3TACK iH9 AN APPEAL TO ■iCHE INHABITANTS UF THK °S' SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC (TRANSVAAL), HV J. G. KOTZE, Chief Justice. PRETORIA : JOHN KEITH. PRINTER, CHURCH STREET WEST. 1898. AN APPEAL TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC (TRANSVAAL), BY J. G. KOTZE, Chief Justice. PRETORIA : JOHN KEITH, PRINTER, CHURCH STREET WEST. 1898. TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC. Gentlemen, You have all by this time heard of the most nujusti- fiable aud illetj^al act of which the Head of the State has been tj^uilty, in arrosfatiug to himself the power of sum- marily and without any trial, as provided by Law, dismiss- ing from ofhce the Chief Justice of the Republic, who holds his appointment for life. You have doubtless asked your- selves upon what grounds, and for what purpose, this most autocratic and despotic deed has been done ? By way of answer to this question, and of pointing out to you the deplorable and baneful meaning of this unwarranted attack upon the independence and sanctity of the Judiciary of the country, I crave your careful attention to what I am about to say on the subject, in the hope that this my appeal to you will not be in vain. I. It will be in your recollection that on the 22nd of January, 1897, the High Court gave judgment in the case of Brown vs. Dr. Lerjds N.O. The action was instituted under the Gold Law, for the purpose of having the plaintiff declared entitled to a licence by means of which he could peg off certain prospecting claims, or (:)therwise to award him a certain sum by way of damages. The Government set up, by way of defence, a certain Volksraad resolution, by which an invalid proclamation, published by the Presi- dent, was affirmed. In order to maintain the validity of this Volksiaad resolution and support the invalid act of the President, the Government appealed to Article 32, of Law No. 4, 1890. This Article reads as follows: " The legal force of a law or resolution, published by the State Presi- dent in the Gazette, may not be disputed, saving the right of the people to petition with respect thereto." The con- tention of counsel for Mr. Brown against this argument was, that the Gold Law can alone be altered legislatively, that is to say, by a declaration of the will of the Legislature in the form of a law, and not by a bare and hurried resolu- 220029'-; 6 tion of the Volksraad, and further that Article 32, of Law No. 4, 18U0j need not he construed as necessarily con- flicting" with the Gi'ondwet or Constitution of the country, and should it be found in conflict therewith, that then it must yield to the conti-olling- voice of the Constitution, as being the higher and fundamental law. You will observe that the arguments directly raised constitutional points of the utmost gravity and importance, not merely to the inhabitants of the State, but also to all institutions and persons domiciled abroad, who have inte- rests at stake in the country. The Court gave a unaniinous judgment in favour of Mr. Brown and against the Grovern- meut. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice AmeshofE hold- ing, ^rsi/*/, that a mere Yolksraad resolution can not alter the existing law of the country, inasmuch as the Yolksraad can oul}" legislate by passing laws, and not by means of bare resolution, as required by the G-rondwet; and, secondly, that a law or resolution of the Yolksraad in conflict with the constitution can not be enforced by the Court in any particular case Avhich may come before it for decision. Mr. Justice Morice thought that the particular Yolksraad reso- lution did not apply to the case of Mr. Brown, as it ought not to be supposed that the Legislature intended it to apply to matters ah-eady pending; in other words, that the Yolks- raad must be taken not to have intended to give the reso- lution retrospective effect. It has been said that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Ameshoff might have avoided these constitutional questions and decided the case upon the narrow ground on which Judge Morice rested his decision, and the most extraordinary and unwarranted motives were suggested in certain quarters for the views expounded by the majority of the Court. These aspei'sions I pass by in silent contempt, for the sword of justice and not the poisoned dagger of the assassin is the weapon which Themis has entrusted to the hands of her priests and votaries in the sacred and impartial exercise of their functions. With all respect for the view taken by Judge Morice, I have no hesitation in saying that to my mind only one interpreta- tion can be put upon the words of the Yolksraad resolution in question, which, reads as follows : " That no person whosoever, deeming himself injured hy this jproclamation, shall be entitled to compensation out of the public Treasury, or from any official who has been instrumental in carrying out the said proclamation." It is difficult to see how Mr. Brown could possibly have come to the Court for redress, unless he deemed himaelf in- jured by the inodamiiHon, and as he did resort to the Court to enforce h:s rif^hts, it is perfectly clear that but for the proclamation, and the Volksraad resolution confirmins: it, he would have had nothing of which to complain. The object of this Volksraad resolution, passed after Mr. Brown had already issued his summons or citation, was to prevent his enforcing his rights and obtaining any compensation. The constitutional questions, therefore, of the capacity of the President and Executive to act contrary to the law, and of the Volksraad to act contrary to the Constitution or Grondwet, were directly in issue, and the Court was bound to give a decision upon them, which, as I have already stated, was pronounced by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Ameshoff. II. In laying down that both the Executive and Volks- raad must exercise their functions in keeping with the con- trolling voice of the Constitution or Grondwet, the Court did not, as is sometimes asserted, seek to raise itself above these two important bodies in the State. On the contrary, the Court has thei'eby simply sought to protect itself and the suitors who resort to it, by maintaining that any inter- ference by the Executive and Legislature with pending cases can not be tolerated, inasmuch as the people have ex- pressly in the Grondwet conferred judicial functions solely upon the Courts of Justice, in the exercise of which they are declared to be free and independent, and inasmuch as the people have also in the Grondwet guaranteed to all persons within the Republic full protection for their rights. The Court merely laid down the obvious and elementary truth that the three powers in the State, the trias politica, if you will, must, each in its own sphere, work side by side with one another, under and subject to the Constitution. The Court was also careful to lay down in the judgment that the Volksraad is the highest authority (hoogsteyezagj in the State, for the simple reason that the Constitution expressly says so. There must necessarily be some such highest authority, as I pointed out in my judgment^ for as such the sanction of the Volksraad is, e.g., re- quired for the validity of treaties concluded with foreign powers, for the alienation of State property, the raismg of loans and pledging the credit of the State, and many other matters which can not be regulated without that sanction. 8 Tliis, however, does not mean that the Volksraad is the supreme or sovereign power in the State, for that vests and resides in the people alone. The Yolksraad, therefore, can not raise itself above the Constitution, and seek by means of laws or resolutions, without any previous knowledge and sanction of the people, to alter the terms of the instrument or Constitution by Avhich it has been created. The Volks- raad then, as explained in Brouut vs. Leyds, N.O., is only the " hig-hest power " under and by virtue of the Constitu- tion, and can not override its provisions. It, therefore, inevitably follows that if any Act of the Yolksraad is alleged to be contrary to the Constitution in any particular suit before the Court, the latter, finding upon due investi- gation that such is the case, is bound to follow the written Constitution under and in accordance with the provisions of which alone the Volksi'aad can exercise legislative functions. If this be not so, and the contrary doctrine is to prevail, viz., that the Volksraad is the supreme and sovereign power and above the Constitution, if in other words the Volksraad be a law unto itself, mark what the results must be. The Volksraad can then at any moment pass a resolu- tion that a person's property may be taken for public or any other purposes, or be expropriated, say for the pur- poses of the railway, without any compensation ; or that the interest stipulated for or running on mortgage bonds, bills of exchange, promissory notes, &c., shall not be claim- able ; or that the day of payment of the principal sum shall be postponed until after the lapse of so many years ; and all this notwithstanding the Grondwet guarantees to every- one his property and personal rig-hts.* If now we are to hold that everything done by the Volk^-raad has the force of law, the legal tribunals in the cases I have supposed would be bound to uphold the action of the Legislature, and thereby violate the Grondwet and deny justice to those who, by an appeal to the Constitution, seek protection of their rights. In the same way, if the Volksraad can do as it pleases, it may, by a mere resolution, abolish the Execu- tive Council or give it full legislative powers ; cause people to be punished without due trial ; create itself into a Su- preme Court of Appeal from all the other judicial tribunals, and in short tear up the Constitution altogether. It is of * This is no exaggerated representation of the matter. The Records aiford abundant proof of similar proceedings by the Volksraad at the sug- gestion of the Government. — J. O.K. 9 no avail for those who hold the theory that the Volksraad is above the Grondwet, to say that if the Volksraad at- tempt to exercise judicial f auction it will be stepping beyond its province and be acting ultra vires, for by this theory the Volksraad, and not the people, is the sovereign and supreme power, and can exercise its will without any restrictions. How then can such a body, ex hypothesi subject to no legal and constitutional restraint, act ultra vires? The only sound view, therefore, is that, seeing we have a G-rondwet in which it is expressly de- clared that all power emanates from the people to the various departments in the State, the sovereign power vests in the people alone. Now, the will of the people is ex- pressly declared in the (xrondwet, by which legislative functions are entrusted to the Volksraad and judicial func- tions to the Courts of Justice. It follows that neither the Legislature nor the Judiciary is subservient to each i.ther, but that both are subject to the controlling terms of the Constitution, by which they have been created. Again, if by the words of Art. &!, of Law No. 4 of 1890, '' the legal validity of a law or resolution, published by the State President in the 'Jazefte, may not be questioned, saving the right of the people to petition with regard thereto," we are to understand that anything and everything pub- lished by the President in the shape of a law or resolution is to be accepted under all circumstances as absolutely binding and beyond inquiry by the Court, when the issue is distinctly raised in a given case, it follows that if it be shown that what has been published as a law has been ap- proved by a A'olksraad, in which there was not the proper quorum, or has never even been before the Raad at all, and private rights are infringed thereby, there will be no re- dress. What is this but a violation of the Constitution — a virtual denial of justice and a closing of the Courts of Law? It is, therefore, clear that the High Court does possess the poAver of testing laws and resolutions by reference to the Grondwet in any particular case which ma}- come bef(jre it, and requires the exercise of that power. It is an accepted axiom by all the most approved constitutional writers that, where the written Constitution of a country is silent on the point, there the Court of necessity possesses the testing power. What would be the use of placing a clause in the Constitution or Grondwet, providing how alone it can be altered in a given and special way, if the testing power does 10 not also necessarily and tacitly accompany it ? Otherwise it would be the simplest thing to pass laws and resolutions contrary to the Grondwet, and if the Court is not to test these either in matter or form, whenever a suitor complains that his rights have been affected thereby in conflict with the Constitution, the protecting clause in the Constitution would at once become a mere dead letter. It can not be too often repeated that in exercising the testing right only when the particular case judicially calls for it, the Court is not guilty of any usurpation of authority, nor does it thereby set itself above the Volksraad. It merely maintains the controlling force of the Constitution or fundamental law over against that of an ordinary law or resolution, just precisely in the same way as the Court would enforce an ordinary law above a resolution by the Executive. Nor can the Legislature by an ordinary law or resolution seek to define and interpret the Constitution for the Court. These principles have been admirably expounded to the plainest demonstration by many of the most competent authorities, among whom it is sufficient at present to men- tion Hamilton in the Federalist, Opzoomer, Cooley, and Bryce. III. It has also been said that the President and the Executive had reason to be dissatisfied with the judgment in Brown vs. Leyds, N.O.; that it came upon them as a complete surprise ; that it reversed two previous decisions given by a majority of the Court ; that it rendered rights and titles insecure, and cast doubts on the validity of other laws and resolutions than the one affecting the case of Brown vs. Leyclx, N.O. ; that the judgment in fact intro- duced a state of legal uncertaintv amounting to chaos. Now, far be it from me to deny that the Government may have been placed in difficulties by the judgment in Mr. Brown's case. These difficulties have, however, been much exag- gerated, and it is with no little surprise that I have seen these exaggerated statements of the difficulties made by persons from whose education and training the public had a right to expect the expression of calmer and sounder views. Moreover, the difficulties which arose through the parti- cular case of Mr. Brown were entirely of the Government's own making. It is perfectly correct that on two previous occasions the High Court had by a majority of two Judges, first in 1 884 and again in 1 888, given a decision at vari- ance with the constitutional doctrines laid down in the 11 Brown judgment ; but this last decision can not fairly be said to have come as a surpi'ise to the President and Execu- tive Council, as the following circumstances will clearly show: — In April of 1895 the case of Hess vs. The State came on in appeal before the full Court. In this case Mr. Hess, who very ably conducted his appeal in person, raised three points for the decision of the Court; the first of which was as follows : " ihat Act 11 of 1893, under which he had been tried, is really no law, inasmuch as (a) it was not passed by the Volksraad with a due observance of the re- quired formalities, and {h) because there existed no press- ing necessity for passing this Act, as required by Article 12 of the Grondwet." On the 2nd May, 1895, some two and a half months before Mr. Brown had issued his sum- mons and before the Volksraad resolution of which he com- plained had been taken, the Court gave a unanimous judg- ment in favour of Mr. Hess on the second of the three points which he had raised. I, howevor, took this oppor- tunity, in a considered written judgment, Avhich will be found reported at page 1- of Mr. Duxbury's Reports,* of openly and solemnly stating, with regard to the first point taken by Mr. bless, that I had come to the conclusion that some of the constitutional positions laid down by the decision in the McCorkindale case in 1884 were untenable and could no longer be supported. This my judgment was also published in the newspapers ot the time, and I can not assume that any members of the Executive nor the legal advisers of the Government were ignorant thereof, more especially if we bear in mind that the State was a party to the case. Here I may add that, although my colleagues (Judges Ameshulf and Jorissen) did not express any opinion on the first point raised by Mr. Hess, it was well known that Mr. Justice Jorissen approved the views expressed by his son, the late lamented Judge S. Jorissen, in the Doms case in 1888. By no possibility can it be said that, after I had publicly stated from the Bench what my views were on the constitutional questions touched upon in the McCorkindale case and raised Vjy Mr., Hess in his appeal, the Government and its legal advisers had any reasonable gounds for think- ing that, when a similar case should come up for decision, I would not follow what I had so recently laid down in the Hess case. Again, if the Government thought it in the 'See also 2, Off. Rep., u. l.S!>, ami Vol. 12, Cape Law Journal, p. 226. —J. O.K. 12 iuterest of the country to close the gold-field which had been set open^ and on which Mr. Brown desired the licence to go and peg off claims, there was nothing to have pre- vented them from introducing legislation to that effect — that is to say, by proposing to alter the Gold Law by a proper draft law (and not by a mere hurried resolution of the Volksraad), under and in terms of Article 12 of the Grondwet, declaring the necessity and urgency of the case, and asking the Yolksraad to dispense with the usual three months' previous publication. Instead of following this safe and constitutional course of altering the Gold Law, subject to any rights which Mr. Brown and others might have acquired in the meanwhile, the Government, wishing to proceed by way of resolution, was advised b\" its law officers to adopt this unconstitutional course in July of 1895, and this in spite of what had fallen from the head of the Court in the case of Hess vs. The State some two and a half months previously. I will nft say that this course was adopted for the express purpose of bringing about a colli- sion between the High Court and the Executive and Legislature, but I do say that in the face of the warning given in the case of Mr. Hess, the Government and its advisers can not justly maintain that they were not suffi- ciently warned. The President personally was well aware of the true position, for, during an interview with His Honour on the afternoon of Saturday the 7th September, 1895, some six weeks after Mr. Brown had issued his summons, Mr. Kruger mentioned the Hess case and wished me to promise him that I would obey and enforce the Volksraad resolution as law. I told the President that I could not give him any such promise, but would do my duty, after I had heard the case, according to law and my conscience. Mr. Kruger, finding I was not to be per- suaded, then informed me that if I did not obey Yolks- raad resolutions he would be obliged to suspend me from office. This, be it remembered, was in September, 1895, fully two months before the Brown case came on for hearing, and while the Volksraad was still in session. I then felt that a trial of strength between the President and the High Court was no longer far off. From the above facts it will be st^en firstly, that the assertion of the Brown judgment having come upon the President and Executive quite un- expectedly, can not be accepted as satisfactory ; and secondly, that had the Government taken a timely warning 13 and been properly advised to adopt the safe and constitu- tional course for altering the Gold Law, the collision caused after the Brown case could not have arisen. Why that course was not taken is a question which those concerned can best answer for themselves. The Court was bound to give a decision in the Brown case according to its lights and conscience. The reasons for the judgment have been fully set forth in the judgment itself ; but the responsibility for the difficulty which arose after that decision entirely rests with the Government. The first and only duty of the Court is not to inform the Government, one of the parties to the suit, what its decision is going to be, but conscien- tiously and fearlessly to do justice. That a Court or Judge may in a subsequent case de- cline to be bound by a previous decision, given between different parties under similar circumstances, goes without saying. Such is not, nor ought it to be, of frequent occur- rence; but to say that such is never under any possibility to happen on a future occasion is to talk nonsense. We may just as well assert that, although men are fallible. Judges are not. But I prefer under present circumstances not to press my own views on this point, and will defer to the opinion of those who on more than one occasion have been a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path, for it is at all times pleasant to travel in good company. Thus Chancellor Kent tells us that for very cogent reasons and upon a clear manifestation of error the Court should depart from its previously pronounced decisions ; and Lord Hale thus expresses himself : " It is most certain that time and long experience is much more ingenious, subtile, and judi- cious, than all the wisest and acutest wits, co-existing in the world, can be. It discovers such varieties of emer- gencies and cases, and such inconvenience in things, that no man would otherwise have imagined." Hence, says Lord Eldon, if a Judge is honestly convinced that his previous decision was wrong, he should not hesita,te to depart from it ; and more recently in our own day the Court of Appeal in England in rr Hallett's Estate set aside a whole series of previous decisions pronounced by itself.* A brother Judge, far removed from South Africa's troublous atmosphere, and well fitted by his experience and training to form an opinion, in addressing * 8ee this matter more fully discussed in Brown\vs. LeycU. N.O., pp. 7-8, published by John Keith, Pretoria. — J.G.K. It me on the subject thus expi'esses himself : " You were deciding- a question which, from your point of view, the Legislature could not deal with at all. In such a case the Court ought to disregard its former decisions if it thinks them wrong, because there is no other way of setting the law right. The Court, whose duty it is to interpret all laws, must have jurisdiction to determine whether a par- ticular act of the Legislature was an infringement of the Grondwet. Your reasoning seems to me to be (|uite un- answerable. That your decision was in favour of good governmeut is certain. In any young country it is most desii-able, in the interests of constitutional freedom, that there should be a fundamental law by which the powers of the Legislature shall be defined, and that this, like any other law, shall be interpreted by the Courts when occasion arises." In the words of the Right Honourable Mr. Bryce, where the Court had " to choose between the evil of un- settling the law by reversing, and the evil of perpetuating bad law by following, a former decision, it may reasonably, in extreme cases, deem the latter evil the greater." Mr. Bryce also points out, as indeed every student of Consti- tutional Law is supposed to know, that the Supreme Court of the United States has on more than one occasion felt called upon to depart from its previous decision, but the state of confusion, anarchy and chaos, which is said to result from such a condition of things, has not manifested itself in the great and free Republic across the North Atlantic, the decisions of whose highest legal tribunal stand forth as among the greatest monuments of judicial learning and skill. IV. Now, although the Grovernment can not be ab- solved from responsibility in not having taken proper legis- lative and constitutional precautionary measures between 2nd May, 1895 (the date of the Hess judgment), and 22nd January, 1897 (the date of the Brown judgment), once the decision in Mr. Brown's case was given, and assuming the Government to have grounds for deeming itself placed in a difficulty thereby, its course was perfectly clear. When the High Court of the country gives a decision, that de- cision must be respected and enforced. It is, however, open to the Government, if it deems it in the interest of the State, to take the necessary steps to remedy oi- remove any difficulty oi* uncei-tainty which the judgment ma}' liave caused. Tho plain road to have travelled was the adoption 15 of the constitutional course, viz., to cause all such Volks- raad resolutions, as might be considered necessary, to be collected together and put into the form of a law and to have laid this law before the Volksraad for immediate adoption and promulgation in terms of Article 12 of the Grondwet. In the next place, the Government should have ceased from proposing and the Volks- raad from sanctioning legislation by means of mere re- solution, as being contrary to the Grondwet. Nor should the Volksraad have attempted altering the Grond- wet in future by ordinary or hurried legislation, but steps should have been taken for introducing an amendment to the Constitution, providing how alone it can be altered by special legislation, and by proposing a draft measure to that effect for the special consideration and sanction of the people.* Instead of adopting this obviously constitutional method, the President and Executive presented a measure to the Volksraad, amounting to a direct attack upon the independence of the High Court in the discharge of its functions. This measure, which goes by the name of Law No. 1, of 1897, and distinctly violates the Grondwet and other laws of the land, was first considered in the Executive Council, one of whose members proposed that the Chief Justice should be called in to discuss the measure and the situation. The President and Dr. Leyds, however, success- fully opposed this proposal. The measure, having passed the Executive, was brought by the President to the notice of the Volksraad in a secret session with closed doors, and on the Monday following, viz., the 22nd February, 1897, was openly laid on the table of the house. This was the first intimation which the Judges received of the intentions of the Government, and on the following day they addressed a document to the head of the State in which they declared themselves as follows : — " In all earnestness they wish to intimate to His Honour the State President and the Executive Council as their unanimous opinion that this measure infringes upon the independence of the High Court. In their opinion the measure can be postponed. At the pre- * I admit that it is a weak spot in the situation, that the Grondwet does not state how it can be altered. It is plain, however, that it can not be altered except by the express notice and sanction of the people, who enacted it. It is afso plain that this defect does not give the Volksraad. the right to override or alter the Grondwet as it pleases. — J.G.K. 16 sent moment there is no immediate dangei' of legal insecurity, whicli, however, might arise thi'ough the over hasty acceptance of the draft measure now on the table. Should the Honourable the First Volks- raad decide to elect a committee from its midst to consider the difficulties of the matter and remove them, the Judges herebj^ offer their assistance, in the conviction that a satisfactory and friendly solu- tion will be arrived at/' This letter from the Judges was not acted on, nor was any reasonable time allowed them to submit a n;y- solution of the supposed difficulty. In the shortest possible period, viz., three days, the measure was affirmed by the Legislature. The most extraordinary, far-fetched, and groundless argu- ments were used by the President and the State Secretary, in hurrying this measure through the Raad. It is impos- sible to read the discussions in the Raad without coming to the conclusion that these two men, placed in positions of the highest trust and respousibility, led on au attack upon the High Court under the guise of protecting rights and titles secured by Volksraad resolutions. Aiid I regret to say that the discussions also show that the great bulk of the members of the Honourable the First Raad, were led away by this obscuring of the real issue involved. They were nearly all imbued with the notion that the High Court sought to set itself above the Volksraad, an idea which I trust I have shewn to be devoid of all foundation. There were a few exceptions, however, notably in the case of Mr. Loveday, who correctly grasped the situation, and who sub- sequently, in an able and elaborate address at Barberton, completely i-efuted most of the untenable arguments and contentions of the President and his supporters.* To seek to justify this measure, known as Law No. 1, 1897, and with which I will deal later on, under the plea that titles and vested rights created by Volksraad resolu- tion have been rendered insecure by the Brown judgment, will, upon a little reflection, appear to be nothing but a subtei'fuge. I think I may safely claim that in Febi'uary, 189/, men looked upon the High Court as the protector of their rights and liberties in case of any illegal infringement thereof. If now hurried Volksraad resoluti<:)ns can create titles and rights, it also follows that similar hui'ried Volks- * This address of Mr. Loveday, wliich is pul^lishcd in the Gold Fields News of 12th Match, 1897, Mill well repay ])erusearing upon the future of tlie Repul)lic. In the " Brown " judgment the Court laid down the principle of its right to test laws made by the Volksraad l)y a reference to the written Constitution of the coun- try. The le^al adviseis of the President, Messrs. Coster and Leyds, doubt- less, finding that tlie establisliment of such a principle wf)uld go far to make the position assured by the President and his oliedient Legislature untenable, probably forced upon His Honour the necessity for direct legis- lation upon the matter. The Law No. 1, 1897, was consequently brought in, discussed in secret session, and passed through the Volksraad in the shortest possible time, ^iz., three days. That this action of tiie Covern- ment and the Legislature was ill-advised and dan^.erous to the people of this Republic, is shown by the universal condemnation which it has met, not onlj- by the independent Press of South Africa, Ijut also of Europe, both France and (iermany having joined in the denunciation of the object of the so-called law. It cannot too often be impressed upon the public that for the present the soundness or unsoundness of the "Brown" judgment has nothing to do with the present position of affairs. As a civiliselown to the winds, ami all these safeguards have been ruth- lessly desti-oyed. It is, therefore, notliing })ut natural that men should in fear and tremble, and ask tlieiiiselves tlie ijne-stion — What next? The speotHclc of iiide[)endci!t dudgcs being siinnnafily disniis.sed at tl.e dicta- tion i>i tiie I're.sident, in violation of their appointment for life, and cast adrift, converts the Ilepublic into an uncivilised and barbarous country. It is an act of injustice and unrighteousness which might be expectetl from a despot, but whicli will inevital>ly bring a))propriate punishment upon a couTitry which boasts of its civilisation and Christianity. It is this which has made the capitalist more than uneasy about his investments in pro- perties of all descriptions It is this that has created distrust in the mind of the poor and industrifius man who lias invested his modest savings in some form or otiier in the country, and who no longer feels safe as to the security of sucli investment. The argument advanced by one of our local contemporaries, that the recent action of the(4overnment and Volksraad is to be justified because many rights on the goldtields are secured by mere bc'ulititeii, or resolutions of the Volksraad, is thus seen to be a hollow sham. Men naturally enquire — when the independent and liii.hest .Judges of the land are treated in this sunniiary, illegal, and drastic manner V}y the simple Ijrushing away of the laws which guarantee their position for life, and protect tiiem against improper interference and dismissal — of what account are we and our belongings— we who are simple burghers or un- enfranchised inhabitants of the lc\nd '! It is a mockery to tell us that, in order to secure our rights, the rights of the Judges of the land, clearly and solemnly guaranteed, nmst be swept away — rights and Kuarantees, moreover, established quite as much fr fur (be cc then be obliged to Justice smiling ) Y surely happen, aud danger to the Stale. people iiief Jni e VolksrnHd and Coc theo^oBeqoences resultin-; therefrom, an I do not tear it. Tbe Court never ao hurriedly or praoipitjilely. The Court wi and other laws. Why should thia cau' discord? The people are too Bsnaible f( Freaidei liud eolotion of the Volkaraad. Yoa c thing else, for you, too, atand under your oatbs, la, tbeu, a resolution of the Yolks- raad, the bigheat authority, not binding oo Chief Justice: loan s&y oo mora than that a luw properly paiead, and a reeola- tion lakeu uacordiuK to law, may be o( Preaideut: But how muat I now under- 3B0lUI fori ep«o(ed? Geriaioly not. President : But in thnt event 1 would no pobliab such u law or resolution. Chief Justice: Yea, but suppose that after all yoa do publish tl? Or, suppoaa tbe Yolkeraad, without aoy emjairy, takes a summary resolution to diamisa you from Ptesid : No, not what I mean. I merely want the Court to reoogoiae and respect a reaolation Tbe reaoloiion of which I am speaking is also as the First Volkaraad wishaa to have it. Look, there can be no doubt, and yoa tbe resolutiou and obeying the voice of the Volksrand, which ia tbe bigheit power. Chief Justice: I cau not say anything else than tbst the Judges will act oaretally according to tbe laws of the land. The Judges dare not do anything else. President (rising) : Now. yes. I trust you will think well over what we have here beeo talking about privately with each This Preaideot laated from aboui eight to ten (Signed) J. G. Kotze. This memorandura was shown me iu September, 1695, by Obiet Justice Kotz6- nben [was obairmao of tbe Qrondnet Re- vision Commission of the First VolkataBd, whereupon I also read the same. (Signed] Paul M&rb. Certified a trae copy of the original ao read und compared by me. (Signed) Fiten. J. Loxnon, Notary Pnblio. The Judicial Question. CHIEF JUSTICE KOTZE'S APPEAL. TO THE PEOPLE. FAILING REDRESS. TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT. With 1 othoo 1 Satu brfore t Mr. Cham- ouae of Com- ' the Dritish inorlerclled Government, an Adverd upon Hia Honour for the pnrpoae of glean- Getting lo the point at onoe, the 'Titer man pat tbe question, "Did yon or did yoo not aend saoh a statement. Chief? " Hia Honour at once and without heaita- • I ha> iao of I Her Maj repies Go- I for redroBs. Tbey ha e ntrus ed tbe Judiciary witi the admi iat alion of JUB- lice, as stated n the Gro» Imust. therefore, lay my ca^n b (or e them, as ia being done by a writt n pjiea lo tbe S'.'' Tl 1 ubliah^d in c'ln fJiii of thia « until I'ZtllT. and found bu y by al. an inde- in the aenae of right f le pp ople for redreea. Shon d I f«il n t his m appeal to the people. will be bo in th t event, to proaeoule my rights n ther iiartera and to appeal t Her Maje ty-> Ooier nment. "It depeoda therefore the voice of the people io t |]0 first ins anc hall not ait still under be grievon « rong one ma V