, when the freedom of the sea is only temporary 
 . an offensive return of the enemy must be foreseen, and sufficient 
 forces must be disposed to save Avhat has been acquired. In fact 
 it is plain that, if la Galissonniere had been defeated off Mahon, 
 the English garrison of Fort St. Philip would have been rein- 
 forced and revictualed, while the troops of Richelieu would have 
 been seriously compromised. 
 
 It is necessary also to look to the future. Unless the landed 
 army obtains overwhelming results — a desirable but improbable 
 thing — it will need to have its ranks filled constantly with fresh 
 troops, and above all to be resupplied; for in our day munitions 
 cannot be manufactured on the spot as was done by Napoleon 
 in Egypt. It is necessary, then, to remain in control of the 
 communications after the landing, without which surrender will 
 be the consequence at the end of a longer or shorter time. If it is 
 foreseen that the communications cannot be assured it is best to 
 refrain from the operations. 
 
 Second Case. — The sea is not free, hut the naval forces at 
 disposal permit risking the hazards of battle. In this case the 
 landing should always be subordinated to a contest which will 
 decide the command of the sea. 
 
 One is confronted then with the following alternatives : either 
 he will be victorious, in which case he can cross in security, 
 profiting by the demoralization (of the loser) that always follows 
 a lost battle ; or else he will be beaten, and then, instead of losing 
 a fleet and an army, the army at least will be saved. 
 
 174
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 When one has a marked superiority over the enemy afloat there 
 may arise the temptation to adopt a mixed solution by dividing the 
 forces into two parts : one, the more numerous, designed to mask 
 the enemy squadron in order to permit the other to conduct the 
 convoy and preserve it from the hardy incursions of single ships. 
 This was the solution that was thought of in 1755. It can have 
 only calamitous results. At the very beginning there will never 
 be too much force to clear the passage, and it would be imprudent 
 to jeopardize the game by withholding a detachment. Finally, 
 whatever care be taken to interpose between the convoy and the 
 enemy, one can never be sure of succeeding in it if the enemy ma- 
 neuvers rapidly and skilfully, profiting by the night hours to steer 
 false courses, or if he masks his movements behind a screen of 
 his light vessels. On the sea the movements of forces are not 
 subject to the same rules as on land, where the troops can only 
 advance by known routes. It is preferable, then, instead of divid- 
 ing the forces to divide the operation into two parts : first fight, 
 then cross over. 
 
 But still it is necessary to be able to fight. It happens most 
 often, however, that the enemy, when he is in inferior numbers, 
 prefers not to face the battle and shuts himself up inside a port. 
 In this event operations cannot be held up until he shall deign to 
 come out; for every delay in the transportation of troops may 
 modify the situation on land and be favorable to the enemy, who 
 often seeks nothing' else than to gain time. One is then content to 
 blockade, or at least to watch closely the enemy forces, in order 
 to prevent them from coming out ; and, behind this covering fleet, 
 to send the convoy across under the escort of several ships of 
 war. The Americans did this at Santiago. 
 
 If the enemy has retired into port after a battle in which he 
 has been defeated or has sufifered severe losses, he does not 
 constitute a serious menace because he is then demoralized and has 
 no other object than his security. Such was the case with the 
 Chinese at Wei-hai-wei, and it was equally the case with the Rus- 
 sians in the recent war ; it is this that justified the Japanese land- 
 ings in the vicinity of Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur. 
 
 Third Case. — The sea is not free, and there is insuificieivt force 
 to clear the passage. It is necessary then to pass over by evasion 
 and this was ever the hope of the French government. But we 
 have seen that this hope was always betrayed excepting in the case 
 
 175
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 of the Egyptian expedition, and there the meeting took place after 
 the passage of the convoy instead of before or during the passage. 
 
 Is it not logical to conclude that it is always a mistake to risk 
 an entire army under conditions of this sort? Such persistent 
 adversity can not be imputed alone to mischance or to faulty exe- 
 cution ; it is rooted solely in an error of principle easy of discovery. 
 To assemble in certain ports a great number of transport vessels, 
 to direct to those same ports columns of troops — these things 
 cannot be done without attracting attention ; thereafter there is no 
 further chance of a surprise and the secret of the operation, which 
 alone can assure success, is divulged. This is why Tourville, 
 Roquefeuil, and Conflans were beaten or dispersed in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of their convoys, the English knowing perfectly that 
 they would find them there, and nowhere else. It was even a 
 happy circumstance for us that the contact did not take place after 
 the departure of the transports, for the disaster would then have 
 been greater still. 
 
 In our opinion an operation presenting itself under such un- 
 favorable conditions should be absolutely forbidden. 
 
 Nothing is easier than to build plans upon paper for the invasion 
 of England. One takes a chart, notes that the ocean is vast and 
 that ships get lost in its solitude, and therefore concludes that the 
 chances of crossing without being seen are indefinitely more num- 
 erous than the chances of being met. But when the hour of execu- 
 tion arrives the dangers that were not discernible at long range 
 come to mind in a flood, together with the consequences in their 
 train. One then hesitates to stake the fortunes of the country 
 upon a throw of the die. The expedition is not given up but one 
 comes to think that everything can be reconciled by having it 
 escorted by a naval force for its protection, and thereby one courts 
 disaster ; because, if the escort were sufficient, the issue of battle 
 would be sought beforehand. 
 
 Let us formally forbid ourselves to build schemes of invasion 
 upon a passage by surprise. When the moment arrives to take the 
 sea men have always recoiled, and they always will recoil ; there 
 are responsibilities that are beyond human strength. Napoleon 
 himself did not dare face them. If the thing were really possible, 
 how can it be explained that the disasters of the Hogue and of 
 Quiheron caused the projected expeditions to be abandoned ; for 
 the army and the transports were unharmed ? 
 
 176
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Think of the state of mind of the admiral charg-ed with the 
 duty of facing all the unknown possibilities of such an operation ! 
 The situation flowing from it is not one that can be laid upon the 
 shoulders of a leader. To convoy an inert mass that is certain 
 to succumb to the least attack without being able to defend itself ; 
 to have charge of thousands of human lives without means of 
 safeguarding them ; to be unable to anticipate the possibility of 
 flight, even, in case of encountering the enemy ; such responsi- 
 bilities are beyond human strength. 
 
 Ask of our admirals to sacrifice their squadrons to assure free- 
 dom of passage ; none will refuse. Demand of them that they fight 
 against odds of two to one ; it has been done, it will be done again. 
 But do not ask of a man that he be an impotent witness to the 
 annihilation of an army upon which the destinies of the fatherland 
 depend. 
 
 By causing the expedition to set out from two or three different 
 points there is the advantage of dividing the attention of the 
 enemy. But unless this is done with the sole object of seeking an 
 occasion to fall in force upon one of the detachments of the enemy, 
 the benefits to be expected do not compensate for the attendant 
 disadvantages ; for, the several corps never being sure of being 
 able to leave at the desired moment or to land at the chosen place, 
 the result is compromised from the beginning. The first comer 
 will share the fate of General Humbert. 
 
 We conclude, then, if France wishes in the future to take up 
 once more her ideas of invasion, she must from now on undertake 
 the sacrifices necessary to clear the passage instead of beginning 
 again the fantastic operations that have made of the Channel and 
 the Atlantic the graveyard of our navy. 
 
 The Fleet in Being. — Let us now examine the problem : 
 What is the role of an inferior force confronted with the menace 
 of an invasion ? Should it offer battle at the risk of being defeated 
 and of leaving the passage clear ? 
 
 The role has been defined by Admiral Colomb in the theory of 
 the " fleet in being." The arguments of the distinguished English 
 historian may be summarized as follows : So long as a naval force 
 exists and makes its existence manifest, an enemy, even superior, 
 cannot undertake a landing; and if he persists in the attempt he 
 places himself in a bad position, and goes to his defeat. 
 
 Admiral Colomb bases his doctrine upon the defense of Torring- 
 
 177
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 ton before the court-martial that tried him for losing the battle 
 of Beachy Head. The example does not seem to us to have been 
 judiciously chosen ; the argument rests upon what Torrington 
 might have been able to do and not upon what he did. Then too, 
 the author credits the French with plans of invasion of which no 
 trace can be found ; ^'* finally the English fleet really left the sea 
 free after its defeat by shutting itself up in the Thames. It can- 
 not, therefore, be taken as a model of the fleet in being. 
 
 Nevertheless, the considerations that Torrington turned to 
 account, after having planned his defense at leisure, have received 
 the confirmation of facts. In the following year Tourville gave a 
 luminous demonstration of the power of an inferior fleet in his 
 famous deep-sea cruise, during which he prevented the English 
 fleet from attacking our coasts without permitting himself to be 
 run down. Other examples might be cited, such as that furnished 
 by the Invincible Armada,'"" by the fleet of d'Orvilliers in 1779,"" 
 by the Italians at Lissa,'" and again very recently by Cervera's 
 squadron, of which we shall speak again later on. 
 
 The fleet in being should then, by serving as a menace, paralyse 
 the movements of the enemy. It acts in the manner of troops 
 operating on the rear or flanks of an enemy. Its entire strength 
 resides in its activity and in the doubt in which it leaves its move- 
 ments shrouded. If chased it necessarily runs away ; as soon as it 
 is left in quiet it should seek contact again to keep the enemy 
 under tension. But it is not as easy as may be thought to play at 
 blindman's-buff, even with superiority of speed. Tourville con- 
 tended that an encounter is inevitable when two fleets are within 
 sight of one another ; and the reasons that he gave are not weak- 
 ened by the advent of steam.'^ To avoid it the enemy must be at 
 a considerable distance, which implies that contact is only made 
 
 ^^ There is nothing in question about them in the correspondence of 
 Seignelay and Tourville after the victory of Beachy Head. 
 
 '^ The Invincible Armada attempted to get its convoy across without 
 taking account of the weaker English fleet ; it was defeated. 
 
 "® The combined fleet, not having been able to overtake the enemy, had to 
 give up convoying the expeditionary corps. 
 
 ''" The Italian squadron intended to capture Lissa without taking due 
 account of the Austrian squadron ; surprised before having time to concen- 
 trate, it was beaten. 
 
 ^^ They rest upon the lack of homogeneity of large fleets. 
 
 178
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 by the scouts. Navigation under sail permitted engaging in what 
 may be called the " game of dead sectors " by utilizing the direc- 
 tion of the wind and its variations. Now only steering false courses 
 can be counted upon ; but that resource is uncertain enough, espe- 
 cially in narrow waters ; and if the pursuit is active the fleet in 
 being will soon be compelled to take refuge in port. Thereafter 
 it is reduced to impotence ; it dies. 
 
 Admiral Colomb contends that such is not the case ; that even 
 shut up it must be taken into account. Captain Mahan holds the 
 contrary opinion/'" and without engaging in the discussion we 
 may say that Mahan is justified by the facts. 
 
 In fact, as long as Cervera's ships were at sea the Americans 
 put ofif the execution of their plans for landing ; "* and the influence 
 that a mobile force can exert at a distance is the more remarkable 
 in this instance because no nation ever professed the same degree 
 of disdain for its adversary as did America."^ But as soon as 
 Cervera had shut himself into Santiago his squadron had no 
 weight in the flow of events. 
 
 Similarly, when the Russian squadron returned to Port Arthur 
 after the unfortunate affair of May lO, the Japanese armies could 
 be disembarked without risk. 
 
 The inferior force should, then, keep the sea as long as the 
 enemy does, and should be as fast. If it succeeds in holding him 
 in check until his bunkers are empty the situation is saved for the 
 moment, and perhaps definitely, for all schemes of invasion have 
 been abandoned after a first miscarriage. Why, then, is it con- 
 tended that speed and radius of action are unnecessary in taking 
 the defensive? 
 
 The theory of the fleet in being is attractive, but it is easier to 
 define than to put in practice. It would be dangerous to build 
 great hopes upon its employment ; and if it is possible to avert 
 the danger of invasion by the aid of a diversion, this means will 
 always be preferable. 
 
 '"^ Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain; and Colomb, Naval Warfare, 
 Preface. 
 
 ^^ This is said by Mahan himself. 
 
 ^'^ The crossing of the Atlantic by Cervera's squadron had consequences 
 that the Spanish government had not foreseen ; if it had suspected them it 
 might have profited in order to gain time and put the Pclayo and the 
 Carlos V in the line. 
 
 179
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Conditions Necessary for the Transportation over Seas 
 OF a Body of Troops of Limited Numbers. — Do the conclusions 
 that we have drawn from the great attempts at invasion apply to 
 the transportation of a few thousand men ? 
 
 Conditions are here very different. As the preparations no 
 longer demand considerable movement of troops and of ships they 
 can remain secret; it becomes possible to do without the aid of 
 the merchant marine, the elements of which are a source of em- 
 barrassment, and to make up a homogeneous and fast division of 
 several ships of war. Difficulties of navigation are thus greatly 
 simplified, and in place of the expedition's setting out from the 
 nearest point to the enemy's coast in order to diminish the diffi- 
 culties due to a slow order of march, a point of departure less 
 under observation may be chosen at a distance. In case of meeting 
 the enemy the expedition will doubtless be dispersed ; but it will 
 not be fatally annihilated, thanks to its speed. Finally, and above 
 all, the consequences of a failure will be less grave ; they will not 
 weigh so heavily upon the issue of the war. It may then be ad- 
 mitted that it is possible to cross seas of which one has not the 
 command when the operation has been surrounded with all these 
 guarantees; but this principle is subject to one condition — the ex- 
 peditionary corps once landed must be able to take possession of 
 the territory, and to maintain itself there on its own resources if 
 the communications remain cut. 
 
 Without speaking of Ireland, into which we have been able to 
 throw detachments on several occasions, confirmation of this rule 
 will be found in the operations that have had their scene in the 
 Antilles at different times, and which we have not cited in order 
 not to lengthen our narrative. In those islands, where the English 
 and French possessions were so closely interspersed, it was always 
 possible to choose a propitious moment to land upon the shores of a 
 neighbor ; but the conquest remained precarious, or even lacked 
 the time for its accomplishment, if the troops landed did not rest 
 upon the support of naval forces. A study of the facts discloses 
 many occasions when men have allowed themselves to be tempted, 
 thoughtlessly and with no heed of the morrow, by the ease with 
 which a handful of men could be transported and landed ; among 
 them were very few where the operation procured any absolute 
 benefits. We do not care to conclude from this that recourse to 
 such operations should be forbidden ; but they should be under- 
 
 i8o
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 taken only with forces sufficient to overcome the resistance of the 
 enemy at one blow, and there should not be the immediate neces- 
 sity to send reinforcements. 
 
 After having studied the principles that should govern conquests 
 of territory over seas, we are now about to see how some large 
 landing operations have been carried through. From this point 
 of view the expeditions to Algeria and to the Crimea were well 
 conducted ; that to Wei-hai-wei by the Japanese may be considered 
 a model of its kind ; as much cannot be said of those to Madagascar 
 and to Cuba, 
 
 The Expedition to Algiers. — The fleet that carried the expe- 
 ditionary corps to Algiers left Toulon, May 23, 1830. It was 
 composed of 676 ships, men-of-war and merchant ships, and 
 carried 36,000 men and 4000 horses. The army was commanded 
 by General de Bourmont and the fleet by Admiral Duperre. In 
 keeping with tradition the relations between the two chiefs were 
 far from cordial ; moreover, they did not even belong to the same 
 political party. 
 
 The fleet set its course towards Africa ; but, on approaching the 
 coast, bad weather made it turn back and seek refuge at the Bale- 
 aric Isles. The land officers, and particularly .the commanding 
 general, were made impatient by this delay. There were sharp 
 exchanges between the two chiefs, and altercations arose between 
 the land and sea officers that ended in duels. The army officers 
 did not seem to comprehend that a landing is impossible with the 
 wind blowing on shore, and that even vessels at anchor are often 
 forced to put to sea at such tim.es. What would have happened 
 if the boats loaded with troops had capsized ; or if one part of the 
 expeditionary corps having been landed, the rest had been carried 
 ofif to sea with the ships ? It would not have been admitted as an 
 excuse that the Admiral had yielded to the solicitations of the 
 General. Nevertheless, had the Admiral had to fear an attack 
 by sea, he would doubtless have preferred to take the risk of land- 
 ing rather than delay in the Balearic Isles ; and for this reason the 
 expedition might very well have ended before it began. 
 
 The fleet remained in Palma Roads an entire week. Finally on 
 June 13, it anchored off the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch, and the 
 
 181
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 next day the landing of the troops began without any opposition 
 from the army of the Bey. The first division was put ashore in 
 half an hour, and the 36,000 men were landed in five hours. The 
 same day the Bey's camp was taken. 
 
 Several days were necessary to land the material, owing to 
 interruptions due to bad weather. As soon as the operation was 
 completed the army took up the march. After this time the part 
 played by the navy was only secondary. 
 
 The Expedition to the Crimea. — In the Crimean expedition 
 it was a question of landing 27,000 French, 28,000 English, and 
 7000 Turks. The fleet, numbering more than four hundred vessels, 
 set sail September 7, 1854, and anchored at Eupatoria on the 13th. 
 The landing of the French began at 7.40 a. m., September 14; 
 at 9.20 a. m. 9000 men were ashore ; at noon the three infantry 
 divisions and eighteen guns with their material ; before night the 
 three divisions with their trains and horses, the engineer company 
 and all its outfit, the horses of the Spahis, and the horses of the 
 Marshal and of his stafif. 
 
 The fourth division was embarked on board steamers that had 
 been to the Bay of Katcha to make a diversion ; it was not dis- 
 embarked until the next day. 
 
 Such a rapid operation shows preparation to minute details ; it 
 was a contrast to the confusion that had attended the embarkation 
 of the material at Marseilles. It was doubtless understood, after 
 a first experience, that order is a primary condition of every com- 
 bined operation. 
 
 The Expedition to Wei-hai-w^ei. — The qualities of organiza- 
 tion shown by the Japanese in the Chino- Japanese war were never 
 better thrown into relief than by the expedition to Wei-hai-wei, 
 which was carried on in the dead of winter ( — 10° C, 14° F.). 
 This operation was peculiar in that the transportation was effected 
 in four convoys, of which only the first was escorted by the fleet. 
 
 Some fifty transports, each carrying a large distinguishing num- 
 ber had been gathered at Talien-wan. The expeditionary corps 
 was composed of 25,000 men, 6000 of whom were coolies, and 
 3000 horses. 
 
 The light Japanese squadron began by making a diversion to the 
 westward of Wei-hai-wei, bombarding the city of Ting-chou-foo 
 and landing there 2000 men ; then it went to sea off Wei-hai-wei 
 in order to cover the crossing. Meantime the first convoy of 
 
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 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 fifteen ships left Talien-wan, accompanied by the Japanese squad- 
 ron and fifteen torpedo vessels. 
 
 Upon approaching land the torpedo vessels were detached to 
 watch Wei-hai-wei, while the cruiser Yayeyama went to recon- 
 noiter Yung-Ching Bay where the landing was to take place. This 
 ship arrived at dawn January 20, cleared the beach with the fire 
 of her guns, and dispersed a detachment of 300 Chinese ; then it 
 made ready for the anchorage of the convoy, which arrived at 6 
 o'clock in the morning. Landing stages were immediately con- 
 structed at the beach by the carpenters, and the disembarkation 
 began. All the troops were ashore by night. 
 
 The second convoy arrived on the 21st, the third on the 23d, the 
 fourth on the 25th, and on the 26th the army was put on the 
 march. 
 
 During all this time the Japanese squadron kept the Chinese 
 ships closely blockaded in Wei-hai-wei. 
 
 It would perhaps have been prudent to blockade them earlier 
 if they had not already suffered the ordeal of the battle of the 
 Yalu ; but in view of their demoralized condition excessive pru- 
 dence was not a demand of the occasion. 
 
 The Expedition to Madagascar. — Although we have only 
 concerned ourselves here with landings that have taken place in 
 countries where the invader had no base (expeditions like those 
 to Mexico, China, or the Transvaal having another character), 
 it is well to say a few words about the expedition to Madagascar 
 because of the teachings of a general character that it affords. 
 
 One wonders how France, which was not without experience 
 in combined operations, was able to commit so many faults in this 
 unfortunate affair. 
 
 The navy had made the preparations for the expedition ; at 
 the last moment it was turned over to the War Department. The 
 navy, wounded in its dignity, took care not to propose its co-opera- 
 tion, which for that matter was not sought, and made ready to 
 judge results ; the spectacle was not common-place. 
 
 The transports were chartered and loaded with material, but no 
 care was taken to put aboard first the articles that should be 
 unloaded last. Then the transports were dispatched in succession 
 at fixed intervals, but there was a neglect to enjoin any date of 
 arrival, so that the ships, not having the same speed, arrived at 
 irregular intervals. There being no arrangements ready on shore 
 
 183
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to receive the troops, those that arrived before the date anticipated 
 had to remain on board ship at Majunga Road, where there was 
 soon an extraordinary congestion. 
 
 The unloading of the material presented insurmountable diffi- 
 culties. The lighters had not arrived, and as there was need of 
 articles of prime necessity, such as guns, that were stowed in the 
 bottom of the hold, it was necessary to empty the holds upon the 
 decks in order to find them. There resulted a tremendous loss of 
 time involving demurrage. 
 
 Lighters were lacking ; but to make up for them six thousand 
 Lefevre carts had been sent, and were found to be in fact of no 
 manner of use. 
 
 The navy had provided a small wharf to facilitate the operation 
 of landing. The army, attempting to do things on a large scale, 
 extended the wharf — on paper — in order to permit ships to lie 
 alongside ; but it had neglected to investigate the nature of the 
 bottom, which did not lend itself to a work of this kind. Besides 
 there was not enough time at disposal to permit undertaking so 
 considerable a work, and the ironwork for the wharf went to the 
 dump alongside the Lefevre carts. 
 
 We shall forbear to speak of the mistakes made by the expedi- 
 tion on its march. 
 
 Ever\-body knows that the sailor loves to play at being soldier, 
 while the soldier adores to play at being sailor. Here it was the 
 last case that arose ; instead of turning over entirely to the navy 
 the maritime part, as was done in the expeditions to Algiers and 
 the Crimea, the army had the ambition to act all by itself. The 
 result was just that to be expected. " Let us not overwork our 
 talent . . . . " says the fabulist. 
 
 The Expedition to Santiago. — If the faults of others can 
 console us for our own, we shall find satisfaction in the way the 
 Americans organized the transport and landing of the expedi- 
 tionary corps to Santiago. 
 
 Thirty-five transports had been gathered at Tampa to transport 
 15,000 men; but such was the confusion that it was not known 
 exactly how many men had set out. Baggage and material were 
 heaped pell-mell into the ships as fast as it could arrive at the 
 wharf. The absolute want of organization may be judged from 
 the two following facts. The several elements of three batteries 
 of artillery were scattered among five transports, which divided
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 lip among them the guns, carriages, munitions, mules, and artillery- 
 men ; it is a question if these batteries were ever reassembled. 
 The order having been given to put on shore the horses of two 
 volunteer regiments whose sailing had been countermanded, the 
 horses could not be found ; they were finally discovered on board 
 a transport that was already in the stream. 
 
 A single line of rails ended at Port Tampa, but it belonged to 
 a private citizen who used it to organize excursions, which only 
 served to make things worse. 
 
 Finally, on June 8, 1898, several transports sailed off by them- 
 selves, and it was necessary to send a war vessel to bring them 
 back. On June 14, the expeditionary corps at last got started. 
 The transports were escorted by several men-of-war ; but soon 
 each was navigating without reference to the rest, and the fleet 
 covered an extent of sea of more than ten miles. 
 
 If only one of the Spanish gunboats then scattered among the 
 ports of Cuba had been commanded by a man of energy, that 
 would have sounded the knell of the expedition. It would have 
 sufficed to disperse all the rest of the transports if one or two 
 tardy ones had been sunk. 
 
 The convoy proceeded slowly. The average speed was less 
 than seven knots although the weather remained good. This in- 
 different result is nowise surprising, for there had been a lack of 
 time necessary for selection among the merchant ships. Further- 
 more all express steamers had to be converted into auxiliary 
 cruisers. 
 
 Finally, on June 20, this extraordinary fleet arrived off Santiago, 
 after passing along the coast to the end that nobody should be 
 ignorant of its presence. On the 22d a diversion was made to the 
 westward while the landing began east of the city, at Daiquiri. 
 It was made under the same conditions as the embarkation. Thus 
 only 6000 men were put ashore the first day ; it is true that the 
 surf greatly hindered operations and smashed several boats. It 
 was not until the 26th that the material was landed ; but already 
 some detachments had been put on the march, without order, 
 taking the first road that came in sight, so that the army, whose 
 objective was the capture of the heights commanding the entrance 
 to Santiago, came out under the walls of the city. To complete 
 the confusion, the inevitable quarrel arose between the Admiral 
 and the General. 
 
 i8s
 
 A Study of N.wal Strategy. 
 
 Nothing- is more curious than the fact that this expedition, so 
 badly organized and so badly led, was crowned with full success. 
 At the moment when General Shafter, fearing disaster, was debat- 
 ing about re-embarking, Santiago, defended by fatuous g-enerals, 
 laid down its arms. 
 
 In the midst of all these shortcomings the American squadron 
 did its duty. Closely blockading Admiral Cervera, it assured the 
 freedom of the sea and guaranteed the safety of the landing. 
 
 No one of these landings was as important as those carried out 
 by Japan in Korea and Manchuria ; but the Japanese government 
 has been very sparing of information regarding these operations 
 and we can give no indication as to the manner in which they were 
 executed. 
 
 From the preceding examples we can deduce the general rules 
 that should govern the transportation and disembarkation of an 
 expeditionary corps when the sea is free. 
 
 The preparations require the constant co-operation of the army 
 and the navy. It consists in the determination of the apportion- 
 ment of the different bodies and of the several arms on board the 
 ships, in order to be able to land them in a way that is logical 
 and at the same time rapid; in the distribution of material to 
 each transport, and in its stowage in such an orderly way that the 
 articles immediately needed will arrive first on the beach ; finally, 
 in assembling the greatest possible number of means for landing. 
 Nothing of all this can be improvised. It is work that demands 
 long and painstaking application, and it ought to be prepared in 
 times of peace, at least in its broad outlines. 
 
 The embarkation will always be easy because a closed port 
 provided with wharves will be available. It will suffice to proceed 
 with method, and to embark the material first in order to obviate 
 the long standing about so wearisome to the personnel. 
 
 Let us now follow the convoy to sea. It will be escorted by all 
 the warships that can be assembled ; although we are supposing the 
 sea free, it is always a matter of concern to have a strong escort. 
 At the outset, freedom of the sea does not imply that the enemy 
 has no longer a single ship in a condition to go to sea ; it means 
 simply that he is unable to put a sufficient force in line to inspire 
 
 i86
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 serious fears. One cannot, therefore, put a convoy at the mercy 
 of a single cruiser, nor can one take too many precautions. Ships 
 of war are well provided with means to facilitate the landing, and 
 this is an added reason for increasing the strength of the escort. 
 
 In order to reduce the number of transports and to accelerate 
 the landing, troops will be embarked on board the warships, ex- 
 cepting those of the light squadron that may be called upon to 
 fulfil special missions. The Admiral will make of these naval 
 vessels three parts ; the first, composed of out-of-date ships will 
 act as guides for the convoy, each serving as file leader for a given 
 number of transports ; the second, divided in groups if the convoy 
 is numerous, will form the escort ; the third, composed of light 
 vessels, will remain available for any duty. 
 
 If the enemy is anticipating invasion it will be well to make a 
 demonstration in order to divert his attention. Even though the 
 defense may have enough perspicacity to doubt that it is more than 
 a feint, it will none the less be obliged to guard against all event- 
 ualities. 
 
 The place of landing will be preferably a beach of large extent, 
 and one that is not too near any large center. It would be of 
 advantage to make use of a closed harbor, but the safe havens 
 are generally provided with means of defense in civilized countries, 
 and it is evident that a landing by main strength is to be avoided 
 at all hazards. It is almost always necessary to be content with 
 an open roadstead, and then weather conditions become an im- 
 portant factor; the state of the sea may necessitate the postpone- 
 ment of the landing for several days. 
 
 The landing is preceded by a reconnaissance made by a light 
 vessel to be assured that the beach is easy of approach and has 
 not been put in a state of defense. 
 
 A division composed entirely of warships will be the first to 
 anchor. It will immediately land the covering force, an affair 
 of a few minutes, and will mark the anchorage of the convoy. It 
 is not desirable to make up the covering force from the (naval 
 ships') landing companies. Besides the fact that sailors make 
 indifferent soldiers, the men-of-war will need all their own com- 
 plements for the discharge of the ships, and the service of the 
 beach and of the boats. 
 
 After the convoy has anchored, the first division, as soon as 
 its troops are landed, will get underway to do the same covering 
 
 187
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 duty on the ocean side that the force landed by it has done on 
 land. 
 
 The beach will be commanded by a naval officer, who will have 
 flags placed to indicate the points where the boats of each transport 
 shall land, and the points of assembly for the several corps. A 
 mixed personnel placed at his disposition will give permanent 
 directions to the detachments for their guidance as soon as they 
 arrive at the beach. 
 
 As soon as this preliminary work has been done the landing 
 of the troops will begin, the landing of the material in the lighters 
 going on at the same time. 
 
 The rapidity of this operation will depend only upon the means 
 at hand and upon the orderliness governing the general movement. 
 
 According to the indications of former expeditions, it may be 
 reckoned that not less than three days will be required to land 
 all the impedimenta of an army of more than 30,000 men. Never- 
 theless much time may be gained by constructing especial material 
 for the purpose, and by numerous exercises in time of peace. As 
 for the troops, they can be landed in a few hours. 
 
 This length of time, three days, gives an idea of the chances 
 of an attack developing from the side of the sea. It is reasonable 
 to admit that the enemy will hold his most important reserves near 
 his own coast if he has naval forces at disposal and is in fear of 
 invasion ; in which case he will need little time to reach the landing 
 place. 
 
 In the transportation of an expeditionary corps the navy comes 
 in only to conduct the troops from one point to another ; it is 
 an intermediary. Delicate though its function may be, it is none 
 the less a secondary one, and the principal objective must be 
 attained by the land forces. It is therefore entirely natural that 
 the supreme command should be lodged in the general. But, none 
 the less, the admiral retains his mdependence in the execution 
 of the program devolving upon him, which is : to take the troops 
 at some given point and to set them down at another point. 
 
 Once the troops are embarked the admiral is responsible for 
 their safety. He may be assailed from one moment to another 
 by a tempest, that permanent enemy of the sailor ; it is he alone, 
 then, that should regulate the order of sailing, give the route to 
 
 II
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 be followed, and decide whether or not the time is fit for the land- 
 ing. The general, on the contrary, finds himself on an element 
 with which he is not familiar, and regrettable consequences might 
 result if he undertook to impose his will. 
 
 We have seen in the expedition to Algiers a remarkable example 
 of the situation that may arise for an admiral, due to the elements, 
 and we believe that the bad part fell to the general commanding in 
 chief, at least in this instance. 
 
 After all we may rest assured that the admiral will not delay 
 needlessly on the way. The burden of conducting large assem- 
 blages of merchant ships is too thankless, and it demands too 
 many precautions and cares, not to make one seek to reduce its 
 duration to a strict minimum ; and no time will be lost except in 
 obedience to imperious necessity. Let it not be forgotten that 
 there is a constant risk of collision among all these transports, 
 strangers to squadron sailing, and that the admiral will count his 
 ships every morning to assure himself that none has gone wrong 
 during the night. 
 
 But though the admiral in his responsibility is free to conduct 
 the fleet according to his own judgment, that is no reason to 
 relegate the general to a merchant steamer, as was done in the last 
 combined maneuvers. He is properly only a passenger, but he is 
 none the less the commander-in-chief; and if he refrains from 
 weighing upon the decisions of the commander of the fleet, he 
 has the right to know what is going on, and the reasons for it. 
 It is even to be desired that he have this knowledge in order to 
 calm his impatience or his uneasiness. Moreover, circumstances 
 may arise to impose a modification of the original program ; the 
 intervention of the commander-in-chief then becomes necessary. 
 For example, if persistent winds make the landing place fixed 
 upon unapproachable, it will be necessary to choose another. The 
 admiral will then propose a new solution ; but it ought to be 
 accepted by the general, because a landing on hostile soil at one 
 place or at another is not a matter of indiflference from the military 
 viewpoint. Again it may happen that the convoy is partly dis- 
 persed by gales. The admiral will tell the general the time he esti- 
 mates necessary to gather in the wanderers, and it will be the 
 general's duty to decide whether to land with his forces reduced, or 
 to seek the vessels that have strayed, or finally to give up the 
 enterprise. 
 
 189
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In a word, the relations between the two chiefs should be 
 permanent ; and this is not possible unless they are on board the 
 same ship. Can the possibility be admitted of their being separated 
 by the chances of a sea voyage ? 
 
 When combined operations have only a secondary importance, 
 and admit only of reduced numbers, the action on land will no 
 longer have a preponderating influence upon the issue of the war. 
 It seems reasonable then to exchange parts and give to the navy 
 the supreme direction. In a naval war nothing can be done with- 
 out ships ; in order not to compromise his naval forces in an 
 isolated attack the decisions ought to be made by the naval com- 
 mander who is informed about what is going on on the sea, and 
 what commands the line of retreat. 
 
 It is astonishing what lamentable results have arisen simply 
 from dissensions between the land and the sea commanders ; and 
 in this particular other nations have no reason to envy France. 
 All these quarrels seem to us very paltry affairs, and it is to be 
 regretted that an article has not been introduced in our Regula- 
 tions to remind officers that the susceptibilities of individuals must 
 yield to the good of the service and the end to be attained. 
 
 190
 
 A STUDY OF NAVAL STRATEGY. 
 
 OPERATIONS.* 
 
 III. 
 
 Commerce Destroying. 
 
 Too much has been written in recent years upon commerce 
 destroying for it to be necessary to explain here what it is and 
 what its avowed object is. 
 
 The EngHsh were the first to try this system of warfare which 
 France afterwards used so frequently against them. Charles I, 
 always short of money, found, as many people of our own time 
 have, that squadrons are very costly ; and, since Holland was an 
 exclusively commercial nation, since she drew her wealth wholly 
 from her sea trade, he thought there was no need to maintain those 
 imposing fleets whose armament was a ruinous expense ; it suf- 
 ficed to launch frigates and light vessels in pursuit of the Dutch 
 merchantmen, and thus to secure the double advantage of drying 
 up the source of the enemy's wealth and at the same time growing 
 rich upon their spoils. 
 
 The trial was made, but the results fell short of the hopes to 
 which it had given birth ; and the English Navy renounced once 
 for all making commerce destroying the principal objective of a 
 naval war. It was France that inherited the method. 
 
 It began to be put to full use under Louis XIV by the first of 
 the Pontchartrains, and for an identical reason: want of money. 
 It may in truth be observed that, at least in the reigns of Louis 
 XIV and Louis XV, the number of ships in commission depended 
 much less upon the actual state of our forces than upon the finan- 
 cial resources of the naval budget. It was not, as several historians 
 affirm, the disaster of La Hogue which marked the decline of the 
 navy, since, the year following, Tourville still kept the sea at the 
 head of seventy ships ; but it is true that the disarming of our 
 squadrons followed close upon that fatal day, and the sole cause 
 of this was the poverty of the Treasury. Pontchartrain then 
 
 * The second section of Operations, dealing with the conquest of over- 
 seas territory, is here omitted, a translation of it by Commander H. S. 
 Knapp, U. S. N., having already been published in the Proceedings (see 
 No. 127). 
 
 191
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 committed the enormous error — not to use a stronger term which 
 would perhaps be more just — of alienating the nation's material 
 and lending its ships to outfitters for carrying on privateering. 
 Under this impulse given by the government, the number of priva- 
 teers increased to fabulous proportions. Renouncing all com- 
 merce in order to capture that of the enemy, having the crews of 
 the King's ships at their disposal for arming their vessels, the 
 privateers settled down upon the Channel and North Sea like a 
 flock of sparrows. 
 
 Privateering was then practised either with single ships of very 
 light scantling or with small divisions composed of ships formerly 
 belonging to the State ; and about such divisions there hung inde- 
 pendent privateers who profited by their protection and seized 
 upon the booty they let slip. 
 
 England, little prepared against a kind of warfare that had 
 never until then been practised to such an extent, does not appear 
 at this period to have organized a system of methodical defense. 
 Instead of seeking to protect her commerce and to prosecute the 
 destruction of our privateers, she took advantage of the free field 
 left her by our squadrons to attempt to destroy the nests where 
 privateers took shelter. Thus she attacked Saint Malo, Dieppe, 
 Dunkirk and Havre. The procedure itself might have been justi- 
 fied, if it had succeeded, but places as strong as our great mari- 
 time ports are not to be reduced by shells and a few thousand 
 men. 
 
 However that may be, British commerce suflFered immense 
 losses. It is said that there were 4200 ships captured during the 
 war of the League of Augsburg : insurance premiums rose to 30 
 per cent. France none the less was vanquished. If, therefore, 
 privateering had some efi'ect, it was not sufficient to bring the 
 adversary to terms. 
 
 During the war of the Spanish Succession, after a trial of 
 squadron warfare which was not without glory (battle of 
 Malaga), privateering was taken up again with energy. We 
 still find a Pontchartrain at the head of the navy, but not the same 
 one ; it is his son Jerome : and it appears that the latter does 
 through principle what his father could argue that he only did 
 through necessity. 
 
 The Northern division, which had been made illustrious by 
 Jean Bart in the previous war, was re-established, and at first 
 
 192 
 
 I
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 several other small divisions were fitted out ; but soon the ships of 
 which they were composed were successively disarmed and there 
 was left nothing but private armed vessels to carry on commerce 
 destroying. Jerome Pontchartrain seemed to have taken upon 
 himself to completely suppress the royal navy."^ " Not only did 
 he no longer replace, no longer even repair the ships of the State, 
 but he dismembered them and sold a certain number piece by piece. 
 Naval officers were more than once reduced to solicit their pay 
 as an alms, and they were seen condemned to serve for the account 
 of private ship-owners ; the soldiers and sailors of the King's 
 ships did the same so as not to die of hunger." "^ On the other 
 hand, privateering was at its apogee: practised by men such as 
 Duguay-Trouin, Forbin, Du Casse, Cassard and the Chevalier 
 Saint Pol, it never had been, and never afterwards was, carried 
 on with so much vigor and audacity. And yet the results are 
 already inferior to those of the last war. The English begin to 
 organize to combat it ; they increase the escorts of convoys, send 
 frigates against the privateers. After 1702, attacks upon the 
 coasts are made less frequently ; all efforts are directed towards 
 protecting convoys. 
 
 Here, according to Campbell, is the result of the first five years 
 of the war: "England has lost 30 warships and 1146 merchant 
 ships, of which 300 v/ere recaptured ; on the other hand, she has 
 captured or destroyed 80 warships, 1346 merchant ships and 175 
 privateers." "^ Throughout the whole war English commerce 
 continued to grow, which indicates that it was efficiently pro- 
 tected. 
 
 What was the final result of the war? The provisions of the 
 treaty of Utrecht, humiliating to France, show us. 
 
 Under Louis XV, the economical, but inglorious administration 
 of Cardinal Fleury had permitted the navy to sink to the lowest 
 ebb. When the war of the Austrian Succession broke out, it was 
 necessary, after a first effort, to recur to privateering. There was 
 no longer any choice of means. 
 
 " Commerce destroying at first gave satisfactory results. Pur- 
 sued with ardor by the national cruisers and by numerous private 
 
 "" In this historical sketch we shall frequently borrow from a remarkable 
 work by Commander Lesquivit, which unhappily has not been made public. 
 ^^Lesquivit, Etude historiqiie ct sirategique de la guerre de course. 
 "* Lesquivit, ibid. 
 
 193
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 ships, it caused very great losses to British commerce and fur- 
 nished occasion for single-ship actions, glorious for our seamen, 
 and in which La Motte-Picquet and Kersaint won fame. Even 
 in distant seas, notably in the West Indies, where our colonists 
 put all their capital into arming privateers, great damages were 
 inflicted upon the English, not less than 950 vessels being taken 
 from them. 
 
 ■' But, after the disasters of 1747, the French flag no longer 
 appeared at sea. Twenty-two ships of the line constituted the 
 whole French Navy, which sixty years before counted one hun- 
 dred and twenty such. The privateers made few captures. Pur- 
 sued everywhere, without protection, almost all of them fell a 
 prey to the English. The British naval forces, without rivals, 
 overran the seas unmolested. In one year, it is said, they took 
 French commerce to the value of nearly i8o,cxx),ooo francs. The 
 balance of captures in their favor was estimated at 2,000,000 
 pounds sterling. ' Estimated in another manner,' says Mahan, 
 ' the losses amounted to 3434 merchant ships for the French and 
 Spanish against 3238 for the English ; but the ratio of these fig- 
 ures to the total ships of each country must not be overlooked.' " "" 
 
 This time, again, did commerce destroying give victory to 
 France? Did the treaty of Aix-la-('hapelle efface the clauses of 
 the treaty of Utrecht? 
 
 The efficacy of a system that ended in a result diametrically 
 opposed to the one proposed to be attained then began to be 
 doubted ; and the ancient ways were reverted to. During the 
 eight years of peace that followed the war of the Austrian Suc- 
 cession, as many ships were laid down as the poverty of our 
 finances permitted. At the beginning of the Seven Years' War, 
 France could put in line sixty ships ; but what could be done with 
 such a force ? After a fortunate start, nothing more was done to 
 constitute squadrons except some unlucky efl:orts that were but 
 the death struggles of the navy. Commerce destroying had to be 
 again recurred to. 
 
 " From 1756 to 1760, the English lost 2500 merchant ships. 
 This figure seems enormous and yet it represents but a tenth of 
 the English vessels. In return we lost 240 privateers during the 
 same period ; our maritime commerce had completely disap- 
 
 "°Lesquivit, op cit. 
 
 194
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 peared ; and at the end of the war, in spite of exchanges, we had 
 25,000 seamen prisoners in Eng'land, while the Eng'hsh had only 
 1200 in France." ^^ This difference is characteristic and requires 
 no comment. 
 
 What were the hostile squadrons doing then while our priva- 
 teers whitened the seas ? No longer finding themselves faced by 
 forces capable of standing up against them, they ravaged our 
 shores, they took from us, one by one, our colonies ; finally they 
 even seized upon Belle-Isle. France could not keep on letting 
 fragments of her liesh be torn from her; it was necessary to nego- 
 tiate to put a stop to this dismemberment that risked letting the 
 English establish themselves at our gates, in the islands that bor- 
 der our coast and form part of the centuries-old heritage of our 
 fathers. The conditions were hard ; we had to give up all that 
 the genius of Dupleix had won for us in the East Indies, besides 
 Canada, Senegal, St. Vincent, Dominica, Tobago and part of 
 Louisiana. Never did commerce destroying so distinctly show its 
 inefi(iciency. 
 
 The infatuation with this system had so completely passed away 
 that as soon as Choiseul succeeded Berryer as Minister of Marine 
 he attempted an invasion of England that it was too late to under- 
 take and devoted himself to reconstructing our fleet. The excess 
 of our misfortunes had, moreover, operated a revulsion ; on all 
 sides the building of ships was demanded. " Cities, corporations 
 and individuals contributed to pay for constructing ships. The 
 estates of Languedoc set the example by offering to the King an 
 80-gun ship. Paris followed them closely by causing to be built 
 at Rochefort the fine ship Ville-de-Paris. Several other prov- 
 inces, towns and companies followed this generous and patriotic 
 inspiration, and, by the end of the month of January, 1762, the 
 national zeal had created fourteen new ships and a frigate. A 
 prodigious activity then made itself felt in ports but recently 
 silent ; everywhere there was building, everywhere repairing of 
 ships." '''• 
 
 It was too late, but all these constructions formed the nucleus 
 of the navy of Louis XVL During the peace, the impulse did not 
 slacken, and the war of American Independence found us ready 
 to make head against the enemy. 
 
 ^''Lesquivit, op. cit. ^'^ Lesquivit, op. cit. 
 
 195
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 I have already liad occasion to say tliat in my opinion the 
 French Navy at this period did not make good use of its forces. 
 It was ahnost always superior in numbers on the field of battle, 
 and, if it had employed against the English the same methods of 
 fighting to the utmost that they employed against us, the result 
 would have been quite dififerent. In spite of all, we succeeded in 
 holding their navy in check, and, on this account, commerce 
 destroying was relegated to the second place ; it became the acces- 
 sory, and no longer the principal. Practised almost exclusively 
 by individuals, it does not seem to have had a great development : 
 the allies (French, Spanish, Americans, Dutch) took from the 
 English 519 ships, and the latter took from them 534. For the 
 first time the treaty of peace was favorable to France. 
 
 We come now to the wars of the Revolution and Empire, and 
 are about to see history repeat itself as it were automatically. At 
 first an attempt will be made to struggle in the lists with means 
 that are insufficient, not in respect to numbers, but as regards 
 quality ; defeat will result and then recourse will be had to com- 
 merce destroying; from time to time squadrons will be reconsti- 
 tuted to attempt a descent upon the enemy's territory ; then, in the 
 last years of the war, commerce destroying and such enterprises 
 as depend only upon chance for success will lose favor ; we will 
 begin to build up again a fighting fleet, but France will be worn 
 out before the task is accomplished. Such is the spectacle that the 
 two naval wars of the reign of Louis XV have afforded us ; such 
 is the spectacle that the two naval wars of the Revolution and the 
 Empire are to exhibit. 
 
 Villaret-Joyeuse is beaten in the battle of 13 Prairial and Mar- 
 tin loses the battle of Noli. 
 
 The Committee of Public Safety announces to the country, with 
 that emphasis which is one of the characteristics of the period, 
 that it inaugurates a new method of warfare. The preambles of 
 the decree of 23 Thermidor, year III, are interesting to recall ; 
 phraseology takes the place of strategy in them : " The new 
 system of political warfare that your committee has adopted is 
 more suitable to our political situation and will procure for us real 
 advantages. This system will harmonize much better with the 
 true interests of the nation than those displays of naval power 
 that do but flatter personal pride and uselessly consume the re- 
 sources of the Republic .... We have a single object to fulfil 
 
 196
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 and this object excites all our solicitudes, is the purpose of all our 
 plans : it is to protect our own commerce and to destroy that of 
 our enemies .... Tlie English government, if it will, may 
 flaunt its squadrons and parade them in tactical order (sic), the 
 French will limit themselves to attacking it in what it holds most 
 dear, in what constitutes its happiness and its existence, in its 
 riches. All our plans, all our cruises, all our movements in port 
 and at sea, will have for object only to ravage its commerce, to 
 destroy, to overturn its colonies, to force it finally into a shameful 
 bankruptcy." "" 
 
 " The results obtained seem at first sight satisfactorv. Ac- 
 cording to a table of Lloyd's (London), stopping at year V, the 
 prizes taken by the two nations were distributed as follows : 
 
 Prizes taken. 
 Year. By Ens^lish. Uy French. 
 
 1793 63 ships. 261 ships. 
 
 1794 88 " 527 " 
 
 1795 47 " 502 " 
 
 1796 63 " 414 " 
 
 1797 114 " 562 " 
 
 Total 375 " 2,266 " 
 
 " We cite these figures because they are constantly reproduced 
 by all academic partisans of commerce destroying, in support of 
 their thesis ; we shall see further on what is to be thought of them. 
 
 " To protect their commerce against these raids of our priva- 
 teers and our single cruisers, the English adopted the double sys- 
 tem of convoys and of patrol by light divisions. Merchant ships 
 were assembled, according to their destination, in ports designated 
 in advance, and from these set sail under the protection of ships 
 of war charged to conduct them to their destination. Three hun- 
 dred, five hundred, even a thousand vessels were to be seen sail- 
 ing in company in particularly exposed regions, such as the en- 
 trance to the Channel or to the Baltic Sea, where a better guard 
 and a stronger protection were needed. This system had, it is 
 true, many disadvantages : time lost in waiting for the convoy to 
 assemble ; inability to follow it on the part of many merchant ships ; 
 great lowering of the price of goods when the convoy arrived, 
 owing to the large quantities thrown on the market at one time. 
 
 "^ Lesquivit, op. cit. 
 
 197
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Thus many ship-owners preferred to run the risks of voyaging 
 alone ; but they were not thereby left completely alone, for upon 
 the principal trade routes were stationed fast frigates, each with 
 a fixed cruising ground and accompanied by light vessels, specially 
 charged with their protection. 
 
 " Thus, closed around on all sides, receiving no help from our 
 squadrons, our privateers, after struggles that were often heroic, 
 but almost always disastrous, ended by falling into the hands of 
 the enemy. Contemporary English writers fix at 743 the number 
 of privateers captured from the opening of hostilities to December 
 31, 1800. Their crews went to crowd the English hulks, in which, 
 in the year VI, there were 22,000 French prisoners. 
 
 " As for warships, the French Navy, which at the beginning 
 of the war possessed 86 ships and 118 frigates, lost, according to 
 the English historian W. James, 34 ships and 82 frigates by cap- 
 ture, 1 1 ships and 14 frigates destroyed by incidents of war, and 
 10 ships and 6 frigates by shipwreck. This is a total of 55 ships 
 and 102 frigates, the latter taken mostly while cruising, in en- 
 gagements between light squadrons or single ships. If to these 
 figures are added 150 smaller warships and 2000 privateers or 
 merchant ships, captured during these ten years of war ; if it is 
 considered that the united crews of all these vessels amount to 
 about 70,000 sailors, that the greater part of these unfortunates 
 perished in combats, in shipwrecks or in the enemy's prisons, the 
 frightful voids then produced in the lists of the maritime inscrip- 
 tion can be estimated. ' Out of 80,000 sailors formerly enrolled, 
 there remained scarcely half to man ships with at the end of the 
 war. So we may conclude that though privateering enriched 
 some ship-owners during this war as well as in previous wars, it 
 ruined our commerce and our maritime inscription.' '^ Com- 
 merce destroying itself had not been to our advantage, since, 
 including privateers, our merchant marine suffered losses equal 
 in number to those of English commerce. 
 
 " Had it at least ruined that commerce, had it led to the shame- 
 ful bankruptcy spoken of by the decree of 23 Thermidor, year 
 III? See what Pitt said on February 18, 1801 : ' If we compare 
 this year of war with the preceding years of peace, we shall see 
 in the production of our revenue and the extension of our com- 
 
 ""V. A. Bourgeois. 
 
 198
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 merce a spectacle as paradoxical as inexplicable and well formed to 
 astonish us. We have raised our internal and external com- 
 merce to a height that it never attained before and we can regard 
 the present year as the most satisfactory ever seen in this 
 country.' " 
 
 In fact, external commerce, exportation and importation, which 
 in 1792, the last year of peace, amounted to £44,500,000, increased 
 in 1797 to £50,000,000, and in 1800 to £73,000,000. 
 
 " Although it cannot be denied that the loss borne by English 
 commerce was a sensible one, it was no more than a war tax that, 
 although burdensome, was incapable by itself alone of exercising 
 a decisive influence on the policy of a powerful and rich country 
 like England. It does not seem to have exceeded 2 per cent or 
 3 per cent of her total commerce. Taking an average of the 
 figures given by different authors, we may estimate the mean 
 number of English ships captured at about 50D per year. Well, 
 in the three years 1793- 1795, the annual number of entries and 
 departures of English ships from English ports was 21,560 ; in the 
 three years 1798-1800 it was 21,369, of which 500 forms but 2.4 
 per cent, although the former number includes neither coastwise 
 nor colonial commerce. 
 
 " If the total number of ships belonging to Great Britain and 
 her dependencies is taken, it v/ill be found to amount to 16,728 in 
 1795, and to 17,885 in 1800, of which latter number 500 is about 
 3 per cent. This is a relative loss slightly greater than that occa- 
 sioned by accidents of the sea at the same period (from 1793 to 
 1800 Lloyd's lists indicate a loss of 2967 ships) and much less than 
 the loss borne by French commerce in the earlier years of the 
 war. It must be added that this loss was partly made up for to 
 England by the ships and goods taken by her own cruisers from 
 the enemy and by the extension of her commercial operations 
 under neutral flags." "" 
 
 Such was the balance-sheet of commerce destroying during the 
 first war. 
 
 Immediately upon the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, Napo- 
 leon turned his whole attention to the project of invading Eng- 
 land, and naval operations were conducted with a view to assur- 
 ing a passage to the Boulogne flotilla. Commerce destroying 
 
 "" Lesquivit, op. cit. 
 
 199
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 was, therefore, at first only practised by private interests, without 
 any well-defmed system. p]ut when the disaster of Trafalgar had 
 dispelled the hopes that Napoleon had founded upon the navy, 
 and it had been demonstrated once more that, in its state of 
 dilapidation, it could no longer stand up against the English, the 
 question arose as to how the remnants of our squadrons might 
 be employed until a complete reorganization could assure him 
 strength together with numbers. 
 
 The Emperor did not wait for Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz to 
 ask his minister for propositions in regard to the employment of 
 his forces. Then it was that Decres submitted to him the plan 
 of flying divisions which, as he thought, must ruin English com- 
 merce. " Such," said he, " was the sort of war that he approved 
 of." It was commerce destroying again, under a form that was 
 not new, but that till then had only been used accidentally and 
 without methodical development. The model for it was furnished, 
 at this precise period, by Rear-Admiral Allemand's cruise. It is 
 interesting to observe what the fate of all these divisions was. 
 
 While the drama of Trafalgar was unrolled, the Brest squadron 
 remained intact. From the ships that composed it, two divisions 
 were formed under the orders of Admirals Willaumez and de 
 Leissegues, put out from Brest together on December 13, and 
 separated at sea to carry out their mission. 
 
 The first division, of six ships and two frigates, was to go first 
 to the Cape of Good Hope, then to cruise in the neighborhood of 
 St. Helena to capture convoys coming from India, and then to pro- 
 ceed to the West Indies. After having ravaged the English colo- 
 nies of those islands, Admiral Willaumez was to steer for New- 
 foundland, where he was to destroy the fisheries ; from there he 
 was to go to Iceland, Spitzbergen and Greenland, where English 
 whalers were to be found, and he was not to return to France until 
 he was incapable of longer remaining at sea. 
 
 Willaumez learned while at sea that the Cape had fallen into 
 the hands of the English: he had to change his program, which 
 made him lose a frigate, the Volontaire, which was captured in 
 March, 1806, at the Cape, where she expected to find the division. 
 The other vessels had gone to Guiana, where they separated into 
 three groups which reached Martinique one after the other in 
 June, 1805, after having barely escaped being captured by the 
 English. On July i, Willaumez left Alartinique ; but very soon
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 his vessels were scattered ; the Foudroyant went into Havana 
 after an action with the Anson; the hnpetuenx ran ashore on the 
 coast near Chesapeake Bay to escape two Enghsh ships, and was 
 burned by them ; the Patriate and Eolc entered the Chesapeake ; 
 the Valenrcuse took refuge at Marcushook ; the Cassard returned 
 to Brest. As for the Veteran, she cruised on the Grand Banks 
 until August 25, waiting for her companions, and then steered for 
 Belle-Isle. Chased by a hostile division, she took refuge at Con- 
 carneau, where a ship of the line had never before been. She did 
 not get out until three years later, on April 20, 1809.'*^ 
 
 Of the ships that stayed in America, two were sold on the spot, 
 the Eole and Valeureuse; the Foudroyant, which carried Admiral 
 Willaumez. reached Brest on February 7, 1807 ; the Patriote did 
 not return until a year later, in January, 1808. 
 
 The division had captured seventeen prizes. 
 
 Rear-Admiral de Leissegues left Brest at the same time as 
 Rear-Admiral Willaumez, with five ships, two frigates and one 
 corvette. The division reached San Domingo in January, 1806 ; 
 but its presence was very soon made known to the English forces 
 stationed in the West Indies, and, on February 6, de Leissegues, 
 on the appearance of the enemy, had to get under way by cutting 
 his cables and to accept battle. The two frigates and the corvette 
 alone escaped. 
 
 Commander le Due set out from Lorient, at the end of March, 
 1806, with three frigates and one brig to go to Spitzbergen to 
 destroy English whalers. The brig, the Nearque, was taken im- 
 mediately after the start by the Niobe. Le Due went first to the 
 Azores, then he steered for Spitzbergen. On June 12, the Guer- 
 riere separated from her consorts, and was taken on the i8th by 
 one of the vessels that had been sent in pursuit of the French 
 division. The two other frigates returned to France at the end of 
 September. They had made thirty-nine prizes. 
 
 Five frigates and two brigs set sail from the Island of Aix on 
 September 24, 1806. Captain Soleil,"" who commanded them, had 
 orders to proceed to Martinique to land some troops there. Seen 
 immediately on its departure, the division was followed and at- 
 tacked by the English blockading squadron. The Infatigable, 
 
 '"The I'eieran was commanded by Jerome Bonaparte. 
 "^A former naval surgeon.
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 Gloirc, Mincrve and Armidc were captured; one frigate and the 
 two brig-s succeeded in escaping. 
 
 The ill success of all these cruises slackened the zeal of Decres, 
 and we must go to the year 1809 to find another one. 
 
 Captain Troude set sail from Lorient on February 26, 1809, 
 with three ships, three frigates and two frigates fitted as supply 
 ships. He had orders to revictual Martinique and Guadeloupe, 
 then to prey upon commerce until his supplies were exhausted, 
 and then to return to the Mediterranean. On the voyage Troude 
 learned that Martinique had been taken by the English, and, not 
 wishing to anchor at Guadeloupe, which affords only open road- 
 steads and was closely watched, he went to Les Saintes. There 
 he was at once blockaded by Admiral Cochrane with five ships, 
 five frigates and 15 light vessels. Not daring to force the en- 
 trance, the English admiral adopted the plan of compelling the 
 French division to go out by seizing the heights that overlook the 
 anchorage ; 3000 men were put on shore and easily drove back the 
 little garrison. Troude, seeing that he w^ould have to endure a 
 bombardment to which he could not reply, decided to run through 
 the English blockade. On April 14, the three ships got under way 
 at 10 o'clock in the evening. Follow- ed immediately by the enemy, 
 two ships escaped and on May 29 reached Cherbourg; the third 
 was captured. 
 
 The dispersion and partial destruction of all these divisions pro- 
 ceeded from the very nature of their mission. As soon as the 
 ships arrived upon their cruising ground, they were obliged to 
 separate, whether to cover a larger extent of sea, or to perform 
 such tasks as putting ashore the crews of captured ships. They 
 therefore cruised only by successive rendezvous, and the enemy 
 bent all his efforts to making them miss these. In fact, as soon 
 as the departure of a division became known, the English govern- 
 ment sent in pursuit of it a greater force, which co-operated with 
 the naval forces permanently on the station. After a longer or 
 shorter time, the French divisions were overtaken, because the 
 prizes they made revealed their presence in the region where they 
 were operating. The successive captures of their bases of opera- 
 tions w^as likewise an obstacle to their movements. We have seen 
 that Willaumez and Troude, proceeding one to the Cape and the 
 other to Martinique, had suddenly to change their plans upon 
 learning of the English captures of those colonies ; and it is lucky
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 that they were able to get this knowledge from neutrals soon 
 enough not to fall into an ambush. The capture of the various 
 ports where our vessels could revictual was a further means of 
 cutting short cruises against commerce. 
 
 Whether for lack of foreign bases, or because of the tragic fate 
 of our divisions, or perhaps for both these motives, an end was put 
 to Decres' system, and commerce-destroying raids ceased after 
 1809; they were only really energetically carried on during the 
 two years following Trafalgar. Thereafter, we were content to 
 send out frigates in pairs, without subjecting them to too rigid 
 instructions, and they were ordered to seek the nearest port when 
 they could no longer keep at sea. Most of these frigates were 
 captured. 
 
 The Emperor had accepted Decres' propositions after Trafalgar 
 without conviction. For a long time he had his mind made up as 
 to the effectiveness of commerce destroying ; but he saw in it a 
 means of training crews in the interval tmtil he had built up again 
 a navy. Ships were being built in all the ports of France, as well 
 as at Antwerp, in Holland and at Genoa. In 1809 we possessed 
 already 60 ships. When the Empire fell, there were 44 of them 
 in ports outside of France, of which we were able to retain but a 
 part. The navy of the Restoration was constituted of those left 
 to us by the enemies. Napoleon, therefore, saw no other way of 
 waging war at sea than by attacking the enemy's naval forces : 
 after an experience of more than 20 years, he reached the same 
 conclusion as the seamen of the reign of Louis XV. 
 
 Such are the facts. It remains for us now to determine what 
 the causes are that have always made commerce destroying fail, 
 and how conditions have been modified by the use of steam and 
 the relative condition of modern navies. Finally we shall have to 
 consider how effective it would be in a conflict with England. 
 
 * * 
 
 The discussions to which the question of commerce destroying 
 has given rise have often led its partisans to search out somewhat 
 curious arguments in favor of their thesis. Thus it has been 
 asserted that the preference shown by admirals for squadrons 
 originated in the desire to hold on to fine commands. I doubt if 
 a motive of this sort has ever influenced, even unwittingly, the 
 views of our chiefs ; but this reason, if it existed, would not suffice 
 
 203
 
 A Study of Xanal Strategy. 
 
 to explain the repugnance manifested by a great majority of offi- 
 cers for any system that led to making commerce destroying the 
 prime object of a naval war. As far as those are concerned for 
 whom an admiral's stars are as inaccessible as the stars that glitter 
 in the heavens, and their name is legion, such a consideration 
 would have no weight with them. I will even go further : if we 
 were not firmly convinced that commerce destroying, raised to the 
 estate of a system, would compromise the maritime destinies of 
 France, our sympathies would be won for it from the start. There 
 is no doubt, in fact, that a direct struggle against the naval 
 strength of a country which, like England, has and will for a long 
 time yet have an incontestible superiority over us, would be a diffi- 
 cult part to play, and one in which we would all risk losing our 
 lives and reputations. Confronted by this grave danger, we 
 would much prefer to devote ourselves exclusively to pursuing the 
 enemy's commerce and to content ourselves with avoiding attack 
 by the enemy's cruisers, if we did not think that we should thus 
 be playing the part of dupes. We must, therefore, have argu- 
 ments of another sort to influence us, and such I shall now en- 
 deavor to set forth. 
 
 " Naval warfare, we are told, should not remain indefinitely cast 
 in the same mold, and direct attack upon the hostile forces has 
 been tried ; to it we owe our worst disasters. Is it not foolish to 
 persist in practising a system of war that has never yielded any- 
 thing but failures ? " 
 
 The reasoning of the partisans of commerce destroying is thus, 
 we believe, faithfully summed up. 
 
 This way of putting the case is not exact ; although squadron 
 warfare has brought us disasters, we owe to it and to it alone 
 our naval glory. 
 
 In what periods has the French Navy shone with the most bril- 
 liant luster? During the first part of the reign of Louis XIV and 
 during the war of American Independence ; that is to say, in the 
 periods when it held the enemy's forces in check. On the con- 
 trary, the blackest pages of our history correspond to the periods 
 when commerce destroying was exclusively practised. It is true 
 that the latter usually followed a defeat ; but it was not always 
 imposed by the helplessness of our navy : the poverty of our 
 finances was often much more its cause than lack of vessels. 
 
 It should not be held, therefore, that France has persisted in 
 
 204
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 wishing to struggle in the lists, when it is manifest, on the con- 
 trary, that on several occasions she has abandoned prematurely, 
 and after a single reverse, a policy that had not been without 
 glory, and that she has persisted in attacking commerce in spite 
 of the negative results thereby gained. And if, contemplating the 
 past, there is something we may regret, it is less the principle itself 
 of squadron warfare than the way in which we practised it."^ 
 
 In any event, it is at least strange to propose as a novelty to-day 
 a system that France practised for more than a century with un- 
 exampled fury and of which she has made a specialty. 
 
 Of the two schools that divide the navy, neither has found a 
 new formula : one is inspired by the traditions of Colbert, Seigne- 
 lay and Castries ; the other has entered upon the heritage of the 
 tribe of Pontchartrains, Berryers and all those ministers who may 
 be considered the assassins of our naval power. We draw no 
 conclusion ; we merely state the fact. 
 
 When the partisans of commerce destroying point out how vul- 
 nerable England is in her commerce, when they complacently 
 enlarge upon the number of merchant ships that furrow the seas, 
 upon the amount of food supplies that they carry, upon the small 
 provision held in the United Kingdom, etc., they make a statement 
 of reasons that does not lack impressiveness. But all these argu- 
 ments are but the statement of the problem ; they do not furnish 
 us with its solution. It is not enough to say : we will starve out 
 England ; it is above all necessary to see what means we shall have 
 at our disposition for attaining our object and what means Eng- 
 land has to oppose them with. The result of this comparison will 
 give us a correct opinion as to the efficacy of commerce destroy- 
 ing. But this nub of the question has always been put aside by 
 partisans of commerce destroying, as if they were afraid to touch 
 it. 
 
 Yet, when a cause has had in its service such men as Jean Bart, 
 Duguay-Trouin, Forbin, Cassard, the Chevalier Saint Pol and 
 still others whose names are less known (Thurot for example), 
 when we see so much heroism and perseverance end in failure, we 
 have the best of reasons to think that, though the principle of 
 commerce destroying is attractive, its application presents serious 
 
 '" We have sought to show, in the first part of this stud}', the difference 
 between our procedures and those of our enemies ; we shall not return to 
 the subject. 
 
 205
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 difficulties ; that, thoug-h it is easy to capture commerce, it is 
 equally possible to protect it. 
 
 How can any sincere man fail to be impressed by the fact that, 
 during war, English commerce, instead of declining, increased? 
 
 If, therefore, to-day we hope for a better result, it is either be- 
 cause a navy of sailing ships was not as well adapted to commerce 
 destroying as a steam navy, or because in the past the thing was 
 badly done. We will now examine into this. 
 
 In the 17th century the respective situation of each side was as 
 follows : 
 
 England had a war fleet and a commercial fleet, and the latter 
 could not give up business on account of the economic situation 
 of the country. 
 
 France had a war fleet and a commercial fleet, and the latter 
 abandoned traffic to prey upon the enemy's commerce. 
 
 Thus privateers supplemented our fleet with a swarm of light 
 vessels that cost the State neither a ship nor a cent, while the 
 English, on the contrary, had to divert a number of ships from 
 their fighting fleet to protect their commercial fleet. 
 
 As long as the French squadrons held in check the English 
 squadrons and forced them to remain concentrated, privateers 
 could with impunity chase the enemy's commerce, but nothing less 
 than this diversion could permit them to venture to sea, since 
 they were almost all of small size."'' 
 
 Practised under such conditions, commerce destroying could 
 not but be advantageous for France. If by itself alone it did not 
 suffice to reduce England, at least it did her serious harm and 
 contributed its share in the general operations. It constituted a 
 net gain, without any counter gain to the adversary. 
 
 But as soon as commerce destroying, ceasing to be the monop- 
 oly of private interests, became more and more the objective of the 
 navy, which devoted its own ships to it, England could divert 
 from her fleets a sufficiently great number of ships to organize 
 
 "^ Many people imagine that our privateers of olden time were capable 
 on occasion of fighting against the enemy's frigates. There actually were 
 some vessels built by ship-owners of Dunkirk and St. Malo which had quite 
 heavy batteries, but they were an insignificant minority On referring to 
 engravings of that period, we note with astonishment that the ordinary 
 type of privateer was very similar to our present Iceland schooners. That 
 is what explains the great number of privateers. 
 
 206
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 a systematic protection of her commerce, without ceasing to pos- 
 sess superiority on the field of battle. So the period of full devel- 
 opment of commerce destroying is not that when its results were 
 most considerable. 
 
 To-day letters of marque are done away with. To carry on 
 commerce destroying, it will be necessary to devote to it national 
 vessels, paid by the State, manned by crews belonging to the 
 State. Consequently, our fleet of the line will be by so much 
 diminished, and England will be able, as well, to diminish hers 
 correspondingly without causing any change in the ratio of forces. 
 To our commerce destroyers she will oppose cruisers. The result 
 will be : on the one hand a fleet of the line opposed to a fleet of the 
 line ; on the other hand, a fleet of commerce destroyers chased by 
 a fleet of cruisers. The situation wall no longer be the same : it 
 will have become worse. 
 
 France can diminish the number of her battleships to increase 
 that of her commerce destroyers : England will do the same, or 
 rather she has already done so. By consulting a list of the Eng- 
 lish fleet, we see that her superiority in cruisers is as great as her 
 superiority in battleships, because every time that we lay down 
 fast ships, her naval program is augmented by a greater number 
 of cruisers that are as fast as ours and are ready before them. 
 
 And if France, yielding to public opinion, decides to turn whollv 
 to commerce destroying, she will cease building new fighting ships 
 and, after a while, will have nothing but commerce destroyers. 
 England, for her part, will likewise have only cruisers. And then 
 we shall find ourselves again, in the matter of the employment of 
 forces, in the situation we were in under Louis XV and after 
 Trafalgar, with this double difference that instead of employing, 
 for or against commerce destroying, ships and frigates, each side 
 will have a special material, and that we French will no longer 
 have the help of the privateers that, taken all together, formed 
 the most numerous part of the commerce-destroying fleet. As 
 far as the means for attacking commerce are concerned, the navy 
 of to-day, therefore, affords resources for commerce destroying 
 inferior to those of former times. 
 
 Will we, at least, find compensation on the side of commerce 
 itself? It does not seem so. 
 
 With steam navigation, merchant ships will be more difficult to 
 find, because they are no longer to the same extent as formerly 
 
 207
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 obliged to make land at the limits that mark the turning points of 
 commercial routes.'" 
 
 Moreover, although British commerce has increased in great 
 proportions, the number of ships that transport it has diminished, 
 because their capacity has largely increased. 
 
 There is also another factor that will sensibly afifect the results 
 of war upon commerce. 
 
 Formerly, neutral commerce was of small importance, and when 
 it fell into the way of our privateers it was always lawful prize 
 under pretence of carrying contraband of war. As the nations to 
 which it belonged had no navies to support their claims, neutrals 
 borrowed the English flag to enjoy its protection.'** But to-day 
 England no longer has an exclusive monopoly of maritime trans- 
 portation, and in time of war this circumstance will be useful to 
 her. We shall be obliged to be mindful of the susceptibilities of 
 neutral powers, in order not to indispose towards us navies as 
 strong as those of Germany and the United States. A part of 
 the products indispensable to Great Britain will sail under neutral 
 colors. Under this aegis, commodities will come to be heaped up 
 in the storehouses of Germany, Belgium and Holland, whence 
 they will only have to cross an easily guarded arm of the sea. 
 
 Finally, the economic conditions of the life of nations have been 
 profoundly altered in a century and have their retro-action upon 
 the duration of conflicts. But commerce destroying, from its very 
 nature, requires a certain period of time ; time is necessary to 
 make its influence felt and, by the privations it engenders, to deter- 
 mine in the country that suffers from them a current of opinion 
 favorable to peace. Can war last long nowadays, seeing the sacri- 
 fices that it exacts ? For France it will entail an absolute stoppage 
 of maritime transportation ; the colonies will be completely iso- 
 lated ; the great commercial ports will remain deserted. At the 
 
 "^ Cape Finisterre and Cape Saint Vincent, for example, see a great 
 number of ships pass daily; but as soon as it is known that there are 
 privateers there, they will keep well out to sea, and all those vessels that 
 during peace are to be found concentrated along a single line will be dis- 
 persed over a width of 50 or even 100 miles. Sailing ships, on account of 
 their crude methods of navigating, could not dispense with making land 
 at certain capes. 
 
 ^" This is a truly extraordinary fact and shows to what an extent English 
 commerce was protected. 
 
 208
 
 I 
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 same time we shall lose our best customer, which is England her- 
 self. How long will such an abnormal condition be able to en- 
 dure ? Is it not to be feared that in seeking, by a prolonged effort, 
 to make the English die of hunger, we shall ourselves succumb 
 to starvation? 
 
 In truth, neither the steam navy nor the economic conditions of 
 the nations can bring to commerce destroying the elements of 
 success that have been wanting to it in the past. 
 
 But perhaps we have not known how to practise it. 
 
 Commerce destroying is a guerilla warfare carried on upon an 
 immense plain : the sea. This plain is furrowed by the commercial 
 routes that merchant ships follow. If we trace these routes on a 
 chart, we observe that in certain regions traffic is very dense, and 
 especially so in the vicinity of England's shores. Let us now 
 shade all the places where traffic is concentrated. All the shaded 
 parts constitute the field of action of commerce destroyers ; they 
 are attracted there as larks by a mirror. 
 
 So long as they remain sole masters of the field, they operate 
 quite at their ease, and, if affairs continue in this state, there is no 
 doubt but that results will accord with forecasts ; but as soon as 
 hostile cruisers hasten there the situation is altered. 
 
 Part of the commerce destroyers succumb ; the rest quit their 
 field of action. The latter are then obliged to fall back upon other 
 regions less frequented, where they are still pursued, and, finally, 
 those that escape take refuge in waters so deserted that their cap- 
 tures have no effect upon the enemy. 
 
 There are, therefore, likewise fields of battle in warfare upon 
 commerce, just as in no matter what system of war ; the only 
 difference is that they are very extensive. If they are easy to take 
 possession of, they will be the more difficult to keep ; and there as 
 elsewhere advantage will rest with numbers — that is, will be Eng- 
 land's. 
 
 Naturally, vast regions cannot be swept clear in an instant ; 
 time and method will be needful. It is for this reason that com- 
 merce destroying always passes through a period of great profit at 
 the beginning of a war ; but bitter disillusions will come from bas- 
 ing calculations on the results of the early phases of hostilities. 
 
 The weak points in commerce destroying are now apparent. 
 
 In order that it may be efficacious, it is necessary not only to 
 occupy the field, but also to remain master of it by force. Well, it 
 
 209
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 has not succeeded in the past precisely because neither privateers 
 nor flying squadrons were of sufficient strength. 
 
 If we admit that England will not let herself be starved to 
 death without using every possible eftort to feed herself, we are 
 forced to this same conclusion in spite of ourselves. 
 
 Let us first fix upon the type of commerce destroyer to adopt, 
 for they cannot be improvised on the day when war is declared. 
 
 Looking at commerce destroying from our former point of view, 
 we need a vessel whose principal qualities are speed and radius 
 of action. These two elements can only be obtained at the ex- 
 pense of armament and protection, and thus we shall have the 
 Guichen type. 
 
 This vessel, in the presence of a hostile cruiser, has not two 
 courses to follow : there is but a single one : to flee. The next step 
 would be to examine the effects produced upon the results of 
 commerce destroying by the necessity of keeping constantly on 
 the qtd-vive and abandoning one's cruising ground to avoid being 
 captured ; but, without going so far, it is more than doubtful if 
 speed will guarantee impunity to the commerce destroyer, since 
 he has other things to do besides fleeing; he is there to stop 
 merchant ships and this obligation will put him in constant 
 danger. 
 
 Let us try to take account of what would happen. 
 
 We are cruising on board the Guichen. Smoke is seen on the 
 horizon; we run down towards it. Is it a freighter? or is it a 
 hostile cruiser? 
 
 It is a freighter. A shot is fired across her bows. She stops. 
 A boat is lowered and takes a boarding officer to examine her 
 papers. 
 
 The vessel is English and so is good prize. A prize crew is put 
 on board and she is sent to France."' 
 
 The Guichen resumes her cruising. 
 
 A second smoke appears. This time it is a fast vessel ; with the 
 telescope three funnels are seen rising above the horizon, and the 
 ship approaches rapidly. 
 
 Is it not a cruiser? The captain becomes cautious; he con- 
 siders whether he shall take to his heels. 
 
 "' Or she might be sunk after taking off her crew. 
 
 210
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 At this instant the vessel changes course ; she has seen us and 
 wishes to fly. Full speed. 
 
 The Guichen fires a shot. It is a lucky one ; the shell, fired at 
 extreme range, falls close by the steamer, which at once stops and 
 turns her broadside to show she has done so. 
 
 The same formalities as before take place. 
 
 But, while the prize is being manned, which threatens to take a 
 long time, since it is necessary to transship part of the personnel, a 
 third smoke is seen to appear. It is another big ship, doubtless a 
 German transatlantic liner : she has four funnels. But no, she 
 heads for the Guichen. Malediction ! It is an enemy cruiser that 
 was following the steamer ; we have fallen into a snare. Fire up, 
 full speed ahead, and let us fly from her. 
 
 At what distance will the commerce destroyer recognize the 
 cruiser? When guns were only effective up to 500 meters one 
 could always take flight well before being within cannon shot, but 
 now .... At 6000 meters it is hard to tell an English cruiser 
 from a liner ; for France is the only country that has given its 
 vessels that long snout which reveals their identity from far ofif. 
 Thus, our commerce destroyer, before she is under full head of 
 steam, will already see shell raining about her ; and, as she has 
 neither guns (or so few as to count for nothing) nor protection, 
 there are nine chances in ten she wall be hit and have her speed 
 reduced. And then she is lost.'^ 
 
 And at night what is to be done? No doubt boarding vessels 
 ought not to be practised,*** but it will be impossible to guard 
 against disagreeable encounters. 
 
 In truth these vessels that will have the double care of w^atch- 
 ing for merchant ships — to stop them — and for warships — to 
 escape from them — seem to me of no account. It is to be feared 
 that anxiety for self-preservation, which is here a necessity, will 
 outweigh desire to capture commerce, and the results of the raid 
 will thereby be sensibly affected. 
 
 It may be admitted that commerce destroyers ought not seek 
 to fight, but none the less they will often be obliged to make a 
 stand, and it is not permissible that they should be constantly com- 
 pelled to interrupt their cruising or to abandon prizes. 
 
 "* There will happen what happened to the Rurik. 
 
 '" Which in itself will let 50% of the commerce escape.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Therefore commerce destroyers must have means equivalent to 
 those of cruisers ; that is why the Guichcn and Chateau-Renault 
 are absokitely unfit for the role that is assii^^ned them. 
 
 This conclusion seems now to be admitted ; the navy, after hav- 
 ing sacrificed 32,000,000 francs (actually thirty-two millions) to 
 meet the views of partisans of commerce destroying", has re- 
 nounced this type of ship to take up with armored cruisers. 
 
 Superiority of speed, that superiority which is counted upon, 
 quite wrongly, to give escape from all bad places, therefore, no 
 longer exists in fact. As we have already said, no power holds a 
 monopoly of speed. This can only be obtained by developing 
 motive power at the expense of military power, and to equal forces 
 will correspond sensibly equal speeds. 
 
 If we seek an increase of strength by an increase of displace- 
 ment,"" France may have on the stocks an unrivaled vessel, like 
 the Jeanne-d'Arc, but she will be immediately followed, caught 
 up with and distanced. In this race of displacements, she will not 
 be able to pretend to possess a collection of cruisers of a mean 
 value equal to that of the English cruisers. 
 
 It is not to our interest, moreover, to seek the *' stronger," 
 which necessarily ends in the " bigger." Since commerce destroy- 
 ing is advocated as an economical system of making war and 
 since, from its very nature, it demands a great number of vessels, 
 it is an absurdity to practise it with instruments no less costly than 
 battleships. Yet despite ourselves we are drawn into the fatal 
 downward path by solicitude not to be gotten the better of, and 
 to be convinced of this it suffices to measure the advance made 
 from the Diipuy-de-Lome to the Jeanne-d'Arc. While the latter 
 was struggling through her trials, the English were already able 
 to oppose to her the cruisers Bacchante, Cressy, Hague and Sutlej 
 of 900 tons greater displacement. The Leon-Gambetta of 12,500 
 tons was then begun, but the Good-Hope of 14,100 tons was in 
 service before her. So a cruiser of 16,000 tons is talked of. And 
 who make such a proposition ? The partisans of commerce de- 
 
 ""This is the method employed by the Americans in 1812. Intervening 
 in the midst of a war carried on with instruments and methods long in use, 
 they opposed to the English frigates a stronger and better armed pattern 
 of frigate. That was the cause of some successes that they obtained in 
 minor operations.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 stroying, those who have not ceased to protest against a navy of 
 floating millions, the adversaries of "leviathans.""' 
 
 From this fact may be judged how complex the problem of 
 commerce destroying, so simple in its conception, becomes when 
 an attempt is made to apply it. Even if we devote all our re- 
 sources to building cruisers, we will never have more than a very 
 restricted number of such dimensions. 
 
 See then what will happen. 
 
 Disposing of only a small number of vessels, we shall be still 
 more imperatively than our ancestors under the necessity of going 
 to seek merchant ships in regions where traffic is very dense ; and 
 we will send our commerce destroyers to cruise upon fixed lines 
 which will thus become barriers."^ 
 
 It is easy to see that England will not let them operate in peace 
 without doing anything. Disposing of a greater number of cruis- 
 ers, she will launch them in pursuit of ours, a part of which will 
 be captured : the rest will have to evacuate a region where there 
 will no longer be any safety for them."^ 
 
 Yet it will be very necessary to return there, for if our cruisers 
 undertake to traverse the seas without system, they will separate 
 themselves from the zones of concentration of commerce and the 
 number of their prizes will at once fall very considerably. They 
 will still inflict upon the enemy losses, but they will only amount to 
 4 per cent or 5 per cent of his total commerce."* 
 
 '^^ Our battleships are as yet only of 14,800 tons. 
 
 ^'"' The only precise suggestion that is to be found in writings upon 
 commerce destroying as to the way to employ cruisers, is that they be 
 sent to cruise on the lines Ouessant to Cape Lizard and Oucssant to Cape 
 Clear. It does not seem that this disposition would produce serious results 
 in the Channel (leaving out of account hostile cruisers). Merchant ships 
 will follow the English coast, and the whole southern part of the Channel 
 will be deserted. (See on this subject C. Ballard's work: Dc la Protec- 
 tion du commerce en temps de guerre.) 
 
 "^ The presence of cruisers cannot remain unknown. Ship-owners know 
 the route followed by their vessels ; they are notified by telegraph at each 
 port of call. The least delay of receipt of a telegram will indicate the 
 presence of the enemy between two stopping points. Neutral vessels that 
 cross the cruising grounds of the enemj' will not fail to relate what they 
 have seen, and the English consuls will inform their government. Finally, 
 in certain regions, the sending of cruisers will not be delayed until com- 
 merce destroyers have made known their exploits. 
 
 ^"^ And this deficit will easily be made up by neutral commerce. 
 
 213
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Thenceforth commerce destroying will have been truly bank- 
 rupted. Not only will it not have attained its object, which is to 
 starve England, but it will have left us wholly disarmed against 
 all the enterprises of the enemy, who will take our colonies one by 
 one ; it will only discount a war tax that we will repay when peace 
 is made. 
 
 Another method will then be sought, which, by increasing the 
 strength of the commerce destroyers, will permit them to main- 
 tain themselves on the cruising ground. For single cruisers, 
 groups of two or three cruisers will be substituted ; and even, for 
 full measure, they should be accompanied by a few light vessels. 
 The object of these divisions will be to hold their own on the 
 cruising ground while the light vessels spread about them, hunt- 
 ing for merchant ships. 
 
 Already the principle of commerce destroying is altered. Its 
 action is decomposed. On the one hand, a division representing 
 the idea of force ; on the other, light vessels which depend upon it 
 not to be captured by the enemy's single cruisers."' 
 
 For a time these new arrangements will disturb the enemy's 
 plans, but after a few days he will follow the movement and adopt 
 a like distribution of forces. Ours will end, therefore, by being 
 taken, as Decres' divisions were, if they are not reinforced in 
 time, and thus, from thread to needle, we shall be led to collect, in 
 regions constituting fields of battle of commerce destroying, all 
 the forces at our disposal, of whatever nature, in order to remain 
 in control. 
 
 Thus commerce destroying, which starts out to be a war of 
 skirmishers, would in the long run end in a war of squadrons, if 
 sufficient means were available to prolong the struggle in- 
 definitely. 
 
 From the moment that two adversaries contend for a field, each 
 of them despite himself is led to outbid the other so as to remain 
 master of it, until all the resources, on each side, have been ex- 
 hausted. The encounter of two masses is, therefore, not the result 
 of a more or less correct conception — it is a consequence of the 
 state of war,"" 
 
 ^'"^ These auxiliaries have no need of either a considerable displacement 
 or fighting strength. 
 
 "" Whether we wish it or not, we shall never be able to attack an assem- 
 blage of forces except with the aid of another assemblage of forces; and 
 
 214
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 We have a striking proof of this in the Dutch-EngHsh wars. 
 
 No struggle between nations has had to an equal degree the 
 character of an economic conflict. Between England and Hol- 
 land, the destruction of commerce was not, as it was later on for 
 France, a means ; it was the very object of the war. The question 
 at issue was to whom should belong the monopoly of maritime 
 commerce. Nevertheless, no other war ofters us the spectacle of 
 so great a number of pitched battles and the assemblage of such 
 great miasses. And the two adversaries did not come thus to con- 
 tend in the lists with fixed determination through a tacit under- 
 standing. They were led there despite themselves, by insensible 
 degrees, because they could not do otherwise. And what proves 
 it is that the concentrations took place especially at the end of 
 each war, after each side had fruitlessly endeavored to attack and 
 protect commerce directly. 
 
 Here then is how we look at industrial warfare. 
 
 The objective is to prevent merchant ships from leaving ports 
 without being captured and to arrest in passage those that are 
 entering them. Against England, therefore, it would be necessarv 
 to occupy in force the Channel, the North Sea and St. George's 
 Channel, and to station there squadrons in sufficient number to 
 hold their ground while light vessels radiate from them.'" There 
 would necessarily result battles in which we would be worsted, 
 because, receiving the onset instead of provoking it, we would be 
 beaten in detail. 
 
 Practically, therefore, it is necessary to abandon temporarily 
 commerce destroying and to employ our forces in defeating squad- 
 rons, not in the Channel or the North Sea, but on the field of 
 
 » 
 
 battle that offers us the greatest chance of success. If we are 
 conquerors, we will then bring our forces back to the field of com- 
 merce destroying, and occup}' it in sufficient strength to prevent 
 the remnants of the hostile scjuadrons from driving us ofit'.'°' As 
 
 we are compelled to collect vessels in squadrons to be the stronger or as 
 little weak as possible. 
 
 ^" But, then, it is no longer necessary to construct a special tj-pe of 
 vessel. 
 
 ^°* Though one be not strong enough to carry the field of battle to the 
 vicinity of the enemy's coasts, which is the point where merchant ships 
 converge, at least all traffic will have been stopped short in the region 
 where one has superiority. Suppose a victory in the Mediterranean so 
 
 2IS
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 may be seen, in this case as in all others, the final object will only 
 be attained after a contest ; it will be the fruit of victory. 
 
 I anticipate the objection here: we shall be beaten. 
 
 It is probable. When a navv has allowed itself to be distracted 
 from its objective by devoting^ its resources to the chimerical pur- 
 suit of direct defense of the coast and to the Utopia of commerce 
 destroying, it finds itself taken unaware when it is obliged to 
 descend into the arena ; but if we could restore to the offensive 
 and to battle all that has been taken from them, we would have a 
 strength so formidable that the strongest navy would not engage 
 in a struggle against us without apprehension. None the less we 
 would be the actual inferior. Even so, what then? That would 
 not prove that guerilla warfare can be carried on in an open, level 
 country, nor that the necessity of fighting can be evaded, whether 
 one be strong or weak. War would verily be too easy if a formula 
 were enough to cause the specter of the English Navy to dis- 
 appear. And I confess, to my shame, that there is something I 
 cannot comprehend when I hear this theory sustained that com- 
 merce can be destroyed without having to fight with those who 
 defend it. 
 
 Between advocates and opponents of commerce destroying 
 there is no difference of opinion as to the best method of warfare 
 to adopt, but only as to the best way of carrying it out.'™ Ought 
 we attack directly property afloat or is it necessary first to aim at 
 the military forces that are the safeguard of that property? The 
 whole question lies there. 
 
 Here we are then back at our point of departure ; for if refer- 
 ence is made to the opening of this study, it will be seen that this is 
 the question that arose fti the first days of modern naval warfare. 
 
 So, for a centurv and a half, maritime nations have dispensed 
 treasures of energy to reach discovery of the most efficient way 
 to destroy maritime wealth, and to-day it is proposed that we 
 should make the same experiment over again at our own expense. 
 It is because France has never been willing to admit, or has not 
 been able to perceive the lesson revealed by events, because for so 
 
 complete as to force the English to evacuate it ; eight or ten ships of any 
 sort, even wooden, will suffice to cut the Mediterranean in two between 
 Tunis and Sardinia, Corsica and Provence, and to stop all merchant ships. 
 "* For, commerce destroying leading to the ends of war, there is no 
 reason to reject the principle of it. 
 
 216
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 long a time she has recommenced history with each new war. 
 Persisting in indefinitely pleading the same process, she has al- 
 ways lost it, because the cause was bad. 
 
 Does this mean that there is nothing to gain from direct attack 
 upon the riches scattered over all the seas of the earth? 
 
 Perhaps there is, but only on condition that it is made a second- 
 ary operation, with the object of immobilizing at small expense a 
 large number of the enemy's vessels. 
 
 We have said that it was the necessity of always keeping the 
 same cruising grounds that ruined the privateers ; but if it is no 
 longer sought to starve the enemy, if we limit ourselves to threat- 
 ening his property so as to compel him to protect it, it is apparent 
 that very mobile divisions can appear in a region which they 
 know to be temporarily unprotected ; then, after having made their 
 presence felt so as to attract the enemy, they can suddenly change 
 their field of action and appear at another point far away. Then 
 the enemy, arriving too late, will remain on the spot for fear of a 
 return to the attack. Evidently the necessity of constantly moving 
 about and of traversing great unoccupied stretches of sea will 
 never permit doing enough harm to commerce to seriously afifect 
 the fate of the war ; but if there can thus be created a sufficiently 
 important diversion to turn the enemy aside from attack upon our 
 colonies, which our foreign stations are too weak to defend, if, 
 above all, he is forced to detach part of his cruisers from his 
 squadrons, the general operations will have been seconded. 
 
 We come thus to a system which resembles that of the light 
 divisions of the First Empire, but which must be perfected so as 
 not to reach the same result. Those divisions ended by disin- 
 tegrating, for lack of maintenance ; for losses always occur in a 
 naval force on active service, even when it does not meet the 
 enemy (which one can never be sure of) ; moreover, even though 
 moving about, they delayed too long in a single region and ended 
 by being come up with. 
 
 In order to avoid these disadvantages, it is necessary that our 
 divisions be more mobile and that they be strengthened in per- 
 manent fashion by mutual co-operation. 
 
 But the effect of these dispositions can have but a limited dura- 
 tion ; at the end of a certain time the enemy will always finish by 
 seeing into our game and by. getting at the commerce destroyers. 
 They will produce their effect, therefore, especially at the begin- 
 
 217
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 ning of a war, before the system of defense has been organized ; 
 if they escape long enough to enable decisive blows to be struck 
 on another field, the object will have been attained. 
 
 But it would be a mistake to weaken oneself by building a 
 special material for this sort of diversion, or to employ in it ships 
 of the first class. Everything indicates that the ships on foreign 
 stations should be devoted to this role. To that end let us assign 
 to such stations vessels of reasonable characteristics, not wooden 
 ships without speed, and especially without radius of action. 
 
 =1-- 
 
 We cannot close this chapter, written before the Russo-Japan- 
 ese w^ar, without adding to it the conclusions to be drawn from 
 that conflict in respect of commerce destroying. 
 
 The belligerents adopted different attitudes with regard to the 
 destruction of commerce. 
 
 Japan occupied herself first with securing freedom of the sea, 
 and completely neglected attacks upon commerce. She only 
 began to stop commerce by cutting ofif access to the two Russian 
 ports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur after there were no more 
 hostile ships to fight. 
 
 Russia preferred to divide her efforts ; she wished to carry on 
 concurrently militar}^ action wath the Port Arthur squadron and 
 commercial action with the Vladivostok cruisers. She thus 
 w^eakened herself in the principal theater of operations without 
 doing appreciable damage to Japan ; since the cruiser division, 
 pursued from the moment its presence was revealed by captures, 
 was obliged to quit its field of operations and hastened to return 
 to port. 
 
 One fine day there happened what must inevitably happen : the 
 cruisers had to accept battle and one of them succumbed. From 
 that moment it was all over with commerce destroying. 
 
 What a lesson for the advocates of war upon commerce ! 
 
 218
 
 IV. 
 
 Blockades. 
 
 Blockades consist of stationing in the vicinity of a port a naval 
 force charged with watching its approaches so that no vessel can 
 enter or leave without being seen and pursued. 
 
 The system of blockading dates from the wars of the Revolu- 
 tion and Empire. Until then France had often seen English fleets 
 cruising ofif Ouessant to watch the going out of our ships or to 
 intercept the Levant contingent on its arrival ; but these appear- 
 ances were only momentary, and they never had either the per- 
 manence or the duration that characterize true blockades. Under 
 the Monarchy, vessels had not yet acquired the nautical qualities, 
 the endurance and the self-dependence necessary to guard the 
 entrance of a hostile port in all seasons and through all weathers. 
 We know, moreover, that fleets were accustomed to disarm at the 
 end of the autumn ; so that naval operations only lasted for a few 
 months and began again on a new basis each spring. 
 
 These customs had a direct influence on the fitting out of ships 
 and on the rules of naval warfare. Fleets of many ships never had 
 enough provisions for cruises of considerable duration ; vessels 
 were not arranged to carry great quantities of food and water, 
 and to that cause should be attributed the epidemics that so often 
 flourished on board of them and hindered their operations. 
 
 When, in 1793, a new period of naval wars opened, which until 
 1814 was only broken by the short peace of Amiens, the nautical 
 art was already in evident progress. The hydrography of the 
 most frequented shores was better known, and the long voyages 
 of exploration undertaken after the American war had brought 
 about modifications in the construction of ships that made them 
 more manageable instruments ; at the same time there were formed 
 officers and crews capable of encountering the elements instead of 
 letting themselves be enslaved by them. 
 
 But it was the special character assumed by the war which, 
 more than any other cause, forced England to enter upon a new 
 way. The government of the Revolution did not conceal its in- 
 tention of taking up on the sea the gage flung down by England, 
 
 219
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 just as it had not feared to stand up against all the continental 
 powers on land ; and it had proved, by Hoche's abortive attempt 
 in Ireland, by General Humbert's expedition and by that to 
 Egypt, that it would not stop at the most risky operations and 
 also the most unexpected. 
 
 Little anxious to experience again so disagreeable a surprise as 
 the conquest of Egypt, fearing all from a nation so enterprising, 
 uneasy lest she might see renewed on the ocean, and at her ex- 
 pense, the prodigies that national enthusiasm had raised up on 
 land, England saw herself forced to abandon the old methods that 
 until then had sufficed to give her dominion over the sea and to 
 guarantee the safety of her territory. For a new situation, new 
 means were necessary. And it was then that she thought of para- 
 lyzing our navy and that of our allies by holding the fleets shut 
 up in port. According to an expression now in use, she aspired 
 to carry her frontier to the enemy's shores ; and, behind that 
 frontier, the sea would belong to her. 
 
 What is stranger is that after having conceived this gigantic 
 plan she succeeded in realizing it, if not completely, at least in an 
 efficient form. 
 
 But the Admiralty did not have recourse to this extreme means 
 at the very first by intuition ; the necessity of it appeared little by 
 little. The war began on the old basis ; the squadrons of the two 
 sides went out and in without being watched ; they encountered 
 one another when opposing interests led them to the same place. 
 
 But when Villaret-Joyeuse is beaten at Groix, at the end of 
 June, 1795, Bridport, who has a convoy of emigres to land at 
 Ouiberon, blockades him at Lorient. The blockade lasted till the 
 day when the Count d'Artois left the island of Yeu, definitely 
 renouncing putting foot in France. It had lasted five months. 
 
 It was an indication. From this moment Brest is constantly 
 watched ; but the bulk of the English forces continue on station 
 in England. The sortie of Morard de Galle, with a fleet of 45 
 ships, shows the need of a stricter watch ; and after 1797 the look- 
 outs of Ouessant, save for short intervals, will lose sight of the 
 English fleet no more. 
 
 The blockade w^as extended to Toulon, Rochefort and Lorient 
 in succession ; then, as new enemies threw themselves into the 
 arena, it enveloped the Texel, Ferrol and Cadiz. The English 
 Nav^■ has never done anything greater.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 To form an idea of the effort required by such a task, the situa- 
 tion of these squadrons must be imagined, cruising far from any 
 base, during entire years, winter and summer, and threatened at 
 each instant with being driven upon a hostile coast by an on-shore 
 gale. 
 
 The solution adopted by England was not perfect. It was 
 exempt neither from disadvantages nor from dangers ; but under 
 the circumstances it was still the best. 
 
 At first the blockades were never permanent ; bad weather al- 
 ways ended by sweeping away the blockading force and opening 
 the entrance to our ports. Bruix and Ganteaume in this way were 
 enabled to go out from Brest ; Brueys and Villeneuve from Tou- 
 lon. And the success that seemed to favor these admirals, at the 
 beginning of their operations, might make us doubt the efficacy 
 of blockades. But when we reflect that the war lasted twenty 
 years, we are astounded that during such a lapse of time our 
 squadrons were able to find only five or six opportunities of escap- 
 ing". And, furthermore, under what conditions? The bad weather 
 that drove ofif the English squadron visited our ships as soon as 
 they went out ; and as their long inaction inside had not prepared 
 them to struggle with the elements, their mission, scarcely begun, 
 was endangered. The xery tempest that permitted Morard de 
 Galle to leave Brest dispersed his ships. Bruix likewise saw his 
 ships dispersed, and it is a miracle that he was able to reassemble 
 them. Villeneuve experiences such damage on his sortie from 
 Toulon that he is forced to return. 
 
 In order to realize how vigorous the blockades of this period 
 were, we must call to mind that our squadrons, and particularly 
 those of Brest and Ferrol, remained in port whole years when 
 they should have been constantly at sea, only returning to port 
 for supplies or after an action. We ought also to take into con- 
 sideration the complete stoppage of all coastwise communications, 
 which made it very difficult to supply and provision our ports.""* 
 
 160 a -pj^g distress of the ports was extreme ; it was impossible to replace 
 the anchor cables that had been carried away by heavy weather in the 
 roadstead (l79S)." "During the whole summer this obstinate blockade 
 that reduces the port of Brest to extreme want is kept up. The fortunate 
 arrival, on January 14, of a convoy from Nantes that succeeds in escaping 
 the English cruisers is all that prevents a famine (1797)." "Until the 
 abandonment of the plan of an expedition under Bonaparte, rope will be
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 One of the advantages, and not the least one, of the blockades 
 was the moral ascendency that they gave to the blockaders. By 
 everywhere rnshing to meet the enemy, challenging- him to com- 
 bat, England showed her superiority and demoralized her adver- 
 saries. She did not hesitate to take advantage of this situation to 
 diminish, in cases of urgency, the strength of her blockading 
 forces.^"' The English ended by having such self-confidence that 
 they ceased to take precautions any longer ; they anchored in our 
 roadsteads and set up their rigging there.'" 
 
 Let us now consider the dangers that flow from the system of 
 blockades. 
 
 All the English forces were scattered and isolated from one 
 another, without powder to sustain each other ; so that if one of 
 our squadrons succeeded in escaping and all trace of it was lost, 
 it could fall unexpectedly upon one of the blockading squadrons 
 of less force and free the blockaded ships ; during this interval the 
 detachments sent in pursuit in wrong directions would be wholly 
 out of touch with the operations.'"' After that the whole system 
 would go to pieces like a house of cards. England had the good 
 luck to escape this danger, but she owed it only to the disorganiza- 
 tion of our navy and to the deadly fear that her ships inspired in 
 our admirals, wdiich would tend to demonstrate to us that under 
 normal conditions it would have been necessary to renounce block- 
 ading. Two examples will make us see this. 
 
 lacking at Brest, and ships will remain unable to get under way because 
 they have been unable to secure cables for their anchors." " Brest not 
 receiving anything was now in straits (1799)." (" Le Blocus de Brest de 
 1793 a 1805," Revue d'Histoire, October, 1902.) 
 
 '^ The Dutch were the only ones who dared deliberately to offer battle 
 to the squadron blockading the Texel (Camperdown). 
 
 "* Admiral Ganteaume, at the instigation of one of his captains, consid- 
 ered taking advantage of this negligence to attack the English squadron 
 in the anchorage of Douarnenez, but he did not carry out his plan. 
 
 ^^ Thus Calder stays in the West Indies five months looking for Gan- 
 teaume, who was in the Mediterranean, and Bridport went to seek Bruix 
 on the Irish coast. At the moment when Villeneuve left the Mediterra- 
 nean, the order had been given to detach ten ships from the Channel to 
 pursue him. If the order had not been countermanded as soon as it was 
 known that Nelson had decided to go to the West Indies on his own 
 responsibility, the forces that were watching Ganteaume would have been 
 reduced to verv little.
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 We have already seen that Bruix, after having left Brest with- 
 out being followed by Bridport, appeared suddenly before Cadiz. 
 Lord Keith was blockading- Mazzaredo there. Bruix could oppose 
 25 ships to 18. Logically he ought to carry off a brilliant success. 
 But it was needful to fight ; he did not do it. Therefore, the 
 maneuver had no serious consequences, but it might have had 
 such, if 25 French ships iiad been able to beat 18 English ships. 
 
 Later, Villeneuve, who was returning from the West Indies 
 after having escaped the blockade of Toulon, fell upon Calder, 
 who was blockading Ferrol. The same disproportion of forces : 
 20 ships against 15. If Calder had been beaten, the blockades of 
 Brest and Rochefort would have been broken, but he was the 
 victor ! ! ! Such a result is disconcerting.'^* 
 
 The situation of all these squadrons was so perilous that his- 
 tory has recorded the apprehensions of the English admirals. 
 " Calder," wrote Collingwood, " is reduced to a skeleton." 
 
 At this period, everybody in France, Napoleon included, had 
 complete contempt for the consequences entailed upon each side by 
 the system of blockades. The current opinion was that the English 
 were wearing themselves out in thus keeping the sea while we 
 were maintaining our material in good condition. Certainly such 
 perpetual cruising entailed excessive fatigue ; certainly the ships 
 were greatly taxed ; but this cruising formed incomparable crews 
 and officers. The monotony of this duty, the continual watchful- 
 ness, exasperated the men, but they engendered a state of mind 
 that favored the Admiralty's designs. Each one saw the end of 
 his sufferings only in a battle which, by suppressing the cause, 
 would suppress the effect ; an encounter came thus to be ardently 
 desired. Thenceforth victory was assured. 
 
 Our squadrons, on the contrary, were worn out with inaction ; 
 the ships, manned by green crews, put to sea only to be the sport 
 of the elements ; the least bit of a gale reduced them to the state 
 of wrecks. Between the crews of the two nations there was the 
 
 ^" Here is a third example that we have not referred to because it has 
 not the same bearing. Admiral Willaumez leaves Brest on February 21, 
 1809, to break the blockades of Lorient and Rochefort. He succeeds, but 
 allows the two hostile blockading forces to escape. Would he have done 
 this if our ships had been as well handled as those of the English? 
 
 223
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 difference that exists between the newly enUsted soldier and the 
 veteran whose arms are rusted and garments worn. 
 
 Blockades were not carried out everywhere in the same manner. 
 
 At Brest, under Bridport and Cornwallis, the bulk of the forces 
 remained off Ouessant, while a light squadron that was called the 
 Inshore Squadron was stationed in the Iroise, pushing in as far 
 as the narrow entrance and placing some vessels in the Bay of 
 Douarnenez to watch the Sein Race. When the weather was fine, 
 the fleet anchored at the entrance of the Iroise or at Douarnenez. 
 Finally, a certain number of ships went periodically to an English 
 dockyard to be repaired and resupplied. 
 
 When Nelson was charged w'ith the blockade of Toulon, in 
 1803, he proceeded differently. He stayed off the port with all 
 his forces during an entire month ; then he withdrew to Magda- 
 lena to give his crews a rest, leaving only some frigates on guard. 
 The line of conduct adopted by Nelson was perhaps imposed 
 upon him by the circumstances ; in any event, it was thoroughly 
 accordant with the opinion he held concerning his role. He main- 
 tained, in his letters to the Admiralty, that his object was not to 
 prevent the French from coming out, but only to fight them if 
 they did come out. This way of looking at things was the correct 
 one, for, if he succeeded in meeting our ships at sea and in de- 
 stroying them, the question was settled in the Mediterranean, and 
 the forces employed in blockading became available for other uses ; 
 but it was necessary, nevertheless, to maintain a sufficient guard 
 not to let the blockaded force get wholly away. And this was not 
 done. 
 
 On a first occasion Villeneuve was able to go out and to return 
 three days later without being molested ; and on a second Nelson 
 went in a wrong direction to look for him. Therefore, Magdalena 
 was a base too far removed from Toulon. 
 
 Moreover, it is not clear how frigates could cruise with im- 
 punity off Toulon without being supported by their squadron. 
 There are always, in a naval force, vessels of speed greater than 
 the rest ; nothing v.'ould have been easier than to send out some 
 ships at night, without lights, to bring the English frigates to a 
 stand against the coast and to force them to fight. If Villeneuve 
 
 224
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 had persistently pursued the scouts that watched him during 
 Nelson's absence, the latter would have had to take them with 
 him whenever he withdrew to Magdalena. Nor does it appear 
 that Villeneuve thought of profiting by the enemy's absence to go 
 out arid put his vessels through exercises which they certainly 
 greatly needed before taking the sea. 
 
 With steam navies all thought of blockading disappeared. At 
 first, no possibility was seen of making long cruises with vessels 
 that had but a small supply of coal and whose machinery was fre- 
 quently in need of overhauling. The blockade of a hostile port 
 verv near the English coasts, such as Brest, alone would have 
 been possible ; and it would still have been necessary to employ 
 forces at least double those blockaded. 
 
 Long years passed thus, but a day came when English publi- 
 cists, supported by politician admirals, gave warning that England 
 was without defense. Pamphlets set forth the invasion of British 
 soil, London besieged, the navy annihilated, etc. 
 
 It has always been enough to press the spring of invasion to 
 open the purse of the islanders. Such was the origin of the 
 enormous development of the English fleet. When they had 
 ships, they took thought how to use them and quite naturally came 
 back to the old ways that had proved their efficiency ; but then a 
 new element had to be reckoned with — the torpedo-boat. 
 
 This latter, when it first appeared, did not have very brilliant 
 nautical qualities ; scarcely could it quit the immediate neighbor- 
 hood of the shore. Built to attack battleships by surprise, it had 
 no chance of encountering them unless they themselves came 
 within reach of its blows. Blockades were, therefore, particularly 
 favorable to the employment of torpedo-boats, and, in purposing 
 to watch our battleships, England risked losing her own. These 
 considerations determined the construction of the flotilla of de- 
 stroyers. But if danger from the torpedo-boat was thus dimin- 
 ished, it was not wholiv removed ; and the questions raised by the 
 use of steam remained living ones, even though improvements in 
 the economy of the machinery had considerably increased the 
 radius of action of ships. The system of distant blockade, which 
 is only an extension and perfection of Nelson's method, thus 
 came into existence. 
 
 225
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 ITerc is what it consists in. 
 
 The blockading squadron takes for a base an anchorage de- 
 fended against the approach of torpedo-boats, in proximity to the 
 hostile coast. It detaches a flotilla of destroyers to cruise in the 
 immediate vicinity of the blockaded port, supporting them with 
 a few cruisers. Finally, a line of communications connects the 
 fighting body with the advance guards, and keeps the fomicr 
 informed of the movements of the enemy. 
 
 Thus single ships that come to enter the port will run upon the 
 cruisers ; and, if the blockaded forces make a sortie in a body, they 
 will be followed by scouts that will bring the squadron into touch 
 with them. 
 
 It has even been said that England, to increase the rapidity of 
 coiumunications, has in view the laying of a cable one end of 
 which would lead on board a vessel, or perhaps onto one of our 
 sea-coast inlands. 
 
 A variation of this form of blockade consists in supporting the 
 light vessels and cruisers by a battleship division that is period- 
 ically relieved. 
 
 Thus, for example, to blockade our Northern squadron in Brest, 
 the English squadron would take the Scilly Islands as base of 
 operations (it is said to be for this purpose that they have been 
 made an advanced base) ; the destroyers would be stationed in the 
 Iroise, and the cruisers between Ouessant and Sein bridge, with 
 detachments in the Race and the Four ; finally, a chain of scouts 
 or a cable would connect the blockaders with their squadron. 
 
 Such, it appears (though we know nothing certain in this re- 
 spect), are the ideas that are current on the other side of the 
 Channel. liut the carrying out of this program raises many 
 objections; happily we do not lack means of opposing these 
 ingenious arrangements. 
 
 As far as direct blockade is concerned, that is not to be thought 
 of ; though the battleships may be sufficiently protected from tor- 
 pedo-boats by destroyers, to-day they must reckon with sub- 
 marines, which will go to seek them much further than is com- 
 monly supposed. These latter will find it all the easier to show 
 their power because, blockades being lengthy operations, it will 
 be allov/able to wait the most favorable conditions for attacking. 
 
 For the same reason, the idea of supporting the blockaders by 
 a battleship division must be renounced. 
 
 226
 
 I 
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The cruisers and destroyers will, therefore, find themselves face 
 to face with all the blockaded forces. They will be constantly 
 exposed to sudden sorties of the light squadron, supported by 
 some battleships, and it appears doubtful that they would always 
 succeed in withdrawing without losses. Moreover, even in the 
 case we are considering, the submarines will have a part to play. 
 Admitting that the destroyers may be safe from torpedoes (which 
 is not proved), cruisers and scouts are not ; and these vessels must 
 anticipate being blown up. 
 
 Furthermore, will the English be able to take possession of an 
 island on our coast to land a cable there? That would suppose a 
 singular incapacity on our part. And how will they keep it, unless 
 by protecting it with their entire squadron, which would mean 
 direct blockade? 
 
 No, blockades will have no more fears for us when our flotilla 
 of submarines has attained its full development. We might even 
 welcome one, at the beginning of a war, to cut ofif from the hos- 
 tile force some of its units, if there were not advantage in im- 
 pressing upon the operations the desired direction by a vigorous 
 oflfensive. 
 
 * 
 
 We cannot leave this subject without saying a few words con- 
 cerning the blockade of Santiago by the American squadron and 
 that of Port Arthur by the Japanese Navy. 
 
 Contrary to all precedents, Admiral Sampson distributed his 
 ships on an extended line that doubled the cordon of light vessels 
 and enclosed the narrow entrance of the harbor ; that is, he estab- 
 lished a military blockade upon the principle of commercial 
 blockades. 
 
 It does not seem that this method ought to be retained. It had 
 no serious consequences, because the Spaniards had made their 
 minds up not to fight : but if they had fallen in a body on one end 
 of the line, the Americans might have suffered useless losses. 
 
 Admiral Togo, on the contrary, carried out during ten months, 
 and with full success, a distant blockade, such as has been de- 
 fined above. He took as base the Elliot Islands, which are only 
 65 miles from Port Arthur, and, from this anchorage, he per- 
 manently detached his torpedo-boats and light vessels to maintain 
 
 227
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 a watch over the approaches of the port. The blockade was never 
 absolute, in the sense that a few junks loaded with provisions 
 succeeded from time to time in getting through the line of guards ; 
 but it was none the less effective as far as results go. 
 
 As the Russians had no submarines at Port Arthur, we see no 
 reason for modifying our previous conclusions. 
 
 228
 
 V. 
 
 Passages by Main Force. 
 
 The object of passages by main force is to get through the 
 passes that give access to a harbor or river. The operation is 
 always a daring one, on account of the concentration of defenses, 
 and the greatness of the result alone can justify the sacrifices it 
 entails. 
 
 Examples of this kind are not abundant ; we will content our- 
 selves with citing two that may be considered the most note- 
 worthy. 
 
 To reach Mobile, Farragut was obliged first to reduce the outer 
 works. A first attack being without result, the American admiral 
 determined to force a passage into the bay. It was not his first 
 essay of the sort, but the difficulties had never been so great. 
 
 On August 5, 1862, at 5.40 a. m., tlie Federal squadron got 
 under way. Seven corvettes, each having a gunboat lashed to it 
 on the port side, formed in column, with the corvette Brooklyn 
 in the lead ; immediately aftei: her came the flagship Hartford. 
 Four monitors formed a second column to starboard of the squad- 
 ron and consequently between the latter and Fort Morgan. 
 
 We cannot give a better account of this passage by main force 
 than by reproducing, in part, the official report of Admiral 
 Farragut : 
 
 " It was only at the urgent request of the captains and com- 
 manding officers that I yielded to the Brooklyn being the leading 
 ship of the line, as she had four chase guns and an ingenious 
 arrangement for picking up torpedoes, and because, in their judg- 
 ment, the flagship ought not to be too much exposed. This I 
 believe to be an error, for apart from the fact that exposure is one 
 of the penalties of rank in the navy, it will always be the aim of 
 the enemy to destroy the flagship, and, as will appear in the 
 sequel, such attempt was very persistently made, but Providence 
 did not permit it to be successful. 
 
 " The attacking fleet steamed steadily up the main ship channel, 
 the Tecumseh firing the first shot at 6.47. At 7.06 the fort opened 
 
 229
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 upon us and was replied to by a g-un from the Brooklyn, and 
 immediately after the action became general. 
 
 " It was soon apparent that there was some difficulty ahead. 
 The Brooklyn, for some cause which I did not then clearly under- 
 stand, but which has since been explained by Captain Alden in his 
 report, arrested the advance of the whole fleet, while at the same 
 time the guns of the fort were playing with great effect upon 
 that vessel and the Hartford. A moment after I saw the Tecum- 
 seh, struck by a torpedo, disappear almost instantaneously beneath 
 the waves, carrying with her her gallant commander and nearly 
 all her crew. I determined at once, as I had originally intended, 
 to take the lead, and after ordering the Metaconiet to send a boat 
 to save, if possible, any of the perishing crew, I dashed ahead 
 with the Hartford, and the ships followed on, their officers be- 
 lieving that they were going to a noble death with their com- 
 mander-in-chief. 
 
 " I steamed through between the buoys where the torpedoes 
 were supposed to have been sunk. These buoys had been previ- 
 ously examined by my flag-lieutenant, J. Crittenden Watson, in 
 several nightly reconnoissances. Though he had not been able 
 to discover the sunken torpedoes, yet we had been assured by 
 refugees, deserters, and others of their existence, but believing 
 that from their having been some, time in the water, they were 
 probably innocuous, I determined to take the chance of their 
 explosion. 
 
 " From the moment I turned to the northwestward to clear the 
 Middle Ground we were enabled to keep such a broadside fire 
 upon the batteries at Fort Morgan that their guns did us com- 
 paratively little injury." 
 
 " With the exception of the momentary arrest of the fleet when 
 the Hartford passed ahead, the order of battle was preserved, and 
 the ships followed each other in close order past the batteries of 
 Fort Morgan, and in comparative safety, too, with the exception 
 of the Oneida. Her boilers were penetrated by a shot from the 
 fort, which completely disabled her ; but her consort, the Galena, 
 firmly fastened to her side, brought her safely through, showing 
 clearly the wisdom of the precaution of carrying the vessels in 
 two abreast." 
 
 ********* 
 
 230
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 " Our ironclads, from their slow speed and bad steering", had 
 some difficulty in getting into and maintaining their position in 
 line as we passed the fort." 
 
 The reports of the commanding- officers attribute the com- 
 paratively small number of injuries to the rapid fire of the squad- 
 ron and the smoke, and they note that the broadsides of grape 
 delivered by several vessels as they passed close by the fort re- 
 duced entirely to silence the Confederate batteries. 
 
 The losses of the squadron amounted to 52 killed and 180 
 wounded, without counting the 120 men who went down with the 
 Tecumseh.^^'^ 
 
 The dispositions taken by Admiral Farragut are noteworthy. 
 Every naval force that may desire in the future to force a passage 
 should draw inspiration from them. 
 
 Let us now consider the feat performed by two French gun- 
 boats, of wood, with no protection. I follow the account of the 
 vessels' officers whom I had occasion to see a few days afterwards. 
 
 The Inconstant and the Comet e presented themselves at the 
 Mei-Nam bar, on July 13, 1893, on their way up to Bangkok. 
 The Inconstant called for a pilot, and met with a refusal. The 
 captain of the J ean-Baptiste-Say , a French steamer making regu- 
 lar runs between Saigon and Bangkok, went on board to act as 
 pilot and, as soon as there was enough water on the bar, the ves- 
 sels stood for the mouth of the river. 
 
 At 4000 meters the Siamese forts opened fire. Commander 
 Borie had not expected this attack ; he could still have turned 
 back, but he did not think of such a thing. His orders directed 
 him to go up to Bangkok — he executed his orders. The masts 
 were housed, magazines opened, and as soon as ready the vessels 
 replied to the fire. 
 
 As they draw near the light-ship that marks the entrance of the 
 river, a torpedo explodes ahead of the Inconstant without doing 
 her any harm. The gunboats cross the bar and pass through the 
 midst of the Siamese fleet drawn up in two lines. 
 
 Night falls. 
 
 The most difficult task had not been accomplished. It was still 
 necessary to pass at 200 meters distance under the fire of Paknam 
 fort, which is at mid-distance between Bangkok and the mouth of 
 
 "° Grasset, La Defense des cotes. 
 
 231
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the river. The Comete, which saw it first, fires a shot. The fort 
 deHvers its broadside too soon ; the boats pass. At 9 o'clock they 
 anchored ofiF the French consulate. On the following- day, at 
 colors, they dressed ship in honor of the 14th of July. Two killed, 
 three wounded. 
 
 Many officers think that under present conditions passages by 
 main force are no longer possible. The Inconstant and Comete 
 have given a striking denial of this. It may be argued, however, 
 that they had affair with Siamese and that things would have 
 happened differently with Europeans. We will be satisfied, there- 
 fore, with feeling proud of this feat of arms, without drawing 
 conclusions from it.^^ 
 
 What basis exists for interdicting the forcing of passages? 
 
 Lines of torpedoes are a hindrance ; they are not a prevention. 
 It is true that they sunk one of Farragut's vessels ; but all com- 
 bats occasion losses, and the forcing of a passage is a combat ; all 
 that is asked is to be the victor. 
 
 Coast-defense cannon are more powerful than they were forty 
 years ago ; but ships are better protected, and after all batteries 
 have no other armament than that used by ships in conflict with 
 them. Let us not forget that it is not a question here of a regular 
 contest in which the batteries must have the best of it, but of a 
 rapid passage during which a hail of fire is poured upon the works 
 to stop their fire momentarily. Well, ships are not annihilated as 
 quickly as one juggles a pea. And then very little is needed for a 
 torpedo not to explode at the moment or place intended, for a 
 shell not to reach the mark. There will also be a certain period, 
 at the beginning of the war, when all the batteries will not yet 
 have been fully manned. 
 
 As a matter of fact, all passages by main force have succeeded. 
 It would be absurd to conclude from this that all passages can be 
 forced ; let us be satisfied with allowing that the operation is not 
 a priori impossible. All passages are not defended like the en- 
 trance of Brest or like the approaches to our naval arsenals ; 
 there are even some that have no lines of torpedoes. 
 
 Still, if Duguay-Trouin, after having cleared the narrow en- 
 trance of Rio-de-Janeiro, had not been sure of having nothing 
 
 ^^ We may be permitted, nevertheless, to remark that had the conditions 
 been different the government would not have taken the chance with unpro- 
 tected ships. 
 
 232
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 more to fear for his ships, he would perhaps have given up the 
 expedition ; if the Inconstant, after having passed under the forts 
 of the Mei-Nam entrance, had found at Bangkok batteries that 
 it would have been necessary to reduce one after the other, she 
 would without doubt have succumbed ; if Admiral Courbet had 
 not known that there was no interior defense abreast Fouchou 
 arsenal, he would not have run into such a trap. 
 
 It is the inner defenses, therefore, those with which it will be 
 necessary to undertake a regular contest, that will prevent the 
 forcing of passages. The others will wound the enemy ; these 
 latter will finish him. 
 
 These considerations show us in what spirit the defense of our 
 places ought to be organized. I insist upon it, because reason has 
 not always been respected in the arming of secondary places. 
 
 233
 
 FOURTH PART 
 
 THE AUXILIARIES OF STRATEGY
 
 \
 
 The Plan of Campaign. 
 
 We have seen, in the first part of this study, that the manner 
 of distribution of one's forces is not an immaterial matter, and 
 that, for equal effort, the result varies according to the direction 
 impressed upon operations. A well-matured plan of campaign is, 
 therefore, necessary. 
 
 When war breaks out is not the moment for asking oneself 
 what must be done. In the entire naval sphere each one will then 
 be overwhelmed by the cares of mobilization ; the central depart- 
 ment will have to provide for imperious necessities and will be 
 burdened with the solution of thousands of questions ; no one will 
 any longer have the calm and coolness indispensable for the com- 
 plete working out of a plan of operations. 
 
 If, at this critical instant, nothing has been prepared ; if there 
 are no orders all ready ; if, in a word, the whole machinery can 
 only be set going by throwing everything out of gear, we shall be 
 carried away by events in spite of ourselves and will rush our 
 squadrons to sea, shutting our eyes to what happens. 
 
 To establish a plan of campaign, the general direction that it is 
 wished to give to operations is first determined, with a view to 
 securing the maximum effect. An outline is thus sketched, then 
 the number and kind of forces necessary for carrying out the plan 
 with chances of success are inquired into, keeping in view all the 
 elements of strategy that are of a nature to strengthen the action 
 of the ships. 
 
 These preliminary labors bring to light defective features, 
 whether in the disposition of ships or in their strategical qualities. 
 Thus the plan of campaign, has an influence upon building pro- 
 grams and upon the characteristics of vessels. 
 
 As new units, designed upon a more rational basis, come into 
 service, the work little by little is perfected. It is not enough to 
 ask what can be done with the material at one's disposal ; it is 
 necessary that it be the material that is adapted to the conditions 
 of war, as they spring from general laws. 
 
 The plan of campaign also has the advantage of connecting 
 
 237
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 together, with a view to a precise object, the different problems 
 that, in peace time, seem to us to be independent of one another 
 because they are studied separately. Thus we avoid attaching- an 
 exaggerated importance to operations that have but a secondary 
 influence upon the final issue. 
 
 It does not seem to be difficult, if we do not let ourselves be 
 taken unawares, to draw up a rational plan t f campaign."' We 
 have to guide us the advice of men of the greatest competence, 
 and we have leisure to study the means at the enemy's disposition 
 and the manner in which he can use them. Nevertheless, war con- 
 stantly shows us enormous faults that are due much more to 
 errors of principle than to a condition of inferiority. This results 
 in the first place from generally not attaching enough importance 
 to reflex actions, to the reactions that events have upon each 
 other, which leads to making fruitless efforts that waste forces 
 without any gain. But the initial cause of those queer conceptions 
 that have no result comes from the fact that as much energy and 
 moral worth are necessary to plan war as to carry it on. Radical 
 solutions are generally repugnant, yet without such no success is 
 possible ; it is sought to conciliate opposing interests and diffuse 
 plans are thus arrived at. 
 
 When P'rance declared war against England in 1778, the gov- 
 ernment of Louis XVI was in possession of a plan of campaign 
 to the elaboration of which a man of great worth, the Count de 
 Broglie, had devoted twenty years of his life. Constantly perfect- 
 ing his work, guided by the exclusive sentiment of the object to be 
 attained, he had made something that could stand by itself. Well, 
 during the war, on several occasions ideas were taken from this 
 work, but without reflecting that they had no value excepting as 
 forming part of the whole. Thus we had a badly built structure, 
 because all that made it strong had been taken a.way from it. 
 
 * * 
 
 What is the part that belongs, in the drawing up of plans, to the 
 principal agents of execution? 
 
 ^" It must be understood by this that it ought to be possible to secure 
 the best utilization of one's forces; for, as far as results are concerned, the 
 skill of the enemy has to be reckoned with, also faults in execution, and 
 finally the balance of forces, which will always make the task difficult for 
 the weaker side, and sometimes even impossible. 
 
 238
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In China, Admiral Courbet was constantly obliged to follow a 
 line of conduct that he disapproved ; and the despatches that he 
 received prove that the government had no very exact ideas about 
 the economic and social situation of the Celestial Empire, any 
 more than about the geographic conditions of those regions. 
 These false ideas were the cause of our vessels and troops being 
 uselessly wasted against Formosa. 
 
 The correspondence exchanged, before and during the Spanish- 
 American war, between Admiral Cervera and the Minister of 
 Marine, revealed a perpetual divergence of opinions between these 
 two general officers, and it is very difficult to decide which of 
 them was right. If, on the one hand, the minister's singular 
 optimism testified to an absolute ignorance of the material that he 
 had charge of, of the enemy's resources and of the elementary 
 principles of war ; on the other hand, the chief of squadron's ever- 
 lasting complaints do not seem to have sensibly bettered the situa- 
 tion. Finally, Admiral Cervera had to yield with groans, which, 
 it will be agreed, is not a guarantee of success. 
 
 Disagreements of this sort can have only fatal consequences. 
 In principle, a chief ought never to be obliged to do what he thinks 
 bad, because nothing is done well that is not understood. More- 
 over, all officers have not the same qualities, nor the same faculties 
 rendering them fit for the accomplishment of all missions ; only 
 what they are capable of can be demanded of people. On the 
 other hand, the departments, from which the plans of campaign 
 emanate, have a tendency always to measure too nicely and they 
 thus demand impossible things ; situated far from the scene of 
 war, they do not take account exactly of the difficulties of execu- 
 tion, because they lack m.eans of estimating at its true value the 
 coefficient of utilization of the naval forces. Everyone knows 
 that at a distance things always seem easy and that assurance is 
 lost in proportion as one draws near. Finally, the departments 
 have no effective responsibility ; if an operation fails, they are 
 not the ones who go before a court-martial, and, in spite of them- 
 selves, this immunity influences their decisions and makes them 
 demand things the execution of which they themselves would not 
 accept. Quite to the contrary, he who is on the spot, who sees 
 things close at hand and who risks his life, and above all his repu- 
 tation, that one is prone to fall into the opposite excess and to 
 
 239
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy, 
 
 see obstacles everywhere. It is not everyone that, like Admiral 
 Conrbet, has an exact appreciation of the situation and of the 
 advantages that can be drawn from it. 
 
 There is but one method of conciliating everything; that is to 
 put everywhere, in the departments as well as in the field, fJie 
 right man in the right place. 
 
 240
 
 II. 
 
 Public Opinion. 
 
 Present-day governments have to contend with a very powerful 
 adversary that sometimes will not leave off making the conduct 
 of operations difficult. I mean public opinion. 
 
 It is well known that the public does not look upon war from 
 the same point of view as professionals ; its attention is turned 
 aside by what is going" on close at hand, and it perceives only 
 vaguely the far-off horizons where the objective is hidden. Well, 
 there is no use in saying that the notion formed by the masses as 
 to the scope of operations is not the true one ; if it were, the mili- 
 tary art would not exist, and genius would be within everybody's 
 reach. All that was powerful in Napoleon's campaigns only 
 becomes apparent to us after the act, when occurrences have 
 illumined our minds and revealed to us new aspects of which we 
 would never have thought. 
 
 The public, when it estimates events, is much more solicitous 
 of the evils that threaten it than of the object to be attained ; mili- 
 tary men, on the contrary, think that war, being an evil in itself, 
 can engender only evil, and that the sole excuse for making it is 
 to do so successfully. 
 
 This divergence of views determines from the beginning a mis- 
 understanding between those who are spectators of the war and 
 those who have the grave responsibility of directing it. 
 
 As soon as the first encounter takes place, the population loses 
 its head, the journals constitute themselves the spokesmen of its 
 complaints ; the government is attacked, and the admirals are not 
 let off. If, then, there is at the head of affairs a man who is not 
 energetic enough to stand fast against the storm, or who is not 
 capable of explaining his acts, because he himself does not know 
 their scope, all the dispositions taken will be reversed. A poor 
 arrangement will be adopted ; sacrifices will be made to public 
 opinion by giving over a part of one's forces in order to meet its 
 views. It is known to be an error, but it is done all the same. It 
 would be better not to wage war than to do so in such a way, for 
 
 241
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 what is the end of it all ? Everything is compromised without 
 satisfying- the public ; when defeat comes, it will no longer be 
 possible to protect anything ; therefore, it is only going back to 
 start over again. 
 
 During the Spanish-American war, the influence of public 
 opinion was manifested on both sides. 
 
 As far as the United States are concerned, the Naval Council 
 thought itself obliged to divide their forces in order to satisfy the 
 northern sections, which were unwilling to remain unprotected ; 
 and A'lahan, who was a member of the Council, frankly confesses 
 that this solution was absolutely contrary to military interests. 
 No harm resulted from this, for the reason that the Spaniards did 
 not think of attacking either the coast or the hostile ships ; but, 
 on the part of Spain, the public apprehension had more serious 
 consequences. 
 
 What a sad history is that of that poor Spanish squadron! 
 Blockaded in Santiago by superior forces, demoralized, it was 
 destined to certain destruction if it went out. In Spain, the jour- 
 nals were wroth at such inaction ; they did not comprehend that 
 four cruisers, poorly armed, could not measure themselves against 
 so many battleships, supported by several cruisers. Politics inter- 
 vening, the squadron ceased to be anything but a means for batter- 
 ing down the government. At first the Minister of Marine put a 
 good face on the matter. He explained to the Cortes that ships 
 were not made to be destroyed ; but his resistance was of short 
 duration. He sent to Cuba the order to make the squadron go 
 out and, in signing that order, he signed the death-warrant of his 
 sailors. 
 
 Admiral Cervera's vessels were marked in advance with the 
 seal of destiny. Nevertheless, would it not have been better to 
 let them stay in port, thus preserving the single chance of saving 
 Santiago, rather than to sacrifice them stupidly to the contentions 
 of the press ? 
 
 The tone of the sea-coast journals, during the grand maneuvers 
 of 1889, gives us but a feeble idea of what will happen in case of 
 war. Not a squadron will be able to go out of sight of shore 
 without there arising cries of treason. And what will happen on 
 the day when an admiral requisitions coast-defense vessels to take 
 them with him? 
 
 What is the remedy for this state of afifairs? To educate the 
 
 242
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 nation ; to show it what its true interests are. There is nothing" 
 to conceal in the principles that govern warfare. What neither 
 the enemy nor the public ought to know is only the manner in 
 which it is intended to apply them. 
 
 Well, it is not impossible to form public opinion and to turn it 
 in the direction of the general interests of the country. Admiral 
 Colomb calls attention to the fact that the English people were 
 never more tranquil than when their squadrons were at sea, be- 
 cause they had a sufficiently clear comprehension of the affairs of 
 war to know that naval forces can only give protection by acting. 
 
 During the hostilities against Russia, the Japanese government 
 was able to make the nation accept a line of conduct that, in 
 France, would have raised recrimmations without end and might 
 have caused a modification of the plan of campaign. 
 
 243
 
 III. 
 
 Preparation. 
 
 It is not enoiic^h to send one's squadrons out to fight ; it is also 
 necessary that they be of such strong- composition that equality of 
 numbers may secure equality and, if possible, superiority of 
 strength. 
 
 Historians, who are principally concerned in recounting facts, 
 distribute praise or blame among chiefs of squadrons according 
 to the results of their encounters. Rarely do they take pains to 
 inquire whether the means at the disposal of the vanquished per- 
 mitted doing anything else than what they did. How many, 
 among those whom fortune betrayed, would have left the reputa- 
 tion of skilful leaders, if the}- had only had means equal to those 
 of their adversaries ! It is very difficult not to commit errors 
 when one finds himself disarmed by mediocrity of material and 
 insufficiency of personnel ; what it is needful to do is easily seen 
 then, but it cannot be done."' 
 
 The humiliations of battlefields are but too often an effect 
 whose causes are due to lack of preparation. 
 
 Between combatants of two hostile nations, there is frequently 
 to be noted a different state of mind, which, by itself alone, 
 is the best presage of the result of the struggle. On one side, the 
 confidence that engenders courage and gives birth to bold plans ; 
 on the other, apprehension, mother of discouragement and of 
 bastard solutions. This difference of moral state could have been 
 observed between the Austrians and Italians, before Lissa; be- 
 tween the Japanese and Chinese, before the Yalu and Wei-hai- 
 
 ^^ We do not assert that there have not often been, among the van- 
 quished, leaders unequal to their tasks ; but even this may be charged 
 against bad organization. In a numerous body, there are always officers 
 endowed with the qualities necessary for exercising the chief command ; 
 if squadrons are entrusted to incapables, it is because they have been 
 placed there from considerations foreign to the good of the service — that 
 is, because the organization is defective. When defeat results, it is these 
 men that are blamed. This is wrong. They are not responsible; they have 
 given the measure of their abilities. The guilty are those who chose them. 
 
 244
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 wei ; between the Americans and Spaniards, before Cavite and 
 Santiago ; "" between the Japanese and the Russians. The con- 
 fidence on one side had its source much more in training than in 
 numerical superiority, since the more numerous were not always 
 the victors. The swagger with which admirals like Barrington, 
 Hood and Cornvvallis used to withstand the attacks of greatly 
 superior forces "° gives us a measure of the moral influence exer- 
 cised by the consciousness of strength. 
 
 The naval greatness of a nation, therefore, depends principally 
 upon the manner in which its forces are prepared and trained. 
 
 * 
 
 In this connection, it is well to call particular attention to the 
 question of personnel. 
 
 The numerical insufficiency of crews was, in the past, one of the 
 main causes of the weakness of the French Navy. Even during 
 the American war, ships never had their full complements. It 
 was much worse during the Revolution and Empire ; the custom 
 grew up of making up shortages of seamen with soldiers. Marked 
 inferiority in gunnery was an immediate consequence of this. 
 
 To-day, the naval enlistment is functioning normally, and it is 
 admitted that we have more sailors to carry on a war with than 
 we need. It is possible ; but what is certain is that in peace time 
 we are still reduced to expedients. Crews never attain the regu- 
 lation number, neither at ordinary times, nor during grand maneu- 
 vers,^'^ in spite of the addition of reservists. Men of one specialty 
 are embarked to take the places of those of another specialty, and 
 it will be understood that that does not fill the bill. 
 
 The question of personnel in our navy has always been rele- 
 gated to a secondary place ; it is preferred to man more vessels 
 and to man them badly. With reduced efifectives, the old ways 
 would reappear in a new form, like corpses that rise to the 
 surface. 
 
 "'See, upon this subject, Admiral Cervera's letters. 
 
 *™ Barrington, with seven ships; is attacked, at St. Lucia, by d'Estaing, 
 who has twelve. Hood fights at anchor, at St. Kitts, with twenty-two 
 ships against de Grasse, who has twenty-six (see Part I). Cornwallis, with 
 five ships, has a running fight with Villaret-Joyeuse's whole squadron. 
 
 "^ During the grand maneuvers, the squadron had to stop at sea and send 
 people aboard a ship that could not keep up. 
 
 245
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The idea that has led to having ships that are manned and yet 
 not manned is not without its attractions. With crews reduced one- 
 half, the material is as well taken care of as in a condition of full 
 armament ; and as organized and enrolled forces are thus provided, 
 it suffices to fill up the complements to make them ready to put to 
 sea almost immediately, if the depots are capable of furnishing the 
 necessary contingent; mobilization is reduced to its very simplest 
 form. 
 
 The misfortune is that ships manned with reduced crews can- 
 not cruise, and it is at sea that seamen and officers are trained. 
 When the whole French fleet has to be mobilized, it will be neces- 
 sary to call upon the reservists ; all the more necessary is it that 
 they be not joined to men whose experience has been confined to 
 harbor work. 
 
 All historians agree in recognizing that the English crews were 
 trained by prolonged blockades, and that Nelson's prodigious suc- 
 cesses had their source in those cruises, while our ships, station- 
 ary in harbors, were like beings all of whose members are be- 
 numbed by inaction. Well, the vessels of our Northern squadron 
 that, yesterday still, had only reduced crews, those vessels were 
 blockaded, though only by their own state ; they got under way 
 only to have target practice, and were incapable of making a pas- 
 sage of any length. When, in the spring, they put to sea, they had 
 crews that were afraid of the sea, borrowed officers, an admiral 
 who perhaps knew how to lead his squadron, but who did not know 
 what could be gotten out of it. When this squadron met with 
 that of the South, as in 1900, the difference between the two 
 forces was striking. 
 
 The system of reduced crews is dangerous ; it gives the illusion 
 of a state of preparation that does not exist. The further we go 
 in reducing the length of military service, the more the complexity 
 of our material increases (alas!), the more necessary it is to give 
 our men sea experience. Well, vessels cannot go to sea without 
 crews. 
 
 The normal complement of vessels is ample to satisfy all re- 
 quirements ; it would even be inconvenient to increase it during 
 peace time ; the men would no longer have sufficient occupation. 
 But in time of war it would be advantageous to have an addition 
 to the personnel, if it be true that we dispose of reserves for whom 
 we shall have no employment. 
 
 246
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The idea of forming on board ship supplementary crews who 
 would serve, as far as required, to replace dead and wounded, has 
 already been put forward. Perhaps the author of this project 
 exaggerated its application ; in any case it is regrettable that the 
 principle was not preserved, with freedom to reduce it to the right 
 proportions. It is difficult to admit that during a combat guns 
 may be out of action for lack of men, while there are idle seamen 
 on shore. But, setting fighting aside, there is a whole class of 
 men whose number ought to be quite doubled at the very begin- 
 ning of war, if it is wished to utilize all the resources of strategy. 
 It is that of firemen. 
 
 Movement, as we have said elsewhere, is the soul of strategy. 
 Well, the fireman is the soul of movement. 
 
 Our vessels seldom cruise with all their fires lighted. Solici- 
 tude to conserve the machinery and the allowances of coal allotted 
 to squadrons do not permit making high speed frequently. The 
 complements of firemen are calculated accordingly.^'* 
 
 When squadrons have power trials, the vessels have only to 
 make a spurt, and an effort is then required from the whole fire- 
 room personnel that could not be kept up ; but when a single ves- 
 sel has to maintain high speed for a long time on account of some 
 special mission, it becomes necessary to send men from the deck 
 force into the bunkers. Such conditions as this are not permis- 
 sible in time of war. 
 
 It is well known that there are in the navy convinced partisans 
 of speed, who imagine that it can make up for anything. This is 
 an evident exaggeration, for, though speed can make force effect- 
 ive, it cannot take its place ; but, after all, it cannot be denied that 
 the faculty of moving rapidly from one place to another is an 
 element of success. Well, it is necessary that it be known that 
 our vessels, and particularly torpedo-boats, are incapable, under 
 existing conditions, of doing their best on account of lack of 
 firemen. 
 
 "^ There is no other navy in which machinists are so numerous and fire- 
 men so few as in the French Navy. 
 
 247
 
 IV. 
 
 The Doctrine. 
 
 To build the ships that are needed, and no others ; to give them 
 the armament suitable to each and to equip them properly, it is 
 needful to know what it is wished to do and how it is to be done ; 
 an aim and a doctrine are necessary. 
 
 How many millions would be saved every year, if we could 
 come to an agreement, not about all types of ship (that would be 
 asking too much in the existing anarchy of ideas), but merely 
 about a single one. We would then have a vessel whose char- 
 acteristics would be well defined, which would respond to a pre- 
 cise object and fulfil fixed conditions ; each new unit would be 
 but the improved reproduction of the preceding one. Then by 
 specializing constructions by public and private shipyards, we 
 should arrive at having a division of labor and an industrial 
 organization that, according to some engineers, would procure 
 a saving of 25 per cent ; our naval strength would find itself in- 
 creased by a quarter. While now each new ship represents a new 
 work, new models, new installations, new principles, new bargains. 
 
 And progress? 
 
 Let us understand one another. Naval material is not the 
 result of the more or less ingenious conceptions of various per- 
 sons ; it ought to derive from the needs of warfare. Therefore, 
 all units of the same type ought to have points in common. Prog- 
 ress will not consist in always making something new ; it will con- 
 sist in perfecting the old. Thus we shall have more powerful 
 guns on a less weight, stronger machinery in less space, more 
 resisting armor of less thickness and, finally, better lines ; but the 
 general dispositions of the plan will remain the same. Neither 
 is it necessary, on each new vessel, to turn all the arrangements 
 upside down so that six months are needed to know one's ship. 
 
 Well, where can there be found any continuity in passing from 
 the Redoutable to the Suifren, through the Duperre, Formidable, 
 Magenta^ Brennus, Bouvet and Charlemagne , without counting 
 the Requin, Jemmapes and Bouvines? They all have dififerent 
 forms, dififerent systems of armor protection, a dififerent battery 
 arrangement, etc. 
 
 248
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 What happened, between the first and the last, that necessitated 
 this incoherent diversity ? Nothing, except that each of those who 
 contributed to the bringing forth of these ships worked for his 
 own account and had his own special point of view, without there 
 appearing anywhere a guiding principle. Thus we have Mr. X's 
 ship, Mr. Y's ship but we are still waiting for the im- 
 personal ship that meets the requirements of war. It is clearly 
 to be seen that each constructor has sought the solution of a 
 problem that interested him ; usually he has found it ; but he has 
 remained outside of the question. 
 
 And so it is that our navy is composed of sexless vessels, the 
 degenerate products of hybrid conceptions. 
 
 Seeing the usage that has been made of progress, one is 
 tempted to believe that it sometimes marches backwards. 
 
 Where is progress when, beyond 17 knots, the Massena wastes 
 in vain efforts the power of her machinery? Where is progress 
 when, after having abandoned on the Boiivet and Charlemagne 
 the battery arrangement of the Brenniis, it is returned to on the 
 Suifren? Where is progress when there is thought of adopting 
 to-day a form of conning-tower that was to be found on the 
 Gloire thirty years ago. Does progress prevent coming to an 
 understanding, once for all, as to the arrangement of piping, of 
 auxiliary engines, of subdivisions, of the drainage system, of the 
 handling of boats, of ventilation, of superstructures, of interior 
 fittings ? 
 
 What happens, in the midst of this anarchy? Just this, — as 
 soon as a vessel is commissioned, line officers and engineers take 
 possession of her to change her from top to bottom, and, until her 
 death, this martyr to transformation will never moor off an ar- 
 senal without becoming the prey of workmen. They interpose, 
 juxtapose, superpose ; they add but never take away. Then the 
 vessel sinks deeper, always deeper. After a few years, her armor 
 belt becomes useless ; sunk beneath the water, it no longer is any- 
 thing but an enormous useless burden. 
 
 Each modification, taken by itself, seems to increase the value 
 of the vessel ; all joined together diminish it, because the ship, 
 built to have fixed arrangements, does not accommodate itself to 
 those that are afterwards added, and because each one pulls in his 
 own direction without regard to harmony. 
 
 All this costs dear, all the dearer that the work is done under 
 
 249
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 uneconomical conditions, taking advantage of short stays in har- 
 bors to send on board workmen who lose half their time in coming 
 and going. And it may well be asked if it would not have been 
 better to utilize all our vessels, such as they were, and to devote 
 all those millions to building new ones. Our naval strength would 
 certainly have been greater than it now is. 
 
 Do you know what our mania for change cost us at the time of 
 the Fashoda incident? The disability of six battleships, of an 
 entire squadron ! We could cite their names. 
 
 It is not necessary to be too exclusive : it must not be made a 
 fixed principle not to touch a vessel any more after she has finished 
 her trials. 
 
 Reconstructions, when they are carried out according to a com- 
 plete plan in which everything is made to harmonize, can give 
 renewed youth to old vessels of no value; but then it is needful 
 to execute them at one time, and rapidly. Well, since vessels are 
 periodically laid up by the need of new boilers, that is plainly the 
 time to do other work on board. Except at this period, work 
 should be limited to making repairs, and the moment of going 
 into dock ought even to be waited for except when they are of an 
 urgent character. 
 
 The complexity and variety of present-day material are such 
 that vessels are no longer properly fitted out ; it has become im- 
 possible to find one's way in the labyrinth. Some ships put to sea 
 with their material incomplete ; on others the arsenals mask their 
 poverty by putting on board them rejected articles, made for other 
 vessels, and whose sole use is to fill the blanks in the equipment 
 sheets. And this distressful state comes from the fact that, 
 nothing being interchangeable, not even the simplest objects, it is 
 impossible to constitute storehouses that will function properly. 
 
 The coming into use of steam and steel, by turning our naval 
 material topsy-turvy, must inevitably throw ideas into some con- 
 fusion ; but this disorder, the consequence of a period of transi- 
 tion, ought to have ended with the latter; and it has remained 
 permanent. Yet it would seem that steam, armor, rifled cannon, 
 and torpedoes are of sufficiently ancient date for the rules that 
 ought to direct their employment to have been fixed upon. For 
 fifteen years there has been nothing apparent that might have 
 prevented the organization of our forces in a reasonable and 
 economical manner ; nothing except the absence of a doctrine. 
 
 250
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 There exist, nevertheless, general principles that are inde- 
 pendent of new inventions, and that might have served as a guide. 
 Here are some of them. 
 
 The power of guns is one thing ; the intensity of their fire is 
 another ; one has no value without the other. If we allow our- 
 selves to be hypnotized by power alone, we will build bigger and 
 bigger guns that will naturally be less and less numerous. The 
 preponderance of power will soon end in an absurdity, under the 
 form of Tonnerres and Caimans. 
 
 Speed is a factor in strength ; but still it is necessary that it 
 should not require an increase of personnel that vessels do not 
 possess in regular service ; otherwise one finds himself in the 
 position of a capitalist who has a great fortune but whose posses- 
 sions are sequestrated. 
 
 It is the same with the radius of action. The arrangement of 
 bunkers ought to permit getting the coal to the furnaces ; in war 
 time the personnel will be worn out by constant vigils, and it will 
 not be possible to employ it every day in transporting coal from 
 one bunker to another. 
 
 Neither is the speed with which a vessel can fill up with coal a 
 matter of indifference ; it plays a part in military operations, and 
 the author of plans ought to take account of it. 
 
 Supplying a fleet with ammunition is so much the easier as the 
 material is less various. It is time, therefore, to put a curb upon 
 this debauch of novelty that has cost us one hundred and twenty- 
 eight different projectiles. Progress can perhaps manifest itself 
 less continuously and proceed by successive leaps, so that before 
 loading our shell rooms and magazines with a new projectile we 
 may be sure of an appreciable advance. People do not seem to 
 have realized the effect that this motley material will have upon 
 strategy. It will interdict every displacement of forces because 
 for each squadron there will be but a single port capable of renew- 
 ing the contents of its magazines. 
 
 Nobody doubts the utility of armor ; still it is necessary that its 
 weight should be in proportion to the offensive power whose 
 value it enhances. In the equation of displacement of a ship there 
 is, therefore, a fixed relation between the two terms, protection 
 and armament. 
 
 The ventilation of warships ought to take account of battle con- 
 ditions ; well, on certain battleships where the ventilators have 
 
 251
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 inlets on the battery deck, it has been completely lost sight of that 
 the noxious gases from bursting shell will be drawn down into the 
 engine and fire rooms and will compel their abandonment. 
 
 A\'hen the needs of taking stations for battle require the pres- 
 ence of ten persons in a conning-tower, it is regrettable to be able 
 to accommodate only half that number. 
 
 Finally, simplicity and strength are two military factors whose 
 importance is often preponderant. 
 
 Considerations of this sort apply not only to the interior organi- 
 zation of a ship, but also to the part it is intended to play. 
 
 It has never been considered doubtful that the light vessels 
 which radiate from squadrons should have a radius of action 
 superior to that of the force to which they are attached. All the 
 scouts of Condor type, which are incapable of keeping the sea as 
 long as a battleship, are, therefore, only dead and useless capital. 
 These observations could be continued indefinitely. 
 \Mience comes it then that it has taken several generations of 
 ships to elucidate a part of these questions, and that others still 
 remain without solution? 
 
 In the first place, uncertainty of ideas : we shall never possess a 
 material appropriate to the conditions of war so long as we do not 
 know exactly how it will be employed. Then, from the applica- 
 tion of a defective method. In the conception of a ship, there are 
 two different points of view to consider : power and efficiency, 
 theory and practice. Well, all the anachronisms we have pointed 
 out merely reveal the struggle between these two factors, a strug- 
 gle in which power tends always to absorb efficiency because it 
 manifests itself more directly to the eyes of the constructor. 
 Efficiency, on the contrary, is a modest personage whose qualities 
 only reveal themselves after much acquaintance. But to obtain a 
 harmonious product, these two rival elements must be joined 
 together. 
 
 Before undertaking to lay down a ship, therefore, a sort of list 
 of conditions ought to be drawn up that would not only indicate 
 its characteristics, but would show under their various aspects the 
 elements of efficiency and would impose absolutely such solutions 
 as were already acquired. 
 
 The day when this ideal shall have been attained, a progress 
 will have been realized much more important than that which 
 consists of doing the opposite of what has been done before. We 
 
 252
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 shall then be guided by a common idea that will economize much 
 money and much labor. 
 
 There is complaint, and with good reason, that the French 
 Navy takes five years instead of two to build a ship, so that ves- 
 sels are out of date before entering active service. The reason for 
 this is quite simple : the workmen who build our fleet are the 
 same who worked on the tower of Babel. 
 
 This confusion would not exist if we had a doctrine. But 
 wdiat is this famous doctrine then? 
 
 It is the bond thanks to which all those who participate in a 
 common work act in accordance with common ideas and prin- 
 ciples. If we do not possess this connecting-link, each will act 
 according- to his own inspirations ; and there are a great manv 
 chances against hitting on the true solution. For, as we have 
 already said, war is not a matter of improvisation ; it is something 
 to be learned. It is subject to very definite laws that disengage 
 themselves from the results of previous struggles ; and it is this 
 aggregate of rules that constitutes the doctrine. 
 
 Some fifteen years ago the navy was flooded with articles and 
 anonymous pamphlets whose authors thought they were inventing 
 naval war. Under the pretence of modernizing military science, 
 they assumed to free themselves from the past ; and thev did not 
 perceive that they were thus making war as children do when they 
 amuse themselves with lead soldiers. It was they who preached 
 that scattering of our forces which the Minister of Marine has 
 called a sanitary cordon, and who thought they had found the true 
 formula when they had placed a fraction of our forces everywhere 
 where the enemy could appear. What remains of these lucubra- 
 tions to-day, in the realm of ideas? Scarcely a memory, because 
 they did not rest upon a solid base. But as far as our material is 
 concerned, the influence of these amateurs has been considerable. 
 Nobody had set forth the principles of naval warfare, and we had 
 no doctrine to oppose to these childish conceptions. The result 
 was that the public adopted them, and they had sufficient effect to 
 give a trend to our naval construction that has fatally damaged 
 the navy. 
 
 Fortunately, the War College, newly created, came to act as 
 
 253
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 counterpoise ; and little by little the doctrine has emerged from the 
 teaching of this school. Well, its mere existence sufficed to arrest 
 the development of ephemeral ideas ; for its teaching" does not 
 rest upon affirmations, like works of pure imagination, but upon 
 demonstrations. It is for this reason that the doctrine takes a 
 long time in developing and requires the co-operation of a suc- 
 cession of professors each of whom brings his contribution to the 
 common edifice. The building is already well advanced, and it 
 must be said that the exclusive credit for it belongs to the War 
 College, whose teachings have spread even outside of the navy ; 
 we have had proof of this in the discussion of the naval appropria- 
 tion bill.'" 
 
 We can, therefore, face the future with confidence ; for the 
 moment we have to liquidate a past whose debt is very heavy. 
 
 * 
 
 We possess all the elements necessary for constructing as well 
 and even better than no matter what nation ; our sea-coast popu- 
 lation, so devoted, is capable of supplying incomparable crews. 
 What we have lacked is guidance. We do not succeed in agree- 
 ing as to what we need ; and thenceforth it becomes impossible to 
 introduce the spirit of continuity into our organism. 
 
 The English admirals are not those who built up the naval 
 power of their country. If England has had Rodney, Hawke and 
 Nelson, we have had Duquesne, Tourville and Suffren. It is that 
 impersonal being that is called the English Admiralty ; it is that 
 which has prepared all the elements of British greatness ; it is that 
 which has known how to create homogeneous fleets, to arm them, 
 equip them, enlist crews for them (God knows at the price of 
 what sacrifices) ; to place at their head the m>ost capable men. 
 Its severity has often been excessive ; but, in exchange, it has 
 never haggled with admirals for its support. 
 
 What a spectacle the French Navy afforded us during this 
 time ! Directed alternately by men of genius and by incapables, 
 it described a sinusoid, passing alternately from greatness to 
 
 '" In this discussion, M. Benazet has done me the great honor of quoting 
 me as professor of strategy at the War College. It is all the more pleasant 
 to render homage to the professors of this school that I have only been 
 there as a pupil. 
 
 254
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 nothingness/" While army officers, such as d'Estrees "" and 
 d'Estaing, commanded its fleets, men like La Motte-Picquet and 
 Suffren remamed in subordinate positions. But what was most 
 fatal was letting ourselves be dazzled by the charm of figures, 
 seeking number without strength. Hence those squadrons that 
 put to sea with incomplete crews, an incomplete armament, incom- 
 plete supplies. In brief, under the Monarchy, indifference or ill- 
 will ; under the Revolution, anarchy ; under the Empire, impotence. 
 
 To-day, it is another affair. The magic of words has replaced 
 the magic of figures. We have a scientific school that integrates 
 war. From all this jumble, vague formulae disengage themselves : 
 defensive, police of the seas, coast defense, commerce destroying. 
 All this while war is forgotten, that work of force and destruc- 
 tion ; war, with its laws, its necessities, its exigences. Each 
 wishes to dress the navy in his own fashion, and, adding a piece to 
 its cloak, contributes to dressing it out like a harlequin. 
 
 A Minister of Marine, contemplating all this disorder, cried 
 out : " Our fleet is a fleet of samples." The phrase, struck like a 
 coin from the die, has remained — the thing also."° 
 
 "* But for the Knights of Malta, who furnished France with a perma- 
 nent reserve of officers, the navy would never have been able periodically 
 to raise itself from its ruins. 
 
 "' It is not necessary to be acquainted with naval history to baptize 
 ships with the names of d'Estrees and d'Estaing. 
 
 "* The institutions, traditions and social condition of a country often 
 have an unexpected reaction upon military history. In the eighteenth 
 century, the system of storehouses, so opposed to the mobility of armies, 
 was a consequence of the method of recruiting of that period; it gave rise 
 to prejudices and traditions still more fatal. Linear tactics itself arose 
 from the necessity of always keeping the mercenary troops under the 
 immediate authority of their leaders. 
 
 There were facts of the same kind in the old navy. The prejudice of 
 birth caused commissions as officers to be given to people who had no sea 
 experience. The defective enlistment of crews was connected with the 
 social state of the realm. In the matter of tactics, we shall point out in a 
 subsequent volume the conventions that perverted its spirit. 
 
 Even to-day the influence of considerations foreign to war makes itself 
 felt. It will be enough to cite two examples of this. 
 
 Any seaman who knows the principles of the composition of squadrons, 
 unless blinded by custom and tradition, would be astonished to see the 
 Formidable at the head of coast-defense vessels that have absolutely dif- 
 ferent characteristics. Yet that is what could have been seen only a few 
 years ago. This assemblage was the very negation of the good utilization 
 
 255
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 of forces. Every one understands this, but tradition requires tliat a vice- 
 admiral shall fly his flag on a battleship of large size ; so much the worse 
 for tactics and strategy. 
 
 It is agreed that torpedo-boats ought to be commanded by young officers. 
 The conditions of life on board them can only be supported by the insou- 
 ciance of youth, while the adventurous side of their sort of attack requires 
 that its character shall not have been too deeply considered. Well, since 
 their creation, three mobile defences (those of Algeria, Tunis and Corsica) 
 have been monopolized by old lieutenants. It is wholly a question of 
 money. These commands are allowed table expenses, and officers who 
 have only their service to make the most of must have reached a certain 
 age in order to have a share of this earthly manna. 
 
 When, in a military organization, acts are no longer in accord with 
 principles, disorganization is near at hand. 
 
 256
 
 V. 
 
 Grand Maneuvers. 
 
 The grand maneuvers have been of incontestable advantage to 
 the navy. They have been the means of stirring the torpor of our 
 squadrons, which, without them, would waste away in inaction, 
 since they have been deprived of the coal and personnel necessary 
 for cruising. It is only during these periods of activity that some 
 of the necessities of war can be taken account of. They train 
 crews and officers ; they show commanders that in war time they 
 will be obliged to give over a part of their authority in order to 
 rest, while, during short sorties, they assume to do everything 
 themselves. From all these points of view there is only benefit to 
 be derived from annual maneuvers. 
 
 As far as strategy is concerned, they furnish indications rather 
 than conclusions. The sole fact that the guns are not loaded gives 
 the operations a conventional form. When it is sure that an 
 encounter with the enemy will not have irreparable consequences, 
 it costs nothing to attempt the most unlikely adventures ; and the 
 rules that impose themselves immediately one risks the fate of his 
 ship are thus deviated from. 
 
 It is above all exercises of getting and keeping contact that are 
 given a false aspect by the fictitious character of maneuvers. It 
 can be foreseen that when shell are fired a new light will be shed 
 upon the conclusions of times of peace. 
 
 The frequency of attacks upon batteries seems, for example, to 
 indicate that naval material could be freely risked in an operation 
 of this sort, whereas the Chinese-Japanese, Spanish-American 
 and Russo-Japanese wars seem to prove the contrary. Moreover, 
 the fashion in which these attacks have sometimes been conducted 
 leads to the supposition that what is sought is less to extinguish 
 the fire of the batteries than to be safe from their shots, in which 
 case the only logical conclusion is that it would be better to ab- 
 stain altogether. 
 
 But a greater danger comes from the choice of themes when 
 they are false a priori. They then reveal regrettable tendencies 
 and completely falsify the spirit of the maneuvers. Admiral Aube, 
 
 257
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to whom belongs the honor of having introduced these annual 
 tests into our navy, would be greatly astonished, if he were living, 
 to see the use that has been made of them. 
 
 At a certain period, the question of protecting the coast with a 
 force superior to the enemy's could not be escaped from. What 
 was sought to be proved ? That the principal role of the navy is 
 coast defense? Or even that we have no better use to make of 
 our forces than to immobilize them along the coast, even with 
 numerical superiority? The result has been to spread abroad false 
 ideas that some day will return to trouble us. 
 
 The officers themselves are influenced by these dangerous prac- 
 tices. By repeating indefinitely the same exercises, they end by 
 persuading themselves that things ought to be just so ; that they 
 cannot happen otherwise ; and this impression becomes a part of 
 them without being discussed. The day when one passes from 
 convention to reality, one quite naturally recurs to giving the 
 same solution to the same problems. 
 
 It is important, therefore, to put in practice only likely themes, 
 and to apply them in a likely manner. 
 
 Thank heaven we are speaking of a time already long past ; in 
 the periods when the fleet was formed, the importance of the 
 effectives permitted enlarging the circle of combinations, and it 
 was sought to elucidate questions of greater interest than the ever- 
 lasting coast defense ; but, there again, the details of execution 
 brought out regrettable consequences. 
 
 The cycle of our maneuvers is not yet closed. Many points 
 upon which there is need of throwing a ray of light still remain 
 obscure. For example : there have already been several attempts 
 to break blockades ; but it ought first to be ascertained if they* are 
 still possible with submarines in existence, and under what con- 
 ditions.'" Commerce destroying itself also affords a vast field for 
 investigations. Almost nothing is known of the problems that its 
 application raises ; hitherto it has only been pointed out to us 
 through economic considerations that relegate it to the domain 
 of pure theory."* 
 
 "^ This exercise can only be productive if it lasts long enough to put the 
 destroyers to the proof and if it includes periods of calm and of bad 
 weather. 
 
 "* Ought commerce destroyers to act singly or in groups ? In the 
 latter case, how should they cruise? At what distance will they distinguish 
 
 258
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Finally, it has been so much repeated that it is possible to assure 
 the protection of the coast solely with flotillas of torpedo-boats 
 and submarines that it is time to justify the assertion. We possess 
 in the Mediterranean numerous defense flotillas and a veritable 
 fleet that would be capable of playing the part of assailant. We, 
 therefore, have in hand all the elements needed to clear up this 
 question. 
 
 For a long time yet we have plenty to give an always new in- 
 terest to our maneuvers. 
 
 a merchant steamer from a hostile cruiser? Will this distance be sufficient 
 to permit escaping? How long will it take to visit a vessel? What 
 should be done with vessels that are captured? Will not the time lost in 
 visiting vessels allow cruisers to interfere with the operations of com- 
 merce destroyers and to endanger their safety? Will visiting be kept up 
 at night? If so, how may unlucky encounters be avoided? How long will 
 it take for cruisers to clear a region of commerce destroyers?
 
 VI. 
 The War Game. 
 
 In default of grand maneuvers, the war t^ame, wliich is within 
 the reach of all purses, can be employed ; with it the whole fleet 
 can be mobilized and an unlimited duration can be given to opera- 
 tions ; but it should be used with discretion. 
 
 P>om the tactical point of view, distractions of this sort ought 
 to be repudiated. Battle depends wholly upon the intelligence of 
 the commander ; and tactics is only the slave of this intelligence. 
 Well, it is impossible, with toys, to approach even remotely to the 
 reality; and there is risk of warping one's judgment by taking 
 what is only a game seriously. 
 
 In strategy, on the contrary, the war game can render some 
 service. Thus, it will show, better than maneuvers, what be- 
 comes of scouting lines as soon as narrow seas are left. But it 
 must not be forgotten that on the board the sea is always calm ; 
 vessels can always give their full speed without ever suffering 
 from scale in the boilers ; in short, damages to the machinery 
 need not be feared. Here again general indications must be 
 sought rather than precise conclusions. 
 
 260
 
 FIFTH PART 
 
 EXAMPLES 
 
 * The Russo-Japanese War has not been considered under this head 
 because it has been the subject of a special work (La Luttc four I'ciiifirc 
 de la mer), to which we refer the reader.
 
 The War of American Independence. 
 
 We shall begin by drawing a comparison between the War of 
 American Independence and Napoleon's great strategic enterprise. 
 We have chosen. these two examples on account of the considerable 
 development of forces that they occasioned ; and, although the 
 final result seems to be in favor of the principles that directed the 
 war of 1778, we think that an attentive examination of the differ- 
 ent conditions of our navy at the two periods will give quite 
 another impression. 
 
 The War of American Independence opens with the sending of 
 d'Estaing to America, with twelve ships carrying troops. There 
 was urgent need of sending help to the insurgents, in order to 
 weaken England's military strength and to oblige her to maintain 
 an important naval force at a great distance.'™ In July took place 
 the encounter between d'Orvilliers and Keppel off Ouessant. The 
 action was indecisive, but it enabled the two sides to estimate their 
 respective strengths. 
 
 In August operations began to take on the character of inde^ 
 cision and incoherence that they continued to have throughout the 
 war. 
 
 D'Orvilliers, after having repaired his injuries, started out 
 again on August 16 and established himself on a cruising ground 
 between Cape Finisterre and Ouessant ; then he returned to Brest 
 without having either sought or met the enemy. The squadron 
 v/as then broken up into small divisions that cruised in the Channel 
 and the Gulf of Gascony until winter. 
 
 ^~^ A naval writer has given out the opinion that it would have been better 
 to send d'Estaing to Brest to reinforce d'Orvilliers' squadron. But 
 d'Estaing's departure precedes the sortie of the Brest squadron by more 
 than three months, and it seems that it was of more importance to aid as 
 soon as possible the American colonies so as not to run the risk of seeing 
 them succumb, which would have enabled England to recall her troops and 
 vessels. Moreover, we have seen that the junction, under existing condi- 
 tions, was an operation difficult to bring about, and the very one that 
 Keppel was instructed to prevent. 
 
 263
 
 A Study of Navai. Strategy. 
 
 Thus the Navy Department fell back into its old ways ; at first 
 it pretended to intercept convoys by means of a fleet of sufficient 
 strength not to fear an encounter ; then, seeing the feeble result 
 obtained, it sought, by means of small divisions, to cover a more 
 extensive area of the sea. The two solutions were equally bad. 
 So long as the French squadron remained concentrated, its action 
 only made itself felt at the place where it was ; as soon as it was 
 divided, it lost its strength and ran the risk of being destroyed in 
 detail. The role of squadrons is to fight the enemy to win command 
 of the sea ; light vessels can then, in full security, attack commerce, 
 without prejudice to all the other advantages that flow from the 
 suppression of the adversary's military forces. 
 
 Since France did not have sufficient strength on the coast of 
 Europe to adopt this course, she ought to have sought another 
 field and to have sent d'Orvilliers' vessels to the West Indies, tak- 
 ing everv precaution to conceal their departure. She could do so 
 without interference, since England, stripped of troops, was unable 
 to attempt any important enterprise against our shores, and, in 
 fact, never thought of doing so during the following years, when 
 our vessels remained whole summers on the Spanish coast. 
 
 From the mere fact of Spain's alliance wnth France, England 
 found herself, in 1779, threatened with attack in her home waters 
 by forces double those that she could oppose to the coalition. The 
 Allies, instead of profiting by the opportunity that offered to strike 
 a deadly blow-, gave England her sole chance of safety by pursuing 
 two objects at the same time ; the siege of Gibraltar and an in- 
 vasion of England. In spite of this disjunction, d'Orvilliers could 
 enter the Channel with seventy ships, where the English had 
 scarcely forty. But the dispositions had been so ill taken that this 
 immense armament dispersed without having done anything. 
 
 In the beginning of 1780, there happened to Admiral Don Juan 
 de Langara one of those adventures to which divisions sent to 
 cruise where merchant ships make a landfall are exposed. Having 
 only nine ships, he was surprised by Rodney, who was going to 
 Gibraltar with twenty-one ships to revictual that place. Only two 
 vessels succeeded in escaping. 
 
 Though it is impossible wholly to escape the surprises that con- 
 stitute one of the fortunes of war, the chances of untoward en- 
 counters at sea can nevertheless be lessened by the aid of informa- 
 tion as to the force, position and probable objective of hostile 
 
 264
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 squadrons. But when a weak squadron is obliged to take station 
 in a region that is in itself a center of attraction, it ought to expect 
 to be attacked there by superior forces, because it cannot for long 
 conceal its presence. 
 
 In the spring, twenty French vessels were sent to Cadiz, where 
 they placed themselves under the orders of Don Luis de Cordova. 
 This admiral made two sorties of short duration, and had the luck 
 to capture a convoy. It was the sole use that he succeeded in 
 making of the immense forces at his disposal. Impatient at the 
 inaction of its vessels, the Versailles Cabinet sent Vice-Admiral 
 d'Estaing to Cadiz, where he took command of the French squad- 
 ron and brought it back to Brest. 
 
 On December 20, 1780, England declared war against Holland. 
 The entry of the United Provinces into the coalition gave France 
 the reinforcement of a navy less numerous than that of Spain, but 
 much more dependable. Never had conditions appeared more 
 favorable, and it seemed as though the campaign of 1781 ought to 
 terminate the war. Nothing of the sort happened, and the Allies, 
 who could have covered themselves with glory, covered themselves 
 with shame. 
 
 Holland made war on her own account, and fought a useless 
 battle off the Dogger-Bank. As for the sailors of the Bourbons, 
 they again concentrated at Cadiz, and the fleet, nearly fifty vessels 
 strong, entered the Mediterranean, whence it stood up the Channel, 
 after having landed 14,000 men at Minorca.^'^" 
 
 The situation of Derby, who commanded the English Channel 
 Squadron, was very critical. Having returned some months before 
 from Gibraltar (which he had revictualed without the great Cadiz 
 fleet having thought of molesting him), he had been able to collect 
 no more than thirty vessels. Forced to withdraw before the com- 
 bined fleet, he anchored in Torbay Bay and made arrangements to 
 fight. Upon the decision taken by the Allies depended the issue 
 of the war. With the exception of seven ships that were operating 
 in the North Sea under Parker,"^ Derby's fleet was the sole de- 
 
 "" Port Mahon capitulated on February 6, 1782. It was the sole advan- 
 tage gained in Europe during the five years of war. Such a result would 
 tend to throw doubt upon the efficiency of navies, if we adopt the opinion 
 of those who consider that the War of American Independence was a 
 glorious period for us. 
 
 ^^^ Protecting convoys from the Baltic. 
 
 265
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 fence that England could oj^jpose to an army of invasion and to the 
 enterprises of our coniincroe destroyers. Would the Allies decide 
 to fight? Until then they had hcen ahle to claim that the cam- 
 paigns of 1779 and 1780 had not heen favorable for an encounter; 
 but this time the enemy was there, inferior by almost half, and he 
 could not escape. 
 
 Then it was that the disintegrating influence of councils of war 
 made itself felt. A leader who has confidence in his valor 
 and his strength goes to the enemy, without following other coun- 
 sels than those that honor and duty dictate to him ; a timid or cow- 
 ardly leader takes advice from his subordinates only to shelter 
 himself behind them for decisions that he knows to be bad. Don 
 Luis de Cordova, who was commander-in-chief, had recourse to 
 this expedient. The council of war decided that it was not neces- 
 sary to fight, and England was saved, without effort on her part, 
 from the sole fact that the councils of the Allies had a majority 
 who declared that ships of war, carrying cannon, were not made 
 to fight. In the course of the discussion that took place on board 
 the Spanish flagship, there was a French officer who dared to main- 
 tain the paradoxical opinion " that the allied fleets ought to turn 
 their whole attention towards the object, easy to attain as well as 
 important, of intercepting the British fleets returning home from 
 the West Indies. This measure could not fail to succeed since 
 they had command of the sea. It would be a terrible blow to 
 England,^*"" from which she would not recover during the war ;" and 
 no one was found to reply to M. de Beausset that these convoys 
 would be intercepted so much the easier if the English squadron 
 could not protect them ; that freedom of the sea does not exist so 
 long as the enemy occupies it ; that attack upon commerce was not 
 as efficacious a method as was claimed, since during three years it 
 had produced no efitect ; that finally the terrible blow from which 
 England could not recover was the destruction of the sole im- 
 portant force behind which she was taking shelter. 
 
 The combined fleet made a useless cruise of short duration in 
 the Channel and on September 5 broke up. Guichen returned to 
 Brest and Don Luis de Cordova took his impotent armada back 
 to Cadiz. 
 
 ^*" It is interesting to compare these words with the phrase of Ramatuelle 
 that we have quoted', and with theories in present vogue. 
 
 266
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 The Dogger-Bank action was fought on August 5, at the 
 moment when the events we have just spoken of were happening. 
 The presence of the Dutch in the North Sea then took away from 
 Derby seven ships, but it deprived the allied fleet of an equal num- 
 ber of vessels. Diversions only have a useful efifect on condition 
 that they are made with forces inferior to those they immobilize 
 away from the principal theater of operations, and at such a dis- 
 tance that the return of the latter cannot alter the state of affairs."' 
 
 The year 1782, the last of the war, was to add still another 
 humiliation to all those tha,t the Allies had already suffered. 
 
 On June 4, Don Luis de Cordova left Cadiz with thirty-seven 
 ships, of which live were French,'" and stood northward. In the 
 Channel he was joined by La Motte-Picquet with eight ships, and 
 the fleet, forty-five strong, began again for the last time its useless 
 cruising. Howe was sighted at the head of twenty-two ships ; he 
 had no difficulty in escaping. At the beginning of August, the 
 combined fleet returned to Cadiz ; on September 10, it anchored at 
 Algeciras, where it took part in the fruitless attempt against 
 Gibraltar that was undertaken at that time.'"" On October 1 1 , 
 Lord Howe appeared in the Strait, escorting an immense convoy 
 with thirty-six ships ; on the 14th he succeeded in getting his mer- 
 chant ships within the shelter of the guns of the fort, before the 
 very eyes of fifty hostile ships,'*" and left the Mediterranean, un- 
 molested. It was the third time that England had succeeded in 
 revictualing the Rock. 
 
 The capture of Gibraltar was the dominant care of the Spanish 
 
 ^*^ The efficacy of diversions is not always positive. Their object usually 
 is to force the enemy to weaken himself in a certain region by threatening 
 him in another ; but this result can rarely be attained without being obliged 
 to weaken oneself, and then the gain is not evident. 
 
 Operations are often called diversions that are not such. M. de Sartines' 
 plan of campaign included four : in America, in the West Indies, in India 
 and in the Mediterranean. Their object was to separate the English from 
 their coasts. They were wrongly named, for these diversions absorbed 
 almost the whole French fleet, which could no longer threaten the enemy's 
 shores without recalling the forces detached to Spain. 
 
 '^^* These vessels had been led to Cadiz by Guichen at the end of the 
 preceding year. 
 
 ^^ We allude to the attack that was to be made by land and by sea and 
 that was interrupted by the failure of the floating batteries. 
 
 ""The combined fleet had been reinforced by the vessels that were 
 stationed on the spot. 
 
 267
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 government throug-hout the war ; and the question now arises 
 whether the method that it adopted to realize its object was the 
 best one. 
 
 Independent of direct attacks, the Spanish proposed to reduce 
 the place by famine. To this end they always kept considerable 
 forces in the Strait. Well, with apparent inconsistency, Rodney, 
 Derby and Howe revictualed Gibraltar at the precise periods 
 when the whole Spanish fleet was concentrated at Cadiz ; so that 
 England appeared to select the least favorable moment for per- 
 forming an operation that, in itself, presented serious difficulties. 
 She could not do otherwise. As soon as the Allies appeared in the 
 Channel, England needed all her forces to avert the danger that 
 threatened her and she was obliged to subordinate her secondary 
 objectives to her principal objective. As soon as the season re- 
 moved from her shores all immediate danger, she reunited all her 
 available vessels, joined to them those that were assigned to her 
 foreign stations, and sent them to the Strait. After that only a 
 tactical operation was required for success, and she rightly trusted 
 in the skill of her admirals to accomplish it. There is good reason 
 to think, therefore, that it would have been advantageous for 
 Spain to have stationed some light vessels at AJgeciras to inter- 
 cept single ships, and to have joined the blockading squadron to 
 the combined fleet when the latter went north. If England had 
 taken advantage of this to revictual the Rock, she would have been 
 obliged to weaken her fleet in the Channel at the moment when her 
 shores were threatened. Eurthermore, it is unnecessary to say 
 that, if the English squadron had been destroyed in the Qiannel 
 in the summer, it would not have been able to go to Gibraltar in 
 the winter ; nevertheless, this obvious proposition does not seem to 
 have been seen by the Allies. 
 
 The events that took place in the West Indies and on the Ameri- 
 can coast had a direct reaction on the conduct of the war, since 
 they were the determining cause of the weakness of the English in 
 the Channel ; the French government's error, therefore, was not in 
 sending forces there, but in having wished to settle the affair in 
 that remote region. The whole interest of the war was transferred 
 there ; and it appeared as if the capture of a small island might 
 topple over England's power. Since circumstances favored direct 
 action against our rival, since it was in Europe that we were the 
 stronger and she the weaker, the key to the situation was in 
 
 268
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Europe. What mattered it then if the Enghsh took some islands 
 from us and we took from them some others ? The two important 
 matters in the Atlantic were first to support the war on land by 
 furnishing the insurgents with troops and the aid of our vessels 
 for their operations, and then to keep as great a number as pos- 
 sible of English vessels away from home. This result obtained, a 
 favorable occasion should have been seized to bring the vessels 
 sent to the West Indies across the Atlantic and to make them 
 participate in operations in the Channel. It was easy to do, because 
 the respective positions of the two sides were not the same. The 
 English, engaged in a continental war that required the transport 
 of troops by sea, and obliged to protect their West Indian posses- 
 sions, did not have free disposition of their forces to the same 
 extent that we did of ours. Moreover, the perpetual coming and 
 going of our squadrons between the American coasts, the West 
 Indies and the shores of France, kept up as to the movements of 
 our forces doubts that it was easy to profit by. When d'Estaing 
 left Boston, November 4, 1778, to go to Martinique, Howe had no 
 knowlege of it,"' and, even if he had had, would probably have 
 been unable to follow him. When Guichen left the West Indies 
 to return to France, Rodney thought he had gone to America and 
 hastened in that direction in pursuit of him. 
 
 It therefore seems that it would have been possible, in order to 
 strike a decisive blow, to make the return of our ships concord with 
 operations in European waters, or even to retain in Europe the 
 detachments intended for the colonies, after having them make a 
 feint at departure. De Grasse got under way from Brest on 
 March 22, 1781, with twenty-six ships, of which twenty were 
 under his direct command. If he had returned to Europe at the 
 beginning of May, we would have been able to get along without 
 the help of the Spaniards, which was so fatal to us. The following 
 year, the same de Grasse was in the West Indies ; if he had been 
 able to escape Rodney's vigilance, the latter would probably have 
 looked for him. at Jamaica, against which an expedition was 
 
 '"At the same time that d'Estaing left Boston, a division of five ships 
 left New York to attack St. Lucia. It was a coincidence ; and we have a 
 right to suppose that, if he had known d'Estaing's plan of going to the 
 West Indies, Howe would not have judged it opportune to choose that 
 moment for attacking St. Lucia. Hotham arrived before d'Estaing and 
 took the island. 
 
 269
 
 A Study of Xaval Strategy. 
 
 planned, and the Uiirt\-thrcc ships that fought the battle of 
 Dominica would have found a more favorable field of action on the 
 English coast. But, to carry out movements of forces of this sort, 
 a plan was necessary ; well, the Allies, after having made several 
 for the execution of which they had neglected to prepare, lived 
 from day to day. 
 
 The details of operations in the West Indies and in America 
 matter little from the general point of view that we are here tak- 
 ing. We have already had occasion to point out the special char- 
 acter that they assumed in the islands. It is, therefore, enough to 
 say that they evidenced the same faults : substitution of secondary 
 objectives for the principal objective,"' exaggerated respect for the 
 enemy afloat. 
 
 The Indian campaign was equally unproductive. For two years 
 Suffren expended treasures of energy and activity, and, in that far- 
 off region, with very weak forces and insufficient resources, he 
 established the true principles of warfare. Local conditions did 
 not lend themselves to transcendent plans ; Suilfren's entire strategy 
 consisted in conquering the empire of the land by that of the sea, 
 and he employed the sole efficient means of settling the question 
 by pursuing the hostile squadron without respite. Not to leave his 
 prey for a single instant, he refused to quit India and, lacking a 
 base of operations, he seized one. Unhappily he acted too far from 
 Europe to be able to weigh upon the issue of the struggle. In fact, 
 the preliminaries of peace, signed January 23, 1783, re-established 
 in that region the statu quo mite helium, although hostilities did 
 not cease in India until July 8. The battle of Cuddalore was 
 fought in the interval. This glorious campaign served only to 
 show what the genius of one man can accomplish with imperfect 
 means. 
 
 Looking back over the past, v/e see that France never had had, 
 and has not since had, so fine an opportunity to break down for a 
 long time the power of her rival. Since 1775 England had been 
 exhausting herself in keeping her American colonies in subjection ; 
 in 1778 France comes to the aid of the insurgents with her troops 
 
 '*' Yet we cannot resist the desire to cite the following occurrence. 
 D'Estaing fights a successful action against Byron, whose vessels are much 
 damaged ; content with having thus protected Grenada, he neglects to pur- 
 sue him, in order to secure his new conquest. See, upon this subject, 
 Mahan's remarks, p. 402, and Suffren's letter. 
 
 270
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 and her fleet; Spain, in 1778, and Holland, in 1781, unite with 
 France. Thus England, still clinging to the hope of not losing her 
 colonies, had no more troops at home, and had to make head 
 against three navies. It was impossible for her to attempt any- 
 thing important against the Allies ; she could at the best only hope 
 to maintain her position. France, on the contrary, was free to dis- 
 jjose of her whole army without reserve and, thanks to her allies, 
 had numerical superiority on the sea. Was not this the moment, 
 after having supplied the insurgents with the contingent of troops 
 that they needed to continue the struggle and to operate a diver- 
 sion, was not this the moment to strike at England's heart and to 
 make everything converge to that end ? 
 
 The Allies, on the contrary, carried on only a petty warfare. In 
 Europe, they exhausted themselves against the wall of Gibraltar ; 
 in the West Indies, they expended their strength in small expedi- 
 tions which, when successful, were immediately compensated by 
 equivalent reverses. 
 
 The war went on thus during five years, at the cost of consider- 
 able financial sacrifices ; and the most important maritime event "' 
 was a disaster for us. 
 
 It was the general lassitude and the crushing of the English 
 troops in America that put an end to hostilities ; so that we have 
 a right to assert that, if England had from the very beginning 
 made a sacrifice of her colonies, instead of using herself up to 
 keep them, she would have made the three navies that had leagued 
 themselves against her pay dearly for their aggression. 
 
 What then was the cause of the impotence of our squadrons, 
 that were, nevertheless, gommanded by ofiicers of merit? As far 
 as the execution is concerned, it must be attributed to an erroneous 
 conception of war, and this initial fault was aggravated by a lack 
 of understanding between the Allies which entailed disconnected 
 efforts. Each country, with the exception of Holland, had entered 
 the coalition with its own special object. The Americans desired 
 their independence ; the Spaniards meant to recapture Gibraltar 
 and Minorca ; France sought the revision of the disastrous treaty 
 of 1763. The individual pretensions of the Allies were legitimate : 
 nations do not go to war for sentimental reasons, but for gain. 
 Their error was in believing that the best means of attaining their 
 
 ^^' The battle of Dominica. 
 
 271
 
 A Study of Xaval STRA'ii-:nv. 
 
 objects was by systematically prosecntino- the conquest of all the 
 points they desired and not by undertakinq; a common action that 
 would have given them in i)lock what they sou,c;ht to o;et in detail. 
 The Spaniards onl\' followed us with regret ; they went northward 
 with looks turned back towards the Mediterranean. 
 
 It was the fatal determination to wish at any cost to retake 
 Gibraltar that ham]>ered most the movement of the allied squad- 
 rons. Mahan, in his masterly exposition, shows us how much this 
 position weighed upon the English plans ; '"" but it weighed much 
 more upon those of the Allies. While England contented herself 
 with revictualing the place from time to time with squadrons that 
 at once proceeded to another destination, the Allies for four years 
 immobilized important forces in keeping up a useless blockade ; 
 and IVIahan concludes that Gibraltar was a powerful diversion in 
 favor of England."^ 
 
 After all, France, with the advantage of the offensive, with 
 superiority of numbers, with a material in many respects com- 
 parable with that of England, with a body of brilliant and well- 
 instructed officers, gained in this long and distressing war nothing 
 but the restitution of Senegal and the little island of Tobago. It 
 was a far cry from the hopes that accompanied the opening of hos- 
 tilities. Nevertheless, in spite of all the accumulated errors, in 
 spite of the lack of understanding between the Allies, in spite of 
 the disconnectedness of operations, this war would have been 
 glorious and productive for France, if her sailors had had for their 
 sole line of conduct to seek before all else the enemy afloat and to 
 engage him seriously each time that conditions allowed of it. 
 
 To cite only examples where the disproportion of forces made 
 victory certain, it is easy to see that the results would have been 
 much more important if Byron had been beaten at Grenada, Bar- 
 rington at St. Lucia, Hood at St.-Kitts, Derby at Torbay. 
 
 We have not spent so much time in reviewing the War of Ameri- 
 
 '"" The importance of Gibraltar only made itself felt during wars in which 
 England had to maintain squadrons in the Mediterranean. The squadrons 
 went there to get supplies and to refit. As soon as circumstances forced 
 the English vessels to evacuate the Mediterranean, Gibraltar became a 
 burden. 
 
 ^"^ A surprise attack that might have taken the Rock in a few days could 
 be understood; but there was no justification for paralyzing whole squad- 
 rons in keeping guard over a few battalions. 
 
 272
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 can Independence for the purpose of criticizing those who con- 
 ducted it. At that period an action carried on with Napoleonic 
 energy would not have been thought justifiable; but though we do 
 not accuse individuals, it is our duty to profit by events. The les- 
 sons that they furnish will enable us eventually to demonstrate to 
 our allies the necessity of not seeking divergent objects and of not 
 sacrificing the general interest to special interests. 
 
 I 
 
 273
 
 II. 
 
 Napoleox's X.wal Strategy. 
 
 In 1803 Xapoleon took up again the plan of invadinjy Eng^land 
 to which the Alhes had i^^iven some thought in 1779, and we shall 
 now see how he made all efforts converge upon a single end, 
 impressing upon operations that unity of action which had been 
 so completely lacking in the war of 1778. We shall likewise see 
 with what fertility of mind he derives advantage from an un- 
 promising situation, modifying his plans according to circum- 
 stances, and never being at a loss to utilize his forces. 
 
 The flotilla of gunboats had completed its concentration in the 
 northern ports, and the moment was approaching when the 150,000 
 men collected at Boulogne would need nothing more but a free 
 passage in order to cross the Strait. The Emperor's solicitude was 
 then to bring to the Strait of Dover sufficient forces to drive off 
 the English cruisers. 
 
 There were then eighteen ships at Brest, five at Rochefort, five 
 at Ferrol, one at Cadiz, and eight at Toulon. All ports excepting 
 Cadiz were blockaded. Nelson was off Toulon, Cornwallis off 
 Brest. 
 
 Napoleon, who thought he could get his army across in the 
 month of February, 1804, counted upon the winter storms to 
 break the blockade of Brest. That squadron was then to proceed 
 to Ireland, to land a body of troops there and to appear suddenly 
 in the Channel. Its force was sufificient to secure freedom of the 
 Strait for a few days. 
 
 Preparations not having been finished for the winter, all hope 
 was lost of being able to leave Brest in the milder weather of 
 summer, which made the hostile force more active ; on the other 
 hand, the strong mistrals that sometimes blow in the warm season 
 forced Nelson from time to time to take refuge in lee of Corsica. 
 
 Napoleon then thought to entrust the Toulon squadron with the 
 role previously assigned to that of Brest, and, with this object, he 
 placed Latouche-Treville at its head. 
 
 The latter was to set sail from Toulon with ten ships,"' to steer 
 
 '*' Two vessels had been fitted out during the winter. 
 
 274
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to the south so as to deceive the EngHsh cruisers, then to stand for 
 the Strait of Gibraltar, to pick up the ship Aigle at Cadiz in pass- 
 ing, to unblock the Rochefort division and to enter the Channel 
 with sixteen ships. 
 
 To mislead Nelson as to the true destination of the squadron, a 
 camp was established near Toulon, the troops of which were offi- 
 cially destined to go to the Levant. 
 
 Meanwhile Ganteaume would keep the squadron blockading 
 Brest occupied by feigned sorties. If Cornwallis, nevertheless, re- 
 ceived information of Latouche-Treville's passage and hastened to 
 pursue him, Ganteaume was to go out ; and one or the other of the 
 two squadrons, perhaps both, would be able to get into the Channel. 
 The death of Latouche-Treville prevented the execution of this 
 plan. Villeneuve took command of the Toulon squadron, while 
 Missiessy replaced Villeneuve at Rochefort. 
 
 All these changes had taken time, and there was no longer hope 
 of doing anything that year. 
 
 For the third time Napoleon modified his plans. Villeneuve's 
 character appearing to him not to be sufficiently resolute, he re- 
 turned to his first idea of entrusting the principal role to the Brest 
 squadron, under Ganteaume's command. The approach of winter, 
 moreover, drew attention to the north. 
 
 Villeneuve and Missiessy were to set out from Toulon and 
 Rochefort, to make a junction in the West Indies, to do what harm 
 they could to the English colonies, and then to return together to 
 Rochefort when their sortie had drawn the English squadrons in 
 their pursuit. On their return they had orders to unblock Ferrol 
 and to join to themselves the French vessels that were there. 
 Ganteaume, setting out from Brest last, was to throw a body of 
 troops into Ireland and then to go to Boulogne, either directly or 
 by the north of Scotland. 
 
 Missiessy, in fact, set sail on January ii, 1805, and Villeneuve 
 on January 18 ; but ten days later the latter, damaged by the 
 storm that had facilitated his exit, was back again at Toulon and 
 asked two months to make repairs. 
 
 In the meantime Spain declared war against England, and 
 Napoleon, wishing to profit by the reinforcement given him by 
 the Spanish Navy, enlarged still further the scope of his com- 
 binations. He wished to bring about in the West Indies a general 
 concentration of all the allied forces and to bring this enormous 
 
 275
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 mass into the Channel, while the English, misled by the rumor 
 that had begun to spread of a great expedition to India, uncertain 
 as to the true destination of all these squadrons starting from all 
 points at once, would scatter to the Orient, to India and to the 
 West Indies. 
 
 To put into execution this gigantic scheme, Villeneuve was to 
 set out from Toulon on the first favorable occasion, to pick up oflf 
 Cadiz Admiral Gravina's six or seven ships, as well as the Aigle, 
 and to proceed to Martinique. There he would form junction with 
 Missiessy, who was already there, and would await the arrival of 
 Ganteaume. The latter would set out from Brest with twenty-one 
 ships and would unblock the Ferrol French-Spanish division in 
 passing. There would thus be fifty or sixty ships brought together 
 in the West Indies. All precautions were taken to insure secrecy. 
 Villeneuve and Ganteaume alone received instructions from the 
 Emperor, which they were not to open until at sea, and which they 
 were forbidden to communicate to their captains. As for the 
 Spaniards, they had to be content to go where they were led. 
 Finally, Napoleon himself went to Italy, in order to take away 
 from the Admiralty any immediate cause for anxiety. 
 
 As is known, the first part of the program was carried out with- 
 out hindrance. Villeneuve set out from Toulon on March 29, 
 1805, joined Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, and the combined squad- 
 ron steered for the West Indies. Already the presence of Missiessy 
 had drawn the attention of the English in that direction, and they 
 had set about reinforcing the two single ships that were there. 
 But Missiessy awaited in vain the arrival of Villeneuve; after 
 having made numerous prizes, destroyed the fortifications of 
 Dominica and St. Christopher, and thrown 500 men into the 
 stronghold of San Domingo, he had returned to Rochefort without 
 being interfered with. This mischance was not serious, since the 
 Rochefort division only consisted of five ships. What was more 
 serious was that Ganteaume did not succeed in getting out of 
 Brest : by a sort of fatality the weather continued fine, making any 
 attempt at evasion impossible. All hope of a concentration in the 
 West Indies, where Villeneuve could not stay indefinitely, very 
 soon had to be given up. Napoleon then made his plan over again 
 once more. At first he thought of making Villeneuve come 
 directly from the West Indies to the Strait of Dover, going by the 
 
 276 
 
 i
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 north of Scotland. Cornwallis kept off Brest by Ganteaume, and 
 Calder held off Ferrol by the French-Spanish division, Villeneuve's 
 twenty ships ought to suffice to secure the Grand Army's passage 
 of the Strait. But Napoleon thought to increase his chances of 
 success by having Villeneuve joined by the Ferrol and Rochefort 
 vessels (the latter having returned from the West Indies), and he 
 finally decided on the following plan : Ganteaume was ordered to 
 wait to be unblocked by Villeneuve before going out ; the latter, 
 leaving the West Indies, would touch at Ferrol to free the five 
 French and seven Spanish vessels that Calder was watching ; then 
 he would appear off Brest, after having picked up in passing the 
 five Rochefort ships ; Ganteaume, freed, would join the allied 
 squadron, which, fifty-six ships strong, would enter the Channel. 
 
 These new arrangements were communicated to Villeneuve by 
 Rear-Admiral Magon, who left Rochefort on May 2 with two 
 ships. Villeneuve at once set sail for Europe (June 10), happy at 
 escaping the English squadron whose arrival had just been an- 
 nounced to him : it was Nelson's squadron. 
 
 " Informed by his frigates of Villeneuve's departure, this gal- 
 lant seaman had waited for him several days between Sardinia 
 and the African coast ; his anxiety was so much the greater be- 
 cause a convoy of troops that had left England for the Mediter- 
 ranean might be intercepted by our ships. As soon as he had been 
 undeceived as to the route the latter had taken, he proceeded to 
 Gibraltar, learned there of Villeneuve's departure for the West 
 Indies, and with one of the finest impulses that marked his career, 
 without hesitation hastened in his pursuit.^" Nelson anchored on 
 June 4 in the Barbados, picked up two of Rear-Admiral Coch- 
 rane's ships there, and went to Trinidad, where he expected to 
 find the combined fleet. Deceived in his hopes, he set sail for 
 Antigua. Informed, on June 12, of Villeneuve's departure for 
 Europe, convinced moreover that the latter was returning to the 
 Mediterranean, he hastened to Gibraltar. Arriving at that anchor- 
 age on July 18, Nelson was much astonished to learn that no 
 French ships had passed through the Strait. Soon apprised of the 
 route followed by our fleet, he went towards the Island of Oues- 
 
 ^^ Nelson left Lagos, where he filled up with water, on the very day that 
 Villeneuve arrived in the West Indies. 
 
 V7
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 sant, left nine shi]:)S with Admiral Cornwallis. who was blockading 
 Brest, and returned to England." '" 
 
 Villeneuve's progress w^as so slow that the brig Ctirieiix, sent 
 by Nelson to England, met the allied fleet at sea ; on July 8 the 
 Admiralty was warned of his return to European waters. Still 
 ignorant of his destination, the Admiralty contented itself with 
 reinforcing its blockading squadrons ; but all it could do in that 
 line was to raise Cornwallis' forces to twenty-four ships and 
 Calder's to fifteen, by the addition of the division that was cruis- 
 ing olT the Straits. It was this squadron of Calder's that \'il- 
 leneuve came upon in the vicinity of Cape Finisterre. He lost 
 two ships in the action, and the wind took him to Vigo, where he 
 anchored on July 28. He set out again on the 31st, and on August 
 2 reached La Corogne, where he joined forces with eleven vessels 
 that he found there. 
 
 There he received the Emperor's last instructions, which urged 
 him to betake himself to Brest. 
 
 Thus, in spite of an unfortunate battle, in spite of a slowness of 
 progress that enabled the English Admiralty to forsee the danger. 
 Napoleon's previsions were realized, and all that was left to do 
 was for the allied fleet to appear before Brest to free Ganteaume. 
 Supposing it should meet Cornwallis before reaching Brest and be 
 crushed in spite of its numerical superiority, Ganteaume would 
 remain untouched and could enter the Channel with twenty-one 
 ships. 
 
 On August 14, Villeneuve left Ferrol. What was the situation 
 of the hostile forces on this date? 
 
 On that very day Nelson had just rejoined Cornwallis and im- 
 mediately went to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the i8th ; 
 Calder, for his part, joined his chief off Brest with his damaged 
 division. Cornwallis thus had thirty-five ships, which he at once 
 divided into tw^o parts ; one fleet of seventeen vessels remained 
 with him before Brest ; another, of eighteen vessels, under Calder, 
 stood for Ferrol, but only arrived there after the departure of the 
 Allies. Therefore, if Villeneuve had continued his route towards 
 Brest, he would have met Allemand, who had the sea free since 
 Calder had been reinforced, on the way. and would have fallen 
 
 ^^* Essai historique sitr la strategie ct la tactiquc dcs Aottcs modernes, by 
 Chabaud- Arnault. 
 
 278
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 upon Cornwallis with thirty-four ships against seventeen. Eng- 
 land would then only have had the eighteen ships of Calder that 
 were in the south as a serious force to meet sixty ships of the 
 Allies. Never had an admiral so fine a chance of carrying off an 
 easy success. Yet it was at this moment that Villeneuve despaired 
 of the Emperor's fortune : he stood for Cadiz, where he arrived on 
 August 20. 
 
 Thus failed the greatest strategic enterprise that was ever 
 attempted on the sea. 
 
 Ought we to conclude from Villeneuve's retreat that the Em- 
 peror's plans were ill conceived or that they were badly executed? 
 
 Yes, all Napoleon's naval conceptions were tainted with an 
 initial defect that in advance made them unfruitful : the allied 
 ships were not fit to make war with. Strategy, let us not forget, 
 is only one of the factors of war ; it is powerless if it is not com- 
 pleted by tactics, which permits profiting from the advantages 
 that strategy prepares, and by the organization of naval forces, 
 thanks to which a vessel or a collection of vessels can meet the 
 requirements of war. So far as equality of numbers does not pro- 
 cure equality of strength, war becomes an insoluble problem ; 
 numerical superiority is no longer anything but a deceptive screen 
 masking the abyss. Well, the action of Cape Finisterre, and still 
 more that of Trafalgar, which was fought a few months later, 
 proved that the allied fleet was but an inert mass, capable of re- 
 ceiving blows, incapable of giving them. The whole campaign 
 was interfered with by the defective outfitting of the ships, and 
 especially of the Spanish ships ; to such an extent that it seems as 
 if Villeneuve's unhappy squadron was only sustained by the 
 tenacious will of Napoleon, who from the continent urges it on 
 and directs it despite itself. Only at the end does the invisible 
 bond that unites Villeneuve to his master finish by breaking, and 
 the admiral gives himself up to discouragement, the forced con- 
 sequence of the deplorable state of his ships. 
 
 It was the disorganized state of our naval service that occa- 
 sioned damages after every storm and forced Villeneuve to return 
 to Toulon ; it was that that retarded the progress of the squadron ; 
 it was that that engendered sickness ; it was that above all that 
 created an unhealthy fear of meeting the enemy, however weak 
 numerically he might be. and prevented \"illeneuve from retaking 
 from Calder two of his shijjs. 
 
 279
 
 A Study of Xa\al Stkategv. 
 
 Tlie English Xavy, at this epoch, had just undergone a transfor- 
 mation analogous to that which the Revolution had stamped upon 
 our armies and which was the origin of Napoleon's prodigious 
 successes. War had taken on a harsh character such as it had not 
 had for a long time : a strug'gle for existence had replaced strug- 
 gles for power and for dynasties. Operations were no longer 
 suspended during the bad season ; it was necessary to keep the 
 squadrons constantly fitted out and to make them keep the sea 
 winter and summer, without rest or let-up. This new situation 
 demanded a radical change in the conditions of cruising. England 
 understood this. Hygiene, so defective on board ship, was im- 
 proved by a series of effective measures, while long cruises trained 
 crews and developed the readiness of officers to an extent until 
 then unknown. Cornwallis could thus blockade Brest during 
 whole years without interruption, and Nelson could accomplish 
 those gigantic raids that would have appeared impossible a few 
 years before. During this tim.e, our ships, immobilized in port, 
 wasted away in an inaction that did not make clear the necessity 
 of no longer relying upon those hap-hazard crews and improvised 
 armaments which had managed to be sufficient in the period when 
 fleets left harbor to fight and returned immediately afterward.'"' 
 Under Louis XVI, a French ship was as good as an English ship ; 
 twenty years later the French Navy could not stand up against the 
 English forces. All the more must we be crushed when incapable 
 captains had been substituted for our experienced officers, when 
 sailors were replaced by soldiers, when ships were rushed to sea 
 with incomplete equipments and worn-out rigging. 
 
 Napoleon's plan, therefore, made default in the means of execu- 
 tion ; but, from an abstract point of view, it seems to us that it 
 was correct in its conception. Perhaps the Emperor will be re- 
 proached with having given such a development to his plans that 
 concordance in the movements of the different forces was difficult 
 to obtain. But this reproach does not apply to the last form that 
 
 "'It was one of the errors of the time to imagine that the English wore 
 themselves out in keeping the sea, while our material remained in good 
 condition in port. The English ships wore themselves out in the fashion 
 of the Emperor's veterans, who swept over all the battle-fields of Europe. 
 The inactive ships were for the French a new tool that they did not know 
 how to use. This same idea is actually to be found in the minds of many 
 people to-day. 
 
 280
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 the operation took, since all the Atlantic detachments were to wait 
 to be successively unblocked, and since they were near enough 
 together to be reached by orders regulating their movements. 
 
 To justify the Emperor's orders, it would be easy to say that, if 
 such or such a circumstance had not come to pass, all would have 
 happened as provided. It can be said, for example, that if Vil- 
 leneuve had not had to return to Toulon, he would have found 
 Missiessy in the West Indies, or even, if the Curieiix had not 
 reached Europe before Villeneuve, Calder would have had only 
 nine ships off Ferrol, and so forth. This manner of judging things 
 would wholly warp the lessons of history: accidents of the sea are 
 factors that ought to be taken account of, and it is necessary always 
 to make proper allowance for them. It is precisely because Vil- 
 leneuve's situation was never compromised (as far as the relation 
 of forces is concerned) and was even particularly brilliant at the 
 moment when he gave up in despair, in spite of a succession of 
 mischances that better organized forces would have escaped ; it is 
 for that reason that we have a right to say that there never was an 
 operation better conceived. 
 
 As soon as the Toulon squadron cleared the Strait of Gibraltar, 
 all immediate danger disappeared : the junction with Gravina gave 
 \"illeneuve numerical superiority, and he kept it to the end. be- 
 cause in his progress he was reinforced by the detachments from 
 Ferrol and Rochefort before meeting Cornwallis. whose forces 
 constituted the principal hostile fleet. The sole critical moment 
 was the passage through the Mediterranean to Cadiz ; after that 
 the operation rested on a firm foundation, strength, the only basis 
 for the tranquillity of mind necessary to a chief to assure success. 
 Unhappily, the state of his ships took away all assurance from 
 Villeneuve and confused all his faculties. 
 
 It is noteworthy that England never kept off Boulogne but a 
 very small number of ships (four), and this manner of acting 
 appears to have been reasonable. If the flotilla proposed to cross 
 without the support of a squadron, light vessels would be enough 
 to destroy it. The true danger lay in our ships of the line, and the 
 most efflcacious way of preventing them from doing any harm was 
 to blockade them in their harbors or to follow them if they came 
 out. England did not have sufficient forces to concentrate ships 
 in the Strait of Dover, to watch our squadrons and to protect her 
 colonies. The event proved that the distribution of the English 
 
 281
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 forces did not exclude all daiijjcr ; but, in the critical situation in 
 which the threat of invasion and the necessity of protecting her 
 colonies placed England, any other solution would have been more 
 dangerous. 
 
 We ought also to bear in mind the perturbation that the evasion 
 of ten French ships produced in the English squadrons. The ap- 
 prehensions of Calder off Ferrol, the conjectures of Collingwood 
 at Gibraltar, Nelson's despair on his return to Portsmouth, must 
 be recalled in order to form a correct idea of the influence of 
 Napoleon's strategic operation. 
 
 282
 
 III. 
 
 The American Civil War. 
 
 We have no intention of here passing in review the long series 
 of attacks upon the coast that distinguished the War of Secession ; 
 moreover, though the details of all these operations cannot be too 
 minutely studied by the tactician, who will find in them an inex- 
 haustible miine of information, from the point of view of strategy 
 this enumeration would be of no utility. The important thing is 
 to examine into causes, not to describe effects. 
 
 The War of Secession is remarkable in this respect — it shows 
 in striking fashion the impotence of a passive naval defence. 
 
 The two adversaries had a common land frontier ; but by reason 
 of a grouping of the population around a few centers far removed 
 from one another, by reason likewise of geographic conditions, the 
 sea was the most practicable and the shortest road by which the 
 belligerents could meet. In conseqi;ence, the war must have 
 begun with a contest on the sea, having as its object the command 
 of the means of communication, if the two sides had had navies 
 capable of fighting for control of the sea ; but the federals alone had 
 sea-going vessels, while the confederates had only gunboats and 
 monitors lacking radius of action, unseaworthy, and whose action 
 only made itself felt at river mouths and inside bays. 
 
 The sea was therefore free for the federals, to whom, on this 
 account, the offensive part belonged ; the confederates were re- 
 duced to keeping on the defensive and waiting for the attack to 
 define itself. The latter's situation was very disadvantageous. 
 They had to defend a considerable extent of coast, and the diffi- 
 culty of communications by land left each of the Confederate States 
 to its own resources, as an island would have been. The federals, 
 on the contrary, masters of the sea, were at liberty to choose their 
 objective and to concentrate on a single point sufficient forces to 
 overcome all resistance. Under these conditions, the issue of the 
 struggle could not be doubtful : the confederates must succumb. 
 Their heroism might retard the moment of their fall ; it could 
 neither prevent it nor change the aspect of affairs. 
 
 In fact, the federals overthrew in succession all the confederates' 
 defences by accumulating at each point forces immensely superior 
 
 283
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 to those that thcv knew would be met there, and by proceeding 
 methodically, at the most convenient time, under the most favor- 
 able conditions. In vain did the confederates accumulate tor- 
 pedoes, monitors, batteries ; nothing availed, because there is a 
 limit beyond which numbers always win. 
 
 Let it be supposed now that the confederates, instead of moni- 
 tors of small radius of action and incapable of going to sea, had 
 possessed a sea-going navy the units of which had the necessary 
 qualities to move about and to concentrate : the situation would 
 have been different. The sea would no longer have been free; 
 consequently the Northern States would have had to renounce 
 installing the commercial blockade which was their first act and 
 which took away from the Southern States the greater part of their 
 resources. Before attacking the coasts and undertaking that series 
 of operations which made the principal confederate places fall one 
 by one, the federals would first have been obliged to destroy the 
 Southern Navy, which would have been able, even though inferior 
 in numbers, to interrupt all the combined attacks and to inflict 
 serious losses upon the federals. It suffices to call to mind the 
 considerable time that the federals required to destroy the sea- 
 coast defences, to become aware that operations of this sort are 
 not possible so long as there is a mobile force in the vicinity. No 
 dovibt, if the sea-going navy of the confederates had been numer- 
 ically inferior, it would have had to succumb, and the coasts would 
 have been left open to attack. But in all ways their situation 
 would have been better. In the first place we know (see the dis- 
 cussion of the " fleet in being ") that a mobile force, even inferior, 
 can paralyze superior forces ; in the second place, inferiority makes 
 itself less felt when one's forces can be concentrated than when 
 they are distributed in small bodies ; for, in one case as in the 
 other, the enemy can always appear with the whole of his forces ; 
 finally, the Confederate Navy would not have been destroyed at a 
 single blow without inflicting serious losses upon the federals 
 (which would have permitted the Southern States to retard the 
 attacks upon the coast and to augment their resources), whereas, 
 with its fleet of monitors, the Southern Navy was incapable of pre- 
 venting a single attack. From the naval point of view it may be 
 said that this fleet played no part at all; and the federals, being 
 free to attack at their convenience and making their expeditions 
 at intervals, could repair their losses according as they occurred. 
 
 284 
 
 4
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 In short, what the confederates lacked was a sea-going navy, 
 capable of disputing command of the sea; for upon that command 
 depended the protection of their seacoast. That is the true lesson 
 to be derived from the War of Secession. 
 
 A^ery well, this lesson has not been understood. To be sure, it is 
 not the first time that false conclusions have been drawn from a 
 war. This one, which ought to have caused the disappearance of 
 monitors, whose impotence had been manifest, on the contrary 
 only increased their vogue. All the powers set to work building 
 them, in imitation of the United States. People said that they 
 had been unable to defend the coast because they were too small 
 and too few in number ; and so they built bigger ones and more of 
 them. But vessels built for offence also grew larger and condi- 
 tions remained unchanged. It needed the war with Spain to dis- 
 gust the United States with monitors and to make them perceive 
 their error. 
 
 This error arose from the preponderance accorded by all mari- 
 time powers, except England perhaps, to the tactical element over 
 the strategic element. In fact, if you will consider only the opera- 
 tion in itself — the attack upon a point on the coast — the more 
 means the defence has the better the chance of repelling the at- 
 tack ; and as a means of defence the monitor is not negligible : 
 therefore, they must be multiplied. The problem of defence as 
 thus laid down is insoluble because it is impossible to collect at 
 each important point of a coast naval defences capable of resisting 
 the totality of the enemy's forces. It is therefore necessary to 
 look at things from a higher view-point ; that is to say, from the 
 strategical point of view. Totally dift'erent conclusions are then 
 arrived at. Instead of awaiting the enemy in port with forces scat- 
 tered over the whole extent of the seacoast, one is led to seeking 
 him on the sea ; instead of dispersing, one endeavors to concen- 
 trate ; in place of monitors, sea-going vessels are desired. 
 
 Up to the present time the naval passive defensive has not yet 
 been wholly renounced, and most nations make two divisions of 
 their forces : one which is supported by fixed defences, the other 
 which acts at sea. This bastard solution has no other effect than 
 to diminish the strength of all the forces devoted to the passive 
 defence as well as of those devoted to the active defence, so that 
 both are compromised. 
 
 285
 
 IV. 
 
 The War between Chile and Peru. 
 
 A\"hcn w c read history, we look above all for facts ; our whole 
 interest is concentrated on the im|)ortant events whose recital 
 causes a dramatic emotion. The reading" over, there remain in the 
 reader's mind only the names of battles, and, if he seeks to form 
 an opinion, it will be influenced by those episodes that are written 
 in large letters. Well, in a war, battle itself is only a conclusion ; 
 what is as important as the battle is the manner in which it was 
 made ready for and the causes that have determined the victory. 
 In order to apply himself to this search the critic is obliged to look 
 more closely into things, and he then perceives that the events 
 that occupy the most space are not always those that have had the 
 most influence. 
 
 For example, in the war between Chile and Peru, we cannot help 
 being struck by the tours dc force that the Chilean Army had to 
 accomplish to reach Lima across the deserts ; we recall the names 
 of the battles of Dolores, Tarapaca, Los Angeles, Tacna, Arica, 
 Chorrillos and Miraflores ; and we are tempted to conclude that it 
 was the Chilean Army that decided the victory for Chile and that 
 the war was above all a land war. 
 
 Well, this war was, above all, naval, because victory must in- 
 evitably belong to the side that remained in command of the sea. 
 From the geographical point of view there is a striking similarity 
 between this war and that of Secession. 
 
 Peru and Chile are separated by immense deserts ; the two coun- 
 tries have no means of communication except by the sea, and the 
 provinces, as well of Chile as of Peru, are equally without means 
 of intercommunication, all the railroads being perpendicular to the 
 coast ; they are abandoned to themselves, they are unable to lend 
 support to one another. Therefore, that one of the two adver- 
 saries who is master of the sea can concentrate and attack in mass, 
 while the other will have his forces scattered without their being 
 able to unite : the latter will necessarily be vanquished. 
 
 It was the Chileans who had command of the sea, and they then 
 carried their army from Chile to Lima in three successive bounds : 
 First, from Valparaiso to Antofagasta ; second, from Antofagasta 
 to Pisagua ; third, from Arica to Curayaco. 
 
 286
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Each of these bounds was across the sea and could not be other- 
 wise : for, although the Ch.ilean Army traversed only relatively 
 short distances over land, the difficulties of its marches reached 
 the limits of human endurance. 
 
 If the Chileans had not had a navy, they would doubtless have 
 been able to land troops at Antofagasta with merchant ships, as 
 they did, since this operation took place in full peace and Bolivia 
 had no vessels with which to prevent it ; but they would not have 
 been able to go any further. 
 
 Inversely, if Peru had been supreme on the sea, she would have 
 protected her territory without having need of a single soldier ; 
 for it was only after the capture of the Hnascar, succeeding to the 
 loss of the Independencia, that the Chileans dared to enter upon 
 Peruvian territory."" 
 
 It was, therefore, truly upon its navy that the destinies of each 
 country depended. 
 
 Let us now see how Chile won command of the sea. 
 
 At the beginning of the war, the naval forces of the two adver- 
 saries were sensibly equal. Two small armored vessels form the 
 basis of each navy — for the Chileans, the Blanco-Encalada and 
 Cochrane; for the Peruvians, the Independencia and Huascar. 
 The two Chilean armorclads are similar, and their strength is 
 midway between that of the Independencia and the Huascar. 
 Each nation also possesses a few wooden ships without military 
 value, and Peru has besides two small armored coast-guard vessels 
 that cannot go to sea. 
 
 A little after the opening of hostilities the two Peruvian armor- 
 clads attack off Iquiqui two wooden vessels, the corvette Esmeralda 
 and the gunboat Covadonga, which had imprudently been left on 
 blockade off that port. The Huascar sinks the corvette by ram- 
 ming her ; the Independencia, the strongest vessel of either navy, 
 in pursuing the gunboat, is stupidly run upon the rocks and lost. 
 
 Thenceforth the Huascar remains alone and, forced to avoid 
 any encounter, has to be satisfied with hindering the enemy's 
 operations during four months by disquieting his coast. She made 
 a few lucky strokes, but finally was forced to fight and had to 
 
 ^*^ It is for this reason that Peru's first care after the war should have 
 been to reorganize her navy, whereas she devoted her resources to the 
 army. 
 
 287
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 surrender. The Chileans then remain uncontested masters of the 
 sea and beo:in to transport tlieir army. Such are the simple facts. 
 
 The brilliant manner in which, for four months, the Huascar 
 bafifled the enemy's efforts, and her heroic end. were the cause of 
 her dominatinoc the whole naval part of the war and made her cap- 
 ture appear its most important event. But nothing of the sort is 
 true. The gravest event of this war was the loss of the Indepcn- 
 dencia. Through this occurrence, command of the sea, until then 
 contested, passed over to the Chileans and, except by a miracle, 
 the final victory must be theirs. The commander of that vessel, 
 in running her on the rocks by an error in navigation, caused his 
 country's ruin."' 
 
 Thereafter the Huascar' s fate is sealed : it is only a question of 
 time, unless she destroys herself or shuts herself up in port. Cer- 
 tainly, so long as she keeps the sea, her presence influences events. 
 The Chileans are as yet only at Antofagasta, as in the first days 
 of the war : they dare not adventure their troops at sea since one 
 transport has been captured, and, if the Peruvians had been able to 
 profit by this respite to put in line new naval units, the Huascar 
 might have saved the day. But, under the conditions in which 
 Peru finds herself, she does nothing more than delay an inevitable 
 result, since the situation does not change. She prevents the 
 enemy from doing harm for the time being, but herself does none, 
 because solicitude for her own preservation forces her to act 
 cautiously : she plays a negative part. Therefore, the services 
 rendered by the Huascar must not be exaggerated. She did what 
 she could, but she could do but little. 
 
 Peru had two small armored coast-guards that played no serious 
 part because, to make them useful, they would have had to go to 
 sea and move about. If. in the place of these cripples, Peru had had 
 a single mobile vessel, though only of the strength of the Huascar, 
 which w'as but a very small ship, she would have won supremacy 
 on the sea from the beginning of the war, and this fact alone might 
 have modified the conduct of the Chileans and made them more 
 circumspect ; in that case the loss of the Independencia would not 
 have been irreparable. As a matter of fact, Peru had more ships 
 than Chile, but the useful part of her fleet was not superior to 
 that of her opponent. 
 
 "' There is a lesson here for those who assert that seamanship is a 
 secondary quahty in the navies of to-day. 
 
 288
 
 V. 
 
 The Spanish-American War. 
 
 Too frequent allusions have been made to this war in the course 
 of our study to make it necessary to dwell at length upon the par- 
 ticular lessons that derive from it. We shall, therefore, content 
 ourselves with speaking of it from the point of view of the general 
 conduct of operations. 
 
 If ever a war might have been foreseen and discounted in ad- 
 vance, it is truly this one. And yet it took Spain unawares. It 
 happened as it so frequently does that the nation that did not wish 
 war, because it saw no means of carrying it on successfully, per- 
 suaded itself that war would not break out and neglected to make 
 ready for it. When the Spanish government was driven to a 
 rupture, it was still ignorant of what to do with its forces. 
 
 It is true that the situation, for Spain, was really not a promis- 
 ing one. She was about to find herself threatened at both extremi- 
 ties of her colonial empire, in Cuba and in the Philippines ; and 
 these two colonies were in full revolt. In the Philippines, the 
 naval forces at Admiral Montojo's disposal were not equal to con- 
 tending with Commodore Dewey's modern cruisers ; and the army 
 had too much difficulty in holding the insurgents in check to be 
 able to pretend to repel a landing. In the West Indies, Spain had 
 only small vessels charged with police duties ; the United States 
 was mistress of the sea. It was therefore going to be necessary 
 to bring into this far-removed theater a squadron capable of re- 
 conquering command of the sea, in order to prevent the Americans 
 from landing and to re-establish communications with the mother 
 country. But the two most powerful units of the fleet, the Pclayo 
 and the Carlos V , were not ready for sea. 
 
 In short, a geographical situation clearly unfavorable ; a marked 
 naval inferiority. 
 
 Spain held but a single trump : the immense army of occupation 
 that she maintained in Cuba and that seemed capable of with- 
 standing the American attempts at disembarkation. But it was 
 necessary for this army to be fed with fresh troops and supplies, 
 
 289
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 and the sea was the sole way of communication. As in all colonial 
 wars, the sea was to play a prepondcratini;- part. 
 
 * * 
 
 The first encounter took place in the Philippines. On April 30. 
 1P98. the Far Eastern American division, under the command of 
 Commodore Dewey, appeared off the coast of the Island of Luzon : 
 the following day it destroyed the Spanish division anchored at 
 Cavite under the feeble protection of two batteries of two guns each. 
 Commodore Dewey covered himself with glory cheaply ; but it 
 cannot be denied that he showed a spirit of decision that reveals 
 m him the qualities of the true warrior. 
 
 Perhaps Subig Bay would have afforded the Spanish vessels a 
 more favorable position than Cavite for awaiting the enemy ; its 
 approach was easy to defend and torpedoes could be moored in the 
 entrance. What is certain is that Admiral Montojo went to estab- 
 lish himself there as soon as war was declared ; afterwards he re- 
 turned to Cavite. If it be true, as has been asserted, that the 
 Spanish division was recalled in order to cover Manila more 
 effectively, this order was unfortunate. Commodore Dewey had 
 and could have no other objective than the Spanish ships ; the 
 proof of it is that he appeared first of all off Subig and only after 
 making sure of the absence of hostile vessels went on to Manila 
 Bay. If then — which we do not know about — Subig Bay offered 
 advantages from a defensive point of view, the Spanish division 
 should have waited for the enemy there and not at Cavite. Since 
 the appearance of American ships off Manila was what was feared, 
 they would be kept away much more surely by sending away the 
 Spanish division which was the object of the enemy's pursuit. 
 
 Commodore Dewey was not accompanied by a landing force. 
 His undertakings against the land must therefore be limited to 
 the bombardment of Manila and Cavite. For that, he had first to 
 get rid of the Spanish division. If he could not destroy it at Subig, 
 he was obliged to blockade it there ; but he did not dispose of sufifi- 
 cicnt forces to carry on at once a blockade and an attack upon 
 shore batteries. Even if it had been otherwise, he would have 
 hesitated to expend his ammunition against breastworks so long 
 as the enemy afloat had not been destroyed. Therefore, as long 
 as the Spanish vessels were afloat, they protected ]\Ianila and 
 
 290
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Cavite ; the one thing- of importance was to place them where they 
 had the best chance of resisting- the enemy's attack. 
 
 The Spanish authorities would doubtless have reasoned in this 
 manner if they had been cool. But weakness is a poor counsellor ; 
 as it scarcely permits finding an absolutely satisfactory solution, 
 it engenders indecision and provokes changes in resolutions. In 
 war the weaker is like a sick man who thinks to find relief by 
 constantly changing position. 
 
 After the destruction of the Spanish division, the operations 
 have no further interest from a naval point of view. The Ameri- 
 cans, protected by the insurgents who were besieging Manila, 
 occupied Cavite arsenal and established a blockade of Manila while 
 awaiting the arrival of an expeditionary corps. The latter arrived 
 during the month of July in successive detachments. On August 
 13, the place, attacked by land and sea, capitulated. 
 
 It was in the West Indies that the decisive part was to be 
 played. 
 
 As soon as diplomatic relations were broken, the United States 
 established a commercial blockade of a part of the Cuban coast. 
 At this moment, the only squadron at Spain's disposal in the 
 Atlantic was at the Cape de Verde Islands, waiting orders. It was 
 composed of four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers, 
 under the command of Rear-Admiral Cervera. 
 
 If this squadron crossed the Atlantic, it would sooner or later 
 run ag-ainst much superior forces and would have no other alterna- 
 tives than either to let itself be beaten or to shut itself up in port. 
 The Spanish government well knew that the efifective strength of 
 the squadron was much less than its apparent strength. It was 
 incompletely equipped, and the Cristobal-Colon, lacked her heavy 
 guns. It was necessary, therefore, to wait until it could be rein- 
 forced by the Pelayo and the Carlos V. Meanwhile, what could 
 happen ? Before thinking of conquering Cuba, the United States, 
 which had no army, would have to begin by forming an expedition- 
 ary corps, an operation that could not be carried out in a few 
 days. That done, they would hesitate to risk the expedition at 
 sea before being sure as to the Spanish squadron, which might 
 come inopportunely to interfere with the operations of landing. 
 Still, the Americans, who are not timid people, might attempt the 
 
 291
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 enterprise ; and then it could be hoped that Marshal Blanco, hav- 
 ing an immense army at his disposition, would be able to prevent 
 the army of invasion from advancing until communications with 
 the home country had been re-established by the arrival of the 
 squadron. 
 
 The Spanish government ought to have speculated upon this 
 situation to delay Admiral Cervera's departure. Such a determina- 
 tion did not imply the im.mobility of the squadron at the Cape de 
 Verde Islands ; it should have been caused to make a feigned de- 
 parture and to leave the public in ignorance of its movements as 
 long as possible. So long as the Americans did not know what to 
 expect from it, they would hesitate to play their big trump card. 
 Thus time would have been gained. 
 
 Without due consideration. Admiral Cervera was made to de- 
 part. He set sail from the Cape de Verde Islands for the West 
 Indies on April 29. It would be interesting to know the 'details 
 of his orders. I understand very well that he was directed to go 
 to the West Indies and preferably to Havana. But afterwards, 
 what was he expected to do? 
 
 * * 
 
 As soon as it became aware of the departure of the Spanish 
 squadron, the American government's solicitude must be to con- 
 centrate all its fighting ships and to await the event. It would 
 thus be in shape to oppose the enemy. As Admiral Cervera must 
 be irresistibly drawn towards the Spanish possessions, where his 
 only bases of operations and supply were to be found ; and as, on 
 the other hand, it was important to support the fleet of light 
 vessels that were carrying on the blockade, the main body should 
 take position in the south. 
 
 If Admiral Cervera set these previsions at naught by appearing 
 off the American coast, the situation would in no wise be com- 
 promised thereby. Threatened with being cut off from the Span- 
 ish West Indies, he would not delay making demonstrations ; and 
 all the ammunition of his four cruisers could not put in peril the 
 fortunes of the United States. 
 
 Well, in an attack of nerves that is surprising on the part of a 
 phlegmatic people, the American government, instead of concen- 
 trating its forces, divided them into three sections, while thirteen 
 old monitors were distributed in the ports. In truth. Admiral 
 
 292
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Cervera was solicitous of quite other things than seeking to meet 
 the enemy ; it is none the less true that an unhoped-for chance of 
 success was thus offered him. And this curious spectacle was 
 afforded : while the people of the American seacoast were tremb- 
 ling- at the thought of seeing the Spanish squadron appear, the 
 latter was in fear of not being able to arrive without hindrance 
 in a well defended harbor; its thoughts were very far from the 
 American coast. 
 
 Thus neither of the belligerents followed the line of conduct 
 that would appear the most reasonable. 
 
 Steaming at economical speed, Admiral Cervera entered San- 
 tiago on May 23, without having had any unlucky encounter. It 
 is curious that this arrival was considered by public opinion and 
 by the Spanish government to be a success for Spain ; and nothing 
 shows better what a false idea the public has of naval war. Yet 
 it was neither a success nor a failure ; it was merely an occurrence 
 that was favorable to the United States. In fact, the latter had 
 no fear of a contest with the Spanish squadron. What troubled 
 them was not knowing its position ; so that they might fear seeing 
 it come unexpectedly to interrupt the blockading operations and 
 the plans of invasion. The arrival of Cervera at Santiago put an 
 end to this provoking uncertainty. Thus, from this moment, the 
 American government recovered itself. Further errors of execu- 
 tion may be pointed out, but there will be no more faults of con- 
 ception. The naval forces are concentrated under the command 
 of Admiral Sampson, who blockades Cervera at Santiago. It is 
 decided to land the expeditionary force in the vicinity of Santiago. 
 A double result will thus be obtained : on the one hand, the forces 
 that blockade Santiago will serve at the same time as a protection 
 against a possible sortie of the Spanish squadron during the land- 
 ing operations ; on the other hand, the capture of the heights that 
 dominate the city will force the hostile ships to leave their refuge. 
 All this is very good. 
 
 In the Spanish squadron, less resolution is shown. The vessels 
 entered Santiago on May 23 ; not until the 31st do the first hostile 
 ships make their appearance off the bay. In the interval it cer- 
 tainly seems as if Admiral Cervera had time enough to supply his 
 ships and leave the port. It was not doubtful that the prime 
 
 293
 
 A Study of X^.wal Strategy. 
 
 necessity was not to let himself be blockaded and to put to sea 
 ag-ain without leaving any traces. In the squadron's precarious 
 situation, this solution did not lead to a positive result, but it threw 
 the American plans into confusion again and permitted gaining 
 time. To gain time ! Ts not that the only thing to do when driven 
 into a position without issue ? 
 
 After June i, the favorable moment for coming out had gone. 
 It was necessary to come to a decision ; to look at the situation 
 from a new point of view and to seek another use for the Spanish 
 squadron. Well, on June 22. the expeditionary corps had begun 
 to disembark at Daiquiri, and on July 2 the enemy's troops arrived 
 under the city's walls. What was to be done? To go out was to 
 succumb to the fire of the American squadron and to deprive the 
 city of the ships' powerful artillery. Marshal Blanco was sending 
 reinforcements by land to the besieged garrison ; it sufficed per- 
 haps for the town to hold out a few days to cause the siege to be 
 raised and to force the Americans to re-embark. If Santiago was 
 obliged to capitulate, it would be time enough then to go out ; 
 while waiting, the ships could take an efficient part in the defence 
 of the city. 
 
 Marshal Blanco looked differently at the situation, and on July 2 
 he sent the squadron an imperative order to go out. The 3d, at 
 10 a. m., the Spanish vessels cleared the pass and sought to escape ; 
 at 1.20 p. m. they were all destroyed. The i6th Santiago surren- 
 dered. If the governor of the place had had the moral and mate- 
 rial assistance that the presence of the squadron would have as- 
 sured him, perhaps he would not have yielded at the very moment 
 when General Shafter was considering re-embarking. 
 
 The Spanish squadron succumbed under the weight of accumu- 
 lated errors. It was a first error to send it prematurely to the 
 West Indies ; it was a second to let it be blockaded in Santiago ; it 
 was a third to make it go out from there. 
 
 Thereafter the United States are in undisputed command of the 
 sea. They profit by it to land in Porto Rico on July 25. Peace 
 put an end to operations on August 12. In less than four months 
 Spain lost her colonial empire. What a lesson for those who do 
 not comprehend the utility of a navy ! 
 
 294
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 In this study, we have endeavored to justify ourselves by his- 
 tory, that is by actual occurrences. Doubtless the navy of to-day 
 has no more relationship with that of fleets under sail ; but the 
 objective has not altered. The sole difference consists in solving- 
 with battleships and torpedo-boats the problem that was formerly 
 set to wooden ships ; the needs of war have remained the same. 
 
 What has particularl}- struck us is that all the operations of 
 naval war, whatever they may be, reduce themselves to a single 
 one : to occupy a field of battle. 
 
 If it is a question of attacking- the enemy's coast, it is necessars'. 
 first of all, to clear the field in the region where one wishes to 
 operate. 
 
 If it is intended to carry an army across the sea, the safety of 
 the passage must be assured. 
 
 If, on the contrary, the capture of commerce is preferred, im- 
 punity must be guaranteed to the commerce destroyers by keeping 
 hostile cruisers away from the cruising grounds. 
 
 In every case where it is wished to operate in a sea not free from 
 the enemy, only operations of short duration and little scope can 
 be imdertaken. They may contribute, if they succeed, to aid the 
 general operations by creating a diversion, but they will not do 
 sufficient harm to the enemy to weigh upon the issue of the war. 
 
 But this field of battle that constitutes the principal aim must 
 first of all be conquered. The stronger side, confident of its 
 strength, will plant itself there from the beginning, defying its 
 weaker adversary to come to dislodge it. The latter, not being 
 able to attack directly the main bodies of the enemy, will seek at 
 first to detach portions of them to weaken them ; then, when it 
 judges itself strong enough, it will draw them into a region where 
 it disposes of all its resources and will strike a decisive blow. If 
 it succeeds, this first victory will bring others in its train. 
 
 To obtain a first victory, movement will be necessary — much 
 movement ; it will be necessary to go to seek the enemy wherever 
 he may be. To profit by the victory, it will be necessary to move 
 again, to change the field of action, in order to utilize vessels that 
 become available. These necessities fix the nature of naval forces 
 
 295
 
 A Study of Na\al Strategy. 
 
 and the qualities that they oug-ht to have. When the navy shall 
 have finally adapted to the construction of its material an organiza- 
 tion that secures the maximum return from its resources, it will 
 have done all that it can do while awaiting the supreme moment. 
 
 This will be much. In the domain of things, order will have 
 been substituted for disorder; simplicity, an indispensable factor 
 of every military organism, will have taken the place of com- 
 plexity and variet}\ In the domain of ideas, pseudo-science, which 
 attributes a fixed and precise value to essentially variable elements, 
 will have been driven out by simple good sense, which is guided 
 by special circumstances and takes account of times and places. 
 
 But it is not sufficient that the navy be constituted upon rational 
 foimdations ; it is necessary that it dispose of sufficient means to 
 fulfil its role ; it imtst be victorious. It is the country, therefore, 
 that has to determine the magnitude of its forces, after their 
 nature has been indicated to it. 
 
 What is the use of developing over-sea commerce, of conquering 
 new colonies, if war is abruptly to bring us back to our natural 
 frontiers? All the accumulated millions in naval material and in 
 the enhanced value of our colonial domain will be lost at a single 
 blow. 
 
 The nation knows the strength of those who covet our riches ; 
 it ought to take upon itself the sacrifices needful to preserve them, 
 under pain of enriching its neighbor. 
 
 Surely navies are costly organisms ; they are the luxury of par- 
 venu countries. So long as a nation has not become unified, so 
 long as it is going through that crisis of growth that precedes its 
 natural development, all of its resources are not too much to en- 
 able it to contend upon its own territory."* That is why England 
 was unable to lay the foundations of her colonial empire until after 
 her union with Scotland. But when a nation has within herself 
 that need of expansion which is the source of the life of peoples, 
 she seeks to substitute lucrative epopees for heroic epopees as soon 
 as she has attained her natural frontiers. After having taken 
 shape, she wishes to become rich ; and she demands of colonies and 
 over-sea commerce openings for the overflow of her energy. 
 
 ^^ It is none the less true that every country bathed by the sea needs a 
 navy. The proof of it is that the kings of France were obliged, so long 
 as they had no national fleet, to call for help from the Genoese, the 
 Aragonaise, the Spaniards and the Dutch. 
 
 296
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 Then the navy appears. 
 
 Upon the new field of action that colonies create, peoples meet 
 with competition. In those vast regions with undetermined boun- 
 daries, the pioneers of civilization end one day by finding them- 
 selves face to face with newcomers. One gets along as best one 
 can ; then interests end by intermingling, and, the development of 
 peoples helping, jostlings and frictions become continual. There is 
 a Niger question, an Egypt question, a Newfoundland question, a 
 Morocco question, etc. Then it is that it is necessary to be strong 
 to make one's pretensions prevail and to conserve one's acquisitions. 
 
 Let no one say there will be no more wars."° Nine years after 
 Fashoda, on the morrow of the Morocco difficulties, such irony 
 would be cruel. Cardinal Fleury also did everything to avoid it ; 
 but it burst forth one day, inevitably. When we have drunk the 
 cup of bitterness to the dregs, we throw it at the heads of those 
 who have forced us to drink it. 
 
 Does France wish to retain her rank ? Does she intend to mingle 
 with the irresistible current that draws all nations towards new 
 outlets? Does she desire that the over-sea markets remain open to 
 her? Does she presume to make her voice heard in the concert 
 of nations? Then she needs a strong navy. 
 
 On the other hand, if she considers that her role as a great 
 power has ended ; if, after having held the first rank, she is not 
 ashamed to sit in the lowest place ; if, in a word, she envies the 
 fate of Spain, then France has no need of a navy. Taxpayers, 
 save the three hundred millions of the naval budget, rid yourselves 
 of this burden, recall us to our families to bring up our children, 
 and live in tranquillity and forgetfulness until the day when your 
 weakness shall tempt the )ieighbor who zvill devour you. 
 
 But, if you have faith in the vitality of your race ; if you wish 
 your sons to be rich and respected ; if you wish to transmit to them 
 the heritage that you have amassed bit by bit, then a navy is neces- 
 sary to you. 
 
 And what is it that we ask of you for this ? More money ? No. 
 We can be content with what we have, but it must be better util- 
 ized. Surveying the whole past with a single glance, we see 
 clearly that it is less the feebleness of our means that has betrayed 
 
 ^ The Russians did not believe any more in a war, and this confidence cost 
 them their entire Pacific squadron. 
 
 297
 
 A Study of Naval Strategy. 
 
 lis than the manner in v/hich we have made use of them. To-day 
 it is still this that will cause our loss. Once again we pretend to 
 profit by victory before having gained it ; and supposing, against 
 all evidence, that the enemy will do likewise, we wish in advance 
 to provide against imaginary dangers. Hence that division of 
 efforts which makes us envisage war from three different points 
 of view : the offensive, the defensive, commerce-destroying. Thus 
 we have built three distinct Reets : a high-seas fleet, a coast-defence 
 fleet, a fleet of big cruisers. One acts, another waits, the third 
 runs away. To be strong everywhere, we have made ourselves 
 weak everywhere. Let us no longer be astonished then that, in 
 spite of milliards spent, our naval power decreases. 
 
 The day when we shall have a single fleet — one that shall have 
 been created to attack the enemy — that day we shall have nothing 
 more to fear. 
 
 " The first thing," it has been said, " that is seen to disappear in 
 a State which is disintegrating, is the navy." 
 
 France, wilt thou be such a nation?
 
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