DANGERS AND 
 
 TOEK 
 
 ADDRESSED TO THE 
 
 HON. J. B. FLOYD, SECRETARY OF WAR, 
 
 MAJOR J. G. BARNARD, 
 
 CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S.A. 
 
 Published by order of the Chamber of Commerce, 
 
 BY PERMISSION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
 
 NEW Y R K : 
 
 I) . V A N N O S T R A N D . 
 
 1859. 
 
THE 
 
 DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 NEW TOEK 
 
 ADDRESSED TO THE 
 
 HON. J. B. FLOYD, SECRETARY OF WAR, 
 
 MAJOR J. G. BARNARD, 
 
 CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S.A. 
 
 Published by order of the Chamber of Commerce 
 
 BY PERMISSION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 D. VAN NOSTRAND 
 
 1859. 
 
TV 
 
 [The accompanying report, which was called for by Gov. Seward in the Senate, 
 not having been sent in in time for publication by that body, and having been 
 seen by several persons interested in the safety and commerce of the port of >Vw 
 York, who thought it important that ih<- information contained in it should be 
 spread before the public, the Chamber of Commerce decided to publish it.] 
 

 iorh, lanuarg 27% 1855. 
 THE HONORABLE J. B. FLOYD, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 SIR, In accordance with the permission kindly given me, as the En 
 gineer Officer in charge of an important portion of the Defences of New 
 York, to communicate my views to you in writing, on this most momen 
 tous theme, I submit to you the following pages, trusting that its intrinsic 
 interest and the variety of topics I have found it necessary to treat, will be 
 my apology for the unexpected volume to which they have swollen. 
 
 I am, Sir, very respectfully, 
 
 Your most obedient, 
 
 J. G. BARNARD, 
 Major of Engineers. 
 
THE 
 
 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF PW IQEI. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 IN a paper prepared nearly a year ago, but which, from cir 
 cumstances unnecessary here to explain, has not yet gone out of 
 my possession, I used the following language, which will now 
 answer my purpose as a brief sketch of what I consider to be the 
 " dangers " to which New York is exposed, and as an introduction 
 to what I shall say as to the defences required. 
 
 It seems to me proper to allude to the 
 
 " entire change in the nature of the problem to be considered in 
 " the defence of this city, since the system under which the exist- 
 " ing works have been constructed, was adopted or rather, since 
 " the defence of New York, as a part of the general system of 
 " coast defence, was decided upon by the Board of Engineers of 
 " 1816." 
 
 " As late as 1840, 1 find the Chief Engineer, in describing the 
 " then existing works at the Narrows, (viz : the present Fort Ilam- 
 " ilton, Fort La Fayette, on the Long Island side, and the old 
 " Forts Tompkins and Richmond, and Batteries Hudson and Mor- 
 " ton on Staten Island) reporting that (when these old works shall 
 " have been repaired) < with the Narrows thus defended, and the 
 " c works near the city in perfect order, New York might be 
 " * regarded as pretty well protected against an attack by water 
 " c through this passage. And more explicitly he elsewhere states, 
 " with regard to repairs of the old works just named on Staten 
 " Island, Nothing further, indeed, being contemplated for this 
 " position, except the construction of a small redoubt on a com- 
 " manding hill a little to the southwest. When it is borne in 
 " mind that since the quite recent date of the Report from which 
 " these quotations are taken (1840), there has been constructed a 
 
6 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 " new Fort Richmond, of three or four times tlic size of the old 
 "work that a large new work in place of Fort Tompkins has 
 been commenced that a new water-battery, nearly equal to Fort 
 k - Uichmond, has been recommended and planned by the present 
 " Board of Engineers in fact, that an enormous increase of works 
 " has been decided to be necessary, over those thus cited by the 
 u Chief Engineer as sufficient to render New York pretty well 
 " <protecte<J .bv w;jter through this passage/ it seems to me evident 
 i ffliat tliti*}*r^fd<Jni involved in this * protection has changed its 
 
 *" character? . ; 
 
 ; \ ; : ^Jlfu se :reftiajkfi/are not made as a criticism upon former 
 
 " <l boards, or the* Cliief Engineer, but to show that a defensive sys- 
 
 " tern for New York such as is now demanded, has never been 
 
 " contemplated as a whole, and that the problem, as it now pre- 
 
 " sents itself, is a modified and enlarged one." 
 
 " It has become so, owing to the immense developments which 
 "have been exhibited in the means of maritime attack within the 
 " last few years, and also to the rapid growth of the city itself, 
 " and of the nation of which it has become the commercial me- 
 " tropolis. Indeed, the experience which the nation had had when 
 " the defensive system of 1816 was adopted, was not such as could 
 " prompt a system adapted to our present circumstances. While 
 k - formidable invasions of our territory had been made by land, 
 " the small works then in existence on Governor s and Bedlow s 
 "Islands, had proved sufficient to protect the city; and such 
 " efforts as were made elsewhere against our maritime places, 
 k proved how weak were the powers of attack of that day against 
 " fortifications how little was required to secure our sea-ports and 
 " maritime cities. While the means of maritime attack have of 
 " late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed 
 " of when our defensive system was planned, and our country has 
 " so increased in population, wealth and military resources, that 
 " no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of 
 " our territory, our great maritime places like New York, have, on 
 " the other hand, increased in even greater proportion, in every - 
 " tiling that could make them objects of attack.* 
 
 " The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence 
 " of New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be 
 " adequate at the present day." 
 
 " The recent war of England and France against Eussia may 
 " illustrate my meaning ; lor it has taught lis what to expect 
 " were either of these nations to wage war against the United 
 "Sta 
 
 " No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest 
 " was made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive 
 " results would flow from such means. The war consisted exclu- 
 " sively in attacks upon maritime places great sea-ports seats of 
 
OFNEWYOKK. 7 
 
 " commercial and naval power. Such places, by their vast import- 
 " ance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation by the large 
 " populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them, 
 " and by their exposure to maritime attack, offer themselves at 
 " once as points at which the most decisive results may be pro- 
 " duced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn, Odessa, 
 " Kertchj Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in 
 "succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as 
 " the first named became, indeed, the true seats of war." 
 
 " Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their re- 
 " sources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said 
 " to have turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided 
 " there, Cronstadt would have been the next field of combat, for 
 " which, indeed, the Allies had made the most enormous prepara- 
 " tions." 
 
 " Is it not certain that in future all war of maritime powers 
 " against the United States, will take a similar course ? All ter- 
 " ritorial invasion being out of the question, it is against our great 
 " sea-ports and strategic points of coast defence such as New 
 " York, New Orleans, and San Francisco pre-eminently New 
 " York, that an enemy will concentrate his efforts. Against these 
 " he will prepare such immense armaments, against these he will 
 " call into existence special agencies of attack, which (unless met 
 " by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall insure success." 
 
 " The mere defense of the city against ordinary fleets, is no 
 " longer the question ; but through the defensive works to be here 
 " erected, the nation is to measure its strength against the most 
 " lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power, aided by 
 " all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or 
 " inventing means of attack, can bring against them / in short, 
 " in fortifying New York, we are really preparing the battle-field 
 " on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be de- 
 " cided." 
 
 I most respectfully invite your attention to the last paragraph 
 here quoted. No language that I could now use, would convey 
 a stronger idea of my profound sense of the real dangers of New 
 York. If the conclusion that I arrive at is well founded, it de 
 mands the instantaneous attention of the War Department, and 
 of Congress. If this conclusion is well founded, then there is no 
 topic connected with the question of national defence which will 
 have a stronger bearing upon these constantly recurring issues with 
 foreign nations, in which we see the war-cloud gathering, which 
 may yet, ere long, burst upon us, than this same topic of the " De 
 fence of New York." I will say more specifically, that on the 
 alternative whether, on the one hand, New York is open to the 
 attack of a maritime force, or liable to be sacked by the sudden 
 dash of an army landed in the vicinity ; or, on the other, is so 
 
8 THE DANGEE8 AND DEFENCES 
 
 nvlv defended by water and land, that it may hurl the invader 
 back to the ocean, will depend greatly the issue of peace or 
 war. 
 
 It is a species of folly approaching to insanity, for a nation 
 80 constantlv holding up to its neighbors tlie momentous issue 
 of war, 10 unavoidably liable t< constant entanglements with the 
 most powerful nations on the face of the earth, to leave this 
 great commercial metropolis liable, the very day almost that war 
 is declared, to the most fearful blow. 
 
 It is estimated tliat the -reat tire of 1835 destroyed 17,000,000 
 of property. Yet its ravages were confined to a very limited 
 area. How, in money or in words, could we estimate tne loss of 
 property, the destruction of military and naval armaments and 
 stores, the paralysis of the nation s commerce, the shock upon 
 our warlike power, the disgrace upon our scutcheon, which would 
 or rn /<jh t result from a successful attack, and a more or less pro 
 longed occupation of the port and harbor. 
 
 I trust, Sir, I have succeeded in impressing you with a vivid 
 idea of the "dangers" to which New lork is exposed, and of the 
 importance of its perfect defence. If so, then I am sure you will 
 concur with me in the opinion that not as a local question con 
 cerning New York merely, nor of the State of New York, nor 
 any sectional group of States but as a great national question, 
 one in which the issues of peace and w r ar, of national triumph or 
 national disgrace are involved, the prompt organization of a 
 complete and adequate system of defences for New York, is de 
 manded. 
 
 To say what this defensive system should be, will, perhaps, be 
 more difficult I have said before, that the subject as a whole, 
 had not yet been discussed in the new lights in which recent years 
 have presented it. I could, therefore, on many points, give only 
 individual opinions, and, of course, these must be very general in 
 their nature. 
 
 But, even in attempting to give such opinions, I am met by 
 the embarrassing fact that the shadow of doubt has been recently 
 thrown over even the elementary principles which have generally 
 governed our defensive works, by high authority ; even yourself, 
 bir, seem to have found reason to entertain such doubts. 
 
 Far be it from me to desire to withhold from the freest discussion 
 anything connected with this great question. I have assumed the 
 problem <>f the defense of New York to be a modified and enlarged 
 one. I am willing, if you choose, Sir, that it should be disciissed 
 even in its simplest elements; and, still further, as everv species 
 of battery, armed witli such artillery as we now have, whether it 
 be the simple earthen parapet, or the massive castellated structure, 
 lifting its numerous guns, tier upon tier, are confessedly inadequate 
 (without auxiliary aid of some kind) to the perfect sealing up of 
 
OF NEW YOKE. 9 
 
 a channel against the rapid passage of a hostile fleet, I shall be 
 the first to hail the inventor, be he one whose " functions are con- 
 " fined to the most elevated branch of military science," or to 
 the workshop of the mechanic, who will provide us with some 
 thing which will do this. 
 
 In attempting to discuss the merits of our coast defences, one 
 is met at the very outset by the opposing characters of the crit 
 icisms by which they have been assailed. It is now scarce twenty 
 years since the entire system was subjected to severe animadver 
 sion from the, then, highest military authority of the government, 
 from one whose public services, military and civil, and high posi 
 tion and character, gave great weight to his strictures.* 
 
 It was maintained by the authority to whom I refer 
 
 " 1. That, for the defence of the coast, the chief reliance should 
 " be on the navy." 
 
 " 2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries 
 " should be introduced wherever they can be used." 
 
 " 3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions, and, 
 " consequently, 
 
 " 4. That the system of the Board of Engineers comprises 
 " works which are unnecessarily large for the purposes they have 
 " to fulfil." 
 
 It was owing to these strictures that the House of Represen 
 tatives, by resolutions of May 9th, 1840, called upon the War 
 Department " to lay before this House as soon as practicable, a 
 " report of a full and connected system of national defence," &c. 
 
 The subject was referred by the War Department to a board 
 of officers of the army and navy, among whom was the present 
 Chief Engineer. The report of that board (see Doc. 206, H. E. 
 26th Congress, 1st session), fully endorsed by the Secretary of 
 War, Mr. Poinsett, is universally admitted to be one of the most 
 able and comprehensive expositions of the whole subject of coast 
 defence extant, and, generally, as a complete refutation of the 
 strictures upon our actual system. 
 
 This discussion has become now somewhat out of date. I al 
 lude to it, however, to call your attention to the two last strictures 
 there made against our system, viz. : 
 
 " That we are not in danger from large expeditions, and, con- 
 " sequently, 
 
 " That the system of the Board of Engineers comprises works 
 " which are unnecessarily large for the purposes they have to ful- 
 " fil ;" and to ask you to bear in mind that the engineers are now 
 censured (whether deservedly or not is not the question) for having 
 been for the last twenty years carrying on its constructions under 
 
 * See Senate Document No. 293, page 1, 24th Congress, 1st session, vol. 4. 
 
10 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 tliis very assumption, that we arc not "in danger from large ex- 
 
 " p> ditions." 
 
 I do n..t discuss, at present, tin- accuracy of this proposition 
 twenty years ago. <r whether it true ///</<, it has ceased to be so 
 
 The report which I have mentioned may be said to have 
 silenced opposition for the next ten years; but it will (as I have 
 said bef ore) De considered out of date, at present, owing to the rapid 
 developments since made in means of maritime attack. I there 
 fore pass to more recent animadversions upon the system. 
 
 In 1S51 the following resolutions were adopted by the House 
 of Representatives: 
 
 u Ut. /iVv//m7, That the Secretary of "War be directed to 
 " report to this House, the second Monday in December next, on 
 " the subject of the land defences of the country, in which he will 
 "review the general system adopted after the war with Great 
 " Britain, and since pursued, in regard to the permanent fortifica- 
 k - tions then divined necessary for the national defence; and that 
 k - he report, whether the general plan may not be now essentially 
 " modified, by reducing the number of works proposed to be 
 " erected, and by abandoning some of the forts now in progress of 
 " construction." 
 
 " 2d. Resolwfl, That the Secretary of War also report the 
 " number of fortifications which have been built, including those 
 " nearly completed under the general system, the number in pro 
 gress of construction, and the number not yet commenced, but 
 " proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently 
 " show the States and Territories in which the several forts are 
 "situated, or to be located; when the work was commenced; 
 " when completed, or expected to be finished ; the number and 
 " calibre of the guns mounted or to be mounted; the estimated 
 " cost, the amount expended, and the sums yet required to finish 
 " or construct, as the case may be, each work ;" and the Secre 
 tary of War, to carry them into effect, addressed the following 
 queries to several distinguished oilicers of the army and nav ;. 
 
 "1st. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of 
 " fortifications for the protection of our sea-board to be modified 
 " in consequence of the application of steam to vessels of war. 
 
 * These officers were, 
 Commodore Slcwnrt. 
 ( oiimio.loi-e Morris, 
 Commodore Perry, 
 Commander Cunninirliam. 
 Commander I)ii|>nt, 
 I. it-ill. -Miuil Lanman, 
 Li. Uleiiaiit Maury, 
 Lieutenant Dahlgren, 
 
 General Totten, 
 >. Colonel Tliaver, 
 
 I),- 
 
 Major ChftM, 
 Major IMafu-U, 
 
OF NEW YORK. 11 
 
 " the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other changes 
 " that liave taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ? " 
 
 " 2d. What reliance could be placed on vessels of war, or of 
 " commerce, floating batteries, gun-boats, and other temporary 
 " substitutes for permanent fortifications ? " 
 
 " 3d. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of 
 " fortifications on the northern lakes ? " 
 
 The character of the strictures with which the defensive 
 system was then assailed, may be judged from the resolutions of 
 Congress, and from the queries proposed. Essentially they were 
 the same which we are constantly hearing now the same which 
 forever will be heard to the end of time, upon all established 
 systems, viz. : that it was behind the times, that railroads, tele 
 graphs, increase of population, war-steamers, and steam ocean-nav 
 igation generally, and " Big Guns" in particular, had rendered 
 the system of defence quite obsolete. 
 
 As to the replies of these several army and navy officers, it 
 may be briefly stated that the defensive system was sustained by 
 Commodores Stewart and Morris, Commanders Cunningham and 
 Dupont, Lieutenants Lanman and (with qualifications) Dahlgren, 
 of the navy, and by General Totten, Colonel De Hussy, and 
 Major Delafield, of the Engineers/* That it was opposed or 
 censured as requiring modifications by Commodore Perry and 
 Lieutenant Maury, of the navy, and Major Chase, of the En 
 gineers. Now, it must be borne in mind that all the recent 
 "changes" which are now supposed to have rendered our 
 maritime defensive works obsolete, or " old fogyish," viz. : in 
 crease of population, great concentration of wealth, population, 
 and national resources in our great cities, railroads, telegraphs, 
 ocean steam-navigation, and the consequent facility of bringing 
 upon our coasts suddenly large armies in steam fleets, improve 
 ments in calibre, and character of sea-coast and naval ordnance, 
 horizontal shell-firing, &c., were then well known, and, indeed, 
 formed the foundation of the strictures of that day. What has 
 happened since, has been but the realization of what was then 
 foreseen. 
 
 If there is any exception to the broad statement just made, it 
 is found in the recent improvement in small arms ; but this is a 
 matter which I conceive to have very little bearing on the topic 
 in hand. 
 
 A few quotations, therefore, from the replies of those officers 
 who opposed or demanded modifications in the system, will be 
 interesting for comparison with the views of objectors of the 
 present day. 
 
 Commodore Perry says, " And besides, we have the expe- 
 
 * Colonel Thayer did not respond; his opinions, however, were well-known. 
 
1 li THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 " rioncc of history to show that extensive military works are 
 "alike destructive of the- pm>perity and the liberties of the 
 " j.i-Mjili-, >a\ing nothing of tin. enormous cost of construction, 
 u and ihe k -eping tlu in in condition for >ervice. I may instance 
 "the fortresses of Spain, of Portugal, and of the former republics 
 "of <u-noa and Venice, as gigantic works, now of little u>e, and 
 u lo,,ked uj.on by tlu voyager only as monument* of tin- cxtrava- 
 u gance and peculating Bpint which, at the time of their erection, 
 "characterized the people of tho-e governments." 
 
 "Experience, moreover, shows that while the fortifications of 
 "San Juan de Tlloa at Vera (. nix, the Moro of Havana, the 
 "Castle protecting the harbor of Carthagena upon the coast of 
 "Columbia, the Venetian fortress of Kapoli de Eomania in 
 " Greece, the Castle of St. Elino in Malta, and many others of 
 " similar extent ami character, are considered by some impregna- 
 " ble, they command only a circuit embraced within the range 
 " of their guns, and cannot, in any manner, prevent a landing of 
 " the enemy upon the coast beyond the extent of such range ; in 
 u a word, these works are useful only to command the entrances 
 "of the ports which they were intended to defend, and to cover 
 " with their guns, vessels anchoring in their immediate vicinity. 
 "The celebrated fortress of Gibraltar neither commands the pas- 
 " sage of the Straits, nor the anchorage on the Spanish side of 
 " the bay of that name. They are, in truth, like chained mons- 
 " ters, harmless beyond the reach of their manacles; not so with 
 " steam batteries : they have the means of locomotion, and 
 " their power can be made effective at any point upon the coast 
 " capable of being reached by an enemy s vessel." 
 
 " Of all the coasts of Europe, that of Great Britain is the 
 "least provided with fortifications ; and yet her soil has not been 
 " trodden by a successful enemy since the conquest ; solely pro- 
 " tecting her military and naval arsenals by perfect and f ir, 11- 
 " garrisoned works. She depends mainly for defence of her 
 " coast upon her navy, and the warlike spirit of her yeomanry ; 
 u and the very absence of fort 5 tied works prevent.- a deceitful 
 " reliance upon such defences, and keeps alive the more gallant 
 and more certain dependence upon their own personal prow- 
 
 ," 
 
 " And thus it should be with us. Man to man, the Americans 
 " arc at least equal to any other race; and they are fully capable 
 "of driving back to their ships or capturing any number of 
 " tr<op.> that might have the temerity to land upon our soil." 
 
 Lieutenant Maury >ays, " Now were it possible for an enemy 
 " with the greatest army that ever was led into battle by the 
 "gn-atest captain, to take the country by -urprise, and to land at 
 " Long Island Sound, or in Lynn Haven I lav. and to be disem- 
 k% barking his la-t piece of artillery before he was discovered, 
 "these railroads, the power of steam, with the aid of lightning, 
 
OF NEW YORK. 13 
 
 " would enable the government, before lie could reach the heights 
 u of Brooklyn, or the outskirts of Norfolk, to have there in wait- 
 " ing, and ready to receive him and beat him back into the sea, 
 " a force two to one greater than his, however strong." 
 
 " Suppose that in 1847, there had been in active operation 
 " between Yera Cruz and the city of Mexico, a line of magnetic 
 " telegraph, and such a railroad as is the Erie road of New York, 
 " can it be supposed that our generals, being cognizant of the 
 " facts, would have so much as entertained the idea of landing 
 " there as they did, and laying siege to the town ?" 
 
 " All the world knows where our railroads are, and that the 
 " country is protected from military surprise and invasion from 
 " the sea, by a net-work of telegraphic wires ; the mere know- 
 " ledge of the fact that Norfolk and New York can bring to their 
 " defence such resources, will forever prevent the thought in the 
 " mind of an enemy of landing in force at Lynn Haven Bay, or 
 " on Long Island." 
 
 " Those roads, therefore, render a siege to any of the works of 
 " defence before those places, out of the question." 
 
 " To lay siege to any place along our sea-front involves not 
 " only the disembarking of an army, but the landing also of the 
 " siege train. This requires time." 
 
 " From the time that the head of our invading column jumped 
 " out of the boats, up to their waists in the water, at Yera Cruz, 
 " till General Scott was ready to send his summons to the city, 
 " was thirteen days, and it was four days more before his heavy 
 " artillery drew overtures from the besieged, total, seventeen 
 " days. 
 
 u Imagine an army, the best equipped, it may be, the world 
 " ever saw, that should attempt to beleaguer one of our strong- 
 " holds for seventeen days ! Within that time, we could bring 
 " against him, by railroads and steamboats, millions of the free- 
 " men which this country ever holds in reserve to fight its battles. 
 " It might be Boston before which this imaginary army is sup- 
 " posed to sit down in imaginary siege ; or it may be New York, 
 " Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, or New Orleans, it is 
 " immaterial where. In less than half the Yera-Cruz time, we 
 " could throw millions of men into any one of these places, and 
 " subsist them, in the meantime, by a daily market-train of cars 
 " and steamboats catering for them in the abundant markets of 
 " the Mississippi Yalley." 
 
 " It is impossible that any army, however brave, spirited, and 
 " daring, should ever think of invading a country like this, and 
 " attacking us upon our own ground, when we have under our 
 " command such powers of concentration, and such force in reserve 
 " as twenty millions of freemen, the electric telegraph, the railroad 
 " car, the locomotive, and the steamboat." 
 
11 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 And again, alluding to an invasion of Washington : " Now, is 
 " it imt obvious, supposing the country to be in a reasonable state 
 "of preparation at the commencement of war supposing this 
 k - much is it not obvious, by sending telegraphic messages, and 
 using the powers of steam for conveyance, the American general 
 " might sit down here, in Washington, and at daylight the next 
 * morning commence an attack upon that enemy, both in front 
 k> and in rear, with almost any amount of force, consisting of 
 " regulars, volunteers, and militia, that can be named I Retreat, 
 " for such a foe, would be out of the question, and re-embarkation 
 " an impossibility. 
 
 " Therefore, so far as the system of 1816 was intended to defend 
 " the country from invasion along the Atlantic sea-board, steam, 
 " railroads, and the telegraph have rendered it as effete as did, the 
 " invention of fire-arms the defences which the military science of 
 " that age had erected against the shafts of the archer." 
 
 Sf -X- * * # * # 
 
 " Suppose the system of 1816 to have been completed ; that 
 "the fortifications therein contemplated had all been built, pro- 
 " visioned, equipped, and garrisoned. Now, saving only those 
 " which protect the large cities from the guns of men-of-war, sup- 
 " pose the alternative should be presented to our military men, 
 " whether they would undertake to defend the country from inva- 
 " sion with such a complete system of fortifications, but without 
 " the assistance of railroads, steamers, and telegraph ; or with the 
 " assistance of railroads, steamers, and telegraph, but without the 
 " aid of fortitications. 
 
 " I suppose, could such an alternative be submitted to every 
 " officer of the army, from the oldest down to the youngest, that 
 " there would be but one answer and that would be, Down 
 " with the forts, and give us the railroad, the locomotive, the 
 " c steamboat, and the telegraph. " 
 
 But, Lieutenant Maury does not dispense entirely with forts ; 
 he says further, " It is chiefly to keep such shigs (i. e., ships of 
 " war) from burning our cities and havens within reach of their 
 " broadsides, that we want forts and castles." 
 
 Exactly so. It is just /b/ that, and if he had said " burning 
 our cities and occupying our havens " (using the term " forts and 
 " castles " technically), I might almost say, only that, that we want 
 them. 
 
 But, as we have seen before, the cry " Down with the forts, 
 "and give us the railroad, the locomotive, the steamboat, and the 
 " telegraph," does not mean " Down with all forts," but only such 
 as we do not want to protect our " cities and havens ;" a very 
 important qualification certainly. 
 
 Furthermore, he says, "The forts already completed, or well 
 " advanced towards completion, are believed to be sufficient for 
 
OF NEW YORK. 15 
 
 " this." At the date this was written, the great port of the 
 Pacific, San Francisco, had not a fort even begun ; the great port 
 and commercial metropolis of the Atlantic, Sew York, had not 
 on its great avenue of approach, the Narrows, works at all 
 capable (see the opinion of Dahlgren, a brother officer of the navy, 
 and one of the very ablest officers of the navy, printed in juxta 
 position to Lieutenant Maury s) of protecting this great city from 
 " burning " by the broadsides or curved fire of ships of war. But 
 this is but a specimen of the accuracy and soundness of criticism 
 with which our defensive system has usually been assailed. 
 
 Lieutenant Maury, however, argues that " if one gun, in open 
 " battery on the shore, whether mounted on a tower or not, be 
 " superior to one or two ships of war, surely our seaport towns 
 " of second and third rate importance (the italics are mine) may 
 " safely rely upon open batteries on the beach, to protect them 
 " from British or any other men-of-war. : 
 
 I make one more citation from Lieutenant Maury, that you 
 may compare with opinions more recently expressed : 
 
 " The fortifications of the coast, says the board of army 
 " officers, whose able report of 1840 quieted the public mind, and 
 " fastened for ten years longer upon the country the effete system 
 "of 1816 The fortifications of the coast, say they, "must be 
 " competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of 
 " ships, and resisting land attacks two distinct and independ- 
 " ent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable 
 " number s, and in proper proportions , of heavy guns, covered l)y 
 " *" parapets, proof against shot and shells. : 
 
 " Now, I propose to show that the railroads, and the means of 
 " locomotion in this country, sufficiently defend our fortifications 
 " from land attacks ; and tliat, consequently, the principal requis- 
 " ite henceforward, in a system of fortifications for the coast, is 
 " merely an array, in suitable numbers and proper proportions, of 
 " heavy guns along the beach, to cover the approaches of ships 
 " from sea, to seaport towns." And particularly I call your atten 
 tion to his recommendation, " That no further expenses be incurred 
 " for preparing our fortifications along the Atlantic sea-board, to 
 " withstand sieges by land." 
 
 Having given, I think, a fair view of the arguments of the 
 objecting naval officers, I now proceed to give a few citations from 
 Major Chase s response. As an engineer officer of rank, connected 
 with the present system of coast defence from its initiation, his 
 objections, or demand for modifications, deserved careful con 
 sideration. 
 
 After giving a history of the rise and progress of the present 
 system of coast-defence referring to the experience of our last 
 war with Great Britain reviewing the " new and important 
 " elements in the national defence and security which have been 
 
16 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 M rapidlv, almost magically, developed in the last thirty-five years, 
 
 - SU( . M as tlu- increase of population the progress of improve- 
 k - nil-lit in agriculture, manufactures. and commerce, and in facile 
 k> lines of intercommunication," he says : 
 
 M In view, then, of all these things, and especially of the new 
 " elements moral, political, and physical claimed to havejuvn 
 developed. and to have greatly increased the power of the United 
 
 States, "// / H h irh inuxt l< < <n,t< nl, r<d in rdatton to the future 
 ,//-/v/////. /in ut of the national d<f> /; . the undersigned thinks 
 " that the general plan adopted thirty -live years ago should be 
 
 -entialiy modified, by reducing tlie number and size of the 
 " works proposed to be constructed, and by abandoning some of 
 * the defences now in progress of construction, or which are about 
 " to be constructed under existing appropriations made by Con- 
 
 " The undersigned is also of the opinion that the best interests 
 " of the country require that the subject of modification should be 
 " submitted to a board, composed of artillery and engineer officers, 
 "and some eminent civilians; That no new work should be 
 " commenced, even if it has been appropriated for by Congress ; 
 " and that no appropriation should be made by Congress for the com- 
 u pletion and repairs of existing works, until the whole subject of 
 " the national defence has been considered and reported upon by 
 %% the said board." And he further advances the opinion " Buffi* 
 " cient has been said to show that railways and the electric tele- 
 " graph contribute largely to the national defence ; that the works 
 " covering our large sea-ports and otfyer important points, placed 
 u in connection with the railways and telegraph, if they were now 
 " to be constructed, might be much reduced in size and cost, if not 
 " in number ; that the facility w T ith which these works could be 
 " relieved in case of an attempted siege, would have rendered it 
 necessary for them to be made secure against a coup-de- 
 
 " Under these views of the subject, it is at once perceived that, 
 " whilst the extension and invention of railways (and the electric 
 " telegraph) do not supersede, they greatly diminish the necessity 
 " of adding to the number and cost of the fortifications on the sea- 
 " board; or, in other words, that the future prosecution of the 
 "system <>f defence by permanent fortifications, should be on a 
 "very reduced scale, in comparison with the magnificent one 
 " adopted thirty-five years ag>." 
 
 And, in relation to the influence of steam-navigation and 
 improvements in artillery, he says : 
 
 "The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of 
 " -team to vosels of war, have certainly added to the facilities of 
 " naval operations, in making attacks and transporting troops, 
 " Hut such operations are necessarily confined to short lines, like 
 
OF NEW YORK. IT 
 
 " those between France and England, in the Mediterranean, or on 
 " the lakes between Canada and the United States." 
 
 " Attacks by steamers can only be formidable when they are 
 " numerous, and filled with troops destined for a grand attack ; 
 " but when they are thus filled with troops, munitions of war, 
 " provisions, armament, and their regular crews, little room is left 
 " for the fuel necessary to propel them to the scene of action and 
 " in retreat.* Such steamers cannot be propelled either con- 
 " veniently or rapidly, until the propelling power can be produced 
 " at a less outlay for fuel. At the rate supposed to be the maxi- 
 " mum of speed of war steamers, lines of operations over one 
 " thousand miles (five hundred in advance and five hundred in 
 " retreat) cannot be occupied advantageously, or with the effi- 
 " ciency necessary to a great movement of strategic or direct 
 " attack. Numerous transports would be necessary to convey 
 " supplies of coal to convenient places on the coast, where depots 
 " for the same would have to be established and defended at great 
 " cost, for they would be constantly in danger of attack by sea 
 " and land by enterprising assailants. Besides, the great loads of 
 " men, munitions, armaments, provisions, and fuel, that w r ar and 
 " transport steamers would be obliged to carry, multiply the dan- 
 " gers of navigation." 
 
 " Certainly, steamers could make sudden and brief attempts 
 " to enter harbors and destroy towns ; but fast-sailing ships, with 
 " favorable winds, could do the same, if this kind of marauding 
 " and piratical warfare was carried on by any Christian nation 
 " calling itself civilized, and if not opposed by the same machines 
 " of war as those used by the enemy and by acts of retaliation." 
 
 " Such attempts might be successful in attack and retreat, if 
 " made in the night, even if the harbor was strongly fortified, if 
 " the fortifications were unaided by rafts and hulks lying across 
 " the channels." 
 
 " But a demonstration on a large scale against the important 
 " ports and arsenals, for the purpose of taking possession and 
 " levying contributions, requires considerable land forces, even 
 " against such points as were not defended by batteries ; for at 
 " such points, in time of war, earth erections would be made and 
 " easily supplied with cannon of heavy caliber, that wmild do 
 " great damage, by direct and vertical cannonade, to the enemy s 
 " vessels and forces afloat, after they had entered the harbor, and 
 " probably compel them to leave it, and force them to select a 
 " more distant point for the initiative of attack." 
 
 " If the enemy, strong in ships and soldiers, could be driven 
 " from Boston, by the erection of some redoubts in the course of 
 " one night, it is hardly to be supposed that he would attempt to 
 " recapture the position, or to attack any other position similarly 
 " situated." 
 
18 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 Any Mich demonstration .it the present day would be checked 
 "by the means just ( numerated, and le met on its flanks and in 
 "front bv the mobile forces rallied by the telegraph to the point 
 "of attack." 
 
 "The improvement in artillery, as regards size and efficiency, 
 "lias been, of late year,-, very great ; but it inures more to the 
 hem-lit of the defence than the attack. In the same way that, if 
 "steam, applied to ships of war, affords any advantages to the 
 " attack, steam, applied on railways, combined with the electric 
 " trli irraph, affords greater advantages to the defence, by reason 
 u of the greater facility with which forces may be moved by the 
 " latter means." 
 
 From all which it may be safely asserted, that the navigation 
 " of the ocean by steam, the application of steam to vessels of war, 
 and recent improvements in artillery and other military inven- 
 " tions, do not exhibit the attack of forts on the sea-board superior 
 "to the defence, when those forts are connected with railways, 
 " and are brought within succor of the surrounding population ; 
 " nor do they render additions to the present fortifications in 
 H number, size or. cost, in any wise necessary. But, on the con- 
 " trary, the improvement in artillery, if those fortifications had 
 " now to be built, would enable their plans to be reduced one-Ji(f 
 " in size, and the armament one-fourth in amount." 
 
 In wliat precedes, I believe 1 have given a fair and complete 
 view of the " objections" to the system of coast defence, as they 
 were urged scarcely eight years ago. I do not pretend that our 
 views of the problem of coast defence should be exactly the same 
 that they were at that date ; for I think, in relation to some of our 
 great sea-ports at least, the developments of the recent war of the 
 Allies against Russia, has made the problem quite a new one. But 
 I do affirm that that war exhibited but a development or realiza 
 tion rather of the changes which form the basis of these criti 
 cisms of 1851. Let us, therefore, sum up these objections of 
 1851. 
 
 Our forts need no longer be so large; " forts and castles" 
 may even be dispensed with, and a few powerful guns, " in open 
 batteries," substituted. The idea of strength against land attack 
 (or siege) is by one critic scouted. " Now, were it possible for an 
 " enemy, with the greatest army that ever was led into battle, by 
 u the greatest captain, to take the country by surprise, and to land 
 " at Long Island Sound, or in Lynn Haven Bay, and to be disem- 
 " barking his last piece of artillery, before he was discovered these 
 "railroads, the power of steam, with the aid of lightning, would 
 
 .able the government, before he could reach the heights of 
 u Brooklyn, or the outskirts of Norfolk, to have there, in waiting, 
 " and ready to receive him, and beat him back into the sea, a 
 "force two to one greater than his, however strong." "While 
 
OF NEW YORK. 19 
 
 another thinks that, " the facility with which these works could 
 " be relieved, in case of an attempted siege, would have rendered 
 " it only necessary for them to be made secure against a coup de 
 "main" And his opinions, as to "demonstrations on a large 
 " scale, against the important ports and arsenals," will be found 
 in the passage already quoted. 
 
 I pass now from " objections " of 1851 to " objections " of 1858. 
 These are found in a " Letter," addressed to yourself, Sir, by 
 Lieutenant Morton, of the Engineers, which has been published, 
 and which, as it appears to have not only had much influence upon 
 your own views, but on the minds of the public, deserves much 
 more than a passing notice. They are summed up by the author 
 in the following language : 
 
 " The first objection I offer to the existing system is with re- 
 " spect to the size. It adopts, even in localities where there is 
 " plenty of room,* different sorts of masonry casemated castles, of 
 " the smallest area that will hold the number of guns required, in 
 "from two to five tiers ; the guns firing through embrasures. in 
 " the scarp wall, which is exposed to its base, or nearly so, to the 
 " fire of flotillas. This remark applies to the sea fronts of all our 
 " sea-coast forts of importance. (Those not on this principle are 
 " small, and situated in localities where one sort of work will 
 " answer as well as another.) The works referred to, have, in 
 " some cases, land fronts ; that is, fronts which do not bear on 
 " the approaches of ships, or on anchorage ground. These are 
 " arranged sometimes on the bastion system, sometimes on the 
 " German ; but in all cases are contracted and weak,f owing to 
 " the difficulty J of joining strong land fronts to casemated sea 
 " fronts, of small development." 
 
 " The small area of these works will prevent them, in the first 
 " place, from holding any more ammunition and stores, than they 
 " will need if exposed to protracted bombardment. As to a siege, 
 " those which are out of the reach of help, such as Key West, 
 " Fort Point, Ship Island, and Pensacola, will, probably, be short 
 " of supplies very soon, and be reduced from that cause. There 
 " will be, in no case, the interior space required to accommodate 
 " the magazines, &c., which must be located and protected, at the 
 
 * " As at Key West, Ship Island, Fort Point, Pensaccla, the site of Fort Tompkins, 
 " and Fort Richmond, at Sandy Hook, Fort Adams, and other places." 
 f " Without any exception, they are smaller than a Vauban front." 
 j " In illustration of this, see Forts Adams and Schuyler, in each of which, two 
 " sides of the main work are flanked by flanking casemates in the outworks. This 
 " arrangement is certainly open to criticism ; but I mention it only to show that it 
 " has been found difficult to connect the sea and land fronts; and I wish it to be 
 "understood, that I do not find fault with the plan of these works but only object 
 " to this plan being followed hereafter, now that it appears to be unsuitable to 
 "circumstances that have arisen since they were built." 
 
20 TlIK DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 u pniuts I have specified, and where the plan of fortification is still 
 " t. In- derided upon." 
 
 " A second disadvantage springing from the contracted area 
 "is, that there i> nr enough room <>u tin- terrepleins to spare for 
 " triii].. .rary homhpmofs, traveives, Are.. which are necessary to 
 "protect the barhette guns i mm ricochet and reverse fire, and 
 k - vertical lire. Also, the garrisun, as well as the guns, will be 
 "closely packed, and during a bombardment the chances of 
 "casualties will be increased from this cause ; and from the fact 
 " that the heads of the casemate arches heing open on the interior, 
 "and having a direction towards a common Centre. more frag- 
 " ments of a single shell, bursting inside the work, will probably 
 " enter them, than if they were developed on longer lines." 
 
 " 3d. Works built on this system expose a large mark to the 
 " fire of flotillas,* which can liardly be missed ; and a certain 
 " proportion of the entire number of shots must, therefore, be 
 " counted upon to enter the embrasures, carrying with them 
 " splinters of stone." 
 
 "Those shots wh irh do not hit the embrasures, will produce a 
 "certain eil ect in shaking the wall; and, considering the calibres 
 " and number of the guns that enter into the armament of a 
 "modern flotilla, there is reason to Tear breaehing."f 
 
 " It must be noted, also, that a small front is exposed to a 
 "more converging fire than a large one ; a point of importance, 
 "according to all military authorities/ 1 
 
 k 4th. The use of casemates brings one tier of guns about at the 
 "level of the ground, or site ; and in those cases where a ditch 
 " cannot lc made to surround the work (as is the case, for exam- 
 " pie, at Fort Adams, Fort Schuyler, Fort Sumtcr, Fort Indepen 
 dence, Fort Hamilton, and others), the defect results that an 
 "entrance may be effected by the enemy by surprise, or under 
 "certain other circumstances, by these embrasures. [It appears 
 "that the southern tower at Bomarsund was entered, and taken, 
 " by a small party of French, who entered through the embrasures, 
 " though all the garrison had not yet retreated from it into the 
 " keep.] The iron shutters, recently proposed, will not entirely 
 " remove this defect, which is inherent to small fronts" 
 
 *"M. Riehild Grivcl (1857) 13 of opinion that, considering the greater calibre 
 "nn<l force of the sea-service guns recently adopted, and tin- co////^/-"/ " safety 
 
 "afforded them by floating batteries, no isolated masonry fort, however solidly cou 
 
 nted, ran long r.-M an att-.ck properly conducted. " 
 
 I - It is c.-rtain that the scarps of our sea-coast works are no stronger than those 
 "of Boiiiursund; brick -.vails of ei<rht feet thi.-kn.-ss, or tin- same backed with coii- 
 " crete, or granite back-d with mncrete, form our scarps, which are three feet 
 "thinner around each mbrasuiv, and are, in ninny ca<e- not bonded to the eounter- 
 " f cits in their rear. J do not assert that the walUof J!omar-und were breached from 
 "the water, but refer back fur a comparison between lari: nuns afloat and small 
 i-hore, to show that a less accurate fire, provided it is from heavier guns, 
 
 " will effect a breach. 
 
OF NEW YORK. 21 
 
 " 5th. The present system is carried out to advantage only on 
 " sites close to the water ; and hence, in many cases, the advan- 
 " tages offered by the nature of commanding plateaus or promon- 
 " tories have been neglected, and works built at the foot of heights, 
 " even when an artificial site was necessary for the purpose.""* 
 
 A system of fortifications, or of anything else, which requires 
 time and money to construct, and which, when constructed, are 
 intended to last for years, must have more flexibility than ordi 
 narily belongs to works of this nature, if it can meet the views of 
 objectors, who, in the brief space of seven years, on the one hand, 
 scout the idea of lund defense entirely, or denounce our works as 
 too strong in this particular ; and on the other, criticise these land 
 defences as " weak and contracted." 
 
 I do not exactly understand what Lieutenant Morton s remedy 
 is for all these alleged evils ; for, though he has proposed a " sys 
 tem " of " detached bastions," connected by earthen curtains, the 
 " smallest application of which .would be a pentagon of 550 yards 
 " a side, and the largest sizes being polygons of 750 yards a 
 side," he himself records, without answering, the objection, " that 
 " the extent of ground occupied by the enclosure is too great for 
 " some of the sites which are available for the location of bat- 
 " teries ;" and moreover states expressly " It must be recollected 
 " that I propose to fortify in this manner, only certain points of 
 " the sea-coasts, which I mention, and, in view of future cases, 
 " define the nature of ;" and his specification and definition is as 
 follows : 
 
 " I propose that the system sketched in the preceding cliscus- 
 " sion should be used at Key West, Ship Island, San Francisco, 
 " possibly at Pensacola, and at other or future points of United 
 " States territory, which are comprised in the following class, or 
 " classes, viz : places that are fitted by nature to form bases of 
 " operations for sea warfare, by being located where they may 
 " protect our commerce, and from which that of the enemy may 
 " be annoyed ; that are convenient places of retreat for repairs or 
 " safety, for government ships and for privateers, or merchantmen 
 " pursued by the enemy ; that can be made also safe and conve- 
 " nient depots for artillery, ammunition and stores ; or places that 
 " may, in addition to some or all of the above properties, be made 
 " centres of defence, from land as well as sea attacks of territories 
 " isolated or distant from the United States." 
 
 Neither the specification nor the definition apply to more than 
 an exceedingly small portion of the " sites" requiring sea-coast 
 batteries, while the objection that he records applies to most of 
 them. If, therefore, the objections made to the " different sorts of 
 " masonry casemated castles " are valid, we find no substitute in 
 
 * " As at Fort Adams, Fort Richmond, Fort Point, and others." 
 
L l THE DANGEKS AND DEFENCES 
 
 his essay, and however forcible the objections maybe, until some 
 thing better i> proposed m- invented, we must be content with 
 them : t r I shall show hereafter that " ma>onry ca>emated castles" 
 have played a great part in preserving Bea-porte commercial and 
 naval depots (the true and proper ohjeets of coast defence) from 
 dc.-truetion that they have t uliilled completely the objects for 
 which they were constructed. 
 
 Let us examine the subject a little more closely. Years ago it 
 had passed into a proverb in France, that " a gun on shore is worth 
 "a snip at sea,"* and the French "Aide-memoire d artillerie" 
 expresses the same idea in other words: "That a battery of four 
 k - pieces of large calibre, well placed, and well served, ought to 
 iivt the better [avoir raison] of a ship of \ 2() guns." 
 
 Hut the question, which of the two will " get the better" in a 
 direct contest, is a very different one from that which concerns the 
 mere rapid passage OI a ship or steamer through a channel de 
 fended by a battery ; and it is, I think, in overlooking in a measure 
 this important distinction that Lieutenant Maury and many others, 
 arguing from the surprising results of certain well-known contests 
 between very small open batteries and ships, have proposed, in 
 stead of stone batteries, " one or more heavy guns planted in open 
 " battery along the beach/ 
 
 Even if it was admitted that the fire of a gun in an "open 
 " battery " was necessarily so much more effective (which I greatly 
 doubt) than that of one in a casemate, it may be remarked that as 
 (in the present state of artillery) it is, at best, but one out of great 
 many shots that touches a ship in a vital part, or sets her on fire, 
 a ft-ii* IJH.HX cannot be expected to prevent the passage of a fleet, 
 nor even of a single vessel. 
 
 I have said already that no battery or system of batteries has 
 yet be-e-n invented which shall seal hermetically, a channel (like 
 the Narrows, for instance) the passage of which offers to an en 
 terprising enemy an object sufficient to induce him to run the risk 
 at all hazards. What, then, can be done ( We must, to defend 
 sHr/t a passage, use only guns of the most cl*t //{</ !ve capacit<<* 
 and we must inuli ipl ij f/ ///, so that we can throw upon him a per 
 fect hail-storm of lire, throughout his whole path and we must 
 
 e no spot either in approaching his object, or after he gets he- 
 fore it, not under our fire ; and even then, we must, in many cases, 
 call in auxiliary aid. 
 
 Again, with regard to the open battery, this peculiar efficiency 
 which Lieutenant Maury attributes to it, does not belong to it at 
 all, except in e</ f<i<n ftito, which cannot always, nor even fre 
 quently, be found. 
 
 Lieutenant Dahlgren says, "So far, therefore, as casemated 
 
 * " Un canon a terre vaut un vai^seau a la incr." 
 
OF NEW YORK. 23 
 
 " batteries are concerned, shells have added very little to the power 
 " of ships ; but against guns en barbette they will be found of ma- 
 " terial assistance, especially if charged with balls and used as 
 " shrapnel. And against open works, the concentration afforded 
 " by the well-served broadsides of one or more ships, should suffice 
 " to silence the works, if the vessels have no unusual disadvantages 
 " to encounter, and are brought within sure distance." And again, 
 in his very interesting and able remarks on the " Incidents of the 
 " War" at the conclusion of his work on " Shells and JShell 
 " Guns :" - 
 
 " The fire of a small barbette or uncovered work, can always 
 "be kept under by the rifled musket and shrapnel, judiciously 
 " postcd ; taking the advantage of such shelter as the locality af- 
 " fords, or using pits for the sharp-shooters if necessary. The 
 " broadside can then be brought to bear, or the men sent ashore 
 " in force to assault circumstances may even admit of the land- 
 " ing one or two cannon to breach the work. 
 
 " The unqualified assumption, that a tower or small redoubt, 
 " with its two or three guns, can of itself make good the defence 
 " against a heavy ship, would naturally suggest more than is con- 
 " templated ; for in that case, why resort to the cost of extensive 
 " works to defend, a harbor, when a few towers might fully answer 
 " the purpose ? But the fact is, that the advantage of site which 
 " is required to give effect to this species of defence, is rarely to 
 " be found just where it is neecfed. It existed neither at Cronstadt 
 " nor at Sweaborg ; and at Sebastopol the elevated works of this 
 " nature only served to command the position for attack on Fort 
 " Constantine from seaward. Of themselves, they could not have 
 " prevented the entrance of a single vessel into the port, nor have 
 " inflicted any material damage on an enemy making the at- 
 " tempt. 
 
 " Again, it frequently happens that the works are too limited 
 " in extent, or isolated and not capable of mutual support ; the 
 " masonry may be bad the site low and the guns unprotected by 
 " casemates the ordnance of inefficient power, and not command- 
 " ing all accessible positions the garrison inadequate in numbers 
 " and quality. In. such cases the ship cannot fail to have the ad- 
 " vantage, and it only remains to use it by attacking in proper 
 " force, rapidly and energetically, concentrating the full fire of the 
 " line at decisive distances upon the unguarded or weak points, 
 " and affording no opportunity for improving the state of the 
 " works. Under this head may be classed those actions where 
 " ships have been eminently successful Algiers, Acre, Vera Cruz, 
 " Kinburn, Petropauloski," &c., &c. 
 
 Even if the "advantages of site" existed, a small number of 
 guns would not always answer the purpose. The whole front of 
 the public lands on Staten Island, at the Narrows, is (or w r ill be) 
 
24: THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 girdled by open earthen batteries, but if / * ?W enough nor would 
 I tru-t tneee open battorfa alone, if they could contain guns 
 enough. y 
 
 Grivel * (who is ^ noted as entertaining the opinion that "no 
 
 " isolated masonry tort, however -<>lidly c>n>tnicted. can long 
 " iv-i>t an attack properly Conducted,") uses the following 
 language: 
 
 " We could then" (he refers to the case in which the site is low 
 and ships can approach near), " if we feared being commanded or 
 - taken in enfilade hy tires of ships, substitute for earthen batte- 
 kt rie>. works in masonry, calcinated, and irifji several stories of 
 " cor. i;<liJi es. [The italics are mine.] This kind of fortification 
 " will expose, it is true, its personnel to the chance of embrasure 
 " sliot, or to wounds from stone fragments" (as if any warlike 
 structure had yet been invented in which there was no /A///*/, r) 
 " and its material to that of a breach; but these inconveniences 
 "will be in part compensated by the <txxur1 jn <>t> r/ / ////, to tlie 
 " greater part of its artillery, from the plunging or enfilading tires 
 "of ships." An " assured protection to the greater ]art of its 
 "artillery" is certainly a irreat object attained by " this kind of 
 " fortification," and it doubtless would lie- aide longer 4t to resist 
 u an attack propei ly condnctetl " than a work which, like Kinburn, 
 had no such assured protection. 
 
 Let me now allude to objections applying ]>arti<-iilni-ly to these 
 kind of works ; \\\\& first as to thil^iabilitv to hi>< < >], , n <j here hinh d 
 at by (Jrivel, and nrired airain by Lieutenant Morton, who refers 
 to GrivePfl authority and opinions. Tliere is not one single fact 
 on record derived from the numerous attacks of the Allies on 
 Kiir-ian "cast-mated castles" (and they presented themselves to 
 the Allied fleets almost everywhere, and with all that constitutes 
 the "objections" to this class of works in their most glaring form), 
 nor in the history of any other maritime attacks on fortifications, 
 to justify this fear. The only event of the war which gives any 
 iijijh/,* at ground for it, is the attack on Kinburn. 
 
 To draw any conclusion from this affair, it is necessary to un 
 derhand the character of the works which had to oppose the 
 tremendous armament arrayed against them, (irivel s account of 
 them conveys a very erroneous impression. lie says, " The 
 "citadel of Kinburn, builtupon a tongue of >and, could be ranked 
 " in the category of those masonry-ca>emated works for which the 
 " Uu>-ians seem to manifest a preference for the defence of insular 
 " positions or of such low >ites. This fort, armed upon all its 
 " faces, offered an incomplete tier of covered fires, surmounted by 
 
 * "La Mavin.- dan? I attnqin- ! fortifications ct le bombardeim-nt !* vill.-- !! 
 "littoral." j-ai-.M. lviohill (M-ivd, I Jfut. iiant <! Vaisecau : 1 ai i-, J.s. iO. Hi> "t>]iinion" 
 i- \\orth as nmrli a- any other iiKlivitlual s, pcfhnjts. AVe ^luill see hcrcafti-r on what 
 
 s .u-h opinion.s a 
 
OF NEW YORK. 25 
 
 " a long barbette battery with earthen parapets ; its armament 
 "amounted to more than sixty guns (bouches a feu), of which, 
 " about half bore upon the open sea. Two new batteries, armed, 
 " one with ten, the other with eleven pieces, and Covered with sand 
 " parapets, were located beyond on the extreme point, and com- 
 " pleted, in concert with those of the other shore, the defence of 
 " the pass of Otchakow." 
 
 One would imagine from this, that we had here a very perfect 
 specimen of Russian works and of sea-coast defences generally ; 
 that the " masonry-casemated works" were such as set at defiance, 
 before Cronstadt, the united maritime power of France and 
 England. 
 
 Lieutenant Morton appears to draw his account of Ivinburn en 
 tirely from Grivel (adding, however, quite gratuitously, " a certain 
 proportion of sixty-pounder guns" to the armament of these (sup 
 posed) formidable works.) 
 
 Having arranged his works, Grivel disposes of them as fol 
 lows : 
 
 " The contest had lasted four hours, and, during this short 
 " space of time, the combined fires of our cannon of great pene- 
 " tration, and of our mortars, had sufficed to put the place out of 
 " condition (hors d etat) to resist longer. Represent to yourself all 
 " its cannon dismounted, practicable breaches in the sea-front, all 
 " its edifices burnt or in ruins ! In a word, the fort of Kinburn 
 " was, after the picturesque expression of our sailors, capsized 
 " (chavire de fond en comble), and if its entire garrison was not 
 " buried under this complete disaster of the defences (son materiel), 
 " it is because the soldiers not employed at the pieces had been 
 " sheltered in the casemates, of which a portion, resisting our 
 " bombs, had remained intact." 
 
 So, the men in the " casemates" fared rather better than those 
 serving barbette guns (open batteries), with which our modern 
 critics are so exclusively in love ; and had they been gun-casemates 
 well arranged, and well constructed, it is likely that the compara 
 tive security would have been about the same. 
 
 But let us contrast this imposing account of the works, and 
 the somewhat terrific exposition of the result, with the actual 
 facts.* 
 
 Dahlgren, drawing his information from " official accounts by 
 " English and French Admirals," describes the works and their 
 location as follows : 
 
 " The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed 
 
 * The author of Chambers Pictorial History of the Russian War, says of Kin- 
 burn : " The fort at that place had been so little attended to by the Russians, that an 
 " English lieutenant had some time previously offered to seize and blow it up if he 
 " had three hundred men to aid him ; but when the Russians saw the English 
 " steamers cruising about, they begun to strengthen the fort and augment the garri- 
 "son, <fec." 
 
26 T HK DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 " ]>artly by the projection of the main shore, partly by a long 
 " narrow >trip of sand-beach, which continues from it and takes 
 u ft north westerly direction, until it passes the promontory of 
 " Otchakov, where it terminates, and from which it is separated 
 " lv the channel whereby the waters of the estuarv empty into 
 "the 1 Hack Sea." 
 
 The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue 
 " and the Point <f ( )tcliakov, or the main shore opposite, is about 
 " two miles ; but the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of 
 "larire voscls of war, except in the narrow channel that runs 
 "nearest to the >pit and its northern shore. Here, therefore, are 
 "placed the works designed to command the entrance. They 
 are three in number. Near the extreme point of the spit is a 
 "covered battery, built of logs, which are tilled in and overlaid 
 k> with sand, pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten." 
 
 "Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, 
 "connected with the spit battery by a covered way. This work, 
 " built of stone, and reveted with turf, is open, and said to be the 
 " most substantial of the three ; it has eleven cannon, and within 
 "is a furnace for heating shot." 
 
 " Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, 
 " is Fort Kinburn, a square, hastium-d work, extending to the sea 
 " on the south, and to the waters of the estuary on the north. It 
 "is ca-einated in part, though but few of these embrasures were 
 "armed, its chief force being in the pieces en ~barltdt\ and 
 " some nine or ten mortars. The masonry, though solid, is 
 "represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and so 
 "dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the 
 " interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space 
 "was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly con- 
 w stnicted, and plastered over." 
 
 " This fort is said to be armed with sixty piece?. The English 
 "admiral states that all three of the works mounted eighty-one 
 "guns and mortars. The calibers are not given officially, but 
 " Mat -d in private letters to be ls-pounders and 32-poundere." 
 
 The above description will, I think, quite justify the further 
 remark as to these works: 
 
 " They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable 
 "of withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The 
 kt main fort was particularly weak in design, and dilapidated ; all 
 "of them were indifferently armed and garrisoned." 
 
 :iuch for the works. As to the character of the armament* 
 brought to the a.ault. the same autlmritv savs : 
 
 u The Allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, 
 
 * I find no detailed statemont of tlio total number of vessels, guns, troops, il,-. t ..f 
 tlio Allied force. The " I irtorial History" um-s the following as tin- Knirlish quota, 
 viz., " i; strum line-of-buttle ships, 17 steam frigates and bloops, 10 gun-boats, f, mor- 
 
OF NEW YORK. 27 
 
 " embracing every description of vessel, from the largest to the 
 " smallest, and all propelled by steam. There were screw-liners, 
 " and like vessels of inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gun- 
 " boats, floating-batteries, mortar-vessels, &c., each armed in what 
 " was considered the most approved manner." And this truly 
 formidable naval force carried besides " some thousand troops " on 
 board, all designed to attack these " dilapidated " works of Kin- 
 burn. 
 
 Without going into the particulars, I will simply give Dahl- 
 gren s account of the affair. 
 
 " The French floating-batteries (Devastation, Lave, and Ton- 
 " nante) steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six 
 " or seven hundred yards off the S. E. bastion of Fort Kiiiburn, 
 " and at 9.20 opened fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of 
 " which six were English, by the gun-boats, five French and six 
 " English, and by the steamer Odin, 16." 
 
 " The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve 
 " 50-pounders 011 the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of 
 " the fort ; and the vertical fire was so good that the French 
 " admiral attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of 
 " the place. The gun-boats also made good ricochet practice, 
 " which was noticed to be severe on the barbette batteries." 
 
 " The Kussian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, 
 " plied their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention 
 " chiefly to the floating-batteries, which were nearest." 
 
 " Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the Royal 
 " Albert, 121, Algiers, 91, Agamemnon, 90, and Princess Royal, 
 " 90, with the four French liners in close order, taking position in 
 " line, ranging N. W. and S. E., about one mile from the fort, in 
 " twenty-eight feet water." 
 
 " At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates,* under Kear- 
 " Admirals Stewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage 
 " to the basin, opening fire on the spit and central batteries in 
 " passing, and anchoring well inside of Fort Nicholaiev and 
 " Otchakov. The attack seaward was completed by the Acre, 100, 
 " CuroQoa, 30, Tribune, 30, and Sphynx, 6, opening on the 
 " central battery ; while the Ilannioal, 91, Dauntless, 24, and 
 " Terrible, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shot 
 " and shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit 
 " battery, the sand falling through between the logs, displaced by 
 
 " tar-vessels, 3 steam-tenders, 10 transports, making 52 vessels, carrying in all about 
 " 1500 guns, arid 5000 troops of all kinds. 
 
 The French force is not stated; but there were 4 ships of the line, a number of 
 steam-vessels and gun-boats, besides the 3 famous floating-batteries (here first 
 employed), and a considerable body of troops. The troops of both nations were 
 landed previous to the naval attack, and the place invested by land. 
 
 * Valorous, 16, Furious, 16, Sidon,22, Leopard, 12, Gladiator, 4, Firebrand, 6 
 Stromboli, 6, Spiteful, 6, Asmodee, Cacique, and Sane. 
 
28 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 "shot and shells, choked the embrasures, and Mocked up the 
 
 ing, In the fort, the light wooden buildings were in ilaines at 
 k - a!i early hour; then the walls In -pin to crumble before the balls 
 k - which came from every quarter, front. Hank, and rear; and as 
 " the guns were disabled successively, the return became feeble, 
 "until few were in condition to lie tired, the central redoubt alone 
 k - dix-harging single guns at long intervals. The Russian com- 
 u mander. however, made n<> Mgn of surrender ; but the admirals, 
 ing that his fire had ceased, and further defence was unavail- 
 k * ing. hoisted the white flap: at 1.35 P. M., upon which the works 
 " were given up on honorable terms." 
 
 u The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men ; their 
 "loss is differently stated, the French admiral says eighty 
 " wounded, another, forty-three killed and one hundred and 
 "fourteen wounded." 
 
 4 - The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded, 
 " besides two killed and two wounded in the Arrow, by the burst- 
 " ing of her two 68-pounder Lancaster guns." 
 
 u The superiority of the Allied vessels in number and caliber 
 " of ordnance was very decided ; they must have had at least six 
 " hundred and fifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and S-inch 
 " .-h-.-il guns, with a fair proportion of OS-pounders and mortars, 
 l - bi -ides the 50-pounders of the French floating-batteries. To 
 " which the Russians could only re]>ly with eighty-one cannon 
 "and mortars, and no guns of heavier caliber than 32-pounders, 
 " while many were lower. The great disparity in offensive power 
 " was not compensated to the works by the advantage of coin- 
 " manding position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon 
 "nearly the same level with the ships batteries, and al.-o very 
 " delicieiit in proper strength. On the other hand, the depth of 
 %% water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile; 
 " and thus their flre was by no means so intense as it would have 
 " been at shorter range." 
 
 " This was the sole occasion in which the floating-batteries had 
 k * an opportunity of proving their endurance: which was the ques- 
 " tion of most importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 
 u 50-pounders, or 68-pounders, when brought within a few hun- 
 " divd yards of masonry, and able to retain the steadiness indis- 
 M pi -n.-able to a breaching fire." 
 
 " No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such 
 M power, for though the Knglish had employed long 68-pounders 
 "at Sevastopol, yet the distance from the objects exceeded a 
 u thousand yard-; and the concentration of fire, so far as any 
 "opinion can be formed from the published statements, was far 
 "inferior to that of tin- thirty-six ."io-pounders. in the broadsides 
 " of the three batteries anchored in dose order." 
 
 They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the 
 
OF NEW YORK. 29 
 
 " Devastation), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other 
 " eifect on the stout iron plates than to dint them, at the most, 
 " one and a half inches, still, there were ten men killed and 
 " wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the 
 " ports, and the majority of damage to the French personel 
 " (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three floating-batteries." 
 
 The affair proves nothing, unless it be, that " dilapidated " 
 and ill-designed and ill-constructed works, armed with inferior 
 calibres, cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of 
 force as was here displayed. But the failure to derive from it 
 any conclusion against " masonry-casemated " works, or " castles," 
 is the more signal, owing to the very important fact that it was 
 mainly a contest of " open " or " barbette " batteries, whose supe 
 riority over casemated ones has been so much insisted on. 
 
 In this account we hear nothing of " practicable breaches," 
 though doubtless thirty-six 50-pdrs., at 500 yards, would " tell " 
 on the walls of such a fort. Yet, as the " vertical fire was so 
 " good that the French admiral attributed to it, in good part, the 
 " speedy surrender of the place," while the " ricochet practice," 
 from the gun-boats, was " severe " upon these open batteries 
 while the " edifices " behind them (old wooden buildings, " slightly 
 constructed, and plastered over ") were in a blaze, which must 
 have made, by heat and smoke, the service of the guns almost 
 impracticable there is no difficulty in accounting for the result 
 of the. contest. 
 
 Whether or not a " practicable breach" was made, is of little 
 consequence, in such a case ; but, turned up-side down as (accord 
 ing to Grivel) the defences were, with the garrison nearly buried 
 in the " ruins," it appears there were only 157 (out of 1,400) 
 killed and wounded a very small loss, under all the circum 
 stances. 
 
 The fact is, that these " open batteries " were " turned upside 
 down" the guns disabled and dismounted, by the deluge of 
 direct, vertical, and ricochet fire poured upon them as in all 
 " open batteries," in such situations, ever will happen* 
 
 * According to the " Pictorial History," the Russian artillerymen at these " open 
 batteries," were exposed besides to the fire of sharpshooters. It says, " Bazaine," 
 (the General commanding the French troops) " placed two companies of chasseurs 
 " under cover, at a distance of 400 yards from the east side of the fort, and kept up 
 "a fusilade on the Russian artillerymen." 
 
 As to the armament, the same author says, "The captors found nearly 80 guns 
 "mounted in the fort and batteries, mostly long and heavy 18 and 24 pounders ; but 
 " there were many others ready for mounting, platforms to support them, and newly 
 " constructed casemates, raising the total of guns to 174." 
 
 Notwithstanding that the fort was (according to Grivel) "capsized" (chavire) 
 and the garrison nearly buried in the " ruins," it does not appear that they were 
 fully sensible of their condition. The "Pictorial History" says, "The officers in 
 " general bore the scene " (the surrender) " with dignity, but with deep mortifica- 
 " tion ; and many of them were said to be on the verge of mutiny against the gover- 
 " nor, so strongly did they resist any proposals for a surrender." 
 
30 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 I have u-iveii much space to this affair of Kinbum, for Grivel 
 parades it ;is a lair illustration of what " floating batteries, com 
 bined with bomb-vessels, gun-boats. Arc.," can do against "nia- 
 sonr\ -rasemated " works. I have shown how inaccurate (by 
 comparison with the official accounts) fcs GriveFs version of the 
 ail air ; and I have further shown, that no conclusion whatever can 
 l)i- drawn from this contest of insignificant works, armed with low 
 calibres, against such overwhelming means of attack as were here 
 arrayed ; unless, indeed, it be this (a fact before well known), that 
 for low sites, open luff- // * are the most inefficient of all. The 
 fort of Kinburn surrendered, not because it was breached, not 
 because its defenders were so far diminished by their losses, as to 
 be unable to protract the contest, but simply because the guns 
 and gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-de-com- 
 bat, and the calibres were incapable of doing any great damage 
 to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed. 
 
 "With regard to the effects and endurance of the much-vaunted 
 floa1<ii<j-l<itt> i i< .v. Commander I )ahlgren very judiciously remarks : 
 
 "The use that can be made of noating-batteries, as auxiliaries 
 " in attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation 
 " of their asserted invulnerability. It may be that the perform- 
 " ancc at Kinburn answered the expectation of the French empe- 
 " ror as regards offensive power, for that is a mere question of the 
 " battering capacity of the heaviest calibres, which is undoubted ; 
 "but the main issue, which concerns their endurance, cannot be 
 " settled by the impact of ;-tt-pdr. shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. 
 " Far heavier projectiles will in future be found on all sea-board 
 "fortifications; and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also be 
 " exerted more successfully than at Kinburn. Still, it is not to be 
 "doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in 
 " assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of absolute invul- 
 " nerability ; and the defence will do well to provide against its 
 . Mplovnient." 
 
 Kxperiments in England have shown, that such vessels, pro 
 tected by wrought-iron plates 4 inches thick, were incapable of 
 resisting a solid GS-pdr. shot at 400 yards.* Such shot, and even 
 greater, they will certainly have to resist, if they are to contend 
 with the modern armament of our fortifications. Grivel sagely 
 cautions them to take position at such a distance that they cannot 
 be penetrated. The only possibility, however, of broaching a 
 well-constructed masonry revetment consists in placing the bat- 
 
 * "The t.-irg. t was nn immense construction of timber and iron, combined exactly 
 "like tin- M.les oMIn- l.att.-ri. -i; iron 4 in. thick. Twenty-four rounds of 68-pdrs. 
 irere fnv.l, the first 14 of which, at 600 yards; and after the first few rounds, the 
 "timber i::ive way in nil din-,-ti..ns. The last 10 rounds, at 4uo, and the work of 
 Itruction WM complete. The last shot fired went completely through target, 
 timber and iron included" (Civil Engineer and Architect s Journal, Jan. 1858.) 
 
OFNEWYOKK. 31 
 
 tery at very short distance. The difficulty of breaching increases 
 enormously, even in land batteries, with increase of distance ; far 
 more in floating-batteries, owing to the unavoidable motion of the 
 vessel, which, at considerable distances, scatters the projectiles. far 
 and wide.* 
 
 The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of land bat 
 teries, which breached the exposed walls of the towers and main 
 work. 
 
 There is no more stringent rule of fortification than that 
 which demands that all masonry shall be covered (by earth works 
 or otherwise) from the action of land batteries, where the circum 
 stances of the location render their use practicable. The Russians 
 disregarded this rule in the arrangement of their works at Bomarr 
 sund, and to that disregard owed the prompt reduction of the 
 place. The masonry was faced with large blocks of granite, of 
 very irregular shape, backed by rubble. I doubt very much, 
 whether Lieutenant Morton s assertion is tenable, that, " It is cer- 
 " tain that the scarp of our sea-coast works are no stronger than 
 " those of Bomarsund. "f 
 
 Concerning the action of the land latteries, Sir Howard 
 Douglas says, " Authentic information, for the accuracy of which 
 " the t author vouches, enables him to state, that, with respect to 
 " the effect of solid shot on the granite, with which the walls were 
 " faced, the French guns made no impression on the blocks when 
 " they struck perpendicularly in the middle of their faces ; nor 
 " did the shot fired from the powerful 32-pounder British guns 
 " split the granite when so struck ; but, when the blocks were hit 
 " by the latter near the edge, or on a joint of the masonry, they 
 " were displaced, the joints penetrated, the wall shaken ; and 
 " this not being backed with solid masonry, but filled in with 
 " rubble, the mass was thrown down, and a practicable breach 
 " formed. This successful operation is very generally, but erro- 
 " neously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships, 
 " and is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, 
 " and ought to attempt elsewhere." 
 
 The large joints which the rubble facing of Bomarsund offered, 
 facilitated greatly the action of batteries. Such joints are not 
 found in our scarps, exposed to vessels fire ; nor, in general, are 
 such walls (where casemated and pierced for guns), " backed with 
 concrete." 
 
 But the experimental practice of the " Edinburgh," upon the 
 walls of Bomarsund (after the capture), deserves to be recorded ; 
 
 * The idea that a floating structure can be made shot-proof, while the walls of a 
 fort cannot be, is so transparently absurd as scarcely to require refutation. All that 
 will be maintained, probably, will be, that in general the lattej are not shot proofc 
 I shall allude to this subject again. 
 
 f See Appendix" A." 
 
32 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 for here, if ever, with all the means, and no hostile shot to en 
 counter, a ship s batteries might he expected to breach k - granite 
 walls." The " Edinhurgh" had in this case, all th^ / AW nt il <j"<i- 
 
 I ,.f a floating-battery, viz., the largest and most powerful 
 iruns in the JJritish navy : shot-proof sides would not have added 
 t< her . // unto powers. 
 
 I give Sir Howard Douglas own words: " Bnt the results of 
 " the experimental tiring at the remnant of the fort, which, unless 
 " the previous tiring of the slii])s during the attack was absolutely 
 "harmle>s, must have heen somewhat damaged, and moreover 
 "shaken hy the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not 
 " warrant this conclusion. even should the attacking sliips he per- 
 ^ mitted, like the Edinburgh, to take up, quietly and coolly, 
 "positions within 500 yards, and then deliberately commence and 
 " continue their firing, without heing fired at ! The firing of the 
 " Edinhurgh, at 1,060 yards, was unsatisfactory. 390 shot and 
 " shells were fired, from the largest and most powerful guns in the 
 " 1 ritMi naw (viz., from the Lancaster gun of 95 cwt., with an 
 " elongated shell of 100 Ibs. ; from 68-pounders of 95 cwt., and 
 " 82-ponnders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns; from 10-inch shell 
 k - iruns of 81 cwt., with hollow shot of 81 Ibs. ; from S-inch shell 
 " guns of 65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 Ibs.), did but 
 "little injury to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells* and 
 "hollow shot were fired. A small breach was formed in the 
 " facing of the outer wall, of extremely bad masonry, and consi 
 derable damage done to the embrasures and other portions of 
 " the wall ; but no decisive result was obtained no practicable 
 "breach formed, hv which the work mi^ht be assaulted, taken, 
 -and effectually destroyed, although 640 "shot and shells (-10,000 
 " Ibs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then 
 "at 480 yards." 
 
 Truly, if floating batteries can do no better than this when 
 thev have it " all their own way," 1 think we need not be in very 
 great apprehension for (even) our "isolated forts," which Grivel 
 seems to think (and Lieutenant Morton quotes his opinion) 
 "cannot long resist an attack properly conducted, however 
 " W / ///// constructed they may be" (The italics are mine.) 
 
 The harbor defenses of Sebastapol were very fair specimens 
 of Itiissian " masonry -casemated" works, and are types of the 
 same class of works built in this country; though the material 
 of which they were built was very inferior, and they were in 
 many r, /;/ important details (as I shall show hereafter), particu 
 larly &mbra#we*) vastly inferior to our oldest specimens, and not 
 to he compared at all with those built by us in the last few years. 
 The " Naval Cannonade" of these works on the 17th October, 
 1854. might be expected to throw some light upon the relative 
 powers and liabilities to injury of the two characters of anna- 
 
OF NEW YORK. 33 
 
 ments here opposed. But such is not the case. The Russian 
 works were not armed with the powerful sea-coast guns now 
 deemed essential ; and, on the other hand, the allied fleet was 
 nothing but a fleet, i. e., it was not provided with those special 
 means of attack (gun-boats, mortar-vessels, floating-batteries, &c.) 
 which will always hereafter be provided for such attacks. It was, 
 therefore, an old-fashioned affair, and might rather be set down 
 as the last attempt to array ships of-the-line and ordinary vessels- 
 o-war against fortifications. This question has long been prac 
 tically (though not confessedly, perhaps) settled. It was settled 
 before our Mexican war, when for near a whole year our fleets 
 threatened San Juan de Ulloa, yet never ventured to measure 
 their strength with it, notwithstanding they had the precedent of 
 the quite recent, much- vaunted French triumph over this very 
 work. It was practically settled throughout this whole European 
 war, in which the powerful allied fleets (the most powerful naval 
 armaments the world had ever seen), threatened in turn all the 
 strongholds of Russia on the Baltic ; and, notwithstanding that 
 public opinion at home, and naval pride in the fleet, demanded 
 some exploit which should be commensurate with the immense 
 preparations made, retired abashed, and confounded, before the 
 " masonry-casemated castles," whose "crockery" walls did not, 
 after all, seem to invite a close contact, or " hard knocks ;" and 
 which so proudly fulfilled their mission in protecting throughout 
 that war, the military and naval depots, the wealth, the com 
 merce, and the national honor of Russia. 
 
 Sweaborg, indeed, suffered ; but it was from a distant bom 
 bardment, which left her fortifications and her harbors intact, and 
 only showed the necessity of protecting at greater distance, all 
 great depots, or great cities. 
 
 Bomarsund alas for Bomarsund ! or rather for the pres 
 tige of the mighty naval armament which would have assaulted 
 it. One single " masonry-casemated castle"* bid defiance to this 
 proud armament, whose chiefs, concluding wisely that " discretion 
 " was the better part of valor," sent home for 10,000 French 
 troops, who, with a few 16 and 32-pounder guns in land-batteries, 
 speedily reduced the work. 
 
 The " Naval Cannonade" at Sebastapol was a mere " simu- 
 " lacre " of an operation of which the inutility was felt, and from 
 which no other results were expected than a diversion of the 
 attention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where 
 a real struggle for predominance was going on between the artil 
 lery fires of besieged and besiegers. 
 
 * It is worthy of remark, in this place, that this " casemated castle" (like very 
 many of the Russian batteries of the same character), had nothing but casemate guns. 
 There was not, (as is invariably the case with our own works), an " open battery " 
 (barbette) on the top; the upper tier of arches being simply made bomb-proof by 
 earth, and roofed over. 
 
 3 
 
34 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 The allied fleet consisted of H French, 10 British, and 2 Turk- 
 i>h ships-of-the-line (some few of which liiul auxiliary steam 
 power), and a number of side-wheel steamers tu tow these; and 
 carried in all about ^"ino guns. It wa> opposed by about ^^n guns 
 from the works. Thetleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable 
 distance (from 1500 to 2000 yards) ; too far to inflict any material 
 injnrv with its armament (82-pOUnders, with a moderate propor 
 tion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the works; too far to receive 
 much from the inefficient armament of the Russian works. 
 
 The only exception to this remark applies to the detached 
 English squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the 
 " Agamemnon," " Sanspareil," " London," " Arethusa," and " Al 
 bion," the first-named of which vessels took a position at 750 or 
 800 yards from Fort Cons tantine, while the others stretched along, 
 at about the same distance from Fort Constantino, the " Wasp 
 Tower," and "Telegraph ISattery." Dahlgren describes the result 
 as follows : 
 
 " The Agamemnon was very seriously maltreated, though not 
 " to such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine. 
 " She was on fire several times ; was struck by 240 shot or shells ; 
 " and, singular to say, only lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 
 " 70 men. The Albion suffered still more, and in an hour was 
 " towed out, crippled, and on fire in more than one place, with a 
 " loss of 81 men. The crews of the London and Arethusa fared 
 " rather better, but the ships nearly as ill ; and they, too, remained 
 "in station but a little time after the Albion. The Queen was 
 "driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great 
 "danger; and the Itodn< // Bad the bare satisfaction of getting 
 " aground and afloat after experiencing some damage." 
 
 ^~" The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was 
 " clearly defined in these results ; being above the dense cloud of 
 "smoke that enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim 
 " was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under the diffi- 
 " culty of firing, with an inconvenient elevation, at objects that 
 "they saw but seldom, and then but dimly and briefly- As a 
 " consequence, three line-of-battle ships and a frigate were driven 
 " off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth badly cut up ; 
 " while the Agamemnon lay opposed to one of the heaviest sea- 
 " forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five hours 
 " came off with comparatively little loss." 
 
 Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may 
 have had (and we have so few details about these works that we 
 can draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of 
 damages received by the vessels), it evidently was not for want of 
 being kit often enough (smoke or no smoke), that the " Agamem 
 non " escaped with so little injury. She " was struck by 2-10 shot 
 " and shells;" and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projec 
 tiles by which she was struck, that she was not destroyed. 
 
OF NEW YORK. 35 
 
 "With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantino, I 
 quote again from Dahlgren, at length : 
 
 " The distance of the Agamemnon and Sanspareil from Fort 
 " Constantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 
 " yards ; Lord Raglan states it to have been rather less. These 
 " two ships could bring to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from 
 " them probably lasted some four hours. There can be no doubt 
 " that it inflicted much damage, for the Russian commander-in- 
 " chief admits it in his official report ; but not sufficient to impair 
 " the strength of the masonry, and far short of effecting a breach 
 " in it." 
 
 " At Bomarsund, the results were rather different : Three 
 " 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from 
 " a ship s spar deck, and placed in battery at 950 yards from the 
 " North Tower the masonry of good quality and 6-J feet thick. 
 " In eight hours, the wall between two embrasures was cut 
 " through from top to bottom, offering a practicable breach, to 
 " effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired,* being at the 
 " rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute ; 
 " or, from each gun, one in 2f minutes. The Tower surrendered." 
 
 " It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able 
 " to accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed 
 "to do, the distances from the object being alike particularly 
 " when it is considered that many of the latter were of greater 
 " calibre, and most of them employed much heavier charges where 
 " the calibres were similar. The guns of the ship, if fired at the 
 " same rate as those of the battery, which was not unusually 
 " rapid, (one round in two and three-fourth minutes,) would have 
 " discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and shells 
 " in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption : a 
 " number of which, if properly applied, would appear, from the 
 " results of three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall 
 " of the fort in fourteen places ; whereas they did not effect a single 
 " breach, which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They 
 " must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, or 
 " else missed it altogether, and this could have been due only to 
 " a want of the precision which was attained by the battery. 
 "The constantly preferred complaint of motion in the ships was 
 " not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading Sevastopol, 
 " there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too large 
 " to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That 
 " the fort did no greater damage to the ships, than it received from 
 " them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, 
 " and the calibres too low. It is said that the Agamemnon was 
 " struck in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells, 
 " which must have been but a small portion of what was fired, 
 
 * Report of General Neil, Commanding Engineers. 
 
36 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 sufficient to be decisive if, as already observed, the 
 "calilnvliad been heavier." 
 
 A uuniher of projectiles sufficient to produce fourteen "prac 
 ticable breaches " if thrown by a land battery, here failed, not 
 only to produce a single breach, but even " to impair the strength 
 of the masonry." 
 
 Commander Dahlgren, indeed, deprecates the " want of pre 
 cision ;" but that degree of precision by which a breach is effected 
 by a land battery, is ititerly unattainable from a floating structure, 
 and the perfect calm which prevailed on this occasion cannot be 
 counted on, in general, and even the swell in the calmest days 
 is quite sufficient to disperse the projectiles from a floating battery, 
 at four hundred and five hundred yards, far and wide.* 
 
 I have said that, as to the contest of ordinary naval means, or 
 fleets, with fortifications, the question has, long since, been prac 
 tically settled. 
 
 The following extract from Grivel will show how the matter is 
 regarded even by those who believe that fortifications may be 
 successfully attacked by naval means specially adapted to the 
 objects. 
 
 " If the coast defences are at the same level, or can be com- 
 " manded by the floating artillery ; if the depth of water permits 
 "to combat them separately and to approach at half-point-blank 
 " distance, (that is 300 or 400 metres,) we would still say to the 
 "ships, however well-armed we suppose them: 
 
 " Never attack without an imperious and absolute necessity." 
 
 " But if these works occupy positions which command the sea 
 " while they reciprocally sustain each other ; if sub-marine 
 " obstacles, or other causes, oblige the floating artillery to main- 
 " tain a greater distance, we do not hesitate to say to ships :" 
 
 " Keep off, the match is too unequal but" 
 " Bring up your siege floating-batteries." 
 
 " For then will be the time to substitute these formidable machines 
 " of war, and their artillery of great penetration, for the vulner- 
 " able sides and guns of less range of ordinary vessels." Even 
 in the most favorable case he can describe, lie says to ships : 
 " Attack not without an imperious and absolute necessity." 
 
 The question of direct contest for superiority between forts 
 and naval armaments, will be narrowed down to this. If forts 
 
 and 
 t<> s<> coru- 
 
 trifling damage done to the Fort, was a poor com- 
 jions;it ion for the loss of over two hundred men, and the serious injuries all the 
 vessels of this detached squadron received. 
 
OFNEWYOEK. 37 
 
 are to protect the channel (as they usually are) through which 
 a fleet must pass to reach our ports or cities, or naval and 
 military depots, the fleet will either run by or, if the works are 
 too formidable decline contest altogether : but, if the object of 
 attack is sufficient to justify the preparation (the great port and 
 city of New York fo r instance) and the defences are such as to 
 invite the effort, the m aritime enemy will provide these " formi 
 dable machines of war," and enter into a direct contest with them, 
 with a view to their reduction. 
 
 I am now considering the latter branch of this subject, and 
 think that I have made it clear, that so far as we have yet any 
 experience, there is nothing to justify the apprehension tnat the 
 masonry scarps of casemated batteries can be destroyed by the 
 cannonade of floating-batteries. Of course, if such vessels are 
 permitted, unopposed by the guns of the battery itself, to take 
 their own time, and to expend unlimited quantities of projectiles, 
 they doubtless can latter down any wall. So far as yet tested by 
 experience, their bulwarks are not proof against eight-inch and 
 ten-inch solid shot at 400 yards. // proof against such projectiles 
 at 800 or 1,000 yards * it is a well-known fact in breaching, that 
 the number of projectiles necessary, even from a land battery, 
 increases enormously with increase of distance. How much more 
 from a floating structure, which cannot maintain any such con 
 centration of fire, at such a distance, as is necessary to cause 
 serious injury to well-constructed walls! Those, however, who 
 believe in such operations, will probably contend that nothing 
 analogous to producing a " breach" is necessary, but that embra 
 sures will be destroyed, and guns dismounted, and gunners 
 disabled by embrasure shots and splinters from the masonry 
 cheeks, or by fragments of broken projectiles. 
 
 This subject has not been overlooked by the corps whose duty 
 it is to make such constructions. A series of experiments was 
 commenced five years ago at "West Point by General Totten, 
 Chief Engineer, and taken up again in 185 5, for this very purpose 
 of determining the best kind ol embrasure, and the necessary 
 thickness of the scarp, to resist these modern projectiles. The 
 results have been published f and are open to the examination of 
 
 * I think it somewhat discreditable to the inventive resources of those whose 
 duty it is to construct and perfect artillery, that this question of a shot-proof vessel 
 should be an open one. The quantity (and therefore the thickness) of the iron 
 sheathing, is limited for the floating-battery. I know no necessary limit to the 
 calibre or weight of the projectile used against it, or why we should now stop at 
 ten-inches, when the navy has already successfully introduced an eleven-inch gun,, 
 capable of throwing a solid shot. The eleven-inch shot weighs 1-3 more than the 
 ten-inch. I shall allude to this subject of large calibres for sea-coast batteries in 
 another place. See Appendix " D." 
 
 f " Casemate Embrasures, Totten," being No. 6 of " Papers of Practical Engi 
 neering," published by the Engineer Department. 
 
38 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 everyone. They may be briefly summed up in the following 
 quotations: 
 
 " A thickness there of five feet has been assumed in our 
 "constructions, and satisfies all these conditions well. (Alluding 
 to the interior arrangement of the casemate with reference to the 
 handling of the gun, Arc., &c.) " But it has been a question of 
 interest, increasing with the growing calibre of naval armaments, 
 * whether this thickness is now sufficient And it was in con- 
 " sequence thereof that some very severe firing \vas directed 
 M against our second target. The gun was a ten-inch Columbiad, 
 4 - placed within 114 yards, firing solid balls, weighing 128 Ibs., 
 " with a charge of 18 Ibs. of powder." 
 
 " The general conclusion from these trials is, that, whether of 
 " cement concrete, of bricks, or of hard stones, the portion of the 
 " wall at, and around each embrasure, having the thickness of 
 "five feet only, should be no larger than is indispensable for the 
 "adaptation of the gun and carriage to the embrasure; if 
 " restricted to a small area, this thickness will suffice not other- 
 " wise." 
 
 " The thickness of five feet will resist a number of these balls, 
 " impinging in succession on that space, provided the bond expand 
 " promptly, above, below, and on each side, into a thickness 
 " greater by some 2 1-2 feet, or 3 feet, or more. "Were the wall 
 " no thicker generally than five feet, being re-inforced only by 
 "piers some 15 feet apart, it would soon be seriously damage d 
 " by battering at short distances with such calibres." 
 
 " To repeat : the scarp at the embrasure may be safely made 
 " of the thickness of five feet, provided the thickness immediately 
 " above, below, and on the sides, be increased considerably. The 
 " space required to be of about this thickness, to accommodate 
 " advantageously the gun and carriage, is so small, that it may be 
 " sakl to be part of the thicker surrounding mass, by which it 
 " really is supported in its resistance." 
 
 And with regard to the embrasure, it is stated : 
 
 " Our experiments show that wronght-iron is the best material 
 " for insertion as above, mentioned ; and that a thickness of 
 " wrought-iron, of eight-inches, solidly backed with masonry, will 
 "resist an eight-inch solid ball, fired Vith 10 1-4 Ibs. of powder 
 " from a distance of 200 yards. It is necessary, as is also shown 
 " by the firings, that the plates of iron should have considerable 
 "breadth to prevent heavy balls from forcing themselves in 
 " between the inner edge and the masonry, thereby crowding the 
 " plate edgewise into the throat." 
 
 From these results an embrasure has been devised by the 
 Chief Engineer, and sanctioned by the War Department, having 
 wrought-iron throat-plates 8 inches thick (capable of resisting 
 the impact of an 8-inch solid shot, from 200 yards distance), and 
 
OF NEW YORK. 39 
 
 the whole surrounding structure of granite-blocks, of large dimen 
 sions, bonded together, and into the adjacent thick parts of the 
 wall, in the strongest manner that such a structure can be made. 
 Those who deny the capability of such a construction, to resist 
 sufficiently the projectiles of an hostile armament, should, at 
 least, prove that their incredulity is justifiable, by experiments as 
 elaborate as those I have referred to. 
 
 But the discussion is cut short, at once, by the following para 
 graph from the report : 
 
 " Were it not for the vastly greater cost, the whole scarp 
 " might be faced with iron indeed might be made of iron only ; 
 " but, until there shall be much stronger reasons than now exist, 
 " or are now anticipated, for believing that well-constructed 
 " masonry batteries may be breached by naval broadsides, the 
 " cheaper construction may be safely followed especially as, 
 " should such a necessity ever arise, they may be externally 
 " plated with iron." 
 
 If the necessity arises if there shall hereafter be " stronger 
 " reasons than now exist, or are now anticipated," for giving 
 still greater strength to the surrounding wall the alternative is 
 open to us, as to those who construct the floating-battery, (with 
 out the objection of weight, so very difficult to overcome in that 
 structure), to coat it (about the embrasures, or further, if neces 
 sary), with iron plates. 
 
 Those who are curious on the subject of "Embrasures," and 
 of the risks to which the gunners behind them are exposed, would 
 do well to examine the work referred to. 
 
 They will find, among other things, that while some of the 
 modern European works present an exterior opening of 54 square 
 feet (in which area, owing to the flaring cheeks, nearly all the 
 small projectiles are reflected through the throat, while large ones 
 are broken and their fragments hurled within), no embrasure has 
 been constructed in the united States, since 1815, having an ex 
 terior opening exceeding 10 or 11 square feet ; and that the model 
 embrasure of 1855, practically reduces the opening to that of the 
 throat, which is but 3 T \ square feet, an object not much larger 
 than the muzzle of a large gun. The security of the gunners be 
 hind this embrasure is as great, probably, as it is practicable to 
 give anywhere ;* it is probably greater than in an open barbette 
 battery. 
 
 The question of the capacity actual and possible of " ma- 
 sonry-casemated castles," to resist the fire of a hostile armament, 
 
 * A simple expedient, advocated by one of our officers, and partially practiced 
 in Europe, to raise the embrasure so that all embrasure shot would pass over the 
 heads of the gunners (as in the barbette battery), would, in a great degree, do away 
 with the danger of the " embrasure shot " of all kinds, and with the necessity of 
 grape-proof " shutters," applied to the new embrasure. 
 
40 T II K DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 need Tint l.e ]Mir.-ued further. AVhen we hear in mind that the 
 hnstile "floating hatterirs," ! whatever description, will them 
 selves lie exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be 
 thrown iVoiu shore batteries, that when they choose to come to 
 "close quarters," to attempt to breach, their" embrasures" pre 
 sent (.pollings (see Paper so. 6, before referred to) through which 
 deluges of grape, canister, and mu.-ket balls can be poured upon 
 the gunners ;* and consider what experience has so far shown, and 
 reason has taught us, with regard to the casemate, we need not 
 be under apprehension that our casemated works will be battered 
 down ; nor doubt that they will, as they did in Russia, answer the 
 important purposes for which they were designed. 
 
 It only remains to show the ///wxv/V// of such works. It, in 
 general, costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, 
 than to build a masonry sructure covered with bomb-proof arcnes, 
 in which to mount it.f All authorities agree that an open bar 
 bette battery (Grivel s very forcible admission has been quoted), 
 on a low site, and to which vessels can approach within 300 or 400 
 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may safely be said, that in nine 
 cases out of ten, the sites which furnish the efficient raking and 
 cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this character; and 
 indeed it very often happens that there are no other*. * 
 
 When such sites are found, it rarely happens that they afford 
 room for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the 
 necessity of putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, 
 the casemated structure. Such works furnishing from their lower 
 tier, a low, rasing fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from 
 
 * Grivel seems to think that, as to embrasure shot, the floating and land battery 
 are on equal terms; but the embrasure of the floating structure cannot be made as 
 small as that of tin- casemate; nor can the expedient of " shutters," or of raising the 
 embrasure* above the heads of the men, be resorted to. 
 
 f The discrepancy in cost is not, ho\vever, by any means, what this naked state 
 ment would make it appear. A gun behind an open parapet is exposed to being 
 disabled or spiked, by a nn-re boat s crew taking the battery by surprise. Some 
 <!><;,,> of defen>ive strength is necessary in all cases ; ami in *<,/// ca-es the neces-.iry 
 -trength involves (independent of other causes) the construction of a regular forti- 
 tication. The open earthen batteries of Lieutenant Morton, rest on enclosed bas 
 tions of masonry, each of which is larger than m<>st of our harbor works. 
 
 ^ Take the ea>e of Sevastopol, about which there are heights. None of them 
 (Commander Dahlgren s remarks have already been quoted), furnish proper sites for 
 defending the harbor. Cron-tadt offered no other sites whatever than artificial ones in, 
 or islands almost level with, the water. Our own harbors vjenerallv offer the same 
 illustration of the absence of favorable sites for open batteries. 
 
 ? Staten Island, at the \arro\vs, furni-hes an apt illustration. The heights here 
 are of about 120 feet. From the open batteries of Fort Tompkins, on the summit, 
 heavy guns will rake the. approach, and have a plunging fire upon passing vessels. 
 The entire face of the heights (so far as the United States properly extends) is, or is 
 to be, girdled with open earth batteries, at heights of 60 and 45 feet. We have here 
 about a-> many guns as can 6e ranged in xnch batteries. But it is not deemed enough ; 
 nor is the character of the fire such as to dispense with the numerous, and close, and 
 ><! tires to be obtained from the sites at the water s edge, on which Fort Rich 
 mond is already built, and another similar " casemated castle" is to be built. 
 
OFNEWYOKK. 41 
 
 their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be 
 contrived, and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite 
 as great as can be given to men thus engaged.* 
 
 On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there 
 is no danger in giving rein to speculation ; but on those of such 
 real and intense practical importance as the security against hos 
 tile aggression, of the great city and port of New 1 ork, it is not 
 admissible to set aside the experience of the past, or the opinions 
 of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects. 
 A means of defence, sanctioned by its being confided in to protect 
 the great ports of Europe which has protected the great ports of 
 Russia against the most formidable naval armament that ever 
 floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our confidence which mere 
 criticism cannot diminish ; and a claim to be adhered to in place 
 of all new " systems," until time and trial shall have necessitated 
 (not merely justified) the change. 
 
 If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what 
 has been judged necessary for the defence of important ports, to 
 experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test 
 of actual trial, we may draw useful conclusions w T ith regard to 
 what is now required to defend New York. We shall find at 
 Sevastopol a narrow harbor, which owed its importance to its 
 being the great naval depot of Russia on the Black seaf an 
 array of TOO guns, about 500 of which were placed in five " ma- 
 sonry-casemated " works (several of them of great size), and the 
 remainder in open batteries.:): These defensive works fulfilled 
 their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on the 
 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage. 
 
 The facility with which sea-ports are attacked by fleets the 
 enormous preparations required the great risks encountered in 
 landing a besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy 
 (while, for protection against the former species of attack, costly 
 works are necessary, and against the latter, field works and men 
 can, in emergency, afford protection), naturally caused the Rus 
 sians to make these water defences their first object. Yet, though 
 almost unprotected on the land side, Sebastopol resisted, for a 
 whole year, an attack on that quarter ; and illustrated how, with 
 
 * The criticism as to their capacity for men and stores, is scarcely deserving of 
 notice. When they are merely water-batteries (as most of them are), they require 
 quarters enough for men to work the guns (5 or 6 to each piece), and ammunition 
 storage enough for one or two protracted cannonades. In the mere service of the 
 guns there is no crowding whatever. 
 
 f An important point surely ; but how small its importance, and the interests 
 involved in its defence, compared with New York ! 
 
 \ It is worthy remark, that the only battery mentioned as silenced by the allied 
 fire, during the cannonade of the 17th of October, 1854, is tha t of the Quarantine 
 Fort, an " open barbette," silenced, as Grivel says, " malgre 1 abri de son parapet 
 en terre" (notwithstanding the shelter of its earthen parapet.) 
 
42 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 plentv of mi ii and material, an energetic and eflectual Itnul de- 
 fence may be improvised, where tin- sea <l<f< ncc is provided for, 
 as thoroughly as it was at that place.* 
 
 Let Cronstadt be another example, (iivat as was the import 
 ance of its defence to Kussia, it was not greater, it was by no 
 means <i* <jr, <if, as that of New York to our own country. This 
 port, and military and naval depot, was defended (in its main ap 
 proach) by upwards of 600 guns,f 500 of which were mounted in 
 live " masonry-casemated " works; the remainder in an open bar 
 bette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. This number 
 is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in 2sV\v 
 York harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable 
 defence as was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and 
 long line of approach, compared with the latter.:): 
 
 These works ful Jiff I d their object. They protected the great 
 port and depot of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from 
 invasion. For two successive years did the mighty armaments of 
 France and England threaten ; but they were over-awed by the 
 frowning array of " casemated castles " which presented itself, and 
 declined the contest. 
 
 Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval depot of France. 
 After the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating 
 a harbor facing the shores of her great rival, England, and an 
 equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a 
 great naval depot, we may suppose that the best means, without 
 regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be 
 employed here, to make this great seat of naval power secure 
 against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great 
 maritime power most likely to be the assailant. The means there 
 employed are (so far as regards mere harbor defence) precisely 
 the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with 
 open batteries where the locations are favorable) ; and the appli 
 cation of means is the same as we have found so successful in 
 Hussia, the same which constitute the system of harbor defence 
 of New York. 
 
 * See Appendix " E." 
 
 f Besides 120 guns on two ships of war, stationed so as to rake the approach. 
 
 i For a more detailed account of the defences of Sevastopol, see Appendix " IV 
 
 A special armament was being fitted out in England, expressly to attack Cron- 
 stadt, had the war lasted another year. It consisted of several hundred "floating- 
 batteries," gun-boats, mortar-vessels, (fee., <fec. It would have been interesting in a 
 professional point of view, to have seen the result; but it is quite doubtful after all, 
 \vht-ther the Allies would have taken the "bull by the horns." They would proba 
 bly have directed their attack upon the shoal- water approaches between the Finland 
 shore and the island of Cronstadt. 
 
OFNEWYOKK. 43 
 
 PART II. 
 
 LET us now consider what, in the present state of the art of 
 war, and in the light of the experience we now have, is required 
 for the defence of the port and city of New York. 
 
 In commencing this paper, I have ventured to call this problem 
 a modified and enlarged one ; the course of the previous discus 
 sion will have shown, however, that I do not believe that we know 
 of anything particularly new in the means to be employed. It is 
 rather in the amount and character of the armaments to which 
 New York will be exposed, which involves a new consideration of 
 the amount and arrangement of defensive means. 
 
 In reviewing the recent European war, we are struck with the 
 facility with which immense bodies of troops were transported and 
 maintained in a distant country, which of itself furnished nothing. 
 France shipped to the Crimea upwards of 300,000 men, and Eng 
 land some 90 or 100,000. We cannot doubt, therefore, that either 
 of these powers can suddenly equip a large army, transport it over 
 the ocean, 3000 miles, to our shores, and maintain it a year or 
 more in a hostile attitude. 
 
 (The question of being able to maintain a footing on OUT 
 , is quite another thing.) 
 
 We are struck, too, by the immense power of creation possessed 
 by these powers (particularly England), in calling forth all manner 
 of warlike military and naval constructions. It seemed as if, the 
 government had but to will, and the immense manufacturing 
 establishments and ship-yards of England, were capable of re 
 sponding to the most unlimited demands, in the briefest possible 
 time. Taught, by the experience of two seasons, the inutility of 
 ordinary naval means against the Russian defences in the Baltic, 
 a flotilla of several hundred vessels gun-boats of different sizes, 
 bearing pieces of the most formidable calibres, mortar vessels, 
 " floating-batteries," despatch vessels, &e., all propelled by steam 
 were constructed in an incredibly short space of time.* 
 
 Such flotillas could be created with the same facility and sent 
 to our shores, if there should be found a sufficient motive for it. 
 
 * A brief account of these vessels, taken from an interesting paper, " Notes and 
 " Observations on the Review at Spithead, by Commander W. M Walker, U. S. 
 " Navy," will be found in Appendix " C." 
 
44 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 t The third point which attracts attention, is the peculiarly ma- 
 ritii/i character of the war. It was not by marching armies into 
 the interior of the enemy s territory, but by assailingnis maritime 
 Beats of population, wealth and power, that the war was prosecuted; 
 and one of their great maritime depots became the true seat of 
 war, about which its issue was decided. 
 
 The lesson to be derived by ourselves is too obvious to be 
 dwelt upon. Our own yt\<it martiim* places would be the points 
 at which alone an European enemy could hope to strike great 
 blows ; New Yuri- pre-eminently. If it is left undefended, or is 
 inadequately defended, its immense commerce, its rich depots of 
 wealth and military and naval resources, the lives and property of 
 its citizens, will be, throughout tie wh< l<> period of the war, at an 
 unpitying enemy s mercy ; and the national honor will suffer an 
 indelible stain, by such a degradation of its great commercial 
 emporium. If defended as it should be, its defences must be cal 
 culated to grapple with such armaments* as we know can and will 
 le brought against it ; and upon the success of the contest, im 
 mense consequences perliaps, as at Sebastopol, the issue of the 
 war will depend. 
 
 The Boards of Engineers who have recently had under consi 
 deration, portions of the defensive system of New York, have not 
 been insensible that great additional strength was now required, 
 over what had been considered sufficient in former years. But 
 they have never had time (each member being charged with 
 onerous individual duties) to take that patient survey of the whole 
 t<if}>j>rf which it requires. Moreover they have only been called 
 upon to decide projects of particular works ; and I may add, that 
 it is only quite recently that we have had the means of taking 
 this re-survey of our wants, with the full light which a perfect 
 knowledge of the events of the recent European war alone could 
 give us. 
 
 It would be presumptuous in me, to say exactly what new 
 works, or what new arrangements are required ; but I can say, 
 with confidence, that the security of New York requires a vast 
 addition to what now exists ; that it demands their prompt execu 
 tion and, enlightened by previous labors of the Boards of Engi 
 neers, and by the opinions of officers of experience, can point out, 
 in a general way, what is necessary, or, at least, what I believe to 
 be so. 
 
 First The Narrows is the great avenue of approach to New 
 York, and the shores being there barely one mile apart, they fur 
 nish the means of a most formidable defence. I have before 
 alluded to the difficulty of, by mere array of batteries, absolutely 
 sealing a channel against the rapid pas^uje of vessels. The true 
 principle, therefore, for the defence of an object, like New York, 
 
OF NEW YORK. 45 
 
 of such importance that the mere passage of the batteries would 
 be risked, is, not only to make those batteries of the most formi 
 dable nature, but so to array batteries that the entire waters, not 
 only of the channel of approach, but those in which the enemy 
 must lie, in his after offensive operations, shall be under their 
 fire.* The Board of Engineers has already considered the nature 
 and extent of additional works at the Narrows ; and, so far as the 
 first condition, of a formidable array of batteries is concerned, I 
 think they have met all the requisites. They have decided that 
 there should be, at this passage, batteries sufficient to concentrate 
 a fire of 300 guns upon every point of a vessel s path within range. 
 When we consider the character of the armament intended for 
 these works,f it will be admitted that the passage, under the most 
 favorable circumstances, will be a thing of no ordinary risk. 
 Combined with the use of obstructions, either floating or fixed, 
 and of floating defences on our part, the defence can be made of 
 the most formidable character. 
 
 But such an array of batteries does not now exist. To aecom- 
 
 5lish it, we require, on Staten Island, besides Fort Richmond, 
 learly completed) the completion of Fort Tompkins (just com 
 menced) ; the construction of another casemated battery south of 
 Fort Richmond, (for which plans are proposed) and the extension 
 of the earthen batteries. Fort Tompkins will cost about $650,000, 
 and the new battery and earthen works about as much more ; or 
 $1,300,000 in all, for the works yet to be constructed on Staten 
 Island. 
 
 This is but for the Staten-Island side of the Narrows. To 
 provide the concentration of 300 guns upon the passage, and to 
 command the waters of Gravesend Bay, the works on the Long- 
 Island side must be enlarged by extending batteries (either open 
 or casemated) along the bluff below Fort Hamilton, and Fort 
 Lafayette must be re-modelled. As the additional works on this 
 side have not been planned, I can only say that I suppose that an 
 expenditure of about $500,000 will be required on the Long- 
 Island shore. 
 
 So much for the defences of the Narrows ; but to fulfill the 
 condition that an enemy s fleet shall be kept under fire wherever 
 he may be, J one or more works are required to fill the gap 
 between the Narrows and the interior line of works, on Bedlow s 
 and Governor s Islands. At least one such work should be built 
 on Bobbins reef a site about midway between the Narrows and 
 Governor s Island, which rakes the approach through the Narrows 
 
 * See Appendix "D." 
 
 f 8" and 10" Columbiads, and 42-pounders for hot shot, and 8-inch sea-coast 
 howitzers for the shorter ranges. 
 
 \ The fulfillment of this condition would be completed by throwing up temporary 
 batteries along the East and North Rivers, in the city and upon the opposite shores. 
 
46 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 and commands the outlets of the " Kills." A work on this site 
 may he roughly estimated at $500,000. 
 
 The foregoing an- what, I tliink, are imperatively demanded 
 for tlic Narrows approach to the city. They include (Fort Rich 
 mond being nearly completed,) the construction of two new works 
 on Stateii Island, "Fort Tompkins, (just Commenced) and the new 
 projected casemated battery; of additional works at Fort Ham 
 ilton, and the re-modelling of Fort Lafayette; and the construc 
 tion of at least OIK new work, on Bobbins Reef, and an expenditure 
 of from two to three millions of dollars. 
 
 But to prevent the occupation of the outer harbor and a dis 
 embarkation in Gravesend Bay, and march on Brooklyn, other 
 works are required, and they may be so arranged, while they 
 fulfill these objects as to add greatly to the risks an enemy would 
 encounter in reaching New York with his fleet. 
 
 To prevent disembarkation in Gravesend Bay, a work seems 
 indispensable on the point of Coney Island. Such a work, in 
 conjunction with the proposed new batteries at Fort Hamilton, 
 would sweep the waters of Gravesend Bay, and take up fire upon 
 a fleet attempting the passage of the Narrows, at a lower point 
 than the Narrows batteries, crossing fire with them. It may 
 indeed, in conjunction with another work to be mentioned here 
 after, be made to constitute another and outer line of defence to 
 the Narrows approach. 
 
 The work on Sandy Hook, authorized by Congress, and just 
 being commenced, is intended, mainly, to prevent the occupation 
 and use of the outer bay by an enemy s fleet. 
 
 It does not thoroughly seal all the entrances to that bay ; but 
 if the works I have described exist above, he will not encounter 
 the fire of Sandy Hook with no greater object than merely to 
 enter the bay. To make a more perfect defence of these outer 
 waters, however, a work on the " West Bank" is desirable, which 
 would command the mouth of all the lesser entrances to the outer 
 harbor, and, in conjunction with the Coney-Island work, form the 
 outer line of the Narrows defences, already mentioned. Perhaps, 
 too, a work on the Romer shoal which should co-operate with 
 Sandy Hook, and command the " Swash " and " East " channels, 
 might be judged expedient. 
 
 The work on Sandy Hook will cost $2,000,000 ; and as to those 
 I have mentioned, it can only be stated that they would require 
 something like $2,000,000 more. 
 
 The narrow passage around Staten Island through the Kills 
 can be passed by light-draught gun-boats and similar craft. It 
 can be easily defended by obstructions or shore batteries ; but 
 whichever means are resorted to, some shore works sufficiently 
 strong to endure an assault are necessary. I only point out the 
 fact, without attempting to indicate what they should be. 
 
OF NEW YORK. 47 
 
 The East-River approach is defended by the formidable work 
 of Fort Sehuyler. Another work opposite to it, on Willett s 
 Point, is deemed necessary ; and the two will, with such auxiliary 
 means as can be easily provided in time of war, complete the 
 defence. The work on Willett s Point may be set down at the 
 same cost as Fort Sehuyler, $800,000. 
 
 I have now indicated in a very general way, what I suppose 
 necessary to put New York in a satisfactory state of security. 
 I have shown, or have attempted to show, not only that it was 
 not now in such a state, but that works requiring some six or 
 eight millions of dollars are imperatively demanded. The sum 
 is large, it is true ; but it is only about the amount of revenue 
 collected here in two months. If I have convinced you, as I have 
 tried to do, and as I certainly believe, that in our next war with 
 a great maritime power, more important issues will be involved 
 in the adequate defence of New York than in almost any other 
 preparation, defensive or offensive, we can make, then, I shall 
 not fear that you or the nation will consider the millions 
 required disproportionate to the object. I believe that the people 
 of the United States can and will be made to understand that the 
 defence of New York is a national, and not a local question ; and 
 as such will be willing to provide for it. 
 
 If I am asked when these works should be undertaken, I 
 answer that I consider that all those that involve the defence of 
 the Narrows are so immensely important to New York that they 
 should be commenced immediately , and carried on with the largest 
 appropriations that can be advantageously applied, to completion ; 
 and simultaneously with them, the work on Coney Island. These 
 works, (Fort Tompkins, the new water-battery on Staten Island 
 the additional works at Fort Hamilton and the work on Coney 
 Island) will cost about $2,000,000 ; and I urgently recommend 
 that at least $500,000 be asked from Congress for them. 
 
 The works just mentioned, (with the work on Sandy Hook, 
 also in progress) would place this approach in a respectable state 
 of defence ; and the other works in the outer bay could be com 
 menced at a later period ; but all that are decided by competent 
 authority to he necessary should be built as soon as possible. 
 
 A complete view of the dangers and defences of New York 
 requires some allusion to the subject of an invasion by land, and 
 particularly from Long Island. The idea of such a danger has 
 nothing whatever of novelty in it. That the British army actually 
 did land in Gravesend Bay defeat the Continental forces under 
 Gen. Washington, at Brooklyn, and capture New York, is well 
 known. That, to prevent the repetition of such an operation during 
 the last war, a large body of militia was called out, is equally well 
 known ; and the liability to a repetition of such an attack has 
 
48 THE DANGERS AND DEFENCES 
 
 "been dwelt upon in almost every official paper treating of the 
 defences of New York. 
 
 The Chief Enpnei-r, General Totten, proposed to secure the 
 c-itv from danger in this particular quarter by an outer l><irr r ; 
 and if the outer bay could be tif i i:t u < i II y cfased 1 , of bourse the 
 danger would be removed. But so to close it will require works * 
 which, if built at all, will not probably be very soon. 
 
 The subject has been before almost every Board of Engineers 
 tli at has had the defence of New York under consideration from 
 1 ^ 16 to the present time. They have presented no formal plan 
 that I recollect, for land defences on Lon<* Island, (at least not of 
 late years) for they have always found otner demands concerning 
 the defences of New Y^ork far more pressing ; and have probably 
 thought, too, that while the general character of the defence was 
 sufficiently obvious, every year that elapsed would alter the details 
 of the problem. 
 
 There are two or three very broad principles bearing on this 
 subject, which I think every one will assent to. 
 
 Pirst : A landing in the face of such a force as could speedily 
 be concentrated (or rather such as always would be at hand in 
 New York) is an operation of great risk as well as great labor, 
 requiring special means and arrangements. No enemy will take 
 this course so long as he, can with Ids fleet, (or with vessels specially 
 adapted to the object} reach the city and effect his object without 
 a landing. While, therefore, this latter operation is open to an 
 enemy, while he can with his fleet, or the gun-boats, or the 
 floating-batteries of his fleet, force his way within range of the 
 city from his shell-guns or curved fire, the question of danger 
 from land attacks sinks into utter insignificance. 
 
 The works to prevent this latter operation are of great mag 
 nitude, as I have endeavored to show in the course of this paper ; 
 require large amounts of money, and much time to complete. 
 Those to prevent the former (land attack) are of a comparatively 
 trivial character. I concur, in fact, with the opinion expressed 
 by yourself, Sir, in your Annual Report, that (at least until the 
 harbor defences are completed) nothing but earth works, to be 
 thrown up in time of war, are necessary.f 
 
 Second: All the arguments which opposers to our system of 
 coast defences have of late years brought forward, bear with their 
 full force, upon our defensive strength in //// * relation ; not at all, 
 upon the degree of strength required for harbor defences. In the 
 words of a Maury, if the " greatest army that ever was led into 
 
 * It is not, anticipated that the work on Sandy Hook can alone close this bay. 
 
 f I consider, however, that the work on Coiu y Island should be immediately 
 built, t. juvv.-nt a landinir in (Inm-send Bay, or on Coney Island ; but this, is not 
 included in the category of land defences, as advocated by others. 
 
OF NEW YORK. 49 
 
 " battle by the greatest captain" were to land on Long Island, 
 " and be disembarking liis last piece of artillery before lie was 
 " discovered these railroads, the power of steam, with the aid 
 " of lightning, would enable the government, before he could 
 " reach the heights of Brooklyn, to have there in waiting and 
 " ready to receive him, and beat him back into the sea, a force 
 " two to one greater than his, however strong ;" and Major W. 
 II. Chase, (in a quotation already given,) has expressed opinions 
 if not quite so strong as these, somewhat similar. It is not 
 necessary to embrace the particular views of either of these officers 
 to acknowledge that there is force in their arguments. 
 
 Third. The great danger to New York and its dependencies, 
 from this kind of an attack, is from the safe and convenient land 
 ing at Gravesend, and the short line of march thence to Brooklyn. 
 Should we find ourselves engaged in war, with no other defence 
 in this quarter than those now existing, prompt and energetic 
 measures would have to be taken to improvise a defence against 
 this danger ; and doubtless prompt and energetic measures could 
 and would be taken. 
 
 "With the work I propose on Coney Island, however, this 
 landing becomes unavailable, and the danger of land attack on 
 Brooklyn or New York becomes comparatively insignificant. A 
 landing, as before remarked, in the face of the dense and warlike 
 population of New York, augmented as the numerical force of its 
 defenders may be, in a day or two, by overwhelming numbers 
 from other quarters, is one of the most dangerous operations of 
 war. It will not be undertaken on the open tea-shore of Long 
 Island, where at any moment the disembarked force would be 
 liable to have its communication with its fleet cut off. It would 
 only be made from Long Island Sound, whence a march of fifteen 
 or twenty miles, at the shortest, would be necessary to reach 
 Brooklyn. At whatever rate such a danger may be estimated, it 
 is sufficient to say that in twenty-four hours after a declaration of 
 war (if thought necessary) an army of 50,000 men may be 
 entrenched on the line of approach to Brooklyn. 
 
 The work on Willett s Point will, by no means, have an insig 
 nificant bearing on such defence. To " leave it behind" is not 
 simply to leave a " fortification" in the enemy s rear ; it is to have 
 in his rear, an entrenched " tete-d>>-pont" whence in twenty-four 
 hours, an overwhelming force may oe thrown from the New- 
 YorJc side, upon his rear, cutting him off from his fleet. 
 
 In conclusion, I would say in this connection, that the policy 
 of our government, and of the Engineer Department, has always 
 ~been (and I conceive, always should be) first, to close all the great 
 approaches l>y water, leading to our dock-yards, commercial cities, 
 &c., and to locate their defences in such a manner as to force any 
 landing that may oe attempted, to as great a distance as possible. 
 
50 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK. 
 
 The defence against approaches by an army landing, must be ly 
 our troops, (surely ii the nation and the people have in themselves 
 a n / inherent power of self-defence it is here they can meet the 
 foe, and "beat him back into the sea,") with the assistance of 
 temporary works, and all the expedients of engineering talent 
 and skill, on * /,// routs as an enemy may have selected. But to 
 leave the coast and construct a girdle of forts about any of our 
 cities as they now exist, would be as wise as to have constructed 
 permanent defences along Brooklyn and Harlem heights, where 
 they were made in 1814 and 15; now within the cities, and to be 
 traced or known only from old maps and plans. Fort Greene, 
 one of the commanding sites of the Brooklyn line of 181415, 
 has been not only occupied by the city, but its commanding emi 
 nence levelled. Nothing short of the power of a despotic gov 
 ernment, with ability to take possession of hundreds of acres (and 
 dwellings,) and forbid the erection of any structures either upon 
 the sites or within yu-n-hot <>f tln-m, could accomplish the scheme 
 of either establishing a girdle of works about Brooklyn, or secure 
 permanently the sites for them. 
 
 The fact that sites, deemed eligible now, are being built upon, 
 is the best proof that they are becoming no longer so. 
 
 Whether these propositions are admitted or not, it is most 
 certain that, at ^>/ >* ///, the great "dangers" of New York are 
 through the inadequately <!< f< nded water approaches. It is to 
 these dangers I most urgently call your attention, and the atten 
 tion of Congress and of the people of the United States ; for it is 
 not a question of local, but of national concern. 
 
 This paper has swollen to a length unanticipated by me in 
 commencing it; but I have judged it imperative, at a period in 
 our growth as a nation, and in the history of our relations with the 
 other great powers of the world, when, I conceive, the subject 
 of security to our great cities and ports has acquired more than 
 ordinary urgency, and when at the same time the very principles on 
 which such security can be obtained are called in question to 
 review, thoroughly^ the whole subject, glancing at the arguments 
 of past years to see how they have been justified by the progress 
 of events, and discussing at length the occurrences of the recent 
 European war which bear on this subject. If I shall convince 
 you that there is urgent and immediate necessity for prosecuting 
 in the most energetic manner all the defenwto works now 
 authorized by Congress for the defence of ]N ew York and of com 
 mencing new ones without delay and if, by means of this paper, 
 I shall awaken the attention, not only of the people of New 
 York, but of all who take the " safety, honor, and welfare," of 
 their country to heart, to the importance of the subject, my 
 object will be accomplished. - 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 [A.] 
 
 THE following description of the manner of construction and materials 
 used in some of the Russian and Prussian works (Bomarsund among 
 others) is interesting ; and will illustrate the degree of authority belonging 
 to the assertion just quoted. It is derived from authentic sources : 
 
 The masonry is described as of boulders, with one end broken off to 
 form the face ; then the sides broken, to give beds and builds of every 
 variety of shape, varying in the number of sides, their length, and, hence, 
 angles made with each other. No stone other than the Finland granite, 
 scattered over the surface in boulders, is available in a large part of north 
 ern Europe. These are used for the face of the wall, the filling being brick 
 or other masonry. The result is a facing of most excellent material for 
 durability as to time, but very inferior and of little or no strength in bond. 
 The stones are left with rounded surfaces on the back, and present no bond 
 of any value, and in size vary as they were picked from the fields, every 
 stone being worked to its largest dimensions for a face, and cut to fit the 
 adjacent ones previously laid. 
 
 ^X/NX Thus, for example, the face of the wall is formed. 
 / \ J The joints perpendicular to the face, as a necessary 
 ^ X ^\X_I7~" \ consequence, vary in depth, according to the size of the 
 \ ,/ \ /boulders, and the bed into which it is being prepared 
 to be laid ; varying from 6 to 12 inches in a work wit 
 nessed under construction. None of the stones could be considered as large ; 
 altogether an exceedingly indifferent character of masonry to resist artil 
 lery, although good against weather and escalade. Such were the Bomar 
 sund towers and casemated water-battery. At Cronstadt the masonry of 
 the scarps and the water fronts is superior to any masonry to be found in 
 the fortifications of Europe ; and equal in every respect to that in our dry- 
 docks at Brooklyn and Norfolk. At Sebastopol it was very indifferent as 
 to the size and quality of the material, though well put together, being of 
 headers and stretchers, with horizontal beds and vertical joints ; but in 
 pieces from 8 to 12 inches rise, and 2 to 4 feet in length for the stretchers, 
 and the mortar not very hard. The coping of the docks and sea-wall of 
 the dock harbor was excellent, and of large blocks of Finland granite, and 
 what appeared to be Quincy granite; but the scarps of the 1 Malakoff, the 
 crenated wall on the west of the city, and the harbor casemated forts, were 
 very poor masonry, both in quality of material and its small size ; the ma 
 terial not as good as the Connecticut sandstone in some of our old harbor 
 defences. 
 
52 APPENDIX. 
 
 [B. ] 
 
 The following more detailed account of the defences of Cronstadt and 
 Sebastopol, is derived from an authentic source : 
 
 The Russians ^ivr their attention, first, to securing the dock-yards and 
 
 establishment at Cronstadt. By permanent casemated batteries, upon pre 
 cisely the same principles we have adopted (differing in some details only), 
 they closed the main entrance against large and small vessels ; and were 
 adding, during the existence of the contest, to these casemated defences, 
 in the construction of a new work on the shoal opposite Cronstadt (south 
 si.le of main channel.) The narrow, circuitous channels through the 
 shoals, from the island of Cronstadt to the Finland shore, were defended 
 by hulk ships permanently anchored at advantageous positions ; as was, 
 likewise, the shoal water between the island of Cronstadt and the main 
 land to the southward. A numerous flotilla of steam propellers and sail 
 ing gun-boats, with many boats propelled with oars, armed each with a 
 heavy gun, together with many steam sloops of war, were ready to operate 
 anywhere, about or on the shoals, their services would be most available 
 at critical moments. 
 
 The city of Cronstadt, on the eastern end of the island, was enclosed 
 by permanent fortifications. 
 
 On the western side, crossing the island, these works took in every 
 building of the commercial city and naval dock-yards; but were so near 
 as to have brought destruction upon the city and naval establishment, 
 by any siege operations carried on against the permanent defences; To 
 obviate this serious difficulty a line of entrenchments was thrown up 
 across the island, far in advance of the permanent works. . These 
 entrenchments were armed with heavy ship s guns, having ditches com 
 manded by concealed caponiers, fraised and palisaded. 
 
 Such were the defences of the main ship-channel to St. Petersburg 
 and the naval establishment, again &t floating offensive operations. Within 
 this line the city of St. Petersburg is approached only through shoal 
 water and among islands. 
 
 All these channels were commanded by temporarily-constructed bat 
 teries, mounting from 6 to 12 heavy guns, on wrought-iron carriages. 
 
 But the city of St. Petersburg on the land, and the whole coast and 
 shores from it, down to the enemy s anchorage, on the north and south, 
 were bare of lines or entrenchments of any kind. 
 
 A large army was in camp south of St. Petersburg, ready to march at 
 any moment, to oppose a landing, or meet any troops the Allies might ven 
 ture to land. Both at Cronstadt and Sebastopol, as well as Sweaborg, 
 Bomarsund and Riga, their defences were in progress of construction, or 
 rather unfinished; those at Cronstadt being actually under construction, 
 both in the dock-yard and casemated forts ; but the land defences they 
 
APPENDIX. 53 
 
 had the good sense to omit, until the great and open route by water had 
 been secured. This latter object they had most successfully attained at 
 Sebastopol, that resisted the combined attack of the most powerful arma 
 ment Europe could bring to bear against fortifications ; and the works thus 
 prepared effectually served to protect the .fleet, dock-yards, city, and all 
 they were destined to secure. But time did not enable the Russians to 
 carry out their plans to cover the land side of these harbor defences. On 
 the west of the city they had a crenated scarp, which held out to the last 
 against the French. Along the south they had nothing but the little Mala- 
 koff tower, of two tiers of loop-holes for infantry, and five guns in barbette 
 a work with a circular trace, the gorge not exceeding 27 feet radius (out 
 to out), admitting of 5 loop-holes only on each side of the door. Tempo 
 rary earthen works were hastily thrown up, on ground most advantageously 
 formed for such a noble and gallant defence as the Russian engineer s skill 
 enabled him to call into action ; while the resources of an immense fleet 
 enabled him to arm and equip his works. 
 
 A first, second, and even third line of defences, the two latter always 
 in advance of their first, occupying positions on the crest of the dock-yard 
 lulls, the Russian engineers pushed forward to meet their allied enemy ; 
 but no permanent works of any kind existed to oppose the Allies on the 
 south, saving the little, exposed, masonry Malakoff, the stone of which was 
 no better than some of our best mortar, and was destroyed from a dis 
 tance of more than 1500 yards, by the first battery constructed against it. 
 There can be no doubt that the Russians labored under every disadvantage 
 from the temporary character of their works ; and it is very certain that 
 neither the Redan nor Korniloff bastion (the Malakoff) would have been 
 entered by a French or English soldier to the day the Russians evacuated 
 them, had there existed either a MASONRY counterscarp, or scarp with 
 suitable BOMB-PROOFS, for the Russian troops. Another winter s campaign 
 would unquestionably have been necessary, had the works been of this 
 more permanent character ; and it may well be doubted whether the 
 resources of the Allies could have equalled such a prolonged contest. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 [C.] 
 
 The Floating-Batteries are of very uncouth and unwieldy appearance, 
 partaking in model about equally of a canal boat and a galliot. In general, 
 their construction is that of iron ships ; the decks arc of 9-inch plank rest 
 ing upon lo.J-inrh beams, placed 1 foot 9 inches from centre to centre ; the 
 "top sides" are covnvd \\ith 6-inch plank, over which, extending to 3 
 f>-et below the water-line, is a sheathing of wrought-iron plates, 14 feet 
 long, 20 inches wide, and 4J inches thick, each secured to the hull by 
 1^-inch screw bolts. They are brig-rig^ d, are fitted with non-condensing 
 
 engines and screw propellers, and can make, under steam alone, 4^ to 5 knots. 
 They are pierced for 30 guns, an 
 
 / -ff 
 
 and mount from 14 to 16 sixty-eights. 
 
 DIMENSIONS. 
 
 
 Horse -power. 
 
 Length. 
 
 Extreme 
 Breadth. 
 
 Depth. 
 
 Draft 
 
 " Meteor" 
 
 150 
 
 173 
 
 48.6 
 
 14.7 
 
 7.9 
 
 "Thunderbolt"... 
 
 200 
 
 186 
 
 48.6 
 
 18.6 
 
 6.6 
 
 The only vessel of this class which has been tested in action was under 
 French colors in the attack upon Kinburn. She was struck in the hull 58 
 times, without receiving any other injury than the indentation of the 
 plates to depths varying from one-fourth to one and one-fourth inches.* Of 
 important particulars respecting the alleged invulnerability of these vessels, 
 I could get no account, and must admit a want of faith in it. 
 
 The Mortar Boats are cutter-rigged vessels of about 70 tons, very much 
 resembling in general form and appearance the "Anchor Hoy," which 
 Mas formerly, and perhaps still may be, attached to the Norfolk Navy 
 Yard. Their draft is five feet. Each mounts a 13-inch mortar. 
 
 GUN BOATS. The largest of these vessels are three-masted schooners, 
 of fine models, of 800 tons, and 210 feet long, with engines of 350 horse 
 power, and a speed under steam of 10 to 11 knots. 
 
 They have a crew of 100 men, and their armament consists of two 68- 
 pounders, of 95 cwt., on pivots one between the fore and main masts and 
 one the forecastle and four 32-pounders on truck carriages. The most 
 note-worthy peculiarity of these craft is the arrangement of their boilers, 
 which is as follows : Their light draft renders it impossible to place the 
 
 * See Pahlgren s account, p. 27 et *eg., ante. Nothing heavier than a 32-pound 
 shot was fired by the Russian batteries at Kinburn. (Author s note.) 
 
APPENDIX. 55 
 
 boilers out of danger below the water-line, without occupying too much 
 of the floor of the vessel ; therefore they are furnished with two descrip 
 tions of boiler the "service" and the "righting" boiler. The first is of 
 the usual form of British marine boiler ; the latter, cylinder tubular. For 
 ordinary service, both boilers are used ; but in close action, the lower or 
 righting boilers only these being sufficient to furnish rather more than 
 half speed. 
 
 The Second-Class Gun Boats are schooners of 650 tons, and 180 feet 
 long, with engines of 200 horse power, and a speed under steam, of nine 
 knots. They are manned with eighty men, and mount, on pivots, one 68- 
 pounder, 95 cwt, and one 32 of 65 cwt, and four 12-pounder howitzers. 
 
 The Third Class, the most numerous, are schooners of about 110 feet in 
 length, with engines of 60 horse power, and a speed, under steam, of eight 
 knots, with a draft of about 6|- feet ; they have a crew of 40 men, and the 
 same armament as the second class. 
 
 The Fourth Class are schooners of 80 feet in length, a draft of five 
 feet, engines of 20 horse power, and a speed, under steam, of six knots, a 
 crew of 30 men, and are armed, a part of them with, one 68 pounder, and 
 one 32-pounder ; others with two 32-pounders. 
 
 The two latter classes are provided with movable shields of iron plate, 
 bullet-proof, which are shipped at pleasure ; raising the height of the bul 
 warks to about seven feet in case of having to force a passage defended by 
 riflemen. 
 
 The engines of all these vessels are " non-condensing " " direct-acting," 
 of great simplicity and compactness, and work to three times their nomi 
 nal power. 
 
 They usually carry a pressure of 60 pounds ; the "boilers" are tested 
 to 1 80 ; and such is the fidelity with which the work has been executed, 
 that no break-down or accident has occurred on board of any one of 
 them.* 
 
 * " Notes and Observations on the Review at Spithead," by Commander M. M. 
 Walker, U. S. Navy. 
 
 A very detailed account of these vessels (as also an immense mass of interesting 
 matter, which would have been of great service to me in preparing this paper, but 
 which I have been unable to avail myself of; though I ha%e received much valuable 
 information from its author) is contained in the able Report to the Secretary of War 
 of Major R. Delafield, Corps of Engineers, one of the Commissioners sent to Europe, 
 during the recent European war, by the Hon. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, 
 for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the state of the military art at a 
 period deemed so favorable for observing its modern developments. 
 
 This Report, unfortunately for the cause of military science in this country, has 
 not yet been published; neither has that of his able coadjutor, Major Mordecai, of 
 the Ordnance Corps. 
 
 The Report of Capt. McLellan, the third Commissioner (from which an extract 
 is made in Appendix "E"), was published more than a year since, and has been 
 promptly appreciated by the military profession. 
 
56 APPENDIX. 
 
 [D.] 
 
 The Engineers are not the inventors nor makers of ordnance. They 
 can but apply to the best advantage such as is supplied to them. 
 
 It does strike me that it* obstruction should, so far as it is intended 
 for harbor defence, be studied exclusively in the light of its adaptability 
 to that object, and without regard to conformity to other models. Large 
 calibres are imperatively demanded for coast defence, nor is there any 
 objection arising from the wfiyht of the guns, which applies so strongly 
 in naval use. Yet the navy have successfully introduced a gun (Dahf- 
 gren s 11-inch gun) which throws a solid shot one-third heavier than our 
 10-inch colmnbiad 
 
 It is even reported that the Ordnance Department are about abandoning 
 the use of solid shot in our 10-inch guns, as if against these new means of 
 attack (iron-clad floating-batteries constructed expressly to batter on for 
 tifications) a 10-inch shell could have any effect whatever. 
 
 If we must throw shells, at least let us throw them of such size, that 
 they may have thickness enough not to break against any thickness of iron 
 a vessel s >ide may oppose. Let us make them such that (to use the 
 sportsman s phrase) "every shot shall be a bird." 
 
 The Turks have, for the defence of the Dardanelles, guns of 30 inches 
 calibre, carrying a stone ball. I do not know whether there is any impos 
 sibility or impracticability in the construction of guns of this size ; but I 
 cannot see why a gun of greatly superior calibre to anything we now have, 
 should not be made expressly for harbor defence. 
 
 Such guns could not be fired with the rapidity of smaller ones; perhaps 
 too, like the Turkish guns, it would be found best to establish them on 
 fixed lines of direction ; but one such shot that hits, would be worth a 
 hundred smaller ones. A 30-inch hole could not be plugged ; and the 
 explosion of a 30-inch shell would send a vessel to the bottom. 
 
 Of the capability of such guns to inflict injury and of. the efficiency of 
 batteries mounted with them, an opinion may be formed by the single 
 instance, (so far as I know) that their qualities have been exhibited, viz : 
 the retreat in 1807 of the fleet of Admiral Duckforth. 
 
 "The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but 
 "few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In 
 "Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence 
 k were made ; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had 
 " not determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even 
 "the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to 
 "resist the demands of Duckforth. 
 
 "The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two 
 
APPENDIX. 57 
 
 " sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen 
 " guns (besides those in the bomb-ships.) 
 
 " Admiral Duckforth sailed through the Dardanelles on the 19th of 
 " February, 1807, with little or no opposition. This being a Turkish fes 
 tival day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities 
 " of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts 
 " which had been prepared for defence. But while the Admiral was 
 " waiting on the sea of Marmora for the result of negotiations, or for a 
 " favorable wind to make the attack upon Constantinople, the fortifications 
 " of this city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed, under 
 " French engineers and artillery officers in repairing the defences of the 
 " Straits. Campbell, in his Naval History, says : " Admiral Duckforth 
 " now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. He 
 might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bom- 
 "barding Constantinople; but unless the bombardment should prove 
 " completely successful in forcing the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he 
 " might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet 
 " must necessarily sustain. With this damaged and crippled fleet, he must 
 " repass the Dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than they were 
 "when he came through them." 
 
 " Under these circumstances, the Admiral determined to retreat ; and 
 "on the 3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of 
 "the channel, with a favorable and strong current. 
 
 " This escape, however," says Baines, " was only from destruction, but 
 " by no means from serious loss and injury. In what instance in the whole 
 " course of our naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so 
 "short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise ? In detailing the extent 
 " of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. The 
 "first had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but 
 " escaped with the loss of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the 
 "second, between the poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen- 
 " mast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing and 
 "wounding twenty men. Two shot struck the third, carrying away her 
 " shrouds and injuring her masts ; loss in killed and wounded thirty. The 
 "fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had 
 "a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower deck ; 
 " loss fifty-five. The sixth not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged, 
 " with a loss of seventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so 
 "much injured that, had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on 
 " the opposite tack she must * gone down ; her loss was eight. The tenth 
 " lost twelve. The eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight 
 " making a total loss in repassing the Dardanelles, of one hundred and 
 "sixty-seven; and in the whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, 
 " exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning of 
 " the Ajax. 
 
 " Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a 
 " favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned 
 " forts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, that had he remained 
 * before Constantinople much longer till the forts had been completely 
 
58 APPENDIX. 
 
 "put in ordt-r no return would have been open to him, and the unavoid- 
 " able sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence. Scarcely 
 had the fleet cleared the Straits before it (the fleet) was reinforced with 
 " eight sail of the line ; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the 
 "English did not venture to renew the contest. They had emoted a most 
 " fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had been con 
 ducted by a more enterprising and experinirrd people, the expedition 
 " would have cost the English their whole squadron."* 
 
 Truly, if halt-dilapidated batteries (worked probably by unpractised 
 hands) could inflict these serious damages upon a fleet, not engaged in 
 actual contest, by merely trying to run 6y, under the most favorable cir 
 cumstances of wind and tide, what might not such batteries be capable of? 
 
 "In what instance," says Ad. r.aines, in the whole course of our naval 
 " warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this 
 " extraordinary enterprise ?" 
 
 It is to be remarked, however, that we have as yet had no fair instance 
 of the power of modern shell guns from land batteries against ordinary 
 ships of war. In the few direct contests which the Allies had with Rus 
 sian fortifications, the modern armament does not appear to have existed ; 
 and where shells were thrown from guns, they appear to have been of in 
 ferior calibre. Yet the Russians with the shefl-guns of their fleet blew up 
 two Turkish frigates at Sinope, in fifteen minutes. 
 
 One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which has 
 givi-n color to the idea that they may be passed, or even attacked with 
 impunity, I conceive to be the want of skill and care in the use of the 
 guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing away 
 of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however, by no 
 means a peculiarity of coast defences The same system of random firing 
 has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land and of heavy 
 ordnance in sea battles ; nor has it occurred apparently to even the great 
 est masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man wounded, or for one 
 effective shot in a vessel s hull, so many thousands of shot should be thrown 
 uselessly into the air. 
 
 But this question is now asked, both in the use of the soldier s rifled 
 musket, and in the management of ships guns, as well as of artillery of all 
 kinds. 
 
 It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the soldier 
 to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform certain motions on 
 parade with the precision of an automaton. The same idea is now infused 
 into all the departments of military and naval science, and is a necessary 
 result of the recent great improvements in the construction of arms. I 
 short, the truth has at last become apparent that the old-fashione 
 system of random firing, though perhaps like the "charge of the six hun 
 dred " at Halaklava, " bicn magnifique, rfest pas la guerre" 
 
 It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle to 
 the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical effect. 
 The volunteers of our cities will constitute mainly, in time of war, the 
 
 * Halleok, "Military Art and Science." 
 
APPENDIX. 59 
 
 gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns. In time of 
 war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it is most desi 
 rable that we should have at all fc megabody of gunners, practised in these 
 exercises. The result would be, not only to give to our citizens, as well as 
 citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences provided for their security, but 
 it would disseminate military knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the 
 bearing and objects of the different defensive works. To carry out this 
 idea, it would be dcsirab e that there should be at each considerable sea 
 port town, a sufficient garrison of artillery troops to aid in the instruction 
 of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army this cannot be 
 hoped, but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail an 
 artillery officer or two for the purpose. 
 
60 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 [E.] 
 
 On the relative value and strength of earthen and masonry revetted 
 works, the following extracts will be read with interest. 
 
 The first is from the Report of Capt. George B. McLcllan, 1st Cavalry, 
 one of the u Military Commission to Europe." 
 
 " This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, 
 " which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the 
 "siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifi- 
 " cations over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that it 
 "proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary 
 " works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a 
 " longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as 
 "field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had 
 " been defended. The main difference between properly constructed per- 
 " manent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary works, is 
 " that the. latter seldom present, an insuperable obstacle against assault, 
 "while the former always do. In addition, permanent works have a 
 u better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and 
 " perfectly planned. The masonry walls which render an assault impos 
 sible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed only by 
 " establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the edge of the ditch ; 
 "the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that point, they may, nn- 
 " til the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, 
 " with the difference that the garrison are not harrassedby the necessity of 
 " being constantlv prepared to repel an assault. 
 
 " Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never 
 " reached the edge of the ditch ; so that, had the fortification been a per- 
 " manent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the siege 
 " remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered way, the 
 u establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage of the 
 " ditch, and the a ault of the breach ; in other words, at the moment when 
 "the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, the true 
 "strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into 
 "play: 1 
 
 " Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was 
 "under existing circumstances, the boir-vrs, on the 8th of September, 
 "would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the 
 "siege would certainly have extended into the winter ; and it may even be 
 " doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the Allies 
 " were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the south side." 
 
APPENDIX. Cl 
 
 These views are, I believe, fully sustained by the other commissioners, 
 Majors Delafield of the Engineers, and Mordecai of the Ordnance Corps. 
 
 But a more remarkable confirmation is found in the recently published 
 "Journal of the Operations of the Engineers" at the siege of Sebastopol, 
 by the French Engineer-in-Chief, Gen. Niel, which I also extract. 
 
 It furnishes, at the same time, a simple and intelligible explanation of 
 the extraordinary length of defence of that place. 
 
 " Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign offi- 
 " cers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not of 
 44 incontestable utility in fortified places." 
 
 " Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications of 
 44 strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as 
 " could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a large army 
 44 which always preserved its free communications with the interior of 
 44 Russia." 
 
 44 If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps; if it 
 44 had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been com- 
 44 polled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the heads 
 44 of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have been an 
 44 impregnable fortress." 
 
 44 When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol with 
 44 those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of Sept., 1855, the 
 44 day of the last assault, we had only executed, after the greatest effort, 
 44 the besieging works which precede the crowning of the covered way ; we 
 44 had not then, as yet, entered upon that period of the works of a siege 
 44 which is the most difficult and the most murderous ; and there was no 
 44 occasion to engage ourselves in them, since the ditches and parapets of 
 44 the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the sequel has proved." 
 
 44 The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a posi- 
 44 tion prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in sur- 
 44 mounting the material obstacle. of the fortification." 
 
 44 Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the besieged 
 44 works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to throw 
 44 ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our artillery had 
 44 forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, behind his numerous 
 4k blindages ; to have gone further would have been inviting the initiative 
 44 in the attack on the part of the Russian army." 
 
 44 The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place from 
 44 escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence ; for the be- 
 44 sieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges of the works, 
 44 strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault, which they saw them- 
 44 selves menaced with from the commencement of the siege." 
 
 44 Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated 
 44 night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able to issue 
 44 out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having to pass 
 44 through the narrow defiles which are formed by the draw-bridges of re- 
 44 vetted places ; they ivere, then, a permanent threat for the besiegers, who 
 44 were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly invaded by the 
 44 greater part of the Russian army." 
 
C2 APPENDIX. 
 
 "Neither side, consequently, \\as in a position analogous to that which 
 " is prorntrd in tin- siege of a fortified place, protected from insult by good 
 "masonry scarps." (Note to page 443.) 
 
 And again, page 423, the same authority remarks (the italics are mine) : 
 
 * Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the con- 
 
 " centric fires of our batteries; for, not being protected by manonry scarps, 
 
 " it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in order to 
 
 " repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced." 
 
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